From the Sidelines of Empire: Canada's Protestant Mission to Korea 1898-1938

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2008

DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

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For Jennifer and Edgar

Table of Contents

Abstract	vi
Acknowledgements	vii
Chapter One – Introduction	1
I- Before the Managers	1
II- Mission Pragmatism?	6
III- Evangelicalism vs. The Iron Cage	13
Chapter Two - Establishment	24
I- Seed Money	24
II- Acquisition	29
III- Venture Capital	48
Chapter Three - A Brief Opposition	52
I- March 1919	52
II- Cooperation	64
III- Church Union	73
Chapter Four - Follow No Divisive Course	82
I- The Shrine Problem	82
II- What Problem?	88
III- The MacRae Problem	95
IV- The Political Problem	103
Chapter Five - Conclusion	109
Bibliography	113
Appendix A - Maps of Korea	118
Appendix B – Picture of Canadian Mission to Korea 1918	121

Abstract

In the early twentieth century the Canadian Presbyterian and subsequent United Church mission to Korea worked within the restrictions of Japanese colonialism until 1942. Given this setting the mission has been portrayed as non-political and pragmatic in its efforts to continue its work under colonial rules which hampered the Canadians' religious, educational and medical projects. The accommodations that the mission made with the Japanese colonial government regarding school curriculum and attendance at State Shinto ceremonies tested not only the mission's overall strategy of creating a self-supporting Korean Church but also the mission's religious underpinnings. In previous histories these accommodations with colonial regulations were depicted as necessary for the survival of mission institutions and in turn the protection of Korean Christians. This study disputes this view and argues that changes in Euro-American business culture and bureaucratic frameworks influenced the Canadian mission. These influences set the mission *organization* as paramount. While seeing themselves as no less religious than their evangelical predecessors, mission administrators who embraced the new bureaucratic model made compromises that aligned the Canadians with Japanese colonial policies intended to stifle Korean nationalism and erode Korean identity.

Chapter One - Introduction
The Business of Conversion

-I-
Before the Managers

The Canadian missionary presence in nineteenth and early twentieth century eastern Asia has been typically portrayed as a two way interaction of ideas and cultures. In challenging the notion of missionaries being "cultural imperialists" historians have recently focused on their positive role as advocates for social change, educators and health care providers.[1] Feminist historians have rightly pointed out that, even within the constraints of the time, missionary work offered a unique place in which women could pursue careers, travel and experience the world in ways that were otherwise deemed unrespectable. What should not be forgotten, however, is that the primary objective of these enterprises was religious conversion. Conversion was the business at hand and the tools used to make conversions were evangelical preaching, medicine and education.

As mission groups expanded, the increasing complexity of organizing this multifaceted approach towards conversion altered mission practices. This thesis will examine how in the early twentieth century, mission bureaucracy adopted new business

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[1] For Canadian works on missions in southeast and eastern Asia see, Alvyn J. Austin, *Saving China, Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom 1888-1959* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Ruth Compton Brouwer, *New Women for God: Canadian Presbyterian Women and India Missions, 1876-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) and *Modern Women Modernizing Men: The Changing Missions of Three Professional Women in Asia and Africa, 1902-1969* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2002); Rosemary Gagan, *A Sensitive Independence: Canadian Methodist Women Missionaries in Canada and the Orient 1881-1925* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992); A. Hamish Ion, *The Cross and the Rising Sun: Volume 1, The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1872-1931* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990) and *The Cross in the Dark Valley: Volume 3, The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931-1945* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999); Laura Macdonald, "'Minister of the Gospel and Doctor of Medicine': The Canadian Presbyterian Medical Mission to Korea, 1898-1923," Master's thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 2000. Ruth Compton Brouwer discusses the question of missionaries as cultural imperialists in her introduction to *Modern Women*. Echoing Andrew Porter Brouwer makes the point that labelling all missions, in all locations as cultural imperialists is problematic.

management techniques in order to make their operations more efficient. I will argue that in using these methods the missions lost sight of their original aims and engaged in compromises that ran counter to their religious beliefs and the goals that these beliefs implied. I examine the Canadian Presbyterian mission to Korea, which also operated in southern Manchuria. This mission began in 1898 and came under the umbrella of the United Church after the Canadian Church Union in 1925. The United Church withdrew from Korea in 1942 at the opening of the Pacific War.

The first five Presbyterian missionaries sent from Halifax, Nova Scotia under the auspices of the Presbyterian Eastern division mission board departed on what became a familiar ritual of speaking engagements across Canada before the actual voyage across the Pacific to Korea via Japan. As part of their fundraising, missionaries explained to their Canadian audiences the situation in the Korean mission field. Korea in 1898 was under the influence of Japan after the Sino-Japanese War and the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa which forced Korea to accept trade with Japan and other nations. Following Japan's victory over China in 1895 the centrality of Chinese intellectual, political and economic authority in Korea was permanently offset.[2] The Koreans whom the Canadians encountered were struggling with uncertainty, not just over sovereignty, but also over core beliefs, institutions and Koreans' place in a new East Asian reality. While sometimes volatile and bewildering for the missionaries, this setting provided a fertile

[2] For background on the rise of Japanese influence in Korea see Carter J. Eckert et al. *Korea Old and New, A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 199-201; Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 86-138; Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2005); Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995); Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974).

environment for potential converts. Koreans who were ambitious, curious, or desperate enough increasingly came to contemplate and explore religions such as Christianity.

This potential was not lost on the missionaries or on the mission board that approved their departure. Korea was still seen as being open to proselytizing and one of the last "untouched" areas for Christian conversion. Africa, India, China and Japan were already the recipients of numerous Canadian Protestant missions from Baptist, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches. Korea in fact was not untouched by the Christian message; it had been the site of Christian mission work since the late eighteenth century Catholic missions followed by Protestant missions arriving in mid-nineteenth century.[3] William and Edith Foote, Robert and Lena Grierson and Duncan MacRae followed independent Canadian missionaries as well as Canadians who had joined American missions already in place in Korea.

This original group were all Nova Scotians, though Foote had been born in Massachusetts and raised in Nova Scotia. He had graduated with a Master of Arts from Acadia University and a degree in Divinity from the Presbyterian College in Halifax. An outstanding student, Foote was considered an intellectual among the Canadian group. After travelling extensively in Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea, Foote went on to lecture at the Union Theological College P'yŏngyang. Returning to Canada in 1927, Foote died in 1930. Robert Grierson was a gregarious alumnus of the Dalhousie University Medical School and also completed a degree in Divinity from the Presbyterian College in Halifax. Grierson acted both as a medical doctor and as a preacher in northern Korea and

[3] For a history of the early Christian missions see James H. Grayson, *Korea: A Religious History* (Oxford University Press, 1989) also Young-sik Yoo, *Earlier Canadian Missionaries in Korea, A Study in History 1888-1898,* (Toronto: The Society for Korean and Related Studies, 1987) and Young-sik Yoo, "The Impact of Canadian Missionaries in Korea: A Historical Survey of Early Canadian Mission Work, 1888-1898," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario 1996.

Manchuria. He retired from the mission in 1937 and died in Canada in 1965. Duncan MacRae was an outspoken graduate of Dalhousie University and the Presbyterian College. MacRae was raised in rural Cape Breton and gained a reputation as an impulsive yet deeply committed member of the Presbyterian mission. Less is recorded of the backgrounds of Edith Foote and Lena Grierson although, as we shall see, they figured in some of the mission's struggles. Australian and British groups were also active on the peninsula before the original Canadian mission arrived in Pusan in 1898.

These Halifax missionaries were considered pioneers for the Canadian Presbyterian Church even though they were not the first. On landing in Pusan the Canadians were assisted by Australian missionaries before moving on to Seoul where they were housed and helped to acclimatize to their new surroundings by American mission members. This help reflected a pattern of cooperation among the Protestant missions that lasted for the next thirty five years. As the novelty and excitement of their voyage wore off the new missionaries began work on the daunting task of learning Korean. Native Korean teachers were assigned to the men of the mission, but levels of speech and the complexity of written *hanja*, based on Chinese characters, coupled with the native phonetic *hangul* system, meant that attaining a working knowledge of the language was not easy. Despite these hurdles Foote applied himself daily in study and went on to publish in Korean. Grierson and MacRae reached a level at which they could preach sermons and teach in spoken Korean.

The dedication and perseverance of the missionaries reflected not only their educational backgrounds as above average students but also, and more important, was their belief in taking the Christian message into what they saw as the darkness of idolatry and ignorance. The missionaries recognized the huge magnitude of the undertaking

evangelizing to a population in such foreign surroundings by a mission organization with very limited resources in people and money. Embarking on extensive itinerating trips by foot, mule and cart deep into rural Korea to preach and distribute religious material, Foote, Grierson and MacRae experienced the culture at a very intimate level. They witnessed a Korea being transformed by industrial development and intensive agricultural methods. These changes were accelerated under colonial rule following the creation of a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and the annexation of Korea in 1910.

The transformation of Korea under "colonial modernity" in many ways mirrored the physical changes in Europe and North America wrought by the introduction of railways, steamship lines, modern communications, industrial manufacturing and urbanization.[4] For the missionaries the physical changes to their environment at home in Canada were accompanied by sweeping changes in the conduct of business and industry. How these changes influenced business administration shifted over time and were mirrored in similar shifts in mission organization, and how the mission changed. How the mission conducted mergers, management and negotiations with colonial government imitated what was occurring in Euro-American business circles, with only a slight lag between the changes in corporations and missions.[5]

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[4] For perspectives of Korea under Japanese rule see Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson eds. *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[5] Discussion of managerial shifts and their influences on society that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century can be found in Martha Banta, *Taylored Lives, Narrative Productions in the Age of Taylor, Veblen and Ford* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); Alfred Chandler, *The Visible Hand, The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alfred Chandler, *The Essential Alfred Chandler, Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); Antonio Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism" in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare (New York: International Publishers, 1972); Charles S. Maier, "Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s," *The Journal of Contemporary History* 5 (1970): 27-61; Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America, Culture & Society in the Gilded Age* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); For a gender perspective see, Graham S. Lowe, *Women in the Administrative Revolution, The Feminization of Clerical Work* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

This emerging business culture embraced maximizing profit to new levels. In particular, the corporation become the main vehicle for achieving this maximization. Informed by Taylorism, Fordism and rational management, this new culture permeated society, and by the 1910s new missionaries brought these influences with them to East Asia. Changes in business culture through trusts, mergers, "scientific management" and the administrative revolution altered the manner in which all organizations and not just businesses conducted themselves. Interaction between workers and management, between businesses, government and consumers took on new forms. New concepts in organizational behaviour changed the Canadian mission enterprise in Korea over the course of its existence, causing the mission to drift away from its initial goal of creating a self-supporting Korean Church.

-II-
Mission Pragmatism?

The mission this thesis examines was originally organized in 1898 under the direction of the Foreign Mission Committee (FMC) of the Presbyterian Church of Canada, Eastern division, based in Halifax. This section of the FMC would later merge, after lengthy financial difficulties and urgent requests for assistance, with the FMC, Western division in February 1915. The Western division, based in Toronto, took over the management of a substantial area of northeastern Korea and southern Manchuria allotted to the Canadians through the Presbyterian Council, an organization created in Korea that promoted cooperation between the different national Presbyterian missions.[6] After the

[6] United Church of Canada, Maritime Conference Archives (hereafter MCA), Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee 1895-1899, box S-13, file S-13/3; MCA Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee 1912-1915, box S-13, file S-13/6;

amalgamation of both the Eastern and Western Presbyterian missions, the administrative structure in Toronto was taken over by R.P. Mackay as Foreign Mission Secretary until 1926. After 1926, MacKay's assistant A.E. Armstrong assumed leadership of the mission.[7] In Korea, orders from the main office were directed through the Mission Secretary and Treasurer in the field. The Secretary and Treasurer kept in close contact with the head office through regular correspondence. Their reports described the political and economic climate as well as the relationship of the Canadian mission to other Christian groups in Korea. Information on individual missionaries also filtered through these field managers as well as statistical data required for long-term planning. Planning involved annual meetings held in Korea among the missionaries from the Canadian stations; although the rules of procedure at these events became increasing dictated from Toronto and the new directives were disseminated through the mission administration in Korea.

Under new management, the mission expanded rapidly. By the mid-1920s, the number of Canadian Presbyterian missionaries had increased almost ten-fold, with stations in five locations boasting schools and hospitals as well as partnerships with other Churches in a seminary, university, major hospital and medical training facility.[8] These facilities and institutions were on such a scale that the objectives of the original mission, evangelization and the creation of a self-supporting Korean Church, became sidelined as the managerial structure of the mission took on a corporate form. Japanese government interference in these efforts increased over time as all of the mission projects in religion,

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William Scott, *The Canadians in Korea : A Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work in Korea, Part One to the Time of the Church Union* (npl: np,1970), 45.

[7] Ion, *Cross and the Rising Sun, vol. 1*, 25-26.

[8] Nova Scotia Archives and Record Management (hereafter NSARM) Maritime Missionaries to Korea Collection, A.F. Robb to Bessie Robb, 27 May 1924, MG1, vol. 2275, file 22; Scott, *Canadians,* 96.

education and medicine came to experience colonial state regulation to varying degrees. By the late 1930s the Canadians complied with state regulations which in some cases challenged the basic religious and strategic underpinnings on which the mission rested.

Although this adaptation has been labelled as pragmatism, this is neither a sufficient nor satisfying explanation for choosing accommodation with the Japanese colonial government. By looking at how changes in business organization in the early twentieth century altered the Canadian mission and allowed for accommodation with the Japanese administration, I am emphasizing an unexamined dynamic in the development of these missions.

Historical accounts of Canadian missionary work began shortly after the missions themselves. These amateur and sometimes church-sponsored works were part of fundraising and recruitment techniques that independent and organized missionary ventures used to continue their work. Until the late twentieth century, these hagiographic and for the most part self-serving depictions of Canadian missionaries were all that existed.

Recent histories have questioned the role of these missions as cultural imperialists while others have concentrated on the importance of women and their role in foreign missions. In the 1960s and 1970s, American and British historians began to seriously consider their missionary presence and the missionary role in imperialism and the subjugation of colonized peoples. Similarly, anthropologists considered missionary groups at a local level as they interacted with indigenous peoples. Yet it was not until the 1980s that Canadian historians began to reflect on Canada's overseas missions. There was no shortage of sources. Canadian church archives abound with missionary papers of a rich

and broad variety. The reluctance to approach the topic of Canadian missionaries reflected an embarrassment, the missionaries being a reminder of Canada's colonial past.

This aversion to creating Canadian missionary history is similar to the wariness of second wave feminist historians in the United States in approaching the history of women missionaries. These historians feared that mission women might not produce the desired role model of the early feminist.[9] For Canadian historians in the 1960s and 1970s it was similarly doubtful that missionaries would produce a picture of Canadians building or creating a separate Canadian vision. The stereotype of the missionary as the single minded, religious zealot was well established. This stereotype had become part of a collective history which in turn dehumanized the missionary.[10]

By the 1980s, professional historians such as Alvyn Austin began to re-evaluate the perception of Canadian missionaries as cultural imperialists. Austin notes the unease of fellow historians in approaching the topic of missionaries as postcolonial theory portrayed the missionary as a symbol of Euro-American arrogance, ignorance and imperialism.[11] Writing about the Chinese mission field, Austin sees Canadian missionaries attempting the "soften the blow" of modernity by introducing modern medicine and education.[12] His reassessment of missionaries concentrates on their "paternalism" rather than what he considers the larger themes that surround the missionary enterprise.[13] What emerges in Austin's *Saving China* is a descriptive, and

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[9] Compton Brouwer, *New Women*, 7.
[10] Andrew Porter discusses early efforts intended to move beyond missionary stereotypes in Andrew Porter, *Religion versus Empire?, British Protestant missionaries and overseas expansion, 1700-1914* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 8.
[11] Austin, *Saving China,* xiv.
[12] *Ibid*., xvii.
[13] *Ibid*., xv.

sympathetic, history of Canadian missionary involvement in China from the late 1880s until the expulsion of westerners in the early 1950s.

In his study of Protestant missionaries working within the Japanese empire, Hamish Ion looks at a broad group of Canadian Protestants as they lived and worked in Taiwan, Korea and the Japanese home islands. One of a series of three volumes, Ion's discussion of Korea in *The Cross and the Rising Sun* is the first serious academic monograph to consider the subject of Canadian missionaries in Japan's empire. Ion sees the Canadian missionaries "as agents of informal relations between Canada and Japan."[14] Through this approach, he looks at the role of Canadian missionaries in East Asia before formal diplomatic ties were established, and before economic relationships formed in any meaningful way.[15]

Ion establishes the exceptional circumstances in which Canadian missionaries worked in East Asia. These were quite different from those in the more familiar narratives of missionaries working in a British colonial setting where the colonized are usually African and the missionaries of the same nationality as the colonial authorities. In East Asia the colonial masters were often Japanese and an ongoing tension in the mission fields of Taiwan, Korea and Japan arose from Canadian and American missionaries' reactions to Japanese rule.[16]

A central theme of *The Cross and the Rising Sun* is the variety of responses provoked as missions were challenged by Japanese colonialism. These reactions depended upon time, location and denomination.[17] Ruth Compton Brouwer in *New*

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[14] Ion, *The Cross and the Rising Sun, vol. 1,* xi.
[15] *Ibid.*, xii, 1.
[16] *Ibid.*, 15.
[17] *Ibid.*, xv.

Women for God recognizes these differences and acknowledges the difficulties, and pitfalls, of painting a complete picture of the Canadian missionary movement based on the experiences of one religious group. For Brouwer the situation in each host country as well as the "denominational identity" of the missionaries played important roles in how mission groups approached the larger "quixotic project" of spreading Christianity in Asia. By studying the significance of gender, Brouwer looks for "a set of shared assumptions and common patterns that cut across the women's foreign missionary movement, making themselves evident in its rhetoric, its strategies, and its ultimate goals." This includes women both in the field and working at home in the mission enterprise.[18]

Brouwer candidly explains the absence of any extensive study before her own. In looking to the United States and the "avoidance" by feminist historians in the 1970s of the topic of women missionaries, Brouwer makes it clear that the "close ties to conservative denominational structures and its imperialist and racist assumptions appeared to have little to offer historians" looking for role models or examples of women seeking autonomy. However, as in the United States, "confidence and maturity" in approaching the subject eventually prevailed.[19]

Besides the obvious difference in focus, *New Women for God* diverges from Austin and Ion in that Brouwer explicitly connects the Canadian Protestant missionary movement with an overt "nationalist/imperialist impulse." That is to say, she makes clear that Canadian missionaries understood their role as being obliged to aid and assist Britain in the making of empire and the enlightenment of the "heathen."[20] In this sense, Brouwer stands apart from Austin and Ion, both of whom emphasize that their missionaries

[18] Brouwer, *New Women,* ix.
[19] *Ibid*., 7.
[20] *Ibid*., 4.

differed from their British and American peers and that they took uniquely Canadian approaches to their work overseas.

Brouwer agrees with Ion regarding the role that Canadian missionaries played in informal connections between Canada and the "exotic" world. The two historians also agree that missionaries were conduits of information between Canadians and an outside world that most Canadians could never hope to experience. Through missionary publications and public presentations, missions altered how Canadians perceived other peoples. But mission outreach also acted as a recruiting tool.[21] As a result of this outreach recruitment of women in the Protestant missions was surprisingly successful. Brouwer attributes this to four main reasons. The first was the belief "that matters of religious and moral responsibility were ones for which women had a special affinity." Second was the fact that Canadian women had knowledge and understanding of the well-established missionary projects in the United States and Great Britain. Third, the segregation of women in some mission field societies excluded male missionaries from preaching the gospel to women. Last, the shifting role of women at home in turn-of-the-century-Canada changed how women saw their own place in the world. New opportunities in education and work outside the home coupled with, in many cases, a sense of adventure prompted women to join missionary groups.[22]

Another work that deals with Canadian women missionaries, in this case Methodists, is Rosemary Gagan's *A Sensitive Independence.* Gagan seeks to "demythologize" and "to strip away the layers of sentimentality that have tended to

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[21] *Ibid.*, 3-4.
[22] *Ibid.*, 5.

obscure the durability of these women."[23] In her description of missionary life and how women fit into the hierarchy of postings Gagan explains how female recruits' backgrounds and connections were all important in deciding the placing of these women. The depiction of the stoic female missionary is challenged by Gagan pointing out that two-thirds of the women who began missionary careers resigned or were let go, often after a very short term.[24] Gagan places those who remained with the missionary organization as inhabiting a space between "politicized feminists…[and] passive apologists for woman's "proper sphere.""[25] She also explores the role of class and how these women, for the most part single, young and middle-class, interacted with potential converts.

In the histories considered above, which touch on the themes of imperialism, cultural interaction and gender, little mention is made of the influences of the administrative and bureaucratic changes that altered how the Canadian missions operated abroad. These influences were first felt at home. The following section will examine how historians have portrayed the Canada in which the Presbyterian missionaries and mission administrators lived and negotiated.

