

THE
ARMY AND NAVY
AT HALIFAX
IN PEACE-TIME 1783-1793

A thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

At the end of the American Revolutionary War the Army and Navy forces based at Halifax were reduced to peace-time levels. Although they remained at these levels until war broke out again with France in 1793, all their activities did not cease nor did their influence on Halifax disappear. To understand better the history of Halifax and its military and naval background, therefore, the composition and roles of these forces are topics worthy of study.

In this thesis, starting with the transition to peace-time conditions, the Army and Navy are each examined in detail with emphasis on the actual forces that were present, the manner in which they were organized, the facilities at their disposal, and the operations on which they were employed. For the Navy the main task is shown to have been the enforcement of trade policies and the fisheries, while for the Army it was one of garrison service and maintaining a readiness for war. The administrative support for these forces, i.e. communications, stores, manning and recruitment, housing and quartering, discipline, religion, health, and morale, is then described with particular reference to the problems that were experienced. Finally, the relative powers of the Governor and the Service commanders are discussed, along with the areas of contact, both friendly and otherwise, that existed between the forces and the civil population. In the conclusion, an assessment of the role of the forces at Halifax indicates that, although this role was a diminishing one, it still remained a significant factor in the town's development.

INTRODUCTION

Halifax was created at a time when wars in Europe and North America were almost continuous, and it is not surprising that nearly forty of the port's first sixty-six years were war-time ones. Nor is it surprising, in view of Halifax's importance in these wars, that much of its early military history is written in terms of war-time events. This emphasis, in writing of a period when war became inter-continental and attention was concentrated on battles, sieges and revolutionary violence, cannot be challenged. The normal fascination of military history is combat and the period 1749-1815 abounded with it. But there were also periods of peace, and to overlook the activities of the Halifax military and naval forces during these periods would be to leave the record incomplete or distorted. It is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to examine the period of peace from 1783 to 1793, and attempt to determine what forces were based at Halifax, how they were organized, what operations they were employed upon, what their relationships were with the local community, and what their role was in Halifax's development. In this way, it is hoped to show that for these forces the peace-time period was not necessarily an empty and uninteresting one, nor one that was entirely devoid of significance for Halifax.

CHAPTER 1

MILITARY SITUATION AT HALIFAX IN 1783.

For Halifax, the War of the American Revolution ended on April 8, 1783, with the newspaper announcement that the preliminary articles of peace with France had been signed at Versailles in January.⁽¹⁾ Four days later at New York, Admiral Digby received news of the ratification of peace, and dispatched vessels to pass the order to all Royal Navy ships cruising on the North American station that they were to return to port.⁽²⁾ Although the final peace treaties were not signed at Versailles and Paris until September,⁽³⁾ Halifax's war-time role had again been completed and the attention of the military forces based there was re-directed towards the problems of peace.

Among these problems, one of the most pressing was the evacuation of the British Army from its war-time base at New York. For some troops this meant a direct voyage to Europe, but for many others it meant a passage via Halifax. Making the task more complicated were the large numbers of Loyalists gathered at New York who also required passage to Nova Scotia. At Halifax the two groups swelled the population until the town became "peopled

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1. Nova Scotia Gazette and Weekly Chronicle, henceforth N.S. Gazette, 8 April, 1783. The provisional articles with the United States had been signed secretly in Paris 30 November, 1782. Hostilities by Great Britain were not ordered to be ended until 14 February, 1783, when the King ratified the provisional articles between Great Britain and the United States, France, Spain and the United Provinces.
 2. Digby to Philip Stephens, 12 April, 1783, Admiralty Secretary's Department, "IN" letters, Admiral's Despatches, North America 1781-1786, Admiral Digby, Public Record Office, Admiralty 1, Vol. 490.
 3. That with the United Provinces was not signed until 20 May, 1784.

... beyond its capability of conveniency."⁽¹⁾ The problem for the military then became one of helping to provide quarters and food for the transient troops and Loyalists while they awaited onward transport either to Europe or to the outlying settlements.

As well as these immediate problems, the armed forces faced the long-term one of adjusting to the new strategic demands that were placed on Halifax. Built originally to counter the threat of the French to the north and to interdict French entry into North America via the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Halifax now formed the British salient or shield against a new enemy to the south. Lord North, Secretary of State for the Home Department and responsible for colonial affairs, quickly appreciated Nova Scotia's new perspective and saw its importance to Great Britain increasing daily and Halifax becoming the North American rendezvous of the fleet.⁽²⁾ To give substance to this new importance, it was decided to maintain in Nova Scotia the unusually large peace-time force of six regiments.⁽³⁾ A continuing military eminence for Halifax was thus guaranteed.

The instruments for maintaining this eminence consisted mainly of troops

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1. Wentworth to Paterson, 30 November, 1783, Governor Wentworth's Letter Book, Vol. 4, 1783-1808, Public Archives of Nova Scotia (P.A.N.S.), Vol. 49.
 2. North to Parr, 5 May, 1783, Military Correspondence between 1782-1784 being transcripts from the Papers in the Royal Institute, London, known as the Dorchester Papers in 56 Volumes, Vol. 1, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369; North to Governor of Nova Scotia, 8 August, 1783, Colonial Office Original Correspondence, Secretary of State, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island, Public Record Office, C.O. 217/56; and North to Paterson, 8 August, 1783, C.O. 217/41.
 3. Carleton to Fox, 12 September, 1783. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain IV, London, 1904-9, 349, as quoted by C.P. Stacey, "Halifax as an International Strategic Factor," Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1949, p. 48.

and ships. To overcome the momentum of the war and reduce these to peacetime levels occupied most of 1783 and early 1784. For the Navy, the speed of this reduction was conditioned largely by the needs of the Army and the Loyalists. Some old ships were released from the Station⁽¹⁾ to return to England for repairs while others, deemed unworthy of repair, were disposed of at public auctions in New York.⁽²⁾ Several, however, had to be retained in North America until the end of the year. These aided in the evacuation of New York and the re-deployment of the Army and the Loyalists, and then provided assistance at the new settlements in Nova Scotia.⁽³⁾

At Halifax, meanwhile, sailing orders were issued to hired merchant vessels to take troops to England with "proportions of men equal to one man to a ton and a half" of burden.⁽⁴⁾ Other transports were chartered to take victuals to Navy ships in the Bay of Fundy⁽⁵⁾ and to assist with the evacuation of New York.⁽⁶⁾ After the completion of the latter in late November, the transports returned to Halifax and were released in early 1784 to return to England. By this time, however, most naval ships had departed from the

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1. Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727-83, Appendix to fourth and fifth volumes, London, 1804, p. 342, note 394, lists Digby's fleet in 1782 as one 64-gun ship, one 60, six 50s, 30 frigates (including two 44s, one 38, ten 32s, ten 28s, five 24s, and two 20s) and 18 sloops of between 14 and 20 guns each.
 2. Digby to Stephens, 6 June, 1783, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.
 3. Digby to Stephens, 22 May, 1783, 29 August, 1783, and 28 October, 1783, all in Adm. 1, Vol. 490.
 4. Duncan to Lieut. Remington (Agent to Transports), 10 November, 1783, Dockyard Records, Halifax, 1783-1785, Commissioner Duncan - General Letter Book, Maritime Museum Greenwich, Public Archives of Canada, Admiralty Supplementary 3, Vol. HAL/F/1.
 5. Duncan to Masters of Friendship and Stoddy, 18 October, 1783, ibid.
 6. Duncan to Fox, 23 October, 1783, HAL/F/2.

Station. Admiral Digby had returned directly to England from New York in his flagship, H.M.S. Amphion,⁽¹⁾ and by January, 1783, only H.M. Ships Bonetta, Atalanta, Renown, Observer, Trepassey, Albacore, and three galleys, the Delaware, Hussar and Vixen, remained on the Station.⁽²⁾ Of these the Renown, Trepassey and Albacore were at Halifax and the remainder in outlying Nova Scotia ports such as Annapolis, Port Mouton, and Passamaquoddy.⁽³⁾

The Halifax Naval Dockyard was also changed from war-time to peace-time conditions. Founded in 1759 as a careening yard for ships on the North American Station, the yard had grown in scope and by the end of American Revolutionary War was able to provide running repairs and services for carpentry, rigging, ordnance and stores.⁽⁴⁾ To provide room for further expansion, including the construction of a new hospital and cemetery, Governor Parr in June, 1783, granted to persons acting on behalf of the Navy approximately twenty acres in the area of what is now the north end of the Dockyard and the H.M.C.S. Stadacona section of Canadian Forces Base Halifax.⁽⁵⁾ Also in June, as a result of the previous Commissioner's recommendations for improving the yard, the new Commissioner, Henry Duncan, was directed to arrange for a third person to purchase from Mauger's Distillery an additional piece of waterfront land to the northward of the existing yard.⁽⁶⁾ This land was needed to provide a

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1. Digby to Stephens, 8 January, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.
 2. See Appendix VII for list of ships stationed at Halifax including classes and numbers of guns.
 3. Duncan to Stephens, 20 December, 1783, HAL/F/2.
 4. N.S. Gazette, 17 June, 1783, H.M.S. Torbay, bound for Jamaica, sustained damage at sea and put into Halifax to refit.
 5. Charles H. Stubbing, "Dockyard Memoranda 1894," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. XIII, 1908, p. 103.
 6. Navy Office to Duncan, 26 June, 1783, HAL/F/2.

site for a new careening wharf, the existing one being open to the northeast and therefore exposed in bad weather.

At the same time a proposal was received from London to relieve the Halifax Dockyard artificers, many of whom had been reported as old and disgruntled after many years in the post, with a new group from England. A further item for the new Commissioner's attention was the state of the official residence and the question of whether or not it should be repaired.⁽¹⁾ In reply, Duncan deferred the matter of the new careening wharf location until he could observe the effects of a winter on the present one; denied that the artificers were dissatisfied or wished to go home; and reported that the Commissioner's house was in such bad repair that a new one should be built.⁽²⁾

The change to peace-time at the Dockyard was also marked by the order to air the prison-ship Jersey, which was no longer required, and to sell it, or, if there were no buyers, to sink it for a wharf.⁽³⁾ Other items, though minor, also serve to illustrate the condition and extent of the 1783 Dockyard. Window repairs and a new floor in the capstan house; repairs in the smith's shop and to a loft door; stone foundations for the boat-house, mast-house and store-house; installation of a crane and lengthening of the anchor wharf; repairs to the south wharf and landing place, and re-hanging of the mast pond gates; were all approved from London in 1783. The approval, however, was accompanied by the admonition, not uncommon in government departments, that in order not to frustrate future Navy Office efforts to obtain funds from Parliament, detailed

1. Ibid.

2. Duncan to Navy Office, 22 October, 1783, ibid.

3. Navy Office to Resident Officers of the Dockyard (henceforth R.O.s), 13 October, 1783, ibid.

and itemized estimates were to be forwarded rather than gross ones.⁽¹⁾

Plans for reducing the strength of the Dockyard were initiated in London in July, 1783,⁽²⁾ when Duncan was asked to propose a new peace-time establishment. Duncan, at this time, was acting as naval Commander-in-Chief in Halifax,⁽³⁾ and, with the yard responsible for preparing many Royal Navy vessels for the return passage to England and for arranging the supply of transports for troops, Loyalists and provisions, immediate reductions in strength were impossible. The Navy Office in London, recognizing this situation, directed Duncan to reduce only as much as work levels would allow.⁽⁴⁾ Duncan's proposed establishment meanwhile had been forwarded to London for consideration. By the time it had been amended and approved, however, reductions had commenced and the effect of the new establishment, when it was finally received, was to reduce the Dockyard's current strength by only thirty-four men.⁽⁵⁾

With these reductions the Navy's transition to peace-time conditions was complete. For both the fleet and the Dockyard the changes appear to have been achieved smoothly. Although there are signs of great activity during the transition, there are no indications that it was attended by any serious difficulties or that there were any major disagreements among the responsible authorities.

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1. Navy Office to Duncan, 4 October, 1783, HAL/F/1.
 2. Navy Office to Duncan, 18 July, 1783, ibid.
 3. Duncan to Digby, 13 October, 1783, ibid.
 4. Navy Office to Duncan, 4 October, 1783, ibid.
 5. Duncan to Thomas, 30 June, 1784, ibid. According to Duncan, the 1775 Dockyard establishment was 142 while that of 1783 was 165. Duncan to Navy Office, 24 January, 1784, HAL/F/2. The Navy Office establishment for Halifax Dockyard totals only 117. This, however, does not include some types of casual labourers. Navy Office to R.O.s Halifax, 25 February, 1784, HAL/F/1.

Digby at New York, and Duncan in Halifax seem to have had each other's and London's confidence and managed the whole affair extremely well.

On the Army side the problem of reducing to peace-time establishments and resuming normal operations at Halifax was aggravated by the temporary necessity to billet large numbers of troops in the town. This was caused not only by the shortage of direct transport from New York to Europe, but also by the fact that many of the troops were from British American regiments and wished to disband and settle in Nova Scotia. Army formations in Halifax in 1783 thus included British and German troops in transit, and North American troops who were waiting to disband. In the spring and summer the German component comprised Waldeckers, Anhalt Zerbsters, Hesse Hanau Grenadiers, Hesse Hanau Yagers, Hessian Recruits and the Regiment de Seitz. The British American forces were the Royal Regiment of Foot (Royal Fusiliers) and the 70th (Surrey) Regiment.⁽¹⁾ Most of the German formations, including 122 women and 69 children, embarked for return to Europe in late July.⁽²⁾ The remaining Germans, the Regiment de Seitz, left in August.

On August 15, 1783, the King's Orders of the 9th June were received whereby six Regiments of Foot, consisting of 471 men per regiment, were to proceed to Halifax to await orders.⁽³⁾ By October the main effects of the New York evacuation were being experienced and several more deployments of troops through

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1. Army Orders, Halifax Headquarters, 1783, P.A.N.S. Vol. HQ 1, entries for 21 May, 29 May, 2 June, 3 June, 24 July, 1783.
 2. Ibid., entry for 30 July, 1783.
 3. Ibid., entry for 15 August, 1783; and North to Carleton, 15 June, 1783, Dorchester papers, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369. The Regiments designated for North American service were the 17th, 33rd, 37th, 42nd, 54th and 57th Regiments of Foot. See Appendix IX for a list of Army components stationed at Halifax 1783-93.

Halifax were ordered. In addition, musters for the disbanding North American Regiments became frequent; the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 60th Royal Americans, the 84th or Royal Highland Emigrants, the Royal Garrison Battalion, the King's Orange Rangers, and the Royal Regiment of Nova Scotia Volunteers, were all disbanded in October.⁽¹⁾ In November they were followed by the South Carolina Royalists, the King's Carolina Rangers and the Royal North Carolina Regiment.⁽²⁾

As winter approached, with its restrictions on overseas transport, the tempo of troop movements continued. The remnants of nine regiments sailed for England in November,⁽³⁾ followed by several others in December.⁽⁴⁾ Except for the disbandment of a detachment of the 84th Regiment which arrived from Antiqua in March, 1784,⁽⁵⁾ and the transport to England of several army captains and their families, this marked the completion of the Army's transition to a peace-time establishment. By mid-January, 1784, the Halifax garrison consisted of the 33rd and 42nd Regiments, 3 companies of the 37th and two companies of Royal Artillery,⁽⁶⁾ a total of approximately 1100 men.

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1. P.A.N.S. Vol. HQ 1, entries for 7 October and 19 October, 1783.
 2. Ibid., entry for 5 November, 1783.
 3. Ibid., entry for 4 November, 1783.
 4. Ibid., entry for 11 December, 1783.
 5. P.A.N.S. Vol. HQ 2, entry for 28 March, 1784.
 6. Ibid., entry for 15 January, 1784, and P.A.N.S. HQ 0 both indicate that the 33rd Regiment was at Halifax. However, neither Charles H. Stewart, The Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America - A Résumé, Second Edition, Ottawa, 1964, nor W.B. Armit, Soldiers Who Founded and Garrisoned a Famous City, Halifax, undated, include the 33rd in their lists of British Regiments serving in Nova Scotia at this time.

The fortifications that these troops manned and the barracks in which they lived were in varying conditions of readiness and repair.⁽¹⁾ Thirty-nine cannon were located in a series of sod and fascine batteries extending from Point Pleasant to the town. These, together with forty-eight cannon on badly decayed works on George's Island, prevented passage of the western channel into the harbour. On the Dartmouth side were fifteen more cannon. Those, however, were too short in range to be able to control the eastern channel and, again, were situated in ruined works.

Except for its blockhouse, an irregular fascine fieldwork with seventy-five cannon located on Citadel Hill was also in ruins. At Fort Needham on a commanding height to the north of the town was an old sod work. To the south and in a much better condition was Fort Massey with thirteen cannon. In the area of the Dockyard were three bastions and a blockhouse, all badly run-down, and at the north-west corner, Fort Coote with three eighteen-pounders. The whole arrangement lacked any comprehensive plan and was of a temporary construction that was unsuitable for the extremes of the Halifax climate.⁽²⁾

Barrack accommodation was available for approximately 2700 men. The main quarter, Red Barracks on Citadel Hill, was old and thoroughly in need of repair. At Birch Cove were log huts for four hundred men. George's Island, Citadel Hill, Fort Needham, Fort Coote and Fort Massey all had barracks, but

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1. See Appendix X for a summary and map of fortifications and barracks based on Lt.-Col. Robert Morse, "A General Description of the Province of Nova Scotia and a Report of the Present State of the Defences, with Observations leading to the future growth and Security of this Colony," (1784), Report on Canadian Archives for 1884, Ottawa, 1885, page xxvii, and on Harry Piers, The Evolution of the Halifax Fortress 1749-1928, Halifax, 1947.
 2. Lt.-Col. Robert Morse, "A General Description...", p. xlv.

only the latter was in good condition. A stone magazine, between Citadel Hill and the town, contained only one thousand barrels of powder and was in danger of collapse. Field magazines were located on George's Island and at the Citadel but they were too damp for service and all the powder in the area, 7000 barrels, was stored in buildings at Eastern Battery. Army store-houses were located at the Ordnance Wharf, an area that had been heavily encroached upon and was no longer adequate for the large quantities of stores that had been accumulated at Halifax during the war. As a result many stores were housed in rented facilities scattered about the town.

In terms of twentieth century force levels the military force at Halifax in early 1784 of about 1100 troops and a squadron of six ships with not more than 1200 sailors does not appear very impressive. Nor is this impression improved by the inclusion of the fortifications, barracks, dockyard and other facilities. However, when compared to Halifax's population at the time, about 5000,⁽¹⁾ the force assumes proportions that are considerably nobler and more consistent with the base's position as the focus of British military power in North America.

1. T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. VIII, 1895, p. 85, notes that Governor Parr estimated the population as 1200 but that this was in 1783 and before the Loyalist immigration. The latter appears to have increased the population to more than 5000 because by 1791, according to Akins, "the population had decreased as scarcely to exceed 5000."

CHAPTER II

NAVAL FORCES 1783-1793

Service Conditions in the Royal Navy.

To serve in the Royal Navy of 1783-93 was to serve in one of the most dismal periods of its history. Far from fresh after a war that had seen it sustain several defeats by the French, Spanish and Dutch, the Navy needed time to re-build its strength and regain its inspiration. Tired ships and men, a pay system that was many years behind the country's rising costs-of-living, and critical weaknesses in organization and administration, were only a few of the problems that the Navy faced. Dissatisfaction with the harshness of service afloat had been muted by the demands of war but now found ways of expressing itself. It is significant that the period opened with a mutiny in the Channel fleet ⁽¹⁾ and closed only four years before that of the Nore.

With the end of the war in America, changes in the size and shape of the fleet came quickly and drastically. The authorized number of seamen and marines fell from 110,000 in 1783 to 26,000 in 1784 and 18,000 in 1785. A substantial increase took place in 1791, when it rose to 24,000 as the result of the preparations to oppose Russia in the Baltic during the Russo-Turkish war, but by early 1792, the war threat receded and the naval strength

1. Part of the mutiny took the form of a refusal by sailors in ships at Spithead to return to the West Indies, R. Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs, p. 416, note 337. Another part was "riotous and even mutinous" behaviour by men who were impatient of the delays in obtaining their releases after the peace. This "mutiny" affected many ships including H.M.S. Raisonnable, 64 guns, where armed intervention by the Captain and his officers was required to put it down. Three men from the ship were hanged. Wm. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. III, London, 1898, p. 339.

was reduced to 16,000. (1)

Concomitant with the cuts in the numbers of personnel were contractions in the numbers of ships. In January, 1783, the Order of Battle stood at 174 ships of the line, i.e. Fourth-rate (60 guns) or better, and 294 smaller vessels. By December, 1792, however, these had been reduced to 129 ships of the line and 201 other craft. (2) Proportionally, since peace-time complements were smaller than war-time ones, the ship reductions were less than those for personnel.

With respect to the quality of Royal Navy ships, their condition could only improve. At the end of the war "they were in a wretched state of feebleness and decay, insomuch that there was not a sound ship in the fleet. Several returning home had foundered on the Banks of Newfoundland owing to their ill-construction and rickety condition." (3) Helping to compensate for this situation, however, were the new classes of frigate then beginning to make their appearance. Though technically not of the line, these ships were highly seaworthy, speedy and versatile, and at a time when First and Second-rates normally had to lay up for the winter, more than made up for their lack of size. In 1780, the 38-gun frigate Minerva was commissioned with twenty-eight 18-pounders on the main deck, and ten 9-pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle. In addition, it was fitted with eight 18-pounder carronades, powerful short-range weapons introduced in 1780. These weapons, which were

1. William L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. III, p. 327.

2. Ibid., p. 328.

3. T.B. Martin, Letters and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Byam Martin, edited by Admiral Sir Richard Hamilton, Vol. III, Navy Records Society, 1903, p. 379.

not included in ships' rated armaments, in effect increased their fire-power greatly; a 24-gun frigate, for example, mounted ten of them and thus actually carried 34 guns. Made by the Carron Company in Scotland, the gun's main innovation was its use of hollowed or cored shot. This produced a much larger hole in the target's timbers than solid shot of the same calibre and was much easier to handle.⁽¹⁾

Other important improvements in naval gunnery were made by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Captain of the Fleet, and put into service use in 1781. Flannel was substituted for silk as a cartridge casing, steel springs installed to control gun recoil, and gun locks utilizing flint and an improved tube introduced into service.⁽²⁾ The period also featured the introduction of the coppering of ships' bottoms, the increasing use of the nautical almanac and chronometer for determining longitude, and better procurement, distribution and stowage procedures for ships' stores.⁽³⁾

Despite these advances in material, the problem of procuring and retaining suitable naval personnel remained desperate. Officers were reluctant to serve without the war-time incentives of excitement and prize-money, and many transferred to the merchant service or the Russian Navy.⁽⁴⁾ Able and ambitious junior officers were rankled by a promotion system that, above

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1. The gun was not without its critics, however. These complained that it was too short in range, tended to over-heat, and that when fired from its quarterdeck position it fouled the ship's rigging. W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. III, p. 332.
 2. G.J. Marcus, A Naval History of England - The Formative Centuries, Boston, 1961, p. 347.
 3. W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. III, p. 336.
 4. Ibid., p. 340.

post captain,⁽¹⁾ was based on seniority rather than on merit, and in which longevity was the sole qualification for ultimate success. Below post captain, promotion was based on 'interest', i.e. the amount of influence one's relatives,⁽²⁾ friends and sponsors were able to exert on senior Admiralty officers and Commanders-in-Chief.⁽³⁾ Commissions were not purchased as in the Army, however; the naval process was more subtle.

... it was not impossible to set a son up in a Service which was still highly exclusive, even when a man's own social pretensions were not great; but only if some degree of affluence could fill the social gap. In plain terms, it was always possible to buy one's protégé in, though not, perhaps, by any of the cruder forms of bribery; and not by the official means of 'Purchase'.

There was not, and never had been, such a thing as Purchase in the Navy; not, that is, in anything like the Army sense of the word.⁽⁴⁾

Coupled with regulations that permitted active admirals and cap-

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1. The term 'post captain' was commonly used to indicate that the officer was qualified to command a 'post ship', i.e. a ship that was complemented to have both the post of Captain and that of Master filled; "a Post Captain to fight the ship and command the whole, and a fully-qualified Master, under him in all save navigation." Michael Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815, London, 1960, p. 192.
 2. When Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, Bart., was Commander-in-Chief at Halifax, a son, Captain Richard Hughes, was in command of one of the six ships on the station, while the captain of another, Lieut. Robert Hughes, and the Fourth Lieutenant of the Flagship, Lieut. Ulysses Hughes, were also possibly relatives. Hughes, himself, has been described as an officer "remembered by history only through Nelson's refusing to obey his order not to enforce the Navigation Acts, in 1785," when he (Hughes) was Commander-in-Chief leeward Islands Station. W. L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol III, p. 538.
 3. Not even the First Lord was safe from interest. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 96, suggests that Lord Howe's removal from office may have been because Pitt wanted the office for his brother, the Earl of Chatham.
 4. Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 40. (Lewis' italics).

tains to hold seats in Parliament where they could mould naval policy to personal ends, such a system of selection and promotion seemed designed to alienate the loyalties of those serving, or being forced to serve, under it. If so, it was successful, for the difficulty of manning the Navy continued in peace to be almost as serious a problem as in war. Bounties and other inducements failed to make up for the low pay, atrocious living conditions, and bad treatment by frequently arrogant officers, with the result that impressment⁽¹⁾ remained a common expedient.

In summary, in the period 1783-93, though its ships were in process of becoming better fighting units than ever,⁽²⁾ the Navy's officers and men were often incompetent and generally unhappy with their conditions of service. From this trough it was to be a long, hard pull to the crests of Copenhagen and Trafalgar.

Naval Organization

Heading the Royal Navy in 1783 were the "Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, etc, and of His Majesty's Plantations, etc." This body dated from the reign of Charles I and was commonly known as the Admiralty Board. The senior member was the First Lord, a cabinet member and political appointee, sometimes a senior and experienced naval officer, but just as frequently a civilian.⁽³⁾ The Board,

1. Infra, p. 103.

2. T.B. Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 140, comments that the time between 1783-90 had not been spent in idleness but was "profitably spent in renovating and augmenting the fleet."

3. See Appendix III for a list of Naval Authorities in Britain, 1783-1793.

which sometimes consisted of extremely youthful and inexperienced politicians,⁽¹⁾ was responsible for all naval operations, policy, and personnel matters including promotions and appointments.⁽²⁾ Its control of the latter gave the First Lord a very powerful source of patronage,⁽³⁾ and one that was not always used wisely.⁽⁴⁾ Linking the Board with all of its subordinate naval commands was the Secretary of the Admiralty, another post of considerable importance and influence.⁽⁵⁾

In Halifax, the authority responsible to the Admiralty for the operational control of the fleet and for the administration of naval personnel at sea was the naval Commander-in-Chief.⁽⁶⁾ Normally a rear-admiral but sometimes a senior post captain or a vice-admiral, the Commander-in-Chief served on the Station for about two years,⁽⁷⁾ and, because of the uncertainty and

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1. In 1783, the two naval members of the Board had little or no business experience, while three of the remaining five civilian members were aged 21, 24, and 27. Lord Barham, Letters and Papers of Lord Barham, Edited by Sir John Knox Laughton, Vol. II, Navy Records Society, 1910, p. 211 fn.
 2. During the period 1733-93, for 36 years, there were 2 naval and 5 civil members; for 13 years, 3 naval and 4 civil, and for 11 years 1 naval and 5 civil. Sir Oswyn A.R. Murray, "The Admiralty," The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. XXIV, 1938, p. 212.
 3. Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 204.
 4. Lord Barham, Letters and Papers, Vol. II, p. viii, "It is not too much to say that by no one has the patronage of the First Lord been so abused as it was by Sandwich." The Earl of Sandwich was First Lord from 1771-82.
 5. Held by Philip Stephens (later, Sir Philip Stephens, Bart.) from 1763-1795.
 6. The descriptive but cumbersome full title was "Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels Employed and to be Employed in the River St. Lawrence and along the Coast of Nova Scotia, the Islands of St. John and Cape Breton and in the Bay of Fundy."
 7. See Appendix IV for list of Naval Authorities at Halifax 1783-1793.

slowness of communications with Admiralty,⁽¹⁾ exercised wide discretionary authority. Important matters such as the employment of ships, appointments of commanding officers,⁽²⁾ the granting of officers releases,⁽³⁾ arranging of reliefs⁽⁴⁾ and the award and approval of punishments,⁽⁵⁾ all came within his jurisdiction.

The action taken by virtue of these powers was subject to review by the Admiralty Board. In most cases, however, owing to the communications delays, the action had been completed before Admiralty could approve or disapprove. This feature of 18th century command and control procedures undoubtedly gave the overseas commanders-in-chief considerable more flexibility and influence on naval policy than they would have enjoyed on home stations. Sometimes the responsibility proved too great for the incumbent to handle with confidence, and placed him at a considerable disadvantage. Such was the case when the Commander-in-Chief at Halifax was confronted with problems associated with the enforcement of the Navigation Laws.⁽⁶⁾

Under the Commanders-in-Chief were the captains of the naval vessels that were assigned to the Station.⁽⁷⁾ The ranks of these captains varied from post captain down to lieutenant depending on the size of the ship they

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1. Infra, p. 90.
 2. Hughes to Stephens, 27 May, 1789, and 16 August, 1790, Adm. I, Vol. 492.
 3. Hughes to Stephens, 28 September, 1791, ibid.
 4. Hughes to Stephens, 27 May, 1791, ibid.
 5. Infra, p. 107.
 6. Infra, pp. 35-39.
 7. See Appendix VII.

commanded. Sixth-rate ships, including frigates, and above were commanded by post captains; sloops by masters and commanders; and cutters, schooners, and armed brigs, transports and store-ships, by lieutenants. In the peacetime period 1783-1793, the squadron based at Halifax normally consisted of a Fourth or Fifth-rate as flagship, one or two frigates, two sloops, and sometimes two or three galleys or armed schooners. The frigates and above remained on the Station for eighteen months or two years and then were relieved and returned to England. The smaller vessels remained much longer.

When the local situation required, as it did, for example, during the re-deployments of forces and Loyalists after the Revolutionary War, the number of ships on the station could be augmented by hired transports or stores-ships. These vessels were, however, unarmed and commanded by civilian masters who, despite the secondment of their vessels to the Navy, remained outside the normal command apparatus. It was thus impossible to court-martial the master of a hired vessel if he failed to carry out satisfactorily the orders given to him.⁽¹⁾ As a means of correcting this weakness in the chain of command, naval lieutenants were appointed as Agents to the hired vessels "to see the Masters do their duty."⁽²⁾

The responsibilities of a ship's Captain, then as now, were the safety of the ship and its readiness for war. Assisting him in a Fourth-rate were approximately fifteen wardroom officers. The senior of these, the First Lieutenant, was the second in command and was responsible for the running of the ship as a whole. The remaining four or five lieutenants served as

1. Digby to Stephens, 12 November, 1782, Adm. I, Vol. 490.

2. Digby to Stephens, 3 December, 1783, ibid.

watchkeepers and performed additional duties such as deputy to the First Lieutenant, signals officer and small arms training officer. A marine lieutenant took charge of the thirty to forty marines that were normally embarked. The remaining officers included the purser and surgeon, and sometimes a master who was responsible for the ships's navigation.

Not of wardroom rank but also charged with important duties were the three Standing Officers,⁽¹⁾ the Gunner, Boatswain and Carpenter. Finally, there were the minor warrant officers, or petty officers, such as the sail-maker, ropemaker, armourer, caulker, cook and master-at-arms. For the types of ships that were based at Halifax, the whole complements including marines varied from about one hundred in a sloop to three hundred and fifty in the flagship.⁽²⁾

So far only the operational organization for the Navy has been outlined. But there was also a supporting administrative and logistic organization. In charge of this civil organization and complementary to the Admiralty Board, was the Navy Board, i.e. the 'Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy.'⁽³⁾ This Board, an innovation of Henry VIII, included among its broad responsibilities the building and repair of ships, the production and procurement of all equipment and stores, and the maintenance of reserve stocks

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1. So called because of the permanence of their attachment aboard. See Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 261.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 24 June, 1785, "State and Condition of H.M. Ships and Vessels under the Command of Herbert Sawyer Esq. Commodore," Adm. 1, Vol. 491; and Hughes to Stephens, 25 July, 1790, "State and condition, etc.," Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 3. Also referred to as the Navy Office, the location at Seething Lane and Crutched Friars in London, from which it conducted its business.

for the management of the dockyards. Although the Navy Board was established more than a century earlier than the Admiralty Board, the latter, by virtue of its succession to the powers of the Lord High Admiral, was in fact the senior board. Its authority, however, was normally only loosely applied and the Navy Board in many respects was practically autonomous.

The head of the Navy Board was the comptroller, whose duty was "to superintend the offices belonging to his department, to attend the great officers and offices of state, and, on some occasions, the cabinet council; to carry their orders which are frequently secret, into execution, and in short to see every part of the business of the office properly executed."⁽¹⁾ During most of the period 1783-93, the Comptroller was Sir Charles Middleton, later Lord Barham, an experienced naval officer who set a precedent for comptrollers by remaining on the active list as a Captain and gaining promotion to rear-admiral.⁽²⁾ Under the Comptroller on the Board were two surveyors; and commissioners for transports, the supply of stores to the ships, and the keeping of records. In addition, there were senior clerks with responsibilities for bills and accounts, foreign accounts and seamen's wages. Most of these Board members were civilians and, at one period while Barham was Comptroller, only one of the five commissioners was a sea officer.⁽³⁾

In Halifax, the authority responsible to the Navy Board was the Commissioner of the Dockyard, a position held from 1783-1801 by Henry Duncan, a former captain in the Royal Navy.⁽⁴⁾ His duties included the repairing of

1. Lord Barham, Letters and Papers, Vol. II, p. 235.

2. Ibid., p. 258.

3. Ibid., p. 237.

4. See T.B. Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 1, for a description of the practice of appointing Dockyard commissioners from retired naval officers.

all naval ships whether serving on the station or transiting it to the West Indies; ⁽¹⁾ the provision of stores and victuals for these ships; pay and allowances for the ships' companies; and the care and maintenance of all naval installations ashore such as docks, magazines, the naval hospital, workshops and store-houses. The Commissioner also acted as the agent of the Navy for arranging contracts for hired transports and for naval stores including victuals.

