SETTING THE AGENDA: AN EXAMINATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS’ IMPACT ON FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DISCUSSIONS

by

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# Table of Contents

List of Tables ................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract............................................................................................................................ v
List of Abbreviations Used ............................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Literature review ......................................................................................... 5
  2.1 Characterizing the Canadian policy infrastructure ............................................... 5
  2.2 Social movements’ influence on mainstream politics .............................................. 9
  2.3 Rationale and rhetoric ............................................................................................ 16
  2.4 The relative efficacy of claims-making tactics ....................................................... 19
Chapter 3: Methods ....................................................................................................... 25
  3.1 Data collection .......................................................................................................... 25
  3.2 Operationalization of variables .............................................................................. 29
  3.3 Data analysis ............................................................................................................. 33
Chapter 4: Do ENGOs influence policy discussions? ...................................................... 34
  4.1 ENGOs’ efforts to influence policy debates ............................................................. 34
  4.2 Non-state actors in official debate ........................................................................... 43
  4.3 Accessing the evidence ............................................................................................ 49
Chapter 5: How do ENGOs advance their claims to policymakers? ............................... 52
  5.1 Actors’ use of framing techniques .......................................................................... 52
  5.2 ENGO’s use of claims-making tactics .................................................................... 59
Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 65
References ......................................................................................................................... 71
Appendix: Coding Scheme .............................................................................................. 79
List of Tables

Table 4.1 Frequency of government officials being the target of ENGO press releases ................................................................. 34
Table 4.2 Primary environmental issue by document type ............................................................ 36
Table 4.3 Percent of Parliamentary cases which mentioned a non-state actor ................ 43
Table 4.4 Percent of ENGOs and other non-state actors appearing before and speaking at committee meetings (n=111) ........................................... 47
Table 5.1 Prevalence of framing techniques by document type ............................................ 55
Table 5.2 Use of four frames by ENGOs .................................................................................. 57
Table 5.3 Use of claims-making tactics by ENGOs ............................................................... 60
List of Figures

**Figure 4.1** Monthly incidence of press release publication .......................... 38

**Figure 4.2** Monthly incidence of press release publication and discussion within Parliament ........................................................................................................ 42

**Figure 4.3** Cases when a specific ENGO was cited to support a claim in Parliament .................................................................................................................. 45

**Figure 5.1** Examples of framing techniques ...................................................... 54
Abstract

Literature on social movement studies and public management both question whether non-state actors play an influential role in forming public policies. This thesis contributes to these debates by examining non-state actors’ agenda-setting capacity, which is a precursor to influencing policy decisions. This is achieved by comparing environmental non-governmental organizations’ (ENGOs) advocacy versus official policy debates concerning the Paris Agreement to assess the presence of other non-state actors. Overall, I find little evidence that ENGOs or other non-state actors play an agenda-setting role in the public climate change policy field, suggesting that public discussion of policy formation remains the exclusive purview of the state. I offer two possible explanations of ENGOs’ limited impact on public policy discussions, firstly that ENGOs frame their claims in a way that policy makers are not receptive to and that their use of institutional claims-making tactics are easily ignored by policy makers.
# List of Abbreviations Used

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The urgent and divisive topic of combating climate change represents an ideal opportunity to examine the potential influence of diverse stakeholders on mainstream politics because it is unclear who gets to contribute to the highly contested debate of how, and if, Canada will transition to a low-carbon economy. My thesis seeks to answer this question by looking at Canadian public debate around the Paris Agreement. While some herald it as a ‘watershed’ moment in Canada’s battle against climate change (CBC 2016) amidst growing scientific consensus that humanity is approaching the point of irreparable damage to our planet (Randalls 2010), others believe that the targets are insufficient to avert disaster (Bergkamp 2016; Nhamo & Nhamo 2016; Rohelij et al. 2016).

My research evaluates the impact that Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) have on official policy discussion through an analysis of their inclusion, or exclusion, from the Canadian federal government's public discussion of the Paris Agreement\(^1\). The objective of this research is to evaluate if, and how, ENGOs influence policy discussions. A nuanced answer to this question requires asking two related questions: 1) whether the state is receptive to the concerns of ENGOs, and 2) whether ENGO concerns are reflected in environmental policy discussions among mainstream political actors. My research, therefore, examines the Canadian state’s public receptiveness to ‘outsiders’ and how they promote their perspectives.

\(^1\) The Paris Agreement is also often referred to as the ‘Paris Accord’. Only the former is used in this document.
My research bridges public management literature and social movement studies, which both assess whether ‘outsiders’ can influence policy-formation. By drawing on, and contributing to two usually distinct areas of research my analysis redresses the tendency of some social movement scholars to ignore mainstream politics (de Bakker et al. 2013). Marrying the two areas of research addresses Davis et al.’s (2005) call for scholarly ‘cross-fertilization’ of social science studies of politics and Andrews and Edward’s (2004) concern that researchers studying the impact of advocacy organization in “neighbouring disciplines fail to learn from one another” (p. 491).

My two research questions are engaged through a case study of policy discussions concerning the Paris Agreement in public venues and through public discourse. Although the Paris Agreement serves merely as the device through which to evaluate non-state actors’ influence on policy formation, it is a particularly timely and contested case study with ramifications for the health of our planet because “political system[s] that are open to the inclusion of different actors and their interests are likely to perform better regarding their environmental policy output” (Jost & Jacob 2004, p. 4). Scientists, business and industry, policy makers, and ENGOs are “actively seeking to establish their particular perspectives” on climate change (Anderson 2009, p. 166).

The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (coined ‘COP21’) brought together leaders from across the world between November 30th and December 12th, 2015 and attracted the attention of environmental, Indigenous, and global justice organizations. The resulting Paris Agreement is an ambitious, international response to global climate change, which was initially ratified by 197 countries around the world. Although the Paris Agreement has been criticized as being too lenient by some (Rogelj et al. 2016), the
treaty is significant because it is the largest environmental treaty ever ratified and includes both developed and developing countries, as well as heavy-emitters China and India.

Although non-binding, signatories to the Paris Agreement pledged to prevent the global average temperature change from reaching 2°C higher than pre-industrial temperature and strive for less than a 1.5°C increase. The Paris Agreement is the first global agreement to gradually eliminate the use of fossil fuels and transition to 100 percent renewable energy sources. It requires each nation to set their own Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which are to be revised at five-year intervals and ‘ratcheted up’ as the world moves away from fossil fuels. Developed countries are also required to finance initiatives to mitigate against the impacts of climate change which are already being felt in the developing world (United Nations, 2015).

To assess this case and analyze my research questions, the thesis takes on the following structure: the next chapter provides an overview of previous research on non-state actors’ influence on mainstream politics. It outlines debates within the social movement and public administration research regarding whether non-state actors shape policy discussions and explains two useful models for understanding the state-outsider nexus as well as how the claims-making strategies and framing techniques employed by ENGOs may dictate their effectiveness. The subsequent chapter explains how data was collected, operationalizes the variables, and outlines the statistical methods used for data analysis. Chapter 4 and 5 are analytical chapters which each address the research questions identified above. Chapter 4 analyzes non-state actors’ presence in Parliament,
both as invited speakers and when their perspectives are legitimated through repetition by policy makers. Chapter 5 compares how ENGOs and policy makers frame their perspectives and their use of claims-making tactics. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and discusses the generalizability of these findings.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter provides an overview of the four areas of literature that I draw upon in formulating my research questions. The first section presents a debate in public management research about how to characterize Canada’s public policy arena and what this means for non-state actors’ ability to influence mainstream politics. The second section examines a similar tension in social movement literature regarding whether social movements can influence mainstream politics. The third and fourth sections explore how framing and claims-making strategies affect how and if non-state actors influence public policy. The third section explains the importance of how ENGOs articulate their grievances and the last section evaluates the relative efficacy of different claims-making strategies.

2.1 Characterizing the Canadian policy infrastructure

A popular assumption in the literature on policy formation, and to a lesser extent in the social movement literature, is that the state has undergone a paradigm shift in the last two decades resulting in a more permeable policy infrastructure, thus allowing non-state actors greater influence in the policy-formation process. Public management scholars who take up this assumption identify the emergence of New Public Governance (NPG) from its predecessor, New Public Management (NPM), and credit it with having brought about these changes. The term ‘NPG’ refers to both a style of governance characterized by diffuse decision-making and the theoretical stance of scholars who view policy formation in this way. Likewise, ‘NPM’ denotes a hierarchical view of policy formation and a theoretical orientation. ‘Governance’ can be broadly defined as the norms, values, and institutions that shape how society makes decisions concerning political, social,
economic, and/or environmental issues (Blair 2000, cited in Bontenbal & van Lindert 2008).

Scholars who adhere to the NPG perspective believe that Canada’s public administration currently embraces an approach to policy-formation where the state expressly considers the concerns of non-state actors when making policy decisions through consultations and co-operation. From this perspective, policy-formation is seen as a collaborative endeavour and the goal of government should be to incorporate the concerns of a wide range of stakeholders and choose the path of maximum public good through compromise and collaboration (Bao et al. 2012; Bryson, Crosby & Bloomberg 2014; Runya, Qigui & Wei 2015). Public policies are the result of negotiation and “coproduction involving the public, the private market, and the non-profit sectors” (Bao et al. 2012, p. 447). NPG is a pluralist perspective, as it observes a “fragmentation of policy power between a growing range of actors, and the [increased] permeability public decision-making process to almost any kind of actors” (Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett 2011, p. 304). Because NPG is characterized by a dispersed field of interests and authority and the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in policy-formation, it has been described as more democratic than New Public Management, which prioritizes market-based solutions to policy issues (Milijan 2008; Runya, Qigui & Wei 2015; Woodford & Preston 2013).

Bao et al. (2012) identify the conflict between economic prosperity and environmental protection as a complex policy issue that has almost limitless conflicting perspectives. For this reason, the authors argue that reconciling these seemingly divergent interests necessitates an NPG approach to policy-formation, characterized by diplomacy
and consensus-making. Likewise, environmental sustainability has been identified as a ‘wicked problem’ by Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett (2011), meaning that it is so complex that it “can only be tackled by bringing together the resources form a range of different providers and interest groups” (p. 301). ENGOs’ effect on combating climate change is seen in how they enabled increased environmental regulation enforcement through their legitimization of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Alm & Burkhart 2006).

However, previous research on policy makers' receptiveness to the concerns of non-state actors, such as ENGOs, is divided and NPM scholars question the existence of NPG (Carter 2011; Evans & Sapeha 2015). ‘New Public Management’, a term coined by Hood (1991), refers to a style of governance that arose in the early 1980s, with the rolling-back of the welfare state across Western democracies, which some scholars believe persists to this day. NPM prioritizes market-based approaches to service delivery, such as competition among private companies for public projects and viewing citizens as customers (Clarke 2007). NPM scholars believe policy-formation remains the exclusive purview of official state agents and that non-state actors do not play an important role in policy formation or discussion (Bourgon, 2007; Conteh & Roberge, 2014; Mackenzie 2008). This approach to policy formation relies on the expertise of professional administrators and elected officials (Bao et al. 2012, p. 450)

NPM rose to prominence in Canada under the mandate of Prime Minister Joe Clark. During his short tenure (1979-1980), he spurred a trend of policy decisions being made exclusively by parliamentarians, particularly Cabinet ministers, rather than civil servants and certainly not non-state actors (Aucoin 1995, 11-12). Only official
government agents were deemed legitimate or authoritative, meaning that the policy apparatus was a hierarchical arrangement where a few powerful policy makers steered the civil service and excluded non-state actors. From this perspective, any instances of stakeholder consultation were simply used to mask the government monopoly on policy decisions, as were buzzwords typically associated with NPG, such as ‘consolatory’ and ‘democratizing’ (Evans and Sapeha 2015). Ironically, “many ENGOs enjoyed their best and most congenial access to the [Department of the Environment]” during this period because a former ENGO lawyer, John Fraser, served as the Environment Minister under Joe Clark (Doern & Conway 1994, p. 107). Despite this temporary access to policy makers by ENGOs, the early 1980s saw the growth of NPM and the consolidation of authority by elected officials. The late 1970s to 1988 is also associated with laxer environmental regulation and few environmental policy innovations (Doern 2002, p. 111). It should be noted that although NPM advocates for the rolling-back of the public sector, it has been implemented by both conservative/neo-liberal and social democratic governments. Social democratic proponents of NPM argue that this approach to governance makes the welfare state more efficient (Lane 2000, p. 7).

