Dedicated to my mom.
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Abstract

Jonathan Haidt has redrawn the ‘map of the moral domain’, by positing six heritable foundations that circumscribe one’s moral reasoning. Known as moral foundations theory, Haidt’s model currently lacks any application to Canadian political leadership. The following study seeks to bridge this gap by (psycho-)analyzing Canadian Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau through the lens of moral foundations theory. Specifically, it will consider whether the personal character of Canadian political leaders are significant factors in assessing their potential for enacting institutional reform—particularly in the context of moral conservatism. The moral similarities found between Trudeau and Harper contain compelling insights into the superficiality of ‘left-right’ ideological division, ultimately suggesting that differences in moral character may bear greater predictive capacity. Additionally, the findings give credence to the centrality of ‘agency’ in the debate between the roles of institutional structure and individual leadership in the policy-making process.
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Character is fate

—Heraclitus (535-475 BCE)
Chapter 1: Introduction

The following section not only seeks to explain what the proceeding study is, but also to justify its importance. To date, a great body of literature has analyzed political personalities and leadership traits, fitting neatly into the tradition of “elite analysis”. However, little attention has been paid to the substance of elites’ moral psychology. With this study, I intend to carry the tradition of elite analysis into the moral realm. I contend that this will yield greater predictive insights with respect to Canadian public policy, especially those with explicit moral dimensions (e.g., state surveillance, border security, etc.). To this end, Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory will figure prominently. Through this lens, Canadian Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau will be used as case studies in which qualitative inferences will be drawn from source material. However, because these subjects haven’t submitted to interviews or questionnaires pertaining to moral foundations theory, I will rely on secondary sources such as biographical and autobiographical texts to draw inferences independently.

1.1 Elite Moral Analysis: What and Why

Margaret Hermann does well to point out that when most of us talk politics, we talk about personalities.¹ We talk about leaders, candidates, parties, and the ideas they represent. We have a natural interest in the people behind them, which explains why it’s often the personality and not the policy that make for memorable headlines and viral news articles. The curiosity we have for political leaders has led to their more detailed scrutiny in the political psychology literature, particularly with regard to presidents, prime ministers, dictators, and heads of state. From this has emerged an entire research tradition devoted to psycho-biography and leadership trait analysis, in which subjects’ lives are studied in order to identify consistent patterns in behaviour, compulsions, and even one’s ‘subconscious’ motivations. Pioneering this enterprise were the likes of early 20th century psychologists Gordon Allport, Erik Erikson, Sigmund and Anna Freud, Albert Bandura,

and Alfred Adler. Of particular importance is Dr. Allport, whose 1936 seminal *Trait-Names: A Psycho-Lexical Study* marked a departure from the prevailing methods of Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis in favour of individualized, empirical value scales. Allport revolutionized the field of personality psychology for his positing that human differences arose primarily in the form of tiered traits—cardinal, central, and secondary—that essentially characterize one’s behaviours, passions, obsessions, and, in sum, their persona. Among many others, I have debts owed to Allport, as trait theory provides the foundation for my own analysis.

This project is a work of political psychology, and one that posits a theory of political leadership. To the extent that personality and leadership intersect, it can equally be considered a personality analysis. But in essence, it is a study of political character. Early research in personality psychology made a concerted effort to distinguish personality from character, as the concept of character was understood as being too loaded with normative content to provide a reliable descriptive account of one’s psychological structure. Whereas personality has to do with such ‘structural’ aspects of the persona, character was construed as “personality evaluated in accordance with moral norms.” As such, the study of one’s character became secondary, if not irrelevant, to the more methodologically rigorous study of personality. At the core of this project is an effort to reclaim the study of character as it applies to our understanding of political leadership, and to challenge the assumption that moral analyses are inherently normative. I aim to demonstrate that, once moral norms are identified, the analysis of political character can not only provide useful insights into the possibilities for public policy and institutional reform, but also present a complementary set of qualities with which we can more critically assess both our leaders and ourselves.

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Throughout the last century, the study of political leadership has undergone a number of substantive changes. An early precedent of note is Henry Murray’s *Analysis of the Personality of Adolph Hitler*, a report composed of two psychoanalytic volumes on the life of Adolph Hitler. Murray’s report provided Allied intelligence agencies with intimate details of Hitler’s origins and his path toward what Murray concluded to be paranoid schizophrenia. The report was written from a Freudian perspective, replete with cant references to the Oedipus complex, the Power of the Father, and the Weakness of the Mother, while taking great interest in his genealogy as well as the formative experiences of his coming-of-age in Austria. Under the influence of such luminaries as B.F. Skinner, the following decades saw the discipline undergo a turn toward the methods of behavioural science. This generated a wealth of psycho-biographical works with a quantitative experimental emphasis; among these include studies on public figures like Bruno Bettelheim, Henry James, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bill Clinton, Saddam Hussein, and the negotiators of the Camp David Accords. Separating these studies from that of the psychoanalysts is their methodological commitment to the coding and analysis of discrete and observable behavioural traits, as opposed to subconscious motivations and desires.

In recent years, the psychological study of personality traits has commingled with the study of morality and emotion. This burgeoning subfield is primarily the domain of Dr. Jonathan Haidt, an American social psychologist and Professor of Ethical Leadership at New York University’s Stern School of Business. In 2012, he authored the *New York Times* bestseller *The Righteous Mind*, a book that fully realizes his earlier research on what he considers the ‘traits’ upon which morality is founded. Although

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7 Ibid., 142.
12 Ibid.
methodologically in keeping with Allport, Haidt refers to these qualities as moral ‘foundations’ rather than traits. This is the basis of his ‘moral foundations theory’, a social-psychological approach to understanding the innate differences in moral reasoning that exist across cultures and individuals. A more detailed summarization of moral foundations theory, and its attendant methodology, is spelled out in the following chapter.

I intend to pick up precisely where Haidt leaves us in The Righteous Mind, by applying his research on moral foundations to the analysis of Canadian political leaders: namely, Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau. The object of the analysis is to devise a profile of the subjects’ moral foundations, and to discern how these moral profiles may affect the kinds of policy they enact. To this end, my process will be methodologically eclectic: taking from the psychoanalysts of old, by placing an emphasis on one’s genealogy and formative experiences, as well as the behaviouralists by remaining committed to the empirical and falsifiable observation of discrete and categorized behaviours. With respect to the former, this is largely in step with the insights of developmental psychology. Specifically, that developmental ‘stages’ in one’s life are important for assessing the robustness of personal characteristics over time. In addition, I will construct a “narrative model” of the subjects’ moral development that is similar in kind to the ‘narrativization’ employed by Freudian scholars. This is a contextualizing effort that is, ultimately, made in the interest of affirming transferability in the research design. That is, to provide what ethnographers call “thick descriptive data” such that determinations about the degree of fit can be made by other scholars who wish to apply or extend the conclusions in their own work. Further, applying this methodology will allow my research to concentrate on, and provide a descriptive account of, the cognitive consistency of one’s moral behaviour across their lifetime rather than small fluctuations.

The bulk of the empirical data implicated in this study is derived from what Margaret Hermann describes as “spontaneous material”: knee-jerk reactions, in-the-moment responses, emotional outbursts, and first hand accounts of events both public and

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15 Donald Munro et al., 2014. Motivation and Culture.
private. This is not to say that media addresses, rehearsed speeches and written communications are excluded, but rather that they figure less prominently due to their premeditated nature. The reason being that pre-written or prepared material can often only be partially attributed to the speaker or author, as it is in many cases a collaborative effort with speech writers and staff members, or in some cases entirely ghostwritten. Therefore, it is taken that spontaneous material, rather than prepared material, usually constitutes a more authentic expression of the subject’s character. Moreover, this is also an effort to differentiate my research from that of conventional rhetorical or discourse analyses, in which rehearsed material is often the central object of study.

Before he was Prime Minister, Stephen Harper once said “politics is a moral affair.” Inseparably so. Virtually all matters of public policy—foreign and domestic—require some degree of moral judgment related to either fairness, harm, liberty or loyalty. A sizable component of this project is dedicated to exploring the relationship between the moral psychology of political leaders, and outcomes in Canadian national security and surveillance policy. This specific policy area was not chosen arbitrarily. It was purposefully selected due to (i) its relevance as an open, contemporary issue of Canadian public policy, (ii) the fact that Canadians demonstrably care about the issue, and (iii) the direct moral considerations that it brings to bear—specifically, those having to do with authority, its limits, and its legitimate ends. My decision to include this is intended to make the project more “policy relevant” in today’s political environment, and allow for linkages to be drawn between the moral-psychological attributes of political leaders and an observable policy outcome. There is, I suggest, perhaps no better justification for undertaking this project: moral character, especially that of our political leaders, is central to political praxis. For this reason, it is an object worthy of study. And, indeed, worthy of

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17 Hermann, 1999. 2.  
reflection and understanding, such that the inevitable differences between moral communities can be better overcome.

1.2 Questions and Hypotheses

How does political character, or one’s ‘moral psychology’, affect Canadian public policy? In other words: does personality matter in politics? This question, above all, is the principal concern of my study. From this emerge a series of secondary research questions both political and psychological in nature. The aim of this study is to make an evidentiary contribution to each of these respective inquiries:

▪ What can we attribute to the moral character of Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau?

▪ Can these moral attributes help explain what Wesley Wark calls the “accountability gaps” in the Canadian state surveillance regime?\(^{21}\)

▪ What can this tell us about the role of individual agency versus institutional structure (or institutional “memory”) in affecting reform?

▪ And, finally, how might these case studies inform our understanding of moral acquisition and development—specifically with regard to Elliot Turiel and Lawrence Kohlberg’s multi-stage theory of morality?\(^{22}\)

To each question, I posit the following hypotheses:

Both Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau express what Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory describes as “Authority”, one of six moral foundations prominent among conservatives. This causes them to be naturally inclined to centralize power, operate within rigid hierarchies, and accept certain asymmetries


\(^{22}\) Jesse Graham et al., 2011. Mapping the moral domain. 367; This concept is discussed in greater detail in subsection 2.2 in the following chapter.
of power as legitimate in the interest of order. As such, there are strict limitations on the kinds of policies and reform initiatives that are compatible with this kind of personality.

Similarly, both Harper and Trudeau express “Loyalty”, another of the three moral foundations common among conservatives. This presents a barrier to reforming Canadian state surveillance institutions with respect to assuring public accountability and oversight mechanisms. This is because such reforms would require allowing out-group members privileged access to potentially subversive information.

Policy ‘entrepreneurship’ by individual leaders is required to enact the kinds of reforms called for in Wesley Wark’s critique of the Canadian surveillance and national security regime. This is highly unlikely so long as those at the apex of power are characterized by Authority and Loyalty.

Therefore, individual leadership (agency) remains a critical force in affecting institutional change, pushing policy innovation, and re-defining possibilities for reform.

The cases of Justin Trudeau and Stephen Harper provide evidence against Kohlberg and Turiel’s thesis regarding the multi-stage acquisition of morality (i.e., that morals are fluid and acquired gradually over developmental phases in one’s life, advancing from a ‘conventional’ to a ‘sophisticated’ moral system.

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1.3 Canada’s Security Agencies: A Brief Institutional History

The burden of empire saw the formation of Canada’s secret police go unchallenged. As some scholars argue, it was made unavoidable by the anxieties and suspicions inherent to a new colonial nation-state. These suspicions were affirmed as, from its outset, the country’s status as an outpost of the British Empire made it a prime target of anti-imperial violence. The Rebellions of 1837 and 1838 saw the Patriotes of Lower Canada (present-day Quebec) and the republican Upper Canada Reformers (now Ontario) launch a series of armed uprisings against the British colonial authorities. These insurgencies ushered in the unification of Upper and Lower Canada into the United Province of Canada, which stood as the predominant colony in British North America until Canadian Confederation in 1867. Following Confederation, radical Irish nationalists (the Fenian Brotherhood) organized assassinations and strategic attacks against British North Americans as part of an independence struggle that was mounting in Ireland. Among their victims was Thomas “D’Arcy” McGee, an Irish-Canadian politician and Father of Confederation who was sympathetic to the British Crown. The assassination of D’Arcy McGee, in April 1868, made the Fenians the first targets of what Reg Whitaker calls the Canadian “political police”, early police forces pre-dating the RCMP that carried out spy operations, secret service work, and extrajudicial prosecution. Toward the end of the 19th century, the threat of Irish radicalism had fallen sharply; however, political policing had become a regular and deeply entrenched practice in the Canadian civil service. From the turn of the century until the outbreak of war, the Dominion Police, then Canada’s national police force, applied the same secret policing tactics to another anti-imperial movement: Sikh and Hindu nationalists that sought the independence of South Asia from the British Raj. The disruptions of World War I and the late-1910s labour movement caused the maturing Canadian security and intelligence service to undergo a broad restructuring that saw the Dominion Police merge with the North-West Mounted Police, amalgamating as

25 Chief among these were the Dominion Police (1868-1920). See, Reg Whitaker et al., 2012. Secret Service. 19, 31.
26 Ibid.
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) by the decade’s end. Until the
modernization of Canada’s state surveillance regime in the 1980s, the RCMP spent the
intervening years launching targeted crack-downs and intelligence gathering missions.
These were directed against the suspected subversives of the day, notably: Bolsheviks
(“the Reds”), anti-Fascists, German and Japanese Canadians, gay men and lesbian
women, post-war artists and intellectuals, Quebec separatists, Sikh extremists, and
Chinese businesspeople. 28 It took the release of the McDonald Commission’s 1981
report on widespread illegal activities undertaken by the RCMP— including hundreds of
warrantless break-ins, and many instances of theft and document forgery—for the
Mounties to lose their monopoly on the powers of state surveillance. 29 In light of the
report, the RCMP Security Service disbanded (the organizational wing responsible for
surveillance and intelligence collection), and a new civilian agency was founded in 1984,
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). From thereafter, CSIS became the
sole government agency tasked with the collection and dissemination of intelligence
related to Canadian national security, and the first of its kind to be held responsible to
Parliament through the Minister of Public Safety. However, foreign and domestic signals
intelligence continued to be collected in tandem by the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE), an agency founded during World War II under the portfolio of the
Department of National Defence. Although the RCMP still maintains an active role in
conducting national security operations, the CSE and CSIS—military and civilian
agencies, respectively—remain the two predominant partners in Canada’s intelligence
and electronic surveillance apparatus. 30

On the recommendation of the McDonald Commission, the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (SIRC) was established as an independent government agency with a
mandate to oversee, review, and investigate complaints against CSIS. Rather than being
held responsible to a Minister of the Crown, SIRC reports directly to the Parliament of

pco/CP32-37-1981-2-2-4-eng.pdf
National Security Activities”. 40.
The CSE, on the other hand, has been overseen by the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC) since 1996, tasked with ensuring the Establishment’s compliance with the law and presenting an annual report to Parliament on such matters.\textsuperscript{32}

1.4 The Future of the Surveillance State in Canada

More recently, state surveillance has become increasingly relevant in Canadian public policy debates as a string of contentious legislative developments have stretched the powers and legal capacities for surveillance to be used as an instrument of governance. To a large extent these have been compounded by developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) that have expanded the means and possible scope for sending, collecting, reviewing, and storing information. No doubt, the demand for increased surveillance capabilities have been advanced by the security imperatives that have arisen in the aftermath of 9/11, and the arrival of a new world marked by intense globalization and technological inter-connection. Therefore, a balance must be struck between guaranteeing a reasonable expectation of security and a commensurate expectation of privacy and liberty.

The passage of the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (Bill C-36), and more recently the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2015 (Bill C-51), have expanded the authority of Canadian security agencies to deploy these same technologies that enable our connection to be used for the purposes of mass surveillance. The introduction of these statutes have had a profound effect on the ability for CSIS and the CSE to monitor and share information derived from the online activity of the general public. Although these agencies have enjoyed expanded powers due to the increasing threat of globalized terrorism, a November 2016 Federal Court ruling found that Canadian intelligence agencies routinely overstep their already broad legal authority. Justice Simon Noël found that, for at least a decade, CSIS has illegally retained electronic data on regular, low-risk Canadian citizens while failing to inform the courts or their oversight agency of the


Indeed, part of the problem rests on the fact that the growing mandate of the intelligence community has not been matched by their respective oversight agencies. In fact, SIRC and OCSEC, Canada’s two surveillance watchdogs, have remained unreformed since their founding in 1984 and 1996, respectively. Making matters worse is the budgetary differential between the spies and their overseers, with CSIS’s whopping $500 million annual operating budget and 3,000 full-time employees dwarfing SIRC’s $2.8 million in funding and 26 employees (with 11 high-value analysts and lawyers expected to be lost in the wake of looming budget cuts).

The consequences of a disempowered watchdog are life-threatening for any liberal democracy. Without sufficient transparency or investigative capacity into the operations of the intelligence community, we would be left without the central mechanism by which such agencies are to be held accountable: through the courts and the due process of the law. For instance, if SIRC cannot maintain its capacity to investigate complaints lodged against CSIS, there would be no source of evidence for the courts to scrutinize and, thus, no binding check on the lawfulness of their conduct. This is a reality antithetical to the liberal-democratic principles of the rule of law, the right to privacy, and the freedom of the individual from the despotic force of arbitrary and unrestricted authority.

Unless a course correction finds its way onto the public agenda, we may come to realize a dystopian world in which state surveillance is used with greater and greater intent as an instrument of governance. This is not an implausible outcome. However, it may manifest in ways less visible than the omniscient eye of Orwell’s Big Brother. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham once wrote about the transformative potential of a new kind of prison he envisioned, called the Panopticon—featuring an architectural design in which inmates could be observed by watchmen at all times, without knowing if or when they might be watched. Bentham conceptualized the Panopticon in a letter he

wrote to his father while visiting disorderly factories in Eastern Europe. He prefaced the letter with a summary description:

A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example: and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against abuse.35

Later, the French intellectual Michel Foucault would reintroduce the idea of the Panopticon as a metaphor for how societal structures build the capacity to discipline counter-normative behaviour. Hierarchical institutions, he argued, naturally evolved panoptic techniques such that dissent could be corrected by self-regulating behaviour, “making it possible to substitute for force or other violent constraints the gentle efficiency of total surveillance.”36

Contemporary scholars have essentially applied Foucault’s Panopticon thesis to their criticisms of today’s electronic surveillance regime. “The knowledge that one might be watched and could be disciplined for political misbehaviour,” writes professor Reg Whitaker, “instils inner controls and self-censorship…intensive surveillance is a chilling, pre-emptive device.”37 This point underscores one of the more insidious features of the surveillance state: the chilling effect on speech that emerges when one is believed to be under the threat of scrutiny. Although it may appear innocuous that the collection of metadata—information about information, the kind often retained by intelligence agencies—is carried out in today’s uncertain security environment, there are stagnating effects on the state of the public discourse that emerge as a consequence even if the majority of records are never acted upon.

This idea is made all the more concerning in light of the many quickly-accelerating developments in consumer technologies that have made personal data abundant, and therefore easily collected: minivans, refrigerators, garage doors, toothbrushes, thermostats—for each of these you can find a model equipped with

37 Whitaker et al., 2012. 253.
internet-enabled sensors that collect and disseminate data about the user in real-time.\textsuperscript{38} Though intended for commercial purposes like advertising and product optimization, these data can and likely will be retained in the interest of security. Thus, the Canadian surveillance debate demands a forward-looking approach that can account for the “surge” of digital communications that are subject to an inevitable “application beyond their original design.”\textsuperscript{39} This technological surge presents an array of new opportunities for mass surveillance and metadata retention that has the potential for compiling a hyper-personalized account of one’s life that does not meet modern standards of privacy and individual freedom. This is precisely why there is a call to reform the Canadian intelligence and security community; to bring these institutions under the command of accountability mechanisms that justifiably and substantively constrain and direct the practice of surveillance. Among those advocating for reform are a small group of legal scholars and social scientists, such as Michael Geist and Colin Bennett, who have developed a body of literature dedicated to exposing the dangers of an unbridled surveillance state, and the importance of digital privacy rights in Canada.\textsuperscript{40} Their mission, it would seem, is to prevent the kind of surveillance state that Bentham first devised.

1.5 “Accountability Gaps” in the Canadian Surveillance Regime

Canadian national security scholar Wesley Wark’s March 2015 policy brief sheds light on the “accountability gaps” ongoing within Canadian surveillance and intelligence institutions. Having situated his critique in the wake of Bill C-51’s reading in the House of Commons, Wark provides a number of instances where public accountability is most glaringly absent, followed by a detailed fleshing out of the Harper government’s countervailing position. The accountability gaps are identified as follows:

1. Insufficient internal oversight at the top, in the form of ministerial accountability.


\textsuperscript{40} Michael Geist, 2015; Colin Bennett, 2001, 2011.
2. The absence of review coverage of the entirety of the (recently) expanded Canadian security and intelligence community, and all of its key components.

3. The inability of Parliament to properly scrutinize security and intelligence.

4. The weak public legitimacy of the elements of the existing accountability system.  

This list is neither exhaustive nor exactly clear about what it’s specifically critiquing: Wark himself admits that these are but the worst of the identifiable holes in what he describes as a “Swiss cheese”. For example, none of the listed items speak to the internal cultures active within the respective agencies or their review bodies.) However, some clarifying comments can be made about each.

Wark’s first concern with ministerial accountability has to do with ministers of key national security portfolios, such as the DND and Public Safety Canada, being inadequately engaged with the day-to-day operations of the agencies they’re responsible for. As such, policy direction from their respective Cabinet minister may be insufficient. In contrast, the United Kingdom has COBRA, a Cabinet-level committee that collaboratively addresses emerging issues and crises events. Without such a committee, Wark argues that ministerial accountability can very easily weaken—a threat attested to by the fact that ministers rarely speak publicly about actual national security threats and agency responses to them.

Regarding external review, Wark raises two important concerns. The first being that since the events of 9/11 the Canadian security-intelligence apparatus has been dramatically empowered far beyond its original capacity. Second, that their oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with this change (in fact, they’ve remained basically untouched since their inception). Wark calls for renewed mandates for the various review bodies (i.e. SIRC, OCSEC) so that they are brought in line with the recommendations of Justice O’Connor’s 2006 Arar Inquiry report. Further, Wark calls

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
for all seventeen (17) government agencies party to Bill C-51’s information-sharing regime to have an independent external review commissioner or agency.\footnote{Ibid.}

Third, Wark recommends overhauling Parliament’s involvement in the national security accountability system. Although he notes that there are already standing committees active within the House of Commons and the Senate, both are plagued by an extremely broad mandate that isn’t focused on matters of surveillance and intelligence. Most importantly, the members of these committees do not have security clearance and are thus denied access to all classified documents and briefings that are critical for understanding agency operations.\footnote{Ibid.}

To satisfy Wark’s first three concerns, I contend, would satisfy the fourth in the process. Understandably, the public image of Canada’s national security regime has suffered considerably following the 2013 Edward Snowden disclosures that indicted the CSE and CSIS for their involvement in mass global surveillance and intelligence-sharing networks.\footnote{Ibid.; The Guardian, “Canada spy agency stops sharing intelligence with international partners”, 28 January 2016.} It also hasn’t helped that Arthur Porter, a Harper-appointed chair of SIRC, spent years jailed in Panama on major fraud charges before dying in 2015 while awaiting extradition to Canada.\footnote{Globe and Mail, “Arthur Porter: Charming, intelligent leader fell from grace”, 17 July 2015.} To enact substantial reforms to the entire accountability system, at both the levels of Parliament and Cabinet, could help restore the public’s confidence in the efficacy of the system altogether. Reg Whitaker, I believe, inadvertently speaks to this possibility: “comprehensive accountability reform, if properly conceived and executed, can improve not only the human-rights records but also the performance of the agencies scrutinized.”\footnote{Whitaker et al., 2012. 520.} In saying this, Whitaker reminds us that we can and should conceive of this issue as one in which deficits in accountability, legitimacy, and institutional efficiency can be corrected simultaneously—to improve one is to improve the others.
Chapter 2: Moral and Political Psychology: Theory and Method

The purpose of this chapter is to orient the reader to the general concepts and theoretical frameworks used in the proceeding sections—namely, social intuitionism, moral foundations theory, and the Authoritarian personality type. In this chapter, the reader will become familiar with the basic tenets of political and moral psychology, such as moral nativism and sentimentalism, as well as the demonstrable relationships between personality, genetics, and ideology. To this end, a brief history of moral philosophy is warranted, and provided. This is necessary as it will allow the reader to better understand why moral foundations theory can be justifiably relied upon: for its pluralistic conception of morality, and its consistency with the literature on the heritability of moral traits. The methods discussed herein serve as the basis of my own methodology, which is described in the closing subsections.

2.1 What is Moral Psychology?

Moral psychology seeks to make sense of our gut instincts by exploring what they are and how we acquire them. Moralizing, however, is the thing of sermons, ethics lectures, unsparing op-eds, and talk radio. The moralist’s mission is to reform one’s subjects’ personal conduct by giving lessons on what constitutes the goodness or badness of one’s act. The moralist confronts life’s normative questions directly, meaning those questions that demand a rigorous examination of how we ought to act as moral agents. When a cashier makes a mistake, scanning the wrong item at checkout leaving you with half the bill you expected to pay; when a security guard gives you the option to cut to the front of the line in return for a small bribe; when your supervisor asks you to upsell your client a superfluous product so they can meet their quarterly sales targets: these are the everyday thought experiments for preachers, parents, and ethics professors to grapple with. They are not the territory of the moral or political psychologist, who, rather than ethicists, dabble in the merely descriptive. In respect of this, nowhere in the following pages will I ascertain the ethical force of an action, rule, or intuition. To investigate our ‘gut instincts’, as the practice of moral psychology demands, compels us to trace the origins of
moral acquisition and explore the contours of moral disagreement. The former will inform our study of the latter.