The Dockyard departmental organization was indicated by the main managerial positions; in addition to the Commissioner there were the Store-keeper, Master Shipwright, ⁽²⁾ Master Attendant, ⁽³⁾ Foreman of Shipwrights, Working Foreman to House Carpenters, Foreman of Smiths, Working Foreman of Labourers, and Working Foreman of Sailmakers. At the lower levels were clerks, caulkers, shipwrights, sawyers, brickmakers, masons, gate porters, watchmen, store porters, servants and labourers. With few opportunities for work in town during peace-time, dockyard positions enjoyed great popularity. ⁽⁴⁾ Once given up or lost, moreover, positions were almost impossible to regain; "no Person discharged from the Dockyard, either by their own desire or otherwise shall ever be entered again." ⁽⁵⁾

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1. E.g., H.M.S. Andromeda refitted at Halifax, August to November, 1783, en route to Jamaica. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 130.
 2. Mr. Provo Wallis, formerly the Builder at New York, was transferred to Halifax through the influence of Admiral Digby. Digby to Stephens, 20 September, 1783, Adm. 1, Vol. 490; and Wallis to Duncan, 21 November, 1783, HAL/F/2.
 3. Added to the Dockyard establishment in late 1784. Navy Office to Respective Officers, 1 September, 1784, HAL/F/1/.
 4. P.H. Watson "The Two-Hundredth Anniversary of the Halifax Dockyard," The Maritime Museum of Canada-Occasional Papers, Number 5, 1959, p. 12.
 5. Duncan to Thomas, 7 November, 1783, HAL/F/1.

Even in the 1780s clerical and bookkeeping tasks formed an important part of Dockyard work and a formidable list of reports and returns were required by Navy Office officials. Monthly reports included: a list of work put out to contract, lists of men discharged and vessels on the station; abstracts of stores musters; a cash account and vouchers for the ships; the state of sails, anchors and cables held in the yard; and an abstract of outstanding correspondence with the Navy Board. Quarterly reports called for an accounting of unserviceable stores sold, of demands made for stores and of stock remaining, and of issues to boatswains and carpenters. Annual reports included a return of negroes;⁽¹⁾ and lists of artificers dead, discharged or newly-entered and of stores received during the year. To complete the picture, annual estimates were required for the works to be taken in hand in the ensuing year along with a report on the state of the works already in hand.⁽²⁾ It was easier for the Navy Office to ask for reports, however, than for the Dockyard staff to produce them, and hastening letters⁽³⁾ and reprimands were sometimes received. "We told you in our Letter of the 6th of May last, that we hoped to see no more frivolous Excuses for errors,... We direct in the most positive manner to be careful not to give cause for our future displeasure."⁽⁴⁾

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1. These were "invaliding Negroes belonging to the King;" presumably they were able to perform certain casual labour. Their origin is unclear but they were probably refugees from the Thirteen Colonies, Navy Office to R.O.s, 25 February, 1784, ibid.
 2. Navy Office to R.O.s, 30 May, 1788, ibid.
 3. Navy Office to R.O.s, 9 September, 1788, ibid.
 4. Admiralty Accountant-General to Halifax Officers, 7 July, 1790, Adm. 49, Vol. 150.

Important factors in Navy Office and Dockyard organization in the period 1783-93 were the movements towards administrative reform. The system of emoluments was particularly in need of improvement. Here, the custom had developed for Navy Office officials to compensate for low salaries by charging increasingly high fees to persons seeking naval administrative positions, and by extracting commissions from agents supplying the navy with goods and services.⁽¹⁾ In the 1770s public awareness of the abuses of the system had led to the formation of a number of committees of inquiry. An early result was the Contractors Bill, which passed Parliament in 1782, and sought to prevent members of Parliament from having interests in government contracts. In addition, although a reform bill by Pitt to eliminate other abuses in public offices was defeated, a Parliamentary Commission was established in 1785 to inquire into the

... Fees, etc., of certain Public Officers to examine into any Abuses which might exist in them, and to report such observations as might occur to them for the better conducting and managing the Business of those Offices.⁽²⁾

At the same time, however, some members of the Navy itself were aware of the need for reform and were taking a lead in introducing measures for this purpose. Of these, Middleton was the outstanding example.

I must own to you, Sir, that I have seen with concern, since I have been in office, the very loose manner in which business has been conducted, and the great waste of money that is occasioned thereby. ...

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1. Bernard Pool, Navy Board Contracts 1660-1832, London, 1966, p. 112. The Chief Clerk at the Navy Office, although only drawing £250 per annum in salary received £2500 in 'gifts'.
 2. Sir Oswyn A.R. Murray, "The Admiralty," The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. XXIV, 1938, p. 337.

The principle of our dockyards at present is a total disregard to public economy in all its branches; and it is so rooted in the professional officers, that they cannot divest themselves of it when brought to higher stations. They have so many relations and dependents, too, in the dockyards, that can only be served by countenancing and promoting improper expenses, that they never lose an opportunity of supporting them when in their power... (1)

Among Middleton's reforms were improved accounting procedures to enable expenses to be more closely controlled, the re-writing of naval regulations and orders, the issue of new orders to prevent abuses in foreign yards, and the overhaul of the stores system.

Although the operational organization and administrative organization of the Navy were in theory separated entirely, the distinctions between the two were not always rigidly maintained. In 1783, for example, when Admiral Digby was in New York and there was no senior naval captain in Halifax, Duncan, the Dockyard Commissioner, was directed to assume the additional duties of naval commander there. (2) This arrangement was not satisfactory to the captains of the ships on the station, however, and they promptly prepared a memorial to Digby protesting their subordination to civilian authority. Digby, in turn, had no choice but to forward this to the Admiralty Board for consideration. (3) Despite this apparent friction, Duncan was able to report from the actual scene at Halifax that the relations between him and Captain Henry of

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1. Middleton to Pitt, 24 August, 1786, Lord Barham, Letters and Papers, p. 218.
 2. Duncan to Digby, 13 October, 1783, HAL/F/2.
 3. Digby to Duncan, 23 October, 1783, ibid. See Lord Barham, Letters and Papers, p. x, for a similar case in which it was alleged that the civilian commissioner was given command only as "an ingenious device for getting a man to command...without giving him a share in any possible prize money."

H.M.S. Renown were quite amicable and he anticipated no difficulties in carrying out his duties in command.⁽¹⁾ Duncan's confidence was borne out the following month by an exchange of correspondence in which he directed Captain Henry to cancel his plans to sail for England and in which Henry readily acquiesced.⁽²⁾

On the other hand, on an occasion when the organizational lines were crossed in the opposite direction, i.e. by the Commander-in-Chief exercising authority over dockyard personnel, the administrative organization refused to comply. In this case, the Commander-in-Chief, Commodore Sir Charles Douglas,⁽³⁾ citing the authority vested in other commanders in his position, and having studied the instructions he was given by the Admiralty on taking up his appointment on the Station,

... judged it to be not only perfectly congenial to those considerations and expedient but also requisite and necessary ... to be informed what Naval Stores might be in his Majesty's Careening Yard ... And ... directed in the Usual Stile Mr. George Thomas, the Storekeeper, to furnish ... an Account thereof.⁽⁴⁾

Thomas' reply was prompt and to the point:

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1. Duncan to Digby, 14 November, 1783, HAL/F/2.
 2. Duncan to Henry and Henry to Duncan, 15 December, 1783, ibid.
 3. In addition to being Rodney's Captain of the Fleet, Douglas had commanded a vessel at Quebec in 1759, headed the Squadron that relieved Quebec in May, 1776, and won a baronetcy for the naval victory at Lake Champlain.
 4. Since Duncan was on a trip to the Bay of Fundy at the time, Douglas gave the order directly to Thomas. Douglas' interest in the Stores had been whetted by a report that cable from the Dockyard had been transferred to a trading ship by the Storekeeper without the knowledge of the senior officer present. Douglas to Stephens 1 August, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491. (Douglas' letter to Thomas was dated 26 July, 1784).

The Store Accounts of the Dockyard, Sir Charles, are so exceedingly heavy, that it will be impossible to state the remains in so particular a manner as you express and desire within the period that I propose to remain here, previous to my Intention of going home, according to the leave which is granted to me - My Deputies shall be constantly employed, in performance thereof, provided it does not interfere with the current and indispensable business of the Office. The Commissioners of the Navy, who are my immediate Superior Officers, are sensible of the impossibility of my classing the exact State of my remains at any given period; and I am too cautious to offer an imperfect Sketch, which may possibly be erroneous. (1)

Thus was the contest for naval hegemony in Halifax joined. Douglas was probably incensed as much by Thomas' tone and refusal to let the matter interfere with his leave, as by his reference to the Navy Office as his immediate superior. In any event, Douglas immediately ordered Thomas to delay proceeding on his six months leave to England, (2) and directed three officers, including the Master Shipwright and the Master of H.M.S. Assistance, to carry out a muster of Dockyard stores. (3)

Thomas, however, was not to be deterred, and after delivering a bundle of Abstracts of Receipts and Issues to Douglas, informed him that he was taking advantage of an available ship to proceed home to England "according to the Navy Board's letter of leave for that purpose." (4) He was thereupon suspended by Douglas and a replacement named. (5) A detailed report on the matter was then sent by Douglas to Admiralty with a request for approval of

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1. Thomas to Douglas, 26 July, 1784, ibid.
 2. Douglas to Thomas, 27 July, 1784, ibid.
 3. Douglas to Wallis, Hemmans and Holliday, 30 July, 1784, ibid.
 4. Thomas to Douglas, 30 July, 1784, ibid.
 5. Douglas to Thomas, 31 July, 1784; and Douglas to Edgcombe, 31 July, 1784, ibid.

his action.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, Thomas proceeded to England to plead his case to his own superiors. The result was that Thomas was ordered to be reinstated as Storekeeper.

This was more than Douglas could stand; on receipt of the news he swiftly acknowledged the defeat of himself and his principles:

Cogent reasons me thereunto impelling which may be gather'd from your letters of 18, 19, & 20 of September; I desire that you may be pleased to move My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to recall me from this Command. ⁽²⁾

If this was a bluff, it failed, for early the following year a relief for Douglas was appointed⁽³⁾ and the strength of the Navy Office thereby firmly recognized in matters affecting the Halifax Station.

Naval Operations

Showing the flag and demonstrating a British naval capability to combat American expansionist ambitions in British North America was unquestionably one of the primary purposes of the Halifax Squadron. However, since the show was not a particularly convincing one,⁽⁴⁾ it must be concluded that the threat was not believed imminent and that a minimal deterrent was all that was con-

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1. Douglas to Stephens, 1 August, 1784, ibid.
 2. Douglas to Stephens, 27 November, 1784, ibid. Both visual and verbal effects of this uncharacteristically brief letter were marred by an extremely long postscript repeating Douglas' view of the case.
 3. Sawyer to Stephens, 17 February, 1785, ibid.
 4. No ships of the line, and normally only four or five ships of Fourth-rate and smaller, were assigned to the Halifax Station. It should be noted, however, that American naval forces were also very weak at this time.

sidered necessary. Strategically, what Halifax represented to the United States, therefore, was not a force-in-being, but merely a potential force, albeit one backed by the entire Royal Navy.

Subsequent events were to justify this policy, for although there were two major war threats that affected Halifax forces during the period 1783-93, neither came from the United States. The first of the alerts was for the French crisis in the winter of 1787-88.⁽¹⁾ In the second, that of the Nootka Affair with Spain in 1790,⁽²⁾ ships were diverted back to Halifax,⁽³⁾ war-time complements embarked,⁽⁴⁾ and action signal procedures implemented.⁽⁵⁾ When war actually came, it was not against the United States but France. Then, instead of looking to the southward, the Navy's attentions were directed towards assisting in the capture of St. Pierre and Miquelon,⁽⁶⁾ attacking French commerce and raiders, and convoying British merchantmen.⁽⁷⁾

With few requirements to show its readiness for war, the peace-time operations of the Halifax Squadron soon became centred on more prosaic activities such as enforcing the Navigation Laws and policing the fisheries. These operations, although not as challenging as those of war, had their

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1. Sawyer to Stephens, 10 November, 1787, Adm. 1, Vol. 491; Parr to Sydney, 14 November, 1787, C.O. 217/60; and Parr to Sydney, 26 January, 1788, ibid.
 2. Grenville to Parr, 6 May, 1790, and 5 August, 1790; Despatches from Board of Trade and Plantations to Governors of Nova Scotia, Vol. 5, 1784-99, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33, Items 53 and 58.
 3. Hughes to Stephens, 13 June, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 4. Hughes to Stephens, 9 April, 1791, ibid.
 5. Hughes to Stephens, 28 July, 1790, ibid.
 6. Dundas to Ogilvie, 15 February, 1793, C.O. 217/64.
 7. Dundas to Wentworth, 9 February, 1793, Despatches from Board of Trade and Plantations to Governors of Nova Scotia, Vol. 5, 1784-1799, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.

moments of crisis and excitement. Of particular interest were those concerning the Navigation and Trade Laws. Before attempting a re-construction of these operations, however, an explanation of the policies behind them is essential.

In late 18th century Britain, mercantilism was firmly expressed in the Navigation Laws. This series of laws, which originated in 1651, generally restricted colonial trade to the Mother Country⁽¹⁾ and required goods to be transported in British bottoms, manned by crews that were at least three-quarters British. By these means it was hoped to develop colonial economies that would complement that of Britain and to foster and protect the British carrying trade. The colonies would supply Britain with provisions and materials and serve as markets for British products. By barring foreign ships from the transport of these goods, foreign fleets would suffer while Britain's grew. As her merchant fleet grew so would her naval power, since the same men, and, in the early days, the same ships, were used for each. The concept was simple and straightforward, and in the Mother Country had enjoyed almost unanimous support for more than a century. In the colonies, on

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1. Initially, all products could be freely exported from the colonies except certain enumerated articles which had to be exported to England or to an English colony. The list of enumerated articles gradually grew and by 1770 included cotton wool, dyewoods, fustic, ginger, indigo, logwood, white and brown sugar, tobacco, rice, molasses, naval stores from America, beaver skins and furs, copper ore, pimento, coffee, cacao-nuts, whale fins, raw silk, hides and skins, potash, iron (to Europe), lumber (to Europe) and gum senegal. In addition, all non-enumerated goods were prohibited from Europe north of Cape Finisterre (1767). The Laws also restricted the imports allowed into the colonies. With a few exceptions such as Irish victuals, Madiera wines, European salt to the fisheries in North America, and Irish linen, all goods had to be obtained from England. In North America the early import policy for goods imported from foreign American colonies, including the West Indies, was quite liberal and these goods could be brought in freely. Later, however, duties were levied in the British colonies on direct imports of molasses and sugar (1733) and rum (1764). Lawrence Harper, The English Navigation Laws, New York, 1939, p. 395.

the other hand, particularly the American ones, the system frequently seemed unreasonable and protests and evasions were common. (1)

At the end of the Revolutionary War, one of the questions that arose was how Britain was to regulate trade with the United States. Obviously, the paternalism of the Navigation Laws would no longer apply to the former colonies, and new trade relationships would have to be substituted. To this end, provision was made in the preamble to the Provisional Agreement of November, 1782, for a commerce treaty to be subsequently arranged between the two principals. Views on what the new policy should be varied widely. Understandably, a large body of British opinion favoured vengeance against the United States and sought to have the Laws rigidly enforced against them. Other and better informed observers, on the other hand, questioned the ability of Canada and Nova Scotia to take the place of the United States in supplying the West Indies with sufficient cattle, timber, and naval stores for the latter's needs. They also saw the desirability of retaining as much of the American market for British products as possible, and therefore favoured a relaxation of the Navigation Laws. (2)

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1. S. Hollingsworth, The Present State of Nova Scotia, Second Edition, Edinburgh, 1787, page 150, contains a contemporary panegyric upon the Laws. For a more balanced view, however, see Lawrence Harper, The English Navigation Laws, p. 245 and pp. 271-274. For Britain the advantages of the system were measurable. Imports from America increased from 12% of the total received at London in 1663 to 36.5% in 1773, while commerce between England and America used over 33 1/3% of English shipping employed in over-seas trade. The monopoly, however, led to resistance both by some colonial governors who were otherwise loyal and by Assemblies. Equally important, it encouraged widespread smuggling. Although it was a serious burden, however, it has probably been over-emphasized as a causative factor of the American Revolution. It is likely, in fact, the Revolution would have taken place even without it.
 2. The opposing points of view, for and against the rigid enforcement of the Navigation Laws against the United States, were represented by Lord Sheffield and Lord Shelburne respectively. See Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America 1783-1820, Cambridge, Mass., 1941, pp. 20 and 23.

Such a divisive issue, playing both on the emotions of British patriots and on the sometimes conflicting interests of ship-owners, merchants and planters, could only be settled by compromise. Thus, in April, 1783, as a temporary expedient, an act was passed enabling the King to regulate commerce with America by Orders-in-Council. These orders were then used to establish a list of articles that could be imported from the United States in ships of British registry that were sailed by British seamen. The intended policy was that until Canada and Nova Scotia could supply the needs of the British West Indies, and provide a market for their products in return, the Navigation Laws should be relaxed sufficiently to let the United States do so. When British North America became stronger, the list of articles would be reduced and the Navigation Laws re-tightened.

In accordance with this policy, the 1783 Orders-in-Council permitted naval stores, such as pitch, tar and turpentine, staves, lumber, livestock, flour and grain produced in the United States to be shipped to the West Indies; and rum, sugar, molasses, coffee, cocoa, nuts, ginger and pimento exported back to the United States in return. Predictably, the exclusion of American meat, fish and dairy products, and the restriction of the trade to British vessels was resented in the United States, and reprisals, including heavy port and tonnage fees and outright denial of entry, were adopted by some states against British ships.⁽¹⁾ To Britain, however, such reprisals were of minor consequence; the preponderance of commercial strength was still on her side and it was considered that little

1. Gerald S. Graham, British Policy and Canada 1774-1791, London, 1930, p. 65; and Adams to Jay, 25 August, 1785, in W.R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States - Canadian Relations 1784-1860, Vol. 1, Washington, 1940, p. 308.

the United States might do could affect it.

Late in 1783, the collapse of the Fox-North coalition gave new encouragement to the proponents of freer trade, and re-kindled the reaction against the Navigation Laws. Pitt, therefore, introduced a bill that would permit free-trade between the West Indies and the United States and give the Americans a share in the carrying trade to Great Britain. But any form of free trade was still well in advance of its time, and, in face of overwhelming opposition, the bill was dropped. As John Adams later observed, "The national Judgement and popular Voice is so decided in favour of the Navigation Acts, that neither Administration nor Opposition dare avow a Thought of relaxing them further than has been already done."⁽¹⁾

As a result, the Pitt Government was forced to fall back to the Enabling Act of 1783, and its subsequent Orders-in-Council, as the basis of its trade policy in North America. Until 1788, these Orders, renewed at six-months intervals, furnished the Government with the chief means for implementing and modifying commercial relations with America. In 1788, the existing provisions were embodied in an Act for Regulating Trade whereby, in emergencies, colonial governors with the advice of their Councils could permit the importation of certain provisions, livestock and lumber products.⁽²⁾

During the entire period from 1783-93, any attempts by the United States to make trade relations more equitable and permanent by drawing up a commerce treaty were either rejected in London or ignored. British opposition to any treaty or easing of commercial relations was firmly based. First, the merchants,

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1. Adams to Jay, 6 August, 1785, in W.R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. 306.
 2. Orders-in-Council, Royal Proclamations and other Documents, P.A.N.S. Vol. 333, Doc. 3, Section XIII.

shippers, and planters realized that a treaty could only be arranged at the cost of some of their privileges or monopolies. Secondly, Loyalist creditors adamantly insisted the Americans should first pay their outstanding debts. Finally, fur traders recognized that the evacuation of British forts in the old Northwest would be a condition of American partnership in such a treaty. So strong was the opposition of these groups that President Washington's private agent in London was forced to conclude in exasperation that the British "...consider a treaty of Commerce with America as being absolutely unnecessary and that they are persuaded that they shall derive all benefit from our trade without a treaty."⁽¹⁾

The implications of the foregoing trade policies on Halifax and the naval forces based there were on the surface unequivocal. The old practice of trading Nova Scotia fish and lumber for West Indies' fruit, molasses and rum and taking the latter items back to Nova Scotia, or to England in exchange for British manufactured products, would continue unchanged. But, although there were trade relaxations between the West Indies and the United States, as far as British North America was concerned, the United States was a foreign country and the Navigation Laws would be applied as rigorously against it as against any other foreign country. All goods and vessels from the United States were therefore prohibited from British North American ports. The Navy's task was to assist in enforcing this prohibition.

Such a policy, however, was not to prove practical or defensible for very long, and the mercantilists of the reorganized British Board of Trade were soon confronted with the realities of northern colonial development.

1. Gouverneur Morris to Washington, 1 May, 1790, in W.R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. 373.

Early recognition of the problem of preventing a hungry and over-expanded colony from importing provisions from a more productive, though unmonarchical, neighbour came in the spring of 1783. On May 5th, Governor Parr and his council recorded the opinion that, until trade and commerce between Great Britain and the United States were established by an Act of Parliament, it would be permissible to import "Bread, flour, and all manner of Grain, Beef, Port and livestock."⁽¹⁾ Later in the summer, however, by requesting the Navy's assistance in preventing vessels from anchoring south of George's Island and landing commodities secretly, the Governor gave evidence that the Government of the Province intended to enforce at least some of the trade restrictions.⁽²⁾

For the remainder of the year the Navy was kept busy evacuating New York and re-deploying troops and Loyalists, and there is no further record of Navigation Law enforcement on the Station. In December, the ships took up winter stations in Halifax, Annapolis, Port Mouton, Passamaquoddy and the St. John River, but these areas were chosen more to aid the new settlements and protect sovereignty than to apply trade policy.⁽³⁾

The following year, as if to emphasize the British intention of denying the entry of American products into Nova Scotia, one of the more than one hundred clauses comprising Parr's official instructions stipulated that he was to permit no bills of an unusual nature that affected trade and shipping

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1. Minutes of His Majesty's Council, 5 May, 1783, P.A.N.S. Vol. 212.
 2. Parr to Capt. Henry, 22 August, 1783, Letter Book of Governor Parr and Secretary Bulkeley, 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 3. Digby to Stephens, 25 January, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.

of the kingdom, until they had been approved in England.⁽¹⁾ In addition, separate orders concerning trade directed him to acquire a thorough knowledge of the Laws for Trade and Navigation and, at risk of serious consequences, to do his utmost to enforce them.⁽²⁾ The obvious purpose of these instructions was to make it clear that trade and commerce with America was to be controlled by London and that few exceptions were to be made or tolerated. But while these instructions were being prepared and dispatched, a major crisis had been precipitated in Halifax by the arrival of the new Commander-in-Chief, Commodore Sir Charles Douglas, Bart.

To Douglas, a die-hard mercantilist, a rigid trade policy vis à vis the United States was both desirable and feasible. On his arrival in Halifax, however, he found a situation in which he considered that the imperial trade policies were being openly evaded. Shortly before his arrival, the captain of one of his ships, H.M.S. Mercury, had been directed by the Governor, because of local complaints, to cease stopping vessels entering and leaving Shelburne.⁽³⁾ Soon afterwards, the Governor and Council added lumber to the list of articles that could be admitted from the United States.⁽⁴⁾ Later, Douglas reported to his superiors that, notwithstanding the latest Order-in-Council of June 18th, 1784, which still restricted American commerce to the West Indies only, a vessel carrying provisions had recently arrived in Halifax from Philadelphia. To add insult to injury, the provisions in question were said to be for the

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1. Instructions to Governor Parr as Governor-in-Chief and Captain-General, 1784, C.O. 217/35.
 2. King George to Parr, 11 September, 1784, C.O. 217/35, p. 115.
 3. Bulkeley to Capt Stanhope, 5 May, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 4. Minutes of H.M. Council, 4 June, 1784, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213.

use of the ships under Douglas' command. ⁽¹⁾

Since the Acts of Navigation had never been suspended, Douglas regarded such an importation from a foreign country as blatantly illegal. He was therefore "under great difficulty and distress of mind..." and longed "with painful anxiety to have a proper Line of Conduct, traced out ... as to the weighty matter in question ..."⁽²⁾

Exacerbating his distress was the knowledge that some of his ships were abroad in the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of St. Lawrence with orders to enforce the Laws by preventing intercourse between the United States and British North America.⁽³⁾

Meanwhile, the Governor's ambivalent policy continued, for, shortly after curtailing Mercury's inspection activities at Shelburne, he directed the Chief Customs Collector at Halifax, Henry Newton, to adhere strictly to the Council's list of permissible imports of the previous May.⁽⁴⁾

Despite this injunction, illegal goods continued to be landed at Halifax, and American ships called at the port, although Douglas refused to allow them to hoist their colours, and the newspaper was allegedly forbidden to announce their arrivals.⁽⁵⁾

The dispute in Halifax over the enforcement of the Navigation Laws continued to arouse great emotions on both sides. In September, Parr was presented with two memorials from leading merchants and inhabitants of Halifax; one urging that no vessels with cargos from the United States be

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1. Douglas to Stephens, 19 September, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 2. Ibid.
 3. An example of the orders issued to ships at this time is contained in Douglas to Capt. Stone, H.M.S. Hermione, 19 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 4. Bulkeley to Newton, 11 May, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. 136.
 5. From an extract of a letter dated at Halifax, 15 June, 1784, Miscellaneous Papers, C.O. 217/56, p. 504.

allowed to enter any of the ports in the province,⁽¹⁾ and the other setting forth the great detriments that would arise to the fishing, agricultural and lumber trade of the province if vessels with provisions and lumber from the United States were restricted from entry.⁽²⁾ Threatened with food shortages and high prices, the Governor opted in favour of continuing to allow the imports,⁽³⁾ and sent Douglas into further paroxysms of anguish.

Informed by the agent responsible for the contracts for the ships' provisions that these provisions would come from the United States, Douglas reiterated both his request and his "longing with painful anxiety" for a proper line of conduct.⁽⁴⁾ In Douglas's view, "the operation of the Celebrated Act ... has never since His Majesty's late Dominions in America became Foreign States, been Legally suspended, in whole or in part, with regard to this His Colony of Nova Scotia."⁽⁵⁾ He was "impatient then beyond expression to have the Line of Conduct in question traced out ... to remove ... painful doubts and difficulties."⁽⁶⁾

Douglas did not remain content, however, with this role of a highly confused executor of a highly confused and contradictory policy. By November, 1784, he was attempting to influence and re-construct that policy. Although recognizing that the importation of American provisions in emergencies may have been justifiable, he condemned what he observed to be the extension of the privilege to cover the simultaneous introduction of foreign spirits, dry goods and whale oil. To avoid similar abuses of the sacrosanct Laws and

1. Minutes of H.M. Council, 16 September, 1784, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213.
2. Ibid., 22 September, 1784.
3. Parr to Sydney, 29 September, 1784, Governor's Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 47.
4. Douglas to Stephens, 6 October, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

prevent them becoming a mockery, Douglas went so far as to suggest that, for a limited time, they be suspended.⁽¹⁾ The merchants of Halifax would at least know then who their competitors were, and would be relieved from the present situation in which they had to contend unexpectedly with illegal shiploads of lower-priced American commodities.

The final salvo in Douglas' battle to obtain firm directions from Admiralty was fired in December when he forwarded a copy of Governor Thomas Carleton's Proclamation on the subject.⁽²⁾ This document unambiguously spelled out the intention of the New Brunswick Government to prevent any form of commercial intercourse whatever with the United States. This resolve, contrasted with the vacillating policy in Nova Scotia, was offered as part explanation for Douglas' confusion. Despite his lack of guidance he was determined to force on in the traditional naval fashion.

At all events, nothing in the meantime on my part, shall be wanting in stationing the Ships as early in the Spring as with propriety may be; in such manner as shall appear to be best for His Majesty's Service: and Acting with prudence in a situation, so Critical to the best of my humble Understanding.⁽³⁾

The only rebuttal offered against Douglas' insistence upon enforcing the Navigation Acts was a simple and powerful one: the expediency of providing food for a population that in 1784 was unable to feed itself. In the Governor's opinion, if American provisions had not been imported, many

1. Douglas to Stephens, 2 November, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.

2. Douglas to Stephens, 24 November, 1784, ibid.

3. Douglas to Stephens, - December, 1784, ibid.

people in the province would have starved.⁽¹⁾ The administration at Halifax was short-staffed and busy in the period of post-war re-adjustment and unprecedented immigration of Loyalists and disbanded soldiers, and it is not remarkable that there was confusion over commercial policy or that some abuses or negligence occurred. It is remarkable, however, in view of Douglas' intransigence, that, except for H.M.S. Mercury at Shelburne, there is no evidence of any conflict between naval ships and the merchant vessels carrying American supplies to Nova Scotian or Canadian ports. Either Douglas' sentiments were not known or shared by his captains, or, because of the size of the sea areas involved, few encounters took place. During the summer of 1784, there were actually only three or four ships on the station between Quebec and Passamaquoddy Bay that were capable of intercepting American commerce and none of these were on station continuously.⁽²⁾

By the spring of 1785 there were signs that a more coherent and practicable trade policy was evolving for Halifax. In early April, the Governor considered that there was then enough lumber in the province for building and all other uses, and directed that in future no more was to be imported from the United States.⁽³⁾ Later that month the Governor and Council resolved to stop allowing American vessels to enter Nova Scotia ports.⁽⁴⁾ In June, Lieutenant-Governor des Barres of Cape Breton Island requested the new naval Commander-in-Chief at Halifax, Commodore Herbert Sawyer, to provide a vessel for the "protection of commerce ... and to

1. Parr to Nepean, 2 January, 1785, C.O. 217/57.
2. See Appendix VIII.
3. Bulkeley to Newton, 4 April, 1785, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137.
4. Bulkeley to Newton, 14 April, 1785, ibid.

enforce the due Observance of the Acts of Navigation and Trade.⁽¹⁾ By these actions it was made clear that authorities in Nova Scotia intended to exert an effort to avoid unnecessary abuse of the Laws. In England, meanwhile, an Order-in-Council of April 8th made the Nova Scotia Government's policy legal by providing for the importation in emergencies of certain provisions and goods e.g. flour, wheat, rice, indian corn, rye indian meal and white oak staves.

The next step towards a commercial policy between Nova Scotia and the United States that the Navy could enforce took place the following spring, when it was announced by Admiralty that the Commissioners of Customs in London would be sending out instructions and extracts of pertinent acts to ships' captains along with deputations authorizing them to act in preventing commercial infractions.⁽²⁾ At the same time an imperial Order-in-Council of March 24th, 1786, further extended the list of items that could be imported from the United States.⁽³⁾ When these directives arrived in Halifax, bonds of surety were issued to the naval captains.⁽⁴⁾ Armed with these missives, the ships of the Squadron were then able to proceed to

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1. Des Barresto Sawyer, 29 June, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 5 June, 1786, ibid.
 3. The new list included horses, neat (i.e. bovine or ox-like) cattle, sheep, hogs, poultry and all other species of livestock and live provisions, peas, beans, potatoes, wheat, flour, bread, biscuit, rice, oats, barley and other species of grain, and lumber of every sort. A proclamation was ordered published signifying that the Governor-in-Council approved the entry of all of these items into Nova Scotia. Minutes of H.M. Council, 23 June, 1786, P.A.N.S. 213. A copy of the actual proclamation is contained in Royal Proclamations 1748-1807, 23 June, 1786, P.A.N.S. 346, pp. 106 and 107.
 4. Captains Paul Minchin, Samuel Hood, and Edward Buller of H.M. Ships Resource, Weazel and Brisk respectively. Order Book, Copies of Proclamations, Orders, Pardons and other miscellaneous Documents 1768-1792, 12 July, 1786, P.A.N.S. Vol. 170.

their cruising stations in a substantially stronger legal position. Formerly, the captains had had to choose between the instructions of an uncompromising Commander-in-Chief, and the confusing permissiveness of a Governor-in-Council. Now they at least had the semblance of an official policy that had been widely promulgated by the Secretary of State, Admiralty, and the Customs Office to their provincial counterparts.

From this point Britain's enforcement of the Navigation Laws became much less doctrinaire. As it became more and more apparent that the British North American provinces were not going to be able to meet their own needs, let alone those of the British West Indies,⁽¹⁾ the Imperial Government became more and more amenable to letting the local governors decide when articles should be allowed into their provinces. Control continued to be exercised in London by limiting the types of items that could be allowed to be imported. By restricting these to provisions and goods that British merchants were generally unable to supply, and by maintaining the regulations that only British vessels and British seamen could participate in the carrying trade, the main purposes of the Navigation Laws continued to be served.⁽²⁾ Subject to this control, by mid-1786 the Governor-in-Council at Halifax was following closely in the footsteps of London by issuing frequent Orders-in-Council to amend

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1. See Gerald S. Graham, British Policy and Canada, pp. 74-76, for a discussion of the reasons for this failure.
 2. In the opinion of John Adams "the Same System continues and is fortified with fresh Provisions!" Adams to Jay, 19 April, 1787, in W.R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. 356. A major factor in the maintenance of the form, if not always the substance of the mercantilist principles of the Navigation Laws, was the firm stand taken by the Board of Trade. This body had been re-constituted in 1784 and had reviewed British trade policy in the mid-1780s.

the list of articles approved for import.⁽¹⁾

The foregoing policy was enunciated more formally in May, 1788, by the Parliamentary "Act for Regulating the Trade between His Majesty's colonies and plantations in North America and in the West Indies and the countries belonging to the United States of America ..." By this Act colonial governments were authorized to permit the importation of staves, planks, scantling, heading boards, shingles, hoops, squared timber of any sort, horses, neat cattle, sheep, hogs, poultry or livestock of any sort, bread biscuit, flour, peas, beans, potatoes, wheat, rice, oats, barley, and grains of any sort. In Halifax, the Governor-in-Council responded with a Proclamation permitting the entry of several of these items into the province for a period of six months. Again, permission was renewed regularly,⁽²⁾ and in May, 1789, as a result of a memorial from the principal merchants and inhabitants of Halifax, the Governor-in-Council unanimously approved the importation of the entire list. This approval, which was also renewed regularly,⁽³⁾ effectively stabilized the trade policy with the United States.

