Erasing Boundaries and Redrawing Lines:  
The Transition from Port Royal to Annapolis Royal, 1700-1713

by

Carli LaPierre

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To all the helping hands along the way.
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Abstract

In 1710, the French ceded Port Royal to British forces after an eight-day siege. This marked the final exchange of the fort between these European powers after years of alternating authority. Geographic information and local knowledge were crucial to the European justification of territorial claims. Cartographic records and related materials from are therefore important for the understanding of French and British claims to Port Royal. This thesis uses these records and an expanded critical cartography framework to track the transition from French Port Royal to British Annapolis Royal, answering the following questions: how did the events of 1710 impact the ways people understood the area geographically? How was geographic information used as a tool? This thesis argues that the events of 1710, while quantitatively small, had a significant qualitative impact on British imperial aspirations in northeastern North America. Geographic representations combined local knowledge and imperial imaginings to make territorial claims.
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Thank you to my family and friends. In my head, I have dubbed this the “Poppy Section” of my thesis, so it only feels right to quote him here: “I’d like to take this opportunity to thank each and every one of you.” You all very graciously listened to my ranting in person or over the phone, and offered much needed words of encouragement. I’ve appreciated your kindness and love more than words can say. Thank you for helping me to put things into perspective.
Chapter One:

Introduction:

After multiple failed attempts in the preceding years, the English took Port Royal from the French for the final time in October 1710. Led by Francis Nicholson and with the approval of Queen Anne, a group of New Englanders and members of the British Marines besieged the fort for eight days. On October 13 Daniel D’Auger de Subercase, the governor of Acadia, signed the articles of capitulation and left the key to the fort in Nicholson’s hands. Plans were made for the French troops to be removed and the fort was promptly renamed Annapolis Royal.¹ In the years that followed, the English attempted to assert their authority within the region, planning expeditions on Quebec, applying the terms of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, and negotiating a treaty with their Indigenous counterparts in 1725/6. Geographic information and corresponding local knowledge were crucial to justifying British claims to authority as it had been for the French before them. Cartographic records and related materials from the first decades of the eighteenth century are therefore important sources when exploring the ways in which the French and British claimed possession of Port Royal.

Focused on the shift from Port Royal to Annapolis Royal, this thesis explores the idea of conquest to understand the term’s applicability in the case of 1710. Conquest has both military and legal implications that have a wide range of impacts on the people involved. This thesis will consider how the transition from Port Royal to Annapolis Royal was experienced and its impacts on imperial aspirations in the following years. With these themes

in mind, this thesis asks: how did the events of 1710 impact the ways people understood the area geographically?

While these historical questions are important, similar studies have already been conducted. The value of this thesis rests in its methodological approach. Along with its historical claims, this thesis will argue that an artistic framework should be added to critical cartography. This means that in addition to considering historical contexts and imperial objectives, maps should be analysed as consciously created works of art. An artistic framework recognizes maps as complex pieces of material culture through the application of the elements and principles of design. Addressing the compositions in this way allows for a more balanced analysis than is typical of critical cartography. The use of maps in this thesis explores how space is imagined and reimagined, as well as the cartographic expression of local knowledge and imperial aspirations. Informed by the case study of the conquest of 1710 and an artistic framework, this thesis asks: how was geographic information used as a tool?

Historians began reconceptualizing the use and analysis of maps in the 1970s-80s. During this shift in historiography, attention was given to the complex nature of maps by individuals such as J.B. Harley. In his 1988 essay, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” Harley looked at the ways in which maps manipulate landscapes to express power. The essay argues that colonial maps were especially used to support state agendas. It is also contended that iconology and historical contextualization are key to understanding the relationship between maps and power. In Canada, the study of historical maps also expanded significantly in the 1980s with a similar focus. Major studies were funded by groups such as the Association of

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Canadian Map Libraries and Archives’ *Explorations in the History of Canadian Mapping: A Collection of Essays*. Canadian scholars worked to legitimize maps as sources in their histories. It was widely agreed that maps combined art, science, and technique that could be better understood with a more inclusive approach to analysis, that incorporated: the technical process of map production, theoretical interpretations, and encouraged comparison. Joan Dawson brought a regional perspective to the study of maps in the 1980s. For her book, *The Mapmaker’s Eye: Nova Scotia Through Early Maps*, Dawson compiled a representative sample of maps of the province. In her analysis of the maps, Dawson considers the tools available to the mapmakers in addition to the varying colonial and imperial perspectives.

Jeffers Lennox’s recent work with northeastern North American maps continues the traditions set out in the 1980s. *Homelands and Empires: Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, and Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1600-1763* argues that the British conquest of northeastern North America was a process, rather than a single event. Maps were integral to this process, and it is important to study the geographic fictions they created. Moreover, this graphic approach is necessary to understanding the northeastern Atlantic world. Maps of Acadia in the early eighteenth century are one example of the sources Lennox uses to validate these claims. Lennox argues that the period from 1710-1726 was one of constant negotiation as imperial fictions competed with the reality of Indigenous

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4 Farrell and Desbarats, eds. *Explorations in the History of Canadian Mapping*, ix-x.


7 Lennox, *Homelands and Empires*, 86.
Lennox’s argument echoes the consensus found in John Reid’s *Essay on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, which argued that imperial plans and colonial realities were inconsistent in the colonization of Acadia and Maine.

Lennox cites *The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions* in his discussion of Port Royal in the early eighteenth century. This collection studies the experience of life in northeastern North America during the early eighteenth century through the events of 1710. John Reid and his co-authors set out to assess the conquest as an event that had both short and long-term impacts. The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710 argues that imperial, colonial, and indigenous perspectives must be recognized within the conquest’s narrative to better understand the larger North Atlantic world in the early eighteenth century. The argument is also made that imperial, colonial and Indigenous interests were constantly being negotiated during the period. The authors find that this negotiation of interests makes it impossible to disregard the network of peoples involved and label this era as solely colonial. As such, the authors define this region as an intermediate model of settlement based on the conquest of 1710 and its impacts. The multiple perspectives on the conquest presented in this book provide a useful background. A sense of consensus on the topic is also offered, giving this thesis a good historical foundation to work from.

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The conquest of 1710 was a turning point in the region. While British and French authority continued to be limited to Port Royal’s walls, there was a shift in the European understanding of imperial authority within Mi’kma’ki/Acadia/Nova Scotia’s boundaries. These changes were then reflected in the expeditions that followed the conquest, and the terms and application of the Treaty of Utrecht in northeastern North America. This thesis uses maps and other geographic information to expand on this understanding of the conquest of 1710 and its impacts. Maps are vital to this inquiry because they present the varied French and British perspectives on the physical boundaries of authority and imperial aspirations during the period.

Maps are important sites of information about a specific place and the people who create and use them. Military maps, in particular, are often perceived as strictly practical documents. This view glosses over the creative action required to make a map. Critical cartography is a valuable framework that recognizes the many layers of imagery found on a map and attributes them to imperial mandates. But is this framework enough? This thesis explores the expansion of critical cartography to also consider the artistic qualities of maps. A broadened approach analyses the signs and symbols left by a cartographer to better understand maps and the context in which they were created.

The artistic framework incorporates the methods of artistic practice with the tools used by art historians. Maps will be discussed in terms of their use of the elements and principles of design, including: line, shape, space, value, and scale. Comparisons will also be made to concurrent art history and other cartographic records to better assess the ordinariness or uniqueness of the maps’ compositions. This framework borrows from the writings of

Arthur Berger and other semioticians to understand the various signs found on maps beyond their face value. Semiotics is a tool used to understand the making and representation of meaning by a specific culture. Signs represent a particular meaning, and are comprised of two parts: the signifier, which is a word, image or object; and the signified, the concept underlying the signifier or the signifier’s meaning. A simple example of this concept are outcroppings of trees on seventeenth and eighteenth century maps (Map 1.1).

A small group of trees (signifier) were meant to represent larger forested areas (signified), and allowed cartographers to indicate terrain to viewers. Semiotics relies on the social and aesthetic conventions used in the creation of an image to assess its meaning. However, meaning changes depending on the image’s context. With this emphasis on context, semiotics lends itself to the historical analysis of an event and the material culture produced at that time. Ultimately, the artistic framework contributes to the development of the larger field of critical cartography. The imperial lens provided by critical cartography is valuable, but it is a limited frame of analysis. Maps must be engaged on

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multiple levels to better understand the contexts in which they were created. An artistic framework, as it is proposed here, should be used in conjunction with typical modes of critical cartography to develop a greater understanding of maps and their surrounding histories. Larger questions about the imagining of space and expressions of identity can then be answered more completely.

To answer questions about the maps’ creation and meaning, this thesis analyses the images in layers: beginning with individual aspects of the image, and then relating them to the rest of the composition as well as the maps’ larger contexts. This analysis is further organized by the separation of the maps’ geographies. Each analysis starts on land, assessing the representation of the terrain, and human interventions. For example, Map 1.1 divides the land into forested areas, indicated by trees, and mixed-use Acadian plots of land. The representation of the Acadian settlement details property lines, farmland, and dwellings creating an image of life at Port Royal in 1708. The second category addressed are transitory spaces between land and water. This includes: dykes, rivers, and coastlines. Map 1.1, for example, represents rivers without additional shading, but uses a gradient around the shorelines leading into the bay. The use of shading around the coast indicates depth and the practical use of the map for navigation. The third space analysed are the waters of the bay. For example, Map 1.2 demonstrates the placement of the water across the length of the map, effectively dividing the image and directing the

Map 1.2: The right panel of De Labat’s Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal a l'Acadie et environs et de ses environs. Partie de la Banlieue du Fort Royal de L'Acadie du coste de lisle aux cheures, 1708.
viewers’ eyes across the page. Much like the example of the water, the thesis’ analysis continues by situating the aspects of each geographic category within the larger composition to better understand the meaning created by the cartographer. Orientation, scale, and movement are considered in addition to comparing value, line quality, and level of detail within the image. The analysis ends with a consideration of the maps’ omissions, based on information from other sources.

With this analytical framework in place, key questions about maps, their creators and the worlds they were a part of can be better studied. It is important to note, though, that intent can never truly be known without the express statements of mapmakers, and bias is always present. The combination of critical cartography and an artistic framework are simply posed as a means of attaining a better understanding of the history. As such, this thesis presents possible interpretations of the chosen maps rather than definitive truths. These interpretations will be coupled with the history of events spanning from 1700-1725 and other primary sources to explore the impacts of the events of 1710 and the role of geographic information.

Each chapter of this thesis is anchored in an expression of geographic information to understand the conquest’s impacts, and the development of imperial aspirations. Chapter Two presents an overview of Acadian life at Port Royal before the conquest to better contextualize the impacts and French responses to the siege. The chapter opens with a summary of Acadian life at Port Royal, beginning with the seventeenth century French attempts at settlement, and the effects of geographic isolation. Along with a discussion of Acadian agricultural practices and economy, this first section of the chapter highlights the relations between the Acadians and Indigenous peoples as well as the Acadians and British up to the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession in 1702. The second section of the
chapter then addresses the role of the French state in Acadia. This brief section provides a summary of the French state’s varied levels of interest in Acadia over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The final section of the chapter focuses on the work of Jean De Labat, the French military engineer stationed at Port Royal. To better analyse De Labat’s work, the section begins with an overview of French military engineering in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban’s role in the development of this increasingly professionalized field. De Labat’s training and arrival at Port Royal is then discussed, before his 1708 map, *Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal a l'Acadie et environes et de ses environs. Partie de la Banlieue du Fort Royal de L'Acadie du coste de lisle aux cheures*, is analysed to provide insight into Acadian life and French imperial prospects before the conquest.

Chapter three turns to the events of the conquest. The first section of the chapter addresses Samuel Vetch, Francis Nicholson, and settler responses to understand the varied motivations behind the conquest. This section provides a summary of Vetch’s and Nicholson’s careers leading to the events of 1710, including: their past experiences in North America and abroad, Vetch’s *Canada Survey’d*, and their work together. The benefits of the planned expedition for British settlers is then discussed to understand their willingness to participate in the venture at Port Royal. Nicholson’s journal and other primary sources are then used in the chapter’s second section to outline the events of the conquest. Beginning with Vetch’s and Nicholson’s efforts to lobby for an expedition on Acadia, this section also details their initial preparations, travel to Port Royal, the correspondence between Nicholson and the French governor at the fort, and the articles of capitulation. Chapter three ends with an analysis of *Plan of Annapolis, late Port Royal Fort, the principal place of strength in*
Chapter four discusses the impacts of the conquest of 1710. The chapter begins by detailing Vetch’s early command at the newly renamed Annapolis Royal. Letters Vetch sent during his first years at Annapolis Royal as well as secondary sources develop a picture of life at the fort and surrounding area for the British garrison, Acadians, and Indigenous peoples. Section two discusses Captain Cyprian Southack’s memorandum on Nova Scotia boundaries, sent to the Board of Trade and to French officials in Quebec in the week following the conquest. The imperial prospects and implications of this memorandum are explored before turning to Admiral Hovenden Walker’s 1711 expedition against Quebec. The expedition on Quebec and the contemporary analysis of its failure highlighted the importance of the conquest of Port Royal to the development of imperial prospects in northeastern North America. These imperial aspirations, aided by geographic materials like Southack’s memorandum, were also central to the Treaty of Utrecht’s negotiations. The fourth section of this chapter addresses Utrecht and the impacts of the treaty on life at Annapolis Royal. As the British attempted to formalize their imperial claims following Utrecht, the chapter concludes with a brief overview of early British treaty making with multiple Indigenous groups in the northeast.

Based on the analysis from these chapters, this thesis argues that the events of 1710 significantly impacted imperial aspirations. At the time of the siege, the events were considered to be a British conquest over the French at Port Royal. A triumphant narrative was created amongst British participants and was reflected in the geographic records they produced. While there was continuity between French and British possessions after 1710, the
conquest was important to the imagining of empire. In the years that followed, British empire could not realistically reach past the fort’s walls and those who possessed local knowledge held enduring power. However, the British continually attempted to expand their realm of authority. Ad hoc geographic representations mixed local knowledge and imperial aspirations to make territorial claims. Further expeditions and treaty negotiations reflected these claims in the following decades. The conquest of 1710, while quantitatively small in the larger scheme of international affairs, was qualitatively important to the multi-generational process of settler colonialism in northeastern North America.
Chapter Two: Defining Lines: Port Royal in the Early Eighteenth Century

Before the conquest of 1710, Port Royal and its surroundings were occupied by French subjects. Known as the Acadians, these people had traveled from France throughout the seventeenth century and developed a way of life rooted in the land. This development of local knowledge that guided Acadian life also impacted the expression of imperial fantasies on maps of the region. French military engineers, although trained to strictly adhere to a set of formal mapmaking rules in the early eighteenth century, were not immune to local realities and let their experiences colour their cartographic representations.

To explore the relationship between people and place, this chapter first discusses the seventeenth and early eighteenth century Acadian experiences at Port Royal, followed by the French state’s role in the colony. The chapter then ends with a brief history of French military engineering to contextualize the work of the fort’s military engineer, Jean De Labat, and his 1708 map of Port Royal. This map provides an important glimpse at Acadia before the conquest of 1710 as well as a French official’s reaction to an earlier English attack on Port Royal.

2.1: The Acadians at Port Royal

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, fish and furs funded the slow process of European settlement in North America. Like other European powers, the French were initially hesitant to establish permanent colonies in the New World. Early failures, such as

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the settlement at Ste Croix in 1604, reinforced this cautious approach and led to a largely migratory trade system. Individual efforts eventually provided the foundations for settlement. These initial settlements interfered little with Indigenous lifeways and the two groups developed a relationship of largely mutual accommodation. This allowed the Acadians to survive in the region because the distance between France and its colony limited imperial support.