2.2 Moral Psychology from Antiquity to Modernity

The ancients were the first to explore morality in both an outward and inward sense. That is, the content of the moral issues that arise from human action, as well as the subjectivities and sentiments localized within the moral actors themselves. Plato and Aristotle developed a conception of morality based on human flourishing (‘eudaimonia’) that was assumed to be the desired end-point of human conduct. For one to attain this, it was said that moral actors had to exhibit certain virtues or ‘excellencies’ (‘aretê’) that were dispositional to the individual agent. In the Republic, Plato revered eudaimonia as an amorphous, ill-defined, and indeed metaphysical state of perfection. The attainment of eudaimonia was made possible only by acting in accordance with the perfection of one’s god-given soul (i.e., the locus of rationality contained in the head); equally, one could instead succumb to the temptations of the irrational and immoral soul housed in one’s body.\(^{51}\) This lesser soul of the body was taken to be the conduit of the emotions and the vices, such as pleasure and pain, anger and lust, foolhardiness and cowardice, and was later understand to be man’s ‘mortal’ soul, as opposed to the head’s immutable higher soul.\(^{52}\) By this account, the pursuit of moral perfection was an ascetic one, predicated on the assumption that human beings were born bestowed with an obligation to respect and act upon the divinity of one’s rational faculties in lieu of their bodily passions. Aristotle would later expand Plato’s model by insisting upon man’s inherent capacity for virtue, and our potential to master these qualities by practicing them as reason dictates (in Aristotle’s case, this usually implies striking a balance between behavioral excess and deficiency). Regarding this, what is most immediately noticeable is that divinity, or ‘sanctity’, was held supreme over all other conventional moral axes, such as harm, cruelty, or honesty. It was the act of avoiding that which taints one’s innermost inviolability that took precedence over any other moral consideration. That is to say,

considerations of purity and ‘the sacred’ either came before—or contained within them—secondary moral considerations such as harm, cruelty, and fair-mindedness.

Underlying the Platonic moral system are two important assumptions about reason and rationality: (i) that it is the sole moral foundation, and (ii) that they are innate properties conferred on conception, with the materialization of one’s immortal soul. As such, the Western conception of morality finds its origin in both the rationalist and the nativist traditions (that is, nativism not in the political but psychological sense). Under these assumptions, moral perfection is the practice of reason over passion. Hence, it belongs to the school of moral rationalism, which holds that moral truths are knowable a priori, or preceding experience. Accordingly, the Platonic model is nativist because it holds our moral foundation to be everlasting, being harbored within us from conception until death, and later carried with us into the afterlife.\textsuperscript{53}

Any argument asserting an ‘original nature’ in a moral sense is inherently nativist. And, in Plato’s case, this is justified on theological grounds. Millennia would transpire until moral nativism would enjoy a philosophical renewal with the advent of evolutionary psychology in the nineteenth century. Like Plato, the Darwinian thesis held that some moral foundation, or ‘trait’, exists innate\textsuperscript{54} to the agent, but because it was selected for by the process of natural selection—that is, it reinterprets trait as adaptation. Following in the same tradition, Jesse Prinz would later sum this revised moral nativism as the notion that “morality is an evolved capacity” that finds expression both in one’s instincts and learned behaviours.\textsuperscript{55} In this way, morality is conceived as a function of Darwinian fitness. To take either the Platonic or Darwinian position is to align yourself with the belief that moral knowledge comes preloaded; either inscribed by God within the mind’s rational faculties, or as evolved moral emotions, respectively. No matter which strand of moral nativism one subscribes to, one remains committed to the overarching project of

\textsuperscript{53} Haidt, 2012. 28.
\textsuperscript{54} In this context, the term ‘innateness’ is used in the same sense that neuroscientist Gary Marcus uses it. That is, to refer to “Nature provid[ing] a first draft, which experience then revises...’built-in’ does not mean unmalleable; it means ‘organized in advance of experience” (Gary Marcus, 2004. The Birth of the Mind. 34).
\textsuperscript{55} Prinz, 2009. Against moral nativism. 168.
rationalism (that moral knowledge is possible \textit{a priori}, and is thus independent of sensory experience).

The Sophists, Plato’s peripatetic rivals in Hellenic Greece, espoused an opposing outlook on the foundations of moral reasoning known as moral “sentimentalism”. This implies that morality originates at least partially from one’s own sentiment, as moral knowledge cannot be merely deduced prior to experience like an operation of logic.\footnote{Such as, for instance, personal concern for one’s reputation. For more, see: Michael B. Gill, 2006. Moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism: Is morality more like math or beauty? 16.} In the eighteenth century, Scottish philosopher David Hume famously followed in this tradition, and effectively turned the ancients of Greece on their heads by positing that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”\footnote{This proclamation is often taken as the basis of Hume’s Fact-Value distinction (that one cannot derive an \textit{ought} from an \textit{is}). For more on this idea see: David Hume, 1739. \textit{Treatise of Human Nature}. Book II s. 3.3. 415.} As such, our passions and desires are not subject to rational evaluation. Hume further challenges Plato by asserting that people are born a \textit{tabula rasa} (‘blank slate’) whereby knowledge, including moral knowledge, is accrued \textit{a posteriori}, or derived from one’s lived experience.\footnote{‘\textit{A posteriori}’ is taken to denote reasoning or knowledge that proceeds from observation and experience, rather than by assumption or prediction. For more on Hume’s empiricism see: David Hume, 1960. \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}. 9.} It is important to note that this view owes yet deeper debts to antiquity by paralleling the Confucianism of the ancient Far East, which also espoused a sentimentalist moral position.\footnote{Doil Kim, 2010. Two Ways of Doing Chinese Philosophy—A Report on the Conference ‘Virtue: East and West’. 136; Shirong Luo, May 2004. \textit{Early Confucian Ethics and Moral Sentimentalism}. PhD Dissertation, University of Miami; In Shirong Luo, 2007. Relation, virtue, and relational virtue: Three concepts of caring. Luo suggests that Hume’s considerations of sympathy, ingratitude and the emotional misery of others is a subset of the Confucian notion of \textit{shu}, and the Mencian notion of \textit{ceyin zhi xin}.}

Hume’s overarching project was to devise a sort of ‘moral science’ in order to better understand human behavior, diversity, and decision-making. Hume took “sentiment” (or ‘intuition’) as the seat of moral fortitude, which, in his view, could not be simply reduced to a few virtues (contra Plato) or moral laws (contra Kant). To support his position, Hume made the following analogy to one’s subjective sense of taste:
Morality is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each particular Being; in the same Manner as the Distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions therefore, ought to be class’d with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.  

In framing moral judgment as a matter of perception, like one’s tastes, Hume’s analogy engenders a range of alternative explanations for social phenomena that rationalism alone was unfit to address. If moral virtues emerge through reason alone, how is it that one’s moral domain varies vastly according to one’s cultural experience? How could it be that cross-cultural ethnographic research finds that one’s social order constitutes their moral order? That is to say, breaking social norms or conventions—say, a young man calling his father by his first name—doesn’t carry moral weight in the United States, but is found to be “wrong, universally wrong, [or] unalterably wrong” to most Indian research subjects. To suggest that one’s moral judgment can be derived rationally prior to experience would be to suggest that moralities reflect one another across cultures.

Alternatively, prominent 20th century rationalists like Elliot Turiel and Lawrence Kohlberg have long maintained that the moral domain consists only of “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other”. By Turiel’s definition, it is implied that any values not pertaining to “justice, rights, and welfare” (e.g., subversion, devotion, or chasteness) were non-moral and, in fact, having the status of mere social convention or personal choice. (For clarity’s sake, note that these ‘non-moral’ acts are described as such because they are taken to not constitute some fundamental moral violation in the act itself, but rather violate some external norm constructed by one’s group.)

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61 Jonathan Haidt et al., 1993. Affect, culture, and morality, or Is it wrong to eat your dog? 613-628.
63 Ibid. Figure 1.1; See also, Haidt, 17.
64 In essence, this would constitute a “naturalistic fallacy” per G.E. Moore.
According to Kohlberg’s multi-stage model of moral development, any consideration of authority, loyalty, or tradition, was indicative of an unsophisticated morality that had not yet developed beyond the ‘conventional’ stage. Therefore, moral concerns extending beyond individual-level considerations of harm or fairness were merely products of immature moral thinking that had not yet ascended to the ‘post-conventional’ stage.\(^{67}\) Rather airily, Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality happened to aggrandize Harm and Fairness, the two moral foundations overwhelmingly associated with the moral profile of the educated, Western, and politically liberal as the universal endpoint of moral development.\(^{68}\) As it happens, the autonomy and welfare of the individual is neither the sole starting point or endpoint of moral inquiry—indeed, there are a variety of socio-centric considerations, namely, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity, that are pervasive across cultures and traditions. These are the ‘binding’ foundations that preserve a moral community’s “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, and technologies that...enable the community to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperation possible.”\(^{69}\)

2.3 Moral Foundations and Social Intuitionism

Without understanding the social function of the ‘binding foundations’, one cannot fully make sense of the great moral diversity that exists across the spectrum of human cultures, nations, and ethnicities. If one accepts the binding foundations as being morally legitimate, then this can explain why those who inhabit the socio-centric cultures of India\(^{70}\), the economically disadvantaged classes of Brazil and North America\(^{71}\), and the conservative right-wing in the United States\(^{72}\), operate under a broader set of moral concerns than those of Kohlberg’s post-conventional model. These concerns involve

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\(^{67}\) Jesse Graham et al., 2011. Mapping the moral domain. 367.
\(^{68}\) Ibid.
\(^{69}\) Haidt, 2012. 292. This concept bears a close intellectual resemblance to Putnam’s (1993) thesis on ‘social capital’.
\(^{70}\) Schweder et al., 1993.
\(^{71}\) Haidt et al., 1993.
principled deliberation about actions or omissions that degrade an entity’s spiritual purity or sanctity (even in the absence of individual harm dealt), actions or omissions that violate legitimate and established roles and hierarchies, and actions or omissions that contravene expectations of loyalty to one’s community or group identity. In light of this, our working definition of the moral domain ought to more closely resemble Haidt’s system of “interlocking sets of values, virtues, [and] norms” that suppress selfishness and make social life possible, than Turiel’s more rigid and totalizing ‘justice, rights, and welfare’ model. Rather than universalizing morality along two axes, Haidt’s functionalist approach has the benefit of conceptualizing societies and communities as constituting moral systems (irrespective of their normative status, as in the cases of patriarchies and despotisms).

Per Haidt, the kinds of moral systems that emerge in a given society are determined by the moral foundations that are held in common within them. This is the lynchpin of Haidt’s moral foundations theory (MFT), which identifies the five foundations that operate like ‘taste buds’ on our moral tongues:

1. Care
   - Protecting the general welfare of others; opposite of harm.
2. Fairness (Proportionality)
   - Rendering justice according to shared rules; opposite of cheating.
3. Loyalty (In-group)
   - Solidarity with group, family, or nation; opposite of betrayal.
4. Authority
   - Offering submission to tradition and legitimate authorities and hierarchies; opposite of subversion.
5. Sanctity (Purity)
   - Abhorrence for disgusting things, foods, actions; opposite of degradation.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{73} Haidt, 2012. 125 (Figure 6.2).
These foundations are held to be innate, but not universally expressed. That is to say, moral foundations are taken to be adaptive mental structures, that, as such, are only ‘innate’ in the sense that they are “organized in advance of experience.” Across populations, these foundations vary like dials on one’s moral system according to individual neurochemistry, personality traits and dispositions, and genetic inheritance. These causes of variation help explain why the moral domain is curiously limited to what Richard Shweder calls the ‘ethic of autonomy’ in WEIRD cultures (White, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic), of which Harm and Fairness prevail above all, as opposed to the ethic of community and divinity found in socially conservative cultures like that of Orissa, India.

In positing the MFT, Haidt assumes the Humean account of moral sentimentalism by de-emphasizing the significance of private moral reasoning while also accepting the notion of Darwinian ‘innateness’ qua evolutionary adaptation. More importantly, Haidt’s model incorporates the often understated but central role of intuition (or ‘gut’ instincts/feelings) by formulating what he calls social intuitionism. This model assumes that (i) moral positions are products of intuition first, and (ii) then rationalized post hoc, while also maintaining (iii) that private reflection and reasoned judgment can influence one’s intuitions, and (iv) that social persuasion (i.e., the judgments of others) also inform one’s intuitions.

74 Ibid, 278.
75 Hatemi et al., 2011. A genome-wide analysis of Liberal and Conservative political attitudes.
76 Dan McAdams, 1995. What do we know when we know a person?; Dan McAdams et al., 2006. A new Big Five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality.
77 Genetic inheritance has been demonstrated to explain between one-third and one-half of the variablility among people’s political and moral attitudes. See: Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005 and 2008
78 Shweder et al., 1987.
79 Haidt, 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral psychology. 815 (Fig. 2).
Haidt effectively takes Hume’s aesthetic appreciation for the “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” and essentially socializes it by allowing for intuitive, pro-social, and rational bases of moral judgments. Haidt does well to simplify this model by way of analogy to an Elephant (gut instincts; automatic) and a Rider (reasoning-why; deliberate):

Automatic processes run the human mind…When human beings evolved the capacity for language and reasoning at some point in the last million years, the brain did not rewire itself to hand over the reins to a new and inexperienced charioteer. Rather, the Rider … evolved because it did something useful for the Elephant…most important, the Rider acts as a spokesman for the Elephant, even though it doesn’t necessarily know what the Elephant is really thinking. The Rider is skilled at fabricating post hoc explanations for whatever the Elephant has just done, and it is good at finding reasons to justify whatever the Elephant wants to do next.\(^8\)

The Elephant-Rider analogy perfectly encapsulates the crux of Haidt’s framework: our moral processing is not matter of emotion (or ‘sentiment’) versus higher cognition (or ‘rationality’), and nor is it a contest between the ‘head and the heart’. Rather, it can be

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\(^8\) Hume, 1777/1960. 2.
\(^8\) Haidt, 2012. 46.
more aptly described as a dual-input system driven by intuition and justified by reasoning. In Humean terms, reason is the servant of the intuitions. 82

In contemporary party politics, political leadership understands the value of the Elephant and the Rider and how they influence partisanship. For example, the Republican Party (U.S.) exploits the Elephant by utilizing emotional triggers such as mugshots of black criminals during campaign advertisements in order to draw attention to soft-on-crime policies. 83 Democrats, on the other hand, typically target the Rider by addressing specific policies and critiquing them on their own merit. However, Haidt does well to point out that unless at the command of an exceptionally charismatic candidate (i.e., Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, FDR), focusing on the Rider doesn’t tend to work well as it fails to grip the moral impulses responsible for galvanizing mass support. 84 Despite the various prejudices that are often played upon, the Republican Party exhibits a ‘thick’ moral palate—offering a message that often satisfies all five of Haidt’s ‘taste receptors’ identified by MFT, paying special attention to the otherwise uncelebrated foundations of Sanctity, Authority, and Loyalty. Being able to understand the psychology of party politics in such a comprehensive way—especially parties and partisan ideologies one does not identify with—is what grants Haidt’s MFT, and social intuitionism more broadly, a heuristic edge over the long line of rationalist models that came before it. By espousing a plurality of moral bases, one can begin to understand and engage with the moral positions of others in a way that goes beyond partisan shouting matches and stubborn disagreement. In other words, moral foundations theory has the unique ability to build bridges between moral communities. For this reason, Haidt’s theory will be relied upon and drawn from heavily in the coming pages.

Like those that came before it, Haidt’s moral theory is not without its criticisms. Some moral theorists writing from the perspective of American progressivism, being committed to the ideals of social justice, have condemned MFT for its supposed

82 Ibid.
83 During the 1988 presidential election, a PAC associated with George H.W. Bush launched an ad blaming Democratic Party candidate Gov. Michael Dukakis for the rape of a white woman by black prisoner Willie Horton (on weekend leave). For more see: thinkprogress.org/republicans-willie-horton-sean-spicer-tim-kaine-ab02fee8a9b6
84 Ibid. 157.
complicity in ‘normalizing’ right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and the social
dominance orientation (SDO).\(^\text{85}\) Both of these concepts were first coined by psychologist
Bob Altemeyer in the 1980s, who employed psychometric methods to discover that those
who exhibit this particular personality are either grossly dominant, submissive, or
conventional (or some combination of the three), and value uniformity and group
authority to the point of using coercion to achieve it.\(^\text{86}\) This development was largely
built on the backs of Theodor Adorno and his research team at University of California at
Berkeley immediately following the Second World War, where the original concept of
the ‘Authoritarian Personality’ was used to describe proto-fascist personalities
predisposed to either lead or follow by deferring “to the dictates and control of others
who offer them the certainty and comfort they cannot provide for themselves.”\(^\text{87}\)

According to theory, Authoritarian personalities have largely undeveloped egos unfit for
coping with anti-authoritarian reactions, and thus feel themselves attacked very easily,
install gross personal insecurities around power and control, adhere to conventional
norms, and revere authorities and institutions that impose them.\(^\text{88}\) Empirically, research
has found that Haidt’s three ‘binding foundations’ are statistically associated with both
RWA and SDO, whereas liberal moral concerns with Fairness and Harm are attributable
to decreased levels of social dominance.\(^\text{89}\) A similar study has found that the expression
of moral foundation Authority has been positively associated with ‘Machiavellianism’
(e.g., amorality, controlling, and status-seeking behaviours) and negatively associated
with an ethic of care (i.e., for the well-being of others).\(^\text{90}\) To include conservative
foundations into our make-up of the moral spectrum, critics suggest, is to abandon the
established ethics of justice and care that has been heralded throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century

\(^{85}\) Matthew Kugler et al., 2014. Another look at moral foundations theory: Do authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation explain liberal-conservative differences in ‘moral’ intuitions?; see
Tables 1B and 2B in Appendix I.
\(^{86}\) Bob Altemeyer, 1998. The Other ‘Authoritarian Personality’. In Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology.
\(^{87}\) Detlef Oesterreich, 2005. Flight into security: A new approach and measure of the
Authoritarian Personality.
\(^{88}\) Theodor W. Adorno et al., 1950. The Authoritarian Personality.
\(^{89}\) Ibid. 413.
\(^{90}\) Laura Niemi and Liane Young, 2013. Caring across boundaries versus keeping boundaries
intact: Links between moral values and interpersonal orientations;
For more on the criticisms of MFT see also: Brooke Jeffrey, 2015. Dismantling Canada. 31.
by such scholars as Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, and of course Elliot Turiel and Lawrence Kohlberg.\textsuperscript{91} Instead, we ought to ‘amoralize’ these foundations, and instead see them for what they are: not moral intuitions, but mere personality dynamics and ideological differences. On these grounds, they reject intuitionist calls for “moving beyond an individualist-consequentialist framework.”\textsuperscript{92} In this way, ethical considerations regarding \textit{how we treat each other} are privileged over those amoral concerns of community and its cohesion.

From this, it is important to draw attention to two key points: the social intuitionist model, and MFT more specifically, is merely a \textit{descriptive} account, whose mission is to make sense of our moral intuitions, and not extend normative consideration to them as an ethicist would. Regardless of one’s normative position or ideological difference, it is important to at least have the perceptive tools for understanding alternative moral systems, as this would serve as a formidable starting point in a well-reasoned critique. Second, the empirical links to the Authoritarian personality (and its modern iterations as RWA and SDO) are indeed valid concerns. It is important, then, for us to ascertain how these personalities arise, how they are expressed, and how to identify their cultivation. Employing Haidt’s descriptive model will give us better empirical tools for locating these personalities and operationalizing their expression in the world, as well as enable us to better identify the moral (and developmental) fault lines apparent between the Authoritarian and the anti-authoritarian.

To identify these traits empirically, we must keenly examine even the most subtle behaviours of the research subject, as well as their natural or ‘unconscious’\textsuperscript{93} predispositions and reactions that are expressed through routine responses, in order to detect the moral foundations that the subjects are beholden to. Haidt suggests that we exhibit these traits in everyday life. For example, a person who expresses the Authority foundation is more inclined to purchase a dog that resembles their own moral matrix, in the sense that they both respect and recognize hierarchy and their own subordination.

\textsuperscript{91} Matthew Kugler et al., 428.
\textsuperscript{92} Jonathan Haidt and Frederik Bjorklund, 2008. 248.
\textsuperscript{93} More in the sense of the cognitive science’s ‘cognitive unconscious’ (i.e., behaviours or reactions that are performed unwittingly by the subject), than in the sense of the Freudian psychoanalytic.
within it. Conversely, an owner who identifies as politically liberal tends to prefer dogs that fit with the values of the Harm foundation, so that they are kind, gentle, and generally warm up nicely to strangers.\(^{94}\) This gives credence to the banality of moral expression: we can feasibly make moral-psychological inferences from actions as seemingly trivial as one’s choice of household pet or go-to stop for lunch, or a process as ordinary as one’s selection of office receptionist or choice of tie at a formal gala. In each instance, one can operationalize either a direct moral influence (i.e., loyalty to one’s preferred group, or an indication of one’s personal predilection for subservience), or an indirect influence (i.e., an inability to control impulses, or a tendency to break established conventions).

Fundamentally, then, what the moral psychologist attempts to identify is the expression of moral or temperamental traits that can offer insight into the subject’s psychological processes. Dan McAdams atomizes psychological personalities into three categories or ‘tiers’.\(^ {95}\) First, are dispositional traits that are broadly consistent across one’s age (e.g., the Big Five personality traits: Openness, Contentiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness). These traits are largely genetic, as twin studies have shown that at least half of the variability in trait scores are a result of genetic inheritance.\(^ {96}\)

Next are characteristic adaptations, which ‘grow’ alongside us as we socialize into our environment; essentially, these adaptations take the genetic blueprint of our moral minds and overwrites them according to our life experience and acculturation. For instance, twins who both express Extraversion and Agreeableness may be socially reared toward community leadership. However, one becomes socialized into the progressive sphere of labour activism as a local representative, whereas the other sibling spends their weekends volunteering with the youth wing of their more conservative local parish church. Lastly, personality becomes structured around what McAdams’s calls the “life narrative” (or ‘Narrative’). One’s Narrative is the result of a major formative event that “provide[s] a bridge between a developing adolescent self and an adult political

\(^{94}\) Haidt, 2012. 162.
\(^{96}\) Thomas J. Bouchard et al., 1990. The Minnesota study of twins reared apart. 223-228.
identity.\textsuperscript{97} Narratives take the form of an internalized autobiographical story from which the narrator derives personal meaning and self-direction, and they are often as overwrought with moral instruction as they are personal counsel.

Take the example of Thomas Clement Douglas. Growing up in the 1910s, Tommy fell and injured his knee, which later became infected with osteomyelitis. Prior to the discovery of antibiotics, the most common method of treatment was amputation. Although doctors told Tommy that his leg would have to be amputated, an orthopedic surgeon based out of Winnipeg became interested in his ailment, and offered to perform surgery for free on the condition that his medical students could stand-in for the operation. That surgeon would save Tommy’s leg, and would leave him with a lasting belief that healthcare should be free and accessible to all. Tommy Douglas would later go on to be elected to the Canadian House of Commons as a member of the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and later serve as the seventh Premier of Saskatchewan from 1944 until 1961. As Premier, he was the first to introduce a single-payer, universal healthcare program. Today he is known as the father of Canadian Medicare.

The Douglas Narrative teems with the moral directives of Harm and Fairness, foundations that were presumably reinforced by his adolescent experiences with osteomyelitis. The narrative of one’s life acts as a cognitive glue that solidifies inherited moral and temperamental dispositions into enduring ideologies. For this reason, it is important that the social and moral theorist not only consider the quantitative observations of their subjects’ behaviour, but also make qualitative inferences to organize them into the narratives that individuals use to construct meaning in their lives. As Haidt points out, these narratives are often simplified and selective reconstructions of one’s personal history, and usually consist of post hoc fabrications of life events.\textsuperscript{98} As such, they are not necessarily ‘true’, but they certainly remain a powerful force in one’s moral mind and self-concept. For these reasons, it is important to pay attention to the formative,
morally-loaded experiences of one’s youth and to make note of the consequences they might bear for their moral development, and indeed identity, later in life.

2.4 Chapter Conclusions

Why social intuitionism? If the answer isn’t already clear, take it from a Kohlbergian himself, philosopher John Rawls, who acknowledges in his 1971 seminal *A Theory of Justice*, that “[moral theorists] have done what we can to render coherent and to justify our convictions of social justice.”99 Rawls’s concession is tantamount to recognition, if not a tacit endorsement, of the intuitionist thesis: principally, moral agents devise post hoc rationalizations of our inherent, spontaneous moral dispositions regarding what constitutes ‘rightness’ or ‘justice’. This allows for interstitial theories and analytical practices to be applied downstream that are grounded by either of Humean sentimentalism or Platonic/Darwinian rationalism.100

Consider the following questions: How do you feel about a man eating the remains of his deceased dog? Does it feel morally repulsive to you, or rather is it only a disturbing break in social convention? How about a star Canadian-born hockey player who decides to exploit a loophole in the Charter of the International Olympics Committee, and don the stripes of Team USA at the Winter Games? Do children deserve to be spanked when defying the authority of their parents? Social intuitionists suggest that you probably had a ‘gut’ feeling that arose immediately when reading those questions, and then you probably mulled over each question for a moment in search of a rationale. As touched on earlier, this is how moral thinking works—by making sense of the gut instincts that drive it. This is the first step to understanding the moral and political reasoning of others, and conveniently provides a common vocabulary with which one can discuss points of moral and political disagreement.

100 E.g., George Lakoff’s application of cognitive linguistics to childrearing, which takes on an essentially neo-psychoanalytic approach to the role of paternity and ‘Strict Fatherhood’ in one’s moral development. Although sampling ideas from both schools, this approach does not fit tidily into the traditions of either sentimentalism or rationalism (See: Lakoff, 2001. *Moral Politics*).
Chapter 3: A Genetic and Patrilineal History of Stephen Harper

This chapter explores the history of the known members of the family of former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen J. Harper. Beginning with their first settlement in the 18th century colony of Nova Scotia, until Stephen Harper’s coming-of-age in the 1970s, behavioural trends will be explored in order to determine particular genetic, moral, and dispositional traits that Stephen adopted or inherited from his family line. The conclusions taken therefrom will be used to draw inferences about Harper’s moral and political composition, and to better inform the reader’s understanding of trait heritability and the role of genealogical influences in the acquisition of moral traits.