For Douglas' successors at Halifax, the above developments towards a more well-defined trade policy somewhat simplified the task of enforcing

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1. Royal Proclamations 1748-1807, 23 June, 1786; 5 April, 1787; 18 May, 1787; and 15 May, 1788; P.A.N.S. Vol. 346, pp. 106, 110, 112, 114 and 116.
 2. Renewal proclamations were issued 3 November, 1788, and 5 May, 1789. Royal Proclamations, P.A.N.S. Vol. 346, pp. 118 and 122.
 3. Renewals are recorded in H.M. Council Minutes, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213, on the dates and pages indicated: 12 November, 1789 (page 161), 8 November, 1790 (193), 24 October, 1791 (200), 18 January, 1792 (206), 2 August, 1792 (230), and 17 December, 1792 (242).

the Navigation Laws. This improved situation, coupled with the complete return to peace-time conditions, made it possible to evolve an operational pattern of employment for the ships on the Station. With occasional exceptions, ships wintered in ports such as Halifax, Passamaquoddy, the lower St. John River, the Annapolis Basin and Shelburne. In these ports they provided a military force if required for the support of the local settlements, and helped to discourage possible breaches of the Navigation Laws. When safe navigation opened in the spring, the ships proceeded back to Halifax to be surveyed and have any defects made good by the Dockyard. In the summer and fall the ships cruised on sea stations in the Bay of Fundy, on the Eastern Shore, along the coasts of Cape Breton Island, the Island of St. John (in 1799 Prince Edward Island), and the Caspé, and in the St. Lawrence as far as Quebec.⁽¹⁾ Although the purpose of these cruises varied, one of the major tasks was the enforcement of the Navigation Laws.

An important requirement of these Laws was that trade be confined to ships of British registry. In British North America this frequently proved difficult to enforce. Complaints of American vessels obtaining false British registrations in the West Indies and at Halifax⁽²⁾ began soon after the end of the war, and Parr was ordered to ensure that the

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1. A highlight of the decade was the Squadron cruise to Quebec in the summer of 1767. Participating units included H.M. Ships Leander (with Cmdre. Sawyer embarked along with his wife, two daughters and a lady friend of theirs), Pegasus, Thisbe, Resource and Weazel. The cruise was marred by the groundings of Thisbe and Leander, the latter so badly that it had to be towed into Halifax when the fleet returned. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers Vol. 1, p. 106; and William Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Volume 1, edited by R.W. Jeffrey, London, 1907, p. 34.
 2. Letter dated 15 June, 1784, at Halifax, C.O. 217/56, p. 504.

abuses at Halifax were stopped immediately.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, to help avoid confusion in the matter, the Council at Halifax in October, 1784, had "resolved that all Vessels being the property of His Majesty's Loyal Subjects taking refuge in this province and by them brought into at the time of their coming shall be entitled to registers and none other American bottoms whatsoever."⁽²⁾ By April, 1785, Parr was able to report that he had already turned down several applications by American ship-owners for British registration, and that a vessel was being held in Vice-Admiralty Court libelled with a charge of false registry.⁽³⁾ Henry Newton, Collector of Customs at Halifax, in turn informed Whitehall that two vessels had been libelled and forfeited and that further steps were being taken to solve the problem.⁽⁴⁾

But making proclamations and writing letters denouncing the illegal practices of petty and ill-paid officials did not succeed in eliminating the fraudulent registries. Complaints continued to find their way back to England where the Secretary of State urged ever more vigilant measures on the Governor⁽⁵⁾ who, in reply, promised strict compliance.⁽⁶⁾ Evidence that the Nova Scotia Government was sincere in its efforts to eliminate the fraud was Parr's refusal to approve several Registry Certific-

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1. Sydney to Parr, 8 January, 1785, Board of Trade Despatches 1784-99, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 2. H.M. Council Minutes, 1 October, 1784, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213, p. 40.
 3. Parr to Sydney, 29 April, 1785, Governor's Despatches 1783-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 47. In Admiralty Law to "libel" was to charge or accuse.
 4. Newton to Sydney, 25 July, 1785, C.O. 217/57.
 5. Sydney to Parr, 20 September, 1787, C.O. 217/60.
 6. Parr to Sydney, 11 November, 1787, ibid.

atos from the Customs Collector at Shelburne until they had been completed precisely in the manner prescribed by Parliament.⁽¹⁾ More practical, was the suggestion of Lord Dorchester that the Collectors or Comptrollers of Customs at Halifax, St. John's and Quebec exchange abstracts of the certificates they had approved so that suspect registries could be verified.⁽²⁾

For the Navy, however, the problem of illegal registries was not one in which much assistance could be rendered. The landing of goods normally took place in the major ports of the provinces where it was under the supervision of the Naval Officer⁽³⁾ and the Collector of Customs. Unless either of these officials detected a fraud and needed naval assistance, the Navy's role was usually only the passive one of maintaining an inhibiting presence. On the other hand, the stopping of merchant vessels on the high seas to scrutinize Certificates of Registry would have caused an international crisis that Britain was not then prepared to risk.

A more flagrant method of circumventing the Navigation Laws than fraudulent registries was the practice of smuggling. Within the confines of major ports, detecting and preventing smuggling were normally func-

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1. Bulkeley to James Bruce, 4 December, 1787, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137.
 2. Enclosed in letter from Hughes to Stephens, - May, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 3. (a) A civilian political appointee of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Naval Officer normally resided at the same ports as the Customs Collector and was responsible for clearing vessels in and out of the port. His office and fees were the causes of investigations and complaints at Halifax in 1790 & 1792.
(b) The civilian Naval Storekeeper in the Halifax Dockyard also held the Admiralty post of Naval Officer. See Duncan to Thomas, 29 September, 1788, HAL/F/1, for an example of this form of address; and Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 20 fn.

tions that were carried out by the port Customs officials. In the outports, and in the uninhabited bays and inlets with which the Station abounded, the task fell to the Royal Navy. Anti-smuggling patrols, therefore, were a major activity for naval units, especially for the smaller vessels such as sloops and schooners. Patrol areas were selected to coincide with likely landing points for contraband⁽¹⁾ and specific cruising instructions issued prescribing the action to be taken. Despite these measures, large-scale smuggling flourished. "Official returns show that articles to the value of £34,762 2s. 6d. were exported to Nova Scotia from Massachusetts alone in the year 1787, and of that amount, deducting the value of goods that could lawfully be admitted under the governor's proclamation, £16,471 10s. 7d. represented contraband."⁽²⁾ Efforts to halt this traffic continued by authorities both in Britain and in Nova Scotia, but the impression is left that neither government was convinced that all smuggling could, or should, be eliminated. To many Nova Scotians, smuggling and its products provided the necessities of life, and no government was able or willing to put forth the huge efforts needed to stop it.

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1. Liverpool, for example, was visited by H.M. Ships and Tenders a total of 13 times between September, 1784, and April, 1793. Eleven of these visits, which varied in length from one day to nearly a month, occurred between April, 1787, and December, 1790, the period when seizures by H.M. Ships were most frequent. See Samuel Perkins, The Diary of Samuel Perkins 1780-89, edited by D.C. Harvey, The Champlain Society, Toronto, 1958, pp. 243, 365, 377, 424, 442, and 495; and The Diary of Samuel Perkins 1790-96, edited by C.E. Fergusson, Toronto, 1961, pp. 21, 28, 30, 57, 67, 71 and 90.
 2. Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America, p. 155.

The commonest and probably easiest item for smuggling into British North America was rum. This staple, because of the prevailing tariff structure and regulations, could be produced in the United States from West Indian molasses and smuggled into the British provinces at lower prices than that shipped direct from the West Indies, or produced in Canada or Nova Scotia from imported molasses.⁽¹⁾ So widespread was the smuggling that London urged diligence by all Government officers and the utmost rigour against offenders.⁽²⁾ Owing to the scope of the problem and the multiplicity of techniques used, however, the Navy with its limited number of ships could make no more than a token effort.⁽³⁾ Vessels were seized and condemned,⁽⁴⁾ but scores went about their illicit business undetected and undeterred.

Despite the relaxations in trade policy in the British provinces during the period, the amount of contraband activity remained high. Liverpool was singled out especially as a leading centre of the trade; "the people there seem to bid defiance to all Order, Laws or Justice."⁽⁵⁾ To make the Navy more effective at anti-smuggling operations in shallow and

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1. Sydney to Parr, 8 November, 1787, Board of Trade Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 2. Ibid. The Collector of Customs at Halifax, however, denied that very much rum had been smuggled into Nova Scotia for the past several years. In support, he gave figures to show that rum imports from the British West Indies nearly doubled in 1787 from the 8660 gals. that had been imported in 1786. Newton to Parr, 26 January, 1788, C.O. 217/60.
 3. Parr considered that it would continue to be smuggled into the Bay of Fundy area "until proper Vessels and a Sufficient number of Officers can be provided." Parr to Sydney, 2 September, 1787, ibid.
 4. Infra, p. 57.
 5. Hughes to Stephens, 10 October, 1789, Adm. 1, Vol. 492. Liverpool was not unaware of its reputation; its leading diarist commented on January 19th, 1790, that "... it Seems the Current is against us in Halifax" Simeon Perkins, The Diary of Simeon Perkins 1790-96, p. 7.

confined waters, the Commander-in-Chief recommended that three or four shallow-draught vessels be purchased for use on the Station.⁽¹⁾ The procurement of three schooners was subsequently arranged,⁽²⁾ and within a year, the vessels were serving in the Squadron.⁽³⁾ In 1792, one of them was employed to stop smuggling activities at Shelburne, another of the North American ports where trade was not always conducted in strict accord with current regulations.⁽⁴⁾

The final type of operation that arose from the Navigation Laws and in which naval forces based at Halifax participated, was the protection of the coal deposits on Cape Breton Island. These well-known deposits were valued as fuel, particularly by fishermen who preferred coal's low-bulk, high-yield qualities over wood for heating their cold, damp vessels. In May, 1784, Parr was directed to give orders that persons sent by the Governor of Newfoundland be allowed to dig and remove the Cape Breton coal.⁽⁵⁾ Two months later, Douglas, having been informed that foreigners were taking away coal from the Spanish River area (Sydney), ordered H.M.S. Resource there to prevent further removals.⁽⁶⁾ A French

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1. Hughes to Stephens, 20 January, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 2. Hughes to Stephens, 18 July, 1790, ibid.
 3. H.M. Ships Diligent, Chatham, and Alert, approx. 90 tons, each with 4 three-pounders and 4 swivel guns. On the outbreak of war in 1793 they were declared unsatisfactory for war service by both the C-in-C and the Commissioner of the Dockyard because of their inability to sail quickly or act offensively. George to Stephens, 25 April, 1793, ibid.
 4. Wentworth to Dundas, 27 June, 1792, Governor's Despatches 1789-94, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48.
 5. Sydney to Parr, 28 May, 1784, C.O. 217/56; and Eulkeley to Chief Magistrate of Cape Breton Island, 1 September, 1784, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 6. Douglas to Capt. Paul Minchin, 31 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.

naval vessel's request at Halifax, at about the same time, for permission to have coal conveyed from Cape Breton to St. Pierre and Miquelon was construed by Douglas as being counter to the Navigation Laws, and was therefore refused. Douglas' decision was subsequently firmly supported by London. Not only French and American subjects were prohibited from removing Cape Breton coal but unauthorized British as well. (1)

Later in the same year Douglas, hearing that residents of St. Pierre and Miquelon were taking advantage of the lateness of the season to remove coal, dispatched H.M.S. Hermione to the scene. (2) To ensure the official policy was fully understood, orders were circulated to all Commanding Officers that only persons with special permission were to be allowed to dig and remove coal. (3) Subsequently, the area became a routine check point for ships cruising on Cape Breton patrols.

Of no less importance to the Halifax-based naval forces of the period 1783-1793 than the Navigation Laws, were the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1763 that concerned American use of the British North American fisheries. Article 3 of this Treaty established that the United States should

continue to enjoy unmolested, the right to take Fish of Every kind on the Grand Banks and on all other Banks of Newfoundland: also in the Gulph of St Lawrence, and at all other places in the Sea: where the Inhabitants of both Countries used at anytime heretofore to Fish: and also that the Inhabitants of the United States, shall have liberty to take Fish of every kind, on such part of

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1. Admiralty to Douglas, 1 October, 1784, ibid.
 2. Douglas to Stephens, 24 November, 1784, ibid.
 3. Douglas to Commanding Officers, 1 April, 1785, ibid.

the Coast of Newfoundland, as British Fishermen shall use: (but not to dry or Cure the same on that Island) and also on the Coasts, Bays, and Creeks of all other of his Britannick Majesty's Dominions in America: and that the American Fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure Fish in any of the unsettled Bays, Harbours & Creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalene Islands, and Labradore, so long as the same shall remain unsettled: but as soon as the same, or either of them shall be settled it shall not be lawful for the said Fishermen to dry or cure Fish, at such Settlement, without a previous Agreement for that purpose with the Inhabitants, Proprietors or Possessors of the Ground.(1)

The contest that developed over this Article continued for many years. For the Americans it was a matter of asserting and maintaining their rights; for the British, particularly the Atlantic provinces, it was a matter of ensuring that the rights or liberties were not abused. Most of the latter task fell to the ships of the Royal Navy.

The protection of the fisheries became a major objective almost as soon as Douglas arrived at Halifax. H.M.S. Hermione was sailed for Quebec and her captain instructed to confer with Governor Haldimand on the best methods of employing naval ships in protecting British subjects who were fishing in the Lower St. Lawrence and around the Gaspé and Bay of Chaleur. En route back the ship was ordered to gather information and encourage British fishermen in the Northumberland Strait, Island of St. John, St. George's Bay and Canoe areas.(2) Two days after these orders were issued, Parr requested naval assistance in displacing some American

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1. Douglas' Standing Orders, 1784, ibid., p. 115. French fishing rights in North America were defined in 1763 by the Treaty of Versailles and in most respects remained unchanged from those of the Treaty of Paris of 1763. Within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, French fishing vessels were prohibited from approaching closer than three leagues to continental or island coasts and fifteen leagues to the seaboard coasts of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island. The major change from 1763 was the shifting of the French Shore of Newfoundland to the West side, i.e. from Cape St. John to Cape Ray.
 2. Douglas to Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Hermione, 19 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.

fishermen who had erected buildings and landed rum and molasses at a harbour that had been reserved for a new settlement. Accompanying this request was a list of the grievances against the Americans; they took bait and caused it to be scarce, they landed and sold fish illegally, they landed rum detrimentally to the King's revenue, and they cut and removed spars and wasted other timber for fuel. To prevent these infractions, warships were needed.⁽¹⁾

Douglas quickly responded by diverting H.M.S. Atalanta, which was about to sail on a cruise to Quebec, to proceed along the Eastern Shore, calling at Leaver Harbour, Country Harbour, and Canso Harbour, and to attempt to prevent any Americans from curing or drying fish without the permission of the residents.⁽²⁾ At the same time, H.M.S. Hermione was also diverted from her direct passage to Quebec, and told to stop at the Bay of Gaspé en route to prevent Treaty infringements there.⁽³⁾ These orders were followed by the issue of Douglas' Standing Orders for protecting His Majesty's subjects employed in fishing. To prevent misunderstandings of rights and privileges these orders included excerpts of relevant sections of the Treaty of Paris.⁽⁴⁾

More explicit directions were still required as to what action was to be taken when infractions were actually discovered. Accordingly, H.M.S.

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1. Parr to Douglas, 21 July, 1784, Parr/Eulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 2. Douglas to C.O. H.M.S. Atalanta, 22 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 3. Douglas to C.O. H.M.S. Hermione, 21 July, 1784, ibid. Hermione was successful in removing Americans from the Island of Bonavista on this trip. Douglas to Respective Captains, 1 April, 1785, ibid.
 4. "Standing Orders and Instructions to be observed by the Captains and Commanders of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels under the Command of Commodore Sir Charles Douglas, Bart.," 1784, ibid., p. 115/59.

Hermione was told that Americans were to be made to desist from landing fish to be cured or dried, and to be warned that their action was contrary to the Treaty of 1783. Diplomacy was to be served by allowing the offenders to remove any fish that had already been cured and dried.⁽¹⁾

During the winter of 1784-85 new plans based on the experience of 1784 were formulated for protecting the fisheries. Since sloops were very useful vessels for fisheries work, Douglas urged that H.M.S. Bonetta return to Halifax after her re-fit in England.⁽²⁾ It was also recommended that galleys, which were not suitable, be taken out of service and replaced by schooners which "might be very usefully employed, more especially during the whole of the Fishing Season."⁽³⁾ Plans for fleet employment called for Hermione to enforce the observance of the Treaty in the Bay of Chaleur, Gaspé and Lower St. Lawrence "for the protection of both the Cod and Whale fisheries of H.M. Subjects in those parts." Mercury was to cruise southeast of Cape Breton Island, along the North Shore of New Brunswick, and around the Island of St. John, while Resource carried out similar patrols from Canso to the south and east coasts of Cape Breton as far as Cape North, looking into Louisbourg and Spanish River, but mainly Canso "where a very great fishing is carried on."⁽⁴⁾ It was also arranged for H.M. Armed Tender Mackerel to be placed at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor of Lower Quebec to visit fishing settlements there until September 30th, 1785.⁽⁵⁾

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1. Douglas to C.O. H.M.S. Hermione, 2 August, 1784, ibid.
 2. Douglas to Stephens, 1 October, 1784, ibid.
 3. Douglas to Stephens, 24 October, 1784, ibid.
 4. Douglas to Stephens, - December, 1784, ibid., p. 165.
 5. Douglas to C.O. Mackerel, 19 June, 1785, ibid. The lieutenant-governor referred to was probably the one at Gaspé.

Before sailing on these patrols all vessels were supplied with revised sets of Standing Orders. These orders referred to the illegal activities of the summer of 1784 and directed captains to prevent Americans processing fish in prohibited areas, but, when the Americans were apprehended, to allow them to remove from shore any fish, oil, salt, provisions and utensils that they had landed. Captains were further instructed to ensure that they and their men behaved with all proper civility. When infractions were discovered, the names of the vessel, masters, and home ports were to be recorded. To dispel possible doubts, American rights in New Brunswick, the Magdalens, Labrador and Nova Scotia, were clearly differentiated from those in Cape Breton Island, the Island of St. John, the Gaspé and Quebec, i.e. in the former, the Americans could land in unsettled areas, and in settled areas with the permission of the inhabitants, whereas in the latter, they had no rights of landing whatsoever.⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, reports of whaler operations ashore, particularly in the St. Lawrence area, had been received in Halifax along with complaints of the amounts of fuel being used in the boiling down process. An additional instruction therefore had to be issued forbidding all activities of this kind everywhere in the command. Whalers found engaged ashore were to be made to withdraw and take all their blubber and gear with them.⁽²⁾

Despite the patrols by naval ships, American fishermen continued to disregard the Treaty regulations. The Lower St. Lawrence area was particularly attractive and it was charged that American activities there

1. Douglas to Respective Captains, 1 April, 1785, ibid.; and Douglas to C.O.s of Ships and Vessels of the Command, 1 May, 1785, ibid.

2. Douglas to Commanding Officers, 1 May, 1785, ibid., a different letter from the above.

were greatly injuring those of the Canadians. A memorial, supported by affidavits, was presented to the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec recommending the Navy increase its patrols by adding one or two shallow-draught schooners to serve in the area during the summers.⁽¹⁾ Commodore Sawyer, the new Commander-in-Chief, in forwarding this to Admiralty noted that, since he had insufficient ships, two additional 4-gun schooners of about 100 tons each would be required.⁽²⁾ These vessels were not supplied, however, and he had to try to manage with those he had.

The following summer, while cruising in the St. Lawrence, H.M.S. Thisbe, Captain Coffin, discovered two schooners from Cape Cod conducting a whale fishery off the Isle of Bic. Judging that the 3rd Article of the 1783 Treaty excluded American fishing from the region, Coffin took the vessels into custody. The Collector of Customs at Quebec referred the matter to the Attorney-General of the province who ruled that the whalers had not, in fact, been violating the Treaty. Lord Dorchester, however, asked his Council for an opinion; they, disagreeing with the Attorney-General, suggested His Majesty's Government make a ruling. In the meantime, observing that the Attorney-General was also the Judge of the Quebec Vice-Admiralty Court, Coffin arranged for the vessels to be released from custody and instructed to leave the river and not return.

At this time Sawyer was also in Quebec and, when he received Coffin's report of the case, sent it to London for an Admiralty opinion on whether or not vessels from the United States had the right to fish in the St.

1. Enclosed in Sawyer to Stephens, 10 October, 1785, ibid.

2. Ibid.

Lawronce.⁽¹⁾ Admiralty, in view of the implications of the case, forwarded it to Lord Sydney to obtain the King's pleasure on it.⁽²⁾ If an answer to Sawyer's question was made by London, it has not been uncovered. It is possible, therefore, that the problem remained unclarified until the fisheries convention of 1818 whereby the Americans were unambiguously excluded from the River.

The other major problem area for fisheries protection was at Canso and Chedabucto Bay. Here, the Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries, George Leonard, found that American fishermen were using their privileges of processing fish ashore to cover the landing and sale of produce and manufactures. He therefore ordered them to leave the area immediately, unless in distress, and thus created a situation that threatened an international dispute.⁽³⁾ The Governor-in-Council at Halifax, unable to support Leonard's action as in conformity with the 1783 Treaty, referred it to London.⁽⁴⁾ Pending the investigation, Leonard left Canso without leave and returned to London. Eventually, however, he was cleared of any fault except over-zealousness and re-instated. His new instructions detailed his duties and obligations in connection with the Treaty of 1783 but also stipulated that no commerce was to be allowed between British and American subjects.⁽⁵⁾ At the same time Parr was advised of Leonard's re-in-

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1. Sawyer to Stephens, 10 August, 1787, ibid.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 6 February, 1788, ibid.
 3. Parr to Sydney, 11 September, 1787, C.O. 217/60.
 4. H.M. Council Minutes, 21 July, 1787, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213, p. 126; and Parr to Sydney, 4 July, 1787, Governor's Despatches 1783-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 47.
 5. Sydney to Leonard, 12 August, 1788, C.O. 217/60.

statement,⁽¹⁾ and told to have the Chief Justice and Attorney-General inquire into possible negligence by the Revenue Officers.⁽²⁾ Thus, the bureaucracy completed its full circle and left the situation virtually unchanged. Leonard was still in office, there were still insufficient navy vessels at Canso to prevent illegal fishing and smuggling, the diligence of the Revenue Officers in the area was questionable, and the American rights were fully restored and recognized.

In the preceding pages, although the background, organization and general pattern of naval operations for enforcing the Navigation Laws and protecting the fisheries have been described in detail, little mention has been made of how this enforcement and protection were actually carried out by the ships themselves. In war-time, the techniques used were the basic ones of shot and shell, but in the peace-time period of 1783-1793, less violent means were required. Ships on patrol in inshore waters were therefore constrained to boarding and searching suspected vessels, and then, if they found evidence of breaches in the regulations, taking them into custody. Vessels trying to escape were pursued,⁽³⁾ and shots fired across the bows to eliminate any misunderstanding about what was expected.⁽⁴⁾ In most cases, however, the vessels were apprehended at

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1. Parr was probably less than pleased with this news. He had written of Leonard that "... it is that Gentleman's natural genius to live in hot Water." Parr to Nepean, 5 May, 1788, *ibid*.
 2. Sydney to Parr, 12 August, 1788, Board of Trade Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 3. Captain Paul Minchin, H.M.S. Resource, vs. Schooner Nancy, August, 1788, Vice-Admiralty Court Register Number 7, P.A.N.S. Vol. 497; and Vice-Admiralty Court Records, P.A.N.S.
 4. Captain Edward Buller, H.M.S. Brisk, vs. Schooner Swallow, June, 1789, *ibid*.

anchor or alongside in port and the boarding party's task was quite simple.⁽¹⁾

When the boarding officer had determined that the registry of the vessel was not in order, or that it was carrying contraband, or engaged in illegal fishing activities, the vessel was libelled and seized. The incentives for captains to make these seizures were glory and prize-money. At a time when the Royal Navy was regarded by many in North America as an impediment to a natural and lucrative commerce, rather than as the guardian of British sovereignty, glory was rarely achieved. On the other hand, prize-money was a more palpable attraction, although by war-time standards the values of the shares were always small.⁽²⁾

After the vessel was seized it was then sailed to the nearest major port to be held pending the decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax. Normally the naval case was presented by Sampson S. Blowers, the attorney-general, but on at least one occasion, the naval captain prosecuted his own case.⁽³⁾ The excuses of the libelled vessels were predictable. One master claimed that the canvas, cordage and other naval

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1. See Appendix XI for a summary of Vice-Admiralty Court cases at Halifax 1789-93.
 2. The highest value assessed at Halifax between 1789 and 1793 for a forfeited vessel and cargo was £301. Of this, Court fees amounted to more than £20. The remainder was then halved between the ship making the seizure and the Crown. Capt. S. Hood, H.M.S. Thisbe, vs. Schooner Eagle, April, 1789, Vice-Admiralty Court Records, P.A.N.S. The ship's share was then divided into eighths; the C-in-C received 1/8, the Captain 2/8, the Captain of Marines, Lieutenants, Master and Physician equal shares in 1/8, lieutenants of Marine, Secretary to the Admiral, Principal Warrant Officers equal shares in 1/8, Midshipmen, Inferior Warrant Officers and Marine Sergeants equal shares in 1/8, and the rest of ship's company equal shares in 2/8. Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 318.
 3. Captain Buller, H.M.S. Brisk, vs. Schooner Polly, September, 1789, Vice-Admiralty Court Records, P.A.N.S.

stores that he had aboard were only for repairs to the vessel itself.⁽¹⁾ A master who was apprehended in Halifax harbour with 900 pounds of American tobacco aboard, blamed a New York merchant who had told him that tobacco had recently been approved for import into Nova Scotia.⁽²⁾ One captain, whose vessel was seized at Lunenburg with a cargo of imports he had not cleared first at Halifax, won an acquittal by insisting that because of poor visibility he had mistaken the islands off the entrance to the harbour and actually had believed he was in Halifax.⁽³⁾ Finally, an American fishing vessel master claimed that, when he laid his vessel ashore at Crow Harbour to repair a leak, the people "were urgent with him to exchange his provisions and stores for fish ... which he consented to ..."⁽⁴⁾ Occasionally, when the violation was flagrant, no defense was presented to the Court at all.⁽⁵⁾

Between April, 1783, and December, 1792, there were 120 cases heard in the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax.⁽⁶⁾ A few of these were petitions for salvage rights or for settlements of disputes between members of a ship's company; most, however, were for seizures of vessels for trade violations. No naval ships were involved in these cases until May, 1787, by which time their captains had been issued bonds of surety and were thus authorized to make seizures. After this date, out of a total of 57

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1. Captain Charles Sawyer, H.M.S. Weazel, vs. Schooner Lucy, August, 1788, ibid.
 2. Captain Samuel Hood, H.M.S. Thisbe, vs. Schooner Ann, June, 1789, ibid.
 3. Captain Buller, H.M.S. Erisk, vs. Schooner Swallow, June, 1789, ibid.
 4. Captain Minchin, H.M.S. Resource, vs. Schooner Nancy, August, 1788, ibid.
 5. Captain Buller, H.M.S. Erisk, vs. Schooner Minx, June, 1787, ibid.
 6. Vice-Admiralty Court Register Number 7, P.A.N.S.

cases, there were 23 as a result of seizures by naval vessels. Most of the remaining seizures were made by the Collector of Customs at Halifax.

Of the 23 naval seizures, 21 were for trade violations and two for illegal fisheries activities. In ten of the trade cases the seized vessel and cargo were ordered forfeit, whereas in nine they were restored to their owners. In the remaining two cases, only the illegal parts of the cargo were forfeited while the vessel and remaining cargo were restored. Neither of the alleged fisheries infractions resulted in a conviction; in one of them, in fact, the captain of the naval vessel was unable to show cause and was therefore ordered to pay costs.⁽¹⁾

From this analysis it is clear that in six years there were only twelve successful prosecutions by ships of the Royal Navy against the British and foreign vessels who were violating the regulations for trade and fisheries. When related to the large numbers of inhabitants of the British provinces who were participating in trafficking during this period, these prosecutions could have been no more than a minor irritation. Certainly, the examples set by the prosecutions did little, if anything, to discourage the illegal intercourse, for it continued undiminished.⁽²⁾ In this respect, therefore, the operations of the Halifax Squadron that were designed to enforce the Navigation Laws and protect the fisheries must be considered a failure.

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1. Captain Buller, H.M.S. Brisk, vs. Schooner Tartar, May, 1790, Vice-Admiralty Court Records, P.A.N.S.
 2. The use of Admiralty Courts as instruments of colonial policy has been criticized as a perversion of their proper role of adjudicating purely nautical matters. L. H. Laing, "Nova Scotia's Admiralty Court as a Problem of Colonial Administration," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June, 1935, p. 160. Another authority, however, questions neither the need for, nor the propriety, of the Court's jurisdiction in trade matters. D.G.L. Fraser, "The Origin and Function of the Court of Vice-Admiralty in Halifax, 1749-59," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. 33, 1961, pp. 57-80.

Several factors combine to provide the explanation for this failure. The delay in establishing a clear-cut trade policy, coupled with the open door provided by the fisheries clause of 1783, gave those who wished to trade freely with the United States the opportunity to seize the initiative and establish contacts and markets. These trading elements thus gained a momentum that the small numbers of naval ships that were finally set loose in 1787 were unable to overcome. Parr recognized the futility of the situation in mid-1787:

... I wish to shut the Rascalls quite out of our Coast, but am afraid to get into a scrape, owing to that part of the Treaty which says they may fish with consent of the Inhabitants etc, that consent they will ever get in some parts of this extensive Coast, and to prevent Smuggling is impossible. (1)

Five years later the consequences of the dilemma had become clear:

I likewise take the liberty to inform you that the Trade and Fisheries of this province will suffer most materially for want of protection on the Sea Coasts, the reduction of the Squadron on the Station has left the whole shore open to the Americans who under the sanction of the Treaty of peace will in a short time put an end to that business being carried on by English Subjects. (2)

Another factor that undermined the naval effort was the trade policy itself. As it evolved, this policy, "dominated by a desire to frustrate American competition and complicated by a need for American provisions, naval stores and lumber," (3) was unrealistic and doomed to failure. In developing the policy, authorities in England were largely at the mercy of advisers with North American experience. Unfortunately, some of these,

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1. Parr to Nepean, 13 July, 1787, C.O. 217/60.
 2. ? to R. Cumberland, 20 September, 1792, Manuscript Documents, Province of Nova Scotia, House of Assembly 1788-1800, P.A.N.S. Vol. 302. Item 13.
 3. Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws, p. 403.

Carleton in particular,⁽¹⁾ were too optimistic about the abilities of the remaining British provinces to develop quickly and sustain themselves and the British West Indies. When the vision evaporated, the Navy found itself with inadequate forces trying to enforce regulations that were manifestly impracticable in the prevailing conditions.

Before concluding this discussion of naval operations, mention must be made of a problem of major and continuing concern to all ships and vessels on the Station, that of navigational hazards. Each aspect of this problem, viewed from to-day's standards, was more than formidable. Treacherous winds, ice, vicious Fundy tides, primitive navigational equipment, frequent fogs, infrequent lighthouses and buoys, and rocks that looked like whales,⁽²⁾ all made the career of the master or navigator a risky one. Compounding the difficulties were the lack of reliable charts and the need for the ships to patrol close inshore to apprehend smugglers.

In such circumstances, accidents at sea were not uncommon. The worst was the loss of the new schooner H.M.S. Alert after a grounding on an uncharted shoal off Tryon River, on the Island of St. John, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from shore. The vessel was subsequently hauled off but it was too late.

The Officers People and Stores (the Masts excepted) are all saved and we should certainly have been able to have got the Schooner into the Adjacent River and saved her Hull, if a Violent Squall and Afterwards a Continued Strong Gale of Wind had not broke away all the casks we had lashed

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1. Gerald S. Graham, British Policy and Canada 1774-1791, London, 1930, p. 70.
 2. On a passage in the Canso area a pilot steered very close to an object he identified as a whale. An army officer aboard, however, reported that it was, in fact, a rock. Lieut. W. Booth "Journal on a Tour with General Campbell in July and August, 1785," Public Archives of Nova Scotia Progress Report, Halifax, 1932, p. 42.

to float her and drove off the Boats and the Chatham Schooner, which had been three Days employed in Clearing and Endeavouring to get the Alert off. (1)

No one in the crew was adjudged to be in the least blameable and the loss was attributed to "the Want of a Proper Pilot, who certainly would have Known the Danger and saved the Schooner by avoiding it." (2)

Other serious accidents, and ones which usually put the ship out of action while it was careened and repaired, were the groundings that occurred on the Station. H.M.S. Weazel touched ground with slight damage on arrival at Halifax in September, 1785, (3) and then again the following year, along with H.M.S. Resource, on a cruise to Chaleur Bay, the Island of St. John, and Cape Breton. (4) When H.M.S. Leander grounded on an uncharted rock in Chaleur Bay the damage was extensive. On being hove down the false keel was found to have been knocked off and considerable repairs were needed to the main keel and rudder. (5) H.M.S. Thisbe also lost a false keel in a grounding at the Island of St. John, (6) but the next year, when she grounded off Orleans Island in the St. Lawrence, the damage was minimal. In the latter case, the ship's captain was praised lavishly for his prompt and seamanlike action in shoring the ship up and preventing it from toppling

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1. Hughes to Stephens, 13 August, 1791, Adm. 1, Vol. 492. The construction, placing and maintenance of lights and buoys to help prevent groundings were provincial responsibilities at this time. Sometimes the Navy assisted. Infra, p. 138.
 2. Ibid. (Hughes' italics). Hughes' allusion to the lack of a proper pilot was probably a reminder to Admiralty officials that they had recently refused the funds to hire pilots on the Station.
 3. Sawyer to Stephens, 27 September, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 4. Sawyer to Stephens, 12 July, 1786, ibid.
 5. Sawyer to Stephens, 10 November, 1787, ibid. A false keel was attached under the true keel for protection and to increase the vessel's stability.
 6. Sawyer to Stephens, 28 April, 1787, ibid.

over and possibly bilging at low tide. (1)

Minor accidents to ships on the Station included such items as sprung bowsprits on H.M.S. Alligator (2) and H.M.S. Winchelsea, (3) the loss of a foremast by H.M.S. Resource en route to Halifax from the Bay of Fundy, (4) and ice damage to the copper sheathing of H.M.S. Assistance. (5)

Having briefly described the types of damage suffered by the ships on the Station, it is appropriate to turn next to the organization responsible for repairing this damage, the naval Dockyard. Here, the operations or activities can be discussed under two main categories; the repair and servicing of ships, and the maintenance and improvement of the Dockyard itself.

