Aristotle’s Concept of Analogy and its Function in the *Metaphysics*

by

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for my parents,
Jeff and Allegra

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Abstract

This thesis aims to settle an old dispute concerning Aristotle’s concept of analogy and its function in the *Metaphysics*. The question is whether Aristotle’s theory of *pros hen legomena*, things predicated in reference to a single term, is implicitly a theory of analogy. In the Middle Ages, such unity of things said in reference to a single source, as the healthy is said in reference to health, was termed the analogy of attribution. Yet Aristotle never explicitly refers to *pros hen* unity as analogical unity. To arrive at an answer to this question, this thesis explores Aristotle’s concept of analogy with an eye to its actual function in the argument of the *Metaphysics*. As such, it offers an account of the place and role of analogy in Aristotelian first philosophy.
# List of Abbreviations Used

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Aristotle’s concept of analogy is the source of an interesting disagreement. At root, the question concerns Aristotle’s concept of the unity of first philosophy, ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as it is articulated in the books of the *Metaphysics*. One central thesis of these books is that being (ἐν), though predicated in a manifold of ways, is always said πρός ἐν, that is, in relation or reference to one thing: substance (οὐσία). ¹ By Aquinas’ time, such unity of reference to a single source was known as the analogy of attribution.² The disagreement is about whether Aristotle himself conceives of analogy in this sense. Recently, Wood (2013) has argued that the concept of analogy presented in the *Metaphysics* offers a “middle ground between strict ontological univocity, which collapses the distinction between the different modes of being altogether, and a radical equivocity in which these modes lack any relation to one another.”³ Central to this position is the thesis of Brentano (1862), which distinguishes two kinds of analogy in Aristotle: the analogy of proportion, where A is to B as C is to D, and the analogy of reference to the same thing as a terminus: *ad eadem terminem*, or *ad unum* (πρός ἐν) in the style of the Latin scholastics. If we can argue that Aristotle conceives of πρός ἐν

¹ I do not mean to imply that this unity of reference secures the unity of first philosophy, which is why I am calling it one central thesis rather than *the* central thesis. I develop this point in part 2.
² See Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy” (Stanford: SEP, 2013) for a brief account of the genesis of this concept, which I discuss in more detail near the end of part 1. The concept, if not the term, is present e.g. at *de Principiis Naturae* 6.46: “Analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem.”
reference as a certain type of analogy, we cannot exclude the possibility, maintained by Wood but denied e.g. by Aubenque (2009), that “the pros hen relationship of Metaphysics IV lays the groundwork for the fully developed theory of the analogia entis that is elaborated in late Scholastic Philosophy.”

Most scholars, however, are in agreement with Aubenque on this point. Lonfat (2004) for instance has argued at length that “la doctrine de l’analogia entis n’est pas une doctrine aristotélicienne, mais une invention médiévale, correspondant à diverses relectures des corpus aristotéliciens grecs et arabes, successivement apparus en traduction chez les latins.”

Mutatis mutandis, this position was endorsed by Owens (1951), who insists that “[t]he nature and functions of the two kinds of equivocals should not be confused. To call the πρὸς ἑν type ‘analogous’ is not Aristotelian usage, though common in later Scholastic works… F. Brentano also follows this later scholastic interpretation of the Aristotelian texts.”

Hesse (1965) puts the dispute in stark relief: “[contra] those neo-scholastics and others who try to elucidate analogy in metaphysical and theological contexts from an Aristotelian standpoint”, “[t]here are, I submit, no further resources in Aristotle for this undertaking, precisely because the elucidation of analogy was not his problem”.

As the title of this thesis indicates, I shall argue that this controversy may be reduced to the question of Aristotle’s ‘concept’ of analogy, and specifically to the grounds on which it is tenable to claim that Aristotle conceives of focal (πρὸς ἑν) unity as a kind of analogical unity. In his Introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger claims that

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4 ibid., 6.
6 The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 59 & n.76.
“Aristotle himself had already understood the unity of [being], as opposed to the manifold of [its] highest [genera], as the unity of analogy.” Part 1 of this thesis aims to elucidate the grounds of this assumption, and to judge whether they are tenable. I conclude that Aristotle systematically distinguishes between analogical and focal unity, such that he would not treat the latter as a species of the former. Having drawn the distinction, part 2 aims to show how analogy and focality, though distinct in Aristotle’s thought, are nonetheless connected.

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8 “Die Einheit dieses transzendentale »Allgemeinen« gegenüber der Mannigfaltigkeit der sachhaltigen obersten Gattungsbegriffe hat schon Aristoteles als die Einheit der Analogie erkannt.” *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), 3. All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.
Chapter 2: Analogy, Focality, and Aristotle’s concept of the *analogia entis*

The chief problem facing the attempt to uncover Aristotle’s concept of the ‘analogy of being’ is that Aristotle never argues directly that being is predicated of different things by analogy. So it is necessary, as Wood (2013, p. 6) admits, to go beyond the letter of the text to justify the claim that Aristotle conceives of being in an analogical sense. Still, since we are inquiring about his *concept* or *recognition* of analogy in this sense, the very necessity of exegesis might well seem to beg the question. Hence it is of genuine concern whether “on est contraint d’admettre que, si Aristote n’a pas parlé d’analogie à propos de l’être, c’est qu’il ne voulait pas en parler”, as Aubenque contends (2009, p. 253). Wood (p. 7) dismisses this on logical grounds. True, the premise of Aristotle’s silence doesn’t necessarily lead to the conclusion of his unwillingness, nor ignorance for that matter. But his silence should engender caution: the question concerns the grounds on which it is tenable to make claims to the effect that ‘Aristotle *himself* understood the unity of being as the unity of analogy’. For there are good grounds on which to argue that such claims anachronistically attribute ‘une invention médiévale’ to Aristotle. In what follows, I aim to bring these grounds to light. As Aristotle writes,
“one who has heard all the disputing arguments as if they were opponents in a lawsuit is necessarily better able to judge.”9

Generally speaking, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is interested in the question of what ‘being’ is: τί τὸ ὄν? (Z.1, 1028b4). Unlike his philosophical predecessors, Aristotle is clearly aware of the ‘equivocity’ of being, that is, our expression of the radical heterogeneity of being(s).10 Witness for instance his general critique of the attempt to understand the fundamental elements of all things: “in general, to seek [as they did] the elements of beings without distinguishing the manifold of ways in which being is said, is to seek what is impossible to find”.11 Here, Aristotle indicates the problem that equivocation poses in the attempt to give an account of what being is.12 By the same token, he indicates why any attempt to give a univocal account of being is destined to fail, for its success would depend upon the generic identity of all beings as such, which is precisely what he is trying to deny. Yet, if the heterogeneity of being(s) is fundamentally irreducible, in what sense is it possible to give an account of what being ‘as such’ is? In book Γ et passim, Aristotle proposes a solution by arguing that being, though said in multiple ways, is always understood ‘in reference to’ (πρὸς) one thing and a single nature, rather than homonymously: τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἄλλα πρὸς ἐν καὶ

9 “Βέλτιων ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίναι τὸν ὀσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τὸν ἀμφιβητούντων λόγων ἀκροότα πάντων” (B.1, 995b2-4).
10 Though Aristotle’s ‘predecessors’ in the pursuit of wisdom (σοφία) are, loosely speaking, everyone who appears in *Meta*. A, the univocity of being was asserted most notoriously by Parmenides.
11 “ἔλος τε τὸ τῶν ὄντων ζητεῖν στοιχεία μὴ διελόντας, πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, ἀδύνατον εὑρεῖν” (A.9, 992b18-9).
12 I deliberately conflate inquiry about being with inquiry about the elements of beings. This shall resurface in part 2.
Here we find a seemingly clear distinction drawn between things said in multiple ways but πρὸς ἑν, and things said in multiple ways but ‘homonymously’. The mention of homonymy presumably refers us to the opening of the Categories, where Aristotle draws a clear distinction between things said homonymously or equivocally, and things said synonymously or univocally. Allow me to introduce the passage in full, for it is precisely this distinction between univocity and equivocity that the scholastic tradition will attempt to overcome in the notion of analogy:

[1] Things are said to be homonymous when only their name is common, but the account of being (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) corresponding to the name differs, for instance, in the way that both a human being and a drawing are ‘animate’; for only the name is common, but the account of being corresponding to the name differs; for if someone were to give an account of what it is for each of these things to be animate, he would give a proper and distinct account of each. [2] Things are said to be synonymous when both their name is common, and the account of being corresponding to that name is the same, for instance, in the way that both a human being and an ox are ‘animate’; for each of these in common is termed animate, and the account of being is the same; for if someone were to give an account of each, [defining] what it is for each of these to be animate, he would give the same account.13

Here, Aristotle draws a strict division between synonymous and homonymous λεγόμενα on the basis of a distinction between univocity (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός) and equivocity (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔτερος). Yet even here in the Categories, this logic is grounded in the being of things: beings (not words) are synonymous, and although the term ‘animate’ is predicated synonymously and univocally of all animals, this is just because what it is for

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13 ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὃν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὸνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔτερος, ὁιν ζῷων ὁ τὸ ἄθροπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὸνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔτερος· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τῷ ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἐκατέρω τῷ ζῳῷ εἶναι, ἵδιον ἐκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὃν τὸ τὸ ὄνομα κοινόν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, ὁιν ζῷων ὁ τὸ ἄθροπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς· τούτων γὰρ ἀπαρέναν κοινὸν ὄνομα προσαγορεύεται ζῷῳ, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἐκατέρου λόγον τῷ ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἐκατέρω τῷ ζῳῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει’ (Cat. 1, 1a1-12). The regular English translation of ‘being animate’ (τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι) is ‘being an animal’. Another possibility is ‘being alive’. We can predicate any of these of a drawing.
each of them to be animate is the same, so that this univocity is just our expression of the ontological identity of all animals qua animals, that is, their generic identity. At least, this is in contrast to predicating ‘animate’ of a human being and of a cartoon, which is an equivocation that leads back, similarly, to the notion of generic difference.

Once we understand that Aristotle’s distinction between homonymy and synonymy leads back to his ontological concept of identity and difference, we can see why he specifies at Meta. Γ’ that being is not said ὁμωνόμως: he is arguing that the ‘manifold of ways in which being is said’ is not simply or purely heterogeneous. There is some organizing principle of the multiplicity. But the multiplicity is real. The insistence that τὸ ὅν λέγεται πολλαχῶς clearly forecloses the possibility of arguing that being is said συνωνόμως and univocally of all being(s). So what is this sudden third possibility, πρὸς ἔν, which seems to have emerged between strict univocity on the one hand, and pure equivocity on the other?

This is where the problem begins. I want to begin by reconstructing the positive hypothesis, that is, the thesis that Aristotle conceives of πρὸς ἔν predication as a kind of analogical predication. I shall postpone voicing objections until this account is sufficiently complete. To that end, I propose that we return more directly to Brentano’s thesis that “the categories are various senses of being, which is said of them κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, and indeed in a double mode: according to analogy of proportionality, and according to analogy to the same terminus.”14 Brentano’s argument is a good test-case for the positive hypothesis because it explains, more directly than most, the sense(s)

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according to which Aristotle may be said to conceive of being as an analogically predicated term. Brentano explicates his own thesis point by point: (1) being is differentiated not as a univocal concept i.e. as genus into species, but as a homonym is differentiated into its several senses, (2) being is not an accidental homonym (ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμον), but rather exhibits a unity of analogy, and (3) this in a twofold sense: analogy of proportionality, and analogy of reference to the same thing as a terminus. He devotes the rest of his analysis to explaining each of these claims in order. I am going to set (1) aside, for we have just seen what it stands on, and because it is not particularly controversial. The grounds he provides for (2) and (3), however, are evidently crucial for our purposes.

Thesis (2), that being exhibits the unity of analogy, begins with an indirect conclusion Brentano draws from an important passage in Δ.6, which contains the first explicit mention of analogy in the argument of the *Metaphysics*. To be sure, Aristotle does not say expressly that e.g. all beings are one by analogy, but this is what Brentano infers. Here is the passage in full:

some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, and others by analogy: in number, things of which the material is one, in species things of which the account is one, in genus things of which the schema of category is the same, and by analogy, things that stand as another in relation to another. The later always follow the former, as things that are one in number are also one in species,

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15 I bypass here the thorny question of Brentano’s focus on the categories as Bedeutungen. I retain the ambiguity of R. George’s ‘senses’ (vs. meanings) only because Brentano’s dissertation was published several decades before Frege’s *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*. For a concise treatment of the general question see Fraser, “Aristoteles ex Aristotele: A Response to the Analytical Reconstruction of the Aristotelian Ontology,” *Dionysius* XX (2002): 51-69.
but not all that are one in species are one in number; but as many as are one in species are also all one in genus, while things that are one in genus are not all one in species, but are all one by analogy, while not all things that are one by analogy are one in genus.\textsuperscript{16}

With laconic precision, Aristotle distinguishes four qualitatively distinct modes of unity and arranges them in sequence:\textsuperscript{17} things that are one in species are not necessarily one in number, things that are one in genus are not necessarily one in species, and things that are one by analogy are not necessarily one in genus. But note the actual conclusion of the inference: (a.) all things one in genus are one by analogy, and (b.) not all things that are one by analogy are one in genus. Let us focus for a moment on this last clause, as Brentano does. Analogy here seems to emerge as the most comprehensive of mode of unity, capable of uniting even generic difference within itself. And what is more, Aristotle is indicating that the genera he has in mind are the highest genera of all, that is, the categorial genera themselves.\textsuperscript{18} It seems natural, then, to infer some concept of their analogical unity.

This is the inference Brentano draws.\textsuperscript{19} Then, rather boldly, he goes on to assert that “Aristotle explicitly [attributes the unity of analogy to being] in the fourth book of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} “τὰ μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐστιν ἕν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἑίδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ἄριθμῷ μὲν ὄν ἢ ἐνὶ μία, ἑίδει δ’ ὃν ὁ λόγος εἶ, γένει δ’ ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ’ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἐχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. ἓκε δὲ τὰ ἴστερα τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖ, οἷον ὅσα ἄριθμῷ καὶ ἑίδει ἕν, ὅσα δ’ ἑίδει ὡς ὅλα γένει πάντα ἐν διάπερ καὶ ἑίδει, ὅσα δὲ γένει ὡς ὅλα γένει ἐν διάπερ ἑίδει ἅλλ’ ἀναλογία: ὅσα δὲ ἀναλογίᾳ ὡς πάντα γένει” (1016b31-17a2).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} As distinct from the quantitative series of ones: “the one is always indivisible, either in amount or in kind / πανταχοῦ δὲ τὸ ἕν ἢ τὸ ποσὸ ἢ τὸ εἶδε άπαραιτοῦ” (1016b23-4). For a thorough account of this distinction cf. Halper, “the series of ones,” in One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Alpha – Delta (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2009), 135-45.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Halper also argues that since what is one in species is what is one in logos, and since “[e]very species, from the lowest to the highest, is one in formula” (ibid., 139), we cannot interpret σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας as any lesser genus. There are no logoi of the highest genera, because a logos involves the specification of some higher genus. We may call them the kinds or even modes of being, but the point is that being is not some higher genus, but something that belongs primarily to substance(s).
  \item \textsuperscript{19} “Since the concepts belonging to the various categories are all called beings (onta), the correctness of [conclusion b.] becomes at once apparent if one attributes to being the unity of analogy” (ibid., 89).
\end{itemize}
the *Metaphysics*. Of course, if this were true, the question concerning Aristotle’s concept of the *analogia entis* could be resolved without dispute. Needless to say, it is not, but the assumption Brentano makes is instructive. As evidence, he cites Γ.2 on the πρὸς ἐν predication of being. His assumption that focal unity is a sort of analogical unity, and that the focal analysis of Γ.2 therefore reveals some concept of the *analogia entis*, is justified only by thesis (3), that is, that focal predication for Aristotle involves an analogy of attribution to the same thing as a terminus. This, I am arguing, is the decisive point.

Before we consider thesis (3), I want to return to the distinction drawn in thesis (2) between accidental homonymy and analogical unity. The relation is not immediately obvious, but when we recall that the notion of homonymy leads back to the notion of generic difference, it is easier to see. Brentano makes the following inference: (i.) the division between ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα in the *Categories* is exhaustive and excludes any third possibility; (ii.) therefore, since being is not univocally named, it must be equivocally named; (iii.) therefore, Aristotle uses the word equivocally-named (ὁμώνυμον) in a narrow sense, viz. what is equivocally-named by chance (ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμον), and in another sense: what is equivocally-named by analogy (ὁμώνυμον κατ᾽ ἀνάλογίαν).

There is no modern scholarly consensus about how the theory of naming outlined at the opening of the *Categories* relates to the theory of focal reference articulated in the *Metaphysics*. Most argue, like Brentano, that the division between ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα is exhaustive, and that beings (ὄντα) must therefore be said homonymously. In order to account for Aristotle’s insistence at Γ.2 and Z.4 that being is not said

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20 “mit klaren Worten”, ibid.
homonymously (οὖχ όμωνύμως) but rather πρός ἐν, we assume some kind of implicit distinction between ‘accidental’ or ‘chance’ homonymy on the one hand, and ‘core-dependent’ or ‘systematic’ homonymy on the other. Brentano rather speaks of ‘analogue’ homonymy, but effectively conflates this with focal homonymy, because he is arguing that focal unity is a kind of analogical unity. We shall sort this out in due course. There is, however, an alternative. In what follows, I provide the basis of this alternative in brief, in order that we might compare it with Brentano’s thesis that Aristotle thinks of being(s) as an example, perhaps the paradigmatic example, of what is equivocally-named by analogy (ὁμώνυμον κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), a phrase, it should be said, Aristotle never quite uses. Then we shall consider thesis (3).

