The ‘Diversity’ Campus

by

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This writing is dedicated to the

people that make up Dalhousie

University’s Department of

Sociology and Social Anthropology.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project is to analyze the morals and logics informing ‘diversity’ policy at Dalhousie University. In order to do so, this project uses the ‘genealogical’ methods developed by Michel Foucault, as well as Paul Rabinow’s methods for an ‘anthropology of the contemporary’. Through an engagement with history texts dealing with the ideas of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, and policy documents written and distributed by Dalhousie University, this project shows the contingency of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, while developing an understanding of how these terms are used by institutions to serve certain purposes and achieve certain goals.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

belong -belong: Supporting an Inclusive and Diverse University

CAB/ACSAR -Report from the Committee on Aboriginal and Black/African Canadian Student Access and Retention: A Focus on Financial support

CCC -Currently Completed Charters

DUSD: Year 2 -Dalhousie University Strategic Direction 2014-2018: Year 2 Progress Report
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This project will be looking at ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ and how these two terms converge to create a network of power relations. Owing much to the ideas of Michel Foucault and his method of discourse analysis, my project takes these methods and extrapolates them to include anthropological methods, a practice often associated with the work of Paul Rabinow, an anthropologist and collaborator of Foucault’s. It is hardly a new premise to apply Foucauldian discourse analysis to fields of identity and subjecthood and their utilization in order to objectivize and govern. In the case of gender and feminism, Judith Butler has done so, Ann Laura Stoler has used Foucault’s first volume of *The History of Sexuality* to reframe questions regarding colonialism and the shaping of racisms in early modern Europe, and Theo Goldberg and, to a certain extent, Ghassan Hage, have drawn either slightly or heavily upon the works of Foucault to create a new understanding of ‘race’ in a global context. It would be disingenuous to suggest that my work does not owe heavily to these works. However, an anthropological approach using concepts first developed by Foucault, has been lacking in regards to our understanding of ‘race’. To my knowledge, of the authors mentioned, only Stoler has any professional background in anthropology and even her text in exploring how colonization and ‘race’ influenced the formation of a bourgeois identity in Europe during the span of the 16th to 19th century, is moreso based on artifacts and texts from the past, while my work deals with the contemporary. The questions I am posing are: (1) what is ‘race’ today and how does it differentiate itself from its past
iterations? and (2) how does Dalhousie University’s policy regarding ‘diversity’ use and understand ‘race’, and what sorts of knowledges and power relationships are supported and/or formed in this discourse? However, before going into detail regarding the texts and methods that will allow me to answer these questions, I would like to present the roundabout way in which my interests have developed. I believe this to be important because, for one, it allows me to situate myself. Donna Harraway’s notion of ‘situated knowledges’ is a vastly important idea for me, and has been something embraced by many of the ethnographers I had read throughout my schooling. ‘Situating’ knowledges means to place the concepts and observations made into a narrative frame that allows the reader to openly question the researcher’s objectivity, while also realizing that the researcher’s search for truth is a valid one where bias is taken into account. Harraway writes that “‘our’ problem, is to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subject, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared...” (Harraway, 1988, p. 579, emphasis original). It is important for a researcher grappling with the ideas that I am to be cautious about their position in creating knowledge and meaning.

Originally, this was intended to be an ethnography dealing with the institutionalization of race through a discourse concerned with ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Struggling with the concept of race today has seemingly changed so much since I first began working on this project. The racially
motivated shooting at a historically black church in South Carolina, a string of apologies from provincial governments (Alberta and Manitoba) concerning the forced relocation of Indigenous youth, an increasing number of Canadians going off to join ISIS because of religious and racial discrimination throughout their youth, amongst other things both in Canada and elsewhere, are all arguably connected by this concept of race, how it is held by the public, and the perceived, and highly invested in, role social institutions have in dealing with these issues. Dalhousie, and Halifax, have not gone through as globally recognized tragedy or situations as those I have just mentioned when it comes to race (though they certainly have in regards to gender and sexual harassment with the Dalhousie Dentistry class of 2015, which has resulted in a large-scale reassessment of Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policy and public relations), but race is not secluded in the extraordinary. It is functioning in various ways, in various places, in various scales. Race is a mobile concept that is constantly changing, moving, and adapting, much like the people ‘race’ attempts to describe.

This project has gone through various iterations of similarly themed research questions. At one point, I was concerned with challenges faced by international students and students of colour coming to Dalhousie (which, I should say at this point, will often be referred to as ‘Dal’ here and there) and how these challenges were conceptualized and ‘resolved’ through certain institutional dialogues and policies, particularly in the classroom and syllabi. My main concern, at this point, was to see how education and race came together to create raced subjects, how knowledge presented in the classroom, under certain, high-pressure conditions, help create subjectivities defined by
ideas and histories of race. However, this project grew too unwieldy (the concepts of race, institutions and knowledge/education, all have rich histories in the fields of social anthropology, sociology and philosophy, in many ways even being topics of significance for these fields’ very formation) and I eventually felt forced to simplify my project into a discussion specifically about race and its institutionalization via a discourse surrounding ‘diversity’.

What made my first research questions feel so cluttered was, without a doubt, the incredible density of research and theory done exploring race, and the struggles of several researchers to grasp it, as ‘race’ twists and turns through everyday life experiences. I realized this at a very particular point during my research. After the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, a march in Halifax was organized by the Halifax poet laureate, El Jones. Promoting the event in The Coast, Halifax’s local DIY newspaper, Jones spoke about the history of racial aggression and oppression targeted towards Black Nova Scotians by the Halifax, provincial and national governments, and how the events, and the resulting riots and further police misconduct in the USA, spoke to Halifax’s local Black population and their experiences. Though I had seen several protests outside of Missouri occurring within the United States, particularly in large urban areas such as New York City, I was a little shocked to see that action was taking place here in Halifax, sparked by a tragic incident occurring roughly 3000 kilometers away. A question arose for me: with a concept like ‘race’, which, at the spur of a moment can cause a mass amount of distress across national borders, how could I possibly (1) reduce it enough for it to become operational in research concerned with
education and institutions and (2) be able to situate it in a particular place, while simultaneously harking back to its global formations as a significant driver in particular discourses?

I went to the march, shocked by the turnout, but also by the breadth of voices using this time to air dissent they felt spoke to issues both particular to their racial experiences, as well as raising awareness about the structural functioning of racisms that are part and partial to creating an environment where something like Mike Brown’s death could occur. After marching down two of Halifax’s busiest commercial streets, Spring Garden Road and Barrington Street (during the afternoon rush no less), the group of marchers stopped at a small patch of land near the Nova Scotia Casino, which has a gorgeous overview of the Halifax peninsula, though it was blocked by large buildings; ‘large’, at least, for Halifax standards. At this point, people who had helped organize and promote the march began to speak about why Brown’s death is an important event globally, and why it speaks to the people of Halifax particularly.

Many of the speakers were religious leaders, and one spoke about their experiences of being a sort of gateway for recently arriving black African migrants who were having a hard time assimilating; not only into the local surroundings, but also into the Black Nova Scotian community, which, according to the speaker, has a hard time accepting outsiders. The speaker felt this to be the case because of the tragic, forced eviction of a large Black community from a place called Africville. The history of Africville and the intricate developments leading to its demolition is not a topic of specific interest in this research. However, as we can see, the significance of this past experience
of forced relocation is still felt today amongst the Black community in the Maritime provinces, and is used to make sense of current issues regarding people and their community. The mixture of specificity and universal generalizations struck me, and can be seen in the attempts by African Nova Scotians to understand contemporary situations of African migration through the use of specific and local histories, as well as the fact that these specific situations were being spoken of in a forum that took place surrounding the death of a Missourian black teenager. It soon became apparent that my project was conceptualizing ‘race’ wrong by not considering it for the same scrutiny I directed towards other ideas and concepts. I was more concerned with how raced students at Dalhousie used ‘diversity’ to influence and comprehend their experience and interaction with the institution, and not realizing that this could further reify the idea of ‘race’ as static, something that can be applied to a large group of different people who all have varying experiences and understandings of their race, how they use the term, and what it means to them. I was not willing to contribute to this and decided that, if I were to analyze ‘diversity’ as a discourse, then I should be doing the same with ‘race.’ ‘Race’ is not something, specifically, above us all; an ossified item of the past to be looked at and studied, or anything of ‘essence’ that helps us define and explain what we see in our day-to-day.

During a lecture on January 7th, 1976, transcribed, translated and printed in *Society Must be Defended* (2003), Michel Foucault speaks about the idea of ‘subjugated knowledges’ and how certain histories were being rediscovered by scholars, allowing for a new space for rethinking history. Foucault attributed Nietzsche's idea of ‘genealogy’ to
this new project of historical reanalysis, and it is in the spirit of this that I wanted to
present this story about the march in Halifax. Foucault said in the lecture, “genealogies
are a combination of erudite knowledge and what people know” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8).
Foucault continues saying that “[w]e have both a meticulous rediscovery of struggles
and the raw memory of fights [...] which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge
of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics” (Foucault,
2003, p. 8). As seen in the example presented above, the march was organized around a
sense of fellowship with the protests of Ferguson’s black people, a bond constituted
through a particular understanding and adoption of a historical narrative; the struggles
that black Missourians were facing are the same as those black Nova Scotians were
facing, and continue to face today. Black people, and African Nova Scotians, felt
connected to the protests of police brutality in Missouri because they identified with a
similar story of institutional discrimination based on ‘race’. The use of historical
narratives was also done by the speaker mentioned earlier, who argued that the
experience of Africville (the forced relocation of a black community) contributed to the
community’s struggle to accept ‘outsiders’ within its local fold, these ‘outsiders’ being
primarily black immigrants. It became apparent just how useful these particular histories
were when used to make sense of peoples’ experiences of ‘race’. An argument could
certainly be made that the reason why there was a sense of affinity with the
experiences of black people in Missouri with people of the same ‘race’ in Halifax was
because they shared the same skin colour and/or racial identity. But what creates that
identity? How does one become a subject of ‘race’? I would like to suggest that a look at
the historical narrative of ‘race’ allows us to discuss this aspect of ‘race’ and its complexity. After all, given the issue of black immigrants and their problems of integrating into the black Nova Scotian life, then we can begin to see the complexity of ‘race’ beyond skin colour, otherwise such an issue would never have been broached at this march.

‘Race’ as historicizable is nothing new. Foucault looked at ‘race’ in *Society Must be Defended* in order to establish that certain ‘racial’ steps were taken to create animosity towards illegitimate monarchies and to establish a new governance of ‘rights’. David Theo Goldberg, throughout his career (Goldberg 1992, 2002, 2009) has been arguing for a new understanding of ‘race’ in a ‘neo-liberal’ world, through arguments delving into the history of racist regimes like the Nazis in Germany, Jim Crow in southern United States and apartheid South Africa and how these moments of racist governance allowed for ‘non-racialized’ or ‘post-racialized’ nation-states that refuse to address racial disparities, despite their presence, because of the ‘defeat’ of the regimes previously listed. Anthony Appiah (1992) uses the history of Pan-African literature by authors like W.E.B. DuBois and Alexander Crummell, to discuss how the decolonization of the African continent was based on the then popular European notions of ‘race’, which were validated through biologics arguing that blood and skin tones were indicative of a particular racial ancestry. My work, though certainly retreading the arguments presented by these previous authors, discusses the kinds of histories being drawn upon in order to legitimate ‘diversity’ policy. In many ways, ‘diversity’ policy legitimizes itself by drawing on histories like the ones covered by those above. ‘Diversity’ policy’s intent
is to ameliorate the past inequalities many were forced to weather. Through policy promoting affirmative action, diverse racial identities in a population, tolerance of others’ difference and controlled spaces where one can express their identity without scrutiny, ‘diversity’ policy aims to distance the institution that adopts it from a popular history where, up until recently, ‘race’ was used to extinguish expression and resource access; in some extreme cases, ‘race’ was utilized to justify murder. Given this, history becomes a means through which certain governance measures are taken. It is in this intermingling of history and governance that my curiosities reside, because a similarity between today’s institutions and the past racist institutions can be seen; both use ‘race’ as a means of governance. ‘Race’, though still present, is nevertheless, very different.

But we would be wrong to dismiss the past as something not worth discussing since it is its presence which gives ‘race’ much of its weight today.

‘Race’, in both its past and current iterations, can be used as a means of influencing power relationships. Though I say that, however, this is not to be taken as though ‘race’ and its understandings have enjoyed any sort of concreteness. The idea of ‘race’ and its influence on past societies is still being assessed (Appiah 1992, Stoler 1995, Foucault 2004). More recent literature is dealing with the recent boom in genetic technologies that have turned ‘race’ over on itself. In her ethnography Reproducing Race, Khiara M. Bridges struggles with presenting her social constructivist notion of ‘race’ at a forum of medical doctors presenting their own work, and amongst whom she performed her fieldwork. After Bridges presented the ideas supporting ‘race’ as a social construction, she recalls “an African-American resident [...] approaching a microphone
stand in the audience and saying, [...] ‘You say that race is a social construction, but, all
day, we’ve been hearing evidence that suggests otherwise” (Bridges, 2011, p. 152). In a
collection of essays entitled What’s the Use of Race: Modern Governance and the
Biology of Difference (2010), Ian Whitmarsh and David S. Jones curate a volume that
directly deals with how biotechnologies are both using and developing genomic
understandings of ‘race’ in order to address a plethora societal woes, from crime to
disease. “Genetics now offers a seemingly more fundamental method of differentiation:
the analysis of genetic sequences. To the extent that we are the product of our genes,
the sequence contains fundamental information about individual identity and can, in
theory, serve as a fundamental measure of difference” (Whitmarsh & Jones, 2010, p. 14,
my emphasis). My work has neither the goals of historical revisers or sociobiologists. I
have no interest in discussing how ‘race’ is thought to be ‘real’, in either a historical or
biological framing. My project assumes ‘race’ to be real from the get go, with no
concern for contributing to literature dealing with how ‘race’ came to be. What I do
wish to understand is how ‘race’ is being used within an institutional setting that
promotes ‘diversity’. My research asks questions differently than those looking at how
‘race’ influenced past societies because I wish to understand how it is constructing the
present. History will, of course, play a significant part in my argument, but only
inasmuch as it is useful to present uses of ‘race’ at Dalhousie. This research is also
different from those discussing ‘race’ and its recent use as genetic fact. This literature is
concerned with discussing how ‘race’ is becoming biologized, a literature I do not see
being directly used to support ‘diversity’ initiatives at Dalhousie. Also, both literatures
are intently concerned with ‘race’ as an identity. I have no interest in how ‘race’ forms identity. Instead, my research is purely based in the words, ideas, terms and images being used to create a governed space. The idea of ‘race’ as something that affirms itself through dialogue has been little discussed of late. The historicizing of ‘race’ is certainly concerned with the discussions occurring in the past, but that is often where it ends. What about ‘race’ as a site of power/knowledge still in motion? How does ‘race’ maintain its malleability when it is used in an institutional setting that is as open to ebbs and flows of new knowledges, like the university? How, for that matter, is it still stuck in a time past despite these new knowledges? In a sense, my project is concerned with ‘race’ in its purely social, where everything about ‘race’ is placed in relations with one another. I do not wish to either refute or prove that ‘race’ is either a biological fact or only socially constructed through long histories, but that all of this is involved in a discussion that is constantly reinterpreting ‘race’ for contemporary purposes. ‘Diversity’ is one of the sites that we can hone in and see ‘race’ doing just this kind of work.

Dalhousie is a particularly unexceptional case for this kind of research. During my years studying at the institution, there have been rumblings of racialized prejudice amongst staff and students. Nothing has garnered much attention in the popular media, though these incidents clearly demonstrate that ‘race’ is very much functioning at Dalhousie. Dalhousie interacts with various raced communities; the university resides on Mi'kmaq land that borders with Métis and Maliseet nations, African Nova Scotians are either a part of or organize along with the student population (along with one of the organizers, many of the speakers were Dalhousie students at the march), and there is a
sizable international student population that either resides or takes part in classes at the university who are considered ‘raced’, or, in Canadian parlance, ‘visible minorities’.

Despite all of this, the university’s staff is remarkably ‘white’. According to the most recent census information (Be Counted: 2015 Census Update, 2016), 8.33% of staff are ‘racially visible’ and 1.45% ‘aboriginal’. Doing the math, this means that, of the 2264 staff respondents, 90.22% consider themselves part of the ‘racial majority’. Though numbers regarding the student population are still being gathered, I do not hesitate to suggest that Dalhousie is an institution where ‘white’ people are the most prominent ‘race’ population at Dalhousie. Outside of its significance in giving a framing of the institution I am studying, this information has little bearing on the questions I am concerned with. Though I am certain that there is most likely some sort of connection that can be made between the university’s primarily ‘white’ population and the kinds of ‘diversity’ being promoted, I am not concerned with that. A question that could be posed is, given the population numbers, how important is ‘diversity’ amongst this population? This would assume that ‘diversity’ policy is only concerned with particular students, like those part of the ‘racial minority’. This is not the case. When Dalhousie speaks about ‘diversity’, its goal is to influence the entire student population and the spaces they interact in. It will be shown further down that ‘diversity’, amongst many other things, is not only concerned for the experiences of students part of the ‘visible minority’ population, but wishes to influence the experiences of all students with a ‘diversity’ program that promotes the idea that ‘diversity’ helps create a certain student.
This sort of analysis, and the argument presented above, are influenced by a particular strain of philosophical and sociological inquiry developed by Michel Foucault. It is often termed ‘genealogy’. Before briefly delving into Foucault’s methods (Foucault is heavily discussed throughout my project, so I do not believe much time should be spent here elaborating on his ideas and methods), I wish to present why I think his methods provide my project some interesting lanes for answering the questions I have regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’. Foucault’s methods provide an uncanny and convincing ability to analyze words, their intents and meanings, while simultaneously grounding them in local specificities. Again, in his January 7th, 1976 lecture, which provides what I believe to be his most convincing defenses and explanations of his methods, Foucault says that, “genealogies are a combination of erudite knowledge and what people know” (Foucault, p. 8, 2003). Foucault continues, “It is a way of playing local, discontinuous, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a science that is in the hands of the few” (Foucault, p. 9, 2003). At this point, I would like to clarify that my project is not attempting to present a local history of ‘race’ at Dalhousie, but instead borrows from the same spirit that Foucault is evoking here. What I wish to suggest is that, through ‘diversity’, there is a disallowing of local, specific, ‘non-legitimate’ knowledges from becoming part of the discussion regarding experiences of identity in the institution. Instead, these knowledges are filtered through the idea of ‘diversity’ and the moral and logical boundaries it adheres to in order to legitimate itself. In other words, one’s
experience of ‘race’ at Dalhousie needs to conform to the logics of ‘diversity’ in order for this experience to be seen as ‘legitimate’. Then the question arises, exactly what histories and what knowledges are Dalhousie using to legitimate their ‘diversity’ policies? Again, I follow in the footsteps of Foucault and attempt to provide insight into the history of ‘race’ as it is popularly understood and, thus, accepted as legitimate for Dalhousie’s purposes, and what this means. I argue that, by considering a particular history of ‘race’, one that is commonly accepted, we can begin to see its pitfalls by further emphasizing the qualities of racialized difference it is attempting to, at the very least, expose to scrutiny, if not outright refute. In light of this, ‘diversity’ policy’ drawing on this history, further reifies ‘race’ by presenting it as a ‘knowable’ experience to be studied and governed. As a result, ‘raced’ student are exposed to levels of institutional intervention that potentially singles them out as ‘different’.

The primary question for my research is, ‘what does ‘diversity’ do discursively at Dalhousie?’ As has already been shown, I argue that ‘diversity’ is spoken of by the institution as a means of creating a particular student, regardless of ‘race’. ‘Diversity’ is believed to enhance the experiences of students at Dalhousie, experiences that will translate into their experiences as alumni. ‘Diversity’ is thus a means of governance, a tactic with a particular goal. However, ‘diversity’ should not be assumed to only speak of ‘race’, but a plethora of other identity markers. ‘Diversity’ takes it upon itself to influence the spaces within which these people interact. Bringing ‘race’ back into it, and given the primarily ‘white’ audience, I become suspect of these tactics and their intentions. I argue that ‘diversity’ has the potential to ‘race’ experience. By drawing on
personal experiences at Dalhousie, and Dalhousie’s policies and recommendations, I argue that through ‘diversity’, raced peoples are assumed to possess a quality that will benefit the student population as a whole. This stress on a ‘diversity’ of perspective further entrenches ‘raced’ students in sites of difference. I will also be arguing that ‘diversity’ normalizes difference and discursively eliminates the potential for particularities to be spoken of regarding ‘race’ issues because of its need to be framed within the discourse of ‘diversity’.

**Literature**

This project follows in line with a larger project proposed by Michel Foucault, which is one concerned with the way words are deployed strategically, drawing upon supposed ‘truths’. These supposed ‘truths’ are revealed through what Foucault termed ‘genealogy’, something I discussed earlier. The tactical expression of these truths is something Foucault would come to describe as ‘governmentality’. Put simply, Foucault says that for government, “it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved (Foucault, 1990, p. 95). Along with this, Foucault clarifies what is exactly that ‘governmentality’ means in three points, the second of which says that governmentality is, “the tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific
governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs” (Foucault, 1990, p. 102, emphasis my own). For my project, it is the emphasized portion of this quote that is of importance. In order for ‘diversity’ or ‘race’ to become useful, certain ‘truths’, or savoirs, are accepted by those engaged in using these words; these truths have to be assumed, essentially, in order for these words to be efficacious for certain ends to be achieved. ‘Diversity’ and ‘race’ at Dalhousie have been employed in varying ways as a means of achieving certain ends for various parties; from the student body, to the administration, to classrooms and syllabi, to student groups advocating for ‘equality’ to Dalhousie’s recruitment materials. All of these, and more, are simultaneously using and (re)forming our notions of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie. This mixture of power (how these words influence actions at various scales) and knowledge (truths, assumptions, predictions) create what Foucault has come to describe as ‘discourse’, another key term for my project.

‘Discourse’ is a much more elaborate concept than it often lets on, and one that I struggle to suggest has any sort of definition, though there are certainly key components that help, at least, to shape what is meant when we use ‘discourse’ as a method of inquiry. At its surface are ‘words’ (the words we say, the ones we publish), and these words act as a sort of in-between, a link between what is meant, and what they do; affect and effect. Using Saussurean semiotics of the ‘sign’ as a base, the analysis of ‘discourse’ attempts to analyse the kinds of relationships that are forged by the words we use; what kind of worlds, or fields, are made. There is no singular
‘discourse’. One discourse does not represent the other. In explaining ‘discourse’ and its politics, Foucault, in lecture says,

What individualizes a discourse such as political economy or general grammar is not the unity of its object, nor its formal structure; nor the coherence of its conceptual architecture, nor its fundamental philosophical choices; it is rather the existence of a set of rules of formation for all its objects (which can often neither be superposed nor serially connected), all its concepts (which may very well be incompatible), all its theoretical options (which are often mutually exclusive) (Foucault, 1990, p. 54).

With this analysis, however, there is a strict ethic of not creating any sort of inference; the focus is on ‘how’ and less so on what. My project attempts to follow in this direction of analysis by not asking “what is ‘diversity’?” or “what is ‘race’?”, but instead to ask how ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ are used and how it has come to be understood within this discourse. I am reluctant to suggest whether or not ‘race’ or ‘diversity’ are bad or good, and I do not wish to provide further refining of these terms. Instead, I wish to suggest ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ as terms that have created spaces for discussion and whose limits are always being redefined. These are attempts at trying to answer these questions “without referring to the consciousness, obscure or explicit, of speaking subjects; without referring the facts of discourse to the will - perhaps involuntary - of
their authors; without having recourse to that intention of saying which always goes beyond what is actually said; without trying to capture the fugitive unheard subtlety of a word that has no text” (Foucault, 1990, p. 59, emphasis my own). With ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, I will come to show, Dalhousie has been able to ‘understand’ and ‘analyze’ particular parts of its student population, and has used this information in an attempt to create and control its campus grounds and buildings. ‘Diversity’ is a tool used in hopes of creating an idealized space that conforms to certain ideals and supposed truths.