-III-
Evangelicalism vs. The Iron Cage

The works examined above concentrate on missions and their experiences abroad. Brian Fraser in *The Social Uplifters* examines the religious and intellectual milieu surrounding Toronto Presbyterians during the turn of the twentieth century. His work helps to reveal the influences that were at work both among mission groups and in the

[23] Gagan, *A Sensitive Independence,* 4.
[24] *Ibid*, 5-6.
[25] *Ibid*., 9.

city that was home to the Presbyterian FMC's head office. In particular, Fraser explores the Social Gospel movement. This movement grew out of "Victorian crisis of faith" in an effort to make Protestant Christianity relevant by promoting "moral and social progress…in terms the modern world could understand."[26]

By examining the lives of six Presbyterian board members, Fraser describes the techniques by which progressives in the church attempted to create a "Christian Canada." Ultimately, this form of Social Gospel floundered following the outbreak World War I.[27] But before the war, university-educated Presbyterian Church leaders influenced Canadian society through a broad spectrum of secular and religious means ranging from schools, universities, the press, literature to the church itself. Fraser points out that while changing universities shaped the thinkers and leaders of late nineteenth-century Canada, as outlined by A.B. McKillop, the Presbyterian progressives sought to spread their message to a much wider audience than the universities could reach.[28]

In part, Fraser's work looks at the influences on Canadian Presbyterians from abroad, Scotland for example, and how these translated in the Canadian context. In doing so, *The Social Uplifters* describes the theological and intellectual environment from which many of the Canadian missionaries emerged. In his introduction Fraser outlines the moral foundations, strategy and intent of the Presbyterian progressives. His summation is worth repeating:

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[26] Brian J. Fraser, *The Social Uplifters: Presbyterian Progressives and the Social Gospel in Canada, 1875-1915* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1988), x-xi.
[27] *Ibid*., 12-13.
[28] Fraser, *The Social Uplifters,* 175; A.B. McKillop, *A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Inquiry and Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979) and A.B. McKillop, *Matters of the Mind: The University in Ontario, 1791-1951* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); John G. Stackhouse Jr., "The Historiography of Canadian Evangelicalism: A Time to Reflect" in *Church History* 64 (1995): 627-634.

> The Presbyterians…like their Scottish mentors, strove for an ethical Christian community characterized by those vital virtues they felt necessary for the regeneration of the world – a strong work ethic, sobriety, probity, thrift, charity, and duty informed by the democratic Christian conscience. They united evangelical zeal with moderated reason in their attempt to establish a universal consensus on individual morality and social responsibility. Taken together, these qualities of character would reform, in an ascending pattern, the family, the city, the province, the nation and ultimately the world.[29]

Although Fraser gives only passing references to the missionary groups from Canada, the Social Gospel he describes did influence the missions that took the progressive message outside the Dominion. And while *The Social Uplifters* is a history of religious leaders addressing the changes brought on by industrialization and the challenges of modernity in Canada, these same challenges confronted the Canadian missionaries overseas. The Christian vision that the Presbyterian leaders held for Canada was emulated by other Christians who took this vision onto the international stage. In the case of the progressives, this meant initial objection to involvement in the First World War, which was later reversed to support and promotion of the allied war effort. As I will show below, there are parallels between this aspect of the failure of the Social Gospel at home and the failure of the mission enterprise abroad in Korea before the Second World War. Fraser's work concludes with a quotation from Wilfrid Laurier in which Laurier deems that the Presbyterian dream for Canada had seen its day as early as 1912.[30] In his treatment of the Presbyterians in turn-of-the-century Canada Fraser points to some of the fundamental shifts which Canadian Presbyterians faced not only at home but also abroad in their efforts to spread their Christian vision for the world.

While Fraser's work focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Robert Wright examines the interwar period. Mission enterprises sought to redefine

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[29] Fraser, *The Social Uplifters,* xiii.
[30] *Ibid.*, 117-178.

themselves after World War I in order to face newly perceived threats to the core beliefs of Christianity. Wright's *A World Mission* investigates the role Canada's Protestant denominations took in the spirit of "internationalism" after the First World War. Expecting to find evidence of Church involvement and pressure towards a new vision of international cooperation and peace, Wright argues that Canadian Protestant churches attempted to revamp their focus on evangelicalism and their foreign mission aims. They did this in the face of communism, fascism "and militant forms of nationalism."[31]

The "new" evangelicalism of this era was not, as the word has come to imply, a radical far-right fundamentalism. Rather, the evangelicalism that Protestant churches espoused was a middle way between the "liberal modernists" and "militant conservative" elements of each denomination. In describing the Protestant search for a new direction Wright raises questions about the mission movement and also Canadian society as whole in the interwar period. The "creeping suspicion that their pre-eminent status in English-Canadian society was threatened" encapsulates what he sees as the fear and uncertainty Christian leaders felt as Canada emerged from World War I. Wright notes that, coupled with this threat, the spectre of "sectarianism, irreligion, and atheism, and the fragmentation that occurred in the wake of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy and the church-union movement" moved churches to consider a new direction in the 1920s and 1930s. This new direction or "internationalism" through missions was not only a way to restore energy in Canadian Protestantism but also as a means "[to come] to terms with modernity."[32]

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[31] Robert Wright, *A World Mission, Canadian Protestantism and the Quest for a New International Order, 1918-1939* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 4.
[32] *Ibid.*, 10.

Wright concludes that this new course was a failure. The reasons for failure were rooted in what he sees as the "Victorian ideas of the inherent superiority of Protestant Christianity, political democracy, and the Anglo-Saxon race." Protestant leaders, according to Wright, were unable to abandon these ideas. *A World Mission* provides examples of how Church leadership and mission field workers could operate at opposite ends of the spectrum. The "somewhat xenophobic nationalism" displayed by church leaders when confronted with the question of Asian immigration to Canada in comparison to conciliatory attitudes of missionaries in Asia during the 1930s is a case in point. Ambiguity and contradiction are two of the terms that Wright uses to describe Canadian Protestant leadership as they found themselves "between an era of colonialism and one of decolonization, between a period of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the world and one of ideological polarization." [33]

In Wright's view, Protestant leaders called for the promotion of a new evangelicalism in the interwar years in order to construct a middle way between extremes in the Church. For Wright the mission field was the place where the middle ground for the new evangelicalism was promoted. Contrary to Wright, G.A. Rawlyk sees evangelicalism in the interwar period as being pushed to the sidelines by Protestant leaders. In his introduction to the collection of essays *Aspects of the Canadian Evangelical Experience,* Rawlyk views evangelicalism as "plastic" within the Canadian experience. In the late nineteenth century evangelism shifted from "conversionism" to the "spread of scriptural holiness by reforming the nation. [A time when m]iddle-class values

[33] *Ibid*., 251-252.

had begun to transform the old evangelicalism."[34] Rawlyk describes how in the interwar years an "evangelical consensus" was shifted by church leadership and evangelicalism drifted to the periphery of religious life, contrasting with Wright's contention that a new evangelicalism emerged and was directed overseas.

The argument over the how evangelicalism developed in the interwar years is further complicated by David Paxton in an essay in Rawlyk's collection. Paxton considers how evangelicalism shaped the United Church after 1925 and contradicts the representation of the United Church as agents of "rampant liberalism, and secularization." Countering Paxton, Barry Mack claims that the United Church meant "disaster" for the Canadian Presbyterian Church. By this, Mack means that the United Church dampened the Presbyterian's evangelical thrust.[35] These differences highlight the reality that the church union in 1925 had implications for not only Canada but also the missionaries and their host countries. The church union meant that in East Asia the mission fields of each country were evaluated from the perspective of a much larger organization with an accompanying bureaucratic eye on expenditures and strategy.

The union also looms large in Hamish Ion's second book on Canadian missionaries in the Japanese empire. *The Cross and the Dark Valley* covers what many consider the years of the missionary movement's lingering death in East Asia: from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 until the defeat of Japan in 1945. Some historians place the beginning of the end immediately after World War I, while others consider the victory of

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[34] G.A. Rawlyk, ed., *Aspects of the Canadian Evangelical Experience* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), xvii.

[35] Rawlyk, Aspects, xxi; David Paxton, ""We Will Evangelize with a Whole Gospel or None": Evangelicalism and the United Church of Canada," in G.A. Rawlyk, ed., *Aspects of the Canadian Evangelical Experience* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 113-115: Barry Mack, "From Preaching to Propaganda to Marginalization: The Lost Centre of Twentieth-Century Presbyterianism," ," in G.A. Rawlyk, ed., *Aspects of the Canadian Evangelical Experience* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 137-138.

the Communists in China during 1949 as the death knell. These arguments aside, Ion's second book on Canadian missionaries deals with an era in which the men and women working in Asia were under tremendous pressure, both from home and from Japan. While the Depression drained mission coffers as Canadians gave less to their churches, in East Asia Japanese nationalism and anti-western sentiment poisoned the atmosphere for missionaries.

Despite these pressures Ion's *The Cross and the Dark Valley* emphasizes the positive cultural interactions between Japanese and Canadians rather than the larger questions of the missions' role in imperialism. He thus excuses the Canadians of cultural imperialism, unlike Brouwer, who places her missionaries in the British imperialist camp. The difference in interpretation is due in part to the location of Brouwer's study, which is British India. In East Asia, however, the connections or relationship between the Canadian missionary movement and imperialism are still unclear.

While the connections between Canadian overseas missions and imperialism have yet to be defined, debate continues among British historians as to how the mission movement participated in the imperialism of that country. As part of this debate British historian Andrew Porter's *Religion versus Empire?*, encapsulates more than two centuries of missionary history and disputes the accepted wisdom that "the missionary…was an advocate of imperialism and the destroyer of indigenous culture and values."[36] His ideas are important to Canadian historians in that if an historian can convincingly argue for a re-evaluation of the British missionary movement as not necessarily imperialist, or agents of imperialism, then an answer to where Canadian missions fit in to the colonial framework may become more apparent. Porter manages to deconstruct the "rigid

[36] Porter, *Religion versus Empire?*, 316.

functional connections between empire, national identity and missions."[37] In doing so, he challenges the "guilt by association" with colonialists that follows missionaries and points out that only by repetition has this idea become an historical gospel that connects missions with the worst of British imperialism.[38] His findings uncovered solid examples of missionary policies surrounding education (which led to a questioning of imperialism), support for home rule organizations, expanded roles for women and the embracing of, rather than the attempt to stifle local languages. None of these actions fit the image of missionaries marching in step with colonial managers. In other words, for Porter, the missions were not imperialists nor capitalists, but *religious* groups first. Missions were religious organizations that thought on a global scale and interacted with like-minded groups on that same level.[39]

As the works above illustrate, the influences on mission strategy of cultural exchange between mission and convert, the role of women in missions and theological shifts in Canada are established themes that define the Canadian missionary presence in East Asia. However, business culture and its adoption both in the mission field and in mission management at home in Canada in many cases overtook and marginalized these influences. The organization and culture of Canadian Presbyterian missionaries in interwar Korea and Manchuria moved towards a business model that required a stable bureaucracy. What distinguished the new organization from that of the early mission was an aversion to grass-roots decision making or the input of popular consensus from the larger body of the Church. As a result, the mission came to fit Max Weber's description of a bureaucracy as an organization where:

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[37] *Ibid.,,* 9.
[38] *Ibid.*, 13.
[39] *Ibid.,* 317, 319, 322-323, 328.

> "[i]ndividuals with documented qualifications fill positions circumscribed by rules, in order to ensure the perpetual fulfillment of the bureau's function. These rules tend to be stable and exhaustive. The resulting structure trends towards hierarchy. Incumbents are expected to keep their work separate from their private lives, so they can concentrate on their duties, which are based more on the processing of documents or files in the abstract and not on interactions with individual persons directly. Consistent with this tendency towards abstraction, the official is then rewarded abstractly by means of job security and a salary in a money economy, thereby making this career a distinct profession."[40]

Thus "[b]ureaucracy thereby tends to channel or frustrate freedom, with astonishing success, which is why Weber famously lamented the "iron cage" that rationalization was building throughout society."[41] As part of this rationalization, and in keeping with Weber's analysis, is the frustration or containment of ambition and autonomy of both women and men in the mission organization. Women played a central role in the early mission that used the close relationships between Korean "Bible women" and Canadian missionary wives and female missionaries. Over time the bureaucratic framework of the organization marginalized the role of women to specific fields and in some cases attempted to exclude them from participating in long-term planning. This was not simply a relative increase in men's power, however. The men of the mission also lost autonomy and individualism as the larger organization, rather than the missionaries themselves, decided on future expansion, education and religious policy.[42] Bureaucratization thus refers in this thesis to the growth in the Korean mission of conformity to norms such as Weber identified:: "[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity,

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[40] William A. Darity Jr. ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, vol.1* (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2008), 390.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Shirley Tillotson examines the role of bureaucratization and the marginalization of women in Shirley Tillotson, *The Public at Play: Gender and the Politics of Recreation in Post-War Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 159; For the erosion of masculinity and individualism within a bureaucracy see William Hollingsworth Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1957).

discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal cost...."[43] When employed by the Canadians in the setting of Japanese-controlled Korea, these norms of bureaucracy meant the abandonment of principles on which the mission was based.

The Canadian mission, initially driven by an evangelical impulse, was transformed into a Weberian bureaucracy, an organization administered and directed under business management and bureaucratic techniques. Rationalization within the mission involved horizontal integration with other Christian groups, centralized control from Toronto, and standardized reports and communiqués from the field to facilitate efficient accounting and statistical analysis. How the application of this business culture and bureaucratization influenced missionaries in the social and political relationships with both Korean converts and the governing Japanese colonial regime is the subject of the thesis.

The next chapter considers the establishment and expansion of the mission in the first two decades of the twentieth century and addresses the stated purpose of the Presbyterian mission of building a self-supporting Korean church. If this was the case then the mission by nature was impermanent. However, the permanence of mission buildings and property and their role in mission decision-making point to other, more complex intentions. The change in the mission from an evangelical to corporate culture explains this tension.

The third chapter deals with the 1920s and the period of "cultural rule" in colonial Korea where relations between missions and the colonial authorities were, for the most

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[43] William A. Darity Jr. ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, vol.1* (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2008), 390.

part, cordial. I will examine how Canadian missionaries debated compliance with Japanese Governor-General regulations regarding education in Korea. These debates show that the missionary perception of their own role was shifting and that the relationship between colonized Koreans and colonizing Japanese had changed.

Chapter four turns to the 1930s. Compliance with colonial government edicts on the compulsory observance of State Shinto in the mid 1930s challenged the religious underpinnings of the international mission community in Korea. As with compliance to colonial laws regarding education, the Canadian United Church mission chose to conform to State Shinto observance. These Canadian missionaries justified compliance with the argument that State Shinto was a manifestation of loyalty to the Emperor rather than a religious observance. The Canadians' approach, while sometimes construed as pragmatic, contradicted with the strongly held views of many Protestants who saw compliance with State Shinto as an act of idolatry. The Canadians' compliance was more a product of the organizational culture that governed their particular mission than it was of a greater "pragmatism" on their part. In what follows, then, I show that the mission contributed to the colonial project not as agents of imperialism but as an organization under the influences of, and motivated by, business and bureaucratic culture.

Chapter Two
Establishment

-I-
Seed Money

"A new way of life spread over the planet with a claim to universality unparalleled since the age when Christianity started out on its own career, only this time the movement was on a purely material level."[1]

The original purpose of the Canadian Presbyterian mission to Korea was to build an indigenous self-supporting church. The mission was by nature impermanent. However, the permanence of mission buildings and property, and their role in mission decision-making, points to other, more complex intentions. The change in mission culture from evangelical to corporate helps explain this tension. This chapter analyzes how the mission was created at the end of the 1890s and tracks its development from its popular roots through its gradual transformation into a structured and systematic organization.

The Korean mission was formed after the June 1895 General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Canada. The assembly had been presented with the findings of a report recommending the creation of a Foreign Mission Committee (FMC) to oversee mission activities. The decision to create the Korean mission was primarily designed to make converts in a previously untouched area for the Canadian Church. This move was made despite financial concerns about funding the mission. The FMC would consist of two divisions, the Eastern division based in Halifax and the Western division based in Toronto. The Conveners of each division were appointed by the General Assembly. Select members from each division would form the body, or joint Conveners, of the committee administering the overall direction of the national FMC. Although the FMC

[1] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 130.

represented a "unification" of mission work in name, the respective divisions still had direct control over existing mission fields in northwest Canada, central India, Formosa, mainland China, South America, the Caribbean, and the south Pacific.[2]

This loose merger of the missions created instances where control over running particular sections of a mission field was traded between divisions and also instances when missionaries from a particular division could be relocated depending on financial or strategic considerations. The Eastern division, usually in a poorer financial position, and granted only half as many Conveners as the Western, was the junior partner in the FMC. As a result, the Eastern division's ability to expand their operations often hinged on Western support.

This pattern is evident when the Eastern division met in Halifax in April 1896 to discuss the possibility of a new mission on the Korean peninsula. Enough monies for initial funding were made available from an anonymous patron and from the estate of Rev. William McKenzie, an independent missionary who had committed suicide in Sorai, Korea. Even with these resources, the Eastern division was concerned about overextending itself. Consequently, the Eastern division did not approve of the new venture but instead offered the opportunity to the Western division.[3]

Finances were of course central in mission planning, but in the late nineteenth century the importance of funds could still be pushed aside by those in the Church who thought that spiritual concerns were more important. Nevertheless, citing debt and the need for increased investment for the Caribbean missions, factions within the FMC were

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[2] MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee 1895-1899, box S-13, file S-13/3, 1-3; Scott, *Canadians*, 67.
[3] MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee 1895-1899, box S-13, file S-13/3, No. 27, 2.

wary of another, potentially unsustainable, undertaking in Asia. What swayed the Eastern division to reverse its decision was a combination of popular pressure from the Woman's Foreign Mission Society (WFMS), theology students and parishioners. Influenced by articles in the religious press that cast Rev. McKenzie as a martyr and Korea as field ready for harvest, these pressure groups promised additional donations for both the existing missions and the proposed Korean project. Combined with suggestions from within the Presbyterian Synod that evangelism in Japan was stagnant and that efforts in China had failed to produce the expected flood of converts, popular consensus within the Church shifted in favour of a Korean mission as the new hope for spreading the gospel.[4] In October 1897 the Presbyterian Synod voted in favour of establishing the Korean mission.

As already mentioned, the creation of the mission was based on the central goal of making converts, with financial considerations often relegated to the periphery of planning. Of course the church bureaucracy already employed business management methods in the organization of the FMC and concerns over debt were real, as were misgivings over promises of future funding for the mission without firm guarantees of steady donations. But these practicalities, while realized by some in the Church, were not at the forefront in 1897 when enthusiasm and faith took priority over what was evident on FMC ledgers.

From its inception the mission struggled because of a lack of funds, forcing the members to seek sponsorship from a number of sources. Dr. Robert Grierson and Rev. William Foote, selected to go to Korea in February 1898, were financed by the FMC Eastern division. The Rev. Duncan McRae received only partially funding by the FMC.

[4] Scott, *Canadians,* 35-40

As a late-coming volunteer to the mission McRae raised his own salary with contributions from the Students' Association of the Presbyterian College, the school of theology in Halifax.[5] The Presbyterian College student group and the Korean mission would share a close relationship in the years to follow. Foote himself had been elected president of the Students' Missionary Association in November 1896 and his term ended shortly after the Synod decision in favour of going to Korea.[6]

Close connections between the students and the mission were not, however, enough to maintain a missionary in the field. Contributions for McRae eventually dried up. In 1902 the student association discussed the possibility of having the salary for McRae paid by the FMC Eastern division. But the students seemed loath to give up on MacRae. Rather than do so, they were prepared to cut off funding to the much more accessible Labrador mission that the students had supported for years. However, the student body simply could not afford to keep McRae, notwithstanding the association's interest in and attachment to the Korean mission. These contradictions in the students' association prompted the college to take a closer role in the student's activities. In addition to a student president, a member of the faculty was installed at the head of the student group, a move by the school's administrators, some of whom were on the FMC, to rein in student enthusiasm. After this process the budget of the students' association dropped considerably. The responsibility for McRae's wages was taken on by the FMC Eastern division and the students' association began to concentrate on the established and

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[5] *Ibid.*, 41

[6] MCA, Pine Hill Divinity Hall, "Minutes of Student Missionary Association 1877-1896," November 12, 1895 and November 10, 1896, PHDH-0009/42. In November 1895, A.F. Robb was elected to vice president of the Student Mission Association. Robb would be a vocal supporter for the mission in the religious press. He and has wife would go on to become missionaries in Korea in the 1900s. The missionary society contributed people and money to local charities in the Halifax area, such as churches, sailors and ladies homes. They also had a mission field in Labrador. Pine hill was the site of a series of lectures presented by missionaries working in India and Formosa in 1895 and 1896.

secondary Trinidad mission and the local work of supplying pastors to rural Nova Scotian churches.

The influence within the Church of groups such as the students' association had been important. Foote and future missionaries Luther Young, E.J.O. Fraser and A.F. Robb played prominent roles in the student association at the Presbyterian College. McRae was also on the board of the students' association for a short time before his departure to Korea. Besides the attempts to sponsor missionaries for Korea, the association had a network of ties with an array of other religious groups. The students kept in contact with the YMCA, Dalhousie University associations, and societies in other Canadian universities such as Queen's, Montreal, Manitoba and Knox. The association was also part of the Student Volunteer Movement and regularly sent representatives to conventions as well as local missionary meetings.

