REGIONALISM ON THE CELTIC FRINGE: HOW A PERIPHERAL COMMUNITY RESISTS, NEGOTIATES, AND ACCOMMODATES POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

by

GLENN GRAHAM

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
February 2016

© Copyright by Glenn Graham, 2016
DEDICATION PAGE

For Claire and Alec and in memory of Dr. Richard Twomey.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... ix

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED .......................................................................................... xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... xiv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Thesis Questions and Research Objectives ................................................................. 7
  1.3 The Case ......................................................................................................................... 9
  1.4 Chapter Organization ................................................................................................... 11
  1.5 Methodology ................................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW .... 21
  2.1 Regions and Regionalism ............................................................................................. 21
  2.2 Regional Identity and Regionality .............................................................................. 24
  2.3 ‘Old’ Regionalism, Globalization, and the New Regionalism .................................. 29
     ‘Old’ Regionalism .......................................................................................................... 29
     Globalization ................................................................................................................ 29
     New Regionalism Theory (NRT) .................................................................................. 32
  2.4 New Institutionalism .................................................................................................... 34
     The ‘Problem’ of Institutional Change ......................................................................... 42
  2.5 Other Pertinent Literature ......................................................................................... 46
     Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 50
Municipal Consolidation and Regional Development .............................................. 145
The Strait Area: Failed Growth Pole? ................................................................ 147

5.3 Community Economic Development (CED) ..................................................... 150
5.4 Political Leadership .......................................................................................... 153
Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 158

CHAPTER 6: CAPE BRETON IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
REGIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS .............. 169

6.1 Political Leadership .......................................................................................... 171
Towards Reform and Austerity .............................................................................. 174

6.2 Regionalization Through Municipal Amalgamation ....................................... 175
Assessing the Amalgamation .................................................................................. 178
After the Merger: Rescaling and ‘Rebooting’ for Region-Building ....................... 180

6.3 Regionalization of Health Care ....................................................................... 182

6.4 Regionalization of Education .......................................................................... 193
Further Amalgamation of Schools and Boards ..................................................... 195
School Amalgamation and Community Resistance ............................................... 198
Rescaling and Regionalizing Mi’kmaw Education ............................................... 201
Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 202

CHAPTER 7: POST-INDUSTRIAL CAPE BRETON: A RE-ENVISIONED
DEVELOPMENT REGIME .................................................................................... 209

7.1 Federal and Provincial Institutions ................................................................... 211
ECBC Matures ....................................................................................................... 212
ECBC Disbanded ................................................................................................... 221
CBDCs .................................................................................................................. 225

7.2 Other Institutions ............................................................................................ 227
Rescaling and Reterritorializing: RDAs to RENs .................................................... 227
The Cape Breton Partnership and the Prosperity Framework ............................... 230
Private Sector Leadership ...................................................................................... 233
### 7.3 Political Leadership and Post-industrial Rescaling

- Bottom-up Agency: CED and Entrepreneurship .................................................. 233
- CBRM: Equalization, Rescaling, and Empowerment ........................................ 239
- Rural Municipalities and Regional Development ............................................... 247
- Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 250

### CHAPTER 8: GLOBALIZING THE “CELTIC FRINGE”: REBUILDING CAPE BRETON WITH CULTURE AND THE ARTS

- 8.1 Culture, Identity, Regionality ......................................................................... 258
- 8.2 Institutions and Cultural Industries ................................................................. 261
  - Canada Council for the Arts ............................................................................. 262
  - Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage ....................................... 262
  - Office of Gaelic Affairs .................................................................................... 266
  - Highland Village Museum (the Highland Village) ........................................... 268
  - The Gaelic College/Colaisde na Gàidhlig ......................................................... 270
  - Celtic Colours International Festival ............................................................... 273
  - The Celtic Music Interpretive Centre ............................................................... 275
  - Celtic Heart of North America Cooperative: A Regional Approach
  - To Marketing Culture ....................................................................................... 279
  - Destination Cape Breton Association ............................................................. 280
- 8.3 Political Leadership ......................................................................................... 282
- Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 287

### CHAPTER 9: UNAMA’KI: FROM MARGINALIZATION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY

- 9.1 Institutions .................................................................................................... 294
  - Moving Towards Unama’ki Autonomy ............................................................. 299
  - Institutional Advances ..................................................................................... 304
- 9.2 Political Leadership ......................................................................................... 309
  - The Membertou Experience ........................................................................... 309
  - Regionalizing Development with the Unama’ki Model and the
Unama’ki Mi’kmaq Benefits Office .......................................................... 313

9.3 Culture and Identity ...................................................................................................... 318

Wagmatcook: Embracing Cultural Tourism and Partnerships in Education .......................................................... 320

Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 322

Towards a Cohesive Unama’ki? .......................................................................................... 323

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 327

10.1 Globalization and Regions .......................................................................................... 327

10.2 Research and Findings ................................................................................................ 328

Generalizing the Findings ................................................................................................. 340

10.3 Theoretical Implications ............................................................................................. 342

10.4 Possible Areas for Future Research ........................................................................... 346

10.5 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 347

Bibliography: ....................................................................................................................... 350

Appendix A: Interviewee Details ...................................................................................... 387

Appendix B: Question Guide for Interviewees ................................................................. 388

Appendix C: Employment Rate 1999-2009 ..................................................................... 389

Appendix D: Nova Scotia Population by County .............................................................. 390

Appendix E: Child and Senior Poverty Compared 2010 ................................................... 391

Appendix F: Median Household Income 2000 and 2005 ................................................... 392

Appendix G: Excerpt from Kenneth Donovan (1990) ....................................................... 393

Appendix H: Example of Provincial Fiscal Capacity Before and After Equalization ....... 394

Appendix I: Distribution of Atlantic Innovation Funding .................................................. 395

Appendix J: NS School Enrolments Decline Example ....................................................... 396

Appendix K: Post-Industrial Cape Breton Sectoral Analysis ............................................. 397

Appendix L: Ivany Report Description and Critique ......................................................... 398

Appendix M: NS Government Administrative History and Programming Sources

Displaying Formal and Informal Institutionalization ....................................................... 399
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: School Enrolment Changes................................................................................... 200

Table 2: NS Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage Operating assistance to Cultural Organizations (Cape Breton) 2014......................................................... 264

Table 3: NS Population by County .................................................................................... 390

Table 4: Post-industrial Cape Breton Sectoral Analysis ..................................................... 397
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: First Nation Communities in Nova Scotia ....................................................... 66
Figure 2: Gaelic Settlement of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island ....................... 67
Figure 3: The First Nations Progression Model (The Membertou Model) .................... 313
ABSTRACT

‘Informal’ peripheral regions have received limited scholarly attention in Canada. This political-economic history of Cape Breton Island analyses how institutional actors build, maintain, and reconstruct a peripheral region, adapt to globalization, and address regional development. The role of culture, identity, institutions and leadership is explored. Analysis combines new regionalism and identity theorizations with new institutionalism’s historical and sociological branches. This theoretical framework facilitates analyzing institutions and regions more broadly in new globalizing and regional settings as well as the identity and agency-related concept of regionality. The triangulated qualitative approach utilizes primary, secondary and online sources and semi-structured ‘elite’ interviews.

Before Confederation, Cape Breton regional identity was imprinted by the Mi’kmaq and other ethno-cultural groups, resulting in ‘Unama’ki’, ‘Isle Royale’, and ‘Celtic Fringe’/‘Gaelic sanctuary’ regional constructions. Into the 20th century, industry-fueled growth cemented a culturally cohesive, Gael-inspired, class-conscious regional construction. Later abandonment of the coal and steel industries by private owners prompted state response to sustain the region. The resultant ‘socialist Island’ was an adaptation in an evolving institutional context. Multi-level political, economic and cultural actors have tried to salvage and reconstruct the region into the neo-liberalism-influenced era of globalization. Regional actors have attempted to both address and initiate regionalization of various institutions and adjust to ‘development downloading’, the new economy, and demographic hurdles. Bright spots signal optimism for the future: Grassroots institution-building, Gaelic cultural revitalization and the notable rise of Mi’kmaw leadership in economic development circles. Although Cape Breton’s future construction is uncertain, the region has been undergoing reconstruction through adaptation and innovation as it moves toward a more endogenous and autonomous development model. While this can be restrained by path dependencies and centralized control at the core of the Westminster system, to some degree regional cultures and institutional actors can resist, accommodate and offset globalization-related pressures and, through incorporating regional preferences, identities, and institution-building, have an ‘indigenizing’ effect on region-building and development.
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Atlantic Development Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECL</td>
<td>Atomic Energy of Canada Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Atlantic Development Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEP</td>
<td>Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Cape Breton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDC</td>
<td>Canadian Business Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDA</td>
<td>Cape Breton District Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDHA</td>
<td>Cape Breton District Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRM</td>
<td>Cape Breton Regional Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB-VRDHA</td>
<td>Cape Breton Victoria Regional School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBGF</td>
<td>Cape Breton Growth Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>Cape Breton University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-FA</td>
<td>Cape Breton University Faculty Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cooperative Commonwealth Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>Community Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCH</td>
<td>Communities, Culture, and Heritage (NS Dept.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHB</td>
<td>Community Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIC</td>
<td>Celtic Music Interpretive Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEE</td>
<td>Centre for Sustainability in Energy and the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devco</td>
<td>Cape Breton Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCBA</td>
<td>Destination Cape Breton Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMA</td>
<td>Development Isle Madame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCO</td>
<td>Dominion Iron and Steel Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMCO</td>
<td>Dominion Coal Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOSCO</td>
<td>Dominion Coal and Steel Corporation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DREE</td>
<td>Department of Regional Economic Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRIE</td>
<td>Department of Regional Industrial Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDA</td>
<td>Economic and Regional Development Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDT</td>
<td>Department of Rural Development and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESREN</td>
<td>Eastern Strait Regional Enterprise Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GASHA</td>
<td>Guysborough Antigonish Strait Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS/GPS</td>
<td>Geographical Information System/Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMA</td>
<td>General Mining Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Inverness Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDD</td>
<td>Industrial Developments Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEL</td>
<td>Industrial Estates Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWK</td>
<td>Isaac Walton Killam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLMSC</td>
<td>Joint Labour Management Study Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jointex</td>
<td>Cape Breton Joint Expenditure Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMNO</td>
<td>Kwilmu 'kw 'Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEDA</td>
<td>Local Economic Assistance program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDO</td>
<td>Non-designated Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRT</td>
<td>New Regionalism Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSBI</td>
<td>Nova Scotia Business Incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCC</td>
<td>Nova Scotia Community College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSERC</td>
<td>National Sciences and Engineering Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWGSC</td>
<td>Public Works and Government Services Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN</td>
<td>Regional Enterprise Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHB</td>
<td>Regional Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEB</td>
<td>Self Employment Benefit program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSHRC</td>
<td>Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSCO</td>
<td>Sydney Steel Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium sized enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Save Our Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSB</td>
<td>Strait Regional School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEBO</td>
<td>Unama’ki Economic Benefits Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMW</td>
<td>United Mine Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSI</td>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM-DMU</td>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities-Department of Municipal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTA</td>
<td>Unama’ki Tourism Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first thank my wife Claire and son Alec for their incredible patience and support throughout the PhD process and writing of this dissertation. I am forever grateful and look forward to making up for some of the lost time that this project took from you. Thank-you also goes out to my ever-supportive (and patient!) parents (Danny and Mary), parents-in-law (John and Minoli), and extended family. I would also like to thank my co-supervisors Bob Finbow and Jim Bickerton for all of their help. They put in countless hours and also remained patient as I worked my way through the subject material. Aside from the dissertation, in particular I learned a lot from Bob in his graduate classes on regionalism and comparative theory, while I have considered Jim to be an academic mentor since my undergrad days at St.FX. His writing and insights have strongly influenced my academic approach and I appreciate all of his help and guidance over the years. I would also like to thank committee member, Lori Turnbull, external examiner Peter Graefe, and department representative Kristin Good for giving up their own time to take part in this project. I learned a lot from Kristin in the class work component of the PhD and Lori was a great help during the comprehensive component. Many thanks also to Karen, Tracy, and Shannon and the remainder of the Dalhousie Political Science Department who have all been helpful in their own ways. Louise Carbert was instrumental with her encouragement as I was deciding to pursue the political science PhD. She also provided guidance for my successful Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) application for this project. Jennifer Smith, David Black, and Catherine Fierlbeck all provided theoretical foundations in my course work and comprehensives that continue to prove invaluable. Frank Harvey, in his various positions, was great in ushering my colleagues and I through the various steps of the PhD program. It was also a pleasure to learn about Canadian politics from the late Peter Aucoin, who was also helpful when I applied for SSHRC funding. On that note, many thanks to SSHRC for awarding me the Joseph-Armand Bombardier Scholarship which supported this project. Thanks also go to the Dal department, as well as Doug Brown and colleagues at the St. FX political science department, who provided me with opportunities to gain teaching experience as I worked through the dissertation. I’d like to also mention and thank Peter Twohig for his academic support over the years, and finally, the late Dr. Richard Twomey. I know Richard would have been a great friend and mentor throughout the ups and downs of the PhD and dissertation writing process. He is fondly remembered.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It has been said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity.
Kofi Annan (2000)

In 1996, Benjamin Barber conceptualized the spread of global capitalism and cultural commodification with the expression, “Jihad vs. McWorld.” It suggests that the world has become increasingly homogenized by global capitalism through ‘onrushing economic, technological, and economic forces that demand integration and uniformity’ and by ‘pressing nations into one homogenous global theme park’ (Barber 1996, 4). What remains is ‘one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce’ (Barber 1996, 4). Paradoxically, he also contends that the world is witnessing a ‘retribalization’ (of ethnic, religious, and other identity groups) as a defensive and reactionary measure against globalizing forces. He suggests that eventually globalization will win out over retribalization and that the best way forward in a new reterritorialized, rescaled, and homogenized reality is to support, encourage and engage in grass-roots civil democracy and some form of global governance. If ‘tribalized’ groups (small, distinctive and/or peripheral regions, cultures, and political entities) are to be viable in the coming McWorld, they will need to find ways to harness globalization processes for their own purposes.

In her 2000 book, No Logo, Naomi Klein offers her own critique of global capitalism, suggesting that it inexorably erases and eradicates all local, indigenous, and traditional forms of culture and ways of living. Regardless of this and other critiques, some writers such as Thomas Friedman suggest that we are in the midst of an accelerating and essentially
inevitable combination of processes that are making our world increasingly flat. Indeed if peripheral communities, regions, and cultures are to establish their lot in today’s ‘flatter’ world, they must look ‘outward’ and be prepared to ‘glocalize’, ‘adopt’, and ‘adapt’ to rapidly changing conditions, and ‘increase the level of trust’ and integration among and between themselves and the many international players with whom they must increasingly interrelate (2005, 324-329).

So is global capitalism really the irresistible, homogenizing force that so many have portrayed it to be? Is there any way for regions and local cultures to come to an accommodation with (or even to resist?) the neo-liberal orthodoxy that has accompanied ‘globalization’, particularly with regard to endogenous goals of regional development and cultural preservation? Perhaps, as John Ralston Saul has noted, the concept of the nation state in the Western world increasingly may be both ‘old fashioned’ and fading, but arguably, it simultaneously may be enjoying a resurgence of sorts (2005, 232-233). As well, reconfigurations of territorial and cultural identities seem to be presented as alternatives to their respective status quos. In short, there may be multiple diverse scenarios still in play (2005, 237-238).

Notions of the onset of an inevitable new “McWorld” may well be overstated. Indeed there is evidence that ‘the world seems to be slipping into national and regional groups’ (2005, 240). One can refer to David Elkins’ conjecture about territoriality: that assumptions of ‘boundedness’ and ‘compactness’ – of territory as ‘turf’ not ‘intermingling’ with that of another – are breaking down (1995, 14). And while he concurs that economic relations have ‘globalized’ and weakened national control over much of their economic functioning, ‘[l]ikewise, political organizations at the local or regional level and at the supra-national level
compete with nations for the allegiance of citizens.’ Past conceptualization of economic, political, and cultural territoriality has changed; space can be occupied in different ways (1995, 15-16). Furthermore, from this proposition can also come the corollary that within different regional frameworks, endogenously forged identities can be used by citizens as a means to seek, protect and negotiate autonomies in the realms of economic, political, and cultural development (Keating et al. 2003; Bickerton 2012). In so conceptualizing, we can refer to Pieterse’s (2001) definition of the term ‘globalism’, which can entail multi-scalar groups managing or fostering globalization. With a critical globalist approach of neither celebrating nor blocking out globalization processes, we may be able to glean how – and to what extent – the pursuits of identity construction, autonomy, integration and regional development are employed as political strategies that are utilized in peripheral communities’ struggle for survival, community integrity and territorial justice. But also worth asking is, when political strategies are perceived by peripheral communities to be externally imposed against their best interests, how have these pressures been resisted, negotiated or managed by these communities?

From this perspective, those who are drafting, proposing or revising regional strategies and development policy frameworks need to be cautious and mindful of capital flows and technological changes and their ramifications for wide-ranging situations. This ‘selective globalization’ allows that the nation state is no longer necessarily the prime unit of development. According to Pieterse, development in that sense is all-societal with avenues that can be cross-border and macro- or micro-regional; the spatial unit of development is becoming more regional and local. Thus, scholarly regional and development analysis would in part involve ‘posing the central question of global inequality in its new transformations’
(2001, 47-48), as well as acknowledging that regionalisms, region-building, and their associated politics remain highly relevant even if one concedes that in the new century, ‘the world is flat’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014; Friedman 2005). This relevance could be highlighted by studying regions between the sub-national and local scales. Such regions should be further acknowledged as important cases of regionalism and territorial politics in and of themselves, especially in the new globalized context as described above. From a pragmatic standpoint, by examining the experiences and processes occurring in a ‘less formal’ (e.g. without a constitutionally-entrenched formal institutional apparatus) sub-national region, active citizens in similar regions may learn important lessons for undertaking regional projects peculiar to their own communities. In adopting this approach, the dominant ideological underpinnings of globalist preaching, which asserts the inevitability of a homogenizing ‘globalization’, can be held to question.¹

The dissertation contemplates that prevailing political and economic dynamics of globalization may well give direction to, or determine the parameters of regional development initiatives (regional development strategy and program formation); this may also be the case for the general trajectory and content of cultural development. Even so, it can be argued that other variables – such as regional institutions and the agency exercised by regional actors – can exert their own endogenous, adaptive and ‘indigenizing’ effect on region-building and regional development, and can do so in a manner that incorporates regional preferences and identities. In effect, endogenous institutions and cultures, and the human agents who establish and act through these institutions and cultures, can resist, accommodate and offset to some degree the homogenizing pressures associated with global change mechanisms.
Notably, endogenous regional actors and institutions may reinforce and *complement* the prevailing political-economic prescriptions espoused in the global order through active, accommodative reconstruction of cultural identities and promotion of regional insertion into the global economy through building a ‘market compliant’ development regime (e.g. strategy, policies, programs). At the same time, institutional factors (such as institutional design and bias or elite interests and preferences) may trump the prevailing economic paradigm as determining factors. In the same vein, it should be noted that ‘local state actors act on their own initiative and at times their preferences conflict markedly with those of national governments’ (Breslin et al. 2002, 17 citing Breslin 2000). In this connection, it is likely that systemic flexibility or inflexibility toward rescaling processes – for instance, Canadian federalism in the case of the region of Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia – will influence region-building strategies as well as policy design, administration and outcomes in the field of regional development.

A study of a unique peripheral region that addresses the above issues could contribute to further understanding the complexities of regionalism – including the regional policy responses of both government and non-governmental actors – in our current globalized climate. While ample scholarship has analyzed the politics of nation states, ‘nation-regions’, and constitutionally recognized and administratively well-endowed sub-state regions such as provinces in Canada, much less scholarship has focused on distinct sub-state communities or peripheral regions with relatively little by way of formal institutional support and with limited (if any) jurisdictional autonomy. The purpose of this study is to analyze how one community falling into this category manages (or not) the challenges of defining, building and maintaining itself as a region in an increasingly globalized setting. In other words, the
study will probe how a distinct peripheral community with limited resources and autonomy responds to globalization through various forms of resistance, negotiation, and accommodation of political, economic and cultural integration.

The need for such studies is timely because demographic, social, cultural, political, and economic pressures are increasing on many peripheral regions. While such pressures may be perceived as beneficial for at least some of the communities in question, for many regions their impacts appear to be quite negative, even bringing into question their long-term survival. For instance, in an era when proposed neo-liberal solutions for economic and social problems predominate, peripheral regions have been challenged to respond to (and sometimes through) its associated capital, territorial, scalar, and policy-related prescriptions for readjustment. Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, Canada (see figure 1) is one of the peripheral regions that has been forced to do so. This thesis will examine how it has adapted to globalization, and closely related to this how it has strategized about regional development and utilized key endogenous factors (culture, identity, institutions and leadership) toward this end. Notions of globalization that suggest a generalized and ‘inevitable’ process of economic and cultural homogenization will be questioned by this study. It will also contribute to our understanding of how small peripheral communities that lack formal political autonomy and jurisdictional authority can nonetheless build a regional capacity to respond and adapt to globalization processes.
1.2 THESIS QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Guided by the conceptual outline above, I intend to ask questions about the relationship between globalization, region, identity and culture, institutions, political leadership, and finally development through a focused, mainly qualitative study of a peripheral region (described below) with distinctive topographical, social, cultural, and economic features. With this exploratory path in mind, I intend to inquire into the following research questions, which may also provide useful insights for other regions facing similar circumstances:

• How have political actors in the peripheral region of Cape Breton envisioned, built, maintained, and when necessary reconstructed their region?

• How have these institutional actors attempted to adapt to globalization, and in this context how have they strategized about regional development?

• What role have the key endogenous factors of culture, identity, institutions and leadership played in these processes?

The above questions are posed in the face of seismic global changes in the economy (Giddens 1991; Amin 1994; Boeckelman 1995; Held 1991; Scott 2000; Friedman 2005) and national and provincial changes in the social and regional dimensions of the welfare state (Banting and Myles 2013). Corresponding to this, rural development scholar Tamara Krawchenko points out the difficult position in which endogenous region-building actors in Atlantic Canada find themselves: ‘The federal government’s focus on deficit reduction, the fiscal constraints of declining tax bases, and the increasing public expenditures faced by Atlantic Canadian governments continue to make for a challenging funding environment’ (2014, 87). In the face of such global, national and provincial pressures, both governmental
and civil society actors in peripheral regions are forced to be innovative, coherent, and coordinated in terms of their strategic response. Therefore, on the one hand, this line of inquiry is concerned with endogenous influences on regional identity constructions and institution-building, as well as the design of regional development agencies, strategies, and programs. On the other, it relates to the possibility as well as the scope of an endogenous effect on the historical process of regional development. Also important for this inquiry is that the very presence of regional agencies and programs is both an indicator of regionalism and a contributing factor to it (to the extent that these become regional institutions), and that as such they constitute spaces within and over which there is likely to be political contestation (both within the periphery and between centre and periphery). Worth noting here is that this inquiry necessarily involves three different dimensions of political analysis: polity, politics, and policy. Important to studies of territorial pluralism (including this one) is the question of how politics (interests, power, ideas, institutions) and policy (programs, expenditures, regulations, other outputs) intersect with the polity dimension (the boundaries of the political community and the territorial identities attached to these boundaries).

With these considerations in mind, the approach to be adopted here is similar to and builds upon that of Keating et al. (2003, 1). As summarized in their work on culture, institutions and economic development, this work intends to ‘illustrate the ways in which different regional growth [and socio-cultural] coalitions’ attempt to build their regions and integrate them into broader national and international markets, while ‘retaining a degree of cultural, social [and political] cohesion.’ Also important to this dissertation is the line of inquiry pursued by Söderbaum and Taylor, who note that ‘the puzzle is to understand and explain the phenomenon of regionalism and the process through which regions come into
existence and are consolidated – their “becoming” so to speak…” (2008, 20). In this regard, we must be conceptually aware that before the region itself comes into existence, there first must be region-builders (2008, 20; Neumann 2003, 162). The dissertation must therefore also ponder ‘by whom, for whom and for what purpose’ is the region built and rebuilt on a continuing basis (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008, 21).²

1.3 THE CASE

Cape Breton Island, in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada is a region with which, as a native, I am intimately familiar, but also with which I have been professionally engaged for more than two decades as a practitioner of a traditional music art form and a participant in the local economy. This familiarity and engagement has made me passionate about the Island’s cultural preservation and concerned with its development prospects. Alternatively, I have been a non-resident of the Island for the most part of the last 16 years. This puts me in a unique position as a scholar seeking to comprehend the Island’s social, economic, and most especially, cultural challenges and institutions: I can provide the theoretically-informed and disinterested analysis of the outside observer, while also harbouring the experientially-derived and empathetic perspective of the embedded participant.³

Not only is Cape Breton worthy of examination in its own right, but also for what it can contribute to the broader study of the politics of regionalism, which continues to be a relevant and important branch of social science inquiry in an era of accelerated global change. From a regional development standpoint, the Island is both a peripheral (in geographic, economic, political, and cultural terms) and socio-economically disadvantaged region relative to national norms. As such, it faces rather daunting development challenges
that have been the focus of governmental and non-governmental initiatives over an extended period of time.

While demographic, geographic, and cultural similarities and commonalities can be discerned in many regions, the jurisdictional and territorialized differences associated with Cape Breton may create a new opening for regional scholarship in Canada that has been largely untapped to date. While Cape Breton is clearly a region in the sense that it constitutes a territorial, political, cultural, and economic space that exists below the nation-state level (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014), as a region subsumed under a Canadian province it does not have formal constitutional status, nor does it enjoy institutionalized jurisdictional power within Canada’s federal system. The study thus endeavors to provide information and conclusions about ‘other forms of spatial politics’; for instance how rescaling affects region-building in ‘less formal’ regions in a Canadian federal system that has overwhelmingly been analyzed through the lenses of federal institutions and social science scholarship that grant provinces a form of ‘uber-regional’ status, as noted by regionalism and federalism scholar James Bickerton (2012). Borrowing from variants of new institutionalism, exploring the creation and political effects of formal and informal institutional arrangements will guide my inquiry into addressing the primary and interrelated research questions. How, for instance, has federalism – as ideology, institution and political process – been used as a political resource (including its rescaling) to negotiate and advance the processes of region-building and development promotion in Cape Breton? Has this occurred through adjustments at the margins even when institutional hierarchies and boundaries appear to be static and unchanged? What role have processes of (re)territorialization, rescaling, and institution-building played in region-building?
In accord with the foregoing discussion, this dissertation will advocate the need to transcend disciplinary boundaries and to reintegrate and reassess variables such as culture that were once considered salient, later discounted, and then eventually reconsidered as possible developmental attributes within regional development models.

1.4 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

The next chapter provides the multi-dimensional theoretical framework that underlies and guides the dissertation’s analysis and provides a review of pertinent literature that has directly or indirectly impacted analyses of Cape Breton regionalism, region-building, and in general the politics of territorial pluralism.

In chapter 3, “Cape Breton as a Region Before Canada: Unama’ki, Isle Royale, and Diasporic Sanctuary for the Scottish Gael”, the settlement patterns and early political, social, and cultural institutionalization of Cape Breton are traced. Indeed, there were notable junctures (e.g. its annexation to Nova Scotia and the influx of Scottish Gaels) that profoundly shaped the Island’s identity and regionality, as well as placing restrictions on, and creating certain opportunities for, its construction and reconstruction.4

Chapter 4, titled “The Becoming of Industrial Cape Breton: Economic, Social, and Cultural Transformation”, begins by noting how the formal institutionalization that accompanied the creation of the federation of Canada played a major part in shaping Cape Breton’s economic, social, and cultural path of development. Industrialization was beginning at the time of Confederation and with the infusion of private capital came various processes of institutionalization that would address it. Leadership, politics, and an increasingly resistant
labour movement figured prominently in the developing *regionality* (theorized in the next chapter) of the Island that carried on into an era of industrial decline and economic crisis, impressing its mark on regional reconstruction into the present.

With vestiges of industrial-era, labourist culture becoming entrenched as a key part of the ‘Celtic Fringe’, the Island was about to address serious economic challenges as it encountered diminishing markets for its steel and coal, the primary products of its industrial base. Chapter 5, “Cape Breton as ‘Socialist Island’: Industrial Decline and the Developmental State”, discusses how Cape Breton attempted to adapt to a severe and extended economic crisis. With private ownership eventually abandoning the coal and steel industries on the Island, and a vertical, clientelist political culture already established, political actors harnessed the state and its institutions to essentially take over ownership and management of the declining industries. In the decades that followed, as Cape Breton was impacted by global economic trends, the prevailing ideological and political-economic approach began to shift, inciting institutional and community actors to engage in a process of regional reconstruction.

Chapters 6-9 take the position that Cape Breton is a region in transition – in effect, under reconstruction – in the current era of globalization. While there are indications of its ongoing redefinition and reconstruction (see the theory discussion in next chapter), it remains unclear what kind of region will emerge from this process. What we do know is that there are multi-scalar region builders on the Island who, using Pieterse’s suggested definition of globalism, are attempting to both *manage* and *foster* globalization at the regional level.

Chapter 6, “Rebuilding Cape Breton in the Era of Globalization: Regionalization of Political and Social Institutions”, discusses the politics of rescaling and reterritorializing
governance, health, and educational structures in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton at a time when neo-liberal ideas about government restraint and shrinking the public sector were becoming prominent throughout the Western World. Determined leadership has been a prominent factor in dismantling embedded structures and institutional practices; the resultant regionalization process at the very least makes possible an enhanced capacity to act, respond and adapt as a region in an era of accelerating globalization.

Chapter 7, “Postindustrial Cape Breton: A Re-Envisioned Development Regime”, provides an analysis of changing regional development institutions. Discussion is interwoven with the multi-level (vertical and horizontal) and multi-actor dynamics that have been occurring on the Island as it alternately attempts to resist, adapt to, and integrate into the new global economy. The complex institutional web constructed during previous phases of regional development has been undergoing change in form and as a result of readjustments by government. This chapter helps to situate the formal institutional aspect of Cape Breton’s reiteration and reconstruction in the contemporary context. However, since regions are always undergoing reconstruction, it remains indeterminate as to exactly what kind of region the Island is ‘becoming’ given these recent institutional changes. The chapter provides an analysis of Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC), the Island’s most prominent development institution in the era of globalization, and then presents an overview of the region’s main institutional actors in a post-ECBC setting after the federal government disbanded the crown corporation. The globalized era, as will be noted, has seen withdrawal and rescaling of government involvement in regional development and an increase in horizontal and multi-level institutional interaction, as well as gathering momentum for a bottom-up endogenous approach to development. The chapter explores action within the
context of the emergence of a new region-building coalition. Notably, municipalities are finding themselves increasingly positioned as directors of economic development as the upper levels of government alter policy and structure. While the chapter implies that ECBC is no longer a player, it should be noted that it was involved with some of the development projects and enterprises that are discussed. This suggests that with the demise of ECBC, there is potentially a major challenge looming on the horizon (in terms of an engaged senior government partner) for the emerging region-building coalition.

Chapter 8, “Globalizing the ‘Celtic Fringe’ through Culture and the Arts”, takes a close look at how Cape Breton has been adapting to the changing global economy through harnessing culture, one of its recognized endogenous strengths. The chapter provides an examination of institutions and institutionalization affecting (and affected by) Cape Breton’s pursuit of cultural, social, and economic development. Though a multicultural region, representations of the Island’s culture and identity have tended to emphasize its predominant Celtic element, as examined in Chapter 3. This is not to deny the importance of the other ethno-cultural groups that have intermingled and cooperated with each other. For example, while not covered in detail in this dissertation, the Island’s Acadians – and how they have responded to globalization – deserve a study of their own. The same holds true of the Mi’kmaw community, the primary focus of Chapter 9. It must be emphasized that restrictions and choices have had to be made for this study as a result of the breadth of institutional, cultural, economic, and social avenues that are available for analysis. So on the question of the ‘Celtic Fringe’, it should be emphasized that although components of the Celtic/Gaelic culture have brought the ‘Celtic Fringe’ to international attention, the Gaelic language remains in a precarious position, even more so than the Island’s other ‘historic’ minority
languages: Acadian French and Mi’kmaq (see Newton 2013). From a new institutionalism standpoint (see next chapter), we will see later in this work that formal institutional and economic power (and stereotyping attitudes accompanying it) – with regard to the capacity to maintain the Gaelic language in Cape Breton – was located elsewhere, not within the Gaelic community itself. That the Gaels were politically and culturally marginalized in this sense, despite their relatively large numbers, demands that I give them close attention in this work. Notably, chapter 8 suggests that increased institutional presence, government support and corresponding political leadership can increase the chances for ‘successful’ region-building and development. This point fittingly bridges Chapters 8 and Chapter 9.

Chapter 9, “Unama’ki: From Marginalization to Economic Integration and Political Autonomy”, recognizes that, like the Gaels, the Mi’kmaw people have been marginalized and peripheralized, although to a more alarming degree. They experienced this because of unyielding power structures that were closed to them and outright racism. However, significant changes have been occurring for the Mi’kmaw in the areas of self-determination and economic development and, as a historically marginalized but growing demographic in Cape Breton and Canada more generally, an analysis of this community is timely. Like the Gaels of Cape Breton, they have been resilient, and through endogenous leadership taking advantage of new resources – and utilizing for development purposes cultural uniqueness, education, institutionalization, and strategic partnering – have forged a path toward increased cultural, social, and economic autonomy.

Chapter 10 provides conclusions and insights regarding general findings about the region(s) Cape Breton has become. It weaves the theoretical threads of the dissertation through the detailed empirical material presented here and outlines how the Cape Breton case
1.5 METHODOLOGY

As noted, the study focuses on a single, distinct regional case; it is contextual, exploring how political and other institutional actors attempt to (re)envision and (re)build a region in response to globalization processes. The methodological approach is mainly qualitative. The dissertation adopts methodological pluralism, or triangulation, as advocated by della Porta and Keating (2008; 2009). The complexity of context and perspectives surrounding the research questions make the research inductive, holistic, and interpretive (see Creswell 2007, 38-41).

The study is a political-economic-historical analysis of a unique case of territorial pluralism. Each chapter provides political-economic and cultural context within an organizational framework that attempts to categorize and capture territorial agency and political processes under (but not restricted to) the main region-building themes of culture and identity, institutions, and political leadership. Described in more detail in Chapter 2, the theoretical framework stems from a blend of components of the new institutionalism (historical and sociological), the new regionalism, and identity. The approach involves political-economic, as well as cultural and social historical description, analysis, and interpretation of a case study region to address the above stated research questions. The work describes how political and other-institutional actors have (re)envisioned and (re)constructed the region, noting policy approaches and adoptions, as well as institution-building and institutional changes which have occurred with regard to Cape Breton (as well as at national,
provincial, and global scales as they relate to the Island). The findings in turn will not only provide an increased empirical understanding of this one single case, but could also in the future through ‘pattern matching’ allow further conclusions to be drawn about territorial pluralism through other-regional comparisons (see Campbell 2004; Thelen and Streeck cited in Steinmo 2008, 168-174). In other words, noting the replication of processes occurring within the case region of Cape Breton and other regional cases would situate this study in, and strengthen and expand the breadth of, research findings in this research field (see Tellis 1997).

A variety of data sources have been either accessed directly or by secondary means throughout the project. These sources include primary ones such as policy documents and annual reports from organizations and government departments and agencies (e.g. Statistics Canada, Government of Nova Scotia, Membertou First Nation). Secondary sources figure prominently and include print and digital news stories and reports; unpublished MA and PhD theses (as the case region is relatively under-represented in the context of regional scholarship); and published books and certain journal articles. These sources provided support for the research questions, and helped to locate and contextualize causal processes, institutional change, and policy adoptions.

‘Elite’ semi-structured interviews were conducted, involving 24 political, government, academic, and community-level leaders who have been involved in region-building in Cape Breton (see Appendix A for Interviewee Details; Appendix B for interviewee question guide). The total number of interviews conducted was decided and based upon a subjective interpretation derived from the following: a) the number effectively contributed, as support sources for the triangulated qualitative approach to the dissertation
while theoretical saturation (of recurring themes and insights) had been subjectively reached and b) the number was reasonable in consideration of space constraints for the dissertation and time constraints for its completion, and the already wide array of detailed empirical information that had been gathered from other sources (Guest et al. 2006).8

The interview selection methods were based on the main criterion that the informants chosen would be well-suited to presenting views representative of region-building leadership on the Island. Participants were chosen mainly through purposive and selective snowball sampling (see King 2004). That is, first, because of my cultural and professional association with the case study region, I was aware of certain potential interviewees who could provide valuable insights for this study. I also utilized web searches for locating ‘prime candidate’ informants from the regional development community. Second, as is often the case, leads for some interviews came from interviewees themselves, as well as from one of my dissertation advisors (snowballing). While a positivist critique could note the subjectivity of such interviews (in terms of their number and content), again, their inclusion is in keeping with the approach of triangulation. It can be argued that interviews help to corroborate other secondary and primary data sources and enhance through contextual first-hand accounts, understanding of how actors in distinctive peripheral regions and multi-scalar settings envision, build and maintain their regions (and interpret these processes) as a response to globalization. They illustrate the importance of the endogenous leadership factor to region-building and highlight the location of power and power relationships that affect regional development. Interviews also provide an opportunity to elicit interpretations of agency occurring ‘on the ground’ and how it may differ from associated claims to action expressed by governments through official policy documents, press releases, and so on. Finally, the
interviews provide interpretation regarding the workings of both formal and informal institutions associated with regional development, a point covered in more detail in the next chapter.

NOTES

1 In *The Cape Breton Fiddle: Making and Maintaining Tradition* (CBU Press, 2006), I questioned arguments about the possible ‘inevitability’ of globalization effects and subsequent cultural homogenization. The survival of an intact and thriving regional art form in the region of Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, hand in hand with its commodification and commercialization, demonstrated that it was indeed possible for cultural self-awareness, community integrity, and distinctive regional identity to flourish in conjunction with a regional economic development strategy (including tourism initiatives) that attempted to connect or tap into globalization trends. In that process, the goal of endogenously influenced resistance, accommodation, and development can be pursued in regions under economic and cultural threat from ‘globalizing’ forces.

2 With regard to the region of analysis -- Cape Breton Island, in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada -- its internationally celebrated traditional art form, as depicted in my previous work, becomes a signifying component of development and community durability, an example of how mobilizing actors of one of Canada’s culturally distinct communities (and a regional case representative of the North Atlantic “Celtic Fringe”) can not only maintain but possibly strengthen the Island as a region. Doing this requires that institutional actors accommodate certain globalization processes by negotiating the Island’s insertion into the global political-economic and cultural environment, as the primary mechanism for addressing its development challenges. As will be noted in the theoretical coverage of Chapter 2, institutions need not be interpreted as solely formal organs of the state. A broader perspective will be utilized, taken from the new institutional theoretical position, emphasizing that institutions can encompass ‘both state and civil society’, as well as be considered ideas, norms, and values within organizational structures found in a wide ‘organizational field’ (see Keating et al. 2003, 3; DiMaggio and Hall 1991).
Cape Breton’s predominant Scottish Gaelic, Acadian, and Mi’kmaw cultural identities have enjoyed a historical moment of revitalization and reinterpretation over the last few decades, although the Gaelic resurgence – peculiar to only this region of North America -- has arguably enjoyed the most attention. The eastern section of the mainland of Nova Scotia could also be included here in that it is experiencing a resurgence in Gaelic-speaking youth; however, it is generally agreed that Cape Breton is the last remaining ‘living’ Gaelic cultural stronghold in North America (see Kennedy 2002), making it a unique and important case study when it comes to exploring the connections between identity and region-building in a globalized setting.

Regionality is a recent term used by Bickerton and Gagnon (2014) that denotes an identity-related agency and consciousness related to region (re)constructing and (re)building. For further elaboration see Chapter 2.

Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC) was the Island’s decades long prominent development body, federally-mandated to support diversification of the Island’s (and adjacent mainland town of Mulgrave’s) economy in the context of heavy industry decline.

Michael Newton contextualizes the ‘ideological foundations’ and comparative institutional ‘situation’ in which the Gaelic language has been placed: ‘Of the three minority languages of Nova Scotia, Gaelic has the weakest ideological foundations. Mi’kmaw can assert its status as the indigenous language of the region and its restoration an aspect of the recognition of the colonial damages inflicted on native peoples. Although Acadian French is distinctive from “standard” forms of French, French enjoys national protection and institutional support across Canada, as well as international prestige, even if most Nova Scotians simply treat it as a job skill to acquire which they expect will enhance employment prospects’ (2013).

In the early part of the last century familial transmission of Gaelic quickly disintegrated. Language loss was multi-causal, part of which has to be assigned to a generation or more of parents and grandparents; however, the position of the dissertation is that there were more powerful and forceful institutional and structural factors at work. As noted on The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia’s website, ‘Reasons cited for Gaelic’s decline are low status and institutional exclusion of the language resulting in ridicule and punishment in public schools and economic disparities and out migration. As a result, Gaelic language and its attendant culture experienced severe decline throughout 20th century Nova Scotia’ (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015a).

Guest et al. (2006) explored the subjective and conceptual notion of theoretical saturation -- ‘the point [when conducting interviews] at which no new information or themes are observed in the data -- as the oft-expressed mode for ‘determining nonprobablistic sample sizes’. Their evidence-based recommendations ‘found that saturation occurred within the first twelve interviews, although basic elements for metathemes were present as early as six interviews’ (2006, 59).
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical survey will begin by examining regionalism and the new regionalism (as well as related theorization pertaining to territoriality and regional identity concepts), and holistically, institutional approaches used in social scientific inquiry. These will form the theoretical foundation for the case study analysis of Cape Breton. These theories in their development and application are interrelated with the onset and unfolding of globalization processes, which will also be theorized.

2.1 REGIONS AND REGIONALISM

Up to this point, region has been discussed without elaborating on what this concept entails. How does one describe such an abstract concept? What is a region? Defining region and regionalism is deceptively difficult; as concepts they are broad, vague, ‘relative’ (Roth 2007, 20), ‘loose’ (DeLombaerde 2012), and clearly mean different things in different situations (De Lombaerde 2012; Roth 2007).

Canadian political scientists have most often defined region within the parameters of the formal institutional apparatus of the federation (see Bickerton 2012). Perhaps from this less contemporary standpoint, region – in Canada as an example – can be formally defined within the workings of its institutions. In that regard regions become the formal, prescribed regional governance units of Canadian federalism — in other words, provinces with set territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. Brodie has noted that federalism
scholars such as ‘Elkins, Simeon, Smiley, Breton, and others have argued that to become mobilized, regional differences must have an institutional focus’ (1990, 15). So, to begin, regions exist wherever formal regional institutions exist, and presumably the obverse also obtains. At the extreme, Donald Smiley suggested banishing the term ‘region’ from our political vocabulary and replacing it – in the Canadian instance – with province (1987, 23). It is my suggestion, however, that we should not restrict our consideration of regions to provinces and territories, as Canadian neo-institutionalists have tended to do. Rather, we must understand that institutions, both formal and informal, occupy a large area of influence in discussing both provinces and other regions. Conflating the notion of province with region would preclude the study of regional entities with other spatial boundaries, including the fact that constitutionally and institutionally defined spaces such as provinces host their own internal regional differences (Matthews 1982, 13-14). Cape Breton, for instance, can be conceived as a nested region within the province of Nova Scotia, and within the nation-state of Canada (Bickerton 2012; Bickerton and Gagnon 2014). Region can also refer to spatial areas that contain more than one political unit – such as supra-national or cross-state areas – and ‘intermediate levels of political representation or governance’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014, 253). This approach to region is certainly less constrained, self-limiting and rigid than that suggested by federalism scholars such as Smiley. It also fits better within the parameters of the new regionalism discussed below.

From a more contemporary standpoint, region implies spatiality but expands beyond strictly formal-institutional and territorial dimensions. It can be conceptualized as ‘sameness within a geographic space that separates or differentiates it from some other
geographic space’; ‘a medium’ used by individuals to perceive and provide meaning to other structural elements; a constructed functional and ‘physical space within which other social, cultural, psychological, and economic forces are at work’ (Bickerton 1999, 209). The content and character of regionalism can therefore vary depending on ‘outcomes of social or political processes’ (Bickerton 1999, 209). It is not, for instance, exclusively a subjective, socio-psychological phenomenon but can also imply political conflict that derives from and revolves around resource distribution across geographic spaces (Bickerton 1990, 331 citing Brodie 1990). Following from this, and as NRT has come to the forefront in regional studies, I favour adopting Bickerton and Gagnon’s working definitions of region and regionalism (influenced by Keating). In their formulation, a region is:

[A] territorial entity distinct from either the local or the nation-state level that constitutes an economic, political, administrative, and/or cultural space, within which different types of human agency interact, and towards which individuals and communities may develop attachments and identities. Regionalism is the manifestation of values, attitudes, opinions, preferences, claims, behaviours, interests, attachments, and identities that can be associated with a particular region (2014, 253).

Conclusively, while we should consider that regions can ‘be explained also by interaction of the underlying differences with the effects of the institutional structure’ (Simeon 1977, 296), their abstractness and multidimensionality (including that of the institutional structure) need not require their banishment from scholarship on account of an insinuated weakness as explanatory variables. To the contrary, the knowledge gathered for this dissertation reiterates that ‘to understand politics in all its complexity’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2009, 72), we must be open to the study of regions and regionalism. They have been influential in shaping the nature of political party systems, constitutions,
government structures, legislatures, identity contestations and formations, and public policies. Indeed, ‘the various manifestations of region, and the complicated dynamics of regionalism, are as important an aspect of politics today as they have ever been’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2009, 72). Finally worth stating is that regions and regionalism involve complex political, economic, social, and cultural interactions and identity-related attachments that can provide added breadth for understanding and explaining politics in an increasingly globalized context. Regions and regionalism, it should be remembered, are continually being constructed and reconstructed; they are ‘the historic work of human actors and actions’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014, 253) and therefore should remain an important area of political inquiry in the future as they are reconstructed in response to accelerating globalization processes.

2.2 REGIONAL IDENTITY AND REGIONALITY

What factors contribute to the development and acknowledgement of regional manifestations and regional dynamics? A crucial theoretical consideration should be identity — more specifically its formation, maintenance and reconstruction. This study builds on previous identity scholarship, linking it to regionalism and territorial politics. Though sometimes conflated (see Fearon 1999), identity cannot be reduced to culture, and may in part be, as some scholars suggest, ‘a product of the discourses in which individuals move’ (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, 188). In a recent interpretation Castineira theorizes that identity is not predetermined; rather, a feeling of identity is progressively constructed (2011, 43). Scholars have moderated the concept into ‘two linked senses’: ‘personal’ (or individual) and ‘social’ identity, with the latter also depicted as a ‘social
category’ (Fearon 1999, 2, 10-38; also see Castineira 2011). An ‘implicit linkage’ exists between the two (Fearon 1999, 14). Personal identity is derived from ‘psychological and neurophysiologic factors and dispositions’ on the one hand, and cultural and social factors on the other (Castineira 2011, 43). Its progressive construction arrives through the interaction of the individual with a group or community within a certain cultural context (2011, 43). Put another way, recognition could be said to be a part of such interaction. As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor notes, ‘our identity requires recognition by others…our identities are formed in dialogue with others’ (Taylor 1991, 45). Personal identity also refers to the ‘special pride’ a person takes in having a socially consequential yet unchangeable [at least in the sense that the individual believes it to be] ‘socially distinguishing feature’. This implies that such a feature is a source of dignity and self-respect for the individual (Fearon 1999, 36-37). Social identity implies a sense of belonging to a social category that can be defined by expected behaviours or characteristic features as well as informal membership rules. With such a linkage, pride, honour, dignity, and self-respect are gained for the individual through membership in a defined social category – such as an ethno-cultural group, or a region -- that provides them with socially distinguishing features, as can also be taken from Taylor’s theorizing above (Fearon, 1999, 32, 35-37; Taylor 1991, 45).

In connection, multiple identities coexist, overlap with, or even compete with one another within, for instance, a regional configuration. To understand multiple identities, we can begin by considering the concept of collective cultural identity (Anthony Smith (1991, 3-8; 1995, 114-115; Castineira 2011). Elements of collective cultural identity should not be viewed as fixed over time. Instead it involves a ‘shared continuity on the
part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit’ (Smith 1995, 114). What we are left with is a collective credence in a common destiny of the group. The ‘ethno-history’ of a collectivity, as opposed to an historian’s interpretation of its history, is therefore a defining feature of cultural identity (1995, 114). From this insight, nationalism scholar Anthony Smith suggests that we can then view ‘the cultural history of humanity’ as an enlargement and differentiation of identity processes ranging from age, gender, clan and tribe, to village communities, city-states, regions, and empires. Through that evolution societies have witnessed stratification that produced other ‘focuses of identification’ such as status groups (e.g. ethnic communities and castes) and classes. Smith therefore suggests that both the number and the scale of cultural identities have grown over time, to the point that the political and cultural norm is now national identification, ‘transcending other loyalties in scope and power’ (1995, 114-115).

Regardless of this last assumption (which has been contested and modified within the new regionalism scholarship discussed below), multiple identities ‘may reinforce national identities or cross-cut them’ (1995, 115 my emphasis). On that note, I quote Christopher Ray summarizing Smith’s reflections on regionalism: ‘The growth of regionalism, according to Smith (1991), can be linked to a reaction to the growth of the state and modern society with their tendencies to centralization, anonymity, economic polarization and cultural uniformity which, the regionalist argues, work to the disadvantage of peripheral, cultural regions’ (1995, 355; also see Tarrow 1977). By also referring to Smith’s recent working definition of national identity, one could place regional identity along the same identity continuum, located on varying points between the ‘global’ and
the ‘local.’ In that regard, a good working definition of regional identity might be derived by replacing ‘national’ with ‘regional’ in the quoted section below:

A ‘sense of national identity’, however significant, is nevertheless a concomitant of the concept of the nation, or ‘national community’: it sums up the members’ perceptions of difference and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other national communities and their members. Hence the rationale for my own working definition of the concept of national identity as ‘the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation by the members of a national community of the pattern of symbols, values, myths, memories and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the variable identification of individual members of that community with that heritage and its cultural elements’ (Smith 2010, 20).

We should also acknowledge Anderson’s stance that human collectivities such as nations or regions are ‘imagined communities’ where members (re)construct such communities, buttressed by a shared common identity that members acknowledge, even though they may not be personally acquainted (1991). Also noteworthy is that leadership influences the ‘invention of regions’, ‘new imaginative spaces’, and the region-building process. This occurs through the ‘selective use of history’ and ‘mobilization of symbolic values’ for the purpose of forming a system of collective action and social regulation below the level of the nation state, where there is a lack of sovereign powers (Keating 1999, 5). So although a key component of regional identity is culture, regional identity is also linked to and created through the influence of leadership, territorial attachment and sense of place, historical memory (especially a sense of grievance), and relatedly, myriad institutional effects (e.g. representation, mobilization, socio-economic effects, and a ‘regional bias’ in values and preferences). The effect of the interactive processes involved in these linkages is a degree of agency and consciousness, or *regionality*, that informs the social construction, maintenance and reinforcement of a region.

Therefore identity, when associated with a territorial configuration inclusive or
non-inclusive of some form of statehood or sub-state jurisdictional authority, and involving such interaction, is an important component of the formation, recognition, and progressive construction of a region, as well provoking or stoking within the region’s denizens a sense of regional consciousness. Regionality, then, is a dimension of regionalism that is constructed and recognized by individuals, groups and institutions within a territorially-defined space, as well as (over time) those from ‘without.’ In other words, regionality should be closely associated with regional identity construction, perception, and promulgation, beginning with the conceptualization of a regional identity involving both the individual subject and the collective group, the establishment of a sense of otherness and a feeling of distinctness, and involving some coincident and correlated measure of agency-driven, region-building process, that occurs within a (re)territorialized space. Regionality somewhat mirrors, without a typologizing approach, Hetne and Söderbaum’s concept of ‘regionness’ (2002) and the degree to which a territorialized community may exhibit this, depending on its agency-related level of regionalization, as depicted later in this text. Regionality is used essentially to express the idea of ‘regionness’, which suggests that regions are unalike not only in their particularities, but also because they can be placed on a continuum of regionness, for example, ranging from ‘deep/substantive’ to ‘shallow/superficial’. “Regionalism” in this construction becomes a manifestation of regionness or regionality, manifesting itself in political, cultural or economic ways, or all of these simultaneously (as regionality grows or deepens). To wit, ‘regionality’ can be utilized ‘to refer to the intensity, distinctiveness, and cohesiveness that distinguishes the regionalist behaviours and practices of a particular regional community, including the possibility of a different degree of
regionality at the societal level (think ‘bottom-up’ agency) as opposed to its expression in
terms of regional political institutions’ (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014, 253).^2

2.3 ‘OLD’ REGIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND NEW REGIONALISM

‘Old’ regionalism is associated with the industrialization and modernization that
occurred in the postwar period and is generally viewed as having stagnated in the mid-
1970s (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002). In the context of restructuring of territorial
management beginning around this time, three emerging types of regionalism could be
distinguished: 1) defensive regionalism, whereby economically-stagnant locales and
deindustrializing urban areas dependent upon traditional and heavy industries (the so-
called rust-belt) resisted change; 2) integrating regionalism, whereby modernization of a
region for the purposes of reinsertion (while relinquishing claims to cultural promotion or
regional distinctness) into its national economy was encouraged; and 3) autonomist
regionalism, whereby a ‘distinct path to modernization’ was pursued by the region, based
on a program combining autonomy, economic modernization, and cultural promotion
(Keating 1997, 24).^3

Globalization

The turn from various forms of old regionalism and the restructuring of territorial
management associated with it was linked to the wider geo-political-economic and
cultural phenomenon of globalization. There is little consensus surrounding the ‘often
muddled and deadlocked debates’ about globalization (Scholte 2000; 2; also see Held et
However, Scholte provides a summation of five general definitions, each with valuable elements to consider (2000, 15-17). The first can be deemed *internationalization*. This involves ‘a growth of international exchange and interdependence’ in the process of ‘cross-border relations between countries’. This notion has been described by Hirst and Thompson as ‘large and growing flows of trade and capital investment between countries’ (1996a quoted in Scholte 2000, 15). A second view presents globalization as *liberalization*, involving increased deregulation of restrictions on economic, trade-related, and migratory activities between countries in efforts to produce a ‘borderless’ world economic system. In that sense, globalization could be defined as ‘the process of international economic integration’ (Sander 1996, 27 cited and quoted in Scholte 2000, 15-16) under the guise of the tenets of neo-liberalism. A third (and actually not so novel) position sees globalization as a process leading to *universalization*. In that respect, and similar to the original queries posed in the introduction, the increasingly integrated human activities and processes being spread around the world are tending towards ultimate global homogenization, a ‘planetary synthesis of cultures’ encompassed by a ‘global humanism’ (Reiser and Davies 1944 quoted in Scholte 2000, 15). Likewise, a fourth interpretation associates globalization with such terms as *modernization*, *westernization*, or *Americanization*. From this standpoint modernity’s social structures such as capitalism, industrialization, rationalism, liberal democracy, and so on, are diffusing worldwide, eliminating or neutralizing non-western cultures and local autonomies in their wake (Scholte 2000, 16). Others deem this interpretation of globalization as nothing other than a continuation of colonization of the developing world by the developed one (Khor 1995; Ling, 2000 cited in Scholte 2000,
A fifth more nuanced definition (highlighting deterritorialization and spatial-temporal parameters) is provided by Held et al. (1999, 16) and is most complementary to the themes addressed in this work. The above definitions either focus on one or a limited number of aspects of globalization, or when emphasizing international connectedness, could be interpreted as interactions between a limited number of countries. To emphasize such definitional limitations, Held et al. first provide a general summation from the scholarly field: globalization ‘refers to the widening, deepening, and speeding up of global interconnectedness’. They suggest that it ‘begs further elaboration’ (1999, 14-15). The above processes could theoretically be more spatially confined and subsumed within regional or a limited number of national interconnections. Held et al. suggest that a definition should reveal what is truly global about globalization. They introduce the need to insist on locating globalization ‘on a continuum with the local, national, and regional’ so that it can represent activities with ‘expansive spatial connections’ between localized and regionalized spaces that in turn have global commonalities. Their definition also provides for noticeable/notable and observable spatial-temporal characteristics about human social, cultural, and economic interactions that take place in globalizing circumstances. Globalization entails,

a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power (1999, 16).

Their definition is inclusive of processes (advocacy of neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions, intensification of transactions via higher-speed technologies, and so on); power parameters (involving regional winners and losers); and spatial nuance (de-
territorialization and re-territorialization for purposes of integration with global markets and other global trends). This interpretation bridges well with globalization conceptualizations extant within NRT.

New Regionalism Theory (NRT)

Regionalism studies were ‘brought back’ within this newer context of global restructuring that involved movement away from Cold War polarization towards multipolarity; a decline of the Westphalian nation-state-focused system in favour of international interdependence; a change in the global power structure and division of labour; and changing views about ‘other’ political systems and the increasingly popular neo-liberal approach to reviving and restructuring national political economies (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002). Notably in this context, regionalism scholarship evolved from conceptualizing the notion of region as a fixed formal institutional ‘container’ to defining the region as an entity that is multidimensional and continually (re)constructed. This insinuates not only that various manifestations of communities are imagined (Anderson 1991) and created, but also that regional definitions have moved toward inclusion of process within them, and also points to the effects incurred from interactions between a growing number of state and non-state actors in a globalizing world. The multiplicity of actors (and regions/regional forms) and the multidimensional nature of regionalisms have widened the breadth of regionalism analysis; this has been accompanied by the emergence of theoretical frameworks within the social sciences that are better equipped to analyze the new ‘regional phenomenon’ (De Lombaerde 2011, 32-35).
The new regionalism explores the newer territorial frameworks that encompass different axes for state and private and ‘other-public’ action. This globalization-related, multi-scalar arrangement of economic and political activity has been described as ‘the changing scale of public action’ that coincides with a restructuring of territorial management (Keating et al. 2003, 6). Arguably, state-centric patterns of social, political, and economic relations have been ‘denationalized’ and are intensified at sub-national and supranational scales in ‘another wave of de- and reterritorialization’ (Brenner 1999, 52). Similar to Held et al’s conceptualizations, New Regionalism theorists suggest that globalization in its contemporary round entails economies, societies, and cultures being enmeshed in ‘a multi-scalar restructuring of capitalist territorial organization’ (Brenner 1999, 68; also see MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, 205 quoting Jessop 1997a, 18 and 522 citing Mayer 1984; Keating et al. 2003). We can also bear in mind, especially with regard to regional development approaches and related agency discussed in the later chapters of the dissertation, five key themes underpinning policy practices associated with NRT: 1) the establishment of clusters and innovation systems; 2) a focus on place-based policy; 3) active engagement in multi-level governance; 4) emphasis placed on knowledge transfer and policy learning; and 5) institutionalized mechanisms for lesson drawing from the many programs and localized initiatives that shape regional development (Bradford 2010).

The importance of process as extrapolated from new definitions of region and NRT complements scholarly recognition of the need to conceptualize and analyze region-building in the study of regions. The dissertation therefore is influenced by, but not restricted to, De Lombaerde’s depiction of region-building: ‘a multi-dimensional process
of social transformation whereby actors, associated with sub-national governance levels and belonging to a limited number of different states (my emphasis) intensify their interactions through the reduction of obstacles, the implementation of coordinated or common actions and policies, and/or the creation of regional institutions, thereby creating a new relevant (regional) space for many aspects of human behaviour and activities’ (2011). This also meshes with the process of regionalization that is described and traced in the case studies undertaken by Söderbaum (2011, 56; also quoting Fawcett 2005, 25): ‘Regionalisation’ refers to the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion and identity creating a regional space (issue-specific or general), and involves state as well as non-state actors.’ For Fawcett (2005, 25), ‘[a]t its most basic it [regionalization] means no more than a concentration of activity – of trade, peoples, ideas, even conflict – at the regional level. This interaction may give rise to the formation of regions, and in turn, to the emergence of regional actors, networks, and organizations.’ And processes of regionalization (e.g. institutionalization, see Amin and Thrift 1994, 15, 17-18) can be both formalized as well as informalized.

2.4 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

Between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, political science analysis was mainly undertaken through an institutionalist approach, concerned with formally describing political and constitutional structures and institutions; as such, it was much less theoretical than would be found later in the field (Peters 2005, 3, 6-11). This traditional focus on institutions waned between the 1940s and 1960s. Developments such as the rise of communism with its extra-constitutional power structure rooted in the Party
and Germany’s catastrophic decline into fascism (despite having been briefly endowed
with a liberal-democratic constitution) discredited a formalistic institutional and
constitutional analysis and moved political science toward analyses ‘based on broader
social, cultural, and economic forces’ (Archer et al. 1995). The scope and size of the state
in the years after WWII, however, was still rather small and many political scientists did
not seriously consider the idea that institutions could have a significant influence on
society (Archer et al. 1995, 2). In American political science especially, institutionalism
became marginalized in the 1960s and 70s. It was depicted as an atheoretical, parochial,
and descriptive mode of analysis lacking the ‘scientific’ foundations of behaviouralist
(society-centred) approaches. Essentially, institutionalism lost ground to behaviouralist
grand theorizing, deduction, and quantification that had reached ascendancy in the social
sciences during that period (Lecours 2005, 3). In the political realm, this positivist
approach focused on quantifying individual political behavior, and in the economic
realm, ‘on the systematic power that flowed from the economic relations of a capitalist
system’. Ultimately this concentration on either the economic system or individual
psychology tended to neglect the influence of institutions (Archer et al. 1995, 2).

By the late 1970s, however, as a response to the growth of welfare states in
western democracies and increased state intervention in ‘economic and social life’,
political scientists were bringing the state back in to their analysis. The importance of
understanding the effects of the state and politics on society had become undeniable
(Archer et al. 1995, 2-3; see Skocpol 1979; 1985; Lecours 2000; Thelen and Steinmo
1992). Indeed as March and Olsen (opening the door for multi-variable causality) were
noting, the state ‘is not only affected by society but also affects it’8 (1984, 738). In short,
the new institutionalism had arrived.⁹

Regardless of this ‘approach shift’, there is no overall agreement among new institutionalists about how institutions should be analysed or even defined (see Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Lecours 2005). It is, however, widely accepted that there are at least three branches, or theoretical strands of new institutionalism. Summarizing them will help decipher how some of these theorists have come to define institutions. These strands include rational choice, sociological, and historical. More recently discursive institutionalism has been suggested as a fourth branch (see Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Lecours 2005; Schmidt 2008; 2011). ¹⁰ As the first three strands have been the most widely accepted, discussed and applied, they will be will be covered here. Of note, this study adopts the historical institutionalist and sociological institutionalist variants (see Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Lecours 2005; Schmidt 2008; 2011).

Old institutionalists and some new institutionalist theorists would (re)emphasize that institutions are ‘formal rules and organizations’ (Streek and Thelen 2005 cited in Steinmo 2008), or ‘material structures’ (namely formal ones) composing the state. Such structures would include constitutions, parliaments, cabinets, courts, bureaucracies, ‘federal or autonomy arrangements’, armed forces, and for those scholars advocating for expanding into the societal realm, party systems and unions (Lecours 2005, 6; see Steinmo et al. 1992).

Other new institutionalists – such as those adopting a rational choice approach – would acknowledge the material and structural nature of institutions but instead emphasize ‘rules of the political game’ within which individuals operate and the ‘equilibrium’ that such rules represent in institutional form (Lecours 2005, 6). In that
vein, rational choice institutionalism is closest to behaviouralism in its focus on quantifying individual actors' behaviours by taking a rationalist ‘calculus approach to the problem of explaining how institutions affect individual action’ en route to maximizing individual self interest (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 945) and strategies (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 9). While new institutional scholars such as March and Olsen (2009; 1995, 30-31) similarly adopt the importance of ‘rules’ to their approach, they depart from the individualistic rational choice branch, suggesting that rules are ‘organized into institutions’ and perpetuate a cognitively and normatively associated ‘logic of appropriateness’ (that countervails utility maximization toward self-interested outcomes) shaping human action (2009, 3). 11

This notion extends to sociological institutionalism. Sociological institutionalists move even further from the materialist interpretation of institutions towards more normative considerations. They conceptualize institutions as ‘cognitive scripts’, beliefs and values that are internalized and ‘culturally framed’ within cultural and normative contexts (Lecours 2005, 7; Schmidt 2001, 47).12 Procedures and forms of organization can be depicted as ‘culturally-specific’ and similar to societal myths and ceremonies, and not necessarily utilized for ‘formal means-ends efficiency’, but for ‘transmission of cultural practices more generally’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 946-947; also see Schmidt 2001, 47). Therefore new institutionalists view conventions as being more than convenient means to outcomes; conventions are thoughts and actions internalized as social rules that affect strategies, preferences, goals, and outcomes (1991, 8; also see Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 9). In relation, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that institutions in the sociological tradition ‘are everywhere’, composing an ‘organizational field’ of
wider territory than would be defined by rational choice and historical institutionalists (1991, 8).

Finally, and again from a more ‘materialist’ interpretation, historical institutionalists generally view institutions as formal structures. But the scope of historical institutionalism is both eclectic and wide, for the following reasons:

1) It broadly conceptualizes relationships between institutions and individual behavior. In that sense it can form a common front with the rational choice and sociological institutionalist positions and address the structure-agency conundrum. Historical institutionalists figure that ‘how one behaves depends on the individual, [but also] on the context, and on the rule’; in other words, ‘there can be no a priori way of knowing what one should study when trying to explain political outcomes’ (Steinmo 2008, my emphasis). Furthermore, history involves a complex combination of interactions between multiple institutions and actors (Lecours 2000, 514) with historical institutionalists viewing ‘goals, strategies, and preferences as something to be explained’ with context, rather than assuming that they are based on self-interest alone (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 9).

2) Historical institutionalism emphasizes power asymmetries associated with the development and operation of institutions. It is important to locate where power lies, and in whose interests it is exercised. In doing so we may be able to see how some institutional designs are favoured over others (Lecours 2000, 514) and how institutional design and the segments of society it privileges, contributes to regionalist activities.13

3) Historical Institutionalism highlights the importance of path dependence in
institutional development. Institutional forms, practices, and policy legacies, once established, often become embedded and are difficult to change. Again, to locate commonality between theoretical threads, sociological institutionalists would point out that the embedded logic of appropriateness affects the path of that institution. To contextualize, ‘once a country or a region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the original choice’ (Lecours 2005, 9 citing Levi in Pierson 2000, 252). But changes do occur, according to historical institutionalists, at critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or through incrementalism (Thelen 2003 cited in Harty 2005, see below), with unintended consequences occurring beyond the original formation of institutions (see Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Such changes, so a major critique of new institutionalism goes, should somehow be explained (see below).

4) Historical Institutionalism integrates other factors, notably ideas, which also contribute to political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). As a part of a new institutional framework, ideas are viewed ‘in terms of norms and values whose importance are a function of the material institutions from which they emanate’ (Lecours 2005, 7) and would therefore seem crucial in explaining institutional formation, affectation, and change (Harty 2005, see below).

More or less insinuating that these dynamics occur primarily within formal political institutions, the materialist inclinations of historical institutionalists are
highlighted against the wider-ranging sociological approach. But because historical institutionalism allows for scholars to incorporate the ideational aspect into their framework, the historical strand becomes more compatible with the sociological branch, which emphasizes norms and ideas but stipulates that they need not have to emanate from formal political structures (Lecours 2005, 7). What is interesting to note too, is that this feature of sociological institutionalism addresses a common criticism of (historical) new institutional analysis -- that the formal materialist focus provides a narrow and simplistic perspective of politics. Yet the merits of the materialist institutional focus can also be highlighted by suggesting that it provides ‘the advantage of analytical clarity because it involves an ontology where institutions and society are more clearly distinct’ (Lecours 2005). Thus it could be argued that the wide reach of the sociological approach is too broad to be able to pinpoint key agent(s) or structure(s) shaping political phenomenon, patterns, or change. In that sense, ‘the normative or ideational definition paints a picture in which state and society are really close, almost indistinguishable’. However, the sociological approach adds valuable analytical (qualitative and triangulated) rigour in that it offers ‘a multidimensional treatment of politics’ (Lecours 2005, 7). Conclusively, institutions provide both ‘opportunities’ for and ‘constraints’ on agency, and from historical and sociological perspectives, ‘affect not only strategies and interests, but also patterns of relationships between actors, preferences, objectives, identities, and indeed, the very existence of actors’. Thus it is argued that institutions are shapers throughout all dimensions and processes of politics although their path-dependent nature can have an ‘overwhelming influence’ [often in a restrictive sense] on actors (Lecours 2005, 9, 11).