My questions are not concerned with what some come to call ‘reality’ or the ‘concrete’. I have no intention of discussing ‘diversity’ policy as though it has a one-to-one relationship with how people conduct themselves and their relationships; but how these are made to become sites for governance. In explaining his project regarding the French prison system, Foucault, in an interview, takes issue with the idea that what he was describing was something realized in its purest form.

These programmings of behaviour, these regimes of jurisdiction and veridiction aren’t abortive schemas for the creation of a reality. They are fragments of reality which induce such particular effects in the ways men ‘direct’, govern’ and ‘conduct’ themselves and others. To grasp these effects as historical events - with what this implies for the question of truth (which is the question of philosophy itself) - this is more or less my theme. You see that this has nothing to
do with the project - an admirable one in itself - of grasping a ‘whole society’ in its ‘living reality’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 82).

It is on this point that I believe that my project is anthropological in its criticism of anthropology.

Anthropologist Paul Rabinow’s use of Foucault was particularly striking in his book, *Anthropos Today*, where the author attempts to reconsider the anthropological project given the insights of Foucault. It’s clear in Rabinow’s work here that there are similarities between the ethics of anthropology and the ideas Foucault presents in his work to challenge methods that rest on their laurels. Inspired by Foucault’s attempt to transcend the hermeneutic and structural theorizations of his time, Rabinow writes,

(...)

understanding is a conceptual, political, and ethical practice. It is conceptual because without concepts one would not know what to think about or where to look in the world. It is political because reflection is made possible by the social conditions that enable this practice (thought may be singular, but it is not individual). It is ethical because the question of why and how to think are questions of what is good in life. Finally, all action is stylized; hence it is aesthetic, insofar as it is shaped and presented to others (Rabinow, 2003, p. 3).
In other words, understanding, and the methods of understanding, are anything but neutral. Foucault advocates for a method that investigates the politics in its claims, a self-reflective science that is open to realizing that its logics and truth claims are contingent. This is a very important idea for my project because what I intend to present is how ‘diversity’ policy at Dalhousie is an anthropological undertaking, in the sense that Dalhousie is reliant upon the idea of anthropos. Foucault, Rabinow argues, “had gotten beyond structuralism and hermeneutics by showing how the historical relations of knowledge and power had produced an object of knowledge that was also the subject of knowledge: Man (sic)” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 3). Focusing on the ‘student’, my project will show how Dalhousie, through its ‘diversity’ policy, creates the ‘student’ as a site for intervention and observation, where ‘race’ is utilized to legitimate its attempts to do so.

The anthropological philosophy of ‘ethnographic reflexivity’ came to mind consistently as I became more familiar with the work of Foucault and his ability to parse through large concepts of incredible influence and use, concepts taken for granted that have, perhaps to our peril, helped us conceive of our world and the people and events which shape it. If you will allow me to refer to my second-year course text, Blasco’s and Wardle’s How to Read Ethnography, underneath ‘reflexivity’, the authors write,

(...) typically a reflexive style of ethnography is one where the figure of the ethnographer him or herself becomes key to the contextualisation (sic) narration and argument of the ethnography. Debates over reflexivity reflect concerns
about the way interactions between ethnographer and informant shape general analysis. They also highlight doubts over whether an ethnographer can create an account that is not a projection or reflection of their personality or autobiography (Blasco & Wardle, 2007, p. 202).

It was often made clear to me throughout my education that I was to make sure that I was aware of the ‘baggage’ I was bringing into the field with me. It was no shock to me when I learned that this self-reflective shift in anthropology was heavily influenced by Foucault’s work, with Donna Haraway, Lila Abu-Lughod and, as previously mentioned, Paul Rabinow, all using Foucault in their work. The problem, however, is that I fail to see the same reflexive scrutiny in attempts by Dalhousie to create policy informed by studies that do not situate their authors. To take it further; what weight should we place in the responses of our informants. Should we take a person’s word as representative of that ‘culture’s’ essence? I will not be trying to answer these questions. Instead, I present them to argue that, for Dalhousie and their ‘diversity’ policy, the answer is most certainly ‘yes’ for both. At the end of this introduction, after presenting the general outline of how my project will develop, I will speak to a question I am certain is arising in reader’s minds; but then what? Do we abandon policy that attempts to deal with things like ‘race’? Allow me to say, forthright that, no, I do not think that is what we should do. However, what I will show is that this line of thought wrongfully presents ‘race’ as a knowable, reified object that subjects particular people to institutional interventions
and that this is following in line with a long history of social scientific inquiry that has
influenced the pervasiveness of ‘race’ as either social or biological fact.

Foucault’s methods provide insight into institutional functioning, knowledge
production, power and truth. The questions I had regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ were
similar to the questions Foucault was asking regarding ‘discipline’, ‘practice’, ‘health’,
‘science’ and ‘sexuality’. My curiosities regarding how ‘diversity’ was organized and its
functioning in imagining a certain kind of student and alumni who would represent the
institutions of Dalhousie outside of its walls, seemed to coalesce well with Foucault’s
research questions regarding the functioning of hospitals and penitentiaries in creating
the idea of ‘the state’ and its goal to achieve an organized populace working together
for the greater good of its people. At the same time, however, I will be actively
challenging some of the pitfalls I’ve come to recognize in Foucault, and work done
referencing Foucault, as daunting as that may be. Already I have touched on the “then
what?” question often posed to Foucault and those who use his methods. Another
potential could be the potential to further subject subjects of ‘race’, simply by other
means. Put another way, there is the potential that by speaking about people who are
considered ‘raced’, I am then further adding to their status as subjects while criticizing
this process. Thus, it would be a mistake to only speak of ‘race’ as a one-way route; one
is deemed ‘raced’ and there is nothing happening in return. I will try not to repeat this
mistake. Non-raced persons (read: ‘white’) are ‘raced’ in this relationship. Particularly,
they are seen as lacking, while the ‘raced’ person is seen as having a quality that can
benefit the non-raced person and other ‘raced’ persons. This is something that has been
discussed by Ghassan Hage in his book *White Nation* (1998), and it is something I will be exploring further on in this text.

It is important for this project to show the varying ways that ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ come together and are used by Dalhousie to promote certain objectives and create certain subjectivities. Some of Dalhousie’s techniques are positive in that they help create a field within which certain things are encouraged and praised. These ‘positive’ techniques coincide with other techniques that are ‘negative’, where certain behaviour is punished or disciplined. These techniques are simultaneously present when Dalhousie utilizes ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ to mold certain students, to create a certain environment, to reach the ideals that it has set for itself. In revealing these techniques, we are able to see how ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ function at Dalhousie and gain insight into the power relations between varying actors that use the discourses behind ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ to gain certain ends, and to promote certain ideals. That is to say that these terms are not neutral and have very specific origins and histories behind them. My work will discuss these histories, and their particularity to Canada, giving clarity to the bases of their use, while also showing their political charge. By doing so, I do not wish to necessarily critique these terms as though they are either oppressive, or even useless in today’s society, but to simply dislodge them from any sort of foothold they may have in our understandings of the world.

The idea of ‘diversity’ would not be possible if it were not for a certain *ethos*. An *ethos* is a moral field upon which the support for certain techniques of power are rationalized. Discourse can be generalized as the intersection between knowledge and
power; knowledge is the rationalization, or philosophy, developing and supporting
certain ideas, certain ways of understanding subjects and creating objects, while ‘power’
is the tactical deployment of these ideas to influence relationships. Discourse can be
said to be the moment when certain ideas come to enact an influence upon
relationships, such as when parameters of surveillance are employed (an instance of
power) in order to understand and gain knowledge regarding the ways in which
employees work, or when student groups gather in order to protest (another instance of
power) the university’s handling of a certain incident involving students. The
rationalization between both these incidents, where power becomes apparent, is where
ethos resides. Through the suggestion of heightened surveillance in the workplace, the
people implementing this strategy are drawing upon certain ethics, such as the
idealization of the ‘hard-worker’ as ‘honorable’ and ‘respectable’, as well as the
supposed ‘good’ in increased capital production when workers become as efficient as
possible in their work. In the latter example, the student protesters are drawing upon an
ethos, much like the ethos I’ll be exploring when it comes to ‘diversity’, that references
ideas of ‘equality’ and ‘rights’. It’s important for this project to develop an
understanding of the kinds of ethical justifications and rationalities that support the
ideas behind and implementation of ‘diversity’, and come to understand it as an
apparatus of governance at Dalhousie. What I mean by an apparatus (Rabinow, 2003,
49) is that ‘diversity’ is a mixture of various techniques and discourses, power relations
and moral philosophies, that come together to materialize as a tool to help create
certain subjects at Dalhousie, ones which adhere to the ideals (ethos) and rationalities
(logoi) that Dalhousie promotes. From here we need to continue our discussion into how it is that Dalhousie has come to problematize ‘race’ through certain adoptions of particular logoi and an adherence to a particular and historicizable (thus, contingent) ethos, and how ‘diversity’ is a concerted effort to address, ameliorate, and, in some instances, solve, the issue of ‘race’.

For Dalhousie, ‘race’ is a problem. It has been credited for creating hostile environments, a sense of inequality, mis- or non-representation amongst the university’s political functioning, conflicts between students, faculty members, staff, etc., and, amongst others, a sense of obligation that is rooted in a wish to address and ameliorate, or repair, certain relationships of abuse that were predicated on racist ideologies propped up by some of the most ridiculous scientific conclusions, cultural ignorances and hierarchization. Though I will further elaborate on this idea of ‘race’ as a ‘problem’ to be addressed by the institution (to problematize the problematization), when we consider the kind of analysis Foucault does in his work, we must try to understand and show that these institutional techniques, discursive networks and power relations all under this idea of ‘diversity’ are developed and considered as means of ‘solving’ the issues that ‘race’ has posed to the institution. However, in order for ‘race’ to be considered a problem, other influential ideas and discourses must be present. Rabinow talks at length about this idea of ‘problematization’. In Anthropos Today, Rabinow writes, “a problematization, then is both a kind of general historical and social situation - saturated with power relations, as are all situations, and imbued with the relational ‘play of truth and falsehood,’ a diacritic marking a subclass of situations -
as well as a nexus of responses to that situation” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 19). Rabinow continues to say that,

(...) what Foucault is attempting to conceptualize is a situation that is neither simply the product of a process of social and historical construction nor the target of a deconstruction. Rather, he is indicating a historical space of conditioned contingency that emerges in relation to (and then forms a feedback situation with) a more general situation, one that is real enough in standard terms but not fixed or static (Rabinow, 2003, p. 19).

Thus, when ‘race’ is problematized by Dalhousie, it is problematized in such a way that particular logics are employed as a means of solving the ‘problem’. In order for ‘race’ to be a problem, certain ideas regarding ‘equality’, ‘rights’, and ‘accountability’ need to be present, in Dalhousie’s case.

In order to analyze these ideals that I see Dalhousie drawing on to problematize ‘race’ and to address these problems with ‘diversity’, I look towards a history of racism, psychoanalysis and another text which uses Foucault to engage in a discussion regarding ‘race’ and its use by national and global institutions. However, these texts are only used to elaborate on the kinds of goals and ideas Dalhousie has set for itself, found in various institutional documents and speech acts, such as their mission statements, diversity policy, equality policy, and the work being done by those asked to look into these things
after the publicity nightmare for Dalhousie that was the Dentistry class scandal. What these texts and ideas come to reveal is this ethos I have spoken of earlier, a field of terms, philosophies, and histories that inform what it is that Dalhousie sees as worth its while, that it believes to be good and true. Without this ethos, it would be impossible to discuss what it is that ‘diversity’ is attempting to do when it is used by Dalhousie. The idea of ethos is significant when we consider the idea of problematizations, which is a philosophical technique that Dalhousie is using in order to rationalize ‘race’ as a problem. This leads to a goal I wish my research to prove and which I think I should state as clearly as possible before I go forward in proving it: ‘diversity’ is both a philosophy and a technique, an idea and a tool, ideological and material; ‘diversity’ is a way of understanding the world that is just as contingent and, essentially, baseless or, at least, shaky in its foundations, as is any attempt to create a universalized understanding of human experience.

Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks’ *Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race* (2000), is a text that attempts to comprehend the idea of ‘race’ as identity through a psychoanalytical lens. For Seshadri-Crooks, ‘race’ is purely symbolic in that it draws more upon history than it does on any sort of reality, but that a certain regime of ‘visibility’ thwarts most attempts to get this point across. Going beyond ‘race’ as simply holding a place within a bimetric spectrum between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, Seshadri-Crooks takes ‘race’ in a different, and admittedly refreshing, direction by looking into how ‘race’ has become both understood as, biologically and genetically, a non-factor, and as something that cannot be dwindled down to its cultural properties as a means of
demarcation. Instead, Seshadri-Crooks adds a new perspective which asks us to understand ‘race’ as the result of an anxiety where its usefulness is in its ability to not demarcate cultural groups, or create racial hierarchies, but to reaffirm our belief in the visual as a means of understanding the world and our place within it. Seshadri-Crooks’ argument is a complicated one, but I believe it to be significant in my discussion regarding how it is we speak about race today, and how I view it being used by Dalhousie. However, I will be leaving the intricacies of her argument to a later time. For now, let me say that, the ‘visual ‘as ‘truth’ is something that has long supported the notion of ‘race’ from its inception, according to scholars like Appiah (1992), Day (2000), George M. Frederickson (2002), Ann Laura Stoler (1995) and Goldberg (2009). The fact that this continues to be an ideal that continues to inform our notions of ‘race’ today, is to also see that there is a linking between a method of inquiry that has been practiced all the way back to Greek philosophers and today’s science.

George M. Frederickson’s *Racism: A Short History* (2002) presents a linear history of the kinds of ideas that led to the development of the idea of ‘race’ and its particular use as a means of discriminating against particular peoples based on various motivations, universalist beliefs and attempts at cultural recovery. The history presented suggests that there is a significant difference between race as a means of cultural demarcation and what has become recognized as ‘racism’. For Goldberg, the shift occurs in the moment when ‘race’ shifts itself from something that addresses heritage, into something that addresses a certain biological intangible: the shape of the skull, muscle mass, average life-span. As the grasp of the Enlightenment extended itself
to the evaluation of biological hierarchization, this is when Frederickson sees ‘race’
became something organizing, something that can be used to mobilize large scale,
public action. In order to elaborate this point, Frederickson looks at three particular
moments: the genocide of Jewish people under the Nazi regime, the Trans-Atlantic slave
trade and South African apartheid. This history is important for my project because it
illustrates the kind of histories of race that we draw upon today in order to make it
useful. I assert that much of the discussions concerning ‘race’ today and how it is used
to promote certain things, and who is held responsible for implementing these things, is
often derived from a certain popular understanding of ‘race’ and how we see its
development and its use in the past as a primarily negative apparatus. Dalhousie, as a
long standing institution who has only recently opened its gates to people of various
backgrounds, is believed to be held responsible to not only make sure that it creates an
open space for those often seen as historically excluded, as well as expected to be at the
forefront of promoting these ideals, but is also believed to somehow answer to the past
injustices it has either took part in directly (refusing the admissions of certain peoples,
or ignoring the complaints of certain peoples), or has been positively affected indirectly
(being located on unceded Mi’kmaq land). I will be countering this historical
presentation of ‘race’ in order to show how this kind of history (1) presents ‘race’ as
something was only meant to exclude and oppress and (2) that it further lends support
to the idea of ‘race’ as knowable.

Through conflicting accounts of the ‘history’ of ‘race’, I follow in the spirit of
Foucault’s genealogical methods. However, allow me to say that I by no means believe
that my project here is attempting a genealogy of ‘race’. The ‘history’ of ‘race’ is not a discussion I wish to contribute to here outside of its relation with how I see Dalhousie understanding, and presenting, ‘race’. What Frederickson provides is not a monolith to the development of the idea of ‘race’ (I will be critiquing its attempt to do so, however), but is an overview of the kind of history I see being referenced often in the discourse of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie; a reference for what it is we wish to achieve when we discuss ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, and as a reference for how ‘race’ mobilizes certain ideas, and eliminates others. What Frederickson’s history also shows is a major shift in who speaks of ‘race’ as a problem and how it has gone from a ‘bio-’ problem, an issue wrapped in the expertise of ‘life’, into one addressed by experts in ‘culture’ and ‘ethics’.

In Theo Goldberg’s The Threat of Race (2009), the author argues for a re-examination of what it is that ‘race’ is performing today discursively. Much like my project, Goldberg argues that the functioning and reasoning for ‘race’ in today’s world is best examined through the ideas it references and what is and is not allowed to be said within its discursive boundaries. Goldberg is very critical of the idea of ‘color-blindness’, the idea that race can be eliminated from our considerations in various contexts and interactions. ‘Color-blindness’, according to Goldberg, idealizes the notions of meritocracy, that history is essentially dead and no longer a factor in today’s societies and how they function, and that it’s been used as an ideal to further sustain institutional inequalities and reasserting racial hierarchization similar to the past, just under different guises.
Goldberg, much like many of today’s scholars of ‘race’, has come to recognize that ‘race’ has shed its eugenicist past, that it has become generally acknowledged that bio-genetic science has ‘disproved’ race as any sort of marker at the molecular level. Instead, however, the remnants of race’s ability to mark boundaries between people has gone to the level of the symbolic, particularly under the idea of ‘culture’ and ‘heritage’. It has become no longer acceptable to suggest that people of varying skin colours are different at a genetic level, but it has become commonplace to suggest that there are ‘cultural’ boundaries, or difference, between people based on skin colour. Goldberg uses this a jumping off point in discussing how ‘race’ has become neo-liberalized. Goldberg uses a very specific definition of neo-liberalism, drawing on Foucault’s elaboration of the term. Essentially, ‘race’ has opened itself as a means of producing subjectivity, a subjectivity that is drawn on to mobilize populations of people, typically those within a recognized nation-state. In a very interesting way, Goldberg goes through the histories of various regions: North America, South Africa, Australia, South America and Europe. Using the histories and current situations of these regions as cases, Goldberg argues that ‘race’ has always been a purely symbolic expression, that, at its core, it has its foundations embedded in a long history of colonialism and Enlightenment logics. However, as the idea of ‘race’ has developed, it’s become a more productive term in that it simultaneously draws boundaries, while also pushing them. Goldberg’s analysis, which heavily draws on the methods and analyses of Michel Foucault (particularly Foucault’s work on ‘sexuality’), comes to argue that ‘race’ is not something used today as a means of oppression, but that it has developed into a tool used in
various ways and with various intents. The inclusion of affirmative action in the employment policies at organizations draw just as much on the idea of a ‘raced’ subject as the expressions against immigration. In order for both these ideas to function, a ‘raced’ subject must be constituted.

Method

Along with realizing a reframing of my project, where both ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ had to be put to question, I came to understand that the questions I am posing here could not be sufficiently examined with the methods that I became familiar with during my studies in anthropology. In pursuing new means of interrogating the ideas of ‘diversity’ and ‘race’, I was exposed to new forms of inquiry that challenged the methodological tropes often present in anthropological study. I found myself in an interesting moment of self-doubt, a self-doubt that was framed inside the idea that anthropology, though filled with varying methods, still prioritized certain methods of ethical, efficacious, and proper enquiry; particularly, the ‘everyday’ as observed by the anthropologist with the understanding that what was observed in a person’s actions represented a certain cultural quality and ‘truth’. When I came to realize that this was not something I was interested in reaffirming for my project, I came to question whether or not my project could still be considered ‘anthropology’ and, if it is, how can I defend my project as anthropological when it does not include methods that, seemed to me, crucial to the anthropological project? It was to Paul Rabinow’s work on the methods of anthropology that I turned, particularly his book *Anthropos Today*, which was mentioned earlier. Much, if not all, of my reasoning for my methodological
approach here is influenced and informed by Rabinow’s challenging of the anthropological method. Rabinow provides my project with tools that simultaneously question anthropology’s means of inquiry, while also opening up new spaces for anthropology to contribute. However, Rabinow’s practical ability to challenge and open up what he sees, and I see, as anthropology’s limits, is complimented by a vigor that attracted me to anthropology in the first place; its ability to reflect, critique and experiment with method. One of the methods I will be employing here includes a discussion regarding the history of ‘race’ as a concept, and its uses in the past. The purpose of this is to emphasize the contingency of the idea of ‘race’, and to refute two ideas that a ‘history’ of ‘race’ proposes: (1) race’s knowability, its ability to be translated into knowledge for the purposes of whomever for whatever, and (2) a challenge to the idea that ‘race’ has gone through, or transcended, or shedded, its past iterations, supposing that today’s idea of ‘race’ is free from, or should be worked towards being freed from, its past. This method is of great importance to a project like mine where “an anthropologist of the contemporary is attentive to the issue of ‘What difference does today make with regard to yesterday?’”, and that “is not fascinated with the new per se but concerned with the emergence and articulation of forms within which old and new elements take on meanings and functions” (Raibinow, 2008, p. 24).

At the beginning of this project, I had a good idea of what it was that I was going to do in order to get data on how ‘diversity’ shapes the way Dalhousie and its participants view ‘race’ on campus. At first, I made it clear that what separated my project from others that were dealing with students of colour in post-secondary
institutions was that, instead of discussing ‘race’ on campus with those who were involved with policy writing, I was going to try and talk to students about ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, how they believed Dalhousie was using these terms and how these terms help them understand, at a certain level, their place within the institution of Dalhousie, and, on another scale, society at large. I was not planning on trying to make such huge claims as the topics I have just mentioned (even before this recent discovery of Rabinow’s reworking of Foucault into anthropological methods, I knew that grand claims of this order were not necessarily welcome in the anthropology I became familiar with at Dalhousie), but I believed these kinds of topics would be able to spark discussion amongst the students I was hoping to interview for my project, conversations that would lead me to flesh out what it is we think ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ does, how it does this, and by what means it does these things.

Unfortunately, two things occurred to me, one as a result of observations and discussion with students about these topics, and another that was not of my control. The latter occurrence involved my failure to recruit any student interviews or any responses from the student groups I was talking with. A few people representing their respective student society responded and said that they would pass word along. To these people, I am incredibly grateful for their efforts. I felt as though reaching out to student groups who were organized around perceived cultural and racial similarities would be a prime area for data. To my dismay, however, no takers. A drastic change was in order for how I was going to go about answering my questions. The former occurrence was a little less abrupt, but developed through my time teaching tutorial
classes with undergraduate students at Dalhousie. Regardless of my intentions to highlight a student voice in my work in order to provide some sort of counter to the kinds of experiences being prioritized in literature concerning ‘race’ at post-secondary institutions in Canada, I soon came to realize that these students simply would not be able to provide me with the data I was looking for. Their understanding of ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ were simply too different from the conversation I was trying to engage in. I realized through these conversations that I was not interested in the personal beliefs and expressions of ‘race’ and how it was being influenced by Dalhousie’s adoption of ‘diversity’ policies. Instead, I found myself more so interested in how these narratives of ‘racialized identities’ were being understood by the administration in order to promote ‘diversity’ policies that are meant to be representative of the student population. I am not interested in gathering data on experiences of race, but wish to understand how the administration makes sense of these experiences in order to justify its policies.

This could leave the impression that I am only interested in one side of the discussion, my interests lying on the side of administrators trying to understand and regulate ‘racial’ experiences, and not so much on the echo that inevitably occurs when students react to the speech acts coming from on high. My project will attempt, however, to ameliorate this imbalance by trying to tie in public expressions from students engaged in dialogues surrounding ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ at Dalhousie. I wish to provide a snapshot of the present, understood through reflections on the past, in hopes of providing sustenance to the idea that ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ are elusive, fast evolving, concepts with numerous potentials for change in the near future. Essentially, I wish to
show these ideas as contingent, open for grabs, and given the power to influence our understanding of experienced life, an understanding that leads to policies hoped to achieve something. I came to a new question; how are students being understood, or theorized, by ‘diversity’ policy and its use of ‘race’? Put another way, how was Dalhousie using ‘diversity’ to create a certain kind of student, and how does ‘race’ factor into this? And, finally, what is it that ‘diversity’ is meant to achieve and why is this considered important?

