

A HUNHU-UBUNTU INFORMED CRITIQUE OF PATRIOTIC HISTORY DISCOURSE AND  
CHIMURENGA NATIONALISM

by

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## Dedications

This thesis is dedicated to the living, loving memories of my mother Mavis Chidzonga and my brother Mudiwa Musekiwa Chidzonga who were summoned too soon to leave this fleeting world for an immortal rest above.

My dear mother was an inspiration to many. Through her drive and ambition she confounded her doubters and rose humbly out of a grim upbringing, defying the constraints of patriarchy to become an exemplary figure for mothers and women everywhere. She never forgot who she was nor where she came from. She gave whole heartedly and loved unconditionally till her last breath. With my equally loving and dedicated father she raised us to be, first and foremost, loving, humble and hardworking, and that all else would flow naturally. It is my hope that I and my siblings reflect these values in her honor. I express a special and immense feeling of gratitude to you ‘Mamoyo’, mother of my heart, the embodiment of love and Hunhu.

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## **Abstract**

This thesis critiques the political discursive hegemony of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism from the year 2000 from the perspective of the ethics of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy. I ask, while claiming to offer deliverance from colonial and neo-colonial rule, has the paradigm managed to successfully generate a sense of belonging and a collective human subjectivity while promoting peace and stability? I find that peace and stability have been impermanent because it fails to formulate a clear and shared ideological direction. It has stalled the nation building project because it mistreats issues around race relations and national unity, citizenship and political identity, ontological security and belonging, leadership and power, violence and politics, modernization and institutional development. I argue that Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy offers a resource for a thoroughly decolonized, peaceful and stable modernization better suited to centrally accommodate plurality and cultural heritage within Zimbabwe's nation building and development agenda.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED**

ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZTV	Zimbabwe Television
ZBC	Zimbabwe's Broadcasting Corporation
MCC	Mbare Chimurenga Choir
BSA	Broadcasting Services Act
POSA	Public Order Security Act
GLLA	General Laws Amendment Act
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ONHRI	Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The liberationist struggles fought against colonialism in Zimbabwe, and similar struggles elsewhere in Africa, strove to elevate Africans from being colonial subjects to instead becoming citizens who could pursue national self-determination and define their own destinies. It was believed that, through the transformation of colonies into sovereign nation-states, economic development benefits could be accrued by liberated Africans who would then instill and uphold democracy, claim human dignity and human rights which colonialism had not allowed (Mamdani, 1996; Zeleza, 2003). It is with great despair that I, like many other Zimbabweans, must concede that political independence is yet to yield the fruits of peace, stability or prosperity, let alone independence in the true sense of the word. The processes of decolonization, democratization and development for Africa are ongoing and wrought with contention. They have been characterized by decades of failed economic development policy, political turmoil and ever growing civil discontent in the post-colonial era.

The post-colonial Zimbabwean state that emerged out of nationalist struggles continues to grapple with the project of nation building which entails the resolution of the interlaced national and agrarian questions. These questions involve regaining lost identity, race relations, settler-native binaries, citizenship, resource ownership, in particular land, and generally regaining control of national public discourse and the public sphere (Mamdani, 1998; Hwami, 2012). These internal struggles have been compounded by struggles to assert African values, concerns and interests in a global environment within which invisible global imperial designs and coloniality of power have ensnared African realities (Quinjano, 2007; Ndlovu-Gathseni, 2013). This “colonial

matrix of power” (Quijano, pp. 168-178) has left the African public sphere infused with, and arguably constrained by, Western intellectual formulations that are the “indelible imprint of colonialism and mimicry of western values that are now re-packaged as global values” (Ndlovu-Gathseni, 2008, p.3).