My research examines ENGOs’ impact on policy-formation and thereby evaluates the usefulness of the NPG and NPM perspectives in understanding policy debates in Canada’s federal government. Such research into how policy recommendations from non-state actors resonate or fail to resonate with policy makers can highlight inconsistencies in the literature (Bourgon, 2008).
2.2 Social movements’ influence on mainstream politics

The debate about whether government policies can be informed by non-state actors is paralleled in the social movement literature by a debate concerning the political efficacy of social movements. Scholars such as Hess (2007), Suh (2012), and Young and Schwartz (2014) have credited social movements with important policy outcomes, but others (i.e., Amenta et al. 2010; Burstein 1999, Giugni 1998) caution that we must be very careful in crediting social movements because they lack access to powerholders and/or are co-opted by the state. In this section, I first introduce the concept of ‘fields’ to situate ENGOs within the broader policy infrastructure, then outline why some social movement researchers believe that non-state actors are influential and describe a commonly cited mechanism of this supposed impact (agenda-setting). This section concludes by outlining two arguments on why ENGOs are ultimately ineffective, namely that they are co-opted by the state and that the empirical ‘evidence’ used to demonstrate their impact on mainstream politics is faulty.

It is important to evaluate the ability of ENGOs to shape policy discussions because social movements’ raison d’être is to effect social change and policy change is one avenue for this change. The current research examines ENGOs’ influence on policy debate in the House of Commons and federal committee meetings, which are both key public policy-setting venues. These two institutional arenas exist within a strategic action field (SAF), which Fligstein and McAdam (2011) define as the social space where several actors with conflicting interests jockey for dominance (i.e., exerting their will and achieving their policy goals). According to their model, all institutional actors and those who attempt to influence them—such as social movements and policy makers—exist
within an SAF and that SAF themselves are often constructed of, and situated within other SAF. This nested arrangement means that “all SAFs are embedded in a complex latticework of other fields, including state fields” (p. 16). Given the complexity which results from various proximate and peripheral SAF and the actors who aim to influence policies, this thesis examines public climate change policy debates to estimate ENGOs’ position within these nested SAF in relation to policy makers.

Stoddart et al. (2017) identify ENGOs, political parties, businesses, social movements, think-tanks, and scientists as members of the climate change policy field (p. 389), which means that all of these actors have a vested interest in climate change policy, not necessarily that they are influential. This thesis tests ENGOs influence in this field. Like all members of the field, ENGOs hope to realize their objective but are restrained by the field’s rules. The rules of engagement between ‘incumbents’ (powerholders, such as policy makers) and ‘challengers’ (those advocating an alternative, such as ENGOs) are defined by the governing institutional logic of the field (Fligstein & McAdam 2011). By measuring the permeability of the policy field, we can determine whether the governing logic in the federal environmental policy field resembles NPG or NPM.

Some social movement scholars, like Sternst and Almedia (2004) have observed an ‘opening-up of the state’ to outside political actors. This argument is much like that offered by public management scholars who adhere to the NPG perspective. Castells (2008), for example, argues that globalization and the consequent emergence of supranational governance structures has created a transnational public sphere in which NGOs and the state can interact, facilitating collaboration in the policy-making process. While some scholars assert that advocacy groups have varied and meaningful political
consequences and should be credited with important political changes (Andrews 2001; Goldstone 2004; Hess 2007; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Young and Schwartz 2014), the “empirical evidence on whether protest shapes policy remains mixed” (Olzak & Soule 2009, p. 201).

In a meta-analysis of social movement articles in five high-impact journals, Amenta and colleagues (2010) found that 83 percent of articles identified at least one positive result from social movement advocacy. Social movements’ supposed impacts on policy takes many forms, from right-to-work legislation credited to the 1950s American labour countermovement, which was spearheaded by members of the business community (Dixon 2008), to changing government priorities in allocating scientific research funding (Hess 2007) and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (Meyer 2005) being attributed to the efforts of the American environmental movement. Also, Doern & Conway (1994) credit Canadian ENGO protests with reversing budget cuts to funding for the environmental movement by the federal government (p. 112).

The environmental movement—which includes ENGOs and environmental social movement organizations (SMOs), members of these organizations, allied scientists and academics, and otherwise unaffiliated activists —has produced some of the largest NGOs and SMOs in the world. It has elevated the issue of environmental degradation to one of the "most intensely and most continuous debated political problems in recent decades" (Rucht 1999, p. 206). Likewise, the environmental movement has been singled out as “one of the largest and most influential movements of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” and the most important within Canada (Tindal & Robinson 2015, p. 211).
ENGOS are frequently consulted by government and are considered a de facto member of the official/institutionalized policy field in Germany, which is a pioneer of environmental policy (Jost & Jacob 2004). My thesis aims to understand whether the same can be said about Canada. Likewise, ENGOs play a significant role in shaping media coverage of climate change policy debates (Cormier & Tindall 2005; Krøvel 2012) and align themselves with like-minded government agents and in opposition to other actors (Stoddart et al. 2017). However, their prominence in media coverage does not directly translate into policy decisions and ENGOs’ influence on the policy agenda varies between countries (ibid; Keskitalo, Westerhoff & Juola 2012).

This skepticism is echoed by scholars who believe that social movements are ultimately ineffective in affecting public policies. Some scholars argue that social movements lack access to powerholders (i.e., Jost & Jacob 2004; Malloy 1999; Rootes & Nulman 2015; Trew 2013), while others highlight the risk of non-state actors being co-opted by the state (i.e., Amenta et al. 2010; Coe 2009; Giugni et al. 1999). For example, the concerns of Canadian labour, environmental, and social justice NGOs regarding the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement were largely excluded from official dialogue because these groups lacked access to policymakers (Trew 2013). While these groups are credited with some piecemeal policy changes (procurement restrictions for Canadian municipalities and pharmaceutical patent extensions), the interests of private business overshadowed non-business civil society groups’ concerns about environmental and social governance (ibid). Likewise, Malloy’s (1999) examination of the Canadian women’s movement found that although avenues exist for feminist organizations to influence policy decisions (echoing an NPG view of policy formation),
the presence of these structures “do not equal actual influence and power [and actors] both within and outside government consider them largely symbolic” (p. 268). In this case, social movements are ineffective in actual decision making and just serve as political symbols.

When social movements are able to access policy makers, they also risk being co-opted by the state (Amenta et al. 2010; Coe 2009; Giugni et al. 1999). Ironically, it can be when social movements have their closest relationship with the state—which might afford them influence in different circumstances—that social movements are most susceptible to being co-opted. As the norms of the state are adopted by the movement and its adherents are incorporated into the policy making process, the original goals of the movement are placated (Clément 2015 p. 76; Coy & Hedeen 2005). For this reason, Jost and Jacob (2004) question whether ENGOs simply play an additive role, meaning that any real environmental protection efforts have their start in the official policy sphere, separate from ENGO efforts to bring about the changes. Similarly, Rootes and Nulman (2015) question whether the passage of the US Clean Air Acts, which is held up as a great victory of the American environmental movement, was more the result of the movement or Congress. Similarly, Hess (2007) attributes co-operation between ENGOs and aligned political parties with pressuring government regulators to reform the chemical industry in some Western European countries, but contends that the movement’s overall impact on policy decisions is “dubious” (p. 100) when we take a historical view. Although the environmental movement has been credited with “grand, often inflated claims” by proponents and adversaries, the true impact(s) of the movement are disputed because of the difficulties of measuring a social movement’s impact on
mainstream politics (Rootes & Nulman 2015). Furthermore, the legitimation and normalization of protest within the social movement society have lead to the convergence of institutional and extra-institutional politics (Meyer & Tarrow 1998), which makes it yet more difficult to discern clear relationships between perspectives in policy debate and their impetus.

Although it is difficult to pinpoint how non-state actors shape environmental policy decisions (as explained below), della Porta (1999) suggests that social movements’ main effect on mainstream politics is their ability to shape the policy arena and to increase the importance of an issue in the eyes of the public and policy makers. This phenomenon, known as ‘agenda-setting’ involves inserting topics into the formal government agenda, which increases the probability that the topic will be discussed by policy makers (Boardman 2015; Keskitalo, Westerhoff & Juola 2012, p. 381; Kingdon 1995, p. 16; Princen 2011; Soroka 2002). This does not assume that non-state actors cannot induce their desired policy alternative, but simply that they are able to increase the salience of certain issues, thus increasing the likelihood that the issue will enter the policy field and that policies will be implemented (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Amenta et al. 2010; Betsill & Corell 2008; Burstein 1999; Hayday 2008, Hess 2007). Social movements impact is greatest at the agenda-setting stage, when policy makers’ support of outsider perspective has the least consequences (Olzak & Soule 2009, p. 204). Dramatic events—such as the global attention paid to COP21 by governments and civil society—have an enabling effect on agenda-setting. Such attention-grabbing events naturally boost the salience of an issue and represent an opportunity for ENGOs to push their agenda (Soroka 2002, p. 18-19).
Previous research has shown that the environmental movement and ENGOs help define the policy agenda on the environment (Doern & Conway 1994; Tindal and Robinson 2015), however, the environmental policy field has several differentiated policy issues (Jost & Jacob 2004) and advocacy organizations which mobilize around climate change specifically are thought to have a lesser impact because the complexity of the problem is so great that ENGOs are unable to offer expert knowledge, as they are able to do with niche issues (Rootes & Nulman 2015). Because agenda-setting is an essential antecedent to the implementation of preferred policies, it is a fruitful avenue of inquiry for the current research.

Speeches from the House of Commons are expected to show more evidence of ENGO agenda-setting than parliamentary committee meetings because “little actual decision making takes place [there]” (Soroka 2002, p. 56) and they are characterized by *symbolic* gestures (Jenner 2012). Evidence of agenda-setting in committee meetings represents a higher evidentiary bar, as committee meetings have a greater impact on policy decisions (Pritchard & Berkowitz 1993; Soroka 2002). Within the House of Commons, the Question Period portion of the debate is expected to show the most evidence of ENGO agenda-setting because it is the most flexible portion of the debate and therefore the most prone to reflect outsider perspectives (Soroka 2002, p. 67-69).

Previous work on agenda-setting informs how non-state actor ‘impact’ is quantified in this research. Instead of considering the implementation of policies which ENGOs and other non-state actors would support as evidence of their impact, this research looks for evidence of them playing an agenda-setting role, despite policy
changes being a common measure of social movement success (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni et al. 1999).

The implementation of preferred policies is widely used as proof of social movements’ influence on policy decisions because it is the "most visible and celebrated indicator of influence" in the social movement literature and therefore faces very little scrutiny (Andrews & Edwards 2004; Giugni 1999; Suh 2012). While this measure is self-evident, it does not recognize that ENGOs exist in complex policy fields that contain allied and conflicting institutional and extra-institutional actors (Goldstone 2004). It is impossible to use the passage of preferred policies as evidence of social movement impact because of the “complex theoretical and methodological problems of mapping the causal links between a movement, other explanatory factors, and outcomes”, which make it impossible to attribute policy decisions to social movement actions (Andrews 1997, p. 800). In other words, the complexity of the policy field prohibits researchers from knowing whether the preferred policy would have been implemented, were it not for the efforts of the social movement (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni et al. 1999; Young & Schwartz 2014). Considering this, and the fact that NPG scholars argue that policy makers are receptive to the concerns of non-state actors—not necessarily that these concerns are reflecting in policy decisions—my thesis tracks ENGOs’ presence in policy discussions occurring in public venues, ignoring the ultimate policy decisions.

2.3 Rationale and rhetoric

‘Framing’ refers to the ways that a movement communicates its grievances to incumbents and third parties, usually by linking its concerns to the concerns or morals of
empathetic bystanders, who are potential movement constituents (Snow et al. 1986). This allows social movements to link their specific grievance to a broader social script and thus connect with a wider audience. Social scripts are implicit social norms about what is considered correct and appropriate in specific social situations (Triandis 1989). By appealing to social scripts, framing allows social movements to illustrate the importance of their perspective(s). They accomplish this by interpreting key/controversial events, promoting their perspective, and explaining their actions in a strategic manner which (hopefully) widens their appeal and demobilizes opponents (Snow et al. 1986). Framing is key to gaining access and influence in a public field of debate. Social movements attempt to illustrate the importance of their perspective by appealing to a commonly understood principle which extends beyond the movement, as is required in all situations where one actor justifies their perspective to another (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006, p. 19).