Gregory Kennedy argues that the geographic distance between Acadia and France created a sense of isolation among the Acadians. Coupled with a generally ambivalent imperial policy throughout the mid-seventeenth century, Acadia’s isolation left settlers with a “skeptical attitude towards the colonial authorities.” This ambiguous policy-making stemmed from a general European disinterest in Acadia, which was viewed as having few natural resources, and limited opportunities for new colonists. While settlers already living in Acadia continued to identify with the metropolis through this period, inconsistent policies led the Acadians to mistrust French authorities. As a result, the Acadians took greater liberties in their implementation of imperial orders than did other French colonies. A distinctly Acadian way of life was able to develop throughout the seventeenth century. This identity was fixed in the marshlands that isolated the Acadians, the shared experience of life between French and English settlements, and the community ties between families. Identifying more

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18 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 34. 
23 Ibid., 61-2.
with the community than the state, kinship lines bridged the gaps of colonial isolation. N.E.S. Griffiths eloquently describes this process as a conscious decision of men and women to “identify their sense of community by the word ‘Acadia’ and in so doing created a people where none had been before.”

On a larger scale, the Acadians filled the voids left by their geographic isolation with economic connections throughout the Atlantic world. While there is some disagreement amongst historians about the extent of natural resources in Acadia, the region was a profitable commercial enterprise by the mid-seventeenth century. The fishing industry and fur trade continued to be important to Acadia’s economy through the period. The development of marshland agriculture was also central to Acadia’s economy and relied heavily upon the community ties between settlers. Mindful of the available resources and of Acadia’s relatively small population, a two-pronged economic pattern emerged. The first was a sedentary economy based on subsistence agriculture and some local exchange of produce. This agricultural exchange contributed to the second facet of the economy, commercial operations, which also included the sale of fish, and furs. Although fewer fish and furs were sold from Acadia than in other North American locations because of the English military and economic presence in the area, commercial operations successfully

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25 Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, xvii.
28 Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 64.
29 Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 69.
linked the sedentary economy to the market of European manufactured goods. Both the sedentary economy and commercial operations intersected at Port Royal.\footnote{Ibid.}

Port Royal was situated along the marshy coasts of the Bay of Fundy. As a result, the settlers’ agriculturally based economy required careful drainage of the marshlands.\footnote{Robert Summerby-Murray, “Four Hundred Years of Mapping in the Upper Bay of Fundy: Changing Coastal Environments and Economies, 1550-1950,” in \textit{Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society}, 15 (2012), 4-5.} Dykes transformed the landscape and allowed the Acadians to better exploit the fertile soil found around Port Royal. Centralized farms supported multiple crops as well as livestock. This allowed for subsistence living and the opportunity for trade.\footnote{Kennedy, \textit{Something of a Peasant Paradise}, 26.} Generally, the Acadians did not stray far from these coastal marshlands into the region’s forests. There is some consensus among historians that this was a result of the Acadians’ relationship with the Mi’kmaq. Acadians were expected to respect the Mi’kmaq’s control over the forests in exchange for their use of the marshlands.\footnote{Ibid., 38.} This respect for boundaries is important to understanding how Acadians negotiated their presence in the region. Despite the European belief that this territory was under French control, Acadia’s inhabitants clearly acknowledged Indigenous rights to land. This perspective was also part of the relationship of mutual accommodation that both groups fostered throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Acadians’ lived experiences were clearly different from imperial imaginings, and this is important to the contextualization of the cartographic case-studies. Acadia’s geographic situation also put the settlers into contact with British subjects. In 1654, this proximity as well as commercial interests led Robert Sedgwick and the English navy to take key Acadian settlements. As a result, the British at Massachusetts effectively controlled Acadia for the next sixteen years.
Many Acadians moved further into the Port Royal Valley in these years. This chapter in Acadian history demonstrated the close ties forged between Acadia and the British along the coast from an early stage. The British were another influential power in the region that would continue to shape Acadian experiences and understanding of their territorial holdings. Sedgwick’s actions were also the first in a line of many British expeditions on Acadia. The Acadians learned to accommodate these shifts in the years to come, but the effects of British occupation continued to shape the region and its peoples.

In the 1670s, Acadian settlements were still effected by their years under British rule. Once direct ties were severed, however, Acadia flourished and firmly established itself amongst the other North American colonies. Griffiths argues that this important change in perception between 1671 and 1686 was the result of fifty years of cohabitation that left the Acadians with the beginnings of a cohesive identity. By the beginning of this period, Port Royal’s settlers could look back on three generations of habitation in the region. This sense of personal history was compounded by France’s efforts to establish more permanent fishing settlements in Acadia and the surrounding colonies. Acadia was developing a degree of importance in the second half of the seventeenth century, both in North America and in Europe. However, this development did not mean that the Acadians were completely self-sufficient. While the Acadian’s agricultural activities supported a relatively high standard of living, their economy could not depend on the French market. In the 1680s, the Acadians

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35 Reid with contributions by Baker, Essays on Northeastern North America, 42.
37 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 132.
38 Ibid., 93.
40 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 99.
were therefore forced to turn to markets in Britain and New England.\textsuperscript{41} The establishment of closer economic ties did not mean that the North American colonies would live in peace with each other. Acadia, New England and Maine were embroiled in disputes about fishery boundaries in the same decade.\textsuperscript{42} These issues foreshadowed the events that awaited the Acadians in the next decades.

As France’s naval power declined and European powers scrambled to control Atlantic trade,\textsuperscript{43} Acadia was raided. The events of 1690 had persistent effects in the following era of Acadian history, especially in terms of the relationship between Acadians, New Englanders and French officials.\textsuperscript{44} While Port Royal was still an influential centre of official, political, religious and economic activity in Acadia,\textsuperscript{45} it was no longer an administrative centre in 1691-1700. With the continued absence of French power in Acadia, as Griffiths explains, “the sense of France as an invincible imperial power had little chance of developing among the settlers.”\textsuperscript{46} Instead, the Acadians maintained their standard of living without a strong French imperial presence and began to assert their right to political views as Acadians. This was an important conceptual shift, and in the next generations the Acadians attempted to assert their identity as a distinct group.\textsuperscript{47} Another, more physical, form of change also defined the twenty-year period around the turn of the century. Acadia was consistently in a state of reconstruction\textsuperscript{48} and therefore lacked a sense of permanence through the 1690s and

\textsuperscript{41} Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire}, 195.
\textsuperscript{42} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 137.
\textsuperscript{44} John G. Reid, “1686-1729: Imperial Intrusions,” in \textit{The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History}, Buckner, Phillip Alfred and John G. Reid, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 82.
\textsuperscript{45} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 181.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{47} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 166-7.
into the early 1700s.\textsuperscript{49} This instability was exacerbated by the continued British attacks on Acadia and crop failure in the late 1690s.\textsuperscript{50} Despite the institution of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, the Acadians still entered the eighteenth century in conflict.\textsuperscript{51} In 1702, the War of Spanish Succession took hold in North America as Benjamin Church assaulted Acadia. Church destroyed Minas and Chignecto during his raid and eliminated any feelings of friendship in the process.\textsuperscript{52}

\subsection*{2.2: The French State in Acadia}

James Pritchard argues in his book, \textit{In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730's}, that “far more than any other French colony, the colonists themselves constructed Acadia.”\textsuperscript{53} However, the French military and other officials continued to be present in the colony: Acadia was a military frontier\textsuperscript{54} influenced by European politics.\textsuperscript{55} The state was generally neglectful in its dealings with the colonists, but it was common for officials to make demands of the Acadians. These demands required the Acadians to become involved in French political conflicts\textsuperscript{56} and therefore reinforced the region’s status as a military frontier. It was in this era that Louis XIV and Jean-Baptiste Colbert began the process of integrating France’s colonies into a single political entity. This grouping of overseas dominions was meant to be under direct royal authority\textsuperscript{57} and was overseen by the Marine Council. The council was a royal advisory body that combined Naval

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, 19.
\textsuperscript{50} Summerby-Murray, “Four Hundred Years of Mapping in the Upper Bay of Fundy,” 5.
\textsuperscript{51} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 169.
\textsuperscript{52} Faragher, \textit{A Great and Noble Scheme}, 112.
\textsuperscript{53} Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire}, 34.
\textsuperscript{54} Kennedy, \textit{Something of a Peasant Paradise}, 48.
\textsuperscript{55} Griffiths, \textit{From Migrant to Acadian}, 195.
\textsuperscript{56} Kennedy, \textit{Something of a Peasant Paradise}, 92.
\textsuperscript{57} Banks, \textit{Chasing Empire Across the Sea}, 22.
and Colonial affairs, furthering Acadia’s connection to French military goals. While royal authority provided the foundations for colonial life in Acadia, communication constraints meant that state power was not as rigid as in France. Officials attempted to bridge the gap between France and its colony, but information continued to move across the Atlantic slowly. These constraints meant that instructions could easily be ignored or modified. In addition, few priests were available to reinforce state authority in the colony. This led to the increasing importance of local governing bodies. Local institutions acted to negotiate and limit state demands. With the collective interests of the senior heads of household in mind, these local bodies acted as a buffer and continued to play an important role in daily life into the eighteenth century.

Between 1686 and 1720 state intervention increased in Acadia. This shift away from the persistent neglect of the past decades decreased Acadian and Indigenous autonomy. These changes coincided with larger political events in the region. The War of Spanish Succession began in 1702. It was at this time that both Acadia and Newfoundland were deemed militarily important to the maintenance of French and British authority. As a result, French officials increasingly prioritized military considerations within the colonies, especially where defence was concerned. Although Acadia’s importance was elevated and more attention was given to its military positioning, France continued to ignore the colony’s material needs. This was in part due to the impacts of the war in Europe. Louis XIV and his

58 Ibid., 3.
59 Ibid., 5.
60 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 105.
61 Kennedy, Something of a Peasant Paradise, 169.
62 Ibid., 205; see also 295.
63 Reid, “1686-1729: Imperial Intrusions,” 79.
64 Reid, “1686-1729: Imperial Intrusions,” 88.
65 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 32.
advisors did not have the resources to support an overseas colony. Acadia’s governor, Daniel d’Auger de Subercase, also struggled to plead the colony’s case from across the Atlantic. Overall, these events denote the stark difference between imperial visions and Acadian realities through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While it was coveted for its possibilities, the harsh realities of life on the ground were not improved by imperial officials in Europe.

2.3: Jean De Labat’s Port Royal

With the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, French military engineers attempted to incorporate new ideas within the existing structure of their absolutist monarchy. While preserving and improving existing social orders, military engineers brought their civilizing efforts into the realm of fortifications. The application of mathematics was essential to this development. In theory, mathematics, especially geometry, brought a degree of certainty and security to the practice of fortifications. Military engineers still faced the unpredictability of their work, however, and many engineers questioned their own purpose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Through this period of change, French military engineers sought to better define their positions and ultimately left a legacy that multiple European nations hoped to follow.

One of the most influential French military engineers of this period was Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban. Present at all of Louis XIV’s wars, Vauban is remembered for his

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66 Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 218.
revolutionary work in the development of siege craft and defensive fortifications.\textsuperscript{70} Throughout his career, Vauban worked closely with Louis XIV and the Minister of War, François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois.\textsuperscript{71} Vauban insisted that military engineers should pursue order in the design, execution, and reporting of their work.\textsuperscript{72} Order was not meant to overshadow practicality, though. As a soldier who had established his career under Louvois, Vauban had learned his craft through experiential learning that made him aware of the importance of adaptability in the field.\textsuperscript{73} Vauban was considered a genius within his lifetime,\textsuperscript{74} and this was, in part, due to the advancements he made in the education of military engineers. In the final decade of the seventeenth century, Vauban developed a system that required commissioned military engineers to pass an entrance examination; complete a work-term of approximately one to two years, referred to as the novitiate; and take a final examination, evaluating both theoretical and practical knowledge.\textsuperscript{75} This system drastically changed the make-up of the corps of military engineers as the Nine Years War simultaneously shifted France’s focus onto the fortification of newly drawn borders.\textsuperscript{76} By the turn of the century, French military engineers were well on their way to ingraining themselves within the Old Regime’s administrations.\textsuperscript{77}

One of Vauban’s followers, Jean De Labat, continued the French tradition at Port Royal. After years of study under the older engineer, De Labat was recommended to the Minister of the Colonies, Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, as a military engineer for

\textsuperscript{71} Langins, \textit{Conserving the Enlightenment}, 62-3.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, 51.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, 55; 77-9.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 47.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.}, 79-81.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}, 80.
\textsuperscript{77} Langins, \textit{Conserving the Enlightenment}, 83.
Acadia. At the turn of the century, De Labat took up his post at Port Royal and was given the rank of lieutenant of the Troupes de Marine. Little is known about De Labat and his career prior to his arrival at Port Royal in 1702. His style and sensibilities were very similar to Vauban’s, which indicates how steeped he was in the French tradition despite his remote location.

The remainder of this chapter discusses De Labat’s work in the first decade of the eighteenth century. While letters and plans from the years immediately after De Labat’s arrival in 1702 will be explored, the focus of this section is his 1708 map, Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal a l’Acadie et environes et de ses environs. Partie de la Banlieue du Fort Royal de L'Acadie du coste de lisle aux cheures. The map is an important piece of material culture that provides insight into life in Acadia in the years prior to the conquest of 1710. With the foundations provided by this map, the impacts of the conquest and the difference between French and British experiences of the region can be explored in later chapters.

At the turn of the century, Jacques-François de Monbeton de Brouillan left his post at Plaisance to govern Acadia, first as a commandant and then as governor. Once he reached Port Royal in 1701, Brouillan organized a meeting with the inhabitants. This meeting resulted in an agreement that the Acadians would aid in the construction of a fort at Port Royal. Before long, an enceinte was built with housing for soldiers, and a report was sent back to France detailing the colony’s failings. In his report, Brouillan expressed his concerns

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79 In 1701 Brouillan used the possibility of English attacks to persuade the Acadians at Les Mines/Grand Pré to create a route to Port Royal. It is likely that a similar tactic was used to gain the Acadians’ support at Port Royal for the development of fortifications. René Baudry, “Monbeton de Brouillan, Jacques-François de,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. II, revised 1982. Accessed May 2019.
about Acadia’s underused fishing resources, which he hoped could mirror Plaisance’s own industry. As such, a fort at La Hève was proposed to act as a fishing port and naval base for France. Brouillan also complained that the Acadians were underutilizing the uplands, which could be made productive farmlands. To encourage further productivity in a colony expecting war, Brouillan recommended a redistribution of workable lands and allotment boundaries at Port Royal. After the report, a plan for a Vauban-style star shaped fortification was approved in France and De Labat was sent with masons, carpenters, supplies and an annual budget of 20,000 livres to complete the project.

The plans for Port Royal lost their momentum shortly after De Labat’s arrival in 1702. De Labat struggled to achieve his goals for the colony’s fort as the War of Spanish Succession extended to North America. Attention was given to less permanent, immediate solutions to the colony’s problems, which was typical of this period in French military history. As the annual budget skyrocketed in the middle of the war to almost 219 million livres, approximately 2-3 million livres were set aside for fortifications. These funds directed to military engineers were not necessarily meant to support new works. It was common practice among military engineers in this period to simply repair and maintain the fortifications under their care, though De Labat’s writings from the early years of his

80 Ibid.
82 Baudry, “Monbeton de Brouillan, Jacques-François de,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography. In comparison, Brouillan earned a salary of 4000 livres and received an additional gratuity of 500 livres upon his appointment as commandant of Acadia in 1701. (Baudry, “Monbeton de Brouillan, Jacques-François de.”) When considering the potential costs of labour and materials, the annual budget to complete the project was not particularly substantial.
83 Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, 49-50.
84 Ibid., 50.
tenancy in Acadia suggest that he struggled to meet even these goals with less than one per cent of France’s fortifications budget.