My thesis is concerned with the manner and form of ongoing decolonisation in Zimbabwe, at the hands of the ruling political party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the ruling elite. An exploration into the mode of nationalism and the discourse deployed therein will help one to understand how the post-colonial Zimbabwean state has attempted to resist and reverse what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) calls “the forcible confinement of their history, values and identities to the barbarian margins of the world” (p.3) in a bid to seize control of the public sphere so as to publicly articulate their common concerns. What is evident in Zimbabwe is that self-rule has not translated directly into a common national vision; further, it has yet to resolve fundamental issues pertaining to the wholesale transfer of the economy from the hands of the minority whites to those of the majority blacks (Osaghae, 2005; Hwami, 2013). Hence, undeniably there is “unfinished business” (Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003, p. 37) lingering even after political independence was won. Thus development will continue to elude Zimbabwe until attainment of liberation as freedom and ownership of the development process has been achieved (Osaghae, 2005).

Importantly, it is the purpose of this thesis to explore, assess and critique the political discourse since the year 2000 which can best be described as the year in which “Zimbabwe plunged into an unprecedented crisis that clouded its development trajectory. The crisis happened in tandem with the metamorphosis of African nationalism into Afro-

radicalism and nativism predicated on an aggressive indigenisation discourse built around land restitution” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, p.4). With the advent of the new millennium the ruling government adopted a distinct and unapologetically anti-Western development framework that attempted to amend what colonialism, neocolonialism and misgovernment had negated for so long. This incisive moment came at the beginning of 2000 in the wake of civil unrest, unprecedented economic and diplomatic crises and blame shifting over Zimbabwe’s post-liberation development impasse. This period is significant because it best captures the crystallisation of anti-colonial liberationist perspectives and the crescendo of ultra-nationalist discourses described by scholars as the Nativist Turn or Nativist Revolution (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, p.5) promoted by Robert Mugabe’s government. What began as the land reform program in early 2000 signified the dawn of a deeply racialised Afro-Radical nationalist turn or the Mugabe turn with an emphasis on cultural nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a). I use the terms above interchangeably to refer to the revolutionary nationalist turn that has come to be aptly named the Third Chimurenga. It signified the continuation of the Liberation Struggle and a reflection of the violent 1890s and 1970s uprisings known as the First and Second Chimurenga wars of resistance against colonial rule. Chimurenga Nationalism involved the repackaging of national history as a series of nationalist revolutions, a repackaging referred to by some scholars as Patriotic History (Ranger, 2004; Tendi, 2010). Patriotic History was strategically cultivated by the ruling government in a bid to reignite the embers of the liberation struggle’s nationalistic solidarity, a sense of belonging and a shared human subjectivity, which was perceived to have been the hallmark of the early liberation struggles.

The ideology of Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse intended to address the issue of incomplete decolonization and resolve questions of social and economic justice through black empowerment and indigenisation while pursuing independence and the defense of national sovereignty. I argue that the partisan politicization of history and culture has created a situation in which the heritage of the liberation struggle has eclipsed and even repressed Zimbabwe's rich cultural heritage, preventing it from shaping and informing reclamation of the development process. Hwami (2013) and other scholars, contend that in order for development to be meaningful there is a need for the advancement of an African philosophy of development that is responsive to the development needs of the general population. Furthermore, "it is the totality of the values, norms, attitudes, beliefs of a society which shapes its social, political and economic organisation and inculcates a general feeling towards development" (Asante 1991, p. 68). It is for this reason that I wish to undertake a critique of Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse, a critique that is informed by the traditional sociocultural values of Hunhu-Ubuntu.

Hunhu-Ubuntu is a philosophical system and way of life derived from ancestral morals and values governing good ethical human behaviour, character or conduct. Essentially Hunhu-Ubuntu means personhood or the essence of being human (Tutu & Abrams, 2004) in a spirit of fellowship, humanity, and compassion (Rukuni, 2012b). Hunhu (or, in some dialects, Unhu) is a chiShona term whereas Ubuntu is the equivalent term in IsiNdebele and the other Nguni languages of Southern Africa (Rukuni, 2012a). For the purposes of my study the hyphenation of Hunhu-Ubuntu will be used to symbolize a coming together of Zimbabwean people, Bantu kin. By doing so I am