As was the case with seagoing operations, a pattern soon developed in the Dockyard. In the spring, ships were repaired as early as the weather allowed, both for the ships already at Halifax and for those that had to return from their winter stations. (6) Work was frequently carried out on several ships at a time to allow them to proceed to their summer stations as soon as possible. (7) Normally, this work was of a relatively minor nature,

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1. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. 1, p. 102.
 2. Hughes to Stephens, 3 September, 1791, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 3. Hughes to Stephens, 19 April, 1792, ibid.
 4. Douglas to Stephens, 29 August, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 5. Sawyer to Stephens, 23 July, 1785, ibid.
 6. Duncan to Respective Officers, 13 March, 1788, HAL/F/1, ordering "That the ships in Port be uncovered and taken in the progress of the Yard for the spring fitting on Monday next."
 7. Duncan to Respective Officers, 8 April, 1789, ibid., ordering H.M. Ships Penelope, Dido, Thisbe, Brisk and Weazel, to be taken in hand and repaired.

such as renewing rigging and caulking, with major repair work being left for extended refits in England.⁽¹⁾ Occasionally, however, these were undertaken in Halifax but this meant that the ship would be out of service for most of the operating season.

During the summer, as ships became due for surveys or inspections, they were brought in from sea one at a time and then returned to their cruising stations. Sometimes, of course, when the results of the surveys were unsatisfactory, the ships were either kept in the yard for repair, dispatched to England for overhaul,⁽²⁾ or in extreme cases removed from service completely. In the late fall, ships returning to spend the winter in Halifax were unrigged, moored and often covered over.⁽³⁾ Ships wintering at Shelburne, Passamaquoddy, Annapolis, or the St. John River were quickly given any running repairs required and then sent to their winter ports.⁽⁴⁾

In spite of peace-time austerities, the Dockyard was able to carry out its own steady programme of its internal maintenance and improvement. Surveys and estimates for internal repair work were forwarded annually to the Navy Office, and funds ranging from £1500 to £6740 assigned in

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1. Sawyer to Stephens, 15 May, 1786, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 15 August, 1787, Adm. 1, Vol. 491, indicating that H.M.S. Ariadne would be returning to England as a result of a survey; and Hughes to Stephens, 18 July, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492, returning H.M.S. Brisk to England for refit.
 3. Duncan to Respective Officers, 16 November, 1787, HAL/F/1, directing that "The ships in port to be covered over as usual for the winter."
 4. Duncan to Respective Officers, 20 November, 1783, ibid. H.M. Ships Bonetta, Mercury and Observer, all of which were wintering outside of Halifax, were all to be inspected and repaired as soon as possible.

(1) return. The nature of the repairs and improvements included such items as a new cooperage, wharf additions and repairs, new chain moorings, repairs to the mast pond wall, and breastworks repairs along the Dockyard boundaries. Two other improvements, both arranged by His Majesty's Surveyor of the Woods, John Wentworth, were a water lot near the mast pond,⁽²⁾ and water rights at a point in Dartmouth, almost directly across the harbour from the Dockyard, from whence ships could be easily watered.⁽³⁾

Comments on the state of the Dockyard during this period were generally laudatory. Douglas, on his arrival, reported: "As to His Majesty's Dockyard here everything bears the appearance of such good Order and regularity as might be expected from the approved assiduity of the Commissioner."⁽⁴⁾ Commodore Sawyer, in turn, on taking up his command, found the yard "in very complete Order, except for the Boat House, for the rebuilding of which, Commissioner Duncan has sent home the proper Estimates..."⁽⁵⁾

Another contemporary observed at Halifax that

There is a small but excellent careening yard for ships of the royal navy. ... It is always kept well provided with naval stores; and ships of the line are hove down and repaired with the greatest ease and safety.⁽⁶⁾

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1. Navy Office to Respective Officers, 19 April, 1785, and 2 January, 1787, ibid.
 2. Wentworth to Commissioners of the Navy, 30 December, 1785, Wentworth Letter Book, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
 3. Wentworth to Commissioners of the Navy, 19 January, 1788, ibid.
 4. Douglas to Stephens, 10 June, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 5. Sawyer to Stephens, 23 July, 1785, ibid.
 6. S. Hollingsworth, The Present State of Nova Scotia, Second Edition, Edinburgh, 1787, p. 140.

Finally, there was the tribute of a young officer who had spent several years in the Portsmouth Dockyard where his father had been Commissioner:

... a very tolerably arranged dockyard with a good careening wharf and pits, in the event of any accident rendering it necessary to perform any shipwright work under the seat of water; ... the Leander of 50 guns could not have been repaired but for this needful means of getting at her keel. (1)

In summary of the foregoing account of the operations of naval forces at Halifax between 1783 and 1793, there are certain features of the period that should be emphasized. The first was the general malaise and lack of efficient organization that characterized the Royal Navy after the completion of the transition to peace. Although reforms were being initiated, the results of these did not reach the lower or working levels of the Navy until late in the period. In the meantime many operational matters languished. Another feature was the incompatibility of the North American trade and fisheries policies that were formulated in London. By itself, a trade policy that was tardily developed and aimed at allowing some goods to enter Nova Scotia but not others was bad enough. But its marriage to a fisheries policy that allowed American vessels into coastal waters, where they could trade with the inhabitants under cover of processing fish, soon produced a situation that was impossible to control.

On the scene at Halifax, the Navy initially had great difficulty in understanding its role. Once this was clarified, the ships undertook to carry out their duties in the usual traditions of their Service. They were severely hampered, however, by factors outside their control. Diverse

1. T. Eyam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. 1, p. 53.

geographical, climatic, political and commercial considerations proved to be more than the diminishing numbers of ships on the Station could cope with, and, despite the generally good quality of their ships and the excellent support of the Dockyard, they were unable to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The result was that the Navy found itself with a role that became increasingly unpopular with the numerous elements who looked to free intercourse with the United States as a means of improving their livelihoods. At the same time, because of its inability to perform this role, smuggling flourished and the fisheries remained unprotected.

CHAPTER III

ARMY FORCES 1783-1793

Service Conditions in the British Army

For many of the same reasons as in the Navy, service conditions in the British Army in 1783 were abysmally bad. The memory of an unsuccessful and frustrating war, the reductions to peace-time levels and relatively dull garrison service, the presence of inept leadership⁽¹⁾ and often corrupt administration, and the lack of adequate amenities as basic as food and shelter, all compounded to make the soldier's life almost unbearable. For the illiterate mis-fits of late 18th century Britain, however, there were few ways to earn a living, and even life in the Army could be preferable to the poor house or prison or slow starvation.

An early indication of the lack of attractiveness of Army service was the rapid exodus of men in the spring of 1783 when the Recruiting Acts of 1778-9 expired and a release option became available. The offer of a re-enlistment bonus of a guinea and a half "was not of the slightest effect. To the consternation of the Government, the men with hardly an exception took their discharge and declined to re-engage, leaving very many regiments with no more than a handful of privates."⁽²⁾ Thus, even after the peace establishment was cut to about 50,000, the same level as

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1. William Cobbett, an NCO in the Army in 1786 in New Brunswick, described officers as "ignorant, lazy and drunken". Quoted, and to some extent rebutted, by C.T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment, Vol. II, Oxford, 1947, p. 42.
 2. J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. III, 1763-93, London, 1911, p. 506.

in 1764, the Army was unable to maintain the required strength. All regiments of foot junior to the 70th were disbanded, and the number of companies in each of the remaining regiments reduced from ten to eight. But as men became eligible for discharge they continued to take their releases. Recruitments were negligible and desertions common.

One of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory conditions in the Army was the manner in which pay and allowances were calculated. Although the office of Paymaster General, which for many years had allowed its incumbent to hold huge sums of public money for personal investments and profit, was reformed in 1782 and a salary substituted for perquisites, many of the former questionable practices associated with pay continued. These practices allowed a series of deductions to be made from a soldier's gross pay until his net pay approached zero. Included in the paymaster's jargon to explain these deductions were terms like poundage, off-reckonings and clearings. ⁽¹⁾ Each of these was as obscure as the other in origin and purpose, but each was brutally effective in depriving the soldier of cash in his pocket. Only one of the deductions had much reality for the soldier paying it, and that was the one labelled "Contribution to Chelsea Hospital." ⁽²⁾ In this case the purpose was patent, and, if he were lucky and lived long enough, the contributor might derive some benefit from it by being provided with food, lodging and companionship during his waning

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1. Poundage was the deduction of one shilling per pound from the pay of the whole Army to provide funds for Chelsea Hospital, Exchequer fees, salaries for the paymaster-general and other officials, and for refunds to certain corps under certain conditions. Off reckonings were stoppages for clothing, toilet articles and other amenities. Clearings included pay withheld and 'Agency', a deduction of two pence per pound on the full pay of the Regiment for the profit of the Agent. Ibid, pp. 519 - 521.
 2. This contribution, or deduction, amounted to one day's full pay per year. It was paid in addition to that included in poundage. Ibid, p. 519.

years at Chelsea.

The problem of Army pay was further complicated by a separate series of accounts that were maintained by the Treasury when drawing up the annual estimates. Here the designations used were full pay, allowances (including those for widows, colonels, captains and agents, all of which were ingeniously concealed by the addition of fictitious men on regimental strengths), gross off-reckonings, net off-reckonings, stock-purses, and non-effective funds.⁽¹⁾ This chaos was not completely adventitious, however, permitting as it did so many opportunities for so many persons, civilian and service alike, to manipulate the accounts to their own advantage. Fortunately, during the 1780s, the seriousness of the situation gained widespread attention and corrective action was commenced. Indeed, by 1792, as a result of the abolition of poundage and other improvements, "the soldier not only received food enough to keep him alive, but the magnificent sum of 18s. 10½d. a year..."⁽²⁾ This pay increase was not shared by subalterns, however, each of whose pay, according to a memorial from the colonels of cavalry regiments in Ireland, "was scarcely equal to the maintenance of his servant and his horse..."⁽³⁾

But there was an agreeable side to the Army as well, especially for the officers who enjoyed access to family fortunes and could therefore extract the best from Army life without suffering unduly from its

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1. Gross off-reckonings were equal to the total off-reckonings of four fictitious men and formed part of a Colonel's special allowances. The difference between these and net off-reckonings is not clear. Stock-purses were funds that regiments of dragoons derived from three sources: the pay of men who were allowed by establishment but not borne, the recruiting fund, and the money received from the sale of old (14 years) horses. The fund was held by the Agent who used it for contingencies and recruiting costs. In the infantry the fund was called the non-effective fund. Ibid., p. 520; and ibid., Vol. II, pp. 590 - 591.
 2. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 525.
 3. Ibid.

hardships.⁽¹⁾ And, if bored in one rank there was usually an opportunity to purchase a higher one.⁽²⁾ Duties were light and a lieutenant in Ireland during the period, though charged with the tasks of adjutant, except for a few marches, had nothing to do but "have a joyous time."⁽³⁾ Not much later this same officer recorded while awaiting transport to Nova Scotia, "I never saw such hard living at the mess as during our stay at the Fort; we were literally drunk almost every day and wishing for the arrival of the transports as we were almost ruined in both purse and constitution."⁽⁴⁾

On peace-time service abroad, such as in Nova Scotia, many army regulars, both officers and men, availed themselves of the privilege of having their families accompany them.⁽⁵⁾ The stabilizing influence and

1. An advantage these officers were thought to have over their naval contemporaries was that they "need not leave their academic pursuits until the age of eighteen, and are consequently well educated, and better prepared for the duties of statesmen, and the civil affairs of the public departments." T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 26.

2. E.g. N.S. Gazette, 29 April 1783, an item noting that "Lieutenant Henry St. Clair, to be Captain-Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Schark, who retires." Prices of commissions in Regiments of Foot were as follows:

	<u>Full Price Of Commission</u>	<u>Successive increment</u>
Lieut-Col	£ 3500	£ 900
Major	2600	1100
Captain	1500	550
Capt-Lieut	950	400
Lieut	550	150
Ensign	400	400

Extracted from War Office Order dated 14 August, 1783, contained in General Orders (43) 20 January, 1784 - 21 September, 1786, P.A.N.S.

3. William Dycott, Diary 1781 - 1845, Vol. I, London, 1907, p. xii.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. For the men, a quota system was used whereby a proportion of the Regiment were allowed to take their wives. Prior to 1783 the number of wives per regiment in North America was 100, or about 25%. Cyril Ray, Regiment of the Line (The Story of the 20th the Lancashire Fusiliers), London, 1963, p. 54. For the officers there were apparently no limits.

services, such as washing, mending and nursing, provided by the wives presumably were considered worth the extra expense and inconvenience to the Crown of moving the women, children and baggage each time the regiment changed its base. Service in colonial garrisons was not always popular, however, and, despite strict regulations monitored from Whitehall, officers "reverted to the old habit of evading duty with them, not the less readily since field-officers set the example."⁽¹⁾

Army Organization

At the end of the American Revolutionary War, although there were several authorities in London with chains of command down to regimental level, control of the Army was largely vested in the Secretary at War. Early in the 18th century, this position had become a political one at almost the same level as a Secretary of State. Housed in what came to be called the War Office, the Secretary at War was responsible for administrative matters such as personnel procurement, posting and quartering. By 1783 his power had expanded to include almost all administration, the ordering of the despatch and transport of troop formations, the exchange of prisoners, and courts martial. To facilitate this control the Secretary had direct correspondence with colonial governors, commanders-in-chief, and corps and regimental commanders. Similar to the Secretary at War in some respects, but with duties restricted to summary discipline, enforcement of Army Regulations, the precedence of regiments, uniform design, etc., was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Another important authority was the Board of Ordnance. Headed by the Master-General of the Ordnance, a political functionary of cabinet

1. J.E. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. III, p.531.
Field officers included majors and above.

rank who was ex officio head of the Artillery and Engineers, the Board was responsible for supplying both the Army and the Navy with arms and ammunition, and with providing and maintaining fortifications, barracks and other military works. The Quarter-Master General who looked after stores and the transport of troops, and the Paymaster-General rounded out the dominant elements of the Army hierarchy.

Under the government of the efficiency-minded Pitt, attempts were made to eliminate some of the duplication and to simplify the Army's operational and administrative control. In 1783, the office of the Secretary at War was made statutory but its powers reduced to the preparation of the Army's annual estimates and the formulation of the Articles of War. The following year, however, the Secretary's powers were more than restored when the Commander-in-Chief retired and the position was allowed to expire.⁽¹⁾ A larger re-organization in 1793, which created a Secretary of State for War, resurrected the Commander-in-Chief's office and made it permanent. Other changes affected the Paymaster-General, who was given the consolidated responsibility for all Forces' pay and treasury functions, and the Master-General of the Ordnance, whose responsibility for barracks was transferred to the newly-established Barrack-Master General. The period was thus one of organizational flux with lines of command that tended to look blurred when viewed from the lower ends.

Commanding officers of garrisons and regiments were responsible for the men and materials under their command, in varying degree, to each of the foregoing authorities. In addition to specialized corps such as the

1. Ibid.

cavalry, dragoons, artillery and engineers,⁽¹⁾ there were approximately seventy regiments of foot or infantry. These were nominally headed by the Colonel of the Regiment, who might hold any rank from brigadier to general. In the field or in garrison they were actually commanded by colonels or lieutenant-colonels. Regiments were normally affiliated with British counties or major cities, and consisted of about four hundred men divided into two battalions with four companies of approximately fifty men each per battalion.⁽²⁾

In North America in 1783, the Army was under the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Sir Guy Carleton, at New York. After the evacuation, the headquarters was moved to Quebec where the appointment was held by Lieutenant-General Frederick Haldimand, and later by Carleton, who by this time had become Lord Dorchester. Under the Commander-in-Chief and in command of the troops in Nova Scotia and its dependencies was a major-general or brigadier-general with headquarters at Halifax.⁽³⁾ The General's staff consisted of an imposing number of service and civilian officers with an equally imposing array of titles. Included were a Major of Brigade, a Fort Major, a Comptroller of Army Accounts, a Clerk of the Cheque, a Commissary, a Barrack-Master, and a Surgeon and

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1. In 1787 the Corps of Engineers was reorganized into the Royal Engineers with the same precedence as the Royal Artillery. Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, London, 1889, p. 216.
 2. Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Forty Second or the Royal Highland Regiment of Foot, London, 1845, p. 80; and C. T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment, Vol. II, p. 40.
 3. The full title of the Army commander at Halifax was "The Major-General Commanding the Forces within His Majesty's Dominions in North America lying on the Atlantic Ocean." See Appendix VI for a list of Army authorities at Halifax.

Chaplain to the Garrison.⁽¹⁾ A Deputy Commissary of Musters and a Deputy Provost Marshal were added by local fiat but, when London disallowed the positions, the appointees were discharged.⁽²⁾

On at least one occasion, three offices were held by one person who presumably received the emoluments of all three.⁽³⁾ Many of the local office-holders were appointed by senior Army authorities in England, sometimes on the recommendation of the local governor or Army commander, and often in exchange for fees or other considerations. Thus, the office of Ordnance Storekeeper was held in gift of the Duke of Richmond, the Master-General of the Ordnance, while that of Barrack-Master, a position worth more than ten shillings per diem, was in gift of Sir George Yonge, the Secretary at War.⁽⁴⁾ A final position on the Army staff at Halifax was the important one of Secretary. Again the holder of the position might also hold another post on the Staff.⁽⁵⁾

Under the General in command at Halifax were the Commanding Officers of the Regiments, and of the companies of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, that were assigned for duty in Nova Scotia. Normally there were five reg-

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1. The pay for the Fort Major was four shillings per diem. Sydney to Parr, 19 August, 1784, Board of Trade Despatches, 1770-1783, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 21 February, 1785.
 3. J. Morden, Esq, was Ordnance Storekeeper, Paymaster, and Barrack-Master in 1791 and 1792. Theophrastus, An Almanack for the Year of our Lord 1791, (and 1792), Halifax, 1791 and 1792.
 4. Wentworth to King George, September, 1792, Governor's Despatches 1789-1794, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48.
 5. Edward Winslow was both Secretary to Brig.-Gen. Fox and Muster-Master-General of His Majesty's Provincial Forces. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 6 August, 1783.

iments in the command.⁽¹⁾ Although the deployments varied, one regiment was usually stationed on Cape Breton Island with two companies on the Island of St. John, and another regiment was broken up into detachments for manning the outposts at Windsor, Annapolis and Shelburne. In 1785, the size of each company was reduced by six privates and a drummer to forty-two men.⁽²⁾

Early in the period, the Engineering Department consisted of a lieutenant-colonel, four captains, three lieutenants,⁽³⁾ and a work party of about three hundred men including civilians and soldiers supplied by garrison regiments.⁽⁴⁾ This force was shortly afterwards reduced and, by 1787, when the Royal Engineers were formed, it was of company size or less under a captain or lieutenant. For most of the period 1783-1789, two companies of Royal Artillery were based at Halifax; after 1789 there was only one.⁽⁵⁾

The last element in the Army organization, the militia, was under the Lieutenant Governor rather than the Army commander. Neither regular nor from overseas, although many of its officers were former regular Army officers on half pay, the militia was proud of its distinctions. Understandably, the regulars regarded it with disdain and gave it neither

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1. See Appendix IX for list of Army components based at Halifax. In 1791 the number of regiments decreased to three, and in 1792 to two.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 11 April, 1785.
 3. Ibid., entry for 23 December, 1783.
 4. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 2 June, 1783; and Doc. 193, Military correspondence between 1782-84, being transcripts of Papers in the Royal Institute London, known as the Dorchester Papers, Vol. 2, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369.
 5. Charles H. Stewart, The Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America - A Résumé, pp. 45-46.

support nor encouragement. During the peace-time period after 1783, most members of the militia were pre-occupied with problems of settlement and, in the words of its historian, "little of interest in militia affairs took place until 1793."⁽¹⁾ Nevertheless, in the war alert of late 1787, Governor Parr, anxious to utilize the many new inhabitants of the province in the militia, asked the Assembly and Council to revise the Militia Laws to ensure that the force would be ready for service whenever required.⁽²⁾ The following year, Parr and the Army commander were cautioned that in the event of war the regular troops might be withdrawn, and that they should "accelerate the putting into order that interior strength which might one day prove their only protection."⁽³⁾ Reaction was slow, however, and it was not until 1790 that Simeon Perkins made the following entry in his diary at Liverpool:

The Militia Mustered agreeable to an order for that purpose from me, in pursuance of the Governor's orders. The men Appeared Very well Dressed, & accoutered, considng the Short Notice they have had, and the Long time it has been Since they mustered before. I think it is upwards of 8 years, and, I believe one half of the present Militia have come of Age Since that time.⁽⁴⁾

But such musters were rare, and it was not until the outbreak of war in 1793 that serious attention was paid to the militia. By this time, because of the lack of arms and accoutrements, its readiness had been

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1. J.P. Edwards, "The Militia of Nova Scotia 1749-1867, "Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. XVII, 1913, p. 76.
 2. Bulkeley to Council and Assembly, 10 November, 1787, Legislative Council Papers 1760-90, P.A.N.S. Vol. 286, Doc. 162.
 3. Dorchester to Ogilvie, 6 June, 1788; and Ogilvie to Parr 15 August, 1788; both in Manuscript Documents of Nova Scotia, Vol. 6 - Miscellaneous Papers 1788-1506, P.A.N.S. Vol. 224, Docs. 12 and 13.
 4. Simeon Perkins, Diary 1790-96, entry for 22 November, 1790, p. 63.

critically weakened. (1)

Army Operations

Turning next from the Army's organization to its operations, it might be expected that since its purpose was largely a defensive one against the threat of an American attack, the Army would concentrate on improving Halifax's fortifications. However, in 1783, "as always, the conclusion of peace caused the suspension of work on the Halifax fortifications." (2) Indeed, by mid-1783, although requirements for quarry stone for works at George's Island were still being advertised, (3) the fortifications were already unclean and falling into bad order. (4) A survey, carried out the following year by the Engineer-in-Chief in America, in response to orders from Carleton, (5) further attested the deteriorating condition of the defenses. (6)

In 1787, a contemporary observer described the Citadel as "regularly fortified, but not so as to be able to withstand a regular attack." (7) Although he was more complimentary about the usefulness of some of the

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1. Wentworth to Dundas, 22 March, 1793, C.O. 217/64, p. 125.
 2. Col. C.P. Stacey, "Halifax as an International Strategic Factor, 1749-1949," Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1949, p.49. See also, Harry Piers, The Evolution of the Halifax Fortress. 1749-1928, Revised by G.M. Self and P. Blakeley under the direction of D.C. Harvey. Halifax, 1947, pp. 21, and 102-104.
 3. N.S. Gazette, 29 July, 1783.
 4. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 11 June, 1783.
 5. Doc. 200, 28 July, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. 2, P.A.N.S. Vol.369.
 6. Supra, p. 9.
 7. S. Hollingsworth, Present State of Nova Scotia, p. 139.

other batteries, particularly that on George's Island, ⁽¹⁾ a more professional opinion indicated that the works were "in most ruinous, defenceless Condition; out of 152 Gun Carriages only 28 are good..." ⁽²⁾ When war with Spain threatened, the fortifications were judged "mere ruins", and the Commanding Officer, Royal Engineers, gave up his leave to assist in case repairs were ordered. ⁽³⁾ With the works still in a defenceless state-six months later, the dutiful engineer again declined leave. ⁽⁴⁾ More than personal sacrifice by one officer was needed, however, and, except for the removal of the old blockhouse on Citadel Hill ⁽⁵⁾ and the erection of a fence to keep the cattle from damaging the Grand Battery, ⁽⁶⁾ no improvements were made to the fortifications until after the news of the outbreak of war with France. A major improvement to the support facilities for the garrison made during the period was the construction of a magazine for 1000 barrels of gunpowder on George's Island. ⁽⁷⁾ The other powder storage, a considerably larger one, was a wooden building at Eastern Battery in Dartmouth. Because of complaints of the hazards of the installation, occupation of adjoining buildings and fires in the area were prohibited

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1. Ibid., p. 140.
 2. Parr to Sydney, 14 November, 1787, C.O. 217/60. Parr was a former Army officer who, after more than 20 years, had gained command of his Regiment, the 20th.
 3. Capt. Sutherland to Duke of Richmond, 12 June, 1790, Commanding Officer Royal Engineers, Halifax, Out letters 1789-1803, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E."B"
 4. Sutherland to Richmond, 23 December, 1790, ibid.
 5. T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," p. 91.
 6. Lt. Bartlett to S.S. Blowers, 18 March, 1793, Commanding Officer, Royal Engineers, Halifax, Letters Received, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. 3.
 7. Sutherland to Board of Ordnance, 8 December, 1789, P.A.N.S. Vol. "B".

after 1784, and sentries posted to control access.⁽¹⁾ Other than the magazine at George's Island, the only important construction work carried out by the Army was the building of a large new store-house in the Gun Wharf area.⁽²⁾

Unlike the Navy, whose peace-time trade and fisheries patrols were similar to war-time activities, Army operations for the troops based at Halifax were more confined. Consequently, the Army was largely restricted to routine deployments and re-deployments to and from overseas posts and within the Atlantic area. These movements, combined with garrison sentry and guard duty, parades, musters, ceremonial, inspections, and routine work associated with the maintenance of quarters and equipment, were essentially the only operations in which the Army was engaged. But each of these operations had characteristic features and by describing and explaining these an appreciation of the Army's role at Halifax can be provided.

After the Army had completed reducing to its peace-time Halifax establishment in January, 1784, the rotation of regiments overseas to other colonies was slow and reasonably predictable. In most cases, except towards the end of the period, the regiments remained in Halifax for at least three years, and not more than two of the five regiments based there were moved in any one year. In 1790, however, at the time of the Nootka Sound Affair, the pattern of the movements abruptly changed. Two regiments scheduled as reliefs were diverted from Nova Scotia to the Bahamas and

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1. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry of 30 January, 1784.
 2. Sutherland to Board of Ordnance, 5 May, 1790, and Sutherland to Ogilvie, 22 August, 1790; both in P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B"

Jamaica, while the regiments they were to relieve remained in North America.⁽¹⁾ During the next three years five regiments left Nova Scotia, four of them for the West Indies,⁽²⁾ and only two arrived as reliefs. To help bolster the dwindling garrison Wentworth volunteered to raise a Provincial Regiment as had been done during the Revolutionary War.⁽³⁾ Early in 1793, with the Halifax force reduced to two regular regiments, the Provincial Regiment was approved.⁽⁴⁾

Movements of troops within the command took the form of transfers of companies or detachments between Halifax and the outlying posts. Some of these, such as the deployment of the thirty-two man detachment to Spanish River, required transport by sea.⁽⁵⁾ For others, such as the relief of the troops at Annapolis or Windsor, the movements were carried out by marching.⁽⁶⁾ Troops were also deployed on occasion to other places in the province to assist a community in distress or to put down a threatened disturbance.⁽⁷⁾

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1. Grenville to Ogilvie, 6 May, 1790, and Ogilvie to Grenville, 12 June, 1790; both in C.O. 217/62.
 2. Wentworth to Dundas, 27 June, 1792, Governor's Despatches 1789-1794, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48; Dundas to Wentworth, 2 January, 1793, and Dundas to Ogilvie, 5 February, 1793, both in C.O. 217/64.
 3. Wentworth to Dundas, 14 September, 1792, Governor's Despatches 1789-1794, P.A.N.S. Vol. Vol. 48.
 4. Dundas to Wentworth, 8 February, 1793, C.O. 217/64.
 5. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entries for 6 August, and 8 August, 1783.
 6. Ibid., entries for 20 August and 24 August, 1783.
 7. Parr to Fox, 21 August, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. 2, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369, Doc. 70, requesting that troops be sent to assist in maintaining order at Shelburne. Troops were used in Halifax itself to help quell disturbances after an extremely tense bye-election in 1788. J.S. Macdonald, "Memoir of Governor John Parr," Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. XIV, 1910, p. 74.

Sentry and guard duty in Halifax between 1783 and 1793 probably had as little appeal as in any other garrison at any other period. Despite such historically and geographically stimulating challenges and replies as "Aberdeen and Glasgow, Nassau and Orange, York and Lancaster, and Sardinia and Sicily,"⁽¹⁾ it was difficult to keep sentries adequately inspired:

The very unmilitary manner of Posted Sentries doing Duty in this Army is really a disgrace to His Majestys Service and to the name of a Soldier, - The Officers Commanding Guards, and Non Commissioned Officers who post the Sentries, are to be responsible that the men are alert and attentive, while on Duty, as Soldiers, and not like an unarmed banditti. The Sentries are not to keep in their Boxes except in very bad Weather, and to be always upon their Guard and prepared to Receive all Officers who approach them ...⁽²⁾

An important factor in the slackness of the sentries was the list of restrictions placed on them. "The Sentinels are not upon any pretence whatsoever to stop the Inhabitants walking on the Batterys or Works or anywhere else that Sentinels are posted (Except over the powder) ..."⁽³⁾ In addition, no person was to be stopped from going into the Citadel from sunrise to sunset. The sentinels were obliged to behave attentively and respectfully to everyone, especially the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor,⁽⁴⁾ and severe punishment was threatened to sentries who did not comply.⁽⁵⁾ These requirements combined to make the duties of a sentry both thankless and futile. And those of a guard were not much better. Except for Sundays,

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1. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entries for 18 May, 1 June, 2 June, and 16 June, 1783. These passwords were referred to as "Paroles and Call Signs."
 2. Ibid., entry for 1 July, 1783.
 3. Ibid., entry for 26 August, 1783.
 4. Ibid., entry for 12 November, 1783.
 5. Ibid., entry for 26 August, 1783.

they were exercised daily on the Grand Parade,⁽¹⁾ and at night, those on the Main Guard patrolled the streets of the town to take into custody any of their fellow soldiers who were drunk or disorderly, or merely out after Tattoo. In addition, each Corps was expected to maintain its own patrol of pickets.⁽²⁾

A similarly monotonous duty was parade drill, in which the troop and weapon manoeuvres expected to be of value in combat were practised to precision. During the period of peace, these drills underwent important changes. After the experiences of 1776, privates ceased carrying pistols and swords, and were issued muskets and bayonets instead.⁽³⁾ Furthermore, the basic fighting formation was altered.

The ranks had generally been reduced from three to two, the files opened, and all movements conducted loosely and irregularly, with an independence of action on the part of small units wholly at variance with the orthodox doctrines of the time. The idea of open formation was repellent to those senior officers who, trained in the German school, had never seen service out of Europe.⁽⁴⁾

In summer, parades and drills were held from 0600 to 0800, and from 1830 to 2000. In winter, if parades could not be held, two long route marches were carried out per week.⁽⁵⁾ The size of the parades varied

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1. Ibid., entry for 17 August, 1783.
 2. Ibid., entries for 9 and 14 October, 1783.
 3. Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Forty-Second Foot, London, 1845, p. 81.
 4. Col. L.I. Cowper (editor), The King's Own (60th Regiment), Vol. I, 1680-1814, Oxford, 1939, p. 284.
 5. C.T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment, Vol II, p. 42.

from that of a platoon or company up to the entire garrison.⁽¹⁾ When the General attended, commendations followed like that approving the "discipline and military appearance ... soldier-like manoeuvres and quick-step of the Royal Nova Scotia Volunteers."⁽²⁾ or another expressing great pleasure and satisfaction and ordering an extra two days' rum allowance for all troops on review.⁽³⁾ A parade highlight for one regiment, the 4th, was their review by His Royal Highness Prince William; for the officers, the highlight was the dinner afterwards at which the Prince, who "dislikes drinking very much ... drank nearly two bottles of Madiera."⁽⁴⁾ Another type of parade was the muster,⁽⁵⁾ a formalized roll-call to confirm that the records of regimental personnel were correct.⁽⁶⁾

Similar to parades, and sometimes scheduled to coincide with them, were ceremonial celebrations. To celebrate His Majesty's birthday, 4 June, 1783, all mounted guns were ordered to be fired at noon commencing at the Citadel, then Fort Massey, McLean's Battery, Point Pleasant, George's Island, and Eastern Battery. At eight o'clock in the evening regiments

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1. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 8 June, 1783; and HQ 2, entry for 21 May, 1784. On the latter occasion the order went out that "Major-General Campbell will review the three Regiments of this garrison on Monday 7th June, if the weather will permit. They will prepare accordingly by frequent Field days as Colonel Yorke shall direct ... "
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 1 entry for 19 August, 1783.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 2 entry for 10 June, 1784.
 4. William Dyott, Diary, 1781-1845, Vol. I, p. 36.
 5. Not to be confused with the stores muster, another frequent task for the troops, especially when barrack furniture and bedding were involved. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 29 June, 1783.
 6. Ibid., entries for 2 August, 1783, and 18 August, 1793; and P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 15 January, 1784.

were to fire a feu de joie near Government House.⁽¹⁾ The following year companies of Grenadiers fired three volleys after the noon salute and gave three cheers to "Long live King George the Third."⁽²⁾ On the Queen's birthday a Royal Tattoo was fired at noon by the guns on the Citadel.⁽³⁾ Other events included the guards that were paraded for the visit of the Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, Brigadier-General Thomas Carleton, in September, 1787,⁽⁴⁾ and for Lieutenant-Governor John Wentworth's landing in May, 1792.⁽⁵⁾ The most memorable army ceremonies of the period, however, were those for Prince William. In July, 1787, he reviewed the troops of the garrison, the 37th, 57th, and 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiments of Foot.⁽⁶⁾ Later in the year, the garrison troops were again turned out for him, this time to line the streets for his triumphal landing and parade.⁽⁷⁾ In September, 1788, he was guest of honour at a mock battle on the Common that was put on by the 4th, 37th and 57th Regiments.⁽⁸⁾ A final type of ceremony, in which the troops took part, was the street-lining procession, and firing of minute guns for the funeral of Governor

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1. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 2 June, 1783.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 3 June, 1784.
 3. Ibid., entries for 17 January, 1784, and 17 January, 1785.
 4. William Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Vol. I, p. 33. The fact that Carleton was not honoured with a public reception on this occasion, however, was a source of displeasure to the people of St. John. J.S. Macdonald, "Memoir of Governor John Parr," p. 71.
 5. T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," p. 103.
 6. Ibid., p. 91.
 7. William Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Vol. I, p. 40.
 8. T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," p. 93.

Parr in November, 1791.⁽¹⁾

But the troops did not spend all their time on guards, parades and ceremonial; there were also work details. These included building and repairing roads,⁽²⁾ maintaining the barracks,⁽³⁾ forming a work-party for the Engineers on construction and other projects,⁽⁴⁾ and acting as shallop crews and labourers.⁽⁵⁾ For some work details, the troops were compensated at the rate of one shilling a day for sergeants, eight pence for corporals, and six pence for privates.⁽⁶⁾ In other cases an extra allowance of rum was sometimes granted.⁽⁷⁾

For the generals in command and their staffs, part of the peace-time routine consisted of inspections of Army works and garrisons, both in Halifax and in the Nova Scotia outposts.⁽⁸⁾ When General Campbell went on his inspection tour in 1784, he moved his Headquarters to Annapolis. The tour lasted several weeks and included Annapolis, Fort Howe and Fort Cumberland.⁽⁹⁾ In 1785, his inspection tour included installations on Cape Breton and the

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1. Ibid., p. 102. Military funerals had their detractors. One observer after the funeral of Lord Charles Montagu commented that Montagu "... was committed to the Earth with much military Foppery & ridiculous Parade." Mather Byles to Rev. Dr. Byles (Boston), 2 January, 1784, Mather Byles Papers, P.A.N.S.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 20 May, 1783.
 3. Ibid., entry for 31 July, 1783.
 4. Ibid., entry for 2 June, 1783.
 5. Ibid., entry for 14 October, 1783.
 6. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 16 January, 1784.
 7. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 20 May, 1783.
 8. Ibid., entry for 20 August, 1783; and Campbell to Sydney, 14 June, 1784, C.O. 217/41.
 9. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 6 July, 1784.