It is in the constituting of ‘race’ as reality that I am interested, and this is where I came to realize that my method of anthropology had to be seriously challenged. My questions are not solely interested in how ‘diversity’ is functioning amongst the student, but also how it is that we can pose such a question and think it valid to research it. It is clear that ‘diversity’ is functioning to some extent amongst those whom it addresses, but by what means? What must be done in order for ‘diversity’ to become a thing, a keyword, an utterance that makes sense? What are its conditions? The same questions are applied to my interest in the idea of ‘race’. Who is ‘raced’ when we speak of ‘diversity’? How does ‘race’ function in the discourse of ‘diversity’, and vice versa?

Through varying experiences that I will address later, as I did my research, it became all the more clear that my original idea of performing ethnographic work was not going to give me the insight I was hoping for. My attention slowly went from focusing on participant-observation in student groups, to more focus on the documents and press materials being handed out by both the Dalhousie administration and student-led race awareness campaigns like ‘How Would YOU React?’ and the logics and ethics they
referenced to make their claims. The documents I was beginning to become interested in as sources of data for my project would, however, come under severe reevaluation after the happening of a particularly controversial moment at Dalhousie, reigniting a discussion surrounding the ideas and functioning of ‘diversity’ on campus.

Though my work wishes to maintain a focus on ‘diversity’ and ‘race’, and not any other identity formations outside of their potential usefulness in elaborating on the interactions of the two, I cannot in good consciousness, justify omitting a very brief aside to go over an event that drastically reshaped ‘diversity’, and thus ‘race’, discourse at Dalhousie. Briefly, a Facebook group involving Dalhousie students in the Dentistry program came to the attention of the administration after the group and its participants began to post polls, images and words that were deemed sexist, provocative, homophobic and, violent. The all-male group was exposed after a female student discovered that some of these posts positioned her and her fellow female classmates in compromising, and sexually imaginative situations. Once it was brought to this student’s attention, she reported the Facebook group to the administration and, eventually, the press, who went on to publish some of the posts. Public outcry soon followed and an immense amount of attention was directed towards the Dalhousie administration and how they were going to deal with these students and their actions, all of which was situated in a larger, international conversation happening regarding women and their experiences of sexualized violence on campuses. It’s important that I mention that I realize that the particularities of this situation are not of explicit interest to my research on ‘race’. However, after this event, the Dalhousie administration went through a frenzy
of ‘diversity’ policy revisioning. A suite of reports, suggestions, ‘task forces’, proposals for, and implementation of, new censuses, and redrafted policies followed. These documents are significant areas of data for my work, as they each show the varying facets of how ‘diversity’ is thought of by the Dalhousie administration, how they believe it can be ‘put to work’, who these new policies are directed towards, and how these policies’ goals reflect certain ideals and goals the administration deem worthy, and how this eventually translates into methods of intervention whose purpose is to create certain subjects for governing.

Paul Rabinow suggests an anthropology of the contemporary, and this idea will be explored and critiqued throughout my writing here, which, as I am sure you can see by now, is just as much an exploration of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie as it is an exploration of form and method. Generally speaking, Rabinow gives a brief defining of the anthropology of the contemporary in his follow up book to *Anthropos Today*, titled *Marking Time* (2008), by questioning what the object of anthropological science is.

I take the object of anthropological science (*Wissenschaft*) to be the dynamic and mutually constitutive, if partial and dynamic, connections between figures of *anthropos* and the diverse, and at times inconsistent, branches of knowledge available during a period of time; that claim authority about the truth of the matter; and whose legitimacy to make such claims is accepted as plausible by other such claimants; as well as the power relations within which and through
which those claims are produced, established, contested, defeated, affirmed, and disseminated” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 4, emphasis original).

This kind of anthropology is a reflective one; an anthropology concerned with *anthropos*. Firstly, an explanation of the idea of *anthropos*. Though contingent and, thus, constantly changing in its specifics, *anthropos* is the person of culture and the search to understand the connections between the individual human and their social surroundings. This kind of concern for such a significant term in the discipline is consistently changing and it is important for Rabinow that the discipline of anthropology maintains a vigilant eye to the ways in which this idea of *anthropos* has, and is, being used. I see the idea of *anthropos* being used in the ideas informing the discourse of ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ at Dalhousie. The idea of *anthropos*, the idea that the human can be understood objectively through its cultural inheritance and engagements, is present throughout much of the talk being done regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ at the local level of Dalhousie University and nowhere else is this more present than in the documents and reports being released by Dalhousie’s senior administration.

Rabinow also suggests “producing anthropological knowledge anthropologically”, a project he finds much significance in if anthropologists wish to understand the contemporary (Rabinow, 2008, p. 5). In order to produce the kind of knowledge Rabinow suggests, I wish to highlight Rabinow’s citing of Niklas Luhmann’s method of ‘second-order observations’ and Rabinow’s understanding of the
The contemporary is the space, or field, within which my anthropology is operating. As opposed to a physical space, and its borders and its specific timeframe, the field of my anthropological observations operates by looking at discursive moments. These moments operate somewhat fluidly, instead of the concreteness that is suggested by a field such as a town in Spain, or a nightclub in Japan. Instead, the field where I am attempting to operate has links to the past, which inform its present and evokes ideas of the future. For an anthropology of the contemporary, focusing on one and not the others, would be a mistake for it has the potential to reify that which is being observed, sticking it in a moment and loading it with meanings that could change with any given moment or with a certain change in observed context. An anthropology that considers its field as one rooted in the past, present, and future is an anthropology that is able to see the contingency of the ideas it is trying to understand, while simultaneously being reflective. However, this is not to say that an anthropology of the contemporary is necessarily an anthropology of ideas or a genealogy, though these methods can certainly be helpful as sources. This is not an attempt to create a new philosophical school of thought. The topics of interest, and the methods of interrogating the ideas that prop up these topics as valid, are very much grounded in the social. It would not be enough for an anthropology of the contemporary to simply look at the ideas of ‘race’ or ‘diversity’ without placing them within a specific space of social complexity and context. Though I am concerned with how ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ are being historicized and theorized by scholars, I take the experiences and efforts of students and activists, the policy enacted by the administrators, which is informed by research done by professors
and public researchers, and media coverage on issues of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, and place them all into equal consideration in order to provide a fleshed out space, a field, where in which we can come to understand these topics in all their complexity and contingency in order to have something pertinent that can contribute to knowledge and method.

Understanding and including the idea of the ‘modern’ is significant for understanding the contemporary. For Rabinow, it is important that we understand the ‘modern’ as not epochal, but as ethical. “The contemporary is a moving ratio of modernity, moving through the recent past and near future in a (nonlinear) space that gauges modernity as an ethos already becoming historical” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 2). The ‘modern’ is a set of beliefs that are considered given, and that, often times, gets used in ways that differentiate the present from the past. In this sense, the ethos of ‘equality’ is a modern means of understanding of how ‘race’, and ‘diversity’, are means through which ideals such as ‘equality’ can be ‘achieved’ and that are used to differentiate the ‘past’ from the ‘present. But what we often struggle to understand is the contingency of almost every idea just presented, as well as moments of contradiction. When we consider the ‘modern’ not as a temporal moment, as something detached from the past, and as progress, Rabinow suggests then that we understand ‘modernity’ as a ‘moving ratio’. It is clear that the modern does have these loose and fluid temporal boundaries. There is a clear difference between ideas of racial segregation and diversity and equality, both in terms of the ideas they put forth, but also in their markings of time. However, both are modern products of their time. Both of these sets of modern ethos cite(d) the past, mould(ed) their presents and believe(d) in a certain future. A modern
ethos is in constant negotiation with its past. It can only be assumed to exist if it has a quality that somehow marks a moment differentiating it from another moment already gone. With this, I will show how ‘race’ is being shaped in the contemporary moment and I will do this through an analysis of ‘diversity’ and a modern ethos informing the ideals that ‘diversity’ references. However, I will be presenting ‘diversity’ as something that also has its own historical referents. In a sort of interplay between ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, the historical referents informing today’s idea of ‘diversity’ are reliant upon ideas of ‘race’, both past and present. To put this more succinctly, ‘diversity’ and ‘race’, both in the past and the present, both relied on one another to define themselves. For example, Day, in his *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (2000), shows that at one point in Canadian history, ‘diversity’ was not considered ‘good’ by many public figures because it was believed that it could impede the need for the country to form its own identity on the international stage, particularly in Canada’s nascent years (one could say that this sort of ethos continues today, at the national level, though this is not something I see being promoted at Dalhousie) (Day, 2000, p. 116). Staying with this example, ‘diversity’ was being seen as a potential problem due to perceived racial differences causing an impression of disunity and probable stratification to come in the future. As we can see, where ‘race’ is being spoken, the idea of ‘diversity’ does not seem to be very far away, and vice versa. It is important to see here that what I am doing is following a certain method of observing the observations of others. In order for my project to answer the questions I am posing, it is not only important that I define a field, such as I am through the concept of the ‘contemporary’ as a ‘moving ratio’ and its
application to the terms of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ as I see them functioning at Dalhousie, and a modern ethos they are being used to promote. What is also important is that I try to understand how it is that people are using these ideas in order to create a break from the past in hopes of achieving a certain future. What is called for is a brief discussion of Niklas Luhmann’s method of ‘second-order observation’ as I understand it through its use by Rabinow.

Second-order observation, at its most basic, is the observing of the observer. In my case, I will be situating myself as observing the observations made by Dalhousie regarding ‘race’ in constructing a discourse of ‘diversity’. The claims Dalhousie policy makes regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ are supported by long, well-funded research done by ‘experts’ in their disciplines who can be relied upon to provide an air of authority to the policies proposed. However, in order for me to observe the observers, I must place their observations within a certain context. For my project, it is important that the observations made by policy, and the research supporting it, be fully interrogated in order to flesh out the contemporary field that I am working within. Firstly, my project does not take the field for granted, but instead understands it as a construction within which the anthropologist can manoeuvre themselves in order to create arguments.

Quoting Luhmann and going into his own reflections, Rabinow writes,

‘Observation,’ Luhmann writes, ‘is any kind of operation that makes a distinction so as to designate one (but not the other) side. Such a definition is itself
contingent, since what is defined would have another meaning given another distinction’ (47). Luhmann is giving the term ‘observation’ an idiosyncratic definition; he means by it simply the starting distinction that organizes and begins an inquiry. The starting distinction situates the observer and identifies that which is to be observed. Only then can inquiry proceed” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 64).

Though both first-order and second-order observation follow this logic, a distinction still remains between the two in how they construct that being observed. A first-order observer sets up their field in a way that allows them to present the area of interest as something real, where the arbitrariness of their distinctions are not reflected on. “First-order observations thus are ordinary realist attempts to grasp a referent [...] It establishes an environment, a point of observation, and a referent” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 64). Second-order observations are distinct in that they take this relationship between the observer and the environment as its referent, allowing for a new environment to be observed where various contexts, histories and situations not included in the observations of the first order. I may be complicating matters by going on so long about the logic behind something that seems rather straight-forward; second-order observation is the observation of observers and their observations. My project is looking at the observations being made by researchers and administrators at Dalhousie. However, by going into some depth regarding this idea of second-order observations, I
am hoping that the similarities between second- and first-order observations become somewhat muddled, revealing their arbitrary natures and the contingency of them.

Much of the idea of second-order observations falls into the trappings of a loop, where the idea becomes both cemented and then questioned at the same moment. As soon as we suggest the scrutiny of observations, we must then question the observations being made of the observers. It’s a frustrating proposition, but nevertheless remains true to the idea of contingency present in the works of Foucault and the reflexive sociology proposed by Loic Wacquaint (“Towards a Reflexive Anthropology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu”, 1989). It is negotiating this contingency in hopes of providing insight into current discourses that Rabinow sees the challenge for anthropologists concerned with the contemporary. The challenge is “to remain close to diverse current practices producing knowledge, ethics, and politics, while adopting an attitude of discernment and adjacency in regard to them, thereby providing a space for a more precise and better formulation of contemporary problem and risks” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 29). In this sense, though the idea of second-order observations does somewhat intentionally include the very string that potentially leads to its unravelling, it also allows for a more precise understanding of the field being observed when coupled with other methods of inquiry. For my project then, where the field is the contemporary use of ‘race’ in ‘diversity’ discourse, I will be applying similar tactics of observation used by Dalhousie in order to create ‘diversity’ policies, while also maintaining a distance, allowing me to present a portrayal of how ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ are being used to achieve certain means, what ethics give these logics legitimacy, while
also allowing for another space where the observations being made by Dalhousie can be reflected on so as to allow for new knowledge and discussion. This is what Rabinow has mentioned, and that I have cited above, as the production of “anthropological knowledge anthropologically” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 5).

In summation, my methods for this project are informed by Rabinow and his challenging of anthropology’s methods of participant observation, which has the tendency of stripping the autonomy of people by presenting each person as a pristine and accurate representation of a knowable and generalizable cultural reality, and Rabinow’s suggestion for a new anthropology of the contemporary which asks that we consider knowledge and power as means through which we rationalize complex social relationships and create the idea of anthropos, the cultural/societal human who is both knowable through, and perfectly representative of, cultural/societal relationships. Rabinow succinctly suggests this to be a “means of producing anthropological knowledge anthropologically”, which is to say this is an attempt at creating a practice of inquiry which is both engaging with methods, while simultaneously subjecting those methods to critique and modification, something similar to Loic Wacquant’s ‘reflexive sociology’ (Wacquant, 1989). The goal is to reflect on the theories behind the methods employed, and to release them from their self-evidence, in hopes of revealing something that will allow us to better those methods for the given context within which our research is based. It shouldn’t be a necessity for participant observation to be used in anthropological research unless it can be adequately defended. In my upbringing through Dalhousie, it was often argued that you must present the logic behind your
methods. However, what I noticed was that many of my peers, as well as many anthropological texts, were using similar techniques that were justified through slight derivations of similar arguments and defenses and that this often led to the methods being taken for granted and reified as logical and worthwhile routes whose scientific rigorousness was assumed. When I came to do my own research and realized that the techniques being employed by the majority of anthropologists did not seem to fit the questions I wished to ask, I began to wonder if my work could still be considered anthropology. Rabinow’s suggestion for an anthropology of the contemporary provides the space I need, methodologically. Rabinow legitimates the argument that it is not only methods such as participant observation which give anthropology its quality, but that another type of anthropology emerges in an engagement with its ideas, its ideals and the ‘truths’ it attempts to establish. Another reason for why this method is most useful for my project is because, as I briefly touched on in my literature section, that what I see Dalhousie doing is using anthropological, or, perhaps more broadly, social science techniques to legitimate their assertions regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, particularly that ‘race’ is a knowable object that we can both see and situate through reference to a particular historical narrative. I wish to challenge this line of thought by suggesting that, though these methods, in my opinion, are sound, that they need to be challenged and placed in a position of contingency so that the knowledge they produce can be properly scrutinized. Dalhousie does not do this and as a result use these methods to support ‘diversity’ policy that further promote ‘race’ as a knowable, isolated, universal
experience that can be separated from its past in order for it to be operationalized for particular ends.

In Conclusion

My paper will be divided into three chapters following this introductory chapter. The next chapter, “Diversity and Race” fleshes out the field I am observing; the contemporary space of ‘race’ and how it is being used to advance policies to include and govern Dalhousie students under a discourse of ‘diversity’. In this section, I will be looking at the history of the idea of ‘race’ and how certain histories are being drawn upon for the sake of ‘diversity’ discourse and its ethics. By looking at histories of ‘race’, I will show how the idea should not be taken for granted, but instead reveal its contingency. I will also be establishing what it is that makes ‘diversity’ a discursive field upon which various speech acts are being done to advance certain policies, and the referents these speech acts rely upon in order to achieve an air of legitimacy and power. Also in this section is an engagement with how it is that ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ have come up through the past to create the current Canadian moment where ‘diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism’ are being touted as ethical cornerstones of the Canadian state and how this history is being used by Dalhousie to give credence to its ‘diversity’ claims and goals, while also giving me the space to establish the contingency of ideas such as ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, challenging their supposed truths and relevance as referents we can use to understand peoples and their experiences. This should be the major takeaway from this chapter. I wish to show how ‘race’ has been used to achieve certain means and that ‘race’ is not a ‘truth’, something to be addressed because of its assumed existence, or
necessarily a total fabrication. Instead, I argue that it should be understood as something in between; an idea used to grasp at uncertainties and affect, an attempt to represent the ‘Real’.

In the next chapter, “Diversity and Race at Dalhousie”, I will be looking at how it is exactly that Dalhousie goes about using ‘diversity’ as a way to achieve certain goals and how ‘race’ becomes factored into this discussion. ‘Race’ is only one thing being referred to in policy at Dalhousie speaking about ‘diversity’, and in this chapter I try to understand what happens when 1) various marks of identification are being placed within one package for ease of addressment and 2) what qualities become crucial to an understanding of ‘race’ in a discourse where so many things are vying for relevance and influence; what does ‘race’ become reduced to in order to fit in, and succeed, with the others? I also try to present a cohesive idea of how it is that ‘diversity’ is used in Dalhousie administrator speech acts. This will be admittedly tricky given the various ways in which ‘diversity’ is being evoked to achieve different means. With that being said, however, I would feel like my project would fall somewhat short if I did not at least try for such an analysis. In order to do this, I will be looking at documents and materials distributed by Dalhousie administrators speaking about ‘diversity’, and use these to create a field where certain ideals and ethics are being referred to in order to gain legitimacy. Many of these ideals and ethics will be presented in the “Diversity and Race’ chapter, but will be put to work in this chapter. Finally, the goals of ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie will be used to establish this field. What is ‘diversity’ intended to achieve at Dalhousie? Why? How? In order to answer these questions, I limit my analysis to one
population; the student. The student engagement in ‘diversity’ discourse is just as significant to its form as the ways in which it is being used by administrators, and the engagement the students take part in will be included in how I come to understand ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie.

Also in this chapter will be a look at how ‘race’ specifically functions at Dalhousie. After detailing the ideas behind ‘diversity’ and ‘race’, their histories and their contingencies, and looking at how ‘diversity’ is used at Dalhousie, I will establish an understanding of how ‘race’ is being theorized as lived experience at Dalhousie. Of all the sections presented here, this section on race at Dalhousie will be drawing just as much on experiences I have had throughout my time at Dalhousie, as it does on policies surrounding race. These experiences involve students engaging with what it means to be raced at Dalhousie. These are examples that struck me as significant, even when I was not decided on dealing with ‘race’ as a topic. These anecdotes and the policies regarding ‘race’ at Dalhousie coalesce into a snapshot of how experience can become raced at Dalhousie. What this section will show is the muddled way that Dalhousie attempts to create, maintain and suggest the achievement of, a racially diverse population and the complex, and unpredictable, ways that this comes to make sense of experiences in various contexts.

In a short conclusion, I will go over my arguments and an answer the question of what, after all the criticizing of ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, should we then do? There is no discussing the usefulness of ‘race’ or ‘diversity’, or whatever other terms might come to be used in the following sections. Completely abandoning these terms would be like
taking one step forward, and two steps back. What I want to do is to shake the sandy foundations upon which these terms are dependent. I want to re-establish their contingency and in order to do this, I look to Dalhousie as a source for how it is that institutions do the opposite. Dalhousie does not want to discuss ‘race’ or ‘diversity’ the way I am here. It’s too reflexive and would probably be an exhaustion of resources available to them. It would be enough, however, if this project at the very least allowed for the reader to reflect, to maintain vigilance, the next time a discussion comes around concerning ‘race’ and/or ‘diversity’. In a way, this is simply a response in a conversation that should never stop taking place. With that being said, I am in complete disapproval of how it is that ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ is being discussed in Dalhousie’s official circles. It’s reductive and repeats the same ignorances and mistakes that have been encircling these terms for centuries. Essentially, to be of a certain ‘race’ means something at Dalhousie. It is not neutral. It shapes and creates. It is political. It contradicts itself, and creates a sense of cohesion. ‘Race’ performs various duties at Dalhousie and both its presence, and the denial of its presence, is unique and, thus, worthwhile for discussion in hopes of clarifying what it means to be a ‘visual minority’ on the diversity campus.
Chapter 2: ‘Race’ & ‘Diversity’

Section 1: ‘Race’

“I wanted to know who I am and where I came from. Just to know, this is what I’m made of.”

-Kim, in a commercial for Ancestry.com

The primary question in this section is, how does a statement like the one above make sense? One way we can go about answering this question is by looking at how ‘race’ has enabled many scientists to form a ‘knowable’ world where one’s ‘race’ reveals aspects of that person’s inner self, and the potential destiny of an entire social grouping.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ as ‘discourses’, networks of speech acts that draw on and create knowledges, through processes of objectification and subjectification, and are strategically deployed to influence power relationships.

‘Race’ and ‘diversity’ are ideas that are supported by certain societal ideals and givens, and are used to create policy, incentivize behaviour, and create new kinds of knowledges. These are powerful tools, and this becomes clear when we consider their influence on societal conduct in the past. The beginning of this chapter will present George M. Frederickson’s 2002 work, *Racism: A Short History*. In its fifth printing as of 2002, and now considered a ‘classic’ according to Princeton’s publishing house, I argue that Frederickson’s book presents a ‘standard narrative’ history of ‘race’ and its developments. I argue that Goldberg’s *Racism* is the type of historical narrative
regarding ‘race’ that is supported and drawn upon by institutions like Dalhousie. It’s neat and tidy, completely avoiding any convoluted language or presenting any of the ‘race’ concept’s more elusive, or complex, aspects. It develops itself within a Hegelian dichotomy; the oppressed and the oppressor, the marked and the marker, the raced and the non-raced. There are breaks in time that are clear and do not overlap. Themes and terms are locked down in the time of their most popular usage, and never move.

Throughout his book, Frederickson incredulously maintains this stance despite the very evidence he presents. ‘Race’ has a beginning and an end for Frederickson. Its beginning, as we shall soon see, is definitive, and its end is, though not yet realized, most certainly inevitable. This historical narrative is not only presented in Frederickson’s book, but is also drawn upon by other scholars such as Anthony Appiah in his book In My Father’s House (1992) and in the introduction to a collection of articles edited by Ian Whitmarsh and David S. Jones called What’s the Use of Race?: Modern Governance and the Biology of Difference (2010). This is the kind of history Foucault has critiqued in many of his works and interviews (Questions of Method, 73, 1991; Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 76, 2010, What is an Author, 110, 2010). Foucault writes that genealogy “rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal signification and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’ (Foucault, 77, 2010).

Following this overview of Frederickson’s work, I will present Foucault’s work regarding ‘race’, a subject spoken of at length in his lectures at the College de France from 1975 to 1976, as well as, to a lesser degree, in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Ann Laura Stoler’s work, Race and the Education of Desire, will compliment
this portion. Stoler’s work to parse out the allusions to ‘race’ in Foucault’s work is provocative in not only showing just how concerned Foucault was in regards to ‘race’, but also how the author reveals some very controversial holes in Foucault’s main thesis for *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*. In exploring how the discourse regarding ‘sexuality’ helped create a bourgeois identity through various strategies supported by certain scientific knowledge, Foucault regarded ‘race’ as a major force in developing bourgeois subjecthood. The bourgeoisies, argued Foucault, needed the idea of ‘race’ in order to create a network of strategies that would prevent potential ‘desanguination’ and dangers posed against the virility of the class. Stoler extends this argument into more depth by exploring colonist populations away from their motherland and their experiences with ‘sexuality’ and ‘race’, as well as arguing that Foucault, while criticizing its presence in other works by historians, nevertheless presents a version of ‘race’ that undercuts its significance in bourgeois identity making, in Foucault’s suggestion that ‘race’ is secondary to, or is the result of, technologies regarding ‘sexuality’. The purpose of this overview of Foucault’s and Stoler’s look into another history of ‘race’ is manifold. For one, it provides a counterpoint to the history presented by Frederickson, and supported by other scholars.