Of note, the above observations illustrate another common critique of the new
institutional approach: its branches appear to be irreconcilable if institutional definition and inclusion is extended beyond the materialist stance. This work, however, adopts the position of some new institutional scholars that a common ‘theoretical core’ is available from the combined perspectives of the new institutionalism. Indeed, ‘[m]uch discussion now focuses on the potential for border crossing, [for instance] with the historical institutionalists left betwixt and between, straddling the fence between these perspectives’ and reclaiming ‘analytic and normative space for issues of power and justice’ (Immergut, 1998, 28). So, by combining historical and sociological institutionalist approaches, we can provide a holistic view of social and political institutionalization processes occurring in unique cases of region-building and territorial pluralism. This would include cases like Cape Breton that are affected by formal state ‘material’ structures, but also norms, ideas, identities, civil society organizations, and so on. In other words, a new institutional framework with wider scope, can more completely address culturally unique sub-state communities such as Cape Breton, which lack formal institutional endowments, but feature a broad institutional field containing multi-scalar public, private, and civil society organizational actors responding to globalization processes.15

Be that as it may, while this broader institutional approach may present a more multidimensional exploration of human agency and coalition-building in informal regions, the primacy of standard political institutions cannot be ignored (Immergut 1992). As Immergut notes, formal political institutions have a significant amount of autonomy; they can ‘facilitate or impede the entry of different groups into the policy-making process’ and often have the ability to even ‘shape demands by changing the strategic
environment in which the demands of groups are formulated’ (1992, xii, xiii).

The ‘Problem’ of Institutional Change

With the understanding that path dependency and institutional stability are primary assumptions and expectations of institutionalism theorizing, a key query that arises is what accounts for the emergence of institutions and change associated with institutions? We could begin with March and Olsen, who note: ‘processes internal to political institutions, although possibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history’ (1984, 738). So, institutions do not just ‘receive’ change from societal influences and conversely they are not just ‘instruments’ subject to the manipulation of actors (Lecours 2005, 8). Markedly this insinuation of the possibility for institutional change to occur (and perhaps more readily than assumed) has been depicted as the ‘Achilles heel of new institutionalism’ (Harty 2005, 52). It runs counter to new institutionalism’s ‘constraints’ assumptions about path dependency and stasis (2005, 52). This lies at the root of one of two main critiques of new institutionalism: 1) that institutions are not as durable as institutional theorists insist; 2) that new institutionalism lacks a ‘self-contained’ theory of endogenous genesis of institutions; in other words, it is too reliant on attributing change to exogenous forces (2005, 52).

Early new institutionalist literature suggests that there are two characteristics of change: that it occurs at critical points or junctures and that it is episodic. Therefore, it is suggested that institutions experience periods of equilibrium whereby they remain locked into a state of stasis. But ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Steinmo 2008) may occur whereby triggers or shocks, often international and exogenous in scope
(e.g. economic crises or terror events) create ‘opportunities for innovation and change’ (Harty 2005, 60). Notably there is not much discussion in the literature about agency; actors are reacting to these shocks at these junctures, resulting in changes that would hopefully restore order and stability (2005, 60). But how sticky must the critique be that there is an overreliance on the exogenous cause of change, or put another way, ‘that political and institutional change is purely a product of fate’ (Steinmo 2008; Harty 2005, 60)? And if that critical assessment is not to be relinquished, how can it be shown that change can be affected endogenously, initiated from within, thus strengthening the new institutionalist theoretical framework? Harty suggests that in an increasingly globalized world, the lines between exogeneity and endogeneity of an institutional system are blurred. As depicted in NRT, states are operating in a complex multi-scalar setting where it is difficult to decipher the difference between external and internal environments. One could postulate that ‘nested’ regional political activities could trigger a policy response at the national or supra-national level that in turn, could result in a significant institutional change (i.e. law, tax reform, institutionalization of a regional development body) at the sub-state level (2005, 60). And to develop this insight further, Radaelli et al (2012) attempt to address ‘pitfalls’ of new institutionalism by bridging together institutions, rules (e.g. the law), and policy. Institutional change, they argue, need not be attributed to assigning institutions per se as causal instruments: ‘institutions do play a role within the policy process not outside it’ [their emphasis]. The institutional domain need not be kept separate from public policy; as these authors note, institutional policies are, quite often, public policies. They add that ‘institutional change has policy effects, such as the creation of new actors, the generation of new arenas and fora, and the redefinition of policy
problems’. Actors involved in such changes ‘mediate’ the policy responses; but I add that new actors brought in may exist outside the formal institutional realm, thus creating an opening for the proposed historical and sociological institutionalist combination advocated herein.

Other new institutionalists such as Kathleen Thelen would suggest that critical junctures do not fully explain change and that the notion does not account for the persistence of some institutions, even in the face of exogenous shocks. Returning to an earlier-mentioned point on incremental change, she states that institutions can experience subtle change over time; the perceived stability of institutions may be the result of an injection of incremental adaptations (to the external environment) over time (2003 cited in Harty 2005, 61). Such reforms could be accomplished through layering or conversion. Layering involves renegotiating certain elements of the institutional structure but leaving others intact, while conversion involves ‘redirecting institutions to new purposes’ (2005, 62). Over time the accumulated change could be substantial yet perhaps not so noticeable without the benefits of hindsight or if its original purpose and constituency are no longer being served (2005, 62).

But do such reforms and refinements amount to change, or stability? And should reform be defined as change? To date these queries seem unanswerable, as the existing body of literature, argues Harty, has not fully addressed this. However, he adds that through combining various theoretical proposals, ‘the beginnings of a theory of endogenous institutional change’ (2005, 62) are possible. First, he provides two preconditions for endogenous institutional change: ‘loss of legitimacy’ and ‘cost calculation.’ Institutions are more likely to be changeable if they are being discredited or
delegitimized. If an institution is failing to guarantee legitimacy to actors or if decision rules often discriminate against these actors, the propensity for institutional change increases. Additionally, a cost-benefit analysis -- which factors in time horizons available to institutional actors -- helps to determine if change is a viable option, and the extent/degree of form that the change should take.\textsuperscript{16} Harty then adds that institutional change can be explained by two independent variables. First, timing is important. ‘Windows of opportunity’ may present more favourable change climates to actors whereby they can accelerate their ‘agendas for change’. Pursuit of change could be costly without a window of opportunity that offers the chance for a viable alternative agenda to be presented. Actors, especially veto players (e.g. cabinet ministers, provincial premiers, top level bureaucrats) can mobilize and be ‘change ready’ to utilize institutional veto points (e.g. centralized Westminster executives with concentrated decision-making powers) when such opportunities are presented (Juillet 2005). Second, resources are the ‘means to change’ and that such resources need not be material. Hence Harty reemphasizes new institutionalism’s stance on the pertinence of ideas, perhaps especially economic ones (also see Steinmo 2008; Hall 1989). Change is more likely to occur if actors have ideas to back up and support the design of their proposed institutional changes. The ‘ideas’ assumption allows that at critical junctures, actors and institutions (arguably most often leaders, e.g. political and economic), acting with political courage and conviction, and utilizing institutional means available to them, can be change shapers through promoting, adopting, and implementing novel, incubated or prevailing ideas and their related policy prescriptions. In sum, with leadership playing ‘a key role’ at ‘formative moments’ (Rothstein 1992), ‘institutional change comes about when powerful
actors have the will and ability to change institutions in favour of new ideas’ (Steinmo 2008, 170).

That there is no consensus on institutional change does not make new institutionalism a weak mode of analysis; not all would even agree that a totally new theory of institutional change is necessary in the academy. Moreover, new institutionalism succeeds in challenging other theories of comparative politics while, as outlined by Harty (who points out resemblances to political mobilization theories), the approach suggests that initiating institutional change is ‘ultimately a political act’. From this discussion we can contemplate, ‘the heavy doses of agency and structure that are present in new institutionalism: our political environment – of which institutions are a part – shapes the realm of the possible and how we organize and mobilize largely determines whether or not we will be successful in our political goals’ (2005, 68).

2.5 OTHER PERTINENT LITERATURE

Raagmaa (2002) emphasizes the importance of regional identity (re)constructions in building regions and regional development regimes. The identity theorizations covered in section 2.2 also relate to processes of reterritorialization and rescaling and to the insights of authors who incorporate some of these concepts into their scholarship that, in turn and to varying degrees, relate to regional dynamics occurring in this dissertation’s specific case study (MacKinnon 1977; McEwan-Fujita 1997; Ray 1997; Johnson 2007, 171; Reid 1993, 504; Pryke 1992; Donovan 1990a; Conrad 2003; Keating 2011, 8; Tanner 2006, 64; Newton 2011; Kennedy 2002; Graham 2006; Bickerton 2012).

Much literature pertaining to regionalism (and more specifically to NRT),
peripherality, and regional development has focused on wide geographic areas. These often featuring entities with formal-legal status and political institutions, exhibiting regionalisms and regionalizations related to economic development challenges and historic grievances rooted in inequitable resource distribution across geographic spaces. Examples of this literature range from Savoie’s work (2006) on Canada’s Maritime provinces as an economically challenged region, to various compiled articles and book chapters covering the new regionalism (see, for example, Breslin et al. 2002). But to reiterate, historical regionalisms stem from a variety of institutional, psychological, cultural, and social forces (Brodie 1989, 1990; Bickerton 1990, 1999, 2012; Thomas 1991; Savoie 2006; Finbow 2004a; 2004b) and we should, in the contemporary multiscalar global context, adopt the ‘openness’ of NRT that enables theoretical leeway in exploring those underexamined regionalisms associated with less institutionalized, sub-state or supra-state spaces.

Most studies relating to the politics of regions in Eastern Canada have been dedicated to provinces as regions (e.g., for Nova Scotia see Bickerton 1990), the Canadian Maritimes (Savoie 2006; Acheson 1977; Clow 1984; Forbes 1979), or Atlantic Canada (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007; Finbow 2004; Reid and Savoie 2011; Conrad 2003). Not surprisingly, poorly institutionalized regions in a ‘soft’ informal regionalization framework (inclusive of non-state actors) have been neglected by political scientists whose scholarly focus has been on regions recognized as having sovereign features (Breslin et al., 2002). However, outside the Canadian context, Söderbaum has noted that ‘since the late 1990s’, ‘a more pluralistic conceptualisation of regions’ among scholars has led to ‘a more intense focus on soft, informal regionalism’ (2012).
In the 20th century, a large portion of ‘old’ regionalism and regional development scholarship focused on explaining the causes and solutions for regional differences and economic disparities (as opposed to region-building and constructions), pointing to disadvantageous geographical location, lack of natural resources, endogenous entrepreneurial and/or cultural weakness, and lower labour productivity, as main factors determining the socio-economic plight of peripheral regions and cultural groups (Turner 1893, cited in Billington 1977, 1; Weber 1958; Gras 1922 cited in Careless 1979; Lewis 1969; Careless 1979, 110; 1989, 115; Graham 1963; Innis 1930, 1940, 1956; MacIntosh 1923; Parks 1965; Watkins 1977; Draché 1995; Saunders 1984; and summarizing the staples approach, Corrignall-Brown and Wien 2009, 327). Although these works provided much value-added material to the study of ‘old’ regionalism, an unfortunate result was the formation and perpetuation of regional stereotypes evinced in some academic studies. Some conclusions from these studies have since been re-evaluated and challenged (Forbes 1979; Clow 1984; Matthews 1983; Bickerton 1990; Hunter 1991; Gerriets and Inwood 1996; Finbow 2001; 2004). Regardless, some authors suggest that a ‘culture of dependency’ perspective has shaped much regional development discourse in the case of Cape Breton Island (deRoche 2003, 227-234).18

Other theoretical areas in which we find psycho-cultural explanations for the socio-economic plight of peripheral societies and regions include diffusionist thought and modernization theories (promoting the need for cultural and economic ‘catch-up’ in peripheral regions) (Tarrow 1978; Lewis 1954; Rostow 1960); fiscal/social transfer dependency and how it can be equilibrated through the application of neo-liberal policy prescriptions (Courchene 1981; Courchene and Melvin 1986; Friedman 1962; Savoie
In contrast, some authors more recently have suggested that cultural distinctiveness may actually be a valuable resource that can be used as a tool to build regional economies (Griffin 1996, cited in Pieterse 2001, 15; Keating et al. 2003). This also applies to identity reconstructions, institution-building, and region-building in general (Keating 1999; 1997). Keating refers to this dynamic as ‘a “useable past” that can be pressed into service’ (1999, 14). Related to this, identity and cultural exploration, as well as general social history overviews, were explored in Morgan’s well-researched works on Cape Breton (2000; 2008; 2009). This study will inquire into whether this ‘usable past’ dynamic of region-building is occurring – and if so how, to what extent, and with what effects – in the case of Cape Breton.

This inquiry combines with some of the above-mentioned scholarship in its focus on the politics of regional development. A highly salient aspect of peripheral-territorial politics, regional development is indeed linked to region-building (1999; 1997), and therefore demands inclusion in the ensuing analysis. On this point, the dissertation adopts the stance that development should not be narrowly conceived as a purely economic concept and suggests that its analysis also requires attention to social, cultural and environmental factors. From this point of view, ‘development can be defined as an ongoing process that advances a society toward inclusive access to a broad and expanding range of goods and services and the opportunity for all individuals to fully realize their own human capacities and potentials within a sustainable physical and social environment conducive to a high quality of life’ (Bickerton 2013, 265).19

Since this dissertation will be exploring the role of human agency and institutions
in Cape Breton’s development history, a philosophical stance and practical approach that must be noted here is Community Economic Development (CED). CED is ‘about building a new economy in a disadvantaged community which lacks planning and decision-making capabilities, access to capital and infrastructural services, and positive linkages with the new economic environment’ (MacNeil and Williams 1994, 6). CED has been utilized by both government and non-government actors at the onset of the globalized era, when difficult economic and social circumstances beset Atlantic Canada, and more particularly Cape Breton (Savoie 2000; Diochon 2003). The role of CED in transforming Cape Breton into a postindustrial region will form part of the subsequent analysis.

Finally, I accept the argument that previous models and approaches to governance within the institutions of Canadian federalism have often not successfully addressed the particular development challenge faced by poorer regions (Finbow 2004), including sub-provincial regions such as Cape Breton Island (Locke and Tomblin 2003). These insights and analyses suggest that unsatisfactory governance regimes may provoke a regionalist response and provide leverage for various institutions and agents of formal political regions (and regions within) for reimagining and reconstructing themselves and their peripheral communities.

Conclusions

The linkages between the theoretical frameworks discussed above (identity, the
new regionalism, and the new institutionalism) address the complex purposes and objectives of the dissertation. Globalization processes have been linked to resurgences in regional identities involving multiple actors within formal and informal institutions at various scalar levels and territorial configurations. In the ‘new regional’ environment that has emerged in the latest phase of globalization, identity is constructed and purveyed by various actors and institutions, who are motivated and aided in the formation and attainment of political, economic, social and cultural goals by multiple overlapping identities and territorializations (which provides spatiality and boundedness to identities). New institutionalism provides a mode of middle range analysis that highlights state and society interrelationships and multi-causality. Historical institutionalism’s emphasis on path dependency contextualizes and highlights the difficulties (e.g. embedded structures and procedures) regional actors face in attempts to reconstruct themselves. Lecours boasts that historical institutionalism is also in a good position to ‘deal with the contingencies of cultural identity, and to explain the spatial-temporal variations of its manifestations’ (2000, 515). Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, can accommodate the multidimensional complexity of formal and informal institutions that must be analyzed in this work. Also, as depicted above, the new institutionalism has an ‘ideas, leadership, and resources window’ for attempting to explain change, and along with its agency-related components, complements the inductive approach to the dissertation. When combined with contemporary conceptualizations of regionalism(s) in an evolving NRT, it seeks to explain how these regions respond to, and attempt to integrate into the current global political-economic context.
NOTES

1 Sidney Tarrow (1977) argues the same when he says that periphery identities and politics are often defensive in character vis a vis the centre (rather than parochial remnants of a traditional past slated to disappear under an irresistible wave of modernity). Translate ‘globalization’ as the latest wave of modernity and his thesis parallels with Anthony Smith and, as such, a general position of this dissertation.

2 The concept of regionality is similar to Burgess’s use of the term ‘federality’ which he uses to evaluate the quality and societal embeddedness of federalism practices in different federal settings. Since Cape Breton is a region that clearly exhibits a form of stateless regionality, the ensuing analysis of regional reconstruction and development would be wanting without an examination of such agency at the societal level (2011, 11).

3 This is not to suggest that regionalism types need be compartmentalized as one or another of the above. A regionalism may be found to be in transition from one type to another, or be a combination of types.

4 So regionalism scholarship has undergone adaptations coinciding with global political-economic and cultural contexts. It has been repositioned -- from relational discussions (economic, political, social, institutional, cultural) pertaining to core and peripheral geographic areas within the context of the nation-state being the main unit/axis for political (and regulatory-economic) action – to redirected discussions more reflective of contemporary globalization-related circumstances theorized in the approach known as ‘the new regionalism’.

5 Seeing the scope that globalization processes entail, Brenner’s related insight is highly pertinent and heeded in this dissertation: ‘A crucial methodological challenge for globalization studies is therefore to analyze currently emergent geographies in ways that transcend the imperative to choose between purely territorialist and non-territorialist or deterritorialized mappings of social and political space’ (1999, 69).

6 Though the definition here is aimed at the emergence of cross-national regions (note the italicized text), it can be adapted for the purposes of this dissertation in that: 1) sub-national need not refer to a constitutionally formalized state or province, as the actors involved in alternative territorializations can still exercise their agency on behalf of their communities in governance and government; 2) the reduction of obstacles here need not be construed in strictly economic terms but could also include, for instance, informal practices such as parochial patronage and vertical patron-client relations which arguably restrict horizontal region-building action; and 3) coordinative or common actions could also involve identity ‘promotion’ as a mode of agency. Therefore these region-related conceptualizations are not inconsistent with the analysis at hand which certainly
envisions the development of complex relationships across traditional ‘national’ boundaries, and with myriad linkages with external actors and systems.

7 A concentration of institutions resulting from regionalization and institutionalization does not necessarily indicate the corresponding existence of a strong and successful economic region. Amin and Thrift, in their edited study on regional economic development, point to the importance of formal and informal institutions to regional development, while stipulating that such ‘institutional thickness’ can bring about both successful and unsuccessful economic results (1994, 17-18). For them, it may not be that institutions per se are of most importance, but institutionalization processes (akin to regionalization above, and as a part of fostering regionality) that may better provide for the stimulation of regional development (1994, 15). Of related importance for this dissertation is that not much is known ‘about the institutional field of local areas’ and, as the Cape Breton case is a prime example of this, it is certainly worth studying in terms of building empirical data and analysis for the fields of the new regionalism and the new institutionalism (1994, 19).

8 New institutionalists have reemphasized that political analysis should at least begin by focusing on institutions rather than societal theorizations of political phenomena (Lecours 2005, 5). But also, while political and social outcomes are shaped by political institutions (Lecours 2000; Thelen and Steinmo 1992) ‘institutions affect as well as reflect identities’ and therefore present a multi-directional causal arrow (Lecours 2000, 502). So relating to this study, for example, one could ask how government cultural policy affects community mobilization behind the goal of accessing cultural activities programs (institutional affectation), or how community leaders have come together to reinforce a sense of identity through language and other cultural components in order to affect cultural policy and institutionalization at the sub-state level (institutional reflection).

9 It has been argued that the Canadian political science tradition in general had never abandoned the notion that institutions should be ‘taken seriously’. Indeed, many Canadian scholars have been sceptical of behaviouralist ‘grand theorizing’, ‘of formulating nomothetic statements devoid of institutional references’ (Lecours 2005, 4).

10 Some scholars also now advocate for a new new institutionalism--discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008, 2011). Schmidt argues that this strand emphasizes the role of discourse and ideas in explaining political processes and outcomes, providing more nuance and complexity in explaining institutional change than do the ‘older’ new institutionalisms (Schmidt 2008, 303). Schmidt argues that once an idea (or ideas) are established as causal factors, one then must ask how it is transmitted from thoughts, to words, and then to actions. Thus the articulating and conveying of ideas through discourse can be interpreted as a form of agency that can invoke institutional change. Political actors can act, think, or speak outside of their institutions while remaining within them through a ‘communicative logic’, through discursive promotion of ideas that can lead them and/or other actors to become mutually motivated to maintain or change those institutions (2008). While the ‘older’ new institutionalisms note that critical
junctures can explain institutional change, Schmidt argues that discursive institutionalism better explains actions occurring at/leading into these junctures; in effect, discursive agency that causes institutional change.

11 March and Olsen theorize ‘logic of appropriateness as such: ‘Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’ (2009, 3).

12 Similarly DiMaggio and Powell note that the sociological tradition rejects individual rational actor models and embraces ‘cognitive and cultural’ explanations by focusing on ‘supraindividual units of analysis’ (1991, 8). They add that ‘institutionalization is both a “phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted” and a state of affairs in which shared cognitions define “what has meaning and what actions are possible” (Quoting Zuker 1983, 2).

13 Again, in relation to this dissertation, were particular individuals, groups or regions favoured by way of a financial, political, or social ‘advantage’ conferred by a particular state policy and/or by institutional redesign or repurposing? Was political or policy leadership (for example, in the form of a Deputy Minister, Premier or community leader) an important variable in securing policy changes that favoured or supported a certain cultural or territorial community, for instance through culturally or regionally-biased programming and institution-building? What were the incremental effects on regional identity construction and region-building more generally, in terms of additional material and symbolic resources? In the area of cultural policy and region-building pertaining to Cape Breton, leadership and institutional effects in the strain of historical institutionalism are thus important forces to be examined.

14 A main assumption behind the notion of institutional stasis is that ‘increased returns’ incurred from avoiding institutional change most often far outweigh the possible benefits attained from actively changing institutions (see also Steinmo 2008).

15 To reiterate, there is no agreement among scholars as to what actually constitutes formal and informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). And as we recall, the complementary new regionalism theory, as well as some new institutionalists would suggest that the multi-scalar and multi-actor nature of region-building should move beyond formal state/political institutional analysis and additionally incorporate coverage of informal cultural rules shaping behavior, and the non-state informal organizations that act within the constraints and parameters of formal and informal rules. NRT recognizes that the current political-economic interface features the above dynamics and NRT incorporates identity, culture, and endogenous as well as exogenous affectation for which new institutionalism allows (see Westlund and Gawell 2012; High et. al 2005; Boussard 2000; Manor 2001; Tsai 2002, cited in Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). In this holistic vein Cape Breton’s lack of formal-legal institutional status as a province suggests that a state-
centric, strictly formal interpretation of institutions for this study would limit its empirical and explanatory depth. The region’s informal institutions comprising its organizational field (Dimaggio and Powell 1991) have had a key part to play in its construction and development.

16 Harty (2005, 67) notes that actors are more likely to initiate an institutional change if they have a long timeline to absorb the costs that would eventually outweighed by the benefits. Likewise, a short time frame, often associated with political actors working within election cycles, would not be conducive to costly institutional change. Incremental change, likely producing short term benefits, would seem more likely to be initiated by actors working within short time lines.

17 Simply stated, such cases are more difficult for scholars to analyze. There is often less availability of official data for regions imagined beyond formal political parameters (although Cape Breton is recognized as an economic region by some statistics/agencies/houses, e.g. Statistics Canada). When getting into smaller community-based sample sizes, a larger proportion of the population is needed to attain statistical accuracy (e.g. confidence interval), thus making for a more challenging study and perhaps thus explaining the low availability of such statistics and the lack of interest by scholars to delve into unexplored and unfamiliar domains (see Morris n.d. “Sampling From Small Populations.” http://uregina.ca/~morrisev/Sociology/Sampling%20from%20small%20populations.htm)

18 Nor have other regions escaped being included within this point of view; this applies, for instance, to the Highlands and Western Isles of Scotland, persisting into the early years of the 21st century (Midwinter et al. 1991, cited in Keating 2003; Mackie 1962, 43; Hunter 1991, 20).

19 This interpretation of development considers that beneficial development outcomes for regional communities must also involve upgrading of human resources and human capital and improvements in overall quality of life. Accordingly, endogenous, agency-based development should be understood as a process that is fostered through multiple, multiscalar influences and inputs.
CHAPTER 3

CAPE BRETON AS A REGION BEFORE CANADA: UNAMA’KI, ISLE ROYALE, AND DIASPORIC SANCTUARY FOR THE SCOTTISH GAEL

“If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.”

Aristotle

Cape Breton is an island of 10,416 km2 which comprises the northeastern portion of the Canadian province of Nova Scotia. According to Statistics Canada’s 2011 Census, Cape Breton’s population was 135,974, roughly 15% of the province of Nova Scotia (StatsCan, 2011). Since 1996 -- in just a decade and a half -- the population declined by 8.6%, from 158,271. But as depicted in this chapter, outmigration is not a recent phenomenon for the Island, due primarily to the fact that double-digit unemployment rates have been commonplace (Johnson 2007, 154). Its primary urban area (Cape Breton Regional Municipality) has undergone significant, long-term economic challenges [related to the demise of its industrial base] and can now be deemed a post-industrial centre for services and larger scale retail (Keith MacDonald interview, 2014). Rural life on the Island – while not without its physical, social and cultural attractions for current as well as potential residents – is supported mainly through its natural resource sector and has generally not provided sufficient economic opportunities to sustain the bulk of its working age population (Appendices C and D illustrate the comparatively dire situation – regionally, and in the Island’s counties of Cape Breton, Inverness, Richmond, and Victoria -- with regard to employment and population numbers respectively). ‘Given such an economic problem, related social problems are present and
noteworthy: poverty, under-education, broken families, family abuse, teen pregnancies, alcohol and drug abuse, youth emigration and a long-standing sense of depression and social malaise’ (Johnson 1997; 2007). As late as 2014, a promising future for Cape Breton’s youth continues to be highly questionable; one third of the Island’s children (approximately 33%) live in poverty, one of the highest rates of child poverty in Canada (Chronicle Herald Nov. 24, 2014; Frank 2014).¹ (To highlight, and for comparative socio-economic and demographic statistics concerning CBRM and other jurisdictions, see Appendices D, E, F with regard to population, child and seniors poverty, and household income respectively).

While this description of Cape Breton at the end of the 20th century is a bleak one, political and economic changes taking place in the context of the new regionalism are in some instances opening up development opportunities for the Island. However, one must be cautious in suggesting that there may be promising future scenarios; witness, for example, the alarming population decline since 1996. Outmigration has been one of a number of factors that contribute to the Island’s cultural distinctness, economic and social disparity, and its regionality. The combination of these features (and others yet to be discussed) support the suggestion that Cape Breton Island constitutes a region in more or less continuous (re)construction, struggling to preserve itself by finding ways to somehow adapt and respond to a challenging, and increasingly globalized, political-economic and cultural environment. An awareness of a common cultural and economic distinctness is part of the identity and regionality felt and expressed by Cape Breton residents. Cape Breton is long considered to be a site of powerful regional identity within the province of Nova Scotia as well as the regional space of the Maritimes, and more broadly Atlantic Canada (Conrad 2002, 61). This chapter will reveal that Cape Breton’s sense of separateness, identity, and regionality has roots that
can be traced back to the pre-Confederation period (Morgan 2000). However, historian Robert Morgan points out that ‘racial, historical and economic interests of Cape Bretoners were too divergent before 1850 to permit a unified sense of themselves and the place’ (2008, 99, my emphasis). Instead, embedded ethno-cultural, imperial, and religious social institutional attachments and affinities most likely predominated in any sense of identification. However, the ensuing pages will reveal the origins of Cape Breton’s progressively (re)constructed cultural and regional identity. As will be noted in this chapter and the next, Cape Breton, especially in its industrial area, eventually encompassed multiple ethno-cultural groups; however, as a result of settlement patterns, the relative size and cultural influence of certain communities, and later government policy interventions, Cape Breton came to be recognized as having a particular set of culturally and socially distinguishing features that would carry over into and inform its present identity and regionality. Its identity then, has been shaped by its colonial, political-economic, and institutional history and settlement patterns (Hornsby 1992; Morgan 2000; Graham 2006; Melin 2012; Huk 2011).

The chapter proceeds with a historical analysis intended to uncover the foundations and emergence of a Cape Breton identity and regionality before Canadian Confederation. It will explain how political, economic, social, and cultural factors have shaped and continue to shape the reconstruction of the region. While research throughout this work (more notably in later chapters) involves a detailed focus on region (re)building in Cape Breton during the current phase of globalization, a look at the Island’s history will provide insight into why local actors have approached region-building in a particular manner, and what ‘usable past’ has become available to them in doing so. Thus to better understand the regionality of the
various constructions of Cape Breton, it is necessary to examine the Island’s early identity formation emerging from settlement patterns and political-economic development in order to provide context surrounding the generally path dependent political, cultural, and social institutions that have contributed to the region-building process. The historical overview will also reveal, as the dissertation goes on, how one regional construction carries over and leaves certain residual or continuous imprints on the next phase of (re)construction. In brief, this chapter provides an historical overview that attempts to explain how the region of Cape Breton came to be constructed and reconstructed from the time of early settlement to Confederation.

3.1 CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Cape Breton’s original inhabitants were most likely people of Algonquin origin, later supplanted by the Mi’kmaq who migrated from the interior Canadian Shield region (Morgan 2008, 6-9). The Mi’kmaq and closely-related Maliseet peoples eventually encompassed what is now eastern Canada and Eastern Maine. The Mi’kmaq named their territory “Mi’kma’ki” and it was divided into seven zones or districts, including that of Unama’ki, the region now commonly known as Cape Breton Island (CBU Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015). A predominantly hunter-gatherer and fishing society, the Mi’kmaq had their own pre-contact and post-contact governance structure.2 The Mi’kmaq were also part of the Wabanaki Confederacy, a coalition of First Nations encompassing Eastern Canada and Northern New England. Regardless of this wider governance structure, however, it should be noted that ‘the band level was the nucleus of social and economic activity’ (Coffin 2003, 113).
After Cape Breton Island was ‘discovered’ in 1497 by John Cabot (Higgins 1993, 34), commencement of European settlement began, linked initially to the Island’s involvement in the European-led staples trade, mainly fishing (Hornsby 1992, xxiv; Morgan 2008, 16-18). Migratory fishing visitations and modest inflows of other ethno-cultural groups to the Island continued, with Cape Breton Island a contested territory between the British and French. This prolonged military struggle between European powers with colonization ambitions was finally resolved by the outcome of the Seven Years War (1756-63). In the aftermath, within the historic Unama’ki zone of Mi’kmaw territory (subsequently regarded as ‘Isle Royale’ by the French), the gradual establishment under British control of a number of culturally distinct communities began. As Hornsby states:

Although numerous small Nova Scotian merchants became involved in the fishery, a handful of merchants based on the English Channel Islands soon controlled much of the industry. They established large fishing stations on the Island, imported supplies and seasonal labour from the Channel Islands, outfitted Acadian, Irish, and Scottish settlers for the fishery, and exported dry fish to overseas markets. By the early nineteenth century, a series of staple enclaves, each heavily dependent on external capital and markets but marked by considerable cultural distinctiveness, had been created around the coast of Cape Breton (xxv, 1992).

At the end of the eighteenth century roughly half of Cape Breton’s inhabitants were French-speaking Acadians dispersed mainly between Chéticamp on its northwestern coast and Isle Madame in the southeast. Besides the Island’s Mi’kmaw people, many of the remainder were Loyalists who emigrated to the Island after the American Revolution, along with some Scottish Gaels, Southern Irish, New Englanders, and English.

Soon thereafter, a second more earnest pattern of regional development began in Cape Breton prompting the establishment of a new, and more permanent cultural landscape (1992, xxvi). The Island was a destination in a wider pattern that ‘focused on agricultural
settlement and included the middle and New England colonies, as well as parts of Eastern Canada’ (1992, xix). These general patterns affected Cape Breton and its political-economic development into the nineteenth century (Hornsby 1992, xix). Settlement came in waves (D. MacKay 1980, xvi) mostly composed of an influx of predominantly Gaelic-speaking and Roman Catholic residents of the Scottish Highlands and Western Isles in search of reprieve from political, economic, cultural, and religious pressures, prejudices and persecutions. These were experienced in the context of anglicizing policies within Great Britain and economic ‘improvements’ through rationalization and eventual tenant clearances (Hornsby 1992; Kennedy 2002; Bumsted 1982; Graham, 2006; Campey 2004, 60).4

Immigration to Cape Breton from the British Isles throughout the nineteenth century was significant.5 The Gaelic influx saw the population of the Island grow from around 2000 to over 9000 between 1802 and 1820, with most Gaels – used to a rural existence -- choosing to settle in rural areas outside of Sydney until mining development began in 1827 (Morgan 2000, 40). The tide continued. By 1851, close to fifty-one thousand people were living on the Island (Feintuch 2010, 11). And from the early to mid-1800s, it is estimated that more than thirty thousand Scottish Gaels emigrated to Cape Breton (Hornsby 1992; Graham 2006, 25; Feintuch 2010, 11). Indeed, by the early 1830s, more Scottish Gaels were moving to Cape Breton than anywhere else on the continent; they quickly came to outnumber the previously-resident Acadian, Irish, and Loyalist families by two to one, and through force of numbers and community cohesion were able to establish ‘a meager rural niche in the rapidly industrializing world’ (Hornsby 1992, 31, 204; Graham 2006; Dembling 1997). Morgan goes so far as to suggest that ‘[t]he fundamental character of Cape Breton Island was established with the settlement of the Highland Scots. Their great numbers caused a major change in the
population of Cape Breton and ultimately set the tone for the island' (2008, 112). This seems a fair assessment as the Gaels ‘transplanted whole communities’ from the Scottish Highlands and Western Isles. Their ethnic majority, collectivism, and generally conservative approach to maintaining traditions, enabled them to carry on living their transported culture (including – for a while – retaining their language in their new sanctuary). Under these conditions their cultural influence, especially their music, gradually spread to and intermingled with neighbouring Mi’kmaw, Acadian, Irish, and other communities (Campey 2004, 185; Graham 2006, 29; MacDonald 1999).

Making a Living; Making and Maintaining Culture

From a modernization perspective, while the period leading into the mid 1800s has been depicted as one of ‘intellectual awakening’ in mainland Nova Scotia, some scholars suggested that parts of Cape Breton were still found to be ‘in the pioneer phase’ (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 77). From another standpoint, the most populous group on the ‘Celtic fringe’, in relatively isolated rural communities, carried on a communal subsistence lifestyle and highly complex oral culture(s) out of adaptive pragmatism and for community cohesiveness. Therefore, value was placed on family, community, and the churches for socio-cultural and economic survival. Small subsistence farms served the pioneers well but by the mid 1800s some began expanding or moving into farming, lumbering, and fishing as profit-making ventures. Although communalism was evident, structural inequalities and stratification were present while some community members, especially those enjoying more advantaged status, pursued more commercial diversification. And while life was difficult, the more modest occupational pluralism of the less advantaged Scottish settlers in Cape Breton
should be considered an adaptive response to, rather than the cause of the economic conditions they experienced (Bitterman 1999).  

In the cultural realm, the Gaels exhibited vibrant creativity accompanied by a streak of resistance. Generational emphasis was placed on religious loyalties, artistic creativity and preservation of language (for certain districts, families and individuals), music, community histories, stories, lineages, and epic poetry, some of which was based on depicting past histories of political and economic exploitation. Notably, popularized poetry of respected bards – which painted a helpless scenario of the early-arriving Gaelic pioneers – came to penetrate Anglo-centric interpretations of the highland immigration period. However, further literary evidence from such respected bards as John MacLean revealed a developing positive attitude among the Gaels with regard to the ‘great advantages which the New World had to offer’ and were reflective of ‘other Gaelic accounts which stress the greater freedoms and better livelihoods which could be realized through emigration’ (Campey 2004, 186; see Kennedy 1999). These findings display early adaptations and integration being undertaken by early-arriving Gaels as they began to construct their region(s) and reconstruct their identity in changing circumstances.  

However, cultural vibrancy did not negate the economic hardship experienced by many of the early settlers. By mid-century significant challenges were present, even with a ‘cultural awakening’ occurring in the Sydneys (the communities surrounding Sydney Harbour) and some other districts (see Donovan 1990 and below); newly-arriving settlers discovered that the good agricultural lands had been taken, not to mention the fact that potato blight (with its associated famine and hardship) arrived from Scotland and Ireland in 1845 (Morgan 2010, 11). With no significant further expansion in agriculture and little in fishing
and lumbering (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 101), the writing was on the wall for many rural dwellers. Many subsequently left the Island (Hornsby 1992) while others migrated to the growing industrial area to work in the coal mines, examined in more detail below (Muise 1980; Frank 1985a). With material resources relatively scarce in many Island communities, many residents and strategic community and political leaders recognized the importance of politics to the building of their region.

3.2 INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

Continuous contact with the generally welcoming Mi’kmaq saw the Europeans enter into agreements and treaties with the Mi’kmaq. The treaties were drawn up to set the principles and conditions for European-Mi’kmaw coexistence and the maintenance of Mi’kmaw autonomy and sovereignty. Mi’kmaw leaders and Catholic missionaries negotiated the first such agreement -- known as the *Concordat* ‘with the Vatican and the Holy See’ -- upon Grand Chief Membertou’s conversion to Catholicism in 1610 (CBU Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015; Dalby 2002, 67). A number of treaties with the ascendant British Crown followed, beginning in 1725. They were reaffirmed in 1752 and came to a culmination with the Treaty and Royal Proclamation of 1763. These agreements generally acknowledged the right of the Mi’kmaw people to hunt and fish in their territory in exchange for their loyalty to the Crown (CBU Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015), and as will be noted, would figure prominently in Mi’kmaw autonomy seeking and region-building.

Unfortunately, due to prevalent Euro-centric values and assumptions, the plight of the Mi’kmaq throughout the settlement period has been largely ignored. Unam’ki land was appropriated through European settlement, which resulted in a ‘historic displacement of the
Mi’kmaq [sic] population’ (Dalby 2002, 65). Notably Mi’kmaw encounters with Gaelic settlers largely happened ‘well after the dominance of anglophone [British] institutions and the devastation of Mi’kmaw communities: by the end of the Seven Years’ War the Indigenous population in Nova Scotia had been reduced to a tiny remnant whose land rights had been made forfeit’ (Newton 2011, 169). Regardless of the manner in which (and by whom and how) the Mi’kmaq were dispossessed of their lands, as the Island became more populated by Scottish Gaels, the result was a reterritorialization and (re)construction (towards an overall recognition) of a Scottish Gaelic Cape Breton region. However, Mi’kmaw marginalization should not be regarded as ‘merely’ a long-term process of incremental and informal land appropriation by incoming settlers. Figure 1 shows the geographical location of Mi’maw communities in Nova Scotia. Unama’ki is the island at the right. Figure 2 provides insight as to how the concentrated influx of Gaels could have a prodigious effect on regional
construction.

Figure 1- First Nation Communities in Nova Scotia. Source: Government of Nova Scotia. novascotia.ca
In the formal institutional realm, between 1755 and 1830, imperial assimilationist policy directly oversaw and managed the appropriation of Indian lands in British North America. The Indian civilization program began in 1830 and was centred on three policy pillars, which involved systemizing a) treaties of land succession; b) ‘Indian reserves and supervisory agents’; and c) education of Indians through ‘day and industrial schools, and later at residential schools’ (Leslie 2002, 24). It was into this setting – where imperial policy pressures were weakening Mi’kmaq and other First Nations’ influence -- that the Gaels were immigrating. Indeed, other significant changes were occurring in that century. Political and economic developments affecting the Island were setting the stage for the further construction of a ‘stateless nested region’ within the scalar contexts of empire, colony-province and nation-state.
The sense of ‘separateness’ and awareness of being ‘distinct’ is a prominent feature of Cape Breton regionality, but it should be emphasized that this is not a recent occurrence. The initial stage of this awareness among residents can be traced back a few centuries. In 1763, shortly after the reestablishment of British rule, Cape Breton was politically annexed to Nova Scotia (Morgan 2000, 104). This could be called the initial stage of Cape Breton’s on-again, off-again incorporation into Nova Scotia. The seeds of regionality were planted -- ‘Cape Bretoners were not happy with the connection, particularly since they were given no direct representation in the house of assembly, while being expected to pay taxes [see below] and serve in the militia’ (Morgan 2000, 104). Then, in 1784, Cape Breton was granted ‘separate’ status from Nova Scotia. It ‘was a separate colony, with a government separate from that of Nova Scotia. It consisted of a lieutenant governor, an appointed executive council and house of assembly’ (Morgan 2000, 153; Cuthbertson 1994, 273). There was a provision that the population of the colony had to be significant enough before warranting the calling of the assembly. As a result, the assembly was never realized, and absent an assembly, taxes and duties on coal, rum, and gypsum could not be collected and allotted in full to Cape Breton. This stymied autonomous Island development, not to mention that British shipping laws were unfavourable at the time and conflicts were commonplace between the lieutenant governor and the council (2000, 153).

After 1800 and during the influx of the Scottish settlers, a movement arose to convince the British government to convene the house of assembly in Cape Breton. The group took the issue to the local courts. The ruling stipulated that a sitting assembly was required in order to legalize the collecting of taxes and duties. Without the ability to raise
funds to support economic and social development, it was not surprising that the colony was near bankruptcy. In 1820, convinced that it would reduce colonial expenses, the British Colonial Office used its power and this window of financial uncertainty to rule that Cape Breton’s assembly would be that of Nova Scotia’s, and the Island was annexed by order-in-council (Cuthbertson 1994; Morgan 2000, 105; 153-154). Not all residents were pleased. Between 1820 and 1851, separatist sentiments gathered momentum in Cape Breton although secession from Nova Scotia would never be realized. The early political representative and institutional apparatus for the Island (or lack thereof) thus contributed to separatist sentiments and feelings of exclusion from Halifax and the mainland of Nova Scotia. A final separation attempt was undertaken seventy-five years later, with the legalities of the annexation brought to the table again, but ‘the Privy Council in London…decided that Cape Breton would remain a part of Nova Scotia’ (Morgan 2008, 93). Worth noting here, is that incorporation of Cape Breton into Nova Scotia in 1820 closed off one potential path of regional political development (as an autonomous colony-province). Nevertheless, the conditions for budding regionality were fostered (even without formal sub-state institutions), along with the social, cultural and economic development of Cape Breton as a distinct, if somewhat formally underinstitutionalized region.

Other Institutions

Contrary to the suggestion that Cape Breton was culturally backward compared to the mainland, in the 1840s the Island was actually experiencing a ‘cultural awakening’ of sorts (Campbell and MacLean 1974; Donovan 1990b, 89-112). In the communities ringing Sydney Harbour, intellectual and social life revolved around the churches, the garrison, and the court
house. Musical performances, public lectures, prominent painters, swordsmanship teaching and practicing, and even town bands could all be found in the area, while immigrant merchants and tradesmen were dispersing throughout the Sydneys. Meanwhile, the various churches were the prime organizers of temperance meetings, bazaars, and parish/community picnics, which enjoyed popularity as standard community institutions for a century or more (up until the 1950s) (Donovan 1990, 96-112).

In rural districts, the stories, poems, music, and dance forms practiced by the Gaels were carried on through aural transmission in community-recognized ‘ceilidh houses’, indicating the importance of the informal institutions of the family and cultural community in creating, maintaining and continually revitalizing Cape Breton culture (Graham 2006; MacNeil 1997; Kennedy 2002). This ‘making and maintaining’ feature of the culture (Graham 2006), as will be depicted, would prove to be important and beneficial in re-strategizing development for the Island in the post-industrial era. Also of note regarding the rural districts, a newer, more Anglo-influenced Scottish organization, ‘the first Cape Breton Branch of the Highland Society [based in Halifax], was formed at Margaree Forks’ and was instrumental in distributing books, establishing circulating libraries, and thus fostering education on the Island (Donovan 1990, 108).

Perhaps the aforementioned Nova Scotia mainland intellectual awakening was not restricted to that region. Additional research has revealed that newspapers and other forms of publication, though faced with significant obstacles and still in their infancy on Cape Breton, were nonetheless contributing to its cultural and intellectual life (Donovan 1990). These publications covered ‘extracts from contemporary literary works’, ‘agricultural and commercial topics’ politically-themed editorials, and local news and poetry. Notably ‘[t]he
local poetry concentrated on political events such as the attempt to repeal the annexation of Cape Breton to the mainland in 1820’ (1990, 90). While such publishing was both culturally and politically relevant and important to constructing an Island identity, the publishing and printing business faced socio-economic and demographic challenges: the population was largely illiterate and the majority were Gaelic speaking. In this connection, in 1845 publisher Jacob D. Kuhn applied to the provincial legislature for funds to publish a Gaelic agricultural manual, a request that was ultimately denied. While this can be seen as an early example of institutional discrimination against Gaelic, it did not diminish the Island’s growing cultural vitality. Donavan concludes that while the Nova Scotia cultural awakening was well documented, Cape Breton’s active role in the process was underemphasized, if not outright dismissed (1990).

It can therefore be argued that some events and socio-cultural signposts on Cape Breton between 1820 and 1850 were mirroring developments on the mainland. Donavan points out that ‘[t]he prime movers in the spread of cultural institutions…were members of the official class in Sydney, prominent merchants, teachers, and clergymen throughout the island’ (1990, 95). The elite-led intellectual, social, and economic development of Sydney and the Island’s smaller communities was an important part of the contents of the Island’s early newspapers and a key institutional support for region-building.

By the second half of the 19th century, the Catholic Church had attained great influence in communities of Scottish and Irish Gaels ‘who still identified with politics in Highland Scotland and Ireland where that church represented freedom and opposition to outside control’ (Morgan 2000, 156). This is not to say that Catholics in Cape Breton and the Maritime communities were always deferential to the authority imposed by over-zealous
Church missionary priests. In many cases in the early 1800s, priests arrived in communities after residents had become accustomed to their new surroundings, had established these communities, and were practicing their faith on their own terms. It was not unusual for incoming dogmatic priests to encounter community resistance. As Terrence Murphy notes, ‘what the clergy considered necessary rules, the people often regarded as interference with their established customs. They were in some respects unruly but in others fiercely independent and self-reliant’ (Murphy 1984, 37).

While many residents of these communities displayed community-building initiative, any displays of defiance as the Church became more influential would often be offset through the establishment of ‘harmonious’ relationships between parish priests and government: backed by civil authorities and sometimes sustained by government salaries, priests could play a key role as middle men, establishing ‘order’, respect for authority, and control over ‘rebellious parishioners’ in unruly communities by playing on their influence with ‘friends in high places’. Government was happy to provide returns in the form of financial favours in this mutually beneficial form of hierarchical, patron-client relationship (Murphy 1984, 42). By the late nineteenth century, the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations had become organized, influential, and culturally dominant institutions that had largely replaced private piety and community-led faith observance (Graham 2006; Hamilton Interview 2015).

Traditionalism: Parties and Patronage

Politics in Nova Scotia has been called ‘a traditional form that was rooted in
patronage’ (Clancy et al. 2000, 16; see also Beck, 1985). Related to this, Ian Stewart notes that ‘especially in Nova Scotia … party has traditionally played a strong role in organizing social behaviour’ (1993, 108). Broadly speaking, prior to the advent of responsible government in Nova Scotia in 1848, two main political groups – the Conservatives (the present-day provincial Progressive Conservative Party) and the Reformers (later to become the Liberal Party) – featured most prominently in the initial stages of party government in Nova Scotia. While the Reformers favoured responsible government, the Conservatives generally supported the status quo, which placed power in the hands of the lieutenant governors and the officials that they appointed to public office. This small group controlled patronage, ‘the tool by which they maintained their power’ (Morgan 2008, 97; also see Simpson 1988, 171).

In relation, in the early political life of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, patronage distribution, often in the form of the political porkbarrel, was also framed by some Cape Bretoners as being biased against them. The perception was that the proportionality of ‘spoils’ distribution throughout Nova Scotia was anything but fair, especially since some Islanders felt their relationship with the mainland was illegitimate.

Not only did Cape Bretoners feel they did not have a fair number of representatives. They also felt there was not enough money spent on their roads and bridges; that the distance to Halifax was too great for travel to the house of assembly; that a reversion to local rule was needed; and that Halifax was not really interested in the island’s problems. And there was the whole legal aspect: according to British law, the King had no right to annex the island to Nova Scotia (Morgan 2008, 97).

Historically, patronage became entrenched and continued to feature throughout the province’s political evolution, extending into the more ‘democratic’ responsible government setting (Simpson 1988, 171). J. Murray Beck points out that, while Nova Scotia was the first
institutionalized responsible government in British North America and a comparative laboratory that other colonies could emulate, its everyday functioning featured continuous conflicts over the dispensation of patronage spoils. Under its new structure it was still ‘anything but an exemplar worthy of imitation’ (1985, 156). Also, as Morgan notes of late 19th century patronage practices, elections were very often chaotic affairs where political handouts were the norm, often with victors receiving occupational spoils – namely work on road construction – while the losers would be ‘cut-off’ (Morgan 2000, 156).

This pervasiveness of patronage politics in Nova Scotia through ‘pre’ and ‘post’ Confederation has been documented by Campbell and MacLean (1974), J. Murray Beck (1985), Jeffrey Simpson (1988 168-184), and Ian Stewart (1993) and acknowledged by various interviewees for the dissertation. Besides patronage in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, Stewart also refers to other closely related corrupt election practices such as gerrymandering (manipulating riding boundaries for partisan purposes) and ‘treating’ (providing money, liquor or gravel for driveways in exchange for votes). He, Simpson, and Morgan state that this patron-client mentality persisted at least into the 1990s (Morgan 2000, 156; Stewart 1993, 90-112; Simpson 1988).

3.3 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The influence of political party elites on the social life of Cape Breton has been significant. For instance, among Joseph Howe’s most ardent supporters in the early 1830s were ‘Catholic Highlanders in Antigonish and Inverness’ (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 242). It has been argued that his election to the House in 1836 was owed in part to this group
and was reflective of both a transfer of clannish loyalty to a new type of revered leader, in a
new setting, and with a progressive intent. The majority of Nova Scotian residents of Scottish
Gaelic descent, in supporting the Joseph Howe-led Reformers, were hoping to gain full
political citizenship as Nova Scotians. This ‘represented the “coming of age” of the
province’s largest ethnic group’ as they became actively involved in seeking progressive
change through the political process (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 243). This took the form
of dedicating their support and loyalties to a singular political leader -- the charismatic
Reformer, Joseph Howe -- who would hopefully secure their political and economic
emancipation.

Regardless of this ‘grass-roots’ mobilization, according to Stewart, the Progressive
Conservative and Liberal parties of Nova Scotia remained elitist organizations until at least
the 1980s. They were ‘dramatically over-represented’ within their elite membership by White
Anglo-Saxon Protestant males; parties lacking in ideological coherence; and political
machines that possessed strong loyalties ‘fortified through the widespread distribution of
patronage’ (2000, 30). It has subsequently and similarly been argued that Nova Scotia’s
‘political regime’ was a well-established system of ‘vertically-integrated patron-client
relations’ (Bickerton 2001, 58). The system was composed of elite-arranged networks
extending from the local to the national level which distributed rewards based on service and
loyalty to party. The Liberal party, for instance, was able to capitalize on and build this
system (and their political dominance) through the long tenures of Premiers Fielding,
Murray, and Macdonald, whose combined premierships between 1882 and 1954
encompassed 72 years (Clancy et al. 2000, 17).  

As a region of the province, Cape Breton, with its ‘clannish traditions’ and ‘have less’
status, was no exception to this political norm, and was perhaps even more open to it (Simpson 1988, 180). The Mainland-Island rivalry, which involved each side blaming the other for draining the public purse, has been a persistent feature of provincial political history. Party elites were attuned to this and capitalized on this system of patronage that helped propel them to capture and keep power. Additionally, they benefitted from a parliamentary system that promoted executive dominance (giving the premier and cabinet ultimate control over the spoils system) and an electoral system that often produced legislative majorities by distorting the popular vote (Clancy et al 2000, 17-18). Therefore, one could locate policy and resource power -- even in these early years -- at the centre of government (and top of the party system) where the leader, his ministers, and a few close cohorts in the vertical party network ultimately controlled the distribution of ‘resources’ valuable to region-building.

Executive control over substantial resource distribution was also readily apparent in the burgeoning coal industry. The production of coal began on the northside of Sydney Harbour in the 1780s. When Cape Breton temporarily became a sole colony in 1784, it ‘received imperial sanction to use the island’s coal to raise revenue’ (DeMont 2009, 43; Muise 1980, 77-78). Systematic coal mining became established after Cape Breton’s reannexation in the 1820s in the towns surrounding Sydney but the mines were mostly unprofitable, production limited, and the workforce generally transient and temporary. In the early 1800s the industry was mainly restricted to ‘a system of negative controls imposed by a mercantilist imperial government’ that inhibited commercial injections of capital or significant technological improvements. (Muise 1980, 77-78).

In the 1820s, a ‘lease to all the mineral rights in Nova Scotia’ was discovered in the
British Patent Office. Drafted, yet not completed, it was set aside in the late 1700s by King George III, to be used for financial gain later by his son, the Duke of York and Albany. In 1827 the new King issued exclusive mining and mineral rights to a British consortium called the General Mining Association (GMA) for 60 years (1980, 78; DeMont 2009); the GMA essentially became a monopoly, gaining control over most of the Nova Scotia’s coalfields.13 Although the coal mining industry would be supplemented by additional expertise and capital, the deal was also designed to pay off royal debts and secure 25% in future profits for the King. Conclusively ‘the people of Nova Scotia had lost out: their minerals, and the riches that went with them, had been cavalierly handed away to old-country landlords in an act of outrageous royal whimsy’ (DeMont 2009, 51).

Although the lease permitted that other mines could open in certain instances, the GMA remained the prime industry player through to the 1840s. Its executives ‘wielded their power’ to prevent expansion of commercialized mining that could threaten their stranglehold on the industry (DeMont 2009, 84; Gerriets 1991). The influence and agency of these executives (at the level/veto point of the political executive) allowed them to neutralize competition and further fortified their economic position, an example of affecting institutional change by restricting the ability of regional actors to gain endogenous control over Island industrial development. Business-friendly leadership, prevailing colonialist ideas (advocating the superior knowledge and skill set of wealthy ‘outside’ power-brokers), the deference of the local population, and compliance of the colonial state (in its non-enforcement of allowances of other-commercial development of the mining industry) created the window of opportunity for executive players to affect change of a long held institution: As DeMont notes, these veto players managed to push aside ‘the time-honoured common-
law practice of treating coal and mineral deposits as public resources’ (2009, 84).

In 1848, after the onset of responsible government in 1840s Nova Scotia, the provincial government under the leadership of provincial secretary Joseph Howe passed legislation that ‘repatriated its coal’. This paved the way for the colony-province to grant leases to a number of other companies (DeMont 2009; also see Muise 1980, 78). And in 1858 the provincial government successfully broke the monopoly position of the GMA so that the state, ‘not some far-off foreign power, decided who got access to the coal seams, where and for how long’ (DeMont 2009, 94). In a setting more conducive to competition, attempts were made by various speculators to gain a foothold in the industry but Cape Breton locals either did not generally have the capital to attain the economies of scale necessary for success, or were eventually bought out, leaving control of the coal industry in foreign hands (2009, 94-95). More egregious dealings between political and corporate executives ensued not long thereafter, as will be noted in the next chapter.

Conclusions

As has been depicted, settlement patterns, institutional embeddedness and evolution, and external economic factors all affected the construction of the region of Cape Breton. Even before the arrival of European fishers and settlers, Cape Breton had been a socially constructed region. Hence its Mi’kmaw name, ‘Unama’ki’, distinguishing the Island from other First Nations territories throughout the North-Eastern area of present-day North America. Soon after ‘contact’, European-First-Nations relations were formalized through the Concordat with the Holy See, and a series of treaties with the British Crown. The embedded codification of the relationship set the parameters that would strongly influence First Nations
development in the future, as will be noted throughout this work. But other regional identity contestation and reconstruction did not take long to commence after the first immigrants arrived. Notably regional identity can have varying forms of content (e.g. meaning) and degrees of contestation, depending on how and by whom it is being imagined and constructed (see Abedelal et al. 2006). After the Seven Years War and the end of British and French military contestation for the Island territory, immigration expanded, and by the mid 19th century, the majority of the Island’s population identified as Scottish Gaelic in ethnic origin. The demographic and cultural impact was immense -- because of sheer numbers and the virtual transplantation of whole communities from the Scottish Highlands and Western Isles, Gaelic identity and culture imprinted itself on the Island. Indeed, it can be said that the territory became their diasporic sanctuary. These inhabitants of the Island’s rural locales were collective, communal, culturally conservative, and highly dependent for their subsistence on natural resources, with many eking out livings through occupational pluralism.

Meanwhile the urbanizing Sydney area was experiencing a cultural awakening. Church and elite-led social institutional development helped to foster regional identity, which could be linked to a separatist movement visible on the Island through the 19th century, as well as the beginnings of an expanding civil society. However, separatist agency could not offset the power of inherited political institutions that influenced the structuring of political outcomes for the Island. In 1820, utilizing a window of financial uncertainty, the Privy Council in London annexed the Island to the mainland, with its governor and house of assembly in the capital city of Halifax. Any hopes for political autonomy in the form of on-Island legislative control over its economic and social development was negated. Thus local
political actors were in no position to bargain as colonial political and business executives forged one-sided coal development deals, precursors to incentivized political-corporate arrangements that would become a mainstay in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. Regardless, during subsequent years political leaders in Cape Breton and Nova Scotia have attempted to initiate, construct, and utilize various identities and institutions for the Island’s economic and social development. Still, even after the transition to responsible government, politics in Nova Scotia remained democratically challenged: concentrated power in the executive branch of government was reinforced by majority governments and vertically-integrated political parties in a two party system that instituted the practices of patronage, gerrymandering, and treating. The result was a path dependent, ‘sophisticated’ parochial mode of power maintenance. While ethical questions arise regarding modes of political decision-making and practices such as these, it seems clear that political elites have had tools at their disposal for building not only their parties, but also their regions. Contributing to the economic life of those regions through the use of patronage has been one means of adjustment to other political-economic realities and institutional obstacles that have presented challenges for these regions (on which there will be more discussion later).

As Confederation neared, Island identities had been reconstructed from Unama’ki, to Isle Royale, to ‘Celtic Fringe’ Cape Breton. The latter Gael-inspired Cape Breton region still exhibited some measure of group regional identity shared among co-habiting groups such as the Mi’kmaq, Acadians, Irish, and others. On that note, and as with this early phase of regional construction, present-day Cape Breton’s identity and regionality is still being fostered with a strong dose of ‘Celticness’ at its core and through struggles ‘to overcome economic and social burdens and to preserve, strengthen and invigorate a distinct society’
As Cape Breton industrialized and as the post-Confederation period advanced, the Island, with its growing regionality, would face new challenges. Reflecting on the above events, it has been pointed out that they did not occur without some degree of cultural and political cohesiveness present among urban and rural residents during this period, although visible too were differences of opinion towards separation and an incipient economic rivalry and sense of separateness between distinct communities on the Island (Morgan 2000). As will be noted below, this awareness would later re-emerge when regional-development policies exacerbated intra-regional competition, an ongoing challenge to regional cohesion and reconstruction.

With cultural differences, resource distribution in question, and the informal and government institutional apparatuses in their early stages, Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia were embarking on formal and informal institutional development that would set the path for both regionalist sentiments and region-building practices for the next century. The ensuing years would also witness identity reconstruction on the Island that would incorporate working class labour culture into the mix.
NOTES

1 While this statistic is alarming, one business-person interviewed for this dissertation suggested that the official figure could be overstating the degree of poverty experienced by youth on the Island. The interviewee pointed out that the underground economy—namely unreported ‘under the table’ untaxed income earned by caregivers—actually contributes positively to the economic well being of some of the Island’s children and youth.

2 Coffin (2003, 113) states that ‘there is no scholarly consensus’ regarding whether the wider political governance structure was a pre-contact or post-contact construction. Each of the seven districts had a district chief who was both a local ruler and a delegate to the Grand Council Sante’ Mawiomi. This was the governing body of the nation and was composed of multiple officers ‘including a kji’i’aqmaw (grand chief), a putus (treaty holder and counselor), and a kji’keptan (grand captain, advisor on political affairs)’ (CBU Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015). The Sante’ Mawiomi determined the location of families’ hunting and fishing grounds and encampments and ‘managed relations with other aboriginal nations’ (CBU Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015).

3 An attempt by the Portuguese in 1525 to establish a colony at present-day St. Ann’s or Glace Bay failed, as well as a Spanish expedition to Cape Breton that same year (Morgan 2008, 17). In 1593 an English expedition to the Island was cut short by clashes with Mi’kmaq. In 1603, most of Cape Breton was claimed by France as part of their territory of ‘La Cadie’ (Acadie) that stretched from New England to the Maritimes. But in 1606, King James I of England ignored all claims by other colonial powers to eastern North America, granting an elite consortium from England all of the land between 38 and 45 degrees latitude. After that, ‘overlapping claims of the French and English to Acadie would prove to be the root cause of European conflict in North America until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713’ (Morgan 2008, 21).

While notably a strong Scottish presence on the Island would not be realized until the late 1700s and 1800s (D. MacKay 1980, xii-xiii; Hornsby 1992; Graham 2006; Melin 2013), in the 1620s, Sir William Alexander under Royal Charter possessed the land between the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the St. Croix River in present day New Brunswick. Envisioning a New Scotland in the New World, he coined the territory Nova Scotia. He founded a settlement on Cape Breton at Balein Bay but it too was short lived, with French soldiers destroying it a few weeks later. Nova Scotia was then ceded to the French in 1631, thus ceasing to be Scottish territory (MacKay 1980, xiv). In 1713 mainland Nova Scotia came under British rule while Cape Breton continued under the French who proceeded to build a major fortress at Louisbourg, where they established a permanent fishing post. Louisbourg was captured by the British in 1745, returned to the French shortly thereafter, and finally re-captured and destroyed by the British in 1758 during the Seven Years’ War (MacKenzie 1999, 12-13; Hornsby 1992, xxv). Many of the French inhabitants on the Island were
deported and the British went about restoring and prosecuting the cod fishery on the island (Hornsby 1992, xxv).

4 The early Industrial Revolution was prompting a restructuring of the land-tenure system in the Highlands and Western Isles which generated cultural and socio-economic pressures on the middle and lower economic strata of Highland and Island society. Such pressures resulted in voluntary emigration, but also later contributed to forced evictions, culturally discriminatory laws, and blatant religious discrimination. Notably, the mounting influence of Calvinism -- which posed a threat to the religious and cultural practices of Scottish Gaels who remained Roman Catholic – was catalytic in prompting community-based, and eventually chain migration (see Bumsted 1982; MacKay 1980; Kennedy 2002; Hornsby 1992; Graham 2006; Morgan 2008). The early migrations were often led by gentry (namely the tacksmen who, as economic middlemen were losing their position in the land tenure system) who urged their clansmen to join them in seeking more cultural, religious, and economic opportunity and freedom in the New World. Other immigrants arrived later, many having been displaced from their crofts during the ongoing Highland Clearances of the nineteenth century (MacKay 1980; Bumsted 1982; Hornsby 1992; Graham 2006; Morgan 2008).

5 Campey points out the importance of the leadership of Catholic priest Father MacEachern during the influx of the Gaels. His ability to influence the settlement pattern of Scottish Catholic immigrants would help to create and affect the making and reterritorialization of a New World Gàidhealtachd, a Gaelic-speaking cultural region originally encompassing parts of Prince Edward Island, eastern Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, and subsequently a persistent Gaelic regionality component that remained strongest in Cape Breton as assimilationist pressures affected the other areas (2004, 61-63).

6 Phillip Wood notes that geographers and historians have labelled this supplementation a ‘strategy of survival’ for property owning fishers and subsistence farmers. This ‘strategy of defensive accommodation’ could also be called ‘occupational pluralism’. The strategy could ‘preserve a degree of independence’ in a changing economy that was moving towards more wage-labour and eventual advanced mechanization (Wood, 1992, 67-68). In this regard it could be argued that the evolving social system in rural Cape Breton and eastern Nova Scotia was ‘one in which non-economic factors dominated’ (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 4-5). But was this an act of ‘resisting capital’ as Wood has stated (1992, 75) and hence an inherent socio-cultural drawback (contributing to underdevelopment) that could be attributed to Cape Breton and rural Nova Scotia in the early 19th century? Or could these early immigrants have been open to capital investment that was actually not easily available, stemming from long-entrenched socio-economic position and strategic-locational reasons more traceable to outside interests? Pryke (in his review of works by Hornsby, Bitterman, et al. found in Kenneth Donavan’s edited book The Island: New Perspectives on Cape Breton History, 1713-1990: In "Scottish Immigration and Settlement") presents Stephen Hornsby’s contention that apart from a few early and relatively prosperous groups of settlers, immigrants to Cape Breton were at a disadvantage upon arrival and found little economic
improvement in their condition. Rusty Bitterman, in his chapter in the same book, examines the relationship between economic stratification and patterns of land settlement in Middle River, Cape Breton, in "Economic Stratification and Agrarian Settlement". His theme overlaps with Hornsby’s contention, saying that the unequal conditions resulting from the settlement process itself, created persistent economic and social differences.

7 While Dalby (2002) alludes to the Gaels as being hegemon agents dispossessing the lands of the Mi’kmaq, Newton (2011) presents a more cautious and nuanced approach to the issue, pointing out that Gaels ‘were comprised of individuals who had been conditioned by specific experiences and who had particular agendas of their own’; and suggesting (through analyzing Gaelic narratives) that encounters were of varying and sometimes no hostility, involving cultural exchanges and peaceful mediation and that Gaels harboured elements of guilt about the plight of Mi’kmaq in the face of immigration.

8 The movement was significant enough for him to devote a chapter titled ‘The Forced Marriage with Nova Scotia’ to his 2008 work on the Island’s history (93-102; also see Morgan 2000, 104-118).

9 Two Cape Breton newspapers began circulation in 1832 and 1833 respectively, but ceased within two years. In the 1840s, Richard Huntington and Jacob D. Kuhn published The Spirit of the Times and Cape Breton Free Press (Donovan 1990).

10 Many interviewees, when asked about patronage, acknowledged its ubiquitous presence in pre-1990s Nova Scotia (e.g. Richie Mann, Rodney MacDonald, Allan MacMaster, Danny Graham, Adam Rodgers, Tom Gunn, and so on).

11 The persistence of these institutional features, along with the path dependence and embeddedness of patronage politics, would be difficult to eliminate or overcome, requiring the intervention of significant institutional reforms. But perhaps the most important factor in any move away from traditional politics would be determined, reform-minded leadership capitalizing on financial pressures and prevailing ideas to initiate such change. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, such a transition began (with some urgency) in the 1990s.

12 A lack of coal profits may have seemed surprising as industrialization and associated coal demands were escalating in England and a promising market loomed in the Northeastern US. But a number of factors were at play. Bootleg coal in poor condition was not competitive with English coal; wages in Cape Breton, at 80% of production costs, were said to be comparatively high; shipping prices were a challenge, much due to shortages of return freights; Cape Breton coal prices in local markets were ‘barely competitive’; and excessive royalty rates attached to short term leases made coal mining operations risky undertakings for even the most adventurous of entrepreneurs (DeMont 2009, 45).

13 The G.M.A. consortium was composed of London jewelers and other investors. The jewelers had relieved the extravagant Duke of a portion of his debts by purchasing his extensive collection of silver. With money to invest, they began looking for opportunities
overseas, eventually creating the GMA from the not-so-successful Columbian Pearl Association (DeMont 2009, 48-52).

14 Regardless of this opening up of private competition, the GMA remained a player in the industry for a number of years. Although the GMA came to be resented -- for fending off competition and failing to deliver tangible wealth among the population -- it injected ‘£66,000 per annum into the Nova Scotia economy by the late 1830s’, and introduced more technology and infrastructure. The GMA also helped establish workforce permanence by building company houses for incoming workers, many of whom arrived from the rural Gaelic communities on the Island. (Muise 1980; DeMont 2009, 86). These internal migrants generally remained in the lower order of the worker hierarchy, while imported British labourers occupied the middle ranks (Muise 1980, 79), revealing restrictions that outside ownership placed on the local population with regard to it gaining local autonomy to affect the economic structure.

15 According to Statistics Canada, respondents in Cape Breton reported ethnic origin as: 46.4% Canadian; 39.9% Scottish; 22.5% English; 21.6% Irish; 16.4% French; 4.1% Acadian; with the remainder divided among a variety of its multi-cultural ethnicities (Statistics Canada “Cape Breton Ethnic Origin” 2006).

