Canada and the U. S. A.

By B. K. Sandwell

The international developments of the last few years have made it abundantly evident that it was an error to suppose that force was becoming less important than it had been in determining the relations between nations. The analogy which we have been accustomed to draw between the relations of individuals under a well-organized state authority, and those of states under no superior authority at all, has been proved to be mistaken, and it has been shown that the task of organizing a superior authority to regulate the relations between states is far more difficult than we had supposed. War is a thing which cannot be left out of account in estimating the relations between states; to which we may add that when it is taken into account it turns out to be one of the most important things in the account.

As a matter of fact, even within the state itself, in the relations between individual citizens and groups, and in the relations between groups and the state, force is not a wholly negligible factor. Democracy itself may be to some extent a product of a certain arrangement of force brought about by the state of knowledge concerning offensive and defensive weapons prevailing at the time. There appears, for example, to be a definite connection between naval power and democracy, and a definite hostility between a large land army and democracy; and the reason may be in part that the force represented by the navy is largely a matter of enormous capital investment, requiring for its operation only a relatively small and highly professional body of sailors, and also that it is incapable of being used to enforce the will of its commanders upon the citizens who maintain it, whereas an army is as effective against the internal enemies of the regime as against the external foes of the realm. Even in land fighting, certain kinds of weapons are favorable to democracy and certain kinds are the opposite. A state of military art in which elephants, or very expensive armor, are a determining factor makes democracy very difficult, whereas a state of military art in which the bow and arrow or the musket, in the hands of very rapidly trained amateur fighters, is an effective weapon makes democracy easy to sustain if there is a desire for it. It is somewhat early to predict the results of the introduction of machinery into modern warfare, but at first glance the outlook is not very reassuring for those who wish to see democracy maintained; for both the tank and the bombing plane look as if they might turn out to have all the qualities of the battleship and the cruiser, without the limitation of being unable to operate inland.

We are now disposed, therefore, to consider the factors connected with military force when discussing the relations between nations, much more frankly and to a much larger extent than we should have in a similar discussion ten years ago; and I propose to take them into account in discussing the relations between Canada and the United States. In so doing I am not suggesting that there is any possibility of a war between Canada and the United States. A war is a trial of strength between nations, and the relations of military strength between Canada and the United States are such that there could never be any trial because there could never be any doubt of the outcome. The only thing which could justify resistance by Canada to any demand of the United States would be the possibility of aiding an ally or associate by fighting a delaying action by holding up American forces which would otherwise be on their way to attack somebody else. There is, I take it, only one nation or group of
nations for which Canada might conceivably be asked to make sacrifice, and that is Great Britain or the British Commonwealth; and it is a fundamental element of British policy that Great Britain must never find itself in a war against the United States. I think that the determination of the United States never to find itself at war against Great Britain, while perhaps less definitely present to the national consciousness, is really just about as fundamental.

The relations between Canada and the United States, then, are by reason of their different degrees of military strength such that it is impossible for Canada to embark upon any policy to which the United States objects seriously enough to use force to prevent it. If, for example, Canada had done as Eire has done, and remained neutral in the Second World War up to the present time, it would, I suggest, be by now quite impossible for her to preserve a strictly neutral behavior; the United States would have shown far less modesty about insisting on the use of Canadian air fields for the defence of Alaska than she has about insisting on the use of Eire naval bases for the defence of her Atlantic fleet. The same is true regarding certain aspects of even our purely domestic policies. It is a very interesting question how far the United States would allow Canada to go in the matter of the seizure of private property without compensation or with seriously inadequate compensation, for a vast amount of such property in Canada belongs to United States investors. It is an interesting question also how far the United States would allow Canada to go in the matter of admitting racial elements which the Republic excludes. The reason why none of these questions ever arise in practice is simply that the dominance of United States policy does not have to be enforced upon Canada by military or the threat of it; the dominance of the United States mind is already enforced upon the Canadian mind by the agencies of a common language, a common literature, common popular arts, and a largely common popular press—and it is no trouble to enforce it, because the Canadian mind is merely another North American mind, conditioned to a state of high receptivity to the majority of American ideas.