Social movements typically frame their grievance(s) using broad, moral discourse, such as human rights, Indigenous rights, or simply justice (Clément 2015; Fraser 2010; Ramos 2015). Social movements which are able to generalize their frames are more successful in gaining public attention, which increases their likelihood of swaying policy discussions (Gordon & Jasper 1996) or gaining access to a policy field. For example, Betsill and Corell (2008) found in their study on ENGOs’ impact on five international environmental accords that ENGOs were most influential when they framed their grievances in a way that aligned with the dominant neoliberal discourse. When social movements’ grievances align with existing sociocultural discourses, ‘discursive opportunities’ are created, which are instances when grievances align with what is considered legitimate in a specific arena and are therefore more likely to resonate (Vasi et
In the case of the climate change policy field, discursive opportunity structures are expected to emerge when ENGOs frame their grievances in a similar manner as policy makers.

In addition to presenting a social movements’ grievances in a way that is congruent with the prevailing discourse, framing allows ENGOs to present their claims as novel, which avoids saturating the limited carrying capacity of public and political interest and risking their concerns being ignored (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988, p. 62). Clear-cut and simplified messages, particularly those which appeal to established cultural scripts, are likely to resonate better than those which attempt to convey the complexity of climate change or mention ambiguous scientific evidence (Hilgartner 1990; Hoffbauer & Ramos 2014). Conversely, Rootes and Nulman (2015) claim that ENGOs frame their grievances using scientific discourse by citing scientific evidence (p. 731). Previous research on environmental advocacy also finds that economic and social frames are common in the climate change policy field and may even overshadow environmental ills (Andrews & Caren 2010; Hoffbauer & Ramos 2014) and the environmental movement has traditionally used angry and alarming rhetoric in an attempt to make sympathetic onlookers fearful of inaction in the face of calamitous climate change, scaring them into mobilizing (Kleres & Wettergren 2017).

The way in which a message is received will affect how likely it is to diffuse throughout the policy field. This is dictated by the ‘discursive opportunity structure’ of that field. Koopmans (2004) argues that three characteristics of a message dictate its discursive opportunities: visibility (its presence in public and political discourse), resonance (whether it stirs reactions from actors), and legitimacy (whether actors support
or condemn the message). Social movements must strike a balance between resonance and legitimacy, as there is a fine line between the two. There is a curvilinear relationship between resonance and legitimacy; social actors with either very little resonance (i.e., a small grassroots SMO which lacks recognition) or very high resonance (i.e., a terrorist organization, to use an extreme example) lacks legitimacy. Messages that are partially controversial are most likely to be debated, and therefore, more likely to resonate in public and political discourses (Koopmans & Olzak 2004).

Framing tactics must be considered in the context of broader social structures to understand their effectiveness as an agenda-setting tool (de Bakker et al. 2013, p.580). For this reason, my thesis asks whether ENGOs draw on forms of justification that frame their grievances in a way that is appealing to policy-makers. This investigation is situated within a larger discussion regarding the cultural structure of their target, namely the receptivity of policy makers to these concerns, whether they embrace the tenets of NPG or NPM.

2.4 The relative efficacy of claims-making strategies

Claims-making strategies, according to Tilly (1995) are “the ways in which […] actors make and receive claims” (p. 43). While frames are the ways that ENGOs articulate their grievance(s), claims-making tactics are the ways that they advance those grievance(s) to policy makers. Tactics include marches, rallies, lobbying, vigils, press conferences, media campaigns, letter writing, and court challenges, civil disobedience, sit-ins/occupation, strikes, boycotting, and even self-immolation, among many others (i.e., Alimi 2015; Amenta et al. 2010; Clément 2015). The effectiveness of the huge variety of
claims-making tactics depends on the movement’s grievance and target, the presence of countermovements, and the political opportunities available. While no tactic is wholly superior, each is appropriate in certain political situations (Alimi 2015; Ayres 1998; Flingstein & McAdam 2011; Giugni et al. 1999; Hammond-Callaghan & Hayday 2008; Meyer, Jenness & Ingram 2005).

Following Andrews’ (2001) critique of previous research on the efficacy of claims-making tactics, this discussion examines the benefits and drawbacks of clusters of claims-making strategies. Tactics are grouped into clusters based on whether they are institutional or extra-institutional and whether they are peaceful or disruptive. Institutional tactics adopt the norms and procedures of the state to advance their claims through state-sanctioned channels and are typically considered to be more peaceful (Andrews 2001; Amenta et al 2010; Giugni et al. 1999). Extra-institutional tactics subvert the state by using informal challenges to advance their claims and are sometimes illegal or even violent (Alimi 2015; Andrews 2001; Coe 2009). It should be noted that these groups are not entirely mutually exclusive (i.e., boycotting is extra-institutional and peaceful).

Institutional and peaceful tactics afford social movements better access to incumbents in pluralist polities, such as when the state embraces the tenets of NPG (Andrews 2001). Examples of peaceful-institutional tactics include lobbying, letter-writing, campaigning or endorsements to affect electoral politics, disseminating information to the public or government, petitioning, education campaigns, and holding press conferences. Because these tactics use established, state-sanctioned avenues to air
grievances, they provide social movements legitimate and routine access to powerholders (Coe 2009; Lounsbury 2005).

Although these tactics are less attention-grabbing than extra-institutional and disruptive tactics, they are believed to be effective in swaying politicians by showing public support for a policy alternative, meaning that being integrated into the official sphere of the policy field “may be one of the most important and influential [tactics] in the long run” (Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005, p. 82). Because elected officials are primarily concerned with re-election, claims-making tactics which demonstrate the size of voting blocs can likely persuade policy makers but cannot induce a decision (Burstein 1999). Consequently, social movements which employ institutional and peaceful tactics are most likely to achieve their desired policy outcome when they advocate for specific, actionable policy alternatives with a substantial degree of public support.

The primary risks associated with these tactics is that they will be ignored or that the movement will adopt the conventions of the state so fully that it becomes co-opted and pacified. Not all scholars believe that institutional tactics inevitably tame a movement’s goals and tactics (Giugni et al. 1999). However, many argue that social movements become limited to aiding the government in pursuing its own agenda rather than challenging the state (Coe 2009; Masson 2015), forced to embrace the “dominant norms and values of the state” or become dependent on the state for funding (Clément 2015, p. 76). Similarly, the social movement society (SMS) thesis argues that (formally) contentious politics have proliferated so fully that social movements are now normalized, and in many cases legitimized, facets of the contemporary political landscape. This routinization is generally accompanied by the use of less disruptive claims-making tactics

21
and the movement being at least partially brought into the state and placated (Meyer & Tarrow 1998; Ramos & Rodgers 2015).

Contrary to those who believe that social movements are able to gain access to policy making through institutional means, there are scholars who understand policy formation as an exclusionary process where social movements rarely exert influence. They propose two avenues for social movements to exert influence on powerholders. The first model contends that disruptive extra-institutional tactics pose a threat to power holders, meaning that the social movement may bring about policy changes or face repression, while the second model endorses peaceful extra-institutional tactics because they appeal to sympathetic bystanders, which in turn promote the movement’s cause (Andrews 2001). Examples of peaceful extra-institutional tactics are marches, vigils, hunger-strikes, and demonstrations. Sit-ins, barricades, direct action, and riots are examples of disruptive extra-institutional tactics. None of these tactics rely on official channels for advancing the movements claim(s) but are distinguished from each other by the fact that disruptive tactics impede the daily-lives of third parties (people who are not movement adherents or targets).

Extra-institutional tactics are available to all social movements because they do not require access to incumbents or other resources. Although disruptive tactics are very effective in increasing the salience of a movement, they risk delegitimizing the movement’s claims because the tactics can overshadow the message or even cause the public and the state to condemn the movement, leading to repression (della Porta 1999; Giugni et al. 1999; Rojas 2006; Meyer et al. 2005). Perhaps for these reasons, Olzak and Soule (2009) find that protest has no observable, direct impact on environmental policy.
choice, despite extra-institutional tactics being about twice as common as institutional tactics.

Andrews (2001) proposes that social movements are most influential when a variety of formal and informal organizations use multiple claims-making tactics to pursue multiple avenues of contention. This is echoed by other scholars (i.e., Andrews & Edwards 2004; Ayres 1998; Hammond-Callaghan & Hayday 2008). Grassroots organizations with informal community leaders are: less easily co-opted by powerholders, more receptive to movement constituents, and able to adapt their claims-making strategies more readily. Meanwhile, professionalized, institutionalized organizations are “a necessary vehicle for advancing a group’s claims [because they] are perceived as legitimate and/or threatening by established political actors” (Andrews 2001, p. 76; Coe 2009, p. 430). The women’s movement in Québec has adopted this approach with great success; some organizations use extra-institutional tactics while other use institutional strategies and have an established history of working with the state (Masson 2015, p. 95).

The four types of institutional claims-making strategies examined in my thesis are: court challenges, demonstrating or displaying public signs of support (i.e., signing a petition or open letter, displaying a lawn-sign), disseminating information (i.e., public talks or releasing reports), and being consulted by the government or attending public consultations. The two types of extra-institutional tactics examined are direct action and participating in a demonstration or march. If Canada’s federal climate change policy field embodies the tenets of NPG, I expect to see evidence of ENGOs exercising an agenda-setting role in official policy debates using institutional and peaceful claims-making
tactics. Conversely, if ENGOs use extra-institutional tactics and are still successful in inserting the grievances into the policy agenda, this suggests that the state embraces an NPM approach to policy formation, but ENGOs may still play an important role in policy formation because of their use of ‘outsider’ tactics. If there is evidence of neither institutional nor extra-institutional tactics pushing ENGO concerns into Parliament, this suggests that ENGOs do not play an important role in the policy field.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Measuring the role that non-state actors play in mainstream politics is hampered by conceptual issues of how to measure ‘impact’ and a lack of empirical research on the topic (Andrews and Edwards 2004, p. 491). To determine if and how non-state actors enter into mainstream politics, I compare environmental advocacy surrounding the Paris Agreement to policy makers’ discussion concerning the same topic in public venues. To accomplish this, I created a database of parliamentary proceedings and press advocacy by performing a content analysis of Hansard records of debates in the House of Commons and committee meetings as well as press releases from seven environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). I analyze how ENGOs influence environmental policy debates and whether their claims enter official policy discussions, signifying that policy makers are receptive to their concerns. This approach offers insight into whether non-state actors are present in officially recorded policy debates on the public record and makes no claims about backstage policy formation. Soroka (2002) suggests that much of the eventual policy implementation is the results of discussions among unelected public servants which occur behind closed doors and are absent from my research. Despite this important limitation, this research design is still worthwhile because it evaluates ENGOs’ agenda-setting capacity and captures which (if any) non-state actors are ostensibly deemed worthy of consideration.

3.1 Data collection

To gauge ENGOs’ and other non-state actors’ presence in official debates among policy makers, I coded Hansards from the House of Commons and parliamentary committee
meetings, which is the official record of debate within Parliament. Parliamentary committees are bipartisan and made up of MPs (and Senators in the case of joint committees) from different parties, according to parties’ representation in the House of Commons. The role of these committees is to scrutinize bills related to their mandate and provide recommendations to Parliament. This is often accomplished by inviting outside experts to speak before the committees (Gatner 1980). It is important to take stock of both parliamentary sources because debate within the House of Commons is the exclusive domain of parliamentarians, whereas committee meetings purposefully seek out non-state actors’ perspectives and it is useful to track which ‘outsiders’ appear before parliamentary committees and whether their claims carry over to debate within the House. Although committees cannot make decisions, they play an important role in parliamentary decision-making by allowing parliamentarians greater, more detailed knowledge on complex issues, with the explicit purpose of informing debate within the House of Commons, where decisions are made. One of the few previous studies on policy agenda-setting in Canada (Howlett 1997) finds some covariance between the frequency of mentioning policy issues in committee meetings and their frequency in news media. This suggests that tracking committee meetings is a proxy measure of issue salience (cited in Soroka 2002).