In short, the alternative emerges from a subtle reading of the last line of Categories 1, which I have neglected thus far. It concerns Aristotle’s notion of paronymy: “[3] Things are said to be paronymous that have their name from something differing in termination, as the grammarian is from grammar and the courageous is from courage.” It is this relationship of derivation that is curious, for it seems to approximate

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22 He comes close at EN I.6 (1096b26-32) and Phys. VII.4 (248a23-5); we will examine these passages later on.
23 “παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικός καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρείος” (1a12-4).
the notion of focal (πρὸς ἄν) reference. I want to clarify the grounds of this alternative reading, for it suggests *inter alia* that Aristotle is preparing here the concept of a * tertium quid* between synonymy and homonymy parallel to the theory of πρὸς ἄν λεγόμενα articulated in the *Metaphysics*.²⁴ Brentano does not consider this alternative. Wood (2013) gives the outline of its basic premises and passages, but much of this depends on the highly complex and multi-layered analysis conducted by Paul Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor* (p. 309-322). I aim to elaborate only what pertains to the elements of this alternative reading.

Ricoeur begins with the premise that distinguishing paronymy in this way from the other two modes of predication would be pointless unless it clarified something about the formal organization of the categories. The notion of derivation becomes operative in *Cat. 2*, where Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of the copula *is*: “of beings, some are predicated of a subject, but are not in a subject”, in the way that human (secondary substance) is said of Socrates (primary substance), while “others are in a subject, but are not predicated of a subject”, in the way that musical (quality) is said of Socrates, though some beings are susceptible to both modes of attribution, while others are subject to neither.²⁵ Encouraged by his explanation “by being in a subject I mean … being incapable of being independently of that subject”,²⁶ we may infer that Aristotle has in mind the distinction between essential (*kath’ auto*) and incidental (*kata symbebekos*) predication: ‘human’ is predicated of Socrates essentially, ‘musical’ is predicated of him incidentally. This distinction between essential and incidental modes of the copula,

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²⁴ Ward (*ibid.*, 105-6) takes issue with Owen’s (1960) interpretation of focality as a * tertium quid*. I shall be more precise later on; it is used here mainly for rhetorical effect.
²⁵ “τῶν δὲ τῶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔστιν … τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστὶ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται” (1a20-4).
²⁶ “ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ λέγω … ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ὃ ἔστιν” (1a23-4).
considered according to presence and absence, yields four classes of substantives, two primordial (Socrates, human) and two derivative (musical, tan). Thus, we uncover the concept of derivation.\textsuperscript{27}

It is important to keep the divisions distinct. Even derivative entities like colors are capable of essential predication; beings of derivative categories can be treated as subjects in their own right, rendering them capable of \textit{per se} analysis. This is why it is possible to predicate ‘blue’ of a color, without specifying what the color is the color of. Blue and grey are generically and therefore univocally and ‘synonymously’ colors. In turn, all colors are species of quality. As such, all colors are capable of essential predication and univocal analysis. And yet this notional independence is understood to be \textit{derivative} from the primordial attribution of secondary substance to primary substance.\textsuperscript{28} This notion of derivativeness, though implicit, is nonetheless at work.

In a moment, we will see how this is related to paronymy. First, let me recall our primary interest: what is the function of \textit{analogy} in this discussion? We are interested in discussing the modes of naming only insofar as this contributes toward understanding a.) the theory of \textit{πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα} operative in \textit{Metaphysics} Γ, and b.) its relation to Aristotle’s concept of analogy.\textsuperscript{29} In this regard, Ricoeur poses exactly the right question:

How does analogy enter into this, if not explicitly (since the word is never mentioned), at least implicitly? Its avenue is this, that as the modalities of the copula become more varied, they progressively weaken the sense of the copula in the passage from primordial, essential predication – which alone is held to have a

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. 6b11-15, where verbs for being in various positions “\textit{παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται}.”

\textsuperscript{28} Kosman, \textit{The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), esp. 27-30, argues that the distinction between primary and secondary substance is overcome in the \textit{Metaphysics}. This is crucial, but it does not undermine this reading of the \textit{Categories}.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Prima facie}, it is tempting to propose that synonymy:univocity :: homonymy:equivocity :: paronymy:analogy. Substituting the Greek equivalents (justified by the text of \textit{Cat.} 1) we would obtain synonymy:homology :: homonymy:heterology :: paronymy:analogy. But things are not so simple.
synonymous sense – towards derived, accidental predication. A correlation suggests itself, therefore, between the distinction made in the Categories on the level of morphology and predication, and the great passage of Metaphysics Γ on the reference of all categories to a first term, texts read by medieval thinkers within the framework of the analogy of being. This correlation is set forth in Metaphysics Z, the text par excellence on substance, which explicitly relates the various forms of predication – and hence the categories – to possible equivocation in regard to the first category, ousia.  

This ‘correlation’ is the key. Now inasmuch as it ‘suggests itself’, it is problematic to claim that this is Aristotle’s own suggestion: we are on no firmer ground than ‘those neo-scholastics and others who try to elucidate analogy in metaphysical and theological contexts from an Aristotelian standpoint.’ But the hypothesis that this correlation is explicitly ‘set forth’ in Meta. Z gives much firmer ground to our thesis concerning the function of paronymy, and possibly of analogy, in Meta. Γ. To clarify: we are noticing a connection between the notion of derivative attribution implicit in the Categories, and the theory of focal (πρὸς ἑν) reference articulated in the Metaphysics. In the Categories, we discovered an implicit distinction between primordial and derivative attribution, as well as a more explicit distinction between essential and incidental attribution. This makes the distinction of paronymy from synonymy functional: only the said-of relation admits of univocal analysis. Primordially, or shall we say primarily, this per se relation belongs to substance(s). Even so, it is understood to hold derivatively of non-substantial being(s). Clearly, the degree to which this corresponds to Γ’s theory of focal reference is not

30 Here Ricoeur quotes Vuillemin: “In the same way, Aristotle assumes the theory of analogy in the Categories: being is said in different ways, but these different acceptations are ordered in that they all derive, more or less directly, from a fundamental acceptation that is the attribution of a secondary substance to a primary substance” (trans. Czerny, 419, n.4).

negligible. So let us turn toward the relevant passages of book Z to see Aristotle make
the explicit connection between derivation and focality.

The ‘correspondence’ between derivative attribution and focal reference is
articulated most explicitly in *Metaphysics* Z. We detect it already in chapter one, where
Aristotle is explaining the priority of substance. Near the end of this chapter, Aristotle
distinguishes three ways in which ‘primary’ (τὸ πρῶτον) is said, and argues that
substance is prior in all three modes: in account (λόγῳ), in knowledge (γνώσει), and in
time (χρόνῳ). (He does not explain its temporal priority until later, so I shall set this
aside). He explains:

For none of the other categories is separable, but only this one; and in account this
is primary (for in the account of each thing, that of its substance must be
included); and we suppose we know (εἰδέναι) each thing most when we know
what it is (τί ἐστιν γνώμεν) – a human being or fire – rather than of-what-sort or
how-much or where it is, since we know even each of these things themselves
when we know what a quantity or a sort is.32

Here, understanding the priority of substance is not simply a matter of understanding its
linguistic function as the ultimate subject of predication, in the sense e.g. that when I
speak of a quantity or quality I am implicitly referring to the quantity or quality of a
substance. Instead, we discern the concept of substance being primarily what the other
categories are derivatively, namely, what something is (τὸ τί ἐστιν). Essence belongs
primarily to substance, and derivatively to the other categories. Aristotle emphasizes that

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32 «Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθέν καταρακτάτοις, αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη· καὶ τὸ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον
(ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐννοήσιν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τὸν ὑπομένεια ἔκαστον
μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γνώμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, μάλλον ἢ τὸ ποιόν ἢ τὸ ποιόν ἢ τὸ ποιόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
αὐτῶν τοῦτων τὸ ἔκαστον ἠξεμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποιόν ἢ τὸ ποιόν γνώμεν” (1028a33-b2).
we know each thing most (μάλιστα) when we know what rather than where, when, how-much, in-what-position (etc.) it is. Primarily, “what-it-is indicates substance / τὸ τι ἐστὶν σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν”, Aristotle writes, “for when we say what [vs. what-sort, how-much] something is, we say not that it is white or hot or three feet long, but that it is a human being or a god” (1028a14-8). Yet even these non-substantial attributes, he implies, are, in a derivative way, what something is.

This concept resurfaces near the end of Z.4, where Aristotle draws the explicit connection between derivative attribution and focal reference. The language of derivation becomes explicit at 1030a22, where he writes, “just as is belongs to all [beings], though not in the same way, but to [one sort] primarily (πρώτως) and to the rest derivatively (ἐπομένως), so too what-something-is belongs simply to substance, but in a qualified way to the rest; for we may also ask what a quality is, such that quality is also what something is, though not simply [i.e. without qualification]”.33 Tredennick and Ross respectively translate ἐπομένως ‘secondarily’ and ‘in a secondary way’.

Presumably, they were thinking of the Latin root secundus (following, next-in-order). This is intriguing, insofar as it captures the notion of sequence and seriality. But it fails to capture the concept of derivation that Aristotle is trying to emphasize.34 What we ought to notice, given our interest in the correlation of this passage with the modes of predication outlined at the beginning of the Categories, is the way in which Aristotle is correlating primordial and derivative attribution of the copula (τὸ ἐστὶν) with the

33 ὀσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν ύπάρχει πάσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτος τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τι ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιόν ἐρωίμεθ᾽ ἂν τι ἐστὶν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ποιόν τὸν τι ἐστὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὧν ἀπλῶς” (1030a21-5).
34 There is presumably a reason to use ἐπομένως rather than δευτέρως. Perhaps ‘secondary’ could also imply ‘tertiary’ etc., in the manner of a series, while Aristotle is trying to emphasize the focality (rather than seriality) of the categories. I will return to this distinction.
unqualified and qualified attribution of quiddity (τὸ τί ἐστὶν). The distinction drawn in
*Categories* 2 ‘on the level of morphology and predication’, which makes the distinction
of paronymous from synonymous attribution functional, is here associated explicitly with
the ontological project of the *Metaphysics*.

Even so, we have yet to witness Aristotle associate all of this with πρὸς ἐν
reference. Thus far, the connection between derivative attribution and focal reference has
merely ‘suggested itself’. It is in the next passage – the one Ricoeur had in mind – that
this connection becomes explicit:

being-what-it-is (τὸ τί ἐστὶν), just as what-it-is (τὸ τί ἐστὶν), will also belong
primarily and without qualification to substance, and then to the rest, not being-
what-it-is without qualification, but being-what-it-is for a quality or quantity. For
it is necessary to say either that these are beings homonymously, or by adding and
taking-away [qualifications], in the way we say the unknowable is knowable,
since the right thing is to say neither homonymously nor in the same way – but as
the ‘medical’ is [said] by relation (τῷ πρὸς) to one and the same thing, not of one
and the same thing, though not homonymously either; for a patient, a deed, and a
tool are said to be ‘medical’ neither homonymously, nor as one thing (καθ᾽ ἔν),
but in relation to one thing (πρὸς ἔν).35

Thus, Aristotle deliberately associates the derivative attribution of being with his concept
of πρὸς ἔν reference. Being is attributed primarily to substance, and derivatively to the
other categories. “This transcendental mode of predication can indeed be called
paronymy,” Ricoeur writes, “by reason of its parallelism with *Categories* 1, and analogy,
at least implicitly.”36 This much is clear: Aristotle is arguing that ‘τὸ ἐστὶν, τὸ τί ἐστὶν,

35 “τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἄπλως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν, οὐχ ἄπλως τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ ποιήθηκε ἡ ποιητὴς τί ἐστιν. δὲ γὰρ ἡ ὁμοσώματος ταύτα φάναι εἶναι ὄντα, ἢ προστιθέντας καὶ ἀφαιροῦντας. ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ὅρθον ἐστι μὴτε ὁμοσώματος φάναι μήτε ὁμοσώματος ἄλλος ὡσπερ τὸ ἱατρικός τῷ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἔν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἔν, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ὁμοσώματος: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἱατρικόν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμοσώματος οὔτε καθ᾽ ἔν ἄλλα πρὸς ἔν” (1030a29-b3).
36 (ibid., 312). Ricoeur notes, “This is what … Vuillemin does: ‘So, if there is no quiddity, in the
primordial sense, with respect to a composite such as white man, there will be quiddity in a derivative
sense. There will be predications by analogy, not in a synonymous but in a paronymous fashion; the
predication is thus “transcendental”’” (ibid., 419).
and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι’ are predicated derivatively (ἐπομένως) of non-substantial being(s). But is ‘parallelism’ with the implicit argument of the Categories really enough to justify the claim that being is predicated paronymously of non-substantial being(s)? I would argue that this intuition can be justified without appealing to parallelism. Why should we assume that derivative attribution is paronymous attribution? We have seen Aristotle argue, mutatis mutandis, that ὄν is predicated derivatively of non-substantial beings. Now we need to see why it is justifiable, in Aristotle’s mind at least, to claim that τὸ ὄν is predicated paronymously of non-substantial beings. This latter thesis involves the additional claim that τὸ ὄν is itself a paronym. Is it possible to justify such a claim? Interestingly enough, the only way to do this is to refer to Metaphysics Γ.

There, after explaining the focal predication of ‘τὸ ὄν’ by analogy with ‘the healthy’ and ‘the medical’, Aristotle concludes: “so it is clear that it also belongs to one science to contemplate beings qua beings (τὰ ὄντα ὃ ὄντα). And science in every instance chiefly concerns what is primary, i.e., that from which the other things depend and on account of which they are called [what they are] (ὅι’ ὃ λέγονται)” (1003b15-7). And in the case of ontology, he specifies, this is οὐσία. Most translators jump the proverbial gun here by translating δι’ ὃ λέγονται ‘in virtue of which they get their names’ (Ross), ‘from which they get their names’ (Tredennick), and ‘through which they are named’ (Sachs). Needless to say, it is impermissible to ignore the distinction in Aristotle’s thought between τὸ ὄνομαζειν and τὸ λέγειν. On the other hand, it is clear

37 Note the shift in premise: before we were inquiring about how ὄν is predicated of all beings. Now the claim is that τὸ ὄν is predicated paronymously of non-substantial beings. Different inquiries yield different answers; homonymy and paronymy do not exclude each other. We will address this more fully in what follows.

38 Out of countless instances, and as if the opening of the Categories were not enough, let us cite Phys. I.1 on “τὰ ὄνομα τρός τὸν λόγον” (184b2).
enough that Aristotle is trying to draw our attention to the linguistic relationship between ὄντα and οὐσία. My translation ‘on account of which they are called [in this case ὄντα]’ preserves the ambiguity: Aristotle is making a point about the way in which all beings are called beings. With that in mind, let us recall his definition of paronymy: “Things are said to be paronymous that have their name from something differing in termination (ὑπὸ τινὸς διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει), as the grammarian is from grammar and the courageous is from courage.” In principle, this definition applies to the examples at Γ.2 and Z.4 of ‘the healthy’ and ‘the medical’. Does it apply to τὸ ὄν?

The reason I said the only way to justify the claim that τὸ ὄν is attributed paronymously to non-substantial being(s) is to refer to Aristotle’s conclusion in Γ.2 that οὐσία is δι’ [όντα] λέγονται is that by contemporary lights, this derivation is really the reverse: the term οὐσία derives from οὖσα, the feminine form of ὄν. Yet Aristotle’s idiosyncrasy in this regard only serves to support the contention that derivative attribution for him is paronymous, and indeed that paronymy is the nominal reflection of focal and derivative reference. As Fraser (2002) writes, “[paronymy] is just the linguistic counterpart of an underlying ontological dependency.” Hence, τὸ ὄν is not only predicated derivatively of non-substantial beings, it is predicated paronymously of them, though this latter claim is justifiable only via recourse to Aristotle himself.

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39 This is in every contemporary discussion of the etymology; cf. e.g. the LSJ Greek-English Lexicon.
40 “Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being qua Being,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXII (Summer 2002): 67. Cf. “a paronymous or otherwise derivative term … expresses the common status of a group of derivative properties relative to their principle” (68), and “πρὸς ἔν predications express the derivative status of a group of properties relative to their common subject genus” (81). Note that these properties need not belong to the genus on which they depend, e.g. odd and even are ‘numerical’ not because they are numbers but because their very definition requires reference to what is ‘numerical’ in the primary way; they are numerical in the ‘derivative’ way.
41 Fraser speculates, “It is perhaps adequate for Aristotle’s purposes that the grammar appears to reflect the underlying relations of ontic priority” (ibid., 67).
Before delivering the promised comparison, there remains one last ambiguity we ought to clarify. Though we noted the correspondence between derivative and paronymous predication on the one hand, and focal (πρὸς ἐν) and paronymous predication on the other, we are still assuming, rightly or wrongly, the correspondence between derivative and focal reference. In the last paragraph, I spoke indifferently of ‘derivative and focal reference’. What justifies such an assumption? Are these simply interchangeable? Are they two ways of saying the same thing? Our passage from Z.4 draws the explicit connection. But it does not explain it in any obvious way. Aristotle does associate derivative attribution of τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἐκτὸς with πρὸς ἐν reference through the figure of ‘adding and subtracting qualifications’. But it is not immediately clear how this process is supposed to explain or mediate the difference. We learn from Z.5 that ‘definition by addition’ means defining a property by making the name (ὄνομα) or account (λόγος) of its underlying subject (what the property is the property of) explicit, in the way that ‘number’ must eventually be “added” to the definition of ‘odd’: “And these are those things in which there is present either the account or the name of that of which they are an attribute, and which cannot be explained separately (ὅλλος ἐπὶ ἄλλος ἐξ ἑκάστης ἔκτος) or without the name of the property (ὄνομα ἐπὶ ἄλλος)” (1030b23-6). The process of ‘addition’ is therefore the explication of this underlying dependency.