3.1. Early Family Lineage: 1774-1951

Stephen Harper’s story begins on March 11, 1774, when Christopher Harper traversed the Atlantic with his family in tow, abandoning his Yorkshire farm in search of greener pastures and lower taxes. Christopher and his family disembarked upon a New England settlement on the Bay of Fundy, known today as Fort Cumberland, New Brunswick. Christopher purchased a fully furnished manor on cleared marshland for the present-day equivalent of £77,500. It was there that Christopher survived the Eddy Rebellion launched by the American Patriots in November 1776, and from thereafter he remained a staunch loyalist to the British Crown.¹⁰¹ Having acquired arable real estate around the Fort, and having proven himself a faithful Tory during the failed American siege attempt, Christopher was appointed Justice of the Peace by British authorities in Halifax.¹⁰² Subsequently, Harper found himself embroiled in a series of legal actions with the Crown and the estate of one Captain Elijah Ayer over the possessions and land claims he won from a prior settlement: Although the Ayer estate had long occupied the plots of land Harper had been given as compensation by the Court, the Ayer’s title had never been granted and the Crown still legally owned the properties. This was said to have elicited

animosity between the settler families of Middle Sackville.\textsuperscript{103} Around this time, Harper was relieved of his post as Justice after having been found guilty of “violent and oppressive measures” by a judicial committee struck by the provincial Supreme Court. In protest, Harper set sail for London, England where he appealed to an ad hoc Board of Commissioners who reversed the Committee’s ruling after Harper presented an impassioned defense.\textsuperscript{104} “It appears decidedly to us to have been a Loss sustained in Consequence of Loyalty,” the Board proclaimed, “…[w]e therefore think ourselves justified in recommending a small allowance to Mr. Harper.”\textsuperscript{105} Local accounts describe Christopher as having returned to Sackville as a man dedicated to public service; until his death in 1820, Harper remained active with both the United Methodist Church and political affairs, which included a successful bid to represent Cumberland County in the Nova Scotia legislature.\textsuperscript{106} Columnist John Ibbitson sums Christopher’s life and contribution aptly: “He left his family and his descendants an example as a man of integrity, a man of courage, a man who hated taxes, and a man who came to the aid of his country in its hour of crisis.”\textsuperscript{107}

Christopher and his wife Elizabeth, about whom little is known, passed on their homestead in present-day New Brunswick to their youngest son, William Harper (1771-1842). A long pedigree marked by public service, self-discipline and national loyalty descends from William to Stephen Harper. Christopher Harper II (b. 1758), brother of William, was a captain in the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{108} Joseph Crandall Harper (1824-1872), son of William, relocated to Baie Verte, Newfoundland in 1849 and went on to become a successful merchant, doing business under the name Black and Harper. His entrepreneurial success led him to amass a wealth of large properties in the Port Elgin region of New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{109} His great-nephew, Donald Harper (1904-1965), was a prominent Middle Sackville aristocrat who served four terms as Member of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, in which capacity he went on to serve as

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ernest A. Clarke, 1995. \textit{The Siege of Fort Cumberland, 1776.} 54-57
\textsuperscript{105} Claim of Christopher Harper.
\textsuperscript{106} Al Smith, 2010.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibbitson, xiv.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Al Smith, 2010.
Secretary-Treasurer and Minister without Portfolio under the government of Louis J. Robichaud, as well as Chairman of the NB Electric Power Commission.\textsuperscript{110} Additionally, Donald was a devout Baptist, and Treasurer of the Middle Sackville Baptist Church.\textsuperscript{111}

Harris Harper (1902-1950), Joseph Crandall’s grandson and paternal grandfather of Stephen Harper, was born on one of the family’s Port Elgin estates. As a boy, Harris served in the Fredericton militia during the First World War, which appears to have instilled a lifelong appreciation for duty, resolve, and country.\textsuperscript{112} During the Second World War, Harris was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Fifth Reserve Armoured Regiment, where he drilled militia recruits.\textsuperscript{113} After the war, Harris went on to become a teacher, and later headmaster, at Prince Edward School in Moncton, New Brunswick. Between teaching and administrating, he also oversaw a cadet corps who he coached into “prize-winning marksmen.”\textsuperscript{114} June LeBlanc, a student of Harris’s seventh grade class, remembers her teacher as a strict disciplinarian:

Harper ran the school like the army. We marched into the building in pairs to the beating of drums. Twice a week, he drilled us around the schoolyard. If you got out of step, he’d tap you on the ankle with his baton. On the coldest winter days, he had the grade six and seven kids run the grade ones around the schoolyard.\textsuperscript{115} June recalls that Harris never shied away from committing corporal punishment if his students spoke out of turn.\textsuperscript{116} His sense of authority also commanded a strong recognition of moral responsibility, however, as demonstrated by his personal insistence on driving home all the school’s youngest students during winter storms, which often kept him away from home until late in the evening.\textsuperscript{117}

In summary, the early Harpers exhibit the qualities of old-stock, politically active Loyalists who, as such, have engrossed themselves in public affairs since their arrival in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{111} Ibid.
\bibitem{112} Michael Harris, 2014a. \textit{Party of One}. 442.
\bibitem{113} Michael Harris, 2014b. Delay, deny and die: The Harper government and veterans.
\bibitem{114} Party of One.
\bibitem{115} Ibid.
\bibitem{116} Ibid.
\bibitem{117} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
Canada. These features are unquestionably a kind of cultural capital—or, “the consciously acquired and the passively inherited features that characterize ways of being and feeling”—that have been passed down through generations.\(^{118}\) Of particular importance is Christopher Harper’s display of Loyalty vis-à-vis his devotion to the Crown during the Fort Cumberland raids (which London’s Board of Commissioners later declared “a Loss sustained in Consequence of Loyalty.”\(^{119}\)). Harris Harper’s expression of Authority is also particularly pronounced, as demonstrated by his military service and regimental school-teaching methods. These serve as clear indicators that Stephen Harper’s descendants, both immediate and distant, exhibit the conservative moral attributes of Loyalty and Authority.

3.2. Tragedy and Toronto: Stephen’s Parental Upbringing

The Harper family was touched by tragedy on the evening of January 21, 1950. While walking home from his doctor’s office, Harris Harper mysteriously went missing. Harris was never found, and the police declared him legally dead some years later. Harris was survived by his wife, Faye Richardson, and their two sons, Joseph and George. Their lives were forever altered by the loss and dejection they suffered at this time. Faye was said to have become skittish and later became overprotective of her grandchildren.\(^{120}\) Stephen once remarked that Harris’s disappearance marked his father, Joseph (“Joe”), with an enduring sense of the temporariness of security and happiness; the affliction was said to have made him “appreciate that all the good things in life, all of the best things in life, in work and play, in friendships and family, are still just passing things.”\(^{121}\)

Joe Harper came of age in the wake of the Second World War, and became deeply fascinated by martial symbolism and culture. In his youth, he served as an Army cadet, during which he began a lifelong collection of military badges and insignia.\(^{122}\) After his

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\(^{118}\) Chiara Saraceno, 2014. Do we need capital accounts for culture? 2.
\(^{119}\) Clarke, 1995. 55.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., 6.
\(^{121}\) Lawrence Martin, 2009. A family tragedy that Stephen Harper has not forgotten. The *Globe and Mail*.
\(^{122}\) Ibid., 443.
father’s death, he left his old life behind him and relocated to Toronto. It was there, in 1952 at the Danforth United Church that Joseph met eighteen-year-old Margaret Johnston, where they eventually married two years later. It appears his politics were largely in keeping with the establishment of the day, as indicated by Joe’s supposed “shock” by the degree of anti-Tory sentiment he discovered when he first visited Margaret’s family farm in Hanover, Ontario. Oddly, he found her family lacked the strong anti-Americanism and support for the British Crown that then permeated the political elite of the Progressive Conservative Party. Although Joseph and Margaret were both quiet people who rarely outwardly expressed their personal or political beliefs, they were said to have leaned Liberal during the premiership of Pierre Trudeau. They were also especially sympathetic to the plight of Israel and, Joseph specifically, supported a “value-oriented foreign policy” in defense of those facing undue persecution.

Joseph and Margaret were both deeply paternal in their nature, and through their attentive parenting exacted considerable influence on the worldview of their sons. This is especially true of Joseph, who the boys appeared to be deeply devoted to, and whose behaviour they emulated closely. When Joe would take up a hobby, like trainspotting, Stephen and the boys would happily spend hours with him at the Leaside train station. Joseph had a fondness and talent for storytelling, and while passing the time with the boys he would share anecdotes that “defined the world outside the family for his sons.” Joe’s anecdotes were often parable-like and featured strong moral undertones, such as those about the experiences of his community during the Great Depression. These stories have maintained strong lasting power over the years, as shown by Stephen’s habit of retelling them during cabinet meetings or in conversation whenever he’s reminded of something his father used to say.

123 Ibbitson, 8.
125 Ibbitson, 322-3.
126 Ibid., 10.
127 Ibid., 11.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 12.
130 Ibid.
Stephen has always spoken affectionately of his father, who he regards as his life’s single greatest influence. After Joseph’s passing in 2003, Stephen remarked during his eulogy: “My father was not merely honest, he had flawless integrity. In spite of his ambitions, he jealously guarded the interests of others as if they were his own.” Stephen has, to some extent, moulded his own character around his father’s. Stephen has taken after his father in many respects: he shares his interest in military artifacts (in his office, Stephen even kept an old Canadian Forces uniform in glass casing), he is rarely seen drinking alcohol (Joseph was a lifelong teetotaler), and he is a quiet and self-reflective disciplinarian, who often becomes emotionally detached and stoic in the face of crisis. Most importantly, he is a man of values—principles passed-down that have doubtlessly influenced his ideas of the family, Canada’s role in the international sphere (from Israel to militant foreign interventionism), and his lifelong dislike of the Tories and the downtown elitism they represented.

If to this point the story of Stephen Harper has seemed at all like a case study in androcentrism, it’s because it is. The history of the Harper’s is recorded as a patrilineal line, where family membership derives from the father’s lineage. Since their beginnings in the country, the Harper’s have consisted of a series of model patriarchies. They are a family of many men, who have long revered and taken after their fathers. With the notable exceptions of Harris’s widow, Faye, and Stephen’s mother, Margaret, the experiences of the Harper women have been marginalized by the historical record—their voices and legacies are virtually absent from all surviving documents detailing Stephen’s heritage. However, what is known is that most, if not all, of the women in the Harper household have played a predominantly domestic role.

Lena Faye Richardson (née Coy), whose first marriage was to Harris Harper, was born in February 1904 in Upper Gaetown, New Brunswick. Aside from a brief note on the neurotic and overprotective tendencies she developed after the loss of her first  

131 Harris, 442.
133 INSERT CITATIONS on Joe/Stephen shared values on foreign policy, Toryism, and family (values).
husband, there is no reliable information available about her. Only little more is
known about Margaret Johnston, Stephen’s mother, and practically nothing is known
about her role as a parent. She is said to be an “extremely quiet” woman, though
energetic and strong-willed. Today she resides in Calgary, and although well into old
age she is still seen regularly riding her bicycle around the city when the weather’s nice,
and shovelling out her driveway when it isn’t. This suggests that Margaret embodies
at least some of the disciplinarian values and conservative predilections toward self-
sufficiency also seen in her son and husband. Although no information exists regarding
her personal beliefs, Margaret’s rural Ontario family is said to have been staunchly
opposed to the elitism of Ottawa in the 1950s. This may, perhaps, have planted the
populist seed that would later mature in her eldest son.

3.3. **Steve: The Toronto Years (1959-1978)**

What do the Toronto Maple Leafs and the collected works of C.S. Lewis and Malcolm
Muggeridge have in common? For a shy, naturally competitive, and precocious teenager
from Leaside, they were hideaways to which he could retreat from the difficulties of
adolescence. Although bouts of asthma kept Stephen away from organized sports, he
idolized the Toronto Maple Leafs and kept a close record of hockey statistics (in 2013,
Harper even published a monograph on the histories of Canadian ice hockey and the
Toronto Maple Leafs—twin histories, in his view). Aside from his interest in sports,
Stephen was known by his brothers as a “voracious reader” who spent a good deal of
his time alone retreating to the company of a book, often ones with religious or political
subject matter. Regarding his public persona, his former school principal recalls
Harper as being a “consummate gentleman but painfully shy,” although also with a soft
and expressive side, adding that “[h]e was an incredible writer…[h]e wrote a beautiful

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134 Ibbitson, 6.
135 Ibid., 11.
136 Ibid., 7.
137 Ibid., 8.
138 For more, see: Stephen Harper, 2013. *A Great Game*.
139 Mackey, 2005. 47.
letter to me that was very poetic and sensitive." Where Harper acquired these traits could be equally nature or nurture, as Steve was brought up by solitary parents by solitary means. At times, the overbearing authority of his parents left him socially isolated. One classmate remembers being asked to a date by the nervous Steve Harper, only to be called off by what she presumed to be his father’s disapproval: “Maybe an hour before, he called to tell me that he was unable to go. I think his father had something to do with it. He had a very strict upbringing.”

During these formative years, Harper developed a knack for autodidacticism: he taught himself French which he later refined in an immersion program, and additionally taught himself how to read and perform music on the keyboard. Part of his motivation to learn French was born out of a fascination with the history and culture of Quebec, and the separatism debate that ensued during the reign of Pierre Trudeau. Stephen was coming to age as the world underwent a market correction following the buoyancy and self-assurance of the nineteen-sixties. To the displeasure of the hippies and the hopefuls, politics-as-usual reclaimed its seat at the head of the table in the decade that followed: the October Crisis, the Watergate scandal, Western military embarrassments overseas, oil crises, slow growth, and soaring inflation combined to require the bold and commanding style of leadership that Pierre Elliot Trudeau provided. Trudeau’s firm and authoritative style of governance, particularly in response to the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), won over an adolescent Harper yearning for order. According to his friends, “he was a huge Trudeau fan…[h]e thought Trudeau was God.”

After graduating with honours, Stephen Harper did what many Harpers had before him: he packed his bags and set off in search of a new beginning. Unlike his forebears, Stephen found his resumption not across the Atlantic or even the country, but instead a thirty-minute drive east along the Gardiner Expressway. Stephen Harper would spend the first couple months of autumn 1978 at Trinity College, Toronto on a full-ride scholarship to study the liberal arts. Half-way through his first semester, Stephen dropped out. Harper

140 Ibbitson, 16.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., 48.
143 Ibid., 22.
had quickly grown to dislike the Oxbridge pretensions at Trinity, and the Family Compact that inhabited it. To his parents’ dismay, he decided to give his ‘new beginning’ another crack. This time, Stephen would find the revival he sought.

Before moving forward, it’s important that the reader draws a number of key inferences from Stephen’s personal history to this point. To recap, his childhood and adolescent experience abounds with the conservative attributes of self-sufficiency and reticence. Further, Stephen’s deference to his father’s authority as well as his admiration of Pierre Trudeau and his unified, pan-Canadian vision attest to his possession of Authority and Loyalty as moral foundations early in life. These serve as prescient indicators of a more developed moral character that Harper would later fully embody during his years in public service.

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Chapter 4: Stephen J. Harper

This chapter explores the moral and political personality of former Prime Minister of Canada, and former leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, the Right Hon. Stephen J. Harper. Biographical writings and first-hand accounts of his life, as both a man and public official, will be drawn upon and analyzed through the lens of social intuitionism and moral foundations theory. Throughout, the formative experiences of his youth, adolescence and young adulthood will be assessed, the conclusions drawn from which will point toward the specific moral-psychological aspects of his character that are later found in his political leadership.


I will not serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it call itself my home, my fatherland, or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use—silence, exile and cunning… I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.145

Though from another Stephen, from another time, these words might as well be Harper’s. At the age of nineteen, Stephen Harper made his way westward and so began his political renewal. He landed in Edmonton, and spent the following three years working as a mailroom clerk for Imperial Oil after his dad secured him a job. In his time there, Harper’s anti-establishment leanings were met with good company. From his arrival in 1978 until he relocated to Calgary in 1981, Stephen came to sympathize with the plight of the Prairie provinces, whose political alienation under Pierre Trudeau had given rise to a new wave of western populism.146

Partly motivated by the western backlash against Trudeau’s perceived economic mismanagement, as well as his own desire to make something of himself, Stephen

145 James Joyce, 2016. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Centennial Edition. This quotation is pulled from two passages spoken by Stephen Daedalus in Chapter 5, but I’ve combined to complete one continuous message he champions throughout the closing of the novel. Quotes pulled from pp. 229 and 235.
enrolled at the University of Calgary in September 1981. He graduated four years later with a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Economics. These four years at U of C served as an incubator for Stephen Harper’s political maturation. He immersed himself in the writings of libertarians and free-market theorists such as Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek.\textsuperscript{147} He read the *Economist* assiduously.\textsuperscript{148} Though of these influences, F.A. Hayek appears to have been the most conspicuous.\textsuperscript{149} Harper’s thesis supervisor, Tom Flanagan, would later remark that Stephen and himself were essentially “students of Hayek”.\textsuperscript{150} Stephen wears his progenitors on his sleeve, and as history will prove, Stephen carried them with him well beyond the confines of the academy, and throughout his life as a public official.

At some point during his undergrad, Harper had coyly approached journalism student Cynthia Williams for a date. She was immediately charmed.\textsuperscript{151} Williams is said to have found Stephen’s humour witty, with a knack for pulling off amusing parodies and impressions. Of his personality, she found him shy, but socially adept. She recalls that he often kept quiet at parties, only making the exception to talk politics whenever the opportunity arose.\textsuperscript{152} Harper’s relationship with Williams culminated with their engagement in the mid-1980s, but after multiple internships in Ottawa, and starting dissimilar career trajectories, they agreed to end it. Stephen’s first such internship was as a legislative aide to Progressive Conservative MP Jim Hawkes after graduating from Calgary. Hawkes remembers Harper as being a diligent worker and an indispensable helper. In a 2015 interview Jim Hawkes said “[Stephen] was better than anybody I’ve ever employed.”\textsuperscript{153} Biographer John Ibbitson hints why: “Harper always had the answers because he worked so hard...[h]e would be at the office when Hawkes arrived in the morning, and there when the MP left at night, which was often after 11 p.m., because the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147] Donald Gutstein, 2014. Harperism: How Stephen Harper and his think tank colleagues have transformed Canada. 12-13, 22.
\item[148] Ian Macleod, "Reality Check: Is Stephen Harper an economist?" *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 August 2015.
\item[149] Gutstein, 234.
\item[151] Ibbitson, 33.
\item[152] Ibid.
\item[153] Tristin Hopper, “The nerd who came from nowhere: Stephen Harper knows you don’t need to like a politician to elect him,” *National Post*, 13 August 2015.
\end{footnotes}
riding was on Mountain Time.”\textsuperscript{154} Maintaining such a work ethic, however, precluded Harper from branching out socially during his time on the Hill. Fellow staffer Goldy Hyder recalls Harper as being “brilliant but aloof”, and that he didn’t make a single friend while working for Hawkes.\textsuperscript{155} Later, he would serve as the first legislative assistant to MP Deborah Gray, based out of her Beaver River constituency office, from 1988 to 1993. She recalls Harper as being particularly bold and demanding for an assistant: “[he was] intense: ‘you have to do this; you have to do that.’”\textsuperscript{156} Deborah Gray, however, wasn’t a Tory. She was a member of the Reform Party of Canada. She was one of Stephen’s own.

Stephen’s stint on Parliament Hill only served to reinforce the anti-Ottawa cynicism he had been long fostering. Feeling disillusioned and misplaced, Harper returned to the University of Calgary the following year to begin a Master of Arts in Economics. The faculty at U of C, well aware of both the political leanings and policy smarts of their new graduate student, introduced Stephen to Preston Manning, who had just founded the Reform Party of Canada and was in need of members. Impressed by Harper’s eloquence, Manning invited Harper to speak at Reform’s first party convention in Winnipeg. After the convention, Harper wrote Manning a private memo that decried the party’s proposed campaign strategy, which was seen as too heavily reliant on the ‘protest vote’ of the western provinces.\textsuperscript{157} Instead, Harper proposed a broad and inclusive strategy that he assumed would attract a politically viable, nationwide coalition. It would be a streamlined strategy based on three simple pillars: the free market economy, traditional family values, and Canadian patriotism.\textsuperscript{158} Based on this proposal, Harper and Manning drafted a 20-point party platform (aka the ‘Blue Book’) and a campaign strategy that would be rolled out during the election of the following year.\textsuperscript{159} In return, Manning hired Harper as the party’s Chief Policy Officer.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibbitson, 74.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibbitson, 75.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibbitson, 2015. 81.
Over the next few years, Harper carefully balanced his dual responsibilities toward academics and politics. In the run-up to the 1988 federal election, knowing that the riding of Calgary West would fall to Tory incumbent Jim Hawkes, Harper elected to run against his old boss. “He phoned me up to ask if it would be OK because he didn’t want to interfere with our relationship,” Hawkes later commented. That fall, Harper lost the election to Hawkes, garnering only 16.6% of the vote. Harper was not alone—in its debut election, the Reform Party failed to secure even a single seat. However, the party would see their first major breakthrough with the following year’s by-election. Reform candidate Deborah Grey won the rural Albertan riding of Beaver River in a snap by-election on March 13, 1989, following the sudden death of MP John Dahmer. It was at this time that Harper began working for Grey as a legislative aide.

In 1991, five years after entering graduate school, Stephen Harper finally submitted his Master’s thesis to Calgary’s Department of Economics, and with that he completed his degree. His thesis, entitled *The Political Business Cycle and Fiscal Policy in Canada*, was essentially Hayekian in nature, in that it critiqued how political parties exploit fiscal policy during election years in order to bolster their chances of re-election. In it, Harper argues that such a misuse of spending powers gives rise to an unstable boom-and-bust “political business cycle” that fluctuates much the same way as a Keynesian mixed market. Ultimately, Harper suggests that one can conceive of the political business cycle “as a consequence of the practice of Keynesian macroeconomic policy.” According to classical liberal theory, such a phenomenon could therefore be prevented by applying the kind of monetarist *laissez-faire* macroeconomics espoused by F.A. Hayek. This is the economic philosophy that Stephen would carry with him to the apex of political power. Stephen would break from the established practices of “the political class”, so he thought. He would refuse to follow in the footsteps of the

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160 *National Post*, “The nerd who came from nowhere...”
Laurentian elites that manipulated public decision-making structures and caused perpetual instability. He never foresaw himself among them.

4.2. **Stephen: The Ottawa Years (1993-2002)**

In the intervening years between finishing grad school and becoming a full-time politician, Stephen Harper married Laureen Tesky. Laureen was working as a graphic designer in Calgary, and was introduced to Stephen by his ex-fiancé Cynthia. From that day forward she became the only person who could directly criticize, and indeed temper, the political ambition of Stephen Harper.

In the 1993 federal election, the Reform Party swept the west. Among them, the riding of Calgary West where Stephen Harper defeated his former mentor, Jim Hawkes. But not without a price. Leading up to the election, Preston Manning selected Rick Anderson, a former Tory with Liberal Party connections, to direct Reform’s 1993 national campaign instead of Harper. It was clear that Harper objected to the appointment—believing himself to be a worthier fit—and, according to Manning, “was prepared to air his objections in the media.” Presumably, Manning was looking for an alternative to Reform’s failed campaign strategy from the previous election cycle, which Manning co-directed with Harper. “Stephen had difficulty accepting that there might be a few other people…who were as smart as he was with respect to policy and strategy…Stephen, at this point, was not really prepared to be a team player or team builder,” Manning recalls. Relations between Stephen and his would-be mentor had begun to fray.

i. **Stephen Harper as Rookie MP**

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163 For more on Harper's thoughts on the "political class" in Canada, see: Ibbitson, 2015. 80.
164 Ibbitson, 92.
165 Wells, 2013. 112.
166 Ibid.
Once arrived in Ottawa, Harper continued to butt heads with Manning while at the same time making waves as a rookie MP. In 1994, Harper was selected by his caucus to represent the Reform Party on the House of Commons’ Board of Internal Economy, and later that year was ranked the “Best Opposition MP During Question Period” by the Canadian Press, for “getting straight to the point and handling curveball returns.”

That same year, however, Manning became embroiled in an embarrassing controversy surrounding his receiving an annual $31,000 leadership stipend from the party. Although it was meant to be kept confidential, it was made public after being leaked to the press. Tom Flanagan, a close confidante of Harper’s at the time, would later hint that Stephen was behind the leaks. Stephen Harper was the only prominent Reformer who spoke openly about Manning’s expenses to the media: “The whole idea of non-accountable expenses is not acceptable…the compensations are not consistent with what the party is asking of Parliament.”

To make matters worse, the Reform Party penned a private letter to Harper condemning him for speaking out against the party leader without first going through internal channels, and Harper promptly leaked that to the media too.

The issue became so divisive that it even affected Manning’s marriage, which caused a serious rift between Harper and Manning.

The following year, still recognizing Harper’s strategic prowess and passable command of the French language, Manning picked Stephen to handle the Quebec unity file as Reform’s intergovernmental affairs critic. Not wanting to repeat the mistakes of Brian Mulroney, Harper opted not to support constitutional negotiations and instead proposed a package of unilateral reforms that would reduce the role of the federal government and “[would] assert the autonomy of the provinces.” However, demonstrating some indecisiveness on the issue, Harper would eventually lend a modicum of support to both the separatists’ notion of sovereignty-association and Jean

168 Johnson, 217.  
170 Johnson, 216.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Wells, 2013. 113.  
173 Manning, 126-136.  
Chretien’s federalist strategy.\textsuperscript{175} As Ontario Premier Bob Rae did well to point out, Harper displayed no real durability in his stance on the Quebec issue. “It isn’t based on any long-term deep compatibility and affection [between Harper and the Québécois],” Rae writes, “I think that will become clear as time goes on.”\textsuperscript{176} And it certainly did.