The purpose of looking at these histories is to show how contingent ‘race’ is, based upon the knowledge and power relations of their time. The intention here is to convince the reader that ‘race’ is a mobile concept that has no fixed definition or purpose. Also, I wish to show that we should, and have the tools to, place the idea of ‘race’ in a space where it can be critically analyzed and considered for reinterpretation.
This is not to demonize the term because, despite its dubious development, the term has a power that cannot be denied and a usefulness that cannot be neglected. ‘Race’ is able to, simultaneously, evoke a past, present and a future, which is why I believe it to be something so important to discuss. In showing the contingency of ‘race’ as a term through discussing Foucault, Frederickson and Stoler, I am able to open up ‘race’ to the discussion I wish to present regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ and their functions at Dalhousie. When discussing ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie, the terms are presented as ‘knowable’. Without this assumption, separating and analyzing the ethos informing the operationalization of ‘race’, the whole idea of policy regarding ‘diversity’ becomes destabilized. Destabilizing these ideas should not be thought of as means to an end, in and of itself. Instead, destabilizing ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, to re-open them for consideration and discussion, allows for us to perform an anthropology of the contemporary that I have spoken of earlier, an anthropology that I have defended for its ability to understand terms in all their potentials; I wish to destabilize ‘race’ in hopes of invigorating a discussion regarding its purposes and goals. Rabinow presents an example in his work *Marking Time* (2008), that concisely explains this, and it is worth quoting at length,

For example, the fact that the human genome has been mapped, and population differences at the molecular level identified, does not mean that older understandings of race disappear in the light of this new knowledge. But neither does it not mean that all of the older understandings of what constitutes
difference undergo a total transformation. Rather, the problem for an anthropology of the contemporary is to inquire into what is taking place without deducing it beforehand. [...] The purpose is not destruction or deconstruction but a reevaluation; its goal is not reform or revolution but rather a type of remediation (Rabinow, 2008, p. 3)

As much as this is a discussion about ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, it is also a discussion about how terms like ‘race’ give us an opportunity to look at how we understand the ways in which the present, past and future operate together to create ‘knowledge’. Lastly, as it pertains to my discussion regarding Dalhousie, I wish this section to show how the institution shows a certain neglect towards the complexity of ‘race’ through its policies which see ‘race’ functioning only amongst those considered ‘visual minorities’. As I will show in this section, ‘race’ is not a one-way street. Through ‘diversity’ policy, ‘visual minorities’ are relegated and separated from the ‘visual majority’ (read: white) population. Inherently, I see nothing wrong in creating distinctions based on ‘race’ should it be for the sake of righting injustices perpetrated in the past that continue to affect us today. What I do take issue with, however, is how ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ have gotten too rooted in the politics of difference supported by an oversight of the fact that ‘race’ functions both ways. In Stoler’s and Foucault’s looks at ‘race’, we see that there is a return effect when we use ‘race’ to address a particular sub-population; by ‘racing’ Others, we ‘race’ ourselves, and it is this return effect that is neglected in Dalhousie’s attempt to deal with ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, and it is this return effect that I see missing in
Frederickson’s treatment of the history of ‘race’. Though this return effect takes different shapes at different times and locations, as we shall see, using this conception of ‘race’ as an interlocutor of power relationships, I see ‘diversity’ policy at Dalhousie ‘racing’ certain peoples not necessarily based on their skin colour or identification (though those are certainly pre-requisites) but on their ability to offer something unknowable to the rest of the population who are considered ‘non-raced’. Through its ‘diversity’ policy, Dalhousie is making it the duty of those seen as the ‘racialized Other’ to impart the knowledge of the experience as Other to the ‘non-racialized’ students, imbuing the former population with qualities that reduce them to their ‘race-ness’ and with expectations and duties that they have neither accepted, or that should be asked of them if they are to be treated as students in equal standing with everyone else. Through a comparative look at Frederickson, Foucault, Stoler, and other authors complementing this comparison, I am able to develop this line of argument whereby ‘race’ should not only be seen as a negative technique of barring, neglecting and disallowing, but having other ‘positive’ techniques of imbuing persons with qualities, expectations and presumed experiences meant to be shared with those lacking such things. Either way, the ‘raced’ subject gets made and the logic of ‘difference’ repeats itself.

*   *   *
Frederickson’s *Racism: A Short History* gives a linear narrative to the idea of ‘race’ and its development as a means to undermine the humanity of certain peoples through certain, primarily biological, logics. Frederickson begins by presenting a time before ‘race’, where religious prejudice was the primary means of persecuting certain people due to their inability to adhere to the popular Christian ideals of the time. Focusing primarily on the European Jewish population, Muslim people and colonized Africans, Frederickson does not believe that ‘racism’ was necessarily a dominant ideology during the time before the 18th century for two particular reasons. One was for the very basic observation that ‘race’ simply was not a developed term used popularly amongst people speaking and researching human diversity. For Frederickson, the concept of ‘race’ is specifically rooted in the physical, thus “[t]he modern concept of races as basic human types classified by physical characteristics (primarily skin color) was not invented until the eighteenth century” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 53). Secondly, before this time, the equality of peoples was a strong ethic rooted in Christian doctrine, meaning “the churches, for the most part, persisted in affirming that Jews and blacks had souls to be saved and were thus the legitimate targets of evangelization” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 51). This sort of practice could not be considered ‘racist’ because “abandoning their ethnoreligious exceptionalism and worshiping the local divinities (or accepting Christianity once it had been established) was an option open to them that would have eliminated most of the Otherness that made them unpopular” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 18). ‘Race’, in Frederickson’s history, is purely grounded in the belief that there is an intrinsic character to a group of people, people who are grouped based on physical
characteristics. All prejudice before the popularization of this logic is not ‘racist’ logic because the characteristics observed were understood to be of possible reversal and remoulding.

Though there was the possibility of salvation for the Jewish, Muslim and black peoples, there persisted an idea during the Middle Ages that perhaps these peoples were, despite their conversion to Christianity, ‘unsavable’ because of their histories. For Frederickson, this is a prejudice based upon ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’, as the latter is understood in biological terms, while the former is understood more in terms of location, perceived temperaments and histories. Folktales and myths were drawn upon to persecute certain peoples not partial to the Christian hegemony. For the Jewish people, some Christians suspected that their salvation was impossible due to their complicity in the crucifixion of Christ. For black peoples, their lineage was supposedly traced back to the Story of Ham, where “the blackening of the skin” was a curse placed upon a people who derive their ancestry from a son of Noah’s who mocked his father after seeing him “in a naked and apparently inebriated state”, thus drawing the wrath of God, who condemned Caan, Ham’s son, and all his descendents “to be ‘servants unto servants’” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 43). Frederickson makes a point to show, however, that while these groups of people were being forced to accept another’s customs and reject their own, which he maintains is not racist according to his restrictionist and myopic definition of it, there were still some people of the Jewish or black communities who were being admired by white practitioners of Christianity for their ability to abide by the Christian ethic. Frederickson highlights the 15th century figure of Prester John of the
Ethiopian Coptic Church, and “[o]ther blacks often presented in saintly or heroic postures,” such as “Saint Gregory the Moor and Parzifal’s mulatto half brother Feirefiz” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 28). These examples are to further Frederickson’s argument that the time before the Enlightenment has little to no bearing on the ‘true’ racism to be seen later amongst the scientific communities of ethnologists, anthropologists, evolutionists, and the like.

Despite all of this, however, Frederickson continues to portray this time as one charged with racial ideation, but refuses to acknowledge it as such. This is particular in his look at Spain and the influence of blood ties on one’s social standing. “To the extent that it was enforced, the Spanish doctrine of purity of blood was undoubtedly racist. It represented the stigmatization of an entire ethnic group on the basis of deficiencies that allegedly could not be eradicated by conversion or assimilation” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 33). In Spain, Jewish persons who converted to Christian ideals, called conversos, were seen as inherently and naturally evil, giving “‘race’ a new and more comprehensive meaning” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 33). The Moriscos, Muslims who were forced to accept the Christian faith, were also seen as lacking in the distinguished civility expected from good, Christian Spaniards. The converted Moors, according to Frederickson, were considerably easier to demonize compared to the conversos due to their continued insistence to practice traditional customs despite their official acceptance of the Christian doctrine. Alongside this discussion of domestic ‘race’ issues, much of Europe was expanding the scope of their respective empires, colonizing the New World, and interacting with indigenous peoples of the Americas.
The Europeans now have to make sense of a new ‘race’ of people, the myriad of Indigenous groups they came across while ‘discovering’ what came to be known as the American colonies, or ‘The New World’. Trying to understand these new interactions, Europeans venturing outside of the motherland came back with stories of people both civil and peaceful, peoples who seem capable of understanding and promoting the doctrines of the Christian God, as well as violent ‘savages’. “Thus was born the dichotomy of the Indian (sic) as either a noble savage who could be civilized or a wild beast who could at best be tamed and at worst should be exterminated” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 36). These new interactions abroad, however, had an effect on the way domestic ‘races’ were to be understood. A debate soon emerged amongst the Spanish about how the Church and the nation should go about treating the people they encountered across the Atlantic. Frederickson highlights the two positions through the prominent Spanish philosophers of the time, Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas. Las Casas argued for a strict understanding of the Bible, wherein all people are to be considered equal. De Sepulveda, conversely, argued that these peoples were “‘barbarous and inhuman peoples abhorring all civil life, customs and virtue’” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 37). The view of Las Casas was eventually taken on as official policy, but this positioned the questions of the conversos and the Moriscos in a new light. There soon arose a “crucial distinction between pagans who had never heard the word of Christ, and infidels, like Jews and Muslims” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 37). “Even if, as was commonly believed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, American Indians (sic) were descended from the lost tribes of Israel, they were not burdened with
the hereditary guilt of Old World Jews; for they had been ‘lost’ before the coming of
Christ and thus had not rejected him or been implicated in the Crucifixion. Only the
infidels - Jews and Muslims - had to be subjugated by force because of the evil in their
hearts” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 37-38). This is an important moment to point out in
Frederickson’s work because it exposes the mobility of the idea of ‘race’. We can see
here that ‘race’ has already achieved a status of worldview; it has become a term with
the ability to indiscriminately explain every interaction one may come into, regardless of
the spaces travelled. This is also another moment where Frederickson’s work to detail
the history of ‘race’ reveals incredible short-sightedness, somewhat due to the linear,
narrative nature of historicism that he wishes to take on; Frederickson writes, “[w]hat
was missing - and why I think such ethnic discrimination should not be labelled racist -
was an ideology or worldview that would persuasively justify such practices”
(Fredrickson, 2002, p. 24). For Frederickson, “to achieve its full potential as an ideology,
racism had to be emancipated from Christian universalism” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 47).
‘Racism’ as an ideology, according to Frederickson, did eventually shed this “Christian
universalism”; in its absence, the Enlightenment took over in lending legitimacy to
‘racist ideology’.

For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Frederickson sees a major shift in
the ways that ‘race’ was being defined. Frederickson credits Swedish naturalist Carl
Linnaeus with the idea that humans were part of the animal kingdom, and this idea of
‘Man being made in the image God’ became increasingly less influential. This soon led to
attempts to apply typological methods of division to the human species. Frederickson
points out the work of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and his 1776 work, *On the Natural Varieties of Mankind*. In this, Blumenbach presented “[h]is fivefold division into Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, American and Malays”, which were applied to peoples based upon certain physical characteristics. A ranking of ‘races’ came along after these theories gained popularity, despite Frederickson’s observation that “ethnological thinkers did not for the most part question the notion that humanity had a common origin and that the variations currently observed must have been environmentally induced” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 58). Despite this common origin, it became increasingly accepted that people whose ancestry derives from, or who look like, Africans, were simple and stupid, unfit to take part in and contribute to civilized society. The black person’s innate predisposition to a life of servitude became written on the flesh, legitimated by scientific speech acts of the moment and propped up by a problematization of ‘race’ seen in centuries past. Jewish people instead became seen as ugly and aesthetically inferior, along with the still prevailing view that they were vindictive and complicit in the death of Jesus Christ; their ugly acts of the past believed to be expressed in their facial features (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 61).

‘Science’ thus begins to serve the discourse of a nationalist project. As the rights of kings to their domain began to dwindle, and the bourgeois class gained influence, it became imperative that a proper, just, and rightful national identity begin to be formed, wherein the people can gain sovereignty over their respective spaces. The idea of ‘rights’ began to be renegotiated, and thinkers took it among themselves to suggest that the right of a certain country belonged to a certain people, whose lineage was being
referenced in order to affirm these rights to the land. ‘Race’ would become a significant node in these debates regarding what people deserved to rule in the royals’ absence. The ‘science’ being presented by the likes of Blumenbach and Linnaeus was being taken up by other people fighting for nationalist unities. Ideas of ‘racial purity’ and ‘miscegenation’ abounded in strategies attempting to realize certain idealized spaces where a people shared, not only a common blood, but a common goal, and Frederickson uses the example of Germany to elaborate on this. Backed with the truth of the races provided by ‘science’, it became clear for the nationalists that “[w]here nationality is ethnic, and if ethnicity is thought to derive from the blood or the genes, those of the wrong ancestry can never be accepted as sons and daughters of the nation” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 70). The German nationalist movement hitched onto the ideas of Johann Gottfried von Herder, who presented the idea that “each ethnic group or nation possesses a unique and presumably eternal Volksgeist (or folk soul)” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 70). “To preserve and nourish its Volksgeist, Herder asserted, a people should remain in one place reacting poetically to the same physical environment that had inspired its ancestors” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 70). It was with this sentiment of cultural and lineage purity, along with the idea of ‘race’ as a valid distinction of biological difference in humans, that Germany, along with other countries, as we shall see in the work of Foucault and Stoler dealing with ‘race’ and nation, was able to mobilize a persuasive network of logics, knowledges and powers that would see the establishment of a unified German state in 1870, after which the ‘Jew’ became problematized as no longer a religious Other, but as a fellow citizen threatening the possibility for a ‘pure’ national
race by draining it of its resources and depriving the true people of Germany of influence and status in a new national economy (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 78). Frederickson notes, however, that the logics of a ‘race’ being accorded the rights of the nation changed from country to country. “If the Germans endowed themselves with a ‘racial’ identity and then excluded others from it, Americans tended to racialize others and consider themselves simply human - citizens of the ‘Universal Yankee Nation’ and beneficiaries of what was promised to ‘all men’ by the Declaration of Independence” (Fredrickson, 2002, p. 73). After this, Frederickson begins to look at the particularities of the Holocaust, the Jim Crow-era of the Southern United States and apartheid in South Africa. These events relied upon the discourses already presented, thus the particularities of these atrocities are of little concern for my purposes.

Before moving on to an overview of Frederickson’s historical narrative of ‘race’, I would like to peruse over other authors that present a similar historical narrative concerning ‘race’. Though drawing on an earlier period, Whitmarsh and Jones’ introduction to a collection of articles called What’s the Use of Race, repeat the sentiment of Frederickson’s where ‘race’ is something that is wholly grounded in the discourse of bioscience. “The Mediterranean, basin, for instance, collected a diverse enough group of people into a small region that early Greek writers, such as Herodotus and the authors of the Hippocratic Corpus, often commented on the existence and consequences of the differences. Difference here did not connote fixed racial types. Ancient Greek medicine, for instance, focused on environmental malleability and attributed the plurality of appearances, susceptibilities, and customs to the influence of
climate, foods, and modes of living (Whitmarsh & Jones 2010, p. 9). Again, the sentiment that ‘race’ should be bracketed in the ‘modern’ era due to its reliance on ‘scientific’, thus insurmountable, terms is repeated in Anthony Appiah’s definition of ‘race’ in Critical Terms for Literary Study. Appiah writes,

Thus, we find Hippocrates in the fifth century B.C.E. in Greece seeking to explain the (supposed) superiority of his own people to the peoples of (Western) Asia by arguing that the barren soils of Greece had forced the Greeks to become tougher and more independent. Such a view attributes the characteristics of a people to their environment, leaving open the possibility that their descendants could change if they moved to new conditions.

While the general opinion in Greece in the few centuries on either side of the beginning of the common era appears to have been that both the black “Ethiopians” to the south and the blonde “Scythians” to the north were inferior to the Hellenes, there was no general assumption that this inferiority was incorrigible (Appiah, 1995, no page number).

Like Frederickson, the works of Appiah, Whitmarsh and Jones seem to repeat the idea that ‘race’ should be considered different from the examples given because the innate qualities of ‘race’ that would develop during the Enlightenment were yet to be popularized and accepted. What I find interesting, however, is how these histories begin to show some cracks the moment we consider the very evidence used to support it. In the logic that ‘climate’ determines one’s superiority, there appears to be a direct link
between the Greek understanding of ‘difference’ and the nationalist projects that occurred in Europe, particularly Germany, during the 19th and 20th centuries. Also, much like the rationality presented by Frederickson to differentiate between ‘race’ and ‘ethnoreligious’ prejudice, where “abandoning their ethnoreligious exceptionalism and worshiping the local divinities” would lead to their acceptance (as though it were that easy, or as though such an act went without personal hardship), Appiah, Whitmarsh and Jones suggest that, since people could abandon their hometowns to live in an area considered more ‘challenging’ or ‘character building’, to appease to the ethos of Greek Man, is similarly outrageous in its attempt to use this logic to suggest stark breaks between these two periods of time, though the ‘modern’ conception of ‘race’, like its ‘Hellenistic’ understanding, was appealing to class virtues and ideals as well. These arguments hierarchize prejudice as a means of distinguishing between different modes of understanding ‘difference’ without considering their lines of convergence; these are arbitrary markings of time. As we will see in Day’s look at how ‘diversity’ has functioned, and continues to function, as a means of realizing a unified Canadian nation-state, there is much to suggest that a line can be traced from Herodotus’ prioritizing of the visual as a means of understanding ‘difference’, and the ways we go about understanding ‘race’ today (Day, 2000, p. 48). These histories also, without much evidence, prop up the ‘biologic’ understanding of ‘race’ as the only rationalisation of it during this time, when this is hardly the truth of the matter, for which Foucault and Stoler present much evidence (Foucault, 2003, Stoler 1995). As for the rest of the ‘history’, Appiah, Whitmarsh and Davis all, more or less, repeat the history presented by Frederickson.
Appiah discusses the curse of Ham (Appiah, 1995, no page numbers) and the development of ‘biological racism’ (which he terms ‘racialism’) in similar terms to Frederickson’s (Appiah, 1992, p. 12-13) and Whitmarsh and Jones historicize ‘race’ similarly to Frederickson in their look at such noted figures as Blumenbach, and the significance of anatomical measurements as a means of distinguishing peoples and evaluating the possibility of their integration into ‘civil ‘society (Whitmarsh & Jones, 2010, p.9). I understand that these moments were significant sites where the power relations of ‘race’ as a discourse was being challenged, revoked, supported and developed. However, the arbitrary dividing of these moments into particular epochs through the kinds of appeals and arguments that Frederickson, Appiah, Whitmarsh and Davis do, need to be pointed out. In order for an anthropology of the contemporary to achieve its goals, we must understand that the past is contingent; that the author is present in these narratives. So, I do not want to dismiss these narrative outright, but wish to show their weaknesses in order to highlight the significance of alternative historical narratives in an attempt to gain a better appreciation for how ‘race’ functions in both the past and present, and how it influences our use of ‘race’ to influence the future. From this point on, I will be referring to this history as that of Frederickson’s, despite the fact that various authors have referenced it similarly. Though each author uses this history differently to serve their own interests, for the sake of ease, I will continue to refer to this historical narrative as that of Frederickson’s while hoping that the reader keep in mind that this history of ‘race’ extends beyond only his work.
In Frederickson’s text, ‘race’ is a thing with a particular history and a definitive beginning, thus making it an object that can be explored through an engagement with its historical uses and defenses, particularly in respect to its understanding amongst a group of European scientists. Frederickson’s conception of ‘race’ is also stagnant, its power never moving outside of the top-down relationship between those who are and who are not ‘raced’. In Frederickson’s work, more often than not, ‘race’ is only seen as that which is being placed or used upon those who are ‘different’ from the norm. For some, according to Frederickson, ‘race’ was not an object to consider for their own identity, but was instead reserved for certain Others. Foucault, to a large extent, presents the conceptual history of ‘race’ quite differently. For one, Foucault is rarely, if ever, concerned with an idea in the strictest sense, for fear of further reifying it. Speaking of an attempt by a British scholar to trace the history of ‘morality’ in a linear fashion, Foucault writes:

He assumed that words had kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys. From these elements, however, genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history - in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of
their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in
different roles (Foucault, 2010, p. 76).

For Foucault, in order to understand an idea is not to envelop them in these
‘monotonous finalities’, but instead to allow our exploration of these terms to grant,
and make room for, potentials. An idea has, can, and most often will, change itself
according to the ways it is being employed by whomever is trying to use the term
strategically and it is my project’s goal to show this movement in action by grounding it
in an analysis of an institution’s use of the idea of ‘race’. This is not a methodological
trait found in Frederickson’s work. Though it would be unfair to suggest that
Frederickson fails to see the influence of past prejudices on the idea of ‘racism’ he is
covering, he nevertheless makes arbitrary marks on a timeline tracing the idea of ‘race’
by suggesting that prejudice based upon religious tenets have nothing to do with the
scientifically backed ‘racisms’ to be seen in the future, and as I have shown, Appiah,
Whitmarsh and Jones repeat this historical distinction. Marking time this way gives the
impression of history as epochal, where old ideas are replaced by new ones that do not
share commonalities. It gives the impression that ‘race’ can shed its negative
connotations, its history and presents its power as never evolving. What concerns me is
how this kind of history allows for ‘race’ to be used in a way that assumes its
generalizability, in that ‘race’ and its history is tangible, knowable, and without moral
and logical biases. This is the kind of generalizability that gets taken up when ‘race’
becomes strategically employed in ‘diversity’ discourse, as well as its inability to
recognize certain overlaps that reveal aspects of ‘race’ and how it functions in its relationships of ‘power’. I vehemently argue that ‘race’ is not generalizable to the extent that ‘diversity’ policy at Dalhousie wishes us to accept through the use of a kind of history that is being presented by Frederickson.

It is this perception of ‘race’ as knowable that allows for its strategic employment in discourses such as ‘diversity’, where it is being used for various means. It is this kind of history that allows ‘race’ to be taken as a given, and it is this kind of history of ‘race’ that allows for universalist worldviews; ‘race’ is a thing, it can be known, and it is the same everywhere and for everyone in that ‘race’ is believed to hold a particular knowledge regarding our relationships with ourselves and others. ‘Race’, understood in this manner, constitutes us and the world and allows for such a statement as the one above, in the Ancestry.com commercial, to be uttered, and understood. To borrow a metaphor from Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange* (2009), Frederickson understands ‘race’ as a billiard ball; it is whole and unchanging and comes against other terms, or, staying within the metaphor, billiard balls, only to clash. However, like groups of people sharing a common social understanding (I hesitate to say ‘cultures’ simply because of how loaded that term can be in any discussion regarding ‘race’), ideas like ‘race’ are porous and absorbing; they adapt and borrow from other terms, causing changes. Terms, like groups of people, are not isomorphic. This is the issue I have with a history of ‘race’ like Frederickson’s; the limits he places on his subject are assumed and unsupported; the rationale behind the limit he placed on ‘race’ on not being ‘real’ until the advent of the Enlightenment and
bureaucracy, are never explained. It is precisely this kind of understanding of ‘race’ that allows it to be taken up in ‘diversity’ discourse and, while I feel comfortable in saying that it is understandable for a community to come to some sort of agreement regarding a common understanding of a certain term like ‘race’ in order to achieve particular ends, it becomes problematic when the group comes to forget the limitations such a term places on the complex power relationships of ‘race’, only to turn around and begin calling it ‘truth’. Foucault was primarily concerned with the deployment of the idea of ‘sexuality’ as a technology of control for realizing a ‘perfect’ bourgeois, nationalist class, but ‘race’ was nevertheless often evoked in his texts attempting to develop an understanding of ‘biopolitics’, a dense term I address below after wrapping up some of the particulars of Frederickson’s argument and introducing the differences in method and conceptualization presented by Foucault. It should not come as a surprise when Foucault delves into the idea of ‘race’ in Europe from the 16th to 20th century, that we see a similar kind of historicism being done, allowing for power relationships to be reexamined and be radically changed.