Corbett and Smith, writing in 1928, took the position that this subordination of Canada to the United States in matters of major policy was greatly mitigated by Canada's membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Separation from that Commonwealth, they assert, or "any policy which tends either in form or in substance towards separation will be a disastrous error of judgment, the ultimate result of which would be to place Canada under the economic, military and political control of the United States". And again: "if Canada were detached from the British Empire there would be no great power whose vital interests would demand the protection of her independence, and the military control of the United States could not be disputed".

Since those words were written there have been many changes, most of them "tending either in form or in substance towards separation." And there has been one great change in the last few years, in the development by which the affairs of Great Britain and the United States have become increasingly "mixed up" through the attack upon their common mode of life by the Axis powers. The mixing up has consisted largely in the transfer by Britain to the United States of powers, facilities and responsibilities relating to the defence of North America. In these changed circumstances the ability of Great Britain to maintain the independence of Canada as against the United States would seem to be greatly lessened, while in view of the "mixing up" process there may have been some reduction even of her interests in doing so. Indeed I may suggest that with the United States permanently established as a reliable ally of Great Britain, a Canada actually incorporated in the United States might appear of more value to Great Britain.

than a Canada which remains within the Commonwealth but which refuses to enter into any commitments for military cooperation with the other members of the Commonwealth and which has the same right as Eire to remain neutral in the Commonwealth’s wars.

In a right-angled triangle the square on the side opposite the right angle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides. The relations between Canada and the United States cannot really be discussed without some consideration of the relations between Canada and Great Britain, and of the relations between Great Britain and the United States.

The development of the submarine and the airplane have enormously increased the amount of margin of naval strength over that of any possible enemy combination which is necessary to give assured control of the seas. Such a margin is now beyond the attainment of Great Britain by herself, because the wealth and productive capacity of various younger nations have enabled them to increase very greatly their naval strength. But the maintenance of such a margin is essential to the security of Great Britain which is an island power deriving a large part of its economic strength from all parts of the world. A firm alliance with another great naval power is therefore imperative. The Entente with France provided such an alliance; but the tragic collapse of France has made it impossible to hope for any naval support from that source, not only in the present war, but possibly within any predictable time to come. It is impossible to estimate either the extent or the duration of the disaster which has fallen upon the French people, but it is probably much greater, rather than less, than is commonly realised. The effects of the detention, continued over several years, of a million French soldiers as prisoners in Germany cannot fail to be ruinously depressing to France’s population, physique and morale for a very long time.

The result is a wholly unprecedented dependence of Great Britain on an alliance with the United States, accompanied fortunately by a growing realisation among Americans of their own dependence upon Great Britain. That dependence, I suggest, is not quite so great as Britain’s on the United States, or at any rate it is not so obvious to the eye of the ordinary citizen; for the United States is itself a continent, not a small island, and exercises a pretty complete domination over the rest of a hemisphere—a hemisphere which however would not be invulnerable if the British fleet held aloof from its defence.

This is a tremendous change from the situation that prevailed before the United States became a great naval power, and even after that time until the elimination of France. During that period the only strong point in the American position was the remoteness of the United States from direct enemy danger, and that remoteness was more apparent to the eyes of the ordinary citizen than real to the eyes of the informed expert. (A sense of danger from Japan, it may be added, has been present to the American mind for at least a generation, but this sense of danger did not lead to any reliance on Great Britain as an assured ally, for Britain herself was in alliance with Japan up to 1921.) This meant that in any closely concerted arrangement between Britain and the United States, Britain would have needed less and contributed more than the United States, and could thus have had the stronger voice in the settlement of terms. That situation is now reversed. The United States is much the less needy of the two parties, but is still sufficiently needy to desire the partnership.