Committee evidence and Hansards were accessed through the Parliament of Canada's website (http://www.parl.gc.ca/parliamentarians/en/publicationsearch). The keywords "environment" and "Paris" were used as search terms and produced 121 committee results and 516 Parliamentary debate results, for a total of 637 parliamentary sources. This included documents that did not contain the search terms in the actual
remark but instead appeared in the topic classification tags that accompanied most
documents. A small proportion of results —10 documents from committee evidence and
26 Hansards—were later excluded from the sample because were unrelated to the Paris
Agreement. (Most exclusions were merely points of order or statements about terrorism.)
Each result represents an instance when ‘Paris’ and the ‘environment’ were mentioned in
Parliament between January 1st, 2015 and December 31st, and may have included more
than one mention of the search terms.

In the second stage of data collection, I examined the efforts of ENGOs to
influence official federal policy discussion about the Paris Agreement. To this end, I
coded press releases from seven ENGOs that are based across the county, the David
Suzuki Foundation, Ecojustice, Environment Defence Canada, Équiterre, Greenpeace
Canada, Pembina Institute, and Sierra Club Canada. Press releases were taken from the
online press archives located on the organizations’ homepages. All press releases were
taken from English online press centres when both English and French website existed.
Even so, four press releases in the sample were written in French. These were coded the
same as the English documents. Although an examination of ENGOs’ online presence
offers only one perspective on their activities—one that is carefully curated by the
organizations—it is useful because these organizations dedicate many resources to these
press releases and they represent their primary form of knowledge dissemination (Carroll
2015). Of the 765 press releases produced by the ENGOs during the two-year period, 149
contain the word ‘Paris’. However, all press releases were coded to assess whether the
entirety of their claims-making attempts during this period had a significant impact on
mainstream politics. Together with the parliamentary material, a total of 1,366 documents
were coded, after exclusions. Due to the changeable nature of documents published online, I downloaded all documents and created permanent copies using Adobe Acrobat to allow for analysis and replication.

These organizations were chosen because each organization explicitly evaluated the Paris Agreement and made at least one claim to have influenced environmental policy. Six even sent constituents to COP 21 (David Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace Canada, Pembina Institute, Environmental Defence, Équiterre, and the international chapter of Sierra Club). These formal organizations provide a good representation of the Canadian environmental movement, a movement that Tindal and Robinson (2015) describe as fragmented but highly professionalized. Importantly, these advocacy groups employ very different tactics for influencing policy and therefore represent the fragmented nature of the Canadian environmental social movement industry. For example, Greenpeace employs attention-seeking and often disruptive tactics (Boardman 2015), Ecojustice relies on litigation and the Pembina Institute and Environmental Defense Canada dedicate their resources to researching environmental policy alternatives and publishing reports.

Because the Paris Agreement is the most encompassing environmental policy ever enacted and is vaguely worded, it affords opportunities to interest groups (such as ENGOs) to influence its implementation (Burstein 1999, p. 18). Considering that this case offers a prime opportunity for ENGOs to influence policy discussions, it exemplifies Flyvbjerg’s (2006) classification of a critical case. If ENGOs are found to be ineffective in this case, they are unlikely to be influential in less ideal circumstances. For this reason, this case is ideal for evaluating the openness of the state and its receptiveness to the
concerns of non-state actors. The analysis focuses on the period between January 1st, 2015 and December 31st, 2016, which represents the lead-up, and response to, the negotiation of the Paris Agreement. This period includes other controversial environmental policy debates which are often discussed in relation to the Paris Agreement, as is evident in later chapters. The other major environmental debates during this period include intergovernmental strife resulting from the federal government’s implementation of carbon taxes (CBC 2016), the economic downturn in oil sands production, and debates around pipeline construction and expansion. Also, federal parties differentiated themselves based on their plans for the environment during the latest election, which occurred shortly before COP 21. Elections typically represent an “opening of an environmental policy window”, when ENGOs may have more access to policy makers and more influence on the discussion (Rootes & Nulman 2015, p. 735).

Given the prominence of the environmental movement and the multiple contentious environmental policy issues during the reference period, coding press releases from these organizations offers a good chance of finding evidence of ENGOs’ impact on policy.

By examining both the inclusion of ENGOs in parliamentary debate and their efforts to influence debates, I aim to determine whether ENGOs play a role in shaping federal environmental policy and ultimately achieve my larger goal of determining whether Canada’s federal government embraces the tenets of New Public Governance.

### 3.2 Operationalization of variables

All sources were coded according to their: author, claims, mentions of non-state actors, use of advocacy strategies, the frames used to justify claims, and mentions of select
contentious environmental debate topics. Non-state actors' inclusion in policy discussion is captured by whether academics, scientists (non-academic/ associated with a university), private companies or ENGOs are cited to support a speaker’s claim(s). As explained in the previous chapter, scholars disagree over whether ENGOs play an agenda-setting role in policy formation (i.e., Doern & Conway 1994; Hess 2007; Jost & Jacob 2004; Rootes & Nulman 2015; Trew 2013). By comparing their advocacy efforts (press releases) to the frequency with which ENGOs and other non-state actors are mentioned to support a policy makers’ claim (thereby legitimating their perspectives as worthy of consideration) and the frequency with which non-state actors are invited to speak at committee meetings. Hess (2007) finds that academics and scientists are largely ineffective in affecting the dominate environmental discourse, which shaped how policy makers and the public perceived environmental harms. However, private businesses have clout in some environmental policy debates (p. 67). By contrast, Moore (1999) asserts that scientists’ perspectives are privileged in policy debates because politicians believe they offer an objective evaluation of policy alternatives (p. 105). By including academic, businesses, and scientists in my analysis, I hope to realize a more nuanced and complete appraisal of the openness of policy formation.

The relative efficacy of social movement strategies is measured by mentions of advocacy group success, their events, and the explicit use of seven social movement strategies (court challenges, direct action, protests/marches, signs of public support, disseminating information, consultation with government or attending public meetings, and other). This addresses a debate about which claims-making strategies are most effective in different circumstances (Andrews 2001; Ayres 1998; Coe 2009; Giugni et al.
investigate questions raised by Jaccard, Nyboer, and Sadownik (2002) and van Nijnatten and Boardman (2002), each case is coded according to its use of four framing techniques: Indigenous rights or issues, scientific support to the claim, social justice/ concerns, and economic justification. As the coding scheme used in this research draws heavily on the scheme developed by Ramos (2015)—and is therefore partially comparable—the current research tests his finding that non-environmental frames feature prominently in ENGO advocacy.

I also noted the following (when applicable): which ENGOs produced press releases, the MPs’ party affiliation, constituency, and position, and the occupation/affiliation of non-parliamentarians who spoke at committee meetings. A source's claims are enumerated as: primary and secondary environmental concern, opinion on the Paris Agreement (fully support, support with amendments, heavily criticize, or fully oppose), whether it suggests amendments to the Agreement, and its discussion of other policy options or pieces of legislation. There are 14 broad categories of environment claims which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Some categories are conceptually related to other categories (i.e., greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel exploration and transportation) and many source documents do not actually make a claim and therefore are listed as ‘not applicable’. (These documents simply relayed information without making a comment on it.) I also coded mentions of controversial environmental issues, including the National Energy Board, specific contentious pipeline projects, and carbon taxes.
My thesis does not measure NSAs’ direct impact on environmental policy *per se* but instead measures ENGOs’ ability to shape policy *discussions* in publicly available settings. Implicit in this research design is that the mere *mention* of non-state actors in official debate indicates that they play a significant role in policy-formation and that the state is receptive to their claims. Even if the final policy decision does not align with a non-state actor’s concerns, this is not proof that NSAs did not influence the policy decision; they may play a significant role upstream, in less public settings, from the final policy decision by inserting their concerns into the discussion. This approach is adopted for two reasons: 1) previous research identifies agenda-setting as the principal outcome of environmental advocacy (Rucht 1999; Tindal and Robinson 2015), and 2) it is conceptually and empirically impossible to quantify the impact of an NSA on policy *decisions* (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni et al. 1999; Young and Schwartz 2014). This approach answers McLevey’s (2015) call for research on how policy ideas are promoted by non-state actors and whether they succeed or fail to penetrate different institutional fields.

By counting both discrete occurrences (i.e., whether something was mentioned or not) and according to their probable effect (i.e., counting whether a statement is likely to present a positive or negative opinion of the Paris Agreement), this coding scheme appeals to both the pragmatic and semantical approaches to content analysis. Please see Appendix 1 for the detailed coding scheme.
3.3 Data analysis

The analysis predominantly uses simple cross-tabular analysis to compare the presence of non-state actors and the use of framing and claims-making techniques in press releases, committee meetings, and the House of Commons. Where appropriate, I calculated the chi-squared value of independence to determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between frequencies. I also used the date variables to convert the complete dataset to a time-series. This allowed me to track the timing of ENGO press release publication, discussion within Parliament, and important dates regarding the Paris Agreement. If ENGOs play a significant agenda-setting role and formal environmental policy discussions are accessible to these actors, I expected to observe more frequent mentions of non-state actors in parliamentary debates leading up to, and during, major environmental policy discussions.
Chapter 4: Do ENGOs influence policy discussions?

The review of the literature shows that scholars disagree on how and if non-state actors can influence mainstream politics. Some argue that they should be credited with influencing or creating specific policy decisions and that the state facilitates their participation, while other researchers believe that non-state actors are mainly ineffective and that policy formation is an exclusionary process. In an effort to see which position is supported, this chapter seeks to see if ENGOs played an agenda-setting role in policy discussions surrounding the Paris Agreement.

4.1 ENGOs’ efforts to influence policy debates

Before assessing whether ENGOs influence policy debates, it is important to determine whether they attempt to influence policy discussions in the first place. In Table 4.1, I analyze this by looking at who ENGOs target in their press releases. Given that the purpose of this research is to determine the degree to which ENGOs potentially influence official policy discussions around the Paris Agreement, it is important to assess their direct efforts to influence politicians in addition to considering the effect of their claims-making, consequently, the table shows both the entirety of their claims-making and hones-in on the 149 press releases which tried to shape discussion of the Paris Agreement.
When this is done, we see that 18 percent of the total press releases were directed at the state, be it an individual, a committee, or government more broadly. Of these cases, the majority, 76 percent, targeted the federal government and the remainder targeted provincial, territorial, and/or foreign governments. The Prime Minister was the most frequent target of press releases, followed by the federal government broadly, and then a variety of Cabinet Ministers and other MPs. The two most common members of Cabinet mentioned in ENGO press releases were the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change\(^2\) and the Minister of Natural Resources.

When we compare this to the press release which pertained to the Paris Agreement, we see that a greater percentage targeted the government and this attention was more focused on the Prime Minister and the federal government. These press release targeted the provincial government(s) and the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change at roughly the same rates but did not target any other MPs. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the government targets of the entire sample of

\(^2\) This office was called “Minister of the Environment” in the 41st Parliament.
ENGO press releases and those which pertained to the Paris Agreement (3.52, 7 d.f., p<0.01). The results from Table 4.1 show that ENGOs attempted to influence mainstream politics and that the federal government was a major focus of claims-making around the Paris Agreement.

Table 4.2 shows the primary environmental issue addressed by discussion and press releases in the three types of source documents. In conjunction with Table 4.1, this demonstrates whether ENGOs advocated for topics related to the Paris Agreement and aimed to affect policy makers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary environmental issue</th>
<th>Parliamentary debate</th>
<th>ENGO press releases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House of Commons (n=480)</td>
<td>Committee meetings (n=111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>23.27%</td>
<td>31.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG emissions</td>
<td>20.61%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuel exploration/ extraction</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green economy</td>
<td>5.51%</td>
<td>8.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic/ dangerous chemicals</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water safety</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected areas</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable energy</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear energy regulation</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban planning</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No claim</td>
<td>48.78%</td>
<td>51.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, 70 percent of speeches within Parliament and ENGO press releases contained at least one environmental claim. (The remaining cases either talked about an environmental issue without supporting a certain perspective on the matter or simply communicated a point of order.) Climate change generally and the two closely related topics of
greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel exploration were present in 45 percent of cases and accounted for almost two thirds (65 percent) of those cases which included an environmental claim. The remaining 35 percent of cases which made an environmental claim concerning 11 other broad categories.