Foucault wishes to understand the functions served by a term such as ‘race’. Frederickson asks, “what is ‘race’ and how has it come to shape the ways we understand the world around us?’ or ‘What effects has ‘race’ as an idea had on the way we interact with one another?’ The solidity of the term ‘race’ can be seen in Frederickson’s work. Frederickson is consistently reminding his reader of the conditions he sees as musts in order for something to be considered ‘race’. Foucault is certainly interested in these questions, but wishes to frame them differently. Instead, Foucault asks questions that
pertain not to what something is, but how something is used, how it is mobilized, what it assumes. Instead of asking “what is ‘race’?”, a question inspired by the methods of Foucault would rearrange this question and instead ask “What does ‘race’ do when we use it?” and in order to answer such a question, it is the kind of answers that Frederickson provides to the question of “What is ‘race’?” that get mobilized. Believing that one knows what ‘race’ is is what allows for the term to be used, and what Foucault wishes to understand is how what we think we know becomes embroiled in contingency and confusion when we consider how it was that these conclusions came about. Reframed in this way, we can see that Frederickson’s work is doing the same work being done by the discourse of ‘science’ he seems to criticize. Like the ethnologists, biologists and geneticists that allowed for the idea of ‘racial’ hierarchization to be commonly adopted and used by the nationalists movement around Europe, Frederickson is deploying a conception of ‘race’ and its history that is knowable and definable, allowing for ‘race’ to be, again, repurposed to provide substance for new deployments where ‘race’ can be used strategically, as in the case of ‘diversity’. This is not to say that Frederickson’s work to objectivize ‘race’ can be used for racist purposes, where the goal is to rescind and reprimand certain behaviours, but that his theorization of ‘race’ does allow for it to be a workable term that draws on historical ‘facts’ so as to generalize ‘race’ as a particular ‘experience’, and this is invaluable to ‘diversity’ techniques that need to assume a generalizable notion of ‘race’ so as to address issues pertaining to it for a large population. To further elaborate on this methodological difference between Foucault and Frederickson, and the significance of generalizing ‘experience’ for the
purpose of governance and the constitution of the self, I would like to look over a
moment where Foucault doubted his project regarding ‘sexuality’ and how it reveals a
time when Foucault was, as far as I am concerned, at his most concise in regards to the
goals of his project.

On his heels after the reception of volume 1, the introduction of volume 2 of his
work *The History of Sexuality* has the author explaining his project, and his life’s work, in
the most concise and direct manner I have seen him do. The critics of Foucault’s first
volume argued that he was redefining sexuality, and tracing its formation, without
referencing any literature before early-modern France. It was said that if Foucault
wanted to examine ‘sexuality’ and its use and understanding in a social scientific
manner, than he fell far short of the mark due to his myopic treatment of history and
how various cultures of varying times understood ‘sexuality’. In this introduction,
Foucault gives the impression that he’s willing to accept this criticism, and admits that
he eventually came to realize that his research project had to be retooled. However,
though he recognizes his project’s need to be recalibrated, Foucault is sure that his
critics seem to be confused about what it is he is trying to accomplish. Foucault writes
that taking a genealogical approach to analyze ‘sexuality’ “does not mean that I
proposed to write a history of the successive conceptions of desire, of concupiscence, or
of libido, but rather to analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their
attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as
subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves and themselves a certain
relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural
or fallen” (Foucault, 1980, p. 5). Foucault is not interested in what ‘sexuality’ is, but “how an ‘experience’ came to be constituted in modern Western societies, an experience that caused individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a ‘sexuality’, which was accessible to very diverse fields of knowledge and linked to a system of rules and constraints” (Foucault, 1980, p. 4).

The reason for this brief aside is not only to reassert my method and Foucault’s influence on my work, but also to further elaborate on how his project differs from the ones like Frederickson’s. When we look at Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in between 1975-6, collected in the anthology *Society Must Be Defended* (2003), we can see a marked difference between the way the two authors approach the idea of ‘race’. ‘Race’, for Frederickson, as I have previously shown, is not only an object to behold and analyze, but is also something that is negative. It would be a mistake to see Frederickson’s goal for his work to be simply the overview of the negative aspects of ‘race’, despite the title of his work directly referencing ‘racism’ as its topic. Frederickson does not present ‘racism’ as a problem, in the sense that ‘race’ can become something different once ‘racism’ is somehow remedied. Instead, Frederickson presents ‘race’ as the problem, with ‘racism’ being its negative expression, in that ‘race’ was used to restrict certain accesses that were available to others. Because of this, it would not be unfair to compare the works on ‘race’ that Foucault and Frederickson present. They are both speaking to the same thing. Foucault also sees the idea of ‘race’ being problematized by those using it to deploy certain social strategies. It’s important to note here, however, that Foucault is trying to further remove himself from the idea of ‘race’,
as opposed to Frederickson, by not suggesting that ‘race’ is a problem, but by looking at how it becomes problematized. Foucault wishes to look at how ‘race’ became such a problem, and in order to do this, Foucault begins in a very different place than Frederickson did, which is during a time in Europe when ‘rights’ were being renegotiated.

In *Society Must be Defended* (2003), Foucault grapples with a certain idea influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, who suggested that war was politics by other means. Foucault takes as his starting point the inversion of that well-known formulation by suggesting that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). Foucault’s interests in this formulation branched with what he called “subjugated knowledges”. This idea of ‘subjugated knowledges’ was integral in Foucault’s work to examine the kinds of history that typical history forgot. “When I say ‘subjugated knowledges,’” I mean two things. On the one hand, I am referring to historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematization” (Foucault, 2003, p. 7). Foucault continues, “I am also referring to a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” (Foucault, 2003, p. 7). For Foucault, it is by unearthing ‘subjugated knowledges’ that we can achieve a genealogical method that “has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific” (Foucault, 2003, p. 7). In the second instance of how he thinks of ‘subjugated knowledges’, there is a clear similarity between this idea
and Harraway’s idea of ‘situated knowledges’, presented in my introduction. To put it simply, Foucault is suggesting a new way of formulating questions regarding history. It is to take something considered historically ‘given’ and then ask of it whether or not it can keep its footing when different questions are asked of it. It is also allowing these knowledges considered ‘unscientific’ to come into play and be taken out of their hierarchical oppression and be considered alongside the ideas deemed ‘scientifically worthy’. “It is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized (sic) knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a science, that is in the hands of the few” (p. 9). This is all well and good, but Foucault, as always, is quick to draw out the potential for his project to become the very thing he wishes to contest. What happens when these ‘subjugated knowledges’ become the accepted knowledge? For, as is of most important to my purposes here, it was such a circumstance that allowed ‘race’ to become a charged node for strategic interlocutors during a time when ‘rights’ were being reformulated, the idea of a ‘nation’ became ever more alluring to those who were disillusioned with a French monarchy.

Firstly, let us consider Foucault’s use of this inverted formulation of Clausewitz, where politics is war by other means. What Foucault is trying to suggest is that, when we take this assertion, we can begin to understand the history of ‘rights’ moving from the monarch to the people in both Britain and France, differently. Foucault is not arguing that this is how he believes society to configured, just that this provides some
interesting new insights into what was being argued for in Britain and France at the time when monarchical reigns were becoming questioned. Foucault writes that, during this time, it was believed that historians needed “to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other” (Foucault, 2003, p. 51). It became overly popular in historical discussions regarding the sovereignty and its ‘right’ to rule that ‘[a] binary structure runs through society’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 51). After the war, where one party is either destroyed or under the rule of the victors, a political struggle immediately emerges, and the war continues, however silent it may seem. This kind of world-making will be addressed in more depth during the next section discussing ‘diversity’ considering, as is demonstrated in the genealogy of Canadian ‘diversity’ by Day, that this was very much a prevailing idea amongst the English colonizers trying to govern the myriad of peoples present in the country. For now, however, it is important that we keep in mind this kind of formulating of society into binary terms in order to move on to the discussion of how ‘race’ factors into this binaristic formulation to create new histories, and new ways for the expression of power.

“The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war” (p. 60). However, “what we see as a polarity, as a binary rift within society, is not a clash of two distinct races. It is the splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace” (Foucault, 2003, p. 61). Already in Foucault’s lectures, we see a starkly different approach to how ‘race’ was
being used during the 17th century when compared to Frederickson’s overview. ‘Race’ becomes historical fact during this time, and it appeals to a certain ‘truth’, a ‘truth’ that becomes a weapon for a new counterhistory. This counterhistory rejects the then common historical analysis that only affirmed the right of the monarch to rule; “[h]istory was a ritual that reinforced sovereignty” (Foucault, 2003, p. 69). Instead, this counterhistory suggests, firstly, “a principle of heterogeneity: The history of some is not the history of others” (Foucault, 2003, p. 69). For these historians, the ‘truth’ simply was not forgotten or lost; the victors of the battle, be it the Normans over the Saxons, or the Franks over the Gauls, hid the ‘truth’, misrepresented it, and abused its sovereign claims in the process. These counterhistories of the ‘racially’ oppressed are protests and their challenge “is to demand rights that have not been recognized, or in other words, to declare war by declaring rights” (Foucault, 2003, p. 73).

I am not trying to present these two historical narratives, one by Foucault and the other by Frederickson, in an attempt to argue that one is more ‘accurate’ than the other. What is more important for this discussion is the ways in which Foucault goes about telling this history and how these methodological choices help destabilize any sort of history that attempts to suggest breakages in time, epochs, complete ideological revolution, and the like. Besides, Foucault is not even trying to suggest his own historical narrative for how the idea of ‘race’ was used, at least in any sort of definitive way, so much as he is trying to comprehend the ways in which a ‘history’ was used to legitimize certain rights claims that were based on racial allegiances. To elaborate on this point, Foucault discusses the myriad of groups who used history as a method of waging a
‘rights war’, and how, with each adoption by a particular group (of which there are vast differences in each one’s respective political goals and aesthetics) the historical narratives “of society and men; them and us; the unjust and the just,...” (Foucault, 2004, 74) changed with each adoption. This kind of narrative had achieved “a sort of strategic polyvalence” (Foucault, 2004, 76) where Foucault lists its uses from the 17th century revolutionary projects of radical English thought and French aristocrats, all the way to decolonization (Foucault, 2004, 77). Thus, the narrative of ‘race’, as a means of pointing out historically legitimized injustices, takes on a starkly different nature compared to the way that Frederickson and others believe the term functioned during this time in Europe. Foucault speaks to this, saying

Although the discourse speaks of races, and although the term “race” appears at a very early stage, it is quite obvious that the word “race” itself is not pinned to a stable biological meaning. And yet the work is not completely free-floating. Ultimately, it designates a certain historico-political divide. It is no doubt wide but it is relatively stable (Foucault, 2004, p. 77)

As we see, the idea of ‘race’ had not only various interpretations, but it also had various uses and was used by various organized groups. However, I go back to the fact that Foucault is speaking about ‘races’ and Frederickson is speaking about ‘racism’. As I said before, there is not one without the other, but both of these uses of ‘race’ are clearly distinguishable; in one example, it relied upon the discourse of ‘biology’ and ‘eugenics’
and, in another example, ‘race’ relied on the idea of ‘language’ and ‘history’. Thus, Foucault shows that ‘race’ was not only used to forward arguments whose purpose was to constrict, demonize and alienate, but to also make claims for rights, for freedoms, and for recognition. This use of ‘race’ to compel people to rebel against the monarch is vastly different from the way Frederickson’s history understands ‘race’ and its usage during the same time. The significance this has for my project is rather simple; I wish to show how ‘race’ has never once been, nor ever will be, bounded down by a single understanding, and that its usage differs from context to context, and goal to goal. The power of the idea of ‘race’ is in its ability to apply itself to anyone’s intentions with it. In Dalhousie’s case, ‘race’ is a strict means of governance, a term needed in order to do various things; whether it be to abide by laws, public perception, an adherence to an ethos, a means to revoke speech acts, or whatever goals for the future it has set up for itself. To put it bluntly, ‘race’ does a lot of things at Dalhousie, but we could not come to realize this if we had restricted ourselves to the kind of ‘history of race’ that Frederickson presents, if it were not for Foucault showing how ‘histories of race’ were not only meant to unearth subjugated knowledges, but are also arbitrary narratives meant to achieve particular ends. There are two things in particular that I would like for the reader to take from this overview of Foucault’s work; one, that ‘race’ is not a knowable object, and two, that ‘race’ is a means through which people are able to organize thought into something operational. However, the operationalizing of ‘race’ is a vastly different proposition that the use of ‘race’ to argue for certain recognitions, and this speaks to my earlier look at Foucault and how the very project of genealogy has the
potential to not only unearth ‘subjugated knowledges’, but to also create the conditions for these once forgotten ‘histories’ to become the ‘histories’ of the people.

As the revolutionary project in Europe began to gain influence and take over the political institutions at national levels away from monarchs, whose right to rule had been successfully proven to be ‘false’, the idea of ‘race’ soon came to change. As mentioned earlier, ‘race’ was a means of mobilizing perceived injustices to convince the ‘peoples’ of their ‘right’ to self-governance, or at the least governance that was not guided by the ruling monarchs who were proven to be unlawfully ruling on the principles of being the ancestors of previous conquerors. With the rise of European republic-nation-states in these areas formerly governed by a sole monarch, Foucault argues that ‘power’ comes under a new stress where we must understand its functioning in a world where monarchies are no longer seen as legitimate sites of government. Foucault calls this kind of understanding of power “economism” (Foucault, 2003, 13). “In the case of the classic juridical theory of power, power is regarded as a right which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity, and which can therefore be transferred or alienated, either completely or partly, through a juridical act or an act that founds a right [...] thanks to the surrender of something or thanks to a concept. Power is the concrete power that an individual can hold, and which he can surrender, either as a whole or in part, so as to constitute a power or a political sovereignty” (Foucault, 2003, 13). Foucault wishes to challenge the validity of this kind of understanding of ‘power’. “If power is exercised, what is the exercise of power? What does it consist of? What is its mechanism?”(Foucault, 2003, p. 15). Foucault believes
that amongst most analysis, it is believed that “[p]ower is essentially that which represses” (Foucault, 2003, p. 15).

It is at this point that we are able to see how it is that ‘race’ functions in an institutional setting, because it is the power of the idea of ‘race’ that allows it to work, allows it to mobilize, to address issues, solve problems; essentially, ‘race’ has power in that it is asked to do certain things, and these things can range. Simply taking the examples I have submitted so far, we can see that ‘race’ has been used to justify laws, justify scientific findings, it has been used to argue for ‘rights’, it has been used for mass-murder and it has been used to create unified communities, identities, resistances and subjectivities. When we ask, how does ‘race’ give all of these things the foundation, the footing, to justify certain actions, we are basically inquiring into the ‘power’ of ‘race’.

This understanding of ‘power’ vehemently refuses to accept the idea that ‘power’ represses in the same way that monarchies used to. At the base of this is the understanding of a new relationships between a state and its constituents; instead of the monarchical state, which emphasized death, the new state after the fall of monarchies and rise of republics, emphasizes life. Foucault says,

[…] I think that one of the greatest transformations political right underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that, I wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let live – was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. […] It is the power to “make” live and “let” die. The
right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die (Foucault, 2003, p. 241).

With this new right of the state to intervene at the level of the individual, to place itself as the one responsible for a life to be realized, protected and influenced, the state thus positions itself as the tool for achieving life’s potentials. That is one of the aspects of this new ‘power’ presented in the above quote. The other thing I wish the reader to take from the above quotation is Foucault’s hesitance to suggest a break with the past in any sort of absolute manner because, with ‘race’ as its tool, and life now being the ultimate site of the state’s protection, there comes along with this a new rationalism where, in order for some to live, other bodies must become the site for negation, and it is in this attempt to find the ‘negative’, or ‘dangerous’, population, that the old sovereign ‘right’ maintains its mighty presence as the decider of taking life or letting live. In order for the state to be seen as the protector of peoples, whom these peoples are protected against must be established. However, there is no need for anyone to be established. The principles promoted, the logics used and the technologies executed have all already been established in the build-up to displacing the monarchy, they simply had to be targeted differently. There is no break between the ideas of ‘race’ being used to organize revolution, and the ideas of ‘race’ to organize prejudice; they are one and the same, and this is where Foucault presents the idea of ‘state racism’.

Before venturing into ‘state racism’ and its function to establish an inner and outer population, one to be protected and the other eliminated, it is important that I
introduce Foucault’s concept of ‘biopolitics’. ‘Biopolitics’ is the technology, the apparatus, of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ converging to legitimate state intervention into the functioning of its designated subjects. Along with this new power, or logic, of intervening at the level of the individual, is a ‘scientific’ knowledge; a ‘biological’ knowledge of the human as species, as a site for ‘deficiencies’, ‘health’, ‘birth’, ‘psychological profiles’, and, most important for our purposes, ‘race’. This new technology,

[...] is addressed to a multiplicity of men (sic), not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on. [...] After the anatomo-politics of the human body established in the course of the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what I would call a “biopolitics” of the human race (Foucault, 2003, p. 243)

‘Biopolitics’ intervenes into the functions of ‘population’, a ‘population’ in need of protection through rationalities that suggest that certain steps, actions and institutional policies and resources can be used to maintain and realize a nation-state whose ‘ideals’ mirror ‘reality’. One means of achieving this end was through the creation of a ‘population’ that was deemed ‘dangerous’, ‘susceptible’, ‘interfering’, ‘unlawful’,
‘without legitimate claims to right’. These were the characteristics placed upon those
deemed ‘racially inferior’ through the burgeoning ‘sciences’ of eugenics and
evolutionism. In order for the people of a certain nation to reach its goals, and to which
the responsibility lied upon the state, it was thus seen as the job of the state to
intervene in eliminating the threat that the ‘racially inferior’ posed to the very survival,
and potential flourishing, of a nation’s ‘population’. Foucault would term this new
technology, ‘state racism’.

Though it was not using this term, ‘state racism’ was broached earlier in our
discussion of Frederickson, who discussed aspects of this technology in the buildup to
the atrocities of Nazi Germany, Jim Crow southern United States and apartheid South
Africa. For Frederickson, the ‘racist’ logics behind these events was rather simple; a new
‘biological’ discourse surfaced that gave the argument that humans, like animals or
plants, could be categorically separated and, more or less, hierarchized. Along with this
was a political dimension that some might call ‘scapegoat’ theory, which is something
Foucault could be accused of utilizing in a glancery consideration of his look at ‘race’.

At this point, the racist thematic is no longer a moment in the struggle between
one social group and the other; it will promote the global strategy of social
conservatism. At this point – and this a paradox, given the goals and the first
form of the discourse I have been talking about – we see the appearance of a
State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own
elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent
purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization (Foucault, 2003, p.62, emphasis my own).

Ann Laura Stoler, however, believes that it would be a mistake to think that Foucault’s idea of ‘state racism’ should be taken as though it were a significant development. As I said above, there is little difference between this idea of ‘state racism’ and the kind of celebration of ‘race’ and its ability to organize mass political mobilizations. “Foucault’s concern is not the changing meaning of race, but the particular discourses of power with which it articulates and in which it is reconceived. [...] what occupies Foucault are the processes of recuperation, of the distillation of earlier discursive imprints, remodeled in new forms (Stoler, 1995, p. 68). Stoler also recognizes Foucault’s more distinctive understandings of how ‘race’ was taken up in ‘state racism’;

[...] racism, in its nineteenth-century elaboration is not consolidated in biological science, but more directly in the biologizing power of the normalizing state. This is a crucial distinction. The biologizing of race is not a nineteenth-century invention [...], but part of an emergent biopower two centuries earlier. Nineteenth-century science may have legitimated racial classifications as many have claimed, but it does so by drawing on an earlier lexicon, on that of the struggle of races (Stoler, 1995, p. 68).
In recognizing this, we must brush aside all attempts to create breaks between the
‘ethno-cultural’ prejudices Frederickson, Appiah, Whitmarsh and Jones recognize as ‘not
really racist’, and the idea that the ‘true’ racism of nineteenth-century eugenics was
some watershed moment where everything before and after has changed completely.
For my project, ‘diversity’ is another technique utilizing the idea of ‘race’ for particular
ends.
Section 2: ‘Diversity’

“Dalhousie has committed itself to fostering a collegial culture grounded in diversity and inclusiveness (Priority 5.2).”

“Diversity is Canada’s strength.”
- Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, November 26th, 2015 (http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/11/26/diversity-canadas-strength)

This section will be noticeably shorter than the previous one on ‘race’. Here, I will be fleshing out this idea of ‘diversity’, which I argue, like other technologies, some of which have been discussed above, has taken the ideas of ‘race’ in hopes of achieving particular outcomes. Before proceeding, I would like to address the reality that ‘diversity’ has come to encapsulate more than the idea of ‘race’. When ‘diversity’ is discussed, some may think that it is referring to issues of ‘gender’, ‘sexuality’, ‘ability’, ‘age’, ‘class’, ‘nationality’, ‘religion’ or ‘race’ and that’s because it very much is. However, I am only speaking about the ways in which ‘race’ gets taken up in discussions regarding ‘diversity’ and can only hope that this may provide perhaps some sort of help
in considering how these other identity markers can get taken up in ‘diversity’, but that is not my job here; I am only concerned with ‘race’.

‘Diversity’ is a ‘technology’ in that it has ‘goals’, it has ‘methods’, it has ‘powers’, and it has ‘knowledges’, amongst other things of course. In order to develop an understanding of ‘diversity’ and its inner-workings, I will be continuing to look at Stoler, who I introduced towards the end of the last section, Jonathan J. F. Day and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks. The insight these three author’s provide in revealing aspects in the relationship between ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ is varied and, yet, cohesive. Through various methods, each author discusses the idea of ‘race’ as a means of governance and knowledge creation. Using the principles of Foucault’s genealogical method, Stoler looks at how ‘race’ during the 19th century was more based upon relationships of colonialism than Foucault gave it credit for, and Day looks at how a colonial context, such as the one in Canada, gave rise to forms of governance that used ‘race’ as a means of nation-building that were remarkably different from the ones in Europe that I discussed above with regards to Foucault and Frederickson. To say the least, ‘physically eliminating the racially inferior’ was a much harder sell in colonized Canada, meaning much more sophisticated means of governance needed to be proposed. Seshadri-Crooks’ work may seem as somewhat of an outlier given the previous authors discussed due to her decidedly ‘Lacanian’ methods. However, Seshadri-Crooks’ look at the desire of ‘racelessness’ would be sorely missed given the author’s success at analyzing the desire of transcending ‘race’, a goal that simultaneously gives ‘diversity’ its reason to exist, as well as a reference for how ‘race’ should be problematized. . In terms of their
engagement with the idea of ‘diversity’, these authors somewhat differ; Day is directly concerned with ‘diversity’ in the Canadian colonial context, while Stoler is more concerned with the Dutch Indies during the nineteenth-century, and Seshadri-Crooks occupies herself with literature from the early-20th century to support her analysis. I will show, however, that when we consider these authors together, and include these insights into a consideration of ‘diversity’, each author has something important to contribute. All in all, the goal of this section is to develop ‘diversity’ as a technique of governance. As opposed to the discussion from before regarding ‘race’ and the logics that inform it, I argue that ‘diversity’, though informed by ‘race’, is something different; ‘race’ serves purposes and ‘diversity’, like the projects using ‘race’ before it, uses ‘race’ to achieve particular ends.

Stoler’s look at Dutch colonialism reveals a particular brand of ‘racing’ often not considered; the ‘racing’ of the oppressor. This kind of Hegelian proposition should be concerning to most; the suggestion that one is also hindered similarly to the one they hold prejudice against or enslave for labour is an idea that should not be taken lightly. However, what Stoler shows is that a concern for the ‘elimination’ of the ‘racially dangerous’ in Europe was not only fueled by fear, but a wish to reaffirm and strengthen certain class aesthetics, leading not only to the persecution of the ‘racially Othered’, but also the persecution of the ‘non-true’ Dutch citizen, a sentiment that often disregarded ‘lineage’ and ‘genes’, in order to forward efforts at normalizing certain class consciousnesses. The fear was as much ‘biological’ as it was ‘cultural’, and while the body was seen as ‘biologically’ porous, the ‘cultural’ component of this nationalist project was
perhaps even more so. Stoler’s observation that once ‘race’ gets used it ‘races’ everyone is interesting, but does such a thing occur when it is used by ‘diversity’? I argue that there are similarities when we consider that one *logoi* informing ‘diversity’ is the logic that all are equal in that all are different, and much of this section will be looking over the possibilities and limits of this idea.