Active and enthusiastic, the students were inspired by the global mission movement and despite the financial difficulties with their missionary to Korea they still had dreams of the next big field in India, which in their view was underexploited. But lack of money stymied their ambitions and more importantly the FMC, through the faculty at the Presbyterian College, sought to exclude what they saw as naïve and at times irritating amateurs from the business of mission organization and funding.[7] This professionalization is an indication that the mission board had begun to mimic the functional rationalization in bookkeeping that was so widespread in Canadian businesses by the early twentieth century.[8]

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[7] *Ibid.*

[8] See Michael Bliss for a description of Canadian business organization in the early twentieth century. Michael Bliss, *Northern Enterprise, Five Centuries of Canadian Business* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 353.

Three key figures in the profesionalization of the future mission were R.P. MacKay, the head of the Western division foreign mission board in Toronto and the subsequent amalgamated board from 1892 until 1926. MacKay groomed his successor, assistant FMB secretary A. E Armstrong.[9] Armstrong had been a Presbyterian missionary to Japan. Key on the ground in Korea was William Scott. Scott emigrated from Scotland to Canada in 1906 as part of a recruiting drive for ministers conducted by the Canadian Presbyterian Church. A graduate of Queens University, Scott studied theology in Vancouver and joined the Korean mission in 1914. He worked as part of the mission for forty-two years as a preacher, school administrator and mission secretary. A close confidant of A.E. Armstrong Scott was a central figure in the mission organization. These men would play important roles in managing the changes that were to come in the Canadian Korean mission.

-II-
Acquisition

Even with the attempts to rationalize the organization of missionary projects, the Eastern division, like the student association, was unable to fund its commitments. The result was a "takeover" of the Eastern division's mission work by the larger, and wealthier, Western division. This was a protracted process beginning at the turn of the century when the Eastern board became increasingly strapped for cash. The better organized and better funded Western board waited until the Eastern board verged on insolvency before forcing a merger whereby, in 1914, the Western division effectively took control over the mission in Korea and Manchuria. Once this occurred the missions in Korea became shaped by a new managerial approach. This development gave the Eastern

[9] Ion, *Cross and the Rising Sun, vol. 1,* 25-26

division missionaries greater access to money for their work in Korea and allowed for long term-planning, but it also meant the marginalization of missionaries who could not adapt to the new organizational structure.

In 1898, however, this was all in the future. The original Canadian missionaries spent their first months in Korea accompanying established missionaries in itinerating as well as scouting for an actual location at which to base their work. The decision on where to settle was not entirely the Canadians' as the Presbyterian Council of Korea had the final say. The council consisted of Northern and Southern Presbyterians from the United States, Australian Presbyterians and the Canadian mission.[10]

The relationships and cooperation that formed because of the council would later translate into joint ventures in establishing universities and hospitals in Korea. The council's role was to prevent overlap and friction between the national Presbyterian groups. To this end, Korea was partitioned among the council members, American Northern Presbyterians gave part of their own territory to the Canadians. The Americans would hand over north eastern Korea as far north as the border with Chinese Manchuria. The town of Wonsan, on Korea's east coast and at the southern extremity of this territory, would be the first mission station for the Canadians. Christian missions were already established in Wonsan but in the rest of the Canadian area westerners were still a rarity.

The size of the territory posed a daunting challenge for the new arrivals. One missionary's history of the early mission describes the territory as "representing 2 ½ of the 13 provinces of Korea, with 35 large magisterial towns and innumerable villages, a coast line of 500 miles, and a population of a million people." All of this was the responsibility of the three male missionaries, their wives and Louise McCully who in

[10] Scott, *Canadians*, 45.

1900 became the first single woman missionary in the group. McCully had experience in China after a three year posting with an American missionary group. Joined by her sister Elizabeth in 1909, McCully worked in Korea for forty years until she retired to Canada in 1941. McCully passed away in 1945. Partially supported by a local Church group from Truro, Nova Scotia, she was an economical addition to the mission: the inexpensiveness of McCully was no doubt welcome, given the budget of the Eastern division. The lack of funding and delays in payments of allowances to missionaries fuelled frustration as well as intrigue. Foote and Grierson would later privately correspond with the Western division in Toronto in an attempt to insure that, should the Eastern division prove unable to support their work in the future, the Western division would step in to help.[11]

As Foote concentrated on Christian groups already started by previous mission work in the area around Wonsan, McRae and Grierson branched out to the north in what in many cases were first attempts at converting local communities. By 1901 Robert and Lena Grierson set up the second Canadian station, with the addition of a hospital, at Songjin. This was an effort to spread limited resources as widely as possible.[12] To make Korean churches self-supporting and self-directing became improbable if not impossible once this expensive infrastructure existed. The Koreans lacked the resources to staff and manage the projects and the Presbyterians could not easily resign themselves to leave behind the investment in time and money.

A remedy for the problems regarding the scale of the project, and the lack of resources, was to adapt the Nevius method of mission organization. Developed in China

[11] United Church of Canada, Victoria College, Presbyterian Church of Canada Board of Overseas Mission (hereafter UCA) R.P. MacKay to Robert Grierson, February 24 1909 and McKay to Foote, September 10 1909, fonds 122, box 1, file 3.
[12] McCully was accompanied on her voyage to Korea by Edith Sutherland, the fiancée of Duncan McRae. Songjin is now Kimchaek. Scott, *Canadians,* 48-50; *The United Churchman*, "Well Done, Good and the Faithful," September 12, 1945.

the Nevius method depended on the creation of self-supporting indigenous church groups, who, after training by Western missionaries, would develop their own hierarchy of pastors, laymen and Bible women. Accompanying the training of Christian workers was the self-funded construction of churches and schools. Using this method the missionaries were working towards the goal that would make themselves obsolete as local Christians established their own organization leading to their own revivals and conversion campaigns. This adaptation was in place and adhered to by the existing Presbyterian groups in Korea before the Canadians arrived. As newcomers the Canadians were expected to adhere to this strategy, "that looked forward to the establishment of a Korean church that would be self-propagating, self-supporting and self-governing."[13]

The physically demanding work of preaching to a large area with multiple congregations was not new, therefore, but a continuation of work done by American and Australian Presbyterians. Canadians, following this precedent, were expected to adhere to the Nevius approach which in the case of Korea conveniently alleviated any additional financial pressure on an already meagre Canadian budget. But the ramifications of the Nevius method and how it related to the place of the Canadian mission within colonial Korean society were far-reaching. As the Canadians established new stations with more infrastructure, however primitive, including medical facilities, schools and accommodations, the contradiction between these permanent facilities and the fundamental principal of all the Presbyterian missions in Korean became more pronounced.[14]

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[13] Scott, *Canadians,* 52.

[14] A. Hamish Ion describes the Nevius method of evangelism as a subsequent and "scientific" version of the circuit preacher, see, Ion, *Cross and the Rising Sun vol. 1*, 148.

The missionaries' enthusiasm about their successes in converting Koreans blinded them to this contradiction. The momentum proved to the missionaries that their methods were sound and that they had finally encountered an East Asian population eager for their message. Success led to increasingly insistent requests for funds and complaints about the need for additional mission personnel that lasted throughout the 1900s.[15]

The Eastern division did manage to send another missionary couple, Rev. Alexander and Bessie Robb, to the mission in Wonsan at the end of 1901. It would take another five years before two additional Eastern division ministers, L.L. Young and A.R. Ross, arrived in Korea. Dr. Kate McMillan, the second medical doctor for the mission, accompanied the Robbs. While McMillan's salary was covered by the Eastern division much of the doctor's medical work in Korea was financed by her own funds or by those of her family.[16] Two other women missionaries, Jennie Robb, sister of Alexander Robb, and Catherine Mair arrived in 1903 and 1905. A large portion of the women missionaries' salaries and expenses were funded by direct donations from church groups, with the Eastern division contributing only a part of their requirements. For much of the early 1900s the mission in Korea made progress because of the hard work of the original members in tandem with the low-cost labour of women missionaries sponsored by the WFMS and individual church groups.[17] Given the debt carried by the Eastern division,

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[15] UCA, Grierson to McKay, May 20 1908, fonds 122, box 1, file 3; MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee, April 1906, box S-13, file S-13/5, 10.
[16] MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee, Nov, 1905, box S-13, file S-13/4, 7; Laura MacDonald, "Minister of the Gospel", 83-85; Scott, *Canadians*, 66.
[17] NSARM, A.F. Robb to Mother, October 21, 1901 MG1 vol. 2275 file 2; Scott, *Canadians*, 51; MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee April 1906, box S-13, file S-13/5, 10, 12.

cautious expansion was one of the few options available. At the first meeting of the mission board in 1907 the projected debt for the year was six thousand dollars.[18]

By 1909 the Western division was well aware of the progress being made in Korea in comparison to other Presbyterian projects abroad. One such comparison was drawn between Korea and the established New Hebrides mission. In a letter to Korea's Grierson, the head of the Western division, R.P. McKay, recognized the appeal of the Korean mission and how it was "selling" in Canada. "[T]he Korean mission has now a fascination that none other has and appeals to Canadians as perhaps no other mission does."[19] By contrast he wrote the effect of the "picturesqueness" of the Presbyterian New Hebrides mission had worn off with the public. Another factor in the Korean mission's appeal was the number and speed at which large groups of Koreans had converted. This rapid success drew widespread attention, even outside of the Presbyterian Church.

The successes in conversion were due to a combination of political and religious factors in Korea. Rev. William Scott attributed these early achievements to what he termed the "Korean Pentecost." Scott also acknowledged the political upheaval of the Russo-Japanese War and the Japanese creation of a protectorate in Korea which forced many Koreans to search for new institutions or faiths in which to believe. Political events also pushed many Koreans into what they considered the safety of Christian congregations. For some Koreans the Christian Church meant the opportunity of responsibility and meaning in a public setting, the majority of the population being effectively barred from participating in their own country's affairs. However, Scott emphasizes a "spiritual awakening" beginning in 1903 during a Missionary Bible

[18] MCA, Presbyterian Synod Record Group: Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee January 1907, box S-13, file S-13/5, 8.
[19] UCA, R.P. MacKay to Robert Grierson, February 24 1909, fonds 122, box 1, file 3.

conference as the defining and pivotal event in Korean Christianity. As part of this awakening, Presbyterian missionaries such as Louise McCully and A.F. Robb exchanged ideas and prayers with Methodist missionaries and revival preachers. These meetings reached a crescendo in 1906 and 1907 as Koreans and missionaries acted out scenes of self-criticism and abandon in what they perceived as a renewal or "cleansing" in their dedication to God.[20]

Not all missionaries or Korean Christians were convinced or impressed by these new and very public demonstrations of faith. William Foote describes how Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries took part in revival "manifestations" in which they made confessions of sexual sins such as infidelity or homosexuality and threw themselves into frenzies of shouting, crying and prostration. Criticized by fellow Presbyterians for "not being filled with the spirit," Foote describes in his defense the revivalist atmosphere in the Wonsan Christian community of early 1906. Many missionaries joined in the outpouring of revivalism, which bewildered some of the Korean parishioners in Wonsan but in other communities and cities, such as P'yŏngyang, this vehicle for fresh conversions began to grab popular attention. In the cold morning after these meetings, missionaries explained their actions as being "instructed by the Holy Spirit". However, as one missionary quipped "you need not tell me the Holy Spirit instructed you to scrub the floor of the church with your backside." The cooperation between Presbyterian and Methodists in Korea that helped spur the revival was, in Foote's opinion, a shallow and

[20] Scott, *Canadians*, 58-59.

tenuous connection at best. Tensions between the Presbyterians and Methodists would later lead to turf wars over contested territory in Manchuria.[21]

Foote's impressions of the cooperation between religious groups in Korea aside, his views of the revival manifestations reveal something more than a middle class attitude of shock over the more extravagant displays of faith. Rather, Foote just did not see the point in these acts. The revival in Wonsan left him, at best, perplexed.[22] To him revivalism was no substitute for the real work of the mission. He thought that the evangelization of Korea involved an intensive study of the language, extensive itinerating in the field, and the promotion of education for Koreans. Education for Koreans was not simply a means to basic literacy in order to read the Bible, but part of a long term process from primary through to the university or theology school level. In other words, Foote did not believe in the quick fix to Christianizing Korea as offered by the revival. Among the missionaries and FMC leadership this reaction left Foote as an outsider. The majority of Presbyterian workers embraced the revival.

The revival, then, meant different things even among the close knit Canadian mission. For a few the revival was a display alien to the purpose and tradition of the church; for others it was viewed as a sincere outpouring of religious fervour. And for yet another element it was a calculated promotional campaign aimed at a population that was for the most part uneducated and susceptible to the theatre, spectacle and emotion of the manifestations.

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[21] NSARM, William Foote Diary, 1906, See entries for January and February, 1906, MG1, vol. 2273, file 3A,

[22] Christy and Gauvreau discuss the uneasiness of the Presbyterian Church and the Canadian middle class towards emotional revivalism in the early twentieth century, See Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau, *A Full-Orbed Christianity, The Protestant Churches and Social Welfare in Canada 1900-1940* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press), 62-65.

The revival did mark a period in which the Korean Christian Church became firmly established and enrolment in Christian schools exploded. Success appears to be a combination of the revival, the desperate political future faced by Koreans, and the missionaries' work on developing a self-supporting Korean Church coming to fruition. Foote's fellow workers, McRae and Grierson, at the frontier of mission activity in the new Canadian stations to the north in Hamheung and Songjin, reported, perhaps in large part for home consumption, scenes of religious fervour during the revival as the highly emotional version of their message touched Christian communities far removed from the Christian centers of Seoul and P'yŏngyang.[23]

Despite the surge in interest attributed to the revival the Canadian mission was unable to fully capitalize on this success. Lack of funds at the Eastern division meant that only a small number of Christian workers could be added to the mission. The shortfall was in part due to the small base of possible contributors in eastern Canada and the lack of a concerted and focused fundraising program.

That the initial success of the revival was followed by the tapering off of interest, due to lack of missionary follow up, indicated that more than evangelism and faith were needed to convert Korea. Better resources, clear goals and central management of the mission were required to take advantage of the new and vast potential in Korea. These points were not lost on the Eastern or the Western division. As the head of the Western section, R.P. MacKay saw the revival first hand on a visit to P'yŏngyang in 1907.[24] The Eastern section, experiencing the frustration of being unable adequately to increase its presence in Korea, began a series of attempts to convince the Western division and

[23] Scott, *Canadians*, 57-61.
[24] *Ibid.*, 70.

MacKay to take over responsibilities on the peninsula. This did not happen immediately. Like a business waiting for the insolvency of a competitor before a takeover, the Western section stalled the process of a true amalgamation with the Eastern division. Despite appeals for help from the Eastern section and individual missionaries, the Western section in 1909 installed its own missionaries in the far north of Korea and in the emerging "market" for converts in Manchuria. Information on this new market had been fed to the Western section leadership in large part by Eastern section missionaries eager to curry favour.

Before the moves by the Western section to develop their own missionaries in Korea, the mission committee in Eastern Canada struggled with constant shortfalls in its budget. Eastern section records show small donations from individuals and churches trickling in, but these were not the long term and sustained amounts needed to outfit and keep a missionary in the field for extended periods. The revival had offered an opportunity of mass conversion if religious instruction could have been maintained after the emotion of the revival had subsided. This opportunity was lost due to the lack of missionaries. As a result infighting broke out over the best location to concentrate the limited funds. Grierson engaged in a letter writing campaign that sought to close the Wonsan mission and shift resources into Manchuria. In a letter from Grierson to MacKay in 1910 Grierson comments on plans for a Japanese railway from Kirin (Jilin) Manchuria to Chung Chin (Chonglin) Korea, which he foresaw as being a boon for the Protestant missions due to quick and efficient transportation through the area. He also mentions that the Roman Catholic Church was doing well in Manchuria and reiterates that the board should give up on Wonsan, let the Methodists have it, and concentrate on more fertile ground to north. The threat of Roman Catholic competition would also spur expansion in

Korea as the Presbyterians raced to establish a Union College in Korea that could vie for students against the schooling offered by the Catholic missions.[25]

A few days after Grierson's warning of a Catholic threat he wrote to Mackay again in order to push his plans for Manchuria. Grierson gives the census information for the Wonsan field which had a population of close to 77,000 Koreans. This field was already split between the Presbyterians and the Methodists. For his "New Northern Field" he gives a population of close to 328,000 Koreans. Hamhung field, under the watch of Duncan McRae and Robert Grierson, had approximately 319,000 people. Manchuria was quickly becoming the preferred destination of Koreans wishing to escape the colonial oppression and land grabs that punctuated Japanese rule in Korea the 1900s and 1910s.[26] Grierson's appeals to the Western section attempted to exploit this migration but at the expense of another original member of the mission, William Foote, who headed the Wonsan mission.[27]

Despite infighting the mission was attempting to develop the local church through education of ministers in classes conducted by Foote in Wonsan. These classes were expanded at Union Theology School in P'yŏngyang. Instruction in church organization and administration as well as the inclusion of Korean representatives on the Presbyterian Council of Korea were also implemented. These moves were made to encourage independence among the leaders of the Korean Presbytery. Starved of funding from their own sources the mission encouraged greater contributions on the part of Koreans at home

[25] UCA, Robert Grierson to R.P. Mackay, 21 January 1910, fonds 122, box 1, file 4.
[26] See Peter Duus and Carter Eckert for their explanations of land ownership in colonial Korea. Duus, *Abacus and the Sword* and Carter Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism 1876-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).
[27] UCA, Robert Grierson to R.P. Mackay, 21 January 1910, fonds 122, box 1, file 4.

and in Manchuria and Siberia.[28] The idea of a self-supporting church became more a necessity than an abstract ideal for the Canadians employed by the Eastern division.

This necessity influenced the creation of Church infrastructure in the first decade of the mission. Churches and schools, for the most part, were built on the donation of money and labour by Korean Christian parishioners. Schools, and in the case of medical facilities for Kate Macmillan, were often rudimentary. This would later work against the mission as it competed with Japanese colonial authorities for students and patients as Koreans realized that education was no longer an exclusive privilege of the elite but instead an essential ingredient to advancement and for many an expression of Korean nationalism. In an attempt to supply this demand the Eastern division made direct purchases of property from the Northern Presbyterians in the first mission station in Wonsan. The division also began its own modest building program in Sungjin where a school, hospital and church were completed in 1902.[29]

Besides these purchases, other accommodations and buildings were rented from local Koreans, in part because of property ownership laws for foreigners. Large scale building projects of Church infrastructure would not occur until the amalgamation of Western and Eastern divisions. Thus, for the first decade of the mission these primarily temporary or local arrangements ran in accord with the overall project to encourage and develop a self-supporting Korean Church.

Even with these improvements in Church infrastructure the Canadian mission in Korea was, by 1908, at the limit of what it could achieve with the resources at hand. The international attention that the revival had attained, along with mediocre results in other

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[28] Scott, *Canadians*, 64.
[29] Scott, *Canadians,* 65-66.

mission fields, pushed the Western division into considering its options in Korea and Manchuria. The Western division could have taken over the existing stations and mission personnel in Korea, as the Eastern division leadership and some of the missionaries themselves had pleaded. The Western division, however, circumvented the established field in Korea and went directly into what appeared to be the most profitable region for new converts. The Western division also ignored offers from Eastern division missionaries who wished to switch divisions. Grierson and Foote, who already had eleven years of experience and language training, were used by the Western division as sources of information and as guides for new Western division arrivals but neither Grierson nor Foote were offered a place under the Western umbrella. Instead, the Western division chose to send their own workers to Northern Korea and Manchuria. The timing and location for this move by the Western FMC was based on the burgeoning Korean population in the Manchurian borderlands who were, to some degree, beyond the reach of Japanese colonial control.

The first Western division missionary, J.M. MacLeod, arrived in northern Korea in December 1909. He came at the beginning of a second revival that swept the peninsula and at a time of political uncertainty when Japan was about to annex Korea. Migration by Koreans across the border into Manchuria increased to such a level that in 1910 an estimated half million Koreans had made the move to the Chientao region of Manchuria. This staggering number of people as well as the sheer expanse of territory to be covered may have proved too much for MacLeod. His tenure as the Western division's first representative in the Korean and Manchurian fields was, for the most part, a disaster. Lasting little over a year MacLeod's time in Korea ended in early 1911. His departure is portrayed in mission correspondence as a case of a sometimes high-strung and sensitive

man succumbing to the mental and physical pressure of culture shock, itinerating and establishing a new mission station. Other factors however, may have contributed to MacLeod's breakdown.[30]

Although Grierson and Foote assisted MacLeod in acclimatizing and establishing the new mission field in Manchuria, MacLeod himself was caught in the at times bitter internal politics between Grierson, who wished to close Wonsan and use its resources to expand in the north, and Foote who desperately sought to hold on to the southern mission station.[31] Added to this, were Grierson's disparaging evaluations of MacLeod which he mailed regularly to A.E. Armstrong, MacLeod's superior and second in command in the Western division offices in Toronto.