making an explicit statement for kinship and national solidarity rather than entrenching Shona dominance and perpetuating political cleavages. Therefore, my approach is explicitly in pursuit of cohesion. Hunhu-Ubuntu is the fundamental spirit and ethos of traditional village societies anchoring what was, or was intended to be, a socially cohesive shared human subjectivity that affirmed humanness through harmonious relationships (Mandova, 2013; Chimuka, 2001;2008; Konyana, 2013). In its nature it possesses pragmatic and flexible characteristics that make it useful for applications as a code of conduct in various facets of human life (Konyana, 2013). Hunhu-Ubuntu is based on “humaneness, a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that individuals and groups display for one another...the foundation for the basic values that manifest themselves in the ways African people think and behave towards each other and everyone else they encounter” (Mangaliso, 2001, p.24). It has been described as collective personhood and collective morality in the fullest and noblest sense (Pearce, 1990; Nkomo, 2011).

Broadly definable as the worldview of the Bantu language speaking people it can be understood as an African conception of humanism, it gives primacy to communal interests over individual interests and favours mutually beneficial social relationships (Mcdonald, 2010). My sense of Hunhu-Ubuntu is derived from an experiential awareness of everyday discourse while drawing on its coverage by other scholars. Hunhu-Ubuntu has received noteworthy coverage from thinkers such as Stanlake Samkange and Tommie Marie Samkange (1980), Carole Pearce (1990), Mongobe B. Ramose (1999), Ronald Nicolson (2008), Patrick Sibanda (2014) and, Fainos Mangena (2012). I will be taking a more critical approach to Vimbai Gukwe Chivaura’s (2006a; 2006b) coverage of the

philosophy. Hunhu-Ubuntu constitutes an ideal theoretical perspective from which to critique the ethics and values expressed through Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse given that the proponents of that discourse often draw on the teachings of Hunhu-Ubuntu as expressed through proverbs. Therefore, collections of Shona proverbs, upon which I will draw, will function as embodiments and enforcers of desirable human conduct which reflect the interests enshrined within a community's common moral position. Proverbs also serve a central role in the socialization, preservation, transmission and authentication of moral code and reflect a philosophical concern with social justice, obligation and responsibility (Masaka & Makahamadze, 2013). Usefully, proverbs act as a conduit for the expression of the central attributes of Hunhu-Ubuntu which include but are not limited to a celebration of mutual social responsibility, mutual assistance, trust, sharing, unselfishness, self-reliance, caring and respect for others.

Hunhu-Ubuntu generates an ethos and attitudes that influence day to day lives, structure acceptable behavioral patterns, and establish parameters within which one can either be qualified or disqualified as *munhu* (being human) (Mandova, 2013). Thus one who qualifies as *munhu* (being human) can be said to be in possession of the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu, an essence of personhood attained through one's actions and societal interactions. Thus "to be human is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, and on that basis, establish respectful human relations with them" (Samkange & Samkange, 1980). Through Hunhu-Ubuntu one is enjoined to be tolerant of diversity of perceptions, perspectives and practices and thus individuality, and so in denying the humanity of others we are only denying our own humanity (Hapanyengwi-

Chemhuru & Makuvaza, 2014). Given that Hunhu-Ubuntu is determined by whether or not one's human relations create societal well-being (Pearce, 1990) it must be actively cultivated by all. Deviation from moral goodness constitutes a loss or negation of one's own humanness.

To perform a critical appraisal of Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse is not to set out to discredit it, but instead, it is to further an understanding of its rationale and defensibility in an appreciation of both its strengths and weaknesses while questioning its sustainability. My critique will therefore use a theoretical framework informed, primarily, by Hunhu-Ubuntu. In so doing, I wish to argue for, and demonstrate the potency of, the reinvigoration and advancement of Hunhu-Ubuntu-informed socio-cultural and ethical values, as a way of life and as a reservoir rich in knowledge. I wish to demonstrate that Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy offers the possibility of a thoroughly decolonized, peaceful and stable modernization better suited to centrally accommodate plurality and cultural heritage within the Zimbabwe's nation building and development agenda. My primary research question is thus: while claiming to offer deliverance from colonial and neo-colonial rule, have Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History managed to successfully generate a sense of belonging and a collective human subjectivity that affirms humanness and harmonious relationships that would engender peace and stability? Further, has the ruling government been able to formulate a clear ideological direction and national vision with which to reconcile and negotiate increasingly divergent civil and political development interests and concerns?