42 “ταύτα δ᾿ ἔστιν ἐν ὃσις ύπάρχει ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ἐκτοῦ τὸ πάθος, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ὅλλος ἐπὶ ἄλλος ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεται ἄλλος ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ ἢνετ τοῦ χώρου” (1030b23-6).
This mode of definition, Fraser observes, “applies, at the most general level of
analysis, to the non-substance categories themselves; a point that is borne out by
Aristotle’s observation, at Θ 1045b31, that the non-substance categories each contain the
definition of substance … just as each particular kind of non-substance contains the
definition of its proper subject” (p. 66-7). As we saw, this reference to substance is not
merely extrinsic: we cannot even explain what a quality is without referring to what
primarily ‘indicates substance’; a quality is what some underlying subject is, e.g. what the
surface is, even though this surface is ultimately the surface of some substance. (This is
why it is not the human per se that is pale, but her skin that is pale.) It is easy enough to
see how ‘defining by addition’, i.e., specifying the mode(s) of dependency exhibited by
the categories relative to substance, can be conceived as a process of focal explication.
But does this help us see the sense in which focal reference corresponds to derivative
attribution?

With our eye on this connection, I suggest we return to Aristotle’s distinction
between adding and taking-away. Sachs (2002) offers a brief gloss on the difference; too
brief, but enough to clarify the relation: “That is, since a quantity (say) is a being only in
a qualified sense (with an addition), it is a being in less than the full sense (with a
subtraction)” (p. 123). That is to say, defining ‘by subtraction’ is simply the inverse
correlate of defining by addition. Derivative attribution is ‘by subtraction’ in the same
way that focal explication is ‘by addition’: each is the inverse of the other. To answer the
question we posed earlier: they are interchangeable because they are two ways of saying
the same thing.\(^43\)

The foregoing considerations illustrate that the qualified identification of focal reference and derivative attribution can be justified by recourse to the *Metaphysics* alone, though the actual definition of paronymy required recourse to the *Categories*. Before we compare all of this with Brentano’s account, I want to draw our attention to a striking confirmation of this interpretation in the well-known argument of *Nicomachean Ethics* I.6 about ‘the good’. This argument begins with Aristotle’s critique of the failure to distinguish between primary and derivative instances of a form: “ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστερον ἐλέγον” (1096a17). He proceeds to distinguish between goodness in the category of substance, goodness in quality, quantity, and so on. The good is not predicated univocally. However, Aristotle eventually raises an objection to his own critique,

on the grounds that the [Academic] arguments were not meant to concern every good, but that the goods said according to one form are those that are pursued and desired *per se*, while the things that are productive or somehow protective of them, or are preventative of their opposites, are said [to be goods] on account of these (διὰ τὰ ταῦτα) and in another way. And so it is clear that ‘goods’ would be said in two ways: some *per se*, and others on account of these (διὰ τὰ ταῦτα).

Clearly, this corresponds to Aristotle’s argument in *Metaphysics* Γ.2. We discern the telltale signs of paronymy and derivation: what is ποιητικὰ (stressed in both passages) or

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44 This is an egregious oversimplification, justified by the fact that I am merely trying to offer a brief sketch of the argument preceding the passages I actually want to emphasize. For a concise treatment of the interpretive issues involved in this part of the text, see Kosman, “Predicating the Good,” *Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 13 (1968): 171-74.

45 “διὰ τὸ μή περὶ παντὸς ἁγαθοῦ τοῖς λόγοις εἰρήσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ’ ἐν ἐδῶς τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἁγαπόμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δὴ λοιπὸν οὐν ὅτι ὑπεττὼς λέγοιτ’ ἄν τάγαθα, καί τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτά, θάτερα δε διὰ ταῦτα” (1096b9-14). For διὰ ταῦτα, Sachs translates, ‘are spoken of as good by *derivation* from these’ and ‘some on account of themselves and others *derived* from these’.
φυλακτικά of what is good *per se* is called good in a derivative way, i.e. with qualification. To define what it is for them to be good is to specify their relation to what is good without qualification. The concept of focal reference is all but explicit. Further, just as in Γ.2, Aristotle is drawing our attention to the *way* in which all goods are called goods: there is what is called good in the primary way, ‘on account of itself’, and what is called good ὑπ' what is called good in the primary way. The good is attributed primarily to some things, and derivatively to others.

It is clear enough that the good is not predicated univocally and synonymously of all goods. But does this mean that good is predicated in the way that ‘bank’ is said of the land alongside a river and of the place that keeps our money? Is there not any intrinsic connection? Something like this leads to that critical passage of EN I.6 on which most discussions of analogy and focality in Aristotle depend.46 I reserved it until now, because I wanted it to confirm (not control) our reading of the *Metaphysics*, and because it links our current discussion of focality and paronymy back to our earlier discussion of focality and homonymy by analogy (*kat' analogian*). For reasons we are about to witness, ‘focal paronymy’ and ‘focal homonymy’ are not mutually exclusive alternatives. (Nor are focal and analogical homonymy, but I will sort this out later). Aristotle writes,

But then in what way *is* good said? For it certainly doesn’t seem like those things that are homonymous by chance. But then are [goods homonymous] by being [derived] from (ὑπ’) one thing or [by] all contributing toward (πρὸς) one thing, or rather by analogy? For as sight is in body, intellect is in soul, and another is in

46 So e.g. Brentano takes the class of *apo tyche homonyma* at EN I.6 as a premise in order to explain *ouk homonymôs* at Meta. Γ.2 & Z.4, but this is widespread. Also, ‘something like this’ is another sketchy oversimplification. Wilson, *Aristotle’s Theory of the Unity of Science* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 197, explains, “[b]ut the EN also moves beyond ends-means focality. The further development comes at 1096b14-26, where Aristotle calls on us to set aside the means and consider whether the ends themselves are good in accordance with a single form (κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν). He claims that the definitions of honour, prudence, and pleasure are different and distinct *qua* goods (ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταῦτα ἡ ἰγαθᾶ). Since they are not related as ends and means and do not share a common definition *qua* goods, we are forced to consider whether they are chance homonyms.”
another. But perhaps these things ought to be let go for now, since to be completely precise about them would belong more to another [mode of] philosophy.\(^{47}\)

Here we find Aristotle distinguishing derivative (ἀφ’ ἐνός) and focal (πρός ἐν) homonymy on the one hand, from homonymy by analogy (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν) on the other.\(^{48}\) As we saw, the distinction between derivative attribution and focal reference, though crucial, is a question of inversion. But Aristotle appears to be drawing some distinction (μᾶλλον) between this mode of homonymy on the one hand, and homonymy ‘by analogy’ on the other. In part 2, I will explain why it is important for Aristotle to distinguish between focality and analogy. For the moment, I want to draw our attention to the fact that all three modes of predication are said to be modes of homonymy.\(^{49}\)

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\(^{47}\) "Ἄλλα πός δή λέγεται; οὐ γάρ ἐσοκε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμορρύμοις. ἀλλ’ ἀρά γε τῷ ἀφ’ ἐνός εἶναι ἔπρος ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὑμῖν, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἦλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ’ ἵσιος ταῦτα μὲν ἄφαιτον τῷ νόμῳ ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἐν εἰς ἑνος φιλοσοφίας οἰκεῖότερον" (1096b26-32). The contrast between ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμορρύμοις and ἀφ’ ἐνός is somewhat lost in translation.

\(^{48}\) It may be objected that I am conflating πρός ἐν and πρός ἐν συντελεῖν. The latter implies hypothetical necessity: X (e.g. self-nourishment) needs to be there in order for Y (e.g. sense-perception) to be accomplished, such that Y necessitates X. By contrast, there is no obvious sense in which substance necessitates the non-substantial categories; indeed, the reverse seems to hold: they are πρός ἐν because they require substance, not because substance requires them. (On the other hand, cf. Fraser [2002, 73]: “It is one thing to suggest that Socrates can exist apart from his present sickly pallor, or his present state of lying at rest. As soon as Socrates returns to health his complexion will improve and he will rise from bed to resume his normal routine. But it is quite another thing to claim that Socrates can exist without any complexion, any quantity, or any position. The categories of non-substantial being determine the very conditions for the concrete existence of substances: all concrete substances have qualities, quantity, relation, temporality, position, etc., just in virtue of being substances. In this sense the relation of substance to the non-substantial categories is a necessary and essential relation, which should admit in principle of a demonstrative explication”; though cf. [2003, 150-3] for the qualification that this explication would be a posteriori).

\(^{49}\) This is clear from the context. Some scholars follow Ross in translating τὸ … ἐνα με ‘are [goods one] by’, which is less specific and keeps the ambiguity open. But it is clear from the context that EN I.6 concerns the multivocity of ‘the good’ and its intrinsic structure.
are we to understand this? The obvious affinity between these passages and our
discussion of the homonymy and paronymy of being is surely enough to justify their
comparison. Of course, this is justified more fundamentally by Aristotle’s insistence that
tάγαθόν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (1096a23), taken in reverse. So let us return to our
consideration of being qua being, and see whether we can be ‘completely precise’.

Here are the results of the inquiry so far: τὸ ὄν in the *Metaphysics* is predicated
derivatively and paronymously of non-substantial being(s) – Γ.2 & Z.4-5. This answers
the question ‘how is τὸ ὄν predicated of non-substantial beings?’ To define what being is
for a quality or a quantity, one must ‘add’ or ‘subtract’ its dependency on substance. But
it is quite another question to ask ‘how is τὸ ὄν predicated of all beings?’ One cannot
answer ‘derivatively’ or ‘paronymously’ without infinite regression. The question
concerning all beings includes substance, the primary and focal sense of being. If we
include substance in the account, we must answer: *homonymously*, but not ἀπὸ τύχης.50
Thus, we may understand τὸ ὄν as a paronym, when predicated of non-substantial
being(s), or as a homonym predicated of all being(s). Different inquiries yield different
answers. The dilemma resolves itself.

50 Fraser (*ibid.*, 69-70) makes this point indirectly: “the properties of number are ‘numerical’ (derived from
number), just as the properties of substance are ‘beings’ (dependent on ὄς). One may, of course,
predicate ‘being’ of an ὄς, just as one may call a number ‘numerical’. But on Aristotle’s view this is an
understatement: ὄς is not simply a ‘being’, it is the primary or genuine being; and number is not simply
‘numerical’, but is the principle of what is numerical. Moreover, there is homonymy in the case of
mathematics: it emerges not in the articulation of the genus, ‘number’, but in the articulation of what is
‘numerical’, i.e. the articulation of the multiple ways in which numerical properties depend upon number.
Similarly the homonymy of being concerns the articulation of the various kinds of dependent beings and
their modes of dependency.”
But in what way is τὸ ὅν said homonymously? In the *N. Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of systematic homonymy: derivative and focal homonymy, and homonymy *kat' analogian*. In *Metaphysics* Γ.2 and Z.4, where the focal paronymy of being is at issue, Aristotle specifies οὐχ ὁμονύμως. But as we saw, the inclusion of substance in the question requires the answer `homonymous τὸ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς or πρὸς ἐν, or rather κατ’ ἀνάλογιαν’. Paronymy and homonymy are not mutually exclusive. Understood in its proper context, Aristotle’s argument that being is said πρὸς ἐν but οὐχ ὁμονύμως does not preclude thesis (2), that being is the paradigmatic species of `what is equivocally-named by analogy’. Indeed, it is this passage from the *Ethics* that Brentano cites as evidence. Interestingly enough, he assumes, as do many, that Aristotle’s example of predicating the good by analogy – as sight is in body, intellect is in soul, etc. – is Aristotle’s *answer* to the question he has just posed. In part 2, we will see reason to question this assumption. However, it is on the basis of this assumption that Brentano proceeds to distinguish two types of analogy in Aristotle, and to argue that being is predicated by analogy in both ways: thesis (3).

Before turning directly to thesis (3), I want to reinforce thesis (2) by recognizing that EN I.6 is not the only place in the corpus where Aristotle considers the possibility of being homonymous by analogy. The crucial instance of this, as Ward (2008) has argued, occurs in *Physics* VII.4, where Aristotle is considering the comparability (“commensurability”) of motions, specifically motions of different kinds. As in the
*Ethics*, the homonymy of motion is essentially determined by the homonymy of being, for “there is no motion apart from things. For what changes always changes either with respect to substance, quantity, quality, or place, and there is nothing common to these to grasp … which is neither ‘this’ nor quantity nor quality nor one of the other categories; such that neither motion nor change will be something besides the things mentioned, since indeed, there is no being besides the things mentioned”.51 The ensuing conclusion that “there are just as many kinds of motion and of change as there are of being”52 justifies comparing the *Physics* on motion with the *Metaphysics* on being in the same way that τάγαθον ἵσαχος λέγεται τῷ ὅντι warranted comparison with the *Ethics*.

*Physics* VII.4 essentially concerns the comparability of motion. If this sounds odd, it is because we have yet to recognize that motion is a homonym. Motion, like being, is said homonymously. Indeed, motion is said homonymously because being is said homonymously. Not only are there different motions, there are different kinds of motion. The homonymy of motion reflects the homonymy of being. Any discussion of the commensurability of generically distinct kinds of motion must therefore take into account the problem of homonymy. In discussing the homonymy of motion, Aristotle writes, “among homonyma, some are far removed, others have a certain similarity, and others are close either by genus or by analogy, for which reason they seem not to be

51 “οὕκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσόν ἢ κατὰ ποιών ἢ κατὰ τόπον, κοινῶν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, δ’ οὔτε τὸ λόγον οὔτε ποσόν οὔτε ποιών οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὕθεν· ὡστ’ οὐδὲ κίνησις οὐδὲ μεταβολή οὕθεν έσται παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, μηθενός γε ὅντος παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα” (200b35-1a4). Kosman (2013, 70) writes, “Becoming is for Aristotle the active exercise of something’s being able to be otherwise. Becoming is therefore not an ontological category separate from being; the analysis that shows motion to be a mode of activity is aimed precisely at explaining the respect in which becoming is a mode of being.”
52 “κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἶδη τοσαύτα ὅσα τοῦ ὅντος” (201a9).
homonymous, though they are.” Here, the possibility of being homonymous by analogy is explicitly affirmed. Aristotle’s concept of homonymy thus includes things that are so close ‘by analogy’ that their generic difference may go unnoticed (λανθάνει). As Ward writes, “[t]his passage … states that there is a range of homonymous things delimited by two extremes: at one end, we find little similarity, and at the other, the degree of similarity reaches the point at which it may escape our notice and so, we run the risk of assuming synonymy.”

Besides Aristotle’s clear concept of homonymy by analogy, I want to draw our attention to his emphasis on the deceptiveness of certain homonyms. This duplicity is perhaps the central problem of another locus classicus of Aristotle’s theory of homonymy, Topics I.15: “Often, even in the accounts the homonymous creeps in unnoticed, for which reason even the accounts need to be examined.” As we learn from Phys. VII.4, this is because some homonyma are so similar, either by genus or by analogy, that they are easily missed for what they are. Haven’t we heard of this problem?

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53 “τὸ γένος οὐχ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο λανθάνει πολλά, εἰσὶν τε τῶν ὁμώνυμων αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαι τινα ὁμοίατητα, αἱ δ’ ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογία, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμία εἶναι οὐσαί” (248a23-5).

54 (ibid., 106). I have omitted, “… is central to our position insofar as it …”. This seems to refer in particular to the thesis that being is said homonymously (despite οὐχ ὁμωνύμως) and in general to the term ‘systematic homonymy’, which I used to describe the theory of non-accidental homonymy outlined at EN I.6. However, Ward (14-16) follows Shields’ (1999, n.23) critique of Ross (1923, i.256) for “supposing that being must be paronymous, because it is ‘intermediate between’ homonymy and synonymy. This is evidently because he thinks the Categories recognizes only discrete homonyms. Since we have shown that Aristotle accepts [comprehensive homonymy] and not [discrete homonymy], we are free not to follow Ross in this inference.” But this assumes that the homonymy and paronymy of being exclude one another, which is unnecessary.

55 “πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει παρακολουθοῦν τὸ ὁμώνυμον· διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων σκεπτέον” (Top. I.15, 107b5-6). Note the parallel with Phys. VII.4 via λανθάνει (see note 53). The example Aristotle gives is of someone saying that “what is indicative and what is productive of health / τὸ σημαντικὸν καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας” are both “commensurately in relation to health / τὸ συμμέτρως ἔχον πρὸς ἑαυτόν”. The concept of focal paronymy is all but explicit. What is explicit is the failure to recognize the implicit equivocation. This is another example of the fact (my thesis) that homonymy and paronymy do not exclude each other. In this example, the focal dependents are paronymous, while their common reference is homonymous insofar as the mode of reference differs. So the paronyms are homonymously πρὸς ἑαυτόν.
before? Is it not precisely what is at issue in Aristotle’s critique of the failure to distinguish the manifold of ways in which being is said (μὴ διελόντας πολλάχως λεγομένων), which I cited near the beginning of this account? According to the Topics, this failure is caused by the failure to recognize the implicit equivocation in the first place. And from the Physics, we learn the cause of this initial failure: being is a ‘close’ homonym whose logoi are so similar (either by genus or by analogy) that its multivocity tends to escape notice. Being, therefore, is homonymous: either by genus, or by analogy.