Island of St. John, and a review of the troops at Shelburne.⁽¹⁾

Before concluding this description of the types of Army employment it should be noted that like those of the Navy almost all of them were limited by the weather. In the winter months, except for snow removal in essential areas and guard duty, operations in many cases came to a virtual standstill. Some of the officers found ways to make up for this curtailment in normal activities; " ... all the month of March, cold nasty weather. Nothing but whist and eating and drinking."⁽²⁾ For the men, with fewer resources to call upon, the winters were more difficult. The two points of view are represented succinctly, though probably not intentionally, in the following description of conditions at Windsor in 1789.

For a great part of the year the road was knee-deep in snow, making marching difficult but travelling by sleigh exceedingly pleasant and picturesque.⁽³⁾

Generally, this same difference in approach characterized all of the operations for the Army units based at Halifax during the period. To the troops it must have been a tedious succession of parades, drills, marches, common labour, and barrack or kit inspections, relieved only by the promise of regular meals and the opportunity for a visit to a local tavern or grog-shop. The only enemy was the sergeant-major, and the only risk was to violate Army Regulations. To the officers, on the other hand, the drills and inspections may have had more purpose. Raised as they were in an era

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1. Lieut. W. Booth, "Journal on a tour with General Campbell," pp. 42-51; and Campbell to Sydney, 29 August, 1785, C.O. 217/41.
 2. William Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Vol. 1, p. 49, describing March, 1783.
 3. Col. L.I. Cowper, The King's Own, Vol. 1, p. 289.

of unremitting war, the possibility of another was always very real, and the need to prepare for it readily appreciated. Similarly, the necessity for ceremonial activities was better understood by the officers, especially those activities that were followed by a carousing mess dinner, or that opened the door for social contacts in the local community. Thus, in the peace-time period, what for the men was unmitigated drudgery was transmuted for the officers into tolerable necessity.

CHAPTER IV

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

An understanding of the role played by the armed forces based at Halifax between 1783 and 1793 requires not only knowledge of their organization and operations but also an appreciation of their administrative support. The manner in which the forces were organized, and what they did have already been described. It is now intended to examine some of the details of the administrative procedures of the period to show how the organization actually worked. At the same time, some of the administrative problems will be indicated, and a further insight thus provided into some of the more fundamental aspects of the peace-time military routine.

Communications

Good communications are an essential part of the administrative support of any organization, whether military or civil. Without them the organization's reaction times become excessive, and its operations lose their effectiveness.

In late 18th century Halifax, military and civil communications shared the same facilities and suffered the same weaknesses. For both sections of the community the only way that information could be exchanged or orders given, other than by direct speech, was by written messages or letters. These, because of hazards such as losses at sea, (1) were extremely slow

1. Despatches were even lost in harbour. E.g., a box of despatches for England was lost in Halifax harbour when a boat taking it to the mail packet capsized in a sudden wind. Parr to Sydney, 5 January, 1784, Governor's Despatches 1783-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 47.

and uncertain, and, as an expedient, the practice developed in the forces of sending two or more copies of the same letter, each by a different conveyance, and each at different times.⁽¹⁾ As an added precaution, some authorities directed that all dates and subjects of intervening correspondence be included in subsequent letters.⁽²⁾

Mail from England to Halifax normally went via New York and often took more than three months. To improve this situation, a direct service was requested in January, 1783.⁽³⁾ Immediate corrective action was promised in reply,⁽⁴⁾ and in December, arrangements were completed in London for direct mail packets from Falmouth to Halifax.⁽⁵⁾ This solution proved temporary, however, for incoming mail from England not only continued to be routed via New York, but outgoing mail from Halifax to England in some cases went in lumber ships via the West Indies.⁽⁶⁾ In May, 1785, the Army commander complained of the long delays in the receipt of despatches,⁽⁷⁾ and the merchants of the town petitioned the Governor for better service.⁽⁸⁾ A year later, with the situation still unchanged, the naval Commander-in-Chief noted in a letter to London that "... letters on His Majesty's

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1. Digby to Stephens, 25 July, 1783, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.
 2. Navy Office to Respective Officers, 20 July, 1784, HAL/F/1.
 3. Parr to Nepean, 22 January, 1783, C.O. 217/59.
 4. North to Governor of Nova Scotia, 8 August, 1783, C.O. 217/56.
 5. A. Todd (GPO) to Parr, 3 December, 1783, Board of Trade Despatches 1770-1783, P.A.M.S. Vol. 32.
 6. Sawyer to Stephens, 27 July, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491; and Parr to Sydney, 10 May, 1785, C.O. 217/57.
 7. Campbell to Sydney, 7 May, 1785, C.O. 217/41.
 8. Parr to Sydney, 10 May, 1785, C.O. 217/59.

Service are seldom forwarded in less than three months [from New York] , and several private letters that I have received from thence have been opened."⁽¹⁾ Meanwhile, a report from the Army commander pointed out that the last letter that he had had acknowledged by London was one that he had written nearly fifteen months earlier.⁽²⁾

In response to these and further requests from Halifax,⁽³⁾ a system of regular summer mail packets to Halifax and Quebec was established in October, 1787.⁽⁴⁾ For a time this service seems to have been adequate but in March, 1790, the issue was raised again, this time by Admiral Hughes who claimed that the mail delays were "prejudicial to the King's Service."⁽⁵⁾ A few days later, substance was added to his complaint when he received letters dated four and five months earlier.⁽⁶⁾ Taking the initiative, Hughes next proposed a plan whereby, during the winter months, one of the recently-acquired naval schooners would sail to Boston and pick up the English mail that had been delivered there from New York.⁽⁷⁾

A trial of this plan was approved for the winter of 1791-92, and the schooners Diligent and Chatham were sent alternately to New York for mail in November, December, January and February.⁽⁸⁾ Two of the trips were

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1. Sawyer to Stephens, 15 May, 1786, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 2. Campbell to Sydney, 15 March, 1786, C.O 217/57.
 3. Parr to Nepean, 4 August, 1787, C.O. 217/60.
 4. Sydney to Parr, 3 October, 1787, ibid.
 5. Hughes to Stephens, 17 March, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 6. Hughes to Stephens, 26 March, 1790, ibid.
 7. Hughes to Stephens, 16 August, 1790, ibid.
 8. Hughes to Stephens, 24 August, 1791, ibid.

successful. Unfortunately, in the others, the ships ran into storms, one of which forced Diligent to head for the West Indies, and the other which resulted in Chatham putting into Nantucket, where she was frozen up for eight weeks. Hughes, in his report, "... inclined to believe that the Attempt at endeavouring to convey the Halifax Mails from New York during the Winter Months must be attended with great Uncertainty and much Hardship to the Crews of the King's Schooners Employ'd upon that Service," and that any more trials were "... not an Object worthy the further attention of the Government."⁽¹⁾

The merchants of Halifax were still not satisfied, however, and in the following winter Chatham and Diligent each made a trip to New York. In both cases the return trip was made in less than six weeks⁽²⁾ and resulted in faster mail deliveries. In view of France's declaration of war in February, the timing of the improved service could not have been more propitious.

In addition to the problem of communications between Halifax and England, was the one between Halifax and Quebec. Here, the difficulties of distance were made worse by the winter freeze-up that prevented mail packets from Halifax from reaching Quebec.⁽³⁾ The result was that for long periods not only was Quebec cut off from England, but it was also cut off from Halifax.

The solution to the problem originated in Quebec. In the early spring of 1783, despatches destined for England were carried from Quebec to

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1. Hughes to Stephens, 15 June, 1792, ibid.
 2. Commodore George to Stephens, 21 March, 1793, ibid.
 3. Parr to North, 21 October, 1783, C.O. 217/56. These freeze-ups occurred as early as October in the St. Lawrence.

Halifax via an overland route to St. John and then across the Bay of Fundy.⁽¹⁾ In view of the success of this trial, during the summer an Army captain was sent overland with more despatches to plan a permanent route.⁽²⁾ The plan was supported by Parr⁽³⁾ and Sir Guy Carleton,⁽⁴⁾ and Haldimand forecast that within another year the route would be "... certain and even commodious."⁽⁵⁾ He also emphasized the military importance of the road and the need for neighbouring commanding officers to have a ready means of communications.⁽⁶⁾ Later, both the need for the route and Haldimand's optimism for it were justified. When war with Spain appeared imminent in 1790, despatches from England for Lord Dorchester were delivered over the route in record time. In achieving this, Lieutenant Tinling of the 57th Regiment, "... esteemed one of the most expeditious travellers in this Province,"⁽⁷⁾ made the return trip from Halifax to Quebec, a total of 1500 miles, mostly in woods, in 53 days. Travelling in March and April when the ice was rotten and dangerous, and with his provisions on his back, the lieutenant's feat was, in the opinion of Governor Parr, well worth the

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1. Haldimand to Maj-Gen. Paterson, - April, 1783; and Haldimand to Parr, 8 May, 1783; both in the Haldimand Collection 1761-83, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 367, pp. 104 and 105.
 2. Haldimand to Parr, 7 July, 1783, ibid., page 110.
 3. Parr to Carleton, 15 August, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369, Doc. 69.
 4. Carleton to Parr, 5 September, 1783, ibid., Doc. 51
 5. Haldimand to Parr, 26 November, 1783, Haldimand Collection, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 367, Doc. 112.
 6. Haldimand to Fox, 26 November, 1783, ibid., Doc. 113.
 7. Parr to Grenville, 23 April, 1790, Governor's Despatches 1789-94, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48.

expense account of £46 7s. plus a guinea a day.⁽¹⁾

Military communications within Nova Scotia itself, although much shorter, reflected some of the same difficulties as those between Halifax and London or Quebec. The solution, however, was much simpler and consisted largely of a system of Army expressmen who rode a regular mail run to Windsor and Annapolis every two weeks.⁽²⁾

As outlined above, overseas military communications between 1783 and 1793 were essentially unreliable and slow, especially in the winter months, but by the end of the period some progress had been made towards improving them. This progress, however, was the result of civil or commercial effort as well as of military action. In the meantime, until the improvements were effected, unsatisfactory communications continued to weaken the military forces in their peace-time operations. This was particularly applicable to the Navy where the confusion surrounding the enforcement of the Navigation Laws and the fisheries was to some extent caused by the delays in receiving instructions and policy guidance from London.

Stores

Included in naval and military stores in the 18th century were the same types of items that comprise modern logistic support, viz. provis-

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1. Parr to Nepean, 11 September, 1790, ibid. It does not compare favourably, however, with the Halifax postal account for public service letters delivered to Halifax from Great Britain, Quebec and New Brunswick between 8 August, 1784, and 12 May, 1789. This account totalled only £66 17s. 2d. (Sterling). Steele (treasury) to Parr, 5 February, 1790, Board of Trade Despatches 1784-99, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entries for 22 January, 1784, 7 February, 1784, and 14 May, 1784.

ions, fuel, money, bedding, mess or barracks furniture, rigging, sails, repair materials, lubricants, candles, etc. The organization in London responsible for procuring and distributing naval stores was the Navy Office; its counterpart in Halifax was the stores organization in the Dockyard under the Commissioner and the Naval Storekeeper. For the Army the responsibility in London rested with the Quartermaster-General; in Halifax it was divided into several functions and assigned to various Deputy and Assistant Commissaries, Storekeepers and Paymasters.⁽¹⁾ With respect to arms and ammunition, the Army and the Navy were both served by the same authority, the Ordnance Board, and its representatives in the Ordnance Yard at Halifax.

Procedures for procuring stores were generally the same for both Services. Some stores were supplied from Britain and shipped to Halifax in transports hired by the Navy Office. Other stores, particularly provisions, were purchased on contract from local merchants or from the Halifax agents of merchants in London. The stores when received in Halifax, if not required for immediate issue, were placed in store-houses. During the period 1783-93, one new main store-house was built by the Army in the Ordnance Yard and plans formulated for another.⁽²⁾ The Navy's store-houses in the Dockyard, which were in better condition, were merely repaired from time to time as part of routine base maintenance.

The handling and processing of the stores received at Halifax were also similar to to-day's practice. Incoming items were checked for de-

1. See Appendix VI.

2. Sutherland to Board of Ordnance, 5 May, 1790; Sutherland to Ogilvie, 22 August, 1790; Sutherland to Board of Ordnance, 23 August, 1791; and Sutherland to Richmond, 17 October, 1791; all in P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B".

facts,⁽¹⁾ issues were made in accordance with authorized allowances,⁽²⁾ and periodic checks of inventory carried out.⁽³⁾ Heads of Departments were obliged to report their holdings,⁽⁴⁾ surplus items were returned to the storekeepers,⁽⁵⁾ stores were periodically examined for damage,⁽⁶⁾ and items no longer required for service use were disposed of by public auction.⁽⁷⁾ To review these procedures and transactions and confirm their propriety and accuracy there was a permanent auditing group.⁽⁸⁾

Early in the period, the armed forces and the civilian community both had difficulty procuring provisions. The Army was the first to suffer, because of the excessive demands made on its Commissary by the large numbers of troops returning from New York, and by the need to supply provisions to the settlers.⁽⁹⁾ By December, 1783, the situation was so serious that a request for any food that could be spared was made to the Dockyard.⁽¹⁰⁾ A

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1. Ogilvie to Bartlett, 23 March, 1792, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. 3, asking that 138,000 shingles received by contract be counted and examined.
 2. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 8 November, 1783.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 5 April, 1784.
 4. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entries for 8 August, and 9 August, 1783.
 5. Ibid., entry for 12 October, 1783. In addition, H.M. Ships were directed to land all unwanted stores in Dockyard before proceeding home to England. Sawyer to Stephens, 22 May, 1787, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 6. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entries for 19 June, 1783, and 29 June, 1783; and P.A.N.S. HQ 2 entry for 2 February, 1784.
 7. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 29 May, 1783.
 8. Ibid., entry for 11 October, 1783.
 9. Infra, p. 133.
 10. Campbell to North, 18 December, 1783, C.O. 217/56; and Campbell to Duncan, 31 December, 1783, HAL/F/2.

transfer was arranged⁽¹⁾ but the problem remained a recurring one for almost a year.⁽²⁾

One of the Navy's problems with provisions was that of price. In 1785, the farmers were accused by Commodore Sawyer of taking advantage of the prohibition of American ships from Halifax by not sending their cattle to market, except in small numbers "... at an exorbitant price, Beef and Mutton selling at ten pence per pound."⁽³⁾ To combat these monopolistic prices and relieve the fresh meat shortage facing the Squadron, a British vessel and crew, accompanied by H.M.S. Mercury, was sent to Boston and brought back a load of live cattle.

As well as provisions, there were also problems in procuring naval stores such as timber, turpentine, tar, pitch, and hemp. To the Navy, a steady and reliable supply of timber for masts, spars, yards, planking, decking and frames was of urgent concern. For many years Britain had relied on countries in the Baltic area for most of its timber,⁽⁴⁾ but there had also been an increasingly important supply from New England.⁽⁵⁾ After the Peace of 1783, the supply from the latter source became as dependent upon diplomatic affairs as that from the Baltic, and Britain was forced to turn to the resources of Quebec and Nova Scotia. By this time, however,

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1. Duncan to A. Thomson, Agent Victualler, 3 January, 1784, HAL/F/1.
 2. Campbell to Sydney, 29 April, 1784, and 14 June, 1784, and Sydney to Campbell, 5 October, 1784; all in C.O. 217/41.
 3. Sawyer to Stephens, 23 July, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 4. G.S. Graham, British Policy and Canada 1774-91, p. 100.
 5. R.G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power - The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 1652-1862, Hamden, Connecticut, 1965, p. 280.

the masts on peninsular Nova Scotia, which had been used as a source of supply since 1721,⁽¹⁾ had been depleted, and the search had to be diverted towards New Brunswick and Cape Breton Island. The basic problem of scarcity was further complicated by the need to find timber that was accessible. Quality and size were important but the over-riding consideration was the ability to move the timber to wherever it was needed.

Recognizing the seriousness of the problem and the impact that settlement would have on Nova Scotia's timber resources, a clause was inserted in the 1783 instructions to the Governor that no land grants were to be made until the Surveyor-General of the Woods, or his deputy, had viewed and marked out reserved areas. As decreed by the King "... the reserving of such bodies of Land within Our Province of Nova Scotia where there are considerable Growths of Timber fit for the use of Our Royal Navy, is a matter of the utmost importance for our Service."⁽²⁾ Early evidences of the need for masts in Halifax were the despatch of a transport to the St. John river in the winter of 1783-84 to pick up masts,⁽³⁾ and Commissioner Duncan's personal survey of the Bay of Fundy area the following summer for possible sources of timber supply.⁽⁴⁾

By October, 1784, the Surveyor-General of the Woods, John Wentworth,

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1. Ibid., p. 351.
 2. Instructions to Governor Farr from King George III, 10 June, 1783, Royal Instructions to Governors of Nova Scotia, Vol 2, 1756-90, P.A.N.S. Vol. 349.
 3. Duncan to Master of Hired Transport Britannia, 4 December, 1783, HAL/F/1.
 4. Douglas to C.O.s H.M.S. Ariadne and Bonetta, 16 July, 1784; and Duncan to Navy Office, 2 November, 1784, HAL/F/2.

had travelled "... near three thousand miles to explore the country and examine the timber, and the water communications whereby it may be cheapest and most certainly brought to places of exportation."⁽¹⁾ Included in the reserves that he established was one at Grand Lake of oak timberland which he believed would supply useful timber for repair work at the Dockyard. With his usual optimism he reported that masts, spruce for smaller spars, elm, ash birch, beech and maple, all abounded there in "great perfection."⁽²⁾ Over the next few years, Wentworth's travels allowed him to survey thousands of square miles in Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island and New Brunswick. By June, 1785, he had reserved over 100,000 acres, the largest reservation being one of 23,200 acres in the Passamaquoddy Bay area, and the smallest a lot of 17 acres at St. George on the same bay.⁽³⁾ For convenience to Halifax, reservations were made near Liscomb's Harbour, Port Medway, and Hammond's Plains.⁽⁴⁾ The best mast timber that Wentworth found, however, were the pines in the Miramichi area. These exceeded "... any shipped from New England for forty years past."⁽⁵⁾ As an early North American conservationist he deplored the wasteful practices of the contractors who cut down ten trees for every one they used,⁽⁶⁾ and urged that strong action be taken against the unauthorized timber-cutting in New

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1. Wentworth to Navy Office, 8 October, 1784, Wentworth's Letter Book Vol. 4, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
 2. Wentworth to Steele, 7 October, 1784, ibid.
 3. Item by Sam Paine, Deputy Surveyor-General, 9 June, 1785, Miscellaneous Documents of Nova Scotia, Vol. 5, 1783-87, P.A.N.S. Vol. 223, Doc. 174.
 4. Wentworth to Navy Office, 12 July, 1786, and 28 May, 1787, Wentworth's Letter Book, Vol. 4, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
 5. Wentworth to Navy Office, 29 December, 1788, ibid.
 6. Wentworth to Navy Office, 16 April, 1785 (or 1786?), ibid.

Brunswick.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, Wentworth himself was not faultless, and, by charging the settlers with illegal survey fees, attracted unfavourable notice in Whitehall.⁽²⁾

Although exports of oak timber, or fir and pine timber, were never significant, after 1787 exports of masts (over twelve inches in diameter) from New Brunswick to Great Britain increased steadily. In 1802, of 8541 masts imported into Britain, 2234 were from New Brunswick.⁽³⁾ Thus, despite the difficulties caused by weaknesses and abuses in the reservation system and by the great distances involved, the Government's mast policy achieved its aim. Not only were the immediate needs of the Squadron met, but those of a great many Royal Navy ships in Europe as well.

Two other essential naval stores were hemp and flax. Hemp was needed for caulking and the manufacture of ropes and cables, and flax for sails. For both items Britain relied heavily on Russia and, in the uncertain international relations of the period, an alternative supply was desirable. Undismayed by failures to develop hemp or flax cultivation in the Thirteen Colonies, the new Board of Trade after 1784 undertook to encourage their growth in British North America. A preliminary study by the Nova Scotia Assembly reported that the soil and climate were both favourable but that a bounty like that formerly provided in America should be considered.⁽⁴⁾ Prompted by Governor Parr, who advised that "... hemp

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1. Wentworth to James Glenie, 9 May, 1790, ibid.
 2. Sydney to Parr, 20 April, 1786, Board of Trade Despatches 1784-99, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 3. R.G. Altion, Forests and Sea Power, Appendix D.
 4. Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Manuscript Documents, Vol. 1, 1758-87, 24 December, 1785, P.A.N.S. Vol. 301, Doc. 71.

raising should be attended to with ... the utmost exertion,⁽¹⁾ the Assembly again took up the matter and voted a bounty of "... £50 for the greatest quantity of merchandisable hemp not less than one ton."⁽²⁾ These efforts and similar ones with respect to flax, particularly in Canada, failed in their objectives, however, and Britain's dependence on Russia continued.

Although there were also problems in Halifax during the peace-time period concerning such stores items as pitch, tar, turpentine and whale oil (for lamps), these largely concerned the civil authorities who needed them to support the fisheries and carrying trade and wished to import them from the United States.⁽³⁾ The Army and Navy normally received these stores from other colonies via Great Britain, and no shortages or difficulties in their procurement are recorded.

Manning and Recruitment

Two basic reasons have been advanced for the Army's problems in recruiting in the late 18th century. One was that more profitable occupations were available elsewhere, and the other was the Army's poor reputation. "Bad as some of the conditions of industrial life were, there was not present the danger of a public disciplinary flogging; and hard as an

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1. Address by Governor Parr to the Assembly, 25 October, 1787, Selections from Files of the N.S. Legislative Council, Vol. 2, 1760-90, P.A.N.S. Vol. 286, Doc. 159.
 2. "Abstract of Monies voted by the Assembly in 1787," Manuscript Documents Vol. 1, 1758-87, P.A.N.S. Vol. 301, Doc. 97.
 3. Wentworth to Dundas, 25 October, 1792, Governor's Despatches 1789-94, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48. In 1793, Parliament passed an act permitting the entry from the United States of pitch, tar, and turpentine into Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

employer might be, he did not exercise a control over one's clothing, appointments and mode of walking."⁽¹⁾ Thus, "The great principle of supply ... was that of conscription limited to the criminal and pauper classes."⁽²⁾ To almost as great a degree the same problem beset the Navy, and for both Services the period was one of continuous shortage of man-power.

Recruitment of personnel, for both the Army and the Navy, was largely carried out in England. Men normally joined for life, but because of sickness, desertion,⁽³⁾ and death, units were almost always under strength. In the case of the Army, recruiting parties were sent home from North America to tour the counties and cities associated with the regiment and to try to sign up replacements.⁽⁴⁾ To attract recruits bounties of three guineas were offered in addition to a bonus of two guineas to the recruiting-sergeant. These inducements were insufficient, however, and in 1787 it was officially stated in England that "The whole country is over-run with recruiting officers and their crimps, and the price of men has risen to 15 guineas a head at least."⁽⁵⁾ As a means of augmenting the supply of men from England, Army attempts to recruit in Nova Scotia proved unsatisfact-

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1. T.H. McGuffie, "Recruiting the Ranks of the Regular British Army During the French Wars," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 34, 1956, p. 50.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Simeon Perkins recorded on 13 October, 1790, that the Marine Officer from H.M.S. Rattler was ashore in Liverpool searching for five deserters from the ship. Diary of Simeon Perkins 1790-96, p. 61.
 4. "Warrant for Regulating the Recruiting and Reviewing of the several Regiments of Foot upon Foreign Stations," George III, 9 January, 1763, re-promulgated by Haldimand 23 August, 1784, in the Quebec Order Book and contained in General Orders 1784-1786, P.A.N.S.
 5. Quoted in A. Lee, History of the 33rd Foot, Norwich, 1922, p. 143.

ory. "There are no good Recruits to be got in this Province, most of those enlisted by Colonel Elherington have either Desert'd or been Drum'd out of the Regiment."⁽¹⁾

The Navy's manning problems were partially solved by the rotation of ships to and from England where they could top up their complements with whatever volunteers they could find. Local recruiting was also attempted⁽²⁾ but, again, the results were minimal. Like the Army, the Navy in Halifax was continually under strength and on at least one occasion a ship was forced to remain in harbour because of lack of seamen.⁽³⁾ At the time of the Nootka Sound Affair, when efforts to bring the ships up to war-time complements failed, Admiral Hughes was forced to resort to impressment. First, since impressing men without the permission of the local civil authorities would have been an " ... Outrageous breach of Law,"⁽⁴⁾ he had to refer the matter to the Provincial Government. The Council, however, not believing that impressment was justified by the local situation

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1. Major Peter Hunter to Haldimand, 20 May, 1787, Haldimand Collection Vol. 1, 1761-83, P.A.N.S. Vol. 366, p. 118.
 2. N.S. Gazette, 1 July, 1783, advertising for six or more good seamen for H.M. Brig Brandywine.
 3. Sawyer to Stephens, 12 July, 1786, Adm. 1, Vol. 491, reporting that H.M.S. Weazel was 21 men short and unable to obtain more at that season.
 4. Proclamation of Governor Parr, 27 November, 1782, Royal Proclamations 1748-1807, P.A.N.S. Vol. 346, Doc. 86. In England, impressment could only be authorized by the issue of a press-warrant by the Government at Whitehall. Each ship had to have a warrant of its own and once the decision to use impressment had been made, these warrants had to be made out by Admiralty clerks. Since the warrants were issued only in war or when war was imminent, advance notice of them was extremely valuable, especially on the Stock Exchange, and the clerks were often bribed. In any event, by the time the ship's captain received the warrant most of the eligible sailors in the port had been warned and had gone into hiding. Michael Lewis, A Social History, pp. 95-104.

refused to authorize it.⁽¹⁾ Hughes, surprised by the refusal and blaming it on the local commercial interests, who wanted seamen for their merchant ships,⁽²⁾ therefore had to fall back on the payment of bounties.

To obtain the money for the bounties Hughes turned to Commissioner Duncan. But, since the latter did not consider himself authorized, Hughes charged them to his own Contingency Account, and then, citing English precedents, requested Admiralty approval.⁽³⁾ The bounties failed to attract recruits, however,⁽⁴⁾ and later in the year, when word was received that Admiralty had not approved them,⁽⁵⁾ they were stopped. Conveniently, since the war scare ended about the same time, complements were ordered back to peace-time levels and the matter was dropped.⁽⁶⁾ What it proved was that, short of actual war, the interests of the Nova Scotia Government and the opportunities for seamen in commercial employment made any substantial recruitment by the Navy practically impossible. It also served to emphasize the lack of a floating population at Halifax and the unattractiveness of the naval life itself.

Housing and Quartering

For the men of the Navy and for most of its officers, housing and quartering on the Halifax Station presented few difficulties. Most lived

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1. R. Bulkeley, Council Minute dated 6 July, 1790, enclosed in Hughes to Stephens, 12 July, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 2. Hughes to Stephens, ibid.
 3. Hughes to Stephens, 25 July, 1790, ibid.
 4. Hughes to Stephens, 16 August, 1790, ibid.
 5. Admiralty Accountant-General to Duncan, 23 August, 1790, and 22 September, 1790, both in Adm. 49, Vol. 150; and Hughes to Stephens, 13 October, 1790, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 6. Hughes to Stephens, 9 April, 1791, ibid.

aboard their ships and, if they had families, left them at home in Britain.⁽¹⁾ Aboard ship the only special problem about the Station was that of keeping warm. Accordingly, an increase in the ships' fuel allowances became necessary.⁽²⁾ Otherwise the naval accommodation was little different from that on any other overseas station.

The commanders-in-chief, on the other hand, because they were accompanied by their families, and because living aboard their flagships anchored in the harbour made it difficult for them to perform their duties ashore, required houses.⁽³⁾ Although Douglas obtained Admiralty approval to acquire a house, no suitable one was available. He therefore arranged for the Surgeon's apartment in the Hospital to be fitted out as an Admiral's quarters,⁽⁴⁾ while the Surgeon was provided with rented accommodation ashore.⁽⁵⁾ For the Dockyard Commissioner, a residence was already in existence. Its condition, however, was so poor that a new large wooden structure was erected as a replacement at a cost of £2186.⁽⁶⁾ This house, "... a very pretty residence,"⁽⁷⁾ was located at the south end of the Dockyard and remained standing until 1909.

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1. One exception at least was Captain Buller of H.M.S. Erisk and H.M.S. Dido who was observed on shore with his wife when the latter vessel visited Liverpool. S. Perkins, Diary 1790-96, 1 June, 1790, p. 29.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 4 January, 1786; and Sawyer and Duncan to Stephens, 27 June, 1786; both in Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 3. Douglas to Stephens, 1 September, 1783, ibid.
 4. Duncan to Respective Officers, 14 June, 1784, HAL/F/1.
 5. Sawyer to Stephens, 5 June, 1786, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 6. Navy Office to R.O.s, 8 March, 1785, HAL/F/1.
 7. B. de Saint-Mesmin, "Journal of Our Navigation leaving from the port of Falmouth to that in Halifax in Nova Scotia - 12 June, 1793," Report of the Department of Public Archives for 1946, Ottawa, 1947, p. xxviii.

Army requirements for quarters for the troops were met almost entirely by barracks. At the end of 1783 there were thirteen barracks in the Halifax garrison area with space for nearly 2700 men,⁽¹⁾ and no additional ones were built until after 1793. The barracks were maintained by the Engineers under the direction of the Barrack-Master.⁽²⁾ Men with families lived in separated sections of the barracks and when the men's formations moved to the Nova Scotia outposts, the families moved as well. Since the families also drew Army rations, they had little or no direct contact with the local economy. As a result there were few accommodation problems either for the single soldier or for the married one who was accompanied by his family.

Officers of the Army lived either in their messes or, if they had their families with them, in rented houses in the town. Rental allowances were paid to these officers,⁽³⁾ but when General Campbell complained that "The extortionate demands of the proprietors of houses for Rent is beyond example, for a very indifferent house in which the successive Commanders have resided, a Rent of £170 a year is now demanded ...,"⁽⁴⁾ and proposed that a residence be provided, there is no evidence of a reply.⁽⁵⁾ At the same time, his request for a special allowance to cover the excessive

1. See Appendix X.

2. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 1 August, 1783; and Sutherland to Richmond, 16 October, 1789, and 11 May, 1791, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B".

3. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 17 April, 1784.

4. Campbell to North, 18 December, 1783, C.O. 217/56.

5. Despite a hastener, drawing attention to the original proposal; Campbell to Sydney, 29 August, 1784, C.O. 217/41.

expenses attached to his position was refused.⁽¹⁾ For Army Officers living in messes there were also financial handicaps. Not only were their expenses high for food and drink, but in addition, they were expected to furnish their own quarters in style.⁽²⁾

In summary, although the barracks in Halifax were crowded at the beginning of the period because of the evacuation of the troops from New York, by the end of 1783 the situation had eased and barrack accommodation was adequate. Amenities may have been lacking, such as proper heating, especially for those personnel arriving from the Southern Colonies or the West Indies, but no serious discontent has been recorded. The principal problem, in fact, appears to have been the lack of suitable accommodation for the officers at rents that they were able or willing to pay.

Discipline

Judged by modern standards the period 1783-93 at Halifax was marked by a disproportionately large number of disciplinary problems with naval officers. According to the opinion that a young midshipman, who served under Prince William and visited Halifax several times, had of his senior officers, most of these problems might have been expected.

The Leander afforded but a bad example to the rest of the Squadron, and perhaps there never was an assemblage of ships so much requiring a good example. Sir James Barclay, the captain, was about as much fit to command a man-of-war as any other old woman in the kingdom.⁽³⁾

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1. Sydney to Campbell, 5 October, 1784, ibid., p. 426.
 2. Col. L.I. Cowper, The King's Own, Vol. I, p. 288.
 3. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 52. Martin though only 14 years old at the time he was at Halifax did not write his memoirs until many years later. He became an Admiral of the Fleet in 1849.

Another ship, H.M.S. Brisk, was commanded by Captain Edward Buller " ... who was no patron of temperance principles, and even in his sober moments about as much of a seaman as his grandmother."⁽¹⁾ Captain Paul Minchin of H.M.S. Resource, who had a large black bear that he used to play with, was described as " ... a dull clodpole, ... of good family but without one quality, natural or acquired, to fit him for the society of gentlemen, or to qualify him for the rank he held."⁽²⁾ And, in 1788, in acting command of the Halifax Squadron was Captain Charles Sandys of H.M.S. Dido, "... one of those vulgar, drunken dolts who bring discredit on the naval service."⁽³⁾ When Prince William went aboard Dido to wait upon Sandys, he "found the sot in bed drunk."⁽⁴⁾

Several actual examples of questionable conduct by officers on the Station during this period tend to support the midshipman's judgement. In 1784, Lieutenant White, the commanding officer of the galley H.M.S. Vixen, deserted his ship.⁽⁵⁾ Another case arose from a dispute between Commodore Sawyer and Captain Bentinck, the commanding officer of the flagship, H.M.S. Assistance. The affair started when Sawyer wrote to Bentinck that

Some Irregularities having been committed last night by two Marines belonging to His Majesty's Ship under your Command whose Wives have hired themselves to us as House Maids, I am to desire that you will give Orders that the Husbands of

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1. Ibid., p. 93. Buller later became a vice-admiral and baronet.
 2. Ibid., p. 103.
 3. Ibid., p. 125.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Douglas to Stephens, 1 August, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491

those Women do not come on Shore, nor that the Women be permitted to go on board till we can provide ourselves with other Servants which we shall do as soon as possible ...⁽¹⁾

Bentinck, however, refused to carry out his superior's order:

... not conceiving small irregularities in a private House, in any wise connected with the Service, and the Captain of the Ship having the entire right of punishment in every Case but that of a Court Martial...⁽²⁾

In reply, Sawyer delivered what was in effect an ultimatum:

Before I proceed to extremities I wish you Sir, to consider with Coolness and deliberation, the contents of your Letter of Yesterday, for I can by no means allow that you as Captain of the Ship where my Pendant is flying, "have the entire right of Punishment in any case but that of a Court Martial," and, I am equally sure you cannot be supported in refusing to obey any Order you receive from me; If the Order is an improper one, I am the Person to be answerable for it.⁽³⁾

What had begun as a petty affair had now reached the stage of serious insubordination and when Bentinck still refused to obey the order, Sawyer suspended him from command and referred the matter to Admiralty for direction.⁽⁴⁾ While this was en route to England, Bentinck requested a court martial.⁽⁵⁾ This was refused, however, on the grounds that it would be improper until direction was received from Admiralty, and that there were insufficient captains on the Station to conduct it.⁽⁶⁾ But Bentinck persisted with his request and Sawyer was obliged to forward it to Admiralty.