In a letter to Monseigneur Villermont, De Labat feared that French officials lacked Acadian support. Following multiple false alarms that the British were invading Acadia between August 1702 and September 1703,85 De Labat told Villermont that a real siege could cause the settlers to desert or revolt against the French.86 The question of the Acadians’ ties to French rule reflect De Labat’s poor regard for the government at Acadia. De Labat wrote that:

Inasmuch as the government is the chief means of enforcing obedience and peace, I shall tell you briefly that here it is following the opposite course and only striving to destroy both [obedience and peace].87

This lack of confidence in the Acadians and French government was also evident in De Labat’s Description of the River of the Dauphin, Otherwise Called Port Royal in Acadie. De Labat echoes Brouillan’s complaint that Port Royal was not as agriculturally productive as possible. Referring to the distribution and use of land, De Labat noted that the 54-55 families that lived between L’isle aux Chevres and the fort “hold by concession all the arable land and much more land, of which they make no use.”88 This negative assessment of the Acadians suggests that the settlers were lazy and unappreciative of the opportunities given to them by French officialdom, a view of settlers that was similar to the one held by many administrators in Quebec at the time.89 De Labat’s comment is also enlightening because it reveals his own shortcomings. Like other commenters on Acadia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,

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86 Ibid., 4.
87 Ibid., 4.
88 Ibid., 9.
De Labat wrongly assumed that the uplands’ soil quality was comparable to France. The uplands around Port Royal were unfertilized, and the soil produced poor yields. The Acadians preferred fertile dyked marshlands, and they were willing to move throughout Acadia to exploit productive marshes. Without a clear understanding of life in Acadia, De Labat struggled to separate imperial expectations from achievable goals with the land presented to him. This initially narrow perspective was an antithesis to Vauban’s insistence on practicality and subsequently hindered De Labat’s success in his first years at Port Royal.

De Labat’s accomplishments in Port Royal were closely linked to his relationships with French officials. His relationship with Brouillan was particularly strained and led to delays in construction. De Labat and Brouillan also disagreed about the plans for the fortification. In his Description of the River, De Labat states that “the fort which is being built protects its immediate surroundings, but in no wise prevents the pillaging and burning of the greater part of the habitations.” To solve this problem, De Labat had suggested that two batteries be built at the mouth of the harbour. However, Brouillan made the decision to direct his funds to other projects. De Labat was left frustrated by the limitations placed on his work and this discord hampered the fort’s development.

Despite De Labat’s early struggles in Acadia, Joan Dawson describes his maps of Acadia as the “most vividly descriptive of any made during the period.” The French began creating state maps as early as the 1550s to better understand the nation’s geography and administrative divisions. Military engineers, such as De Labat, were expected to participate

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90 Clark, Acadia, 161.
91 Morse, “Chapter VII: Biographica,” 46.
92 Morse, “Chapter VI: Letter of Delabat to Monseigneur Villermont (1703) and Description of the Rivers Seine and Dauphin (c. 1703),” 12.
93 Ibid., 12.
in this tradition. In their role as map makers, military engineers primarily concentrated on local geographies linked to their own work. Members of the public, such as the Cassini family, were creating maps of France for commercial purposes through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These productions were considered inferior by military engineers who were attempting to professionalize their career in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With such a large emphasis on cartographic accuracy amongst the military engineers and De Labat’s own struggle to assert his will in Port Royal, it is no wonder that Dawson found his work to be so descriptive. Unconfident in the abilities of the other French officials stationed in Acadia, De Labat imposed his own order on the pages of his maps.

De Labat created multiple architectural plans and maps in his time at Port Royal. One of the closest to the events of 1710 is his Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal a l’Acadie et environs et de ses environs, 1708 (Map 2.1). Just a year before the map was completed, New Englanders had sailed to Port Royal and laid siege to the settlement. Many Acadians lost property within the boundaries of the banlieu during the attack, and the landscape was segmented by English trenches. De Labat personally lost his home and stores in 1707, as well as his thumb when a cannon backfired while he was defending the fort. Once the English returned to their own colony, De Labat pleaded to be returned to France, but he was not granted leave until 1713. This snub may be explained by Vauban’s death in the same year. Without his former teacher to act as a patron, De Labat would have lost much of his

95 Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, 65-6.
98 Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, 81.
leverage within the system of French officials that he already struggled to navigate. It was in this context that De Labat created *Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal*, 1708.

De Labat’s 1708 map, done in two sections, combined both imperial fictions and the stark realities of life at Port Royal following the 1707 siege. Military engineers were responsible for creating “the notion of a space that could be conceived as a whole, managed, and improved,” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 1708 map contributes to this tradition in the wake of the siege because De Labat presented an orderly landscape when French authority was actively being challenged. However, the well-defined and structured settlement was also represented by an individual with knowledge of daily life in the colony. Behind the clinical presentation, De Labat displayed the ravages of life on the borderlands with the addition of English trenches, and notes on houses that were burnt down during the siege. The 1708 map of Port Royal therefore provides a unique glimpse at both imperial aspirations and colonial realities at a turning point for the French administration at Port Royal. A more in-depth analysis of the map’s geography, structures, and overall composition as they relate to themes of administration and local knowledge will be conducted in the

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following paragraphs. This analysis will combine both critical cartography and an artistic analysis to develop a deeper understanding of life before the events of 1710 and the role of the map in this history.

While the overall experience of the geography is quite orderly and manageable on the map, De Labat’s representation of Port Royal’s forests tells multiple stories. In his 1703 *Description of the River*, De Labat reported that the narrow river is “bordered by high[?] mountains so densely wooded that a man can scarcely cross them.”\(^{100}\) The density of trees is represented using shading as well as the close placement of trees along boundary lines (Map 2.2). This reflects the use of trees to mark judicial and political boundaries in the public and private spheres in France from as early as the 1300s.\(^{101}\) Despite some denser outcroppings, though, the trees are generally placed around the map in an orderly fashion. At the time, the French thought trees represented human and divine power.\(^{102}\) In France, trees were also used to mark political and judicial legitimacy and arboreal stewardship became closely linked to the monarchy’s success.\(^{103}\) The almost pattern-like standardization of the trees’ placement across the landscape therefore attests to an orderly colony. Considering the history surrounding the

\(^{100}\) Morse, “Chapter VI: Letter of Delabat to Monseigneur Villermont (1703) and Description of the Rivers Seine and Dauphin (c. 1703),” 9.


\(^{103}\) *Ibid.*, 3-4.
map’s creation, this representation of the trees suggests a fictive French imperial authority at Port Royal.

The trees are rather amorphous shapes. This was not a common stylistic choice among De Labat’s contemporaries. Vauban, for example, was closer in style to Samuel de Champlain. Both represented trees as stylized individual figures discernable from lower lying brush (Maps 2.3 and 2.4). Marc-René, marquis de Montalembert, a prominent French military engineer working in the second half of the eighteenth century, also showed trees as more defined shapes in his maps (Map 2.5).¹⁰⁴ De Labat’s break from canonical design, despite his strict education, can therefore be analyzed as an individual artistic expression. To create De Labat’s blot-like trees, a hurried hand motion was likely required. This suggests a frantic anxiety related to the forests surrounding the town of Port Royal. De Labat’s anxiety may be due to his unfamiliarity with the woods, which were considered Mi’kmaq territory.¹⁰⁵ The undefined shape of the trees may also suggest a precarious French authority at Port Royal following the 1707 siege and the

lack of control felt amongst inhabitants. Overall, the individual shapes of the trees provide an alternative vision as compared to the structured imperial order of their placement.

The trees also contrast with De Labat’s apparent familiarity with the colony in the banlieue region (Map 2.6). Marked by a circular line that moves across both panels of the map and into its borders, the banlieue incorporates the town of Port Royal, the fort, and surrounding waterways. The dark boundary line was rendered with precision and is further highlighted by De Labat’s clearing of the areas directly around the marker. This, along with its central position within the composition, draws the viewer’s focus and suggests the importance of the encapsulated image. From an imperial perspective, the delineation between the banlieu and the outer realms orders the settlement into manageable administrative territories. For a colony struggling to maintain its position against English attacks, this semblance of administrative order was an important imperial fiction to maintain. The continuation of the boundary beyond the frame of the map also has imperial implications.
Through the extension of the banlieue into an imaginary space, De Labat suggests that there is a wider reality of French imperial authority at Port Royal and supports an expansionist agenda.

Within the banlieue, De Labat uses the legend to identify well defined plots of land. The first point singled out for the viewer is the fort (Map 2.7). Its primacy on the legend as well as its central position within the composition suggests the fort’s importance as well as the significance of the French military presence in the region. The placement of the fort also alludes to other symbols of French imperial authority found in Europe. André Le Nôtre’s French garden style, popularized by his work at Versailles, centred around a main axis.106 This form would be familiar to French viewers and is mirrored by the central position of the fort on the map. In addition, the “A” in the middle of the fort acts as a pinpoint from which the lines of the fort extend out towards property boundaries and the contours of the landscape. This extends the imperial authority symbolized by the fort across the banlieue and into the outer reaches of the map. Through this period of unease

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in Acadia, this reminder of imperial power and order would have been important in grounding French authority for the officials who would have worked with this map.

This sentiment is further supported by the fort’s representation. De Labat used strong lines that stand out against the small patch of negative space surrounding the fort. As an artistic choice, this draws the viewer’s focus to a feature of the map that is relatively small. In an otherwise flat landscape, De Labat also made the decision to create the illusion of three-dimensional space using shading. The outer walls of the fort utilize light and shadow to make the fort pop from the page. With the impression that the structure is rising above the rest of the image, the fort becomes a beacon of French imperial authority that rises above issues faced on the ground. Considering the 1707 siege, this is an important statement of continued French authority in the region that would be questioned in 1710. It must not be forgotten that, like the map, the fort is another of De Labat’s creations. De Labat’s prominent representation of the fort validates his work in the settlement. This was particularly important as he struggled to maintain a working relationship with Acadia’s governor and faced the consequences of the siege.

The effects of the siege are also apparent throughout the legend (Map 2.8). De Labat provided an extensive listing of property owners throughout the region and indicated whether any damages were suffered during the siege. This is exemplified by the properties at O, P, and Q (Map 2.7 and 2.8). De Labat notes on the legend that the “maison du Sr. Lupiner” (Point O) was burnt during the siege, but there are no visual clues of this at the designated plot. The lack of visual representation allowed De Labat to record the colony’s recent history without giving the impression that the siege had lasting impacts. De Labat effectively diminished the threat of English power at Port Royal through this visual erasure of the siege,
leaving the viewer with the sense that life continued without major changes. As a result, De Labat created an imperial fiction of an impenetrable French regime for the viewer. This artistic decision is even more apparent because De Labat went to such great lengths to detail his other representations. Plots are differentiated by property lines, shading, patterns of lines and the imprints of buildings of varying size across the map. Such a degree of specificity suggests to the viewer that De Labat was not capable to omitting important visual information from the map. This false sense of security ultimately allowed De Labat to create an imperial fiction as officials at Port Royal struggled to maintain control.

Administrative order was also maintained in the arrangement of the legend. After the fort, the first names included on the legend are high ranking French officials. Their homes, including the commander Bonnaventure (Point B) and the newest governor Subercase (Point C), have a central position within the settlement around the fort. This positioning reinforces their importance within the structure of life at Port Royal and attempts to validate the centrality of French imperial rule. De Labat’s attention to property and the ramifications of the 1707 siege reflects the importance of data collection within seventeenth and eighteenth century French military engineering.

Map 2.8: Detail of the legend from De Labat’s Plan de la Banlieu du Fort Royal a l’Acadie, 1708.
Mapping and statistics went hand in hand amongst the engineers. In his correspondences, Vauban is recorded as requiring Hüe de Caligny, the director of fortifications in Flanders, to create a map with “administrative divisions indicated and marked by dotted lines and distinguished by color.” Vauban also demanded that his engineers’ maps included Parisian measurements of scale, details about agricultural productivity, garrison size, ecclesiastical presence, demography, and land use. De Labat, through his use of the legend and representation of plots, maintained these ideals despite his geographic isolation from France. While the details themselves were based in the realms of science and math, the engineer’s artistic abilities allowed for the effective expression of information. An example of this is De Labat’s representation of the marais (Map 2.9).

While most of the landscape is dotted with trees or shaded in darker grays, the marais are cut across with a light wash of gray lines. The lines are indicative of Acadian dykes, a hypothesis that is reinforced by the translation of marais as “swamp” or “marsh.” Very few maps from the early eighteenth century depicted dykes. De Labat’s inclusion of the marais therefore shows his commitment to the aggregation of statistical information in a visual

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108 Ibid., 67.
109 Ibid.
110 Summerby-Murray, “Four Hundred Years of Mapping in the Upper Bay of Fundy,” 5.
format. Able to compare swampy areas to other cultivated or wooded areas, the viewer was provided with local information to better understand land usage in Port Royal in 1708. This documentation of the marais and other productive lands is important considering French officials’ insistence on increasing the colony’s agricultural output. Productive land was localized around the banlieue and shorelines, echoing previous concerns about the underuse of the heavily wooded uplands. The map presents areas in which the Acadians were excelling, while also pointing to opportunities for improvement. De Labat suggests that Acadian productivity could be extended and with it, French imperial authority across the landscape. This imagined future is important following the siege as the need to validate the French position at Port Royal increased. Local knowledge was an important factor in De Labat’s ability to manufacture a plausible future in his prospective image of Port Royal. De Labat’s personal experience also contributed to his ability to impose a sense of administrative order as he visually rationalized the colony’s landscape in organized and labeled plots.

The shorelines that the marais run along are another important feature of De Labat’s map. Early on in his tenancy, De Labat described the shore as being “very rugged because of the great surf, for here the sea is greatly stirred up by winds from the north, north-west, west and south.”¹¹¹ In his writings from 1703, De Labat presented the wild nature of the colonial landscape using scientific observations of wind patterns. De Labat also attempted to rationalize the landscape through the common French practice of creating on the spot views of colonial towns.¹¹² While sailing in the basin, De Labat took stock of the shore in a drawing

¹¹¹ Morse, “Chapter VI: Letter of Delabat to Monseigneur Villermont (1703) and Description of the Rivers Seine and Dauphin (c. 1703),” 9.
that he attached to his 1703 letter to Villermont. Although the drawing is no longer attached to this document, its inclusion reveals De Labat’s early interest in capturing the shores and sharing the colony with other French subjects and navigators.

In 1708, De Labat provided another iteration of the same shoreline with his map (Map 2.10). Here, the shores are drawn with strong lines that wrap the coasts in organic sweeps across the two pages. These natural forms echo the rugged shores that De Labat noted in 1703 and give a sense of the untamable waves the settlers faced, while the heavy lines De Labat used to define this space suggest a certainty in his knowledge of the terrain and of the boundaries of French authority. De Labat’s strong lines were important symbols following the siege and suggest a strength in the colony’s borders. The line quality also provides a distinct line for the viewer to travel on the page, effectively guiding the eye across a continuous stretch of territory claimed by the French.

The lines around the shores also show the beginnings of a hydrographic survey of the basin. An amorphous and stippled shape is shown around Ille aux Chevres, for example (Map 2.11). Current maps of the island match the more defined form and the dotted area surrounding it may represent shallower sections of the basin. This was functionally important information for De Labat to document, because ships needed to successfully navigate the waters. De Labat’s application of scientific reason, much like his notes on the wind’s impacts

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113 Morse, “Chapter VI: Letter of Delabat to Monseigneur Villermont (1703) and Description of the Rivers Seine and Dauphin (c. 1703),” 1.
on the shores, also brought order to the natural environment surrounding the settlement. By asserting administrative order in this fashion, the French claims to authority at Port Royal were validated. What’s more, the extension of the shores past the obvious boundaries of the landscape symbolically suggest the continuation of French imperial authority beyond the land they were inhabiting. The technique De Labat used to represent this area contributes to this meaning. Stippling, with its undefined forms, suggests permeability. There is room for the French to move in and out of this transitory space, and possibly stake a claim to the larger area surrounding Port Royal.