16 These authors all support strongly the distinctive identity exhibited and progressively constructed on the Island. Cape Breton has been described as a distinct society with its economic hardships, scenic beauty, and distinct Gaelic culture (Finbow 2001, 213); a region ‘culturally, as well as geographically, distinct from the rest of the province (if not the entire country)’ (Corbin and Hunter 2007, 173); and a region whose residents exhibit ‘pride of place and local attachment’ (DeRoche 2001, 328). Its peripherality must not be overlooked and contributes to its identity: ‘Fundamental to understanding them [Cape Bretoners] is that they live on an island’ (Feintuch 2010, 1). Corbin and Hunter add that ‘perceiving that political and cultural institutions are concentrated in centres such as Halifax and Ottawa and that decision-making excludes them, Cape Bretoners express a popular sentiment that they are at the periphery of power’ (2007, 173). Thus territorial, cultural, institutional, and socio-economic factors have come together with region-building processes to inform its regionality. Of late, autonomist ideas and discourse have also contributed to fostering regionality among Cape Breton’s ethno-cultural groups. John Reid has noted that since the 1970s, “self-direction” has grown within Atlantic Canada’s socio-cultural groups through ‘united action by those facing disparities along the lines of geographical location, ethnicity, gender and social class’ (1993, 504). In relation, Feintuch adds from his scholarly and intimate observations of Cape Breton that he is ‘fascinated with how a small island can be both economically stressed and so culturally productive and active’ (2010, 5). In short, a psychological attachment to territorial space emerged from – and is conjoined with – the above factors that shape(d) identity, regionality, and regionalism on the Island.
CHAPTER 4
THE BECOMING OF INDUSTRIAL CAPE BRETON: ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

‘An almost tribal pride grew up from within... A sense of place was born, a place of connection, a place of reaching out and of looking out. The “I’s” had become a singular “we”’ Cape Breton native and former Lieutenant Governor Mayan Francis

With Nova Scotia’s signing of the Constitution Act of 1867 (then the BNA Act), the informal nested region of Cape Breton was incorporated into the new formally institutionalized political system of Canada. The rules and roles set out in the document affected the socio-economic direction of ethno-cultural groups on the Island, as well as the path of regional underdevelopment of both Cape Breton and the Maritimes (Leslie 2002; Savoie 2006; 2013). Also, the growing influence of foreign capital and international markets and concomitant industrialization in a burgeoning coal and steel region combined with these and other institutional factors to influence the ‘becoming’ of both Industrial Cape Breton and Cape Breton Island.

This chapter discusses regional construction from (circa) the time of Confederation and begins by providing context regarding industrialization of the Sydneys as well as challenges faced by rural areas. It then proceeds to outline the formal institutional apparatus that emerged from the creation of the Canadian federation and its effects on the development path of the region and its ethno-cultural groups. Analysis of other institutions, related community leadership, and cultural development and identity then follows. Political leadership will also be highlighted as it played a major role in fostering regionality, regionalism, and the becoming of Industrial Cape Breton during this period.
4.1 COAL, STEEL, AND THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CAPE BRETON

By the late nineteenth century, an industrializing and urbanizing core was emerging in Cape Breton around communities such as Sydney, Glace Bay, New Waterford, Sydney Mines, and Dominion (Hornsby 1992; Bickerton 1990; Feintuch 2010; Morgan 2008).3 Beginning in the 1870s, this sub-region within Cape Breton experienced a major wave of immigration; many of these labourers were Gaels from neighbouring counties (Muise 1980; DeMont 2009). And with bountiful supply and coal operations expanding, a steel complex (see below) was established in Sydney at the turn of the twentieth century (Muise 1980, 77). The migration to the industrializing urban core was significant: The population had increased from 12,246 in 1871, to 18,005 in 1891, to 57,263 by 1911 (Frank 1985, 58; DeMont 2009, 102). The provincial capital of Halifax, by comparison, grew from 38,556 in 1891 to 46,619 in 1911.

Industrial Cape Breton became synonymous with ‘company houses’ in ‘company towns’ (Higgins 1993, 136). Its residents became actively engaged in building the region at the community institutional level. But the economic power and political influence of external owners and managers -- linked to large scale investments in coal and steel operations -- placed restrictions on their autonomy (Higgins 1993, 136). In that regard, American entrepreneur H.M. Whitney persuaded the Nova Scotia government to allow him to expand coal production in Cape Breton when he secured a 99-year lease with a legislated fixed royalty for the untapped Sydney coal fields resources. In the 1890s he acquired control of every mine on the Island. (Crawley 1990, 145; Higgins 1993, 137; DeMont 2009). With his one large Dominion Coal Company (DOMCO) in place, he then decided to capitalize on other market possibilities by forming the Nova Scotia Steel Company in 1895. Four years
later, after gaining royalty, tax, and land concessions from the various levels of government, he became the president of a new conglomerate, the Dominion Iron and Steel Company (DISCO). Two years after this, a deal was in place for DOMCO to supply coal to DISCO. Whitney, having landed $15.5 million of stock value, soon withdrew from the enterprises, and control fell into the hands of Montreal-based business tycoon James Ross (DeMont 2009, 121).

DISCO benefited from the railway construction boom underway in Canada but eventually faltered due to mismanagement and competition-related challenges (Crawley 1990 145-149; Higgins 1993, 137). While the industrial growth rate in Nova Scotia for a time actually exceeded that of all Canadian provinces, including Ontario, the many obstacles listed above took their toll, and by the 1920s the coal and steel industries ‘were in serious trouble’ (Lotz and Lotz 1974, 103). The initial boom subsided while Cape Bretoners saw control of their heavy industries remain with outside interests (Frank 1985, Introduction). Within this context, the ‘Whitney’ conglomerate was taken over in 1920 by the British Empire Steel Corporation (BESCO), which ten years later was itself reorganized into the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation (DOSCO). At the time, DOSCO was the country’s largest private sector employer (Higgins 1993, 137). Although overall economic conditions were improving in Nova Scotia in the mid to late 1930s, coal production had fallen – from 8 million tons in 1913 to 5.2 million tons annually between 1930 and 1932 -- and little progress occurred in the coal and steel sector over the next three decades (Beck 1985, 164, 167; DeMont 2009, 217). Over that period the Island, and especially Industrial Cape Breton, experienced hardship, chronic labour unrest, and high levels of unemployment (Higgins, 1993). With faltering heavy industry the mainstay of the economy and monopolistic
ownership in private hands outside the Island, the capacity of Cape Breton residents to have an autonomous and endogenous effect on overall economic prospects was, aside from the protection afforded them by a growing labour movement, highly questionable. 

4.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

Though Cape Breton regionality was already emerging at the time of Confederation, political, economic and cultural decision-making remained within the domain of foreign capital, the churches, and the jurisdictional boundaries set out in the Constitution. In other words, the power to decide on matters of social, economic, and cultural importance to the Island community lay inside ‘rule-making’ institutions that were outside the purview of Island residents. In spatial terms this meant political and corporate decision-making power affecting the everyday lives of Cape Bretoners was exercised in Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax.

The division of powers entrenched in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act established that the federal government had broad access to revenue through its taxing powers (as well as an inferred spending power; see Dunsmuir 1991 citing Hogg 1985, 124) and that provincial governments (especially the more densely populated central Canadian provinces) were the privileged regions in the federation (See Savoie 2006). Informal regions had sharply constrained capacities within this setting, as did municipal governments. For instance, while the establishment of municipal government in Nova Scotia in the 1870s (Morgan 2000) had the salutary effect of embedding local issues within a complementary formal institutional structure, municipalities were then (and continue to be) ‘creatures of the provinces’, without a constitutional basis for their limited powers. Therefore, feelings of
powerlessness could be anticipated among municipal political actors who could not affect positive change without significant provincial and federal involvement. This would leave regions like Cape Breton and its municipal government actors vulnerable to decision-making leaders and institutions in Halifax and Ottawa.

Chapter 3 stipulated that the inherited Westminster style of parliamentary government (found in the Constitution’s preamble) yielded an executive-dominant system that by custom produced strict party-discipline and concentrated executive powers in the hands of prime ministers and premiers. And because the House of Commons and provincial legislatures are elected based on representation by population, marginal regions with small populations such as Cape Breton became, over many years, increasingly disadvantaged and disempowered. Political representation is reduced as constituencies are lost or amalgamated through redistribution. Further to this, with powerful provincial states and large contingents of MPs within the federal Parliament, Ontario and Quebec have dominated through force-of-numbers; accordingly, political calculus at the centre of government has produced ‘many policy decisions that benefited the centre at the expense of the regions’ (Savoie 2013, 8). Exacerbating the institutional disadvantage experienced by Canada’s regions was the ineffectualness of the Senate. While the appointed Senate was intended to offset the ‘rep-by-pop’ advantage inherent within the lower house -- by being a voice and defender of regional interests -- it turned out to be completely overshadowed by the elected House of Commons, and lacking democratic legitimacy has generally acted as a docile rubber stamp for government legislation. For instance, with regard to having any influence on politically driven tariff and transportation policies negatively affecting Cape Breton, the Senate was a lame duck. Conclusively, the Maritimes and Cape Breton had entered into a ‘federation
game’ that over time became progressively more heavily tilted against them.

At the provincial level, government policy reshaped the competitive playing field for the coal industry by helping to buttress the position of private foreign owners. This was evidenced, as noted, in the late 1800s when Nova Scotia Premier W.S. Fielding hoped to capitalize on the market for coal in New England. Acquiescent and eager to see tangible economic results, he granted Whitney and his investment consortium the 99-year lease and pushed through legislation that capped royalty payments (DeMont 2009, 105-107; 109).\(^6\)

However, it was soon realized that Cape Breton coalmine operations were ‘plagued with difficulties’ (Feintuch 2010), some stemming from the business ineptitude of the Whitney group (MacGillivray 2005), while others can be traced to political institutional effects. Prime Minister John A. Macdonald’s National Policy bolstered the coal industry in its early years as tariff-protected coal was shipped cheaply by sea to Montreal, strengthening the Nova Scotia merchant marine, while the Short Line and Inter-colonial railroads helped seal the economic bond between the Maritimes and Montreal regions (Acheson 1977, 94). However, tariffs were eventually removed on American coal going to Ontario as central Canadian industry found it more advantageous to import coal from the US rather than Cape Breton, a decision that ‘shifted important economic power to central Canada’ (Savoie 2006, 27).\(^7\) That policy decision points to central Canadian political ‘veto players’ embracing Macdonald’s centralized vision of nation building (via the then popular ideas underlying mercantilist intervention), which also happened to serve the government well politically in terms of securing support in vote-rich central Canada. The policy change aided Ontario in developing its own steel industry, constraining the possibility of expanded production in Nova Scotia (Forbes 1993, 17).\(^8\) Along with global market effects and Whitney’s failure to
convince Ottawa to retain the US coal tariff, the policy helped push Cape Breton down the path of industrial decline (MacGillivray 2005).

It would be naïve to suggest that specific transportation-related policy decisions made by federal politicians and bureaucrats did not contribute to the economic and demographic difficulties of the Maritimes and Cape Breton Island. Once the labour needs of the coal and steel industries were filled, new immigration into the region virtually ceased, while Gaels and other ethno-cultural groups began leaving the Island in search of better employment opportunities elsewhere. On the other hand, the western provinces benefitted from federal immigration policies designed to move people into this newly developing, heavily agricultural region. The low railway fares provided a further incentive for native Nova Scotians and new immigrants to expand their horizons and head west (Campbell and MacLean 1974, 104).

Meanwhile, as industrialization fueled by injections of foreign capital was changing the face of the region, and immigrants of many cultural backgrounds flooded into the indigenous Mi’kmaq territory of Unama’ki, a paternalistic approach to managing the affairs of Indigenous peoples would continue in the post-Confederation era.

Institutionalization and Regionalization of Mi’kmaw Politics

The Constitution Act 1867 and the 1876 Indian Act institutionalized a one-sided power relationship between federal governments and the Mi’kmaq and other First Nations across the country. The latter became wards of a paternalistic federal state whereby the federal government was granted control over administration and legislation regarding ‘Indians and Lands reserved for Indians’ (Government of Canada, 1867; Leslie 2002). The
Indian Act was an enforcement of these powers and controlled First Nations by having a strong influence ‘on all aspects of Indian reserve life’ (e.g. enumerating powers for band councils and chiefs and dictating what constituted an Indian band, reserve, or member thereof); ‘directing government administration’; and establishing resource management rules (Leslie 2002, 25). But the Indian Act failed in its objective of assimilating the First Nations, even with subsequent modifications. These included increasing the powers of Indian agents, providing the Minister of Indian Affairs the power to direct residential or industrial schools, making school attendance compulsory, and in 1927, inserting a ban on Indian attempts to pursue land claims (2002, 25).

The government policy of sending First Nations children to residential schools affected the Mi’kmaq when, between 1930 and 1966, 1000 Mi’kmaw children from the Atlantic provinces were sent to the Shubenacadie Indian Residential School. If the government’s goal was to culturally assimilate the children, the Church’s was religious indoctrination. As well as abuse, language and cultural loss was a routine effect of the residential school experience as ‘the regimented structure of the school forbade any aspects of Mi’kmaw culture and identity’ and ‘disrupted the roles and responsibilities of Mi’kmaw Elders, parents, and youth’ (Mi’kmaq Resource Centre 2015). Add to this the appointment of Indian agents and the eventual process of electing band councils beginning in the 1950s and 60s, and one can conclude that Mi’kmaw society was a society disrupted.10

Throughout the 20th century, however, Mi’kmaw leaders were still politically active in trying to resist top-down infringements on their autonomy. The 1920s witnessed the emergence of political activism in Cape Breton’s Mi’kmaw community (Coffin 2003). In 1916, by court order, 125 Mi’kmaq were to be forcibly relocated from Kings Road Reserve
on Sydney’s increasingly busy harbour. In 1926, the community was officially moved to its present location approximately three kilometers from the downtown core of Sydney (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). Through this period Chief Ben Christmas led the charge for social and economic change, fighting to have the poor socio-economic conditions on his home Kings Road Reserve addressed by the federal government and demanding that federal action be taken following a tuberculosis outbreak (Coffin 2003, 42; also see Brennan 2000, 97; Mi’kmaq Association for Cultural Studies 2015). Additionally, in the aftermath of the re-location of the community to the new ‘model reserve’ (named Membertou after 16th century Grand Chief Membertou), Christmas began a letter writing drive urging the government to provide acceptable living conditions on the new reserve (Mi’kmaq Association for Cultural Studies 2015; Coffin 2003, 42).

By the 1940s the federal assimilationist policies were not achieving anticipated outcomes. Intending to curb the itinerant lifestyle of the Mi’kmaq, the government moved to centralize Cape Breton Mi’kmaq into one large Eskasoni reserve and the mainland Mi’kmaq into one reserve in Shubenacadie (Morgan 2009, 186). Although Grand Chief Sylliboy was convinced by the government to support centralization, Grand Captains from Membertou and Shubenacadie opposed it. They influenced most residents to remain on these reserves, keeping the communities alive. Members of other reserves complied with the measure, resulting in the disappearance of the Malagawatch reserve and decades-long tensions among youth on the central Eskasoni reserve, after some members from the Whycocomah reserve had re-located there. Be that as it may, by 1949 centralization was deemed a failure (Morgan 2009, 186-187). Over the following decade the Department of Indian Affairs would formally segment Unama’ki into five bands, heeding a memorandum that Cape Breton ‘Indians’
would waive any claim to reserve lands on the mainland, while mainland ‘Indians’ would reciprocate with regard to reserves in Cape Breton (Coffin 2003, 67; Brennan 2000, 160; Morgan 2009, 190). The memorandum was indicative of the distinct regional identity felt by the Mi’kmaq of Unama’ki and was an antecedent (see Chapter 5) of further political regionalization: ‘For as long as many Mi’kmaq can remember, there has always been a degree of separation’ between the Mi’kmaq of Unama’ki and those on the mainland (Coffin 2003, 67). Also noteworthy is that as a response to the whole centralization proposal, a Grand General Indian Council of Cape Breton had been created, but was short-lived (see Brennan 2000; Daugherty 1982). Regardless, it is an indicator of Mi’kmaw contributions to Cape Breton regionality from ‘awareness’ and ‘agency’ perspectives. Such agency by Mi’kmaw leaders in the early-to-mid 20th century set a precedent for future resistance against the paternal institutional order and was a marker of Mi’kmaw and regional identity maintenance and construction, as well as negotiated integration into regionality-related processes emerging on the Island. In the meantime, the Island’s largest ethno-cultural group was dealing with institutional discrimination of its own.

Gaelic and Discrimination in an Anglicizing World

In 1890, Senator Robert MacInnes introduced a bill to make Gaelic (then still widely spoken throughout the country) Canada’s third official language. The bill was dismissed, considered ‘a time-wasting prank’ by many political elites (though some, including John A. Macdonald, spoke it), who perceived Gaelic as having no economic, social, or intellectual value in the public realm. Institutionally excluding Gaelic in this way constituted a denial of the potential significance of the language to the development of the country. Formal
recognition of Gaelic language and culture fell outside the dual identity approach that relegated ethnic groups from the British Isles as “British” or else part of the confounding discursive categorization of ‘English Canada’. For Gaels, there was ‘little or no opportunity for the institutional and professional expression and continued growth of their language’ (Kennedy 2004, 38; Jeffrey MacDonald interview 2014).

In Eastern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, poverty and outmigration stemming from the region’s economic challenges were major factors causing the decline of Gaelic. A discriminatory and Anglo-centric education system is also widely cited as a main culprit (Dembling 1997; Kennedy 2004; NS Office of Gaelic Affairs Draft Report 2011). Nova Scotia’s fledgling education system featured an education act with ‘toothless’ clauses that granted parents ‘begrudging permission to temporarily use Gaelic to provide their children with an otherwise thoroughly English education’ (Kennedy 2004, 47). The Free Schools Act of 1864 made matters worse for the Gaels with the language clause altogether dropped and an amendment in 1865 that required candidates for the teaching profession to either pass provincial examinations or to enroll in the monolingual teaching college in Truro (Kennedy 2004, 47). With the anglicization of the education system virtually complete at a time when Gaelic was widely spoken in the province, communities that had once featured Gaelic literacy were later found to have essentially lost it. Nor was this language loss adequately replaced with English literacy after the compulsory English educational system came to predominate (2004, 43-53).

Reports of teachers issuing corporal punishment for speaking Gaelic in the school setting are remarked upon to the present day (see Dembling 1997; Various interviewees 2014), while Kennedy notes that such ‘educators helped to perpetuate the myth that Gaelic
was an inherently “backward” language unsuited to advanced intellectual function and incapable of fulfilling any institutional role’ (2004, 49). Some observers have argued that this marginalization of their native language negatively affected the cultural and economic prospects for many Cape Breton Gaels (Cox 1994, 37; Kennedy 2004, 52-53). An ethnocultural group once proud of its culture and traditions was forced to bear witness to its language being associated with ‘a culture of poverty, laziness and a lack of ambition’ (Graham 2006, 51; e-mail correspondence with Dr. Kenneth MacKinnon, 2004). Many came to accept the stigma as reality, leading to active discouragement of familial/community transmission (Dembling 1997; Mertz 1982; McEwan-Fujita 2013). In such an atmosphere, it should be no surprise that by the 1950s, community-wide familial transmission of the language had virtually come to an end (see McEwan-Fujita 2013). The economically-linked and institutionally-led psycho-cultural effects on the Island’s dominant ethnic group and their Gaelic language have lasted up to the present day. In 1901, there were 50,000 Gaelic speakers in Nova Scotia (Statistics Canada cited in Dembling 2006; Newton 2013). However, this number fell steadily throughout the 20th century such that by 2011, just 1275 Nova Scotians claimed to be Gaelic speakers, with only 300 identifying the language as their mother tongue.

While this seemingly inexorable decline led to grave doubts about the survival of the language, the ‘moment’ of revitalization in the new millenium can be understood to be part of a recent round of identity reconstruction and region-building. This will be explored further in Chapter 8.
4.3 OTHER INSTITUTIONS

By 1890, processes of cultural change, a decline in agricultural opportunities, industrial expansion, and correlated intra and outmigration was underway; subsequently, further economic integration became a key priority for community leaders in Cape Breton (Lotz and Lotz 93, 1974; Campey 2004, 183). Various religious, political and economic leaders hoped to both negotiate and capitalize on the employment and investment opportunities (or lack thereof in some cases) that accompanied the intensifying exploitation of local resources. Catholic clergy in Cape Breton’s rural parishes were concerned about cultural loss and community decline and routinely selected young men in their parishes who showed academic promise, could be groomed for further education (most often at the seminary or St. Francis Xavier), and could then possibly return to help build their communities and region as capable leaders in various professions (Hamilton interview, 2015). In urban Cape Breton, clergy were region-builders and development advocates in their own right as they tried to improve the wellbeing of congregations struggling with the social consequences of industrialization. Clergy participated in temperance organizations and benefit societies and, in the colliery districts, helped establish the area’s first hospitals (Frank 1985, 207). Community-mindedness also pervaded Industrial Cape Breton’s multicultural and multi-denominational communities and groups, who had leaders involved with various charity initiatives and community-oriented, region-building events (Richard MacKinnon interview 2014; DeMont 2009, 164). 17

Rural decline in the early 20th century also prompted region-building endeavours by a number of Roman Catholic priests in the Diocese of Antigonish, which covered Cape Breton.
and eastern Nova Scotia. After a 1917 meeting to discuss the problem, Father Donald MacAdam, a Gaelic scholar, led a ‘call to action’ by founding the Scottish Gaelic Society in Iona in 1919 and establishing the quarterly *Mosglach* (‘the awakening’), which was created to support Gaelic language continuance and development, and ‘rural renewal as a counter to out-migration’ (Graham 2006, 56; Kennedy 2002, 232). Additionally in the 1920s, local agency triggered the formation of the Scottish Catholic Society (SCS), which aimed for ‘advancement’ for Scottish Catholics in educational, moral, social and other realms (Frank 1985).18

The work of the SCS led in 1928, under the leadership of Rev. Moses Coady and Dr. Jimmy Tomkins, to the founding of the Antigonish Movement (Graham 2006, 56; Laidlaw 1961; Coady 1939; Dodaro and Pluta 2012). The movement was built on the premise of ‘social reform through economic activity’ and ‘economic betterment through adult education’. Coady, Tomkins and a number of others worked with a newly-formed extension department at St. FX University to help local farmers, fishers, and small business entrepreneurs in northeastern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton to improve their lives by becoming ‘masters of their own destiny’ (Coady 1939). The formation of community study clubs, cooperatives, and credit unions ensued (Coady 1939, 9-57; Graham 2006, 56; Dodaro and Pluta, 2012). To its progenitors, the movement was a ‘middle way’ alternative between socialism and a capitalist system that was not providing adequate social and economic benefits to residents of the region (Dodaro and Pluta 2012; MacAulay 2001, 213; MacInnes 2015).19 It was a prominent early example of the importance of culture and identity, institutional support, and community leadership to the process of regional construction. It used this sense of regional community for mobilization purposes, and contributed to a
stronger regional awareness among its participants. The class-basis of the movement was also prominent as it worked toward fostering economic and social self-determination for independent commodity producers, forged through an institutional network of Catholic priest-leaders and churches. While its ethno-cultural foundations were in the Scottish-Gaelic-dominated rural locales of Cape Breton and eastern NS, the coastal Acadian communities, as well as the more scattered Irish population, all became actively involved (Dodaro and Pluta 2012, 21; MacInnes 2015).

In August, 1932 the movement extended into Industrial Cape Breton, setting up an office in Glace Bay to establish community co-operatives and credit unions in the area (Alexander 1997, 89). By 1938 there were over 10,000 members of various cooperatives while the adult education program extended to over 1000 community-based study clubs in Cape Breton and Eastern Nova Scotia (MacAulay 2001, 113).

While the Antigonish Movement lasted for decades and left a legacy of co-operatives and credit unions, it ‘virtually ceased to exist’ in its original form as the 1960s came to a close (Dodaro and Pluta 2012, 316). The movement’s leaders adapted too slowly to the changed economic environment and social context of the post-WWII era. During the latter decades, inconsistency and lack of cohesion in terms of vision, development approach, communication, and planning between the movement’s leaders and its associated university institutions (the Coady International Institute and the St.FX extension department) eventually took their toll (Dodaro and Pluta 2012, 313-319). The movement also failed to effectively bridge ‘the gap between its social base in the rural villages and the industrial working class’ in the coal and steel communities, where industrial workers were unable to harness the movement to improve or control their workplaces (Bickerton 1990, 73). Ultimately, the
Antigonish Movement did not seek to transform itself into a viable political movement, thus nullifying ‘to a great extent any political challenge it may have represented to the dominant social and political order’ (Bickerton 1990, 74).

Even so, its organizational efforts and alternative economic approach may have contributed to gains made by the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party in Industrial Cape Breton (Earle and Gamberg 1989). Without a doubt, however, in the coal and steel communities it was the labour movement and union activity, as noted below, that remained the main avenue of struggle for social and economic progress for Cape Breton’s industrial workers and their families.

The Labour Movement

Labour unrest did not take long to manifest itself after the coal industry had gained momentum. There were notable outbreaks of labour resistance in 1876, 1882, 1904, and 1909, and most notably 1925, when police and military forces – brought in by the Attorney General Under the Militia Act21 -- were used to quell a strike held by workers encountering near-starvation conditions (MacGillivray 1980).22 With violence erupting on June 11, 1925, a company policeman killed one miner and one other was seriously injured; five more workers were hospitalized, along with 30 policemen (MacGillivray 1980, 105). It has been argued that the added military presence during these times of unrest ‘doubtless increased the bitterness of many working men in the area and gave those radicals committed to class warfare an excellent platform…The apparent willingness of both the federal and provincial governments to ignore the acute distress coupled with the recurring appearance of federal troops, doubtless contributed to these feelings’ (1980, 106-109; 109). The Militia Act may
well have fuelled further conflict instead of subduing it. It is another example of how the actions of a state institution, at a critical juncture, contributed to a sense of regional grievance linked to social and cultural memory in the communities of Industrial Cape Breton.

The early 20th century saw the emergence of the labour movement among steel workers in Cape Breton, as well as a response to a decrease in already meager wages, high rents, and sub-standard living and working conditions (Crawley 1990, 154). Some industrial workers were absorbed into the Provincial Workmen’s Association (PWA), which had represented local and mainland coalminers since 1879, while some ‘other-ethnic’ factions also organized for union recognition. Workers clashed on a number of occasions with DISCO between 1899 and 1903 (1990, 157). However, in 1904 a major strike ended with terms indicating that ‘the steel company reigned supreme in Sydney’. While the major strike ‘left wounds’ in the community, it fostered Island regionality and marked the beginnings of the struggle for political, social, and economic transformation among workers in Industrial Cape Breton (1990, 164). The strife that continued into the 1920s created an atmosphere that was conducive to both resisting and trying to negotiate economic integration through strong working class action that persisted for decades (see Frank 1985, 217). In the process, a form of defensive regionalism was increasingly evident.

From the late 1800s onward, the associated trade union movement can be linked (among other factors) to the growing popularity of socialism in Cape Breton, part of a wider Maritime socialist movement that had become visible by this time (Frank and Reilly 1979, 88). Over time, increased institutionalization of the idea would contribute to the cultural character of Cape Breton politics and civil society. A Socialist Club was established on November 22, 1904 in Glace Bay, as well as a similar one the following year in Sydney.
Mines. The clubs gained visibility by engaging in public debates with clergy and began to have influence within the PWA (1979, 89). In 1907 a Cape Breton local of the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) was formed and by the end of 1909 Cape Breton locals could be found in Dominion, Dominion #6, Sydney, and Sydney Mines (n.d. 91, 92). Socialist sympathizers failed to establish a presence in rural fishing and farming communities, but attained influence among the working classes in industrial districts such as Cape Breton’s coal and steel communities. Visits and speeches by prominent SPC members from outside the Island and distribution of socialist literature by party members among workers in the area contributed to the strengthening of the labour movement. Alliances and networks were formed with like-minded labour and community organizations, bolstering Island regionality. Some members were recognized as leaders who would set Cape Breton on a path that saw it eventually being reconstructed as a ‘socialist Island’.

In 1909 five Cape Breton locals met and decided that the party would take part in an official capacity in the next federal election, declaring that the traditional party system was not adequately addressing the plight of workers. Their candidate, Alex MacKinnon failed to garner significant support in the election. However, one candidate in particular, J.B. McLachlan, was able to garner support in the six times (often polling respectably) that he ran as a labour candidate ‘under a number of banners, including those of the Socialist, Communist and Labour parties’ (three provincially and three federally) in elections between 1916 and 1935. (Frank 1990, 187-89). Later success of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), which accomplished an electoral breakthrough victory in a 1939 provincial by-election, would reveal that Island identity remained composed in part by presence of the socialist touch (see Frank 1990; Beck 1985).
The storied CCF presence in Cape Breton reveals that McLachlan and other leaders helped to foster regionality and infuse it with a strong element of class consciousness and solidarity. After the effects of the Great Depression had set in to aggravate even further the declining economic and social fortunes of the Island, national CCF leader J.S. Woodsworth visited Cape Breton in 1933, and under the influence of local proponents such as J.B. McLachlan and Forman Waye, the labour movement and later its political affiliate the CCF etched out a substantial presence in Industrial Cape Breton by the late 1930s (MacLean 1977, 21-22).\(^27\) In the 1940 federal election, Clarie Gillis became the first CCF candidate to be elected federally in Nova Scotia (and the only one east of Ontario). In the provincial election that followed in 1941, two more CCF members from Cape Breton – Donald MacDonald and Douglas Brodie – were elected along with Douglas MacDonald, these three constituting half the total number of CCF candidates who ran in the election (see Beck 1985, 191).

From early on the CCF in Nova Scotia exhibited a dichotomous regional character. In Cape Breton, leaders were those who had already established themselves in the political realm and membership was based in the trade union movement. In Halifax leadership seemed to consist of professionals and business owners such as L.E. Shaw Limited’s owner Lloyd E. Shaw, while membership came from the reform-minded middle class, academics, and protestant clergy (MacLean 1977, 29). Related to this, the influence of the ‘centre’ over the ‘periphery,’ even in internal party politics, was evident in the mid-1940s when the CCF party headquarters was placed in Halifax, ‘accentuating the differences between the two groups’ (1977, 30). These points reveal the awareness component of regionality that was manifesting on the Island in the political party system, among other realms. While support for the CCF declined after 1945 and the power of the once-mighty UMW weakened in a coal industry that
had increasingly poor prospects (1977, 34, 37), the labour movement’s significant
collection to the cultural and identity melange at the core of Cape Breton’s regionality is
undeniable. However, in keeping with earlier observations about ideology and party politics
in Nova Scotia, labour culture infused *all* local politics, and *all* party candidates tapped into
it, whether CCF-NDP, Liberal or Progressive Conservative. Political representatives of all
parties from Industrial Cape Breton would have been considered left-leaning within their
respective caucuses, defending local industry and taking the side of steelworkers and
coalminers in their struggles, and so on. Their re-election depended on presenting themselves
as ‘labour’s friends’ (Bickerton e-mail correspondence 2016).

4.3 IDENTITY AND CULTURE

In the ‘becoming of Industrial Cape Breton’ context, the Mi’kmaq were generally a
long way from achieving economic integration and were prevented from deriving socio-
economic benefit and opportunity (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). However, they were not
silent in the face of trying circumstances. Although examples are scant, there is further
evidence of Cape Breton Mi’kmaq leadership resisting political infringement upon their
rights and cultural sovereignty, as well as trying to negotiate better political and economic
terms within the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia regions in the early part of the last
century. In 1928, Cape Breton Grand Chief Gabriel Sylliboy initiated a challenge to the
1926 *Lands and Forests Act*, suggesting that it was unfairly leading to legal prosecutions of
Mi’kmaw persons wishing to exercise their treaty rights to hunt. He also tried to mobilize the
mainland Mi’kmaw community by writing a letter to Shubenacadie Chief John B. Maloney
(Coffin 2003, 42). Sylliboy was encouraging the Chief to join him in assembling all Mi’kmaw hunters and trappers to appeal to the Nova Scotia government to support the ‘biggest movement ever attempted to help the Indian hunters and trappers of Nova Scotia’ (Ben E. Christmas to Chief John B. Maloney, January 26, 1935, quoted in Coffin 2003, 42). Sylliboy was also adamant in his attempts to negotiate cultural positioning for his people by showcasing Mi’kmaw participants in the Nova Scotia Exhibition in Halifax as well as through performances, encampments, and shows in Sydney, Louisbourg, and surrounding communities (Coffin 2003, 42). Notably in the political sphere, Sylliboy was also representing a Unama’ki presence in larger regional First Nations political bodies such as the United Indian General Council of Nova Scotia and the Indians of the Maritime Provinces, both of which would soon fade out of existence (Coffin 2003, 43). Indeed, Mi’kmaw leadership that emphasized social justice and cultural pride – both locally and beyond-- was integral to Mi’kmaw contributions to Island regionality.

And even prior to the Sylliboy initiatives, the Gaels were forging their weighty regionality imprint as they moved to the industrializing area, relying on extensive family networks and often remaining closely connected to their former rural communities and their associated culture. The relative homogeneity of the new workforce came to shape the coal towns (Muise 1980). ‘It was this cohesiveness, reinforced by the common experience of the migration process and the work world of the mines that allowed for the development of a class consciousness that was unparalleled in pre-1900 Canada’ (Muise 1980, 83-84). The cultural cohesiveness existing between these migrant workers and their ‘home’ rural communities melded with worker solidarity in the new urban setting as industrial relations intensified. This helped establish the ethno-cultural and class affinities that shaped Cape
Breton’s regional identity.

Certain cultural features and elements continued to mark a rural-urban connection, but as depicted above, the language element of the widely shared Gaelic cultural heritage came under mounting pressure. Notably greater ethnic diversity, urbanization, and industrialization at the beginning of 20th century made Industrial Cape Breton increasingly distinct from the more Gaelic character of rural areas of the Island (see Campbell and MacLean 1974, 284). And during the 20th century the World Wars, economically-driven migration, and an expanding mass media changed people and culture; Cape Bretoners were anything but passive in this context which found Island residents looking both ‘inward’ and ‘outward’, seeking to protect and promote their interests in an increasingly accessible world. Individuals, communities, and governments (see leadership section below) used culture-based practices, symbols, organizations, and projects attached to Island identity as an important means of creating economic opportunity for the Island. For example, the advent of record-label-promoted traditional music recordings in the 1920s and 30s, and the establishment of culturally supportive radio stations in the 1940s and 50s helped to preserve aspects of the Gaelic culture (if not the language itself) and foster Island identity in both the industrial and rural areas, while local traditional music, dance, and song were also utilized for fundraising at community venues (Graham 2006).

Island regionality was shaped by this unique brand of cultural cohesion and the institution-building that accompanied the process of industrialization. The more polyglot, working-class culture of Industrial Cape Breton was clearly distinct from, yet still linked to the more traditional and ethnically homogenous rural areas of the Island; regional reconstruction was not occurring without the ‘previous Cape Breton’ leaving its imprint.
Bickerton captures this notion of Cape Breton identity and awareness as discussed by Muise, highlighting that dimension of regionality present on the Island:

…Cape Breton was divided between an urbanized, working class, industrial area, itself politically fragmented into a small city and several towns, and surrounding rural communities that were lightly populated, ethnically homogenous, and the source and sustenance of the island’s predominantly Celtic-inspired culture. This combination of factors – peripheral location, island geography, a shared sense of class solidarity and external exploitation, and a distinctive cultural heritage – created both a strong sense of community identity and a suspicion and mistrust of the motives of external political and economic actors (2012, 109). ²⁹

On that note, a look at leadership in the formal political economic sphere within the context of industrialization and integration ensues.

4.4 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

As depicted, prior to and in the early Confederation years, political decisions had affected the development path of Cape Breton. Joseph Howe’s coal rights ‘repatriation’ initiative (DeMont 2009, 90) had yielded an income stream for the province while Fielding’s willingness to curry favour with industrial financiers such as Whitney helped assure industrial production, but also reinforced in its infancy the political norm of providing attractive incentives to prospective foreign corporate investors to operate in the province. ³⁰ Also noteworthy is that at certain points both leaders favoured a Nova Scotia exit from Confederation. In the mid-to-late 1880s this position conflicted with the overwhelmingly pro-unionist position of provincial Conservative and Liberal politicians throughout Cape Breton (Howell 1979, 38), creating regional (and intra-Liberal party) divisions in Nova Scotia. Support for Confederation remained strong among Island residents and politicians because of the greater potential it seemed to offer for developing the coal and steel industries, which
were being buttressed at the time by the tariff protection afforded by the National Policy (Howell 1979; Fingard 2003). It is therefore not surprising that in the post-Confederation era (between 1878 and 1891) the Conservatives held electoral strongholds in industrializing areas of the province, including Cape Breton (Muise 1971). And in the 1886 provincial election that saw Fielding campaign on repeal, political representatives in areas of Cape Breton that were industrializing, along with representatives from Inverness County, where there were also coal mine operations, did not toe the Liberal party line on the repeal issue, as they perceived no tangible benefits (and real risks) in the repeal stance (Howell 1979, 36). In any event, the brief repeal moment soon faded; by the time of the 1896 federal election, the Liberal party had become less adamant about free trade and more accommodating toward ‘national aspirations’ in the economic sphere, marking the inauguration of a new political era (Muise 1971, 196).

In 1896, Fielding went on to serve in Wilfred Laurier’s federal cabinet while George Murray took the position of provincial secretary (finance minister), and then premier in 1897. Having inherited the well-oiled provincial Liberal party from Fielding, Murray held power for 26 years by taking a cautious, fiscally conservative, yet ‘mildly progressive’ approach to governing (Fingard 2003). On the positive side, his governments sponsored infrastructure, initiated technical education in the province, secured rail-line subsidies, and improved children’s welfare. Consistent with his predecessors, his governments were generous in their dealings to entice New England financiers to invest in Cape Breton. In 1899, a ‘highly favourable’ lease was granted to a New England consortium for pulpwood cutting in Northern Cape Breton. That same year coal royalties were reduced by 50 per cent. Ironically this obstructed growth in the coal mining industry as a result of a lower price for coal
(Fingard 2003; see DeMont 2009). While Murray’s reputation for honesty, modesty, integrity and caution helped to assure his long tenure, Fingard suggests that ‘most historians would now argue that Nova Scotia’s coal resources were vastly underutilized and the potential for greater industrialization [supported by more interventionist leadership] was squandered during Murray’s premiership’ (2003). After the relatively brief interlude of two Conservative majorities following Murray’s departure, a new Liberal leader would come to dominate the provincial scene, in the process leaving an indelible mark on Cape Breton Island.

The brevity of the Conservative interregnum and the failure of labour parties and the CCF to make a major breakthrough in Nova Scotia could be attributed to the ability of the Liberals to maintain their hegemony through brokerage politics and patron-client relations, but also in part to the legendary leadership of Cape Breton-born Angus L. Macdonald. Highly celebrated (such that some Cape Bretoners named their dogs ‘Angus L.’), he was premier of Nova Scotia from 1933 to 1940 and again – after a hiatus from provincial politics to become the Minister of National Defence and Naval Services during the Second World War – from 1945 to 1954 (see Henderson 2007, 3, 63, 214). Macdonald was a transitional figure who came of age during the period of classical federalism and who returned from Ottawa worried about the centralization of power, growing dependence on the federal government, and loss of provincial autonomy for Nova Scotia. Undoubtedly Macdonald was one of the province’s most prominent and respected political figures; however, hagiographic references to ‘transformation’ occurring in the province under his premiership (see Henderson 2007) neglect to fully appreciate the broad political-economic contextual factors that contributed to change in the province during his premierships. Much of what was accomplished occurred within the milieu of major wartime investments undertaken by the
Canadian state and can be linked to the launching of national social programs and the general expansion of other transfers to the provinces in the ‘postwar boom’ period. All provinces experienced a major growth of government revenues and spending as a result, not just Nova Scotia. As political biographer Henderson attests, MacDonald himself was a classical small ‘l’ liberal in terms of his view of the role of government (limited government and balanced budgets). He was not a proponent of the developmental state, which perhaps left him increasingly ‘out of step’ as time went on (2007; Bickerton e-mail correspondence 2015). However, like other leaders in other jurisdictions (both in Canada and more broadly in the western world) who were operating in a similar macro-political-economic context, he ably capitalized on available resources to invest in important region-building initiatives for Nova Scotia and Cape Breton.

In this regard, a distinction can be made between Macdonald’s depression-era initiatives (which were noteworthy and progressive for the time) and the postwar period when he returned home from Ottawa. During the latter period, all regions of Canada, and particularly the poorer ones, benefitted from redistributive policies and a larger role for government. These Keynesian-inspired policies, harnessed widely by governments, facilitated the social and economic integration of Maritimers (and after 1949, Newfoundland) into the Canadian nation-state. This does not devalue, however, ‘Angus L’s’ personal impact on politics and region-building in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. He was a unifying figure who fostered the Cape Breton identity, and more broadly the Celtic heritage that increasingly became Nova Scotia’s ‘brand’ in the tourism and culture sector. That being said, three particular aspects of his leadership are pertinent and reveal how a changing national and global context, leader-agency, institutions, policy, and identity were interrelated in Cape
Breton’s region-building dynamics during his tenure as premier. Highlights during his first
turn as premier beginning in the 1930s included the following:

1) He sparked unique or important economic contributions or innovations such as issuing a Provincial Commission of Economic Inquiry in 1934; planning construction of the Canso Causeway (that would link the Island to the mainland); and promoting a provincial branding/tourism strategy. In addition, although not unique in North America at the time, he undertook a rural electrification program and a rural resettlement program that were important socio-economic advancements (Henderson 2007; McKay 1992; Graham 2006; Graham Interview 2014; Bickerton e-mail correspondence 2015).³⁴

- The 1934 Royal Commission, known as the Jones Commission, was established to investigate economic policy and approaches to fiscal federalism going forward for Nova Scotia, as Macdonald felt that all provinces should have the fiscal capacity to provide social and economic opportunities for their citizens comparable to that of wealthier provinces (Henderson 2007, 61-64).

- The Canso Causeway officially opened a year after Macdonald’s death in 1955. The new transportation infrastructure, it was hoped, would bring new industries and technologies across the Strait of Canso; in other words, increased integration and economic growth. The project was markedly the product of multi-scalar politics, multiple actors³⁵, and determined leadership: ‘The physical joining of Cape Breton Island to mainland Nova Scotia … completed decades of hard work by Royal Commissions, federal and provincial politicians, local lobby groups, and premier Angus L. Macdonald’ (Beaton 2001, 86), all indicating a move toward further regionalization of development efforts and integration.³⁶
Meanwhile Macdonald’s other development initiatives in Cape Breton were in hindsight part of a regional tourism strategy for the Island. They laid a foundation for what would later become a regionally unique tourism and culture node and included various highway improvements (most notably the paving of the Cabot Trail), the Cape Breton Highlands National Park (created in 1936) and its accompanying Keltic Lodge and Resort; establishment of the Gaelic College of Arts and Crafts (1938) (Graham 2006, 53; Cabot Trail 2016; Henderson 2007); and promotion of the Nova Scotia Highland Village. To complement such infrastructure initiatives, and at the core of a strategy to expand the tourism industry, the provincial state devised a highly romanticized or ‘tartanized’ Scottish provincial identity (McKay 1992) that ran counter to the transplanted Gaelic culture found Cape Breton and eastern Nova Scotia. The associated tourism marketing strategy saw heritage culture begin to supplant living culture as a means of attracting tourists and growing the economy (Graham 2006, 53). Despite the sometimes denigrating aspects of this representation of Scottishness (as alluded to in McKay 1992), Macdonald’s undertaking of what today would be regarded as a ‘branding’ exercise was motivated by a desire to promote the province, and particularly Cape Breton, to a burgeoning US tourism market. Indeed, some proposals for additional ‘radical and expensive themes of tartanism’ were refused (Henderson 2007). Further, as an indication that he recognized the importance of identity and culture in building regions, as well as the need for a more pluralistic perspective within the Department of Education, he created an employment position for “Gaelic Advisor” (Henderson 2007, 205). More importantly, tourism initiatives that were either established or ‘tartanized’ under his
premiership increased the potential of this new industry and still remain, in altered form, a key part of provincial and Island tourism initiatives and campaigns (e.g. Colaisde na Gàidhlig/the Gaelic College; the Keltic Lodge and Highland Links golf course; and the Nova Scotia Museum’s Highland Village).

2) Macdonald adhered to traditional patronage politics, suggesting no break with the past, true also of his unwavering loyalty to the Liberal party and his role in maintaining the political hegemony of the Liberal party in Nova Scotia both provincially and federally. ‘Kept awash’ in Halifax of partisan demands emanating from the Island (Simpson 1988, 180), he and other party leaders understood that party organization and participation was dependent upon the delivery of patronage rewards (Graham interview 2015; Boudreau 2000).

3) Through his actions and personal heritage, Macdonald became an important symbolic and cultural figure for Cape Breton Gaels. The Gaels’ pride and self-esteem increased in that one of their own – a native Cape Breton Gaelic speaker - was provincial premier. His acknowledgement and recognition of the community, and the value that this entailed, provided validation of their identity; an identity that had been, as noted, institutionally and societally disparaged or marginalized. While his policy directives were an attempt to provide economic benefits for this community by ‘marketing’ it to the burgeoning American tourism market, there were limits to this recognition and validation. This was evinced by the continuing decline of the Gaelic language while Macdonald was premier (e.g. no change in education policies). While Gaelic was still viewed as a vestige of the past (perhaps a proud vestige, but a vestige nonetheless), Macdonald was different from his predecessors in that he recognized that it possessed some inherent value in the modern world, even if this was to be realized by marketing it as a unique cultural artifact.
Conclusions

Regional remnants contribute to the content and character of whatever new socially-constructed region emerges out of previous ones. So to recall, the culture, identity and economy (subsistence agriculture/barter/seasonal cash-earning) of the Gaels during their heyday in 19th century Cape Breton was mostly eclipsed at the end of that century by sweeping economic, cultural and political forces – industrialization, social modernization and cultural homogenization (aided and abetted by the state through education and other policies). But the Mi’kmaw and Gael-inspired cultures and identities did not disappear (though the Gaelic language nearly did); they continued to imprint themselves on the region during the industrial era. Gaels merged into the labour culture of the rising industrial working class and the demographic, economic and cultural changes that went along with this. While still embracing elements of their Gaelic heritage, coal miners and steel workers who were ethnic Gaels joined with other migrants to Industrial Cape Breton to form new community bonds, simultaneously altering the character and the depth of Island regionality. Notably, a socialist-inspired ethic of egalitarianism and an ideal of working class agency advocated by such community leaders as J.B. McLachlan helped to shape the ‘becoming’ of Industrial Cape Breton. A growing regional awareness was evident. Within a marked portion of the population, there was a willingness to express community resistance to exploitation (e.g. Mi’kmaw and worker protests) and a determination to negotiate their integration into the economy through institutions such as the labour movement and through the vehicle of party politics. Gaels and their polyethnic counterparts in Industrial Cape Breton came together through institutionalization, resistance, and negotiation and ‘fought wage reductions, built
unions, joined cooperatives, and voted for labour candidates’ (Frank 1985a, 203, see also 1985b).

While in the pre-Confederation years Joe Howe managed to reclaim provincial rights to minerals and mining in the province, Premiers Fielding and Murray, perhaps desperate to capitalize on this resource during a period of industrialization, were compliant in their dealings with business tycoons and consortiums: capitalists such as Whitney maximized their windows of opportunity to maintain their position of regional industrial dominance while the Province’s own position -- in part due to unwise leadership decisions leading to institutional entrenchment -- remained precarious at best, having been left with meagre royalties, one-sided mineral leases, and brewing worker unrest.

For the changing region of Cape Breton, determined local and provincial leadership revealed how regional actors and state institutions were contributing to its construction. Local communities fostered cultural maintenance and civil society institution-building while revered premier Angus L. Macdonald, within the political economic context of increased federal funding in the postwar years, capitalized and embarked on economic planning and building infrastructure. This included major projects such as the Canso Causeway and a marketing strategy that focused on the Island’s heritage assets. As a symbol of modernization (in the form of integration with the national and international economy) (see Rostow 1960; Beaton 2001), the Canso Causeway’s construction and opening was a major milestone of Macdonald’s infrastructure strategy (Henderson 2007, 193). This ‘legacy project’, along with his other infrastructure initiatives and his uplifting effect on the pride, self-esteem and identity of the Island’s Gaels, solidified Macdonald as one of the most notable region-building political actors/leaders in Nova Scotia history. As well, the path was being
established for further state intervention in regional development as the ideological and
programmatic shift to Keynesianism (see below) was underway.

After a period of industry-fueled growth, the culturally cohesive, Gael-inspired, class-
conscious Cape Breton, with a strong and sometimes militant labour movement -- a Cape
Breton region constructed under the aegis of King coal – was about to encounter serious
challenges. With an expanded social base of institutions and regionality on the Island,
regional acors, aided by increasingly extensive state intervention, would have to narrow their
focus and expend their energies on sustaining and reviving an economy that would be
virtually abandoned by corporate capital, as discussed in the next chapter.

_________________________
NOTES

1 A quotation from former Lieutenant Governor Mayann Francis’s website, cited in DeMont
(2009, 166). While this quotation most likely is directed at the community dynamics that
affected community identity in Whitney Pier, it also reflects the process of identity
reconstruction occurring at the time for the whole Island region.

2 Here it should be reinforced that Cape Breton has reconstructed itself as a region over time.
While social, economic, and cultural conditions change and affect the reconstruction,
elements of it (sometimes residual) remain. The city of Sydney, North Sydney, and coal
mining towns and villages such as Glace Bay, Dominion, New Waterford, Sydney Mines,
Lingan, and so on, geographically and culturally represent the area known as ‘Industrial Cape
Breton’. After the decline and end of the coal and steel industries, some people (perhaps
correctly) refer to this area as ‘Post-Industrial Cape Breton’ and even suggest that the Strait
Area -- with its Pulp and Paper operation and port-based activities – is now a closer
representation of an industrial area. Regardless of these insights, throughout the dissertation
the original conceptualization and identification of Industrial Cape Breton is used as, at the
time of writing and regional construction, it remains the most widely understood descriptor
of Cape Breton’s most populous area.

3 Entering into the 20th century other mines opened later on the west coast of the Island in
Inverness County (see DeMont 2009, 151-153)
While Sydney had certain advantages that could support a steel industry -- such as available natural resources and established port and rail infrastructure -- Crawley also notes that industry promoters still managed to successfully lobby for provincial and federal financial assistance, tax and royalty breaks and free site land and water (1990, 145-146). DeMont, too, elaborates: ‘To develop his steel complex he [Whitney] struck a typical deal with a desperate Nova Scotia government: a 50 percent royalty cut, a reduction in federal bounties, a thirty-year municipal tax exemption and a grant of 480 acres right on Sydney Harbour’ (2009).

As will be depicted in ensuing chapters, eventually the combined geological, geographic, and political-economic obstacles to coal and steel development would result in its collapse toward the end of the twentieth century, setting the Island’s residents on course for further regional reconstruction.

Also in the area of policy, seeing the need for more labour, the province became more proactive in enticing further immigration (DeMont 2009).

Donald Savoie is insistent that Ottawa has usually tended to systematically favour the interests of Central Canada.

Bickerton has also reflected on the factors that - as early as the 1890s – negatively affected the economic dynamic of the Maritimes. These included a lack of domestic and state customers (and unfavourable state policies) that could encourage a modern shipping and shipbuilding industry; a dearth of foreign investment; a comparatively slow rate of industrialization; and again, rail transportation policy (1990, 36-41).

In fact, this notion was supported in the findings of the Royal Commission of Economic Inquiry, known as the Jones Commission, established in 1934 by Nova Scotia premier Angus L. Macdonald (Henderson 2007, 61-64).

The newly introduced government structure ‘managed to weaken the power of the Grand Council of Chiefs’ (Morgan 2009, 186), the historic overall political and spiritual/religious overseer of decisions regarding Mi’kmaw society.

Higher numbers of women left the region because of few employment prospects as traditionally they did not work in the resource sectors. Women were crucial for the transmission of Gaelic language, and more uniquely, music (working songs, mouth music), and dance.

The Legislative Council did not wish for the Gaelic (and other languages) allowance to go through. But to avoid conflict and appease concerns expressed in the Legislature, the Council allowed a more watered down version [omitting compulsory teaching of other languages] of the clause in the Act to pass (see Kennedy 2004, 47).
Graham (2006) in correspondence with Kenneth MacKinnon, comes to the same conclusions regarding the institutional failure to adequately address Gaelic language and culture.

The pre-WWII generation of native Gaelic speakers had come to be educated in a language and system which failed to recognize ‘native intellectual strengths or cultural patterns’ (Kennedy 2004, 52). In turn, it seems that Gaels came to accept the prevailing modernization message that, not only was their language intellectually inferior, but that economic integration (perhaps especially with the deeply felt effects of the Great Depression) through adoption of Ango-American values was the key to progress (Kennedy 2004; Dembling 1997; McEwan-Fujita 2013, 160).

A 2011 draft of the Nova Scotia Gaelic Language and Cultural Framework 2013-18 concurs and suggests the decline in Gaelic can be attributed to ‘systemic institutional exclusion’; ‘negative attitudes pertaining to language use and transmission’ [that can be traced back a number of generations to the core informal family institutional influence and education system prejudice] and related ‘punishment for and ridicule of Gaelic language use in schools; the World Wars, and ‘economic disparity’ (20). Related to this, David Frank also mentions the decline of the Gaelic language, pointing to the eventual demise of the Gaelic Newspaper Mac-Talla that had been published between 1892 and 1904 (1985, 205).

Languages, however, do not disappear simply because of a local acceptance of prevailing ideas (Newton 2013; Nettle and Romain 2000, 6). As Nettle and Romain suggest, ‘people do not fling away their languages for no good reason … many instances of language shift and death occur under duress and stressful social circumstances, where there is no realistic choice but to give in’ (2000, 6).

For an extensive list of institutional agency and organizations created which fostered regionality in the multicultural Whitney Pier area of Industrial Cape Breton, see DeMont 2009, 164).

There were 15 councils formed, with three located in the mining towns. However, the Society soon declined in the coal towns as its membership was composed of company and church elites who were not generally sympathetic to the workers in the industrial conflicts that arose in the 1920s (Frank 1985, 203). In the 1950s, with a new generation of clergy more sympathetic toward the industrial working experience, relations between the church and labour movement became more congenial and cooperative (1985, 217), allowing for more institutional cohesion and a growing degree of regionality.

This middling approach was consistent with the Church’s social teachings and could be reconciled with the movement being a recipient of financial support from the US-based Carnegie Foundation (Bickerton 1990, 72).

Dodaro and Pluta note a common identity and unity being constructed among the Gaels, Irish, and Acadian communities as the ‘three ethnic groups were united not only by their
common religious affiliation but also by a history of religious persecution, social and political discrimination, economic exploitation, and inferior social and political status’ (2012, 21).

21 The Militia Act was amended under recommendation by a Royal Commission (MacGillivray 1980).

22 In the early 20th century the strikes that occurred in the coal mines were mainly a response to poor living and working conditions that the miners were experiencing (Lotz and Lotz 1974, 60). Between 1901 and 1914 the Glace Bay mines alone saw twenty strikes occur (DeMont 2009, 161). The most significant 1925 upheaval was a response to a ‘sluggish’ coal and steel industry, BESCO reducing work in the mines, and the related socio-economic effects on the workers.

23 In Industrial Cape Breton, Belgian and Scottish immigrants and native Cape Bretoners returning from the US and Western Canada brought socialist ideas with them, exerting a major influence on the local labour environment. The movement suffered early setbacks in Cape Breton at the turn of the century that included the failed 1904 steel strike; a poor showing by a labour candidate in a provincial by-election; and a sound defeat in the federal election for the Independent Labour Party (led by PWA leader Stephen B. MacNeil) (Frank and Reilly 1979, 88-89).

24 Frank and Reilly outline the region-building agency and institutionalization contributing to the Island’s regionality at the time: ‘In a group of 25 prominent SPC members in industrial Cape Breton, at least 12 were coal miners; other occupations included steelworkers and printers, a baker and a tailor. Three party members … were officials in local cooperative societies; … two were also active in the formation of the Cooperative Union of Canada. Four party members were prominent trade union leaders: J.B. McLachlan and J.D. McLennan were executive officers of District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America, Alf Brenchley was secretary of a UMW local, and steelworker H.C. Gregory was secretary of the Sydney Trades and Labour Council (1979, 102).

25 In the provincial election of 1911, Alex McKinnon was the first candidate to contest an election under the socialist banner in any legislature east of Saskatchewan. Although he polled no better than the labour candidate of 1904, his numbers indicated that the socialist support did have some strength in Industrial Cape Breton. However, the result also suggested that two-party dominance was entrenched; the Liberals and Conservatives were still able to run candidates who could appeal to workers’ interests (104-105).

26 McLachlan’s support, propped up by the unions, was strongest within the mining districts. He polled from 11 to 25 percent in these towns and in some polls had the most support of any candidate. Certainly left-leaning tendencies were not insignificant in Industrial Cape Breton in the 1920s and 30s.
In 1938, at their biennial convention and in a meeting of District 26, United Mine Workers of America (UMW), the Cape Breton Labour Party (founded in 1936) and Lodge 1064 of the Steelworkers Organizing Committee agreed to the authorization of the establishment of a CCF provincial branch in Nova Scotia. Just over a month later, ‘[t]he CCF National council agreed to send Lewis and Angus MacInnis, MP for Vancouver East, to Nova Scotia to organize a provincial section of the CCF’ (MacLean 1977, 25). Miner and union executive Clarence (Clarie) Gillis became the first leader of the provincial party and in 1939, Douglas MacDonald was elected as the first CCF member in a by-election in the riding of Cape Breton Centre, after a vote split between an independent Liberal and a Liberal candidate (Beck 1985, 181).

To maintain and foster party ideology (and indeed the ideology of the CCF as a movement) CCF clubs were organized throughout Nova Scotia, and proved to have a strong presence in Industrial Cape Breton. MacLean surmises that, ‘[i]t was in Cape Breton and only Cape Breton that the CCF took on the characteristics of a vibrant “movement”, sustained by club enthusiasm’ (MacLean 1977, 29).

As Campbell and MacLean noted of Cape Breton County (which encompassed Industrial Cape Breton):

‘What Scottish impact existed in this county by the 1880s was strongly augmented after 1900 by large numbers moving in to the Sydneys and the mining towns from Inverness and Victoria Counties. But soon after, these were joined by other ethnic groups, Ukrainians, Poles, Italians and many others, all seeking employment in an expanding industrial area. The cultural cohesion that existed in the rural areas could not be maintained in this new environment and many did not use the language and soon forgot it. Therefore, the population growth was quite different; it generally occurred later and it took other directions in a changing economic pattern’ (1974, 284). While Campbell and MacLean aptly point out the more multicultural character of the industrial area and the toll this took on Gaelic language-speakers, David Frank states that even by 1921, typically, ‘the resident of the mining community was most likely to be Scottish and Catholic”; and that ‘Scottish and Catholic traditions were the most common ones” in most of the mining towns (1985, 204-205).

This is not to say that Industrial Cape Breton’s multicultural character always fostered harmonious ethno-cultural relations. As DeMont notes, ‘the waves of arrivals rubbed up against each other’ (2009, 162). Black steel workers who came from the US faced continued racism and inequality while Italian immigrants had to walk through Sydney’s streets in groups to protect themselves from violent locals. Indeed, state intolerance and paranoia -- stemming from Hitler and Mussolini’s Second World War fanaticism and actions -- resulted in Cape Breton Italians being sent off to internment camps (2009, 162).

Fielding was not alone when it came to gladhanding business executives. Cape Breton Conservative MP David MacKeen, elected in the 1887 and 1891 elections, dismissed concerns raised in the House of Commons about American capitalist involvement in the Cape Breton coal industry. He labelled such concerns “most childish” and logically unsound. Soon thereafter he became manager of Whitney’s Dominion Coal (MacGillivray 1998).
As Judith Fingard has noted, Murray’s government ‘intervened directly, and perhaps naively, to promote the interests of capitalists in a period when their activities were characterized by exploitation of labour, watering of stock, influence peddling, hostile mergers, non-resident control, and private speculation at the expense of local advances. Nowhere was this trend more evident than in Cape Breton, where Murray was keen to see development’ (2003).

Macdonald’s Progressive Conservative successor Robert Stanfield pushed the province in a more interventionist direction with regard to economic development, aided by increased transfers from the federal government (See Bickerton 1990; Clancy et al. 2000).

Indeed, this new form of social citizenship was the hallmark of the postwar welfare state everywhere in the developed world.

In Cheticamp, community members were able to capitalize on Macdonald’s 1934 rural electrification initiative. As the community was dependent upon the fishery and to an extent gypsum mining, local businesses and community leaders were contemplating the economic benefits that could be accrued for the area with electrification. Utilizing party and government elite connections, they engaged both the local community and the government to bring in electrification. After various meetings in the community and Halifax (with some encountered resistance), electricity arrived to Cheticamp on August 15, 1937, and followed in other northern Inverness County communities soon thereafter (Boudreau 2000, 162-164).

Regionality was bolstered through multiple-actor agency associated with the creation of The Canso Crossing Association. An umbrella association of lobby and business groups and leaders, it was instrumental in advocating for federal and provincial action on the causeway project, and acted in cooperation with Premier Angus L. Macdonald (Beaton 2001, 66-67).

Additionally, parochial patronage was visibly alive and well before the causeway project was even underway as business people with vested interests in securing construction contracts lobbied Premier Macdonald, reminding him of the value of their potential support for his political party (Beaton 2001, 73-74).

The NS Highland Village was a community replication of a pioneer settlement envisioned by Angus L. MacDonald in the 1930s after he witnessed a similar construction while visiting the United Empire Exhibition of Scotland. The idea was put to rest during the Second World War but reemerged in the mid 1950s when the Nova Scotia Association of Scottish Societies sought input into a location for a community museum exploring Scottish culture. An Iona community group emerged and promoted central Cape Breton as the best site for the museum. After their pitch – made in the Gaelic language to the refereeing committee – Iona became the site for the museum, and in 1959 Nova Scotia’s Highland Village was incorporated (Highland Village 2013).

However, ‘heritage’ culture and ‘living’ culture need not be conflictual concepts in this instance, and there are examples that show this. Macdonald’s involvement in Scottish themed
projects was most likely courageous at a time when a) the English aspect of Britishness and ‘all things empire’ were emphasized within a British-Canadian majoritarian nationalism b) the Gaelic language was ostracized and under rapid decline; and c) appropriation of Gaelic cultural components by Anglo-elites presented a confusing interpretation of Gaelic culture. Two of Macdonald’s involvements displaying both heritage and living culture (with an eventual greater focus, through their evolution, placed on living culture) are the Gaelic College and the Nova Scotia Highland Village.

39 Scottish identity at the time was a confusing mix of inaccurate discursive terms. ‘Highland’ was appropriated from a Gaelic spatial and cultural context and became a generic romanticized/tartanized descriptor of Scottishness. This emerged from Victorian times through the influence of such celebrated authors as Sir Walter Scott and glorification advocated by Queen Victoria herself. And the descriptor ‘Scottish’ largely ignores the existence of regional and cultural variants within that region. Although a resultant homogenous depiction of Scottish culture has remained relatively ubiquitous worldwide, it is through revitalization of Gaelic cultural art forms (promoted through community agency, political leadership, and recent scholarship), that the identity of Gaelic Cape Breton has arguably been reinforced against such depictions and continues to be reinvented (see Chapter 9; Kennedy 2004; Graham 2006; Shears 2008).

40 Thus the Scottish Gaelic culture, transplanted from the peripheral Scottish Highland and Western Isles region, was overshadowed in the public eye by the lowland-influenced, tartanized Scottishness championed by the Macdonald government (see McKay 1992; Newton 2013) that was designed to capture the tourist imagination.

41 Nowhere was this business-as-usual clientelist network of party maintenance more visible than in Cape Breton. Both main political parties maintained linkages between the grass roots and leadership through locally organized partisan party committees that would put forward names of party supporters who should fill employment positions, most notably in the area of highways construction and repair in rural Cape Breton (Interview with Danny Graham, March 8, 2015, Boudreau 2000).
CHAPTER 5
CAPE BRETON AS ‘SOCIALIST ISLAND’: INDUSTRIAL DECLINE AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

“It is not the strongest or the most intelligent who will survive but those who can best manage change.” Charles Darwin

Postwar prosperity was widespread in Canada but Cape Breton faced significant challenges. Working class labour culture, a predominantly Scottish Gaelic identity, a tartanized provincial tourism brand, and a significant measure of community-building agency were all notable components of Island regionality. There were external influences and pressures that were eroding some cultural components of Island identity (e.g. Gaelic and music), but the 1970s were also a transition period of cultural vibrancy (see Donovan 1990c highlights in Appendix F; Graham 2006). Additionally some Unama’ki community members were embracing educational opportunities that would help them as they became more politically active (Coffin 2003). The economy looked less promising. Like coal and steel communities elsewhere, the Island’s industrial base was confronted with a major international market contraction (Bowden and Malloy 2002). Both orders of government, while reconfiguring their development approaches, encountered a severe crisis when the Island’s dominant private sector employer suddenly announced the impending closure of its Cape Breton operations.

This chapter will outline the factors and conditions (political/government institutions and policies, culture and identity, and political and community leadership) that made possible a state-led ‘resolution’ to the regional crisis of the 1960s. And as the
1990s arrived, Cape Breton would begin to transition from a defensive mode of regionalism to one that was simultaneously more integrative and autonomous.\textsuperscript{1} Both rescaling and reterritorialization processes were involved; multiple institutional actors would attempt to (re)construct and (re)adapt the region in response to a profound existential threat to the region’s economy and society (Bickerton 2013, 281).

5.1 CULTURE AND IDENTITY

In the 1960s, increased exposure to pop-culture and ‘Americanization’ of entertainment negatively impacted some cultural practices among Cape Breton Gaels. A 1971 CBC documentary by filmmaker Ron MacInnis cautioned that the Cape Breton fiddling tradition was ‘vanishing.’ The film prompted community leaders to initiate a successful grass-roots revitalization of the art form which by the early 1990s had gained international acclaim. It contributed to the economy as a community-building cultural component and a major tourist attraction (Graham 2006, Thompson 2004). Historian Kenneth Donavan asserts that a significant ‘cultural revival’ was happening in Cape Breton during the last few decades of the 20th century (1990). Cultural self-awareness, oftentimes aided by a developmental state, nurtured Island-wide cultural initiatives. This cultural revival was ‘more concentrated and focused’ than broader Canadian developments in the arts; an increasing density of social and cultural institutions was both underlining and reinforcing Cape Breton regionality (Appendix F).\textsuperscript{2}

With regard to the Unama’ki Mi’kmaq communities, the 1951 revisions to the Indian Act had loosened the government’s grip on Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and in 1960 they were granted federal enfranchisement (Leslie 2002, 26). After a period of
limited political activity in the 1950s and early 60s, the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton became more vocal and political, a local manifestation of the gathering momentum of the national First Nations movement (Coffin 2003, 43-45, also see White Paper below). In 1968 for instance, medical, transportation, and housing challenges led to a protest outside the Eskasoni Indian Affairs Office (2003, 43-44). And in 1969 a number of Cape Breton Mi’kmaw men formed the Ulnuegg Igonidike, an organization intended to gain support among Nova Scotian Mi’kmaq to protest adverse socio-economic conditions through democratic and cooperative means, sharing resources, and promoting aboriginal rights. An appointed body, Ulnuegg Igonidike was perceived locally as a ‘top-down’ initiative and failed to gain the support of the five Cape Breton Mi’kmaw communities (2003, 43-44). Although discontinued, its creation reflected the growth of Mi’kmaw political mobilization.

Political mobilization also was fostered by St. Francis Xavier University’s extension department. Between 1957 and 1963, it engaged eastern Nova Scotian communities to encourage local leadership and community development. Communities included Margaree (with four of the five Mi’kmaw communities on the Island participating) and Membertou in 1957. In 1964 the department utilized Department of Indian Affairs funds ‘to continue its community development training and leadership courses on the five Cape Breton and eastern Nova Scotia reserves’ (Coffin 2003, 47). Extension department reports suggest that its courses and programs promoted skills and increased political efficacy among the Mi’kmaq. Some trainees became employees of the Extension department while the department also worked towards job placement, marketing Mi’kmaw products, and supporting communities in their negotiations with the
federal government (Coffin 2003, 49).

The extension department’s relationship with the Mi’kmaq groomed some leaders who responded to the federal government’s assimilationist *White Paper* of 1969. In 1968-69 the federal government initiated a round of aboriginal consultations regarding further Indian Act changes. The consultations revealed that aboriginals ‘wanted greater self-government; more funds for economic and social development; settlement of land claims; protection of treaty rights; and constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights’ (Leslie 2002, 26). Considering that the ensuing *White Paper* ‘went right back to the 19th century,’ First Nations across the country took action (2002, 26). Convinced that the federal government had failed to address their concerns -- as relayed through the Maritime Indian Advisory Council -- the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq responded by forming the Union of Nova Scotia Indians (UNSI) to be ‘a united voice to respond to the perceived assimilative threats of Ottawa’s *White Paper*’ and to represent the socio-economic demands of the Mi’kmaq in the province (Clancy 2005, 332; Coffin 2003, Morgan 2009, 192). UNSI’s leadership had strong representation from Cape Breton Mi’kmaq; they represented ‘the first generation of leadership trained to go toe-to-toe with the government’ in ‘representing their interests to all Canadians’ (Coffin 2003, 55). The UNSI employed some community members and garnered federal government support to act as a lobbying body in health and education, community development, and self-government (2003, 58).