MacLeod's short sojourn in Korea and Manchuria was a disappointment to the Western section but the men and women who took his place shortly after his departure in 1911 and 1912 were to prove both professional and energetic in establishing a new mission field that straddled the Korean-Manchurian border. The new Western section missionaries, Dr. T.D. Mansfield, Rev. A.H. Barker, and Rev. D.A. MacDonald, along with their wives, would establish the Hoiryung and Yong Jung (Lungchingtsun) stations. Land in Hoiryung had been bought with mission funds by MacLeod. Added to this were land purchases in Yong Jung and additional land purchased in Hoiryung on the arrival of the new Western division members. Housing for the mission members and a dispensary for Hoiryung were only the first parts of what was to be an extensive building program.[32]

The relationship between the Western and Eastern section missionaries was a source of confusion even to the missionaries themselves. Were they to work as a single

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[30] UCA, Robert Grierson to R.P. MacKay 17 February 1911, fonds 122, box 1, file 4.
[31] Scott, *Canadians,* 74-77.
[32] *Ibid*., 77.

Church mission or were they to adhere to the division between eastern and western Canada? Rev. Barker sought clarification on this basic issue and received what appears to be a straightforward reply from A.E. Armstrong stating that the missions should work together. In practice however, in Korea and at the leadership level in Toronto, relations between the mission sections were less than straightforward. In the field Western missionaries kept their own meetings during general assemblies, and in spite of their own directives encouraging cooperation, the Western section leadership kept their distance from the Eastern board which was at a standstill in Korea due to the lack of funds and internal squabbles among their missionaries.

In contrast to the Eastern section's stagnation, the Western section missionaries were embarking on a new and potentially lucrative venture in Manchuria which, with adequate funding, would outstrip the efforts of the Eastern section in a reasonably short time. The Eastern section had for a number of years lobbied for an amalgamation of the two sections. The effectiveness of these calls was diminished by the fact that the mission in Korea had been neglected for too long. Eastern section missionaries Grierson, Ross, the McCully sisters, and Young signed a group statement addressing the FMC that outlined what the estimated costs would be to bring the three Eastern section mission stations up to the standards of other Presbyterian groups in Korea. The sum came to the substantial amount of $102,000 in Canadian currency. These figures were based on the amounts spent in 1912 by the US Northern Presbyterian mission for its efforts in Korea.[33]

Nevertheless, by 1913 it appeared as if the Western section had given in to calls for amalgamation. These calls came from the Rev. J. McPherson who was in Korea on a fact finding tour as well as from the Eastern section leaders in Canada and their

[33] UCA, "To the Foreign Mission Board of the Presbyterian," April 27 1913, fonds 122, box 2, file 13.

missionaries in the field. The general assembly of the Church in Canada approved the amalgamation. However, the Western section conceded nothing in the negotiation of the amalgamation. On the contrary, its board under R.P. Mackay and A.E. Armstrong effectively gained control of all the Canadian efforts in Korea and Manchuria. In 1914 the Western division proposed a single board with a combined budget to direct all foreign missions under a single Presbyterian Foreign Mission Committee. In 1915 this process was approved by the Church. The Western section's strategy of waiting until the near collapse of the Eastern section's mission placed them in a position to lead efforts in the manner in which they saw fit. R.P. MacKay cried poverty to Eastern section missionaries up until the plans to merge the sections together. Citing tight money markets and the Church's dependence on bank loans for large parts of the year, MacKay played down any sense that the Western section was going to be an easy and ready source of funding.[34] Once the amalgamation was finalized, however, resources from the Western division were directed into Korea. Fifteen missionaries were added in the space of two years and cash became available for a hospital building program in Sungjin.[35] Starved of funding since the beginning of the mission in 1898, the Eastern division missionaries welcomed the final takeover when it arrived in 1915. Buoyed by new money and new personnel, the missionaries saw the merger as a fresh start in which the combined efforts of both sections could take advantage of the gains made through evangelization and the political turmoil of annexation.

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[34] UCA, R.P. MacKay to A.F. Robb, July 16, 1913 fonds 122, box 2, file 15; See also, UCA, "Open Letter to Brethren from Mission Board Secretary" fonds 122, box 2 file 23, September 19 1914. In this letter the mission board comments on the plans to greatly increase mission personnel despite the pre-war economic depression in Canada and the uncertainty of donations from parishioners in the home Churches.
[35] Scott, *Canadians,* 79-80.

Despite this optimism, amalgamation did not bring immediate success in gaining converts. Instead the mission's focus shifted as the structure of the organization was altered to reflect business practices. Within the mission the failure of the combined divisions to benefit from the new circumstances has been blamed on a number of factors. William Scott, who joined the mission in 1914, saw the war years as a time of "consolidation rather than expansion."[36] Scott, a central figure in the mission's bureaucracy in Korea even as late as the 1970s, wished to portray the organization in the best light as possible. Despite these biases, Scott was correct in many aspects of his analysis yet he neglected the full impact and drain on mission resources that occurred during the First World War. Scott blames the lack of progress in converting Koreans during World War I as a result of Japanese colonial investment in schools, hospitals and infrastructure after annexation in 1910. This development robbed the mission of the "prestige" of modernity. Scott also blames increased surveillance and harassment of Korean Christians following the assassination of Prince Ito Hirobumi by a Korean Christian and a highly publicized case in which Christians were suspected of plotting the assassination of Count Terauchi Masatake, the Governor–General of Korea from 1910 to 1916.[37] The results of annexation undoubtedly influenced mission strategy, but many of these results occurred before the final amalgamation in 1915. These influences do not therefore, fully explain why the mission retreated from the revivalism and evangelization that typified the first decade of work in Korea. This is especially the case in Chientao, Manchuria where in 1915 the Japanese presence was limited to a few consular offices with attached gendarmes. Since the thrust of the new mission was to be in Manchuria and

[36] Scott, *Canadians,* 85; On entrenchment during World War I see also, UCA, A.E. Armstrong to Robert Grierson, February 24 1915, fonds 122, box 3, file 32.
[37] Scott, *Canadians,* 82-83; Ion, *Cross and the Rising Sun, vol. 1,* 187.

the border regions of Korea, William Scott's argument that Japanese colonial regulation after 1910 stymied the activity of the mission is questionable.[38] Rather than Japanese regulation wartime constraints on available missionaries, because of the many who were needed in France, and the diversion of monies for the war effort, impeded expansion by the new FMB.[39]

These constraints played a role in shifting the Canadians away from vigorous proselytizing and encouraging of an indigenous Korean Church to a more cautious approach. The connection between Korean nationalism and the Korean Christian movement through both the assassination of Ito and the "Conspiracy Case," in which many of the suspects plotting to kill Terauchi were Christians, placed the new mission in an uncomfortable situation. Although the early mission had publicly discouraged political involvement by its parishioners, privately many missionaries supported protest against the harsh treatment of Koreans during the early Japanese occupation. These views were tempered, however, by the Canadians' belief that recognized Japan's policies were a necessary, if at times heavy handed, "civilizing" influence.

After 1915 the new mission incorporated this belief into a marked shift in the management and direction of policy. The shift involved a departure from evangelical preaching and itinerating as central strategies and a further distancing of the mission from Korean aspirations for independence. The new management moved towards closer cooperation with the colonial regime in the realization that the dissolved Korean

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[38] *Ibid.*, 82-85.

[39] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to A.H. Barker, November 7 1914, fonds 122, box 2, file 24. In this letter Armstrong declines a proposal for a new boys' academy in Manchuria as well as a proposal by the Canadian mission to take over some of the work of Irish Presbyterians in Northern China.

government and military would not be restored.[40] New mission policy was aided by the increase in resources available to the mission after amalgamation and the fact that long-term planning was now possible. The *ad hoc* nature of the Eastern division's expansion in Korea would give way to an increasingly structured management model that valued discipline to the enterprise, or the organization, as opposed to the loose rein previously given to many of the home-grown Korean churches. The mission's direction changed as bureaucratization transformed the organization.

As part of this discipline the FMB developed strategies to address its new direction by taking into consideration the rapid changes in colonial Korea. The modernization of Korea under Japanese rule was a factor in alterations to mission principles but the new organization of the FMB was underpinned by modern management techniques developed in the business world. The impact of those techniques was delayed by the loss of resources to the First World War. Letters from home brought news of the mounting casualties in Europe, some of whom were from the Halifax theology college. In an effort to retain staff, A.E. Armstrong chided and cajoled male missionaries into staying at their posts in Korea to serve the Church and the mission rather than join the military and be shipped to France.[41]

Due to the economic and political uncertainty during the war years the new mission made only modest increases in physical infrastructure, although with staff retention and new members, mission personnel increased substantially during World War I. The war had reduced available Church revenues and distracted public attention from the

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[40] I will discuss the Canadian mission's reaction to the March 1919 independence rallies in the next chapter; See Christie and Gauvreau, *A Full- Orbed Christianity,* 35, for their discussion of the beginnings of business culture in the Canadian Presbyterian Church starting in 1908.

[41] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to A.F. Robb, September 17 1914, fonds 122, box 2, file 23.

overseas mission movement. Yet by 1918 the division between Eastern and Western boards had been erased by an amalgamation that lagged behind, but duplicated in spirit the "merger mania" of only a few years previous in the financial sphere.[42]

-III-
Venture Capital

By the end of World War I the Church sought to revitalize its work abroad. The methods that had been used for wartime funding drives were taken up by a consortium of Canadian Churches in the massive Forward Movement fundraising campaign that began in 1918. Between 1918 and 1923 the Forward Movement in Canada raised over four million dollars. Of that, $600,000 was slated for missionary activity. Scott describes the importance of this cash injection, spurring a spending spree in Korea:

> From 1914-18, building grants totaled less than $40,000 [for the Canadian mission]. From 1919-23 they exceeded $200,000. This enabled the mission to begin the most extensive building program in their history: schools, hospitals and dormitories, long overdue were provided, and the mission enabled to meet the standards required by the government and expected by the general public. From this time dates the purchase of additional land on all stations required for building sites and school playgrounds; the erection of 3 girls' schools, 2 boys' academies; the Martha Wilson Bible Training school and dormitory; Bible institute buildings and dormitories on several stations; the completion of the hospital in Yon Jung and the extension of the hospital in Hamheung, with equipment for both; the installation of furnaces in schools, hospitals and residences; grants towards the capital accounts of the Chosun Christian College and the Pyengyang Theological Seminary.[43]

The emphasis on new mission schools was in response to the burgeoning market for education in Korea. This market had grown in part out of Korean nationalism which recognized education as a counter to Japanese repression. Koreans were also willing to participate in modern industry and business, pursuits which were promoted by colonial

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[42] Bliss, *Northern Enterprise,* 338.
[43] Scott, *Canadians,* 96.

authorities. Aware of these trends, the mission approached this new demand with cost effectiveness in mind. The mission expected that the consumers, Korean families with students in the new schools, would contribute to the schools' construction and upkeep. The colonial government, while investing considerable amounts in education, was still unable to meet demand and thus left a niche for mission schools at the high school level and for Korean schools at the primary level. Yet the colonial government created new standards for educational institutions which meant that the often poorly funded and ill equipped mission primary and middle schools were no longer acceptable. Also to disappear was the original mission's provision of free health care. Dr. Kate McMillan's practice of supporting her own dispensary gave way to mission doctors such as Florence Murray, who charged for services. Japanese hospitals in Korea were still run on charitable donations but were of a high standard.[44]

The senior doctor, Kate McMillan, was a native of Jacquet River, New Brunswick and joined the mission to Korea in 1901. Criticized by Murray, her successor, as having been unprofessional in her medical work, McMillan worked under the pressure of being both a doctor and an evangelist. She died in Hamheung in 1922 from typhoid after treating Korean children from the mission girls' school. Florence J. Murray was born in Pictou Landing, Nova Scotia in 1894. After graduating from Dalhousie University Medical School in 1914 she practiced medicine in the United States and Canada. Murray joined the Presbyterian mission and left for Korea in 1921. She was one of the last missionaries to leave Korea in 1942 and returned from 1947 to 1969 to help rebuild the

[44] MacDonald, "Minister of the Gospel", 94; UCA, T.D. Mansfield to Claribel Platt, 10 April 1913, fonds 122, box, file 13; NSARM, Florence Murray to Charlie Murray, March 11 1922 , MG1, vol. 2276.

mission. She died in 1975, and left a memoir of her Korean work in *At the foot of Dragon Hill.*

Murray would replace McMillan in a mission that emerged from the First World War as a substantial organization with an emphasis on education and, to a lesser extent, medicine. Evangelization as the original members had known it had fallen out of favour. The new focus for the mission required permanent buildings and institutions. This permanence flew against the philosophy of developing a Korean self-supporting church and the eventual departure of the missionaries to leave Christian work to Koreans.

What had changed? Why had the mission drifted from an association born out of grass roots support within the Church funded by individual contributions from a variety of sources to a bureaucratic establishment with the trappings of a corporation and a highly organized and integrated fundraising machine? The answer lies less in conscious decisions made by mission boards or individual missionaries to move in this direction than in an all-pervasive culture of business management that directed the mission towards professional management, takeover, merger and the acquisition of assets. Shortly after its creation the mission steered away from a consensus style of organization and direction. As the mission became increasingly bureaucratic the emphasis on the local Korean Church and the use of revivalism and evangelism declined. Submitting to organizational discipline and practicing cautious planning now defined the new missionary. These trends made distancing of the mission from the Korean church and cooperation with the colonial government necessary for the continuation of the Canadian mission.

In the next chapter I will explore how the mission eventually complied with the Japanese government after the Canadians debated Governor-General regulations regarding education in colonial Korea. I will examine what these debates tell us about the

shifting missionary perception of their own role and how their relationship between colonized Koreans and colonizing Japanese had altered after 1918.

Chapter Three
A Brief Opposition

-I-
March 1919

"Missions and politics are very much interrelated here at present and one can only speculate as to the outcome. If the Japanese Government only realized it the missionaries are their best friends as without exception they try to suppress any ultra-patriotic feeling among the Korean Christians."[1]

Following World War I, fundraising efforts by the Forward Movement in Canada ushered in a new era for the Canadian Presbyterian mission in Korea. In 1919 the Canadians were enthusiastic about developing their work which had been frustrated by lack of personnel and resources. Ties with other missions in Korea were strengthened and overall the mood among the Canadians was one of hope and optimism for the future. For Koreans, the immediate post-war period also held hope. Korean Christians, Buddhists and practitioners of the syncretic Ch'ŏndogyo religion, inspired in many cases by Wilsonian dreams, organized a nationwide independence movement based on non-aggression.[2]

Korean cooperation across religious and class barriers culminated in huge independence protests in March 1919, which were met by retaliation from both Japanese settlers and the Japanese military. After these ill-fated protests, Canadian missionaries defended Korean human rights in 1919 and 1920, but neither the Christian workers in the field nor the mission board believed that the Korean people were capable of governing themselves. While condemning Japanese colonial violence the vast majority of Canadian missionaries still supported and accepted the "civilizing" influence of Japanese

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[1] UCA, Presbyterian Church of Canada Board of Overseas Mission, D.A. MacDonald to A.E. Armstrong, 18 March 1912, fond 122, box 1, file 7. D.A. Macdonald arrived in the first wave of Western board missionaries in 1912.

[2] Scott, *Canadians*, 86-87; Donald Clark documents instances when Koreans did resort to violence as the protest continued through 1919. See Donald N. Clark, *Living Dangerously in Korea, The Western Experience 1900-1950* (*Norwalk*: Eastbridge, 2003), 52.

colonialism and modernity. Historian Hamish Ion viewed the relationship between the Canadians, the Japanese colonial government and Koreans as one in which the Presbyterian mission's "naïve humanitarianism and concern for Korean Christians produced results that were interpreted as political actions by their Korean associates and by Japanese colonial officials." Ion goes on to add that the outcome of the missionaries' actions "produced results of which the missionaries were largely unconscious."[3] Frank Baldwin, in his study of missions in Korea and their reaction to the Japanese colonial violence against Koreans in 1919, takes a slightly different view. For Baldwin, Christian missions in colonial Korea "accomplished the nearly impossible: In large measure they adhered to a position of not taking a position. Despite the gravest provocations they inched along that "tightrope between the devil and the deep blue sea" from March, 1919, into 1920."[4] In Baldwin's essay the missionary's tightrope traversed support for Japanese colonial rule on one side and support for Korean nationalism on the other. Explanations of missionary actions, then, waver between accidental political activity and intentional, and successful, avoidance of politics by the missionaries. I will argue that as a whole the Canadian mission was very aware of, and intentionally active in, the political landscape of colonial Korea.

To comprehend the seeming contradiction between the accidental involvement or the avoidance of the political by mission groups, the relationship between the mission administration and the colonial government merits closer scrutiny. In this relationship, the organizational order of the Canadian Presbyterian mission played an important role. New

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[3] Ion, *Dark Valley*, 28.
[4] Frank Baldwin, "Missionaries and the March First Movement: Can Moral Men be Neutral?" in *Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule, Studies of the Policy and Techniques of Japanese Colonialism*, ed. Andrew C. Nahm (Michigan: Center for Korean Studies Western Michigan University, 1973), 193-219.

bureaucratic methods adopted by the mission meant that their acceptance of colonial regulations became an apparently rational result of an almost natural progression. This acceptance had broad and serious consequences for the population of Korea. It meant that the missionaries accepted Japan's colonial rule despite the fact that from the standpoint of the colonizers shifts in governance reflected a concerted and deliberate program of assimilation through education. The place of the Japanese language, allegiance to the Japanese Emperor and adherence to State Shinto in the education system challenged not only Korean identity, but also any sense of superiority that missionaries held.

Nevertheless, mission accommodation to colonial regulations became the norm after 1920, even though the suppression of Korean independence movement in 1919 placed the Canadians in direct opposition to the colonial regime. Missionaries and Foreign Mission Board head office bureaucrats such as A.E. Armstrong documented and exposed the reprisals that followed the protests. However, such opposition occurred only briefly between 1919 and 1920. Questions arise, then, as to why the Canadians displayed such vigorous opposition to the crackdown for only a short period. Also, why did this opposition occur when the shift to rational management within the mission organization had already taken place? Rational management or simple pragmatism should have dictated that the mission keep quiet and wait for the government backlash to subside. This was not the case: criticism by Canadian missionaries such as F.W. Schofield and William Foote reached the international stage in 1919 and 1920, as their pictures and reports drew the attention of the Anglo-American press. Armstrong also voiced his opinions to the

Japanese consulates in Canada and the United States while embassies in East Asia were kept busy with mission letters and cables imploring that action be taken.[5]

Although missionaries did initially act out of a sense of outrage and a genuine concern for Koreans, the answer to why rational management was seemingly set aside in this instance lies in who the Japanese military victimized and arrested. However much rational management dictated calm, the mission's interests were directly at stake when the crackdown of the nationalists targeted Korean Christians. Many of those imprisoned and executed were Korean Protestants. Although freedom of religion was entrenched in the Meiji Constitution, Christians were targeted to such an extent that the banning or eradication of Christianity in Korea appeared to the missionaries to have been a real possibility. Missionary A.H. Barker was quick to distance the Church from any involvement in the protests. In a letter to the head of the mission board:

> I might add in regard to the movement in Korea that the Japanese seem to be suspicious of the missionaries. I suppose it is because some of the Christians have joined in the movement. But it is not a movement led by the Church. The missionaries are not urging the people to rebellion. We in Kainei are alas under suspicion. We have been examined two or three times. If they knew the facts that we had nothing to do with it they would not be suspicious of us. Ever since we came to Korea we have kept out of politics and in this matter have done nothing. So far as possible we have kept anything of a political nature out of our schools and churches.

Barker, in an effort to stress the neutrality of the Canadians, continues that the mission also declined offers from Japanese authorities to become informants.[6] On hearing the news of the disturbances in Korea, mission chief R.P. Mackay felt sure that his workers would be left alone by Japanese authorities since they had been non-political in the past. In support of this view, Mackay asserted that, "[t]he relationships between the

[5] UCA, A.H. Barker to R.P. MacKay, 27 March 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.
[6] UCA, A.H. Barker to R.P. MacKay, 31 March 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.

missionaries and the government have been so cordial that one feels grateful for conditions as they exist and every effort will be made to maintain such a happy relationship."[7]

The widespread claim that missionaries were non-political was a misnomer. Missionaries' discouraging participation in the nationalist movement was political action in itself, as were the very public reports by Canadians calculated to embarrass the Japanese government as part of a directed diplomatic and media campaign. The campaign was to ensure that Western governments were aware that Korean civilians were being abused, but more importantly, that Christianity in Korea was being threatened by persecution. The publicity campaign was successful, but not before unrest and reprisals spilled over the border into Manchuria.

In 1920 the Japanese Imperial army carried out a punitive invasion of southern Manchuria, in order to crush any remnants of Korean resistance. But the negative publicity created by articles written by William Foote, among others, created enough public and diplomatic pressure to influence Japanese policy in Korea and in neighbouring Manchuria. Part of this pressure resulted in the replacement of Governor-General Hasegawa Yoshimichi with Admiral Saitō Makoto in August 1919. Saitō, a veteran of the Sino-Japanese War and former cabinet minister, became a favourite of the missionaries in Korea. He was connected to the missionary movement in Japan through his marriage to Nire Haruko, who was educated in a Canadian mission school. Until his death in Tokyo, during the failed military coup of 1936, the praise for Saitō by the Canadian missionaries in Korea bordered on the sentimental.[8]

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[7] UCA, R.P. MacKay to S.H. Martin, 26 March 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 55
[8] Ion, *The Cross and the Rising Sun, Volume 1,* 118.