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1. Sawyer to Bentinck, 15 November, 1785, ibid.
 2. Bentinck to Sawyer, 16 November, 1785, ibid.
 3. Sawyer to Bentinck, 17 November, 1785, ibid.
 4. Sawyer to Stephens, 19 November, 1785, ibid.
 5. Bentinck to Sawyer, 22 January, 1786, ibid.
 6. Sawyer to Bentinck, 23 January, 1786, ibid.

ty.⁽¹⁾ Bentinck remained in his limbo for six months and then "... thoroughly convinced of his Error, and of the Impropriety of his Conduct, and having made proper Concessions ... for the same,"⁽²⁾ he was removed from suspension by Sawyer and re-instated in command of the flagship.

Meanwhile, Captain Stanhope of H.M.S. Mercury had incurred Sawyer's displeasure by writing him a disrespectful letter after Mercury had been criticized for faulty flag signals in Halifax harbour. Again, although the matter was viewed seriously and Sawyer thought that a court martial was warranted, there were not enough captains in the port and he could only refer the case to Admiralty.⁽³⁾ By this time Mercury had finished her tour on the Station and, with Stanhope still in command, had returned to England. The final disposition of the case is unknown. However, it is unlikely Stanhope came off unscathed, for a report of the reprehensible style of his correspondence with the Governor of Massachusetts, over insults Stanhope claimed to have received from the people and press of Boston, had also been sent to London.⁽⁴⁾ This report was in turn passed to Lord Howe, the First Lord of the Admiralty.⁽⁵⁾

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1. Sawyer to Bentinck, 24 January, 1786, ibid. Although it was winter Sawyer considered the matter urgent enough to send H.M.S. Brisk to England with a report of it.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 11 June, 1786, ibid. There is considerable doubt that Bentinck's stand concerning the disciplining of the flagship's crew was, in fact, improper even in 1785. Present practice would be that the ship's Captain, not the Commodore, would discipline the crew. The practice to-day would also require that the captain obey the Commodore's order immediately and then, if he did not agree with the order, state a grievance.
 3. Sawyer to Stephens, 15 May, 1786, ibid.
 4. Jay to Adams, 6 September, 1785, in W.R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 15.
 5. Adams to Jay, 27 October, 1785, ibid.

The next disciplinary incident concerned another ship captain, Edward Buller of H.M.S. Brisk, who on arrival back in Halifax from England sent a negro boy to the Governor with the despatches and failed to pay the customary call.⁽¹⁾ He soon repented, however, and apologised for what Parr afterwards chose to consider a youthful indiscretion.⁽²⁾

Naval officers were again shown in a bad light while the Squadron was at Quebec in 1787. The circumstances were that John Bullen, Masters Mate of H.M.S. Resource, had been found guilty of taking the First Lieutenant "... by the collar in a riotous and mutinous manner,"⁽³⁾ during a quarrel in the cockpit, and sentenced to death. By design or chance, the execution was scheduled for the ship's yard-arm in full view of hundreds of spectators who had just witnessed a demonstration of the Battle of Quebec by troops from the garrison. After the rope had been placed around Bullen's neck, however, Commodore Sawyer reprieved him. The granting of mercy, which had been recommended by the Court Martial and by Prince William,⁽⁴⁾ was probably delayed in this manner by Sawyer to achieve a dramatic effect on the crews of the Squadron ships present. Regrettably, it also gave the public more evidence of the basic cruelty of some naval discipline.

The final example of officers' disciplinary problems was the court martial of Captain Isaac Coffin of H.M.S. Thisbe in 1788 for falsely re-

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1. Parr to Nepean, 28 June, 1786, C.O. 217/58.
 2. Parr to Nepean, 12 July, 1786, ibid.
 3. T. Eyam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 105.
 4. Sawyer to Stephens, 19 November, 1787, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.

porting the muster of three young men, his nephew and Lord Dorchester's two sons, who had been entered on his ship's books to give them the earliest possible seniority dates as midshipmen. Coffin was found guilty and dismissed his ship. Lord Howe, on reviewing the case at Admiralty, considered the punishment inadequate and ordered Coffin struck from the Navy List of post captains. Coffin, however, after appealing, was re-instated on the List and continued to serve until he died as a Rear-Admiral and baronet.⁽¹⁾ After Coffin's court martial, the practice of false musters, which up until then had been regarded as acceptable, rapidly died out.⁽²⁾

Problems of discipline with the men were proportionately less frequent than with the officers. One of the most serious crimes was desertion and strong efforts were made to combat it, both by preventive action beforehand and by severe punishments to those who were apprehended. Troops were warned not to conspire at shielding deserters,⁽³⁾ and rewards promised for recovering them.⁽⁴⁾ When recovered, deserters' punishments by court martial ranged from 1000 lashes with a cat-of-nine-tails on the bare back⁽⁵⁾

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1. W.L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, Vol. III, p. 350.
 2. T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 127fn. The Bishop of Nova Scotia's opinion of the Coffin affair was as follows. "The sentence of the Court Martial that tried him, is very extraordinary. He is in fact acquitted with honour; and yet he is removed from his Ship; and I am firmly persuaded there is not a Post Captain in the Navy, of equal standing, who would not on trial, be liable to similar treatment. My son, a child 5 years old was borne on the Europe's books (a line of battle ship) upwards of a twelvemonth at New York; but without pay or rations as was the case in Captain Coffin's instance; & it was universally practised in the navy." Inglis to Lord Dorchester, 20 May, 1788, Charles Inglis Papers, Letter Book c-23, P.A.N.S.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 17 August, 1783.
 4. N.S. Gazette, 17 June, 1783; and P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 7 June, 1784.
 5. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 29 January, 1784.

to death.⁽¹⁾ In the latter case, orders were explicit that the sentences were to be executed speedily. It was also prescribed that these orders be read to soldiers and recruits in the presence of their officers.⁽²⁾

For a Hessian soldier who was negligent on watch, the punishment was thirty days stoppage of spruce beer,⁽³⁾ for a private convicted of stealing watches the sentence was "five hundred lashes in the usual manner,"⁽⁴⁾ while for a private who threatened revenge on a sergeant, it was an apology and four days in the guard house.⁽⁵⁾ A few years later a naval man was sentenced to death, with a recommendation for mercy, for collaring and striking his officers ashore. Two others charged with being accessories to a murder aboard H.M.S. Dido, and a marine charged with striking the boatswain, however, were all acquitted.⁽⁶⁾

Although some of these examples of offences and punishments may look harsh to-day, they were probably reasonably moderate for the Army and Navy of the late 18th century.⁽⁷⁾ The only distinctive characteristic of the discipline of the armed forces at Halifax, therefore, was the excessive insubordination and disrespect for authority that was shown by the officers.

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1. Ibid., entry for 2 September, 1784.
 2. War Office Order, 10 March, 1785, in General Orders 1784-1786, P.A.N.S.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry of 21 May, 1783.
 4. Ibid., entry of 18 October, 1783.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Hughes to Stephens, 10 October, 1789, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 7. As a means of comparing Service punishments with civilian ones of the period, it is noted that a woman convicted of stealing a quilted petticoat in Liverpool in 1785 was "... Sentenced to Receive 25 Stripes on her Naked Back, then to be Committed to the House of Correction Six months & pay Charges of Prosicution." S. Perkins, Diary 1780-89, p.295.

Health

Lacking knowledge of dietetics, human engineering, preventive medicine, and other later developments, health services at Halifax were limited to hospitals ashore and first aid facilities afloat. The naval hospital was situated at the north end of the Dockyard and, from the reports of the captains who visited it in turns every week, Commodore Sawyer concluded that it was "... under very good Regulation and good Order preserved, and the People supplied with as good and wholesome Food as the country can furnish for them."⁽¹⁾ Soon after, however, when some repairs were made and a more thorough examination conducted, it was found that more extensive work was required.⁽²⁾ In addition, because of daily complaints of the disorder and drunkenness of the seamen and marine patients, and the unreliability of some of the staff, a Master-at-Arms was stationed at the hospital. Subsequently an improvement was noted, and men recovered much more quickly.⁽³⁾ Two years later the hospital and health of naval personnel were described as follows:

An elegant and convenient building has been erected near the town, for the convalescence of the navy; but the healthiness of the climate has as yet prevented many persons from becoming patients, scarcely any ships in the world being so free from complaints of every kind, in regard to health, as those that are employed upon this station.⁽⁴⁾

This salubrity could not have lasted very long, for within a few years, cases of bad health were being reported among the senior officers of the Squadron. Captain Sandys of the Dido was relieved in command, and Captain

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1. Sawyer to Stephens, 23 July, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 2. Sawyer to Stephens, 12 October, 1785, ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. S. Hollingsworth, Present State of Nova Scotia, (1787), p. 141.

Knowl of the Adamant declared unfit for sea, both because of bad health.⁽¹⁾ The Commander-in-Chief, himself, reported that the severity of the previous winter had so injured his health that, unless he regained it, he would have to return to England.⁽²⁾ He later recovered and remained in Halifax. His son, however, the acting Captain of H.M.S. Sphinx, had to be sent south for health reasons, while another captain sailed the Sphinx back to England.⁽³⁾

Other than the above, there is such a scarcity of contemporary comment on the health of personnel of the Army and Navy that one can only conclude that it was not a matter of serious concern. Undoubtedly, personnel became ill, some went to hospital, some recovered, and some died, but rarely was the subject considered important enough to be included in official correspondence.

Religion

The administration of religious matters in the armed forces was the responsibility of the chaplains. Since there was a shortage of these in the Navy at Halifax,⁽⁴⁾ formal religious instruction and services in the ships and Dockyard languished, although sometimes the duties were assumed by regular ships' officers. When Sawyer was Commander-in-Chief, "... there was not a Chaplain for any of the Ships - a circumstance which he often regret-

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1. Hughes to Stephens, 27 May, 1791, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 2. Hughes to Stephens, 3 December, 1791, ibid.
 3. Hughes to Stephens, 18 May, 1792, ibid.
 4. By 1790, Admiralty Regulations required every Fifth-rate or higher to have a chaplain appointed. "But it is quite certain that this rule was not observed: and the reason was because there were nothing like enough clergymen who were prepared to go to sea." Michael Lewis, A Social History, p. 251.

ted."⁽¹⁾ In Hughes' time a chaplain was borne in H.M.S. Adamant, the flagship, but this may have been only temporary.⁽²⁾ To improve the situation a proposal was forwarded to Admiralty by Bishop Inglis suggesting that a resident chaplain be appointed for the 1000-1500 seamen in the Dockyard, hospital and ships. Payment of the chaplain's salary would be made either from a fund for this purpose, to which it was believed each sailor already contributed four pence a day, or from a special subscription. An additional suggestion was that every seamen's mess be provided with a bible, prayer book and a few religious tracts. As a means of making sure these suggestions would receive a sympathetic audience, Inglis pronounced his preference for "the honest bluntness of a common Seaman, to the smooth duplicity too often found upon land," and declared, with Hughes' concurrence, that the seamen were "as capable of improvement, as any whatsoever."⁽³⁾

In the Army, each regiment had a chaplain who remained at home in England and for whom the post was largely a sinecure. To carry out his actual duties, particularly when the regiment was deployed abroad, the chaplain arranged a deputy from amongst the local clergy. This deputy was then paid a small portion, about 2s. 6d. a day, from the chaplain's benefits. At Halifax, in addition to whatever deputy chaplains were appointed,

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1. Inglis to Lord Hood, 9 October, 1789, Inglis Papers, C-23, P.A.N.S.
 2. There is doubt that this chaplain, William Nicholson, who was only in deacon's orders, remained very long in his post. Although initially he frequently preached at St. Paul's and was preparing himself for ordination, he was criticized for using printed sermons and because "some marks of levity appeared in his conduct." An incident then occurred which is not explained, but from which it can be inferred that Nicholson's duties were terminated. Bishop Inglis' Journal, - May, 1790, ibid, C-4.
 3. Ibid.

there was a Garrison Chaplain who was paid 6s. per diem.⁽¹⁾ During the period from 1776 to 1794, and possibly later,⁽²⁾ this position was filled by Reverend Dr. Mather Byles, a Loyalist from a distinguished family from New England.

Early in the peace-time period there is evidence that Byles did, in fact, perform duties with the military forces. "The Battalion to which I have so often officiated at Birch-Cove was disbanded and embarked for England."⁽³⁾ On occasion, he also took part in funerals.⁽⁴⁾ For that of Colonel de Seitz of the Hessian Regiment, "Besides the usual perquisite of Gloves, Scarfe and Hatband, [he was] presented with an unexpected Guinea for [his] extraordinary Services."⁽⁵⁾ Later, however, when Byles was being considered for duties at St. John, the Bishop wrote that Byles, "who lives here wholly unemployed,"⁽⁶⁾ had "... no clerical duty whatever to perform here, and the Commander of His Majesty's forces has granted him leave of absence and permission to settle wherever he chuses in the British Dominions."⁽⁷⁾ Advised that Byles' transfer to St. John had not been approved, the Bishop provided more detail on the duties of the Garrison

1. Sydney to Parr, 19 August, 1784, Board of Trade Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
2. Although Byles moved to St. John in 1789 he is still shown as the Garrison Chaplain at Halifax in the 1794 Army List. In 1800 he is shown as the Chaplain at St. John.
3. Byles to Rev. Dr. Byles (Boston), 22 November, 1783, Mather Byles Papers 1777-1818, P.A.N.S. Byles recorded separately that he had officiated at Birch Cove 5 November, 1782, 27 April, 25 May, 20 July, 27 July, and 17 August, 1783. Byles to his Sisters, 6 February, 10 June, and 18 August, 1783, ibid.
4. Ibid., 20 February, 1784.
5. Ibid., 6 February, 1783.
6. Inglis to Archbishop of Canterbury, 18 April, 1788, Inglis Papers, C-23, P.A.N.S.
7. Inglis to Dr. Morice (Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel), 7 April, 1788, ibid.

Chaplain at Halifax.

... if Dr. Eyles had any duty whatever in this Garrison - had he been called on to baptize a child once a month, or even once a year, I should not consent to his leaving it. But having no duty to perform, & being a sensible, regular man & a good preacher, ... I thought it wrong to leave him here wholly idle & useless ... Add to this that he had leave of absence from the Commander in Chief, as each regiment had a Deputy Chaplain ... & that the Chaplains of Annapolis & Quebec reside in England, no difficulty appeared to me in the case. ... Dr. Byles had actually consented to appoint the Revd. Mr. Houseall, who resides here, to be his Deputy & to allow him part of his Salary.⁽¹⁾

Eyles, himself, confirmed the Bishop's assessment of the post. "As my chaplaincy here is a perfect Sinecure, I have Liberty to retain it, & Leave of Absence, appointing my own Deputy purely as a Matter of Form."⁽²⁾

But Chaplain's sinecures did not always work out as planned.

Stanser, who succeeded Breynton as rector at St. Paul's, had been led to expect that he would also be appointed Deputy Chaplain to regiments in the garrison and to the ships of war, and that he could thus considerably increase his emoluments.⁽³⁾ "Those perquisites, of right, belong to him as rector (for he has much trouble with the Soldiers and Seamen); & on the supposition that he would have them, the Society allowed him no more than £30 a year ..."⁽⁴⁾ As it turned out, however, Stanser received none of the posts. The 21st Regiment brought their own Dep-

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1. Inglis to Archbishop of Canterbury, 13 September, 1788, ibid.
 2. Byles to his Sisters, February or March, 1789, Mather Byles Papers, p. 28, P.A.N.S. The main reason that Army chaplaincies were sinecures was that the soldiers normally attended services in the public churches where the regular ministers officiated. Although Byles had been active while the troops were garrisoned out of town at Birch Cove, once they departed he had nothing left to do.
 3. Inglis to Archbishop of Canterbury, 30 November, 1789, Inglis Papers, C-23, P.A.N.S.
 4. Ibid., 20 March, 1792, referring to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

uty Chaplain to Halifax,⁽¹⁾ and Parr already had named one for the 16th. A similar appointment of a chaplain to replace one who had absconded from the flagship was also made locally before Stanser's arrival.⁽²⁾ As a result, the Bishop requested that Stanser be compensated and that new regulations be formulated governing chaplaincies.

The expenditure of public money on this account is considerable; yet little benefit arises from it on the present plan.

No Chaplains attend; the instruction of Soldiers & Seamen is neglected; if dissoluteness of manners prevails among many of them, it is a consequence that might be naturally expected. ... In short - the business of Chaplains calls for revision. Under proper regulations, they may be serviceable to the Army, Navy & Inhabitants.⁽³⁾

From the preceding paragraphs it is apparent that religious administration for the armed forces based at Halifax was casual at best. It is possible that regimental or garrison services were arranged only on special occasions. For example, when the Bishop visited Charlottetown in H.M.S. Dido, a Sunday service was arranged that was attended by the garrison and ninety sailors from the ship.⁽⁴⁾ On the other hand, at the beginning of the period a garrison order directing "Troops to march to and from Divine Service without Music; nor any drummer or Fifer to Beat or Play on a Sunday except on the Grand Parade ...,"⁽⁵⁾ indicates that

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1. This chaplain officiated at the Presbyterian Meeting House in Halifax in the absence of Dr. Brown, the regular minister. Inglis to Morice, 16 April, 1792, ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid. Chaplains' corps were established in the forces early in the 19th century.
 4. Bishop Inglis' Journal, 24 May, 1789, Inglis Papers, C-5, P.A.N.S. Since the town did not yet have a proper church, the service was held in the largest house available and attended by more than 300.
 5. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 17 November, 1783, repeating an order of 16 August, 1783.

Sunday church parades were a regular occurrence. Moreover, at the Annapolis garrison regular services were undoubtedly carried out, for when the Bishop visited there he found that the local church authorities were asking for about £100 to allow them to finish their church by building a gallery in it for the soldiers. ⁽¹⁾ What in fact probably happened, therefore, was that the troops stationed at Halifax were given reasonably regular services by the deputy chaplains but that otherwise little religious assistance was provided.

Morale

A useful measure of the effectiveness of the administrative processes of the armed forces can usually be obtained by a scrutiny of the forces' morale. Enough aspects have already been touched on in the discussions on service conditions, recruitment and discipline, to indicate that morale was generally low and that life in the peace-time forces was unable to appeal to men and officers in either the numbers or the qualities required. Other aspects of the problem are also worthy of note.

For both officers and men a key factor in reducing morale was inadequate pay. Even for the commanders-in-chief personally, the matter was a serious one. General Campbell recorded that it "... cost him not under three times the sum of his staff appointment to support his rank and dignity."⁽²⁾ Moreover, this low pay level was coupled with a system of imprests, whereby a senior officer's pay and allowances could be withheld for long periods, while possible deductions for unauthorized Command expenses

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1. Bishop Inglis' Journal, 31 August, 1788, Inglis Papers, C-5, P.A.N.S.
 2. Campbell to the Secretary at War, 20 September, 1785, C.O. 217/41.

were investigated. Both Digby ⁽¹⁾ and Douglas suffered great financial embarrassment by these imprests. With Douglas, it reached the point that many months after being relieved, he was being forced to consider selling what little stock he had so that he could support his family. ⁽²⁾

A factor attesting both the low morale of the Navy, and the lack of attractiveness of the Station, was the obvious desire of senior officers not to remain in Halifax, particularly in the winter months. Whether this was caused by a dislike of Nova Scotia or by strong family ties in Britain is moot. But the fact that at least three commanders-in-chief contrived to avoid service at Halifax or to leave the Station early indicates its lack of popularity. ⁽³⁾ It is certain that this reluctance of senior officers to serve at Halifax reflected the feelings of the lesser ranks, and by reinforcing these feelings, adversely affected the morale on the Station.

In the Army, even an unmarried young officer of the means and charm of Lieutenant Dyott was sometimes hard-pressed to maintain a high state

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1. Digby to Stephens, 28 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.
 2. Douglas to Stephens, 16 December, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 3. (a) Digby returned to England directly from New York rather than proceeding to Halifax "...at this season of the year." Digby to Stephens, 25 November, 1783, Adm. 1, Vol. 490.

(b) Douglas' passage from England to Halifax included several weeks in Barbados en route that delayed his arrival until June. Douglas to Stephens, 5 February, 1784 (at Barbados) and 10 June, 1784 (at Halifax), both in Adm. 1, Vol. 490.

(c) Sawyer, who requested relief for family reasons, arrived home in England several weeks earlier than expected on the excuse that he did not want Leander to make the passage any later than August because of her grounding the previous year. Sawyer to Stephens, 3 February, 1788, and 25 August, 1788, Adm. 1, Vol. 491. When Sawyer arrived in England, it was observed that he was "... not in very good Spirits." Sydney to Parr, 5 September, 1788, C.O. 217/60.

of morale.⁽¹⁾ Another Army officer, Lieutenant Sutherland of the Engineers, however, gave evidence of a less capricious morale by twice deferring his leave in order to be available for the war preparations of 1790.⁽²⁾ Regrettably, Sutherland's loyalty and fine example came to an early end three years later when he was killed at the Battle of Lannoy in Flanders. In reporting his untimely death it was noted that "... his ability in his profession, and worth in private life, [would] make him long and sincerely regretted by all who knew him."⁽³⁾ From such isolated examples it is impossible to assess accurately the actual state of the Army officers' morale, even if yard-sticks were available for measuring such abstract phenomena. Still, there were many diversions, like hunting, fishing, gambling and drinking, with which the officers could keep their spirits up, and it can be assumed, therefore, that generally their morale was satisfactory.

The men's morale, lacking the stimulus of war or the enticement of pay, was substantially conditioned by beer and rum. Early in the period, the practice was started of issuing the troops with three pints of good spruce beer instead of a ration of rum.⁽⁴⁾ Rum issue for work parties and artificers, however, was continued at the rate of one quarter of a pint per man per day.⁽⁵⁾ The Navy rum issue continued until 1785 when Commodore Sawyer, observing the rum in Nova Scotia had "... pernicious effects," ordered it not to be served except in cases of absolute necessity.⁽⁶⁾

1. W. Dyott, Diary, 1781-1845, Vol. I, p. 64.

2. Supra, p. 79.

3. Quoted by W. Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 219.

4. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 15 July, 1783.

5. Ibid., entry for 9 August, 1783.

6. Sawyer to Stephens, 12 October, 1785, Adm. 1, Vol. 491. The issue of rum to men from ships employed on shore was also stopped by Duncan.

But these set-backs to the position of rum as a Service staple were no more than temporary,⁽¹⁾ and only partially account for the low state of morale.

Given adequate food, clothing and quarters, the main elements lacking in the soldier's or sailor's life at Halifax were pay and good leadership. Of these, the most strikingly missing was the latter. However, at a time when commissions were awarded more as a result of social or of financial position than of merit, such a deficiency was probably neither uncommon in the forces of the period, nor peculiar to Halifax. The symptom may have been a local one; the illness itself was not.

Summary

Of the administrative problems faced by the forces at Halifax between 1783 and 1793, the most critical or absorbing ones were poor communications, man-power shortages, housing for Army officers, naval officers' discipline, and low morale. Although no progress was made during the period towards overcoming the man-power shortages or low morale, in communications a significant improvement was made by the introduction of faster and more reliable overseas and overland mail services. In the case of housing, the payment of extra allowances eased the difficulty somewhat for all officers except the Army commander. In addition, by the end of the period, the disciplinary problems with naval officers had decreased. Meanwhile, the administrative strengths had been maintained and no deteriorations in stores services,

1. Subsequent to Sawyer's and Duncan's action, substantial quantities continued to be licensed for the use of H.M. Ships. Minutes of H.M. Council for Nova Scotia, 10 October, 1783, to 24 December, 1798, Book E, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213, entries on 20 January, and 16 February, 1786, authorize 2000 and 1500 gallons respectively for naval use.

hospitals, quarters or men's discipline were recorded. On balance, in several respects the forces were stronger administratively at the end of the period than in the early years of it. They were unfortunately, fewer in strength and still lacked the vital requisite of high morale.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

The Governor and the Armed Forces

A matter of fundamental importance in understanding the role of the forces based at Halifax is an explanation of the command relationships that existed between the Governor and the Army and Navy commanders. Ideally, this explanation would be found by reviewing the terms of reference of the three major authorities and ascertaining the limits of each. Firm lines of responsibility would be quickly distinguished and the position of military and naval forces with respect to the Governor would be readily understood. Unfortunately, such terms of reference do not exist and much of the relationship was left undefined. By examining the records that are available, however, some light can be shed on this otherwise murky area.

Both of Parr's sets of titles, that of Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of Nova Scotia in 1782 and 1784, and that of Lieutenant-Governor and Commander-in-Chief in 1786 when Lord Dorchester became Governor, implied military command. Moreover, in both cases there is evidence that such command was intended. Included in Parr's commission from the King in 1784 was the grant of "... full power and Authority to levy Arm Muster Command and Employ all persons whatsoever residing within our said Province and Islands ... to march from one place to another or to embark them for the resisting and withstanding of all enemies ...". It also gave him power to execute martial law, and to build or demolish forts. Finally, the commission commanded "... all officers and ministers Civil and Military and all other Inhabitants...

to be obedient aiding and assisting ... the said John Parr in the execution of the powers and authorities herein contained ..."(1)

Although some of these powers related only to the command of the militia, the others could be construed to include command over regular forces as well. This interpretation of the scope of the Governor's responsibilities is strengthened by the King's Instruction to him to report on the state of the fortifications, ammunition and other war stores.(2)

A more explicit statement of the military powers that went with the office of Governor concerned Lord Dorchester's position at Quebec. At the time of Dorchester's appointment, a letter was prepared in Whitehall noting that he had been appointed to both the civil and the military command and would therefore settle any disputes between Army commands.(3) Similarly, an appreciation of the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor can be formed from an instruction issued to Lieutenant-Governor Des Barres of Cape Breton Island:

"... all orders to the Troops stationed within your district of Government should be issued by the officer commanding them, to whom...you are empowered... for the benefit of your Government to give Orders for the Marching of Troops under

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1. "Commission to John Parr Esq., Governor of Nova Scotia, September 11th, 1784," Public Archives of Canada, MSS Vol. 8.
 2. Instructions to Governor Parr, 1782, C.O. 218/9. Instruction No. 87; and the same, dated 1784, C.O. 217/35, Instruction No. 90. These instruction also indicated that Parr would be commissioned by Admiralty as a Vice-Admiral and that he was "... required and directed carefully to put in execution the several Powers thereby granted." ibid., Instruction No. 70.
 3. Rough draft of a letter to Major-General Campbell, 18 April, 1786, abstracted in D. Brymner, Report on Canadian Archives 1894, Ottawa, 1895, p. 441.

his Command the Disposition of them, the making and Marching of Detachments, Escorts, and such purely Military Services; but that you are not to Interfere in any Respect with the detail of the Regimental Duty and Discipline." (1)

Although neither of these examples applied specifically to Parr, there is sufficient duplication in the Instructions that were issued from London to the contemporary governors and lieutenant-governors to infer that the delineation was probably the same in Nova Scotia as in the other provinces. Such powers would also be consistent with Dorchester's general recommendations of 1783 when he wrote that the Governor of Nova Scotia ought "... to possess all the authority that can be delegated to the King's representative, for while he is accountable for his administration to the King in Council, the Dignity and influence of his station cannot be too great." (2)

Additional evidence of the Nova Scotia Governor's military authority was provided in September, 1787, when war with France threatened and the Secretary of State, by secret despatch directed Parr to take preparatory steps and report the state of the defences.⁽³⁾ Again, in 1793, when Whitehall addressed its order to initiate defence measures to the Lieutenant-Governor, it was made clear that he was considered in many respects as the military as well as the civil

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1. Yonge to Des Barres, 23 August, 1784, Secretary of State's patches to Governor of Cape Breton, 1784-97, P.A.N.S. Vol. 315, Doc. 2.
 2. Carleton to North, 5 October, 1783, Dorchester Papers Vol. 2, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369.
 3. Parr to Sydney, 14 November, 1787, C.O. 217/60 acknowledging Sydney's letter of 20 September, 1787.

commander of the Province. (1)

In practice, however, there were definite limitations on the exercise of the Governor's military authority. In August, 1783, when Parr proposed that troops be sent to prevent Americans from trespassing across the border near Passamaquoddy,⁽²⁾ the Army commander at Halifax claimed that a boundary commission and negotiation would provide a better solution than military force and he, therefore, "... did not incline to interfere in the matter."⁽³⁾ Parr again requested that an Army detachment be sent to the area in 1784,⁽⁴⁾ but was again turned down, and the refusal supported by Whitehall.⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand, when the Governor asked for troops to assist in maintaining order at Shelburne, the Army commander complied.⁽⁶⁾ It was thus demonstrated that troops would be deployed at the Governor's request only when considered necessary by the Army commander. In other words, the Governor's wide nominal powers were, in effect, subject to the veto of the Army commander.

In Parr's view these limitations became critical when Carleton returned to Canada in 1786 as Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief

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1. Wentworth to Dundas, 22 March, 1793, C.O. 217/64, p. 214.
 2. Parr to Fox, 14 August, 1783, Dorchester Papers Vol. 2, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369, Doc. 68.
 3. Fox to Carleton, 1 November, 1783, ibid., Doc. 210.
 4. Parr to Campbell, 21 June, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1763-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 5. Sydney to Campbell, 5 October, 1784, C.O. 217/41, p. 273.
 6. Campbell to Sydney, 26 August, 1784, ibid., p. 225.

over all of British North America.

I have met with several little Rubs in life, but never with one so Capital as this of being reduced from the Rank of Governor to that of Lieut Govr, my feelings are hurt exceedingly by it, as it decreases my consequence in the eye of every person on this side the Atlantic ... As some mark of Royal favor might in some degree re establish me, may I take the liberty to point out that of giving me the Rank of Major General in the Army, which I should have had, had I remained in it... (1)

Parr's difficulties were further emphasized at the time of the French threat in 1787.

I can not here avoid remarking ... that in case the French should pay us a Visit at Halifax, which I think not impossible, on account of the great importance of this Harbour and Careening Yard, I shall be at the greatest loss to know how to act with propriety in Military matters etc. with Colonel Ogilvie, who has got a letter of Service as Brig[adie]r General. I shall pay all oedience to the King's letters, but wish it had been otherwise, things would have been full as well conducted. (2)

Three months later, he drew attention to his discomfort in his military position once more.

... as the Civil Governors have not had any thing to say to the Fortifications, since the Military Command has been taken from them, may I request to know how far, (I hope not at all) I may interfere in them, I have always acted with the greatest caution in respect of every thing Military either by Sea or Land, from a thorough knowledge of the jealousy of these People in cases of interference. (3)

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1. Parr to Nepean, 28 May, 1786, C.O. 217/58.
 2. Parr to Nepean, 14 November, 1787, *ibid.* Ogilvie's promotion was most important; had he remained a colonel, the actual command of the troops, in all matters except discipline and "economy", would have been transferred to Parr. See Yonge to Des Barres, 23 August, 1784, Secretary to State's Despatches to Governor of Cape Breton, 1784-97, P.A.N.S. 315 Doc. 2
 3. Parr to Nepean, 27 January, 1788, C.O. 217/60.

On the other hand, the Army commander was not satisfied with his powers either, and complained that the civil authority was encroaching on that of the military. He requested therefore, that in order to avoid rivalry between the two departments, the limits of commands be clearly delineated.⁽¹⁾ Hence, the doubtful areas of military authority were matters of concern to both parties. There is no indication, however, that further changes or clarification were provided, and the uncertain situation continued.

Despite this confusion, the arrangement generally worked well and relations between the Governor and armed forces commanders were quite cordial. When Brigadier-General Fox was relieved of his command, Parr praised "... his ready Aid and Compliance in every Measure for the King's Service..." and added that his "... Conduct in his Command has caused his departure to be much and universally regretted."⁽²⁾ The Governor's relations with Douglas were apparently less successful, for when his "old friend, Sawyer" arrived, Parr wrote "... we shall do well together, both as to public matters and that of family Society, neither of which I should have enjoyed near so well with his Predecessor."⁽³⁾ Campbell's departure was as much lamented as that of Fox "... he has been here 3½ years, during which time we have lived in the most perfect state of friendship, and public business has felt the good effect of it."⁽⁴⁾ The good feeling sometimes

1. Campbell to Secretary at War, 20 September, 1785, C.O. 217/41.

2. Parr to North, 16 December, 1783, C.O. 217/56.

3. Parr to Nepean, 1 August, 1785, C.O. 217/57.

4. Parr to Nepean, 25 May, 1787, C.O. 217/60.

extended from the Governor down to the Army unit level: "I cannot see your detachment of the 37th leave without giving testimony of their Orderly Behaviour and decent appearance at all times whilst on duty in this Garrison."⁽¹⁾ Marring the harmony only slightly were the minor incident between Parr and the Captain of H.M.S. Brisk,⁽²⁾ and a dispute with an Engineer who charged that Parr had been granting lands that had been reserved for fortifications.⁽³⁾

Thus, in the absence of a clear definition of military responsibility from London, what resulted at Halifax was a modus vivendi that took account both of customary practice and the personalities of the three main authorities. Whether Whitehall's policy of vagueness was by design or by accident, it was nevertheless realistic and ensured ultimately the optimum division of power. A more rigid allocation would have been unable to adapt to local exigencies, and would also have undermined the confidence of whichever authority was relegated to an inferior position. By avoiding this inflexibility, London gave the Halifax authorities the opportunity to evolve on the spot how control of the various military functions would be exercised. That this control fell increasingly into the hands of the Service commanders was as much the result of Parr's concessions as of Whitehall's directions. In due course, Parr's cooperation was reciprocated by the Service Commanders and an amicable relationship established that avoided

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1. Parr to Capt. Cameron, 28 July, 1789, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137.
 2. Supra, p. 111.
 3. Parr to Nepean, 12 June, 1787, and 13 July, 1787, C.O. 217/60. Parr countered the charges by noting that the lands were merely leased and wrote "The conduct of the Engineer continues very illiberal, I believe he is not right in his Head."

the serious disagreements that occurred in other colonies such as New Brunswick and Cape Breton.