In May 1996, conservative pundits Ezra Levant and David Frum organized a conference in Calgary to bring together the leading thinkers of the Canadian political right. Dubbed “Winds of Change”, the conference featured an impressive keynote address by hometown darling Stephen Harper, co-authored by Tom Flanagan, that would reveal their long-term vision for the conservative movement in Canada. It called for a “Three Sisters” coalition capable of taking back Ottawa from the Liberals, which included traditional Tories, grassroots populism, and French-Canadian nationalists.\textsuperscript{177} Interestingly, Harper appeared to be extending an olive branch to the Progressive Conservatives he had long rivalled. Most surprising, however, was Harper’s inclusion of the “third sister”, the Quebecois, a faction largely considered untouchable for the conservative establishment. Such a statement was unexpected by his colleagues in Ottawa, as it constituted a major change in tone and approach from the party line to that point. In truth, Harper had not consulted his party caucus or his constituents before announcing his Winds of Change strategy—Stephen had stepped over both the party line and its line of command. Stephen had spurned Manning yet again. Regarding the matter, Manning later reflected:

At this point, I did not fully appreciate that while Stephen was a strong Reformer with respect to our economic, fiscal, and constitutional positions, he had serious reservations about Reform’s and my belief in the value of grassroots consultation and participation in key decisions and my conviction that the adjective to distinguish our particular brand of conservatism should be ‘democratic’.\textsuperscript{178}

Unsurprisingly, Harper became disaffected as a Reformer. And as such, he resigned his seat in the House of Commons on January 14, 1997. “I’m looking for an opportunity

\textsuperscript{175} Chantal Hebert, 2008. French Kiss: Stephen Harper’s Blind Date with Quebec. 158, 232.
\textsuperscript{176} Wells, 2007. 273.
\textsuperscript{177} Tom Flanagan, 2007. 16.
\textsuperscript{178} Manning, 49.
where I’m not bound by a party line,” Stephen told the media, “and where I can simply push the kind of public policy matters that are most important to me.”\(^{179}\)  

ii. National Citizens Coalition and Return to the Private Sector

On the day of his resignation, Stephen Harper was hired as Vice-President of the National Citizens Coalition (NCC), a conservative lobby group, and would later be promoted to the rank of President within a year.\(^{180}\) During his tenure with the NCC, Harper delivered perhaps one of the most revealing speeches of his career, in June 1997, to the American Council for National Policy. In his speech, he expressed fondness for the American presidential-congressional system in which a separate legislative center of power can provide a ‘check’ on another. Further, he derided the parliamentary system of governance, implying that the Westminster model gave rise to a sort of Prime Ministerial dictatorship where deeply centralized power in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) reduced the House of Commons to a mere ‘rubber stamp’ on the government’s legislative agenda.\(^{181}\) Whether Harper was pandering to his American audience, or whether this was an honest expression of his political opinion, is secondary to the fact that Harper plainly recognized some perceived flaws in the Canadian model of democracy. And, more importantly, that Harper saw some merit in ‘presidentializing’ the office of Prime Minister.

For the next four years, Stephen Harper led the National Citizens’ Coalition with puritanical discipline. Gerry Nicholls, an NCC colleague at the time, remembers Harper as “an emotionless robot”, who attempted to persuade Gerry into leaking a memo to the media that would have disparaged Preston Manning in the run-up to the 1998 Tory leadership race.\(^{182}\) Though Nicholls refused, Harper persisted in a way that Nicholls later likened to “Captain Ahab hunting the white whale.”\(^{183}\) Generally, Harper ran a tight ship

\(^{179}\) Johnson, 2006. 258.  
\(^{181}\) Harris, 2014a. 31.  
\(^{182}\) Martin, 5-6.  
\(^{183}\) Ibid, 13.
during his tenure with the NCC, and quickly made his authority known around the office. After taking control of the organization, Harper introduced an unprecedented level of corporate austerity—such as scrapping their Friday afternoon “drink parties” that had become an end-of-week tradition, and terminating employee Christmas bonuses.\textsuperscript{184} These unwelcome measures won Harper little approval among his employees, who would often insult him behind his back for his stodgy temperament and frequently tease him about his junk food addiction.\textsuperscript{185}

Harper, however, was unconcerned. By the turn of the millennium, he had already begun reacquainting himself with his political associates back in Calgary, Tom Flanagan and Ted Morton. Together, in January 2001, they published the Alberta Firewall Letter in the \textit{National Post} following the defeat of Reform’s successor, the Canadian Alliance, in the 2000 federal election.\textsuperscript{186} The letter called for Albertan Premier Ralph Klein to use the full constitutional powers afforded to him to “build firewalls around Alberta” to safeguard the province against federal government encroachment, much like how network firewalls safeguard against unwelcome traffic.\textsuperscript{187} Dubbed the ‘Alberta Agenda’, their proposal clearly signalled that Stephen Harper was unfinished with federal affairs. However, Harper saw little opportunity to venture back into federal politics, as the conservative movement appeared deeply divided between Manning’s new Canadian Alliance (CA) and Joe Clark’s Progressive Conservatives. By this point, Harper, along with Flanagan, had already made their opinion clear that the Liberals could not be removed from power unless the right-of-centre opposition parties were to associate under a common banner or settle for a power-sharing agreement.\textsuperscript{188} That was until Stockwell Day, who had succeeded Manning as Alliance leader, called a party leadership race to take place in early 2002. Manning had vacated his seat with the party, and now Day, his unpopular inheritor, was facing internal pressure to step down as well—and with that, Harper’s opportunity had come.
iii. *The Canadian Alliance: A Return to Federal Politics*

Without media fanfare or as much as a press tour, Harper resigned from his post with the NCC and announced his candidacy for leader of the Canadian Alliance in December 2001. Holding true to his ‘Three Sisters’ of conservatism, Harper campaigned in opposition to Day’s social conservatism while pushing a pro-merger agenda that sought to unite the CA and Clark’s PCs.¹⁸⁹ Notably, Harper’s campaign team faced considerable internal turmoil throughout the campaign period which climaxed with Harper’s mass firing of all paid staffers, who were coolly replaced in the following days.¹⁹⁰ One of Harper’s new hires, press secretary Carolyn Stewart-Olsen, quickly became one of Harper’s trusted internal associates. “She was the perfect person to work for Harper,” writes campaign manager Tom Flanagan, “intensely committed, loyal, and self-effacing.”¹⁹¹ Harper and his overhauled team managed to congeal well in the weeks leading up to the convention by launching a “hard-headed economist’s” campaign, marked by cutthroat utility maximization.¹⁹² At one point, Harper began to privately contact members of the Alliance party caucus to personally ask if they would turn on Day and throw their support behind Harper’s leadership bid.¹⁹³ Commenting on his campaign strategy, *National Post* columnist Andrew Coyne described Harper as “Manning with a mean streak”.¹⁹⁴ His aggressive campaigning proved effective in the end, as Harper was elected leader of the Alliance by a margin of 17.5 percentage points, and with that became the Leader of the Official Opposition for the first time.

Moments after Harper’s leadership win, journalist Paul Wells was at a downtown pub in Ottawa where Stephen and his team were celebrating. Wells notes that he unwittingly stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Stephen Harper for ten minutes before noticing anybody was there, much less the Leader of the Opposition.¹⁹⁵ But Harper’s

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 39.
¹⁹¹ Ibid.
¹⁹² Ibid., 56.
¹⁹³ Ibid., 27.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 62.
¹⁹⁵ Wells, 2007. 25.
unassuming presence would not last long. According to a senior CA official, Harper imposed a new level of discipline on the party:

Only by virtue of absolutely bloody-minded, brutal tactics, exercising completely iron grip on the party’s organization…and you know, you would have your piece of the discussion while [the policy-making process] was going on. But once the caucus had decided that X was going to be the direction, X was the fucking direction. If you didn’t like X, you could shut the fuck up. But there was no other path forward.\textsuperscript{196}

Progressive Conservative MP John Crosbie, commenting on Ottawa’s perception of Harper at this time, said that “people believe Harper’s cold…and he is cold. He doesn’t have human warmth. He’s not able to even work a room.”\textsuperscript{197} Globe and Mail journalist Lawrence Martin described the new Opposition leader as such: “methodical, deliberate, and puritanically disciplined.”\textsuperscript{198} From early on, Harper revealed himself as the kind of leader that would not shy away from exerting the authority and capacity to control that he worked so long to acquire.

4.3. Harper’s Breakthrough: The Opposition Years (2003-2006)

In 2003, a few major events shaped Harper’s experience as leader of the still-fledgling Alliance. First was his address to the House of Commons on March 20\textsuperscript{th}, which carefully praised the U.S.’ engagement in Iraq—espousing their legal and ethical authority to do so—while at the same time falling short of directly calling for Canadian military assistance.\textsuperscript{199}

As a signal of Harper’s character, the address reveals Harper’s normative position on foreign policy: one situated against the “moral neutrality, moral relativism, and moral equivalence” of the dominant Canadian political class.\textsuperscript{200} Instead, Harper took an affirmative position possessed of his own moral convictions regarding duty, universal rights and liberties, collective security, and international comradery—principles he would keep throughout his life in public office. Second was his speech to Civitas, a private

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 57. \\
\textsuperscript{197} Martin, 2011. 8. \\
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 5. \\
\textsuperscript{199} Flanagan, 88. \\
\textsuperscript{200} Martin, 81.
\end{flushright}
society of libertarians and classical liberals, on April 25th. In this address, Harper expanded on his fundamental opposition to the moral lynchpins of the liberal political establishment: relativism, neutrality, and equivalence. Harper’s speech did not merely associate these principles with liberal culture, but rather conflated them with liberal progressivism altogether. As such, liberalism was indicted of having committed ethical pluralism, enabling the secularism that underlies it, and engendering the dark moral nihilism that emerges from such confusion. Harper, by contrast, presented himself as a beacon of moral clarity. He presented himself as carrying the burden of moral authority amid the rootless cynics and moral absentees of the liberal establishment.

The third event of that year revealed another side of Stephen Harper. The side that’s deeply, if not intrinsically, embedded in his personal strategy: the pragmatist. After the Alliance suffered a significant by-election loss in Perth-Middlesex to the Progressive Conservatives on May 21st, Harper entered into early negotiations with PC leader Peter McKay regarding a power-sharing agreement. This arrangement was to involve both parties running “a single slate of candidates” in contestable ridings. From May until October, concessions were traded between both parties until finally, on October 14, McKay agreed to Harper’s party merger proposal on the condition that Harper accept a particular demand regarding riding membership. The merger agreement was announced two days later, which included McKay’s requirement that candidates be allocated to ridings mathematically according to voter membership; a complex arrangement that notably swung the balance of power, however slightly, in McKay’s favour. Regarding the matter, Harper recognized that he needed to move forward with the agreement as proposed, stating that McKay had a “lack of any spirit of compromise” on the riding issue. Future Conservative Party Senator, Hugh Segal, later remarked that

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201 In broad terms, moral equivalence refers to the denial of ‘moral hierarchy’ between two sides in a conflict. This is essentially an extension of moral relativism, which denies the objectivity or universality of normative ethics. For more on objectivity and relativism in moral politics, see: Russ Shafer-Landau, 2003, *Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?* For more on the concept of equivalence, see: Richard Shorten, 2011. *Towards a political rhetoric of wrongdoing: The case of moral equivalence.*

202 Jeffrey, 41.

203 Flanagan, 97.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid., 123.

206 Wells, 2007. 68.
Harper’s compromise was “an act of supreme statesmanship”.\textsuperscript{207} Having made the necessary concessions to McKay’s Progressive Conservatives, Stephen was now seeking the leadership of a united conservative movement in Canada, for the first time in his life.

4.4.1. \textit{Conservative Party Leadership and the Defection of Belinda Stronach}

Harper’s pragmatism carried forward into the early days of his tenure as leader of the newly founded Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). On March 20, 2004, Stephen Harper was elected leader after comfortably defeating candidates Tony Clement and Belinda Stronach at the inaugural party convention. Notably, the latter of the two had served as CEO of Magna International and whose big money campaign was an early favourite in the leadership race.\textsuperscript{208} According to Stronach’s biographer, after Harper’s leadership victory he “seemed to do everything in his power to neutralize what he perceived as a future rival through isolation, marginalization and humiliation…they added up to a coordinated putdown strategy in Stronach’s mind.”\textsuperscript{209} In his first year as Conservative leader, Harper and Stronach clashed repeatedly. Harper made a concession to Stronach’s more progressive wing of the caucus by appointing her International Trade critic, only to be minimized or outright excluded in his shadow cabinet. During an April 2005 caucus meeting, Harper cut off Stronach before she could deliver her scheduled report on the Taiwan Affairs Act, instead forcing a free vote on the matter. This incident reportedly infuriated Stronach.\textsuperscript{210} However, their intra-party rivalry hit its first boiling a month earlier, at the party’s policy convention in March. The convention was stalled by an altercation after Ontario MP Scott Reid, an associate of Harper’s, introduced a proposal to change the delegate-per-riding formula that McKay included in the merger agreement. Stronach and McKay—who at this time were involved in a high-profile romantic relationship—threatened to shut down the convention over the proposal.\textsuperscript{211} Harper met privately with Stronach and apparently “tore a strip off her”, according to one

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{207} Flanagan, 101.
\bibitem{208} Flanagan, 107.
\bibitem{210} Ibid., 182.
\bibitem{211} Wells, 2007. 145.
\end{thebibliography}

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MP who Stronach had later confided in. Harper’s behaviour was allegedly erratic; the episode was described by Stronach as a “rampage” and a “chair-kicking tantrum”. By the meeting’s end, Stephen had posed an ultimatum to her: Stronach would either cooperate in the interest of the party, or she would be expelled from it.

That day, Stronach capitulated and allowed the convention to proceed. But less than two months later, Stronach would exact redress by crossing the floor and joining Paul Martin’s minority government as Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, spoiling a critical Conservative-NDP non-confidence vote. Stronach’s decision came largely as a result of her personal incompatibility with Harper’s leadership style, his political vision, and his insistence that Stronach would not have a future in the Conservative Party. “He surrounds himself with like-minded people and doesn’t want input from others who have a different viewpoint,” Stronach told the press. “Stephen never wanted anyone who would challenge [his] ideas,” she continued, “...if you did challenge his ideas, he would shut you out.” Biographer John Ibbitson claims that Harper perceived Stronach’s defection as an act of betrayal, and subsequently enacted structural changes to the Party by removing potential “weaknesses” from his inner circle, and crafting a “more resilient...more capable, more unified campaign team”. In leaving, Stronach had labelled Harper a threat to national unity by allying himself with the Bloc Quebecois. Evidently, Harper hadn’t taken lightly to the charge.

4.4.2. **Election Campaign 2004**

The defection of Belinda Stronach was the second of two major setbacks in Harper’s early days as Opposition leader. The first was his party’s decisive loss in the June 2004 federal election. During the ’04 campaign, Stephen’s pragmatism shone through: his

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212 Ibid., 150.
213 Don Martin, 171.
215 Don Martin, 151.
"Demanding Better" policy platform was described by Harper as a “moderate, modern, and mainstream” slate of proposals that sought to distance the CPC from the social conservatism of the Reform and Alliance.\(^{220}\) Included in their campaign strategy was a direct outreach effort to Quebec. During the critical late-writ campaigning period, Harper spent three entire days away from the trail to practice for the French language debate.\(^{221}\) After a strong debate performance, Harper enjoyed an uptick in support from Quebec, which led him to begin pursuing the province more intently. Harper’s campaign team purchased last-minute radio advertising in French, and re-routed their tour bus along the Montreal-Quebec corridor and the Eastern Townships.\(^{222}\) It became clear to Harper that the Quebecois, traditionally anti-Tory by nature, could potentially secure him the Third Sister he required for a majority government.

However, the Conservatives began to lose their momentum in the polls after a series of media gaffes by CPC candidates and party staffers, which included a defamatory media release accusing Paul Martin of supporting child pornography.\(^{223}\) Making matters worse, Conservative backbencher Randy White told the media that his party would invoke the Charter’s notwithstanding clause in order to dismiss Canadian courts’ opinions on same-sex marriage rights.\(^{224}\) These incidents allowed Martin’s Liberals to accuse Harper and his party of being nefarious and untrustworthy ideologues who concealed their hidden agenda from the public.\(^{225}\) But what Harper lost in public support he gained in resilience: Harper hired former Alliance pollster Dimitri Pantazopolous to run various value-based polls, of which Harper heavily edited and oversaw prior to release, in an effort to revive the Conservative’s image by curating positive polling results.\(^{226}\) Long-time Tory pollster Dave Crapper recalls that, while working for the governments of Brian Mulroney and Pat Binns, he had never seen such a level of personal involvement in drafting and proofreading poll material as Harper’s.\(^{227}\)

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\(^{220}\) Jeffrey, 52; For more on the "Demanding Better" platform see Flanagan, 2007, p. 156.
\(^{221}\) Flanagan, 2007. 173.
\(^{222}\) Ibid., 174-175.
\(^{226}\) Wells, 2013. 9.
\(^{227}\) Ibid.
Biographer Paul Wells claims Harper “had a thousand questions he wanted answered…he had a huge, massive amount of polling done to see where things had gone wrong…how much his name had been beaten up,” during this stage in the campaign.\(^{228}\)

Despite his efforts, Harper failed to galvanize any renewed support toward the end of the writ period, as additional campaign errors hindered his opportunity to save face. By the final week of the campaign, Harper had tightly clamped down on party messaging and began prudently sticking to a script. During this critical stage, however, party headquarters ran out of original scripting while at a tour stop in Quebec City.\(^{229}\) A former aide of Harper’s recalls the anger that Stephen could harbor when strategy is interfered with, or plans fail to proceed as intended: “We are fucking going to do this, and you are fucking going to do that and I want to see this fucking thing done right now,” Harper shouted at senior staff during a conference call later that day in Quebec.\(^{230}\)

Evidently, Stephen did not take well the fact that the campaign, at least internally, was beginning to face difficulties with carrying out its planned operations. On the more public-facing side of the campaign, Harper’s seminal failure was his hesitancy to attack. The Liberal Party had launched a series of late-writ television ads accusing Harper of supporting the Iraq War, and for critiquing Chrétien’s refusal to provide direct military assistance to the coalition. The Conservative Party failed to prepare counter-advertisements against Martin, which further damaged Harper’s personal image. “[Harper] learned that if you’re hit and don’t hit back, you always lose,” Wells writes, “…that was a seminal event in the development of [Harper’s] tactics.”\(^{231}\)

In a career marked until then by success, Harper suffered his first major political loss on the election night of June 28, 2004. The Conservatives won only 99 seats in the 38\(^{th}\) Canadian Parliament—not enough to secure a plurality in the House, but sufficient to hold Martin to a minority. Harper hadn’t won a single seat in Quebec. He also underperformed in British Columbia, where his party secured five fewer seats than the Canadian Alliance had in the 2000 election. For a period of time following the election,

\(^{228}\) Wells, 2007. 134.
\(^{229}\) Ibid., 127.
\(^{231}\) Wells, 2013. 70.
Stephen was emotionally “devastated”, and by some accounts fell into a quiet depression.\textsuperscript{232} Reportedly, Harper even began to seriously question whether he was able to continue in federal politics at this time.\textsuperscript{233} “One of Harper’s characteristics is that he has always taken defeat badly,” writes biographer Paul Wells, “[a]nother is that, before long, he sets to work figuring out how to do better.”\textsuperscript{234} Former Conservative House leader Jay Hill corroborates Wells’ claim: “As a person with high-achiever objectives, Harper finds it difficult to fail…Stephen was blaming himself…It took a while, and many people, to lift that burden of blame from him”.\textsuperscript{235} Ultimately, Harper decided to remain as Conservative leader, and to maintain Tom Flanagan as campaign manager for the following election, presumed to take place within a year. With renewed resolve, Flanagan and Harper set out to devise a “Made in Quebec” election strategy that would ensure the support of the Quebecois, thus securing the Third Sister they needed for a viable coalition.\textsuperscript{236}

4.4.3. \textit{Election Campaign 2006}

By early 2005, an entire year before the eventual election, Harper had already begun rolling out his campaign strategy. Stephen invited Joseé Verner, the unsuccessful Conservative candidate for the Quebec riding of Louis-St. Laurent, to caucus with his party as a member of the opposition shadow cabinet. Additionally, several Francophone staff from Quebec were hand-picked by Harper to work in both the Opposition Leader’s Office in Ottawa, as well as in the field in a research and communications capacity.\textsuperscript{237} These efforts were undertaken in a deliberate attempt to bolster the party’s image among French Canadians, and to diversify the “overwhelmingly English Conservative establishment”.\textsuperscript{238} To this end, Harper decided to host the party’s inaugural policy convention in Montreal in March 2005 (infamous for the McKay-Stronach affair). Harper

\textsuperscript{232} Lloyd Mackey, 2005. 7.  
\textsuperscript{233} Wells, 2007. 134.  
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{235} Mackey, 7.  
\textsuperscript{236} Flanagan, 2007. 197.  
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
made this decision at the risk of sustaining personal loss, as such a location would encourage more Red Tory delegates from Quebec to show up and potentially oppose the Western base of the party that he predominantly represented. During this time, Harper undertook something of a personal obsession with courting conservative Quebeckers: “Stephen never gave up on his dream of making a breakthrough in Quebec,” Paul Wells writes, “[h]e repeatedly visited the province…and kept searching for candidates and organizers.”

By the time the writ of election dropped in late November 2005, the Conservatives were already “miles ahead in conceptualizing [the] Quebec campaign,” according to manager Tom Flanagan. Both Flanagan and Harper spearheaded an “indigenous” Quebec campaign strategy that, rather than simply copying and translating English party messaging, involved original slogans and advertising specific to Quebec’s political situation—directed particularly toward the Bloc Quebecois. Further, Harper made efforts to unify the highly factionalized Quebec party association by accepting French Tory demands for an “organizationally separate Quebec wing of the Conservative Party.” In the weeks leading up to the writ, and throughout the campaign period, Harper was given French lessons from his office. Harper was intent on winning the vote of the Quebecois.

At a campaign stop in Quebec City on December 19, Harper revealed his Quebec policy platform. This included significant pledges and concessions to the people of Quebec, such as granting Quebec permanent standing within UNESCO—the UN agency responsible for the preservation of cultural and natural heritage—and a formal recognition of the Quebecois as a “nation” by the Government of Canada. Interestingly, Harper also used the opportunity to unveil his commitment to ‘open federalism’, framed as an imperative for national unity, fiscal balancing, and the

239 Ibid., 198.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., 210.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid., 220.
244 Ibid., 245.
245 Ibid., 244, 277.
cultivation of “new ideas that address Quebec’s unique demands”. The party’s vision of decentralized federalism, in this context, was reimagined as a vehicle of emancipation for the Quebecois: as a means to releasing the people of Quebec from the misuse of the federal spending power, which had long obliged the province into acquiescing to costly federal social programs. In closing, Harper made unprecedented rhetorical appeals to French Canadian nationalists:

The foundation of Quebec is also the birth of the state that became Canada. We must never forget that Canada was founded in Quebec City and founded by Francophones. That is why I say that Quebec is the heart of Canada, and the French language an undeniable part of the identity of all Canadians. 

Unsurprisingly, the Quebec media praised Harper’s proposals, and polling data indicated that French-speaking supporters of the Bloc Quebecois and the Liberals were defecting to the Conservative Party.

So as not to jeopardize their improved public standing, Harper appointed Flanagan the ‘Editor General’ of the campaign. In this capacity, Flanagan would carefully expurgate all party releases and statements in order to prevent another incident like the 2004 child porn debacle. If CPC candidates were requested for an interview by news media, they were ordered to call a hotline at party headquarters where lengthy coaching sessions would groom the candidate to espouse official party messaging. This was part of a greater party messaging strategy that involved the use of shrewd tactics to influence the news media to generate politically advantageous stories or conveniently distracting headlines. For example, Montreal lawyer Michael Fortier and Conservative MP John Reynolds co-authored an open letter to their CPC colleagues that cast a positive light on Stephen Harper amid rumours that his leadership was being internally contested prior to the writ being dropped. During the campaign period, this method was

247 Ibid., 244.
248 Ibid., 245, 267.
249 Ibid. 232.
employed again as seemingly internal memos and letters were ‘leaked’ to the media to create sympathetic and cost-effective press coverage.  

Messaging, and the maintenance of party image, was of paramount importance to the Conservative leader before, during, and after the campaign. During the campaign itself, Harper used carefully sanitized daily press releases and public appearances to announce a new policy initiative every day. In this way, media headlines would be occupied by positive coverage that could drown out any potential gaffes or errors the press might pick up on. Harper reprimanded his top campaign strategists, Patrick Muttart and Ray Novak, after all major policy proposals had been announced with still a couple weeks remaining until polling day: “I want to be making fucking news until the platform comes out…[e]very goddamn day, you’ve got to have something there.” This is a testament to the personal importance Harper put on the ability to influence the news cycle and their projection of his party. Other times, however, Harper would evade issues affecting party image altogether by distancing himself personally from the incident. In the months leading to the election, Conservative MP Gurmant Grewall leaked conversations he recorded with senior Liberal Party officials who were offering personal inducements to Grewall, including a Senate seat for his wife, in exchange for crossing the aisle. Stephen Harper had full knowledge of what was going on, and potentially approved of the activity when he met with Grewall the day before the incident. When Grewall’s actions became the centre of an entrapment controversy, Harper scolded Grewall publicly and encouraged him not to seek re-election; this sort of “scapegoating,” as Paul Wells describes it, would become a commonplace tactic for Harper to save face and eschew culpability. To this end, Stephen Harper refused Parliamentary Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro’s repeated requests for a meeting over the ensuing four-month public inquiry, opting to detach himself from a controversy that would naturally dissolve after Grewall’s resignation.

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252 Ibid.,
255 Wells, 2007. 175.
256 Office of the Ethics Commissioner, January 2006. The Grewall-Dosanjh Inquiry, pursuant to the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons. 9, para. 5.
Another key pillar of the 2006 campaign was the Conservative’s response to the Gomery Commission. The Commission was struck in early 2004 after Auditor General Sheila Fraser found irregularities within the Liberal Party’s sponsorship program in Quebec. After Fraser’s Phase I Report was released in November 2005, widespread accusations of corruption were levied at Martin’s Liberals (despite the incidents having occurred under the Chrétien administration). Being keen to not repeat the same mistakes as the ’04 campaign, Harper seized the opportunity to brand his party as a fresh-faced alternative to the political establishment’s scheming old guard. This time Harper was first to launch attack ads, with the first ones criticizing Prime Minister Martin using quotations from the Gomery Commission. Not shying from his intentions, Harper told the *Montreal Gazette* that “information is the lifeblood of democracy…[w]ithout adequate access to key information about government policies and programs, citizens and parliamentarians cannot make informed decisions and incompetent or corrupt governance can be hidden under a cloak of secrecy.” Public accountability and transparency were key selling points for the Conservatives, as Harper explicitly positioned the party as constituting the plain-speaking, nothing-to-hide answer to the Liberal hold on Ottawa.