Part of the reason for this praise may have been due to Saitō's Christian connections and the Admiral's willingness to give missionaries a hearing. But undoubtedly the main reason was the reforms carried out during Saitō's tenure as Governor-General. March 1919 marks a transition in the nature of Japanese colonial policy in Korea, from "Military Rule" (*Gunjin Seiji*) to a "Cultural Policy" (*Bunka Seiji)*. The "Cultural Policy" represented a series of carrot and stick reforms aimed at pacifying and assimilating colonial subjects. These reforms gave a veneer of change after which Koreans formed community associations and limited freedom of the press was allowed. In contrast to the heavy handed treatment of the colony in the 1910s, the new Cultural Policy of the 1920s permitted an atmosphere in which a broad spectrum of Korean nationalist organizations developed.[9] However, the new regime traded the physical violence of previous colonial administrations for less visible methods of control, using censorship and surveillance to govern the peninsula. Missionary groups were willing to live with these methods as long as overt persecution of Korean Christian groups ceased.

Another development which dampened missionary criticism of Japanese policy was the fear of Bolshevism. So pervasive was this fear that by late 1920 mission criticism of Japanese policies became mute. As early as March 1920, William Foote, one of the more vocal and eloquent opponents of Japanese rule in Korea, attempted to discourage Korean students at his high school in Manchuria from making Korean flags in remembrance of the 1919 uprising. After being caught be police the boys and their teachers were lectured by Japanese authorities on the importance of a pan-Asian vision in which Chinese, Koreans and Japanese formed an equal partnership in a new Asia. Seven

[9] Eckert, *Korea Old and New*, 282-289.

of the twenty-one boys were deported back to Korea by the Japanese gendarmes.[10] This example indicates how missionaries attempted to dissuade Koreans from political involvement. The trend was exacerbated with news of the ongoing revolution in Russia.

These seemingly conflicting actions surrounding the missionaries' political stance were part of the missionary movement's search for a place within the Japanese empire. In trying to define where they stood, Presbyterian missions as early as in 1912 took pains to point out to Japanese authorities that they were non-political. In a letter to the Chargé d' affaires of the Japanese embassy in Washington, American Arthur Brown outlined four options available to the missionary in Korea regarding their relationship to the colonial government. These were opposition, aloofness, cooperation and loyal recognition. During a 1912 meeting among the Presbyterian groups the unanimous consensus was to opt for a position of loyal recognition to the colonial government – an analogy to this stance was made with Christians living within the Roman empire. This position differed from cooperation in that missionaries believed that they should be neither for nor against a government.[11]

There was no escape from the political, however, and in 1919, in the weeks following the uprising in Korea, the spectre of the Bolshevik threat appears in mission correspondence. From Toronto R.P. Mackay wrote to O.R. Avison, a missionary with the American Presbyterians and head of the Severence Hospital in Seoul. Mackay conveyed his views on Japan, which were widespread among the Canadian missionaries. Mackay writes, "[y]ou are under Japanese protection, which means a good deal in this era of Bolshevism. If Britain and Japan and America stand firm, they can not only suppress

[10] NSARM, William Foote to Jean, March 6 1920, MG1, vol. 2273, file 6.
[11] See correspondence between Arthur Brown and R.P. Mackay, 29 July, 1912. UCA, Arthur Brown to Masanao Hanihara, 16 February 1912, fond 122, box 1, file 8.

Germany and Junkerism, but they can also suppress such irrational arisings as that of the Bolshevists. We have them here already, with similar excess if they had power. They are composed mostly of foreigners."[12] The public expression of these views had to be tempered after A.E. Armstrong returned to Canada. Armstrong had been touring Asia as the violence of March 1919 erupted. He cut his trip short to collect and then publicize reports of the colonial backlash. After he reported the extent and ferocity of the violence to R.P. Mackay both Armstrong and his superior began a letter writing campaign that sought a balance between censuring colonial authorities in Korea while at the same time stifling support for the independence movement.

Given the graphic evidence collected, Mackay still chose to tailor his response to specific audiences and curbed any sympathy for the independence movement. In a letter to S.H. Martin stationed in the Canadian mission in Manchuria, Mackay wrote, "The Japanese have made such wonderful progress in the last half-century that one regrets a return to such violent methods of suppression. The Koreans may be wrong in seeking independence, but surely not in seeking reform by peaceful methods. I trust the reports are exaggerated. The world will know sooner or later and Japan's reputation will suffer – indeed has already suffered by what has taken place."[13] In contrast to this conciliatory tone Mackay wrote on the same day to Canadian Member of Parliament N.W. Rowell. In his letter to Rowell Mackay portrays Japan as the "German Machine", the colonial government as a junta out of control, and the actions of Japanese troops as repetition of

[12] UCA, R.P. MacKay to O.R. Avison, 28 March 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.
[13] UCA, R.P. MacKay to S.H. Martin, 14 April 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.

the "Armenian atrocities," in reference to the Armenian genocide carried out by Ottoman Turkey.[14]

A.E. Armstrong also adapted his depiction of events in Korea to suit his readers and the objectives of the mission. Writing to J.H. Ritson of the British and Foreign Bible Society in London, Armstrong lay the foundations for a publicity campaign against Japanese "militarism" in the British press. Armstrong also stressed to Ritson that the sources of information quoted should be cited as "foreigners" rather than missionaries and that the majority of blame for the violence should be attributed to Japanese militarists in contrast with "growing democratic sentiment in Japan." The fact that the Korean protests were for independence is not mentioned in the letter.[15]

The independence movement was mentioned in correspondence from Armstrong to the Korean Student Missionary Society based in Parkville, Mississippi. The letter served three purposes. The first was to smother the Society's release of further circulars that called attention to the situation in Korea. Armstrong leaves the impression that his Church is directing an international publicity and diplomatic effort and that the amateur student group should desist from further releases. The second purpose of the letter was to attack Korean leftists working in China. Armstrong condemns propaganda that was reprinted in the student circular in which the number of Koreans killed during the uprising was exaggerated. The third purpose was to offer false hope. Armstrong admits to the student group that, although independence under the immediate circumstances was unlikely, the work of the League of Nations might bring about freedom for Koreans in the

[14] UCA, R.P. MacKay to N.W. Rowell, 9 April 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.
[15] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to J.H. Ritson, 10 April, 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.

future. It appears doubtful that either Armstrong or R.P. Mackay believed this or even wished independence for Koreans.[16]

Missionary workers from the field also saw the Korean nationalist movement as a lost cause that should be discouraged. In 1919 Mrs. Jennie Robb wrote from the Kennedy School of Missions where she was taking courses. Robb wrote to comfort Mrs. Sutherland, mother of Edith McRae, as to any danger that the Canadians might be in due to the 1919 unrest. "My sympathies are all with the Koreans in their desire for independence and I was not surprised that many of the Christians shared in the movement for I know how patriotic they were." However, Robb continues, "I was sorry to hear that the work of the missionaries was so badly interrupted. I wonder what will be the outcome of it all, for unless the powers take an interest in Korea I do not see that the people by themselves can accomplish very much."[17]

For the leadership of the Presbyterian mission, the independence movement was bound to fail. The protests could still be used, however, to the advantage of the mission. From Toronto Mackay and Armstrong attempted to control information in order to manipulate the Anglo-American response to the colonial violence. The mission had already decided to work with Japanese authorities and the campaign by Armstrong and Mackay was directed against elements of the colonial and Japanese home island polity that posed the greatest threat to the mission movement. From the beginning of the campaign the underlying theme of the Presbyterian message was that Japan was the legitimate government in Korea and that the violence of the colonial authorities was attributable to rogue factions within the Japanese military. The mission view was that if

[16] UCCA, A.E. Armstrong to The President or Secretary, Korean Student Missionary Society, 10 April 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 61.
[17] NSARM, Jennie Robb to Mrs. Sutherland, May 4 1919, MG1, vol. 2275, file 18.

democratic factions within Japan could be given encouragement by foreign powers then the situation in the colony would improve for Koreans. In turn a more democratic home island and colonial government would provide a more stable and accommodating environment for the mission cause. Armstrong was surprisingly candid in replying to the publishers of a new periodical which concentrated on Korea. His estimation of the political situation is telling:

> …I was in Korea seven weeks ago, and learned a great deal about the revolution, and I am in entire sympathy with the Movement so far as it aims at securing sweeping reforms in the government of Korea, and especially opposing the militarists who dominate. I only wish that the Koreans had shown more capacity in maintaining an orderly and satisfactory government prior to annexation, and I wish that now they would show themselves more capable of administering the affairs of the country. As a friend of both Korea and Japan, I am anxious to see both peoples become democratic and Christian. One would like to do everything possible to overthrow militarism and see Koreans and Japanese come to the point where they could live together as two races under one empire as the English and Scotch do.[18]

In order to allow groups opposed to the military in Japan time to control the colonial government, Armstrong delayed releasing the bulk of his findings. His reports were recorded in Seoul just weeks after the initial uprising. The leadership of the mission in other words was willing to suppress information to allow Japanese factions more sympathetic to the missionaries to take control.[19]

Moderates within the Japanese diplomatic corps did get the message. In a letter to O.R. Avison at the Severence hospital in Seoul, Armstrong comments that recent statements from the Japanese ambassador in Washington hint at Koreans taking a greater

[18] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to The Korean Publication, 5 May, 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 62.
[19] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to William Scott, 16 May 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 62.

part in administration and development in Korea, and as Armstrong notes, these moves were to mirror the activities of the United States in the Philippines and Britain in India.[20]

By March 1920 the colonial government in Korea had changed and the new government's reforms reflected what appeared to be a more enlightened and accommodating system of colonial administration. After a year of criticising Japanese policy in Korea, Armstrong submitted a column to the *Presbyterian Witness* aimed at allaying tension. In "Be Fair with Japan" Armstrong strives to quell anti-Japanese feeling by separating militarists from the majority of the Japanese people. Governor-General Saitō's reforms figure prominently in the piece. Armstrong appeals to mission supporters who think that withdrawing from Korea in protest is an option and states that "Turkish atrocities against Armenia never stopped missionary effort in that land."[21] These appeals were designed to shift attention back to the work of the mission and away from the distraction caused by the independence movement and the ensuing crackdown. His piece marks a departure from previous articles in the *Presbyterian Witness* by missionaries who in some cases were severe critics of the colonial judicial process. Here again, Saitō's reforms, along with his policy of devolution of power to hand-picked Korean councils, did much to address these criticisms. But with these reforms came new regulations that directly affected mission education and medical projects.[22] The mission was now willing to cooperate with and to support the colonial government, which in turn made the mission unmistakably and overtly political. A claim of loyal recognition that was distinct from

[20] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to O.R. Avison, 26 May 1919, fond 122, box 4, file 62.
[21] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong, "Be fair with Japan," in *The Presbyterian Witness*, March 6 1920, Microfilm #8415.
[22] Eckert, *Korea Old and New*, 282.

cooperation with the colonial regime was no longer defendable: the missionaries were willing to do business.

-II-
Cooperation

While the new bureaucracy in the mission meant a shift to cooperation with the Government-General, the mission organization did so in part to continue its work within a sometimes hostile colonial structure. This is not to say that acceptance of new rules regarding education and medicine went unchallenged within the mission. Internal debates and disagreement regarding compliance to Japanese regulations stemmed in part from a marginalized, but vocal, minority who did not fully adapt to the bureaucratic model. These debates continued from 1920 until 1938, during which years two new sets of education regulations were handed down by the authorities in Seoul and implemented in mission schools. The mission as a whole responded to these new regulations with a growing willingness to accommodate government policy. Accommodation with the government required compromises on the part of the mission that further contradicted both their religious beliefs and the long-term goal of a self-supporting Korean Church.

After March 1919 Koreans themselves often called for more accessible, and better, education, which led to a demand for better equipped schools. This appeal ran in tandem with the government's insistence that all schools must reach certain minimum standards by 1925.[23] These standards were part of the New Educational Ordinance introduced by the Government-General in 1921 as a response to the unrest of 1919. The new guidelines replaced the Chosen Educational Ordinance of 1911, based on the Meiji Rescript on Education of 1890.

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[23] Scott, *Canadians,* 25.

The Chosen Ordinance had been part of a consolidation of power after the annexation of Korea in 1910. New rules for educational institutions were accompanied by regulations for hospital and medical training facilities. Before the Canadian Eastern and Western mission divisions merged, missionaries were restricted in their response to the new rules. Medical dispensaries and schools run by the Canadian missions were considered inferior to colonial institutions by both Koreans and the missionaries themselves. After the merger of the divisions in 1915 discussions between the main mission board and missionaries in the field covered a wide range of issues that sought to address the colonial regulations.

One of the more challenging of these new regulations was the requirement after 1915 that a thorough knowledge of Japanese was expected in order to hold a government license to teach in the colony. The senate of the Federated Missions, a council that consisted of all the Presbyterian missions in Korea, recommended that all mission schools, including the Canadians', should comply as soon as possible.[24] The Federation also recommended compliance with Japanese educational laws at the college level. In writing to the prominent American missionary, H.G. Underwood, R.P. MacKay agreed that "it would not do to leave the education of Korea in the hands of non-Christians, however hampered temporarily by inconvenient laws..."[25] This direction was confirmed again in 1918 when "[t]he Presbyterian Council was in session [September] 6, 7th at Sensen. The resolution re Schools was: We recommend, that in all matters of curriculum and teacher qualifications etc., all our mission schools be brought up to the government requirements

[24] UCA, Statement by Canadian missionaries L.L. Young and R.W. Baker, "Japanese Language in all Schools", n.d. July, 1915, fond 122, box 2, file 28.
[25] UCA, R.P. Mackay to H.G. Underwood, 30 November 1915, fond 122, box 2, file 30.

as rapidly as possible and that with regards to Bible instruction and religious exercises we continue in our established schools, to teach these as long as the law permits."[26]

Pressure to comply with Japanese regulations and standards meant increased expense for the missions. To cut costs while at the same time increasing standards, the American, Australian and Canadian missions co-operated in projects such as the Union College and the Severence Hospital. In 1915 the mentor to many of the original Canadians, Dr. O.R. Avison, working for the American Presbyterians, described the advantages of cooperation. As head of the Severence Hospital, Avison encouraged the Canadian mission board to send doctors to improve the teaching faculty at the institution. In order for Korean doctors to be licensed under new government regulations a more extensive curriculum was required during their internships. The missionary also kept a keen eye on the potential for "influence" and "esteem" should his students be able to graduate without further examinations by the colonial regime.[27] Avison would go on to recommend to his own mission board in New York that medical services conducted by the missions be directed in a more centralized fashion in an effort towards efficiency and standardized care.[28]

Standardization in education posed a different set of problems for the Canadians. In 1916, while funds were certainly more available than in the early days of the mission, the cost of bringing schools up to government standards still fueled debate as to the main purpose of missionary education. Luther Young pondered whether the Canadians should pull out of what was increasingly a secular education system and concentrate on Sunday schools and Bible study. Young was blunt in his assessment that the missionaries could

[26] NSARM, Diary of William Foote, MG1, vol. 2273, file 7, 43-44.
[27] UCA, O.R. Avison to A.E. Armstrong, 20 March 1915, fond 122, box 2, file 26.
[28] UCA, O.R. Avison to A.J. Brown, 17 December 1915, fond 122, box 2, file 30.

not compete with government schools when it came to education. But he was confident that the mission could attract converts with Christianity alone, unaided by what he described as the bait of secular teaching.[29]

While missionaries like Luther Young sought to use Sunday schools and Bible study as an answer to increasing pressure from new education rules, fellow Canadians explored cooperative educational work with other Christian groups through the establishment of industrial schools in Korea. In line with contemporary colonial government policy American Methodists approached the Canadians with a proposal to develop a silk production facility in Wonsan. The school would provide industrial training as well as language and Bible instruction. This proposal, apart from the intent to teach Bible classes, was met with approval by the Japanese director of internal affairs in Seoul.[30]

As the mission expanded and engaged in cooperative agreements with other groups, opinions such as Young's were still permitted in private letters. However, the new mission board in Toronto became increasingly concerned with how debate over the organization's direction was portrayed in public. In an effort to corral any dissension by missionaries in the field the board altered the by-laws of the Mission Council in Korea. The council consisted of Canadians from the various Presbyterian stations in Korea and Manchuria and the new bylaws denied any voting rights for the wives of missionaries, whether these women worked for the mission or not. In practice almost all of these women did do medical, educational or religious work. Another move made by the mission board to impose discipline was an attempt to censure the use of circular letters

[29] UCA, L.L. Young to John Somerville, 3 April 1916, fond 122, box 3, file 34.
[30] UCA, Mabel Head to R.P. Mackay, 15 June 1917, fond 122, box 3, file 47.

amongst missionaries. These circulars were at times mean-spirited, but they were also a means of discussion and a forum for ideas at the grass-roots level of missionary work.[31] Unsuccessful in completely curbing the use of circular letters, FMB leadership had at least served notice, that in public the mission should project a unified voice.

While the missionaries adapted to a new mission board, after 1919 the Canadians also had to conform to the new colonial administration. The mission was given time to comply with government orders and were offered three years in which to act in accordance with the new education ordinance. This was in itself a substantial compromise by Governor-General Saitō. Saitō's ordinance also recommended a study to investigate education in the colony as a whole and prompted the creation of teacher's schools for each province, as well as Korea's first and only Imperial University in Seoul. Enrolment at Keijo Imperial University shows the limits set in Japanese colonial education. The student body was limited to a quota of around thirty five percent Korean students with the remainder of student body being made up of Japanese colonists. Similarly, Korean professors at the university were restricted to teaching Korean language, Chinese literature and mathematics. Although opportunities at the university level were limited for Koreans the colonial government made substantial investments in primary and secondary education and this was reflected in increasing enrollment statistics. Growth of student enrollment from 1919 to 1940 showed an increase of over 1.3 million students registered in Japanese colonial schools.[32]

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[31] UCA, A.E. Armstrong to Thomas Mansfield, 5 May 1916, fond 122, box 3, file 35; The decision to ban missionary wives from voting was later reversed after the Canadian Church Union in 1925: see Scott, *Canadians*, 101.

[32] Eugene C. Kim, "Education in Korea Under the Japanese Colonial Rule", in *Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule, Studies of the Policy and Techniques of Japanese Colonialism,* ed. Andrew C. Nahm (Michigan: Western Michigan University, 1973), 137-145.

Government-General figures show that Korean enrollments in private and public schools were 152,648 pupils in 1920 and 222,007 in 1921, an increase of over forty-five percent in just one year. At the same time attendance in Christian schools increased eighty-seven percent from 28,803 to 53,821. These figures drove the extensive building and upgrading program at the four main Canadian mission stations for both girls' and boys' schools. Upgrades to mission buildings were also part of compliance with Governor-General regulations that required "adequate accommodation" be provided at schools as well as a $7,000 a year operating fund to be set aside for each institution. In light of these rules the mission was forced to consolidate and rationalize its educational plans.

By 1923, as part of this rationalization, the mission was in full discussions with Korean church leaders as to the direction of education policy. Decisions had to be made regarding the designation of schools as High Common Schools (non-religious schools), compliant with Japanese education standards, rather than Designated Schools (religious schools), being able to give religious instruction but not recognized on the same level as public institutions.[33] These discussions among mission and Korean church leaders could be construed as a growing willingness by the Canadians to devolve power to the Korean Church. Devolution was, after all, the foundation of the Anglo-American mission strategy in Korea. Yet ideas about how much inclusion was appropriate, or whether to include Korean Christians at all in mission projects, were contested among the missionaries. Some members of the mission argued that complete control should be handed over and that the mission should accept a secondary role, while others were sceptical of Koreans' ability to competently and honestly manage FMB grants and contributions unsupervised.

[33] Scott, *Canadians*, 96-98.

However, the sharing of expenses with an increasingly affluent Korean congregation and, more importantly, the need for a Korean face at the forefront of mission institutions in Korea prompted a new and inclusive approach to Church planning. At the same time, Koreans demanded a say in how their Church and education was organized. But devolution only went so far: the Canadian mission excluded Korean participation in the hospital boards, which remained the purview of the Anglo-American missionary elite in Korea.[34]

It was no accident, then, that Koreans found themselves included in the administration of education, while being barred from the administration of medicine. Education was by far the more contentious and potentially volatile field in which the missionaries operated. Missionary medicine, on the other hand, along with the operation of hospitals, dispensaries and medical schools, usefully complemented the modernising, yet overburdened colonial medical system in Korea. Colonial authorities could live with the lacklustre results missions achieved in converting Koreans through mission medical aid.[35] But mission schools grated against key policies and long-term goals of the Goverment-General. Missionaries and their boards may be forgiven for overlooking or being unaware of the possible implications of complying with colonial government regulations regarding language and curriculum in schools during the 1910s. But by the 1920s and 1930s the colonial policies of *dōka* and eventually *kōminka*, or assimilation and imperialization, were in many ways dependent on strict adherence to a structured

[34] UCA, E.J.O. Fraser to A.E. Armstrong, 10 May 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 4.
[35] For the connections between mission medicine and religious conversion in Korea see, Brouwer, "The Triumphs of "Standards" over "Sisterhood": Florence Murray's Approach to the Practice and Teaching of Western Medicine in Korea, 1921-69", in *Modern Women,* 66-95.

school system that promoted and inculcated the values of these policies.[36] After 1920 the missions were aware that new regulations surrounding schools were part of a concerted effort to create a new identity for Koreans by forcing Japanese education and culture on colonial subjects.