Between the 1960s and 1980s regional division and political friction festered between the Mi’kmaq of Unama’ki and those of the mainland. Representational rivalries and cultural differences (e.g. regarding the greater emphasis Unama’ki residents placed
on Indigenous language, spoken at a much higher rate on the Island) were cited for the division (2003, 23). Cape Breton Mi’kmaq also maintained closer ties to the Catholic Church and to Mi’kmaq traditions, including the Grand Council (2003, 23). These factors and opposing political and economic ambitions triggered a split in 1986. That year, the mainland Mi’kmaq formed their own organization, the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs, while the five Unama’ki communities constituted the UNSI (Coffin 2003, 3, 10). However, three of the mainland Mi’kmaw communities subsequently rejoined the UNSI (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

The split did not prevent the two organizations from cooperating in claiming treaty rights and political autonomy. In 1976, the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia filed a land claim and presented it to the provincial and federal governments as two documents: “The Crown Land Rights and Hunting and Fishing Rights of the MicMac Indians” and “The Nova Scotia Aboriginal Rights Position Paper” (Clancy 2005, 332). The first referred to hunting, fishing, and trapping rights, and was ‘a partial claim of aboriginal title’; the documents were dismissed by the federal government as having been ‘superceded by law’, and by the provincial government as falling under federal jurisdiction. The claims remained ‘deadlocked’ for decades (Clancy 2005, 332), but served as cornerstones in a path-dependent process of future negotiation and autonomy-seeking for mainland and Unama’ki Mi’kmaq.

While government response to Indigenous claims prior to the era of globalization was lacking, the courts were more proactive in affirming rights (Clancy 2005, 332). As Clancy notes, incremental case law expanded beyond initial jurisdictions while some rights were advanced in mainland Nova Scotia and Unama’ki: Nova Scotia Appeal Court
rulings such as Isaac (1975), Simon (1985), and R. v. Denny, Paul, and Sylliboy (1990) affirmed Mi’kmaw hunting and food-fishing rights to which they claimed entitlement (2005, 332-333).

The 1980s brought constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights, a growing self-determination consensus, and educated leaders trying to build their communities. The region’s Mi’kmaq were becoming more institutionally organized and better-equipped to negotiate treaty rights, economic integration, and cultural autonomy. Their growing ‘confidence in their culture and sense of nationhood inevitably led to the desire to have more control of their affairs, within their own traditions’ (Morgan 2009, 192).3 Connections between cultural maintenance, economic development, and region-building continued into the era of globalization, as will be discussed further in Chapter 9.

5.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

In the aftermath of the Depression, the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois) addressed Canada’s fiscal, social and economic inequalities. It influenced postwar Keynesian policy initiatives including the constitutional ‘scaling up’ – from the provincial to federal orders – of employment insurance responsibilities in 1940 and the 1957 introduction of equalization payments. The latter were negotiated by the St. Laurent-led Liberal government (1948-57) and introduced by Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government (1957-63).4 Such initiatives placed poorer provinces on a better fiscal and socio-economic footing; they benefitted from equalization and social transfers in the form of increased personal incomes and the improved public services associated with augmented provincial social
programming capabilities (Finbow 2004; Bickerton 2011). But Keynesian policies did not fully address regional disparities, prompting other interventionist measures. This was true not only for Canada but throughout the industrialized western world. A number of regional initiatives were introduced (and at times reconfigured), for instance rural-focused development bodies and collaborative arrangements and funding agreements between both orders of government in Canada (Savoie 2006; Bickerton and MacNeil 2007). By 1969 Canada’s ‘hodge-podge collection of federal development agencies was superceded by the creation of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE)’ (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 56, 58). DREE’s emphasis then moved from rural development to an exogenous urban growth-pole strategy centering on ‘unilateral federal initiatives that would reflect a regional economic strategy devised by state planners in Ottawa.’ In this arrangement there was ‘little tolerance for “interference” from local actors’ (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 56, 58; Bickerton 1990, 211-213). Through the leadership and influence of Cape Breton Highlands-Canso MP and senior federal cabinet minister Allan J. MacEachen, the town of Port Hawkesbury in the Strait Area of Cape Breton, primarily because of its potential as a deepwater ‘super-port’, was chosen, along with greater Halifax, to be a ‘special area’ growth pole in Nova Scotia. Notably, the province’s second most populous area, Industrial Cape Breton, was excluded (see Bickerton 1990, 242; Jackson 2003, 4-5).

After a departmental review in 1973, DREE shifted its approach to federal-provincial General Development Agreements (GDAs) as programming vehicles. With bilateral intergovernmental relations taking precedence over any regional perspective, the GDA format effectively reversed the relationship between Ottawa and the provinces;
‘provincial governments were now proposing initiatives, and the federal government was reacting’ (Savoie 2006, 103). Most economic sectors were covered by GDAs with the added advantage of Ottawa covering 80-90 per cent of project costs (Savoie 2006, 101, 104). Nova Scotia’s GDA-sponsored initiatives in Cape Breton were found in the mineral, agricultural, tourism, forestry, energy and industrial sectors, dry dock development, and included special measures for the Strait of Canso area and Sydney Steel, as described below (Savoie 2006, 101-102).

In 1982, Prime Minister Trudeau disbanded DREE, transferring its GDAs and policy role to a newly-created Ministry of State for Economic and Regional Development. Regional incentives programming was absorbed into a new Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) (Savoie 2006, 118). Economic and Regional Development Agreements (ERDAs) replaced GDAs and were to be more simplified arrangements with the provinces that included a greater range of federal departments (Savoie 2006, 123). Resource-based megaprojects were to be the main tools in the new regional development policy, but a global collapse in resource prices and an international recession pre-empted most of the proposed megaprojects (Savoie 2006, 119; Bickerton 1990, 277).

Government Takeover of the Coal and Steel Industry

Over much of the last century the impact from the decline of heavy industry on Cape Breton was significant. According to Lotz and Lotz, between 1921 and 1966 more than 40 coal mines were closed, while steel making began to buckle under competitive pressures (1974, 109-110). Over this period (1921 to 1961), 57,000 people left Cape
Breton Island, while the period between 1951 and 1966 saw one out of every four people between 15 and 24 years of age migrating elsewhere. Most who those who left were under 40 years old (1974, 104).

Critical to Cape Breton’s economic development path was the 1966-67 DOSCO crisis (Bickerton 2012). With the coal and steel industries in trouble, DOSCO announced the imminent closure of its collieries, threatening the jobs of 6,500 miners and the social collapse of the mining communities of Cape Breton (Higgins 1993, 138; Bickerton 2012, 109). Then on ‘Black Friday’ in 1967, DOSCO announced that it would be closing its Sydney steel operations. With Industrial Cape Breton in turmoil, its residents took action. A ‘March of Concern’ drew 20,000 people in Sydney in a display of protest and solidarity (Lotz and Lotz 1974, 109). With close to 10,000 unionized jobs at stake (Corbin and Hunter 2007, 181), the political ramifications for representatives at all government levels were obvious. The political and social reaction which ensued was a combination of both defensive and integrative regionalism. The interventionist state context yielding the regional development initiatives cited above also supported the creation of the Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco), a crucial instance of state-led institution-building at a time of extreme social and economic duress. Enter the politics of Devco.

Under intense political pressure, the federal and provincial governments intervened in the DOSCO crisis. Minister MacEachen backed a nationalization plan that legislated Devco into existence in 1967 (Bickerton 1990, 201; Higgins 1993, 139). Its mandate was to take over, operate, and phase out DOSCO’s Cape Breton coal mines and ‘through its Industrial Development Division [IDD]…endeavour to develop other sectors,
industries and enterprises in the Cape Breton economy’ (Higgins 1993, 139; also see Lotz 1974). But the Nova Scotia government subsequently failed to convince their federal counterparts to include DOSCO’s Sydney steel works in the federal crown corporation. As a result, the Province created the Sydney Steel Corporation (SYSCO) in 1967 with plans to modernize the plant (Bickerton 1990, 200; Lotz 1974, 109). The federal government did contribute $2 million to SYSCO and concluded a $4 million purchase agreement for the plant’s coke ovens. These interventions constituted a ‘significant’ historical juncture: political executive-level leadership had utilized prevailing interventionist ideas and practices to rescale economic development in the region. The DOSCO crisis ‘brought forth the federal and provincial governments as the new principal actors in the Cape Breton economy’ (Johnson 2007, 154; see also Bickerton 1990; 2013).

Subsequently Devco and SYSCO attempted to address their challenges. For SYSCO, this involved a series of modernization studies and projects under (at times) questionable management. Keeping steel-making alive in Cape Breton was also propelled by the rhetoric of politicians seeking re-election (Bickerton 1990; Bishop 1990, 182-84; Jackson 2003). Political responses to the industry’s woes involved scale-jumping and federal-provincial (dis)entanglement scenarios, all in the guise of modernization implementation for SYSCO, though for a period also for Devco.8

By 1975 the global economic context was changing. The first OPEC oil crisis and the ensuing period of stagflation halted provincial public sector expansion and secondary manufacturing investments (Clancy et al. 2000, 22).9 With Nova Scotia’s economic prospects dubious and electricity rates spiking in 1978, the John Buchanan-led Progressive Conservatives won the provincial election, though without a single Cape
Breton seat (2000, 23). With hope dwindling for local steel-making, more state-sponsored modernization and downsizing of SYSCO continued under Buchanan. Finally, in 1987 the decision was taken to write off SYSCO’s $785 million debt. The much down-sized operation was finally closed when John Hamm’s Progressive Conservative government pulled the plug in 2001, well into the new globalized era (Bishop 1990; Jackson 2003).

While the woes of Cape Breton steel-making were being addressed (Higgins 1993, 140), Devco worked toward rebuilding and diversifying the region’s economy through its Industrial Development Division and intergovernmental arrangements (accessing DREE and later DRIE funding, and Nova Scotia’s economic development corporation, Industrial Estates Ltd. [IEL]). Starting in 1975 Devco initiatives included: building industrial parks which hosted a number of ‘footloose industries’ attracted with IEL’s help (see Haddow 2000 and Bickerton 1990; also see Beck 1988, 302; Lotz 1974, 112); purchasing and funding various types of infrastructure; trying to improve coal quality and coal production techniques; attracting outside capital for modernization of the steel industry; investing in small tourism and farming operations; attempting to replace farming and forestry product imports; and assisting in the establishment of the University College of Cape Breton, [CBU] (Lotz and Lotz 1974; Higgins 1993).

Devco reduced the structural deficit of its mining operations from $30 million in 1967 to $10 million in 1980-81 but even with federal and provincial interventions, the coal enterprise ultimately could not be made profitable (Higgins 1993, 140). Devco’s involvement with coal was ended by the federal government in 1999, ending any significant presence for the coal industry in Cape Breton’s economy (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 56; Jackson 2003, 29). By the time it folded, state interventionism in the
economy had become passé to many policy actors.

Despite restructuring in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, it seems Atlantic Canada and Cape Breton ended up in relatively the same position under both DREE and DRIE: regional development spending remained primarily focused on resource industries and infrastructure, with the exception of Devco’s mostly failed attempts to attract secondary manufacturing and the periodic injections of funds to prop up SYSCO. This would seem to suggest that prior to, during, and in the wake of the failed megaproject strategy, the federal government had trouble finding solutions for regional economic development. Any innovative strategy emerging from these institutional arrangements was dubious or at best modestly effective. Indeed, regional unemployment rose in the 1980s to its highest level in fifty years (Savoie 1986; Finbow 2004; Bickerton 1990, 276; Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 59). During this period, state and community actors (save attempts at development occurring through Devco’s IDD) were deeply enmeshed in a defensive mode of regionalism, a response common to regions dependent on declining heavy industry (Keating 1999, 24). Although this may have (at least temporarily) maintained material gains for labour and scored political points for local politicians, it could be seen as counterproductive in that it delayed movement toward necessary restructuring and retooling to prepare the region for the emerging reality of a postindustrial, global economy. If the Cape Breton region was to survive and rebuild itself after a long and bruising period of deindustrialization, a new kind of regionalism would be essential. This would require a different sort of leadership, one more adept at (or at least inclined to focus on) building a new economy, utilizing culture and identity to this end and a new set of institutions to support these purposes.
ECB, ECBC, ACOA and the New Economic Interface

Responding to the new economic challenges faced by Canada, the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald Commission) submitted its findings and recommendations in 1985 to the recently elected Mulroney Progressive Conservative government. In the main, they reflected neo-liberal thinking brought to the forefront elsewhere (e.g., ‘Thatcherism’ in the UK and ‘Reaganomics’ in the USA). The commission’s recommendations included: market solutions to address regional disparities; abandoning the first National Policy’s tariffs and transportation features and negotiating a free trade agreement with the US; reforming social programs and subsidies to increase flexibility and efficiency; and broadening the sales tax from manufacturing to include all goods and services (Forbes 1993, 28; Inwood 2005, 322; Canada, Macdonald Commission Reports 1984). The Mulroney government was sympathetic to these increasingly popular neo-liberal economic prescriptions (incorporated into the government’s expenditure-reviewing Neilsen Task Force). However, it adopted a ‘mixed’ approach to governing: some neo-liberal policies with regional development spending driven by federal-provincial relations and partisan political considerations (Forbes 1993; Milne 1986; Bickerton Correspondence 2013).

Cape Breton Island provides a contextual, peripheral region example of the economic situation during this period. In a rapidly globalizing setting, Mulroney was undertaking pan-national goals which could easily lead to fragmentation: a more decentralized, denationalized, yet more unified federation (through free trade, new inter-
regional trade blocs, and constitutional reform) and a multi-regional coalition of support that required regionally-sensitive political maneuvering and the channels (e.g. refurbished regional development agencies) through which to distribute federal monies that would maintain and foster partisan ties and allegiances. While ‘in with the new’ neo-liberal prescriptions were permeating policy circles, ‘out with the old’ was less evident in the sense of the practice of partisan politics and vertical clientelist relations that had been a more-or-less permanent feature of regional development.

DRIE and the ERDAs continued briefly under Mulroney’s watch, while much of the industrial and regional development programming was downloaded to the provinces (Savoie 2006, 132). Changes were consistent with the rise of neo-liberal ideas in the 1980s; ‘regional development policy was losing the perception war’ as needs assessment and eliminating disparities between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ would no longer be the priority; building regional capacities and seizing opportunities was the new mantra (Savoie 2003 quoted in Bradford 2010; Bradford 2010). The regional development approach moved to ‘a triple policy shift – from closing disparities to realizing potential, from bureaucratic to more community-driven design, and from DREE [and then DRIE] to more decentralized agency coordination’ (Bradford 2010, my emphasis). This affected economic development initiatives and projects, and Cape Breton in particular suffered as a result.

Finance minister Michael Wilson’s first budget in 1984 stipulated that the Island’s two Crown Corporation heavy water plants (see Political Leadership below) would be closed, with the loss of 700 well-paid jobs (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 59). On top of this, 1200 mining jobs disappeared after a devastating fire in Devco’s most productive
colliery. Cape Breton was thrust into yet another crisis situation. In response the federal government appointed ‘a private-sector advisory committee to recommend initiatives to the federal and provincial governments to promote economic development and productive employment in Cape Breton. The finance minister also unveiled an enriched tax-incentive scheme for new investment in the area’ (Savoie 2006, 134; Murray interview, 2014).

Enterprise Cape Breton (ECB) was created, comprised of a board of local notables and business people to aid the government strategy of channelling regional development incentives to the private sector. ECB would give industrial investment control to local entrepreneurs; ‘the lure of generous tax credits’, it was hoped, would attract capital, both independently and through partnerships, and entice companies to locate in Cape Breton (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 60). A new Cape Breton Topping Up Assistance Program would be administered by ECB, designed to provide grants of up to 60% of eligible capital costs to potential businesses (Savoie 2006, 136). The new arrangement would hopefully reduce bureaucratic red tape and a perceived deficit of autonomous local decision-making capacity. As Senator Lowell Murray notes, ‘here, once again, as with the old DRIE, the issue for many people in the whole [Atlantic] region, and Cape Breton also, was the bureaucratic hoops that one had to go through to get anything done. To get projects considered or approved was all being done by people who were strangers to the region and had no experience with it or perhaps not even much interest in it’ (Murray interview, 2014).

While ECB appeared to be locally-directed, however, control over the tax credit program remained with the federal government. Greater efficiency through
decentralization would happen through the agency’s improved responsiveness and
decision-making speed, better serving the interests of investors (Bickerton and MacNeil
2006, 61). The tax credit scheme was a development ‘tool’ that allowed millions of
dollars to be channelled into proposed projects (e.g. hotels in Sydney) and existing
enterprises, and was arguably ‘effective in job creation’ (MacLeod 2011). However, this
new approach also produced a significant number of ‘high profile business failures’ with
the concomitant loss of ECB-provided public funds (Bickerton and MacNeil 2006; Brait

In 1986 Mulroney’s position was that DRIE was ineffective. He decided to bypass
the Ottawa bureaucracy and hire Maritime regional development scholar Donald Savoie
to help design a new Atlantic regional development agency (Savoie 2006, 145-146). Savoie’s 1987 report led to the creation of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
(ACOA) in 1988. ACOA diverged from Savoie’s proposal and had features in common
with previous DRIE programs. ‘Former DREE and DRIE staff simply continued to do
what they did best—design and deliver programs and federal-provincial agreements’
(Savoie 1997, 23-26, 26). ACOA had challenges in influencing federal programs and
policies; though promoted as a cross-department agency, in its operation its difference
from a line department proved to be superficial. As noted by Savoie ten years after
submitting his report, ‘Indeed, ACOA is now operating as…a kind of regional operation
in a large government department traditionally concerned with the economic
circumstances of southern Ontario and Quebec’ (Savoie 1997, 26; Murray interview
2014).
On a positive note, while primary sectors and transportation continued to be sponsored as they had been with DREE and DRIE (Savoie 1997, 23-26), ACOA acknowledged the changing global economy by directing more funds toward human resource development, innovation and technology transfer, trade and marketing development, and promoting entrepreneurship (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 63; see Appendix G for distribution of innovation monies by ACOA and other bodies). While the new regional development mantras/directions were promoted federally, local development actors were left with a reduced annual regional development allotment in the early 1990s and were ‘under direct threat from provisions of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement’ (Bickerton 1991, 149).

For Cape Breton, the Mulroney-era changes included moving Devco’s responsibility for industrial development to a new Crown Corporation, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC), which replaced ECB (Savoie 2006, 150-51, 153). ECBC would report to, and have its funds funnelled through ACOA (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007). This restructuring was part of a wider government strategy to decentralize regional development bodies to Canadian regions.17 ECBC’s mandate was ‘to promote and assist, either alone or in conjunction with any person or the Government of Canada or of Nova Scotia or any agency of either of those governments, the financing and development of industry on the Island of Cape Breton to provide employment outside the coal producing industry and to broaden the base of the economy of the island’ (Legislation quoted in Savoie 2006, 153). In effect, Devco’s diversification branch would live on with this ‘restyled’ development agency (Bickerton 2014, 280). Early on ECBC pursued a familiar agenda of promoting and supporting ‘the agricultural, forestry and fishery sectors,
tourism and craft developments, and…mid-size industrial projects’ (Johnson 2007, 156). Its significant role as a region-building institution in Cape Breton’s re-scaled development regime is noted below, but will be traced in more detail in the following chapters.

The Provincial State and Regional Development

At the turn of the 21st century, Rodney Haddow noted that Nova Scotia’s development policies between the 1960s and 1990s ‘lacked strategic focus’ and - similar to federal approaches above - seemed to reflect a random and incoherent ‘collection of initiatives designed to sustain existing activities or promote new ones’ (2000, 83). He also observed that federal-provincial cooperation in the development field ‘lacked a centralized and coordinated agency able to direct a coherent plan for developing the provincial economy’ and that provincial spending on economic development was modest (Haddow 2000, 83). This observation is better understood by acknowledging the province’s lack of prioritized funds for this area rather than its unwillingness to tackle economic development projects (2000, 84). It also points to the idea that the ‘scaling up’ of much of the regional development responsibility (through the creation of federal development agencies such as Devco and ECBC) was beneficial to Cape Breton because of provincial fiscal constraints.

Nova Scotia governments did undertake a number of development experiments that included private sector liaisons. Prior to Stanfield’s tenure as premier (1956-67), Macdonald’s government provided support for the manufacturing sector in the province,
primarily through the creation of the Department of Trade and Industry and the passing of
the Industrial Loan Act and the Industrial Expansion Act in 1948 and 1951 respectively.
This yielded modest successes with some small industries setting up or expanding, but
industrial development lagged behind the rest of Canada (George 1973, 5).

In the 1956 election campaign Robert Stanfield’s highlighting of Nova Scotia’s
lagging economy vaulted his Progressive Conservatives into power for the first time in 23
years. Paralleling other jurisdictions in Canada, a more activist state under Stanfield in
the development field marked the beginning of the modern era of regional development
in Nova Scotia (Clancy et al. 2000; Bickerton 1990). His interventionism was shaped by
factors like: a newly-elected Diefenbaker government in Ottawa which was sympathetic
to the economic claims of poorer provinces; the growth in federal transfer payments and
emergence of more predictable unconditional funding via equalization that began while
Stanfield was premier, allowing for social program and infrastructure expansion (Clancy
et al 2000, 18-20; Finbow e-mail correspondence 2015); an expanding provincial public
sector; and a well-performing national economy which carried on through the 1960s and
into the 1970s (2000). In this context provincial investments occurred not only in
economic development (including agriculture, forestry, and highways) but also and
especially in health and education (Bickerton 1990).

Shortly after the arrival of the Stanfield government, the Province created
Industrial Estates Limited with a mandate to attract business investment to Nova Scotia.
IEL, a provincial development agency at arms-length from government under Stanfield
and his successor G.I. Smith (1967-70), was overseen by a board of directors comprised
of prominent Nova Scotia businessmen. It was funded by the provincial government,
private banks ‘on the Eurodollar market’ and a federal ADB (Atlantic Development Board) grant. Stanfield also initiated Voluntary Economic Planning (VEP) to provide private sector guidance on the provincial economic strategy. A further innovation in 1967 was the Joint Labour-Management Study Committee (JLMSC), created to advise on overlapping business and labour concerns (Haddow 2000, 85-86; Bickerton 1990; George 1973 on IEL). Early on much of VEP’s time was spent on Cape Breton’s ‘coal-and-steel problem’, but eventually both VEP and JLMSC faded because of member disaffection and ‘no public acknowledgement or strategy of support for the organization on the part of government’ (Bickerton 1990, 238).

IEL’s involvement with Cape Breton’s economy was considerable. In the 1960s its focus diverged from Ottawa’s rural development leanings; IEL’s primary mandate was to attract and help to establish secondary industries (George 1973).19 It provided companies an interest holiday of five years if they located in ‘special need’ areas such as Springhill, Pictou, and Cape Breton (George 1973, 48).20 The emphasis was contrary to DREE’s 1973 growth pole approach which focused on Halifax and the Strait/Port Hawkesbury area (Bickerton 1990, 242). This reveals the above-mentioned lack of coordination between both orders of government as well as the ad-hoc strategizing that plagued provincial governments in the economic development field. After the Gerald Regan-led Liberals somewhat surprisingly defeated the Ike Smith government in 1970, they reigned in IEL by having it work within a newly formed Department of Development. Sharply criticized by opposition parties -- largely because of high-profile business failures – IEL was eventually dismantled.

The Nova Scotia government did introduce some other initiatives that provided
lasting economic benefits for Cape Breton (George 1973). Development Minister Ralph Fiske expanded programs relating to small businesses and promoted forestry, agriculture, and tourism through the province’s agreements with DREE. (Hawkins 1990, 196). By 1974 there were 140 new or expanded manufacturing plants in the province and a new small business loan program. A Resources Development Board provided approximately 800 loans, totalling around forty-one million dollars. Former political colleague Jack Hawkins remarks that ‘[e]ssentially the development structure that Fiske set up in the first [Regan] administration, remained in operation even under [the ensuing premier] Buchanan’ until a restructuring in the latter years of his tenure (Hawkins 1990, 197).

Another Regan minister, Garnett Brown, oversaw the creation of a new Department of Tourism, recognizing the industry’s economic potential. Institutionalizing tourism into the bureaucracy in this way was recognition of the sector’s growing economic importance, rendering it more professionalized and enhancing opportunities to tap into and attract outside markets (Richie Mann interview, 2014; Hawkins 1990). A major hydro development project in Wreck Cove, Cape Breton was a success for its environmental implications and construction spin-offs (Hawkins 1990, 230). Somewhat in contradiction from an environment point of view, there were also efforts to promote the use of Cape Breton coal for power generation in the province (Hawkins 1990, 231).

Despite these positive efforts, Gerald Regan’s government experienced some notable failures in the development field. A prime example in 1974-75 of the hit-or-miss approach to economic development throughout the postwar period was the $400 million Shaheen oil refinery project at the Strait that failed to materialize (see below). ‘Government was involved in acquiring land, and the construction of a common-user
dock on which $2.4 million had been spent' (Hawkins 1990, 230). Conclusively, provincial government performance and effectiveness in the development field was inconsistent. And with regard to Cape Breton in particular, long-term institutions, initiatives, and solutions to address region-building and reconstruction were wanting.

Municipal Consolidation and Regional Development

Economic development, even if impermanent in certain instances, created municipal pressures where expanded social service and infrastructure needs could not be met (see the Strait Area below) (Bickerton 244-245). A main factor was that provincial governments consistently failed to commit to municipal structural change; ‘as the twentieth century drew to a close, Nova Scotia continued to have a municipal framework which had changed little since the nineteenth century’ (Stewart 2000, 202). Municipal reform pressures began mounting in Nova Scotia in the 1960s. The neighbouring New Brunswick government under Louis Robichaud was instituting sweeping changes to its local government structure. It was within this political context that a Royal Commission on Education, Public Services, and Provincial-Municipal Relations (the Graham Commission) was established, reporting its findings to the Regan government in 1974 (2000, 203; Bickerton 1990, 245). The Commission recommended sweeping changes to the ‘outdated’ and unclear organization of public services (e.g. education) and to municipal governments in Nova Scotia. It suggested that ‘overlap’ and ‘duplication’ should be addressed with general services – those affecting the province as a whole -- assigned to the province (e.g. health, education, social welfare, emergency measure
programs, administration of justice) and local services – affecting local communities and groups of people – (e.g. police and fire services, some transportation facilities, garbage disposal and collection, water and sewerage, economic development, recreation, tourism, community services) assigned to the municipalities (Vojnovic 1999, 514, 517). In what proved to be a far-sighted analysis, the commission stipulated that Nova Scotia’s municipalities were excessively numerous (66), ‘fragmented’ and ‘unsuited’ to the social, political, and economic context of the 1970s (Graham Commission 1974, Stewart 2000, 203-205) and that the more urban and populous areas of Halifax, Pictou, and Cape Breton ‘be designated as metropolitan counties’ (Graham Commission 1974).

That the Regan government failed to act on most of Graham’s recommendations was a missed opportunity, according to political observers (Bickerton e-mail correspondence, 2014). Making the recommended reforms could have triggered 1) an earlier regionalized local government in Industrial Cape Breton that may have been more equipped for strategizing and building a regional development coalition and 2) an earlier rationalized system of service delivery responsibilities which may have injected more accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency into provincial-municipal relations (Vojnovic 1999). While a more cohesive economic development apparatus could have emerged in the 1970s, institutional change always comes with unexpected and undesired consequences, at least in the short term. When municipal reform finally did come in the 1990s (see Chapter 6), such was the case regarding service exchange between the province and municipalities. Most municipal units in Cape Breton would experience increased costs after service exchanges began to be implemented in the 1990s (Vojnovic 1999).
Subsequent studies and provincial-municipal meetings between 1975 and 1989 built upon and acknowledged the findings of the Graham Commission’s massive report.\textsuperscript{23} A final 1989 provincial-municipal meeting facilitated the eventual 1991 Task Force on Local Government that was a catalyst for significant municipal reform in the 1990s, almost 20 years after the tabling of the Graham Commission Report (Vojnovic 1999, 518).\textsuperscript{24}

The Strait Area: Failed Growth Pole?

In the postwar interventionist setting, the Canso Causeway provided a link to further integrate the Island into the national economy. However, its completion (at least in the short term) was ‘a double-edged sword’ (Beaton 2001, 114). While the ice-free, deepwater harbour created by the construction of the Causeway was a clear development asset that helped to attract a pulp and paper mill (see below), immediate migration and social and economic dislocation resulted from the closing of the Canadian National Railways (CNR) ferry system for local communities such as Mulgrave and Point Tupper. Three hundred families were affected; ‘[by] the end of April 1955 more than 200 CNR employees in the Strait area received notices that as of May 14, 1955, they no longer had jobs with the company’ (Beaton 2001, 115, 121).

Local communities formed the ‘Four County Development’ association to find alternative employment for CNR workers who lost their jobs. The association worked with government -- which granted generous stumpage as added enticement -- and attracted the paper mill to the Strait in 1961-62 (MacLean interview 2014; Beaton 2001,
Such concessions, though suspect among critics, reaped economic and social returns in this instance. The resulting economic improvement after the arrival of the mill was undeniable. Income in the town of Port Hawkesbury by 1966 rose above the provincial average by twenty per cent while the surrounding ‘counties of Richmond and Inverness experienced income increases of twenty-five per cent and forty-five per cent, respectively’ (Beaton 2001, 125 quoting Twohig 1992, 65).

And for a while other prospects looked promising (Higgins 1993, 142): Gulf Oil built an oil refinery; Canadian General Electric constructed a heavy water plant that was eventually owned by AECL; Nova Scotia Power constructed a thermal power station near the heavy water plant; and a petrochemical plant was envisioned for the near future (Bickerton 1990, 243-244). Other projects would ensue, such as a $5.7 million tools manufacturing plant to be constructed by a group of Ontario companies through the help of ECBC (CBC 1986; CB Music and Historical Society 2014), and Louisiana Pacific’s unique wallboard manufacturing facility, later purchased by USG Corporation (The Free Library 1997). However, the grand economic vision that the Strait area would become a dynamic growth pole never became a reality. Of the many industrial enterprises established, only a downsized version of the pulp and paper plant remains. Although the latter has been a local economic driver for decades, the operation has repeatedly experienced new ownership and provincial government financial support, with periodic reductions in production, workforce, and wages (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 57-58; CBC News 2012).

Besides outright business failures, the investment surge incurred problems related to ‘the character of state priorities in the development field and the poverty of
development planning in Nova Scotia in the 1968-75 period’ (Bickerton 1990, 245). The Strait received DREE infrastructure and a 1974 industrial development agreement for similar undertakings, and a Strait of Canso Industrial Development Agency was created. These initiatives would appear to indicate that a coherent strategy was crystallizing; however, the narrow focus on industrial and economic growth was not accompanied by a similar concern for the social and environmental dimensions of rapid development: relatively few long term jobs, spin-offs, and economic linkages (aside from the mill) resulted; the local population rapidly increased, putting strains on services and amenities; and residents of the host community of Point Tupper – besides the immediate job losses related to the cessation of ferry activities -- were put at risk of being affected by pollution and industrial accidents (Bickerton 1990, 244). Existing municipal infrastructure was inadequate and the provincial government failed to provide assistance for, and to mediate, rivalries between neighbouring municipalities dealing with the ‘chaotic’ scene (Bickerton 1990, 244-245). Additional problems were ‘poor industrial relations, major cost overruns, and little relief from high levels of local unemployment despite the construction boom’ (Bickerton 1990, 245).

Embedded oppositional labour practices and community rivalries also came into play. Wild cat strikes initiated by a workforce comprised of former miners from Industrial Cape Breton reflected both labour unrest and an embedded labour culture that could at times be exclusive; for instance, many unemployed locals could not get hired at the Strait as union membership access was controlled in Industrial Cape Breton (Bickerton 1990, 245). These locals thus expressed frustration and at times hostility towards non-locals and their labour tactics, norms, and institutions (Bickerton 1990, 246).
When all was said and done, the single industry left standing – pulp and paper – has provided steady work for two generations of employees, bringing an important measure of stability and economic activity to the area. Maintaining and ‘re-inflating’ that industrial base continues to be a challenge as various actors try to reconstruct the Strait as a significant node of economic growth within an Island regional framework in the era of globalization (see ensuing chapters).

5.3 COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (CED)

CED was adopted by community leaders in Cape Breton as a supplementary and alternative approach to the shortcomings of state-led growth pole strategies; it also became an institutionalized extension of the state development apparatus in the latter part of the 20th century (MacAulay 2001; Diochon 2003). CED is rooted in the cooperative movement that arose in the 1930s, evident locally in Nova Scotia in the form of the Antigonish Movement (Diochon 2003, 49). By the 1960s, the CED alternative vision to top-down economic development gained some momentum with CED organizations forming in Canada. Only in the 1970s, however, did government sponsored economic development initiatives start to incorporate some measure of community involvement (Diochon 2003, 50), though this did not preclude the centralized policy approach that was still predominant in federal regional development policy.

Community development corporations in the Industrial Cape Breton area – commonly known as a ‘distinct “family” of CED organizations’ -- were established in this environment. It was clear that government strategies were not delivering desired
results in Cape Breton communities; many were in decline in the early 1970s, prompting a group of citizens under the leadership of Father Greg MacLeod to address the issue (MacAulay 2001; MacLeod 1997, 114; New Dawn, 2013; Sutherland 2010, 75). As not-for-profit corporations with broadly representative boards of appointed volunteers to guide operations, the CED organizations employed business practices that addressed community needs where public and private business activity were lacking. Included in the CED family were New Dawn Enterprises, New Deal Development Limited, BCA Holdings, and Tompkins Development Corporation (MacAulay 2001, 114; Sutherland 2010, 75).26

New Dawn is a pioneering and successful community development organization in Cape Breton committed to business and social development, while striving to promote an Island culture of self-reliance and community-building. To achieve these ends, it ‘seeks to identify community needs and to establish and operate ventures that speak to those needs’ (New Dawn, 2013). By utilizing CED business, planning, and organizational principles, New Dawn has tried to synchronize the social and the economic through establishing projects such as The Cape Breton School of Crafts, halfway houses, dental clinics, and a number of housing projects (New Dawn 2013). New Dawn has thrived with the advance of globalization into the new regionalism context; by the 1990s it employed a staff of over 100 with a payroll exceeding $1.7 million, and assets totalling over $14 million (MacLeod 1997, 114-115). In 2016 it appears that New Dawn is attempting to harness globalization by expanding operations across the Island region beyond CBRM (and perhaps beyond). With a goal of attracting $3 million investment dollars to its community economic development fund -- which ‘typically raises about $1.5 million a
year’ -- New Dawn ‘made presentations at municipal councils in Port Hawkesbury and Inverness’ with a ‘plan to do the same in Victoria and Richmond counties’. Its intentions are to ‘invest in innovative companies that generally export their products’ (LeBlanc-Smith 2016).

Federal government-funded Community Business Development Corporations (CBDCs) were also established in the mid-1970s as part of a Canada Employment and Immigration pilot program. They challenged and engaged local communities to develop economic solutions suitable for local conditions, championing the refrain that ‘local people know where the ice is thin’ (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 66; Patricia MacNeil Interview, paraphrasing Jimmy Tompkins, 2014). In 1979 CBDCs were absorbed into the Local Economic Assistance program (LEDA) and ‘were perhaps the first federally funded organizations with a clear small business focus in conjunction with a community focus’ (Diochon 2003, 45). A similar federal initiative in 1986 was the Community Futures program that emerged from the Mulroney government’s Canadian Jobs Strategy. It focused on assessing communities’ economic problems and growing ‘employment opportunities through small business development, entrepreneurial support, training and relocation assistance’ (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 66). CBDCs are continuing under the watch of ACOA (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 66), providing business skills, training, and loan programs. The three CBDCs operating in Cape Breton, which have been active in their communities for decades, include Coastal Business in Sydney, Northside Victoria in Sydney Mines, and InRich in Inverness (InRich 2013).27

In the 1990s, there was a strategic shift toward more endogenous development approaches, with CED as a central tenet. The formation and presence of New Dawn in
Industrial Cape Breton and the CBDCs around the Island, the associated businesses they have fostered, and networking between them and like-minded organizations, have made an important contribution to Cape Breton regionality in the era of globalization. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7.

5.4 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Between the 1930s and 50s, so long as Angus L. Macdonald was premier and party leader, the long dominance of the Liberals in Nova Scotia appeared ‘unshakeable’. His leadership was complemented by a fully integrated and cooperative federal-provincial party machine ‘cemented by entrenched patronage practices and a seemingly unending string of electoral successes’ (Clancy et al. 2000, 17-18). However, after a century of embedded patronage, ‘old-style’ politics was beginning to fade in the province with the election of the Stanfield government (Clancy et al. 2000). Still, although Liberal dominance of provincial politics had ended, the nature of the regime change retained residual institutional characteristics; it was ‘a reaffirmation of the historically important position of political leadership and party organization in a system of party competition largely devoid of meaningful philosophical or ideological differences’ (Bickerton 1990, 143).

National Liberal party dominance had been cemented by central elite control and party discipline. This acted counter to any inclinations of Maritime MPs and operatives toward seeking readjustment of national policies that had little to no net economic benefit in their peripheral region(s). Disaffection saw defections to the Progressive Conservative
party as a gradual erosion of support for the Liberals in the Maritimes was becoming evident (Bickerton 1990, 139-140). While the Conservatives (with the ‘Progressive’ tacked on in 1942) had been equally as centralist and elitist as the Liberals, the federal party under John Diefenbaker transformed itself ‘into a vehicle that was both sympathetic and progressive in its orientation towards the periphery’ (Bickerton 1990, 140).

Prime Minister Diefenbaker (like St. Laurent before him and Pearson and Trudeau thereafter) embraced the welfare state. Hence, greater parity gradually occurred across the country in the realms of provincial finances and social development, though disparities in economic development proved more problematic. Premier Stanfield introduced a new development regime with the aid of increased federal social transfers; his successors – Smith, Regan and various cabinet ministers like Fisk – continued in similar fashion with each government hitting bumps in the regional development road along the way. Stanfield’s leadership impacted Cape Breton through IEL-supported attempts at economic development and myriad personal interventions. As long time Port Hawkesbury mayor and Buchanan-era cabinet minister Billy Joe MacLean notes, Stanfield’s leadership was instrumental in finalizing the deal to locate the pulp mill in the Strait area (e.g. he met with corporate owners in Sweden). In general, Stanfield helped to secure this period of ‘economic renewal’ that resulted for the area (MacLean interview, 2014).

During the postwar era political actors still reverted to patronage mode, especially through porkbarrelling associated with spending on highways. To be sure, vertical clientelist relations and partisan politics affected and were affected by the regional development apparatus as changes (eg, creating growth centres as with Cape
Breton’s Strait area) occurred through such modes as canvassing by MPs [with influence at the centre of government, often] in vote-rich areas, issuing cabinet-approved orders-in-council, and manoeuvring by the regional minister (Savoie 2006, 95). Later, John Buchanan’s extended premiership (1978-90) can be partly attributed to 1) the faith held among many Nova Scotians in the 1980s that there would be an oil and gas future and 2) his own uncanny ability to i) sell such prospects with the aid of his personal charm and ii) utilize informal traditional institutions to his advantage. Under Buchanan the politics of government reform took a retroactive turn back to the politics of ‘patronage and partisan bias’ and the ‘old guard’ (Clancy et al. 2000, 23; Hawkins 1990, 34; Stewart 2000b, 32).

Through to and including the Buchanan years, politicians -- particularly those representing ridings that held parts of Cape Breton within their boundaries -- bolstered their political capital by facilitating injections of infrastructure spending and related employment opportunities into their constituencies. The Buchanan government has often been chastised for its patronage stances but one could argue that its ministers were well intentioned. They were utilizing informal institutions that perhaps compensated for weaknesses and ‘inefficiencies’ in the formal structure. Some of these ministers were astute behind-the-scenes political players, and could be effective region-builders. Locally in Cape Breton, Billy Joe MacLean notes his political interactions with Allan J. MacEachen, Premier Buchanan, and economic development minister Roland Thornhill, to locate the Nautical Institute, a marine training academy, to Port Hawkesbury. A federal-provincial agreement was essentially scrapped to land the nautical school: at the provincial level, an infrastructure ‘project swap’ occurred whereby Thornhill’s riding would benefit from funding for the Shubenacadie Canal if the nautical school could be
located in the Strait area. MacLean says he ‘did the legwork’ behind the scenes while [federal regional minister] MacEachen ‘had the power’ (MacLean interview 2014) to make it happen. The current principal of the institution (now Nova Scotia Community College Campus), Tom Gunn, recalls ‘Allan J’s’ influence, noting that ‘Allan J. had the vision for the Nautical [Institute] here and it was a federal investment’ (Gunn interview, 2014).

MacEachen’s former Cape-Breton executive assistant and Halifax lawyer Kenzie MacKinnon also provides reflections on political leadership and how powerful politicians such as MacEachen manoeuvred horizontally and vertically within and between institutions to deliver infrastructure such as the Nautical Institute to their region at a time when globalization was on the horizon:

[W]e talked to leading figures on nautical education in the world…a pretty thorough examination of the issue and then…our office would have tried to find funding available from different sources in Ottawa that would assist that process going forward. Again I think there would have been a culture in the Trudeau government that encouraged ministers to recognize...It was an explicit priority of the government that...[they look for promising prospects] for regional development. So if the regional ministers were pursuing regional development they had to make sense, and I still think that [the Nautical Institute] was a very good project, for example (MacKinnon interview, 2014).

MacEachen was Cape Breton’s most influential political leader and the most successful at harnessing the interventionist state to deliver on regional development, especially through using the state apparatus to lever new industrial activity during periodic crises. As MP for Cape Breton Highlands Canso and a federal cabinet minister for 21 years (1963-84), including a stint as Deputy Prime Minister, he exerted significant and sustained influence in steering region-building projects, involving both large and
small institutions, to the Island. “If anyone doubts Allan J’s clout, he need only consider the make-work projects that left cemetery fences and churches glistening with new paint throughout his riding; or the marine academy and heavy-water plant at Port Hawkesbury; or the new wharves sprinkled throughout the constituency…Allan J. was heir to a long tradition” (Simpson 1988, 169).

Two crown corporation heavy water plants – the other located in Glace Bay -- were recommended to be built in Cape Breton by MacEachen. The Glace Bay project was IEL-associated/supported and, due to management, labour and overall design shortcomings, turned out to be an economic let-down emerging out of the 1960s (George 1973, 77-85). While the plants did not operate at a profit, Kenzie MacKinnon clarified the rationale for trying to maintain operation in the Strait in particular. Because of the unpredictability of the global market and significant amount of prior investment, the strategy was to bide time and keep the plant open, anticipating ‘more sales of CANDU’ ‘new markets.’ He further clarified a) the leadership role that MacEachen was playing at the centre of government to develop his region and b) the region-building dynamic and cautious economic rationale that yielded ‘solid reasons’ for maintaining the plant’s operation (e.g. the reasonable expectation of an expanded nuclear energy market), considering that the project today could be deemed a white elephant by critics without the proper context (MacKinnon interview 2014).

Although MacEachen was a strong regional minister and Prime Ministerial confidant, MacKinnon emphasizes his dedication to constituency matters. MacEachen held ‘clinics’ around the constituency where ‘copious notes’ were taken; ‘part of our job was to make sure those concerns got successfully addressed’ (MacKinnon interview,
2014). When it came to constituency matters and the politics of region-building, MacEachen was detailed and tuned in (MacKinnon interview 2014), ‘had weight at the cabinet table’ (Graham Interview, 2014) and ‘was ruthlessly in favour of Cape Breton, toward social reform’ (Hawkins 1990, 24). Former provincial cabinet minister Richie Mann did not mince his words concerning MacEachen’s influence in the Strait Area: ‘Well you know, I think at the time, in the time, Allan J. MacEachen was “God” in the Strait area’ (Mann interview, 2014). The mark left by MacEachen’s presence and leadership in developing the Strait is summed up well by Tom Gunn in his recollections of MacEachen’s region-building legacy:

I think Allan J. had a real clear vision…and those days may be gone now but you see all the development that happened in the Strait, so much of it was, you can just pinpoint; those were all Alan J. projects, right? You’re not seeing that kind of … maybe that’s a thing of the past, but that kind of powerful cabinet minister, for an area like this, it was [beneficial]’ (Gunn interview, 2014).31

Political agency played a role in bringing the state into Island development by securing institutional initiatives, policy, and projects. MacEachen’s leadership affected change on the Island at a time when social and economic crisis could quickly have led to regional collapse. Other politicians too played their part in utilizing their positions, sometimes relying on embedded patronage practices and backroom politicking, to both maintain their party in power and bring development projects to the Island.

Conclusions

Culture and politics played a pivotal role in Cape Breton in the postwar era. The
chapter revealed that strong multiple identities were manifesting on the Island: Gaelic and Mi’kmaw cultural identity, combined with these groups’ attachments to the territory of Cape Breton (with educational support from the St.FX extension department), fostered region-building agency among these groups that encouraged political mobilization and institution-building. On the provincial political front, Stanfield, ensuing premiers, and various cabinet ministers were dedicated to fostering regional development (although often without federal-provincial coordination and organization) by 1) interacting with and influencing public, private, and civil society institutional actors; 2) directing federal transfers and federal-provincial agreement funds towards numerous projects and 3) often accomplishing this through tweaking or creating government departments, corporations, or arms-length regional agencies such as IEL. At the federal level, leaders such as Allan J. MacEachen, and later Lowell Murray -- who shared a strong sense of Island identity and a stake in the overall survival of the Cape Breton community -- influenced both the level of funding and the institutional ‘machinery’ of regional development.32 Their political leadership assured that Devco and ECBC would be important institutional actors in Cape Breton’s attempts to adjust and adapt to economic crisis and change, regardless of the failings of regional development institutions to produce the intended economic results.

State intervention in Cape Breton – utilized by determined leaders at formative moments -- was more than just a minor variation on the general theme of regional development policies. It was a product of the unique history, economy and political character of the region. Industrial Cape Breton in particular maintained much of the imprint left from the previously constructed Cape Breton at the height of heavy industry.
Its communities were cultural and political milieus featuring robust and resistant labour activity, left-leaning leaders and ideas, and embedded patron client politics, all about to be mixed with a strong dose of the developmental state. It could be argued that, for a time, Cape Breton became a ‘socialist island.’

The state response to the DOSCO crisis was not only an example of state-aided adjustment to a changing international economic context, but also how a flexible federalism could enable a process of rescaling and reterritorialization that fosters, or at least makes possible, the emergence of a new regional development coalition. As Bickerton notes, the state response produced at least three ‘substantive shifts’ that affected the reconstruction of the Island:

It shifted control over and responsibility for the region’s economy from the private sector to the Canadian state; within the state it shifted this responsibility for regional development from the provincial to the federal level; and finally, a third shift was the rather uneasy transformation from liberal welfare state to activist developmental state. The latter derived from the interventionist nature of DEVCO’s economic diversification mandate, twinned with the task of gradually phasing out mining operations with minimal social disruption, giving the corporation a peculiarly broad ambit with significant social as well as economic responsibilities’ (2012, 110).

Of note, state-led regional development during this period was reflective of similar developments in other nation-states in the larger political-economic context. Significant state funds were being distributed for regional development purposes throughout Canada (Savoie 2006). Thus any criticism about injecting public funds into Cape Breton’s troubled economy should include context and also acknowledge that there were other regions benefiting from regional development funds. In hindsight,
MacEachen and other political actors embraced interventionist ideas to institute change within a window of crisis; Devco’s creation was an act of policy and institutional innovation, a source of light for the region in a dark time. The state ‘take-over’ also included a conscious attempt to open avenues of eventual autonomy from government in order to gain the necessary flexibility to advance a daunting development project: to diversify the Island’s economy by attracting new capital investment and fostering endogenous entrepreneurship and industry, coincident with the gradual phasing out of labour-intensive, but inefficient and increasingly unprofitable coal operations. In that sense, a new form of regionalism was emerging.

The setting and context for regional politics and policy at this time was a tug-of-war over regional spending and programming between skeptical centralizing technocrats in Ottawa and the vertical clientelism favoured by politicians and utilized within partisan political networks. This institutional and political matrix certainly overshadowed the emergence of more horizontal, bottom-up, community-based institutional networks and approaches to development. But for that matter, there is never anything quick or dramatic about CED or endogenous approaches to regional development. Slow, steady, incremental, and sustainable headway has always been the CED watchword. In such a crisis where a coal and steel industrial base was collapsing, the CED approach would have been totally overwhelmed. It had to be a locally directed (or located) supplement (e.g. through forming institutions like New Dawn and CBDCs), part of a multipronged strategy rather than the main response (Bickerton correspondence 2015). Markedly at this point in the last century the bottom-up development approach would have been at odds with or unsuited to 1) the dominant model of development in vogue at the behest of the
federal and provincial states (e.g. attracting and trying to secure footloose manufacturing and ‘quick return’ mega-industrial projects such as those in the Strait area); 2) the political, social, and economic structures within which political, bureaucratic and interest group elites were operating (e.g. state-interventionism as negotiated through technocrats and strategizing politicians above); and 3) the constraints and opportunities afforded by the prevailing national and international political economy (e.g. volatile resource commodity markets increasingly dominated by multinational companies, growing concentration of corporate ownership in agriculture and the fisheries, and state-led modernization and development still centred on national economies).

The state response constituted a ‘bridging strategy’, sustaining the region until economic and political adjustments could occur. It would be part of an evolving institutional context where multi-level political, economic and cultural actors would have to be involved in salvaging and reconstructing the region within the forthcoming more globalized era. Although an institutional development apparatus was being adjusted to compensate for the Island’s challenges (and prospects for coal industry growth briefly looked promising in the early 1980s), by the mid-1980s Cape Breton’s economic and social situation was ‘perhaps the worst in the island’s history’ (Bickerton 2006, 32).

Between 1970 and 1985, the economic deterioration of the Island was evident. Its unemployment rate averaged 16.5%, 5.6% higher than the province’s and 8.4% above the national average. And following the closure of the no. 26 Glace Bay colliery and two heavy water plants, the rate rose to around 25%. Per capita incomes declined from $15,485 in 1970 (slightly above the national average) to $15,395 in 1985 (falling well below the national average of $17,518). Add to that declining income from the Island’s
export sector and stagnant population growth over the same period, and it was easy to conclude that further multi-actor planning and adjustments were needed if Cape Breton’s economic foundation was to be rebuilt (Bickerton 2006, 13, citing Canmac Economics 2003, 4-9).

In this context, the Mulroney years saw the beginnings of a new regional framework, the first stage of the new economic interface. Increasingly the challenge was to negotiate the Island’s integration into a more globalized political economy that was influenced predominantly by the policy dictates and ideas of neo-liberalism. National regional development politics and bodies were beginning to be overhauled for a more globalized economy and a more decentralized federation. And as will be noted in the following chapters, adjustments would continue to be played out on the emerging international interface with successive governments both affected by, and attempting to come into compliance with global trends and policy prescriptions. In the meantime, Cape Bretoners would continue their struggle to forge a viable regional development coalition. In this connection, a new challenge arising in the 1990s would be the negative effect of fiscal retrenchment policies instituted by federal and provincial governments.

-------------------

NOTES

1 Interviewee responses indicated that a degree of defensive regionalism still exists in Cape Breton, especially Industrial Cape Breton where some residents still yearn for a return to the glory days of coal and steel production and the associated well-paying unionized jobs that injected money into the regional economy.

2 A number of Donovan’s examples involve the promotion and preservation of the traditional music prevalent in Cape Breton. The musical performance context has adapted to new conditions. Community social events (e.g. dances) were carried over from the
‘ceilidh house’ to outdoor stages at community picnics, to school houses, to local pubs, taverns, festival stages, and cultural interpretive centres (Graham 2006).

3 Therefore cultural roots became more celebrated: Chapel Island’s waning annual July 26 St. Ann’s day celebrations regained popularity; the Micmac Association of Cultural Studies and community leader Sarah Denys helped to revive Mi’kmaw dance; and the annual October 1st Treaty Day celebrations (marking the 1752 Treaty) were revived by Grand Chief Donald Marshall (2009, 192).

4 Equalization was formulated to enable less well-off provinces to provide public services that were relatively comparable to their wealthier provincial counterparts. Through formulaic adjustments over successive intergovernmental agreements (it is ‘typically subject to a technical review every five years, in collaboration with provincial and territorial administrations’) it is a salient and contentious topic of intergovernmental relations (Canada, by Nadeau 2014). Equalization became so important to the Canadian values fabric that it was embedded in Section 36 of the Canadian Constitution. Regardless of critics of transfer payments (e.g. see Courchene 1981; 1986) and equalization, social scientists in the Atlantic region have expressed that ‘without such redistributive transfers, the region would be even less-well positioned to adjust to the new economic challenges that it faces’ (Finbow 2004; Bickerton 2011, see Appendix I for graphical illustration). In other words, national social programs became even more important for the region in lieu of the (at best) limited success of interventionist regional development policies and programs aimed at accelerating regional economic development (Finbow 2004).

5 ‘The Strait’ was a regional construction made visible by the Canso Causeway’s completion. It is a Cape Breton/eastern Nova Scotia-constructed economic region that encompasses the towns of Port Hawkesbury and Mulgrave and parts of Inverness, Richmond, Antigonish, and Guysborough counties.

6 This federal government decision brought regional tension to Cape Breton as, in past institutional arrangements, ‘the designation by DREE of the Straight [sic] of Canso as an economic centre, and not Sydney, created a natural competitive rivalry that continues to the present day and is partially reflected in the [past] organization of economic development boards, and the decision to establish 13 Regional Development Associations in the province with two in Cape Breton’ (Locke and Tomblin 2003, 25, my emphasis) (for more on RDAs and further reconfiguration in the New Regional Era see Chapter 7).

7 The design assured greater recognition of federal involvement with development initiatives than had been evident with GDAs (Savoie 2006, 123).

8 This scenario saw DREE and the provincial government envision ‘CANSTEEL’, first as a federally-directed mega project of upgrades and infrastructure that never materialized, then as CANSTEEL Corporation, established by Gerald Regan’s government in 1975. The corporation was planning a future for SYSCO as a large, modern steel complex that
would be internationally competitive, pursue private investment to this end, and explore modernization and/or expansion of the existing Sydney plant under this scenario (Bickerton 1990, 252; also see Bishop 1990, 182-84; Jackson 2003, 55-56).

9 Nonetheless, in 1977 an agreement between DREE and the province saw $19.5 million put into SYSCO for further modernization, but at the price of continued workforce downsizing.

10 In 1986, Buchanan said Sydney Steel’s fate was ‘the biggest crisis of his eight years as premier’, noting the province was ‘in a very serious situation’ if a domestic market could not be secured with orders guaranteed from the Canadian National (CN) railway (CBC 1986; CB Music and Historical Society, Facebook, 2014). While a Sydney Steel Workers Advisory Committee issued a post card blitz to Prime Minister Mulroney and advised against the closure (with criticisms of CN not living up to its national obligations) the mill’s eventual demise could not be forestalled (CBC 1986; CB Music and Historical Society 2014).

11 With a temporary decision to modernize mining rather than phase it out (as originally mandated), Devco utilized DREE loan financing to support development of the Prince Mine in Point Aconi upon the phasing out of the aging Princess Mine that had begun in 1974 (Jackson 2003, 35-36). In 1984, DRIE approved $324 million for further mine development (Bickerton 1990, 294).

12 The oddly fragmented but influential federal and provincial leadership was nonetheless able to develop the Keynesian focus that equipped Cape Breton to survive crises. Orders of government worked at cross purposes (e.g. through intergovernmental agreements and personal interventions by leaders) that limited the emergence of intense regionalist responses, but perhaps eventually resulted in frustration with these approaches, contributing to the elaboration of a new conceptualization of regionality in the globalized era.

13 Savoie (1986; 2006) and Bickerton (1990) provide more detailed analyses of these Canadian state-sponsored agencies and programs. Savoie stipulates the difficulties in establishing a consensus surrounding any cost-benefit analysis of these various agencies and programs.

14 These ideological tenets were especially promoted by commission economist Thomas Courchene (Forbes 1993, 27), who argued that social programs such as the minimum wage prevented regional wages from falling to the point at which labour outflow from the Maritimes would occur. Following the logic of neo-classical economics, lower social spending would trigger a virtuous upward spiral of more inward investment, producing a tighter labour market, higher wages and tax revenues, and reduced regional disparities. He also suggested that equalization payments alone would sufficiently address Maritime economic woes (Forbes 1993, 27-28; see Canada, Macdonald Commission Report Vol. 2, 1984).
Business failures are an everyday occurrence but one can assume that some ECB-supported ones extended from ‘schemes’ that left players in the patron-clientelist political game well rewarded. Taxpayers, ECBC, and the region’s political and community actors were left to address the financial and reputational damages.

Savoie’s report contained input from over 100 Atlantic Canadians associated with regional development. It included provincial premiers, deputy ministers, regional cabinet ministers, senior officials, business people, academics, labour, and voluntary associations (Savoie 2006, 146).

Along with ACOA, a sister regional development agency -- Western Economic Diversification (WED) – was established for the Western provinces. Within a few years, similar agencies were also created for Quebec regions (CEDQ) and Northern Ontario (FedNor, housed within Industry Canada) (Bradford and Wolf 2012, 74).

According to PC party strategist Dalton Camp, the margin of victory could be attributed to Cape Breton Catholics who, feeling that Stanfield would be the best candidate to help them build the region’s economy, helped him capture five of the ten seats previously held by the Liberals on the Island (Bickerton 1990, 140-143; 142).

Because it appeared that local business start-ups were not prioritized, a Small Loans Program was commenced to assist local entrepreneurs (George 1973, 47).

In 1957 Premier Stanfield noted that IEL strategy would involve trying to locate industry in places experiencing urgent need but in 1961 his Minister of Industry and Trade declared that IEL would not attempt to influence a company to establish itself in one area over another. This revised stance changed that same year when specified areas would receive prioritized attention (George 1973, 48).

Seventy-eight million dollars from DREE transfers arrived while Fiske was minister with fifty-two million of those funds dispensed as grants in the province.

Along with its accomplishments, the Regan government was found to have established party trust funds fed by kick-backs from liquor companies. The funds financed partisan activities and topped-up party leaders’ earnings. Media exposure and a slow response to the scandal factored into the leadership demise of Liberal leader Vince MacLean in 1992. He resigned after only receiving 51% support in a leadership review at a Liberal Party annual meeting where the trust fund issue was the main agenda item (Stewart 1993, 98, 106).

In 1975 the Department of Municipal Affairs (DMA) and the Joint Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) commenced a task force to study reforming provincial-municipal governance. Their 1978 UNSM-DMA report New Directions in Municipal Government in Nova Scotia echoed the Graham Commission’s proposals for service
reallocations, again with no notable changes implemented. But a 1985 provincial-
municipal meeting in Digby and a 1989 conference in Blomidon prompted action with
the 1991 provincial Task Force on Local Government (Vojnovic 1999, 518)

24 Stewart thus concurs with Vojnovic noting Buchanan’s failure to address the Graham
Commission’s municipal reform recommendations (2000, 204). In 1987, however,
Municipal Affairs Minister David Nantes, upon the urging of Cape Breton municipal
leaders, initiated a study about improving service delivery cooperation across the
Industrial Cape Breton municipalities. This initiative did not seriously challenge the
political status quo. The report recommended forming a regional authority that could
deliver services but did not call for amalgamation (Ramsay 1998, 26-28), again
exemplifying the embeddedness of municipal structure on the Island over the last century.

25 Additional support came from local associations and Local 1 Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Canada (Beaton 2001, 121-122).

26 A board composed of local citizens established New Dawn and ‘signed a bank
guarantee and borrowed $20,000 in 1973’ to commence its operations (MacLeod 1997,
114). Incorporated in 1976, it is Canada’s oldest community business corporation (New
Dawn 2013; also see MacLeod 1997, 114-117). Organizers recognized a need for a
bottom-up approach in a top-down era (see MacAulay 2001).

27 For example, InRich was established in 1981, serves a population of approximately
28,000 in Inverness and Richmond Counties, and has assisted ‘over 1400 businesses with
start-up and expansions’ (InRich 2013).

28 For an alternative interpretation of events surrounding the nautical school -- by former
Allan J. MacEachen aide Kenzie MacKinnon -- see his letter to the editor titled 'Time to
set the record straight on "inaccurate load of malarkey" from Billy Joe on Nautical

29 This MacKinnon in-text quote began with the following contextual lead-in:
As I recall the process, the federal government would have done a commission.
An investigative commission into...[a] death that occurred on the Great Lakes
when a boat sank with a loss of several lives. And the conclusions of the report
were that there was inadequate training available for sailors in Canada. The
recommendation was that it should be, I think it was four or five different sailing
instruction schools set up -- ...professional sailors, not recreational -- set up
across Canada, including Atlantic Canada. And as I recall it...the provincial
government of the time coincidently was talking about upgrading the quality of
its Nautical Institute in Halifax, which at that time was really just kind of a shed
on the water front where they would carry out testing of sailors who were
applying for papers. And so our office, Mr. MacEachen's office said, 'Ah ha! Why
don't we try to use these two factors as the basis for setting up a school, and is it
reasonable to think that that school can be set up in eastern Nova Scotia?"  
(MacKinnon Interview, 2014).

30 As dissertation interviewees have noted, MacEachen ‘was key’ in securing the AECL plant’s operation to the Strait area in the 1970s (Billy Joe MacLean, Tom Gunn, Danny Graham interviews, 2014).

31 The above comments are consistent with theorizations of regional development and public administration scholar Donald Savoie, among others. As MacEachen was a close political confidant and advisor to Trudeau, his ability to ‘pull strings’ at the centre of government in the interest of his constituency and region was irrefutable. MacEachen was, as the argument goes (and as observed by Tom Gunn), one of the last of a dying breed of regional cabinet ministers on whom prime ministers relied to broker regional party and voter support. Cabinet as a decision-influencing institution, and regional ministers as key political insiders, would later be ‘bypassed’ by pollsters, partisan advisors from the Prime Minister’s Office, and media increasingly focused on heads of government and party leaders and a 24 hour news cycle (See Savoie 1999).

32 For instance the original intent regarding DREE funding was to aid slow growth regions but the process was usurped (except where there was a powerful regional minister such as MacEachen to intervene) by the lobbying of influential MPs from relatively prosperous regions. Those areas became well-endowed beneficiaries of regional development spending (Savoie 2006, 94).

33 In fact the welter of agencies created under Trudeau and Mulroney revealed the inevitable political pressures to provide support to localities nationwide (Finbow e-mail correspondence 2015; also see Savoie 2006).
CHAPTER 6
CAPE BRETON IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
REGIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

“The man who is swimming against the stream knows the strength of it.” Woodrow Wilson

In the early 1990s, Cape Breton was entering the era of globalization. Canada was a signatory to the tri-lateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which launched on January 1, 1994. Leaders promoted the agreement’s promise on a new regional and global economic playing field; however, there were fiscal challenges. The Mulroney government had ‘introduced ambitious structural reforms and made numerous efforts to reduce spending’, but the Jean Chretien Liberals inherited a large and growing national debt and were under pressure by experts to deal with Canada’s ‘unsustainable’ deficits, exacerbated by rising interest rates (Bourgon 2009; Globe and Mail Feb. 1993; see Klein 2007, 257-59). Politically, it was a good time to act as ‘an April 1993 Gallup poll reported that 70 per cent of Canadians would cut spending to reduce the deficit, rather than increase spending to stimulate the economy. A broad-based societal consensus for action had emerged’ (Bourgon, 2009, 12). By most indications, this neo-liberal shift in popular attitudes and federal policy had embedded itself over the preceding decade. In 1984, a Decima Research poll indicated that ‘less than two per cent of respondents considered the federal deficit and national debt to be the most important economic problem’; by 1990 Canadians considered deficit control as the country’s top priority (2009, 7, 10). As the decade progressed, Canada’s financial situation was characterized as dire, even as Canada held an A++ credit rating with Moody’s (Klein 2007, 257). The threat of economic upheaval convinced the government to act with a
program review exercise and eventual far-reaching public spending and program cuts. Federal downloading and restraint forced Nova Scotia and other provinces to adopt their own austerity-based approaches.

Banting and Myles stipulate that ‘Canada experienced a “neo-liberal moment” during the 1990s, when the federal and provincial governments made dramatic changes’ (2013, 3). The changes resulted from a number of factors: global economic pressures, a shift in popular attitudes and party ideology, the declining influence of labour unions, equality-seeking civil society organizations and think tanks, realignment in the party system, shifting bureaucratic politics, and federal decentralization. From the policy community perspective, the shift was cemented through governmental and bureaucratic ‘policy change’ and ‘policy drift’ (2013, 2, 3). Practices associated with this ‘neo-liberal moment’ included the privatization of public utilities; public-private partnership formations; civil service, education and health streamlining and reforms; cuts in transfer payments to provinces; service reductions; deregulation; and down-loading of service provisions by higher orders of government to lower ones, or off-loading to private contractors. Linked to the neo-liberal program, some network nodes in the vertical interface were, and continue to be, eliminated, neutralized, or replaced. Examples included new development programs and/or agencies, the introduction (and neutralization) of ‘horizontal’ private and civil society actors, a revamping of procurement procedures, and so on. Nova Scotia’s new political regime under Liberal premier John Savage operated in this context as it attempted to re-shape the political, economic and social fabric of the province. The global and federal setting affected the provincial regime’s decision to institute sweeping reforms to health and education delivery, economic development, as well as the structure of regional governance in Halifax and
Industrial Cape Breton. While expanding global markets and a rescaled and regionalized institutional apparatus pointed to possible opportunities, it remains to be seen to what extent they will be realized. This chapter addresses how political actors in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton used this pronounced moment of ideational and global change to initiate institutional reforms that could possibly accommodate the new political economic landscape.

6.1 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

By 1990, the lack of significant political change in Nova Scotia was taking its toll on the province (Stewart 2000a, 31; Clancy et al. 2000). Two years after its final election victory, the Buchanan government’s spendthrift accrual of mounting deficits seriously threatened Nova Scotia’s fiscal stability. Additionally, successive scandals had rocked the government; one of them revealed that ‘Buchanan had repeatedly interfered in government operations to the benefit of his friends’ (Clancy et. al 2000). In this context of repeated old-style political scripts and embedded norms in Nova Scotia politics, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney facilitated Buchanan’s departure from the provincial scene with a Senate appointment (Clancy et. al 2000). In retrospect, his exit ‘unblocked’ the political system and triggered an accelerated transitioning of the political and economic landscape; in effect, the inception of a new provincial political regime (Bickerton 2001). After 12 years of ‘Buchananism’, the province would finally return to the reformist agenda that began under Robert Stanfield.1

After Buchanan, an atmosphere of change was palpable within the governing Progressive Conservative party. It chose as Buchanan’s successor the practical-minded, straight-talking, and fiscally conservative Donald Cameron. He campaigned for the
leadership with a call for the reform of traditional pork barrel and patronage politics, and as
leader and premier, insisted on an agenda of tight fiscal management and structural reform
(Clancy et al. 2000, 25). It did not take long for Premier Cameron to cement his reputation as
a reformer. He appointed to the Nova Scotia Council on Higher Education a new chairperson
assigned the task of rationalizing university programs. He sanctioned the replacement of the
government-controlled system of overseeing electoral district boundaries with an
independent boundaries commission (Smith and Turnbull 2008). He also forged a
controversial legacy of his own with the privatization of the Nova Scotia Power Corporation.
Additionally Cameron championed municipal reform by appointing the Task Force on Local
Government, which issued the sobering recommendation that amalgamation of up to 20 of
the province’s 66 municipalities should occur. Agreeing that municipal reform was
necessary, Cameron announced in late 1992 that the metro area of Halifax would be
amalgamated into one municipality in time for the 1994 municipal elections; restructuring
would also occur in Cape Breton (Ramsay 1998, 17; Stewart 2000; 204-205). To this end,
Cameron appointed Charles A. Campbell as the commissioner to oversee a report on creating
a new regional government for Cape Breton County (Ramsay 1998, 37).

