The Intellectual Genealogy of the Antigonish Movement

by

Paul Fraser Armstrong

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Dedication

We are generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can subsist under customs and manners extremely different from our own; and we are apt to exaggerate the misery of barbarous times, by an imagination of what we ourselves should suffer in a situation to which we are not accustomed. But every age hath its consolations, as well as its sufferings.

Adam Ferguson

We have no desire to create a nation of shopkeepers, whose only thoughts run to groceries and dividends. We want our people to look into the sun, and into the depths of the sea. We want them to explore the hearts of flowers and the hearts of their fellow man. We want them to live, to love, to play and pray with all their being …

Moses Coady
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Abstract

‘Civil society’ has been re-established in the social sciences as a central theoretical motif during the last twenty-five years – particularly within the fields of historical sociology, political philosophy, and moral theology. Yet, a deeper understanding of its conceptual history is essential to advance the present efforts to develop a better theory.

In this study in historical sociology, I trace the emergence of the modern imaginary of civil society and explore two major ideologies of resistance to it. The study focuses on various inflection points in this history, which together, provide an overview of, what I view as, the critical theoretical issues.

I then discuss the intellectual roots of the Antigonish Movement, and show how it drew from each of these major ideologies of resistance. In the early years of the twentieth century, the ‘Antigonish Movement’ in Nova Scotia was instituted using a Catholic counter-model of political organization, and an Anglo-French counter-model of économie sociale, to build a co-operative movement, a vision of co-operation which was subsequently widely emulated. While there has been considerable scholarly attention to various aspects of this Movement, particularly to its adult education methodology, this study contributes to a better understanding of the Movement’s intellectual origins, and may contribute to an improved understanding of the remaining intellectual problems in developing a coherent theory of civil society suitable for the present moment.

In this last aim, the study would be a prolegomenon to what Adam Ferguson, the Eighteenth-Century Scottish moral philosopher, would call ‘moral science’, which he defined as “the study of what men ought to be, and of what they ought to wish, for themselves and for their country.”
Acknowledgements

There are so many people who have helped my learning along the way. We all learn from others, but it doesn't lessen the debt that I owe.

My early teachers – Robert Eden in political philosophy, Graham Morgan in sociology, and Richard Langlois in economics – helped me aim much higher than anything my imagination had prepared me for. It took me more than thirty years to realize these aims.

I owe a great debt to Richard Apostle who first proposed that I work on the history of the social sciences when I was an undergraduate. He quietly supported and encouraged me throughout my master's and doctoral work, and never seemed surprised by any of the intellectual turns I took, but rather, as I found, had been there all along, waiting for me. Howard Ramos and Shirley Tillotson are not just advisors and colleagues, but friends, and have always been generous with their time and knowledge. I owe the three of them unpayable debts, not discharged yet with this dissertation. My early interest in the history of sociology was influenced by Neil McLaughlin’s work in this area, and I am deeply grateful to him for his willingness to act as my external reviewer.

Peter Ludlow, Dan MacInnes, Terry Murphy, Ken Fraser, and Neil Robertson have read one or more chapter drafts, and their feedback has been precious to me. More than just benefiting from their criticism, my work has benefited immensely from their own scholarship. My thanks to Julia Poertner and Emily Varto for their help in translating portions of Riedel’s challenging text on civil society.

It is essential to comment on the great assistance provided by Document Delivery services at Dalhousie over many years, and the archival assistance provided by Kathleen MacKenzie at the St. Francis Xavier University Archives and Shane MacDonald of the Catholic University of America Archives. As everybody who has done this kind of work knows, it would simply be impossible without the kind of unstinting help which I was given.
To my family and a long list of friends, some of whom who have died before I could complete this, who with their kindnesses, and the forbearance with which they endured hundreds of my conversations, served to give me repeated glimpses of the virtuous life. This is, consequently, a better work because I knew you.

And, finally, and most importantly, this was only possible with the help of Joan Greenwood, who stood by my side through many tribulations, taught me the perseverance to accomplish this work through her own loyalty and love, and gave me the freedom to do so, deferring or abandoning more of her own projects and dreams to help get this done, than should be necessary for any human life.

To all these people, my thanks.
Methodology and theory in the social sciences are very close.

In the broadest terms, methodology is the \textit{theory of scientific inquiry}. If, however, as I hold, the phenomena of the social sciences are not just more complex than those of physics, but are constitutionally distinct, then they require a different logic of inquiry. Unlike the physical world,\textsuperscript{1} social phenomena are constituted by the kind of understanding which people have of them, and the domain of interest is, therefore, that of meaningful action.

The understanding of physical phenomena, of course, is shaped by the kind of knowledge developed about them, how these phenomena can be used to serve human needs, and what kind of predictions can be made about their behaviour. Science studies are quite correct, therefore, as seeing a relationship in which these objects are mentally constituted by our understanding. However, physical phenomena have an existence independent of our ideas which social phenomena do not. It is in this sense that social phenomena are ‘constructed’ in a way that physical phenomena are not. They are not constructed in any voluntary way, though, but constitute the horizon of possibility in which social action takes place. As Giddens suggested, social phenomena are both a resource and a constraint.

The empiria of the social sciences are constituted by knowing subjects. Wilfrid Sellars, in his 1956 London lectures, published as “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, distinguished the logical space of reasons as \textit{sui generis}, a domain of justification rather than causation:

\textsuperscript{1} I use ‘physical world’ rather than ‘natural’ as I want to hold open the possibility that other domains – that of chemistry and biology – may also be distinct from physics. Ilya Prigogine’s \textit{The End of Certainty} (1997) is an argument for the distinction of the domain of chemistry. For a very interesting recent discussion seeking to reconcile complexity theory with quantum theory, see Maldonado (2017).
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says (Sellars, 1956: 298-299).

Justification, of course, implies warrant or true belief. What matters here, though, as McDowell (2009) has pointed out, is that the space of giving reasons is the space of a speaker. It is a person who gives a reason.

Given the central concern of the social sciences with subjectively meaningful action – action done for a reason – the intertwining of reasons for and reasons why means that the logic of the social sciences and the empirical phenomena which are their objects of investigation interpenetrate and are dependent upon one another.

**Historical Sociology as Methodology**

This begs the question, though, about how this study in historical sociology is possible. I think of historical sociology as the methodology of history. I mean by this something different from both philosophy of history and from the narratives of history itself. In terms of methodology, the concern is with the investigation of the concepts and logics which underpin the historical narrative; in terms of ‘history’, the concern is not with chronology, but with the temporal structures of human action. Historical sociology, in this view, then, is concerned with the historical concepts and logics of human action.

The historical sociology of historical sociology, the rather amusing title by Steinmetz (2007), has received critical attention recently. The titles of Andrew Abbott’s (1991) “History and Sociology: The Lost Synthesis” and Craig Calhoun’s (1996) “The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology” stand as telling comments about their judgements on what Adams, Clemens, and Örloff (2005) have referred to as the ‘second wave’ of historical sociology. George Steinmetz (2010) has provided some explanation of the failure of the transfer of

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2 In the nineteenth century, philosophy of history had a normative-evolutionary character. With the development of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, its concerns focussed more on epistemological issues, and it exists now largely as the investigation of the conditions of possibility for history.
knowledge from the ‘first wave’ of historical sociologists to the second, with his article, “Ideas in Exile: Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Failure to Transplant Historical Sociology into the United States”. In their historical overview, Adams, Clemens, and Orloff argue that there is a resurgence in the last few years of a new historical sociology in a ‘third wave’. Their argument has been sharply criticized by Andrew Abbott for, what he sees as, its theoretical failure:

You will not find in this book much of anything about what exactly it means that social reality is historical. You will not find a worked-out theory of the historicality of experience nor any attempt to create general models of the historicality of experience nor any attempt to create general models of the nature of temporality, contingency, or succession (Abbott, 2006: 344).

There is some justice in this criticism where Abbott (2001) has himself made advances in the theory and methodology of historicity. However, there are other issues related to historical sociology besides historicity. What justifies the Adams-Clemens-Orloff periodization in separating the third wave from its predecessors is the ‘linguistic turn’ of the social sciences – what Elisabeth Clemens in her concluding essay of the Remaking Modernity volume referred to as the focus on multiplicity and agency:

Cumulatively, these efforts have begun to converge on a new style of finding form in history, a new style of explaining social change. The distinctive features of this new sensibility include appreciations of multiplicity and agency that contrast with the combination of structural coherence and individual rationality that powered the resurgence of historical sociology in past decades. (Clemens, 2005: 494)

This has led to other issues besides Abbott’s concern with temporal problems. It leads, for instance, to a different role for ideas, or discourse if one uses the setting of practice theory. While the discourse of ideas is a form of social practice with its own history, these linguistic practices are also the means by which one understands other

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3 It is noteworthy that the linguistic turn in philosophy (Hacker, 2013) occurred at an earlier moment than that in the social sciences (Wagner, 2003). The philosophical turn should be dated to the 1950s (see Rorty, 1967, for an influential collection of essays from that period), while the turn in the social sciences, variously referred to as the ‘interpretive turn’ (Hiley, Bohman, and Shusterman, 1991), the ‘historic turn’ (McDonald, 1996), or the ‘cultural turn’ (Bonnell and Hunt, 1999), should be dated to the late 1970s and early 1980s (Sewell, 2005b; Wagner, 2008).
practices. It is in this sense that Peter Winch contended that “a man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality”. “Indeed”, he argued, “permeated’ is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of ideas about reality” (1958: 23). The integration of ideas with practice still leaves it necessary, however, to distinguish between theoria and phronesis.

Nor is embedding ideas in culture a solution. Samuel Moyn has put paid to the belief that the thick description of culture is enough:

There is no way to study representations as culture without taking into account the concepts that make up culture, which is not simply a system of thick meaning⁴ but also one in which principled rationales for and justifications of the social order always matter and indeed inhabit social practice to the core. (Moyn, 2014: 121)

What is happening is that the social sciences are being forced to give up their vulgar materialisms and the history of ideas is being forced to give up its effete idealisms. This is tantalizingly in evidence in William Sewell’s (2005a), Logics of History, even as he continues to struggle with his inheritance of structural logics.

The Concept of the Social Imaginary

In the last few decades, this program has been advanced by Cambridge contextual reconstruction, German Begriffsgeschichte, and the French history of mentalités. However, sociological theorists have demanded a more satisfactory model of the relation between individual biography and social conduct. To this end, the concept of the ‘social imaginary’ has received considerable attention in recent years. It has been developed in theoretical projects such as is found in Cornelius Castoriadis ([1976] 1987), Paul Ricoeur (1986), and Charles Taylor (2004). Taylor has defined the concept of the social imaginary in the following terms:

By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the

⁴ See Geertz (1973), particularly Chapter 1.
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations (Taylor, 2004: 23).

Taylor, therefore, understands the social imaginary (a) as constituted in social practices, (b) as background in the Heideggerian sense, and (c) as common understanding or meaning. The concept of ‘social practices’ has become the dominant view of how agency and structure are mediated, and the constitutive quality of practices has become the standard means of explaining the formation of the routines and customs of everyday life. There has been more difficulty, though, in the theorization of institutional formation and development as part of a logic of practice given the difficulties of incorporating ideas to practice.

It is, therefore, the “common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (Taylor, 2004: 23) that makes the concept of the social imaginary of theoretical interest. Moyn comments that “the social imaginary is much more ‘high concept’ both about the nature of human community and the approaches needed to study it than the notion of culture has traditionally allowed” (2014: 119), and, I would add, more ‘high concept’ than Geertz allowed.

Practices are, therefore, not an autonomous domain of “non-sapient activity from which intellectual life somehow originated” (Moyn, 2014: 116). The ideas we hold, our representations of the world, are not related to practices as cause is to effect, but rather are a form of internal relation. As Peter Winch indicated to us years ago during the first wave of the linguistic turn, “the social relations between men and the ideas which men’s actions embody are really the same thing considered from different points of view” (1958: 121). It is somewhat more complicated than that, however, as ideas or representations are additionally embodied in discourse as a form of practice, one with a vital reflexive function. It is this expression of ideas-as-practice that underwrites the concept of the social imaginary and gives ideas an autonomous motivational role.6

5 While ‘discourse’ is related to the adjective ‘discursive’, I am using it here in its most generic sense, one compatible, for instance, with Taylor’s (2016) argument for the expressive value of language.
6 A recent literature in sociology incorporates a theoretical distinction from psychology between conscious and sub-conscious mental systems, where cultural habitus is identified with a subconscious “practical consciousness” (Vaisey, 2009, Lizardo et al. 2016). While this development provides a better grounding for the
Taylor suggests that the social imaginary “while nourished in embodied habitus is given expression on the symbolic level” (quoted in Gaonkar, 2002: 11). Neither theory nor naked practice, the social imaginary is not embodied solely in an intelligentsia, but is the common property of a people, and this “common understanding of what they are doing operates more at an imaginary or symbolic level … carried in images, stories, legends, and so on” (Taylor, 2007: 29-30).

Put simply, theories of social imaginaries elucidate the ways in which cultural configurations of meaning creatively configure the human encounter with – and formation (as articulation and doing) of – the world, on the one hand, and, articulate their centrality for the emergence, formation and reproduction of social institutions and practices, that is, of social change and social continuity on the other (Adams et al., 2015: 19).

The promise of the social imaginary as a concept, therefore, is its potential to connect representations and practices, agency and structure, but the content of the imaginary always comes from outside theory.

The Problem of Tyranny

The remaining problem is that the concept of the social imaginary in this form does not allow for the possibility of tyranny. When still wedded to the naturalizing assumptions of modernity, it remains a form of idealism. We can see this in the blurring of imagination with imaginary.

The role of imagination is discussed by Suzi Adams et al. in their analysis of social imaginaries. They argue that, by drawing on an understanding of the imagination as “authentically creative (as opposed

role of habitual social behaviour and its rationalization, “strong practice theory and the sociological dual-process model do not provide a clear model for the causal role of discursive consciousness in decision-making, how discursive consciousness overrides practical consciousness, or how discursive and practical consciousness interact to affect decision-making” (Vila-Henninger, 2015: 241).

A ‘people’ can be defined at any level of aggregation, and there is no particular merit in defining it according to legal concepts, such as the ‘state’.

The concept is not immune to other criticism (Abbey 2004; Grant, 2014; Stankiewicz, 2016). However, I take a different approach in what follows.
... an elaboration of social imaginaries involves a significant, qualitative shift in the understanding of societies as collectively and politically-(auto) instituted formations that are irreducible to inter-subjectivity or systemic logics” (2015: 15).

This claim points to an ambiguity, though, in the distinction between the *imagination* as a psychological process and the *imaginary* as a social process. In his important theory of cultural imagination, Paul Ricoeur (1976) argues, mistakenly in my view, for a parallel between the psychological shaking off of intellectual background conditions and the imaginative construction of alternative possibilities, on the one hand, and the social movement from ideologies of reproduction to the utopian production of social change, on the other. However, a *positive* description of the psychological process cannot be assimilated to a *normative* interpretation of the social process. A genealogical conception of social development as progression, always getting better except for the retarding efforts of reactionary interests, has become entirely problematic.

Modernity was built on the naturalization of means and ends. What we call interests are *naturalized ends*, unmediated by intentions or any conception of the good. Given the early modern psychologies of sense impressions, the problem of order was seen to revolve around the struggle between naturalized interests. But as psychology developed a deeper understanding of intentionality and the ethical critique of self-interest became more compelling through the nineteenth century, German social thought was able to historicize interests. This is seen in Max Weber’s famous passage about the switchmen:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Weber, [1915] 1946: 280).

Interests directly govern conduct, but they are not themselves primitives, but are historically derivative from the tracks laid down by world images.9 We see here Weber’s fierce commitment to the role of ultimate values.

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9 See Lizardo and Stoltz (Forthcoming) for a discussion of the distinction between ideal and material interests.
Similarly, the naturalization of means was accomplished with the divorce of empirical science from metaphysics. While this was extremely fruitful for the natural sciences, it has led to a progressive moral evacuation of the social order. Unlike the natural order, the social order is constituted by the kind of conception of it which people hold, and the social sciences cannot, therefore, provide any observation independent of the ultimate values which people advance. Unlike the historicist destruction of naturalized ends at the end of the nineteenth century, though, there remained a commitment, notably with Weber, to the objectivity of science based on a value-neutral logic in which concepts and their use were kept distinct. It was only in the later twentieth century with the absorption of Wittgenstein’s reconstruction of meaning and the collapse of the distinction between concepts and their use that it became clear that the social order is dependent on a metaphysics that precedes and informs its social science.

The final collapse of the naturalization project of modernity has vitiated the notion of progress and, once again, allows for the possibility of tyranny. Most importantly for social inquiry, it legitimates a history of ideas within the larger cultural embedding that the social imaginary provides.

The Study Approach

This conception of a non-naturalized social imaginary constitutes the methodological framework within which this study is conducted. The large narrative is one where I trace the development of the modern imaginary of civil society, and explore two major ideologies of resistance to it. I then discuss the intellectual roots of the Antigonish Movement, and show how it drew from each of these major ideologies of resistance. I conclude with a brief discussion of where the Movement fell short.

In the following, the first chapter of this argument, I outline the recovery of the concept of civil society growing out of the Eastern European resistance to Soviet domination, demonstrate the need for better theoretical foundations, and make a first cut at exploring such foundations by outlining the late medieval conception of civil society and its Renaissance transformation. This initial discussion of "civil society au début" serves as a benchmark against which to measure the development of, and resistance to, the modern conception of civil
These six central chapters are divided into two streams, following the "Dissertation Schematic" on the next page. The one stream occupies the political domain, the other the economic domain, each stream divided into two parts, with the first part outlining the development of the modern imaginary and the nineteenth century resistance to it, and the second part connecting that tradition to the local culture of the Antigonish Movement. The effort in the first part is to show the sometimes exhausting accretion of ideas and their embedding in a particular intellectual culture that develops over centuries. The Antigonish Movement did not hold a self-conscious theorization of its own intellectual grounding, but it rather emerged out of this larger intellectual culture. The burden of the second part of each stream, therefore, is to show the connection between the larger social imaginary and its Antigonish expression.

The two streams – the political and economic – are not symmetrical. The concerns of the Antigonish Movement were centrally economic. The people in their Eastern Nova Scotia were suffering great poverty and exploitation at the hands of the merchants and industrialists, with resulting waves of out-migration from the area, and a cadre of strong Catholic priests, centred at St. Francis Xavier University, tried to change that. The Antigonish Movement was, essentially, a movement of social and economic renewal. It did not, therefore, have political aims in the sense of constitutional objectives. It was inspired, though, by a political tradition of reform and authority within the Catholic tradition, and this was reflected in the Movement's approach to ‘organizing from below’, with an emphasis on the ‘kitchen meeting’ and adult education, the cooperative, and the credit union.

As a result, the first of these streams focusses on the political doctrine of the Catholic Church in Chapter 3, demonstrating the continuing tensions between reform and stability, and demonstrating its slow embedding in various practices of the faithful. In Chapter 4, I argue that the political and economic convulsions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provided the impetus for a resolution of these tensions with a major ideology of resistance grounded in the theory of solidarity and subsidiarity. In Chapter 5, I connect the early stutterings of this political theory with the clerical regimes in Eastern Nova Scotia during the nineteenth century, establishing the political conception found among the priests of the Antigonish Movement.
Figure A – Dissertation Schematic

**Ch #1: Introduction to Thesis**

**Ch #2: Civil Society au Début**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL DOMAIN</th>
<th>ECONOMIC DOMAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch #3: The Reform of Catholic Political Doctrine</td>
<td>Ch #6: The Triumph of Commercial Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1414-1713</td>
<td>1600-1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch #4: The Intellectual Recovery of <em>Communicatio Politica</em></td>
<td>Ch #7: The Turn to Social Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713-1862</td>
<td>1804-1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch #5: The Heatherton Inheritance</td>
<td>Ch #8: The Radicalism of D. J. MacDonald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772-1877</td>
<td>1881-1948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ch #9: Conclusion**
In the second stream, I do something similar for economic theory, only here discussing the economic imaginary at the centre of modernity. In Chapter 6, I outline the transformation of economic theory in the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and, in Chapter 7, the great resistance of German economics to it, culminating in the final turn to social economics before the First World War. In Chapter 8, I discuss its incomplete takeup by the Antigonish Movement through the Anglo-French version of économie sociale and show how that was given expression and connected to the Movement through the life of D. J. MacDonald.

Apart from the different substantive focus, the periodization of the political and economic streams is also somewhat different. The political theory chapters, with their focus on Catholic political doctrine, run from the Council of Constance (1414-1418) to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965); the two economics theory chapters run from Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) to Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), and then through the nineteenth century to the social economics which emerged in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Antigonish studies are built around the figure of D. J. MacDonald, the ‘Banker’ of the Antigonish Movement, where the political ideology of resistance he inherits, and the economic ideology of resistance he learns as a graduate student, are both potent, but theoretically incomplete. The thread which connects the political domain with the economic, and the social imaginary with local culture, is the Jansenist position which plays some role in all four quadrants.

In the conclusion, I discuss the “failure” of the Antigonish Movement. I conclude that the Movement was a creature of a particular moment in which two great ideologies of resistance, political and economic, were being formed, but were still not mature. In hindsight, the Antigonish Movement is notable for having assembled an extraordinary cadre of organizing and administrative talent, but for having lacked a theoretical voice of any real depth or capability. Without a mature ideology to draw from, and with no theoretical voice of its own, it was overcome, in the end, by the competing intellectual voices of the postwar era.

I go on to re-connect this failure with a larger discussion of the evolution of civil society. Civil society is not a natural kind, but a moral order, a description of a particular social formation formed by and given legitimacy by the dominant social imaginary of the time. In the large arc of the overall study, I describe the transition to modernity as a move from a one-sector to a two-sector formation. Theoretical work at the present time is aimed at developing a three-sector model,
and the Antigonish Movement, I suggest, is best understood as a moment in that development.

The study is accomplished in these chapters with a mix of biographical notes, reception sketches, individual influences, concept explication, and logical entailment. It shares the aim, with other studies of the social imaginary, in “focusing on constitutive representations in the making of the social order” (Moyn, 2014: 123). It is an experiment with a different type of evidence than is typical in sociology, more compatible, I hope, with explanation that is rooted in the “multiplicity and agency” of the social world.

The argument begins, therefore, with a discussion in the next chapter of the pre-modern position where the political and economic factors are mingled.
Civil society, in recent years, has become one of the major conceptual building blocks of contemporary social theory. Its contemporary significance derives initially from the theory and practice of the Eastern European dissident movements which helped to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989, something I will only come back to in the concluding chapter.  

Prior to that, it had a quite different meaning under the dominant modern conception, which we might date, in its fullest expression, from 1821 with the publication of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. The modern conception of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft, société civile) has, in this kind of summary history, its roots in the Roman *societas civilis*, something which was a translation of the *koinōnia politikē* of Greek usage. Koselleck has noted that “contained in the etymology are the earlier conceptions of a free political self-organization that cannot be erased from the European experience” (2002: 208).  

The German term for civil society, ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’, provides some insight into the modern conception, dominant throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. The root of the first term, ‘bürger’, has the meaning of both ‘citizen’ and ‘bourgeoisie’ (Kocka, 2005: 143). When the whole term is translated as ‘bourgeois society’, it denotes the form of society that emerged out of the *sattelzeit* (saddle period) during the second half of the eighteenth century.

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10 A second strand of interest in civil society was initiated by Robert Putnam and the related literature which developed about social capital, a move which lost momentum when it became clear that the ‘capital’ metaphor was reductionist.  
11 A critique of this kind of shallow history of the concept was developed in a paper by Kumar (1993), reflecting negatively on the first flush of scholarly engagement following the 1989 Soviet collapse. In a subsequent paper, Kumar (2000: 176) reports that “I too am less convinced than I was earlier that we should simply discard the concept of civil society, as a pointless and potentially distracting exercise in retrieval”. Kumar is usefully complemented by Kocka (2005) who exhibits a rather ebullient enthusiasm for the concept.
and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. This new form of civil society as a distinct domain was contrasted with, what was formerly understood as, the political order itself. In its new form, “in exaggerated terms, its citizens were not concerned with exercising political rule but rather with procuring participation in the authority of the state in order to secure their economic interests” (Koselleck, 2002: 212).

The emergence of this bourgeois society was famously conceptualized and contrasted by Ferdinand Tönnies in his distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. His use of the stand-alone term Gesellschaft, without the bürgerliche adjective, is, therefore, an abbreviation of civil society – perhaps, in Tönnies eyes, a repudiation, a denial that it satisfies koinōnia politikē. Be that as it may, the abbreviation of the term with the dropping of the word ‘civil’ has caused great confusion in the social sciences. The new bourgeois society – civil society reconceptualized – was the domain of investigation around which economics and sociology were built.

In this chapter, I will try to elucidate the various conceptions of civil society in the late medieval and early modern periods to form a base position au début against which the modern conception can be compared. I trace this early conception across the different social and political forms where these usages both played a central role and marked the changes. This inquiry is an effort, therefore, to probe

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12 The sattelzeit concept was foundational to Reinhart Koselleck’s project of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. See, for instance, Koselleck (2011).
13 Gemeinschaft, as Tönnies used it, was a contrast class related to “the ascendancy of a middle class responding to the costs of modernity, individualism, commercialisation and industrialisation” (Bond, 2011: 498). It runs deeper, though, than Bond allows in this passage. Tönnies owed much to Otto von Gierke’s work: “in both writers, the romantic distillation of the Germanic folk tradition of borough, commons or small town (Gemeinde, gemein Wesen) was a decisive starting-point” (Black, 1984: 217).
14 “When we turn to the eighteenth century in search of the ancestors of the social sciences, we find that those ‘social things’ that provided Durkheim with the objects of the social sciences had already been claimed by disciplines devoted not to the study of ‘society,’ but rather something called ‘civil society’” (Schmidt, 1995: 900).
15 Although much discussed in the social sciences since the linguistic turn, this conception of the role of language is still at issue. Already in 1972, Reinhart Koselleck had argued, in his Introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, that the concepts of the historical lexicon “may be treated as building blocks for a type of research that considers social and political language, particularly the specialized terminology of these domains, both as causal factors and as indicators of historical
the different conceptions of civil society which are available, and perhaps, in this probing, to excavate meanings across the full spectrum of the modalities of language, which may then open new horizons of possibility for our own time. Let us turn, then, to these early conceptions.

The Translation Problem

The presenting question is what was meant by Aristotle’s conception of κοινόνia politiké. John Keane argues that for Aristotle, “civil society is that society, the polis, which contains and dominates all others. In this old European tradition, civil society was coterminous with the state” (Keane, 1988: 35-36). In this passage, though, the terms ‘society’ and ‘state’ are still blurred by Keane. Leo Strauss, discussing Aristotle’s polis, or city-state, writes that “when we speak today of ‘state’, we understand ‘state’ in contradistinction to ‘society’, yet ‘city’ comprises ‘state’ and ‘society’. More precisely, ‘city’ antedates the distinction between state and society and cannot therefore be put together out of ‘state’ and ‘society’” (1964: 30). Keane is also misleading with his language of “contains and dominates” to describe the relation between the polity of the city-state and the subordinate associations it encompasses. Strauss writes that “the city is a society which embraces various kinds of smaller and subordinate societies; among these the family or the household is the most important” (1964: change” (Koselleck, 2011: 8). Anthony Pagden supports this constitutive role of language by arguing for the “interdependence of the propositional content of an argument and the language … in which it is made” (1987: 1; quoted in Black, 1992: 10). While there is support for such a constitutive function of language – “the concept of a ‘language’ in the sense used by Pocock and Skinner … derives from Wittgenstein’s insight that language and thought or mind itself stand in a dynamic, interacting relation, so that what is said is coloured, and the parameters of what can be said – and therefore known – fixed, by the words used to say it” (Black, 1991: 316), Black points to the inadequacy of Pagden’s position: “At least one purpose of human languages in the ordinary sense is that people can express different points of view in them; they were designed for dialogue – as Homer put it ‘when two men go together, each one spots different things first’” (1992: 10). The problem with Pagden’s position, therefore, is not the constitutive function of language in simultaneously constraining and supporting particular practices, but the limiting connection to propositional content, which excludes the larger range of “expressive-constitutive” functions. Black’s point about the expressive function of language has been repeatedly explicated and advanced by Charles Taylor in a series of critical essays, most recently, in The Language Animal (2016).
Let's look at Aristotle’s position more closely. In Book I of *Politics*, Aristotle defines the purpose of the City:

Observation shows us, first, that every *polis* is a species of *koinōnia*, and, secondly, that all *koinōnia* come into being for the sake of some good — for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good. It is clear therefore that all *koinōnia* aim at some good, and that the particular *koinōnia* which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign and inclusive *koinōnia* is the *polis* as it is called, or the *koinōnia politike*.


The translation of the italicized terms is central to the interpretation of the passage by Keane. In contemporary translations, Harris Rackham (1932), Saunders (1995), and Ernest Barker ([1946] 1998) translate *koinōnia* as ‘association’, Carnes Lord (1984) translates it as ‘partnership’, and James Schmidt (1986) and Carnes Lord (2013) translate it as ‘community’. The words ‘association’ and ‘partnership’ give a better sense of the pluralism and particularity of the various forms of sovereignty, while ‘community’ gives a better sense of the common good. However, these both evoke something quite different from the ‘society’ of Leonardo Bruni’s fifteenth century Latin translation, *societas civilis*.16

Schütrumpf (2014), Riedel (1975), Schmidt (1986), and Hallberg and Wittrock (2006) are among those who have recently paid close attention to the late medieval and early modern conceptions of civil society.17 All of the scholars discuss the translation history of *koinōnia politike* in the important early efforts by William of Moerbeke, a Flemish Dominican, in 1265, where he uses the Latin *communicatio*

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16 Of course, the term ‘society’ is understood now in a comprehensive way that departs from anything even Bruni would recognize. Yet I want to suggest that this was already implicit in Bruni.

17 There is a large literature about the political discourses of medieval society. Antony Black (1991, 1992), working within this broader frame, has given attention to the different political languages of the late medieval world. He draws attention to five different ‘languages’: the language of Roman law, the legal language of Germanic custom, the theological language of Christianity, the Aristotelian language of classicism, and the Ciceronian language of humanism (1991: 317-318).
political for the translation, and by Leonardo Bruni, a Florentine humanist, in 1438, where he uses societas civilis. The translation choices of Moerbeke and Bruni are fundamental.

Eckart Schütrumpf (2014), engaged these matters in his Morphomata Lectures at the University of Cologne. Moerbeke and Bruni differed not just in their translations, as we will see, but also in their approach to translation. The methodology of classical translation distinguished between ad verbum and ad sensum, the one focussed on the fidelity of exact translation, and the other on its sense or intelligibility. Using the ad verbum approach, Moerbeke made, “in general, a very accurate rendering” (Dunbabin, 1982: 723), although its intelligibility suffered. He “had access to old and excellent Greek manuscripts” (Beullens, 2005: 515), and was conscientious to the point of creating Latin transliterations of the Greek, when the existing Latin vocabulary was not adequate. Beullens comments that “William allowed himself to adapt the Latin language accordingly. In his view Latin must still have been an evolving, if not a living, language … Undoubtedly Moerbeke intended to shape a new technical vocabulary through his Aristotelian translations as an attempt to get as close as possible to the Greek original” (2015: para. 7). Bruni, however, adopted the ad sensum approach – the Ciceronian approach to translation. By doing so, though, Beullens suggests that Bruni “at times ran the risk of Romanizing Aristotle’s text” (2015: para. 6), and reports on an instance where Bruni in fact did so. It is clear that Schütrumpf favours the more ‘graceful’ translation of Bruni, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that his own judgement is all too obviously consistent with the judgement of history. The Moerbeke translation is of interest just because of its counterfactual potential.18

Similarly, Riedel (1975), in a seminal essay, titled “Gesellschaft, bürgerliche”, argued for the superiority of the translation of koinōnia politike as societas civilis, based on a synonymy of terms in Aristotle, and refers to these as “linguistic actualities” [“sprachlichen Tatsachen”] (pp. 726-727). However, there are just no linguistic actualities, only linguistic practices – langue is simply an idealization of parole (Rayner, 1988, 1990). Riedel’s references to Cicero in the article are the key to his own understanding. He refers to a unity of conception in Aristotle of the terms polis and koinōnia politike. Schmidt (1986: 296-298), however, argues that the re-wording, or substitution, by Aristotle of koinōnia politike for polis constitutes an expansion of the concept. This

18 For a review of the Schütrumpf lecture making much the same point, see Robinson (2015).
expansion allowed Aristotle to make a distinction among three different forms of koinōnia – the polis, the kôme (village), and the oikos (household) – and, by making this distinction, he was able to compare these forms to each other, and to other organizational forms, such as alliance or empire. What unites the several forms of koinōnia is a common goal: “Their pursuit of this goal is marked by a concern with justice, fairness, and reciprocity [to dikaion] and they are united in this pursuit by bonds of good will and fellowship [philia]. These two traits – to dikaion and philia – are, as Aristotle stressed in the Ethics, the hallmarks of every koinōnia” (p. 297). While Cicero referred to his translations of classical Greek as “my philosophical writings differing very little from Peripatetic teachings” (De Officiis I.2, quoted in Nicgorski, 2013/14: 34), he understood and translated koinōnia politikē in light of the “horizons of possibility” of his own location, as societas civilis. At least, Hans Baron argues just this – that Cicero “set himself the task of adapting the Greek spirit of philosophical investigation to the needs of Roman citizens … incorporating significant changes that he allowed himself to make in his Latin adaptations of his Greek models” (1988: 97-98).

Let us return, then, to our discussion of Moerbeke and Bruni. The translation choices which they each made are analyzed by the scholars mentioned (Schütrumpf, Riedel, Schmidt, and Hallberg and Wittrock) in terms of the late medieval theology of William of Moerbeke and the early modern civic humanism of Bruni: a two-category model of the conceptions of “civil society”. However, in a later paper, Schmidt (1995) suggests a three-category taxonomy which provides better traction, in my view, for understanding the conceptual transition which occurred from Moerbeke to Bruni.

Slightly adapting Schmidt’s language, the contrasts which define civil society at this time are (a) civilized, not barbarous (the ‘theological conception’), (b) orderly, not without rule (the ‘political conception’), and (c) worldly, not ecclesiastical (the ‘economic conception’). In the following, I want to pick up and advance this version of Schmidt’s taxonomy and apply it to the Moerbeke and Bruni conceptions.
The Scholastic Conception

William was born between 1215 and 1235 in Moerbeke, in what is now Belgium (Beullens, 2005: 515) and “probably entered the Dominican convent at Louvain as a young man” (Dod, 1982: 63). Reported to be “a friend and collaborator of Thomas Aquinas” (p. 63), both of whom were Dominicans, he had become the confessor to the pope by 1271, and was consecrated as Archbishop of Corinth in 1278. Moerbeke “translated virtually all of the genuine works of Aristotle from Greek into Latin, either in the form of revisions of previous translations ... or new renditions of texts that had never before been translated directly from the Greek (Beullens, 2005: 515). Such was the case with Aristotle’s Politics, where he provided the first translation to the Latin West. His translations “became the standard texts of Aristotle up to and beyond the Renaissance” (Dod, 1982: 62-64; cf. Rubinstein, 1987: 42), and “laid the basis for the rich scholastic commentary tradition” (Beullens, 2005: 516).

Moerbeke might have used civitas or its derivative as a translation, but, Schmidt (1986: 305) argues, civitas had become quite ambiguous. It had both a legal connotation as a physical space and a philosophical connotation as a social space.

The legal connotation had its origin in Roman law, where civitas referred to a territory, and was constituted by order of a magistrate with the appointment of a ‘defender of the city’, a defensor civitatis. While this linguistic usage survived the long withdrawal of the Roman Empire, the medieval polity was centred on the parish, in a world where “the Church was the sole claimant to the title of defensor civitatis” (Schmidt, 1986: 305). St Augustine's two cities – the City of God and the City of Man – had an earthly parallel: political space was at once a diocese or a parish as well as a city or village. As Schmidt suggests, “Aristotle’s category of koinônia politikē was being inserted into a tradition which was poorly equipped to make a clear distinction between what was political and what was not” (p. 312).

What’s more, St Augustine, in common with other early Christians, understood civitas as a social space, not as a territory. “Early Christians”, Chadwick (1988: 11) contends, “understood the Church to which they adhered to consist of a community called out to serve

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19 Beullens (2005) indicates William's birthplace might have been Morbecque, France, not Moerbeke, Belgium.
God as his people”. Figgis ([1921] 1963: 51) argued that St Augustine’s “primary distinction is always between two societies, the body of the *reprobate* and the *communio sanctorum*; not between Church and State”. These societies are not two corporate bodies, though, but departures from, or abidance in, a life of sanctification. Figgis (1913: 199) indicates that “nobody in the Middle Ages denied that the king was God’s minister, or that the bishops were great lords in the commonwealth. Pope and emperor, when they quarrelled, quarrelled like brothers, as members of the same society, the *civitas Dei*.20 Or as Chadwick (1988: 13) notes, in a comment on St Paul: “The magistrate will get no one to heaven, but may yet do something to fence the broad road to the hell of anarchy which, as Thucydides first observed with disturbing eloquence, brings out the full human capacity for depravity”. The two cities in the Augustinian tradition, then, were ideal-types, mixed together in practice, and would “only be distinguished eschatologically, that is at the last judgement” (Canning, 1996: 41).

Late medieval theology, however, departed from the Augustinian position. The recovery and translation of the texts of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers played a key role in this. While Boethius had translated some of the classical texts in logic during the sixth century, they remained little known. The major translation effort of Aristotle began in the twelfth century with a progressive translation of the entire corpus over a period of about 150 years – William of Moerbeke being the last of the great translators.

Further, translations of Aristotle were often made from Arabic to Latin, and there was a reception of Muslim and Jewish Commentaries. Luscombe and Evans (1988: 334) note that “Latin translations of the writings of Maimonides, Avicenna and Averroes were to exert an incalculably wide and deep influence on the scholastics”. The translation effort and the wide reception of the Greek, Jewish, and Islamic works was only possible because of cultural developments within Europe – the emergence of the schools, the formation of new religious orders, the formation of medieval cities, and the growing trade and circulation of goods, ideas, and technical skills, contributing the most. This cultural development led to a scholastic flowering within Christian theology, the most important of which was the

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20 In this, as in all things, medieval theologians were not unanimous. St Ambrose, one of the “Doctors” of the Church, for instance, held to the dualism of church and state (Chadwick, 1988: 19).
synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas. Antony Black (1992: 2-3) has a good summary of these developments:

The period 1250-1350 was especially innovative in philosophy. Mental life was not merely a repetitive rediscovery of past achievements; new problems of understanding and action were perceived and new conceptions sought. With Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham, ideas about God, human beings, social life and ethics developed anew and were perceived as improvements ... The ultimate driving force was the tension and complementarity between the Judaeo-Christian and the Graeco-Roman. This was surely why ‘Europe’ developed along such different lines, intellectually and in the long run politically, from eastern Christendom and the world of Islam.

This was the world in which Moerbeke lived. He was a Dominican, and was particularly influenced by St Jerome’s translation of the Greek New Testament, where koinōnia “plays an especially important role in the writings of St. Paul ... Paul used the term in the joint sense of a fellowship between believers and their participation through the Eucharist, in the body and blood of Christ” (Schmidt, 1986: 300). Moerbeke, in the end, translated koinōnia politikē into the Latin communicatio politica – something which is referring to politics as ‘a making common of’.

**Legal Counter-Tendencies**

The political and moral philosophy of the theologians was understood as a form of knowledge, an episteme: “it was concerned not with the understanding of the human (or positive) law, but rather with the interpretation of the law of nature, the ius naturae, that body of rationally perceived first principles which God has inscribed in the hearts of all men” (Pagden, 1987: 3). The jurists, on the other hand, worked in a domain of practical wisdom, phronesis: “for legal (as for social) judgement pure logic must be subordinate to practical reason, rational consistency to human values (good or bad), explanation to interpretation, and universal to ‘local knowledge’” (Kelley, 1987: 76).

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21 See MacIntyre (1990).
While the thirteenth century saw a great blossoming of Christian theological advances, there had already been a considerable development of juristic practice. This juristic development was the result, in the first instance, of the recovery of Roman law in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, formalized in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, but more abidingly from the development of canon law, formalized in the Corpus iuris canonici, completed in the fourteenth century. Under this steady development, the Church became a “universal juridical entity” (Meyjes, 1991: 299).

During the thirteenth century, Albertus Magnus, building on ancient and patristic writings, played a central role in establishing a ‘hierarchy of the sciences’, arguing that “theology is higher than all the other sciences in six ways: in honour or nobility, in origin, in trustworthiness, in applicability, in demonstrative force, and in infinity of its object” (Stone, 2000: 43). By this standard, “the task of theology is to deduce the catholic truths from the sources of revelation. The results of theological study are taken by the canonists as the starting point of their discipline” (Alphonsus van Hove, quoted in Meyjes, 1991: 300-301). However, influenced by (a) the growing extension of the civil law into wider domains, (b) the interpretative practices of commentary and interpretation which developed among jurists, and (c) the development of corporation theory, a growing separation developed between theology and canon law:

While in Gratian’s age [Decretum Gratianum, c. 1139-1150] theology and canon law were closely connected, and their practice even combined by the same person … a separation between the two disciplines began to emerge in the thirteenth century. Breaking away from the guardianship of theology, canon law in this period became involved in a process of emancipation and developed into an independent discipline … In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries this opposition grew even more pronounced. (Meyjes, 1991: 302-303)

Meyjes argues that the focus on positive rules – the lex canonica of the jurists, rather than the lex divina of theology – could only lead to an elision of the spiritual and the temporal. “The result of this would be an unwanted over-emphasis on the exterior of the Church, its power and wealth, and an intolerable secularization” (Meyjes, 1991: 312).

22 “In fact, as we have seen, the works of Justinian’s Corpus—with the exception always of the Novels—were virtually unknown between the sixth and the eleventh centuries (Radding and Ciaralli, 2007: 211)
A complementary account is given in Canning (1988) who examines the conceptual development within the legal commentaries of the jurists from the late thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth century. He argues that the juridical discourse concerning the relationship between positive law and divine law, the role of norms, will, and feudal custom, the rights of the community, and the enforceability of normative structures, led to “a specifically juristic contribution to the emergence of the idea of the state” (1988: 454).

**Economic Counter-Tendencies**

With foundations built upon the Roman legal system, however, “law was also Christian society’s instrument for protecting the weak against the strong, and securing the personal rights of the poor and defenceless” (Black, 2001: 33). Roman law secured individual property ownership and regulated its transfer and use, and the emerging Christian understanding of natural law accommodated that. Antony Black argues that “the legitimacy of commerce and the opportunity to trade were inherent in the system” (p. 34).

With the Gospels, and the commentaries of Augustine and Ambrose, the fundamentals of early Christian economics were in place by the end of the fifth century. Doctrines related to wealth, property, and gain were left largely intact until the twelfth century scholastic awakening. Aquinas broke with the communal conception of wealth in the early Church. While condemning avarice, he argued that “what the state of innocence might have permitted has become impossible through the Fall”, and that the ownership of wealth is part of the natural order in a fallen world (Le Bras, 1963: 558). The scholastic doctors addressed, secondly, the question of ‘exchange’. While work is the desirable means of creating goods and property, exchange can be mutually beneficial. Building on the Nicomachean Ethics, the foundation of exchange was the concept of just price, and St Albert the Great and St Thomas held that the chief point of that was “the need of the purchaser, the demand” (p. 563). Finally, the principal issue concerning lawful gain was the prevention of usury. While Scripture and patristic thought justified its prevention, the translation of the works of Aristotle, together with the available Jewish and Arabic commentaries, only strengthened the opposition to usury by the Scholastics. Le Bras notes that “such severity, which interfered with business and impeded all those who derive avowed or unavowed profit therefrom, was bound to give rise to many objections” (p. 567). These
pressures resulted in various relaxations of the principle for specific exceptions, with the result that “an ever-increasing firmness in the statement of principles was accompanied by an increasing flexibility in the comprehension of facts” (p. 570). This doctrinal framework was, therefore, both an opening of societas Christiana to the great commercialisation that had begun, and a setting of standards of justice for the koinonia politike, albeit standards that were significantly changed from the Patristic period of Christianity. How, then, did economic development play out?

The High Medieval period was the site of rapid economic development. “Vast land reclamation characterizing the eleventh and twelfth centuries” (Lyon, 1957: 47), and in England alone “involved the cultivation of hundreds of thousands of previously under-utilized acres” (Bailey, 1989: 1). The development of towns involved in long-distance trade “set in motion the process of urban development” (van Werveke, 1963: 22). The fairs and markets of these centres were often important sites for itinerant traders (Verlinden, 1963). Richard Britnell, in discussing the medieval English economy, notes that “even villagers whose transactions were predominantly of a mixed character needed both coinage and some goods their neighbours could not produce. By 1086 there were many contexts in which goods changed hands not according to traditions of kinship, neighbourhood or community but according to rules of the market” (1993: 7). The development of guilds provided skill training, improved labour mobility, and established standardization and quality control (Thrupp, 1963; Richardson, 2001).23 As trade volumes increased during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, “the techniques of credits and payments greatly improved” (Postan, 1973: 10), capital pools were accumulated, banking and credit intermediation was developed, and by 1300 “permanent representation abroad by means of partners, factors or correspondents” (de Roover, 1963: 43) was slowly being established. Between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, Janet Coleman notes:

the population increased threefold, urban centres attracted an increasingly mobile populace and there was a massive minting of money … More generally, the commercial revolution of this period produced a market economy centred on towns; and the agriculture which was still the main activity of medieval men and women became organised for that economy. (Coleman, 1988: 607)

23 For a wider discussion of guilds, pertinent to our purpose, see Black (1984).
Michael Postan pushed back against the “commercial revolution” thesis by arguing that “in the late Middle Ages, as in earlier centuries, agriculture was still by far the most important form of employment and the largest source of national income”, which must still “have accounted for 90 per cent of the entire income of western Europe” (1973: 22). The economic picture, though, is complicated by the Black Death, which decimated European populations during the fourteenth century when some one-third of the total population died, and this inevitably had a dramatic impact on economic output. The economic impact of the Black Death, though, is generally consistent with what we would expect on the basis of economic theory:

With the decline in population, total output also fell but the decline in output was not as large as the decline in population; output per capita increased after 1350 … Due to differences in age-specific mortality rates, the labour force may have declined even more than the population … Real wages doubled in most countries and cities during the century following the first occurrence of the plague. As land became more abundant relative to labour, prices of agricultural goods declined relative to manufactures, especially in relation to manufactures with high labour content … Agriculture as well as manufactures began to develop along more capital-intensive lines as a result. (Pamuk, 2007: 294)

The conditions were ripe then for a new growth push. And it was just this series of slow improvements in skill development, industrial organization, production technique, capital development, and institutional support over several hundred years that laid the foundation for that growth. It is in these circumstances that Bruni made his translation of koinonia politikē in 1438.

The Early Modern Finesse

Almost two centuries after Moerbeke, Leonardo Bruni, living in Renaissance Florence, then at its zenith as a city-state, was located in a quite different social milieu. Florence was the centre of international merchant banking and textiles in the Mediterranean arena – an instance of what Max Weber called the “merchant city” ([1922, 1968] 1978: 1215-1217). Home of the Medici family, the social networks of

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Florence resembled those of the great patrician families of the Roman empire. Bruni understood Florence, and was not a spectator to this, but a political champion. His most important work was *Histories of the Florentine People*, a text which “embodies the civic Humanism of early Quattrocento Florence like no other literary product of the time” (Baron 1988: 43).

Florence in the Renaissance shimmers for us now as the beginning of modernity. This aesthetic image is captured by the great art of Leonardo of Vinci, a town within the city-state of Florence. But it is the political image which gave it fire. Hans Baron gives expression to this. By the year 1400, he wrote,

> the civic society of the Italian city-states had been in existence for many generations and was perhaps already past its prime; and the hour when the Italian courts would transform Renaissance culture to their likeness still lay in the future. The places which held cultural predominance in the first decades of the Quattrocento were not as yet the seats of the tyrants, later to become famous, but rather the remaining city-state republics led by Florence. Yet at that very moment, with comparative suddenness, a change in Humanism as well as in the arts took place which ever since has been considered to have given birth to the mature pattern of the Renaissance. (Baron, 1966: xxv)

The “comparative suddenness” which Baron claimed in this passage has been criticized since he wrote those words, but this has not weakened the significance or validity of the Renaissance moment (Witt, 1996).

“Civic humanism has come to stand for the view that, during the Italian Renaissance, there existed a powerful symbiosis between the republican traditions of city-states such as Florence and Venice, on the one hand, and that strain of Renaissance literary and intellectual life known as humanism, on the other” (Hankins, 2001: ix). What is that republican tradition? It is not just a conception of the virtue practiced by its citizens, but of citizenship itself, the practice of citizens who actively engage in political affairs. “Civic humanism denotes a style of thought ... in which it is contended that the development of the individual towards self-fulfillment is possible only where the individual

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25 See the work of John Padgett, Christopher Ansell, and Paul McLean on the social networks of Florence: The Paper by Padgett and Ansell (1993) provides an entry to this work.
acts as a citizen, that is as a conscious and autonomous participant in an autonomous decision-taking political community, the polis or republic” (Pocock, 1971: 85; quoted in Skinner, [1971] 1982: 1).

Recent historiographical work has exposed a deep “prehistory” to Bruni’s civic humanism in medieval thought (Witt, 2012, Hankins, 2000, 2007). What is of more interest for our purposes, though, are the different elements of republican citizenship and humanist virtue which were brought together by Bruni in his formulation. Bruni’s commitment to ‘popular’ government, though, was not to democratic participation, but to the equality of all before the law: “Therefore the only legitimate form of governing a state which remains is the popular one … in which there is true liberty, in which all citizens are treated fairly and equally before the law” (Bruni, 1428; quoted in Black, 1992: 133). What is shimmering in Florence is not the ‘city on a hill’ of Christianity (Matthew 5: 14), but commercial success under the rule of law, “in which people can studiously pursue the virtues without being suspect” (Bruni, 1428; quoted in Black, 1992: 133).

What I have referred to as the countervailing tendencies which developed in the legal and economic spheres met in Florence. And it was just because of that volatile theoretical mixture that it was practically unstable:

The close of the Middle Ages, and in Italy the deepening of the Renaissance, saw the rise of the Medici in Florence and the decline of civic independence in some places. Cities and city-states soon ceased to be treated as a genus apart with any distinctive political role in European society. (Black, 1992: 135)

In his translation of Aristotle’s Politics, Bruni had drawn parallels between Florence and the ancient city-states. In doing so, he rejected Moerbeke’s language with an alternative that affirmed and strengthened the conditions of possibility within his home of Florence. He, therefore, translated koinōnia politike into the Latin societas civilis.

26 What we might call ‘democratic equality’ is something quite different. Pocock outlines the criteria of republican citizenship as follows: “To qualify for equality and citizenship, the individual must be master of his own household, proprietor along with his equals of the only arms permitted to be borne in wars which must be publicly undertaken, and possessor of property whose function was to bring him not profit and luxury, but independence and leisure. Without property he must be a servant; without a public and civic monopoly of arms, his citizenship must be corrupted” (Pocock, 1983: 236).
This translation remained intact until it was taken up again in the Enlightenment.

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We have, therefore, two translations of *koinònia politikè* – the Moerbeke translation as *communicatio politica* and the Bruni translation as *societas civillis* – each embedded in their respective historical locations, and both reflecting and pushing the theological, political, and economic formations at each moment.

Bruni formulated a conception of civic humanism, buttressed in part by his particular translation of *koinònia politikè*. Beyond that, it remains an open question about the extent to which he extended and deepened it as well with his Ciceronian interpretation. In the following centuries, the various commercial and political connotations of Bruni’s translation became ever more dominant with the *polis* becoming the State, and the theological conception was pushed farther and farther back, such that it was almost forgotten.

We now have a benchmark, therefore, against which to measure the development of the modern conception of civil society. The next major conceptual overhaul doesn’t happen until the *Sattelzeit* of the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the following pair of chapters, I survey the long effort at political reform within the Catholic tradition, its final apostasy in the universal sovereignty of the French Revolution, and the gradual recovery during the nineteenth century of a deeper and more authentic understanding of the subsidiary character of all authority.
In the previous chapter, I outlined the different models of civil society which developed in the late medieval and early modern periods – the *communicatio politica* of the Medieval church and the *societas civilis* of Renaissance humanism. In this chapter, I will discuss the centuries-long development and reform of Catholic political doctrine in early and middle modernity, focussing particularly on the church’s conception of authority. It is of interest not just because this history informs the priest-leadership of the Antigonish Movement, but because it is the single most sustained intellectual debate we have about the nature and sources of authority in civil society.

Unitary conceptions of sovereignty, whether of kingship or democracy, homogenize all political questions in terms of a single principle. Pluralist conceptions, on the other hand, provide for alternative answers built on different principles. The Augustinian theology of the heavenly and earthly cities is pluralist in this sense. In Catholic political thought, various unitary and pluralist conceptions of authority were developed, often in contention with one another. The structure of the narrative I will be telling is the movement from a pluralist, if still weakly developed, conception of authority in late medieval theory, to a unitary conception related to the confessionalization of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the subsequent recovery and resolution of a pluralist conception in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

27 ‘Middle modernity’ is sometimes defined as the period between 1700 and 1900. While there is an argument for the fin-de-siècle anomie in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century as being the ground of a pivotal turn, I think there are stronger grounds for seeing the transition of World War Two as being the decisive crystallisation. In terms of the Catholic Church, we might date middle modernity from the papal Encyclical *Unigenitus* in 1713 to the convening of the Second Vatican Council in 1962.