The preceding account shows that the distinction drawn in thesis (2) between homonymy ‘by chance’ and homonymy ‘by analogy’ is genuinely Aristotelian. Hence, we may speak of Aristotle’s concept of analogical homonymy, etc., without anachronism.

Both the Physics and the Ethics essentially affirm the class of homonyma kat’ analogian. Thesis (2) does not attribute a medieval discovery to an ancient thinker. To be sure, critiques in this respect concern the analogy of being, not Aristotle’s concept of homonyma kat’ analogian. But I have just argued that being for Aristotle is the paradigmatic species of what is homonymous by analogy. Is this enough to justify claims about Aristotle’s “concept” of the analogy of being? Perhaps. But what about the actual content of this concept? That Aristotle has some concept of ontological analogy is now

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56 I speak of the Ethics indifferently only because the EE clearly recognizes the possibility of non-accidental homonymy: the three species of friendship “are said neither all as one (καθ’ ἑν) nor as species of one genus, nor wholly homonymously (πάμπαν ὁμονύμως)” (1236a17). As Irwin (1981) writes, “‘completely homonymously’ … suggests that there is a type of homonymy that is not complete” (532, n.14). The passage continues, “πρὸς μίαν γὰρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρῶτην, ὡσπερ τὸ ἰατρικὸν. καὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σώμα λέγομεν καὶ ὀργανὸν καὶ ἐργόν, ἄλλα κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ’ οὖ λόγος ἐν ήμιν ὑπάρχει”; note the parallel with Meta. Z.4 (cf. note 35).
clear. But what does it involve? In what follows, we turn at last to thesis (3), which claims to explain Aristotle’s twofold concept of the analogy of being.

The first aspect of thesis (3) concerns what may be termed the proportionality of being.\(^{57}\) The analogy of proportionality is undoubtedly Aristotelian. Aristotle himself gives its origin and definition in book V of the *Ethics*: “the just, therefore, is a certain proportion (ἀνάλογόν τι). For proportion belongs not only to the numbers of arithmetic, but to number in general, for proportionality (ἀναλογία) is equality of ratios, and in at least four things.”\(^{58}\) In this sense, analogy is quantitative proportionality, which consists in the equality of ratio: for instance, 8:4::4:2, namely *double*. That is to say, quantitative proportionality is equality of quantitative *relation*. (There are still four terms here because, as Aristotle points out, “even a continuous proportion is in four terms, since it uses one [term] as two and says it twice, e.g. ‘as A is to (πρὸς) B, so is B to (πρὸς) C’.”)\(^{59}\) Whether or not this analogy is mathematical (or μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἱδιον), it is *quantitative* proportionality, i.e., equality of quantitative relation.

The next mode of analogy is qualitative, in the sense that it concerns similarity or likeness (ὁμοιότητα): “those things are the same (ταὐτὰ) of which the substance is one, similar (ὅμοιοι) of which the quality is one, and equal (ἴσα) of which the quantity is one”

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57 I will not distinguish the ‘analogy of proportion’ from the ‘analogy of proportionality’ here, which is crucial in medieval debates. As Ricoeur writes, “both [are] capable of falling within the Aristotelian *analogía*” (*ibid.*, 324-5). For an account of Aquinas’ labor on this question, see *ibid.*, 322-30. Cf. Hesse (*ibid.*, 329-33) for an account of the two senses in Aristotle.

58 “ἐστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἱδιον, ἀλλ’ ὅλως ἀριθμοῖ: ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἱσότης ἐστὶ λόγου, καὶ ἐν τέταρτιν ἔλαχιστος” (1131a29-32).

59 (1131a33-b1).
(Meta. Δ.15, 1021a11-3). So similarity is oneness in quality, equality is oneness in quantity, and so on. Similarity is therefore qualitative unity. Analogy in this sense is qualitative proportion. A clear expression of qualitative proportionality is present in the Topics: “Similarity of things in different genera needs to be examined: as A is to (πρὸς) B, C is to D (e.g. as knowledge is to the knowable, sense-perception is to the sensible), and as A is in B, C is in D (e.g. as sight is in the eye, intellect is in the soul, and as calmness is in the sea, stillness is in the air).” The comparison here is not between quantities. In this sense, analogy is qualitative proportionality, which consists in the similarity of form.

Brentano divides qualitative analogy into two kinds, based on a distinction Aristotle draws at de. Gen. et Corr. II.6. Aristotle himself refers only to the second of these as analogy. The first consists of one and the same quality belonging to different subjects to the same or different degrees – for “qualities admit of the more and less” (Cat. 8, 10b26) – e.g., body A is warmer than body B to the same degree that body B is warmer than body C. As Brentano points out, this comparison is still quantitative, inasmuch as the actual terms of comparison are quantities. In Aristotle’s example, it is the amount of cooling power (δύναται ψύχειν) possessed by one measure of water and ten of air that is being compared. These are comparable according to quantity, as Aristotle says, not qua quantity, but qua so-much power (ἡ δύναται τι). This proportion is still quantitative, insofar as it is essentially quantifiable. I am not sure whether to follow Brentano here in

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60 ἡ τὴν δὲ ὀμοιότητα σκεπτέον ἐπὶ τὲ τῶν ἐν ἐπτέρως γένεσιν, ὡς ἔτερον πρὸς ἔτερον τι, οὕτως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο (οἶνον ὡς ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητίκην, οὕτως ἀισθήσεως πρὸς ἀισθητέον), καὶ ὡς ἔτερον ἐν ἐπέρω τινί, οὕτως ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ (οἶνον ὡς ὕπαι ἐν ὄφθαλμῳ, νοῦς ἐν νοηχῇ, καὶ ὡς γαλήνη ἐν θαλάσσῃ, νηνεμία ἐν ἀέρι)” (108a4-12).

61 Owens (ibid., 58) writes, “[t]he proportion can be of actions or habits to their objects, or of forms to their subjects of inhesion.”
considering this a (qualified) type of qualitative analogy. We are still considering a quantity of power. At any rate, Aristotle reserves the term for the next kind of comparison.

This type of comparison is most important for our purposes, for it appears in the *Metaphysics*. Unlike the former, it involves the proportion of *different* qualities belonging to different subjects in the same way. Aristotle writes, “instead of comparing the powers by measure of the quantity, they may be compared by proportion (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), e.g. as this is white, this is hot. Yet this ‘as’ indicates likeness in quality, but equality in quantity.”62 These sensible qualities are comparable by analogy, such that this subject is πρὸς white in the same way that (as) this subject is πρὸς hot.63 And yet, Aristotle suggests, this ‘as’ is comprehensive of unity in different categories. This point is articulated somewhat more clearly in another cryptic remark he makes near the end of *Metaphysics* N: “in each category of being there is the analogous: as the straight is in length, so is the flat in breadth, and maybe the odd in number and the white in color.”64 The analogy here is transcategorial: odd is πρὸς number in the same way that white is πρὸς color. There are several obvious disanalogies here, chief among them the difference between a property (of number) and a species (of color). Yet these serve to clarify the analogy at issue, which concerns the relation of different subjects to their qualitative determinations. What I want to draw from these relatively obscure examples is the fact that Aristotle in both instances points to the possibility of transcategorial analogy. For

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62 ἐὰν δ’ ἂν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλεσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, οἶον ὡς τὸ δε λευκὸν τὸ δὲ θερμόν. τὸ δ’ ὡς τὸ δὲ σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιὸ τὸ ὅμοιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τῷ ἴσον” (GC II.6, 333a27-31).
63 Cf. DA III.7, 431a20-b1.
64 ἐὰν ἑκάστῃ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς εὖθει ἐν μὴκει σύτως ἐν πλάτει τὸ ὅμοιον, ἴσως ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ περιττόν, ἐν δὲ χροὶ τὸ λευκόν” (1093b18-21).
this is what is crucial for understanding the proportionality (ἀναλογία) of being, what we might call ontological proportionality.

In what follows, I elucidate what I take to be the two types or aspects of ontological proportionality. In order to ground this in the text of the Metaphysics, it is necessary to return our attention to the passage from Δ.6 on the series of ones we considered earlier. There, I explained one of its implications thus: things one in species are not necessarily one in number, things one in genus are not necessarily one in species, things one by analogy are not necessarily one in genus. Now, I want to draw our attention to the inverse claim: things one in number (e.g. Socrates and Socrates sitting) are necessarily one in species (i.e. are necessarily particular instances of a certain species,

e.g. this individual named Socrates who happens to be sitting in the Lyceum is a particular instance of human-being), things one in species are necessarily one in genus (e.g. this particular human is a certain kind of animal and substance), and things one in genus are necessarily one by analogy. Halper (2009) argues that the consequence of this is that “Socrates’ being one in species should make him also one in genus and one by analogy; and each determination in this series would characterize an individual” (p. 136).

It is easy enough to see why being one in species implies being one in genus: any individual is one instance of its species, and is therefore one instance of its genus and categorial genus (e.g. animal and substance). The reverse does not hold: an instance of

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65 “the one in number means nothing different from the particular; for we speak of the particular in that way, as one in number / τὸ ἄριθμῷ ἔν ἢ τὸ καθ᾽ ἐκαστον λέγειν διαφέρει οὐθέν: οὕτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ᾽ ἐκαστον, τὸ ἄριθμῷ ἔν” (B.4, 999b33-5).
substance-being is not necessarily therefore an instance of human-being. What is not so clear is why being one instance of a genus would also make Socrates one by analogy.

Halper argues that there are two senses in which Socrates is one by analogy. These are the two aspects of ontological proportionality we ought to consider. The first is purely tautological. At *Metaphysics* Z.17, Aristotle argues that one must answer the question ‘why is something itself?’ with the equally tautological ‘because a thing is itself’ (e.g. why a human being is a human being, or why the musical is musical), and that the only way to expand on this is to explain that each thing is indivisible with respect to itself, and that this is what ‘being one’ is: ἀδιαιρετὸν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἔκαστον, τοῦτο δ’ ἢν τὸ ἑνι εἶνα, 1041a18-9. The explanation that something is indivisible πρὸς itself fits the characterization of analogical unity at Δ.6: “[things are one by analogy] that stand as something in relation to another (ἐχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο).” As Halper points out, “‘[s]omething’ and ‘another’ need not be distinct; Aristotle means only that an analogy is a four term relation, a/b :: c/d. Different letters here indicate different terms, not necessarily different values. Thus, man and musical are each called ‘one’ by analogy because man stands to itself, as musical stands to itself” (137-8). Tautologically, all beings are called ‘one’ by analogy insofar as each is necessarily the same as itself. Since each being is πρὸς itself in the same way that every other being is πρὸς itself, tautological unity is predicated by analogy.⁶⁶

The second sense in which Socrates is one by analogy is not tautological. It concerns the relation of each instance of a genus to its genus, e.g. the relation of Socrates to substance. Halper writes, “Socrates is also one by analogy in this way; that is, he is

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⁶⁶ Of course, Aristotle is arguing that such self-relation is common and uninformative; I will return to this.
called ‘one’ because he is one by analogy with everything else that is an instance of its genus. This analogy makes clear why whatever is one in genus is also one by analogy.”

Now this analogy holds indifferently of substances and non-substances alike, and at the most general level of analysis. This is where Brentano makes the crucial point: “as the human is related to its substantial being (οὐσία), so is the white related to quality as its corresponding being (ὅν), as is the number seven to quantity, etc. There is therefore an equality of relations here, an analogy, just as Trendelenburg explains, and just as Aristotle himself claimed for his categories” (p. 93). The proportionality here is purely ontological, and may thus be called the proportionality of being. Each instance of being is related to its categorial genus in the same way that all other instances of being are related to their categorial genera. That relation, we can specify, is the καθ᾽ἕν relation of an individual to its species and genus. Every instance of being is πρὸς its categorial genus in the same way, namely καθ᾽ἕν. In this way, all instances of being are analogous, regardless of which genus they belong to. Yet by the same token, we realize that the proportionality (ἀναλογία) of being is distinct, or at least distinguishable, from the πρὸς

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67 (ibid., 138), which continues, “but the universality of such analogies also signals their relative insignificance.” Again, I will return to this.

68 (ibid., 93). Corresponding is entsprechenden, equality of relations is Gleichheit der Verhältnisse. Brentano’s account of proportional analogy is explicitly indebted to the work of Trendelenburg (1846). However, as Wood (ibid., 8) writes, “Brentano takes issue with the interpretation of Adolf Trendelenberg [sic] precisely because the latter had argued that Aristotle links the different modes of being in the Categories ‘in an equality of relations.’ While Brentano does not actually deny that it is possible to find such an equality of relations among the different modes of being, his contention is that this proportional analogy does not adequately express the pros hen relationship among the senses of being enumerated by Aristotle. He thus agrees with Trendelenberg [sic] to the extent that he sees an analogical relation between the senses of being, but disagrees with him to the extent that he takes this relation to correspond more to the second form of analogy (analogy to the same terminus) than to the first, i.e., proportional analogy.”

69 Cf. Fraser (2002, 57-64): “[t]he καθ᾽ἕν connection denotes precisely and exclusively the connection of synonymy shared by the species kinds when viewed under their common generic nature” (57); “[a]ctually... καθ᾽ἕν inclusion applies throughout the descending structure of genus-species-individual, wherever a more universal term is ‘said of’ its inferiors” (n.23). “The subject of the predication can be either an individual or a species, and the predicate can be a species, genus, or differentia (3a37-b2). This scheme applies equally to the hierarchy of non-substantial genera, species, differentiae, and individuals” (n.26).
Let me now raise several objections to the preceding account of ontological proportionality. First, we should note that each passage I have introduced as an example of Aristotle’s concept of ontological proportionality (the ‘proportional’ analogy of being) emerges in a critical context: GC II.6 versus Empedocles, *Meta.* N.6 versus the (broadly speaking) Pythagorean desire to ascribe causal agency to numbers,70 and Z.17 vis-à-vis tautology. None of these are ‘positive’ arguments concerning the ἀναλογία of being.

Second, I should point out that Halper’s account is intended to show that “an analogy has little ontological status and is not the sort of unity that can be the object of knowledge. In contrast, being can be known and be the object of the science of metaphysics because it is a pros hen” (p. 145). The categorial (vs. tautological) aspect of ontological proportionality is “equally trivial” (138). Indeed, it is difficult to see what the proportionality of being tells us about being. Aristotle is clearly aware of it. But he does not seem to be concerned with its implications. Why not? I would suggest this is precisely because of its failure to disclose anything about the nature of being. Assuming that the general project of the *Metaphysics* is to understand what being is, metaphysical

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70 “These people are like the ancient Homeric interpreters who saw small similarities but overlooked large ones / ὅμοιοι δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς ἄρχαίοις Ὅμηρικοῖς, οἱ μικρὰς ὀμοιότητας ὁρῶσι μεγάλας δὲ παρορόσιν” (1093a26-8).
analogy in the sense of ontological *proportionality* has little or nothing to teach us.\textsuperscript{71} By contrast, Aristotle is interested in ontological *focality*, because understanding the being of substance is supposed to enable the understanding of being in general: τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τίς ἡ ὑσία (1028b4). It is this ‘pedagogical’ function of focality that makes it worth pursuing.\textsuperscript{72} By contrast, it is the pedagogical failure or “triviality” of ontological proportionality that makes it comparatively uninteresting, for Aristotle’s purposes at least.

Now we should attend to what this seems to entail: if ἀναλογία in Aristotle is absolutely equivalent to ‘proportionality’ in the sense of EN V.3, it is clearly necessary to draw a fundamental distinction in his thought between analogy and focality. If on the other hand Brentano is right, and Aristotle conceives of πρὸς ὑν reference as a kind of analogy, viz. analogy of reference to the same terminus, this distinction would collapse. The decision is of some importance, for it bears directly on the question of whether the theory of *ad unum* analogy articulated during the Middle Ages has any “genuine” basis in the text of the *Metaphysics*, in the sense of being exegesis of Aristotle’s own doctrine. This, I take it, is what Wood (2013, p. 6) means by “suggesting that the *pros hen* relationship of *Metaphysics* IV lays the groundwork for the fully developed theory of the *analogia entis* that is elaborated in late Scholastic Philosophy.” Evidently, the question is not ‘whether it lays the groundwork’, which is beyond dispute, but whether this theory is

\textsuperscript{71} I am thinking here of the more general argument of Levin (1982, 25): “In this study I wish to show that Aristotle’s theory of metaphor in fact is consistent, that although Aristotle is concerned to describe the contribution made by metaphor to the force and beauty of poetry that is not his primary motive, that his larger purpose is to explain how metaphor promotes to consciousness an awareness of relations that subsist between the objects and concepts that make up our universe. I will argue that Aristotle’s theory takes the form it does under the influence of his preoccupation with the teaching function of metaphor, the role it plays in the transmission and acquisition of knowledge.”

\textsuperscript{72} Technically ‘anagogical’.
constituted in exegesis of Aristotle’s own doctrine, or rather in a profound instance of creative misinterpretation.