Harper’s messaging strategy paid dividends on election night, as January 23, 2006 saw roughly one in four Quebec votes go to the Conservatives—up from less than one in ten in 2004. This earned them ten seats in the province of Quebec, and secured Stephen Harper’s first minority government. Such a breakthrough could not have occurred, says political commentator Chantal Hébert, without Harper’s articulation of open federalism, which promised a federal governing strategy more compatible with Quebec’s unique national interests. Columnist Paul Wells considers this grand gesture a subtle act of retribution for Belinda Stronach’s prior accusation that Harper constituted a threat to national unity. Although, it is perhaps equally likely that Harper was simply masking his longstanding preference for small, decentralized government with rhetoric appealing

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257 Martin did well to use this to his defence, pleading that he was kept in the dark about such uses of public funds while he was Finance Minister under Chrétien. Martin framed the affair as an intra-party conflict between the *ancien régime* of Chrétien and his own fully-modernized successor regime. 
258 As quoted in Lawrence Martin, 2011. 254-5. 
to Quebeckers disgruntled by the federal government’s overreach into Francophone affairs. Either way, Stephen had considerable convincing left to do. He was now Prime Minister-designate of what would be the smallest minority government since Confederation—a post attained on the promise of deep structural changes to the nature of Canadian federalism, and indeed to the practice of Canadian politics itself.

This chapter will explore Stephen Harper’s tenure as Prime Minister of Canada from February 6, 2006 until his resignation request on November 4, 2015. Given the vast amount of information and large number of notable events that transpired over the near decade of Harper’s premiership, events will necessarily be selectively analyzed according to their relevance to moral foundations theory. This will require certain events to be discussed and interpreted irrespective of chronological order.

The following sections are conceptually complex. For the sake of clarity, the following premises must be understood: (i) Given the distinctively top-down governing style of Stephen Harper, some policies and statements of his government or the Conservative Party at large will be taken as an expression of Harper himself; (ii) The moral foundations Authority and Loyalty will be examined in detail, as they represent the key aspects of Harper’s morality that have been made apparent to this point. Other foundations of Harper’s moral character are not the subject of analysis as they are not as demonstrably consistent over time, and have less bearing on the initial research question—that is, how the nature of the Canadian security and surveillance system intersect with personal morality, agency, and leadership.

5.1. Overview of Events as Prime Minister

Stephen Harper’s original cabinet, composing the 28th Canadian Ministry, included four Quebec MPs out of a total of ten available, in addition to the unelected Michael Fortier, a Montreal lawyer later appointed to the Senate who co-chaired Harper’s 2006 campaign.261 This began a series of major concessions to Quebec throughout Harper’s first minority government. Within days of his swearing in, Harper developed a close bilateral relationship with Quebec premier Jean Charest. The two leaders reportedly met countless times before summer.262 Out of this relationship emerged a slate of major policy initiatives that firmly established Quebec as a top priority on Harper’s agenda,

261 Wells, 2007. 250.
262 Ibid., 289.
culminating with his famous acknowledgement that the Quebecois “form a nation within a united Canada” via parliamentary motion.263

Apart from the Quebec file, Harper’s first order of business involved the passage of the Federal Accountability Act, an anti-corruption bill implementing some of the recommendations of the Gomery Commission’s Phase II Report related to government spending and financial donations to political actors. However, by early 2008 Justice John Gomery, the presiding Commission chair, lamented that most of the recommendations that not yet been implemented by the Harper government. Rather, Gomery reported that a “dangerous and growing concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office,” since the start of Harper’s mandate, had given rise to new venues for political interference.264

The remainder of Harper’s first mandate included tough-on-crime legislation, public transit security investments in response to international terrorist attacks, a national child-care allowance, a failed free vote on whether to re-open the issue of same-sex marriage, and formal apologies to those subjected to the Chinese head tax and survivors of the Indian residential school system. Of Harper’s governing style, Lawrence Martin writes: “Harper combined the traits of two Liberal leaders he had watched with aversion… [h]e combined Pierre Trudeau’s imperious intellectual strengths with Jean Chretien’s bare-knuckled toughness, but had neither man’s charms.”265

His charm notwithstanding, Harper won a second mandate as Prime Minister on October 14, 2008 after securing 143 seats in the 40th Canadian Parliament. This marked an improvement from the 124 won in the prior election, although not enough for a majority. Despite his concessions to and outreach efforts in Quebec, Harper failed to increase his party’s seat count in la belle province. Following his election win, Harper became embroiled in a high-profile prorogation scandal after the Liberal Party and the NDP signalled their intention to defeat the Conservative government on a motion of non-confidence. Governor General Michaëlle Jean prorogued parliament until January 29, 2009, which bought Harper sufficient time to persuade Michael Ignatieff’s Liberals to

263 The Globe and Mail, "PM makes UNESCO deal with Quebec", 4 May, 2006; For Quebec nation motion see Lawrence Martin, 2011, p. 83-87.
264 The Globe and Mail, "Gomery blasts Tory response to sponsorship recommendations
265 Lawrence Martin, 2011. 5.
distance themselves from their coalition pact with the NDP.\textsuperscript{266} From thereafter, Harper and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty released a series of federal stimulus budgets aimed at recovering from the effects of the late-2000s financial crisis through heavy deficit spending.\textsuperscript{267} To biographer Paul Wells, Harper’s successive stimulus packages motioned that he “had finally come out as a deficit-spending Keynesian.”\textsuperscript{268}

After his government was found to be \textit{prima facie} in contempt of parliament by Speaker of the House Peter Milliken, Harper asked Governor General David Johnston to issue the writ of election. On May 2, 2011, the Conservative Party won 166 seats, including a major breakthrough in Ontario, and finally secured their long sought after majority government. Harper’s tenure as Prime Minister of Canada ended after losing the October 19, 2015 federal election to Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party, putting an end to his decade-long reign as head of government.

5.2. \textbf{Primary Trait Analysis: Authority/Subversion}

In his seminal text \textit{The Righteous Mind}, Jonathan Haidt identifies Authority/Subversion (hereafter referred to as ‘Authority’) as one of the five foundations of morality. This is a key component of his moral foundations theory (MFT), which holds that morality varies across human communities according to one’s inheritance and cultivation of such moral foundations as Harm, Loyalty, Fairness, and Sanctity. Of each foundation identified by MFT, there are relevant virtues and emotional characteristics that operationalize its expression in the world. For Authority, these emotions are (i) respect, and (ii) fear; conversely, its virtues are (a) obedience, and (b) deference.\textsuperscript{269} According to Haidt, the Authority foundation boasts greater ontological complexity because of its bidirectional status: Authority simultaneously points upward toward superiors while also pointing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{266}] \textit{Globe and Mail}, "Harper, Ignatieff hold budget talks", 12 December 2008; For Ignatieff’s capitulation see \textit{CBC News}, "Ignatieff puts Tories ‘on probation’ with budget demand", 28 January 2009.
\item[\textsuperscript{267}] Harper and Flaherty ran budget deficits from 2008 until 2013, adding over $150bn to Canada’s national debt.
\item[\textsuperscript{268}] Wells, 2013. 240.
\item[\textsuperscript{269}] Haidt, 2012. 125, Fig. 6.2. See Table 7A in the Appendix for more on each foundation’s associated emotions and virtues.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
down toward subordinates, working at once to produce a hierarchy within which relationships can be founded. Authority constructs hierarchies as such in an effort to preserve Order; the obverse would be a kind of radical egalitarianism, or simply anarchy, in which each actor wields an equal amount of directorial power as their fellow group member irrespective of concerns of efficiency, stability, or security.

Before moving forward, it’s important to consider that Authority does not represent some oppressive, totalitarian impulse, but rather the recognition of legitimate and sometimes necessary asymmetries of power. Alan Fiske’s research on authority relations across cultures finds that authority figures and their subordinates “have mutual expectations that are more like those of a parent and a child than those of a dictator and fearful underlings”. The ‘mutual expectations’ Fiske refers to encompass qualities that are thought to be mutually beneficial to both parties in an authority relationship, as the subordinates are often entitled to pastoral care and protection from their higher-ups who are accorded greater prestige and prerogative. Fiske ultimately counters liberal-progressive assumptions about social hierarchy by concluding that such relationships are not inherently exploitative but rather a legitimate, transitive, and reflexive mode of ordering. However, Fiske notes that leaders within hierarchies, in the process of maintaining such relations, can view dissent as an act of insubordination. This, understandably, speaks to the unfortunate reality that leaders who occupy positions of asymmetric power sometimes exploit it to their personal advantage. (What determines this autocratic turn likely depends on the moral-psychological qualities of such a leader.) Therefore, it’s best to proceed with the understanding that social hierarchy, while not having an essential element of exploitation, can be corrupted for this purpose depending on the expression of Authority by those at the top.

It is only possible to cleanly gauge and ascertain the expression of Authority by breaking it down to its constituent elements, instance by instance. In each case, there is

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270 Ibid., 144.
271 Ibid., 143.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid., 697.
often a corresponding ‘emotional’ aspect (e.g. respect, fear) or ‘virtuous’ aspect to which one can point to (as in its relation to virtue, e.g. deference, chaste). Of the empirical cases listed and explored below, a new angle or moral ‘trend line’ that extends from Authority will be used to attest to its being. For example, in the case of ‘Message Control’, the control of information is a behavioural trend that’s considered its own subcategory of Authority and, principally, as supporting evidence to the existence/expression of Authority itself. In this instance, Message Control reflects a fear of dissent, a hyper-sensitivity to in-group image, and respect for obedience and suppression. Naturally, we can attribute these characteristics to the top-down expression of Authority within a hierarchical order.

(i) **Permanent Campaign**

Stephen Harper led what’s called a ‘permanent electoral campaign’ throughout his nearly twelve-year tenure as leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. The notion of the permanent campaign first entered popular discourse after journalist Sidney Blumenthal’s aptly-titled book *The Permanent Campaign*. Blumenthal introduced audiences to the idea that modern advances in communications technology have increased the importance of opinion polling and the news media, largely replacing the old-world standards of patronage and parochialism that dominated for centuries prior. Campaigning now has become a form of around-the-clock governing through the maintenance of favourability ratings and public opinion—and as such, requiring a constant party-wide effort to manage the kind of information that might influence the electorate’s support.

Recently, Alex Marland’s Donner Prize-winning *Brand Command* details how, coinciding with the Stephen Harper era, the locus of political power shifted in Canada. The dramatic influence of social media, and the advent of Web 2.0, have made political communications a massively effective force in concentrating power in the hands of the prime minister and central agents, argues Marland. Rather than being a product of

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personal leveraging, it is argued that developments in information and communications technology have made “communications control” and “branding strateg[ies]” an unstoppable political reality regardless of individual leadership personalities.\textsuperscript{277} As true as this may be, Marland appears to diminish the role of individual leadership style in arriving at this conclusion—the same empirical examples Marland relies upon, in fact, appear to work against his argument that ‘communications control’ is technologically determined as a political necessity. Throughout Harper’s premiership, his responses to questions asked by journalists and members of the parliamentary press gallery—as seldom as they were—were, whenever possible, hand-picked by Harper prior to their asking. In another instance, Marland relies on the fact that Harper’s 2015 election writ period was among the longest official campaigns in Canadian history. “Ostensibly to constrain third parties’ ability to advertise,” Marland claims, “…and to bleed the resources of his opponents.”\textsuperscript{278} Examples such as these are offered throughout Marland’s book to attest to the new reality that political messaging imposes upon Canadian democracy.

However, little is said about the possibility of alternative leadership styles that would leverage one’s messaging strategy in a way that’s consistent with standards of openness and transparency. One might imagine a public official who, despite knowing the political importance of remaining on-message, refuses to pre-screen press gallery members or personally curate their questions so that they may appear spontaneous, unconstrained, and unafraid of the opposition. As evidenced by the electoral successes of Donald Trump and Nigel Farage, such a casual, unadulterated style has a certain appeal to voters attracted to raw, undaunted communiqué. In the era of social media, such practices are all the more powerful as the virality of web content can quickly expose their messages to a wider audience than if released ‘traditionally’ (i.e. without mass grassroots sharing and circulation). All of this is to say that political messages can be communicated appealingly without having to resort to the command-and-control media tactics of Stephen Harper’s administration. It must be emphasized that Harper, then, did not control

\textsuperscript{277} Marland, 2016; Later elaborated upon in Marland, Giasson, and Esselment, 2017. Permanent Campaigning in Canada.
\textsuperscript{278} Marland, Giasson, and Esselment, 2017. 11.
the message as a result of political necessity in the sense that such practices are some kind of ‘new standard’. Rather, he embellished them and exploited them to maximize perceived gain when, in fact, such efforts may have been unnecessary or even counter-productive for obtaining political support. Therefore, political messaging is not simply technologically determined and cannot be explained away as such: leadership personalities can, and do, matter.

Table 5.1, Cases: Permanent Campaign

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Former campaign strategists on Harper’s pre-writ election campaigning: “The Conservatives have invested so heavily in the pre-writ period that they have introduced a new model of campaigning in Canada—the permanent campaign—in which pre-writ spending and activities are just as important as what happens in the writ period.”279</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>On the rationale behind Harper’s extensive year-round campaigning: “Harper and his team understood the importance of being prepared for electoral warfare at any moment…The party implemented a disciplined and fused style of communication messages and resources in its bid for election, to stay in power, and to win the next election with a majority of seats.”280</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Following a 2010 directive from the PMO, the Government of Canada was re-stylized as the “Harper Government” on all press releases and official communications.281 Peter Aucoin condemned the rebranding as “the executive abusing the powers of government for purely partisan purposes.”282</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>The Conservative Party of Canada spent $83.3m on their advertising budget in 2010-2011, more than twice what the Liberals spent in their last year in office.</td>
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279 Jeffrey, 2015. 78.  
280 Marland, 2016. 8.  
281 Jeffrey, 88.  
282 Ibid., 89.
5. The Paille Report found that the Government of Canada violated political neutrality rules by spending at least $521,000 on subscriptions to public opinion polls during the 2006-2007 year that were of a “partisan nature”.  

6. A national re-branding strategy that John Meisel refers to as the “Harperization” of the hearts and minds of Canadians, in which the Canadian national image is conflated with that of particular Conservative achievements and ambitions (e.g. sovereignty of the Arctic, a proud history of militarism, the elevation of the Prime Minister as *embodying* government).  

7. Harper’s incremental approach to public policymaking is said to be inspired by Charles Lindblom’s ‘muddling through’ technique. This entails major changes being “smuggled” into the political system through minor initiatives and amendments unceremoniously introduced in rapid succession. These developments essentially “sneak up” on citizens as they often go unreported or undiscussed by the general population. In effect, this maintains a visage of positive public reception, as the electorate remains uninformed of the government’s greater agenda.  

8. A 2010 Canadian Press investigation found that a new federal communication tool called the Message Event Proposal heavily scripted federal representative’s response to media inquiries. This included ambassadors, diplomats, and civil servants. This degree of message control was considered “unprecedented in federal politics,” and to have undermined Canadian democracy, as it blurs the distinction between public servants and party politics.  

(ii) **Media Suppression**


284 Toronto Star, “‘Harperizing’ our minds,” 19 April 2011.  


The following are noted cases of media suppression, among other violations of press freedom. Each instance relates to Authority in the sense that they reflect an asymmetry of power between the ‘superior’ figure (the Executive) and subordinate (the press), rather than a more horizontal power arrangement where members of the press can freely cover government affairs. The element of fear is closely at play in each instance, as the ‘superior’ attempts to frustrate any potential subversive or otherwise negative press coverage that may disrupt their position of authority, or undermine the relationship on which its founded.

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<tr>
<th>Table 5.2, Cases: Media Suppression</th>
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<td>1. The PMO blocked media access to a hotel hosting a party “retreat” in Atlantic Canada in 2007. 287</td>
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<td>2. During 2011 general election campaign, reporters were kept behind barricades during Harper’s stop in Halifax. 288</td>
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<td>3. Harper was instrumental in the formation of the conservative Sun News Network, and later pushed for the network’s mandatory carriage by cable and satellite TV providers to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). 289</td>
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<td>4. Sun News Network, a right-wing news network known for coverage sympathetic to the CPC, was given exclusive access to the Conservative Party’s fall 2013 caucus room speeches. 290</td>
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<td>5. Harper disparaged the results of opinion polls by market research organization Ipsos-Reid, alleging “Liberal pollsters get Liberal results” while being interviewed on Fox News in the United States. 291</td>
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287 Ibid., 94.
288 Ibid.
290 Jeffrey, 94.
6. Harper’s Department of Citizenship and Immigration, headed by Minister Jason Kenney, spent $745,000 in public funds on monitoring “ethnic media” from 2009 and 2012. This was seen as going beyond standard government communications practices, and as being a partisan exercise. ²⁹²

7. Habitually, government “departmental communications advisors” would arrive at the scene of an emergency or a developing situation to guard “against the threat of unauthorized media interviews.” This includes an incident involving a small fire at the National Research Council, where government communications staff arrived before first responders to deny Press Gallery members access to the scene. ²⁹³


(iii) ‘Hierarchizing’ and Subordination

The following cases depict acts in which Prime Minister Harper subordinates, makes subject, or makes subservient his peers. By their nature, these acts demand obedience and deference to, and respect for, his judgment as their superior and as such they are expressions of power. In these instances, Harper reinforces his position of supremacy by exercising power over those within the ‘authority ranking’, such as his peers, mentors, caucus members, and cabinet ministers. In so doing, he effectively reifies the hierarchies that separate his subordinates from himself.

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<th>Table 5.3, Cases: ‘Hierarchizing’ and Subordination</th>
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<td>1. In April 2010, Conservative Minister of Status of Women Helena Guergis was expelled from caucus and forced to resign her Cabinet seat after being charged</td>
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²⁹² Jeffrey, 92.
²⁹³ Wells, 2007. 36; 37-41.
²⁹⁴ Ibid., 302-9
with “baseless” and unspecific allegations against her. After an RCMP investigation, no evidence of criminal wrongdoing was found. Guergis later filed a defamation lawsuit against Harper.295

2. Conservative Party strategist Patrick Muttart was abruptly relieved of his duties during the 2011 election campaign after the CEO of Sun Media Corporation accused Muttart of submitting a fabricated photograph of Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff. Muttart considered the accusations to be unfounded and decried Harper and campaign chair Guy Giorno’s decision to fire him.296

3. After experiencing a falling-out with long-time mentor and political associate Tom Flanagan, Harper became livid after noticing Flanagan’s presence at a speech during the 2010 Calgary Stampede. In the green room, he asked his staff “who the fuck let him in?” and ordered them to keep Flanagan away from the CPC team.297

4. Gordon Shaw, a family friend of the Harper’s, described Stephen as being “constitutionally incapable” of deferring authority, and that he remembers Harper as having said that he “just can’t stand to have anyone tell me what to do.”298

5. “He has difficulty feigning interest [in others]. His associates talk of him sometimes simply turning his back and walking away from them while they are in mid-sentence. He rarely displays much ability or desire to be collegial, or even polite.”299

6. Commenting on the CPC’s campaign experience during the 2004 election: “[Harper] didn’t like being part of a team. He could never work under another’s leadership.”300

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297 Wells, 2013. 287.
298 Ibbitson, 101.
299 Ibid., 258.
300 Ibid., 98.
7. Harper met with Belinda Stronach at Stornoway after she told the press that the CPC would attempt to force an election before the end of 2005. During the meeting, Harper allegedly told her: “You’ll never have a future in this party, you’re too ambitious.”

8. On Michael Chong’s resignation from Cabinet after Harper’s Quebec nationhood motion: “…just as Harper could not tolerate authority when he was a subordinate, so too he could not tolerate dissent when he was in charge. Michael Chong, by behaving the way Harper used to behave when he served under Preston Manning—obstinate, principled—had doomed his career. Stephen Harper would never hire Stephen Harper.”

9. Former Canadian Alliance MP Dr. Keith Martin on Harper’s governing ethos: “He felt the best way to govern was per Leo Strauss—that a small number of people at the top determine what has to be done.”

10. Michael D. Behiels likened Harper’s governing practices to that of “an autocrat” and that, under Harper’s premiership “the executive is everything.”

11. Stephen Harper elected to write his 2008 apology to the survivors of the Indian residential school system on his own, despite the wishes of the Privy Council Office, the Justice Department, and the Department of Indian Affairs.

12. Compared to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker for “treating [his political foes] like termites” and generally distaining his opposition.

13. Commenting on Harper’s controversial protection of Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn following a scandal at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC): “Harper’s new normal was submit or be crushed—

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301 Ibid., 210.
302 Ibid., 251.
303 Lawrence Martin, 2011. 124.
304 Ibid., 125.
305 Ibid., 134.
something arm’s-length officers of Parliament and heads of tribunals had never seen before.”

14. Biographer John Ibitson on Harper’s tendency to exile or estrange those who were formerly his superiors (paraphrasing strategist Tom Flanagan):
“...is the product of Harper’s need to dominate whatever environment he is in...I think he has this very strong instinct to be in charge...to be the Alpha figure, and he’s achieved that. So part of that is to dispose of anyone who might be considered a rival.”

(iv) **Secrecy, Transparency and Information Control**

The following cases are instances in which the Harper government, or Harper himself, withheld public information or deliberately stymied the flow of information that ought to be open and accessible. In effect, this is an inquiry into transparency, and the opaqueness that characterizes Stephen Harper’s governing style. Also included are cases where Harper failed to satisfy some prior commitment to transparency, or miscarried his commitment by not fully rectifying an issue to the extent one would reasonably expect (e.g., his legislative response to the Gomery Commission). Harper expresses the Authority foundation in this way by basically constructing an airtight valve on the availability of public information—one in which information is only permitted for release according to top-down approval. In effect, this indicates a fear of intra- and extra-party subversion, an insecurity of self-image (of party, administration, or persona), or a demand to respect self-censorship and to disdain contradictory evidence. Further, failure to act transparently as a public official—that is to say, to act secretly—has a distinct connection to Authority as a moral trait. This is because such an act denies one’s liberty to access the desired information on the assumption that only those with sufficient

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307 Ibid., 169.
308 Ibitson, 2015. 98.
hierarchical status can be trusted to obtain it. For secrecy to be practiced legitimately requires one’s obedience to and respect for such an ethic.

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<th>Table 5.4, Cases: Secrecy, Transparency and Information Control</th>
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<td>1. Linda Keen, former President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, commenting on her being blacklisted from the Public Service of Canada following her 2008 dismissal by Harper: “The [principles] promised in the Accountability Act never happened. We now know all of this was a house of cards.” 309</td>
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<td>2. Stephen Harper’s first Information Commissioner appointment, Robert Marleau, later remarked that his appointer had “done nothing to improve transparency and information flow…[i]t is no longer a trickle of information coming down from the trop; it’s shut off.” 310</td>
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<td>3. According to close confidante and former Chief of Staff Ian Brodie, Harper was taught the value of tightly controlling the flow of information by Jeffrey Simpson’s 1980 book <em>Discipline of Power</em>. 311</td>
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<td>4. A 2014 revelation by Parliamentary Budget Officer Jean-Denis Fréchette broke the news that federal agents, himself included, were made to pay “exorbitant fees” for Access to Information (ATI) requests. To date, 24 of his 33 ATI requests had only returned “somewhat useful” responses, and the remaining 9 had been outright denied. 312</td>
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<td>5. In regards to the above case (Item 4), Pat Martin, the NDP Chair of the House Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, proclaimed that “[i]t’s an absurd, almost Orwellian, notion that the [PBO] should have to file ATI requests to get information.” 313</td>
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309 Michael Harris, 2014. 186.
310 Ibid., 436-7.
311 Lawrence Martin, 2011. 122.
312 Jeffrey, 186.
313 Ibid.
6. Former Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page took Harper to court in 2012 over the government’s refusal to provide data allowing Page to scrutinize the impacts of 2012 federal budget’s $5.2bn cuts from the federal public service. The Government claimed that Page was attempting to overstep his mandate, and the case was later dismissed in Federal Court on a technicality.\(^\text{314}\)

7. Compounding the above cases (Items 4-6) is Harper’s ethical contradiction regarding governmental transparency. During the Quebec sponsorship scandal, Harper condemned Paul Martin’s withholding of budget information: “We expect open and honest information here…not to have to make fifty-eight thousand access-to-information requests.”\(^\text{315}\)

8. A 2010 report by journalists Gloria Galloway and Bill Curry indicated that “[m]ajor government departments have hired outside consultants to clear the backlogs of delayed files, often by asking journalists and other requesters to simply abandon their requests.” They go on to add that “[t]he Harper government has a reputation for controlling information,” and that “some Conservatives question whether its worth it.”\(^\text{316}\)

9. From Information Commissioner Robert Marleau’s 2006-2007 annual report: “Too often, responses to access requests are late, incomplete, or overly censored. Too often, access is denied to hide wrongdoing, or to protect officials from embarrassment, rather than to serve a legitimate confidentiality requirement.” Commissioner Marleau resigned from his position after tabling the report.\(^\text{317}\)

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\(^{314}\) The Canadian Press, “Canada’s budget watchdog takes government to court for refusing to release austerity details”, 21 November 2012.


\(^{316}\) Globe and Mail, “Five years later, information access is still stalled,” 8 October 2010.