28 One of the strands in this theoretical development is the juridical concept of “the freedom of the church”, which has a long and significant history and a very rich literature. I will not be addressing this theoretical strand here, but see Richard
The development of these conceptions, thus, has a long intellectual history, which we will trace forward, beginning from the early fifteenth century. As one would expect, the theory and practices of the church have influenced secular conceptions of authority within the social order. Indeed, Brian Tierney has argued that “it is impossible really to understand the growth of Western constitutional thought unless we consider constantly, side by side, ecclesiology and political theory, ideas about the church and ideas about the state” (Tierney, 1982: 1). If the Church is understood as an ideal organization, the incarnation of divine intention, then we would expect the Church to be a model for constitutional order. Just so, Nicole Oresme, writing in the fourteenth century, held that the governance of the church should be an exemplar for other polities:

The community of those whom we call the ‘people of the Church’ can be called a city. And they have a polity which is universal and general in many countries and kingdoms. And it should be a mirror and exemplar for other polities, and it should direct them (Oresme, quoted in Blythe, 1992: 235).\(^{29}\)

As Brian Tierney comments, though, “it is a dream that we have lost” (Tierney, 2008: 325).

In this chapter, then, I will begin with an exposition of the conciliar movement at the Councils of Constance and Basel in the fifteenth century. I proceed to discuss Catholic confessionalization and the instabilities it generated. I then outline the Jansenist efforts at reform with case studies of biblical translation in the Low Countries and devotional renewal in Spain, both representing initiatives which helped lay foundations for a future political resolution.

**The Conciliar Demand for Reform**

The Catholic Church holds that the Church was divinely instituted by Christ for proclaiming the Gospel and guiding the faithful, and that “Christ's promises to his church are fulfilled by its indefectibility, its continuity with truth” (McDonagh, 1971: 800). This guidance is

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29 Quoted in part by Tierney, 2008: 325.
necessary because the truth of revelation is obscured by disordered appetites, and limited by weaknesses of imagination:

Though human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, who watches over and controls the world by his providence, and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator; yet there are many obstacles which prevent reason from the effective and fruitful use of this inborn faculty. For the truths that concern the relations between God and man wholly transcend the visible order of things, and, if they are translated into human action and influence it, they call for self-surrender and abnegation. The human mind, in its turn, is hampered in the attaining of such truths, not only by the impact of the senses and the imagination, but also by disordered appetites which are the consequences of original sin. So it happens that men in such matters easily persuade themselves that what they would not like to be true is false or at least doubtful.30

As a result, the “Church, Mother and Teacher”, exists to nourish and sustain the sanctification of the faithful.31 The Church’s teaching mission is guaranteed by Christ’s promise:

For the Church, and the apostolic succession in the Church, God’s link with its activity is no more than a covenant relation, but it is enough to secure the unerring character of the Church (Mt 16.18), its indefectibility in that which bears specifically upon the substance of the covenant, and hence, the decisive acts which touch upon the preservation and interpretation of the deposit (Congar, 1967: 312).

The concept of indefectibility outlined by the Dominican theologian, Yves Congar (1905-1995),32 is distinctive to the Catholic conception of the church, and is universally accepted there. The question about the conditions which are necessary to establish the unerring character of the teaching mission, however, do not receive the same universal assent. The very idea of a corporate teaching mission to a fallen humanity assumes the obstacles indicated in the Catechetical quotation above. In any resolution of this question, the role of the pope becomes

32 See also Congar, 1970 and 1971.
the central issue. The “keys to the kingdom” text in Scripture is widely accepted in Catholic theology as establishing papal primacy, the pope as *primus inter pares*:

And I will give unto thee [Peter] the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. 
(Matthew 16:19)

The question that is debated, however, is whether this is as juridical administrator for the Church as a whole, or as the divinely appointed, and therefore infallible, teacher of the Church. Christ’s promise to Peter in Luke is the “most commonly cited in favour of papal infallibility” (Tierney, 1972: 11):

And the Lord said, Simon, Simon ... I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren. (Luke 22:31-32)

Tierney comments, though, that while “there is no lack of patristic commentary on the text”, “none of the Fathers interpreted it as meaning that Peter’s successors were infallible” (1972: 11). This means that it is necessary to develop a theology of doctrinal evolution. Charles Taylor suggests just this in his recent article on magisterial authority:

There is widespread acceptance of the idea that we are on a journey, over the centuries, in which we hope that, guided by the Holy Spirit, we can better discern the path that our faith opens to us. But ‘we’ here refers to the whole church ... And thus a crucial component of our understanding comes from tradition. But what is at any given time understood as tradition may need completion and correction to take account of realities hitherto underappreciated (2011: 267).

“Realities hitherto underappreciated” stands as the key term, and in writing this, Taylor stands within a long line of theologians. The Catholic Church has, of course, frequently elaborated doctrine to be held by the faithful, but theologians, including those Doctors of the Church like Bonaventure and Aquinas, made it clear that such elaboration was not “attempting to supplement a revelation that was, in fact, immutable” (Oakley, 2011: 29). Francis Oakley, perhaps the greatest historian of the Council of Constance and the Catholic conciliar tradition, suggests, though, that the theory of doctrinal development itself needs further development:
Constance and what it taught and did has been reinjected once more into the Catholic ecclesial consciousness in such a way as to suggest that traditional theories of essentially continuous doctrinal development will have to be rethought – and rethought in such a way as to render them capable of accounting for radically discontinuous change in doctrinal matters central to the church’s very self-understanding (Oakley, 2011: 49).

In these initial remarks, one can see the tension between immutable reality, on the one hand, and a better appreciation, on the other, a tension that is, specifically, modern. In terms of governance within the Church, the tension is between infallibility, as the commitment to immutable reality, and conciliarism, as the commitment to a better appreciation.

The Call for Reform at Constance

Most of the interpretative literature about the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century has been centrally concerned with the reform of governance,33 which, of course, was, indeed, a pivotal concern, as we shall see, given the practical exigency which prompted the Council of Constance. The larger agenda of reform issues at Constance concerned (a) fiscal reforms concerned with taxation and indulgences, (b) the provisions for filling church offices and benefices, (c) reforms of the Roman ‘Head’, including the curia, the sacred college, the papal oath of office, the transfers of prelates, and deposition, and (d) reform of the ‘Members’ related to clerical mores and privileges, qualifications, pastoral care, and monastic orders (Stump, 1994).

Referred to as the ‘Great Schism’, the precipitating event for the conciliar movement started as a dispute over the election of Urban VI as Pope in 1378. It is clear that the Cardinals in conclave were

33 Antony Black writes, for instance, “The conciliar movement of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was an attempt to modify and limit papal control over the Church by means of general councils” (1988: 573). Giuseppe Alberigo departed from the ‘reform of governance’ interpretation with his 1981 study, advancing an argument that the papalist interpretation of conciliarism “began with [Pope] Eugenius IV and his supporters after the breach with the Council of Basel” (Stump, 1994: 15). He went on to indicate that the most important decree at Constance concerned with governance, Haece sancta, was uncontroversial among the delegates, and he rather insisted on “the demand for reform as the unifying theme in the thought of the whole generation of Europeans which flourished during the Councils of Pisa and Constance” (p. 16).
“subject to what any impartial observer might call ‘inordinate pressures’” (Morrissey, 1979: 495), including the claim that the Cardinals “were in fear for their very lives” (Oakley, 2003: 33). The Pope’s subsequent behaviour, including judicial torture and the suggestion of insanity, led, in the rather understated description of Frances Oakley, “to something of a breakdown in relations” (2003: 33). After escaping from Rome, the Cardinals repudiated Urban VI, and elected one of their own number, who took the name, Clement VII. Without any procedure for deposing a Pope, and unable to win the support of all Christian nations for either appointment, it meant that there were now two popes, each of which established their own lines, and had successors, one at Avignon, and the other at Rome. In order to fix this, a General Council of the Church met at Pisa in 1409. The Council took the step of deposing both of the then existing Popes as “notorious schismatics and obdurate heretics” (Oakley, 2003: 37), and elected Alexander V, who was himself succeeded a year later by John XXIII.34

While there was wide support within the church for the decisions at Pisa, John XXIII’s own weaknesses were such as to undermine the authority of Pisa, and the Roman and Avignonese popes survived. There were now three papal lines of claimants. This situation was finally resolved with the convening of the Council of Constance (1414-1418). Given the nature and duration of the scandal, the Council resolved not just to settle the problem of who was Pope, but to advance a “much-needed regeneration in the whole life of the Church” (Tierney, 1955: 247).

In a celebrated address by Jean Gerson in the spring of 1415, a noted theologian and chancellor of the University of Paris, he argued that “the Church, or a general council representing it” can regulate papal authority “by known rules and laws for the edification of the Church” (Gerson, quoted in Oakley, 2003: 39). It was an argument for the priority of a conciliar constitutionalism and the rule of law. This led to the decree, *Haec sancta synodus*, declaring that the Council derived its authority directly from Christ and that all Christians, including the Pope, were bound by it and all future general councils, in matters of faith and governance. The decree was adopted in Session 5, of the Council on 06 April, 1415:

34 No other Popes subsequently chose the papal name ‘John’ until Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli was elected in 1958. The decision that he would be known as John XXIII affirmed the anti-papal status of the Council of Pisa appointment of 1409, and that person is now referred to as Antipope John XXIII.
It declares that, legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit, constituting a general council and representing the catholic church militant, it has power immediately from Christ; and that everyone of whatever state or dignity, even papal, is bound to obey it in those matters which pertain to the faith, the eradication of the said schism and the general reform of the said church of God in head and members (Tanner, 1990: 409; italics added).

What Stump suggests is that “the general reform” of the Church was not incidental to the decree, but was paired with the practical need to eradicate the schism. He focusses attention on the omission of the phrase about reform in the Decree by Cardinal Zabarella at the fourth session:

The uproar that ensued makes clear that the majority of the Council believed that these words were essential to the decree, and it was for this reason that the decree was enacted again in fifth session, 8 April, with the missing words restored. Again and again the Council fathers had stressed that effective reunion of the Church was impossible without reform (Stump, 2009: 412).

In the end, though, while some practical reforms were initiated, the difficulties of instituting a major reform agenda had to be weighed against the urgency of restoring the unity of the church and the papal office. This led the Council, in Session 39 of 09 October, 1417, to adopt a supplementary decree, Frequens, which provided for the assembly of General Council at frequent and regular intervals (Tanner, 1990: 438-439). A month later, a new Pope was elected, taking the name of Martin V, and “the church had at last a pope whose claim to office was universally recognized to be legitimate and the Great Schism was at an end” (Oakley, 2003: 41-42).

Failure at the Council of Basel

Under the terms of Frequens, the then Pope, Eugenius IV, called the Council of Basel (1431-1449) into being. There were high expectations within the conciliar movement that Basel would begin the needed task of general reformation that had been anticipated at Constance. Resistance by the Pope and his supporters, notably by the

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35 There was an interim Council at Pavia in 1423, dissolved quickly the next year without accomplishing much.
Dominican theologian Juan de Torquemada (1388-1468), led to an escalating struggle over papal versus conciliar authority. On the Council's part, there was an excessive demand and a failed attempt to depose Eugenius. On the Pope's part, he sought to undermine the Council by attracting the support of the monarchs and was eventually successful by offering “exceedingly generous practical concessions” (Oakley, 2003: 50). Thomas Morrissey comments on the pragmatic role of self-interest in deciding the outcome:

The reform movement met entrenched interests at all levels; papal rights of provision, prevalency of nepotism, and the desire for local control of the churches and of patronage are some examples. In the subsequent decades, in the quarrels between the Council of Basel and Pope Eugenius IV, the desire of Basel to implement reform and to gain support from varying sectors of the Church revealed the contradiction. To win support required the use of patronage, which was precisely what the reform system was trying to curb. In part the victory of the papacy over the council in the fifteenth century was due to its realistic and pragmatic approach to this question and its shrewd use of patronage (Morrissey, 1979: 499-500).

This was a Pyrrhic victory for the papacy, however, for it radically undercut Vatican revenues, and accelerated the disintegration of the international church, de facto if not de jure, into national establishments (Oakley, 2003: 52-53).

Dénouement at the Fifth Lateran Council

The conciliar movement made one last attempt to reassert itself from its weakened position. In early 1511, a group of five dissident cardinals convened what is now known as the Conciliabulum of Pisa to once again attempt reform. Primarily supported by the French, it was sparsely attended and was not able to develop anything of

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36 While Juan de Torquemada was the leading defender of papal authority at Basel (Izbicki, 1986), he also defended the rights of the marginalized. His Tractatus contra Madianitas et Ismaelitas was a forthright defence of the Spanish conversos, the Jews who had converted to Christianity, against the Toledo attacks in the mid-fifteenth century (Izbicki, 1999). His nephew, Tomàs de Torquemada (1420-1498), the first Grand Inquisitor of the Spanish Inquisition, however, was not of the same irenic disposition, but was a principal figure in the heresy trials in Spain, and the leading instigator of the mass Jewish expulsion(s) under Queen Isabella (Roth, [1995] 2002: 293).
consequence, dissolving a year later. It did trigger, however, the Pope’s convocation of the Fifth Lateran Council, announced in the summer of 1511 to meet in 1512. It also led, at the Pope’s urging, to the publication that autumn of a major critique of conciliarism by Thomas Cajetan, *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*. Cajetan, an Italian philosopher and theologian, “perhaps the greatest theologian of his time” (Oakley, 2003: 120), argued for a distinction between inherent and delegated power:

What Peter had, what his papal successors have – and have uniquely in the whole ecclesiastical hierarchy – is, Cajetan says, essentially different from, and superior to, the authority of the other Apostles and of their successors in the episcopate. The bishops, in their apostolic capacity, have a kind of executive power (velut potestas exequitiva). This is certainly a power to govern: Aquinas, indeed (whom Cajetan invokes repeatedly throughout the tract), calls it *auctoritas gubernandi*. Peter’s, however, was a ‘preceptive power’, and Aquinas’s term for it is *auctoritas regiminis* … [W]e are to conclude the pope’s power is his *ex propria auctoritate*, while the bishops’ ‘executive powers’ are theirs only by delegation (Burns, 1991: 418).

Cajetan went on to denounce both the general conciliarist position against the “innovative fantasy of Jean Gerson” (Burns, 1991: 420), who had played such a crucial role at the Council of Constance, and “the more modest claim that, in times of emergency, the cardinals, acting independently of the pope, had the right to convocate a general council” (Oakley, 1965: 674). In relatively short order, there were strong and able replies from Jacques Almain, a young theologian at the University of Paris and from John Mair (Major), the great Scottish theologian.37 Too late, however, as the Fifth Lateran Council quickly renounced the practical means to hold the Papacy accountable, by declaring that “it is clearly established that only the contemporary Roman pontiff, as holding authority over all councils, has the full right and power to summon, transfer and dissolve councils” (Tanner, 1990: 642), and with that decree, the Conciliar Movement was dead.

It can be seen as a matter of some irony, then, that Martin Luther’s profession of his 95 theses occurred in 1517, a scant seven months after the dissolution of the Lateran Council.

Catholic Confessionalization

The Catholic Church responded to the first campaigns of the Protestant Reformation with the Council of Trent (1545-1563). “What had been, and probably would have remained, a matter of renewal and reform within the confines of religious and ecclesiastical tradition became also a defence of that tradition and a struggle to maintain and restore it” (Olin, 1974: 306).

Trent was the most visible symbol of the Catholic ‘Counter-Reformation’. The term ‘Counter-Reformation’, however, is not a particularly apt term, as it implies a defensive Catholic reaction countering a capacious Protestant reform, and the Council of Trent did, in fact, initiate a programme of considerable reform. As Reinhard describes it, “the relation between ‘Reformation’ and ‘Counter-Reformation’ was not just that of action and reaction, but much more that of slightly dislocated parallel processes” (Reinhard, 1989: 384).

The concept of ‘confessionalization’ provides a better tool to understand what is going on. The term was developed in German scholarship as an aid to analysis of the Lutheran and Calvinist reformation movement (Schilling, 2004). It was conceptualized initially as “an argument about the role of religious communities called ‘confessions’ in the post-Reformation passage of Europe from the Middle Ages to modernity” (Brady, 2004: 3). The initial work on confessionalization in the 1970s was focussed on the sixteenth century, with a hypothesis which had the causal arrow running from confessionalization to state formation, and confessions which were characterized by social practices rather than doctrine, all in aid of pushing back against the then prevalent economic and state-administration explanations of the post-Reformation passage. All three of these analytical elements – periodization, causal arrow, and creedal avoidance – have been criticized, resulting in the development of considerably more complex theories and a richer empirical literature. Above all, as the literature has developed, confessionalization has been accepted as a broader temporal process,

38 In a formulation which stresses ‘defence’, rather than ‘renewal’, William Doyle comments on Trent that “there was never much doubt that its purpose was not reconciliation, but recovery ... Above all, it reaffirmed the authority of the Pope: so much so that no pontiff felt the need to convene another general council for 306 years” (Doyle, 2000: 7).
39 The term was established in German historiography by Leopold von Ranke (Lotz-Heumann, 2008: 137).
and one which includes the Catholic Church. The concept is considerably more evocative of the actual historical evolution which occurred in Catholicism, than is the language of ‘Counter-Reformation’.40

Catholic confessionalization in Europe emerged in its strongest form in France, where it is referred to as ‘Gallicanism’. Gallicanism emerged as a movement within French Catholicism during the seventeenth century as a set of religious opinions which emphasized the authority of the national church. There was no formal Gallican organization, but guiding principles of the movement were already evident in the Assembly of the Clergy of 1625 (Becker, 1974), and were formalized in the Declaration of the Clergy of France in 1682. The Declaration tried to separate the spiritual jurisdiction of the papacy from the temporal jurisdiction of the national church. This was more than a matter of internal governance, though. It was related to the intimate relations between religion and politics which were characteristic of the confessionalization which was underway.

When medieval ‘Christianity’ broke down into different churches, national and territorial states, these new entities still maintained the traditional claim of total commitment. Society was still not split up into more or less autonomous subsystems as is the case today, such as ‘politics’, ‘religion’, ‘economy’, ‘family life’, etc., where members may be different, but membership is compatible. Quite the opposite: society remained unitarian; ‘religion’ included ‘politics’ as ‘politics’ included ‘religion’, and it was not possible to pursue economic purposes or to lead a family life outside of both. Under such conditions, the development of the early modern state could not take place without regard to ‘Confession’, but only based upon “fundamental consent on religion, church, and culture, shared by authorities and subjects” (Heinz Schilling)” (Reinhard, 1989: 398).

40 Schilling is insistent that the concept of confessionalization is justified as “a qualitative modification of the traditional historical point of departure – the ‘formation of confessions’ – in the direction of [a] scientific, methodological-theoretical societal paradigm”. In this view, “what are relevant primarily are the cultural, social, and political functions of the process of confessionalization within the emerging societal system of early modern Europe” (2004: 24). However, while a functionalism, such as this, which emphasizes the central historical role of religion, would have been a reasonable response to the socio-economic functionalism of the 1970s, in either its liberal or Marxist expressions, the philosophical critiques of functionalism since then have been such that paradigms of confessionalization which rely on intentionality are now viewed as legitimate, contrary to Schilling’s insistence.
Gallican confessionalization can be distinguished by its Episcopal and Royal varieties. As far as Episcopal Gallicanism, Kilcullen suggests that conciliarism was one of its sources (2010: 41), but, if so, it was a concern with practical abuses and their reform as much as with an abstract concern about governance. “The chief areas of contention were provisions to benefices and supervision of the regulars”, matters which had for long been pressed. “Putting an end to circumvention of episcopal discipline was, then, the main thrust of the Gallicanism of seventeenth-century bishops” (Becker, 1974: 66). In this sense, the ‘national church’ was a means seen as necessary to implement the practical reforms about which the imperial papacy was both too remote and too little committed.

The Royal variety of Gallicanism is more complex, and is concerned more directly with the role of the Gallican movement in effecting state formation:

The confessional state is what took the place of the medieval ideal of a seamless Catholic Christendom when, after both the Protestant and Catholic reformations and more than a century of intermittent religious conflict, the Treat of Westphalia in 1648 retroactively ratified the fact of religious diversity ... Thereafter each state and dynasty sought to give itself legitimacy by replacing the universal Catholic Church with an established confessional church that, even if ‘Catholic’, acted as a state or dynastic church as well. The well-nigh unanimously accepted assumption that underlay this arrangement was that political unity presupposed religious unity and that obedience to secular law would be impossible to enforce without the concurrent moral suasion of the inner conscience. The consequence was that confessional conformity to these ecclesiastical establishments was everywhere the equivalent of today's 'citizenship'. (Van Kley, 2011: 109).

What made France different, and made both its Catholicism and its Gallican instantiation unique, was the early weakness of the Capetian monarchy (987-1328), the difficulty of defending French borders, and the resulting need to form a particularly strong bond with the religious citizenry (Van Kley, 2011: 110). Gallicanism, therefore, developed in

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41 Berlis and Schoon (2009) propose a typology with four forms of Jansenism: (a) dogmatic and theological Jansenism, (b) spiritual and pious practice Jansenism, (c) episcopal and canon law Jansenism, and (d) parliamentary Jansenism. The last two categories, episcopal and parliamentary Jansenism, are better understood, in my view, as forms of Gallicanism – in its “Episcopal and Royal varieties” – with which the dogmatic and spiritual Jansenists became increasingly allied.
France out of a long and complicated history. As the confessional French state grew in strength and stability, it was assisted by the emoluments proffered by the Papacy in its own efforts to maintain a unitary sovereignty – emoluments which were part of the Gallican demand for practical reform. What emerged was a triangular set of relations among the Papacy, the Monarchy, and the Gallican Parlement, where clashes oscillated between innovation and disciplinization. The combined effort to advance royal and papal absolutism constituted a condition with considerable destabilizing potential. This destabilizing potential was realized, and became activated, through the particular reform solutions which the Vatican, with its unitary conception of authority under the Kingship of Christ, adopted.

The Failure of Trent

The Council of Trent did reply to the Protestant challenge with careful doctrinal development, most importantly concerning (a) a Decree Concerning the Canonical Scriptures, and an expansive concept of the gifts of the Holy Spirit which included both scripture and the

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42 Both Foucault and Elias have notably written on social disciplinization. More recently, Philip Gorski has challenged these theorizations with an hypothesis that “the formation of national states in early modern Europe (1517-1789) was not solely the product of an administrative revolution ... [but] equally the result of a disciplinary revolution sparked by ascetic religious movements” (1993: 266); compare Gorski (2001). With a more modest theoretical position, Reinhard has commented on the role of education, censorship, and parish visitations in confessionalization, that while leading to the success of the churches, also had unintended results which “contributed to the further development of rationality” and “trained their members in discipline and made them accustomed to being objects of bureaucratic administration – both essential preconditions of modern industrial societies" (1989: 397).

43 A complicating matter is the role of the Jesuits, who, with their special vow of obedience to the Pope, repeatedly acted as the agent of papal disciplinization. “Their devotion to the church, however, made the Jesuits its staunch defenders. With Ignatius they believed that the church was the mystical ‘spouse of Christ,’ and they saw it as the measure of spiritual authenticity and Christian truth. Such a concept is basic to the spirituality and theology of Ignatius and the early Jesuits, and in this sense Ignatius is the great Counter-Luther, just as the early Jesuits appear as Counter-Protestants (Olin, 1974: 283).

44 The term ‘development’ is anachronistic as it implies an historical movement which was not then recognized. The self-understanding at Trent would have been closer to a ‘fulfilment’ or ‘completion’ of already existing doctrine.
apostolic tradition (Congar, 1967: 156-169); (b) a Decree Concerning Justification which affirmed “a trust in saving grace apprehended in faith” (Mullett, 1999: 44), significant for eliminating the word ‘alone’ in Luther’s formula, ‘by faith alone’, and, therefore, a denial of predestination; and (c) a Decree Concerning the Sacraments which upheld the seven sacraments as “the Church’s channels of divine grace” (Mullett, 1999: 46), and insisted that they were all instituted by Christ and had been transmitted in an unbroken and undeviating tradition (O’Malley, 2002: 212).

However, the greater part of the work of the Council concerned its systematic work on pastoral reform. It seems clear that the legitimacy which Luther was able to acquire was significantly underpinned by the deep failures of the church in terms of pastoral care throughout Europe. Scribner, discussing this grievance in Germany in the early sixteenth century, makes the point:

Of the numerous criticisms and expressions of grievance directed at the Church in Germany on the eve of the Reformation, the most devastating was the charge of inadequate pastoral care. Reformers of all complexions bewailed the poor state of the parish clergy and the inadequate manner in which they provided for the spiritual needs of their flocks. At the very least, the parish clergy were ill-educated and ill-prepared for their pastoral tasks; at the very worst, they exploited those to whom they should have ministered, charging for their services, treating layfolk as merely a means of increasing their incomes, and, above all, resorting to the tyranny of the spiritual ban to uphold their position (Scribner, 1991: 77).

But, of course, the Catholic Church was also aware of this, and the turbulent movements flowing from Luther and Calvin drove the point home. The initiatives for pastoral reform at Trent were not invented de novo. Indeed, the fathers advanced many of those aspirations which the reformers at the Council of Constance had tried to fulfill, with decrees concerning the selection, theological formation, morals, and demeanour of parish priests; the duties of bishops in terms of disciplinary functions and appointments, and a requirement that they maintain episcopal residence; the institution of seminaries, additional fiscal powers for their financing, and the requirement for theological training before ordination; regulations concerning the conferment of

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45 The Council of Trent affirmed ecclesial practice and theology which identified seven sacraments of baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, and marriage.
benefices, the elimination of provisions for inheritance, and restrictions on patronage; and improved regulation of religious orders (Mullett, 1999: 29-68). It was “a code of reform that provided the essential inspiration for the Catholic renewal in early modern Europe” (p. 68).

The Council of Trent, therefore, accomplished much, both in terms of doctrine and in terms of reform, but it was, nevertheless, restrictive in its scope. John O’Malley comments on this limited character of the Council’s work:

‘Doctrine and reform.’ Put in such terms the agenda sounds global, without delimitation, as if comprehending every aspect of Catholic belief and life … Under ‘doctrine’ the Council meant to treat only Protestant teachings that were seen to conflict with Catholic teaching. Thus Trent made no pronouncements about the Trinity, the Incarnation, and other Christian truths that Protestants accepted … ‘Reform’ had a similarly precise focus. For the bishops at Trent, ‘reform of the clergy and the Christian people’ – or, as it was more commonly expressed, ‘the reform of the church’ – meant essentially reform of three offices in the church: the papacy, the episcopacy, and the pastorate (O’Malley, 2002: 209).

O’Malley is pointing to a disconnect in the understanding of reform. There is a gap between the needed spiritual regeneration of the Church as the people of God and the ecclesiastical reform accomplished at Trent. John Ohlin argues that the reform movement, working over the previous two centuries, influenced by Erasmus and the Christian humanists, expressed itself in the desire for both personal and pastoral reform:

As we see it, two characteristics run like a double rhythm through the Catholic Reformation: the preoccupation of the Catholic reformers with individual or personal reformation, and their concern for the restoration and renewal of the Church’s pastoral mission (Olin, 1974: 307).

In the following section about Jansenist experiments with reform during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we will try to portray the everyday struggle which occurred between those Catholics who aimed at a personal reform and spiritual regeneration of the Church in a movement from below and those Catholics who aimed at the ecclesiastical reform of the Church in a movement from above. While there was a precise doctrinal sense to the Augustinian theology which Cornelius Jansen espoused, Jansenism evolved into a label which
denoted this movement from below. More important than the particular theological positions that were initially espoused was the view that Trent was not adequate as a reform solution.

**Jansenist Experiments with Reform**

Jansenism was the central reform movement within Catholicism during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It, therefore, contributes to the destabilization of a unitary papacy, but it is also part of the search for “a better understanding”.

It is into this mix that Jansenism was injected. Jansenism derived its name from the Louvain theologian, Cornelius Jansen, given as an epithet by Jesuits reacting to the post-humous 1640 publication of his three-volume monograph, *Augustinus*. Quickly spreading from the Low Countries to France through the agency of Saint-Cyran and the Abbey Port-Royal in Paris, the ‘austere’ Augustinian theology of unearned grace and its demand for personal reform constituted a powerful alternative to the ‘lax’ theology of free will of the Jesuits and their alliance with the papacy on ecclesiastical reform.

Doyle comments that “Jansenism may have originated at Louvain, but what enabled it to spread so effectively was the unique protection it would receive from the anti-papal traditions of French law and the French Church” (Doyle, 2000: 23). It is certainly true that the Gallican movement remained something autonomous from Jansenism, but it is also the case that Jansenism provided a theoretical and dogmatic justification for the national church which went beyond what Gallicanism itself could provide. There was, therefore, an overlap between the two movements. Jansenism gained shelter within the Gallican movement and provided a substantive theoretical core for the Gallican resistance to papal authority. Both of these intellectual movements became international exports.

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46 Indeed, Van Kley indicates that the Jesuit order “was defined by its loyalty to the papacy” (2015: 19).
47 For an overview of the respective theological positions, see Flint ([1988] 2009; 1998).
48 Expressions of Gallicanism can be found in Spain (Smidt, 2010a), in Germany (Printy, 2010), and in England (Lunn, 1972). See Van Kley (2006) and Berlis and Schoon (2009) for some discussion of Jansenism in the international context, and my discussion below.
As the movement spread and deepened, both geographically and into other occupational classes beyond the clerics and theologians, the call for personal reform deepened as well, with an emphasis on the development of devotional disciplines, vernacular translation of the Bible and its regular reading, and greater piety in ritualistic practice and ceremony. Indeed, the concern with liturgical and spiritual practices was present from early days. Antoine Arnaud, “the major Jansenist theologian” (Weaver, 1985: 513), published *De la fréquente communion* in 1643, a “kind of founding manifesto of the Jansenist party” (Kolakowski, 1995: 68), in which he argued that the prerequisite for communion was repentance, and that ‘frequent communion’ required perseverance in piety and virtue. Ellen Weaver, a Jansenist scholar, notes that “Arnauld is credited with setting off the controversy over Jansenist practice which paralleled the debate on grace” (Weaver, 1982: 43).

Now that the theoretical stage has been set, we will turn to this culture of pious practice. Two case studies will be used to explore the tensions between the reform movement from below and the reform movement from above. The first case examined concerns bible translation in the Netherlands during the early Jansenism of the seventeenth century. The second case examined concerns devotional renewal in Spain during the late Jansenism of the eighteenth century. This juxtaposition will also help us see how much Jansenism itself evolved these the two periods.

*Bible Translation in the Netherlands*

The Council of Trent made pastoral renewal the centre-piece of their reformation strategy, but it was, nevertheless, a renewal centred on the priest’s duties and a commitment to the sacraments. While there was attention to the education of the faithful, it was mediated by the episcopacy, with the related goals of improving the training of parish priests and instituting better discipline concerning regular preaching and catechetical instruction. Given these aims, the Council had difficulties coming to terms with vernacular translations of the bible for the faithful. This was, perhaps, to be expected. Late scholasticism had been more attuned to propositional and doctrinal issues – to *ratio theologica* – than to liturgical and pastoral issues. As a result, “biblical theology waned in the Schools and the direct influence of the Bible on Catholic life grew less” (McNally, 1966: 206). Despite the calls from Dutch humanists like Erasmus to place “Holy Scripture in the hands of the Christian community” and thus to open “a new chapter in the
history of Catholic spirituality” (p. 205), the Fathers at the Council of Trent “neglected to provide a vernacular Bible for the use both of the clergy and of the laity” (p. 206). Indeed, the difficulties of interpretation were such that some argued at the Council of Trent that Scripture could be seen as “a dangerous source of religious error for the faithful, for the simple laity and the ill-instructed” (p. 209). The most striking rebuttal at Trent, though, was from Cardinal Madruzzo who argued that “the vernacular language itself is a gift of the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ … and every good heart that loves Christ can be the receptacle (bibliotheca) where the book of Christ rests” (p. 221). Given this division of opinion, the Council remained silent on the issue of vernacular translation, just maintaining that the Latin Vulgate be recognized as the authorized version of the Bible (and therefore the base for any vernacular translation), “that no one dare to presume under any pretext whatsoever to reject it” (quoted in Cheely, 2013: 579). Upon the assumption of office of the conservative Pope Paul IV, though, this lacuna was filled in 1559, by decree of the Roman Inquisition: “No Bible translation into the vernacular, German, French, Spanish, Italian, English, or Flemish, may in any manner be printed or read or possessed without permission in writing from the Holy Office of the Roman Inquisition” (quoted in McNally, 1966: 226).

With their devotion to lay participation and spiritual renewal, the Jansenists became committed very early to a vernacular of the mass and scripture, including the translation of the bible. Vernacular translation itself wasn’t controversial, at least in principle, as the Council of Trent had highlighted the importance of the education of the faithful and the strengthening of parish life, and this required, at a minimum, that the priests be able to interpret and communicate the content of Scripture. But, as Antoine Arnaud commented, “how many pastors are capable of translating directly from Latin into French?” (Weaver, 1985: 514). In the early 1640s, the Messieurs de Port-Royal commenced a new scholarly translation of the bible using both the Vulgate and Greek versions, with the publication of their Le Nouveau Testament de Mons in 1667. The publication was condemned immediately by the Archbishop of Paris, and a year later in 1668 by Pope Clement IX. Translation work continued by the Messieurs,

49 This can be sharply contrasted with the Protestant communities. “Between 1534 and 1620 about one hundred editions of the Bible came from Wittenburg – a total production of perhaps 200,000 copies (not counting issues of single Testaments and books; if they are included with the product of other towns the number of editions rises to 430)” (M. H. Black, quoted in McNally, 1966: 207).
however, on the Old Testament and the complete *Bible de Port-Royal* was published in 1693, becoming the most important and widely used French translation for over a century.50

With this background, we turn now to the Netherlands to examine the progress of the vernacular translation project there. The Netherlands is of interest for its location at the geographical interface between the Romance and Germanic cultures, and, in religion, between Catholics and the Calvinists. In 1581 the seven provinces of the Northern part of the Netherlands declared their independence from the rule of the Spanish monarchy, confirmed at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and “became a predominantly Protestant nation” (Agten, 2016: 129). The southern part, however, remained under the control of the Spanish monarch as a Catholic state.51 Of some historical importance to the narrative here was the economic position of the Netherlands. “The central position of Antwerp in the sixteenth century, not only in the world market but also in cultural life, is comparable to that of Venice” (Huizinga, 1933: 1968: 149), although this dynamism was increasingly concentrated in the northern part of the Lowlands – the Dutch Republic – during the seventeenth century. From the late sixteenth, through the seventeenth century, the Dutch became the leading European trading nation, including trade in ideas and information. “During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, indeed, the Dutch republic made itself the unquestioned intellectual entrepôt of Europe” (Gibbs, 1971: 323). In particular it had become the most important centre for book publishing in Europe “especially bibles, atlases, devotional, and professional books” (p. 323). It is not an accident, then, that vernacular bible translation should have become a centrepiece of conflict between the Jansenists and the Papacy in the Lowlands, often closely connected with the University of Louvain where Cornelius Jansen had had an appointment as Regius Chair of Sacred Scripture and later as Rector of the University. In the discussion which follows, I take up the cases of Aegidius de Witte and Johannes van Neercassel in order to examine the translation conflict. The cases of De Witte and Neercassel are emblematic of the disciplinization of the confessional church by the papacy.

50 “From the end of the seventeenth century until the nineteenth century for instance, the so-called *Bible de Port-Royal* was the most widespread French translation of the Bible” (Agten, 2011: 9).
51 “The division was not the result of religion. It was, as Pieter Geyl has described it, the outcome of military operations determined by geographical factors: the Spaniards were able to reconquer the southern land areas but were prevented from taking the water provinces” (Brechka, 1970: 13).
While the Port-Royal translation stands out for the quality of its scholarship, some of its greatest value was as a base document for further vernacular translations. It spurred work, particularly, in the Low Countries with a number of vernacular translations into Dutch, in which “the New Testament portion of these translations was based more or less on Le Nouveau Testament de Mons” (Agten, 2015: 273). One such translation of the New Testament was accomplished by Aegidius de Witte in 1696. De Witte had studied philosophy and theology at Louvain University, and subsequently went to Paris to learn from ‘the religious’ of Port-Royal. While there, he became friends with Arnauld (Agten, 2014: 336) and “an ardent defender of the Jansenist cause and of vernacular Bible reading” (Agten, 2015: 272). De Witte returned to Mechelen and was ordained a priest in 1684. Holding to the value of Bible reading, he resolved to make a Dutch translation, which was completed about 1690. The Archbishop of Mechelen refused him permission to publish and condemned the translation. The following year, the Archbishop issued a decree forbidding private Bible reading (Agten, 2015: 274). De Witte resigned his position and moved into northern exile in the Dutch Republic, where he published his translation. This led to a withering series of critiques of his work, and bitter exchanges with the anti-Jansenist corps, and finally to the condemnation of the translation by Pope Clement XI in 1712.

It was not an accident that vernacular translation would have been a priority in the liminal Catholic-Calvinist environment of the Lowlands. For Johannes van Neercassel, the Vicar Apostolic to the Holland Mission in the north of the Netherlands, “Catholic priests had to be well educated and acquainted with the bible in order to face the competition from Protestant preachers” (Agten, 2014: 328). Indeed, Ackermans suggests that in this space, “where the position of Catholic worship was insecure”, “competition was its most striking feature: competition between denominations as well as between pastoral strategies” (Ackermans, 2003: 261-262). Neercassel’s friendship with Antoine Arnauld, Pasquier Quesnel, and Pierre Nicole may, therefore, have been based more on the Jansenist approach to the liturgy, and the vernacular which suited the evangelical space in which he worked than to any theological commitment he had to their doctrine of grace. But this is just to say that the Jansenist focus on personal spiritual renewal went well beyond the ecclesiastical reforms of Trent and had a warm reception at the parish level, a reception not necessarily tied to the Jansenist theology of grace. Nevertheless, Neercassel was accused of Jansenism and “had to defend himself against the various allegations that were pronounced against him, in
particular his Jansenist sympathies and his aversion to the Jesuits” (Agten, 2014: 327):

In 1669 he was accused of Jansenism by the Regular orders, in particular by the Franciscans. The latter sent seven propositions taken from his sermons to the Holy Office in Rome in order to have him condemned. When Van Neercassel went to Rome in 1670-71 for his visit ad limina, to report on the state of his missionary area, he had to accept the papal bull *Ad sacram* and to sign the *Formulary* of Pope Alexander VII, thus subscribing to the condemnation of the five famous Jansenist propositions (Agten, 2014: 327).

Be that as it may, Van Neercassel counted Antoine Arnaud, Pasquier Quesnel, and Pierre Nicole – the French Jansenist intellectual leadership – as friends, and provided accommodation to Arnaud in his home in Utrecht in 1680 (Agten, 2014, 326-327).

The theological faculty at Louvain shared Neercassel’s concerns about the “study of the Bible and the controversy with Protestantism” (Ackermans, 2003: 266), and this led Neercassel to concentrate seminary training in the Netherlands at Louvain. Given that the Protestants “considered all kinds of deplorable abuses and superstitions as essentials of the Catholic faith” (p. 268), Neercassel was particularly motivated to set high standards for the intellectual and moral foundation of seminary students, and exercised tight discipline on the priests under his care. Above all, the sermon was “a crucial instrument” in the education of the faithful: “The protestant minister, the predikant, was above all a preacher. As the Reformation tradition claimed the Bible for its own purposes, Neercassel insisted on a thorough preparation of sermons, which should include the study of Scripture” (p. 265). Having readily available translations of the Bible in the Dutch vernacular was, therefore, a central priority.

Neercassel’s pastoral strategy was supported by the 300 ‘secular priests’ in the Mission, but resisted by the 150 ‘regular priests’, most of them Jesuits. An attack on vernacular translation was mounted by a Jesuit, Cornelius Hazart, in 1675, to which Neercassel responded with his own tract, launching a lengthy series of exchanges of attack and defence without resolution. The last work of Neercassel’s life was a publication, *Amor Poenitens*, about the practice of confession and the need for “a strict penitential regime”, constituting a critique of Jesuit laxism. It aroused once again the charge that he was a Jansenist. “When he in his last years referred to his enemies, it was not to those Christians who refused to accept the authority of the Roman Catholic
Church, but mostly to the Jesuits” (Ackermans, 2003: 269). Four years after his death, Neercassel’s work, *Amor Poenitens*, was officially suspended *donec corrigatur* (forbidden until corrected).

The kind of impulses which motivated De Witte and Neercassel to promote the value of Bible reading for the education of the laity and the formation of seminary students, and the commitment to the sermon as a crucial instrument in the education of the faithful were consistent with the decrees of the Council of Trent. The great objection was that, in trying to meet the challenge of the Protestants, they had elevated spiritual renewal, rather than episcopal reform, as the central mission goal, and did so while operating outside of the unitary authority of Rome.

The campaign against the Jansenists culminated with the condemnation of Pasquier Quesnel’s *Le Nouveau testament en français avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset* (1692) in the papal bull, *Unigenitus*, promulgated in 1713. Quesnel was widely regarded as having succeeded to the moral leadership of the Jansenist community following the death of Antoine Arnaud. He had written *Réflexions Morales* as a devotional aid and commentary on the Port-Royal “*de Mons*” translation of the New Testament, and this was widely circulated in Europe (Cheely, 2013). To avoid persecution, Quesnel found it necessary to flee from Paris to Brussels, and later to Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, the opposition to Quesnel’s work was led by a French Jesuit, Michel Le Tellier, who became royal confessor to Louis XIV in France (Gres-Gayer, 1988). Disciplinary action taken before and after *Unigenitus* was strongest in France, “the epicentre of anti-Jesuit rhetoric and action in Catholic Europe” (Van Kley, 2015: 14): the nuns of Port-Royal were expelled and their buildings razed to the ground; there was a purging of sympathizers within the episcopacy, university faculties, and religious orders; the Eucharist and extreme unction were denied to suspects; and the Bastille became filled with Jansenists (Gres-Gayer, 1988; Van Kley, 2015). In the Catholic Netherlands, the University of Louvain was the prime target with a series of inquiries into the orthodoxy of the theological faculty members (Quaghebeur, 2007a, 2007b). The repression was effective in the short-term.

**Devotional Renewal in Bourbon Spain**

In contrast to the Netherlands, Spain is of interest because of its status in illustrating the development of Jansenist culture within one of the
The weak Habsburg dynasty of the seventeenth century was succeeded by the reformist Bourbon dynasty of the eighteenth. The reign of Felipe V (1700-1746), the grandson of Louis XIV of France, was followed by the reign of each of his sons, Fernando VI (1746-1759) and Carlos III (1759-1788), and then that of his grandson, Carlos IV (1788-1808). Spain had remained relatively aloof from the social tensions which developed in France and the Netherlands during the seventeenth century, but Richard Herr suggests a change with the Bourbon kings of the eighteenth century, who “were moved by a sincere desire to improve their country” (Herr, 1958: 11). Certainly, there was a progression of reforms which strengthened the state and advanced trade and economic development, climaxing with the enlightened leadership of Charles III (Spanish – Carlos III). The crown was aided by some very able administrators – people such as Melchor de Macanaz (1670-1760), “the first great reformer and the most prolific political writer of Bourbon Spain” (Kamen, 1965: 699), Ricardo Wall (1694-1777), “the main political representative of the second half of the reign of Fernando VI and the hinge between Fernando VI and Carlos III” (Alarcia, 2003: 132), Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744-1810), “together, [Jovellanos’ ideas and beliefs] are the summa of the Enlightened Spain of the late eighteenth century” (Polt, 1971: 29), and Pedro Campomanes (1723-1802), “the soul of Bourbon reformism, especially in the field of economic policy” (Guasti, 2013: 233).

While the Jansenist disputes in the Netherlands and France had become something of a cause célèbre in Europe by the time that Unigenitus was proclaimed, it had not become a political matter in other European countries. This changed, though, as “ideological cleansing” was pressed in other countries – in Scotland, for instance (McMillan, 1981, 1982, 1988, 1993) – and as Gallicanism spread to other regimes. The Gallican-Jansenist alliance, which had developed in France, then began to emerge in other states, including Spain:

The circumstances under which this controversial bull [Unigenitus] was received in the 18th-century Europe, and particularly in France, contributed to disagreement and discord that occasioned the construction of factions in many dynastic states – factions either

52 It is also of interest here because of the establishment of the Royal Scots College in Valladolid in 1771, something which will be discussed in the next chapter.
53 Philip’s son, Louis, ruled for seven months in 1724 before dying from smallpox, and Philip’s great-grandson, Ferdinand VII, only ruled for two months in 1808 until being overthrown by Napoleon. The Bourbon line was later restored to power.
pro-\textit{Unigenitus} or pro-Augustinian (including but not limited to Jansenists) (Burson, 2014: 672).

The decree of \textit{Unigenitus}, thus, marks the inflection point of a transition from a movement where theological and doctrinal concerns were dominant, to a cultural Jansenism that spread throughout Catholic Europe.

What distinguished the situation in Spain from that of France was the absence of a parliament. The alliance of the French Jansenists with the Gallican tradition worked because the French \textit{Parlement} acted as a buffer between the Papacy on one side and the Crown on the other, providing the French church with a political voice of its own. In Spain, there was no third party, and the governance of the Spanish Church was much more of a two-way contest between the Papacy and the Crown. “With no \textit{parlements} in Spain, Spanish regalists employed Gallicanism to work toward a church structure similar to Henry VIII’s of England, with the king replacing the pope as the head” (Smidt, 2014: 331). This situation was recognized by some in the Spanish Church. In a letter of October, 1768, Bishop Climent of Barcelona wrote:

The ills … are exposed; it is apparent that the undermining of the Discipline, mentioned in the letter of the 6th, comes as much from Regalism as it does from Ultramontanism, the secular authority claiming and acquiring the powers that the Pontiff is losing, leaving the bishops as badly off as, or worse off than, they were before (Climent, quoted in Smidt, 2014: 332).

All that said, the Jansenist devotion to piety and spiritual renewal attracted many clerics and they united in a larger movement with the regalists and enlightenment intellectuals in their desire for reform and their anti-Jesuit sentiment:

Jansenism found most of its outstanding supporters among the clergy, however, especially from mid-century onwards. Beginning in the 1760s a number were promoted into the church hierarchy in a deliberate ministerial attempt to shore up Jansenist reform and undermine Jesuit and ultramontane influences. Bishops José Climent of Barcelona, Anotoniyo Tavira y Almazán of Salamanca and Felipe Bertrán, one of several enlightened Jansenist Inquisitor Generals, were among them (Noel, 2001: 127).

The location of the Spanish Church “between two fires that beat us down and humiliate us” (Climent, quoted in Smidt, 2014: 332) was one
of the factors leading reformers to draw more from their own intellectual traditions, rather than from French Gallican and Enlightenment ideas. The result was a cultural Jansenism that had an irenic quality.

This becomes evident through an examination of devotional practices in Spain in the second-half of the eighteenth century. By then, state administration had advanced considerably, new academies, scientific associations, and cultural institutions had been founded (Sanchez-Blanco, 2014), and the release of innovation at the community and parish level had become a priority for the monarchy. A culture of practical cooperation had developed, necessary in part because the Spanish Church may have controlled as much as one-quarter of national income, albeit with part of that being captured by the State, and, in some cases, “by the claims of secular patrons of parish churches” (Callahan, 1984: 41).54 The Spanish Minister of State, Marquis D’Argenson, observed in 1752 that “Jansenism has become the universal religion and dominates the Kingdom”, but Brian Strayer indicates that it was “not because everyone had fallen into heresy, but because nearly everyone had become allies of the Jansenists against the Jesuits” (D’Argenson, quoted in Strayer, 2008: 206).

At the start of the eighteenth century, the devotional culture of Spain can only be described as extravagant. The Council of Trent had sought renewal with a pastoral focus on the parish, leading in early modern Spain to “religiosity intertwined with sociability” (Noel, 2001: 124). The baroque religion which developed was expressed through the development of pious associations and confraternities, often focussed on specific shrines, saints, or devotions. “Members cared for their altar or image, carried it proudly in street processions, or otherwise advertised and praised it” (p. 125). Callahan notes that the principal events of life – birth, marriage, death – were all celebrated around church ceremonies. Apart from that, “social life in town and country centred on the festivals of the liturgical calendar. Religious ceremonies took extravagant forms whether in the great processions of Holy Week or the sombre flagellation rites of Lent” (Callahan, 1979: 46).

54 In the 1970 study of Gonzalo Anes, he estimated the church in the twenty-two provinces of Castile “may have reached the substantial proportion of nearly 28 percent of the gross income of all economic sectors (Callahan, 1984: 41). “Castile consisted of mainland Spain except Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia” (Noel, 2001: 152, fn 40).
For in the late sixteenth century Catholic worship still preserved that highly clerical complexion which it had received in the Middle Ages. Its character was festival, dramatic and artistic more than corporate, Biblical and interior. The Council of Trent stimulated neither a liturgical reform nor a liturgical renaissance (McNally, 1965: 37).

In common with other countries in the southern religious crescent—“the Catholic Germanies in the southeast through the north-central Italies, including Rome in the center, and on through the Iberian peninsula in the West” (Bradley and Van Kley, 2001: 15)—the culture of Spain had been less affected by the Calvinist demands for reform and the theological disputes of the seventeenth century. Indeed, “Spain had witnessed a closing off from European culture at the same time that the rest of Europe was opening up to new worlds, both geographically and intellectually” (Smidt, 2010a: 27). The turn under the Bourbon monarchy in the early eighteenth century, therefore, was toward a new openness. “Opposed though it was to the excesses of ‘baroque’ Catholicism and open to the newer sciences, it bears everywhere the marks of a revival of Christian humanism” (Bradley and Van Kley, 2001: 15).

Only loosely associated with the better-known phenomenon of French Jansenism, Spanish Jansenism did not share the same theological heritage as its French counterpart and was based instead on the humanist and Erasmian traditions of 16th century Spain which promoted individual spirituality and reading of Scripture (Smidt, 2010b: 407).

What was common in the cultural Jansenism that spread throughout the Spanish Catholic world in the eighteenth century was an attention to the personal reform and spiritual renewal of this tradition. Bishop Climent, for instance, embodied just this kind of piety. “His sermons and pastoral instructions make clear his desire to bolster interior spirituality in each parishioner’s devotional life in contrast to Baroque rituals. His pushes for seminary reform and increased lay literacy in Barcelona make him an exceptional figure of Catholic Enlightenment” (Smidt, 2014: 330).

The shift in emphasis from an Augustinian theological core to a renewed devotional practice was a natural result of a broad enculturation process in which the initiative shifted from intellectual elites to everyday parish life. It was also the result of the devasting repression of Jansenist theologians with their progressive removal from universities, episcopacies and the curia throughout Europe. At
the level where the papal authority could have direct effect, the disciplinization of the Jansenist insurgency had been very effective. At the level of the parish, however, the Catholic states had become strong enough that both greater independence from the papacy and the greater individuation of its citizens was possible.

As noted, the Jansenist and Gallican reform in Spain was closely related to the aspirations of the monarchy which pursued regalism with a competent administrative cadre, to great effect. Indeed, Smidt suggests that during the eighteenth century, “Spain and her empire underwent a dramatic restructuring process of governmental infrastructure, leading to one of the most impressive renovations of political authority in the early modern world” (Smidt, 2012: 33). In Spain, the Jansenist Enlightenment was particularly strong during the reign of Charles III with the restoration of Patristic theology, the cleansing of superstition, and a Gallican emphasis on the national church (Smidt, 2010b: 404). Jansenism in Spain, therefore, while not without a theological dimension, had become embedded in a deeper cultural turn from the baroque Catholicism which it overturned.

For Jansenists, extravagance in art and sacred objects had externalized religion to the point of excess. Spanish Jansenism was therefore centered on the renovation of Spanish religiosity through a reform of pastoral work and conceptions of spirituality … In general, Jansenism is correctly associated with Enlightenment because of its tendency to appeal directly to the critical common sense of the individual in his own internal spiritual devotion rather than give primacy to the larger external expressions of group or social religiosity (Smidt, 2010b: 407-408).

As was the case in other countries, the Jansenist reformers “favoured the communication of religious knowledge through editions of the scriptures in the vernacular” and “preach[ed] simply to their congregations instead of relying on obscure and bombastic rhetoric” (Callahan, 1979: 48). The focus was on the education of the faithful toward a greater interior piety and devotion. In this work of “interior conversion”, however, there were communal and liturgical dimensions.

The Catholic Church today would applaud the recovery of Scripture, the focus on the Eucharist as the sacrament of the unity of the people, the development of a liturgy in which the people participated and could hear the prayers at the altar, and in which the readings were in the vernacular, and the development of an ecclesiology of the Mystical Body of Christ, the assembly of the faithful, in which the laity held responsible positions and the priest
was truly the president of his particular Eucharistic assembly (Weaver, 1982: 69).

The late Spanish Jansenism of the eighteenth century was not embroiled in the theological controversies which bedevilled the French and Lowland churches in the sixteenth century. More importantly, though, the aims of individual spiritual renewal and community revitalization had become uncontroversial as parts of a reform movement from below.

Jansenism was critical to the confessionalization of the Catholic Church. It provided sufficient theological legitimacy to push back against the papacy, something which went beyond the Gallicanism of tradition, and Gallicanism provided sufficient political grounds to defend Jansenism. Jansenism and Gallicanism, therefore, spread together.