Let me reveal my conclusion at the outset: I am not convinced by Brentano’s argument; the crucial inference is invalid. First, he recognizes that Aristotle’s claim is not that the categories are “beings” because each instance of them is related to them in the same way, i.e. because of their proportionality; rather, the claim is that they are πρὸς ἑν. Aristotle does not say that they are one by analogy, but rather that they are πρὸς ἑν. Next, Brentano explains the difference: focal (πρὸς ἑν) predication is precisely disproportionate. What is indicative of health and what is productive of it, he argues, can form a proportion relative to health only if they mean the same thing, i.e. only if they are related to health in the same way. But the relation is different in each case. The ‘equality of relation’ that defines ἀναλογία is absent. From this, Brentano infers that it is necessary to assume a second type of analogy. This is obviously invalid. In fact, this is entirely groundless unless we are assuming from the outset that Aristotle conceives of focal reference as disproportionate analogy. But we cannot assume what we are trying to prove. The conclusion must be implied in the premises. But it cannot be one of the premises. The fact remains that Aristotle never calls this mode of unity analogical. And indeed, as I have suggested, he may have good reason not to. On any account, it is important to distinguish focality from proportionality. What we are trying to understand

73 “We believe, for these reasons, that we must assume a second type of analogy in addition to the one discussed by Trendelenburg, which occupies, together with the first kind, an intermediate position between the univocal and the merely equivocal… While the analoga discussed in the first place displayed an equality of relations together with a difference of concepts, we here find an entirely different relation, but a relation to the same concept as terminus, a relation to the same ἀρχή” (trans. George, 64-5, modified). Aubenque (ibid., 238) maintains that “il ne suffit pas qu’il y ait rapport pour qu’il y ait, au sens propre du terme, analogie: il faut qu’il y ait en outre égalité de rapports.” Wood (ibid., 7-9) takes issue with this, and invokes Brentano in support.

74 Apart from attempting to prove the indemonstrable, which is “laughable” (Phys. II.1, 193a1-9).
is whether Aristotle’s concept of analogy is broad enough to include both. Brentano provides no reason to suppose that it does. On the contrary, assuming that Aristotle does distinguish between proportionality and focality, we have good reason to suppose he would draw a sharp distinction between *anologa*, things said by analogy, and *pros hen legomena*, things said in reference to a single term.

Brentano is not the first to suppose that Aristotle’s theory of *pros hen legomena* is implicitly a theory of analogy. Owens (1951) makes this point nicely: “[t]he nature and functions of the two kinds of equivocals should not be confused. To call the πρὸς ἰν type ‘analogous’ is not Aristotelian usage, though common in later Scholastic works… F. Brentano also follows this later scholastic interpretation of the Aristotelian texts.”75 One of the most important instances of this conflation is the theory of *pros hen analogy* developed by Aquinas in *Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria* and elsewhere. Presumably, this is the basic assumption operative in Brentano’s account. Witness how Aquinas explains our passage from Δ.6:

Things are one by proportion or analogy that agree in this, that this stands to that as another does to another. And this can be taken in two ways: (1) either in the way that any two things stand in different relations to one thing (as healthy is said of urine because it indicates the relation of a sign of health [to health itself]; and of medicine because it indicates the relation of a cause with respect to the same); (2) or in the way that the proportion of two things to two others is the same (as calmness is to the sea [what] stillness is to the air; for calmness is rest [vs. motion] of the sea and stillness is rest [vs. motion] of the air).76

75 (59 & n.76).
76 “Proportione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut alius ad alium. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modis, vel in eo quod aliquis duo habent diversas habitudines ad unum; sicut sanativum de urina dictum habitudinem significat signi sanitatis; de medicina...
Halper puts the difference in nuce: “either two things are related to one thing differently or two things are related to two other things in the same way” (p. 144, n.92). Sense (2) corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of proportionality (ἀναλογία) at EN V.3. The example is the same used in the Topics to exhibit qualitative proportionality. Sense (1) does not. The example is the same used in the Metaphysics to exhibit focal (πρὸς ἓν) predication. Aquinas makes what is implicit here more explicit elsewhere, e.g. de Principiis Natura 6.45-9, where he argues that being is predicated analogously of substance(s) and non-substance(s) because it is attributed disproportionately to them: “it is not wholly the same reason by which being is [attributed to] substance, quantity, etc.” And what is more, this disproportionality leads Aquinas to conclude that being is said primarily of substance, and derivatively of the rest: “ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantia, et per posterius de aliis.”

Ashworth (2013) notes that this priority and posteriority of predication, what I called primary and derivative (or disproportionate) attribution, is the distinctive mark of what by Aquinas’ time was known as the analogy of attribution, as distinct from the analogy of proportionality or “equality of ratios” at EN V.3. Being is attributed primarily to substance(s) and derivatively to non-substance(s), and is thus attributed to them by vero, quia significat habitudinem causae respectu eiusdem. Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa, sicut tranquillitatis ad mare et serenitatis ad aerem. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris” (V. L.8, 879).

77 Another crucial instance of this definition is Poet. 21: “by analogy I mean where B stands to A as D stands to C / κατὰ τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον” (1457b16-7).

78 “Non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens, et quantitas, et alia” (6.47).

79 (6.48), which continues, “And therefore being is not the genus of substance and quantity, because no genus is predicated of its species primarily and derivatively, but [being] is predicated analogically. And this is what we mean when we say that substance and quantity differ by genus but are the same by analogy / Et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed praedicatur analogice. Et hoc est quod diximus quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere, sed sunt idem analogia.”
analogy *ad unum*: “things are said to be predicated by analogy that are predicated of many things of which the articulations (rationes) are different, yet attributed to some one thing”.* As Owens points out, this is not Aristotle’s usage. I have suggested that this fact is because it is crucial for Aristotle to distinguish focality from proportionality. In part 2, I will explain why.

To conclude, I want to draw our attention to Lonfat’s recent *Archéologie de la notion d’analogie d’Aristote à Saint Thomas d’Aquinc*, which argues *inter alia* that

Le tournant platonicien des doctrines de l’analogie a déjà son inflexion principale chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Celui-ci va en effet *interpréter le rapport à un premier en terme de série selon l’antérieur et le postérieur, théorique qui ne se trouve pas chez le Stagirite*, mais qui va devenir le point central de l’interprétation des problématiques liées à l’homonymie, à la synonymie et à l’unification des différents sens de l’être.*

According to this logic, what eventually distinguishes the analogy of attribution from strict proportionality, namely “le rapport à un premier”, is interpreted by Alexander in terms of a series (τὸ ἐφεξῆς). For Lonfat, “le rapport πρὸς ἑν [chez Aristote] … ne comporte pas d’aspect sériel de l’antérieur et du postérieur, mais seulement un premier qui ne fait finalement que renvoyer aux autres acceptions” (p. 50). On this account, the Exegete attributes to focality what Aristotle attributes only to seriality. This entails that a certain conflation occurs in Alexander. The decisive passage occurs near the end of Γ.2, where Aristotle “seems to introduce yet another mode of inclusion, another way in which a diverse collection of entities can be brought into the ambit of a single scientific investigation” (Fraser, 2003, p. 135). Aristotle writes, “but even if one is said in many ways, the others will be said in relation to the primary – as well as the contraries – and

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80 “Analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem” (6.46).
81 (54, my emphasis).
through this; even if being or one is not universal and the same in every instance nor separable, as perhaps it is not: some things are in relation to one and others are in a series.”

Witness how Alexander interprets this last clause:

While both are among things said in many ways, things in a series differ from things said in relation to one, in that things said in relation to one are said in this way because they belong to that one thing, and have a certain order in relation to one another (τάξιν τινά ἐξοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα), as healthy things, medical things, and beings have been shown to have; but things in a series are among things said in many ways only according to this, that one of them is primary while another is secondary. For three, four, and the series of numbers are not numbers because they belong to two or because they contribute something to two; on the contrary, that which is primary in this way contributes to the things that come after it. For which reason, in the case of things thus said in many ways, the posterior [members of the series] are more complete, while in the case of things said in relation to one, the one is that to which the others are referred.

Alexander here attributes to focality what Aristotle, supposedly, only attributes to seriality: the order of relative priority and posteriority. Though the first member of a series is prior in relation to what comes after it, each successive member is both prior (in relation to what comes after it) and posterior (in relation to the first). In this sense, seriality is defined by the order of relative priority and posteriority: τάξιν τινά … πρὸς ἄλληλα. By contrast, focality simply implies the priority of the one and the posteriority of the rest; it ignores the order of the focal dependents in relation to one another. Further, Alexander is distinguishing focality from seriality on the premise that the primary referent of a focal dependent is ‘more complete’, whereas the first member of a series is not. Hence, he attributes relative priority and posteriority (the mark of seriality) to focality itself, and thence to pros hen legomena like being. As Lonfat points out, this seems to contradict the opening lines of Meta. Λ: “if the all is some whole, substance is

82 “ἄλλα ὁμως εἰ καὶ πολλαγώς λέγεται τὸ ἐν, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον τὰλα λεγθήσεται καὶ τα ἐναντία ὁμοίως, καὶ διὸ τούτο καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὅν ἢ τὸ ἐν καθόλου καὶ ταῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων ἤ χωριστόν, ὡσπερ ἱσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλα τα μὲν πρὸς ἐν τα δὲ το ἐφεξῆς” (1005a6-11).

83 In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, 263.22-33.
the primary part; and if it is in a series, even so substance is primary, then quality, then quantity.**84**

Indeed, Aristotle does not distinguish focality from seriality on the basis of whether or not the first acts as final cause. Rather, as Fraser (2003) has demonstrated, the focal and serial structure of the categories are really one and the same structure, understood in different stages of articulation or refinement. We first have the recognition of the ‘focal’ priority of substance relative to the non-substances collectively; and then the more elaborate recognition that the non-substances *themselves* fall into internal relations of priority and posteriority, exhibiting degrees of proximity to the underlying substrate.**85**

With this distinction in mind, let us revise Lonfat’s claim that “[l]e tournant platonicien” is in effect “interpréter le rapport à un premier” (focality) “en terme de série selon l’antérieur et le postérieur” (seriality), “théorie qui ne se trouve pas chez le Stagirite.” On the contrary, this theory is at work in Aristotle, albeit, as Fraser emphasizes, in a preliminary and open-ended way. By the same token, it is true to say that Aristotle does not attribute the order of priority and posteriority to focal dependents as such: “πρὸς ἐν [chez Aristote] ne comporte pas d’aspect sériel de l’antérieur et du postérieur.” Focal

**84** “εἰ ὁς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἢ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος: καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὐσία πρῶτην ἢ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν” (1069a19-21). Frede (2000, 66-7) is skeptical about the second εἰτα, “[f]or there is no reason why a view which involves the assumption of a series of connected layers of reality *eo ipso* should be committed to the ordering substance, quality, quantity.” He suggests ‘then quality or quantity’.

**85** (132-3). Cf. (2002) “While it is acceptable, within the broadest perspective, to speak of a single mode of non-substantial being, over and against the substantial, in truth the non-substances have distinct modes of ‘what-is-being’ (see [Meta. Z.4]), in virtue of their different relations to the underlying οὐσία. In general the mode of being of non-substances, following the *Categories*, is that of inherence in a substrate (being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ), but for each category there is a different way of being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. The determination of the πρὸς ἐν relations yields a different result for each category” (73). “This notion of serial unity (unity το ἐφεξῆς) can be regarded as a more precise articulation of the πρὸς ἐν unity of the categories, since it recognizes that the non-substances *themselves* fall into structured relations of priority and posteriority, and exhibit degrees of proximity to the underlying οὐσία” (74). “Some caution is required here. I do not mean to say that every instance of focal connection can be articulated in terms of a serial structure. For instance, the various ways of being ‘healthy’ do not obviously admit of any such hierarchical ordering. However I *would* say, inversely, that every serial structure can be regarded as a species of πρὸς ἐν connection” (2003, 139).
dependents are focal dependents independently of their serial order with respect to one another. Alexander attributes this order of *relative* priority and posteriority to focality itself, and thus attributes seriality to *pros hen legomena* like being. Yet focality and seriality in Aristotle, though carefully distinguished, remain two different ways of understanding the same structure: πρὸς ἑν and τῷ ἐφέξης. In the same manner, I shall argue in part 2 that analogy and focality, though carefully distinguished in Aristotle’s thought, remain two different ways of understanding the same thing.
Chapter 3: The Function of Analogy within the Metaphysics

In part 1, I promised to explain why it is crucial for Aristotle to distinguish between analogy (ἀναλογία), where two things are related to two others in the same way, and focality (πρὸς ἐν), where two things relate to a primary thing in different ways. At EN 1.6, Aristotle seems to defer ‘precision’ about this distinction to first philosophy, with regard to the question ‘whether goods are focally or analogically related’. Certainly, both analogy and focality play important roles in the argument of the Metaphysics. It is clear enough what the function of focality is. At Z.1, Aristotle promises that understanding the nature of substance-being (οὐσία) will allow us to understand the nature of being (ὂν) in general. Thus, οὐσία is the focus of the science of being. But what about the function of analogy in the science of being? Interestingly enough, the two most elaborate considerations of analogy in the Metaphysics are specifically concerned with questions about the principles (ἀρχαί) of being: at Θ.6, Aristotle uses analogy to clarify the concept of ἐνέργεια, the ultimate principle of metaphysical explanation, and at Λ.4-5, he argues that the principles of all beings are the same by analogy. In this respect, we might say that although Aristotle is not interested in the analogy of being, he is interested in the analogy of its principles and causes. On the other hand, when Aristotle

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86 “But then in what way is good said? For it certainly doesn’t seem like those things that are homonymous by chance. But then are [goods homonymous] by being [derived] from one thing or [by] all contributing toward one thing, or rather by analogy? For as sight is in body, intellect is in soul, and another is in another. But perhaps these things ought to be let go for now, since to be completely precise about them would belong more to another [mode of] philosophy / ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἐσοκε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμονόμοις. ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἐνός εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἀπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ᾽ ἄναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὅψις, ἐν νυστῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐν ἀλληλ. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοθὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀλληλῆς ἐν εἴπι φιλοσοφίας οἰκείοτερον” (1096b26-32). I conflate (1) πρὸς ἐν with πρὸς ἐν συντελεῖν and (2) ἀφ᾽ ἐνός with πρὸς ἐν; I explain why in part 1.

87 “τί τὸ ὅν, τοὐτὸ ἐστὶ τῆς ἡ ὁμοια” (1028b4).

88 On the “triviality” of ontological proportionality e.g. human is to substance as white is to quality, where the priority of substance is irrelevant, see part 1.
speaks of substance as the principle of being (Γ.2), he is referring to the focality of being, rather than the analogy of being. Hence, pace Brentano, Aristotle is careful to distinguish the focality of being from the analogy of being. In what follows, I aim to show that analogy and focality are nonetheless related to one another in a fixed and determinate manner.

G. E. L. Owen (1960) conceived of analogy and focality as alternative solutions to the same problem, though he recognized “[this does not mean] that where [Aristotle] adopted a focal analysis he consequently rejected the weaker description in terms of analogy as false or improper” (181, n.1). Since “when Aristotle says in [book] A that the elements of all things are the same by analogy, the priority he ascribes to substance is only natural priority and he does not recognize any general science of τὸ ὅν ἦ ὃν”, and since “[t]here is no mention of πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα in Λ, and none of analogy in Γ”, Owen concludes that “[i]t is Γ, not Λ, that moves decisively beyond the old polemic, the denunciation of any general inquiry into the ‘elements of things’ which is still audible in [book] A.” For Owen, then, the analogical account of the ἀρχαί presented in Meta. Α was eventually superseded by the focal account in Meta. Γ.

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89 “being is said in a manifold of ways, but all in relation to a single principle / τὸ ὅν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ἄλλ᾽ ἄπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν” (1003b5-6). The best treatment of this premise in my view is Kosman (2015, esp. 244-8 ‘How Sub stance is the Principle of Being’).

90 “proportionality (analogia) is equality of ratios, and in at least four things / ἡ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρισιν ἐλεγχόμενος” (EN V.3, 1131a29-32); “by analogy I mean where B stands to A as D stands to C / [κατὰ] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον” (Poet. 21, 1457b16-7); “[things are one by analogy] that stand as another in relation to another / ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο” (Meta. Δ.6, 1016b 34-4).

91 “Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in Aristotle and Plato in the mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. Düring & G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg: 1960), 180-1. Owen is referring to A.9’s well-known critique of the attempt “to seek the elements of beings without distinguishing the manifold of ways in which being is said / τὸ τῶν ὄντων ζητεῖ στοιχεία μὴ διελόντας, πολλαχῶς λεγομένων” (992b18-9), which I discuss in part 1.
Whatever their views on the question of development, most scholars agree in principle with the thesis of J. Owens (1951) that analogy and focality are two distinct ways of viewing the same phenomenon:

There is nothing in the Aristotelian text, however, to preclude the same things from being equivocal in both ways, as perhaps may occur in the case of the causes. The two types, though clearly distinct, are not mutually exclusive. Just as things may be denominated univocally or equivocally by the same word, according as their nature demands, so things may be expressed by the same term analogously or through reference, according as their nature allows. Owens observes that it is possible to understand the same thing ‘by analogy’ or ‘through reference’. Since the two types of equivocals, namely *homonyma kat’ analogian* and *pros hen legomena*, are not mutually exclusive, there is no need to posit a ‘development’ between the analogical account of Α.4-5 and the focal account of Γ.2. As Wilson (2000, p. 176) writes, “[o]n this view Α does not aim at unifying the subject-genera of the science of Being, as Γ does, but at drawing to our attention the differences and identities among the *principles* of various kinds of Being. Different problems, even if they involve some of the same objects, will naturally require different solutions.” So as long as we understand the proper context of Aristotle’s interest in metaphysical analogy, we need not assume that he develops away from this interest, and that analogy and focality are different solutions to the same problem. This context, to be clear, concerns the unity of the principles and causes (ἀρχαί καὶ αἴτια) of being, as distinct from that of the categorial genera *per se*. For “talk about the principles of things”, as Wilson writes, “is distinct from talk about things in their own right” (p. 179).

92 (ibid., 59-60). Aristotle’s example of the same thing being expressed univocally and equivocally, Owens points out, is ‘being animate’ (τὸ ζώον εἶναι) at Categories 1, which I discuss in part 1. See Wilson (ibid., 176 & n.3) for the claim that “Owens may be taken as the *vox consensus* in pronouncing that ‘the two types though clearly distinct are not mutually exclusive.’”

