OPERATIONALIZING “WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT” AS AN APPROACH TO STATE FRAGILITY AND INSTABILITY: CASE STUDIES FROM OTTAWA, CANADA AND LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM

By

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Abstract

Whole-of-Government (WoG) is a form of collaboration that occurs between any number of government departments; however, over the past 20 years the word has been adopted by international security and development actors as an approach to navigating the complex issues associated with state fragility. Implementing a WoG approach in such a context involves policy analysts, humanitarian workers, diplomats, military personnel, bureaucrats and politicians. Departmental priorities, organizational cultures, accountability frameworks, access to resources and shifting political interests are just a subset of the barriers involved with such an undertaking.

The primary goal of this thesis was to enhance our understanding of the organizational attributes that determine how WoG is operationalized in practice. Interdisciplinary literature reviews and two case studies were completed in order to develop a framework for WoG that describes key organizational barriers to and incentives for designing, managing, evaluating and enhancing WoG initiatives. The research was advanced through four stages. First, the conceptual meaning of WoG was examined using Rodger’s evolutionary approach to conceptual analysis. Second, a preliminary theoretical framework of 10 operational attributes of WoG was developed. Third, the phenomenon of WoG was examined through the creation and evolution of two WoG instruments: Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Unit (SU). The final stage of the research involved returning to the previously developed theoretical framework and modifying it based on the insights gleaned from the case analyses. The final framework evolved to better reflect the dynamic relationships that exist between operational attributes. It is not a road map for operationalization; however, it strives to highlight key factors to be considered in the design, implementation and evolution of WoG initiatives. The results of the research emphasize that investing in WoG requires the thoughtful consideration of how organizational systems can enable or prevent cross-boundary collaboration and that an important aspect of developing a WoG organizational capacity involves investing in individuals with key skills and attributes. In this sense, the final framework provides a management perspective on WoG that is underexplored in some disciplines.
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<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister (Canada)</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Task Force (Canada)</td>
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<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy (UK)</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (UK)</td>
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<td>Civil-military coordination</td>
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<td>Collaborative public management</td>
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<td>Conflict prevention pools (UK)</td>
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<td>Civil Stabilisation Group (UK)</td>
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<td>Canada School of Public Service</td>
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<td>Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (UK)</td>
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<td>GCPP</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NSSP</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
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<td>Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat</td>
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<td>3C</td>
<td>Coordination, coherence and complementarity</td>
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<td>3D</td>
<td>Defence, development and diplomacy</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UNHCD</td>
<td>United Nations, Conflict and Humanitarian Division</td>
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<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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<td>WoS</td>
<td>Whole of System</td>
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Acknowledgements

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Finally, this PhD would not have been possible without the support and love of my husband. We have a partnership in every sense of the word. You have never held me back from doing anything. Instead, you celebrate my career and my independence. You look
out for me when I’m not looking out for myself and you remind me that life can’t always be so serious. Thank you for the goofy moments, the animated conversations about the world, the gift that is your musical ability, the complexity of your character and the deep joy the grows within me when I see you.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In ancient times alchemists believed implicitly in the existence of a philosopher’s stone, which would provide the key to the universe and, in effect, solve all the problems of mankind. The quest for coordination is in many respects the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher’s stone. If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent. Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics, Position and Power, 1986 (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996)

In 1995 the government of Canada established nine task forces all led by Deputy Ministers, including one mandated to better understand the dynamics of managing horizontal policy issues – issues that transcended the organizational mandate of any single department (Government of Canada, 1996). In the very first pages of its report the Task Force on Horizontal Issues chose to introduce its work and its recommendations with the quotation above. There was a sharp edge to the observations of Seidman and Gilmour as they positioned the quest for coordination on the part of public servants and policy makers as being equal to those mythical, utopian pursuits that have so entranced human beings throughout the ages. The analogy presented a suite of ironic observations that suggested the pursuit of the holy grail of coordination across public sector boundaries – whether they be legal, organizational or cultural – was a fool’s chase. Of special note was the suggestion that, like the philosopher’s stone, humankind has long been chasing more efficient and effective approaches to the management of public organizations and resources.

In recent decades there has been growing consensus amongst public servants, politicians, the media and the general public that it is not acceptable to concede issues as being irreconcilable - that the level of human suffering related to the world’s most complex social issues has far surpassed any tolerable threshold (United Nations, 2005; World Bank, 2011). Moreover, there has been a widespread understanding that social unrest and the destabilization of communities in one part of the world can have very direct impacts on political and economic systems worldwide. The result has been a push
from researchers, practitioners and policy makers to better understand how we might design, build, resource, implement and evaluate those programs and initiatives tasked with a mandate to work on these seemingly irreconcilable issues that transcend traditional boundaries. The premise is that since the causes and consequences of poverty and violent conflict do not fall neatly into categories that align with our academic disciplines, organizational designs or professional cultures, those organizations, teams and individual actors who wish to positively influence these issues must be adaptable, agile and flexible. Navigating these complex environments inevitably involves crossing or spanning boundaries that divide organizations and communities.

A suite of terms and concepts have emerged over the past twenty years as researchers and practitioners have striven to better understand both the drivers for and the mechanics of boundary-spanning or cross-boundary collaboration. The literature presents a cohesive picture that while the degree of interaction among actors can and should vary from case to case, some level of collaboration among actors is desirable. Communication, cooperation, coordination and collaboration\(^1\) are desirable in order to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that competing interests and diverging cultures do not get in the way of accomplishing mandates that involve outcomes related to both security and development actors. Despite the clear case for more collaboration around cross-cutting issues, the ‘how’ of cross-boundary efforts is less clear-cut. As a result, various converging and diverging perspectives from a number of academic disciplines exist within the literature inform our current understanding of the major barriers, opportunities, incentives and success factors related to achieving effective cross-boundary coordination in complex environments.

One form of cross-boundary collaboration known as Whole-of-Government (WoG)\(^2\) involves those government departments working to navigate the complex policy

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\(^1\) In this dissertation the terms collaboration and coordination are used interchangeably, which is consistent with their use in both peer reviewed and grey literature. While they may represent different degrees of interconnectedness between actors, the broader literature from multiple disciplines does not establish a common frame of reference for either word. As a result, both are used here to describe a form of interaction between two actors that involves shared interests, a common mandate, joint activities and the possibility of interactions around decision-making and the allocation of resources.

\(^2\) As will be demonstrated over the course of this dissertation, there are dozens of terms used interchangeably with ‘whole-of-government’. To avoid confusion, ‘whole-of-government’ will be the primary term used to articulate the concept of cross-boundary collaboration. It is used often a noun but can also be used as a descriptor (i.e., ‘whole-of-government’ approach, ‘whole-of-government’ initiative,
and programming environments that weave together issues of international security and development. Interest in WoG as an approach to fragility, instability and conflict has grown over the past decade (OECD, 2003, 2006, 2008; DFID, 2005c; Carment, Gazo, & Prest, 2007; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009; Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 2010). The international community has grappled with costly engagement in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq where multi-faceted engagement has involved stabilization, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency, peacebuilding and long-term development. Communities of practice and academic researchers have been working to determine how to better coordinate the interests and efforts of hundreds of actors whose mandates task them to improve some facet of complex environments characterized by both pervasive insecurity and chronic underdevelopment. These conflicts, along with others in Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Syria, to name a few, have accentuated the importance of, first, recognizing and acknowledging the myriad critical connections that exist between the realms of security and development and, second, designing organizations, teams and initiatives that are better equipped to navigate these spaces in which a diversity of interests, values, mandates, cultures, perspectives and tactical approaches exist and, often, compete.

This research aspires to advance our understanding of how WoG is operationalized as an approach to fragile and conflict-affected states. It is based on a central argument that there are numerous operational building blocks (attributes) that must be considered in the design and implementation of a WoG instrument. Moreover, from the outset operationalizing WoG will be viewed as a complex undertaking that involves more than innovations to machinery of government. The research intends to develop an interdisciplinary framework of operational attributes that enhances our understanding of WoG. The framework will integrate not only established knowledge from several academic disciplines but also the experiences and perspectives of practitioners who have first-hand knowledge of what is involved with implementing WoG in practice. By developing an understanding of the key organizational barriers to and incentives for designing, managing, evaluating and enhancing WoG initiatives, the

‘whole-of-government’ policy). Occasionally ‘cross-departmental’ will be used an interchangeable descriptor.
research agenda hopes to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how WoG is operationalized and, thereby, contribute to several scholarly bodies of literature and the practical work of public servants.

The research remains relevant as fragile states remain a priority for governments and organizations from a variety of perspectives whether it be a sense of responsibility for improving the conditions for human development and security in these regions or the persistent belief that fragile states remain a source of insecurity for the international community. The drivers for cross-boundary interaction that will be examined in this introductory chapter continue to exist: violent conflict continues to affect fragile states, the millennium development goals remain unattained (and have now been superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs), major humanitarian crises continue where violence persists (e.g., in Iraq, Syria, Libya) and the threat of global terrorism continues to inform the security priorities and decisions of western countries.

The purpose of this opening chapter is to acquaint the reader with the vocabulary and issues most relevant to establishing key contextual elements that frame the research agenda and determine the scope of expectations around the development of a new theoretical framework for understanding WoG and its application to practice. The chapter begins with an overview of how the primary research objective is advanced throughout subsequent chapters. The second section explores those historical, political, social and economic events and phenomena that have triggered and advanced the call for more efficient and effective cross-boundary interaction and have, in turn, contributed to the development and evolution of WoG as a concept. The final section offers some reflections on several core dichotomies that exist in the relevant literature that should be addressed in order to best frame the strengths and limitations of the research agenda.

**Research architecture**

The dissertation is organized to lead the reader through the various stages of theory development and analysis on the basis of which a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theoretical model of WoG is advanced. Chapter 2 presents the research design and methods by which the primary research objective was achieved. The choice of the case
study approach – specifically Robert Yin’s case study method – is examined, as are case selection, participant recruitment and data collection.

Chapter 3 provides the reader with a concept analysis of WoG. Anchored in a concept analysis method from the field of nursing, this chapter builds on the conceptual drivers discussed in Chapter 1 to identify the core conceptual attributes of WoG as it is applied in the contexts discussed in this chapter. The concept analysis aims to provide a robust understanding of WoG as a vehicle for articulating the idea of cross-boundary interaction. The purpose of this chapter is not to define WoG, but to establish an understanding of the term that incorporates key temporal, socio-cultural and situational considerations and allows for ongoing conceptual evolution. This chapter is intended to frame the subsequent stages of the research and potentially contribute to research and practice by establishing the major points of ambiguity that exist for users of the term and proposing suggestions to clarify understanding of the concept.

Chapter 4 builds the theoretical framework of the major operational attributes (often expressed as organizational considerations, mechanics, opportunities or barriers) of WoG. Leveraging an interdisciplinary body of literature, the framework seeks to establish core thematic areas that, when combined, present a comprehensive picture of how WoG could be operationalized in practice. Early versions of this theoretical analysis informed the development of interview questions that were posed to participants from two case studies. The penultimate version of the framework presents WoG as comprising 10 operational attributes that include: organizational design, accountability, institutional governance, funding and resources, organizational culture, human resources, information sharing tools and systems, the political environment, leadership and social capital, and individual WoG skills. Some early observations with respect to which attributes might be most impervious to change or influence and therefore be considered more significant obstacles to achieving WoG are included in the theoretical framework. However, this preliminary framework was developed so that it could be refined and improved as a result of the case study analysis. In many ways it can be considered a preliminary canvas upon which additional colour and richness will be added by the results of the case studies, which capture impressions from those who have worked on and in WoG initiatives.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the individual case studies, which were based on secondary data and participant interviews. The interviews were intended to capture insights into the mechanics and practical considerations necessary for designing and delivering WoG initiatives. Themes from the interviews were distilled in a manner that allowed for analyses within and between the two cases. These chapters tell the story of WoG in Canada and the UK with a specific focus on the development and implementation of two macro-coordinating bodies (one in each country) that were established in the mid-aughts\(^3\) with a WoG mandate and a focus on international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in fragile states.

Chapter 7 presents the cross-case analysis – a comparison of the themes that emerged in each individual case study. One of the major differences between the two cases pertains to the organizational structure of the WoG instruments being examined. Consequently, the cross-case comparative analysis offers the reader an opportunity to consider the advantages and disadvantages of two approaches to designing a WoG initiative. The comparative analysis also provides the opportunity for reflection on how WoG practitioners prioritize the major barriers to and opportunities for cross-boundary work based on their own experiences and if/how priorities change depending on departmental perspectives. This concluding chapter also attempts to reconcile the theoretical framework from Chapter 4 with context-specific themes that emerge from the participant interviews to generate a framework that presents a comprehensive, interdisciplinary understanding of how WoG initiatives work and how they can be improved. The original framework is revisited and modified to incorporate new results and insights. Conclusions are presented concerning the extent to which the framework may be generalizable to other contexts and the potential impact on future policy and programming efforts for WoG initiatives in post-conflict peacebuilding environments. This final framework may inform future efforts to develop metrics such as critical success factors or key performance indicators that would allow researchers and practitioners to more rigorously monitor and evaluate the cross-boundary interaction of those WoG

\(^3\) A widely accepted term of reference for the first decade of a century does not exist; however, the term ‘aughts’ has gained some traction (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/01/04/what-do-you-call-it) and will be used throughout this dissertation.
initiatives undertaken to address cross-cutting issues in international security and development.

Establishing scope and context

Context: The WoG Lexicon

In countries like Canada and the UK, the quest for improved cross-boundary collaboration within and among public sector organizations has had many names. Over the past 15 years, the term WoG (WoG) has emerged as a common descriptor of cross-departmental collaboration in government. In the most generic sense, WoG is part of a lexicon of terms that communicates the desire for greater collaboration (and therefore less duplication of effort and resources) among departments, teams and units from multiple departments and agencies within a government. In 2006 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offered the following understanding of a WoG approach:

\[\text{Where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives (p. 14).}\]

With respect to the actors involved in WoG initiatives, the OECD is clear that WoG is limited to spanning boundaries that exist among departments, teams and individuals within a government. Yet, WoG has also been presented as coordination across multiple levels of government (federal-provincial-municipal), between a government and other parts of society (private sector, non-governmental organizations, etc.) and among nations that has resulted in confusion about when and how politicians, policy makers and researchers use the term. This conceptual ambiguity is compounded by the vast assortment of terms used somewhat interchangeably with WoG, all of which speak to the idea of crossing boundaries: joined-up government, policy coherence, horizontal coordination, collaborative public management (CPM), interagency coordination, comprehensive approach, integrated approach, civil-military coordination (CIMIC), 3D (defence, development and diplomacy) and 3C (coordination, coherence...
and complementarity). Depending on how the terms are used, some can be considered true synonyms to WoG, while others have contextual variations that alter their meaning to varying degrees. They may speak of coordination exclusively from the perspective of a single nation state (i.e., joined-up government in the UK), coordination in the realm of policy development but not in programming efforts (i.e., policy coherence for development with the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee) or coordination that includes both government actors and networks from other sectors (i.e., CPM in the United States).

It is this latter interpretation that hampers efforts to establish a common understanding of any of the terms in the lexicon. Many of the terms noted above – most notably CIMIC, comprehensive approach and integrated approach – describe a kind of cross-boundary interaction that is more complex with respect to number of actors than WoG and is referred to as ‘whole-of-system’ (CCDP, 2009). ‘Whole-of-system’ (WoS) involves coordination within and amongst government actors and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, local actors, private sectors, etc. Given the conceptual variance, the question that emerges is: should the WoS literature be considered in a research project like the one being advanced here or should it be disregarded altogether? The choice has been made to allow the WoS literature to inform the analysis because, first and foremost, the various terms are used so inconsistently that it is impossible to completely distil the literature into two clearly defined categories. A second consideration is that both WoG and WoS boil down to a form of cross-boundary collaboration. Simply put, there are divisions among individuals, groups, organizations and communities that behave as barriers to collaborative efforts. While the scope of the collaborative effort is different between the two terms, they are largely embodiments of the same conceptual meaning, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Arguably, the events and circumstances that have prompted calls for more collaboration and coherence between a country’s military and its development agency(ies) are generally the same events prompting calls for more collaboration amongst the larger swath of actors navigating the complex operational environment of fragile states.

However, the concepts differ with respect to the number of actors, sectors and systems involved, the complexity of relationships between communities of practice,
organizations and individual personalities and variance in organizational features such as structure, governance, accountability and funding mechanisms. As such, it becomes impossible, with any confidence, to draw conclusions around how cross-boundary interaction efforts can be achieved in every situation. It is important to distinguish between WoG and WoS in order to properly contextualize the analysis and contributions to both research and practice. The focus of the analyses presented in this and subsequent chapters is WoG and more specifically, collaboration amongst key departments, most notably: defence, diplomacy, development, central agencies and specific WoG units.

**Context: Environment**

In order to frame this research within a specific policy, programming and operational environment, WoG will refer to the imperative for cross-boundary interaction that has come to the forefront in the post-9/11 era and the resulting efforts on the part of individual nation states to better coordinate their response to those issues emerging from areas of state fragility, where security and development issues are inextricably interwoven.

The idea that a country can possess a certain level of strength, fragility or resilience has been a dominant and contested concept in the international relations, security studies, economic and international development literature over the past 25 years (Call, 2008; Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009; OECD, 2015). The exact definition of state fragility varies from scholar to politician to organization, with variations in when and how the various descriptors (failed, failing, fragile or weak) are used. These descriptors have been criticized for their tendency to oversimplify a profoundly complex suite of interrelated issues and their normative nature that imposes a western narrative of societal progress and resiliency upon countries still in the relatively early stages of state development (OECD, 2008). Nonetheless, the word ‘fragile state’ is used in this research to describe the specific contextual environment in which WoG approaches are being undertaken. As they are described below, fragile states represent countries characterized by issues of violent conflict and chronic underdevelopment with respect to basic human needs and a complex assortment of interrelated issues that often result in international
engagement that might better serve the people of the country in question if the various actors were better coordinated.

In general terms, a state is described as fragile as it moves along a continuum from a functioning state government that possesses both capacity and resiliency (Ikpe, 2007) and the ability to uphold a social contract with its citizens (Stewart, 2004) towards an ineffective or non-existent government that demonstrates an increasing inability for state structures to support a national currency, enforce state laws and regulations, and provide for the basic human needs of its citizens.

A disintegrated state with a collapsed economy experiences eruptions of violence, multiplication of human rights violations, victimization of civilians through systematic terror, rape and property destruction, displacement and forced conscription of young people. Health conditions deteriorate and refugee numbers soar; the conflict spills over to neighboring states and causes international instability ... failed or rogue states can be used as platforms for transnational criminal and terrorist networks. (Fukuda-Parr & Picciotto, 2007, p. 9)

The evidence of state failure can be viewed through two lenses (Dorff, 2005), but the outcomes for citizens in the country are similar. Through the first lens we can see state failure as the result of a broken social contract between a government and its people. The social contract establishes the authority and legitimacy upon which a government establishes and enforces rules – the conditions and services that need to be provided by the state in order for people to accept its authority (Stewart, 2004). The contract can break under a number of compounding circumstances including insufficient funds or capacities to provide basic services or inability to protect citizens from threats to their lives, safety or livelihoods. Through the second lens, we see state failure as an unwillingness or an inability on the part of a government to maintain services, security and order to all or part of the population it governs. “The state fails to provide security because of the arbitrary and capricious manner in which power is wielded against its own citizens, and it certainly fails to provide social justice” (Dorff, 2005, p. 23). The level of fragility experienced by a state and its population can be assessed along a number of dimensions. The Washington think-tank Fund for Peace produces an annual Failed States Index (FSI) that assesses the fragility of states using 12 indicators that range from demographic pressures (disease, malnutrition, food scarcity) to poverty and economic decline (inflation, GDP,
unemployment) to security apparatus (internal conflict, small arms proliferation, bombings) and demonstrates the critical interplay of security and development issues in these environments (FFP, 2013).

Today, fragile states represent a perfect storm of concern for the international community, from both a security and development perspective. Fragile states or regions of chronic state fragility are thought to be potential safe havens for current and future terrorists (Picciotto, 2004). They are often enmeshed in interwoven cycles of violence and poverty and they are politically, economically and environmentally unstable. Due to inadequate infrastructure and services, they are more vulnerable to natural disasters and the consequences of global climate change (Brattberg & Sundelius, 2011) yet they are complex and difficult environments for aid agencies and non-governmental organizations to operate in. They are “hot spots” of violence that threaten the lives of millions of people with little capacity for a central government to provide for or protect its population.

Prior to the events of 9/11, fragile states might have fallen exclusively within the domain of international development and humanitarian assistance (OECD, 2006a). However, due to many of the characteristics listed above, they have become not only the focus of international development/aid mandates but are also perceived as direct security threats for many developed countries (Government of Canada, 2005) and catalysts for regional instability in strategic locations around the world (Travers & Owen, 2008). Consequently, the decade following 9/11 saw instability in several fragile states become the focus of the security and development communities simultaneously – for example, Afghanistan (2001–present), Iraq (2003–2011) and Sudan/Chad/South Sudan (2003–present). From 2003 onwards, all three examples have been broadly viewed as situations that prompt a deeper level of thinking around WoG (OECD, 2006a; Weiss, 2011; Egnell, 2006; Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008; Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 2010; Hrychuk, 2009) and thus continued evolution of the concept in policy and practice (Korski, 2009; UK Ministry of Defence; 2006; Bensahel, 2007; van de Goor, 2012; Mason & Lanz, 2009). These events have involved cycles of open conflict and extensive post-conflict efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. Because the post-conflict stage remains unstable and volatile, military and humanitarian actors are often on the ground at the
same time, having to navigate an unfamiliar interdependence between the two realms (Egnell, 2008).

**Context: Actors**

A natural consequence of the environment described above is that, for the purposes of this dissertation, WoG includes coordination amongst both civilian and military actors. This will allow for (indeed require) a synthesis of a number of disciplinary perspectives, each of which offers important insights. Each, however, has a critical limitation, hence the imperative to weave together the two bodies of literature. Within the disciplines of political science (and its sub-fields of security studies and military studies) and international development studies, there is a rich literature that looks at the need for and concerns related to cross-boundary interaction for activities such as humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction in fragile states (Meharg, 2007; Travers & Owen, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2009; Hrychuk, 2009; Stoddard & Harmer, 2006). These authors acknowledge and, in fact, focus on the unique challenges of coordination between civilian and military partners. The limitation to this disciplinary perspective is that researchers scratch only the surface of how WoG interaction might be accomplished from organizational and management perspectives. The detailed nuances around how WoG is conceptualized and implemented are more the domain of public administration and public management. Researchers in this area have long been exploring interdepartmental coordination and collaboration under the descriptor of horizontal management or horizontal coordination (Ryan & Walsh, 2004; McGuire, 2006; May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006; Ray & Elder, 2007; Sproule-Jones, 2008). These authors have delved into topics such as governance, design, accountability, human resources, the complexity of the policy-programming cycle and individual skill development to explore how WoG might be achieved. However, the most notable limitation here is that this extensive body of literature is focused on coordination amongst those departments and agencies that address domestic issues. Very little of the public administration literature examines the mechanics of horizontality within the context of line departments that have internationally focused mandates related to security and development. As a result, the unique characteristics of the structures, cultures and
mandates that define the armed forces, the Foreign Service and international development
departments are not included in the analysis of how to best achieve WoG. This limitation is
problematic in that WoG coordination around the issues posed by state fragility cannot be
undertaken without considering the military apparatus of a nation state as one of the key
departmental partners. As a result, from these two established traditions, there is a void in
the literature that casts a large, underexplored shadow on our collective understanding of
how WoG coordination might be achieved within the context of fragile states. This
research is intended to contribute to filling this gap.

**Historical drivers of WoG**

A scan of events, issues, conditions, organizations and personalities that have
contributed to the increasing emphasis on cross-boundary interaction in the public sector
reveals a number of broad thematic categories of drivers that help us understand how the
concept of WoG has developed over time and across disciplines. Examining these stages
of conceptual evolution presents an opportunity for the synthesis and integration of
knowledge across a number of disciplines and establishes the overall relevance and
timeliness of the line of inquiry being pursued in the dissertation. A scan of literature
from disciplines such as military and security studies, public administration, international
development studies, peace and conflict studies, along with grey literature produced by
governments, international organizations and think-tanks reveals, the long-standing intent
to enhance government influence, impact and efficiency through improved coordination
amongst sub-units. The literature also establishes a number of key events and conditions
that have heightened interest in understanding coordination at various moments in time.
As might be expected, different academic and professional disciplines highlight different
conceptual drivers. The next section will touch on three thematic categories of drivers
that tell the story of the evolution of cross-boundary interaction and, more specifically,
WoG efforts in the public sector over the past 30 years.
**Driver: Rapid change and increasing complexity**

The first stream of drivers is associated with the widely referenced perception that over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s⁴ the international community and national governments faced increasingly complex issues and problems that were a result of rapidly changing political, economic and technological environments. The language of complexity appears in multiple disciplines and builds a case that efforts addressing these complex problems need to involve a different way of working that includes more coordination and collaboration among actors (APS, 2007).

Despite ubiquitous and long-running efforts to enhance coordination across large, complex public-sector organizations (6, 2004; Kavanagh & Richards, 2001), large-scale shifts occurring within and across the international community over the past 20 years have heightened collective awareness of the perils of fragmentation and siloization within national and international institutions. From multiple disciplines we see the call for horizontality and WoG linked closely to dramatic changes in social, economic and political systems worldwide: globalization (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004; Peters, 1998; Caslen Jr. & Loudon, 2011), fiscal pressures facing governments in the 1980s and 1990s (Bourgon, 2009; Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996), enhanced communication and information technology (Hunt, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2000) and a series of public sector reforms (under the title New Public Management) implemented in numerous Anglo-Saxon countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; Christensen, Fimreite, & Laegreid, 2007; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004). These drivers of WoG efforts can be referenced in the context of peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction, but are more often associated with broad systemic change and therefore can be linked with any number of complex boundary-spanning issues facing governments, including climate change, natural resource management and health care delivery.

Through the lens of globalization it is possible to envision the global community as a web or network of cultural, social, economic and political issues and phenomena.

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⁴ The period of time being examined in this research (2002-2012) can be somewhat challenging to reference as the first decade of a century does not have a widely understood descriptor (i.e., 1995 is in the mid-nineties). As a point of clarification for the reader, the decade will be described as the early 2000s. Occasionally, when it is desirable to refer to a more specific point within the decade (i.e., mid or late) the term ‘aughts’ will be used. This is a word used by some to describe the first decade of a new century. It is used in this dissertation rarely, but can be helpful when making reference to the middle or end of the decade (i.e., the mid-aughts or the late-aughts).
integrated to such an extent that change or action in one community has the potential to influence or impact other communities regardless of physical distance. The state of globalization or the level of integration among the major systems within the network increases as advances in technology, transportation, communications and social media emerge and disperse people, products and ideas throughout the system at a rapid and often unpredictable rate. As a result, the physical and geographical boundaries of a state or region can no longer contain the impact of domestic events and crises in the domestic environment. Within the context of WoG, globalization is seen as a phenomenon that increases pressure on governments to perform both domestically and internationally (OECD, 2008) and has produced economic and political systems interconnected at the global level to such a point that downturns or upheaval in one part of the system can threaten the prosperity or security of the system as a whole (US Department of Defence, 2010). The phenomenon of globalization expands the traditional boundaries that were thought to organize people and states in the international system and requires professionals and organizations who can function and indeed thrive in an integrated, holistic space. WoG can be seen to emerge as a response to this more integrated, complex world.

Related to globalization and the rapid changes to our economic, political and technological systems is the idea that WoG is, in part, a response to the high level of complexity that characterizes many of today’s most pressing social issues (Hrychuk, 2009; Government of Canada, 2005). These complex or ‘wicked’ problems are “difficult to clearly define, have many interdependencies, are multi-causal, are unstable, have no clear solution, are socially complex, hardly ever sit conveniently within the responsibility of any one organization and are characterised by chronic policy failure” (APS, 2007, pp. 3-4). Over time, these kinds of problems prompt governments and organizations to change how they work: to re-evaluate their information processing, decision making, planning and implementation mechanisms. If the complexity of the problems is increasing, the argument runs, then the complexity of our collective response must increase as well. Wicked problems require “holistic not partial or linear thinking, capable of encompassing interaction between a wide variety of activities, habits, behaviour and attitudes; a capacity to think outside and work across organizational boundaries;
embracing a willingness to think and work in completely new ways” (Ling, 2002, p. 622), all of which are characteristics of WoG.

Driver: A renewed focus on horizontal coordination within public administration

The second stream includes drivers for cross-boundary efforts that emerge predominantly from within public administration literature. As noted previously, the quest for coordination in the public sector is not new and therefore development of WoG as a concept can be linked with much of the vast literature that has explored the idea of horizontality in public organizations since the advent of the modern government system. Nonetheless, a review of literature produced since 1990 reveals a few specific issues, trends, events and government documents that are especially relevant to understanding how cross-boundary interaction has emerged more recently as an important topic. Perhaps the most prevalent theme in the literature is that the emergence of WoG can be understood, in part, through the lens of New Public Management (NPM), a series of public-sector reforms that rolled out in predominately Anglo-Saxon countries in the late 20th century. NPM reforms were anchored in neo-liberal economic rationales and the goal of more efficient, leaner governments. They were focused on the devolution of organizational structures, which included multiple ‘single-purpose’, vertical organizations with specialized and non-overlapping roles and functions, with the intent to establish “separate autonomous bodies for various purposes: ownership, control, regulation, policy advice, service production, and purchasing” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006, p. 19). These reforms were intended to produce “clearer visions and goals, more professional autonomy, more easily measurable performance and results, clearer accountability and greater use of incentives” (Christensen, Fimreite, & Laegreid, 2007, p. 390). However, as the reforms were implemented it soon became clear that a critical consequence of NPM was a high level of structural fragmentation across government departments (Larbi, 1999). In the face of cross-cutting issues, multi-actor engagement and national populaces with high expectations for coordinated service delivery, the reforms became associated with limitations to effectiveness and efficiency. Despite intentions for a leaner, more efficient public service, the organizational consequences of NPM reforms included: fragmentation, lack of coordination, structural devolution (silos/chimneys) and public management strategies dominated by economic insights and theories (Christensen &
In other words, it is possible to see NPM reforms as a driver for the creation and/or reinforcement of organizational boundaries within governments. As a result, WoG and the increased interest in understanding the mechanics of horizontality and cross-boundary collaboration are considered by some as a reform to the NPM reforms (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). Those countries that were seen as trailblazers of NPM have also been enthusiastic adopters of WoG reforms (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s a series of government initiatives appeared in several countries, including Canada and the UK. They reflected the recognition on the part of government that public management philosophies that reinforced organizational silos were not sufficient given the service delivery expectations of citizens and the rapidly changing political, economic and technological environments. Governments began to make the case for strategies and approaches that found efficiency and effectiveness through coordination across organizational boundaries. In 1999, the Labour government in the UK, under Prime Minister Tony Blair’s leadership, produced a white paper titled *Modernising Government*, which laid out a series of priorities and strategies for rejuvenating and modernizing the UK public service. In its plan for ensuring an approach to public service delivery that was responsive to the needs and expectations of citizens and that took into careful consideration the challenges and opportunities associated with the information age, the white paper established a mandate for ‘joined-up government’ or “getting different parts of government to work together, when necessary” (United Kingdom, 1999, p. 16). While a clear definition for joined-up-government was not included in the white paper, a number of researchers continued to explore the idea of ‘joined-upness’ as the term began to get traction amongst politicians and public servants. A 2003 article by Chris Pollitt defined ‘joined-up government’ as:

* a phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking and action. Through this co-ordination it is hoped that a number of benefits can be achieved. First, situations in which different policies undermine each other can be eliminated. Second, better use an be made of scarce resources. Third, synergies may be created through the bringing together of different key stakeholders in a particular policy field of network. Fourth, it becomes possible to offer
citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to a set of related services (p. 35).

The concept is not a full synonym for WoG as its focus on service delivery rightly includes coordination across dimensions including levels of government and between government and the private sector. Still, it was an important building block in the evolution of the WoG concept as it was associated with practical innovations developed within the UK government in the early 2000s, such as the Social Exclusion Unit, the Performance and Innovation Unit and a number of pooled-funding initiatives (including the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, both established in 2001). These management innovations enhanced the profile of cross-boundary efforts and were the focus of academic and practical reflections on best practices and lessons learned, all of which advanced thinking around the virtues, challenges and mechanics of coordination efforts. The advancement of joined-up government as a concept to inform policy and programming efforts in the UK established a critical mass of public servants devoted to conceptualizing how cross-boundary efforts might be achieved – an organizational resource that would be critical as the country moved into the post 9/11 security era.

Meanwhile, in Canada, the ‘horizontal challenge’ came to occupy the attention of both academics and practitioners (Peters, 1998; Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2002; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004). As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Deputy Minister’s Task Force on Managing Horizontal Issues was established in 1995. Its final report made it clear that its recommendations were not “intended to serve as a formal blueprint for public service renewal” (p. i); however, with hindsight, it is possible to recognize how the observations and learnings of the Task Force established important ground work for advancing knowledge and understanding around the issue of horizontal coordination. The final report identified the importance of context to understanding coordination efforts – that there is no one path to success – and offered a comprehensive discussion of horizontal issue management in three dimensions: process, systems and culture. Around the same time that the Task Force was completing its work, parallel efforts were occurring amongst scholars interested in horizontal coordination in the Canadian and US landscapes. B. Guy Peters and Donald Savoie produced a number of papers on the topic
between 1994 and 1998, many of which are referenced by the Task Force. Of particular note are Peters and Savoie’s (1996) identification of five drivers in society that increase the importance of coordination: cross-cutting policy issues, globalization of trade and investment, fiscal pressures, the problems of overlap and duplication, and demands from the public for fair and equal treatment. The work by Peters and Savoie was complemented by subsequent publications from the Canada School of Public Service and the Canadian Centre for Management Development that offered in-depth explorations of the key assumptions, challenges and success factors related to horizontal coordination.\(^5\) While the Canadian efforts did not have the same public profile as the UK White Paper, they delved more deeply into the mechanics of how horizontal coordination might be accomplished. Worth noting is that the rich literature on horizontal coordination during this time period was focused on coordination efforts around domestic priorities such as aboriginal issues, climate change or the provision of health care. The literature did not incorporate any of the language that would emerge in the mid-aughts from successive Canadian federal governments that presented WoG and its predecessor “3D”\(^6\) as a specific boundary spanning approach to foreign policy priority areas.

In 2004 the Management Advisory Committee of the Australian federal government published a document entitled *Connecting Government. Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges.* Accompanied by a Good Practice document and supported by a series of in-depth case studies, this 254-page document represents the most comprehensive examination of the mechanics of WoG to be produced by a government. It goes further than the previously noted Canadian and UK efforts in its efforts to document the Australian Public Service’s (APS) successes and failures with coordination and how these efforts might be improved. The report offered a formal definition of WoG:

*Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated*

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6 A term that refers to the three major departments involved with foreign policy issues in fragile states: defence, development and diplomacy.
government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery (p. 1).

*Connecting Government* examined four primary organizational areas in which coordination needs should be considered: structures and processes, culture and capability, information management and infrastructure, and budget and accountability frameworks. The case studies include a look at the Australian response to the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali nightclubs. In including at least one clear-cut example of an internationally focused security issue in which one of the partner departments includes the Australian Defence Force, the report does begin to integrate issues raised in the general public administration literature with more specific security and defence issues in a manner not seen in public administration literature to that point.

A final conceptual building block of cross-boundary coordination to emerge from the public administration literature was the term collaborative public management (CPM), which is referenced predominantly in the context of the US public service.

*Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-sector and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity and can include the public* (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).

The volume of scholarly and grey literature on CPM increased significantly throughout the early 2000s⁷ – a trend thought to reflect the aforementioned realities of complex, cross-cutting issues and an ongoing emphasis on securing efficiencies through collaborative efforts (Kettl, 2006; O'Leary & Vij, 2012). From the literature on the topic it is clear that the term shares drivers similar to those of WoG (cross-cutting issues, need for efficiencies, globalization). Like ‘joined-up government’, CPM speaks of collaboration across a number of dimensions including the private and not-for-profit sectors and multiple levels of government. Its contributions to the conceptual evolution of WoG include the trend in CPM literature to not only explore the mechanics of CPM but

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⁷ See the 2006 special issue of *Public Administration Review* and the IBM Centre for Business and Government’s *Collaboration Across Boundaries* publication series.
also the core individual attributes of the collaborative public manager (O'Leary & Blomgren Bingham, 2009; O'Leary & Gerard, 2012). Whereas WoG and ‘joined-up government’ tend to speak of cross-boundary coordination, CPM focuses on collaboration, an intensity of interaction amongst actors that is deeper than coordination. CPM is often situated in the idea of a continuum or spectrum of interactions that includes cooperation, coordination, collaboration and integration (O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Even though there is a vagueness to how some of these interactions are formally defined, the acknowledgement that the nature of the relationships and expectations would be different depending on the level of interaction adds another layer of conceptual understanding to any term that speaks of cross-boundary interactions. Finally, like the horizontal coordination literature, the exploration of CPM has not only focused on the importance of cross-boundary efforts, but also peeled the metaphorical onion to understand how they operate (Agranoff, 2006). However, CPM and its practical insights appear not to inform the discourse around cross-boundary efforts in the context of international security and development operations. Much of the knowledge built throughout the public administration scholarly works does not easily cross the disciplinary boundary that divides the field from international relations and international development studies.

**Driver: Connections between security and development**

The third stream of drivers for WoG efforts, and the one that will be explored in most detail in this chapter, emerges jointly from the scholarly fields of political science and international development studies and the practical realities facing those international organizations, government departments and communities of practice working in the realms of international development and security. These drivers emerge along similar timeframes as those noted in the public administration literature but focus less on the mechanics of how coordination might be achieved and instead advance the development of the concept specifically as it pertains to increased coordination among public sector actors working on complex and interrelated security and development issues. From this perspective these drivers establish the strong imperative for coordination and the idea that when it comes to complex environments like those found in conflict and post-conflict environments coordination amongst actors is an imperfect exercise and therefore needs to
be better understood. Additionally, these drivers emphasize the scale of the consequences that result from failure to improve coordination efforts. From regional destabilization to global security threats to the loss of millions of lives in these environments, these drivers tell the story of a political and economic system built upon World War II – a system that established distinct organizational units and academic disciplines for international security and international development. The subsequent pages will delve first into a set of prominent drivers that emerged in the 1990s to establish discourses in the international community aimed at improving the collective ability to influence the new wars of the decade – violent conflict that threatened the lives, safety and welfare of millions and that was increasingly entwined with issues related to human development. A second wave of drivers emerged in the decade after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and from these drivers we observe the specific use of terms such as WoG and ‘comprehensive approach’ to describe a new approach to some of the most serious security and development issues facing the global community today. These include the internal and external threats posed by state fragility, peacebuilding and stabilization efforts around the world, the war on terror, and the securitization of the humanitarian space, to name a few.

**First wave of security-development drivers: 1990s**

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War and an era in international relations that stretched back to the end of World War II in 1945. Initial declarations of a promising new world order vanished in short order as the international community wrestled with the emergence of violent conflict that played out tragically in states like Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor and Kosovo. In every way these new conflicts (often referred to as internal wars, intra-state conflicts, civil wars, and/or ethnic conflicts) were distortions of what war was “supposed” to look like. “Unlike the bipolar, nuclear, and ideological confrontation of the Cold War, today's local wars are dispersed, fragmented, and context-specific” (Picciotto, 2004, p. 546). Described as “bewildering, complex, asymmetric” (Egnell, 2006, p. 1043) the violent conflicts of the 1990s were characterized by a confusing assortment of combatants – military, paramilitary, civilian – who moved freely within and across porous state boundaries, and compounded by poverty and inequality. Unlike scenarios in which sovereign states
fought each other and combattants on both sides were predominantly professional soldiers wielding an arsenal of heavy weapons, new wars were fought by all forms of state and non-state actors. Additionally, they were characterized by high civilian death rates, massive internal displacement of the population, widespread use of rape as a weapon against women and children, ethnic cleansing, the exodus of hundreds of thousands into refugee camps just beyond state borders, a prevalence of relatively inexpensive, easy-to-transport, hard-to-detect small arms that were distributed amongst the population to arm combatants, and profound challenges to human development requiring not only security forces but also humanitarian assistance. Combatants looked different, victims looked different and international laws designed to protect civilians from the perils of violent conflict were shown to be dramatically ineffective in the face of these new threats. Another characteristic of intrastate conflict was the massive movement of internally displaced persons out of communities in an effort to stay a step ahead of the violence. With the movement of people came the destabilization of local economies and an increase in the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS (World Bank, 2003).

Simply put, in the decade after the end of the Cold War, armed conflict took on a more complex character, and security policy responses included diverse efforts aimed at conflict transformation, peacebuilding, the amelioration of political emergencies, crisis management, intra-state conflict and the pursuit of human security. The international political and economic systems designed with traditional post-World War II conflicts in mind proved, at times, both unwilling and unable to change and adapt to new circumstances. The complexity of violent conflict was well beyond what a single agency or branch of an organization could manage on its own (de Coning, Luras, Nagelhus Schia, & Ulriksen, 2009). By the middle of the decade powerful individuals and organizations in the international community began to call for a change in how we understand and approach security issues in a post–Cold War environment. Stumped by the imperative of state sovereignty and lacking laws and mandates for effective intervention, a new generation of politicians, bureaucrats and academics was prompted to devise new theories, frameworks and strategies for understanding, managing and (ideally) preventing violent conflict and in doing so reframed the connections between security
and development. A small sample of the pivotal thinking to emerge from the events of the 1990s include: the advancement of modern peacebuilding through the United Nations Agenda for Peace (1992), Preventing Deadly Conflict by the Carnegie Commission (1997) and the greed versus grievance debate⁸ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). These contributions laid the foundation on which others have continued to build an understanding of the complex, multi-facted nature of violent conflict and its interplay with traditional development issues.

In addition to the research noted above, the decade also yielded a new concept that attempted to reframe how the international community and its member states understand security issues. At its core, human security is the consideration of and focus on the insecurities of the individual and of local communities, in an issue area that would have once focused almost exclusively on the concerns of the state.

*Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.*

(UNDP, 1994, p. 23)

Human security is not only differentiated from traditional state security by its focus on the individual, but also in its mechanisms – an inclination towards soft (diplomatic) power and multilateralism. The term was popularized in the United Nations

⁸Most commonly associated with economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the “Greed vs. Grievance” theory is a lens through which the causes of intra-state conflict (civil war) can be understood. Their first paper on the topic was published in 1998 and was followed closely in 2000 by a World Bank policy research working paper entitled *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, which statistically assessed which motivation was most likely to cause civil war. The *greed* theory was presented as the premise that people are inclined or mobilized to take up arms and participate in a civil war when they have an opportunity for increased access to wealth, power and/or resources (primary commodities such as oil or diamonds). Variables related to greed include the relative military advantage of the rebel group determined by looking at geographic features and the fractionalization of the society, the cost of recruitment (determined by secondary school enrollment, average income, population growth and income growth) and start-up financing from foreign governments and diaspora. Conversely the *grievance* theory surmised that people will commit violent acts to address a social or political needs and wants. Variables related to grievance include political exclusion via repression and marginalization, vengeance and inter-group hatred. Using the variables to build a series of mathematical formulae, several data sets from 1960–1999 were analyzed to reproduce empirical results including a conclusion that it is “opportunities for primary commodity predation (greed) that causes conflict and that the grievances which this generates induce diasporas to finance further conflict” (2000, p. 27).
Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report. A response to the chaos experienced by the international community in missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which resulted in large-scale loss of life and human suffering that played out on television screens around the world, the idea of human security gained traction as a potential foreign policy directive in certain countries – including Canada. The human security agenda would become associated with some high profile successes, such as the 1997 Ottawa Convention and resulting Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines; however, the concept quickly became entangled in debate concerning its definition, its (ir)relevance to major global powers and its inability to inform clear policy.

The early understanding of human security as it was framed by the UNDP and even the Canadian government, quickly fractured as critics charged the concept with being too broad to have relevance in either a policy or academic context. As a result, human security became characterized as having both a narrow and broad scope, with different governments and organizations adhering to one or the other. The narrow definition of the term, also referred to as the ‘Freedom From Fear’ definition, focused on direct and violent threats to individuals and removed a concern with the issues related to human development. In contrast, the broad definition (‘Freedom From Want’), which was most similar to the original definition put forth in 1994 and continued to advance the case that contemporary security issues cannot be untangled from pressing development issues, argued for a security agenda that included issues such as hunger, disease and poverty. In short, a boundary was re-installed between security issues and development issues. The narrow definition was appealing to politicians and policy makers because it provided more practical direction and focus for policy decisions (Busumtwi-sam, 2002). Moreover, the broad definition of human security was accused of creating a situation in which multiple, unmanageable variables are in play making it impossible to understand causal relationships. “A concept that aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing,” argued one of the key proponents of the narrower freedom from fear approach (Mack, 2004, p. 367). The narrow definition attempted to please multiple actors by being slightly more relevant to the larger, more powerful nations that discounted human
security and its case for soft power (Liotta, 2005), while still allowing middle powers to build political and strategic niches around the human security movement.

The advent of human security and its contentious relationship with practitioners, policy makers and researchers throughout the 1990s can be seen as as an important antecedent for cross-boundary interaction and the conceptual evolution of WoG as it is understood today. First, the practical and intellectual development of human security generated an enormous volume of reflection, analysis, debate and discourse in communities of research and practice, much of which examined the challenges associated with advancing holistic, multi-faceted concepts that may better reflect the truth of human experience and complexity of an issue but are inherently difficult to use as the basis for formulating and implementing policies that have clear objectives, political resonance and measurable impact. Human security is a concept that speaks to important synergies between security and development issues. Many of the challenges it faced in designing policies, structures and programs that fostered synergistic, coordinated activity also exist for WoG.

Second, through the lens of human security we can see both the effort to advance a concept that weaves together issues and considerations from the realms of security and development and the strength of the boundaries that for decades have separated these realms. By the end of the 1990s the term’s accepted separation into narrow and broad definitions can be seen as reinforcing the very professional and academic silos that early adopters of human security had hoped to break down earlier in the decade. While a number of important, initial successes can be attributed to the narrow definition of human security – the Human Security Network (Axworthy, 2001), the Human Security Report (Human Security Centre, 2005), the Ottawa Convention (to ban landmines) (Gwozdecky & Sinclair, 2001), the Kimberly Process (to ban conflict diamonds) (Grayson, 2004), the International Criminal Court (Robinson, 2001) and even the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001) – it did not demand of governments profound change to organizational design, structure or even culture. The Freedom from Fear approach allowed for a certain status quo to be maintained while still speaking in a language that emphasized the value of human security and human welfare.
This conceptual journey of human security influenced a number of individuals and departments in Canada that would, in the aughts, go on to advance concepts such as ‘3D’, WoG and the ‘comprehensive approach’. A very specific example of this connection between human security and WoG can be seen in 2005 when the Canadian Human Security Program established during the tenure of the Chrétien government came to an end and a large majority of the staff found a home in the WoG flagship initiative: the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) (Desrosiers & Lagasse, 2009).

Finally, in many ways human security can be seen as an early descriptor of the security-development nexus – a construct that became more prevalent and more widely cited throughout the early 2000s (Tschirgi, Lund, & Francesco, 2010). Generally speaking, the security-development nexus attempts to describe the idea that in many regions around the world pervasive and chronic insecurity and underdevelopment co-exist and impact each other. This physical and theoretical space, where the realms of security and development overlap, encompasses a multitude of complex, context-dependent relationships between actors, issues, interests and priorities. It is referenced by both the security and development communities and is associated with some of the most pressing issues facing the international community today, such as state fragility, the war on terror and current peacebuilding and stabilization efforts worldwide. Consequently, the nexus can be understood as an important driver of the current discourse around increased and improved coordination in conflict and post-conflict environments, and is the focus of the next section of this chapter.

In summary, the events of the 1990s produced a number of drivers for cross-boundary interaction between the security and development communities. If the security-development drivers of the time are juxtaposed against the drivers noted from the public administration literature it is possible to identify a certain multi-disciplinary convergence that began to play out towards the end of the 1990s: two separate paths highlighting the increasing need for more and better coordination within and across public sector organizations. From an academic perspective, the two paths do not appear to inform or influence each other to any substantial degree. However, from the perspective of the day-to-day work of governments and international organizations, the new millennium began with events that reinforced the cross-cutting nature of security and development issues
and presented an opportunity for the task forces, white papers and general thinking around enhanced coordination and horizontality from the 1990s to inform the intensified discussion about the imperative of coordination amongst security and development actors.

**Second wave of security-development drivers: 2000s**

The second wave of security-development drivers for WoG emerged throughout the early 2000s in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent War on Terror. These events and phenomena added heightened emotion, political urgency and layers of complexity to already complicated global issues (Waddell, 2006) and prompted another major shift in the international community’s collective understanding of war, violence and insecurity. The events of 9/11 and the resulting realization that state borders and defences were increasingly permeable and vulnerable to non-traditional acts of aggression marked an intensified culture of fear in western countries and the security discourse within these countries became focused on a new ‘enemy’. The challenging intrastate conflicts of the 1990s started important conversations around the role of the international community in the protection of civilians living in fragile states; however, the potential spillover of violence in Rwanda or Somalia did not directly threaten the lives of citizens living in powerful western countries. After 9/11 the threat to western governments and societies became more tangible and, at the same time, the ‘enemy’ became more opaque. Non-state actors, in the form of insurgents and terrorists, were not obligated or inclined to fight by the ‘rules of war’ and were associated with “decentralized shadow economies, trans-border migratory flows and non-state global insurgent networks that, in an interdependent world, are able to threaten international stability” (Duffield, 2005, p. 143).

Western military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq shone a bright light on the need for improved coordination amongst security and development actors in these areas as conflicts were waged in the same physical space occupied by individual citizens in need of humanitarian aid and development assistance. Prolific human suffering, the deaths of thousands of western soldiers and continued advancements in technology allowed both journalists and average citizens to disseminate pictures, ideas and opinions about the challenges facing security and development efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This highlighted the coordination challenges facing actors working in peacebuilding, stabilization, reconstruction, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance environments. Furthermore, unabating violence in African countries such as Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the complex connections between terrorism and state fragility (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006; Menkhaus, 2004; Dorff, 2005) and the observation that violent conflict was a clear barrier to the achievement of development goals in many countries (Stewart, 2003; Tujan, Gaughran, & Mollett, 2004) provoked calls (in the form of high-profile mandates, reports and panels) for cross-boundary interaction at all levels: across government departments and across the broader system of actors working on these issues.

Built on the foundations of the human security discourse and framed by the post-9/11 security environment, our contemporary understanding of WoG has been informed by a suite of pressing and interconnected phenomena that were played out through the lens of state fragility including: global terrorism and associated counter-terrorism efforts, the changing dynamics of contemporary peacebuilding and stabilization initiatives, and the emergence of the security-development nexus as a priority issue for politicians, practitioners and researchers. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s these drivers continued to prompt a more in-depth understanding of how security and development issues and actors influence and impact each other, thereby advancing the case that improved coordination amongst relevant actors is essential to successful outcomes.

Global Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Efforts

*It is sometimes said that terrorists flourish in the gaps between countries, those ungoverned spaces along remote borders and even within states. It would be just as accurate to say that terrorists flourish in the gaps between agencies, exploiting discontinuities between government functions. Quite naturally, terrorists seek out these gaps between agencies and among governments trying to coordinate their strategies in collective approaches to terrorism.* (Shemella, 2006, p. 449)

The post-9/11 security environment has been dominated by the war on terror and the perpetual ripple effect of ongoing missions, campaigns and calls for action undertaken in the name of bringing to justice those responsible for the terrorist attacks in the US and eliminating the threat of terrorism worldwide. The impacts of such activities, which more recently have included efforts to combat the rise of ISIS and Boko Haram, are seen
largely through the lens of western countries, have critical normative and emotionally charged attributes and have played out predominately on the canvas of state fragility. Perhaps the most notable actions undertaken by the international community in the fight against global terrorism have been large-scale military and humanitarian assistance campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have displayed counter-terrorism operations against insurgents that have incorporated multi-facted strategies on a number of fronts: diplomacy, development (short and longer term) and security (military and police) (Muggah, 2014; Stoddard & Harmer, 2006). However, the war on terror has also played out over the past decade in a number of African countries – Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Nigeria to name a few. These countries would have been considered conflict-affected states prior to any international intervention to erradicate terrorist groups and have consistently appeared at the top of the Failed States Index and the bottom of the Human Development Index, meaning that they struggle concomitantly with persistent insecurity and chronic underdevelopment. Within these environments, the connection between global terrorism and state fragility is best described using the principle of *mutual vulnerability*, which encapsulates the idea that established terrorist groups look to fragile states for sanctuary due to the chaotic and informal nature of governance, economies and security within the country (Stoddard & Harmer, 2006). Once in a country, the terrorist group’s recruitment of individuals is facilitated by the grievances prevalent in the society related to chronic poverty, unpredictable violence and foreign occupation (United Nations, 2004). Consequently, the war on terror has been fought on a number of dimensions ranging from the physical destruction of terrorists and terrorist organizations to eliminating means through which terrorists are supported and provided sanctuary to diminishing the underlying political, social and economic conditions that facilitate the recruitment of new individuals to terrorist organizations (United States, 2003; Malan, 2002; Makinda, 2006)

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*Mutual vulnerability is a concept that emerges in numerous disciplines including education and environmental studies. It also has a place in human security literature. In his book *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability* (1999), author Jorge Nef provided descriptions of the concept that lends itself well to this discussion: “Interconnectedness means that dysfunctions in the weaker components of the global fabric result in reciprocating, self-reinforcing, and vicious cycles of planetary magnitude” (p. 9) and “security threats are systemically related and that dysfunctions in one sphere tend to express themselves in other subsystems; that is, mutual vulnerability is constituted by multiple dysfunctions sequentially and structurally linked in vicious circuits of multiple causality” (p. 23).*
Non-military counter-terrorism efforts to tackle the issue of mutual vulnerability have included politically and financially supporting specific regimes or groups over others in an effort to eliminate some of the conditions that make fragile states a favourable base for terrorist groups (Cilliers, 2006). Counter-terrorism measures have included renewing relationships with governments that otherwise would be considered *persona non gratae* due to widespread human rights violations in their countries. For example, in 2002 the US government renewed talks with the government of Sudan to obtain a commitment that officials in Khartoum would share information on al-Qaeda’s leadership and methods, detain large numbers of individuals for interrogation and provide access to relevant financial records (Morrison, 2002). This demonstrates the tension that exists between the objective of eliminating environments that are conducive to recruiting, training and protecting terrorists and terrorist organizations, and efforts to address pre-existing security and development concerns that have existed, in the case of Somalia, Sudan and other African countries, for decades if not generations.

Another aspect of the war on terror that has highlighted the overlap between the security and development communities has been the heavily contested practice of refocusing official development assistance (ODA) away from longer-term efforts aimed at poverty reduction towards a broader range of counter-terrorism efforts including democracy building and post-conflict stabilization. This approach is criticized for the potential it offers for donor countries to provide aid to countries strategically significant to their counter-terrorism efforts. Several authors reference the concept of “*aid orphans*” and the idea that the emergence of these geopolitically insignificant countries is the result of the current predominance of security issues in the development arena. Some donor countries, under pressure to show progress with the development agenda in the face of billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan and Iraq, are favouring countries “with institutional and policy characteristics that are deemed to generate good growth performance” (Fukuda-Parr & Picciotto, 2007, p. 4). Unless a state is identified as a

10 The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines ODA as financial resources provided to “countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions ... for the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective” (OECD website). For the purpose of this research it is noteworthy that military equipment and services and anti-terrorism activities are not ODA-eligible; however, “the cost of using donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible".
security threat, this approach moves ODA out of least-developed nations and into the emerging market states such as Brazil, India and China. This securitization of development lends itself to a situation in which security at home becomes the overriding priority on both security and development agendas, meaning that development policy may find itself subordinated to either a military strategy or the short-term political considerations of donor countries (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2005; Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006; van Veen, 2007). In an attempt to ensure this trend does not continue, organizations like the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom and the OECD have generated reports to ensure that the poverty alleviation focus of ODA remains central, but how successful these efforts have been remains uncertain.

Overall, reflections on counter-terrorism efforts pursued in fragile states over the past decade benefit greatly from a lens that not only examines outcomes related to counter-terrorism objectives, but also other core objectives for a country or region. It can be argued that many initiatives undertaken in the name of counter-terrorism are destabilizing in their own way as they are designed and implemented for the purpose of achieving western counter-terrorism objectives and do not prioritize the needs of the host country and its citizens. Mobilizing financial and political support for one group or individual over another, training and outfitting local security forces, targeting humanitarian assistance or debt relief, re-legitimizing a government or group in the eyes of the international community, removing economic sanctions for strategic advantage – all these actions present the opportunity to shift internal power dynamics and create an alternative process through which conflict-affected and poverty-ridden states access or manipulate resources. There is a concern that the war on terror may yield a reality in which those countries that are not perceived to be harbouring an immediate terrorist threat may not have equal access to development assistance (Malan, 2002). Overall, unless great care is taken in the planning, coordination and execution of counter-terrorism measures, they have the potential to undermine democracy and erode civil liberties as effectively as terrorism and risk, creating long-term instability (Makinda, 2006).

Coordination of effort and purpose becomes a core attribute of the multi-facted approach that leverages resources (human, financial and infrastructure) and networks from both the
security and development spheres (Abrahamsen, 2005). In light of these considerations, the security and development apparati within governments and international organizations began extending their traditional roles and mandates to allow for a more holistic approach to interventions (AusAID, 2003; DFID, 2005c; Baltazar & Kvitashvili, 2007).

**Changing dynamics of peacebuilding and stabilization efforts**

The lexicon of terms used to describe the various stages of a cycle or continuum of conflict, peace and development in a region is extensive. During the Cold War the main stages along the path from conflict to peace would have included peacemaking (through diplomatic or military means) and peacekeeping in which UN missions monitored and enforced the terms of a peace agreement. In the 1990s, as violent conflict raged in states increasingly described as failed or fragile, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding emerged to reflect the idea that the cessation of hostilities was not enough to put a country or a region on the path to sustainable peace. Durable and long-lasting peace, it was argued, involves promotion of “a culture of peace in place of a culture of violence” (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 279), which must be built on a foundation of state and societal capacity and resiliency in a number of domains. Therefore, peacebuilding speaks of the need for the state to rebuild capacity in governance, physical infrastructure, justice and security institutions and the provision of socio-economic development in order to ensure peace that is durable and long-lasting. Similar to the discourse surrounding the narrow and broad definitions for human security, the depth and extent of the relationship between the security elements of peacebuilding and longer-term development efforts depend on the lens applied. Smoljan (2003) presents two contrasting approaches to understanding peacebuilding. The exclusivist methodology views it as a short-term response to security problems that lays the groundwork for a longer-term development strategy. In the inclusivist approach “development underlies the philosophy of peacebuilding … they are mutually reinforcing procedures, capable of operating simultaneously and working towards a common goal” (p. 233).

In the post-9/11 security environment, peacebuilding has been paired with terms such as stabilization, reconstruction and state-building. Stabilization is a stage of the war-
peace system of interventions. Figure 1 depicts some of the activities that occur within such a system as a community’s or society’s experience with violent conflict advances to a state of long-term peace and development. The model displays critical areas of overlap between activities to impress upon the reader that the various activities involved with conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction efforts do not occur as self-contained steps in a process. Instead, the reality facing practitioners is much messier in that mandates, actors and issues collide and conflict within any of the areas of overlap. Also worth noting is the fact that violent conflict can stabilize, abate and intensify any number of times prompting a shift in priorities and a need to engage or re-engage actors with different skills and resources.

Figure 1: States of fragility - overlaps between stabilisation and other policy spheres

(Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010, p. 11)

Stabilization is also a term that has been increasingly associated with the international community’s response to natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami in
Indonesia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Post-disaster stabilization and post-conflict stabilization differ along a number of dimensions including: operations/logistics, access to and availability of funds, engagement of the western public and clarity of overall mission. Nonetheless, the vulnerability of fragile states to natural disasters and the likelihood of pre-existing security forces and humanitarian actors in such regions prior to a natural disaster led practitioners and academics to consider the complexities of post-disaster stabilization as part of the discourse around cross-boundary interaction (Brattberg & Sundelius, 2011).

Despite its increased prevalence in the security and development vocabularies of the past 15 years, stabilization is not new to the peace-conflict continuum. Its revival in the post-9/11 world incorporates new elements such as the range and diversity of actors, a more prominent role of private contractors and change of context effectively described by Zyck, Barakat, and Deely (2014): “rather than taking place in mid-conflict contexts such as Vietnam or post-conflict contexts such as Kosovo, they emerged primarily in no-war-no-peace situations in which there was neither an ongoing war nor a durable and consensual peace agreement” (pp. 30-31). International campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout the early 2000s exemplified this context. They lacked clear transitions from declared conflict to stable, post-conflict environments. In both cases, the stage after conflict between warring parties continued to involve violence and open hostilities. While peacebuilding efforts and the distribution of humanitarian aid were undertaken, they occurred in an environment that remained largely unsafe for diplomats, aid workers, development professionals and local populations. Because defence departments and their military branches have far greater capacity than any other government unit to operationalize, access substantial funding and deploy quickly, stabilization efforts demand a close relationship between military and civilian actors. Military and security forces were not just present to battle insurgents and keep the peace; they became more involved in protecting and escorting aid workers (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2005) and were increasingly responsible for distributing targeted aid as part of winning a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign (Gordon, 2010). As a result of the conflicting interests and mandates noted above, “stabilization generates a complex array of vertical and horizontal tensions. Vertical tensions arise due to the juxtaposition of international and domestic priorities.
Horizontal tensions often emerge when specific government departments jockey for position, resources and status” (Muggah, p. 8).

The focus on stabilization as a critical stage in moving from open conflict to sustainable peace is one of the most recent and pressing drivers of WoG. “In order to secure or support a particular political dispensation, stabilization efforts routinely mobilize a combination of military, political, development and humanitarian resources” (Collinson, Elhawary & Muggah, 2010, p. S282). The explicit inclusion of the military as a primary actor in the environment deepens our understanding of cross-boundary interaction. Whereas ‘joined-up government’ and horizontal coordination are more often presented as coordination amongst traditional civilian line departments and agencies, WoG in the context of stabilization speaks of a suite of perspectives, values and mandates that comes from both military and civilian (political and development) units. Additionally, stabilization efforts throughout the early 2000s involved an unprecedented investment of money, equipment, people and human lives on the part of western countries and resulted in a high level of scrutiny by the media, general public and researchers. In Canada, the UK and the US, to name a few, political careers and the quest for re-election became connected with a government’s ability to demonstrate some kind of success in Afghanistan and/or Iraq.

Consequently, the first decade of the 2000s yielded a number of formal initiatives, directives and high-level reports emphasizing the need for strong cross-boundary interaction. From the UN, high-level panels in 2004 (A More Secure World) and 2005 (In Larger Freedom) emphasized the important connections between security and development and the inherent difficulties experienced by international organizations and state governments in their efforts to coordinate cross-cutting policy and programming efforts. The UNDP focused on similar connections in its 2005 annual human development report, International Cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an unequal world. From the OECD came a series of influential publications related to fragile states, including Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (2006) and Statebuilding in Fragile Situations (2008). In 2007, OECD ministers adopted the 10 Fragile States Principles, which acknowledged the profound connections between security and development issues in areas of state fragility. A decade of thinking around
the impact and implications of the security-development nexus culminated in the 2011 World Bank Development Report *Conflict, Security and Development*.

At the nation-state level, publications and policy documents continued to reinforce the critical connections between security and development and lobbied for improved cross-boundary interaction. The 2005 Canadian International Policy Statement (IPS), *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, focused on the importance of more coordination amongst development, defence and diplomacy actors, coining the term 3D as an articulation of core boundaries that need to be spanned in order to work effectively on the most pressing security and development issues. In 2008 an independent panel on Canada’s future in Afghanistan released recommendations in its final report that included both the observation that more effective coordination amongst key departments and programs within the Canadian government was essential and some ideas on how this might be accomplished. In the UK the Department for International Development (DFID) published *Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states* (2005), *Fighting poverty to build a safe world. A strategy for security and development* (2005), and *Preventing Violent Conflict* (2007). In the US, two Presidential Decision Directives (56 and 44) signed by Bill Clinton (1997) and George W. Bush (2005) respectively detail the responsibilities of the various governmental actors involved with interagency planning in complex operations (Caudill, Leonard, & Thresher, 2008) and institutionalize policy coordination processes (Bensahel, 2007).

In response to the focus on stabilization efforts in fragile states, a number of western governments “rapidly sought to develop, institutionalise and integrate various national capacities for responding to the immediate” (Gordon, 2010, p. S370). Canada announced the creation of its Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in 2005. Situated in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the new unit had an initial mandate to contribute to the “planning and preparation across government for crises in fragile and failing states … and will promote faster, more efficient coordination and action of Canada’s response to support stabilization and reconstruction” (Government of Canada, 2005, p. 11). In the US, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established in the Department of State in 2004 and integrated into a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in 2011.
the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was created in 2004 and then renamed the Stabilisation Unit (SU) in 2007. Similar units were developed in Australia and numerous European countries. While all were designed to strengthen stabilization and reconstruction efforts and contribute to enhanced coordination of individuals and departments, the various initiatives differed in a number of ways including scope of mandate, availability of funding, the institutional ‘home’ within the organizational design of government and its impact on governance, resonance and overall impact.

Finally, the widespread focus on stabilization also yielded some thinking around approaches and frameworks that might be applied to accomplish coordination across relevant actors. Such frameworks as those noted below demonstrate the extent to which practitioners conceptualize what cross-boundary collaboration might look like for actors in the realms of policy and programming, thereby taking the understanding of concepts such as WoG to a deeper level. In 2005, the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a Stability Assessment Framework which advanced the case that achieving sustainable stability required an integrated approach in three main policy domains: governance, security and socio-economic development. The framework led actors through a process in which they jointly crafted terms of reference, conducted analyses to arrive at a shared understanding of the situation, workshopped policy options and developed a comprehensive strategy for moving forward. In 2008, an interagency working group in the US government developed the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). Based on the need to address the causes and consequences of state fragility, the ICAF was intended to foster an interagency process that would result in the “development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife” (S/CRS, 2008, p. 1). Finally, in 2009 the United States Institute for Peace produced a Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction to clarify major end states and necessary conditions for successful stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The framework also presented a set of seven cross-cutting principles that were considered relevant to every actor regardless of a narrowly established mandate or more linear approach. The principles speak to the complex, multi-facted environment they were designed to address. In particular, the principle concerning ‘unity of effort’ speaks to the imperative of cross-boundary interaction and while it refers to broad whole-of-system
coordination, its conditions for success are applicable to WoG as well: “a shared understanding of the situation, a shared strategic goal, integration across capabilities, cooperation and coherence, civil-military cooperation in three dimensions and recognition of humanitarian space” (United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 3-18–3-19).

The Security-Development Nexus

As a term of reference, the security-development nexus has been used to identify a series of critical connections between cross-cutting issues that have traditionally fallen within the purview of a single disciplinary, professional or academic domain: either security or development. As a metaphor, the nexus speaks to a figurative and physical space in which the two realms overlap. In this area of overlap exist innumerable issues, actors (organizations, communities and individuals), political, economic, historical and social contexts, catalysts for change, and dynamic, as opposed to static, relationships. How issues are connected at any given point in time or space is context-specific and impossible to quantify in any meaningful way. In many ways, the aforementioned drivers of global terrorism and changes to stabilization and peacebuilding environments cannot themselves be distinguished from the security-development nexus. Identifying the nexus here as a separate driver for cross-boundary coordination is to discuss how increasing reference to the term amongst practitioners and researchers around 2010 placed the nexus and concepts such as WoG in a dynamic cycle of conceptual development. In other words, understanding the nature of the relationship between the issues that cut across the two spheres of security and development yielded insight into the importance of coordination amongst individuals and organizations and the fact that coordination needed to be understood as context-dependent. Conversely, efforts to understand the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of WoG contributed to the discourse around the security-development nexus, revealing how important it was to understand the issues in order to design programs, policies and procedures that could be effective in the nexus.

While the ‘security-development’ nexus has become more prevalent within academic research and policy communities in the years since the 2001 (Tschirgi, Lund, & Francesco, 2010), the term describes a relationship that has been observed and described in many ways prior to the events of 9/11. Much of this research emerged independently within academic disciplines and we do not see a great deal of cross-disciplinary
reference, which would indicate that the security-development nexus was conceptually
developed in a clear, evolutionary manner, with one theory building upon another.
Instead, the relationship and the subsequent calls for change and innovation in order to
better navigate the nexus appear haphazardly amidst the massive volume of research that
explored issues in international security and development from 1945 up to the end of the
Cold War in 1989. From this interdisciplinary perspective, we can see that for many years
researchers have been positing ways in which security and development issues are
intertwined and making recommendations for a more holistic understanding of the
relationship between insecurity and underdevelopment. Norwegian sociologist Johan
Galtung – father of the academic field of peace and conflict studies – suggested that a
distinction existed between negative peace (the absence of war) and positive peace (the
societal accomplishment of a state of being in which all forms of violence are eliminated)
(1964). Galtung also framed an understanding of conflict through the lens of three kinds
of violence which, in addition to direct or overt violence, included the concepts of
structural (1969) and cultural violence (1996) both of which integrated the complexities
of economics, politics and human behaviour into the discourse around the origins of
insecurity. The field of psychology introduced theories concerning human needs and
ideas around how individuals prioritize and pursue fundamental needs (Maslow, 1943).
Sociologists such as Edward Azar (1985) and John Burton (1990) examined protracted
social conflicts and the potential roles that issues perceived as stemming from the realm
of development have in the perpetuation of violent conflict. In the 1990s political
scientists explored the merits of concepts such as the previously mentioned human
security, which focused on the security of the individual and implicitly involved both
freedom from want and freedom from fear.

In the post-9/11 era, global events such as those noted earlier in this section have
prompted a new generation of practitioners, policy makers and researchers to explore the
complex and problematic relationship that exists between violent conflict (traditionally
the domain of security actors) and extreme poverty (traditionally the domain of
development actors). In 2005 a report from the Secretary-General of the United Nations
titled In Larger Freedom highlighted the need for the international community to
consider and acknowledge the role of conflict in perpetuating extreme poverty and the
potential of poverty to exacerbate violent conflict. The report and, in particular, its assessment that security and development are ‘inextricably linked’ has been the starting point for many scholars who have worked to clarify and better understand the nature of the relationship between the two spheres and what ability, if any, the relationship has to inform policy (Waddell, 2006; Stern & Ojendal, 2010; Fukuda-Parr, 2010). In 2011 the World Bank’s annual World Development Report (WDR 2011) was titled simply Conflict, Security and Development. The report establishes 21st century conflict and violence not just as a security concern but also as a primary development challenge – one that international organizations and national governments are poorly equipped to address.

One-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict or large-scale, organized criminal violence and no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single United Nations Millennium Development Goal ... while much of the world has made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the past 60 years, areas characterized by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence are being left far behind, their economic growth compromised and their human indicators stagnant (World Bank, 2011, p. 1).

In the academic literature, unpacking the relationship has included understanding security as both an objective and an instrument of development (Stewart, 2004); situating our understanding of the contemporary nexus in a variety of historical contexts (Hettne, 2010; Duffield, 2010); building frameworks to map the multitude of perspectives and understandings that inform the conceptual development of the nexus (Stern & Ojendal, 2010; Stern & Ojendal, 2011; Reid-Henry, 2011); identifying the various dimensions of policy coherence necessary for navigating within the nexus (Kent, 2007); framing our understanding of the nexus in the context of the associated political functions and characteristics of its two core elements (security and development) and the types of relationships possible (Spear & Williams, 2012); questioning whose security is being pursued in the name of the nexus – i.e., security of states vs. people, security of western countries vs. fragile states (Waddell, 2006); presenting the security-development nexus as troublesome rhetoric that fosters an unfocused policy discussion amongst an ad hoc assortment of actors – the very uncoordinated outcome that the nexus pretends to address (Chandler, 2007); and advancing the case for the continued development of WoG
approaches to achieving policy coherence across the nexus (Fukuda-Parr, 2010; OECD, 2006a).

Acknowledging violent conflict as a barrier to the achievement of short- and long-term development goals has been accompanied by the contrasting point that the nature of and manner in which a donor country or organization provides development aid, especially short-term relief, can be as damaging to peacebuilding efforts as it can be beneficial. In this case it is the development actors that need to be aware of their ability to foster instability and insecurity in a post-conflict zone. In her 1999 book Do No Harm, Mary Anderson explores the double-edged sword of aid and its ability to support both peace and war. Anderson reflects on her personal experience in the field of international development and several ways in which the economic and political components of aid can work against peacebuilding efforts. Her book remains a valuable resource for international development agencies working to enhance their effectiveness in conflict zones (DFID, 2010). Over the last decade, many of these points have been further explored by other authors and practitioners. First, aid holds great potential for fostering or catalyzing violent conflict by establishing and reinforcing power dynamics between those who are receiving aid and those who are not. The ability of short- and long-term aid to empower some individuals or groups at the expense of others can enhance or cause new fracture lines and social tension within a community or region. “Aid is a tangible ‘change actor’ in the field and can be stigmatised as a symbol of ‘loss’ of local norms and values” (OECD, 2003, p. 18). Aid that reinforces or ignores issues such as poor governance can actually strengthen the position of unaccountable leaders or governments, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities between elites and masses (Commission for Africa, 2005; Munslow & Brown, 1999; Coyne, 2006). Beyond the ability of aid to polarize social dynamics, the financial capital and in-kind resources combined with corruption in some recipient governments can mean that aid is able to continue funding conflict and illegal activities. Even without corruption as an issue, money and physical resources can be stolen by armed groups simply because a government lacks the infrastructure and capacity to safeguard it. Conflict can also be enabled or perpetuated when development assistance provides for the needs of civilians, providing them the time and opportunity to support and/or participate in rebel groups, organizations or movements. “Aid substitutes
for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing them to support conflict” and “legitimizes people and their actions or agendas, supporting the pursuit of war or peace” (Anderson, 1999, p. 39). For all of these reasons donor countries need to be cognizant of the potential unintended negative consequences of the way in which aid is delivered and its contribution to the community perceived.

It can be observed that more often than not the barrier to translating the knowledge connections between the development imperative into policy and practice is not so much a lack of belief in the importance of the nexus, but a systemic inability on the part of governments and organizations to conceptualize and implement responses to such a complex policy context. A comprehensive research agenda that integrates academic study with the timely real-world reflections of policy makers and practitioners could significantly enable the development, evaluation and advocacy of policy mechanisms, organizational mandates and innovative frameworks for conflict prevention and peacebuilding that more closely reflect the reality of the human experience.
Chapter 2: Research Design

A number of complementary processes informed and guided the overall research design: Allan F. Repko’s integrated approach to the interdisciplinary research process, R.K. Yin’s multiple-case study method and Beth L Rodgers’ concept analysis method (see Chapter 3). This chapter will present the interdisciplinary foundations of the research strategy, rationale for the choice of the case study method, the resulting research design and the mechanics of participant recruitment, data collection and data analysis.

Interdisciplinary foundations

Repko’s integrated approach (see Figure 2), published in 2008, resulted from an effort to reconcile a number of approaches to interdisciplinary research produced by his contemporaries such as Julie Klein (1990), William Newell (2001) and Rick Szostak (2002). The model was not designed to be prescriptive in nature as many interdisciplinary scholars, including Repko, espouse the idea that a single path or formula for interdisciplinary research and learning is counter-intuitive to the value and innovative nature of interdisciplinarity. Instead, the model reminds researchers that interdisciplinary insights must be anchored in disciplinary contributions and competencies (Repko, 2008) and that purposeful techniques and strategies (seen in the last four stages of Repko’s model) exist for integrating insights with the purpose of producing an interdisciplinary understanding of a problem or phenomenon.
Figure 2: Overview of Yin’s multiple-case study method and Repko’s integrated approach to the interdisciplinary research process
The value of incorporating elements of Repko’s model in the research design was to ensure opportunities for synthesis and integration across a number of disciplines were highlighted and pursued. As noted in Chapter 1, the multi-faceted research subject meant that certain aspects of WoG were examined to differing degrees by the fields of public administration, political science, international development studies, military studies (as distinct from political science), business management and complexity studies. At the most basic level, the mechanics of cross-boundary efforts were studied extensively within public administration, business administration and, to some degree, military studies. In contrast, the specific nuances of the environment of focus in which WoG initiatives were targeted (fragile states) were best understood through the lenses of political science and international development studies. As a result, an interdisciplinary research approach was a priority from the outset of the research design process with an understanding that one of the potential contributions of the research would be to weave knowledge, theories and perspectives from a number of disciplines into a comprehensive understanding of WoG.

Repko’s model was also well suited to complementing Yin’s multiple-case method. Of special note was the fact that in conceptualizing the two approaches as mutually influencing it was possible to see that Yin’s method allowed for the integration of disciplinary insights at various points, not just as a summative exercise. Figure 2 highlights the occurrence of the integration activities at the theory development stage of the case study method and then again within the cross-case comparison, allowing for multiple iterations of integration across a number of dimensions: disciplinary, systems of government and socio-cultural. The theory development stage included two separate analyses, one that identified the conceptual attributes of WoG and a second that explored the operational attributes of the term. Both analyses recognized contributions from the disciplines noted above and, if viewed through Repko’s model, could be seen to identify conflicts between insights and their sources, discover common ground, integrate insights through redefinition and theory expansion and produce a preliminary interdisciplinary understanding expressed through development of the theoretical model. The integration
of insight occurred again through the cross-case comparison and a summative effort at generating an interdisciplinary understanding of WoG was expressed via modification of the theoretical model based on the comparative-case analysis and an assessment of implications of the conclusions on policy and programming efforts.

Case study approach

In addition to its fit with interdisciplinary research, the case study approach was selected as the primary vehicle for research design and analysis because of its stated purpose of exploring a phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin R. K., 2009) in contrast to a more traditional model of research in which knowledge would be generated independently of context by focusing on efforts to control variables of study. The emphasis on acknowledging context was important given observations made in the WoG literature that there was a tremendous amount of acknowledged variance in what WoG initiatives should look like, how they should be designed, how they should behave and what expectations should be associated with them (de Coning & Luras, 2009; Friis & Rehman, 2010; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). These differences occurred as the political, physical, economic and social environments changed, hence the need for an approach to research that encouraged the inclusion of contextual elements.

Additionally, the case study approach was best suited for research seeking to explore questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin R. K., 2009), with the ‘how’ of WoG at the core of this research. The case study “ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544). Since its inception the goal of this research has been to explore the real-life drivers, mechanics and consequences of WoG – to integrate information from a number of disciplinary perspectives with the reflections and observations of public servants who have experienced the reality of WoG in a number of ways.
While many case studies incorporate quantitative or mixed method analyses (Yin, 2009), the case study is a well-established vehicle for qualitative research. The definition and parameters of the ‘case study’ vary extensively from researcher to researcher, and discipline to discipline. The research design presented in this chapter is anchored in the work of prolific case study scholar Robert Yin and the 4th edition of his book *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (2009). Yin developed a technical definition of the case study (see Box 1) that clarifies critical characteristics of the case study approach – elements that should be present in a compelling and rigorous case study.

The proposed research detailed in this chapter meets all of the criteria Yin’s definition of the case study. First, the focus is the phenomenon of cross-organizational or boundary-spanning collaboration amongst those government departments working in the areas of international peacebuilding and stabilization. As noted in Chapter 1, the phenomenon has been present in the public sector for many years; however, drivers such as the security-development nexus have emerged over the past 15 years to renew interest in the enhanced collaboration between large and, at times, unwieldy government departments and agencies, especially in reference to efforts conducted in the context of international peacebuilding and stabilization in fragile regions of the world.

Second, Yin’s multiple-case design allows for the exploration of WoG in its real life context by examining the experiences of Canadian and British public servants who

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**Box 1: Yin’s technical definition of case studies (scope and core characteristics)**

1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
   a. Investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when
   b. the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident
2. The case study inquiry
   a. Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
   b. Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
   c. Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. (Yin R. K., 2009, p.18)
have been involved with WoG approaches, programs and structures. Their individual and collective experiences were highly context-dependent and the case study method allowed this researcher to explore the nuances of implementing WoG without having to divorce context from the analysis. Context, in these cases, allowed for critical insights as the organizational structures and levels of international influence differed between cases.

Moreover, the volatile, high-risk environment of international peacebuilding and stabilization means that WoG efforts might be expected to look and behave differently depending on the complex suite of variables at play in an engagement zone. To cite a specific example, the Canadian experience in Kandahar might be expected to yield different impressions and observations from practitioners than the British experience in Helmand. Finally, throughout subsequent chapters and an analysis that includes robust efforts at theory development and sources that include both documents and primary interviews with public servants, the reader will be able to see the vast number of variables that exist in a real-life WoG initiative.

**Case study limitations**

Frequently noted limitations of the case study include: a) a sense that the case study does not meet traditional standards for high-quality academic research, insofar as case studies may generate hypotheses but do not facilitate the testing of these hypotheses and result in “a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221); b) case-study conclusions or observations are so singular in nature and context-specific that they cannot be applied confidently to other contexts and therefore cannot contribute to theory development; and c) ongoing confusion around the nature of the case study – is it a method or a methodology? Is it an approach to research or a teaching tool? In response to these concerns, case study researchers have, over time, developed a more deliberate set of methods for their research. Many of these structured methods and protocols, at both the level of design and data collection, require that the researcher actively contemplate and address possible limitations. The key limitations and important strategies for designing and delivering robust research via the case study approach are explored below.
Nature of the case study

Used extensively throughout the social sciences and health professions, definitions of the “case study” abound, creating uncertainty concerning the nature, definition and merits of this approach to academic research. Gerring (2004) referenced the case study paradox that plays out in the field of political science where case studies have yielded many meaningful and respected contributions to disciplinary literature yet ‘extreme circumspection’ is at play when methodologists explore the merits of an approach criticized for being overly ambiguous.