The basin that the shores lead into is largely blank, save the mottled sections hugging the coasts and a few notations about where vessels could safely anchor (Map 2.12). In the otherwise densely packed composition, this negative space is a source of relief that draws the eye to the centre of the map. De Labat’s lack of detail within the basin may reflect a lack of interest in the use of the basin. At the end of the seventeenth century, the French navy turned to commercial pursuits as they attempted to work with a limited budget. Vauban endorsed this system and naval commanders were required to uphold a “strict control of the French navy’s ‘limited’
assets.” If Governor Brouillan’s fears about the settlement’s fishing industry are to be believed, the basin was not being utilized to its maximum capacity in the early 1700s. In addition, tensions between the people of Maine, New England, and Acadia through the end of the seventeenth century stemmed from fishery boundary disputes. The contestation of French authority over the waters around Port Royal was therefore a point of friction. Unable to meet the French navy’s expectations of commercial gain, the basin was not an essential facet of the French imperial agenda, and therefore did not require a detailed representation. Still, the relief it provided and central position suggest that the basin was of importance to De Labat and life at Port Royal. There is room for possibility in the empty space De Labat left in the basin. Much like the uplands, settlers could extend into this space and continue to validate the French presence at Port Royal. For the time of the map’s creation though, there is still a gap between imperial fantasies and life on the ground.

The rivers snaking around Port Royal was of importance to daily life in the colony. Acadian settlers travelled along the rivers in both canoes and chaloupes rather than crossing the woods, conceivably because of the accommodation agreement between the Acadians and Mi’kmaq. In his representation of the rivers, De Labat presents cleared and easily navigable paths through the landscape that often funnel into the basin (Map 2.13). This connects the internal world of the settlement to the outside world beyond the basin’s waters. Functionally, this representation gives the viewer an idea of the navigability of the area and rationalizes the landscape. Local knowledge of the river systems therefore allows for the institution of administrative order in the region. On an imperial scale, this depiction also

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115 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 137.
116 Kennedy, Something of a Peasant Paradise, 38.
links the colonial settlement to the larger empire. This is an important theme to underscore considering the relative isolation of Port Royal from France and in the aftermath of the 1707 siege. In addition, the rivers draw the viewer’s eye further into the heavily detailed landscape and highlight the colonial settlement. This is an encouraging reminder for the viewer of the power of French imperialism to master a foreign landscape with administrative order. The rivers therefore present a nexus where practical local knowledge meets with imperial visions of grandeur through the application of administrative order, and the manipulation of geographic information.

De Labat’s map has a glaring omission. On the map, De Labat does not expressly document an Indigenous presence. While his representation of features such as the woods and rivers suggest an awareness of mutual accommodation, there are no other indications of the Mi’kmaq. This may be the case for multiple reasons. One possibility is that De Labat was fostering an imperial fantasy of North America as a vacant space available to European imperial powers. Earlier close views of northeastern North American colonies created by Champlain in the seventeenth centuries often included Indigenous peoples. For example, Champlain’s *Port Royal*, 1613 included practical information about Mi`kmaq fishing.
grounds. In New France, Champlain extended his representations to include prominently placed Indigenous figures on maps. However, De Labat was primarily focused on military actions and town plans as a military engineer specifically sent to Port Royal to attend to fortifications. This may have narrowed his focus and led him to prioritize the supposed exploitability of the region for imperial purposes. As a result, the Mi’kmaq presence at Port Royal was omitted to enhance imperial claims and prospects. The omission of the Indigenous presence in the region may also reflect the tacit agreement between the Acadians and Mi’kmaq to accommodate one another. De Labat may have felt there was no need to document the Indigenous presence around Port Royal because they were not an immediate threat to life at Port Royal.

In the wake of the 1707 siege, however, the military engineer did feel that it was imperative to detail English positions around the settlement. De Labat recorded the English trenches and battlefields as well as the places they moored and raided around Port Royal. These physical marks, which could not be covered like the burnt Acadian properties, tell a story of conflict in a relatively sterile manner. The trenches the English carved into the landscape are orderly and the places they anchored are simply marked by two neatly drawn

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anchors (Map 2.14). De Labat’s decision to represent the conflict in this manner denotes its tactical importance, but does not overshadow the notion that the English could easily be overcome by the administration of the French empire. It is also interesting that De Labat marked the initial point of English attack (Map 2.15). In 1703, De Labat had marked this position as a prime location for the construction of batteries to increase the defensibility of the settlement. De Labat’s note on the 1708 map supports his earlier sentiments and subsequently validates his opinions. This in turn endorses the information provided elsewhere on the map and his other work. The inclusion of the English presence therefore advances military tactics, French imperial authority, and De Labat’s own visions of the settlement.

An anomaly of De Labat’s map is a cleared circular patch of land in the forested area above the settlement (Map 2.16). The cleared space does not appear to be linked to any point on the legend, and is covered in a later composite edition of the map. It is possible that a stamp or a compass resided in this space as neither are found elsewhere on the map. The orientation of the map completely flips north and south. Without a compass, a viewer unfamiliar with the area would not be aware of this major shift. De Labat was therefore able to construct a composition that privileged a view of the main settlement and fort. On an imperial level, this framing supports the significance of the French settlement and subsequently validates imperial authority within the colony. This orientation also changes the way the geography is read. Reading the map from left to right, as

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119 Morse, “Chapter VI: Letter of Delabat to Monseigneur Villermont (1703) and Description of the Rivers Seine and Dauphin (c. 1703),” 12.
is common in western societies, moves the eye from the bowels of the basin out into the larger Bay of Fundy region and Atlantic Ocean (Map 2.17). By following the trajectory De Labat provided, the viewer is moved away from the colony. This subliminal message may have reflected fear following the English attack and De Labat’s personal requests to leave his post at Port Royal following the siege. Despite the grander imperial narratives presented across the map, De Labat’s own experiences may be present in this artistic decision.

The map was released a second time (Map 2.18). In 1710, the map was used as a base for a compilation of other views of Port Royal. On the brink of British attack, De Labat’s 1710 edition is another detailed look at life in Acadia in the early eighteenth century. While the 1710 map shows the expansion of De Labat’s local knowledge and application of administrative order on the landscape, the geographic information is largely unchanged. In the 1710 edition, the woods are denser and the plots that comprise the settlement are even more detailed. The inserts provided by De Labat include a close-up of the fort, the mouth of the basin, and a sketch of the waterways running through the region. These changes are tactically important and denote preparations for battle. For this reason, the earlier edition of
the map was chosen to provide a more grounded representation of daily life before the events of 1710. The 1708 map also provides a unique opportunity to assess the French reaction to an English attack. Despite the physical impacts of the siege, De Labat continued to expound on the virtues of French imperialism and the strength of administrative order. The military engineer even went so far as to suggest a future in which the Acadian settlement could expand the realm of French authority and productivity across the landscape. This response is important to contextualizing French actions following the events of 1710. Would this same attitude continue following Subercase’s capitulation and the installation of an English colonial government?

2.4: Conclusion

In the eighteenth century, French visual culture primarily represented colonial landscapes through cartography, and architecture. These representations, which were often used to emphasize the consistency between settlements, were meant to secure the monarch’s good will. Through his artistic decisions, De Labat favoured local knowledge and administrative order that ultimately supported French imperialism at Port Royal. This focus

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120 Crowley, “‘Taken on the Spot,’” 3-4.
was important considering the context of the 1707 siege and the apparent need to bolster French claims to authority in the region.

By 1708, the Acadians and French officials living at Port Royal had established a way of life uniquely suited to their environment. An agricultural economy was supported by other economic ventures, and the Mi’kmaq were accommodating the settler presence in the region. The settlers had adapted to their geographic distance from France. French officialdom stationed at the colony had established an administrative order in response to their colonial experiences. There was also an expectation of intermittent English attacks. As they approached 1710, there was no indication that the regular ebbs, and flows of daily life at Port Royal would significantly change. The events of the conquest and its aftermath must therefore be considered in light of these circumstances.
Chapter Three:
Erasing Boundaries: The British Conquest of Port Royal in 1710

Two years after De Labat combined colonial realities and imperial prospects on the pages of his map, the English effectively put a stop to his imaginings at Port Royal. On October 5, 1710, French officials surrendered Port Royal to joint British and New England forces after an eight-day siege.\(^{121}\) This came at the end of a roughly twenty-year era of constant reshuffling in northeastern North America.\(^{122}\) Yet, Port Royal, renamed Annapolis Royal after the events of the siege, was still a site where local knowledge and imperial fantasies mingled. While British maps of the region were scant in the early eighteenth century, a map created at the time of the siege embodies British imperial prospects in a new landscape.

This chapter focuses on the events of October 1710 and its surrounding contexts. It begins with brief biographies of the conquest’s primary supporters, Samuel Vetch and Francis Nicholson, as well as the colonial environments they inhabited. The siege will then be discussed in three parts: its approval, execution, and resolution. To better understand this event and its impacts, the chapter will end with an analysis of *Plan of Annapolis, late Port Royal Fort, the principal place of strength in Nova Scotia*, 1710. The anonymously produced map supported a military narrative that clearly viewed the events of 1710 as a British conquest of the French at Annapolis Royal. The cartographer fostered the prospect of empire, and the expansion of British authority, while also drawing on local knowledge.

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3.1: Vetch, Nicholson and the Colonies

Born in Edinburgh in 1668, Samuel Vetch made his way to North America in 1699 after serving in William of Orange’s military first in Holland, and then in England. Vetch set his sights on commercial success upon his arrival in New York, where he married Margaret Livingston, the daughter of the prominent merchant Robert Livingston, and began an illegal trade with New France. When his illicit practices became known to the public, he was sent to Boston. While Vetch became Governor Dudley’s political partner in Boston, he continued to struggle to maintain a positive public image. When it became public knowledge in 1706 that Vetch was trading weapons with the French at Acadia, the Massachusetts General Court convicted him for his illegal trading. Unhappy with his conviction, Vetch travelled to England where he successfully sought acquittal from the Privy Council. While at Queen Anne’s court, Vetch also pushed for action in northeastern North America. His essay, Canada Survey’d, argued for the conquest of New France. The proposed conquest would require a joint marine and land-based attack on Quebec City and Montreal to remove the French from the area. Vetch included a long description of his target, and the negative effects of the French presence on surrounding British claims to support his plans. Britain’s colonies in North America were described as an important source of resources for the empire, with a specific note to the sale of wood, and food to the Caribbean. Vetch insisted that the French presence limited colonists’ ability to exploit these resources and redirected their

126 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 47.
attentions to defensive military actions. The proposed conquest of New France would ultimately be economically beneficial for the British. The removal of the French presence would clear the path for the settlers to better supply their own needs and those of the empire, while also disrupting the French market. Vetch also argued that this would be the first step in a larger British expansion across North America, but he did not specify how this could be done.\textsuperscript{128}

In 1707 Vetch gained the support of Francis Nicholson.\textsuperscript{129} Nicholson was an English soldier with experience in Flanders and Tangier, before being sent to the newly formed Dominion of New England in 1686 as the captain of a company of foot. Before the Dominion’s collapse in 1689, Nicholson spent some time in Port Royal attempting to regain a captured New England fishing ketch. While he was ultimately unsuccessful, Nicholson did gain valuable knowledge about Acadian affairs. In 1690 Nicholson was named lieutenant-governor of Virginia, a position he held for 15 years. During his time in Virginia, Nicholson was a keen supporter of defending British frontiers against Canadian raids in New York,\textsuperscript{130} a priority that reflected Vetch’s own aims to conserve and expand upon territorial claims in North America.

Both Vetch and Nicholson had valuable experiences in northeastern North America to support their plans for conquest, and their proposal’s economic claims suited the fiscal-military state that the English were creating at the time.\textsuperscript{131} British administration was not in a

\textsuperscript{128} Plank, \textit{An Unsettled Conquest}, 47.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Ibid.}, 50.
position to consider overseas initiatives in the first years of the eighteenth century because they were preoccupied with the War of Spanish Succession in Europe. By the summer of 1708, both Queen Anne’s War and the War of Spanish Succession were well underway and the British government was willing to entertain overseas proposals. The government hoped an overseas venture could improve public opinion of the administration or shift the balance in their European war efforts.\textsuperscript{132} Canada Survey’d was up against multiple bids for the limited administrative support that was available, but ultimately gained approval before Vetch’s departure from the ministry in 1709. Part of Vetch’s success was due to his last-minute addition of Newfoundland and Spanish America to his original tract. Vetch argued that Placentia would naturally fall to the British after New France was conquered, removing a commercial block within the British fishery. Without the distraction of the French in North America, Vetch believed British armed and naval forces would be free to attack St. Augustine in Florida and then move to resettle Providence in the Bahamas. This plan would purportedly solve Britain’s struggles across the Atlantic, dismissing the administration’s critics, and allowing military resources to focus on the struggle in Europe. However, support for the plan lapsed shortly afterwards, and the British contingent required for the planned attack on New France never arrived.\textsuperscript{133} In late 1709, as a result of their aborted expedition, Vetch and Nicholson turned their attention to Port Royal.\textsuperscript{134}

Despite the public’s issues with Vetch’s personal ventures into New France and Acadia, James D. Alsop noted that “the key colonies were aggressively in favour of

\textsuperscript{132} Alsop, “Samuel Vetch’s ‘Canada Survey’d,’” 49.
\textsuperscript{133} Alsop, “Samuel Vetch’s ‘Canada Survey’d,’” 50-3.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
[Vetch’s] initiative.\textsuperscript{135} The ideas presented in \textit{Canada Survey’d} suited the time,\textsuperscript{136} and met the needs of the merchant elites in the colonies. The British-American colonial experience was deeply linked with the Atlantic. Elizabeth Mancke has described the ocean as “both a buffer against the metropolitan government and a conceptual marchland between Europe and the extra-European world, between the foreign and the domestic, between empires and states.”\textsuperscript{137} The trans-Atlantic migratory fishery had extended towards Maine by the beginning of the seventeenth century,\textsuperscript{138} and merchants in New England were eager to exploit this resource.\textsuperscript{139} As a result, settlements tended to develop around accessible coastlines and river valleys.\textsuperscript{140} The elites of these coastal settlements created a continental staple region between the Atlantic and interior in the early eighteenth century. This granted colonial merchants economic independence,\textsuperscript{141} and elevated the importance of these local elites and their commercial activities within communities.\textsuperscript{142}

The conquest posed economic benefits for merchants because it would keep sea lanes open for New England’s fishery.\textsuperscript{143} Seventeenth century maps often placed Acadia closer to New England than it was in actuality, including Champlain’s map of Canada and surrounding territories that was produced in Paris by Pierre Du Val in 1664 (Map 3.1). This placement, along with its proximity to the St. Lawrence River and North Atlantic fishing

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{138} Hornsby, \textit{British Atlantic, American Frontier}, 75.
\textsuperscript{139} Hornsby, \textit{British Atlantic, American Frontier}, 127.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 73.
banks,\textsuperscript{144} made Port Royal an ideal location to expand the colonies’ fishing industry. In addition, there was already ill-will between New Englanders and Acadians. The 1690 expedition left little trust between the two groups, and the French empire’s increased attention to their colony following the attack continued to raise fears in New England. Rhetoric surrounding New England’s dealings with the Acadians quickly turned to punishment and retribution.\textsuperscript{145} The Deerfield Massacre in 1704 cemented these views,\textsuperscript{146} and support for Vetch’s planned conquest was partially linked to revenge.\textsuperscript{147} Simultaneously, British promoters brought a civilizing ideology to the scheme.\textsuperscript{148} The English wanted to create a Protestant colony,\textsuperscript{149} and they believed the conquest would provide them with the opportunity to convert the Indigenous population and deport the Catholic Acadians.\textsuperscript{150} While there were obvious economic, and social arguments in support of the conquest, there was little agreement amongst the conquerors on their war aims.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{144} Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 19-21.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 32-3.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{147} Plank, “New England and the Conquest” in The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710, 69.
\textsuperscript{148} Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 4.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 40.
Moreover, the language of the instructions and council meetings from 1710 simply referenced the reduction of a common enemy.152

3.2: The Conquest of 1710

More lobbying was required as Vetch and Nicholson turned to Acadia in 1709. Nicholson sailed to London and argued to the British parliament that an expedition in Acadia would be an important preliminary step for a larger attack against the French in North America.153 Without any immediate plans for New France or the removal of the Acadians, Nicholson was given the court’s approval in the spring of 1710.154

In a letter from the Court of St. James dated March 18, Nicholson was appointed the General and Commander in Chief of the expedition “design’d for the reducing of Port Royal in Nova Scotia or any other place in those parts now in the Possession of the enemy.”155 In the Court’s accompanying instructions, Nicholson was promised 500 marines, a bomb ketch, and stores. Governors in the colonies and a volunteer militia were expected to supply the rest of the necessary supplies and manpower, because the English could not afford to redirect any more of their resources from their European war efforts. The instructions requested that pilots, including Capt. Southack, be assembled for the expedition before the plans were carried out.156 Pilots were important to the expedition’s success because of their highly

specialized local knowledge of an area’s hydrography.\textsuperscript{157} Southack was a naval commander and cartographer with previous experience navigating the Bay of Fundy.\textsuperscript{158} His inclusion, along with other pilots, suggests the delicate balance between imperial goals and the value of local knowledge. Nicholson was instructed to organize a Council of War in the colonies to better define plans for attack before leaving for Port Royal.\textsuperscript{159} Finally, the Court instructed Nicholson to name Vetch the commander of Port Royal if the expedition was successful.\textsuperscript{160}

Some accounts of the Court’s approval of the plan also note the importance of visiting Iroquois emissaries.\textsuperscript{161} Four Iroquois men were marketed to the public as exotic kings and brought to various cultural events in London in 1710. While the kings sparked public debate about the feasibility of civilizing projects in North America, their presence also “strengthened the argument that the native peoples of North America would support the British conquest of New France.”\textsuperscript{162} The plans for an attack on Port Royal were approved before the kings’ arrival.\textsuperscript{163} However, their presence helped to establish “the imaginative construction of empire”\textsuperscript{164} for the English public in the early 1700s.