For Day, ‘diversity’ has been taken up in Canadian politics since its colonization by British and French settlers. From the outset, Day shows that an idea of ‘diversity’ has been developing for centuries in the Canadian context, it being a popular tool to achieve the ‘assimilation’ of the Other into Canadian ‘culture’. This aspect of ‘diversity’ still retains some of its potency today. By using ‘race’, ‘diversity’ is trying to govern its expressions and experiences through a series of attempts at trying to understand how ‘raced’ persons express and experience ‘race’. By doing so, ‘diversity’ policies are effectively reducing the ideas surrounding ‘race’ to ‘easy-to-use’ and ‘easy-to-implement’ understandings that will allow some sort of measurement of ‘race’ that is somewhat tangible and applicable to policy statements. Any sort of attempt to understand the complexity of ‘race’, its use as an identifier, and the history leading us to the current circumstances, is pushed aside in favour of understandings of ‘race’ that can be easily applied. The idea of ‘race’ is thus ‘assimilated’ into an understanding that fits institutional goals and procedures and I want to point out that this is a starkly different proposition than the idea that ‘people’ are assimilated, a slippery slope Day can often times overlook. I am not proposing that students at Dal are assimilated in any sort of psychologically-concrete manner, but that the idea of ‘race’ that a student might wish to
use to express their feelings or experiences has been assimilated, controlled, limited, into a discursive network that normalizes it and flattens it into something manageable, and that this discourse is called, oddly, ‘diversity’.

Seshadri-Crooks’ argument revolves around the idea of ‘desiring whiteness’.

What Seshadri-Crooks means by ‘whiteness’ is not its ‘racial’ connotation, but, instead, the desire to transcend ‘race’, to become blank, unmarked. This text allows me to broach the idea of ‘racelessness’, or ‘colour blindness’, which is the idealist positioning that one does not see colour, or sees colour, but does not infer anything on to it, whether it be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ presumptions. Seshadri-Crooks looks at this idea of ‘desiring whiteness’ as an impossibility if we are to continue to privilege the ‘visual’, the ability to discern reality upon the factuality of what we see. This look at the impossibility of ‘racelessness’ is interesting in the context of ‘diversity’ which seems to suggest that an overabundance of ‘race’ will lead to the eventual conclusion of ‘racelessness’.

However, it is not through the acknowledgement of ‘race’ and its particularities that ‘diversity’ understands ‘race’. In order to achieve the goal of having ‘race’ be as non-disruptive as possible in the respective institution, ‘diversity’ attempts to reduce ‘race’ to the seeable and understandable. Basically, the use of ‘race’ by ‘diversity’ policies is not an attempt at recognizing everyone as ‘racially’ distinctive, in that each and every person has their own understanding and relationship with the idea of ‘race’ and how it pertains to their own understandings and identities (such an understanding of ‘race’ is inherently unmanageable), but instead presents ‘race’ as something we all have in common, and that these commonalities allow students to transcend differences to
become a functioning, and manageable, population whose commonalities reside in their differences, so long as those differences are seen as not particular, but generalizable and governable.

Ann Laura Stoler is not as pre-occupied with the ‘biological’ as was Foucault. Instead, the author of *Race and the Education of Desire* (1995) takes a look at ‘race’ and how it was used to promote and disparage certain cultural and class aesthetics.

“Degeneracy characterized those who were seen to veer off bourgeois course in their choice of language, domestic arrangement, and cultural affiliations (Stoler, 1995, p. 32). Stoler’s argument takes Foucault’s look at ‘race’ to consider aspects of this discourse and how it relied upon knowledges and power-relationships far outside of Europe, the domain in which Foucault has kept most of his works. Stoler challenges Foucault’s non-consideration of the role of colonialism upon the ‘race’ discourses that were proliferating in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. Wonderfully stated, Stoler deserves to be quoted at length:

When we turn to the nineteenth century anxieties around Eurasians, Indos and mestizos, the colonial entailments of these discourses become clear. These were not only groups seen as ‘mixed’ by blood. They were the “enemy within”, those who might transgress the “interior frontiers” of the nation-state […]. Science and medicine may have fueled the re-emergence of the beliefs in blood, but so did nationalist discourse in which a folk theory of contamination based on cultural contagions, not biological taintings, distinguished true members of the body
politic from those who were not. These folk theories of race were derived from
how empire was experienced in Europe. They were disseminated through an
imperial logic in which cultural hybridities be seen as subversive and subversion
was contagious (Stoler, 1995, p. 52).

There is much to go through in this above quote. Firstly, there is the point that Stoler
does not see the uses of ‘biologicisms’ and ‘cultures’ to support nationalist projects as
separable due to their reliance on similar ideas and terms, such as ‘mixing’. It is more so
like they bleed into one another, to be used when the situation deems it necessary.
Stoler is also presenting an expansion of the terrestrial scope of the nationalist projects
in Europe during the time, involving the experience of ‘imperial expansion’ into the
development of ‘state racism’, which is something that Foucault never did, though he
certainly recognized its potential;

It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its
political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other
continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of
power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions and techniques of
power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the
result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an
internal colonialism, on itself (Foucault, 2003, p. 103).
Simply put, Stoler took Foucault’s brief and unexplored aside during his 1976 lectures at the Collège de France and ran with it, not only expanding on Foucault’s observations, but straining them to their limits and improving on them.

Stoler focuses on the Dutch colonization of the Indies to show how the prospect of ‘mixed’ cultures stirred up nationalist anxieties and how these anxieties led to the use of ‘race’ as a means of justifying certain state interventions into their colonial populations, particularly the Dutch who were born outside of, or who resided for lengthy amounts of time away from, the homeland. Stoler cites several authors from the 19th century who were using ideas of ‘race’ and ‘culture’ to argue for a new understanding of how colonialism had the potential to ruin the purity of the Dutch, but for the sake of time, I wish to only highlight one example from Stoler’s work that can help develop our understanding of how ‘race’ becomes taken up by techniques like ‘diversity’, as a means of setting a ‘grid of intelligibility’ that legitimizes institutional interventions and governances. This example also continues to develop Stoler’s look at how ‘race’ refers both to ‘cultural’ and ‘biological’ knowledges. In citing R.L. Witter and Dr. J. Kohlbrugge, Stoler introduces a term that was often used to express the potential turmoil of a bourgeois class unprotected; the *inlandsche kinderen*. This term refers to populations of children born outside of Holland, in colonies such as Java, but were becoming increasingly seen by the state as uncontrollable sites for ‘racial transgressions’. “It identified an ambiguous, hybrid population of those who were neither endowed with the class background nor cultural accoutrements that could count them as truly European and fit to rule […]” (Stoler, 1995, p. 106). This example highlights
certain ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ techniques used for realizing a population that adheres to the cultural, and biological, ideals of the Dutch bourgeois.

Utilizing an understanding of ‘power’ discussed earlier in regards to Foucault, Stoler refuses to simply look at the efforts to bar any attempts at ‘mixing’, be it either in the space of ‘blood’ or ‘culture’, as the sole means of achieving a ‘pure’ Dutch population, but also highlights that this ‘nationalist’ discourse is incentivizing certain behaviours. This is a major methodological philosophy in any work trying to use Foucault’s formulation of ‘power’ to understand the inner-workings of discourses. Technologies like ‘diversity’ and ‘nationalism’ are not wholly ‘negative’ or ‘positive’, but utilize all aspects of ‘power’ afforded them. For our purposes then, ‘diversity’ is not using ‘race’ as a means of solely banning behaviours, but, along with this, is also incentivizing behaviours. This leads to another important point on ‘diversity’ and its use of ‘race’; ‘diversity’ is not repressing ‘race’ in an attempt to achieve its goals, though it may seem as such. This will be further explored in the next chapter, but it should be said here that ‘diversity’ and its attempt at creating a space of ‘equality’ by eliminating tensions that may be ‘racially’ based are not repressing ‘race’. Instead, and perhaps contradictory of its intent, ‘diversity’ is proliferating the idea of ‘race’ and is opening up an avenue for ‘power’ to be directed from multiple outside sites, be it student unions, ‘race’ activists, ‘racists’ or other institutions, who are also using the ‘power’ of ‘race’ to forward their own arguments. That is not to say, however, that ‘diversity’ has not influenced the ways we speak about ‘race’, but that will be explored further in our
discussion regarding Dalhousie and its use of ‘diversity’ to influence its spaces. For now, I would like to restate what Stoler reveals in her work.

The use of ‘race’ by nationalists has always been just as much concerned with the idea of ‘culture’ as it was with ‘biology’ or ‘blood’. An anthropology of the contemporary should not discount any of the ways ‘race’ has been used to justify certain futures, either in the past or the present. Stoler’s work shows how important the idea of ‘cultural contagions’ were to the development of bourgeois identity during the nineteenth century. The significance of ‘culture’ in informing our ideas of ‘race’ today has not been lost. Stoler’s work also reveals the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ techniques involved in a technology that utilizes the ‘power’ of ‘race’ to achieve certain ends. From here, I would like to look at Day’s work, *Multiculturalism and the History of Diversity in Canada*, to further develop the ways we can look at ‘race’ and its use in technologies like ‘nationalism’ and ‘diversity’, but to also localize it inside the Canadian context.

Day traces a complex and long history between Hellenist philosophy and the continued stress on Canadian ‘diversity’ as a ‘nationalist’ project still being used today, as can be seen in the quote of Trudeau’s speech presented at the beginning of this section. For my purposes, I would like to briefly focus on one particular aspect of Day’s look at ‘diversity’ in Canada; its problematization. In formulating how it is that ‘diversity’ becomes problematized, Day begins his inquiry looking at the methods of Herodotus, particularly what Day calls the ‘law of individual-group identification’. “This law lets the one stand for the many, and vice versa, and thereby allows the inquirer to know and describe that most useful of abstraction, ‘the people’” (Day, p. 50, 2000). The usefulness
of this idea of ‘the people’ cannot be understated when it comes to ‘diversity’. Day continues,

The use of stereotypical, reductionist formulas to describe peoples and all individuals considered to be ‘of’ these peoples was correlated in Herodotus, and in later formations of the European discourse on diversity, with a tendency to freeze these forms, to grant them a certain imperviousness to the ravages of time and change (Day, 2000, p. 51).

Going back to Foucault, such a method of observation was crucial in the development of nationalist projects and biopolitics.

What we are dealing with in this new technology of power is not exactly society, nor is it the individual-as-body. It is a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they may not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem (Foucault, 2003, p. 245).

When discussing ‘diversity’, these two technologies come together in that ‘diversity’ is addressing the ‘population’ as the problem, and ‘race’ as a problem within that ‘population’, whereby the idea of ‘race’ is also constituting certain borders for the sake
of differentiation. These are crucial aspects of ‘diversity’ that must be understood because, without these, ‘diversity’ could not possibly ever make any logical sense.

So, why is ‘diversity’ a problem? According to Trudeau, it is not. However, Day sees this as an inherently contradictory position.

Canadian multiculturalism appears as neither a generous gift of liberal democracy, nor a divisive practice threatening to destroy the enjoyment of Canadianess for all. Rather, it is a reproduction of an ethnocultural economy which takes as its raw material the ‘objective contents’ of Canadian diversity and hopes to produce out of it a simulacrum of Canadian unity. The reality of Canadian diversity is symbiotically dependent upon this fantasy of unity – without it, a diversity simply could not exist, and certainly could not be a problem (Day, 2000, p. 9).

‘Diversity’ in Canada is presented as ‘fact’ and it does so through a logic drawing upon observations of ‘difference’ that are supported by the reductionist methods mentioned in reference to Herodotus. It is not so much that ‘difference’ is assumed so much as ‘difference’ is assumed through an abidance to particular discourses. To put it in terms presented previously here then, ‘race’ is a problem because it creates ‘differences’, be they historical, cultural, biological or what have you. This, however, is not the issue. The issue is that these ‘differences’ become assumed, uncriticized, and ‘taken for granted’ by their uptake in a discussion of ‘diversity’ or ‘multiculturalism’. It continues to
promote the acceptance of an ‘inherent difference’ that cannot be overcome. Thus, ‘diversity’ is simultaneously ‘realized’ as both incontrovertible ‘fact’ and ‘problem’, the solution of which is already within itself. The problem of ‘diversity’ is thus solved in recognizing ‘diversity’. What this does is flatten the particularities of ‘race’ into manageable pieces that can be addressed by something like ‘diversity’ policy. For Day, this was a crucial moment for arguments that not only suggested a ‘Canadian identity’, but that the ideals of this ‘Canadian identity’ had to be protected. Day writes that ‘diversity’ or ‘multiculturalism’ assume certain ‘realities’:

(1) Canadian diversity is seen as a natural-historical, objective fact, resulting from innate difference in human types based on race, culture, ethnicity, geography, and climate; (2) this diversity is thought to represent a public problem meriting state intervention, or a series of rational bureaucratic acts; (3) inasmuch as the fact of multiculturalism is conflated with the act, the problem of Canadian diversity is thought to contain its own solution, to be in the process of solving itself, or achieving its own ideal (Day, 2000, p. 44, emphases original)

This analysis of the problematization of ‘diversity’ is useful for this project’s purposes because it fleshes out an important aspect of how Dalhousie, as a Canadian institution, understands its particular issues with ‘diversity’ in a national context. Similarities can certainly be seen in the respective attempts at understanding ‘diversity’ at the level of the nation and the level of Dalhousie as a Canadian institution. There are
some differences, however. For example, the goals for ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie are much different than the ones at the national level, but this discussion is something that will be considered in more depth in the next section dealing with ‘diversity’ as it is explicitly used at Dalhousie. What I wish the reader to take from Day for now is how ‘diversity’ in Canada makes lofty assumptions about the validity of the ways we rationalize ‘difference’, how this logic of ‘difference’ relies upon particular discourses, like the one on ‘race’ discussed in the previous section, and how ‘difference’ is made governable by making it generalizably applicable to an entire ‘population’, and is used to coincide with institutional goals; ‘difference’ becomes ‘normalized’ in the technology of ‘diversity’.

Before moving onto the next chapter, this space will be devoted to a discussion regarding Seshadri-Crooks’ idea of the ‘desire of whiteness’. The argument is an interesting one that considers several pieces of media to flesh out how it is that we understand the terms and conditions ‘race’ has set for us as we attempt to create identities. Seshadri-Crooks’ project is, admittedly, a little too concerned with ‘race’ as an identity, as opposed to my look at ‘race’ as ‘political power’, but there are persuasive moments in Seshadri-Crooks’ project that give some depth to the ideas ‘diversity’ uses to convince us of its purpose and goals, such as the ‘desire of Whiteness’. Seshadri-Crooks summarizes her argument as such:

Race is a regime of visibility that secures our investment in racial identity. We make such an investment because the unconscious signifier Whiteness, which founds the logic of racial difference, promises wholeness. (This is what it means
to desire Whiteness: not a desire to become Caucasian [!] but, to put it redundantly, it is an “insatiable desire” on the part of all raced subjects to overcome difference.) Whiteness attempts to signify being, or that aspect of the subject which escapes language. Obviously, such a project is impossible because Whiteness is a historical and cultural invention. However, what guarantees Whiteness its place as a master signifier is visual difference. The phenotype secures our belief in racial difference, thereby perpetuating our desire for Whiteness (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 21).

It is a provocative argument and I think it would be worth our brief while to consider this statement in terms of how it fits with my project.

I have presented ‘diversity’ as an attempt to use ‘race’ as a means of governance by assuming its validity, and by reducing its particularities and complexities so as to make it manageable. This should not be mistaken as the ‘repression’ of ‘race’, however. It is very much the opposite. ‘Diversity’ is constantly renegotiating the ways in which it is using ‘race’ because the idea of ‘race’ is not its own. With that being said, when Dalhousie uses ‘diversity’ to address ‘race’, it is moulding it to the specifics of what the institution believes its goals are and what it believes are good methods. As a hypothetical, if someone wishes to alter the ways in which a certain ‘race’ is being treated on campus at Dalhousie, the recommendation must use the idea of ‘race’ in a manner that conforms to ‘diversity’; if the recommendation is to make sense, its goals must match those of ‘diversity’ policies, and its methods of speaking about ‘race’ must
match as well. Paradoxically, ‘diversity’ is using the idea of ‘race’ to suggest that we are all the same in that we all value the same ideals and are all motivated towards the same goals, something discussed previously in regards to Day and how ‘multiculturalism’ serves a nationalist project of unity, or wholeness. This wholeness is something Seshadri-Crooks touched upon in the above quote and it is an important aspect of ‘diversity’ policy, which argues for the expressions of difference so long as it conforms to the ideals put forth. Your ‘difference’ must serve the ‘greater good’.

Another important point in this argument is the reliance upon the visual as the ultimate means of understanding. There is something striking in the way that Seshadri-Crooks suggests the impossibility of fully unlearning the effects of ‘race’, while not relying on similar arguments presented above. Seshadri-Crooks places the ‘visual’ right in the middle of it, and this placing of the ‘visual’, our own very sight, into an almost ontological discussion, brilliantly reaffirms many of the things I have discussed so far in regards to Herodotus and the prioritizing of ‘scientific’ knowledge, and how the ‘visual’ took part in creating something as powerful as ‘race’. ‘Diversity’ policy reaffirms our reliance, and belief in, the ‘visual’ in that it relies heavily on the perception of ‘difference’. Consider your typical ‘diversity’ pamphlet and the picture of a collection of bodies with varying skin tones and features, suggesting a moment of simultaneous clashing (based upon supposedly innate bio-cultural differences and opposing historical allegiances) and harmony (these people occupy the same space and are enjoying each other’s company). If we are to believe ‘diversity’ pamphlets, it seems as though we already have transcended the marks of ‘race’ that Seshadri-Crooks speaks of, and have
achieved ‘wholeness’, ‘Whiteness’, ‘unity’. In looking at Dalhousie and its use of ‘race’ in ‘diversity’ policy, we will see that the situation is far more complex than this.
Chapter 3: Diversity & Race at Dalhousie

It was the beginning of the winter term at Dalhousie in 2013, my final term at Dalhousie as an undergraduate student. I realized while walking to the first session of a class on Atlantic Canada that a fellow Honours student was sitting in the front row of the class and I decided to join him. We were both from rural, working class, Atlantic Canada and were discussing how weird it was going to be to discuss, in general terms, something that we had such a complex, up-and-down relationship with. We broke our discussion as the professor walked in and began his introductory lecture by suggesting we look at the mapping of Atlantic Canada. The first image of the map was your widely-recognized European-striated fare. The borders of lands recognized as New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Foundland & Labrador were all present. After a brief discussion regarding the land as it was presented in this map, the professor asked if whether or not there were different ways in which the land could be interpreted, if there were borders we were not recognizing or acknowledging.

The Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie is quite small. All the professors and students in the Honours program get to know each other’s faces quite well, if not one another’s particular research interests and basic biography. After asking this question regarding the map of Atlantic Canada, the professor looked at my friend and me. I took this as a recognition that the professor knew that we were both from Atlantic Canada and that we were the only people in the class that they knew
such a detail of. However, there was something else lingering underneath all of this. I looked over to my left, to my fellow Honours student, and was quick to realize there was something very particular occurring, something that I had often heard about, but never thought would be something I would see so close up, or be in the midst of watching unfold. My friend did not wish to raise his hand, despite the clear pressure to do so. As soon as the discussion moved on, and someone else had recognized that the map had not represented the borders of the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet and Métis peoples, my friend grabbed my attention and said, “I didn’t want to be that guy. I’m always that guy.” What my friend was talking about was the expectation placed upon him, as a person from an indigenous nation (I choose not to specify the nation, despite the risk of perpetuating the idea that all ‘indigenous’ peoples can be grouped under such an umbrella term). What my friend was drawing attention to was the feeling of constantly being called upon to represent this group in a classroom setting; to be the one to speak up, to impart with his wisdom, his knowledge, of what it is to be ‘indigenous’. My fellow Honours student at the time was assumed to inherently possess a certain quality based upon on his ‘racial’ identity.

* * * *

This chapter will be focusing on developing how ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ are thought about at Dalhousie University. In order to accomplish this, I will be looking at Dalhousie’s widely accessible press releases and policies regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’. These documents are what Rabinow considers “serious speech acts” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 20) and they display a particular line of thought. The ways in which ‘diversity’ and ‘race’
interact at Dalhousie is complex. Each one relies on the other to support itself. Without ‘race’, ‘diversity’ initiatives could never make sense or achieve its goals because ‘diversity’ is inherently dependent upon the notion of ‘difference’, and ‘race’ is a means by which ‘difference’ is constituted. Vice versa, the influence of ‘diversity’ upon the problematizing of ‘race’ is significant in its ability to reaffirm the fact of ‘race’ without resorting to the ‘negative’ or ‘hindering’ aspects similar to those spoken of before.

Through ‘diversity’, ‘race’ is given new ‘power’ properties, if you will, in that its usefulness has broadened to not only include its use as a means of bordering, but also as a means of ‘including’ (though it certainly relies upon its history of non-inclusion for its ‘power’). Here, I will work through an understanding of the relationship between these two throughout this chapter. This chapter will also present answers to questions brought up throughout the paper thus far. This chapter will show how ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ are ‘problematized’, thought of as issues in need of addressing and remedies.

In several ways, ‘diversity’ at Dal is similar to the kind of history Day presented at the end of Chapter 2, wherein ‘diversity’ is both ‘fact’ and ‘problem’, with the ‘solution’ being argued as the ‘diversity’ itself. If that is hard to make sense of, that is the point. Sara Ahmed, in her ethnography, *On Being Included*, summarizes this point incisively when she interviews ‘diversity’ workers, people at universities whose job is to create and maintain a ‘diverse’ campus. “The diversity worker has a job because diversity and equality are not already given; this obvious fact has some less obvious consequences. When your task is to remove the necessity of your existence, then your existence is necessary for the task” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 23). The job of the ‘diversity’ worker is, then,
to achieve a space where their job is no longer needed, as well as the very existence of the job itself being constitutive of the goal being striven for. Plenty of moments will be shown to exhibit how Dalhousie simultaneously sees itself as both having and lacking ‘diversity’.

After looking at how Dalhousie understands the problems of ‘diversity’ and ‘race’, I will explore how it is that Dalhousie uses ‘diversity’ as a technique of governance, as a set of technologies meant to interrupt, manipulate and control the ‘power of race’ so as to achieve particular ends (‘meant’ is a keyword in this phrase). Without ‘race’, much of what Dalhousie is proposing in regards to creating a productive and worthwhile experience and environment for its students, would not make much sense. Dalhousie relies on ‘race’ to make sense of itself, to understand its situations, as well as to develop and promote initiatives that ameliorate certain unwanted conditions. The technique of ‘diversity’ is not to eliminate ‘race’, or to create a situation of ‘racelessness’. It is the complete opposite. ‘Diversity’ is presented as a celebration of ‘difference’ and much of this ‘difference’ is reliant upon the notion that inherent in ‘race’ are differences; though the character of those ‘differences’ are far from the ones seen in past examples of ‘racial purity’ and the like, and is more so the belief in the idea that people of different ‘races’ have different socio-cultural experiences, histories and understandings. What begins to develop out of this, however, is a new discursive arena in which feelings like the one above with my Honours friend, begin to emerge. My friend’s difference is also his gift. This student is a part of the ‘diversity’ Dalhousie promotes, and he is seen as having his part to play in the achieving of a ‘diverse’
Dalhousie. The students’ race becomes seen as a quality to be shared for the enrichment of the Dalhousie community.