One key challenge faced by the case study is the lack of consensus across and within disciplines as to whether it is a research methodology, a research method or research strategy (Anthony & Jack, 2009; Bryar, 1999/2000; VanWynsberghe & Kahn, 2007). Many researchers refer to the case study as one of the three without explaining their understanding of the term. In contrast, there are researchers who deliberately reference the case study as neither methodology nor method. Yin, whose work influences much of this research, refers to the case study as a method; however, he is referring largely to the specific research procedures and tactics developed through his work. He positions the case study as a research method that can complement or be an alternative to established methods such as experiments, surveys, archival analysis, etc. Despite the tremendous value of Yin’s method to strengthening and deepening the research community’s thinking, much case study research exists in the absence of established or agreed-upon best practices or procedures (Meyer, 2001). As a result, it was difficult to refer to the case study only as a method. Similarly, Luck et al. (2006) reflected on whether or not the case study could be considered a research methodology and concluded that due to its flexible methodological and paradigmatic positions, the case study could not itself be considered a research methodology. This position was reinforced by the work of VanWynsberghe and Kahn (2007) who argued that the case study is neither methodology nor method. Their definition of the case study states:

*Case study is a transparadigmatic and transdisciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for which evidence is being collected (event, concept, program, process, etc.)* (p. 1).
The authors labeled the case study as a heuristic or “an approach that focuses one’s attention during learning, construction, discovery, or problem solving” (p. 2). The understanding of the case study as transparadigmatic and transdisciplinary resonated strongly with my research agenda, which was seeking to avoid being bound by a single disciplinary perspective. For this reason and the lack of consensus amongst researchers around its proper categorization in academic nomenclature, the case study as an approach to research was deemed an appropriate frame of reference for this research project.

Additional confusion stems from the existence of the case study approach to teaching that is particularly prominent in business schools, clinical health profession programs and increasingly in teaching environments across disciplines. The teaching case study is not the same as the case study approach to research: “the purpose of the teaching case is to establish a framework for discussion and debate among students” (Yin, 2009, p. 5). It does not set out to develop theory nor does it purposefully incorporate any of the core considerations that go into sound research design, including issues related to validity and reliability.

**Academic Rigour**

The case study has faced a number of criticisms about its ability to foster research that meets the standards of high-quality design and analysis. First, there is the concern that the role of the researcher in a case study is problematic, that there were not enough tools and strategies for controlling the bias of the researcher within the research (Flyvberg, 2006; Meyer, 2001). Because the case study approach encourages the development of theory in advance of the case design, there have been concerns that a researcher might design a research strategy that reinforces his or her preconceived conclusions (Yin R. K., 2009). Case study champions argue that this observation is a common concern around qualitative approaches more broadly, that there exists a level of subjectivity in all contributions to human research, and that “the case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 237). Efforts to avoid researcher bias in case
study research include self-awareness and self-reflection throughout the case selection, data collection and data analysis processes, consultation with colleagues throughout the research process, a willingness to modify or reconceptualize models and frameworks based on the output of the case analysis, the inclusion of multiple cases in which the researcher contrasts themes and observations within each case but also conducts an analysis between the cases (Meyer, 2001) and purposeful consideration and application of appropriate case study decisions related to holistic versus embedded designs (Yin R. K., 2009).

Besides the concern around researcher bias, there are persistent concerns that the case study fails to fulfill core attributes of empirical social research, most notably reliability and validity (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Yin’s case study method does acknowledge these important criteria of high quality research and proposes tactics or best practices that can be applied during the data collection and data analysis stages. Yin suggests the use of multiple sources of evidence and the establishment of a chain of evidence by the researcher in an effort to address the test of construct validity, i.e., to reduce the possibility that “subjective judgements are used to collect the data” (2009, p. 41). With respect to the concerns around reliability or the potential for another researcher to replicate the research using established procedures and arrive at the same conclusions, Yin’s method recommends the use of case study protocol to document research procedures. The case study protocol should include: an introduction to the case study, field procedures, case study questions (guiding the interviewing of study participants) and a guide for the case study report (2009, p. 81). Table 1 summarizes how many of Yin’s suggested tactics for enhancing the quality of the research were incorporated into this study.
Table 1: Yin’s suggested tactics for conducting robust case study analyses and how these tactics were incorporated into research efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of quality research</th>
<th>Tactics suggested to enhance quality of case study research (Yin, 2009, p. 41)</th>
<th>Incorporation of tactics in research efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Construct Validity            | • Use multiple sources of evidence  
                                  • Establish chain of evidence  
                                  • Have key informants review draft case study report | Both documentation review and interviews were used in this research with the intent of triangulating emerging themes from the cases and to corroborate, wherever possible, facts and evidence discussed in both sources. With respect to chain of evidence, all primary data collected were saved in their original format (audio) and as written transcriptions. Documents used in the analysis were uploaded and coded in databases that were part of NVivo qualitative data analysis software. |
| Internal Validity             | • Do pattern matching  
                                  • Do explanation building  
                                  • Address rival explanations  
                                  • Use logic models | All four analytical approaches have been included at various stages of the case study analysis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). They are supported by robust theoretical framework development in Chapters 3 and 4, which provide an opportunity to test patterns or outcomes that could be expected based on the theoretical model. |
| External validity             | • Use theory in single-case studies  
                                  • Use replication logic in multiple-case studies | Replication logic was applied to the multiple-case studies. Chapter 4 concludes with a theoretical framework that posits under what conditions (related to operational considerations) WoG might be expected to work (literal replication) and when it might not (theoretical replication). |

Theory development
A final concern about the case study approach is the perception that it is impossible to generalize on the basis of a single case and therefore impossible to advance theory development through the case study approach. Because the case study is such an excellent vehicle for incorporating context into understanding the generation of knowledge, it is natural that there would be a concern around the ability of the approach to focus on one occurrence of a phenomenon and then attempt to draw broader conclusions or postulate theory concerning how the phenomenon might occur within
different contexts. This concern also reflects the previously mentioned issue around validity, especially the test of external validity, which works to determine whether “a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study” (Yin R. K., 2009, p. 43).

Kathleen Eisenhart, who has written about case study methodology from the discipline of industrial engineering, posits a framework and a counter-argument that addresses this concern. Eisenhart (1989) presents an eight-step process with multiple activities that would allow theory to be built from case study research. She recommends: a clear research focus established early on with a defined research question; selection of cases based on theoretical reasons (as opposed to statistical reasons); multiple data collection method; overlapping data analysis and data collection; within-case data analysis (the embedded case) and comparison of emerging results with the established body of literature on the subject. All of these activities have been incorporated into the case design, data collection and data analysis stages of the research presented here. Eisenhart argues that multiple cases, different types of data and potentially different investigators “increases the likelihood of creative reframing into a new theoretical vision. This constant juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends to ‘unfreeze’ thinking, and so the process has the potential to generate theory with less researcher bias than theory built from incremental studies or armchair, axiomatic deduction” (Eisenhart, 1989, p. 54).

Yin (2009) also tackles the concern around ability of the case study to yield generalizations that can be applied to other contexts. He argues that this concern often stems from an incorrect contrast of the case study with survey research that relies on statistical generalization. In contrast, Yin argues that case studies rely on analytical generalization in which “the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (p. 43). The analytical generalization requires the development of a rich theoretical framework that guides both case design and data analysis:

*The framework needs to state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well as the conditions when it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication). The theoretical framework later becomes the vehicle for generalizing to new cases* (Yin R. K., 2009, p. 54).
Another important strategy that can allow case study results to advance theory development is the idea of rigorously clarifying the unit of analysis (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The careful delineation of the case boundaries – who or what is being studied, within what timeframes and physical contexts, and clarifying what is not being studied – will help avoid the problem of research questions and objectives that are too broad.

**Research Design**

The primary objective of the research presented in this dissertation is to develop a comprehensive, interdisciplinary framework for understanding operational attributes of WoG initiatives and, therein, the critical barriers to and opportunities for developing and implementing these initiatives within the context of international stabilization efforts. The research is focused on the initiatives and experiences of the governments of Canada and the UK during the period 2002–2012. During this time, both countries emphasized the importance of cross-departmental collaboration by implementing new organizational instruments designed to foster a WoG approach to engagement in fragile states. To accomplish the primary research objective, four categories of secondary objectives were conceptualized as part of the overall research design, all of which align with the established stages of the multiple-case study approach (see Table 2) theory development, case study design, case study analysis and modification of the theoretical framework (Yin, 2009).
Table 2: Secondary research objectives aligned with the stages of Yin's case study approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Yin’s case study approach</th>
<th>Secondary research objectives</th>
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| Theory development (Concept Analysis) | • Identify the core conceptual attributes of WoG  
• Explore how the meaning of the concept has evolved within its temporal, socio-cultural, disciplinary and situational contexts  
• Examine how variance in conceptual definition impacts our ability to design and implement WoG initiatives  
• Clarify an understanding of the concept that can frame the subsequent stages of the research. |
| Theory development (Literature Review) | • Develop a theoretical framework of the operational attributes of WoG initiatives  
• Within the framework, identify barriers to and opportunities for designing and implementing WoG initiatives |
| Case study design and analysis | • Examine the practical realities of implementing WoG initiatives within the Canadian and UK systems of government.  
• Explore how variance in the operational attributes across the two cases influenced design, implementation and perceived success of WoG initiatives.  
• Explore how variance in the contextual environments across the two cases influenced design, implementation and perceived success of WoG initiatives.  
• Establish primary versus secondary barriers and incentives within each case -which are the most/least accessible from the perspective of fostering organizational change. |
| Modification of the theoretical framework | • Modify the theoretical framework of WoG to incorporate themes and insights that emerge from the participant interviews and case study analysis with the purpose of better understanding the relationships between the operational attributes and how they are influenced by contextual factors.  
• Identify implications for future WoG policy, programming and management efforts. |

Anchored in these research objectives, the research design included three main components: theory development through a literature review and concept analysis, a multiple-case study that examined operationalization of WoG within the Canadian and British contexts during the stated time period, and a concluding synthesis that reconciled
the theoretical frameworks established during the theory-development stage with the practical insights captured through the case studies. Sources of evidence included: peer-reviewed literature; grey literature in the form of documents and reports produced by governments; international organizations and think-tanks and primary interviews with public servants in both countries. The overall research design is best presented by a visual model (Figure 3) that depicts the various stages of the research as building blocks that anchor and inform subsequent stages of research.

**Figure 3: Research design**

![Research Design Diagram](image)

**Theory development: interdisciplinary literature review and concept analysis**

Yin (2009) identified the development of a ‘rich, theoretical framework’ as a key step to the development of robust multiple-case studies, that is, to ensure that replication
logic, as opposed to sampling logic, guides design. “The framework needs to state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well as the conditions when it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication). The theoretical framework later becomes the vehicle for generalizing to new cases” (p. 54). As presented in Figure 3, the research design included two theory development stages in which themes and theories from various bodies of literature were analyzed so as to weave together knowledge from disparate disciplines and, in doing so, produce new insights into both the operational and conceptual attributes of WoG.

The operational attributes of WoG initiatives were identified and captured via an interdisciplinary literature review (Chapter 4) that explored the core mechanics of how WoG coordination works – key organizational design considerations and critical points of operational influence (barriers to and incentives for WoG). Theoretical contributions and perspectives were identified and reviewed from the fields of public administration, political science, international development studies, peace and conflict studies, business management and systems theory. The literature review yielded a preliminary theoretical framework that included eight organizational attributes of WoG initiatives. The framework highlighted key relationships between attributes and categorized the eight attributes into two broad categories: structural attributes and people-oriented attributes. The framework presented the attributes as being largely equal in importance, did not identify nuances that might change or alter with context or environment and, as expected, reflected almost exclusively a theoretical perspective on the idea of WoG. The framework was a foundation upon which additional levels of insight, captured through practitioner interviews and subsequent case study analysis, were to be overlaid. The theoretical framework also informed the development of semi-structured interview questions and provided a point of comparison and triangulation against the information gathered through participant interviews, with the eventual outcome being a comprehensive framework informed by both theory and practice.

The second stage of theory development involved identification of the conceptual attributes of WoG. Establishing the ontological properties of the concept of cross-
boundary or boundary spanning coordination was an important element of the overall research agenda to ensure that the case study analysis that followed was anchored in some clarity as to the meaning and intent of the primary concept being studied. WoG as a concept has been understood differently by a wide range of stakeholders all of whom have different perspectives and motivations for framing their understanding of the concept. Beyond differing perspectives, there is also the challenge presented by the fact that a number of terms are used to articulate the meaning behind WoG. Concepts such as 3D, 3C, Comprehensive Approach and Joined-Up Government are just some of the terms that exist as quasi-alternatives to WoG. Depending on the researcher, politician or policy maker, these terms can be considered synonymous to WoG, or concepts with shared properties but slightly differing definitions. The consequence of this reality is that it becomes increasingly difficult to establish a consensus around the understanding of WoG, which, in turn, makes it almost impossible to capture transferable lessons learned from any WoG initiative. Establishing a shared and common vocabulary of the conceptual attributes of WoG was an important preliminary step to ensuring that the researcher, participants and reviewers shared a common understanding of what is meant by the term. With this in mind, the research design included a robust concept analysis anchored in the extensive concept analysis research present in the nursing discipline (Kelly & Vincent, 2011). There were a number of models of concept analysis available; however, the model adopted for this research was informed by the work of B.L. Rodgers (2000) who started with the premise that individual concepts are in a state of dynamic evolution, are heavily contextual and, therefore, are without universal meaning. These theoretical underpinnings aligned well with well-established rapid evolution of cross-boundary coordination throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the variance in understanding and meaning that existed within different communities of practice and research, and the stated purpose of this research to frame the context in which WoG would be understood – international stabilization efforts in fragile states. The results of the concept analysis along with supplemental information pertaining to the choice of concept analysis method, data collection and data analysis are presented in Chapter 3.
Multiple-case study design

Two cases were selected for analysis. Aside from being comprised of more than a single case study, Yin’s multiple-case design does not insist upon a certain number of cases to ensure analytical robustness. While every additional case provides another opportunity to apply replication logic to a study, the number of cases is not the sole aspect of the research design responsible for ensuring rigor (see previous discussion around theory development and case study limitations). However, Yin’s approach does caution that when the research design includes only two or three cases, the cases should be carefully selected so that they allow for literal replication (i.e., there are enough similarities between the cases that similar results could be expected). The two selected cases and the process by which they were selected are noted below.

- **Case A – CANADA**: with a specific focus on the experiences of individuals who worked for or interacted with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
- **Case B – UNITED KINGDOM**: with a specific focus on the experiences of individuals who worked for or interacted with the Stabilisation Unit (SU)

These cases emerged from a short list of countries and international organizations that had demonstrated a commitment to enhanced cross-boundary efforts amongst its security and development actors through the creation of dedicated WoG funds and/or units. The short-list included: Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations (Delivering as One program and/or the Peacebuilding Commission). The potential case studies were evaluated against five criteria (see Table 3).
First, case selection looked for a public sector initiative designed with WoG as a key feature of its mandate. This criterion worked to ensure a common frame of comparative reference and eliminated the possibility of including private sector organizations and not-for-profit initiatives, which have a far greater flexibility to their organizational design. It also eliminated those public sector initiatives that might have an informal WoG focus but were not designed or managed with a WoG imperative. The possibility of including an international organization such as the United Nations was eliminated based on this criterion. Second, a potential case was desirable if it included government line departments that were primarily focused on foreign policy, thereby establishing the inclusion of both military and civilian actors. This criterion was included because, as has been noted, cross-boundary coordination and, more specifically, WoG are terms used widely across government departments. This research was focused on WoG within the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction in fragile states. The researcher was especially interested in examining WoG initiatives that required some level of cooperation between the military and development agencies – two arenas with profoundly different philosophies, cultures and approaches to management. It is this tension that made this research particularly interesting and timely. This criterion,
therefore, prevented the inclusion of WoG initiatives that existed across departments focused on domestic issues such as health, environment, justice, etc.

The third and fourth criteria related to the inclusion of newly created WoG initiatives in the form of units and/or pooled funds dedicated to the purpose of achieving cross-departmental coordination. Such organizational units could be described as a macro-coordinating body – a formal unit or sub-unit designed with a mandate for facilitating WoG efforts related to given issue or policy area. Similarly, pooled funds supported cross-departmental work by establishing financial resources that could be accessed by multiple departments in a more flexible manner. These criteria eliminated one-off/singular-focus WoG initiatives like the Afghanistan Task Force or the Sudan Task Force in Canada. It also eliminated Sweden’s WoG approach, which was advanced with a robust policy framework (Policy on Global Development) but not a new organizational structure. Finally, the potential cases were considered from the perspective of determining which ones shared similar systems of government. Based on this criterion, Canada, Australia and the UK emerged as strong candidates for a comparative case analysis. While not identical in every respect, the three countries share features of Westminster Parliamentary systems. Commonalities such as ministerial accountability, cabinet government and the distribution of power held by prime ministers and heads of departments helped standardize certain parts of the context in which the WoG initiatives were situated. From these three contenders, the Canadian and UK cases were selected because despite their similarities they offered an interesting point of comparison. In the Canadian case, START was structurally situated within a line department – the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). While START had a clear mandate for WoG coordination, the unit was a DFAIT initiative, staffed with DFAIT employees. In contrast, the SU was established outside of the three parent departments (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence) which shared responsibility for governance, operations and funding. Selecting these two cases allowed for an examination of how the
operationalization of WoG differed depending on design, a topic around which there was some discussion within the literature (Patrick & Brown, 2007; de Coning & Luras, 2009).

In summary, each of the two selected cases examined a complex macro-coordinating organization characterized by a mandate for coordinating a WoG approach amongst a number of large line departments and central agencies that were involved with cross-departmental, post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in fragile states. Consequently, each case was explored by incorporating the perspectives of individuals who had worked within the macro-coordinating body as well as individuals who had interacted with the macro-coordinating body from the perspective of another department or agency. The primary departments and agencies to focus on were identified through an extensive review of the literature, a review of organizational charts available publicly on the Internet, and participation in a WoG working group and preliminary meetings with DFAIT, CIDA, PCO, DND and TBS in Ottawa. The purpose of these meetings was to gain a better understanding of the inner workings of these complex departments, information that is both dynamic in nature and largely unavailable in peer-reviewed literature. In short, there were three considerations involved in selecting the departments and agencies that would be reflected in the case studies:

1. In both cases the individual macro-coordinating bodies were the starting point for identifying potential participants.

2. Three line departments were included because of the existence of a formal or informal relationship with the macro-coordinating body or because they shared a mandate/focus area with the macro-coordinating body. The names of the line departments differ in the two cases; however, they can generically be referred to as departments that focus on a) development, b) defence and c) diplomacy/foreign affairs

11 In this paper the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) are referred to by their own acronyms, as separate organizational units. The 2013 Canadian federal budget announced the amalgamation of the two units into a single department called the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). Because the research project is focused on the 2000–2012 period and because all interviews with Canadian participants
3. Two central agencies were included and played an integral role in ensuring the comprehensiveness of the case studies. Throughout the literature on WoG the focus tended to be on the line departments referenced above. The role of the central management agencies, such as treasury and machinery of government, were not often integrated into the broader analysis on WoG. Their inclusion in this study broadens the scope of both the case and participant sampling and is vital to the study of how WoG works.

**Participant Recruitment**

The number of participants recruited for semi-structured interviews was dependent on the desire for representation across not only the macro-coordinating body but from departments that contributed to the work of the macro-coordinating body. Based on the departments and sub-units identified in in Table 4, the number of participants pre-recruitment was estimated to be 20 per case study.

**Table 4: Summary of departments and units that were potential sources of study participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Agency – CANADA</th>
<th>Department/Agency – UNITED KINGDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro Coordinating Body: (START)</strong> (situated within DFAIT):</td>
<td><strong>Macro Coordinating Body: SU</strong> (sits outside the traditional line departments but reports jointly to FCO, DFID and MOD):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deployment and Coordination</td>
<td>- Capability Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division</td>
<td>- Deployments Team (3 sub-units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy</td>
<td>- Planning and Countries Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs</td>
<td>- Lessons Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of National Defence (DND)</strong> - Civilian and Military</td>
<td>- Security and Justice Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Defence (MOD)</strong> - Civilian and Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were conducted prior to the amalgamation, the two units will be referred to distinctly throughout the document.
Because it was crucial that each case study incorporate the perspectives of specific departments, the participant sampling technique was largely purposeful in nature. The initial stage of recruitment involved inviting participants from the macro-coordinating body (START and SU). Because the intention was to have more than one participant from these units and I wanted to avoid having numerous recruitment emails circulating, which might generate confusion, recruitment began by approaching the directors and/or senior staff of both START and SU by email and phone, using information publicly available online via the Government Electronic Directory Services. The introductory email to the directors requested that they review both the study proposal and the recruitment materials and determine whether their staff could be invited to participate. In both cases senior approval was obtained and the initial round of interviews was coordinated by a staff person in the unit. Subsequent rounds of participant recruitment were based on recommendations from the first round of interviewees. They recommended colleagues within START or the SU and colleagues in various partner departments – individuals who had previous experience with the macro-coordinating body. These referrals were very valuable to the research given that employees move
throughout government departments quickly, meaning that someone with experience and insight may no longer work in the macro-coordinating body. These individuals were most likely to be identified by colleagues. In addition to the referrals, potential participants were also identified using departmental organizational charts and electronic government directories. Overall, these additional rounds of participant recruitment ensured that a diverse and experienced collection of organizational perspectives were included in the case study analysis.

Ethics approval for this research was obtained through the Research Ethics Board of Dalhousie University in October 2011. Ethical considerations with respect to recruitment and data collection were anticipated and addressed. Of note was the fact that the case studies were focused on departments and agencies and their sub-units that worked on issues with a high profile in the mainstream media and the minds of the Canadian public (i.e., Canada’s involvement in the war on terror and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan). Consequently, there was political interest associated with the policy and programming efforts of START and its counterparts meaning that participant recruitment from the identified departments had the potential to be somewhat delicate. Discussing operational attributes of WoG was impossible to separate from a discussion concerning Canadian and British efforts in Afghanistan, and in the case of the latter, Iraq. To address any reluctance that might be associated with the invitation to participate in an interview, an abridged version of the research proposal was made available to anyone for whom senior approval for participation was necessary. For example, the team at START asked to vet the proposed research with the Office of the Minister or Deputy Minister prior to recruitment.

The risks associated with this study were understood to be minimal. While the identity of each participant was not explicitly revealed in the course of the study or in resulting publications it was noted to participants, via the informed consent form, that their position, status in community or committee groups may make it possible for others to guess their identity. Of some concern was the fact that the recruitment model, which involved a relatively small sample size within each unit or department, involved directors...
recommending potential participants and interviewees recommending colleagues. This recruitment method made it impossible to guarantee research participants complete anonymity. This risk was clearly identified within the recruitment email, the informed consent form and discussed prior to commencing each interview. As a result, it was determined that the analysis and overall study design would focus exclusively on aggregated results as opposed to personal quotes; the analysis avoided any attribution that might violate the promise of anonymity.

Case study interview questions
In advance of each interview the respondent was asked to review the informed consent form and provide written consent. Interviews were conducted in person and over the phone. Each interview took 30–60 minutes and was recorded on a digital recorder. The interview was guided by a semi-structured interview tool (see Appendix A) that was developed following the literature review phase of the research. An early theoretical framework had emerged from the literature review and the interview tool was a balance of questions that explored some of the themes from the framework while still allowing for opportunities for new discoveries. The semi-structured model was especially important to ensure that context-specific questions could be examined and themes that converged or diverged from the theoretical framework or from other participants could be more closely explored. Not every question from the interview tool was posed to every participant. The open-ended, conversational nature of the initial questions often resulted in the participant addressing some of the more specific questions that would come later.

It is important to acknowledge that while all of the participants interviewed were familiar with START or the SU based on their previous or current duties, it was impossible to distill all of their comments and opinions on WoG as being exclusively attributed to their experiences with these specific units. Many of the participants had been part of their country’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and, for the UK, in Iraq. These Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRTs) were WoG initiatives in their own right that also had close connections to START and the SU. Other participants experienced WoG through various interdepartmental task forces, interdepartmental
working groups or the fact that the nature of their work in fragile states required frequent communication and information sharing with individuals in other departments. Specific reflections about START and the SU tended to emerge most often in discussions around organizational design, institutional commitment or issues related to accountability. When discussing other topics, especially culture, politics, bureaucracy or issues related to human resources, participants’ answers were more often a reflection of their collective experiences. This output was not unexpected and is a natural consequence of the semi-structured interview tool design.

A suite of warm-up questions (see Appendix A) were designed to ensure that the early versions of the framework presented in Chapter 4 (operational attributes of WoG), which was built on literature and theoretical perspectives in advance of the interviews did not rigidly influence the direction of the interview. Through these open-ended, less targeted questions it was hoped that new, previously unconsidered barriers and opportunities would emerge – insights that might only come from the practitioner’s hands-on perspective, thereby capturing a richer sense of the cultural and bureaucratic issues at play. Prior to data analysis, the digital files were transcribed partially by the researcher and partially by a professional transcription service. In the case of the latter, the researcher read each interview transcript while listening to the initial audio file to ensure the transcribed file was an accurate capture of the interview.

**Data analysis (interviews)**

All transcribed interviews were uploaded into the NVivo qualitative data analysis software. The data from the interviews were aggregated so that responses could not be associated with a particular participant. Each interview was classified based on the profile of the participant. The profiles, which are presented in detail in Chapter 5, allowed for the following context- or perspective-based features to be taken into consideration: country perspective, department perspective, headquarters or field perspective and civilian or military perspective. In addition to the participant profiles, the text of each interview was subjected to a content analysis in which themes were identified and coded. Despite the presence of the theoretical framework, the coding exercise was open in nature, allowing
themes to emerge without the prescription of the framework. Subsequent analyses were conducted by comparing themes to the various perspectives within the participant profiles. Points of convergence and divergence within and between the Canadian and UK participants were the most obvious comparisons; however, other cross-comparisons yielded interesting insights, which facilitated a multi-faceted analysis.
Chapter 3: Concept Analysis – “Whole-of-Government”

Introduction

The pursuit of enhanced coordination in the name of government efficiency and effectiveness is a historic one and dates back to Max Weber’s classic model of the modern government bureaucracy (Sproule-Jones, 2000) and the foundations of ministerial accountability and vertical line departments that inform the structure and behavior of today’s Westminster governments (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001; Hood, 2005). However, the international community’s quest for global security, sustainable peace and development in an increasingly complex world has focused a new spotlight and a sense of urgency on the need for departments, teams and individuals to better understand what is meant by cross-boundary or boundary spanning coordination and how it might be achieved. A number of terms with various disciplinary and professional origins have been used to express the concept of cross-boundary coordination including: WoG, joined-up government, ‘Diplomacy, Defence, Development’ (3D), ‘Coordination, Coherence, Complementarity’ (3C), collaborative public management (CPM), horizontal coordination, interagency collaboration, comprehensive approach (CA) and civil-military coordination (CIMIC). As noted previously, the research agenda pursued here uses the term WoG when referencing the concept of cross-boundary coordination within the context of international peacebuilding and stabilization efforts in fragile states.

The existence of multiple terms to describe the nuanced components of the same concept, a tendency to use them interchangeably and the compounding effect that meaning and understanding vary across academic disciplines and communities of policy and practices, has resulted in a profound lack of clarity around how WoG is understood as a concept. In the absence of a comprehensive and shared conceptual understanding, it is difficult for WoG research to inform public policy or public management practices. For similar reasons it is almost impossible for practitioners to capture and share best practices or lessons learned across departmental or government platforms. Establishing a shared vocabulary around WoG is therefore an important preliminary step to ensuring that the
researcher, participants and reviewers share a common understanding of a concept that drives the entire research agenda. Thus, in order to pursue the main objectives of the overall research agenda it is crucial to anchor the subsequent case analysis in a thorough concept analysis.

At its core the purpose of a concept analysis is to explore the essential characteristics or attributes of a concept; to obtain a more thorough understanding or provide clarity around how a concept is defined and used as context (time, discipline, culture, professional perspective, and physical environment) changes. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify how WoG is understood and described by those who reference the concept in both academic research and grey literature. As a foundation to a broader research exercise, the concept analysis will assess how various meanings and uses of WoG converge and diverge depending on the perspective of a specific person or organization. More specifically, the concept analysis will seek to synthesize perspectives from disparate disciplines of practice and research and, in doing so, explore how the concept of WoG has evolved since the beginning of the 1990s and put forth a comprehensive understanding of the concept based on core conceptual attributes as they exist in contemporary usage.

In certain academic disciplines, such as nursing, a concept analysis is a well-recognized research method with established procedures and models. The concept analysis, as developed by the nursing community, seeks to provide “clarity and understanding, rather than mere knowing” (Baldwin, 2008, p.50) and the opportunity to synthesize a large number of conceptual definitions presented by multiple authors throughout one or more bodies of literature (Simmons, 2010, p. 1152). It is especially valuable in cases where the attributes of a concept are not clear or where it has become difficult to differentiate between ‘the concept of interest and other concepts that may be related’ (Rodgers, 1989).

The various concept analysis models that have evolved within nursing research have as their origin the work of John Wilson, an educator with a relativist approach to concepts and knowledge. Wilson’s initial discussion of the concept analysis, introduced
in 1963, includes 11 key considerations, many of which were focused on the development of cases (model, contrary, related, borderline and invented) by the researcher in an effort to capture conceptual meaning (Hupcey & Penrod, 2005). The method was adopted by nurse researchers in the early 1980s with the work of Walker and Avant who proposed an eight-step process that maintained the Wilsonian emphasis on cases, but introduced the inclusion of contextual descriptors such as antecedents and consequences, used the language of conceptual attributes to describe the key characteristics of the concept and yielded ‘clear and precise theoretical and operational definitions’ (Hupcey & Penrod, 2005, p. 202). Within nursing research, subsequent models have evolved that vary in their ontological position (realist vs. relativist), their beliefs around empirically based understandings of reality and truth, their philosophical underpinnings, and their positions on whether and how model cases (a core element of Wilson’s original model) should be incorporated into the concept analysis.

The concept analysis presented in this chapter is anchored in the rich nursing research literature. While nursing research and political science or public administration may have very different approaches to theory building, knowledge generation and research methodologies, it is possible to identify several core synergies between the fields that would support the use of the nursing framework as the analytical lens for better understanding WoG. First, within the nursing research literature, concept analyses are conducted with the stated purpose of gaining clarity around concepts to better guide work being done in research, policy and practice (Emmanuel & St. John, 2010). Similarly, Risjord (2009) posits that in order “to make the meaning of a scientific concept clear, a theoretical concept analysis must make explicit both the theoretical role of the concept and its relation to observation or practice” (p. 689). Furthermore, Baldwin (2008) observes that “the concept analysis can provide a knowledge base for practice by offering clarity and enabling understanding, rather than mere knowing” (p. 50). In this vein, the structure of a concept analysis from nursing researchers often concludes with a reflection on the relevance and implications of the analysis on the applied components of the nursing field, namely clinical practice and related policy development (Meeberg, 1993;
Weaver, Morse, & Mitcham, 2008; Horne, 2012). This component of the concept analysis is a deliberate effort to translate knowledge from the domain of research to the domain of practice. In a research agenda that is attempting to synthesize theories and knowledge from the fields of public administration and international relations, this purposeful focus on implications and knowledge translation for the practitioner has great resonance. How can policies and programs be designed, delivered or evaluated if the initial concept and its related goals are not clear?

Second, nurse researchers, especially those who have examined the merits and weaknesses of the various models of concept analyses presented within their field, have contemplated how the concept analysis is situated within the broader contexts of concept creation and development and knowledge generation (Duncan, 2007; Risjord, 2009). They have debated whether or not concepts should be understood as scientific units of meaning or ‘knots in a network of systematic interrelationships; a tapestry of interwoven, knotted conceptual threads’ (Hupcey & Penrod, 2005, p. 404). They have also emphasized the importance of context in analyzing concepts (Duncan et al, 2007; Risjord, 2009). In particular, Hupcey and Penrod (2005) have argued that “…concepts cannot be critically analyzed if pulled from or isolated from the broader theoretical landscape without seriously compromising the value of the analytic product” (p. 200). The idea that concepts must be explored within their contexts implies a dynamic understanding of concepts; that meaning and significance change and evolve over time and space. While such a perspective may be challenging to reconcile with the idea of generalizing insights garnered in one context to another, it does align with case study research which is very much about studying a concept within its context. Additionally, this research design adheres to Yin’s approach which encourages the researcher to develop a theoretical framework based on numerous data sources and use the framework as the vehicle for generalizing insights. Allowing for concepts to be dynamic in nature suggests that, if possible, the theoretical framework reflects the evolving nature of WoG. As previously stated, this research agenda is exploring WoG as it pertains to the dynamic environments of international peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction efforts in fragile states.
With its breadth of issues, complexity of stakeholder group relationships and a sense of urgency anchored in violent conflict and extreme underdevelopment, it is hard to imagine a more dynamic context. It is therefore important to apply a model of analysis that insists on recognizing the impact of context on meaning and understanding.

Third, from the perspective of research design there are great synergies possible between a concept analysis and a case study analysis. Like the concept analysis, the case study approach was selected, in part, for its ability to incorporate contextual elements and their influence in our ability to understand the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of phenomenon such as WoG. Hupcey and Penrod (2005) have positioned the concept analysis as a method “ideally employed to determine the state of the science; the point from which the concept may be strategically advanced toward a higher level of scientific utility” (p. 198). From this perspective, the concept analysis offers great value to case study research which encourages time spent by the researcher in theory development in advance of case design and data collection. In this research, the concept analysis of WoG will contribute to theory development by situating the concept within various social, temporal and disciplinary perspectives. In short, the concept analysis will explore the question of ‘what’ WoG is, whereas later chapters – including a preliminary model for WoG and the within- and cross-case analysis of the case study – examine the question of ‘how’ WoG works in theory and practice.

This chapter will introduce Beth Rodger’s evolutionary approach to concept analysis and the primary activities that are part of the method. The bulk of the analysis is presented in three sections – the first being the attributes that best explain the meaning of WoG; the second a contextual analysis that explores variance in meaning with various situational contexts and how meaning has evolved over time; and the third an examination of the consequences of WoG and what these phenomena tell us about the ongoing evolution of the concept. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the core components of the concept analysis (attributes and context) and presents a model for conceptual understanding that will form the basis of the case study analysis. The conclusion will also discuss how a comprehensive understanding of WoG might impact
our ability to study the concept and influence our ability to design and implement WoG initiatives.

Methods

Concept Analysis: Evolutionary Approach

This chapter adopts a method of concept analysis developed in a 1994 model presented by Beth Rodgers known as an evolutionary approach to concept development and used widely by nurse researchers (Kelly & Vincent, 2011; Emmanuel & St. John, 2010; Hudon, St-Cyr Tribble, Bravo, & Poitras, 2010). Rodgers’ model begins with the foundational idea that in order to be effectively studied, evaluated or used to inform the development of policy, programs or strategic direction, a concept must share a common understanding across various communities of practice.

*Concepts contribute to the continuing development of knowledge even outside the context of an existing theory through their explanatory or descriptive powers. When the attributes of a concept are unclear, the contribution made by the concept in this regard is greatly limited* (Rodgers, 1989)

Offered originally as an alternative to Wilson’s reductionist approach to concept analysis, Rodgers’ model proposes that the researcher begin from the position that “concept development can be described and illustrated as a cycle that continues through time and within a particular context” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 81). The cycle implies a dynamic element to concept development: that concepts evolve over time as they are referenced, used and passed through social and educational environments. “Concepts are considered to change, grow and develop (and need to be developed) in an evolutionary manner to enhance and maintain clarity and utility in the discipline” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 100). The significance of a concept – generally demonstrated by its ability to resonate with or influence actors and groups – is also noted as a contributing factor to conceptual development in that the more significant a concept, the more it is used, and the more opportunities it has to evolve. The significance of a concept may differ across various
communities of practice or academic disciplines, thereby resulting in varying rates of conceptual evolution and understanding.

Rodgers’s model (see Box 2) was selected because of its rigorous inductive approach and its relevance to concepts that continue to evolve or change, such as WoG. The six primary activities establish the overall structure of the chapter. At each major subject heading an infographic will indicate to the reader which step of the concept analysis is being embarked upon: identify concept of interest, identify realm, data collection, analysis (attributes, context and consequences) and implications.

The method provides the researcher with an option of using a model or exemplar case. Numerous concept analyses exist without the inclusion of the examplar case (Emmanuel & St. John, 2010; Kelly & Vincent, 2011; Cowles & Rodgers, 2000). If used, the researcher is strongly advised to identify the case as opposed to constructing or inventing the case (Rodgers, 2000). Often it is difficult for a researcher to identify a single case or a small group of cases that effectively exemplify the attributes of the concept in a way that both contextualizes and enhances meaning and understanding. “The researcher should be cautious in presenting an examplar in these situations to avoid premature closure, giving the impression that the concept is more clear, better developed or more useful than it really is in its current state” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 97). The analysis that follows will demonstrate that it is difficult to identify cases that clearly articulate a collective understanding of WoG. Even multiple

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**Box 2: Primary activities of the evolutionary method of concept analysis.**

1. Identify the concept of interest and associated expressions (including surrogate terms)
2. Identify and select an appropriate realm (setting and sample) for data collection.
3. Collect data relevant to identify:
   i. Analyze the data regarding the above characteristics of the concept.
   ii. The attributes of the concept; and
4. The contextual basis of the concept including interdisciplinary, sociocultural and temporal (antecedents and consequential occurrences) variations.
5. Identify an exemplar of the concept, if appropriate
6. Identify implications (of the study for communities of practice), hypotheses and implications for further development of the concept (Rodgers, 2000, p. 85).
cases would be challenged to present the concept in its entirety due to the variety of
disciplinary understandings that have been offered. As will be demonstrated within the
situational analysis, the emergence of WoG typologies speaks to the efforts being made
to clarify the concept by producing new sub-concepts that might provide researchers and
practitioners with a more in-depth vocabulary that includes greater collective
understanding of relevant terms. At that point, the identification of exemplar cases may
be a more valuable addition to a concept analysis.

As with any method, there are a number of limitations associated with an
evolutionary approach to concept analysis. The first limitation is related to the data that
fuels the analysis. It is agreed throughout the nursing literature that it is acceptable, and at
times preferable, for data to originate from either interviews or a review of the academic
literature (Rodgers, 1989). Risjord (2009) refers to the literature-based model as a
theoretical concept analysis (as opposed to a colloquial concept analysis which focuses
more on people and how they are using the term in a clinical community). The theoretical
concept analysis is “primarily useful for making the content of an existing theoretical
concept explicit” (p. 689). The concept analysis presented in the remainder of this chapter
is anchored exclusively in the literature (peer-reviewed and publications from
governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations). Despite
the established value of this data source, other researchers have acknowledged that the
challenge with obtaining data exclusively from literature is that it is impossible to include
all “relevant literature and unpublished material” (Hudon, St-Cyr Tribble, Bravo, &
Poitras, 2010, p. 147). Because the concept analysis encourages researchers to capture
data from multiple disciplines and across various contexts, there is an unwieldy amount
of literature which could be included in any given concept analysis. As a result, many
researchers, including Rodgers, have established standards and procedures around the
identification of literature that ‘counts’. These procedures are explored later in the chapter
and have been implemented in an effort to address the limitation related to both the
inability to include all relevant information and the resulting risk of researcher
subjectivity in determining what literature should be included.
The second limitation is advanced by some critics of the evolutionary view who are concerned that Rodgers’ model steps away from the Wilsonian approach which focused largely on the construction or invention of model cases. Such cases are not included in the evolutionary approach. There is an argument that “specific cases with clear boundaries minimize the relationship between concepts and context thereby moving the method from relativist to realist” (Duncan, Duff Cloutier, & Bailey, 2007, p. 297). Rodgers (1989) argues that approaches to concept analysis which include the invented case “value reduction in attempt to isolate the apparent essence of a concept rather than focusing on vast interrelationships that exist in the world” (p. 331). This position is supported by Hupcey and Penrod (2005) who argue that the “derived conceptualization of model cases is unable to capture the meanings inherent to complex human experiences” (p. 200). Instead, the omission of the invented case allows the evolutionary view, which does not include a dictionary-style definition of the concept as an intended outcome, to incorporate surrogate terms (a crucial component in studying WoG which is often deployed using varying words or terms).

Finally, the evolutionary approach posited by Rodgers is based in a general philosophy that is not shared by all nurse researchers who use and study the concept analysis method. As noted above, this approach attempts to allow for multiple understandings of a concept across time, disciplines and any number of other contextual elements. In contrast, there are researchers who espouse a model in which “concept advancement strategies push the concept towards a level of scientific clarity, moving the concept from the realm of everyday meaning towards a more precise or narrow scientific meaning” (Hupcey et al., 2001, p. 283). A version of the concept analysis, often referred to as the principle-based approach, advanced by Morse and colleagues, is designed to achieve this enhanced state of clarity by yielding concrete definitions of a concept. That the evolutionary approach pursues an outcome that allows for meaning and understanding to change in various contexts and does not pursue a single definition is what makes is what makes Rodger’s model preferable. While variance in meaning certainly adds a challenge for operationalizing WoG, it is a true reflection of its conceptual development.
and an accurate depiction of the challenges facing practitioners when it comes to implementing WoG initiatives. The pursuit of a single definition may appear to offer clarity; however, reconciling multiple perspectives is no small task. It can be problematic when the discourse becomes dominated by the quest for a universal definition than understanding how the concept is achieved in practice (see the evolution of human security discussed in Chapter #1). Instead, there is value to an approach that concedes from the outset that conceptual understanding changes over time and space and, from that position, acknowledges that the manifestation of WoG will likely differ from context to context.

**Concept of Interest**

The concept of interest is cross-boundary interaction amongst public sector actors (individuals, teams and organizational units) tasked with working on complex, cross-cutting issues, such as those related to fragile states. WoG is the term used to articulate an occurrence of the concept; however, “it is important to remember that a concept is not a word, but the idea or characteristics associated with the word. Words are used to express concepts; they are not the concepts themselves” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 85). As noted earlier, the concept has been advanced by a variety of terms that have emerged from various disciplines and communities of practice. These related terms and expressions cannot be understood as pure synonyms as they differ in a number of respects: some are more politicized terms and have become associated with individuals and governments more so than clear functional definitions, some are anchored in one disciplinary perspective over another and some differ on ‘who’ is involved in the interconnections being described or the breadth of the stakeholder group. The variances and the commonalities are explored within the analysis; however, it should be emphasized that based on how these words are used in research and practice, this concept
analysis takes the position that all of the aforementioned words are expressions of the same basic concept.

**Identify Realm: Setting and Sample Selection**

The setting, which comprises time period and contributing disciplines, captures a period of time in which the contemporary security-development nexus emerges as a major issue for researchers and practitioners in global peace and security. As a result, this concept analysis uses sources selected from English language literature published in the fields of international studies (which captured largely contributions from political science, and a smaller number of sources from international development studies) and public administration during the years 1990 – 2013. In addition to these core bodies of literature, a third field – military studies – emerged over the course of the literature search to offer a different perspective on the concept of WoG. Each individual source was classified based on its disciplinary perspective. Source classification was based on the title of the academic journal from which it originated or, in cases where the journal title was ambiguous, from the online description of the journal’s website. Journals focused on military studies included elements of both public administration and international relations but the issues facing the armed forces differ from those facing civilian institutions, which tend to be the focus of the two core disciplines. For this reason, the data analysis identified military studies as its own discipline. The large majority of literature-based concept analyses in nursing research tend to use exclusively peer-reviewed journal articles. Rodgers’ model does allow for the inclusion of popular or grey literature, indicating that it can be “beneficial in bridging the gap between the perspectives of providers and those who are recipients of care” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 87). Translated to the world of policy and politics, the inclusion of grey literature, such as government documents, reports from international
organizations and think tanks or even conference proceedings, can provide the opportunity to include the perspective of those responsible for developing policies or delivering programs with WoG in mind and, to a lesser extent, the perspectives of the recipients of such policies and programs. As a result, the literature search was conducted to first identify sources from peer reviewed journal articles, after which a secondary search was conducted to identify relevant grey literature.

Once the setting was established the next step was to build a sample of sources from the total number that emerged from the literature searches. The challenge for the researcher was to identify the sample while taking steps to reduce the impact of researcher bias. There have been critiques put forward by those who study concept analysis method, that too many researchers justify their sample of sources by using vague descriptors such as the sources chosen were ‘relevant’ or ‘contributed to a deeper understanding of the concept’ (Hudon, St-Cyr Tribble, Bravo, & Poitras, 2010, p. 2).

Rodgers’ model addresses this concern, in part, by suggesting that the researcher build the sample by first indexing the sources by field (in this case academic discipline) and then assigning unique identifier numbers to each source. Some researcher bias remains as the initial key words were used to compile sources were developed by the researcher. However, using computer-generated random numbers to select a number of sources from each discipline to be used in the analysis allows for a robust analysis with limited researcher bias. Rodgers and her colleagues recommend as a general guide that at least 30 sources from each discipline or 20% of the total population selected, whichever is greater in order to ‘ensure an adequate basis for identifying consensus within the discipline’ (Rodgers, 2000, p. 89).
Data Collection

Rodgers recommends “a systematic means of sampling such as selection drawn from computerized databases [in order] to increase the likelihood that the items included in the analysis are representative of the total population” (2000, p. 89). Consequently, building the sample of literature for the analysis began with a literature search that involved searches in the databases Political Science Complete, PAIS International (ProQuest), International Security and Terrorism Reference Centre (ISTRC) and JStor. Within each database queries were made for each of the key words (Table 5) found in the Abstract field. The date range for each search was limited to 1990–Present and the searches were restricted to English-language articles in scholarly journals. The only problematic keywords proved to be 3D and civil-military. 3D was more commonly understood to be an abbreviation for 3-dimensional and therefore searches for 3D yielded hundreds of unrelated articles. An alternate search for 3D proved to be ‘diplomacy’ AND ‘defence’ AND ‘development. Civil military as a key word search yielded over 500 articles in each of Political Science Complete and the ISTRC. To better focus these queries Boolean operators were used to search for civil military within the context of the countries known to be core champions of the WoG concept (i.e., Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia).
Table 5: Keywords used to express the “concept of interest”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Whole-of-government”</th>
<th>3D</th>
<th>3C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Comprehensive approach”</td>
<td>“Joined-up government”</td>
<td>“Collaborative Public Management”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Horizontal management”</td>
<td>“Horizontal accountability”</td>
<td>“Horizontal initiatives”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAgency AND collaboration</td>
<td>InterAgency AND coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Civil Military” AND Canada</td>
<td>“Civil Military” AND United States</td>
<td>“Civil Military” AND UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Civil Military” AND Australia</td>
<td>“Comprehensive security”</td>
<td>“Policy coherence” AND security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Policy coherence” AND development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of each database query (titles and abstracts) were reviewed and the majority of the articles identified in each search were imported into Refworks. The only articles not imported into Refworks were articles that were clearly identified as being beyond the contextual focus of the research (i.e., WoG in relation to provincial – federal interactions). This choice to focus the context at the sampling stage is supported by the work of Risjord (2009) who cautions researchers that “by failing to attend to contextual differences, authors dilute their evidence base to the point that is impossible to justify any selection of attributes” (p. 687) In total 399 articles were imported into Refworks. Duplicates were identified and removed, yielding 261 articles which were then stratified by discipline. Table 6 shows the number of articles from each discipline and the number of articles required to meet the 20% minimum recommended by Rodgers. Beyond the articles selected randomly, 35 additional peer reviewed journal articles were identified through purposive sampling (Rodgers, 2000) and 52 works of grey literature (government documents, reports from international organizations and conference proceedings) were added. In total 168 individual articles were identified for data analysis.
Table 6: Summary of results of the literature search for cross-disciplinary concept analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>No. of articles from search</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th># contributed from random sample</th>
<th># contributed from purposive sample and grey literature</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Studies</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thematic content analysis of the literature was conducted using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo. 168 sources were imported into NVivo and three parent codes were established: *antecedents* (events or phenomena that precede an occurrence of the concept), *consequences* (events or phenomena that follow an occurrence of the concept) and *attributes* (characteristics that define the concept). Each individual source was reviewed and child codes or sub-codes for each of the aforementioned parent codes emerged as coding went along. While the researcher had an idea of what child codes would be present (i.e., one might expect to see the war on terror emerge as an antecedent for cross boundary interactions), the coding process was deliberately emergent in nature so as to entertain as many different perspectives and interpretations as possible. Throughout the coding process additional levels of hierarchy within a code were added and occasionally codes were merged. In addition to coding the text, each individual source was classified in order to be able to explore and discuss contextual influences on the codes. Sources were classified in five categories: Source type (i.e., journal article), Primary Concept (i.e., WoG), Discipline (i.e., Public Administration), Country (i.e., Canada) and Year (i.e., 2010). The results of the thematic analysis are discussed below.
and integrated into a single conceptual model within the discussion that concludes the
chapter.

**Analysis: Attributes of WoG**

According to Rodgers, “identification of the attributes of the concept represents the primary accomplishment of concept analysis” (Rodgers, 2000, p. 91). Attributes are best understood to be the characteristics of a concept which appear over and over again when the concept is defined or described (Walker & Avant, 1988). Therefore, understanding the prevalence of attributes, their distribution across disciplines and over time and the relationships that may exist between attributes, can yield insight into how conceptual meaning develops and evolves. The coding exercise for conceptual attributes yielded 40 individual codes – a number that was unwieldy for the purposes of sense-making and unhelpful as part of an exercise to establish conceptual clarity. As a follow-up activity, the codes were analyzed to see if any commonalities could be identified that might allow for categorization of the attributes and enhance efforts to reframe an interdisciplinary understanding of WoG. The next 4 sections describe these commonalities.

**WoG as a statement of purpose**

Attributes within this cluster speak to what WoG is intended to accomplish and therein shed some light onto what political philosophies, management frameworks or systems of government might be most aligned with the concept of cross-boundary coordination in the public sector. These attributes also establish the expectations that are associated with WoG initiatives and mandates and, in doing so, offer some insights into the kinds of boundaries that must be traversed and the inherent complexities of WoG in practice.
Public interest

The idea that WoG mandates, initiatives and approaches are intended to serve the public interest emerges from a number of disciplinary perspectives. From the public administration literature WoG is associated with improved service delivery and more effective policies. This association is referenced largely within the context of WoG approaches to domestic policy issues and advanced most prominently by the term ‘joined-up-government’, which is understood to be a primary mechanism for improving responsiveness to citizens (Teicher & Dow, 2002) and providing them with less fragmented access to a set of related services (Pollitt, 2003). From the international relations literature public interest is also mentioned as a desired outcome of cross-boundary efforts; however, it is more closely connected with the context of local communities and individuals in recipient countries that may be targeted by a WoG initiative from a western country. It is asserted that “coherent policies and activities are generally considered to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of recipient countries” (Anten, van Beijnum, & Specker, 2009).

Also emerging as a theme is WoG as a necessary approach for serving the broader public interest (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996; Bourgon, 2009) which is best met by government departments looking beyond the specific interests of their targeted stakeholder group and understanding that in a world connected by globalization and technology the interests of one group often become indirectly the interests of the bigger community. This position is relevant in a discussion framed by a global political and security apparatus that emphasize the direct and indirect threats posed by areas of destabilization and violence to the broader international community.

Optimization: effectiveness and efficiency

Optimization, or the idea of improvement and enhancement, referenced in relation to improved overall effectiveness (Anten, van Beijnum, & Specker, 2009; St-Louis, 2008; de Coning, Luras, Nagelhus Schia, & Ulriksen, 2009), increased efficiency in the use of available, and often scarce, resources (Pollitt, 2003), avoiding or reducing duplication of effort (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; Hrychuk, 2009;
Ojo, Janowski, & Estevez, 2011), minimizing redundancy and incoherence (Peters, 1998), elimination of policies that undermine each other (Pollitt, 2003) and maximizing the impact of a country or organization’s contribution in the field (St-Louis, 2008; de Coning & Friis, 2011).

The idea has roots in the private sector management theory of re-engineering, and it aims at streamlining processes from input to output, in order to maximize efficiency, and to remove overlap and duplication. In a theoretical sense, re-engineering seeks to create an end-to-end process that cuts across traditional ‘stovepipes,’ leading to an organization that runs more smoothly and efficiently. (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008, p.5)

This characteristic frames WoG through a very positive lens that resonates strongly with individuals and organizations that remember the security and development challenges of the 1990s – in which the international community’s collective response (or lack thereof) to violent conflict in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, among others, was accused of being incredibly ineffective and terribly inefficient. Similarly, concerns around aid effectiveness are an ever-present focus of politicians and practitioners who are spending significant amounts of tax payers’ money to address complex and pervasive social issues such as poverty, famine, and chronic cycles of violence. Donor countries and organizations may never see a tangible return on investment within the political lifespan of a specific government. As a result, any concept that has optimization as a characteristic has the potential to address the persistent concerns and critiques related to program efficiency and effectiveness.

**Shared goal or common purpose**

Definitions within the literature frequently reference the idea that WoG explicitly involves working towards shared, common or joint goals/purposes/mandates within and across civilian and military actors (Kernaghan, 1993; Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011; Travers & Owen, 2008; Egnell, 2008; Crisis Management Initiative, 2008; van de Goor, 2012; Lacroix, 2009). The shared goal or common purpose is an important conceptual element as practitioners have long lists of initiatives that have been
undertaken with the purpose of coordination but without effort being spent to jointly clarify a common understanding of purpose or expected outcomes. Certainly, the process through which the shared purpose is developed and advanced throughout a network of partners is not simple within public sector departments and agencies due to issues around accountability and ministerial responsibility which are explored in detail in Chapter 4. It is therefore telling that the shared or common goal emerges as an attribute for WoG; that in the absence of a shared purpose an initiative or mandate may need to be recognized as something other than WoG.

From this vantage point it is possible to identify a connection between this attribute and the idea that WoG is understood to be a purposeful, deliberate activity (see WoG as an adjective). Is it enough for the common goal to be issued from a higher authority or must the multi-actor network identify common goals through a process of participation and engagement? Both of these scenarios require deliberate effort on the part of stakeholders; they would emerge from an established policy development and programming system and not happen by accident. Similarly, the shared goal attribute is also related to the attribute of optimization and the view that without WoG – without establishing common or shared goals – departments and organizations will work at cross purposes and potentially undermine each other to the point that effectiveness is severely challenged. Within the literature it is often suggested that common goals are a requirement of synergistic efforts on the part of multiple stakeholders (Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009); that effectiveness is anchored in a clear vision of the desired outcome (Kass & London, 2013).

**Coherence and Harmonization**

Finally, within the cluster of WoG motivations are the characteristics of coherence and harmonization. They are being referenced together as they often appear together within the WoG literature. Coherence is especially prominent in the literature discussing the terms policy coherence, 3C (where one of the C’s is coherence) and the Comprehensive Approach. As a result of an affinity for the attribute within the security and development communities, coherence exists prominently within the international
relations and military studies bodies of literature and the documents produced by branches of international organizations focused on aid effectiveness such as the OECD and the European Union. Coherence refers to logical connections between parts and because it is often associated with cross-boundary efforts at the system level it speaks most often to a sense of unity and common purpose across a wide range of actors. As an attribute that sheds light into what WoG is intended to achieve, coherence speaks to the idea that WoG initiatives should behave as united, cohesive undertakings amongst actors but also across the dimensions of peacebuilding activities – strategy-policy-operations (3C Conference, 2009) or the program cycle: analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation (de Coning, 2007, p.12).

Whereas coherence speaks to unifying parts of a whole, harmonization is the action of making something, in this case policies, programs or strategies, consistent or compatible with each other (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013). Harmonization, related to harmony or harmonious, implies activities that are not just coordinated because of common interests that incentivize cross-boundary efforts, but done with a sense of accord between the participating units (Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009). Both attributes share a relationship with the attribute of common or shared purpose in that the literature often references coherence as an outcome of the shared purpose (Government of Canada, 2005; de Coning & Friis, 2011) or links an enhanced statement of common purpose (behind which all actors stand) to deliberate efforts of harmonization across all relevant instruments within a network of actors (Egnell, 2008).

WoG as an adjective
The attributes within this cluster appeared within the literature when authors attempted to describe the nature or essence of WoG.

Holistic
The holistic nature of WoG is widespread within definitions for cross-boundary interaction. The attribute is used to describe: styles of government and approaches to
public management that are conducive to cross-boundary efforts (Raab, & Bellamy, 2005), the purpose of a WoG initiative (Andersson & Liff, 2012), an approach for military strategists to undertake in the face of complex national security challenges (Kass & London, 2013), expected WoG policy outcomes (Hunt, 2005) and a specific approach to fragile states (OECD, 2006). In the context of public policy and international relations, holistic becomes a feature of initiatives and approaches that work to mobilize the whole of an organization’s collective resources to tackle cross-cutting issues such as those presented by the security-development nexus (Fitz-Gerald, 2004; Egnell, 2008; Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). Accountability structures within government organizations and the international political system make it impossible to completely ignore the individual parts; however, the inclusion of holistic as an attribute for WoG approaches can be viewed as a response to the perceived level of fragmentation, departmentalism and turf protection present in the workings of contemporary governments broadly and in international peacebuilding initiatives more specifically. Incorporating holistic into the understanding of WoG is a call for government departments to work and behave differently than they are designed to do; they are being called to acknowledge the fact that issues within the security-development nexus can be deeply interwoven and that to explore the big, interconnected issues, they themselves must be interconnected in some meaningful way.

As an attribute, holistic can also impart a certain set of values upon WoG. To many people the descriptor may be closely associated with terms such as ‘alternative’, ‘natural’ or ‘organic’. For some who value nature, the environment and a change to a lifestyle that recognizes the interconnections in global and local ecosystems the term reflects an appealing image of desirable improvement; for others who value established mechanisms of political power and influence holistic may imply an undesirable weakness.
Flexible

The flexible nature of WoG is associated with the idea that the concept requires such a departure from the status quo in how governments and international political systems work that any WoG approach or initiative requires that people and structures flex and adapt as new protocols, standards, and accountability frameworks evolve (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). WoG is flexible in that it speaks of an organizational agility, a responsive decision-making processes (Bourgon, 2009) and the ability to reconcile or choose among a spectrum of competing options (Kass & London, 2013).

Flexible is also related to the urgency of any number of situations that emerge from environments facing both security and development challenges. The ability to mobilize and deploy well-trained and appropriate resources urgently in the face of a natural disaster in a fragile state or a conflict zone in need of humanitarian aid requires flexible response systems within large, bureaucratic institutions.

Political

Despite the lack of explicit reference within definitions, WoGs’ political nature is present within the literature in a number of ways. Many of the specific terms used to describe cross-boundary interaction are associated closely with the reforms and legacies of specific politicians and/or political parties (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006); they have become strategic enablers to advance a political brand or differentiate one government’s agenda from the next (Halligan, Buick, & O'Flynn, 2011; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009). Another way in which political is an attribute to WoG pertains to the level of political commitment required to bring together departments, agencies or organizations with different mandates and reporting structures to work towards a common purpose. In the model of Westminster government found in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, the head of each line department is a political figure meaning that any WoG initiative requiring collaboration across two or more departments must take into consideration the political drivers, motives and competing interests of powerful ministers (Peters, 1998). In certain scenarios the political element can also diminish the impact and influence of the
concept. If the concept is seen by stakeholders to be more jargon than a substantive guide for policy and programing, it can be dismissed by public servants and the public. The opposite of the term being mere political jargon is that a WoG initiative or response can be of such enormous political interest to a government, such as the Canadian effort in Afghanistan in the early 2000s, that the coordination role takes place at the Cabinet level. Hameriri (2008) goes so far as to suggest that this placement of considerable power within the executive branch is the political appeal of WoG.

The concept may evolve over time to be less political and more an assumed element of good governance. Its origins and current use still reflect a push and pull between establishing WoG as a standard, institutional response to issues of great complexity, using the concept as a form of political capital to generate a desired change (Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011) or demonstrating an adherence to growing norms that scratch the surface but do not penetrate throughout the workings of an organization.

Resource Intensive

Within the literature the idea that WoG is resource intensive is linked to arguments that: the processes of consultation, consensus building and compromise can be time and resource consuming (European Union, 2007; Bakvis and Juillet, 2004), efforts to balance priorities and capabilities at the onset of an initiative can require laborious negotiations (Patrick & Brown, 2007), transaction costs can be higher (Pollitt, 2003), a great amount of political will can be necessary (Olson & Gregorian, 2007) and trust building requires a large investment of time and energy (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001).

The attribute of resource intensity contrasts with the previously mentioned attribute of optimizing efficiency and effectiveness; however, the two attributes are not mutually exclusive. If one looks at the scale and scope of the problems that demand cross-boundary engagement, it is possible for WoG to be both resource intensive and efficient. While WoG may reduce fiscal pressures for a government overall, the cost to individual departments, especially lead departments, may be higher than expected (Peters, 1998). WoG could be the approach most likely to accomplish the desired outcomes and still be
costly with respect to financial commitments, human resources and physical infrastructure. Another way to look at the two attributes is that getting a WoG approach off the ground at the planning and development stage may require more time, more people and more money than a traditional departmental initiative (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996); however, if the work is done well at this stage, there may be efficiencies at the implementation stage. At a minimum the effort spent in the planning stage may reduce the likelihood of taking on unanticipated costs associated with a number of uncoordinated initiatives. While WoG may be costly in the short run, comprehensive planning may still yield efficiencies in the long term. With this in mind, it is important to consider the tension that exists between this attribute and the political characteristic of WoG. Reconciling short term political interests with tangible efficiencies that may only be seen beyond a political horizon can complicate the realization of WoG.

**Purposeful**

Of all the attributes discussed, purposeful was the least dominant in the coding exercise. It could have been discarded from this thematic analysis; however, upon reflection there is a pressing insight offered by this attribute – an insight that may be assumed in the bulk of the literature but is important nonetheless. Purposeful can be seen as a key attribute of WoG because the design of international organizations, state governments and the global system of actors that respond to issues of peace and security do not naturally facilitate or foster coordination, collaboration or integration across departments, agencies, organizations or people. Aside from the informal efforts anchored in individual relationships, any effort to work together to optimize efficiency or accomplish a shared goal requires a purposeful, deliberate effort on the part of stakeholders (Hunt, 2005; Egnell, 2008).

**WoG as a form of interaction**

At its most basic WoG refers to a form of interaction amongst actors. The nature and intensity of this interaction are core attributes of WoG and are described by words such as cooperation, coordination, collaboration and integration. These words refer to ways in which people, teams and organizations work together and describe degrees of
coherence related to level of trust, commitment, division of labour, planning and decision making processes, financial contributions, evaluation tools and information sharing systems. The terms are often differentiated based on the level of intensity of the interaction and, consequently, can be understood both through their individual definitions and in relation to each other. The various forms of interaction are often depicted on a continuum that begins with no interaction and no shared efforts (coexistence) and advances to a point at which a group of disparate actors work together seamlessly as a single unit. O’Leary and Vij (2002) discussed the idea that as one moves along the spectrum toward collaboration the processes become more dynamic and emergent – less static. de Coning & Friis (2011) presented a comprehensive approach model in which the relationships of participating actors are characterized by differing degrees of coherence. Their model was conceptualized within the context of international peacebuilding and stabilization efforts and included along the continuum levels of interaction such as competition, coexistence, coordination, cooperation, integration and full state of unity.

O’Flynn (2009) refers to a relevant typology developed in 1992 by Mattessich and Monsey in which cooperation is presented on a spectrum encompassing coordination and collaboration, with the first term described as an informal relationship between individuals or organizations or a more formal agreement between independent units to cooperate where required. There is an increased sense of complementary mandates and there is a willingness to go further in organizing activities together with others, although such arrangements are typically temporary, context-specific and may need to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis (de Coning & Friis, 2011, p. 256).

Coordination refers to a relationship between independent actors who often have different mandates but share some strategic interests (de Coning & Friis, 2011). Often one of the participating units dominates or leads the process (Andersson & Liff, 2012) as a coordinating entity that creates opportunities and processes for bringing actors together for short and long term horizontal efforts. This lead unit often has the responsibility for assessing and reporting on the success of the coordinated venture. The level of interaction involves information sharing but often discrete planning and decision making processes
are maintained within each unit. The term ‘partnership’ also appears as a descriptor for this intermediate level of interaction (Askim, Christensen, Fimreite, & Laegreid, 2009); although in the case of a partnership the tool that facilitates the joint effort may be a legal contract instead of a lead coordinating body.

Collaboration does not appear as a specific level of interaction within deConing and Friis’ model; however, it is present throughout the WoG literature. Collaboration is characterized as a more ‘durable and pervasive relationship’ (Thomson & Perry, 2006) – a high-order type of collective action (Whitford, Lee, Yun, & Jung, 2010, p. 325) involving “new structures, a common mission, shared planning, formal communication across multiple levels, pooling and jointly acquiring resources, shared rewards, and more risk” (O’Flynn, 2009, p 114). Bakvis and Juillet (2004) describe collaboration as the process of “not only coordinating activities but also developing, agreeing to and implementing a strategy for achieving set objectives” (p. 8).

The WoG literature struggles somewhat in its efforts to clarify whether the concept is characterized most often by one of these forms of interaction or all of them. Can WoG be characterized by coordination in one case and collaboration in another? Can WoG move from one level of interaction to the next within the same initiative or effort? Does such movement have to be purposeful in nature or can it be a more organic, emergent phenomenon? The struggle to answer these questions is compounded by inconsistent use of the various terms. Some authors use the terms interchangeably while others acknowledge that the terms imply different forms of interaction but do not offer insight into the specifics of how interactions differ. More problematic is that amongst those authors who do offer definitions for one or more of these attributes, there is a surprising lack of consistency across definitions. Within the literature there are contradictory statements around where on the continuum the various attributes sit, meaning that researchers do not share a common understanding of what terms imply greater levels of interaction amongst actors. For example, depending on the author, cooperation and coordination could exchange places on the continuum. O’Flynn (2009) describes cooperation very similarly to the understanding of coordination presented
above. In her article coordination is a deeper level of interaction than cooperation. For deConning and Fiis, the situation is reversed and cooperation is the relationship with more intensive interaction. Hopkins, Couture and Moore (2001) discuss the terms horizontal coordination and horizontal collaboration and in doing so present integration as part of the definition for collaboration; i.e., that collaboration can be differentiated from coordination because of the occurrence of integration.

This conceptual ambiguity could be attributed to how widespread terms such as cooperation and collaboration are within society. They can be used to describe every day occurrences at home and at work without too much thought concerning their true meaning thereby creating a certain fuzziness around if and how they should be differentiated from each other. There are powerful, practical implications to associating poorly or inconsistently understood attributes to WoG. Establishing and managing expectations across actors, developing common indicators or benchmarks for successful WoG and sharing best practices and lessons learned are just some of the key activities within public management that are near impossible without some clarity around how these attributes inform the collective understanding of WoG. Until this clarity is obtained a critical best practice for any WoG initiative would be to ensure that in the early stages participating individuals and teams share an understanding as to what form or level(s) of interaction is expected.

**WoG as a complex system**

From a management theory perspective, “a complex system has the following characteristics: it involves a large numbers of interacting elements, the interactions are nonlinear and minor changes can produce disproportionately major consequences, the system is dynamic (the whole is greater than the sum of its parts)…the system has a history and the past is integrated with the present; the elements evolve with one another and with the environment;…hindsight does not lead to foresight because the external conditions and systems constantly change” (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 71). WoG can be viewed as a response to complex or wicked problems; an approach that acknowledges the many moving, interrelated pieces of the issues and problems facing governments.
However, it may also be possible to understand WoG approaches and initiatives as examples of complex systems; that WoG shares many of the conceptual attributes of complex systems noted above. This perspective reflects the reality of the environments in which cross-boundary interaction is undertaken by policy makers, practitioners and military professionals.

In the understandable effort to manage the scope of a research project, policy analysis or project plan, there is a tendency within the literature to examine WoG in specific operational contexts and not within its operational system. For example, WoG can be applied as an adjective to policy development (Jochim & May, 2010; Askim, Christensen, Fimreite, & Laegreid, 2009) or military planning efforts or joint program development; to activities in headquarters or activities in the field. In reality, these activities do not occur in nicely packaged, self-contained boxes. Similarly, WoG can be characterized as a concept that can be applied across the breadth of the expansive cycle of peacebuilding-conflict resolution activities that take place in fragile states. It can be discussed within the context of international stabilization efforts or disaster relief or ODA (each of which includes hundreds of activities that involve thousands of moving pieces); however, as a more accurate representation of the environment, WoG can be understood in a way that recognizes the operational and strategic linkages that occur between these various activities. In order to establish an understanding of WoG that best reflects the daily work of practitioners it is necessary to view the distinct stages of conflict and instability or the individual processes and protocols for developing policy, programs and military campaigns pieces of a bigger operational puzzle.

Through these two contextual examples it is possible to present WoG as an example of a complex system; a term that expresses the idea of many interconnected moving pieces, non-linear relationships between those pieces which can be seen through the presence of positive and negative feedback loops, and a dynamic and fluid environment that can yield any number of unanticipated consequences while working on problems that are difficult to define and therefore impossible to solve in their entirety.
The multiple moving pieces and the non-linear nature of the relationships within the two contextual dimensions of WoG are depicted together in Figures 4 and 5.

**Figure 4: Policy - programming cycle (from Bougon, 2009)**

![Policy - programming cycle](image)

**Figure 5: Overlapping forms of interventions (from Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010)**

![Overlapping forms of interventions](image)

The activities included therein are not intended to be all-encompassing; however, they do provide a sound assessment of the primary activities from expert researchers in the relevant bodies of literature. The processes through which policy is formulated, and subsequently implemented, are dynamic in nature, involve multiple actors and include ongoing cycles of monitoring, evaluation and re-formulation. These cycles are influenced strongly by social pressures, the political environment, organizational dynamics and individual personalities. The 1996 Task Force on Horizontal Issues touched on the nature of policy development and provides some insight into the dynamic, non-linear nature of WoG as a concept.

*In some instances, policy development is an orderly step-by-step process going through a cycle of analysis, options development, selection of a preferred option and implementation. Very often, however, policy development is not predictable and does not follow a predetermined schedule of events. Within this dynamic context, each department has responsibility for ensuring coherence within its mandate (6).*

Similarly, programming cycles within government could include analysis, implementation, management and evaluation (de Coning, Luras, Nagelhus Schia, &
Uliksen, 2009; Ojo, Janowski, & Estevez, 2011) or design, implementation and evaluation (Anten, van Beijnum, & Specker, 2009). Figure 4, produced by established academic and practitioner Jocelyne Bourgon (2009), expands upon these ideas and displays the policy (politics) cycle and the programming (administration) cycle as two different but mutually reinforcing systems. Bourgon’s model is a response to a separation she sees between the work of public servants and the work of elected officials. At each stage of the model hundreds of tasks occur, each of which could involve different barriers and incentives to collaboration. Individual departments would have different organizational cultures and leadership styles that would impact the work at each stage. It can also be useful to consider the profile of the various stakeholders or actors who work at each step of the process. Core competencies, personality traits, the physical environment and the nature of the work may differ greatly across these activities meaning that: a) application of WoG might look different depending on the actors and the context; and b) there may be natural barriers to WoG initiatives embedded in the differing cultures and perspectives. It can be useful to consider each stage as a node or point at which meaningful interaction can occur (or be obstructed). First, interaction can occur between a number of contributing departments or teams at a single point (i.e., a single policy to guide all units can be crafted or individual policies can be reviewed to ensure coherence to a central mandate). Second, interaction can occur as a single unit or as multiple units move from one stage to the next.

Figure 5 was introduced in Chapter 1 and originates from the work of Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah (2010). The model emphasizes the scale and scope of any WoG approach intended to work over multiple phases or stages of the peace-conflict system. The number of moving pieces for even a single government to consider is enormous; each of which has a tremendous potential to influence other parts of the system in unpredictable ways. A WoG approach or initiative can spread over any number of these stages and manifest itself somewhat differently within each stage. Additionally, through this lens, the WoG system becomes characterized by longer time horizons than might
normally be considered by some of the partner departments (van de Goor & Major, 2012).

One final set of activities not depicted in Bourgon’s model but relevant to the concept of WoG are those activities that would originate from the military. Given the role of the military within the peace-conflict system it is important to recognize the extra level of internal processes being brought to a WoG system. Amongst the vocabulary of military actors, words such as policy and programing are not commonplace. Instead, the military planning process is framed through a conceptual framework that includes three, and sometimes four levels: tactical, operational, strategic (military) and strategic (national). They are implied within the peace-conflict cycle but not explicitly stated. This terminology dates back to the 19th century where it was expressed as ‘levels of war’. “The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions … there are no finite limits or boundaries between them … understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks” (US Army, 2001). It is a classification structure that can be applied to objectives, resources, planning, etc. Like the activities noted within the civilian policy-programming cycles discussed previously, each level of military activity involves different mandates, foci, actors and resources. An understanding of WoG that involves the military must expand to incorporate an expectation of coherence between any or all of the various civilian policy-programming activities and those planning and engagement activities undertaken by the military.

Core elements of the WoG system discussed above can be adapted and superimposed upon each other (see Figure 6). Presenting them together in one figure serves the purpose of reminding the reader that there are moving pieces and interconnections not only within each contextual dimensions but across dimensions.
The policy-programming cycle can be put into motion any number of times within each of the stages of the peace-conflict system. As the various dimensions advance at pace, the actors (individuals and departments) and their respective positions of authority, political interests, mandates and professional skills change adding additional levels of complexity to the WoG system. Understanding WoG as a complex system better reflects the magnitude of the interconnected pieces within the space, the vastness of the boundaries being spanned and the overall messiness of WoG initiatives. While the systemic characteristics of the concept risk leaving readers with the oversimplified impression that, in fact, WoG means any interaction between anyone at any stage of the process, that is not the intent. There could be any number of points within the system at which informed choices may be made to not engage a WoG approach; that the need for a cross-boundary effort does not measure up to the investment of funds, people or political
capital. Nonetheless, WoG as a complex system is a true reflection of how the concept behaves in practice and should, therefore, be included in its conceptual meaning.

Analysis: Context

A key component of the evolutionary concept analysis method is the acknowledgement of contextual elements that influence our understanding of the concept in question; i.e., that understanding and meaning can change across time and perspective. Such contextual themes emerged through a secondary coding process whereby each source item was classified by source type (journal article, government document, conference document or report/grey literature), primary term (which cross-boundary term was the primary focus of the article – WoG or one of its surrogate terms), discipline (public administration, international relations or military studies), country (the country of focus in the article) and year of publication (ranging from 1990 – 2013). Cross-comparisons of the source classifications yielded a number of observations related to contextual elements.

Interdisciplinary Context

Each individual source was classified against a list of primary terms. When one of the primary terms was not evident after a complete review of the source, a classification of ‘unassigned’ was applied. Fifteen sources were unclassified with respect to any primary term. In most cases these sources focused on generic terminology that could apply to any of the individual terms such as coordination, collaboration, integration or partnership. Of the classified sources, a single term was identified for each source as the primary term of focus within the piece of literature. Occasionally multiple terms would be referenced, in which case the title and/or abstract would be consulted to determine the
primary term. It was not a perfect classification process; however, the purpose of this process was to capture broad, sweeping trends related to context and the classification process allowed for this. Figure 7 compares the primary term classifications against the discipline classification.

**Figure 7: Comparison of primary term classifications against discipline classifications**

![Comparison of primary term classifications against discipline classifications](image)

While the term WoG appears relatively equally within the international relations and public administration sources the same cannot be said for the surrogate terms. There are some terms that appear in one body of literature and not the other(s). Terms such as *collaborative public management, horizontal* (which includes related terms such as horizontal management and horizontality) and *joined-up government* appear almost exclusively in the public administration literature. In contrast, terms such as *3C, 3D, Comprehensive Approach* and *civil military* (which includes civil military coordination – CIMIC) are the domain of international relations and, in the case of civil military, military studies. The public administration terms have a much more generic focus, on the drivers and mechanisms for collaboration and coordination more broadly. The research around these terms involves a great deal of thinking concerning the mechanics of how the
terms can be implemented or operationalized. Aside from *joined-up government* which has been clearly associated with Tony Blair and the Labor Party in Britain, these terms are less political – less tied to specific politicians and governments and less associated by researchers and the public with high profile global events such as the United Kingdom’s involvement in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are more generally related to the ongoing quest for government efficiency and effectiveness and within the literature they are explored within the context of domestic policies and programs.

In contrast, the cluster of international relations/military studies terms has a greater political profile, having been associated with the post 9-11 security environment which has included persistent and controversial conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These terms are anchored firmly to efficiency and effectiveness of actors engaged in the international security and development environments and as a result they implicitly include the civilian and military branches of the armed forces, which are rarely mentioned in the public administration literature. The clear fracture between the two main bodies of literature has a number of implications for the study and practice of WoG. First, from a concept development lens it is possible that these largely similar terms are evolving in parallel with little to no cross-fertilization of theory building, hypothesis testing, historical foundations or lessons learned. Given that the public administration literature, especially the research in the area of *horizontality*, has been more inclined to explore the ‘how’s’ of WoG, researchers and practitioners in international relations who are grappling with urgent and complex scenarios involving violent conflict and chronic underdevelopment might benefit greatly from accessing the rich public administration literature on the topic. In contrast, the clear, and puzzling absence of both the military and international security issues from the public administration literature creates crucial gaps in the theories and frameworks on collaboration presented by the discipline. The military of any given country is its own kind of organizations, with its own values, mandates, culture and structure. It is part of a government structure and yet is also clearly different from its civilian counterparts. The knowledge and expertise around how the military behaves in relationship to other actors and the complex dynamics of the international
security environment are clearly concentrated within the international relations and military studies disciplines. It is possible that the divide between the bodies of literature is preventing a more comprehensive understanding of WoG from evolving.

**Temporal and Situational Contexts**

Identifying contextual elements of the concept over time involved two analytical approaches. The first analysis stemmed from the initial coding exercise which yielded concept attributes that have already been explored. In addition to identifying attributes, the coding exercise also identified and coded the antecedents and consequences of WoG. As per Rodgers (1989), antecedents can be understood as “events or phenomena that are generally found to precede an instance of the concept” (p. 334). The antecedents, also referred to as conceptual drivers, were presented in Chapter 1. The consequences are events or phenomena that follow an occurrence of the concept being studied. The second analytical approach accessed the previously mentioned source classifications to more closely observe the emergence of WoG in the literature over a specific time period (1990–2012).

**Source classification: time and primary term**

Figure 8 charts source classification by year (the publication dates of all the literature under analysis) and reveals a clear growth in research and writing around the concept. While the quest for efficiency in government existed before 1990 these results suggest that a different language was used to articulate the concept and that WoG takes root in the minds of researchers and policy makers in the late 1990s, achieving greater profile by the mid-aughts. The source classification made it possible to identify trends around the emergence of individual terms within the literature over time.
These trends can be interpreted by looking at some of the drivers of WoG discussed in Chapter 1. For example, Figure 9 contrasts the prevalence of joined-up government in the literature in comparison to WoG. As expected, joined-up government emerges in advance of WoG and then fades in the middle of the decade.

**Figure 9: WoG vs. joined-up government (# of occurrences in the literature)**
This trend is consistent with the popularization of the term in the United Kingdom around the *Modernising Government* white paper. Eventually, other terms such as the comprehensive approach or integrated approach were adopted to communicate the cross-boundary interaction required in the implementation of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy objectives.

**Consequences**

The final element of the situational analysis is the identification of conceptual consequences: phenomena or events that follow an occurrence of the concept. In other words, what tends to happen when the concept is presented within the literature, when a WoG approach is advanced by a government or when a WoG initiative is launched? Rogers theory of conceptual development expects that the meaning of a concept continues to evolve as it is used. Conceptual evolution therefore emerges as a narrative: a story in which cycles of conceptual development are catalyzed by certain antecedents or drivers that prompt the propagation of the concept through various communities of research and practice. The concept evolves to a certain point, all the while generating observations, critiques, and reflections which result in new recommendations which become the antecedents for the next round of conceptual development. The coding exercise yielded a number of insights into what happens when the WoG concept has been used in research, policy and government programs.

**Calls for clarity**

With a concept associated with a large number of terms, used by so many different actors in so many environments, it is not surprising that some of the consequences in this cluster are related to calls for enhanced clarity and understanding. As has been highlighted throughout this chapter, WoG is expressed using a wide variety
of related terms. The terms lack common definitions, are used somewhat differently by different actors, have different levels of association with different communities of practice, and have evolved over time. “The multiple terms, meanings, and implications are overlapping, elusive, and unclear, leading to inconsistencies in the nomenclature” (O'Leary & Vij, 2012, p. 517). It is not a surprise, therefore, that emerging from the literature are calls by both researchers and practitioners for common terminology. The WoG literature abounds with calls for a common definition or term (Hrychuk, 2009; Caslen Jr. & Loudon, 2011; UK Ministry of Defence, 2006; Desai, 2005) with the hopes that a common understanding might eliminate ambiguity (Halligan, Buick, & O'Flynn, 2011), confusion (Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011) and redundancy (Ortiz, 2008).

A noteworthy theme is around how the fractured understanding of the term actually reinforces the compartmentalized environment that creates the need for WoG to begin with. Despite the pervasive effort to enhance cooperation and collaboration between the broad communities of international security and development, the two communities are thought to possess very different cultures, norms, values and perspectives on the world; hence the ‘inevitable’ conflict or tension that prompts calls for WoG efforts. With this in mind, alternative perceptions around the meaning and understanding of language can be an ongoing source of tension. For example, Civil-Military Cooperation, or CIMIC, is often thought to be misunderstood by civilian actors for whom the term “is perceived as being synonymous with the co-optation of the civil environment by military planners or as the domination of long-term development contexts by the constraints of security policy” (Kasselmann, 2012, p. 19).