James Scarth Gale, a veteran Canadian missionary who spent his career in Korea with the American Presbyterians, outlined what he considered to be the end result of Japanese assimilation policies, based on these new forms of education in the colony. Gale's groundbreaking work in Korean translations of biblical scriptures, Korean literature, folklore and history placed him as one of the premier Anglo-American experts on Korean culture. Gale had the knowledge and the experience to comment on what colonial education guidelines meant for Korean society. Through newspaper articles he warned the Church and mission community that what he saw was an attempt to suffocate Korean identity not only through the draconian legal system of pre-Saitō Korea, but also the suppression of Korean literature and language.[37] Gale's writings have been described as an accusation of "cultural genocide."[38] These charges aside, compliance with colonial education rules by mission schools after 1920 was made with the knowledge that a curriculum based on Japanese language instruction, "ethics," and a stress on teaching the "Japanese spirit" was part of suppressing Korean nationalism and cultural identity.[39] By

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[36] For discussions of *dōka*, *kōminka* and assimilation through education see, E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan" in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 275-311; For an enlarged discussion of these policies on Taiwan, and by extension in Korea, see Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese", Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

[37] NSARM, Article by James Scarth Gale, in *The Presbyterian Witness*, 29 November 1919, Microfilm #8415.

[38] Clark, *Living Dangerously*, 53.

[39] Tsurumi, "Colonial Education", 300; For a discussion of the subtleties of assimilation, education and language policies under Saitō see, Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), particularly chapter three.

integrating the colonial education rules into the mission school curriculum the Canadians acquiesced in the colonial government's plans to supplant Korean identity with that of the Imperial Japanese subject.

So why did the missions comply with education ordinances if these rules were suppressing the very people that they had come to save, in the religious sense, and who they protected in a very physical sense, during the uprisings? Some missionaries tried to understand and appreciate Korean culture. Missionaries who had invested years in learning Korean, such as William Foote and James Scarth Gale, took their study of the language to an advanced level. Foote and Gale eventually published Christian works in Korean and translated Korean literature significant in understanding the history and structure of Korean society. For other missionaries language study was the daily grind of spoken and written lessons without which they would be unable to connect with their parishioners. Among the missionaries themselves those unable to pass Korean language exams were ineligible to vote on council business. The importance of the local language was ingrained in the missionary but many began to overlook the time they had sacrificed in learning the native language. The explosion of interest in education along with its potential for new converts made many missionaries turn their backs on Korean language and culture as missions became conduits of enforced Japanese language training and Japanese culture through mandatory classes in primary and secondary schools. Jennie Robb wrote to her friend Edith MacRae describing the education boom, whether the educators were Japanese or Anglo-American. "The Koreans seem to have awakened to the value of modern education as never before and at the new school year all mission schools - and the Government schools, too I think - received far more applications for

admittance than they could accept."[40] Coupled with the advantages of offering education to a larger segment of the population and reaching a wider audience with the Christian message, the 1925 deadline set for compliance to school regulations spurred mission administrators into funding compliance with a curriculum that emphasized the "Japanization" of Koreans.

-III-
Church Union

The deadline for compliance also coincided with the merger in Canada of the major Protestant churches. The Church Union marked a rationalization of the Protestant denominations in Canada and this trend was mirrored in the mission field. A senior mission school administrator described the new mood in Korea following the creation of the United Church mission, which included the majority of the Presbyterian missionaries. "Korea has fallen upon a period of lean years when, instead of the rich in gathering of earlier days, we are compelled to seek slower but steadier increase. We are in a time of transition from the period of reverent but less thoughtful evangelism to one of emphasis upon a reasonable faith and application of Christian principles."[41]

The author of this summary had good reason to reflect on what he saw as a period of change. Earlier in the year, while still under pressure to conform to colonial regulations, the Hamheung school for boys experienced protests and a boycott when Korean students demanded that the Canadian mission apply for High Common School (a non-religious school where Christian teaching was forbidden) certification rather than the Designated School (religious school) certificate. Riots also broke out at the mission school at Lungchingtsun in Chientao the following year, where E.J.O. Fraser blamed the violence

[40] NSARM, Jennie Robb to Edith MacRae, 24 April 1921, MG1, vol. 2275, file 18.
[41] UCA, William Scott to Alfred Gandier, 29 December 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 3.

on a "communistic, anti-Christian virus" that had taken hold in the senior year of the boys' academy. Fraser and other members of the faculty had to depend on the protection of Chinese police and finally Japanese gendarmeries as Fraser's home was threatened by students. Although the incidents at Hamheung and Lungchingtsun stemmed from different grievances the common thread was the religious underpinnings of the mission schools.[42]

Registration as a Designated School meant that religious instruction was allowed but prospects for further education after graduation from such a school were limited, rendering attendance at a Designated School an option of last resort for parents and students. Presbyterians had viewed the Methodist mission in Korea as having caved in to government demands to register their schools as non-religious or holding the High Common School status. The Canadians had stalled to some degree in registering their schools in the hope that either they could persuade the Japanese bureaucracy that a Designated School license be granted, and the mission could continue to teach the Bible, or that individuals in the colonial education department would eventually be replaced by more sympathetic administrators.

The sticking point was the right to proselytize Christianity rather than any United Church squeamishness about teaching Japanese language or Japanese mores to Koreans. Korean nationalism or cultural survival was not a concern. The Canadians would have readily conceded to the changes in curriculum as long as they could teach Bible studies in their classrooms. The colonial government would not compromise in granting special permits to the Canadians. In fact, only one American school ever achieved the designated

[42] UCA, E.J.O. Fraser to A.E. Armstrong, 9 May 1927, fond 502, box 1, file 20.

status, something thought to have happened due to an administrative error in the Department of Education.[43]

The relationship between the mission and the Education Bureau was not always as strained. Mission school administrators were invited on a tour of schools on the home islands in order for the government in Seoul to showcase the advances made in the education system in Japan. The travel expenses were partially funded by the Japanese government. The purpose was to woo missionary support and to quell any complaints that could be lodged with foreign governments by missions who thought they were being unfairly treated. William Scott, who took the offer to go to Japan, was well aware that the trip was a choreographed exercise that placed the very best Japanese schools on the itinerary of the missionaries. While not seduced into becoming an advocate for Japanese colonial policy, Scott was nonetheless impressed by what he saw and the trip may have contributed to his reversal of opinion on how the Canadians should register their schools.[44]

By 1927 Scott had rethought his earlier views on Methodist administrators being weak-kneed for having applied for Higher Common School (non-religious) status. His opinion shifted from describing the Methodists as breaking a common front among the mission groups to one of using the Methodist example as the way forward. In other words by 1927 Scott began to push for registration of his schools as non-religious institutions. Declining enrolment in schools without Higher Common School status and lack of support for the Designated School option from the Korean Church also helped Scott to conclude that mission schools should be registered as non-religious. In his argument to

[43] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 14 June 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 9.
[44] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 24 April 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 9; For Scott's visit to Japan see also, Clark, *Living Dangerous*, 64.

visiting dignitaries from the United Church, Scott justified his change of heart by saying "...we can make our education Christian by the spirit in which we conduct it, even if we are forbidden to give direct Christian teaching." This rather ambiguous explanation of how the mission could operate within the framework of Japanese colonial policies foreshadowed the Canadian mission's approach to the Shinto shrine issue that would challenge the Canadians in the 1930s. In the late 1920s, however, Scott found comfort in the fact that Methodist mission schools that had been registered as non-religious gained an exemption from having to attend State Shinto ceremonies. This situation would change in the years to come.

With his new views on school registration, Scott steered the Canadian mission towards compliance with the government and took aim at those who opposed compromise. In 1926 Scott wrote that although "we come from an imperialistic nation our sympathies and our mission policies are the most democratic in Korea. And our religious outlook is more sanely liberal-conservative than most American missions."[45] Scott's comments were aimed at conservative elements of the American Presbyterian missions in Korea that may have been unwilling to accept the new Canadian United Church in the union of Presbyterian missions.[46] The same conservative elements in the American Church had rejected outright the possibility of operating schools under the new Japanese regulations that outlawed Bible study in schools. By contrast, the "liberal" view among American missionaries that strove for accommodation with colonial authorities was championed in part by the Underwood family. The Underwoods, of Underwood typewriter fame, had the

[45] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 9 August 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 3.
[46] Fears that the new United Church mission would be rejected by other Presbyterian missions in Korea were later proved wrong, see UCA, E.J.O. Fraser to A.E. Armstrong, 3 December 1926, fond 502, box 1, file 4.

missionary pedigree, influence and money to lobby for secular education in mission schools and colleges in order to attract the children of the Korean elite, or the future business and to some extent local government leaders of the country. Donald Clark views this clash from a theological standpoint; "[t]he very language of the Underwood brothers' rationale for wanting a Christian college in Seoul thus triggered a battle in Korea that mirrored the war between modern culture and traditional theology in the United States." The struggle between American conservatives in P'yŏngyang and new management proponents like the Underwoods in Seoul, saw the conservatives attack what they perceived as liberal secularism, which contradicted the motivation for donations from home parishes, the donations being intended for the religious training of native pastors.[47]

The Canadian mission was distinct from their American counterparts in that the battle between "traditionalism" and "modernism" in the United States still gripped the Presbyterian and Baptist Churches. As Michael Gauvreau explains, "[a]lthough the Canadian and Methodist Churches, and the United Church after 1925, remained free of the more extreme "liberal" and "fundamentalist" public controversies that bedeviled the American Baptists and Presbyterians, many clergymen were troubled by the religious turmoil in America." Gauvreau goes on to explain that Canadian denominations were not as concerned over the "authority of the Bible and the question of evolution" as they were over the controversy of Church Union in Canada. The second factor in Canadian theological moderation was the leadership of the United Church itself, which less inclined to dismiss "modern knowledge" as was the case of church leaders in America. The third influence that Gauvreau cites is that of contemporary Scottish theology which was firmly

[47] Clark, *Living Dangerously*, 131-133.

rooted in the United Church seminaries. Again, this theology sought a middle-way between "modernism" and "fundamentalism."[48]

Conservative Canadians or opponents of registering schools used the argument that the colonial education laws were the bellwether of threats to religious freedom, and not just missionary freedom, throughout East Asia. The Korean Church, under pressure from families who wished their children to attend mission schools, saw things differently. For Koreans, education and the recognition of that education by the colonial government meant the possibility of advancement for their children in the emerging economy or a clerical job in a bureaucracy that accepted a limited number of colonial subjects in junior positions. Faced with the prospect of having their children relegated to low paying and menial professions some parents were willing to accept a degree of "Japanization" in their schools. A.F. Robb, an opponent of registration, saw these parents as deluding themselves with hopes of advancement for their children. Robb pointed out that a quota system on higher education and limited opportunities even for graduates of government schools meant that registering of mission schools would only contribute to the production of a disgruntled group of unemployed youth open to the perils of "Communistic and Bolshevistic propaganda." Partly rooted in the conceit that Korean children would be better served by an education in the trades or "technical training" Robb was right to assume that his students were limited by a very real career ceiling. Robb's arguments presented some uncomfortable assertions that delayed proponents of registration in their drive to comply with regulations.[49]

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[48] Michael Gauvreau, *The Evangelical Century: College and Creed in English Canada from the Great Revival to the Great Depression* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991) 269-271.
[49] UCA, A.F. Robb to A.E. Armstrong, 1 March 1928, fond 502, box 1, file 28.

At a General Assembly meeting of the Presbyterian missions and Korean Church presbyteries in the fall of 1927, conservative elements of the American missions were successful in quashing a proposal by the Canadians to register their schools. This decision was reversed under appeal, but the vote on the subject revealed deep rifts in the missionary community that was now split between those who would effectively allow their institutions to become non-religious, and those who stood by the original purpose and direction of mission education. The move to comply was only temporarily stalled.

The bureaucratic organization in the Canadian mission which favored compliance was spearheaded by William Scott in Korea but backed by A.E. Armstrong at the Foreign Mission Board headquarters in Toronto as well as Alfred Gandier, chairman of the FMB and James Endicott, Moderator of the United Church.[50] During their visit to Korea in June 1927 Gandier and Endicott received a verbal promise from the colonial Education Bureau that registered schools would be allowed to teach religion as an extra-curricular activity. On his return to Canada, Gandier used this verbal assurance to convince the FMB to push ahead with registration in May 1928, despite the opposition from the majority of missions that comprised the General Assembly in Korea.[51]

The final vote by the Canadian mission to approve registration of their schools was, by July 1928, a formality. Opposition voiced by veteran missionaries Duncan MacRae, A.F. Robb and A.R. Ross merely added to the pretense of democracy within the mission. William Scott took the school issue so seriously that he delayed his furlough in order to negotiate registration, while still holding on to the hope that a provision would be

[50] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 16 October 1927, fond 502, box 1, file 25.
[51] UCA, William Scott to Governor-General Yamanashi, 28 June, 1928, fond 502, box 1, file 25. Yamanashi became Governor-General in December 1927 after the departure of Saitō.

allowed to include Christian education after school hours.[52] While on the surface Scott's conscientiousness seems commendable, his delayed departure stemmed more from anxiety over what might occur among missionaries in opposition to the registration plans. Applications for registration of the mission schools as non-religious were accepted by the Education Department only to be delayed by new rules regarding ownership of registered schools and wording of mission constitutions regarding the establishment of their schools.[53] The mission trudged through the process of registration and adherence to colonial curriculum as bureaucrats from both the Church and the colonial Education Bureau haggled over the minutiae of terminology.[54]

These struggles, then, were not simply the results of differences in theology among Presbyterian sects. The differences were the result of broader changes in bureaucratic methods occurring on a global scale, driving members of the Canadian mission and their superiors in Canada down a road to compromise in order to perpetuate their *organization*. The new leaders of the missions were no less religious or Christian than their opponents within their churches. What separated the "conservative" members of the respective missions from a new form of mission manager was the willingness to embrace a bureaucratic model that had already been used to manage large businesses and governments. The campaign to register the mission schools as non-religious or as Higher Common schools represents the shift to rational management within the mission bureaucracy that calculated the compromise as acceptable given the interference of colonial government regulations. Those who opposed the registration saw the move as a

[52] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 7 July 1928, fond 502, box 1, file 25.
[53] UCA, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 27 March 1929, fond 502, box 1, file 31; UCA, D.A. MacDonald to A.E. Armstrong, 11 March 1930, fond 502, box 2, file 40.
[54] UCA, A.F. Robb to A.E. Armstrong, 1 March 1928, fond 502, box 1, file 28.

deeply troubling indication of how the new techniques of mission management had drifted from the mission values and beliefs of the past. While making the application for registration, the convictions that originally inspired the establishment of missions in Korea were overlooked or swept aside under the auspices of rationalization.

The Canadian mission was neither naïve in its compliance with colonial education rules nor was it coldly pragmatic. The widely distributed writings of James Scarth Gale alerted missionaries to what Japanese colonial policy meant to Korean culture and Korean identity. However, the decision to comply with authorities was not based on simple survival of the mission at the expense of Koreans. Compliance stemmed from a deeply held belief in a Church whose actions were increasingly guided and justified by the mechanisms and structures of bureaucratic management. The shift that informed and directed the mission held rational organization as a basic principle that was believed to be logical and moderate. The Canadian mission had developed through amalgamation and mergers with other Presbyterian groups and then finally as the Korean arm of the much larger United Church of Canada. Little wonder then that the techniques and culture of large bureaucracy seeped into the day-to-day workings of mission relations with colonial government, Koreans and other mission groups.

The compromises made in order to continue mission education in colonial Korea were, however, only a precursor to a much more divisive issue that confronted the Canadians in the 1930s. Japanese colonial authorities enacted a series of laws making the observance of State Shinto ceremonies mandatory in the colony. How the Canadians dealt with this challenge to the foundations of their faith will be the subject of the next chapter

Chapter Three
Follow No Divisive Course

-I-
The Shrine Problem

"I have always thought that patriotism was regarded as a religious act and attitude, whether actually called that or not."[1]

By the mid-1930s compliance with Japanese colonial government orders on the compulsory observance of State Shinto ceremonies challenged the religious underpinnings of the international missionary community in Korea. Just as they complied with colonial laws regarding education, so the Canadian mission chose also to conform to the Government-General's regulations on State Shinto. Canadian missionaries justified their compliance by arguing that State Shinto was a manifestation of loyalty to the Emperor rather than a religious observance. New rules handed down from the government demanded that all students and teachers from approved schools attend State Shinto ceremonies. Therefore, all missionaries who served as teachers or administrators in approved schools were required to attend and perform obeisance at State Shinto shrines, or *jinja.* The debate among missions over the religious or non-religious nature of these ceremonies created deep divisions within many mission denominations. Among the Canadians, those opposed to obeisance were marginalized and eventually muzzled. The bureaucracy of the Canadian mission required discipline within the organization and was unwilling to indulge any feelings of unease or objection to policy over the shrine issue.

The arguments and apprehension over the shrine issue were largely due to ambiguity over where State Shinto belonged in the society and polity of Japan. The

[1] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to D.A. Macdonald, December 11 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 58.

political status of Shinto in Korea mirrored in many respects the creation and implementation of State Shinto practices in Japan proper. By implementing obligatory obeisance the colonial government strove to further integrate Korean society into an ongoing process in which, after the Meiji Restoration, the architects of the Japanese state strove to harness the disparate elements of Shinto into a national religion. The Canadians chose to recognize the political aspects of State Shinto while downplaying or ignoring its religious meanings. Recognizing only the political enabled the Canadians to continue their work. The Canadians' policy on State Shinto contradicted the approach taken by missionaries of other nations. Many missionaries from the United States stood by their religious principles and left Korea rather than partake in what they saw as idolatrous acts. However, the Canadians' "pragmatism" was not simply an act of self-preservation; rather their actions were the product of the organizational culture that governed their particular mission.

Rather than examining organizational causes for the Canadian mission's response, historians have viewed the United Church missions' compliance with State Shinto ceremony as a matter of missionaries blithely agreeing to an explanation that observance was patriotic rather than religious. In addition, many Canadians are portrayed as relegating the Shinto issue to the sphere of education rather than religious participation. According to Hamish Ion, school teachers and students became the responsibility of the missionaries and the decision to attend ceremonies by parishioners, in a religious context, became the responsibility of the Korean Church.[2] Underlying this reasoning is the premise that the Canadian decision to attend State Shinto ceremonies was taken for the benefit of the Korean people. In other words, the missionaries attending did so as an act

[2] Ion, *Dark Valley*, 82.

of selflessness taken in order to stop reprisals against the Korean Christians by colonial authorities. In this view, the actions of American Presbyterians who opposed State Shinto edicts, on religious grounds, are viewed as both reckless and naïve.[3]

Added to the theory that the Koreans were the beneficiaries of the Canadian response is the confusion in the 1930s over the religiosity of the shrine ceremonies. Examined in strictly religious terms, State Shinto was "suprareligious" and Christian missionaries used creative arguments to make attendance at the ceremonies seem to be acts of respect for authority or displays of patriotism and loyalty to the Japanese Emperor.[4] FMB administrator, A.E. Armstrong, drew an analogy between this act of respect and that performed by "an American standing with bare head before the tomb of George Washington or bowing before the grave of the unknown soldier."[5] The irony of comparing George Washington to the Emperor of Japan or paying respects to Imperial Army war dead, from a Korean standpoint in the mid-1930s, was lost on Armstrong when he made his case for compliance with Shinto regulations.

This comparison is important, however, in that the ceremony involved was exceptionally political and beyond a simple acknowledgement of a head of state. The ceremonies represented much more than explicit acts of recognition or etiquette and were part of larger goals for state and colonial management. These larger themes were recognized by some in the missionary movement in Korea, and histories of the American Presbyterian missions the emphasis in accounts of the reaction to the shrine issue is on the

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[3] *Ibid.*, 96,100.

[4] For a discussion of how State Shinto was manufactured and the difficulty in placing Shinto within Anglo-American concepts of religion see the introduction and chapter one of, Helen Hardacre, *Shintō and the State, 1868-1988*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Hardacre expands on the idea of Shinto a suprareligious by stating, "[t]he [Shinto] priesthood developed a conviction, still prevalent at the end of the twentieth century, that Shinto was a nonreligious or suprareligious entity with the political function of establishing the spiritual unity of the populace", see Hardacre, *Shintō,* 22.