93 See part 1 for my discussion of analogical vs. focal homonymy.
But if talk about the principles of things is distinct from talk about things in their own right, does it follow that they are concerned with different objects? It depends on whether the principle of the thing in question is something other than the thing itself. For they may also concern the same thing under different descriptions. Aristotle makes this clear at *Meta.* 1.1:

> there is a sense in which fire is an element (though perhaps in its own right [the element] is the indeterminate or something of that sort), and a sense in which it is not; for being fire and being an element are not the same, but as a certain thing and nature, fire is an element, and the word indicates that this attribute belongs to it, because something is [constituted] from it as a primary constituent. Thus also with ‘cause’ and ‘one’ and all such terms. ⁹⁴

In this sense, it is possible to treat the principle of something, say water, as something in its own right. Conversely, once we start treating water as something in its own right, we stop treating it as the principle of something else.⁹⁵ In this respect, we can say that one basic premise of Aristotle’s ontology is that substance can be regarded both as the principle of being and as something in its own right. As the principle of being, substance is the focus of ontology: τὸ δὲ λέγεται πολλαχῶς ἄλλῳ ἃπαν πρὸς μίαν ἄρχῃν. As something in its own right, substance is the subject of its own science, call it ousiology.

The science of substance involves knowledge of the principles and causes of substantiality. Aristotle favors two pairs of principles: material (.sendKeys) and form (.sendKeys),

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⁹⁴ “ἐστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς στοιχεῖον τὸ πῦρ (ἐστι δὲ ἴσως καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον), ἐστι δὲ ὡς οὖ: οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πυρὶ καὶ στοιχεῖῳ εἶναι, ἄλλ’ ὡς μὲν πράγμα τι καὶ φύσις τὸ πῦρ στοιχεῖον, τὸ δὲ ὅνομα σημαίνει τὸ τοιοῦτον συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχοντος. οὕτω καί ἐπὶ αἰτίου καὶ ἄρτος καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἄπαντον” (1052b9-15).

⁹⁵ Wilson (*ibid.*, 180) notes, “Aristotle makes this claim of all terms that describe relative functions rather than things. Fire has a nature in its own right, but relative to some other subject it performs a certain function. To say that fire is an element is to include this relative function in its definition. All causes and elements as such will be definitionally related to that of which they are the causes and principles.”
and potency (δύναμις) and activity (ἐνέργεια), which he discusses in tandem at Θ.6 and Λ.4-5.96

Yet Aristotle insists throughout that the principles of substance are generically (and therefore specifically and numerically) distinct from the principles of quantity, quality, and so on. We saw this in his critique of the attempt to inquire (and claim knowledge) about the principles of all beings “without distinguishing the manifold of ways in which being is said” (992b19). The homonymy of being prevents any univocal account of its principles. But if the principles and causes of being are just as heterogeneous as being itself, how could they be universal enough to constitute the principles of a single science?97 That is, in what sense could there be any explanatory unity to the science of being? This question is resolved in the absurdly condensed conclusion of Λ.4-5, which argues that there are three senses in which the principles and causes of all beings are the same:

as for inquiring what the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities are, whether the same or different, it is clear that when said in many ways, [those] of each [are the same], but when they have been distinguished they are not the same but different, except in a way [those] of all [are the same], (1) in the way that they are the same or analogous, because [they are] material, form, privation, and a mover, and (2) in the way that the causes of substances [can be regarded] as the causes of all things, because when [they are] taken away all is taken away; further, (3) that which is first in complete activity.98

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96 Strictly speaking, the former pair belongs to the 3-principle view, which includes privation or absence (στέρησις). The other locus classicus is Phys. I.7-9.
97 “For if there is nothing apart from the particulars, while the particulars are infinite, how is it possible to attain knowledge of infinite things? For insofar as something is one and the same, and insofar as something is universally present, in this way we know everything: ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἐκαστὰ, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ ἀπειρὰ, τὸν δ’ ἀπειρὸν πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; ἢ γὰρ ἐν τι καὶ ταύτῳ, καὶ ἢ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ πάντα γνωρίζομεν” (B.1, 999a26-9).
98 “τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τίνες ἁρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἔτεραι, ἤδην ὅτι πολλαχός γε λεγομένων ἔστων ἑκάστου, διαφερθέντων δὲ οὐ taυτά ἄλλ᾽ ἔτερα, πλὴν οὐδὲ καὶ πάντων, οὐδὲ μὲν ταῦτα ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὑπερ, εἰδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ ώς αὐτα πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρομένων: ἢ το τρόπον ἐντελεχεία” (1071a29-36). The translation "complete activity’ will recommend itself in due course.
Here Aristotle distinguishes three senses in which the principles of all things are identical. It is worth noting that these distinct senses roughly correspond to the various ways in which commentators have described Aristotle’s concept of first philosophy. (1) Analogical identity makes possible a general ontology grounded in the common structure of all being. (2) What one is tempted to call focal identity corresponds to the general theory of substance and substantiality. (3) The numerical identity of τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία permits the science of a first principle, which Aristotle develops at Λ.6-10. Notice that Aristotle draws a distinction here between (1) the analogical unity of the principles and (2) the unity of the principles provided by the natural priority of substance. The priority of substance is supposed to indicate the way in which the categorial genera themselves are connected. By contrast, it is the principles and causes that are one by analogy, not the categories themselves. Thus, Aristotle distinguishes the unity of the principles from the unity of the categories. Of course, his ultimate claim is that the causes of substances may be treated as the causes of all beings. Thus, Aristotle indicates that analogical identity is somehow dependent upon the categorial framework provided by the priority of substance.

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99 I owe this observation to Crubellier (2000, 141): “[a]nalogical identity coheres with a general ontology describing formal structures common to all beings of whichever category; for instance, the theory of actuality and potentiality set out in the first part of *Metaphysics* Θ. Focal identity makes first philosophy a theory of substance, like that of Z-H, while the numerical identity of the first mover results in a theology, such as the second part of Λ is supposed to be.” However, I will not assume that (2) refers to focality, nor that (3) refers to theology.

100 Sense (2) is called natural priority at Δ.11: “some things are called prior and posterior according to nature and substance, which are able to be without others, while those others are not able to be without them; a distinction Plato used / τὰ μὲν δὴ οὗτο λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ἕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὥσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἑκείνων μή: ἡ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων” (1019a1-4). Beere (2008, 430) calls this ‘Plato’s criterion’ and provides the helpful definition: ‘non-reciprocal entailment of being’.

101 Or penultimate, depending on how we interpret its relation to ‘ἐτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία.’
It is not immediately clear what function this simultaneous distinction and connection is supposed to perform within the argument of book Α. *Prima facie*, the conclusion that the principles of all beings are one by analogy might seem to constitute a positive solution to the problem of their heterogeneity.\(^{102}\) Wood (2013, p. 15) suggests that it functions as such a solution. Others however maintain that the argument leading to this conclusion is a negative argument leading to a negative solution. On this reading, analogy functions not as the positive solution to an *aporia* so much as a sign of the inadequacy of a certain thesis, which is implicitly under critique. The dispute is signaled halfway through Α.4, where Aristotle distinguishes between principle or source (ἄρχη) and element (στοιχεῖον):

The elements and principles of these things, then, are the same (though those of different things are different), but one cannot say in this way that the elements and principles of *all* things are the same, except by analogy, just as if one were to say that there are three principles: form, privation, and material. But each of these is different for each genus; for instance, in color they are white, black, and surface; or light, darkness, and air, from which there is day and night. But since it is not only the constituents [of things] that are [their] causes, but these are also among external things, i.e. the mover, it is clear that ‘principle’ and ‘element’ are different, though both are causes.\(^{103}\)

On this basis, Aristotle proceeds to argue that there are by analogy three elements, but four causes and principles, since the cause of motion is not an element of what it causes, insofar as ‘element’ refers to ‘the primary internal constituent of each thing.’\(^{104}\) Άρχαι, by contrast, are not necessarily immanent causes. Crubellier (2000, p. 152) writes, “the point here is that the moving cause, being an external cause, is free from the constraints

\(^{102}\) See B.4 (999b24-1000a4) for the relevant *aporia*.

\(^{103}\) “τούτων μὲν οὖν ταῦτα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄρχη (ἄλλων δ᾽ ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὐτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ, ὅσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἄρχη εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ η ἑτέρης καὶ ἡ ὑλή. ἄλλ᾽ ἐκαστὸν τούτων ἐπερ ἔκαστον γένος ἔστιν, οἷον ἐν χρῶματι λευκών μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια: φῶς σκότος ἀθρ., ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἰτία, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ἐκτός οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δήλον ὅτι ἐπερ ἄρχη καὶ στοιχεῖα, αἰτία δ᾽ ἀμφότερον” (1070b16-24).

\(^{104}\) “τὸ πρώτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστορ” (Δ.3, 1014b14-5).
imposed by the equivocity of being on the theory of principles conceived of as elements, that is, immanent and internal causes.” On Crubellier’s reading, Λ.4-5 is concerned throughout with this concept of principles as elements i.e. immanent constituents, whether material constituents or ‘formal’ constituents, sc. universal terms contained within the notion of a being, e.g. ‘animal’. Finally, Crubellier argues that the rival ‘stoicheological’ conception of the ἄρχαι at Λ.4-5 is specifically Platonic, such that the overall argument of Λ.4-5 may be regarded as a critique of Plato’s account of the ἄρχαι as elements of all things. As Menn (forthcoming) brings out, it is precisely this hypothesis that leads to the negative conclusion of Λ.5 that the principles of all things are only (πλὴν) the same by analogy. I quote from his discussion of Owen’s thesis, cited earlier, concerning the function of Γ.2 within what Menn calls the ‘archeological’ aim and argument of the Metaphysics:

Owen is of course right that Λ4’s thesis that the elements of all things are the same by analogy is different from Γ2’s thesis that being is said πρὸς ἕν; but the thesis of Γ2 is intended as an argument for the positive result of Λ1-5, stated not in Λ4 but in Λ5, that the causes of substances are the causes of all beings. This is the only genuine path to the desired numerically single principle, while the negative argument of Α9 and Λ4 is devoted to showing, against Plato, that the path to the ἄρχαι as στοιχεῖα of all beings can reach only analogically and not numerically (or even specifically or generically) single ἄρχαι.

Within the context of the inquiry about the principles (ἄρχαι) and causes (αἰτία) of being initiated in book A, i.e. from the perspective of the progressive determination of wisdom

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105 “so none of the intelligibles like being or oneness is an element / οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἄστιν, οἶν τὸ ἐν ἢ τὸ ἑν” (1070b7); “the moderns posit that it is more-so universals that are substances (for genera are universals, which they say are more-so principles and substances, because they inquire dialectically), but the ancients posit that these are particulars, like fire and earth, not the commonality ‘body’ / οἷς μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον πάθεσιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἀ φαιν ἄρχας καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ἤτειν): οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα, οἶν πῦρ καὶ γῆ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ κοινόν, σῶμα” (1069a26-30).

Plato’s treatment of the ἀρχαί as elements (sc. immanent constituents) of all beings leads to the conclusion that the principles of all things fundamentally differ except (πλῆν) by analogy, since these ‘things’ belong to distinct categories. So the force of πλῆν is negative throughout. By contrast, if one treats the principles as causes, and primarily as causes of substances, it is possible to ascend through one or more of the four causal chains to ‘the desired numerically single principle’. Thus, the ultimate function of analogy in the argument of Λ.4-5 is negative, even though Aristotle does not deny the analogical unity of the principles of all things. In this respect, the analogy of the principles is just as “trivial” as the analogy of being. At the very least, analogical identity is inadequate for the purpose of book Λ.

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107 This equivalence is established at A.1-2: “so it is clear that wisdom is science concerning certain principles and causes / ὅτι οὖν ἡ σοφία περὶ τινας ἀρχῶς καὶ αἰτίας ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον” (982a1-3); “that for the sake of which we are now making this argument is this: everyone presupposes that what is named wisdom concerns first causes i.e. principles / οὗ ἐνεκα τῶν πρώτων λόγων τοῦτο ἔστιν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνομαζόμενην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἰτία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες” (981b27-9); “this [science] must be contemplative of first principles and causes / διὰ γὰρ τινὰν ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων εἶναι θεωρητικὴν” (982b8-10). Cf. Menn (ibid., 1a2) ‘The strategy of progressive definition and the argument of A1-2’.

108 I will return to this point, but it is worth laying out some of the grounds here. This program is stated most clearly at Meta. A.7. Summarizing the results of A.3-6, Aristotle writes, “of those who have spoken about principle and cause, not one has said anything outside of those that have been distinguished by us in our work on nature, but all appear to be touching upon them in some way (ποις), though ambiguously. For some speak of the principle as matter (οἱ γὰρ ὃς ὤλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν), whether they suppose one or more than one, and whether they posit this as a body or as bodiless; e.g. Plato speaks of the great and the small…” (988a21-6, my emphasis). A.7 concludes that “the ἀρχαί are to be sought either in all of these ways or in some one of them” (988b18-9, accepting Menn’s correction at ibid., 1b10). These ways (τρόποι) are what I am calling causal chains or paths. The “doxographical” account of A.3-10 is chiefly interested in how (or whether) previous philosophers used their principles as causes, i.e. in the way(s) in which their principles were used to explain what they were supposed to be principles of. (Cf. 985a18-21, where ‘using’ νοῦς is equivalent to αἰτιάτω ‘holding it responsible, as the cause’.) Menn (ibid., 5) writes, “The doxographical tradition, both before and after Aristotle, is chiefly interested in which ἀρχαί, and how many ἀρχαί, each philosopher posited – e.g. water, or air, or the ἄτομον, or atoms and the void. Aristotle asks this question too, but his interest is directed toward discovering in what way these philosophers used their ἀρχαί as causes – that is, what role the ἀρχαί play in explaining the things that come after them in the philosophers’ accounts. The philosophers themselves may not have made this explicit, particularly if they followed a narrative order – ‘first X was, then Y arose, then Z’ – but they can justify positing their ἀρχαί only if these ἀρχαί function somehow as causes of the things that arise after them, and Aristotle wants to classify the ways that this was supposed to work.”
Indeed, the only unambiguously ‘positive’ function of analogy in the *Metaphysics* occurs at Θ.6 where Aristotle attempts to clarify the concept of ἐνέργεια through analogy instead of definition:

what we mean to say is clear by induction from particular examples, nor is it necessary to seek a definition of everything, but one can also comprehend by analogy, that which is as the one building is to the one capable of building, the awake to the asleep, the one seeing to the one having its eyes shut but having sight, what is formed out of the material to the material, and what has been finished to what is unfinished.  

Here Aristotle claims that it is sufficient, if not necessary, to provide an analogical account of the ἄρχαι. This sudden lack of concern for definition might well take us by surprise. What could possibly justify the appeal to analogy at such a crucial juncture? We might refine this question by noting what I take to be the essential difference between the function of analogy in Θ.6 and Λ.4-5: while analogy is sufficient (if not necessary) for Aristotle’s purpose in Θ.6, it is precisely insufficient for his purpose in book Λ. Hence, we may equally ask: what is the function of analogy in Θ.6 such that it suffices for the purpose of Θ.6?

Wood (2013, 2015) suggests that the context of this appeal to analogy will become clearer if we attend to a conclusion Aristotle draws at E.1, which raises a problem that the appeal to analogy at Θ.6 seems to resolve. Without specifying its details, the argument that leads to this conclusion can be summarized in this way: insofar as substance or essence is fundamentally presupposed by demonstrative science as such

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109 “δὴ λογος δ᾽ ἔπι τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ τῇ ἐπαργυγῇ ὁ Βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντός ὁρὸν ζητεῖν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ώς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορᾶς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὄρον πρὸς τὸ μῦδον μὲν ὄν ὃς ἐχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπαργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον” (1048a35-b4). Unlike Sachs (“nor is it necessary to”) and Tredennick (“we need not”), Ross and Makin take οὐ δεῖ in the much stronger sense of “we must not” and “one should not”. It is worth noting the difference between the claim that ‘it is not necessary to’ and that ‘it is necessary not to’: the former implies possibility, the latter impossibility.
(and so by each of the demonstrative sciences), substance and essence are fundamentally indemonstrable. “For this reason”, Aristotle writes, “it is clear by induction from such examples that there is neither demonstration of substance nor of essence, but some other way of clarifying it.”\textsuperscript{110} Wood associates this ‘other way’ with the attempt at \(\Theta.6\) to clarify the concept of \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\) via analogy versus definition. Given that the argument of \textit{Meta.} ZH\(\Theta\) does generally move from treating substance as the principle of being toward treating \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\) as the principle of being, this is probably a justifiable assumption. We might point to the conclusion of \(\Theta.8\) that substance properly speaking \textit{is} \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\).\textsuperscript{111}

Equally telling is the conclusion of H.2 that “[the differentia] in each case is what is analogous [to substance]; and just as in substances what is predicated of the material is itself the \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\), so too in the other definitions [it is] what is most the \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\).”\textsuperscript{112}

The substance of composite beings in the governing sense is the \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\) predicated (κατηγοροφθαι) of the underlying material. In every non-substantial instance of being there is something analogous to substance and the \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\) of substance. If the attempt to clarify what substance is requires recourse to and refinement of the concept of \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\), the attempt to clarify what \(\text{ἐνέργεια}\) is would evidently belong to this project.

Thus, analogy may be regarded as a positive solution to the problem raised at E.1.