I have suggested that Jansenism should be understood as a call for personal reform and individual spiritual renewal, something with a substantially different focus than the corporate reform and pastoral renewal of Tridentine papalism. The Jansenist stream shared a similar impulse to that of the Protestant reformers. Both had roots in the conciliar movement’s calls for the reform of abuses and governance. The basic difference in the understanding of the call for reform between the Jansenists and the Jesuits formed the ground of an enduring religious conflict over the two centuries following Trent.

The early Jansenism of the seventeenth century, located chiefly in the theological colleges and religious communities, had a strong and austere theological core which supported the claims of individual conscience. The efforts for vernacular Bible translation were aimed at supporting that renewal of individual conscience. Relentlessly, the Jesuits used established mechanisms of influence and appointment to enforce papal disciplinization against what they saw as Jansenist insurgents. These efforts culminated in the papal bull, Unigenitus.55

55 The literature about Unigenitus is very large. See Gres-Gayer, 1988; Burson, 2014; and Van Kley, 1979 for introductions to the literature.
in 1713, which ultimately brought the theological debate to an end within Catholicism.

Rather than accomplishing its aims of mopping up resistance, however, it led to a deepening intransigence and resentment of the papacy and had the effect, of transforming the opposition, in an important sense, of pushing it underground. In his work on the religious origins of the French Revolution, Van Kley has focussed attention on what can be called political Jansenism in France, the role of *Unigenitus* in fusing “the originally distinct elements of Jansenism, the several strains of Gallicanism, and parlementary constitutionalism” (Van Kley, 1979: 637-638). He has recently summarized the implications of this fusion:

Yet another symbol of Bourbon absolutism, that bull was in turn to result in a religious and political conflict that would result in the undoing of sacral absolutism, making the French eighteenth century a century of *Unigenitus* as much as of ‘lights” (Van Kley, 2011: 120).

I have focussed attention on the later Jansenism of the eighteenth century in terms of its expression as a cultural movement in Spain, more broadly centred on a rebuilding of devotional life at the parish level. “Not until the 1780s and above all in the mid- and late 1790s did they achieve the predominance they hoped for, and then for a mere few years” (Noel, 2001: 126).

These common international resonances showed up half a century after *Unigenitus* in the expulsion of the Jesuit order, in a wave running from one country to another. The wave of actions which physically expelled the Jesuit order and seized their property, began in Portugal in 1759, moved to France in 1764, and then to Spain in 1767. In an action even more extraordinary, the Society of Jesus was suppressed altogether by papal decree in 1773.

Hundreds of schools closed or passed into the hands of secular clergy, other religious orders, or the state; far-flung mission fields were abandoned; libraries were dispersed; and thousands of men (both priests and brothers) found themselves in a new, discomfiting category: that of the ex-Jesuit (Wright and Burson, 2015: 2).

The dissolution of the Jesuit Society is widely taken as Jansenist payback for *Unigenitus*, the ‘Revenge of Port-Royal’. 
For the purposes of our narrative, though, more important than the common resonances in the different expressions of Jansenist confessionalization are the differences in outcome between France and Spain. In France, the expulsion of the Jesuits was a way-stop on the road to the crushing of the church in the French Revolution. In Spain, it was a way-stop to an irenic renewal, brief as it turned out to be. As we will see, a Catholic seminary was established in Valladolid, Spain, and became the late eighteenth century base for the training of Scottish priests, particularly for the ‘Celtic Catholics’ of Highland Scotland. As a result, the cultural Jansenism present in Spain at that time is salient for the social imaginary of nineteenth century Antigonish Catholicism.
For the Catholic Church, the nineteenth century is usually seen as a period of restoration, and the rise to dominance of a militant ultramontanism,\(^56\) climaxing with the decree on papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council. The restoration was only a moment, though, in the long durée, and nineteenth century Catholicism is more important for the recovery of Thomism and its understanding of civil society as communicatio politica.

Let us first set the stage. The restoration movement has received various explanations. Izbicki suggests, for instance, that “the destruction of Gallicanism by the French Revolution permitted the Ultramontanes to bury conciliarism, pretending it existed only as an aberration” (Izbicki, 2005: 1344). What Izbicki says is perfectly true in explaining what led to the declaration of infallibility at the First Vatican Council in 1870, but does not go beyond “the cabal of intriguers” form of explanation. Richard Costigan expresses a similar idea, but aimed at the symbolic rather than practical failure of Gallicanism: “Another [root] is the underlying and most fundamental factor in the rise of Ultramontanism, the demise of the historic sacral order of the national Gallican Church” (Costigan, 1980: 9). Paul Misner goes farther when he argued that “the results [of the condemnation of Jansen] over the next two centuries were as devastating to the relationship of Roman Catholicism with an evolving historical consciousness as the condemnation of Galileo in 1633 by the same Pope Urban VIII was to its relationship with modern science” (Misner, 1988: 199). Congar provides a practical link between the two explanations by noting that “the study of history and traditions had been the mainstay of the Gallican position against real or supposed

\(^{56}\) Ultramontanism, meaning ‘over the mountain’, was “the broad movement of thought and sentiment on behalf of the full supremacy in the Church of the Roman Pontiff”. It is usefully illuminated with Yves Congar’s contrasting definition of Gallicanism: “the desire not to let the pole Church be absorbed by the pole Papacy. (Costigan, 1980: xiii, xvi).

None of these important and germane explanations, though, says anything about the ‘Reign of Terror’ under Robespierre. The mainstream judgement of the Church in the nineteenth century was that the Terror and its anticlerical dechristianization was a necessary outcome of too much questioning, not enough answers, too much conciliarism, not enough pope. Such nineteenth century critics as Joseph de Maistre, Henri Brémond, Edmond Fuzet, and Léon Seché “launched their literary sallies against the Jansenists for their role in undermining clerical morale, weakening the authority of Church and State, and thus contributing to the overthrow of the political order” (Williams, 1977: 576). A present-day scholar of the French Old Regime and the Revolution, Dale Van Kley, has made much the same point:

\[\text{At least prior to the Maupeou ‘revolution’ of the 1770s, these mixed religious, ecclesiastical, and political controversies were central, not peripheral, to the unraveling of the Old Regime and the coming of the French Revolution. For they appear to have engendered the ideological and political divisions which later burst forth with greater clarity during the Revolution itself, which was hence as much a product of these divisions as it was a progenitor of them in its turn (Van Kley, 1979: 663).}\]

The alliance between the Jansenist spiritual mission and the political mission of Gallican conciliarism, thus, constituted the crucible of Catholic political theory against which the ultramontane reaction of the nineteenth century pushed back. In 1870, the First Vatican Council – the 20th Ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church – declared that the Pope was infallible, when speaking from his teaching office, in matters of faith and morals.\(^58\)

There is, however, a much more interesting and important intellectual stream which developed in response to the Terror during the nineteenth century, quickened in the early twentieth century, and ultimately became one of the central lines feeding the pastoral turn of

\(^{57}\) See also Van Kley (2003) which explores this question at greater length.
\(^{58}\) See Congar (1970) for an analysis of the theological content of the decision.
Vatican II. It begins with the theory of subsidiarity. The concept has been summarized this way by Patrick Brennan in a recent discussion:

Negatively, it is a principle of non-absorption of lower societies by higher societies, above all by the state. Positively, subsidiarity demands that when aid is given to a particular society, it be for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening that society. Societies are opportunities for activities by which rational agents achieve perfections proper to their nature, specifically by causing good in others through solidarity (Brennan, 2014: 29).

The concept was developed through two independent lines: the German line developing from the work of Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler (1811-1877), and the Italian line developing from the work of Father Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio (1793-1862). In what follows, I will sketch the different conceptions of each line, and then discuss the mature formulation developed during the interwar and early postwar years.

**Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler**

Ketteler grew up within the culture of German Romanticism and was one of the central public figures in the mid-century clash with the emerging “administrative state”, famously for his ‘Advent Sermons’ of 1848.59 “The critique of overreaching political centralization continued to be a central theme of his political writings during his tenure as bishop of Mainz (1850-d.1877)” (O’Malley, 2008b: 25). Heinrich Reinarz considered Ketteler to be “the first architect of a Christian social and political system” (cited in Bock, 1967: 3).

Kettler “had deep roots in Westphalia” and “the Ketteler family was among the dozen or so great patrons of the diocese for many centuries” (O’Malley, 2007: 132). Much like the liminality of the Low Countries or Scotland, Westphalian Catholicism was “pragmatic”, and “of a variety different from both the independent Gallicanism of the French to the west and the defiant ultramontanism of the Bavarians to the southeast” (p. 134).

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59 O’Malley refers to the ‘Advent Sermons’ as a ‘Catholic Manifesto’ (2008a).
Ketteler initially followed in his father’s footsteps by taking a degree in law at the University of Berlin (with additional studies at Göttingen, Heidelberg, and Munich), graduating in 1833. For the next five years, he worked in the Prussian Legal Bureau in Münster, when he left to begin theological studies. He was influenced in these studies by Johann Adam Möhler, Johann Joseph von Görres, and Ignaz Döllinger. Ketteler was ordained to the priesthood in 1844, and appointed as Bishop of Mainz in 1850, which position he retained until his death in 1877.

O’Malley makes a convincing case that Ketteler’s legal training provided the grounding for his conception of subsidiarity. In his legal studies, Ketteler was a student of Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), the founder of the Historical School of Law.61

[Savigny was] the most articulate and influential proponent within his own specialized discipline of a more general, cross-disciplinary historicist perspective in which not only the genesis but also the validity of ideals, values and norms was grounded in the immanent, evolving, differentiated world of historical cultures, rather than in some unchanging transcendent sphere (Toews, 1989: 139).

Savigny became “world-famous” (Whitman, 1990: 3) in 1814 with the publication of his pamphlet *On the Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Legal Science*, a reply to Anton Thibault who had called for the codification of a system of rational natural law. Savigny argued that “a system of laws should not be imposed on a people from without but must evolve from custom, for law forms an ‘organic’ part of the

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60 Möhler was the greatest representative of the Tübingen School of the nineteenth century. His “organic, historical exposition of ecclesiology and doctrinal development appealed to the sensibilities of the Romantic period through exploitation of the Romantic notions of community, historicity, and vital organic totality” (McCool, 1977: 67). The efforts of the Tübingen School to rebuild theology were forestalled by the institutionalization of Thomistic theology in the 1879 Encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. However, as often happens, an appreciation of Möhler developed again among theologians in the leadup to Vatican II. “Theologians who prepared the way for a change of thinking at the Second Vatican Council, from Cardinal Ratzinger and Hans Kung to Yves Congar, who died recently, all would admit some debt to Möhler” (Franklin, 1996: 131). Similarly, Görres, and Döllinger had filiations with Romanticism (Bock, 1967: 17-21).

61 Wilhelm Roscher, the German historical economist against whom Max Weber began his series of methodological critiques, “proposed in 1843 to achieve for economics what the method of Friedrich Savigny and Karl Eichhorn had done for jurisprudence” (Lindenfeld, 1993: 406). Together, state law and political economy formed the core of the German *Staatwissenschaften* of the nineteenth century.
national culture, like its Constitution or its language, which grow out of the ‘common consciousness of the people’”, what he later called its Volksgeist, the spirit of the people (Gale, 1982: 131). In contrast to Thibault, Savigny and the historical school of jurisprudence he founded “worked to collect, understand, and ultimately preserve what they believed to be the essential core of Roman law as it had been adopted and cultivated in German lands” (O’Malley, 2008b: 28). He upheld the enduring value of Roman law in a mix with Canon law and Customary law, developed over centuries of experience, seeking only to extract general principles from it through careful historical research and exhumation, something he tried to accomplish with his own opus of the 1840s, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts. While Savigny’s thought evolved to recognize “universal elements incarnate in individual law”, there was, in 1840, still a “substantial continuity” with the romantic critique he had made in 1814 (Toews, 1989: 141-142).

Ketteler’s theorization of subsidiarity derives specifically, O’Malley argues, from the “choice of law” jurisprudence of this Germanic tradition. It is related to the interaction between local customary law and the higher ius commune of formal law:

Law in the Middle Ages was generally thought of as local or personal law, embodying local or personal rights. Dwellers of a given medieval city or territory would expect the law of that city or territory to be applied to them in whatever court they might find themselves; they might also expect the law of the nation to which their distant ancestors had belonged – for example the law of the Lombards or the law of the Burgundians – to be applied to them. Such law was local law, personal law, ‘one’s own’ law. ‘One’s own’ law conferred upon a person rights – grants of special privilege from a monarch, tax exemptions, marital property rights, rights of reciprocity from other cities and territories, and so on (Whitman, 1990: 7-8).

By its nature, this intricate system of local privileges and patronage was not and could not be formalized in a legal code, but it was recognized as valid jurisprudence, and was accepted by the courts. Instead of a reference to a formal code, this local law was established through the testimony of witnesses or written documentation. Failing such evidence, disputes in law would be adjudicated by reference to the body of formal law, the ius commune. This formal law was an amalgam of Roman law, the Corpus Juris Civilis, the Canon law of the church, the Corpus Juris Canonici, and the various statutes of larger and smaller principalities. The law, therefore, was constituted through a variety of
autonomous sources, and these were ordered in an ascending hierarchy from least general to most general.

This [choice-of-law] universe, as first conceived in Italy, was made up of concentric sovereign circles. As a rule, the innermost circles, the realms of local customs and local statutes, were realms of local and personal law, embodying the rights of litigants. Courts would always recognize those rights if their applicability could be proven, sometimes giving local customs priority over local statutes, sometimes giving local statutes priority over local customs. However, if the applicability of local or personal rights could not be proven, the court would move outward in the universe of concentric circles … to choose a legal system of a larger territory … The term “ius commune” referred to the wider of any two circles, the higher of any two bodies of law (Whitman, 1990: 8-9; quoted in O’Malley, 2008b: 28).

Ketteler’s conception of subsidiarity was consistent with this legal model: “subsidiarity is the principle that the most local capable authority should rule” (O’Malley, 2008b: 26).

**Father Luigi Taparelli**

Taparelli’s conception of subsidiarity has a different foundation than Ketteler, one that is theological, rather than legal, and of a more theoretical than practical character. Born in Italy, Taparelli was not subject to the same Romantic culture as was present in Germany, but there was, nevertheless, a radical questioning which occurred in the early years of the nineteenth century throughout Europe.

While the French Revolution had erased feudal privileges with its ‘August 4th Decree’ of 1789, announcing that “the National Assembly entirely destroys the feudal regime” (quoted in Kohler, 2005-06: 893), it was not until ‘Le Chapelier's Law’ was passed two years later, 14 June, 1791, that the complete suppression of all guilds and corporations was accomplished. Robespierre himself argued that the law “would injure the poor and the weak, who have the greatest need for collective action” (Kohler, 2005-06: 908). The results of this *de jure*, if not *de facto*, suppression of intermediate institutions, perhaps the defining feature of a liberal society, became evident in the dislocations of the rural poor and the immiseration of the new industrial working class:
Emancipated from the hierarchical structures and social bonds that once determined their place in life, individuals were also placed outside the complex set of reciprocal duties that previously had protected the vulnerable through the obligations that they imposed on the strong. Without the presence of bodies that could mediate the relationship between them, increasing numbers of people stood exposed to the growing power of market institutions and to the expanding claims of the newly rising state (Kohler, 2005-06: 912).

The Church, as one of the corporations itself, was particularly alert to this problem, although the National Assembly addressed the particular status of the church as a distinct matter from the guilds. In its Decree of 13 February, 1790, the Assembly abolished the ‘regular’ congregations, and on 18 August, 1792 abolished ‘general’ congregations. As Rosanvallon suggests, “In both cases [the abolition of guilds and corporations and the abolition of religious congregations] it was the existence of intermediary bodies that was at issue (Rosanvallon, 2007: 16).

Older than Ketteler and, therefore, nearer the Revolution, Taparelli entered the Society of Jesus in 1814, the year in which Pope Pius VII, signalling the early Restoration, reversed the suppression of the Jesuit Order that had been issued by his predecessor, Clement XIV in 1773. Rising rapidly, he was appointed as Rector of the Collegio Romano, the Jesuit Seminary in Rome. Perhaps stimulated by his teaching responsibilities, he was “converted” to Thomism by 1825 (Behr, 2003: 100). Taparelli became an important figure in the recovery and dissemination of Thomism in the nineteenth century.

The research of Pirri and Dezza clearly place Taparelli at the lead of one of the most important currents of the Thomistic revival in Italy, within the Jesuit order. From the early initiatives (in the

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62 Significantly, among his students in the 1820s was Vincenzo Pecci (1810-1903), who became Pope Leo XIII and authored the 1891 Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, the “Magna Carta of Catholic social doctrine” (Behr, 2000: 256).
63 Taparelli’s work has been translated into German, Spanish, and French, but I am only aware of one article at present in English: Taparelli ([1857] 2011), translated by Thomas Behr.
64 I will use the term ‘Thomism’ to refer to the interpretations and revivals of Thomas’ thought, as opposed to ‘Thomasian’ thought which refers to the ideas of Thomas himself (parallel with the same kind of distinction we see with ‘Marxist’ and ‘Marxian’). Collish (1975: 433) and some other scholars use the term ‘Neo-Thomism’ “to denote express revivals of Thomas’ thought”, while ‘Thomism’ is “used simply as an adjective referring to Thomas’ thought”.

1830s) by Taparelli and later in collaboration with Liberatore to
revive the ‘Ratio Studiorum’ of the post-Tridentine period with its
emphasis on the philosophy of St. Thomas, would have widespread
reverberations where the Jesuits were active, especially in France,
Belgium, and Germany (Behr, 2000: 105).65

The Dominicans, of course, had always maintained their commitment
to Thomist theology. “Somehow it did remain in the Dominican
order, even when the Order was drastically reduced by the ravages of
the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic
occupation of a great part of Europe”. In fact, the internal
constitutions of the Order “required all Dominicans to teach the
doctrine of St. Thomas both in philosophy and in theology”
(Weisheipl, 1968: 171). However, this teaching had been running very
much against the tide since the Reformation:

Catholic universities and seminaries [had been] greatly influenced
by ‘modern’ philosophers, nonscholastic thinkers, many of whom
were non-Catholic … Catholic colleges and seminaries in France,
Belgium, and Italy taught Cartesian philosophy or some form of it
as late as 1850. It became fashionable to ridicule the Middle Ages,
scholasticism, and Aristotelianism even without bothering to
explain why (Weisheipl, 1968: 165-166).

By the middle of the eighteenth century, even the Dominicans were
flagging, and, in 1777, the Master General, Juan Tomas Boxadors
“insisted that all return immediately to the solid teaching of the
Angelic Doctor” (Weisheipl, 1968: 171). Salvatore Roselli, a
Dominican, published in that same year a six volume treatise, Summa
philosophica, as “an attempt to a restoration of Thomism within the
Dominican Order itself” (Bonansea, 1954: 12). A Vincentian and
gifted theologian, Canon Vincenzo Buzzetti, developed a Thomist
orientation, probably as a result of reading Roselli’s work, and is now
widely regarded as the progenitor of the Thomist renewal. Buzzetti’s
disciples included Serafino and Domenico Sordi and Giuseppe Pecci
(the brother of Vincenzo Pecci, later Pope Leo XIII), all three of
whom became Jesuits. Luigi Taparelli, in turn, was trained in
Thomism by Serafino Sordi (Bonansea, 1954, 19-22) and Domenico
Sordi (Weisheipl, 1968: 174). With this early recovery, the Italian

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65 Both Bonansea (1954) and Weisheipl (1968) place Taparelli in a more
subordinate role than does Behr. This is in keeping with an earlier historiography
which placed more emphasis on the metaphysics of Thomism than on its social
theory.
Jesuits were central to propelling a theological renewal of surprising force and salience, culminating in 1879 with the Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, promoting Thomism as the intellectual core of Catholic theology.

What is of interest for our purposes, however, is Taparelli’s particular interest in the content and application of Thomist theology to social theory. In 1839, he was asked to teach a course on natural law at Palermo, and was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at the College. He began work then on a systematic treatise where the project was “to apply the clarity and order possible with the rebirth of metaphysics to the confusing world of social and political theory bequeathed from the 18th century” (Behr, 2000: 112), “in order to overcome the breach between speculative and practical reasoning” (Behr, 2003, 102). Over the next three years, from 1840 to 1843, he composed his masterwork, the *Saggio* (*Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right Based on Fact*), a work in social philosophy, with chapters on the nature of man and human agency, the concept of society and its origins, law-making, political authority, social interdependence, subsidiarity, and international order (Behr, 2000: 128-129). Taparelli became, perhaps, even better known for his work as co-founder, editor and regular contributor to the Jesuit periodical, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, an outlet for a steady stream of work by him on social philosophy and contemporary social and economic policy which he continued until his death. Thomas Burke suggests that Taparelli “has a good claim to being the father of Catholic social teaching” (Burke, 2010: 106).

Taparelli’s conception of subsidiarity is a function of his recovery of a scholastic theory of society as “a complex association made up of subsidiary societies” (Behr, 2005: 10), associations embedded in a nested hierarchy. The state, in this perspective, is simply one more association, although one with a particular and very general function:

Taparelli meant to demystify the modern notion of the state as a monolithic, ideal association of isolated individuals. He was looking to recover, against the modern ideal, the concept of the state advanced by Augustine and expounded by Thomas Aquinas and the later scholastics that consider it in purely utilitarian terms, as an association formed, under actual historical circumstances, for the advancement of the common good (Behr, 2005, 10).

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66 The full title is *Saggio teoretico di diritto natural appoggiato sul fatto.*
The implication of such a collection of subsidiary societies is that each has its own end and competence. He designated a society made of subsidiary societies as an *associazione ipotattica*, “meant to clarify that the minor societies are not subordinate to the larger society insofar as their own ends are concerned” (Behr, 2003: 106). The word *ipotattica* is derived from the Greek rules of grammar, *hypotaxis*, concerning the arrangement of subordinate clauses within a complete sentence. *Hypotaxis* can be translated from the Greek into Latin as *sub sedeo* (Behr, 2003: 105). Pope Pius XI later coined the more felicitous term, *subsidiarity*, in his 1931 Encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*.

Unlike Ketteler, though, Taparelli connects subsidiarity to a concept of *sociality* which he appropriates from Pufendorf and incorporates into a Thomist framework. Like Pufendorf, he held that “it is the multiple natural needs of human beings and their physically limited capacities that make them look for support in the act of forming associations”. However, Taparelli’s sociality is constituted in associations with ends of their own, separate and distinct from those of its members. The unity of the association is not a unity of substance – not a natural kind – but a unity of order, a *unitas ordinis*, as Thomas described it:

> It must be known that the whole which the political group or the family constitutes has only a unity of order [*habet solam ordinis unitatem*], for it is not something absolutely one. A part of this whole, therefore, can have an operation that is not the operation of the whole as a soldier in an army has activity that does not belong to the whole army. However, this whole does have an operation that is not proper to its parts but to the whole (Thomas Aquinas, quoted in Hittinger, 2008: 81).

This is not, therefore, an organicist model with a life of its own, such as was later evident in the Durkheimian tradition, but is constituted out of the desires and needs of its members, and, therefore, exists to satisfy the common good, which “in both its material and supernatural dimensions, obliges us to seek the good of others” (Behr, 2003: 106). Seeking the good of others – the positive duty of assistance and mutual
consideration, now referred to as solidarity — is a function of sociality itself, where a society is not a partnership but a unity of order, but it is also constituted by an anthropology in which “self-interest properly understood”, Taparelli believed, would include not only prudence, but “interests in justice and charity” as well (Behr, 2005: 8).

The Reason of Rerum Novarum

What is now referred to as “Catholic Social Teaching” was first given formal expression with the theory of subsidiarity in the 1891 Encyclical, Rerum Novarum, by Pope Leo XIII, further delineated and expanded with the 1931 Encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, under Pope Pius XI. These Encyclicals built upon the two lines of intellectual development we have just discussed – the line which arose from Ketteler’s work and the line which arose from Taparelli’s work.

Rerum Novarum “On The Condition of Labor” was a blunt statement about social policy which critically confronted fin-de-siècle liberalism, and what were regarded as its socialist progeny. It opens by enumerating the central issues concerning the ‘social question’:

67 Russell Hittinger suggests that “we should bear in mind the original meaning of ‘solidarity’. In France, solidaires were those bound together in collective responsibility, according to the semi-autonomous societies called communautés. The idea of solidarité was drawn remotely from the legal expression in solidum, which, in Roman law, was the status of responsibility for another person’s debts. Usually, the legal status of solidaires presupposed membership in a society (nation, family, etc.) that persists over time and is not exhausted in a single exchange nor characterized as a limited liability partnership. The Napoleonic Code (1804) expressly forbade the presumption of solidarité (art. 1202) in order to underscore the ontology of natural persons bound together chiefly, or only, in the state, and secondarily by contracts engaged by individuals. Thus, one becomes a solidaire only contractually (arts. 395-396, 1033, 1197-1216, 1442, 1887, 2002). With the revolutions which followed in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, and with the onset of the industrial revolution, the term ‘solidarity’ began to acquire the plethora of meanings it has today: solidarity of workers, political parties, nations, churches, and humanity in general. This was due to the widespread alarm at the disintegration of society and a renewed interest in intermediate associations” (Hittinger, 2008: 99).

68 Pope Benedict XVI distinguished solidarity and subsidiarity as follows: “Solidarity refers to the virtue enabling the human family to share fully the treasure of material and spiritual goods, and subsidiarity is the coordination of society’s activities in a way that supports the internal life of the local communities” (Pope Benedict XVI, 2008: 16)
That the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy is not surprising. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changes reactions of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population; and, finally, a general moral deterioration (Rerum Novarum, 1891: para. 1; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 366).

The Encyclical then proceeded to uphold the value of private property against socialism, but went on to defend the working classes against the employers and the wealthy and the need for state intervention in various matters. It called for a just wage such that “the remuneration must be enough to support the wage earner in reasonable and frugal comfort” (Rerum Novarum, 1891: para. 34; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 386) and endorsed the value of worker associations, subsequently interpreted as the endorsement of labour unions, and the competence of the church’s interest and the necessity of its participation in these matters.

Much of the early historiography about Rerum Novarum saw the Encyclical as being built upon the intellectual line flowing from Bishop Ketteler’s work. John Courtney Murray (1904-1967), the well-known American Jesuit theologian, for instance, asserts that “when Leo XIII finally issued Rerum novarum in 1891, he firmly took his stand with Ketteler” (Murray, 1953: 551). However, this widespread belief in early historiography was a function of the existing knowledge at that time about the details of its authorship, and the then still recent influence of Quadragesimo Anno’s own intellectual thrust, not from an empirical investigation of the actual sources. It is true that Leo XIII, in conversation with the Swiss reformer, Caspar Decurtins, is said to have referred to Ketteler as “my great predecessor” (Mueller, 1984: 70), and there is a broad consistency in the themes of the Encyclical with an intellectual genealogy from Ketteler, through his disciple, Karl von Vogelsang, to René de La Tour du Pin’s Fribourg Union. However, as Paul Misner has indicated, “the actual influence supposedly exercised on the making of Rerum Novarum by the intermediate links of the chain is unsubstantiated. Leo evidently did not come to these views through the mediation of the Fribourg gentlemen” (Misner, 1994: 213).
While the Popes set the terms of reference for major teaching documents like an Encyclical, intervene in the revision process, and commonly add or modify portions of the document before final release, there are typically several writers, often theologians or ecclesiastics, who draft and revise such documents. In the case of *Rerum Novarum*, we now know that the Italian Jesuit theologian, Matteo Liberatore, wrote the first draft of the Encyclical, submitted 05 July, 1890. Tommaso Cardinal Zigliara, a Dominican, then prepared a draft revision “following Liberatore’s organization of the material”. An unknown person then merged the drafts of Liberatore and Zigliara. Following a translation into Latin, “the Pope then had Msgr. Gabriele Boccali (1843-1892), his private secretary, reorganize and rewrite the whole letter” after which it was again translated into Latin. Final editing changes were then made to the Encyclical and it was issued 15 May, 1891 (Misner, 1991a: 450).

Of more than a little interest is the fact that both Liberatore (Inglis, 1998: 156; Thibault, 1972: 143; Boyle, 1981: 20) and Zigliara (Ashley, 1990: 197) had previously been involved in the drafting of the text for the 1879 Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, which institutionalized Thomism. Both of them were Thomist philosophers, more than theologians, but where Zigliara was a specialist in the philosophy of Aquinas, Liberatore had given his attention to socio-economic and political philosophy. Liberatore was a co-founder in 1850, and then co-editor with Taparelli, of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the journal which Misner calls “the social-philosophical taproot of *Rerum Novarum*” (Misner, 1991a: 451).

Liberatore was “relatively expert and knowledgeable about the workings of the modern industrial economy”. His book, Principles of Political Economy, published in 1891, aimed at “a kind of popularization of economic science in the context of a sound moral philosophy”, and showed a familiarity with various work by “Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo through Jean Simonde de Sismondi, Jean-Baptiste Say and Frédéric Bastiat to John Stuart Mill”, and among Catholic theorists, “clearly partial to Charles Périn of Louvain (especially his Doctrines économiques depuis un siècle, 1880), and Claudio Jannet (1844-1894) in Paris, a conservative social economist”. At least as regards the social content of the Encyclical, “the major channel of influences remains Matteo Liberatore” ((Misner, 1991a: 458-460).

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69 It has not been possible to conclusively establish the authorship of the drafting of the text to this date. Existing attributions rely on oral and informal histories.
This discussion can be advanced by looking at the roots of Leo XIII’s defence of workers’ rights. His defence was not based on the medieval juristic tradition of local custom being predominant, the theoretical platform upon which Ketteler built, but on the Thomist argument for the right of association. In *Contra impugnantes* (1256), Thomas defended from attack the right of association of the newly formed mendicant orders, most particularly the Dominicans of which he was a member, who had moved away from the traditional monastic model of living in a settled community, and developed an active itinerant ministry:

Thomas contends that the ‘active life’ consists of more than political rule and mercantile pursuits. Granted that religious are neither magistrates or businessmen, they are active in other ways, including the communication of knowledge and wisdom by teaching and preaching. The active life, generically understood, is the communication of gifts. In this, all agents imitate God (Hittinger, 2001: 15)

Thomas grounds his argument, therefore, on the perfectibility of mankind, where utilitarian considerations of the established social order are not an adequate constitution for the *communicatio* — “the making something common, one rational agent participating in the life of another” (Hittinger, 2001: 15) — of social life:

Therefore, to prevent free men and women from associating for the purpose of communicating gifts is contrary to the natural law. It is tantamount to denying to rational agents the perfection proper to their nature, and denying to the commonweal goods it would not enjoy were it not for free associations (Hittinger, 2001: 16).

**The Extensions of Quadragesimo Anno**

Pius XI issued the Encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, ‘On Reconstruction of the Social Order’ in 1931. He advanced the social teaching of the church with two significant conceptual developments: an emphasis on the “gifts of social life” — the *munera* - was greatly deepened and the demand for economic reform was given form with the call for “vocational orders”.

The ‘gifts of social life’ has been the deepest and most enduring of these extensions. “Pius XI (1922-29), to whom we attribute the
teachings on social justice and subsidiarity, is the pope who began to systematically develop the ontology of the *munera* [understood as ‘gifts, duties, vocations, missions’]” (Hittinger, 2002: 390, 393). Pius XI was born in 1857 near Milan, and “was formed in the Thomism of the Leonine revival, and was trained under one of Leo’s chief teachers, Matteo Liberatore” (Hittinger, 2002: 391-392). Even the title, *Quadragesimo Anno* – ‘After Forty Years’, is a reference to the *Rerum Novarum* of 1891. 70

Catholic social thought, consistent with its theology, focusses attention not on the utilitarian goods of social forms, but on their intrinsic value aimed at the perfection of life. Pius XI addressed the question of liberal rights and argued that they are derived not from an abstract human nature, but from antecedent *munera*. The *munera* are not a matter of juridical adjudication, but of something already provided. Given the social being of mankind, the exercise of the *munera* and the perfection of life are accomplished through the social forms devoted to the common good:

For, according to Christian doctrine, man, endowed with a social nature, is placed here on earth in order that he may spend his life in the society, and under an authority ordained by God; that he may develop and evolve to the full all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator; and that, by fulfilling faithfully the duties [*munere*] of his station, he may obtain to temporal and eternal happiness (*Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931: para. 118; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 432).

The pope went on to articulate the concept of *subsidiarity* in social organization, and it stands as a bridge concept linking the concept of the gifts of social life with the concept of vocational orders:

So too it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable, and it retains its full truth today. Of its very nature, the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them. The state should leave to these smaller groups the settlement of

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70 Other anniversaries have subsequently been marked with Encyclicals, the most important of which was *Centesimus Annus*, issued on the one hundredth anniversary by Pope John Paul II.
business of minor importance. It will thus carry out with greater freedom, power, and success the tasks belonging to it, because it alone can effectively accomplish these, directing, watching, stimulating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this principle be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between the various subsidiary organizations, the more excellent will be both the authority and the efficiency of the social organization as a whole and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the state (Quadragesimo Anno, 1931: para. 79-80; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 422-23).

The concepts of the gifts of social life, subsidiarity and solidarity, when embedded within the Thomist understanding of communicatio as the ‘making something common’, constitute a recovery and renewal of the concept of civil(izing) society. It is an enduring and powerful achievement.

Pius XI went further, however, in defining what a renewal of the social order would look like. It was this concept of vocational orders, “the hub of its program of social reform” (von Nell-Breuning, 1951: 89) which attracted the most attention. The drafting of the Encyclical was done by the Jesuit, Oswald von Nell-Breuning (Von Nell-Breuning, [1971] 1986). He had been a student of Heinrich Pesch and was a participant in Pesch’s Königswinter Group, “among such respected political economists as Gotz Briefs, Theodore Brauer, and his fellow Jesuit Gustav Gundlach” (Hinze, 2004: 154). Others in the Circle included Franz Mueller, Wilhelm Schwer, Paul Jostock, Heinrich Rommen and Theodor Brauer (O’Boyle, 2002: 28). Pesch (1854-1926) had studied with the German historical economist, Adolph Wagner (von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 5) and published a five-volume treatise on his own ‘solidarist economics’. “According to Pesch, the overall goal of establishing a Christian order was tantamount to the goal of establishing a natural organic order” (Teixeira and Almodovar, 2014: 122). This was expressed in the Encyclical as the call for what came to be known as a vocational order, where vocational groups, guilds or corporations come into being anew “binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society … These groups, in a true sense autonomous, are considered by many to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its natural and spontaneous development” (Quadragesimo Anno, 1931: para. 83; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 423). Two decades later, von Nell-Breuning explained it this way:
What possibilities are there of getting beyond the capitalist class society? The answer is: This artificial structure of society, which in reality is only a mechanical stratification according to property, must be replaced by a genuine order. The Encyclical recognizes the social function as the decisive criterion of organization (von Nell-Breuning, 1951: 93).

This discussion about vocational orders was extended in the Encyclical in several paragraphs that the Pope himself wrote (para. 91-96) about “a special syndical and corporative organization [which] has been inaugurated” (Quadragesimo Anno, 1931: para. 91; von Nell-Breuning, 1936: 425), a reference to the fascist regime then organized in Italy, represented in these paragraphs in a positive light. While von Nell-Breuning was “enthusiastic” about this addition about fascism at the time, some forty years later, he indicated that he had become “firmly convinced that [Pius XI] did not understand it, that he was not acquainted with the social and political character of fascism” (von Nell-Breuning, [1971] 1986: 63). Paul Misner comments that “that Pius XI, at least until 1937, harbored illusions about how Fascism might serve the Church’s purposes” (Misner, 2004: 660).

The problem was that the church held a political model of Christ’s Kingship which required unitary authority. This was no less the case with Pius XI who had “instituted the feast of Christ the King in 1925, after having sounded the theme of the kingship of Christ in his inaugural Encyclical and in his motto, Pax Christi in regno Christi” (Misner, 2004: 658).

QA offers little evidence that Pius was moving away from the accent on hierarchical-organic ‘corporate’ institutions that had entered Catholicism (ironically in the era of fascism) by way of German social thought. In contrast to its Anglo-American counterparts, this approach celebrated Gemeinschaftlich communal ties and the Volksgeist, an underlying mystical bond that connected a people across class lines (Hinze, 2004: 168).

This sacral model of kingship was only finally transcended with the Thomist theologies of the interwar years: “Maritain’s generation had to win the argument about the nature of the state” (Hittinger, 2001: 23). Not a renunciation of papal infallibility, but a complement to it, Vatican II was an expression of this achievement. The centuries-long struggle for political reform within the church – a reform which promoted a pluralist conception of authority – had finally turned a corner.
I suggested at the beginning of the previous chapter that there was an inevitable tension between ‘immutable reality’ and a ‘better appreciation’. The Catholic modernity which I have tried to portray is one in which successive waves of a reforming ‘better appreciation’ break on the rocks of ‘immutable reality’. A ‘better appreciation’ is always an appreciation of something outside of itself. If we understand religion as “a way of finding final meaning in temporal experience with reference to a ‘reality’ outside of and transcending it” (Van Kley, 2011: 108), then the story of experiments, repeated errors, and small hard-won achievements which I have told begins to make more sense.

I discussed the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century and the Jansenist experiments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a struggle between pluralist reform innovation and unitary papal authority. It is hard to avoid seeing the inflexibility – even intransigence – of the papacy to be the author of its own misfortune. Yet, both the conciliar movement and the Jansenist experiments failed spectacularly in a kind of self-immolation. Isn’t that the fate of all reform movements, though: a path-dependent cycling of excess? These reform initiatives, though, set the stage for a theoretical political resolution which developed slowly through the nineteenth century, resolved in its main principles of subsidiarity and solidarity only during the interwar and early postwar years, still being actively elaborated. It was a political resolution, although still at an early stage, which resonated in Antigonish through its early formulation in *Rerum Novarum*, expressed as a commitment to workers’ organizations through their producer co-operatives.

Perhaps Nicole Oresme’s mirror in which the Church holds up the City of God to the City of Man is not a dream quite as lost as Tierney suggested. The concepts of subsidiarity and solidarity are now central to almost every contemporary theorization of civil society. In the chapter which follows, I will examine how the Antigonish Movement in Nova Scotia, built themselves in part upon this history.
5 The Heatherton Inheritance

In this chapter, my aim is to link the larger Catholic political framework of the last two chapters to the local framework of Antigonish.\textsuperscript{71} I do so through an analysis of the Celtic Catholic culture into which Daniel J. MacDonald, one of the leaders of the Antigonish Movement, was born.

The concept of ‘culture’ has received considerable criticism in recent years on the grounds that it assumes a homogeneity that is not realistic.\textsuperscript{72} A similar criticism had already been raised in economics almost a century ago in an attack on Alfred Marshall’s concept of the ‘representative firm’. Marshall introduced the concept of the ‘representative firm’ in 1891 in an effort to go beyond statistical averages, later developed by other economists as the ‘representative agent’: “Marshall recommended intensive study of few ‘carefully chosen’ cases rather than ‘the extensive method of collecting […] very numerous observations […] obtaining broad averages in which inaccuracies and idiosyncrasies may be trusted to counteract one another to some extent” (Marshall, quoted in Dardi, 2005: 8-9). The justified criticism of the concept, first raised by Lionel Robbins was that “it cloaks the essential heterogeneity of productive factors” (Robbins, 1928: 399).

\textsuperscript{71} I use the word “Antigonish” here, and generally throughout the chapter, to refer to the region of Eastern Nova Scotia. It is synonymous with the present Diocese of Antigonish, consisting of Cape Breton Island, and the Counties of Antigonish, Guysborough, and Pictou. In the early years, however, the diocesan name and boundaries varied, as did county names. The word is being used, therefore, as a generic term for a region, rather than as a reference to the town of Antigonish. \textsuperscript{72} It is also argued that the concept of culture ignores the power asymmetries in which culture is not just a description and system of intelligibility, but is also a justification and system of domination. This criticism, however, at least in the form in which it is usually advanced, is dependent on a theory of “interests” which I find incoherent.
However, it is not heterogeneity all the way down, but only that which is causally salient. Ideal-type concepts are analytically relevant only at some particular level of contextuality, varying systematically from local to universal applications. The ideal-type of ‘culture’ is, I want to claim, a meso-level concept, still contextually particular, but with some application across different communities. Here I provide background for a regional model of Scottish Catholic culture in late nineteenth century Nova Scotia by assembling a portrait of the life and circumstances of D. J. MacDonald.

Let me begin with a sketch of Father MacDonald and a preliminary sketch of his role in the Antigonish Movement. Born to John B. and Flora MacDonald in Glassburn (Immaculate Conception Parish), near the village of Heatherton, some 10 miles east of Antigonish, Daniel Joseph MacDonald (1881-1948) took his Bachelor of Arts degree at St. Francis Xavier University (St. F.X.), graduating in 1900, and followed this with theological studies in Rome at Urban College. He was ordained as a priest by Cardinal Respighi in 1904, and returned to Nova Scotia to serve in parish life. In 1910, he entered the Catholic University of America in Washington to do graduate work in social science. He received his Master’s degree in 1911 and his Ph.D. in 1912. Upon his return to Antigonish diocese, he was appointed as Professor of Economics and Sociology at St. F.X., in which position he continued until his retirement in 1944. He took on additional responsibilities, first as Vice-Rector from 1925 to 1930, then as Vice-President from 1930 to 1936, and finally as President from 1936 to 1944. As the Antigonish Movement was led and administered by St. F.X., MacDonald’s responsibilities properly make him the ‘banker’ of the Movement. He died in 1948 and was buried in the local parish cemetery in Heatherton near the home where he had been born.

I want to turn now to what I will call the ‘Heatherton Inheritance’, the Gaelic Catholic culture in which MacDonald was raised. In the following sections, I outline three aspects of the inheritance of D. J. MacDonald: a clan lineage and identity shaped by the history and

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73 This discussion draws on my master’s thesis (Dalhousie University, 2010).
74 In his first year at St. F.X., MacDonald taught English and History, but thereafter taught Economics and Sociology. There was a brief period when another faculty member taught Sociology, and further appointments in both Economics and Sociology were made again after his appointment as President in 1936.
75 Sources for the biographical material include Johnston (1994), his obituary in The Casket newspaper for Sept. 16, 1948, and the University Calendars for 1912/13 to 1944/45.
practices of Highland Catholicism; the Antigonish clerical regime, which maintained a Jansenist sensibility; and the religious position of the Heatherton community, given to a rather stiff resistance to ultramontane authority. What we will find is a worldview held up by the sinews of clan tradition, community reliance and religious devotion.

The Rise and Fall of Clan Donald

In the early medieval period, the Gaidhealtachd76 – the dominion of the Gaels – encompassed large swaths of territory in what is now Scotland and Ireland (Snow, 2001). In the broad scheme, the cultural separation of the Irish and Scots Gaels began with the incursions of the Norsemen down through the northern lands and the western isles and coast between what is now Scotland and Ireland, and the Angles who drove northwards on the other coast, up the south and east side of the Scots Gaelic territory.

In the case of the great movement up from the south, it led naturally to a cultural penetration, an anglicization of language and social practices, in the southern and eastern regions of the Gaelic territory and a gradual replacement of clan organization and land holdings with a feudal order. By the mid-sixteenth century, concerns about France's intentions for Scottish welfare, weakness in the Catholic response to Protestant insurgents, and a capable revolutionary leadership, constituted conditions leading to a radical shift in the social imaginary of the southern Scottish elites:

In early 1559 Protestants were an outlawed minority in a Catholic and pro-French state. In less than eighteen months, they won a civil war, created a new Protestant and pro-English establishment, and outlawed the practice of Catholicism in turn (Ryrie, 2006: 196).

The result was that Catholicism was pushed back from the cultural and economic centres of Scottish life in the south. It remained stubbornly

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76 Gaeldom is a linguistic and cultural concept referring to a ‘people’, rather than a territorial state. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Scottish Gaidhealtachd was concentrated in the Highlands and Western Isles. There was a parallel Irish Gaeltacht, and the long-standing English hostility toward this people was, in part, the threat of “a consolidated Gaelic kingdom spanning the North Channel” (Ellis, 1999: 453).
rooted, most particularly, however, among the Catholic clans of the Highlands – Gordon, Stewart, Chisholm, Fraser, MacDonald, and Cameron – and was highly correlated with the religious affiliation of the Clan Chief (Smith, 2007: 4).77

In the case of the southward movement of the Norsemen, there was a similar cultural penetration with the union of the Gaelic and Viking regimes under Somerled,78 but one in which the kinship and clan systems of governance were compatible and the Gaelic language and Christian faith could be maintained. The “most powerful of the Gaelic clans”, Clan Donald,79 developed from this founding of the ‘Lordship of the Isles’ and the begetting of the Somerled line, eventually to include many branches, of whom the most important for our purposes is Clan MacDonald of Clanranald. There were repeated struggles with the crown over territorial sovereignty until 1493, when, as what now seems to be the result of an overextension of MacDonald power into the territory of Clan Ross (MacDougall, 2000), the MacDonald clan suffered decisive setbacks resulting in the forfeiture of the Lord’s estates and title.

In the eyes of central government, it [the Lordship of the Isles] became a crown possession after the final forfeiture in 1493, but not until 1545, with the death of Donald Dubh, great great grandson of Donald, did the inhabitants thereof finally accept the crown as their immediate superior (Bannerman, 1977: 212).

Accepting the crown, of course, is one thing, while abandoning all interests and influence, quite another. Alison Cathcart notes the difference:

77 It should be noted that some of the same factors led to the division of Scotland into Highlanders and Lowlanders, a matter about which Jane Dawson (1998) has written incisively.
78 “The early leaders of Clann Somhairle saw themselves as competitors for the kingship of the Isles on the basis of their descent through their mother Ragnhilt [Consort of Somerled] from her father Amlaíb Derg, king of the Isles, circa 1113-54. The claim of Clann Somhairle to royal status was based on its position as a segment of Úi Ímair, the dynasty which had ruled Dublin, the Isles and Northumbria for much of the tenth century but which by the late twelfth century was confined to the Isles” (Woolf, 2005: 211).
79 “Most powerful” at least before the post-Reformation rise of the Campbells, who had quite early aligned themselves with the Scottish crown and Protestantism. “That the acceptance of the new religion favoured particular kin groups is evidenced by the meteoric rise of the Campbells in Argyll, Forbes and Frasers in the north-east” (Spurlock, 2013: 236).
Unquestionably the lordship came to an end with the 1493 forfeiture and while genuine efforts to restore it were doomed, this does not mean the MacDonalds, as a force in the West, were finished. The clan was divided by policy and weakened by internal dissent, but Clan Donald influence in the west continued (Cathcart, 2014: 269).

State formation was further propelled forward with the union of the crowns in 1603, and the effort to implement a unitary conception of sovereignty throughout all the various territories (Spurlock, 2013: 235). Considerable efforts were then expended to consolidate the Scottish Kingdom:

The major motive for this assault on the Gaidhealtachdan was political: the governments of Elizabeth I in Ireland and James VI in Scotland both pursued policies of reducing the native Gaelic lordships in order to bring these largely autonomous communities under central control (Macdonald, 2006: 2).

Among other actions to that end, an assembly of Clan chiefs of the Western Isles was convened in 1609 by Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles in the Church of Scotland, on the instructions of James VI “to reduce that rude people to some order and acknowledgment of our authority” (quoted in MacLean, 1952: 6), and use “all kynd of hostilitie yf thay continew rebellious and dissobedyent” (quoted in Cathcart, 2010: 26). The purpose of the assembly was to negotiate an agreement, now known as the ‘Statutes of Iona’, which provided, among other things, for the education of chiefs’ heirs in Lowland schools, formal acceptance of the Protestant religion, and restrictions on various cultural aspects of Gaelic society. “Since their [the Islemens’] alternatives were to be forced from their land by the earl of Argyll, who had received a commission to extirpate the Clan Donald, or to see their patrimonial lands planted like Lewis or Ulster, the Highland elite were amenable and open to negotiation with Knox” (Cathcart, 2010: 26).

The consolidation of the Scottish state and the inward turning of the Scottish Gaels was paralleled by an inward turn of the Irish Gaels. Jane Dawson indicates that there was a rather broad social causation which led to this separation: “growing Scottish self-confidence”, found in arts and crafts production and, I would add scholarship, under the ‘Lordship of the Isles’; linguistic divergence in which “the spoken languages of the Gaels within Ireland and Scotland also grew apart”; distinct Scottish literary forms which emerged, where “two of the important Scottish developments, the waulking songs and strophic
verse, were not exported to Ireland”; musical evolution, such that “in the Gaidhealtachd of Scotland the harp was gradually replaced by the bagpipe”; structural political differences which saw the “ruthless destruction of their [the Gaelic chiefs] influence in Ireland, but, within Scotland, an attempt to incorporate them into national politics”; and, finally, the development of religious differences where the Irish resistance to colonization led to “a shared commitment to the Catholic cause”, unlike Scotland where political union with England provided “Gaelic Calvinism” with traction among some Highland clans. “By the end of the early modern period separate and distinctive Scottish and Irish identities had emerged within the Gaelic world” (Dawson, 1998: 259; 262-267). As Fiona Macdonald has summarized:

Politically, this period [from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century] marked a transition from fairly autonomous Gaelic units – lordships and clans with distinct social and economic frameworks – to the assimilation of the Gaidhealtachdan into their respective nation states (Macdonald, 2006: 1).

The erosion of MacDonald clan governance in the Western Highlands and Isles occurred, not coincidentally, just as the Scottish reformation was being institutionalized. The result was that for some period of time, an outlawed Catholic Church was simply absent in Scotland. Duncan MacLean indicates that “by 1600, it can safely be assumed, through lack of evidence to the contrary, that not only were there no bishops, but there were few, if any priests left to minister to the needs of the teeming thousands who inhabited those regions” (MacLean, 1952: 6). Moreover, “the surviving evidence indicates that at least some communities drifted into a state of semi-paganism while retaining a modicum of Catholic traditions” (Macdonald, 2006: 56). The Jesuits had made some placements in the late sixteenth century, but their activities were largely confined to the north-eastern lowlands due to the language barrier that Gaelic constituted (p. 55). Apart from occasional forays of short duration, the first collective response was the Franciscan Mission to the Highlands in the early 1600s.

80 John Campbell makes a similar claim: “The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was unable to replace the old pre-Reformation parish priests as these died out. By the end of the sixteenth century the greater part of Gaelic-speaking Scotland had become a spiritual vacuum” (Campbell, 1964: 108).
Franciscan-MacDonald Co-operation

As a result of the pressing need for a Catholic ministry in the Western Isles and Highlands, various petitions for help were made, including “petitions from Scottish exiles for help from the Irish Franciscans in Louvain” in 1611 (Harris, 2016: 205). St. Anthony’s College, with a bull of foundation issued only in 1607 (O’Connor, 2010: 281), had quickly become “the intellectual power-house of the Irish in exile” (Roberts, 1998: 64), the “cynosure of Gaelic learning in exile”, so an appeal to the College “was no coincidence” (Macdonald, 2006: 67). St. Anthony’s was founded by Archbishop Florence Conry OFM (1560-1629), who had trained in Salamanca in Spain, initially at the Irish College under Jesuit control. While there, he “developed a comprehensive opposition to the Jesuit mission in Ireland and to the Society’s influence in the church in general”, at which point he relocated to the Franciscan College in Salamanca to complete his training. The Salamanca faculty, with whom he studied were involved in contemporary debates, “notably that concerning the nature of the operation of divine grace … [where] the Dominicans, among others, favoured a rigorist interpretation, [and] the Jesuits tended towards laxism” (O’Connor, 2002: 93). The new college which Conry later founded at Louvain reflected his orientation, and “was pointedly anti-Jesuit and devoted to promoting the training of Franciscans to combat heresy in Ireland” (Casway, 2011: 113). Conry appointed the first faculty at Louvain, Irish Franciscans trained at Salamanca, with a theology consistent with his own attitudes:

Thanks to the Spanish-trained faculty, Irish Franciscan novices in Louvain were introduced to a strict version of Augustine and versed in rigorist pastoral practices, particularly with regard to penance. Conry also cultivated links with the Augustinian tendency in Louvain university, especially that fostered by Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638)” (O’Connor, 2010: 281).82

81 Casway indicates that “the College was granted a charter on September 21, 1606” (Casway, 2011: 114).
82 The Franciscans, as we will see, were influential in the proselytization and renewal of Highland Catholicism and, accordingly, in communicating the Augustinian piety which they embraced. This account, therefore, is confronted with Alasdair Roberts’ claim of “a crucially different view of appropriate styles of piety” (1998: 84) between what he sees as the Jansenist Lowland and non-Jansenist Highland styles of piety in Scotland. Roberts’ assessment, however, is dependent on Pierre Chanu’s thesis of a positive relation between Jansenism and Protestant competition (2003: 113), and the empirical legitimacy of the charges advanced by Father Colin Campbell, the chief complainant in the Scottish ‘Jansenist Controversy’
Given such a recent establishment in Louvain, with both limited people and finance, and the compelling need they faced in Ireland itself, the Franciscan seminary in Louvain did not respond corporately to the Scottish petitions for some time. However, John Oglivie, a Scottish Franciscan living at St. Anthony’s was evidently inspired by the petitions to leave for Scotland in 1612 to gather intelligence and make a reconnaissance. Whatever obstacles there were to a Franciscan corporate endeavour, they were overcome when the pope “personally intervened to guarantee some level of funding” (Harris, 2016: 210). The papal intervention, Harris argues, was enabled by the stabilization of the Scottish state and the containment of Clan Donald, such that “missionary work replaced military resistance as the main avenue for aspirations towards religious toleration” (p. 211). In early 1619, a corporate mission to the Highlands and Islands was established, and three Franciscan missionaries (Brady, McCann, Stuart) were sent to Scotland, soon to be joined by a fourth (Robertson). Protestant persecution led to the capture and imprisonment of McCann in 1620 and Stuart in 1624. In late 1623, papal approval was given to add three more friars to the Franciscan mission (O’Neill, Hegarty, Ward). This first Franciscan mission was conducted between 1619 and 1647. It was followed by a Vincentian mission between 1651 and 1679, and then a second Franciscan mission between 1665 and 1687.