[5] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to Duncan MacRae, 25 February 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3 file 85.

marked lack of cooperation with the government in contrast to the responses of the majority of Canadian Christian workers. Many Americans believed that State Shinto represented an integral part of the attempt to inculcate in Koreans a sense of "Japaneseness." Coupled with an emphasis on the more conservative theology of the American Presbyterians, the Americans' recognition of the assimilative role of State Shinto highlights the differences between the histories of American and Canadian missionary experience in Korea at the time. Ultimately, in 1936 the American Northern Presbyterians voted to close their educational institutions rather than comply with regulations that they saw as an attack on not only their religious freedom but on the core of their faith. Participation in Shinto ceremonies was tantamount to worshiping false gods. Like the Canadians, the American Presbyterians justified their actions as being in the best interest of Koreans, the difference being that many Americans believed that they were saving their followers from acts contrary to Christian teaching.[6] The Australian Presbyterians based in southern Korea also took a stand against the shrine rules and in February 1936 they issued a statement citing their inability to worship false gods as a reason for their refusal to attend. This statement was made available to Armstrong in Toronto:[7]

> A Pro Re nata meeting of the Mission Council of the Australian Presbyterian Mission in Korea was held at Masan on Feb 7th 1936 *Inter alia* it was on motion agreed that
> "We wish to express with high respect and honour which we hold towards His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan....We recognize our obligation to promote the virtues of obedience and loyalty in our students. We desire that our schools should participate in all national ceremonies. But since we worship one God

[6] Clark, *Living Dangerously*, 209-221; Ion, *Dark Valley*, 112.
[7] NSARM, "A Pro Re Nata (sic) meeting of the Mission Council of the Australian Presbyterian Mission in Korea", 7 February 1936, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.

alone....We therefore are unable ourselves to make obeisances, or to instruct our schools to do so."[8]

Apart from the Australians, both the Canadian and the American missions had factions within their organizations that opposed their individual boards' policies with regard to the Shinto issue. In the American camp the majority of missionaries were against the new rules. The minority in favour of compliance was headed by the Underwood family, and as they had done in the fight to register mission schools with the government, the Underwoods pushed for attendance in Shinto ceremonies. In a paper presented during a 1937 mission conference, H.H. Underwood resorted to blaming the victim by questioning Korean Christians' "conscientious scruples" about resisting obeisance.[9] Most of the Canadians agreed with the Underwoods.

While the majority of Canadian missionaries sided with the views of Underwood, compliance to Shinto attendance was not inevitable. In an atmosphere of colonial government coercion and political and economic instability the pressure to comply intensified. Yet other missions resisted these pressures, pointing to distinct factors that contributed to Canadian acquiescence. As the 1930s progressed, resistance among the Canadians against Shinto rules slowly declined with only a few exceptions remaining to challenge the authorities.

One Canadian missionary willing to challenge colonial law was Mrs. R.W. Barker, the principal of the Wonsan Girls' school. A graduate of the University of Toronto Barker was the wife of Rev. A.H. Barker. She arrived in Korea with the first wave of missionaries from the Western Board Presbyterians in 1911. After the death of her

[8] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to Duncan MacRae, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.
[9] NSARM, "A Paper presented by H.H. Underwood," March 19 1937, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.

husband in 1927 Barker continued her work in Korea until 1938. She died in New Brunswick three months after her return to Canada. Barker, unable to comply Shinto regulations based on her religious convictions, resigned her position in 1933. Mission secretary D.A. Macdonald accepted the resignation and relayed to A.E. Armstrong at the FMB in Toronto an account of the events leading up to Barker's resignation. Her action stemmed from directives that required missionaries working in Korean schools to participate in remembrance ceremonies for Japanese war dead of the 1931 Manchurian invasion. While these ceremonies of remembrance at Shinto shrines initially met resistance from Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian missions in 1932, much of the opposition, by the Catholics and Methodists at least, began to crumble in 1933. This made Barker's opposition all the more irksome for the colonial education administration. After the resignation Japanese provincial officials advised the Canadian mission secretary to choose a less "biased" principal to replace Mrs. Barker.[10]

Such pressure from colonial education authorities was certainly a factor in the lack of opposition by the Canadians, and the same pressure was part of the reason for many of the other missions to change their minds over the shrine issue. Missionaries emphasized the difficulty in determining whether the ceremonies were strictly patriotic or if they were indeed religious, and in so doing this helped to salve the pride of those who had decided to give in to government demands. Nevertheless, it appears that in 1933 A.E. Armstrong felt no confusion as to what State Shinto represented. In Armstrong's reply to MacDonald's letter regarding the resignation of Mrs. Barker, the FMB chief was unambiguous in what he thought was the purpose and tenor of the State Shinto ceremonies, "You didn't say how Mrs. MacDonald, as Mrs. Barker's successor, is going

[10] NSARM, D.A Macdonald to A.E. Armstrong, 4 November 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 58.

to meet the situation of conforming to the Government requirements concerning visits to shrines [illegible] nationalism, patriotism or religion, whatever it is. I have always thought that patriotism was regarded as a religious act and attitude, whether actually called that or not."[11]

-II-
What Problem?

While Canadian missionaries may have been privately squeamish at the thought of attending State Shinto rites, they held few misgivings over the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, a campaign for which some of the Shinto ceremonies commemorated Japanese casualties. At a time when United Church missionaries were praising the Japanese military presence in what was to become Manchukuo, Mrs. Barker's stand becomes all the more noteworthy. There was a general feeling of relief, given the advantages that the occupation of Manchuria gave the mission. This sentiment was expressed by doctor and founding member of the Canadian Presbyterian mission, Robert Grierson. Grierson described what he saw as the benefits of Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China proper: "The Japanese Empire is doing for the gospel and its speedy transmission what the Roman Empire did in its day; and may be the same providence that sent the Roman Eagles into Britain and Gaul and Asia and Africa that is sending the Flag of the Rising Sun into Manchuria and China with its laws and stability and safety of life and property."[12]

Missionary support for the Japanese military and their presence in Manchuria was evident shortly after the Mukden Incident in 1931. D.A. MacDonald commented on what he saw as the hypocrisy of "International Morality" as the United States among others

[11] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to D.A. Macdonald, 11 December 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 58.
[12] NSARM, Robert Grierson to A.E. Armstrong, April 25 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2 file 60.

condemned Japan for its actions in China.[13] Stationed at Lungchingtsun in Manchuria, Dr. Black, on a similar note, replied to Armstrong's request for information on the situation in Manchuria as a whole. Black praised the infrastructure, monetary policy and law and order that Japanese brought to Manchuria which he saw as a benefit to migrant Koreans: "The Korean population certainly stands to gain considerably by the change for they were previously used to no small extent as innocent agents of Japanese penetration and, as such, were disliked and persecuted by the Chinese."[14] Overall, then, workers in the Korean and Manchurian mission fields were in favour of the Japanese military presence in northerneastern China.

Armstrong agreed that Japanese troops had improved the security situation in southern Manchuria where Communist groups and others had created an environment of lawlessness. However, given Armstrong's focus on a broader picture of the situation in East Asia, he cautioned that the Japanese military invasion of Shanghai showed Japanese expansion in a poor light.[15] As the occupation of Manchuria lengthened, E.J. O. Fraser commented on the efforts of Japanese police and troops: "We have a great deal of sympathy for the Japanese in this matter, as we can see no other way for the Manchurian land to reach a state of peace and quiet…Japan alone can bring peace there, and while we may not like the methods employed, it is being done in a way that shows a great deal of moderation on the part of Japan, when one considers how short a time they have had

[13] NSARM, D. A. MacDonald to A.E. Armstrong, January 13 1932, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2 file 53.
[14] NSARM, D.M. Black to A.E. Armstrong, Oct 15 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 61; For a discussion on how Korean settlers were manipulated as part of Japanese military expansion into Manchuria see, Barbra J. Brooks, "Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion," in *Japan's Competing Modernities, Issues in Culture and Democracy 1900-1930,* Ed., Sharon A. Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 1998); Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed, Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
[15] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to D. A. MacDonald, 12 February 1932, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2 file 53.

influences of peace propaganda bearing on them."[16] Such support for Japanese policies in the region by the Canadian mission was the norm. Apart from a very brief interlude in 1919 when the Canadian mission actively opposed the colonial government during the Korean independence protests, the policies of the Japanese military government met with little resistance from the mission. On the contrary, the missionaries often mentioned the civilizing influence of Japan in Korea. During the Russo-Japanese War, the protectorate period and final annexation of Korea, this general trend continued. And so it was with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. However, in this case the Canadian missionaries were fundamentally out of step with world opinion regarding the invasion. Their approval of Japanese military policy and the final acceptance of colonial regulations, such as the State Shinto edicts, raises the questions as to why they chose to cooperate as closely as they did with a regime that was increasingly steering towards militarism, ultra-nationalism and "anti-westernism."

This was the backdrop, then, when the United Church mission chose an attitude of cooperation and in many respects accord with Japanese military expansion in the East Asian mainland. Part of this cooperation involved willing compliance with State Shinto, even in the absence of large scale manipulation or strong-arming of Canadian missionaries on the part of mission leadership. This level of agreement indicates a lack scepticism that was not naiveté but a reflection of how far rational management and the bureaucratic model had become the natural and logical framework for the vast majority of

[16] NSARM, E.J.O. Fraser to A.E. Armstrong, 6 December 1932, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 54; For an overview of what methods the Japanese military used in Manchuria see, Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967); Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983) and Erik Esselstrom, "Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909-1937," *Modern Asian Studies* 39.1 (2005): 39-75.

Canadian missionaries in the 1930s. This is not to say that cases of dissent did not arise. But as the economic hardships of the Depression wore increasingly on budgets and nerves, bureaucrats within mission leadership became particularly intolerant of deviation from the organization's policies. The outcome of this organizational culture meant the destruction of careers that spanned a lifetime of work in the mission field. Those missionaries who were still willing to publicly voice their opinions on the shrine issue were censured by friends, colleagues and management until they were effectively muzzled or sidelined.

The quashing of dissent intensified shortly after a series of deep cuts to the mission budget due to the Depression and its impact on Church collections and investments. After the initial cuts, mission leaders' attention shifted from strictly economic concerns to the increasingly pressing issue of Shinto obeisance. A.E. Armstrong requested that "each missionary please give me his individual viewpoint regarding shrine ceremonies…I am to make a study of the matter, not only with reference to Korea but also Japan…." Armstrong was to seek advice from other missionaries in Formosa and Japan. He took note that in Formosa, educational work by the Presbyterians had been taken over by colonial authorities and that medical work in Korea might also go the same way.

Armstrong's enquiries were part of a larger assessment that mission leadership undertook in order to determine their position on Shinto compliance. How the three pillars of the mission - education, medicine and evangelism - could be retained under Japanese colonial governments that were increasingly assertive with foreign missionaries and challenged Christian organizations in almost every aspect of their work in East Asia. While missionary medicine in Formosa was threatened by the colonial government, in Korea the world economic crisis prompted change especially in the area of missionary

hospital work. In 1934, O.R. Avison, head of the Severence Medical College, suggested merging the established Christian colleges in Korea. This was partly due to the drop in receipts at Severence Hospital as patients could no longer afford the fees. Avison chose this time to step down as president of Severence, leaving the position for the first time to a Korean doctor, K.S. Oh. Avison also retired from his presidency of the Chosen Christian College, and was replaced by H.H. Underwood.[17] The missionary medical school now entered a new era in which the government approved, and encouraged, medical education through the college. This was in contrast to non-medical mission schools and colleges that struggled with regulations constricting their ability to teach the subjects they desired. These non-medical schools were also pressured to conform to Shinto laws. With K.S. Oh as president of Severence and a newly drafted memorandum from the Imperial Education Bureau that recognized the medical college as officially competent to train doctors and medical staff, the school served as an example to mission managers that if rules were adhered to then the colonial government could be tolerant of foreign institutions.[18]

The fact remained, however, that education rather than medicine was of primary importance to a colonial regime intent on creating imperial subjects. The pressure on missionary schools to conform to tighter and less palatable government controls would not disappear with the devolution of power to Korean school principals or administrators. Increasingly, government control proved too much for some missions and during the summer of 1936 minutes of Canadian FMB meetings point to the possibility of the American Northern Presbyterians withdrawing from secular education in Korea. A

[17] NSARM, O.R. Avison to A.E. Armstrong, 31 January 1934, MG1, vol. 2331. box 3, file 73.
[18] NSARM, O.R. Avison to A.E. Armstrong, 20 March 1934, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 73.

motion was carried to voice the concern of the FMB regarding the actions of the Americans but there was little the United Church could do to influence the larger and better funded Northern Presbyterian mission.[19] The Canadian mission now faced not only financial pressure as their international investment income faltered, but also the possible loss of support from American mission partners who had borne the bulk of the expenses for union medical work and union educational work in the Christian university and theological institutions of Korea. These fears were realized towards the end of 1936 when "Our Mission received a letter dated [November 17th] from the Board of Directors of Union Christian College stating the purpose of said Board to cooperate with the Presbyterian Mission North in its decision to withdraw from educational work....It was reported in the "Seoul Press" a few days ago that schools supported by the Presbyterian Mission South are likely to be closed, if such a decision is finally made by the Schools and Mission it will affect 5000 students and 300 teachers."[20]

Confusion reigned as conflicting reports reached the Canadian mission bureaucrats as to which side of the Shinto issue the Americans would take. In writing to his mission secretary in Korea, Armstrong tried to make sense of newspaper and government comments concerning the American response. He wrote:

> I thank you for your letter of October 15th containing an important clipping from the "Seoul Press" stating that the shrine question has been settled at Pyengyang to the satisfaction of the Government. This is the first intimation I have had of the fact that the A.P.M. [American Presbyterian Mission] has bowed to the will of the government. A letter has just come from Principal Roberts saying that they were closing out their secular education work. I do not like this term 'secular' when applied to Mission Schools but I suppose they mean the Union College and the school for girls

[19] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to W.A. Burbidge, 21 September 1936, MG1, vol.2331, box 3, file 81.
[20] NSARM, W.A. Burbidge to A.E. Armstrong 11 November 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 81.

> at Pyengyang. It is, therefore, surprising that Principal Roberts would write in that fashion when about the same time the Chief of the Provincial Police Department reported to the Government General that there had been "a satisfactory settlement of the shrine obeisance issue."[21]

Further complicating matters was Japanese education policy in Manchukuo.[22] As an alternative to State Shinto in schools, the Manchukuo administration sought to develop a sense of Pan-Asianism among its Chinese, Japanese and Korean citizens. D.M. Black, writing from the St. Andrew's mission hospital in Lungchingtsun, gave a synopsis of what government policy was in the Chinese schools now under the auspices of the Manchukuo government. Black's comparisons between the Confucian "Kingly Way," promoted in Manchukuo and State Shinto in Korea are notable. Also significant are Black's comments concerning what he perceived as the religiosity behind the state sponsored ceremonies:

> In Manchuria as a whole, however, as part of the doctrine of the Kingly Way as the governing principle of the State there has been much emphasis placed on the worship of Confucius. All schools have, I am told, been required to observe the Confucian anniversaries and in most cases, to attend ceremonies at Confucian temples. Some of these ceremonies have included animal sacrifices and those attending have been required to bow and touch their heads to the ground. It is a matter which has caused much concern among some missions operating schools in Manchuria.
>
> As I would interpret it the two sets of observances [State Shinto and Confucian] are very similar and are both evidences of a desire to enlist a religious consciousness behind the State and to identify the two. In other words they are both moves towards at least a modified conception of the totalitarian state. The main object of the observances is undoubtedly patriotic but in spite of statements to the contrary from official sources it also very difficult to deny that they are religious as well. Whether it is the place of foreign missionaries who are guests in the country to oppose such regulations

[21] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to E.J.O Fraser, 10 November 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 82.
[22] After the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 the creation of Manchukuo was an attempt by the Japanese military to deflect international accusations of aggressive imperialism, For the manufacturing of Manchukuo as a nation state see Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); For the economic, military and cultural significance of Manchukuo in Japanese society during the 1930s and 1940s see Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999).

> is very much of a question. It would seem more fitting that opposition should come from nationals but in Korea such opposition is complicated by the fact that there may be at least a subconscious element of Korean nationalism which prompts a disinclination to participate in the observances because of their patriotic as well as their religious significance.[23]

Black clearly saw State Shinto and the Kingly Way as the state manufacturing a sense of identity *and* as religious acts. However, the familiar message about the "non-political" role of the Canadian mission allowed Black and others to keep what they saw as a neutral stance regarding the Japanese military imposition of state religion.

-III-
The MacRae Problem

Armstrong had no doubt over the standpoint of one of his missionaries in the shrine issue debate. The most vocal Canadian opponent of compliance with State Shinto rules, and United Church education policy, was the veteran Korean missionary Duncan MacRae. Coming near the end of his career, MacRae embodied much of what mission management came to reject after its bureaucracy had embraced rational management. How MacRae's protests were handled by the mission leadership in field and at the FMB has the hallmarks of how a bureaucratic organization deals with a perceived threat from within its own ranks. One of the original five Canadian missionaries to land in Korea in the late 1890s, MacRae bombarded the FMB in Toronto with letters, newspaper clippings and pamphlets that railed against the perils of giving in to government demands over Shinto. Bombastic, independent and given to language that grated against the polite restrictions of business correspondence, MacRae was a symbol of an earlier age when the

[23] NSARM, D.M. Black to A.E. Armstrong, 24 October 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 83.

missionary both required and projected the characteristics of the evangelist and the trailblazer for God.

Mission leaders used these characteristics to trivialize and condescend to MacRae on one level, while on another the bureaucrats in both Toronto and Korea feared that his influence, especially in Canada, would jeopardize funding. Most worrisome was the possibility of MacRae publicising his depiction of the Canadian mission as sycophants and participants in "pagan rituals." Potentially his audience would be substantial as he engaged in the traditional speaking tour across Canada while on his final retirement voyage from Korea to Cape Breton Island. In the minds of mission bureaucrats, MacRae was a loose cannon who had to be restrained before he could inflict serious damage on the organization. These fears were confirmed in 1937 when MacRae included a scathing critique of mission policy in a speech to a Women's Foreign Mission Society meeting.[24]

It would be easy to dismiss MacRae's opposition to the shrine issue as the result of bitterness and ill-will following the news that he and his family were slated to be cut from the mission in 1935. But MacRae's opposition to complying with colonial regulations, which in his view compromised the basic religious purpose of the mission, was present long before he was chosen to go home. MacRae had been outspoken regarding the registration of mission schools and the accompanying restrictions on religious teaching. It is unclear if his previous objections to mission accommodation were taken into consideration but certainly part of the decision to send MacRae home was the result of massive spending cuts that forced the reduction of the mission due to the financial crisis brought on by the Depression. Nevertheless, as the time for MacRae to depart drew near and his opposition to mission policy over the shrine issue became more

[24] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to D.M. Black, 15 July 1937, MG1, vol. 2331, box 4, file 89.

forceful, mission administrators began to orchestrate his exit. The steps taken to edge MacRae out were designed to minimize any negative reaction by members of the United Church and other church groups at home, who were already chary of the expense involved in overseas missions.

This caution was paramount within the Church and was the result of the world economic slump that forced the FMB to make cuts in all their foreign fields; Korea was the hardest hit with the total budget slashed from $67,000 to $40,000 a year.[25] At the FMB in Toronto, Armstrong justified the Korean mission taking the heaviest reduction of all the missions under a strategy that if percentage cuts were made across the board to all foreign fields then the impact on Church members at home would be much less than "nearly wrecking one of the missions." Armstrong hoped that the shock of bringing the Korea enterprise to the verge of collapse would convince the home church to increase support for foreign missions. The cutting of $27,000 from the Korean budget was a drastic move, considering that the total amount cut by the FMB from all its missions was $100,000.[26] Armstrong explained the decisions of the Church in choosing Korea to take the largest blow "partly because of our property interests there are not so great but mainly because the Church there has reached in its development the place which would make it probable that it could carry on with less injury with only a skeleton foreign staff than could the Church in any other field." Armstrong did not personally make the cuts as they were the result of a policy committee of the United Church. To counter the committee, Armstrong encouraged the missionaries to fight for Korea, but not publicly. He advised them to direct letters only to those in Church administration and not to the parishes of

[25] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to E.J.O. Fraser, 29 June 1935, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 77.
[26] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to E.J.O Fraser, 13 August 1935, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 77.

home churches.[27] Scrambling to adjust to the shortfall, the FMB and the Korean mission accepted that six families be slated for return to Canada. The FMB selected two of the original mission families, the Griersons and MacRaes, to go along with the Bacons, the daughter and son-in-law of Duncan MacRae.

MacRae postponed his departure due to poor health. Although mission managers suspected delaying tactics as he pondered the best way in which to negotiate his retirement and his opposition to the Shinto issue. Mission bureaucrats in Korea increasingly viewed MacRae as working against not only the common purpose of the mission but also the personal plans of the mission secretary and treasurer. Outside of the United Church mission MacRae also encountered colleagues who now shied away from what was beginning to be perceived as his radical stance. In trying to slip information past colonial censors, MacRae requested that the Lieutenant Commissioner of the Seoul Salvation Army hand carry letters out of the country which pertained to the shrine issue. Yet, even though the commissioner agreed in principle to MacRae's position, the Canadian was snubbed and received the following reply:

> In the first place, as I have already informed you, I am not at all in accord with the attitude of the Mission on the question of the Shrine. In the second place it would be a most unfortunate thing for The Salvation Army in Korea and throughout Japan if it were discovered that I was taking this correspondence. I think you will readily understand that in my position it would be a very unwise thing for me to do.[28]

MacRae was further marginalized within the mission when E.J.O. Fraser described how MacRae, a missionary with thirty-eight years of experience in Korea, was no longer trusted by those who controlled official policy: "Confidentially, may I say that Dr. MacRae's presence is an added factor in the last mentioned matter, [the delay of

[27] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to W.A. Burbidge, 13 August 1935, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 77.
[28] NSARM, Letter from the Salvation Army in Seoul to Duncan MacRae, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.