It would not do to attach too much weight to the very far-reaching proposals which have emanated from some American sources, such as those of the modified “Union Now” schemes of Mr. Clarence Streit, which in their actual operation would give the United States a virtual control over the policies of a united English-speaking world. Such schemes probably go a good deal further, both in their definiteness and in their
provision for American control, than anything which the American government would be likely to contemplate. But some kind of close association, closer and more prominent than a mere alliance, seems fairly certain to develop out of the present war, and my point is that both the size and the enormously advantageous geographical position of the United States can hardly fail to give it a dominating influence in any such association. Professor Corbett in a recent book entitled *Post-War Worlds*, discussing the possibilities of the amended and limited "Union Now," says: "It may be that the British peoples have suffered enough by war to be willing to give up their cherished and somewhat haughty separateness. If the realisation of the need of American aid has not completely eradicated a certain ineffable sense of superiority to all things American, it has at least driven it into a concealment maintained by all but the more irresponsible members of society." Writing last September or October, Professor Corbett did not think that the Americans had come anywhere near to a readiness for any "close and permanent association" with the other English-speaking countries; and he expressed the view that "Probably nothing but great suffering, and the conviction that there lay the only way of escape, could cause such a change; and the suffering has not yet crossed the Atlantic." Since he wrote, the suffering has at least crossed the Pacific, and a great deal more of it will cross the Pacific and the Atlantic to the inviolate shores of North America before the war is over; and that suffering will not be without its profound effect on the American people. Meanwhile the events of the war are eliminating with great speed some of the most important causes of mutual distrust between the Americans and the British nations. The Americans, for example, seem likely to be relieved of all cause for worry about the effects of British Imperialism on the peoples of India almost as soon as the British are relieved of all cause for worry—which they never felt—about the effects of American Imperialism on the peoples of the Philippine Islands. The Old School Tie—unless Sir Stafford Cripps, being an old Wykehamite, is to be regarded as an example of it—is fast being eliminated from British political and official life, a process which will leave the Roosevelt clan and one or two other American families as almost the only ruling hereditary aristocracy in the modern world. The invidious task of curbing the complete independence of Eire, by demanding the use of her harbours for the defence of our common civilisation, seems likely to be surrendered by Britain to the United States itself, which will probably perform it much more ruthlessly and efficiently. Above all, the discovery by the Americans that they too are not exempt from the natural weakness of a democracy which is making a belated start in war against a well prepared autocratic foe is aiding immensely in the growth of a feeling of mutual respect and affection between the two countries, in place of the old feeling which Professor Corbett describes as a requited disdain.

What should be Canada's attitude towards this rapprochement between the two other corners of the Canada-United States-Britain triangle? The executive of the Toronto branch of the League of Nations Society recently adopted a resolution that in its opinion Canada should not oppose any measure of association or union between the other two countries upon which they themselves might agree. To denounce this highly negative position as colonialism would not be quite fair. A nation of eleven million cannot say much, as a nation, to a nation of sixty million and another of 130 million about how they should organise their relations one with the other, and to refrain from doing so is not so much colonialism as decent modesty.

One more positive course I can however suggest. That is, that Canadians who recognise, as most of us probably do, that our loyalties are not entirely limited to that purely Canadian authority which is situated at Ottawa and which is the
only authority whose policies are directly controlled by our votes, should be very careful about the picture that we make to ourselves of these super-Canadian or extra-Canadian authority to which we direct our further allegiance. It is a little too easy, because of certain historic and picturesque attributes which cluster around the Halls of Westminster, for us to get into the habit of thinking of the King, Lords and Commons who there assemble as being the proper recipients of this super-Canadian loyalty.

The truth may very well be that that Parliament, and the people who elect and maintain it, do not wish to be the exclusive recipients of this loyalty which we feel for something beyond our borders. It would, I think, have been better if for many years back our sentiment of loyalty had been directed more towards the British Commonwealth of Nations than merely towards the nation which is at its centre; if we had felt as much loyalty towards our fellow citizens of the Commonwealth in South Africa and Australia as towards those in the little islands from which so many of us came. All the factors of history and picturesqueness were against our doing so, and that is one of the reasons why the Commonwealth has not been more of a unity than it has. But the fact remains that it is the Commonwealth to which we belong, and not the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and that in the event of a close rapprochement between the Commonwealth and the United States, with the United States accepting and exercising many of the functions of leadership in that association, we shall have to learn to look upon the United States much less as a foreign nation and much more as the inheritor of the central position among English-speaking and democratic countries. It may well be that after this war there will eventually come about so extensive a breakdown of the system of absolute national sovereignties that loyalties of this kind, including even our loyalty to Canada, will become of less importance. But such a condition will certainly not come about immediately at the conclusion of the present hostilities. During those hostilities, and during the reconstruction period which must intervene between the signing of peace and the eventual establishment of some kind of workable and general supra-national authority, I suggest that Canada's attitude in regard to the United States must inevitably be greatly changed from what it has been in the past. That Republic is now the greatest, the most resourceful and the most energetic ally of the British Commonwealth in a struggle in which the free existence of both the Commonwealth and the Republic are at stake. We cannot continue to look upon it or to feel towards it as we did when it was an isolationist and sometimes almost anti-British nation.