Fostering public support of the British administration was important not only in London at the turn of the eighteenth century. In the colonies, a similar enthusiasm was necessary to meeting imperial goals. The \textit{Boston News Letter} was published by the city’s postmaster, John Campbell, for the first time on April 24, 1704. The paper combined British

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\item Marsters, “Approaches to Empire,” 2.
\item “Nicholson’s Journal of the Capture of Annapolis in 1710,” 61.
\item “Nicholson’s Journal of the Capture of Annapolis in 1710,” 62.
\item Plank, \textit{An Unsettled Conquest}, 51-2.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, 52.
\item Hinderaker, “The ‘Four Indian Kings,’” 526.
\end{enumerate}
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articles with local news and had no competition in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia until the 1720s. Between October 30 and November 6, 1710, Campbell drew the public’s attention to the conquest of Port Royal. In the November 6 issue alone, copies of letters and descriptions from Nicholson’s journal were published for public consumption, ending with a proclamation for public thanksgiving.

Excerpts published in the *Boston News Letter* begin with Nicholson’s arrival in Boston on July 15. From the time of his arrival until late September, Nicholson gathered the necessary people, and materials for the expedition “in obedience to Her Majesty’s said commands.” In confirmation of these efforts, the Governor’s Council and Assembly at Massachusetts Bay addressed Queen Anne on August 22, 1710. The address explained that preparations were being made for the expedition, including the arrival of British aid and the raising of 900 well-equipped men in New England. Almost a month later, on September 18, preparations were complete and Nicholson sailed for Port Royal.

Assisted by favourable winds, the fleet sailed up the coast until September 21. The expedition briefly anchored at the mouth of Passamaquoddy Harbour, where they had their first bout of poor weather and were met with some Indigenous resistance. No damages were recorded for or against the British while they were anchored, and in the early morning hours of September 24 they set sail towards the Bay of Fundy. Despite the loss of the *Caesar* and

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167 Ibid., 64.
168 Ibid.
169 Nova Scotia Archives, “Address of the Governor Council and Assembly of the province of Massachusetts Bay to Queen Ann, Respecting the Expedition against Port Royal and Nova Scotia and asking that Forts may be established after this reduction – 22 August 1710,” in A Volume of papers relating to affairs at Annapolis Royal – From the year 1710 to 1714. RG 1, vol. 7½, no. 1, microfilm 15220.
170 Ibid., 1-2.
its Capt. Jeremiah Tay on the shore around Port Royal river, Nicholson’s expeditionary
forces, which anchored just past Goat Island on September 24,\textsuperscript{172} outnumbered the French
forces stationed at Port Royal.\textsuperscript{173} While Nicholson called a Council of War to discuss the best
positions for a camp and further steps, the French moved their inhabitants into the fort for the
impending battle.\textsuperscript{174}

After a few days of rainy warfare,\textsuperscript{175} “two French officers an Ensign and Sergeant
with a Drummer came out of the Fort with a Flag of Truce, and brought our General a letter
from Monsieur Subercase.”\textsuperscript{176} In the days that followed, Nicholson and Subercase, the
Governor at Port Royal, fought on land and on paper. Subercase initially opened this avenue
of communication to seek protection for officers’ wives in the fort and surrounding woods.\textsuperscript{177}
The conversation quickly turned to the art of gentlemanly warfare and the language barrier
between the pair.\textsuperscript{178} While the two bickered in their letters, the siege continued around
them.\textsuperscript{179} Between September 30 and October 1, Subercase first broached the subject of
capitulation in his letters. Subercase wrote to Nicholson that “to prevent the spilling of both
English and French Blood, I am ready to hold up both hands for a Capitulation that will be
honourable to both of us.”\textsuperscript{180} This approach to the ongoing siege was common in the context
of Europe’s emerging “age of limited warfare” that favoured capitulation.\textsuperscript{181} On October 1,
the British and French ceased fire. Articles of capitulation were agreed upon a day later, and the fort was formally transferred to the British on October 5.

The 12 articles of capitulation, which confirmed the fort’s surrender, made provisions for French officials and Acadian inhabitants. The French garrison were promised safe passage to France, and there were options for inhabitants to travel to Placentia or Canada. Those who chose to stay within a three-mile radius of the fort would be protected for two years. In return, an oath of allegiance to the British Crown was expected of the French subjects. This was a common practice in British treaty making at the time, but would continue to be a point of contention in northeastern North America throughout the eighteenth century.

While the French tried to protect as much as possible in the fallout of the siege, the British savoured what was gained. The Council of War met on October 14 to craft a memorial for the Queen recounting their conquest. In the memorial, the Council proclaimed to Queen Anne that they were blessed to have “reduced to your Royall obedience; the Fort of Port Royall, (now Annapolis Royall) the only fortified place; in all the vast terrorys of L’Accadie and Nova Scotia.” The Council also believed that this conquest added the swath of space between the St. Croix River, the Cape Gaspe, and mouth of the St. Lawrence River to the Queen’s imperial holdings. These territorial claims brought the prospect of an expanded and enriched British Empire with greater access to natural resources, such as

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187 Ibid., 1-2.
timber and fish. The public was also made aware of the empire’s good fortune in Acadia. In late October, Governor Dudley proclaimed that November 16 was to be a day for thanksgiving in the provinces of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire.

The conquest of 1710 was the result of years of strained British-French relations in northeastern North America and the plotting of a few enterprising men. France could not combat this threat and negotiations reflected this position, but most Acadians were not fazed by the most recent attack on Port Royal and thought life would eventually return to normal. The year 1710 was significant, though, because the French never returned to power in the region after decades of back and forth imperial jockeying. Reid described the siege of 1710 as “the achievement of the new British nation,” which was “a recent and emerging construction no matter how much earlier historical developments were mined for the legitimacy they might lend.” The year 1710 was a turning point in empire. While the definition of conquest and its applicability to these events can be squabbled over, there was a shift in northeastern North America. Empire was changing, and the public was becoming aware of this transformation. At this stage, empire could still take many forms, and 1710 provided new spaces for British imperialists to imagine their future. Some of these prospective futures found their way onto maps where they were met with local realities. The Plan of Annapolis created during the siege of Port Royal is a snapshot of this time and place in British imperialism.

188 Ibid., 2.
191 Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 131.
3.3: Taking Stock on the Battlefield

The conquest in 1710 was a single step in a much larger process,\textsuperscript{194} and as Lennox has explained, “making territorial claims would not be easy because Nova Scotia had to be invented as an imperial territory before it could be claimed.”\textsuperscript{195} Maps were important to grounding imperial fictions within a given landscape. The British were in the middle of a relatively unproductive period of cartographic production at the beginning of the eighteenth century, though.\textsuperscript{196} With few theoretical or practical advancements,\textsuperscript{197} British cartographers sent from New England faced a challenging situation.\textsuperscript{198} Plan of Annapolis, like the conquest, was one of the first steps in this process of validating imperial claims. The remainder of the chapter will discuss the history of cartography in England as well as analysing the map as a reflection of imperial prospects and local realities.

England largely depended on French and Dutch maps through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{199} The Dutch were considered master cartographers, and most representations of English coasts and harbours came from their desks during this period.\textsuperscript{200} English reliance on these Dutch works dissipated around 1670, when publication began to be promoted from within the country.\textsuperscript{201} French maps continued to be frequently used, but increased publication efforts in England aided the expansion of the field. Colonizing

\textsuperscript{194} Plank, \textit{An Unsettled Conquest}, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{195} Lennox, \textit{Homelands and Empires}, 54.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Ibid.}, 180.
\textsuperscript{199} John E. Crowley, “‘Taken on the Spot’: The Visual Appropriation of New France for the Global British Landscape,” in \textit{Canadian Historical Review}, 86, 1 (March 2005), 11.
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Ibid.}, 103.
activities were also an inciting factor in the development of English cartography. In the eighteenth century, maps were increasingly referenced to assert territorial sovereignty, and this resulted in a greater need for accuracy.

In the colonies, English cartographers had traditionally created coastal charts without detailing settlements. Following the medieval portolan tradition, these charts only identified large landmarks. While this did not help to develop an understanding of colonial towns, these reconnaissance maps did serve army and navy officers who were “concerned with the spatial problem of bringing military forces to bear in a given landscape.” When military cartographers ventured past the coastlines they often created manuscript maps focused on terrain, which was shown in relief. Maps were appended to reports sent to both civilian and military colonial authorities on either side of the Atlantic. These maps were then used to plan settlements or military activities. Plan of Annapolis (Map 3.2) fits within this history of English military mapping in the colonies. Without a clearly identifiable cartographer attached to the map, these traditions and similar productions will be used to assess the uniqueness of the map’s qualities.

A benchmark for Plan of Annapolis is the work that was completed by British cartographers for the Hudson’s Bay Company. Much like other maps created by the British,
the company only produced maps when necessary. However, an unofficial policy for mapmaking did evolve between 1670 and 1770. Coastal exploration expanded into the interior in the late seventeenth century, but this was not extensive, as the company had to combat competing French claims. Accordingly, maps from the era were primarily concerned with coastlines that would assist movement and validate the company’s territorial claims. Like the British maps of Hudson’s Bay, Plan of Annapolis was an early, but accurate, representation of a new territorial claim. The subject matter of the composition focused along the coasts, and combated French authority in the region. The map was both a practical and ideological tool. It provided useful geographic information and supported imperial fantasies for its audiences, which included the Board of Trade and French officials in Canada.


210 Ibid., 28.
211 Ibid., 125-6.
212 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 54.
213 Nova Scotia Archives, “Council of War address to Vaudreil respecting surrender of Port Royal – stopping Indian hostilities with enclosures of - 11 October 1710,” in A Volume of papers relating to affairs at Annapolis Royal – From the year 1710 to 1714. RG 1, vol. 7½, no. 4, microfilm 15220.
Names on maps of colonial northeastern North America played a crucial role in imperial agendas. As imperial powers attempted to assert their sovereignty in a given area, specific names would be employed to stake claims. Consequently, the names used on maps represent the tension between competing powers.\textsuperscript{214} Reid makes this point in his discussion of Nova Scotia’s name, and it is also applicable to \textit{Plan of Annapolis}. The full title on the map reads: \textit{Plan of Annapolis, late Port Royal Fort, the principal place of strength in Nova Scotia in Lat. 44.25: Surrendered to Her Majesty’s Arms under the Command of Colonel Francis Nicholson after 8 days siege in October 1710} (Map 3.2).\textsuperscript{215} The use of both Annapolis and Port Royal recognizes the transitory state that followed the siege. Additional details about the successful conquest suggest a British triumph that would prospectively overshadow the fort’s French past. However, the mapmaker was quick to remind viewers that this was a recent French past. The fort was recognized as “the principal place of strength in Nova Scotia,” reflecting earlier British claims, and suggesting a return to imperial order in the region. British claims to this new territory were also supported by the mapmaker’s reference to the fort’s latitude. The inclusion of Lat. 44.25 in the title attempted to rationalize the space and created an unquestionable claim to this specific place.

The mapmaker continued to express imperial hopes and local realities in their representation of land. The land, which covers most of the composition, is broken up into multiple sections using shading and borders. By visually categorizing the space into different environments, the map rationalized the space and familiarized British officials with a new imperial claim. Part of this differentiation of space relied on the use of hatching. Through the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{214} Reid with contributions by Baker, \textit{Essays on Northeastern North America}, 89-90.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{215} “Plan of Annapolis Royall Fort the principall place of Strength in Nova Scotia in America, 1710” is the title on the file at the Nova Scotia Archives and has been used as to identify the map in bibliographic entries.}
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, hatching was popular around shorelines.\textsuperscript{216} This is evident around Hoggs Island (Map 3.3) and Goat Island (Map 3.4). However, the application of hatching was not consistently applied to other parts of the map. Hatching was used to a small extent in the area surrounding the fort (Map 3.5). The cartographer was expressing hydrographic differences between marshier terrain, shallow waters and the solid ground the fort sat on. Differentiation was important for navigation in the area, and demonstrated the cartographer’s presumption that other British ships would be landing at Annapolis in the future. Local knowledge of the area expressed a mastery of the landscape that allowed the cartographer to make a significant imperial claim to authority in the region shortly after the conquest.

One of the environments the cartographer featured was the area’s forests. Much of the territory represented on the map is populated by neatly positioned, stylized trees (Map 3.6). This

sanitized the thick woods around the settlement and brought it into the realm of imperial order. Considering the recent historical context, it was important for this map of the region to impose this structure and give the viewer the impression that the British were in control. This design was also in keeping with the British cartographic style before 1750. Typically, forests were symbolized by singular trees with shadows stretching toward the east. While the cartographer did not follow the normal procedure with their shadows, the trees still maintain British imperial structure. The representation would have been easily recognizable for viewers, and therefore able to reinforce imperial claims in this newly acquired territory.

Another important environment depicted on the map are marshes. The legend noted two instances of marshes at points three and five (Map 3.7). Point three marks a “large morasses which by draining & daming out the heigh tyds made a great part arable.” On the map, both areas are shaded in a darker gray and the vegetation looks like grassy brush rather than the trees found elsewhere. Point three also includes dotted strips of crops and a few scattered homes. (Map 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10) This representation, in addition to the legend’s description, continued to

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217 Lynam, *The Mapmaker’s Art*, 41.
define the space for British viewers. The cartographer’s ability to categorize this space indicated a mastery of the landscape and the imposition of imperial authority. However, this information relied upon French experiences and the ways in which they adapted to their environment. At the point of the conquest, British officials could only hope to employ the landscape in the same ways or better than their French counterparts. The inclusion of the marshes, and instructions about their use represent British hopes for a prosperous future in the Bay of Fundy area. It also reflects the agricultural and economic promises made before the siege was undertaken. The marshes therefore confirm the reliability and power of the British empire in northeastern North America.