William Scott's furlough] as he [MacRae] is so opposed to the Hamheung Boys' Academy, that Mr. Scott does not wish to leave the station to him alone there." MacRae's stance against secular education and his criticism of how the mission had drifted away from evangelical preaching isolated him from the other Canadians.[29] MacRae saw the shrine issue as another sign of weakness in mission leadership, but his arguments were not the bitter mutterings of an employee forced into retirement. Rather, MacRae now stood as one of the very few public voices in the mission who was willing to challenge accepted wisdom. William Scott attempted to cast MacRae as irrational and self-serving in both his views over school registration and mission finances. Attacking Scott directly, MacRae refused to take as binding the decisions made by the FMB, under the direction of William Scott, because MacRae saw the process by which those decisions had been taken as undemocratic under the rules of the Korean Mission Council. For Scott, much of what MacRae proposed was ludicrous given that it would involve reneging on a signed contract with the colonial government. Under the auspices of rational management, the adherence to contract trumped MacRae's poorly presented opposition and public *ad hominem* directed against Scott.[30]

While Scott made sure that his side of the argument between MacRae and himself was clearly laid out for his superiors in Toronto, MacRae continued with his campaign against adherence to shrine ceremonies. However, MacRae made the mistake of personally affronting Armstrong by claiming that the FMB had been asleep at the helm while Japanese officials enforced attendance at ceremonies. Armstrong's reply to MacRae draws attention to the public statements of the Governor-General of Korea which stressed

[29] NSARM, E.J.O. Fraser to A.E. Armstrong, 21 March 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 82.
[30] NSARM, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 5 October 1935, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3 file 86.

that the ceremonies were not religious and that patriotism and respect for ancestors were the underlying purposes of State Shinto in the colony. Armstrong dismissed MacRae's concerns and hinted at the missionary's failing health as a possible reason for his daring to question not only FMB policy but also the competence of the organization. Taken at face value, Armstrong's reply appears to be the end of any further discussion on the shrine issue. The rebuttal to MacRae is clear in that Armstrong claimed to be in agreement with the Governor-General's explanation over State Shinto and the absence of any religious meaning in the ceremonies.[31] Although Armstrong dismissed MacRae's argument, he did not dismiss the importance of the issue. He recognized the possibility of religious meaning and more importantly the long term threat that the inculcation of State Shinto practices entailed for the Christian community in East Asia.[32]

Unwilling to give up, MacRae baited Armstrong with newspaper clippings reporting the Papal decision on the shrine issue. Unfazed by the MacRae's slight in equating him to the Catholic leader, Armstrong replied:

> [On] the Pope's pronouncement on the Shrine question. I am not qualified to speak dogmatically, but from what I know of the matter from Japan, Korea and Formosa I am inclined to agree with the policy followed by the Methodists, and now by the Pope, is the wise one, especially as I think time, the great healer, will solve the question in the way that those most opposed among the Presbyterians desire. That is to say, I think we should accept the Government's declaration that it is patriotic and not religious. However, I know you do not agree with this point of view and there is nothing gained by discussing it in correspondence. I feel that very much will be lost to the Christian Cause by withdrawing from secular education, for thereby we help the Christian Church to secure trained leaders of intellectual quality and spiritual fitness."[33]

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[31] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to Duncan MacRae, 25 February 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 85.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to Duncan MacRae, 4 September 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 85.

Armstrong continued to use the argument that attending State Shinto events was for the good of Koreans and the Korean Church. His patience with MacRae had worn out, and by November 1936 MacRae was notified that his salary was to end in December. Payments to both his own account and to that of his family at home in Canada would cease at the end of the year. The FMB cited MacRae's health and the financial cuts brought on by the Depression in their decision to force the missionary into retirement. Backed into a corner, MacRae had no choice and made arrangements to return to Canada.[34] This move effectively quashed any dissent within the Canadian mission regarding either the continuation of secular education or obeisance to State Shinto. In disgust MacRae sent his parting shot to Armstrong:

> When I came to Korea, I did not come in answer to a call from the Ministry of Education, God called me, I answered his call, by dedicating my life, my all to Him and His service. When I came to Korea, I did not come as a bondservant to any government, or earthly potentate. I came as a "bondservant" of Jesus Christ. Nor did I come as a hireling shepherd, ready to flee when the wolf of hard times appears at the door. I shared my life with the Koreans in their successes and failures, in their sorrows and joy, I passed through with them the deep valley of humiliation. In the short period that may remain to me for the Master, I give my all.[35]

Heartfelt as such statements may have been, they had little effect on mission bureaucrats. The pressure on MacRae to back down from his public criticism of the mission was relentless. As MacRae took his protest home to Canada, Robert Grierson, a long-time friend and fellow founding member of the mission in Korea, badgered MacRae in order to silence him. Grierson thought that MacRae "would be reticent in public discourse, and refrain from confusing and disturbing the minds of the members of the Church in your public utterances." Grierson continued, "From what I hear this is not the

[34] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to Duncan MacRae, 5 November 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 85.
[35] NSARM, Duncan MacRae to A.E. Armstrong, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.

case. You are, it seems, continuing your condemnation of the Mission, and of its policies in reference to the "Shrine" question and school matters, in public discourse." In common with most of the Canadian missionaries, Grierson asserted, in public at least, that Shinto ceremonies were patriotic rather than religious events and that:

> [t]he majority of the Korean Mission maintain that as yet, the Glory of God is best conserved by submission to the National procedure of patriotic expression. If I were to add to this, also, the implications of your degree in Divinity…Your honoured title breeds responsibility, when accepted, for building up, for keeping the boat steady…If I remember rightly, our old Presbyterian Order had us ordinands all promise to "follow no divisive course"…I am told that there are some hearing you who go away saying that they will discontinue their contributions to Mission Work. And that leads me to another point. We who are on the Pension Fund, have a special duty toward the M&M Fund, to aid in building it up, and that our pension grant also relates to that Fund…How foolish, and ungrateful, then, for us to smite the hand that feeds us, and saw at the limb on which we precariously sit.[36]

In April 1938, finally at home in Baddeck, Nova Scotia, MacRae received a visit from James Falconer of Pine Hill Divinity Hall, the Presbyterian College in Halifax. Falconer had been sent at the request, and the expense, of Armstrong and the FMB. In a letter to Armstrong, Falconer described his conversation with the retired missionary, writing that MacRae "is very much a disappointed man, and thinks that his life work has been wrecked." Falconer "tried to point out the wisdom of accepting the mature decision of the board; saying that he would not compromise himself by keeping silence." In effect, Falconer went to Cape Breton to convince MacRae to stop making trouble within the Church. MacRae's forthrightness over the shrine issue and the mission's concentration on secular education cast church leaders in a bad light among home congregations. MacRae was eventually silenced by the combined efforts of friends, colleagues and most importantly his superiors, who controlled his pension. All of these parties made it clear

[36] NSARM, Robert Grierson to Duncan MacRae, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number.

that to stray and rebel against the bureaucratic organization was unacceptable.[37] MacRae represented one of the last, and certainly the most vocal opponent in a very small minority of Canadian missionaries in Korea who opposed policies that placed the organization before the underlying principles of the mission.

-IV-
The Political Problem

This privileging of organization over principle was not simply the result, as some historians have suggested, of Canadians being confused about the religiosity of the shrine ceremonies themselves. Confusion is too generous a description. Consider the example that historian Donald Clark uses to illustrate the Canadians' views: namely, a December 1936 letter from William Scott to his superior in Toronto. Describing his first attendance at a State Shinto ceremony Scott stated that "[i]t was a very simple service, and there was nothing that one could object to…There is no idol on the altar, no incense is burned, a simple prayer is said, the hands clapped twice, all bow reverently, and the ceremony ends."[38] This passage by itself seems to be proof that Scott believed that State Shinto presented little that could offend or contradict Protestant teaching or doctrine. However, Clark quotes this passage out of its context. The rest of Scott's letter clearly shows that he considered parts of the State Shinto ritual to be religious in nature. In a discussion of how the American Presbyterians were handling the Shinto issue Scott resigned himself to the position that mandatory attendance was a fait accompli but mentions that some Americans are "manoeuvr[ing] as to arrive late for the religious rite." As part of his

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[37] NSARM, James Falconer to A.E. Armstrong, MG1, vol. 2281, no file number; For an account of the ousting of MacRae see also, John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun, Canada encounters Japan, 1929-1941* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 132.

[38] NSARM, William Scott to A.E. Armstrong, 13 December 1936, MG1, vol. 2331, box 3, file 86; Donald Clark uses this example to contrast the differing views among Christian groups over the Shrine issue, see, Clark, *Living Dangerously*, 213.

description of the ceremony Scott made direct comparisons with Catholic observances and refers to the ceremonies as a "service." Coupled with A.E. Armstrong's belief that the patriotic aspect of the Shinto ritual "was regarded as a religious act and attitude, whether actually called that or not,"[39] both Scott and Armstrong privately voiced that they thought State Shinto was, in part at least, religious in nature, while at the same time publicly criticizing those who voiced the same concerns.

The point here is not merely that Scott and Armstrong were hypocritical about the religious nature of State Shinto. What is more important is the tacit support that the mission gave to the cultural and political intent behind the ceremonies. By downplaying the importance of the shrine issue, the Canadian mission bolstered the Japanese military government in Korea to whom "...the religious/spiritual landscape was just as important or effective as imperialism on the battlefield."[40] It is in this sense that compliance with the State Shinto practices was deeply political, even though not deliberately imperialist. The very fact that the Canadians did not resist in a meaningful way to compliance with shrine ordinances was in line with their mission's longstanding stifling of Korean nationalism. This approach was not the result of any feeling of loyalty towards the Japanese empire, nor was it due to any allegiance to the imperialist project as a whole. The mission response against Japanese colonial aggression in Korea in 1919 is proof that the Canadians held no allegiance to the empire or its expansion. What compliance did represent was an acceptance that, in order to defend their own bureaucratic organization, the missionaries and their leaders were willing to sacrifice the cultural identity of those

[39] NSARM, A.E. Armstrong to D.A. Macdonald, 11 December 1933, MG1, vol. 2331, box 2, file 58.
[40] For a general overview of State Shinto in the Japanese empire see, Cary S. Takagaki, "State shinto and the use of shrines in Japanese colonies." Japanese Studies Association of Canada Annual Conference 2006, Kamloops, British Columbia; Japanese Studies Association of Canada, Toronto, 2008, 22.

they set about to "save" and to disregard the fundamental religious footings on which the mission rested. Examples of these basic Protestant tenets being dismissed is the very association with Shinto ceremonies, which rightly or wrongly, smacked of ancestor worship and worship of false Gods.

The decisions made by the Canadians to continue under the constraints of the colonial government did not alleviate the daily pressure of life under colonial rule for the mission's students and parishioners. From 1931 onwards Governors-General Ugaki and Minami enacted a new phase of Japanese rule in Korea that aggressively emphasized the policies of Japanization. As part of this process Japanese language laws were vigorously applied in an effort to further erode Korean identity. In 1937, mission secretary W.A. Burbidge reported to Armstrong that "[t]he Government is insisting upon the use of the Japanese language not alone in teaching hours but also out of hours. New missionaries coming to the field for educational work should certainly get a working knowledge of Japanese."[41] By late 1937 when censorship and shrine laws were being imposed more rigidly, Burbidge wrote:

> The Southern Presbyterians have closed out their schools and were helped on doing so by the Government who undertook to take responsibility for all the students and teachers rather than face the possibility of them not attending the shrine. In the meantime the latter question or rather the attendance at the shrine is being requested of all citizens. The only thing to do is to take the Government at its word and take this as part of one's duty to the State but one can worship only one God. We are told that a school under Miss Kerr an Australian in South Korea was noted for being particularly devout. They had let it be known that they would bow to God in silent prayer and thus for them it was not merely a formal act.[42]

In his role as mission secretary in the field, Burbidge continued the strategy of his predecessors. This strategy required that any private qualms over the religious

[41] NSARM, W.A. Burbidge to A.E. Armstrong, 20 July 1937, MG1, vol. 2331, box 4, file 87.
[42] NSARM, W.A. Burbidge to A.E. Armstrong, 10 November 1937, MG1, vol. 2331, box 4 file 87.

significance of State Shinto ceremonies be smothered and set aside. Paramount would be the official policy of the mission organization and the good of the FMB as a whole.

As the mission continued on a path of accommodation with colonial authorities in the late 1930s, the Church bureaucracy touted their policy on the shrine issue as non-political, even though that policy was indeed political. As an example to their Korean parishioners and students, the Canadians' stance emphasized the hopelessness of Korea's situation, discouraging even non-violent resistance. The actions of Korean Church members and ministers who underwent imprisonment, torture and in some cases execution in defence of their national autonomy illustrate the disconnect between many in the Korean Christian community and the direction which the United Church bureaucracy chose. For many in the Korean Church, the Shinto issue was a religious and cultural affront. By May 1938, the Korean Presbyterian Church closed its schools in protest over participation in Shinto rituals. By September, however, the Korean Presbyterian Church buckled under pressure and acknowledged that Shinto observance was "not religious in nature." In an effort to relieve its members from ongoing harassment from colonial police, the Korean Church reopened its schools.[43] However, in contrast to their missionary mentors, the Korean Christians persisted in their resistance: in 1940 more protests against Shinto came from the Korean Christian community.

Echoing Duncan MacRae, many Korean Christians believed that Shinto ceremonies were tantamount to "idolatry." Increasingly, Japanese authorities returned to violence to quash defiance. The result was the arrest of Korean ministers and thousands

[43] Wan-yao Chou, "The *Kōminka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, eds., Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 47; Ion, *Dark Valley*, 93-96; Meehan, *The Dominion,* 132.

of Christian parishioners. Over fifty ministers died while in detention. Still, the attitude of the Canadian mission towards the Korean Church was to dismiss their protests as either the result of Korean nationalism or an adherence to overly conservative theology. Arguments by the Canadian missionaries who saw staying on in Korea and adapting to colonial policy as beneficial for Koreans could no longer be justified in the larger picture of Korean Christianity which meant the Korean Church developing its own institutions independent of the foreign missions. Far from defending Korean Christians, many in the mission community chastised the Korean Church for their opposition to government rules.[44]

The United Church mission would continue its education and medical work in Korea as the nation became inexorably entwined in the Japanese military's plans for total war. Defending their organization as long as possible, the Canadian missionaries were evacuated in 1942 when eventually all foreign missions were required to leave Korea under an exchange of Japanese nationals for westerners after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The withdrawal from Korea marked the end of forty-four years of continuous missionary work in what was one of the most successful foreign fields in Asia in terms of religious conversion.

This success was due to the approach the mission organization took to working within the Japanese colonial system and the ability of the mission to adapt and change over time. The accommodation to State Shinto by the United Church mission and the FMB during the shrine issue debates exemplifies the extent to which the Canadian mission had drifted away from its beginnings as an organization for evangelical outreach. The bureaucratization of the Church hierarchy and the mission meant that when faced

[44] Chou, "The *Kōminka* Movement," 47.

with the shrine issue, which challenged the basic religious foundations of the mission, the organization came first. The core religious meaning of the foreign mission was set aside, as was the nurturing and encouragement of a self-supporting Korean Church, a key element of all Protestant missionary work in Korea.

Chapter Five
Conclusion

When the original five missionaries departed Halifax, Nova Scotia for Korea at the end on the nineteenth century they did so with the hope of making substantial religious conversions in East Asia. While Protestant Christianity in Japan and China had made footholds, results were disappointing and Korea was still relatively fresh ground for evangelism and Christian teaching. Despite the Canadians' accommodation with the Japanese colonial government on both education and Shinto policies, the Presbyterian and United Church missions' were at the vanguard of creating one of the largest Protestant congregations in Asia and of being ardent supporters of Korea. The legacy that the mission and the Church would prefer is that they were in part responsible for the survival of Korean Protestantism. Despite Japanese colonialism, Protestantism is now the Republic of Korea's most popular religion after Buddhism.[1]

Questions, however, surround the interwar period as to how Koreans adapted, accommodated and worked within the colonial system. The Canadian mission has, thus far, been able to avoid the taint of "collaboration" as narratives have concentrated on the mission's brief opposition to colonial violence during the March 1919 independence protests. What I have laid out in the preceding chapters is not an accusation of deliberate collaboration or an accusation of cultural genocide on the part of the mission. What I do assert is that the actions of the mission in the 1920s and the 1930s contradicted their original purpose of establishing a self-supporting Korean church. In doing so the mission ignored reports from fellow missionary experts on Korean culture who warned that

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[1] Grayson, *Korea,* 249.

adhering to colonial education and language policies would spell the deep erosion if not the eradication of Korean identity. The mission also stifled Korean identity by engaging in a consistent and sustained campaign to suffocate Korean nationalism within the Church.

The Presbyterian and United Church continued these policies while claiming to be non-political. Yet, the Canadians were acutely aware of where they stood both in terms of international events and within the context of the Japanese colony in which they worked. The mission was in fact highly political and astute in manoeuvring through the minefields associated with working in a country where their status was often questioned by the governing authorities and the local population. What guided the mission, and in the end allowed them to justify abandoning religious principles, was not a reasonable pragmatism, nor an affinity for imperialism. The mission was, after all, at the sidelines of the Japanese empire and so does not fit the stereotype of a missionary group in a colonial setting. The mission did not act out of pragmatism in so far as pragmatism is measured as a means toward a goal. The mission's actions in the 1930s did not serve the goal of the mission, that of the creation of a self-supporting Korean Church. Nor did the mission act solely for the protection of Koreans, as Koreans did not want to attend mandatory Shinto ceremonies, or to assume Japanese mores, or to accept the erosion of their culture.

What guided the Canadians was the adoption of business practices and bureaucratic methods which were adapted from the Euro-American business world of the early twentieth century. Those in the mission who could not adjust to the constraints and procedures of a bureaucratic organization were quickly marginalized, or in the case of some missionaries, removed from the field. Under the new framework women were increasingly relegated to specific fields and excluded from decision making. Men also had to adapt to an organization where creativity and autonomy were discouraged.

But for mission managers and field workers working within a Weberian bureaucracy, the compromises made to perpetuate the mission organization were perfectly acceptable. Doubts over the religious nature of mandatory Shinto ceremonies or the effects of education policy on Korean identity were disregarded. The organization could justify the registering of mission schools as non-religious while at the same time making the schools conduits for a Japanese colonial policy of forced assimilation. Similarly, while missionaries from other nations took a stand against mandatory Shinto observance, or when Korean Christians chose prison over the same observance these choices could be dismissed by the Canadian organization as either selfish, naïve or the product of overt nationalism. After the process of the Church Union in 1925, moderate Church leadership and theology distinguished the Canadian mission from their American and Australian counterparts in many respects. These influences may also have made the adoption and acceptance of modern bureaucratic methods more palatable to the Canadian organization which in turn made acceptance of Japanese colonial policy more agreeable. Given that the Canadians, Americans and Australians were from similar Presbyterian denominations what this example certainly shows is that the relationship between missions and elements of empire are very particular and contingent on specific circumstances.

In post-World War II Korea, colonization was for many a period to be left in the past. As the United States established aid for South Korea after the Japanese surrender, United Church missionaries like William Scott and Florence Murray returned to work among refugees in the south. Korean Protestant denominations and the mission would now align themselves with the new regime. Syngman Rhee, fellow Christian and first President of the Republic of Korea, built political support based on a strong anti-

communist platform. But by 1960 Rhee's authoritarianism and brutality forced students to take to the streets in protest. Robert Grierson, now retired in Ontario, was unwilling to comment on student protests in a newspaper interview. However, he did comment on Rhee describing him as "a well meaning dictator."[2] Faithful to the organization even in retirement, Grierson's comments were not unusual for his fellow missionaries. The mission would continue to function in Korea with the blessing of a series of military governments who saw value in the Christian Church as an aid in suppressing communism and unrest. Despite extreme state violence against its own citizens, postwar South Korean governments could still depend on the tacit support of the Canadian mission.[3] At home in Canada, United Church missionaries and administrators ignored the actions of the South Korean military junta in order to protect the mission organization: a pattern that mirrored the interwar years.

[2] NSARM, Robert Grierson in an interview in the *Free London Press* (Ontario), no date 1960, MG1, vol. 2270, file 6.

[3] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun,* particularly chapter seven; Eckert, *Korea Old and New*, chapter 19; For a gender perspective of post-war South Korean governance see also Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005); NSARM, The Korean Mission After Fifty Years, a sermon delivered at Saint Mathew's Church, Halifax, Nova Scotia, January 1949, MG1, vol. 2275, file 27. In this sermon commemorating the Presbyterian mission support for the Rhee regime is encouraged.

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Appendix A:
Pre-World War II Korean Missions

Source: NSARM, MG1, vol. 2337.

The Division of Korea by Protestant Denominations Pre-World War II



Source: James H. Grayson, *Korea: A Religious History* (Oxford University Press, 1989)

Pre-World War II and Post-Korean War Canadian Mission Stations



Source: William Scott, *The Canadians in Korea*: *A Brief Historical Sketch of Canadian Mission Work in Korea, Part One to the Time of the Church Union,* (npl: np, 1970)

Appendix B:
Photograph of the Canadian Mission in 1918

Source: NSARM, MG1, vol. 2300, file 1.

A group photograph of the Canadian Presbyterian mission in 1918. Luther Young is seen seventh from the left in the back row. Robert Grierson is first on the left in the second row from the back. William Foote is seventh from the left in the second row from the back. Duncan MacRae (seated) is fourth from the left in the third row from the back.