A natural consequence of these calls for greater understanding is that the concept begins to evolve. This evolution appears in the literature in two main forms. First, over time we see specific terms, some of which are highly political, adopted and then discarded by both researchers and practitioners as the most effective articulation of the cross-boundary ideal. Various drivers prompt new terms for WoG to be adopted and to gain popularity within various political and administrative circles generally, under the guise of ‘moving beyond’ an earlier term. Such drivers include using terms that are more
inclusive and accurate in portraying the reality of complex environments (Cooper, 2005) or a change in terminology linked to changes in political leadership and direction (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). In Europe practitioners have ‘moved beyond WGA towards a 3C approach’ (Anten, van Beijnum, & Specker, 2009). 3C also ‘moves beyond the earlier 3D concept’ (3C Conference, 2009). Joined-up Government was associated almost exclusively with the Tony Blair government of the UK in the late 1990’s/early 2000’s (Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011). Now the term is obsolete in the United Kingdom, having been replaced broadly by the Comprehensive Approach (Farrell & Gordon, 2009).

The second form of conceptual evolution is the development of greater conceptual meaning and understanding through the process of breaking the concept down into differentiated categories or typologies – i.e., distinguishing between types of WoG. This conceptual disaggregation allows users to better clarify meaning, take account of the context or address critiques that the concept is ‘all things to all people’. Typologies of WoG have been suggested based on “the nature and extent of the power exercised by the partners” (Kernaghan, 1993, p. 62), the various dimensions of joined-up government (internal life, organizational life, delivery of services and vertical accountabilities (Ling, 2002), the underlying perspectives through which WoG can be understood (instrumental, cultural-institutional or myth) (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006) and the levels of coherence that are possible (intra-agency, whole-of-government, interagency, international-local) (de Coning & Friis, 2011).

While these new typologies may help advance the concept, there is no common resource that pulls all of the typologies together for alignment or further exploration. In the absence of such an effort the fields of public administration and and international relations will continue to produce theories and frameworks in their academic silos. Another serious consequence of so many new typologies for WoG is that the overall vocabulary surrounding the concept grows, meaning that there are more terms requiring common definitions. WoG is already burdened with the large number of related terms associated with the concept. In addition, there is variance in the understanding of
collaboration, coordination, harmonization, alignment and other commonly used terms. The advancement of typologies without efforts to clarify foundational attributes of the concept puts at risk the possibility of conducting both meaningful research around the concept and robust evaluation of the concept in practice. Consequently, efforts to align meaning and understanding across the academic disciplines are an important, yet missing step, in the continued advancement of the concept.

*Tension and Increased Fragmentation*

Observations within the literature reveal the possibility that the implementation of WoG approaches can reinforce organizational boundaries and cause actors to protect their organizational *raison d’être* and bureaucratic space (Cooper, 2005). This can be seen notably when multiple departments are brought together at headquarters to formalize WoG definitions, policies and frameworks. Korski (2009) refers to efforts in the UK to bring together core stakeholders to develop principles for the comprehensive approach and the barriers to it put up by the Cabinet Office, a central agency of the UK government that directly supports the efforts of the Prime Minister. This tension between central agencies and line departments is also mentioned in Bakvis and Juillet’s 2004 report on the horizontal challenge.

Korski also notes tensions around choice of analytical tools between the newly developed SU tasked with a cross-departmental mandate, and its parent departments. This theme is developed in more detail by Bensahel (2008) who also notes the resistance facing those new units designed for the promotion of interagency coordination. Much of the resistance came from the very departments the new units were intended to coordinate. “The greater the mandate these offices possess, the more likely they are to provoke resistance from agencies that view them as intruding on their turf and interfering with their mission” (p. 6). This need to protect one’s organizational purpose or space can be fueled if a perception exists that one department or unit is attempting to take over the primary area of expertise of another unit (Hrychuk, 2009; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009, 2009).
Another tension that results from WoG is anchored in long-standing cultural and philosophical differences between the military, development agencies and humanitarian actors (Wright, 2005; Smith, 2008; Peabody, 2006). While the necessity of greater coordination or collaboration between actors may be conceded, tension persists concerning how that coordination is manifested; in other words, who delivers humanitarian aid in conflict and post-conflict zones, who leads the exercises, and who is involved in decision making processes. Another source of tension between the security and development communities continues to be the challenge of reconciling the significantly different time horizons that guide their work (Patrick & Brown, 2007). For example, time horizons for a defence department could on the scale of several months (whatever is necessary to complete the objectives of the mission) whereas the time horizons of development actors could be on the scale of decades or generations.

In many cases these tensions may be counterproductive, contributing to increased fragmentation between individuals, groups and communities of practice. The authors who identify this concern in their writing are not necessarily saying that WoG should be discarded because it fosters the very environment it seeks to improve, but that practitioners should be aware that the implementation of WoG may result in tension and reinforced territories and that this should be addressed by strong leadership and management. The biggest issues at play appear to be the possibility that WoG can increase competition between departments for ‘policy ownership and access to resources’ (Travers & Owen, 2008, p. 686) and that (as in the case of Canada’s approach to fragile states) WoG policies actually “…glossed over departmental cultural divides and autonomous practices and gave the appearance of common cause and coordination…allowing departments to maintain, and even strengthen, their autonomy as well as bound and protect their fiefdoms” (Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009, p. 660). Finally, it has been observed that WoG actually risks highlighting and reinforcing distinct communities especially when the concept is used to articulate a coordination or cooperation model which involves a ‘lead’ agency as opposed to a more comprehensive integrative approach (Desai, 2005).
On one hand, the tension and dysfunction between actors is often presented as inevitable; therefore systems and frameworks should be developed that create space for the tension (Vincent, 1999) (Ryan & Walsh, 2004) instead of assuming that it can be eliminated through relationship management or common purpose. Conversely, the tension observed as a consequence of WoG has been helpful in the continued conceptualization of strategies and frameworks for implementation. Some articles present the resulting tension as a source of insight into how WoG approaches can be improved or fine-tuned. For example, Peters (1998) looked at a Canadian program review and observed that,

*The general experience has been that organizations that were closest together ideologically and that provided similar types of service were the most difficult to co-ordinate. They tend to fight over the same policy (and budgetary) turf, while more diverse organizations have found co-operation less threatening (p. 304).*

Other lessons learned from the tension that results from WoG include the importance of transparency in building confidence and trust between departments and organizations (NATO, 2003) and the importance of counterparts or formal liaison positions to enhance cross-department communication (Drechsler, 2005). Finally, Shemella (2006) presents the tension as a positive consequence of WoG due to its ability to generate opposing recommendations and ideas, providing decision-makers with a more diverse range of options: “Governments that have learned to harness the power of competition can make interagency coordination work for them” (p. 451).

**Question of universality (one-size-does-not-fit-all)**

The one-size-does-not-fit-all consequence refers to the warning issued in many articles that WoG can and should look different in different environments; that there is no universal model for implementing the concept (O'Leary & Vij, 2012; van de Goor & Major, 2012). Thus, context is crucial. While the mandate of such a concept has tremendous value, the collective “we” must be cautious about conceptualizing a rigid understanding, definition or framework based on experiences in a single environment –
for example, Afghanistan – and believing that the same approach will work in the next peacebuilding, stabilization or reconstruction effort. The 1996 Canadian Task Force on Horizontal Issues speaks of degrees of horizontality and interdependence. Similarly, de Coning (2011) observes,

*The level of coherence achievable in one situation will not necessarily be achievable in the next one, where another type of coherence may be more appropriate. Coherence needs to be managed on a case-by-case basis, and the comprehensive approach concept should be flexible enough to provide for a range of possible levels of coherence, where different actors can engage in varying degrees of coherence, based on their own interests and changing circumstances over time* (p. 271).

Occasions or contexts in which WoG may not be the universal choice include circumstances in which competing objectives between actors are so irreconcilable that meaningful collaboration is impossible (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), where the risks or costs of WoG, such as prolonged decision-making timeframes or group think, outweigh the potential benefit of the concept (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001); or where WoG might spark competition instead of collaboration (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004). This consequence comes with calls for taking a different look at WoG. Vincent (1999) argues the concept is more ‘art than science’ (p. 51) meaning that practitioners looking to implement or manage WoG in any context must possess skills that allow them to foster creativity in complex teams and reward flexibility in structured environments. Finally, this consequence implies that WoG is not always the answer; that there are some situations and contexts that are better served with more traditional or alternative approaches (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006).

**Jargon and Politicization**

The literature reflects the observation that the concept has become heavily politicized by individuals and groups who wish to be identified with its positive attributes. The concept has been described as a fad (O'Flynn, 2009), as window dressing (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006), as a feel-good idea (Wright, 2005) and as empty jargon (Vincent, 1999) with little meaning and minimal understanding among the general public.
There is a tendency for new governments to change the term they use in reference to cross-departmental collaboration and to present the new term as a better version of the previous one without actually defining the old or new terms in any way that allows understanding on the part of people and groups outside of government. An often referenced example comes from Canada where the Liberal government of Paul Martin initially advanced the term ‘3D’ to articulate its desire for enhanced coherence across internationally focused ministries. In 2005 when a new Conservative government took office under the leadership of Prime Minster Stephen Harper, ‘3D’ was eliminated from the government vocabulary and was replaced by WoG – a term being advanced by the OECD (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). The general meaning and intention behind the terms was the same. This institutional change is evident even in the temporal data for this concept analysis. As noted in Figure 7, ‘3D’ is present in the literature towards the mid-aughts but virtually disappears soon after 2005.

The terms, and therefore the concept, have been heavily associated with a number of post-9/11 events such as conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and international responses to natural disasters in Haiti and chronic instability in Sudan. As a result, it has been far too easy to muddy the general understanding behind the use of WoG, and to question its effectiveness as a guide to policy and programming. Travers and Owen (2008) examine Canada’s integrated approach in Afghanistan and state, “Critics have characterized the policy as an empty vessel or a convenient repackaging of old practices” (p. 686). The authors highlight the dangers of empty rhetoric, which “...takes up policy space, distracts attention from other challenges, and discourages clear thinking” (p. 701; see also Hrychuk, 2009). Desrosiers & Lagassé (2009) also examines the Canadian experience with WoG, observing that the major players such as DFAIT and DND were able to adapt to the novel image of unity presented by the federal government, but were still able to keep largely to themselves and compromise very little of their core mission to the WoG mandate. In general, the accusation that the concept is empty of true meaning erodes its legitimacy as a feasible approach to complex issues or a viable means of developing and
implementing policy.

**Securitization of humanitarian space**

For communities struggling with both violent conflict and extreme poverty, WoG refers to cross-boundary efforts intended to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the protection of human life which often involves both the distribution of humanitarian assistance and the capabilities and resources of armed forces. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are impassioned feelings around what role, if any, the armed forces have to play in principled humanitarian action. From this perspective, WoG can be seen as a vehicle for advancing or empowering the role of the military and therefore a consequence of WoG is securitization of the humanitarian space. Under the securitization umbrella is the concern that military involvement in humanitarian activities jeopardizes the humanitarian aid agency’s ability to be viewed as neutral, impartial and non-political, thereby endangering both the humanitarian effort and possibly the safety of humanitarian workers (Egnell, 2008; Korski, 2009; Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Peabody, 2006). Additionally there is a concern that the development community’s fundamental goal of poverty alleviation will become secondary to the imperative of short-term security priorities (Patrick & Brown, 2007). A final concern attributed to the securitization of the humanitarian space is that ODA is being appropriated for non-development activities related to stabilization and reconstruction which are undertaken in the name of WoG (Picciotto, 2004).

**New Organizational Structures**

A consequence of the calls for cross-boundary interaction within both the academic literature and multiple white papers and reports published by governments and international organizations throughout the early 2000s was the development of several new, formal bureaucratic structures in countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement introduced a new headquarter (Ottawa) – based coordinating body – the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) (Canada 2005) -while prolonged conflict in Afghanistan throughout the same decade yielded additional coordinating mechanisms
intended to improve cross-government coherence, such as the Parliamentary Committee on Afghanistan (PCOA) (Buchan 2010) and the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) (Canada, 2008).

In addition to new organizational structures and units devoted to the coordination of WoG initiatives, the literature also makes a case that the study and practice of WoG has yielded a long list of innovative recommendations and solutions to the challenges inherent in cross-boundary efforts. New strategies, new training projects like Common Effort – a civil-military training exercise aimed at improving cooperation amongst actors (van de Goor, 2012) – common training and guidepost manuals (Franke V., 2006), and integrated approaches to budgeting for national security (Brook, 2012) are just a few of the recommendations that result from efforts to move WoG from a theory to practice. A notable example of an innovative recommendation was developed in a 2010 white paper and further advanced by Caslen and Loudon (2011) who, writing from the perspective of the American venture with WoG, discuss the potential merits and value of an Interagency University.

Gradduates would serve as a synchronizing element and enabling influence for future inter-agency training, educational, and operational efforts. These agile and adaptive leaders would be able to leverage all the instruments of national power in a precise and effective manner, unencumbered by organizational agendas and bias. This cadre of elite, multifaceted strategic thinkers would serve as a foundation in the Nation’s quest to achieve a truly collaborative and cooperative whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations (p. 12).

The advancement of the concept has yielded a great deal of thinking around the very pressing question of how to realize a WoG initiative while honouring the long-standing principle of vertical authority in government departments (Wilkins, 2002) (Fitzpatrick, 2000) (Andersson & Liff, 2012) (Christensen, Fimreite, & Laegreid, 2007) (Michels & Meijer, 2008) (Sproule-Jones, 2000).
Imbalance at the decision-making table

This consequence refers to the tendency for dialogue around WoG to result in discussions and debate around how leadership, funding, representation and, most importantly, decision-making authority, manifest within a WoG environment. At a fundamental level the question becomes who is contributing the most money, who is taking the most risk and what does this mean for who has a seat or a voice at the decision-making table? The result is an imbalance or perceived imbalance between key actors (Travers & Owen, 2008; Smith, 2008) which can jeopardize relationships and overall outcomes. Perceptions and commentary around power, power-sharing, and a sense of inequality or marginalization amongst actors in a so-called partnership all appeared as consequences of WoG practices (Barth Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005; Desai, 2005).

The question of representation at the decision making or policy making tables in WoG initiatives can be a crucial issue with respect to balance (Bensahel, 2007). WoG can be used by politicians and public servants as a reassuring approach to stakeholders indicating that every effort is being made to take a holistic approach to an issue; that everyone’s concern and values will be heard around a table. Under this guise, the experience of WoG can be even more disappointing when actors are invited to the table only to be informed (explicitly or tacitly) that their perspective is important but other priorities will drive the decision making process. This theme emerges from analysis of Canada’s 3D approaches in both Haiti (Thompson, 2005) and Afghanistan (Hrychuk, 2009). There is a sense that a WoG mandate or initiative can bring actors to the table with different priorities, but does not provide a clear means for reconciling conflicting priorities.

Striking the right balance requires a structured process for assessing the sources of fragility, weighing the relative interests at stake, and determining how to sequence interventions. Such an outcome is less likely if there are gross asymmetries in the policy influence and resources of the relevant departments—as in the United States, where the massive resources of the Department of Defense cast a large shadow over policy, and where the national development agency lacks independence and is
thus a beleaguered and marginal player (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 129 & 130).

Notably, the literature contains the perspective that to achieve success with WoG mandates some level of imbalance is required; in fact, it is necessary for one actor or group to dominate within a cooperative or collaborative initiative in order for the initiative to realize successful outcomes (Andersson & Liff, 2012). This theme appears most often in articles that examine shared responsibility and accountability more broadly and not in articles that were looking at WoG through the lens of the security-development nexus – although the OECD report does indicate that some kind of leadership or authority in coordination ventures is necessary to ensure decisions get made in a timely way.

Finally, imbalance also appears as an issue with respect to the contribution of funds and resources to a WoG initiative. Does the size of financial contribution determine the influence an actor or unit brings to the decision-making table? The 2006 OECD Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States specifically flags some concerns around the possibility that overarching development priorities, including the nuances of ODA eligibility, can differ greatly from more short-term stabilization and reconstruction priorities. Additionally, the management of shared funds can require an alignment of procedures, protocols, reporting requirements and financial systems that simply does not exist across government departments.

**Disconnect between theory and practice**

Given the already identified consequence of the need for conceptual clarity, it should not be a surprise that among authors examining WoG in practice, there are observations of a disconnect between the theoretical conceptualization and practical implementation (Patrick & Brown, 2007; Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011; Travers & Owen, 2008; van de Goor, 2012). Likely some of this disconnect can be attributed to unclear and inconsistently used terms. Another possibility is that for those practitioners working on the ground in conflict zones there are numerous ad hoc methods for coordinating with actors from various groups – methods that have been implemented
for decades. In this context, the idea of a formalized WoG approach is easily dismissed as another example of headquarters being disconnected from the field.

Due in part to the prolific and political nature of some global issues with which WoG is associated, practitioners have begun crafting documents and strategies to provide more substance and guidance to WoG initiatives. At the UN, doctrine has been developed that explains “peace operations as an integrated activity well beyond the sole deployment of military forces” (Smith, 2008, p. 246). Similarly, the 2005 national security presidential directive, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, was considered a great success for providing guidance to the interagency process although ambiguities still exist with respect to “chain of command and guidelines for transitioning from military-led to civilian-led operations” (Bensahel, 2007, p. 47). In Canada guides such as Managing Collaborative Arrangements: A guide for Regional Managers have been produced to support efforts at horizontal management (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004).

More tangible disconnects relate to the information technology systems and other institutional systems and processes that are core components of any projects undertaken by actors in a WoG initiative. To this point, Korski (2009) examines the UK experience with civil-military integration and comments on the fact that different government departments use different computer systems which means they “can only transfer classified documents inter-departmentally with the greatest difficulty” (p. 20).

**Challenges with Assessment and Evaluation**

A final consequence of WoG in practice is that in many cases the actors involved do not share the same processes and systems for assessing and evaluating programs and initiatives. With high-profile, high-budget efforts it is absolutely expected that robust assessment of impact and success is taking place. For initiatives in which multiple actors are involved, with potentially different expectations around what success will look like, assessment can be a complicated and challenging exercise. A look into the work of the UK’s SU revealed extensive efforts on the part of the SU team to design cross-
departmental assessments, only to have these rejected by a parent department who chose to continue using their own assessment tools. (Korski, 2009).

Beyond the standard expectations for measuring final impact, there is also the challenge of determining how to evaluate WoG processes – for example, how to measure an elusive attribute such as coherence amongst actors. What metrics or indicators can be developed to ascertain whether the outputs or impacts of a WoG initiative were more successful or efficient than a more traditional single-department effort (Olson & Gregorian, 2007)? In addition to the issue of program assessment and evaluation is the imperative of reporting the results of assessment, especially for government departments and agencies. Without established guidelines for joint or shared reporting responsibilities, WoG programs “may suffer from the stigma of non-transparency in the discharge of their accountability obligations” (Ryan & Walsh, 2004, p. 269). Consequently, recommendations for integrated annual reports (Canada, 2005) emerge within the literature.
Implications

The purpose of this chapter was to clarify how WoG is understood and described by those who reference the concept in both academic research and grey literature with the intent of establishing a comprehensive set of core conceptual attributes woven together from the key fields of study: international studies, public administration and military studies. Consistent with Roger’s evolutionary method, a single concrete definition of the concept was not developed. However, the core attributes of the concept have been captured and presented within their situational context (see Figure 10) in order to present a clear, conceptual understanding that can form the foundation of the broader research agenda. Additionally, it is my hope that this conceptual model can also make its own contribution to the study and practice of WoG by presenting an understanding of WoG that may be accessible to multiple disciplines.
Figure 10: WoG conceptual analysis – attributes presented within their situational contexts.

Antecedents

Noted in Chapter 1 as drivers of ‘whole-of-government’:

General:
Globalization, changing economic/ political/social systems, enhanced information and communication technologies, prevalence and impact of complex/wicked problems

Public Administration Drivers:
Consequences of New Public Management (NPM) reforms: fragmentation, structural devolution, departmentalism, economic focus

Renewed focus on cross-boundary efforts (Canada Horizontal, UK-joined-up Government, Australia’s Whole-of-Government, EU-Interagency and Collaborative Public Mgmt)

Security/Development Drivers:
First Wave (1990s) – prevalence and impact of interstate conflict, human security agenda, crises in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans

Second Wave (2000s) – millennium development goals, global terrorism and the war on terror, dynamics of international peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, the security-development nexus, conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan

Attributes

‘Whole-of-government’ as a statement of purpose:
Public Interest, Optimization, Shared/ Common Goal, Coherence & Harmonization

‘Whole-of-government’ as an adjective:
Holistic, Flexible, Political, Resource Intensive, Purposeful

‘Whole-of-government’ as a form of interaction with varying levels of intensity:
Cooperation, Coordination, Collaboration, Integration, Informal vs. Formal

Whole of Government as a complex system
Policy and Programming Cycle superimposed on stages of the Peace & Conflict System

Consequences

Language and Meaning
Emergence of benchmarks and indicators
Emergence of typologies
New structures (HQ and Field)
Reinforcement of organizational boundaries
Tension and increased fragmentation
Calls for clarity/understanding in language and meaning

Politicalization of the associated terms
Reflection on ability of concept to inform policy (excessively context-dependent)

Concept becomes an issue within the security-development nexus, a driver for the securitization of development

Disconnect between theory and practice

Challenges around expectation management; distribution of decision making authorities
Going forward there are a number of the implications gleaned from the concept analysis. First, currently there is no consensus around a single definition or common understanding of the concept within and across academic disciplines and communities of practice. While some definitions, such as the one offered by the OECD, are more commonly referenced by the international studies communities, they have no place within the public administration literature. Similarly, some of the generic terms for the concept such as ‘horizontality’, appear to have more longevity in the literature and are less bogged down in politics and jargon. The term makes reference to many of the key attributes of WoG (purposeful, flexible, holistic, etc.) and therefore, it may have much to offer with respect to advancing a common understanding of WoG. Still, it has been so poorly adopted by researchers and actors outside of public administration that it is difficult to picture the term emerging as a champion of the cross-boundary concept within the security-development communities.

Perhaps the most compelling indication that the concept is not at the apex of its development is the identification of the more dynamic attributes (form of interaction, systemic dimensions) and their ability to muddy the waters of conceptual meaning. WoG can manifest itself in many different ways – from a weekly interdepartmental phone call to an institutionalized taskforce; from an initiative focused on stabilization to longer-term development policy; from an attempt at cooperation to full integration. All of these states of being exist within the WoG concept. From an evolutionary perspective, one would expect that researchers may develop and strengthen a series of typologies that would break the concept down into sub-elements. To date, however, none of the typologies noted within the literature have been able to reconcile a shared understanding. This is due in part to the strong disciplinary approaches applied to the typology development. Another option may be to develop a model or matrix in which WoG exists along a number of spectrums or dimensions. This might allow researchers and practitioners to identify and thereby clarify which point(s) on each spectrum best represents the concept as it is being studied or used. From a cross-disciplinary, comprehensive matrix of
attributes, it may be possible to better establish expectations around WoG within specific contexts and therefore further develop critical success factors or key performance indicators. Without some consensus on a shared understanding or an agreed upon variance of meaning, it is almost impossible to measure, evaluate or capture lessons learned from WoG efforts.

Additionally, as noted earlier, there is a significant disconnect in understanding between the contributing bodies of literature. This analysis attempts to synthesize the disciplinary contributions in an effort to capture a broad articulation of conceptual attributes. The public administration literature holds insights into the mechanics (the ‘how’) of WoG; however, very little of this richness translates specifically to the international security and development environment. While there are many transferable themes and strategies, they do need to be explored and contextualized to an environment that is not just looking for a level of collaboration between government line departments, but also between line departments and military bodies based on very different cultures, structures and norms. In contrast, the international relations literature provides a strong foundation for considering why WoG is so valuable to working in complex environments; however, there is little exploration of mechanics. The military studies literature is vast and has some insights to offer; however, civil-military relations is an all-encompassing term of its own with only a small portion relevant to the WoG discourse. Overall, it can be argued that the disconnect that exists between public administration literature and international relations literature is a key factor that limits the conceptual development of WoG. Going forward it is important to ascertain what insights from public administration can be relevant to improving WoG efforts and, conversely, how international context influences or alters theories developed with domestic issues in mind.

Another implication from the concept analysis is the ever present theme that there is a strong political element to WoG. This feature is present within the attributes of the concept but also within the antecedents and consequences that were identified. The politicization of the concept, specifically within the context of international security and development issues, is likely related in large part to the prolific and, at times,
controversial, characteristics of the international security environment. Mobilizing armed forces, conducting military campaigns in sovereign states, conflicting values and norms around how best to fight global terrorism and focusing on the needs of other states while one’s domestic interests (economy, health, education) demand attention are just some of the aspects of the environment that colour any discourse around cross-boundary, interdepartmental efforts. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile across actors and stakeholders what the desired outcome should be in contexts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, DRC, or Syria, to name a few. While WoG has been articulated as a concept that can bring key stakeholders together, it is not a panacea for resolving differing images on how the world should work. It was noted by Rodgers early in this chapter that the more significant a term the more often it is used and the more quickly it might change with respect to understanding. Given that the concept is politically significant within a number of different environments, it is changing as often as governments arrive and depart from the political scene, as the concept becomes associated with one international initiative and then another. Sometimes the terms of reference changes and the overall meaning stays the same; sometimes the terms of reference remain the same but the associated meaning begins to alter. Consequently, researchers and practitioners are dealing with a somewhat dynamic concept which prevents consensus from building around a collective understanding of the term.

Given the fractured understanding of the concept and its political volatility to date, researchers and practitioners should take the time to clarify their understanding of the concept in advance of presenting findings, results or proposing new initiatives. There is a diversity of perspectives around this concept and it cannot be assumed that a common understanding of the concept will prevail. Providing an understanding that will frame an analysis may make it more possible to compare efforts, conduct comparative analyses and perhaps better enhance our abilities to share lessons learned in a way that observations and conclusions, while context-specific, can be leveraged in a meaningful way to improve future efforts.
Within the bigger picture of the proposed research, the exercise undertaken in this chapter has framed the discourse that will follow in a comprehensive, interdisciplinary understanding of WoG that reflects the nuances of cross-boundary interaction within the security-development sphere. Going forward, the identification of the operational attributes of WoG (Chapter 4), the multiple-case study (Chapters 5-7) and final conclusions will all be framed within the conceptual understanding of WoG developed in this chapter and in doing so provide clarity of scope and purpose to the overall research agenda.
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework – Operational Attributes of WoG

Previous chapters have explored the conceptual development of WoG across a number of disciplines. Why the concept gained such resonance within the policy, programming and military communities in recent years was established in the introduction and the core conceptual attributes were identified in Chapter 3. In addition to establishing why the concept is important and to whom, there is also the critical question of how the concept might be realized in practice within the policy and programming environments; how does WoG work? The answer to this question lies in a comprehensive exploration of the operational attributes of the concept. They should not be confused with the conceptual attributes presented in the previous chapter. Whereas the conceptual attributes represent the core features of how a concept is understood, the operational attributes represent those elements of organizations, management and governance that are vital to operationalizing WoG. Discussed often as barriers to cross-boundary interaction, and the means to overcome them, these operational attributes can also behave as critical points of influence where, if altered or changed, they could enhance the ability of leaders and managers to facilitate collaboration across organizational silos.

As does Chapter 3, this chapter serves the joint purpose of integrating multiple disciplinary perspectives and developing theory that can inform the multiple-case study analysis that follows. What, according to the existing literature, are the primary organizational barriers to achieving WoG? What incentives can be mobilized to accelerate adoption of WoG approaches? What operational attributes are most impervious to change, and which are most open to influence, innovation and change? These questions are at the core of the broader research agenda and answering them begins here with an effort to produce a preliminary, literature-based framework that highlights the major organizational considerations that must be considered when designing, launching and managing a WoG team or project. This theoretical model will then be refined and modified in light of insights captured from Canadian and British public servants in the
individual case studies (Chapters 5 and 6) and the cross-case synthesis (Chapter 7).

**Attribute Cluster #1: Organizational Structure**

Some of the most important considerations when designing and implementing WoG initiatives pertain to elements of organizational structure which can be understood as “the sum total of the ways in which its labour is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 2). In the case of this research the dynamics of organizational structure are complicated by the inherent challenges associated with the size, scale and conflicting mandates of the line departments and central agencies that make up a national government. WoG initiatives are designed with the objectives of leveraging a holistic, cross-boundary perspective on the issues at hand (Andersson & Liff, 2012); however, the structural attributes of a single national government present some significant barriers to achieving this objective.

Sociologist Randall Collins (1988) made a case for being able to apply principles of organizational theory to public policy, an approach that is applied throughout this chapter. Collins presented government agencies as both single organizations linked together by a common mandate and sub-units of a larger organization. With this in mind, an exploration of the structural attributes of WoG must first be contextualized so as to confirm the primary organization being discussed. Line departments and central agencies can each employ thousands of individuals, hold responsibility for a vast assortment of mandates and manage departmental budgets in the billions of dollars. From this perspective, it would be possible and entirely appropriate to explore issues of coordination simply within the departmental unit. However, for the purpose of this chapter the primary or parent organization is the national or federal government as a whole and the coordination to be achieved is across the various departmental and agency boundaries. In addition to line departments and central agencies, another key sub-unit under the umbrella of a national government is the state military (both its civilian and military branches). This inclusion adds another layer of complexity to the understanding
of the organization and application of organizational theory. Within the armed forces or departments of defence, the language of authority and supervision is articulated as a ‘chain of command’ which presents itself vertically and so, in that way, is similar to the structure of other line departments. Attributes examined under the heading of organizational structure will include: accountability, organizational design or architecture (where a WoG initiative is situated within the government’s organizational structure) within the context of a Westminster political system, institutional governance, and funding and resources.

**Accountability**

A key attribute to be considered when operationalizing WoG is the issue of accountability (specifically ministerial accountability), which is at the core of why the federal government structure is so very inflexible to change and consequently why WoG is such a difficult approach to adopt (Kettl, 2006; Young, 2008; Johnson, 2005; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004). The profound tension between horizontal imperatives and vertical accountabilities are noted frequently within the literature as a key barrier to WoG (Ojo, 2011; Australian Public Service Commission, 2007; Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid, 2007). Additionally, “the need to reconcile individual accountability with a collective sense of purpose and responsibility is one of the most significant tensions to be resolved in the management of a horizontal initiative” (Hopkins, Couture and Moore, 2001, p. 19).

Ministerial accountability might vary somewhat across government systems; however, a fundamental principle in Westminster government structures is that accountability for decision making and reporting within an individual department moves up along a vertical hierarchy to the senior public servants. In Canada these senior public servants are the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) and the Deputy Minister (DM). Above the DM in the hierarchy is the federal minister (also a Member of Parliament and therefore a politically elected official) who has the ultimate accountability for the decisions of his/her department. The federal minister is accountable to Parliament for the decisions, actions and financial management of his/her department (Fitzpatrick, 2000). In this sense, ministerial accountability is a crucial element of the democratic process.
Ministers, who also form a government’s Cabinet or executive office, are recommended for their position by the Prime Minister, to whom they are also accountable (Attorney General of Canada, 2005). Complicating matters is the issue that the minister’s dual roles as both an organizational leader of powerful sub-units of government and an elected public official do not always align in a way that favours WoG. In most cases personal pride and career advancement for ministers is much more easily attained via departmental achievements than horizontal efforts (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001; Sing, 2010). When it comes to horizontal initiatives it is less clear which minister will get to make an announcement about new funding, who will speak to the press and who will get attributed with program success – important considerations in political careers.

At the core of any discussion around horizontal accountability within and between government departments is the question of ‘who needs to be involved?’ The number of necessary partners at any given point in time, their relative positions of power and influence within the government, the personalities of individuals within each unit, any legal considerations that exist within the established mandate of each unit, the financial contribution of each unit to the project and the ease with which resources (financial and otherwise) can be made available are just a sample of the issues for consideration once the necessary partners are determined. Within the context of dealing with issues emerging from the security-development nexus such as terrorism, state fragility, peacebuilding, stabilization and the securitization of humanitarian aid, one of the partners that must be involved in the partnership to some degree is the security branch of the government. The security element is most often represented by a department or ministry of defence which reports to parliament on behalf of both its civilian and military components, the latter of which is generally the comparatively powerful armed forces. The alignment of civilian reporting lines with the chain of command present in the armed forces is a barrier in every way – organizationally, legally and culturally. In a 2009 report by Joint Task Force Afghanistan that examined the application of WoG within the context of Canadian efforts in Afghanistan, it was observed that military personnel often perceive civilian lines of authority as unclear (p. 4); and that the clarity of command and control in the armed
forces makes it almost impossible to share accountability on individual objectives. This nuanced form of WoG has made it difficult to apply lessons learned from those WoG experiences focused on education, health and climate change, for example – all of which can be conducted without including the military element. Can a shared accountability framework be designed for such a situation or does WoG accountability have to look a bit different when the military is involved?

Despite the profound challenge presented by ministerial accountability, strategies for overcoming this barrier are present in the literature (Sproule-Jones, 2000). There is space in the Westminster system for horizontal collaboration; however, “the relationship between the accountable parties and the forum to which account is rendered must be plain” (Michels & Meijer, 2008, p. 170). With this core recommendation in place several governments have looked to new approaches for establishing accountability for collaborative efforts. In Australia important legislation has been amended to “allow for the creation of new agencies, working to (for) ministers, to carry out functions not suitable for a single department” (Management Advisory Committee, 2004, p. 20). These ‘frontier’ agencies tend to focus on problems that cross departmental boundaries but they are led by ministers whose sole focus is the integrated nature of the work being done, as opposed to more traditional line departments that might have one or two WoG initiatives within their unit, but are still managing a much broader departmental mandate that does not always align with the few specific WoG projects. In the United Kingdom, a tri-departmental Public Service Agreement (PSA) between the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID) established clear aims, objectives, performance targets, a strategy for ‘value for money’ and a statement of who is responsible for the delivery of each target (Talbot, 2010). Regardless of whether or not a new agency is developed with a cross-departmental focus and a WoG mandate or traditional departments are tasked to take on a WoG initiative, it is crucial that the following information is both clear and formalized for all stakeholders: who makes decisions, how are decisions made, who is accountable
(and to whom), how are group members accountable to each other and what reporting requirements are necessary (Johnson, 2005)?

WoG or more general joint accountability frameworks denoting decision making processes and reporting protocols must be established early in the formation of a WoG initiative. The imperative in the literature is first, to ensure that such frameworks exist (Ross et al., 2011; Young 2008) and second, to make the frameworks as clear and specific as possible (Hrychuk, 2009; Joint Task Force Afghanistan, 2009; Pollitt, 2003) while still allowing for a certain flexibility or agility to exist within the framework both of which are necessary when dealing with complex, cross-cutting, multi-interest, multi-stakeholder problems that characterize the security-development nexus. Such frameworks must also take into consideration the organizational design and individual assignment of responsibilities that exist in all participating departments. In an exploration of the US interagency process during the Iraq war in the early 2000s, Donald Drechsler (2005), observed that the lack of counterparts across the key departments had a major impact on the ability of the government to achieve inter-departmental cohesion. Without counterparts it can be difficult to ascertain at a practical level how coordination, collaboration or even information sharing can take place. In their 2009 article exploring the UK’s ‘comprehensive approach’ efforts in Helmand province, Afghanistan, Farrell and Gordon (2009) commented on the major differences in opinion around what role the military expected the development teams to take on, and vice versa. While these differences with respect to expectations of the ‘other’ are strongly related to issues of organizational culture (which is discussed later in this chapter), they are also part of the discussion around accountability, roles and responsibility. This impediment of unclear roles and expectations is a common theme throughout the literature (Auditor General of Canada, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Mason & Lanz, 2009; Management Advisory Committee, 2004).

Accountability frameworks that expect to facilitate WoG must be built in such a way that they proactively address the question of who is responsible to whom, who is responsible for what, how decisions are made and how fundamental differences will be
resolved. Horizontal, networked or joint accountability frameworks must not only clarify primary responsibility at the ministerial level, but also consider the assignment of responsibility at the various policy and programming stages of any security, humanitarian or longer term development activity. In addition to describing how accountability is distributed and managed across an initiative, the framework should also articulate a shared vision of what the initiative is intended to accomplish (Crisis Management Initiative, 2008; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; Auditor General, 2000). Moreover, it should be clear how success or impact will be evaluated. Success for whom is a critical question to consider in the conceptualization of a shared purpose. While this research considers WoG largely within the context of coordination and collaboration across government departments, a vast network of stakeholders are connected to said departments. Most notably would communities, organizations and individuals in country whose gauge for success could be significantly different than success in national capitals such as Ottawa or London. Establishing a comprehensive, agreed-upon understanding of the shared purpose from the outset can help navigate more challenging cross-department dynamics that arise at a later date (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001).

Organizational Design

The guiding principle that authority and responsibility sit along a vertical and linear chain, influences the design of public sector organizations, the assignment of roles and responsibilities and the choice and implementation of key technologies related to information management, budgeting, and program evaluation that facilitate the work of government units. The elements of organizational design include sub-units and teams of people who work on various tasks, all of which contribute back to achieving the overall objectives of the organization. The design of the organization also determines the chain of command or reporting structure which assigns responsibilities and accountability to individuals and roles. These reporting structures can be vertical in nature with a team leader reporting to a senior supervisor who reports to a more senior supervisor (and so on along a series of hierarchical levels) or more flat (horizontal) in nature), with only layer of reporting. Anand and Daft describe five design principles to the horizontal structure:
First, organize around complete workflow processes rather than tasks. Second, diminish hierarchical differences and use teams to carry out the work. Third, appoint process team leaders to manage internal team processes in addition to coordinating the work. Fourth, allow team members to interact with customers and suppliers directly, so as to adapt and respond quickly if required. Finally, provide required expertise from the outside as and when required. (2007, p.332)

The design of an organization, in many ways, establishes points of fragmentation or organizational divides in which one sub-group can work ineffectively, competitively or at cross-purposes with other groups. Complex organizations with multiple mandates and objectives which can only be achieved by bringing together a diverse assortment of personalities, skills, interests, values and leadership styles are at greater risk of fragmentation between sub-units. This risk is compounded when teams from multiple organizations are asked to coordinate efforts to ensure efficiencies, coherence and the achievement of policy or programming objectives. This challenging coordination scenario is well-documented in the efforts of modern nation-state government systems which are characterized by both significant organizational complexity and institutional fragmentation (Kettl, 2003).

Under the umbrella of organizational design are a number of key issues to consider. First is the consistent observation from both academics and practitioners that when it comes to discerning how to design a WoG initiative leaders and managers should be driven by the idea that ‘form follows function’. In other words, the same approach, logic and organizational design principles will not work in every situation. The 2005 UN Report on Integrated Missions – Practical Perspectives and Recommendations’ argues that ‘overarching objectives the mission is supposed to achieve and the activities need to get there should determine the structure’ (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005, p. 4). The report also posits that the design of integrated missions should include the consideration that not every aspect of the coordinated effort needs to be integrated; that, in fact, integration can happen where required but not demand that complex, rigidly structured units collapse completely into a flat structure. The stage of the program or policy life cycle is also a consideration (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001). Political,
historical, economic and other contextual attributes of the policy and programming environments would also vary greatly from one situation to the next. Similarly, a 2004 report issued by the Government of Australia entitled *Connecting Government. Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges* states that, “The choice of structure depends on the task. Which of these structures is used will depend very much on the nature of the task, its urgency, priority, level of contention and difficulty, as well as the resources available.” (pg. 25) These observations speak to the need for either a commitment to re-design the structure of WoG initiatives with each iteration or, at minimum, a modicum of adaptability on the part of both the organization and the individuals working within it. This adaptability or organizational agility can never be assumed when discussing horizontal efforts within a Westminster government where redesigning a line department or a number of line departments in order to enhance collaborative opportunities does not only require buy-in from senior public servants and politicians but also has to be authorized by Parliament.

The second point of consideration related to organizational design are the merits and challenges associated with those units within governmental structures established with the dedicated purpose of facilitating coordination and collaboration between departments and agencies. Liaison positions, task forces, standing committees and integrating managers all represent opportunities to either ensure relevant information passes across vertical lines of the organization or to carve out a space within functional or product organization that brings together employees and managers from different vertical branches (Mintzberg, 1979).

One common liaison device used within governments is the *lead department*; a mechanism for addressing both the communication barriers presented by the organizational structure and the imperative of accountability which is critical to public sector organizations. In the Canadian context the Auditor General of Canada proposed a framework for collaborative arrangements that suggests a lead department be identified and that as lead it should be responsible for ensuring that issues are “managed in a way that meets the partners’ objectives and obligations” (Ryan & Walsh, 2004, p. 623). A lead
department structure may be able to bridge the gap between vertical management and horizontal collaboration; however, there is an ever present concern of stakeholders that the optics of a lead agency model are such that one unit and their respective priorities are perceived to hold power over the partner organizations (Travers & Owen, 2008; Hrychuk, 2009) – i.e., power to spend money and to make decisions. When there is already a cultural gulf between units, such as is typically the case between development practitioners and the armed forces, having a perceived disparity in control and influence does not work to bring stakeholders together in a collaborative process. If you look at solely the organizational structures of the three primary Canadian departments that work in post-conflict environments there are several nuances of the lead department model that play out in complex ways. Often times the lead department in a WoG initiative is largely a product of the structural capabilities of the units and the external context in which the units are found. For example, it is almost impossible to picture any scenario in which a development agency, a diplomatic unit or any other civilian unit for that matter can deploy resources as quickly or efficiently as a Department of Defence. Similarly, armed forces are able to tolerate a much higher degree of risk when it comes to its members being in harm’s way. These abilities are critical to working in the wake of violent conflict and natural disasters. Defence departments often end up in a formal or informal lead position, despite other considerations (such as concerns related to the securitization of development or the relatively quick rotation of defence staff in and out of a conflict zone) that might suggest they are not the optimal candidate for leadership of WoG initiatives. The question becomes what strategies are put in place to ensure that the diverse collection of departmental interests and policy perspectives are taken into consideration when decisions are made? Another challenge posed by the lead department model is the power relationships that exist between the various line departments and agencies. For example, in the United Kingdom the Department for International Development (DFID) is a full line department with both power and influence. In the United States the DFID counterpart is USAID, whose policy direction comes from the State Department and who is bound by its formal authorities granted through legislation to interact only with civilians
(Hendrickson, 1999). Whereas, DFID carries significant political clout and is able to be a full partner in WoG initiatives such as the Conflict Pool and the SU. A solution to the power issue would be to ensure that a clear agreement be reached about leadership roles prior to implementing a program in the field. “However, the question of which actor takes the leadership role is less important than ensuring that all actors have a clear understanding of who has leadership responsibility” (OECD, 2008, p. 10).

Task forces and standing committees are other commonly used liaison devices for governments. Ranging in levels of formality, these structural tools provide a conduit for individuals from differing departments and agencies to work together on a common problem or issue. The **taskforce** is established with formal protocols for joint problem solving around a special issue and is understood to generally be established with time limits. There are numerous advantages to the interdepartmental or interagency task force including “network-building beyond the confines of departmental mandates” (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996, p. 20) and “expansion of the menu of ideas available to the decision-maker, while diluting narrow institutional thinking” (Shemella, 2006, p. 452). Additionally, the formal nature of the taskforce, especially when it is accompanied by significant political support from the prime minister or a senior Cabinet minister, can work through complicated, divisive policy perspectives in a way that is often unachievable by departments working on their own (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). In contrast, taskforces can be expensive and require the re-assignment of resources, both financial and human. There is also the issue that “employees become loyal to the taskforce and committed to the new work. This is a particular problem when taskforces are extended. Employees may miss out on opportunities for promotions or have difficulty assimilating back into their department” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, p. 31).

The **standing committee** or interdepartmental committee is less formal than the taskforce and as a result allows for a bit more flexibility with respect to coordinating efforts and strategies. They may exist as regularly scheduled breakfast meetings, retreats, policy forums or regular meetings. The committee model assigns responsibility for
analysis and research to the contributing line departments and the purpose of the committee is to bring the perspectives of varying stakeholders to the collective table.

*When well led and supported, and the participants adopt the behaviours that are critical to good whole of government cooperation, they can play a positive role in developing and reinforcing the whole of government ethic, as well as informal networks. The consensual approach adopted by IDCs encourages negotiation and allows the expression of dissenting views* (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004)

Challenges associated with this model include that its more flexible, less formal status can result in the standing committee being vulnerable to change in interest from senior staff or ministers (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). Because the committee is not struck with a formal mandate that is accompanied with resources and staff capacity, its political weight may not be enough to maintain the necessary traction to advance a coordinated recommendation in the face of differing opinions from line departments. In addition, standing committees “often become preoccupied with transactional items, leaving little time for policy planning or policy development…with few formal mechanisms for reflection and discussion of long-term, strategic policy issues” (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996, p. 20).

Beyond the establishment of a taskforce or committee, another strategy for achieving enhanced coordination across departments involves assigning the mandate for coordination to a specific individual. The liaison staff member is assigned the role by their home department and they are tasked to work closely with a team or unit of another department. Throughout their tenure they remain an employee of their home department and their performance continues to be evaluated by their home supervisor. The role of the liaison officer is to facilitate interdepartmental working in that there is an opportunity for an increased awareness and understanding around organizational values and ways of working. They also provide formal mechanisms for ensuring that two departments remain updated on the work being undertaken and accomplished by the other. Generally, the liaison officer is not empowered to make major decisions on behalf of their home department and therefore as a tool of WoG this position has limitations in fostering coordination.
As introduced in the paragraphs above, there are a number of design approaches that can be taken to operationalize WoG. Many of these approaches have been attempted in recent years and the result is a growing collection of literature that documents and reflects on the WoG designs that have emerged to date, including: the development of a new coordinating unit situated outside the organizational boundaries of the participating units (the SU, UK), the new coordinating unit situated within the boundaries of a single, lead department (the START, Canada) and the new coordinating unit situated within a powerful central agency and monitored by the highest powers in a country (the Afghanistan Task Force, Canada). All three were established to enhance the ability of key departments to behave in a horizontal manner while still adhering to core principles of vertical accountability and governance that are inherent to the parliamentary and federal government systems. The SU and START are the focus of the multiple-case studies and will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Institutional Governance (Central Agencies)

The role of central agencies – organizational units responsible for government-wide functions related to financial management, performance management, human resource management, information management, machinery of government, procurement, priority-setting and institutional reform - is another consideration in the operationalization of WoG. Fundamentally, central agencies have two key roles to play within horizontal initiatives; they are part of the process through which horizontal initiatives are approved and established and, as experts in how government works, they play a critical role in assisting line departments through any coordination process (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004). In Canada the term central agency applies to a collection of departments that include the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Privy Council Office and the Department of Finance. For other Westminster governments, including the UK and Australia, similar agencies exist.

There are a number of roles available to central agencies in designing and implementing WoG initiatives. At a minimum it is important to engage central agencies early in the planning process to ensure that WoG initiatives begin with clear frameworks
for priority setting, accountability and risk management (Young, 2008; Management Advisory Committee, 2004). Bakvis and Julliet (2004) posit that central agencies “have a key role in establishing horizontal initiatives, and they should also offer direct assistance to the collaboration and coordination processes” (p. 52). Treasury boards play a critical role in ensuring that a WoG initiative receives sufficient levels of funding that take into consideration the additional costs in time and money that were discussed in reference to organizational structure. Additionally, there are opportunities for central agencies to assist with trouble shooting throughout the coordination process and encourage innovation within the team of partner departments (Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1996). All of these opportunities assume that the central agencies have identified management frameworks and strategies for realizing horizontal coordination. Since 2000 there has been a call for the central agencies to give more attention to how such initiatives might be governed and implemented while still preserving the established democratic processes that are so closely linked to vertical accountability (Auditor General of Canada, 2005).

Despite the theoretical opportunities that exist for central agencies to facilitate horizontal initiatives, it does appear that in practice there is a significant tension between the call for increased horizontality and the reality that good governance and accountability exist within government as rigid, vertical structures. If staff from central agencies cannot navigate through the legalities and regulatory environment of ministerial accountability and envision innovative solutions for horizontal coordination then as guardians of the machinery of government they can be a major obstacle to any WoG initiative. Similarly, the central agencies may be inclined to support horizontal innovations; however, the political and prolific nature of issues related to the security-development nexus may mean that they will not or are unable to put their considerable might behind a horizontal coordination effort.

Other challenges relate to how the balance of authority and leadership is achieved between the central agencies and the line departments (Auditor General of Canada, 2005). On one hand the central agencies have the technical expertise and knowledge
around how a government works to advance and formalize policy and then see that policy priorities evolve into specific programs. On the other hand, the line departments have the critical, contextual knowledge about the political, geographic, economic and historical factors that surround the issue at hand. Moreover, this substantive knowledge of the issue is spread across multiple line departments who are likely to frame the issue from varying perspectives. Determining how a horizontal initiative is to move ahead can be a daunting task and at times it can be challenging for central agencies to support and advise throughout the approval process and then return leadership of the initiative back to the network of line departments. Consequently, it is very important to ensure that the central agencies are fully aware of not only their role in a WoG initiative but also how the mechanics of horizontal government differ from the status quo and how a central agency can be a barrier to or enabler of horizontality. On this point it is not uncommon to see misunderstandings or misperceptions exist between line department staff and the staff of central agencies:

The line departments resent the power exercised by control organisations that do not directly serve the public and which, it is argued, know little about the programs being delivered. Staff organisations (including central agencies) tend to believe that line agencies have extremely narrow views on policy and do not understand the need to impose overall priorities on government (Peters, 1998, p. 29)

A 1996 Canadian Deputy Minister’s Task Force that explored the topic of managing horizontal government suggested four ways in which central agencies can assist both lead and partner departments:

First, clarifying expected outcomes and give a sense of overall government priority to individual initiatives and to the importance of interdepartmental cooperation during policy development; second, encouraging the development of effective mechanisms to support horizontal policy development; third, clarifying the relative accountabilities of lead and partner departments; and fourth playing an important trouble-shooting/advisory role in the coordination process (Privy Council Office, 1996, p.11).

The DM task force was also quick to point out that the one of the great challenges facing the PCO was striking the right balance between supporting the horizontal
initiatives of line departments without giving the appearance of taking over the lead department. A similar issue pertaining to the relationship between the line departments and the central agencies relates to the differing professional perspectives brought to the table. The staff in the central agencies, whose area of expertise relate to governance, budget, finance, legal and parliamentary issues, do not always see the substantive issues of the WoG initiative the same way as the line departments (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004).

In addition to supporting the work of the line departments, it is also possible for a central agency to become a lead unit on a horizontal initiative, thereby emphasizing the importance of the initiative and its work to the Prime Minister office (Marten, 2010). An example of a central-agency led WoG initiative was the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) that oversaw Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan from 2008-2012. Led by a deputy minister and situated within the Privy Council Office (PCO), the task force reported directly to cabinet and the country’s prime minister. Staff were seconded from relevant departments across the Canadian government, ensuring a multitude of perspectives and sources of knowledge were centralized into a single working environment. Departmental task forces and teams focused on Afghanistan continued to persist throughout the time the ATF was working; however, their work was vetted through the ATF. For some, this approach is the only model with enough power, influence and focused leadership to truly overcome the challenges of vertical accountability and achieve policy coherence around issues as complex as those that play out in fragile and failing states (Patrick & Brown, 2007). As a model of WoG that is anchored in the political will and resources of a central agency, it has been recommended as a preferred alternative to the scenario in which numerous departmental task forces exist and the imperative of coordination is managed by the various line departments (Manley Report, 2008). Despite the enthusiasm for this approach however, it is generally agreed that the high-level task force is not feasible in every situation. The Canadian model was possible in the case of Afghanistan due to the conflict’s status as a priority of the government and the high-profile nature of the conflict in the minds of Canadians. While the ATF took on the role of coordinating government policy and programming efforts within the context of the Afghanistan conflict, the unit
disbanded in 2012 and there has been no discussion of establishing a similar PCO-level unit to facilitate a WoG response to any of the other conflict-affected areas in the world.

Part of what makes the inclusion of central agencies amongst the suite of core operational attributes of WoG unique, is the apparent contrast that exists between the tremendously important role they play in any horizontal effort and their noted absence from the bodies of literature on such modalities, especially in the fields of political science and international development studies. The call for improved coordination amongst development, defence and diplomatic arms of government is widespread within these fields; however, they rarely touch upon the broader aspects of government machinery, including the central agencies. With all the challenges already facing WoG initiatives it seems that reconceptualising the role of central agencies so that staff from both line departments and within central agencies see the centre of government as a partner, as opposed to an obstacle, to WoG responses to fragility, instability and conflict.

**Funding and Resources**

The availability of resources – both financial and human – is a critical element of designing and implementing successful WoG initiatives (Task Force on Horizontal Initiatives, 1996; DAC Fragile States Group, 2006; Korski, 2010). The questions of how and when financial resources can be accessed are critical to ascertaining the extent to which partnering departments and agencies can collaborate with each other. The ability to contribute funds to an initiative can influence greatly the power dynamics that exist amongst the various partner departments and agencies – whose voice is strongest around the decision making table. In fact, without control over a budget that is funding a WoG initiative, the ability of a coordinating body or individual leader to influence or direct the initiative is severely diminished (Newman, 2002). Closely related to the organizational structure and the formal nature of government line departments, the funding of initiatives in such a way that joint or collaborative management and accountability of financial resources is enabled can be a substantial challenge for public servants. Horizontality is also challenged by the traditional roles each contributing department has within the
broader government. A number of themes under the funding and resources umbrella have been identified as operational considerations for WoG. A policy and management environment in which these items are missing can be understood to present barriers to effective WoG. Additionally, the literature reveals a great deal of thinking around how some of these incentives work best. This is an important stage of intellectual inquiry as it moves practitioners and researchers beyond the question of ‘should we establish pooled funds?’ to ‘how can we best establish and manage pooled funds to foster a strong and successful coordinated effort between departments?’

Availability of Financial Resources

Being able to contribute funds to a project is part of having a voice at the decision making table, yet every department that contributes to a WoG initiative would have a financial and budgetary framework that aligns with their established departmental mandates, targeted objectives and spheres of work. Not unexpectedly, challenges arise with respect to funding initiatives that cut across departmental foci and interest areas. There can be significant disparities around the availability of financial resources for each of the WoG partner departments (DAC Fragile States Group, 2006). Simply put, in most western countries the budget of a defence department cannot be matched by other departments and agencies. This is, in part, due to the tremendous costs associated with militaries and military campaigns. Consequently, not only are their financial reserves large but there is always some portion that can be categorized as contingency funding (United Kingdom, 2010), meaning that as an organization they are well-designed for quick deployment and response. Foreign affairs departments and ministries traditionally have had a sizeable budget for running their foreign service; however, they do not typically have funds to allocate to programming initiatives outside of embassies. Many of the coordinating bodies established throughout the early 2000s to streamline WoG efforts in stabilization and reconstruction experienced a lack of financial resources especially with respect to operational resources to build staff capacity (Bensahel, 2008).
Accessing Financial Resources

The issue of accessing necessary funds has a number of features. It could mean that for an individual department or agency, part or all of the financial resources allocated to them for a fiscal year are tied to very specific terms of reference that are generally anchored to the legal and governance frameworks that have guided the department since its inception. Development departments and agencies commonly find themselves in this situation. For example, in the UK, the Department for International Development (DFID) is governed by the International Development Act that ‘mandates that funds have to focus on poverty-alleviation’ (Korski, 2010, pg. 21). While poverty and the hundreds of societal impacts that stem from poverty certainly play critical roles in most fragile states that are experiencing violent conflict, it is not the only feature of these environments. Korski notes that such a mandate does not just influence specific decision-making frameworks but the overall organizational culture which creates an environment in which individuals and teams can work fiercely to ensure funds earmarked for poverty alleviation are not mis-directed to other programs associated with conflict and post-conflict environments.

Compounding the horizontal challenge is the very context-specific reality of the immediate, dangerous and often volatile attributes of fragile states and the security-development nexus. As a result, the availability of resources includes not only having funds and people earmarked for contributing to interdepartmental initiatives but ensuring that protocols and processes exist for the quick-disbursement and flexible mobilization of both ‘boots on the ground’ and necessary funding to support complex and resource-intensive operations and programs. Traditional budget protocols would generally dictate that projects and programs need to be identified in advance and funds assigned or approved based on the anticipated costs and potential impacts. In the case of conflict and state fragility, the crises emerge suddenly and the operating environments are characterized by such unpredictability that traditional budget protocols can hinder the ability of a department or group of departments to mobilize funding for a timely response (Bensahel, 2008). Stewart and Brown (2007) make the case for, “fast- disbursing resource windows that can jump-start rapid conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction
activities in crisis prone states. Such contingency funding is essential to avoid wasting precious time on preparing an additional appropriation of resources for the current crisis, or getting bogged down in the inevitable bureaucratic struggles involved in reallocating monies already dedicated to other purposes” (pg. 142). The OECD (2006) supports these observations by calling for donor countries to ensure that there are always some flexible funds available for crisis situations. They call for countries to delegate funds to the field level where practitioners best able to gauge the situation on the ground make the decision about quickly releasing funds according to a simplified decision-making framework as opposed to vetting all decisions through the more bureaucratic procedures associated with national headquarters.

Pooled Funding (include ODA Earmarked)

Pooled funding is one of the most commonly referenced innovations in financial administration associated with WoG initiatives and cross-cutting work (Anten, van Beijnum & Specker, 2009; DAC Fragile States Group, 2006; Flinders, 2002; Brown and Stewart, 2007). In its work on security sector reform in fragile states, the OECD has produced a large volume of work on WoG funding, most notably the concept of pooled funding – a common pool of funds with contributions from the budgets of two or more line departments. Pooled funding is the quintessential WoG effort as the combined ‘ownership’ of the pool requires a level of collaborative management and administration on the part of the partner units. While pooled funding can occur between any departments that share a common focus, they are especially useful in the context of work in fragile states where cross-cutting issues related to security and development are prevalent. The delicate balance between stabilization and a return to violent conflict, the chronic vulnerability of many fragile states to natural disasters and the magnitude of underdevelopment are all drivers for funding mechanisms that allow WoG partners to respond in an effective and timely way. In the decade since 9/11 many western countries have designed and implemented a variety of pooled funds meant to enhance the ability of WoG partners to respond to issues of global peace and security. According to Stewart and
Brown (2007) pooled funding instruments “can bring relevant agencies to the table and encourage buy-in, lead to compromises on objectives, reduce time lags for addressing urgent needs, and facilitate the conducting of joint assessments and the formulation of genuinely integrated country strategies. Over time, they may play a socializing role among agencies, in helping participants understand the perspectives of their counterparts” (p. 134).

Like other WoG initiatives, pooled funds work best when clear and participatory governance structures are in place. “The biggest challenge is for each department to overcome the tendency to evaluate joined-up activities against its own single departmental aims and to view them instead against a new strategic set of joined up policy criteria (Fitzgerald A. M., 2004, p. 16). In the United Kingdom Public Service Agreements (PSAs) signed by contributing departments provide a framework against which WoG activities can be evaluated. The most common success factor associated with the effective use of pooled funding to support cross-boundary programs and policy areas is the early establishment of sound management and accountability frameworks (Wilkins, 2002) and early agreement on strategic priorities (Stewart and Brown, 2007). Linking to the issue of ministerial accountability presented earlier in this chapter, pooled funds need to be governed by a framework that clearly lays out how decisions are made with respect to the prioritization and disbursement of financial resources to programs and initiatives. The reporting element of this also needs to be clarified; do common budget protocols and monitoring and evaluation tools exist, how is success or impact determined, and who reports the results of such assessments to parliament and broader governing bodies?

One of the most common critiques of pooled contingency funds (funds meant to provide government departments with the means of responding quickly to conflict or crisis) has been that requiring line departments to “specify the ways in which the funds will be used ahead of time defeats the purpose of a contingency fund and hinders mission accomplishment (Bensahel, 2008, pg. 9). Consequently, an important element to the planning of pooled funding structures is to incorporate financial management protocols that provide employees with the discretion to authorise action. “Once a crisis has begun,
financial systems must be able to deliver appropriate resources to enable decision makers to quickly meet policy priorities, while also satisfying government financial guidelines” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004). Additional challenges with pooled funds include the difficulty in aligning the budgetary planning cycles of contributing departments (Mason & Lanz, 2009), the tendency for pooled funds to be regulated in a way that allows only for short-term funding (Clingendael, 2008), the fact that the simple pooling of financial resources does not guarantee that funding can be quickly and easily mobilized for crises, the possibility of pooled funding being exploited or repackaged to support programming interests exclusive to one of the parent departments (Stewart and Brown, 2007; DAC Fragile States Group, 2006) and the reality that “joint decision-making will normally only be done among departments who have contributed financially to the fund. If not all relevant actors have contributed, joint decision-making will exclude some of the relevant stakeholders” (Clingendael, 2008, p. 10).

A final consideration concerning pooled funds that relate jointly to international security and development is the inclusion of both ODA eligible and ODA non-eligible funds. ODA stands for Official Development Assistance which is tracked by the OECD and is the only official measure of foreign aid. Since 1970 donor countries have been challenged to contribute 0.7% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to ODA; however, very few countries have reached the target. In an effort to ensure that ODA is provided for the purpose of economic and social development, there is a long list of activities that are considered non-eligible, most of which are related to military aid (in equipment and services), peacekeeping enforcement and anti-terrorism (Development Assistance Committee, 2008).

In the past five years the ODA eligibility criteria have been revised to reflect the realities of fragile and post-conflict states (Fitzgerald, 2004). As a result, the use of donor military forces to deliver humanitarian aid is now ODA eligible. The balance of ODA eligible versus non-eligible funds within a pooled funding structure is a complex issue and one that generates strong opinions from contributing departments. If pooled funds are composed exclusively of ODA eligible funds then only activities that fall under the
eligibility guidelines can be funded. Given that many of the pooled funds are established to deal with state building in fragile states, the ODA eligibility criteria can make the pool less effective than intended; hence the need to find the right balance, which has yet to be identified by pooled funding structures. If a government’s foreign policy in fragile states is focused on security sector reform (SSR) and it is known that many SSR activities are not ODA eligible, then the balance of ODA and non-ODA funds in the pool should enable the policy direction to be pursued. The situation is complicated when priorities change within a budget cycle or when the fund is accessed for an international crisis resulting in an unanticipated disruption of the ODA balance. The dilemma for the international community seems to be that because of the ODA eligibility issue, pooled funds cannot necessarily be the WoG panacea – the funding mechanism that brings all relevant departments together in a collaborative manner. As a result, some activities in fragile states are funded by funds from a traditional department, most often a defence department. The result is the potential for disjointed policy and programming around fragile states. Because of this it remains difficult to determine whether pooled funds on their own are an effective WoG initiative in the case of fragile states or whether pooled funds are best suited to fund other WoG structures and initiatives.

Non-financial Resources

In addition to financial resources is the issue of the availability of personnel able and willing to deploy to post-conflict zones and participate in cross-cutting programs. Depending on the WoG partner department the issues related to human resources different. In the case of the armed forces, military and security staff can be assigned in any number of arenas worldwide with relative ease. They are very well trained and equipped for the volatile nature of conflict and peacekeeping environments. However, as the nature of global conflict and instability changed since the events of 9/11 and stabilization, post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency and humanitarian assistance have all emerged as activities in which the armed forces may have a role, it becomes important to consider if and how the training of military personnel is changing
to recognize the complex dynamics and shifting priorities of a post-conflict environment. Beyond training, there is always the challenge of managing concurrency commitments, troop levels and the necessary equipment so that both personnel and equipment can be available at the moment a crisis occurs. In the case of civilian employees within development departments, the considerations are very different. There is a question of readiness and training; how many staff at any point in time are prepared to be sent to conflict and post-conflict environments to coordinate the interests and efforts of the development branch or, at a minimum, contribute a development perspective to broader stabilization efforts that may be taking place? Additionally, there can be the issue of willingness to be trained to work in a hostile environment (United Kingdom, 2010). The working cultures of the armed forces and the development communities are vastly different and, as a result, joint efforts in fragile states have been fragmented and disjointed. There is an understanding on the part of soldiers that the work they do often occurs in a hostile space. It is not necessarily the same for all development practitioners. In addition to opportunities for training staff to work in and navigate safely hostile environments, development and foreign affairs departments in western governments have been increasingly focused on identifying rosters of trained and willing staff who could be deployed at any given moment (Bensahel, 2008).

**Attribute Cluster #2: People-Oriented Systems**

> Joining up is a mind-set and a culture. It is not a system or a structure. The concept of joining up recognises that no one has all the knowledge and resources, or controls all the levers to bring about sustainable solutions to complex issues (UK Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 6).

The operational attributes explored in this section build off this quote insofar as they explore the operationalization of WoG from the perspective of the people working within departments and agencies as opposed to the processes and protocols linked to organizational structure. It should be noted that multiple connections exist between the attributes noted here and those noted in the section on structure, with the relationship
between organizational structure and organizational culture being perhaps the most noteworthy. These cross-category relationships will be noted where possible. This section will highlight operational attributes such as: organizational culture, human resources, and information sharing tools and practices.

**Organizational Culture**

*Governmental organisations—agencies, services, or departments—are driven to defend their essences. In basic terms, an organisational essence is an identity that is reproduced through institutional practices, norms, and culture. An organisational essence is that which forms an organisation’s raison d’être. It is a self-definition of what an agency, service, or department is, what it does, and how it does it, how it relates to other agencies, services, departments, and to the government or the state as a whole* (Desrosiers, 2009, p. 660).

The importance of organizational culture within each government department and sub-unit is an integral factor to the ability of a WoG initiative to take hold and succeed. In fact, there is a large collection of voices within the literature calling for the cultural element of the WoG approach to receive as much attention, if not more, than the structure (Ojo, Janowski, & Estever, 2011; Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; Desai, 2005). At its core the issue of culture in WoG is based on observations from researchers, and more importantly, practitioners, that first, the individual cultures of the participating organizations differ greatly with respect to what objectives are most important within an environment in which security and development issues overlap; and second, in moments where a common understanding does exist there can still be significant differences of belief and opinion with respect to which process and strategies should be pursued in an effort to achieve the desired outcomes. In summary the challenge is related to the fact that individual cultures dominate or trump any WoG culture that might exist in a cross-boundary initiative (Desai, Solving the Interagency Puzzle, 2005).

From a cross-disciplinary perspective, the topic of organizational culture is best explored through the lens of organizational or industrial psychology, which anchors
literature from both the fields of business management and public administration. A multitude of definitions, conceptual attributes and frameworks exist within the wealth of literature on the topic. To this point, a recent literature review by Jung et al. (2009) identified over 100 conceptual dimensions associated with the term. American social psychologist Edgar H. Schein has written prolifically on the topic of organizational culture and the critical role it plays in fostering or destabilizing organizational effectiveness. Schein defines organizational culture as “the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about and reacts to its various environments” (Schein, 1996, p. 236). Building on Schein’s work, McShane and Steen (2009) reference three core elements of organizational culture: artifacts which can manifest as stories, language, décor or ceremonies; shared values which serve as the lens through which employees determine what is good/bad; and shared assumptions which are ‘unconscious, taken-for-granted perceptions or beliefs’ (p. 324). Some of these elements emerge within the literature reviewed for this chapter as key barriers to or opportunities for cross-boundary work. Specifically, those writing on the topic speak about the challenges presented by differing values and norms and the incongruence between language, vocabulary and understanding across professional silos. Most commonly referenced are the specific cultural nuances of the civil-military divide (a feature that is specific to WoG work in the security-development nexus) (Sing, 2010; Buchan, 2010; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009).

There are important linkages between organizational culture and organizational structure. When an organizational structure is established with minimal interdepartmental interaction, a rigid bureaucracy and strong vertical reporting lines, the culture of that organization can be unreceptive to change (Ford & Randolph, 1992) and therefore unreceptive to the idea of horizontal management. Despite this connection to organizational structure, there is a central message about culture: “structure alone cannot drive cultural change, as processes and attitudes also need addressing” (Pollitt, 2003, p.41). Desrosiers and Lagassé (2009), would argue that, in fact, organizational culture is at the crux of understanding how to make WoG initiatives work; that organizations would
“rather operate alone than put their organisational essence at risk” (p. 661). From this perspective, organizations will collaborate willingly only when there is no perceived threat to their departmental culture and norms and that the suggestion of collaborative ventures will yield a predictable behaviour that works to ensure that collaboration might appear to happen on the surface but in reality partner units engage in an implicit agreement that states ‘we’ll let you do your thing if you let us do ours’ (Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009). Ascertaining the degree to which individuals, teams and units are committing to the WoG process becomes an important management priority for WoG leaders.

At Schein’s top level of cultural awareness is the idea of artifacts or organizational attributes that develop and perpetuate cultural elements in a direct manner using language, tributes, stories, decorations, etc. Within the WoG literature language and professional vocabularies emerge as the most prevalent artifact at play in cross-boundary efforts. Of specific note are the various words, terms, concepts and acronyms used by actors in the various fields of practice related to peacebuilding and also those actors working across the more natural divides present within a public institution: policy making vs. program evaluation vs. project management vs. financial management. Additionally, contradictory understandings of key terms such as peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance and development exist between and within these vast government departments (Travers & Owen, 2008). The terms are reflective of complex, contextually framed environments and therefore naturally defy being defined in simple terms. That expert opinions, professional experiences and organizational perspectives make it even more difficult to establish a common lexicon of terms that serve as the foundation for WoG mandates and processes. Confusion around language and terms not only makes it difficult to take on tangible aspects of programming such as establishing a clear mandate and a framework for monitoring, evaluation and reporting, but also reinforces any challenges that may exist between individuals and teams and their efforts to understand the ‘other’. Different languages can strengthen the structural and professional boundaries already in place and link actors with a set of assumptions related to their preferences, behaviours, attitudes,
perspectives and mental models. Generalizations develop around which groups are more open to change, more locked in bureaucratic processes, more team oriented, more efficient, better communicators, etc.

It has been argued that establishing a common language for WoG efforts within the security-development nexus could eliminate confusion between actors (Caslen & Loudon, 2011; Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001; May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006). Of importance would be to ensure that terminology is ‘intuitively recognisable and agreeable to a wide range of participants” (UK-JDCC, 2006, pp. 1-12). In addition to establishing a common language, it has been argued that staff in the relevant organizations need to be more fluent in the operational and policy languages of the most relevant departments and agencies. Building this fluency is most often associated with human resource strategies that enable and encourage mobility of staff throughout various departments (Government of Canada, 1996). Options for increased mobility are explored in more detail later in this chapter.

While any of the various departments’ collection of acronyms would likely be enough to forever stymie meaningful communication, the biggest disconnect seems to exist between military forces and civilian units. Two recent studies, drafted from the military perspective, both speak to the role that common language and understanding play in WoG initiatives. Without these abilities there is the risk that staff from the distinct units will not be able to communicate effectively with their WoG colleagues. Another risk is that some terms which might appear to have universal meaning are actually used very differently within each unit. “In many ways, the concepts evoked by these words are similar, but few understand the similarities, nuances and differences” (Sing, 2010, p. 26). Daniel Sing makes the argument that where civilian staff speak in terms of governance and management their peers in the military do not have reference points for these concepts. Instead military officers speak of command and control. Similarly, the 2009 report from Joint Task Force Afghanistan identified the fundamental differences in language demonstrated in how military and civilian staff referred to their programming efforts:
Where civilians refer to business routine in staffing documents and coordinating meetings, the military refers to battle rhythm...the military deals in operational plans which become increasingly more detailed as they are elaborated throughout the levels of command and control. On the other hand, our civilian partners deal in high-level action plans that from a military perspective often do not provide sufficient detail or direction for specific operational planning. (p. 6)

In this context the major consequence of not sharing a common language is that staff are far more likely to focus on the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ instead of seeing the shared purpose of their work.

The lack of common point of reference for values and norms is also a significant hindrance to achieving WoG. Norms are best understood as unwritten rules of behaviour or well-established expectations for how an individual or team should behave in a given situation (Cummings & Worley, 2001). Organizational values are commonly put forth by the organization in its mission and values statement. At a basic level they let employees, customers and other stakeholders know what is important to the organization, what it will focus on and, in some cases, how it will pursue the outcomes that are most important or valuable. It is not uncommon that these values would be clearly indicated within a physical office space – on computers, in email, on signage – or referenced often and publicly by leaders. The issue of contradictory value systems is noted extensively in the literature. Reference is made to the differing contextual, disciplinary and professional frameworks that various actors bring to the peacebuilding environment (de Coning & Friis, 2011). From the public administration literature other tensions are identified between core values of the public service in government systems such as Canada’s. Negotiating the imperative of accountability to Parliament is seen to be at odds with ‘devotion to the public service’ (Government of Canada, 1996) when the best interests of the public could be best achieved by coordinating efforts across department boundaries in an effort to find efficiencies of scale. Despite this tension, the 1996 Task Force on Managing Horizontal Issues also spoke of the supporting linkages between the quest for horizontality and other values of the public service such as the quest for professionalism, policy excellence, and integrity.
In addition to a framework of values that guides the work of an organization, individuals bring their own values to the workplace. Often there can be significant alignment or ‘fit’ between individual and organizational values. At the deepest level of organizational culture exist basic assumptions, described below by Cummings & Worley (2001):

*These are taken for granted assumptions about how organisational problems should be solved. They tell members how to perceive, think and feel about things. They are non-confrontable and non-debatable assumptions about relating to the environment and about human nature, human activity and human relationships.* (p. 503).

Perhaps the most obvious example of tension between basic assumptions is present in the issue of the securitization of the humanitarian space which was referenced in Chapter 1. The cultural gulf that exists between civilian and military actors navigating the security-development nexus remains vast despite a certain level of understanding that there are important roles for both groups in peacebuilding, stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. Humanitarian organizations that navigate in this space place tremendous importance on the idea of principled humanitarian action which immediately links efforts at humanitarian assistance or relief to the established principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. For many humanitarian organizations these principles reflect the organizational essence of what work must be accomplished, and how. These principles are anchored in a history that includes the story of Henri Dunant, the origins of the Geneva Conventions and the advent of international humanitarian law. They are non-negotiable and consequently are a potential barrier for efforts that require coordination between such organizations and security or military forces that are associated with any political body, whether it be a state government or international governance organization like the United Nations or NATO (Smith M., 2008; Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, & von Hippel, 2005; Peabody, 2006; Franke, 2006).

From researchers and practitioners who look at the security-development nexus in the post 9/11 era, we see the use of descriptors such as jealousy and suspicion (Korski, 2009). The cultural drivers and the functional imperatives become quite closely linked in that for the military the mandate is about national security interests as opposed to the
more outward looking perspective of the humanitarian community that aspires to alleviate human suffering regardless of whether or not it aligns with specific national interests (Egnell, 2008). Development branches of governments are different from non-governmental agencies doing similar work in that the former still has to take into consideration national and political interests in its policy decisions and programs; nonetheless, there can still be a strong tension between a development agency and its defence counterparts. For example, as noted above, the scale and scope of DFID’s work is outlined by the International Development Act, which dictates that DFID funds must be spent on poverty-alleviation (Korski, 2009). Civil-military cultural tensions can emerge again when pooled funds are established to facilitate cross-boundary efforts in areas of state fragility, where poverty and insecurity take on a complicated relationship. Those public servants accustomed to managing DFID funds and who are institutionally committed to the imperative of poverty-reduction bring that frame of reference to cross-boundary teams governing the pooled fund. Even if the governance framework allows the funds to be spent on issues beyond poverty-reduction, there is still the ever present challenge to individual public servants to set aside their departmental frame of reference when it comes to prioritizing the use of the pooled funding. A similar tension would exist for decisions that need to be made concerning common understanding of the causes of violent conflict (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). Because there are hundreds of models and theories around the causes of violent conflict and no likelihood that consensus will ever emerge on the topic due to the social complexities involved, organizational cultures often develop their own preferences and perspectives on ‘true’ or ‘root’ causes of violent conflict and human suffering.

**Human Resources**

The role of human resources (HR) policy and procedures in the staffing, skill development and performance management of personnel is closely linked to the discussion in the previous section on organizational culture. While human resource
management presents its own set of boundaries to WoG initiatives, it is also an area in which opportunities for positively effecting change in organizational culture are possible.

In 1996 a Canadian Deputy Minister Taskforce looked at the challenges of managing horizontal policy issues. In their final report they noted that at the time “a large proportion of the policy community spend their whole careers within a single department -- reinforcing the development of narrow, single issue viewpoints” (p. 26). The report recommends temporary assignments and exchanges or secondments between units as methods for accomplishing greater staff mobility across the federal public service. Such positions are dual purpose in that an individual and their ‘home’ department gain invaluable insight into the cultural and operational attributes of key departments and, at the same time, contribute their departmental perspective to new teams and units that can also learn more about the ‘other’ by having them take part in the day-to-day working of the department. In the larger picture these positions have the potential to build an increasingly skilled cohort of staff situated throughout the public service who are fluent in the languages and processes of multiple departments and, consequently, can successfully navigate complex WoG dynamics and advance WoG mandates.

Over a decade later, the literature still calls for more opportunities for secondments, exchanges or rotational training positions (UK, 2010; Franke, 2006; Desai, 2005; Marten, 2010; OECD, 2006a) as there are still key institutional barriers that work against the movement of staff across departments. These temporary opportunities, which help build personal networks and therefore hone social capital (Galbraith, 2008), are especially important for WoG units that are situated within a traditional line department and staffed largely with individuals from the parent department. In this instance, employees of the WoG initiative can be in a situation where they are coordinating a horizontal policy but lack opportunities to gain insight into the work and perspectives of colleagues in other departments. The challenge of secondments and rotational positions is convincing another WoG partner to release a staff person who holds value and expertise for their home unit. This is especially difficult in a situation where the WoG initiative does not feel like a shared endeavour for those departments involved. Such a scenario
might exist when partner departments were not all involved to the same degree in the conceptualization and/or launch of the WoG initiative or when there is a perception of a power imbalance amongst partner departments. At a more basic level, personnel policies on secondments can be a disincentive if the home agency “is not reimbursed for that expert’s salary, much less the cost of hiring someone to replace that person during the secondment” (Bensahel, 2008, p 8). Additionally, voluntary secondments, in which an individual pursues the secondment opportunity, can be discouraged by the logic of career advancement in the public service. There is a belief within public institutions that choosing to work for a period of time in a different department via a secondment or exchange might mean losing traction with career development in their home department (Korski, 2009; Desai, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007). Creating incentives for interagency secondments is an important element for WoG units. This might be something that could be considered when a WoG initiative is being put together. A staff exchange program that allows two employees to change spots for a period of time would be able to achieve the same advantages as a formal secondment but without the disincentives to the partner units. Although, such an exchange program would have to be designed in such a way so as to address the concerns of staff about limitations to career progression.

Another HR innovation related to mobility of staff is the idea of the liaison officer – a more permanent position whose primary task is to move information between their home department and another department within the government. For example, in Canada there are DND-CIDA and DND-START liaison positions. In both cases a military representative works extensively with the civilian unit to become more familiar with the work being done by the civilian team, to offer expertise and perspective when required and to develop and relay back to DND a greater understanding of how the civilian units prioritize and accomplish their objectives. In comparison to a secondment the advantages to the liaison position would be increased clarity with respect to reporting structures and performance management (the annual performance of the liaison officer would be evaluated by a superior in DND). Additionally, the military liaison does not have to step outside of the established professional incentives and career advancement paths
associated with DND. Finally, the contribution by DND of a liaison officer to these units can be understood by the host department as a serious resource commitment to boundary-spanning efforts (OECD, 2006a) and therefore an acknowledgement of the important role other departments have to play in international peacebuilding, stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Like temporary secondments or exchanges, the value of the liaison officer is dependent on the assignment of a capable individual to the position. A 2006 article that explored the US experience with civil-military coordination (CIMIC) observed a tendency for supervisors to assign “their most expendable people, those with limited capabilities, to liaison positions” (Shemella, p. 455). In cases where this occurs it is easy to envision how the liaison position could work against the idea of WoG, with borders and negative assumptions of the ‘other’ being enhanced.

Aside from staff mobility, there are also challenges related to the staffing of WoG initiatives with individuals who are a good fit both with respect to skill and attitude. Consequently, efforts in recruiting, retaining and managing the performance of staff are noted as barriers to many boundary-spanning initiatives (Young, 2008). Human resource managers are faced with difficult questions such as how to identify key WoG skills and competencies throughout the hiring process, how to determine what university programs and professional experiences are most likely to provide students with an opportunity to develop some of these skills, and how to ensure that potential recruits know that these skills can be valued within a WoG unit, even if they are not the primary concern of more traditional government recruitment policies. These are just some of the challenges that need to be addressed if WoG units are going to recruit the employees they need to do their work.

Many of the aforementioned barriers that serve as disincentives to public servants considering secondments and exchanges also exist when it comes to recruiting staff into new WoG initiatives. New organizational structures like START or the SU were initially established with quite extensive, although vague, mandates concerning the need for staff to demonstrate competency in both program development (evaluation and project management) and policy analysis. Developing both skills sets was not always understood
to be advantageous for career development in parent departments and as a result a position with one of these structures was not always desirable. Recruiting and retaining staff in WoG initiatives such as the SU also involves the reality that deployment to an international area of fragility and insecurity is a likely element of the job. Working in international conflict and post-conflict zones is a regular occurrence for military professionals and is recognized and rewarded accordingly within the military staffing model; however, the same cannot always be said for civilian personnel who are being asked to deploy alongside military colleagues. Consequently, an important human resource consideration has been to ensure that compensation models and opportunities for advancement within the organization are adjusted so that all deployable staff (civilian or military) have the same, or similar, professional incentives (Farrell & Gordon, COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan, 2009).