Re-habilitation of Disbanded Troops

The next important issue of mutual interest to the civil and military communities was the re-habilitation of the disbanded troops. Conceived by Parr as a means of helping to achieve the population growth needed to bolster the province's labour supply and ensure its healthy development,⁽¹⁾ the proposed policy of assisting the troops to settle in Nova Scotia gained immediate acceptance.⁽²⁾ In accordance with this policy, personnel eligible for release were given the choices of returning to England, re-enlisting in regiments remaining in North America, or staying in Nova Scotia as settlers.⁽³⁾ For those choosing to stay and settle, liberal assistance was urged on the grounds that any expenses incurred would be justified in a few years by the Province's increased importance to Great Britain.⁽⁴⁾

The chief method of assisting the military settlers was by land grants. Exclusive of their normal family entitlements, field officers were granted 1000 acres, captains 700, subalterns and warrant officers 500, non-commissioned officers 100, and privates 50 acres, free of fees and with no quit

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1. Parr to Townshend, 20 February, 1783, Governor's Despatches 1783-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 47.
 2. North to Parr, 5 May, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369; and North to Parr, 8 August, 1783, Board of Trade Despatches 1770-83, P.A.N.S. Vol. 32.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 1 entries for 4 September, 1783, and 12 October, 1783.
 4. Carleton to North, 5 October, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369, Doc. 192.

rents for ten years.⁽¹⁾ Wherever possible, to retain the unity of troop formations in the event of future emergencies, the grants to personnel of the same regiments or companies were to be contiguous.⁽²⁾ No grants or aid were provided, however, for personnel who wished to remain in Halifax as labourers.⁽³⁾ Recognizing the difficulty of reaching a subsistence level in agriculture in the undeveloped areas where the land grants were located, one year's provisions at normal ration levels were to be supplied to all settlers.⁽⁴⁾ As added incentives fourteen days pay⁽⁵⁾ and free lumber supplies⁽⁶⁾ were given to military settlers and they were allowed to keep

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1. Instructions to Governor Parr, 10 June, 1783, and 7 August, 1783, both in C.O. 217/56, pp. 406 and 407. Family entitlements for all settlers were 100 acres for the head of the family and 50 acres for each dependent. The normal purchase charge of 10s. per acre was waived. Quit rent rates were 2s. per hundred acres per year. In Nova Scotia these rents had rarely been collected and in 1772 payment of them was suspended by royal instruction. N. Macdonald, Canada, 1763-1841 Immigration and Settlement, The Administration of the Imperial Land Regulations, London 1939, p. 210.
 2. North to Parr, 7 August, 1783, Board of Trade Despatches 1770-83, P.A.N.S. Vol. 32; and Instructions to Governor Parr, 1784, C.O. 217/35, p. 60. In accordance with this policy the 84th Regiment received 81,400 acres in Halifax County near Kennetcook, Miscellaneous Documents 1783-87, P.A.N.S. Vol. 223, Doc. 45; and 68 officers and men of the 60th Regiment 12,700 acres near Chedabucto Bay, ibid. Doc. 105.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry of 15 November, 1783.
 4. North to Officer Commanding H.M. Forces at Halifax, 31 May, 1783, enclosed in North to Carleton, 15 June, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369.
 5. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry of 28 March, 1784.
 6. Receipted accounts dated 5 June, 1784, and 5 July, 1785, Miscellaneous Documents 1783-87, P.A.N.S. Vol. 223, Docs. 40 and 116. The Lumber grants ceased in late 1784. Parr to Sydney, 15 November, 1784, C.O. 217/56.

their arms and accoutrements. (1)

This policy, despite its generosity, was the source of several problems for the military and civil authorities at Halifax. Initially, based on precedents from 1763, the size of field officers' grants had been intended as 5000 acres, but this led to complaints from civilian Loyalist settlers and a drastic reduction was ordered. (2) Although this, in turn, angered the field officers, in almost all cases their pleas were refused. (3) Bad feeling was also caused by the timber reservations for the Royal Navy. These interfered with settlement, and gave Wentworth the chance to extract illegal survey fees. Another difficulty arose from the distribution of provisions to the settlers. This task was an Army responsibility, (4) but the control of the provisions caused a small-scale power struggle between the Governor and the commanding general that was not settled in the latter's favour until 1786. (5)

Meanwhile, because of the inability of many of the settlers to become self-sufficient, the Government in London had had to continue the free issue

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1. North to Officer Commanding H.M. Forces at Halifax 31 May, 1783, enclosed in North to Carleton, 15 June, 1783, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369.
 2. Parr to Sydney, 4 March, 1784 C.O. 217/56; Parr to Nepean, 16 March, 1784, C.O. 217/59; and Bulkeley to A. Stewart, T. Knox, and S. Gouldsbury, 11 March, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 3. Parr to Nepean, 10 April, 1784, C.O. 217/59; and Sydney to Parr, 7 June, 1784, C.O. 217/56.
 4. George Rose, Treasury to Parr 9 March, 1784, Board of Trade Despatches 1784-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33.
 5. Parr to Carleton, 10 March, 1785, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137; Rose to Parr, 28 May, 1785, Board of Trade Despatches 1784-89, P.A.N.S. Vol. 33; Campbell to Treasury, 24 September, 1785, C.C. 217/41; and Campbell to Sydney, 10 January, 1786, C.O. 217/42. The disputes were more intense in Cape Breton and New Brunswick, however. See Campbell to Sydney, 1 January, 1786, and 10 January, 1786, both in C. O. 217/42.

of provisions for more than three years.⁽¹⁾ Abuses in the system of distribution⁽²⁾ resulted in a permanent Board of Enquiry being established to examine settlers' claims for provisions,⁽³⁾ and a system of provisions musters being inaugurated.⁽⁴⁾ The most plaintive of the difficulties of settling the disbanded troops, however, was that described in a petition by nearly 300 NCOs and privates of the Duke of Cumberland's Regiment of Foot:

That being entire Strangers in this part of America, we pray that you will point out some Method, that we can procure Companions for life, there being only ten married women in the whole Regt, and the few number of females in this Province, renders it impossible for us to succeed and prosper, without assistance from England ...⁽⁵⁾

Although an accurate count of the number of discharged military personnel who availed themselves of Government assistance to settle in Nova Scotia after 1783 is impossible, figures are available that can be used to provide a reasonable estimate. In 1783, disbanded military personnel, their wives, children and servants settling in peninsular Nova Scotia totalled approximately 9500; 7400 of these went to Port Roseway (Shelburne),

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1. Campbell to North, 1 April, 1784, C.O. 217/41; Sydney to Campbell, 7 June, 1784, *ibid*; Campbell to Parr, 24 November, 1785, C.O. 217/42; Campbell to Sydney, 10 December, 1785, *ibid*. Despite these extensions, 577 Annapolis settlers still petitioned for more. "Memorial of Annapolis Settlers," May, 1786, Miscellaneous Documents, 1783-87, P.A.N.S. Vol. 223, Doc. 130.
 2. Campbell to Sydney, 20 April, 1784, C.O. 217/41; "Extract of a letter from a Halifax gentleman," 30 April, 1784, C.O. 217.59.
 3. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 21 April, 1784.
 4. Campbell to Sydney, 6 May, 1784, C.O. 217/41.
 5. Petition to Lieut. Robert Barrett, probably dated in 1785, C.O. 217/57.

2000 to Annapolis, and 100 to Halifax.⁽¹⁾ Since the total number of settlers in these areas was only about 22,000,⁽²⁾ it follows that well over 40% of the settlers were from military families.

All of these settlers did not remain in Nova Scotia, however, and 2428 of the 22,000 are known to have given up their grants and left. In addition, there were unknown numbers of other settlers who stayed without grants or who sold their grants before leaving.⁽³⁾ Wentworth, whose impression of the situation was more striking than could be illustrated with mere figures, complained that

There are not 30 of the privates living within one hundred miles of Chedabucto, five, or six Officers only, are in this country, the rest are abroad; many of the Privates Sold their lotts for a dollar, or a pair of Shoes, or a few pounds of Tobacco - but most for a Gallon of New England rum, and quit the Country without taking any residence.⁽⁴⁾

Later, the departure of many of the settlers was confirmed by the Lieutenant-Governor: "I am sorry to observe that several of these people returned to the United States, soon after the delivery of Provisions from Government was discontinued which has considerably reduced their numbers."⁽⁵⁾

The costs of the assistance given to all settlers by the Imperial Government between June, 1783 and October, 1789, totalled over £32,000,⁽⁶⁾ or

1. Returns of Loyalists in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia formerly belonging to Army lists, 1783-84, Dorchester papers Vol. I, P.A.N.S. Vol. 368, Docs. 44-47.
2. Margaret Ells, "Settling the Loyalists in Nova Scotia," Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1934, p. 108.
3. Ibid. This exodus started very soon after the period of settlement ended. Campbell to Sydney, 24 June, 1785, C.O. 217/41.
4. Wentworth to Parr, 5 March, 1788, Wentworth Letter Book Vol. 4 1783-1808, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
5. Parr to Grenville, 25 May, 1791, Governor's Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48.
6. Memoranda of Expenditures on Loyalist Settlements October 1789, P.A.N.S. Vol. 224, Doc. 46.

assuming a total of 32,000 settlers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,⁽¹⁾ approximately one pound per person. This figure, however, did not include the transport costs for bringing the settlers to Nova Scotia, which totalled tens of thousands of pounds,⁽²⁾ nor the value of the lands that were granted. At a time when the annual Civil List supplied to Nova Scotia by London was less than £6000,⁽³⁾ this expenditure on settlement represented a huge investment and one that was not always considered a success. In Wentworth's view, for example, "The bounties issued for the settlement of the Loyalists and disbanded soldiers in this Province expensive as they were, produced very little good effect but rather tended to idleness and profusion."⁽⁴⁾

Although the impact of the military re-habilitation described above was mostly felt in the rural areas, Halifax also was affected. For the Army and Navy headquarters there, the task was one of controlling and assisting in the transport of the settlers and in providing them with provisions both by land and sea. For the civil authorities it was one of arranging the land grants, surveying them, registering them and redressing the inevitable complaints. In addition, there was the problem posed by the discharged men who either remained in Halifax or returned

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1. M. Ells, "Clearing the Decks for the Loyalists," Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1933, p. 55.
 2. The total cost of transporting the Loyalists to Nova Scotia, Quebec, Jamaica, Dominica and Bahamas was £212,000. Navy Office Account, 3 April, 1786, Adm. 49, Vol. 9.
 3. The Civil List in 1784 was £2840, C.O. 217/56, p. 312; for 1786 it was £3851, Parr to Sydney, 24 May, 1787, C.O. 217/58; and for 1788 it was £5845, Parr to Sydney, 18 August, 1788, C.O. 217/60.
 4. Wentworth to Dundas, 22 March, 1793, Governor's Despatches, P.A.N.S. Vol. 48.

to it after failing to find success in the settlements:

... many Disbanded Soldiers are Daily and Mightly picked up in the Streets in a perishing state & sent to the poor House afflicted with various Disorders (i) which Disable them from Getting their Livelyhood ...

Despite its many difficulties and short-comings, the British Government's re-habilitation policy was far from a complete failure, and there was a better residue from all the effort and money that went into it than abandoned settlements and broken-down soldiers on the streets of Halifax. By far the majority of the disbanded officers and troops remained in the province, perhaps not on the farms they had taken up, but in other valuable occupations such as ship-building, fishing, and school teaching. Others undoubtedly even found their way into Halifax and became successful in industry, government and commerce. In every case, some measure of credit must be given to the cooperation between the military and civil components of the community that made the re-habilitation and settlement policies of the 1780s as successful as they were.

Military Support

The supply of provisions to the new settlers by the armed forces has already been noted. But there were other forms of military support as well, and each of these represented points of contact between the civil and military sections of the community. In some case, only token gestures of support were needed or could be given; in others the support was essential and provided in abundance. Sometimes it served to bring the two communities closer together; on other occasions, whether given or denied, it caused resentment and acted as a separating force.

1. Poor Overseers' report to Parr, 1784, Manuscript Documents, House of Assembly 1758-1787, P.A.N.S. Vol. 301, Doc. 57.

Naval support consisted largely of transport services and Dockyard assistance. Supplies were delivered to remote areas by naval ships in emergencies,⁽¹⁾ provisions were shipped to the new settlements in naval transports,⁽²⁾ and mail,⁽³⁾ newspapers,⁽⁴⁾ and passengers⁽⁵⁾ were carried in naval ships. Wentworth, both as Surveyor-General and Lieutenant-Governor, made frequent use of naval transport,⁽⁶⁾ even to the point of borrowing and losing a Navy sloop at Spanish River.⁽⁷⁾ On at least one occasion a Royal Navy ship conducted the necessary surveys to provide data on the navigational hazards in the area of a provincial lighthouse.⁽⁸⁾ On another occasion, a ship's doctor attended a sick woman ashore.⁽⁹⁾ A final type of

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1. Douglas to C.O. H.M.S. Observer, 6 July, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491, directing the Observer to proceed to Port Matoon (Mouton) and help in relieving the suffering after the fire there.
 2. Parr to Douglas, 9 July, 1784, ibid.
 3. Commodore George to Stephens, 21 March, 1793, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 4. N.S. Gazette, 1 July, 1783.
 5. J.S. Macdonald, "Memoir of Governor Parr," p. 73, notes that Governor Parr took passage in H.M.S. Dido to Guysborough in 1788 and 1789, while B. Murdoch, A History of Nova Scotia, Vol. III, Halifax, 1867, p. 74, records that Bishop Charles Inglis, Rev. Mr. Jones of the Church of Rome and the Hon. J. Binney of the Council took passage in Dido from Halifax to Charlottetown in May, 1789. Bishop Inglis also embarked for passages in H.M. Ships Weazel and Thisbe. Bishop Inglis' Journal, 17 August, 1789, 20 July, 1790, and 12 August, 1790, Inglis Papers, C-7 and C-8, P.A.N.S.
 6. Wentworth to C.O. H.M.S. Assistance, 18 October, 1785, Wentworth Letter Book, 1783-1808, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49; and George to Stephens, 15 September, 1792, Adm. 1, Vol. 492.
 7. Wentworth to Duncan, 11 December, 1786, Wentworth Letter Book, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
 8. Wentworth to Dundas, 25 October, 1792, C.O. 217/64.
 9. Simeon Perkins, Diary 1790-96, entry for 30 May, 1790, p. 28.

ship support was the aid given to civil authorities in quelling local disturbances such as those at Shelburne in 1784.⁽¹⁾

Assistance was sometimes given to the civilian community by the Dockyard when normal commercial facilities were unable to cope. Examples of this assistance included repairs to merchant ships⁽²⁾ and supplies of certain naval stores such as rope cable.⁽³⁾ In addition, the Dockyard maintained the Provincial vessel Greyhound. None of these services were provided free, however. For example, charges for the work done on Greyhound during a three year period came to £422 Sterling.⁽⁴⁾

The Army supported the civilian community in emergencies by the issue of stores, such as the blankets and food that were made available to the shipload of refugees who arrived from St. Augustine in 1785,⁽⁵⁾ and by the provision of temporary quarters in the barracks.⁽⁶⁾ Other forms of support included fire-fighting,⁽⁷⁾ and road-building. But, unless the road was a definite military requirement, e.g. "for a light field piece to move with celerity,"⁽⁸⁾ or was needed to connect strategic points like Shelburne and

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1. Parr to Douglas, 31 August, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136. The cause of the disturbances is not indicated.
 2. Duncan to Thomas, 7 November, 1783, HAL/F/1.
 3. Duncan to Thomas, 4 December, 1783, ibid.; and Douglas to Stephens, 1 August, 1784, Adm. 1, Vol. 491.
 4. Duncan to R.O.s, 24 April, 1786, HAL/F/1; and Thomas to Navy Office, 27 July, 1790, Adm. 106, Number 2027.
 5. Parr to Campbell, - April, 1785, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137.
 6. P.A.N.S. HQ 2, entry for 20 January, 1784; Parr to Campbell, 23 September, 1784, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136; and Campbell to Sydney, 24 September, 1784, C.O. 217/41.
 7. W. Dyott, Diary, 1781-1845, Vol. I, p. 61; and Byles to his Sisters, undated, describing a fire on 4 June, 1786, Mather Byles Papers, P.A.N.S.
 8. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 20 May, 1783.

Annapolis,⁽¹⁾ the Army was reluctant to undertake the work without financial support.⁽²⁾ However, since Whitehall was unwilling to provide funds except for roads to aid distressed settlers,⁽³⁾ and the Province's funds were inadequate, the Army's contribution to road-building fell well short of what the community would have liked.⁽⁴⁾

Areas of Friction

Some areas of contact between the civilian and military communities resulted in friction and misunderstanding. Examples such as the Navy's enforcement of the Navigation Laws,⁽⁵⁾ and impressment, have already been discussed, but there were others that should be pointed out as well. The first of these concern military grievances against civilians.

Allegations by the armed forces that they were being exploited by civilians were not unique either in Halifax or the 18th century. They have featured military and civilian relations for hundreds of years in hundreds of localities. Usually, landlords have borne the brunt of these

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1. Campbell's plan for opening up the Shelburne-Annapolis road included providing a suit of working clothes and sixpence per day to each of the negroes in Annapolis and Digby who worked on the road. Eulkeley to Justices of the Peace in County of Annapolis and Township of Digby, 24 June, 1784, Parr/Eulkeley Letter Book 1760-84, P.A.N.S. Vol. 136.
 2. Campbell to Sydney, 24 September, 1784, C.O. 217/41.
 3. Sydney to Campbell, 8 March, 1785, ibid.
 4. As a Shelburne merchant expressed it, "If you would have the goodness to get the secretary at Warr to order the Military to work a few Months in the Year on the Roads, it will be of great advantage to the Province." Alexander Lecky to ?, 26 March, 1790, C.O. 217/62.
 5. Explicit examples of altercations are recorded by Simeon Perkins, Diary 1780-89, pp. 495 and 496; and Diary 1790-96, p. 28.

charges, but in Halifax in the period 1783-93, this does not appear to have been the case. Except for officers, who were aided by allowances, few military families were obliged to find accommodation outside the Service establishments, and complaints, with the notable exception of that of the Army commander personally, were relatively few.

Exploitation by local merchants and farmers, however, was a definite problem for both Services. For the Army, it was serious enough for special cooperative action to be taken with the Governor against frauds and monopoly in the garrison markets.⁽¹⁾ For the Navy, as already described, it resulted at one point in vessels proceeding to Boston under naval orders to bring back live cattle.⁽²⁾

Property difficulties also caused friction between the armed forces and civilians. In one case, that of a local merchant who was attempting to improve his shipping facilities by erecting a new wharf and building adjacent to the Ordnance yard on land that was needed by the Army, the dispute lasted for over a year.⁽³⁾ In others, where townsmen had unknowingly built structures that partly encroached on Service property, the settle-

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1. P.A.N.S. HQ 1, entry for 15 July, 1783.
 2. Supra, p. 97.
 3. Sutherland to Farr, 4 August, 1790, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B"; Farr to J.B. Dight, 4 August 1790, C.O. 217/62; Sutherland to Ogilvie, 9 August, 1790, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B"; Ogilvie to Parr, 27 September, 1790, City of Halifax Miscellaneous Papers 1754-1828, P.A.N.S. Vol. 411; Bulkeley to Dight, 27 September, 1790, ibid.; Bulkeley to Dight 5 February, 1791, Farr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137; Dight to Bulkeley, 7 February, 1791, ibid.; Sutherland to Richmond, 23 August, 1791, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B"; Sutherland to Ogilvie 27 August, 1791, P.A.N.S. Vol. 411; Bulkeley to Dight, 15 September, 1791, ibid.; and Sutherland to Richmond, 17 October, 1791, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. "B". It is of interest in these lengthy proceedings that Mr. Dight was the Agent for a British contractor to H.M. forces in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the Island of St. John, Cape Breton and Newfoundland.

ments were more amicable.⁽¹⁾ On another occasion, troops and store-houses were placed on a private wharf to the annoyance of the owner, who, when he sought redress from the Governor, was directed to the Courts.⁽²⁾ Military claims to land at Halifax even caused pique on the part of the Church.

There is no Church Yard to the Church of Halifax; the consequence of which is, that the ground about the Church is made a receptacle of filth, & Divine Service is often disturbed. I applied for some of the vacant ground round the Church which the Inhabitants offered to inclose; but I was told it belonged to the King was intended for a Parade, & could not be granted. We have at least six parades besides; & as I wish to go on as inoffensively as possible, I acquiesced for the present.⁽³⁾

Another issue that was a source of friction was the exemption from Provincial import duties of rum that was intended for the use of the Army and Navy.⁽⁴⁾ Whitehall's policy was to give strong support to these exemptions,⁽⁵⁾ but twice when the acts came up for renewal, the Assembly balked. The first time was in 1783 over the rum for the Navy, when it was charged that there were frauds and trafficking in rum in the Dockyard.⁽⁶⁾ A year later, despite a plea relayed from Whitehall by the Governor,⁽⁷⁾

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1. Campbell to Sydney, 11 October, 1785, C.O. 217/41.
 2. Bulkeley to James Kavanagh, 19 June, 1790, Parr/Bulkeley Letter Book 1784-91, P.A.N.S. Vol. 137.
 3. Bishop of Nova Scotia to Grenville, 20 May, 1790, C.O. 217/62.
 4. An Act to exempt Rum and molasses from duty, 29 June, 1782, C.O. 219/17.
 5. North to Parr, 24 June, 1783, Board of Trade Despatches 1770-83, P.A.N.S. Vol. 32.
 6. Report of the Committee on Public Accounts, 25 October, 1783, C.O. 217/59, p. 442.
 7. Sydney to Parr, 5 October, 1784, C.O. 217/56.

the Assembly refused to exempt the Army's rum. The Governor, however, with whom was vested the executive power for initiating action to recover the duty, declined to exercise it and, in effect, the exemption continued.⁽¹⁾ A similar example of civil attempts to curtail military privilege was an Assembly act in 1789 that imposed a duty on American imports including flour, but that deviated from previous ones by failing to exclude the forces from payment of it.⁽²⁾

Powder storage provided the civil population with another grievance against the forces. In early 1793, concern over the hazard presented to the town by the gunpowder stored at Eastern Battery was expressed in a joint address by the Council and Assembly. As a result the Commanding officer of the Royal Engineers was ordered to report on the arrangements and make recommendations for improving the situation.⁽³⁾ After the start of the wars with France the problem was largely solved by the construction of a large bomb-proof magazine at the southeast end of the Citadel.⁽⁴⁾

A final factor contributing towards resentment against the forces was the generous granting of lands to serving senior officers. In one instance Wentworth reserved 6000 acres of choice land in Cape Breton; 1000 acres each for Commodore Douglas, and Captains Stone and Bentinck, and 500 acres each for six officers of lesser rank.⁽⁵⁾ More vexing

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1. Parr to Sydney, 27 December, 1784, C.O. 217/57.
 2. Memorial to Governor Farr from J.B. Dight, 23 March, 1790, Legislative Council Papers 1760-90, P.A.N.S. Vol. 286.
 3. Ogilvie to Bartlett, 11 March, 1793, P.A.N.S. Vol. R.E. 3.
 4. H. Piers, Evolution of the Halifax Fortress, p. 21.
 5. Wentworth to Captain Stone of H.M.S. Hermione, 20 November, 1785, Wentworth Letter Book 1783-1808, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.

to the Haligonians, however, were the grants of 65 acres on the Halifax peninsula to General Campbell⁽¹⁾ and 5 acres on the North-west Arm to Commissioner Duncan.⁽²⁾

Social Relations

Compensating to a great extent for the areas of friction or sensitivity were the friendly social links that existed between armed forces and civilian personnel, particularly those of the officer or professional classes. The ease with which the two elements mingled was demonstrated by Brigadier-General Fox's order to the sentries that they were not to stop the town's inhabitants unless they were in the vicinity of gunpowder.⁽³⁾ So close was the friendship between some of the officers and local residents that when Captain Bentinck was suspended from command, Wentworth and his wife were able to take pleasure from the opportunity it gave them to enjoy more of Bentinck's company.⁽⁴⁾ The position of the Services at the centre of the town's social activities frequently meant that the Navy and Army commanders had to take the lead in entertaining visiting dignitaries. On a minor scale this was the case when Brigadier-General Ogilvie, Commissioner Duncan and Commodore George each hosted the French émigré, Saint-Mesmin, in 1793.⁽⁵⁾

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1. H.M.Council Minutes, 20 October, 1785, P.A.N.S. Vol. 213, p. 68.
 2. H.M.Council Minutes, 29 July, 1790, ibid., p. 192. Duncan by this time was a member of the Council.
 3. Supra, p. 82.
 4. Wentworth to Des Barres, 9 January, 1786, Wentworth Letter Book 1783-1808, P.A.N.S. Vol. 49.
 5. B. de Saint-Mesmin, "Journal etc.," pp. xxvii and xxviii.

More important social occasions for both the military and civil communities, however, were the visits of Prince William to Halifax in H.M. Ships Pegasus and Andromeda in 1786, 1787 and 1788. These proved to be the social highlights of the decade and on each occasion the uniformed and civil establishments joined for an almost unending round of reputedly joyous receptions, dinners, balls and other celebrations.⁽¹⁾ Later, after the Prince had left for the last time, the officers of the garrison and fleet performed a series of plays at the town's New Theatre during which they played to crowded houses and collected about £400, almost all of which was spent on improvements to the theatre.⁽²⁾ The following year the Army and Navy combined to give a ball and supper for the town that was climaxed by many of the hosts fighting a fire in the downtown shopping area.⁽³⁾

Additional evidence of the social position of the military forces

1. W. Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Vol. I, 5 November, 1787, p. 39, and 17 August, 1788, pp. 50-55; and Parr to Council and Assembly, 6 November, 1787, Legislative Council Papers 1760-90, P.A.N.S. Vol. 286. The most splendid of the balls was the one given by the Province in early November, 1787. One townsman, however, declined his invitation, "... having always had, from [his] earliest years, a natural Aversion to acting like a Fool." Byles to his Sisters, undated, describing the ball of 5 November, 1787, Mather Byles Papers, P.A.N.S. One party, a dinner afloat to be followed by a ball ashore, turned into an utter social disaster when a gale blew up during the dinner and forced the guests, including the ladies, to remain aboard until eight o'clock the following morning. Meanwhile, "the presence of this worthless commodore [Sandys] and his libertine captains led to an excess of drinking, and all its train of vulgarity and levity." T. Byam Martin, Letters and Papers, Vol. I, p. 125.
2. W. Dyott, Diary 1781-1845, Vol. I, pp. 60-62.
3. Ibid., 22 January, 1789, p. 61. Naval officers, however, did not limit their participation in social events to those at Halifax. In Liverpool, for example, they were both guests and hosts. Simeon Perkins, Diary 1790-96, pp. 32, 58, and 63. Generally, they were observed to be very civil, ibid., pp. 57 and 68, although earlier they had created disturbances at two evening church meetings. S. Perkins, Diary 1780-89, entries for 19 and 21 September, 1784, p. 246.

in the community was a series of articles in the town newspaper entitled "Advice to the Officers of the British Army." These articles were prodigally spiced with such items as the following:

To Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels commanding corps ...

It is your duty also to be very attentive to the good of your regiment, and to keep a watchful eye to its advantage, except when it clashes with your own. If you have interest with the Commander in Chief, always be careful to secure yourself good winter quarters; and if you have an inclination to any particular town, either from having a mistress there, or any other good cause, you need not mind marching your regiment two or three hundred miles to it ... (1)

and

To the Surgeon ...

Whenever you are ignorant of a soldier's complaint, you should first take a little blood from him, and then give him an emetic and a cathartic - to which you may add a blister. This will serve, at least, to diminish the number of your patients.

Keep two lancets; a blunt one for the soldiers, and a sharp one for the officers: this will be making a proper distinction between them. (2)

This satire suggests that each element, military and civilian, had a certain sense of humour and even, perhaps, some mutual affection.

Summary of Chapter V

To establish a proper perspective from which to review the relationship between the armed forces and civil elements at Halifax, it should be appreciated that the town's population was only about 5000, (3) whereas the strength of the garrison, including women and children, probably

1. N.S. Gazette, 3 June, 1783.

2. Ibid., 24 June, 1783.

3. In 1791 the population was 4897. T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," p. 103.

totalled about 2300.⁽¹⁾ In addition there were normally up to 1000 sailors in the ships of the Squadron. Taking account also of the Dockyard force, agents, and others working with the Services, it can be concluded that at least half of the town's total population depended on the Army and the Navy for a livelihood. As a corollary, it would be reasonable to expect military considerations to have an important influence in the town's affairs.

In fact, this influence has been shown to be supported by the record. In social events the military contributed a large share of the leadership and facilities. In command and control it was virtually an even balance between the Governor on one hand with most of the forms of power, and the two Service commanders on the other with the forces to back this power up and in many ways independent of the Governor's authority. With respect to the support provided to the civilian community, although it was neither large nor completely essential, it was at least a reminder of the town's dependence. And, where there were areas of friction, they were as often as not resolved in favour of the military. Thus, the relationship between the forces and the remainder of the community at Halifax may be described as a competitive one, with each side holding the other in healthy respect, and neither gaining a permanent or pronounced advantage over the other.

1. Based on the following list of forces at Halifax in late 1783, reduced by 50% to allow for the shrinking garrison in the early 1790s.

6 Regiments of Troops	3000
Artillery	200
Engineer's Department	300
Civil Departments	100
Women and Children	1000
Total	4600

From Doc. 193 dated 5 October, 1783, *Lorchester Papers* Vol. II, P.A.N.S. Vol. 369.

CONCLUSION

In an assessment of the role of the Army and Navy in Halifax's development in the peace-time period of 1783-1793, consideration must first be given to Imperial policy concerning Halifax itself, that is as a strategic base in British North America and a link in the trading chain between Britain and the West Indies. During the decade of peace this policy was modified. With the temporary abatement of the seriousness of the threats from the United States and France in North America, the strategic importance of Halifax declined. At the same time, Imperial hopes that British North America would develop as a major source of supply for the British West Indies proved premature and Halifax's position as a major trade centre failed to materialize. The changes in policy that were necessitated by these circumstances were reflected in the role of the armed forces.

As conceived in Whitehall in 1783, the Army and Navy collectively would provide a deterrent against American expansion or French resurgence in the Atlantic provinces and Canada, while the Navy preserved Britain's trading monopoly in the western Atlantic. Nevertheless, once the initial flurry of activity associated with troop deployments and disbandments had subsided, this concept was gradually modified. Strategically, the scene of expected action shifted towards the West Indies and most of the regiments based at Halifax were transferred to that area. Meanwhile the Navy had failed in its efforts to enforce the Navigation Laws and protect the fisheries, and by early 1793, because of changed priorities at the Admiralty, the number of naval ships at Halifax had been reduced to less than half of what it had been in 1784.

Consequently, Halifax had become more a symbol than an effective embodiment of British sea power.

Halifax's decreased strategic position and unfulfilled trade prospects have to be set against the development of Halifax as the political and commercial capital of Nova Scotia, rather than merely as an Imperial military base. The effect of this trend, which was given impetus by the reductions in the armed forces based there and by the requirements of the Loyalist settlers for administrative and commercial services, was to render Halifax less dependent than formerly on the armed forces. This changing relationship was demonstrated in two ways: first, by the Assembly's attempts to curtail Service privileges, such as the duty-free importation of rum and provisions, and secondly, by the reduction of the lieutenant-governor's military powers and his increased pre-occupation with civil matters. Halifax's new independence, however, was an extremely limited one. Economically, the town continued to rely heavily on the forces as the area's prime consumer of goods and services, while socially the community needed the facilities and leadership that only the Army and Navy could provide. Moreover, the trend towards independence was short-lived, for after the outbreak of war with France in 1793 the size and importance of the forces at Halifax increased substantially, and the Army and Navy quickly resumed their dominating influence over Halifax's development.

Reduced to its simplest terms, therefore, the role of the Army and Navy at Halifax between 1783 and 1793 embodied four main characteristics. It represented a steadily shrinking strategic force, a generally unsuccessful protector of Britain's impractical trade and

fisheries policies, an indispensable member of the social order of the town, and an economic mainstay. The first two of these characteristics tended to decrease Halifax's traditional dependence on the armed forces. The latter characteristics, on the other hand, were the overriding ones and ensured that the main forms of the dependence persisted. It can be concluded, therefore, that the armed forces based at Halifax continued throughout the peace-time period to be an essential feature of the town's development, and would remain so until after 1815. By that time Halifax was strong enough to face the world on its own.

APPENDIX I

COLONIAL AUTHORITIES IN BRITAIN 1783-1793

Secretaries of State, Home Department

Thomas Townshend (Viscount Sydney, 1783), 17 July, 1782 - 18 April, 1783
Lord North, 18 April, 1783 - 23 December, 1783
Lord Sydney, 23 December, 1783 - 5 June, 1789
Wm. Wyndham Grenville (Baron Grenville, 1790), 5 June, 1789 - 8 June, 1791
Henry Dundas (Later Viscount Melville), 8 June, 1791 - 7 August, 1794

Permanent Under Secretaries, Home Department

Evan Nepean 1782-89
Scrope Bernard 1789-92
John King 1792-1801

Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations

(Replaced former Board of Trade and Plantations in August, 1784)
President - Charles Jenkinson (Later, Lord Hawkesbury)
Members included: Lord Sydney, Grenville, Dundas, and, after 1786, Pitt
Secretariat; Stephen Cottrell, William Fawkner, and Grey Elliott

Agent for Nova Scotia in London

Richard Cumberland

APPENDIX II

CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN NORTH AMERICA INCLUDING HALIFAX, 1783-1793

Quebec

Frederick Haldimand, Governor, 1778-1784
Henry Hamilton, Lieutenant-Governor, 1784-85
Henry Hope, Lieutenant-Governor, 1785-86
Lord Dorchester, Governor-in-Chief of Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia
and their dependencies, 1786-1791
Sir Alured Clarke, Lieutenant-Governor, 1791

Newfoundland

Vice-Admiral John Campbell, 1782-1786
Rear-Admiral John Elliot, 1786-1789
Vice-Admiral Mark Milbanke, 1789-1792
Rear-Admiral Sir Richard King, 1792-1794

New Brunswick

Thomas Carleton, Governor, 1784-1786, and Lieutenant-Governor, 1786-1803

Prince Edward Island

Walter Patterson, Governor, 1780-1787
Edmund Fanning, Lieutenant-Governor, 1787-1805

Cape Breton Island

Joseph F.W. Des Barres, Lieutenant-Governor, 1784-1787
William McCarmick, Lieutenant-Governor, 1787-1795

Nova Scotia

John Parr, Governor, 1782-1786
John Parr, Lieutenant-Governor, 1786-1791
Richard Bulkeley, Administrator, 1791-1792
John Wentworth, Lieutenant-Governor, 1792-1808

Government Officials

Bryan Finucane, Chief Justice, 1783-1785
Isaac Deschamps, Chief Justice, 1785-1788

Jeremiah Pemberton, Chief Justice, 1788-1791
Thomas Strange, Chief Justice, 1791
Richard Bulkeley, Secretary of the Province, 1783-1792
J. Freke Bulkeley, Secretary of the Province, 1792
Richard J. Uniacke, Solicitor-General
Sampson S. Blowers, Attorney-General, 1784
Charles Morris, Surveyor-General

Provincial Court of Admiralty

Judge - Richard Bulkeley
Advocate General - R.J. Uniacke
Registrar - Charles Morris until 1790, and then Charles Wright
Marshal - J. Freke Bulkeley

H.M. Council - 1783

John Parr
Richard Bulkeley
Henry Newton
Jonathan Binney
Arthur Goold
Isaac Deschamps
John Creighton
Alexander Brymer
Bryan Finucane
Joseph Goreham
John Butler

H.M. Council - 1789

John Parr
Richard Bulkeley
Henry Newton
Joseph Goreham
Arthur Goold (died 1792)
John Butler
Alexander Brymer
Isaac Deschamps
Thomas Cochran
Charles Morris
John Halliburton
Henry Duncan
Sampson Blowers

Halifax Officials

Henry Newton - Collector of Customs
Winckworth Tonge - Naval Officer until 1792, and then Wm Cottnam Tonge

APPENDIX III

NAVAL AUTHORITIES IN BRITAIN 1783-1793

1. Admiralty Board (Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland etc., and of His Majesty's Plantations, etc.)