The legend also noted points of settlement on the map. The first settlement is rather small and found within the marshy regions in the map’s lower left corner (point 2, Map 3.11). Scattered homes, shown from the front or in perspective, were placed between rows of crops. This placement suggests the connection between people and
agriculture, as well as the general productivity of the region. Agricultural production was an important aspect of the marketing of the conquest to stakeholders, and this reminder would have helped to support the importance of the conquest. The vague representation of the houses also allows the viewer to attach their own meaning to the illustrations, subsequently creating a bond to this new imperial holding. The second settlement surrounds the fort and was described as “the severall houses & inclosures of the inhabitants,” (point 16, Map 3.12). A bird’s-eye view of buildings, despite the dissimilarity from the other houses, was common practice through the early eighteenth century. The cartographer’s use of this common form of representation made this new geography legible to British viewers as they transitioned into a new role in the region.

Just above the settlement, the legend noted the shores where British forces landed for the siege (point 4, Map 3.13). In addition to this point, two other points of military

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218 Ibid., 43.
importance were located on the map. These include: the placement of the cannons and ammunition (point 17, Map 3.13), as well as where the regiments were encamped (point 19, Map 3.13). Given the title of the map and its military context, this illustration of events would have aided viewers in understanding the conquest’s narrative. In addition, these points would have increased the British viewers’ familiarity with the territory, and their sense of local knowledge. A copy of the map was enclosed in a letter to Governor Vaudrille in New France. The letter to Vaudrille detailed the articles of capitulation and reminded the French governor that non-compliance would ensure the Acadians’ harm.219 The military narrative portrayed by the map continued to serve as a reminder of France’s recent losses, and demonstrate British imperial power.

The military narrative also continues if these three points are triangulated (Map 3.14). The viewers’ eyes are drawn through the fort and the highlighted space between the points encompasses the primary place of settlement within the banlieu. This effectively focused the viewers’ attention on the conquest’s primary gains. A triumphant military narrative was therefore supported by the

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219 Nova Scotia Archives, “Council of War address to Vaudreil respecting surrender of Port Royal,” RG 1, vol. 7½, no. 4, microfilm 15220.
map’s composition. Despite differences in orientation and scale, this framing of the fort and surrounding settlements also resembles De Labat’s 1708 map. This continuity reaffirms the connection between a military presence, and the maintenance of colonial settlements. The fort and settlement are symbols of imperial authority that both the French and English used to support their territorial claims.

The fort is a prominent feature of the military narrative. Points 6-15 on the legend include the fort and its component parts (Map 3.15), easily making it the most detailed portion of the map. The features included were: provisions (point 7); a bake house and forge (point 8); magazines (points 9, 10); lodgings for the garrison (point 11); houses for the governor and lieutenant-governor (points 12, 13); a chapel (point 14); and a bastion directed towards the river (point 15). The cartographer’s decision to represent the fort in this manner provided a comprehensive backdrop for the events of the siege. Viewers could better image the narratives provided to them, and this would have aided in the validation of British imperial claims in the region. In addition, these details provided a sense of life within the fort, and suggest an intimate level of knowledge. This reflected the success of the siege because a British cartographer was given access to this information. As a result, the representation of the fort glorified imperial claims, and demonstrated the imposition of British authority in the region. The fort’s importance was also enhanced by its central position in the composition. When the rule-of-thirds is applied to the map, the fort is situated on the upper band of the central square (Map 3.16). This position draws the viewer’s eye and underscores the importance of the military narrative.
The focus on the fort may also indicate a lack of information about the rest of the region. In comparison to De Labat’s representation, *Plan of Annapolis*’ fort is larger in scale and more detailed. However, the area surrounding the fort lacks the same specificity. By making the fort a focal point within the composition, the cartographer may have been compensating for the lack of detail elsewhere, and distracting viewers from these informational gaps. These compositional decisions therefore allowed the cartographer to maintain a triumphant military narrative while British claims were still being conceived.

Water is a central feature that snakes vertically up and down the middle of the map. This placement is the result of the map’s unique orientation, which positioned north towards the left of the composition. The orientation, combined with the stark contrast between the heavily lined coasts and blank waters, draws the viewer’s eye around the image. Following the narrative of the siege and the numbering from the legend, the eye begins at the bottom of the map and moves upwards. This suggests progress that ultimately supports a positive association with the siege. In addition, the placement of Goat Island creates a barrier that discourages the viewer’s eye from leaving the composition from this point (Map 3.17).
Attention is then focused on action in the harbour, which further supports the importance of the conquest’s narrative and British success. Without an exit at the bottom of the map, the eye inevitably continues up to the two rivers which branch into the landscape beyond the map’s borders. The cartographer used the water’s placement to reinforce the importance of the siege narrative, and suggest the prospective expansion of British imperial claims across the landscape.

While the legend provided an extensive account of the landmasses represented on the map, a feature that it did not describe was the small cross symbol near the fort (Map 3.18). In her cataloguing of the plan and other maps from the period, Dawson argued that the symbol corresponded with a large cross that was erected by the Acadians between the church and town-centre.\(^{220}\) One possible explanation for the lack of detail about the cross is that it was such a prominent feature of the community that it did not require labeling. This suggests a familiarity with the region and its people amongst the cartographer and their viewers. Alternatively, this partial erasure of Catholicism could have been done to assuage

\(^{220}\) Dawson, *The Mapmaker’s Eye*, 78.
stakeholders. Some of the conquest’s supporters had hoped to create a Protestant settlement in the Bay of Fundy region, and the omission of a label may have suggested that a conversion process was imminent. Much like the first option, this explanation for the lack of detail presents a British mastery over the landscape, and the religion of its people.

A starker omission from the plan is the Indigenous presence in the area. Nicholson’s journal clearly states that the British regiments and Indigenous peoples fired on each other. What’s more, the publication of the journal would have ensured that the public was aware of the Indigenous presence around the siege, and their resistance to the British presence in the region. This earlier openness may suggest that the Mi’kmaq were not purposefully removed from the map’s composition. Rather, the cartographer may not have encountered Indigenous peoples at Annapolis Royal during the conquest, and the map reflected this absence of experience. However, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples sustained an illusion of British imperial power that benefited the public image of the Crown in North America. This was particularly important considering the larger context of Queen Anne’s War overarching the conquest. The Wabanaki were aligned with the French, and their omission from the map allowed the British to skew the war’s narrative in their favour. Additionally, the siege’s promotion as a civilizing project may have influenced the cartographer’s omission. Without an Indigenous presence, viewers were presented a tabula rasa that could not oppose the application of a British Protestant colony. In either case, the cartographer overlooked local realities in favour of imperial claims and prospective futures.

3.4: Conclusion

In the decades that followed the conquest of 1710, British cartography flourished and the public became increasingly interested in on-the-spot landscape representations.²²³ Plan of Annapolis predated these major shifts in British visual culture, but it was a part of the transition between imperial powers. When considering the impact of 1710, this transition is an important factor. Conquest is defined as “the subjugation and assumption of control of a place or people by military force.”²²⁴ By this definition, the events of 1710 should be considered a conquest of a British military force over the French in this specific region. Evidence from the British map of the siege confirms this conclusion. This military effort was considered a conquest in its own time and this must be respected. However, Indigenous peoples were not involved in this transaction, and the map does not suggest this was a large-scale conquest that ceded all of France’s holdings in northeastern North America. The conquest of 1710 was not a watershed moment, but it was a significant European shift in the region. This was something worth recording in a precise manner, and the map was a testament to this moment of transition.

The events of 1710 were the result of years of tension between the English and French in northeastern North America, enterprising merchants, and favourable circumstances for Nicholson and his men. This was not the end of the struggle in the region. The articles of capitulation allowed the Acadians living within the banlieue to remain unharmed for two years, and there was still a belief that the French would return to power. Vetch and his troops were left to tangibly establish British imperialism in the newly named Annapolis Royal. The

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/conquest
cartographer’s military map was one of the first steps in this process following the siege. The straightforward *Plan of Annapolis* was created as a military map that infused imperial claims with the beginnings of local knowledge. Prospects at this turning point could not expand past these claims, and the attack’s promoted goals were addressed to a lesser degree. These claims would soon be put to the test as the combatants approached the Treaty of Utrecht.
Chapter Four: Redrawing Borders: The Establishment of Annapolis Royal

While celebrations were held to commemorate the conquest of Port Royal, Vetch started in his new position as the commander at Annapolis Royal.\textsuperscript{225} The British Atlantic could not be generalized as a homogenous culture under a single legal and governmental system,\textsuperscript{226} and Acadia brought new challenges to governing. As the region’s inhabitants, both Acadian and Mi’kmaq, fought to maintain their lifeways, the English struggled to enforce their own order.\textsuperscript{227} This transition to British power following the conquest was difficult, and the process did not end when the Treaty of Utrecht was signed. Although “Nova Scotia” was years from being realized, it became a regional interest after 1710,\textsuperscript{228} and the policies that came out of the colony had far reaching impacts in North America.\textsuperscript{229}

This chapter assesses the impacts of the conquest of 1710, and the imposition of British rule in Acadia. Focused on the period between 1710 and 1713, it will discuss: the beginning of Vetch’s time in office at Annapolis Royal, including the responses of his troops; the Acadians and their responses; and the Mi’kmaq response to the new government. The conquest led the British to make larger territorial claims in the region. This chapter’s second section analyses a memorandum written by Cyprian Southack that defined the boundaries of British power as they were understood in late-1710. The following sections discuss the

\textsuperscript{225} Nova Scotia Archives, “Copy of a Memoriall of the Council of War, relating to ye settlements of Annapolis Royal. Dated Oct. the 14\textsuperscript{th} 1710,” RG 1, vol. 5, no. 2, microfilm 15220, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{227} John G. Reid with contributions by Emerson W. Baker, Essays on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 104.
\textsuperscript{228} Jeffers Lennox, Homelands and Empires: Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, and Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1600-1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 47.
Walker expedition on Quebec, the Treaty of Utrecht, and early Peace and Friendship treaties because the conquest was spun into a larger imperial narrative. Despite the formal claims made in the treaties and the more informal aspirations that sprang from the conquest, European empire continued to be a fantasy in the region. This fantasy was not unimportant though. Imperial aspirations were important regardless of their real-world applicability because they reinforced the idea of an imperial future in North America, supported further expansionist ventures, and led to the Crown’s increased sense of authority within the region. Local knowledge, or the lack thereof, was important to the transition from fiction to reality and in the creation of cartographic records that documented these changes.

4.1: Vetch’s Command at Annapolis Royal

The British forces that had taken Port Royal were convinced that they had successfully established the Crown’s authority in the region, and they began to aspire to further imperial expansion. In a congratulatory address to the Queen, General Nicholson and the Council of War announced that:

We have concluded all the said expedition against Port Royall Fort and brought it under Your Majesty’s Obedience. And have declared all to be done which the season of the year cann allow, and left it in the possession of Coll. Samuel Vetch by the name of Annapolis Royall.²³⁰

As the council and many of the soldiers who had made up the conquering forces dispersed following the transfer of power into British hands, Vetch was left to maintain Her Majesty’s claims. Improvements were made to the French fortification, and small army and naval forces were able to keep Annapolis Royal under British rule while Vetch was in office. Still,

²³⁰ Nova Scotia Archives, “Address of General Nicholson and the Council of War to the Queen about the division of the Conquered country,” RG 1, vol. 7 1/2, no. 6, microfilm 15220, p. 1.
Vetch was a military officer commanding the region without a legislative assembly, and multiple groups reacted negatively to his actions.

Between 1650-1720 the British population in Europe was decreasing, and as a result migration also declined. Without a significant boost from either New England or Britain, the British population from 1710-1713 at Annapolis consisted primarily of those living in the garrison. Immediately after the conquest this included 500 troops, but numbers would continue to dwindle over the period. The troops stationed at Annapolis Royal were denied the plunder they believed they had been promised upon volunteering for the expedition. Discontented with the conquest’s outcome, the troops faced harsh conditions in the dilapidated fort. In a May 1711 letter to the Lord Treasurer, Vetch explained that he had to draw for the Country troops full pay because they “had no cloathing from the Country save only a thin Livery Coat.” In a letter to Lord Dartmouth from the same month, Vetch lamented that death and desertion had led to the loss of at least 114 men following a cold winter in a new climate.

While his troops scrambled for shoes, stockings, shirts, and cravats, Vetch dreamed of establishing a regiment under his command. This disconnect between the garrison’s reality and Vetch’s fantasies would continue to be an issue as he pushed for his own

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aggrandizement. Vetch lacked support from Britain because parliament was focused on other wartime issues, such as the Walker Expedition and conflicts in Europe.\textsuperscript{240} Within his first year as commander at Annapolis Royal the British and New Englanders were so divided that the existence of the garrison was in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{241} Forced to rely on merchants in New England to support the settlement, Vetch believed that he would also have to turn to the Acadians for labour and trade.\textsuperscript{242} This move was a product of necessity, but it also acknowledged the Acadians’ skill in navigating life in the region. Vetch’s reliance on the Acadian’s local knowledge displayed the connection between colonial realities and imperial prospects as the commander struggled to maintain control. This adoption of Acadian lifeways allowed for their persistence following the conquest despite a new imperial administration.

Vetch relied on Acadian knowledge to sustain his rule, but he also imposed a system that changed community life in economic, political, and social spheres.\textsuperscript{243} Vetch’s initial plan was to use the Acadians as pawns in negotiations between Canada and New England,\textsuperscript{244} a position that was espoused in the Council of War’s address to Vaudreil after the conquest.\textsuperscript{245} He also struggled to trust the Acadians’ loyalty, and subsequently treated the inhabitants as an exploitable resource when his request to remove the Acadians was ignored by the Crown in 1711. This exploitation was manifest in Vetch’s extensive levying of the Acadians to supply the garrison.\textsuperscript{246} By 1712, Vetch had changed his tactics to reflect his experiences at

\textsuperscript{240} Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 58-9.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{245} Nova Scotia Archives, “Council of War address to Vaudreil respecting surrender of Port Royal – stopping Indian hostilities with enclosures of - 11 October 1710,” in A Volume of papers relating to affairs at Annapolis Royal – From the year 1710 to 1714. RG 1, vol. 7½, no. 4, microfilm 15220.
\textsuperscript{246} Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 131-2.
Annapolis Royal. Reflecting on earlier Tory arguments, Vetch determined that he would have to keep the Acadians to meet his needs for labour and trade. In addition, Vetch feared that if they were sent to New France, the Acadians’ collective potential as subjects could be harnessed against the British. This stance continued to have currency in the following generation, and the Acadians remained for the time being. 247

The 481 persons who lived in the banlieu248 were left in their homes and protected by the articles of capitulation. In her work on Acadian history, N.E.S. Griffiths evaluated the conquest’s impacts as causing “no radical change in the daily round of much of Acadian life.”249 Some Acadians accommodated British rule, acting as pilots and liaisons for example, but without a militia or large scale taxation the British state did not weigh heavily on daily life. In addition, English law excluded the Acadians from participating in multiple facets of public life because they were Roman Catholic. These conditions hindered Vetch’s ability to administer the countryside, so his control was effectively limited to the fort and its immediate surroundings. These were familiar circumstances for the Acadians. From 1670-1710 Port Royal saw the rule of eleven different governors or deputy-governors, and financial insecurity added to the general instability of the French administration.250 Without effective imperial supervision, the Acadians enjoyed an independence that continued into British rule.251 In January 1711, Acadian resistance began in the region.252 Major pushback was felt in the banlieu, where Acadians were divided in their support of British authority. Vetch

247 Ibid., 59.
248 Nova Scotia Archives, “Roll of Families at Port Royal within three miles circuit of the Fort being 481 persons at the occupation. October 20, 1710,” RG 1, vol. 7 1/2, no. 9, microfilm 15220.
249 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 251.
252 Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 133.
reported to Lord Dartmouth in June 1711 that the few Acadians who had taken the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown were being harassed by their neighbours and local priests. The resulting unrest led Vetch to request support at Annapolis Royal and an attack on Canada to balance power in the region.253

Acadians who resisted British efforts argued that the French would soon regain power in the region.254 Even Subercase, who had surrendered the fort to Vetch, shared a plan to return Acadia to the French with the Minister of the Marine in 1711.255 French imperial authority had turned their attention to Ile Royale, though.256 Although they had not abandoned hopes of reclaiming their lost territory,257 Ile Royale presented an opportunity to develop the French fishery, and control the St Lawrence.258 French officials made efforts to persuade the Acadians to move elsewhere following the conquest, but the decision to move was complicated by their attachment to the land.259

Many of the Indigenous people surrounding Annapolis Royal permanently moved away from the immediate area following the events of 1710.260 However, both the Abanaki and Mi’kmaq continued to be a dominant presence in the region. In their refusal to accept British claims, the Wabanaki confederacy began resistance efforts against British authorities during the summer of 1711.261 A Council of War met in early June, fearing that they would no longer be able to maintain power at Annapolis Royal following attacks. The letter

254 Ibid.
255 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 53-4.
256 Ibid., 57.
257 Ibid., 46.
260 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 40.
261 Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 135.
explained that Vetch was in the process of contacting the New England government for reinforcements. Many men had been lost, including the fort’s military engineer Major Forbes. 262 18 men, including Forbes, were killed and 10 were wounded while collecting materials to repair the fortifications surrounding the woods. Vetch reported this serious loss to Lord Dartmouth, and indicated that members of the Wabanaki confederacy were to blame for this attack, as well as a blockade occurring on land. 263 Major Forbes’ death at such a critical point in the reconstruction of the fort would have been a terrible blow to the maintenance of British authority. In addition, the absence of a military engineer may explain the lack of cartographic representations in the period immediately following the conquest.