WoG recruitment strategies also need to ensure that young public servants can see opportunities for career development by being involved with horizontal initiatives. In favour of WoG initiatives is potential for employees to be able to network, and perhaps rotate, widely across partner units, an opportunity to hone a number of strategic and operational skills sets that could be beneficial to their future careers and the dynamic environment of those WoG initiatives that benefit from high-level political interest. In contrast, those WoG initiatives that are struggling to make horizontality work or that are bogged down by negative relationships between the WoG partners may have less appeal for potential recruits. WoG initiatives also have to be cognisant of perceptions (or misperceptions) concerning the nature of the work being done by the unit.

Another problematic attribute of performance management systems in the public sector is that, as with funding and accountability structures, performance management is anchored soundly to the mandates and competency requirements of the vertical line departments (Pollitt, 2003; Vincent, 1999) meaning that performance management systems ‘run the risk of reinforcing a silo mentality’ (Management Advisory Committee, 2004, p. 49). The result is that in the case of secondments or efforts to recruit staff into new coordinating bodies such as START and the SU, there are challenges related to
differing performance measurement frameworks. In the case of secondments, a staff member might be evaluated by the framework of their ‘new’ home for the duration of their tenure, but this framework might not align with the key performance indicators of their initial department.

Boundary spanning work can mean that multiple departments deploy staff to the same environment. In the case of the security-development nexus such environments are generally characterized by significant levels of danger, instability and hostility. Hence, there is a critical need to ensure a critical mass and adequate distribution across relevant departments of staff qualified to work in such environments (Bensahel, 2008; Mason, 2009). Building a cohort of civilian staff with sufficient training, expertise, interest and willingness to join a roster of staff available for rapid deployment to hostile environment and strong skills in navigating the WoG space takes time. Additionally, for staff to be effective in such environments they must be able to “take strategic decisions and operate without having to refer back to the headquarters level for every little detail” (OECD, 2006a, p. 36). Identifying suitable candidates within and external to the public service and managing the roster has prompted several countries to devote resources to centralizing staffing information about such individuals and managing them as a common resource even though as individuals their day-to-day activities remain with their home department. This coordination effort become a key pillar of the work done by both START and SU.

Possibly the most commonly referenced human resource recommendation around the practical implementation of a WoG initiative is the idea of increasing or enhancing the amount and quality of targeted and custom-designed training, education and professional development opportunities for actors from all contributing departments (3C Conference, 2009; Management Advisory Committee, 2004; Longhurst, 2006-2007; Caslen & Loudon; Shemella, 2006; Lacroix, 2009).

*This kind of training program is effective because a dialogue across hierarchical and functional boundaries increases the chances of applying the knowledge with a strategic perspective when managers re-enter their work setting. This perspective enables participants to link their local*
decisions and daily operations to the broader organisational mission, thereby, improving organisational effectiveness and learning (Watad & Ospina, 1999, p. 186).

Joint training provides individuals at all levels of a department an opportunity to build a common language, network with colleagues that may work in different buildings and gain appreciation for different skill sets and perspectives. The building of relationships and mutual trust are often referenced as key outcomes of a commitment to robust joint training opportunities (Franke, 2006; Shemella, 2006)). Joint training also lays the foundation for more informal forms of collaboration, whether it is a weekly meeting over coffee or a greater inclination to pick up the phone to ask a question. All of these outcomes of joint training allow for the building of trust and respect amongst colleagues. In addition to the implicit benefits of a common training arena, there is also the question of what explicit skills are being developed in the training experience. A subsequent section of this chapter explores the individual skills and capabilities that are thought to be critical to the WoG practitioner. Presumably, workshops and education opportunities could be designed to develop and hone such skills. However, within the literature the primary focus of joint training to date has been the pre-deployment training programs designed and delivered to equip civilian staff with skills that allow them to navigate safely in hostile international environments. Generally, this training is offered by experts in the area; namely the military. It has also been recommended that “civilians being posted to conflict areas such as Afghanistan should participate in pre-deployment training with the military about to be sent to such areas” (UK Defence Committee, 2010, p. 7).

The degree to which various departments participate in joint training can be related to the financial cost of such training opportunities, alignment between joint training and important departmental strategic priorities, an established appreciation for professional development within a department or the personalities and preferences of individual leaders who make the decisions on what training opportunities are paid for or when staff time can be given up for training. There is a culture of training and professional development in the military meaning that there is training infrastructure
established and teams of people devoted to teaching, learning and staff development. The same level of resources for professional development is not available in CIDA or DFAIT, meaning that financial pressures exist may prevent full engagement in anything more than the most critical training issues, such as pre-deployment of civilians. It is imperative, therefore, to ensure that from the outset, when mandates are struck and budgets established, all members of a WoG initiative have access to the funding necessary to fully engage in a way that makes them relatively equal partners.

Missing from the literature on WoG joint training and staffing is the importance of including staff from central agencies in joint training initiatives. It can be easy to forget about staff from the central agencies; however, in many ways the biggest feeling of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ can be between the WoG unit or line department and the central agency. Staff in the WoG unit can have the perception that staff in the central agencies, especially in the TBS, have no sense of the real world, are bound by unhelpful rules and regulations and do not understand the nature of the important work being done in the unit. Conversely, staff in TBS can believe that the line departments are full of individuals who have little respect for the work of TBS, who do not take the time to understand the rules and regulations and how innovation can happen within the system. Engaging staff from TBS in joint training opportunities or seconding a TBS staff member into the WoG unit, even on a temporary basis, may improve working relationships.

What joint training should look like, who should deliver training to achieve greatest impact, who is being trained and who is paying for the training are just some the questions that need to be answered to meet the objective of meaningful training (Finland, 2008). The Joint Task Force Afghanistan observed that stumbling over common language and practices in the field was a source of frustration for staff (2009). As a result, the authors recommended a comprehensive interagency course that would focus on integrated operational planning and “which could be complemented by a mentoring relationship where both sides learn from each other how to develop the products they will need to see the operation through and to achieve the mandates and benchmarks established by the respective Chain of Commands” (p. 11). At the Canada School of
Public Service, a new course has been launched entitled *Integrated Planning in the Public Service: An Overview*. This one-day course, designed for all public servants, “provides a holistic approach to organizational planning that includes the integration of business planning of line managers with internal services and enabling functions such as finance, human resources, procurement, materiel management and real property, information management, information technology, internal audit, communication, policy, evaluation, science and technology, service delivery, security, corporate planning and regulation” (Canada School of Public Service, 2010). Additional innovations recommended in the literature include a national interagency university for senior staff personnel (Desai, 2005), cross-country exercises and workshops for capturing and sharing lessons learned (van de Goor, 2012), a professional stream across a number of departments that would provide custom training of officials or young leaders to create specialists in boundary-spanning work (Korski, 2009), and education efforts to establish a Culture of Collaboration across departments (UK-JDCC, 2006).

**Information sharing tools and practices**

These operational attributes relate to observations from academics and practitioners that at the core of successful implementation of WoG is the imperative of effective, extensive and customizable information sharing among those parties responsible for delivering a WoG initiative (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001; van de Goor, 2012). While the sharing of information is related, in part, to the strength of individual relationships and the ability of organizational design to facilitate good communication, there are also more tangible tools and systems to be considered: joint, shared or common approaches or protocols for assessment, measuring, evaluation and reporting (MER) and the tools associated with each. Assessment is referred to largely as the analysis conducted at the outset by participating units and departments to articulate the development, security and political nuances of the conflict or post-conflict environments. The MER terms refer to the processes by which impact and success of the inter-departmental initiative are determined. In addition to the aforementioned items, this
section will also look at the lack of measures for evaluating WoG as an outcome beyond the stated goals and objectives of an initiative and the call for documenting and sharing lessons learned and best practices.

Joint assessment tools have the potential to provide WoG partners with a platform for comprehensive, integrated analysis of the situation in the field. It has been extensively observed that the presence of shared assessment and analytical tools is a critical component from the outset of any cross-boundary venture (van de Goor & Major, 2012; Task Force on Horizontal Issues, 1999; UK Defence Committee, 2010; 3C Conference, 2009; DAC Fragile States Group, 2006). The common and comprehensive assessment of the origins, context, key players and key issues at play in a conflict or post-conflict environment is not just about understanding the situation on the ground in its current state but also about anticipating complex relationships, key points of influence and key fracture lines within a society. The joint assessment of conflict and societal dynamics is also a commitment to the OECD principle of ensuring that intervening in a fragile states does no further harm to the communities involved (OECD, 2008). An understanding of these complex dynamics crafted and vetted from the perspectives of multiple departments is thought to lay the foundation for one of the criteria most often associated with successful WoG initiatives – joint planning, shared objectives, common purpose; with a clear understanding of whose competencies and resources should be mobilized at various stages. Without shared assessment tools at the outset, the WoG planning process at headquarters or in the field can be fraught with misunderstanding, miscommunication and diverging perspectives.

[Joint assessments] must share a general conceptualisation of the problem, including the primary sources of instability in the country, a strategy on how best to intervene, specifying both short-term priorities for action and long-term goals for the national effort, a common pool of resources, ensuring that funding flows to the true priority areas in the country and an integrated administration and decision-making structure, to ensure that the efforts of each government department do not impede, or even actively undermine, the efforts of the others. (Carment, Gazo, & Prest, 2007, p. 57)
Examples of such assessment tools would be the Post-conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) which are often used to “improve co-ordination in strategy development and programme planning” (OECD, 2007a, p. 103), the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment which can “provide a basis for the assessment of capacity issues in fragile states” (OECD, 2008, p. 12) and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), created by an interagency working group of the United States government to allow partner departments and agencies craft a common understanding of violent conflict within a country (OCRS, 2008).

With respect to in-program monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) of WoG initiatives, there are a number of challenges facing practitioners. The aforementioned challenge of ministerial accountability can have a direct influence on the ability to identify and leverage MER tools (Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011). The issue of ministerial accountability means that the primary needs related to departmental and project reporting relate to the specific interests and mandate of the individual department. These interests are the responsibility of the minister and both measures and technical information management systems such as databases and budgeting software were designed and secured with departmental priorities in mind. It is very possible that within a national government, various line departments and agencies choose different technical systems to meet their informational management and budgeting needs. When these systems are unable to speak to each other or when information is collected using different criteria, parameters and query fields it can become, from purely a practical perspective, very difficult to align the MER elements of a cross-departmental initiative. In their 2004 report Connecting Government, the Australian government’s Management Advisory Committee observed that “A recent survey by the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) identified 17 primary financial management information systems (FMIS) currently being used across government” (p. 61). Kavanagh and Richards (2001) observed that due to the different information technology platforms put to use in the UK government at the time of the initial joined-up government initiatives there were civil servants who could “not communicate via e-mail with their equivalents in other
departments” (p. 9).

Efforts by an assigned coordinating body to develop MER tools that could be used by a number of partner departments are not always successful. Despite the commitment of time and resources, such an activity can become a difficult exercise in consensus building between units and departments that may have already invested substantial internal resources into the design of their own tools (Korski, 2009). Additionally, such consensus-building activities can be fraught with interdepartmental tensions related to organizational culture, past experiences, individual personalities or turf protection. Framed within the context of departments working in areas of conflict and state fragility, there are also disagreements related to how common monitoring systems related to early detection of crises and instability should incorporate short-term versus longer-term considerations (Patrick and Brown, 2007).

There are also legitimate concerns related to the legal and ethical considerations around information sharing such as the responsibility to protect the privacy of staff information, the need to ‘lock-down’ certain e-mail and archive systems for security concerns and the imperative of security clearance. These security considerations have to be aligned with WoG innovations that seek efficiencies concerning how information is stored, located, retrieved and transmitted.

*Information Management in the Comprehensive Approach concept relies on an understanding of the complex, multi-dimensional information requirements of each Department across both cultural and technical boundaries and the discrete characteristics of hardware, capacity (both human and technical) and sophistication of each individual area (UK-JDCC, 2006, pp. 1-10)*

Consequently, information management frameworks and holistic information technology strategies need to be designed and incorporated into the planning stage to ensure that all units have the information they need to do their work while keeping in consideration the department-specific requirements unrelated to the WoG imperative (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004).

Finally, the literature notes that there is a critical lack of WoG measures available to practitioners (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004; Ryan & Walsh, 2004; Olson &
Gregorian, 2007). Measures of success for program or project outcomes are a key component of any government initiative; however, the literature does not make reference of any measures or indicators that would allow WoG teams to evaluate the success of their cross-boundary collaboration. The existence and implementation of shared accountability frameworks, the demonstrated ability to overcome institution barriers to WoG, levels of organizational conflict or turf protection, and commitment to cross-training would be just a few of the measures or key performance indicators related to a WoG initiative. In other words, it is important to not just measure whether the stated goals of a program were accomplished but also assess the manner in which they were achieved. Because the WoG aspect of the initiative is not being measured it becomes more challenging to capture, disseminate and compare lessons learned and best practices related to the design and implementation of WoG programs.

Attribute Cluster #3: Individual Considerations

WoG Skills

The idea that individual competencies, skills and traits have a role to play in an individual employee’s ability to successful navigate, influence and achieve desired outcomes within a cross-boundary environment is advanced widely within the public administration literature which argues that the necessary skills of employees in WoG initiatives are different from those required for more traditional positions (McGuire, 2006; Vincent, 1999; Flinders, 2002; Australian Public Service Commission, 2007). Canadian researchers reference the importance of certain skills within their writing on horizontal management and horizontal collaboration. In the United States, researchers in the realms of integrative leadership and collaborative public management explore the skills required of employees and leaders in an era where collaboration across organizational and sectoral boundaries is a new imperative for public servants. In 2006 the Public Administration Review published a special supplement on collaborative public management and in 2010 Leadership Quarterly published a special issue that explored integrative leadership within the public sector. Numerous researchers have tried to identify, categorize and prioritize those individual skills necessary for public servants
working in a WoG space. A noteworthy trend is that researchers are increasingly focusing on the role of the individual who is being asked to collaborate as opposed to the ability of the organization to foster collaborative action.

Paul Williams (2002) examined the increasingly complex and interconnected public policy landscape and prevalence of wicked problems. His work establishes a profile of characteristics possessed by competent ‘boundary spanners’ or those important actors within organizations that manage and thrive within ‘inter-organisational theatres’ (p. 103). Williams synthesizes the relevant literature and presents a number of skill or competency categories as being key to the identity and success of the boundary spanner. The networker, the entrepreneur, the innovator, the interpreter, the trust-builder, and the leader are all aspects of strong boundary spanners. Williams identifies the importance of certain personality traits such as ‘personable, respectful, reliable, tolerant, diplomatic, caring and committed’ (p. 112) as being critical to successful boundary spanners.

Rosemary O’Leary is another prolific writer on this topic, producing several articles with colleagues in the late 20-aughts that examine the skill set of the successful collaborator. Alongside colleagues Choi and Gerard, O’Leary conducted a study (2012) with members of the U.S Senior Executive Services in which participants were asked to rank the importance of a number of skills associated with collaborative management strategies. The authors presented the skills in a framework that involved categories such as: individual attributes, interpersonal skills, group process skills, strategic leadership and substantive/technical knowledge. The study respondents surprised the research team by prioritizing individual attributes and interpersonal skills as being most important to a successful collaborator. O’Leary, Choi and Gerard’s study emphasizes the importance of individual attributes or characteristics. The authors note being surprised that study results indicated these individual attributes, which could be naturally occurring aspects of individual personalities or traits developed and honed through life experiences, were referenced most often by participants. From the perspective of the military, Longhurst’s 2006 article discusses the necessary qualities of a good operator within a civil military coordination (CIMIC) activity. Again, individual traits emerge as key. Table 7 displays
the individual attributes discussed in both articles and highlights those traits that were common to both contexts.

Table 7: Individual attributes deemed valuable for collaborating across boundaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual attributes of a successful collaborator (public service) (O’Leary, Choi and Gerard, 2012)</th>
<th>Qualities of a good CIMIC operator (Longhurst, 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honest Persistence and Diligent Unselfish Flexible Friendly Empathetic</td>
<td>Honesty Diligence Selflessness Flexibility Personableness Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-aware Open mind Patience Self-confidence Diplomatic Trustworthy Respectful Goal-oriented Decisive</td>
<td>Loyalty Ethical behaviour Courage Fairness Responsibility Maturity Dedication Resourcefulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessing a sense of humour</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Many of the attributes noted in Table 7 fall upon the spectrum of traits related to emotional intelligence, which is put forth by other researchers as a key attribute of individuals who have success in cross-boundary work (Sy & Cote, 2004; Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001). Additionally, Caslen and Loudon (2011) make a case for the importance of individual agility and adaptability as being central to individual success and impact in cross-boundary initiatives.

Skills associated with an individual’s ability to understand and work well with others fall under the category of interpersonal skills. At the forefront of suite of skills include competencies in listening and communication (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Ross, Frere, Healey, & Humphreys, 2011; McGuire, 2006).
A cross-boundary working environment would not only require strength in these areas but also knowledge in how to adapt listening and communication strategies to different contexts depending on which actors are involved, what interests are being advanced and what political, financial or time pressures are at play. A profound understanding and appreciation for the myriad of communication styles that exist and how they can be best influenced is key. Related skills might include: diplomacy and cultural awareness/sensitivity (Joint Task Force Afghanistan, 2009) and the ability to influence members to participate and engage (Mandell & Steelman, 2003).

Group process skills can be differentiated from interpersonal skills by considering the latter as the necessary skills for successful interaction with others in any number of formal and informal situations. In contrast, group process skills are used by “a person to appropriately interact with others in a group” (O’Leary, Choi, & Geard, 2012, p. 577). The difference may appear quite minimal; however, within the management literature there is clear focus on understanding teams, team dynamics and team processes. The frameworks, skills and tools associated with understanding groups and teams are different from those associated with an individual’s ability to work well with others. Nevertheless, interpersonal skills can certainly influence an individual’s ability to successfully leverage group process skills which include facilitation, negotiation, collaborative problem solving or brainstorming, dealing with personalities, conflict resolution and consensus building (O’Leary, Choi, & Geard, 2012). Negotiation, mediation and skills in managing conflict are frequently noted in other articles (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004).

Additional skills noted in the literature include context specific program planning and project management (Joint Task Force Afghanistan, 2009); process skills (including situational analysis, strategy and policy formulation, organizational analysis, financial analysis, legislative analysis and drafting and donor liaison (SU, 2008); experience and knowledge in the complex operational fields of security sector reform, peacebuilding, etc. (OECD, 2007a); and stakeholder engagement and management (Vincent, 1999). Of special note, because the terms are so closely related to the core attributes of the concept of WoG, are competencies in holistic thinking and systems thinking. Holistic thinking
plays an unsurprising role in the discussion of skills given the holistic attributes of WoG noted in Chapter 3 (see McGuire 2006, Vincent 1999 and Ling 2002). The term is associated with the ability to connect the dots in a complex situation and is described as an “approach that captures both the whole and its parts, allowing one to grasp multi-dimensional, dynamic relationships as they are today and as they might evolve tomorrow” (Kass & London, 2013, p. 61). Similarly, systems thinking is related to understanding complex problems and issues through the multitude of interdependent relationships between issues, actors, and grievances. It also requires the systems thinking to be aware of and consider contextual elements such as historical, political, economic, cultural and environmental drivers of past events and catalysts for future events. Noted as a whole of government skill by Ling (2002), Hopkins, Couture and Moore (2001) and Kass and London (2013), the idea of systems thinking has its origins in engineering, the natural sciences and management and has been advanced in recent years under the umbrella of complexity, complex systems and wicked problems.

In addition to the skills of individual employees, a suite of essential skills for those leading boundary-spanning initiatives are also noted. The absence of these skills in part or in full can be understood as barriers to WoG. Desai (2005) noted that interagency taskforces should be led by experienced leaders from outside of the participating departments; and that the essential skills are the more intangible soft skills and not necessarily subject matter expertise. Specific skills associated with a WoG leader are noted in Table 8.

**Table 8: Skills essential for leading boundary-spanning efforts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Abilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holistic Thinker</td>
<td>• to determine how best to strike the critical balance between the needs of their unit and the needs of the horizontal network (Shemella, 2006; Sproule-Jones, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• to focus strategically to see the big picture (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, p. 53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• to identify “systemic linkages, goal conflicts, and sources of resistance” (Hopkins, Couture, &amp; Moore, 2001, p 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enabler</strong></td>
<td>- skills such as ‘negotiation, facilitation, collaborative problem solving and conflict management’ (O’Leary &amp; Vij, 2012, p. 516) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Diviner**  | - to ‘inspire a sense of purpose…harness people toward a common goal…articulate what a whole of government approach looks like (Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, p. 53)  
- to communicate areas of mutual interest (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001, p 8) |
| **Curator**  | - an understanding that culture and not just projects and budgets must be managed effectively (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 2001)  
- an awareness that they “must function as the focal points in interagency efforts, establishing climates of collaboration and cooperation” (Caslen & Loudon, 2011, p. 12) |
| **Innovator**| - to “exploit the potential for innovation, fusing new concepts, technologies, approaches, and organisational structures into overwhelming combinations of effects” (Kass & London, 2013), |
| **Convenor** | - to bring people together, to engage partners horizontally, and to bring multiple collaborators together for a common end in a situation of interdependence. (O'Leary & Vij, 2012, p. 516). |

Recognizing and acknowledging the important role of these individual traits in successful cross-boundary initiatives leads to an understanding of the synergistic relationship between individual skills and customized recruitment strategies and performance evaluation metrics. Teams in which individuals are competent in the necessary skill areas also provide leaders with key tools for advancing change within an organization and its culture. Moreover, the idea that opportunities or incentives for WoG exist not just at the organizational level but also the level of the individual means identifying or designing opportunities that allow for the development of cross-boundary expertise within staff. Professional development workshops, training programs, executive education certificates and university and college programs that educate future public servants are all vehicles for skill development. A critical barrier to developing these critical soft skills was their omission within the curriculum of many public administration programs. There was a general assumption that these skills would be learned in the workplace; however, if mentors and supervisors did not have the skills themselves or
lacked the inclination to deliberately coach to these skills then the necessary skill development would not occur (Sproule-Jones, 2000). In cases where the necessary skills are not present in a team and the cost of developing the skills is prohibitive other options include outsourcing specific work to individuals or teams from the private sector, civil society or another government department (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007).

In addition to enhancing the organization’s ability to recruit for and continue the development of key skills, the literature also advances the importance of determining how best to assess or measure competencies related to an individual’s potential to successfully collaborate with others. A 2008 article by Heather Gertha-Taylor looked to the US public service to examine what indicators public service managers might use to determine the level of competency in several core skills related to successful collaboration, such as: initiative, interpersonal understanding, relationship building, teamwork and cooperation, and self-confidence, to name a few. The research concludes that a problematic disconnect exists between what “human resource managers believe collaborative competencies to be and what exemplary collaborators demonstrate” (p. 117).

Cross-cutting attribute: Political Environment

_The starting point for an effective WoG approach is clear political guidance and leadership. To provide the institutional impetus for the different phases of a WGA requires commitment and leadership from the political top: the different actors need to understand the importance of their involvement_ (OECD, 2008, p. 23).

Political support from the upper echelons (ministers or even the prime minister) and the presence of WoG champions within senior leadership are commonly seen as criteria for success in boundary spanning initiatives (Young, 2008; Finland, 2008; Kavanagh & Richards, 2001; Flinders, 2002; Bensahel, 2008; Sing 2010; Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; OECD, 2006a; Ojo, Janowski, & Estever, 2011); the absence of these attributes is sure to make the task of designing and
implementing a meaningful initiative challenging, if not impossible. There are numerous ways in which leadership impacts the success of WoG initiatives. At the highest level political will, understood here to be the implicit and explicit support from not only senior individuals but also the consensus of the government, the wider parliament and the public, is essential for getting a new WoG initiative off the ground (Young, 2008; Hunt, 2005; Bensahel, 2008). This high level buy-in can provide WoG initiatives with clear policy direction, the mobilization of resources and the ability to create a sense of urgency that generates results. Clear political support and leadership motivates staff and creates literal and figurative space for staff to more easily engage various aspects of the organization to approach complex problems (Anten, van Beijnum, & Specker, 3C Approaches to Fragile and Conflict Situations – Taking stock of commitments and challenges, 2009).

Related to the role of leadership and political will in WoG is the specific role for the political leader of government, whether that be a prime minister or a president. The direct attention and involvement of a prime minister can strongly incentivize collaborative or coordinated activities (Hunt, 2005; Flinders, 2002; Kavanagh & Richards, 2001; Bensahel, 2008) as policy coordination is an extremely political exercise (Peters, 1998). A position of such power and influence can be understood as a force that can bring together politically driven department ministers. It is a top-down approach to establishing an imperative for WoG and in many ways can be considered a forced approach in that it does not necessarily address or resolve underlying barriers of culture, but instead mandates a coordinated effort that for a short period of time can circumvent issues that would generally prevent cross-boundary work. When a prime minister ensures that a priority initiative has been supported with sufficient funds and skilled staff or situates a WoG initiative within a central agency thereby keeping it in closer proximity to the prime minister’s office, it becomes clear to all actors that expectations exist with respect to not only achieving stated goals but doing so in a collaborative and efficient manner. This level of political leadership was evident in the early 2000s by countries like Canada and the UK where boundary-spanning efforts in Afghanistan and, in the case of
the UK, Iraq, were closely monitored by the prime ministers of both countries. In such cases prime ministerial involvement does not immediately change the established structure, mandates and culture of departments and individuals. Instead, the attention of the prime minister most likely results in the formation of a temporary unit or team with a mandate for coordinating any and all government departments engaged in the region of conflict or fragility. A new structure, such as a taskforce, situated within a central agency and led by a senior staff member who reports directly to the prime minister or a cabinet committee is struck. Within the Canadian context, this model addresses the issue related to accountability by establishing the responsibility of the taskforce directly under the purview of the prime minister. From a structural perspective however, these initiatives are not sustainable in the long-term. Once the issue has abated or once the reins of government change to another political party with different interests, the task force is generally disbanded with no structural legacy. From a cultural perspective, there is a possibility that some awareness, education and modification of departmental assumptions and values does take place as staff move from departmental units into the WoG initiative and then back to their home departments.

A major concern associated with the recommendation that Prime Ministerial involvement is a key indicator for success of a WoG initiative has to do with feasibility. Prime Ministerial involvement can be considered a significant investment of political capital – a finite resource that is spent only after careful consideration of where it can have the greatest impact. Some political leaders are more powerful than others, meaning that there is a certain discrepancy in how much forced coordination can be ‘purchased’ with such capital. Additionally, departmental ministers are powerful in their own right and depending on other political machinations taking place at the time, the purchase of their coordination can be quite costly. From this perspective, individual prime ministers might only spend their political capital on WoG projects that are dealing with projects that are so volatile that the risk of incurring enormous costs (financial, political and others) to the prime minister and his/her government is so high that an additional level of oversight and coordination is required. If such involvement is truly a primary condition of
success, then WoG may be an approach that is only achievable in the case of few very politically salient situations. This is highly problematic given the myriad drivers for cross-boundary coordination facing contemporary governments and the systemic sources of instability created by fragility and conflict within the international community. Some version of cross-departmental coordination is desirable in every situation in which security issues and development issues overlap, not just those areas that are of political interest to a state government. From this perspective Prime Ministerial influence might be best invested not only in specific initiatives such as taskforces, but also in establishing a WoG approach to fragile states as a priority for central agencies. The institutional systems for ensuring accountability, transparency and sound fiscal management (i.e., budgeting, reporting, performance measurement and machinery of government) sit within the domain of the central agencies. Finding a way to better reconcile these systems and processes with the design and implementation of WoG initiatives in cross-cutting policy issues such as state fragility would be one way in which central agencies could facilitate WoG. There is some evidence that one strategy for better facilitating the development of WoG leadership is to integrate WoG targets and expectations into performance management frameworks (Vincent, Collaboration and Integrated Services in the NSW Public Sector, 1999).

Generally, political will is connected closely to the effective management of departmental power and preferences (OECD, 2003; Stewart & Brown, 2007). As the diverse perspectives of stakeholders divide around a politically sensitive issue, the political will for the issue will wane as well. Strong leaders will need to decide how much priority to give each group. Many of the issues related to the security-development nexus in fragile states (like Afghanistan) provoke strong feelings from a large group of stakeholders and consequently these issues have the potential to be divisive. The public is very likely to have strong and differing opinions about issues like Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan. It is also possible that certain topics, such as the role of military forces in the distribution of humanitarian aid, may be very divisive for WoG partners, despite a strategic framework that puts everyone on the same page. This example speaks to the
importance of having leaders at all levels of the organization that are skilled enough to effectively engage stakeholders, both internal and external to the WoG unit. Similarly, there is an argument that the support of senior leadership within government for cross-boundary work is a key element to growing organizational cultures that are more conducive to WoG initiatives (Government of Canada, 1996; Flinders, 2002).

Demonstrating in practice a commitment to collegiality and cultural understanding establishes expectations of behavior from junior staff. With this in mind, identifying, mentoring, promoting and rewarding leadership potential that promises to align well with an increasing focus on horizontal management is a key component in fostering WoG capabilities.

The importance of leadership does not end with the work of senior staff. Intermediate leaders and managers who are involved with more of the day to day efforts can also have a great impact on the success of the WoG team. From one perspective these individuals are in the best position to link WoG directives from senior staff and politicians with participatory, consultative processes that engage junior staff; they can potentially foster both top-down and bottom-up approaches that are both recommended as key strategies to implementing a WoG approach (Mason & Lanz, 2009). In contrast, these middle managers are often given a very small mandate for change and innovation that is not directly linked to specific outcomes, project deadlines or budget frameworks and as a result, they can be seen as a major impediment to WoG approaches that require flexibility and, potentially, a re-distribution of financial and human resources. This speaks to the importance of managers being given a formal directive from senior leadership that a WoG approach and its changing time frames, altered accountability frameworks and implications on resources is a priority.

Leaders who can “take a government-wide view when proceeding with departmental business and reviewing programs and initiatives and who can model the behaviour of good collaborative colleagues” (Management Advisory Committee, 2004, p. 48) are seen as having the ability to make a tremendous impact on the WoG team and its work. The literature on matrix and horizontal structures supports the importance of strong
leadership at every level within complex organizations; i.e., that certain leadership/management philosophies and characteristics are necessary to achieve success within the structure. In a 2004 paper Thomas Sy and Stephanie Cote identified four interpersonal challenges of the matrix. Misaligned goals between the two branches of authority within the matrix, lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities and a silo-focus can remain prevalent within the matrix despite the structured effort to instil a horizontal overlay to decrease the impact of the vertical lines of authority. Their paper suggests that leaders and/or managers who have strong emotional intelligence abilities are much more likely to overcome any of the four interpersonal challenges described above.

Silo-focus is prevalent. In matrix forms of organisation, emotionally intelligent individuals may not only cooperate better, but also foster collaboration in others. First, emotional intelligent individuals accurately perceive the emotions of others. Perceiving others’ emotions, such as interest and anxiety, is important to build strong relationships because such perception is necessary for empathy, and empathy enhances the quality of social relationships which lead to richer social networks that discourage silo-focused attitudes and behaviours (Sy & Cote, 2004, p. 452)

The final challenge facing a leader working with a WoG team is to remember that it cannot expect “all parties to an agreement to share a common “language”, cultural references or history. This means that leaders must “recognise the legitimate roles of others and the validity of their viewpoints, and work within them rather than blaming others for shortcomings of the system” (Johnson, 2005, p. 39). The hiring, training, recruitment, development and retention of leaders who can excel within the WoG initiatives may vary from established protocols within line departments, central agencies and the government as a whole. Given the important relationship that exists between an organizational structure and the abilities of individuals to lead and manage change within that structure, the ability to lead within horizontal structure is a critical consideration in the implementation of WoG.
Conclusion

This chapter set out to identify and explore the primary operational attributes of WoG as they are discussed and understood within the current literature. Resulting from this exercise is a preliminary model for WoG (see Figure 11) that captures the main operational attributes. The model attempts to demonstrate some commonalities amongst groups of attributes and proposes some early observations about which attributes should be considered more disruptive to operationalizing WoG. The attributes in blue are largely structural in nature and based on the analysis in this chapter are presented as being the most impervious to change. They are anchored in fundamental principles that guide the design and behaviour of public sector organizations, including ministerial accountability, parliamentary mandates and legislation that governs how money is spent. WoG innovations are not in impossible in these areas; however, they often require the mobilization of significant amounts of political will and/or investment of resources. In green are the attributes associated with the people-oriented systems within an organization. They are linked in many ways to the structural attributes; however, it may be possible to effect changes in these areas with small innovations that will require champions and leadership but not necessarily the political will of the prime minister’s office. Finally, in orange are two attributes that are much more about individuals and their immediate teams and supervisors. Opportunities to overcome barriers related to these attributes are more numerous and change occurs at a level that is much easier to manage and achieve, although in the short-term the overall impact may be experienced on a smaller scale. It is less about creating a new WoG unit and more about fostering the development of a cadre of WoG practitioners and a culture of collaboration. As an attribute the political environment sits in the centre of the model as a reminder that its existence is unique to cross-boundary efforts in public sector organizations and that it has the ability to influence to varying degrees all of the other attributes.

This preliminary model informed the development of semi-structured interview questions that were posed to public servants from Canada and the United Kingdom. In addition to capturing their impressions of WoG based on their lived experiences, the
interviews sought to gain some insights that better reflect the dynamic nature of WoG in practice; to identify new operational attributes, to reconceptualise the ones noted in this literature-based model, better capture dependencies that exist amongst the operational attributes and continue to identify those attributes that can be altered in a way that would incentivize WoG practices.
Figure 11: Preliminary framework: operational attributes of WoG organized by how difficult they are to influence.
Chapter 5: Case Study – Canada

In the decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Government of Canada advanced the concept of WoG as an approach to dealing with the complex economic, social and security issues facing Canadians at home and as a driving feature of the country’s international engagement in areas of conflict, fragility and underdevelopment worldwide. The leading example of Canada’s experimentation with WoG was the development, implementation and evolution of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and its funding mechanism the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). The case study presented in this chapter seeks to deepen our understanding of the WoG phenomenon by exploring the experiences and insights of practitioners, policy makers and military professionals who participated in international stabilization and humanitarian assistance campaigns between 2002 and 2012. In addition to the primary research noted above, the case analysis incorporates information and data gleaned from key government documents including internal evaluations and audits, white papers and annual management expenditure reports issued by government departments. This chapter begins by establishing the broader planning and policy environment influencing START and its WoG partners and goes on to identify the organizational actors who were in a position to impact the administration and governance of START. The second part of the chapter looks at the origins and evolution of START from 2005–2012 and highlights some important lessons learned that were captured through a series of internal program evaluations. The final part of the chapter presents the results of the thematically coded participant interview data. This discussion captures participant insights around core elements of their WoG experiences and identifies themes and topics around which participants’ opinions diverge as a result of their individual or departmental experiences with START (see summary Table 9). The conclusion synthesizes the key lessons learned from all components of the case study and summarizes how the Canadian experience with START advances our collective understanding of the WoG phenomenon.
Table 9: Summary of key findings from participant interviews: Canadian case

<table>
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<tr>
<th>INTERCONNECTED OPERATIONAL ATTRIBUTES</th>
<th>SUMMARY DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Actions speak louder than words: the importance of institutional commitment</td>
<td>A high-level, public enthusiasm for WoG is not always an indication that sufficient institutional commitment exists for an effective implementation of a WoG initiative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Into the maelstrom! Ministerial accountability, politics and wicked problems</td>
<td>Despite the cross-cutting nature of issues related to stabilization and humanitarian assistance, a perfect storm of issues resulted in ministerial accountability and departmental authority becoming more pronounced during this time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 The Culture – Structure – Human Resource Conundrum</td>
<td>There is a complex and problematic interplay between structure, culture and human resources. If the structures were not so rigid, the cultures not so well established, the sense of difference not quite so profound and the human resource systems more agile, cross-boundary collaboration might occur more organically.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Perspective Matters: Power, Politics &amp; Proximity to the Centre</td>
<td>WoG leaders and team members must appreciate the role of perspective and what conditions cause practitioners to be somewhat blind to perspectives that are different from their own.</td>
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<td>5 Being equipped to manage boundaries</td>
<td>Organizational boundaries cannot be ignored or destroyed. Instead, they must be aptly navigated and managed. Successful WoG is, therefore, strongly dependent on the skills, aptitudes and personality traits of the individuals involved.</td>
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<td>6 Developing a WoG Professional Cadre: joint training &amp; education</td>
<td>Joint training and education might foster the development a cross-departmental WoG professional cadre; a contingent of talented and versatile individuals equipped with skills necessary for cross-boundary collaboration but also the specialized abilities that would allow them to thrive in complex post-conflict or humanitarian emergencies.</td>
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Background: Programming, Policy and Operational Environments

This preliminary section of the case study examines the broader context in which START was designed and implemented. It looks to highlight the major events and political forces at play from 2002 to 2012 that may have impacted the network of actors involved with WoG initiatives in Canada and decisions related to the launch and evolution of START.

Domestic Considerations

The programming and policy environment in which START was conceptualized and implemented was dominated by a number of domestic issues and events. After more than a decade of Liberal government, Canada saw a number of changes in government between 2002 and 2012. These changing power dynamics, political priorities and ideological positions from which Canada’s role in the world was envisioned heavily influenced the political environment in which government programs, policy and military operations were conceptualized, designed and implemented. In late 2003, the long-serving Liberal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, stepped down and was succeeded by Paul Martin, the former Minister of Finance.12. The changing and, at times, uncertain landscape of Canadian politics is relevant to the case study in that it speaks to a certain ambiguity that existed for policy makers during this time. WoG as an approach to security and development crises, the 2005 International Policy Statement, START and the GPSF all originated under the mandate of a long-standing Liberal government. Whether these concepts and initiatives would continue to exist and/or how they might change under the management and foreign policy priorities of a different political party was an unknown. Was the commitment of the GPSF secure in its five-year horizon and under what conditions would the funds be accessible to START staff? Would the mandate of the initiative remain consistent as governments changed? Would changing foreign policy priorities influence the relationship between START and its WoG partners, which

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12 As Prime Minister, Martin led a majority government for only a short time (December 2003–Summer 2004). In the 2004 federal election Martin won a minority government for the Liberals but was only in power until February 2006 at which point the first of two Conservative minority governments led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper began. The Conservatives finally secured a majority government in May 2011.
included not only line departments and central agencies but emerging departmental and interdepartmental task forces working on hot priority areas such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Haiti?

In addition to the political consequences of consecutive minority governments, the administrative landscape was shaped extensively by several initiatives. Perhaps the one with the highest profile was the public inquiry known as the Gomery Commission (2004–2006), which was established to investigate allegations of mismanagement and corruption within the federal government’s sponsorship program in Quebec. The Commission’s final report, *Restoring Accountability – Recommendations*, tackled critical issues pertaining to ministerial accountability and the sound management of public resources. The report devoted an entire chapter to examining the complex relationship between ministers and their senior public servants (deputy ministers) and made an effort to clarify who was responsible for what within the context of federal government administration, management and leadership (CISPAA, 2006). The political reverberations of the scandal and the detailed work of the Commission brought the joint issues of accountability, responsibility and excellence in public management to the forefront of the minds of politicians, public servants and the Canadian public throughout the mid-aughts. It could be posited that any new government initiative launched during this period, especially an initiative associated with significant public funds, would not have much room for creative approaches to accountability frameworks. In many ways the imperative of vertical or ministerial accountability was more prominent and fiercely guarded during this period than any other in recent memory thereby creating a management environment in which WoG was recognized as important but had to be pursued within the parameters of established accountability frameworks.

Equally relevant to the policy and programming environment of the day was a series of initiatives intended to make the management of government more efficient and effective. The 2003 Public Service Modernization Act (PSMA) set out to modernize federal human resources management by creating “a more flexible staffing framework to manage and support employees and to attract the best people, when and where they are needed” (TBS, 2008). Outputs of the PSMA included the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) and the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS). The MAF was
designed to “ensure that federal departments and agencies are well managed, accountable and that resources are allocated to achieve results” (TBS, 2014, para 2) and focused on management practices most relevant to deputy ministers whose profile in the accountability discourse had been heightened by the Gomery Commission. Amongst its programs and initiatives designed to develop critical skills and competencies of Canadian public servants, the CSPS fostered research and learning initiatives related to horizontal management. Most notable of these was the 2004 research of Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet published by the CSPS in a report entitled The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership.

Finally, in 2005 the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) introduced the Management, Resources and Results Structure (MRRS) Policy, which was designed to improve management within all government departments. The policy presented a framework focused on the identification of strategic outcomes, a program activity architecture, performance measures and governance structure for each department that were intended to “support results-based management practices across the federal government; demonstrate value for money; and provide key stakeholders with the information necessary to support decision-making” (Scratch, 2005, p. 1). In addition to influencing the management environment in which START was launched, the MRRS policy also advanced the concept of WoG within the Canadian government by introducing both a standardized management language across departments and a common information framework that allowed for a wider and more effective transfer of information across departments.

As the TBS embedded WoG within its vernacular so did departments such as DFAIT, CIDA and DND. All three units used the terminology extensively in their annual Reports on Priorities and Planning (RPPs) in the period 2002–2012. Early in this window the term was used most often in reference to the International Policy Statement, which is explored in more detail in the next section. For example, in 2004 CIDA referenced the new direction it intended to embark upon. This three-year plan included reference to “taking an integrated whole-of-government approach to development” that brings together “diplomacy, development, defence and trade in a coherent, WoG vision for sustainable development in developing countries and countries in transition” (CIDA,
When the major shift in political power occurred in 2006, certain cross-boundary terms such as ‘3D’ and ‘human security’ – strongly associated with the Liberal agenda – were expunged from the government vocabulary. However, WoG persisted amongst the major international players, especially the OECD and its focus on fragile states. Perhaps, for this reason, the Conservative government continued to use WoG as the term of reference used to advance the idea of a coherent and comprehensive approach to international security and development issues. The term conveyed a sense of efficiency and effectiveness associated with mobilizing multiple streams of resources in a manner that reduced duplication of effort or working at cross-purposes. It remained an organizational approach through which DFAIT advanced its priorities up to 2012. Similarly, CIDA and DND consistently incorporated WoG in the language they used to describe their strategic outcomes, program activities and priority areas. They often associated the term with specific departmental activities in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan and used it to highlight critical, strategic connections between the three internationally focused departments.

**International Considerations**

Beyond Canada’s borders a number of events and initiatives heavily influenced the environment in which START and its WoG partners worked, many of which were explored in great detail in the introductory chapter. In short, the events of 9/11 and the resulting realization that state borders and defences were increasingly permeable and vulnerable to non-traditional acts of aggression led to an intensified culture of fear in western countries and the security discourse in these countries became dominated by a new ‘enemy’. After 9/11 the threat to western governments and societies became more tangible and, at the same time, the ‘enemy’ became more opaque. Non-state actors, in the form of insurgents and terrorists, were not obligated or inclined to fight within the ‘rules

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13 In its 2006 RPP, DFAIT made reference to WoG on 58 occasions and, of special note, linked the term as part of ensuring the foreign ministry is both “modern and agile” (p. 65). In 2007, the RPP included no reference to WoG but nine references were made to ‘all-of-government’ as though the department was experimenting with new term that had no association with the Liberal brand. By 2008, WoG returned to the DFAIT vernacular and was used in the RPP 38 times.

14 Specific examples of departmental commitment to Canada’s WOG approach to areas of conflict and instability can be found at: DND, 2008, pp. 26-27; CIDA, 2007, p.10; DND, 2009, p. 29; CIDA, 2012a, p. 18.
of war’ and were associated with “decentralized shadow economies, trans-border migratory flows and non-state global insurgent networks that, in an interdependent world, are able to threaten international stability” (Duffield, 2005, p. 143). The failed, fragile and failing states discourse dominated the security and development agendas of western countries, including Canada where they were a dominant priority in the country’s 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS). A result of the Liberal government’s comprehensive review of all facets of its foreign policy, the IPS was presented as an integration of policies, priorities and future directions for the departments of foreign affairs (diplomacy), defence, development and international trade. A WoG undertaking of its own, the IPS was grounded in the position that “Canada is a vibrant liberal democracy, with both regional and global responsibilities, whose success is intimately tied to a stable international order” (IPS, p. 5). In many ways it was the platform from which the START initiative was announced as the IPS presented START as the vehicle through which the country’s policy and programming efforts in fragile states were to be coordinated. State fragility was also a priority for the international community where organizations such as the OECD undertook the challenge of crafting standard operation procedures or terms of reference for engaging in failed states. In 2007, the OECD put forth 10 principles intended to guide the work of actors involved in “development co-operations, peacebuilding, state-building and security in fragile and conflict-affected states” (OECD, 2007a, para 2). Known as the Fragile States Principles, these guidelines were adopted by OECD members, including Canada.

In the period 2002–2012, the most high-profile efforts undertaken by the international community in the fight against global terrorism were large-scale counter-insurgency and stabilization campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which involved multi-actor, multi-pronged operations along a number of policy and operational fronts: diplomacy, development (short and longer term) and security (military and police) (Muggah, 2014; Stoddard & Harmer, 2006). The US-led War on Terror which began in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks informed much of Canada’s foreign policy as it pertained to the country’s involvement in the fight against al-Qaeda, development assistance in fragile states and its counter-terrorism efforts broadly. In 2001 the decision was made to contribute Canadian Forces personnel and resources to a US-led coalition of
international partners that had been established to dismantle al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the Taliban from power. This policy decision set Canada on a trajectory that resulted in a costly decade-long commitment to the UN-sanctioned, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and, more specifically, the PRT responsible for counter-insurgency, stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the volatile Afghan province of Kandahar.

So critical were questions related to the nature, effectiveness and duration of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan to the Canadian public and politicians that in 2007 an independent panel was struck to make recommendations about the country’s future role in Afghanistan. Chaired by former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley the panel produced a final report in 2008, commonly referred to as the Manley Report. This document yielded a series of recommendations that would advise Parliament and guide Canada’s post-2009 approach in Afghanistan. The recommendations spoke in a language that was strongly WoG; they referred to a “comprehensive strategy” that would be “more coherent” and focus on “security, better governance and development” (p. 34). Of special note was the report’s recommendation for a new high-level task force:

...the Canadian government needs to elevate coordination in Ottawa among Canadian departments and agencies engaged in Afghanistan for better efficiency and effectiveness ... separate departmental task forces are not the answer to inadequate coordination of Canadian activities. These coordinating efforts would have stronger effect, and achieve greater cross-government coherence, if they were led by the Prime Minister, supported by a cabinet committee and staffed by a single full-time task force. Fulfilling Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan requires the political energy only a Prime Minister can impart (DFAIT, 2008c, p. 28).

A result of this recommendation was the creation of the powerful Afghanistan Task Force (ATF), which joined the cast of WoG actors in 2009. ATF represented another level of coordination and an interesting contrast in organizational design and purpose to START. Overall, Afghanistan had a dominating influence on all aspects of Canadian foreign policy during the 2002–2012 window.15

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15 DND stated that over 39,000 members of the armed forces “served in an Afghanistan theatre of operations or in support of the mission from other locations around the world” (DND, 2014). Stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan persisted as a stated priority of DFAIT, DND and
Other major international influences on the programming and policy environment in which START was launched and implemented included WoG–branded approaches to Canada’s military, diplomatic and development objectives and priorities in Haiti (Government of Canada, 2013) and, to a lesser extent, Sudan. Haiti was an international priority for Canada long before the devastating 2010 earthquake that wracked the country. Haiti’s political, social and economic systems experienced turbulence throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and the country could be identified as both conflict-afflicted and struggling with short- and long-term development priorities. In 2006 the Canadian government earmarked $520 million to be spent during the window of July 2006–September 2011 for reconstruction and development in the country (CIDA, 2006a). Canada’s heightened interest in Haiti could be attributed to common ties between the two countries related to language and culture, which were accentuated by a large Haitian diaspora living in Canada. Moreover, the Canadian government was committed to building relationships with countries located in the Americas and La Francophonie. The devastating earthquake exacerbated Haiti’s governance, economic and social problems and Canada’s military, diplomats and aid workers had a major role to play in immediate humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts along with longer-term reconstruction and development. As demonstrated through targeted evaluations of the GPSF in 2007 and 2009, both Haiti and Sudan were countries in which START and its WoG partners in the Canadian government operated and delivered programs extensively throughout the 2000s (DFAIT, 2007; DFAIT, 2009).

While START and Canada’s role in international stabilization and reconstruction remained core elements of the country’s foreign policy despite the frequently occurring federal elections, other priority areas did emerge and change over the decade emphasizing the competing interests at play for policy makers and practitioners affiliated with START during this time. Under the Conservative government and in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, economic priorities that might traditionally have been advanced solely by

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the international trade branch of DFAIT began to emerge as drivers of other foreign policy decisions. Enhancing the economic competitiveness of the country by focusing on growing and emerging markets was the number one priority of DFAIT from 2009 to 2012, ahead of even Canada’s role in Afghanistan (DFAIT, 2010, 2011, and 2012). The presentation of the country’s economic prosperity and its security as mutually reinforcing not only influenced the work of DFAIT, but also shaped the priorities of other government departments:

...an issue that is preoccupying the entire international community (is) exceptional volatility and uncertainty in the global economy, which is adversely affecting jobs, credit markets, and business and consumer confidence. Given these unprecedented events, the Government of Canada has pushed its response to the global economic downturn to the very forefront of its policy and program agendas. (p. 9).

Other foreign policy priorities to emerge under the auspices of the Conservative government included: re-building Canada’s relationship with the United States (DFAIT, 2008a), Arctic sovereignty (DFAIT, 2011a), the Global Commerce Strategy (DFAIT, 2011a), increasing food security (CIDA, 2010a, 2011 and 2012a) and the 2010 Muskoka Initiative on maternal, newborn and child health, which was adopted quickly as a development priority that the Canadian government wanted to champion internationally (CIDA, 2011; Government of Canada, 2014).

Whole-of-Government (WoG) Actors

It is not possible to tell the story of START without recognizing its organizational and governance relationships within the Government of Canada. This included several key departments that might be referred to as WoG partners to START and to each other. Many of these departments were made mention of earlier in this chapter. What follows is a brief introduction to each organizational unit, its relationship with START and key policies and legislation that informed its work in relation to START. This part of the case study begins with an overview of those departments most commonly associated with WoG efforts responding to conflict, fragility and instability: defence, diplomacy and development. However, this section will also include the under-explored central agencies
and the international assistance envelope (IAE).

**Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)**

DFAIT was the organizational home of START and the GPSF and, as such, was the lead department responsible for managing START’s fiscal responsibilities, realizing its mandate, auditing its performance and reporting to Parliament on its work. From the perspective of budget, staff, scope and political influence, DFAIT was a mammoth department within the Canadian public service. With well over 10,000 full-time equivalent staff located at headquarters in Ottawa and embassies and missions around the world, DFAIT was the international face of the Canadian government and responsible for conducting “all official diplomatic communications and negotiations between the Government of Canada and other countries and international organizations” (DFAIT, 2012, p. 4).

DFAIT and its areas of authority were established in 1985 by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act. While its mandate did not change during the 2002–2012 window, DFAIT underwent a number of organizational restructuring and rebranding initiatives during this period. Plans to recognize the foreign affairs and international trade branches of the department as separate units were advanced under Martin’s Liberal government and then reversed when the Conservatives gained power in 2006. Consequently, departmental publications and letterhead during this time were marked by a rapid succession of different departmental names: Foreign Affairs Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The changes could be associated with the changing agendas of various governments; however, they also reflected a more in-depth understanding of how the nature of work involved with advancing Canadian interests in the international arena was changing rapidly throughout the decade. Departmental transformation was referenced first as an area of focus for the department in January 2005 and again in 2008 when a six-prong transformation agenda was advanced that focused less on organizational change and more on sharpening and clarifying the focus of the department’s work (DFAIT, 2008a). Framed in the context of the increasingly complex and ever-changing nature of issues, events and networks of actors influencing Canadian
interests abroad, the 2008 transformation agenda spoke of enhancements that would demonstrate operational flexibility, the ability to respond to unforeseen events and the role of WoG as the perspective with which the department would manage the country’s international relations (DFAIT, 2008a).

Of special note was the observation made by the department in 2006 that DFAIT was in the midst of an evolution from “a policy-oriented organization to one also heavily involved in program and project design, management and delivery, especially with respect to security issues” (DFAIT, 2006, p. 23). As will be discussed throughout this chapter, this evolution within DFAIT was strongly impacted by the emergence of START, its broad mandate and the dynamic and volatile nature of the operational environment in which START worked. In one sense, START enhanced DFAIT’s role as a leader in the WoG approach to coordinating and managing responses to international crises, but could also be seen as a source of organizational change that altered DFAIT’s way of working and, as a result, its relationship with other government departments, most notably CIDA and DND.

DFAIT’s relationship with CIDA is relevant to the Canadian case study presented here, especially as a point of contrast to the relationship between the counterpart units in the UK government (discussed in Chapter 6). While day-to-day responsibility for CIDA fell under the direct auspices of the Minister of International Cooperation, CIDA was legally part of the DFAIT portfolio and its Minister was junior to the more powerful Minister of Foreign Affairs:

*The powers, duties and functions of the Minister [of Foreign Affairs] extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction, not by law assigned to any other department, board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada, including international trade and commerce and international development ... in exercising his powers and carrying out his duties and functions under this Act, the Minister shall have the control and supervision of the Canadian International Development Agency (DFAIT Act, 1985, point 10 and 10.2.f).*

In an organization the size of DFAIT with the scope of its international mandate, the practical manifestation of the relationship described above was that CIDA headquarters were physically separate from the main DFAIT offices, the agency made its own
submissions (separate from DFAIT) through the government’s expenditure management system, reported to Parliament through its Minister, managed its portion of the international assistance envelope in conformity with its specific organizational mandate and fostered an organizational culture distinct from the DFAIT culture. Still, DFAIT was the primary guardian of Canada’s involvement with the world beyond its borders and established the strategic priorities and direction that guided the work of the entire DFAIT portfolio.

Finally, beyond the START initiative, DFAIT staff and units were a part of the WoG ecosystem, especially as it pertained to Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan. As an outcome of the Manley report and in an effort to achieve greater operational cohesion between Canadian military and civilian actors working in country, a new civilian administrative position was created: the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (the RoCK). In addition to coordinating the Canadian civilians in Kandahar, the RoCK and the “military commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan – who also commanded Task Force Kandahar (TFK) – were responsible for coordinating all of their actions and all of their public messages” (Marten, 2010, p. 228). The first person assigned the position was a DFAIT diplomat, Elissa Golberg, who after her tenure as the RoCK went on to serve as Executive Director of START. This was the first of many examples in which government officials who demonstrated proficiency in boundary-spanning collaboration, relationship management and leadership advanced along career paths that continued to leverage these skills.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

CIDA was established in 1968 with a mandate to administer the majority of Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) program. In 1995 CIDA’s responsibilities were expanded to include the administration of official assistance (OA) to countries in transition, namely countries in central and Eastern Europe that were experiencing economic, political and social destabilization in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between 2002 and 2012, CIDA worked to accomplish its ODA/OA mandate through the stated goals of reducing poverty, promoting human rights and
supporting sustainable development (CIDA, 2007). From 2008–2012, the organization framed its work as follows:

The mandate of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is to manage Canada’s aid program effectively and accountably to achieve meaningful, sustainable development results, and to engage in policy development in Canada and internationally, enabling Canada to realize its development objectives. Canada recognizes that achieving significant economic, social and democratic progress in the developing world will increase the prosperity and long-term security of Canadians, promote our values, reduce poverty for billions of people in recipient countries, and contribute to a better and safer world (CIDA, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Like its internationally focused counterparts, early in the decade CIDA was focused on its contribution to the International Policy Statement, as result of which the organization made a point of adopting the WoG vocabulary and emphasizing the importance of an integrated, WoG approach to development. In subsequent years, CIDA’s work was influenced by changing governments and ministers and new TBS processes and guidelines intended to yield a more efficient and targeted use of government resources. More specifically, in 2006 a federal budget was presented in which “the Government of Canada reaffirmed its commitment to double international assistance between 2001 and 2011” (CIDA, 2006a, p. 2). It is important to note, however, that international assistance and official development assistance, the latter of which was the domain of CIDA, have different meanings. The former included ODA but also government funds earmarked for Canada’s commitments to international financial institutions, global peace and security programs and crises overseas. An increase in international assistance did not necessarily translate to a direct increase to funds available to CIDA. In that same year, the new Minister for International Cooperation identified a new approach that would result in the concentration of aid in fewer countries, which would be:

...chosen on the basis of their needs and their abilities to use aid effectively and on Canada’s capacity to make a concrete difference. Resources will also be used to support countries of strategic importance to Canada, for example, to support efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and Haiti. (CIDA, 2006a, p. 1).
This evolution of CIDA’s approach to its work was reinforced in 2007 when CIDA adopted the new TBS program activity architecture (PAA) and used this management framework to establish categories of priority countries that focused the agency’s efforts in high-impact areas: countries of concentration, fragile state and/or countries experiencing humanitarian crises and selected countries and regions (CIDA, 2007). These strategic categories continued until 2010 when the categories were rebranded (fragile countries and crisis-affected communities, low-income countries and middle-income countries) and, as per the OECD’s determination of ODA-eligible countries, the low- and middle-income countries were identified based on annual gross national income (GNI). CIDAs focus on strategic categories and the agency’s desire to concentrate aid resources caused concerns that ODA was being distributed in a manner that first served the security interests of the Canadian government (Black, 2009) and which threatened to detract from CIDA’s primary focus of poverty reduction (Brown, 2007; Cameron, 2007).

CIDA’s growing role in crisis zones such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan was demonstrated in the agency’s PAA where fragile states and crisis-affected communities were identified as priority areas for CIDA funding and programming efforts. The prioritization of issues and events related to fragility and instability increased CIDA’s interaction with other government departments that worked in this space and, as a result, the agency became a key player in specific WoG initiatives such as START and the PCO-led Afghanistan Task Force. By 2008 the agency was acknowledging the practical implications of working in crisis-affected areas including challenges related to the number of actors and interests present in the programming environment, the increased physical risks to the health and safety of staff, and the profound difficulty in achieving desirable, measurable impacts in the face of interconnected security and development issues (CIDA, 2008).

As CIDA’s mandate was focused on the administration of Canada’s ODA, any changes to the definition, focus or management of ODA within the international community could impact the work of the agency. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which yielded five principles and a roadmap intended to make ODA

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17 The 5 Principles for Smart Aid included: Ownership (Developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption), Alignment (Donor countries and organizations
more effective, strongly influenced how CIDA was to go about accomplishing its mandate. From this perspective CIDA was always in a challenging position of being responsible to the Canadian government and the interests of Canadians – as any unit of the federal government would be – and also adhering to international standards, best practices and terms of eligibility negotiated by the DAC of the OECD and adopted by member states, including Canada. The question of ODA eligibility was especially important for all donor countries during the 2002–2012 time period as fragile states emerged as dominant priority areas and resulted in development programs and military campaigns taking place jointly within a time and space. The OECD stated clearly that “No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA. Anti-terrorism activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible” (OECD, 2015). The question of whether or not ODA funds could be used to fund military activities in humanitarian zones or the distribution of humanitarian assistance by military personnel was controversial on a number of fronts. It was heavily contested by practitioners, especially organizations outside of government, who felt this “securitization of the humanitarian space” allowed donor countries to move ODA funds towards regions and countries that were seen as security threats and away from less strategically important countries that still might have a great need for poverty-alleviation programming (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006). In late 2007, Canada’s aid program was reviewed by the DAC. Of special relevance to the START case study, the review recognized “Canada's progress in areas such as its WoG approach to working with fragile states (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), humanitarian action in Africa, and increases in the aid budget” (p. 4) but flagged areas for improvement such as “continuing to increase aid to meet Canada’s commitments made at Monterrey; focusing its aid on fewer partner countries to generate stronger impact; and galvanizing the implementation of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” (CIDA, 2008, p. 4). In addition to the Paris Declaration and the 2007 DAC review, CIDA’s work from 2002–2012 was also heavily bring their support in line with these strategies and use local systems, Harmonisation (Donor countries and organizations co-ordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication), Managing for Results (Developing countries and donors focus on producing – and measuring – results) and Mutual Accountability (Donors and developing countries are accountable for development results). (OECD, 2005)
informed by the 2000 United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus.

On the Canadian front, legislation entitled the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act was passed in 2008 with the stated purpose of clarifying the purpose and manner of Canadian ODA expenditures:

*The purpose of this Act is to ensure that all Canadian official development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on poverty reduction and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2, 2005, sustainable development and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights standards (Government of Canada, 2008, point 2.1)*

The Act also provided a suite of definitions that clarified the government’s understanding of terms such as Canadian values, international assistance, international human rights standards and civil society organizations. In the same year the agency produced a document that reflected the increasing importance of fragile states to its mandate. *An Internal Guide for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States. On the Road to Recovery: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty and Fragility*\(^{18}\) circulated as an internal document and made an effort to capture the nuances and key areas of focus for Canada’s interaction with fragile states. Aligned with similar international efforts at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the document makes note of the importance of WoG approaches and references the role of START in coordinating Canada’s WoG approach.

Given the high-profile nature of issues and events related to security and underdevelopment in fragile states and their stated importance as priority areas for the Government of Canada, it made sense for CIDA to be closely linked to the START initiative in DFAIT. In fact, the 2005 submission for “Approval of a Fund to Implement Activities under the Global Peace and Security Fund and to Establish the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force” was made jointly by the two organizations (Foreign

\(^{18}\) This document was not made publicly available; however, its existence has been discussed in academic literature (Patrick & Brown, 2007). The document was also mentioned and shared by several interview participants.
Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2011). Despite CIDA’s role in START’s origins and ongoing governance structure (CIDA had a seat on the START Advisory Board), which are explored in more detail later in this chapter, START was seen clearly by government staff, politicians and actors beyond government as a DFAIT initiative (Patrick & Brown, 2007; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009; Marten, 2010).

**Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF)**

The Canadian Defence portfolio included both the civilian Department of National Defence (DND) and its military arm, the Canadian Forces (CF). For ease of reference the Defence portfolio is referred to in this analysis as DND because both the civilian and military branches worked in close cooperation, fell jointly under the authority of the Minister of National Defence and were governed by the same piece of legislation, the 1985 National Defence Act. Broadly stated, the mandate of DND was to “defend Canada and Canadian interest and values while contributing to international peace and security” (DND, 2005, p. 6). It is in the latter case that DND’s policy and operational space overlapped in a variety of dimensions with the policy and programming space of DFAIT and CIDA, especially in the case of specific operational arenas such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. DND resources, expertise and operational capacity were critical to Canada’s contribution to the war on terror and international counter-terrorism efforts more broadly. They were also mobilized for several catastrophic natural disasters such as the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Such events called for a spectrum of possible responses from DND – from a broad-scale investment of soldiers and resources in a ‘boots-on-the-ground’ mission to the rapid deployment of small, specially trained units such as the Disaster Assistance Response team (DART).

As with DFAIT and CIDA, organizational transformation was a major theme for DND from 2002–2012. The decade began with DND participating fully in both the international policy review, which would result in the International Policy Statement, and its own defence policy review. Change came in 2006 when the federal election yielded a new Conservative minority government that quickly stated its intent to clarify a new vision for and approach to managing and investing in the Canadian Forces. After years of
fiscal restraint under Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government that included significant reductions in defence spending, the 2006 Budget\textsuperscript{19} reflected the most “significant investment in the Canadian Forces in three decades” (DND, 2006). As part of its stated effort to refocus government spending on the priorities of Canadians and strengthen Canada’s role in the world, the budget committed $5.3 billion over five years to enhance the capacity of the CF (Government of Canada, 2006). Following the 2008 federal election, which yielded another minority government but more seats and votes for the governing Conservatives, the Prime Minister reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Canada’s military by unveiling a new roadmap for modernizing the CF entitled the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS).

\textit{The Canadian Forces will need to be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team will constitute a core element of a whole-of-government approach to meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.} (CFDS, 2008, p. 3/4).

The CFDS laid out Defence priorities and strategic outcomes to guide efforts to build capacity within the Canadian Forces with the aim of ensuring Canada’s military could achieve success with respect to its domestic and international commitments.

The single biggest operational priority for DND during the 2002–2012 period was achieving mission success in Afghanistan. As the mission in Afghanistan grew in resource intensity, operational complexity and political importance over the course of the decade, so did DND’s proclivity for recognizing the relationship between mission success and effective coordination with its WoG partners:

\textit{Internationally, an integrated approach combining diplomacy, defence and development is the best strategy for supporting states, including failed and failing states, that are dealing with a broad range of interconnected problems. Defence will co-operate closely with other government departments, non-government organizations and other organizations on the developing situations in Haiti, Sudan and the Middle East, while}

\textsuperscript{19} While the re-investment in the Canadian Forces began during Paul Martin’s short tenure as Prime Minister, it was aligned closely with the new Conservative government’s platform and was a necessary position given the dramatic changes in the international security environment and Canada’s involvement in fragile states.
maintaining its efforts on Afghanistan. Defence will work closely with DFAIT and CIDA representatives when they are in theatre, thereby increasing co-operation at the tactical and operational levels by using the ‘Whole of Government Approach’.” (DND, 2006, p. 62)

As a key partner in any WoG undertaking coordinated by START, DND could be broadly understood as supportive of the concept. Indicators of this assessment included a demonstrated organizational commitment to fostering strategic partnerships with other government departments (OGDs) that appears throughout DND publications. In its 2004 RPP the department made reference to a significant increase in the “number of CF officers seconded and posted to liaison assignments with other government institutions” (DND, 2004, p. 47). A similar claim was made by the department in 2005, reflecting DND’s support of mobilizing human resources in a way that optimized opportunities for information sharing and coordinating across departments. As a point of contrast, a search of DFAIT and CIDA RPP reports from 2002–2012 yields no reference to secondments or liaison positions. Additionally, a number of DND forums tasked with capturing lessons learned, sharing best practices or translating the practical experiences of soldiers and defence policy staff into theoretical frameworks and models for contemplation amongst broader communities of practice generated important knowledge concerning the understanding of WoG.20 Similarly, the Canadian Forces College, a training and leadership development facility with a mission of preparing “selected senior Canadian Armed Forces officers, international military, public service and private sector leaders, for joint command and staff appointments or future strategic responsibilities within a complex global security environment” (Government of Canada, 2014) produced a wealth of research on topics related to Canada’s WoG efforts in Afghanistan as outputs of its Master of Defence Studies graduate program (Sing, 2010; Hendrigan, 2008). Arguably, the culture of DND reflected a greater commitment to capturing and sharing insights from

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20 The Canadian Military Journal, the official professional journal of the CF, produced opinion pieces and articles that explored the merits and challenges associated with various facets of Canada’s WoG approach in Afghanistan: leadership through cabinet-level oversight (Buchan, 2010), the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (St-Louis L.-C. M.-H., 2009); the alignment of 3D coordination principles with counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics (Confliffe, 2009); the evolution of Canadian CIMIC to its current practic in the Afghanistan theatre (Longhurst, 2006-2007) developing Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public capability within the Forces (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008), provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) (Maloney S., 2003)
its staff in publicly available literature than was displayed by other government departments discussed in this case.

As previously discussed, the overlapping security and development issues in fragile states generated extensive discussion and concerns around what role, if any, a military organization should have in the delivery of principled humanitarian action. In fact, this topic was explored at some length in a 2007 Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, which sought to determine whether Canadian troops would be able to achieve mission success in Afghanistan. The committee examined the spectrum of interventions that were required in the conflict zone (from humanitarian assistance to counter-insurgency and reconstruction) and the challenges facing civil-military coordination at a system level.

_We agree that where professional aid agencies are able to do so, they, not military forces, should deliver such assistance. Military commanders also agree. The problem arises when professional agencies cannot, or will not, engage a suffering population. This is the problem in Kandahar province_ (Standing Committee on National Defence, 2007, p. 77).

DND was quite clear that it believed it had an important role to play within the system of actors responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance in crisis-affected regions of the world. “In the whole-of-government approach to the problem of failed and failing states, Defence has the task of providing the secure environment that lays the foundation for the delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance” (DND, 2007, p. 3). In every RPP from 2004 to 2012, DND identifies the direct or indirect provision of humanitarian assistance as an aspect of its contribution to international peace and security. Additionally, DND was home to a number of specific sub-units whose work was critical to the humanitarian assistance ecosystem including the previously mentioned DART and Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, whose role it was to “provide planning, rapid response and oversight capabilities to conduct all overseas operations including humanitarian, peace support and combat operations” (DND, 2008). In both cases DND recognized its critical capacity in the rapid deployment of staff, equipment and funding, which could not be matched by its WoG partners such as DFAIT and CIDA.
Central Agencies

WoG commonly refers to an assortment of departments whose individual mandates cause them to share a multi-issue, multi-actor policy or programming environment. Each department has the authority to work on certain issues or provide certain services on behalf of its government. In the Canadian case this collection of partners was discussed largely in the context of the ‘big three’ or 3D: diplomacy (DFAIT), defence (DND) and development (CIDA) along with a network of departments with specialized expertise relevant to stabilization and reconstruction in fragile states. Rarely, however, did the academic literature discuss or even recognize the role of central agencies such as the PCO or the TBS in its exploration of WoG approaches, initiatives and mindsets. The one exception to this trend was reference to the role of PCO as the institutional home to the high-level Afghanistan Task Force (Patrick & Brown, 2007).

The overall tendency to pass over or neglect the role of the central agencies may be attributed to a disciplinary divide between the bodies of literature associated with security studies, international development studies and public administration. The latter discipline would be more likely to incorporate the central agencies in research around the mechanics of concepts such as horizontality, collaborative public management or joined-up government. However, as has been discussed, the public administration literature rarely addressed these concepts through the lens of the internationally focused government portfolios and, as a result, generally fails to incorporate the tensions and opportunities associated with civil–military interactions. In contrast, security studies, international relations and international development studies would naturally examine the boundaries between those organizational units pressed to work together in the operational or programming space (including the military), but rarely consider the role of central agencies in cross-boundary collaboration. This analysis is framed from the outset as being both comprehensive and interdisciplinary; consequently, it posits that the role of the central agencies as guardians of government-wide policy coherence, fiscal management, organizational structure and concentrated political power are critical to understanding cross-boundary collaboration within the Canadian federal government and should be included in any systematic exploration of START.
The term ‘central agency’ is intended to differentiate the work of several key units at the centre of the Canadian governance model – PCO, TBS and the Finance Department – from the line departments noted above. Central agencies have a coordinating role within the government structure and the authority to manage the systems, processes and authorities that determine how government’s work is accomplished, whereas line departments “provide services directly to Canadians and do not have the authority or mandate to direct other departments in their operations” (Smith, 2009, p. 1). The coordination or facilitation role of central agencies pertains to government-wide functions such as: financial management, performance management, human resource management, information management, machinery of government, procurement, priority-setting and institutional reform. Central agencies also hold a challenge function deemed an essential feature of the responsibilities they hold for ensuring that government resources are managed in a responsible and transparent manner and that the work of departments is aligned with the priorities of Cabinet and the Prime Minister. The challenge function can be applied at any point that a line departments engages with the centre: budget negotiations, memorandums of understanding between departments, protocols and authorities for new funding arrangements or proposals for new units or government structures. While the review and approval protocols are an important aspect of responsible government they are also a source of the cumbersome bureaucracy associated with public sector institutions. As such, central agencies can often be perceived as being at odds with the efforts of line departments to be innovative, creating an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dynamic in department/central agency relations. The following pages will introduce the PCO and TBS as key actors in the design, implementation, and evolution of START.

Privy Council Office (PCO)
The Privy Council Office’s mandate was best described as follows:

The mandate of the Privy Council Office (PCO) is to serve Canada and Canadians by providing the best professional, non-partisan advice and support to the Prime Minister, the ministers within the Prime Minister’s portfolio and the Cabinet. PCO supports the development of the Government of Canada’s policy agenda; coordinates responses to issues facing the Government and the country; and supports the effective operation of the Cabinet. (PCO, 2010, p. 1)
As part of the system that managed the process through which policy objectives were achieved through formal legislation (the Memorandum to Cabinet), the work of the PCO heavily impacted the design, approval and launch of new organizational units such as START, which was established within DFAIT following government approvals obtained through a Memorandum to Cabinet process. The DFAIT–CIDA submission would have been crafted in consultation with PCO staff, specifically those working in the Machinery of Government secretariat, which guided the Prime Minister on all decisions related to the “the structure, organization and functioning of government” (PCO, 2011, p. 9).

Another major role of the PCO was to help “other government departments and agencies to deliver on their core mandates by working to ensure an integrated, cross-government response to issues that affect Canadians” (PCO, 2010, p. 5). In this sense, PCO was itself a WoG initiative within the federal government. It accomplished its coordination mandate through formal and informal mechanisms of consultation that ranged from “informal telephone calls between analysts to interdepartmental consultations to specially convened meetings of deputy ministers” (PCO, 2010, p. 28). With enough political and administrative clout to be able to convene deputy ministers and with easy access to powerful cabinet-level committees such as the Foreign and Defence Policy Committee, some role-confusion between PCO and START would be understandable. How do staff navigate this organizational relationship? What are the practical, daily implications of two coordinating bodies – more meetings, more networks, more consultation? Does the power of the PCO impact START’s ability to foster the relationships with its WoG partners that are necessary for the unit to achieve its own coordination mandate?

Additional circumstances brought START’s coordination and programming efforts into the orbit and influence of the PCO. In short, the PCO is the unit within the public service tasked to provide non-political advice and guidance on all policy issues relevant to the work of government and the interests of the Prime Minister. Like all government units the PCO has both an administrative, non-political head – a deputy minister – and a political head accountable to Parliament for the performance and management of the unit. The political head of the PCO is, in fact, the Prime Minister, which means that if a policy issue was of great priority to the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet then resources within the PCO would be devoted accordingly. Certainly START’s mandate for coordinating the government’s stabilization, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance efforts in fragile states at a time when events in certain fragile states were huge political priorities for the Prime Minister and his Cabinet would suggest that at the height of the Afghanistan conflict, the relationships between START, its DFAIT leadership team, its WoG partners and various secretariats within the PCO would have been under intense scrutiny.

_Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS)_

**Whereas the PCO’s major functions fall under the domain of policy formulation and policy advice (including advice to the Prime Minister on organizational structure and function), the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) is focused on the ethical and responsible management of government human and financial resources and as such has an oversight role of the ‘financial management functions in departments and agencies’. In the same way that the PCO secretariats or administrative bodies support the work of Cabinet and its committees, the TBS supports the single cabinet committee to which it is responsible – the Treasury Board, which is best understood as the general manager of the Canadian government. With authorities established in the _Financial Administration Act_, the TBS manages the expenditure management system of the government, which includes establishing the processes, protocols and standards through which the various departments report on how they plan and prioritize the use of financial resources available to them. Main Estimates, Reports on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports are examples of the documentation submitted annually by departments to establish departmental priorities, expected results, necessary resource requirements and concrete accomplishments (TBS, 2010). Like the PCO, the TBS can be seen as a WoG initiative in its own right as it works to standardize and enhance the responsible and transparent management of government resources and, in doing so, must always be aware of the big picture: overarching financial commitments and government-wide priorities that establish the mandate to which all individual departments contribute. Under the tenure of the Conservative government, the TBS used a Whole of Government
Framework to help align departmental priorities and activities with a set of “high-level outcome areas defined for the government as a whole” (TBS, 2010, para 1).

It is important to note that the TBS use of the term WoG is not completely aligned at a conceptual level with the WoG terminology advanced by START, its key departmental partners within the Canadian government and the broader security-development actors on the international stage, such as the OECD. TBS’s WoG framework is a reporting vehicle intended to ensure that the work of individual departments can be clearly associated with a bigger picture of government’s work in its stated priority realms of economic affairs, social affairs, international affairs and government affairs. It can be understood as a form of cross-boundary coordination in that it guides the work of and transcends the individual preferences of the departments; however, it is not a call for any administrative innovations that might foster WoG in the realm of human resources, organizational design or organizational culture. Nor does it speak to the collaborative imperative that was associated with efforts in interdepartmental programming, shared accountability, joint decision making or consensus-building amongst interdepartmental actors – all of which are part of the WoG concept used by START. Interestingly, when the TBS does reference a concept more akin to the one just described, it uses the term ‘horizontal initiative’. In fact, the TBS maintains a database of horizontal initiatives as part of its expenditure management system.

A horizontal initiative is defined as an initiative in which partners from two or more organizations have established a formal funding agreement (e.g., Memorandum to Cabinet, Treasury Board submission, federal-provincial agreement) to work toward achieving shared outcomes (TBS, 2014, para 3).

The database captures the details of the funding agreements, shared outcomes, governance structure, programming highlights and breakdown of funding by lead and partner departments. From 2005 to 2012, the START-managed Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) existed as a horizontal initiative within DFAIT and was included in the database. The existence of reporting protocols for horizontal initiatives in the expenditure management systems speaks to the importance of TBS in ensuring that formal and substantive boundary spanning initiatives can be permitted to exist in an organizational system dominated by the imperative of vertical accountability and
authorities. However, the somewhat conflicting use of terms and concepts by different branches of a single government draws attention to how the TBS and its vernacular around WoG could also be a barrier to START’s efforts at undertaking WoG initiatives. As manager of not only the expenditure management system, but also for government-wide processes related to human resources, risk management, information management and use of technology, values and ethics within the public service and the management accountability framework, the TBS is a core player in any discussion of new policies, processes or procedures that might address barriers associated with the key mechanical attributes of WoG, like those discussed throughout Chapter 4. If a central agency and a line department are engaging around a critical concept using different terminology and understanding of meaning and intent then, arguably, there is already a barrier between the departmental unit mandated with achieving WoG and the central agency which is in control of any change to organizational standards and processes that may be necessary for the department to be successful in its task.

The day-to-day interactions between START officials and the TBS occur with analysts in the International Affairs, Security and Justice Sector (IASJ) of the TBS. In its work with departments responsible for international affairs, international development, defence, justice and security, the IASJ “provides strategic advice, guidance and support to federal organizations in their implementation and application of Treasury Board policies, government priorities, risk management strategies, and performance management” (TBS, 2014, para 2). Of special note is the role of the IASJ in reviewing and providing feedback to departments in the preparation of Memoranda to Cabinet and formal Treasury Board submissions. Whereas a “Memorandum to Cabinet focuses primarily on the policy rationale and overall funding for a new policy or program initiative, a Treasury Board (TB) submission provides details on program design, specific costs, expected results and outcomes, and program delivery and implementation” (TBS, 2007, p. 4). More specifically, TB submissions are “submitted by a sponsoring minister on behalf of a federal organization seeking approval or authority from the Treasury Board for an initiative that the organization would not otherwise be able to undertake or that is outside its delegated authorities” (TBS, 2007, p. 4). For example, a TB Submission would have been necessary for DFAIT to establish both START and the GPSF.
Given that TB submissions often involve requests for “authority to carry out a project or initiative the costs of which would exceed a minister’s delegated authority or the authority to enter into a contract above or outside a federal organization’s or minister’s authority” (TBS, 2007, p. 3) it could be positioned that TB submissions are a vehicle through which some level of WoG or horizontality can be attained despite the imperative of ministerial accountability. In support of this observation is the fact that the TB submission process requires departments to identify, discuss and address the necessity or rationale behind a horizontal initiative within the established mandates of the sponsoring departments, horizontal issues related to accountabilities and governance and strategies for managing shared risks (TBS, 2013).

As with PCO, the TBS frames its work largely as a resource to line departments that are navigating these submission processes; however, it also is clear that this role exemplifies the aforementioned challenge function of central agencies that can result in an ongoing discourse to ensure a submission aligns with government-wide priorities, processes and established management practices. The speed at which a TB submission moves through the review and approval process is dependent on the submission by the department and the due diligence review by the TBS, which determines whether the submission will move along for TB review or be returned to the department to be strengthened in quality. As is depicted in Figure 12, this important part of public sector administration is extensive with multiple stages of analysis, consultation and feedback. The TBS program sector staff have duties that support the department in its submission but also have duties to the TB to which they provide a thorough assessment and resulting recommendations around the quality of a TB submission.
The level of departmental frustration with the role of the TBS is unknown; however, it is fair to suggest that when practitioners and observers of WoG critique the bureaucratic nature of WoG they are likely referring to protocols managed by the central agencies. While the TBS does publicly state its service standards for the timely review of TB submissions, any review or approval process that extends over a long period of time or that stymies innovative management practices in its effort to align with standardized, government-wide approaches could be perceived as a major barrier to success for organizations such as START that work in rapidly evolving environments such as those requiring humanitarian assistance or stabilization operations.

**International Assistance Envelope (IAE)**

The International Assistance Envelope (IAE) was not a WoG partner to START in the same manner as the aforementioned departments and agencies. The IAE was not an organizational unit within the Canadian federal government but was the name of a pool of financial resources established in 1991 to fund the country’s official development
assistance (ODA) initiatives. It is relevant to this case analysis for three reasons. First, the IAE has been held up as a WoG instrument in its own right. “It enables ministers to review how various programmes and expenditures combine to create the Canadian response to global challenges” (OECD, 2007b, p. 14). Second, increases in overall international assistance spending, the philosophical and practical tensions between the 2008 Official Development Assistance Act and the increasing proclivity to fund non-ODA eligible activities such as counter-terrorism and capacity building from the IAE were issues that reinforced tensions between WoG actors in this case. Finally, and most importantly, there was a direct connection between changes to the IAE in 2005 and the creation of the GPSF, which would, in turn, fund START. The events and issues that dominated the 2005 International Policy Statement and created the need for an organization like START were also at the root of changes to the IAE announced in the 2005 federal budget. A new management framework divided the IAE into five distinct pools (see Figure 13) – a framework intended to facilitate:

Coherent priority setting across all government departments participating in the aid program; decentralized management with clear accountability; transparency in the allocation of new resources; predictability in budgeting and stability in programming; flexibility to respond to new initiatives; and fiscal integrity (CIDA, 2006a, p. 10).
Until 2005, approximately 96% of the IAE was accounted for by ODA, with the remaining funds allocated to OA. The envelope was the funding source for CIDA’s programming and operating budgets; consequently, the vast majority of the IAE was allocated to and managed by CIDA. In 2004 CIDA directly managed 84% of the IAE (CIDA, 2006b) but by 2012 the portion of the IAE funding allocated to CIDA programming was closer to 71% (DFATD, 2013). As shown in Table 10\(^{21}\), the decrease in % of IAE for CIDA was not an indication that agency funding was clawed back significantly during this window. In fact, ODA funding increased steadily over the course of the decade as per a commitment in the 2006 federal budget. Instead, the percentage of total IAE reflects the involvement of more government departments in the delivery of ODA/OA activities and, as a result of the increasingly interconnected security-development issues facing the Canadian government in high priority environments, the need for more flexibility in the allocation and disbursement of IAE funds.