\(^{317}\) Information Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report Information Commissioner 2006-2007, 11. For more on Marleau’s resignation, see:
10. A 2010 study from the University College London ranked Canada dead last in government transparency in relation to four other developed parliamentary democracies: Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.\footnote{Hazell and Worthy, 2010. Assessing the performance of freedom of information. Government Information Quarterly. 358.}

11. A 2008 book *Fallen Behind*, by freedom-of-information specialist Stanley Tromp catalogues 46 cases of information “stonewalling” by the Canadian government. Roughly half of the text details numerous campaign promises to reform government transparency in the Conservative’s 2006 platform that were abandoned or insufficiently fulfilled.\footnote{Stanley L. Tromp, 2008. *Fallen Behind: Canada’s Access to Information Act in the World Context*.}

12. In 2011, Speaker Peter Milliken twice ruled that the Harper Government was in contempt of Parliament after withholding information about defunding non-profit organization and later refusing to disclose the costs of the F-35 fighter jet program.\footnote{Michael Harris, 2014. 115-119.} Opposition Leader Michael Ignatieff later wrote of the affair: “They gave the impression of being less a government than a motorcycle gang…[it was] unprecedented in the history of Canadian parliamentary government.”\footnote{Michael Ignatieff, 2013. 143-5.}

13. The 2011-2012 federal budget reduced the Statistics Canada operating budget by roughly $54mn, resulting in lay-offs for half of the agency’s staff and the elimination of three national roundtable institutions that analyze and communicate StatsCan data. Author and professor Donald Gutstein characterized these specific austerity measures as an ideological effort to undercut scientific knowledge and erode the government’s institutional memory.\footnote{Donald Gutstein, 2014. *Harperism: How Stephen Harper and his think tank colleagues have transformed Canada*. 169-72.}

14. The Military Police Complaints Commission released a 2012 report following their inquiry into the Afghan detainee affair. The Commission devoted a chapter of its report to discussing the various issues they experienced while
trying to access evidence and witnesses. “Doors were basically slammed shut on document disclosure. The Commission did not receive a single, new document from the Government throughout that time period despite many requests,” the report reads.323

15. Regarding the Afghan detainee issue discussed in Item 14, retired Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, veteran of the War in Afghanistan, remarked that there is a “problem of openness between the Conservative Party and the military…[including] not admitting fault or admitting any flaws”.324

16. Author Lawrence Martin on Harper ghostwriting sections of Tom Flanagan’s 1995 book on Reform leader Preston Manning: “Harper, Flanagan had noticed, was very unusual in respect to secrecy and information control. He was practically manic.”325

(v) Censorship, Security and Surveillance

The following cases broadly depict instances in which the Harper government, or Stephen Harper himself, engaged in acts of censorship, expanded state surveillance powers without commensurate oversight, or exercised security measures that a reasonable person may consider excessively forceful. Although wide-ranging, these cases share a resemblance to Authority as they demonstrate a political impulse to achieve hierarchical security through the application of force (i.e. clear and lasting demarcation lines between the citizen as subject, and the state as supreme). For such an arrangement to work, it demands the subordinate in the authority ranking to acquiesce to the judgment and action of those above them. Some of the cases below are similar in kind to those of earlier categories (e.g. Table 5.2, Media Suppression), and therefore may ‘overlap’ with them. Primarily, however, cases of censorship not directly related to the media are found here.

Table 5.5, Cases: Censorship, Security and Surveillance

323 Maclean’s, “Afghan detainees: The final report of the MPCC”, 27 June 2012.
324 Wells, 2013. 265.
325 Lawrence Martin, 2011. 10.
1. In 2005, an audio tape revealed Stephen Harper’s involvement in a bribery scandal. This involved the offer of an expensive life insurance package for dying MP Chuck Cadman in return for voting against the Liberal budget. When the tape resurfaced in 2008, Harper threatened a $3.5mn libel suit against Liberal leader Stéphane Dion after the Liberal’s use of the recorded material. University of Toronto Professor of Law Peter Russell said of the matter: “This use of legal action to silence the opposition is characteristic of authoritarian governments…[i]t is incompatible with democratic government.”

2. 2013 reports from the University of Victoria Environmental Law Clinic, in collaboration with Democracy Watch, reveal systematic efforts by the federal government to muzzle Canadian scientists by “forcing scientists to jump through hoops before speaking with the media.”

3. Scott Findlay notes a “systemic campaign to reduce the flow of scientific evidence to Canadians,” waged by the Harper government. “As a result, the public hears and sees only information that supports federal government policy or ideology. That’s not evidence, that’s propaganda,” Findlay added.

4. Michael Behiels penned a 2010 op-ed in the Ottawa Citizen denouncing Harper’s position on the nationhood of Quebec, Marjory LeBreton, Leader of the Government in the Senate, contacted the University chancellor demanding disciplinary action be taken against Behiels. The Liberal Senate caucus responded by characterizing the incident as one of many in which the Government of Canada has tried to silence dissenting opinion.

5. Nature, one of the world’s leading scientific journals, declared Harper’s tenure as prime minister “[n]ine years of censorship”. Under his government, federal scientists could release stories that “only reflect economics, and what you could sell, not what you could save or conserve,” the journal argues. Alarmingly,

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326 Wells, 2013. 127.
328 Jeffrey, 2015. 106.
329 Lawrence Martin, 2011. 117
scientists were instructed that they were not to criticize Harper “even on their own time”. 331

6. To explore the pervasiveness of the censorship issue, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC) ran an independent survey of scientists in 40 federal departments and agencies (n=4,067). They found that 90% of respondents “do not feel that they can speak freely to the media about the work they do,” and a striking 24% report being “directly asked to exclude or alter information for non-scientific reasons.” 332

7. The Anti-terrorism Act, 2015 (popularly known as Bill C-51) received Royal Assent on June 18, 2015. The bill greatly expanded the powers of Canada’s intelligence and national security agencies while providing no additional oversight mechanisms in the legislation. Stephen Harper’s biographer, John Ibbitson, claims that the CPC “refused to create a parliamentary committee to keep a watch on [intelligence agencies], arguing off the record that the opposition parties couldn’t be trusted to protect state secrets.” 333

8. Stephen Harper deliberately ignored Federal Court orders to repatriate Canadian citizen Omar Khadr, a former child soldier who fought for the Afghan insurgency. Canadian Forces detained Khadr in 2002 and handed him over to U.S. authorities who subjected him to enhanced interrogation techniques and denied him due process of law in Guantanamo Bay. In 2009, 64% of the Canadian public supported the repatriation of Khadr. 334 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously decided that the Government of Canada has a responsibility to protect Khadr in January 2010, and Khadr was finally transferred to a Canadian prison over two and a half years later in September 2012. 335

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333 Ibbitson, 2015, 355.
9. The combined costs of the 2010 G20/G8 summits in Toronto and Huntsville, Ontario amounted to $858mn, with roughly $676mn (or 61.5%) allocated for security. This proved to be the costliest security operation in the nation’s history, and was criticised by some for having “virtually no oversight.”

Subsequently, the 2013 global surveillance leaks by Edward Snowden revealed that Canada “assisted the U.S. National Security Agency to spy on allies while this country was their host”.336

10. In September 2008, Stephen Harper appointed physician Arthur Porter as chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the sole, independent oversight body tasked with scrutinizing CSIS. He resigned in 2011 after being arrested on numerous fraud charges related to his business connections with international lobbyists and foreign leaders. These included a contract between Porter and Israeli arms dealer Ari Ben-Menashe, involving a US$120mn grant from Russia to fund infrastructure development in his home country of Sierra Leone.338

“Harper had created a very powerful subordinate [in Porter]”, wrote journalist Michael Harris. Despite having the reputation of a fraudster, Stephen remained close friends with him and even publicly defended Porter for some time.339

11. Harper long pursued a tough-on-crime agenda as prime minister, some of which, however, clashed with the protection of human rights and civil liberties. Notably, the 2007 Correctional Service of Canada policy report, Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety, was widely panned as being particularly flawed. Conrad Black critiqued the Roadmap as “the self-serving work of reactionary, authoritarian palookas…it appears to defy a number of Supreme Court decisions and is an affront, at least to the spirit of the Charter.”340

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337 Harris, 2014. 260.
338 National Post, “Canada’s spy watchdog’s questionable $200,000 deal”, 8 November 2011.
339 Ibid., 268.
Graham Stewart and Michael Jackson said of the report: “It is a flawed moral and legal compass...[the proposed changes] dismantle a generation of reform painstakingly put in place by both previous Conservative and Liberal governments, and will make a mockery of Canada’s claim to leadership in the vindication of human rights.”

12. Each of the major Conservative crime bills introduced between 2008 and 2014, Bill C-9 (40th Parliament), Bill C-36 (41st), and Bill C-30 (41st) expanded the powers of law enforcement authorities to prosecute and monitor “small-time players,” according to Paul Wells. Other experts considered some of the crime measures “moralistic” and “regressive”—especially with respect to the criminalization of sex work—and as constituting an undue or overblown expansion of the state incarceration regime.

13. The Harper government perennially affirmed a moral position opposed to recreational drug use, in contradiction to a body of mounting research on the merits of drug decriminalization and harm prevention (e.g. failing to approve the expansion of Vancouver’s Insite safe injection spaces). In September 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously ruled that the Harper government’s decision to withdraw the legal exemption of safe injection spaces under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, “not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

14. In a 2015 report by the Centre for International Policy Studies, the allegedly “Straussian” influences on Harper’s neoconservative foreign policy are detailed. This resulted in his undoing of Canada’s identification with the United Nations and their peacekeeping programme, to replace it with the image of a “courageous warrior nation”. This encompassed increased military spending and a more involved position in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan and later Iraq. The threat of terrorism was taken as a stabilizing force for public order, and

342 Wells, 2013. 258; Jeffrey, 2015. 221.
343 Wells, 2013. 223-4.
served as a reminder that Canada’s “most urgent and primary task is its self-preservation.”

15. Stephen Harper launched a militant overseas anti-terrorism campaign based on firm “moral judgments and [a] reject[ion] of relativism.” Specifically, Harper either initiated or increased Canadian Forces commitments in Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, and Iraq. Giving credence to the charges laid against him by Gutstein (Item 14), Harper once told Canadian troops in Afghanistan that “[t]errorism will come home if we don’t confront it here.”

(vi) Consolidation and Concentration of Executive Power

To be sure, many of the cases already discussed could be described as an act of power consolidation. However, the cases listed below are distinct for their direct involvement of person-to-person reifications of hierarchy. That is to say in each case there is an immediate expression of power being exerted from Harper, or the executive, to be imposed upon those beneath them in the hierarchy—this includes backbench MPs, caucus members, party staffs, and federal public servants. This reflects Authority’s central preoccupation with submission to status of higher rank, and to respect those boundaries that delineate such rankings (i.e., from Prime Minister’s Office to Cabinet, from Cabinet to backbench, etc.).

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<tr>
<th>Table 5.6, Cases: Consolidation/Concentration of Executive Power</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Harper placated the greater Conservative caucus by organizing a 6-MP “caucus advisory committee,” in which backbench members could voice their concerns to each Minister of the Crown. This was ridiculed as being a mechanism for pacifying dissent within the party, and as giving only the impression of parity and empowerment. Often, these committees would be used to discourage private</td>
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member’s bills on official languages, abortion, or other political non-starters such as the definition of marriage.346

| 2. | In 2012, Harper personally barred Conservative backbencher Mark Warawa from speaking during Question Period as he feared Warawa would re-open the issue of sex-selective abortion in Parliament. Warawa spoke out against Harper’s muzzling, and was backed by six other Conservative MPs.347 |
| 3. | For voting against the 2007 federal budget, and for speaking out personally against Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Senator Anne Cools and MP Bill Casey were both dispelled from caucus and forced to sit in their respective chambers as independents.348 |
| 4. | Former Conservative Party staffer, David Krayden, commenting after Harper’s 2015 election loss: “The Harper imprisonment is over…Stephen Harper insisted upon absolute caucus control and on absolutely getting his own way on every question. MPs who resisted this form of party discipline quickly discovered what life on the Parliamentary Library Committee was like.”349 |
| 5. | The Harper government blocked a private member’s bill (C-484) sponsored by a member of their own caucus, Ken Epp. Fearing that the bill may re-open parliamentary debate on abortion, Harper precluded it from passing its second reading in committee. Epp later opted not to seek re-election in the 2008 election.350 |
| 6. | John Gomery, the former jurist at the head of the Gomery Commission, indicted the Harper government in 2008 for abandoning its pledge to deconsolidate power in the executive. Rather, Gomery stated that since Harper’s swearing-in |

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346 Wells, 2013. 389.
347 Ibid., 400.
349 David Krayden, “Why a lot of Conservatives were happy to see Harper go,” iPolitics. 21 October 2015.
“there’s more concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office than we’ve ever had before”.\(^{351}\)

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<th>7.</th>
<th>Tom Flanagan alleges that Harper’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ style of leadership, in which peripheral party members have direct communications with the decision-making centers cloistered around the PMO, was used to prevent party middlemen from gaining control over his decision-making processes. This was in contrast to Paul Martin’s ‘Boardroom’ arrangement, where his long-term staff members refused others access to the PM and, in doing so, inflicted a sort of “incestuous groupthink” on his administration.(^{352})</th>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Donald J. Savoie described Stephen Harper’s administration as a “court government” in which Harper and his courtiers reign with the presumption of a sovereign. This is used to describe the insular power arrangement between the Prime Minister and his senior associates—particularly the Chief of Staff and Finance Minister—that became prominent with Pierre Trudeau in the 1960s and was later carried on by the successive governments thereafter. In this way, a stark separation of authority arises between the upper echelons of the executive branch and the rest of the party caucus and the legislature generally.(^{353})</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Columnist James Travers, during Harper’s first term as prime minister, observed that Harper practiced a style of governing “like a CEO,” in which the most senior executive ought to “have maximum control and minimum constraints.” This was evidenced early on, says Travers, by Harper’s appointment of the unelected (and unaccountable) Michael Fortier as Minister of Public Works, and by his “muting” of his Cabinet ministers.(^{354})</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>In what was described by him as the “nadir” of his experience as Prime Minister, Stephen Harper clashed with Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin over the 2013...</td>
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\(^{351}\) Toronto Star, “Gomery Criticizes PMO’s hold on power”, 31 January 2008.

\(^{352}\) Flanagan, 2007. 81.

\(^{353}\) Lawrence Martin, 2011. 123. See also: Toronto Star, “Travers: Stephen Harper’s choice is more power or effective democracy”, 1 May 2010.

\(^{354}\) Toronto Star, “Harper’s closed shop; After centring his election campaign on openness, the Conservative Prime Minister is muzzling his ministers,” [ONT Edition], 23 March 2006.
appointment of Marc Nadon to the country’s top court. In 2014, the SCC ruled that Nadon’s appointment was unconstitutional, owing to his failure to satisfy the requirements for representing the Province of Quebec set forth in the Supreme Court Act. The PMO accused McLachlin of “inappropriately intervening in the process,” and later ignoring her attempts to reach out and privately discuss the issue.355

The dispute was widely criticized as an assault on the independence of the Canadian judiciary, and received harsh condemnation from the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists.356

11. With respect to the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court appointment of Marc Nadon (Item 10), Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin reportedly said that “[the Harper] government has done more than any previous government to damage the relationship between the Supreme Court of Canada and Parliament.”357

5.3. **Secondary Trait Analysis: Loyalty and Betrayal**

Jonathan Haidt identifies Loyalty/Betrayal (hereafter referred to as ‘Loyalty’) as one of the five foundations of morality. In other words, Loyalty serves as one of the various five ‘intuitions’ that underlay moral judgment according to social intuitionism. Per Haidt, Loyalty is a part of the moral conservative’s “innate preparation for meeting the adaptive challenge of forming cohesive coalitions.”358 Or, in more temporal terms, Loyalty triggers our sense of who is a team player and who isn’t. Methodologically, instead of breaking down the various cases into subcategories all instances will be listed together as a single dataset and treated as a unified series of moral judgments related to Loyalty and

355 *CBC News*, “Beverley McLachlin, PMO give duelling statements on Nadon’s appointment fight”, 1 May 2014.
357 *Toronto Star*, “PM refused to take ‘inadvisable, inappropriate’ call from chief justice, PMO says”, 1 May 2014.
358 Haidt, 2012. 140.
Betrayal. The intention is that analyzing Harper’s sense of Loyalty will complement our understanding of his expression of Authority; this is predicated on the basis that both foundations share a strong positive correlation with political conservatism, and as ‘binding’ foundations they generally co-occur across ideological-moral communities.\(^\text{359}\) Thus, the presence of Loyalty reinforces our confidence in the subject’s expression of Authority and vice versa. According to Haidt, the emotional indicators of Loyalty are group pride and rage against traitors, while its virtues are allegiance, patriotism, out-group vigilance, and self-sacrifice.\(^\text{360}\)

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<th>Table 5.7, Cases: Loyalty and Betrayal</th>
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<td>1. When former friend and campaign advisor Tom Flanagan published his 2007 book <em>Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power</em>, Stephen Harper considered it an act of betrayal and cut all ties to Flanagan. The text generally paints a positive portrait of Stephen, as both man and public official, but provides a behind-the-scenes account of Harper’s campaign strategies and personal philosophy on governing. Since its publication, Harper and Flanagan have reportedly gone without speaking.(^\text{361})</td>
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<td>2. After launching an long-term political campaign to win the countenance of <em>la bleue Quebecoise</em> from 2004 until 2008— which included the UNESCO motion, the recognition of the Quebecois as a nation, various francophone appointments to Cabinet, budget concessions to the Jean Charest government, a dedicated Quebec campaign team and organizational wing of the party, and the promotion of official bilingualism— Quebec voters returned the gesture by posting neutral-to-negative results for the Conservatives in the 2008 federal election. As a consequence, Harper’s strategy sharply pivoted away from the Quebecois as he</td>
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\(^{360}\) Haidt, 2012. 125 (Figure 6.2).

\(^{361}\) Wells, 2013. 44.
began to court “moral conservatives” within Canadian ethnic minority groups as his alternate Third Sister.  

3. “PM likely looking for ‘revenge’ for Quebec Liberal leader’s 2007 tax-cut betrayal,” reads the lead on an August 2012 Canadian Press article. After Jean Charest converted Stephen Harper’s generous transfer payment increases in the 2007 federal budget into $700mn in provincial income tax cuts, relations quickly deteriorated between the two leaders.  

4. Liberal MP Bob Rae, on Harper’s first-term appeals to Quebec: “I’ve always thought that the love affair between the people of Quebec and Stephen Harper made less sense than Britney Spear’s first marriage. There’s no durability. It isn’t based on any long-term deep compatibility and affection. And I think that will become clear as time goes on.” Rae, here, is commenting on the superficiality of Harper’s commitment to the province—it is framed as being a commitment of political necessity, and not one genuine loyalty.  

5. Harper’s enduring concern for unity, at both the national and party-level, speaks to a sort of in-group solidarity he may consider incumbent upon Canadians and Conservative Party members. For example, his initial concessions to Quebec during his first term were framed as an effort to preserve federal and national unity. Before that, his successful bid to merge the two dominant Canadian conservative parties was formulated in much the same vein.  

6. For his entire adult life, Harper tenaciously maintained the importance of the sort of solidarity discussed in Item 5, a fact attested by his adolescent support for Pierre Trudeau’s constitutional struggles to preserve Canadian unity against the forces of separatism, and by Preston Manning’s appointment of Harper to handle the “unity file” during his tenure with the Reform Party.  

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362 Jeffrey, 2015. 64, 320.  
367 Ibbitson, 2015. 15.
7. Harper’s fixation on national unity once again came to the fore with Belinda Stronach’s defection from the Conservative Party in 2005. “When Belinda left the party, declaring Harper a threat to national unity, she could not have known how seriously he took that argument,” writes Paul Wells. From thereafter, Harper doubled down on his campaign efforts in Quebec in which, between 2005 to 2008, the discourse of national unity figured prominently.368

8. According to an anonymous witness account of a Conservative staffer present during the first reading of Harper’s 2006 mandate letters: “I am the kingpin…so whatever you do around me, you have to know that I am sacrosanct.” This demonstrates not only Harper’s insistence upon hierarchy and authority but also his need for intra-party solidarity around his leadership.369

9. On Harper’s personal allegiance to his party: “If you think of Harper as a conservative ideologue...you run into no end of confusion and contradiction. But if you think of him as a Conservative partisan, most of what he does makes sense. He protects the team.”370

10. Rhetorically, Harper often invoked the notion of unity (i.e., of purpose, direction, cause, etc.) during public addresses. For example, after securing his majority government on the night of the 2011 election, Harper thanked Canadians who “chose hope, unity of purpose, and a strong Canada.” Or alternatively, during his Quebec nation motion which emphasized the Quebecois’s status as a “nation within a united Canada.”371

11. During Harper’s last term in office, a national scandal erupted surrounding Conservative Senator Mike Duffy who claimed travel and living allowances for which he was not eligible. During the fallout, Duffy repaid the costs to the Senate using a personal loan from Harper’s Chief of Staff Nigel Wright. Commenting on the incident, Paul Wells writes: “Wright’s cheque was an

368 Wells, 2007. 217.
370 Ibid., 33.
ultimate expression of loyalty, not to Duffy, of course, but to Stephen Harper. Loyalty was all Harper had ever asked. All he ever demanded.”

12. In a 2014 interview for *Maclean’s* magazine, exiled Harper strategist Tom Flanagan said: “…Prime Minister Harper has made a practice of treating people as disposable, regardless of previous contributions to him and the Conservative party.” Providing an example, Flanagan recounts how in 2007 Harper directed his caucus not to speak to former prime minister Brian Mulroney. To Flanagan this appeared to be an act of betrayal, as Mulroney had been among the first to personally contact and console Harper after Belinda Stronach crossed the floor in May 2005, all the while Mulroney was hospitalized and battling a life-threatening case of pancreatitis. This appears to present a sort of unidirectional sense of loyalty in Stephen Harper: one that expects others’ allegiance while displaying no sense of fidelity in return.

13. John Ibbitson’s 2015 biography comments on Harper’s asymmetrical sense of loyalty: “Another of Harper’s less attractive qualities is a perceived lack of loyalty toward others…Harper has betrayed or estranged many in the conservative movement who were at one time senior to him—Joe Clark, Jim Hawkes, Brian Mulroney, Preston Manning.”

14. Stephen Harper appears to conflate citizenship with loyalty to one’s country. This is evidenced by his questioning of Thomas Mulcair, who holds both French and Canadian passports, on his national allegiances while campaigning for the 2012 NDP leadership election. Mulcair and the NDP considered Harper’s message an insult to the nearly 900,000 Canadians who hold dual citizenship.

15. During his years with Reform, Harper became disgruntled with the management of the party and lack of partisanship maintained by its members. Recalling Harper’s attitude at the time, Preston Manning said that: “[w]hat soured Stephen early on with Reform was that if a member’s constituents differed from the Party’s position, we allowed the member to represent the constituents…”

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372 Wells, 2013. 403.
bothered Stephen that one rogue member could undermine all our work. While the Conservatives and Liberals appeared united, we sometimes got hammered by our own people, and that soured Stephen Harper.  

16. Bob Rae commenting on Stephen Harper’s commitment to the interests and motives of his party before those of the public: “I’ve never seen a politician act with less compassion, or so intent on never going beyond partisanship.” Rae’s comment reflects a general opinion that Harper devotes himself to partisanship as a basis for his decision-making rather than making reasoned, deliberate choices according to one’s circumstance.  

5.4. Conclusions: Trait Analyses on Authority and Loyalty  

Harper has a strong and affirmative sense of Authority, and an evident appreciation for Loyalty, although both are curiously self-serving. That is, Stephen Harper appears to exhibit both traits unidirectionally: they are respected when they serve to protect or reinforce his position of power, but they are gladly undermined when in the interest of self-preservation. In other words, Harper conceives of these traits as something owed from those subordinate to him, and as typically not something due in return. With this being the case, Loyalty appears to be only secondary to Authority—the latter being the proximate feature of Harper’s moral profile. Items 12-13 of Table 5.7 demonstrate that Harper only marginally discerns any sort of fidelity to those within the same authority ranking as he; as evidenced, he has the capacity to undercut those above him and dispose of them when it is politically advantageous to do so. This is not to say, however, that the concept of loyalty is lost on Harper. Evidently, Stephen Harper’s sense of Loyalty is strong and central to his moral character as shown by Items 1-11 of Table 5.7, though it is tempered by his impulse to reclaim or protect his position of authority. From this I conclude that Authority constitutes the central pillar of Harper’s moral character, as it apparently takes precedence over considerations of Loyalty.

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375 Harris, 2014. 24.
5.5.  **The Authoritarian Personality and Further Conclusions**

Any sophisticated portrayal of Stephen Harper would be sure to underscore the fact that the man is far from the amoral character that a cursory analysis may have you believe—he is neither heartless nor unfair, a chauvinist nor bigot. He is with certainty, however, a man compelled by the moral Authority. Understanding this as the basis of his moral identity is the starting point in reaching a clearer, more holistic representation of the man.

Harper, throughout his life, has shown himself to have many qualities across the moral axes identified by Jonathan Haidt. When Liberal partisan Warren Kinsella’s father died, Stephen was among the first to personally call Kinsella’s bereaved mother and console her for her loss.377 Opposition Leader Tom Mulcair regards Harper’s decision to offer a state funeral for the late Jack Layton to be an “extremely decent…classy, noble gesture.”378 Often Harper would stop to chat with tourists outside the doors of Langevin Block for ten or more minutes, and would occasionally invite families into the building for a tour of his office.379 And one of the lesser-known aspects of Stephen’s character is that, while stern, he’s personable too. “A conversation with Stephen Harper is a real conversation,” says columnist Paul Wells, “[h]e listens, is curious, asks questions, responds with something that relates to what you said…[and] shuts up if you know more.”380 According to many, he’s funny, and can be mordantly amusing in his parodies and impressions of other political figures on the Hill.381 In fact, he would often refuse to do Press Gallery speeches if for whatever reason he couldn’t be funny.382 And—at least according to his barber—Stephen’s a good tipper too.383 As for his temper, those who know him claim that it’s “cathartic” only, and that it’s not a true expression of himself.384 Perhaps, some might argue, there may be ulterior motives behind his benevolence, some

378 Mulcair, 2015. 171.
383 Harris, 2014. 479.
384 Ibid., 286.
nefarious purpose relating to power and his sustaining it, but none seem apparent to those closest to him.