Despite this activist reform agenda, Cameron faced setbacks that ultimately derailed
his government. Porkbarreling was still rampant within the Department of Transportation.
Close to three quarters of the province’s road-paving budget went to Tory-held ridings,
although they only held slightly over half the province’s constituencies. Old-style parochial
politics resurfaced with complaints about the distribution of student summer employment,
‘especially in Cape Breton where 70 per cent of the island’s summer jobs were concentrated
in cabinet minister Brian Young’s constituency’ (Stewart 2000a, 33). In its final year, the
staleness of the government met with the tragic Westray Mine disaster of 9 May 1992. The political fall-out that emanated from details surrounding it -- including Cameron’s past involvement with the file as a cabinet minister -- proved too heavy a burden for the government (2000, 25-26). The tragedy, a tired government, entrenched institutional practices, and the cumulative weight of past policies, all led to defeat in June, 1993. Liberal leader John Savage (a physician and former Dartmouth mayor) formed a majority government, including a strong contingent from Cape Breton, and committed to pursuing the reformist path that began with Cameron (Stewart 2000a).²

Savage’s tenure began with a focus on eliminating ‘blue collar’ patronage (e.g. the hiring of highways workers, truckers, and liquor store personnel), but with a lenient position on ‘white collar’ patronage. He argued that people hired to boards should have views that are reflective of Liberal policy. He was criticized on both fronts. In rural areas such as Inverness in Cape Breton, he was publicly criticized by his own backbencher Charles MacArthur. MacArthur insinuated that patronage was the way that things were traditionally done in rural areas and that he supported the practice (2000a, 38-43). Richie Mann, a minister in the Savage government, contextualizes the embedded nature of patronage practices at the time he entered government: ‘When we got in, if you got in [as] the transportation minister in a Liberal government after fifteen years of being in opposition, there were…roads in a whole lot of Liberal ridings that you were going to pave…you were going to catch up…get rid of people…bring in some loyal troopers (Mann interview 2014)’. But his ensuing comments suggest that new ideas adopted by leaders and political actors at critical moments can propel a pronounced departure from previous institutional stasis or incrementalism:

… And you were there [in elected office] for about…twenty minutes and you realized, I can't do all of that. 1) We don't have the budget…2) We've got all of these
laws that have come into place in those last fifteen years and…prevented you from doing a lot of those things that you thought you might do. So it forced a re-thinking...It wasn't popular with some of your own supporters, but…there wasn't a hell of a lot you could do about it anyhow…But it's just a nicer way to be. It's a better way to treat people. And so the politics started to play a second role (Mann interview 2014).

Towards Reform and Austerity

The Savage years displayed that the tug-of-war (and sometimes congruence) between formal rules and informal norms and practices can be ushered towards change by determined leadership. Nova Scotia was still affected by the 1990 recession when the Savage government was elected in 1993. It faced a large public debt; mounting inherited provincial deficits; falling tax receipts that were not meeting increasing social demands; federal government social transfer reductions; and directly related to this, weak business confidence (Clancy 2000, 54-60). Similar to the national scene at the time, polling indicated that the public was ready for a bout of serious belt-tightening. The 1993-1997 period yielded restraint and change for the province and the region of Cape Breton. A number of significant fiscal, political and social reforms in the Savage years produced ‘limited concrete accomplishments’ in the areas of municipal governance, health, education, labour market training, and economic development (Clancy et al. 2000, 27).  

Faced with an operating deficit of $650 million upon election, finance minister Bernie Boudreau (part of the Cape Breton cabinet contingent) prioritized ‘chopping hundreds of millions in program spending’ and clawing back public sector wages (2000, 66-67). This fiscal restraint agenda went hand in hand with redesigning institutions and governance; the aim was to ‘blast the traditional clientele relationships of the “special interest state” in health, education, municipal services, universities and social assistance’ (Clancy 2000, 75). These
reforms would affect Cape Breton’s political, economic and social development apparatus going forward. The institutional reforms associated with the Savage years (some of which were tweaked by ensuing governments) provided a regionalized base from which the Island could attempt to address its rebuilding challenge. And indeed, post-Buchannan leadership moved Cape Breton toward becoming a more formally-institutionalized region within the province.

6.2 REGIONALIZATION THROUGH MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATION

When the Savage government was elected in 1993, municipal reform along the lines recommended by the 1974 Graham Commission had seen little progress. This changed when Savage initiated ‘top-down’ amalgamations in Metro Halifax and Industrial Cape Breton. While municipal government scholar Andrew Sancton cautioned in 2003 that ‘the recent round of municipal amalgamations in eastern Canada has not been part of any world-wide trend’ (2003, 1-2), it was still one avenue used by governments to 1) score political points by appearing proactive on institutional reform; 2) equip regions to respond to wider economic and social processes.5

By 1991 – well after the reports of several commissions and studies (e.g. the Plunkett, Finnis, and Graham Commissions, and UNSM-DMA municipal reform proposals) -- meaningful government action on recommendations had yet to occur. However, during his brief stint as premier, Donald Cameron had opened the doors to reform (Stewart 2000; Ramsay 1998, 21, 41). The 1992 Task Force on Local Government recommended revamping provincial-municipal service exchange and amalgamating municipal units in five counties, including those of Cape Breton and Halifax. Premier Cameron appointed Charles Campbell
(a Sydney engineer who was consulted on the Finnis Report) as Commissioner to undertake a report on amalgamation in Industrial Cape Breton. Cameron set a deadline for September 1994 for the restructuring of Industrial Cape Breton and Metropolitan Halifax municipal units (Stewart 2000, 204-205; Ramsay 1998, 37; Vojnovic 1999). With a provincial election looming in 1993, Savage had tried to distance his position on municipal reform from Cameron. But after his election victory, the Campbell Report was tabled and Savage directed municipal affairs minister Sandy Jolly to begin an ‘easing in’ period of preliminary reform discussions with municipal leaders from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (Stewart 2000b, 206). In mid-1994, Savage tipped his hand by publicizing his support for municipal amalgamation in Cape Breton (Sancton 2000, 90).

Municipal leaders in Cape Breton had several concerns, mainly involving accessible and effective representation, fair tax revenue reallocation, and community autonomy and identity loss (Morgan 2009, 222; Collins 2004; Mann interview 2014; Ramsay 1998, 46-47). While some municipal leaders favoured amalgamation, others representing more fiscally stable units like North Sydney and Cape Breton County felt they could end up paying -- through taxes and job losses -- for the mismanagement of other municipalities (Collins, 2004). Additionally, government officials from the ‘western side’ of the Island were concerned that the proposed super-municipality enveloping all of Cape Breton County would be perceived as representative of the whole Island (Morgan 2009, 222; Rooyakers, 1994).

The Savage government remained steadfast in the face of this resistance. During a ‘consultation’ visit to the industrial area, Minister Jolly stated that when the Province requested regionalization, the majority of municipal leaders had favoured it. However, she was probably aware there was some ‘vigorous opposition.’ The talk of amalgamation had
created a simmering competition for resources between leaders and units. Sydney mayor Vince Maclean – with his hands effectively tied and facing ever-increasing revenue-raising pressures – moved to annex wealthier areas of the surrounding county. This was perhaps a final straw that triggered the government’s decision to legislate the merger (Stewart 2000b, 206). Jolly emphasized the government was ‘not prepared to stand by and see large sums wasted, cooperative efforts jeopardized and hard feelings arise in an annexation battle when a better solution exists’ (Campbell, 1994). While NDP opposition critic John Holm questioned the level of engaged consultation that had occurred, Premier Savage’s response for the media was simply, ‘All I would tell you is we didn’t wait to get direction from the municipal leaders in Cape Breton … We consulted them yesterday’ (Campbell, 1994). Cape Breton Regional Municipality (CBRM) was legislated on June 30, 1994 with elections to be held the following May (Stewart 2000, 206; Sancton et al. 2000, 33).

Although forced amalgamation went counter to Savage’s campaign statements, municipal reform represented meaningful, overdue change. A merger of municipalities was expected to address immediate financial woes in Industrial Cape Breton (Ramsay 1998, 34; Mann interview 2014) and also theoretically meet other expectations: ‘economies of scale, more coherent regional planning, ending destructive competition and increasing horizontal equity’ (Bickerton 2012, 111; Stewart, 2000b; Morgan 2009, 21; Mann interview 2014; Sancton 2003).

Two of the eight Cape Breton municipalities involved in the merger were ‘chronically insolvent’ (Stewart 2000b, 206; Mann interview 2014), with the fiscal outlook even worse. Previously ‘emergency funding’ grants from both orders of government had helped the strapped municipalities; over fourteen years they received $37 million from the province
A Devco grant of $3.7 million was issued in 1994/95 ‘in lieu of taxes to six of the eight municipal units’ while a pre-amalgamation Devco announcement stipulated that the grant in lieu of taxes would be reduced to $1.8 million the following year (Ramsay 1998, 47; Campbell, Cape Breton Post, 1994); clearly, the sustainability of such aid was in question.

The pre-amalgamation set-up in Cape Breton County was a tangled web. With around 90 special purpose bodies overseeing provision of services, results and accountability were uneven (Ramsay 1998, 34, 39). One body that resembled a regionalized governance tier (in the form of institutionalized municipal cooperation) was the Cape Breton Joint Expenditure Board (Jointex). It was formed by the area’s eight municipalities in the 1960s to oversee joint expenditures for projects benefiting multiple units. But within a decade of its founding, it was argued that Jointex was lacking in central, coordinated planning capabilities (Hanratty et. al 1970; Ramsay 1998, 40). Upon amalgamation Jointex was scrapped, as recommended by the Campbell Commission. This is pertinent because it represents the embeddedness of institutions and political resistance to change over the last century. Significant change had been held up for decades; it did not help, for instance, that Jointex was itself actively searching for alternative municipal governance arrangements. The status quo complemented the self-interest of Jointex members and the preservation of existing municipal units; ‘most believed that some form of regional cooperation and delivery of services would stave off amalgamation in the region’ (Ramsay 1990, 40). It was within this context of political and institutional self-preservation that the decision was taken to force amalgamation.

Assessing the Amalgamation

In the years following the merger the impact was ‘extremely difficult to assess’ but
definitively the financially insolvent towns staved off bankruptcy (Sancton 2000, 90; Stewart 2000b). Also, the notion that the province’s cities and surrounding areas were over-governed is difficult to dispute. Industrial Cape Breton had eight municipal units, each with its own mayor, council, and administration; there were over 70 councillors and 845 municipal employees; 145 were middle managers and considered redundant in the amalgamation. Though the amalgamation was expected to yield a savings of $14 million, this figure was later readjusted to $6.5 million (Stewart 2000b, 207). Predicted savings and efficiencies from economies of scale proved ‘largely illusory’ and were not realized (Stewart 2000b, 209; also see Sancton 2003). And deathbed spending by the folding municipalities rang in at $4.5 million, a legacy inherited by the new municipality (Morgan 2009, 222; Stewart 2000b, 210, 212). Other costs included one-time retirement and severance packages, building renovations, branding, and upward service and salary pressures (due to increased responsibilities for some individuals) (Morgan 2009, 222; Stewart 2000b, 207-213).

Any preconceived notion of increased service equity (a ‘levelling up’ of services across the region upon greater demand from ‘have-less’ areas) could put a further squeeze on finances if services increased (Stewart 2000, 212). There was no early evidence that parochial competition among previous units was gone (2000b, 218). For instance Sydney was receiving a higher proportion of project monies than were other districts (2000, 218). While residents in the new region could benefit from sharing a broader, stronger tax base, in 1998 tax rates were higher within the rural county areas than they were pre-amalgamation, but lower for the former towns and the city of Sydney (Sancton 2000, 90). Regardless of the discrepancies and the tax benefits derived for some areas post-amalgamation, inherited combined debt from the former units left CBRM’s newly elected Mayor John Coady seeking
a bailout from the province. The provincial response was to provide a conditional interest-free loan contingent upon service cuts and tax hikes to improve the amalgamated municipality’s fiscal stability (2000, 208).

After the Merger: Rescaling and ‘Rebooting’ for Region-Building

Inevitably, reterritorialization and the subsequent rescaling of government responsibilities within CBRM incurred new costs. The 1992 Local Government Task Force recommendation for service exchange was addressed in 1995. The service exchange program was expected to 1) provide relief for financially challenged municipalities; 2) be revenue-neutral in implementation so that neither level of government would be advantaged at the expense of the other; and 3) provide more efficiency and accountability in the delivery of services by clearly establishing a) which level of government would set service parameters and b) which one would administer specific services. In the province’s efforts to accomplish objectives 2 and 3, the distributional effects of the service exchange made conditions worse for some municipalities. For instance, the rescinding of cost-sharing agreements and downloading of police service provision were contributing factors to increased costs for some already financially troubled municipalities (Vojnovic 1999, 529, 530).

The resultant province-wide service exchange deal between the province and municipalities negatively affected CBRM’s finances. While the Campbell Report (before details of the deal were released) had expected the rescaling process to yield $7.3 million per annum in savings for the amalgamated municipality, the service exchange agreement actually resulted in a loss of close to $5 million for the region (Ramsay 1998, 52; Vojnovic 1999). The Island’s other municipal units were also disadvantaged by the service swap. The impact
on Port Hawkesbury was an additional $18,313; Richmond County $88,586; and Victoria County $97,503. Inverness County was the only rural municipality experiencing a net economic gain, of $344,356. In contrast, Halifax experienced overall net reductions in costs of $9,173,199 for Halifax (city); $3,330,687 for Dartmouth; and $428,653 for Bedford (Vojnovic 1999, 525).

Noting the financial difficulties that CBRM faced, the Savage government addressed the nearly $5 million shortfall with a pilot project with the municipality (as well as the amalgamated Halifax Regional Municipality and the Region of Queens). The province would cover general assistance for social services (Stewart 2000b, 214; Ramsay 1998, 53; Vojnovic 1999 530, 532), taking over all but $1 million of the social services envelope for CBRM. While the assistance provided temporary relief, it only lasted two years, leaving CBRM to deal with the shortfall thereafter. This ongoing fiscal burden had a disempowering effect on CBRM (Stewart 2000b, 214).

Service exchange resulted in ‘a major realignment of responsibilities,’ but it remained an ongoing area of provincial-municipal discussion, often due to political pressure placed on successive provincial governments by the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (NS-UNSM Review 2013, 2). Such was the case after the 1995 service exchange when municipalities began to experience adverse effects. This precipitated a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding between the province and municipalities that focused on funding for social services, equalization grants, and bridge maintenance. The MOU called for a phasing out of municipal contributions to social services; restoration of full equalization funding to the municipalities; and continued provincial responsibilities for the maintenance of bridges (Vojnovic 1999, 532). These objectives were to be carried out between the 1998-1999 and
2002-2003 fiscal years. Following this (and with unresolved service exchange issues in areas such as education costs), a 1999 Roles and Responsibilities review recommended shifting $22 million of costs to the province without the requirement of revenue neutrality. Regardless of the recommendations, ‘the review resulted in few changes to the funding structure between the province and municipalities’ (NS-UNSM Review 2013, 2-3), a further indication that the ‘politically cautious’ approach to municipal reform continued to be a hallmark of Nova Scotia politics. Unfortunately, this outcome would continue to leave CBRM in a precarious financial position.

6.3 REGIONALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE

Prior to the 1990s there was little progress in Nova Scotia in the area of health care reform. Governmental approaches to the health care sector in the 1960s and 70s has variously been described as ‘reactive,’ ‘inactive,’ and ‘extremely conservative’ (Boase 1995, 82). Boase’s 1994 study of government-group relations in Canada’s health care sector reported that health system analysts from Dalhousie University found policy making in Nova Scotia to be ‘cautious, conventional, and very slow to change, [it is] a province intensely aware of its historical background, and one which still puts its faith in the traditional “noblesse oblige” approach to medicine’ (1995, 82).

Recommendations for regionalization from as early as 1972 until well into the 1980s were ignored; significant regionalization of health care only began in the 1990s (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 10). The provincial health ministry and bureaucracy were considered ‘aloof and impassive’ with a gradual and reactive approach to policy making (Boase 1995, 83).
aversion to change co-existed with a ‘physician-dominated, hierarchical, medical model of health care’ (Bickerton 2000, 116). Government task forces from the 1970s (1972; 1976) found that the system was in disarray, and in need of changes, with ‘too much decision-making centralized in Halifax’ (Bickerton 2000, 116; Boase 1994, 83-89). Antigonish-based ophthalmologist, community leader, and local historian Dr. John Hamilton adds that, after the advent of medicare in the late 1960s, ‘the [Dalhousie] medical school was a very powerful organization in the firmament of how services were organized and the Victoria General Hospital was the flagship of the whole enterprise’ (Interview, March 8, 2015). Not a promising picture for peripheral regions within the province.

Boase notes that the realities of financial constraints in the 1970s encouraged certain governments (e.g. Ontario) to take more assertive positions in regulating the health field (1994, 88). This observation also applies to Nova Scotia, albeit more so in the 1990s. As Bickerton notes, ‘[w]ith rising deficits and the continued growth of health-related spending, the province was forced to consider more systematic intervention in the name of restraint’ (2000, 117). This was further aggravated by federal cuts. In this context the 1987 (Gallant) Royal Commission on Health Care was appointed by the Buchanan government to analyze increasing health care costs and to provide recommendations addressing how the costs could be reduced. Its recommendations set the foundation for subsequent rationalization (Bickerton 2000, 117, 119).

The Gallant commission laid out five principles to underlie reform: ‘health policies oriented to healthy outcomes’; citizen participation; regionalization and decentralization; accountability; and a focus on matching available resources to health needs (2000, 119). It recommended that a minister-appointed Provincial Health Council be established for the
purpose of providing health system-related advice to the minister (MacLeod 1996, 32). The commissioners further recommended regionalization and decentralization by establishing four ‘relatively autonomous’ health authorities across the province to manage and administer health care on behalf of the ministry.

Instituting voluntary community health boards was also suggested (Bickerton 2000, 119; Minister’s Task Force 1999, 10). It was suggested that the regional health boards (RHBs) be appointed ‘based on a public nomination process defined in consultation with the Provincial Health Council’ (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 10). Members would be carefully selected and nominated from various sectors of society and act as sounding boards, providing an avenue for citizen participation in the decision-making process (Bickerton 2000, 119). The recommendations received a token response from the Buchanan government, which in typical fashion deferred any action by calling for further study. One tangible response, however, was the appointment of six advisory-only health agencies across the province (MacLeod 1996, 32). Regions such as Cape Breton would have to wait awhile longer for regionalized decision-making. This was further evidence that the norms and power relations embedded in the higher echelons of the health apparatus of the province would be difficult to alter. As Bickerton notes, ‘provincial bureaucrats and their political masters dug in their heels on the question of devolving any of their powers and responsibilities to citizen boards. Better cost control was a pressing objective for provincial authorities at this time; democratization of health governance was not’ (2000, 121).

Regardless of these entrenched barriers to regionalization, pressure from Cape Breton’s medical community, local business, and civil society organizations during the Buchanan years did lead to plans for the establishment of a well-equipped regional hospital
on the Island. In the late 1970s small hospitals were having difficulty keeping up to advances in medical technology. In the face of this challenge, Sydney City Hospital’s chief surgeon, Dr. M.A. Naqvi led a group of citizens in a lobby effort to secure a new consolidated hospital equipped with the latest technologies and methods to serve the regional population (2009, 234; Hamilton Interview 2015). In 1987 the Buchanan government committed to the $100 million project. Cooperation among three levels of government coalesced with a $17 million fundraising campaign headed by local businessman Jack Yazer. Construction began in 1991, and by 1994 the new regional hospital was fully operational. At that point, the 338-bed facility had 1550 employees, 150 of whom were physicians (Morgan 2009, 234).

Soon after his election, Premier John Savage appointed Dr. Ron Stewart (a native Cape Bretoner) as his minister of health. Stewart had received accolades for establishing a health emergency medical system in Los Angeles County and appeared to be a good candidate to carry forward the government’s health reform agenda (Bickerton 2000, 122). Despite his impeccable credentials and vision, Stewart faced major obstacles. Federal austerity measures delivered a shock to the Nova Scotia health system with a $340 million cut in federal transfer payments (Government of NS Health Investment Fund, 1999, 7). During this period of unprecedented fiscal restraint, Minister Stewart embarked immediately upon trying to revamp a system that was rapidly becoming unsustainable. The crux of this effort was a radical plan aimed at ‘regionalization of health service delivery and administration, and the attendant restructuring and downsizing of hospital-based services’ (Clancy et al. 2000, 243). During the politically painful process that followed, he encountered stiff resistance from militant citizen activists and deeply entrenched interests unwilling to countenance the proposed reforms.
Stewart’s reform plan was launched as part of his own government’s restraint budget of 1994, which announced 3% public sector wage rollbacks affecting 40,000 workers (Cape Breton Post 1994), and cuts to the healthcare budget of $62 million (Poels 1994), all part of a four year Expenditure Control Plan (Nova Scotia Legislature Hansard, April 25, 1996). A predictable public outcry ensued. On May 3 1994, fourteen unions and professional groups, including the NS Medical Society, met to discuss the budget plan. Savage reacted by saying ‘We’ll wait ‘til we hear from them…Our policies are as indicated and this government will not change’ (Cape Breton Post, May 4, 1994, 1). In Cape Breton, a rally that drew over 1000 public sector employees from NSGEU and CUPE was held where one participant summed up the overall situation as ‘a fight for survival’ (Cape Breton Post, May 13, 1994). The scene was a strong example of civil society organizations uniting to resist the negative effects of government restraint.

In this setting Stewart established the “Blueprint Committee” tasked with designing the new regionalized and decentralized health system. It recommended the creation of four Regional Health Boards (RHBs), a number of localized Community Health Boards (CHBs), and a Provincial Programs Advisory Committee (PPAC). It further recommended that RHBs be composed of members from community boards and that the PPAC be drawn from RHB representatives and health department officials, among others. These structures would empower citizens with avenues of support for participation and decision-making. In theory accountable to their communities, the regional and community boards would ensure some measure of local control within a system where provincially-set standards would have to be met (Bickerton 2000, 122-123; MacLeod 1994).

Key to the plan was the implied autonomy achieved through decentralization to the
regional and local scale. CHBs representing a minimum community population of 10,000 ‘consumers’ would carry most responsibilities and decision-making, including budgetary authority for all services, while the RHBs would be charged with funding, planning, rationalizing, and planning services and programs for their respective regions. The 36 hospital boards would be phased out and their respective facilities taken under the operational responsibility and ownership of the RHBs (Bickerton 2000, 123-124; Redden 2002), who thenceforth would become responsible for determining the number and type of hospitals in each region (Poels 1994).

The government responded to the Blueprint Committee’s recommendations with framework legislation known as Bill 95 while a ‘bridging document’ (1995) set the course for addressing the committee’s recommendations (Bickerton 2000, 124). The envisaged reforms would have greatly democratized the governance of the health care system, but the government did not fully adopt the plan. Instead the RHBs were assigned most of the administrative, decision-making, and budgetary duties originally envisaged for the CHBs, while the mandate of the latter was narrowed in scope (2000, 124-125).

The regionalization process triggered by the Blueprint Committee document was a years-long process beginning ‘in 1996 with the devolution of major health care responsibilities to four Regional Health Boards - Western, Central, Northern, and Eastern (MacLeod 1996, 42) – and thirty-four Community Health Boards (established as of July 1999) (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 3). While the geographical region of Cape Breton would not have its own regional board,10 administrative streamlining was achieved through the merger of Cape Breton Regional Hospital, Glace Bay Healthcare Corporation, New Waterford Consolidated and the Northside Harbourview Hospital into the Cape Breton
The incomplete regionalization process and the overall health care reform agenda became troublesome issues for the Liberals in the lead-up to the 1998 election. Savage’s successor as Premier – Russell MacLellan – was chastised for government inaction, most notably for not legislating Community Health Boards (Bickerton 2000, 130). Even so, the Liberals eked out a minority election victory and appointed yet another Task Force to examine the state of regionalized health care in the province and ways to improve it (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 3). The task force recommended further regionalization; continued CHB development (as stakeholders had concluded that there was inadequate community representation at the regional board level), a revamped RHB funding arrangement; devolution of long-term and home care responsibilities to RHBs; maintenance of existing boundaries, and a change in the status of non-designated organizations (e.g. ‘stand alone’ organizations such as Cape Breton Healthcare Complex, not directly integrated into the regionalization). The report suggested ‘merging the boards of the Cape Breton Healthcare Complex and the Eastern Regional Health Board to capture the strengths of both in a single Eastern Regional Health Board.’ (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 3, 5-7).

RHB boundaries were an issue for two ‘minority’ dissenters on the task force. They wanted to create an Industrial Cape Breton region encompassing either Industrial Cape Breton or Industrial Cape Breton with Victoria County. They advocated for ‘regionalization but only if for the purpose of region building’, and resisted integration that could weaken the area’s autonomy and ability to foster social capital. Their proposed region would ‘provide specific organizational focus on developing community and public sector partnerships in an area with the most significant and deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the province.’
In a new regionalist vein, the proposed region could ‘create a geographic community of interest among significant public sector partners, including health, education, and Human Resources Development Canada, and encourage the development of intersectoral [sic] partnerships’ (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 29). Also, a large majority of board members of non-designated organizations (NDOs) such as the Cape Breton Health Complex expressed that the NDOs should remain outside of the jurisdiction of RHBs, citing ‘a lack of confidence in RHBs’ and concern about ‘ceding autonomy’ that the NDOs enjoyed at the time (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 61).

In April 1999 the Minister’s Task Force made its recommendations with an appendix summary of the regionalization process; under the oversight of the minister and Department of Health four regional health boards continued to operate along with four Non-Designated Organizations. The NDOs as yet did not fall under the RHB jurisdictions, providing them with a more direct route to influence government (1999, 80; Redden 2002, 107). At the local level, 33 community health boards had convened operations. These provided health plans that would be incorporated into their respective RHB plans, which in turn would be integrated provincially (1999, 80).

The MacLellan government had little time to address the Task Force recommendations. Forced into a quick election, MacLellan’s promise to borrow an extra $800 million to inject into the health system did not translate into re-election of his government. Instead, the Progressive Conservative government under leader John Hamm (like Savage, a physician) carried the day and proceeded to put its own stamp on health care reform by bringing its administration closer to communities. As noted by Rodney MacDonald, a Hamm government minister at the time, ‘in 1999, John Hamm felt that there
wasn’t enough community input in the [health delivery] process; hence the creation of additional boards’ (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015). MacDonald was referring to the further decentralization (and in the case of some NDOs, the further integration) of the regionalized health governance system. The Health Authorities Act, in theory, made health delivery more place-based and brought health decision-making closer to the people by replacing the four regional boards with nine district health authorities (DHAs).

The CHBs established under Savage were retained while the DHAs were given the power to establish new community health boards and worked towards the same objectives as the previous RHBs (Health Authorities Act 2000, Clauses 19 and 20). The four NDOs would be ‘brought into the new system’ prompting them to ‘work with and not against the DHAs’ (Redden 2002, 107). Cape Breton was more closely positioned to have a single health authority encompassing the whole Island region geographically—Cape Breton District Health Authority (CBDHA). The exception was the Island’s south-western area (close to the Strait of Canso), which was drawn into the Guysborough Antigonish Strait Health Authority (GASHA).

The community health boards continued to have advisory, outreach, and community analysis and consultation duties. Within the CBDHA, a number of CHBs were established while GASHA housed three CHBs, with the Strait-Richmond CHB representing the 16,900 citizens in its Cape Breton catchment area. Besides relaying to the DHAs community concerns and ideas for health strategies, CHBs were to network with other CHBs and organizations to gain further health related insights and knowledge. They were also mandated to provide funds to various organizations that were deemed to play important roles in the well-being of respective communities (GASHA Annual Report 2013-14, 19).

After the flurry of regionalizing reforms under the Savage government, subject to some readjustment by the Hamm government, no further reforms occurred in the first decade of the new century. However, the election of the Stephen McNeil-led Liberals in 2013 (displacing a one-term NDP government) seems to have turned back the clock on regionalization. Promising savings by slashing administration costs, the new government followed through on its election promise to dismantle the regional health boards. The *Health Authorities Act: An Act to Provide for Health Authorities and Community Health Boards*, enacted on October 3, 2014 (CBC 2013), still appears to provide some autonomy for local communities in that CHBs would remain a part of the overall health governance structure. More tellingly, however, the DHAs were consolidated into a single provincial authority, with a second authority solely for the IWK Health Centre in Halifax. Under the legislation, ‘management zones’ were created within the new provincial authority that mirror the Savage-era RHBs (for instance, a Cape Breton, Guysborough and Antigonish zone). The minister retains responsibility for allocating ‘available resources’ to the health authorities. While the Community Health Boards survived the MacNeil redesign, they continue ‘at the pleasure’ of the minister; moreover, the provincial health authority is empowered to change their boundaries or reduce their number upon ministerial approval (Nova Scotia Legislature Health Authorities Act 2014; NS Health Authority 2015). In this context, the role that CHBs are expected to play in the new system remains unclear; this was not a priority area addressed in the transition to a single authority.

Concerning to health care professionals that were involved with the now-dismantled
DHA’s is the introduction of new ‘levels’ or ‘nodes’ of bureaucracy, in particular the management zone VP positions. The bureaucratic transition to a provincial health authority brings with it a web of complexity that will take time (and money) to sort out. This has fostered disappointment among Cape Breton-associated community representatives who felt their voices could be lost in the shuffle (Amit interview 2015; Rodney MacDonald interview 2015; Murray Interview 2014). Subsequent to the passage of the legislation, transition cost concerns have been substantiated; the Chronicle Herald reported that the merger ‘was $3 million more than the previously discussed total’ of $5.7 million (Gorman 2015). Outgoing CEO and VP severance costs totalled $4.8 million, while merging the DHA’s computer financial systems brought total costs to $9 million. NDP health critic Dave Wilson noted that ‘there was supposed to be significant savings in Year 1 with the amalgamation of the district health authorities and we know now that that’s not the case’. A government spokesperson, on the other hand, suggested the merged financial system ‘will allow the new organization to operate efficiently as it moves forward’ (Gorman 2015). Of course, the possibility of future savings and efficiencies remain to be seen.

In retrospect, the Savage government’s installation of a region-wide governance structure complemented by decentralized, community-based institutions – the combination of which offered the potential for regional empowerment in the social sphere – did Cape Breton a service. At the same time, final decision-making power remained with provincial institutions and actors. Both the previous arrangements and the latest iteration of a single health authority with regional management zones work within a system of centralized executive dominance over decision-making. As always in the Westminster parliamentary system, the buck generally stops with the premier, his/her office, the minister, and the
department. While input, ideas, and some planning could originate at the community level, they are never permitted to override the provincial government’s authority to plan, determine finances, and develop an overall vision for the system. Nor can community inputs hope to override stronger vested interests within the system, such as doctors and institutions (e.g. Dalhousie Medical School and NDOs) who retain their long-established role as major ‘influencers’ and/or veto points within the health system (Redden 2002, 113).

While this outlook suggests there always has been shortcomings in the regionalization process – in terms of empowering the community to build its region by assuming a greater role in directing its own social development – this does not preclude the possibility that over time community engagement within a regionalized structure can open doors to innovative ideas for social development and region-building. At the time of writing, however, the future direction of health system reform remains unclear.

6.4 REGIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION

The colony-province’s first school legislation in 1766 established a loose network of (often) denominational schools overseen by private interests, voluntary organizations, trustees, local boards, and the colonial government (Guilford, 1994; Clancy 2000, 143). By the 1840s, schools were developing in communities such as Arichat, Baddeck, and the Sydneys in Cape Breton (Morgan 2009, 5; Pinaud 1997; Xavier 1957, 65). Other legislation further professionalized the system, creating a provincially appointed superintendent of schools (1850) and a teacher training facility in Truro in 1854. Free public schooling arrived with the 1864 Free School Act and was generally supported by both the public and the provincial political parties; however, the politics of denominational conflict held back
progress on free public schooling across the province (Guilford, 1994). The 1860s free school legislation distributed financial and administrative powers among appointed regional school boards and locally elected school trustees. It also ‘created both the Council of Public Instruction -- made up entirely of the members of the provincial cabinet -- and a small bureaucracy consisting of a provincial Superintendent of Schools and a small cadre of County Inspectors. Initially, the system vested the most power in politicians’ (Guilford 1994). The principle of free common schools was paired with a municipal-provincial joint funding principle legislated in 1865; however, the principle invoking ‘direct local responsibility’ would not be a point of emphasis until later years (Clancy 2000, 143).

In postwar Nova Scotia the influential Report of the Pottier Royal Commission outlined a strategy for local supervision of the education system suggesting local authorities own and maintain school facilities and hire teachers while the province would set a standard curriculum and share systemic education costs with the municipalities within set rules (Clancy 2000, 143). This system was scrutinized in the 1974 Graham Report, which recommended consolidating the plethora of school boards in the province into 11 regional boards. As with Graham’s municipal reform recommendations, this one was not implemented (Clancy 200, 145). Between 1980 and 1981, as education costs were growing and enrolments declining, the Commission on Public Education Finance (the Walker Commission) suggested that the fragmented system of 74 district boards should coincide with the county boundaries of the province and a global ‘per student’ funding formula be instituted to support the boards. The Buchanan government adopted these recommendations, reducing the number of boards to 21. Thus, incremental adjustments to education in the province were evident prior to the Savage years (Clancy 2000, 144-145, 142). With student
numbers continuing to decline, 20 per cent of the province’s schools were closed in the 1980s (2000, 149), including elementary schools in Cape Breton communities such as Creignish, Princeville, Strathlorne, and Scotsville. Fiscal constraints, funding formulas not conducive to maintaining rural communities, and local boards at the mercy of the political executive through provincial statute, consistently restricted both community survival and educational autonomy for citizens who wished to affect change at the local level.

Further Amalgamation of Schools and Boards

In the early 20th century there were many one and two room schools in Cape Breton. Outmigration in the 1960s, expanding communications, and the development of roads and bussing led to closure of these small schools and the process began of locating P-12 consolidated schools in ‘larger’ centres. There was opposition to the transition, but eventually communities were ‘redefined’ around the new schools (MacDonald 2003). Through the 1970s and 80s these consolidated schools were deteriorating, families were shrinking, and young people were leaving the Island. With declining enrolments in the 1980s (MacDonald 2003), local school boards were increasingly squeezed by per-student funding formulas. Cape Breton, an area experiencing increased outmigration, had to begin closing and amalgamating its schools (Appendix J) provides an illustrative example of the (comparative) severity of enrolment declines that have occurred in Cape Breton).

In 1990 the provincial government reduced the growth rate of its annual grant to school boards, further downloading program delivery pressures to the boards and municipalities, which were left to trim costs (2000, 148). Service cuts, programming, teaching and support staff layoffs, and outright school closures (19 schools in the province
were closed in 1990) irked the public (2000). Mounting community and student protests developed into a province-wide community response that came to be known as ‘Save Our Schools’ (SOS) (2000, 149). The insistent overtone of the SOS protests postponed and/or reduced the number of closures (see below for Cape Breton examples) and contributed to the government’s decision to call for public consultation and advance notice regarding future school closures.

Other provincial education initiatives in the late 20th century included establishing formula review committees; the 1991 Select Committee on Education (the Kimball Committee) mandated to consult on school board taxing powers and other educational matters; the 1991 School Boards Act, which legislated elected boards; and a 1991 budget freeze of public sector salaries, including teachers, which offered ‘temporary breathing space for school board budgets’ (Clancy 2000, 150; Fleming 1997). The more pronounced structural overhaul of the mid-1990s, however, emerged because of determined leadership. When former Cape Breton school teacher John MacEachern became the Minister of Education and Culture in the Savage cabinet, the move to educational reform began with another public consultation on revamping the education system (Fleming 1997). A 1994 discussion paper titled *Restructuring Nova Scotia’s Education System* was followed by the government’s pivotal 1995 white paper *Educational Horizons*. Complementing the government’s four-year plan for fiscal recovery for the province (Clancy 2000 151), *Educational Horizons* recommended changes in education delivery and consultation (Fleming 1997). Three program areas were revamped – the public school program; the university system; and the Nova Scotia community college system (2000, 143). The upshot for Cape Breton was that it would have a more regionalized and region-specific public
education delivery system. In 1996 the reduction to seven regional boards was realized (MacDonald 2003, 3; Clancy et al. 2000, 258). The restructuring that complemented *Educational Horizons* featured the following initiatives that demonstrate identity politics, the new regionalism (regionalization, bottom-up governance); and neo-liberal ideas (budgetary austerity, public-private partnerships):

- Amalgamation of the 22 existing school boards to 7 regional boards with one single French Acadian board created for the purpose of harmonization of services for French First Language services. Cape Breton schools would be represented by two regional school boards -- the Cape Breton-Victoria Regional School Board (CB-VRSB), encompassing Cape Breton and Victoria Counties, and the Strait Regional School Board, composed of Inverness and Richmond Counties in Cape Breton, and Antigonish and Guysborough towns and counties on the mainland (see Figure 3).
- Education Act changes that clearly redefined responsibilities and roles of main actors in the system such as parents, students, school boards, and staff.
- Creation of school advisory councils for many schools (Fleming 1997; Government of Nova Scotia 2015a).
- Cuts that saw general education funding reduced from $806.5 million to $769.6 million, with the university spending envelope reduced to $185 million from $212.5 million.
- Construction of new schools under a private-public-partnership (P-3) model (Clancy 2000, 152-54).
School Amalgamation and Community Resistance

Anticipating that school boards were planning to shut down their schools in the late 1990s, resistant Cape Breton communities took action. With the existence of their rural communities under threat, citizens vowed to resist both the regional boards and the government. Although there were rural school closure concerns around the Island, Inverness County provides a strong example (see MacDonald 2003) of how Island communities strategized social development and tried to resist and accommodate change in the face of institutional and economic pressures in a globalizing environment.  

Before 1996, school closure rumours were circulating although in Inverness County the school board had announced (in 1995) a one-year moratorium on school closure studies. This changed with the creation of the new regional board, which revealed its plans for amalgamation in a document titled “The Future is Now” (MacDonald 2003, 3). In December 1996 concerned parents in Judique, Inverness County allowed a group of students to ‘occupy’ their school as a symbol of both resistance to the board’s plans and of solidarity among parents, staff, many teachers, and students in the community (MacDonald 1996, 4). Fearing the closure of local schools elsewhere in Inverness County, residents also formed a kilometer-long human chain as a protest of proposed changes in the school system.

In February 1997, the Strait Regional Board released another document, “Education for a New Century,” with the promise that no schools would be closed in 1997-98. However, students could be moved from one school to another. Coinciding with the report, the board created nine sub-regions in the district. These independently facilitated focus groups would meet and try to agree upon an amalgamation solution. One group included the communities of Judique, Port Hood, Mabou and Whycocomah. (MacDonald 2003, 4).
Related to this, large ‘P’ and small ‘p’ politics converged in a local Liberal nomination in Inverness County in the winter of 1998. Two favoured candidates in the nomination were from neighbouring communities, Judique and Port Hood. With Judique, Port Hood, Mabou, and Whycocomah fearing the closure of their own school within various closure scenarios presented by the board, a committee was formed in Port Hood to campaign for its ‘home’ candidate, hoping to assure that Port Hood would receive a school. In keeping with the original position of the regional focus group, the Judique candidate’s ‘campaign position’ was to keep a minimum P-8 school presence in all four communities. This candidate was unable to offset the number of all-party and multi-community supporters who, wanting to assure a school be built in their communities (Port Hood and Mabou), ‘signed up’ as card carrying Liberals and supported the victorious Port Hood candidate in the nomination. The nomination results could partly be attributed to the community committee work leading up to the nomination (Graham interview 2014).

This episode demonstrates how local community identities on the Island may become more pronounced during crises, yet still exist alongside a commonly held regional identity. It also illustrates how community rivalries and parochialism may be a barrier to cooperative, region-based development. Community action was undertaken to try to negotiate better terms for the community of Port Hood by trying to access the levers of power within the school board and government. The committee strategized to gain formal political control at the local level and the community of Port Hood, which secured the winning candidate and a new P-8 school. Judique lost its school while the neighbouring communities in Mabou and Whycocomah gained a new P-12 and P-8 schools respectively. While this political mobilization benefited some communities on that issue, political ‘clout’ may have been lost
from a regional development standpoint. The winning Liberal candidate did not receive a hoped-for cabinet appointment, leaving the Inverness riding out-voiced by other Island constituencies whose MLAs went on to be influential in the Savage cabinet.\textsuperscript{16}

Inverness journalist and author Frank Macdonald noted in an October, 2000 interview with scholar Burt Feintuch the grass-roots resilience and resistance that arose from Cape Breton communities in reaction to conditions threatening their survival:

Every single one of these communities has an extremely strong identity. We’ve just gone through fourteen years of what you would call an education war because the government has been trying since 1985 to amalgamate all the schools in this area. This year they succeeded in doing that. But every single community was defending, very successfully defending, their schools. They managed to prevent this amalgamation for fifteen years…now these communities are starting to re-form around their closed schools.

Table 1 shows the enrolment numbers that were influencing the school boards representing Cape Breton. Table 1 notes the numbers affecting the aforementioned Inverness County scenario. For a more recent regional school enrolment scenario see Appendix J.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
School & Number of Students & Change During Period \\
\hline
Judique-Creignish Consolidated & 383 & 324 & 240 & -143  \\
Port Hood Consolidated & 320 & 333 & 304 & -16  \\
Mabou Consolidated & 443 & 351 & 308 & -135  \\
Whycocomagch Consolidated & 309 & 342 & 320 & +11  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Change in School Enrollment: Judique, Port Hood, Mabou, and Whycocomagch, 1990-2000.}
\label{table:change-enrollment}
\end{table}

School boards and governments have been faced with the task of addressing further school closures.\textsuperscript{17} With declining enrollments in Cape Breton, the 1990s move towards
amalgamation and regionalization appears to have been a politically pragmatic decision. And there have been further declines: In 2005-06 there were 17,882 students under the jurisdiction of the Cape Breton-Victoria board; by 2012-13 that number fell to 13,839. Enrollment for the Strait Board for the same years declined from 8,584 to 6,816 (Nova Scotia Government Enrollments by Board (historical) 2015). While the formation of two regional school boards created a wider sense of community unity (as inter-community friction fades in some instances), the long-term result may well be that Cape Breton could re-assemble as a unified region to address common demographic and fiscal challenges. If enrollment trends continue, will more schools close? Will two regional boards become one Cape Breton board? Will this promote a stronger regionality on the Island at the cost of eroding local identities? Certainly, further centralization or consolidation of school boards cannot be ruled out.\textsuperscript{18} As the politics of fiscal restraint and regionalization continue unabated, it remains to be seen how Cape Breton communities respond and adapt. How will they attempt to defend, rebuild and redefine themselves and their communities?

Rescaling and Regionalizing Mi’kmaw Education

Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey is a ‘special purpose body’ formed to support Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw communities in ‘implementing their jurisdiction over education’ (McCarthy 2001, 11). Plans for its realization date back at least to the early 1990s when the federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs was approached by the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw Chiefs about creating a Mi’kmaw education authority. The initiative reflected the common desire -- among First Nations communities across the country -- for autonomy and self-determination over their social, cultural, and economic affairs. A provincial framework
agreement was signed between the department and the 13 Mi’kmaw chiefs in 1992. They would, through negotiation, devolve government-run educational programming to Nova Scotian Mi’kmaw communities.

In 1993, a Mi’kmaq Education Authority (MEA) was created to develop education curriculum for Mi’kmaw communities. It was evident in the communities that more control over education was desired; the Assembly, with the MEA heading negotiations, asked the federal government to transfer jurisdiction over education to Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaw communities. A political accord was signed in 1994, specifying that there was mutual agreement to negotiate toward the jurisdictional transfer (2001, 3). Community consultations ensued; working groups were created and involved multi-level governance including MEA staff, chiefs, provincial and federal government officials, educators, and community representatives from across the province (2001, 3). In 1997 Canada, the Province, and the 13 Mi’kmaw communities signed a final agreement and ‘on April 22, 1999 the Mi’kmaq Education Act incorporated Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey in federal law’ (2001, 3). This exercise in rescaling and reterritorializing education within a new regionalism context was a critical juncture in the socio-economic development of Mi’kmaq communities, notably Unama’ki/Cape Breton. All communities did not immediately buy into the transfer; in the ensuing years all but one (the mainland community of Millbrook) eventually assumed educational control (Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey, kinu.ca, 2015). As will be noted in the next chapter, gaining autonomy over education provided fruitful results in the realm of Mi’kmaw social and economic development and its contribution to Cape Breton region-building.

Conclusions

The departure of John Buchanan from provincial politics marked the emergence of a
new political regime in Nova Scotia. Ensuing provincial governments – especially that of John Savage – governed with a general promotion of neo-liberal fiscal prescriptions and political and social institutional reform. In a province not acclimatized to abrupt institutional change, it was not surprising that citizen and regional resistance manifested itself.

Interviewee Richie Mann raises the point that regional and community identity can be a passionate issue (2014); identities are personally meaningful, can be reconstructed, maintained, and multiple. Such was the case as Cape Breton communities resisted and tried to adapt to the reform and regionalization of political, health and educational institutions, in rapid succession.

Regardless of immediate resistance and subsequent growing pains after the municipal merger in Cape Breton, significant points can be extrapolated regarding regionalization, region-building, and development. A re-territorialized (regional, functional, institutional, infrastructural) foundation was set for more cohesive and re-scaled economic development planning and strategizing. It can be argued that a unified political voice, consolidated services, and a more regionalized Cape Breton identity was/is being forged/reconstructed for future region-building purposes. Former CBRM Economic Development Manager John Whalley summarizes the opportunity he saw in regionalization:

There’s been a real evolution…although we were forced to amalgamate…ourselves and HRM are probably light years ahead of the rest of the province in terms of dealing with…preparing a region for basically a world order where all regions are basically competing against all other regions with fairly minimal…federal and provincial assistance … protection … whatever you’d like to call it. It’s pretty wide open. So you’re seeing all kinds of things happening now at the municipal level…a new round now, of essentially forcing municipal governments to amalgamate. It’s being done a little differently. It’s not being done…politically. It’s being done financially by essentially withholding resources from municipalities and…in many ways we were very fortunate. …We were fortunate to have been forced into amalgamation because it forced us to look at the world differently. And although we haven’t shown a great deal of success I think in many ways the last twenty years has
been about…putting the building blocks in place. A very slow process, but it has happened (Interview 2014).

In line with the underpinnings of the new regionalism, CBRM was positioned to strategize for economic development from a regional perspective through one economic development manager working in tandem with the mayor and council and various multi-scalar and multi-sectoral stakeholders (Whalley Interview 2014).\(^{19}\) Regionalization opened the door for leadership to more effectively region-build and negotiate both economic integration and options for enhanced regional autonomy.

The amalgamation came at a time when defensive regionalism was approaching a crossroads in Cape Breton. As neo-liberal ideas largely overtook political economic discourse in the Western World, federal and provincial leadership became lukewarm toward continued interventionist support for the coal and steel sectors in Cape Breton. And after further trade liberalization, regional development readjustments, and fiscal restraint measures were brought in by both orders of government, regional actors – CBRM, ECBC, the Cape Breton Health Complex and regional health and education authorities – became important institutional nodes in an ongoing transition to a more pro-active, autonomous regionality throughout the Island, if not more specifically within CBRM.\(^{20}\)

The social institutions reformed and created in the province as the new globalized era began to unfold were the result of determined and arguably courageous leadership. The Savage government initiated institutional change by capitalizing on a ‘window of opportunity’ emerging from fiscal crises and an ideational paradigm shift. The rationale behind such changes complemented the political-economic landscape, or axis, that arose in this period – a multiple actor, multi-scalar, new regionalism setting resulting from
globalizing processes (denationalization, privatization, and so on). Regionalization of school boards and health delivery/administration was reflective of and sensitive to regional particularisms in the province, producing a system of RHBs-cum-DHAs (and most recently a single provincial authority with regional management zones) and CHBs embodying distinct cultural and social identities.

Similarly, the 1990s saw Unama’ki and Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw leadership respond to the socio-economic realities that the new global era posed. Strong leadership and identity, and a more entrenched idea of self-determination, met with governance prescriptions of the day (decentralization, scaling down, and so on) to further empower the Mi’kmaw people of Unama’ki to take control of the education of their children. The new regionalism setting was evident with the creation of a Mi’kmaw education authority -- the Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey – which would deliver education to most Mi’kmaw communities across the province. The outcome has been more autonomy for Unama’ki communities to educate their future leaders from an indigenous outlook and prepare them to partake in regional (re)construction in the new global era.

Although fiscal, social, and demographic challenges continued to hinder Cape Breton’s development prospects, these same realities contributed to institutional changes that furthered regionality through a more formally regionalized Island, now better equipped to be reconstructed in a globalized, post-industrial, new regionalism era.

________________________
NOTES

1 While the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties came to dominate Nova Scotia’s party system up until at least the turn of the 20th century, there were not many discrepancies that could be found between them. Continually visible in Nova Scotia party politics was the notion that ‘[p]olitics were elitist, leader-dominated and partisan’ (Bickerton 2001; 2001, 58).

2 The leader of the provincial Liberals before John Savage, Vince MacLean was accused of receiving income from party trusts which were funded over many years by kickback money; the scandal ushered the end of his leadership when he resigned after a close leadership review vote (Stewart 2000a, 34). He soon moved on to municipal politics, becoming the mayor of Sydney. One interviewee suggests that the deposing of MacLean was also associated with the ‘Halifax establishment’ faction of the Liberal party taking an opportunity to secure a new leader who would not be from Cape Breton.

3 An article in the Cape Breton Post dated May 2, 1994 (4) pointed to a poll released by the provincial government a week earlier that suggested Nova Scotians were ‘ready for a major change in such areas as public spending, education and health care. Fully 83% of 600 Nova Scotians questioned said it’s time for major reform of the school system and 75% said that about health. Even on spending control, 57% agreed it’s time for drastic action.’

4 Subsequent governments also left a mark in some of these areas.

5 As Garcea and LeSage Jr. note, ‘the turn-of-the-millennium period’ constituted ‘another important modernization initiative designed to help municipal governments, and to some extent their respective provincial and territorial governments, deal with challenges posed not only by demographic, economic, and social factors in the domestic and international environments, but also their own past policy decisions and those of other governments within the Canadian and international political systems’ (2005 citing Frisken, 1994; Coffey, 1994a; Sancton, 1994; Blais, 1994; Andrew, 1995; Boswell, 1995; Magnusson, 1996; Andrew, 1997; Graham et al., 1998; Tindal and Tindal, 2004: 1–21, 61–84; Sancton, 2000a).

6 The 1972 task force report was titled “Health Care in Nova Scotia: A New Direction for the Seventies. The 1976 report was titled ‘Report of the Committee on Health Professions Licencing (Boase 1995, 89). Bickerton (2000) says that the 1972 task force provided a ‘stinging critique’ of the provincial system that, besides it’s Halifax-centric approach, also found that hospital beds were inappropriately used; the province lacked a comprehensive approach to homecare; and that professional health workers (especially nurses) were not being utilized to their full potential. These same issues were still evident in the Ross Report of 2010, pointing to the embeddedness of institutions and institutional behavior in Nova Scotia’s health field.

7 Dr. Hamilton’s comments on the centre-periphery dynamic in the healthcare system were illuminating: ‘There came the possibility really, of expanding particularly specialty services
to regional hospitals in a fashion which had not ever really been considered. And…many of the specialists in Halifax…viewed themselves as “tertiary specialists”, mostly because they had access to equipment which smaller institutions couldn’t afford and [the specialists in Halifax] effectively ran these bits of equipment as monopolies and thereby maintained control of how access and expansion were going to take place’ (Interview March 8, 2015.

Savage was personally affected by the resistance to the budget, facing physical abuse at the hands of construction workers as he left the House on budget day while other members such as Economic Renewal Minister Ross Bragg and Ron Stewart were victims of crank phone calls and home invasion respectively (Cape Breton Post, “Cabinet Ministers Worried,” May 19, 1994).

The Cape Breton Regional Hospital had to deal with a provincial government cut of 1.3%. New Waterford’s hospital faced a 15% cut, Strait-Richmond a cut of 5.5%, Inverness Consolidated Hospital an 8.1% cut, and Glace Bay Healthcare Corporation a cut of 8% (Cape Breton Post, “Latest Cuts Have Hospital Workers Fearing for Jobs, May 13, 1994; Cape Breton Post, “Hospitals Deal with Cuts,” May 12, 1994).

Not all stakeholders favour one board for all of Cape Breton. From discussions with health care specialists, the author notes that other territorial configurations transcending Island-mainland boundaries could in certain instances be more desirable for functional, cultural, and practical reasons.

The report also found that regionalization was ‘widely misunderstood.’ The general impression was that the main goal was cost cutting and that regionalization was the cause of many system deficiencies such as nurse and doctor shortages, long waiting times, and bed reductions. The report pointed out that these systemic shortfalls occurred previously to, or concurrently with regionalization (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 3).

Although some Task Force respondents felt disenfranchised with regional boards usurping local community autonomy, boundary changes were presumed to be ‘disruptive’ and ‘expensive’ and premature at that point in the regionalization process (Minister’s Task Force 1999, 5-7).

The Nautical Institute is incorporated into NSCC Strait Campus in Port Hawkesbury.

Resistance also occurred in other Island areas and at other scales. In neighbouring Richmond County, residents publicly expressed concerns about the location of a proposed new school. Such events drew notable media attention and also brought the school closures issue into the federal sphere. Cape Breton MP Michelle Dockrill linked the lack of resources and amalgamation plan to the fiscal dictates of the federal government, saying that it ‘created a budget squeeze with its cuts to transfer payments’ (Dockrill 1999).

A common interviewee theme was that inter-community competition for resources is an obstacle to region-building.
He was defeated in the next election by rival PC candidate Rodney MacDonald, who would eventually go on to become provincial premier.


On a positive note, after the major overhaul of the 1990s, it can be stated that Cape Breton-based school boards, schools, and teachers have been providing a comparatively favourable educational experience for their students. A 2008 Atlantic Institute of Market Studies (AIMS) report card placed Cape Breton Highlands Academy of Terre Noire in top place out of twelve Nova Scotia Schools. Five Cape Breton schools placed in the top eight (Atlantic Institute for Market Studies 2008).

However, speaking with one voice is difficult when opinions vary on how a region should proceed in its efforts to develop. With regionality further entrenched on the Island with the amalgamation, separatist sentiments were also resurfacing in community meetings and newspaper opinion pieces, based on the usual notions: Cape Breton is culturally unique and geographically insular; the Island is larger than Prince Edward Island by population and landmass yet does not get to enjoy the institutional and economic endowments derived from being a constitutionally recognized province-region; provincial governments out of Halifax do not treat Cape Breton with fairness, considering the Island’s past fiscal contributions in the heyday of coal; and relatively recent scaling up of economic development to federal institutions reduced identification with the provincial government (Morgan 2009; also see Bickerton 2012). Notably these sentiments and the amalgamation itself converged, yielding ‘one regional voice’ for deliberation with representatives from various economic sectors and other levels of government.

For instance, developing the post-industrial remediation industry, the creative economy, cultural tourism, and visions for further commercial development of cultural products (e.g. Celtic music) were being embraced as tools to be utilized by a more globalized Cape Breton (Keith MacDonald Interview 2014; Joella Foulds Interview with Glenn Graham July 2014; see ensuing chapters).
CHAPTER 7
POST-INDUSTRIAL CAPE BRETON:
A RE-ENVISIONED DEVELOPMENT REGIME

“The key to the Island’s future will be found within the Island and, in particular, within the intelligence, vision, creativity, imagination, and entrepreneurial skill of young Cape Bretoners.” CBU Professor David Johnson, 2007.

By the 1990s manufacturing-based economies in the western world gave way to a ‘post-industrial’ (Boeckelman 1995), ‘post-fordist’ context (Amin 1994). Along with globalization (Giddens 1991; Held 1999; Friedman 2005) came decline and decay for many cities, towns and rural areas. Communities dependent upon traditional industries have been affected by changes in agriculture and resource industries; outmigration; global financial crises; and related government economic and social policy responses. Peripheral regions like Cape Breton have been particularly affected; economic and social scenarios for these regions present many challenges.1 Citizens and institutions now interact within a new technologically connected knowledge economy (Smith 2002; Powell and Snellman 2004). This ‘cognitive cultural’, or creative economy, is propelled by human creativity and knowledge with a focus on the knowledge-based industries (see Florida 2002; 2008; 2010; Gibson 2012; Scott 1999; Howkins 2001).

While there is no consensus about what exactly the ‘knowledge’, ‘creative’ and/or ‘cultural’ economy and industries encompass, there is a dynamic cultural industries subset that, along with emerging high-tech initiatives, figure prominently on Cape Breton. Opportunities exist for peripheral regions in this context in the areas of environmental remediation, information technology, and – although no silver bullet – the creative cultural
sector. By the turn of this century, ‘the consumption of cultural products of all kinds’ was ‘expanding at an accelerated pace’ (Scott 2000, 3) and some Cape Bretoners had begun reconstructing the Island economy through a sectoral shift, engaging in services and commercialized cultural and high-tech endeavours. ‘In Cape Breton, with the collapse of the coal and steel industries, the population, although still primarily of a working-class background, is coming to perceive that a prosperous and stable future may lie in the knowledge and cultural sectors’ (Urbaniak 2006). But economic actors in Cape Breton are being strategic – they are noting the importance of partnerships, embracing a networked sector-by-sector approach, and focusing on growth areas within region-specific settings (Prosperity Framework 2015; Ian MacNeil interview 2015; Gunn interview 2015). Political and government leaders in CBRM are committed to an economic vision that taps into globalization through developing trade and the port of Sydney with such endeavours as global container shipping (Whalley interview 2014), and in the Strait Area, re-developing the ice-free superport (Various interviewees 2014).

A look at approaches to rebuilding Cape Breton in the era of globalization follows. Some traditional sector maintenance is visible, in combination with diversification in the areas of technology, tourism, exports (e.g. through web initiatives and infrastructure and commercial lands development) and culture, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter. I will trace region-building initiatives across a number of institutions, propelled by political, business, and community actors. I begin with Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation. After the demise of Devco, it became ‘the principal federal government organization for economic development in Cape Breton’ (ECBC Annual Report 2007). Its presence can also be correlated to the aforementioned sectoral shifts that have become apparent in Cape Breton’s
I situate ECBC within new regionalism theory (NRT) and provide examples of initiatives and projects it has supported. The chapter also describes and analyzes other key development institutions, institutionalization, and the accompanying agency of multiple state and non-state actors as they have attempted to construct a post-industrial Cape Breton in the new era of globalization.

### 7.1. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL INSTITUTIONS

At the dawn of the 21st century, politics, regional competition, a history of top-down development, and a transitioning economy were affecting Cape Breton’s economic plight. Robert Finbow summarized the situation faced by Atlantic Canada and regions within it: ‘economic disparities have persisted’, while ‘economic change is marked by the collapse of fisheries, which has forced thousands from their traditional livelihood.’ The ‘consolidation into corporate forms in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry drives out small producers. Communities brace for the loss of traditional livelihoods while welcoming greater integration via new technologies’ (2001, 314).

Now regions would be competing with each other in various scalar and territorialized configurations (Whalley interview 2014); to survive in this new regional context, the region of Cape Breton had to transition from its previous ‘Socialist Island’ construction. By the mid-1990s the steel and coal economy was nearing its end as the downsized mill and last mine were slated for imminent closure. Their contribution to Cape Breton’s economy had dropped from 46 per cent of Island GDP in 1961 to 36 per cent in 1986 to 20.5 per cent by 1996. In the new post-industrial context, government, education, tourism, medicine and retail trade made up 80 per cent of the Island economy (Morgan 2009, 28). Lionaise (2011; see
Appendix K for detailed table) highlights the transition, specifically between 2004 and 2009, well after ECBC had readjusted its development approach:

…the Cape Breton economy was significantly lagging behind the national economy in the goods producing sector but did outpace growth in some service sectors. Public administration jobs and information, culture and recreation jobs were particular strong categories for Cape Breton. The accommodation and food service sector and the health care and social assistance sector also grew significantly over this period (2011, 16).

Sectoral change and promising innovation is visible but not surprisingly the ‘socialist island’ imprint is still purported to be psychologically tethered to some Island residents. And with the contours of a viable new economy still in the making, the Island can be said to remain ‘in crisis’ (Richard MacKinnon Interview, July 22, 2014; Morrison Interview, August 26, 2014). Still, out of the ashes of the region’s collapsed industrial base and working class way of life, the difficult transition away from its ‘socialist island’ iteration is under way. The provincially-mandated regionalization process that created CBRM has better positioned post-industrial Cape Breton to have a more unified collective voice and enhanced strategic capacity for development planning (Whalley interview 2014). The federal development agency in Cape Breton – ECBC – has also been actively engaged.

ECBC Matures

During the first decade of the 21st century, Canada’s development approach was defined by a ‘third wave’ of regional development policy (Bradford and Wolf, 2012). This approach is ‘informed by the research underlying the new regionalism’ and ‘recognizes that regions need to maximize their investments in local assets that cannot be easily replicated or moved to other parts of the globe’ (Bradford 2010, 5). This third wave has three policy
pillars according to the OECD: growing clusters within regional innovation systems; focusing on place-based policy and multi-level governance; and policy learning and knowledge transfer based on the notion that local and place-based analysis, local social knowledge, and overall evaluation are all part of the social learning process that is key to innovation (Bradford and Wolf 2012, 77). After a ‘breaking in’ process, ECBC changed its own approach to adapt to this third wave of new regionalism pillars and themes. Through flexible federalism, ECBC had some autonomy and was granted discretion over various funding allocations. It became highly involved in fostering regional partnerships and collaborating ‘in the construction of regional development strategy through networking relationships with local political and business elites and higher education institutions, as well as social and cultural organizations’ (Johnson 2007; Bickerton 2014, 281). I will highlight earlier ECBC development contributions here, based on Johnson (2007) and Morgan (2009) and build from that to illustrate its involvement with stakeholders in adapting the region to a post-industrial setting.

Early on, ECBC somewhat mirrored its predecessor, Devco’s IDD, prioritizing forestry, agriculture, the fishery, crafts, and tourism, as well as mid-sized industrial initiatives (Johnson 2007). In 1990, signifying the beginning of a transition, ECBC partnered with the University College of Cape Breton through an MOU, agreeing to work together to foster a high technology sector in Cape Breton (Morgan 2009, 229; Johnson 2007). The MOU emphasized multi-sectoral partnerships, technology promotion, community development, and local entrepreneurship for development. These ingredients, ECBC core funding, and business and skills training and knowledge, were considered vital for future economic development and growth (Johnson 2007, 157). The university and local community benefited, gaining
facilities such as a GIS/GPS Centre, an Environmental Service Lab, an Electromagnetics Lab, and a Virtual Reality Facility (Morgan 2009, 229). Business, Youth, and Technology Advisory Groups hosted open ‘information gatherings’ that sought to inform Islanders about the new economy; notably, the Technology Advisory Group – supported by the university and ECBC – held meetings featuring new technology presentations. They nurtured tech leaders and grew in popularity. By one estimate, between 600 and 700 public and private sector groups became active in the new economy (Morgan 2009, 229).

Through the 1990s, small business support and programs such as those promoting indigenous and women’s entrepreneurialism were prioritized by ECBC. In 1991, ECBC supported two pioneering high tech companies, Magi and MicroNav. These companies did not survive in the long term but ECBC’s support demonstrated that the institution’s approach had shifted toward becoming ‘a major promoter of high technology and information technology development within Cape Breton’ (Johnson 2007, 58). ECBC’s direction change was in part a response to the federal government’s Brait Report (1991) on regional development in Cape Breton, which criticized the agency’s focus on subsidies for larger industries. ECBC began reorienting itself toward high technology and service industries, the skills training and knowledge needed to participate in such industries, and entrepreneurialism (Johnson 2007).

In the mid-90s an arrangement was made within the federal regional development apparatus that revealed some flexibility toward accommodating appeals for regional autonomy: ‘In 1995, ECBC and ACOA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allowing ECBC to design its programming and economic development strategies to complement ACOA programming. The MOU was renegotiated with ACOA for two
additional five-year terms effective April 1, 2000 and April 1, 2005’ (ECBC Annual Report 2007). Some might see this as bureaucratic thickening but the MOU was both symbolic and pragmatic: it recognized that Cape Breton is a region with a unique history that would benefit from having a local development institution that understood the Island’s specific needs and challenges. As ECBC matured, it and ACOA understood the value of the agency’s close involvement with local stakeholders. This dynamic involved 1) fostering social capital and trust, 2) aiding further institutionalization, multi-level governance, and place-based development, and 3) continuing a unique rescaled and reterritorialized arrangement whereby Cape Breton could have a distinctive federal development institution with more capacity to facilitate place-based development than could be said for either mainland Nova Scotia or other regions within Atlantic Canada.

In 1995 ECBC endorsed a development report released by the Cape Breton County Economic Development Authority. Written by regional development analyst Keith Brown, the Brown Report suggested that to experience growth, Cape Breton must embrace the new economy and utilize all levels of government to promote and support economic clusters in promising areas such as information technology, government services, and tourism (Johnson 2007, 158-161). ECBC attempted to implement some of the report’s recommendations while other stakeholder responses varied. A key recommendation of the Brown Report was to decentralize 1000 government jobs to Sydney (a proposal supported by Cape Breton MP and federal public works minister David Dingwall). However, the recommendation did not gain traction within government. ECBC and other stakeholders embraced the recommendation that the promising tourism industry should be fostered. The report stated that the industry lacked overall professionalism; despite this, tourism had seen revenues increase from $17
million to $200 million between 1964 and 1997 (see next chapter) (Johnson 2007; Morgan 2009).

ECBC supported the development of a high tech cluster tagged as ‘Silicon Island’ near Sydney’s downtown core. By 1999 there were 22 (mostly) IT and multimedia firms located there. ECBC noted that Cape Breton was home to 41 IT firms with 600 employees (Morgan 2009, 230), and perhaps as many as 800 (Johnson 2007, 161). CBU professor Richard MacKinnon confirmed the tech sector dynamism during this period, which ‘could be seen as a success’ due in large part to the support of ECBC. But he laments that continued ECBC support and sustained tech sector growth (aside from a few notable successes) did not pan out (Interview, July 22, 2014). MacKinnon’s comments show how a regional development body can play a role in buttressing infant industries and companies as they attempt to grow in a peripheral region lacking in ‘head-start’ advantages. Without such support, a Cape Breton tech cluster/centre could not take root as it has in the Ontario region of Kitchener-Waterloo. The latter benefits from a number of advantages: one-hour proximity to Toronto; centrally-located post-secondary institutions historically focused on mathematics and technology; urban planning that emphasized attracting talent and economic activity through architectural design and down-town location; greater scale of integration of government, academia, and the private sector in the development model; and ‘hundreds of millions’ of philanthropic dollars from RIM and other executives in fostering these initiatives (Gillmor 2012).

In 1999, to ‘soften the economic blow’ from the coalmine and Sysco closures, the federal government created the Cape Breton Growth Fund (CBGF), which, like ECBC, would report to Parliament through the ACOA minister, although administered by ECBC.
The $68 million fund was topped up with a provincial government contribution of $12 million and a further boost of $18 million by the federal government, bringing the fund to $98 million (Johnson 2007). A large portion went to creating jobs quickly through financial incentives to attract call centres to the Island, in order to offset the jobs that were lost with the end of steel and coal; as well, 36 other initiatives were supported in areas such as agriculture, environmental remediation, tourism infrastructure, culture and the arts, high technology, and community development undertakings (Johnson 2007, citing Office of the Auditor General 2005).

It should be noted that into the first decade of the new century, ECBC did not cease to support traditional industries such as fishing and agriculture. Intertwined with CBGF, however, ECBC developed a new focus on entrepreneurship dealing with remediation technology solutions and initiatives that addressed the toxic environmental remnants – like the Sydney Tar Ponds – of a century of heavy industry activity. Related employment and spin-off entrepreneurship was anticipated, as well as long-term knowledge, expertise, and skills that could be transferred to develop the environmental remediation industry (Johnson 2007).

In 2004, acknowledging that globalization can expand export opportunities, ECBC created an e-Commerce initiative to help local businesses adopt a web presence ‘in the form of an informational website and/or fully functional e-Commerce website’ (ECBC Annual Report 2007). These were designed to foster technology infrastructure that would give the region’s businesses a ‘competitive edge’ by increasing the accessibility of Island products in international markets (2007). A cost-benefit analysis of the initiative was commissioned by ECBC in 2006 and the report found that for each dollar spent on e-Commerce, $50.70 was
generated in sales (2007). It said ECBC’s clients were very satisfied with the corporation’s business involvement. Clients estimated that 44.5 per cent of benefits would not have been realized without the assistance of ECBC (2007).

By 2006 the Island’s unemployment rate had fallen to around 13 per cent, its lowest in decades and a significant decline since the paroxysm of unemployment that accompanied the end of the coal and steel era, when the rate was at 18 per cent (ECBC Annual Report 2007). While the turnaround cannot be fully attributed to ECBC, its work towards diversifying the economy was arguably a significant factor. Other ECBC initiatives in the mid-2000s included reactivation of DARR, a real estate holdings company that encourages private investment in economically promising properties; transfer of 3700 acres of Devco lands to ECBC; funding towards a manufacturing facility for Ground Zero Communications Inc.’s ‘first fully-integrated, web-based communications system’; and funding to Cape Breton Developers Inc. to build a retirement resort community in Louisbourg for European developers (ECBC Annual Report 2007). ECBC provided community development support in the form of CBU infrastructure improvements and new building investments for Francophone Community Television and the Cape Breton Centre for Craft and Design.4 Community funding leveraged through ECBC reached $4.96 million in 2006-7 for items like convention and sporting events while over 70 festivals and events were supported with $1.3 million leveraged (ECBC Annual Report 2007).