It is my intention that my research will contribute to scholarship seeking to describe and explain why development, unity and stability have eluded Zimbabwe. I seek

to join the search for fresh ideas capable of preventing and transcending recurrent crises that plague post-liberation African states. I argue for an appreciation of African cultural heritage that will bring forth African thought from the margins to the centre of intellectual formulations and development thinking. By demonstrating the resilience and dynamism of Hunhu-Ubuntu, I will add a voice to the growing crescendo of intellectuals making compelling claims for the need to not only draw upon, but modernize and formalize indigenous knowledge, traditional values, wisdom, practices and institutions. This has been in light of the severe shortcomings of inappropriate Western-centric development models and institutions that are the embodiment of the lasting legacy of colonialism (Rukuni, 2007; Samkange & Samkange, 1980; Shizha, 2006; Ntibagrirwa, 2009; Mandova, 2013). I intend to contribute to the ongoing wave of efforts to develop a revolutionary departure from an overemphasis on Western-centric institutions and thought that “were never originally intended to serve the majority of Afrikans...” (Rukuni, 2009, p.140) as seen by their tendency to overstate the primacy of economic and political development to the detriment of significant socio-cultural factors (Ntibagrirwa, 2009, Enslin, 2010).

Pivotaly, a new era is on the horizon for Zimbabwe as the nation enters the unfamiliar yet ultimately inevitable territory that is the issue of succession of the presidency, a potential transition from a leadership structure that has been in place for three and a half decades. Whether or not President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s ideology will breathe anew in another form, or be done away with altogether, remains worryingly unclear. Nonetheless, amid crippling uncertainty stemming from political factionalism within an already fractured society, new and promising ideas must continue

to take root and take strides towards national self-definition and formulate a national vision in a capable of withstanding the onslaught of global colonial matrices of power.

## CHAPTER 2 PATRIOTIC HISTORY DISCOURSE AND CHIMURENGA NATIONALISM

### 2.1 Situating the Zimbabwean Development Conundrum within a Crisis of African Development.

The existing extensive literature on the crises of African development has generated much debate and contestation. Different approaches for explaining the causes of African underdevelopment have been sought, with some bearing more empirical support and currency than others. Broadly, theorists argue that Africa's development conundrum is a result of the interplay of external and domestic factors both past and present (Soko & Lehmann, 2011). These include but are not limited to, European colonization and slavery (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010), economic mismanagement (Mills, 2011), ill-conceived structural adjustment policies (Soko & Lehmann; Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005), interstate and intra-state conflict and failed regionalism (Magbadelo, 2003; Collier, 2007), unfair trade terms, foreign debt, aid dependence (Soko & Lehmann), poor governance, weak states and institutional decay (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010; Rukuni, 2012b). Therefore African underdevelopment should be understood as “fundamentally rooted in the policy prescriptions of various development thinking paradigms that have been employed without success over the past decades” (Soko & Lehmann, p. 101). The paradigms that emerged out of largely theoretical debates about international development issues have thus far failed to generate sustained economic growth and promote human welfare in practice (Le Pere & Ikome, 2009). Most if not all coverage of African development challenges and opportunities places emphasis on the need to take into account the impact of past experiences, prominently, slavery and

colonialism as in some way shaping present challenges and bearing heavily on future prospects.