In many ways, Stephen and his family before him are commendable people, born with a strong sense of civic duty and a spirit for public service. From his colonial roots beginning with Christopher Harper of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, to his grandfather Harris Harper, the Moncton school teacher, Stephen descended from a long line of civically-minded men with an immutable sense of moral responsibility. No doubt, this trait has been handed down to him as cultural capital. In this way, Stephen has become a Harper. And by all accounts, Stephen is a loving and involved father and husband who deeply cares for his family and, both before and after taking office, has always put them first. 385 Basic moral graces such as these—caring for others, and dedicating oneself to public service—are moral values that many of us share and most can easily recognize. They are as clear to us as the sounds we hear and the sights we see around us, and, unless born with a disability, we all come equipped with such senses. As it were, some other moral senses aren’t so universal. This is especially true of the moral Authority, which Stephen exhibits to perhaps its greatest extent.

Author and journalist Lawrence Martin described Harper’s governing persona in two words: “autocratic and authoritarian.” 386 Others have defined him in even less flattering terms. Michael Harris describes him as “a nerdy guy who doesn’t like being questioned, much less contradicted.” 387 CBC columnist Greg Weston, during the 2008 campaign, labelled him a “bland-looking authoritarian.” 388 (Not only does he act the part but looks it too, apparently.) The concept of authority is invoked in nearly all descriptions of the man’s character and governing persona. Harper embodies the moral Authority to such a degree that one could rightly attribute to him the sort of authoritarian personality type that Theodor Adorno explored in his seminal study on the origins of fascism. 389 This, of course, is not to say that Harper is by any means a fascist, but rather that he

385 Ibid., 188.
386 Martin, 2011. 120.
387 Harris, 2014. 116.
shares a moral quality also belonging to fascist leaders—namely, a belief in absolute
deferece to one’s own authority, and the subordination of others on that basis. I
contend that Harper cannot merely be given the label ‘right-wing authoritarian’—a
separate personality type coined by Bob Altemeyer—since Harper’s obedience to
authority is distinctively one dimensional. That is to say, his respect for authority
simply ends wherever he is compelled to acquire it.

A distinct quality of the authoritarian personality type is that it is “perpetuated
by perceived social threat and a sense of self-righteousness, motivating individuals to
express uncritical support for the existing social order and respond with negativity to
those perceived to undermine this state of affairs.” Without having to explore the
concept much further, it becomes clear that Harper fits neatly into this category. Tom
Flanagan, one of the select few to become truly close with Stephen during his time as a
public official, affirms this claim:

There is a huge streak of paranoia in Stephen. And he attracts people who have a
paranoid streak. And if you don’t have one to begin with, you develop it, because
you’re constantly hearing theories...there’s a visceral reluctance to trust the
motives of other people...the initial response is always suspicion.

Throughout his tenure, Harper has championed conservative values that support the kind
of perceived social order that he wishes to maintain in Canadian society. Some
controversial examples of this include his refusal to participate in the Toronto Pride
Parade, and his levelling of the Status of Women Canada budget. Opposition to
Harper’s policies and positions, no matter how virulent, are largely discarded according
to his belief in where the legitimacy for such policies emanate. Christian Nadeau alleges
that Harper believes his administration to serve the same purpose as Thomas Hobbes’

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390 A key feature of Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is “a high degree of
submissiveness to authorities perceived as legitimate.” For RWA to be present, then, authority
must be respectfully given and expected in return, according to one’s ranking in the hierarchy. This
appears to be absent in the case of Stephen Harper, and this is what is meant by the term “one
dimensional” in the text.
For more on RWA and its more recent applications, see: Ted Ruffman et al., 2016. Age differences
in right-wing authoritarianism and their relation to emotion recognition. 226-236.
391 Ted Ruffman et al., 2016. 226.
393 On Harper’s position toward employment insurance see: Wells, 2013. 252; For Harper on Status of
Women Canada and Toronto Pride see: Jeffrey, 2015. 209-10.
“Leviathan”. According to Nadeau, Harper perceives his moral mission as being defensible precisely because his government is seen as the source of legitimacy in Canadian parliamentary democracy. In Harper’s administration, “pluralism, democracy, and freedom of expression,” writes Nadeau, “only make sense if they do not impede the smooth functioning of government.” To take such a Hobbesian approach to one’s governing, I argue, is evidence to the fact that Harper understands himself as a beacon of moral authority. His practices, and indeed persona, while in government suggest that he conceives of himself as crusading for some threatened moral community in tune with an additional moral sense—namely, Authority, and an appreciation for the structures of power that encompass it. (It should be noted that this might constitute Harper’s Life Narrative, the internal personal story coined by psychologist Dan McAdams that guides one’s moral cause in life.) In any event, this characterization of Harper is consistent with Adorno’s description of the authoritarian personality.

Given his possession of Authority, in the moral sense, it is no wonder that Harper can justify himself on Hobbesian grounds, as the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes demands the top-down imposition of order from the pinnacle figure in the dominance hierarchy. Hobbes, of course, names this figure the Leviathan, a serpentine metaphor for the power of the sovereign. Now, does Stephen Harper really consider himself a sovereign entity? Surely not—this, obviously, being the Crown. But Harper very likely considers himself an agent of the sovereign, and by extension having attained the legitimacy to govern at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As such, Harper is not obliged to cater to dissenting opinion, as this is simply not the source of his legitimacy. This is inherently an uncritical and absolutist conception of legitimacy, and perhaps only an authoritarian personality type could possibly conceive of oneself in this way. But what is certain is that only in the presence of the moral Authority can one govern in this manner. It is for this reason that Stephen Harper makes for what is an immensely interesting case study in morality, political leadership, and moral psychology. And if a lesson is to be drawn from

395 Ibid., 35.
it it’s that the pursuit of power and its preservation exerts a power of its own on one’s moral mind.
Chapter 6: Justin Trudeau and the Moral Mind

To this point we’ve explored the moral character of Stephen Harper—but what can be said of incumbent Prime Minister Justin Trudeau? This chapter will briefly touch on the lineage, upbringing, and personality of Trudeau and some of the major policies and decisions he’s made since taking office. Again, moral foundations theory will be applied by ascertaining Trudeau’s expression of Authority and Loyalty. This is significant for the purposes of this study as it dictates whether we can expect structural changes to be made to the Canadian state security and surveillance regime during Trudeau’s tenure as prime minister.

6.1. Family Background and Early Years in Ottawa

Justin Pierre Trudeau’s legacy begins with dynastic origins extending far beyond his father, Pierre Elliot. When Justin was born at Ottawa Civic Hospital on Christmas Day 1971, he carried on a bloodline of colonialists, statesmen and civic leaders beginning with his 5th-great grandfather, Major-General William Farquhar (1774-1839), the first Governor of Singapore. Farquhar was a British colonist and senior employee of the East India Company, and although relatively little is known of him and his public influence he is remembered by history as a “forgotten founder” of modern Singapore. A generation ahead of Farquhar, on Justin’s paternal side, is Marc-Solime Cardinal (1815-1897), one of the first mayors of Saint-Constant, Quebec, a mid-size Canadian Pacific Railway settlement on the south shore of Montreal. Cardinal’s grandson was Charles-Emile Trudeau (1887-1935), Justin’s paternal grandfather, a “gregarious, boisterous, and extravagant” French Canadian lawyer and entrepreneur. Charles-Emile (“Charlie”) later became involved in provincial politics in Quebec, befriending and financially supporting future Premier Maurice Duplessis, while backing the original Conservative

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Party of Canada at the federal level. Both Charlie and his wife, Grace Elliot, were devout Roman Catholics—a devotion they would later impart on their son, Pierre Elliot.

Justin’s maternal grandfather, James Sinclair (1908-1984), was a prominent British Columbian businessman, a Rhodes Scholar, and World War II veteran who served three tours with the Royal Canadian Air Force. Upon returning from the war, James was elected to the Canadian House of Commons representing the riding of Vancouver North, and was later appointed Minister of Fisheries in the government of Louis St. Laurent. In his memoir, Justin states that he has always been close with his extended family, and has been particularly touched by the influence of Grace Elliot and James Sinclair.

While James was in office, his wife Doris Bernard—a kinswoman of the Peerage of Ireland—gave birth to Justin’s mother, Margaret Sinclair. Though Margaret took on a reputation as a “flower child”, care-free and detached from public life, her husband Pierre Elliot had committed himself to religious piety and public service from an early age. “My father’s life was strictly regimented and almost monastic,” remembers Justin. Pierre received a rigorous Jesuit education in his early years, and later became engrossed in the intellectual currents in fashion among the Quebec Roman Catholic circles of the day. This included the study of such socialist thinkers as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, who both reinvigorated the Catholic left by espousing a theological perspective geared toward social and economic emancipation. Pierre fell under the influence of such Catholic luminaries, though early accounts of Pierre’s life ambiguously maintain that he “accepted the church’s politics as well as its morality.”

In the 1940s, Pierre received a law degree from the Université de Montréal, and later a Master’s degree from Harvard University’s Graduate School of Public Administration.

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398 Ibid.
403 Justin Trudeau, 2014. 37.
404 Ibid., 40.
before briefly pursuing a doctorate in Marxist political economy from the London School of Economics. Pierre returned home to Quebec after withdrawing from doctoral studies and quickly made a name for himself as a leading force among the Quebec intelligentsia. He co-founded a dissident journal in the 1950s, Cité Libre, that set the groundwork for Quebec’s Quiet Revolution by advocating for a modernized, secular, and multi-cultural Quebec society. Brief stints working in Ottawa as an economic policy advisor, and later as an associate professor of law at the Université de Montréal, proved unfulfilling for the young Trudeau when he dropped both career paths to join the Liberal Party of Canada in 1965. That year, he was elected to the House of Commons for the riding of Mount Royal, a seat he would hold until his famed “walk in the snow” in 1984.

After only two years in the House, Pierre was appointed Minister of Justice by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, and was responsible for passing Bill C-150, one of the most comprehensive criminal justice reform bills ever devised in the nation’s history. The following year, in April 1968, Pierre won the Liberal leadership election on the fourth ballot, and was sworn in as Prime Minister days later. As Prime Minister, he employed the idea of a ‘Just Society’ as a rhetorical device for describing his vision for a progressive Canada—one which included the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an official policy of multiculturalism, and full legal equality for Indigenous peoples. Under his four majority governments, Canada saw these grand initiatives realized into law, in addition to patriating the power to amend the Constitution from the United Kingdom’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This culminated with the acquisition of full legislative independence from the British Parliament with the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982. Although the government of Quebec never signed off on the constitutional reforms, the Act was nevertheless brought into law.

Although a controversial and polarizing figure by temperament, perhaps his most contentious act was his decision to invoke the War Measures Act in response to the

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408 David Seljak, 1996. Why the Quiet Revolution was ‘Quiet’: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec after 1960. 113.
409 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69 (SC 1968-69, c 38.).
October Crisis of 1970. The measures propelled Canadian society into a temporary state of emergency which granted law enforcement agencies increased powers to arrest and detain individuals without trial, a move that NDP leader Tommy Douglas condemned as “using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut.”

Pierre Trudeau was no stranger to utilizing the full extent of his authority to affect public policy as he saw fit. It is well understood that Trudeau, upon ascending to the office of prime minister, deeply changed the central machinery of government so as to concentrate power among the upper echelons of the executive branch. In effect, these structural changes have allowed prime ministers to essentially “govern by personal fiat” as such expediencies are considered necessary due to “the pressures of federalism, a twenty-four-four news media, and globalization [that] create[s] both opportunity and incentive to do so.”

Peter Aucoin alternatively argues that these reforms reflect less the motives of an autocrat but rather Trudeau’s personal method of rational management. However, more recently, it has been suggested that Pierre’s decision to invoke the War Measures Act is telling of the fact that personal governing style, more so than institutional structure, ultimately defines the power of a prime minister. (Although, this alludes to the more self-evident truth that both personal leadership style and institutional structure act as driving and limiting forces, respectively, as co-determinants of a leader’s political will in practice.) Trudeau was personally committed to rational management—this is true—but the War Measures Act remains “arguably one of the single-most intrusive federal decisions in Canadian history,” and is an emblematic case of the Prime Minister acting in the manner of an autocrat. 

There may be no better way to illustrate

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412 H.D. Munroe, 2011. Style within the centre: Pierre Trudeau, the War Measures Act, and the nature of prime ministerial power. 532.
413 Aucoin, 1986.
415 Ibid., 537.
this point than Trudeau’s terse reply to a journalist’s question of how far he would go to ensure Canadians’ security: “Just watch me.”  

No doubt, Pierre Trudeau deeply reinforced the authority of the government’s centripetal forces, namely the PMO, to exact policy. Donald Savoie has written extensively on the rise of “court government” since the premiership of Pierre Trudeau, a phenomenon that he argues weakens the state of parliamentary democracy by severing traditional chains of accountability in government. The “court” that Savoie refers to is a metaphor for a monarch whose advisors, known as courtiers, direct the agenda of the royal household. Such an arrangement has been put in place, argues Savoie, by Trudeau’s deliberate politicization of the public service by allowing agenda-setting to occur not at the level of Cabinet but rather with an informal circle of key actors in the Prime Minister’s Office. In his seminal text on the issue, The Rise of Court Government in Canada, Savoie concludes:

[M]inisters now, in many cases, have to give up some share of their authority and control to other ministers if the totality of policies is to be coordinated…. ministers have less chance to appear in roles of clear and firm decision. There is no doubt that, beginning with Trudeau, power has not shifted to Cabinet, as might have been initially hoped. Rather, it has increasingly gone to the prime minister and to central agencies.

Whether such an arrangement is good or bad for the function of Canadian democracy—and the organizing principle on which it overlays, responsible government—is a normative debate that extends beyond the scope of this project. However, there can be no reservations on the claim that Pierre Trudeau, though an exponent of participatory democracy and its value in a Just Society, exhibited a personal style of governing that fully embraced the exercise of authority to perhaps its farthest extent possible under the law. This practice, I contend, can only be legitimated by an individual ethic that respects

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419 Ibid., 650.
the function of authority, power, and hierarchy. That one upholds such an ethic is made possible only by one’s character being subject to Haidt’s Authority foundation.

Justin Trudeau remembers his father’s decision-making as being more horizontal than his reputation suggests. “He would rarely discuss his own views in any detail until everyone else had had their say,” he clarifies, “which was in contrast with his public image as…almost autocratic.” However, from an early age Justin understood his father’s position of immense authority, a job he called the “boss of Canada” when he was a child.

While growing up at 24 Sussex, Pierre exerted a similar degree of discipline and control over Justin as he did his government. On one occasion, Justin and his friend Jeff Gibbin thought it would be funny to run away from the RCMP officers that were tasked with supervising them throughout the day. When Pierre caught wind of what had happened, he scolded them both and made them solemnly apologize to the officers. “This was a total lack of respect for them,” Justin recalls his father saying, “I raised you better than that.” As always, Justin was deeply affected by his father’s castigation:

Disappointing my father was just about the worst thing I could do as a child. I yearned…for his attention and approval. While he gave me both often, his disapproval was a wrenching experience for me. I know that our parents, especially our father, had zero tolerance for anything other than respectful behaviour.

Pierre’s sternness as a parent, perhaps more than as a statesman, exposes a great deal about both his personality and moral character. In contrast with Justin’s more lenient mother, Pierre was a parent of near imperial presumption who was heavily committed to his mission as the moral overseer of his children. Commenting on the personality clash between his parents, Justin writes that “[m]y mother saw Pierre as a workaholic, a man whose identity appeared defined by his devotion to his country…[b]ut his devotion to his kids was equally strong.” As is evident from the eulogy Justin delivered at Pierre’s state funeral, Pierre was a teacher and mentor inasmuch as he was a father. Today, Justin remembers their sparring matches in the boxing ring, and their long overnight fishing

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420 Justin Trudeau, 2014. 21.
421 Ibid., 14.
422 Ibid., 27.
423 Ibid., 27-8.
424 Ibid., 38.
trips in Algonquin Park, as didactic learning experiences more than family getaways. Justin considers these the best memories of his youth, much the same way that Stephen Harper fondly remembers his excursions to Leaside train station with his father.425

Justin is open about his experience growing up in the limelight of his father. In his memoir, he details how he had to become emotionally detached, aloof, and stone-faced in response to relentless bullying.426 The bullying intensified during his parents highly-publicized separation and ensuing custody battle, a dark period in Justin’s life during which he’d often cope by committing himself to academic pursuits and maintaining his outstanding grade-point average. Justin admits that for a while he felt guilty about this time in his life, believing that he should have been enough for his mother to stay at 24 Sussex.427 While at CEGEP, he became the de facto leader of the school-wide debate on Quebec separatism, where he staunchly advocated a federalist position similar to his father’s.428 Despite being engrossed in familial strife and the reality of separation at home, he espoused a fiercely pro-unity position on the issue of Quebec’s place in the Canadian federation. This, I contend, reveals a disposition toward Loyalty—and its constituent, unity—that pervades his character as both a man and political leader.

Pierre was predisposed by temperament to occupy a position of authority and power. “I must become a great man,” a 19 year-old Pierre once scrawled in his diary. “I must continually work for perfection…I would like so much to be a great politician and to guide my nation,” he continues on.429 And this, Pierre did. As did his father-in-law, so too did his father. And, to varying degrees, their fathers before them as well. Justin’s bloodline has been marked by a succession of men who have embraced authority, respected it, and exercised it liberally. From this it is evident that Pierre, and likely his progenitors, were sensitive to Authority as a moral foundation. This is as true of strict fathers as it is of austere statesmen. And like all strict fathers, Pierre had a sort of moral

425 Ibid., 144-6.
427 Ibid., 42.
428 Ibid., 65.
clarity, and understood himself as having a duty to impart it upon his sons. A clarity that was not lost on them.

6.2. Justin Trudeau: A Moral Analysis

Justin Trudeau was elected leader of the Liberal Party of Canada on April 14, 2013, garnering a massive 80.1% of delegate support, and winning every riding outside the province of British Columbia.\(^{430}\) As one of his first orders of business as Liberal leader Justin declared that, as of January 2014, all 32 senators sitting as Liberals would be from thereon considered independent and therefore lose their ability to caucus with the party.\(^{431}\) The move was an especial shock, even by those among the Senate Liberal caucus, who were reportedly “scrambling to figure out what to do” after catching wind of the announcement.\(^{432}\) The governing Conservatives capitalized on the opportunity to charge Trudeau with launching a “smokescreen”, seeing the move as a way of distancing himself from ongoing Senate expense scandals and any potential future controversies involving the red chamber.\(^{433}\) It would not be until Trudeau won his majority government, defeating Stephen Harper’s Conservatives in the 2015 federal election, that he would expand upon his vision for Senate reform by establishing independent advisory boards for all member nominations. Under this arrangement, new candidates would be appointed not by the Prime Minister alone but rather a committee of five non-partisan board members who pick from a pool of eligible nominees according to individual merit.\(^{434}\) To free the upper chamber from the binds of party discipline has been largely seen as a means of empowering the Senate, who can now more autonomously assert themselves.\(^{435}\) As such, Trudeau’s policy on the Senate can only be seen as a power-deconsolidating effort.

\(^{430}\) National Post, “Justin Trudeau elected Liberal leader in landslide victory”, 14 April 2013.
\(^{431}\) Globe and Mail, “Liberals to set up advisory board for Senate nominees, but B.C. won’t take part”, 3 December 2015.
\(^{432}\) National Post, “Justin Trudeau kicks all 32 Liberal senators out of caucus in bid for reform”, 29 January 2014.
\(^{433}\) Ibid.
\(^{434}\) Globe and Mail, “Liberals set up advisory board for Senate nominees”
Justin Trudeau’s stance on partisanship in the red chamber does not at all reflect his attitude toward the House of Commons. Although Trudeau campaigned on the promise to loosen party discipline in Ottawa, in some respects party discipline has been embraced since his appointment as Liberal leader, and to a degree without precedent. In 2014, Trudeau faced stern criticism from the party’s socially conservative wing when he publicly stated that all Liberal MPs and candidates must support the party’s pro-choice position.\footnote{Maclean’s, “Justin Trudeau and abortion”, 8 May 2014.} Under his directive, MPs were barred from even abstaining from any abortion-related votes.\footnote{Maclean’s, “A few more thoughts on Trudeau, abortion and the party whip”, 4 June 2014.} As one pundit commented: “Justin Trudeau—he who has…decreed that all Liberal Party candidates must be pro-choice…has control-freak tendencies and no doubt would as prime minister, too. It’s in his genes.”\footnote{Winnipeg Free Press, “Control freaks and dictators”, 11 February 2014.} Similarly, Trudeau has faced reproach from religious leaders. Cardinal Collins, Archbishop of Toronto, penned an open letter to Mr. Trudeau:

> Political leaders surely have the right to insist on party unity and discipline in political matters which are within the legitimate scope of their authority. But that authority is not limitless: it does not extend to matters of conscience and religious faith. It does not govern all aspects of life.\footnote{Maclean’s, “Is the Liberal leader wrong to whip the vote? If so, why?”, 26 May 2014.}

In making the decision to whip the abortion vote, Justin Trudeau has asserted that his political authority as party leader ought to take priority over the personal authority of one’s conscience or religious conviction. Justin defended this position in his memoir, where he essentially proclaimed a Burkean notion of representative democracy: “In the interest of fairness to not have others subject to another’s will, and for MPs to serve the interests of the collective [rather than themselves].”\footnote{Trudeau, 2015. 17.} At its core, this message resonates with the model of representation coined by Irish philosopher Edmund Burke, who championed the notion that representatives are trustees for their constituency, and as such ought to act for the common good, or in the national interest, even if it goes against personal interests or those of their constituents.\footnote{For a thorough explanation of the differences between Burke's model of representation versus the 'delegate' model of representation, see: Helena Aten, 2009. "Competing informed principals and representative democracy".}
In another case, although of a different sort, Trudeau sought to unify his party’s direction by outright banning candidate Christine Innes from running as a Liberal in the 2014 Trinity-Spadina by-election.\textsuperscript{442} Officially, the move was justified on the grounds that her campaign team used “intimidation and bullying” tactics to undermine Chrystia Freeland, a prized new Liberal MP in Toronto Centre. However, Innes maintains that these allegations were “totally baseless” and “manufactured”, claiming that it was merely the party’s retaliation for her refusal to bend to the Liberal’s plan for 2015, when all Toronto ridings would be re-shuffled and their MPs relocated.\textsuperscript{443} “It was clear to me that if I did not submit to their demands that they would ‘still get their way’,” Innes claimed, who in the same interview alleged that Trudeau failed to honour his commitment to open party nominations.\textsuperscript{444} While in power, some degree of central control has been exerted upon the Liberal caucus as well. Two private member’s bills, introduced in October 2016 by Liberal MPs Bryan May and Mark Gerretsen, were accompanied by “bill kits” circulated by the party whip’s office that unambiguously declared the government’s opposition to them. “The cabinet will not be supporting Bill C-240,” reads the kit on MP May’s bill.\textsuperscript{445} However, defiant Liberal backbenchers voted out of party line and ended up passing both bills in the House. This gives credence to the belief that, although Trudeau’s central authority is certainly felt within the party, Liberal MPs are legitimately given the opportunity to freely vote in Parliament.

Trudeau himself has clarified his position on party discipline, articulating it thoroughly in his 2013 campaign handbill:

Party discipline has become absurdly over-used in Parliament…Members of a Liberal government caucus led by me would be required to vote with the Cabinet on only three categories of bills: those that implement the 2015 Liberal platform; those that enable budget or significant money measures; and those that speak to the shared values embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.\textsuperscript{446}

\textsuperscript{442} \textit{Toronto Star}, “Justin Trudeau blocks woman’s Liberal candidacy over bullying complaints”, 13 March 2014.
\textsuperscript{443} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{445} \textit{CBC News}, “Liberal MPs voted against Trudeau’s recommendations on 2 bills last month”, 6 November 2016.
What is perhaps concerning about such a far-reaching statement is its openness to interpretation, particularly with respect to the breadth of the 2015 Liberal platform (a whopping 88-page policy document) and what constitutes a “shared value embodied in the Charter” (such matters are constantly litigated in the country’s higher courts). Feasibly, under this protocol the vast majority of legislative initiatives, particularly those of moral substance, could very well be whipped by party authorities. However, to date Trudeau has maintained an honest record regarding party discipline, as he has undoubtedly granted his caucus members a level of autonomy unseen in the previous government. The question remains open as to whether this can be maintained as he mobilizes his legislative agenda in preparation for the 2019 election cycle.

Regarding Justin’s personal governing style, in some ways he appears to mirror his predecessors, both Stephen Harper and Pierre Elliot. According to Alex Marland, the ‘presidentialization’ of the Canadian parliamentary system—a process first initiated by Trudeau senior—seems to be intensifying under Trudeau junior.\textsuperscript{447} The Prime Minister and his wife fully embrace the domestic and international media frenzy that have elevated his public image to that of royalty, or at least a head of state. Marland argues that Trudeau and his strategists exploit his natural likeability to project a sort of personality cult that could shield the party from scrutiny or criticism.\textsuperscript{448} It is argued that Trudeau’s celebrity alone is a power-consolidating force, as it develops a central ‘brand’ of the party, which, according to Marland, necessitates a central command to enforce it (“where there’s a central brand, there’s a central command”).\textsuperscript{449}

“Given the connection between unity of communications and unity of command, it creates serious problems for Canadian democracy,” says Marland.\textsuperscript{450} Communications control, a mainstay in Stephen Harper’s political playbook, has yet to loosen as Trudeau once promised.\textsuperscript{451} An investigative study in March 2017 found that government-wide message standardization, a practice ramped up under the Harper government, has yet to

\textsuperscript{447} Alex Marland, “Justin Trudeau’s sunny grip of control”, Inroads Journal, Issue 39.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{449} Toronto Star, “In Justin Trudeau’s Ottawa, the brand plays on: Delacourt”, 18 March 2016. For more on the Justin Trudeau brand see: Alex Marland, 2016. Brand Command.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{451} Maclean’s, “Trudeau promises he’d be accessible PM, unmuzzle bureaucrats”, 22 December 2014.
be abandoned under Trudeau, and, in some ways has accelerated by way of active social media spinners hired by the PMO—a tactic the first of its kind in Canada. Further, a March 2016 article by the Canadian Medical Association Journal reports that Health Canada scientists remain muzzled by communications policies and internal cultures that have carried over from the Harper era. In other words, the ‘big chill’ placed on federal bureaucrats has yet to thaw over under Trudeau’s influence. Most concerning, however, is Justin Trudeau’s introduction of “Delivery Units”, teams tasked with driving the PMO’s priorities to the forefront of the federal public service and monitoring their implementation. How exactly Delivery Units will affect relations with the civil service remain to be seen, yet the potential certainly exists for these Units to centralize the agenda-setting process and undercut the Liberal’s commitment to reinstate ‘government by cabinet’.