4.2: Making Territorial Claims

The British required geographic information to support their imperial prospects, and their accompanying territorial claims. From 1710 to 1726, “European powers worked to marshal geographic evidence that could anticipate an Acadia or Nova Scotia that did not yet exist.” 264 The British were at a disadvantage in this competition for territorial claims because of their dependence on French and Dutch cartographic records. 265 In addition, British officials at Annapolis Royal were more concerned with local issues than with the definition of Nova Scotia’s boundaries immediately following the conquest. However, British attentions shifted to boundaries in the lead up to the Treaty of Utrecht. 266 In 1712, the Board

263 Nova Scotia Archives, “Governor Vetch to Lord Dartmouth. Annapolis Royal June 18, 1711,” RG 1, vol. 7 1/2, no. 21, microfilm 15220.
264 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 46.
266 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 53-4.
of Trade developed maps of Nova Scotia’s borders to make their imperial claims. One of the sources available to the Board of Trade’s was Captain Cyprian Southack.

Southack was born in London in 1662, but soon found himself at sea. In 1685, he settled in Boston, where he worked as a cartographer and privateer. Five years after his arrival, the Massachusetts government hired Southack as the commander of the man-of-war *Mary* to protect New England’s coasts and shipping ventures. Southack was also involved in multiple naval expeditions across northeastern North America, including the conquest in 1710 and Quebec Expedition. Through this work, Southack became what Roger Marsters has described as an “intercultural communicator,” who adapted British naval strategies to the North American environment. As an agent of the Massachusetts government, Southack continued to gain local knowledge of the coasts that he documented in his mapmaking and manuscript descriptions. Southack’s body of work, which includes *New England Coasting Pilot*, demonstrated his abilities as “an enthusiastic, if not always reliable, mapmaker.” Generally, his work provided information to guide coastal navigation, and made observations about the possible uses of the coasts.

Not all of Southack’s geographic works were confined to visual records. On October 16, 1710 Southack wrote a memorandum on Nova Scotia’s boundaries used by British officials and sent to the French governor at Quebec. In his memorandum, Southack claimed that Nova Scotia’s coastlines spanned from:

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271 Ibid.
St Georges to Grand-Manoan 45 leagues from thence to St Johns 14 from thence to Schednecto 40 from thence to Port Royall Entry 45 from thence to Cape Table 35 from thence to ye Gutt of Canier 85 from thence to Cape St Lawrence on Cape Brittoon Island 30 from thence to Cape Gaspe in Canada Rover 122 from thence to Pisquitt ye Bay of Sillione 30 from thence to Schednecto ye Bounds by Land 4 miles.272

These dimensions effectively encompassed present-day Nova Scotia, and valuable fishing grounds between Cape Breton and the St. Lawrence River. Map 4.1 marks eight of the points Southack described at their modern-day approximations, including: St. George, Grand Manan Island, and St. John in New Brunswick; Chignecto Bay; Annapolis Royal; Cape St. Lawrence; Gaspé; and the region around Grand Pré. Modern equivalents for Cape Table and the Gutt of Canier could not be found using historical name databases. Based on the distances Southack provided in his memorandum, these points were likely located along Nova Scotia’s southern and eastern shores. The red polygon surrounding the area is meant to represent a general guideline for the coasts that could be included within Nova Scotia’s borders based on the location of his reference points.

In his interpretation of Southack’s memorandum, Jeffers Lennox summarized the boundaries as “starting at the St George River in the Dawnland and cutting through the

thickly forested interior to the Gaspé, down through the narrow Gut of Canso and around the
eastern coast of the peninsula.” This suggests that, while Cape St. Lawrence is at the
northern tip of Cape Breton Island, Southack’s borders for Nova Scotia did not include the
island itself. Instead, Southack claimed that the British simply held the waters to the west of
the island.

The differences in Maps 4.1 and 4.2 highlight the difficulties posed by a
textual record of geographic holdings. For
a pilot, such as Southack, who was
familiar with the region this memorandum
would have been relatively easy to follow
despite its lack of directions. This reflects
the importance of local knowledge to both
define the boundaries and understand their
meaning. However, the memorandum was attached to documents that were sent to the French
at Quebec, and the Board of Trade in London shortly after the conquest of 1710. These
audiences would have brought very different experiences and frames of reference to their
interpretations of Southack’s borders.

The question of Cape Breton’s inclusion or exclusion from territorial claims reflected
different imperial plans for the region. Cape Breton had potential as a natural extension of

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British claims from mainland Nova Scotia, as well as providing harbours for fishing activities. Canso, in particular, was a fishing base that had been used by the French and British since the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{276} The short distance between Canso and Cape Breton may have made the island a potentially beneficial holding to support claims to these fishing grounds. However, imperial forces did not show a sustained interest in Canso until 1718.\textsuperscript{277} The understanding of Acadia’s limits also effected Cape Breton’s inclusion or exclusion from British imperial claims. Based on Southack’s memorandum, the British felt that the conquest of 1710 gave them rights to a much larger territory than the fortifications at Annapolis Royal. As Acadia’s self-proclaimed inheritors, the British were responsible for determining the boundaries that would be imperially beneficial. In the years to come, Cape Breton’s inclusion or exclusion continued to be a variable that changed depending on the shifting balance of power.

Cape Breton was not unique. Ambiguity was a hallmark of French and British conceptions of geography in this region during the eighteenth century. In addition to the creation of maps, manuscript charts were produced to assist in the understanding of northeastern North America. Mariners often created their own manuscript charts when they were without other printed charts or directions. These records included hydrographic details, such as water depth and currents, that the manuscript’s creator would use personally or share with peers.\textsuperscript{278} In the eighteenth century, there were two ways that this valuable information was acquired: a hydrographic survey or lived experience.\textsuperscript{279} Southack’s memorandum

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{278} Marsters, “Approaches to Empire,” 45.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 14.
provided his audiences with a relatively simple report on the geography. While charts in this period often followed the Medieval portolan tradition, and therefore focused on identifying landmarks rather than providing extreme detail,\(^{280}\) this memorandum only provided place names and the distances between them. No directions or identifying features are mentioned, let alone hydrographic details that would help other mariners successfully navigate the waters. This suggests that Southack did not intend for his audiences to use the document to travel within the region. Instead, the list of locations and the boundary they meant to create gave the British local knowledge to support imperial schemes.

The lack of hydrographic details may also be a result of the way the memorandum was created. Rather than conducting a survey at the time of writing, Southack may have relied upon his past experiences and vernacular knowledge of the region. Descriptions from the Quebec Expedition indicate that their warships left Cape Sable Island on August 3 and arrived at eastern Cape Breton on August 8.\(^{281}\) While weather and other conditions would vary the amount of time it would have taken to cross this distance, the duration of travel in 1711 for this small portion of the total territory Southack claimed as Nova Scotia suggests substantial time was required to travel the entire boundary. The memorandum was dated October 16, 1710, just over a week after the conquest. Southack was part of the siege in 1710, and it is therefore likely that the boundary lines were created based on his past experiences of the region. This increases the margin for error in the figures he provided and supports the theory that the memorandum was used as a purely imperial rather than navigational tool.

\(^{280}\) *Ibid.*, 47.
The lack of substantial time between the conquest and the creation of the memorandum likely explains the variations in Port Royal/Annapolis Royal’s naming in the text. The memorandum is signed from “on board Her Majesty’s Ship Draggon in ye Bason Harbour of Annapolis Royall.” However, the text of the memorandum indicated Port Royall Entry as a reference point for Nova Scotia’s boundary. Southack’s sign-off celebrated the location’s recent transfer into British hands. Little time had elapsed since the conquest, though, and the use of Port Royal may have provided audiences with a familiar location to consult on available maps or other pieces of geographic information. The use of both names is not a poor reflection on the conquest’s impacts, but rather a practical solution for identifying Nova Scotia’s boundaries and situating readers in a familiar geography.

Regardless of names, Southack’s boundaries theoretically provided the British with expansive and valuable coastlines. In total, Southack accounted for 446 leagues between his markers and 4 miles of land. These were coastlines that the British had fished from for years, but had lacked political grounds for occupying the harbours. With Southack’s claims, British fishermen could stop drying their fish onboard their vessels and expand the fishery’s economic prospects. The memorandum’s ambiguities, lack of detail, and use of both Port Royal and Annapolis Royal left room for readers to imagine their own Nova Scotia. This prospect of British imperial expansion was rooted in the local knowledge Southack provided, and was facilitated by his memorandum.

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283 Dawson, The Mapmaker’s Eye, 43.
284 Dawson, The Mapmaker’s Eye, 40.
4.3: The Walker Expedition

Creating geographic information was a persistent issue for the British in northeastern North America. Capitalizing on the success of the conquest, Nicholson traveled to London and gained the ministry’s approval for an attack on Quebec.\textsuperscript{285} Admiral Hovenden Walker was placed at the head of this mission. Walker was a British naval commander with previous experience on both sides of the Atlantic, and had received a knighthood as well as the promotion to rear-admiral in the months before his attempted attack on Quebec.\textsuperscript{286} The fleet that left Boston in late July 1711 included approximately seventy ships to hold the 7500 troops and marines sent from Great Britain or gathered from the British colonies in North America. Vetch was among these ranks, having joined the expedition as the commander of the New England troops.\textsuperscript{287} The attacking forces entered the St Lawrence in August 1711.\textsuperscript{288}

Before reaching the fort at Quebec, though, the expedition suffered an overwhelming loss. On August 23, the fleet sailed too close to the St Lawrence’s north shore as they passed west of Anticosti Island.\textsuperscript{289} When a severe storm began, eight ships were wrecked and 889 seamen lost. The remaining fleet was rescued, but the expedition was abandoned after consulting local pilots. During his return to England, Walker lost his official records of the expedition in an explosion. While this left him unable to account for his actions, Walker did not face any formal consequences for the failed expedition. New Englanders, however, felt

\textsuperscript{285} Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 49.
\textsuperscript{288} Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 49.
the reproach of British settlers across the Atlantic. Settlers in New England were blamed for the failure because of their supposed apathy and the greed of local merchants.²⁹⁰

New England-born colonial agent Jeremiah Dummer penned an assessment of the failed endeavor in 1712, titled *A Letter to a Noble Lord concerning the Late Expedition to Canada*. Lennox notes that the pamphlet “offered an explanation for Walker’s failure while simultaneously emphasizing the success of Nicholson’s campaign against Port Royal.”²⁹¹ Dummer justified the expedition by arguing Canada’s importance to British imperial schemes. The British hoped to remove the French imperial presence in North America. Canada was both a French stronghold and a prospectively beneficial settlement for the British. Dummer argued that the British would have a captive market for manufactured goods, improved Indigenous relations, and a better hold on the fishery if they settled Canada. But because the expedition had failed, Dummer concluded that an imperial fiction of Nova Scotia had to be fostered to maintain power in northeastern North America. Thinking geographically was key to his proposed imperial fiction. Rather than focusing on the failed expedition, Dummer implored his readers to celebrate the conquest of 1710 that had secured Nova Scotia. British control of this territory removed the French threat on New England, and Dummer hoped it would also allow settlers to expand northwards.²⁹² Southack’s memorandum, with its extensive boundaries, supported the imperial fantasy Dummer was trying to foster amongst his readers in London.

The British success at Annapolis Royal was held as an important moment in the minds of people like Jeremiah Dummer in the wake of Walker’s failure. In *The ‘Conquest’ of*

²⁹⁰ Lennox, *Homelands and Empires*, 49.
²⁹¹ Ibid., 50.
²⁹² Ibid., 49-51.
Acadia Reid cautions historians who have linked the Quebec expedition to the conquest of 1710, and the later conquest of Canada.\textsuperscript{293} After all, Nova Scotia would continue to be a pale on the fringes of British authority in northeastern North America for another fifty years after the Walker Expedition.\textsuperscript{294} The conquest of 1710 and the Quebec expedition that it spawned were a part of a larger process, though. New Englanders were aspiring to a British empire in North America. Work, like Southack’s memorandum, represented these aspirations and the development of the idea of imperialism in the early eighteenth century that led to these expeditions. While a British empire in North America was not yet a reality, it was a potent idea that was brought to later negotiations.

\textbf{4.4: The Treaty of Utrecht and Its Implications}

Despite Southack’s claims that the British held a vast coastline in northeastern North America, by 1712 few New Englanders felt safe enough to leave fortified settlements.\textsuperscript{295} The settlers’ situation at Annapolis Royal was only slightly improved. Vetch continued to struggle to gain the necessary forces and funds to support the garrison. A letter from Vetch to Lord Dartmouth, dated January 1712, proposed the creation of a company of Indigenous men led by Major Livingston to supplement the forces at Annapolis Royal.\textsuperscript{296} In the same letter, Vetch bemoaned the lack of funding he was receiving that “hath so discouraged the Agent and all the Merchants here, that I shall be much difficulted to find credit enough for the

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\textsuperscript{293} Reid, et al., \textit{The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia}, xiii.
\textsuperscript{294} \textit{Ibid.}, 135.
Beyond paying the forces stationed within the garrison, Vetch struggled with his new military engineer: 200 men, a military engineer, and a commander had been sent from the failed Quebec Expedition to replace the garrison at Annapolis Royal in late 1711. George Vane, the new military engineer, had worked for the Republic of Venice and for the British at Newfoundland before he was assigned to the Quebec Expedition. Vane struggled to gain approval for his plans once he was stationed at Annapolis Royal.

Regardless of these issues, Vane reported in May 1712 that the garrison had made it through the winter peaceably. The transfer of troops from the Quebec Expedition had helped to stabilize the garrison. British officials stationed at Annapolis Royal were discussing trade agreements with the Mi’kmaq beyond the fortification’s walls. British-French relations were simultaneously improved following the last campaigning season of the war in North America. In The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, Reid and his colleagues argue that these circumstances provided the affected parties at Annapolis Royal the opportunity to begin negotiating the outcomes of the siege in 1710.