Let us return to our question: what is the function of analogy at \(\Theta.6\) such that it is sufficient if not necessary for Aristotle’s purpose? If we assume that the purpose of \(\Theta.6\)

\textsuperscript{110} “διὸπερ φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἦσθι ἀπόδαξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τῷ τί ἦσθι ἐκ τῆς τοιούτης ἐπιγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς διηλύσεως” (1025b14-6).

\textsuperscript{111} “… but in cases where the work is not something apart from the activity, the activity is present in [the agents] themselves; as the act of sight is in the one seeing and the act of contemplation in the one contemplating, and life in the soul, hence also happiness, for it is a certain sort of life. So it is clear that the substance and the form are activity / ὅσον δὲ μὴ ἦσθι ἄλλο τι ἐργὸν παρὰ τὴν ἑνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἑνέργεια (οἷον ἢ ὅρας ἐν τῷ ὄραντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ ἐνδεικνυόν: ᾧ ὁ γὰρ ποίης τῆς ἑστιν), ὥσπερ φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἔδος ἑνέργεια ἦστιν” (1050a34-b3).

\textsuperscript{112} “τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν ἑκάστῳ: καὶ ὡς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ τῆς ἄλλης κατηγοροφθαι συμβαίνει ἡ ἑνέργεια, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄρθιον ὑπόστασις” (1043a5-7).
is to lead its audience to a concept of activity (*energeia*) prior to and independent of motion (*kinesis*), we might say that the role analogy plays in this process is *heuristic*.

This claim is intriguing, for earlier I argued that Aristotle’s apparent lack of interest in ontological analogy (e.g. horse is to substance as white is to quality) is due to the failure of such analogies to disclose the nature of being ‘as such’. Yet in Θ.6, the analogy is supposed to ‘clarify’ the nature of the principles. Of course, this analogical exposition seems to be necessary only because it is capable of clarifying the nature of *energeia* in every instance, even when these instances are generically distinct. And yet the purpose of Θ.6 is not simply to explain or clarify the nature of *energeia* in general. It is supposed to lead its audience to a concept of activity prior to and independent of motion. And it is this ‘heuristic’ function that analogy is supposed to serve. In what sense?

Wood (2015, p. 336) points out that the analogical character of the exposition, strictly speaking, consists in “comparing things in terms of likenesses other than the properly generic and specific ones by which they are substantially defined.” In this respect, it is crucial to recognize Aristotle’s concerted effort to specify the likeness or similarity at issue. He does this, as Wood writes, “by pointing out that all true instances of activity share the property of being complete, τελεία, at any moment” (*ibid.*) Indeed, the basic contrast drawn at Θ.6 is between the complete nature of an activity and the incomplete nature of a motion. To be sure, motion is a kind of activity, but it is

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113 Wood comes at this from the question, “does the complex analogy by which he illustrates the concept of activity count as a metaphor?” (*ibid.*) The response: “Yet we can also see in this comparative act that Aristotle’s own deployment of comparisons, similes and analogies is characterized by an effort to mitigate confusion as much as possible, by making explicit the relevant similarity underlying the objects being compared” (*ibid.*)
essentially incomplete activity.\textsuperscript{114} It is the realization (entelecheia) of the ability to be something qua ability (Phys. III.1), and is thus incomplete (ateles) by definition. Hence, motion is the incomplete sort of activity.\textsuperscript{115} This essentially differentiates it from the sort of activity that \textit{Θ.6} is finally meant to disclose, what we might call, in accord with this distinction, the complete sort of activity. Thus, analogy allows us to comprehend each instance of activity as such, regardless of the difference between complete and incomplete activity, and leads us through the examples to recognize the distinction.

Ultimately, Aristotle will reserve the term \textit{energeia} for the complete sort of activity.\textsuperscript{116} In this sense, the ultimate function of analogy in \textit{Θ.6} is heuristic, insofar as it leads us from a familiar concept of activity to an unfamiliar one.

The last point Wood makes about the analogical exposition of activity in \textit{Θ.6} is vital. Although each of the examples cited in \textit{Θ.6} is a perfect instance of activity insofar as it is τελεία in the relevant respect, it is crucial to see that the paradigm examples Aristotle isolates toward the end of the chapter are all instances of \textit{living} activity: seeing, exercising practical judgement, contemplating, flourishing, living well, and being alive.

\textsuperscript{114} The Neoplatonic concept of \textit{energeia} as ‘motionless motion’ arises from exegesis of Aristotle’s assertion at DA III.7 that “ἄλλο εἴδος τούτο κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ’ ἀπλοῦς ἐνέργεια ἐπέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου” (431a5-7). Everything hinges on how one takes the genitive κινήσεως: is Aristotle saying that activity (\textit{energeia}) is a kind of motion, or is he saying that activity is a different kind of thing than motion? The problem with the former reading, and hence with ‘motionless motion’, is that it would contradict Aristotle’s critique in book I of the assumption that soul is moved or moves itself. In this way, one can reconcile Aristotle with Plato at the price of charging him with hypocrisy. However, I take the genitive to be ablative, that is, a genitive of separation and/or comparison. As the following considerations bear out, Aristotle wouldn’t call activity a kind of motion, but he would call motion a kind of activity. That said, this is only a terminological dispute, rather than a conceptual difference. ‘Motionless motion’ nicely emphasizes the distinction between \textit{energeia} and static rest, which is crucial.

\textsuperscript{115} Aristotle states at the beginning and end of \textit{Θ.6} that his aim is to elucidate ‘what \textit{energeia} is and of what sort’. See Kosman (2015, ch.2) for a thorough discussion of the definition of motion.

\textsuperscript{116} Wood’s claim that ‘all true instances of activity share the property of being complete at any moment’ is complicated by Aristotle’s claim at \textit{Θ.3} (1047a30-2) that the word \textit{energeia} has come to apply to other things from belonging especially (μάλιστα) to motions. My argument does not depend on sorting this out, which is why I am content to speak rather nebulously of Aristotle ‘reserving’ the term for complete activity. The solution presumably lies in drawing a distinction between what is first for us and what is first in itself.
Assuming that the paradigmatic activity is exhibited by living beings *qua* living, Wood concludes that if (or insofar as) activity and being alive are suggested to be coextensive, “a hierarchy is implicitly posited among living beings, requiring that those whose characteristic activities are more complete, by virtue of being more permanently in possession of the ends, are more active, and therefore *more alive* than others”, which entails that the principle of this hierarchy would be “characterized by a perfect activity, eternally in possession of its end, which is for this reason the *most alive*” (*ibid.*, 337). In this way, even though the property in virtue of which all instances of activity are analogous (τελεία) is predicable of all living beings as such, this analogy ultimately reveals and gives way to an implicit hierarchy of living activities leading from the least complete to the most complete. To borrow Aristotle’s term from Α.5, we might say that the analogical intelligibility of activity, once the cause of the analogy is specified, implicitly reveals τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία. In this sense, the ‘likeness’ that Aristotle wants us to comprehend in Θ.6 indirectly reveals

that the entire cosmos is structured analogically according to secondary likenesses between the perfect activity of the divine and the imperfect activity of those beings whose lives are understood to be an imitation of the former in its utmost completeness. Activity itself is therefore not at all a metaphor, but it reveals something like a metaphoric or iconic relationship in the very ontological structure of the cosmos, because it shows that all forms of activity other than the divine, while complete in their own way, derive their completeness by imitation of *true* activity, which is the perfect life of self-thinking thought.\(^{117}\)

The implication of Θ.6, in other words, is that τελεία is predicated primarily of divine activity, and derivatively of its dependents. Clearly, this focal structure is the same we observed in the πρὸς ἐν predication of being, the so-called analogy of attribution.\(^{118}\)

According to Wood, the structure implied in Θ.6 reveals “a continuous, analogical chain

\(^{117}\) *ibid.* Again, Wood approaches this from the question of metaphor.

\(^{118}\) On the equivalence, see part 1.
of being” (*ibid.*) leading from the least complete to the most complete activity.

Obviously, this conclusion problematizes the preceding account of analogy’s role in the science of being. If it holds, it is clearly necessary to qualify claims about the ‘triviality’ of ontological analogy in Aristotle. In the context of inquiry about what being is (Z.1), where understanding the nature of substance-being is supposed to enable the science of being in general, I argued that analogical comprehension is inadequate. In the context of inquiry about the principles and causes of all things, I argued that analogical identity is inadequate for the purpose of book Α. In each case, the actual function of analogy in the argument turned out to be negative, even ‘aporetic’ in the Heideggerian sense.¹¹⁹ For this reason, it should seem odd that the function of analogy in Θ.6 is not only positive but revelatory.

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this instance serves a positive heuristic function in the pursuit of wisdom. What is implied at Θ.6, viz. the seriality of biological activity, is brought out more fully elsewhere, primarily in De Anima. Of course, the principle of this hierarchy is treated in itself at Meta. Λ.6-10. Indeed, assuming that the inquiry undertaken in book A and fulfilled in book Λ is fundamentally in pursuit of wisdom (σοφία), i.e. theoretical or contemplative science of first principles as causes, we may say that the ‘consequence’ of Θ.6 is implicit throughout the Metaphysics. But Θ.6 is not supposed to exhibit the causal dependence of the various analogues upon τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία. It is necessary to draw some distinction between the specific aim of Θ.6 and this focal implication, for the same reason it is necessary to distinguish between analogical and focal predication.

In this respect, we should recognize that neither the focal relation nor the serial relation of the activities is at issue in Θ.6. Rather, the analogical likeness shows that all activities share the property of being complete (τελεία) in themselves, regardless of their priority or posteriority in relation to one another. This indifference toward relative priority and posteriority is precisely what distinguishes proportionality (ἀναλογία) from focality, which consists in the disproportionate relation of multiple terms to a ‘first’ term. In this sense, analogy is capable of comparing focal terms without taking their focal relationship into consideration. In part 1, I argued that focal dependents are focal dependents independently of any serial order they might exhibit in relation to one

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120 The locus classicus is DA II.3 (414b19-33), where the seriality of soul is compared to the series of plane figures. See Diamond, Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle's De Anima (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), esp. ch.1 “Defining the Soul—The Serial Logic of De Anima II.1-3” for a thorough account.

121 ἵππος ταύτην [ἐπιστήμην] τῶν πρῶτων ἰρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων ἐν τῇ τοῦ τὰ ἑν ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἑστίν” (A.1, 982b8-10). By ‘fulfillment’ I do not mean to imply that M and N do not belong to the Metaphysics. Both deal with aporiai articulated in B. Further, I see no reason to insist on the posteriority of MN to Λ. That said, I am rather partial to Sachs’ (2002) description ‘Final Caution: Misguided Approaches to the Source of Being’.
another. In the same fashion, I would argue that analogues are analogous independently of their focal relationship. Thus, the analogy ‘horse is to substance as white is to quality’ is precisely (by definition) indifferent to the priority of substance. The analogy holds regardless. The function of substance as the principle of quality does not enter into the equation, because it is not relevant to it. In the same way, the function of το πρωτον ἐντελεχεία as the principle of the analogues at Θ.6 is not relevant to the analogy. We may well infer that τελεία is predicated primarily of divine activity and derivatively of its dependents, but this does not imply for Aristotle that it is predicated ‘analogically’ of them. Or rather, we might say that completeness is predicated analogically of divine activity and its dependents, but that this would not imply for Aristotle that it is predicated primarily of the one and derivatively of the rest. This possibility is important, because it is important that all activities are analogous by virtue of being τελεία in themselves, i.e., without reference to something else. But it is equally crucial to recognize that this analogy holds indifferently of all activities alike, and exhibits neither their dependence on divine activity, nor their particular mode of dependence. Such an exhibition would already involve focal explanation.

Yet we should not let this difference lead us to conclude that analogical comprehension and focal explanation are incompatible. As we just saw, the fact that Θ.6 does not attempt to arrange the various activities according to focal or serial order does not exclude the possibility of such an analysis. Let us consider for a moment this notion of analysis. Scholars sometimes speak of analogy and focality as two distinct modes of analysis. In this regard, Fraser (2003, 138, n.7) makes an interesting observation: “[o]n the focal scheme, predications about non-substances are translated into predications about
substances: to ‘be’ for a non-substance is just to be an attribute of a substance. In the case of analogy, by contrast, we do not analyze one use of a predicate in terms of another; we merely compare the two uses.”

Again, we note that analogical comparison is indifferent to the focal or serial relationship of the terms compared. But what Fraser points out is that it may be misleading to think of analogy as a mode of ‘analysis’ at all. Even within the context of Θ.6, where analogy serves a positive heuristic function, Aristotle’s goal is not to analyze incomplete activity (kinesis) in terms of complete activity (energeia), but rather to show ‘what activity is and of what sort’. The indifference of the analogy to this distinction is signaled by his conclusion that “not all things are said to be in activity in the same way, other than by analogy: as this is in or relative to this, that is in or relative to that. For some things are as motion is related to ability, and others as substance is related to some material.”

Both are related as potency to act. As Makin (2006, p. 132) writes, “Θ.6 is not a ‘horizontal’ move, from a discussion of one relation (change–capacity) ‘sideways’ to discussion of another (substance–matter). It is rather a ‘vertical’ move, from discussion of the change–capacity relation ‘upwards’ to consideration of the more general schema: actual–potential being.”

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122 Owen (ibid., 180) writes, “[t]he claim of Γ that ‘being’ is an expression with focal meaning is a claim that statements about non-substances can be reduced to – translated into – statements about substances… To establish a case of focal meaning is to show a particular connexion between the definitions of a polychrestic word. To find an analogy, whether between the uses of such a word or anything else, is not to engage in any such analysis of meanings: it is merely to arrange certain terms in a (supposedly) self-evident scheme of proportion.”

123 “λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεία οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τόσῳ ἢ πρὸς τόσῳ: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δ᾽ ὡς υἱόσπια πρὸς τινα ἀλλην” (1048b6-9). Sachs (2002, 174, n.8) notes, “This is the reason being-at-work is not definable. Potency is clearest to us in the capacity for motion or change, but motion itself is defined as a form of being-at-work-staying-complete. But being-at-work is usually reserved for the activities that are not motions. In Aristotle’s discourse, energeia is an ultimate explanatory term, not itself explainable by anything simpler or clearer.”

124 Which continues, “Of course, a consequence of making that vertical move is that the wider perspective thereby attained now takes in another relation, substance–matter.”
the incomplete sort of activity: thus ‘τί τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποιῶν τι’.\textsuperscript{125} The analogy is indifferent to this distinction, and thereby serves its heuristic function by “showing that [energeia] can be applied, beyond the domain of activities, to οὐσίαι … and … by showing that it can be applied to activities which are not motions.”\textsuperscript{126} Still, the analogy does not preclude the distinction between complete and incomplete activity, where the former is the sort of activity that is prior to and independent of motion. Indeed it presupposes it. All this means is that the analogical ‘discovery’ of this prior sense is not a method of ‘analysis’ in the sense Fraser intends.

If we are going to distinguish analogy from focality by virtue of its non-analytic character, we need to specify what we mean by analysis. Fraser supplies the clue by specifying that ‘on the focal scheme, predications about non-substances are translated into predications about substances’. Analysis in this sense is ‘translating’ what is implicitly a predication about substance into an explicit predication about substance, by making explicit the way in which it refers to substance-being. In part 1, I called this focal explication. Since focal analysis applies to more than just τὸ ὅν, we might call the focal explication of being ‘ontological analysis’. Of course, such analysis already presupposes a certain degree of clarity about the focality of being. In this respect, it is worth noting that Aristotle also makes this point about ‘translation’ in a more general context. At Δ.7,

\textsuperscript{125} (1048a26-7). τέλεια is understood as ‘qualitative’ in this sense at Δ.16 (1021b30-22a3), where things that are called complete \emph{per se} are distinguished from those said to be complete “either by making something be such, by having [something of this sort], by being in tune with this, or by being said in some way or other in relation to the things primarily said to be complete / τῷ ἔν συν τοιούτῳ ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ἀριστείαν ἢ μὴ γε λέγεσθαι πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ λεγόμενα τέλεια.” Also, “excellence is a certain completeness / ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειοσύς της” (\textit{ibid.} 1021b20-1), and excellence is goodness predicated in the category of quality (EN 1.6). Kosman (1968, 174) writes, “when we say that Socrates is courageous, we predicate ἐν τῷ συν, but we also predicate good of him. For being courageous or being virtuous in general is a good way to be; courage and virtue in general, that is, are good qualities.” Delving deeper into this question would involve sorting out the controversial relation of qualitative to substantial form.