Aside from personal branding, Trudeau has spent considerable time and effort since taking office to strengthen central decision-making mechanisms. None perhaps more evident than his enthusiasm for First Ministers’ conferences—closed-door meetings that epitomize executive federalism. In his first year as prime minister, Trudeau participated in more First Ministers’ conferences than Stephen Harper did during his entire duration in Ottawa. In these meetings, Prime Minister Trudeau has acted as the principal agent by imposing pan-Canadian strategies on climate change, refugee intake, and a potential price on carbon. On other issues, Trudeau has defaulted on his pledge for institutional reform that would either decentralize power or potentially weaken the strength of his political party. This is true of his position on electoral reform, as his promise to revoke the first-past-the-post voting system was entirely abandoned in early 2017, and partially true of his promise to introduce parliamentary oversight to Canadian

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452 Alex Marland, 2017. Strategic management of media relations: Communications centralization and spin in the government of Canada. Canadian Public Policy, 43(1). 47.
455 Between November 2015 and December 2016, Trudeau hosted three First Ministers’ conferences compared to Harper’s two. For a complete list of conferences see: Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, “Newsroom”. Online: http://www.scics.ca/en/newsroom/
456 Marland, 2016. “Justin Trudeau’s sunny grip”
intelligence agencies, which was widely criticized as being insufficient.\footnote{For Trudeau’s reneging on electoral reform, see: \textit{Globe and Mail}, “Trudeau abandons electoral reform, breaking key campaign promise”, 1 February 2017. For national security oversight, see: \textit{National Post}, “New anti-terrorism bill abandons Liberal call for real-time parliamentary ‘oversight’ into CSIS”, 30 October 2016.} In both cases, his government stands to benefit from maintaining the status quo: in the former, a first-past-the-post voting system grants the Liberal Party a more likely chance of securing a majority than a proportional representation system; in the latter, full parliamentary oversight would grant opposition parties privileged access to sensitive information and to scrutinize government-appointed agents. Regarding Parliament more generally—proposed initiatives, like the introduction of a weekly “Prime Minister’s Question Period,” will likely only further the trend of Prime Ministerial supremacy, and serve to embolden the cult of personality that surrounds him.\footnote{Ibid. For the white paper, see: Government of Canada, March 2017. “Reforming the Standing Orders of the House of Commons”.} All-party parliamentary committees, surely a decentralizing force in the policy-making process, have yet to tangibly improve under Trudeau’s reign. Instead, parliamentary secretaries have been tasked with monitoring them.\footnote{Marland, 2016. “Justin Trudeau’s sunny grip”} And, if it weren’t already implied, Justin’s personal opinion of parliamentary standing committees is weary, if not cynical:

\begin{quote}
In my experience [on committees], what witnesses say, or experts recommend, or opposition members propose all matters far less than the optics and the politics that surround a particular issue…the truth is that, these days, most of the proceedings in committees are sword-strokes in a pond, creating only small ripples that disappear quickly.\footnote{Trudeau, 2015. 224-225.}
\end{quote}

In sum, all of the above cases demonstrate an attitudinal resistance to redistribute authority, or to fully commit oneself to dispersing it horizontally across parliamentary or intra-governmental bodies. From this, it can be concluded that Justin Trudeau, although displaying some degree of openness toward de-hierarchizing the loci of decision-making (for example, his leniency on matters of party discipline), nonetheless exhibits the conservative moral senses of Authority and Loyalty. This is made evident by his appreciation for central command and the idyllic branding of his personal image, his expectation of party unity on issues pertaining to a wide array of priorities and values, his
lukewarm stance on parliamentary committees, his deploying of PMO-based Delivery Units to push a central agenda, his embracing of executive federalism, and his reneging on electoral and national security reform. To be sure, there is reason to be optimistic about Trudeau’s potential to flatten some of the hierarchical mechanisms of government—perhaps by further empowering the role of backbench MPs and the Speaker of the House. But given what appears to be a moral configuration inclined toward maintaining authority, and the hierarchies that sanction it, one should remain reserved about the prospect of substantive, decentralizing institutional reform during Justin Trudeau’s tenure as prime minister. This is especially true of those critical reforms to the Canadian state surveillance institutions that Wesley Wark has called for.

Indeed, there is still reason to be optimistic about Trudeau’s capacity to bring about some degree of institutional reform previously unobtainable under Harper. This is because Authority, while remaining a part of Trudeau’s moral expression, appears secondary to greater considerations of Loyalty and the traditionally liberal moral attributes of Harm and Fairness. Not only is Trudeau loyal to his pan-Canadian vision of the country, much the same way as Harper, but he has also demonstrated a lifelong fidelity to his party’s mission, as well as his colleagues and political associates. The latter is made most apparent by Trudeau’s longstanding relationship with Principal Secretary Gerald Butts, whom he first met as an undergraduate at McGill. Trudeau has maintained a close friendship with Butts for over twenty-five years, the last five of which he has spent consulting Mr. Butts’s advice on political strategy.461 Compare this with Harper, who has cut ties with most of his long-term associates such as Tom Flanagan, Preston Manning, and Patrick Muttart. Second, Trudeau has remained unwaveringly loyal to the Liberal Party of Canada’s vision of the state; that is, one which is open, expressive, modern, diverse, and united. Justin has committed himself to the same political ideal as his father, a dedication first displayed by his anti-secessionist activism while in CEGEP. To date, there is little evidence to suggest that Justin Trudeau has departed from his father’s aspiration of a “just society”: state multiculturalism, humanitarianism, social welfare

spending, and collaborative federalism have only been retrenched under Justin’s command. It is fair to suggest that Justin has remained loyal to the abiding aspirations of both his father Pierre and the Liberal Party of Canada throughout his adult life, which has no doubt played a fundamental role in driving his own policy dispositions.

Justin Trudeau has championed socially liberal positions with respect to LGBTQ+ issues, reconciliation with Indigenous communities, increasing the annual intake of immigrants, and providing asylum to over 46,000 Syrian refugees. These cases evince that Trudeau has made efforts toward dissolving certain boundaries and social hierarchies that, while potentially antithetical to considerations of Authority, are made in the greater interest of Harm and Fairness. This attests to a critical detail about Trudeau’s political character: that considerations of Loyalty, Harm and Fairness appear to take precedence over those of Authority. As such, this provides moral space for institutional reform to take place under Trudeau to an extent far beyond what was possible under his predecessor. It must be made clear, then, that Authority is not in itself wholly negative when exerted by political leaders, rather that it simply is political leadership in the sense that it is deeply embedded in its practice. Politics, in this way, is inherently a conservative affair. However, what is more indeterminate is its degree of intensity, and to what extent it takes priority over peripheral moral considerations—on both counts, Trudeau is set apart from Harper.

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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussion

This chapter provides an overview of the general arguments drawn in the preceding sections. Chief among them, that Justin Trudeau and Stephen Harper both exhibit a moral character that includes the foundations Authority and Loyalty. However, Harper appears to express Authority to a greater extent than Trudeau, and, unlike Trudeau, Harper exhibits the trait in a curiously unidirectional manner (i.e., primarily when it benefits his position in the dominance hierarchy). The implications that this brings to bear on today’s policy discussion regarding state surveillance and public accountability will be detailed. Specifically, this will concern the Trudeau government’s pledge to amend the national security accountability system with Bill C-59 and Bill C-22, which are currently being read in the House and Senate, respectively, as of August 2017. Ultimately, the centrality of political leadership will be emphasized, with particular attention paid to the role of morality and personal character, and how these elements likely circumscribe political outcomes.

7.1. Discussion and Executive Summary

Justin Trudeau has neither the nature nor temperament of his father, being constitutionally of another type, yet it is evident that he has imitated, consciously or not, some of his father’s traits and few of his mother’s. Trudeau descends from a long line of men on both his paternal and maternal side that have occupied positions of power that typically require a great degree of respect for authority and hierarchy. These include a British Army Major-General and founding Governor of Singapore, a Quebecois mayor, a former federal Cabinet minister in the St. Laurent government, a successful lawyer-turned-auto industry tycoon and political benefactor, and of course a former Prime Minister of Canada. This is important in light of research in behavioural and psychological genetics that indicates that personal dispositions regarding political orientations, moral attitudes, and personality traits are heritable qualities.\textsuperscript{463} We can infer, then, that their moral sensitivity toward such conservative foundations like Authority

\textsuperscript{463} Hatermi et al., 2011; McAdams, 1995; Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005, 2008.
have been passed down to Prime Minister Trudeau. This is evinced by the leadership style that Trudeau has embraced since taking office. As Prime Minister, Trudeau has not let up with regard to a number of power-centralizing practices, including: stringent government-wide message control, his insistence upon whipping a number of contentious votes in the House of Commons (including overtly moral issues like abortion), barring politically unfavourable candidates from running for a Liberal Party nomination, the introduction of “bill kits” that encourage a unified position on private member’s bills, his embracing of a media-driven ‘cult of personality’ around the image and prestige of the Prime Minister, deliberate and pervasive Liberal Party branding, the organization of Delivery Units that push the PMO’s agenda on the federal civil service, reneging on his commitment to overhaul the same electoral system that granted him his majority government, and his favouring of First Ministers’ conferences.

Each of the cases listed above, I contend, attest to Trudeau’s moral sensibility to Authority. In embracing a leadership style that celebrates a top-down, centrally-driven form of governance, Trudeau is tacitly (if not explicitly) indicating that he takes no issue with asserting power and influence over those beneath him within his party or administration’s hierarchy. That is, he appears to take no moral issue with asserting himself in this way, likely due to his belief that such expressions are legitimate and that to go against them would constitute a subversive act. In other words, for example, if a popularly elected Liberal MP were to go against Trudeau’s directive and choose to abstain from voting on an abortion-related motion in the House of Commons, Trudeau would likely consider this act subversive by virtue of its contradicting his authority. It is reasonable to assume that Trudeau would take disciplinary action against the Member of Parliament, and potentially even expel him or her from caucus, for acting in this way. Now, it’s important to reimagine this same scenario but under a leader who does not express the Authority foundation. Would the outcome be any different? Both Jonathan Haidt and myself would suggest that, yes, the outcome certainly would. If Prime Minister Jane Doe, whose moral palate is limited to considerations of Harm and Fairness, were to be put in the same scenario as Trudeau, we would have no reason to expect disciplinary action to be taken as there would be no moral wrongdoing perceived. Sure, Prime Minister Doe may be frustrated by her colleague’s attempt at obstructing her party’s
policy initiative, but there would be no consideration or attendant consequence apropos of the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of their act. Although the Doe Government may not rank among the most efficient, the notion stands that such a scenario is plausible, and that individual character can affect political outcomes in a myriad of ways.

To be sure, this is not to paint a pessimistic picture of Prime Minister Trudeau as a paragon of the moral status quo. No doubt, there have been some marked changes under Trudeau’s tenure regarding, for instance, party discipline: in 2016, Bills C-240 and C-243 passed second reading in the House with the support of backbench Liberal MPs, despite the government publicly disapproving both.464 As party leader, Trudeau promptly ousted all Liberal-appointed Senators from caucusing with his party—a move that can hardly be considered a centralizing gesture. As such, there is some evidence to suggest that Justin Trudeau appears refreshingly comfortable with dispersing authority where it is perceived to be illegitimate or unwarranted. Another ancillary feature of Trudeau’s character is his prevailing senses of Harm, Fairness and, in particular, Loyalty, which have been shown to usurp more immediate concerns of Authority. This, I argue, provides some cause for optimism for the purposes of institutional reform and policy entrepreneurship, the implications of which are discussed in the proceeding subsection.

Stephen Harper, on the other hand, is an entirely different case. Harper seems to directly descend from his father with respect to moral and temperamental dispositions. Joseph Harper, morally forthright in his parenting and his politics, proved hugely influential on his son Stephen. Both Joseph and Stephen exhibit a strong sense of moral clarity regarding responsibility, unity, anti-elitism, anti-relativism, and the conservative ethic around personal discipline and self-reliance. In terms of Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory, Prime Minister Harper exhibits the foundations Authority and Loyalty to great extents, with the former exceeding that of his successor Justin Trudeau. How he has asserted control over not only the subordinates within his party and his administration, but also external parties such as the news media and his political opposition, are a testament to this fact. In fact, Harper’s unidirectional expression of

Authority—that is, when and wherever it stands to benefit him personally—is so pronounced that it corresponds with Theodor Adorno’s description of the ‘authoritarian personality type’. It’s for this reason that many power-dispersing reforms, such as those detailed by Wesley Wark, would not have been consistent with Harper’s character; to have done so would have constituted an illegitimate or unwarranted delegation of authority and, as such, a moral fault.

As an aside, it is worth noting that these findings may be of some value to developmental psychology. Interestingly, both Trudeau and Harper’s moral development appear to go against Elliot Turiel and Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of morality acquisition. Specifically, Kohlberg and Turiel assert a multi-stage model of moral development in which individuals progress linearly toward a “post-conventional” morality at critical junctures during one’s formative years.\(^{465}\) By Turiel’s account, both Harper and Trudeau would be considered developmentally ‘stuck’ at the conventional stage where moral considerations of in-group loyalty and social hierarchy override concerns of harm and welfare.\(^{466}\) However, the cases explored in this study seem to give credence to a countervailing explanation: that subjects are innately equipped with particular moral senses through socialization and genetic inheritance, which remain relatively consistent throughout one’s life.

However, as a matter of politics, Harper and Trudeau are clearly unlike one another. Harper, on one hand, is a quintessential conservative—that is, interested in sustaining a moral community, is sentimental about tradition, and loyal to historical precedent. Trudeau, conversely, espouses liberal progressivism—rather, interested in caring for the victims of oppression, open to political novelty, and embraces experimentalism. Yet despite their obvious political differences, both have a similar moral framework with regard to their sensitivity to Authority and, to a lesser extent, Loyalty. Trudeau marks a temperamental shift, no doubt, but his expression of the moral Authority leads one to believe that substantive, decentralizing reform is unlikely. And with this, we arrive at a singular point: political ideology may be superficial in matters of centralizing and

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\(^{465}\) Jesse Graham et al., 2011. Mapping the moral domain. 367.

\(^{466}\) Turiel, Hildebrant, and Wainryb, 1991.
decentralizing authority. This is because Authority, as a moral trait, is a powerful and pervasive force in the character of political leaders. When highly expressed, it appears that it can circumscribe one’s capacity to enact meaningful political change, and only in its absence can certain change come about.

This observation points to a less immediate but more essential insight into the nature of political leadership: that character matters. That is, personality and moral psychology—intimate aspects of one’s mind and persona—make up a fundamental component of the political process. Specifically, that the moral composition, or character, of a political leader defines and circumscribes the range of policy initiatives made possible under their command. If we are to assume that ideology is an accurate predictor of policy outcomes, we would expect two diametrically opposite outcomes under Harper and Trudeau. But interestingly the policy solutions (to date) under both Prime Ministers have failed to satisfy Wark’s concerns regarding public accountability in Canada’s state surveillance agencies. In this way, both policy outcomes have reflected each other by evading such concerns. This lends itself to the idea that perhaps political character, a quality constituted by moral dispositions, is a more robust indicator of certain outcomes in public policy. Although partisan politics abounds with political and ideological differences, these are in fact superficial in comparison to the differences in character that underlay them. And, as such, this key feature must be paid greater attention to during the electoral process as it may be critical in assessing a candidate’s potential for enacting new political possibilities. In light of this, it can be concluded that possibilities for institutional reform are likely co-constituted by both institutional constraint and personal character. This gives credence to the idea that institutional “structure” alone does not determine the outcome of political processes—agency, and the character exerting it, is of mutual importance.

Knowing what we do about Prime Minister Trudeau’s moral psychology, can we expect him to resolve the “accountability gaps” in Canada’s state surveillance regime? Before suggesting an answer, it’s important to first consider what a resolution would actually look like in practice. With this established, judgements can then be made as to whether such policies would be consistent with Trudeau’s character.

At the time of writing, the Trudeau government is busy advancing their major national security reform packages, Bills C-59 and C-22, through its reading in the House. These are welcome initiatives, as they cover some of the most pressing concerns in the struggle for a rights-security balance: if they receive royal assent, they will give rise to a new independent review agency composed of experts in matters of national security, with an investigative reach extending beyond that of SIRC and OCSEC.\(^{467}\) The bills have been lauded by some prominent figures in the Canadian national security and intelligence community as well as advocates of digital privacy and civil liberties.\(^{468}\) However, as much as the proposed legislation marks significant progress in ensuring effective public accountability, they still suffer from a number of flaws that keep it from fully resolving Wark’s concerns. For one, CSIS’s mandate will be rewritten anew, with language formally authorizing the collection and retention of public “datasets”.\(^{469}\) Of greater concern is its amendments to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which deliberately maintains the existing definition of “security” introduced in Bill C-51; as such, vast amounts of sensitive information will be given the legal go-ahead to be shared government-wide.\(^{470}\) Elsewhere, the bills have been panned for their expanding of the CSE’s legal authority to collect signals intelligence, and doing too little to roll back the interagency information-sharing powers initially introduced under Bill C-51.\(^{471}\) Kent Roach and Craig Forcese refer to the Bill C-59 as a “patchwork quilt”—a mishmash of

\(^{467}\) *Globe and Mail,* “Liberals’ bold Bill C-59 would redraw the national security landscape”, 20 June 2017.

\(^{468}\) Ibid; *Maclean’s,* “The roses and the thorns of Canada’s new national security bill”, 20 June 2017;

\(^{469}\) Ibid.

\(^{470}\) Ibid.

\(^{471}\) *National Post,* “In massive security law overhaul, Liberals expand cyber-spying and create powerful new watchdog”, 20 June 2017.
piecemeal reforms that cover far from the entirety of the national security system’s flaws. 472

In light of these deficiencies, I suggest the following policy initiatives would suffice for resolving Wark’s accountability gaps: (i) the creation of a permanent, independent, and security-cleared Standing Joint Committee of Parliament with the sole mandate of overseeing the operations of the Canadian national security and intelligence community, including those agencies with which they have information-sharing arrangements; (ii) that the Standing Joint Committee report to Parliament, and be chaired by a relevant Cabinet minister responsible for the exercise of its duties; (iii) that SIRC, or its equivalent body, be given the administrative authority to render binding, and not merely suggestive, decisions regarding the conduct of government surveillance agencies; (iv) an amendment to the 2006 Federal Accountability Act such that public sector whistleblowers can commit “conscience-driven disclosures” as a valid defense to be used in court—with juries to decide if the disclosure is sufficiently justified. 473

There is no evidence to suggest that Prime Minister Trudeau, like Harper before him, exhibits the qualities of character to initiate such sweeping legislation. It’s true, the Liberal’s Bill C-59 will introduce broad and much-needed relief to an ineffective accountability system. This primarily being in the form of their newly proposed review body, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), which combines the authority and personnel of all the existing review agencies into one. 474 With what will almost certainly reduce barriers to investigation and streamline information-sharing, this is a laudable step forward. However, with this being the key pillar in Trudeau’s new accountability framework, Wark’s concerns are still left mostly untouched: Parliament will remain disempowered and almost entirely detached from the secretive affairs of the national security world, and there is still no indication of ministerial responsibility

472 Maclean’s, “The roses and the thorns of Canada’s new national security bill”, 20 June 2017
473 This proposal is drawn from Dr, David Pozen’s summary recommendations in: Bruce Schneier, 2016. Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World. 178.
playing a role in the process (as an independent agency, the NSIRA will not fall under the portfolio of a Cabinet minister).

Bill C-22, rather, makes a commendable stride toward introducing Parliamentarians to the national security tent by legislating a nine-member, security-cleared Parliamentary Standing Committee tasked with “reviewing” all twenty of Canada’s intelligence-sharing agencies and departments. However, as the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) and the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) point out, a number of drawbacks prevent this initiative from truly decentralizing the extant mechanisms of accountability. For one, both the chair and participating members of the Committee are appointed by the Prime Minister, to whom the Committee reports and is responsible to. Curiously, the Prime Minister can order “a revised version” of the Committee’s report before the final draft is made publicly available. In a November 2016 white paper, the CBA appropriately suggest that this opens up the possibility of “potential politicization”, and obfuscates the principle of independent review. As a result, this move can be credibly argued as having a power-consolidating effect on the Office of the Prime Minister. Second, serious limits are imposed on the Committee’s access to classified information, and they are granted no statutory powers to compel witnesses or order the production of evidentiary documents. And, making matters worse, Ministers are given vaguely worded grounds to refuse the production of such documents if requested by Committee members. Lastly, critics have rightly criticized the Committee for its disproportionately small size when compared to that of our allied counterparts, with only nine Parliamentarians being tasked with reviewing all twenty agencies and institutions party to the national security community. The United Kingdom’s national security oversight committee is of the same size, but only tasked with reviewing three government agencies; on the other hand, the relevant US House and

475 This clause is found in s. 21(5) of the Act.
477 These limitations are spelled out in s. 14-16 of the Act.
478 This clause is found in s. 16 of the Act.
Senate Committees combine for a total of 36 members. Ultimately, Bill C-22 may give rise to a self-defeating scenario in which the government of the day appoints an under-powered and under-resourced parliamentary committee to review its own surveillance activities. This, I contend, calls into question the veracity of the Bill’s intent to provide legitimate and independent review of the Canadian national security regime.

One can hope, however, that these initiatives may work toward resolving the system’s legitimacy deficit in the eyes of the general public, though this may be as far as these efforts reach with regard to Wark’s accountability concerns. To meaningfully involve independent Parliamentarians at the committee level, and to introduce ministerial responsibility to the accountability system, would likely open too many vulnerabilities for a government interested in centralizing authority and maintaining a tightly controlled public image. To move beyond this, I argue, would first require change from the top.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
Appendix

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alphas for the Moral Foundation Subscales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>Total ((N = 34,476))</th>
<th>Liberals ((n = 21,933))</th>
<th>Moderates ((n = 3,205))</th>
<th>Conservatives ((n = 4,128))</th>
<th>Libertarians ((n = 2,969))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harm</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>3.77 (0.80)</td>
<td>3.93 (0.70)</td>
<td>3.68 (0.84)</td>
<td>3.48 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgments</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>3.08 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.32 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.95 (1.09)</td>
<td>2.48 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>3.42 (0.84)</td>
<td>3.62 (0.74)</td>
<td>3.31 (0.81)</td>
<td>2.98 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>3.89 (0.78)</td>
<td>4.04 (0.67)</td>
<td>3.77 (0.77)</td>
<td>3.44 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgments</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>3.21 (0.93)</td>
<td>3.43 (0.86)</td>
<td>3.06 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.59 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>3.55 (0.75)</td>
<td>3.74 (0.65)</td>
<td>3.39 (0.68)</td>
<td>3.02 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>2.24 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.06 (0.94)</td>
<td>2.36 (1.00)</td>
<td>2.03 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgments</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>2.28 (0.98)</td>
<td>2.09 (0.91)</td>
<td>2.39 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.13 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>2.26 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.07 (0.77)</td>
<td>2.38 (0.79)</td>
<td>2.08 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>2.03 (0.95)</td>
<td>1.88 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.37 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.16 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgments</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>2.52 (1.12)</td>
<td>2.23 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.97 (0.94)</td>
<td>2.74 (0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.57 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.36 (0.79)</td>
<td>2.67 (0.77)</td>
<td>2.58 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purity</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>1.68 (1.11)</td>
<td>1.44 (0.94)</td>
<td>2.09 (1.09)</td>
<td>2.08 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgments</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>1.41 (1.20)</td>
<td>1.09 (0.96)</td>
<td>1.88 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.54 (1.08)</td>
<td>1.27 (0.88)</td>
<td>1.99 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.03 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Range for all items and subscales is 0–5. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 2.1. From: Graham et al., 2011. 372.

Pearson Correlations of Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) Subscales With External Scales and Scale Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External scale criteria group</th>
<th>MFQ subscales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good-Self: Kind/caring, sympathetic/compassionate, generous/giving</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI-Empathy</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz Value: Benevolence</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopathy (reversed)</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harm scales average</strong></td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good-Self: Fair just</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz Value: Social justice</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Dominance Orientation (reversed)</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fairness scales average</strong></td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz Values: Loyalty, national security, family security</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good-Self: Loyal/faithful</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ingroup scales average</strong></td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz Values: Social order, authority, respect for tradition,</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>honoring parents, obedience</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive and Traditional Justice Scale–Traditionalism</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority scales average</strong></td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz Values: Self-discipline, clean, devout</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust Scale—Revised</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purity scales average</strong></td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The highest correlation for each set of scales is shown in bold. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index.

Table 1.2. From: Graham et al., 2011. 377.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptive challenge</th>
<th>Care/harm</th>
<th>Fairness/cheating</th>
<th>Loyalty/betrayal</th>
<th>Authority/subversion</th>
<th>Sanctity/degradation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protect and care for children</td>
<td>Reap benefits of two-way partnerships</td>
<td>Form cohesive coalitions</td>
<td>Forge beneficial relationships within hierarchies</td>
<td>Avoid contaminants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original triggers</td>
<td>Suffering, distress, or neediness expressed by one's child</td>
<td>Cheating, cooperation, deception</td>
<td>Threat or challenge to group</td>
<td>Signs of dominance and submission</td>
<td>Waste products, diseased people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current triggers</td>
<td>Baby seals, cute cartoon characters</td>
<td>Marital fidelity, broken vending machines</td>
<td>Sports teams, nations</td>
<td>Bosses, respected professionals</td>
<td>Taboo ideas (communism, racism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic emotions</td>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>Anger, gratitude, guilt</td>
<td>Group pride, rage at traitors</td>
<td>Respect, fear</td>
<td>Disgust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant virtues</td>
<td>Caring, kindness</td>
<td>Fairness, justice, trustworthiness</td>
<td>Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice</td>
<td>Obedience, deference</td>
<td>Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The five foundations of morality*

Table 2.3. From: Haidt, 2012. 125 (Fig. 6.2).
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