In Europe, imperial powers were meeting to end their conflicts on both sides of the Atlantic. The Treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713. The agreements signed at Utrecht were primarily determined by Britain and France, who made provisions to protect commercial and maritime claims. Both imperial powers scrambled for geographic information to assure

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297 Ibid., 3.
that they benefited from the negotiations. France had a great deal of experience in this form of diplomacy. Maps and other geographic reports were collected leading up to the negotiations that organized France’s North American claims into what Lennox has described as “a coherent, though imaginary, colony.”302 Jérome de Phélypeux, the French Secretary of State for the Marine and one of Vauban’s students,303 requested that French commissioners protected their fishery in northeastern North America. The French subsequently used their geographic information to argue that the Kennebec River was the boundary between New England and Acadia.304

The British were newer to the cartographic competition for Atlantic empire and had to operate on their rivals’ terms. As a rule, European powers negotiated their claims to empire from their positions within Europe.305 With its lower financial and military costs, treaty making was also favoured by colonial governments.306 Britain had limited cartographic materials to refer to during negotiations, but they had argued their territorial claims with the French using a map of North America in December 1712. While that map has since been lost, Herman Moll and John Senex’s maps of North America provide an example of the British understanding of their claims going into Utrecht (Maps 4.3 and 4.4). These maps offered stylized images of North America that supported imperial fantasies of authority and

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302 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 51.
304 Ibid.
expansion. The Crown hoped to maintain the monarchy’s claims to authority and land without imperial expansion. This reflected British wartime strategy in North America, which was concerned with conserving their overseas holdings. Acadia was located in the strategically valuable space between New England and the St. Lawrence, and provided access to the North Atlantic fishing stocks. The results of the treaty negotiations would determine who had access to this centrally positioned and potentially profitable region.

The treaty’s signatories eventually agreed that the French would maintain the majority of their power in Europe. In northeastern North America, the treaty ceded most of Acadia to the British, confirming their authority at Annapolis Royal. These terms were a part of a larger shift in international relations. However, boundary disputes continued after the treaty was signed. While the boundaries for commercial activities in northeastern North America were made clear, Acadia was never defined. Negotiators prioritized other territorial claims at Utrecht and decided that a future commission would review competing French and British demands. In the years that followed, Britain argued that Acadia’s

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309 Ibid., 30.
311 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 252-3.
312 Mancke, “Empire and State,” 185.
314 Lennox, Homelands and Empires, 51-2.
“ancient limits,” which they had gained in the treaty, continued to the St. Lawrence River and contained Cape Breton. The British set their sights on expanding their claims to new geographic holdings with the support of the Treaty of Utrecht. In addition, claiming the territory as a part of Acadia’s ancient limits would effectively remove the French imperial presence from the area and solidify the British position.

The French constructed their own geography to limit British-held Acadia to peninsular Nova Scotia. This protected their claims to Ile Royale and allowed the French to maintain a foothold in the region. France’s argument held for the next 50 years, allowing for their continued presence between the Masquash and Kennebec Rivers. The French success in northeastern North America reflects their proficiency in geographic matters. In Europe, the French had longstanding cartographic traditions and military engineers who valued mapmaking. These trends extended to overseas claims, and at the time of the treaty’s negotiation the French had been mapping Acadia for a hundred years. Faced with the Treaty of Utrecht’s ambiguous terms, the French mobilized these geographic records along with their extensive local knowledge to benefit their imperial claims.

Far from the negotiations at Utrecht, Vetch was dismissed from his post at Annapolis Royal and charged with misadministration. Geoffrey Plank argues that, even if Vetch had not been replaced, the Treaty of Utrecht’s outcomes effectively ended his original dreams of imperial expansion across northeastern North America. As this era drew to a close,

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315 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 406-7.
316 Ibid.
320 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, 61.
Nicholson took Vetch’s place at Annapolis Royal. Their claims confirmed, the British were now tasked with managing a new colony, and its varied inhabitants who were not willing to give up their autonomy.

The Acadians’ circumstances were altered because of the Treaty of Utrecht. Now a “border people of the English empire,” the Acadians were central figures in British plans to control the region. The treaty included clauses that protected certain Acadian rights. The Acadians were given a year to relocate or they would become British subjects. The treaty also recognized the Acadians’ right to religious freedom, even if they were to become the Crown’s subjects. This religious freedom posed multiple issues, the first of which was its disregard for the dream of a Protestant colony promoted before the conquest of 1710. Secondly, the treaty stated that religious freedom was to be defined by British law. In the early eighteenth century, there were many restrictions placed on British Catholics. Unable to hold office or practice law, Catholics also held limited rights to property. In Acadia, British officials dealt with property rights by waiving restrictions for an Acadian if they became a British subject. The decision to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown continued to be a fraught issue for the Acadians. British officials insisted upon an unconditional oath that would see the Acadians swear their allegiance or move from the region. Acadians debated the oath’s terms long after the Treaty of Utrecht was signed.

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322 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 257.
323 Ibid., 254.
324 Ibid., 255.
325 John Bartlet Brebner, New England’s Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada (New York: Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, 1927), 64.
326 Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme, 136-7.
327 Ibid., 139-40.
328 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 267.
The Treaty of Utrecht excluded the Indigenous peoples of North America with its European negotiations and signatories. The Wabenaki Confederacy actively resisted the treaty’s claims,\(^{329}\) which formalized British claims to authority within the region.\(^{330}\) Lennox explains that in the wake of the treaty, “the Wabenaki dominated this terrain and controlled access to it, preventing their enemies from mapping, knowing, and absorbing their surroundings into imperial space.”\(^{331}\) The conquest of 1710 was between two European powers. This resistance was therefore significant because European claims in northeastern North America relied on the maintenance of imperial fictions. In the years that followed the conquest and the signing of the treaty, settler experiences at Annapolis and Indigenous reactions limited the actual impacts of imperial prospects in the area. The British struggled to expand beyond fortifications and, as a result, lacked the local knowledge required to support their imperial claims. The British settlers’ vulnerability was exemplified by the threat the Mi’kmaq posed to Annapolis Royal in 1713.\(^{332}\) It would be just over ten years before another major cartographic representation of Annapolis Royal was undertaken (Map 4.5), coinciding with the signing of


\(^{331}\) Lennox, *Homelands and Empires*, 87.
\(^{332}\) Reid, “1686-1729: Imperial Intrusions,” 100.
Peace and Friendship Treaties between the Mi’kmaq and British officials.  

4.5: Peace and Friendship

British officials continually attempted to formalize territorial claims after the Treaty of Utrecht. William Dudley, the son of Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley, was a military officer and a member of the Massachusetts legislature involved in this claims process. Dudley was a part of multiple expeditions including the 1707 attack on Port Royal, the 1710 conquest, and the 1711 Walker expedition on Quebec before entering his political career. Through these and other experiences, Dudley came to be known by his peers as a “gentleman woodmen” with an extensive knowledge of the back country and land value. The peace conferences for the Treaty of Portsmouth (1713) were the first negotiations he participated in as a witness or commissioner. The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed between British officials and Indigenous groups mainly in the New Hampshire region. However, this was the first treaty to also involve Indigenous groups from what is now Canada, including the Wuastukwiuk, as well as some Mi’kmaq and Abenaki contingents. The framework of the peace and friendship agreement was not new, but Portsmouth did recognize Indigenous rights to gather and to live unmolested by British settlers. The presence of colonial officials, such as Dudley, highlights the importance of British imperial aspirations and local knowledge within these agreements. Dudley was present at multiple times.

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expeditions before he found himself at treaty negotiations. The events he participated in were closely linked to the expansion of British imperial authority in northeastern North America over their French counterparts. As they attempted to solidify their imperial authority through formal written agreements with Indigenous groups, the British needed to base their claims within local realities. Dudley and other individuals with similar experiences provided this support and continued to foster imperial aspirations in the region. Southack had a similar impact with his 1710 memorandum, exemplifying the importance of quantitatively small British events to the overall maintenance of imperial prospects.

Without better established relationships with Indigenous nations, the British had to continually make efforts to maintain alliances and treaties in the following years. From 1720-1786, the British negotiated more than thirty-two formal agreements with Indigenous peoples in northeastern North America.\textsuperscript{337} Dudley continued to be involved in these negotiations, which included the Treaties of 1725/26.\textsuperscript{338} The Treaty of Boston (1725), and Treaty No. 239 or Mascarene’s Treaty (1726) included much of the same terms as the earlier Treaty of Portsmouth, but had much grander aspirations. The British hoped to confirm their rights to Nova Scotia or Acadia as stated in the Treaty of Utrecht. The Mi’kmaq, Wuastukwiuk, and Abenaki were asked to recognize the Crown’s rule.\textsuperscript{339} However, no land was ceded in these treaties and the Indigenous groups involved only agreed to peace and friendship. Regardless of the outcomes, these treaties demonstrated the imperial aspirations of British officials in northeastern North America. The conquest of 1710 and the events that followed provided the necessary conditions for the British to feel justified in this claim to power.

\textsuperscript{337} Miller, \textit{Compact, Contract, Covenant}, 61-2.
\textsuperscript{339} Dickason, \textit{Canada’s First Nations}, 148.
4.6: Conclusion

British imperial power was not secured once the articles of capitulation were agreed upon and Vetch took control of the fort at the newly named Annapolis Royal. Vetch struggled to assert himself and British rule from his position in the garrison. Faced with financial constraints, the forces stationed at the fort suffered from a lack of supplies in addition to death and desertion in the conquest’s immediate aftermath. Acadians were left with a choice. Some decided to comply with British rule, taking an oath of allegiance to the Crown or acting as liaisons, while others actively resisted the new commanders and waited for French power to be restored. Indigenous resistance was also felt in the region. The Wabanaki Confederacy actively opposed British authority at Annapolis Royal from the time of the siege.

While the British lacked an extensive cartographic record of their claims in northeastern North America, manuscript records reveal imperial prospects based on local knowledge. Southack claimed a vast swath of territory from mainland Nova Scotia to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. This memorandum, which was made possible by the conquest of 1710, informed larger claims that were then used in negotiations at Utrecht. Overall, the relatively small military action at Port Royal/Annapolis Royal in 1710 had a much larger impact on imperial aspirations in the region. The failed Walker expedition, and the claims made at Utrecht as well as in later treaty negotiations in the eighteenth century drew on the success of the conquest, and developed an idea of empire before it could be realistically established in northeastern North America.

The Treaty of Utrecht formally recognized British claims to mainland Nova Scotia, but the terms of the agreements were never fully defined. Both the French and British
attempted to use these ambiguities to their advantage with varying degrees of success. Geographic information was a tool that imperial powers harnessed to maintain their positions in northeastern North America, even after terms had been tentatively set at Utrecht. These fantasies were informed by local knowledge. In the years that followed the signing of the treaty, the French and Indigenous peoples used their superior local knowledge to stake their claims, and stall British imperial expansion. This did not stop the British from aspiring to expand their small foothold in North America into a larger imperial claim. Negotiations with Indigenous groups following the Treaty of Utrecht exemplified the ambitions of British officials stationed in the region that relied on past successes and local knowledge.
Chapter Five:

Conclusion:

This thesis asked: how did the events of 1710 change the ways in which people understood the area? Defining the events of 1710 was important to answering this question. Conquest refers to a military action that leads to one group’s control over another group or place. With this definition, the applicability of the term “conquest” rests on two questions: what happened and what impacts did the event have? A required scope is not specified, and success is not measured by the degree to which one group maintains control. Conquest occurs on a scale of gradients. The events at Port Royal in 1710 sit along this scale. The British undertook an expedition on Port Royal, and the French signed articles of capitulation that gave their fort to the attacking forces. As a British conquest over the French in Acadia, the events of 1710 marked a significant shift in European imperial authority in the region. While the French would be a continued presence as the British struggled to assert themselves, they would not regain power. Despite there being little material change, the conquest of 1710 provided the British with an important toe-hold in northeastern North America, and changed imperial aspirations for the area. It is important to remember, though, that this event was a European conquest of another European power that happened to take place in northeastern North America. The Mi’kmaq and other Indigenous groups were not conquered, but unfortunately wrapped up in European attempts to claim imperial authority.

Nothing is created in a vacuum. The conquest of 1710 was the result of multiple preceding events, and the actions of many individuals. Chapter two focused on the period immediately before the conquest. French settlers had been living at Port Royal since the early 1600s, and had established a system of mutual accommodation with the Indigenous peoples.
of the region. As the settlers adapted to their geographic isolation from France and their new environment, a distinctly Acadian identity developed. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the Acadians were used to the back and forth between French and British authority in the region. Jean De Labat arrived at Port Royal in 1702 ready to reinforce French imperial claims, and implement his plans for the fort as the new military engineer. French military engineering was in the process of professionalizing under the guidance of Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban and his contemporaries. Military engineers across France’s holdings were expected to put their training to use, and represent their plans with a keen attention to detail. De Labat was no different. His 1708 map of Port Royal mingled local realities with imperial aspirations for his post after a British attack. De Labat’s map provided an example of how French officials maintained and further developed an image of imperial authority, further contextualizing their responses to the conquest of 1710.

De Labat’s plans were ultimately stifled by Britain’s next attack on Port Royal. Chapter three addressed the conquest of 1710. Samuel Vetch had been developing plans to overtake Canada years before he collaborated with Francis Nicholson. Vetch and Nicholson narrowed the scope of their imperial designs to focus on Acadia, and gained Queen Anne’s approval in 1710. The pair gathered the necessary forces and provisions before leaving, but the goals of this attack remained unclear. Daniel d’Auger de Subercase, Acadia’s governor, capitulated after an eight-day siege. This turning point in French-British relations at the newly renamed Annapolis Royal was commemorated by the anonymously produced *Plan of Annapolis, late Port Royal Fort, the principal place of strength in Nova Scotia*. This map, made during the battle, proudly celebrated the event as a conquest and supported British imperial claims to authority in the region.
Chapter four discussed the conquest’s impacts, and assessed the continued development of imperial aspirations. After taking command of the fort at Annapolis Royal, Vetch struggled to maintain order. Captain Cyprian Southack created a memorandum within a week of the conquest. The memorandum defined the boundaries of British control following the conquest, and was sent to both the French governor at Quebec and the Board of Trade in London. Geographic information, including Southack’s work, contributed to the development of imperial aspirations for northeastern North America along with the success of the conquest. As the British attempted to realize their imperial dreams, an expedition on Quebec was approved. The Quebec Expedition, led by Admiral Hovenden Walker, was a failure. However, this only highlighted the success of the Acadian conquest more, and the British continued to aspire to empire in their treaty negotiations. The Treaty of Utrecht formalized British claims to Acadia/Nova Scotia. The reality on the ground did not reflect these claims, though, and the French and Indigenous nations continually resisted British authority. British imperial aspirations persisted and further negotiations were undertaken in an attempt to solidify claims.

This thesis evaluated the impacts of the conquest of 1710 within the region, and the larger context of European imperialism. Though materially limited, the conquest was important to the imagination of empire before it was a real possibility in North America. This was revealed when answering this thesis’ second question: how was geographic information used as a tool? Geographic information surrounding the conquest and its formalization, from maps to descriptions, were manipulated to better represent imperial dreams for the region. Critical cartography was an important framework for analysing these representations, and conclusions were enhanced by the addition of an artistic analysis. Intent can never be known
without the express statements of those involved, but these frameworks allowed for a more nuanced understanding of people and events. Beyond the expression of imperial aspirations, the geographic representations created of Port Royal/Annapolis Royal reflected the importance of local knowledge. The importance of the local did not preclude the imperial, though. Local knowledge was mobilized to assert imperial claims and to develop aspirations. The conquest of 1710 was not an all-encompassing or definitive event. There was still a stark difference between imperial fictions and local realities in the early eighteenth century. However, the aspirations that fueled the conquest persisted into the future.

Further studies of the development of empire would benefit from an intensified analysis of visual culture. Maps and other geographic representations are conduits for understanding people’s perception of imperialism, and its application within a landscape. Increasing the scope of research to include geographic materials also requires a development of analytical frameworks. An artistic analysis, coupled with existing critical cartography frameworks, expands the analysis of materials and the historical contexts they inhabit. The conquest of 1710 provided a case study for the importance of furthering analysis, and considering the ways in which maps and conquest interpret each other.
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