\(^{21}\) Table shows the IAE allocation across the main WoG partners discussed in this chapter. A small portion of the IAE would also be allocated to departments such as Health Canada, Public Works, Canadian Heritage, etc. Data compiled from Statistical Reports of ODA International Assistance 2002–2003 fiscal year to 2012–2013 fiscal year.
Table 10: Allocation of the International Assistance Envelope across departments by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004-2005 (billion $ / % of IAE)</th>
<th>2007-2008 (billion $ / % of IAE)</th>
<th>2010-2011 (billion $ / % of IAE)</th>
<th>2012-2013 (billion $ / % of IAE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total IAE</td>
<td>3.8 billion / 100%</td>
<td>4.0 billion / 100%</td>
<td>5.1 billion / 100%</td>
<td>4.8 billion / 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>3.1 billion / 81%</td>
<td>3.1 billion / 77.3%</td>
<td>3.6 billion / 76%</td>
<td>3.4 billion / 71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>368 million / 9.5%</td>
<td>368 million / 9.1%</td>
<td>810 million / 15.8%</td>
<td>604 million / 12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>140 million / 3.6%</td>
<td>339 million / 8.4%</td>
<td>489 million / 9.6%</td>
<td>428 million / 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>9.4 million / 0.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.9 million22 / 0.19%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: compiled from statistical reports on ODA (CIDA, 2006b, 2010b, 2012b and 2014)*

In the redesign of the IAE, DFAIT was given responsibility for the majority of the Peace and Security Pool along with a small portion of the Development Pool and co-management (along with CIDA and the central agencies) of the new Crisis Pool. The allocation of these funds, especially the Peace and Security Pool, to DFAIT established the department as a significant player in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of government-run and government-sponsored programs, which had, up to that point, not been a capacity area for the department. From the Peace and Security Pool came the funds required to advance government priorities in fragile states and crisis zones. One part of these efforts included the operationalization of the new Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).

### Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START)

This section of the case analysis examines the journey of START from its pre-2005 origins to its initial design, from early challenges and areas for improvement to its redesign in the late-aughts. Announced as a foreign policy priority initiative in the April 2005 International Policy Statement, START was approved by the Canadian government

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22 DND allocation associated with initial response to Haiti Earthquake.
on October 3, 2005; a result of a joint submission to Treasury Board by DFAIT and CIDA (DFAIT, 2011b). Its early mission was to:

*ensure timely, coordinated and effective responses to international crises (natural and human-made), requiring whole-of-government action; plan and deliver coherent, effective conflict prevention, crisis response, post-conflict peacebuilding, and civilian protection and stabilization initiatives in states in transition, where Canadian interests and values are implicated; and manage the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), a C$142 million financial resource (fiscal year 2006-2007), used to develop and deliver peace and security initiatives (START, 2006, p. 1)*.

It followed in the footsteps of similar units established in the United States (the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization – established in July 2004) and the United Kingdom (the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit – established in September 2004). Like START, these new units were dedicated to achieving an enhanced level of WoG coordination within their respective country’s efforts at stabilization and reconstruction in fragile states.

START and its associated committees and boards began contributing to the stabilization and reconstruction landscape in late 2005/early 2006. Through the end of the period being examined in this study (2012), the unit and the pool of funds for which it was responsible played an important role in coordinating various aspects of Canada’s WoG programming efforts and policy formulation related to countries and regions of strategic interest – Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan being the most notable of these. In Afghanistan GPSF funds (managed by START) were distributed to enhance the presence and capabilities of civilians – from police officers to diplomats to development experts – in Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar (START YiR, 2008). Sudan, with its high-profile humanitarian crisis and pervasive violent conflict, was a major recipient of GPSF funding with $108 million invested in 47 projects by early 2009, including a major focus on the Darfur Peace Process and support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (DFAIT, 2011b). Haiti was already the largest recipient in the Western Hemisphere of Canada’s ODA when the GPSF began funding programs in Haiti in the 2005–2006 fiscal year (DFAIT, 2009). By 2009, $37.5 million of GPSF funding had been allocated to 24 projects in the country and the fund was
recognized as being jointly aligned with the stated priorities of the Haitian government (Haiti, 2007) and simultaneously the “primary financing mechanism of the Canadian’s security agenda in Haiti” (Haiti, 2007, p. 14).

The WoG element of START’s mandate, combined with its responsibilities for both policy and programming, meant that the unit could embody any number of coordination roles in different contexts: it could lead or co-lead with a partner department the country’s response to an emerging crisis, it could take on the role as convenor to bring the necessary combination of government actors to an information-sharing or decision-making table, it could authorize the transfer of funds to a partner department that would advance a coherent WoG strategy in a fragile state or region and it could provide support or expertise in the areas of state fragility, stabilization and civilian deployment to other units, departments or task forces. Additionally, its coordination role was achieved through staff who were able to navigate not only the administrative and bureaucratic space at headquarters, but also the volatile field conditions characteristic of areas plagued by conflict, underdevelopment and, increasingly, catastrophic natural disasters. This section of the case study looks at how START was designed to advance a mandate for WoG coordination and what organizational and bureaucratic challenges it faced as a result of both its initial design and the specific contextual nuances of its policy and programming environments.

Source material for this part of the case analysis originated from both peer-reviewed and grey literature. Where possible, the two are interwoven; however, the academic research was not as extensive or comprehensive as one might hope. Certainly, a substantive body of academic research and analysis examined civil-military coordination and ‘whole-of-system’ efforts undertaken by western countries in Afghanistan over the course of the early 2000s. However, only a small subset of this literature touches specifically on the strengths and weaknesses of START as it worked to achieve its

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23 In Canada, specifically, the interconnected challenges that faced the security and development professionals on the PRTs and the sense that the country was struggling to implement successful military campaigns and civilian programs in a region still wracked with violent conflict resulted in a large pool of literature emerging from the fields of international relations, security studies and military studies that examined various Canadian approaches to achieving policy and operational coherence or civil-military coordination in the complex Afghan environment (Buchan, 2010; Fleming 2008; Travers & Owen, 2008; Sing, 2010; Fitzgerald, 2009; Leslie, 2008).
mandate (Marten, 2010; Lacroix, 2009; Hrychuk, 2009; Desrosiers & Lagassé, 2009; Bensahel, 2007). Patrick and Brown’s 2007 book *Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole-of-Government” Approaches to Fragile States* offers one of most revealing glimpses into the early years of START and the GPSF as the authors present a collection of case studies that addressed the merits and shortcomings of the new WoG coordinating bodies. The case studies were based on secondary research and “off-the-record interview with officials in donor ministries” (p. ix) conducted throughout 2006. Chapter Three is dedicated to Canada’s very early years with START. The publication represents the most comprehensive scholarly work to examine the advent and early challenges facing START and its contemporaries and is the only publication to explore in some detail the operational or management aspects of WoG in the context of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In conjunction with the 2006 OECD report *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, and Nora Bensahel’s 2007 overview of units designed for the purpose of achieving interagency coherence in international nation-building efforts (of which START is one), Patrick and Brown’s book provided a preliminary understanding of the pressures in fragile states that demanded a WoG approach, the country-specific origins of dedicated units such as START, sources of friction between various WoG partners, and some of the early lessons that emerged in the first few years as these units began their work.

The sources that provided the most comprehensive examination of START’s evolution from 2005 to 2011 were contained in a suite of documents produced as a result of a series of program audits and evaluations:

- May 2008: *Internal Program Audit of the Global Peace and Security*
- April 2009: *Summative Evaluation of START’s Global Peace and Security Fund – Haiti*\(^24\)

\(^{24}\) Released in 2009 – before the January 12, 2010, earthquake that compounded many of the security and development issues impacting the country and its people.

\(^{25}\) Evaluation findings are based on “in excess of 350 key informant interviews (which) were conducted both in-person and by telephone. Interviews were conducted with staff from relevant units at DFAIT (including START), representatives from OGD partners, beneficiary organizations, and representatives
Produced by the Internal Audit Division of DFAIT, these publicly available (but rarely referenced) reports established a rich array of insights into the operational and administrative challenges facing the new unit, framing in significant detail the practical realities of what was involved with trying to achieve WoG through a mechanism such as START. Each report presented the findings and recommendations of the auditors as well as START management’s responses to the recommendations; whether or not they were in agreement with a recommendation and what action may be taken going forward. In each case, the auditors interviewed individuals from within and outside START, capturing the perspectives and experiences of hundreds of employees who were connected to START in some manner from 2007 through 2011. It could be argued that a weakness of these reports is that they reflect an internal DFAIT review of a DFAIT unit, that an unavoidable bias in assessment might exist or that measures of success would be established from DFAIT’s perspective that may not be shared by other WoG partners. Nonetheless, the audits can be seen as valuable in that each report documents dozens of findings all of which shed a light on hurdles related to bureaucratic processes, human resources policies and management controls that are not present to the same degree within the academic literature. From the perspective of understanding the organizational mechanics of WoG, these reports were invaluable.

**Designing START**

The organizational foundations were laid for START before its inception in 2005 (Bensahel, 2007). Canada’s Human Security Program (HSP) had been established within DFAIT in the late 1990s – a result of Lloyd Axworthy’s championing of the concept as a new way of looking at security issues. With an annual budget of $10 million for programming, the HSP was not a major player amongst those Canadian departments tasked with funding and implementing programming that addressed issues related to state failure and crises. However, the HSP was noteworthy in that it gave DFAIT a role in the programming environment – something that up that point in time was almost unheard of as the department was focused almost exclusively on diplomacy and policy. What the

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from various UN departments. Field missions were conducted in Colombia (Aug 24-Sept 5, 2009), Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan (Oct 6-30, 2009), Afghanistan (October 11-22, 2009), and New York (Oct 19-23, 2009)” (DFAIT, 2011, p. 24),
HSP meant for START was that from 2000–2005, DFAIT slowly developed institutional capacity in the programming realm and accumulated human resource expertise and competency in understanding and navigating the issues of fragile states. From a change management perspective, the pre-existence of the HSP and the fact that the majority of HSP staff were incorporated into START were recognized by those who have compared various models for cross-boundary coordination as important conditions for success (Desrosier & Lagasse, 2009; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Bensahel, 2007). In building on existing personnel and relationships START “minimised the bureaucratic threat it posed to other parts of the ministry and to other Canadian government agencies, since it largely continued the substantive work those existing offices had already been doing rather than taking on new responsibilities” (Bensahel, 2007, p. 65).

Whether it was a result of the established organizational capabilities and expertise, a growing focus at DFAIT for developing programming abilities within the organization or DFAIT’s formal function as the department in charge of Canada’s interaction with the international community, START was placed firmly within International Security branch of DFAIT’s organizational structure and as such existed as a lead-department model. START’s mandate for cross-boundary coordination was advanced through a governance model in which a single line department was accountable for its performance. In other words, through the START Secretariat (most often referred to simply as START), DFAIT managed the day-to-day operations of the unit and the significant financial resources associated with START. While a joint submission to Treasury Board might imply a strong alignment of purpose at the political or strategic levels, enthusiasm for a lead-department model did not necessarily translate throughout the communities of non-DFAIT actors, which did not see this approach to coordination as an effective vehicle for addressing ‘bureaucratic turf battles’ (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 57) or the inevitable tension between START’s WoG mandate and ministerial accountability (Patrick & Brown, 2007). To address these concerns, organizational liaison and advisory positions were proposed to formally create a space for CIDA, and eventually other WoG partners within START’s authority structures and decision-making processes. Still, the question of whether CIDA employees were satisfied with a model that appeared to give DFAIT a stronger voice at the decision-making table or whether the
model improved or reinforced issues related to departmentalism and turf protection would be an important point of reflection as START began its work.

Aside from START’s placement within the broader government architecture, the other organizational design feature of note was the distribution of responsibilities and the reporting structure within the new unit. Overseen by a Director General, the work of the secretariat was divided into one executive group and four areas of thematic focus: humanitarian affairs and disaster response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, mine action and small arms, and peacekeeping and peace operations (DFAIT, 2008b). As a self-identified matrix organization (DFAIT, 2008b), START’s employees in each division reported to the Director of that division but also had responsibilities to various cross-cutting project teams. Ford and Randolph (1992) define a matrix structure as “cross-functional organizational overlays that create multiple lines of authority and that place people in teams to work on tasks for finite periods of time” (p. 272). At the most basic level the structure, on paper, resembles a two-way matrix in which the top horizontal row represents function managers, the left vertical row represents project managers and the remaining blocks of the matrix represent team members who work within a dual-authority structure. In a balanced matrix every team member reports to both a functional manager and a project manager. In the case of START, the functional managers would be the division directors who supervised teams of people responsible for policy development and program management within their thematic area. The cross-functional element was introduced by START’s responsibilities for managing the GPSF – a pool of financial resources that could be used to fund programs implemented and managed by START or by any of its WoG partners. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, the GPSF was broken down into three sub-program pools that did not align with the four thematic of the Secretariat meaning that an assortment of financial authorities was distributed in such a way that multiple lines of accountability existed for employees depending on their specific projects and programs.

A matrix structure is thought to be well suited for conditions in which there is a need to pursue a dual or multiple priority strategy (Galbraith, 2008), where complexity and uncertainty abound within the environmental context (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990), where pressure to share resources exists (Daft, 2004) and/or where there is a requirement
that an organization must process a large amount of information (Cummings & Worley, 2001). The cross-functional abilities of the matrix are thought to make it a more flexible and adaptable kind of structure. The structure creates an environment in which multiple information channels that exist across the matrix “allowed the organization to capture and analyze external complexity” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990, p. 139). It also creates an environment in which functional knowledge can be applied to all projects (Cummings & Worley, 2001). However, in practice there are challenges to managing a matrix structure, the most evident being that employees find it frustrating and confusing to report to two managers. In this sense the success of the structure can become highly dependent on the characteristics and approaches of the managers and leaders in the system. To this point, the 2008 audit identified that a certain lack of clarity in accountabilities existed in START’s matrix structure and that any success to date was more related to the efforts and competencies of individual staff (p. 8) than a result of an effective or compelling organizational structure. The audit, which was focused on START’s management of the GPSF, referenced concerns around a lack of accountability for the three sub-programs of the GPSF with START staff being unclear about where responsibilities sat for a number of financial envelopes. This lack of clarity prompted the auditing team to suggest START management consider a review of the organizational structure.

Apart from the internal evaluations various researchers suggested that the lead-department design may not be the optimal choice and that the Canadian Government should consider adopting the UK’s interagency model set outside of the major line departments (Lacroix, 2009; Hrychuk, 2009). There was a sense that the START model made a great deal of sense if you were a DFAIT employee but that there would always be resistance from other WoG partners and that as a result of this resistance START would never be truly successful in its role as convenor, catalyst or coordinator for WoG activities. With hindsight, though, it is possible to reflect and observe the strikingly different paths taken by the UK and Canadian experiments in establishing dedicated units for coordinating government-wide initiatives in fragile states. This comparative analysis is undertaken in Chapter 7.
Staffing START

Given the relatively small size of START – it had approximately 70 staff at its inception with no more than 16 staff in a given division (DFAIT, 2007) – the multi-faceted functional mandate (policy and programming) of each division required versatile staff members with wide-ranging skill sets. At the same time, the matrix structure added another level of complexity to be managed. As a result, a collection of critical human resource challenges emerged in the 2008 audit, most notably, the recruitment and retention of competent staff. The distribution of roles and responsibilities within each of the four divisions and the executive group resulted in a need for employees who were knowledgeable in subject matter and equipped to navigate the disparate professional realms of policy and programming or project management. As has been discussed, the inclusion of individual competencies related to programming was relatively new within DFAIT culture. Given its long history without a large programming function, DFAIT staff were traditionally required to be talented diplomats and analysts but not project managers. Moreover, there was a perception amongst DFAIT staff that positions involving project management were not a desirable career path within DFAIT, that they “generally perceive programming/project management responsibilities to be administrative in nature and that the policy-related role is more intellectual-oriented” (DFAIT, 2008b, p. 10). The audit team recommended to START management that the organizational structure be reviewed to see if it might be possible to eliminate or reduce the need for the two functions to be assigned to one individual by “establishing a unit dedicated to program/project delivery. The establishment of such a unit would also provide a logical home for any additional functional resources that are required” (2008, p. 11).

Other suggestions for ensuring START was well-equipped with the best people in various positions involved addressing government-wide human resource barriers that limited secondments and exchanges crucial to fostering WoG (Lacroix, 2009; START Secretariat, 2011), and providing START with more resources (financial, technical and human) that would allow the unit to better manage the joint policy-programming responsibilities (Marten, 2010).
Funding START

Critical to the work of START and its WoG partners was the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). In fact, the joint establishment of the administrative unit and a dedicated funding pool was observed by those who compared the various coordinating bodies launched throughout the aughts to be a best practice (Bensahel, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007). Initiated through the same 2005 Treasury Board submission that resulted in approvals for START, the GPSF was approved at $100 million per year for five years. Prior to the GPSF, funding instruments for fragile states outside of official development assistance (ODA) programming were limited. “The Crisis Pool within the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), with its multi-minister governance structure, proved a slow and cumbersome instrument for crisis response” (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 27). DFAIT had a small funding instrument at its disposal with the Human Security Program; however, the total annual funding amounted to $15 million which was insufficient for the scale of programs and initiatives to be launched within START’s purview. CIDA had similar difficulties in accessing funding for engagement in fragile states. Despite the fact that, as a branch of government, CIDA had a mandate for developing, implementing and funding programs (unlike DFAIT proper), the agency could not mobilize its established funding resources unless the initiative was aligned with CIDA’s ODA mandate. Special submissions to government for funding were possible but time-consuming and, therefore, not well suited for crisis response. DND’s ample financial resources could be quickly mobilized; however, these were earmarked specifically for peace support operations. Finally, stabilization and reconstruction efforts in fragile states and crisis zones often required the involvement of multiple other government departments (OGDs) that did not have an “international mandate, or funding authorities that permit them to deploy resources or spend departmental or agency funds outside of Canada” (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 30).

In short, the GPSF was, and remains today, the only fund that provides a significant amount of resources expressly dedicated to crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building, and post conflict stabilization within the GoC. It continues to fill both a temporal (rapid response) and structural (mandate related) funding gap within the GoC, thereby enhancing the ability of the GoC to respond to international crises in a timely and coherent manner (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 28).
The HID confirms the initial end date of the GPSF as March 31, 2010, and the eventual extension of the end date of the fund to March 31, 2013. A final extension would be granted to enable the fund to function to end of fiscal year 2014. Additionally, the base funding allocation was increased in June 2007 “to $235 million for 2007–2008 and $152 million per year each for 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 (TBS, 2008, para. 2). The source fund for the GPSF was the Peace and Security Pool of the IAE (TBS, 2006), but governance and management of the GPSF was delegated to START and its suite of departmental and interdepartmental committees. The executive office within START, to which the financial staff for the unit were assigned, held formal responsibility for program management of the GPSF (DFAIT-Sudan) and its three programs: the Global Peace and Security Programme,26 Global Peace Operations Program,27 and the Human Security Program (which would be renamed the Glyn Berry program).28 “The GPSF’s sub-programs are divided into units known as funding envelopes, each of which is assigned to a particular group or division charged with administering their respective apportionment of the GPSF for the year” (DFAIT, 2009, p. 9). In addition to providing DFAIT (through START) with the ability to implement and manage its own programs (through a WoG lens), the fund allowed for direct transfers from START to other departments,29 providing them with the opportunity to manage a portion of GPSF funds

26 Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP): GPOP supports the development of global capacity for peace operations with a primary focus on Africa through medium-term capacity-building for integrated peace operations involving military, police and civilians. The program fulfills Canada’s commitments to the G8 as reaffirmed by the Prime Minister at the St Petersburg and Heiligendamm summits (DFAIT, 2009, p. 4).

27 Global Peace and Security Program (GPSP): GPSP is intended to provide timely, coherent and effective responses to peace and security challenges of fragile states, including conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives. The GPSP’s objective is to stabilize large-scale crisis situations and restore security for local populations while maintaining an analytical capacity to provide expert advice on conflict prevention and early warning (DFAIT, 2009, p. 4).

28 Glyn Berry Program (GBP): the GBP is intended to advance Canadian foreign policy priorities of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law around the world through diplomatic leadership and policy advocacy, strengthening multilateral mechanisms, Canadian capacity building, and targeted country specific initiatives (DFAIT, 2009, p. 4).

29 At various points in time, the following departments and agencies were noted as federal partners who accessed the GPSF through START, meaning that they administered a portion of the total annual allocation in the service of the Government of Canada’s efforts most notably in fragile states like: Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan: Canadian International Development Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National Defence, Justice Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Privy Council Office, Canada Border Services Agency, Correctional Service of Canada, Canadian Commercial Corporation.
for the purpose of implementing specific projects or programs that aligned with START’s stabilization and reconstruction mandate.

Consultations with various actors in START’s networks concluded that the fund did allow for OGDs without international mandates to play a role in international arenas (DFAIT, 2009). However, it was also observed that the short-term, project-based nature of START’s mandate and GPSF authorities was problematic because in order for OGDs without international mandates to roll out programs in fragile states and crises zones they needed to augment staff and departmental capacity – from training staff for deployment in conflict zones or acquiring new expertise that would allow for the transfer of domestically focused skills and knowledge to be re-purposed and contextually relevant for an international arena. That investment had to be moderated because “once funding for a project ceases, the capacity developed to support the project is often dissipated or lost” (DFAIT, 2009, p. 41). Certainly, the existence of GPSF funding and its ability to be accessed and disbursed in a manner that allowed for timely and rapid civilian response to emerging crises in fragile states was recognized as a tool that allowed Canada to be more responsive and versatile in its efforts (DFAIT, 2009). However, it was challenging to establish protocols and strategies that allowed these highly customized short-term projects to be smoothly transitioned to other funding instruments or incorporated into projects with a longer time horizon so that the critical investment made by the GPSF was not lost or weakened.

While the start date for START is noted as October 3, 2005, and programming initiatives were undertaken throughout 2006, full authorities and terms for the GPSF were delayed for several years. Given the critical relationship between the fund and the programming mandate of START and the role the fund played in carving out a space for START amongst its WoG partners, these delays fast became barriers to the unit’s ability to engage in long-term planning or respond effectively to the crisis situations noted in its mission. The first delay was related to the fact that the GPSF was not established with its own custom-designed, context-relevant terms and conditions. In fact, during much of its first year the terms and conditions of the pre-existing Human Security Program guided GPSF operations (DFAIT, 2007). Whether it was due to a sense of hurry around launching START given its status in the International Policy Statement as a new and
innovative foreign policy tool, or some inexperience on the part of DFAIT with navigating the financial controls of funds dedicated to operations and programming, or a natural and expected bureaucratic delay, the terms and conditions for a $15 million annual fund were not sufficient for a fund with the scope intended for the GPSF and its $100 million annual allocation. The 2007 evaluation of the GPSF’s programming activities in Sudan noted fundamental tension between financial controls that allowed for only short-term planning and the internationally agreed upon principles for engagement in fragile states. “The relatively short-term support provided by the GPSF is not well-suited to the enormity of the long-term capacity building challenges in Sudan” (DFAIT, 2007, p. 92). This contradiction was especially difficult to reconcile given that the GPSF-funded projects in Sudan were one year in duration but would require a considerably longer time to accomplish stated project objectives (DFAIT, 2007). This issue was addressed in part when a second round of Treasury Board approvals established GPSF with its own terms and conditions in September 2006 (DFAIT, 2007; DFAIT, 2011b), almost a full year after START was launched.

Even after terms and conditions were approved, a second funding issue persisted: the total allocation of the GPSF was not immediately approved by the Treasury Board; meaning that until authorities for the full allocation of the fund for a five-year period were granted to START, the GPSF was “limited to programming for a fiscal year at a time” (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 13). As a result, it was impossible to engage in long-term strategic planning for START or the GPSF and the programs it funded (DFAIT, 2008b). The delay in approvals was not arbitrary in nature. The Treasury Board was seeking robust financial governance and accountability protocols and memorandums of understanding that would establish how GPSF funds were to be managed. Nonetheless, throughout 2006 and 2007 funding was limited to predetermined initiatives in targeted fragile environments: Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, Lebanon and West Bank/Gaza (DFAIT, 2011b). In 2007, programming efforts were able to expand to additional regions; however, the remaining portions of the total GPSF allocation remained frozen pending evaluations and renewed authorizations. Finally,

On February 14th, 2008, the government approved the extension of GPSF policy and funding authority until 2012/13 at the extant level of CAD
$164.715 million per year, and further, with the acceptance of GPSF results and achievements to date, unfroze 2008/09 and 2009/10 funds held in trust. Notably, at the same time, multi-year authority was given to GPSF for project-based programming. GPSF also received endorsement for its engagement in fragile states other than Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti, within the Terms and Conditions approved on September, 18th 2006. (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 13)

In summary, it took over two years for START (through the GPSF) to develop the necessary financial controls and acquire the necessary authorities to be a fully resourced policy and programming unit. It is not clear whether the delay was completely attributable to bureaucratic approval processes managed by TBS and PCO or a political element associated with a new government’s desire to review all major initiatives of its predecessor. Regardless, in the context of crisis situations and complex stabilization efforts, two years is a long time to wait to acquire the financial resources required to deliver on a mandate, especially when the GPSF commitment had started as only a five-year commitment. These issues are indicative of the challenges involved with clarifying responsibilities and authorities in a WoG initiative, even one characterized by a lead-department model. Given the rarity of funds such as the GPSF, it can be assumed that many of the financial controls and accountability measures had to be developed from scratch. The GPSF’s contribution to future initiatives may be enhanced institutional capacity for launching a large, internationally focused fund with a cross-departmental mandate. Treasury Board and the line departments learned how to better anticipate and troubleshoot what is required to ensure a smooth launch.

**Governing START**

The governance and management of the GPSF was in the organizational fabric of START and as such START and the GPSF are impossible to disassociate: the former is the administrative unit that managed the fund and delivered some of the programming initiatives supported by the fund; the latter was the dedicated funding that made both the administrative unit and its programming possible. This complex relationship is best demonstrated through the series of internal evaluations conducted from 2007 to 2011 in which the sound management of GPSF is the focus of the audit, yet, it is really the structure, resource distribution and general management of START this is being
evaluated. In other words, to audit or evaluate the GPSF was to evaluate START. Both entities were surrounded by a myriad of organizational units intended to assist with WoG engagement and coordination of OGDs, policy coherence (coordination without integration) and application of good financial management principles to programs and initiatives that emerged from START.

Several features of START’s governance structures ensured the unit could achieve its WoG mandate while working within established departmental accountability structures. They were conduits through which partners (both in DFAIT and other government departments) could share information and align common efforts, interests and objectives. Their existence emphasizes the efforts that must be undertaken in a lead-department model to address the pervasive threats to cross-boundary collaboration, including departmentalism, turf-protection, aversion to change and differences in organization culture. Striking a balance in which key partners were both consulted and incorporated into decision-making processes while preserving the imperative of ministerial accountability was clearly a challenge for START from the outset.

**DFAIT – CIDA Memorandum of Understanding**

With ministerial accountability as the backdrop, one of the first governance issues to be addressed for START, at the request of TBS, was for the two co-sponsors of the unit to clarify and agree upon division of roles and responsibilities. While it was clear that a joint understanding existed that a physical and policy space existed around stabilization, reconstruction and peacebuilding in fragile states in which both DFAIT (through START) and CIDA would have to work closely, there was also a sense that this space of overlap also had boundaries to it, that the two organizations were not linked in perpetuity and that at some point CIDA’s longer-term development mandate would take over as stability was established in a region. This awareness of the need to clarify responsibilities is demonstrated throughout the internal audits and evaluations and their frequent reference to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that existed between DFAIT and CIDA from the outset (DFAIT, 2007; DFAIT, 2009). Table 11 outlines how the two organizations viewed their different roles in fragile states and international crisis zones.
Table 11: DFAIT and CIDA’s roles and responsibilities in fragile states and countries in crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DFAIT (START/GPSF)</th>
<th>CIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing/duration</strong></td>
<td>Immediate crisis response</td>
<td>Longer term development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian assistance</strong></td>
<td>Humanitarian policy development, crisis coordination</td>
<td>Operational humanitarian assistance in emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict prevention</strong></td>
<td>Conflict mediation and negotiation, policy and diplomatic support</td>
<td>Conflict-sensitive development programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilisation/reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>Judicial rapid response, police and corrections deployments, border control, coordination with Department of National Defence, CIDA and other government departments and agencies’ peace operations, peace negotiations</td>
<td>Support to public institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice and security system reform</strong></td>
<td>Technical assistance, training for military corrections, justice, and police support to courts and war crimes tribunals</td>
<td>Longer-term legal and judicial reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic transition</strong></td>
<td>Peace negotiations, constitutional processes</td>
<td>Electoral institutions, civil society, media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Canada

(OECD, 2007b, p. 66)

While the early development of the MOU was essential for an initiative seeking to foster WoG coordination in an organizational environment in which departmental and ministerial accountability has primacy, ensuring the prescribed division of responsibility aligned with administrative protocols and processes was not guaranteed and had to be monitored. In 2006, the OECD underscored the operational challenges related to achieving coherence between START and CIDA:

*At the operational level, it remains to be seen how START will be able to co-ordinate the Global Peace and Security Fund with CIDA bilateral programmes, and promote coherence between short-term stabilisation and longer-term institution building. The latter is normally the purview of development co-operation. How START will work with CIDA bilateral desks to ensure complementary design and delivery of longer-term programmes, as well as how exit strategies will be developed, remains to be seen* (OECD, 2006b, p. 49).
Similarly, the internal evaluation of the GPSF in Sudan flagged the practical tensions that existed between the different planning time horizons of DFAIT and CIDA, the one-year funding authorities of the GPSF instrument and the overarching mandate for close coordination of planning between START and CIDA in areas in which they jointly operated. As has been discussed, in the early years of START GPSF funds were being approved for only one year at a time and, as a result, the time horizon for START’s planning efforts went out no further than 12 months. CIDA’s longer-term planning cycles made it impossible for the two units to produce coordinated planning frameworks as requested by the MOU (DFAIT, 2009). Despite this challenge, in its 2007 Peer Review of Canada the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee acknowledge the MOU as a good practice with the suggestion being made that similar arrangements be undertaken between all government departments working in fragile states. In recognition of the uncharted territory being explored, the MOU was understood to be an agreement that would be closely monitored to ensure the engagement of ministers, deputy ministers and other high-level actors, and that it could be altered as the relationship and the complex environment became better understood. To this end, two key committees were established as part of START’s governance model.

**Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister Committees**

Within START’s governance model, ministerial accountability was preserved by establishing two high-level committees tasked with two-way communication between START officials and senior leadership. These committees provided the opportunity to delineate and monitor distinct roles and responsibilities for START and CIDA and ensure the complementary work of both units remained in line with key government priorities in fragile states and crisis zones. Their existence is a demonstration of the resource commitment in time and people required to achieve WoG through a lead-department model.

The **Deputy Ministers’ Committee** was composed of the DFAIT Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the CIDA President (2011, p. 6) and served the purpose of ensuring a high level of coordination between the two government departments that initially sponsored START through the TB submission process and whose respective
mandates overlapped in the domain of fragile states. Essentially, the accountability for the terms agreed upon in the DFAIT-CIDA MOU sat with the DM Committee, which had the authority to modify terms, if necessary (DFAIT, 2007). In this vein, the DM Committee was to meet at least twice a year for the purpose of ensuring senior leadership at the ministerial level was kept informed of START and CIDA’s efforts in “achieving and implementing Government policies in crises, fragile states and countries or thematic areas of engagement effort in GoC priority areas” (DFAIT, 2007, p. 103).

The Assistant Deputy Ministers’ (ADM) Committee met first in September 2007 (DFAIT, 2007) and incorporated broader representation from key branches of DFAIT and CIDA and, in doing so, acknowledged the extensive and related work already being undertaken by staff and teams in various geographic and thematic groups working in both organizations by reviewing “START and CIDA activities and results in crisis and fragile states to ensure policy coherence and avoid duplication in common countries and thematic areas of engagement” (p. 6). The committee was tasked with specific activities intended to fulfill its role to provide guidance to the interdepartmental START Advisory Board (SAB), which, in turn, guided the strategic direction of START and the financial resources allocated to the GPSF.

At the outset of START, both committees were composed exclusively of staff from DFAIT and CIDA. Early evaluations referenced the importance of incorporating staff from other government departments in the membership of both committees (DFAIT, 2008b) which was permitted at first on a case-by-case basis and eventually formalized, with roles for OGDs on the committees being a project undertaken by the START Advisory Board (DFAIT, 2008b).

START Advisory Board (SAB)

As early conceptualizations of START situated the new WoG initiative distinctly within DFAIT, it became clear that some kind of organizational vehicle for overcoming resistance from key federal partners would be required if START was to have any hope achieving WoG coordination (Patrick & Brown, 2007). The result was that START’s governance structure included an interdepartmental advisory board (SAB) that was tasked by Cabinet with the responsibility for sharing departmental information and perspectives.
with START’s executive office, endorsing START’s work, acting as a conduit between
START and senior administration within DFAIT and CIDA and, overall, ensuring WoG
policy coherence in the areas of stabilization and crisis response in fragile states (DFAIT,
2008b). The SAB was chaired by the Director General of START and comprised senior
officials (Director General level) from DFAIT, CIDA, DND and other government
departments deemed to be relevant to policy and programming on fragile states. At the
outset the SAB’s responsibilities were:

1. Establishing a WoG strategic policy, priority setting and direction with respect to
   fragile states and complex emergencies within the framework of individual
departmental authorities.
2. Undertaking regular (annual or more frequent) assessments of progress towards
   the milestones and exit strategies defined in specific integrated country strategies
   along with the potential for reallocation of resources in line with the pace of
   events and opportunities presented by competing crises and priorities.
3. Information exchange on program-related activities to ensure complementarities
   and avoid duplication, while encouraging the formation of country task forces at
   the operational level as required. (DFAIT, 2007, p. 8)

Additionally, SAB played an important role as an intermediary between the day-to-
day work of the secretariat and the higher-level Interdepartmental Assistant Deputy
Minister (ADM) Committee. As part of its actitivites the board was to identify areas of
overlap between the activities of WoG partners and bring them to the attention of the
ADM committee. In the same vein, the SAB was tasked with producing semi-annual
reports for the committee on “START policy advocacy and coordination activities and
START/CIDA activities in crisis and fragile states, and those of its partners that it funds”
(DFAIT, 2011b, p. 78).

Several of the formal evaluations of the GPSF and START noted ways in which
the SAB missed an opportunity to fulfill its mandate and facilitate WoG across key
government partners. In the case of START’s work in Sudan, it was observed that despite
the acknowledged priority of WoG within the mandates of START and the GPSF, there
was a noted absence of a “clearly articulated and commonly understood vision for WoG
among START stakeholders specifying Canadian expectations for the concept, making WoG difficult to plan, implement and evaluate for GPSF” (DFAIT, 2007, p. 92). Given that a specific responsibility of the SAB was to establish a WoG strategic policy, the absence of a shared understanding of WoG within the context of fragile states could be seen as a failing of SAB and the work of its cross-departmental membership.

Strengthening the SAB mandate through clear and formal terms of reference, enhancing its membership to include representation from all relevant OGDs and meeting with more regularity were all recommendations for strengthening the SAB in the early years of START, all of which were recognized by START management as actions to be undertaken throughout 2007 and 2008 (DFAIT, 2007).

**Internal DFAIT Committees**

Internal to DFAIT were two key committees, established by START, which provided advice to the Director General of START and, in doing so, worked to ensure that the programming proposals considered for funding were considered through the lens of sound financial and legal management principles and practices. The DFAIT Program Planning Committee (PPC) considered “concept papers related to program policy and/or specific projects (usually projects valued at CAD $500,000 or more), and projects that respond to GoC commitments and projects that raise the profile of the GoC” (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 7). Committee representation included START Directors and Director Generals from other bureaus within DFAIT who provided advice to the START DG as part of his/her decision making process around final approvals for project funding. The DFAIT Project Development Management Working Group behaved as a “technical review committee” (DFAIT, 2008b, p. 6) and as such, reviewed “all projects for their merits, design, implementing arrangements, monitoring, evaluation, reporting arrangements, results-based management, risk-based management, legal and other technical arrangements, lessons learned, and compliance with GPSF terms and conditions and the Treasury Board’s Transfer Payment Policy” (START, 2006, p. 2). The working group met weekly to consider proposals, was chaired by a START senior director and included START employees (from each of the four divisions), representatives from geographic desks and individuals with functional expertise, when required (DFAIT, 2011b). Like the
PCC, the working group would make recommendations to the START Director General who could then consolidate the committee assessments with strategic guidance from SAB.

**Navigating a crowded space**

The inherent challenges facing any government department or unit with a mandate for cross-boundary collaboration have been thoroughly established in previous chapters. From ministerial accountability to turf protection to competing interests and organizational cultures, achieving its WoG mandate was never going to be an easy task for START. Compounding on these widespread barriers to WoG was the fact that START was not the only unit in government or even within DFAIT with the task of achieving cross-boundary coordination in fragile states and crisis zones. While START housed much of DFAIT’s expertise on topics related to reconstruction, stabilization and peacebuilding, and was fostering the departmental capacity for deploying civilians into conflict-affected areas, other branches within DFAIT housed more specific knowledge related to particular regions and countries and formally held responsibility for Canada’s bilateral relationship with a given country. Simply because a state was categorized as fragile did not mean that the responsibility for the bilateral relationship between that state and the Government of Canada was assumed by START. Hence a nuanced form of coordination was required between the geographic or bilateral branch of DFAIT and START proper to ensure that in-depth understanding of country-specific contexts was incorporated into START programming efforts, and that a more holistic understanding of the fragile state’s immediate needs and issues remained part of the diplomatic relationship in the long term. Still, ascertaining who was coordinating who was not completely clear especially in fragile states and crisis zones that were clear priority areas for the Government of Canada: Afghanistan, Sudan and Haiti. In the case Sudan, DFAIT’s Sudan Task Force worked alongside START in the region.

*While the divisions within START have developed engagement strategies for their respective areas of competence, responsibility and accountability for strategic planning and synergistic programming of GPSF as a whole in Sudan remains unclear. Although START is nominally charged with this responsibility, the development and management of a strategic framework for Canada’s WoG response to the crisis in Sudan appears to have been
To muddy the waters even more, the Sudan Task Force was initially established within the Bilateral Relations Branch of DFAIT, moved to the START Secretariat for a short period of time and then moved back to the BRB after the 2006 election (DFAIT, 2007). In the case of Haiti, DFAIT’s Haiti Task Force was “charged with developing Canada’s WoG Country Strategy for Haiti” (DFAIT, 2009, p. 11). Additionally, an interdepartmental Steering Committee co-chaired by DFAIT and CIDA existed as an information-sharing forum and was supported by a suite of working groups including one chaired by the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding division of START (DFAIT, 2009). Clarification of roles and responsibilities between the administration units of START, the SAB and country-specific task forces was a common thread in the evaluation of the GPSF in both Haiti and Sudan. Unlike the MOU between DFAIT and CIDA, no clear agreement existed to delineate roles of units within DFAIT.

**Evolution: Re-Start**

The findings and recommendations captured through three extensive evaluations of the GPSF (and therefore of START) from 2007 to 2009 identified areas in which START began fulfilling its mandate for more timely, responsive and coordinated responses to reconstruction and stabilization efforts in fragile states and crises areas. The GPSF was observed to be administered by START with an acceptable management control framework and START programming in a few key countries was recognized as contributing to the Government of Canada’s international priorities while aligning with the international norms established through the OECD’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States* (OECD, 2007b). START was also recognized as a key element of Canada’s WoG approach to fragile states which was referenced positively by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee peer reviews of Canada in both 2007 and 2012. However, as has been noted, there was room for improvement and this was clearly acknowledged by START management in its response.

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30 It should be noted that the 2012 OECD Peer Review recommended that START work to ensure that its programming incorporate the reforms proposed through the New Deal.
to the findings of each of the early evaluations, especially related to the distribution of roles and responsibilities throughout the Secretariat, increased interdepartmental representation on affiliated committees and boards, and re-thinking around how best to develop the complex suite of competencies and skill profiles required of staff. Of particular note are management’s response to recommendations in the 2008 program audit. It is clear that even before reviewing the audit findings, a full review of START’s organizational structure was underway and new models were being considered.

*IRD (the executive unit) has proposed renewal of the current organizational structure vis-à-vis the needs and management requirements for programming for each of the distinct types of programming [immediate crisis response; short and medium-term support for post-crisis stabilization, reconstruction and peace-building; responsive vs. directive programming; and organizational and institutional capacity building].

Areas of priority will include the nature and distribution of human resources and programming modalities. An initial proposal centered on distinct policy and programming divisions working in tandem has been approved by IFM, and is currently being fleshed out for implementation. (DFAIT, 2008b, pp. 33-34)

As a result of the program audits, a pre-existing understanding by management that structure could be strengthened and the February 2008 commitment from TBS that multi-year funding was possible through the GPSF, a re-organization of START – referred to as “Re-START” – began in the summer of 2008 (DFAIT, 2009) and was launched in November 2009 (DFAIT, 2011b) with the purpose of implementing “new business processes and produce a clearer vision of START” that will foster enhanced “policy leadership…operational agility and programming excellence. A comparison of the initial START and Re-START structures along with a description of the main function of the four divisions and executive group are presented in Table 12. Of note is a change in language in the description of the work of each division. In the case of both the Conflict Prevention / Peacebuilding (IRC) and the Peacekeeping / Peace Support (IRP) divisions, the 2006 language describes policy, planning and programming functions for each unit whereas in 2008, IRP had become a focused policy unit with “a cadre of staff dedicated to research and policy development … intended, among other things, to
strengthen START’s capacity to perform targeted analysis of crises (2011, p. 81). This new hub for policy development allowed IRC to amalgamate START’s growing expertise in corporate management functions from financial practices to the training and deployment of civilian human resources. The latter is of special note as this fulfilled a commitment of the initial TB submission to establish a unit that could manage civilian staff from various government departments tasked to bring their expertise to the field in fragile states and crisis zones (DFAIT, 2008b). On the programming side, the newly formed Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs division was divided into three geographic teams and a thematic team, each of which was led by a Deputy Director (DFAIT, 2011b). This model allowed for START’s programming capacity to be assembled in one common division but sub-organized in a way that mirrored the geographic desks in DFAIT’s bilateral branch or CIDA’s geographic desks thereby streamlining certain aspects of interdepartmental coordination efforts.

On the point of improvements to the SAB, the 2011 evaluation documented that meeting frequency and structure had increased since the 2008 issues persisted with respect to the board meeting its intended purpose of interdepartmental decision making and provision of WoG strategic direction to START.

*OGD representatives consulted for this evaluation conveyed a certain measure of frustration with respect to their input in strategic decision-making on the use of the GPSF, often remarking that decisions are made and presented before the Board as a fait accompli with an invitation to Board members to merely comment* (DFAIT, 2011b, p. 78).
Table 12: Comparison of START’s organizational structure (initial versus Re-START)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial START Organizational Structure – 2006&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>START Executive Office (IRD):</strong> This office turns human and financial resources into practical projects to improve international security, while ensuring accountability to taxpayers, by providing financial management, planning and project design, as well as communications outreach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thematic Divisions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (IRC)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In collaboration with other federal government departments and DFAIT geographic bureaus, this team is responsible for the development and implementation of Canadian conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy, strategies and GPSF programming for priority countries and regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IRP)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key responsibilities focus on policy, planning and coordination of Canadian engagement in integrated international peace operations. This unit also delivers on Canada’s commitment with G8 colleagues to enhance global capacity for the conduct of peace support operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response (IRH)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-managed with DFAIT’s Global Issues Bureau, this START team develops, implements and coordinates Canadian policy on international humanitarian affairs and Canadian responses to humanitarian crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Action and Small Arms (ILX)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This team continues to provide Canadian leadership in the global campaign to rid the world of the scourge of antipersonnel mines and to combat the proliferation and illicit use of small arms and light weapons.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Re-START Organizational Structure – 2008&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The START Director General (IRD):</strong> IRD provides guidance and strategic direction on policy development, program management and operational control of the GPSF. The Director General of START reports to the ADM for Programming and Departmental Security (IPM) for project approval and the ADM for International Security and Political Director (IFM) for policy direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional Divisions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Coordination and Deployment Division (IRC)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC provides strategic program and financial advice and services in managing the GPSF, directs and coordinates corporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy Division (IRP)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRP develops and coordinates policy around fragile states, conflict management, integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division (IRH)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRH is responsible for the development, implementation and coordination of Canadian policy on international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs Division (IRG)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRG is organized along geographic (GPSF: Asia, Latin America and Europe, Africa and the Middle East)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<sup>31</sup> (START, 2006)  
<sup>32</sup> (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2011)
responsibilities of the
START bureau,
including its
accountability
mechanisms and leads
and manages WoG
expert civilian
deployments.
international
peacekeeping and
peacebuilding
initiatives where
Canadian interests
are engaged.
humanitarian affairs,
in cooperation with
other government
departments, and
coordination of
Canadian responses
to international
humanitarian crises
caused by both
natural disasters and
armed conflict.
and thematic lines
(GPOP, GBP
including
Explosive
Remnants of War
[ERW]). IRG
provides guidance,
direction and
horizontal
coordination for
the GPSF and its
envelopes.

In the years after Re-START, the unit’s value and relevance to Canada’s
international priorities continued to grow as violent conflict, instability and emerging
humanitarian and natural disasters continued unabated. Over the course of 2009 and early
2010, “START coordinated Canada’s timely response to 10 natural disasters in 15
countries, including major earthquakes in Haiti, Chile and Indonesia and responded to
humanitarian crises in Sudan, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sri
Lanka” (DFAIT, 2010, p. 28). In 2010 the unit “helped deploy 286 RCMP officers to
various peacekeeping missions, including the mission in Afghanistan, and developed a
WoG framework to support the deployment of civilian experts” (DFAIT, 2011, p. 17).

The 2011 evaluation of the GPSF concluded that “the original rationale for the
creation of GPSF continues to be valid. Prior to the GPSF, funding sources within DFAIT
and those within OGDs were insufficient to support fragile state engagement (2011, p.
27). Additionally, “Most of the institutional deficits identified in previous evaluations and
audits have been addressed, thus placing START in a solid position to deliver on the
mandate of the GPSF (DFAIT, 2011, xviii).

Insights from Study Participants
The final element of this case study is an examination of how WoG was
experienced first-hand by a cross-departmental pool of practitioners. Insights from these
interviews are intended to add a practical frame of reference for WoG and further develop
an understanding of the critical barriers to and opportunities for developing and
implementing WoG initiatives within the context of international stabilization and
peacebuilding efforts. Over the course of 2012 and part of 2013, 22 interviews were
conducted with government staff who worked for START or whose work with a partner department was related to stabilization efforts in fragile states and international crisis zones, thereby requiring some familiarity with the work and operations of START.

While Chapter 4 presented the operational attributes of WoG as each being a distinct entity, the qualitative data produced by the interviews was not easily distilled into distinct categories or headings. The coding exercise sought to first identify key barriers to and opportunities (or incentives) for the operationalization of WoG. As discussed in Chapter 2, the semi-structured interview questions were designed to capture each participant’s perspective and experiences related to the operational attributes that emerged in Chapter 4. While Chapter 4 presented the core operational attributes of WoG as they are discussed in literature, the purpose of the primary research in the case studies was to determine how these operational attributes are experienced in practice. Moreover, do any new attributes emerge from the practitioner perspective? As one might expect given the complexity of the operational environment, the issues and the organizations involved participant insights are difficult to categorize cleanly. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, WoG at a conceptual level is vastly multi-dimensional. The situation is the same at the operational level where various attributes such as structure, culture, funding, etc. exist as an interconnected network in which it is impossible to draw conclusions about a single attribute without considering its relationship with other pieces of the WoG system. For example, can ministerial accountability and organizational culture be examined separately from each other? Can the impact of human resource policies be understood separately from organizational structure? Can any of the operational attributes of WoG be explored without always coming back to the collection of environmental characteristics that produced a unique, multi-dimensional environment in which WoG was required? Simplifying the participant data into clean attribute categories would not accurately honour the experiences and reflections of the practitioners. As a result, this research makes an effort to discuss participant insights in a way that acknowledges the systemic-nature of WoG by presenting the results as six themes, each of which advances our understanding of WoG by focusing on a part of the system in which several threads intersect. The themes to be discussed are:
1. Actions speak louder than words: the importance of institutional commitment
2. Into the maelstrom! Ministerial accountability, politics and wicked problems
3. The Culture – Structure – Human Resource Conundrum
4. Perspective Matters: Power and Politics
5. Being Equipped to Manage Boundaries
6. Developing a WoG Professional Cadre

Action speaks louder than words: the importance of institutional commitment

Closely related to the previous theme was the emergence of an operational attribute that would be a new addition to the framework developed in Chapter 4. There are two elements to this theme; the first being that a lack of institutional commitment was often discussed as a barrier to achieving WoG mandates. The second aspect is related to the manner in which a government, a department and/or its senior leaders can articulate institutional support for a new way of doing things – such as WoG. Certainly, a lack of timely or accessible funds and/or insufficient human resources were discussed as indicators of a lack of institutional commitment. However, the more nuanced observations were related to the contradiction they saw between a public enthusiasm for WoG as demonstrated by the prevalence of the term in government publications, websites and press releases and an inability or unwillingness on the part of institutional leadership to mobilize the political will necessary for creating a policy environment in which WoG could truly take root. In other words, perceived inaction was louder than the public championing of WoG as an approach to Canada’s efforts in fragile states.

As has been discussed previously, efforts at horizontal collaboration were not new to government; however, in the context of the internationally focused departments in the mid-aughts WoG was presented in a number of public-facing documents as a new way of doing business for the Canadian government. The 2005 International Policy Statement was the most obvious case of that; however, the WoG terminology and the more general concept of cross-boundary collaboration were also presented in numerous Government of Canada publications and websites, all of which were written for easy consumption by the

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33 Given that the institutions being discussed in this case are government departments and agencies it is impossible to completely dissociate institutional commitment embodied through stated mandates and the commitment of resources from political commitment. Arguably, the political element is pervasive in institutional decisions taken by governments.
Moreover, the creation of START and the GPSF can be seen as clear commitments by senior leadership to a cross-boundary approach to tackling issues in fragile states and crises zones. Yet, despite this overt demonstration of support for WoG, a persistent theme in the interview data was that despite the existence of START and the GPSF, WoG may not have had the level of institutional support necessary for achieving successful cross-boundary collaboration.

Several participants made mention of a document that had been jointly developed by CIDA and DFAIT and involved an interdepartmental committee of ADMs from a number of departments. Produced in 2009, the document was entitled *Sustaining Canada’s Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations*. At the time of the interviews the document had not received approvals for public release, yet it has been acknowledged and referenced in publicly available documents (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013; Fitz-Gerald & Macnamara, 2012; DFAIT, 2011b). Participants did not specifically state that the inability of partner departments to offer approvals for public release was a demonstration of low institutional commitment; however, it seems likely that the situation can be viewed through this lens. Participants from various home departments referenced the following as barriers to WoG initiatives: lack of a common vernacular or vocabulary, lack of a common stabilization framework, lack of common training standards for individuals going into conflict zones, and a lack of a common understanding of WoG. None of these can be achieved independently by a single department or agency. It can be argued that they only emerge from high-level institutional commitment; powerful individuals or organizational elements that bring relevant units to the table or that incentivize or mandate the adoption, where necessary, of a common understanding of terms and concepts related to stabilization, conflict and state fragility.

The aforementioned internal document was the vehicle through which this might have been achieved. It existed as a 63-page, polished document that had been crafted and vetted by a number of interdepartmental working groups. In other words, it was not simply a working draft. One CIDA participant dated initial efforts to craft fragile states

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34 To date the publication is still not available to the public.
guidelines back to 2004 and noted the significant allocation of time, effort and expertise invested in the exercise over four years. That the final version of the document failed to obtain the necessary departmental endorsement for publication and distribution could be interpreted by individuals and teams involved in its creation as an indication that high-level institutional support for fostering WoG initiatives was, at best, inconsistent. Aside from the optics of the situation, the other issue mentioned by a participant was that the document contained a series of recommendations that were very important if individual departments and cross-boundary initiatives such as START, the ATF or interdepartmental working groups were to enhance their WoG capacity. Because the report was never fully endorsed by all key departments and never distributed beyond the confines of government, the recommendations did not benefit from being considered by a broader audience nor did they become the priorities they might have been had they been presented to stakeholder groups as being mutually agreed upon by a suite of powerful departments. That such a document was created but never agreed upon in a way that allowed for wider distribution speaks to a number of barriers to WoG at play within the Canadian case. First, at the most basic level it demonstrates the inherent challenges presented by bureaucratic politics and the natural resistance of departments to share their domain of influence and specialization in any meaningful way. Second, overcoming bureaucratic politics would generally require firm and compelling instruction from a level higher than the departments – perhaps at the level of the Cabinet or even the Prime Minister. One way of interpreting the institutional silence around these publications was that an insufficient level of political will or interest existed at the highest level of the institution.

The consequence of not achieving some level of cross-departmental agreement around the issues discussed in the documents was that individuals and teams working on WoG initiatives lacked a common glossary of key terms and a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities of government actors navigating the complex realms of stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. As a result, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to start a meaningful discourse around joint assessment, joint planning
and joint evaluation of WoG initiatives. One START participant (10201) referenced the inherent challenges of trying to make decisions about allocation of resources and program direction when the relevant policy area was largely delineated by speeches and statements, as opposed to capturing a WoG policy on paper and knowing that the document has gone up the chain of multiple departments and received final approvals from a committee of deputy ministers. Another CIDA participant (10303) referenced a 2-3 page stabilization paper being developed by START and how after a year there still was not agreement. In these cases, the barrier to achieving WoG was not perceived to be other staff in other departments, but instead the more ambiguous political-bureaucratic machine. The sentiments expressed were that, in fact, staff from all departments were being prevented from doing the work they had been tasked to do by a nebulous institutional entity – not so much an individual leader but rather the political-bureaucratic machine.

Into the maelstrom: ministerial accountability, politics and wicked problems

From participants of all departments the reality and impact of ministerial accountability was discussed as a dominant barrier to conceptualizing and achieving WoG programs, initiatives or policies in a public sector environment. Furthermore, participants referenced a number of pressing issues interconnected with ministerial accountability: its role in establishing rigid and inflexible organizational structures, its role in reinforcing organizational cultures and the likelihood that the accountability imperatives result in WoG initiatives being as likely to reinforce boundaries as transcend them. Participants describe a perfect storm of issues that resulted in ministerial accountability and departmental authority becoming more pronounced even though what was actually required was some flexibility in this area.

To demonstrate the intricacies of this policy and programming environment one needs only to look to the examples of Canadian efforts in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan from 2002 to 2012. All three are good examples of what happens when you have highly politicized issues that are, at the same time, very difficult to resolve. The political nature

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35 5-digit numbers have been assigned to each participant and are included in the analysis as a way of sourcing the insights being discussed.
of the issues stems from a number of factors: lingering emotions related to 9/11, the controversial nature of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, celebrity interest in events in Sudan and widespread availability of images of earthquake-wrecked Haiti. The result was ever-increasing interest from traditional news outlets, new media (embodied by digital technologies such as social media) and the general public. The high-profile nature of events and Canadian involvement in all three regions meant that they were naturally of significant interest to political elements within government: the Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet committees and powerful departmental ministers. Juxtaposed against this political reality was the fact that the issues at play in all three regions were complex in nature, impossible to resolve quickly or easily and high risk along a number of dimensions – most notably a significant risk for loss of life. Success by any measure was elusive. Moreover, the work of units such as START and the ATF was closely monitored by branches of the government that were arguably more risk-adverse: TBS, PCO and the PMO. Such an environment was not an ideal space for pushing the envelope on what might be possible with shared accountabilities. The result for many staff on the ground was a sense that the rigid, vertical accountability framework limited true collaboration between departments and agencies. It was widely conceded that while there were many conduits for cross-departmental information sharing and communication, truly shared accountability was not a viable option for achieving WoG. As a barrier to WoG ministerial accountability is deeply resistant to change and innovative practices designed to achieve cross-boundary collaboration must reflect this reality.

It could be argued that shared accountability is not a necessary pre-condition for successful WoG; however, in the sense that ministerial accountability is the bedrock upon which inflexible departmental structures and authorities are established, it can be seen as barrier that stymies institutional innovation and change within other facets of the organization that were discussed as critical for WoG efforts to be successful. Most notable were organizational systems related to human resources, information technology and financial management. In all three cases tools, procedures and policies that would facilitate the sharing of staff and information would have made WoG easier to achieve. However, the firm departmental boundaries, established by the organizational design of the federal government, resulted in individual departments running systems that were
different than systems of a similar purpose in partner departments. Recruitment vehicles and competitions into individual departments, standards and protocols for deploying civilians to conflict zones, resources for pre-deployment training for civilians, performance evaluation metrics and development of career streams and professional competencies were all mentioned by participants as elements of human resource systems that varied across DFAIT, CIDA and DND, not to mention those departments without mandates for international engagement. On the information sharing front, the fact that intradepartmental communication tools of one department did not often always communicate with communication tools from another department. Similarly, the classified and unclassified systems of civilian actors versus military actors different. The impact of different technologies resulted in barriers to sharing information with WoG partners but also meant that data were being collected and stored as per the needs of each department, meaning that they did not lend well to being queried in a manner that facilitated joint analysis. Throughout the interviews, participants, regardless of their home department, returned to these key elements of their WoG experience: the politics, the bureaucracy and the inherent volatility of those regions in which stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian response efforts were being undertaken. They might not be categorized as operational attributes of WoG; however, it was clear that failing to understand the impact of an environment characterized by these elements was in and of itself a barrier to achieving WoG.

The Culture – Structure – Human Resource Conundrum

The interwoven issues of organization culture and human resources that influence WoG efforts have their foundation in the vertical structure of government departments, which is defined, in part, by the previously discussed imperative of ministerial accountability. This rigid organizational structure informs and perpetuates powerful organizational cultures associated with each of the key departments. From distinct departmental values, language and perspectives to the clear sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that is present within even the friendliest accounts of WoG interactions, CIDA, DND, DFAIT and the central agencies each have an organizational identity that greatly informs the experiences of individuals who partake in WoG activities. In fact, departmental culture can be seen not only as a barrier to WoG activities but also a reason why deliberate WoG
efforts are necessary in the first place. Interviews with participants revealed a number of entrenched mindsets formed around departmental lines. These organizational mindsets define one group’s understanding of both themselves and of others. In the case of public sector organizations, it is possible to see how these mindsets become reinforced through an organizational design that draws firm boundaries in which values, lenses and sense of self are developed and perpetuated. These entrenched mindsets have the power to undermine WoG initiatives on a number of fronts and can even be reinforced by a WoG initiative that fails to recognize and address perceived inequalities or the sources of turf-protection. Participant interviews yielded insights into two of these departmental divides: the civil-military divide and the CIDA–START divide.

**Civil – Military Divide**

The most often referenced tension between cultures was the civil-military divide; a juxtaposition of civilian and military cultures that manifested itself both explicitly (as part of a response to the question about organizational culture) but also implicitly at other points within participant interviews. It is important to note that this is not exclusively a departmental divide nor can it be simplified as having a hyper-aggressive, war-enthusiastic military machine on one side with a pacifistic, peace-loving humanitarian on the other. As has been previously discussed, in this case DND is being used in reference to the Defence portfolio which includes both the Canadian Forces and the civilian department. From this organizational governance structure flows an organization enormous in staff, resources and scope of mandate. It also demonstrates that civil-military boundaries not only exist between departments but also within the various perspectives, languages and operational systems of a single department like DND. However, all of the DND participants were military officers and none of them referenced civilian counterparts from their home department when discussing the civil-military divide. Similarly, the term civilian can be extended to any non-military actor. These caveats aside, it is still possible to see that distinct departmental structures support the culture of the Canadian military actors and the civilian departments. Some of the most important elements of the divide are nuanced, engrained and related to functional capabilities, organizational authorities and professional languages, all of which are honed beneath
different departmental umbrellas. What follows here are some examples of how the civil-military divide was embodied in the responses of study participants.

One of the most obvious manifestations of the divide was evidenced when participants talked about joint planning efforts that were necessary for WoG efforts in Afghanistan and Haiti. Civilians used a wide range of terms interchangeably when they were discussing how a team or unit planned for a future initiative, whether it be in the immediate future or on a longer time horizon. Project management, programming, planning, logistics and organization were just some of the terms referenced by civilian participants. In contrast, the term planning had a very specific meaning for military participants who clearly saw within their training and their skill profile the ability to fully develop plans that could be implemented under a wide variety of conditions to achieve a desired outcome (10101). It is also the military perspective that the two functions of planning and operations are separate in the sense the same person would never be doing both at the same time (this would reduce an individual’s ability to be effective at either) but related in that proficiency in one assists with the other. Both represent critical capabilities for military personnel and, as a result, are continuously being honed and developed over the course of a career. Additionally, this commitment to planning is associated with the military’s ability to make decisions that yield the timely deployment of resources whether they be troops, equipment or supplies. It was clear that they perceived this approach to be in strong contrast to how civilian departments organize themselves around planning and programming – a view supported by a CIDA participant (10303) who commented on the sophisticated nature of military planning and observed that the primacy of military planning is an indicator of fundamental differences in the design of military and civilian entities. The former spends the vast majority of its time in the planning and training stage. The Canadian Forces spend a small fraction of time in theatre compared to the amount of time they spend preparing to be in theatre. In contrast, development actors implement programs with limited resources to spend on planning, administration and training. Their raison d’etre is to deliver programs and services deemed necessary. Their funding is associated largely with the delivery of their programs and with little opportunity to earmark funding for activities other than programming.
Moreover, at least one DND participant discussed this capacity for planning as something military officers are raised with, thereby imbuing the skill with meaning far greater than one might expect to associate with a functional competency. Civilian practitioners would not make the same connections to project management or program evaluation. This small insight speaks to the challenges one might anticipate when launching an initiative that brings together military and civilian actors. Possible outcomes include one group dismissing the efforts of the other, the two groups having a different understanding of the resources required for comprehensive planning efforts or two parties leaving a meeting with a different understanding of expectations and next steps.

The civil-military divide was also referenced in the context of differing time horizons. One DND participant (10102) referenced the idea that up until the 1990s the deployment of military personnel would often be framed within a six-month time horizon. Not that the entire effort would be complete in six months, but that the objective would be to transition over to other actors promptly. The participant recalled a joint training exercise that occurred in the early 2000s and involved development actors discussing their potential impact using a 50-year timeframe. The collective military response was described as ‘flabbergasted’. In contrast a central agency perspective spoke of the six-month timeframe as short-term planning for civilian organizations such as DFAIT and CIDA (10401). The time horizon issue is problematic at an operational level – the different partners have different mandates and interests – and also at the level of cross-boundary communication. Similar to the previously discussed term ‘planning’, the use of commonplace terms such as short-term, long-term or immediate responses could result in miscommunication in any WoG dialogue around mission or program success, investment of resources, risk assessment or desired impact.

References to different decision making cultures were framed through the military chain-of-command structure and the civilian consensus-building approach. Interestingly, both military and civilian participants recognized the importance of the consensus-building approach to WoG efforts, especially given the barrier of ministerial accountability therein preventing the development of any formal, integrated accountability structures across departments that might have established top-down authorities to advance a shared agenda. As result, WoG for practitioners is an exercise in
consultation, influence, diplomacy, negotiation and building trust, none of which are
achieved by imposing the military decision-making model upon the civilian actors.
Despite a common understanding that consensus-building is part and parcel of WoG, the
consequences of these opposing decision-making approaches are ever-present in the lives
of study participants: incredulity on the part of military actors about the number of
meetings involved with WoG efforts (10205), resignation around the amount of time it
takes to make decisions (10101), lingering sentiments on the part of civilians that military
actors are not accustomed to having their decisions questioned (10202) or that the
perceived efficiencies of military planning result in efforts that do not take into
consideration longer term development goals (10305).

Other differences between military and civilian cultures included the civilian
observation that the military has a stronger culture of capturing and sharing lessons
learned (10301). This was attributed in part to the culture of planning and training but
also because the military culture acknowledges a heightened awareness of the fact that
human lives are in jeopardy if they are not committed to learning from past performance.
There appears to be a different level of risk-aversion from the civilian departments which
conduct lessons learned exercises but do not always share the results or organize them in
a manner that can be accessed for future reference. Despite the recognition that DND was
most enthusiastic about lessons learned exercises, a theme that emerges from the
participant data was the sense that Canadian efforts in Afghanistan have played a
significant role in capacity development – to such a degree that various informal
initiatives were being undertaken in 2012 to leverage the experiences of staff in
Afghanistan. How these initiatives might take root and evolve as institutional best
practice was unclear at the time, but there was a sense that DND, CIDA and DFAIT had
all emerged from the Afghanistan PRT exercise with more staff equipped to work on
WoG initiatives in international conflict and disaster zones. One CIDA staff member
(10305) referenced a results-based management framework applied to development in
fragile states that had been developed in Kandahar and was about to be discussed with a
small working group in Ottawa. Participants were not suggesting that the Afghanistan
model(s) (as embodied through ATF, START or any number of departmental taskforces)
is the best way to implement WoG. As has been discussed, context and the ever-changing
interests of actors involved should inform decisions about how WoG is operationalized. However, there was a sense that Afghanistan was the catalyst which prompted the government’s interest in WoG and that the various organizational instruments designed to enhance Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan provided civilian and military staff with WoG experiences at an accelerated rate. Arguably, without the Afghanistan experience the development of WoG capacity amongst staff would have taken much longer to build.

There was a sense that civil-military tensions are somewhat better navigated in situations of disaster response (i.e., Haiti) versus stabilization and peacebuilding efforts (i.e., Afghanistan). While both efforts take place largely in fragile states, meaning that all forms of political, economic and social instability may be present, civilian staff at START discussed civil-military relations in the context of disaster response with a relatively positive outlook (10203, 10206) as a result of a longer tradition of joint training, joint deployment and more deliberate lessons learned exercises. The sentiments expressed included the idea that the lines between civilian and military actors are clearer in these situations. This clarity can be attributed to established standard operation procedures (Guidelines for the use of military operations). These are Canadian protocols that exist in addition to the UN Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (also referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines”). The clarity of roles may also be related to the fact that often in response to international natural disasters the military is taking on the role of logistics specialist which may be less threatening to principled humanitarian action than the role of armed soldiers that is more prevalent in post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. CIDA staff were clear that while a role may exist for the military in disaster response it is assessed on a case by case basis; that there are times when military involvement is not necessary or appropriate (10302)

Finally, as one might expect, participant interviews captured various examples of how their understanding of the ‘other’ was fostered and reinforced. One CIDA participant spoke of their daily interaction with military officers in the PRT and how, in order to have a desired impact with military counterparts, one had to engage with a heightened level of aggression and intensity (10305). This frame of reference resulted in reflections that the two cultures were very much an ‘us and them’ situation and that development
practitioners needed to acquire a certain directness and firmness in communication style if they wanted to advance the interests of the development community in civil-military interactions.

**CIDA – START (DFAIT) Divide**

Some level of operational or philosophical tension between CIDA and DFAIT can be expected in any examination of their organizational relationship. Both units were vast organizations in their own right, well-established for many years. Thanks to ministerial accountability and mandates established clearly in legislation, there was plenty of time and opportunity for distinct and powerful organizational cultures to grow within each department. Their cultures are not at odds with each other; however, discussions with participants from both departments did reveal some tensions between the two units related in part to established ideas of each other’s domains of expertise, the onset of START and the possibility that new roles and responsibilities threatened organizational identities.

A primary source of tension between the two units pertains to a difference of opinion on the value and appropriateness of the lead department model embodied by START. On this point levels of enthusiasm for the lead department model, as embodied by the placement of START within the DFAIT structure, varied clearly depending on the home department of the participant. The participants who saw START’s lead department model as optimal tended to be START staff (10206). While START staff did discuss some challenges related to turf protection and the importance of doing their jobs well so as to gain the trust and respect of staff from other departments, there was a general sense that there was a role to fill and that the START/GPSF model was well-designed to fill that role. Moreover, some START staff spoke of very deliberate efforts made early on to ensure that everyone understood the new unit did not belong exclusively to DFAIT, that it was a shared asset (10206). In contrast, not every non-START participant was as enthusiastic about the lead-department model. This position was especially strongly held from the CIDA perspective. CIDA participants identified issues with the lead-department model ranging from the basic belief that in the context of the public sector a lead-department model simply cannot be a truly shared model (10501), to the view that
implicitly such a model has to advance first the interests of the home department, leaving others to feel disconnected or unrepresented at the decision-making table (10301, 10303). An especially strong sentiment from a CIDA participant described the lead-department model in the case of START as tragic and a blatant illustration of a lack of ‘whole-of government’ in that it actually fosters territorialism amongst units that look to guard the unique value proposition they offer to the work of government (10303). Why provide DFAIT with a pool of money, a programming mandate and position it as coordinator (or leader) in a domain of practice that CIDA was well equipped to lead? From a CIDA perspective the development of programming and project management capabilities within the diplomatic service could be seen as an extreme redundancy, a poor use of resources and a bit of an insult to the often-maligned, under-funded CIDA programs that were managed by staff whose core competencies lay in program design, evaluation and fiscal management.

Interestingly, the CIDA participants who spoke to this issue did not suggest that the unit should have been established within CIDA. Instead, they spoke favourably of the idea of a neutral ground, a unit that did not have to align with competing departmental objectives but could focus on government-wide objectives and develop its own staff complement with the right expertise. The UK model was not viewed as an ideal alternative to the lead-department model because experienced public servants could see that a model in which a new unit reported jointly to three parent departments would not necessarily force reconciliation of competing interests and generated concerns about the unit being assigned responsibilities but no real authority (10301). Instead, there was a sense that a preferable model might look like the cabinet-level taskforce model as embodied by the Afghanistan Task Force whose institutional home was the PCO and whose WoG mandate was seen to transcend the individual and at times diverging interests and mandates of the various departments (10303 and 10305). Essentially, the cabinet-level taskforce was viewed as a model in which departments were included around the planning and decision-making table more as equals. Additionally, the model had the advantage of putting PCO at the helm to coordinate policy, provide direction and resolve differences of opinion while still allowing the individual departments to retain their respective areas of expertise (10303).
In addition to the operational observations made by some CIDA participants about the appropriateness or effectiveness of situating START within the DFAIT architecture, it was also clear that undercurrents of other themes were contributing to the ongoing divide. The tension between the departments did not come across as a blatant contrast in values (like those often associated with the civil-military divide). Participants from both departments made positive reference to regular connections with colleagues in other departments, informal channels of communication, common working groups and taskforces and an understanding of DFAIT’s role as the main interface between Canada and the world (10302; 10303). There was the occasional suggestion by CIDA participants that DFAIT staff had a sense of superiority that was only magnified by the placement of START within its institutional boundaries and that DFAIT liked to be in control. Still, the divide between CIDA and DFAIT (START) involved some nuances that may have been related, in part, to its role as junior partner in the START undertaking (10301), but appeared also to be connected to DFAIT’s new programming role that was a consequence of START and the GPSF funding role. On this point it was possible to see in the language used by CIDA participants that this new role for DFAIT was a direct affront to CIDA’s departmental identity and raison d’etre.

Whereas START participants discussed the logical division of responsibilities based on departmental expertise (10206), from a CIDA perspective the idea that START would be focused on political issues (i.e. rule of law) and CIDA on poverty-related issues was a massive oversimplification of the issues at hand (10303). The idea that governance work, rule of law and security system reform would fall under the purview of START while CIDA worked exclusively on poverty alleviation suggested that the two spaces were not interconnected at all, which goes against the very nexus of issues that brought WoG to the fore in the post-911 era. The point was made that CIDA has had ‘rule of law’ experts on hand for the better part of 20 years (10303). Moreover, CIDA participants discussed the fact that DFAIT knowledge on these topics from a policy perspective did not equate to DFAIT being equipped to manage programs. From a CIDA perspective, DFAIT staff were trained to be diplomats and the political skills associated with diplomats were referenced with respect (10303). CIDA’s domain of expertise was in project management and programming (10401). However, it was clear CIDA participants did not believe the skills
of a diplomat included project management. In fact, it was suggested that START staff asked simple questions that displayed their lack of preparation and knowledge in project management, and that their presence in the programming space was an affront to the decades of project management experience held by CIDA and a source of tension between the two units.

In summary, START’s lead department model reinforced both DFAIT’s vision of itself as the hub and centre of Canada’s relationship with the world and CIDA’s sense that it has a critical, but much underappreciated or undervalued, role in the same space. As a result, one faction (DFAIT) saw the START model as a great vehicle for achieving WoG while the other faction (CIDA) saw the model as somehow anti-WoG. The takeaway insight is that a number of best practices were associated with the design and launch of START, including a joint DFAIT-CIDA submission to TBS, and a Memorandum of Understanding that carved out clear operational spaces for the two units. Nonetheless, while leadership within DFAIT and CIDA may have done its best to address the big-picture questions related to governance and standard operating procedures, the network of pre-existing issues already fostering mistrust and frustration between the two units may not have been adequately considered and addressed when START was launched in 2005.

The Conundrum

The two examples of divides and tensions associated with departmental cultures and perspective were not unexpected given the size, scale and differing mandates of the departments involved. However, what emerged as a dominant insight from the interview data was the complex and problematic interplay between structure, culture and human resources. If the structures were not so rigid, the cultures not so well-established and the sense of difference not quite so profound, cross-boundary collaboration might occur more organically. Instead, we see a government structure that establishes and reinforces departmental cultures that are so strong that turf-protection and departmentalism must be overcome for WoG to be successful. In addition to structure and culture there is a connection to human resources policies and practices. Whereas organizational structure is perceived to be impervious to significant change, the management of human resources
may offer the best opportunity to break down the cultural divide without having to redesign the machinery of government. Secondments, liaison positions, common performance evaluation metrics, rotational opportunities, joint training and value placed on experience in other government departments were discussed by participants as being critical to seeing that the people with the “right” expertise, skills and attitudes were working on WoG projects. Despite the collective understanding that human resource management was essential to operationalizing WoG, participants talked at length about how, in fact, current human resource practices did not foster an environment in which any of the above-mentioned opportunities were easily achieved. This was attributed, in part, to the fact that human resource policies, priorities and processes existed on a department by department basis and therefore were as much a manifestation of a departmental culture as a vehicle for transcending organizational cultures. Therein lay the conundrum. Human resources were linked to organizational structure and behaved more as a vehicle for reinforcing departmental cultures and silos than a tool for achieving WoG. Interview participants observed a number of ways in which human resource management differed across departments and how these differences behaved as a barrier to WoG efforts. These are addressed below:

**Recruiting**

DND, CIDA, DFAIT and the central agencies had different recruiting practices for staff. The most obvious example of this was the differences in recruiting for the Canadian Forces versus civilian departments; however, the most often discussed concern with recruitment was the differing standards and approaches of the civilian departments. In DFAIT, employees belonged to one of two main recruitment and training programs: Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who rotated between international missions (embassies and consular offices) and non-rotational staff who worked primarily at headquarters in Ottawa and passport offices in Canada. The title of the latter group is somewhat deceiving in that staff are non-rotational in the sense that they do not move throughout the various Canadian embassies; however, they may rotate or move throughout various government departments and agencies that form the federal public service. In fact, all

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36 The skill profile of a WoG professional is discussed later in this chapter – in the section “Being Equipped to Manage Boundaries”
DFAIT employees interviewed for this case study had experience working with other government departments (OGDs). Often movement from one department to another was instigated by the employee who applied for and secured a position with a new department; however, many federal public servants would be recruited to the federal government through leadership development or policy training programs that would, as part of the training process, move new public servants through a number of departments. START was staffed with a combination of rotational and non-rotational staff. The policy analyst positions were non-rotational, meaning that they left only when they chose to pursue a new opportunity (10201). As START laid down roots, the inclusion of these non-rotational positions allowed for the development of institutional memory and capacity.

**Investment in OGD expertise**

The importance of understanding how other government departments (OGDs) work is touched on throughout the interviews. The organizational structure and processes of government are so complex and vast that it is really impossible to learn about them comprehensively through books or courses (10401). Moving through government departments, experiencing the internal processes and protocols, observing the disparate departmental cultures first-hand: this is the only way to truly understand how government works and, consequently, how to have an impact within the system.

OGD experience can be achieved in many ways, one of which is to recruit staff with prior experience in another government department. Looking at the small pool of 22 participants, source classification data tell us that all three CA participants had OGD experience at other central agencies and within line departments. Of the 8 START participants 4 had OGD experience and 4 did not. This may be explained by the presence of career FSOs in the unit, staff brought in for their NGO experience or the fact that at its launch START absorbed the staff from the Human Security Program. Subjects from CIDA and DND had less OGD experience prior to joining the respective departments. Of the CIDA participants, only 1 of the 5 had OGD experience and at DND none of the 5 had formal OGD experience prior to their time with DND. There are some important differences, though, between CIDA and DND in this respect. All of the DND participants
were military officers and the fact that none of them worked for another department prior to joining the Canadian Forces is therefore not a surprise. Generally, the choice of an individual to join the military is a long-term commitment made relatively early in a career. However, DND demonstrates its commitment to achieving OGD experience in other ways. Source classification data reveal that when it comes to investing resources in garnering insights into the processes, cultures and expertise of OGDs, DND comes out on top. Out of the interview pool, two DND staff were working in formal liaison positions; one in START and one in CIDA. Of the four participants who had experienced a secondment during their career, three were DND staff (one seconded to START, one to PCO and one to PCO-ATF). While the source classification data certainly do not clearly indicate a widespread trend, they did suggest that some departments may be more open to the idea of secondments because they understand the strategic value of formal liaison positions or they have the organizational capacity (resources distribution, human resource policies) to make it happen. One might also expect that those departments with a very strong organizational culture might be more apprehensive about establishing opportunities for staff to move in and out of departments – more suspicious of ‘others’ in their domain of policy and practice. This would be consistent with what we know about the strength of the departmental and professional cultures of DND and CIDA.

Other observations to emerge from the participant interviews include the idea that START leadership had to work very hard for 2-3 years to secure a commitment for a secondment of a DND officer to work on the team (10204; 10206). The effort required for this to happen was memorable to participants and is reflective of how difficult it was for START to be staffed with more than DFAIT employees. The fact that the entire team (aside from the DND secondment) was composed of DFAIT staff was an issue internally for leaders who would have liked to develop more competencies and more formal connections back to other WoG partners by having more departmental perspectives sharing the physical office space and contributing to START directly. Additionally, the almost full complement of DFAIT staff reinforced the perspective from other departments, namely CIDA, that START was very much a DFAIT production. It may be possible to design HR innovations that address some of the issues that make secondments and liaison positions unfeasible other for departments.
In addition to secondments and liaison positions, joint education and training positions also allow staff to develop an understanding of OGDs. These topics are explored in depth in the next section; however, there was a vignette from a CIDA participant that reinforced the idea that even when great opportunities exist for WoG training, the fact that the commitment of human resources is determined at the departmental level means that financial restraints or cultural norms can prevent a department and its staff from participating. The participant (10303) referenced the National Security Studies Program (NSSP) which was offered at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. The year-long educational program is designed for military officers. It provides up-and-coming leaders in the CF an opportunity to complete a master’s degree while engaging in important networking opportunities. The CIDA participant explained how DND opens the door to civilian participation as it sees the tremendous learning opportunity for its staff to have OGD participants in the classroom. DND had invited a CIDA participant for 4-5 years and offered to pay the full cost of board and tuition. CIDA would only have needed to cover the salary to allow one staff person to step away from their regular responsibilities. However, at the time the interviews were conducted, CIDA had never sent a staff person to the program. In contrast, DFAIT ran an annual competition to send one of their staff to the program each year (10202).

In summary, a common sentiment from participants was that while they had few expectations that ministerial accountability and the departmental model of government would change, the same could not be said for human resource management. The inability to move people around in a way that would ensure the right people were on the job or to provide cross-cultural opportunities to better understand each other was a strong frustration for participants and associated with an overly bureaucratic system and a senior leadership that displayed little enthusiasm for exploring human resource innovations despite the mandate for cross-boundary efforts. Alterations or innovations to human resources policies and processes are not perceived to be within the realm of influence for junior or mid-level staff in government departments. The necessary change can only come from senior elements within line departments and the central agencies. Its absence could be considered another indicator that institutional commitment for WoG was not sufficient.
Perspective Matters: Power and Politics

We have already discussed a number of themes related to WoG that are viewed differently by participants. From how the term is understood and defined to the value of the lead-department model, a participant’s departmental and individual perspective understandably informs their opinions on a matter. The insights discussed in this section emphasize how important individual and collective perspectives can be when implementing cross-boundary collaboration efforts. Moreover, the two examples examined here emphasize how important it is for WoG leaders and team members to appreciate the role of perspective and what conditions can make it easy for WoG practitioners to be somewhat blind to perspectives different from their own.