Scott Spurlock complements this account with a deeper analysis of the role of Clan Donald in the organization of the missions, arguing that “what is crucial for understanding the resurgence of Catholicism in Gaelic-speaking Scotland is that it was not primarily driven by...

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83 Harris has a detailed discussion of other possible reasons for delay, including his surmise “that the Highlanders and islanders were left hanging while the Irish and the Lowland Scots jostled for prestige and position on the continent” (Harris, 2016: 208). O’Connor, however, confirms that there were “ongoing financial difficulties” in the early years (O’Connor, 2010: 281).

84 McInally indicates that John Stuart accompanied Ogilvie in 1612, although Stuart is best known for being part of the 1619 missionary effort (McInally, 2012: in 6, 154). “Stuart reported back in 1614 and after further difficulties (largely financial) two Irish priests, Patrick Brady and Edmund McCann, set out with Stuart in the guise of soldiers to Montana Scotiae in 1619” (p. 182).
Rome, nor did it reflect models of counter-reformation from elsewhere in Europe” (Spurlock, 2016: 170). Rather, he argues, “at the behest of some clan elites in Scotland, and with their financial provision, a process of confessionalization among clans took place” (p. 171).

A MacDonald role in the ‘engineering’ of the first mission is evidenced by a letter in 1618 “sent from Cardinal Borghese in Rome to the nuncio in Brussels, who at this time was responsible for the affairs of Scotland, asking him to persuade the Irish Franciscans at Louvain to provide some missionaries for Scotland ‘under the guidance of a Scottish laird named MacDonald’” (Spurlock, 2016: 172). This ‘engineering’ went further when the Franciscan mission was later underpinned with a home base for operations in Bonamargy Priory in Antrim, on the north-east coast of Ireland, for which MacDonnell of Antrim provided the main financial support.

Stronger evidence yet is found in Franciscan Brother O’Neill’s ‘reconciliation’ in 1624 of Eoin Muideartach, chief of the MacDonalds of Clanranald from 1619-1670, together with “my wife and brother, with the greater part of our family”, an event which was followed in 1626 with a letter from Muideartach to the Pope. He asked for some practical help – “four ships well fitted for war and sufficient arms for us to equip 7,000 or so of our subjects” (Muideartach letter, Campbell, 1953: 116) – in order to retake Scotland and make it Catholic once again:

If we receive help of this kind we shall easily reduce the whole of Scotland to obedience to the faith of Christ and of your Holiness, nor do we expect any other reward for this (God is our witness) than His glory, the salvation of our souls and freedom from the miserable yoke and intolerable slavery of diabolical heresy … All the Gaelic-speaking Scots and the greater part of the Irish chieftains joined to us by ties of friendship, from whom we once received the faith (in which we still glory) from whose stock we first sprang, will begin war each in his own district to the glory of God (Muideartach letter, Campbell, 1953: 115-116).

Indeed, by 1626, not only the Chief and clansmen of Clanranald, but also “MacLeod of Harris, John Campbell of Cawdor and Archibald Campbell of Barbeck … Coll Ciotach MacDonald, MacLean of Lochbuie … the family of the MacDonald laird of Islay (here probably

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85 From Iain Muideartach’s letter to Pope Urban VIII, in Campbell (1953: 114).
meaning the territories of MacLeod of Harris), with all their subjects and with the inhabitants of the islands of the Hebrides … Jura, Arran, Uist (Iriod), Canna and Barra (Cintua Barra), had embraced the faith” (Spurlock, 2016: 180). Spurlock goes on to note that the apparent profusion of clans has a Clan Donald core as Muideartach was “connected by marriage with the MacLeods, the MacNeills and the MacLeans of Duart” (p. 180).

In short, the Franciscan mission, and the reconciliation and conversion of the faithful in the Isles and Western Highlands after the Protestant Reformation were anchored by Clan Donald:

Thus there appears to be a Clan Donald backbone to the mission stretching from Antrim to Islay, through Coll Ciotach on Colonsay and to the MacDonalds of Clanranald (spanning from Barra across to Arisaig and Moidart) and Sleat and the MacDonnells of Glengarry (Spurlock, 2016: 180).

The various missions in early seventeenth century Scotland were conducted by the regular orders86 – for the most part, these were Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, and Vincentians. Perhaps as a result of increased recognition of the mission opportunities in Scotland by Rome, an Apostolic Prefecture87 for Scotland was established in 1653, with the appointment of William Ballantine.

With the organisation of the Scottish Mission under the Prefect William Ballatyne in 1653, it was at once obvious that Scotland was really two very different missionary territories. In the Gaidhealtachd there were something in the region of 12,000 Catholics, served by three or four priests. In the Lowlands about 2,000 Catholics were served by only fifteen or so. The shortage of priests throughout Scotland was desperately serious. In the Highlands it was particularly so (MacDonald, 1978: 57).88

86 ‘Regular’ clergy, often abbreviated to ‘regulars’, from ordo regularis, refers to those clergy who are subject to a rule, being members of a religious order, now referred to as a ‘religious institute’.

87 An apostolic prefect is a ‘secular’ priest (not a member of a monastic order or religious institute), who operates in a mission territory, not yet a diocese, and in the exercise of his duties has only limited faculties.

88 About a century later, in 1764, the number of Scottish Catholics is put at 33,000, of which 23,000 were in the Highlands; this is relative to a total population of 1.3 million (Toomey, 1991: 4). The increase is, at least, partly due to the fact that “a considerable increase in Highland Catholics early in the [eighteenth] century took place when Jacobite hopes were high” (Roberts, 1998: 86).
It was almost another forty years before the territory was raised to an Apostolic Vicariate, with the appointment of Thomas Nicholson as Bishop in 1694. “It was under his vigorous and authoritative leadership that boundaries for priests were established in 1701, the ministry in the Highlands and Lowlands was properly linked and the first priest since the Reformation was ordained in Scotland in 1704” (Spurlock, 2013: 244-245). Upon his death, Nicholson was succeeded by Bishop James Gordon in 1718, of the Letterfourie branch of the Gordon clan, which clan anchored Catholicism in the North-East.89 He began his studies at the University of Louvain, and after four years went for further work at the Scots College at Paris, ordained on his return to Scotland in 1692. As coadjutor before Nicholson’s death, Bishop Gordon made several tours of the Gaelic Highlands, where it became clear that “the most pressing need in the Gaelic Church was for indigenous clergy” (MacDonald, 1978: 57). As a result, he established a “minor seminary” in Loch Morar. It collapsed in the aftermath of the 1715 Jacobite Rising, and the Bishop then founded the famous seminary at Scalan, in the Braes of Glenlivet, in 1716.90

In 1720, a Presbyterian report commented on the role of the seminary:

After study at Scalan and abroad, these young men are returned in orders to Scotland, and by these means the nation is furnished with Priests suited to the genius and Language of every Country; and with Such as have friends and Blood Relations to Countenance and Shelter them (Stewart, 1994: 32).

On the recommendation of Bishop Gordon to the Pope, the Vicariate itself was split into the Lowland and Highland districts in 1727, with Gordon staying on as Bishop for the Lowland district. Hugh MacDonald, son of the MacDonald laird of Morar, which clan anchored Catholicism in the North-West, had been a student at the junior seminary in Morar, and went on to complete his seminary studies at Scalan in 1725, when he was then ordained as priest. Consequent upon the division of the Vicariate, he was consecrated as Bishop of the Highland district in 1731. “At an earlier stage the

89 “After 1715 the Highland area’s Catholic strength was seen to depend very largely on the Clan Ranald MacDonals and the Gordons. In the Central Highlands (and also the North-east Lowlands) the Dukes of Gordon sheltered Catholic tenants, encouraging them to adhere to the faith which was shared by the ducal house and the exiled Stuart monarchy. The Highland territory of the Gordons stretched from Glenlivet to Lochaber, where it marched with the lands of the Camerons and MacDonalds (Stewart, 1994: 31).

90 Notably, the General Assembly referred to it as “a famous Popish nursery” (Stewart, 1994: 32).
strongest candidate had appeared to be Colin Campbell”, who made the Jansenist accusations a few months later, “but in the end (and leaving personalities on one side) the Clan Ranald connection appears to have been decisive since Gordon described Hugh MacDonald as being ‘of a clan the most numerous and which had the greatest weight in the country’” (Stewart, 1994: 36).

This recitation takes us to the period when the migration of Highland Gaels to Eastern Nova Scotia began. The central lineage which underpins this migration was Clan Donald, with a mission to rebuild their society in the New World – the clan tradition in Nova Scotia is particular, not general:

Highland settlement consistencies in Eastern Nova Scotia had been constructed on the geography of clan. In particular, Clan Donald, which had borne much of the retribution after Culloden, was the largest contributor to the emigration … The implicit ghost hiding the relationship between priest and people was that most Catholic Highlanders in Eastern Nova Scotia and Prince Edward island were from branches of Clan Donald (MacInnes, 2014: 110).

The MacDonald clan was at the centre of the Catholic renewal of the Highland Gaidhealtachd. The clan position as ‘Lord of the Isles’ had been depredated by the ambitions of a Scottish state hostile to the norms of clan organization and reciprocity, and a Protestantism unbridled. In co-operation with Franciscan missionaries, the MacDonalds had rebuilt clan identity in the Highlands with a renewal of ‘Old Catholicism’, enriched and strengthened by a Jansenist ethic of ‘reform from below’.

And, as should be obvious, D. J. MacDonald was himself a member of Clan Donald.91

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91 The many years which passed between the events I have recounted and the period when D.J. MacDonald was born, raise a question about the continued salience of clan identity in late nineteenth century Antigonish. In an anecdote related in 2001, however, Judge Hugh MacPherson, Gaelic scholar and historian, recounted the scandal which had occurred in the community of St. Andrews, Nova Scotia in 1876 when Angus Campbell married Margaret MacDonald. Clan identity evidently still held some force at that time (Peter Ludlow, email communication, 06 March, 2017). St. Andrews is located about 9 miles from D.J. MacDonald’s home in Glassburn. This account can be further supported with an item in the Antigonish Casket for 1940. There, it was reported, that “All Scotland was impressed when a Campbell was consecrated by a MacDonald at St. Columba’s cathedral at Oban, Scotland … Of deep significance to the crowds who braved the icy cold winter’s day … was the fact that all clan feuds were of the past, and here at least was a haven of
The Celtic Catholicism of Bishop Fraser

Father William Fraser (1779-1851) came out to the Apostolic Vicariate in Nova Scotia in 1822, following “some of his fellow Highlanders who had immigrated to Nova Scotia” (Flemming, 1985). He had been born in Craskie, Glen Cannich, into a large family with ten siblings, to a Catholic father, John ‘Ian Mac Thomais’ Fraser, “kinsman of Lord Lovat Fraser”, and a Presbyterian mother converted to Catholicism before marriage, Jane Chisholm (Johnston, 1955: 113). Lord Lovat Fraser, here, refers to Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, a chief supporter of the Jacobite cause in 1745, captured near Loch Morar on Clanranald lands, and beheaded at the Tower of London in 1747. Fraser’s father was descended in a parallel lineage from “famous Highland chiefs – The Chisholm and Lochiel” – and was first cousin (once removed) to Bishops John Chisholm (1752-1814, trained at Douai) and Bishop Aeneas (Angus) Chisholm (1759-1818, trained at Valladolid), appointed in succession as Vicars Apostolic to the Highland District, respectively, for 1791-1814 and 1814-1818. The Chisholms had a long history of fidelity to the Catholic religion, although some individual members moved back and forth between Protestantism and Catholicism, as was true of all the clans. As early as 1579, “Thomas Chisholm, Laird of Stathglass, was summoned before the Court for his adhesion to the ancient creed”, suffering imprisonment for it (Rev. Angus MacKenzie, 1846; quoted in Blundell, 1909: 191-192). William Fraser’s training and his early years of work in Scotland were conducted for the most part under the direction of his Chisholm cousins.

Fraser began attending the Samalaman seminary in Moidart as a boy;92 and was sent to the Scot’s College in Valladolid, Spain in 1794 at the age of fifteen (Johnston, 1935-36: 23). Fraser remained in studies at Valladolid for ten years and was ordained there in 1804. While at Valladolid, he was noted “for his deep piety, his thorough knowledge of theology and of the classics, and his more than ordinary physical strength” (p. 23). After serving ten years in the parish of Lochaber in Scotland, he was appointed to head the College of Killechiarain at Lismore in 1814, where his interests “as a great linguist and classical scholar” (Johnston, 1960a: 5) could be used. He taught there for eight years before obtaining leave to join several of his

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92 The Samalaman seminary was moved to Lismore by Bishop John Chisholm in 1803.
brothers and a sister who had already emigrated in 1818. He came to Nova Scotia in 1822, therefore, as a mature and capable priest. He served in the Bras d’Or mission, and then was transferred to Antigonish as the existing priest was not able to hear the Gaelic confessions of his parishioners. Following the death of Bishop Burke in Halifax in 1820, and a lengthy period of difficulties which Rome had in finding a suitable candidate for the Irish-Catholic congregations of Halifax, Fraser was appointed Bishop and consecrated as Vicar Apostolic of Nova Scotia in 1827 at St. Ninian’s, the church he had built in Antigonish. The vicariate was comprised of all of mainland Nova Scotia, with the addition of Cape Breton in 1830 and Bermuda in 1836.

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93 “Jean [his sister] and her brothers all urged William to emigrate, as Gaelic-speaking priests were sorely needed in the new land” (MacLean, 1991: 192). It is of some interest to note that his brothers settled at Fraser’s Grant, located a couple of miles outside of Heatherton, about halfway to Glassburn where D.J. Macdonald was born. Similarly, it should be noted that D. J. MacDonald’s great-grandfather and grandmother came from Kiltarlity, near Beauly, in Inverness-shire (Whidden, 1934: 204-205). Kiltarlity is about 20 miles from Craskie where Bishop Fraser was born. The co-location of both family groups in Scotland and Antigonish is not an accident, but speaks to the bonds of loyalty – what we now inadequately refer to as social capital – which existed in clan society. And, as might be expected, the families were inter-married. D.J. MacDonald’s brother, for instance, Colin Francis MacDonald, was married to Cecilia Chisholm, and she was a great-grand-niece of Bishop Fraser. Those bonds of blood mattered in a clan-based society. Indeed, a few comments about the role of loyalty in the clan system are warranted. Daniel MacInnes argues that “in a clan, collective welfare depended on loyalties to the chief, the clan’s allies, and to the King” (MacInnes, 2014: 86-87). He goes on to say that “in the politics of the clan, privilege accorded to the chief was expressed by elaborate genealogies that created a network united by blood” (p. 87), something evident in the elaborate naming systems of the Scots Gaels. “Loyalty was close to the bone. It was a life or death issue. While primarily considered as an exchange between chief and people, when faced with the possibility of starvation, degrees of loyalty separated those who would die and those who would live through a famine” (p. 87). The rebuilding of clan affiliations in Nova Scotia – including co-location – and the bone-deep loyalties which went with that, was not just a convivial exercise, but was a means to survival itself.

94 “Mature and capable” seems hardly adequate to describe the extent of the commitment needed at that time. John Parker Lawson, writing in 1836, described the circumstances of the Catholic priests in Scotland: “Whatsoever may be the opinion formed of the Romish church, as a system, we hesitate not to say that the poverty and privations to which the clergy of that church dedicate themselves in Scotland is almost incredible, and is hardly surpassed in any country. It is an act of self-denial which, resulting as it must from a strong conviction of the truths of their system, and a romantic attachment to its cause and service, is ‘above all Greek, above all Roman fame’” (Lawson, 1836: 299).
In 1831, Bishop Fraser estimated the Catholic population of the territory to be about 50,000 persons, about 50 percent Scots, mostly in the eastern region, and 10 percent Irish, mostly in the Halifax area (Flemming, 1985). In addition to the geographic concentration of Catholics in eastern Nova Scotia, he had been recruited by Bishop Burke with a view “to take charge of Antigonish, settled by Scottish Highlanders who knew only Gaelic” (Johnston, 1960a: 5). As a result, Fraser decided to remain based in Antigonish “to carry on the active work of a missionary among his Gaelic-speaking people”, rather than to relocate to Halifax (p. 5). This base also allowed him to continue the Latin school he had started in Antigonish which he was using to prepare native Nova Scotia sons to enter seminary.

Tensions concerning governance, however, developed with the Irish Catholics in Halifax,95 and Rome attempted to resolve these by raising the Vicariate to a Diocese in 1842 and appointing an Irish Co-Adjutor, Bishop William Walsh, with residence in Halifax. The Roman decision was made, Cardinal Fransoni assured Bishop Fraser, at least in part on the advice of Father Colin MacKinnon, pastor at St. Andrew’s near Antigonish, the first Nova Scotia-born seminarian of Bishop Fraser’s to return as a priest, and someone “who had always been a warm friend and supporter of his bishop” (Johnston, 1935-36: 28-29).96 Continuing tensions, however, led two years later to the splitting of the diocese in 1844, Walsh becoming Bishop of the Halifax diocese and Fraser becoming Bishop of the Arichat diocese (renamed Antigonish diocese in 1886).

Much ink has been spilled over the relations between Irish and Scottish Catholicism during these years, but it has largely focussed on the narrative that can be developed from the papers in the various Vatican and Church archives. Peter Ludlow (2015a) has recently attempted to go beyond this narrative with a larger story of ethnic conflict. I want to extend this larger narrative by looking at the conflict as one between ecclesial regimes – between the Scots Gaelic ‘Old Catholic’ culture of Fraser’s Antigonish and the Hiberno-Roman formalist culture of Bishop Walsh and later Bishop Cameron.

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95 Several reasons for these tensions have been advanced, including restrictions on mixed marriages, the needs of the growing Irish political and merchant class in Halifax, and troubles with parish administration.
96 “In a letter dated 19 Oct. 1840 a similar recommendation was made by Father Vincent de Paul [Merle], superior of the Trappists in Nova Scotia and a friend of Fraser’s” (Flemming, 1985).
In the previous chapter on Catholic political theory, I discussed the tension between the commitment to ‘immutable reality’ and ‘a better appreciation’, and discussed how it had been expressed in the church in different movements, alternatively pressing for the exercise of papal authority or clamorously demanding reform. In the previous section of this chapter, I described a Scots Gaelic ‘Old Catholic’ culture that was pre-Tridentine in ecclesiology, clan-based in organization, and infused with a Jansenist devotional piety. The task of this section is to show how this Celtic Catholic imaginary was transmitted to Nova Scotia.


The Scottish population started migrating into eastern Nova Scotia in the late 1700s, mainly composed of Gaelic Highlanders (Bumsted: 1981, 2001). Those who were Catholic largely moved into Cape Breton and the two eastern counties of Mainland Nova Scotia. The Presbyterians settled largely in Central Nova Scotia, particularly in what are now Pictou and Colchester Counties. For the purpose of understanding the Heatherton inheritance of D. J. MacDonald, Antigonish Catholicism can be conceptualized as having been organized around two pastoral regimes in the nineteenth century – the Highland Catholic regime of Bishop Fraser in the early and mid-nineteenth century, and the Hiberno-Roman regime of Bishop Cameron in the late nineteenth century, with the period of Bishop

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97 This information is further usefully refined in his posthumous *Antigonish Diocese Priests and Bishops, 1786-1925*. The inclination of Johnston’s work is as much genealogical compilation as historical narrative: the masses of detail he provides, ever more accurate with each successive publication, provide the necessary foundations upon which larger synthetic histories can be developed.
MacKinnon’s rule acting as a transition from one to the other. This taxonomy of regimes is closely correlated with the birthplace and training of the priests who were active in the diocese. J. M. Bumsted comments on the early attraction of Nova Scotia for the ‘Old Catholic’ Highlanders:

Lowlanders tended to migrate alone rather than in the larger families and/or communities the Highlanders preferred [with a] tendency to go to the United States ... The Highlanders were sensible enough to recognize that the more populated and organized jurisdictions of the New World would not encourage the maintenance of the old ways ... And in the wilderness regions of the Maritimes they managed to replicate most of the features of the pastoral and independent existence they had long enjoyed (Bumsted, 1981: 70, 85).98

Such family groupings, and the clan ensembles of chain migration, were a lubricant to attract priests from the Home country with whom they were attached. It is no surprise, then, that a good many Highland priests did, in fact, emigrate to the Antigonish region during the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, of whom the most prominent was William Fraser. As the social infrastructure strengthened and church institutional structures were established, seminaries for training local priests were built and native Nova Scotian sons began to serve the Antigonish diocese. During the transition period, between the Scottish priests who “came out” with their congregations, and those native Nova Scotian priests who were trained in Canada, various priests of Irish, French, German, Dutch and Belgian extraction served in Antigonish parishes. A total of fifteen Scottish priests served in the Antigonish diocese up until the year D. J. MacDonald was born (see the table on the next page).99

We can gain a picture of the religious imaginary of the priests through some knowledge of the seminaries where they did their training. Given the perilous state of the Catholic Church in Scotland, the small colleges which existed in Scotland during the eighteenth century, perhaps most notably Scalan (Geddes, 1963; Watts, 1999),

98 The similarities of geography and topography between Scotland and Cape Breton were undoubtedly a factor as well.
99 Three other priests – John Chisholm (1800-1834), John Vincent MacDonell (1818-1888), and John MacDougall (1825-1891) – were born in Scotland, but were brought with their families to Nova Scotia as children and raised there, later attending seminary in either Quebec or Antigonish.
functioned in the main as junior seminaries (Anderson, 1963: 90; Prunier, 2013: 125). Seminary training for Scottish boys was, for the most part, done on the Continent in one or other of several ‘Scots Colleges’ which had been created in Flanders, Paris, Rome and Spain. Of the fifteen Scots priests who came to Nova Scotia, ten were trained at the Scots College, Valladolid, Spain; two were trained at Lismore in the Highlands of Scotland; two were trained at the Scots College, Rome; and one was trained at the Scots College, Paris. In the previous chapter, we discussed the tension between the Jesuit’s unitary vision of authority and the Jansenist pluralist vision of authority, the Jesuits with a strong base in Rome, and the Jansenists, with a growing base in the Lowlands, France, and Spain. It is this fact which has some salience for the Valladolid training of the majority of the Scottish priests.

I want to explore this religious imaginary, therefore, through an examination of the Scots College in Valladolid. The Scots College in Spain was initially founded in Madrid in 1627 by Hugh Semple, “with

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<tr>
<th>Priest</th>
<th>Seminary</th>
<th>Antigonish</th>
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<tr>
<td>James MacDonald (1736-1785)</td>
<td>Rome (1754-1765)</td>
<td>1772-1785</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Hugh MacDonald II (1745-1807)</td>
<td>Paris (17xx-1770)</td>
<td>1791-1798</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angus B MacEachern (1759-1835)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1777-1787)</td>
<td>1791-1821</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander MacDonald (1753-1816)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1770-1777)</td>
<td>1802-1816</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ursean MacDonald (1744-1807)</td>
<td>Rome (1757-1769)</td>
<td>1803-1807</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander MacDonnell (1782-1841)</td>
<td>Lismore (1803-1808)</td>
<td>1811-1841</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Chisholm (1779-1818)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1803-1808)</td>
<td>1817-1818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colin P Grant (1784-1839)</td>
<td>Lismore (18xx-1808)</td>
<td>1818-1830</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Fraser (1779-1851)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1794-1804)</td>
<td>1822-1851</td>
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<td>Alex (M) MacDonald (1801-1865)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1816-1822)</td>
<td>1842-1865</td>
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<td>Angus MacDonald (xxxx-1889)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1816-1822)</td>
<td>1843-1845</td>
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<td>Alexander MacSween (1803-1870)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1820-1827)</td>
<td>1844-1870</td>
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<td>Angus Gillis (1807-1851)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1826-1837)</td>
<td>1846-1851</td>
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<td>Alexander MacRae (1821-1856)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1833-1844)</td>
<td>1853-1856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allan MacLean (1804-1877)</td>
<td>Valladolid (1826-1836)</td>
<td>1854-1877</td>
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Sources: Johnston (1955, 1971, 1994)
the stipulation that the college be administered by Jesuits” (Kilburn, 2004). Following the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain in 1767, however, there was a need to act swiftly to maintain the property and operations in Spain, and John Geddes (1735-1799), a trusted Lowland priest, was given the task.

Geddes was himself trained at the Scots College in Rome (1750-1759), but happened to do so during the papacy of Benedict XIV (1740-1758), who gained a reputation as the philosopher-pope: “Benedict was as near as a philosophe ever came to the throne of St. Peter” (Goldie, 1992: 286). In addition, the Rector of the Scots College in Rome was an Italian Jesuit, Lorenzo Alticoczi, “an enlightened and capable man, especially when compared with some of his predecessors and successors” (Taylor, 1971: 50), perhaps complementing “the exceptional common sense and moderation” (Rosa, 2014: 44) of Benedict. Marion Rosa notes that Benedict was “greatly committed to the control of ecclesiastical institutions, the training and customs of the clergy, and the spiritual growth of the laity”, viz: the restoration of simpler, more crucicentrist forms of liturgy and devotion; the establishment or improvement of educational institutions – the expansion of the Vatican library, the founding of academies and museums, and a reduction of book censorship; the opening of an “ongoing dialogue with Jansenism”; and the appointment of an Apostolic Investigator into the Portuguese Jesuits, which led under Clement XIV to suppressing and abolishing the Society (Rosa, 2014).

In fact, though, some resolution to the Jesuit-Jansenist division over a theology of grace – the mutual criticisms of laxism and rigorism existing throughout Europe - was a pre-requisite to any genuine opening. The opening of a dialogue with Jansenism, therefore, was the critical step needed for the whole enterprise of reform undertaken by Benedict. As Mark Goldie indicates, it was just this step towards a theological resolution which Benedict took:

Benedict was appalled at the continued diversion of Catholic intellectual energy into quarrels over Unigenitus, the Bull of 1713 which condemned Jansenism. He helped cure Catholicism of two centuries of argument over the theology of grace, pronouncing that ‘on the question of grace the opinions of the Dominicans, the Augustinians and the Jesuits are all tolerated’ ... Meanwhile, in Naples, Alphonse Liguori [named a ‘Doctor’ of the Church in 1871] was fashioning a theological compromise, a restitution of the Thomist middle way on grace, which would become canonical in modern Catholicism” (Goldie, 1992: 288).
Unfortunately, this opening to reform was not carried forward by Benedict’s successor and, on that turning away, much of the trajectory of Catholicism in the nineteenth century followed. What is important, here, is that John Geddes was shaped during that brief ‘shining night’ of Benedict’s papacy.100

Following his ordination in Rome in 1759, Geddes was posted to the Shenvale mission, “where he lived alongside the Jacobite Vicar Apostolic of the Highland district, Hugh MacDonald” (Kilburn, 2004). In 1762, he was appointed to the seminary at Scalans in Glenlivet which had fallen into a low state. In the next five years, he renewed the sub-lease on the land, built a new and larger stone building, and attracted a considerable group of new students. With that experience in hand, he accepted the mission in Valladolid and left for Spain, arriving in 1770. After a lengthy period of relationship-building101 and negotiation with the Spanish Court, Geddes was able to acquire a suitable set of buildings at Valladolid, formerly a Jesuit College, obtain a royal charter, and establish the educational philosophy and instructional program of the new Scots College as its first rector. Kilburn summarizes Geddes stewardship:

He was a controversial rector, allowing his students greater freedom to mingle with each other and with townspeople than the Scottish bishops thought proper, but his friendships with local administrators and Scottish businessmen in Spain helped integrate Valladolid into the intellectual and economic geography of Scottish and Spanish religious life” (Kilburn, 2004).

The previous chapter outlined the cultural Jansenism which developed in Spain during the second half of the eighteenth century. This fitted nicely with Geddes’ own training under the expansive papacy of Benedict XIV. It made for a practical and non-dogmatic ideology for the Valladolid seminary, and formed students in a devotional piety.

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100 “There can be no doubt of Benedict’s deep influence on their [Hay and Geddes] later intellectual and pastoral preoccupations … At every turn the stamp of Benedict was upon Hay and Geddes” (Goldie, 1992: 285-291).

101 The relationship building was extensive and durable. In 1777, for instance, just a little over one year from its publication, Geddes translated part of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations at the request of Pedro Campomanes, then a leading Spanish statesman and a patron of the Scots College. A few years later, in 1885, Rector Alexander Cameron forwarded a copy of, what must have been, the third edition of Wealth of Nations to Campomanes as a gift from Adam Smith himself (Schwartz, 2001: 118-121).
focussed on contrition and redeeming grace, rather than ritual form and ceremony.

Geddes remained in that position until appointed Coadjutor Vicar Apostolic and Bishop in the Lowland District of Scotland, returning to Edinburgh in 1781. Geddes’ continuing influence was already established, however, with the succeeding rector. Alexander Cameron, Valladolid Rector 1781-1798, was taught by Geddes at Scalan College, and succeeded Geddes as Co-Adjutor Vicar Apostolic of the Lowland District in 1797 (Cooper, 2004). John Gordon, Valladolid Rector 1799-1810, was also taught by Geddes at Scalan College, and, after his appointment to Valladolid, remained in the office of Rector until his death. Alexander Cameron (II), Valladolid Rector 1810-1833, a nephew of Bishop Alexander Cameron, studied initially at Scalan, and then went to Valladolid as a student, for a time under Geddes. As far as the Scottish priestly core of Bishop Fraser’s regime, all of those who studied at Valladolid did so under one of the Rectors just mentioned. The influence of John Geddes is measured, though, not in these relations and modes of influence, but in terms of his vision and personality, “without exception the most charming personality among the post-Reformation Catholic clergy of Scotland” (McRoberts, 1955: 46), someone about whom Robbie Burns wrote “the first (best) clerical character I ever saw was a Roman Catholic – a Popish bishop, Geddes” (Burns quoted in Goldie, 1994: 82; also McRoberts, 1955: 46).

With Geddes, we find an intelligent and gracious man who had the requisite philosophical training, charisma and skills to institute a program of education at Valladolid that would set the tone for Bishop Fraser’s regime in Nova Scotia. Contrary to the ‘backwoods’ characterization of Fraser by Bishop Walsh in Halifax – the habits of “those of the plainest farmer”, someone who does not “live like a bishop nor perform the duties of a bishop” (Walsh to Tobias Kirby, 1843, Archdiocese of Halifax Archives; quoted in Ludlow, 2014: 5), Fraser was an erudite scholar, but practiced an older Highland Catholicism, leavened with the irenic educational philosophy of Geddes and the cultural Jansenism of late eighteenth century Spain. Joseph Howe provides a commentary on a pleasant social occasion he had in Antigonish, and gives good expression to the flavour of Fraser’s regime:

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102 Father Allan MacLean and Father Angus Gillis did the majority of their training under Alexander Cameron (II), but the last few years under Rector John Cameron (1833-1873).
At the hospitable board of R. N. Henry, Esq., the then Postmaster of Antigonish, I met four men, each differing in training, profession and character, but each in his own time sufficiently remarkable to make his society very attractive. These were Dr. Fraser, who became Catholic Bishop of the Diocese, Dr. McDonald, then in the full enjoyment of a large country practice, the Rev. Thomas Trotter, Presbyterian pastor of the village congregation, and our old friend Sandy McDougall. They were all Scotchmen or of Scotch descent, were fast friends and cronies. Each would stand up for his own church or his own snuff-box, but they would all stand up for old Scotland, and fight to prove a thistle more fragrant than a rose. I would have given a trifle to have seen and heard our four old friends once more chaffing each other in Latin, English, Greek and Gaelic. With these four men I remained in terms of intimacy and friendship while they lived. Nothing impressed me so much as to hear questions of philosophy, of practical or abstract science, or of European politics, discussed in the county of Sydney with the keenest of logic and fullness of information scarcely met with in the capital (Howe, quoted in Johnston, 1960b: 465-466; also quoted in Chisholm, 1935: 295).

Heatherton Stampeders

Tobias Kirby, to whom Bishop Walsh wrote his demeaning remarks about Fraser, was, at that time, Vice-Rector of the Irish College in Rome. He became Rector of the College after Paul Cullen was appointed Archbishop of Armagh (Ireland) and Apostolic Delegate in 1849. Kirby was located at one of the communication hubs of the Ultramontane movement in the mid-nineteenth century. It was not unusual, then, for Kirby to be the recipient of a lament from J. P. Cooke, a Waterford priest, in 1850:

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103 R. N. Henry, then Antigonish postmaster, had a son, W. A. Henry, who became one of the ‘Fathers’ of Confederation; Sandy (Alexander) Macdougall, then a young lawyer, later became Solicitor-General of Nova Scotia.

104 The County of Sydney was renamed as the County of Antigonish in 1863.

105 ‘Apostolic Delegate’ is a diplomatic representative of the Pope in countries without regular relations with the Holy See.

106 See Barr (2008) for an analysis of Cullen’s central role in promoting ultramontanism in the English-speaking world.
If you knew all there is to remedy, all the evil there is to check! ... We have not had a conference here since the beginning of the distress, four years now probably - & but one retreat all that time & everyone doing & thinking & speaking as it listeth him, & no one to prevent it” (Cook to Tobias, Irish College Archives, quoted in Larkin, 1972: 625).

This lament, however, would be remedied over the next decades, both in Ireland and in Nova Scotia. In the Antigonish region, it showed itself with the struggle between Walsh and Fraser and the resulting division of the diocese, in a transition regime under Bishop Colin MacKinnon, but most spectacularly with the rigid and unbending administration of Bishop John Cameron.

Ultramontanism was an expression of the same unitary conception of authority which was so evident in the struggles through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between Jesuits and Jansenists. Following the French Revolution – as a result of the “faltering fidelity and submission of many a son, led astray by the phrenzy of recent revolution, and the false liberality of the day, and the desolating philosophism of France”107 – the Jesuit order was re-established with papal approval and the ultramontane movement re-emerged. The Movement steadily gained strength during the Bourbon Restoration, and reached its apotheosis during the papacy of Pius IX with the First Vatican Council doctrine of papal infallibility:

Ultramontanes looked ‘beyond the mountains’ to Rome for leadership and spiritual guidance and welcomed the centralisation of ecclesiastical authority in the papacy. Their manifesto was Joseph de Maistre’s Du Pape (1817), which argued that the secular power was inferior to the spiritual power and that the papacy, as the supreme spiritual power, should have the ultimate say in the governance of peoples and nations (McMillan, 2001: 115).

Bishop Colin MacKinnon’s transitional regime (1851-1877) sits somewhat uneasily between the Heather Priests of Bishop Fraser and the Ultramontanism of Bishop Cameron. With aspirations for the priesthood, MacKinnon could only do preparatory studies in Nova Scotia, and was recommended for seminary training by Bishop Fraser, obtaining both PhD and DD degrees at the Urban College in Rome (1829-1837). Returning that summer, it was just one year later that MacKinnon established St. Andrew’s Grammar School at the parish in

which he was serving near Antigonish, in what was to be his first educational experiment leading to an eventual seminary in Antigonish. MacKinnon’s appointment as successor to Fraser was promoted by Bishop Walsh a full 14 months before Fraser died (Walsh to Tobias Kirby, 1850, quoted in Ludlow, 2014: 5). He was duly consecrated by Walsh in February, 1852, and three months later, in May, 1852, Walsh was raised to Archbishop of Halifax, “with jurisdiction over the newly formed ecclesiastical province of Nova Scotia” (Flemming, 1972), including, therefore, Antigonish as a suffragan see. The finesse was extended to seminary training. Two years later, MacKinnon founded the St. F.X. seminary in July, 1853. John Cameron, who had studied at St. Andrew's Grammar School under MacKinnon and had then gone for seminary training to Urban College (1844-1853) in Rome, was ordained a priest that same month. After one more year of studies to obtain his doctoral degree in theology, Cameron returned to Nova Scotia, where, upon his arrival in the fall of 1854, he was appointed Rector of St. F.X. 

It was, however, in the soft innovations in worship and liturgy that the Romanization of Antigonish was constructed (Ludlow, 2014: 5-9): Marian devotion was advanced by placing the diocese under her patronage on the same day of the Bishop’s consecration (Nicholson, 1954: 106), responding no doubt to the 1849 encyclical Ubi primum of Pope Pius IX describing Mary as a Mediator of salvation. Over the next few years, MacKinnon instituted the following ‘improvements’: clergy discipline was tightened and enforced, communicated at a diocesan synod in 1854, and pastoral letters were issued on “everything from doctrine to church music”; regular and frequent communion was demanded of parishioners; paintings, artwork, new missals and breviaries, ornamented vessels, and formal vestments were obtained for parish use; a Corpus Christi celebration, in which the Blessed Sacrament is processed through the community, was instituted; and the language of the local church progressively shifted from the Gaelic vernacular to the common languages of Latin and English. Perhaps, most importantly, though, was the gradual shift from a parish-centred ministry toward a universalising focus on the episcopacy and papal authority.

The transition of soft innovations which was initiated by Bishop MacKinnon was, throughout his term, tolerated, even embraced, by Antigonish parishioners as a maturation of their religious culture, not as its opponent. And by the second half of his tenure, MacKinnon himself had backed off of some of his early Roman enthusiasm (Ludlow, 2014: 9), perhaps being re-socialized when back among his
Gaelic clansmen. This was the world into which D. J. MacDonald was born in 1881.

Such lukewarm Romanism was not the case, though, with the appointment of Bishop Cameron. Under Cameron, the Roman ideology was extended, completed and consolidated. Cameron brought a degree of authority and intransigence to the diocese that simply brooked no opposition. R. A. MacLean notes that Cameron's ten years of training at the Urban College and the friendships he made there, led to “moulding a Catholicism which obediently followed the leadership of Rome” (MacLean, 1991: 9). Cameron's years in Rome were shaped by the civil unrest he witnessed, and his letters home in 1848 and 1849 are filled with his “growing abhorrence of the political turmoil in Rome” (p. 14). It was this experience, MacLean argues, which convinced Cameron of the need for a determined authority to establish and maintain order:

The violence Cameron thus witnessed during his student years in Rome made him a life long enemy to the foes of established authority. It is fair to assume that the dogmatism of Pius IX also held a strong appeal for the young student ... There was no questioning of hierarchical authority in his attitude nor was there any doubt as to the correctness of his beliefs. The rigorous education and training was having the intended results; the formation of a character ready to defend the beliefs of Roman Catholicism (MacLean, 1991: 13, 16).

With the 'hard-shell' ultramontanism of Bishop Cameron, it became evident to both clergy and people that the Highland Catholicism of Bishop Fraser had been abandoned and throughout Cameron's term there was growing resistance. Most well-known, was the resistance of the 'Heatherton Stampeders' to Bishop Cameron's instruction about how to vote in the federal election concerning the Manitoba school question,108 issued from the pulpit in Heatherton in 1896:109

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108 The Manitoba school question concerned the conversion of a denominational school system to a public school system.
109 That this was not centrally a political issue is born out by other instances of resistance in the diocese, the most notable of which was the Lismore parish church fiasco, where Bishop Cameron ordered the building of a new church at Bailey's Brook, a distant location from the existing church and cemetery, a decision which met with the ongoing resistance of parishioners. When parishioners refused to attend the new church, “the ‘recalcitrants’ were denied the sacraments and threatened with excommunication, a tactic that Cameron used all too frequently”
The feeling against the letter in Heatherton, ten miles east of Antigonish, was so strong that when it was being read at least 40 parishioners walked out of the church. Incensed, the bishop accused the protesters of having insulted the priest by leaving; they countered that they were being coerced into voting for the Conservatives. Cameron denied the protesters the right to the sacraments until they apologized for causing scandal, and it was not until 1900, after the intervention of the apostolic delegate, that the dispute was resolved (MacLean, 1994).

What is of interest for our purposes is that D. J. MacDonald’s father was one of the Stampeders who walked out.110

What I have called the ‘Heatherton Inheritance’, therefore, is a rather complex amalgam of identities and ideas about Gaelic culture and the Catholic religion in Antigonish. I explored this through a picture of the world into which D. J. MacDonald, our Antigonish Movement ‘banker’, was born.

D. J. Macdonald inherited a family lineage which stretched back into the Highlands of Scotland and the resistance of Clan Donald, (Ludlow, 2015: 39). Dozens of letters over the last six years of Cameron’s life detail the imbroglio, involving extensive correspondence between parishioners, the bishop, the apostolic delegate, and the cardinal with responsibility. This matter was only settled by Archbishop Morrison in 1913, several years after Cameron’s death, when he arranged a consultation with disaffected parishioners and brokered a deal to resolve the impasse, where the old Lismore church was allowed to reopen as a mortuary chapel with its cemetery becoming the primary burial ground, on the provision that all parishioners would attend the new Bailey’s Brook church (Ludlow, 2015: 59).

110 The connections are rather rich. The Heatherton priest at the time was Father Roderick Grant, who had been born in Heatherton. His brother was one of the Stampeders who walked out, suggesting that the priest might have known it was going to happen. Father Grant lied to Bishop Cameron about the actions of his brother, saying he was away that morning, and the parish was taken from him in 1898; he chose retirement, rather than accept a new parish. Again the Heatherton families are inter-married. D. J. MacDonald’s sister, Margaret Jane MacDonald, was married to Duncan Grant, who was a nephew of Father Rod Grant (Email Correspondence: Peter Ludlow, 09 Aug, 2017; Flora Marie MacDonald, 14 Aug, 2017).
embedded within a clan system of social affiliation which had been rebuilt in the New World, and part of a Gaelic ‘Old Catholic’ culture, with a pre-Tridentine ecclesiology and a Jansenist devotional piety, practical and self-reliant in its *oeconomia* of household management and networks of loyalty-bonds. These attributes of the ideal-type suggest a culture which had been bypassed by modernity.

This generation, though, – the generation of D. J. Macdonald, the generation of those who led the Antigonish Movement\(^{111}\) – engaged with modernity in a fierce and impassioned way on a great arc of social action. As I have tried to make clear in this chapter, though, they did so from a political foundation in nineteenth century culture – ‘the Heatherton Inheritance’ – that they had received. It was an inheritance that predates the intellectual recovery of *communicatio politica* and the full flowering of the Catholic understanding of solidarity and subsidiarity. And it is in that sense that the Antigonish Movement can be understood as essentially a movement of resistance, not transformation. They simply did not have the intellectual tools to cut deeply enough.

\(^{111}\) D. J. Macdonald (1881-1948); Jimmy Tompkins (1870-1953); Moses Coady (1882-1959); A. B. MacDonald (1893-1952).
6 The Triumph of Commercial Society

In this chapter, we leave our narrative about the political order, and pick up the story about the juristic and economic contributions to a different conception of civil society in the centuries following the societas civilis of Leonardo Bruni. The objective is to expose the transition to commercial sociability, which emerges during the Enlightenment as the moral philosophy of the new industrial society. In the following chapter after this, I trace the intellectual resistance to commercial society which developed in Germany, and, in the next chapter again, I show how this resistance was picked up by D. J. MacDonald. This trio of chapters, therefore, is an effort to outline the economic imaginary of the Antigonish Movement.

The scholarship of the last few decades in the intellectual history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has given us quite a different picture of the evolution of European social thought in that period than was held previously. Indeed, the moral philosophy of the nineteenth century is now “seen increasingly as not so much an antithesis to the Enlightenment, but rather as a continuation, restatement and critical re-working of eighteenth century themes” (Hont, 1994: 54).

112 Bradley and Van Kley (2001: 2-17) have a good review of the historiography of the French Revolutionary image of the Enlightenment and its collapse since the linguistic turn.

113 I am using ‘moral philosophy’ as a portmanteau term to refer to political, economic, and legal thought, a form of inquiry distinguished from ‘natural philosophy’. It is used here in the sense it held before the rise of the social sciences. Adam Ferguson, for instance, held the Chair in Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh from 1764 to 1785.
The Enlightenment itself has been successively decomposed, first by geography, then by religion, and then by individual thinker, cumulatively reorganizing our understanding of the evolution of social thought. Close historical reconstruction of the debates in theology and political thought which actually took place, and the dialectic of revision and adjustment which that reconstruction shows, lead to a rather different understanding of Enlightenment thought (Hont, 1994: 55). The overall picture is one of a series of incremental changes in moral philosophy, often moving hand-in-hand with expressions of religious reform and dissent, throughout the early Modern period. Modern culture has both secular and religious roots (Lehner, 2010: 1). As Keith Baker has suggested, “neither could be thought without reference to the other” (Baker, 1994: 105).

Already when still a young man, John Dunn had disabused us of the notion of a Lockean liberal revolution which replaced the virtue ethic of civic humanism. Unlike Hobbes, or Hume, or Adam Smith, who can be described as “practical atheists”, Dunn argues that “the entire framework of [Locke’s] thinking was ‘theocentric’ and the key commitment of his intellectual life as a whole was the epistemological vindication of this framework” (Dunn, 1983: 119). For Locke, our conduct in this life was simply preparation “to meet the requirements of an alien, objective and non-human authority” (Dunn, 1989: 148). As Hont comments, “Dunn’s reading … severed the cherished link in the liberal mythology of American histories of modern political thought which place Locke at the beginning of ‘liberalism’ and ‘Enlightenment’” (Hont, 1994: 56).

In the lacuna resulting from this severance, current scholarship has identified three different strands in the moral philosophy of the Enlightenment: (1) the virtue tradition of civic humanism; (2) the

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114 See, for instance, Porter and Teich (1981), which inaugurated the geographic decomposition. Since that publication, the decomposition has continued, with many texts now addressing different national Enlightenments.

115 See, for instance, Sorkin (2008) and Miller (1978).

116 The work of Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, Istvan Hont, Duncan Forbes, Donald Winch, Keith Baker, James Moore, Knud Haakonssen, Dale Van Kley, John Dunn, and Richard Tuck are of particular note in this context.

117 Dunn’s first book, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, was published in 1969 when he was 29 years old. See also, Dunn (1983, 1989, 1996).

118 Cf. Dunn, 1996: 105: “Locke was a theocentric thinker for whom the truth of the Christian religion as he understood this was an indispensable major premiss of a scheme of practical reason within which most human beings had sufficient motivational grounds for behaving as in his view they ought”. 

discourse on natural jurisprudence; and (3) the theory of the moral sciences.\footnote{Haakonssen (1996b) discusses these strands in his “Introduction”, although the formulation I have given them is my own.} While there were elements of a common discourse throughout the European societies, innovation and reception are always local. The nature or extent of the innovation, and the depth and character of the reception, are not therefore, homogeneous across cultures. Despite a wide dissemination of ideas, the concepts of ‘history’ in Germany, or ‘equality’ in France, or ‘commercial society’ in Scotland, had a salience that was particular to those local cultures. In this chapter, I want to examine the sociability of commercial society, a concept for which Scottish moral philosophy was central.

I will examine, then, each of these three strands in some detail, and conclude with a few comments about their joint influence on the paradigm of sociability which emerged as the new constitutive framework for civil society. The new understanding of sociability, something which was practically mobilized as ‘commercial society’, was one of the conditions for the transition to the modern world.

**Civic Humanism**

John Pocock has been one of the most persistent scholars in examining the construction of Renaissance humanism and its subsequent declension through the early modern period. In his important monograph, *The Machiavellian Moment*, Pocock described the philosophical tenor, context, and dynamics of Renaissance political philosophy, with some notes on “the fortunes of the texts, and the discourses they may be said to have conveyed” in the various contexts of the Atlantic World (Pocock, 2003: 554) – in this respect, arguing that “the American Revolution can be considered the last great act of civic humanism of the Renaissance” (Pocock, 1975: 606). By civic humanism, Pocock is referring to the classical conception of citizenship which was revived, first in Florence, notably in the late fourteenth century and early fifteenth by Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni, and later famously by Niccolò Machiavelli’s “doctrine of the armed and active citizen” (Pocock, 2003: 566):

> It was enough for me to affirm that ideas of active citizenship were formulated by Florentines, that they could be said to have rested on
the ideal of the *zoon politikon* expressed by Aristotle, and that they had come to be identified with the possession of arms by the citizen. (Pocock, 2003: 555).120

In much of his subsequent work, the notes have become the central focus, exploring the clash between “the ancient ideal of civic and military virtue, and its response to the challenge, in the eighteenth century, of the new ideals, and realities, of commercial and civil society” (Pocock, 1999: 2). Much of Pocock’s later attention has focussed on English politics, with particular attention to James Harrington (1611-1677), a political theorist of classical republicanism, and Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), “British historian of Rome and universal historian”.121 The civic humanist ideal in Britain, Pocock argues, was used as a form of criticism of the ‘Whig oligarchy’, concerning the institution of public credit, political patronage, and English-Scottish union, each of which were seen as either a form of corruption or dependency. The republican model was one of aristocratic equality, rather than democratic equality. It relied on agrarian production to yield the independence, self-mastery, and leisure necessary for the active political life. The Whig reforms were aimed at supporting commerce and the growth of trade in order to underpin the English parliamentary monarchy. It can be seen, therefore, as a struggle between the Country and the Court, a struggle that had been lost in England to the emerging state by the late 1700s (Pocock, 1983).

An improved understanding of the developments in political and theological thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of which Pocock’s analysis of the civic humanism tradition was one strand, led to a reevaluation of the Enlightenment. As Pocock suggests in an article published more than twenty years after *The Machiavellian Moment*:

We are moving toward a reassessment of Enlightenment, in which there will no longer be “The Enlightenment”, a unitary and universal phenomenon with a single history to be either celebrated or condemned, but instead a family of discourses arising about the same time in a number of European cultures, Protestant as well as

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120 Pocock comments that he views “Quentin Skinner’s employment of ‘Ciceronian’ concepts of citizenship, as against the ultimately ‘Machiavellian’ concepts developed by Baron and myself, as tending toward the reconstruction of the republic as a community of citizens regulated by law and justice” (Pocock, 2003: 561-562).

121 This phrase is taken from the title of an article by Peter Ghosh (1999).
Catholic, insular as well as peninsular, and certainly not all occasioned by the Parisian intellectual hegemony that sought to establish itself among them. (Pocock, 1997: 7)

One of the lines of discourse within that family was the historical concern about *enthusiasm*, a concern which ultimately contributed to the undermining of the civic humanism tradition. Pocock (1985) has made important contributions to this historiography with his arguments for a conservative Enlightenment in England. The concern about enthusiasm arose with the European Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, triggered by the onset of the Protestant Reformation and, although conventionally closed with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Pocock argues for its extension to cover the War of the Three Kingdoms, the series of civil conflicts in England, Scotland and Ireland which lasted a few years longer (Pocock, 1997: 9). The central thesis of Pocock is that “the Enlightenment was first and foremost a movement to preserve civilised society against any resurgence of religious enthusiasm and superstition, that is to say, of evangelical Protestantism and Counter-Reformation Catholicism” (Haakonssen, 1996a: 2).

In the British Isles, the initial cross-pollination of Enlightenment ideas, Bradley and Van Kley indicate, was with the other northern Protestant countries, which “stretched like a crescent from England and Scotland through the Protestant Netherlands and western Germanies only to end in the Swiss cities like Geneva and Lausanne”. This had a counterpart in a Catholic Enlightenment which “seems to have formed another and southern crescent from the Catholic Germanies in the southeast through the north-central Italies, including Rome in the center, and on through the Iberian Peninsula in the West” (Bradley and Van Kley, 2001: 15). This leaves France where secular Enlightenment thought – the enlightenment of the *philosophes* – was the strongest, and even there the Jansenist movement constituted a continuing backbone of religious dissent (see Van Kley, 1996). “Between and within these crescents”, Bradley and Van Kley note, “a distinctively civic humanistic and proto-republican Enlightenment which, opposed to commerce, ‘luxury,’ and many aspects of modern ‘civilization,’ made common cause with certain forms of British Nonconformist and Jansenist dissent, has forced itself onto the scholarly agenda” (Bradley and Van Kley, 2001: 15).

122 In this discussion, Bradley and Van Kley reference Pocock’s work (1999) concerning the Protestant crescent (cf. also Pocock, 1985: 530) and Plongeron (1969) and Miller’s (1978) work concerning the Catholic crescent.
Pocock pursues this by arguing that the beginnings of an English Enlightenment *sans philosophes* were to be found among the clergy of the Church of England, a church *re-established* in 1660, with the return of Charles II to a restored monarchy. Among churchmen, sympathies ran towards latitudinarianism, which built upon Richard Hooker’s position, perhaps the greatest of the Anglican Divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Pocock indicates that among the concerns of the Latitudinarians was the perceived need to overcome, reject or assimilate what was known as ‘enthusiasm’: the belief in personal inspiration, in the infusion, in-pouring or in-breathing of the Holy Spirit to the psyche of the individual, which during the Interregnum of the 1640s and 1650s had shown itself capable of leading to antinomian and so to socially revolutionary consequences. (Pocock, 1985: 531)

Hume and Gibbon, Pocock goes on to note, “concurred in a polemic against enthusiasm which had been initiated by churchmen” (Pocock, 1985: 532). Hume, for instance, considered enthusiasm and superstition to be “two species of false religion” ([1777] 1987: 73), and contended that “religions, which partake of enthusiasm are, on their first rise, more furious and violent than those which partake of superstition” (p. 76), going on to provide examples of the Anabaptists in Germany, the Camisars in France, the Levellers in England, and the Covenanters in Scotland, although ultimately concluding that superstition was the worse of the two diseases.