After discussing the suggested remedies to the problem of ‘diversity’ and ‘race’ at Dalhousie, I will be looking at exactly what is that Dalhousie wishes to achieve with its ‘diversity’ policies. ‘Diversity’ has several goals, one of which (achieving a ‘diverse’ campus) has already been mentioned. I will not be focusing on this aspect of ‘diversity’ policy. I will be looking at how it is that ‘diversity’ is used as a means of promoting and creating a particular student, what I would like to call the ‘ideal’ student. The experience of ‘diversity’ at Dalhousie is of significant import for the Dalhousie student. The particular student Dalhousie wants to create has very specific qualities; they are worldly, able to compete in a global labour economy, able to adapt, have certain beliefs and ethics. ‘Diversity’ is a means through which students are able to be etched with these values and characteristics. The Dalhousie student is also idealized as a means of achieving what Dalhousie calls a ‘reputation’. Dalhousie’s ‘reputation’ has become a growing concern for the institution and it has developed techniques to understand the ‘student’, techniques that subjectivize the student as an area of intervention for its idealization, as a vessel for Dalhousie’s ethics, as well as a site for objectification, a ‘population’ that can be understood anthropologically (there are, of course, various means of understanding a ‘population’, such as ‘statistics’, ‘psychology’, and ‘history’, to name just a few). Many of the techniques Dalhousie uses to subjectivize and objectivize its ‘student population’ lends its methods to the idea of anthropos, the person of culture. Before proceeding with my argument regarding Dalhousie and its usage of
‘race’ and ‘diversity’ as tools for governance, I would like to do a little housekeeping in regards to methods, particularly the ideas of ‘serious speech acts’ and ‘problematization’.

What my project intends to do here is to observe and analyze these ‘problematizations’, or, put in a way that harkens back to my introduction, what I am doing here is ‘second-order observation’. Seeing a problem, however, is far different from ‘problematization’. In discussing Foucault, Rabinow presents the late, French scholar as becoming progressively concerned with the act of ‘thinking’. For Foucault, thought proceeds from ‘problematization’. The basic idea behind ‘problematization’ is the posing of a question based upon perceived difficulties. “It is not thinking per se that makes an object available for thought. ‘In effect, in order for a domain of action to enter into the field of thought, it is necessary that a certain number of factors have made it uncertain, have made it lose its familiarity, or have produced around it a certain number of difficulties’” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 47, quoting Foucault). Thus, drawing upon the example Foucault provided previously in his discussion regarding ‘race wars’, in 18th and 19th century Europe, there arose a problem of ‘rights’. The ability for a select few to be so influential in the governance of so much land and persons, was deemed problematic. Questions were then asked such as: Who, then, should be seen as the rightful people to govern the land? Why is this even a problem to begin with? The answer to these questions was a complex mixture of ‘race’ and ‘history’. Reasons given for why the monarchs should not govern is because they are, for one, ancestors of brutal conquerors who were seen as neglecting their obligation to the people they conquered,
and are ‘racially’, not only the numerical minority, but inferior. As a result of these answers, new questions are posed, ad infinitum. Given this example, we can see another crucial aspect of Foucault’s overall methodology, where ‘problems’ and their ‘problematization’ are always in reference to, and always influencing other, same such ‘problems’ and ‘problematizations’. This is an important point when I come to discuss Dalhousie and its recent project to analyze the involvement of Lord Dalhousie, from whom it gains its namesake, and his involvement in perpetuating ‘racism’ and being involved in the transatlantic slave trade. But, for now, in light of this understanding of ‘problematization’, I would like to move onto the idea of an ‘apparatus’.

An ‘apparatus’ in this context is “‘a resolutely heterogenous grouping comprising discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements’” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 51; quoting Foucault). This defining of the apparatus of Foucault should be considered alongside a later elaboration on the idea, one that does not necessarily change these core characteristics, but adds to it the significance of an apparatus’ flexibility. “‘The apparatus is fundamentally of a strategic nature. [...] It is always inscribed in a play of power, but it is always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge’” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 53, quoting Foucault). When the former is
taken with the latter, Foucault’s idea of the ‘apparatus’ allows us a little bit more room to maneuver. Taken all together, Foucault concisely explains that an ‘apparatus’ is the means of legitimating “an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (Foucault, 1982, 789).

The means through which we can establish ‘problematizations’ and ‘apparatuses’ appearing in institutional settings is through a novel, yet simple, consideration of what Rabinow calls ‘serious speech acts’. Foucault, in developing a new means of understanding ‘power relationships’, made it clear that he was opposed to the means of analysis that his contemporaries were using, which is to try and find the ‘truth’ in official, State correspondence.

My goal was not to analyze power at the level of intentions or decisions, not to try to approach it from inside, and not to ask the question [...] : So who has power? What is going in his (sic) head [...]? The goal was, on the contrary to study power at the point where his (sic) intentions – if, that is, any intention is involved – are completely invested in real and effective practices; to study power by looking, as it were, at its external face, at the point where it relates directly and immediately to what we might, very provisionally, call its object, its target, its field of application, or, in other words, the place where it implants itself and produces its real effects (Foucault, 2003, p. 28).
Rabinow takes this methodological choice and develops the idea of the ‘serious speech act’, a term first introduced by him, alongside Hubert Dreyfuss, in their book *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). The idea is fairly simple; relationships of ‘power’ can be analyzed through documents and speech endorsed by institutions when they are taken at face-value. Rabinow says,

[...] Foucault requires that the situation in question contain institutionally legitimated claims to truth or one or another type of sanctioned seriousness; Dreyfus and I called them “serious speech acts.” Without the presence of serious speech acts, there is no problematization in the strict sense of the term, although obviously there could be problems (Rabinow, 2003, p. 20).

Rabinow later develops this idea and how it stood compared to Foucault’s contemporaries, while also relating it to the idea of ‘culture’.

He was not doing what many French historians and anthropologists were doing at the time, and continue to do, that is, the analysis of the underlying system of codes that shapes a culture’s thought and behavior. He was neither analyzing culture as a total system (whether of signs or exchanges) nor exploring how such a system impacted lived experience (Rabinow, 2003, p. 46).
This last quote from Rabinow is important in not only developing the idea of ‘serious speech acts’ and what their intended purposes are, but also as a means for me to introduce what informs Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policy and its understanding of ‘race’. I will be developing this point later on, but for now I would like to say that Dalhousie takes part in this kind of logic when it comes to ‘race’ as stemming from a ‘cultural truth’, an expression, or perhaps a mark, but at the very least a presence, of an underlying ‘cultural code’ that is not only influencing the ways in which students experience ‘race’ on campus, but also as something that can be understood, an object for consideration, analysis, and ultimately, as a means to achieve the goals of not only a particular environment, but also the creation of a ‘student’ who is “grounded in the principles of diversity and inclusiveness” ([*An Update on Diversity and Inclusiveness at Dalhousie*]).

In summation, what follows from here is a look at Dalhousie and how it problematizes ‘race’ and ‘diversity’. I will show that ‘race’ poses a ‘problem’ at Dalhousie that is understood in terms of being both ‘historical’ and ‘cultural’. Meanwhile, ‘diversity’ is seen as a potential remedy to certain experiences of ‘race’, such as its potential to be used as discriminatory or biased. However, ‘diversity’ in and of itself is an issue, given its particularly binary framing; as either ‘lacking’ or ‘fulfilled’. Given these ‘problematizations’, I then develop an understanding of ‘diversity’ as an ‘apparatus’ that draws on ‘race’ discourse (among other things as well) to legitimate itself. Both of these arguments will be supported almost exclusively from documents
distributed by Dalhousie. I will be looking at 2014’s *belong* (sic): *Supporting an Inclusive and Diverse University*, 2015’s *An Update on Diversity and Inclusiveness at Dalhousie*, *Report on the Task Force on Misogyny, Sexism and Homophobia in Dalhousie University Faculty of Dentistry*, *A Report from the Committee on Aboriginal and Black/African Canadian Student Access and Retention: A Focus on Financial support* and 2016’s *Dalhousie University Strategic Direction 2014-2018: Year 2 Progress Report, June 2016*. I will be drawing on various other resources, such as news released from Dalhousie’s official website, Dal News, or any other documents that were released through Dalhousie’s online distribution.

* * *

Dalhousie has recalibrated its focuses and methods as a new president took seat. Dr. Richard Florizone has argued for new ways of interaction between the institution and its students. This began with the *100 Days of Listening*, where the president and his staff spoke and collected data on various ‘communities’ in hopes of gaining a better understanding of the issues and concerns the people of Dalhousie believe to be of significance, and the president has placed it upon himself and the institution to understand and remedy these issues. One of the main aspects of this new initiative is the issue of ‘diversity’ and after the report of the *100 Days of Listening*, a new collection of policy initiatives were introduced in a document curiously titled ‘Currently Completed Charters’ (CCC). I am uncertain if the intention of this title is meant to suggest that the ‘charters’ have been completed in terms of the ‘goals’ being achieved, or if the ‘charters’ themselves have been completed in the sense that they have been proposed.
and understood to the institution’s standards and are thus ready to be pursued. I will leave this to the reader to decide. Regardless, in the ‘project charter’, 5 ‘strategic priorities’ are detailed, each one with ‘sub-priorities. These ‘strategic priorities’ are: (1) Teaching and Learning, (2) Research, (3) Service, (4) Partnership and Reputation and (5) Infrastructure and Support. Underneath the fifth ‘strategic priority’ is the second ‘sub-priority’ whose goal is to “[f]oster a collegial culture grounded in diversity and inclusiveness” (CCC). In a brief description of this ‘sub-priority’ is a general look at how Dalhousie general defines ‘diversity’:

Inclusiveness and diversity are inherent in Dalhousie’s founding values. However, we recognize that no one action is sufficient and that there is not some moment in time at which we will be able to cease our efforts to foster a culture grounded in diversity and inclusiveness.

Dalhousie seeks to develop and nurture diversity among faculty, staff and students. These efforts are reflected in ensuring principles of equity and inclusion are integral in recruitment efforts, hiring practices and day-to-day interactions. Likewise, there are many university policies, guidelines, campaigns and partnerships aimed at contributing to the creation of a diverse and inclusive environment and correcting basic historic disadvantage to ensure that Dalhousie is a community reflective of current Nova Scotian and Canadian society.

Communicating these policies, programs and initiatives on diversity and inclusion at Dalhousie is an ongoing effort in a complex environment (CCC).
I would like the reader to keep in mind this passage whenever I refer to Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policy. It is hardly the only document that I will be using to develop an understanding of how ‘diversity’ is used as a means of governance, but, in general, it concisely touches upon the main points I wish to make going forward. For now, I would like to continue with a discussion regarding this ‘historic disadvantage’ aspect of the above passage and how this is taken up in discussions regarding ‘race’ and its role in ‘achieving’ a ‘diverse and inclusive’ Dalhousie. What I will show in the following section is how Dalhousie presents a history of ‘race’ that is strategic, in that it is a method to promote Dalhousie’s ideals and morals, while reaffirming the assumptions of ‘differences’ that ‘race’ has historically relied upon to constitute itself.

I realize I am treading on controversial ground here. I would like to make it clear from the outset exactly what it is I am not doing. I am not suggesting that (1), the history of the atrocities ‘race’ has legitimated and condoned should be ignored or, (2) that any discussion of these atrocities and attempts to address them in our current institutions are futile. In regards to the first possible objection, I hope I have shown in previous sections that it is exactly the ignorance of certain aspects of ‘race’ as it has functioned in the past that I am trying to argue against. Nothing should be forgotten, and more should be discussed, and found, in regards to the multiple ways in which the ideas of ‘differentiation’ have developed certain logics and ethics that continue to influence us today, regardless of how subtle or how grand these gestures may or may not have been. In regards to the second possible objection, I am not saying that Dalhousie should not consider themselves as responsible for fostering a discussion in regards to how it can
operationally ameliorate the conditions of people of certain ‘races’ that have been barred and ostracized from resources given to members of the majority society. What I do intend to show is the contradiction inherent in any attempt to use ‘race’ as a means of understanding and governing ‘people’, while simultaneously saying that ‘race’ and its past use as a means of governing and understanding ‘people’ is irrelevant to how you are using it yourself. The ‘power of race’, the ‘power’ by which it contains the ability to influence actions and ‘serious speech acts’, relies upon its history in all of its complexity. What Dalhousie is doing, as I will show, is promoting one history (‘race’ as a means of hindering and barring; a ‘negative power’), and is doing so strategically to prove its goals as worthwhile and meaningful.

‘Race’ has the power to make sense of a lot of things at Dalhousie. The purpose of ‘diversity’ policy is to hinder that, reign it in, and to use that ‘power’ and channel it into something that compliments Dalhousie’s goals, such as creating a ‘diverse and inclusive’ campus. As has been discussed, much of this ‘power’ is reliant upon its use as a referent to past conditions. In May of 2016, Dr. Florizone commissioned an inquiry into the history of Lord Dalhousie (*Terms of Reference for a Scholarly Panel to Examine Lord Dalhousie’s History on Slavery and Race*), Dalhousie’s namesake. Of primary interest is Lord Dalhousie’s relationship with the African Nova Scotian community, and his role in the transatlantic slave trade.
Diversity and inclusiveness are central values at Dalhousie University. In 1818 when Lord Dalhousie established the university, he envisioned a college with access for all, regardless of class or creed – a radical view for its time, though its benefits seem obvious today.

We also know that, despite Lord Dalhousie’s progressive views on higher education, his documented views on race and the African Nova Scotian community are of great concern (Lord Dalhousie’s History on Slavery and Race).

In these opening few sentences, Florizone is already positioning ‘history’ as a means of marking time strategically, and is doing so in a similar vein to the kinds of markings that were proposed by Frederickson and a particular history of ‘race’ that other scholars draw upon. Firstly, the transcending of ‘class and creed’ as a means of discrimination are celebrated, not only in the sense that Lord Dalhousie is being presented as ‘ahead of his time’, but also as a quality that continues to persist in Dalhousie’s contemporary ethos. There is also this arbitrary distinction being made between different discriminatory practices, where the logic of ‘difference’ as a means of knowledge is displaced from critique so as to focus upon the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ways of creating and using distinctions, despite their reliance upon similar assumptions; that there are differences between peoples, but that within these differences are referents to certain qualities whose “benefits seem obvious today.”
In this strategically crafted historical narrative, wherein Dalhousie is presented as both the forbearer of contemporary ‘progress’, as well as being reliant upon past ideological biases and economic exploitations, Florizone puts in motion a scholarly endeavor that is explicitly meant to promote Dalhousie and its ideals.

The panel will gather the historical facts on Lord Dalhousie’s statements and actions with regards to slavery and race; interpret those facts in both their historical and modern context; and recommend actions that Dalhousie could take to respond to this legacy, in order to build a stronger, more inclusive university that fully reflects our history, our values and our aspirations (*Lord Dalhousie’s History on Slavery and Race*).

The intent of this project is clear, at least from where Dalhousie is positioned (the project could, of course, take on various iterations, interpretations or uses after the fact, dependent upon on how it is written and who reads it; the report is expected in August of 2017). This project for an understanding of Dalhousie and its legacy is being strategically aligned with Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policies and projects. From Dalhousie’s perspective, this history is strategically relevant to the overall project of ‘diversity’ and its use of ‘race’. The reexamination of the history of Lord Dalhousie is reliant upon the ‘power of race’ to both justify its proposal, as well as its potential to reaffirm the institution and its positioning and commitment to projects already in play and that are
also relying on the ‘power of race’. However, there is a distinct paradox here. Dalhousie is proposing research into the complex, specific and, for all intents and purposes, incomprehensible experience, and effects, of slavery that was based upon the logics of ‘race’ to govern bodies, to promote universal and vague ethics that all Dalhousie participants are expected to agree upon; ethics of ‘inclusiveness and equality’. Put another way, Dalhousie is using the history of a specific people during a tumultuous and exploitative time, in order to suggest that this is the history of all Dalhousie students, regardless of ‘race’, because, inherent in this endeavor, are the goals and morals we all share. The specific experience of black slavery, whose history continues to echo in the socio-historico-economic positioning of black people across the Americas, is being used by Dalhousie to address the conditions and governance of all its students. Similarly to Foucault’s look at ‘history’ and its use by the European bourgeoisie, this is history being used strategically. It is a history within which the institution of Dalhousie is seen as simultaneously the thing which profited from slavery, and the thing that can remedy any of its ill-effects.

This kind of history is a way in which Dalhousie problematizes ‘race’ and ‘diversity’. Dalhousie admits that its founder took part in the perpetuation of ‘racist’ speech and slave economies. What resulted were, “negative legacies such as social, economic, legal and educational disadvantage, and anti-Black racism for the province and country’s Black populations” (Lord Dalhousie’s History on Slavery and Race). Dalhousie relies on this history of ‘race’ to lend power to its policies regarding ‘diversity’. By presenting a history wherein ‘race’ was being used as a means to limit and
disenfranchise particular persons based on their ‘race’, Dalhousie is able to position itself strategically as opposite of this, against it, not of it, or at least not of it anymore. One problem with ‘race’ then, as Dalhousie sees it, is its ability to reference a past for which Dalhousie staunchly suggests it is against. However, Dalhousie not only says that it is against these acts, but is also concerned with remedying them. Before moving onto a discussion in regards to how these problems are used to implement techniques of governance, I would like to look at another way Dalhousie problematizes ‘race’ and ‘diversity’, which is through the concept of anthropos.

As was seen in the previous chapter’s overview of ‘race’ and its ‘biological’ understanding during the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe, ‘race’ was discussed as innate, inseperable and constant amongst a particular group of people based on the logics of ancestry, nationality, skin colour and anatomical features. None of these logics are used to support Dalhousie’s understanding of ‘race’ today and how Dalhousie intends to use it. With that being said, the remnants past logics maintain and there continues to persist this notion of ‘race’ being indicative of background, identity and experiences. This notion has been very much supported through the logic of anthropos, the person of culture. I have touched upon the idea of anthropos previously, both in my introduction and in my overview of how it was used to create ‘racialized distinctions’. However, I think it worth the while to go over anthropos briefly, once more, in order to clarify how it is being used by Dalhousie to legitimate how it problematizes ‘race’ and how it validates ‘diversity’ as a means of solving these problems.
Anthropos is the person of culture, a person who is constituted through an understanding that the ‘culture’ in which they take part in can give insight into the person, their experiences, and the tools these people use in order to engage in their cultural community. There is also feedback. Anthropos is used as a means of understanding a culture, it being thought that a person of a cultural community is a carrier of that culture’s knowledges and customs. Thus, the figure of anthropos occupies a space in between the personal and the cultural, and represents the site at which the two converge. It would be irresponsible of me to leave it here, however. The idea of anthropos has been, and continues to be, discussed in an anthropology concerned with how such a concrete understanding of the term often leads to the reifying of ‘culture’ as an overtly accessible, dominating and knowable object. Alongside this, there has grown a similar concern for the portrayal of people recognized as a part of a ‘culture’, and the possibility of misrepresenting them as not constantly negotiating, or actively engaging in and interpreting their ‘culture’, its traits, customs and organization. The constancy and validity of anthropos has been challenged within anthropology for a long time, and it was a crucial aspect of my undergraduate degree to understand texts like Donna Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” (Haraway, 1988), which was mentioned earlier, or Joao Biehl’s Vita (Biehl, 2013), which looks at how a woman was constantly engaging with her surroundings and her understandings of it, as well as Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ look at impoverished Brazilian mothers who were negotiating the terms of what it meant to be a ‘good mother’ in its Catholic iteration, while also dealing with extreme poverty (Scheper-Hughes, 1989). Looking back on what I have presented in regards to
Rabinow will also give an example of an anthropologist struggling to determine how we can come to use *anthropos*, while simultaneously addressing its short-comings.

However, what I will show is that Dalhousie uses anthropological methods in order to understand ‘raced’ populations. By doing so, it is able to legitimate claims that give it the ability to intervene into the lives of students and how they experience ‘race’. The idea of *anthropos* also has another function for Dalhousie; to understand and establish itself as a ‘culture’ in need of intervention. Essentially *anthropos* allows Dalhousie to use one stone, for two birds: *anthropos* allows for the subjectivizing and objectivizing of both ‘raced’ and ‘Dal’ student alike, establishing them both as sites for intervention, research, and governance.

First, there is the problem. After the dentistry scandal at Dalhousie, a ‘task force’ was assembled, including various actors both inside and outside the institution.

Following in line with precedents set by the institution in *Dalhousie’s Strategic Direction 2014-2018* and *100 Days of Listening*, the ‘task force’ produced a document presenting a range of recommendations that Dalhousie should consider if it were to fulfill the ‘strategic priorities’ it presented in the *Dalhousie’s Strategic Direction* document. The ‘task force’ presented *belong* (sic): *Supporting an Inclusive and Diverse University* (henceforth, *belong*). In the introduction to this document, a question is posed: “What would Dalhousie look like if all of us felt we truly belonged?” (*belong*). In order to answer this question, the ‘task force’ went and spoke to various people involved at Dalhousie, including students, staff and professors.
Our meetings confirmed pervasive, and often extreme, experiences of isolation and marginality. Many students, faculty, and staff reported profound levels of disrespect. The formal measures of value at Dalhousie can be unfairly distributed. Many members of our community do not feel included in the work of their units or faculties; expertise and experience is disregarded in decision-making; there is frustration at being asked once again what needs to be done and skepticism that anything will change. The challenges of exclusion due to hierarchies and bureaucracy are too often compounded by systemic misogyny, sexism, racism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, colonialism, socio-economic disadvantage, ableism, ageism, sexualized violence, harassment, and discrimination (belong).

The problem is very clearly set out. Issues of discrimination are being experienced by various people involved in Dalhousie’s everyday operation. Having recognized this problem, the report then begins to ‘problematize’ it, asking questions in regards to how such a problem can become a site for intervention; what can Dalhousie do to stop these experiences from either continuing or repeating? The report continues by presenting a particular logic and what the goals of this intervention should try to achieve, all in compliance with an ethos we have already become familiar with at this point.
In many cases, exclusion and marginalization are unintentional – a matter of unquestioned assumptions, lack of knowledge, or inadequate skill. While that may make it a challenge to recognize the barriers to inclusion, the effects of exclusion are profound, even when not intentional. Moreover, individuals can be acutely conscious of some dimensions of exclusion while being oblivious to other dimensions of exclusion. Openness to an understanding of the experience of others is crucial. If we want to create an institution that values democratic engagement, and that celebrates our participation in both local and global society from our home on the shore of the Atlantic, we need to develop and support new skills (belong).

I see Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policy and policy recommendations using *anthropos* in two different ways. In one way, it is a means of separating groups of people into distinct spaces where their experiences of Dalhousie is seen as constant among them. ‘Black’ people and, in official institutional parlance, ‘Aboriginal’ people are understood by Dalhousie as having similar experiences with the university, within their respective grouping. It would even seem as though Dalhousie’s ‘diversity’ policy even lumps all forms of identification that does not fall in line with the majority-norm as being, if not similar, at the very least close enough to legitimate the idea that an overarching ‘diversity’ policy can address the specific and complex issues by an individual regardless of how they identify in terms of ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘sexuality’, ‘class’, ‘age’, ‘ability’, ‘religion’ or ‘nationality’. The other way in which I see the logic of *anthropos* being used
is in the understanding of the institution itself as a ‘culture’. In the belong report, some skepticism is shown in regards to the possibility of “deep cultural change” not being achieved with “simply changing a policy or two, or identifying a key point person responsible for inclusion on campus” (belong). A description of this ‘culture’ is seen in the above block quote. In this excerpt, we see a presentation of people being unknowingly complicit in an institutional ‘culture’ that hesitates to be ‘diverse and inclusive’. These people are immediately targeted as sites for intervention and are presented as lacking the “skills” needed “to create an institution that values democratic engagement” (belong).