When the three document types are examined individually, we see stark differences between ENGO press releases compared to the parliamentary material. Eighty-five percent of ENGO press releases and 91 percent of those related to the Paris Agreement contained at least one environmental claim, compared to 51 percent of speeches from the House of Commons and 49 percent of those in committee meetings. The press releases concerned 14 different environmental topics, compared to nine in committee meetings and six in the House of Commons. The narrower scope of parliamentary discussion is expected because the sample only includes cases which included the words ‘environment’ and ‘Paris’ or were indexed as such, whereas the press releases included all those published during the study period. Climate change was the primary environmental issue in almost half of press releases related to the Paris Agreement, with greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel exploration/extraction accounting for most of the remaining press releases which made a claim. There is a statistically significant relationship between document type and the likelihood of making a claim ($778.05, 34 \text{ d.f.}, p<0.01$). This indicates that ENGOs did attempt to influence environmental policy debate, but their advocacy is not limited to the climate change policy field.
Figure 4.1: Monthly incidence of press release publication

- All press releases (n=765)
- Press releases about the Paris Agreement (n=145)
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 probe these initial results further by analysing ENGOs’ efforts to influence policy discussions by comparing the timing of press releases publication to the Paris Agreement or parliamentary discussion. Figure 4.1 tracks the number of press releases published by all of the ENGOs each month between January 1st, 2015 and December 31st, 2016. The figure shows both the total number of press releases and the number that specifically related to the Paris Agreement. Environmental Defence Canada produced the greatest proportion of ENGO press releases at 27 percent. This is followed by Green Peace Canada which accounted for 23 percent, the Pembina Institute and David Suzuki Foundation at 14 percent each, Ecojustice at 9 percent, Équiterre at 8 percent, and Sierra Club Canada at four percent.\(^3\)

As expected, the number of press releases related to the Paris Agreement peaked in November 2015 and remained high in December 2015. A smaller increase is observed a year later. These times correspond with the negotiation and ratification and initial implementation of the Paris Agreement, respectively. This increase contributes to higher overall publication rates; November 2015 and November 2016 have the greatest overall number of press releases and the most pertaining to the Agreement. ENGOs released five press releases on the final day of COP21, which is substantially higher than the average of 1.05 press releases per day. Also noteworthy is the fact that this was one of only ten instances when ENGOs wrote press release during the weekend. However, other issues dominated ENGO claims-making during other parts of the study period. The number of

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\(^3\) The sum of these values does not equal 100% due to rounding.
press releases per month increased during the spring and summer of each year when claims about the Agreement were rare.

Figure 4.2 compares the number of press releases issued by ENGOs and discussion of the Paris Agreement in committee meetings and the House of Commons. The timing of parliamentary discussion of the Paris Agreement is dictated by when the House of Commons sits. There was no debate during either summer or preceding the federal election, which occurred on October 19th, 2015. Conversely, ENGOs produced press releases during each month of the study period, ranging from 14 in August 2016 to 57 in November 2016. Forty-one percent of debate concerning the Paris Agreement in the House of Commons debates occurred on October 2nd, 3rd, or 4th, 2016, immediately prior to the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, discussion of the Paris Agreement in committee meetings varies according to when the Parliament was seated. The topic was mainly absent from debate during the 41st Parliament but picked up steeply after parliamentarians returned after the federal election and COP21. Discussion climbed during the spring of 2016 and peaked in May with 31 addresses that month. This echoes the trend seen in the House of Commons during those months. Although there is a small increase during the Fall of 2016, the timing of discussion of the Paris Agreement in committee meetings seems to be unrelated to key events. However, the increase in discussion in the House of Commons and committee meetings at this time does correspond to increased ENGO press releases.

Figure 4.2 offers no clear association between the timing of ENGO claims-making and discussion by policy makers. Taken together, these trends suggest that although ENGOs attempted to shape discussions of the Paris Agreement (by directing
press releases at policy makers and by writing press releases at pivotal moments), the Paris Agreement was not the principal concern of ENGOs and their efforts had little to no impact on the timing of debate among policy makers because the latter was bound by the schedule of Parliament.
4.2 Non-state actors in official policy debate

Having established that ENGOs attempted to influence environmental policy discussion surrounding the Paris Agreement, I next examine whether ENGOs’ concerns were present in official policy debate, in two publicly available settings, thus determining the permeability of the policy field. This section asks whether ENGOs and other non-state actors were mentioned in policy discussions. Mentions offer evidence on whether ENGOs and their claims are deemed authoritative or are considered a stakeholder worthy of mention, which suggests that ENGOs have some influence over recorded policy discussions. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of discussion which mentioned ENGO(s) and/or other non-state actors in the committee meetings and the House of Commons debates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliamentary committees (n=111)</th>
<th>House of Commons (n=490)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGO</td>
<td>9.01%</td>
<td>5.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>8.11%</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private business</td>
<td>7.21%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any</td>
<td>18.02%</td>
<td>10.41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENGOs were cited more often than other types of non-state actors in committee meetings and were the second most frequently in the House of Commons. Nine percent of cases in committee meetings cited an ENGO, followed by academics at eight percent, private businesses at seven percent, and scientists at two percent. By contrast, only five percent of House of Commons cases mentioned ENGOs, with private businesses, academics, and
scientists present in six percent, one percent, and one percent of the discussion, respectively. When considered together, only 12 percent of officially recorded policy debates mentioned one or more of the non-state actors listed. Eighteen percent of committee meeting cases cited one or more of these non-state actors, compared to just 10 percent in the House of Commons. Academics and ENGOs, in particular, were cited at a substantially higher rate. Mentions of ENGOs in recorded policy debate provides some initial support for claims of a penetrable policy field. Overall, ENGOs and private businesses perspectives entered policy debates more than academics or scientists. There is no statistically significant relationship between document type and the incidence of mentioning non-state actors (2.55, 4 d.f., p<0.01).

Figure 4.3 shows the eight instances when a specific ENGO was mentioned to support a speakers’ claims. This shows the relative presence of the seven ENGOs in debates and how parliamentarians incorporate ENGOs’ perspectives in the House of Commons.
Figure 4.3: Cases when a specific ENGO was cited to support a claim in Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House of Commons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;As the Pembina Institute put it: Canada is well positioned to compete in the field of clean energy technology, creating jobs and economic prosperity across the country.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Matthew Kellway, MP for Beaches-East York, February 19, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Speaker, at the Paris conference, the government made a commitment to the entire world to fight climate change. According to the Pembina Institute, however, if the energy east pipeline goes into service, greenhouse gas emissions will increase by 32 million tonnes a year.  

(Luc Thériault, MP for Montcalm, March 21, 2016)

"Motion No. 45 would position Canada to be an active and respected global partner in the worldwide fight against climate change [...] I must applaud the environmental organizations in my city for their work calling on government to address climate change, organizations like the Ecology Action Centre, the Dalhousie University Sustainability Office, the Citizens' Climate Lobby, NSPIRG working groups, the Canadian Youth Climate Coalition, and Sierra Club Atlantic"

(Andy Filmore, MP for Halifax, May 5, 2016)

"Both the Paris and Vancouver agreements commit the government to a just transition to a clean energy economy. The federal government must contribute more generously to programs already in place, including building Canadian expertise and offering hands-on training in the renewable and energy efficiency sectors. [...] As the Pembina Institute has said, Canada needs to be at the front of the race for a new global, clean, sustainable economy."

(Linda Duncan, MP for Edmonton Strathcona, October 3, 2016)

"The [David] Suzuki Foundation has said that the federal government will need to rely on additional policies to reduce emissions to meet the 2030 targets, given the modest carbon price compared to existing provincial policies."

(Linda Duncan, MP for Edmonton Strathcona, October 3, 2016)

"I support the ratification of the Paris agreement. I support aggressive action to cut carbon pollution and to create clean energy jobs. [...] I had the opportunity to meet last night with David Suzuki to talk about the carbon pricing that the Liberals have put on the table, and I can say that he was as deeply disappointed as the people in my riding are with what this plan would actually accomplish."

(Murry Rankin, MP for Victoria, October 5, 2016)

"Vancouver Quadra is home to many pioneers who understand the challenge of climate change and are committed to solutions. Whether they be members of the David Suzuki Foundation, which raises awareness [...] or ordinary people in the streets of Vancouver Quadra, this is a high priority in my riding."

(Joyce Murray, MP for Vancouver Quadra, November 4, 2016)

Parliamentary committee meetings

"researchers at Simon Fraser University [...] drew their inspiration from a report that I had prepared for the David Suzuki Foundation called "Sustainability within a Generation", which in turn had its roots in a very inspiring Swedish law that was passed in 1999 and that really set Sweden on a trajectory to become the global leader that it is today in the field of sustainable development."

(Dr. David Boyd, Adjunct Professor, Resource and Environmental Management, Simon Fraser University, April 14, 2016)
No ENGO exerted considerably more influence in recorded policy discussions than other organizations. Only seven of the 26 instances when ENGOs were cited to support claims in the House of Commons named a specific ENGO coded for during data-collection. The Pembina Institute and David Suzuki Foundation were each mentioned thrice, and Sierra Club Canada is mentioned once. The only other instance of a parliamentarian citing a specific ENGO to strengthen their argument was a reference to the now-defunct Economic Instruments Collaborative. These values are similar to committee meetings.

At committee meetings, the David Suzuki Foundation was the only ENGO in the sample that was referenced by another actor to support their claims. Ecojustice and the Pembina Institute were mentioned by their founder and Executive Director, respectively. In a similar vein, a member of the Atlantic chapter of Sierra Club Canada mentioned his own organization and its American equivalent to support his claims. I contend that these examples should be viewed the same as the David Suzuki Foundation being cited by an exterior actor because the ENGOs’ concerns are undoubtedly being disseminated into the policy field, just in a different manner. Non-specific environmental organizations were mentioned four times in committee meetings.

The likelihood of being cited by name does not appear to be related to the number of press releases disseminated by these organizations. Environmental Defence Canada is not mentioned in debate despite producing 6.7 times as many press releases as Sierra Club Canada during the study period. The rarity of ENGOs being cited by name prohibits identifying any organizations as markedly more influential than others. Neither Sierra Club Canada’s claim to be the “most influential grassroots environmental organization in
North America” in partnership with its American counterpart (September 15, 2015) nor Environmental Defence Canada’s claim that they are “Canada’s most effective environmental action organization”, is supported by the data. By and large, none of the ENGOs examined here were shown to be very influential.

In the remainder of instances when ENGOs were mentioned in the House of Commons, MPs did not refer to a specific organization but rather generic ‘environmental organizations’. These tokenistic mentions fail to communicate specific grievances to fellow policy makers and therefore cannot be taken as bona fide evidence of a permeable policy field. Interestingly, the MPs responsible for such comments often incorporate terms which public management scholars use to characterize NPG. For example, Celina Caesar Chavannes, MP for Whitby, stated that the government “engaged with our partners at the provincial and territorial level, with Indigenous groups, with industry, and with environmental groups […] at every step of the ratification of the Paris Agreement” (October 3, 2016, emphasis added).

Table 4.4 provides a more detailed analysis of which actors were represented in discussions surrounding the Paris Agreement in committee meetings. It includes both an overview of which non-state actors were invited to speak to committees and how these groups contributed to the discussion. It is important to look at both the performative and effectual spheres of federal policy debate—the House of Commons versus committee meetings, respectively (Gartner 1980)—because the former illustrates which perspectives and values the state ostensibly values and those which are effective in policy formation. ENGOs’ presence in committee meetings allows them to insert their perspectives into the discussion and demonstrates a genuine interest in ENGOs’ opinions on part of the policy
makers (Andrews & Edwards 2004, p. 495). If we find evidence that ENGOs play an agenda-setting role, this suggests that policy makers value ENGO’s opinions and that they may embrace the tenets of NPG.