Locke, also, in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, published in 1690, devoted an entire chapter to a critique of enthusiasm, and suggested for its containment, the check of reflection:

This I take to be properly Enthusiasm, which though founded neither on Reason, nor Divine Revelation, but rising from the Conceits of a warmed or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfuly on the Perswasions and Actions of Men, than either of those two, or both together … For strong conceit like a new Principle carries all easily with it, when got above common Sense, and freed from all restraint of Reason, and check of Reflection, it is heightened into a Divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination. (Locke, Nidditch edition, Chapter XIX, Book IV, §7: [1790] 1975: 699)

123 The famous 1662 revision of the Book of Common Prayer became the central text of a restored Anglican church.
The critique of enthusiasm, however, was pushed farther than Locke allowed with a ratcheting of insistence on polite society, an emphasis on the reciprocity between persons - a reciprocity of interaction which contained both social intercourse and commercial trade. “With the growth of trade and more complex exchange relationships, manners began to be softened and passions refined, le doux commerce made its appearance” (Pocock, 1983: 241). At this time, the English word polite (politesse, gentile) retained the meaning of ‘polished’, and so joined with ‘reasonable’ and ‘sociable’ to convey the meaning that even in religion, men were social beings: that even their communion with God in His Church was formed as they interacted with one another in society, and thus ‘polished’ or wore away the angular fanaticisms of the Puritan and the uncontrolled pseudo-spiritual impulses of the ‘enthusiast’ (Pocock, 1985: 533).

What Pocock’s discussion of civic humanism shows is the slow migration of ideas from the Renaissance into something quite different in English society of the early eighteenth century. Civic humanism was transformed: no longer an ethic of individual virtue in the polis, but a social conception of reciprocity and politesse in social interaction. Such a changed conception is open to commercial sociability. This transmutation of civic humanism prepares the way for a reconstruction of moral philosophy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and we turn to that now.

Natural Jurisprudence

Whereas in England, Locke’s writings were used in the early eighteenth century to promote stabilization “in a prolonged debate concerning the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England”, they were employed in Scotland, where the moderate Dissension of the Presbyterian Kirk was the established church, with a much different reception “as an academic treatise on moral philosophy” (Moore, 1981: 62). This was true more generally, though: moral philosophy was the central discourse of the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed, Peter Stein makes this claim about Adam Smith himself, whose moral philosophy is often seen as, at best, complementary to his prime allegiance to economics:
The recent publication of an extended set of notes of Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence has demonstrated how his economic theory grew out of his legal theory and how his legal theory grew out of his moral theory. The line of this development was suggested by the course of studies in moral philosophy in Scotland, and more particularly in the University of Glasgow in which Smith held the Chair of Moral Philosophy from 1752 until 1763. (Stein, 1988a: 381)

Scottish moral philosophy did not develop autonomously, but was part of a larger European discourse during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What was significant about the Scottish philosophers was the unusual concentration of talent which developed there as the eighteenth century developed, and the particular engagement they had with the discourse of natural jurisprudence. This resulted in a new theory of sociability comprised of three conceptual building blocks – material progress, naturalized interests, and spontaneous order. In this section, I will concentrate on the evolution of these several concepts.

Conjectural Histories and Material Progress

In the Scottish context, the contrast category for polite was rude, used in the sense of primitive, and these categories were employed widely in a literature expounding a conjectural history of civilization.124 ‘Conjectural history’ was terminology first used by Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), holding the Edinburgh Chair in Moral Philosophy (immediately following Adam Ferguson), who was described by Annette Meyer as the “ideographic custodian of the inheritance of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Meyer, [2008] 2016: 134). Stewart provided a substantive definition of what such a conjectural history would consist: ”our intellectual acquirements, our opinions, manners and institutions, [and] those which prevail among rude tribes” (Stewart, quoted in Hopfl, 1978: 19). Much of the intellectual debate in the Scottish Enlightenment took place through the mixtures of historical inquiry, comparative studies, philosophical anthropology, and logical claims in the various conjectural histories. “The reliance on accounts of ‘rude nations’ and the use of anthropological data”, particularly those accounts of North American natives, “permitted the development of analogies that would allow plausible conjecture about

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124 Richard Sher (1995) has edited a magisterial seven-volume collection of primary sources for the conjectural histories of the Scottish Enlightenment.
epochs of early history otherwise subject only to wild fantasizing” (Meyer, [2008] 2016: 134). Conjectural histories of this kind can be found in different forms in the writings of such Scottish intellectuals as Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), John Millar (1735-1801), Lord Kames (1696-1782), David Hume (1711-1776), and William Robertson (1721-1793).

‘Conjectural history’ is not, however, a neutral term, even in 1793 when Stewart first used it, as Meyer so brilliantly demonstrates, but allowed Stewart to distance himself from “attempts to develop a universal history with scientific claims” (Meyer, [2008] 2016: 134). In his later *Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy Since the Revival of Letters in Europe*, written in the early nineteenth century more than twenty years after his initial formulation, Stewart rejects the approach altogether as having any serious intellectual value:

To a philosophical mind, no study certainly can be more delightful than this species of history; but as an organ of instruction, I am not disposed to estimate its practical utility so highly as D’Alembert. It does not seem to me at all adapted to interest the curiosity of novices; nor is it so well calculated to engage the attention of those who wish to enlarge their scientific knowledge, as of persons accustomed to reflect on the phenomena and laws of the intellectual world. (Stewart, [1815-21] 1829: 351; partially quoted in Meyer, [2008] 2016: 134)

The problem for Stewart by this time was that he no longer recognized the legitimacy of the historico-philosophical frameworks of his Scottish forebears – his commitment to the empirical method “already points to nineteenth-century positivism” (Meyer, [2008] 2016: 135). But Adam Ferguson, arguably the leading Scottish theorist of civil society, had rejected the notion that history was just ‘one damn thing after another’, and sought to engage history at the level of mankind itself. “According to Ferguson, the only scientific account of all human concerns – whether present, past or future, whether of the species or of the individual – is the ‘natural history of man’” (p. 139). Such a task, however, requires a theoretical framework – a philosophical history – while, as an empirical science, continuing to use whatever historical evidence, comparative studies, and anthropological research can be found:

Ferguson pointed out that, analogous to the physical law, the correspondence between the isolated historical fact and the scientific historical theory was ‘moral law’ ... a conception of
individual morality as the indicator of the historical sustainability of societies (Meyer, [2008] 2016: 140).

Ferguson’s species-history, however, can only be understood against the historical development of mankind over time, with a conception of historical change:

In other classes of animals, the individual advances from infancy to age or maturity; and he attains, in the compass of a single life, to all the perfection his nature can reach: but, in the human kind, the species has a progress as well as the individual; they build in every subsequent age on foundations formerly laid; and, in a succession of years, tend to a perfection in the application of their faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to which many generations must have combined their endeavours. (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 10; quoted in part by Merolle, [2009] 2016: 80)

Ferguson is, therefore, developing a species-history which incorporates a concept of historicity. This is different from the stadial theories of Hume (and I would add Smith) which “could conceive the idea of progress, but not that of historical change” (Merolle, [2009] 2016: 87). Indeed, more than a century passes until German historicism is able to put paid to the stadial conception of progress.

Ferguson’s historicity was not embraced by his Scottish fellow-philosophers – indeed, Hume was sharply critical of Ferguson’s Essay, even though they were close friends. So, let us turn now to these more limited stadial histories. The tradition of conjectural history during the Scottish Enlightenment led eventually to the four-stage stadial theory of Adam Smith (1723-1790):125 a model which marked the evolution of society through various forms of production from a hunting base, to the several pastoral, agricultural, and finally commercial bases of society (Meek, 1976).126 It is not the case, however, that different forms of production, and their influences on institutional formation, were not known before this time. “What happened in the 1750s was that a three stage theory, which had been

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125 There was a French tradition as well, and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot independently developed a four-stage theory in the late 1850s.
126 Meek is committed to seeing Adam Smith’s four-stage theory as a satisfactory resolution of eighteenth century stadial theory – that is, to a Smithian understanding of the mode of subsistence as the key factor in a progressive framework of socio-economic development. His normative commitment is so strong, though, as to vitiate his historical analysis. Cf. Meek (1971) for an even stronger version of this position.
known since antiquity, was transformed and given new meaning by the
addition of the fourth stage” (Stein, 1988b: 396). Aristotle, in his
Politics, had discussed the relation between different means of
obtaining food and the consequences for different ways of life. He also
recognized that some people made a living with barter and trade. So,
while Aristotle held all of the elements, he “refused to put them in any
kind of order of progression; indeed he stressed that many people
combine different ways of life, such as those who engage in both
hunting and agriculture” (Stein, 1988b: 396). It is now acknowledged
that the Ancient Greeks had a conception of progress, contrary to
Walter Bagehot’s 1872 assertion. However, when it did emerge, in
what was a rather limited way as compared to the modern conception
of progress, it “found the field already occupied by two great anti-
progressive myths which threatened to strangle it at birth, the myth of
the Lost Paradise … and the myth of Eternal Recurrence” (Dodds,
1973: 3). Even when those myths were discounted, the Greek
conception of progress was constrained by a teleological conception of
life that was even more widely held.

What does emerge briefly with Dicaearchus, a student of Aristotle,
is an argument relating the mode of production to the forms of
property that were held: “the rise of private property was associated
first with the domestication of certain animals, such as sheep, and then
with the acquisition of land for cultivation” (Stein, 1988b: 397). “The
earliest period”, Stein summarizes, “was a state of nature in which man
lived on the earth’s spontaneous produce, the second stage was marked
by the domestication of such wild animals as were capable of being
tamed and the third stage by the cultivation of the earth” (p. 397).
What Adam Smith accomplishes for the Scottish Enlightenment is to
add ‘commercial society’ as a fourth stage.

As Istvan Hont has noted, “a closer look at Smith’s own position,
however, reveals a certain incoherence”:

[Smith’s] explanation for the emergence of the fourth stage was
quite different in kind from those which explained the first three.
The principle of progress in the first three stages was simple.
Mankind found itself compelled to turn from hunting to
shepherding and then to agriculture as the primary ways of self-
preservation under the double pressure of depleting natural
resources and growing population. (Hont, 1987: 254)

The stadial theory of material progress such as we find in Smith,
however, gets its power from the presupposition that historical change
is ‘progressive’. In contrast, Ferguson allows for historical change to
be either progressive or regressive, and maintains that different forms 
of change in the moral order cannot be ranked as an unalloyed good:

We are generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can subsist 
under customs and manners extremely different from our own; and 
we are apt to exaggerate the misery of barbarous times, by an 
imagination of what we ourselves should suffer in a situation to 
which we are not accustomed. But every age hath its consolations, 
as well as its sufferings (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 103).

Even if one were to accept the stadial narrative of material progress, 
though, Smith’s next step does not follow:

Smith claimed that the age of commerce was just as much a ‘natural’ 
development. But it was a development of not quite the same kind. 
It was not marked with any further step in the natural acquisition of 
property through occupation or accession. Commerce itself could 
not possibly be a primary mode of acquiring property, since barter 
presupposed that the objects offered for exchange were already 
owned. (Hont, 1987: 254)

Stein (1988b: 401-409) has suggested an alternative that, since the 
development of ‘commercial society’ did not involve new property 
rights, “the elaboration of the three-stage theory into a four-stage 
theory was thus the result of applying an historical perspective to legal 
institutions other than property … It was a switch from attention to 
property to attention to contract that made the four stage theory” (p. 
401). What commercial society did introduce, Stein argues, was a 
requirement for new contract law, and he believes that it was this 
recognition by Smith which led him to theorize ‘commercial society’ 
as a fourth stage. The really significant innovation in stadial theory, 
though, was not the recognition of the fourth stage per se, but the 
view that changes in law were being propelled by changes in the mode 
of production – indeed, that the mode of production was the engine of 
civilization – and this innovation had multiple sources. Montesquieu’s 
followers, for instance, “treated mode of subsistence not merely as one 
of several factors affecting a society’s laws [as Montesquieu had] but as 
the crucial circumstance that dictated their character and extent (p. 
402). It is an innovation as this thinking was not characteristic of 
ancient or medieval thought. Montesquieu was, himself, “reluctant to 
acknowledge any relationship of cause and effect” (p. 403) between the 
mode of production and the legal regime, and raises just this point that 
there is no evidence of its existence in ancient thought: “I am not 
ignorant that men prepossessed with these two ideas, that commerce is 
of the greatest service to a state, and that the Romans had the best
regulated government in the world, have believed that these people greatly honoured and encouraged commerce: but the truth is, they seldom troubled their heads about it” (Montesquieu, quoted in Stein, 1988b: 403).

This is one of the pivotal issues in terms of the theory of spontaneous order and the emergent conception of civil society as a sphere with its own autonomous dynamics, separate from the polity, a conception finally stabilized with Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. If the development of four-stage theory did not revolve around an expansion of legal rights or a deepening of commercial law – if it was not about the legal order – then what was Smith doing?

Hont argues that Smith was using the quantitative increases in commercial activity, “as an index of qualitative changes in the basic modus operandi of that society” (Hont, 2015: 3). Smith’s four-stage theory was announcing the shift, and connecting it to a moral philosophy which could support a conception of sociability “to describe a society whose members related to one another as interactive commercial individuals, behaving generally as merchants act when entering a market” (p. 3). Self-interest, as Bernard Mandeville had already suggested in 1714 in *The Fable of the Bees*, was a better engine than virtue.

*Pufendorf’s Naturalization of Interests*

To appreciate the centrality of self-interest, it is necessary to review a somewhat earlier set of developments in moral philosophy which influenced the Scottish Enlightenment through Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), a century before. Pufendorf is of interest for his reconstruction of natural jurisprudence in reaction to Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. Hegel, for instance, claimed Pufendorf as the “real modern starting point” of modern natural law (Hont, 1994: 62), and Pufendorf, himself, was self-consciously responding to Grotius and Hobbes:

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127 See also: “A commercial society is not a theory of trading communities, nor in the first instance an economic notion at all; a Christian society could easily be a trading community. A commercial society was rather an alternative model of imagining how human beings can form a society, for example a sustained form of common living, if they did not share such bonding principles as the ones offered by Christianity” (Hont, 1994: 60).
Pufendorf used *socialitas* [the social life of man] as the cornerstone of the anti-relativist or anti-sceptical intellectual strategy which lay at the centre of the modern tradition which he claimed began with Grotius and was continued by Hobbes. (Hont, 1994: 62)

To what then was Pufendorf responding? Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), born in Holland, was widely recognized by the end of the seventeenth century as “the one who ‘broke the ice’ after the long winter of Aristotelianism … He was the inventor of a new ‘science of morality’, which was taken up in various ways by all the major figures of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Pufendorf himself” (Tuck, 1991: 499).

Grotius realized that he needed to distinguish the positive law of particular societies, from the natural law common to all mankind. In doing so, he contrasted the civilized with the rude society, and set out a model in which self-preservation and sociability, both of which he thought were characteristic of social life, were the grounds for his moral philosophy:

These two properties temper and inform each other: the desire for self-preservation is limited by the social impulse, so that humans do not naturally seek to maintain and enhance their being at all costs; conversely, the need for the company of other humans is limited by the self-preservation drive, for individuals must naturally strive to secure the means for their well-being. (Miller, 2011: 13)

His position on the sociability of human nature, which would limit the impulse for self-preservation, was, therefore, a *primitive* for Grotius. It was exposed, however, to a skeptical criticism. If the claim of Grotius was that Aristotle’s *zoon politikon* was simply positive law drawn from a particular Greek society, what insulated the position of Grotius from the same consideration: “For by admitting as a means of establishing the law of nature the common custom of the more civilised nations, he had given a place within his own system to the sceptical view of history as cultural diversity” (Hont, 1987: 259).

Hobbes (1588-1679) responded to Grotius with a reduction, rejecting sociability as the natural state of man. While Hobbes agreed that self-preservation “offered the only incontrovertible anthropological foundation for natural law” (Hont, 1987: 262), the sociability of Grotius was vulnerable. If universal love was natural, the plurality of nations and states, which was everywhere in evidence, would not exist. Hobbes rejected the natural teleology of sociability and held that “every *Voluntary* Action tends either to *Profit*, or
Pleasure” (Hobbes, quoted in Malcolm, 1991: 534). The foundation of natural law for Hobbes was self-preservation, and given this state of nature, government was an arrangement to minimize the war of all against all. His rejection of teleology was, therefore, a cleansing of moral philosophy of its theological and metaphysical roots:

The main Ciceronian and Thomist traditions of natural law saw self-preservation as the ground floor, so to speak, of a whole structure of human needs and values … In Hobbes’ argument, self-preservation is a sheer need which takes precedence over other needs (Malcolm, 1991: 539).

Let’s return to Pufendorf now, and see what he does with this. Pufendorf agreed that man shared the same basic need for self-preservation with the animals, but “lacked the corresponding ability”. The essential human condition was one of imbecillitas and indigentia – weakness and need – with desires which “did not cease when the instinct of self-preservation was minimally satisfied” (Hont, 1994: 66). The deconstruction of self-preservation in this way allowed sociability to be brought back in:

While a human being was helpless alone, what men had discovered was that they could be of use to each other in escaping from their indigence by joining their efforts. Once co-operation started men could not only satisfy their basic needs, but also perfect their life and then create new needs … The theory of society presented here was a theory of needs, Bedürfnisse, leading to a theory of civilisation and to the idea of a fully developed commercial society. (Hont, 1994: 67)

The accomplishment here is not obvious. For Hobbes, civil society emerges out of the natural state only with the institution of government. What Pufendorf does is establish civil society within the natural state itself, prior to government.

Legal institutions could be natural in two ways. First, there were certain institutions which could be regarded as necessary even for men living in a state of nature, before any kind of civil society had been established. Secondly, there were those conclusions of natural reason which men in certain kinds of society have thought fit to

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128 “From the time of Augustine Christian theologians had developed the doctrine of rationally ordered love, caritas ordinata, which prescribed that a man has a duty to himself as strong as his duty to his neighbour” (Stein, 1988a: 380).
establish for the better running of such societies. (Stein, 1988b: 398)

Thus, Pufendorf builds on Hobbesian self-preservation with a deeper diagnosis of the human condition, one that is more compatible with his Lutheran commitments, in order to transcend the Hobbesian account. The significance of this, for our purpose, is that, in doing so, Pufendorf separates civil society from the polis.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Pufendorf’s De Officio hominis et civis (On the Duty of Man and Citizen) was “the standard textbook of moral philosophy” in Scotland and other parts of Europe (Stein, 1988a: 381). Pufendorf’s text had been published in an English translation by Andrew Tooke at London in 1691 (and in four subsequent editions, the last in 1716), and in French translation by Jean Barbeyrac in 1707. The text was published in Scotland in Latin by Gerschom Carmichael (1672-1729) in 1718, together with notes and supplements. Carmichael was the first occupant of the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow – a chair subsequently held by Francis Hutcheson, a little later by Adam Smith, and then by Thomas Reid. Hutcheson commented that he considered the notes of Carmichael on Pufendorf to be “of more value than the text itself” (Moore and Silverthorne, 1983: 74). In short, Pufendorf was injected directly into the bloodstream of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Ferguson’s Spontaneous Order

I turn back now to the work of Adam Ferguson to compare several arguments in his conjectural history, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, to the work of Samuel Pufendorf, a century before. Ferguson (1723-1816) was born in Perthshire, on the boundary between the Scottish Highlands and Lowlands. He had knowledge of Gaelic, and a “keen awareness of the tension between the integrous community of the highland clans and the urban, polite, and commercial sensitivities of a modern age” (Oz-Salzberger, 2004).

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129 This text was an abridgement for students of his masterwork, De jure naturae et gentium (On the Law of Nature and Nations) (Saunders and Hunter, 2003: 218). John Locke declared the masterwork as “the best book of that kind” (Locke, quoted in Moore, 2014: 6).

130 Testa (2007: vii) suggests that Ferguson had “native-like control of the Gaelic sound system, indicating fluency from a young age”.
Ferguson was friends with William Robertson, Hugh Blair, and Alexander Carlyle, and had close associations with Adam Smith, and David Hume. Sometimes referred to as the “Scottish Cato”, his writings were read by Herder, Hamann, Novalis, Hegel, and Marx, and had a distinguished following through the early nineteenth century. Ferguson was appointed to the Chair in Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1764, and published his Essay three years later in 1767. It has proved to be his most durable work. Oz-Salzberger refers to him as “the last ‘neo-Roman’ of eighteenth-century Scottish thought” (Oz-Salzberger, 2003: 168), and, among Scottish Enlightenment figures, its “keenest promoter of the political discourse of civic humanism” (Oz-Salzberger, 1993: 61). While this is obviously true, Istvan Hont agreed with Oz-Salzberger that Ferguson’s humanism needs to be qualified: “Ferguson wasn’t simply the bard of the old Machiavellian song vis-à-vis the new line of Hume and Smith. He used the Machiavellian tradition selectively and his struggle with the implications of the new line took place inside the new discursive space itself” (Hont, n.d.). Oz-Salzberger puts it somewhat differently:

Yet, as the Scottish thinkers would readily admit, the modern senses of ‘politeness’ and ‘civilization’ had new power of their own … The traditional republican discourse had no answers for the new respectability of wealth and social refinement, which eighteenth-century Scots came to associate with the modern age. A choice had to be made: the civic values had to be radically adjusted to the new ethics of sociability, commerce and freedom under the law; or else new proof was required for their relevance to the modern state. David Hume, and more decisively Adam Smith, chose the first of these solutions. Adam Ferguson opted for the second … The Essay was a bid to reclaim the idea of civic virtue on behalf of the modern, commercial state … It conveys an attempt to come to grips with the ideas of the natural jurists, Montesquieu and Mandeville, and to shift their combined significance into a course different from the one taken by Hume and Smith. (Oz-Salzberger, 1995: xvi-xvii)

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131 See Nicolai’s (2011) doctoral dissertation and her discussion of the literature.
132 Denise Testa in her doctoral dissertation examines the influence of Gaelic culture on Ferguson, particularly its “vestigial shame-honour culture” (p. vii). She writes about the various forms of conflict common in Highland culture at that time, and suggests that “experiencing and witnessing these types of events may have been just as crucial and influential in the formation of Ferguson’s theory concerning conflict as those of the civic humanist tradition and classical antiquity” (Testa, 2007: 141-142).
Indeed, Ferguson’s position is already captured in the title he used, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*: the word ‘history’ refers to the methodology of conjectural history, the word ‘civil’ captures the civic humanism which he advocates, and the word ‘society’ underscores his commitment to a moral order distinct from the state.

Hobbes, I noted above, contrasted a rude state of nature riven by the war of all against all, in comparison with the *artifice* of the civilized state, where the state adjudicates right and enforces sociability. Pufendorf modified this by arguing that, given the *imbecillitas* and *indigentia* of mankind, self-preservation required more than self-interest, it required cooperation. The cooperation generated, nevertheless, is still a form of utility. Ferguson, on the other hand, advances a much broader conception of sociability. He takes up this question, in the very first chapter of the *Essay*, “Of the Question relating to the State of Nature”, and again in a later chapter, “Of the History of Arts”. Ferguson begins by naming the Hobbesian position with which he disagrees,133 and then advances his argument by showing that the arts have been present at all stages of rude and civilized society:

We have already observed, that art is natural to man; and that the skill he acquires after many ages of practice, is only the improvement of a talent he possessed at the first. Vitruvius finds the rudiments of architecture in the form of a Scythian cottage. The armourer may find the first productions of his calling in the sling and the bow; and the ship-wright of his in the canoe of the savage. Even the historian and the poet may find the original essays of the arts in the tale, and the song, which celebrate the wars, the loves, and the adventures of men in their rudest condition (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 161).

While broadening the conception of sociability beyond utility, Ferguson has done so in a way which maintains it as part of the natural

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133 “Among the writers who have attempted to distinguish, in the human character, its original qualities, and to point out the limits between nature and art, some have represented mankind in their first condition, as possessed of mere animal sensibility, without any exercise of the faculties that render them superior to the brutes ... Others have made the state of nature to consist in perpetual wars, kindled by competition for dominion and interest, where every individual had a separate quarrel with his kind, and where the presence of a fellow-creature was the signal of battle” (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 8).
world, concluding finally that all human behaviour is natural, and the distinction of his opponents is false:

Opposed to affectation, frowardness, or any other defect of the temper of character, the natural is an epithet of praise; but employed to specify a conduct which proceeds from the nature of man, can serve to distinguish nothing: for all the actions of men are equally the result of their nature (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 15).

With this discussion of human nature, Ferguson has established key elements of a foundation to push back against the naturalized moral philosophy of Hume and Smith.

Ferguson’s own naturalism supports a conception of spontaneous order, albeit one in which he aims to preserve morality from its naturalization. The understanding of spontaneous order and unintended consequences had already been established in Scottish discourse with Bernard Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees* in 1714. Mandeville had argued that the “self-interested actions of private individuals, bent on accumulating wealth, could amount to increasing comfort and liberty in the public sphere … [and justified] the replacement of political virtue with time-tested institutions” (Oz-Salzberger, 2003: 169-170). Ferguson rejected this account of self-interest by showing how different interests beyond utility are found across all societies. When he engages directly with Mandeville, though, Ferguson makes it clear that it is the moral character of human action that stands in opposition to Mandeville’s beehive, and grounds his objection to Hume and Smith:

Is man therefore, in respect to this object, to be classed with the mere brutes, and only to be distinguished by faculties that qualify him to multiply contrivances for the support and convenience of animal life … As actors or spectators, we are perpetually made to feel the difference of human conduct … Our sensibility on this subject … joined to the powers of deliberation and reason, it constitutes the basis of a moral nature (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 35-36).

Ferguson then deconstructs Mandeville’s position showing that he cannot escape his own strictures – hoisting Mandeville on his own petard:

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134 McDaniel (2013: Ch. 3) has a nice discussion of Ferguson’s position on this question.
It is pleasant to find men, who, in their speculations, deny the reality of moral distinctions, forget in detail the general positions they maintain, and give loose to ridicule, indignation, and scorn, as if any of these sentiments could have place, were the actions of men indifferent; and with acrimony\textsuperscript{135} pretend to detect the fraud by which moral restraints have been imposed, as if to censure a fraud were not already to take a part on the side of morality (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 36-37).\textsuperscript{136}

Despite a philosophical anthropology which puts the moral nature of mankind at the centre, however, Ferguson accepts the Mandevillian corollary of spontaneous order. Indeed, he is the author of one of its most famous formulations:

Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 119).

Scottish moral philosophy in this period largely resisted the account of will which the Lockean tradition promoted:

The Scottish science of man is particularly attuned to the non-deliberative aspects of human social life – to sympathy, to habit and to custom. This, as we will see, complements the awareness of unintended complexity and the downplaying of purposive action in the generation [of] social institutions (Smith, 2009: 12).

Ferguson accepted this common sense Scottish discourse on the ‘habit of society’. While mankind, he acknowledged, has dispositions for self-preservation, he also has powers of discernment, or reason, and a disposition to habit:

He enjoys his felicity likewise on certain fixed and determinate conditions; and either as an individual apart, or as a member of civil society, must take a particular course in order to reap the advantages

\textsuperscript{135} In the 1768 edition of the text, Ferguson changed “and with acrimony” to “or with acrimony” (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 267).
\textsuperscript{136} Oz-Salzberger notes that “the moral dimension of political society, where men cease to behave like bees, is set in blunt opposition to Mandeville’s bees (and all other ‘gregarious and political’ animals in Ferguson’s Principles of Moral and Political Science (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 176, fn 45). See Part I, Chap. 1, Sect. II, Of the Definition of Animals Associating and Political (Ferguson, [1792] 1975: 18-25).
of his nature. He is, withal, in a very high degree susceptible of habits; and can, by forbearance or exercise, so far weaken, confirm, or even diversify his talents, and his dispositions, as to appear, in a great measure, the arbiter of his own rank in nature, and the author of all the varieties which are exhibited in the actual history of his species (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 16-17).

Ferguson's recognition of the instinctive propensity to habit, and his rejection of what would now be called 'social constructivism', led him to endorse the theory of spontaneous order. Where he differs with Hume and Smith, however, is in rejecting its rationality. Drawing from his commitment to the virtue tradition of civic humanism, he maintains, in the first instance, that commerce is (we might now express it) ‘necessary but not sufficient’ for national felicity:

Wealth, commerce, extent of territory, and the knowledge of arts, are, when properly employed, the means of preservation, and the foundations of power. If they fail in part, the nation is weakened; if they were entirely with-held, the race would perish: their tendency is to maintain numbers of men, but not to constitute happiness. They will accordingly maintain the wretched, as well as the happy. They answer one purpose, but are not therefore sufficient for all; and are of little significance, when only employed to maintain a timid, dejected, and servile people (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 60).137

This failure of national felicity is not, in Ferguson’s view, a direct cause of the pursuit of commerce, but of the corruption of the political domain (Geuna, 2002: 185).138 As participation in political affairs is its own good, corruption is not just a consequence of a disorder within the polity – not just a result of such particulars as malfeasance or graft – but is also a failure of the constitution of the polity itself. “Ferguson pointed at the moral loopholes of a politics devoid of virtuous civic alertness and over-dependent on the – essentially apolitical – ideas of ‘unintended consequences’ in economic and social processes and perennial constitutions of either the ‘ancient’ or the philosophical brand. There are no self-regulating mechanisms in politics, Ferguson argued” (Oz-Salzberger 2003: 168).

137 Quoted in part by Geuna, 2002: 185.
138 “For Ferguson, economic expansion and the accompanying preoccupation with individual economic improvement can be both cause of the advance of the political arts and also responsible for their deterioration” (Varty, 2007: 42).
The history of England, and of every free country, abounds with the example of statutes enacted when the people or their representatives assembled, but never executed when the crown or the executive was left to itself. The most equitable laws on paper are consistent with the utmost despotism in administration. Even the form of trial by juries in England had its authority in law, while the proceedings of courts were arbitrary and oppressive … If even the safety of the person, and the tenure of property, which may be so well defined in the words of a statute, depend, for their preservation, on the vigour and jealousy of a free people, and on the degree of consideration which every order of the state maintains for itself; it is still more evident, that what we have called the political freedom, or the right of the individual to act in his station for himself and the public, cannot be made to rest on any other foundation (Ferguson, [1767] 1995: 160).

The question that remains open is whether Ferguson’s conception of spontaneous order, beyond the potential for political disorder which he recognized, is really compatible with his commitment to naturalization.

Theory of the Moral Sciences

Ferguson’s arguments did not carry the day. It was not a matter that his position did not get a hearing among the Scottish philosophers, but that he failed to convince his audience. Indeed, David Hume disliked Ferguson’s account (Raynor, [2009] 2016; Merolle, [2009] 2016), and this dislike seems to derive from the greater empiricism of Hume as against the greater historicism of Ferguson:

Hume is a man of the Enlightenment, Ferguson a precursor of Historicism and Romanticism … The Essay has much to say in the field of historical knowledge because it constitutes a comprehensive theory of historical change, on the basis of the concept of human nature, which remains similar and stable through the ages. By contrast, the Enlightenment, and Hume with it, could conceive the idea of progress, but not that of historical change. (Merolle, ([2009] 2016: 86-87)

In this section, I will explore this division by further probing the evolution of the concept of interest, which played, as I will argue, a
crucial role in the failure of Ferguson’s arguments for civil society, and established the foundation for an alternative in the moral sciences.

Johan Heilbron has suggested that there were two reasons that led to the concept of ‘interest’ assuming its intellectual prominence in early modern Europe: “first by suggesting a more realistic conceptualization of human nature and human action; and second, by providing a conceptual basis for new forms of political, social and economic theory” (Heilbron, 1998: 77). What will become clear is that the “more realistic” view of human nature is a replacement for an understanding of virtue as the telos and end of humankind. Given the dominance of the various virtue traditions at that time, it is not clear how the transition could have happened very easily. The language of “more realist” is a claim, not a fact, and only plausible because anachronistic. More emphasis will need to be placed, therefore, on Heilbron’s second reason, the desire for a ‘science of man’.

In the story which I have portrayed up until now, Scottish Enlightenment discourse has played the central role, although I have referred to Dutch, English and German debates. Indeed, I could have discussed the influences of Montesquieu and Rousseau on the Scottish discourse as well, but it still would not have altered the centrality of the Scottish position. However, on the question of the interests, the French discourse is the central one.

The re-conceptualization of interest arose in France during the seventeenth century out of the Jansenist anthropology. Jansenism was a pietistic movement within Catholicism, oriented toward Augustinian theology, and emphasizing the unredeemable depravity of mankind in the absence of God’s grace, without which “man was a prisoner of concupiscence and could only do evil” (Van Kley, 1987: 70). Jansenist theology rested on the Augustinian separation of the City of Man and

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139 For much of this section, I will follow Heilbron’s argument. Albert Hirschman (1977, 1986) has offered an important parallel account, complementary to Heilbron’s study.
140 Given the success of the new moral philosophy of commercial sociability, it is now the case that larger and larger swaths of late modern behaviour are explicitly understood as self-interested, but it is an historical question of what was the case in the eighteenth century. This chapter is not the place to examine this complex question. Suffice it to say that Heilbron makes no argument as to why he thinks it is “a more realistic conceptualization”.
141 One might begin by examining Hont (2015) for a comparative study of the thought of Rousseau and Smith, and see Sher (1994), Moore (2009), and Broadie (2012) on the influence of Montesquieu on the Scottish philosophers.

Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), Professor of Scriptural Interpretation at the Old University of Louvain, in what is now Belgium, published his masterwork, *Augustinus*, on the theology of St. Augustine in 1640, and it attracted many adherents, notably Blaise Pascal, Pierre Nicole, Antoine Arnaud, Jean Racine, and Pasquier Quesnel. The Old University of Louvain became a great centre of Jansenism as did the Abbey of Port-Royal-des-Champs, located near Paris. Established in 1204, the Abbey was reformed in the early seventeenth century by its abbess, Mother Marie Angelique Arnaud. In 1634, Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, a companion of Jansen, was appointed as spiritual director of the Abbey, and he promoted Jansenism in France, eventually acquiring a widening circle of friends within the nobility and at court. The Jansenists advocated “a simple and pious life, while opposing the laxist morality of the Jesuits” (Heilbron, 1998: 83). David Hume commented on the differences in the orientation of the Jansenists and Jesuits in terms of his analysis of superstition and enthusiasm, discussed earlier:

... the jesuits are great friends to superstition, rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and devoted to the authority of the priests, and to tradition. The jansenists are enthusiasts, and zealous promoters of the passionate devotion, and of inward life; little influenced by authority; and in a word, but half catholics. (Hume, quoted in Heilbron, 1998: 84)

This conflict between Jansenists and Jesuits became a kind of ‘trench warfare’, engaged in over many years throughout much of the Catholic world. It was a conflict which led to a succession of Papal condemnations of the Jansenist position, and eventually led to the expulsion of the Jesuits from each of France, Portugal, and Spain.143

However, before these events, in the first half of the sixteenth century, the Jansenists created an intellectual network of ‘co-travellers’ with major nodes at Louvain and Port-Royal. The Marquise de Sablé, for instance, lived next door to the Port-Royal Abbey, and hosted a prominent salon which was frequented by clerics, literary figures, and

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142 Pascal's piety shines such a strong light that he is really in a different category from the others. Kolakowski (1993) provides a starting place.
143 See Van Kley (1975) for a discussion of the Jesuit expulsion from France.
nobility, contributing to the “French Moralist” tradition\textsuperscript{144} by such authors as François de la Rochefoucauld, Abbé Nicolas d’Ailly, Madame de Lafayette, Pierre Nicole, Jacques Esprit, Blaise Pascal, and the Marquise herself.\textsuperscript{145}

The predominance of self-love and its consequences was one of the main themes in the exchanges between disillusioned nobles and Jansenist writers. Jansenists demonstrated that because even the noblest human acts were manifestations of self-love, there was no reason to credit human beings with any virtuous or noble motive. In this respect they followed the Augustinian psychology in which self-love and love of God were radically opposed. (Heilbron, 1998: 89)

The theological issue of self-love for the Jansenists turned on the question of concupiscence, or sensuous desire. Given that a Godly life – sanctified and made holy – is not available without help from God, a grace that is not in abundance given the pervasive sinfulness of mankind, how could one account for the degree of social order which is present?

Some Jansenists did so in terms of sin or ‘concupiscence’ itself. Now for the Jansenist, the essence of ‘concupiscence’ was the preferment of self or self-love to God. To explain order and civility in terms of concupiscence was therefore to explain it in terms of self-love which, however much an impediment to one’s salvation in the hereafter, became by the same token indispensable to the smooth running of the world here below. (Van Kley, 1987: 72)

Pierre Nicole, Jansenist theologian and key participant in the Port-Royal circle, became the foremost architect of this position, communicated in his widely read \textit{Essais de morale}. The Second Treatise of Volume 3 is entitled “Of Charity and Self-Love”, published about 1680, and is explicit about the role of concupiscence in promoting social order.\textsuperscript{146} Nicole indicates that “the name of self-
love is not sufficient to make us know its nature, being we may love our selves divers ways” (Nicole, 1680: 124). He goes on to suggest three bonds which temper naked self-love and promote social order: self-preservation (fear), material conveniences (interest), and the good estimation of others (esteem), of which the last is, if not “the strongest passion which springs from self-love, at least it is the most general” (p. 133). The inclination for the esteem of others is “so nice, and subtle, and at the same time of such a latitude, that there is nothing it cannot enter into, and it knows so well how to trim it self up with the appearances of Charity, that it is almost impossible to know exquisitely what distinguishes it from Charity … there is nothing in this, but what self-love imitates perfectly” (p. 135, 138). If this is so, then “this obscurity which impedes and hinders him from distinguishing clearly whether he acts by Charity, or by Self-love” (p. 172), means that it “should be very unfortunate to wander and stray out of the way whereto Charity and Self-interest equally inclines me, and to render my self, in forsaking them, equally odious to God and man” (p, 176).

Writing more succinctly in his *Pensées*, Blaise Pascal made the same argument. Pascal held that the Fall had left mankind with “inquiétude and irresoluteness”, and without God as the centre and “proper object for human longing” (Rahe, 2013: 130, 133), charity becomes self-love. Even in this fallen state, Pascal noted “the grandeur of man amidst concupiscence itself, in knowing how to derive from it such an admirable order and in having made of it an image of charity” (Pascal, quoted in Van Kley, 1987: 79).

From the point-of-view of moral philosophy, Nicole and the Jansenists made a strong and interesting response to Hobbes, one consistent with their pietistic Christianity. Indeed, there are some parallels with Pufendorf’s response to Hobbes. However, unlike Pufendorf’s cooperative self-interest, the austerity of the Jansensist theology, rooted in the unrelieved sinfulness of mankind, leads to an emphasis on the self-love which seeks the esteem of others, which parades self-interest as concern for others. Without the theological roots, however, how would the Jansenist psychology be picked up in Enlightenment thought?

did not see that – because of a providence that is benevolent, no matter how few souls are actually saved – self-love mimics the work of grace-given charity so perfectly that we are never in a position to say from which motive an action springs, not even an action of our own. But if selfishness is nearly the same as Christian love, in regard to observable behavior, then forms of government less authoritarian than Hobbes would allow can be sufficient to guarantee public order and civic decency” (Schneewind, 1990: 370).
The key link, at least for the Scottish Enlightenment, was Bernard Mandeville and his ‘succès de scandale’, *The Fable of the Bees*. Mandeville, was “not simply an eccentric who surfaced unaccountably” (Horne, 1978: 19), as he appears on first reading to someone in the present day. Mandeville (1670-1733) was born in Rotterdam in the Netherlands, studied philosophy and medicine at Leiden University, and moved to London in the early 1690s, where he practiced as a “specialist in the diseases of the nerves and the stomach, that is, as a psychiatrist, and continued to do so for the following thirty-seven years” (Hayek, 1966: 126). In 1705, he published a satirical poem, *The Grumbling Hive*, subsequently republished with a prose commentary in 1714 as *The Fable of the Bees, Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, expanding in successive editions until its sixth version in 1729 (with a seventh edition, the last while Mandeville was alive, published in 1732).

The fable aims to show how public benefit can be an outcome of private vice, and, spurred by his invocation of self-love, yielded “the twin ideas of evolution and of the spontaneous formation of an order” (Hayek, 1966: 126). Mandeville’s association with the ‘French Moralists’ was widely recognized, and his contemporaries “noted the importance of Bayle,148 while many also mentioned Esprit and La Rochefoucauld” (Horne, 1978: 19). As Horne notes, “Mandeville’s work clearly shows certain similarities with this kind of religious thought” (p. 22). Laurence Dickey argues that “Jansenism provided Mandeville – as early as 1705 – with sophisticated ideological tools

147 The first stanza of the poem gives something of the idea: “A Spacious Hive well stockt with Bees, That liv’d in Luxury and Ease; And yet as fam’d for Laws and Arms, As yielding large and early Swarms; Was counted the great Nursery Of Sciences and Industry. No Bees had better Government, More Fickleness, or less Content: They were not Slaves to Tyranny, Nor rul’d by wild Democracy; But Kings, that could not wrong, because Their Power was circumscrib’d by Laws” (Mandeville, [1732] 1988).

148 Rahe (2013: 135) reports that Mandeville was a student of Pierre Bayle, but Van Bunge (2008: 203) indicates that this has not yet been positively established. Goldsmith (2004) indicates that Mandeville was “likely to have heard” the two notable French Protestant exiles, Pierre Bayle and Pierre Jurieu. What is certain, though, is the considerable influence that Pierre Bayle, *le philosophe de Rotterdam*, had on Mandeville. Apart from textual analysis, we have it in Mandeville’s own words: “Those who are vers’d in books will soon discover, that I have made great use of Monsieur Baile without mentioning him” (Mandeville, quoted in Van Bunge, 2008: 203; and in Robertson, 2005: 262). Pierre Bayle was himself much influenced by the French Moralists, but “secularized what had been in Augustine, Pascal, and Nicole a religious argument, contending that *amour propre* is a ‘passion inseparable from our nature’” (Rahe, 2013: 135).
with which to fashion an egoistic psychology that did not require the
development of a Hobbesian political mechanism to sustain it”, and
used that psychology “to historicize the concept of self-love (amour-propre)” (Dickey, 1990: 387-388). What I think would be a better
construction here would be to talk about Mandeville using that
psychology to naturalize the concept of self-love. Pierre Nicole, as I
noted above, identified fear, interest, and esteem as social bonds.
Mandeville uses the same three bonds in his argument, but places
“interest at the end of the sequence” (p. 422).

In short, I am arguing that the big difference between seventeenth
and eighteenth century moral philosophy is the naturalization of
sociability. We have seen the naturalism already in the moral
philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, but it is being reinforced
also by the progress in the natural sciences and the emerging
philosophy of science which underpins it. “Although there were many
contributions in the seventeenth century, it was the philosophers of the
early to mid-eighteenth century, Giambattista Vico, Montesquieu,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hume, and Smith, who took pains to articulate
the sense in which the moral sciences were analogous to the natural
sciences” (Schabas, 2015: 3).

Roger Emerson has argued, rather strenuously, that more attention
in Enlightenment studies should be paid to the impact of the natural
sciences, the practical improvements that they engendered, and the
networks of patronage and support that they required. His “Science
and the Origins and Concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment”
(Emerson, 1988) describes the growing dominance of Newtonian
Science in the Scottish universities during the Enlightenment, and the
intricate pattern of faculty appointments which supported that. In his
1992 and 2008 studies, Emerson builds on his early works to detail the
elaborate system of patronage and appointments at the five Scottish
universities. He directly confronts the accounts of civic humanism and
natural jurisprudence which I have laid out earlier:

Scottish social and political thought in the eighteenth century is
usually seen as belonging to one of two traditions – to natural law
theory or to civic humanism. In either case there can be little
doubt that the enlightenment in Scotland put both views upon
an increasingly sophisticated empirical foundation which was
consciously related to the new science. (Emerson, 1988: 351)

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149 Of course, it has been disputed by two prominent scholars, John Robertson and
Richard Sher, both with articles in Wood (2000).
Moral philosophy could neither be separated from logic or from natural philosophy, nor developed separately as students of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Phillipson seem to believe. Scots who wished to become the Newtons of the moral sciences could and did borrow a method and an aim from the natural sciences along with the logic which seemed appropriate to them (Emerson, 1988: 349).

And what is of considerable interest with this last comment is that it was just this aspiration – “to be the Newton of the moral world” – which was found in Turnbull, Hutcheson, Kames, Hume, and Reid (Emerson, 1988: 364).

David Hume (1711-1776) is paradigmatic for the new ‘moral science’. Indeed, the full title of his first major work, *A Treatise of Human Nature: An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, published in several volumes during 1739 and 1740, announces his intent. In his ‘Introduction’, Hume explains that it should not surprise anyone that “the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century” (Hume, [1739-40] 1978: xvi), that is between Francis Bacon and “some late philosophers in England”, as there had been a similar interval of time between Thales and Socrates at the origins of the sciences in Ancient Greece. While he contends that “the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation” (p. xvi), Hume suggests there is one significant difference with the natural sciences, that “in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation” (p. xviii-xix), so that it is necessary to glean our knowledge “from a cautious observation of human life”. He concludes by expressing his ambition that “where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension” (p. xix).

Hume’s empirical commitment, then, is obvious, and recent scholarship is shedding more light on Hume’s knowledge of natural philosophy and the question of his ‘Newtonianism’ (Barfoot, 1990; McIntyre, 1994, Sapadin, 1997, Schliesser, 2007). Be that as it may, other scholars – Broadie (2007) and Wood (2003), for instance –

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150 Hume specifies Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutchinson, and Butler as being among those “late philosophers”. In the 1740 promotional abstract which Hume published, he also mentions Malebranche, Leibniz, and Descartes.
concur with Emerson about the significance of natural philosophy for the Scottish Enlightenment.

This is consistent with earlier scholarship as well. James McCosh’s *The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical*, published in 1875 while he was President of Princeton University, argued for a common methodological stance to the Scottish Enlightenment:

Successive generations of scholars have celebrated what McCosh perceived to be the signal methodological innovation of Hume, Reid, and the Scottish ‘school’, namely the application of the inductive method to the study of human nature. (Wood, 1989: 114)

We won’t spend any more time on the question at this general level. At this point in the argument, we can bring it to a close by establishing Hume’s link with Mandeville with a few comments.

Hayek saw Mandeville as providing “the foundations on which David Hume was able to build” (1966: 138). John Robertson agrees that “the general principles of [Hume’s] approach to the study of man were congruent with Mandeville’s” (Robertson, 2005: 291). This is so, particularly with regard to Mandeville’s naturalism, but Hume goes well beyond Mandeville in his moral philosophy. Hume criticized Mandeville’s account on two grounds: firstly, the range of virtues and vices is considerably broader than Mandeville allows with an analysis restricted just to social consequences; and, secondly, the social regulation accomplished through approbation and blame, regardless of how it was instituted, requires some natural sentiment for it to arise in the first place. Hume accepted Mandeville’s establishment of the foundations of sociability on interest, but argued that interest is not opposed to the passions, as it was for Mandeville, but grows out of them: approbation and blame are not means of securing interests, but rather “utility makes a direct contribution to the way we draw moral distinctions” (Robertson, 2005: 292). The ‘natural sentiment’ which Hume posits as the mechanism which converts interests into the moral codes of approbation and blame is *sympathy*:

But tho’ this system be erroneous, it may teach us, that moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interest of society, and that ‘tis our concern for that interest, which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently ‘tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage.
or loss. (Hume, [1739-40] 1975: III.3.1.11, with variant reading; quoted in Robertson, 2005: 292, without variant reading)

Hume’s essential criticism of Mandeville, therefore, was that his naturalism had not gone far enough: “Mandeville had missed the extent to which men had (and must have) developed moral sentiments compatible with human nature, and hence with the passions” (Robertson, 2005: 292). It was in this way that Hume founded the moral sciences. The foundation needed some further work to solidify a conception of material progress, something which finds its fullest flower in Adam Smith, but the hard work in naturalizing morality had been accomplished with Hume.

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The philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment played the central role at the beginning of the Sattelzeit – the transition from early modernity to modernity proper. The moral science which Hume baptized turned out to have been itself a stepping stone to the final elimination of any moral framework from the social sciences in the early twentieth century. The Scottish philosophers were not, for the most part, secular in intent, so much as seeking to re-establish moral philosophy on certain grounds, and those grounds needed to be naturalistic. Other Enlightenments made other contributions, many of them more enduring than the Scottish philosophy, which “had had its day by the mid-nineteenth century” (Graham, 2003: 340).

What characterizes the contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment is the troika of material progress, naturalized interests, and spontaneous order. I have tried to follow the several discourses which developed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to show the conjunction of the several traditions of civic humanism, natural jurisprudence, and philosophy of science, and how they overlapped and reinforced one another. The question that I raised was why Ferguson’s critique of spontaneous order and naturalized interest was not sufficient to alter the course of events. It is all too easy, and equally anachronistic, to see him as paddling against the stream. Clearly, Hume’s critique of the Mandevillian conception of interest is more cogent than the objections which Ferguson brings to bear, and Ferguson’s rhetoric does not have the same analytical power as Hume, but the question remains why Ferguson wasn’t more influential.
There is the suggestion that the strands of civic humanism and his upholding of warrior culture were seen as old-fashioned and out-of-step with the emerging commercial society. This criticism, however, has already assumed the outcome, rather than explained it. What made the difference, in the narrative I have outlined, was the powerful foundational work in the philosophy of science. The movement toward a naturalized epistemology, and the conveniences it brought, carried the day against the virtue ethic of Ferguson.

The Renaissance translation of *koinonia politike* as *civilis societas* made the political order – what became the state – the centre-piece of the moral order. With the naturalization of the spontaneous order of society and the grounding of the interests of *amour propre*, the state was no longer at the centre. The moral order had been re-founded on an autonomous sociality.

It seems clear from the dictionaries, then, that a critical shift in the meaning of *société* occurs at the end of the seventeenth century. The earlier, voluntaristic associations of the term with partnership, companiability, and civility do not disappear; but they are joined by a more general meaning of society as the basic form of collective human existence, at once natural to human beings and instituted by them, a corollary of human needs and a human response to those needs ... to a notion of society as an autonomous ground of human existence. (Baker, 1994: 108, 119)

None of the Scottish philosophers, including Adam Ferguson, outlined a systematic philosophy of civil society. That had to wait for Hegel. However, the building blocks are clear. Civil society would now be understood as *commercial sociability*.

In the next chapter, I outline the long development of a theoretical critique of commercial sociability through the nineteenth century, focussing on the development of German historical economics to its final achievement as Weberian *Sozialökonomik*. The achievement was finally accomplished by overcoming the naturalization of moral philosophy with an historicized epistemology.

The links between Scottish economic philosophy and Antigonish were, given the ethnic background of immigrants to Eastern Nova Scotia, more direct than those links with the democratic populism of French political philosophy. More importantly, though, the direct and pressing problems of Antigonish society were not fundamentally those
of an overbearing state, but those related to commercial society. As a result, it was the great economic resistance of the nineteenth century that attracted the attention of the Antigonish leaders. It is to this development that we now turn.
The Scottish model of commercial society and its effect on legal and organizational practices was very influential in the Anglo-American world, but also diffused rapidly throughout Western Europe. Bound together with the mechanical technology which developed in parallel space, this imaginary unleashed a complex path-dependent process of industrialization. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the negative effects of these developments became increasingly apparent in the exploitation of workers, the monopoly power of corporate firms, urban alienation, rural poverty, and a widespread sense of moral decline. In this chapter, we will trace the intellectual resistance to the theory of commercial society as it developed in German economics.

The name which was adopted for the intellectual and institutional failure of commercial society to take account of its own negative consequences was called the ‘social question’, a term perhaps most widely used in Germany (Fischer, 1966: 65-67). Hans von Scheel, then a Professor for Economics, Finance and Statistics at the University of Bern, described it thus in his *Die Theorie der sozialen Frage* (1871):

Every contradiction, as soon as it becomes conscious, becomes a thought problem: a question. And in this way the formulation of the social question of the present time reveals itself to us very simply and specifically: it is the contradiction between national economic development and the societal development principle –

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151 It is worth noting that von Scheel authored an article, “Die politische ökonomie als Wissenschaft” for Gustav von Schönberg’s *Handbuch der Politischen Ökonomie*. Schönberg’s *Handbuch* was the target for replacement by Max Weber’s *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*. Von Scheel joined the Imperial Statistical Office in Berlin in 1877, where he authored the major work, *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jahrhunderts*, published in 1900, as part of the continuing debate (Tooze, 2001: 40-43). He was a member of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, along with Gustav von Schmoller, Lujo Bretano, Adolph Wagner, and Gustav von Schönberg.
which appears to us as an ideal — of freedom and equality. The study and solution of this contradiction is the study and solution of the contemporary social question (von Scheel, quoted in Case, 2016: 759).

Before examining the response of the St. F.X. intellectuals to the Antigonish social question, we need to develop some understanding of the intellectual response which developed in Europe during the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, social thought had coalesced into something which H. Stuart Hughes, in a memorable passage, has referred to as an “intellectual revolution”:

There are certain periods of history in which a number of advanced thinkers, usually working independently one of another, have proposed views on human conduct so different from those commonly accepted at the time – and yet so manifestly interrelated — that together they seem to constitute an intellectual revolution. The decade of the 1890s was one of such periods. In this decade and the one immediately succeeding it, the basic assumptions of eighteenth and nineteenth-century social thought underwent a critical review from which there emerged the new assumptions characteristic of our own time (Hughes, [1958] 2002: 33).