On December 31, 2009, not long after collaborating with ECBC and CBU to create a research chair in mine water research and a Centre for Sustainability in Energy and the Environment at CBU, the ‘loose ends/winding down’ remainder of Devco was dissolved with its remaining assets and liabilities transferred to ECBC (ECBC Annual Report 2010; Ayers
2009). This prompted then CEO John Lynn to say that ECBC’s ‘economic development mandate was complemented with the addition of the CBDC’s [Devco’s] real property assets, as well as its responsibility for environmental remediation and monitoring’ (ECBC Annual Report 2010). He added that the readjustment established ‘four clear lines of business that serve to strengthen the Corporation’s ability to achieve its mandate. They are commercial development, community development, environmental stewardship and property development’ (ECBC Annual Report 2010).

During this recalibration, the Island experienced the effects of the ‘Great Recession’ that followed the international financial collapse of 2008-09: its export sector suffered with manufacturer shut-downs and fish product export declines while the tourism sector (perhaps also affected by a strong Canadian dollar) failed to perform as well in 2009 as it had in 2008 (ECBC Annual Report 2010). However, ECBC saw ‘bright spots on the horizon’ like potential commercial development for the Port of Sydney; various infrastructure projects; continued economic returns from Sydney Tar Ponds and Donkin Mine remediation; and a Biomass project slated for the paper mill in Point Tupper (ECBC Annual Report 2010).

A review of ECBC’s funding of its festivals and events program (begun in 2002-2003) concluded that its work remained relevant, that ECBC’s contributions to various festivals and events (including a highly successful international music festival, Celtic Colours) were critical, and with improvements and changes, the program would continue. The report found that ‘the economic impact of the initiative since 2002 was $221.2 million in GDP, $25.8 million in provincial tax revenues from direct and spin-off impacts, $31.2 million in federal tax revenues, and as many as 7,632 jobs’ (ECBC Annual Report 2010).

ECBC focused on helping businesses deal with the recession through sector
development and aiding in accessing capital and prospecting for investment and trade. It supported initiatives that included: $5.3 million in Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) commercial development funding; a human resource undertaking with Port Hawkesbury’s NewPage mill to address employee turnover; its own portable trade and marketing mission that travelled with a branded sailing yacht in the *Clipper 09-10 Round the World Yacht Race*; ‘incoming trade missions’ such as the Atlantic Gateway mission focusing on India and related initiatives such as Celtic Colours Incoming Buyers Mission and the East Coast Music Awards’ International Export Program; a $3.5-million equity position in a $5 million coal-bed methane pilot project; and collaboration with tourism partners and development of an ‘internal tourism strategy’ to enhance the tourism industry (ECBC Annual Report 2010).

After some decline, in 2012, the unemployment rate climbed again to 16 per cent by year’s end. Through 2013 ECBC’s program objectives and activities focus continued to be carried over from its integration of Devco’s responsibilities. Its 2012-13 sectors of focus were energy, tourism, and innovation (ECBC Annual Report 2013). ECBC worked with stakeholders on discussing and promoting Cape Breton’s involvement in the clean energy sector. It also continued to engage with clients from the sector that ‘received funding to advance projects in the areas of wind energy development, geothermal applications, biomass, torrefaction and green carbon material’ (ECBC Annual Report 2013). Other undertakings included financial assistance for trade shows; establishment of its ‘executive leadership role in establishing a vision for a four-season recreation complex in Ben Eoin’; support of the modernization of East Coast Metal Fabricators at Sydport Industrial Park; financial support to business totalling $5.6 million which in turn leveraged $7.6 million in other investments’ (ECBC Annual Report 2013).
In keeping with the new regionalism theme of multi-level governance, ECBC continued working with Island communities, provincial and municipal governments, and stakeholders in economic development and regional development agencies, to identify community needs. In 2012-13, its last full year of operation, ECBC partnered and cost shared ‘with 33 organizations on 37 projects’ and subsequent leveraging of around $5 million, reaching 270% of the leveraged investment goal which they had set (ECBC Annual Report 2013). The initiatives mirror sentiments expressed in ECBC reports that speak of approaching regional development through multi-scalar and multi-stakeholder dynamics:

In addition to its relationship with CBGF and ACOA, ECBC has a history of working in partnership with the federal Department of Human Resources and Social Development, Nova Scotia Economic Development, Regional Development Authorities, Nova Scotia Business Inc., Nova Scotia Department of Tourism, Nova Scotia Department of Energy, Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO), Destination Cape Breton, community business development corporations (CBDCs), various not-for-profit organizations, municipalities and the private sector on a number of economic development initiatives (ECBC Annual Report 2007).

All this suggests that ECBC had matured into an institution equipped to respond to economic change in a new regional setting.

ECBC Disbanded

In March 2014, Rob Moore, the Minister of State for ACOA, announced that ECBC would be ‘decommissioned and rolled into ACOA’ but the day to day operations would be ‘business as usual’ under the ACOA banner (Sutherland 2014). All staff members would remain based in Sydney with the previous ECBC budget maintained. According to then acting CEO Marlene Usher, the federal justification for the move was based on ACOA receiving accolades that claimed it was the best program delivery model for regional
development. Additionally, the minister wanted more accountability (through ministerial discretion, rather than through an arms-length set-up that ECBC enjoyed). Usher, while noting her respect for ACOA as an organization, ‘always felt that the crown corporation model was better because it’s localized and the decisions are all local’ (Sutherland Interview with Usher 2014).

Still ‘others question what it could mean for economic development’ (Sutherland in Interview with Usher 2015). Former ECBC VP Pat Bates was concerned that ECBC’s budget, though maintained at the time, could become a part of ACOA’s overall ‘macro budget’, with a net loss to Cape Breton-specific funding. Another concern was that changes in legislation could restrict the way that funds would be spent; such changes could also negatively affect funding possibilities for future projects. Usher was ‘disappointed’ with the decision and noted that there was going to be ‘a loss of local control’, a point echoed by a number of interviewees (Lowell Murray, Richard MacKinnon, Kenzie MacKinnon, Tom Gunn, and others). She added that while she was ECBC CEO, the organization had worked within ACOA’s stricter guidelines; ECBC’s programs were ‘completely flexible’ and enabled it to ‘do anything pretty much other than get involved with coal’, emphasizing that ECBC’s mandate involved diversifying the economy with a place-based approach. She provided ECBC programming examples that could no longer be offered under ACOA: incentive grants to call centres; equity deals such as those that were offered to ‘innovative and high risk’ operations such as Techlink and Halifax Biomedical; and the purchase and control of real estate and land holdings (e.g. the Ben Eoin Marina, its associated real estate, and properties previously owned by Devco) which would all be transferred to [the federal department of] Public Works (the 10-12 ECBC employees responsible for these holdings and
properties would be moved to Public Works, but remain based in Sydney). Usher assured that Celtic Colours International Festival and regional tourism organization Destination Cape Breton (see next chapter) would still receive support under ACOA programming and that the annual budget for ECBC was ‘safe’, although she could not ‘speak to the future’ (Usher Interview with Steve Sutherland 2014).

CBRM and Port Hawkesbury Mayors Cecil Clarke and Billy Joe MacLean were optimistic about the change. MacLean expressed that without ECBC, decisions would be less flexible and less community-specific; however, he criticized the institution for being ‘wavering’ and suggested that the public ‘never knew what the priorities were at any given time’. It was difficult to know what answers to expect regarding the Corporation’s direction. Overall ‘some sort of governance change had to happen’ (paraphrased by Sutherland 2015). Usher agreed that policies did change over time, but in response to changing economic circumstances, new information, and pertinent studies; policies are also region-specific to prevent conflicts.

Others saw the disbanding of ECBC as an opportunity for the region to escape from stereotypes and parochial politics. Strait-Highlands Chamber of Commerce head Adam Rodgers conceded that ECBC did ‘a lot of good things…wonderful things’ for facilitating development. But its demise actually makes the Island attractive to investors by ‘getting rid of the brand’ that depicts Cape Breton as a ‘downtrodden’ region requiring its very own ‘government mandated economic agency’ (Interview 2014). A new environment without ECBC would be ‘good for Cape Breton’. John Whalley added that ‘ECBC was political and was project-driven and it was controlling’; it made more sense for certain assets and economic development strategies to be under the control of the elected CBRM council
The disbanding eliminated competition that existed between ECBC and CBRM for control of economically viable land and port assets up for divestiture from the federal government (e.g. the Sydney Harbour bed) (Whalley interview 2014). It also eliminated much ‘competition for who was really speaking for the community and what entity was going to control the development of the community’.

Another respondent echoed Whalley’s comments, but identified a sub-regional bias with regard to ECBC’s operations, saying it was a ‘very politically motivated organization, very Sydney-oriented’ (Interviewee 2014).

Cape Breton’s ability to pursue place-based development with adequate resources appears to be in a precarious state within the broader top-down development apparatus of ACOA (multiple interviewees 2014). And while some may question ECBC’s performance and legacy in the areas of clientelist politics-based decision-making and accountability, it made valuable economic diversification contributions. In retrospect, it did much more good than harm and provided supports that helped the Island survive and transition away from defensive regionalism as highlighted here:

The five-year survival rate for ECBC-assisted existing firms is 95%. In 2011 this rate was 91%. The five year survival rate for ECBC-assisted new start-ups is 71%. According to an Industry Canada report (Key Small Business Statistics, July 2012), survival rates for SMEs (with less than 250 employees) in Canada decline over time. About 85% of businesses that enter the marketplace survive for one full year, 70% survive for two years, and 51% survive for five years (ECBC 2013 Annual Report).

In its later years ECBC showed signs of maturity in service communication, accessibility, and delivery. In 2006, 77.8 per cent of ECBC’s clients reported that they were either satisfied or very satisfied with service delivery levels; by 2012 that figure had risen to 93.5 per cent. While in 2006 83.3 per cent of clients reported that they were either satisfied or very satisfied
-- with how their application was managed by an ECBC representative -- reports of satisfaction rose in 2012 to 97.8 per cent (ECBC Annual Report 2012). With ECBC gone, there is a ‘local-delivery gap’ that raises questions, although for the time being ACOA can be accessed for region-building resources. Still, other government and non-government institutions that have been involved in the region-building project for Cape Breton in the era of globalization will now have to compensate for the lacuna left by ECBC’s demise.

CBDCs

At the time of writing there are 13 CBDCs operating in Nova Scotia, part of an umbrella network supporting the Atlantic group’s common needs. Three are located in Cape Breton. They continue to provide advisory, training, and financial services to entrepreneurs (CBDC 2015). The CBDCs’ programs and services include: Students in Business Program and Youth Internship Program (provincial initiatives that CBDC delivers); Management Training Support for Women; Business Management Skills Training; Self Employment Benefit Program; Social Enterprise Loan; First Time Entrepreneur Loan; General Business Loan; Youth Loan; and, for harnessing the knowledge economy, the CBDC Innovation Loan (CBDC 2015). Through their decades-long existence CBDCs have evolved from pursuing a top-down centralized approach, to a more decentralized one, and with the recent dissolution of ECBC, back towards a more centralized approach under the watchful eyes of ACOA (Interviewee 2015).

One community leader with expertise in CBDCs and regional development notes that aside from the formal Atlantic and provincial groups, ‘there’s kind of an informal [Cape Breton group]’ known among other members as ‘the Cape Breton Mafia.’ The informant
adds that the three CBDCs from Cape Breton ‘see things a little differently’ and even ‘see things a little differently too depending on the side of the Island’. Because of rural location, the other two Cape Breton CBDCs, InRich and Northside Victoria, may at times face different issues or encounter certain issues (e.g. workers from a sector leaving the province) before they would reach the more urban CBDC catchment area. The interviewee has observed that CBDC programs suit local situations in Cape Breton, and that the CBDCs have roundtables where strategies and experiences can be discussed. For instance, the Youth Internship Program is flexible and adaptable, providing recent young graduates -- some ‘with Masters degrees’ – the job experience needed for further employment ‘in non-profit organizations who really needed people’. It prioritizes ‘retention and development of young people...those who wanted to stay and work in their field’. This suits a region that is experiencing population decline and needs to retain its youth and the program successes can be discussed at the provincial roundtables (Interviewee 2014).

The CBDC self-employment benefit program (SEB) has also seen success: Studies were undertaken, providing ‘statistical analysis on those [cases] usually 5 to 10 years afterwards to see who was still in business. And [at least one CBDC] had really, really high rates. Around the 80% mark…which was in contrast to StatsCan who had looked at Atlantic Canada and looked at the results…5 years out. So [this CBDC’s performance was] probably six times greater than that’ (Interviewee 2014). In the new post-industrial setting the respondent has witnessed ‘spin-off’ activity from the remediation of the steel and coal sites and suggested that some CBDC clients -- who originally worked at Devco -- utilized CBDC help when starting their own businesses: ‘There are two of them that come to mind, two nurseries, and landscapers that have done most of the Devco remediation and they’ve had to
change what they did to fit the market’. [Interviewer: ‘adaptation?’] [Interviewee]

‘Exactly...adaptation could be transported if there was another mine closure somewhere else and they could use their skills to pick up contracts in other areas’ (Interview 2014). As these examples reveal, CBDCs have been local and flexible institutions that have helped Cape Breton adapt to the new post-industrial economy.

7.2. OTHER INSTITUTIONS

Rescaling and Reterritorializing: RDAs to RENs

The Savage Liberals indicated their intention to take a Community Economic Development approach before the 1993 election. When the new government realized the province’s fiscal position, only modest funds were allocated to CED; however, decentralized local regional development associations (RDAs) were created throughout the province (Haddow 2000; Mann interview 2014). They were funded by municipal, provincial, and federal (through ECBC) governments. RDAs became part of a network of partnerships between government, businesses, and local communities working together toward strategy development and economic development projects (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 66; Malcolm interview 2014). An example is the Strait-Highlands RDA, which had good relationships with development stakeholders as a facilitator of community development (Malcolm interview 2014). It facilitated multi-scalar governmental supports, partnerships, consultations, and synergy in establishing a community-based, non-profit transit service for the Strait. Although faced with funding issues (partly due to the 1990s provincial downloading of transit responsibilities to the municipalities, of which some seemed to be unaware during Strait Area Transit’s early years), the transit service is still operating, helping
eliminate ‘barriers to employment, education, medical appointments and social interactions’ that had previously existed throughout the region\textsuperscript{10} (Malcolm interview 2014; Strait Area Transit 2015). Despite successes, RDA effectiveness was placed in question by some, including federal authorities, and in May 2012 the Harper Conservative government announced that funding for Atlantic Canadian RDAs would be eliminated in May 2013 (Nova Scotia RDA Review Panel 2012; MacLean interview 2014).

During the Dexter NDP government’s 2009-2013 mandate in Nova Scotia, an RDA review was initiated by Economic and Rural Development and Tourism minister Percy Paris.\textsuperscript{11} The review panel prioritized understanding ‘how the current approach to regional economic development has worked and whether it could evolve’ (NS RDA Review Panel 2012, 2). The panel’s conclusions revealed both the weaknesses and the challenges faced by the RDAs: their configuration prioritized communities, municipalities, and constituencies rather than provincial region(s), and RDAs could not adequately address and bridge the poor alignment and coordination that exists between levels of government. A number of recommendations were presented, quoted below:

- Refine the mission of regional economic development organizations to guide and navigate regional economic development while providing support to businesses.
- Introduce a model of Regional Enterprise Networks (RENs) to reflect the organizations’ roles as connectors among economic development partners.
- Focus core activities for RENs to provide regional leadership on economic priorities, develop regional economic plans, and provide support to businesses.
- Introduce a shared governance model and enhanced governance practices.
- Refine performance standards to improve accountability and reporting.
- Align regions around communities of interest to support the development of priority and emerging sectors.
- Introduce a new funding model for regional economic development partners.
- Identify opportunities for the federal government to participate in regional economic development activities that align with its priorities.
- Establish six RENs to support regional economic development in rural Nova Scotia (2012, 1).
The disbanding of the RDAs, subsequent off-loading of funding sources, and provincially and municipally guided formation of Regional Enterprise Networks (RENs) can be seen to be in accord with New Regionalism Theory (NRT), initiating as it did further rescaling, reterritorializing (e.g. changing boundaries and actors working across established political boundaries), and regionalization processes. Visible in the REN implementation process is the involvement of multi-scalar actors (influenced by centralized government decisions) as well as a more endogenous, multi-actor/multi-scale, bottom-up development vision. Further off-loading of responsibility to municipalities seems to be occurring in the new configuration of these local development bodies as the province left it to municipalities to decide how they would re-institutionalize local development in the form of Regional Enterprise Networks.

In Cape Breton competing interests (and regions) postponed deciding how RENs would be regionalized. While many development actors in Cape Breton had reached the point where they were comfortable with an Island-wide REN, Port Hawkesbury leadership continued to identify with the Strait Area inclusive of neighbouring mainland municipalities, no doubt anticipating a stronger voice in decision making in a Strait-centred REN (Malcolm interview 2014; Cape Breton Post “Port Hawkesbury” 2015). With no Island-wide consensus, in January 2014 the Island’s four largest municipalities – CBRM, Victoria, Inverness, and Richmond -- signed a Declaration of Cooperation creating a REN to be cost shared between the municipalities and the provincial government (CBRM 2014). Other institutional tweaking ensued with the Cape Breton Small Business Development Centre renamed Business Cape Breton, to be headquartered in Sydney. Mayor Cecil Clarke added that ‘the Cape Breton Partnership will be responsible for “strategic initiatives,” as part of its Prosperity Framework Project’. Business Cape Breton would have an operating budget of
$874,000 per year with the province contributing half the funding, CBRM providing $227,000, and the three rural municipalities $70,000 each (Shannon 2014a). On April 8 2015, the ‘Eastern Strait Regional Enterprise Network’ (ESREN) was created that includes ‘the towns of Antigonish and Port Hawkesbury, and the municipalities of Antigonish, Guysborough and St. Mary's.’ Composed of a board appointed by provincial and municipal representatives, ESREN’s goal is to adopt a private sector-led ‘regional approach to economic development’ (101.5 The Hawk 2015a). With the Strait area of Cape Breton opting to join the ESREN configuration due to divergent historical and geographical interests and identities, complete Island-wide regionalization of economic development remains elusive.

The Cape Breton Partnership and the Prosperity Framework

The Cape Breton Partnership (the Partnership) was created in 2004 as a member-based organization of over 100 members developed to foster collaboration among stakeholders in stimulating Island economic development. The stated strategic goals of the partnership include:

- ‘Create and promote a unique brand;
- Develop a united approach to addressing economic issues and growth opportunities;
- Encourage the retention and expansion of existing companies by identifying barriers and finding ways to remove them; and
- Create a dynamic organization that will foster private and public partnerships’ (CB Partnership, 2012).

To further enhance and promote collaboration and cooperation between organizations,
the Partnership has signed MOUs with the Island’s three Chambers of Commerce: the Strait Area Chamber of Commerce, the Sydney and Area Chamber of Commerce, and the Northeast Highlands Chamber of Commerce (CB Partnership 2015). According to its website, its aim is to instil pride and confidence and foster prosperity ‘in Cape Breton and the Strait’ (CB Partnership, 2013). The creation of the Partnership further indicates a groundswell movement towards regionalization on the Island. Former rivals in promoting economic development for their own areas (Various interviewees 2014) have realized that a broader regional effort is needed to usher further Cape Breton development. Partnership CEO Keith MacDonald echoed these sentiments, also noting that the organization has tried to forge a ‘multiple economy’ approach that capitalizes on intra-regional strengths when it comes to economic strategizing. The Partnership’s staff are active in the economic development community on the Island, arranging, networking, and presenting at investor summits, meetings, luncheons, awards dinners, trade shows, and so on. The Partnership also writes, solicits, and posts reports on its website that encourage capacity and skills development and provide information for analyzing the Island’s economy (Cape Breton Partnership; Tom Gunn interview).

Most of the main actors (aside from ACOA and ECBC) that the Partnership has brought together for development strategizing include: the provincial department of Economic and Rural Development and Tourism (in various incarnations; four-five employees); Nova Scotia Business Inc. and InnovaCorp (one employee each, see below); National Research Council (one representative); CBU and its Shannon School of Business; and the Chambers of Commerce (with members on the Partnership Board) (Keith MacDonald interview 2014).
The Prosperity Framework (the Framework) is an offshoot/branch of the regionalizing work of the Cape Breton Partnership; in other words, an organization/framework strategy combination. The Framework collaborates with businesses and stakeholders from the private and public sectors ‘towards developing a shared vision of prosperity for Cape Breton and Mulgrave’. It uses an evidence-based approach of compiling commissioned economic development studies to inform a strategy for the region in the globalized era (Prosperity Framework 2015). It focuses on collaboration and strategizing among stakeholders that recognizes the importance of an intra-regional sectoral focus, as different regions have different strengths and needs. The Framework emphasizes that environmental sustainability is both practical and profitable (Prosperity Framework 2015; Prosperity Framework 2015).

The target sectors for the Cape Breton Partnership include tourism, arts, and culture; the ocean industries; and ‘resource extraction, production and processing businesses’ (Prosperity Framework 2015). It suggests that Island development depends on existing and future businesses focused on industrial remediation, green energy and technology, information and communications technology, international trans-shipping (ports), and biotechnology (Prosperity Framework 2015). McNeil notes that the organization’s approach was ‘singled out’ by the Ivany Commission as an example of how economic advancement can be achieved by key sectors and actors at all levels in planning and implementing transformative change (McNeil interview 2014, citing Ivany report 67).12 The valuable work done by the Prosperity Framework and Partnership on the Island is undeniable. However, one must caution that, although involved with Mi’kmaw development players for instance (Keith MacDonald interview 2014), parties represented in the Partnership and Framework may not
be representative of all class segments and sectoral interests. The corporate focus and stated goals lean toward neo-liberal ideas (e.g. private-public partnerships and removing barriers). In that sense, similar to criticism leveled at the Greater Halifax Partnership, Island citizens may feel coerced to ‘support a corporate competitiveness agenda’ over other aspects of Island development if bodies dominated by corporate memberships are the prevailing voices of development (Finbow 2009).

Private Sector Leadership

Cape Breton’s three Chambers of Commerce are active members in the Cape Breton Partnership and promote united approaches to encouraging economic activity in their communities. These organizations can strategize economic development by tapping into a network of 450 Chambers and Boards of Trade across Canada. While multi-scalar business-friendly policy is a concern of the Island Chambers, their ground-level work to foster economic activity has been notable. The Strait Chamber’s involvement in trying to establish a Liquid Natural Gas enterprise in the Strait area is one example (Rodgers interview 2014). Chambers and their impressive membership recruitment efforts (Rodgers interview 2014, regarding the Strait Chamber) indicate social capital building and institutional thickening, which complement entrepreneurship efforts that underlie development strands such as CED.

Bottom-Up Agency: CED and Entrepreneurship

The popularity of the CED concept/process grew in conjunction with the socio-economic hardship resulting from the collapse of the Atlantic groundfishery in the early
1990s. The federal government responded to the devastation with the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) that was designed to help fishers and plant workers deal with job losses through ‘upgrading of academic skills and training for new occupations and were conducted most often in the home communities of the fishermen’ (Bickerton and MacNeil 2007, 65). A 1997 federal audit questioned the effectiveness of TAGS. Though $2 billion in funds were expended, ‘programs to retrain fishermen and plant workers for new jobs failed, and were cut back, then scrapped in August 1996’. Most of the money (76 per cent) thereafter went towards passive income support (Lotz and MacIntyre 2003, 71).

During this crisis period, in the face of the groundfishery collapse, a Cape Breton ‘bottom-up’ CED experience from the community of Isle Madame is illustrative of success in the globalizing context (Savoie 2000; Lotz and MacIntyre 2003; Diochon 2003). With the shutdown of the Richmond Fisheries processing plant and the ‘loss of 500 jobs in a community of 4300’ Isle Madame decided it had to put control of its future ‘into its own hands’ (Savoie 2000, 86). It received support from Human Resources Development. It provided a grant to support the formation of an Industrial Adjustment Service Committee, which hired GTA Consultants ‘to review the emerging crisis in the fishery and to propose solutions’ and provide a report (Savoie 2000, 88). The community embraced the GTA report which called for a new local economy. The CED approach included: community mobilization and establishment of a leadership structure; definition of options, needs, and opportunities; preparation of plans to address social and economic needs; and plan implementation involving leveraging government programs (Savoie 2000, 90).

A newly formed task force, the non-profit community owned company Development Isle Madame (DIMA), was formed (Savoie 2000, 90; Lotz and MacIntyre 2003). Working
with a network of local community, business, and government representatives and organizations, DIMA et al. were able to recharge the economy in Isle Madame: a call centre was established; a number of aquaculture projects were launched; tourism was aggressively promoted; ‘aspiring entrepreneurs’ were supported in developing new businesses; and a fisherman’s cooperative was formed from an initiative to secure a shrimp license for the community from among a pool of individual applications (Savoie 2000, 94).

Isle Madame’s local economy has evolved over time as some businesses thrived and others dissolved. In this connection, Lotz and MacIntyre (2003, 71) mention failed aquaculture venture Scotia Rainbow. However, Isle Madame’s CED experience can be viewed as a ‘successful’ example of a culturally unique community exemplifying a bottom-up approach to development in the globalized era (Hamilton interview 2015). DIMA has a well branded website (growislemadame.com); has spearheaded a number of initiatives and strategies regarding housing and population retention; has enhanced eco-tourism prospects through constructing an 8.8 km eco-trail; has regularly hosted the festival ‘Codstock’; and is home to a number of ‘niche’ and cutting edge businesses including a Tank Manufacturing outfit, a custom furnishings and turnings operation, a clean energy outfitting and consulting company, and a fish harvesting, marketing, and processing enterprise (Grow Isle Madame 2015; Hamilton interview 2015; Premium Seafoods 2015). Indeed CED is an important complementary element utilized by the emerging regional development regime of Cape Breton.

7.3 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POST-INDUSTRIAL RESCALING

Since Haddow’s overview of provincial economic development in Nova Scotia
(2000), four economic development entities stand out with regard to advancing the provincial economy in the globalized era: the above described RDA-REN agencies; Innovacorp (a crown corporation created by the Savage Liberal government in 1995); Nova Scotia Business Inc. (established by the Hamm PC government in 2003); and the latest version of the ‘one stop shop’, the Department of Business created under the McNeil Liberal government in 2015. The latter is so recent that an adequate analysis cannot be warranted here.15

Innovacorp was a corporation formed ‘to promote, stimulate, and encourage the successful development and commercialization of technology’ (Nova Scotia Legislature, Innovation Corporation Act 1994-1995). It has supported a number of high tech enterprises in the province. It operates a program called ‘Spark Cape Breton’ which awards funding (through a competition) to innovative start-up ventures, mainly in the life sciences, information technology, oceans technology, and clean technology sectors (Innovacorp 2015a). Innovacorp recognizes that globalization could enable entrepreneurs to think outside of the box in terms of creating and expanding business opportunities. Two examples based out of Cape Breton show how government – through its instrument Innovacorp -- helped entrepreneurs in Cape Breton to harness the new economy. They are Health Outcomes Worldwide (HOW, based in New Waterford) and Marcato International (Sydney). HOW uses award winning software, offered as a mobile app, to analyse ‘complicated data to empower nurses and physicians with more knowledge to help them improve patient care and dramatically reduce costs’ (Innovacorp 2015b; Innovacorp 2015c). Marcato Digital Solutions Ltd. developed ‘a fully integrated scalable web-based management service for the global music industry’. Its internet service facilitates promotion, management, scheduling, and remuneration and revenue stream tracking, as well as general accounting for music industry
managers, artists, and supporting organizations (Innovacorp 2015b). Marcato’s services have been utilized on the Island by the Celtic Colours International Festival and KitchenFest (see next chapter).

Nova Scotia Business Incorporated (NSBI) is a crown agency representative of the various provincial economic development iterations and approaches. Inspired by Stanfield’s Industrial Estates Ltd. (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015), it was conceptualized in the Province’s Growth Strategy document titled *Opportunities for Prosperity* in 2000 as ‘a private-sector led, business development agency’ and began operating in November of 2001. Its mission is ‘to encourage economic growth throughout the province by helping existing businesses expand and attracting new investment to Nova Scotia’ (NSBI Annual Report 2003). One Cape Breton enterprise that benefited from the services of NSBI is Inverness County’s Glenora Distillers. Co-owned by Lauchie MacLean, Glenora Distillery has capitalized on the natural and cultural attributes of the Island by distilling unique high-end brands of Scotch Whiskey and other liquors and housing and entertaining tourists and locals in its dining and lodging facilities (Glenora Distillery 2015). By the turn of the century, Glen Breton Rare had gained successful global market entry. And upon MacLean’s request for help, a representative developed a market export strategy with the enterprise to access New England’s ‘Tri-state’ area. MacLean commented positively, noting NSBI helped ‘put together the relevant market information required to obtain advertising financing’ for accessing the New York market (NSBI Annual Report 2015). Despite such success stories, CBRM council noted in 2011 that Halifax received 77 per cent of NSBI economic development funds ‘over the past four years’. CBRM mayor John Morgan contended that this
proved ‘that the regions are suffering to bolster development in the provincial capital’ (Cape Breton Post 2011a).

The most discussed development story in Cape Breton’s tourism sector is the Cabot Links golf course, located in Inverness. Inverness was ‘a boom town of 3,000 in the late 1800s [which] suffered steep decline after the collapse of coal mining’ (DeMont “Rural Revolution” 2014). The story of Cabot Links exemplifies region-building through informal networking between business and political elites, local institutionalization and strategizing, and collaborative private-public agency. In the early 1990s the locally formed Inverness Development Association (IDA) saw opportunity for reconstructing the local economy by redeveloping beachside lands over the abandoned coal mines into a golf course. For many years (beginning around 1993) the IDA had unsuccessfully lobbied government and investors with the idea. Years later at a dinner also attended by entrepreneur Ben Cowan-Dewar, Inverness MLA and Tourism and Culture minister Rodney MacDonald promoted the attractiveness of the IDA development proposal. Cowan-Dewar’s interest was piqued and shortly after, e-mail exchanges began between the IDA’s Tom Ryan, ECBC and provincial representatives, Cowan-Dewar’s development team, and other individuals, leading to a plan (Thompson 2014; DeMont 2014). With the beach lands provided by the IDA, and assistance from two separate ECBC loans of $2.5 million and $250,000, a links-style golf course, replete with an adjacent pub and accommodations, was constructed and has been operating since 2012. An even more spectacular adjacent course, Cabot Cliffs (also supported by an ECBC loan of $2.75 million), is expected to be fully operating in 2016. Cabot Links has been ranked in the world’s top 50 courses since 2013, employs over 200 (with more to be employed at Cabot Cliffs), been the main factor in increased land values in the area, and has
generated a new enthusiasm and optimism throughout the region (DeMont 2014; Lumpkin 2015; Cape Breton Post 2014). Regardless of some opposition to the project (mainly over environmental and local regulatory concerns), Cabot Links employees and locals suggest the development is creating opportunities for regional reconstruction, community reinvention, and retention of youth (DeMont 2014; Pottie 2015b).

CBRM: Equalization, Rescaling, and Empowerment

The CBRM amalgamation resulted in a regionalized ‘one voice’ governance structure that arguably is more conducive to economic, social, and cultural development. Entering the new century, CBRM was trying to negotiate regional integration into the wider political economy (provincial, national and global) by pursuing economic and social development through a number of avenues: legal means, utilization of the private sector financing divestitures (Whalley interview), asset acquisitions, multi-level governmental relations and potential agreements, pursued both collaboratively and combatively.

A major juncture affecting the development path of the municipality occurred with the election of John Morgan as CBRM mayor on October 21, 2000. Soon after a report was commissioned (completed by Memorial University’s Wade Locke and Stephen Tomblin in 2003) that called for governance changes that would enable CBRM’s economic sustainability. It found that the municipality was not receiving its proportionate share of provincial funding reflective of CBRM tax revenues paid to the province (Shannon 2012; Locke and Tomblin 2003). On October 6, 2003, Morgan brought a significant resolution to council. The approved resolution allowed council to seek legal advice from a constitutional lawyer on whether the Province was fulfilling its constitutional obligation in connection with
section 36 of the Constitution (equalization provisions). The implication was that the province was failing to fairly distribute federally-provided equalization funds to CBRM and its residents (Shannon 2012). Constitutional law expert Neil Finkelstein was hired to analyse the case against the Province.

Notably, the 2003 governance report’s findings and Morgan’s inclinations to push for change through legal means were reinforced by a 2005 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities commissioned report. “A Question of Balance – An Assessment of the State of Local Government in Nova Scotia” was prepared by academics Paul Hobson, David Cameron, and Wade Locke. That paper also identified funding gaps experienced by Nova Scotia municipalities and analysed the province’s method of financing municipalities. It stipulated that ‘it is a clear responsibility of the Province (and indirectly the federal government) to ensure that municipalities have the financial ability to provide essential municipal services of reasonable quality. This responsibility includes the financing of an appropriately designed municipal equalization program’ (2005 iii). However, in Nova Scotia’s case the equalization program’s functioning was compromised because of chronic underfunding (2005, iii).

CBRM council embarked on a strategy of resisting municipal integration on the province’s terms and set out to negotiate a more autonomous status for itself, this time through legal means. On May 26, 2006 CBRM, although under fire from some council members for a lack of debate or vote on the issue, filed its case against the Province with the provincial Supreme Court (Shannon 2012; see Bickerton 2012). In June 2007, Morgan effectively ‘scale-jumped’ to the federal level with his equalization case, appearing before the Senate Finance Committee, which was ‘studying equalization, the fiscal balance between Ottawa and the provinces and territories, and also municipal funding issues’ (Cape Breton
Then, on April 23, 2008, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia dismissed CBRM’s lawsuit, reasoning that while the case had standing, it did not have justiciability.

Although he faced backlash from prominent members of the CBRM business community (some of whom he accused of politically interfering because of ties to the Conservatives), Morgan sought to appeal the case all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ultimately refused to give CBRM leave to appeal (Shannon 2008; 2009a; 2012; Pottie 2009). Throughout the process – now six years after then deputy premier Frank Corbett stated (in the aftermath of the court decision) that the province was willing to have discussions with the municipality ‘on an issue-by-issue basis’ -- CBRM and other municipalities are still feeling squeezed by the province’s method of municipal equalization (Shannon 2009b; Guy 2015). ‘While the annual equalization amount from the federal government to the province has increased, the equalization transfer to the CBRM has declined – by $317,000 last year’ (Guy 2015).

Another CBRM attempt at forcing a change in its status occurred in 2009. The municipality was four years into a five-year ‘federal gas transfer agreement’ that provided $7 million to the municipalities annually, on the condition that they submit to the federal government a yearly Integrated Community Sustainability Plan (Pottie 2009b; Rogers 2015). CBRM Economic Development Manager John Whalley was commissioned to provide the 2009 report; it suggested that to be sustainable, the region must only be served by one government and that arms-length bodies such as the Cape Breton District Health Authority and CBU Board of Governors should be eliminated and brought under regional council’s control (Pottie 2009b). The report was met with skepticism and received criticism that it lacked a road map for addressing ‘urgent social, economic, infrastructure and ecological
needs’ of the region (Pottie 2009b quoting Tom Urbaniak). Although Morgan suggested the report was a ‘preliminary step’ towards greater self-governance, he and only one other member of council supported the plan (2009b).

With the Whalley plan rejected, consultancy firm Stantec was commissioned to provide another one. It organized a public consultation symposium – *Ideas Powered by Passion* – intended to open avenues to explore other options and opportunities for CBRM. The symposium included a visioning session for revitalizing and rebuilding CBRM within the governance status quo and discussed climate change, wind energy, alternative energy product manufacturing, and population and economic trends (Rogers 2015).

In addition to his combative approach to municipal-provincial relations, Morgan has been characterized as a leader who disdained old-style politics, a ‘big picture’ politician with no traditional party ties needing accommodation (Whalley interview 2014; Urbaniak quoted in Shannon 2012). He did not engage to any notable degree in ‘grass roots community development projects’, favouring a ‘big policy issues’ focus (Urbaniak quoted in Shannon 2012). While his big picture court cases were being pursued, Morgan still emphasized essential services, funding capital projects like water and sewer treatment plants (see Ayers 2008) and equipping the region for future development. A Utility and Review Board (URB) hearing reviewing CBRM council size highlights Morgan’s approach. There he represented a citizens lobbying group that called for a reduction of council to 8 members, rather than the municipality’s proposal of 16 members plus the mayor. In July 2011, in a compromise decision, the URB reduced the number of council districts to 12. Morgan insisted this created a governance structure more conducive to addressing ‘regional issues’ (Shannon 2012).

Morgan was also active in pursuing port development. Under his watch CBRM
contributed $2 million to a tri-level agreement that saw a $37 million Sydney Harbour dredging project begin. It was geared toward deepening the harbour to make it more marketable as the location for a container terminal (Shannon 2012). While Morgan supported the dredging, the project’s realization still reflected the traditional approach to Island development (carried over from the previous era) whereby old-style politics and mega projects figured prominently. The federally funded project was considered by many observers to be an instance of political pork-barreling, ‘an effort to elect Conservative candidate Cecil Clarke’ in the 2011 federal election (Donham 2011). Upon his subsequent defeat, Clarke was hired by Cape Breton County Economic Development Agency as a $135,000 per year consultant, with ECBC ponying up the funds for the salary (Donham 2011). Morgan cried foul, arguing that economic development efforts in CBRM (which already had its own economic development manager) would ‘now be tainted by patronage’ (Cape Breton Post 2011b). Such conflicts aside, Morgan oversaw other strategic development efforts, including the purchase of a Sydport Industrial Park ‘greenfield site’ for $6 million ‘to assert its control over the harbour asset as the future location of a container terminal’ (Cape Breton Post 2011b). Morgan’s controversial tenure as CBRM mayor ended in 2012 when he did not re-offer for the position.

Elected as Morgan’s replacement, Cecil Clarke (the former Conservative candidate and ECBC consultant) claimed he would take ‘a different approach to the leadership of the Cape Breton Regional Municipality’ (CBRM 2012). His council-approved document “Shaping our Future in the Cape Breton Municipality: A Reorganization Plan for Positive Change” outlined a number of initiatives and goals for the future. They included, among some social development goals: establishment of a CBRM Charter Act (see below); a
commitment to more transparency and consultation with community stakeholders on forming policy; a strong focus on developing the Port of Sydney and attracting container shipping business; capitalizing on the Muskrat Falls hydro-electric megaproject and the federal shipbuilding strategy (by ensuring CBRM was treated fairly in the contracting process); supporting local economic development bodies; utilizing a “worst first” standard to create a five-year [public] works plan; and dealing with the municipality’s troubled financial status by establishing an Organizational Operating Review Task Force, acting on its recommendations, and inserting a negotiated Communities Fund into the CBRM Charter Act (see below).

Action had already begun on many of these initiatives by the end of Clarke’s first year in office, including ‘CBRM-wide budget consultation sessions’; the hosting of a Port Summit in February 2012; the unveiling of a 5-year, $300 million capital plan; and unanimous approval of Clarke’s first budget. Regarding the Mayor’s governance approach and rescaling strategy for autonomous development, the CBRM legal department began ‘reviewing the lessons learned from the HRM Charter’ and ‘HRM by Design’ as a preliminary move toward attaining a similar CBRM Charter (CBRM 2012, 3-4).

During his election campaign, and throughout his first mandate, Clarke insisted that the province’s second largest municipality should have ‘a stand-alone deal with the province’ in the form of a provincial statute known as the CBRM Charter Act (CBRM 2012; MacIntyre 2012). He has envisioned that a Cape Breton Regional Municipality Charter Act would help to carve out a new path for the economically challenged municipality. The Act would emulate the direction taken by other urban municipalities and would put it on the same governance footing as Halifax. Adopting a discourse emphasizing rescaling and political devolution, Clarke noted that through the Charter, CBRM would seek to exit legislative
requirements applied to regular municipalities in the province. This would allow CBRM more capacity to decide and act on problems and opportunities, and in the process to function more efficiently and effectively (MacIntyre 2012). His plan to incorporate a Communities Fund into the Act would ‘provide the CBRM with the necessary financial resources and tools to address our fiscal demands’ (CBRM 2012). While Clarke is optimistic about the opportunities a charter could bring, CBRM’s ex-economic development officer John Whalley remains skeptical, pondering whether the most pressing of issues could actually be tackled:

Would that allow you to implement a different approach to taxation? So the current property taxation…the residential assessment side has been capped…which builds a lot of inequity into the system. It’s capped at the consumer price index, which means that we’re also transferring a lot of burden over the years to the commercial side of things. So our equalization fund has been capped for a decade. The residential side is capped now. The amount of money that we have to transfer to the province for education, corrections, and housing is growing. So we’re really in a bind (Interview 2015).

CBU political scientist Jim Guy, however, sees Clarke’s proposed charter as a ‘great idea’. A contractual document of its kind could, if planned properly allow for various financial guarantees, enable CBRM to strategize economic development with the insurance of having long-term, predictable transfers (Guy 2015).

In 2014 CBRM prioritized ‘promoting the Port of Sydney’ with Clarke noting that Harbourside Commercial Park and Sydport were under consideration for new investments (CBRM 2014b). Three initiatives regarding the harbour had begun: ‘The transfer of Sydney harbour lots to the CBRM, the transfer of former Enterprise Cape Breton Corp. properties to the CBRM, and the $20 million expansion of the cruise terminal to allow the docking of two vessels at one time’ (CBRM 2014b). However, the actions were stalled when Membertou First Nation initiated a land claim to the harbour bed and some surrounding properties in the
fall of 2014 (Shannon 2015). By February of 2015, federal-municipal-aboriginal consultations were advancing with news that aboriginal representation on a new Port of Sydney Corporation board was being entertained (Shannon 2015). 17

At the time of writing, CBRM was continuing its work at growing the port. One significant event had occurred. A key informant for this dissertation, John Whalley, suddenly resigned in May 2015, just hours after being informed that he would no longer have any responsibility in developing the port, the heart of the CBRM’s economic development strategy (Pottie 2015a). It appears that he was reassigned to a new file after having a disagreement with staff, having raised concerns regarding a conflict of interest and Municipal Government Act contravention (Pottie 2015a; Ayers 2015a). Whalley voiced doubt about the newly-created Port Corporation handling port development on its own with a small staff, a $1.5 million budget, and now potentially without a CBRM staff-backed Economic Development Manager on the file (Ayers 2015a).

Only days after Whalley’s resignation, Mayor Clarke ‘announced a proposed land purchase at Sydport Industrial Park intended to attract a tugboat operator from Hamilton, Ontario, and the possibility of an exclusive contract with private consultants to market the municipality’s greenfield site as a container terminal’ (Ayers 2015a). Clarke also discussed another proposed deal that would involve getting council to approve an exclusive marketing contract for a private consortium, Harbour Port Development Partners, which would ‘market the greenfield property internationally to container terminal operators’ at no cost to the municipality, with rewards for accumulated business negotiated later (Ayers 2015a). With details of the deals unclear, some council members were requesting a meeting with Whalley to gain a better grasp of the new developments (Ayers 2015a).
CBRM has also been pursuing other avenues of development, utilizing multi-level partnering and private investment. It announced a major proposed downtown revitalization project with anticipated partnering from the provincial government and ‘Federal government participation through the P3 Canada Fund component of Building Canada’. The project would involve a new central public library, an NSCC downtown campus, and a mixed use commercial and residential provincial building which could house municipal and provincial offices. Clarke noted that the large scale of the project complements CBRM’s economic development and waterfront vision strategies (CBRM 2015).18

These initiatives, and a promising attitude toward culture displayed under Clarke’s leadership (Foulds interview 2014, see next chapter) indicate that a multi-actor and multi-sector approach to development is being pursued by CBRM, albeit with primary focus placed on port promotion and infrastructure asset acquisition.

Rural Municipalities and Regional Development

Cape Breton’s rural municipal leaders and organizations are also addressing local community development challenges. In Victoria County, the municipality commissioned Dalhousie University College of Continuing Education to undertake an updated strategic plan for the County. Released in 2009, the plan recommended that the Council hire an economic development officer (Novak et al. 2009). By 2015 this recommendation had not been implemented but Victoria County Municipal Council minutes (April 13, 2015) suggested that council would ‘begin the process of working out the details for hiring an Economic Development Officer for Victoria County’ and that the position be filled through the new REN, Business Cape Breton (Victoria County Council 2015).
Following the dismantling of RDAs, Inverness County hired a community development facilitator while Richmond County has a director and a coordinator for economic development and tourism (Malcolm interview 2014; Richmond County 2015). With the ‘scaling down’ of economic development having occurred only recently, municipalities have yet to adjust, as noted by Keith MacDonald when questioned about the Partnership’s involvement with municipalities (and municipalities’ work in economic development):

Author: Are the municipalities stepping up to the plate with you?

KMD: More so. The municipalities used to put money into the RDAs, but they’re no more. Some of the municipalities have ‘quote unquote’ economic development officers. We try to work with them as closely as possible but they’re mostly directed by their councils. And their councils usually don’t have a business focus. We just did … an investment readiness project with each municipality where they went through a number of exercises so they could realize how ready or not … their municipalities are … and we’re working on a number of next steps that were identified in the report to … get them moving along.

There are indications of increased municipal involvement and multi-level partnerships in economic development initiatives. Richmond County undertook private and public stakeholder consultations and kicked off a major $6.7 million tourism strategy of waterways branding and infrastructure construction in April 2014. The municipality contributed $2,233,769, which was matched by the federal government (Ayers 2015b). Michel Samson, MLA for Richmond and currently provincial tourism minister, also added that the Province would be contributing $100,000 to the strategy. He noted that the once ‘very territorial’ municipal governments of Cape Breton were working in a new cooperative era, a sentiment echoed by CBRM mayor Clarke when he noted that the municipalities ‘made a conscious decision to work together for Cape Breton Island’… ‘We’re too small of an area not to work
The Municipality of the County of Inverness also has been involved with facilitating and supporting social and economic development. In 2014 and 2015 it hosted ‘a county-wide forum’ called Engage Inverness County. Originally sponsored in part by ECBC, the Cape Breton Prosperity Framework, and the NS Department of Economic and Rural Development, Engage Inverness County assembles businesses, organizations, individuals, and service providers to learn about, discuss, and address collective prosperity and health matters (Municipality of Inverness 2014; 2015a). The 2014 forum revealed that ‘residents from across all sectors and districts…were interested in working together and becoming more community and regionally connected’ (Municipality of Inverness quoting Warden Duart MacAulay 2015a). The 2015 forum theme was ‘Community Matters’ and featured an opening panel titled ‘Practice of Inclusive Communities’ that emphasized committing to cooperation between the Municipality and Wacobah First Nation, which is situated within County boundaries (Municipality of Inverness 2015a). The annual forum is designed to challenge beliefs and attitudes, inspire new approaches and ideas, and foster collaboration (Municipality of Inverness 2015a).

Around the same time, the municipality released a briefing regarding a planned Inverness County Repopulation and Prosperity Strategic Framework. It will work toward ‘increased diversification and investment, a more globally competitive, responsive business climate and greater emphasis on tourism – our main gateway for business renewal, investment and repopulation’ (Municipality of Inverness 2015b). The Framework presents four strategies: ‘1) Destination Inverness County Tourism Strategy, 2) Expansion of the Margaree Airport (Cape Breton Island Airport Strategy), 3) Business Investment &
Readiness Strategy and 4) Community Engagement Strategy’ (2015b). The first strategy’s main focus is to work with other levels of government to develop and promote product that complements the new County tourism and economic development brand, “Canada’s Musical Coast”, a nod to the county’s internationally renowned Celtic/Gaelic music tradition (see next chapter). The second strategy, inspired by the Inverness Cabot Links/Cabot Cliffs developer Ben Cowan Dewar, is geared toward implementing a ‘tourism gateway’ concept whereby an upgraded and expanded Margaree airstrip can bring ‘high end’ and ‘short stay’ tourists nearer to prime attractions and destinations in the County and on the Island (2015b; Malcolm interview 2014). The third strategy involves using various avenues to attract investment that could bring in creative entrepreneurs and innovative engineering and new technology companies similar to Mabou’s Halifax Biomedical and Inverness’s Sky Squirrel Technologies. The fourth highlights initiatives the Municipality had already been working on: business readiness and tourism strategies; a local food initiative (MacLennan 2015); streetscape and façade programs; renewable energy option research; community-based transit; community engagement forums; cell phone coverage lobbying; and water and sewer improvements (Municipality of Inverness 2015b).

Conclusions

The reality of a new post-industrial economy in the 1990s prompted attempts by Cape Breton’s development actors to steer the Island away from a defensive regionalism focussed on maintaining the Island’s industrial base to one featuring postindustrial diversification and place-based autonomous development. ECBC was the most visible and financially potent actor in this process. In its infancy it leaned toward supporting traditional sectors, but with
new directives-from-above and a steady maturation cognizant of development trends and patterns in the new regionalism setting, ECBC began to forge a different path forward. It invested in IT, tourism and culture, infrastructure, energy and clean technology, land holdings and real estate, support for CED, and so on. It pursued development through multi-scalar relationships in tandem with public, private, and civil society stakeholders.

However, the Harper Conservative government proved wary of an asymmetrical federalism approach to addressing economic development in disparate regions. As an executive veto player strongly influenced by neo-liberal ideas of imposed austerity as the appropriate approach to overcoming economic and financial problems, the federal government triggered a change in regional development institutions by dismantling ECBC and pulling funding for the RDAs. The demise of the latter and the rescaling and reterritorializing that accompanied creation of the RENs has yielded a new and arguably more regionalized development regime. Region-builders will now attempt to negotiate Cape Breton’s political-economic integration in the new globalized era without the presence – for the first time in almost 50 years – of a relatively autonomous Cape Breton development agency. They will rely instead on ACOA directly, as well as an activist and ambitious CBRM, more collaborative rural municipalities, the Partnership and Prosperity Framework, NSBI, Innovacorp, the Department of Business, RENs, Chambers of Commerce and last but certainly not least, myriad CED actors and community organizations. The void left by the demise of Devco-ECBC is cause for concern as these different organizations and actors (most especially CBRM) attempt to take up the slack, albeit without flexible financial resources and assets comparable to the previous development regime. As a regionalized entity, CBRM has been trying to harness globalization through Sydney port development and
the associated export-related opportunities it could bring. Downtown development and infrastructure are also important. However, with reference to the theoretical framework of this dissertation, CBRM’s strategy and activity is a prime example of a peripheral region’s resort to rescaling and reterritorializing as it undergoes reconstruction and attempts to pursue more autonomous development in the new postindustrial, globalized era. Mayor Clarke’s words provide a fitting wrap-up to the development situation within which CBRM finds itself:

There is no provincial mandate legislatively or policy-wise for municipalities but it’s now not only a matter of choice but necessity to do economic development. …the port and port development has been our No.1 working effort so that in improving outcomes for the port, we’ll create new economic streams, in terms of taxation and investments, so that our stability within the operating capacity of the municipality will be improved (Interview with Cape Breton Post, January 10, 2015b).

Partnering among and between multiple sectors and informal institution-building and networking becomes all the more crucial in pursuing development. With community/economic development officers and the new REN structure, municipalities are strategizing development and focusing on endogenous strengths and assets, such as music and culture in Inverness and tourism in Richmond. The governance dynamics associated with globalization and NRT (e.g. scaling down service responsibilities) are not always willingly embraced or easily addressed by development actors in peripheral regions like Cape Breton; rather, it seems they must adapt to survive, and innovate to prosper. Indeed, although Cape Breton may be moving toward a more endogenous development model and demanding more autonomy in some regards, this is restrained by the centralized control that remains at the core of the Westminster system of government and by regional dependence on intergovernmental transfers and the federal government’s greater fiscal resources and

252
flexibility. Nevertheless, some bright spots that signal optimism for the future can be identified. Two of these -- Gaelic cultural revitalization and the rise of vibrant Mi’kmaw leadership in economic development circles – will be discussed next.

________________________

NOTES


2 Bradford notes a policy target shift from the first to second policy stage, ‘from chasing smoke stacks to building research infrastructure and filling market gaps’; but ‘both approaches relied on the same top-down organizational structures, creating a plethora of new programs administered by discrete branches of individual line departments with little integration of instruments or coordination across programs’ (2010, 5). Recognition of their institutional and structural limits led to the gradual emergence of a third approach (described in the main text) that ‘evolved over the 1990s and 2000s’ (2010, 5).

3 In 1990 $300,000 went to a seafood company; the performing arts industry received $107,000; $200,000 went to supported promoting and marketing a Cape Breton Bed and Breakfast program; $258,000 was committed to 97 crafts projects; and to more of an extent, ‘small business ventures’ and industrial projects received funding (Brown 2007, 156; ECBC 1990; 1990-91).

4 Because of the breadth of examples that illustrate culture utilization for development, some (e.g. Cape Breton Centre for Craft and Design) were not included.

5 Examples include: assistance to Sydney Ports Corporation to improve visitor and tourism infrastructure for the Joan Harriss Cruise Pavilion; assistance to Cheticamp River Atlantic Salmon Association to develop a plan for restoration and habitat management of the salmon of the Cheticamp watershed; funding assistance ($305,745) to the Inverness Development Association for Inverness Beach infrastructure, with an additional $526,000 leveraged
($415,000 of which came from the private sector); cost-shared contribution of $168,678 for capital improvements to community centres totalling around $403,000; ‘financial support for destination marketing and product development initiatives’ for Destination Cape Breton Cape Breton; strategic investments in major events (e.g. separate $4 million contributions to Sydney’s Centre 200 upgrades and Emera Centre Construction in North Sydney; and construction assistance of over $3 million for the Port Hawkesbury Civic Centre) (ECBC Annual Report 2013).

6 ECBC delivered the following initiatives and programs on behalf of ACOA ‘in support of ACOA’s Enterprise and Community Development program activities’ and in so doing, was able to use its own discretion and accumulated knowledge of local conditions in making decisions: Business Development Program, Consultant Advisory Services, Community-based Business Development, Innovative Communities Fund, Atlantic Innovation Fund, and the Community Infrastructure Improvement Fund (ECBC Annual Report 2012).

7 Interviewee Bob MacEachern also pointed out that ECBC ‘was a unique and useful tool in developing the Island's economy’, ‘had autonomy, and for a bureaucratic system, had great flexibility to respond to the needs of the local community’ (Interview 2014).

8 The equity investment, upon the complete transition to ACOA, would be kept and transferred to ACOA.

9 Whalley argues that ECBC had taken on ‘the personality of the person at the top’, pointing to ‘two very kind of controlling personalities’ of previous ECBC CEOs who along with ECBC and other actors, vied for control of the Island’s development apparatus. CEO John Lynn ‘faced a storm of controversy’ in 2013 with accusations of hiring three employees with known federal Conservative Party connections. He was also accused of being in a conflict of interest over ECBC’s intention to demolish Sydney’s Royal Cape Breton Yacht Club while injecting $4 million into a New Marina approximately 20 km away in Ben Eoin (CBC News “Enterprise Cape Breton to be Scrapped” 2014).

10 The Strait-Highlands Regional Development Agency’s catchment area included the counties of Inverness and Richmond, and Port Hawkesbury. Interviewee Karen Malcolm, former Community Development Facilitator for Inverness Municipality represents a ‘pattern’ of late among Cape Breton municipalities to hire Community Development Facilitators/Officers, reflecting the new regionalism context described throughout the dissertation.

11 Two community leaders with extensive development experience – Keith MacDonald of the Partnership and Strait area business and cultural leader Bob MacEachern -- were chosen to be among the four panel appointees.

12 The Ivany Commission was released with much fanfare. Its ‘call to action’ emerged in part from anecdotal insights suggesting Nova Scotia needs a quick attitude change to both address
alarming demographics and spur entrepreneurship. For a full description and critique see Appendix I.

13 Not all observers agree. Billy Joe MacLean stated that the effectiveness of Chambers and RDAs in the region has been dubious (Interview 2015).

14 Multi-scalar and multi-actor dynamics surrounding the project are evident: Chamber officials communicated with LNG representatives and government counterparts in the project’s early stages. Official Damien MacInnis said LNG was consulting with the Mi’kmaq community, having signed an MOU with the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs, and that the business community anticipate ‘a huge spinoffs and business expansions’ (101.5 The Hawk 2015b).

15 The McNeil government’s Department of Business aligned with Ivany Report recommendations.

16 Alex Cameron, legal council for the province said that CBRM’s case was weak because it failed to challenge any statute or legislation, which perhaps would have given it a chance for legal standing. Meanwhile Premier Rodney MacDonald toed the customary government line saying the Province’s equalization system was fair (Shannon 2009). The spokesperson for ensuing Premier Darrell Dexter also relayed a diplomatic answer as the province was preparing a defence, noting that the government’s defence filing ‘doesn’t stop the province from seeking to negotiate equalization with municipalities’ and that it does not in any way dampen our willingness, and preference frankly, to negotiate a solution that’s satisfactory to CBRM and other municipalities’ (Pottie 2009a). Upon the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear CBRM’s appeal, Dexter said the government was ready to build a constructive relationship with CBRM but any equalization discussions would be best left in the forum of the UNSM (King 2010).

17 Former ECBC acting head Marlene Usher became the CEO of the new board of the Port of Sydney Corporation.

18 These announcements speak of projects in a ‘preliminary’ stage, perhaps part of a political strategy to pressure government and stakeholders to commit to the projects.

19 The Margaree airstrip improvement idea has raised skepticism. Port Hawkesbury mayor Billy Joe MacLean suggests it is a waste of money. It creates competition with the Port Hastings airport (adjacent to Port Hawkesbury) that has been servicing Cabot Links golfers. Another informant, John Hamilton, presented reservations of a more logistical nature, figuring that the Margaree airstrip may not be able to safely accommodate the planes that would be landing there (MacLean and Hamilton Interviews 2014).
“Growing up in Cape Breton, I can say that so many of my continued ties to the island are because of the culture, crafts and creativity of residents, despite the obstacles to success”

Susanna Fuller, One Nova Scotia Commission, 2015

Cape Breton is considered the last living Gàidhealtachd (Gaelic cultural community) in North America with thriving cultural components such as its traditional music and a (tenuously) revitalizing language scene (Graham 2006; Doherty 2015; Newton 2013; McEwan-Fujita 2010). There are 1275 Gaelic speakers in Nova Scotia, with 300 respondents reporting Gaelic as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada 2011). While these numbers may suggest that the prospects for language survival are dire, what is promising is that after a long and steady decline in Gaelic speakers, the number of individuals claiming to speak Gaelic languages actually increased by over 40% between 2006-2011. Despite the official figures, the Nova Scotia Office of Gaelic Affairs (see below) estimates that there are 2000 speakers in the province (Statistics Canada, 2006; 2011; Nova Scotia Office of Gaelic Affairs 2015).

From an identity standpoint, 32% of Nova Scotians in the 2006 census claimed they were of Scottish ethnic origin, which speaks to the strong Celtic-inspired identity of Cape Breton (recall the high percentage of Gaels living on the Island in the 1800s). As noted by the community’s main lobbying body, the Nova Scotia Gaelic Council:

Thousands of Nova Scotians through family connections, music, dance, humour, ancestry and community residence feel that Gaelic language and culture are aspects of their identity and feel a visceral connection to these… The vast majority of these while not Gaelic speaking are descendants of Gaelic speakers having their linguistic and cultural origins in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015a).
These figures suggest there is potential for Gaelic-related cultural and economic activity in the more concentrated Gaelic cultural region of Cape Breton. The Province’s 2002 *Gaelic Nova Scotia: An Economic, Cultural, and Social Impact Study* (authored by Dr. Michael Kennedy) confirms this: at the beginning of the 2000s Gaelic-related initiatives and products generated direct revenue of $23.5 million from ‘275 Gaelic specific activities. 380,000 people were attending 2070 events per year (Kennedy 2002; The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015a). By 2014, Cape Breton’s 9 day Celtic Colours International Festival was generating $10.4 million in revenue spent by festival attendees. The festival featured over 40 performances that showcased 20 Celtic/Gaelic music artists, exemplifying the contributions that Gaelic cultural products have been making to the Cape Breton economy (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015a). Conclusively, not only can it be said that ‘culture sells in Cape Breton’ (Hamilton interview 2015), but also that culture sells Cape Breton as a unique, creative region.

With regard to social development, Gaelic education is easily accessible on the Island with community level youth and adult language learning programs held regularly. Province-wide, over ‘14 communities have participated in community-based adult Gaelic language learning’ (NS Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage 2010). Postsecondary courses relating to Gaelic culture are taught at Cape Breton University (CBU), St. Francis Xavier in Antigonish, Saint Mary’s in Halifax, and now the Gaelic College in St. Ann’s, Cape Breton. Over 1000 students are enrolled in public school Gaelic language classes. The Gaelic Council, the community’s main non-profit lobbying and advocacy body, cites two major festivals on Cape Breton that primarily feature Gaelic content – Celtic Colours and KitchenFest. There are also many smaller community festivals that feature Gaelic cultural
content (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015a). Cape Breton’s rural areas, especially Inverness County, have fostered the Island’s world-renowned traditional music; there may be more fiddlers per capita raised in Inverness County than anywhere in the world, displaying the cultural distinctness of the region (Doherty 2015). A number of institutions and initiatives have contributed to Gaelic cultural and arts revitalization in the globalized era. They have been utilized as a catalyst to boost Cape Breton’s economy. They would not have been realized without strong and determined leadership guided by a clear vision of a better future; when it comes to positive developmental change in such contexts, such leadership is a major affective variable. This chapter will analyse how culture and the arts (with a focus on Gaelic culture) have been utilized as endogenous assets for rebuilding Cape Breton in the globalized era. Through an overview of institutions and actors involved in this process, the importance of leadership in affecting institutional change will become evident.

8.1 CULTURE, IDENTITY, REGIONALITY

As institutional and regionalization-induced changes were occurring on the Island, they combined with cultural revitalization to shape and strengthen Cape Breton regionality. Community and family resilience, guidance, and agency continued to rejuvenate Cape Breton traditional music and by the early 1990s the global music industry was taking note. Indeed, what was once referred to as “Scottish” or “Scotch” fiddling has been relabelled with a regional marker; it is now generally known and presented as “Cape Breton” fiddling (Graham 2006; Morgan 2009; Doherty 2015). Into the 1990s musicians and bands were signed to major music labels and their popularity led to even further revitalization and fan base expansion of the music both locally and internationally. The globalized era made
international touring and recording more accessible and regularized video play, artist web presence and eventually music streaming, and more overall professionalization of artists and the industry. It also carved out a new tourist segment and an expanded ‘tourist draw’ for the Island (Foulds interview 2014; Smith interview 2015).

Through the 1990s Cape Breton’s cultural revival was in full force. The Island is so rich in musical artistry that it was, and still is, the only non-province region recognized in award competitions for the East Coast Music Awards. Stage shows such as the Cape Breton Summertime Revue – showcasing regional, and at times politically influenced, humour and music -- and award-winning artists gained international acclaim. The traditional and globally-influenced music, avidly played by Gaels, Acadians, Mi’kmaq, and others, became a symbol of regional pride and solidarity. Songs influenced by the living Gaelic culture such as Jimmy Rankin’s *Mull River Shuffle* and *Sleepy Maggie* (written and performed by Ashley MacIsaac, Gordie Sampson, and Mary Jane Lamond), became popular regionally, nationally, and internationally. Other songs -- about Industrial Cape Breton’s working class and mining culture – included titles such as *The Island*, *Working Man*, and *Coal Town Road*. They invoked regional pride, a sense of deep regionality, and have been heard internationally when sung by local icons such as the Barra MacNeils and the late Rita MacNeil. Islanders are proud that Cape Breton is now recognized as the ‘home’ or birthplace of internationally acclaimed and award winning musicians and writers of global reach such as the Rankins, Rita MacNeil, Natalie MacMaster, Ashley MacIsaac, Gordie Sampson, Alistair MacLeod, Lyndon MacIntyre, Frank Macdonald, and recent Giller Prize winner Lynn Coady. For some, their successes and promotion of the Island extend not only from individual talent, but from regional attachment, family and community guidance, influence, and agency, and the
momentum of this late 20th century cultural revival (Graham 2006; Morgan 2009; Donovan 1990). Their words and works have contributed to Island identity narratives, to cultural and economic region-building, and to the professional careers of other aspiring artists. While the overall impact of arts and culture may not be as great for Cape Breton as it is for Halifax (the province’s political, economic and cultural metropole), the unique Gaelic aspect of Cape Breton’s arts and culture scene has helped the sector become a promising growth component in Cape Breton’s economy. Arts and culture have arguably replaced coal and steel as prime symbols of regionality in the globalized era.

While in previous decades the local agency of these high-profile artists was a main factor in building professional careers and creating cultural awareness, various institutions and leaders have also been influential in affecting this cultural revitalization. The revitalization of the music was accompanied by revival of the language (see below). Gaelic College CEO (and former provincial premier) Rodney MacDonald notes that agency at the local level is ‘definitely’ evident; there has been more of a utilization and realization of the value of culture, technology, and partnerships to developing Cape Breton. He has observed ‘a more professional attitude’, ‘more discussion’ and ‘more working together…from a marketing perspective’ (Interview 2014). MacDonald provides fitting examples which epitomize the notion of globalizing the ‘Celtic Fringe’ whereby private and civil society actors – some supported by government programming – interact to foster economic activity of international reach:

Obviously the success with Celtic Colours [International Festival] and now…our own festival, the Gaelic College Kitchenfest. But they are not just festivals; what they are…working with…home-grown companies like Marcato, where they provided a technology…from Cape Breton Island, from Sydney…excellent technology for all of that information piece for your festival which you have for years…and now that technology is being found across the world. And Marcato really resulted [from] a
partnership with Celtic Colours. So we use that now. So we just started using that in our festival...A home grown festival, talent, and now it’s being exported, but it’s still home. They didn’t have to go and set up shop in Toronto. They’re set up in Sydney (Interview, 2015).

Creative arts and cultural entrepreneurs are utilizing the technological tools of the globalized era and at one time or another have taken part in projects and awards shows that received support from all levels of government. Studio engineer/musicians such as Jamie Foulds, Fred Lavery, Gordie Sampson, and Mike Shepherd have gained skills both on and off-Island and have established and been employed in world-class studio facilities in Cape Breton (Sound Park and Lakewind Sound Studios). These attract award-winning clienteles, some of whom received career support from government programs (see below). The internet and web presence has enabled artists to start and grow businesses by accessing customers and markets across the world. Many Cape Breton musicians have websites, social media access points, and digital distribution platforms that enable customer interaction, networking, and product sales. Also, the NS Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage has supported web-based marketing presence for artists through its programming. These developments support the perpetuation and deepening of Island regionality. The following section will trace further what has been happening on the cultural front in Cape Breton in the era of globalization, with a focus on institutions.

### 8.2. INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURAL INDUSTRIES

Whether through program funding or ad-hoc measures, municipal, provincial and federal governments have provided culture funding to numerous individuals, groups, and organizations located in Cape Breton. This funding has been crucial to the financial survival
of many organizations, not to mention the intangible benefits that accrue from cultural development and maintenance.

Canada Council for the Arts

Between 1998 and 2013 the federal Canada Council for the Arts (the Canada Council) provided funding to 75 recipients in Cape Breton (individuals or groups) in a wide range of programming areas including aboriginal arts, audience and market development, UNESCO-related programming, dance, media arts, music, theatre, visual arts, and writing and publishing (Canada Council 2015). While the list of recipients is too long to provide here, it should be noted that this funding aided well-known recipients in producing and marketing cultural products accessible to local residents, tourists, and wider global markets. CBU has regularly received a block grant for the publishing of award-nominated and winning novels and non-fiction works concerned with various aspects of Cape Breton history and culture. Well-known musicians such as Slainte Mhath, Jerry Holland, the Beaton Sisters, Allister MacGillivray, and the Cottars all benefited from modest funding in the areas of specialized music sound recording, music festival travel, music touring, and individual musician grants (Canada Council 2015).

Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage

At the provincial level, most funding for culture comes from the Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage (CCH, previously known as the Department of Tourism, Culture, and Heritage), which along with its subsidiary offices of Gaelic Affairs, African
Nova Scotian Affairs, and Acadian Affairs, distributes program funding to artists and various community and other organizations (see Appendix M). Throughout the era of globalization, organizations across the province have received provincial support. For instance, as of late in 2014, CCH provided operational funding to 55 cultural organizations, 9 of which were located in or based out of Cape Breton (see Table 8.1 below).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Organization</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highland Village (part of NS Museum system)</td>
<td>$720,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaelic College</td>
<td>$230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic Colours Festival Society</td>
<td>$125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic Music Interpretive Centre</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comhairle na Gàidhlig, Alba Nuadh</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commun Féis an Eilein</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil des Arts de Cheticamp</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverness County Council of the Arts</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoy Theatre</td>
<td>$67,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathspey Place Association</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2- NS Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage Operating Assistance to Cultural Organizations (Cape Breton), 2014. Source: NS Dept. of Communities, Culture, and Heritage. https://cch.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/inline/documents/oaco-recipients-201408.pdf Accessed May 22, 2015; Rodney MacDonald interview 2015; NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14

There are a number of other cultural organizations that receive funding from CCH. This falls in line with the platitude found on its website: ‘Supporting our culture and heritage, while investing in our own creative class, contributes to Nova Scotia's vital creative economy’ (NS Dept. of CCH 2015). Because of the breadth of this project, four of these organizations, as
well as the provincial Office of Gaelic Affairs, will be discussed because they are useful examples of multi-scalar institutional agency and institutionalization on/of the ‘Celtic Fringe’ and the new regional context in the global era. They are recognized as key institutions that are preserving, promoting, and commodifying Gaelic culture for the purposes of social and community development. As main text space does not allow, I will not be providing overviews of the ample examples of Acadian and other ethno-cultural organizations and experiences (see Appendix M). And a more extensive overview of Mi’kmaw region-building in the era of globalization follows in the next chapter. I will begin with some points on Gaelic language and culture.

In Nova Scotia, the historic institutional and arts and culture community exclusion of Gaelic may in some regards be waning. The 2010 summary report of the Nova Scotia Arts and Culture Consultation for the Culture Division of CCH has sections dealing with regional and ethno-cultural issues. It reports that in 8 of 11 consultation sessions, ‘participants discussed the importance of support for Gaelic culture in the province, including support through mentorship, funding, and the development of an Advisory Council’; however, 9 of 11 consultation sessions revealed that ‘more could currently be done to increase equity and support diversity in the province’ (Horizons Community Development Associates Inc. 2015, 56).¹ The following section will provide brief overviews of the state of Gaelic in the economic and social life of the province and Cape Breton, and of mainly Gaelic-focused institutions and institutionalization associated with the ‘Celtic Fringe’.
Office of Gaelic Affairs

The Nova Scotia Office of Gaelic Affairs was established in 2006; however the government was increasing focus on Gaelic culture previous to this. The Progressive Conservative Hamm government released the Gaelic economic impact study by Dr. Michael Kennedy in 2002. That same year the Province signed an MOU with Scotland’s Highland Council that recognized Gaelic cultural links between Gaelic speaking areas of Scotland and Nova Scotia (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015). The MOU has three focus areas: education, cultural development, and tourism and encourages joint ventures between and among private and public sector, as well as community and volunteer organizations. The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia states that activities arising from the MOU included a number of exchanges such as bringing students to the Celtic Colours International Festival from Plockton’s Centre for Excellence in Traditional Music (Scotland), and supporting Nova Scotia Gaelic instructors by sending them to Scotland for professional training and development of (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia, 2015). CCH under Minister Rodney MacDonald also began a Gaelic Cultural Activities Program and soon hired a Gaelic Coordinator, locating her office in Mabou, Inverness County, Cape Breton. MacDonald relates that ‘I got a very hard time. I got a lot of push-back within my own department about hiring someone, first of all, and secondly I got a very difficult time about the fact it [the job] would be in Cape Breton Island. They thought it should be in Halifax. And we disagreed on that point but we ended up putting it on the Island’ (Interview 2015). This push-back by bureaucrats was indicative of institutional stigma against Gaelic language and culture,
witnessed as high up as the Executive Director level of the public service (MacMaster Interview 2014); centre-periphery power relations; and how regionalism can stem in part from formal institutional actors’ attitudes and related policy choices.

But the move to initiate formal institutionalization of Gaelic culture -- ‘to give a voice at the [cabinet] table for Gaelic’ -- continued in CCH with the creation of the Office of Gaelic Affairs in 2006. Angus MacIsaac, MLA for Antigonish, was the first minister responsible (Rodney MacDonald Interview 2015). The intention was to give Gaelic a voice in the public both provincially and internationally. As of Spring, 2015, the Office has three Gaelic speaking employees in the positions of Executive Director and two Gaelic field officers.

The Office of Gaelic Affairs seems to work as a multi-level governance facilitator, envisioning its main role as Gaelic language renewal, ‘so that it remains a vital part of Nova Scotia’ (Nova Scotia Office of Gaelic Affairs 2015). As facilitator it tries to:

• Promote Gaelic’s contribution and value throughout the province
• Support language and cultural programs that address the Gaelic community’s needs
• Facilitate dialogue with community partners and government regarding policies affecting Gaelic development
• Create learning materials for Gaelic language learners and instructors
• Provide training for instructors
• Support and assist community projects and initiatives
• Provide translation services
• Collaborate with international partners to increase Gaelic learning and encourage cultural exchange (NS Office of Gaelic Affairs 2015)
The Office of Gaelic Affairs is allotted a modest annual programming budget of $68,000 and currently provides three main programs: Gaelic Language in the Community Program (for not-for-profits seeking to create Gaelic-related opportunities); Bun is Bàrr (Root and Branch) Mentoring Programs; and Gàidhlig Le Luathas (an immersion outreach program) (NS Office of Gaelic Affairs 2015).

Highland Village Museum (the Highland Village)

The Highland Village, located at Iona, Cape Breton exemplifies the benefits of increased formal institutionalization. As mentioned, this ‘replica’ Highland Village was the brainchild of long-serving, Gaelic-speaking premier Angus L. MacDonald. Since its incorporation under Nova Scotia’s Society Act in 1959 (the museum is a registered charity) and its first Highland Village Day fundraising concert in 1962, the museum’s operations have expanded. The 43-acre operation includes a museum and cultural facility that consist of the Highland Village Living History Museum and Gaelic Folklife Centre, the Highland Village Gift Shop, the Roots Cape Breton Genealogy & Family History Centre, and an outdoor entertainment/theatre complex (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14, 2). From a new regionalism standpoint, the Highland Village exemplifies how vertical and horizontal multi-scalar actors have worked together on a project designed to celebrate, preserve, and promote regional culture. The Highland Village Annual Report states that it is committed to ‘community partnerships and outreach’ and works ‘with other local community groups to support community economic and cultural development’ and to market the facility as a Gaelic cultural destination and international Gaelic heritage centre (NS Highland Village
One partnership is with the Goat Island/Eskasoni First Nation Cultural Journey. The two sites have collaborated by celebrating the ‘natural linkages’ between Mi’kmaw and Gaelic culture. The Highland Village also partners with Celtic Colours International Festival, remaining open for visitors during the festival each year. Technology associated with globalization has also enabled the Highland Village to expand its outreach through growing its presence on Facebook and Instagram (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14). The Highland Village’s Vision and Mission statements also reflect new regionalism’s culture-for-development dynamics (mentioned, for instance, in Keating et al. 2003) whereby there are economic and social benefits attached to the preservation of distinct minority cultures.

This **vision** of the Highland Village Museum/An Clachan Gàidhealach is to be internationally acknowledged for advancing research, fostering appreciation, learning and sharing authentic Gaelic language and heritage while serving a vibrant Gaelic cultural community (i.e. a Gaelic institution). The **mission** of the Highland Village Museum/An Clachan Gàidhealach, a living history museum, is to research, collect, preserve and share the Gaelic heritage and culture of Nova Scotia inclusive of Gaelic folklife from settlement to present, including, but not limited to, language, cultural expressions, lifestyles, crafts, customs, and represent it accurately and vibrantly (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14, 4).

The Highland Village’s Annual Report recognizes the importance of ‘financial and in-kind’ support from the department, as well as other departments and agencies such as the Office of Gaelic Affairs, Economic and Rural Development, and Internal Services. It is supported by all three levels of government (ECBC/ACOA and Service Canada federally) and partners with other organizations and communities (2013-14, 4).
The Gaelic College/Colaisde na Gàidhlig

‘To promote, preserve and perpetuate through studies in all related areas: the culture, music, language, arts, crafts, customs and traditions of immigrants from the Highlands of Scotland’ (Gaelic College Mission Statement, 2015a).

The Gaelic College of Arts and Crafts (Colaisde na Gàidhlig, or, the Gaelic College) was founded by the local community of St. Ann’s under the leadership of A.W. R. MacKenzie (a non-Gaelic speaking Scot) in 1938 (Gaelic College 2015; Newton 2014; Graham 2006, 89). In 1939 its first building was constructed on site after a Gaelic College foundation and committee was established to raise funds for its realization (Gaelic College 2015). Early on its classes included Gaelic grammar, Gaelic language, Gaelic song, social economics, and the history of Gaelic; however historians and scholars have noted that MacKenzie’s ‘symbolic Gaelic College’ promoted a mandate that presented the College as a ‘tartanistic tourist centre’ with a weak commitment to reviving the language (Graham 2006, 89; Newton 2014; Dembling 2006). Because of programming decisions made by the College’s leadership, it became known for providing instruction in art forms not typically associated with the indigenous cultural practices of Cape Breton’s Gaels.³

A major shift in direction for the College occurred with the September 2011 hiring of former premier and Inverness MLA Rodney MacDonald as the College’s CEO.⁴ A Gaelic learner, well-known fiddler and local business owner, his ‘first priority was to get the organization in a stronger financial position,’ as the College was ‘losing revenue every year’ and had ‘racked up a considerable debt’. The debt was addressed by selling a large parcel of
land to the Province as he felt that the College’s growth would be limited and the
organization ‘would not be taken seriously by the private sector’ and students if the debt was
not eliminated (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015). The other priority (in line with identity
and regionality) was to ensure that the College ‘reflected the Island and the culture of the
area’ and not a culture or language ‘that was not our own.’ With emphasis, MacDonald stated
that ‘we were the Gaelic College, Colaisde na Gàidhlig, and we were going to act like that.
We were going to make sure that everything we did, we tied in to Gaelic.’ The College
changed its branding by referring to itself as ‘Colaisde na Gàidhlig’, complemented by a new
logo and, for local and global marketing aims, a revamped website (Gaelic College 2015a;
Rodney MacDonald interview 2015). It introduced new Gaelic language and culture
mentorship programs for youth and prioritized local music and dance styles as educational
course offerings. Some of the changes proposed near the end of 2011 did not happen without
backlash. While MacDonald’s decision was congruent with identity re-construction and re-
claiming that had been occurring within the Gaelic cultural community (Graham 2013), some
who continued to identify primarily with Clan Societies, tartanism, and the competitive
musical arts associated with Highland Games were not receptive to such mandate
reconstruction, reclamation of the Gaelic arts and re-emphasis on the language.5

Another identity-related controversy surrounding the Gaelic College arose in
December of 2013. Months earlier, Cape Breton ex-pat Kevin MacLeod, the Canadian
Secretary to the Queen, approached the College Board of Governors Chair Alex Morrison
with the suggestion that a royal prefix bestowed on the College by the Queen ‘would be a
fitting tribute for the College as it celebrates its 75th anniversary’ (Shannon 2014b). In
agreement, Morrison convinced the Board to accept the proposal without consultation from
the Gaelic College Foundation, the organization’s membership body; he later suggested to the media that the designation/Royal prefix should be considered an ‘honour.’ Inverness MLA Allan MacMaster did not think so; he was concerned that those ‘who sought the royal designation didn't stop to think about all of the Gaels out there who would find the term offensive and hurtful given the history of the Crown trying to eradicate the Gaelic language and Gaelic culture’ (CBC 2013b). Others in the Gaelic community saw the ‘royal’ connection to the College as a dated identity concept -- an ‘Anglo-centric interpretation of Gaelic culture’, a symbol of ‘cultural appropriation’, and an imposition on the reclaimed Gaelic identity among the Gaels on the Island (Graham 2013). With international media attention and a majority vote by the Gaelic College Foundation membership to remove the royal prefix, the Board of Governors worked towards a compromise on the issue. They announced that ‘while the college was honoured with the royal designation, it would not use the royal prefix in its “day to day operations.”’ (MacIntyre 2014b). This was an example of a community having an endogenous effect (in the form of resistance and negotiation) on politically-imposed decisions and ultimately a degree of control over the meaning and direction of future regional development.

Identity-related controversies aside, the College continued to pursue other initiatives and goals under MacDonald’s leadership. These included the development of a strategic plan focused on implementing a governance charter and updating/creating new provincial legislation for the College; implementation of a Gaelic policy that prioritized language knowledge as an asset for employment positions; actively pursuing marketing, capital improvements/facility enhancements and excellence in education and all activities; and the strategic building of partnerships that would enable the College ‘to be a true College’
(Rodney MacDonald interview 2015). On the last initiative, MacDonald cites a recent partnership with CBU that has led to an MOU, the creation of online programs with the university, and a 6 credit course offering in Gaelic language training in combination with labs provided by the College’s Director of Gaelic. The organization plans to sign more MOUs with other educational institutions such as NSCC and NSCAD. Other goals include offering more courses, increasing student enrolment, and growing its presence across the Island and ‘looking at new ways of reaching out to people’ (e.g. offering more ‘in-person’ lessons throughout the region as well as 180 online lessons in different disciplines).

MacDonald also notes that the institution is ‘transitioning’ in the area of employment as more youth with Gaelic language background are being hired. ‘There are young people getting jobs there [at the College] because they speak Gaelic’ (Jeffrey MacDonald interview 2014). Benefits packages have also been offered to employees. One of its most recent development initiatives is KitchenFest, a week-long annual celebration started in 2014 that is similar to the Celtic Colours International Festival (e.g. in its liaisons with government programming representatives, regional presentation approach, bringing musical performances to communities around the Island), but different in that the focus is strictly on Cape Breton artists and music. The 8-day festival holds over 100 events featuring more than 150 musicians (Gaelic College KitchenFest 2015).

Celtic Colours International Festival

The genesis of this festival points to multi-scalar, region-building actors coming together in attempts to reap the benefits of economic and cultural globalization. The festival was the brainchild of two musicians, cultural entrepreneurs, and Cape Breton residents Max...
MacDonald and Joella Foulds. In the early 1990s Cape Breton artists were gaining national and international prominence ‘taking the culture of the Island and actually turning it into something economically viable for themselves, and ultimately as a great promotion of the Island’ (Foulds interview 2014). While tourism was expanding on the Island, it ‘was not about the culture’; Foulds was observing that tourists would ‘discover the culture’ when they arrived. Foulds saw through her involvement with the East Coast Music Awards that Cape Breton’s notable ‘raw talent’ could be fostered and built on the momentum created by the ‘bright lights’ already celebrated on national and international stages. She and MacDonald saw the opportunity ‘to develop and help develop some more infrastructure that was going to help people to get their music out, get the world to see it. That’s where the festival came in’ (Foulds interview 2014).

At the time of Celtic Colours’ conception, two Cape Breton politicians were influential players in their governments. Cape Breton MP Dave Dingwall was the federal minister responsible for ACOA while Richmond MLA Richie Mann was the provincial minister responsible for economic development. Much of the original funding for Celtic Colours came from a $188 million federal-provincial diversification agreement signed between Mann and Dingwall. Indicative of the move away from supporting footloose industrial initiatives and the Savage government’s pre-election CED discourse, Mann said that the government wanted to fund sustainable projects, ‘things that would withstand the test of time’. In a Halifax boardroom with Foulds present, an agreement to fund the Celtic Colours International Festival was signed: ‘There were all kinds of ideas to do things that would have been like a one time event, or fund [a proposed one-off project] this one time but it would have gone away but ... I don't know, who'd be the real champion of that? But it's

274
As noted early in this chapter, the statistics regarding Celtic Colours’ economic impact show that the organization is successfully harnessing internal cultural strengths to create economic opportunities on the Island. It has attracted global audiences. In 2012 the festival drew 55% of its audience from off-Island with reported visitors of 7,371, while 9 live streamed concerts drew an international audience of 13,854 viewers, indicating how (along with its multi-level and multi-actor interactions) the organization negotiates integration (ECBC Annual Report 2012).

The Celtic Music Interpretive Centre

The Celtic Music Interpretive Centre (CMIC) is located in the community of Judique in Inverness County. The CMIC can be understood in the context of points made about region-building by Keating et al. and Pieterse in the first chapter: It is an example of a community capitalizing on regional strengths for the purposes of development in a globalizing and new regional context. The CMIC is the brainchild of community leaders who recognized that creative solutions were required in the face of community decline. Amenities had closed or were pending closure, including a service station, the local school, and the post office. The individuals were aware that Judique was widely known as a hotbed of traditional music. They also recognized that there was a need and development opportunity in the region for an organization specializing in interpreting the musical culture. A community group was organized to carry out conceptual and construction plans for a musical interpretive complex. The committee utilized its various members’ strengths and political connections to undertake
a multi-scalar/sectoral solicitation process to secure funding for the proposed project (see political leadership below). The committee also worked closely with ECBC in accessing available funding for the project. Led by the committee, the community privately raised $250,000 to contribute to a multi-level funding scheme that saw the CMIC realized.

The new facility and organization was established as a not-for-profit society with a mandate ‘to collect, preserve and promote the traditional Celtic music of Cape Breton Island through education, research and performance’ (Graham interview 2015; Celtic Music Interpretive Centre 2015a). The CMIC features a performance stage, bar, kitchen and restaurant where the living musical tradition is traditionally practiced and transmitted to visitors and locals. The building also houses a well-equipped archive room, a gift shop, and office space and utilizes the internet for marketing, selling products online, and providing online archived concerts at a fee. The CMIC also hosts year round cultural performances (ceilidhs); provides one-on-one historical/cultural/music demonstrations; holds musical workshops, Gaelic language events, seniors’ events, and private functions. It also stages the annual Buddy MacMaster School of Fiddling which draws top instructors and international students (CMIC 2015a; Smith interview 2015).

Current Executive Director Cheryl Smith notes that while many aspects of the CMIC have been quite successful (e.g. the weekly ceilidhs, gift shop, and educational programs), other aspects are facing challenges. It was difficult to find and employ a trained archivist at the CMIC, slowing archival processing. However, an archives technician has since rejuvenated some aspects of the CMIC’s operations such as digitizing of old recordings, videos, and listening stations (Smith interview 2015). The CMIC also spearheaded a region-wide Féis Movement. Partnering with the Celtic Colours International Festival and other
stakeholders, the new initiative emulates the successful Féis Movement in Scotland, which approaches cultural learning holistically, incorporating and emphasizing common linkages between cultural components such as the Gaelic language, dance, song, and instrumental music (Smith interview 2015). The CMIC hired well-known musicians Mac Morin, Kimberly Fraser, and Shelly Campbell to share duties coordinating for the Féis Movement starting in 2015. Based out of Judique’s CMIC, they are responsible for locating areas where Gaelic arts programming is needed and ‘implementing two youth music mentorship programs to take place across Cape Breton Island’ as a part of the Féis Movement concept (101.5 The Hawk 2015c; Smith interview 2015). The CMIC states that the Féis focus is to ‘reignite the passion for traditional Celtic music and culture by developing skills, fostering development in a natural way, reflecting on tradition, providing opportunity to connect with community at cultural events, providing opportunities for more self-directed learning and providing an outlet for playing and performance, ensuring it remains a vibrant and living tradition for generations to come’ (Celtic Music Interpretive Centre 2015b).

The CMIC receives an ongoing support from an excellent core of volunteers and operational funding from an annual celebrity golf tournament and occasional private donations, and regular financial support by construction magnate and Judique ex-pat Tom Rankin. The board created an endowment fund with the help of ECBC, who assigned the CMIC a consultant with expertise in fundraising for non-profits. The endowment fund goal of $1 million reflects the desire of the organization to not need government assistance as government operating grants and other supports are not counted on to continue in the long term in the present fiscal environment.
The CMIC serves as a good case illustration of ECBC’s impact on the region. The CMIC cultivated a ‘very good’ working relationship with ECBC staff; the federal crown corporation ‘did a great job’ with program funding delivery and ‘really invested in culture’ (Smith interview 2015). Smith says projects would not have been realized without support from ECBC and considered important the leadership of long time ECBC staff member Donna MacKenzie -- to the CMIC-ECBC relationship -- who has an intimate understanding of the local culture of Inverness County and the Island. Smith mentioned the contributions made by ECBC that increased returns for the CMIC: capital grants, equipment and technology upgrades and a consultancy grant for the hiring of a chef and revamping of the restaurant menu. With regard to the latter, ‘it was a small thing for them to invest in but it made a huge difference for us’, leaving to question the social capital that could be lost with the folding of ECBC; it appears in preliminary stages that funding as a percentage of total costs will decrease from 75% through ECBC to 50% with ACOA (Smith interview 2015). There are worries that the disbanding of ECBC and the transferal of services and programming to ACOA could result in a withdrawal of support for ‘small’ and unique Cape Breton-based initiatives that had needs and characteristics understood by ECBC programmers: ‘ACOA is just bigger; they don’t know us or anything about the Celtic Music Centre’ (Smith interview 2015).

With regard to other government funding, a contribution from the Nova Scotia Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage remained fixed at $25,000 between 2006 and 2014, although it was increased to $29,000 in 2015. The CMIC is usually able to secure one 14-week student position through the provincial Student Career Skills Development grant program. On the federal end, the CMIC applies for two or three 14 week Canada
Summer Jobs Student Grants and usually receives an 8-week grant to hire one student. Since 2012 the Municipality of Inverness has provided operational funding to the CMIC and other cultural organizations in the county. Although resources are limited for the County, they ‘have been really good’ when it comes to supporting cultural organizations attempting to build the Island’s tourism and culture sectors (Smith interview 2015).

Celtic Heart of North America Cooperative: A Regional Approach to Marketing Culture

The Celtic Heart of North America Cooperative (est. circa 2010) is a membership-based partnered marketing cooperative of nine organizations representing ‘the amazing Celtic and Gaelic cultural experience on Cape Breton Island’ (Celtic Heart 2015; Smith interview 2015). Signature members have included the Celtic Colours International Festival, Highland Village Museum, The Gaelic College, Cape Breton Centre for Craft and Design, Glenora Inn and Distillery, Féis an Eilean, and the Celtic Music Interpretive Centre. The counties of Inverness and Victoria are also members. While the intentions of and conceptions for the organization appear to be of sound strategic value there is a lack of coordination among the members in the cooperative and there is only one person working full time for the group (Smith interview 2015). Although the main purpose is to market the Celtic cultural experience as exemplified by its members, the vision and effectiveness remains in question: Questions surrounding the benefits signature members receive for a $2500 annual ‘marketing’ fee, how much marketing the organization is undertaking, and whether the Celtic Heart acts and markets for all of Cape Breton and all the cultural [groups] or…only the signature members’ (Smith interview 2015). Along with CCH, ECBC was the major funder
of the Celtic Heart, leaving the organization’s continuation in question (Cheryl Smith interview 2015; Foulds interview 2015; Grant 2010).

Destination Cape Breton Association

Not a cultural organization per se, Destination Cape Breton Association (DCBA) is the official tourism association of the Island and takes a regional approach to and utilizes Cape Breton’s cultural strengths for building and promoting the Island’s tourism industry. The association’s main objectives include focusing on ‘tourism product development’, marketing, and servicing visitors (Destination Cape Breton Association 2015): ‘Destination Cape Breton has based its tourism strategy on an ACOA plan released in late 2010 focusing on what is believed to really draw visitors to Atlantic Canada, including culture and major festivals and events’ (King 2015).

DCBA was largely ‘the brainchild of ECBC’ (Foulds interview 2014). Since ECBC’s disbanding, ACOA has stated that federal funding commitment to the organization, through matching private funds, remains (King, 2015). The private funding in question is a 2% marketing levy assigned to the accommodations sector, essentially to fund a portion of DCBA’s operations so that it could fund tourism projects and market the Island (Foulds interview 2015; Cape Breton Post 2010; King 2015a). ECBC matched the monies gained from the levy to increase the marketing fund (Cape Breton Post 2010). When the levy was proposed, DCBA’s intentions to regionalize tourism marketing and promotion still raised skepticism among tourism stakeholders outside of CBRM. Some, especially those in Inverness County, ‘dug their heels in’ on the issue – they thought of the levy as a tax that would hinder tourism in an already competitive industry. Inverness County council originally
voted to opt out of the levy (Cape Breton Post 2010). When the municipal levy was to be
enshrined in the 2010 updated Cape Breton Island Marketing Levy Act (2005), MLA Allan
MacMaster was the only representative in the legislature to vote against it. He would not
support the levy ‘because the operators that were going to have to collect the levy were
opposed to it’ (Interview 2013). Regardless of disagreement in DCBA’s early existence, the
counties warmed up to a more regional approach. Inverness County came on board during
the levy’s second year (King 2015a). The levy and matching funds from ECBC and now
ACOA have ended up helping to market the Island. In 2011-12, $520,000 was raised; this
increased to $560,000 the following year and climbed further in 2013-14 to $650,000. Prior
to the levy, DCBA operated on around $70,000 annually; it now operates on approximately
$1.8 million per year and is staffed with 5 full-time employees (King 2015a).

With DCBA came a move to tourism regionalization. ‘Destination Cape Breton is the
overall Island strategy’; the organization is inclusive of all counties, regardless of some being
‘a little bit independent’. ‘Progress’ and ‘benefits’ are accruing from the DCBA arrangement,
resulting in less resistance out of rural counties and a move toward more cooperation (Foulds
interview 2014). DCBA has also showed promise through the ways it has adapted to and
harnessed technological tools of globalization. It created a presence for the Island by
marketing it as a golf and scenery destination in international magazines; ‘worked closely’
with Celtic Colours by supporting and purchasing advertisements in live streams of
performances; and prioritized the Island’s scenery, attractions, and three predominant
cultures in its marketing efforts through creating TV and youtube advertisements (with the
taglines ‘Your Heart Will Never Leave”; ‘Your True…Once Upon a Time’); and so on
(Foulds interview 2014; Cape Breton Island youtube 2012; 2013).
These kinds of initiatives reinforce the notion that cultural capital and institutions on Cape Breton are continuously ‘thickening’; institutions are cooperating and regionalizing (both formally and informally) toward common cultural and economic development goals (Smith interview 2015). They are illustrative also of the growing importance of accessing the technological tools of globalization to attract potential participants, travellers, consumers and investors to the Cape Breton culture and tourism sectors.

**8.3 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP**

As far as provincial support of culture through the globalized era goes, the region and its Gaelic culture received most attention from the PC governments of John Hamm (1999-2006) and Rodney MacDonald (2006-2009). Early in the Hamm mandate, on June 17, 2000, the Highland Village’s operations were more formally institutionalized within the Government of Nova Scotia. Upon consultation with the Cape Breton Gaelic and heritage community and in line with a recommendation by the Nova Scotia Museum Board of Governors, the provincial Department of Tourism and Culture (under Minister Rodney MacDonald) brought the Highland Village under Nova Scotia’s provincial museum system (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14, 2). Since then, the museum has been run as a partnership between its society and CCH. The more formal institutionalization has provided the organization with more substantial funding (as noted in table 2 above) to enrich its Gaelic culture and heritage initiatives and partnerships. The Hamm government, through CCH, also commissioned what would be the Kennedy Report (on the social, cultural, and economic impact of Gaelic on the province) and reviewed cultural programming. MacDonald concluded that previously programs were not well known or ‘weren’t even being
advertised…you couldn’t find them’ (MacDonald interview 2015). A more ‘clear and open’ and facilitated process was subsequently made available to cultural groups province-wide. As minister responsible, MacDonald ‘at one time considered…suggesting to our department that perhaps [it] should split up the money regionally and evenly and then do the programs.’ He envisioned four regions: Cape Breton, Northern Nova Scotia, Halifax area, and South-Western Nova Scotia, ‘much like we had for sport and recreation which worked very well’ (MacDonald interview 2014). The department did not follow through with regionalized programming ‘because we were going through so much change’, reflecting that although change was accomplished in the department, extensive change can be difficult because of institutional embeddedness and conflicting interests.

Dissertation interviewees (e.g. Joella Foulds, Jeffrey MacDonald, Richard MacKinnon) recognized the importance and value of the Gaelic initiatives, the Office of Gaelic Affairs, and the leadership of Rodney MacDonald to the revitalization of Gaelic language and culture in the province in the early 2000s. As a minister and premier, MacDonald enabled institutional changes through determined leadership and his embrace of program ideas that related identity and culture to economic development. His institutional changes, like those of Angus L. Macdonald many years before, were critical to cultural and economic development for Cape Breton Island:

With Rodney in office…the fact of getting Kennedy’s report done. And just starting to swing government opinion on the thing. The bureaucrats. It just opened the door…Well to me, it’s this ‘hearts and minds’ [aspect]. It’s this hidden stuff that’s going on…It’s small but it’s massive at the same time, that you can see we’re changing the hearts and minds [of government and the public], so then with Gaelic Affairs, I think we’re doing a lot…(Jeffrey MacDonald interview 2014).
As minister for CCH MacDonald also undertook the controversial move of disbanding the arms-length Nova Scotia Arts Council and replacing it with a Nova Scotia Arts and Culture Partnership Council, which would have ministerial oversight. While some artists feared the politicization of funding allotments, the new council had a rigorous peer-review jury and committee process that did not involve politicians (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015; Foulds interview 2014). MacDonald said he wanted to redirect the high administration costs of the top-heavy Arts Council back to the artists who needed the money. He and other community arts leaders point out that under the NS Arts Council there was a regional bias – towards Halifax recipients -- in funding awards (MacDonald interview 2015; Graham 2006; Doherty 2015; Foulds interview 2014):

Cape Breton was so underrepresented in successful applications. And if you looked at that, you could see why. Because there was a pattern of juries of Halifax-based people. Very few Cape Breton people had been through the system. And it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. So they didn’t get on juries so people didn’t get approved because the applications didn’t get anywhere ... [After MacDonald’s change] you could probably trace that there was quite an improvement in the Cape Breton participation and levels of funding (Foulds interview 2014).

After the defeat of the MacDonald-led PC government in 2009, the Dexter NDP government essentially maintained the status quo at Gaelic Affairs, although ‘for administrative purposes’ the ethno-cultural offices of Gaelic, African Nova Scotian and Acadian affairs were absorbed under the overall responsibility of the CCH ministry by order-in-council in 2011 (Yarmouth County Vanguard 2011; Nova Scotia Legislature 2015). NDP ministers responsible included Maureen MacDonald and Maurice Smith. They were supportive of Gaelic Affairs’ mandate. Under the NDP’s watch the Gaelic Affairs office maintained its MOU relationship with the Scottish government, with a bursary program announced in 2011 to support Gaelic students travelling to Scotland for instruction (NS
Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage 2011a). The Dexter government, through Gaelic Affairs, also introduced the community-based ‘Bun is Bàrr’ (Root and Branch) master-apprentice program, which enables learners to ‘participate in immersion activities with a Gaelic elder’ (NS Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage 2011b).

The McNeil government has maintained program funding for Gaelic Affairs, although the Office was still affected by the 2015 budget (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia. 2015a). The austerity budget included 320 civil service cuts, 108 of which were in the Economic and Rural Development and Tourism Department (ERDT). Notably, cuts in other departments were less publicized. A 40 per cent staffing cut (two of five positions) was applied to the Office of Gaelic Affairs where two positions were lost in its Antigonish satellite office. Rumours also circulated about the possible shuttering of the branch office in Mabou, Inverness County (Rankin 2015a). Almost immediately after the 2015 budget was made public, community and political activists and leaders from Cape Breton and across the province were expressing resistance to the initiatives. Organizations and community/political leaders such as Comhairle na Gàidhlig/The Nova Scotia Gaelic Council, Mabou Development’s David Greenwell, Inverness MLA Allan MacMaster, and Gaelic College CEO Rodney MacDonald expressed publicly, in the legislature, and at meetings with government, their disappointment with the cuts (Rankin 2015a; Rodney MacDonald interview 2015; Greenwell Facebook Post, April 22, 2015; Hansard Nova Scotia House of Assembly Debates, April 10, 2015). The 40 per cent staff cut ‘blindsided’ MacDonald who noted that the cuts came at a time of cultural revitalization. These leaders also pointed out that the Gaelic Affairs office was hit harder, in terms of the percentage in staffing cut, than were similar offices like Acadian Affairs and African-Nova Scotian Affairs. From a region-
building standpoint, MacDonald was using leadership influence and public pressure to resist a provincial cabinet decision adversely affecting Cape Breton’s cultural autonomy, and negotiate for the maintenance of both the Office of Gaelic Affairs and the community branch office in Mabou. ‘It sends a very strong message, if that office should close…it would make a statement. It’s an office, it’s a community where the Gaelic language is a living language for not just seniors but people in the working world and youth.’ He added that one ‘can’t underestimate the contribution that the Gaelic Affairs Office has made to growing the culture on this Island and throughout the province. These cuts have weakened our community profoundly’ (2015a). The Nova Scotia Gaelic Council requested and was granted a meeting with Ministers Delorey (Gaelic Affairs) and Ince (CCH) to discuss and clarify the cuts and direction planned for Gaelic. It seems resistance from Gaelic community leaders had an effect, as the office in Mabou (the only one in Cape Breton) remains open.9

Multi-scalar leadership interactions were also important to securing support for the Celtic Music Interpretive centre in Judique. Its planning committee members (one of which was a former local Liberal MLA) lobbied Rodney MacDonald, Rodger Cuzner (MP for Cape Breton-Canso), and Joe McGuire (ACOA Minister at the time), all of whom were helpful in the realization of the project (Graham interview 2014). And new governance relationships are being established at the local level – The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia has been well received at meetings with municipal representatives, fostering social capital and receiving some financial commitments for Gaelic initiatives (The Gaelic Council of Nova Scotia 2015b). Related to this, municipal leaders in Cape Breton have also acknowledged the importance of fostering culture for region-building. Examples include the hiring of community development officers in the rural counties, Inverness Municipality’s ‘Musical
Coast Initiative’ and support of cultural institutions, and Richmond’s tourism strategy. And under Mayor Clarke’s leadership, CBRM seems to be paying more attention to the role that culture plays in economic development. In June 2014 a report that reviewed CBRM performance venues was tabled. It was prepared by Vibe Creative Group, in collaboration with a partnered steering committee including representatives from CBRM, the Province of Nova Scotia, and ECBC (Vibe Creative Group 2014). Also, in 2014 Joella Foulds of Celtic Colours chaired a mayor’s roundtable to formulate the ‘next steps’ for growing ‘the creative economy and how the municipality can assist’ with region-building supports (CBRM 2014).

Conclusions

The Gaelic or ‘Celtic Fringe’ identity has been an element of continuity across regional constructions and remains prominent as the region redefines and rebuilds itself while moving away from its previous iteration as ‘Industrial Cape Breton/Socialist Island’. While in the last century Gaelic culture moved with migrants to affect and be affected by other cultures, the process was slower and more ‘locked in’, or ‘containerized’ within national economies, borders, and migration vicinities such as Boston and Toronto (Graham 2006; Doherty 2015). Globalization and the accompanying new regional setting created daunting challenges, amongst which were deindustrialization, crippling job losses, and demographic change. But globalization also brought opportunities with accelerated technological innovations that have enabled regional cultural leaders, institutions, and actors to ‘globalize’ the Celtic Fringe by accessing global markets through fostering social and cultural capital, quite often with the click of a computer mouse. In the performing arts scene, musicians became more professionalized and began making an impact internationally, setting
precedents for other culture bearers to take part in the creative economy. Their varied accomplishments and successes increased regional pride and strengthened Island identity. Institution-building, endogenous community-based agency, multi-level governance, and leadership at the centre of government helped regional actors to increasingly incorporate culture into development planning.

At federal, provincial, and municipal scales, institutional actors have played a part in globalizing the Celtic Fringe and building the Island through various supports and initiatives. The Canada Council and ACOA, Department of CCH, and Island municipalities have provided financial backing for cultural artists, projects, and day-to-day operations of cultural institutions. This chapter has explored the workings and creation of a number of these institutions to reveal how they are utilizing distinctive regional cultural attributes for region-building and regional development purposes.

The revamping of provincial program funding and creation of the Office of Gaelic Affairs was indicative of a) how political leadership (in this instance Inverness MLA Rodney MacDonald working as minister and premier) at the government executive level can harness regional development ideas (as depicted in Keating et al. 2003). This was facilitated by a window of opportunity (attaining provincial government mandates at a time of cultural revitalization in Cape Breton) which effected the initiation of formal institutional change; and secondly by a ‘scaling up’ of responsibility for Gaelic culture, whereby jurisdiction and resources to affect Gaelic cultural preservation and promotion was moved from the under-resourced and underpowered informal community and civil society sector (encompassed largely by the ‘informal’ region of Cape Breton), to the well-resourced and empowered (though fiscally-challenged) institutional realm of the provincial government. MacDonald
was also instrumental in bringing the Nova Scotia Highland Village into the Nova Scotia Museum family, providing one of the province’s (and Island’s) most vital culture-promoting and preserving institutions with greater financial capacity and security to carry out its operations. As Minister of CCH, MacDonald also made the controversial decision to scrap and replace the Nova Scotia Arts Council. This initiative saw the creation of a new body that was still able to provide an arms-length jury process for funding allotment, but was less Halifax-centric in terms of jury member composition and funding distribution. The move created more fairness in the sense that organizations and artists in regions outside of Halifax, such as Cape Breton, could have a better chance for accessing funding and other supports.

Other cultural institutions have also been involved in collaboration, partnerships, and regionalization processes in attempts to globalize the Celtic Fringe and build the region. The Gaelic College, currently under Rodney MacDonald’s leadership, made more extensive changes in programming to better reflect the institution’s mandate and the region’s Gaelic culture. The College also partnered with CBU to provide higher education offerings and created online platforms for teaching language and music to a global clientele. An example of new regionalism dynamics at play, Celtic Colours International Festival -- the creation of community leaders and entrepreneurs Joella Foulds and Max MacDonald -- came about because of a federal-provincial diversification agreement signed by a provincial and federal ministers (Richie Mann and David Dingwall, respectively), both of whom represented constituencies in Cape Breton. The festival has utilized cutting-edge technology to market music and culture around the world and extend the Island’s tourism season by drawing thousands of festival goers for the week-long event. The Celtic Music Interpretive Centre (CMIC) was created to preserve and promote the region’s Celtic music and serves as an
example of how community agency and multi-level governance interactions can create an institution that utilizes endogenous cultural strengths for region-building purposes. It has struck a balance between preserving and commodifying culture by hosting performances and a music camp and harnessing technology to sell products and make the Island’s music accessible to a global audience. It has also partnered with other like-minded institutions on the Island and accessed municipal support to commence a regionalized Féis Movement. This more collaborative regionalization process was also seen with the creation of the Celtic Heart of North America Cooperative and Destination Cape Breton, two other institutions which aim to promote a globalized Celtic Fringe as a regionalized and cohesive tourism and culture package. These initiatives and the CMIC depended on guidance and financial support from ECBC, further indication of the Island-based, federal crown corporation’s value to the economic diversification of the Cape Breton region.

The Island has unique cultural attributes, now conjoined with the corresponding cultural institutions required for development. Agency and leadership at the local, provincial, and federal levels, along with a more regionalized vision, are important (as noted by new institutionalists) for making these institutions more salient and effective.

I believe people think of a culturally rich community when they think of Cape Breton. We have a number of institutions which have played a key role in maintaining and expanding that cultural identity… But leadership is always the key. Having committed local people on the ground available to commit long-term to the building of the Island will make the difference. If we can find a vision that all sectors and corners of the Island can buy into, it would be a great start (MacEachern interview 2014).

While opportunities for development in a new regional and globalized setting through harnessing culture are important for regional reconstruction, depending solely on culture to promote growth and development does not appear to be enough (Whalley interview 2014).
Economic benefits have accrued from formal and grass-roots institution-building, developing cultural products, as well as intrinsic, often intangible identity-related value that can bolster community confidence. The Celtic/Gaelic music sector epitomizes this, but one must express caution about the overall economic viability of music and culture as primary career and region-building pursuits: ‘[There are] many, many, many musicians who in fact are the last real bearers of the Gaelic tradition. And they’ve been very successful. The thing is, you can generate an industry from that in tourism, but expanding that sense to, say, encompassing whole communities is at present fraught with some difficulties’ (Hamilton interview 2015). The cultural industries have become an important cog in the economic development wheel, but throughout the period of cultural revitalization of the ‘Celtic Fringe’ – years that have coincided with the onset of globalization – the Island’s population has continued to skid downwards. This shrinking population has become the main challenge that the community is facing, one mentioned by most of the interviewees for this dissertation. The last two decades have seen continuous outmigration. Reiterating alarming introductory comments from Chapter 3, Cape Breton’s population was just over 158,000 in 1996. ‘By 2006, that number dropped 10% to 142,298. The 2011 census reported a further 4.4% decline in population to 135,974. In the past 15 years, the population of Cape Breton Island shrunk by a stunning 14.1%’ (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14 citing Statistics Canada 1996, 2006, 2011). From a development perspective, the Island could benefit from looking to some of its own First Nations communities for inspiration, as some have managed to counter and reverse not only negative population trends, but also development barriers that have persisted for two centuries. This impressive turnaround will be explored in the next chapter.
NOTES

1 Gaelic field officer Jeffrey MacDonald has pointed out that there is an openness for diversity in the province and the world whereby it is expected that ‘the French can speak French and the Mi’kmaw can speak Mi’kmaw.’ However, he suggests that there is still an internalized stigma among Cape Breton Gaels that parallels their genuine love for Gaelic culture, stemming back to persecution and modernization influences. He supports this notion by noting that ‘in Inverness County, when they were trying to get core Gaelic in down at Bayview and Dalbrea [public schools], and the parents [were saying] ‘Oh we love the Gaelic, but they need French to get ahead.’ He says, ‘See, you’ve still got the rational mind saying, ‘can’t do it’ and [on the other hand] crying with how beautiful that [Gaelic] song sounds’ (Interview 2014).

2 These partners include Cape Breton University, St. FX University, NSCAD University, Celtic Heart of North America Cooperative, Sgoil Mhic Fhraing a’ Chaolais/Rankin School of the Narrows, Eskasoni First Nation, Glenora Distillery, Silver Dart Hotel, Castle Moffet, Cabot Trail Motel, Cape Breton B&Bs, and Destination Cape Breton. The Highland Village is also affiliated with various tourism associations and museum organizations, as well as the Island’s Chambers of Commerce (NS Highland Village Annual Report 2013-14, 4).

3 Therefore, soft-soled highland dancing and militarized pipe band music were at the forefront of programming for many years rather than step-dancing, bagpipings for stepdancing, and fiddling. It was not until the last couple of decades that programming began to change and be more reflective of the cultural components practiced in the Island’s Gaelic communities (Graham 2006; Shears 2008).

4 While in government, MacDonald also held positions of Minister responsible for Intergovernmental Affairs, Minister of Tourism, Culture, and Heritage, and Minister of Health Promotion, and Minister of Immigration, and responsibilities for Sport and Recreation, the NS Liquor Corporation and various provincial Acts (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015).

5 For instance, Tom Wallace, president of the Federation for Scottish Culture in Nova Scotia protested that ‘there is an isolationist element in the Gaelic community that is disavowing cultural traditions like Highland dance and competitive piping that borders almost on xenophobia’ (MacIntyre, Chronicle Herald, 2011).
Coined the ‘Dean’ and ‘Master’ of Cape Breton fiddling, Buddy MacMaster was awarded the Order of Canada and inducted into the American Folk Music Hall of Fame.

The previous persons from the community holding this head position were Cape Breton poet Joyce Rankin and former business owner and well-known fiddler/composer Kinnon Beaton. Early in the organization’s mandate, the board was insistent on hiring for the director’s position, someone who possessed business acumen, but more importantly an intimate knowledge of the music and culture. Notably Smith is a business owner and musician with a long held love of Irish and Cape Breton music and has performed regularly with some of Cape Breton’s most well established musicians.

By 2016 the CMIC withdrew from the Celtic Heart Cooperative. Cheryl Smith notes that the CMIC was ‘not seeing much of a return on investment for the $12,500 we spent on membership fees over 5 years’; instead, funds were redirected toward the CMIC’s ‘own marketing initiatives’ including a “Taste of Nova Scotia” membership to market its restaurant. ‘This membership provided immediate benefits to us’ (Interview 2015).

Of note, former NDP finance minister Graham Steele suggested that Gaelic Affairs would have been a sensible place to make funding cuts while he was in government, but the government ultimately maintained the status quo. Ironically he was formally responsible for Acadian Affairs but somehow reasoned that the Gaels of the Celtic Fringe were just that -- a fringe group having a few vocal renegades who would create too much controversy for the government, should the Gaelic Affairs office be hit with cuts (Steele 2014).
CHAPTER 9
UNAMA’KI: FROM MARGINALIZATION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY

“Our young people have this vision and hope that their career and their future is going to be in Membertou, and it’s because they see all these opportunities.” Membertou First Nation senior adviser Dan Christmas (Ayers 2015d)

Indigenous peoples are the fastest growing demographic in Canada. The five First Nation communities of Unama’ki have a combined population of over 8,000, the majority of which feature populations with over 50 per cent under the age of 25. ‘Island First Nations are bracing for a “demographic tsunami” of young people who will be driving economic growth on and off reserves in years ahead’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011, citing Dan Christmas; Fitzgerald, 2011). Aware that opportunities exist for creating employment and in fostering human resource needs on the Island, educated, well-informed and politically astute leaders are leading change in Unama’ki (2011).

Development opportunities are growing for Canada’s indigenous peoples; however, embedded political institutions and uncooperative governments can still constitute a source of tension and challenge as First Nations communities attempt to build themselves socially and economically. For instance, in 2012 the Harper government’s Bills C-45 and C-38 were implemented without proper consultation with First Nations. C-45 amended the *Navigable Waters Protection Act* and removed ‘federal oversight from most of the lakes and rivers in Canada’ with potential environmental impacts threatening the health and livelihood of Indigenous Peoples (Assembly of First Nations 2012); C-38 purportedly infringed on treaty rights by restricting fish habitat protection to instances that did not include, and threatened,
the ‘Mi’kmaq livelihood fishery’ recognized by the Supreme Court’s *Marshall* decision (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2012b). National Indigenous resistance has been strong, yet Indigenous political leaders have to navigate within the system (as flawed as has been shown to be) in order to deliver and maintain funding and services for their communities. Unama’ki community leader, member of the Eskasoni First Nation, and former CBU Mi’kmaw Studies professor Murdena Marshall puts into perspective the dichotomous nature of the political apparatus within which First Nations leaders must work, and the ultimate goals of communal social development, self-governance, and self-reliance for which these communities strive:

Well there are two kinds of leadership in the community. There’s the type that you vote in … Then there is the community leader … And I don’t think the two of them can be carried by one person. Because I see all politicians just pushing the policies of the Indian Affairs [department], which we’ve been fighting since 1492. But it’s what Ottawa says, and these leaders have to abide by [Ottawa’s] principles or else they’ll lose funding. And their main concern, most of them, is to get more funding to appease [their] people. But in doing so, you also injure [the people] in some way, ’cause the policies that they have been fighting for years, now they have to swallow – or have nothing to swallow’ (Interview with Steve Sutherland 2010, 128).

Mi’kmaw leaders in Unama’ki work in that complex context, having to balance community and traditional cultural values with those of development and economic growth. This chapter explores the increasing integration of Unama’ki communities into the local and global economy. Unama’ki regionalization of economic development is analyzed by providing profiles of Unama’ki communities and the strategies and leadership that have been exercised by the Mi’kmaw of Unama’ki to develop their communities and the wider Cape Breton region. Multi-level governance and multi-actor partnering among public, private, and civil society sectors within the new regionalism setting will be noted.
9.1. INSTITUTIONS

Brief profiles will be provided for three Unama’ki communities. Notably the most populous communities of Membertou and Eskasoni are said to receive the most day-to-day, media, and scholarly attention (Gunn interview 2014). However, Membertou and the small rural community of Wagmatcook have been chosen as cases to be covered in the most detail later in the chapter. Membertou is included because it has been one of the country’s most successful First Nations communities in the realm of economic development and serves as an excellent development model from which other communities can learn and/or emulate. The case of Wagmatcook provides insight with regard to how rural Mi’kmaw communities have embraced social development and endogenous strengths that can contribute to region-building. Membertou and Wagmatcook have undertaken unique development initiatives that are pertinent to this dissertation (in the areas of institutionalization, institutional thickening, rescaling, ‘culture-for-development’, and so on) while additionally they provide perspective regarding ‘urban’ versus ‘rural’ development experiences on Unama’ki.

Two of the five Unama’ki communities, Membertou and Eskasoni, are located within CBRM, the province’s second largest municipality. In fact, as noted in Chapter 3, Membertou is just 3 km from Sydney’s downtown core, making it an ‘urban reserve.’ The other communities (including Eskasoni) are considered rural and are located at various locations around the Island’s Bras d’Or Lakes.

Eskasoni First Nation, 50 km from Sydney, is Atlantic Canada’s largest Mi’kmaw community (pop. 4000) with the largest Mi’kmaw-speaking population. It is home of Unama’ki Training Centre, a facility for adult upgrading established in 1990. The centre has
been an invaluable asset, contributing to the social development of Eskasoni and Unama’ki. Graduates from the school ‘include an elementary school principal, registered nurses, teachers, environmental technicians, university and community college students and many others. There are few families in Eskasoni whose lives have not been touched by the Unama’ki Training and Education Centre’ (Unama’ki Training and Education Centre 2015).

Eskasoni is also the home of the Unama’ki Institute of Natural Resources (UINR). Begun in 1999, the UINR’s goals are: to provide resources that work toward equal participation for Mi’kmaq in managing Unama’ki’s natural resources and traditional territory; to strengthen Mi’kmaw natural resource management and research while simultaneously honouring Mi’kmaw world views and traditions; and ‘to partner with other groups sharing the same desire to protect and preserve our resources for future generations’ (Unama’ki Institute of Natural Resources 2015).²

Infrastructure, leadership, culture, and education continue to play important roles in building Eskasoni and Unama’ki. Recent development initiatives in Eskasoni include a new arena and a new supermarket. The community’s website lists over 20 businesses active in the community, including First Nation Construction, a ‘major construction work’ and contracting company with over 200 pieces of heavy equipment and more than 25 years participating in the industry (Eskasoni 2015). On the leadership and culture front, the community claims as its own late respected community leaders such as Dr. Rita Joe, poet laureate of the Mi’kmaw Nation; multi-award-winning fiddler Lee Cremo; and Kji Keptin Alex Denny, the late Grand Captain of the Mi’kmaw Nation. And reinforcing the importance of Mi’kmaw youth education in helping to build Unama’ki, in May of 2015, two Eskasoni men became ‘historic firsts’ when they graduated from CBU with nursing degrees, reflecting the rise in young,
educated Mi’kmak. One of the graduates, Athanasius Sylliboy, reinforced that point: ‘We are lawyers and doctors. We’re educated. We’re opening eyes not only to our own people, but others who might see us as less.’ He also revealed that there is a new generation of educated leadership wishing to represent the Mi’kmaw people where necessary, saying that his desire was ‘to be that mediator that speaks for the Mi’kmak in the hospital who may not have a voice’ (Rankin 2015b).

Potlotek First Nation (Chapel Island, pop. 624) is approximately 70 km south west of Sydney and a short drive from the rural service community of St. Peter’s in Richmond County. Potlotek is recognized for its strong ties to Catholicism and has held a yearly mission since 1742 that draws ‘thousands of Mi’kmaw people’ from the Atlantic region. A number of local businesses operate in Potlotek including a local gas station/convenience store, a ‘Unama’ki-wide Mi’kmaw-owned drama business’, a diving company, an auto-body shop, and an additional new gas station that features a convenience store and a Robin’s Donuts drive-thru. The community houses a band administration centre, recreation and health centre, a sewage and garbage facility, a police department, 118 housing units, and offers a daycare program. In 2013 the community formed the Potlotek Tourist information Centre Society ‘to help create jobs within the community and build partnerships with the tourism industry’ (Potlotek 2015a). The society was inspired by a group of Potletek adult learners and provides learning and skills revitalization in native medicines harvesting (‘an achieved skill from parents through hands on training and oral traditions’); computer literacy; written and oral Mi’kmaw language; life skills, budgeting, and so on (Potlotek 2015a). A human resources centre provides employment-seeking help and training and skills development in such areas
as ‘canoe building, basket weaving, house repairs, heavy equipment, truck driving, first aid, etc.’ (Potlotek 2015b)

Waycobah First Nation (pop. 900) is centrally located on the Bras d’Or Lakes between the Canso Causeway and the tourist village of Baddeck. Its survival can partly be attributed to family resistance to the federal centralization initiative of the 1940s; a few families remained on the reserve despite being denied support and financial assistance from government. Community infrastructure includes a police department, a new fire department, a newly built health centre (2009), and a fitness and recreation centre. In 2007 a new kindergarten-12 school was built in Waycobah. Community revenue comes from a number of enterprises including a gas station, Atlantic Canada’s largest basket shop, a video gaming centre, and ‘fishing enterprises with numerous quotas on a year-round basis.’ The community also hosts a major annual PowWow and fishing derby (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Waycobah.ca 2015).

Moving Towards Unama’ki Autonomy

As the 20th century was ending, Unama’ki communities joined other First Nations across the country in their quest for political and cultural autonomy. Discrimination against indigenous peoples by the mainstream political system was highlighted publically with the 1989 Report of the provincial Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, which provided dark details about, and recommendations to address, the Membertou resident’s wrongful murder conviction in 1971. On the heels of the report, Mi’kmaw communities ‘experimented with a tribal police force, and set up the first Mi’kmaw court at Eskasoni in 1995’ (Morgan 2009, 192; Connors 2001). The police force was created through
a five year, 51-49% funding agreement of almost $1 million between the federal and provincial governments. With only a modest funding increase to $1.3 million towards the end of the agreement, then Membertou Chief and police commissioner Terry Paul declared that the Unama’ki force would fold, since it needed around $1.9 million to function effectively. Paul, reinforcing community self-determination, said that ‘[a]fter many meetings I think one kind of accepts the fact that they’re not going to give any more money’ and stated that the Unama’ki communities ‘have a better chance of getting our people into the [existing] police forces and we’re still going to continue to do whatever we can to make sure our people are involved in policing our people’ (Connors 2001).

Donald Marshall Jr. again became a willing agent of change for the Mi’kmaq in 1996. He was charged with ‘selling eels without a license, fishing out of season, and using illegal nets’ (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative Press Release A 2009; Morgan 2009, 193). He appealed the conviction, basing his case on 1760-61 Peace and Friendship Treaties between the Crown and the Mi’kmaq. A Supreme Court of Canada judgement acquitted Marshall, interpreting that the Treaties gave the Mi’kmaq the right to earn a ‘moderate livelihood’ through trading game and fish (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2009; Morgan 2009, 193). A fishing license ‘buy-back’ -- from established and willing non-Native fishers -- ensued whereby the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans redistributed licenses to First Nations throughout the Maritime provinces. Opportunities for community development resulted for all five Unama’ki communities. Eskasoni First Nation, for instance, received 35 lobster licenses and was able to employ 100 people in a profitable region-building enterprise (Morgan 2009, 193).
‘Pioneering’ institutionalization by community business leaders occurred in Unama’ki in the 1990s. It laid a foundational path for further development in the new century. In the late 1990s the proposed Sable Offshore Development Project (Sable) was depicted as one that could yield potential economic opportunity for Mi’kmaw businesses. A number of individuals from the Mi’kmaw community became involved in negotiating involvement of the Mi’kmaq in the project. A key actor was Eric Christmas (then head of the Ulnooweg Development Group and Director of Corporate Affairs, Wagmatcook First Nation) who moved on to become the industry liaison officer for the Sable energy project between 1998 and 2001. Aboriginals from Unama’ki and various Sable players wanted to incorporate ‘native content’ (companies and staff) into Sable’s operations. Christmas’s involvement began with an aboriginal trade show. The Sable Offshore group was invited so that Indigenous companies and owners could network with its representatives and shore up business for the project. After the trade show, Christmas was invited to work with Sable. About a week later, lead player and Diversity Management Group owner Robert Bernard was invited to assist Christmas to work with Sable on potential contracts. He also became Industry Liaison Officer for Sable from 1998-2002. Soon thereafter, Christmas began the process of forming an aboriginal alliance of companies for work on Sable, recruiting business leaders to be involved, including Tim Donham of Kings Security and Locksmithing; Darrell Bernard of Kukwes Consultants (member of the Alliance from 1998-2003) and Christopher Googoo, manager of Ulnooweg Development Group (Alliance executive board member between 2001-2003).

In 1999 a meeting was held to bring together companies that could potentially capitalize on the Sable project. The Aboriginal Alliance of Companies (The Aboriginal
Alliance) emerged from the meeting and an executive was chosen. The group of 40-45 companies organized and worked together to reach a common goal of providing a ready and skilled workforce for the Sable offshore project. The companies looked for ways to build capacity within the companies and more broadly within the communities. Christmas informed Mi’kmaw communities of the training and investments required to secure contracts and employment, linking them to the needs of the Sable Offshore project leaders. The goal was to have job-ready individuals prepared to be employed when needed (e.g. through construction safety training). One focus area was pinpointing how companies would be promoted. ‘Reverse’ trade shows proved effective, whereby potential industry partners (e.g. trade unions and NSCC campuses), including government representatives, were hosted and networked with the Aboriginal Alliance.

Many of the partnerships formed were those between Alliance companies, with investment coming from Sable itself. Companies in the Alliance with less capacity benefited from seeing the ‘bigger picture’, for instance in the area of training, through working with larger companies. The Public Affairs Manager for Exxon Mobile and Imperial Oil additionally suggested that the company prioritize trying to provide benefits to the communities in which it operated, as a matter of policy. Reflecting on measurable success produced from the Alliance-Sable process, Christmas stated that ‘the direct benefit in terms of both contracts, the valuation for the jobs, investment into community ventures, was $2.5 million.

Through the same period, the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq were establishing a stronger bargaining position with regard to rights, land, resources, title, and the related consultation processes. Dan Christmas, Senior advisor for Membertou First Nation, pointed out that a BC
court decision -- *Delgamuuk v. British Columbia* -- had ‘provided a new definition for aboriginal title in Canada’ and ‘really strengthened the Mi’kmaq claim to lands and resources in this part of the world’ (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2005). On this basis of increased legal recognition of rights, the Mi’kmaq decided to intervene in the Sable project to assert their rights; the door was opened for consultation between leadership from Sable, the Nova Scotia Government, and the aboriginal community. The Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs applied for and received approval to stand before the environmental assessment panel set up to address the Sable project. On top of dealing with land, taxation, and other issues at this hearing, the Assembly also requested that an economic benefits agreement be formed between the two main Sable Offshore companies and the Mi’kmaq people. With the Sable companies and the federal and provincial governments realizing that a $4 billion project could be disrupted if Mi’kmaq leaders brought the process before the courts, the negotiation table became more attractive. Out of this a ‘Made in Nova Scotia’ process of collaborative consultation emerged and became institutionalized.

Throughout this period, leading into 2003-2004, the Supreme Court’s Marshall decision directed attention away from offshore projects to the fishing industry, leading the Aboriginal Alliance to shift its attention away from the offshore sector. In 2001 Christmas moved on to work with Membertou First Nation. Bernard stayed with the Alliance until 2003. On the ‘fizzling out’ of Sable, Alliance members suggest that aboriginal and other governments could have been more supportive, but also recognized that hoped-for opportunities for future growth were not being realized and the future of the offshore industry was far from predictable. While the project did not provide the anticipated long-term employment, it did facilitate skills development and some players went on to be successful
with other ventures. Most importantly, Mi’kmaw leadership was able to assert their claim to Treaty Rights and Aboriginal Title while the Aboriginal business community was concomitantly maturing.

Meanwhile, other partnerships emerged during the Sable period. CBU, in partnership with Sable Offshore, initiated a new integrative science program (which combined western and indigenous science approaches) with the intention of encouraging more Mi’kmaw participation in post-secondary programming. Early on, approximately 50 Mi’kmaw students participated in the program. These combined developments that emerged in the Aboriginal Alliance era helped to empower the Unama’ki business community. Linkages were created and social and human capital developed, better preparing Unama’ki residents and institutions to take advantage of new opportunities such as the Sydney Tarponds cleanup/remediation (see below).

Institutional Advances

In the era of globalization Unama’ki communities are autonomy-seeking and pursuing integrative alternatives to the embedded institutional constraints of the last two centuries. Putting past differences aside, Unama’ki communities have joined mainland Mi’kmaq and other Indigenous Peoples across the country in forming agreements surrounding rights and title with the Crown, which aim to address Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed in the Constitution (Sec. 35), treaties, and judicial interpretation. In that context the Mi’kmaw people see opportunity and ‘freedom to try new approaches and negotiate new things without being stuck with Canada’s old and outdated Indian policies’ (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2005).
An important juncture for Mi’kmaw autonomy and development was the signing of a Mi’kmaq-Nova Scotia-Canada Framework Agreement on June 7, 2002. The umbrella agreement between the three parties ‘recognized there are outstanding constitutional rights issues amongst them, including the inherent right to self-government, Aboriginal rights, including assertions of title, and treaty issues’ and ‘that they will take into account the unique circumstances of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia when developing their mandates and that their positions may differ from Canada's Comprehensive Land Claims Policy’ [as Crown-Mi’kmaq treaties did not cede lands, see Ayers 2015c)] (Government of Canada Mi’kmaq - Nova Scotia - Canada Framework Agreement 2002). The agreement acknowledges that federal and provincial representatives of the Crown have a constitutional obligation ‘to consult aboriginal people on government policy and development’ that could adversely affect treaty rights and Aboriginal rights (Ayers 2015c; also see Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2015; Canada-Nova Scotia Memorandum of Understanding 2012). 4 In 2010 a tripartite agreement -- the Mi’kmaq-Nova Scotia-Canada Terms of Reference (TOR) – was finalized. It is a guiding document to be ‘used by Canada and Nova Scotia to consult, in a more efficient and effective manner, with the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia on proposed activities or projects that affect them’ (Government of Canada 2012; Government of Canada Mi’kmaq - Nova Scotia - Canada Framework Agreement 2015). The TOR has been utilized by the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq and the Province to develop a number of innovative consultation practices such as the consultation roundtable. Roundtables are comprised of bilateral committees gathered to discuss and consult on various sectors such as fisheries, mining, transportation, energy, infrastructure, and the environment. Committees include representation from the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw community, the NS Office of Aboriginal Affairs, ‘the lead department responsible
for the sector’, and occasionally federal departments and proponents (Government of Nova Scotia 2015b, 24).^5

In October 2012, as a result of focusing on implementation of the TOR, the Province of Nova Scotia and Canada signed the Canada-Nova Scotia Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation Regarding Duty to Consult (Nova Scotia Office of Aboriginal Affairs 2015). Additionally in 2012, the 2009 Proponents Guide for consultation was updated. *The Proponents' Guide: Engagement with the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia* acknowledges that proponents (third parties) do not have a legal duty to consult; however, ‘governments delegate procedural aspects of consultation to third parties’ and this guide outlines the process that should be followed (Nova Scotia Office of Aboriginal Affairs 2015).

In and of itself, the Mi’kmaw institutional governance structure is consultative and collaborative. The Chiefs and Councils are elected (as per the Indian Act) to act as decision-makers and represent their communities’ interests to government. All thirteen NS Mi’kmaw communities signed the 2010 TOR while presently one consults independently (Government of Nova Scotia 2015b, 11). The Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs is composed of 13 chiefs and 2 ex-officio members, and has support staff and advisors. Two Chiefs co-chair the Assembly while most chiefs take on portfolio responsibilities in such areas as mining, wildlife, fisheries, lands, forestry, and so on. The Assembly is a major player ‘in collective decision making for the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia, particularly on issues pertaining to Mi’kmaw rights and governance’, and ‘on behalf of 12 Mi’kmaw communities under the TOR, heads negotiations with the federal and provincial governments, overseeing the consultation process. It meets regularly to discuss consultation-related issues (2015, 11).
Another organization representing the negotiations ‘on behalf of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia’ is Kwilmu’kw Maw-klusuaqn (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative). This group of researchers, negotiators, and Mi’kmaq advisors was ‘developed by the Mi’kmaq, for the Mi’kmaq’; its office is called the Kwilmu’kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office (KMNO) and is considered ‘the main interface of consultation’ for the 12 Mi’kmaw communities and falls under the directives of the Assembly (2015, 12; Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2015).

The Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative outlines 5 pillars that highlight autonomy seeking, rescaling, and integration/resistance through fostering identity, community, development, and governance:

1. To achieve recognition, acceptance, implementation and protection of treaty, title, and other rights of the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia;
2. To develop systems of Mi’kmaw governance and resource management;
3. To revive, promote and protect a healthy Mi’kmaq identity;
4. To obtain the basis for a shared economy and social development; and
5. To negotiate toward these goals with community involvement and support (Quoted from Mi’maq Rights Initiative 2015).

Institutional evolution, so to speak, is occurring and increasing and creating opportunities for the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia and Unama’ki to have an endogenous effect on development. It could be suggested that, with accumulation of court judgements reiterating the federal duty to consult and the ‘fleshing out’ of formal institutions’ consultation processes, that informal rules of engagement are becoming embedded, especially where proponents are concerned. Aboriginal lawyer and former Membertou CEO Bernd Christmas notes that (with regard to proponents and financial compensation to affected First Nations): ‘In legal terms, there’s no requirement for economic accommodation, but in practical terms, it seems to happen on almost every case that I’ve come across’ (Ayers 2015c). Unama’ki communities have been involved in proponent consultations for the purposes of sustainable economic development.
Since 2004 the KMNO has been engaging with a number of proponents encompassing a diverse array of public and private sector developments; in 2015 it is involved in over 100 consultations with some of Nova Scotia’s major corporations (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2015). Other consultation initiatives affecting Unama’ki include The Atlantic Salmon Conservation Harvesting Plan and the Atlantic Salmon Species at Risk Listings.

The KMNO has recommended Mi’kmaw ecological knowledge and Mi’kmaw fisheries studies be completed for such projects as those above and has worked with corporations, relevant government departments and Mi’kmaw institutions such as Mi’kmaq Conservation Group and Unama’ki Institute of Natural Resources in the process (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2014). And in 2013, the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs and Port Hawkesbury Paper representatives signed an MOU that commits both parties to work together towards a Socio-economic Benefits Agreement ensuring Mi’kmaw participation and employment in the industry and mill’s operations, and finalization of an environmental agreement (Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative 2013).

Another collaborative change involves land codes. These agreements transfer control of Aboriginal land development from the federal government to communities (in a sense, rescaling made possible by ‘flexible federalism’); Crown lands cannot be sold, but can be utilized for revenue generation. In January, 2012, Membertou joined a First Nations land management regime with 18 other First Nations across the country. It lets communities ‘opt out of provisions in Canada's Indian Act relating to land use’ and ‘borrow money by using its land as collateral’ (CBC News 2012b). A national organization called The Lands Advisory Board (LAB) aids First Nations in developing land codes. LAB chairman Robert Louis noted that 25 per cent of Canada’s First Nations already have a land code, are in the process of
developing one, or have been placed on a waiting list to create one. Communities that have land codes enjoy up to 10 times economic returns of investment and perform better financially than those that do not. ‘First Nations are becoming far less dependent upon federal funding than they have ever been in the past, so it's a very positive thing and it's probably one of the main reasons the Department of Indian Affairs has demonstrated their ongoing support for this very important initiative’ (Ayers 2014a quoting Louis). Conclusively, consultation rules and land codes initiatives are creating opportunities for more endogenous First Nations development.

8.2. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

‘Many business and political leaders across Canada marvel at what is often referred to as the “Membertou miracle.” A small, impoverished community has become an economic generator for its people, the people of CBRM and indeed the province of Nova Scotia’

Keith Brown, 2015.

The Membertou Experience

Strong leadership and management capabilities have been main factors in community-building and improving the lives of Membertou First Nation residents in the era of globalization (Brown 2015). Prominent agents of economic and social change on this urban reserve of 1200 were Chief Terry Paul, and lawyer and administrator/CEO Bernd Christmas (Sutherland 2010; Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). Around 2000, Christmas was working at a Bay Street law firm when he received a call from Membertou First Nation Chief Terry Paul to come back to work for the people of Membertou. Membertou was in financial duress, ‘a state of dependence’ (Terry Paul, quoted in Sutherland 2010, 39). Upon
deliberating with band council, they decided that their financial problems should be addressed by recruiting community-born leaders who had gone away to gain work experience and earn their formal education. Christmas matched the criteria and he accepted the Chief’s request to come back to Membertou (Sutherland 2010, 40).

When Christmas arrived, Membertou was working with a $4.5 million budget and facing a $1 million deficit. The unemployment rate was 95% with only 30 people employed by the band. Under the leadership of Paul and Christmas, Membertou pursued economic development through partnerships with the private sector and government (Morgan 2009, 193). Christmas embarked on courting government support for entry into what would turn out to be a ‘very successful’ foray into the gaming industry; by 2014, net revenues from gambling totalled $11 million’ (Bernt Christmas interview with Steve Sutherland, 2009; Ayers 2015d). While working to reduce the band’s deficit, Membertou leadership attracted a number of well-established multi-nationals to locate to the reserve and, with the support of Aboriginal Business Canada and the federal Business Development Program and a $2 million Band investment, secured a multi-million-dollar Membertou Trade and Convention Centre for the community. A pedway now links the busy facility to a new hotel and other new businesses dot the community (see below).