Sixty-nine people spoke at committee meetings, of which 21 were MPs, seven were civil servants, and 41 were non-state actors. Each of the four types of non-state actors examined in this research spoke at committee meetings. Not only were non-state actors expressly invited to the discussion, their concerns were legitimized by parliamentarians through their inclusion in policy discussions at a higher rate than within debate in the House of Commons. Five individuals associated with ENGOs were invited to speak before committees. These were the Executive Director of the Pembina Institute, the Atlantic Chapter Executive for Sierra Club Canada, the founder of Ecojustice, a lawyer with the Canadian Environmental Law Association, and the Executive Vice-President of the Canadian Wildlife Federation. ENGOs were tied with academics, industry associations, and (non-environmental) interest groups as the second most common type of non-state actor present at meetings. Unions were the most common type with six individuals having been invited. Other non-state actors present at committee meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Invited to committee</th>
<th>Speak at committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGO</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>17.14%</td>
<td>8.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27.14%</td>
<td>20.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any</td>
<td>58.57%</td>
<td>45.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixty-nine people spoke at committee meetings, of which 21 were MPs, seven were civil servants, and 41 were non-state actors. Each of the four types of non-state actors examined in this research spoke at committee meetings. Not only were non-state actors expressly invited to the discussion, their concerns were legitimized by parliamentarians through their inclusion in policy discussions at a higher rate than within debate in the House of Commons. Five individuals associated with ENGOs were invited to speak before committees. These were the Executive Director of the Pembina Institute, the Atlantic Chapter Executive for Sierra Club Canada, the founder of Ecojustice, a lawyer with the Canadian Environmental Law Association, and the Executive Vice-President of the Canadian Wildlife Federation. ENGOs were tied with academics, industry associations, and (non-environmental) interest groups as the second most common type of non-state actor present at meetings. Unions were the most common type with six individuals having been invited. Other non-state actors present at committee meetings
include private businesses, research organizations (n=3), non-environmental NGOs, think tanks (n=2), an environmental consultant, First Nations chief, intergovernmental organization, postal worker, and a pro-resource extraction social movement organization (n=1)\(^4\). Together, these five individuals and organizations account for 13 percent of the remarks. ENGOs’ participation in committee discussions demonstrates a higher level of legitimacy than simply bringing their concerns to the table.

Notably, ENGOs were only legitimated as experts in committee meetings by non-parliamentarians. ENGOs can voice their concerns only through their presence at these meetings and the presence of other non-state actors (specifically academics and interest groups) and a single civil servant. This suggests that appearing before committee meetings may be an effective avenue for advancing claims to policy makers—as evident by the substantially higher frequency of ENGOs being mentioned in policy discussions, compared to the House of Commons—but that their grievances do not necessarily resonate with policy makers. The lower rate of ENGO (and other non-state actors) perspectives in the House of Commons indicates that ENGOs’ relative success in committee meetings does not carry over to the House of Commons, where policy decisions are formally sanctioned.

### 4.3 Assessing the evidence

This chapter provides conflicting evidence concerning whether ENGOs play an agenda-setting role and whether policy formation is characterized by the principles of New

\(^4\) One other individual was invited to speak before committee. This individual is not an MP or a civil servant, but their affiliation is otherwise unknown.
Public Governance (i.e., accessibility and accountability to stakeholders, a diffuse network of powerholders, policy makers being receptive to the concerns of non-state actors). Although ENGOs clearly targeted policy makers and the timing of their press releases indicates a (partial) focus on the Paris Agreement and an attempt to leverage high-profile events, the timing of press releases publication does not appear to be correlated with the timing of debates on the Paris Agreement in Parliament. This casts doubt on the claim that ENGOs fulfill an agenda-setting role.

ENGOs and other non-state actors are mentioned to support claims at varying rates between committee meeting, the House of Commons, and in press releases. Press releases cite other non-state actors as a significantly higher rate (37 percent) than committee meetings (18 percent) or the House of Commons (10 percent). Committee meetings seem to be more open than the House of Commons, but neither cite non-state actors at a rate close to ENGO press releases. Despite numerous non-state actors being invited to speak at committee meetings, demonstrating a high level of legitimacy, ENGOs are only cited as experts by non-parliamentarians before a committee. Lastly, there are few examples of genuine transmission of ENGO concerns on part of policy makers. Although some ways of viewing the data support an NPG/ agenda-setting view of policy formation, subsequent analysis undermines the initial conclusion and instead finds little support for this perspective.

There is limited evidence to suggest that ENGOs or other non-state actors are influential in the official policy sphere, despite their apparent efforts to shape the policy agenda. However, this lack of evidence to support an NPG/ agenda-setting perspective cannot be taken as conclusive proof that the opposite is true, that the state adheres to the
tenets of NPM and that ENGOs were entirely ineffective in this policy field. This research looked for evidence that ENGOs did influence policy discussions because it is conceptually very difficult to prove that ENGOs did not have an impact. The dearth of such evidence does not provide solid support for an NPM view of policy debates, but simply that ENGOs have a nominal impact on policy debates and that a New Public Governance perspective may be unwarranted. Ultimately, there is limited evidence that ENGOs played an agenda-setting role in discussions surrounding the Paris Agreement or that the state was receptive to their concerns.
Chapter 5: How do ENGOs advance their claims to policymakers?

The previous chapter established that there is only limited evidence to suggest that non-state actors influence official discussions surrounding the ratification and implementation of the Paris Agreement, this chapter examines two possible explanations for why this is the case. First, it examines whether ENGOs articulate their claims and promote them in a way that is potentially appealing to policymakers and then examines whether their tactical repertoire allows their claims to gain traction in the policy field.

5.1 Actors’ use of framing techniques

Four common frames are prominent in previous research on environmental policy debates: economic frames, Indigenous rights frames, scientific frames, and social and moral frames (i.e., Jaccard, Nyboer & Sadownik 2002; Ramos 2015; van Nijnatten & Boardman 2002). These are the ‘big ideas’ that shape the spaces that political actors use to position their argument and attach their claims to something larger.

I defined the four frames in the following ways. Economic frames highlight the monetary costs of climate change and associated environmental ills or present the climate crisis as an opportunity for economic innovation through the expansion of the green economy. An example of this rhetoric is that ‘the economy and environment go hand-in-hand’, an oft-quoted phrase by parliamentarians, particularly those in the Liberal party. Indigenous rights frames rely on the government’s and private business’ duty to consult with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples as stewards of the land, protecting their traditional way of life, and incorporating Indigenous knowledge and perspectives into conversations surrounding resource extraction. Scientific frames cite climatological,
meteorological, and health research to support a perspective. This discourse often uses a lot of discipline-specific jargon. Social and moral frames argue that Canada has an ethical obligation to prevent further environmental degradation (i.e., a duty to future generations), that the legally or morally right approach has not been followed, that certain perspectives do not have a social licence or highlights injustices associated with climate change. Both the Indigenous rights frames and the social and moral frames are characterized by the use of modal verbs and claims to be morally right. By contrast, economic and scientific frames more often rely on numeric data and emphasize that their position is functionally accurate.

Figure 5.1 provides selected excerpts from the House of Commons, committee meetings and ENGO press releases which demonstrate the four types of frames. This is far from a comprehensive list of all cases which used these frames. These quotes were selected because they exemplify some of the most common themes within each framing category and are therefore representative of the type of justification present in the policy field.
### Economic discourse

"Agriculture in the [Greater Golden Horseshoe] contributes $11 billion annually to Ontario’s economy. It also supplies $1.6 billion in environmental benefits per year including absorption of carbon pollution, water filtration, protection against erosion and runoff control."

(Environmental Defence Canada, November 24, 2015)

Climate change "puts the quality and quantity of our drinking water at risk, and it jeopardizes Halifax’s status and viability as a great Canadian port city, a key economic driver in my riding, my province, and eastern Canada”

(Andy Fillmore, MP for Halifax)

"The harmful effects of neonic far outweigh the benefits of their use. Pollinator health is critical to Ontario’s agricultural sector. Bees and other pollinators are responsible for pollinating crops worth $897 million annually, including many fruit, vegetable, and field crops.”

(Sir Nicholas Stern "called on the planet to invest 1% of global GDP now to avoid a potential loss of 20% of global GDP by 2050 [due to the affects of climate change]."

(Environmental Defence Canada, June 9, 2015)

### Indigenous rights discourse

First Nations in the region, facing increasing health and environmental impacts, had been asking for the cancellation of this project in their traditional territory.

(Environmental Defence Canada, February 23, 2015)

"[…] restoring public confidence in the process by renewing our nation-to-nation relationship with indigenous peoples through meaningful consultation. [and] ensuring [that] evidence includes traditional Indigenous knowledge.”

(Jim Carr, MP for Winnipeg South Centre and Minister of Natural Resources, April 11, 2016)

"The health of indigenous women cannot be separated from the health of our environment, the practice of our spirituality, and the expression of our inherent right to self-determination, upon which the mental, physical, and social health of our communities is based.”

(Lyne Gools, Executive Director of Native Women’s Association of Canada, November 17, 2016)

Working with indigenous communities to protect wilderness is “a way that respects indigenous rights and interests offers a huge opportunity to advance both conservation and reconciliation efforts in Canada”.

(April Woodley, National Director of Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, May 5, 2016)

### Social justice and morality discourse

"If the revised review process is really about projects needing social license – as the federal government has indicated – the review must conclude with a no. […] A petition has garnered over 90,000 signature in Quebec.”

(Environmental Defence Canada, June 16, 2016)

"EcoJustice lawyers […] argue that a number of pesticides containing two neonicotinoid active ingredients (Clothianidin and Thiamethoxam) are unlawfully registered in Canada.”

(Ecojustice, July 6, 2016)

"Addressing climate change must transcend politics. We owe it to our children and grandchildren to work on this together.”

(Deb Schultz, MP for King-Vaughan, October 4, 2016)

"There’s not enough in [the Paris Agreement] for the nations and people on the frontlines of climate change. It contains an inherent, ingrained injustice. The nations which caused this problem have promised too little help to the people who are already losing their lives and livelihoods.”

(Greenpeace, December 12, 2015)

### Scientific discourse

"Methane as a greenhouse gas is 25 times more potent that carbon dioxide, and regulating it will lead to substantial greenhouse gas reductions.”

(Deepak Obhrai, MP for Calgary East, June 4, 2015)

There is "growing evidence of disproportionate heat- and air-pollution-related health burdens in neighbourhoods with less green space and suggests that low-income inner-city neighbourhoods are generally more vulnerable.”

(David Suzuki Foundation, March 24, 2015)

"Phthalates are also known endocrine disruptors, and have been linked to asthma, infertility, risk factors for diabetes, and one phthalate has been linked to cancer. [...] These tiny bits of plastic absorb toxic chemicals from the environment, and when eaten by fish, those chemicals can gain access to the food chain.”

(Environmental Defence Canada, June 11, 2016)

"The city of Mississauga was hammered by a flash flood of over 123 millimeters of rainfall in just a couple of hours. […] we had three of these so-called 50-year storms in the last 10 years.”

(Peter Fonseca, MP for Mississauga East-Cooksville, October 3, 2016)
To explore these frames further and to determine whether ENGOs frame their concerns in a manner that is congruent with how policymakers discuss the Paris Agreement, Table 5.1 compares the use of the four frames across environmental policy debates. If ENGOs tailor their messages to the policymakers, which are often the direct target of their grievances (see section 4.1), we would expect press releases to use the four frames in a similar frequency as parliamentarians in the House of Commons and committee meetings. The same is expected from non-state actors which appeared before committees.

Overall, economic justification was the most common basis of argumentation. Twenty-seven percent of sources used economic reasoning, followed by social and moral justification at 19 percent, scientific justification at 18 percent, and 11 percent relied on Indigenous rights discourse. Cross-tabular analysis shows that ENGOs justified their arguments in a manner that is incongruent with official policymakers. The press release relied less on economic discourse to justify their claims than speakers in committee meetings and House of Commons, where economic discourse far out-ranks the other three types of frames. Instead, ENGO press releases used scientific and social/moral frames more frequently, which were each used in 24 percent of press releases. Economic justification is slightly less common at 22 percent. Indigenous rights discourse is least common, at 14 percent, but this is still more common than the other two document types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliamentary committees (n=111)</th>
<th>House of Commons (n=490)</th>
<th>ENGO press releases (n=765)</th>
<th>Total (n=1357)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentarians (n=44)</td>
<td>Non-parliamentarians (n=67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>20.45%</td>
<td>43.28%</td>
<td>34.23%</td>
<td>21.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and moral</td>
<td>6.82%</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>23.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
<td>13.43%</td>
<td>9.01%</td>
<td>23.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous rights</td>
<td>6.82%</td>
<td>11.94%</td>
<td>9.91%</td>
<td>13.99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Debates in the House of Commons and committee meetings were characterized by economic justifications in lieu of the three other frames. Discussion in the official policy arenas used scientific and social and moral justifications at around half the rate of ENGO press releases and used economic discourse at about 1.5 times the rate. Within in committee meetings, we also see a stark contrast between how parliamentarians and non-state actors talked about the Paris Agreement. Non-state actors used scientific, social and moral frames, and Indigenous rights discourse to a lesser extent than economic frames to situate their claims compared to parliamentarians. However, the use of these frames was not as frequent as with ENGOs. Non-state actors in committee meetings differed from ENGOs in their use of economic frames; 43 percent of comments by non-parliamentarians in committee meetings used economic frames to support their claims, which is more than twice as frequently as in press releases and substantially higher than parliamentarians. A chi-square test of independence shows a statistically significant relationship between document type and frequency of the four frames of justification (18.04, 6 d.f., p<0.01). ENGOs and non-state actors speaking before committee meetings framed their grievances differently than policymakers.