Power and politics

Who holds power and influence? How do these concepts manifest themselves in a WoG undertaking? What institutional processes or leadership approaches can result in disempowerment of WoG partners? What is the difference between real power imbalance and perceived power imbalance? What is the impact of either on WoG initiatives? As discussed in the section on structure, culture and human resources, DND and DFAIT participants were quite complimentary about CIDA, its staff and programs, but there were times when CIDA participants were quicker to defend their space and their work, to delineate roles and responsibilities. They tended to come across as more defensive and protectionist of the key departmental functions. The insight here may be that it is easier to be generous with how you see others when you are in a position of power. DND’s power and influence comes from its very design and authorities. DFAIT, through START, was given a mandate and a pool of financial resources. CIDA was a partner to both DFAIT and DND but had less political influence and a narrow mandate that carved out a scope of practice anchored to Canada’s ODA, which did not easily align with stabilization efforts.

To better understand how power and influence manifest themselves in interdepartmental government relations, it is necessary to look to decision-making processes amongst the main WoG partners. The reality of decision making around cross-cutting issues in the stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance environments is that everyone can appreciate the importance of consensus-building, but
at the end of the day the military is perceived to be in the position of power because it is equipped to work in crisis zones with equipment, funding and authority to deploy rapidly. One DND participant made reference to how simple it was for a DND employee to spend thousands of dollars on supplies necessary for the Afghanistan mission compared to a CIDA staff person who had little to no devolved authority to spend even a few hundred dollars, regardless of how important their project might be (10101). Moreover, in these environments, often civilian actors cannot deploy without military support such as planes for transporting humanitarian supplies and staff or soldiers to secure an operational space. While it was widely conceded by civilians that DND is very open to the idea of WoG – as demonstrated by its enthusiasm for joint training, sharing of lessons learned and the degree to which it encouraged secondments and liaison positions within other government departments, CIDA’s enthusiasm for WoG as it was embodied by START was moderated. The sentiment from CIDA participants that the development agency was not an equal player to DFAIT and DND at decision-making tables was juxtaposed against their belief that CIDA had expertise that was essential for the Government of Canada to achieve its desired impact in key regions of fragility and instability. CIDA staff see themselves as best placed to act as an interface or translator between the Canadian military and the NGOs that have a huge role in stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance efforts (10302). From a trust-building or relationship management perspective, this tension is related to understanding how actors perceive the distribution of power and influence around the decision-making table. Having the relevant actors at the table is one critical element but understanding that those actors arrive at the table with pre-established ideas of whose departmental voice is most influential will impact any consensus-building effort. Those who perceive themselves to be without power or overly dependent on another partner may see a decision-making table at which they are not welcome or appreciated. They will experience WoG through this lens and look for actions, behaviours and results that reinforce this perspective. While not exclusively a civil-military tension, this dynamic between departments is understandable but not ideal for cross-boundary collaboration.
Headquarters (HQ) vs the Field

A perspective that emerged from participant interviews across departmental boundaries was that WoG was achieved with greater success in the field than at headquarters and that barriers and incentives for WoG manifested themselves differently in the two arenas. Twenty of the 22 participants had some level of international field experience related to stabilization activities, with the Afghanistan PRT in Kandahar and the Canadian involvement in Haiti being the most dominant points of reference. The HQ-Field divide emerged often as a result of one of the warm-up questions that asked participants to reflect upon a time when WoG was working well. Instead of identifying a specific Canadian response, program or activity, some participants spoke of WoG in the field as a point of contrast with WoG in Ottawa.

A theme emerged from the interviews that in many ways WoG was more likely to be achieved in the field than HQ. Participants made reference to a sense of urgency and recognized volatility that came from being physically co-located in a conflict or disaster zone and to a heightened awareness of the very tangible consequences of the cross-cutting issues at play in hostile operational environments. Moreover, they spoke of how sharing a physical space and navigating common challenges contributed to the breaking down of departmental boundaries. In addition to advancing our understanding of what conditions help foster WoG, the idea that practitioners with field experience might have different, more favourable perspectives on WoG and individuals from other departments than those held by HQ-orientated staff emphasizes an important insight into operationalizing WoG that is quite specific to how the concept is advanced in stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance efforts.

A DFAIT participant (10202) shared a story that demonstrated a disconnect between headquarters and the field. The example pertained to the general service medal, a CF award that could be issued to civilians working with the military. Until 2010 all civilians deployed in Kandahar had received the award; however, when DFAIT took over the leadership of the PRT civilian staff were no longer formally working on a military operation. The result was that despite the danger, commitment and sacrifice of time spent in Kandahar, there were two groups of civilian staff, those who had received the honour and those who had not. The participant observed that the situation was a result of DFAIT
staff in Ottawa who did not consider medals as being of importance to DFAIT staff and the DFAIT culture. That assessment may have been accurate but failed to allow for the possibility that the intensity of the field experience in Afghanistan might have generated a new dimension in the DFAIT culture for those staff deployed to a field posting that much more resembled a military outpost than any embassy posting. This example was effective at demonstrating how different a situation can look from headquarters than the operational trenches.

Another lens on this issue was the idea that the impact of the political manoeuvring and power dynamics among ministers, deputy ministers and political actors, such as the Prime Minister’s Office, was far greater for staff working on Canada’s WoG approach to Afghanistan from headquarters in Ottawa (10101). In Ottawa it is possible, at times, to be distracted by the back and forth of cross-departmental negotiations and consensus-building activities and forget about the practical realities facing staff on the ground in conflict zones. A DND participant (10105) discussed the anonymity of headquarters work and the ease with which staff would simply fall into cultural norms and controls, whereas in the Kandahar PRT the departmental hierarchies disappeared somewhat and the work day became much more about working with people you see every morning for coffee and with whom you share the same risks. Another DND participant (10102) referenced the problematic contribution of HQ to the work being done in the field. The actors in the PRT negotiate a joint plan or develop a common understanding and then submit their reports to their respective HQ teams. The staff in HQ see the situation differently and are more inclined to disagree with the common assessment because of turf-protection issues, political influences or because they are unable to appreciate the true nature of the issues facing staff in theatre. The result is that the different departments in Ottawa send contradictory messages to their staff in the field, which at a minimum undoes the initial effort undertaken by field staff and in more severe cases diminishes the impact of the Canadian effort overall and fosters frustration amongst staff in the field.

A CIDA participant (10301) who spent time in Kandahar also spoke of how the cohabitation and sharing of physical space on a daily basis brought people together. One example referenced was a series of interviews conducted as part of a lessons learned project. The interviews did capture certain irritants and resentments between the military
and CIDA staff; however, the participant emphasized that every person he spoke with during his interviews made it clear that on an individual, person-to-person level there was great admiration and appreciation for the work being done. The same participant also observed that the cross-departmental relationships in the field went so well, in fact, that it created a new kind of tension with Ottawa because HQ staff were not having the same experience. The entrenched mindsets were somewhat relaxed in the field, but as firm as ever in Ottawa. Activities in the field would naturally push individuals from different departments to find a way to work together while HQ cautioned staff members deployed to the PRT not to go too far in working together (10301). Similarly, another CIDA participant (10303) reflected on their own field experience and extolled the virtues of working together in a shared environment because it presented an opportunity to look at the same problem together. In their experience, if a joint understanding emerges at the same time the opportunities for involvement from all partners become more obvious and less fraught with tension. The participant spoke of how disheartening it was to return to Ottawa and see the silos as strong as ever. Finally, a third CIDA participant (10305) described the profound change in perspective that emerged from their time in the field working closely with Canadian military officers, that they came to a more sophisticated understanding of what the military can do and its role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in fragile states. This participant talked about the challenges of returning to Ottawa with this new perspective where long-time CIDA colleagues thought time in the field had dramatically changed long-held beliefs and values. This story reflected the assumptions of a ‘peacenik’ CIDA identity pitched against the ‘war-mongering’ military culture. The participant credited time deployed to Afghanistan, and the opportunity to work closely with the Canadian military, as being responsible for breaking down these stereotypes.

There are many implications of the perspective from practitioners that WoG in the field is more effective and less vulnerable to competing organizational cultures and interests than similar efforts in Ottawa. That WoG policy and WoG operations or programming may require different strategies and frameworks for implementation, that leaders and managers based in Ottawa can be perceived by those in the field as barriers to WoG and that from HQ a number of nuanced factors for incentivizing WoG can be
missed are just some of the lessons learned from participant interviews. Moreover, there is an important opportunity emerging from the field experiences of practitioners who have been on joint deployments. A START participant (10204) made mention of the fact that one of the Directors General of START assumed her position after having been the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). She would have seen first-hand the wealth of WoG experience and breaking down of cultural barriers that happened on the ground. The participant observed that upon arriving at START the DG searched out staff members who had in-theatre experience in Afghanistan or Haiti because they possessed this invaluable field experience. As a result, START slowly began developing a critical mass of employees who had WoG experiences forged in hostile operational environments. These staff had a frame of reference for the importance of establishing a common purpose, conducting joint analysis and demonstrating respect for departmental areas of expertise. Military officers and CIDA staff were returning to their respective departments with a similar frame of reference. How these experiences were debriefed and institutional lessons learned collected is not clear, yet a critical mass of government staff moved through their respective organizations with a shared understanding that, from the field, HQ is more a barrier to WoG than a facilitator. This could, over time, result in positive changes to how HQ staff see their role in WoG initiatives. In a future study it would be interesting to follow the career paths of those civilian and military staff who experienced WoG in the field through Canadian initiatives in Afghanistan and Haiti. It might be possible to determine if or how their WoG insights were leveraged in career advancement or whether it is possible to attribute any changes in approaches to WoG in headquarters to the movement of these WoG practitioners through the federal government.

**Being equipped to manage boundaries**

Aside from the opportunities that appeared to exist for practitioners in the field, the interview results were replete with a sense from all departments that breaking down the structural and cultural boundaries that existed between the main departments was not a viable option. Ministerial accountability ensured that authorities and accountabilities ran vertically and that the political reality of federal ministers would be an ever-present barrier to WoG initiatives, especially those undertaken in complex, high-risk, high-profile
international environments. In the same vein, the strength of the departmental cultures was linked to the rigidity of the departmental structures, meaning that divides and tensions among departments, teams and individuals are a natural aspect of any WoG initiative undertaken by the suite of internationally focused Canadian departments, their domestic counterparts and the central agencies. As a result, when the interview data are coded from the perspective of identifying incentives and opportunities for conceptualizing, implementing and fostering WoG initiatives, the insight that emerges is that the boundaries cannot be ignored or destroyed. Instead, they must be aptly navigated and managed. Successful WoG as it has occurred in Canada is, therefore, strongly dependent on the skills, aptitudes and personality traits of the individuals involved. From a senior staff member in START (10206) came the observation that WoG is very difficult at every level, including the individual level. The idea that there are people more suited for WoG than others was widespread amongst participants. They approached this theme from a range of perspectives including what happens when the wrong people are on the job, what skills and competencies make someone the right person for the job, and how to find and recruit that person. This section will examine some of the most compelling themes to emerge from participants.

A practitioner who can successfully navigate and influence a WoG network has to be equipped with some specific skills that include both technical competencies and soft or interpersonal abilities. Table 13 summarizes skills and aptitudes that interview participants identified as being part of the WoG tool kit for any successful practitioner. The majority of the skills emerged from answers to a question that asked participants to reflect on what skills they would look for if they were building a WoG team. The resulting data, which were rich and textured, can only be touched upon here; however, several high-level insights are worth noting. First, while the participants often identified and discussed different skills, those that emerged were consistent and complementary and, when assembled, laid the foundations of a skill profile that would be desirable in any WoG undertaking launched by DFAIT, DND, CIDA or the central agencies. From the bigger picture, this cross-departmental shared vision of the WoG practitioner could be enormously valuable to future efforts to recruit, retain and train staff. It also speaks to the recurring theme that as a result of cross-boundary initiatives and campaigns such as
START, ATF, the Kandahar PRT and other WoG programs in various fragile states, these skills are being honed in staff throughout all of the relevant departments, meaning that an institutional capacity may be developing organically. This sentiment that staff have developed new skills and a new way of seeing things based on their experiences in Afghanistan and Haiti was echoed by some participants (10301, 10305). If HR processes can provide more opportunities to leverage and continue to foster this institutional capacity, it may be possible to achieve WoG in a way that starts with having the right people on the team rather than a preoccupation with machinery of government.

Table 13: Summary of WoG skills discussed by participants during interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soft Skills</th>
<th>Personality Traits / Aptitudes</th>
<th>Communication Skills</th>
<th>Relationship Management Skills</th>
<th>Seeing the connections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curiosity</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Team building</td>
<td>Interdisciplinary perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Openness to sharing and learning</td>
<td>Translation / Translator</td>
<td>Ability to work with others</td>
<td>Creative thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outlook (positive; solution-oriented)</td>
<td>Listening</td>
<td>Cultural awareness</td>
<td>Holistic Thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sense of humour</td>
<td>Ability to communicate position – role</td>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td>Big Picture Thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>Ability to articulate someone else’s vision</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Lateral Thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Change management / leading change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appreciation</td>
<td>Visionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comfort with conflict – tension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patience</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authenticity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Understanding other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open-mindedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Skills</td>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Field experience</td>
<td>Planning &amp; logistics</td>
<td>Strategic Thinking</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of central agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country knowledge</td>
<td>Tactical background</td>
<td>Business planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of their home department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credible, relevant knowledge</td>
<td>Problem identification / problem solving</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding of other departments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Writing – analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Legal knowledge</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, Table 13 incorporates both the technical and the soft skills because it reflects commentary from interview participants who reinforced the idea that the right person has a blend of technical expertise whether in operations or geographic knowledge or familiarity with conflict and crisis zones, plus the interpersonal skills that allow them to build relationships and have influence with actors from across a WoG network. The blend is, in fact, critical and it is linked with credibility and building trust across a network of actors. While this is achieved in part by strong people-skills, several participants talked about the enormous importance ensuring that WoG practitioners bring a skill or expertise of value to the table whether that be at the assessment stage, the planning stage, the implementation stage, the policy development stage or the evaluation stage. At any of these points in a stabilization or humanitarian assistance undertaking, the cross-departmental body requires individuals who can bring expertise in country knowledge, conflict- or crisis-specific knowledge and field experience (10203). In this sense, the blending of technical skills with soft skills leads to a skill profile that is quite customized for a practitioner working in conflict-affected fragile states. There are a number of necessary proficiencies unique to this context. The importance of individuals bringing to the collective table competencies such as those referenced above is in part so that the WoG team can advance its mandate; however, it is also related to building credibility, trust and social capital across departmental boundaries.

A number of DFAIT participants were especially vocal on the importance of individuals being able to establish credibility that is based on recognized experience in order to build meaningful relationships (10205; 20206). This perspective links back to the previous discussion around WoG in the field and the power of the joint deployment. One CIDA participant (10301) reflected on the ability of individuals to build trust as critical to the information-sharing element of WoG. In the absence of common information management systems or information sharing standards that allow information to move with ease across departmental boundaries, the only option for WoG practitioners is to have relationships with key counterparts in different departments. Such relationships are nuanced in that they require a level of trust that would allow an individual from one department to share information with a counterpart at another department. Individual A has to be invested enough in the working relationship or the belief in a shared objective that they would think to pass on information that would allow Individual B to do their job well, all the while being confident that sharing the information would not result in an undesirable outcome at a personal or organizational level for Individual A. From this perspective, practitioners are talking about a fairly high level of trust and a trust-building, relationship-building aptitude that has to be somewhat deliberate as some staff rotate through positions quickly, meaning that new relationships need to be built. The skill is how to build these relationships in ways that are both strategic (i.e., networking or building social capital with those individuals who possess desired skills, information or influence) and authentic (the strategic value of the relationship is not so dominant that one person feels as though they are being used by the other). Such proficiency in relationship management is no small undertaking. It involves any number of interpersonal skills combined with certain personality traits. A DND participant (10102) recounted their efforts at relationship building and helping civilians overcome negative impressions they might hold about military officers. It was called the indirect approach, which was described as less overbearing and involved making a few suggestions in a group meeting then going to individuals for one-on-one meetings where ideas can be planted. The challenge is that the participant has to be proficient in a number of approaches as he has to use a different strategy when communicating with colleagues at DND, for example.
The versatility of being able to move from one communication approach to another has been honed over a number of WoG projects.

Third, in addition to reflecting on what they would look for in the right person joining a WoG team, participants talked about how leaders and administrators should embody various skills. A participant in a senior position at START (10206) reflected on the reality that not every new addition to the team was going to possess all of the necessary skills, and therefore it was the responsibility of directors general, directors and deputy directors to provide opportunities for further skill development and to impress upon new staff the necessity of building positive relationships with CIDA in order for START to achieve its WoG mandate. The participant saw the role of leadership as including modeling WoG at every turn, in a manner that did not undermine or compromise the expertise and value being offered by the home department. From a civilian perspective, having leadership model WoG was even more important for the military actors. The same participant recounted experiences from Afghanistan where they had worked with both an unsupportive and a supportive General. In the former case, the result was a lack of coordination throughout the entire military structure. In the latter, the General set a tone that encouraged WoG and there was buy-in all the way along the military structure. In a similar vein, a START participant (10203) commented on the impact it has when leaders participate in all of the work that makes WoG so difficult, especially in the context of the long days and the urgency of international crises. Being able to watch someone engage and organize the complex web of stakeholders and effectively restate their individual interests while developing a shared vision was a powerful learning opportunity for someone developing their own WoG competencies.

Another important feature of a WoG leader is the ability to recognize the greater good, which does not always align with personal career interests or organizational politics (10301).

Finally, in addition to soft and technical skills was the somewhat intangible, but often referenced, individual attribute of personality. Some participants differentiated personality from soft skills although the connection between the two is evident. Personality attributes or traits are included in Table 13 as skills because in many ways they can be developed and honed through forms of management skill development and
deliberate practice. However, they also reflect certain tendencies and outlooks that individuals may come by naturally either as a result of their genetic make-up or how their personality is shaped over the course of their lives. One DND participant (10105) was clear that, in fact, the question of the right person is less about specific skills and more about personality, that WoG is profoundly personality-driven. A CIDA participant (10301) commented that general personality traits are often underestimated, that the basic inclination that some people have to make connections, take people for coffee and build relationships serves practitioners well in the WoG space. Another CIDA participant (10305) talked about personality by juxtaposing the aggressive personality they saw as typical of a DND actor with the submissive or passive personality of a CIDA staff person. The participant interviews did not yield one single personality profile that was optimal for WoG but instead discussed a combination of personality traits (i.e., open-mindedness, flexibility or adaptability) that when paired with tangible communication and conflict resolution skills and tactics might allow an individual to have an impact in a space that contained personalities very different from their own.

**Fostering a WoG Cadre: Joint Training and Education**

If, at the individual level, there exists a broad set of abilities and personality traits that characterize a skilled WoG practitioner, the necessary follow-up addresses how to recruit and retain these individuals to WoG teams and/or how best to develop the skill profiles in staff who are already contributing to WoG programs, initiatives and operations. Examination of the culture/structure/human resource conundrum expanded on some of the challenges associated with efforts to ensure a WoG team is staffed with the right people. Given those significant challenges, might it be possible to contemplate the existence of a cross-departmental WoG professional cadre – a contingent of talented and versatile individuals with skills necessary for cross-boundary collaboration but also with specialized abilities that would allow them to thrive in complex post-conflict or humanitarian emergencies? The answer might be yes… eventually. Despite the organizational and institutional barriers to ‘whole-of-government, a critical mass of WoG practitioners was being established in Ottawa from 2002–2012. Their existence, like that of organizations such as START and the ATF, was anchored in the changing nature and
increasing importance of the security-development nexus in fragile states. Most notably, Canada’s prolonged engagement in Afghanistan resulted in an unprecedented experience with both joint deployment and joint training. The power of joint deployment to both accelerate skill development and break down departmental barriers was discussed earlier. Joint training is discussed here as a second important cornerstone from which an informal cadre of WoG professionals has developed.

Joint training could be discussed as a WoG undertaking in its own right. Opportunities for a cross-departmental assortment of staff to learn together in a way that highlighted the cross-cutting nature of the issues, policies and operational environments while providing opportunities to break down stereotypes through person-to-person interaction were important vehicles for fostering WoG capacity within government. Increasingly, joint training was not only crossing boundaries for the participants but for those involved with the design and implementation of the training regimes. More often, though, participants spoke about the importance of joint training as an activity that supported or facilitated WoG initiatives such as joint deployments or interdepartmental taskforces and working groups, by providing opportunities for staff from different departments to enhance their understanding and appreciation of other and the role they all had to play in stabilization and humanitarian efforts.

There was a level of enthusiasm for joint training and education opportunities by participants from DND, CIDA, DFAIT and the central agencies that shared their favourable impression of joint deployment as an effective incentive for WoG. Joint training might not have the danger, volatility and immersive qualities of field deployment; however, it did provide some opportunity to learn more about departmental cultures and roles, and build a network of cross-departmental connections in advance of actual deployment to the field. Having a pool of ready-to-deploy civilians was understood as an important part of preparing for future stabilization, peacebuilding and disaster response efforts. This point was driven home by the evolution of civilian deployment training programs that emerged from WoG coordinating bodies such as START. In the 2009 Re-START initiatives, one of the four core divisions was renamed the Coordination and Deployment Division. In the UK the focus on developing a cross-departmental cadre of civilians considered deployable to international crisis zones would eventually become
the primary raison d’etre for the SU. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. This widespread enthusiasm for joint training may also be attributable to the fact that the activity did not appear to be viewed by practitioners as something that was limited or negatively impacted by either ministerial accountability or the political element of government departments. In other words, study participants did not indicate that political interests or machinations amongst senior staff prevented departments from being involved in joint training opportunities. Amongst study participants, the perceived benefits of partaking in joint training opportunities were numerous.

First and perhaps foremost, joint training provided an opportunity to break down departmental stereotypes and develop a better understanding of departmental perspectives and cultures thereby diminishing resistance to WoG by those who participated. From a military perspective joint training and joint education opportunities were discussed as the solution to addressing the core barriers to WoG: different departmental cultures and different professional languages (10102). Another military participant (10104) spoke about the importance of military staff better understanding civilians’ perspectives on military involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It was conceded that there were good reasons why the military should not always be involved in a visible way on some humanitarian projects and often these reasons were more effectively communicated and understood in the person-to-person interactions available during joint training, as opposed to the department vs. department (Canadian Forces vs. CIDA) communications (emails, memos, reports) that were features of day-to-day administrative interactions. An example of a joint education opportunity was the National Security Studies Program (NSSP) course at the Canadian Forces College. DND opened the course to other departments and covered the bulk of the costs. DFAIT maintained a single seat in the program and sent one staff person each year because they recognized the importance of the opportunity for two-way education offered by the 10-month program (10202). On one hand, participating in the program provided a DFAIT staff person with an in-depth understanding of their military colleagues. Additionally, participation in the program was seen as an opportunity for DFAIT to influence the training of the ‘next generation of military leaders’. For 10 months the DFAIT participant could offer alternative perspectives or, more importantly, explain those perspectives in a room full of colleagues
who were spending 10 months devoted to the learning exercise. In its own way the NSSP program created similar conditions to joint deployment to the field – an immersive exercise without the looming crisis.

Whether it was the NSSP program, the pre-deployment Hazardous Environment Training (HET) program offered by the Canadian Forces or the annual DART training exercises that support the commitment to co-deployment as the WoG rapid response to international disasters, joint training opportunities were discussed as a vehicle for providing civilian staff with a chance to acquire an understanding of the characteristics of a deployment in which the military provided logistics or had a dominant role (which was inevitable in post-conflict and stabilization environments) (10202). What are the cultural and operational realities of this environment and how are they best navigated by a civilian staff person? Civilian deployment can be a nuanced undertaking because adapting to a military field environment involved everything from understanding the safety issues – you can’t wander away from base on a whim – to how to go about establishing credibility and building relationships. One of the examples provided was that if the daily rhythm of the field base started at 6am then you needed to be ready to go at 6am in order to be taken seriously (10207). It may not have mattered a great deal to the few military officers that you were working with directly, but if the desired outcome was building new relationships and establishing trust, civilians needed to be able to recognize the importance of the small gestures and actions that would be noticed by their military colleagues. Another DFAIT participant (10208) observed that they understood DND best when they participated in HET in Kingston as part of their pre-deployment preparation. They found it especially interesting that until then their main frame of reference for WoG was from a policy perspective – information collecting, information sharing, analysis, etc. However, the training really emphasized WoG from an implementation or operational perspective and, thus, the critical role the military had to play in that context. Conversely, those military officers who were embedded in civilian offices (seconded to line departments or posted to liaison positions) discovered that they needed to learn a new way of doing things – new approaches to decision making, communication and networking. A CA participant (10401) reflected on their experience deploying to Afghanistan and how the pre-deployment training and the experience in-country provided
a much greater understanding of how staff from the different departments think about planning and analysis. The participant associated this insight with the time spent sharing physical location and seeing departmental staff as individuals in their own right. Training opportunities provided staff from all departments with more cultural insights so that when they were jointly deployed there was a foundation of cultural understanding that could be leveraged in cross-boundary efforts.

Beyond its role as an opportunity for demystifying departmental cultures and approaches for individuals, joint training also played a part in providing departments with the opportunity to contribute to a WoG effort in a way that specific areas of expertise could be incorporated and acknowledged by the bigger network of players. This seemed to go some way to addressing CIDA’s perception that it was, at times, undervalued in the stabilization sphere or that its mandate and perspective on issues did not carry the same weight as other departments. One CIDA participant talked about joint training as an opportunity for the agency to contribute to the success of military officers, to provide them with context, knowledge and practices that might allow them to connect with people – a critical element of delivering humanitarian assistance (10305). CIDA participants recognized that many Canadian soldiers had very effective interpersonal skills and that they had been seen to demonstrate a respect for different processes and an understanding that local populations need to participate in and lead their own rebuilding. (10305). These attributes are related in some part to their training and there is a role for CIDA in contributing to the development a military professional who can recognize and navigate the nuances of the humanitarian assistance space. Reinforcing this viewpoint, CIDA was recognized by a DND participant (10104) as being an important partner in the delivery of comprehensive and effective table-top exercises (TTX) and command post exercises (CPX) that are part of DND training and preparation.

Participants identified a few important challenges associated with joint training and joint education. The first was that departmental capacities for participating in and contributing to joint training could not match the demand (10103, 10202). Despite the tremendous appetite and enthusiasm within DND for integrating other departments into their training exercises, the time, scale, financial resources and human resources devoted to training members of the Canadian Forces on an annual basis existed in a different
universe to what was possible for the civilian departments who would be able to send only a few staff for a minimal time. One DND participant felt that joint training was a missed opportunity (10105) in that the small contingent of civilians present at pre-deployment training added enormously to adequate the participant’s preparation for a WoG deployment, but with so few civilians participating it would take much longer for the value of the joint training to permeate back through the civilian departments. A DFAIT participant discussed the capacity issue as being not just one of investment but also of basic numbers. With 1,100 Foreign Service Officers and 65,000 military it was fundamentally impossible to distribute DFAIT resources in any way that would satisfy DND training commitments.

A second challenge identified by CIDA participants was that not everyone was effusively supportive of joint training. They discussed a concern heard from colleagues that joint training’s efforts to break down barriers was, in fact, an effort to create a single, assimilated group of public servants who would all see an issue the same way – that in participating in joint training they might become “the other” (10304). Amongst some development staff there existed a fear that participating in joint training exercises might result in the militarization of development staff, that aspects of military culture had a contagious element (10305). Whether the concern was that this was a deliberate outcome or more an accidental but unavoidable one was not clear. However, the participant reflected on how important it was for individuals to return from joint training able to demonstrate that it is possible to train with staff from other departments, learn to understand each other’s worldview and still not adopt the culture, values, perspectives and, most importantly, priorities in place of one’s own. In situations where perceptions of each other are fiercely held and where it feels necessary to protect one’s ideological position, it can be difficult to make the case that understanding another culture is not a threat to your own, that developing a more positive outlook of each other does not have to reflect a softening of your unit’s core identity and capabilities.

**Conclusion**

How is our understanding of WoG furthered by examining the history of START and the reflections of practitioners who worked in the WoG ecosystem linked primarily to
DFAIT, CIDA and DND from 2002 to 2012? If one were to make connections between the policy and programming environments, departmental priorities, lessons learned from the design and launch of START and perceptions of WoG practitioners, what key learnings emerge?

Despite a formal investment of resources, like those committed to START and the GPSF, there may be certain conditions present in both internal and external environments that can work against Canada’s WoG efforts. The first condition emerges throughout various components of the case study and relates to institutional commitment from powerful central agencies and departmental leadership. Other than allocating resources, how else is institutional commitment manifested and what roles does it play in facilitating WoG? In the Canadian case study there are some indications that institutional commitment may not have been sufficient. From the internal audits we learn about delayed financial authorities for START’s management of the GPSF—authorities that could only be granted by central agencies. From participants there was reference to internal documents that might have provided a much-needed shared understanding of the stabilization vernacular and priorities but were never approved by senior leadership. Scans of government websites reveal that WoG as a term of reference was being used distinctly differently by TBS than the line departments that contributed to stabilization and humanitarian assistance priorities, suggesting that the central agency was not prepared to fully explore its own role in facilitating the kind of cross-boundary collaboration required within the internationally focused departments. These problematic actions were juxtaposed against a widespread use of the term WoG that suggested the concept was an important part of how Government of Canada wanted to brand its approach to high-profile, international stabilization efforts, the most notable being the country’s engagement in Afghanistan. START and the GPSF were launched in the name of achieving WoG and the term was referenced with a sense of pride on public websites, in ministerial speeches and in those annual documents issued to outline departmental priorities and commitments. The insight here may be that a high-level public enthusiasm for WoG is not always an indication that sufficient institutional commitment exists for an effective implementation of a WoG initiative.
The second condition pertains to the pre-existing dynamics among WoG partners and how they must be considered in the design of WoG initiatives. Interestingly, by the end of the case the question of whether or not the lead-department model embodied by START was an effective vehicle for achieving a WoG mandate emerged as being less interesting than the question about the conditions under which the START model might be effective. On one hand, it does not threaten the imperative of ministerial accountability nor does it involve great changes to the machinery of government. In both respects, this would suggest the model holds a certain degree of administrative feasibility and sustainability. On the other hand, the case study demonstrated how the complicated relationship between CIDA and the other departments impacted CIDA’s perception of START. The divides between CIDA and the others could be attributed to a combination of strong departmental cultures, competition for limited financial resources and ideological differences related the role of the military in the humanitarian space. In many respects the underlying tension pertains to the way CIDA saw itself in relation to the others: that it is always the “younger sibling” with less power, less influence and a belief that its expertise was held in less respect. There was nothing from participant data to suggest that other departments saw CIDA this way; however, as was mentioned in the case study, the distribution of financial, political and decision-making power within a network is often seen as more evenly distributed by those who hold power. Regardless, the idea of CIDA as a junior partner to DFAIT and DND emerged as a dominant storyline in the Canadian case study. Under such conditions, a lead department model might not be the optimal vehicle for achieving WoG.37

The third condition, as discussed in the case study, was the perfect storm of factors that resulted in a situation in which the complex web of issues characterizing fragile states demanded a WoG approach but that those same issues strengthened barriers to WoG making it difficult to explore any innovative changes to government structure and its processes. The Canadian case is actually a perfect exemplar of this kind of

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37 It would be interesting to re-examine this observation in the context of the CIDA–DFAIT merger and the role of START within Global Affairs Canada. What does the lead department model look like once two of the partner departments merge? Does the fact that everyone is now a GAC employee result in more buy-in for START as a coordinating unit? Do former CIDA staff feel more ownership in START? Given the strong organizational cultures that existed before the merger it is unlikely that having everyone under the same organizational roof would be sufficient to overcome long-standing tensions.
situation. The cross-cutting nature of the issues at play in stabilization and humanitarian assistance environments was undeniable; they could not be addressed by a single government department. Hence a WoG approach of some form was necessary. Yet, fragile states were characterized by intractable social issues and persistent violence, which resulted in programs and campaigns that were financially expensive and presented very real risks to the health and safety of both civilian and military staff. Moreover, operational or programmatic success in these environments was very difficult to achieve. The issues were too complex to solve easily and many of the critical measures of success were on a time horizon well beyond that of the average departmental minister. In essence, because success was difficult to define the chance of achieving it was relatively low, and yet, risks were high. These were the kinds of conditions in which ministers had very few incentives for looking for innovative work-arounds to ministerial accountability. In other words, ministerial accountability and all of the organizational dynamics associated with the accountability framework were at their most inflexible around issues most in need of WoG efforts. This lesson is important because it differentiates the kind of WoG efforts discussed in the context of international stabilization efforts from the practice of cross-boundary collaboration or horizontal management in less volatile contexts. It speaks to the critical linkage between the environment and the conceptual and operational understanding of the term WoG.

Despite these challenges, the Canadian case also demonstrates the very important insight that because WoG is a dynamic concept that manifested itself in any number of formal and informal initiatives and because it was widely agreed that many of the most pressing security and development issues facing the country at the time were profoundly interconnected, there have been plenty of opportunities for institutional learning and individual skill development. Regardless of the longevity of START, the GPSF, the ATF and other formal structures, an advanced understanding and technical capacity for WoG emerged within CIDA, DFAIT, DND and many other federal departments that worked with these units or were involved with WoG operations. While barriers to WoG were evident and widely discussed, tremendous opportunity rested with, and continues to be embodied by, the individuals who were involved. WoG may, in the final analysis, be as much about the people as it is the structures. A decade of joint deployment, joint training
and an unheard-of level of civilian deployment has yielded a subset of civil servants and military professionals who do not require departmental boundaries to disappear in order to do their work. Instead, they are able to pair their technical proficiency in project management, planning, assessment, evaluation or policy development with an ability to navigate departmental cultures and processes and an appreciation for what it means to advance a WoG mandate in an environment characterized by instability, risk, competing priorities and shifting versions of success. The Canadian case impresses upon us the need to recognize the importance of individual WoG practitioners. What strategic opportunities exist for leveraging their collective experiences and growing expertise to identify innovative structures, processes, management tools, coordination technologies and training opportunities that would take the country’s WoG institutional capacity to another level?
Chapter 6: Case Study – United Kingdom

The case study presented in this chapter seeks to enhance our understanding of the WoG phenomenon as it was experienced in the UK context. In 1997, the concept of achieving greater impact and organizational efficiencies through enhanced cross-boundary coordination emerged as a distinct, high-level priority for the Government of the United Kingdom. As a response to the new modernization agenda for public service reform and calls for “joined-up-government”, several cross-departmental initiatives were created to better address cross-cutting policy issues. They were designed with the intent to circumvent the challenges of bureaucratic stovepipes that were reinforced, in part, by a Westminster system of government that naturally fostered departmentalism through its vertical line departments and cabinet structure. Amongst the many instruments designed and implemented in the UK between 2002 and 2012 to facilitate cross-departmental efforts were the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP) and the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). Both organizational innovations were intended to support the efforts of the UK government in its engagement in fragile states and evolved over the course of 2002–2012, which resulted in several name changes during that time. For ease of reference, the two units will be referred to by the names they possessed towards the end of the decade: the Conflict Pool (CP) and the Stabilisation Unit (SU). The primary focus of the case study is the SU as it provides the strongest comparative frame of reference to Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Unlike the Canadian case, where START was connected to the GPSF through its organizational design, the same degree of connection did not exist between the SU and the CP. Aside from their status as tri-departmental initiatives undertaking work in the stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction sphere, the two UK units emerged, operated and evolved quite separately from each other. Nonetheless, the story of the SU cannot be told without reference to the CP. Despite their independent starts, connections between the units would grow over time and, more importantly, they were both features of the UK’s capacity to deal with conflict prevention, stabilization and the humanitarian
emergencies so prevalent in failed and fragile states. They were part of the same ecosystem of actors, so to speak.

The case study begins by examining some of the most pressing domestic and international influences on the planning and policy environment in which the SU worked, and goes on to identify the key government actors that were in a position to impact the administration and governance of the SU. The second part of the chapter looks at the origin and evolution of the SU and highlights some important lessons learned that were captured through government publications. The final part of the chapter presents the results of the thematically coded participant interview data and organizes participant insights into clusters of key themes that examine the mechanics of WoG, while acknowledging the interconnected nature of the issues being discussed (see Table 14). A concluding discussion identifies and explores key aspects of the SU initiative that inform our understanding of key barriers to or opportunities for advancing WoG an approach to state fragility and instability.

Table 14: Summary of key findings from participant interviews: UK case

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<tr>
<th>INTERCONNECTED OPERATIONAL ATTRIBUTES</th>
<th>SUMMARY DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Family dysfunction: the challenges of having three parents</td>
<td>While many hold the tri-departmental model as the ideal design for a WoG initiative, the three-parent / one-child model does create barriers to WoG. While the independence of the SU from its parents can appear desirable - in that it does not belong to a lead department - the model can also result in unproductive relationships between the new unit and its parents.</td>
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<td>2 Carving out a piece of the pie</td>
<td>Despite challenges presented by the tri-departmental model, it has proven possible for the SU to focus on a few specific functions and carve out a place for itself amongst the cast of characters engaged in the UK. stabilization agenda</td>
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<td>3 Translating intent to results – not everyone can see the whole elephant</td>
<td>Institutional processes and systems (such as information technology or joint conflict analysis tools) are critical to ensuring that individuals and departments are able to see the many sides of a given event, issue or operation.</td>
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<td>4 WoG championed at the centre of government</td>
<td>The National Security Council era in the UK brought clarity in the form of strategy documents that aligned departmental interests and priorities with a government-wide vision. The Cabinet Office is a key player in the UK’s WoG architecture as it engages in regions of instability and fragility.</td>
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Background: Programming, Policy and Operational Environments

This preliminary section of the case study examines the broader context in which the SU was designed and implemented. It looks to highlight the major events and political forces at play from 2002 to 2012 that may have impacted the network of actors involved with WoG initiatives in the United Kingdom and decisions related to the launch and evolution of the SU.

Domestic Considerations

The UK experienced relative political stability from 1997 to 2010. Beginning in 1997, Tony Blair and the Labour party secured majority governments in three consecutive general elections, and in 2007 another Labour majority government came to power under the leadership of Gordon Brown. A distinct change in political ideology and government priorities occurred in 2010 with the election of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition government. Taking power in the midst of a global financial crisis with costly military campaigns ongoing in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the new government, led by Prime Minister David Cameron, placed a strong focus on structural reform within government for the purpose of achieving economic stability, deficit reduction, operational efficiencies and transparency in government spending.

The political stability provided by a decade of Labour government is a noteworthy influence on the environment in which the SU was created. The 1999 white paper Modernising Government established joined-up government as a cornerstone of the new Labour approach. In the foreword of the report Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, “to improve the way we provide services, we need all parts of government to work together better. We need joined-up government. We need integrated government” (HM Government, 1999, p. 5). The agenda for modernization in the UK included an emphasis on cross-boundary coordination. Government white papers, annual performance reports,
program evaluations and departmental audits from all branches of government reflected an openness to experimentation with machinery of government innovations and new funding models that might better facilitate joined-up, cross-Whitehall, cross-departmental or integrated efforts between government departments. All of these terms referred to the government’s focus on improved service delivery and overcoming high levels of departmentalism and fragmentation within and across the UK’s public institutions, which were preventing the government from having its desired impact (Parker et al., 2010). In addition to the CP and the SU, new cross-departmental units such as the Social Exclusion Unit, the Performance and Innovation Unit and the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit were examples of initiatives designed with the intention of improving access to and delivery of government services to UK citizens.

Also part of the Modernising Government agenda were public management instruments designed to make critical linkages between departmental performance, government-wide service delivery goals and government spending. Such instruments included comprehensive spending reviews, which established the government’s plans for spending over a three-year window and public service agreements (PSAs) which were institutional mechanisms for setting service delivery targets for government departments (HM Government, 1999). As a public service reform, PSAs were intended to provide “a clear statement of what the Government is trying to achieve; a clear sense of direction and ambition; a focus on delivering results; a basis for what is and is not working; and better accountability” (Gay, 2005, pp. 3-4). As part of the modernization agenda they represented a commitment by the government to its citizens for improved levels of service delivery that had been a focus of their election platform. PSA targets were established by the centre of government and were reflective of the government’s overarching priority areas. In this sense PSAs were also an agreement of sorts between Her Majesty’s Treasury and the line departments in which the line department made service delivery commitments in exchange for resources (Talbot, 2010). As such, departments aligned their own strategic priorities with PSA targets and reported their progress against established indicators within their annual departmental report (often referred to as the Annual Reports and Accounts document).
Their relevance to this research is multi-fold. First, PSAs behaved as an “experiment in pooled accountability” (Parker et al., 2010, p. 82). Originally numbering 600, the number of PSAs dropped to 110 in 2004 and by 2007 there were 30 (Panchamia & Thomas, 2014). Each spending review launched a growing number of PSA targets that cut across policy areas and made explicit the critical connections between resources and expertise held by multiple departments. While a lead department may have been assigned to each target, the PSA would clearly note that responsibility for achieving the PSA target rested with more than one department. Performance towards achieving cross-cutting PSA targets would be reported on annually by all of the departments involved and, as such, fostered a certain level of cross-departmental communication and activity. The final set of PSAs were developed as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review and were intended to reflect the highest priorities of the government for the spending period.

Contributing departments agreed to a single Delivery Agreement that was developed in consultation with all partners (Cabinet Office, 2009). PSAs can be seen as an administrative innovation designed and implemented by the centre of government that attempted to incentivize cross-departmental coordination and facilitate cross-departmental reporting. Possible tensions between these attributes of the PSA system and established lines of accountability were not lost on central agencies such as Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) or the Cabinet Office (CO). In its 2007 pre-budget report, HMT made reference to a number of features of the PSA design that were intended to address, in part, concerns about accountability: the assignment of a lead department, new Cabinet Committees responsible for monitoring PSA progress, and the creation of a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for each PSA. The SRO will “chair a senior official PSA delivery board comprising all lead and supporting departments and reports to the relevant Cabinet Committee” (p. 187). The House of Commons Treasury Committee also acknowledged the accountability concern and made a recommendation that progress towards the new PSAs be reported on in “cross-departmental publications on a bi-annual basis…to encourage more effective cross-cutting scrutiny of Public Service Agreements between select (departmental) committees” (p. 20).

The second connection between the PSA system and the case study is that even in the early days of the PSA era, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the
Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) jointly held a PSA target related to global conflict prevention (see Table 15). The pursuit of this PSA target was linked to first the Conflict Pool (FCO, 2004; FCO, 2008a) and then the SU (FCO, 2009), both of which were jointly owned by the three departments assigned to the PSA. The question of whether or not the PSA system can be considered a driver or incentive for cross-departmental behaviour and activities or whether, in the case of the conflict prevention and reduction targets, the PSA was a reflection of a cross-departmental imperative established by the nature of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and DFID’s increasing awareness of the impact of violent conflict on its poverty reduction mandate, is not definitively answered within the literature.

Table 15: PSA Targets for conflict prevention for each spending period (delivery partners noted)

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<td>Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and by a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant impact</td>
<td>Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and by a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant impact</td>
<td>By 2008, deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support for conflict prevention by addressing the long-term structural causes of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution.</td>
<td>Global conflict: Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced international efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivery partners</td>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>FCO (lead)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>MOD</td>
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<td>Cabinet Office</td>
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The global conflict prevention priority continued through to the final set of PSAs in 2007 with PSA 30: “Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced international efforts”:

*the UK Government will develop its joined-up approach to conflict and strengthen its own policy coherence. The Cabinet Office will lead departments in their use of a new strategic approach to inform decisions relating to the UK’s engagement in conflict situations spanning the spectrum from conflict prevention, management and stabilisation to consolidating peace....When making decisions about UK Government engagement in conflict, FCO, DFID and MOD Ministers will be able to assess the relative balance of investment in activities across and between conflicts, and determine priorities for the allocation of UK effort and resources accordingly. This will help the UK Government develop the agility required to respond earlier and more quickly to opportunities to prevent, manage and resolve conflict (HM Government, 2007, 15)*

The PSA system became a public sector reform that attracted significant attention from outside the UK (Panchamia & Thomas, 2014); however, it was an imperfect tool. A 2007 report by the House of Commons Treasury Committee noted that the system was ‘top-down and unwieldy’ and that the indicators and data measurement tools had critical limitations that made it difficult to ascertain true performance towards a PSA target. The report also noted that because PSAs and their associated service delivery targets changed significantly every three years, annual departmental reports were often reporting on PSA data that was in flux, resulting in as much confusion as clarity. Additionally, PSAs were criticized for the lack of penalties associated with failing to meet targets and the lack of robust shared evidence base between partner departments (Parker et al., 2010).

The PSA era came to an end in 2010 with the election of the Coalition government, which implemented a new form of departmental performance management. From the May 2010 election through the following summer, the new government, led by the Prime Minister’s office (often called “No. 10” in reference to its physical location at 10 Downing Street), worked to define its priorities for governing and identify what reforms would be necessary to achieve its plans for the government and the country. Structural reform plans for each department were developed with the intention of establishing departmental priorities that aligned with the vision of the new government.
The Coalition is committed to a programme of reform that will turn government on its head. We want to bring about a power shift, taking power away from Whitehall and putting it into the hands of people and communities, and a horizon shift, making the decisions that will equip Britain for long term success. For too long citizens have been treated as passive recipients of centralised, standardised services. This Government is putting citizens back in charge, and Structural Reform Plans are part of this shift of power from government to people. (DFID, 2011a, p. 6)

By the spring of 2011, the structural reform process yielded departmental business plans that used a standard template to report on plans and progress towards departmental priorities over a four-year window (2011–2015). The business plan template was formatted as a PowerPoint slide deck and as such was short, organized and clearly stated. It included a vision statement, stated structural reform priorities for the department and a matrix of actions, tasks and deadlines that served as an implementation plan for each of the stated priorities. The tasks or implementation strategies noted in the business plans were updated regularly to track progress against the stated timelines. Essentially, the business plans were a tool by which departments reported to the centre of government, which collected the information and, in turn, reported to the general public via the No. 10 website with the intention of meeting the established goal of enhanced democratic accountability. They were intended to be vehicles through which departments were accountable to the Centre for delivering on key reform priorities and, in turn, that allowed the Centre, or the outward face of government, to be accountable to the public. On the first point, the business plans were likely more valuable to the Centre than to the departments, which still had to report on their broad spread of responsibilities that were not directly linked to Coalition priorities using other tools such as the Annual Performance and Accounts documents. However, business plans were stronger vehicles for communicating progress to the general public than the PSA framework. As discussed, the PSAs changed significantly with every three-year spending review and, as a result, struggled to articulate a clear, accessible message to the public about the priorities of government. Progress towards the PSAs was reported on each year in departmental reports and as such were marked by changing indicators, vague evaluation parameters and complicated financial reporting standards. Business plans were more accessible to the public in that they were shorter and included only the highest-level financial information. The abbreviated implementation plans were far less cumbersome for readers than the
ever-changing indicators of the PSAs and the inclusion of proposed end dates for each action was an effective vehicle for demonstrating progress.

However, the business plan model put little emphasis on connections between departments – something that was a defining characteristic of the PSA system. A 2011 report published by the Institute for Government in the UK entitled *See-Through Whitehall. Departmental Business Plans one year on* noted that in addition to some uncertainty about the scope of the business plans and variable levels of engagement by the departments, the business plans were not strong administrative tools for fostering shared accountability across departments. The business plan template did not require departments to highlight cross-cutting priorities, programs or shared responsibilities. As such, they lacked a WoG perspective. Moreover, “any disputes or conflicting priorities between departments are dealt with via bilateral discussions with the Centre. This siloed approach can lead to confused internal accountabilities and can feel unfair to departments who have to publicly mark actions as overdue due to impacts from the prioritisation of other departments (Stephen, Martin, & Atkinson, 2011, p. 24)”. A quick look at business plans for DFID, FCO and MOD reveals that there were no structural reform priorities shared by the three units despite the fact that many of the priorities could certainly be considered cross-cutting. For example, one of DFID’s structural reform priorities in both 2011 and 2012 was to “strengthen governance and security in fragile and conflict-affected countries” (DFID, 2011a, p. 3). The 2011 business plan made reference to FCO and MOD throughout the actions proposed to advance that particular priority area. However, in the FCO 2011 plan not only did the structural reform priorities differ from DFID’s but also there was no reference to DFID in its implementation plan. Nor did DFID appear in the MOD 2011 business plan. As such, it is possible to conclude that the business plan model involved establishing a clear cross-cutting priority for DFID without establishing within FCO or MOD the same urgency. That is not to say that FCO and MOD did not contribute to DFID’s work or that joined-up efforts were not taking place, but they were doing so in spite of the business plan model and not because of it.

Despite the strong association between joined-up government and the previous Labour governments and the fact that the business plan model appeared to be a step backwards with respect to using performance management systems to facilitate cross-
departmental coordination, the early years of the Coalition government did not end the government’s interest in cross-departmental coordination. By 2010 a critical momentum and capacity for cross-departmental coordination had taken root.

The past decade has seen perhaps the most extensive attempt yet to solve Whitehall’s collaboration challenge, which can be summed up as how to align incentives, cultures and structures of authority to fit critical tasks that cut across organisational boundaries (Parker et al., 2010, p. 74).

Several reports published by the National Audit Office (NAO) continued to advance the joined-up agenda using the term integration (NAO, 2013; NAO 2014). In particular, the 2013 report Integration Across Government found that cross-departmental integration offers desirable efficiencies of scale, effort and spending while also increasing impact of programming and service delivery; however, “departments vary in their commitment to integrated working and their ability to work collaboratively” (p. 7).

According to the report, successful integration stems from strong commitment as demonstrated by shared vision, effective leadership and established incentives and organizational capability for implementation exemplified by appropriate program and risk management strategies, information and technology requirements, accountability arrangements, funding mechanisms and knowledge sharing vehicles.

**International Considerations**

At the international level, one defining feature of the government’s lens on domestic issues was its demonstrated understanding of the linkages between foreign policy and domestic priorities. Of special note was the clear connection made between global conflict and instability, and the security and prosperity of UK citizens.

*Foreign policy is domestic policy. Another lesson reinforced over the past year is that we are increasingly affected by events in other parts of the world. Foreign policy is no longer foreign. It directly concerns us all, inside and outside government (FCO, 2004, p. 6).*
Where conflict exists, achievement of any other UK Government objective is harder to achieve. So preventing and managing international conflicts is core UK Government business. Preventing and resolving conflict allows the benefits of economic prosperity to spread, allows democracy and good governance to take root and flourish, allows the rule of law (including human rights) to be established and respected, and improves the quality of life of those threatened by, suffering or emerging from conflict” (UK, 2007, p. 3).

In today’s interdependent world, eradicating extreme poverty also serves the UK national interest. Many of the most serious threats to the UK’s prosperity and security are global, and are caused or exacerbated by poverty in developing countries, such as conflict, climate change, international organised crime and the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 125).

The distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy is unhelpful in a world where globalisation can exacerbate domestic security challenges, but also bring new opportunities to tackle them (Cabinet Office, 2008b, p. 8).

On the international stage a number of issues and events influenced the operational and political environment in which the SU evolved, many of which have been explored in great detail in the introductory chapter. Part of examining these international forces involves considering the UK’s position within the international community. The UK is one of the five permanent members of the UN security council and carries substantial influence within NATO, the European Union and most of the world’s major international organizations. Moreover, in 2005 the UK held presidencies of both the G8 and the European Union, opportunities which prompted the country to clarify its foreign policy priorities and advance them on the international stage. The UK is typically a strong champion of international institutions and the work undertaken by organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, the EU and the OECD. As such, UK security and development actors were influenced by a number of initiatives advanced within such organizations: the OECD’s failed states agenda, the EU’s interest in policy coherence for development, NATO’s advancement of the comprehensive approach and efforts in the UN to increase interest in system-wide coherence and coordination with the development of new entities within the UN architecture designed to achieve a greater impact in zones of conflict and/or instability, most notably the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and One UN.
With respect to specific international issues of impact, as has been demonstrated, the post-9/11 security environment was characterized for many countries by costly military engagements as part of the war on terror and, more broadly, the instability of failed and fragile states. In 2003, in the context of the war on terror, the UK joined the US-led invasion of Iraq. The case for involvement made by Prime Minister Blair was built around the imperative of disarming Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, to put an end to the regime of Saddam Hussein and its support of terrorist groups that threaten western societies, and to bring peace and security to the Iraqi people (The Guardian, 2003). Referenced in the UK as Operation Telic, the campaign in Iraq was the largest theatre of operations for the UK from 2003–2006 (MOD, 2009a). After the initial invasion and combat to topple the power structures within the country, Operation Telic was largely focused on “providing security, training the Iraqi Security Forces and creating the conditions for reconstruction and restoring the political process” (MOD, 2006, p. 27). DFID and FCO were acknowledged partners in UK security sector reform efforts with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Basra being the primary vehicle through which the joined-up effort was advanced. DFID was recognized by MOD as the lead for the UK’s reconstruction efforts in Iraq (MOD, 2006) and, in turn, DFID acknowledged its role in post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq through the following stated objectives: “to promote rapid and sustainable economic growth; to encourage effective and accountable governance; and to promote social and political cohesion and stability” (DFID, 2005a, p. 75). DFID also recognized that amidst its capacity-building and institution-building priorities there were persistent concerns about the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people (DFID, 2007a). The mission ended in the spring of 2009 with the restoration of the Iraq government. Over the mission’s tenure 178 soldiers died (MOD, 2014) and, using the most conservative calculations, the UK spent over £8 billion (MOD, 2015).

For both military and civilian personnel, the mission was characterized by the volatility and complexity associated with stabilization and reconstruction efforts undertaken in a region in which violent conflict has not yet abated. Such an environment demanded cross-departmental planning and operational coordination. In early 2003, FCO led a new cross-Whitehall unit called the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU) which was established
to ensure “a coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict planning for Iraq’s political and economic reconstruction and the effective handling of the humanitarian challenges” (FCO, 2003a, p. 35) yet the government struggled with cross-departmental planning (Teutan & Korski, 2010). In addition to coordination challenges, the stabilization and reconstruction environment in Iraq presented staffing challenges. As it became clear that post-conflict reconstruction activities were going to be taking place in regions and communities still experiencing conflict, the challenges associated with civilian deployment began to emerge. Were there sufficient numbers of civilians available to be deployed based on the needs; were civilians staffed across a spectrum of skills and expertise suitably trained to do their work in hostile or conflict environments; and were the civilian departments being funded in a way that acknowledges these new human resource pressures? The SU (under the PCRU name) would be established in 2004 in an attempt to address some of these persistent challenges.

The UK’s contribution to the military effort in Afghanistan started in the fall of 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks perpetrated in the US by al-Qaeda. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UN in December 2001 and from 2002 onwards UK military operations in Afghanistan were conducted under the name Operation Herrick. For the first four years of its tenure, Operation Herrick was small relative to the UK’s mission in Iraq. However, in 2006 Afghanistan became a larger priority for the UK government. It jointly chaired the 2006 London Conference that resulted in the Afghanistan Compact (MOD, 2006) and that same year the UK committed to the deployment of 3,300 troops to Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan as part of a UK taskforce and a UK-led PRT (MOD, 2006). This was no small undertaking as the region was still experiencing high levels of violence and instability. Counter-insurgency efforts, reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance were all part of the Helmand mandate. The challenging conditions within the province were exemplified by the ever-increasing troop levels. While initial projects indicated that total UK troop levels would peak at 5,700 in mid-2006 (MOD, 2006), in fact they ballooned from 6,300 in spring 2007 (MOD, 2008a) to over 9,000 by 2009. From 2001–2005 there had been five UK fatalities. From 2006 to January 2013, 436 UK personnel lost their lives in Afghanistan, making the campaign the most deadly UK
operation on foreign soil since the Korean war in the 1950s (MOD, 2014). Even with the platform for fiscal constraint and responsibility brought in by the Coalition government in 2010, success in Afghanistan remained a stated priority for the new government. Business plans for 2011 produced by MOD, DFID and FCO all identified their contribution to the UK effort in Afghanistan as a departmental priority that aligned with Coalition priorities (MOD, 2011; DFID, 2011; FCO, 2011a). As simply stated by MOD: “Operations in Afghanistan continue to be the MOD’s top priority. Our objective is to protect British national security by helping the Afghans take control of theirs” (MOD, 2013, p. 12).

UK development actors had a presence in Afghanistan well before the military campaigns of 2001. A severe drought had affected the country since 1998 and UK development actors had been providing assistance during this time (DFID, 2002). The conflict that engulfed the country in 2001 exacerbated Afghanistan’s pre-existing attributes as a fragile state. “It remains one of the world’s poorest countries and is off track on all of the MDGs. In some provinces over 90% of the population is living below the poverty line. Afghanistan has some of the worst human development indicators in the world, ranking among the bottom five countries on the 2004 UNDP Human Development Index” (DFID, 2006a, 68). A major obstacle to addressing these issues was the lack of security (DFID, 2003; DFID, 2005c). From ongoing counter-insurgency campaigns to community violence associated with the narcotics trade, DFID’s efforts in Afghanistan were complicated by the dynamics of conflict and instability. Amongst the many humanitarian and development programs launched in the Helmand PRT, one activity was increasingly referenced as being a key aspect of the stabilization space for military, diplomatic and development actors: Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs).

With origins dating back to the first Gulf War and the Balkans, QIPs were part of the UK stabilization discourse in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They were “short-term, small-scale, low-cost and rapidly implemented” (DCDC, 2009, p. 101), designed to make an immediate contribution to post-conflict stabilization. The potential contribution could be either direct or indirect, with the former focusing on “key elements of security, political and economic infrastructure” (SU, 2008, p. 20) and the latter intending to “influence ‘perceptions’ in support of the process of stabilisation” (SU, 2008, p. 21).
Referenced frequently by DFID and MOD in the context of their efforts in Afghanistan, QIPs can be seen as institutional mechanisms through which departments (including MOD) could apply to DFID for funding to implement projects that fell within the DFID mandate but were best implemented by another department. From this perspective, they were small exercises in temporary, shared accountability. The proposals could be reviewed and approved within 24 hours and therefore were designed to meet the ever-changing needs of the stabilization environment. The QIP approval and monitoring processes involved reference to joint monitoring of each project and progress reports written by one department using a template created by another. In 2006, DFID published *Quick Impact Projects: A Handbook for the Military*. The handbook is an example of helpful and important cross-departmental communication as it attempts to communicate to military actors how to incorporate the ‘do no harm’ principle into their conceptualization of QIPs. It also makes reference to a suite of actors and units that are part of the QIP approval process, each of which is working to achieve coherence between DFID’s fundamental goal of poverty reduction and its role in the stabilization sphere of operations. Moreover, the handbook clarifies important parameters that guide the relationship between DFID and military forces in post-conflict stabilization and recovery efforts and the circumstances under which DFID might choose to fund the military to implement a QIP. Institutional thinking about QIPs was captured again in 2008 when the SU produced a report in consultation with MOD, DFID and FCO entitled *Quick Impact Projects*. Less operational in nature than DFID’s handbook, the SU focused on examining key issues that should be considered in the design, review and implementation of QIPs by any government body. The report discussed the tension between the political objectives of stabilization and the principles of humanitarian aid, the perils of weak program management systems in QIP outcomes, and the importance of grounding QIPs in the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. Moreover, the report emphasizes that ‘harm’ can take many forms, all of which need to be considered, and reducing the likelihood of causing harm involves a comprehensive, cross-departmental perspective.

A third high-profile civil-military mission occurred later in the time period being discussed and was a dominant stabilization issue at the time participant interviews were being conducted. In 2011, armed conflict broke out in Libya between authoritarian leader
Muammar Gaddafi’s forces and rebels looking to oust Gaddafi and his family from power. What ensued was a civil war in which western countries supported the efforts of the rebels to liberate the country and establish a new, democratic government. With its actions sanctioned by UN resolutions, the UK provided personnel, equipment and financial resources to both the NATO-led operations and the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts. All of the major actors discussed in this case had roles to play. For the MOD, engagement in Libya involved 2,300 military personnel committed to the NATO mission (MOD, 2012b). The FCO hosted an international conference for Foreign Ministers “to strengthen and broaden the international coalition” (FCO, 2011b, p. 7). Under the direction of the newly formed National Security Council (NSC), which had responsibility for coordinating the UK response to the Libyan civil war, the SU deployed to Benghazi the country’s first overseas civilian-military Stabilisation Response Team (SRT) (MOD, 2012b). Meanwhile, the Conflict Pool “funded deployment of a Defence Advisory & Training Team (DATT) to Tripoli to support the transition process” (MOD, 2012b, p. 22) and DFID provided humanitarian support that played an “important role in addressing remaining humanitarian concerns and in supporting early recovery efforts” (DFID, 2012, p. 74).

In addition to engagement in high-profile international conflicts, the UK government was also committed to global poverty reduction on a scale largely unmatched by other developed countries. Debt relief for the world’s poorest countries, moving towards the 0.7% of GDP commitment to official development assistance, championing policy coherence for development (PCD) at home, and leading initiatives within the international community to develop and adopt frameworks guiding aid effectiveness are a snapshot of the priorities advanced by the UK largely under the auspices of DFID. During his time as Prime Minister, Tony Blair demonstrated a marked enthusiasm for an international development department that would be both powerful within the UK government and a leader within the international community (OECD, 2006b). The resource commitments of the Labour government to the international development portfolio during his tenure reflected the mobilization of this political will. Perhaps the most significant international development priority for the government was progress towards the MDGs in Africa. While the dynamics of development and humanitarian
assistance in sub-Saharan Africa was decidedly different than the dynamics that informed DFID’s work in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflict and instability remained key considerations for DFID in Africa. Of the 16 focus countries identified by the department in 2004–2006, eight were noted in the top 28 of the 2006 Failed States Index and of those eight, five were identified in Project Ploughshares 2006 Armed Conflict Report. Simply stated, DFID was trying to impact areas in which chronic poverty and persistent conflict were deeply inter-connected. As a result, DFID worked to better understand both the impact of conflict on its mandate and how its poverty reduction efforts might contribute to the alleviation or exacerbation of conflict. To this end, the department produced a suite of reports that highlighted its efforts to reconcile the critical connections between its poverty-reduction priorities and issues that generally were within the realm of the security and military spheres. Fighting poverty to build a safer world. A strategy for security and development (2005), Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states (2005), and Preventing Violent Conflict (2006) complemented four white papers produced between 1997 and 2009, the last of which devoted a chapter to the challenges posed by conflict and fragility.

DFID’s interest in and commitment to cross-departmental coordination as it pertained to global conflict, humanitarian assistance and failed states was complemented by publications emerging from other departments. Seeking to capture and advance departmental thinking on pressing policy issues, the reports were characterized by an understanding that departmental mandates could only be achieved through improved levels of coordination and coherence. Of note were publications by the MOD’s Development, Concepts an Doctrine Centre that included a 2009, 265-page publication titled Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution. MOD was also making the Comprehensive Approach a key component of its operational capacity. A 2005 report examining the merits of the Comprehensive Approach was built upon in early 2010 when the House of Common Defence Committee published The Comprehensive


Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace. Working across government to resolve, reduce and prevent conflict was also a theme in FCO’s 2006 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World, and the 2008 National Security Strategy. In 2009 the UK think-tank, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), published Shared Responsibilities. A national security strategy for the UK. This document reflected the results of an IPPR Commission on national security. It came after the two national security strategies produced by the Labour government but before the 2010 NSS of the Coalition government. Many of its 109 recommendations are evident in the changes that would define the new national security apparatus in 2010 and demonstrate a certain continuity of effort and intent from the Labour government to the Coalition government. The Commission’s report included several recommendations for breaking down departmental silos that were impeding effective cross-Whitehall efforts: an empowered National Security Council to replace the current cabinet committee model and a comprehensive security review that extended beyond traditional defence capabilities. Indeed researchers have observed that Prime Minister Brown’s government was already going in the direction of an NSC prior to the 2010 election (Devanny & Harris, 2014). These reports laid the foundation upon which a cross-Whitehall national security policy and supporting structures would be established beginning in late 2010.

A confluence of the domestic and international drivers discussed above resulted in the October 2010 publication of two strategic documents that would guide the direction of the country’s security policy and infrastructure: an overarching statement of security objectives and a capability review of the government’s ability to realize these objectives. Not attributed to a single department, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (NSS) and Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) were created in consultation with multiple departments but presented as a unified, government-wide vision for the UK and its new government. The foundational message in both was a clear understanding that achieving national security priorities required a comprehensive, government-wide perspective. In its discussion of how best to achieve the goals and vision laid out in the NSS, the SDSR made frequent reference to an integrated approach – a term that was used
extensively in the 2008 NSS and which conceptually mirrors terms such as ‘whole-of-government approach’ or ‘joined-up approach’.

The SDSR referenced a set of eight cross-cutting National Security Tasks announced by the NSC that would guide decisions related to the government’s security policies and infrastructure. Of the eight, two clearly mandated ongoing coordination between FCO, MOD and DFID, and those cross-departmental initiatives in which they participated. National security task #2 was to ‘tackle the root causes of instability’ and the associated requirements were:

An effective international development programme making the optimal contribution to national security within its overall objective of poverty reduction, with the Department for International Development focusing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragile states; civilian and military stabilisation capabilities that can be deployed early together to help countries avoid crisis or deal with conflict; and targeted programmes in the UK, and in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK, to stop people becoming terrorists (HM Government, 2010, p. 11).

Task #6 was to ‘help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability’:

An integrated approach to building stability overseas, bringing together better diplomatic, development, military and other national security tools; armed Forces capable of both stabilisation and intervention operations; a civilian response scaled to support concurrency and scale of military operations; the military ability to help evacuate UK citizens from crises overseas (HM Government, 2010, p. 11).

Working towards the national security tasks was cross-departmental work in and of itself. Co-located teams and small coordination teams comprising officials from relevant departments.

The SDSR also announced that a robust, shared understanding of the integrated approach and its role in stabilization efforts would be made clear in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), which was published in the spring of 2011. Unlike the NSS and SDSR, which were positioned as publications of HM Government and therefore connected directly to the authority of the centre, the BSOS was a joint publication of DFID, FCO and MOD. As such, it was a formal confirmation that the three actors shared a common understanding of the key issues, objectives and a strategy going forward. The strategy included a commitment to an integrated approach (see Box 3) along every
dimension of instability and conflict: early warning, rapid crisis prevention, and investing in upstream prevention.

Box 3: Excerpt from the Building Stability Overseas Strategy

We will strengthen our integrated approach, maximising the contribution of UK capabilities to tackling instability and conflict. This will help us draw more effectively on the skills and capacities across government and internationally and to tailor our approach to each situation. These skills and capacities include:

- **Strong intelligence and assessments** which underpin political analysis and can help spot emerging risks and opportunities and also make sense of the huge amounts of electronic information generated at times of crisis.
- **Diplomacy** which can influence events in countries and across regions, build our understanding of what is happening, and generate international consensus to act, including through our permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.
- **Development work** which helps to build or re-build critical institutions, support security and justice and generate jobs and public confidence.
- **Defence engagement** which is critical to support security sector reform and develop accountable security services that can win the trust of their people.
- **Work to promote trade and open markets** which can create economic opportunities.
- **The Stabilisation Unit** which can respond rapidly to conflict or pre-conflict situations on behalf of the government, and in partnership with other key players. The unit draws upon expertise from across government, the police and the military to deliver these outcomes. It also manages the Civilian Stabilisation Group of over 1000 civilian experts from the public and private sector with critical stabilisation skills and experience. (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2011, p. 19)

Commitments of the BSOS included: Building Stability Overseas Steering Group with inter-departmental composition and led by a Director General (p. 20), investment in an early warning system (p. 20), introduction of a cross-government strategy conflict assessment (p. 24), implementation of a cross-government reporting framework (p. 33), and greater alignment between the priorities established by BSOS and the work of the Conflict Pool. Eventually, a BSOS Board was created and given oversight of the SU, the peacekeeping budget and the Conflict Pool. While the NSS, SDSR and BSOS were produced five years after the SU was created and towards the end of the timeframe of this
thesis, they are critical influencers of SU evolution and reflect the UK government’s continued high-level commitment to establishing a common understanding of key security issues and an overarching strategy to guide the work of relevant departments and units involved in the conflict, stability and humanitarian space.

Whole-of-Government Actors
The subsequent pages introduce key departments within the UK government that influenced the design and evolution of the SU. These include several that might be referred to as parent departments to the SU and partner departments to each other. Many of these departments were referred to in the environmental scan detailed above. What follows is a brief introduction to each organizational unit, its relationship with the SU and key policies and legislation that informed its work in international stabilization efforts. This part of the case study begins with an overview of those departments most commonly associated with WoG efforts responding to conflict, fragility and instability: defence, diplomacy and development. However, the summary of WoG actors will also include the under-explored central agencies and the evolution of the Conflict Pool.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was responsible for the UK’s relationships with the world beyond its state borders and in this capacity was the home of the UK diplomatic and consular services. Given the historic role of the British Empire in global affairs such a mandate was no small undertaking. The modern FCO resulted from a merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office in 1968. The powerful department is led by the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (also known as the Foreign Secretary) who is, in turn, supported by a number of Ministers of State and Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State. Management of the department staff and functions falls under the purview of FCO’s Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is also considered the head of the UK Diplomatic Service (FCO, 2002). As part of these duties the PUS chairs the FCO management board, which provides corporate leadership
to the department. More recently, the department established a strategic-level supervisory board that is chaired by the Foreign Secretary (FCO, 2012).

FCO was a ‘parent’ department to both the Conflict Pool and the SU – a responsibility shared with two other parents: MOD and DFID. FCO’s capacity and expertise in the area of conflict and instability sits with its Conflict Issues Group (CIG). Established in 2004 to provide a conflict lens for the work of the geographical teams and directorates (Teuten & Korski, 2010), the CIG “manages the FCO’s involvement with the two conflict pools, as well as other FCO programs with their own funds relating to conflict, serving as a liaison with DFID and the MoD on conflict issues, and as the main FCO point of contact with the PCRU” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 14). The creation of CIG marked a growing commitment within FCO for developing conflict-specific knowledge and skills amongst its staff. In 2005 an online conflict toolbox, a virtual group for mentoring and tailored training were some of the new initiatives undertaken (FCO, 2006). Besides its contributions to the SU, the Conflict Pool and work undertaken to achieve the jointly held PSA target focused on global conflict, FCO’s policies, services, funding decisions and programs were guided by strategic objectives that consistently established a mandate for FCO on issues related to global security. As such, FCO’s departmental priorities included strengthening international structures and systems, public diplomacy through the BBC and the British Council, advancing the climate security discourse, promoting UK economic interests and addressing such threats as global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration and international crime. The department’s capacity for programming was minimal in comparison to its other areas of work. However, access to the the Conflict Pool allocation allowed it to enhance its programming abilities. Additionally, FCO did have some dedicated programming funds in the form of the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) which was established in 2003 with an allocation £120 million over the 2003–2006 spending period (FCO, 2003a). The fund enabled FCO to identify and fund projects and programs that could contribute to the government’s strategic priorities. Seen alongside other funds such as early iterations of the CP, the GOF sought to complement established funding mechanisms by focusing on “human rights and legal reform, good governance (political and economic), energy and environment, (and) international security (particularly counter-terrorism)” (FCO, 2003a,
p. 23). The fund was established with a Central Management Unit to “support staff working on GOF projects, monitor and report on program expenditure and capture best practices in project management” (FCO, 2004, p. 82). By 2004 the GOF had become FCO’s largest program budget and counter-terrorism programs represented the largest proportion of programs funded (FCO, 2004). In 2007 the GOF was replaced by the Strategic Programme Fund (SPF) (FCO, 2008b).

Several key developments within the FCO provide some insight into the workings and overall departmental perspective on issues related to conflict, instability and the joined-up imperative. First, in 2004 the department began to make reference to the enormous challenges facing the department as a result of heavy engagements in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan (FCO, 2004, p. 4). A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee (2004) supported the assessment of FCO that the department’s current funding allocations and staffing models were not sufficient to sustain the level of engagement in volatile, resource-intensive operational environments. FCO underwent a departmental Capability Review in 2007. “In response to the review, the FCO has committed to: work with stakeholders to clarify our distinctive contribution to the achievement of the Government’s objectives overseas; focus even more sharply on the top Strategic Priorities and further strengthen business planning and resource allocation, managing internal change and human resources strategies” (FCO, 2007, 116). Progress reviews in late 2007 and again in 2009 concluded that FCO was making significant process on all fronts (FCO, 2008a; FCO 2009a).

In 2006 FCO and DFID developed a Shared Service Delivery Plan (SSDP) to formalize the sharing of resources when doing so might allow both departments to achieve value for money. With a focus on operations in Africa and South Asia, the plan addressed potential efficiencies in human resources, information systems and co-location of staff. The plan included a goal: “In countries where we both have a presence, … increase the proportion of DFID staff who are in co-located offices by at least 25%” (International Development Committee, 2007, p. 22). The departments acknowledged that the co-location and sharing of overseas resources had the potential to foster stronger information sharing and communication practices amongst staff and therefore improve cross-departmental cooperation (FCO, 2008a). Since the SSDP, the commitment to
sharing resources overseas has grown to include a network of government actors beyond DFID and FCO. The One HMG Overseas initiative aimed to achieve five cross-departmental objectives related to the management of government resources: co-locations, regionalization, consolidation, collaboration and harmonization (NAO, 2016), and resulted in many of the corporate service functions sitting with FCO. Much of the One HMG Overseas work was conducted in the years after 2012 and it continues to face challenges due in part to the size and complexity of the organizational systems involved. However, it is worth referencing here as it can be seen in some ways as a legacy of the initial SSDP. The challenges experienced in its implementation are also a reminder that barriers to joined-up government persist even with a formal mandate for innovation.

Anchored in part to the modernization agenda and in part to the changing nature of FCO’s work, the department pursued a number of initiatives intended to enhance its capacity to achieve its stated outcomes and objectives. Early in the decade the department went so far as to showcase its commitment to provide staff with the opportunity to broaden their cross-government perspectives and experiences. Encouragement of staff to take up secondments or interchange opportunities was referenced in departmental reports in 2002 and 2003 and supported by establishing benchmarks for desired increases in engagement with the Interchange program (FCO, 2003a). Even several years later, FCO’s language around other-government-department (OGD) experience was favourable: “To broaden our skills and horizons, the FCO is encouraging staff at all levels to consider spending part of their career outside the FCO – for example with another government department or in the private or voluntary sector” (FCO, 2008a, p. 102). Additional capacity-building efforts were undertaken to improve the department’s ability to rapidly deploy staff to international emergencies or consular crises impacting British citizens living or traveling abroad. The result was the creation of three Rapid Deployment Teams composed of staff from across FCO who were on permanent standby in case of natural disasters, terrorist attacks or the sudden outbreak of political violence overseas (FCO, 2003a; FCO, 2006).

In most respects the focus of FCO’s work did not change dramatically with the arrival of the Coalition government in 2010. The five structural reform priorities established for the department included a specific mandate to reform the machinery of
government that framed the country’s foreign policy. FCO was tasked with establishing a “National Security Council as the centre of decision-making on all international and national security issues, and help to implement the foreign policy elements of the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review” (FCO, 2011a, p. 2). FCO laid out a series of actions in its 2011 business plan to advance this objective which included convening the first meeting of the NSC and institutionalizing cross-departmental working (FCO, 2011a). BSOS, NSS and SDSR would become core documents of the UK’s foreign policy.

Department for International Development (DFID)

From 1979 to 1997 the UK’s Official Development Assistance was the responsibility of the Overseas Development Administration, which fell within FCO’s organizational architecture. Restructuring under the Labour government in 1997 resulted in the creation of a full government ministry called the Department for International Development (DFID) headed by a Cabinet Minister (Secretary of State for International Development). The model of a politically and financially empowered development unit within a state government has been recognized as a best practice in development assistance (OECD, 2006b; OECD, 2010; OECD, 2014) and amongst OECD members the UK is the only country to possess such a model. In such a position DFID was champion of development priorities across the UK government and worked to ensure that a development perspective was included in a vast array of policy issues including those not traditionally a part of the ODA scope of work, such as climate, conflict and trade. During the 13 years of Labour governments, DFID remained steadfast in its focus on fighting global poverty, its commitment to the MDGs and its efforts to adapt and evolve with the changing landscape of international development (DFID, 1997; DFID, 2003; DFID, 2005b; DFID 2006a; DFID 2006b; DFID, 2009). High-level political support from the Prime Minister (Blair) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (Brown) established DFID’s prominent status as an influential and powerful department in the UK government and a leader in the international development community (OECD, 2006b). The early years of DFID were also influenced by the strong leadership of Clare Short who held the position as Secretary of International Development from 1997–2003 and who is recognized as being a powerful force behind the development of an organization that was driven,
capable and innovative in its efforts to advance its poverty alleviation mandate (Goldfarb & Tapp, 2006). The budget allocations and resource commitments of the Labour government to DFID during its time in office reflect the consequences of strong departmental leadership and high-level political will.

Over the period 1997–2006, its (DFID’s) increased commitment to global poverty reduction led to the UK planning on a 93% real increase in official development assistance (oda) (from 0.23 per cent of GNI in 1997 to 0.40 per cent of GNI by 2005/6): the sharpest increase of any Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) state (Austin & Chalmers, 2004, p. 4)

In addition to increasing the allocation of government resources to development assistance, efforts were also undertaken to protect these funds for their stated purpose of poverty reduction. The 2002 International Development Act provided a legal framework that ensured the development budget could not be repurposed for other foreign policy priorities or national interests (Teuten & Korski, 2010; Goldfarb & Tapp, 2006). A subsequent piece of legislation, the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act of 2006 established certain requirements of DFID to produce transparent and accessible data related to overall aid expenditure, results-based performance measures for aid effectiveness and progress towards “the United Nations’ target for Official Development Assistance (ODA) to make up 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) by 2013” (DFID, 2007a, p. xiii).

Several major themes characterized DFID’s approach to development assistance from 2002 to 2012. First, the fundamental goal of DFID, established through the publication of four white papers between 1997 and 2009, was the elimination of poverty worldwide. Beginning in 2000, DFID’s poverty reduction mandate was aligned with the international community’s pursuit of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Moreover, DFID’s departmental performance and its contribution to the MDGs was measured by the Public Service Agreement (PSA) system which established three-year service delivery targets for poverty-reduction objectives in a select number of least developed countries (DFID, 2002). Figure 14 demonstrates the linkages between the MDGs, PSA targets and country plans. Of note is the fact that within DFID’s measurements of its progress towards a variety of PSA objectives and targets was its
involvement with both the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (a predecessor of the CP) and the SU. Both of these tri-departmental units were viewed as tools and occasionally partners in achieving departmental objectives.

Second, a pillar within DFID’s approach to poverty reduction was untying its aid so that development assistance would be provided to countries without the condition that recipient countries would be obligated to purchase goods and services from the donor country. Through DFID’s efforts, the UK government championed the untying of aid as a means through which donor countries could increase the value and effectiveness of their development assistance (DFID, 2003). Along with other members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, the UK agreed to untying aid for least developed countries in 2001 and then, via the 2002 International Development Act, went beyond the minimum international commitment and effectively made tied aid to any aid recipients illegal (DFID, 2002). Third, despite being well-resourced, well-supported politically and having its funds and mandate protected with legislation, DFID’s approach to development assistance was grounded in a stated belief that strong international institutions supported by an engaged network of donor countries and non-governmental organizations all brought together through ambitious declarations and agreements was essential if any true and lasting progress was to be made in eliminating global poverty. DFID was a recognized leader within the OECD’s

Figure 14: DFID strategy and performance management

(DFID, 2005, p. 9)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Teuten & Korski, 2010), a key player in developing and championing both the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2006) and the 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (DFID, 2010b) and a strong advocate for the Policy Coherence for Development movement advanced by both the OECD and the European Union. The department supported the formation of UN initiatives, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) both of which were designed to foster system-wide coherence across security and development actors within the UN system (DFID, 2006b; DFID, 2007; DFID, 2008). It was also an influential actor in the European Union system.

Fourth, DFID’s narrative to Parliament and the general public emphasized the critical connections between global poverty reduction and the prosperity of UK citizens.

*Tackling poverty is a moral obligation. But eliminating poverty is also in our self-interest. We are becoming increasingly inter-dependent with people in far away countries. We trade more and more goods and services with people all round the world. This trade can be affected by currency crises or other shocks in other countries. The media brings to our homes images of conflicts in the remotest locations. And refugees, fleeing these conflicts, seek shelter in other countries, including the UK. Our prosperity and that of people throughout the world are inextricably linked* (DFID, 2002, p. 8).

Part of this discourse of mutual obligation and reciprocity involved an increasing awareness within DFID, FCO and MOD of the complex relationship between poverty, state fragility and the dynamics of conflict and instability. This multi-faceted relationship involved DFID’s recognition that conflict and instability were limiting factors for longer-term sustainable development. In short, reducing poverty involves working with partners within and beyond the UK government to reduce conflict (DFID, 2002). Conversely, development actors have a responsibility to do no harm in delivering development assistance and therefore need to be able anticipate and mitigate outcomes in which the provision of aid might exacerbate conflict and instability. This challenging relationship between insecurity and underdevelopment was most pronounced in countries in the throes of state fragility. As a result, a core element of DFID’s mandate and institutional capacity was focused on conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and, eventually, stabilization.
and post-conflict reconstruction (DFID, 2007b; DFID, 2008). It is in this cross-cutting policy sphere that joined-up efforts with FCO and MOD became more institutionalized. From the Conflict Pool to the SU to the joint PSA targets related to conflict prevention to the Building Stability Overseas Strategy and Board, cross-departmental initiatives were an important component of the UK’s approach to state fragility. DFID made it clear that the interconnected nature of the issues should not be interpreted as a dilution of its poverty alleviation mandate. The allocation of DFID resources was still predicated on a poverty reduction case (DFID, 2005b). However, because of the strong connections between fragility, instability and underdevelopment, the department’s efforts to address human security issues in a region or community could be seen as supporting government-wide efforts in stabilization and peacebuilding in fragile states. The department published prolifically on these topics throughout the 2002–2012 timeframe. In 2010 it published Building Peaceful States and Society (BPSS) in which it presented a strong case for why peacebuilding and statebuilding activities should be considered core functions of development agencies and actors working to alleviate poverty in fragile states.