When one looks through Canada's history during the century and more of peace and the undefended frontier, it is astonishing to find how great an amount of the energy of Canadians has been devoted to resisting something which the resistors chose to regard as Americanisation, but which very often was merely North Americanisation, an adaptation of old British ideas and habits and practices to the soil and planet and economic and social conditions of a new continent. In Professor Landon's recent book on Western Ontario and the American Frontier there are many fascinating tales of the resistance put up in that part of Canada (which of course was specially exposed by its geographical location), in the name of the British connection to innovations which eventually became quite harmless parts of our normal life. Colonel Talbot, for example, the feudal lord of the Talbot settlement on Lake Erie, was convinced that the temperance leagues of his Methodist neighbours—damned cold water drinking societies he called them—were hotbeds of sedition, and called upon the authorities to help him in rooting them out. A perusal of that most interesting volume cannot, I think, fail to convince one that an enormous amount of so called Americanism, about which terrific outcries were at first raised, has been incorporated into

Our habits and practices with singularly little harm to either.

We, like the British, will have to reconcile ourselves to being more and more mixed up with the Americans as time goes on. Because we live so much closer to them, and because we have for several generations cultivated an attitude of resistance towards them, that process may be a little more painful for us than for the British. But it will be a poor kind of loyalty to the British if we insist upon being more British than they are, to the extent of being more anti-American. One of the respects in which it seems to me that we are persisting in being, not perhaps more anti-American, but at least more non-American, than the British have any wish for us to be, is in our continued refusal to have anything to do with the Pan-American Union. I sometimes suspect that that refusal is really nothing more than another form of our colonialism, our unwillingness to accept anything in the way of a responsibility or a commitment, our inability to make up our minds. Canada, with her large Latin element of population, and with her combination of English language, Anglo-Saxon business methods, and distinctness from the United States, could exercise a most powerful influence on the nations of South America if we would accept the responsibilities of a North American nation.

Pan Americanism is not Enough—Two Opinions

By R. G. Trotter and R. A. MacKay

EDITOR'S NOTE: The question whether or not Canada should become a member of the Pan American Union has been a controversial one for a long time. In the following articles the reasons for and against are examined by two well known students of Canada's external policy.

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By R. G. Trotter

HAPPILY, Canadian relations with Latin America have recently been growing more intimate and more cordial. Exchange of regular diplomatic representatives with several of the leading countries in South America has marked this growth in relations. Our Minister of Trade and Commerce has been able, as a result of his recent trade mission, to report the negotiation of several advantageous commercial treaties. All Canadians will approve these developments, which augur well for future growth of economic interchange within the relatively narrow limits set by natural conditions, for, although this interchange is likely to form no very large proportion of our international commerce, it is well that we should make as much of it as we can. Culturally, the Latin tradition of French Canada creates a bond of sympathy with Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Americans that offsets to some extent the lack of close community of cultural outlook between the latter and English-speaking North Americans.

Politically, the fact that Canada has reached nationhood without adopting republican institutions and has maintained her monarchical association with other nations of the British Commonwealth, sets her apart from the world of American Republics in their eyes as well as in her own. Nevertheless, Latin Americans are recognizing increasingly Canada's national position. Our enlarging interest in the Latin-Americans and our growing intercourse with them sometimes lead to discussion of the possibilities of formal relations with the Pan-American system. Some Canadians would like Canada to seek membership in the Pan-American Union and participate as a member in the conferences held under its auspices, feeling sure that its definition as an association of American Republics could readily be modified to