In terms of economic thought, this revolution saw the emergence of a full-fledged ‘social economics’ under the leadership of Max Weber. This development was the result of a long incubation over many years, most importantly in Germany. While there were popular movements and economic policy initiatives present in each of Great Britain, France, and Italy, the core theoretical work was done in Germany. This chapter is aimed at outlining that development.

152 From this point-of-view, Marxian thought belongs to the developmental period when the critique of commercial society was just emerging, a critique which did not mature until the end of the century. Marxism, as a social movement, was something else altogether. Keith Tribe succinctly makes the distinction: “The elevation of Marx into the leading ‘theorist of socialism’ was largely the work of Friedrich Engels in a number of publications, a campaign that only intensified after Marx’s death in 1883, with the publication in 1884 of Engels’ Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, plus the first independent publication of Marx’s Wage Labour and Capital … [together with] the first German translation of Marx’s 1847 critique of Proudhon, Misère de la philosophie … Marx’s writings also became available in the same fashion to a broader readership that included historians and economists; the reception of Marx's work thus ran in parallel to, rather than prompted, existing German work on the economic history of development” (Tribe, 2014: 722).
German Political Economy

By the early eighteenth century, political governance by the sovereign, it was widely held, revolved around “an excellent army and well-fed subjects” (J. P. von Ludewig citing Cyrus; quoted in Tribe, 1995: 8). With the establishment of a Chair in Public Policy and Economics at the University of Halle in 1727, the German sciences of administration — the Polizei- and Kameralkwissenschaften — were institutionalized on just such an understanding. German intellectual society, however, developed in critical opposition to the mechanical philosophy of English and French society, a reaction grounded in a critical philosophy of history and aesthetic development.

The early historicism of Johan Gottfried Herder, Justus Möser, Johann Martin Chladenius, Johann Georg Hamann, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and its counterpart in a constitutive view of language (Beiser, 2011; Taylor, 2016) pushed back against the rationalism and empiricism of the Anglo-French tradition. Georg Iggers (1968: 34-35) suggests that this early historicism rested on two concepts basic to Herder’s position, “which remain fundamental to the entire affirmative tradition of German historicism”:

The first of these concepts involves the idea of individuality. Herder, in contrast to natural law philosophy assumes that all values and all cognitions are historic and individual … The second central concept of Herder’s philosophy of history was that history was a benevolent process … the historicist position denied that there was any unilinear advance in history or that history developed according

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153 Adam Smith’s statement about the three ‘duties of the sovereign’ — “protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies”, “establishing an exact administration of justice”, and “erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals” (Smith, 1976: Book V, Chapter I, Part I, II, III, pp. 689, 708-709, 723) — although more precise and circumscribed, was considerably later. The question of comparability between the two statements revolves around the scope of Smith’s conception of ‘publick Works’ and ‘publick Institutions’. Smith goes on to indicate that “after the publick institutions and publick works necessary for the defence of the society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the society; and those for promoting the instruction of the people” (p. 723). Even, therefore, if Smith’s specification was drawn from the earlier maxim, he goes considerably beyond it.
to a scheme ... History is the source of real value (Iggers, 1968: 35-36).

“What distinguished the German tradition of history”, therefore, Iggers suggests, “was its emphasis upon the uniqueness and irrationality of values transmitted by history” (p. 33). ‘Irrationality’ is used here to mean that it is not possible to rationally ground values, not that history is meaningless or lacking in value. Herder, for instance, believed that “Providence carried along the thread of development” (Herder, [1774] 2004: 11). The emphasis on individuality supported a Humanitätsideal, stressing the self-formation of the whole individual, both rational and irrational elements, and rejecting comfort or happiness as the end of action.

However, as Iggers argues, events shifted the historical consciousness of German intellectual society. The declension of the French Revolution, and the subsequent Napoleonic occupation of Germany “strengthened national feeling, and in the public mind identified Enlightenment values with a hated French culture” (Iggers, 1968: 40). As Humboldt wrote, the French “lacked the striving for the divine” (Humboldt, quoted in Iggers, 1968: 41). The rejection of universal Enlightenment values and the need for a common military defence contributed to the development of a nationalist conception of historical purpose: “a third idea, absent in earlier historicism, now occupies a central place in historicist doctrine: the concept of the primacy of the state in the nation and in society” (Iggers, 1968: 43).

Under these influences, the early administrative sciences were progressively reorganized as the Staatswissenschaften of the nineteenth century:

The canon of the Staatswissenschaften, as defined by August Ludwig v. Schlozer in 1804, included, in addition to state law and administration, the ‘historical’ disciplines of statistics (which he defined as ‘how states really are’) and political history (or ‘how states came to be what they really are’). During the early nineteenth century, as the more narrowly technical subjects within the cameral sciences gravitated to separate institutes, the remaining ones came to be grouped with the sciences of state (Lindenfeld, 2002: 58-59).

By the mid-nineteenth century, there was an increasing symbiosis between the state and the German research university. The intellectual relations of the seminar, which united research and teaching, provided a well-defined route to employment within the
German civil service, and contributed to the pre-eminence of the German university for foreign students in the second half of the nineteenth century. What we would now understand as the cross-disciplinary character of these studies had a particular effect on academic publications: in this system, the focus of publication was on the textbook, and innovations in theory were made there.

This institutionalization of the Staatswissenschaften led to particularly strong relations between law, history, and economics. Building on the early economic contributions of Karl Heinrich Rau and Friedrich von Hermann, Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) is commonly credited as being the father of German historical economics. His own cross-fertilization with history and law was supported by his studies with the historians Dahlmann, Gervinus and Ranke, and the jurists, Friedrich Savigny and Karl Eichhorn. Indeed, Roscher “proposed in 1843 to achieve for economics what the method of Friedrich Savigny and Karl Eichhorn had done for jurisprudence” (Lindenfeld, 1993: 406):

[Roscher] not only integrated the economic and political theories of this tradition but also developed a specific historicist research programme for economics and thereby became the founding father of the German historical school of economics (Milford, 1992: 164).

German historical economics is of interest as classical British political economy had run into a dead-end with Ricardo and Mill with their labour theory of value, and the situation in France was not any better. In the early nineteenth century, however, German historical economics had started building a way past this dead-end, a path decisively advanced in the last decades by the marginal theory of Carl Menger, and brought to full fruition in the historical social science of Max Weber. Menger, an Austrian theorist, is significant as one of the progenitors of the marginal revolution in economics. His Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics), completed as the basis of his Habilitation dissertation and published in 1871, made a compelling case for the theory of marginal value as the basis for a ‘new economics’. While both Jevons and Walras developed their own formulations of marginal theory, it was the Austrian version with took the economics world by storm, with a dominant influence right through the 1920s.

Knut Wicksell, writing in 1893, comments on the stalemate that had developed within classical economics:
At the end of the last century and at the beginning, or during the first third, of the present century the theory of political economy underwent a rapid development – especially in England, at the hands of Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. This seemed to promise that one day this branch of knowledge would be raised to the same level as the exact sciences ... However, apart from the work of Stanley Jevons ... no general law ... has been laid down by any of their followers ... J. S. Mill’s famous work, Principle of Political Economy, although already nearly fifty years old, can still – or at least until quite recently – be regarded as embracing the whole of classical economic knowledge in England. The same is true of France, whose economic literature during the present century, doubtless includes many eminent thinkers, but few original thinkers. (Wicksell, [1893] 1954: 29).154

In his later obituary review of Carl Menger’s contribution, Wicksell spells out the significance of the breakthrough that marginal theory constituted:

The passing of Carl Menger constitutes the departure of the last of the three well-known economists (the others were Jevons and Walras) who, in the 1870s through the concept of marginal utility – or more generally the principle of scarcity or marginality – gave theoretical economics the upsurge on which it continues to thrive … [E]conomists [had begun] to despair of theory and increasingly turned to historical studies. The new doctrine therefore was like a bolt from the blue (Wicksell, [1921] 2011: 464).

Wicksell is reflecting a consensus view in 1921 on the success of the ‘Marginal Revolution’ of the last quarter of the nineteenth century in overcoming the labour theory of value. That view is still dominant today.155

154 It should be noted that Wicksell extended his assessment of theoretical immobility to Germany as well. I attempt to show in the following, though, that this was not the case for Germany, but that Menger built upon a considerable tradition.
155 This is true regardless of how the contribution of classical economics is assessed. Following Piero Sraffa’s analysis, Kurz and Salvadori argue that “the Classical economists and Marx were unable to develop a coherent, logically unassailable theory of value and distribution, because the analytical tools at their disposal were not up to the complexity of their highly sophisticated and empirically rich concepts: production conceived of as a circular flow generating a surplus product, where inputs are advanced at the beginning of the production period and consist of heterogeneous commodities. The mismatch between tools and concepts landed these authors in an impasse, with which they tried to cope as best as they could. The result of this impasse was the labour theory of value” (Kurz and Salvadori, 2015: 52; see also
Alfred Marshall, the great English economist at that time, made a different assessment, though. While rejecting the criticism of Jevons about “the mazy and preposterous assumptions of the Ricardian School” (Jevons, 1888: xliii), Marshall acknowledged that while the Classicals “were possessed of a fairly well developed theory of production and thus supply”, they “lacked an equally developed theory of demand” (Kurz and Salvadori, 2015: 50). However, Marshall’s principal complaint about the Classicals was not directed so much to their understanding of supply and demand – something which Streissler emphasizes was “already fully understood in the mercantilist period and thereafter was not new” (Streissler, 2002: 138) – as it was to their abistorical conception of economic law:

For the sake of simplicity of argument, Ricardo and his followers often spoke as though they regarded man as a constant quantity, and they never gave themselves enough trouble to study his variations … They therefore attributed to the forces of supply and demand a much more mechanical and regular action than is to be found in real life; and they laid down laws with regard to profits and wages that did not really hold even for England in their own time (Marshall, 1920: 762-763; quoted in part in Hutchison, 1978: 235).

It was for these reasons, developed, at least in part, through his own study of German political economy156 and his travels on the Continent, that Marshall celebrated the German achievement: “the most important economic work that has been done on the Continent in recent times is that of Germany … It would be difficult to overrate the value of the work which they and their fellow-workers in other countries have done in tracing and explaining the history of economic habits and institutions” (Marshall, 1920: 767-768; quoted in part in Hutchison, 1978: 235). In fact, German political economy had become the focus of theoretical innovation and advance in economics throughout the entire middle years of the nineteenth century. “Seen internationally, in the two middle quarters of the nineteenth century economics theory was most advanced in German universities” (Streissler, 2015: 153).

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156 “Marshall learned his supply and demand analysis from Roscher (a close follower of Rau) in the 1860s, i.e. before the Austrians ever entered the stage” (Streissler, 2015: 155).
What characterized the German historical economics of the mid-nineteenth century then? Wilhelm Hennis, using it as a foil for his portrayal of Max Weber, provides a useful analytical description:

Weber is only comprehensible on the basis of the polemical posture of Nationalökonomie with respect to Western theory, which constituted the object of its scientific endeavour in the so-called basic economic concepts (goods, value, property, wealth, economy, etc.) ... Nationalökonomie sought to free itself of this tyranny, and it did so by conceiving of ‘the economy’ as the outcome of man’s ‘economic activity’ under real historical conditions and subject also to the ‘heteronomy of ends’. The real aim of the Historical School was to place empirical man at the centre of economic reflection – while recognizing the methodological utility of ‘constructed’ man (Hennis, 1987: 42).

Expressed in a different way than Hennis, we can say that German historical economics was concerned with promoting an historical, subjective, and ethical economics.

Its Historical Character

Susan Schultz has noted that “the intellectuals in the tradition of the German Historical Schools of Law, Economics and ‘Volkerpsychologie’ regarded the predominant conception of natural philosophy in France during the eighteenth century to have been mechanistic, with matter viewed as basically inert, and receiving motion from external forces, mechanical in nature” (Schultz, 1985: 12). The fumblings of eighteenth century stage theory toward a conception of progress were equally dismissed as inadequate to the inner spiritual nature of ‘mankind’ and the organic and constitutive nature of the relationships among individuals. The German economists maintained that society was not a spontaneous order caused by the mechanical connections of atomic individuals, but an organic entity uniting its members in a collective endeavour. In terms of economics, the classical search for economic laws valid for all times and places was seen as incompatible with a science of reality.

Friedrich List (1789-1846), well-known for his National System and ‘infant industries’ protection, was not a theoretical economist so much as, what we would now call, a policy analyst, one with a rather flamboyant journalistic flair. “The fact remains”, Tribe notes, “that his work was taken seriously in the 1840s by major German
economists like Rau and Hildebrand and the continued attention that his work has drawn far exceeds that of any other nineteenth-century economist” (Tribe, 1988: 19). List’s general criticism of the classical system was that in the aim for general and universal laws, the ‘political’ had been eliminated from ‘political economy’: “they had become cosmopolitical economists, expounding an economics of spurious generality and limited utility” (p. 18).

His contention was that economic welfare was a function of simultaneous performance in three orders – the order of the individual, the order of the nation, and the order of humanity\textsuperscript{157} – and that Smithian economics, in its advocacy of free trade, considered only the orders of the individual and humanity. The theoretical foundation for this criticism concerned the “different endowments of national entities” (p. 35) and the resulting system of industrial complementarities which provided the opportunities which the individual faced. The nation, which had a necessary interest in the welfare of its citizens, could not, therefore, be indifferent to the structure and organization of its own economy.

“German economics of this time was, in general, indifferent to the questions of distribution and production that one encounters in contemporary English and French writing. What interested List (and Rau and Roscher and all the rest of these ‘forgotten economists’) was the nature of economic order and the various forms that it might assume (Tribe, 1988: 35).

The early concern of List with the national economic order slowly pivoted in the discourse of the following decades to a deeper concern with the social economy. In his 1883 textbook revision, Karl Knies distinguishes economics and political economics by denying that the discipline is “a simply technical branch of knowledge” (Tribe, 2010: 70):

It should not be concerned with a mere doctrine of economy (bloß\emme Wirtschafts-Lehre), but with political economy … Rather should be understood by political economy the sense used previously, as descriptive of the phenomena of social economy, a meaning which could gain wide acceptance; the entire first part of political economy should be solely concerned with the investigation of the economic life of man in society (das gesellschaftliche

\textsuperscript{157} The ‘order of humanity’ might be rendered today as ‘catallaxy’, a term that Friedrich Hayek has helped make current.
Wirtschaftsleben des Menschen), as manifested in its autonomy from all political influence. It is enough for us here to recognize that the expression ‘political economy’ also implies ‘social economy’ (Knies, quoted in Tribe, 2010: 70).

An interest in national economic formation remained true even for Max Weber, who engaged this matter in his 1895 Freiburg Address, “The National State and Economic Policy”, given as his Inaugural Lecture in the Chair in Economics and Finance at the University of Freiburg. In his opening remarks, Weber indicated that, following a discussion of his case study of migrant farm-workers in West-Prussia, he would “add some reflections on the situation of states which rest on national foundations – as ours does – in the framework of a consideration of economic policy” (Weber, [1895] 1994: 2). Weber goes on to use the address to excoriate the mistaken ethical position which he finds within German ‘Practical Economics’ (Aldenhoff-Hubinger, 2004), but this doesn’t take anything away from his own historical commitments. While he rejects the organicist and ethical conceptions of German historical economics, “what Weber could have taken from Knies was instead the idea that economic actions were socially constituted” (Tribe, 2010: 80).

Its Subjective Character

In the political economics of the nineteenth century, ‘subjective economics’ concerned the analysis of demand, as against the ‘objective economics’ of supply. It is not an unrestrained subjectivity, however. Hermann argued that the self-interest of the individual was restrained by Gemeinsinn, or communal spirit, something subsequently taken up by Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies (Betz, 1995). Indeed, “the program of the German Historical School fit well with the Hegelian emphasis on the reigning Volksgeist. Rather than a reine Wirtschaftswissenschaft, a pure science of economics, economics was

158 Gemeinsinn is also sometimes translated as “sense of community” or “public spirit”, but these translations do not adequately capture the extent to which “economic phenomena were seen as entangled in an organic whole, a Volksleben” (De Sousa, 2010: 224).

159 Hildebrand was sensitive to the implications, suggesting that “all economic laws based on self-interest … would be rendered invalid once the presence of Gemeinsinn is stipulated as a restraining force” (Betz, 1995: fn 9; citing Hildebrand). This is just the obstacle which Menger sought to overcome.
conceptualized as a *Volkswirtschaftslehre*, the economy of a people” (de Sousa, 2010, citing Koslowski).

The history of the German historical school’s engagement with ‘subjective economics’ was taken up in a very influential article by Erich Streissler (1990), who examined the influence of German historical economics on the work of Menger and Marshall. Since then, Streissler has extended this study with other research, and stimulated work by several other scholars, the most important of which, for our purposes, has been John Chipman (2005, 2014).

Karl Heinrich Rau (1792-1870), according to Streissler, played the key role in establishing the foundations for early German political economy, giving it the standard three-part division into economic theory, policy, and finance. Running to eight editions between 1826 and 1869, his theory textbook laid out a unified theory of price using demand and supply analysis. Rau built on Adam Smith, and “probably owes quite a bit to J. B. Say” (Streissler, 2001: 318), defining economizing from the point of view of the consumer:

The much more subjective nature of Rau’s treatment relative to the classicists is already seen in the definition of the economic principle in the introduction, which is ‘the desire to satisfy wants with the least effort’ (Streissler, 2001: 318).

Rau goes on to argue that price depends on value, costs, and the extent of competition, where value is “determined by the greatest sacrifice which we decide to make in order to obtain it” (Rau, quoted in Streissler, 2001: 319), foreshadowing the concept of opportunity cost which Friedrich Wieser developed within the Austrian paradigm. Rau applied the same price theory to the factors of production as well, indicating that labour value is determined “by the purposes for which the labourer is used” (Rau, quoted in Streissler, 2001: 319-320), that is, by the marginal output which is produced.

Rau’s formulation, however, was incomplete, with a falling demand curve, but not yet a rising supply curve. This solution was provided in the work of Friedrich Benedikt Wilhelm Hermann (1795-1868), “who developed the rising supply curve as a general proposition” (Streissler, 2001: 320), arguing as follows:

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If different persons have the command, some over cheaper, some over more expensive methods of production, then the price will have to rise to the level of the cost of those commodities which are produced under the least advantageous circumstances that have to be used in order to satisfy demand" (Hermann, quoted in Streissler, 2001: 320).

Price is the result, therefore, of a rising cost curve meeting demand on a falling curve. Rau takes this insight from Hermann, and in the fourth edition of his textbook presents the famous scissors diagram which became famous only much later with Alfred Marshall.161

In the story of German historical political economy, Rau and Hermann constitute the ‘pre-history’ to what Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) then constituted with his declaration of historical intent. Highly versed in the history of economic thought, Roscher was “the main German-language textbook author of economics in the second half of the nineteenth century”, with his Foundations of National Economics running to 26 editions (Streissler, 2005: 642).

Along with Bruno Hildebrand and Karl Knies, Roscher was referred to as a member of the ‘Older Historical School’.162 As distinct from the microeconomic work of Rau and Hermann who preceded him, Roscher “can be considered the first macroeconomist of the group, in particular relation to marginal productivity theory, but also in other respects” (Streissler, 2001: 316):

As a price theoretician he is more interested in processes of development over time; and in social theory he is rich in incentive arguments on the one hand, and arguments using imperfect information on the other ... Roscher basically thought in terms of what some might call a substitutive macroeconomic production function, both with and without technical progress ... For Roscher

161 Unlike Cournot, Rau’s diagram had price on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal axis, the same configuration which Marshall used. This configuration presented a problem for Walrasian equilibrium analysis where competition was a state, and price was the independent variable, but not for historical analysis where competition was a process of rivalry and quantity what was varied.

162 This was in contrast to those who were considered to constitute the Younger Historical School, including such scholars as Gustav von Schneller, Karl Bücher, Adolph Wagner, Lujo Brentano, and Gustav von Schönberg. Max Weber, himself, identified as a member of the Younger German Historical School (Weber, [1895] 1989: 200), although the translation of Weber’s self-identification in the Lassman and Speirs edition is not as unambiguous in its meaning: Weber, [1895] 1994: 19).
the whole of history is a vast process of substitution of the classical factors of production: development starts out with an abundance of ‘nature’, then labour increases and substitutes for nature, then capital, which substitutes for both of the other factors ... His full grasp of marginal productivity consequences is what counted for later development (Streissler, 2001: 324-325).

John Chipman (2014), as noted, has extended Streissler’s discussion with a magisterial analysis of the work on utility theory by some twenty German economists in the nineteenth-century, together with an English translation of their key material. He reports that his “conclusion is that the major figure in all this development was Karl Heinrich Rau, whose treatise ... had an extraordinary influence” (2005: 157). He goes on to characterize the subsequent take-up of Rau’s demand and supply analysis and, by 1847, “a clear statement of the principle of diminishing marginal utility” (p. 158), by noting that “Rau’s principal followers were the three founders of the older historical school (Hildebrand, Knies, and Roscher)” (p. 158). Chipman summarizes his analysis of the German historical school of economics in this way:

Thus Rau (1847) and the three founding members of the older historical school, Hildebrand (1848), Knies (1855), and Roscher (1857), developed – although the latter three under Hildebrand’s special assumptions concerning consumer preferences – the essential ideas of the marginal revolution later associated with the names of Gossen (1854), Menger (1871), and Jevons (1871) (Chipman, 2005: 205).

**Its Ethical Character**

German political economy was shaped by the tradition of Bildung or self-formation that had developed. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Wilhelm von Humboldt “made a crucial contribution to the development and canonization of the German conception of self-formation or self-cultivation (Bildung)” (Sorkin, 1983: 55). It was a conception built on a richer understanding of human nature than the self-interested man, one in which individual activity is the means to the realization of human potentialities: “man’s highest purpose – the one prescribed by eternal immutable reason, not by changing inclinations (was) the highest and most proportioned development of his resources into one whole” (von Humboldt, quoted in Hörcher, 2015: 79).
Hörcher suggests that this conception of the unfolding of potentialities was part of a conceptual tension within Christianity – “the fact that although humans are always already in the possession of the image of God within themselves, yet they need to strive to realize this likeness” (Hörcher, 2015: 69). It was a conception made more salient with the German ‘discovery’ of history.

Humboldt identified two conditions for fulfillment of this species-concept: “one essential condition for such activity is freedom: one must be assured of the freedom to act for oneself, that is, to be self-reliant; a second essential condition is ‘social intercourse’: one develops through the voluntary interchange of one’s individuality with that of others. Self-formation, in other words, requires social bonds” (Sorkin, 1983: 58). He rejected, therefore, the classical liberal conception of the first condition as standing alone, but believed that “the education of the individual requires his incorporation into society and involves his links with society at large” (Humboldt, quoted in Alias, 2016: 27).

Humboldt studied at the University of Göttingen where he became friends with August Wilhelm Schlegel, George Forster, and Friedrich Jacobi, and subsequently established “life-long personal and intellectual ties with the poets Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller” (Mueller-Vollmer and Messling, 2016: 7). His philosophical writings during these early years gave him a reputation, and from 1803 to 1808, he served with distinction as the Prussian envoy to the Vatican, returning to Germany to take a position as Head of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education. “In the short period from 1809 to 1810 he was able to institute a radical reform of the entire Prussian educational system from elementary to secondary school to the University which was based on the principle of free and universal education” (p. 12). This reform institutionalized his conception of self-formation and self-cultivation as the foundation of German educational philosophy.

This reform, the aim of Bildung as the perfection of character, and its conception of the human being as imago Dei, made the economic argument for universal self-interest seem ludicrous. The demand for a richer conception of human interests – an ethical foundation – was common to all members of the Historical School.

Karl Knies, “the methodologist of the Historical School” (Yagi, 2005: 314), has perhaps the greatest claim to theorizing the ethical character of German political economy. Indeed, he was considered by Gustav Schmoller, founder and early chairman of the Verein für
Socialpolitik, to be “the theoretical founder of modern historical-ethical German economics” (Schmoller, quoted in Betz, 1995: 90):

Knies especially inveighed against the defective psychology of those economists who based their entire deductive system upon the operation of one compelling motive, that of ‘desire for wealth,’ ‘hope of gain,’ or self-interest. Like the other historical economists, he demanded that the whole complex of motives and interests, varying among themselves in intensity at different occasions and times should always be taken into account by the investigator of any form of human behavior … Always weighting heavily the social or aggregative tendency in men, the historical economists refused to eliminate the ethical element (Gay, 1941: 10).

Knies received some attention for his three-volume treatise on Money and Credit (1873-1879), but it was his methodological work, Political Economy from the Historical Standpoint (1853; 1883) which stood as his main work. After a few years at Freiburg, he accepted a position as Professor of Economics at the University of Heidelberg where he taught for over thirty years. Heidelberg, Germany’s oldest university, was, in the late nineteenth century, “one of the centers where young promising economics students gathered … J. B. Clark visited Heidelberg in 1874, Eugen Bohm-Bawerk and Friedrich Wieser in 1876, R. T. Ely in 1878 and N. Kanai in 1887” (Yagi, 2005: 315).163

Knies advanced a position in which economics was “concerned with a perceptible ‘outer-world’ of phenomena conditioned by ‘inner-worldly’ causation and therefore not entirely accessible through the methods of natural-scientific research” (Kobayashi, 2001: 55-56). Historical investigation was required where the objects of investigation included “the socio-political structure of national economy, the purposeful human activities, and their societal outcomes as well as the motivational forces giving rise to these phenomena of the external world” (Betz, 1995: 91). Knies recognized the explanatory role of both external and internal factors, therefore, but considered them to be accessible to historical investigation. He went beyond the programmatic calls of Roscher and Hildebrand to outline “a rather full-fledged research programme” (p. 95):

163 In the years before the First World War, the attraction of Heidelberg had, if anything, increased – “students flocked from all over the world to Heidelberg, the unofficial intellectual capital of Germany” (Karadi, 1987: 499, citing Karl Jaspers), stimulated, no doubt, in part by the Weber Circle which existed there.
Since the judgement, consciousness and imagination of man’s inner world are variable and capable of development, attempts at causal explanations of economic behaviour require that appropriate scientific attention be given to psychological and ethnographic-historical investigations (Betz, 1995: 92).

Knies went on to elaborate this program of investigation in some considerable detail.

The methodological implication of Knies position on “the distinction between the permanence of natural factors and the variability of those associated with the human mind” (p. 92) is a critique and abandonment of universal social law. The thrust of Knies position was to introduce contextuality, although it is ultimately restricted to the national level:

First in natural science it is postulated that the same cause produces the same phenomenon, a conception that is also of great significance to real processes. But in a national economy, which has the task of surveying historical phenomena, one cannot expect that the same phenomenon will really recur, because spiritual-personal factors as causes of economic phenomena do not have the constant character observed in material things (Kobayashi, 2001: 58, citing Knies, 1883).

The ability to conduct social analysis, however, is maintained with the ordering of socio-political life – contextuality doesn’t go all the way down. Knies “had in mind a ‘national man’, whose behaviour is determined by the Volksgeist (‘spirit of the nation’)” (Krabbe, 1995: 165):164

However, there are constant factors in all human life and activity. Through them individuals are connected to the common whole, i.e. they belong to mankind. These factors also appear in community life (Gemeinschaftsleben, i.e., socio-politically ordered life, and so they are to be discerned in the economic activity of man (Kobayashi, 2001: 58, citing Knies, 1883).

164 “[A] nation is something more than an accidental aggregate of individuals. Its historical existence includes various living circles through which the same spirit is blowing, enclosing all individuality in a unifying frame, whereby this whole develops into a coherent movement” (Knies, quoted in Krabbe, 1995: 165).
This leads Knies to argue for the method of analogy as the basis for a science of (historical) political economy:

If we are to compare the conditions and processes of national economies in various countries and periods, we have to deal with a law in due course, the law of phenomena that considers both similarity and difference. In this case we obtain only a law of analogy, not a universal law of causality ... Analogous phenomena are defined as those that show coincidence up to a certain point, but beyond it present differences from each other. This coincidence gives substantial proof that both phenomena belong to the same genus. The difference is described as a consequence of their own specific conditions (Kobayashi, 2001: 59, citing Knies, 1883).

What Knies has done in this sequence of arguments is to build a case for political economy as a moral science. The resulting character of economic life, varying thus between nations, provides the "relative justification per se of different economic institutions and different economic policy measures" (Knies, quoted in Betz, 1995: 94; original emphasis).

Closer to home, Max Weber himself studied with Karl Knies during his first three semesters at Heidelberg. During his first semester, Weber couldn't stand "the extremely dry economics lectures by the veteran professor Knies" (Weber, [1926] 1975: 65). By the third semester, however, Weber was greatly impressed:

Now that I have gained a few basic economic concepts through studying Adam Smith and others, Knies makes a quite different impression on me than he did a year ago, when in mid-semester I went once and found it dreadfully dreary. Only he speaks too fast, one has the greatest difficulty in taking notes from what he says, for his lecturing is even more fluent than that of Kuno Fischer. It is only his voice – it always seems troubled by the world, as if he regretted all the facts that he introduces – that weaken the impact of his extremely intelligent and creative disquisitions (Weber, Letter to his father, 1883; quoted in Hennis, 1987: 40)

Hennis argues for "the overwhelming importance of Knies in Weber's socioeconomic education" (p. 41), that "Weber received from Knies, leading proponent of the 'Historical School' as he was, his first instruction in the material of Nationalökonomie and was provided with the perspective of the School, a perspective that Weber never renounced" (fn 79). Indeed, Weber succeeded Knies in the Chair of Economics at Heidelberg in 1897, and began teaching within the same course structure. We find some takeup of Knies, then, in Weber, not
least with the blazing intensity with which Weber engaged with ethical concerns, shown already in his ‘Report on German Agricultural Workers’ in 1894:

We do not want ... to shape the conditions of life in a way that makes people feel good, but such that, under the pressure of the unavoidable struggle for life, the best in them, the physical and psychological qualities that we want to save for our nation, will be preserved (Weber, quoted in Aldenhoff-Hübinger, 2004: 143).

Knies and Weber share that much anyway. Yet, by 1906, Weber had published a three-part monograph on “theory construction and systematization in the social sciences” (Shils, quoted in Oakes, 1975: 4) which critiqued both Roscher and Knies. In order to understand where Weber separated himself from Knies and the German Historical School, it is necessary to discuss the work of Carl Menger and the development of the Austrian tradition.

The Mengerian Turn

Carl Menger’s fame rests upon his development of marginal utility theory with his 1871 textbook, *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (published in English in 1950 as *Principles of Economics*), and his subsequent 1883 methodological treatise, *Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere* (published in English in 1963, reprinted with a more faithful title in 1985 as *Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics*). Knut Wicksell in his memorial following Menger’s death, comments on the significance of the *Grundsätze*:

His fame rests on this work and it is due to it that his name will be known to posterity, for it should be safe to claim that since Ricardo’s *Principles* no book – not even excepting Jevons’ ingenious, but all to aphoristic work, and Walras’ work that is regrettably too difficult to read165 – has had such great influence on the development of economic theory as Menger’s *Grundsätze* (Wicksell, [1921] 2011: 469).

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165 Hayek translates this last phrase from the Swedish as “Walras’ unfortunately difficult work”, which seems more apt given Wicksell’s mathematical competence than the translation of this particular phrasing by Per Bylund (Hayek, 1934: 403).
Wicksell also comments on Menger’s *Investigations*, though, and indicates that it “suffers from tiring opacity”. Indeed, he suggests that Menger’s methodological works “constituted a loss of energy, which to some extent pulled him from actual field of work” (p. 469). Wicksell’s view that Menger’s significance is located in his contribution to the marginal utility theory, has been dominant in the literature.

In recent years, though, significant ‘archaeological’ efforts in Mengerian scholarship have started to reverse that view, such that it is Menger’s methodological work that is the more significant, and his contribution to marginal utility theory is really an *expression* of more fundamental philosophical determinations. Following his publication of *Investigations* in 1883, Menger made three further methodological contributions: *Die Irrthümer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie* (1884), *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1887), and *Grundzüge einer Klassifikation der Wirtschaftswissenschaften* (1889). In 1923, his son, Karl Menger, posthumously published a second edition of his *Grundsätze*, which Menger had been working on for years. This edition constitutes a reform of Menger’s position on several key methodological issues — what Becchio (2014a: 262) refers to as “the more complex methodological approach of the Menger of the second edition”.

Kiichiro Yagi, one of the few scholars who has studied the Menger archives at both Hitotsubashi and Duke University, argues that there was a progressive methodological reflection by Menger beginning soon after 1871, at least in part, stimulated by the criticism he received on his *Grundsätze*, such that “the posthumous edition of the *Grundsätze* incorporating Menger’s reflections is like a geometrical stratification, ranging across many years” (2010: 21). Yagi goes on to summarize the result:


Evidently, the interpretation of the *Methodenstreit* between Menger and Schmoller as a confrontation in economic theory between an emerging Austrian School of marginalist economics and an antiquated

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166 The *Grundzüge* has been translated and is referenced here as Menger ([1889] 1994).
German school of historical economics, is not adequate. In this section, I want to describe the initial position and subsequent development of Menger’s methodological understanding.

Menger begins his 1871 textbook, the *Grundsätze*, with a discussion about the inadequacies of economic science as compared to the great progresses of the natural sciences, and his own goal to seek a resolution through a foundational inquiry into the principles of economics:

The impartial observer can have no doubt about the reason our generation pays general and enthusiastic tribute to progress in the field of the natural sciences, while economic science receives little attention and its value is seriously questioned by the very men in society to whom it should provide a guide for practical action … The cause of such remarkable indifference must not be sought elsewhere than in the present state of our science itself, in the sterility of all past endeavors to find its empirical foundations … To aim at the discovery of the fundamentals of our science is to devote one’s abilities to the solution of a problem that is directly related to human welfare, to serve a public interest of the highest importance, and to enter a path where even error is not entirely without merit … This is the ground on which I stand (Menger, [1871] 1950: 45-46).

Karl Milford (1990, 1992, 1995, 2010, 2012) in a series of articles over the last twenty-five years, has argued that in developing a solution for this “problem situation”, Menger was led to reconstitute the methodological foundation of German economics: “the *Methodenstreit* is the outcome of different solutions of genuine philosophical and methodological problems” (Milford, 1995: 26).

Before proceeding, it will be helpful to minimally identify what those philosophical and methodological problems are. The conventional way that they are categorized is to distinguish between methodological positions about the logic of inquiry, and ontological positions about the ‘furniture’ of the world, typically

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167 In his essay, *Historical Ontology*, Ian Hacking suggested, “if, like myself, you can understand the aims of psychology, cosmology, and theology, but are hard pressed to explain what a study of being in general would be, you can hardly welcome talk of ontology” (2002: 1). He goes on to discuss ontology in terms of his ‘dynamic nominalism’: “the genealogy to be unravelled is how we, as people in civilizations with histories, have become moral agents, through constituting ourselves as moral agents in quite specific, local, historical ways” (2002: 3).
subdivided in social philosophy between various forms of ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ ontologies, and then to locate particular scholars or propositions within that matrix. These concepts, when juxtaposed, then yield a matrix cross-related between the different methodological and ontological positions about the individual and society, although there are grounds to think that some of the philosophical positions are more coherent than others.

Milford (2010: 163) uses a variation of this matrix in a very interesting way to compare individualist and collectivist stances with subjectivist and objectivist theories of value, and he allocates Menger, Roscher, Smith and Marx into the various cells (as shown in Figure B below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological positions</th>
<th>Theories of evaluating behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Carl Menger (1871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>Wilhelm Roscher (1842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adam Smith (1776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karl Marx (1867)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Milford (2010)

In my discussion above about German historical economics, I outlined the intellectual history of German subjective value theory, a base upon which Carl Menger built his own position. Milford agrees with that history – indeed has contributed to it himself with Streissler (Streissler and Milford, 1993-1994) – and uses it in this matrix to forcefully identify the antagonism between German historical economics and, on the one hand, Anglo-French classical economics, and, on the other, Marxist economics. With that separation made, Milford argues that the crucial move made by Menger is a methodological move from collectivism to individualism.

168 Collina (2016: 26) uses such a matrix, for instance, in her analysis of Menger’s methodological position.
This is a compelling account, but the weakness, from my perspective, is that it doesn’t allow us to see how Max Weber goes beyond Menger, it doesn’t provide for the evolution of Menger’s own philosophy of science over the course of his life, it provides little guidance on the range of possible methodological positions and their utility as explanatory strategies, and it narrows the determining ontological issues.

The critical shift which Milford is pointing to in Menger is the move from an historical economics studying social phenomena to a marginal economics studying individual phenomena, something which he – and many others – refer to as ‘methodological individualism’. In his *Grundsätze*, Menger explicitly writes that the prime problem he intends to solve is to develop a unified price theory, “[...] a price theory based upon reality and placing all [price] phenomena (including interest, wages, ground rent, etc.) together under one unified principle” (Menger ([1871] 1950: 49). “His solution to the problem,” Milford indicates, “consists of two components: a theory of subjective evaluations (subjective value theory) and the position of methodological individualism” (Milford, 2010: 155).

However, just before the passage which Milford quotes, Menger defines what he understands economic theory to be – that is, he defines the basis of a solution for his goal of developing a unified price theory:

For economic theory is concerned, not with practical rules for economic activity, but with the conditions under which men engage in provident activity directed to the satisfaction of their needs. Economic theory is related to the practical activities of economizing men … (Menger, [1871] 1950: 48).

Menger’s translator introduces a footnote at this point which addresses the term ‘economizing men’:

The terms ‘wirtschaftender Mensch,’ ‘wirtschaftendes Individuum,’ and ‘wirtschaftende Person’ occur continually throughout the work. The adjective ‘wirtschaftend’ does not refer to the properties or motives of individuals but to the activity in which they are engaged. More specifically, it does not refer to ‘the profit motive’ or to ‘the pursuit of self-interest,’ but to the act of economizing (Menger, [1871] 1950: 48).

What I want to suggest is that the more important move which Menger makes is not the move to the individual-in-himself –
something which I consider to belong to social ontology – but the move to the economizing individual. It is *economizing action* that is the core element, not the individual, and it is this which allows for some shift in Menger's position over time.

In order to understand Menger's innovation, therefore, we need a model which probes more deeply into the 'subjective value' position of German historical economics, but which has a better resolved conception of the distinction between methodology as the logic of investigation and social ontology. Let’s look at these elements in a revised schematic in Figure C below:

![Figure C - Early Menger Revised](image)

Working within this model, Menger's concept of “economizing men” has been *constituted* as an «individual» with actions which can be *investigated* in terms of their «rationality». And the rootedness of Roscher and the Historical School in organicist theories of society and an historical logic of investigation should be clear from my previous discussion of that school.

Menger's assertion about “economizing men” as the central concern of economic theory incorporates *in nuce* three claims about the nature of economic theory:

- *economic scarcity* – Menger distinguishes economic goods from non-economic goods on the basis of scarcity (Menger, [1871] 1950: 94-106), building on earlier work by the German historical school; scarcity is the prerequisite for economizing activity;
• **human need** – “Our well-being at any given time, to the extent that it depends upon the satisfaction of our needs, is assured if we have at our disposal the goods required for their direct satisfaction” (Menger, [1871] 1950: 56);\\(^{169}\)

• **direct causation** – “If, therefore, one passes from a state of need to a state in which the need is satisfied, sufficient causes for this change must exist ... If, however, we both recognize this causal connection, and have the power actually to direct the useful things to the satisfaction of our needs, we call them goods” (Menger, [1871] 1950: 52).

Menger’s *Grundsätze* received four academic reviews, of which Menger took one – a review by Friedrich Hack in 1872\\(^{170}\) – as important and legitimate criticism.\\(^{171}\) In his review, Hack advanced criticism both about human needs and about direct causation, leaving Menger’s purely economic argument about scarcity intact:

For example, we do not think that the so-called causal relation between needs and goods is of the nature of cause and result, but of the nature of ends and means. Also, we do not think that the well-known dispute whether the laws of economic behaviors are compatible with the free will is solved by the remark that economic theory is concerned, not with practical rules for economic activity, but with the conditions under which men engage in provident activity directed to the satisfaction of their needs (Hack, quoted and translated by Yagi, 1997: 238).

Hack’s criticism is attacking the direct relation which Menger posited between economic goods and human needs on two fronts. On the first front, the criticism undermines the status of needs as a primitive;

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\\(^{169}\) In a later comment, Menger relates human needs to drives, but the connection is wholly unmediated such that needs are understood by him as a primitive: “Needs arise from our drives and the drives are imbedded in our nature. An imperfect satisfaction of needs leads to the stunting of our nature. Failure to satisfy them brings about our destruction. But to satisfy our needs is to live and prosper” (Menger, [1871] 1950: 77).

\\(^{170}\) Hack was then Professor of Economics at Tübingen, later Mayor of Stuttgart.

\\(^{171}\) Menger had several special copies of his book printed with blank pages inserted. With an intent to revise and expand his initial work, he made detailed notes and editing changes in these copies, two of which are available in the Duke archive, and one of which is available in the Hitotsubashi archive. “In the author copy of the *Grundsätze* in the Carl Menger Library (the Hitotsubashi Copy) Menger clearly approved both points raised by Hack” (Yagi, 1997: 238).
needs are not confronted directly with goods, but are mediated by a conception of the aim of the economic action. On the second front, Menger’s causal relation between goods and needs shows no indication of the distinction between physical and mental relations; the mental means-ends relation is not analogous to the physical cause-effect relation.

Yagi restates this problem with the early Mengerian position in a different way: “the weakness of the methodological view of 1871 can be found in the lack of distinction [between] real economic actions and the so-called ‘ideal type’ of actions requested for the construction of the law in theory” (Yagi, 1997: 240). Before turning to Weber’s innovation, though, let’s follow the path of Menger’s later intellectual development.

Menger had written his 1871 Grundsätze as the first installment of a larger work that would have four parts. Yagi indicates that while there is no evidence that Menger ever progressed with that large ambition, he did start to make some revisions to his first edition, trying to address particularly the criticism of Hack which he accepted. Yagi indicates that “the second stage of the attempt at revision seems to have occurred in the mid-1880s, after the pause in the Debate on Method (Methodenstreit) enabled Menger to return to theoretical investigation” (Yagi, 2010: 26).

Menger resigned his Vienna professorship in 1903, at the age of 63, and devoted the last twenty years of his life to the continuing work on his revised edition. At his death in 1921, he left “a considerable number of notes and manuscripts” and a library of some 20,000 volumes, “one of the best collections of economic literature in the world” (Yagi, 2010: 21), subsequently acquired by Hitotsubashi University in Japan, now housing the ‘Carl Menger Library’. While he was not able to complete his revision before his death, his son, Karl Menger, using the manuscripts and notes of his father, published a second edition of the Grundätze in 1923. What is significant is the break with some of Menger’s earlier positions, something that incorporated and built upon the original criticism of the 1872 book review by Hack.

One of the ways which Menger responded to Hack was by radicalizing his subjectivism. Yagi claims that this deepening was a direct response to the Hack criticism of causality: “Menger realized his subjectivist position by receiving Hack’s criticism on ‘causal relations’ and consciously deepened his subjectivism further over time”
(Yagi, 2016: para 3). He did so, critically, by subjectivizing human needs:

In the second edition, Menger (1923: 1) defined a human need in a new way, as ‘the starting point of any economic inquiry,’ and he reformulated the first prerequisite of an economic good as follows: no longer simply ‘a human need’ but ‘the perception or anticipation of a human need’ (Becchio, 2014a: 248).

Menger accomplishes this by arguing for a disjunction between our ideas about needs and needs-in-themselves. On the one hand, we experience ill-thought out demands that have no authentic connection to human needs:

The practical economic life of human actors is not guided by the wants but by the temporary opinions on the necessaries for the maintenance of their life and welfare. Indeed, it is seldom determined directly by their emotions and drives (Menger, 1923: 4; quoted in Yagi, 2010: 36).

On the other hand, in a mature state of need identification, Menger acknowledges that “the moment of direct feeling retreats more and more” in the face of the “recognition of our wants”. The process of reflection on our wants – itself the result of growing wisdom and self-awareness, one might suggest – breaks the determinate connection between feelings and wants: “it becomes successively towards a rational want that is grounded by experience, forecast, and judgement” (Menger, 1923: 4-5; quoted in Yagi, 2010: 35). Yagi comments that “Menger’s reflection on economic theory has now reached the depth of subjective rationality (economic man)” (Yagi, 2010: 35).

But, Yagi notes, this turn to deeper subjectivity “contains indeterminateness and allows room for the working of institutions” (Yagi, 2016: para 4). Menger opened this up in the second edition by positing a new economic agent, the ‘human association’:

“Given that there is a need perceived by an agent, the nature of the human economy can be fully understood only when there is a complete definition of any possible economic agent.” On developing this specific point, Menger introduced the existence of a new economic agent: ‘the human association’. Human associations were “societies, associations, corporations, communities, and the state, of the national or global economy” (Gesellschaften, Genossenschaften, Korporationen, Gemeinden, Staat, Volks- und Welthwirtschaft) (quoting Menger, 1923: 7, Becchio, 2014a: 249).
In light of current debates in the philosophy of the social sciences, the question that arises for us concerns the exact status of these associations: were they, for instance, aggregations, joint action, or emergent orders. Menger elaborates on his view of human association by discussing an expanded theory of needs, where he elaborates on common needs, collective needs, and the needs of human associations. Menger’s derivation of a distinct institutional order is evident in the following passage:

The ‘needs of human associations’ [are] common needs shared by individuals who are voluntarily linked in a particular association able to provide common goods required by the members of that association. As soon as they arise, they are no longer the sum of single individuals, and they cease to be merely means to satisfy common needs: they acquire their own needs, and social goods are required to satisfy them (Menger, 1923; quoted in Becchio, 2014b: 56)

What we see, therefore, in Menger’s second edition is a gentle relaxation of his youthful stridency, a reconstruction of key elements of his theory to incorporate the criticism by Hack, and a modest evolution out of the individualist ontology with which he started. As interesting as is Menger’s slowing deepening understanding of the human experience, in the next section, I will discuss how many years before Max Weber had already gone well beyond what Menger was still struggling with in his final years, and it is to this that we now turn.

The *Sozialökonomik* Synthesis

Weber, as is well-known, seized an opportunity in the 1890s to relocate from law to economics, and, while able to utilize his economic studies with Karl Knies at Heidelberg and the various Berlin economists, it is clear that Weber had to invest heavily in familiarizing himself with contemporary economics as preparation for his lectures, first at Freiburg from 1894, then at Heidelberg from 1897, where he gave lectures in general and theoretical economics, finance, applied economics, history of economics, agrarian policy and the labour question (Aldenhoff-Hübinger, 2009: 192).

In this study, Weber was greatly influenced in his conception of theoretical economics by the work of Menger. His early lecture notes show that he was both knowledgeable about Austrian work and
thought the theoretical core, if not the methodological stance, was sound:

The publication of Max Weber’s early lecture notes on economic theory as Volume III/1 of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (MWG) reveals for the first time how much his teaching in Freiburg and Heidelberg from 1894 to 1898 was influenced by the ‘modern economics’ of Carl Menger and his students, Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen Böhm-Bawerk (Tribe, 2012: 282).

Moreover, this assessment is not just evident now in light of the close critical analysis of archival documents, but was obvious to students and faculty at the time as well, as can be seen from the remarks of a student, writing in 1898 about Weber’s lectures in Heidelberg:

… the mentioned professor Weber, who might be known to you from the national-social party, was invited in the last term from Freiberg to occupy the chair of Knies, the primus of the Historical School. Fairly great expectation was set on him by some groups for the young power he had concealed in gray. What kind of spirit this child kept was shown from the first lecture. After saying some radical words he presented himself out of the chrysalis now as the fighter of the Austrian school who wished to import the system of Böhm-Bawerk and Menger to Germany … (Der Sozialistische Student, quoted in Yagi, 1997: 250).

The great respect for Menger’s accomplishment held by Weber, however, was tempered by the more profound ‘methodological’ achievement which Weber accomplished, allowing him to go well beyond Menger’s early methodological struggle. The methodological distance from Menger shows up most directly in Weber’s (1904) famous essay on Objectivity, where he discusses ideal-types:

There is not then the shadow of a doubt that Weber had the greatest respect for Menger’s achievement, nor that Weber’s construction of the ideal type build directly upon the conceptual architecture of ‘abstract theory’ … Nevertheless, that capacity of rendering the ‘cultural meaning’ of ‘cultural problems’ into the terms of a science founded upon ‘objectivity’ — this quality that makes Weber’s ‘methodology’ so stimulating — is completely beyond Menger’s cognizance (Hennis 1991: 31).

Guy Oakes argues that Weber’s first and longest methodological paper — his three-part essay on Roscher and Knies — outlines his solution to the Methodenstreit, and in doing so, I would add, establishes a
platform on which he can then go beyond Menger in his subsequent essay on objectivity and the ideal-type. “It would not be an exaggeration to describe these solutions and the arguments Weber uses to support them as the foundation of Weber’s metatheoretical work” (Oakes, 1975: 37-38). For my purpose, I want to relate Weber’s methodological effort to the criticisms which Hack raised for Menger about human needs and social causation and indicate for each the solution which Weber adopts.

**Question of Human Needs**

As early as 1895, Weber had already identified the theme of ‘value freedom’ in his Freiburg Inaugural Address, foreshadowing his later extended critique of the ethical economics of the historical school, and the fierce claims he was to make for the unrelenting conflict of ultimate values which he advanced throughout his life:172

[N]ot only has the notion sprung up in the minds of the rising generation that the work of national economics has greatly extended our understanding (‘Erkenntnis’) of the nature of human communities, but they also believe that there exists a completely new criterion by which these phenomena can ultimately be evaluated. They think that political economy is able to derive ideals of its ‘own’ from its subject matter. The notion that there are such things as independent economic or ‘socio-political ideals shows itself clearly to be an optical illusion (Weber, [1895] 1994: 18).

As Wilhelm Hennis has argued, this statement is not an early sketch of a methodological position, but rather was part of “a solitary struggle for the rescue of the genuine problems, the decisively substantial questions, and against the overestimation of methodology” (Hennis,

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172 Weber’s ([1917] 2012) most mature expression of his stance on *Wertfreiheit* is found in his 1917 essay, “The Meaning of Value Freedom in the Sociological and Economic Sciences”, an expanded version of his prepared statement of 1913 to the Verein, itself an elaboration of his position in the controversial debate which had erupted at the Vienna Conference of the Verein in 1909, a debate, it should be noted, in which Weber had been one of the principals.
The motivating issue about value-freedom can be seen already in Weber's early East Prussian agrarian research of the 1890s.

Weber's early training in law, “heavily biased to the historical development of its respective Roman, German and communal origins” (Whimster, 2001: 54), dictated the topics of his 1889 Dissertation on medieval trading companies, published that year as the first of only two books during his lifetime, *The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages* (Weber, [1889] 2003), and, two years later, of his 1891 *Habilitation*, titled *Roman Agrarian History* (Weber [1891] 2008). From there, Weber turned to “practical science … guided by judgements of relevance to practical values” (Scaff, 1984: 88). With some fifty publications during the 1890s, the core of which concerned agricultural policy, Weber “developed a public reputation as an agricultural expert and policy adviser” (Whimster, 2001: 54-55).

In 1890, the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* commissioned a national survey into “The Conditions of Farm Workers in Germany”. Weber accepted an assignment to analyse and report on the survey of landowners in the East Elbian region of Germany. Working under great pressure, he prepared 77 general reports and 573 special reports, with data for each administrative district, all completed in time for the September, 1892 conference, published as one of four volumes of the enquiry:

The results of this 891-page investigation became a leitmotiv through Weber’s work, making the knowledge of the results undeniably important for a comprehensive understanding of his work. Neither his inaugural lecture in Freiburg in 1895, nor his lecture on the occasion of the World Exhibition in St Louis in 1904175 can be understood without a knowledge of the inquiries (Käsler, 1988: 53).

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173 Cf. John Gunnell’s (2007: 59-60) comment: “It is now widely recognized that Weber was quite explicit about the fact that he became involved in epistemological and methodological issues by necessity rather than choice and that many of his arguments, about such matters as factual and evaluative statements, were part of a rhetorical strategy designed to clarify and defend his research”.

174 “As it turned out, the meeting planned for September 1892 was postponed, in part because of a cholera epidemic, but also in part because of a poor attendance. The meeting was instead held in March 1893 in Berlin” (Tribe [1983] 1989: 98).

175 See the translation of the St. Louis lecture by Peter Ghosh ([1904] 2005a), together with his commentary on it (2005b).
The intellectual background to Weber's analysis is located in the changing economic conditions of agriculture in Germany, the impact of migrant agricultural workers, and the related implications for state security:

From 1865 to 1879 Germany had had a free-trade policy in grain with the full support of the landowners. By the early seventies protectionist sentiment increased as American and Russian grain exports mounted and falling prices on the world market had an adverse effect on the sale of German grain. In 1879 tariffs were imposed for the first time, and they were increased in 1885 and 1887 (Bendix, 1960: 37).

The shift in trade policy was part of a larger and more radical shift in Bismark's domestic policy in 1879 toward the political ‘right’, including the ‘anti-socialist laws’ which outlawed the Social Democratic party. During his year of military service in Strasbourg in 1883, Weber developed a close attachment to Hermann Baumgarten, his uncle on his mother’s side, and ended up falling in love, for the first time, with his cousin, Emmy. Baumgarten, a Professor of History at Strasbourg, “belonged to that small minority of German liberals who had preserved the spirit of 1848 (the year which saw an unsuccessful democratic revolution)” (Käsl, 1988: 53). During the 1880s, Baumgarten became Weber's “political and intellectual mentor and confidant” (p. 53), sharing a political analysis which helped shape Weber's early outlook:

Baumgarten was important for Weber as a skilful critic of the growing complacency and confusion within liberalism's ranks in the 1880s and as a remarkably prescient (and isolated) analyst of the crippling effects of Bismark’s ‘caesarist demagogy’ (Scaff, 1984: 86).