- a. First Lord

John, Earl of Sandwich, 12 January, 1771 - 30 March, 1782
Admiral Hon. A. Keppel, 30 March, 1782 - 30 January, 1783
Admiral Viscount Howe, 30 January, 1783 - 10 April, 1783
Admiral Viscount Keppel, 10 April, 1783 - 31 December, 1783
Admiral Viscount Howe, 31 December, 1783 - July, 1788
John, Earl of Chatham, July, 1788 -

- b. Members

Admiral Hugh Pigott, 1783
Lord Viscount Duncannon, 1783
Hon. John Townshend, 1783
Sir John Lindsay, 1783
William Jolliffe, 1783
Whithead Keene, 1783
Charles Brett, 1784-1787
J.J. Pratt, 1784-1785
J. Leveson Gower, 1784-1788
Lord Apsley, 1784-1789
C.G. Percival, 1784
J.M. Heywood, 1784
Richard Hopkins, 1784-c.1790
Lord Arden, 1784-1793
Viscount Bayham, 1786-1789
Admiral Lord Hood, 1788-93
Viscount Belgrave, 1790-?
Hon. J.T. Townshend, 1790-1793
Alan Gardner, 1790-1793
C.S. Pibus, ? -1793
John Smith, ?-1793

- c. Secretaries

Philip Stephens, 1783-1793
John Ibbetson, 1783-1793

- d. Treasurer of the Navy

Henry Dundas, 1783-1793

e. Paymaster of the Navy

Andrew Douglas, 1783-1787
A. Trotter, 1787-1793

2. Navy Board (The Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy)

a. Comptroller

Sir Charles Middleton, 1778-1790
Sir Henry Martin, 1790-1794

b. Members

Sir John Williams, 1783-1785
Edward Hunt, 1783-1787
George Marsh, 1783-1793
William Palmer, 1783-1793
George Rogers, 1783-1793
William Campbell, 1783-c.1789
Sir Richard Temple, 1783-1785
Samuel Wallis, 1783-1784
Edward Le Cras 1784-1793
John Henslow, 1785-1793
William Bellingham, 1790-1793

c. Secretaries

Joshua Thomas, 1783-1790
A. Serle, 1790-?
John Margetson, ?-1793

APPENDIX IV

NAVAL AUTHORITIES AT HALIFAX 1783-1793

1. Commanders-in-Chief and Senior Officers in Command at Halifax

- a. Rear-Admiral(R) Robert Digby, Commander-in-Chief North America, 13 June, 1781 - 5 December, 1783
- b. Henry Duncan, Captain, R.N. (ret'd), Acting Senior Officer in Command, late 1783 to 30 May, 1784
- c. Commodore Sir Charles Douglas, Bart., Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels Employed and to be Employed in the River St. Lawrence and along the Coast of Nova Scotia, the Islands of St. John and Cape Breton and in the Bay of Fundy, arrived Halifax 30 May, 1784, sailed for England 2 August, 1785
- d. Commodore Herbert Sawyer (Rear-Admiral (W) in November, 1787), Commander-in-Chief ... etc., arrived Halifax 10 June, 1785, sailed for England 5 August, 1788
- e. Captain John Linzee, H.M.S. PENELOPE, Senior Officer H.M. Ships and vessels in North America, August, 1788 to August, 1789
- f. Rear-Admiral(R) Sir Richard Hughes, Bart., (Vice-Admiral(B) in September, 1790), Commander-in-Chief ... etc., arrived Halifax 1 August, 1789, sailed for England 20 April, 1792
- g. Captain Richard Fisher, H.M.S. WINCHELSEA, Senior Officer H.M. Ships and vessels in North America, 19 April, 1792 to 12 May, 1792
- h. Commodore Rupert George, Commander-in-Chief ... etc., arrived Halifax 12 May, 1792 until 14 July, 1794

2. Dockyard Officials

- a. Henry Duncan, Commissioner, 1782-1798
- b. Thomas Read, Master Attendant, 1784-1793 and later
- c. Provo Wallis, Master Shipwright, 1784-1793 and later
- d. George Thomas, Naval Officer and Storekeeper, 1783-1790
- e. Titus Livie, Naval Officer and Storekeeper, 1790-1793 and later

3. Naval Hospital

- a. Hon. John Halliburton, Surgeon and Agent, 1783-1792
- b. Mr. M'Evoy, Assistant, 1783-93

APPENDIX V

ARMY AUTHORITIES IN BRITAIN 1783-1793

1. Secretary at War

Sir G. Yonge, Bt., 10 July, 1782 - 9 April, 1783
Rt. Hon. R. Fitzpatrick, 9 April, 1783 - 6 January, 1784
Sir G. Yonge, Bt., 6 January, 1784 - 11 July, 1794

2. Master-General of the Ordnance

Duke of Richmond, 30 March, 1782 - 12 April, 1783
Marquis of Townshend 12 April, 1783 - 27 December, 1783
Duke of Richmond, 27 December, 1783 - 1795

3. Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance

General Sir William (late Lord) Howe, 1782-1804

4. Paymaster-General of the Forces

Rt. Hon. Isaac Barré, 27 July, 1782 - 8 April, 1783
Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, 8 April, 1783 - 30 December, 1783
Rt. Hon. William Grenville, 30 December, 1783 - 15 August, 1789
Marquis of Graham (later Duke of Montrose), 1789-1801

APPENDIX VI

ARMY AUTHORITIES AT HALIFAX 1783-1793*

1. Officers Commanding**

Major-General James Paterson, until 5 August, 1783
Brigadier-General Fox, 6 August - 17 December, 1783
Major-General John Campbell, 18 December, 1783 - May, 1787
Brigadier-General James Ogilvie, 1787-1794

2. Garrison and Staff Officers

a. Secretary

Edward Winslow, December, 1783 (A) - ?

b. Fort Major

Captain Charles Lyons, ? - 1786 to 1788 (B) - ?
Captain John Hodgson, ? - 1791 to 1794 (B)

c. Barrack Master

James Morden, ? - 1776 to 1791 (B), died 1792
Stephen Hall Binney, ? - 1794 (B)

d. Deputy Barrack Master General

James Putnam, 1783(A) - 1792(C)

e. Storekeeper to Deputy Barrack Master General

Mr. Ward, 1783 (A) - ?

* - Based on P.A.N.S. Vol. HQ 2 entry for 23 December, 1783, annotated (A); Army Lists for 1776, 1786, 1787, 1788, 1791, 1794, and 1800, annotated (B); and on Theophrastus, An Almanack for the Year of Our Lord 1791 (and 1792), annotated (C). Where appropriate, annotations are used to indicate the source of information. Where dates cannot be determined, question marks are used.

** - Major-General Campbell's title was "Major-General Commanding the Forces within His Majesty's Dominions in North America lying on the Atlantic Ocean."

- f. Commissary of Accounts (later, Comptroller of Army Accounts)
Freke Bulkeley, 1783 (A) - 1792 (C)
- g. Deputy Commissary of Accounts
Peter Wemyss, 1783 (A) - ?
- h. Commissary of Stores
Thomas Williams, 1776 - 1786, for Annapolis (B)
1787 - 1800, for Nova Scotia (B)
- i. Deputy Commissary of Stores
George Brinley, 1783 (A) - ?
- j. Assistant Commissary of Stores (provisions)
Gregory Townsend, 1783 (A) - 1792 (C)
- k. Assistant Commissary of Stores (fuel)
John Butler Dight, until December, 1783
Roger Johnson, 1783 (A) - 1792 (C)
- l. General Storekeeper
James Lodge, 1783 (A) - ?
George Brinley, ? - 1792 (C)
- m. Clerk to Storekeeper
William Coffin, 1783 (A) - ?
- n. Ordnance Storekeeper
James Morden, ? - 1792 (C)
- o. Commissary of the Musters
F. W. Hecht, ? - 1786, for Annapolis (B)
1787 - 1800, for Nova Scotia (B)
- p. Paymaster
James Morden, ? - 1792 (C)
- q. Deputy Paymaster to the Forces
Alex. Brymer, ? - 1792 (C)

r. Clerk and Cashier to Paymaster of Contingencies

Henry Whitelock, 1783 (A) - ?

s. Clerk of the Check

J. S. Heaton, ? - 1792 (C)

t. Chaplain, Nova Scotia

William Neyle, ? - 1786, for Annapolis (B)
1787 - 1800, for Nova Scotia (B)

u. Chaplain, Halifax Garrison

Mather Byles, prior to 1782 - 1794 (B) and possibly later
(in 1800 listed as Chaplain in New Brunswick) (B)

v. Surgeon to Nova Scotia

Abraham van Hulst, ? - 1786 to 1794 (B)

w. Surgeon to the Halifax Garrison

Thomas Irwin ? - 1794 (B)

x. Surgeon to the Ordnance and Artillery

W. J. Almon, ? - 1792 (C)

APPENDIX VII - LIST OF SHIPS ON THE HALIFAX STATION 1783-1793*

SHIP	TYPE	NUMBER OF GUNS	DATE BUILT	CAPTAIN AND SENIORITY	DATES ON STATION	REMARKS
ADAMANT	4th Rate	50	1779	Captain D. Knox, 1782	1789-92	Flagship. Crew: 335 men.
ALBACORE	Sloop	16	N.K.**	Captain R. Callcott, 1782	1783-84	Captured from Fr. 1781.
ALERT	Schooner	8	N.K.	N.K.	1790-91	Grounded and sank, PEI.
ALLIGATOR	Frigate	28	1786	Captain I. Coffin, 1782, in command 1791; Capt. W. Affleck, in command in 1793.	1791 and 1793	Ship returned to England in late 1791, and return to Halifax in 1793.
ANDROMEDA	Frigate	32	1784	Captain, Prince William, 1786	1788	750 tons; 220 men.
ARIADNE	Frigate	24	1776	Captain Samuel Osborne, 1782	1784-88	140 men.
ASSISTANCE	4th Rate	50	1781	Captain William Bentinck, 1783	1784-86	Flagship. 320 men.
ATALANTA	Sloop	14	1775	Commander T. Foley, 1782	1783-84	-----
BONETTA	Sloop	16	1779	Commander G. Keats, 1782	1783-84	-----

* Based on Public Record Office, Admiralty 1 series, Secretary's Department "In" letters, Vols. 490-492; and on D. Steel, "Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy Corrected to 31 March, 1783," London, 1783, and subsequent monthly or quarterly lists to 1793.

** Not Known, i.e. records incomplete or not available.

SHIP	TYPE	NUMBER OF GUNS	DATE BUILT	CAPTAIN AND SENIORITY	DATES ON STATION	REMARKS
BRISK	Sloop	16	N.K.	Commander E.Buller, 1783	1785-90	100 men.
CHATHAM	Schooner	8	N.K.	Lieutenant G.Sayer, 1790	1790-92	93 tons.
CIRCE	Frigate	28	1785	Commander J.S.Yorke, 1790	1792	152 men.
DELAWARE	Galley	NK	N.K.	Lieutenant R.Percy, 1783	1783-85	-----
DIDO	Frigate	28	1784	Captain C.Sandys, 1783	1788-90	Buller became CO in 1790.
DILIGENT	Schooner	8	N.K.	Lieutenant Robert Hughes, 1783	1790-92	89 tons.
FELICITY	Schooner	8	N.K.	Lieutenant M. M'Namara, 1781	1784-85	-----
HERMIONE	Frigate	32	1782	Captain J. Stone	1783-85	-----
HUSSAR	Galley	20	N.K.	Captain T.M.Russell, 1781	1783-84	Taken from U.S. 1780.
HUSSAR	Frigate	28	1784	Captain R.George, 1781	1792-93	159 men.
LEANDER	4th Rate	50	1780	Captain Sir James Barclay, 1783	1787-88	Flagship.
MERCURY	Frigate	28	1780	Captain H.E. Stanhope, 1781	1784-86	180 men.
OBSERVER	Armed Brig	10	N.K.	Lieutenant J.Crymes, 1779	1783-84	J.Elphinstone CO in 1784.
PEGASUS	Frigate	28	1779	Captain, Prince William, 1786	1786-87	Wintered in West Indies
PENELOPE	Frigate	32	1783	Captain J.Linzee, 1777, CO until 1791; then Capt. G.Tripp, 1786	1789-92	200 men.

SHIP	TYPE	NUMBER OF GUNS	DATE BUILT	CAPTAIN AND SENIORITY	DATES ON STATION	REMARKS
RATTLER	Sloop	16	1781	Commander J.Beale, 1787, and then T.Twysden	1790-92	100 men.
RENOWN	4th Rate	50	1774	Captain John Henry, 1777	1783-84	-----
RESOURCE	Frigate	28	N.K.	Captain Paul Minchin, 1783	1784-88	180 men.
SOPHIE	N.K.	22	N.K.	Captain H.Mowat, 1782	1783-84	Taken from French 1782.
SPHYNX	Frigate	20	1775	Captain G.Tripp, 1786, until Sept. '91; then Lieut. Richard Hughes	1791-92	-----
THISBE	Frigate	28	1783	Captain G.Robertson; then Captain Isaac Coffin, 1782; then in 1788 Captain S.Hood; and Capt. R. George in 1790	1785-91	THISBE returned to England for a period in 1789-90.
TREPASSEY	Brig	14	N.K.	Commander F.Cole, 1782	1783-84	Recaptured 1782.
TRITON	Frigate	28	1783	Captain G.Murray, 1782	1791-92	-----
VIXEN	Galley	10	N.K.	Lieutenant White; then Lieutenant Mark Wentworth, 1780	1783-85	-----
WEAZEL	Sloop, rigged as brig	12	N.K.	Commander S.Hood, 1782, until 1788; then Commander H.Browell, 1788.	1785-89	Cdr. Charles Sawyer may have taken command 1788-
WINCHELSEA	Frigate	32	N.K.	Captain R.Fisher, 1782	1792-93	-----

APPENDIX VIII - SHIP OPERATIONS 1783-1793

SHIP	1783	1784	1785
MONETTA (16)	<i>M</i>	Port Mouton St. John R. Fundy	--> To England
TALANTA (14)	<i>M</i>	Annapolis St. Lawrence	--> To England
RENOWN (50)	<i>M</i>	Halifax	--- To England
RESERVER (10)	<i>M</i>	St. John R. Port Mouton	--> To England
REPASSEY (14)	<i>M</i>	Halifax	--> To England
LEACORE (16)	<i>M</i>	Halifax	--> ? (Probably paid off)
WIXEN (10)	<i>M</i>	Passamaquoddy Annapolis- Halifax re-fit	Annapolis Paid off
RUSSAR (20)	<i>M</i>	Passamaquoddy Halifax re-fit	Passamaquoddy Paid off
DELAWARE (NK)	<i>M</i>	St. John R. Halifax re-fit	St. John R. Paid off
BERNICE (32)	<i>M</i>	Sandy Hook Barbados Hfx-CBI-PEI-Quebec	Halifax Gaspé St. Lawrence --> To E
OPHIE (22)	<i>M</i>	Shelburne ?	--> To England

SHIP	1784	1785	1786
ASSISTANCE (50)	Barbados Halifax	Halifax CBI Gaspé Halifax	Halifax ---> To England
MERCURY (28)	Shelburne Halifax	Shelburne Cape Sable Hfx. Boston	Halifax ---> To England
ARIADNE (24)	Barbados Hfx. Shel. Fundy	Passamaquoddy CBI Gaspé Halifax	Passamaquoddy Halifax
RESOURCE (28)	Halifax CBI	St. John R. Cape Sambro Halifax	Halifax Chaleur PEI CBI Halifax
HELICITY (8)	Quebec	Halifax CBI	---> ? (Probably paid off)
PHISEE (28)		Hfx. with Sawyer	Newfoundland Quebec Halifax
BEAZEL (12)		Halifax	Halifax Bahamas Hfx. Chaleur She
RISK (16)		Halifax	Halifax England Hfx. Patrols Pas
PEGASUS (28)			Halifax -> W.

SHIP	1787	1788	1789
ARIADNE (24)	Hfx. Survey Quebec	---> To England	
RESOURCE (28)	Hfx. CBI Quebec	Halifax ---> To England	
THISEE (28)	Hfx. L'pool Quebec	Quebec St. Lawrence Hfx CBI Shel Halifax	---> To England
WEAZEL (12)	Shel. Hfx Quebec	Halifax Shel. L'pool. ???	---> To England
BRISK (16)	Passa. Hfx Liverpool	Passamaquoddy Hfx L'pool. ???	Various
PEGASUS (28)	Hfx Quebec	Hfx ---> To England	
LEANDER (50)	Hfx Quebec	Halifax Halifax ---> To England	
ANDROMEDA (32)		Hfx re-fit ---> To West Indies	
DIDO (28)		Halifax	Halifax
ADAMANT (50)			Halifax
PENELOPE (32)			Halifax

SHIP	1790	1791	1792
PHISEE (28)	Halifax	---	To England
BRISK (16)	L'pool	---	To England
DIDO (28)	Hfx L'pool PEI Halifax	---	To England
ADAMANT (50)	Hfx PEI Halifax	Quebec Halifax	---
PENELOPE (32)	Hfx	L'pool Hfx L'pool Canso Chaleur CBI	---
BATTLER (16)	L'pool	L'pool Halifax	Jeddore Cape Negro
DILIGENT (8)	Halifax	Cape Sable	Mail to U.S. & at Halifax Fundy Halifax
ALERT (8)	Halifax	Quebec PEI	←--(Grounded and Sank)
CHATHAM (8)	Halifax	Canso	Mail to U.S. & at Halifax St.Lawrence Halifax
ALLIGATOR (28)	Hfx C.Sable Fundy	---	To England
SPHYNA (20)	Halifax	---	To England
FRITON (28)	Quebec	Halifax	---
WINCHELSEA (32)	Hfx	St.Lawrence	Halifax
HUSSAR (28)	Hfx	CBI Fundy	Halifax
CIRCE (28)	Halifax		

SHIP	1793
ALLIGATOR (28)	Hfx}--- War operations
WINCHELSEA (32)	Halifax }--- War operations
HUSSAR (28)	Halifax }--- War operations
CIRCE (28)	Halifax }--- War operations

APPENDIX IX

ARMY COMPONENTS STATIONED AT HALIFAX 1783-1793

1. Royal Artillery

39th Company of the 4th Battalion, 1783-1786
41st Company of the 4th Battalion, 1783-1785
26th Company of the 1st Battalion, 1787-1789
57th Company of the 2nd Battalion, 1789-1793, Capt. John Macleod

2. Corps of Engineers - Officers Commanding

Lieut-Col. Robert Morse, 1783-1784
Lieut. William Booth, 1784-1789

3. Corps of Royal Engineers - Officers Commanding

Captain John Campbell, 1789
Captain Alex Sutherland, 1789-1792
Lieut. W. Bartlett, 1792-1795

4. Regiments (See Table on following page for dates)

4th (or the King's Own) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieut-Gen. Sir John Burgoyne until 1792, then
Lieut-Gen George Morrison
Lieut.-Col. - Col. (later Brig.-Gen.) James Ogilvie
Major - Lord Napier 1787-1789, then
Peregrine Thorne

6th (or the 1st Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Gen. Sir William Boothby, Bt., until 1787, then
Lieut.-Gen. Lancelot Baugh
Lieut.-Col. - Col. John Whyte
Major - Hew Dalrymple until 1787, then
George Vesey

16th (or the Buckinghamshire) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Major-Gen. Hon. Thomas Bruce
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel James H. Craig
Major - Hon George James Rawdon

17th (or the Leicestershire) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieut.-Gen. George Morrison
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel Henry Johnson
Major - Robert Clayton

20th (or the East Devonshire) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Major-General West Hyde
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel John Lind
Major - Charles Boyd

21st Regiment of Foot (or the Royal North British Fusiliers)

Colonel - General the Honourable James Murray
Lieut.-Col. - Major-General James Hamilton until 1792, then
Lieut.-Col. Colin Graham
Major - Lieut.-Col. Colin Graham until September, 1793, then
Hon. Andrew Cochrane Johnstone

33rd (or the 1st Yorkshire West Riding) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieutenant-General Charles, Earl Cornwallis
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel John Yorke
Major - Lieutenant-Colonel William Dansey

37th (or the North Hampshire) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieutenant-General Sir John Dalling, Bt.
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel R. Abercromby until 1786, then
Frederick Mackenzie
Major - James Graham until 1786, then
Charles Ross

42nd (or the Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot - 1st Battalion

Colonel - General, Lord John Murray until 1787, then
Lieutenant-General Sir Hector Munro
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel Charles Graham
Major - Walter Home

54th (or the West Norfolk) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieutenant-General Mariscoe Frederick
Lieut.-Col. - Colonel Andrew Bruce
Major - Sir Andrew Fortster, Bt.

57th (or the West Middlesex) Regiment of Foot

Colonel - Lieutenant-General John Campbell
Lieut.-Col. - Charles Brownlow
Major - Thomas Thompson

60th (or Royal American) Regiment of Foot, 1st Battalion

Colonel-in-Chief - General Jeffrey, Lord Amherst

Colonel-Commandant - Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Haldimand

Lieut.-Col. - Colonel George Etherington

Major - Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Hunter

APPENDIX IX - REGIMENTS STATIONED AT HALIFAX 1783-1793

REGIMENT	1783	1784	1785	1786	1787	1788	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	
17th Regiment of Foot	Hfx Shelburne			--> To England								
33rd Regiment of Foot	Halifax		C.B.I.	--> To England								
37th Regiment of Foot	3 Companies only - Halifax						--> To England					
4th Regiment of Foot	Hfx	New Brunswick		Hfx	New Brunswick and Quebec			--> To England				
42nd Regiment of Foot	Halifax			Cape Breton Island and P.E.I.		--> To England						
57th Regiment of Foot	N.S. Outposts			At Halifax					--> To England			
6th Regiment of Foot					Halifax				--> Departed			
50th Regiment of Foot				Halifax	--> Departed							
4th Regiment of Foot					Halifax	Outposts			Halifax			
20th Regiment of Foot							Halifax			--> To W.I.		
21st Regiment of Foot							Halifax				--> W.I.	
16th Regiment of Foot									Hfx.	--> To W.I.		

APPENDIX X - ARMY INSTALLATIONS AT HALIFAX 1783-1793 *

INSTALLATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	GUNS and/or MEN	REMARKS
Citadel, Fort & Barracks	Citadel Hill	Polygonal earthwork with fascine revetments. Central tower or blockhouse.	<u>Mounted</u> : 62-24pdrs, 2-12pdrs, 4-4pdrs, 3-6pdrs, 1-5½pdr brass howitzer, total 72 guns, 1566 lbs. <u>Unmounted</u> : 28-12pdrs and below. Accommodation for 100 men.	Included 2 field magazines. Fort in poor condition.
Fort Massey, Fort & Barracks	Queen and South Streets	Two semi-circular works of earth and fascines. Octagonal blockhouse.	10-24pdrs, 3-12pdrs, and 4 small brass mortars. Accommodation for 130 men.	Good condition.
George's Island Fort & Barracks	George's Island	Sod and fascine works. Lunettes on south and east, and redan to northward.	6-42pdrs, 29-24pdrs, 3-18pdrs, 9-12pdrs, 1-6pdr; total 48 guns, 1116 lbs.	Included field magazine, in poor condition.
Fort Needham	North Gottingen Street	Pentagonal earthen redoubt.	Total of four guns.	Poor condition.
Eastern Battery	Dartmouth side near present N.S. Hospital.	Lower battery plus earthen fort above and in rear.	15-24pdrs.	H-shaped large building became powder storage for 7000 barrels. Works in poor condition.
Fielding's Battery	Point Pleasant	Sod and fascine works.	5-24pdrs, 2-9pdrs.	Formerly Point Pleasant Battery.

* - Based on Lt-Col. Robert Morse, "... Report on the present State of Defences ... 1784," Report on Canadian Archives 1884, Ottawa, 1885, pages xxvii-lix; and H. Piers, The Evolution of the Halifax Fortress, P.A.N.S. Halifax, 1947.


INSTALLATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	GUNS and/or MEN	REMARKS
Flagstaff Battery	North-west Arm	Sod and fascine works.	2-18pdrs, 2-9pdrs.	Formerly N.W.Arm or Barbette Battery.
Bayside Battery Number 1	Green Bank on south side of harbour	Sod and fascine works.	2-12pdrs, 3-6pdrs.	New in 1782.
Bayside Battery Number 2	Black Rock Pt.	Sod and fascine works.	2-6pdrs.	New in 1782.
North-west Battery #1	Chain Rock	Sod and fascine works.	3-6pdrs.	New in 1782.
North-west Battery #2	Chain Rock	Sod and fascine works.	2-4pdrs.	New in 1782.
Maclean's or Principal Battery and Barracks	Lumber Yard	Sod and fascine works.	5-42pdrs, 5-32pdrs, 6-24pdrs. Accommodation for 100 men.	Enfiladed Point Pleasant and covered Western Channel of harbour.
Fort Coote, Fort and Barracks	North end of naval yard	Blockhouse in redoubt.	3-18pdrs, on parapet overlooking yard. 20 men.	Built about 1775.
Two Blockhouses	SW and NW corners of naval yard	Twenty feet square.	Accommodation for 40 men.	Built in 1775. Decayed.
Three detached bastions	West side of naval yard on Erunswick St.	One with blockhouse.	Nil.	Completely decayed.

INSTALLATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	GUNS and/or MEN	REMARKS
Ordnance Yard	Water Street at foot of Buckingham	Two sections split by Water Street. Store-houses & Armourers' Shop on west side: Bedding Store, large L-shaped store-house and laboratory on east side.	Nil.	Yard heavily encroached on and without sufficient space for stores.
Red Barracks	Near SW corner Cogswell & Brunswick Streets	-----	1168 men.	Old, in need of repair.
Cornwallis Barracks	SE Corner Sackville & Brunswick	-----	520 men.	-----
New Barracks	N.S. Hospital area	Two main buildings.	112 men.	-----
Luttrell Fort Barracks	SW corner Cogswell & Gottingen	-----	128 men.	-----
Grenadier Fort Barracks	N. side Jacob St. at Argyle St.	-----	120 men.	-----
Old Artillery Barracks	R.A. Park area	-----	96 men.	-----
New Artillery Barracks	R.A. Park area	-----	160 men.	-----



Fort Coote

Naval Dockyard



Grenadier Barracks

Red Barracks

Ordnance Yard

Luttrell Barracks

Citadel

Cornwallis Barracks

Artillery Barracks

Fort Massey

Maclean's Battery

George's Island

New Barrack

Eastern Battery

HALIFAX

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

1783-1793

Bayside Bty. #1

Bayside Bty. #2

Fielding's Battery

N.W. Bty. #1 & #2

Flagstaff Battery

APPENDIX XI

SUMMARY OF HALIFAX VICE-ADMIRALTY COURT CASES IN WHICH H.M. SHIPS PARTICIPATED 1783 - 1793.

DATE OF SEIZURE	VESSEL SEIZED	REGISTRY	WHERE SEIZED	H.M. SHIP	ALLEGED VIOLATION	JUDGEMENT AND DATE
- Mar '87	Whale boat & moses boat	Probably U.S.	Passamaquoddy	BRISK	Trade Acts: vessels contained tobacco, sugar and two pairs women shoes.	Vessels and contents condemned as forfeit 27 June 1787.
27 May '87	Schooner INDEPENDENCE	Foreign	St. John's River Labrador	WEAZEL	1783 Fisheries Clause: gear landed without permission of residents.	Vessel and cargo re-stored to owner. Claimant to pay costs. 15 August, 1787.
11 Jun '87	Schooner MINX	Foreign	Campobello Island	BRISK	Trade Acts: foreign bottom with cargo of indian corn and meal, rye flour and bread.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit 7 September, 1787.
9 Sep '87	Schooner MERMAID	Foreign	Halifax Harbour	BRISK	Trade Acts: foreign bottom with cargo of lumber, cattle poultry and misc. merchandise.	Vessel and cargo re-stored. Claimant to pay costs. 17 September, 1787.
5 Aug '88	Schooner NANCY	Foreign	Crow Harbour Chedabucto Bay	RESOURCE	Trade Acts: foreign bottom. Fish and other merchandise aboard. Some already landed.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit 27 August, 1788.
6 Aug '88	Schooner POLLY	Foreign	Fox Island Chedabucto Bay	RESOURCE	Trade Acts; foreign bottom within 2 leagues of shore. Rum, molasses, casks and other goods aboard.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. 27 August, 1788.

DATE OF SEIZURE	VESSEL SEIZED	REGISTRY	WHERE SEIZED	H.M.SHIP	ALLEGED VIOLATION	JUDGEMENT AND DATE
8 Sep'88	Schooner LUCY	British	Warrington Hbr. Shelburne	WEAZEL	Trade Acts: cargo included tar, cordage, canvas earthenwear cotton wool and other merchandise.	Vessel and all cargo except items on Governor's enumerated list forfeit. 15 September, 1788.
N.K.*	Schooner FLORENCE	N.K.*	N.K.*	BRISK	Trade Acts: cargo included pitch, tar, bread, corn. flour	Vessel and flour acquitted Remaining cargo forfeited. 25 October, 1788.
19 Apr'89	Schooner EAGLE	British	Halifax Harbour	THISBE	Trade Acts; cargo included oats, bricks, 11 boxes tea, 18 kegs spirits, nankeens, etc.	Vessel and cargo forfeit. Value £301. 29 May 1789.
8 Jun'89	Schooner SWALLOW	British	Lunenburg Harbour	BRISK	Trade Acts: cargo included spirits and other goods contrary to statute.	Restored. Claimants to pay costs. 10 July, 1789.
9 Jun'89	Schooner ANN	British	Halifax Harbour	THISBE	Trade Acts: cargo included 900 lbs. tobacco.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. 9 September, 1789.
6 Jul'89	Schooner POLLY	Foreign	At anchor in Liverpool Hbr.	BRISK	Trade Acts: foreign bottom, cargo included salt pork, indian corn and other goods.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. 9 September, 1789.
10 Sep '89	Schooner SWALLOW	British	Halifax Harbour	THISBE	Trade Acts: cargo included 2000 bricks and other goods.	Restored. 17 September, 1789.

* Not Known - records incomplete

DATE OF SEIZURE	VESSEL SEIZED	REGISTRY	WHERE SEIZED	H.M.SHIP	ALLEGED VIOLATION	JUDGEMENT AND DATE
10 Sep'89	Brig HARRIET	British	Halifax Harbour	THISSE	Trade Acts; cargo included bricks and other prohibited goods.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. 29 October, 1789. Owner appealed. Result N.K.
21 Sep'89	Schooner CHARMING SALLY	British	Liverpool Harbour	BRISK	Trade Acts: cargo included 2000 bricks, 7 bbls molasses, 81 gal. rum.	Vessel and cargo restored claimant to pay costs. 10 July, 1790.
21 Sep'89	Schooner POLLY	British	Liverpool Harbour	BRISK	Trade Acts; cargo of fish and salt.	Vessel and cargo restored Each party to pay costs. 20 October, 1789.
21 Sep'89	Schooner SEA FLOWER	British	Near Liverpool Harbour	BRISK	Trade Acts; cargo of fish and lumber for Bermuda but no clearance from customs.	Vessel and cargo restored Each party to pay costs. 24 October, 1789.
3 May'90	Schooner PEGGY and POLLY	Foreign	Schooner Cove Liverpool Hbr. at anchor.	BRISK	Trade Acts; foreign bottom cargo various. (vessel claimed to be repairing storm damaged)	Vessel and cargo restored. BRISK'S Captain to pay 15 May 1790.
3 May'90	Schooner TARTAR	Foreign	Schooner Cove Liverpool Hbr. at anchor.	BRISK	Trade Acts: foreign bottom cargo various (vessel claimed to be repairing storm damage.	Vessel and cargo restored Brisk's Captain to pay costs. 15 May 1790.
15 Oct'89	Schooner WILLIAM	Foreign	Margarets Eay	BRISK	1783 Fisheries Clause: vessel about to fish in prohibited waters.	Acquitted. BRISK'S Captain to pay costs 10 July 1790. Appealed Results N.K.

DATE OF SEIZURE	VESSEL	REGISTRY	WHERE SEIZED	H.M.SHIP	ALLEGED VIOLATION	JUDGEMENT AND DATE
8 Sep'90	Schooner DUNMUIR	Eritish	Hillsborough Bay, P.E.I.	DIDO	Trade Acts: cargo included 12 casks tobacco, and 49 ox hides already landed.	Hides and tobacco forfeited. Clairant to pay costs. 23 September 1790.
23 Oct'90	Schooner FOX	Eritish	Chester Harbour	PENELOPE	Trade Acts: cargo included wines, rum, cider, molasses leather, chocolate and bricks.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. 4 November 1790.
23 Sep'91	Sloop THREE FRIENDS	Eritish	Annapolis Gut	DILIGENT	Trade Acts: cargo included apples, bread, flour, pickled pork, 4 bbls. limes, tobacco and 30 chamber pots.	Vessel and cargo condemned as forfeit. Claimants to pay costs 10 December, 1791.

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