Somewhat of an assemblage emerges when looking at the Report from the Committee on Aboriginal and Black/African Canadian Student Access and Retention: A Focus on Financial support (CAB/ACSAR), where these two logics of anthropos come into contact in order to convince the university of increasing its funding to the retention and recruitment of ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Black/African Canadians’, a population Dalhousie considers to be ‘problematic’ given the low retention numbers among these two ‘racialized’ populations. Using research to develop an understanding of “the Black/African Canadian Student experience” (CAB/ACSAR) and “the Aboriginal student experience” (CAB/ACSAR), and funded by Dalhousie, the report continues to pursue this line of thought where students of a shared ‘racial’ background can be understood whole-cloth in terms of their experiences at Dalhousie, and that the very presence of this ‘cultural’ bloc achieves various goals, be it either the ‘diverse and inclusive’ campus Dalhousie desires, or the perception of a university that is maintaining a competitive
edge by being ‘ahead of the curve’ or ‘progressive’. These students are presented as a “critical mass” needed in order for the university to thrive.

Attainment of a funding level at 16% of overall student assistance (8% for each group) would enhance the chances of achieving a critical mass of Black/African Canadian and Aboriginal students for self-sustainability wherein Dalhousie students from these populations would themselves be agents for increased access, retention and success. It would also recognize the historical disadvantage faced by these groups […], and provide a proportion consistent with that used by other countries which have addresses similar issues. It is the right time to give added momentum to efforts already underway in order to achieve this goal (CAB/ACSAR, emphasis mine).

In this report, we see the argument for the increased presence of people from different backgrounds. However, in order for this to be argued properly, there must be an attempt to understand what it is that is being ‘experienced’ by these populations so as to properly allocate funds. The report relies on an argument that, for all intents and purposes, reduces the experiences of a ‘race’ to its most accessible and useful (“the Black/African Canadian Student experience”, “the Aboriginal student experience”, in order to convince the institution of believing it properly operational. I am not saying that I think Dalhousie, in this circumstance, is arguing that there has to be some sort of
economic rationale behind wanting students of a ‘racially diverse’ background to be included. However, if Dalhousie is being asked to allocate funds, in this instance, the people writing the report felt it necessary to appeal to a particular logic that reduces the experience of ‘race’ to its talking-points. It presents ‘race’ as ‘knowable’, as a shared experience that holds certain constants across those experiencing it. Essentially, ‘race’ here is being used, again, strategically, as a means of argument and relies on the idea *anthropos* to make these claims, the person is understandable through the isolating and understanding of their culture, and vice versa. In this instance, it was not felt like it would be enough of an effort to convince Dalhousie that it struggles to retain people who identify as ‘racially Other’ to the norm simply by showing it as such. Thus, in a bid to increase the funding of an obscenely underfunded project that tries to listen to students and their experiences of the complex, emotional, and sometimes violent, experience of ‘race’ on campus, the people writing this report made an appeal to the idea of ‘race’ as knowable, operational, demonstrable, stable and constant. This group felt compelled, borrowing an aphorism from Foucault, to follow the rules of the game.

It would not be surprising if the reader, like me, came to ask oneself, how, then, is it possible to simultaneously advocate for something that is based upon ‘racialized’ disparities, without simultaneously reducing ‘race’ to something operational? I feel compelled to tell a story I was a part of in order to elaborate on this point. Do not expect an answer, so much so as my attempt to grapple with this question at a different level of analysis. During my time as a teacher’s assistant at Dalhousie, a professor explained their research, using an example of ‘cowboys and Indians’. Unfortunately, the
professor did not properly contextualize their research, and how it was critical of this clearly ‘racist’ narrative. An ‘Indigenous’ student (again, I omit their ‘nationality’ for the sake of anonymity) raised their concern over the use of the term ‘Indian’, a term, as they explained to me, that evokes violent experiences confronted by both themselves, their friends and family. Another teacher’s assistant and I spoke to the student about their experience and they expressed a concern somewhat similar to the one I spoke about in regards to my Honours student friend. The ‘Indigenous’ student, at first, did not want to bring the issue up until they were convinced of doing so after relaying their feelings to another teacher’s assistant in casual conversation. I asked why this was so. They said that they did not want to be that person once again, that trouble-rousing, confrontational Indigenous student. Partially, this was because they did not want to bring on any more trouble than they had to, being a full-time student and a parent. There was also a hesitancy because they did not want to confront that expectation of being the one who had to stand up, once more, for the respect of Indigenous peoples, something this person has grown exhausted and weary of. In order to make their point, they would have to reduce themselves to their ‘Indigeneity’. This is why I find the logic in the CAB/ASCAR document so troubling; it is complicit in a logic that has the potential to further reify people to their ‘racialized’ identities despite its intent to alleviate these pressures. The CAB/ASCAR document asks for funding that has the potential to address issues faced by individuals dealing with ‘race’, through a logic that doubles down on ‘race’ as not extraneous to these people, but as innate, as shared, and as common. At Dalhousie, ‘race’ maintains its ability to subjectivize and objectivize whole groups of
people through logics of *anthropos*, legitimating institutional intervention. This is a strategy I have shown to be in play for some time.

At this point, we begin to see the establishment of sites for Dalhousie to intervene. Dalhousie has created ‘subjects’ for governance through the use of ‘histories’ and a logic reliant on *anthropos*. ‘Black/African Canadians’, ‘Aboriginals’ and the greater community of Dalhousie have now been established as the site where the institution needs to focus its efforts to achieve particular ends. Methods have already been established; increased funding to heighten the retention of a ‘problematic’ population, the recruitment of workers and the establishment of a new position in the upper-offices of the senior administration (Vice-Provost, Student Affairs), research targeting specific groups of people to gather information on their shared ‘experiences’, and a new census gathering information “on the diversity of our student body” (belong) called *Be Counted*, among other ongoing projects and programs to intervene at the level of the individual, while understanding the ‘population’, in order to achieve Dalhousie’s stated goals. One goal of this ‘apparatus’ is fairly clear for President Florizone, at least when it comes to students. “It is a mission deeply rooted in our history and informed by a desire to transform the lives of students from Nova Scotia, Canada and around the world” who have a “shared understanding [that] includes a vision of inspiration and impact, inspiring our scholarly community to make a difference in the world” (Inspiration and Impact). Students are considered carriers of Dalhousie’s morals and ethics, and ‘diversity and inclusivity’ are a major component.
What Dalhousie has in mind for its student body is what I have come to refer to as the ‘ideal’ student. Ultimately, the people leaving as graduates of Dalhousie are expected to not only embody the institution’s morals and ideals, but are also expected to use these, and promote them, as they integrate into the labour force. What Dalhousie expects from their students is probably best seen when looking at their recruitment materials, such as Become a Citizen of Dalhousie, and their profiling of particular students for their news outlet, Dal News. What I intend to show here is how everything that has been discussed so far in regards to ‘diversity and inclusivity’ (what I will often refer to as an ‘apparatus’) is justified by Dalhousie as being necessary for the development of a particular student. ‘Diversity and inclusivity’ is presented as a winning formula for the creation of a student body and alumnus that can ‘change the world’.

When incorporating ‘race’ into this discussion, Dalhousie is hoping that these ‘differences’ become secondary to one’s identification as a Dalhousie student, or “citizen”, if you will. Thus, if one is to argue for this or that, and wishes to utilize ‘race’ as a means of justifying it, one must include in this argument how it is that it will benefit Dalhousie as a whole. It is in this, the idea that ‘diversity and inclusion’ is meant to serve Dalhousie as a whole, that I see a lot of tension. It is in this framing that we can begin to find ties between the ‘apparatus’ presented so far, and the comments from my Honours friend and the student during my time as a teacher’s assistant. Underlying both of these moments are expectations that both people, to different degrees, chose to either ignore or draw attention to. One way in which I think we can understand these moments is by considering how it is that Dalhousie has created a situation where ‘racial’
identities have become imbued with a certain quality upon which a ‘diverse and inclusive’ campus can be achieved, and whose personal experiences with ‘race’ can be seen as a quality worth imparting so that Dalhousie can achieve its ‘ideal’ student.

Turning over the first page of Dalhousie’s undergraduate recruitment document, *Become a Citizen of Dalhousie*, it asks its reader “What does it mean to be a citizen of Dalhousie?” Turning the page over once more the document answers with “You can be more than a student” typed across a picture of a woman dressed in traditional Mi’kmaq clothing, dancing in the university quad, during what I can only assume was Dalhousie’s annual pow-wow. Firstly, the answer does not seem to grammatically fit here, but that is neither here nor there. Underneath this answer, the document continues, saying that “[a]t Dalhousie, your ambition will be fueled by an inspiring academic experience, a balanced lifestyle and a welcoming environment. You’ll shape your university experience just as much as it shapes you. After you graduate, you’ll continue to be part of a community that’s changing the world” (*Be a Citizen of Dalhousie*). I do not wish to give these examples any heft they are undeserving of. I recognize that the intention of this document is to be attractive to prospective students. However, I do not find it misleading to suggest that Dalhousie is trying to suggest some sort of ‘communal uniformity’ amongst those who attend or work at the institution. In the final phrase of Dr. Florizone’s “President’s Message” in the *Dalhousie University Strategic Direction 2014-2018: Year 2 Progress Report* (DUSD: Year 2) document, he writes “I sincerely look forward to working with you in the year ahead as we strive to achieve our collective
vision”. Before this, Dr. Florizone wrote, in regards to ‘diversity and inclusiveness’ being one of “our toughest challenges” (DUSD: Year 2),

I am proud of the steps we have taken to improve Dalhousie’s diversity and inclusiveness, including a number of significant community consultations, important hires into new key roles and the commitment of our Senate, Board and broader Dal community. We have much work ahead of us, but we have made real progress in creating an environment that is open to tough questions, committed to transparency and united in a desire for positive change (DUSD: Year 2).

From both of these documents, a ‘community’ is being established through the use of moral universals that are meant to appeal to everyone reading the document. I am not concerned with what these morals are exactly, so much so as the methods through which Dalhousie is able to establish its participants as sites for moral intervention. In all of the documents presented so far, there is a moral milieu that Dalhousie is trying to establish, and through its policies it is creating subjectivities who are needed in order for these goals to be achieved. When Dalhousie speaks about ‘diversity and inclusiveness’, they are not doing so in an echo chamber. It is trying to appeal to people in its community to help them achieve these goals, given that they are in agreement with the morals presented. This is what I am seeing in regards to the stories I have presented so
far. There is an agreement that the morals Dalhousie is presenting are good, thus there is a feeling of expectation that all those who are in line with the institution’s morals should do their best to comply and take part, however way they can. For these two students, however, the roles asked of them are demonstrably more complex and intertwine with very personal and emotional aspects of their identity. So how does Dalhousie make sense of these experience in its use of ‘race’ and how it can be used in an attempt to create a campus that is ‘diverse and inclusive’? It cannot.

I do not want to say that these students are either unwilling to participate in this project because they don’t agree with the expectations or the morals being presented. I also don’t think that it is an overtly rebellious act. I think it should be understood as simply their lack of wanting to do it dependent on the time and the place. This is not my primary point, however. My point is that nowhere in Dalhousie’s ‘diversity and inclusiveness’ policies is there a place where this kind of experience is able to make sense. Dalhousie’s understanding of the issues regarding ‘race’ and ‘diversity’ is very myopic in that, if it is not able to be argued with any reference to how it can be profitable for Dalhousie at large, than it can’t be spoken of at the capacity of policy in the institution. This experience is a complete outlier, but is nonetheless very much intertwined with the histories, and morals, upon which ‘diversity and inclusivity’ draw on for its support. In Dalhousie’s inability to comprehend the complexity of how ‘race’ interacts at the personal level, and an inability to understand ‘race’ in terms that do not comply with its own, these students are disconnected from the logic of the institution and its goals. ‘Race’ continues to maintain a divide between Dalhousie and its students,
despite Dalhousie’s efforts to harness its ‘power’ for its own gains. Instead, these students are using ‘race’ to make sense of what Dalhousie cannot, and are doing so for themselves.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

In this brief conclusion, I will be summarizing my argument while making an appeal for an understanding of ‘race’ that does not rely on its laurels, despite the pressure to do so given the current political climate. ‘Race’ today, as it has always been, is being used to make sense of complex ‘power’ relationships, and when this is done, the significance for both reflection and a dialogue that takes ‘race’ seriously, in all its nuance, is of serious import. Otherwise, we may be continuing to perpetuate an understanding of ‘race’ that maintains certain assumptions, without consideration for how it is different today, how it is similar, what it draws on to maintain its power, and how we are using it. As I have shown, our moment needs to be understood in its historical context, and that context needs to be understood and developed using tools that develop with it. For this, I have drawn heavily on the work of Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow. These two authors provide intriguing means of producing knowledge that simultaneously challenge us to consider the appeals to ‘power’ that ‘knowledge formation’ is in direct relationship with, while also forcing us to consider the current scenarios in how they have developed in, and draw on, the past and formulate an imagination of a future yet to be realized. Reflection and serious inquiry into the terms and tools of observation and argumentation are significant topics for my research, and those of Rabinow and Foucault. I can only hope that, through a direct struggle with the idea of ‘race’, that I have shown the reader that it is not my intent to debase ‘race’ as a worthwhile term to be used to understand our current problems (as if such a thing
could ever happen), but to show that we need to consistently debate and discuss what it is that ‘race’ is doing for us. The usefulness of ‘race’ is without question, but the terms and ideas that ‘race’ draws upon in order for its ‘usefulness’ to be maintained need to be in constant consideration, and we need to be privy to the ways that it is reforming itself, is being used to negotiate new, unexplored phenomena, and what ends it is being used to achieve.

In the introduction, I proposed a research project that looked at how it is that Dalhousie utilizes the idea of ‘race’ to achieve certain ends, and how it is that ‘diversity’ policy utilizes, constrains and directs the ‘power of race’. I have shown that race is heavily relied upon to make sense of ‘diversity’ policies, its deployments, its strategies and its goals. For Dalhousie, ‘race’ is a means of making sense of the institution’s ‘history’, as well as the experiences of its participants, particularly, in my case, the students. This latter use of ‘race’ was what I considered to be in line with the logic of anthropos, ‘person’ and ‘culture’ as complimentary objects for analyses, each coming into an interplay that constitutes these two sites as areas for ‘truth claims’. The person as a crystalized representation of their culture, and the culture as an unmitigated space where its effects on its people are without question, negotiation, or resistance. This line of argument is very much influenced by Rabinow and his struggle with the idea of anthropos given its stagnancy in recent anthropological scholarship. Like Rabinow, I am similarly concerned with this, and wanted my work to reflect this concern by situating anthropology in a relationship where it is used strategically as a means to end, something that completely contradicts my upbringing as an anthropologist.
‘Race’ has much changed in these past centuries; the significance of physiological components, skin colour and the like have been downplayed recently, making way for the idea of ‘race’ to find purchase in ideas regarding culture and anthropos, while a genomic discourse begins to produce and affirm itself. However, an aspect of ‘race’ has maintained itself throughout these slight deviations, and that is its application in the promotion of ‘morals’. ‘Race’, as shown in my look at Frederickson, Foucault and Stoler, was always, if not more so, concerned with the ‘value’ of ‘race’, the physical characteristics often taking on a supporting role. It was not enough for racist Europeans to suggest that the difference between themselves and Others was simply skin colour and, perhaps, cultural practice and customs. There was always an appeal to a morality, a field of ‘values’. In Stoler’s work, along with how the bourgeois created a ‘white’ identity based upon ‘racial stratification’, it should be understood that the Other was being constructed as both actively and passively ‘destroying’ bourgeois values, and in order to affirm this belief, and even to establish these ‘values’ and their characteristics, the bourgeois relied upon a valuable tool of the time, a discourse that was being popularly defended and circulated; that of eugenics and biologics.

In order to establish this history, I relied upon the work of Frederickson, who presented a history of ‘race’ that was reliant on a particular framing wherein ‘race’ was seen as epochal. ‘Race’, in the history Frederickson presented, was a specifically ‘scientific’ notion, a term that could not be separated from its ‘eugenic’ and ‘biological’ logics. This history, as I had shown, has been supported and drawn upon by several other researchers. This research establishes ‘race’ as something that can be separated,
understood within a particular marking of time. What this work does not consider is how ‘race’ depends not only on logics, but also morals, an ethos. This is shows especially in how this particular history wishes to make arbitrary distinctions between the ideas of ‘difference’ that have been established centuries before ‘race’ and its reliance on logics of ‘science’, which is exemplified in the ideas of Greek philosopher Herodotus, and ‘Christian’ doctrines. By establishing these breaks, the history of Frederickson is able to make certain arguments in regards to ‘race’ and its use of a particular logic to condone the measures taken by Nazi Germany, Jim Crow laws in the southern United States and apartheid South Africa. I have shown however that, though these ‘racial’ measures were certainly reliant on these logics of genes and the ‘scientific’ survival of a ‘race’, there is a demonstrable overlooking of the significance of moral attitudes that have been developing over an extended period of time before these particularly monstrous, nationalistic acts. What I wanted to show was the ‘power of race’ and how this ‘power’ extends to our contemporary uses of it. Through a relegation of ‘race’ to its eugenic logics of the past, we create a break from its usefulness today, establishing a blockage between what it is today and what it was, without a consideration for how ‘race’ in the past continues to establish its usefulness for us in the contemporary. When we consider ‘race’ not as a ‘scientific’ notion, but as something that can be used to promote ethical ideals, we can see that ‘race’ has always, and continues, to support certain claims, regardless of the contents of those claims. Whether or not ‘race’ is being used to evoke fear of the Other and its potential to usurp morals that create the basis for a large and influential population, as it was used by the European bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th
centuries, or ‘race’ and its use to establish a campus that is ‘diverse and inclusive’, as it is at Dalhousie in the 21st century, we can see that there is a clear connection here; ‘race’ is being developed as a moral issue whose techniques adapt to the times. Any attempt to establish breaks, I argue, is not only arbitrary, but can also hinder our ability to understand ‘race’ and its uses, in all its complexities and nuances.

Through complimenting the history presented by Frederickson with other historical narratives of ‘race’ from Foucault, Stoler and Day, I had shown that the history of ‘race’ can be extended to how it is that we use ‘race’ contemporaneously as a moral project and not a ‘biological’ or ‘eugenic’ one. With this framing, I was able to show how the current use of ‘race’ at Dalhousie University, used to promote a moral project to create a ‘diverse and inclusive’ campus, continues to utilize the ‘power of race’ and its ability to promote the morals and ethos of the time. Dalhousie uses several similar techniques to establish an ‘apparatus’ to utilize ‘race’ as a means to legitimize its use of ‘race’ to subjectify and objectify the Dalhousie ‘student population’ as a site for intervention in hopes of achieving several goals. Two of the several logics included in this ‘apparatus’ are logics reliant on ‘history’ and *anthropos*, logics that have consistently been present in many uses of ‘race’ as a means to govern. In Dalhousie’s case, the history of itself and the history of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, were both drawn upon in order to legitimate its use of ‘race’ to situate itself and achieve its goals. *Anthropos* is used by Dalhousie as a means of understanding the experience of ‘race’ amongst particular subjects participating in Dalhousie day-to-day operations. These two logics were important in framing certain ‘problems’, their understanding, and what
Dalhousie intends to achieve by addressing these problems. This is a line of thought Foucault presented, along with clarifications by Rabinow, as the strategy of ‘problematization’. Using Foucault idea of ‘problematization’, a nuanced line of thought begins to develop in regards to what it is that Dalhousie is trying to do, which is to eliminate problems of ‘race’ as both ‘experience’ and ‘history’, through a suggestion that places the institution first, above one’s identity as a ‘raced’ subject; to find ‘equality’ and ‘inclusion’ in the Dalhousie community. The ‘ideal’ student for Dalhousie is not ‘raced’; they are ‘diverse’. One’s particularities are secondary to an overall acceptance and identification with the idea of Dalhousie as a moral space, and within this moral space are attempts to reduce the particularities of ‘experience’ into a workable, functioning, and operationalized universalism wherein one’s ‘experiences’ are not to be ‘understood’ however one sees fit, but must be developed and finessed into something that is good for Dalhousie at large. In order to make an appeal for Dalhousie to recognize certain ‘experiences’, the ‘experience’ must be presented in a way that shows its conformity with the ideals at Dalhousie and how these ‘experiences’ contribute to the project of creating a particular Dalhousie. ‘Experience’, for Dalhousie, as can be seen in its policies and proposals, is not meant to be understood so much so as it is meant to be used. It is not enough to understand. Policy must use that information to create something like an ‘ideal’ student that is able to be ‘diverse’ first, and ‘particular’ second. This is the underlying ethos girding ‘diversity’ policy. The logical formulations that Dalhousie uses to reduce ‘race’ to its essences is continued in the realization of the ‘ideal’ student. These reductions are not only means of governing the
‘student body’, but are also a means of producing knowledge that is operable in the creation of a student that is beyond ‘race’, that transcends its problematic potentials and, in its stead, takes on the morals and logics promoted by ‘diversity’ policy.

I realize that a contradiction could be seen here, however. How could I possibly critique these attempts to ‘understand race’ while simultaneously suggesting that we need to understand ‘race’, though in a markedly different manner? I would say that what needs to be accepted about ‘race’ is its unknowability, or at least its ability to quickly shift itself into complex reiterations. It is a consistently elusive concept. It is to create research that is able to both understand ‘race’ as something that can be discussed and analyzed, while simultaneously giving it the space to allow for its potentials. It is to leave as many answers as questions. Answering questions specific to the current moment, and its basis in the Dalhousie campus, is how I attempted to give some insight into how it is that ‘race’ functions in the governing of peoples, and in the creation of ‘knowledge’. However, as always, questions still remain and it is in our attempts to answer these questions that I would like to make a plea to realize and keep in mind the ways in which ‘race’ continues to evade our attempts to pin it down.

The social climate today, as it has almost always been, is ‘racially’ charged. There has been a stark rise of migrants entering Canada from the United States amongst fears of deportation. Several communities in Canada are without working water infrastructure. A mosque was attacked in Quebec City. Groups like Soldiers of Odin police neighbourhoods they deem as ‘problematic’. All of these ‘things’ are using ‘race’ as a means of understanding, as a cause for action, and as a tool for observation,
amongst several other motivations and perspectives. With these ‘things’ in mind, I am concerned that we are going to be asking a lot from ‘race’ in the near future when it comes to addressing issues like the ones I listed. This is, of course, fine. What I hope for, however, is that we remain cognizant of how ‘race’ is being employed and the assumptions being made. We must maintain a vigilance in regards to ‘race’ and its potentials. It is important that this urge to reify this idea of ‘race’ so as to make it useful to our purposes, be immediately recognized and dealt with accordingly. It will be tempting to do otherwise. However, in regards to ‘race’, I think it time to reflect.

It would not surprise me if, having taken so much inspiration from Foucault, that a certain question has come to the minds of those reading this, a question that has long been associated with the author: then what? If ‘race’ is all the things I say it is, then what should we do with it? Get rid of it? In regards to the final question, no, of course not. The usefulness of ‘race’ as a means of making sense is without question and that is how I have been using ‘race’; as a tool for making sense of Dalhousie University and its ‘diversity’ policies. What I have presented, I do not think, strays too far from this basic curiosity of wondering what words do, how they do it, etc. With that being said, however, I do think that the kind of analysis I have presented needs to be further pursued if we wish to understand ‘race’ and its nuances. ‘Race’ is in constant motion, it is constantly being shaped by, and shaping, the contemporary. ‘Race’ is consistently folding back in on itself, drawing on past logics and morals, to support its claims. Conversely, ‘race’ is being used in manners that were never thought possible, in context never preconceived, and it will continue to do such. Through a consideration of ‘race’ at
this moment, and in this space, I was able to show the mobility of ‘race’; its ability to condense time into a compact, single syllable word, its ability to address everyone in the room, its ability to influence massive actions that reverberate for centuries, and its necessary inclusion in ever little detail of policy decisions taking place at a university in Atlantic Canada. My project was not an attempt to shake ‘race’ until it was no longer recognizable, a pile of words, meanings, and motivations without structure. Above all else, this was certainly not an attempt to minimize ‘race’ to something where it could be brushed aside as useless. If anything at all, my intent for this project was to appreciate ‘race’ in its ability to do so much, while keeping a safe distance so as not to be overcome by its Leviathan-like lure. I will not pretend to suggest that my analysis is necessarily useful to anyone. That would be up to the person reading this. However, what my project does do successfully is give ‘race’ its deserved due as something never to be taken for granted.
References