What Baumgarten argued for, and Weber agreed with, was a recognition of the political revanchement of 1877-78 as a turning point in German politics, with a decisive move to the ‘right’. For Weber, “all of the conditions for political paralysis, bureaucratic domination, and ‘feudalization’ of the social order were present in 1878” (Scaff, 1984: 86). It is just this analysis which Weber advances in his study of migrant labour in the East Elbian Region, an analysis he then disseminated in the most public way with his Freiburg Inaugural Lecture:

Weber was highly conscious of the change brought about in his thinking, and he used the Freiburg inaugural address (1895) partly
as a device for summarizing that change and identifying the new orientation (Scaff, 1984: 87).

Indeed, the study of migrant labour represented the first of Weber’s policy-oriented studies on the ‘social question’, a theme which he later defined in his 1904 ‘Objectivity’ essay as “one of the main tasks” of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik for which he had just become an editor:

Up to now, our journal has already advisedly limited its tasks … In this connection, the journal has not limited itself to the practical and developmental problems known as the ‘social question’ (in the narrowest sense of the term), that is, the relationship of the modern class of wage earners to the existing social order. Nevertheless, one of the main tasks of the journal from its outset had to be the scientific exploration of precisely this particular question [against the background of] the widening interest that it commanded in Germany in the 1880s (Weber, [1904] 2012: 110).176

Let’s turn now to the analysis itself which Weber outlines in his Freiburg address. What was known before the study was that there were large numbers of Polish agricultural workers entering the East Elbe region of Germany, and it was seen as undermining German labour and represented something of a security risk on the eastern border. Weber’s study, therefore, was aimed at learning more about the circumstances which led to that migration and the kind of policy options which were available.

Using a dataset which had limited scope, Weber was able to combine data on the quality of arable land (and its tax yield), land holding patterns, and ethnic nationality (via religious affiliation as a proxy), and tie it to a theoretical framework of considerable power. He uses this data to map the transformation of agrarian society from a patrimonial ‘estate’ economy to capitalist agricultural production, and attributes this to changes in law facilitating economic

176 In the more mature formulation of 1904, Weber goes on to indicate that the continuing investigations of the social question in the previous years had made it necessary to adopt a “more universal context in which these problems belong”, and named it as “the scientific investigation of the general cultural significance and importance of the social-economic structure of human communities, and of their historical forms of organization” (Weber, [1904] 2012: 110). There is, therefore, a single intellectual trajectory for Weber from the social questions of the 1880s, to his work on the East Elbian migrant workers, to his redefinition of the editorial policy of the Archiv.
rationalization, competitive market pressures, and the adoption of bourgeois standards of life (Riesebrodt, [1986] 1989: 141). Given these several economic pressures, Weber concludes, the Junker estate holders in the East Elbe region had recruited Polish migrant workers to whom they could play lower wages in order to maintain their existing economic privileges, with the natural result of ‘forcing’ the German farm workers off the land.

What Weber accomplished with this analysis is identifying the conflicting values that are in play: the values of the large land-owners, who gained political leverage in 1878, acquiring both tariff protection for their agricultural products and open borders for their recruitment of migratory labour; in contrast with the German peasants trying to eke out a living and running from “the prospect of toiling away on someone else’s land” (Weber [1895] 1994: 8) in a deteriorating economy. But what, Weber asks, can the science of political economy contribute to a resolution.

Policy debate within the Verein was being conducted around the question of productivity – “indeed the grain productivity on the East Elbian estates” – and Weber “became aware of the problems of acting in a situation of conflicting values precisely through this problem of productivity” (Hennis, 1994: 117). The debate, as Weber later framed it, was between the broad goal of human development and the narrow goal of economic productivity:

People on the traditional farms have asked: ‘How do I go about feeding as many heads as possible in a given area through their work?’ On a capitalist farm one asks (and this is its characteristic concept [Begriffsmerkmal], what can I do to achieve a maximum of goods available for the market in a given area with a maximum saving of unnecessary work?’” (Weber, 1904, quoted in Hennis, 1994: 117-118).

Hennis argues that “what Weber does here is merely to bring out the issue of ‘productivity,’ to ‘problematize’ the interest in profit as the only supposed economic value, and to emphasize the contradictions between values and interests … The scandalous nature of the inaugural lecture did not lie in the supposed nationalism, but rather in the destruction of the harmonious image of a specific economic interest,

177 Here he draws on Rodbertus’ conception of “the oikos as a self-sufficient economic unit run on a natural economic basis under the rule of the pater familias” (Riesebrodt, [1986] 1989: 137).
namely that of ‘productivity’ or of ‘profitability’” (Hennis, 1994: 118). Weber showed, therefore, that the discussion in the Verein about productivity was compromised by uncritically accepting the value-commitments of the dominant interests in play. An objective economic science could only be justified with a commitment to value freedom.

This explication of Weber’s conception of value freedom allows us now to examine the question of human needs. Unlike Menger who puts needs and goods in direct relation, Weber incorporates needs within a conception of action. In a draft outline for an economics textbook he planned during the 1890s, he defines economic action for a section titled, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of Economy’:

By ‘economic action’ we understand a specific form of external purposeful activity (Zweckstrebens) – ie. a conscious, planful relation to nature and people – which is brought about by those needs that require external means for their satisfaction – whether these needs be themselves ‘material’ or ‘ideal’ – and which serve the purpose of provision for the future. (Weber [MWG III/1, Vorlesungen 1894-1898: 122]; quoted in Tribe, 2012: 287).

The passage deliberately echoes Menger’s position, but goes beyond it in two ways: economic action here intervenes between need and its satisfaction, thus, incorporating the notion of intention into the causal chain; and needs are specifically identified as being both material and ideal, and are, therefore, no longer a causal primitive, rooted in an autonomous human nature. This second feature is clarified by Weber in the text following where he discusses ‘economic need’:

Quite obviously, what is decisive for theory is the actuality of factual subjectively conceived feeling on the part of the economic subject, theory being ethically indifferent. – The degree and nature of need on the part of the individual is historically and individually mutable and capable of development, both quantitatively – this generally occurring incrementally – as well as qualitatively – this is in principle unlimited and illimitable. The entire economic history of the Occident is the history of the qualitative expansion of the degree and nature of need (Weber [MWG III/1, Vorlesungen 1894-1898: 123]; quoted in Tribe, 2012: 288).

Keith Tribe comments that Weber was less concerned with Menger’s focus on the ranking of needs and their marginal valuation under conditions of scarcity, than he was with the institutional conditions
which influenced the mutable and developmental quality of needs. Weber makes this explicit by defining the underpinning for his science of political economy with just this conception of human needs: “Political economy is not a science of nature and its properties, but of man and his needs” (Weber [MWG III/1, Vorlesungen 1894-1898: 125]; quoted in Tribe, 2012: 288).

Question of Social Causation

Weber’s emerging position on Wertfreiheit in the early 1890s is already suggestive of the position he would take on social causation upon the assumption of editorial control with Sombart and Jaffé of the Archiv in 1904. In his essay, “The Objectivity of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”, Weber ([1904] 2012) theorizes a conception of the ‘ideal type’ and relates that to his position on ‘objectivity’. In doing so, “Weber proffered nothing less than his solution to the dispute opposing the interpretive approach of the German ‘historical school’ of economics and social science and the nomothetic approach extolled by the marginal utility theorists” (McFalls et al., 2007: 3).

Weber agreed with Menger’s position that the epistemological basis of the Historical school of economics – the school of Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies – was not adequate, something Weber had lashed out against in his own essay on Roscher and Knies. Let us first recap Menger’s position:

If we summarize what has been said, then the question is easily answered concerning the true nature of those errors into which the historical school of German economists has fallen, as far as the view that theoretical economics is a historical science is concerned. It does not distinguish the specifically historical understanding of economy from the theoretical and confuses the two (Menger, [1883] 1985: 46).

Weber could have written just what Menger did, although he was in 1883 at the edge of developing a much more sophisticated understanding of concept formation and theory construction than Menger ever did. For Weber, he was later to argue, the historical phenomena that the social sciences encounter are so profuse that we are as lost sheep in the absence of the conceptual tools that would render that experience intelligible:
First of all, the possibility of selection from the infinity of the
determinants is conditioned by the nature of our historical interest.
As we have seen, the statement that history should causally
understand the concrete reality of an ‘event’ in its individuality
obviously does not mean that [history] should ‘reproduce’ and
causally explain [the ‘event’] in its entirety, with the totality of its
individual qualities; such a task would not just be impossible in
practice, it would also be meaningless in principle (Weber, [1906]
2012: 173).

All explanation, including all scientific explanation, therefore, requires
the application of a point-of-view – requires a theoretical understanding.

Weber was also in accord with Menger on the theoretical utility of
‘pure types’ as a theoretical device, although now clearly differing in
orientation from the realism of Menger. Concept formation for
Weber involved a construct, isolating just those ideational elements of
analytical significance:

The concept of the ideal type can direct judgement in matters of
imputation; it is not a ‘hypothesis’, but seeks to guide the formation
of hypotheses … It is formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or
several perspectives, and through the synthesis of a variety of diffuse,
discrete, individual phenomena, present sometimes more,
sometimes less, sometimes not at all; subsumed by such one-sided,
emphatic viewpoints so that they form a uniform construction in

Menger also maintained that the apprehension and analysis of full
empirical reality was not only not feasible, but was a “methodological
absurdity” (Menger [1883] 1985: 79). For Menger, however, concept
formation was not a mental construct, but something extracted from
the phenomenal world through the removal of extraneous material:

Even the most realistic orientation of theoretical research imaginable
must accordingly operate with abstractions. The aspiration for
types and typical relationships of real phenomena which refer in
each case to the ‘full empirical reality’ of the latter is accordingly an
aspiration that simply contradicts the nature of theoretical research
as it presents itself on the basis of reality (Menger [1883] 1985: 80;
Menger’s realism about concept formation is made plain in his methodological approach to knowledge about “the practical activities of economizing men”:

‘The exact theory of political economy’ is a theory of this kind, a theory which teaches us to follow and understand in an exact way the manifestations of human self-interest in the efforts of economic humans aimed at the provision of their material needs ... It has only the task of affording us the understanding of a special side of human life, to be sure, the most important, the economic. On the other hand the understanding of the remaining sides of it could only be attained by other theories which would make us aware of the formations of human life from the point of view of the remaining propensities (e.g., from the point of view of public spirit, of the strict way of the ideal of justice, etc.) (Menger, [1883] 1985: 87); partially quoted in Mäki, 1997: 480-481).

Menger goes on to elaborate his understanding of marginal value and ‘exact laws’ of economics, but they are based on how that “special side of human life” works, how human beings would value economic goods if all those other sides did not exist. When Menger characterizes value as “the importance that we first attribute to the satisfaction of our needs” (Menger, [1871] 1950: 116), he is, as Nancy Cartwright notes, “already making an idealization. For he does not mean the importance ‘we’ real people each attribute to our own needs, but rather the importance attributed by ‘the economizing man,’ i.e. the importance that should be attributed to the need” (Cartwright, 1994: 177). Without empirical input, Menger’s project of a priori economics is problematic.

Weber, of course, doesn’t have this problem. His commitment to the goal of an empirical science of culture is positively majestic:

The social science that we wish to pursue is a science of reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). Our aim is an understanding of the uniqueness (Eigenart) of the lived reality within which we are placed. We wish to understand on the one hand the context and cultural significance of individual phenomena in this lived reality; and on the other, the reasons for their being historically so and not otherwise (Weber, [1904] 2004: 374).

However, Weber is seen as being located between the Austrian School and the Historical School precisely because “ideal-types” are, for him, the means of conducting historical investigations:
There is no absolutely ‘objective’ scientific analysis of cultural life – or to put it perhaps more precisely, without however materially altering our meaning – there is no ‘objective’ analysis of ‘social phenomena’ independent of special and ‘one-sided’ perspectives, on the basis of which such phenomena can be (explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously) selected as an object of research, analysed and systematically represented (Weber, [1904] 2004: 374).

Of the greatest significance for Weber’s position, though, is his claim that such one-sided perspectives still yield universally valid knowledge:

It has been and continues to be true that a methodologically correct form of proof in the social sciences, if thought to be complete, has to be recognized as correct even by a Chinaman, or – more precisely that it must at any rate strive to reach a goal perhaps not completely attainable for lack of material. Moreover, even logical analysis of an ideal with respect to its content and its ultimate axioms, together with demonstration of the local and practical consequences arising from pursuit of such an ideal should, if they are to be deemed successful, likewise have to be valid for this Chinaman. Although he might be ‘deaf’ to our ethical imperatives, can and certainly often will reject this ideal and the concrete evaluations flowing from it, this in no respect detracts from the scientific value of such conceptual analysis (Weber, [1904] 2004: 365).

If the conceptual armament that science brings to bear in its investigation of reality is determined by the subjective values of the investigator, however, on what basis can Weber claim to produce universally valid knowledge? Weber provides two interlocking answers.

His first answer was to acknowledge that “validity’ was a practical matter”: “it was individually, historically, and culturally relative – no matter what transcendent or extra-political standards one might call upon as justification” (Gunnell, 2007: 64). The Chinaman’s assent, therefore, is not assent in general, but assent to the particular empirical analysis given the value position in play. The implication is that each ‘one-sided’ perspective would bring different data to bear, resulting in multiple interpretations, each partial but equally objective.

In principle, a history of banking in a particular country that adduced only economic motives as explanations is just as unworkable as an ‘explanation’ of the Sistine Madonna in terms of the contemporary socio-economic foundations of cultural life; and
it is in no respects any more exhaustive than, for instance, the
derivation of capitalism from certain transformations of religious
consciousness that played a part in the genesis of the capitalist
spirit, nor the derivation of a political structure from geographical
conditions. Decisive in all these cases for the degree of significance
given to economic conditions is the class of causes to which are
imputed those specific elements of the phenomenon at issue that
have a meaning of interest to us (Weber, [1904] 2004: 373).

As Gunnell notes, “such ‘one-sided’ analysis of cultural reality from
specific ‘perspectives’ was, however, acceptable, if there was a plurality
of such analyses, since a plurality of relatively arbitrary perspectives
would not only facilitate a more comprehensive and neutral overall
representation but provide wider access to the infinite dimensions of
social phenomena, while achieving the kind of delimitation that would
allow claims about causal explanation” (Gunnell, 2007: 64-65).

Weber’s second answer lay in the intentional constitution of the
social world. As he argued, the idea that the aim of social science is
the “reduction of the empirical to ‘laws’ - is nonsense”. While
regarding the search for regularities as legitimate and valuable, it could
only ever be a means to the knowledge of social reality, for “no
knowledge of cultural processes can be conceived separately from the
meaning which the consistently individuated shaping of life’s reality has
for us in respect of specific individual relationships”(Weber, [1904]
2004: 380):

The transcendental presupposition of any cultural science is not that
we find one or any ‘culture’ to be of value, but that we are cultural
beings endowed with the capacity and the desire to adopt a position
with respect to the world, and lend it meaning. Whatever this
meaning might be, it will lead to our judging those phenomena
arising from human association, from this perspective ascribing to
them a positive or a negative significance (Weber, [1904] 2004: 380-
381).

The meaning-dependent character of cultural phenomena constitutes
a fundamental distinction to the meaningless of the natural world, with
the result that “social phenomena are ontologically and epistemologically ‘given’ in a way natural phenomena are not”. Unlike
the natural world which is made known through the concepts of
natural science, “as conventional objects [social facts] logically and
temporally, precede the theory, language, and concepts of social
science” (Gunnell, 2007: 67). This distinction means that “explanation
was primarily, as Weber pointedly stressed, a matter of ‘interpretation’” (p. 68).

The position of Weber is, therefore, very different from that of the early Menger. Weber understood ‘human need’ as a mediated goal rather than a primitive drive, and social causation as ‘objective’ but value-dependent. It is a position that Friedrich Hack, Menger’s critic, would have found much more congenial.178

How then did Weber conceptualize Sozialökonomik, located as he was at the pinnacle of the German development of the social sciences, then head and shoulders above other national traditions in terms of its methodological sophistication. Tenbruck, Schluchter, Hennis, and Ghosh have offered interpretations of the substantive work of Weber with compelling erudition, but we have to acknowledge the ultimate commitment of Weber to the value of the cultural sciences themselves. The Grundrisse der Socialökonomik, the great ‘handbook’ project which Weber led, was, therefore, not simply a substantive project, although it was also that, but it stands as his effort to articulate the vision of social economics from where he stood at the top of the bridge.

In his Objectivity essay, Weber elaborates a conception of social economics as part of his effort to define the mission of the journal. He began by delimiting the scope to the satisfaction of needs (both material and ideal) which require scarce external means — assenting to the Mengerian core of theoretical economics — but then expanded the scope to include not just economic phenomena-in-themselves, but also

178 The value-dependence of science, for Weber, relates to the choice of phenomena in which one is interested, but not to the logic of their investigation. As Guy Oakes has commented, although Weber’s choice between alternative constitutive concepts is determined by values, “a value-neutral logic - ‘the norms of our thought’ - determines how these concepts are used to produce and verify interpretations and explanations”. What Oakes argues, and I endorse, is that “it is not clear how this distinction can be made ... Weber cannot solve the problem of objectivity by employing a pre-Wittgensteinian distinction between concepts and their use” (Oakes, 1998: 298). Cf. Oakes, 1988. Weber accomplished much with his Sozialökonomik synthesis, and his methodological position has influenced large sections of the social sciences during the last century, but, with our present knowledge, it is clear that he did not satisfactorily resolve the question of objectivity, and his dichotomy between facts and values ultimately fails.
those causes (‘economically relevant’ phenomena) and effects
(‘economically conditioned’ phenomena) which precede, or flow from,
economic phenomena-in-themselves. This widening of ‘causes’ and
‘effects’ is a radical introduction of institutional frameworks to the core
of economizing action:

That complex of human relationships, norms and relations
determined by norms we refer to as the ‘state’ is, for example, an
‘economic’ phenomenon with respect to state finances: to the
to the extent that it has an impact on economic life through legislation and
so on (and indeed in those aspects where its behaviour is governed
by factors far removed from economic perspectives) it is
‘economically relevant’; finally, where its behaviour and its
attributes are determined by motives other than those of its
‘economic’ relationships, then it is ‘economically conditioned’

What we have here is an institutionalism rooted in “the purposeful
action of individuals seeking to meet their economic needs – whatever
these needs might be” (Tribe, 2012: 288). As Tribe notes, “Max
Weber did not himself ever develop this line of thinking to its logical
conclusion; the closest he got was Chapter 2 of Economy and society,
which was elaborated on the basis of [his] lecture notes [of the 1890s]”. In
the meantime, the universalism of neo-classical economics vitiates a
social economics aimed at understanding “the rationalities involved in
the linkage of human action to the institutional context which shape
and are shaped by such actions” (p. 289).

What Weber has done, therefore, is to reject Menger’s rationality as
an adequate methodological approach for the investigation of human
action, subsuming rationality within a larger conception of
intentionality where other ethical values can hold sway. Similarly, the
narrow individualism of the early Menger doesn’t adequately reflect
the action embedded in the various social formations which develop.
This is the institutionalism for which Weber is known. Figure D
below shows Weber’s location mediating between the German
Historical School and the economics of the Austrian School.
Figure D – Expanded Model (Locating Weber and the Late Carl Menger)

Weber’s *Sozialökonomik* is an attempt to recognize the role of self-interest within a larger conception of intentionality which human beings display. His conception is perhaps given best expression in his famous dictum about the role of world-images as ‘switchmen’:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Weber, [1915] 1946: 280).

Material and ideal interests, understood as motivations, are part of the fundamental categories through which Weber, located at the end of the great struggle between idealism and materialism in German culture. What is crucial in the quotation above, though, is that the world-images that determine the tracks are created by ideas:

But how else could material self-interest itself, which is here [in social science] supposed to be dichotomous with ideas, exert any influence over action, except as mediated by ideas? Even in situations where material self-interest is allegedly the source of the action in question, the actual cause of action must be one’s perception of one’s self-interest, which is an idea – unless one thinks that our interests move us to act in a way that is not mediated by either motive or habit (Eastwood, 2005: 97).
Weber’s accomplishment with *Sozialökonomik* was a partial transcendence of the opposition between idealism and materialism. His achievement was to show that the Mengerian position in the Methodenstreit was not adequate, but that self-interest could, and needed to be, incorporated into a methodology of the cultural sciences that was still historical, subjective, and ethical.

In terms of economics, it was this advanced lesson about the role of self-interest that the Antigonish Movement missed. What we will see is that their economics was pre-Weberian. It was influenced by the German historical school, but these influences were importantly transmitted through the weaker tradition of Anglo-French *économie sociale*. Antigonish economics, therefore, was derivative and not strong enough to constitute a genuine alternative. The Movement was vulnerable to theoretical criticism, and, as it later turned out, to the competitive pressures of self-interested action unleashed after the Second World War. It is to this story that we turn in the next chapter.

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179 Moyn’s judgement (2014: 115-116) of a failure in transcendence seems overly strong.
The ‘social question’ dominated intellectual discourse at the end of the nineteenth century. At the end of a century of intellectual resistance and growing social resistance to commercial society, it was this discourse which motivated the writing of *Rerum Novarum*. The encyclical particularly fired the imaginations of those young Catholics who came to age at that time – the generation to which D. J. MacDonald belonged – who eventually found themselves in positions to activate and support the Antigonish Movement.

In Nova Scotia and the Maritime Provinces, the ‘social question’ showed up in outmigration and rural poverty. The problem of leaving home to make a living has been a historical reality for generations of Maritimers. As one historian of the region perceptively argued, “the consciousness of the Maritimes as a distinct place was largely developed in the first place through the common experiences of people who worked away from home then later returned” (Ernie Forbes, cited in Burrill, 1992: 4). By 1880, Burrill reports, “there were already more Nova Scotians in Boston than in Yarmouth, Sydney and Pictou combined” (1992: 4-5). The experience of migration from every community of Nova Scotia has dominated the historical literature, and for good reason. “Going out west appears to be the order of the day in Cape Breton this spring”, printed the *Aurora*, an Antigonish broadsheet in 1883, while the Shelburne *Budget* reported in 1899 that the “ever-increasing exodus” had drained the South Shore of the province of “many of its best men”.

Attempts to describe and explain the economic forces behind this extensive migration have consumed historians and social scientists, and various regional studies have made claims about the impact of this migration on the various ethnic communities throughout the region. In a pioneering study on the Nova Scotian Scots, for instance, D. A.

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180 Yarmouth and Pictou were among the largest communities outside of Halifax-Dartmouth at that time, and Sydney was soon destined to be.
Campbell and R. A. MacLean argued that emigration was an alternative to the poor economy that was utilized by Scottish individuals “to a higher degree than any other ethnic group in the province” (Campbell and MacLean, 1974: 93). One clergyman, ministering in a small eastern Nova Scotia community in the 1920s, admitted to issuing “far more birth certificates for emigrants than for newborn babies” (Nearing, 1975: 25). The Dominion Bureau of Statistics estimated that gross out-migration from the Maritimes to other Canadian provinces and ‘the Boston States’ during the fifty-year period between 1881 and 1931 was about 600,000 persons, with net out-migration of 470,000. As Patricia Thornton notes, this constituted “some 50 per cent of the population still present in 1931 at the end of the period” (1985: 5).

Thornton argues that outmigration did not become problematic for the Maritimes until after 1881, peaking during the 1920s. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Daniel J. MacDonald (“D.J.”) (1927), himself, wrote an early paper addressing the issue. Published by the N.S. Dept. of Natural Resources, and clearly aimed at a popular readership, MacDonald argued against the ‘demand-pull’ of migration, pointing out that the social and family costs of city life offset the benefits of higher incomes and suggesting that these costs needed to be weighed against the greater stability and community embedding of rural life in Nova Scotia. The focus of MacDonald’s rebuttal of the desirability of migration stands in contrast with the cost-push argument of R. H. Coats. Writing that same year from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Coats argued that, in light of the dramatic population declines experienced, the “study of population tendencies in the Maritimes since Confederation may therefore be regarded as illustrating and reflecting the course of their economic development” (1927: 3; quoted in part in Thornton, 1985).

A vigorous academic debate about the reasons for this devastating social implosion was mounted through the 1970s and ‘80s. These debates got traction by taking issue with S.A. Saunders’s classical analysis of the Maritime staple economy (1932, 1939), and focussed research on the implosion of the manufacturing sector. The most influential critiques built on various forms of dependency theory,

181 Conversely, argued Judith Fingard, the French Acadiens “were one of the few ethnic groups to be threatened but not weakened by out-migration” (1993: 103).
182 See Thornton, 1985: fn 8, fn 6, together with the references there.
183 Her position stands in contrast with the argument of Brookes (1976), although not his data.
criticizing the weakness of Maritime entrepreneurship, limited capital access, discriminatory tariff policy, high freight rates, agricultural under-performance, and external business acquisition.\textsuperscript{184} However, as early as 1985, Michael Clow argued that “we have reached a situation where theoretical speculation has outrun substantive research” (p. 150).

In subsequent work during the 1990s, a couple of studies helped to undermine the thesis that Confederation itself led to the decline of the Maritime economy. Robert MacKinnon, in his analysis of the history of Nova Scotia agriculture, states flatly that “agriculture did not experience a ‘prolonged crisis’ in the second half of the nineteenth century” (1996: 259). Kris Inwood makes a similar claim about Maritime industrialization: “Manufacturing in Nova Scotia follows a more interesting pattern; profitability was low in 1870 but it had largely recovered by 1890 after a decade of National Policy expansion … Nova Scotia did relatively well during the following forty years [from 1870 to 1910] in contrast to the disastrous experience of New Brunswick industry” (1991: 136). However, both studies point to volatility in the macro-economic indicators in the Maritimes during the 1870-1890 period, and go on to detail a rather sharp pattern of decline after 1890.

Recent work by Inwood and Keay (2005, 2008, 2012) and by Chernoff (2014) have begun the work of building an alternative explanation of Maritime industrial decline. Inwood and Keay have build a database of Canadian and American border-state financials for manufacturing enterprises using micro-data from industrial censuses of 1870 and 1871. This data enables an analysis of factor costs, value-added, profitability, and total factor productivity. After exclusions, the Canadian sample consists of 27,111 establishments, and the U.S. sample consists of 8,149 establishments. They conclude that, while Canadian industrialization did not follow the same path as did establishments in the United States, it was still highly competitive:

We find that, in 1871, a wide range of Canadian manufacturers employed technology with significant scale economies, that Canadian establishments were technically efficient relative to geographically proximate US producers, and that any productivity differences associated with establishment size, seasonality, capital intensity, and power source were small … It is not what the

Canadian establishments looked like—how large they were, where they were located, or their willingness to adopt capital-intensive, mechanized technologies that determined success. Rather, what mattered was the producers’ willingness to foster more fundamental determinants of growth—technical efficiency, appropriate input and technology decisions, and the realization of scale economies (Inwood and Keay, 2012: 312).

They also found that it was not a uniform Canadian performance, though. Using the same data, Alex Chernoff analyzed this further with his study of productivity differentials in Maritime manufacturing. He focuses on the high concentration of rural manufacturing in the Maritimes relative to the rest of Canada, and finds that while urban manufacturing was fully competitive in the Maritimes, “rural manufacturers in the Maritimes were less productive when compared to rural establishments in Ontario” (Chernoff, 2014: 78). Additionally, Chernoff makes a suggestive observation of a difference in industrial organization in Ontario between 1871 and 1891:

During this era, the industrial landscape in Ontario and Quebec featured dense clusters of manufacturing establishments that extended from the urban centres into the countryside. By contrast, in the Maritimes there was a lack of integration between the process of industrialization in Saint John and Halifax and the region’s rural communities (Chernoff, 2014: 67).

He goes on to theorize that “regional agglomeration effects may have emerged as important determinants of growth during the late 19th century” (2014: 88), and makes some preliminary tests of this thesis.

This thesis is consistent with developments in growth theory that needed to wait for a much deeper empirical knowledge than was earlier possible. A distinction is now made between the macro-economic framework conditions which sustain growth from those meso-economic proximate factors which ignite growth.\textsuperscript{185} This focus on meso-structural dynamics is concerned centrally with innovation and production linkages. José Antonio Ocampo, then U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, characterizes it thus:

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{185} The distinction between sustaining and igniting growth is made by Dani Rodrik (2005).
\end{footnotesize}
The dynamics of production structures may be visualized as the interaction between two basic, though multidimensional, forces, namely (1) innovations, broadly understood as new activities and new ways of doing previous activities, and the learning processes that characterize both the full realization of their potentialities and their diffusion through the economic system; and (2) the complementarities, linkages or networks among firms and production activities, and the institutions required for the full development of such complementarities, whose maturation is also subject to learning. Elastic factor supplies are, on the other hand, essential to guarantee that these dynamic processes can deploy their full potentialities. The combination of these three factors determines what we can characterize as the dynamic efficiency of a given production system (Ocampo, 2005: 13).

The macro-economic factors identified by the dependency theory of the 1970s and ‘80s highlighted important framework conditions which undermined industrial performance in the Maritimes, leading to a highly critical assessment of the Antigonish Movement. Current theoretical work, though, suggests that an analysis of the Antigonish Movement should focus more on the extent to which they were able to foster innovation and build linkages.

The general approach of the Antigonish Movement is well-understood – its focus on adult education, the organization of producer and consumer cooperatives and credit unions, and the emphasis on self-help and grass-roots organizing. What is missing is an adequate understanding of how these ideas were connected to the larger frameworks of intellectual thought which have been elucidated in earlier chapters. This chapter is preliminary, then, to connecting the analysis of the Movement’s role in fostering innovation and building linkages, but is a pre-requisite to that future task.

In this chapter, therefore, I want to examine the intellectual building blocks on which D. J. MacDonald built his own vision of social renewal. This will be done through short studies in four areas: MacDonald’s graduate education in Washington, the roots of that education in Anglo-French économie sociale, the resulting intellectual position that he held, and the work he accomplished.
Graduate Economics with Frank O’Hara

Following his Bachelor’s degree in Sacred Theology from Urban College in Rome in 1902, 186 his ordination in 1904, and a few years of parish work at Bridgeport and Brook Village in Nova Scotia, D. J. MacDonald went on to do graduate work at the Catholic University of America (CUA) in Washington, no doubt at the request, and possibly with the financial support, of his Antigonish Bishop.

CUA had a strong reputation within Catholic higher education. Like Johns Hopkins, it had been established in 1889 as a graduate school only, for research and graduate instruction. It was only in 1904 that CUA introduced an undergraduate option in order to broaden its income base, rectify undergraduate deficiencies before entering graduate work, and provide a reliable source of students for its graduate departments. In 1911, CUA was deemed by the U.S. Commissioner of Education to be the only Catholic institution in the U.S. to satisfy the standard for adequate graduate preparation of its baccalaureates (Nuesse, 1988). It was with a view of getting the best graduate training possible that the Catholic University would have been selected by MacDonald.

MacDonald entered studies at CUA in September, 1910, and was there for two years, during which time, he acquired a Master’s degree and a Doctorate. The annual report to his Diocesan bishop for 1910-1911 indicates that he took courses in Economics (then taught by Professor Frank O’Hara), Sociology (taught by Professor William Joseph Kerby), and Advanced English (taught by Professor Patrick Joseph Lennox) during his first year, and was “conscientious in his application to study, gentlemanly and priestly in his habits, kind and obliging in disposition, [and] fairly regular in his attendance at the community exercises” (MG1/2/538, St.F.X. Archives). In the second year, he did work in Philosophy (with Professors Edward Aloysius Pace and William Turner), Economics (with Professor Frank O’Hara), and English (with Professor Patrick Joseph Lennox). As MacDonald taught Économis and Sociology for almost his entire teaching career at St. F.X., the initial focus of attention here is on MacDonald’s studies with Professor O’Hara.

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186MacDonald’s education in Rome was financed by his uncle, Colin MacDonald. Colin had, a generation earlier, gone to Boston to train as a medical doctor, and his brother, John B., the father of Daniel, had sold his sawmill to raise funds for his brother’s education. Dr. Colin repaid that kindness by funding his nephew’s seminary training in Rome (Interview with Flora Marie MacDonald, 05 Aug, 2017).
As one commentator saw him, O’Hara was a “social Progressive investigator” (Yellowitz, 1968: 348). Born March 24, 1876 in Lanesboro, Minnesota, his outlook was shaped by the Progressive Movement of the American Midwest. He was raised and did his undergraduate degree in Minnesota, and followed it with a Master’s degree at the University of Notre Dame. His doctoral studies were conducted at the University of Berlin where he studied with members of the German historical school of economics, recording his great debt to Professors Adolf Wagner, Gustav von Schmoller, and Max Sering (O’Hara, 1916: v).

O’Hara’s 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia article on “Political Economy” provides a good overview of the views he held during the period when D. J. MacDonald was his student. The article exhibits a good grasp of the history of economics with a discussion of patristic and late medieval economic philosophy, the debates between mercantilists and physiocrats, ‘classical’ Anglo-French political economy, and German historical economics. He outlines the contribution of Mengerian economics, mentioning the parallel work in England by W. S. Jevons and in the U.S by J. B. Clark, but conceptualizes that contribution, in what was then the standard understanding, as supplementing the inductive approach with the deductive approach, rather than addressing the more fundamental distinction between theory and observation which was advanced by Menger. The article is notable in its failure to address either the concept of scarcity or marginal choice in any significant way, defining the province of economics as “the social science which treats of man’s activities in providing the material means to satisfy his wants” (p. 213), a definition rather similar to Alfred Marshall’s. In fact, O’Hara

187 Biographical details are taken from Cook (1934-35), Curtis (1911), and CER Editor (1938), not all details of which are consistent with one another.
188 While Professors Wagner and Schmoller are well-known, and were referred to in the previous chapter, it may be helpful to offer a word about Professor Max Sering. Sering (1857-1939) completed his doctorate under Schmoller at Strassburg (Nelson, 2015: 1) and, after a period at the University of Bonn, was appointed Professor of Economics at the Agricultural Institute in Berlin, and Privat-dozent at the University, being raised to Extraordinary Professor at the University in 1893 (Personal Notes, 1894: 159). He conducted a fact-finding mission to Canada and the United States concerning grain production in 1883, and published several studies on the economics of the German agricultural sector. He was a principal architect of the Verein’s rural survey in the early 1890s (Tribe, 1989a: 98), and “had a relatively close relationship at the beginning of the 1890s” with Max Weber (Riebel, 1989: 148; cf. Roth, 2002: 68). Weber and Sering, in fact, moved in much the same circles: Sering had, for instance, been offered the faculty position at Freiburg prior to Weber (Tribe, 1995: 82).
references Marshall's *Principles* (1898), along with a number of other commonly used Anglo-French and American introductory texts, the most important of which were: (i) Henry Rogers Seager's *Introduction to Economics* (1908), (Professor of Political Economy at Columbia, 1902-1930, two years of study overseas at Halle, Berlin, and Vienna under Johannes Conrad, Gustav von Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, and Carl Menger); (ii) Richard Ely's *Outlines of Economics* (1908), (Professor of Political Economy at Wisconsin (Madison) 1892-1925, three years of study overseas in Halle and Heidelberg under Johannes Conrad and Karl Knies; teacher of John R. Commons and Wesley Mitchell); and (iii) Edwin R. A. Seligman's *Principles of Economics* (1905), (Professor of Political Economy at Columbia 1885-1931; three years of study in Berlin, Heidelberg, Geneva, and Paris with Karl Knies, Adolf Wagner, and Gustav von Schmoller (with Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, a fellow-student); a prominent advocate of a progressive income tax). O’Hara’s core references, therefore, cite authors which had very similar backgrounds to his own. D. J. MacDonald used the Seager text and the Ely text in his course in ‘Introduction to Economics’. In the case of the Ely text, it was used in 22 years of the 29 years that MacDonald was listed as teaching the course.189 Asso and Fiorito, in their “Introduction” to the republication of Edwin Seligman’s autobiography, nicely summarize the viewpoint of this ‘Progressive’ American economics, the kind of outlook which O’Hara seems to have shared:

Seligman was one of the first American economists of his age who followed historicism without dogmatically rejecting the innovations introduced with marginalism and the inclination toward formal logie in economics. Having spent in Germany the decisive years of his formation as an economist, he grew up with the conviction that the academic fighting over methodological divergences was a rather unproductive enterprise and did not need to take the front stage of scientific research. Thus he remained throughout his life a fervent advocate of the cooperative coexistence – or the “peaceful rapprochement” as Brad Bateman (2004) called it – between different methodological approaches. Following Seligman, Richard Ely, John Bates Clark, and others, this apparently odd alliance between historicists and marginalists against the supporters of the

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189 MacDonald was a faculty member in economics for 30 years, but there is no calendar for one of those years. It is not likely that he taught all of, or perhaps any of, the years that he was President, but there is not, at present, any information to determine this, and he continued to be listed in the University Calendar as having Professorial responsibilities.
old classical doctrines was soon to become a distinctive feature of
the Progressive era and is now considered to have determined the
blossoming of that peculiar pluralism which has so profitably
characterized American economic thought in the subsequent
decades. The use of different or complementary methods came to
be normally accepted and respected within American economics, as
long as economists were all seriously engaged in investigating the
real changes in economic conditions and as long as they
strengthened their participation in policy reforms and designs for
their amelioration (Asso and Fiorito, 2006: 151).

There is another component, however, to O’Hara’s analysis of
political economy. After a brief discussion of Marxist socialism,
O’Hara identifies ‘Christian Democracy’ as “the movement which has
been gaining ground for the last half-century among Christian
churches, both Catholic and non-Catholic to emphasize the
importance of religious and moral elements in a healthy economic life”
(1913: 215-216). He then goes on to talk about the practical efforts
toward co-operative association, distinguishing between, what we
would now identify as, civil society-led and state-led wings:

The more “liberal” wing, led by such economists as Le Play, Pépin,
and Victor Brants, would reduce state action to a minimum, while
others, looking to Bishop Ketteler, Cardinal Manning, and Count
de Mun, would invoke a considerable measure of so-called State
socialism (O’Hara, 1913: 216).

In his 1916 textbook, to a greater extent in his 1939 textbook, and in
several publications on credit unions, O’Hara amplified his discussion
of the co-operative movement.

**Anglo-French économie sociale**

The international standing of the German university in the nineteenth
century as a model for advanced research and teaching, and its distinct
histrionicization of political economy were not the only differences with
the Anglo-French tradition. I want to highlight two other principal
differences – in their methodological approach, and their conception
of choice.

John Neville Keynes (father of John Maynard, lecturer in Moral
Sciences at Cambridge) provided the standard for Anglo-French
economics methodology in the late nineteenth-century with his *Scope and Method of Political Economy* (1891). It was his analysis which led to the common understanding of the *Methodenstreit* between Menger and Schmoller as being a conflict over the roles of deduction versus induction. Indeed, as I indicated, Frank O’Hara assumed this same position, although watered down by failing to connect the “bitter struggle” to the methodological arguments of Menger:190

In opposition to this narrow and non-ethical view of the Classical School, there arose in Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Historical School, holding that political economy is an inductive and an ethical science … After a bitter struggle of half a century the opposition between the schools has almost disappeared. And it is now generally recognized that the economist must use both the deductive and the inductive methods, using now one predominantly and now the other, according to the nature of the problem upon which he happens to be engaged (O’Hara, 1913: 214).

But as I tried to show in the previous chapter, the heart of the methodological debate was not about the roles of induction versus deduction, but about the role of theory versus observation. It was this understanding of the debate which allowed Weber to push back against the Mengerian abstractions with his conception of ‘ideal-types’, extending and deepening the historicization of the social sciences within a now more rigorous theoretical methodology. Keith Tribe makes the point:

The contrast which is at work here is not one which turns on an opposition of historical to analytical method, nor one which turns on the deductive-inductive opposition emphasized by Keynes. Weber has no time for a mathematical apprehension of economic phenomena as practiced by Jevons and as developed by Marshall because he believed that this left to one side a considerable proportion of the subject matter proper to economics. If we are to identify a relevant contrast separating the economics of Weber from that of Marshall or J. B. Clark then the distinction would perhaps turn on his opposition to the development of a mathematically-based science of economic behaviour and his belief in the material variety of economic life (Tribe, 1989b: 6-7).

190 O’Hara cites the Keynes text in his bibliography to his 1913 article.
The differences in the Anglo-French and German theorization of the economics of choice is similar. The Anglo-French tradition had been built upon a simple psychology of observation, thought-experiments, and sense-impressions without the same awareness of historicality and language that developed in the German tradition. As sophisticated as some of the strands in the Anglo-French tradition were, even those elements in Scholastic theology that were most erudite and philosophically sensitive remained “ahistorical and metaphysically oriented” (Leinsle, [1995] 2010: 354). As we saw in our discussion of the conceptualizations of Carl Menger and Max Weber, the German economics of choice had philosophical roots in a discussion of ‘human need’, intimately entwined with ontological issues of value and human nature which such a discussion presupposed. In the Anglo-French tradition, the same conversation about the economics of choice was about interests, plain and simple, without reflection on how those interests were formed or whether they served human need. The elision of need with demand in the Anglo-French tradition led inevitably to a focus on the calculus of choice, and the eventual mathematization of economics. Keith Tribe again elucidates these differences:

The theoretical tradition of Nationalökonomie in which Weber stood, unlike the Anglo-French tradition of political economy, turned on the concept of ‘human need’, its variations and the modes in which it could be satisfied. Thus Menger's *Grundsätze* of 1871 begins from the nature of utilities which, when embodied in a manner related to the satisfaction of need are called ‘economic goods’ (1968: 2). In establishing this point Menger appends a lengthy footnote which begins with a definition drawn from Aristotle and, via physiocratic literature, works its way towards earlier nineteenth century writers such as Soden, Hufeland, and Jacob. Likewise in his later discussion of value, this is constantly related to the question of the satisfaction of needs. If we compare this approach with the contemporary work of Jevons we can immediately note some differences: here the calculus of pleasure and pain is employed so that the value of a good in exchange might be related to the optimization of utility with respect to quantity of a good. This theory of economics is, as Jevons states, ‘purely mathematical in character’ (1879: 3). The new economics of later nineteenth-century Britain carries over from Smith and Ricardo a concern with value, but formulated in a mathematical fashion first by Jevons, and then by Marshall (Tribe, 1989b: 4-5).
The emerging Anglo-French focus on optimization was simply not important in any fundamental sense in the German tradition. It was not a matter of overlooking the question, or of lacking the necessary skills, but of believing that such a focus was philosophically inept and theoretically defective. “The basic problem” for German economics “was not the allocation of scarce resources; it was the wider question of the conditions under which economic order and general welfare were secured” (Tribe, 1988a: 6).

Of course, there was, and continues to be, both a left-wing and a right-wing in the Anglo-French tradition of economics. Indeed, the underlying commitment to ‘progress’ in that tradition absolutely requires a distinction between those partisans committed to radical advance and those reactionaries who defend entrenched interests. We will refer to the Anglo-French tradition, of both the left and right, as économie sociale, for they both shared a commitment to the rights of the poor and dispossessed. The thesis being advanced here is that the kind of social science which was taught at the Catholic University of America when D. J. MacDonald was a student was a form of économie sociale, informed by and adapting German historical economics, but doing so within an Anglo-French tradition. In the remainder of this section, I want to sketch the history of Anglo-French Catholic économie sociale.

Social Catholicism was a response to what Paul Misner refers to as ‘economic modernization’: “the process commenced with the well-named industrial revolution in Great Britain. It reached Catholic countries first in Belgium and France in the 1820s and 1830s” (Misner, 1991b: 3). It gained traction not so much as an intellectual critique of commercial sociability, or as a reaction to the horror of la Terreur, but in response to the manifest poverty generated by industrialization:

Previously, poverty was diffuse: with industrialization, it became heavily concentrated in some categories of the population and in some places. It was massive, obvious, and visible and its very existence seemed tightly linked to the huge and parallel development of wealth. A new word was needed for this new world: “paupérisme” started to be widely used in the French language from the 1820s on. With pauperism, what would be called later the “social question” was posed (Faccarello, 2014: 81).

The Catholic critique of this period was launched by Vicomte Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784-1850) in his three-volume work, Économie politique chrétienne ou Recherche sur la nature et les causes du paupérisme en France et en Europe (1834). Building on the earlier
work of the Swiss Protestant, J. C. L. Sismondi, Villeneuve-Bargement’s book “created sensation because of its powerful denunciation of the evil of pauperism and its supposed causes: the policies suggested by political economy” (Faccarello, 2014: 86). He argued that “charitable institutions, agricultural labours, and particularly the assistance provided by a deeply moved religious charity were quite more efficient than our dissertations of political economy” (1934: 7; quoted in Almodovar and Teixeira, 2012: 209). He went on, though, to call for institutional reform:

The kind of reform that Villeneuve-Bargemont had in mind meant that those values were necessarily to be embedded into a new legal and institutional framework … His proposal was not just a question of improving charity within the existing system, for he also emphasised the importance of agricultural development, and asked for a general reorganisation of industry in order to prevent the excessive concentration of wealth (Almodovar and Teixeira, 2012: 211).

In spite of these criticisms and proposals, Villeneuve-Bargemont stands at the head of a more traditional strand of economic reform. His family’s property had been confiscated during the French Revolution, and he remained a “legitimist”, loyal to the monarchy of the Bourbon Restoration (1814-1830). He was a member of the Académie des Sciences Morales and a Deputy in the National Assembly. In the latter role, he was “one of the foremost authors of the law of 1841 limiting child labour” (Goyau, 1913: 431). Villeneuve-Bargemont had, therefore, a deep concern with economic reform, but it was one consistent with state regulation and the order of natural law.

Charles de Coux (1787-1864) stands at the head of a more radical strand of economic reform, advocating independent action from below. Coux was part of a cluster of activists who formed around the charismatic Félicité Robert de Lamennais in the later 1820s and early 1830s. Lamennais (1782-1854) was a complex figure, whose evolving thought moved from one strong religious position to another. Initially, an outspoken advocate of ultramontanism, he had, by the end of his life become an outspoken advocate of radical socialism. Armenteros argues that the common thread in Lamennais’ life was his effort “to realize completely what defenders of the faith had advocated since the middle of the eighteenth century, when they combated

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191 Among others, “Villeneuve-Bargemont exercised a considerable influence on Tocqueville’s opinions about economic and social issues” (Drolet, 2003: 95).
philosophie by brandishing the facts against the imagination” (Armenteros, 2014: 154). Inspired by this intellectual ferment, several members of the circle – Jean-Baptiste-Henri Lacordaire, Charles de Montalembert, Harel du Tancrel, Olympe-Philippe Gerbet, and Charles de Coux – started a daily newspaper, l’Avenir, in 1830, with the motto ‘God and Liberty’. Although this publication was shortly condemned by papal encyclical, the group “progressively formed a powerful network of influence … [and] exerted a lasting influence on the French intellectual life” (Faccarello, 2014: 87).

It was Coux who had the knowledge and interest in political economy. His family had fled the French Revolution when he was three years old, and he had been raised in Great Britain by his mother, an Englishwoman, and subsequently “worked for some years as an interpreter at the Legislature of Louisiana in the United States” (Faccarello, 2017: 7), later spending time in Brazil. He returned to France in 1823, at 36 years of age, and contacted Lamennais in 1830 expressing a desire to publish some articles about political economy. Of those in the Avenir Movement, Coux had the most interaction with Lamennais, and “alone of this group definitely shared the general tendencies of Lamennais’ thought” (Stearns, 1960: 843). Coux shared an interest with Lamennais in social reform as an independent and autonomous goal, not as simply a means to either a restoration, or a renewal, of the church.

Coux was appointed to a Chair in Political Economy at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1834. The university, once the centre of Jansenism in the Low Countries, had been established in 1425, but had been forced to close by the French in 1797 during the Revolutionary Wars, only being able to open again in 1834. This became a base for Coux to lecture and publish for the next 11 years:

Coux’s lectures on political economy – broadly understood as ‘social and political economy’ – involved two courses: one on social economics (‘économie sociale’), and the other on ‘political economy in its strict sense’, sometimes also called ‘économie réglementaire’ (regulatory economics). But some of his lectures reached a wider

192 It is of some note that Gerbet and Coux lectured at a series of conferences in 1832 – the Conférences de philosophie catholique’ – on the invitation of Antoine-Frédéric Ozanam. These conferences were a precursor to what later became the ‘Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul’. Coux lectured there on political economy, and this “brought Coux’s ideas to the attention of a broader audience than the circle close to l’Avenir” (Faccarello, 2017: 8).
Coux’s work focussed on a critique of the political economist’s commitment to spontaneous order. He argued that the bargaining position between workers and owners was fundamentally unequal, that the neglect of distribution unjustly favoured the owner, and that wealth was artificially restricted to material goods. Finally, Coux argued that political economy, rather than constituting a science of natural laws was simply arbitrarily mapping a particular form of economic activity, one that was then prevalent:

According to Zoroaster, ancient magi believed that the spirit of the seas would severely punish the least stain on his waters; they consequently detested navigation and, in the interest of their eternal happiness, they relinquished the incalculable advantages they could have drawn from it. With such a doctrine, trade could not flourish; a moral obstacle opposed its development and ... Say and Sismondi, had they lived among the fire worshippers, would have been as useful to them as a dance teacher for paralysed people (Coux, quoted in Faccarello, 2017: 1).

It seems clear that Coux had intended to publish a major treatise on Christian political economy, but it did not come about. Charles Périn took over the Chair in Political Economy from Coux in 1845, and Coux commented to a friend that “the person who replaced me in Louvain knows all my ideas. He must publish a treatise on political economy. They could be stated in a much better way than I could do it myself” (Thibeaud, quoted in Faccarello, 2017: 12).

Charles Périn (1815-1905), a student of Coux, did publish extensively, as did Victor Brants (1856-1917), a student of Périn, who succeeded him to the Chair in 1881 and died “in the saddle”. However, Catholic social thought in the second half of the century migrated from Coux’s theoretical confrontation to more practical concerns with social organization and reform. Périn advocated for the principles of renunciation – “curbing the excesses of the individual search for wealth” – and charity – “lessen[ing] the excessive existing inequalities” (Almodovar and Teixeira, 2008: 71), but this was no

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193 In addition to publishing in *L'Avenir, L'Université catholique, Revue de Bruxelles,* and *Le Correspondant,* Coux published at least five long English-language articles in *The Dublin Review,* a journal founded in 1836 by several well-known Irish Catholics – Daniel O’Connell, Cardinal Wiseman, and Michael Joseph Quin.
longer the same theoretical undertaking that had been mounted by Coux:

Social Catholicism mainly focused on important but practical goals – hence the quasi-disappearance of the phrase “Christian political economy”. Authors aimed, for example, at changing the legislation in favour of the working classes (limitation of child labour and the working day, improvement of working conditions, decent housing, education, insurance, charity and the role of religion, etc.), and among other actions at the promotion of new forms of cooperation between workers, and between capitalists and their employees (invention of new forms of guilds or corporations) ... The dream of a Christian political economy was over (Faccarello, 2017: 38).

While this practical engagement developed, significant differences emerged between those advocating for civil society-led solutions and those advocating for state-led solutions. In an 1883 book, Brants surveyed the existing schools of political economy, dividing them into the science libérale and the science morale (Almodovar and Teixeira, 2008: 72). The schools of morale science were, in turn, divided into four lines, each built around their principal champions – Ketteler, Périn, Le Play, and Roscher. Charles Antoine, a Jesuit Professor of Moral Theology and Social Economy (Nitsch, 1990: 58-61), in his 1896 book, Cours d’Economie Sociale, reduced the four lines to two: those of the ‘Angers’ school - Claudio Jannet, Charles Périn, Frederic Le Play – advocating for civil-society led solutions, and those of the ‘Liège’ School – La Tour du Pin, Ketteler, Pesch, Vogelsang – advocating for state-led solutions (Solari, 2007).194 “This taxonomy was to become a standard for most of the subsequent works” (Almodovar and Teixeira, 2010: 130).

Louvain, therefore, became an institutional centre in the late 1800s for an ‘économie sociale from-below’. The difference between the ‘Angers’ and ‘Liège’ schools has considerable resonance with the earlier struggles between the Conciliars and Papists, the Jansenists and the Jesuits, and the Gallicans and Ultramontanes. Although Jansenism was ruthlessly eradicated at the University of Louvain in the first half of the eighteenth century, its resuscitation under different auspices in the late nineteenth century speaks to the enduring patterns of culture – beyond all doctrine - at Louvain.

194 The names given to the schools – ‘Angers’ and ‘Liège’ – refer to their clerical ‘sponsors’ at this time: Monsignor Charles Freppel in Angers and Bishop Doutreloux in Liège.
Graduate Sociology with William J. Kerby

Frank O'Hara's economics was one of “peaceful rapprochement” between, what he understood as, the induction of historical economics and the deduction of marginal economics, albeit leavened by the policy concerns of économie sociale. The Anglo-French tradition of Catholic social science, however, was injected even more strongly into the curriculum of the Catholic University in Washington through the charismatic teaching of William J. Kerby.

Matthew Hoehn remarks that “in 1895 [Kerby] joined the faculty of Catholic University where Dr. Thomas Bouquillon took an interest in him and urged him to enter the field of sociology” (Hoehn, 1948: 385). True as far it goes, but the role of Bouquillon was considerably larger than what is allowed in this simple statement.