\textsuperscript{126} Menn (\textit{ibid.}, IIIα2, 37). This is supposed to characterize the function of both ‘halves’ of Θ.6. I am adapting it to explain the function of analogy in Θ.6 as a whole.
having distinguished the several modes of *per se* being indicated by the categories, he observes that “it makes no difference whether ‘the human is healing’ or ‘the human heals’, nor whether ‘the human is walking or cutting’ or ‘the human walks or cuts’, and likewise in the other [predications].” As Kosman (1968, p. 173-4) writes, “What this shows is that it is possible in Greek as in English to predicate being without explicitly using the verb ‘εἶναι’ or ‘to be.’ Thus to say ‘Socrates is a man’ is to predicate being in the category of τί ἐστι, to say ‘Socrates is cultured’ is to predicate being in the category of ποιόν, and to say ‘Socrates walks’ is equally to predicate being (in the category of ποιεῖν) even though no explicit use is made of the verb ‘to be’.” Thus, the procedure of making explicit the respect in which there is a predication of being is also a sort of explication or analysis. Yet, it does not seem precisely equivalent to the focal sort of analysis Aristotle has in mind at Γ.2 and Z.4. Are they distinct? Are they related? Consider the distinction Aristotle draws at *Cat. 2-4* between simple and compound expressions: “of things said, some are said by composition, some without composition. Examples of the former are ‘the man runs’ and ‘the man wins’; of the latter ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.” In this light, we might say that the sort of analysis at issue in Δ.7 is supposed to show how all compound expressions are ultimately predications of being. By the same token, we can say that the sort of analysis at issue in Γ.2 and Z.4, viz. focal analysis, is supposed to show how all simple expressions, when revealed for what they are i.e. as ways of predicking being, are ultimately predications of substance. The former reveals the respect in which there is a predication of being; the latter the respect in

127 οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ύγιαίνων ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ύγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων” (1017a27-30).
128 “Τὸν λεγομένον τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκήν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, τὰ μὲν ὁμως κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ” (1a16-19).
which there is a predication of substance. In either mode, analysis refers to the explication of ontological dependence.\textsuperscript{129}

Thus, the non-analytic character of analogical comprehension consists in the absence of explication. Again, this does not mean that analogues are incapable of focal analysis. It just means that the beginning of analysis is the end of analogy. Wood’s analysis of Θ.6 stands as a profound example of this fact. For heuristic reasons, Θ.6 considers neither the focal nor the serial relation of the various activities with respect to one another. What Θ.6 reveals is the ‘likeness’ in virtue of which all instances of activity are analogous. As Wood points out, Aristotle deliberately specifies what the similarity is: all activities are alike in being complete in themselves, that is, \textit{without} reference to something else. Once we begin to exhibit how they are complete by reference to τὸ πρῶτον ἐνεργεία, we have broken the analogy. But this is where one needs to be delicate. It is not that the activities stop being analogous once we start analyzing them focally or serially (πρὸς ἐν or τῷ ἐφεξῆς). It is just that we stop regarding them \textit{qua} analogous. In the same way that focality and seriality “are really one and the same structure, understood in different stages of articulation or refinement,”\textsuperscript{130} analogy and focality are just two ways of understanding the same structure, comprehended by analogy and explained focally.

It is important to recognize the difference between analogical comprehension and focal explanation. In the context of Θ.6, where the aim is to comprehend (συνορᾶν) the ἁρχαί by analogy, analogical comprehension is necessary because of its indifference.

\textsuperscript{129} This would also seem to apply to ὁνάμας and ἐνέργεια. For example, to say that someone is amenable is to predicate ὁνάμας of them inexplicitly. Such terms are disguised means (to borrow Kosman’s term) of predicating capacity.

\textsuperscript{130} Fraser (ibid., 132); see the conclusion of part 1.
toward the relative priority and posteriority of the terms compared. In the context of Λ, where the aim is to understand the first principle – τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία – as cause, analogical comprehension is inadequate for precisely the same reason. Aristotle’s thesis that the causes of substances are the causes of all beings – τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αἰτία ὡς αἰτία πάντων – clearly implies the assumption of its priority, which he states at the outset of Λ,\(^{131}\) and indicates via the gloss ‘because all is taken away when they are taken away.’ Aristotle calls such non-reciprocal entailment of being natural priority at Δ.11.\(^{132}\) Now natural priority and focal priority are distinct. For Owen, as we saw, the fact that Λ.4-5 never mentions focal priority implies that natural priority was superseded by focal priority in Γ. Focal priority, as we saw in part 1, necessarily involves definitional inclusion, where the name or definition of the focus is necessarily included in the definition of its dependents.\(^{133}\) At Λ.4-5, there is no mention of definitional inclusion. On the other hand, Aristotle is talking about the causes of being, and causes are definitionally related to what they are the causes of, in the way that water qua element is per se related to the watery. Without water, the aqueous could not exist. In this respect, natural priority also involves definitional inclusion: the natural priority of substance means that it is necessarily included in the definition of non-substance. At the same time, focal priority implies natural priority: the focus is non-reciprocally entailed in the definition of its dependents. Thus, as Wilson notes, “the difference between the two

\(^{131}\) “if the all is some whole, substance is the primary part; and if it is in a series, even so substance is primary, then quality, then quantity / εἰ ὡς δὴν τί τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος: καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐφέξης, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν” (1069a19-21). Again, Frede is skeptical about the second εἶτα.

\(^{132}\) See note 100.

\(^{133}\) “πάντα ἐξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον” (Θ.1, 1045b31). The sense in which ‘reference’ is equivalent to ‘explication’ is present at the very beginning of Θ: “περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρῶτος ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὁ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος ἀναφέρονται εὑρηταί” (1045b27-8), where ἀναφέρονται is equivalent to reference. Heidegger (ibid., 35) takes ἀναφέρονται to be equivalent to ἀναλέγονται ‘are said back’. Again, this is not Aristotle’s usage.
concept in this context can be exaggerated.”\(^\text{134}\) Granted, the gloss is “ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων”, not “ὅτι πάντα ἔξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον”. Yet this does not exclude the possibility of focal explication. It just means that focal analysis is a more articulate expression of what is already implicit in the notion of natural priority. If we understand the ‘development’ of focal explanation in this way, we need not assume that Aristotle was unaware of focal priority when he wrote \(\Lambda\). Indeed, as we shall see, he explicitly refers to focality at \(\Lambda.10\). The further gloss then specifies τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία, which is precisely what analogy is unable to capture as such, that is, as first cause and therefore principle.\(^\text{135}\)

Now that we have distinguished analogical comprehension from focal analysis, let us note what is perhaps the most crucial pre-Aristotelian attempt to provide an analogical account of the first principle. At \(\Theta.6\), Aristotle tries to clarify what activity is by analogy. At Republic VI, Plato tries to clarify what the Good is by analogy.\(^\text{136}\) Inasmuch as the

\(^{134}\) (ibid., 185, n.14), which continues, “After all, Aristotle is talking here about the causes of things, and causes provide what he considers to be scientific explanations, and scientific explanations must have a per se relation with that of which they are the explanation. Natural priority here necessarily involves a per se (2) relation: “non-substance belongs to substance, because substance is included in the definition of non-substance.”

\(^{135}\) On the equivalence of first cause and ἀρχή, which I suggested in note 107 by translating the καὶ in ‘first causes i.e. principles’ epexegetically, see Menn (ibid., 1α3, 2-5) and (2012, 208-9): “Ἀρχή” is connected with being prior or first, ‘cause’ with explaining something, and for this reason it is possible to speak of ‘the ἀρχαι’ absolutely, the first of all things, while a cause is always a cause of. While in a broad sense, every cause can be called an ἀρχή, Aristotle often speaks interchangeably of ἀρχή and ‘first cause’ (where ‘prior’ or ‘first’ can be taken more or less strictly); while ‘the ἀρχαι’ very often means ‘the first of all things’, ‘the causes’ would mean something much broader, not restricted to first causes” (208). I would add: since all first causes are principles, Λ is in pursuit of the first principle: “πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης” (Phys. VIII.1, 251a8).

\(^{136}\) “But blessed ones, let us leave aside for now what the good-itself is, for it appears to me to be beyond the impulse we’ve got at present to reach the things that now seem to me to be the case. But I am willing to speak of what appears to be an offspring of the good and most like it (ὁς ἔκγενος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὀμοιότατος ἔκκινε), if that’s congenial to you as well, or if not, to let it go” (506D-E); “this is what I mean by the offspring of the good, which the good generated as analogous to (or in proportion with) itself (ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ); what the good-itself is in the intelligible realm in relation to intellect and the intelligible, [the sun] is in the visible realm in relation to sight and the visible” (508B-C). It is crucial that ἔκγενος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ implies some sort of causal relation, but as Menn (1992, 2012, forthcoming) brings out, Aristotle’s critique, following Plato’s critique of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo, is that Plato does not ‘use’
first principle in Λ turns out to be pure activity, it is as if both Θ.6 and Republic VI constitute analogical accounts of the first principle. As I have insisted, it is important that this is not strictly true. The analogy in Θ.6 needs to hold independently of which activity is ‘first’. This is why analogical comprehension is inadequate at the end of Λ.5. The aim of book Λ, broadly speaking, is to understand the first principle as cause. Aristotle specifies τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία because of the four causal chains leading to first causes or principles, only the chain of final causes can be referred to a principle that is one in number, not just by analogy. In the following passage, just before the conclusion of Λ.5, Aristotle argues that material, form, and the mover (i.e. the material, formal, and efficient causes of all things) differ except by analogy:

if the causes of substances are the causes of all things, but there are different causes and elements of different things, then, as was said, the causes of things not in the same genus, e.g. of colors and sounds or of substances and quantity, are different except by analogy; those of things in the same species are also different, not in species, but because those of particular things are different, your material and form and mover from mine, though in their universal account they are the same.137

Aristotle then proceeds to conclude that it is only by investigating the causes of substances as all beings that it is possible to arrive at the first principle, τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία. Analogical unity is inadequate, because it ignores the priority of substance and its principles, and moreover τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία. As we saw, natural

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137 ἔπειτα, εἴ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων αἰτία καὶ στοιχεῖα, όπως ἐλέγη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταῦτῷ γένει, χρηματίσων ύποπτων συμβαίνει, πλὴν τὸ ἀνάλογον: καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶδε ἔτερα, οὐκ εἶδεν ἄλλα ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκαστόν ἄλλο, ἢ τε σῇ ὑλῇ καὶ τὸ εἰδός καὶ τὸ κινήσαν καὶ ἢ ἐμῆ, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταύτα” (1071a24-9).
priority in this context involves causal priority, and it is precisely this causal priority that
analogical comprehension is unable to capture. Aristotle articulates this causal priority in
terms of focal priority at Λ.10, in explaining the relation of the cosmos to the first
principle qua good:

One must also consider which way the nature of the whole possesses the good and
the best: as something separated and by itself, or as the order. Or is it both ways,
as an army does? For the goodness is both in the order and is the general; and
more-so the latter. For he is not due to the order, but the order is due to him. And
all things are somehow ordered together, though not in the same way – things that
swim, things that fly, things that grow in the ground; and yet [the order] is not
such that nothing is related to another, but there is some relation. For all things
are co-ordinated in relation to one thing (πρὸς ἕν)…

Here we have an account of the good as the cause of world-order. Further, Aristotle
expresses its causal and explanatory function in terms of focal priority. Thus, book Λ
yields a non-analogical account of the good as cause.

It would seem, then, that the question EN I.6 cedes to first philosophy – whether
goods are homonymous by reference or derivation, or rather by analogy – receives its
definitive answer at the culmination of the Metaphysics. Even that which is good and
telēia in itself somehow refers to τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία. As ends in themselves, all self-
sufficient activities are essentially complete. All activities are analogous in this
respect. Nonetheless, Aristotle implies that this analogical identity is somehow due to
their mutual reference to the good-itself. This reference is supposed to explain how (ποις)

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138 “ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρος ἔχει ἢ τοῦ ὅλου φύσες τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ 
κατὰ καθ’ αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφιστέρους διδὼν στράτευμα: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ 
στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὕτως: οὐ γὰρ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτον ἔστιν. πάντα δὲ 
συντέτακται πῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλοῦτα καὶ πτηνά καὶ φυτά: καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὅστε μὴ εἶναι 
θατέρω πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀπαντά συντέτακται” (1075a11–9).

139 Cf. Pol. I.2: “nature is an end; for what each thing is when it has completed its coming-to-be is that
which we say is the nature of each, as of a human being, a horse, a house. And that-for-the-sake-of-which
i.e. the end is also the best; and self-sufficiency is both an end and the best / ἡ φύσις τέλος ἐστιν: ὅλον γὰρ 
ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὅσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου 
oikias. ἐπὶ τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βελτιστον: ἡ δ’ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βελτιστον” (1252b31-53a1).
different things are related to one another, εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον, which is the very condition of analogical identity: ἔχει ὡς ὁλλο πρὸς ὁλλο (Δ.6). In this sense, focality is the ground of analogy.\footnote{Wilson (ibid., 176-7) comes at this from a different perspective: “[w]hether or not focality was explicitly articulated at a later stage of Aristotle’s development, in its logical nature it is prior to analogy in two ways. At a general level it is a logical precondition for all analogy, and as a result one might say that analogy is a focal derivative of focality. For in order for there to be analogy, there must be different genera, each one constituted out of elements per se related to its core subject in the focal manner. So, while focality can exist independently of analogy, analogy cannot exist independently of focality. Since the focal connection is identical with the normal per se connection, this focal precondition has generally escaped notice, in spite of the fact that it is common to all analogies. It is most apparent in the case of potentialities: they are analogously the same, but each is homonymous with its corresponding actuality (e.g., the potentially and the actually hot) and includes its actuality in its definition.”}

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that ‘the good’ is homonymous by analogy. Aristotle’s thesis that the homonymy of good reflects the homonymy of being (τὰ γαθόν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι)\footnote{EN I.6, 1096a23; cf. EE I.8 (1217b25-34).} genuinely signals the possibility of a categorial analogy along the lines of ‘virtue is to quality as god is to substance’ and so on. This analogy is just as legitimate as the analogy ‘white is to quality as horse is to substance’, etc. On the other hand, such categorial analogies are not particularly interesting or revealing, I have argued, because they ignore the natural and focal posteriority of the former analogue in relation to the latter. Insofar as the \textit{Metaphysics} is in pursuit of wisdom (σοφία), i.e. theoretical and contemplative knowledge of first principles as causes, analogical comprehension is inadequate by definition.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

To tie all of this together, let me sum up the basic conclusions of the preceding argument. In part 1, we reviewed in detail two theses in particular. The first concerns the homonymy of being. I have argued that Aristotle explicitly admits of two sorts of non-incidental homonymy: analogical and focal. Being is predicated by analogy insofar as all instances of being are related to their categorial genera in the same way, such that white is to quality as human is to substance, and so on. Upon closer inspection, however, we realize that being exhibits the same focused homonymy as ‘the healthy’ and ‘the medical’: just as ‘healthy’ is predicated of some things derivatively, i.e., in reference to that which is primarily said to be healthy, namely the body of a living being, ‘being’ is predicated of non-substantial beings derivatively, that is, in reference to that which is primarily said to be, namely substance. Tangentially, we also considered the paronymy of being, that is, the fact that being (τὸ ὄν) for Aristotle literally derives from substance-being (ὁὐσία), just as ‘the healthy’ and ‘the medical’ derive respectively from ‘health’ and ‘medicine’. Contra the assumption that the homonymy and paronymy of being are mutually exclusive, I argued that τὸ ὄν is understood as a paronym when predicated of non-substantial being(s) and as a homonym when predicated of all being(s). Again, the homonymy of being is twofold: analogical and focal. It is crucial for Aristotle to draw this distinction, I argued, because analogy and focality represent distinct modes of understanding. *Pace* Wood, Heidegger, Brentano, and the entire scholastic tradition, I would insist that Aristotle nowhere treats focal unity as a type of analogical unity, such that the distinction between focal and analogical homonymy would collapse. Rather, he consistently distinguishes the two for good theoretical reasons.
In part 2, I set out to explore what these reasons might be. Broadly speaking, my conclusion is that analogy and focality must be carefully distinguished in order to understand how they are intrinsically connected. We can speak of things as being analogous by virtue of their common reference to a single source, in the way of the *analogia attributionis* as distinct from the *analogia proportionalitatis*. However, this way of speaking conceals the fact that the particular *mode* of reference in each case differs. Since the distinctive mark of analogical identity is ‘equality of relation’ (EN V.3), the fact that things predicated in reference to a single term (πρὸς ἑν λεγόμενα) relate to that term in different ways distinguishes them from the class of things that are homonymous by analogy (ὁμώνυμα κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν). Nonetheless, both modes of predication may concern the same thing under different descriptions. The fact that being is amenable to focal analysis does not mean that it is not predicated analogically. It just means that the analogy of being is susceptible to focal and even serial analysis in terms of priority and posteriority. The same goes for good, complete, alive, and all such terms.

Furthermore, I maintained that although Aristotle is quite aware of the analogical unity of being, he is relatively uninterested in it. On the other hand, I maintained that he is interested in the analogical unity of its principles and causes. Once we have distinguished the manifold of ways in which being is predicated, we are led to conclude that the principles (ἁρχαί) of being, when understood as the elements (sc. immanent constituents) of all beings, are only identical by analogy (Λ.4-5). This is supposed to be a negative conclusion resulting from a stoicheiological conception of the ἁρχαί, which Aristotle implicitly attributes to Plato. Indeed, the principles and causes of all beings are one by analogy, but this analogy ignores the natural and focal priority of the principles
and causes of substantiality. Of course, the priority of substance is supposed to indicate the way in which the categorial genera themselves are united. In this sense, the focal unity of the categories is the precondition for the analogical unity of the principles. Thus, ontological focality is the ground of ontological analogy.

Finally, I have argued that analogy relates to focality in the same way that focality relates to seriality. Serial analysis starts with the recognition that focal dependents may exhibit an order of priority and posteriority in relation to one another, such that one member of the series may be posterior in relation to the focus but prior in relation to another member of the series. Focal analysis ignores this relative order of priority and posteriority, and simply concentrates on the priority of the focus and the posteriority of its dependents. In the same way, analogical comprehension ignores the order of priority and posteriority altogether, in order to reveal ontological likeness and similarity. At Θ.6, Aristotle specifies that all activities (ἐνέργειαι) are analogous by virtue of being complete (τελεία) in themselves. As such, all self-sufficient activities are ends in themselves; this likeness is grasped by analogical comprehension. Once we begin to consider the priority of some activities in relation to others, this analogy submits to focal and even serial explication in terms of prior and posterior activities, revealing a hierarchy whose principle is primarily what its analogues are derivatively.
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