To further investigate how ENGOs articulate their claims, Table 5.2 shows how individual organizations frame their grievances. This analysis identifies whether some ENGOs articulate their claims in a manner that is more in line with policymakers’ discourse than other ENGOs. Because there were only ten cases of specific ENGOs being mentioned in official debates, we cannot simply compare ENGOs’ framing techniques to their inclusion or exclusion from Parliament. This approach would implicitly identify an ideal way to articulate grievances and such a finding would not be empirically founded
because of the rarity of specific ENGOs being cited in official debates. Consequently, the remainder of this section compares ENGO framing versus the averages for parliamentary committees and the House of Commons, rather than focusing just on the ENGOs which were named in official debate (Ecojustice, David Suzuki Foundation, the Pembina Institute, and Sierra Club Canada).

Table 5.2: Use of four frames by ENGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGO</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social and moral</th>
<th>Scientific</th>
<th>Indigenous rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecojustice (n=72)</td>
<td>6.94%</td>
<td>47.22%</td>
<td>41.67%</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Defence Canada (n=207)</td>
<td>24.64%</td>
<td>27.54%</td>
<td>21.74%</td>
<td>7.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Équiterre (n=64)</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>23.44%</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Peace Canada (n=178)</td>
<td>12.92%</td>
<td>24.16%</td>
<td>24.72%</td>
<td>36.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembina Institute (n=108)</td>
<td>39.81%</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>15.74%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Club Canada (n=32)</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
<td>22.58%</td>
<td>22.58%</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Suzuki Foundation (n=104)</td>
<td>30.77%</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
<td>24.04%</td>
<td>10.58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While most ENGOs relied heavily on the scientific and social and moral discourses in lieu of economic arguments, Table 5.2 illustrates that some ENGOs departed from this trend and justified their claims in a vastly different manner. For example, the Pembina Institute used social and moral frames in only three percent of cases, which is much lower than the other ENGOs and in official arenas. Conversely, 40 percent of their press releases used economic discourse, which is higher than official policymakers. The David Suzuki Foundation also used economic frames much more frequently than other ENGOs, while Ecojustice and the Sierra Club used these frames least frequently. Ecojustice used
scientific and social and moral arguments very frequently compared to other ENGOs and especially compared to official arenas. Greenpeace was also an outlier because of its use of Indigenous rights rhetoric in 37 percent of its press releases. In each of these cases, the percentages diverged substantially from the expected values, based on the chi-squared test. Despite this divergence, there was no overall statistically significant relationship between ENGO and framing (5.75, 18 d.f.).

By comparing Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, we gain a sense of which ENGOs framed their claims most in line with policy makers. Based on the average of the absolute difference between the percentage of press releases from each organization which used the four frames versus debate within the House of Commons and committee meetings, the Pembina Institute framed their concerns in a manner most like parliamentarians, while Ecojustice was most dissimilar. The average absolute difference between the use of the four frames in the Pembina Institute’s press releases versus debate in committees and the House of Commons was six percent, whereas Ecojustice’s framing diverged 23 percent from parliamentary committees and 25 percent from the House of Commons averages. The David Suzuki Foundation framed their grievances in the second most similar manner to policymakers. Their use of framing had an eight percent absolute difference from committee meetings and the House of Commons. Environmental Defence Canada was next most similar with a six percent and 10 percent absolute difference from committee meetings and the House of Commons, respectively. Both Sierra Club Canada’s and Équiterre’s framing was 12 and 13 percent different from committee meetings and the House of Commons, respectively. Green Peace Canada framed their grievances in a substantially different manner than policymakers, diverging
19 percent from the two official policy arenas, making it the second most dissimilar, after Ecojustice. The stark differences in framing techniques among ENGOs illustrate that they are a heterogeneous mix of organizations that share the same ultimate goal (stopping and reserving environmental degradation) but have varied approaches to achieving this end. The Pembina Institute was identified as marginally more influential than the other mainly ineffectual ENGOs examined this study (see Chapter 4). It may be deemed more authoritative and their perspectives worthier of consideration because it most closely reflects how Parliamentarians frame their arguments.

5.2 ENGOs’ use of claims-making tactics

By examining how ENGOs advance their claims to policymakers, this section tests another possible explanation for what appears to be a limited impact on official debates, ineffective/ inappropriate use of claims-making tactics. As was the case in the previous section, it is impossible to assess the efficacy of different claims-making strategies based on ENGOs presence in official debates because of the rarity of ENGOs being mentioned by name. Instead, this section simply outlines organizations’ use of different techniques and identifies which are deemed worthy of mention by policymakers. Table 5.3 shows the frequency that seven types of claims-making techniques were mentioned in ENGO press releases.
Table 5.3: Use of claims-making tactics by ENGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ecojustice (n=72)</th>
<th>Environmental Defence Canada (n=207)</th>
<th>Équiterre (n=64)</th>
<th>Green Peace Canada (n=179)</th>
<th>Pembina Institute (n=107)</th>
<th>Sierra Club Canada (n=32)</th>
<th>David Suzuki Foundation (n=104)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disseminating information</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>15.46%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>10.58%</td>
<td>7.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court challenge</td>
<td>55.56%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>7.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>10.14%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>9.35%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>7.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign of public support</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest/ march</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending consultations</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Action</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>5.59%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>38.89%</td>
<td>72.95%</td>
<td>84.38%</td>
<td>70.39%</td>
<td>84.11%</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>68.27%</td>
<td>71.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Twenty-nine percent of press releases mentioned using a claims-making tactic to advance claims to policy-makers, however, the prevalence varied greatly between ENGOs. The greatest percentage of Ecojustice press releases mentioned a strategy (61 percent), followed by the David Suzuki Foundation (32 percent), Green Peace (30 percent), Environmental Defence Canada (27 percent), Sierra Club Canada (25 percent), the Pembina Institute (16 percent), and Équiterre (16 percent). Only one percent of press releases referenced more than one claims-making strategies.

These results show that highly institutionalized claims-making tactics were preferred over radical, extra-institutional forms. Various techniques for disseminating information (i.e., releasing reports, hosting public events) were mentioned in eight percent of press releases, making it the most popular group of advocacy techniques. Environmental Defence Canada and the David Suzuki Foundation relied on these strategies more than the other organizations. Court challenges were the second most popular tactic, at eight percent. Most Ecojustice press releases (56 percent) mentioned court challenges, which is unsurprising considering that the organization’s expressed purpose is to provide legal support to affiliated environmental organizations by launching lawsuits. Correspondingly, three-quarters of Ecojustice press releases mention other ENGO(s). This value is substantially higher than the other organizations examined here, which ranged from 17 percent (Pembina Institute) to 47 percent (Équiterre). Another set of institutional tactics—demonstrating signs of social support/licence—was seen in two percent of cases and was most popular with Green Peace Canada. This category includes signing petitions, displaying lawn-signs, signing an open letter, and other means of demonstrating widespread support for a perspective. Consequently, the press releases
which mention these types of tactics almost always use social and moral arguments to frame their grievance(s). Attending public consultations and providing information to the government was also present in two percent of cases and was most popular with Sierra Club Canada.

The two extra-institutional advocacy strategies present in press releases differ from the institutional tactics in that they are potentially disruptive, illegal, or even violent. Protests and marches were mentioned in two percent of cases, twice by Équiterre, thrice by the David Suzuki Foundation, and nine times by Green Peace Canada. Direct action was noted ten times, exclusively by Green Peace Canada. No violent protests were documented. Interestingly, there was only one mention of a protest or march which would align with our traditional image of protest (the March for Jobs, Justice and the Climate on July 2, 2015). The other examples incorporated innovative techniques, such as two gigantic art installations which were displayed at COP21 and when ‘kayaktivists’ accompanied activists at sit-ins at two Kinder Morgan terminals and followed an Arctic-bound oil exploration vessel. Green Peace Canada understands these acts of civil disobedience as ways “to withdraw your consent in ways that the government can’t ignore” (August 4th, 2016). It is worth noting that the art installations were the only examples of protest or direct action which were aimed specifically at shaping the discourse surrounding the Paris Agreement. The remaining instances concerned climate change more broadly and/or natural resource extraction, many of which mention the Paris Agreement to frame the issues in a worldwide context.

Seven percent of press releases mentioned advocacy strategies not captured in the coding scheme. Thirteen and ten percent of press releases from the David Suzuki
Foundation and Environmental Defence Canada mentioned other tactics, respectively. These ‘other’ tactics were all examples of institutional advocacy strategies and included disseminating videos or infographics to the public, mentioning a coalition of environmental and social justice organizations, and being available for comment on environmental debates or publishing op-eds. There was no statistically significant relationship between ENGO and their choice of claims-making tactics (226.21, 36 d.f.).

Examining which claims-making strategies are mentioned in official discourse indicates which ones are effective in gaining policy space. Unlike press releases, references to claims-making strategies are largely absent from the official discussion. A single committee invitee mentioned a letter-writing campaign (a sign of public support), a protest, and a cross-country truck rally in support of a liquified natural gas project in Fort St. John, British Columbia. The only three mentions of claims-making strategies in the House of Commons came from members of peripheral parties and were not specifically related to the Paris Agreement. Backbencher MPs from the NDP and the Bloc Québécois mentioned protests and the leader of the Green Party mentioned petitions twice. The inclusion of these four examples of claims-making tactics in the official debate is insufficient to add to social movement scholarship on the relative efficacy of different forms of claims-making. Instead, it suggests that non-state actors are, by and large, excluded from policy debates and that the claims-making strategies employed by ENGOs are not legitimated in official debates.

In conclusion, economic framing dominated the Canadian federal environmental policy field, with social and moral and scientific claims being about two-thirds as popular and Indigenous rights discourse being used less than half as often. This aggregate pattern
was not expressed equally among the three policy arenas or among ENGOs. Policymakers frame their perspectives in economic terms more than most ENGOs and the non-state actors who appeared before committee meetings used this lens even more frequently. Press releases relied on economic, scientific and social and moral frames at almost equal rates and used Indigenous rights arguments more than other actors. As a whole, ENGOs articulate their claims in a markedly different manner than parliamentarians. This was a statistically significant relationship.

ENGOs framed their grievances in a variety of ways. Most notably, the Pembina Institute used economic discourse more frequently, while Ecojustice used the scientific and social and moral frames, and Green Peace Canada relied on Indigenous rights. As a result, the Pembina Institute most closely approximated policymakers’ argumentation and Ecojustice was most dissimilar. Despite this wide variation, there was no statistically significant relationship between ENGOs and framing techniques.

Twenty-nine percent of ENGO press releases mention a claims-making strategy which was much higher than the less than half of a percent of parliamentary cases which did the same. This suggests that ENGOs’ claims-making strategies are not worthy of consideration in the eyes of policymakers. The percentage of press releases which mentioned claims-making tactics varies between organizations, from Ecojustice (61 percent) to Équiterre (16 percent). Institutional tactics were favoured over extra-institutional. Extra-institutional tactics were used in three percent of cases and were most associated with Green Peace Canada. Although infrequent, these cases provided some evidence of tactical innovation.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The objective of this research was to address calls for empirically based research on the political influence of advocacy organizations by determining whether non-state actors play an important role in shaping policy discussions, or whether it remains the exclusive purview of official government agents. To achieve this end, my thesis examined ENGOs’ efforts to shape the discussion surrounding the Paris Agreement, in recorded and public venues, and to see whether non-state actors appear in parliamentary debate concerning this topic. In perusing this question, I contributed to two scholarly traditions, public management research and social movement studies. Overall, ENGOs attempted to influence policy debates concerning the Paris Agreement, but I found no evidence that their efforts were rewarded. Two possible reasons for their lack of influence are that they used different framing techniques compared to parliamentarians and that they may have relied too heavily on institutional claims-making strategies.