Thomas Joseph Bouquillon (1840-1902), a Belgian theologian, had been recruited by Rector John Keane in 1889 from the Benedictine monastery at Maredsous (Kerby, 1913: 715) as the first occupant of the Francis A. Drexel Chair of Moral Theology at CUA. Described in 1902 as “the most erudite man in the Catholic World today” (Nuesse, 1986a: 602), Bouquillon had special expertise “in the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly those of Spain and the Low Countries” (p. 602) - where, as we saw in an earlier chapter, Jansenism took root and grew – and was “sociologically knowledgeable” (Nuesse, 2000: 80), indeed, Nuesse argued, the “‘precursor’ of the social sciences” at CUA (Nuesse, 1986a: 619). According to Thomas Shahan, his colleague and later Rector of the university, it was Bouquillon “who really laid its academic foundation” (Curran, 1995: 157).

195 The next important occupant of the Chair after Bouquillon was the notable Dr. John Ryan, himself a student of, and much influenced by, Bouquillon: “The most fortunate experience in my student life at the University was association with the Very Rev. Dr. Thomas Thomas Bouquillon ... His lectures and seminars were especially helpful to me because they gave comprehensive attention to social problems. Whenever he had to apply a moral rule or principle to economic or social conditions, he set forth in specific terms the pertinent economic or social transaction or institution. In other words, he took adequate account and gave an adequate description of the economics of the sociology as well as the ethics of the problem” (Ryan, 1941: 63).
Bouquillon, a Neo-Thomist, was “a firm supporter and follower of Pope Leo’s program of renewal with its emphasis on Neo-Scholasticism as the only true and adequate method for Catholic theology and philosophy” (Curran, 1995: 163). Bouquillon had, though, what would then have been considered, an expansive conception of the scope of moral theology:

Even before coming to the university, he had written to impress upon the rector, whom he had not yet met, that moral theology was not to be regarded as “simply casuistic,” but ought to be “highly scientific” in view of its task to interpret in a “living” rather than a merely “formal” manner the great principles to be applied “to all the manifestations not only of individual life, but also of social, economic, political life.” To accomplish this task the moral theologian would have to be constantly en rapport with the applicable practical sciences (Nuesse, 1986a: 609, quoting Bouquillon).

This position was not just principled, but well-informed. In 1891, the Rector John Keane was already considering the creation of a ‘School of the Social Sciences’, something actually established in 1895. At the request of the Rector, Bouquillon prepared advice on the status of Catholic social movements in Europe, referred to as the “Bouquillon Memorandum”. In the Memorandum, he referred to, among others, the work of Bishop Ketteler, Comte de Mun, M. Le Play, Claudio Jannet, Brants, Pépin, Father Taparelli and Liberatore, and

196 William Callyhan Robinson (1834-1911), who was appointed to the CUA faculty in 1895 and became the Dean of the Law School, considered the primary conception of the founders to be “that of a school in which the scholastic philosophy is taught as the basis of all scientific knowledge and with it those other sciences which derive from it their principles or reach their conclusions through its methods” (Robinson, quoted in Nuesse, 1986b: 33).

197 Compare his survey article, “Moral Theology at the End of the Nineteenth Century”, where Bouquillon comments that “when we consider the time and talent devoted to the study of the moral sciences in our day, the efforts made to improve methods and to awaken the public to a sense of their importance, we must regretfully admit that Moral Theology has failed to keep pace with the times” (1899: 244).

198 The initial name proposed was ‘School of Sociology and Comparative Jurisprudence’, but William Graham Sumner was consulted, and it was reported to President Keane that “he says that Sociology is a word having no meaning and not a suitable one to use; that there is no name now in use which would cover the field we desire to describe; that no name is likely to be invented expressing the whole body of the social sciences, and that a suitable appellation for such a school would be ‘School of the Social Sciences’” (Letter from Robinson to Keane, quoted in Nuesse, 1986b: 35).
Tocqueville – all figures that are familiar from our own discussion here. Significantly, Bouquillon summarizes his survey by discussing the division between what I have referred to as ‘économie sociale from-below’ and ‘state-led économie sociale’:

It suffices to travel to the congresses or to read the reviews to note that Catholics have until now been divided into two camps. One fears the intervention of the state; it relies especially on private initiative; it opposes obligatory insurance, etc. This faction is now led by M. Perin, M. Claudio Jannet, Bishop Freppel, M. Woeste (in Belgium) – its organs are the Réforme sociale, the Revue catholiques des institutions et du droit; its ideas prevailed last year at the Congress of Angers. The other finds that the intervention of the state is necessary to eliminate abuses from the point of view of wages, hours of work, etc. This faction is led by Cardinal Manning, Cardinal Langèneuse (Rheims), M. de Mun, etc.; in Germany the great majority is favorable to this view; it prevailed last year at the congress of Liège. The recent encyclical of the Pope [Rerum Novarum] is favorable to the partisans of state intervention (Bouquillon, quoted in Nuesse, 1991: 9-10).

While Bouquillon provided advice such as this, and otherwise communicated in publications and correspondence, he had a deeper and more direct influence through his own efforts at institutionalization. As early as 1891, Bouquillon had aspirations to develop an “Academy of Moral Sciences”. The previous year, he had inaugurated a seminar that he led modelled on the German university seminar, as “a course organized for training in research, with stated meetings at which the students present for criticism and discussion the results of their studies” (Bouquillon, quoting Clement Lawrence Smith; quoted in Nuesse, 1986a: 613). In the first year of its offering, the seminar topic was ‘suicide’, and Bouquillon proudly reported that it was “the first seminar in moral theology in any Catholic university anywhere” (Bouquillon, quoted in Nuesse, 1986a: 613). In terms of content, suicide “had been considered in its philosophic, theological, juridical, and social aspects” and “that with the use of statistics, account had been taken of such factors as race, religion, social and political circumstances, the economic situation, and general morality” (Nuesse, 1986a: 614).199

199 Emile Durkheim published his study, Le Suicide, in 1897. Bouquillon’s seminar on suicide was, therefore, conducted some five years before Durkheim’s study. It is possible that Bouquillon knew Durkheim as he was very knowledgeable about European social thought and continued to attend conferences in Western Europe.
It seems fair, therefore, to regard Bouquillon as a progenitor of the social sciences at CUA. Apart from defining a general model for the “moral sciences” and developing an institution path, Bouquillon’s other contribution was training William Kerby and John Ryan – “the two pioneers of American Catholic social thought who were to rise to national influence as members of the university faculty” (Nuesse, 1986a: 605-606). Ryan was appointed to the Chair of Moral Theology in 1915, and was, therefore, not on the faculty when D. J. MacDonald was a graduate student there. MacDonald took sociology from Professor Kerby, though, during the 1910-1911 academic year. While Kerby gained national prominence during his life, he was also prominent within the University itself, such that, by 1903, it could be said that “his influence in every department of University activity has been far-reaching and constructive” (Senate Minutes, quoted in Nuesse, 1986b: 39).

Kerby had already been teaching sociology at CUA for 13 years when MacDonald became a graduate student. Kerby was recruited by President Keane to the new Chair in Sociology in 1895, and funded for his doctoral study in Europe. President Keane suggested he consider the University of Louvain which had opened its School of Political and Social Sciences a couple of years previously, but there was no doctoral program yet anywhere in Europe. At Louvain, “only in the Faculty of Arts would the Thomistic theologians have a stance favorable to the kind of program that Thomas Bouquillon, Bishop Keane and William Kerby had in mind” (Blasi, 2005: 115). It was home to the Neo-Scholastic, Désiré Mercier (later Cardinal Mercier) whose article “distinguishing between positive science and the positivism that the followers of Comte were propagating” (Nuesse, 2001: 650) was reprinted in 1895 in The Catholic University Bulletin. However, Bouquillon advised Kerby to go to Leipzig or Berlin.

After spending the summer of 1895 in Bonn, Kerby went to Berlin for the next three semesters, studying with Georg Simmel, Gustav von Schmoller, and Adolf Wagner, among others (Mulvaney, 1955). Kerby took five courses in ‘Nationalökonomie’ (three of them with Schmoller), a course in German social history, and four courses in the

His interest may just have arisen, though, out of a shared intellectual context. As Ian Hacking has demonstrated in *The Taming of Chance*, the concern with administrative statistics of this sort, equally in France, had a lengthy history well before Durkheim’s publication.

200 “Empirical Volkerpsychologie was to be found in Leipzig with Wilhelm Max Wundt, but William I. Thomas had yet to make it common sociological currency in the English-speaking world” (Blasi, 2005: 115-116).
philosophy of law and practical philosophy “in which many of the topics that were being included in the emerging European sociology were being treated” (Nuesse, 2001: 652). Above all, though, “all these topics might well have been given a focus by the lectures of Georg Simmel” (p. 652) in the course which Kerby took with him in sociology. In the fall of 1896, Kerby transferred to the University of Louvain and wrote a dissertation on socialism in its School of Political and Social Sciences — *Le socialisme aux États-Unis* (Kerby, 1897) — returning to Washington to start teaching in the fall of 1897. After examining Kerby’s detailed lecture notes, Nuesse concludes that “Kerby’s Berlin stay was clearly the more significant of the two years that he spent in Europe” (2000: 81).

Blasi records that the first part of Simmel’s course covered the history of sociological thought, touching on various mid- and late-nineteenth century social thinkers, and the second part covered material that was later published in Simmel’s *Soziologie* ([1908] 2009). Kerby’s sociology was rooted in Simmel’s ‘form sociology’, although he used the term ‘patterns of behavior’, rather than form. The Simmelian form is an ideal-type construction, but Simmel was more interested in the dynamics of social interaction than the civilizational dynamics which attracted Weber. What Kerby does is to insert this understanding of social cognition into a Thomist moral framework:

Morality for Kerby was not a matter of religious commands. In his day, Catholic moral thought had moved away from a normative approach. The pedagogical method in moral theology moved away from running through the Ten Commandments and instead used the Thomistic catalog of virtues and vices. The focus was on the quality of dispositions to act, not on rules … By focusing on interior intent and predispositions, the revived Thomistic approach would have the moral actor consider the quality of a proposed action, the quality of the means of accomplishing it, and the circumstances under which the action would be performed … The changed system of Catholic moral theology involved an analysis of the empirical situation, not a mechanical reading of a normative code. Empirical goods included one’s own welfare, but also the welfare of individual others and of the society as a whole (“common good”) (Blasi, 2005: 117-118).

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201 It should be noted that Anthony Blasi was one of the editors/translators of the Brill translation of Simmel’s text: *Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms*. I am drawing from Blasi’s account in the remainder of this paragraph.
The link between material goods and the satisfaction of human need, therefore, is not direct, as it was for Carl Menger in his ‘first edition’ position, but is mediated by human intention, which itself is dependent on the ultimate values held and the social forms which are available. As a result, socialization – into skills, the preferences of others, and sensitivity to the common good – becomes a critical vector for building virtue. Socialization, though, is aimed at building the moral character of people, and needs to be further fulfilled through the processes of individualization and idealization. Individualization revolves around the recognition of the individual as an end in himself, such that “social protection is assured to each part of society, each person, because personality is conceived as an end” (Kerby, 1948: 92). The reconciliation of socialization and individualization is achieved through idealization. “Idealization is the setting up and winning of respect for ideals by which both socialization and individualization are judged (p. 105). Kerby, therefore, was developing a sociology which moved some distance to satisfying Bouquillon’s conception of the moral sciences, where the particular sciences are enveloped within the larger frame of moral theology.

The inspiration for Kerby’s dissertation may have also had its source in Simmel’s course. Kerby’s notes from his time in Berlin include material about the involvement of the German churches, both Protestant and Catholic, in social reform (Blasi, 2005: 116). However, Simmel also “treated at some length the origins of conservatism and radicalism and the bases of social continuity” (Nuesse, 2000: 82). By the beginning of 1896, there is a shift in Kerby’s dissertation plans, with a decision to focus on socialism since he discovered for it in Europe “an enthusiasm before which argument is powerless” (Kerby to Keane, quoted in Nuesse, 2001: 652). In his dissertation at Louvain, Kerby indicated that he believed America, with its Christian and Democratic traditions, could avoid socialism, but was in danger of going too far and closing off legitimate avenues of reform. He argued that socialism “incited idealism without providing the adherent with a reasonable program based on an understanding of history and the limitations of human nature ... and threatened to suppress the individual personality” (Lavey, 1986: 101). His alternative was institutional social reform supported by a coalition of civil society

202 The first three chapters of the four chapter posthumous publication of Kerby’s sociology textbook, *Introduction to Social Living* (1948), are titled ‘Socialization’, ‘Individualization’, and ‘Idealization’.

elements (notably the churches and universities), with a positive but limited role for government (pp. 102-106).

In the years of his teaching before the First World War, Kerby revisited and expanded on many of these themes with an extensive publication record, but he also worked with them in the courses he offered, primarily to graduate student learners. In the 1896-97 academic year, Kerby offered a course in the ‘History and Literature of Sociology’, which was “designed to study sociological theory ‘historically rather than critically’ as subsequent announcements put it” and a course in the ‘Elements of Sociology’, which had “rather a methodological and philosophical cast” (Nuesse, 2001: 656). In the years remaining before the First World War, though, Kerby created a series of specialized courses building on his Berlin studies:

During 1898-99 Kerby added to his previous offerings a course on socialism and a seminar on sociological literature. During 1900-1901 he began to offer work “on the Labor Question and the Social Reform Program of the Catholic Church,” thus indicating the active interest in labor problems that he maintained for some years. During 1901-1902 he offered a course on the sociological aspects of the medieval guilds and during the following year a course on the sociological aspects of the labor movement … Other courses that Kerby introduced before 1915 treated “social processes in American life with particular reference to the functions of conservatism and radicalism” (1907-1908), the sociological background of poverty and aims and methods in charity (1908-1909), and principles and methods in social reform and social legislation (1910-11) (Nuesse, 2001: 656-657).

And it was in this last year that D. J. MacDonald from Antigonish did his graduate work with Kerby.

The Intellectual Perspective of D. J. MacDonald

MacDonald was no different than many of us in being subject to – perhaps even seeking out – multiple strands of influence in a complex path of intellectual and moral development. To make sense of MacDonald's intellectual outlook, we need to begin by locating his doctoral dissertation, which, unexpectedly, was in English.
In his graduate studies, D. J. MacDonald majored in English with a minor in Economics. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, English had a primacy in the educational curriculum derived from the Arnoldian model of ‘liberal education’. The study of literature and poetry was the glue that held the rest of the subjects together. The subject matter of MacDonald’s dissertation in English, then, might better be considered as a ‘capstone’ project for his studies in the social sciences, than it was an indication of competing interests.

Indeed, the title of MacDonald’s dissertation – *The Radicalism of Shelley and its Sources* – betrays the influence of Professor Kerby’s sociology. Kerby was drawn to the question of social change and published a number of articles about the relation between radicalism and conservatism, perhaps inspired initially by the lectures of Simmel on this question, as was indicated above. Apart from his studies of socialism and social change which started with his 1897 dissertation and continued through another ten journal articles, Kerby wrote directly on radicalism and conservatism in three articles: ‘Radical and Conservative Fault-Finding’ (1911), ‘The Conservative Mind’ (1920a), and ‘Processes in Radicalism’ (1920b), the last of which was read to the American Sociological Society, of which he was a member of the Executive at that time. So, it is not unexpected to see a topic in which Kerby is deeply interested, then show up as the topic of MacDonald’s dissertation.

Apart from the influence of Kerby, though, it must also have been the case that MacDonald felt some interest in, and perhaps attraction to, Romanticism. In an earlier chapter, I discussed Jansenism as an expression of the impulse for a ‘better appreciation’ of immutable reality. Romanticism also, at least in its philosophical and literary inquiry, focussed on the creative impulse and had some resonance with earlier Jansenism.204 Thomas O’Meara, a Dominican priest and now

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204 It should be understood that Jansenism was never altogether extinguished. Rev. Peter A. Nearing, an Antigonish priest and member of the St. F.X. Extension staff in the 1930s, in a 1965 interview about Bishop John R. MacDonald (who succeeded Archbishop James Morrison to the Antigonish Diocese in 1950), commented that “we talk a lot about Jansenism and the results of Jansenism” (Antigonish Diocesan Archive, Peter Nearing Papers, Fonds 9, Series 2, Sub-Series 1). This, comment, it should be remembered, was made over 250 years after *Unigenitus*, the 1713 encyclical which condemned Jansenism. Nearing summarized his own assessment of the Antigonish Movement in a 1937 article, arguing that “the necessity of intelligent [social] reconstruction is evident” (p. 76) and that “the modern vehicle which carries the common man to the point where he may embark upon the great journey of exploration into those foreign lands of spiritual and material greatness is adult education and consumer’s co-operation” (p.79). It is worth noting that Nearing’s
Emeritus Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame, in his influential book, *Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism*, writes:

There are, in the cultural history of the nineteenth century, two great segments; the middle of the century, particularly the years leading to 1848, separates them. The following pages chart the first segment; in many ways the rest of the century – modernism, late Romanticism, neo-scholasticism, socialism – are a reaction to the creativity of the first decades … The upheavals in church and theology before and after Vatican II have their sources in this earlier renewal, a stream which rose in 1790 and ebbed after 1840 … only to rise again in our century (O’Meara, 1982: 12, 15)

In any event, in his dissertation, MacDonald conducts an inquiry into Shelley’s intellectual influences, and uses that to contextualize Shelley’s poetic output. He concludes that Shelley expressed a noble impulse for reform, but was hampered by a limited sociology:

“It cannot be said that Shelley had a clear consciousness of the social forces at work in society or of the good being done by the institutions of his time … Shelley would do away with government and authority. Surely some would say, that is enough to discredit him as a thinker forever. On the contrary, it shows how far in advance of his time he was; it shows he had a good grasp of the sociological principle that the less compulsion and the more cooperation under direction there is in any state the better it is … Shelley may not have the ‘sense of established facts,’ and may be unable to offer suggestions which will work out well in practice, but he does infuse a higher and a nobler conception of life into the consciousness of a people” (MacDonald, 1912: 141, 152).

This claim that MacDonald’s dissertation was built around themes of social reform – is given support with the pattern of teaching appointments which MacDonald assumed at St. F.X. after his return. In the first year of his appointment to the faculty at St. Francis Xavier University, 1912/13, MacDonald’s position was ‘Lecturer in English Literature and History’, assisting A. G. MacEchen, ‘Professor English Literature, Political Economy & Law’. In the second and third years, MacDonald took over from Professor MacEchen with the position

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article was published in the journal, *Rural Sociology*, which had strong editorial links to the University of Wisconsin and the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics (see Gilbert, 2015). It may not also be an accident that Edwin O’Hara of CUA was a contributing editor.
‘Lecturer in English Language, Sociology & Economics’. In the fourth year, 1915/16, MacDonald’s position was ‘Lecturer in Sociology & Economics’, but this was reversed in the fifth years to give precedence to Economics, with the position titled, ‘Lecturer in Economics & Sociology’, and MacDonald was raised to ‘Professor in Economics & Sociology’ in the following year, 1917/18. For the next three of the immediate postwar years, 1918/19 – 1920/21, MacDonald benefited from the appointment of Henry Somerville as Lecturer in Sociology, allowing MacDonald to consolidate his position as ‘Professor of Economics’.205 For the following three years, 1921/22–1923/24, MacDonald continued in the position as ‘Professor of Economics’, although now teaching in sociology as well, perhaps hoping to regain another lecturer in sociology. In 1924-25, MacDonald’s position is renamed ‘Professor of Economics & Sociology’, a title he retains until his retirement from the university in 1944. How do we make sense of this rotation around economics and sociology?

The Simmelian sociology in which Kerby was trained, and later reproduced in his teaching, provided latitude for an alternative to the evolutionary models being developed in America. In the German tradition, sociology grew out of economics itself in a schema with a much broader economic horizon. In the Anglo-French tradition, on the other hand, sociology was conceptualized along Comtean lines as an inversion of the Christian ontology of the sacred and secular, such that society was reified and sociology was enthroned as the queen of the social sciences. In his 1922 ‘Amalgamation Report’, MacDonald shows himself to be thoroughly familiar with, and hostile to, the social determinism of the early American literature in sociology.206

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205 Somerville, an Englishman, had founded the Catholic Socialist Society in Britain in 1907. He came to Canada in late 1915 where he made a name for himself in Catholic circles with a column on social reform in The Catholic Register. Quick to recruit talent, St. F.X. gave him a three-year appointment as Lecturer in Sociology, beginning in the fall semester of 1918; unfortunately, Somerville had to return to England late in the second year of his appointment because of family obligations. He returned to Canada in 1933 upon the offer of a position as editor of The Catholic Register, a position he held for the next 20 years until his death. Jeanne Beck has suggested that “Henry Somerville was for many years, particularly during the 1930s, the most influential layman in the English-speaking Catholic Church in Canada” (Beck, 1977: 434; Cf. Beck, 1975 and 1993, and Sinasac, 2003).

206 Among American sociologists which would still be recognized, he quotes from Robert E. Park, Franklin Giddings, Charles Ellwood, William I. Thomas, Charles Sumner, Edward A. Ross, and Robert MacIver. By the time of Parsons’ 1937 reconstruction of sociology around Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, Simmel had been eliminated and Weber assimilated. The positivism of American
MacDonald later defined sociology as "the science which attempts to
describe the origin, growth, structure and functioning of group life by
the operation of geographical, biological, psychological, and cultural
forces, operating in interpenetration through a process of evolution"
(MacDonald, 1931). I suggest that the determinism of Anglo-French
sociology pushed MacDonald toward economics, defined in the then
conventional manner as the ordinary business of life, but with the
German focus on ethics:207

They say that Economics investigates the laws governing the
production and distribution of wealth and that it takes no account
of the ethical value of these laws. This opinion is fast losing ground
however, and the best economists of today recognize the intimate
connection between the subject matter of Economics and the
subject matter of Ethics and Religion ... Chemistry and other
physical sciences are neither Christian nor anti-Christian, but this is
not true of Economics. Chemistry deals with the actions of matter
— dead matter — of molecules and of atoms; but Economics with the
actions of men, and with these the Church is greatly concerned
(MacDonald, 1915; emphasis added).

This kind of focus on economics rather than sociology was, in fact,
rather common, particularly among Catholics within social science. At
the Catholic University of America, for instance, William Kerby was
the sole appointment in sociology until 1915. At that point, Dr. John
O’Grady, who had just taken his doctorate in economics, was hired,
initially “engaged to help with the social work activities of the
Department”, but appointed as Professor of Sociology in 1928
(Mulvaney, 1955: 268). So, the priority given to economics by D. J.
MacDonald is understandable, and his expertise in sociology was still
recognized by his colleagues. In a letter from Moses Coady to Dr.
MacPherson while doing studies in education at CUA during the
1914/15 academic year (dated 30 October, 1914), Coady writes about
wanting to take some courses in sociology: “I should, I suppose take
some sociology for this and may do so later. Does Dr. D. J. teach any
sociology at St. F.X? If I could get an elementary course at home it
would be just as good.” (G5/9/2007, St. F.X. Archives).

207 One of the textbooks that MacDonald used was William Smart’s An Introduction
to the Theory of Value on the Lines of Menger, Wieser, and Bohm-Bawerk (1891, 1910).

The link between MacDonald's economics and his sociology is shown quite clearly in his discussion of economic scarcity:

Again, Economics deals with the wants of men, and with the good upon which the satisfaction of these wants depends. There are more wants than goods to satisfy them. Where there is scarcity, there will be two men wanting the same thing, and consequently an antagonism of interests ... [But] Economics is concerned not only with the conflict between man and man for the possession of economic goods but also with a conflict of interests within the individual himself ... If one desire is satisfied some other desire must remain unsatisfied ... This conflict may be lessened by either modifying our desires or by increasing the volume of want satisfying goods. The Church has something to say about regulating desires. It grades them for us in some cases, tells us which are the important ones, and which not. In this way the Church affects the value of things for the value of things depends on the desire, the demand for them (MacDonald, 1915).

The crucial difference from what later became neoclassical economics revolves around the treatment of preferences. For MacDonald’s social economics, preferences were not given, but were a variable that could and should be taught and socialized. That socialization of desire, however, most importantly of the young, is slow work. “Men are naturally conservative, they do not readily give up old habits and old ways of thinking” (MacDonald, 1915):

In the family one gets one’s first habits. There one gets one’s language, one’s religion, one’s like and dislikes; there the child adopts unconsciously the ways of talking, of thinking, and acting of his parents. We are all chips off the old block, not so much because of physical inheritance, but because of the traits that we have developed in family relationships. Moreover, there is a natural tendency to look for the approbation of others, and on that account we act as others act in our environment (MacDonald, 1943).

The right ordering of desires must ultimately be aligned with “the eternal law or God's plan” (MacDonald, 1939: 12). Ultimate values were not arbitrary for MacDonald, therefore, but already given to ethics as natural law:

According to individualism, the goal of man is freedom. But freedom is not the goal of man. In Christian ethics, freedom is the indispensable free condition for the moral act of man, but as such it is only the means for the attainment of man's ultimate aim, i.e., his
perfection and final union with god. The goal of all men, is man's perfection, material and spiritual (MacDonald, 1939: 13).

The alignment of desires with the principles of Christianity leads to a demand for the “renovation of spiritual and material orders” (MacDonald, 1915). “This means,” argued MacDonald, “the re-shaping of society for the better or in more detail a co-operative effort toward the development of a social order in which there is less friction and more harmony, a world where there is more human well-being for all” (Macdonald, 1931).

In his early essay, “Economics and the Church”, while still fresh from his doctoral studies, MacDonal d (1915) made it clear that, what later was referred to by Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1951) as the ‘vocational order’, was the basis for an appropriate and viable strategy for the reconstruction of society. He began by referring to the late medieval guilds:

To protect themselves against excessive legislation, and to defend their trade against aggression, the members of each trade leagued themselves into a guild. These trade guilds were prevalent in every town in the 15th century. They were not combinations of laborers to resist capitalists, but they comprised all the members of the trade both employers and employed. The members were knit together by bonds of religion, of mutual help and of trade interest. The rich burgher and the poor journeyman met on terms of equality … The union created by the guild minimized oppression and gave to the poorer craftsman a certain measure of content and a sense of security that the workman does not enjoy today … They saw to it that a workman got a decent living and neither he nor his family would suffer want. Besides being brotherhoods for the temporal welfare of their members, the guilds were also religious confraternities. They paid as much, if not more, care to the spiritual side of life (MacDonald, 1916).

MacDonald then tied this to the efforts at social reform that had been made in Europe in recent decades. He referred to Catholic work being done in Germany to promote social legislation, and identifies the “campaign of social reform” and the “methods of co-operation” that were inspired by Bishop Ketteler. He went on to report that “in France, Switzerland, and Belgium, every town has its Catholic

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208 Von Nell-Breuning, it will be remembered, was a principal author in the drafting of the encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno.
association of workmen”, and celebrated “the great work of Cardinal Manning in behalf of the working classes” of England, embodied there “in the Catholic social Guild”. Finally, he commented on the American interest in the social question, the development of “social science schools in all our large Catholic universities” and “the works of Dr. Kerby and Dr. Ryan of The Catholic University”, of which Ryan’s book, A Living Wage (1906) was “the foundation rock on which all advocates of a living wage base their claims” (MacDonald, 1916).209 MacDonald concluded by connecting the économie sociale of this reform with the guild model he had outlined:

These efforts are having their effect and we now find a disposition among governments to go back to the old method, to go back and regulate as was done in the Middle Ages. People see that it is not right to leave the fixing of prices to unrestrained competition; they see that the strong oppress the weak, and hence the need of regulation and restraint. We are beginning to get minimum wage laws, Old Age Pensions, workmen’s compensation acts, &c. We are beginning in a word to go back to the system of the Middle Ages (MacDonald, 1916).

The ‘Banker’ of the Antigonish Movement

The theoretical understanding which MacDonald absorbed at CUA was combined with MacDonald’s cultural location in the ‘Heatherton Inheritance’. As I have described it, the Heatherton community, clan-organized and Jansenist-influenced, was the ‘seat’ of the Scottish resistance to the ultramontanist campaign which had been waged by Bishop Cameron. The Antigonish Movement became a platform for that resistance to be advanced and placed within a world-historical mission.

MacDonald, as we saw earlier from Coady’s remark about sociology, was known as “D.J.”. This was no doubt an aid to distinguishing among the various MacDonald clansmen at St. F.X., but it was also a

209 MacDonald had an ongoing relationship with both Kerby and Ryan: He used publications of Kerby’s ‘National Conference of Catholic Charities’ for many years in his ‘Introduction to Sociology’ courses, and Ryan was invited to speak at an Antigonish conference in 1920, and various of his writings were reprinted and circulated in the Diocese.
mark of affection, confidence, and respect. D. J. Macdonald was an ‘insider’ at Antigonish who worked closely with the key figures in the Antigonish Movement. In many ways, MacDonald was something of an ‘éminence grise’ who played his role behind the public scene. Although having a strong philosophical commitment to social reform, the chief role he was to play was administrative. MacDonald, it can be said, was the ‘banker’ for the Antigonish Movement.

Indeed, it was no accident that Daniel’s younger brother, A.B. Macdonald became the public face as ‘organizer’ of the movement, as distinct from Coady, the ‘animateur’ or Tompkins, the ‘visionary’. Of these three leaders, A(ngus) B(ernard) MacDonald was the one who was most involved in the formation of credit unions, and later founded, first, the Nova Scotia Credit Union League, and then the Co-operative Union of Canada. It was the same capability for organization and administration which his older brother Daniel had.

I have described the intellectual formation of MacDonald in some detail in order to locate him as one of the major conduits for the theoretical influences on the Movement, working with the intellectual tools that were then available. He himself made no theoretical advance, and there is no evidence that he was aware of German theoretical work, beyond that of Simmel whom he would have known through Kerby; most of his activities were involved in teaching and administration, and he did not write much. And, yet, what writings do survive show a deft and confident handling of theoretical concepts that were far removed from the practical organizing problems of the Antigonish Movement, and an unyielding commitment to the transformation of society. It was no accident, therefore, that Tompkins referred to MacDonald as being the most radical of them all (Tompkins, 1924; cited in Cameron, 1996: 472). Tompkins said this, it seems evident, because he recognized the intellectual prowess of MacDonald’s capacity to penetrate to fundamentals. In the spring of 1936, for instance, Tompkins wrote a letter to A. B. MacDonald discussing a book by Father John Ryan on social reconstruction, asking ‘A.B.’ to speak to his brother about the suitability of reproducing one of the chapters for dissemination in the diocese (RG30-2/21, R345d, St. F.X. Archives). Tompkins was enrolling D. J. MacDonald in

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210 A. B. Macdonald did an undergraduate arts degree at St. F.X., a degree in agriculture at the Nova Scotia College of Agriculture in Truro, and graduate work in agriculture, economics, and education at the Ontario Agricultural College in Guelph, at the University of Toronto, and at the Ontario School of Education (RG25.3/4/2731, “Biography of A. B. Macdonald”, St. Francis Xavier University Archives).
‘vetting’ the theoretical stance of the Movement. This mastery of fundamentals was given final expression in the Memorial in The Casket after MacDonald’s death:

Dr. D.J. had a keen sense of justice. He could not tolerate the enslavement of men by unjust employers or a system which permitted men to be enslaved. In company with other pioneers in the St. F.X. social movement, he saw the feasibility of a full, free life for every person within the framework of a Christian society. He saw Christianity as a practical way of life (The Casket, Sep 16, 1948).

MacDonald’s first significant effort at uniting his theoretical understanding with his administrative capability occurred with his authorship of “A Report on the Proposed Federation of the Maritime Universities” presented to the Governors of St. F.X. in 1922. The Carnegie Foundation, concerned about the volume of requests for financial assistance from the various Maritime universities, had commissioned a member of their staff, Dr. William S. Learned, and the President of Bowdoin College in Maine, Dr. Kenneth C. M. Sills, to investigate the situation of the Maritime colleges and to recommend “a constructive policy for the treatment particularly of the institutions that had applied for aid” (Learned and Sills, 1922: vii). In their report, published in the spring of 1922, they made a recommendation for a ‘confederation’ of the institutions of higher education, centred on Dalhousie University in Halifax. This proposal, however, did not adequately account for the religious foundation of the different colleges – Acadia (Baptist), Mount Allison (Methodist), St. Francis Xavier and Saint Mary’s (Roman Catholic), and Dalhousie (by default, Presbyterian) – and the parallel geographical location of their constituencies. MacDonald’s report was scathing in its rejection of the proposed ‘confederation’, arguing that the undergraduate liberal arts institution served a vital and essential function in the economic and social life of its region, that St. F.X. satisfied the minimum scale requirements for an efficient operation, and that the inevitably procrustean bed of studies at Dalhousie would lead to the secularization of values, the erosion of religious vocations, and the undermining of Catholic society in Eastern Nova Scotia. Tompkins, the most ardent supporter of ‘confederation’ among the diocesan priests, claimed that MacDonald did not believe a word of the report he had written (Tompkins, 1924; cited in Cameron, 1996: 472), but given the intellectual passion with which MacDonald advances his argument against ‘confederation’, this comment strains credulity to the point of breaking. Tompkins’ observation is, rather, an indication of how clouded Tompkins’ own judgement could become in the face of
his own passions. From our present location in history, it seems almost self-evidently true that ‘confederation’ would not, in fact, have served the interests of St. F.X., the Catholic faith, or the people of Eastern Nova Scotia. History, it seems, would have sided with the judgements of Father MacDonald and Bishop Morrison on this matter, not with the opinions of Father Tompkins. In any event, the Report prepared by MacDonald was such as to convince the Board of Governors not to proceed with the talks on amalgamation, but to turn its attention to his own alternative, “the reform of Maritime rural life and economic relations” (Cameron, 1996: 241).

The Report opened an administrative path for MacDonald, and it was in just this way that he could serve the Antigonish Movement. Having the confidence of both Bishop Morrison and the Board of Governors, MacDonald was appointed as Vice-Rector in 1925, and then to the Office of Vice-President in 1930. The retirement of H. P. MacPherson in 1936, at the end of a thirty-six year Presidency (1900-1936), came as a shock to the university community, but it provided an opening for MacDonald, at the age of 55, to succeed him to the Presidency of St. F.X.

By then, the Antigonish Movement was in full stride.211 In its classic form, the ‘mass meeting’ was the initial building block of the Movement, followed by the formation of study-groups proceeding “on the general principle that study should issue as soon as possible in action calculated to bring about the economic betterment of the people” (RG31.3/25/973, St. Francis Xavier University Archives). The Extension Department of St. F.X., the animation and organizing unit of the Movement, was formed in 1928 with Moses Coady as its Director. In 1931-32, the Department organized 280 ‘mass meetings’ with some 20,000 people attending. In the five years ending in 1935-36, the number of mass meetings annually had risen to 470 with some 43,000 people attending. Apart from the community organizers

211 There is a large literature about the Antigonish Movement, including 13 doctoral dissertations (Alexander, 1985; Burbridge, 1943; Dennis, 2015; Dutcher, 2001; Hogan, 1986; Laidlaw, 1958; MacInnes, 1978; Mifflen, 1974; Murphy, 1949; Neal, 1995; Sacouman, 1976; Schirber, 1940; Sowder, 1967), a number of which have later been published as books. A handful of other scholarly monographs have been published as specialized studies (Coutinho, 1966; Dodara and Pluta, 2012; Ludlow, 2015; MacPherson, 1979; Mathews, 1999), and the influential collection of essays edited by Brym and Sacouman (1979) should be mentioned. Finally, there is a literature by Movement workers; see, for instance: Boyle, 1953; Coady, 1939, 1971; Delaney, 1985. Beyond this, there is a voluminous literature of popular books, articles, and secondary studies which are readily accessible.
themselves, this activity was supported by an annual ‘Rural and Industrial Conference’, a yearly ‘Short Course for Leaders’, a bi-weekly Extension Bulletin, and a resource library of books, pamphlets and articles. The achievements were found in the formation of co-operative stores, producer co-operatives, and credit unions. In his 1939 paper presented to the Canadian Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, MacDonald reported that the Antigonish Movement then had 11 full-time, 2 part-time, and 30 project workers. What is remarkable about this situation is that the number of Extension workers was then greater than the entire teaching faculty of the university. That situation speaks not just to the charisma and organizing capabilities of the Movement leadership, but to the anchoring hand of MacDonald's back-office capabilities as the ‘banker’ for the Movement.212

MacDonald's alignment with the aims of the Antigonish Movement is perhaps displayed best in his 1939 paper. The paper was titled, 'The Philosophy of the Antigonish Movement', and shows that MacDonald was every bit as committed to the world-historical mission of the Movement as Coady was. He uses this paper to outline the aim of adult education to raise up the poor and dispossessed and help them organize themselves cooperatively to build institutions of self-help and renewal. As he says, “Nowadays not so much attention is paid to bombing the Maginot line of the entrenched interests, but stress is laid rather on the value of study, and of the co-operative movement” (MacDonald, 1939: 7). After detailing the various forms of co-operation which have been developed under Movement auspices, MacDonald expands the discourse to claim that “the social injustice and misery that prevail come from either the individualist or collectivist philosophies” (p. 11). Arguing that they are philosophically problematic, he indicates that “the Antigonish Movement is entirely antagonistic to these two philosophies” (p. 16), and proceeds to make the case for co-operation as the ‘solution’ for these social and economic ills. He quotes Cardinal Capecelatro who argues for an emerging apologia – a justification for social action – as the product of Catholicism and the science that Catholicism inspires:

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212 The role of banker is one at arm's length from day-to-day transactions, but is involved in the review, assessment, and possible underwriting of the strategic allocation of funds. The minutes for Sept. 11 and Sept. 18, 1939 of the Board of Governors' Committee on Extension Expenses, on which D. J. MacDonald sat, provide a good example of the extent to which the spending envelope of Extension was dependent on the strategic decisions relating to a larger financial architecture (Minutes, BOG Committee on Extension Expense, St. F.X. Archives).
God Almighty has so constituted the Christian life, that in every age or rather in every series of ages, it appears with a new apologia, due to the new conditions of the race. Now, in our day, if I am not deceived, this new apologia will be the product of the Social Question, and progress in that question will most certainly be made in the name of Jesus Christ living in His Church. To the classic defences of the past — the martyrdom, to the more perfect sanctity of the Church, to the doctrine of the Fathers, to the monastic life, to the overthrow of barbarous Powers, to Christian Art and literature, to the harmony of science and faith, and the new forms of charity of the last two centuries will be added this fresh apologia, a solution of the Social Question by Catholicism and by the Science Catholicism inspires (Capecelatro (1909); quoted in MacDonald, 1939: 17).

MacDonald defines the world-historical mission of the Antigonish Movement with its philosophy of co-operation as the means to a resolution of the Social Question. The implication is that all the world was conspiring in this Movement as the fulfillment of the Church’s social teaching. MacDonald closes his lecture with the words of uplift and encouragement by Cardinal Pacelli to Bishop Morrison:213 “They (the teachers of St. Francis Xavier University), strive to help them (the poor) better their lot in such a way that the full teaching of the encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno may be put into practice” (MacDonald, 1939: 26-27).

In the earlier chapter on ‘The Heatherton Inheritance’, I described the intellectual culture into which D. J. MacDonald was born: a Scottish Highland, Jansenist-influenced Catholicism, of rural farming and self-sufficient economies, organized in a clan-based system of affiliation and reciprocity. In this chapter, I have sought to describe the more proximate intellectual influences on MacDonald. In doing so, I have concentrated on his graduate education at the Catholic University of America in Washington. I then tried to show how that intellectual

213 Letter to Morrison, March 8, 1938. Cardinal Pacelli was raised to the papacy as Pius XII on March 2, 1939.
platform provided the foundation for MacDonald's back-office leadership as the 'banker' of the Antigonish Movement.

Certainly the texts which MacDonald used most frequently in his courses at St. F.X. were consistent with his training. I focussed attention then on the writings of MacDonald himself, and tried to show that they were broadly consistent with a pattern evident in the early foundation of social science there by Thomas Bouquillon, and the later teachings of Frank O'Hara and William Kerby. I suggested that what was common was an approach in which the specialized social sciences were contained within a framework of moral theology.

In the case of MacDonald, his interests were more strongly focussed on the economic than the sociological, and his sociology seems to find a place as part of his own économie sociale. No doubt, this interest was more compatible with the pragmatic Scottish culture in which Macdonald was raised. However, his economics was conditioned by the Anglo-French tradition of social science, rather than the new theoretical models then being developed in German social science, and there is no hint of the methodological concerns that we find with Weber. In MacDonald's takeup of the Anglo-French models of social reform, MacDonald is attracted to a reconstruction of the vocational order with the model of the medieval guild. Rather than a state-led approach to regulation, however, he is committed to an 'économie sociale from-below', the approach with which Kerby would have become familiar at Louvain. The Antigonish co-operative movement was simply the contemporary expression of the medieval guild built from the bottom up.

The failure to grasp the deeper theoretical issues of German Sozialökonomik, however, left MacDonald and the Antigonish Movement critically vulnerable. With the neoclassical synthesis of postwar economics, there was not an adequate philosophical or practical response to the market competition that the cooperative enterprise began to face. Dodara and Pluta (2012), in their recent analysis, flag the failure to integrate the various economic activities into a self-generating system. That failure, however, was, not just one of practice, but was, more critically, a theoretical failure. The Antigonish Movement was theoretically too weak to survive the postwar assault on its practices.

Given the theoretical developments that have happened since then – something about which I will make a few comments in the concluding chapter – hindsight suggests that it would have been virtually impossible for those brave activists to have found the deeper
solutions that were required. That task, in fact, awaits a new Antigonish Movement in the present day.
9 Conclusion

A simple answer to the intellectual origins of the Antigonish Movement would have been to say that it was inspired by that great initial statement of Catholic social doctrine, *Rerum Novarum*, the 1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. The encyclical arguments are palpable on almost every page of D. J. MacDonald's own ‘economic manifesto’, *Economics and the Church*, published in 1915. But the simple answer begs the question of why those ideas resonated for MacDonald and for the other Antigonish leaders, and it ignores the question of specifically which ideas had the most prominence, what elements were pushed forward, and what resisted.

I have attempted to address the question of this resonance through the concept of the social imaginary. I tried to explain how ideas are both descriptions and justifications of the practices and the formal institutions of social life, and constitute the background understanding that is the normative framework for human conduct. In carrying out my study of the Antigonish social imaginary, we might call the method I have tried to develop here ‘historico-cultural exegesis’.

I have elaborated the long modern contention between authority and reform in the Catholic Church, what I called the tension between ‘immutable reality’ and a ‘better appreciation’. I tried to show how the longing for a ‘better appreciation’ in the Jansenist movement became culturally embedded in different European societies, particularly after the suppression of its doctrinal theology during the second half of the seventeenth century. I went on to show how the particular circumstances of the revival of Celtic Catholicism in the Western Isles and Highlands of Scotland had eventually led to the training of Bishop Fraser and many of the early Antigonish priests at the Valladolid seminary in Spain, then still influenced by the cultural opening to a ‘better appreciation’ which had flowered in that country. It is primarily this Jansenist-influenced Clan Catholicism that underpins the Antigonish political imaginary. It was only secondarily
informed by the theoretical synthesis in Catholic political thought that had begun to develop during the nineteenth century.

It is the economic imaginary that is more critical for the main work of the Antigonish Movement. In the two-sector model of modernity—civil society and the state—the economic priority of self-interest takes precedence over the common goods of the state. Notwithstanding the Hegelian finesse, this was so both for Liberalism and for Marxism during the nineteenth century. The early contribution of the Jansenists to this conceptual revolution is not accidental. In their desire for a more authentic spiritual life, they focused attention on concupiscence, the preferment of self or self-love to God. Given the pervasive sinfulness of mankind, the logic of Jansenism required that they had to explain the degree of social order which is actually present in terms of the debased actions of self-love. This early moment in the naturalization of human nature, when combined with the naturalization of means through the sciences, constituted the emergence of the modern economic imaginary. It resulted, however, in a great intellectual resistance during the nineteenth century, most prominently in Germany. I traced that resistance through the considerable intellectual achievements of German historical economics, and the parallel but theoretically weak movement of économie sociale which was to mediate the direct influence on D. J. MacDonald. That influence is evident in the co-operative formula, where the Antigonish Movement allowed for self-interest with patronage dividends and allowed for the common good with one-member-one-vote.214

I have suggested that the Antigonish Movement lacked theoretical capabilities of its own. MacDonald was probably the most theoretically adept of the group, yet he was not familiar with Weber’s work and did not develop any meaningful social science. The Antigonish Movement drew on the best theory that was available to them, something that can only be described as a set of partial solutions. In the interwar period, properly the years of the Antigonish Movement, the leadership was at least resolutely clear that they were not aiming at bringing the marginalized into full participation, as most social movements are today. They aimed, rather, at developing a systematic alternative to the aggressive merchant capitalism that they faced.215 In order to understand the failure of the Antigonish Movement, it will be helpful to place the Movement within the larger

214 The most glaring practical failure of the co-operative model was its inability to solve the problem of raising capital.
arc of civil society development which underpins the narrative I have provided.

I began by outlining the gradual separation of economic and legal practice from that of theology during the transition from the medieval *communicatio politica* of Moerbeke to the early renaissance modernity of Leonardo Bruni and his *societas civilis*. I tried to show that the Renaissance renewal of interest in, and scholarship about, the ancient world had shifted the Scholastic conception of politics as ‘a making common of’ to a unitary conception of the city-state drawn from the Roman imperium, and later apostatized as absolute monarchy.

The modern conception of civil society emerged out of the prolonged struggle over the question of reform. In the Catholic history that I surveyed, this question was occupied by a struggle between Jansenists and Jesuits, between renewal from below and renewal from above. Supported by the intellectual class of the ‘city’, the growing networks of trade and finance, and the various forms of religious dissent, Enlightenment philosophies built on this reform platform by naturalizing interests and the social order, and refounding civil society on ‘commercial sociability’. Unlike the unitary model of civil society which had existed until then, civil society in middle modernity decomposed into what Kupyers referred to as ‘spheres of sovereignty’, the most important of which was the decomposition into political life and economic life, now the ‘state’ and the ‘market’.

The first systematic effort at theorizing a three-sector model of civil society that directly addresses and goes beyond the two-sector model of modernity was Gramsci’s reconstruction of Marxism\(^{216}\):

The unique position that civil society occupies in Gramsci’s conceptual system causes not one but two reversals as regards the

\(^{215}\) It is certainly fair to see a failure by the Movement to adequately understand and respond to the industrial capitalism which developed around coal and steel in Cape Breton, and to some extent in Pictou.

\(^{216}\) Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) also conceptualized a three-sector model of *state, political society, and civil society*, although not engaged with or responding to the Hegelian model. His work, influenced most importantly by Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, focuses essentially on the political imaginary of modernity, something he travelled to witness in America for himself. His humility and, perhaps as a result, his sensitivity and insight into human affairs, has provided a resource in his masterwork, *Democracy in America*, which has had a large and growing impact on the theorization of civil society in recent years. What similarities there are, though, between Tocqueville and Gramsci concerning the importance of voluntary associations are co-incidental, as they have quite different intellectual foundations.
traditional, scholastic interpretation of the thought of Marx and Engels: the first consists in his according primacy to the superstructure over the base; the second in the primacy given, within the superstructure itself, to the ideological factor over the institutional factor (Bobbio, 1988: 88).

Gramsci’s mature position was only fully developed in his “Prison Notebooks”, which were just published in English in the 1970s. The recovery of the concept of civil society from its last prominence with Hegel, began, most importantly, in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s in reference to the “Committee for the Defence of Workers” (later named “Committee for Social Defence”), one of the precursors to the formation of the Polish labour movement, Solidarity. Jacques Rupnik, a Czech intellectual, writing at that time suggested a transition had occurred between 1968 and 1978, which he represented as “the end of revisionism and the rebirth of civil society” (Rupnik, 1979, quoted in Pelcynski, 1988: 361). What Rupnik was referring to was the emergence of a new form of democratic opposition in Poland that developed in the late 1970s. Adam Michnik, one of its Polish theoreticians, referring to it as ‘the new evolutionism’, “postulated the creation of all kinds of independent, self-governing associations and publications alongside the party-controlled institutional framework, through which social pressure could be even more powerfully exercised” (p. 362). The parallels with Gramsci’s work are obvious. In the following years, the theoretical problems in mapping Polish practice with Gramscian theory became clearer, and Gramsci became part of the background.

The recovery of a theory of civil society during the 1980s, which seemed to get empirical justification with the election of Solidarity in Poland and the fall of the Berlin Wall, led to a large international scholarly attention to the concept of civil society, first crossing more than 40,000 publications per year in 2003 and continuing above that level ever since. The attention has been such that John Ehrenberg, writing in 2017, suggested that civil society has, in the past thirty-five years, moved “to the center of democratic theory and political discourse” (2017: 1). Since that early recovery of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, scholarly work which uses a three-sector model of civil society is now everywhere in abundance, although there is, as we would expect, less work on its theoretical development.217

217 Among those works I would mention are John Keane’s Civil Society and the State (1988), Cohen and Arato’s Civil Society and Political Theory (1992), Adam Seligman’s The Idea of Civil Society (1992), Jeffrey Alexander’s The Civil Sphere (2006), and Peter
The recent publication of Lester Salamon’s study, *Explaining Civil Society Development*, is a good illustration of a particular take-up of civil society that is now common (Salamon, Sokolowski and Haddock, 2017). The book is the “capstone product” of a twenty-five year project as the “Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project”, a project which involved local study teams in 41 countries, produced an entire book series, 66 working papers, over 200 other articles and reports, and “two landmark additions to the official global statistical system” (pp. xiii-iv). It is an example of what Michael Burawoy would have called “professional” sociology at its best (Burawoy, 2005).

Operationalizing their definition of civil society as the non-profit sector, they estimate that civil sector employment averages 6% of the economically active population across the countries they have surveyed from a low of 1% in Romania to 16% in the Netherlands, growing, however, at 4.6% per year during their period of analysis. Pertinent for our discussion is their separation of “expressive” from “service” activities, with expressive functions including things such as advocacy, cultural expression, human rights, and religion, and service functions including things such as health, education, and welfare services. The Gramscian distinction between ideological and institutional functions is, therefore, vacated without any theoretical argument for what is distinct about the non-profit sector beyond its instantiation as a particular corporate form.

The opening of a theory of civil society in the 1980s to a central focus on its meaning-making function was significant. But the key theoretical issues are quite different than can be advanced by focussing on its corporate form. The most urgent relate to the foundational role of the family, the institutional pre-requisites of civil society, and human nature as ‘*imago dei*’.

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218 For this reason, they did not include cooperatives and mutuals “that do not adhere to the nondistribution constraint” (p. 11).

219 This compares to overall economic growth of 1.1% growth across the sample countries during the same period. The growth estimates were drawn from a study of employment growth rates for 14 countries between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s.

220 A serious examination of these issues is well-beyond the scope of this study apart from the few notes I make in the following paragraph, and well-beyond my existing knowledge as well. There is a complex and extensive literature that engages all three issues, and others besides.
In the modern conception of civil society, the family was privatized and excluded as a theoretical object. The family, however, is the central medium of meaning-making. The missing family is connected with the theoretical ambiguity in the concept of an institution itself, and it is not clear that the opening to meaning-making does not also require an institutional embedding – the Gramscian separation seems too sharp. This ambiguity can also be seen in the postwar settlement in western societies which saw the rise of the welfare state. This settlement can equally be understood as the removal of institutional duties from the church, for there has never been an historical situation in which there were no welfare services. The de-Christianization which has accompanied that state expropriation of welfare functions raises fundamental questions about the institutional pre-requisites for an autonomous meaning-making. Finally, the conception of self-interest as an instrument for good was dependent on the naturalization project of modernity. Without it, both self-interest and, its theoretical complement, altruism, fail. The transcendence of modernity simply cannot be accomplished without the recovery of an understanding of human nature as ‘imago dei’, without a conception that is strong enough to incinerate self-interest.

In light of these comments about the theory of civil society, it should be clear that the Antigonish Movement had no real chance of building an alternative to the modern social order. The Antigonish Movement grew out of the nineteenth-century movements of resistance in political and economic thought, and even then before either ideology had received a mature formulation. The theoretical limitations of the early formulations blinded the Movement to the intellectual objections which, after World War II, would eventually carry the day. In other words, the Antigonish Movement, I suggest, should be seen as a way-station in a longer trajectory.

At the local level, an empirical inquiry into the development of the modern social imaginary in the Saint John River Valley of New Brunswick might bear much fruit. Unlike Nova Scotia, the Christian Evangelical tradition in New Brunswick has been much more dominant. Wilfred Currier Keirstead and Alfred G. Bailey were major figures in the social sciences at the University of New Brunswick during the early and middle years of the twentieth century. Keirstead was himself ordained as a Baptist minister, although his principal orientation was as a social scientist and philosopher. In recent years, there has been some interesting work examining the overlaps between the Catholic conception of subsidiarity and the Evangelical conception
of sphere sovereignty. A study of social philosophy in New Brunswick may, therefore, usefully complement the present study of Antigonish.

The intertwining of moral theologies to which I am pointing holds some promise for a way out of the current impasse. By incorporating a commitment to an intentionality that is not grounded in self-interest and a polity that is radically pluralist, in a three-sector model of civil society, the social sciences might be able to recover their original mission as ‘moral sciences’. It would be a commitment to what Adam Ferguson defined as “the study of what men ought to be, and of what they ought to wish for, for themselves and for their country”.

This does not seem to me to be so far away from what the Antigonish Movement began in Nova Scotia about a century ago.

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References