When Christmas left in 2006, Membertou First Nation boasted $45 million in assets, 500 employees, a budget of $76 million, and had eliminated its deficit (Sutherland 2010, 40). Chief Paul noted the importance of Christmas’s leadership to the turnaround. ‘He’s brought us to where we are today. I know that it takes a group effort, but you need a fantastic leader to be able to accomplish the dreams people have. And that’s what I feel we did while Bernd was here’ (Terry Paul, 2006, quoted in Sutherland, 2010).
the reserve had risen to over 600, a significant difference from the mere 37 employed during the 1990s ‘crisis’ period:

In the mid-90s, Membertou was totally dependent on government funding and had 95% unemployment. With a focus on education and business, today it has almost full employment for its residents and 40% of those employed in Membertou are not Aboriginal. Membertou now generates 75% of its own revenue through its community businesses, business investments and partnerships (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

By 2014, 83% of Membertou’s revenue sources were from community ventures. The revenues ‘have enabled the band to pay for social services and programs beyond the funding provided by the federal government’ (Ayers 2015d). And between 2011 and 2015 Membertou was pursuing further opportunities for change and economic development. In 2011 the 33,000 square foot Membertou Business Centre was opened; 2012 saw the arrival of a 148 room Hampton Inn (by Hilton Membertou) and the opening of its 5500 square foot Membertou Heritage Park; in 2013 the 22,000 square foot Membertou Professional Centre was opened. By 2014 the community’s financials were strong with ‘a cash surplus of around $4 million (Ayers 2015d) while the community also saw growth in housing, membership, land acquisition, land governance, and social program services. The future Membertou Sport and Wellness Centre – equipped with a community fitness centre, walking track, and 1250 seat arena – was in the works. Additionally, in September of 2014, ‘with a financial assistance of $5.9 million from Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey,’ construction of a new community elementary school was completed (Membertou Annual Report 2014).7

In the fall of 2014, the community hosted the Lands Advisory Board AGM and announced that as early as 2015, Membertou would be ready to enter into a land code agreement with the federal government. Membertou’s senior advisor Dan Christmas noted
that a land code would increase efficiency in reaching development agreements with businesses. He suggested that, although Membertou development ‘has been rapid,’ reaching business deals has been ‘like swimming upstream’ as the ‘old and cumbersome’ Indian Act has been ‘restrictive’ to business development on reserves. Christmas reflected on the new opportunities that could arise from the final agreement: ‘I think the land code is almost like switching the direction of the stream here. At least we'll be going with the stream and it's going to be very interesting to see how much quicker we can do business…Our goal is to be able to do business at the speed of business’ (Ayers 2014a).

While the story of Membertou’s rise has been called a ‘miracle’, the descriptor does not do justice to the leading players and human agency involved. Leadership, planning, partnerships, rescaling and multi-scalar institutional agency, flexible federalism, and plain hard work and dedication have turned around the economic fortunes of the community. However, development does not come without its challenges and critics. The Indian Act restricts First Nations from using real estate as securities on loans, limiting them to receiving short-term loans from lending institutions. However, Membertou overcame this barrier by partnering with the First Nations Finance Authority, an institution that can provide financing instruments that are similarly available to provincial governments. This has allowed Membertou to secure longer term loans for items such as sub-division and infrastructure development and housing needs (Canadian Business Journal 2015; Withers 2015).

An earlier 2003 ‘snapshot in time’ analysis of Membertou provided challenges faced by the community that included addressing quality leadership succession, ‘attitudinal change’ (e.g. elders lamenting economic development as an avenue towards cultural loss) and continued development of human capital (Scott 2004). Yet from the experiences described
above, those challenges are being addressed. Development, using the dissertation’s definition, encompasses more than economic parameters. It is also inclusive from a regional perspective. ‘Today, the Nation emphasizes creating employment opportunities, education for children, and supporting the economic growth of the Membertou First Nation on and off the reserve’ while also ‘Membertou First Nation is not just interested in its own success, and finds equal importance in enriching the entire community and its surrounding areas. This means working hard and bringing business development to other areas across Sydney’ (Canadian Business Journal 2015). Figure 3 encapsulates Membertou’s successful development model.

Regionalizing Development with the Unama’ki Model and the Unama’ki Economic Benefits Office

The Membertou experience has both informed, and is a part of the Unama’ki model, a First Nations model for economic development and training. The region’s Mi’kmaw
communities recognized that through industrialization and into the 20th century, thousands of Cape Bretoners derived economic and social benefit from the coal and steel industries but there was minimal Mi’kmaw participation. In the setting of the new global economy, Mi’kmaw leaders prepared themselves to take action and embrace opportunities for economic development in their communities. An economic development model was derived from a regionalized approach taken by the five Unama’ki communities. It is ‘community driven’ and ‘not driven by government’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Fitzgerald 2011). The approach involves collaboration between Unama’ki, business, and government and involves forming partnerships based on ‘recognizing industry needs and then working to fill those needs’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Fitzgerald 2011).

In 2007 an Unama’ki Economic Benefits steering committee was formed. Composed of two to three leaders from each of the five Unama’ki communities, the steering committee’s immediate goals were to secure ‘near term economic benefits’ in the form of jobs and contracts for the communities. The committee also planned to strengthen long-term economic capacity and expertise within the communities and recognized an immediate opportunity in the federal government announcement of the $4 billion Sydney Tar Ponds remediation megaproject. When reflecting on past agreements with business -- that had called for Aboriginal involvement in various development initiatives -- the committee could see that aboriginal involvement seldom occurred. They recognized the need for business savvy individuals and an office to follow up on agreements such as MOUs and transform the intentions into tangible action (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Fitzgerald 2011). The steering committee submitted a proposal to the federal and provincial governments asking them to partner with the Unama’ki communities in establishing an office for that purpose.
ECBC and government partners involved with the Sydney Tar Ponds clean-up project -- Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) and the Nova Scotia Department of Transportation and Infrastructure Renewal -- partnered with the five Unama’ki communities in creating the Unama’ki Economic Benefits Office (UEBO), which opened in July, 2007. Sydney business leader Owen Fitzgerald became the Executive Director of the office, which staffs seven employees (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

The Sydney Tar Ponds clean-up initiative was a transformational project for the five Unama’ki communities. Years of negotiation and planning yielded an agreement that saw $19 million in Tar Ponds ‘set-asides’ contract work go to the Unama’ki Mi’kmaq. The communities worked with PWGSC to develop and implement a plan to build capacity and create employment. A goal was set to reach 75% Aboriginal employment for the set-asides; they attained a rate of 82% (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Fitzgerald 2011). The Unama’ki approach was utilized uniquely in the area of contract work: it was shared among the top three bidders rather than awarded to the top bidder. The plan offered incentives to have training and mentorship provided whenever possible; in turn the UEBO assured that it ‘had the capacity to provide support for the individual workers and for the Aboriginal businesses’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). The Tar Ponds project built community and business capacity and confidence within the Unima’ki communities and resulted in the creation of 200 jobs, contracts worth $72 million, hiring of two Eskasoni construction companies to complete multi-million dollar Tar Ponds contracts, and a widened scope of the Economic Benefits Office’s outreach through pursuing new partnerships and economic opportunities (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).
Recognizing that long-term economic success for Unama’ki would depend on education and training, the Steering Committee submitted ‘a long-term training proposal’ for Unama’ki to the federal government. Human Resource Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) responded by funding the training program to the tune of $3.4 million over four years. Titled the Unama’ki ASEP Training Project (Unama’ki Partnership for Prosperity), the program was designed to partner with industry and to tie training to industry needs. A number of programs were delivered through the NSCC Marconi Campus, the Strait Campus, or directly within the Unama’ki communities. To ensure that the Unama’ki ASEP training program goals were being met, a two stage monitoring program was administered, beginning with training monitoring and followed by workplace monitoring (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

HRSDC provided Unama’ki an additional $2.13 million in funding for training in 2008 and $1.3 million in 2009. The funding was delivered by the Economic Benefits Office and resulted in ‘a very successful skills development project’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). Federal minister Dianne Finley noted how the federal government was ‘taking action’ in helping First Nations improve employment skills. The government’s Economic Action Plan was providing ‘training and skills development opportunities for Aboriginal people in the Cape Breton area’ with the project allowing ‘community members to remain close to home and secure long-term employment’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

With the Tar Ponds clean-up project finishing between 2013 and 2014, Unama’ki leaders had positioned themselves to embrace other opportunities in the new economy. UEBO Director Alex Paul noted that ‘[n]ew [Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership] (ASEP) funding allowed Unama’ki Economic Benefits Office to broaden its efforts in new
areas of the economy such as port development, environmental remediation and green energy’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011; Fitzgerald 2011).

A wider range of partners was assembled as a Board of Directors to steer the ASEP training project. The board included the five Unama’ki Chiefs and other community leaders and also partner representation from industry, government, and the education sector. Industry partners joining the Board were the Sydney Tar Ponds Agency, Devco, Sydney Marine Group, and Newpage (now Port Hawkesbury Paper), while other partners included NSCC, PWGSC, the Nova Scotia Department of Labour-Workforce Development, and other Mi’kmaw economic development organizations such as the Mi’kmaq Employment Training Secretariat, the Ulnooweg Development Corporation, and Unama’ki College, CBU. (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). These leaders and partners were vital to the training program, the results it produced, and the development of social capital that emerged: ‘What makes the Unama’ki Economic Benefits Office, and in particular, the ASEP program, so successful, is the energy, enthusiasm and professionalism that the members of the Steering Committee and Training Committee bring to the table as an advisory committee’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

Strong leadership, planning, and continued partnering paid off with tangible results by the end of 2011: 316 trained or training clients from across the Unama’ki communities; 416 assessments of potential clients for training; 148 clients employed full-time; a number of new training programs launched. Notably much of the training was delivered in the communities by, or on the campuses of, NSCC. Training programs designed to fulfill the employment needs of partners were also underway or set to commence. These included training for EMERA, its sister company Nova Scotia Power, Bell Aliant, and the Canadian
Coast Guard College in Point Edward. The UEBO also partnered with paper company NewPage to promote recruitment and training of Unama’ki employees, which turned out to be a resounding success (all of those trained became employed), and could be said to be a precursor arrangement to the MOU the Mi’kmaq signed with Port Hawkesbury Paper (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011).

Additional partnering in 2011 provided more opportunities for Unama’ki. In May of that year, Irving Shipbuilding CEO Jim Irving ‘announced his commitment to the new Centre for Sustainability in Energy and the Environment (CSEE)’ at CBU. A $500,000 donation funded undergraduate and graduate scholarships in environmental management and remediation, with Irving emphasizing that there was ‘a growing bond between industry and the aboriginal community’ (Unama’ki Annual Report 2011). More recently, Alex Paul of the Mi’kmaw Economic Benefits Office and community employment officers recognized a skills gap in the region created a failure for it to accommodate infrastructure projects. They ‘wanted to find ways to fill the need for skilled labour without having to go outside the community’ (King 2015). A partnership between the Office and Membertou created a ‘26-week on-the job training program to learn the basics of concrete finishing’. The newly acquired skills will allow youth and other locals to work on projects in the community and region. ‘The program could also be exported to other communities’ (King paraphrasing Paul 2015).

9.3 CULTURE AND IDENTITY

While the economic success of Membertou is well-known and celebrated, less known is the community’s connection to social development and to its culture. Membertou leaders
note that it ‘is a community first and foremost, the Mi’kmaq culture and heritage is something that is held closely and protected’ (Membertou Annual Report 2014). Alongside the above economic initiatives and strategies, the community utilizes its unique culture for economic integration, community and region-building. In September 2014, the community hosted its 12th Annual Powwow. The non-competitive event attracted ‘visitors from across the Maritimes’ (Ayers, 2014). Evan GooGoo, a dancer from Wagmatcook, emphasized the impact that such cultural events have on social and cultural development: dancing represents and reflects stories about the Mi’kmaw people. ‘It’s also to inspire our children. We want to pass on these teachings and be a positive role model. It’s being proud of who we are …When you look at the struggles of our people over the years, the residential school survivors, we respect the people who fought for us by following their teachings’ (2014). The importance of authenticity is reflected in his comments and is a common theme when it comes to using cultural tourism for economic development in Unama’ki communities (CBU-FA 2011). All five Unama’ki communities support cultural tourism promotion, whether through supporting individual arts and crafts initiatives, or wider scale events such as Powwows (Brown et al. 2008; CBU-FA 2011).

But indigenous cultural tourism in Cape Breton is ‘a business venture still in the state of becoming. Because this is a relatively new market, there are as many opportunities as there are challenges’ (CBU-FA 2011; Pyke et. al 2008). The federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs was mandated ‘with the task of promoting cultural tourism development initiatives within Canada’s First Nations’ and advocated creating business plans by facilitating ‘institutional linkages’ between orders of government, their departments and
agencies, and private sector marketers and tourism developers (CBU-FA 2011; Pyke et al. 2008).

Unama’ki leaders recognize ‘the uniqueness of each community and its tourism offerings was a cultural strength for the entire Mi’kmaq cultural venture’; they note that ‘Cape Breton’s Mi’kmaq need to speak with a single voice if they are to fully realize their cultural tourism potential’; a cohesive, regional approach to cultural tourism involving multi-level/multi sector partnerships is the way forward (CBU-FA 2011; Pyke et al. 2008). Membertou, Waycobah, and Wagmatcook have embraced the value of promoting endogenous cultural strengths as a tourism product, through supporting construction of tourism-related facilities and amenities (CBU-FA 2011; Pyke et al 2008). The case of Wagmatcook illustrates these insights.

Wagmatcook: Embracing Cultural Tourism and Partnerships in Education

The community of Wagmatcook is located near Baddeck, approximately a 50 minute drive from the Canso Causeway on the Bras d’Or Lakes. Recently established operations in Wagmatcook include a Smoke and Tobacco Shop, a youth centre, and a fitness centre (Wagmatcook First Nation 2015). More notably it has utilized cultural tourism for community economic development, and as of late is embracing partnerships in education. Wagmatcook and the other Unama’ki communities have joined forces and created a regional body -- the Unama’ki Tourism Association (UTA). The UTA supports sustainable and competitive tourism and provides regional coordination and leadership in the tourism sector. It works ‘with industry partners and stakeholders to grow Aboriginal tourism through activities such as marketing, research, product development and training’ (Unama’ki Tourism
The UTA website takes note of the Wagmatcook Heritage and Cultural Centre, established in 2001 as a cultural tourism institution that interweaves other aspects of development with its culture offerings. ‘Mi’kmaw cultural interpretation centres are presently the primary way in which Mi’kmaw culture is shared with tourists’; Wagmatcook’s is one of three such centres in Nova Scotia (Lynch 2009, 19). It is equipped for conventions and meetings and houses a restaurant and gift shop that features authentic Mi’kmaw art and crafts, ‘some of the best on the Island’ (Wagmatcook Centre 2015). It has partnered with the Celtic Colours International Festival to showcase concerts and since 2011 hosts the annual Wagmatcook Aboriginal Art and Culture Festival.

Through the centre’s website, global audiences interested in Mi’kmaw perspectives on culture and development can access a video archive. One particular video, *The Four Elements: A Return to Balance* (2009), documents a Wagmatcook community initiative -- Wagmatcook First Nation Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations Project -- that brings together perspectives on how the community can adapt to climate change and its effects, for instance by incorporating the climate change issue into Wagmatcook’s Community Plan. The network is ‘an initiative [which aims] to enhance the communications and promotion of the Wagmatcook Culture & Heritage Centre … and has since proved to be a significant communications tool for the community’ (Wagmatcook Centre 2005).

In August 2014, a $3-$4 million renovation created a Nova Scotia Community College (NSCC) satellite Learning Centre that opened in Wagmatcook (Gunn interview 2014). The community owns and operates the centre while NSCC offers programs in electrical and industrial construction, plumbing, and – in keeping with linking culture and identity with development -- Mi’kmaw health and wellness (Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey
The Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton have asserted their right to self-determination. They have been able to work cooperatively (often through institutionalization and institutional agency at multiple scales) in laying claim to their Charter and Treaty rights, education
system, and insistence on being consulted by third parties when development affects their lands and rights. Advances in structuring an institutional framework for the consultation process were discussed. The federal and provincial governments and their lead and supporting departments, agencies, and offices have come together collaboratively with the Unama’ki Mi’kmaq to construct these guiding consultation documents. While governments have been active in this process, some governments more than others have shown that they wish to interact in good faith with First Nations. While the chapter noted some positive development initiatives occurring under the Harper Government’s watch, Bills C-45 and C-38 had detrimental implications for Mi’kmaw and First Nations’ societies. The Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative -- the advocacy institution created by the Mi’kmaq for the Mi’kmaq -- has been a strong voice against such measures and throughout the consultation-building process.

Unama’ki Mi’kmaq, especially in Membertou, have demonstrated their ability to collaborate, form partnerships, and gain control over their lands through land codes, in order to pursue economic development. Political and community leadership, as displayed by community and region-builders such as former Membertou CEO Bernt Christmas and Chief Terry Paul, have driven development in Membertou and Unama’ki. In the globalized era, harnessing culture and identity has factored into economic development and cultural tourism in Unama’ki, whether through powwows, handicrafts and arts, or building cultural interpretive centres, as revealed through the notable example of Wagmatcook.

*Toward a Cohesive Unama’ki?*

The question of an Unama’ki regionality is still being sorted out. Regional awareness, agency, institutionalization, and integration with a globalized economy, are present (e.g. with common resistance through the Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative, a regional benefits office and
tourism body, partnerships with government and multi-national companies, and a cohesive emphasis on cultural maintenance). However, as with unity issues occurring between other economic development players and institutions in Cape Breton, strains between community/cultural interests and economic interests still exist in Unama’ki (Scott 2004), as well as community competition and rivalry, leading one to question the future of a regional approach to development (Gunn interview 2014). While difficult to measure, it could be argued that the project of building Unama’ki regionality is an ongoing process experiencing ‘hills and valleys’ with regard to social trust. Tom Gunn cautiously suggests that, although Unama’ki has produced a collaborative approach with development partners, community and intra-regional divisions still exist.

The Unama’ki Chiefs had a really strong identity together, but then there’s been a lot of pull to create that as a Nova Scotia identity and that might be doing a disservice to Cape Breton, like for the strength of the five Cape Breton communities working together. There may not be as strong a unity amongst the five Cape Breton communities as you had several years ago … Membertou and Eskasoni have created [an] economic partnership called Memski which again is Industrial Cape Breton-based. And so then you have the three rural bands, being Wagmatcook, Wacobah, and Potlettek that are kind of on the … fringe. So there are some really interesting dynamics happening there right now (Interview 2014).

Another challenge/barrier faced by Unama’ki economic development players is stereotyping and racism. Cape Breton Partnership CEO Keith MacDonald – who notes the proactive and positive approach being taken by Unama’ki communities – speaks of the challenge they face, revealing that both the entrepreneurial culture of Cape Breton and the possibility of a united cultural front has yet to fully mature. ‘We still have a ways to go in convincing people that First Nations are ready for work and they have a lot of stereotypes about First Nations
people. But I still think that’s decreasing…but I still hear some negative reactions to, you know, some of the work Membertou and Eskasoni is doing’ (Interview 2014)

Regardless of these challenges, Unama’ki communities serve as good leadership and development examples – through institutional adaptations, institution-building, networking, partnering, training, culture building and maintaining -- that other communities in Cape Breton and elsewhere can emulate as they try to integrate into the global economy in the new regional setting of multi-scalar and multi-actor region-building.

________________________
NOTES

1 Unama’ki profile information is based on and cited from Unama’ki Annual Report 2011 unless otherwise noted.

2 UINR partners have included Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Parks Canada, Cape Breton municipalities, the province of Nova Scotia, Cape Breton University, New Page, Georgia Pacific, and a number of other organizations and government departments (Unama’ki Institute of Natural Resources 2015).

3 One Handshake at a Time: Mi’kmaw First Nation Involvement in the Sable Offshore Energy Project (2007), a featured video sponsored by Exxon Mobile and produced by the community of Wagmatcook’s Diversity Management Group, highlights pioneering Unama’ki region-building initiatives during the onset of the globalized era. This chapter section about opportunities arising from the Sable Offshore Project is based on the video and paraphrases and quotes comments from the leaders mentioned.

4 The duty to consult is linked to 2004 and 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decisions (mikmaqrights.com/consultation/), outlined, for instance, in the Canada-Nova Scotia MOU on Cooperation Regarding Duty to Consult where it states in 3.4 ‘The common law duty to consult is based on judicial interpretation of the obligation of the Crown. In the Haida, Taku
River, Mikisew Cree and Little Salmon/Carmacks decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal obligation to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate, when the Crown contemplates conduct that might adversely impact Aboriginal or treaty rights (established or potential) of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, recognized in section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982’ (Canada-Nova Scotia MOU 2012).

5 The “Government of Nova Scotia Policy and Guidelines: Consultation with the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia” document states that a ‘proponent’, or ‘project proponent’ may include, but is not limited to, industry and various levels of government including a department, ministry, other government agencies, Aboriginal governments, Crown corporations, municipalities, boards, private entities, and individuals requiring an authorization from the Crown’ (2015, 24).

6 Bernd Christmas mentions some corporate players: the Emera Maritime Link project, LNG Ltd. Bear Head project, and the Goldboro LNG project in Guysborough County (which could affect fisheries off Unama’ki/Cape Breton), again pointing to the consultation that is expected of proponents. ‘Whether it’s the Maritime Link, or Bear Head, or any of the gold stuff that’s happening in Goldboro or Goldenville area, or anywhere where there’s going to be infrastructure — the twinning of the highways, any new road work — that all has to have some kind of consultation with the Mi’kmaq… There’s been some hiccups along the way, but at least there’s a way to move forward where everyone can work together’ (Ayers 2015c quoting Bernd Christmas).

7 The Membertou Annual Report (2014) says that the plans for the school included the involvement of Efficiency Nova Scotia and assistance from the AANDC’s EcoEnergy program. This allowed for installation of geothermal heating and solar panels, revealing how Membertou embraces sustainability and traditional respect for the environment, yet harnesses technology in the globalized context in pursuing development while minimizing the community’s carbon footprint.

8 The website also links to other video produced by Wagmatcook Community Television Network.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

10.1 GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONS

This work was an in-depth case study that set out to explore how the concepts and theorizations surrounding globalization, the new regionalism, identity, and new institutionalism can inform analysis of the emergence, construction and reconstruction, and the development of peripheral regions. The economic and political processes and dynamics of globalization have a powerful effect on regional constructions. They also affect regional development approaches taken by state and non-state actors, as well as the content and trajectory of cultural development. For regions to survive the economic and social challenges posed by the new globalized era, regional actors have to somehow navigate its dynamics in a manner that gives citizens the opportunity to remain in the region and to attain an equitable and societally-appropriate level of social and economic development. While theoretical literature on the subject has been growing, very little of it explores regions that are comparatively lacking in formal institutional endowments and capacity. This project has addressed that gap by focusing its attention on one such region: Cape Breton Island in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada. Throughout, it has sought to answer the following questions:

1. How have political actors in the peripheral region of Cape Breton envisioned, built, maintained, and when necessary reconstructed their region?

2. How have these institutional actors attempted to adapt to globalization, and in this context how have they strategized about regional development?
3. What role have the key endogenous factors of culture, identity, institutions and leadership played in these processes?

The next section summarizes the research that was undertaken and the approaches used to address these questions. The study’s findings are then presented, interweaving them with the dissertation’s conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and linking them across the various chapters. Finally, the theoretical implications of this study will be assessed and suggestions made for further research, followed by a reiteration of the dissertation’s contribution to the field.

10.2 RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

The study began with an introduction that contextualized the globalized era in which peripheral regions are situated. It raises questions about the effects of globalization on the political and economic life of peripheral communities. Is globalization really an inevitably homogenizing force, or do we live in a world where nation states, regions, and localities are able to employ endogenous characteristics and assets to resist, traverse, and/or adapt to its effects (constraints and opportunities) and its accompanying prescriptions and ideas? Are there institutional or other means available to regions that can help to devise and facilitate such responses? The dissertation proceeds by narrowing these queries to workable research questions, reasoning that the case study region of Cape Breton has a unique economic, political, and cultural history that is worthy of intensive examination in this area. This is followed by a literature review in the second chapter that encompasses theorizations of regions, old and new regionalism, identity, new institutionalism, and globalization. The study’s conceptual and theoretical framework, derived from these theorizations, has been
further informed by the concept and theory development embodied in this research.

To understand the present region of Cape Breton, it has been necessary to undertake a political, economic and socio-cultural history of the Island, as the study acknowledges that development scenarios available to peripheral communities today are largely path dependent. Indeed as the third chapter reveals, Cape Breton regional identity came to be imprinted by the Mi’kmaq, subsequent waves of settlers, and by successive layers of institutional grounding. Unama’ki was forever changed upon the arrival of migrant French fishers and coastal settlers and soon thereafter overwhelmed by the influx of Gaelic immigrants who – because of their large numbers, tragic history as an oppressed minority forced into migration, deep loyalty to their own cultural traditions, and strong sense of collective identity – were able to transform the Island into a form of diasporic sanctuary.

The region’s annexation to the British colony of Nova Scotia and the incorporation of the latter into Confederation forged a path dependent development trajectory. From a historical institutionalism perspective, the Mi’kmaq became wards of the federal state while the Island came under the influence of Westminster-style executive decision-making and policies exercised out of Ottawa and Halifax. This greatly constrained the ability of civil society actors to have an endogenous effect on their community’s development. Education legislation which actively discouraged Gaelic instruction was a crushing blow to the minority language’s preservation and its perceived value as a public form of communication and its congruence with individual betterment. It became stigmatized, minimizing Gaelic participation and identity-related influence on formal institutional apparatuses. Its decline in some areas could also be attributed to other-cultural influences and family educational choices. As political patronage and other forms of clientelism became the standard way for
politicians and parties to maintain their power base and the electoral support of constituencies and regions, yet another set of practices was embedded that would affect the manner in which Cape Bretoners came to perceive themselves and their community, and how they envisaged development possibilities. Nonetheless, the Island attempted to compensate for what it lacked in formal institutional endowments by engaging in informal, community-based, institution-building endeavours. Social and cultural institutions from this early period can be considered precursors to the multi-level and multi-actor institutionalization that would occur in the era of globalization, made necessary by new economic and cultural challenges and opportunities.

As the 1900s approached, the more populous Sydney area of the Island which literally sat on top of extensive coal deposits underwent industrialization. Development of an integrated coal and steel industry -- dominated by foreign owners granted generous royalties by the Province – favoured a hegemonic corporate approach to development, nurtured by compliant federal and provincial politicians, that contributed to later economic and class struggles. The Gaelic identity and culture prominent in rural Cape Breton was carried into its ‘urban’ area at this time to merge with that of other ethno-cultural immigrant groups seeking to participate in the rapidly expanding industrial economy. Over a relatively brief period, the Island sanctuary of a Gaelic/Celtic folk would witness the ‘becoming’ of a completely different kind of region: Industrial Cape Breton. Resistant working class agency soon propelled a strong labour movement and related political party mobilizations, later complemented by the Church-led Antigonish movement with its cooperatives, credit unions, and adult education components. Both labour and cooperative movements sought to address the gross inequities of capitalist development of the period. The increased human agency and
institution-building that resulted, and the linked growth of social capital, fed into a deepening Island regionality (as theorized in Chapter 2).

For the first half of the last century, a strong labourist culture was ascendant on the Island. At the same time, indications of Mi’kmaw resistance were beginning to emerge as Mi’kmaw leadership led protests against poor living conditions on reserves and culturally-insensitive, highly centralist government policies. While Gaelic declined due to the lack of either formal or informal institutional support, the Gaels’ pride and identity were validated and positively affected by political and cultural leadership and by region-building policies (for instance, those that utilized tartanism and Scottish-symbolist marketing). At the centre of this ‘revival’ of sorts was one of their ‘own’: the celebrated, Cape Breton-born, Gaelic-speaking premier, Angus L. Macdonald. During his long tenure, he was both an initiator and emblematic of the defining Celtic character of the region.

By the 1960s, Nova Scotia’s political system was modernizing while the foundations of its economy were crumbling. Premier Robert Stanfield was moving away from embedded parochial politics as he and his federal counterparts adopted postwar Keynesian interventionist ideas, redistributive social policies, and a developmental role for the state in the economy. Structural changes in the national and international economy were jeopardizing Cape Breton’s coal and steel enterprises. As multinational, corporate capital suddenly abandoned its aging industrial works on the Island, both the workforce and the region were thrown into crisis mode. Once again, strong, endogenous political leadership came to the fore. Led by a senior cabinet minister from the Keynesian wing of the governing party (Cape Bretoner Allan J. MacEachen), the extensive coalmining operations on the Island, along with the mandate to diversify the region’s economy, were ‘scaled up’ (as described by region-
building theorizations) to the federal government (an example of flexible federalism). This began a substantial region rebuilding exercise at the centre of which was the creation of the federal crown corporation, Devco. But as global competitive pressures mounted through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, both the crown corporation and other regional development agencies were increasingly over-matched in their attempts to address regional inequalities and disparities by reviving the local economy.

Up to this point, institutional embeddedness had conclusively restricted the flexibility of Island residents to pursue an autonomous development path. After annexation and Confederation, non-state, civil society actors did what they could with what little they had (e.g. formed and lobbied with organizations, protested, joined parties and interest groups, met with MPs), but the levers of power rested primarily with political and business elites. Such elites are in a difficult position -- it is often easier to maintain power by taking a status quo approach to political practices and institutions that already benefit those in power. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 5, political parties holding federal office found it politically rewarding to divert regional development funds, infrastructure, and projects to more populous areas that were already better served than peripheral regions. Delivering projects was most easily done, both federally and provincially, through patronage and clientelist political relations.

Other constitutionally entrenched political institutions have not served the regions as intended (e.g. the Senate) or in a manner that could reverse political and economic decline (e.g. representation by population creating a ‘snowball effect’ that strengthens the centre and weakens the periphery). Strict party discipline and the concentration of power at the centre of government can neutralize dissenting voices within and without the governing party, making it more difficult for peripheral regions to effect policy change or even to be taken seriously.
Thus one can note here the institutional links to peripheral regionalism. To Cape Breton’s benefit, quite serendipitously, from the 1960s to the 1980s it had a powerful regional minister at the centre of the national government to push and protect a state-led, region-building project, so to speak.

While Cape Breton was experiencing a cultural revival and Mi’kmaw political mobilization --- both influenced by community leadership and continuous (mainly informal) institution-building -- the region’s worsening economic crisis also brought to the forefront neo-liberal political-economic prescriptions to address both mounting public debts and stubborn economic stagnation. In Canada these ideas were promoted by the 1985 Report of the Macdonald Commission on the Economic Union and Canada’s Development Prospects, which was subsequently embraced by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. This began a governmental march away from Keynesian policies toward ‘borderless’ free trade, privatization, deregulation, and reformation/streamlining of social and regional development policies, programs, and agencies. In the second Mulroney mandate (1988-93), the prominent role of the government’s leader in the Senate (Cape Bretoner Lowell Murray) was evident with adjustments to the federal presence in Cape Breton that saw ECBC created to replace Devco’s Industrial Development Division as the Island’s main development agency. This reincarnated ‘one-stop-shop’ for regional development was crucial to attempts to diversify the economy, although it remained a powerful tool for political players to continue old-style clientelist practices which can build political capital and buttress power maintenance.

And in Nova Scotia, as noted in Chapter 6, globalization-related reforms which began under PC premier Donald Cameron continued in earnest under the Liberal government of John Savage, at a time when the transition into the globalized era was gathering momentum.
It was throughout this period that processes observed by new regionalism and new institutionalism theorists were presenting themselves in Nova Scotia and more specifically Cape Breton. Faced with budgetary constraints, Savage embarked on a thoroughgoing (though perhaps at times clumsy) reform of political and social institutions through a strategy of reterritorialization, regionalization, and rescaling of municipal government in the province’s two urban centres (Industrial Cape Breton and Halifax), as well as health and education ‘governance’ and delivery throughout the province. His regime changes brought Cape Breton close to (though not quite) Island-wide municipal, health, and education structures. Additional reterritorializing was instituted under PC premier John Hamm (1999-2006). While one could argue that the formal reterritorialization and regionalization that resulted actually diminished the prospect of Cape Breton once again being a region of note, certainly other identity-related psychological, social, economic, geographic, and agency elements that factor into regionality processes would run counter to that suggestion. As noted in this study’s theoretical chapter, regional spaces are constructed from a number of interrelated factors; they are not the product of formal political boundaries alone. In this connection, from Chapter 6 onward, and upon the arrival of the new regional and globalized nexus, Cape Breton’s deepening regionality and move toward a more autonomous region-and-institution-building coalition was depicted.

Chapters 6-9 argue that globalization has both directly and indirectly changed the constraints and opportunities for peripheral communities. An environment was created in which they can adapt, address, combat, and manage their condition of peripherality through grass roots developments and strategies of region-building (including identity formation and adaptation) and the construction of multi-actor/multiscalar regional development coalitions.
Of related importance is that globalization has provided a more open and flexible, but also less stable and secure interface for the people of peripheral regions who seek to negotiate (both among themselves and with other regions and governments) and address their marginalized position in the present global political-economic order. In Chapter 6, the Savage government used the ideas of neo-liberalism and the ‘window’ of crisis and restraint to undertake reforms that appeared to bring development and governance closer to the people (e.g. CBRM regionalization to create one strong voice for economic development; regional and community boards to rationalize and administer health care delivery; RDAs to be intermediary facilitators of economic development in a globalizing economy). Autonomy and integration – affecting the scalar, territorial and functional structuring of the state – can thus be strategies employed or pursued by both the periphery and the centre to achieve their objectives. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 present cases in point. In chapter 7 it was shown that executive decision-makers (the Harper government) disbanded the semi-autonomous ECBC, putting Cape Breton regional development responsibilities directly under the purview of ACOA. This enforced their interpretation of how regional development autonomy and integration should be configured, in effect downgrading the importance of Cape Breton-focussed solutions emerging from strategies to promote reginal adaptation and identity.

While power in the Westminster system is vested with the political executive, this did not prevent regional actors from coming together to envision a new development regime and to construct a new set of coalitions to achieve it. For instance, Gaelic, Mi’kmaq, and other constuencies were found to be becoming connected to shared pursuits regarding key cultural, economic and political endeavours. As strategies, autonomy and integration might even be pursued simultaneously (i.e. in different sectors of activity or among/within a cultural
community), and this too can be done by centre or periphery, or by both concurrently. This places the politics of peripheral regions and their changing relations with other levels and orders of government at the centre of this dissertation.

From economic, political, cultural, and multi-scalar standpoints, globalization processes can help to reforge – within some peripheral communities – affirmative regional identities and agencies, ‘regionalities’ that challenge negative cultural and political stereotyping that has occurred in past analyses of some peripheral regions. All chapters have revealed actor-agency leading to institutionalization. Indeed, the study contributes to regionalism literature by showing that regions assigned ‘dependency’ descriptors are not passive victims, whether of national and provincial politics or broad economic forces that tend toward the agglomeration of economic activity in metropolitan centres. As the study notes, there are dedicated agents and institutions working to sustain and diversify development in the region. However, the inequitable constraints of the larger regional, federal, continental and global relationships do give actors in some regions more opportunity and flexibility to pursue such goals than others. As the research has revealed, through community as well as institutional and institutional-elite influences, regional cultures and identities can be recast and reimagined, in order to increase their utility in adapting and reconstructing regions and regional development regimes. Indeed, both the likelihood and the prospects of such a political, cultural and economic reconfiguration can be directly linked to the current context of multi-dimensional stresses and complexities (e.g. those related to scale, territorialization, governance, technology, tourism and culture marketing, ports development, and indeed social and economic injustices) that are associated with globalization. A key point is that multi-actor and multi-scalar agency for region-building is occurring through exploring
the above avenues and dynamics in Cape Breton and this case study provides added insight into what regional actors in a unique peripheral community can do in the globalization context.

The latter chapters revealed similar conclusions to Keating et al. (2003). These regional actors recognize the ‘regional dimension’ of development; it was exemplified through interviewee comments noting the increase in cohesive, internal cooperation among development actors in the region, as well as the realization of region-wide initiatives (e.g., the Cape Breton Partnership, Unama’ki Tourism Association, Celtic Colours International Festival, Féis Cape Breton, and so on). At the private and civil society levels, territorial region and community-building (in part emphasizing the link between culture and development) is evident in Cape Breton, as evinced by the creation of such institutions as the CMIC, Unama’ki Tourism Association, Cape Breton Partnership, and the Strategic Framework.

Similar developments were also noted in the strong emphasis leaders and communities placed on institution-building, Gaelic language and music (e.g. Premier Rodney MacDonald), and heritage-themed tourism packaging (e.g. Premier A.L. Macdonald). Also, the importance of language and culture to Mi’kmaw development was displayed through, for instance, cultural tourism (Wagmatcook initiatives) and, though more focused on partnerships for economic development, the Unama’ki Model and Membertou ‘miracle’. The utilization of culture for development purposes, it can be argued, is more recently approached from a regional perspective than was the case previously, with like-minded organizations partnering and meeting to discuss strategies to foster development. The sustained agency
behind institutional thickening and regional identity construction is further indication of the growth of regionality on the Island.

But to reiterate, there continue to be global economic and institutional constraints on region-building and Island development. Keating et al. aptly state the following, which also pertains to Cape Breton:

It is common in the literature on regionalism to talk of ‘governance’ as a new mode of regulation replacing government in the traditional sense. The idea is that power has shifted from formal political institutions into networks spanning the various levels of the state and transnational regimes, and the public and private sectors. Yet our studies suggest that regional government, where it exists, does matter, and that mere governance will not always fulfill the tasks of mobilisation and collective action. Elected government gives a symbolic legitimacy to the region as a political space and endows it with the one form of legitimation that, in a democratic society, trumps all others (2003, 183).

The regionalization of CBRM arguably yielded more legitimation in the sense that there was a government on the Island that, at least potentially, could articulate a single, coherent vision for regional development purposes. Although this remains a contentious issue in other Island municipalities, some argue that CBRM symbolically represents the Island in the sense that it is the only major municipal player, containing within its boundaries the great majority of Cape Breton’s population. And with ECBC disbanded and collaborative municipalities now more directly involved in economic development, including giving form and direction to the RENs, the central place of CBRM in the region-building process and legitimation of the Island as a region is indisputable. However, being a ‘creature of the province’, CBRM (as well as the Island’s rural municipalities) ultimately may be denied the capacity and resources to be the leading development actor that some would envision. Mayor Morgan’s equalization fight and Mayor Clarke’s lobbying at various levels of government for augmented funds and a municipal Charter, reveal that these government actors are seeking more ‘power’ to
accomplish their region-building goals. Internal and provincial-municipal dynamics since regionalization indicate a certain weakness with the present institutional set-up: municipalities and development bodies attempt to act within an emphasized ‘governance’ framework, but without adequate fiscal resources, which of course are important for regional development. Nonetheless new institutionalism’s flexibility highlights coordination efforts among informal local and ethno-cultural communities and organizations that have been crucial to reconstructing the region. In that vein, the emphasized governance dimension – not necessarily focusing on centralized regional decision making, but on a variety of public and private sector actors – becomes all the more salient when it comes to both building and studying formal and informal regions.

While the regional dynamics highlighted in the above quote are occurring on the Island, the buck still stops with the ‘Westminster’ political executives and their centre-of-government advisors in Halifax and Ottawa. If the global economy is influencing fiscal resources and producing an evolving regional crisis of one form or another, the modification or elimination of institutional structures (whether development agencies or municipal governance structures) happens on the directives from the centre of government. This also justifies, in a sense, the privileged place that some new institutionalism theorists have allocated for political institutions when trying to comprehend change, events, and other political phenomena. This would be the case with regard to core decisions on jurisdictions, funding, local powers, and so on. In that regard, the region’s circumstances depend in part on 1) an ultimate reality that the province has repeatedly adjusted its economic development structures, and is likely to continue to do so, producing inconsistency and frequent changes of direction when it comes to provincial development strategy and 2) the other reality that
‘scaled up’ development through financially and functionally well-endowed federal development corporations tailored to the region’s needs is, for all intents and purposes, now relegated to a particular historical phase of regional development. The possibilities for clientelist politics remain, although this reversion seems less likely, and most would agree should not return as the predominant mode of political and governmental action. But new institutionalists do not focus only on those ‘old core’ institutions and this work focalizes the networks of ‘new’ social, cultural and local actors that have forged a path toward regional reconstruction and constitute important and effective institutions in their own right.

It is too early to tell if the present formal and informal components of the regional development coalition – well attuned to the practice and importance of governance and cooperative agency – are adequately equipped to continue with the difficult task of region-building in a deteriorating demographic and volatile global setting. It is also rather early in the latest iteration of the region to know for certain what kind of region Cape Breton is ‘becoming’.

Generalizing the Findings

Particular regionalisms (with their various cultural, economic, social and political aspects) result from multi-dimensional, path-dependent processes involving both endogenous and exogenous variables. Related regional development coalition formation in peripheral communities in part depends on prevailing general economic conditions, related universalized government policy responses and prescriptions, and the overall direction mandated by political executives and bureaucratic elites. It seems that the key for peripheral regions is to find ways to adapt, alter or affect these processes in order to build toward social,
cultural, and economic development goals and outcomes that are perceived by residents of the region to be beneficial to the region; in other words, development strategies and policies that are endogenously influenced. When it comes to region-building, regionalism and related processes, the causal arrow often points in both directions. Of critical importance to both analysis and reaching solutions are the influence of economic and bureaucratic structures, and in general of embedded institutions; elite power-brokering and alliances; the salience of state support of the scope and variety required to meet region-based goals; and as this analysis has shown, bottom-up informal cultural and social institutional agency (e.g. interactive Mi’kmaw, Gaelic, and CED elements).

The above findings suggest that Cape Breton is facing an uphill battle against a strong and entrenched institutional structure. However, opportunity can be extracted from this in that relinquishing and reshuffling regional development responsibilities through rescaling, re-territorializing, and other processes creates flexibility in the federal system that allows other actors to try their hand at affecting change, actors (e.g. those working within Gaelic, Mi’kmaw, and other communities and less formal organizations) that arguably have a more intimate knowledge of, and greater commitment to the regions they are trying to build. The prospects for more autonomous and/or endogenous development are ‘freed up’ in terms of new actors gaining influence and responsibilities, but these prospects will remain restricted if supports are not forthcoming from the aforementioned entrenched formal institutional apparatus. Active endogenous agency can offset (at least partially) what would otherwise be passifying, debilitating and overwhelming global economic processes. Endogenous actors do this by responding and adapting: through collaborative strategizing and institutional thickening, as well as selective resistance and integration with global economic dynamics.
Regional leadership, too, is highly salient and is a mode of harnessing certain identities and cultural characteristics which might otherwise be deemed detrimental to regional development.

**10.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS**

Modernization theory of the past, in some regards, does not apply well to studying region-building in the era of a globalized economy. Deindustrialization has coincided with the advancement of technologies and services and the onset of the creative economy, all currently on the rise in Cape Breton. Contrary to the cultural ‘catch-up’ or ‘gap closing’ requirement found in early modernization theory, this study has contributed to the literature that suggests that endogenous regional cultures, while exhibiting different features than Western ‘mainstream’ culture, can be harnessed for economic development purposes (as exemplified in this study through examples such as the Gaelic College, CMIC, Mi’kmaq cultural centres and powwows, Celtic Colours International Festival, and so on). Related to this, the study has also contributed to and aligns with theorizing by Keating et al. (2003) that paralyzing ‘fragmentation’ and ‘internal conflict’ need not arise when different actors of different backgrounds work collaboratively towards development within a territory endowed with limited financial resources. To the contrary, this study contends that ‘common identity forged by regional culture [in this case, a predominantly Celtic/Gaelic yet multi-cultural and traditionally labourist culture, recently inclusive of a reimagined – though perhaps internally contested -- Unama’ki] also permits actors to reconcile some rather discordant themes’ (176-177). Indeed, multi-actor networking, planning, and partnerships among these groups has become commonplace on Cape Breton Island (e.g., the Unama’ki model; Highland Village
and Cape Breton Partnership initiatives; the NSCC satellite campus in Wagmatcook, and so on). Regional actors are increasingly speaking ‘with one voice, supporting each other’ (Rodney MacDonald interview 2015), although some interviewees still highlighted intra-regional rivalries and contestations over limited development resources.

The theoretical framework which incorporates the insights of identity, new institutionalism, and new regionalism analysis, combined with a recognition of the constraints and challenges posed by globalization, has been demonstrated to be useful and effective. New regionalism theory (NRT) provides researchers with the broad political-economic context within which regions are built and within which regionalisms are manifested. It incorporates globalization with the concepts of scale, territoriality, and multi-actor agency, all concepts that were explored in this study and which helped to address, if not definitively answer the dissertation’s research questions. Identity contributed to Island residents’ ‘consciousness’ of their region’s deliberate reconstruction, a region with unique cultural characteristics, and with citizens who derived meaning from this by feeling a part of the territorial social group and its undertakings. The region of Cape Breton has been reimagined and reconstructed as circumstances, events, cultural imprints, and periodic crises affected it.

In this area of identity theorizing, the study brings to the literature further development of Bickerton and Gagnon’s concept of ‘regionality’ (2014). It is a degree of consciousness and agency that can be placed, depending on its intensity, on a continuum of ‘regionness’ as theorized by Hettne and Söderbaum. The study incorporated Bickerton and Gagnon’s point about regionality – that it can be expressed with different intensities at the formal institutional level and at the societal level. This is crucial because of Cape Breton’s
relative lack of formal institutionalization. The concept of regionality facilitates the further exploration of the role of identity and agency in regionalism, and with more ‘types’ of regions than could be realized if restricting analysis to describing formal institutional arrangements and interactions. At the same time, a drawback of utilizing the concept of regionality, at least for this study, is that it is difficult to measure and to precisely situate a region on a regionality continuum, with attendant political and social implications. The study therefore restricted its use of the concept to that of regionality ‘presence’, or alternatively ‘growing’ or ‘deepening’ regionality, as indicated from research and through interview observations. Further studies incorporating the concept could undertake an in-depth (perhaps longitudinal) classification system of societal level regionalism and formalized regional institutions created and active through periods/eras, and combine these with a survey that enables construction of a regional identity/perception scale. Given this study’s already extensive breadth, due to its holistic historical and deep empirical approach, this alternative project in the opinion of this author would have proven too ambitious and complex to accomplish.

With regard to the new institutionalism, this study demonstrated that, as predicted by the historical institutionalists, path dependency shapes regional construction and development; hence, the remarks above about path-setting junctures and Westminster political institutions. Some institutions, while displaying at times a ‘stubborn streak’ or embeddedness, can undergo change -- sometimes incremental, and sometimes relatively sudden. This often depends on a convergence of factors: externally-caused ‘shocks’ or crises; the permeation of new ideas, often economic in nature, that are transferred to institutional actors and determined leaders that can embrace new ideas and mobilize their communities
during windows of opportunity and challenge.

Further to that, new institutionalism provided a base from which to study middle range structural changes and political policies and decisions that coincided with regional reconstructions occurring in Cape Breton (e.g. regionalization of municipalities, health and education authorities, and economic development agencies; creation of Devco, ECBC, and the Office of Gaelic Affairs). However, because new institutionalism is flexible, with at least three theoretical strands, the study also incorporated, perhaps to a larger degree, sociological institutional tenets. This allowed for a more in-depth and holistic analysis of new institutional forms among cultural groups and communities leading the region toward an alternative development model within the confines of Canadian federalism and processes associated with the new globalized era. As was depicted, the ‘informal’ region’s various actors region-build by accessing not only political institutions (and accompanying roles and rule regimes and policies), but also by accessing and building societal organizations and forming and following informal rules of engagement and collaboration to accomplish social and economic development goals (e.g., by building cultural organizations or lobbying for patronage spoils).

Therefore it can be argued that the study’s approach is useful for researching regions without much by the way of a formal institutional apparatus. In this way it contributes to the general study of territorial pluralism by suggesting how understudied regional types can be studied. This raises a possible obstacle regarding the research niche. The lack of basic research in Canada on informal regions may make it difficult to gather foundational and empirical data and construct a narrative about such regions. While there have been ample studies on provinces and states, generating data sets pertaining to them, along with compilations of relevant statistics, this could prove difficult for a good number of informal
regions. In other words, the low availability of demographic, economic, and social data specific to a regional construction that is not formally conceptualized as such creates a difficult starting point for researchers. On the bright side, this provides a research advantage in that this work’s discussion of the multifaceted character of Cape Breton regionalism (Indigenous, Gaelic, formal, other informal institutional elements and so on) can be seen as innovative -- a strength and form of innovational contribution to the overall field of regional studies. In other words, that similarly less formal regional study cases at the outset have daunting challenges, only re-emphasizes the potential importance of this study. It makes its own contribution to the larger picture of the form and functioning of territory, and more specifically economic, cultural, and social regions in the global and new regional context.

10.4 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The synthesized theoretical framework and historical/sociological new institutionalism approach could be a useful conceptual foundation for undertaking future studies of informal regions that rarely receive scholarly attention. As noted above, an opening exists for further developing and analyzing the Bickerton and Gagnon (2014) concept of regionality. It could serve as a concept that lends more analytical ‘teeth’ to the psychological emphasis assigned to the various ‘ism’ concepts; it helps to describe the results of interconnected identity, psycho-social, and agency-related processes. A problem exists, however, with measuring the degree to which such processes are present, which would allow for the placement of regions on a regionality continuum; hence, my suggestions above for addressing measurability. This may itself prove too difficult, however, as the concept, though in part a very real psycho-social, agency-related phenomenon, is abstract and therefore
difficult to encapsulate fully through a classification system. Perhaps more important is exploring how and why regionality occurs or becomes more prevalent in informal and formal regions. In that regard, a future work could involve compiling a book containing cases of more informal regions in Canada or around the world. This study can also be considered a new case to be added to the research area of island studies. Other island regions could be studied by mirroring this work’s theoretical and analytical approach to region-building. More importantly, however, is adding more case studies to the field to gain more insights about the workings of a variety of region types. The theoretical framework underlying this study could also be used to undertake more sector specific analyses of region-building which could provide insights about how grass roots agency and institutionalization are undertaken to address sectoral development or diversification in response to globalization processes.

10.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The dissertation has shown that regions of different types affect, and are affected by, politics. While the discourses, processes, policies, and other political-economic dynamics generated by globalization and neo-liberal-leaning governments exert many and varied pressures on peripheral communities, this case study of territorial pluralism has revealed how regional actors can attempt to exert an endogenous approach to building their regions and pursuing regional development. On that note, a main contribution of this work is that it provides, with a solid, supportive theoretical framework, an illustration of the institution-building that has gone on in Cape Breton within the civil society ‘governance’ dimension. This was especially reflected during the globalized postindustrial era during which Cape Breton has struggled to reinvent and reconstruct itself as a region. It serves as yet another
case study, but a somewhat unique one, that can be added to the multi-dimensional areas of research variously known as new regionalism, territorial pluralism, and territorial politics. Suggestively the theoretical foundation and ‘template’ could be adopted by other scholars undertaking studies about region-building and regional development that involve regions exhibiting varying degrees and types of institutionalization. The study also shows that in the present globalized and new regional context, building regions, especially informal ones, is not an easy task. Regions and their associated identities can be reconstructed and distinctive cultures may be recruited for economic development purposes.

This suggests that while globalization is a powerful and intimidating phenomenon, it has yet to obliterate the endogenous influence that regional actors can have on defining and reconstructing their regions, and the culture(s) that will be linked to and inform region-building agency. Gaelic and Mi’kmaw cultures have been reconstructed by reclaiming the authenticity taken from them through past government policies and racially-motivated stigmatization. That cultural authenticity is now being mobilized in some instances for economic and social development purposes. The reconstruction of Cape Breton will require further cooperation between these and other cultures as regional actors continue to construct an Island community that seems to have a relatively cohesive regional identity and which exhibits deepening regionality in the globalized era. But again, the rebuilding of Cape Breton continues to confront many challenges. As Bickerton notes:

Internal cohesion will always be problematic for regions that embody a variety of class, sub-regional and ethnocultural interests and identities. Overcoming these internal tendencies and tensions is an essential part of the ‘regional project’ of constructing and reconstructing the region for development purposes. A binding cultural affinity and shared historical narrative can be one way of doing this. The geography of islandness itself does not guarantee regionality (though it helps). Cape Breton as a coherent region will have to be economically, socially and politically
constructed over time, but it will be contingent on a number of historical factors (2014).

This study has addressed some of the above discernments. Whatever the future may hold for Cape Breton, one thing seems fairly certain: even without further political autonomy, unless the Island’s post-industrial economy utterly fails, leading to the dwindling of its population and the eventual withering of its vibrant culture (and the risk is there), Cape Breton will continue to be a highly distinctive and evolving region of Canada.


---. E-mail message to author. 2014.

---. E-mail message to author 2015.

---. E-mail message to author 2016.


http://www.jstor.org/stable/4355128


Cape Breton Post. *Cape Breton Post* (Sydney), May 4, 1994, A1 sec.


---. "Clarke Addresses Issues (Interview)." Cape Breton Post, January 10, 2015, C1, C2 sec.


Careless, J.M.S. "Metropolis and Region: The Interplay Between City and Region in Canadian History Before 1914." Urban History Review 3, no. 78 (February 1979): 99-118.


Fearon, James D. What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)? DRAFT. MS, Stanford University.


---. E-mail message to author 2015.


http://novascotia.ca/abor/docs/Consultation/NOVASCOTIACANADAMOUFINAL.pdf


http://novascotia.ca/abor/docs/April%202015_GNS%20Mi'kmaq%20Consultation%20Policy%20and%20Guidelines%20FINAL.pdf


Greenwell, David. Interview with Glenn Graham. E-mail interview. April 14, 2015.


Huk, John. *Strangers in the Land: The Ukranian Presence in Cape Breton*. Sydney, NS: Centre For Cape Breton Studies, Cape Breton University, 2011.


MacEachern, Bob. Interview with Glenn Graham. E-mail interview. September 10, 2014.


MacLean, Billy Joe. Interview with Glenn Graham. Personal interview. Port Hawkesbury, August 8, 2014.


McNeil, Ian. Interview with Glenn Graham. E-mail interview. October 17, 2014.


http://www.inverness-

Murphy, Terence. "The Emergence of Maritime Catholicism, 1781-1830." Acadiensis 

Murray, Lowell. Interview with Glenn Graham. Personal interview. Margaree, August 14, 
2014.

Nettle, Daniel and Suzanne Romaine. Vanishing Voices: The Extinction of the World’s 

Neumann, I. B. "A Region-Building Approach." In Theories of New Regionalism: A 

http://newdawn.ca/about/.

Identity and Culture in North America." In The Shaping of Scottish Identities: Sex, 
Nation, and the Worlds Beyond, edited by Jodi A. Campbell, Elizabeth Ewan and 

---. "The Macs Meet the ‘Micmacs’:Scottish Gaelic First Encounter Narratives From Nova 

gaelic-in-nova-scotia/.

---. "Should the Gaelic College Flush the Royal?" The Virtual Gael (blog), January 7, 2014. 
Accessed May 26, 2015. http://virtualgael.wordpress.com/2014/01/07/should-the-
gaelic-college-flush-the-royal/.

June 4, 2015. http://www.novascotiabusiness.com/site-
nsbi/media/NovaScotiaBusinessInc/ar-NSBI2002-03.pdf.

Nova Scotia Department of Communities, Culture, and Heritage. "Province Celebrates 
Gaelic Awareness Month 2010-Mìos Na Gàidhlig 2010." News release, April 29, 
http://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20111014011


Nova Scotia Department of Economic and Rural Development and Tourism.


Tellis, W. "Introduction to Case Study [68 Paragraphs]." The Qualitative Report [Online Serial] 3, no. 2 (July 1997).


Usher, Marlene (interview). "Reaction from Acting CEO of ECBC: Marlene Usher on This Week's Change to ECBC and Its Future." Interview by Steven Sutherland. *CBC Information Morning*, March 21, 2014.


APPENDIX A   INTERVIEWEE DETAILS

All personal interviews were recorded by digital phone recorder. Interviewer/Author also took notes.

• Dr. Minoli Amit. Consultant Pediatrician. Personal interview, Antigonish NS, April 4 and 5, 2015.
• Danny Graham. Former Inverness South MLA and CMIC Board Chair. Personal interview, Judique, NS, July 22, 2014.
• David Greenwell. Mabou Development. E-mail interview, April 14, 2015.
• Tom Gunn. NSCC Principal, CB Partnership board. Personal Interview, Port Hawkesbury NS, August 27, 2014.
• Dr. John Hamilton. Ophthalmologist/Local Historian. Personal interview, Antigonish NS, March 8, 2015.
• Keith MacDonald. CEO Cape Breton Partnership. Personal interview, Mabou NS, July, 2014.
• Jeffrey MacDonald. Office of Gaelic Affairs Gaelic Cultural Officer. Personal interview, Antigonish NS, August 8, 2014.
• Hon. Rodney MacDonald. Former NS premier and cabinet minister; Gaelic College CEO. Personal interview, Mabou NS, March 6, 2015.
• Bob MacEachern. Owner 101.5 the Hawk; community business and cultural leader. E-mail interview. September 10, 2014.
• Richard MacKinnon. Dept. Chair, Professor, Folklore, CBU. Personal interview, Sydney, NS July 22, 2014.
• Billy Joe MacLean. Port Hawkesbury mayor; former cabinet minister and MLA Inverness South. Personal interview, August 8, 2014.
• Allan MacMaster. MLA Inverness. Personal Interview, Halifax, NS, November 14, 2013.
• Karen Malcolm. ACOA account manager; former community development officer; former Strait-Highlands RDA employee. Personal interview, Port Hood, NS, July, 2014.
• Hon. Richie Mann. VP Maher Melford; former cabinet minister, MLA, and councillor, Richmond. Personal interview. Halifax, October 2, 2014.
• Ian McNeil. Prosperity Framework, former CBC radio host. E-mail interview. October 17, 2014.
• Mary Jane Morrison. Instructor, Hospitality and Tourism Management, CBU. Personal interview. Sydney, August 26, 2014.
• Adam Rodgers. Lawyer; President Strait Area Chamber of Commerce. Personal interview. Port Hawkesbury, August 8, 2014.
• Cheryl Smith. CMIC executive Director; cultural entrepreneur. Personal interview, March 3, 2015.
APPENDIX  B  

QUESTION GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWEES

*Question sets – largely the same, but tailored to interviewee ‘type’-- were also developed for community leaders, business owners, and academics.

Questions for Public Officials (e.g. politicians, bureaucrats, regional development officers)

- What role have you and your organization/department played with regard to dealing with Cape Breton?
- From an ‘identity’ standpoint, how would you describe Cape Breton Island?
- Does Cape Breton have a distinct regional identity? Multiple identities?
- Have you noticed any changes in the discourse(es)/strategies/ideas affecting, and associated with, region-building/regional development over time (i.e. the last few decades)?
- How would you describe (briefly) the political-economic history/narrative associated with this region?
- Do you agree with the predominant narrative?
- Describe this/these regions in socio-demographic terms and how you perceive them in cultural and economic, ‘identity’ terms.
- How has your department driven change in these regions and how do you see your role going forward?
- Do any political or bureaucratic leaders (and their actions) stand out as having caused significant change with regard to this region?
- What have been factors that affect this region’s position in the current globalized setting?
- Who do you see as the main actors in these communities’ development and maintenance?
- In what ways have these actors been successful in building/developing their regions? In what ways not?
- What challenges does this region face now and in the future?
- What role should/do other levels of government play in the development of the region?
- What other actors are involved and how should region-building/development be approached by them?
- Where does most region-building/development discussion, thought, and action occur; is there a prevailing discourse or set of ideas and policies affecting it, and who are the main players purveying this?
Figure 5: Employment Rate 1999-2009. Cape Breton’s employment rate with reference to other comparator communities. Source: Doug Lionaise. 2012. “Cape Breton Prosperity Gap Study.” Presented to Cape Breton Partnership.
Table 3: NS Population by County. Reveals that, of the province’s eighteen counties, only two fared worse than the four Island counties in terms of decreasing population. Source: Statistics Canada (cited underneath); Canmac Economics. 2012. *Nova Scotia Demographic-Economic Outlook 2011-2021.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>2006 Census</th>
<th>2011 Census</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis</td>
<td>21,438</td>
<td>20,756</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigonish</td>
<td>18,836</td>
<td>19,589</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cape Breton</strong></td>
<td><strong>105,928</strong></td>
<td><strong>101,619</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>50,023</td>
<td>50,968</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>32,046</td>
<td>31,353</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digby</td>
<td>18,992</td>
<td>18,036</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guysborough</td>
<td>9,058</td>
<td>8,143</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>372,858</td>
<td>390,328</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hants</td>
<td>41,182</td>
<td>42,304</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverness</td>
<td>19,036</td>
<td>17,947</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kings</td>
<td>60,035</td>
<td>60,589</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunenburg</td>
<td>47,150</td>
<td>47,313</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictou</td>
<td>46,513</td>
<td>45,643</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td>11,212</td>
<td>10,960</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>9,740</td>
<td>9,293</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelburne</td>
<td>15,544</td>
<td>14,496</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>7,115</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yarmouth</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,277</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,275</strong></td>
<td><strong>-3.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX E CHILD AND SENIOR POVERTY COMPARED, 2010

APPENDIX  F  MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME (2000 AND 2005)

Figure 6- Median Household Income (2000 and 2005). A notable gap exists between Cape Breton's counties and other comparator areas. 'The gap between the median income in Cape Breton County and Canada, for instance was $14,517 in 2000 and $13,183 in 2005.' Source: Lionaise 2011. Such gaps/disparities displayed in this and other appendices support the notion that regionalist sentiments and a unique Island regionality have emerged in part due to real socio-economic difference from other communities.
APPENDIX G  EXCERPT FROM KENNETH DONOVAN (1990):  
LISTING OF CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS INDICATIVE OF A CAPE BRETON ‘CULTURAL REVIVAL’ AND DEEPENING REGIONALITY

…the opening of the Alexander Graham Bell Museum (1956); the first Broad Cove Concert (1958); the reconstruction of Fortress Louisbourg (1961); the beginning of Nova Scotia Highland Village Day at Iona (1962); the first Big Pond Concert (1964); the founding of the Old Sydney Society (1966); the opening of the Miner’s Museum and the commencement of the Men of the Deeps Choir (1967); the establishment of the Cape Breton Gaelic Society (1969); the first Acadian Festival in Petit-de-Gras (1971); the publication of Cape Breton’s Magazine (1972); the inauguration of the Cape Breton Chorale (1973); the Glendale festival (1973); the creation of the Beaton Institute of Cape Breton Studies (1975); the inauguration of the College of Cape Breton Press (1975); the beginning of the teaching of Gaelic in Inverness County schools (1975); the restoration of the Savoy Theatre (1976); the first Rise and Follies of Cape Breton Musical Revue (1977); the publication of the Inverness County Recreation and Culture newspaper, Patrícipaper, (1979); the establishment of the first Micmac-controlled school at Eskasoni (1980); the granting of university status to the University College of Cape Breton (1982); the introduction of a school for Acadians at Petit-de-Gras (1982); the organization of the Centre Bras d’Or Festival of the Arts (1983); the formation of the Cape Breton Gaelic Choir, Oranaiche Cheap Breatuinn (1983); the beginning of the Inverness County Council of the Arts (1983); the initiation of the Inverness Arts festival (1983); the teaching of Gaelic at the Nova Scotia Highland Village (1984); Sydney’s Bicentennial Celebrations (1985); the beginning of the MicMac studies program at the University College of Cape Breton (1986); the hosting of the Canada Winter Games (1987); the expansion of McConnell Memorial Library (1988); the creation of a Cape Breton Arts Council 91989); a Gaelic Language Council (1989); and the publication of a Gaelic instruction book by the Gaelic College (1989) (1999, 1-2). Also from (Sutherland 2010, 74-75): Fr. Greg MacLeod’s 1974 founding of the Tompkins Institute for Human Values and Technology at CBU which looks for ‘ways to use the “tools of capitalism” to further social development.’
APPENDIX H EXAMPLE OF PROVINCIAL FISCAL CAPACITY BEFORE AND AFTER EQUALIZATION

Figure 7- Suggests the further challenges a peripheral region—in an equalization-receiving province—would face without a national equalization program in place. Source: Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing. May, 2006.
Figure 8- Source: Whalley 2008 (inclusive of text). Whalley adds: ‘Note: Federal funding provided by the Atlantic Innovation Fund, Canadian Institute for Health Research, Canada Foundation for Innovation, NSERC and SSHRC.’
APPENDIX J  NS SCHOOL ENROLMENT DECLINES EXAMPLE

SCHOOL ENROLMENTS
In the 2012-13 academic year, 13,839 students were enrolled in the Cape Breton-Victoria Regional School Board (CBVRSB), down 22.6% from 17,882 in 2005-06. CBVRSB’s decline over these seven years is nearly twice the provincial average (13.8%). Since 1970, total enrolment has declined 66.5% (or 27,447 from 41,286), for an average decline of 2.6% annually per year over the past 42 years.

Where did all the students go?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41,286</td>
<td>17,882</td>
<td>13,839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9- Source (inclusive of all text): Community Foundation of Nova Scotia. 2013. CBRM Vital Signs Report
APPENDIX K: POST-INDUSTRIAL CAPE BRETON SECTORAL ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location Quotient vs Canada 2009</th>
<th>Shift Share vs Canada 2004-09</th>
<th>Average Income Nova Scotia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Breton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods-producing sector</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry, fishing, mining, oil and gas</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>-36%</td>
<td>$32,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>$29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>$37,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services-producing sector</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>$22,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and warehousing</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$41,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance, real estate and leasing</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-49%</td>
<td>$31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, scientific and technical services</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, building and other support services</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>$17,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational services</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>$37,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and social assistance</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>$38,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information, culture and recreation</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>$33,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and food services</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>$21,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>$57,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4- Post-industrial Cape Breton Sectoral Analysis. Lionaise 2011. (Cape Breton Partnership). The location quotient (first column) notes ‘the relative concentration of jobs in that sector compared to the national economy for the year 2009’ (2011, 14). A location quotient of 1 means that the relative location of jobs in that sector matches that of the national economy. A value over 1 indicates a ‘relative job concentration’ above the national average in that sector while a value below 1 indicates that jobs are lacking in that sector. The ‘shift turn’ in the second column indicates to what extent the Cape Breton economy is either outgrowing or falling behind the national economy (2011).
APPENDIX L  IVANY REPORT DESCRIPTION AND CRITIQUE

The Ivany Commission report was released with much fanfare. Its ‘call to action’ emerged in part from anecdotal insights suggesting Nova Scotia needs a quick attitude change to address alarming demographics and spur entrepreneurship. It stipulated that leaders of multiple stakeholder institutions must redirect Nova Scotia in a united province-building exercise. Recommendations included: prioritizing sustainable development and re-building the exporting economy; focusing on math, sciences, entrepreneurship, and growth sector job training; improving conditions for immigrants and marginalized ethno-cultural groups; coordination of economic development services and agencies, and so on. It recommended all-political-party cooperation and an all-party committee to create an action plan. The McNeil government appointed the One NS Coalition to undertake consultations across the province (Lightstone 2015). ‘CBRM appointees’ included cultural expert Joella Foulds and, as interviewee John Whalley highlighted – Liberal leaning New Dawn enterprises head Rankin MacSween. MacSween, one of the region’s most noted regional development practitioners, was a candidate in the mayorality contest against the eventual winner, Cecil Clarke, a former provincial PC cabinet minister (Interview 2014). The report is not without critics. Jim Guy, CBU Professor Emeritus in political science questioned some recommendations: What exactly would reforming ‘regional government and regional service structures’ and ‘reevaluating regional governance structures’ entail? He warned that in an austere environment provincial governments would probably not entertain readjusting equalization in the municipalities’ favour. And the ‘ideological’ recommendation of prioritizing Halifax as the urban growth engine for the province reflects ‘trickle down economics and a third world model of economic prosperity’ that leads to concentration of economic and social wealth rather than state-wide sharing of it (Guy 2014; Government of Nova Scotia 2014).
APPENDIX M: NS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY AND PROGRAMMING SOURCES DISPLAYING ETHNO-CULTURAL FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

For an administrative history regarding these offices in the following order: African Nova Scotian, Gaelic, Acadian Affairs, see: http://novascotia.ca/archives/gaho/authority.asp?ID=7
http://novascotia.ca/archives/gaho/authority.asp?ID=38
The Office of Aboriginal Affairs remains its own entity:
http://novascotia.ca/archives/gaho/authority.asp?ID=1
All Accessed May 21, 2015.