We will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or eliminate global poverty if the international community does not address conflict and fragility more effectively. Simply increasing the volume of aid will not be enough without tackling the underlying causes directly. There is a tendency in development to work ‘around’ conflict and fragility. A step change in international approaches is required (DFID, 2010, p. 6)

The paper also advanced the idea of an integrated approach that was not just a call for more communication and coordination amongst relevant actors but also a framework of four interrelated objectives that should “help shape development programmes and broader international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries” (p. 29). Through its elaboration on the various objectives, the report establishes DFID’s thinking on the role of the department in stabilization activities. There is no uncertainty on this

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40 In addition to the four white papers, each of which included conflict and instability as issues relevant to DFID’s work, the department also published: Fragile States: Difficult environments for poverty reduction (2004); Fighting Poverty: A strategy for security and development (2005); Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states (2005); Preventing Conflict (2006)

41 BPSS Integrated Approach: 4 objectives: (1) Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms; (2) Support inclusive political settlements and processes; (3) Develop core state functions; (4) Respond to public expectations
point. The paper establishes the critical linkages between the three dimensions of stabilization (preventing, stopping or reducing violent conflict; protecting people and their livelihoods; preparing for Peace) (p. 37) and the integrated approach’s first objective to “address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility and build conflict resolution mechanisms” (p. 17). The BPSS paper was accompanied by a series of briefing notes each of which tackled a different aspect of Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations. They complement and expand upon BPSS topics and highlight the depth of DFID’s thinking on how conflict and fragility influence and inform its work. Perhaps most relevant to this case study is Briefing Paper C which examined links between politics, security and development and, in doing so, reflected on its experiences with WoG approaches designed to establish these linkages at the operational or organizational level (see Box 4). To address some of these barriers the briefing paper goes on to discuss core functions that need to be undertaken in a joint manner if WoG is to be successful: analysis, strategies, funding and working arrangements. Together the briefing notes and the BPSS paper establish not only DFID’s willingness to work in a joined-up or integrated fashion but also the department’s interest in ascertaining how the quality of such integration might be improved. They also demonstrate both a willingness to examine a relationship (between security and development) that can be profoundly troublesome for many development practitioners and to make its thinking on these points available for public consumption.

**Box 4: UK’s experience shows that difficulties in achieving Whole-of-Government Approaches arise from:**

- different mandates of government departments, leading to different priorities (some of which may be in tension);
- tensions between short-term and long-term approaches (with development approaches typically being longer term than security or political ones);
- use of different terminology by government departments, leading to communication problems and lack of mutual understanding;
- differences in where decisions are made (i.e. London or in country);
- definitions of ODA (Official Development Assistance) and non-ODA financing, leading to challenges around funding the security sector. (DFID, 2010, p. 2)
As a result of the high priority placed on themes related to conflict and instability, DFID’s institutional capacity for applying a conflict lens to its policies, programs and corporate functions grew. Of particular note were longstanding efforts to develop and incorporate robust conflict analysis into departmental work (DFID, 2002; DFID, 2005a; DFID, 2010c). Much of this conflict expertise was located within the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE). Established in 1997 as the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, CHASE’s mandate involved providing “policy leadership on security, conflict and humanitarian issues to the rest of DFID; funding to humanitarian and conflict multilateral organisations; core funding to relevant Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and humanitarian support to affected populations” (CHASE, 2011, p. 3). By 2012, CHASE was not only serving policy and programming functions critical to the advancement of DFID’s mandate but also representing DFID’s interests and expertise in discussions, planning sessions and decision-making bodies in the broader government network. CHASE was a prominent player in the development of the UK Strategic Security and Defence Review (2010), the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011) and the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011). Still, CHASE was not the only unit within DFID relevant to the security-development-humanitarian assistance domain and, as a result, several complicated organizational relationships existed within the department. An examination of how DFID’s organizational structure evolved over a decade offers some helpful insights about the coordination and coherence challenges within line departments that contribute to cross-cutting policy discourses and cross-departmental initiatives.

For most of the 2002–2012 timeframe, DFID’s organizational structure included three primary directorates under which numerous geographical and thematic divisions advanced the department’s mandate. Each directorate was led by a Director General who reported directly to DFID’s Permanent Secretary. One directorate was focused on the department’s corporate functions, such as financial systems and human resource management. Another encompassed those divisions focused on regional or country programming. The final directorate was policy focused and included DFID programs related to international, thematic priorities that extended beyond the confines of a single geographic division. CHASE was located within this Policy and International Directorate
as issues related to conflict, humanitarian assistance and security transcended geographic or regional categorization. In 2005 DFID restructured the directorate in an effort to create a locus of organizational expertise in conflict and humanitarian policy issues (DFID, 2005a). As a result CHASE became one of several units assigned to the newly formed United Nations, Conflict and Humanitarian Division (UNCHD). Also located within the UNHCD was DFID’s contribution to the PCRU. While PCRU was tri-departmental in its design, during its early years a DFID Deputy Director within the UNHCD was head of the unit. Meanwhile, over in the Country Program Directorate the Africa Division housed the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU). Staff from ACHU had responsibilities for DFID’s contribution to the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Steering Committee. Locating CHASE and the PCRU within the Policy and International Directorate was a logical but somewhat problematic placement as it had the potential to create organizational barriers between DFID’s conflict expertise and the country expertise necessary for ensuring conflict analysis was contextually relevant. Additionally, there were no formal connections between CHASE and ACHU (HERR, 2011). The 2006 OECD peer evaluation of UK development assistance observed that “the overlapping mandates of CHASE and ACHU can cause difficulties for interaction with field offices and their respective responsibilities could be clarified further” (p. 20). Between 2007 and 2012 multiple reorganization and renaming exercises attempted to distribute departmental resources in a manner that could foster greater levels of coherence across those units focused on conflict and instability. These efforts paralleled organizational reforms occurring in both the Conflict Prevention Pools and the SU and structural reform plans advanced government-wide by the new Coalition government elected in 2010. By 2012 the top-level directorates were redesigned to allow for thematic and geographic overlap within a directorate. A fourth directorate was established to focus on Humanitarian, Security, Conflict and International Finance. It included: the Middle East and North Africa Department, the International Finance Division, the Syria Crisis Unit, CHASE, and the West Africa and Stabilisation Division (in which DFID’s contribution to the SU resided) (ALNAP, 2013). Moreover, once the CPPs were merged into a single Conflict Pool, the responsibilities for DFID’s contribution to the Pool were assigned to CHASE (CHASE, 2012) thereby centralizing DFID’s conflict expertise more fully.
In addition to influencing the organization of departmental functions and expertise, DFID’s interest in issues related to conflict and insecurity also had an impact on the management of the department’s human resources. Beyond the conflict expertise and perspective offered by CHASE, a large portion of DFID staff working in country offices were working in zones of moderate to extreme insecurity. The department’s poverty alleviation mandate was focused on the least developed countries in the world, the vast majority of which were experiencing multiple dimensions of instability (political, social, economic), humanitarian crises and/or were disproportionately vulnerable to natural disasters. Working in these insecure environments is a costly endeavour as higher staff allowances, enhanced security measures and the elevated costs associated with mobilizing resources in emergency and crisis situations all result in higher administrative costs for both in-country teams and division offices (NAO, 2008).

On the human resource front insecure programming environments posed a serious threat to the safety and well-being of DFID staff. Developing a department-wide capacity to assess and mitigate the risk to staff was no small undertaking. A 2008 report by the National Audit Office (NAO) observed that, “attracting home civil service staff to work in insecure environments is difficult and fewer apply to work in insecure countries than other overseas posts” (p. 28). In addition to concerns about direct threats, the inability to bring a spouse or family, limited career benefits, abbreviated posting durations which resulted in frequent and disruptive staff turnover, inconsistent investment in hostile environment training for staff and a lack of clarity around duty of care guidelines across units and divisions were noted as important HR challenges that needed to be addressed.

As a consequence of the aforementioned cross-cutting issues and environments that were at the forefront of DFID’s work and a government-wide emphasis on achieving efficiencies and value for money through joined-up government, DFID was engaged in an increasing number of joined-up initiatives. Annual departmental reports clearly stated that DFID’s mandate, objectives and PSA targets could only be achieved through effective collaboration with other government departments, including: the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), HM Treasury (HMT), the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Home Office, the Department of Health and the Department of Education (DFID, 2005a; DFID, 2006a).
The most important partnership was arguably with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. In addition to the PCRU/SU, the CPPs and the joint PSAs, the 2003 DFID-FCO Closer Working Action Plan, co-location in-country where it makes sense to do so, the joint FCO-DFID Sudan Unit, the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2006 Shared Service Delivery Plan and are some examples of the close ties between the two departments (OECD, 2006; DFID, 2008; OECD, 2010).

The election of the Coalition government in 2010 did not fundamentally alter DFID’s mandate, its focus on conflict and fragility, or its position that partnership with other actors within and beyond government were critical to the pursuit of its goals and objectives. However, the manner in which the department undertook its work did present opportunities for transformation for the new government. Like all departments, DFID was asked to submit a structural reform plan and a business plan to identify how the department would be contributing to the “coalition priorities” established by the government (see Box 5). The new government challenged all departments to be more results-based and more transparent in how they spent financial resources within a period of fiscal discipline. To this end DFID undertook a Bilateral Aid Review and a Multilateral Aid Review to gauge the effectiveness of all of its investments to determine where value for money was clearly being demonstrated and where improvement was required (NAO, 2011). The reviews resulted in the

**Box 5. Structural Reform Priorities relevant to DFID, as stated in the 2011-2015 departmental Business Plan**

1. Honour the UK’s international commitments and support actions to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
2. Make British aid more effective by improving transparency and value for money
3. Make British international development policy more focused on boosting economic growth and wealth creation
4. Improve the coherence and performance of British international development policy in fragile and conflict-affected countries, with a particular focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan
5. Work to empower and educate girls, recognise the role of women in development and help to ensure that healthy mothers can raise strong children
6. Drive urgent action to tackle climate change, and support adaptation and low carbon growth in developing countries (DFID, 2011, p. 3)
department focusing on fewer countries (where resources could have the greatest impact) and piloting a new form of results-oriented financing that made “payments contingent on the independent verification of pre-agreed results, encouraging recipients to innovate and minimise waste” (DFID, 2012, p. 85). Beyond the structural reform agenda, DFID was an important player in the development and implementation of the National Security Council and its associated strategy documents (DFID, 2011a).

Ministry of Defence (MoD)
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is both a Department of State and the institutional home of the UK’s Armed Forces. As such, MOD is responsible for establishing UK defence policy and managing its vast resources to ensure sufficient military capability is on hand to “deliver Defence policy and to support wider Government policy objectives” (MOD, 2010, p. 2). The modern MOD has its origins in the 1964 Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act which transferred the functions of a collection of individual Departments of State under the central umbrella of the newly created MOD and a single Secretary of State for Defence (HMG, 1964). This influential Secretary of State was supported in his/her work by Under Secretaries (junior ministers), the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) (the most senior civil servant) and Chiefs of Staff from the three military branches (Navy, Army and Air Force) (MOD, 2004). Management and governance of the MOD at the most senior levels occurred through two departmental bodies upon which many of the aforementioned positions sit. The Defence Management Board (DMB) guides the corporate functions of the department and the Defence Council provides “the formal legal basis for the conduct of defence in the UK through a range of powers vested in it by statute and Letters Patent” (MOD, 2004, p. 171). MOD’s power and influence stem from a number of sources including its pronounced role in major events in UK government, the high profile and high risk of contemporary defence policy issues, its vast operating budget (see Table 16), its role as a major employer (see Table 16), its purchasing power demonstrated through procurement of supplies and equipment necessary to support a modern military, and its position as one of the country’s largest landowners (MOD properties occupy about 1% of the UK – MOD, 2008b).
Table 16: MOD operation budget (RRF1 and RRF2) and workforce numbers at intervals between 2002 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget – Request for Resources 1 (RRF1) (£M)</th>
<th>Budget – Request for Resources 2 (RRF2) (£M)</th>
<th>Workforce – Service (full-time equivalent persons)</th>
<th>Workforce – Civilian (full-time equivalent persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>32,302</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>213,600</td>
<td>92,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>33,076</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>193,610</td>
<td>83,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>44,995</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>194,690</td>
<td>74,858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data acquired through annual departmental reports: MOD, 2004; MOD 2008b; MOD, 2011b

As of 2002, the MOD policy and operations were guided by the 1997 Strategic Defence Review. The Ministry’s mandate or primary activity remained the same from 2002 to 2012: “to deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism, and act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and security” (MOD, 2004, p. 10). In 2009, the language was altered slightly by replacing ‘peace and security’ with ‘peace and stability’, likely an acknowledgement of the changing nature of issues and environments in which militaries and security forces around the world found themselves having a role to play. In service of this high-level mandate, the work of MOD military personnel and civilian staff involved four core activities: current operations, future operations, defence policy and engaging with the wider government. The fourth activity was added in 2005 and marks the department’s increasing recognition of the “importance of working closely with other

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42 RRF1: “Provision of Defence Capability, provides for expenditure primarily to meet the MOD’s operational support and logistics services costs and the costs of providing the equipment capability required by defence policy (MOD, 2009b, p. 160) (net total outturn or actual costs)

43 RRF2: MOD’s net additional costs of operations and peacekeeping (net total outturn or actual costs)
government departments and the wider community to both deliver defence objectives and in support of wider government objectives” (MOD, 2005, p. 10)

While the mandate of MOD did not change over the course of the decade, the nature of the work did evolve. Several major events and issues influenced the Ministry’s policy and activities in the 2002–2012 window. First, the rapidly changing nature of the global security environment and the clear impact of international security issues on domestic security prompted the 2003 Defence White Paper which examined the UK armed forces within the context of contemporary security threats and, furthermore, its capability to respond to crises and deliver security to both UK citizens and the broader international community. Highlighted as key issues driving change and modernization within the Armed Forces were international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed and failing states (MOD, 2003). The 2003 white paper and its subsequent 2004 capability report were focused on the need for the UK Armed Forces to adapt and change to ensure it could effectively contribute to peace support operations, stabilization efforts, post-conflict reconstruction and counter-terrorism activities:

*It is highly likely that the Armed Forces will, in future, be more frequently employed on peace support and counter-terrorist operations where the focus will be on conflict prevention and stabilisation, rather than the defeat of opposing forces* (MOD, 2003, p. 5),

In response to the changing operational environment, departmental objectives and PSA targets from 2002–2009 reflected the government’s intent that its Armed Forces be able to achieve success in current military operations and be suitably prepared to respond in a timely and effective manner to situations that might arise. To this end, the UK government committed to modernizing its Armed Forces so that systems, equipment and personnel could be flexible, agile, capable and easily deployed (HMT, 2007). This investment in the country’s military emerged over consecutive spending reviews in 2002, 2004 and 2007, each of which saw increases to defence spending and marked the “longest period of sustained real increases for MOD expenditure in almost three decades” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 231).
The second significant force influencing the MOD was its standing commitments for the UK Armed Forces during the 2002–2012 window. While these commitments included a military presence in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Gibraltar, it was the contingent military operations (responses to emerging or unforeseen conflict and instability) that would have the strongest impact on MOD resources and personnel. A confluence of events stemming from the War on Terror and issues emerging from failed and fragile states yielded complex, multi-actor operational environments that demanded military actors be adaptable and capable in functions that ranged from engaging in open hostilities to counter-insurgency to stabilization to security sector reform. The MOD would eventually find itself heavily committed to two of these operations at the same time with missions in Iraq (Operation TELIC) and Afghanistan (Operation HERRICK). Concurrency levels were an established element of managing a modern military force, especially one with the resources and international responsibilities of the UK military; however, maintaining concurrent missions for a sustained period of time puts pressures on resources and potentially reduces the capacity of the military to respond to future operations that may emerge (MOD, 2009a). Figure 15 displays concurrency levels from 2001–2008. The broken, black line in the upper part of the image indicates routine concurrency or levels of concurrency for which MOD would plan to be able to resource. From 2003–2005 the UK military was focused largely on the war in Iraq. 2006 marks that point at which the country became heavily invested in missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is at this point that the annual departmental reports began using descriptors such as challenging and demanding when discussing the environments in which the UK armed forces were engaged (MOD, 2006; MOD, 2007).
Operational costs in Afghanistan doubled between 2006-07 and 2007-08 as UK activity in Helmand Province increased (MOD, 2008b). The increase in the number of personnel, ammunition, equipment and resources accounted for a good portion of the additional costs. However, certain characteristics of the operations in Helmand Province emphasize the costs of operating in theatres still largely deemed unstable. Most notable were the soaring costs of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs); a category of expenses that arose in rapidly changing environments (MOD, 2008b). Funded by additional resources from HMT, UORs involved the timely procurement of equipment necessary to fill capability gaps and provided the UK Armed Forces with the ability to adapt and flex with a changing environment (MOD 2008b; MOD, 2012a). Close to £811 million was spent on UORs during the war-fighting and peace enforcement phases of UK engagement in Iraq between 2003 and 2005 (Committee of Public Accounts, 2005).
Third, drivers for joined-up activity and improved coordination between MOD and its partners were emerging on multiple fronts. The *Modernising Government* agenda, the PSA framework (which always included a shared target for MOD, FCO and DFID), the Conflict Pool and the SU are referenced throughout this case study; however, MOD was having other experiences with joined-up government that informed its thinking and practice of cross-departmental coordination. Beyond government partners, MOD recognized the need for enhanced coherence and coordination amongst the broader sphere of actors navigating conflict and crisis zones.

In 1991, UK military personnel deployed to Bosnia witnessed crisis and conflict involving a complex interplay of civilian, para-military and military groups and individuals, International Organisations (IOs) and the mass Media. This situation was characterised by a bewildering diversity of influences and factors and it was recognised that the military instrument alone could not deal with complex modern crises involving, and occurring among, communities and populations (JDCC, 2005, p. 1-1).

The need for effective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) at the tactical, operational and strategic levels became an ongoing area of focus for MOD throughout the aughts. Framed by NATO’s parallel interest in improving civil-military coordination, MOD became an early and persistent champion of the comprehensive approach (CA), another term in the WoG lexicon. While the CA can refer to coordination exclusively among government departments, it is more often referred to as a form of cross-boundary coordination that extends beyond the confines of government departments. In this sense it is similar to joined-up government, which encourages collaboration with non-government actors. However, the two terms differ in that the comprehensive approach is a term predominately used to discuss communication between and coordination across civil and military actors sharing an operational environment. Joined-up government, by contrast, is

44 Additional examples of MOD coordinating with other government departments included: its involvement in PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq (MOD, 2007) and the tri-departmental Security Sector Development Advisory Teams (MOD, 2008a); its contributions to the UK’s counter-terrorist strategy (CONTEST) (MOD, 2009a); its role as a key partner in PSA 26 – a 2007 cross-cutting target focused specifically on limiting the impact of international terrorism on UK citizens and interests (MOD, 2009a); combatting piracy along the Somalia coast (MOD, 2011b) and the importance it placed on understanding the symbiotic relationships between defence objectives and activities and the work of government departments on issues related to veterans, cadets, climate change, health services and sustainable procurement (MOD, 2005; MOD, 2007).
more often used in the context of domestic issues and their respective stakeholders. The military may be referenced in the context of a joined-up approach related to London’s 2012 hosting of the summer Olympic Games, but generally joined-up government does not take into consideration the barriers and incentives specific to civil-military interactions in an operational theatre.

The UK’s defence community made important contributions to advancing thinking around the mechanics of the comprehensive approach. A 2005 discussion note established four principles of the comprehensive approach: a proactive cross-Whitehall approach, a shared understanding that incorporates diverse perspectives and analytical approaches, outcome-based thinking and collaborative working. So clear were the possible advantages provided to the military by the comprehensive approach that the discussion note suggested a variety of ideas for developing a capacity for the comprehensive approach within the UK government. A 2010 report by the House of Commons Defence Committee looked to the UK’s experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to understand the merits, impacts and critical success factors for the comprehensive approach. The report uncovered a number of lessons learned that would enhance or improve future efforts, but overall recognized its importance and recommended that the upcoming security and defence review was an opportunity to see that “the Comprehensive Approach is embedded in future Government policy and that the Armed Forces are designed, trained and equipped to perform their role in such operations” (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010, p. 3).

Finally, conflict prevention and, eventually, stabilization were dominant themes within UK foreign policy and MOD was a central player in influencing and implementing policies related to conflict prevention. MOD’s connection to this policy domain was clear. “While the primary focus of the Ministry of Defence remains providing the capability to conduct military operations, it is clearly better to prevent the need for them arising” (MOD, 2006, p. 48). As a consequence of its shared PSA target related to global conflict prevention, MOD incorporated conflict prevention as an integral part of its departmental performance in each annual report. It reported on both its contributions to government-wide conflict prevention activities and how said activities contributed to the

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45 The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace.
Ministry’s efforts to ensure defence policy aligned with new threats and instabilities facing the UK (MOD, 2004a; MOD 2005a). Early iterations of the Conflict Pool (the Global Conflict Prevention Pool – GCPP and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool – ACPP) were often referenced by MOD as innovative tools that facilitated an improved level of communication and coordination across government departments (MOD, 2007; MOD, 2006). Programs and initiatives funded by the Pools worked to address the underlying causes of conflict and, in so doing, improved the government’s response to conflict and instability (MOD, 2004). Attributed to the Pools were numerous MOD programs and activities related to security sector reform such as providing training to Armed Forces of African countries so that they could participate in peacekeeping missions and training the Armed Forces in countries emerging from violent conflict such as Sierra Leone and Afghanistan to help “build professional, democratically accountable Armed Forces” as part of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. MOD involvement with the ACPP was focused on “developing African capacity for planning and executing peace support operations and assisting selected Security Sector Reform programmes” (MOD, 2005a, p. 49). A number of peace support training centres such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) and the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (Sarajevo) were developed with the assistance of ACPP and GCPP funding (MOD, 2006).

Despite the numerous successes noted in departmental publications, certain tensions existed between MOD and its WoG partners. Sharing of information, a cornerstone of joint analysis and joint planning, was often made difficult by the existence of classified information held by one WoG partner or another (most often MOD or FCO). Sanitizing documents so that they could be distributed to a wider team of stakeholders was both time consuming (Austin et al., 2004) and problematic in that removing classified data from a report increased the likelihood that WoG partners did not share a complete understanding of the issues, threats and priorities. In a security and development environment characterized by expensive and unpredictable engagement in failed states, MOD could access funds beyond its budget allocation approved by Parliament more easily than FCO and DFID. Whereas the civilian departments were
required to reallocate existing priorities in order to meet unforeseen expenditures, MOD was seen to have preferential access to the Reserve (Teuten & Korski, 2010).

As conflict prevention language gave way to include stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction in failed and fragile states, MOD’s relevance to the discourse only grew. The emergence of stabilization as a major priority for MOD, FCO and, to some degree, DFID resulted in substantive thinking about the military’s role in stabilization and enhancing its capacity for contributing to stabilization efforts accordingly. In 2008 MOD created a new military task: Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development (MASD) (DCDC, 2009). MASD operations were characterized by variable compliance by actors in theatre, shifting intensity and complexity, high degrees of force protection, and coordination across a wide range of actors. In support of this new functional task, MOD developed a joint operational doctrine that was articulated through the 2009 publication of Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution. Produced for a military audience, the 265-page document articulated a framework for understanding state fragility, a clear definition for the term stabilization,\(^46\) the evolution of the UK’s approach to stabilization and the military’s contribution to stabilization activities such as provision of security, security force training, institutional capacity building and infrastructure development. The report acknowledged the issues that traditionally made stabilization efforts challenging for the military:

\textit{Stabilisation campaigns require endurance and patience. At times observing and shaping, rather than engaging in aggressive operations, may be the best approach. This can be difficult for a military which expects to deliver rapid, ideally decisive results; just one of the paradoxes that these types of conflict present} (p. xii).

The doctrine also examined standard military activities such as intelligence gathering, situational analyses, planning, execution and capturing of lessons learned through the lens of stabilization. The section on planning is especially interesting as it explored the

\(^{46}\) “Stabilisation is the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order to: prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. Its ultimate purpose is to strengthen an existing political order, or to reshape it, to become more acceptable to that nation’s population and more consistent with the UK’s strategic interests” (DCDC, 2009, p. xi).
importance of joint planning efforts across MOD, FCO and DFID. Planning is a core function within the military and, as such, the dynamics of joint planning are as important to understanding and achieving cross-departmental coordination as joint analysis is to the civilian departments. To this end, the report presented the different language and terminology related to the various planning processes that underlined the work of MOD, DFID and the SU and went on to propose models for joint planning that would permit individual departmental plans for stabilization to exist while still achieving effective coordination at the operational and strategic levels.

With task and doctrine established, MOD then went on to dedicate staff and resources to the stabilization mandate. In 2009 it renamed its Joint CIMIC Group the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) and assigned to it stabilization-specific roles and functions that included:

*Gather and analyse civil information, provide an interface and staff focus for civil environment, integrate civil and military planning and effects, provide co-ordination and co-operation in support of the mission between the different actors in Theatre, contribute to the Influence Campaign, provide information through interaction, support the force through securing resources, be prepared to act on behalf of OGDs and support Humanitarian Assistance to Disaster Relief (HADR) operations as required (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010)*

At the time of its creation MSSG’s focus was Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan. Composed exclusively of military personnel from all three services, MSSG staff had to be capable of deploying to areas still too dangerous for civilian stabilization advisors but also equipped with strong communication, influencing and stakeholder engagement skills (MOD, 2010). Each member of the group could be deployed to support an in-theatre unit outside of the MSSG or as part of an independent Military Stabilisation Support Team (MSST) (MOD, 2012c). The development of MSSG dramatically increased MOD’s ability to achieve civil-military coordination in theatre; however, some questions emerged about when and how the MSSG would work with the SU and its deployable Stabilisation Advisors (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010). While both units were focused on stabilization and the issues related to civil-military coordination that dominate the stabilization space, their relationship was also an exercise in civil-military coordination.
The relationship between the SU and MSSG began to clarify in the years after MSSG’s creation. A joint exercise in disaster preparedness in Uganda in 2010 marked the first overseas collaboration between the two units (MOD, 2011).

The election of the Coalition government in 2010 was accompanied by the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Additional influences on MOD strategic direction, resource management and activities included the 2010 Spending Review, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the new government’s mandate for structural reform, value for money and fiscal restraint. The first MOD business plan was published in 2011 and in addition to standing commitments, departmental priorities included: success in Afghanistan, implementation of the SDSR by “restructuring the Armed Forces and their capabilities; rebuilding the Armed Forces Covenant; and developing a New Employment Model” (MOD, 2011a, p. 1) and, in search of efficiencies and cost reductions, “a fundamental examination of how MOD is structure and managed” (MOD, 2010) carried out by the newly established Defence Reform Unit. MOD was a partner in the creation of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) published in 2011 and had representatives on the resulting BSOS, which was given responsibilities for both the Conflict Pool and the SU.

Central Agencies: Cabinet Office and Her Majesty’s Treasury
In addition to the three key line departments noted above, central agencies also had important roles to play facilitating cross-departmental coordination government-wide and, more specifically, as partners in some of the cross-departmental initiatives discussed in this case. As was described in the Canadian case, central agencies are different from the line departments, such as FCO, DFID and MOD, each of which had responsibilities within specific policy domains and provided services and programs related to these policy issues. In contrast, the central agencies held responsibilities specific to their department and central functions essential for coordinating government-wide systems and processes (all aspects of the budget cycle, corporate improvement, civil service reform, departmental performance management, human resources, information management and risk management, to name a few). In this sense, the central agencies
held a certain authority over the line departments to ensure that departmental activities aligned with the high-level priorities and objectives of Cabinet and fulfilled the requirements for transparency, sound management practices and value for money. Despite this authority, the UK government system traditionally saw a great deal of power devolved to the line departments resulting in small and relatively weak central agencies (Teuten & Korski, 2010). This changed, however, throughout the early 2000s: “strong Prime Ministers and chancellors have strengthened the Cabinet Office (CO) and Treasury (HMT) to provide a counterweight to a fragmented public sector, and to ensure that government priorities are ‘delivered’ on the ground” (Parker et al., 2010, p. 18). The central agencies most relevant to this case study were the Cabinet Office (CO) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT). Occasional reference may also be made to No. 10 (the Prime Minister’s Office), the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (created in 2001) and the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (created in 2002) which were also institutions at the centre of government that had a strong influence on any efforts undertaken to achieve efficiencies and greater effectiveness through cross-departmental communication and coordination due to the Prime Minister’s strong interest in improved service delivery through joined-up government. For the most part, these units were the responsibility of either the CO or HMT.
The relationship between UK line departments and central agencies (see Figure 16) is such that HMT and the CO influenced the work of line departments through their strategic, coordination and corporate improvement functions while line departments submitted policy proposals, departmental performance information and spending data that ensured central agencies were in possession of the necessary information for advising Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the head of HMT) and informing adjustments to government-wide systems and corporate policies. Below is a brief overview of HMT and the CO.

**Figure 16: Relationship between UK line departments and central agencies**

(NAO, 2014, p. 13)

**HM Treasury (HMT)**

Unlike most OECD countries, the UK government placed both its economics and finance functions in a single department, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT). As such, HMT was responsible for the UK’s tax system, economic analysis, the annual budget, spending
reviews, public spending controls, fiscal strategies, debt management and oversight of major public service expenditure (NAO, 2014). Beginning with the 1997 Labour government, certain aspects of HMT responsibilities changed as the strategic role of the department was enhanced.⁴⁷ The department was led by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a powerful and historic office in the UK system (Allen, 2013). From 1997 to 2007, Gordon Brown would serve as Chancellor before taking over as head of the Labour party following Tony Blair’s departure from politics. Brown would become Prime Minister when the Labour party was returned to power in the 2007 election. Brown’s tenure is worth noting as it underlines the political stability that existed in the UK for a large portion of the 2002–2012 window. New initiatives and programs implemented under Blair and Brown benefitted from their relatively long tenures (four election cycles). It was in this environment that the Conflict Pool and the SU were created. It was also under Brown and Blair’s collective leadership that DFID was created and the UK’s commitment to global poverty reduction was enshrined in legislation. Departmental objectives for HMT in the mid-aughts make clear the government’s position that UK economic success required stability and prosperity overseas. One of four HMT objectives in 2005 was to “promote UK economic prospects by pursuing increased productivity and efficiency in the EU, international financial stability and increased global prosperity, including especially protecting the most vulnerable” (HMT, 2005, p. 15).

With its increasing strategic perspective HMT began influencing “departmental policy development and implementation through, for example, its comprehensive spending reviews, efficiency programmes and a new performance management framework” (Teuten & Korski, 2010, 31-32). Examples of performance management frameworks include the PSAs (2001–2009) and the structural reform/business plan model brought in by the Coalition government in 2010. In this sense, HMT can be understood to have a major role in creating and implementing performance management frameworks that facilitate or advance an overall priority for cross-departmental coordination or integration. While the purpose of performance management frameworks in government is

⁴⁷ For example, in 2005 HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) was created and made responsible for collection of tax revenue. HMT still led on high-level tax decisions, but the operational responsibility was moved to HMRC (CO, 2007).
not exclusively to foster cross-governmental coordination, it can be a criterion for assessment of such frameworks. It has been previously discussed that the business plan model, which came into effect following the election of the Coalition government, placed less value on achieving cross-departmental coordination than the PSA framework (NAO, 2012a).

While WoG was not a widely adopted term in the UK case (joined-up government being the main nomenclature in use), HMT did use the term. Whole-of-government was a descriptor for a set of consolidated financial statements – an accounting system used widely across the UK public sector. Whole of government accounts (WGA) was “a major step forward in transparency and accountability as it supports the government’s agenda to make more public data available. WGA enables the direct comparability of financial data across public sector entities and is producing trend data that will help to inform future analysis and decision making” (HMT, 2013, para 2). This is an example of HMT making widespread use of a term that might be understood differently in a different government department. While the key actors in the UK case do not reference the term extensively, the OECD was clearly establishing the term in its aid effectiveness and working in fragile states reports, initiatives in which the UK government (through the work of DFID and FCO) was heavily involved. Interestingly, this same occurrence was observed in the Canadian case where TBS used WoG very literally – to reference systems or standards that applied to all-of-government. Yet, DFAIT, DND and CIDA used the term as it was being used by actors in the state fragility, humanitarian assistance and stabilization realms.

A primary function of HMT from 2002–2012 was to manage the institutional processes through which government spending occurred: spending reviews and the annual budget. Multi-year spending reviews established high-level government priorities and allocated fixed departmental expenditure limits (DEL) for the purpose of discretionary spending. “Departments may spend against their DEL without seeking further Treasury consent, subject to a requirement for approval for any novel or contentious streams of expenditure or projects above a given value – their ‘delegated authority’” (NAO, 2012a, p. 13). Approvals for large projects that require financing beyond what was originally approved by Parliament through the estimates process must
go through HMT. In theory, the budget process, especially the stage through which HMT negotiates budget settlements with line departments, did provide an opportunity to “facilitate and incentivise cross-government work to cut costs” (NAO, 2012a, p. 13). An early stage of the budget cycle involved individual departments submitting to HMT a high-level view of how they intended to spend their budget allocation. They could include joint submissions at this stage or, in theory, HMT could encourage them to consider cross-departmental efficiencies or innovations at this time (NAO, 2012a). However, HMT’s main focus was to review the submission to ensure a department’s major spending areas were in line with government-wide priorities. The budget autonomy provided to individual departments meant that few institutional levers were available to HMT to encourage, require or reward departments to collaborate (or even communicate) as they prepared their individual budget submissions. Once submissions were made the subsequent negotiations that determine each department’s final budget settlement were largely bilateral in nature (between HMT and each line department), limiting discourse and coordination between departments. Moreover, the reality of these negotiations is that they often occurred directly between individual Secretaries of State and the Prime Minister or Chancellor of the Exchequer (Allen, 2014).

**Cabinet Office:**

The Cabinet Office had one overarching aim during the time period of this case study: to make government work better (CO, 2004; CO, 2009; CO, 2011). A variety of strategic objectives in pursuit of this aim were established for each spending period; however, the three primary functions of the Cabinet Office were consistent from 2002 to 2012: supporting the Prime Minister, supporting the Cabinet and strengthening the civil service (CO, 2006). Its mandate to support and advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet reflected the CO’s responsibilities for coordinating policy and operations across

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48 Strategic Objectives for the Cabinet Office in 2006 included: “Build an effective UK intelligence community in support of UK national interests; and the capabilities to deal with disruptive challenges to the UK; Support the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in domestic, European, overseas and defence policy-making; Improve outcomes for most excluded people in society; Enable a thriving third sector; Transform public services so that they better meet the individual needs of the citizen and business; Build the capacity and capability of the Civil Service to deliver the Government’s objectives; and promote the highest standards of propriety, integrity and governance in public life” (CO, 2006, p. 10)
government. Its capacity for policy coordination sat with a collection of secretariats each
of which had a role in “bringing people together, communicating the Prime Minister’s
views, brokering agreement on difficult issues, and preparing policy proposals for
Ministers to consider and decide on (Cabinet Office, 2008a, p. 17). Leadership of the
Cabinet Office sits with the Prime Minister and a small team of Ministers and
Parliamentary Secretaries. Like other UK departments, the CO had a management board
comprising senior civil servants from the CO and led by the Cabinet Secretary. The
Cabinet Secretary was the most senior civil servant in the UK and, as such, was also the
Head of the Home Civil Service.

The CO’s role in the UK experience with cross-departmental coordination
concerning issues related to stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian emergencies
was two-fold. First, while the CO held responsibility for policy coordination across the
breadth of government, it had specific responsibilities related to the coordination of
strategy and activities related to national security (CO, 2003; CO, 2008; NAO, 2014).
The CO’s Defence and Overseas Secretariat (DOS) (renamed the Foreign and Defence
Policy Secretariat in 2008) supported Cabinet’s National Security and International
Development Committee (NSIDC). In this role the DOS/FDPS worked to:

...ensure that the UK has a proactive, co-ordinated and effective role in
international affairs; contribute to developing effective policies to protect
and promote the UK’s interests; and to contribute to ensuring the
Government can deal effectively with crises, including those that threaten
its continuity. The Secretariat achieves this through high quality, highly
flexible and responsive analysis, strategic policymaking and critical
challenge for the Prime Minister and improved policy and decision
making on key cross-cutting policy issues, through effective co-ordination
and collaboration with Departments and other units within the centre.
(CO, 2007, p. 10).

The extent to which the CO’s coordination function should be a decree from on
high as opposed to building consensus amongst key departments was not easily
reconciled. Because of its responsibilities for coordinating policy in such a way that the
priorities of the Prime Minister and Cabinet are advanced, the political power wielded by
the CO as the voice of the Prime Minister, the delegation of authority to powerful Cabinet
ministers and the high-profile nature of modern security threats and issues, it would be
understandable that CO staff might interact with staff from other departments in a top-down or authoritarian manner. However, this approach is somewhat counter to both the primacy placed on ministerial accountability and cabinet government within a Westminster system and the autonomy granted to UK line departments through other centralized processes such as the aforementioned budget process. Assessments of the CO’s involvement in cross-departmental initiatives related to the UK’s response to conflict and instability revealed that in most circumstances the central agency was reluctant or unable to take a position that would provide firm direction to the powerful line departments and their Secretaries of State (Patrick & Brown, 2007; Teuten & Korski, 2010). It was observed that in the early years of the CPPs and the PCRU, the UK’s WoG approach to fragile states lacked “a strong, central coordinating entity with directive authority over the individual departments. The Cabinet Office, despite its placement at the heart of government, is generally incapable of pushing departments toward the pursuit of common strategic goals” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 16).

However, as the political landscape began to change towards the end of the decade and the era of the National Security Council drew near, the CO’s leadership and direct involvement in national security became more pronounced. 2007 marked the election of a new Prime Minister in Gordon Brown and a new comprehensive spending review. The profile of national security issues was heightened by costly military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2005 terrorist bombings in the London Underground. In March of 2008 the CO published a National Security Strategy: *Security in an interdependent world*, demonstrating the increasing role of the CO in national security issues. In response to the strategy and in alignment with newly stated departmental strategic objectives, the CO created the National Security Secretariat (NSSec) and worked to secure “Ministerial agreement to a Strategic Framework for conflict and cross-Whitehall agreement to Conflict funding arrangements for 2009/2010” (CO, 2009a, p. 58). The new secretariat advised and supported the Prime Minister and worked across government to manage “the Government’s response to crises and monitor… performance against the National Security Strategy. The Secretariat operates and coordinates central government’s crisis management facility (COBR) and manages central government’s response to emergencies. (Cabinet Office, 2009a, p. 10). Other
relevant priorities for the CO at this juncture included coordinating the UK response to piracy off the Horn of Africa and the drawdown of UK military forces in Iraq (CO, 2009a). The CO was a named delivery partner for PSA 26 (international terrorism) and PSA 30 (global conflict) established in 2007, thereby establishing performance expectations that the CO would work alongside MOD, FCO, DFID, Home Office and others on these cross-cutting targets. These examples provide a small sense of the level of interaction that would have existed between CO staff and staff at DFID, MOD and FCO and present the CO as an actor with growing influence in the national security discourse.

The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2010 was one of the first acts of the new Coalition government. The NSC, which still exists today, is a cabinet committee of senior ministers chaired by the Prime Minister and supported by the Cabinet Office’s NSSec which, at its inception, included 200 staff working across six directorates (Devanny & Harris, 2014). A National Security Advisor was appointed to advise the Prime Minister and manage NSSec with the support of two Deputy NSAs. The NSC was created to ensure “strong cross-government leadership and coordination on all security issues” (CO, 2011b, p. 7). The NSC and the NSSec were guardians and champions of the priorities laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the accompanying Security and Defence Strategic Review (SDSR), both of which were published by the UK government in 2010. The strategic documents meant that a single, shared understanding of the UK’s national security priorities was now clearly established; there was a high-level roadmap that made it clear what policies, programs and services required cross-departmental coherence and alignment. Creating the institutional bodies within the Cabinet Office and clearly associating the two strategies directly with the political will of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister provided greater levers of influence for the CO to undertake its coordinating function. With MOD, FCO, DFID, the Conflict Pool and the SU established as vehicles through which various aspects of both strategies would be advanced or achieved, the connections between the CO and the line departments were now very clear. Admittedly, the WoG space related to the UK’s stabilization efforts now included numerous actors playing different roles. Whether the formal role for the CO translated to more effective WoG efforts is not clear.
In addition to the CO’s role in coordinating aspects of UK national security policy and the impact of this on the SU and its WoG partners, other functions of the CO made the central agency relevant to the design and implementation of cross-departmental initiatives. The CO’s objective for strengthening the UK civil service and therein improve Government performance, was related to its central function in human resource management. The centralization of human resource leadership sat within the CO’s Civil Service Capability Group (CSCG). “The case for central leadership revolves around the need to recruit, retain and develop a talented group of senior civil servants with a common framework for skills, performance management and ethics, and to retain some control over the pay bill” (Parker et al., 2010, p. 31). In 2004 the CO launched the Professional Skills for Government (PSG) program. PSG was considered a “major, long-term change programme designed to ensure that civil servants, wherever they work, have the right mix of skills and expertise to enable their departments or agencies to deliver effective services … the aim is to professionalise the business of government” (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, p. 15). The CO was also responsible for programs that enhanced departmental performance and capability. After eight years of the modernization agenda and its focus on efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, in 2006 the CO launched the Capability Review program to help the UK government gain a better understanding of departmental strengths and weaknesses. Each department underwent a Capability Review to establish a benchmark for performance, received feedback from the CO’s Capability Review Teams, indicated where and how they would make improvements and then underwent a follow-up review two years later. Examined collectively the Capability Reviews revealed that three main improvements were necessary: “reshaping the Civil Service; introducing new approaches to performance management and benchmarking; and increasing skills and innovation at the heart of government” (UK, 2009, p. 48). The Capability Reviews were replaced by Departmental Improvement Plans in 2012.

With government-wide programs like the PSG or the Capability Reviews, the CO could be considered an important institutional enabler of WoG. Such programs could be powerful tools through which a suite of skills or capabilities associated with WoG could be institutionalized into training programs, performance evaluation frameworks or
recruitment strategies. However, the work of the CSCG was impugned by the reality that “below the level of the Senior Civil Service (less than 1% of all civil servants), responsibility for recruitment, staff development, pay and grading is delegated almost entirely to individual departments (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, p. 9).

Decentralisation means that levels of pay for the same job can vary widely across departments. This can make machinery of government changes complicated and potentially very expensive, as newly created departments inherit staff doing similar jobs on different rates, and generally have to level pay upwards. Differing pay scales and performance schemes can also hamper collaboration, because employees of particular departments may be reluctant to transfer to a different department or joint unit to work on cross-cutting projects. Finally, departments often duplicate effort to develop their own recruitment and pay policies, leading to inefficiencies (Parker, Paun, McClory, & Blatchford, 2010, p. 31).

The Conflict Pool

The Conflict Pool (CP) was an important instrument for the UK’s cross-departmental approach to conflict prevention, conflict management and stabilization. The origins of the CP rest in the 2001 creation of two conflict prevention pools – the previously referenced GCPP and the ACPP. The term ‘pool’ refers to financial resources that are ear-marked, or in UK vernacular ring-fenced, for programs or activities that advance UK priorities in a specific policy domain. Pooled funds are often described as such because they reflect a distribution of money that sits outside traditional spending mechanisms: departmental budget allocations. Sometimes these pools of funds represent a commitment by the centre of government to supplement funding in a policy area without increasing budget allocations to line departments. Conversely, pooled funds can exist as a pot of money into which multiple departments contribute funds from their established budget allocation. In either case the pooled funding model was recognized by the UK government as a powerful institutional lever for encouraging cross-departmental coordination (HM Government, 1999). They implicitly acknowledge the role of multiple actors around a given policy domain and establish fund governance and reporting structures that reflect shared accountability. To this point, the GCPP and ACPP were jointly managed by FCO, DFID and MOD and possessed a ‘tri-departmental key’,
meaning that funds could only be spent with the approval of all three parent departments thereby incentivizing communication, information sharing and coordination on programming initiatives related to conflict prevention.

The relevance of the CP and its predecessors to the case study is that they both emerged from the same institutional commitment for joined-up government and enhanced capacity for the government in its approaches to fragile states. The creation of the original Pools in 2001 was an indication that some level of thinking and reflection around the design and implementation of a tri-departmental model between FCO, DFID and MOD had taken place prior to the birth of the SU in 2004. Additionally, there were more publicly available reviews, audits and assessments of the CP than the SU. The evolution of the CP emphasizes the extent to which the three parent departments were formalizing their cross-departmental relationships, a point that is relevant to the design and function of the SU. This overview of the evolution of the CP model throughout the 2002–2012 window highlights key operational features of the tri-departmental design and impressions of how effective they were in fostering an enhanced level of coordination and coherence across parent departments.


Created alongside several other pooled funding initiatives associated with the UK’s modernization agenda, the ACPP was focused on programming in sub-Saharan Africa while the GCPP supported conflict prevention efforts in other parts of the world. The creation of two pools early on was intended to ensure conflict prevention activities undertaken in support of the UK’s poverty reduction priorities in sub-Saharan Africa were protected from priorities emerging in other regions of the globe. The origins of both pools can be found in two cross-cutting reviews, completed as part of the 2000 Spending Review, which recommended building on levels of coordination already occurring between DFID, FCO and MOD in order to increase their collective capacity in the realm of conflict prevention (Austin et al., 2004). It is worth noting that both reviews were produced prior to the events of September 11, 2001. As such, their recommendations were framed through the perspective of the escalating costs of peacekeeping and peace support operations that characterized the 1990s and not the dynamics of the War on Terror that would shape the security and development landscape starting in late 2001.
The pools were designed to be an organizational model that fostered more effective conflict-prevention efforts based on the underlying premise that successful conflict prevention was less costly on numerous fronts than the investment required for engaging in full-scale conflict (Austin et al., 2004). While it was widely recognized that coordination amongst the three departments had occurred successfully prior to 2001, the Pools were designed to achieve a deeper level of coordination that would occur systematically at various decision-making points within the security and development structures from London to field offices, embassies and networks in fragile states (ACPP, 2004).

The source of funding for the Pools evolved during the first few years of their existence. Initially, each parent department would make a contribution to the Pools and these funds were “supplemented by Treasury to give an annual budget that is shared between the departments for programming activities” (ACPP, 2004, p. 25). In this context, the Pools did not necessarily indicate a new investment of government funds in conflict prevention activities, but instead were novel because of their status as a shared or jointly governed fund. Situating financial resources under one umbrella (“pooling resources”) with the understanding that in order to allocate any portion of the funds all three parent departments needed to be in agreement was thought to be an incentive for enhanced communication and coordination between departments (Teuten & Korski, 2010). Ideally the Pools were mechanisms that strove to foster a better understanding of interests and priorities in the conflict prevention space and prevent scenarios in which the departments worked at cross-purposes or duplicated efforts. By 2003 the funding model had changed so that each Pool would engage in the annual budget process alongside parent departments (FCO, 2003b; NAO, 2012b). Departmental contributions were no longer required. Instead, each pool would make a case to HMT for a budget allocation outside of the allocation being requested by its parent departments and then engage in negotiations with HMT to determine the final allocation. The financial resources within the Pools were still jointly managed but no longer required parent departments to allocate funds from their own budgets. While the funding commitments no longer needed to come directly from the parent departments, the terms of the funding indicated that neither GCPP nor ACPP could allocate any funds for administrative purposes, with the day-to-
day work of the Pools undertaken by departmental staff. As such, there were no GCPP or ACPP staff, so to speak. Staff involved with the steering committees or country program teams were employees of the various parent departments. Individual contributions or responsibilities to the Pools and their programs were in addition to regular departmental responsibilities and duties.

A feature of the Pools that added to the complexity of how they were managed was that within each pool financial resources were allocated for two operational purposes: conflict prevention programming and peacekeeping or peace support operations. Funds dedicated to peacekeeping were not intended to cover the costs of UK military deployed to conflict zones. Instead, they reflected the UK’s obligation to multinational organizations, such as the United Nations, that were deploying personnel and resources to various conflict and crisis zones. Prior to 2001 these costs were paid for directly by HMT (FCO, 2003b). The thought behind the co-location of the peacekeeping and conflict prevention funds was to acknowledge the policy and operational connections between the two and pursue a line of thinking that combining the funds represented good value for the financial resources being spent. This ‘spend to save’ logic argued that if conflict prevention activities accomplished their stated aims then the need for peacekeeping funds would be reduced, resulting in significant savings (Austin, Brusset, Chalmers, & Pierce, 2004). Essentially each Pool earmarked funds for three purposes: assessed peacekeeping (the UK’s obligatory contribution to the peacekeeping budgets of organizations such as the UN or the OSCE), non-assessed peacekeeping (voluntary contributions) and conflict prevention activities (FCO, 2003b). If peacekeeping costs exceeded their allocated portions of the Pool, the conflict prevention funds would be the first source tapped to cover additional peacekeeping/peace support costs (NAO, 2012b). The balance remaining in the Pools after all peacekeeping costs had been covered would then be available for conflict prevention programming. Given the enormous pressures placed on the UN’s peacekeeping and peace support mechanisms as a result of conflict and instability in fragile states, the peacekeeping funds in the Pools were quickly depleted, leaving the conflict prevention funds vulnerable. From the perspective of fund

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49 ACPP administration was completed by the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit in DFID; GCPP administration was completed by FCO’s Conflict Prevention Unit.
administration, program efficacy and long term planning, the utility of the Pools for conflict prevention – let alone the grander plan of investing in conflict prevention in order to reduce peacekeeping costs – was limited (ICAI, 2012).

Officials from across the three departments told us that budget volatility undermines planning and increases the management burden. When combined with cumbersome management processes, it creates disincentives for staff from the three departments to engage seriously with the Conflict Pool. (ICAI, 2012, p. 12-13).

In addition to the split between program and peacekeeping funds, another feature of the Pools was their ability to combine ODA and non-ODA expenditures, providing them with more flexibility than was typical of departmental funding at the time. They were designed to facilitate engagement in a wide range of security sector reform initiatives, which tended to blur the lines between formal development assistance and counter-terrorism efforts that would not necessarily be considered ODA-eligible. The challenge for the pools, however, was that peacekeeping costs were considered non-ODA. As peacekeeping costs rose, the non-ODA funding in the pool for conflict prevention programs decreased to a nominal level. As a result, reforms to the terms of reference that guided the Pools evolved in an effort to identify an optimal balance between ODA and non-ODA funds (ICAI, 2012).

From an organizational design perspective, the Pools demonstrated tri-departmental representation at various decision-making points throughout their structures. However, in line with the principle of ministerial accountability a lead department was assigned for each pool. DFID was lead for the ACPP and FCO was lead for the GCPP (GCPP, 2003). Joint priority setting at the Ministerial level for both the ACPP and GCPP was achieved through the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention which approved “all spending in gross amounts, and bears responsibility for the appropriate use of the funds against the PSA objectives” (Austin et al., 2004, p. 55). The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of International Development would take turns chairing the sub-committee depending on whether the discussion pertained to GCPP matters or ACPP matters. Cross-departmental collaboration below the Ministerial level was facilitated by
meetings of Interdepartmental Steering Groups\textsuperscript{50} (ACPP, 2004), which were a key design feature of their cross-departmental remit. In addition to the involvement of the three parent departments, the governance of both Pools involved central agencies. The movement of information between the sub-committee and each Pool was coordinated by the Cabinet Office secretariat that supported the Defence and Overseas Policy Cabinet Committee (DOP). HMT officials sat on the Steering Groups of both Pools and “consistently pressed for greater accountability and greater adherence to strategic objectives of the (Pools)” (Austin et al., 2004, p. 60).

In 2004 both Pools underwent an extensive evaluation that included an assessment of their effect on preventing new conflicts/containing existing ones, international arrangements, inter-departmental processes and whether they were, in fact, achieving value for money. The summary finding of the report stated:

\begin{quote}
Officials interviewed shared an almost unanimous view that the CPPs have promoted significantly better interaction and cooperation between the Departments concerned, especially in London. According to several officials, the expanded availability of pooled funds has acted as an incentive for cooperation. (However) Without an agreed analytical framework officials have been denied a coherent and consistent method for determining in-country priorities for conflict prevention. This factor may be creating otherwise avoidable tensions between Departments (Austin et al., 2004, p. 8).
\end{quote}

In addition to challenges related to mainstreaming a common analytical framework for understanding conflict, a persistent issue perceived to limit the efficacy of the Pools was the lack of a coherent, over-arching strategy that would establish a shared understanding of the UK’s approach to conflict prevention and that would inform the work of both the Pools and programs undertaken separately by FCO, MOD and DFID (Fitz-Gerald, 2008; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Teuten & Korski, 2010). The PSA target in conflict prevention could be perceived as such an effort on the part of the UK.

\textsuperscript{50} An interesting historical point is that “Ministers had originally agreed that the Steering Groups of officials for both CPPs should be chaired by a Cabinet Office official, although it was subsequently agreed that Cabinet Office would delegate day to day management responsibility to a lead department” (Austin, Brusset, Chalmers, & Pierce, 2004, pp. 55-56).
government to articulate an overarching priority; however, it was deemed to be too broad and too easily open to interpretation to be effective (Fitz-Gerald, 2008). The consequences of minimal strategic direction made it easy for parent departments to approach the Pools solely as a resource that might contribute to their respective interests as long as those interests overlapped in the conflict prevention sphere instead of parent departments understanding themselves to be tasked with the responsibility of advancing a single, coherent mandate in conflict prevention. The pools were, therefore, susceptible to ‘raiding’ from parent departments, especially FCO and MOD, who were under substantial pressures as a result of UK activities in Afghanistan and Iraq (Patrick & Brown, 2007). In the face of urgent needs emerging from conflict zones deemed to be national interests, the GCPP especially was hard-pressed to preserve funds specifically for conflict prevention activities given the pressures on the peacekeeping portion of the fund.

2008–2012: CPP Reforms
The two-pool model persisted until 2007 when a new government, a comprehensive spending review and a new set of PSA targets resulted in restructuring of the Pools. The first major change was that the ACPP and GCPP were merged into a single Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) in an effort to reduce bureaucracy and increase effectiveness. The second change was the creation of a new tri-departmental fund held by MOD valued at £269 million (Cabinet Office, 2008b). The Stabilisation Aid Fund was designed to “fund civil conflict stabilisation activities in volatile or hostile areas where the security situation does not yet permit the roll-out of programmes that the Pools have traditionally funded” (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 129). In Afghanistan and Iraq, where operations and programs were implemented in an area still characterized by instability and violence, the previous system was limited by its conflict prevention mandate. Dividing up the conflict prevention pot and the stabilization pot of money was an effort to prevent the country’s missions in Afghanistan and Iraq from absorbing all of the CPP funds. This new CPP model did not last through its expected tenure. Financial pressures stemming from the fluctuation in value of British currency and increases in assessed contributions to peacekeeping operations resulted in the SAF merging with the CPP in 2009 to yield the Conflict Pool (CP) (Teuten & Korski, 2010, p. 50).
The Conflict Pool seeks to reduce the impact of conflict and instability around the world. The UK is committed to preventing, managing and resolving conflict, and building peace and stability in the priority regions where the risk and impact of conflict is greatest (Conflict Pool, 2010, p. 1).

From 2009 to 2012 the CP was part of a much larger reform exercise being undertaken by the Coalition government (elected in 2010) to consolidate and strengthen the UK’s national security architecture. The creation of the National Security Council represented another step in the UK’s effort at joined-up government in the domain of security and development as the cross-Whitehall NSC became an umbrella under which several already-established cross-departmental initiatives such as the CP and SU would sit. While it maintained its tri-departmental ownership model, the CP was recognized as an organizational tool through which the implementation of the National Security Strategy, the Security and Defence Review Strategy and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy could be supported. As part of its review of UK capability, the SDSR increased the size of the Conflict Pool, expanded the responsibilities of the SU and announced the creation of Stabilisation Response Teams that would be composed of experts from across government and be capable of rapid deployment (HM Government, 2010). Moreover, structural reforms were instituted to link the CP directly to a tri-departmental board tasked with implementing all elements of the BSOS (ICAI, 2012). This BSO Board comprised Conflict Directors from FCO, MOD and DFID and provided an overarching strategic direction to the CP and its parent departments that had been missing with the CPPs (NAO, 2012b). In comparison to previous governance committees within the two-pool model, the BSO Board included a chair position that rotated between the three parent departments (Conflict Pool, 2013). While consensus-based decisions were made by FCO, DFID and MOD members, the BSO Board also included staff from the Cabinet Office and the SU (Conflict Pool, 2013).
Beyond the BSO Board, the CP possessed an elaborate structure (see Figure 17) that included a secretariat tasked to support the BSO Board, five program boards, a program manager for each board and in-country teams. The program boards held management responsibility for their respective geographic regions – Africa, Afghanistan, South Asia, Middle East/North Africa and Wider Europe – and included a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) each of whom ensured the perspectives, expertise and interests of each parent department were incorporated into program management decisions (ICAI, 2012). While day-to-day operations of CP programs and initiatives were undertaken by in-country teams, the accountability for delivery of the results sat with the SROs. The SROs were high-ranking individuals from their respective departments and their work with the CP represented only a small portion of their duties (ICAI, 2012). As such, each board was supported by a program manager who held administrative responsibilities and was a conduit for information between program boards and in-country teams. Aside from the individual role of the program manager, all of the other elements of the CP had tri-departmental representation. On paper the structure of the Conflict Pool appeared to advance its tri-departmental mandate at the strategic, management and operational levels, therein achieving, or at least pursuing, an enviable level of joint communication and coordination.
The Conflict Pool is at its best when it acts as a venture capital fund for peacebuilding activities. Its strengths are its willingness to act quickly and flexibly in complex and dynamic environments and its ability to identify and nurture promising conflict prevention initiatives. (ICIA, 2012, 10)

However, below the surface certain aspects of the CP structure were compounded by the realities of the broader organizational environment and presented certain barriers to the joined-up efforts of CP staff. First, it was observed that the elaborate CP structure generated too many points at which tri-departmental consensus was required to achieve approval (NAO, 2013) and, as a result, involved decision-making processes and related fund administration that tended to be “slow and painstaking” (ICAI, 2012, p. 5). As a result, over time the three parent departments demonstrated changing levels of enthusiasm for pursuing CP funds for programming purposes. In the case of FCO, a line department that did not traditionally have a large programming mandate, the CP funds were a unique source of available funds and the time spent on securing spending approvals was worthwhile. In contrast, DFID was well resourced in its own right and the amounts of money available for programming by the Conflict Pool was minimal in comparison to its own budget allocation. The outcome of these relationships between parent departments and the CP were that FCO deployed the majority of Conflict Pool resources with DFID spending little to none of Pool funding in a year (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013; ICAI, 2012). MOD was likely in a similar situation to DFID as the budget allocation for the British defence system vastly exceeded the nominal funds held within the CP. While such a scenario was not an indication that DFID or MOD did not play its appointed role in CP governance or that the CP was not serving its purpose as a forum for cross-departmental coordination, it does suggest that when coordination is challenging it is fairly easy for certain departments to retreat to their departmental resources and advance conflict prevention programs in a way they see fit without the consensus-building imperative of the CP.

Early on in the BSOS era the CP was able to develop institutional capacity in a number of areas that had been perceived as problematic during the early years of the Pools. Protecting (or ring-fencing) a portion of the total funds in the pool for the purpose of addressing unforeseen developments related to conflict and instability led to the
establishment within the CP of an Early Action Facility (EAF) (DFID, FCO & MOD, 2011). Additionally, in 2012 a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework was established as a long-awaited approach to supporting the efforts to produce a shared understanding of a given conflict or zone of instability by integrating the expertise and analytical approaches of different departments (Stabilisation Unit, 2014).

To summarize the discussion thus far, it is worth clarifying the relationship between the CP and the SU. As has been noted, the two initiatives existed as separate exercises in cross-departmental coordination related to the consequences of violent conflict experienced predominantly by fragile states. Earlier on in their existence one could look at the two units as being focused on different parts of the conflict cycle with the CP as the vehicle with which the government tackled conflict prevention and the PCRU/SU as a vehicle with which the UK advanced stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. As the CP evolved and its mandate expanded to include other dimensions of conflict, the operational focus of the two entities became less distinct. In the era of the NSC the CP and the SU are more closely connected (see Figures 18 & 19). A representative from the SU sits on the BSO Board and CP funds provide the operational funding for the SU (ICAI, 2012; Conflict Pool, 2013).
Figure 18: Governance model of the conflict pool in the BSOS era

Figure 19: Division of conflict pool finances in the BSOS era

(Conflict Pool, 2013, p. 13)
The Conflict Pool was replaced in April 2015 with the £1 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). Governed by the NSC and still jointly “owned” by FCO, MOD and DFID, the CSSF built on the work of the Conflict Pool and continued to support the implementation of the BSOS, NSS and SDSR.

**The Stabilization Unit (SU)**

This section of the case study explores the implementation and evolution of the SU and examines several of the most pronounced challenges facing the unit in its effort to advance a cross-departmental mandate. Sources for this part of the case analysis originated from both peer-reviewed and grey literature. Where possible, the two are interwoven; however, it should be noted that similar to the Canadian case, the academic research was not as extensive or comprehensive as one might hope. The most notable sources offered by the academic community include Patrick and Brown’s 2007 book, *Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing “Whole-of-Government” Approaches to Fragile States*, which devoted a chapter to examining the early years of both the CPPs and the PCRU. An even more in-depth look at the SU was provided in Volume 74 of the Whitehall Papers (2010), *Preparing for Peace*. Over eight chapters, authors Richard Teuten and Daniel Korski provided a systematic exploration of Britain’s capacity for stabilizing fragile states. The analysis leveraged the extensive experiences of the authors and interviews with 50 civil servants, military officers and academics familiar with the UK’s stabilization. In so doing, they unpack a breadth of challenges facing the UK in this sphere and offer recommendations for enhancing its stabilization capacity at the strategic and operational levels. In various publications reference is made to internal reviews of the SU conducted in 2008 (Teuten & Korski, 2010) and again in 2012 (Conflict Pool, 2013). These reviews have not been made publicly available – unusual given the ease with which one can access reviews of other departments, including two substantial reviews of the Conflict Pool. The SU itself published a series of documents that demonstrate the lengths to which the unit went to inform the stabilization discourse.

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51 Richard Teuten was the head of the Stabilisation Unit from 2006–2010. Daniel Korski’s past experiences included being Deputy Head of the PCRU and head of the PRT team in Basra, Iraq (2007). At the time of *Preparing for Peace*’s publication he was working for DFID on the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
and establish themselves as a relevant actor that could strengthen the UK’s stabilization efforts.

The predecessor of the SU, the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), was created in the summer of 2004 and very much followed the model of joint-ownership between FCO, MOD and DFID established with the aforementioned conflict prevention pools. At this juncture, the UK government was heavily invested in Iraq and on the cusp of another, more intensive mission in Afghanistan. Both operational theatres encapsulated all of the volatility and complexity associated with engagement in fragile states. Moreover, both post-conflict zones would become poster children for the contemporary emphasis on stabilization as a new stage in the peace and conflict cycle. Developing policy, planning operations and implementing programs and activities on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan involved a vast network of interconnected issues and actors related to humanitarian emergencies, active hostilities, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, statebuilding, reconstruction, peacebuilding and longer-term development. These fluid and high-risk environments required timely and flexible responses from both military and civilian actors. However, some degree of stability and a modicum of guaranteed security was necessary if civilian actors were to be able to contribute in a meaningful manner. In an effort to enhance the UK’s capacity for stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction in such environments, the PCRU was created. The Unit did not have dedicated funds for programming nor did its mandate provide a policy or operational realm in which the Unit could act independently. For the Unit to be active in country it had to be invited by one of its parent departments which, in order to so, would have to recognize a need for the skills, capacity and availability of Unit staff. Examples of this engagement in the early years included managing a strategic communications campaign in support of the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan (SU, 2007c) and the provision of advisors, equipment and integrated planning capacity to the PRT in Afghanistan’s Helmand province (SU, 2007d).

The Unit was overseen by the Stabilisation Unit Board which comprised Directors from each of the parent departments and the Cabinet Office (SU, 2009). The Board answered to the same governing body that looked after the CP, the Conflict Prevention
and Reconstruction Sub-Committee\textsuperscript{52} of the Defence and Overseas Cabinet Committee. In this sense, at the highest levels the accountability for the effective operation of the both the SU and the CP sat with the Cabinet sub-committee (Cabinet Office, 2007). Beyond structure, the Unit’s staff complement also reflected its cross-departmental identity. The core staff was relatively small in its early years, numbering 28 in 2006 (PCRU, 2006a). Staff numbers would double in size around 2009 at which point core staff “comprised twenty-five personnel from DFID, fifteen MoD civil servants, four military officers, eleven personnel from the Foreign Office, three serving police officers, five from other departments and four from outside the UK public sector” (Teuten & Korski, 2010, p. 96). The hope was that such a design and its staff composition would build formal conduits and mechanisms for communication and coordination and limit concerns often associated with a lead department model in which one or more partners would feel subordinate to the primary department.

At the time of its creation, early expectations were that the Unit would “lead UK engagement in crisis countries, including not only defining the strategy but also running the operations” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 28). For a variety of reasons still to be discussed, the idea that the Unit would facilitate a WoG approach by coordinating the activities or operations of its three, powerful parent departments was never realized. Instead, the scope of its mandate was reduced and focused on three primary activities that would position the SU as a hub of necessary expertise that could be mobilized in support of work being undertaken by its parent departments. The three primary activities involved providing “integrated and common assessments and plans to determine essential stabilisation needs and priorities; operational capability to deploy staff at short notice for a time limited period to a country identified for stabilisation support; and evaluation of key stabilisation lesson learning” (PCRU, 2006b, para 3). When examined through the lens of these stated goals, the SU has made some important contributions to the UK’s stabilization capacity.

\textsuperscript{52} Core membership of the DOP-CPR included the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for International Development, Secretary of State for Defence and Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
The SU took its role in capturing and sharing lessons learned related to stabilization seriously and began to develop and make public a series of reports and fact sheets\(^{53}\) that framed the stabilization discourse. These resources worked to advance a common understanding of stabilization and how it was different from other activities in conflict zones (SU, 2007b). The Unit communicated consistently the “3P’s” of stabilization: protect civilians and institutions, prevent recurrence of violent conflict and prepare for longer-term inclusive political processes and sustainable development (SU, 2007a). As a demonstration of a shared understanding of stabilization as a necessary element of working in fragile states, the SU’s language began to appear in publications from parent departments: in DFID’s *Building Peaceful States and Societies* report (2010) and MOD’s joint doctrine publication, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (2009).

SU guidance notes were published in 2008 and captured emerging best practices related to the UK’s approach to stabilization. The guidance notes do not reflect on the efficacy of the SU itself (in other words the SU was not the embodiment of the UK approach to stabilization). Instead the report captured best practices distilled from an approach that was distinctly and deliberately cross-departmental in nature and heavily informed by context. The guidance notes included a matrix of activities that would be required in country to achieve levels of stabilization sufficient for peacebuilding and longer term development activities to commence. In addition to over 100 stabilization activities the matrix also suggested “who would need to take lead responsibility for the different tasks in ‘non-permissive’ and ‘permissive’ environments between Military (M), Police (P) and Civilians (C)” and identified “the “skill sets” required to complete the various tasks specified” (SU, 2008, p. 68). Core skills for stabilization advisors and specialists included: situation analysis, strategy and policy formulation, organizational analysis, donor liaison and joint program planning, project management and understanding Whitehall processes (SU, 2008). Even as early as 2008 the SU was demonstrating a commitment to informing and advancing a collective knowledge base far

\(^{53}\) All produced by the PCRU/SU: *UK Concept of Stabilisation* (2007); *Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)* (2008); *The UK Approach to Stabilisation* (2008); *Planning for Stabilisation: Structures and Processes* (2009); *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments. Lessons identified by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit* (2010).
greater than similar efforts being undertaken by other OECD countries invested in Stabilisation. A second lessons learned publication entitled *Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments* was published by the SU in 2010. The document demonstrated a more mature perspective on capturing and applying lessons learned in a manner that acknowledges that not every lesson can be readily applied from one context to another. Other insights included:

*there is no such thing as an apolitical engagement in a conflict environment* (p. 7).

*When asked to work together government departments generally look to liaise or coordinate, to retain their own teams whilst negotiating with other departments. Experience from the field has shown that in the complex, fast moving and highly pressurised environment of conflict this does not work. The transactional costs are too high* (p. 9).

*Integration is primarily driven by the process of people from different institutions and different disciplines working side by side at several levels to ensure that their perspectives and activities reinforce each other. Integration requires low-level cooperation and mid-level coordination, supplemented by high-level alignment of overall strategic objective”* (p. 9).

*Stabilisation activities do not readily lend themselves to linear planning, or to conventional monitoring and evaluation based on a straightforward causal logic between inputs, outputs, and anticipated outcomes. A more flexible and adaptive approach is required* (p. 13).

*It is important to ensure that the best people with the required skills and abilities are included in the capability from the outset. Once the initial capability is established, entry requirements can be further raised so that subsequent people incorporated into the capability serve to improve the overall quality.* (SU, 2010, p. 17)

The second major accomplishment of the SU has been its role in increasing the number of civilian staff available for deployment to stabilisation zones worldwide. The Civil Stabilisation Group (CSG) represented a deployable force in possession of a diverse set of technical skill sets (from engineers to governance experts), quickly mobilized, capable of effectively navigating the civil-military dynamics of stabilization efforts and sufficiently trained to work in hostile environments. Enhancing this capacity was no small undertaking. The CSG included civilian experts from outside government and the
Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre, a pool of civil servants working across government who could be deployed with agreement from their home department. The SU worked towards capability targets that involved developing a pool of deployable staff that was deep enough so that the UK could deploy up to 200 civilians and 150 civilian police at one time (Teuten & Korski, 2010). The deployment model reflected ‘standby’ capability as opposed to ‘standing’ capability. In the case of the former, individuals would be paid only when deployed as opposed to the latter where payment is issued regardless of whether someone deploys or not (SU, 2010). By 2010, the CSG included 1,000 members, each of whom would have completed some degree of training. The SU held some responsibilities for delivering training to CSG members, most notably core training related to stabilization, civil-military coordination and working in hostile environments. The SU’s focus on civilian deployment meant that it developed an expertise that paired knowledge and understanding about the stabilization environment with insight into the various people, personabilities and skills that are able to thrive in that environment. This knowledge is incorporated into its recruitment and training programs for the CSG but also into its responsibilities for capturing and disseminating lessons learned.

Despite these important contributions and the fact that all three parent departments expressed enthusiasm for the SU as a dedicated resource to the stabilization sphere, as an instrument for advancing some of their own priorities, and as a valuable experiment in cross-departmental collaboration (DFID, 2005a; DFID, 2006a; DFID, 2007a; DFID, 2008a; MOD, 2005; MOD, 2006; MOD, 2007; MOD, 2009a; FCO, 2007) it has been widely acknowledged that the SU struggled to identify an organizational purpose and function that were acceptable to its parent departments and to wield sufficient institutional and political influence so as to inform the stabilization discourse happening at various levels of government. The challenges facing the Unit appeared to be related in large part to where it was situated within the government structure. Unlike the lead department model, embodied by START, the SU was placed at arm’s length of all three departments that were most dominant in and relevant to the realm of international conflict and stability. Establishing it outside all three departments but placing it under a tri-departmental key formalized the model of joint, multi-departmental ownership. For many, especially those looking from outside of the UK, this was an optimal design.
Lacroix, 2009; Hrychuk, 2009), a deliberate commitment to ‘whole-of-government and one that had already been practiced with the Conflict Pool. However, the reality of the SU’s relative independence from a single line department was problematic in three interrelated ways.

First, political and bureaucratic power in the Westminster system sit with departments and their ministers. While the hope with the PCRU model may have been that it would benefit from the power of all three departments, the reality was that it had no locus of power – no one was championing it at the highest levels (Teuten & Korski, 2010). Its separation from the line departments was just that – separation from funds, formal authorities and the key decision-making tables. Interestingly, the original intent for the unit was that it be hosted by the Cabinet Office; however, the CO rejected that scenario (Patrick & Brown, 2007) and, instead, the Unit was established under the joint ownership of three departments. Second, while there was no denying the that SU was jointly owned by three parents, for many years DFID had a slightly greater role in the accountability framework than the other parent departments. The head of the SU was a DFID Director, the DFID permanent secretary was responsible for staffing and financial issues (PCRU, 2006a), the offices for the SU were in DFID’s London headquarters and, until 2009, the £10 million budget for the PCRU was provided by DFID (Teuten & Korski, 2010). While the literature does not flag DFID’s heightened role as a barrier to the work of the PCRU/SU it is reasonable to think that for some the initiative must have been more closely associated with the DFID brand than with the other parent departments.

Finally, as has been established in previous sections of this chapter, there was no lack of conflict expertise within the three parent departments. FCO’s Conflict Group, DFID’s CHASE and essentially all of MOD were already dominant actors. MOD had a long-standing Joint CIMIC group that evolved into the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) in 2009. The SU did not represent the amalgamation of this expertise in a single hub. Instead it became a fourth player in an already crowded space. The jostling for resources and influence was compounded by the fact that many of these conflict-focused teams were facing “significant challenges in penetrating the realm of country-specific policy-making, where geographical departments, posts and country offices
remain pre-eminent and under no obligation to seek their assistance or to undertake integrated planning or implementation” (Teuten & Korski, 2010, p. 41). In such a cross-cutting policy area it is not surprising that certain tensions would exist. Overcoming these organizational obstacles leads to a general question of what incentives can be created to make the benefits of collaborating outweigh the perceived risks or threats. This juxtaposition can be demonstrated by comparing the Conflict Pool and the Stabiliation Unit – both built on a tri-departmental model but with different institutional levers available. The CP was essentially a dedicated fund with minimal administrative resources available outside of resources provided by its parent departments. In contrast, the SU was an organizational unit with dedicated staff and but no financial resources beyond what was allocated for operating costs. Put simply, the value of the CP to the parent departments was very clear: additional financial resources for a policy sphere in which the costs of programming were exorbitant. In contrast, the SU was designed to offer specialized expertise and capacity that was, to some degree, perceived to already exist within the parent departments. The value of the SU was less pronounced, allowing departmental concerns that the SU might threaten departmental capacity, identity and influence to outweigh any advantages to supporting a more empowered or influential SU.

A period of change for the Unit began in 2007. The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, the new set of PSA targets and the 2008 National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2008b; HM Government, 2007) reaffirmed the government’s support for the Unit and its three-fold mandate. Reviews of the SU in 2008 and 2009 resulted in a doubling in size of the unit’s core staff (Teuten & Korski, 2010). It was at this juncture that the Unit’s name changed from the PCRU to the SU, largely as a result of the importance of enhanced stabilization capacity in the UK’s approach to fragile states. Part of the SU story at this point was changes being made to the Conflict Pool. The two original pools had merged into a single conflict prevention pool and a new £269 million Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF) had been created with the suggestion that the SU would have a role in its management (SU, 2007b). However, the SAF would be short-lived. Its merger with the Conflict Prevention Pool to form the Conflict Pool essentially eliminated any scenarios in which the SU would hold management responsibilities for a dedicated program fund.
A second major wave of change arrived in 2010 with the election of the Coalition government and the resulting substantive changes to the UK’s national security architecture. The new National Security Strategy, the Strategic Security and Defence Review and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy all worked to draw closer lines between the SU and the new national security priorities and instruments (Conflict Pool, 2013), while maintaining its tri-departmental model. Oversight of the SU was transferred to the newly formed Building Stability Overseas (BSO) Board (NAO, 2012b). As the BSO Board was also issued responsibility for the Conflict Pool, this updated governance structure made more explicit connections between the CP and the SU and ensured that both were more closely aligned with the common strategic vision being advanced by the centre of government.

One priority within the SDSR was ensuring the UK continued to develop its capacity for deploying integrated civil-military teams into post-conflict environments. A new vehicle for bringing civilian and military expertise together was the Stabilisation Response Team. “During 2011-12, the SU deployed the first overseas civilian-military ‘Stabilisation Response Team’ (SRT), to Libya, in response to tasking from the National Security Council” (MOD, 2012b, p. 24). By the end of the 2002–2012 window, a certain comfort level on the part of the SU for its mandate and its relationship with other government departments was displayed (SU, 2010). Box 6 displays the SU’s articulation of the value it has to offer. Whereas in the early years of the PCRU the parent departments would often reference the Unit largely in the context of

Box 6. What We (SU) Can Do for You (MOD):
- Provide planners versed in the methodologies and languages of the FCO, DFID and the MOD to facilitate identification of common HMG stabilisation aims and coordination of your plans with wider HMG efforts.
- Provide experts with extensive experience of the stabilisation environment and its particular challenges to support your staff.
- Design and maintenance of catalytic programmes creating entry points for long term development in conflict environments.
- Provide focused and experienced security and justice expertise and design of institutional capacity building programmes.
- Development opportunities and training for your staff to improve their understanding of stabilisation, conflict and partner departments through our training courses and through membership of the Civil Response Team. (DCDC, 2012, p. 4)
being jointly owned, in the years leading up to 2012 there was a shift in how the relationship between the SU and its parent departments was referenced. It was far more often referenced as an independent partner that works jointly alongside FCO, MOD and DFID in areas of conflict, instability and fragility (DFID, 2011b; MOD, 2011b).

Several valuable insights into WoG as it was experienced by the SU emerged in Teuten and Korski’s (2010) Whitehall Papers. One not yet referenced was discussed in a chapter devoted to ensuring the right people are part of cross-departmental initiatives. The authors also underscored the position that “the success of British policy on fragile states rests on the individuals it employs, contracts and deploys. The best strategies and institutions are nothing without capable, well-led, motivated and appropriately incentivised people” (p. 89). Ensuring stabilization efforts are designed and implemented by the ‘right’ people is a multi-facted undertaking that includes understanding what skill sets and personalities are necessary for certain conditions, developing HR processes and mechanisms that allow such individuals to be identified, recruited and rewarded for their desired career paths and professional fields and identifying opportunities for training and skill development that foster these desired skills and abilities in current staff. For the SU the issue of skilled staff was paramount to its mandate for growing its pool of deployable civilians and was complicated by the fact that everyone in their database had an affiliation to a specific government department, private sector company or not-for-profit organization. As such, their career paths and performance evaluations were anchored to their full-time positions, which did not necessarily place value on the skills and capacities that were of importance to stabilization activities.

*Hiring and training someone to become a good DFID employee, or an officer suited to leadership in a high-intensity state-on-state war, does not necessarily mean that same person performs well in a cross-departmental environment* (Teuten & Korski, 2010, p. 90)

Teuten and Korski also offered a series of recommendations related to training opportunities, from broadening the pool of individuals capable of leading cross-departmental teams to greater cross-departmental cooperation in the design and delivery of stabilization and predeployment training.
Insights from Study Participants

The findings discussed thus far in this case study are enriched through an examination of how WoG was experienced first-hand by a cross-departmental pool of practitioners. Insights from these interviews add a practical frame of reference for WoG and further develop an understanding of the critical barriers to and opportunities for developing and implementing WoG initiatives within the context of international stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. Interviews were conducted with government staff who worked for the SU or whose work with a parent department was related to stabilization efforts in fragile states and international crisis zones thereby requiring some familiarity with the work and operations of the SU. It is important to acknowledge that while all of the participants interviewed were familiar with the SU based on their previous or current duties, it is impossible to distill all of their comments and opinions on WoG as being exclusively attributable to the SU. Many of the participants had been part of the UK’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq – WoG initiatives in their own right that had a stabilization mandate and involved deployment of SU staff in country. Other participants experienced WoG through secondments or appointments to OGDs, involvement with programs funded by the Conflict Pool, participation on an integrated approach working group or the simple fact that the nature of their work in fragile states required frequent communication and information sharing with individuals in other departments. Specific reflections about the SU tended to emerge most often in discussions around its primary functions (capturing lessons learned and civilian deployment) or the dynamics of its tri-departmental structure. When discussing other topics, especially authority paradigms, the role of the centre, politics, bureaucracy or issues related to human resources, each participant’s answers tended to reflect the totality of their WoG experiences and not necessarily a specific experience with the SU. This output was not unexpected and is a natural consequence of the semi-structured interview tool.

As one might expect, given the complexity of the operational environments, the issues and the organizations involved, the qualitative data produced by the interviews was not easily distilled into distinct categories or headings (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Simplifying the participant data into clean attribute categories would not accurately
capture the experiences and reflections of the practitioner. As a result, participant insights are discussed in a way that acknowledges the systemic nature of WoG by presenting the results as five themes, each of which advances our understanding of WoG within this context by shining a light on a part of the system in which several threads intersect. The themes to be discussed are:

1. Family dysfunction: the challenges of having three parents
2. Carving out a piece of the pie
3. Translating intent to results – not everyone can see the whole elephant
4. WOG championed at the centre of government: the era of the National Security Council
5. People and organizational systems: facilitating the art of the possible

**Family dysfunction: the challenges of having three parents**

Study participants made reference at various points during their interviews to challenging times experienced by the SU in recent years (20704, 20705, 20201). Staff with the most direct involvement with the SU spoke of a recent period of disillusionment experienced by Unit staff: that they were pushing against a wall every time they tried to communicate what they had to offer to actors outside the SU and that it was easy to feel walked over by staff from parent departments (20704). Participants also made reference to past pressures placed on the unit to prove its worth and avoid being closed altogether (20705), pressures made all the more pronounced by a strong skepticism about the purpose and value of the SU that existed within parent departments (20705). Many of these challenges were associated with the practical manifestation of the tri-departmental model that informed the mandate, scope of practice and day-to-day work of the SU as staff responded to requests from parent departments to mobilize Unit resources (stabilization advisors to the field, civilian deployments, stabilization expertise in the planning process of a new program or initiative) and made efforts to carve out a scope of practice and influence for itself. With the policies, money and delivery methods necessary for the SU to engage in stabilization activities being controlled by the parent departments (20301) and their default position being to protect their departmental interests over the common interests of government (20705), the tri-departmental model was not automatically conducive to facilitating cross-departmental coordination. The role of DFID, MOD and FCO in relationship to the SU has been widely described as parental
in nature – the term “parent department” is established clearly in government documents, program evaluations and academic literature. Some participants reflected on the limitations of the tri-departmental model by discussing it in terms of a child who has three parents who all live in different parts of town and have a tendency to be distracted by their own issues. The metaphor was an effective one for contemplating the challenges of the tri-departmental model.