About one-fifth of the press releases produced by the seven ENGOs in 2015 and 2016 targeted the government (n=140). A similar number concerned the Paris Agreement (n=149). About one-quarter of press releases about the Paris Agreement mentioned the state, primarily the federal government. Other evidence of ENGOs’ attempts to influence policy debates is seen in the increases in overall and Paris Agreement-specific press release publication during key events (the ratification and negotiation of the accord). However, there was no indication that the publication date of press releases is correlated with when the Agreement was talked about in Parliament, as this was dictated by when Parliament sat and a predetermined official agenda. This suggests that ENGOs did not
play an agenda-setting role, contrary to Doern and Conway (1994) and Tindall and Robinson (2015).

Twelve percent of Parliamentary actors mentioned a non-state actor to support their claim(s). This rate was higher in committee meetings (18 percent) than in the House of Commons (10 percent). ENGOs and businesses were mentioned more frequently than academics or scientists. This provided an initial indication that the policy field is best understood through the lens of NPG. ENGOs presence in official debates, albeit limited presence, runs counter to research by Trew (2012), Jost and Jacob (2004) and Rootes and Nulman (2015).

While there was no evidence that any ENGO exerted much influence in the policy field, and non-recorded and private policy discussion was not captured in my analysis, the David Suzuki Foundation and the Pembina Institute were mentioned more frequently than other organizations in both committee meetings and the House of Commons and the Executive Director of the Pembina Institute was invited to speak at a committee meeting. By contrast, Environmental Defence Canada, Équiterre, and Greenpeace were not mentioned once or invited to appear before the committees. Based on the relatively few cases when ENGOs permeated official policy debates, we can speculate that the organizations’ differential success may be the consequence of the ‘radical flank effect’. This hypothesis states that more radical organizations serve as a foil to more institutionalized organizations, thus legitimizing the institutionalized organizations and affording them greater influence (Rootes & Nulman 2015). Greenpeace has long been considered a more radical, extra-institutional ENGO, which is reflected in the current research by its use of disruptive claims-making tactics. By contrast, the Pembina
Institute, David Suzuki Foundation, and Sierra Club Canada use more mundane claims-making tactics and the Pembina Institute even provides professional consulting services (research and advising) to various stakeholders, including all levels of government and petroleum producers such as Shell and BP (Pembina Institute 2018).

The majority of the cases where ENGOs were mentioned did not cite a specific organization, but rather environmental organizations in general. These were tokenistic mentions of ENGOs and therefore do not represent the bona fide transmission of their concerns or that they were view as authoritative stakeholders. Although ENGOs were the second most common type of non-state actor invited to committee meetings—and accounted for 13 percent of the discussion—ENGOs were only cited to support a claim in committee meetings by other non-parliamentarians. Despite being legitimated by their invitation to speak at the meetings, ENGO concerns did not appear to resonate with policy makers.

Aligning with previous research (Andrews & Caren 2010; Hoffbauer & Ramos 2014), economic frames were most common in the climate change policy field, overshadowing environmental issues. Economic frames were followed by social and moral frames, scientific frames, and lastly, Indigenous rights frames. ENGOs framed their grievances in a statistically significantly different way than policy makers. The greatest difference between press releases and official debates comes from ENGOs’ greater use of social and moral and scientific frames. Interestingly, non-parliamentarians in committee meetings used economic frames at a much higher rate than Parliamentarians and press releases. It should be noted, however, that ENGOs are not a homogenous group as they articulate their claims in vastly different ways. The Pembina Institute frames their
arguments in a manner most congruous with policy makers while Ecojustice is most dissimilar.

Twenty-nine percent of press releases mentioned a claims-making tactic, but this value also varied greatly between organizations. Ecojustice was, by far, the most likely to mention an advocacy tactic, which was primarily litigation. Overall, institutional tactics were more common than extra-institutional tactics, which runs counter to Olzak and Soule’s (2009) content analysis of media coverage of the American environmental movement. Disseminating information to the public and government was the most common tactics and no violent tactics were noted. Contrary to predictions from Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005), Burstein (1999), and Loundsbury (2005), the use of institutional tactics did not afford ENGOs access to powerholders. Greenpeace Canada accounted for most of the relatively few cases of extra-institutional tactics; they were the only organization to mention direct action. This confirms previous research on the tactical repertoires of Greenpeace Canada and Sierra Club Canada, which shows the former embracing more extra-institutional tactics and the later using institutional tactics like educational campaigns (Doern & Conway 1994; Ramos 2015). Despite stark differences between organizations, there was no statistically significant relationship between ENGO and the use of different claims-making tactics. There were extremely few mentions of advocacy tactics in official debate and none were related to the Paris Agreement directly. This suggests that ENGOs’ use of claims-making tactics was not considered legitimate by policy makers.

Overall, my analysis finds only limited support for NPG as the governing logic, meaning the ENGOs were largely not influential in shaping policy discussions. If we
apply this conclusion to Fligstein and McAdam’s model of conflict between competing parties and logics, we conclude that the lack of evidence of NPG means that official policy-makers (incumbents) were privileged over ENGOs (challengers) in this field. Although there is little support for an NPG/ agenda-setting view of the state-social movement relationship, this cannot be taken as proof that the state is characterized by the tenets of NPM and that non-state actors are ineffectual in policy formation, because of the methodological limitations of this research.

On balance, there is little evidence to support characterizing policy debates concerning the Paris Agreement as embracing the tenets of NPG, contrary to Bao et al. (2012), Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014), Evans and Sapeha (2015), Runya, Qigui and Wei (2015). Likewise, ENGOs rarely entered official policy discussion in a significant way, meaning that there is limited evidence that ENGOs plan an agenda-setting role in this discussion (Bourgon, 2007; Conteh & Roberge, 2014; Mackenzie 2008). Although ENGOs and other non-state actors can voice their concerns in committee meetings, and in the House of Commons to a lesser extent, the incorporation of ENGOs claims solely by non-state actors within committee meetings and the prevalence of tokenistic mentions of ENGOs by parliamentarians suggest that the state rejects the tenets of NPG even if they embrace its vocabulary. ENGOs’ inability to communicate their grievances to policy-makers in a meaningful way means that they will likely not shape the policy agenda and/or formally participation in policy-formation (Carter 2011).

Having conducted a meta-analysis of sociological literature on the political consequences of social movements, Amenta et al. (2010) conclude that answering the
question, “Do social movements matter to mainstream politics?” is too broad a question for any single researcher to answer because such an answer would necessitate longitudinal and geographically dispersed case studies. Instead, scholars are limited to making conclusions about whether a certain social movement is influential in a particular historical and political context, without generalizing to other social movements in other contexts. Following this advice, I conclude simply that the Canadian ENGOs examined here do not appear to matter much in the climate change policy field.
References


Appendix: Coding scheme

Identification information

1. **ID**
   - Hansard and committee evidence: Document type (H/C), followed by year, month, day, sequential letter
   - Press release: Source organization code (DS/EJ/ED/EQ/GP/PI/SC), followed by sequential number

2. **Dtype** (document type)
   - 0. House of Commons Hansard
   - 1. Committee evidence
   - 2. ENGO press release

3. **Year**
4. **Month**
5. **Day**
6. **Par#** (Parliament number)
   - 41. 41st Parliament (up to and including August 5th, 2015)
   - 42. 42nd Parliament (after and including December 3rd, 2015)

7. **HanCom#** (Hansard number of committee name)
   - *Write-in name*
   - 99. Not applicable (press releases)

8. **Paris** ("Paris" in main text)
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

9. **Environment** ("environment" in main text)
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

10. **Party**
    - 1. Liberal Party
    - 2. Conservative Party
    - 3. NDP
    - 4. Bloc Québécois
    - 5. Green Party
    - *Write-in name and affiliation of non-parliamentarians in committee evidence*
    - 99. Not applicable (press releases)

11. **Section**
1. Adjournment Proceedings
2. Government Orders
3. Oral Question Period
4. Orders of the Day
5. Private Members’ Business
6. Routine Proceedings
7. Speech from the Throne
8. Statements by Members
99. Not applicable (committee evidence and press releases)

12. MP1
Hansards and committee evidence: position of speaker
Press releases: position of target
1. Prime Minister
2. Another party leader
3. Cabinet minister
4. Other MP
5. non-MP

13. MP2
Press releases: name or position of target
*write-in*
99. Not applicable (Hansards and committee evidence)

14. Prov
*write-in two-letter province code of MP or location of publication*
99. Not applicable

15. Jurisdiction (constituency)
*write-in MP constituency name*
99. Not applicable (press releases and non-parliamentarians in committee evidence)

16. Organization (source organization)
1. EcoJustice
2. Environmental Defence Canada
3. Équiterre
4. Green Peace Canada
5. Pembina Institute
6. Sierra Club Canada
7. David Suzuki Foundation
99. Not applicable (Hansards and committee evidence)
Non-state actors mentioned

17. **ENGÓ** (cited to support claim)
   1. Yes
   2. No

18. **Which_ENGO** (cited to support claim)
   1. Ecojustice
   2. Environmental Defence Canada
   3. Équiterre
   4. Greenpeace Canada
   5. Sierra Club Canada
   6. David Suzuki Foundation
   7. Other
   99. Not applicable

19. **Scientist** (scientist cited to support claim)
   1. Yes
   2. No

20. **Academic** (academic cited to support claim)
   1. Yes
   2. No

21. **Business** (business cited to support claim)
   1. Yes
   2. No

22. **Expert_example**
    *write-in example of citing non-state actor to support claim*
    99. Not applicable

Claims

23. **Jurisdiction** (area of concern)
    *write-in areas on concern*
    99. Not applicable

24. **Primary_enviro** (primary environmental issue)
    *write in primary environmental issue (climate change/ GHG emissions/ green economy/ protected areas/ water safety/ wildlife/ fossil fuel exploration and transportation/ environmental assessment/ nuclear energy*
regulation/ urban planning/ toxic or dangerous chemicals/ forestry/
renewable energy/ other)

25. **Secondary_enviro** (secondary environmental issue)
   *write in secondary environmental issue (climate change/ GHG emissions/
green economy/ protected areas/ water safety/ wildlife/ fossil fuel
exploration and transportation/ environmental assessment/ nuclear energy
regulation/ urban planning/ toxic or dangerous chemicals/ forestry/
renewable energy/ other)

26. **Policy** (non-Paris Agreement policy mentioned)
   *write in the policy name

27. **Policy_note** (note on non-Paris Agree policy)
   *write-in*

28. **PA** (Paris Agreement mentioned)
   1. Yes
   2. No

29. **PA_opinion** (expressed opinion of Paris Agreement)
   1. Fully support
   2. Support with amendments
   3. Heavily criticize
   4. Fully oppose

30. **PA_ammend** (expressed amendment to Paris Agreement)
    *write-in amendment*

31. **PA_note** (general notes on the Paris Agreement)
    *write-in notes*

32. **Legis** (legislation mentioned)
    *write-in legislation

*ENGO tactics*

33. **Campaign** (campaign for social or policy change mentioned)
    1. Yes
    2. No

34. **Event** (specific event for social or policy change mentioned)
    1. Yes
    2. No

35. **Tactic** (social movement strategy mentioned)
    1. Court challenge
2. Direct action
3. Protest/march
4. Signs of public support (i.e., petition, lawn-signs, signing an open letter)
5. Disseminating information (i.e., public talk, release report)
6. Consulted by government or attended public consultations
7. Other (see CAexample for details)
99. Not applicable

36. Success (explicit mention of ENGO successful social and policy change)
   1. Yes
   2. No

37. CA_example
   *write-in example of campaigns/events/tactics/success

Rhetorical constructions

38. IN_arg (Indigenous rights discourse)
   1. Yes
   2. No

39. ECON_arg (economic justification)
   1. Yes
   2. No

40. SOC_arg (social and moral justification)
   1. Yes
   2. No

41. SCI_arg (scientific argumentation)
   1. Yes
   2. No

42. Justification_note
   *write-in example of discourse used

Contentious topics

43. NEB (National Energy Board)
   1. Yes
   2. No

44. Pipeline
   1. Energy East
   2. Keystone XL
   3. Trans Mountain
4. Northern Gateway
5. Other names pipeline/ general pipeline discussion

45. Carbontax
   1. Yes
   2. No

46. Notes
   *write-in additional information