Tension among parent departments was not a dominant theme raised by participants although brief reference was made to the long-standing push and pull between FCO and DFID, which did not always agree on how to share the foreign policy space (20702). Instead, the main sources of dysfunction were the complicated relationships that existed between each parent department and its child (the SU). The dynamics of these relationships appeared to differ, with MOD being more supportive of the SU and its contribution to the stabilization agenda than FCO and DFID (20704; 20705). The perception held by several participants was that the most difficult relationship for the SU was with the FCO, which saw overlap with some of its core departmental functions and perceived less value in the SU’s contribution to the stabilization landscape within the government (20705; 20302; 20704). The idea that the SU’s existence might diminish the scope of influence of its parent departments was likely related in part to the hubs of pre-existing expertise on conflict and instability that existed in the respective departments. The existence of complementary or possibly competing hubs of expertise over which the SU had no authority and that were able to leverage the institutional power and influence that came from being closer to the traditional loci of power and influence (line departments headed by Secretaries of State) made it difficult for the SU to build an organizational identity for itself. FCO, in particular, already had two players in the game with its Conflict Group and SecPol divisions (20301). While both units had a vested interest in the conflict space, they were not fully coordinated themselves, which added another level of confusion to the efforts to find a common message (20301).

According to those interviewed, the relationship between the SU and DFID was not quite as strained. Despite some blurring of the lines between the Unit and CHASE (20701; 20703) and the resulting tensions from trying to tease apart the apolitical nature
of humanitarian assistance and the political interests of stabilization while incorporating both into the UK’s engagement in fragile states, the SU-DFID relationship might have been moderated in some way by a form of organizational proximity that existed between the two units that was not present with the other two parent departments. As was discussed previously, of the three parent departments DFID was the parent with slightly more responsibilities and which, to continue the metaphor, had sole “physical custody” of the SU from 2004 to 2012. This may have assisted with the relationship between the SU and DFID but can also be seen as a source of problems for the SU in its relationship with its other parents. Most participants who touched upon this theme made reference to the very practical ways in which this relationship manifested itself. The co-location of the SU and DFID in one building (at DFID’s London headquarters) was discussed (20201, 20701, 20704). While the shared proximity made it easier for SU staff to engage in person-to-person dialogue with CHASE staff (20704), co-location also created barriers to cross-departmental communication. The first issue was that at the time of the interviews DFID offices were a 15-minute walk from the powerful centre of Whitehall where MOD and FCO were located. This created a physical dislocation between DFID and its WoG partners, which had ramifications for the SU. Because the SU was across the park from two of its parent departments it was easy to get into the habit of describing its location as being “over with DFID”. One participant believed that this kind of physical dislocation could contribute to other forms of dislocation (20201).

The second issue related to the close ties between the two units was that because the SU was ensconced in DFID headquarters it was supported by the DFID IT system. The result was that SU staff had @dfid.gov.uk email addresses. SU staff (20701; 20704) mentioned that their email addresses were intended to be @stabilisation.gov.uk, but the IT systems could not make it happen. The sentiment from the participant was that the symbolism of the email address issue and how it was perceived by those outside of the SU should not be underestimated. While clearly understanding that the SU was cross-governmental in its structure and composition and did not belong to a single department, those participants with connections to the military observed that the SU’s location within DFID was interpreted by MOD personnel as indicating that the Unit belonged to DFID and was being influenced more strongly by DFID than the others (20101; 20704).
conceded that this was an unfair perception but suspected it was fairly widely held nonetheless. The level of awareness on this matter appeared to be recognized as plans were already under way to move the physical offices of the SU. Plans for moving DFID HQ closer to Whitehall were also in the works at the time of the interviews and, as a part of the move, the SU would be moving into FCO HQ, while maintaining the Head of the Unit and the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for the Unit within the DFID structure. There was a hope that this might help strengthen relations between the SU and FCO staff (20705) and provide an opportunity to resolve the email issue by creating @stabilisation.gov.uk addresses for the team (20701). This is a small but powerful example of how innovative structures can be designed and the profound challenges of shared accountability negotiated and then hit barriers related to institutional systems and physical locations.

Aside from relationships among departments, a second feature of the tri-departmental model that proved problematic was that its functionality was fairly dependent on the assumption that people in leadership positions would champion the SU and the importance of its work to the key UK interests. However, as there were no terms of reference or institutional mechanisms that ensured a minister or a senior staff with a parent department, would take an interest in the SU, the model was quite vulnerable. Participants recalled different ministers having varying levels of interest in being associated with the SU and, similarly, moments in time where SU champions would emerge and take interest in the Unit only for their interest to be quashed (20705). Given the complex cast of characters and the potential for competing interests not just at the departmental level but also amongst individual staff, quashing efforts to advance the position or influence of the SU was not overly difficult. Such activities would require identifying like-minded individuals, consultation with the parent departments and, inevitably, a lot of meetings. Meetings could easily be delayed or made unproductive and too many important meetings or decisions could be hauled back into the departmental domain. Another problematic scenario involved a disconnect in support for the SU between levels – for example, between the higher, strategic levels and the day-to-day management of the SU. The observation pertained to the importance of having alignment of support at both levels. High-level enthusiasm for the Unit was not enough to overcome
a weakness in those managing the Unit at an operational level (20704). In this sense, high-level support for the SU should involve thoughtful assignment of capable staff to leadership positions within the unit.

Other problematic disconnects that could occur between key players from different parent departments included incongruence in grade or rank between staff invited to a meeting, which could far too easily result in a situation in which staff cannot or will not negotiate with each other (20301). Similarly, a Whitehall meeting in which not all departmental representatives have formal or delegated authority can hold up dialogue and decision making (20302; 20201). From its inception, the Head of the SU was a one-star Director while the SU Board was composed of two-stars – a situation that was perceived to disempower the SU in its interactions with other parts of government. An SU participant (20701) discussed with much anticipation upcoming changes within the Unit that would result in it being led by a two-star Director thereby instilling greater autonomy to the SU’s top leadership position. Having the right people around the table is made all the more difficult by the different authority paradigms that exist across parent departments (20301). For MOD and FCO the locus of power sits clearly at headquarters in London; however, DFID delegates much of its authority to country offices meaning that it is possible that meetings in HQ would reasonably require consultation with staff in country or relaying information through country desks, which represent a different branch of the department than CHASE.

**Carving out a piece of the pie**

Despite the challenges associated with its tri-departmental model, an equally strong counter-theme in the interview data was that in some specific areas the SU had been very successful in slowly carving out a place for itself amongst the cast of characters engaged in the stabilization agenda. Established with a mandate for enhancing the UK’s stabilization capacity, it took several years to discern how that capacity would manifest itself, given the already established wealth of resources allocated to security and development within the UK system. Without authorities and funds necessary for program delivery, the Unit would never be positioned as a coordinating body that would manage the collective stabilization efforts of government departments nor would it have
institutional levers powerful enough to align policy. There were some differing perspectives on whether means should be developed for the SU to have a larger role in strategy and policy or whether the value of the Unit was its role as a resource that could support and augment the work of its parent departments in stabilization activities. Nonetheless, by the time the interviews were conducted in 2012, it would appear that certain functions of the SU were valued as an important element of the UK’s approach to instability and fragility. All participants were in agreement that the SU’s primary contributions to the stabilization space were facilitating strong civilian deployment to stabilization zones and capturing and disseminating lessons learned, and that these contributions were valued by other departments. For FCO and DFID, both SU functions fulfilled capability gaps in their respective departments. MOD arguably had capability in both functional areas as the military was widely recognized for their robust systems for collecting and disseminating lessons learned (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010) and clearly had a history of deploying MOD civil servants to hostile environments. However, the MOD participant (20101) interviewed here displayed no concern over the SU’s primary functions; in fact, the participant referenced the SU in a way that suggested the Unit’s growing capacity in pre-deployment training for civilians was positive. This would be consistent with how MOD referenced the SU’s capacity in its annual reports. The SU’s capacity in this area related not only to developing the database of deployable civilians and coordinating pre-deployment training but also to the logistics of actual deployment. The Unit’s ability to get civilians into very dangerous places (20201) and to get people on the ground very quickly (20701) was acknowledged and appreciated. On the topic of lessons learned, the SU was recognized as an instrument through which lessons being learned in Libya could be agreed upon and then cemented into policy processes and standard operation procedures so that lessons need not be relearned with every new crisis (20301). The lessons learned capability was discussed as a method through which the SU could inform policy without having the mandate or authority to set it (20703). A final way for the SU to add value without being perceived as a threat by parent departments was to leverage its growing expertise on matters related to stabilization and contribute to cross-departmental planning and assessments activities (20703; 20704).
That support for the SU and its functions emerged amongst participants and the fact that institutional support for the SU continued over the course of multiple governments could be attributed to a number of things, from the relatively small price tag for the unit to the tremendous pressures emerging from stabilization zones to the fact that the consensus was that it was proficient in its primary functions. It is also possible that one way in which the SU established its value was that it settled into a very specific, very focused mandate and ensured that its capability in this area was sound. From this perspective it did not threaten the operational or policy space of its parent departments nor did it fall into the trap of trying to be too many things to too many players and failing to do anything well. The sentiments that the value of the SU is related to its narrow domain of influence (20201; 20301) or that any effort by the SU to push for a coordinating role with more authority would be rebuked by the parent departments (20302) both appear in the interview data. The arrival of the National Security Council (NSC) era (discussed in more detail below) likely eliminated any lingering aspirations the Unit may have had as the NSC and its Secretariat now represent the overarching umbrella under which all of the UK’s security and conflict architecture sit.

Occasionally lost within the discourse of who coordinates what, which is a common theme for practitioners and researchers considering WOG mechanics, is the reality that WOG coordination itself manifests differently in different contexts. In the absence of institutional authorities, dedicated funds or political champions and given the arrival of the NSC, the SU will never have the convening power to bring departments together for the purpose of coordinating policy or operations (20201). However, this does not mean that the SU has been unsuccessful at facilitating or experimenting with WOG. The lessons learned collected by the Unit pertain to stabilization writ-large, a policy and operational domain that sits with no single department. Developing a repository of information and insights that can be accessed easily and quickly by multiple departments to inform program design, joint planning and program implementation lays the foundations for effective WOG elsewhere in the organization. Similarly, the SU’s work in developing the Civilian Stabilisation Group is a WOG undertaking that facilitates a stronger, more effective WOG response from the UK because its civilian contribution to stabilization zones is sufficiently prepared to navigate the complexities of civil-military
coordination and the challenges of hostile environments. Its 2010 target of seeing that 390 of its CSG membership received core training related to working in conflict-affected fragile states, stabilization challenges and civil-military collaboration (Teuten & Korski, 2010) means that close to 400 individuals working across government and perhaps beyond it share a similar frame of reference for the challenges of stabilization regardless of their departmental perspective or technical competencies. The recruitment, training and deployment of the CSG by the SU can be seen as powerful instruments for fostering, over time, a professional WOG cadre within the UK civil service.

**Translating intent to results – Not everyone can see the whole elephant**

Despite the fact that the SU was created in a period when the UK government writ large and key departments such as DFID, MOD and FCO were recognizing the critical importance of cross-departmental coordination in the country’s response to global conflict and instability, intent did not always translate into results (20101; 20201; 20301). This is an important theme given the extent to which cross-Whitehall, joined-up government and integrated approaches were advanced by senior elements of the UK government including the prime minister, secretaries of state and central agencies, namely the Cabinet Office. Arguably there was more sustained political will and financial investments behind WOG in the UK than in any other country that developed cross-departmental initiatives in response to fragile states during this timeframe. Reflections captured from individuals who experienced these initiatives first-hand suggest that while this high-level political will is important, it is not always sufficient to overcome all of the institutional barriers that exist. When examined collectively the institutional barriers most dominant in the interviews pertained to processes and systems that were not designed or implemented in such as way as to allow individuals and departments to see the whole story of a given event, issue or operation. This was described by one participant (20701) as not being able to see the whole elephant; some people could see the tail while others could only see the head.

One system that was perceived as a barrier to the effective dissemination of necessary information to multiple departments was information technology (IT). With each department managing its IT systems and support in-house, there was no guarantee of
alignment in software, hardware, networks, information management protocols or security requirements (think classified versus unclassified information). In an era when emphasis was being placed on joint analysis and joint planning, having IT products and systems that could speak to each other was a critical pre-condition for successful consultation and communication (20302). Given the volatility and emerging nature of stabilization activities, the pressures to access information quickly and then compile it in a briefing note or memo that was reviewed by relevant stakeholders were not insignificant. Something as mundane as sharing draft documents with people in a timely manner was, far too often, very difficult (20201). IT as a barrier is interesting in that, arguably, conversations around the necessary tools for cross-departmental coordination would not be front of mind when the prime minister, secretaries of state or even permanent secretaries call for a joined-up approach yet ensuring departments can talk to each other is as much about their IT systems being able to talk to each other as it is about the departmental language and cultures that prevent their staff from being able to talk to each other.

Another institutional barrier that prevented various actors from being able to see the whole picture was the lack of a common conflict analysis framework or tool. At the time of the interviews the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability had recently been developed and was thought to be a vehicle that would ensure more effective and transparent information sharing between departments (20701). Previous sections of this chapter detailed earlier efforts to design and mainstream a common conflict analysis, such as the DFID Strategic Conflict Analysis tool. An expectation of the early CPPs was that they would facilitate the development of such a tool. It took more than 10 years after the creation of the Pools for the three departments to agree on a common framework. That there was optimism that JACS would be adopted by the necessary actors may have been in part because it does not necessarily supplant frameworks already in use by departments. Instead, in an effort to promote a common understanding of conflict and stability, it incorporates “different analytical capabilities which, over the years, have existed in separate UK government departments” (SU, 2014, p. 10). Related to the shared understanding of the issues and the operational environment is the importance of a common unifying purpose. Certainly a shared understanding of the issues would increase
the likelihood that actors would share an understanding of what was to be done to address the issues. Still, one participant discussed the importance of making sure the unifying purpose was established clearly and early (20301; 20101). One can see how this observation would have emerged through the UK’s experience in Iraq and again in Libya. Was the purpose of UK engagement to prevent large-scale human suffering, to overthrow (or support the overthrow of) a dictatorship, to achieve counter-terrorism objectives or to save the world from WMDs? The answer is often “all of the above”; however, the sooner the message can coalesce around a common set of objectives established by a voice in government that all departments will take notice of, the sooner departments can see their respective roles in the bigger picture and where and how cross-departmental coordination is necessary.

**WOG championed at the centre of government: the era of the National Security Council**

Prompted in part by the question about the role of central agencies in WOG were two interconnected themes: the strong role of the Cabinet Office in the UK’s joined-up efforts, including the SU, and the prominence of the newly created National Security Council in cross-departmental efforts pertaining to a swath of security issues that involved the SU and its parent departments. The connection between the two is obvious in that the NSC is woven into the organizational fabric of the Cabinet Office. To discuss the role of the NSC in WOG is to discuss the role of the Cabinet Office.

Participants recognized the NSC architecture (the Cabinet-level Council, its CO-staffed secretariat and the National Security Strategy and Security and Defence Strategy Review that informed the work of both) as an organizational innovation that was key to achieving cross-departmental coordination (20101; 20201; 20301; 20701; 20705). For major undertakings such as the UK engagement in Libya, the NSC offered a model that facilitated equal buy-in from departments because everyone knew that even if a single department was assigned lead responsibilities it was receiving guidance and direction from the NSC (20101). Both the NSC and the NSSec were perceived to have sufficient power and influence to hold departments accountable to overarching strategies (20301). Chaired by the Prime Minister, the NSC had the ultimate convening power and this
power was transitioned onto CO staff in the NSSec. If a staff person from a line department was not sufficiently engaged in agreed-upon NSC activities, it was understood and accepted that a junior staff person from the Cabinet Office would be in touch (even if there was a discrepancy in rank or grade) to make sure the situation was resolved (20301). Interestingly, the interviews paint a picture of the NSC and the NSSec as somewhat top-down and prescriptive in their approach; however, there is no dispute over their value. The NSC is clearly filling the gap in institutional capacity for a joined-up approach to conflict and instability that had been identified by practitioners and scholars in the years leading up to 2010. The NSC architecture provided the cross-departmental strategic functions that had been missing (20301; 20701) – an overarching strategy around which individual departments can align and a high-level strategic decision-making capacity that can be deployed in times of crisis but also in anticipating and planning for future challenges (20301). The NSC era was also associated with the tri-departmental Building Stability Overseas (BSO) strategy and the BSO Board. While both were less than a year old at the time of the interviews, they were referenced in the context of clarifying a commonly understood role for DFID within the stabilization agenda (20301) and linking both the SU and the CP more clearly back to government-defined national interests (20701). The BSO Board included representatives from both the CO and HMT and, therefore, embodied a model of WOG that included formal roles for the three parent departments and central agencies (20301). One participant suggested that the best indicator for the UK’s cross departmental approach to stabilization is not the jointly owned SU or the CP, but the BSO document itself (20302).

One unexpected theme from participants was a ‘new’ cross-departmental disconnect that was highlighted by the NSC. As an instrument for facilitating WOG, the NSC introduced another key department to discussions that had previously been undertaken by MOD, FCO and DFID. After defence, diplomacy and development, the Home Office’s (HO) responsibility for domestic security was the fourth ‘d’ to enter the mix (20701). The HO was responsible for policy and programs related to counter-terrorism, policy, illegal drugs and immigration and, as a result, had a strong voice on the issues considered by the NSC. After all, the fundamental purpose of the NSC was not first and foremost foreign policy. The NSC was focused on the country’s national
security – keeping its citizens and territories safe and ensuring the conditions for prosperity were not jeopardized by security threats. In this sense the NSC was slightly more aligned with the interests and mandate of the Home Office. It was not the forum for establishing the UK’s international development priorities, yet the role for international development in addressing the many causes of conflict and instability and, conversely, the impact of conflict on the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and the reduction of global poverty had been well established by the UK government. In this context, and despite the clear role for both DFID and the Home Office on the NSC, the relationship between the two was described as problematic by participants. Especially in discussions about counter-terrorism, it was referenced as an example of two organizational cultures that saw the world in different ways (20302). The major source of friction between the two departments was a lack of appreciation on the part of HO staff for DFID’s poverty reduction mandate and the protection enshrined in law of its significant budget allocation for the purpose of poverty reduction (20301).

Beyond specific references to the NSC, participants discussed the important role played by central agencies in WOG in a more general sense. This was somewhat expected given the stated role of the CO as a partner along with FCO, MOD and DFID in the public service agreement focused on conflict (PSA 30) and its role on the SU Board. In fact, some participants suggested that the CO should have a stronger role in the oversight and governance of the SU, that being situated within the CO might allow the SU to more easily put its expertise to use and lead certain initiatives where appropriate (20704; 20705). The ability of the CO to bring people together was discussed from the perspective of its institutional influence (20302) but also, in a very practical sense, its ability to devote resources to arrange the meetings, book rooms, draft minutes and circulate what was agreed upon (20201). Achieving WOG communication or coordination requires big-picture thinking and strong facilitation skills that are able to both foster a discussion in which pertinent information is brought forward and everyone’s perspective or interests are acknowledged and bring the dialogue to an end by forcing or encouraging people to reach conclusions. These capabilities were expected of CO secretariat staff (20201). Another virtue of the CO presence in both the NSC and the other Cabinet committees was that in pushing for coherence, communication and
coordination at the highest level there was an opportunity to model joint efforts in a way that informed the behaviour and actions of staff all the way through the organization (20201). It was a more nuanced exercise than one might think as the message to department staff was not that everyone has to get along. Instead, a perfectly acceptable outcome was the message to department staff that they were to continue defending the departments’ interests and perspectives but that information and analysis would be readily shared and they should work to avoid creating barriers or problems for other departments (20201).

**People and organizational systems: facilitating the art of the possible**

The interview data were rich with reflections and insights related to the importance of having the right people working on WoG initiatives if there were to be any chance of practical success. The role of the individual in WoG was not just related to a suite of skills and traits that lent themselves well to a cross-departmental working environment, but also the institutional systems, processes and levers that made it possible to recruit, retain and reward people who possess these skills into teams, departments and cross-departmental initiatives working on cross-cutting policy issues. Moreover, what training and talent management opportunities could be created to further develop these skills? It is an indication of the interconnectedness of WoGs’ operational attributes that focusing on people over structure leads one eventually to human resource systems, policies and processes that are, in turn, strongly associated with the same inflexible structure of Westminster government systems that drives the need for cross-departmental work in the first place. As a result, we return to the important understanding that organization design, organizational culture, human resource systems and the skills and capabilities of individuals must be seen as a tapestry of operational attributes and not divided into distinct categories. People build structures and structures inform the systems that manage people and information. This section will provide a summary of the skills and traits identified as desirable by participants and then go on to discuss some of the specific HR issues that are perceived to impact the effectiveness and efficiency of WoG efforts.
When discussing key skills and traits that allow an individual to thrive in a cross-departmental environment, practitioner insights could be distilled into three sub-categories: technical skills, soft skills and personality traits. In the case of technical skills, reference was made to strong problem-solving skills that allowed an individual to anticipate strategies and outcomes that might address not only the interests of their own department but also collective needs. Analytical skills that enabled individuals to see the big picture, identify policy constraints and understand the political imperatives at play, along with logistics and project management were deemed essential. The necessity of having recognized expertise and subject-matter experience was also noted and appeared strongly from interviewees discussing how staff from the SU established their relevance with staff from other departments. Personality traits included flexibility, adaptability, open-mindedness, self-motivation, resiliency and a tolerance for ambiguity. As expected, the desirable soft skills included a cluster of characteristics related to interpersonal communication and relationship management. Some deeper thinking on this topic included the importance of being able to: influence up and out across power structures, work at various organizational and cultural boundaries without insisting that the boundaries are pulled down, negotiate a middle ground based on true constraints (as opposed to emotionally driven posturing) and facilitate decisions and outcomes that allow for key departmental expertise and identity to be preserved and valued (20201).

With respect to leadership traits that allow individuals to navigate and impact various cross-departmental meetings, dialogues and/or broader initiatives, participants discussed the importance of leaders having good judgement and foresight, to be able to help pave the way for junior staff by anticipating the political nuances of a policy or programming environment and intervening so that any political negotiations or manoeuvring is complete before staff have to engage (20101). Similarly, WOG leadership involved having a strong understanding of the lexicon of terms related to stabilization, fragility and conflict that emerged from the various departments. The nuanced leader would be able to acknowledge that different meanings and interpretations exist for the various terms and then clearly establish the meaning that would be used for a briefing meeting, analysis or planning process, thereby ensuring that a common understanding was established at the outset but that staff from various departments did
not feel as though their language was being ignored or stripped from the lexicon (20701). Another challenge facing leadership of a unit such as the SU, where there was no formal authority over any other department, was to determine how to influence the myriad of actors involved in stabilization activities without having the proverbial carrot or stick (20703). Facilitation skills were also referenced a number of times as being critical to achieving cross-departmental success (20701; 20302).

A reoccurring theme from participants was the importance of team members and leaders at all levels being able to understand other people – their perspectives, positions, cultures, language and processes. While the word ‘empathy’ was not used in the interviews, the importance of developing an understanding of people who see the world a different way or who have been tasked with departmental priorities different from one’s own was widely discussed. The MOD participant (20101) discussed the tension between military culture and the high tolerance for ambiguity that existed in the civilian departments. The sentiment expressed was that having worked in a position that required cross-departmental activities provided insight into the value of ambiguity – how it might be useful in finding room to manoeuvre and adapt. The powerful insight was that gaining an understanding of why intolerable levels of ambiguity might be desirable did not convince the participant that the military culture should change, but it did remove the previously held association that high levels of ambiguity were indicative of limited capacity. Participants discussed cultural differences in a way that acknowledged the importance of understanding someone else’s context and the pressures they were facing. A shared theme was that this level of understanding was best achieved through shared experience, shared physical space, personal interactions and deliberate communication to negotiate a middle ground (20101; 20201; 20703).

SU participants commented on the Unit’s ability to foster this understanding by bringing people together who would not normally work alongside each other (20701; 20705). The cross-departmental staffing of its team and training exercises provided to members of the CSG represented opportunities to learn each others’ languages – how the most innocuous phrase, such as ‘let’s engage’ could have profoundly different meanings for MOD and DFID. In addition to opportunities created by the SU, sharing opportunities for learning more about each other by sharing physical space ranged from walking across
Whitehall to talk to someone in person (20101), being in theatre together (where everyone is experiencing the same difficult conditions and the same pressures) (20101) and social interactions early on that allow people to share more dimensions of their personality than just their departmental identity (20301). Pursuing any of these opportunities that would allow for a greater understanding of others required changes to traditional human resource systems and policies. The general sense provided by participants was that insufficient incentives existed for gaining valuable other-government-department (OGD) experience, whether it be through rotational programs, training opportunities or temporary appointments such as secondments or appointments.

The staffing of the SU did shed light on the value of secondments to WoG initiatives. Essentially, the staffing of the SU occurred in two ways: open job competitions and secondments or appointments. The latter involved temporal parameters that guaranteed a seconded or appointment staff would stay with the SU two years or another pre-determined period of time. In contrast, open competitions allowed civil servants to apply for a position and then, once they arrived, apply quickly for a position in another part of government. One participant spoke of how the challenging operational environment within the SU and low staff morale resulted in dramatically high staff turnover that took away from the Unit’s collective knowledge and experience and, therefore, its credibility with other departments (20704). While the impetus for staff departures was the management of the Unit, the fact that they were able to leave at the same time was because of the staffing model. Making it easier for managers to staff teams in a way that ensured a new unit was not critically vulnerable to a massive exodus of staff was important for its success. In short, secondments were desirable both for staff looking for OGD experience and for those managing SU resources; however, they were disincentivized by the broader HR system (20301; 20704). HR barriers to cross-department mobility included the perception by civil servants that temporarily leaving a department was problematic because the work you did while away from the department was not always recognized or measured equally upon your return, thereby disrupting career progression (20201). For the lending department, secondments involved maintaining the capacity provided by the staff person leaving and keeping a position available while they were away. The result was an inflated staff count during a time when
departments were trying to reduce headcounts. For the person considering a secondment, the disincentive was that if your exact position was not preserved in your absence then you would go into a redeployment pool, which was an undesirable outcome from the perspective of career progression.

Another institutional barrier created by HR systems was that performance measurement frameworks (PMFs) were not adapted to align with cross-departmental work (20301; 20701; 20201). PMFs were created and managed at the departmental level meaning that performance evaluation and subsequent promotion was based on performance metrics that advance departmental interests. Despite a growing value placed on joined-up activities across the UK government, there was no sense from participants that this priority had been incorporated into PMFs. One example of this point was that the PMFs did not place value on how well staff shared information with other departments. In the absence of this metric staff were far more incentivized to hold on to information so that it could be used to advance departmental priorities (20701). The same staff person noted that the major change they would like to see enacted to foster stronger cross-departmental coordination was to have one compulsory objective included on all PMFs across the civil service, that all staff be able to demonstrate how their work contributes to their wider team, their wider unit, the wider department and cross-government objectives. By establishing this objective within PMFs’ performance, management would be able to incentivize cross-departmental behaviour. Such an approach would incorporate an element of the ‘collective good’ into a system designed entirely around individual performance and reward. Another SU participant who was appointed to the Unit from MOD discussed how for the tenure of the appointment annual performance reports would be submitted through SU reporting lines. The participant’s line manager at the SU was from FCO so the annual report was written by a military officer in the SU to ensure it was written using language and terminology that MOD, which would consult the report when considering future promotions, would understand.
Conclusion

How is our understanding of WoG advanced by examining the story of the SU and the reflections of practitioners who worked in the WoG ecosystem linked primarily to FCO, MOD, DFID and the CO from 2002 to 2012? If one were to make connections between the policy and programming environments, departmental priorities, lessons learned from the design and launch of the SU and impressions from WoG practitioners, what key lessons emerge?

Perhaps the most dominant lesson is discovered when you examine the totality of the UK experience over 10 years. From this vantage point it is possible to see the whole elephant, so to speak. The story of the SU is situated in creation of the CPPs and the UK’s experimentation with joined-up government and is influenced by the growing discourse around stabilization that is anchored to the country’s challenging experiences with PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this same vein, the SU is part of the ecosystem that drives the development of the NSC architecture and the creation of the Joint Conflict and Stability Assessment. At the end of the decade, the UK had three formal structures (the CP, the SU and the NSC) that played different but complementary roles in its WoG approach to fragility and instability and the three line departments of importance have had a decade of experimenting with the tri-departmental accountability and governance model. Moreover, all relevant actors have contributed to and are responsible for implementation of the National Security Strategy, the Security and Defence Strategic Review and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. Based on the UK’s story one can conclude that WOG is not achieved through a single organizational innovation, but, in fact, through an orchestra of WOG instruments that together allow for cross-departmental information sharing, planning, decision making and program implementation at various levels. The UK model is both top-down (with the NSC) and bottom-up (through the individual members of the CSG and the SU staff who come from across government to develop a repository of lessons learned and expertise that can be used to support the efforts of the line departments). The existence of the NSC thus has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the SU and the CP.

Another lesson from the UK case relates to the relative equality across the three parent departments of both the CP and the SU and how this facilitates the use of a tri-
departmental design (as opposed to the lead department model seen in the Canadian case). The challenges of the model are discussed by participants and it is certainly not a perfect model. It was not devoid of departmentalist tendencies and there would certainly be policy areas and operations in which one had a comparative advantage, and therefore a louder voice, over the others. However, the reason the model was possible at all is likely due to the fact that three players who needed to be involved all came to the ‘marriage’ with significant political clout and financial resources. In almost any other OECD country, by contrast, the development actor would be subordinate in some way to FCO. DFID’s budget allocation was significant and well-protected by law; neither the CPP nor the SU created opportunities for development assistance funds to be usurped by others. The well-documented support for DFID and its Secretary of International Development by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Labour years also ensured that DFID was an equal player. In addition, it is possible to suggest that because the three departments did not have to devote time and resources to defending their relevance to matters at hand, they were able to find common ground on topics of shared importance. Examples of this common ground exist in substantive documents such as DFID’s *Building Peaceful States and Societies*, MOD’s joint doctrine *Security & Stabilisation: the Military Doctrine*, and the jointly produced *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*. All of these documents acknowledged the points around which the departments saw issues differently and some of the problematic tensions related to humanitarian assistance, stabilization and military involvement in the distribution of aid. Still, their different perspectives and interests did not prevent them from advancing their individual and collective thinking on these complex topics; nor did they refrain from consulting each other in the development of these materials.

Despite the exceptional levels of support for joined-up government as a critical feature of the country’s approach to state fragility, instability and crisis, we learn from WOG practitioners that institutional barriers to successful and impactful WOG exist, with information technology and human resources systems being the most prominent. Opportunities for working within other departments, joint training or any other opportunity that enhances the understanding of other people and units are highly desirable yet difficult to achieve. It is interesting to consider whether barriers persist
because of the magnitude of change required to align or integrate systems of this size and complexity. Is there a role for the Cabinet Office and its responsibilities for civil service reform to establish some common WOG performance metrics for all departments? Or are these institutional barriers a reflection of a disconnect within each department, between those responsible for corporate functions and management systems and those staff from policy branches and country desks being asked to engage in cross-departmental communication and activities? It is possible that achieving WOG involves closer intra-departmental communication and coordination?

Finally, the UK case reveals a general impression from study participants that having the right people is more important than the right structure; that the day in–day out negotiating of middle ground and building relationships, which might not produce perfect outcomes but is enough to advance more pragmatic and plausible goals, is a result of skilled individuals and not a specific organizational design. The perspective from practitioners that people trump structure is not an indictment of the SU model or a statement that time spent on organizational design is unimportant. Instead, it is more likely a reflection of the fact that UK government employees who were involved in the stabilization, conflict and humanitarian assistance space from 2002 to 2012 would have experienced a large number of different structures designed to foster, facilitate or encourage cross-departmental coordination. The SU, the CP, PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq and the NSC are just a sample of institutional initiatives undertaken in the name of joined-up government, civil-military coordination, cross-Whitehall collaboration, the integrated approach, or the comprehensive approach. All of these new initiatives had notable successes, along with a long list of ways in which they could be improved. In this sense, the complicated element of design as a pre-condition for success is that any number of designs can be effective depending on the context. On the other hand, the imperative of attracting and retaining skilled WoG professionals applies regardless of the organizational design in place. Whether a new organizational unit is led by a single department, is jointly owned, or is managed from the centre does not appear to change the perspective of practitioners that properly designed human resource systems have the potential to be a tremendous enabler of cross-departmental collaboration.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This chapter offers three concluding perspectives on the research project: a cross-case synthesis of the insights garnered in the two case studies, a return to the theoretical framework for WoG developed in Chapter 4 (to reflect the perspectives and experiences of practitioners, as revealed in Chapters 5 and 6) and closing thoughts concerning the limitations and contributions of the overall research.

Cross-Case Analysis

A comparative synthesis of the two cases is a continuation of the overarching research objective to better understand the operationalization of WoG as an approach to fragile and conflict-affected states. The SU and START were created within a year of each other with the overarching purpose of enhancing the stabilization capacity of their respective countries. Their governance structures involved the same group of partner or parent departments: those focused on defence, diplomacy and development. Moreover, the design and evolution of both units was heavily informed by their respective governments’ engagement in dangerous and volatile PRTs in Afghanistan (Kandahar Province and Helmand Province), the dynamics of the War on Terror and the increasing relevance of fragile states to each country’s security and development priorities. Given the similarity of the contexts of the two cases examined, a cross-case synthesis allows us to glean insights that are shared across cases, despite the different organizational designs of START and the SU. We are also able to look at those insights that differ between the two cases and query whether the differences are a simple consequence of the different designs or if there are other explanations to be explored that might contribute to a deeper understanding of WoG. The cross-case synthesis is the final step before re-visiting the theoretical framework for of operational attributes for WoG first developed in Chapter #4.
WoG instruments are possible and we should expect their form and function to differ depending on context

A simple but compelling insight to emerge when one looks at the two cases side-by-side is that, first, implementing new WoG instruments, even dedicated units, is very much possible and, second, many structural barriers can, in fact, be overcome in pursuit of WoG. The first point is reinforced not only by the existence of the Stabilisation Unit and START but also the vast array of other WoG instruments that were implemented from 2002 to 2012 in both Canada and the UK. In addition to the dedicated coordinating bodies, both countries experimented with WoG operationalized by pooled funding initiatives, provincial reconstruction teams, interdepartmental task forces and a cabinet-level task forces and committees. The idea that machinery of government can be changed marks an evolution of the analysis presented in Chapter #4 were structural barriers were discussed as being largely impervious to change. The case studies enhance our understanding of WoG in that they emphasize that if enough political capital is spent a number of innovations to government machinery are possible. The insight gleaned from the case studies is that there is no single innovation to government structure that embodies a WoG best practice.

START and the SU demonstrated different ways in which machinery of government can influenced in the pursuit of enhanced cross-departmental collaboration. The focus on stabilization was shared; however, their specific mandates, scope of practice and domains of influence differed. The two units had very different relationships with their respective funding bodies – design choices that were connected to their mandates, governance structures and pre-existing capabilities of the various parent / partner departments. The most distinct difference between the two models was the placement of the new unit within its respective government architecture, which resulted in different approaches to “sharing” accountability. From different locations within government structure a WoG coordinating body would have different sources of political, financial and bureaucratic power to be leveraged for convening actors, building consensus, aligning priorities, influencing policy and implementing shared programs. Certainly, it could be suggested that a model in which three departments formally share in the oversight and staffing of a unit that sits outside of their organizational boundaries’ tri-departmental model sounds like a design that would strongly incentivize cross-
departmental coordination. Conversely, the same enthusiasm could be expressed for a model in which a new unit with a mandate for coordination is expressly linked to a pool of financial resources that can be used to advance said mandate. However, despite the importance of these structural choices in the design of new WoG initiatives, the cases do not support a conclusion that one form of WoG, as embodied by START and the SU respectively, was better than another. Instead, the case studies reveal some interesting nuances around this topic.

When examined within their respective contexts, it becomes clear that the decisions of where to place the units within the government architecture and what connections to establish with financial resources reflected the intricacies of pre-existing relationships amongst partner / parent departments, their government’s recent history with WoG and the perceived capability gaps that were pertinent to their country’s stabilization agenda. In the UK, the early iterations of the Conflict Pool had been launched three years prior to the creation of the SU. Not only did early investment in the CP mean that a dedicated pool of funds had already been created for the purpose of conflict prevention and, eventually, stabilization programming but it laid the foundations of the formal tri-departmental model relationship between FCO, MOD and DFID. The Canadian journey towards START was different. Instead of having the foundations of shared accountability as demonstrated through the CP, the Canadian government was grappling with repercussions of the Sponsorship scandal and Gomery Commission, which meant that politicians, public servants, the press and the public in Canada had a heightened level of awareness around issues of accountability. It is difficult to imagine that any initiative that stretched the parameters of ministerial accountability would have been welcomed by a TBS that was, at the time, focused on developing and implementing government-wide systems and policies that would strengthen accountability frameworks. Canadian participants spoke at length about accountability structures as a barrier to WoG. It was a far less dominant theme in the UK case.

Another point of contrast is that the tri-departmental model of WoG demonstrated within the UK case is anchored in large part to the idea that three departments of relatively equal power, influence and resources will share ownership. DFID’s position within the UK government was distinctly different than CIDA’s position in relation to
DFAIT. Not only was there the issue of authority that DFAIT already had over CIDA and over Canada’s foreign policy writ large, but, more importantly, there was the pre-existing barriers between the two departments as evidenced by CIDA participants’ concerns about the placement of START within DFAIT, the allocation of GPSF funding to START and preference that the PCO play the role of coordinating body. These concerns reflect a view that CIDA was under valued as an organization and/or that its work was deemed less important by senior decision makers. In this respect, had the tri-departmental model been applied in Canada at the time it would have brought these dynamics to the decision making table. It raises the question of what the tri-departmental model looks like when there is a dramatic imbalance in power and influence?

Beyond placement within government architecture structure the other main design feature that differed was the affiliation of the new organizational unit with a funding body. The SU was designed with the knowledge that the Conflict Pool was already established and accessible to the parent departments which each had large budget allocations that, for the majority of the 2002-2012 period, increased with each spending review. There was no real need to fund the SU beyond its operating budget. In contrast, affixing the GPSF to START made sense in many respects if one were planning on a lead department model with the lead department being DFAIT, who until that point had minimal funds for the purpose of programming. They were all logical design choices based on pre-existing relationships between departments. However, as has been discussed, the operationalization of WoG involves a network of interconnected attributes. In this sense, there is much to consider and anticipate in the original design. Without dedicated funds and in the absence of a policy mandate, the SU ended up with very minimal organizational currency necessary to bring people together and impart the expertise and capacity being built within the Unit. START’s position amongst partner departments was significantly strengthened by its access to and management of GPSF resources. However, the corporate and project management skills required to effectively manage the fund and its programs were not present amongst DFAIT employees who, as a result of the lead department model, formed the majority of START’s staff.

START and the SU were the first initiatives of their kind within their respective governments, so there were not a lot of best practices to draw on. Moreover, the
increasing pressures and rapidly changing nature of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and other conflict regions meant that the units were designed and implemented quickly. Still, a lesson acquired by examining the interconnected issues at play is that there are any number of WoG designs that could achieve cross-departmental coordination objectives. The skill for managers is to be able to evaluate the strengths and unique characteristics of the organizational boundaries that need to be overcome and use that insight to inform key design choices related to: location within the government architecture, funding mechanisms, and governance models. Both case studies prompted certain questions about whether some of the barriers experienced by both START and SU should have been acknowledged and addressed within the design of the units. The dynamic between DFAIT and CIDA, the possibility that the FCO might be not appreciate the contributions of the SU or the consequences of aligning the SU a bit too strongly with DFID are some examples of issues that compromised the effectiveness of both initiatives. These issues may have been widely discussed by those who assembled the building blocks for both units; however, the literature and the participants do note the short window of time in which they were created and launched. From the perspective of capturing lessons learned, perhaps the emphasis should not be on identifying the strongest models for WoG, but instead allowing for there to be a wide range of versions of WoG that, if designed with context in mind, could achieve their desired impact. Certainly, dozens of analytical tools exist to help public sector managers with their efforts to determine the best vehicle for advancing a policy priority. Perhaps there is room for one more tool which could be used in conjunction with assessments that are linked to the policy issue and programming environments. Figure 20 compiles information gleaned from the case studies and presents an early version of a WoG Boundary Analysis. The use of such a tool, once refined, could inform choices about the design of a new initiative by taking into consideration pre-existing boundary relationships and assessing the ability of established organizational systems to foster or deter cross-departmental activities.
Organizational structure is a red herring – the real opportunity exists with organizational systems

Arguably, the most dominant participant insight, shared widely across both cases, was the observation that organizational systems related to human resource management, information technology and institutional performance management could do much more to foster WoG. This insight pertained to innovations that could strengthen the design of WoG instruments, but also strengthen the institutional capability of the organization for cross-boundary collaboration. In the absence of systems that aligned with a WoG imperative, the barriers to effective and efficient collaboration were innumerable.

Organizational structure is presented here as a red herring because it is obvious how the question of structure (where a new instrument is located within the government architecture and the distribution of roles and responsibilities) distracts researchers and practitioners from more substantive dialogue around organizational systems. De-emphasizing the question of structure is posited on the basis that a significant amount of political will is required to influence machinery of government and install new WoG units. If new instruments are developed and organizational systems do not evolve to
support the WoG imperative however, then the systems will work at cross-purpose to the structure.

The cases demonstrated that regardless of high levels of political will being expended, allocating significant financial resources to a new WoG initiative or establishing cabinet-level oversight, WoG practitioners shared similar reflections on how organizational systems – specifically those related to human resource management – behaved as critical barriers to WoG. Facilitating the active development, recruitment and retention of individuals well-equipped for cross-departmental work was constrained by institutional systems. Similarly, the inability of human resource systems to foster a desirable career path for individuals moving in and out of cross-departmental initiatives or to facilitate the acquisition of OGD experience through secondments or other HR instruments were widely discussed by participants in both cases. Performance management systems that failed to recognize or reward skills deemed essential for WoG practitioners and inconsistent opportunities for joint training were additional ways in which HR systems behaved as barriers to cross-departmental coordination. Compounding the HR challenge is that multiple actors, outside of the key WoG actors, have responsibility for organizational systems. Each line department would have a division tasked with the responsibility of the department’s corporate functions, including financial management, human resource management, risk assessment, etc. A government’s central agencies would also have a role to play in that they hold government-wide responsibilities for human resources, information technology, financial management, performance measurement, risk assessment and machinery of government.

Given the size of government departments (in terms of employees and scope of practice), it is not difficult to see why the HR issues are so difficult to influence. First, both START and the SU were placed into pre-existing organizational systems and would have had no reasonable expectation for any kind of autonomy in these areas. Despite their WoG mandate and composition, there were no options for hybrid or custom-designed HR systems. Instead, START’s HR procedures were determined by DFAIT and the SU’s procedures determined by DFID both of which would have experienced competing pressures related to fiscal restraint. Second, individual departments did possess a significant amount of autonomy with respect to how they managed their own human
resources and many of their HR decisions (such as the decision to approve a secondment) were informed by fiscal or performance priorities that outweighed the importance of making a contribute to a cross-departmental initiative.

The difference in the two units from an HR perspective should be acknowledged here. As an initiative firmly ensconced within DFAIT and because its organizational origins involved incorporate the pre-existing capacity of staff from the Human Security Program, START was staffed almost entirely of DFAIT staff. In contrast, the SU was staffed by individuals from its three parent departments and other government entities. Interestingly, while the SU was certainly able to achieve stronger cross-departmental composition within its team as a result of its tri-departmental structure, participants familiar with the SU still discussed very similar HR issues to those that emerged from Canadian participants. Challenges with secondments, career paths, recruitment and performance evaluation were present in both cases which speaks to the fact that even though the mechanisms for staffing each unit were very different, individuals navigating the WoG ecosystem (which would have also included other cross-departmental initiatives) all reference a fundamental misalignment between the stated desire of cross-departmental coordination and its practical implementation. Participants experience this misalignment as a contradiction between words and action: that the higher echelons of power and influence say they want more joined-up approaches, but are unwilling to allocate the funds necessary to reform institutional systems so that they behave as enablers of a cross-departmental imperative.

Other corporate functions that were perceived as institutional barriers to WoG included: critical disconnects between departmental IT systems, different approaches to collecting, classifying and sharing information, and review and approval processes for critical funds and operational authorities that were slow, time consuming, and, therefore, disconnected with the urgency and volatility of the operational environment. When considered alongside the afore mentioned HR issues, it becomes clear that not only should these institutional systems be considered in the design and implementation of new WoG initiatives but that progress can, and should, be made towards making these systems a more critical element of a country’s WoG capacity regardless of whether or not a new cross-departmental initiative is being launched. Unlike the issue of structure, which has
been identified as dependent on both future needs and pre-existing boundaries and relationships, the issue of institutional HR, IT and financial systems could be seen as less context-specific. First of all, these are systems characterized by a multiplicity of actors and complex organizational relationships, and, as such, they cannot be changed overnight or even within a few months. Whereas START, the SU, ATF and even the NSC were implemented relatively quickly in government terms, changes to institutional systems take more time. Second, the changes that are required for the systems to behave more as enablers of WoG than barriers do not change significantly if the vehicle for government is a task force, a committee, a new unit or a pooled fund. The dynamics of the boundaries are often the same: the need for mobility across departments is still critical and holistic performance management structures are still important. More importantly, incentivizing and facilitating OGD experience for as many people as possible and HR tools for recruiting individuals with a strong capacity for WoG work are still imperative to achieving cross-departmental success. The roles for central agencies in WoG have been discussed throughout the cases and some powerful examples of how central agencies can champion WoG have been presented (notably the UK’s NSC). However, it would appear that one of the most important contributions that could be made by central agencies to accelerate their government’s collective capacity for WoG is to establish cross-boundary collaboration as a high-level priority of government and, in doing so, use centralized initiatives and platforms (such as civil service reform, the budget cycle, and performance management frameworks) to tackle these lingering issues.

WoG capacity at an organizational level benefits from political and/or institutional commitment

A look at the two cases from a comparative perspective suggests that having sustained political commitment for WoG capacity government-wide (in addition to support for a WoG response to a specific event or issue) may help over time to enable a deeper institutional commitment to WoG to take root within departments and central agencies. The best example of this is in the UK case where, at the end of a 13-year window in which consecutive Labour governments took an interest in cross-departmental coordination, the country’s WoG response to fragile states included a tri-departmental conflict pool, a tri-departmental centre of expertise in stabilization, a joint conflict
assessment tool, three strategic documents to align activities, a swath of departmental reports that contribute to and advance collective understanding of concepts and priorities, and a powerful cabinet-level coordinating body in the NSC. That is not to say this is the model for WoG but in most respects it appears as though the UK government has moved beyond the idea that its WoG response to international conflict and instability is advanced by a single coordinating body or a fixed set of relationships between departments. By 2012 the PCO Afghanistan Task Force had concluded and the GPSF was operating on single year extensions. To that point, there were no joint publications or, for that matter, individual publications by START or its partner departments to contribute to or advance a common understanding of terminology, roles or lessons learned related to stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction. The document that had been created for this purpose was never made public because the departments could not reach agreement on its content. Based on interviews with Canadian participants it is difficult to attribute this perceived lack of commitment to the efforts of staff at any of the relevant departments. Participants were enthusiastic about the importance of cross-department coordination and embodied the institutional capacity for WoG that was being developed organically through the country’s experiences in Afghanistan, Haiti and other fragile states. The absence of more robust institutional commitment to WoG in Canada may relate to the political instability brought about by multiple minority governments, association of the WoG agenda with the agenda of a previous government, restrictions placed on departments by the Prime Minister’s Office that discouraged them from disclosing too much about their work outside of standard reporting structures or difficulties in aligning departmental perspectives as a result of the complicated relationships among the key partner departments.

Dramatic variation in the conceptual understanding of ‘whole of government’ exists across practitioners

This theme emerged widely across both cases – from practitioners and from the literature. That the meaning of WoG varies for different people is not unexpected (see Chapter #3). However, the conceptual variance has implications for any effort to design or implement a WoG initiative or advance a WoG agenda. It is intrinsically linked to widely held recommendations that a shared mandate be established as early as possible in a cross-departmental undertaking. If WoG is intended to incorporate the possibility of
joint analyses, joint evaluation, and a shared understanding of success, then part of that process must involve a common understanding of WoG itself. The variance in meaning and understanding occurs on multiple dimensions (see below) and therefore carries with it a certain amount of conceptual ambiguity for practitioners. First and foremost, participants made it clear through their responses that WoG was exemplified through more initiatives than START and the SU. The concept was applied as a descriptor to a government response, a specific initiative or program, a fund, a strategy, a tool, a team and a philosophy. A wide range of specific initiatives and institutions were described as WoG undertakings, including the Disaster Assistance Response Team (Canada), the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (ROCK), the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (UK) and the Joint Analysis for Conflict and Stability (UK). Also referenced as examples of WoG were ad-hoc efforts to bring together cross-departmental teams (interdepartmental task forces and working groups) and any joint effort that crossed departmental boundaries (joint assessment, training, decision making, efforts to produced shared documents). Participants from all departments frequently distilled the essence of WoG to be about relationships between individuals and as a result framed WoG as an exercise in relationship management and communication. In the same vein, WoG was discussed not as a formal undertaking but as a suite of basic activities such as meetings, information sharing through any number of conduits (phone, email, or stopping by someone’s office) and making connections through a shared physical presence. Finally, a number of themes spoke to the variable characteristic of WoG; that its identity changes and looks different depending on the context. To this end, participants referenced formal vs. informal and direct vs. indirect versions of the concept, as well as different manifestations of WoG in different departments, different field environments, and different stages of the conflict cycle. Participant interviews and the literature reaffirm the existence of a vast lexicon of terms generated by different disciplines and practitioner groups that speak to the fundamental idea of cross-boundary collaboration.

Why is variance in conceptual meaning relevant to understanding its operational elements? It is a simple, but important, reminder that the WoG lexicon is vast, with the potential for many of the terms to possess slightly (or vastly) different meanings when
used by different actors. From an expectation management exercise it is possible that individuals, teams and departments have different expectations around the level of interaction expected of partners and/or the number and scope of partners. Translated to a joint planning meeting this variation in meaning could easily result in misunderstandings amongst actors or, because of the political weight assigned to some of the terms, the focus becomes on what words are being used to brand the exercises instead of on the underlying intent of enhanced communication and coordination. From the perspective of operationalizing WoG it is critical that those responsible for launching a new initiative or a new team understand that the term has a complex conceptual identity which needs to be clarified at the beginning of a new venture. Otherwise there is a strong risk that different visions of WoG are guiding the work of individuals within the team. Part of developing a shared understanding of an initiative’s purpose or mission should also include establishing a clear understanding of what WoG will mean to all members of the team and how it will be incorporated into the team’s evaluation metrics – for example, is the team using a coordination or a collaboration model, what strategies are used to facilitate consensus building amongst actors, what negative perceptions of WoG exist and how might they be overcome, and what behaviours need to be changed to achieve the desired level of trust and interaction amongst actors?

Moreover, acknowledging conceptual variance is a valuable reminder that cross-boundary collaboration in the context of conflict and instability in fragile states is very different from cross-boundary collaboration in other policy realms where joining-up across departments and working horizontally are a priority (such as health or climate change). There are three primary features of the operational environments discussed in these two cases that are unique and, consequently, generate a different set of institutional barriers to WoG that must be considered. The engagement of a country’s defence, development and diplomatic actors in fragile states is characterized by the distinctive dynamics of civil-military relations, the unpredictability and physical dangers of hostile environments and a level of political attention that can be both helpful and de-stabilizing as the interests of individual Prime Ministers, political heads of departments and very senior civil servants impact cross-departmental efforts. Such dynamics yield a collection of actors, some of whom are designed for rapid deployment but who do not always have
the expertise or social license for navigating the humanitarian space. Conversely, other actors have this expertise but limited ability (from a resource, training and legal authority perspective) to deploy into crisis zones. WoG in this context must overcome distinct and polarized departmental languages, processes and values, and it must be flexible, adaptable and capable of responding in a timely way to shifting needs and priorities.

**Comprehensive tools for measuring WoG do not exist**

The final theme to emerge from the cross-case synthesis is interesting because, in fact, it was not overtly addressed by any participants nor can it be found within the relevant literature. However, its absence from the discourse is itself problematic and a barrier to operationalizing WoG. Practitioners and researchers have yet to pursue substantial metrics or indicators for WoG in the context of its application as approach to fragile states. Due to the high-profile nature of stabilization activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Haiti – where the media and public were watching closely and political careers could be tied to mission success – the primary benchmarks for success were most often related to specific mission or program targets. Did the activity, which happened to be delivered using a WoG approach, achieve its stated goals? What is rarely measured are the mechanics of the approach. In other words, what was the quality of the WoG effort?

There could be hundreds of metrics here, but to start it would make sense to establish WoG goals (outside of desired impact in country) at the outset of a program or activity and measure performance against these goals. Key performance indicators might include: information sharing, application of decision making frameworks, establishing a common language, joint reporting, joint accountability, frequency and quality of meetings, flexibility of financial tools and instruments and adaptability of a cross-departmental team to changing environment. The design and use of these kinds of metrics would allow practitioners to discern actual costs of WoG (which are anecdotally thought to be high), align data about the quality of the WoG effort to the achievement of program goals, and plan for future efforts.

Another potential metric of success of a WoG initiative is its ability to contribute to the cadre of WoG professionals who have both the necessary experience in cross-departmental skills and the desired skill profile to thrive in WoG initiatives. Some
researchers from public administration (Williams, 2002) and business administration (Yip, Ernst, & Campbell, 2011) have referred to a term that embodies the essence of the WoG professional: *the boundary spanner*. The case studies speak to the importance of a combination of skills that allow an individual staff member to thrive in a WoG environment. They also make it clear that every time an individual is part of a WoG initiative or has an opportunity to move throughout other government departments they are both honing these skills and accumulating insights about the culture, processes and perspectives of different departments that can be put to use in the future. There should be a way to measure the accumulation and distribution of these skills across government departments so that individuals can be provided with ongoing training, flagged for future opportunities and see if, over time, a culture of WoG is propagated throughout government. In some ways the SU’s efforts with the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) did this work; however, their focus was on a pool of individuals who have desirable technical skills and who are suitably trained for the challenging dynamics of stabilization environments. What is being suggested here is a step beyond that. This starts with developing a skill profile that includes the most desirable attributes of the WoG professional. Assessment criteria for this skill profile could be incorporated into individual performance evaluations of staff who are part of or interacting regularly with WoG initiatives. It would not need to supplant the skills that were required for specific job postings and responsibilities. Nor would it need to require the installation of a new professional group. Instead it could represent a supplementary set of skills that, when added to established expertise and knowledge, are an indicator of the potential an individual has for thriving in a WoG initiative. Being able to follow these individuals throughout their career paths would yield valuable information about how ‘boundary-spanners’ are created or identified within organizations, how their talent should be managed for greatest reward to the individual and the organization, and what leadership opportunities are best suited for their strengths.
Returning to the WoG Framework

In Chapter 4, a literature review was conducted to examine the mechanics of WoG – to better understanding how WoG instruments are operationalized. This yielded a suite of operational attributes to be considered when designing, launching and managing a WoG unit, team or project. Discussed often as barriers to cross-boundary interaction, these operational attributes can also serve as critical points of influence that, if altered or changed, could enhance the ability of leaders and managers to facilitate collaboration across organizational silos. Building the theoretical framework involved several iterations. The first was a basic graphic that presented the core operational attributes as a collection of 10 individual categories (see Figure 21).

**Figure 21: Operational attributes of WoG: organized by individual categories**

The framework that emerged at the end of Chapter 4 (noted below in Figure 22), made an effort to distill insights from the literature with respect to the degree to which attributes behaved as organizational barriers to achieving WoG. The literature revealed that these attributes categories reflected organizational elements of a WoG instrument and its surrounding ecosystem that could very much behave as incentives or opportunities for achieving cross-boundary collaboration. The model persisted in presenting the attributes as individual categories with some effort to cluster them to reflect certain commonalities. Based on an analysis that looked at literature from the 2002-2012 window, the vast
majority of the attributes were discussed as barriers to WoG. However, their resistance to change and innovation determined if they should be considered an incentive to WoG or a barrier. The preliminary model for WoG makes some suggestions around the degree to which an attribute is resistant to change and, as a result, presented the attributes in clusters: 1\textsuperscript{st} tier Barriers, 2\textsuperscript{nd} tier barriers and 3\textsuperscript{rd} tier barriers. 1\textsuperscript{st} tier barriers (noted in blue) included structural attributes such as accountability models and organizational design which were deemed to have a high degree of negative impact on efforts to collaborate across departmental boundaries \textit{and} were difficult to change for the better due to the primacy of ministerial accountability and the inflexible nature of the vertical line departments that characterize Westminster systems of government. 2\textsuperscript{nd} tier barriers (noted in green) still had a high degree of impact on WoG efforts; however, the literature review concluded that it may be possible to influence these attributes so that they behaved more as incentives for WoG through organizational innovations that would require champions and leadership but not necessarily the political will of the prime minister’s office. It should be noted that the manifestation of both 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} tier barriers (silo mentality, differing worldviews encompassed and reinforced by organizational culture, funding frameworks linked individual departments) represent the very reason that cross-boundary collaboration is necessary in the first place. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} tier barriers (noted in orange) could still have a high degree of impact on WoG efforts; however, the literature was more optimistic about our collective ability to identify individuals and leaders who would be considered well-equipped to work on cross-boundary initiatives and teams. Opportunities to overcome barriers related to these attributes were more numerous, more inclined to happen accidently or organically and required less organizational effort to achieve on a small scale. As an attribute the political environment was placed at the centre of the model as a reminder that its existence has unique repercussions for cross-boundary efforts in public sector organizations and that political will should be thought of as a form of finite and heavily guarded currency that can be used for effecting changes that would be conducive to achieving WoG objectives.
Based on the case studies and the insights gleaned from WoG practitioners, this preliminary framework for WoG has been revised to reflect a deeper understanding of how the various operational attributes behave and interconnect (see Figure 23). While the core elements of the framework still apply, it now attempts to convey more of the practical realities of what is involved with operationalizing WoG. This summative model of WoG begins with the assumption that there is no single roadmap for achieving WoG. It aims to assist WoG practitioners in their efforts to, first, evaluate the strengths and unique characteristics of the organizational boundaries that need to be overcome, second, take into consideration the interconnected nature of the operational attributes and, finally, use context-specific insights to inform key design choices related to the form, function, resourcing and measurement of WoG instruments. The updated model is discussed over the following pages.
Figure 23: Final framework: Operationalizing WoG as an approach to fragile and conflict-affected states
The final framework for operationalizing WoG as an approach to fragile and conflict-affected states includes five components. First, the framework insists that several key contextual lenses be considered in the design and implementation of WoG instruments. Second, the individual operational attributes are included but have been refined. They are slightly less generic in their descriptors and aim to better describe the area of public sector management being examined. Third, the framework suggests five key ways in which the operational attributes are interconnected. It is not an exhaustive list but is intended to emphasize to practitioners that failing to recognize the critical connections between the attributes can severely impact the ability of the WoG instrument to achieve cross-boundary collaboration. Fourth, the framework emphasizes to the reader that the operational attributes can be assembled to yield any number of different WoG instruments and that the form and function of the instrument should be informed by the contextual factors and the ways in which attributes are interconnected. Finally, the framework concludes with a reminder that considering how WoG will be measured along a number of dimensions is a vital part of the design and implementation processes. The components are discussed in more detail below.

**Context**

The initial framework acknowledged the importance of the political environment as an ever-present force on the management of public resources. The case studies reiterated the importance of the political element but also introduced and discussed a number of other critical contextual elements that should be taken into consideration when examining how various operational attributes can work together to foster WoG efforts. As a result, the framework now includes two other contextual lenses that influence how WoG is operationalized. First, the case studies highlighted certain characteristics of the
operating and programming environment that are unique to fragile and conflict-affected states. The civil-military dynamic is a defining feature of WoG in these complex operational environments. Different professional languages, time horizons, operational priorities, risk tolerance, access to funds and equipment, decision making paradigms and perspectives on the role of ‘other’ in stabilization activities are some ways in which the civil-military tension manifested itself within the case studies. Moreover, the contrasting experiences of WoG practitioners in the field versus those working at headquarters, the pronounced political pressures and the volatility, danger and high-costs of the stabilization environment require WoG in this context to be flexible, adaptable, resilient and very aware of the unique cultural differences that exist between civilian and military actors.

The framework now also acknowledges that the operationalization of WoG is heavily influenced by pre-existing boundaries that exist between actors who are being asked to work together. Described here as the WoG ecosystem, this contextual element speaks to the reality that new WoG instruments are inevitably being created within a cast of characters (departments and units) that includes previous efforts at cross-departmental coordination. Sometimes these efforts have expired but the institutional knowledge still exists and should be considered. Other times multiple WoG instruments exist side by side, as different tools to be used for different purposes, as seen in the UK case where the SU, the Conflict Pool, the National Security Council and a cross-cutting Public Service Agreement targeted at conflict prevention all co-existed. The ecosystem metaphor also encompasses the idea that new organizational initiatives are launched amidst a web of pre-existing relationships that can impact the efficacy and efficiency of a WoG
instrument. These themes were prominent in both case studies. In the Canadian case the pre-existing relationship between CIDA and DFAIT clearly impacted CIDA employees’ attitudes on the value of the lead department model embodied by START. In the UK case, the WoG ecosystem included not only the SU and the Conflict Pool but also pre-existing expertise related to conflict and fragility in each of the parent departments. In order to navigate the ecosystem, with its pre-existing boundaries and relationships, effectively and realize the potential efficiencies and innovations that exist at these boundaries, the dynamics of the ecosystem must be well understood and taken into consideration when designing or refining a WoG instrument or approach.

**Operational Attributes**

The updated framework continues to included the operational attributes as individual categories, despite the case studies revealing the depth of their interconnected nature. Noting them individually allows the viewer to see them as building blocks that can be positioned in any number of ways. Each attribute area can still hold any number of innovations or modifications that could be mobilized to foster WoG. Persisting with the individual categories also highlights the lesson that multiple facets of public management exist and must be aligned in order to foster or achieve cross-boundary collaboration. They are also a reminder to practitioners of the various areas of expertise that must be engaged in order to operationalize WoG.

The summative model identifies 13 attribute categories. The growth in attribute categories is largely a result highlighting some important operational considerations that were encapsulated within one of the original attribute categories. For example, two key aspects of organizational design are now noted and instead of a single category called “Funding and Resources” the revised framework displays an attribute called “Funding
Models” and one called “Staffing Models” to reinforce the idea that determining how to fund and staff a new WoG instrument are important, yet distinct choices that are made throughout the design process. Additionally, “Joint Assessment & Training”, which was originally discussed in the context of organizational culture and human resource management, has become its own high-level attribute as a result of the case studies and reflections from practitioners. Finally, the case studies emphasized that co-locating staff who were tasked with WoG objectives was understood by practitioners as an important enabling condition for WoG, hence, the new operational attribute: “Shared physical space”.

The three attributes highlighted in yellow reflect those that were discussed in the cross-case comparison as being ripe for reform regardless of whether or not a new WoG initiative is being undertaken. These operational attributes related to organizational systems (human resource management, information management and institutional performance management) are vehicles whereby WoG can be systematically achieved across a government and, emphasize the critical role of central agencies as enablers (or obstacles) to WoG. In associating these attributes with not just the corporate functions within line departments but also the powerful central agencies, the framework reveals why reforming these systems can be a significant undertaking that might involve just as much political will and financial resources as new machinery of government.

Interconnected Nature of the Attributes
The analysis of study participant insights in both cases revealed how difficult it was to discuss the various operational attributes of WoG as individual, self-contained entities. It was clear that in practice the relationships between the attributes are complex and cannot be distilled into distinct categories. The framework includes five ways in
which the operational attributes of WoG can impact each other. It is not intended to be a finite list. They are the most prominent themes from the individual cases and the cross-case analysis and, arguably, would be relevant and applicable to most WoG initiatives being undertaken today as approaches to fragile and conflict-affected states.

**Choice of WoG Instrument**

The framework seeks to communicate the idea that operational attributes can be assembled in a wide range of ways that will yield different WoG instruments. Ideally, the choice and design of the instrument will reflect a strong fit with the previously mentioned contextual elements. This aspect of the framework reflects the insight that when choosing to undertake a WoG exercise there is not a single instrument that is most likely to achieve the desired level of coordination and coherence. Practitioners should be cognizant of the various instruments that can be implemented to advance WoG objectives. This aspect of the framework also reminds the reader that designing a WoG instrument should not involve achieving a best practice but instead a best fit to the WoG ecosystem in which its being implemented. The case studies are effective as windows into why different WoG instruments, thought to be so similar to each other, would actually be designed so differently.

**Measuring WoG**

The framework concludes with a reminder that evaluating WoG instruments should involve measuring how well a unit or team engaged in cross-boundary collaboration; yet such measures or indicators of success do not currently exist. The framework acknowledges that the ability of the instrument to achieve its desired impact should be an aspect of evaluating WoG, but that a number of other dimensions for
evaluation exist. The cross-case comparison in this chapter discussed some of the nuances around measuring WoG and it is strongly recommended that future research aim to develop indicators that would allow researchers and practitioners to evaluate the strength of cross-boundary collaboration achieved by a dedicated unit. Additionally, the framework suggests that the proper evaluation tools might also be able to assess the development of WoG capacity (both at the level of the individual and the organization) and the development of social capital across organizational boundaries.
Research Limitations

As discussed in Chapter 2, researchers and readers must be cautious about the generalizability of findings in case studies. While the two case studies were selected for their important similarities, as has been discussed, some stark differences also existed. Moreover, while the case studies were thoroughly examined and a rich narrative presented, they still represent two singular experiences of WoG and, therefore, the findings within each case and in the cross-case analysis cannot be applied widely to all efforts at WoG in other temporal, geographic or political contexts. Nonetheless, the researcher posits that the final framework of WoG presented in this concluding chapter provides key insights. While it is certainly not a roadmap or a recipe for operationalizing WoG in every situation, it is designed to reflect the breadth of issues and attributes that can be considered in the design, implementation and evolution of WoG initiatives. The research design that guided the framework development included consideration of numerous best practices from case study researchers: careful delineation of the case boundaries, analytical generalization versus statistical generalization (generalizing to a rich theoretical framework), and the use of multiple cases and different data types.

Some readers may believe the analysis does not give sufficient attention to the performance of the two units being examined: START and the SU. Were they effective in their efforts to achieve their stated mandates? Were efficiencies achieved? Was WoG, as embodied by these two units, successful? The study is not able to draw clear conclusions on this point, in part because answering these questions, no matter how interesting such answers might be, was not within the scope of the project. The choice to focus on the conceptual and operational attributes of WoG was based on multiple factors. It was critically important to be able to incorporate practitioner perspectives captured through interviews into the analysis. It was believed that focusing too much on the question of success might be a barrier to participant recruitment due to the high-profile nature of the issues being referenced (notably the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq). Also, it was not easy for participants to distill their reflections and insights to a single WoG initiative such as START or the SU. Because of the movement of personnel through departments and positions, their understanding of WoG was informed by multiple experiences – from the coordinating bodies, to interdepartmental taskforces, to the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The interview tool as designed did not allow for conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness or performance of any specific WoG initiative. Drawing conclusions about performance more broadly, such as Canada’s approach to WoG in fragile states, was equally difficult given the myriad of distinct WoG initiatives being implemented from 2002 to 2012. Another element of the decision not to focus on performance was the challenge of determining from whose perspective success would be determined. The research is focused on WoG at the level of government departments engaged in international stabilization and humanitarian assistance in fragile states. A rigorous examination of success would have had to include an assessment of success by numerous actors beyond these departments – most notably local organizations, communities and individuals in country. While such an exercise would be very interesting and an important contribution to the WoG field, it was simply beyond the scope of this research study. It was determined that, in the absence of an established comprehensive examination of the operational attributes of WoG, this study would aim to serve as the foundational step to future work on the question of performance. Conclusions noted in this chapter support this point as the case studies revealed that a critical missing element in operationalizing WoG were effective indicators or benchmarks for evaluating WoG in its own right.

Another limitation of the research pertains to the number of participants involved with the two case studies. Participant recruitment was more successful in Canada, with the total number of participants (22) being higher than the number of UK participants (12). Moreover, the representation of participants across relevant Canadian departments was better than in the UK. UK recruitment did not include participants from either of the two central agencies and the smaller number of total participants meant that only one or two perspectives from each department was incorporated into the analysis. This limitation means that the insights gleaned from the UK participants are at greater risk of being non-representative of the experience of other colleagues and counterparts. However, this risk is present in all qualitative research regardless of recruitment numbers. In fact, a key attribute of qualitative methods, such as interviews, is that they allow the researcher to consider individual experiences and perspectives that may or may not be reflective of a consensus opinion on a topic or issue. The nature of this research is that the role of the participant interviews was to triangulate key elements of the theoretical framework.
developed in Chapter 4. Their role was to help ascertain if the theoretical framework was complete – did participants view or experience the operational attributes of WoG in the same way the theory suggested. In fact, the practitioner perspectives proved to be invaluable as they emphasized the interconnected nature of the operational attributes, added new points for consideration and deepened understanding of key barriers and opportunities for WoG.

**Research Contributions**

Notwithstanding research limitations, this study does offer valuable insights concerning both the study and practice of WoG as an approach to fragility, instability and conflict. First and foremost, the overarching objective of the study (to produce a comprehensive, interdisciplinary framework of key factors that should be considered in the operationalization of WoG) was achieved. The framework evolved through the various stages of the research and the result was a model that attempts to reflect the complex relationships that exist between operational attributes. Moreover, it highlights key factors or attributes to be considered in the design, implementation and evolution of WoG. It is not a road map for operationalization; however, it strives to clarify the breadth of issues that can and should be considered when launching a WoG initiative regardless of its size or scope. At a minimum it highlights that investing in WoG requires the thoughtful consideration of how organizational systems can enable or prevent cross-boundary collaboration and that an important aspect of developing a WoG organizational capacity involves investing in individuals with key skills and attributes. In this sense, the framework provides a management perspective on a concept that, in some disciplines, is underexplored in operational terms. It also is built, at every stage, on a commitment to integrating knowledge, theory and practical insights from multiple disciplinary perspectives. In this way it contributes to filling the theoretical and operational ‘gap’ between the disciplines of public administration, political science (international relations/security studies), and international development studies with respect to WoG as a response to fragility, instability and conflict. From the perspective of political science and international development studies, the model provides a management lens that is unique to the discourse on state fragility, stabilization and humanitarian crises.
Conversely, the model adds a new layer to public administration’s exploration of horizontal coordination by considering the distinctive challenges and demands of cross-departmental coordination in the context of volatile and hostile operational environments and with primary actors that include both civilian and military personnel.

Beyond the framework, the study yielded other models that may be able to contribute to the practice of WoG. The cross-case analysis yielded a WoG Boundary Analysis, which could be the starting point for a helpful analytical framework for WoG practitioners. Over the past 20 years, the cross-cutting nature of international stabilization environments has yielded a number of assessment tools designed to assist key actors to achieve a common understanding of the issues at hand or, at a minimum, a stronger appreciation at the outset for the ways in which their interests, mandates and approaches differ. While the Boundary Analysis tool is not tested, its emergence from the cross-case analysis suggests that, in the same way that joint conflict assessments have emerged as an important tool, it may facilitate the evaluation of pre-existing boundary relationships and assess the ability of established organizational systems to foster or deter cross-departmental activities in a systematic manner. Additionally, the conceptual analysis in Chapter 3 is a unique and comprehensive exploration of how the meaning of WoG has evolved in recent years. While it purposefully does not offer a specific definition of the concept, it does offer a conceptual model that communicates its key attributes. Given that one of the themes to emerge from the case studies is the lack of common understanding of the term WoG, it may be possible for the model developed in Chapter 3 to inform future policy or programming efforts that would benefit from a common starting point for dialogue and practice.

The three afore-mentioned outputs of the research remain timely despite the fact that the period of study (2002-2012) has become a more historical point of reference. START and the SU both still exist in their respective countries, as do many of the other stabilization-focused units that were created in the mid-aughts. As such, it may be possible for this research to contribute to their future evolution. While the WoG framework generated in this chapter is not prescriptive in nature, it does highlight the importance of several operational attributes related to human resource systems, information technology systems, institutional commitment and individual WoG skills, all
of which are influenced and informed not only by specific line departments but also central agencies. The model emphasizes that operationalizing WoG is not just the domain of those departments with specific policy interests. Others have a role to play in enabling or limiting WoG as well. The case studies may also offer a valuable frame of reference that can be used as a benchmark to assess changes that have occurred in the years since 2012.

In addition to the ongoing relevance of START and the SU within their respective systems, there has been no indication in the years since 2012 that the need for WoG has abated in any significant way. In fact, the case for WoG has only increased. Both Canada and the UK are still prioritizing foreign policy issues that emerge from fragile states – issues that continue to reflect the interplay between security and development. In the UK, the Conflict Pool evolved yet again in 2015 to become the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Deploying £1billion annually, the CSSF is under the direction of the National Security Council.

“It (the CSSF) will ensure our work in fragile or conflict-affected states supports the full range of UK objectives, as set out in the National Security Strategy and underpinned notably by the Building Stability Overseas Strategy framework. We will draw on the most effective combination of defence, diplomacy, development assistance, and national security assets at Her Majesty’s Government’s disposal to promote peace and stability and to tackle threats to UK interests arising from instability overseas” (UK Parliament, 2014).

Similarly, the Canadian government has very recently recommitted to supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development in Afghanistan through to 2020.

“On July 9, 2016, the Government of Canada announced a comprehensive package of $465 million in security and development support to Afghanistan. While important progress has been made, Afghanistan remains one of the world’s least developed, poorest and most fragile states, and continues to be characterized by pervasive human rights abuses, conflict and violence” (Prime Minister of Canada, 2016).

Moreover, the saga of instability, fragility, conflict and humanitarian crisis in Iraq and surrounding countries (most notably Syria) has persisted with the emergence of the militant group ISIS (or ISIL) and the impact it has had on regional and global security and human development since 2014. In addition to military efforts being undertaken to
combat ISIS, countries like Canada and the UK have struggled with their response to the global refugee crisis created by a chronically destabilized Middle East and how best to counter Islamic radicalization both within and beyond their state boundaries. In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau and his government have used WoG to specifically describe Canada’s approach to the refugee crisis that has had such a tremendous impact on global affairs in the past year\(^5\). These pressing issues continue to evoke the concept of WoG as an approach to cross cutting foreign policy domains. There continues to be a need for strong communication, coordination, coherence and collaboration across a swath of government departments whose mandates and expertise create a role for them in fragile states. Politicians, policy makers, practitioners and even the media continue to highlight the complex and interwoven nature of the security and development issues emerging from fragile states. The models generated in this research have attempted to better reflect these complexities and, in this sense, offer a perspective on the conceptual and operational attributes of WoG that more thoroughly reflects the reality of the human experience.

**Future Research**

The opportunities for future research highlighted by this study are numerous. Three clear directions are particularly compelling. First, given the continued prioritization of fragile states in Canadian and British foreign policy and shifting political powers in Ottawa and London it would be interesting to update the cases to reflect on how WoG has been experienced since 2012. The idea of cross-departmental collaboration remains both a policy and management issue and it is almost certain that the concept has continued to evolve both conceptually and operationally. Updating the cases to reflect recent changes in the political, temporal and social contexts would be timely and important. Second, a more focused exploration of the individual skills and capabilities of WoG professionals is needed. A targeted survey that allows for both quantitative and qualitative analysis amongst practitioners to see what individual attributes are most valuable to WoG could


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complement research generated in the field of collaborative public management. Moreover, several recent practitioner conferences and events have indicated an interest in better understanding what people are best equipped to contribute to WoG, how such people are recruited, how such skills are developed in current staff and how individual staff can be rewarded for excelling in these specific areas\textsuperscript{55}. Finally, an interesting future research project would be to examine WoG performance on the part of specific initiatives (such as START, the SU, the BSOS Board, the CSSF, or any number of interdepartmental taskforces) in an effort to identify key performance indicators or critical success factors for WoG that might take the issue of performance measurement to a higher level of analysis and rigor.

In concluding it is appropriate to return to the idea articulated by Seidman and Gilmour that the pursuit of WoG, in any of its forms, is akin to the mythical quest for the philosopher’s stone. The observations and conclusions of this study in many respects support their assessment that WoG attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Certainly the long list of individual attributes suggest a complete WoG professional would need to be a super-human being. Similarly, the challenges of changing organizational systems that are embedded in the complex relationships between organizational structure, culture and human resources or trying to account for and navigate the unpredictable impact of political interests within public organizations is daunting. Nonetheless, two unchanging norms related to the management of public organizations persist: government organizations are inherently and rigidly vertical structures and the most pressing issues facing government organizations are profoundly horizontal or cross-cutting in nature. As long as these key dynamics exist so will the quest for WoG. The cautionary note from Seidman and Gilmour is that looking for a single, magic formula to the coordination challenge is a fool’s errand. This research reinforces this assessment and posits that,

\textsuperscript{55} The UK think-tank Overseas Development Institute’s (ODI) April 2016 conference focused on \textit{Building Resilient Development Agencies in the 21st Century}. In addition to a session focused on WoG, the program included a session that set out to examine how development agencies equip and resource themselves for optimal impact (\url{https://www.odi.org/events/4358-building-resilient-development-agencies}). Similarly, the 2016 Kingston Conference on International Security Engagement Between Peace and War: How Soldiers and Military Institutions Adapt included a session on defining and generating competencies for the modern soldier (\url{http://www.queensu.ca/kcis/}).
instead, we are best served by advancing a model of WoG that is as adaptable and flexible as the practitioners engaged in its practice.
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## Appendix A: Semi-structured Interview Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Sample Questions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consent process</td>
<td>The interview process will commence with the researcher introducing herself, providing the participant with a business card and thanking them for their time. Introductions will be followed by a review of the written consent form including permission to audio-record and quote the interview. Time will also be taken to answer any questions the respondents have about the interview and nature of the study.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Warm-up Questions | 1. What is your professional background?  
2. What are your primary responsibilities in your current position?  
3. What are the first thoughts that come to your mind when I say WoG?  
4. What specific cases of WoG operations or policy making have you been professionally involved with? |
| General questions | Within the context of international stabilization/reconstruction in fragile states:  
1. Think of a time when WoG was working well.  
   - What did it look like?  
   - What challenges did you face?  
   - What success did you achieve?  
2. Think of a time when WoG was not working well.  
   - What did it look like?  
   - What challenges did you face?  
   - What success did you achieve? |
| Questions specific to the macro-coordinating body (START, GPSF, Stabilisation Unit or CPP). Wherever ‘START’ appears it will | 1. How does START go about coordinating WoG policy and programming in fragile states?  
2. How do you measure your success in coordinating WoG policy and programming in fragile states?  
3. What resource implications do you associate with WoG work?  
4. How does decision making occur amongst participating units and departments  
**The following questions will be posed if these topics do not arise through the previous questions.**  
1. What issues/challenges to WoG operations relate to the central agencies? (Treasury Board, PCO, Department of Finance)  
2. What issues/challenges to WoG operations relate to funding?  
3. Are there ways in which issues related to organizational culture support or inhibit WoG work?  
4. How do human resource policies or procedures support or inhibit WoG work? |
5. START exists as ‘lead agency’ model of WoG (i.e., situated with DFAIT). What advantages and disadvantages come with this model?
6. Departmentalism and accountability are often referenced as significant barriers to WoG. Can you provide some examples of how START overcomes these barriers? Can you provide some examples of how START struggles with these barriers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions specific to Participating units outside of macro-coordinating body</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How does your unit work with/interact with START? What formal and informal opportunities for collaboration exist?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. How does decision making occur amongst participating units and departments?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. What opportunities exist for you to influence or change policies within a WoG context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Aside from working with coordinating bodies like START, what other opportunities for WoG collaboration exist (within the context of policies toward fragile states)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. What resource implications do you associate with WoG work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. What issues/challenges to WoG operations relate to the central agencies? (Treasury Board, PCO, Department of Finance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What issues/challenges to WoG operations relate to funding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Are there ways in which issues related to organizational culture support or inhibit WoG work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How do human resource policies or procedures support or inhibit WoG work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Canada has several ‘lead agency’ models of WoG (i.e., START situated with DFAIT). What advantages and disadvantages come with this model?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Departmentalism and accountability are often referenced as significant barriers to WoG. Can you provide some examples of how these barriers can be overcome?</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summation questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Do you believe that WoG offers a more effective way of developing policy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. What do you consider to be the most important organizational factors or considerations involved with delivering on a WoG mandate?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Are there any other issues you think I should be focusing on related to the 'whole of government' Interview ends with researcher offering sincere thanks to participant for their involvement.</td>
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