These explanations clearly do not capture the entirety of the complex development debates on challenges and/or actors shaping the prospects of Africa, as cultural explanations for example have tended to receive less attention (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010). I would argue that cultural explanations or perspectives have been complicated by the immense diversity of distinct ethnic and cultural configurations that characterise the African continent. Thus, any attempts to explain or remedy all African development crises in a generalized manner would not only be immensely challenging, but would likely result in an oversimplification of the unique and diverse composition, experiences, challenges and opportunities facing African nations. I, like other scholars before me, emphasize the importance of a historical understanding of both domestic and external theorizations regarding the state of African development (Soko & Lehmann, 2011; Swaniker, 2013; Hwami, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). In this manner I wish to demonstrate the importance of focussed and contextualized understandings of African development, more specifically, the post-independence development crises experienced in Zimbabwe.

I chose Zimbabwe because I believe it uniquely encapsulates and reveals the struggle to break away from colonial legacies and neocolonial ensnarement while attempting to forge a thoroughly decolonised modernization and autonomous nation building project. Raftopoulos (2003) explains, “Zimbabwe provides an important case study for broader economic and political problems in a region with certain linkages in the mode of colonial penetration, forms of liberation struggle, and problems of post-colonial

development” (p.10). Most importantly, Zimbabwean political economic development leading up to and since the year 2000, has been a useful source of insight into the possible motivations behind nativist and Afro-radical development discourses and philosophies adopted by African leadership. I use Afro-radicalism here to refer to the opinions and behaviours of the ruling government that reflected a drastic shift in post-independence government policy in favour of the black African majority population. My interest is in understanding the conditions under which nativist policies were engineered, and the manner in which they were deployed and justified by the President Robert Mugabe, the ruling party ZANU-PF and their various allegiants. My intention is to go beyond one dimensional theses which understand Zimbabwe’s development crisis as stemming from purely domestic malaise. This critical approach will help by theorizing transformations and creating an awareness of what is, how it has come to be, and what it might become. It is on this basis that people acquire the potential to remake their lives (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 4).

This pivotal juncture in Zimbabwe’s history better known as the Third Chimurenga, I argue, must be understood within the context of shifting and failed development paradigms to which Africa generally, and Zimbabwe in particular were subjected, in particular, within the context of the constraints of developmentalist projects of postcolonial African states (Raftopoulos & Phimster, 2004). This contextualization is necessary in order to grasp the conditions under which Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse took hold. Having attained political independence in 1980, yet lacking black majority economic empowerment, Zimbabwe showed early promise in its state-led developmentalist socioeconomic orientation packaged closely with a welfarist

program that included promises of land restitution (Raftopoulos & Phimster, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). The idea was that eventually the government would do away with the system in which the white 1 percent of the population owned and controlled 70 percent of arable land through a complicated history of unjust colonial acquisition (Mugabe, 2001, p.26). Initial government policies were auto-centric and based on Marxist principles that rejected Western capitalism and outward oriented economic policies (Soko & Lehmann, 2011). However, this policy prescription went on to become yet another example of the failure of inward-orientated development strategies adopted by most post-independence African ruling elites in the 1980s. These policies have often been criticised as inward and isolationist, engendering poor policy decisions hampering already weak institutions and ultimately undermining growth and foreign investment attractiveness (Luiz, 2006).

Zimbabwe would go on to epitomise the failures of externally-driven development models of the 1990's influenced by structural adjustment policies and governance conditionalities. Granted, these policies were adopted in the midst of international recession, drought and increasing volatility in mining and commercial agricultural sectors (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). The intended outcome was to stimulate investment activity and remove what were perceived to be constraints to growth (Republic of Zimbabwe, 1990), that is, the heavy hand of the state. Implicitly, this meant a transition away from the social welfare programmes and redistributive policies adopted in the first decade of independence (Dansereau & Zamponi). Zimbabwe's experience in this case exemplified the sheer pervasive influence, misguided or otherwise, of the Bretton Woods institutions' intervention and dictation of development policy. Crucially,

Zimbabwe exemplified the manner in which state-led development was transitioned into a neoliberal market economy at the hands of the very same institutions, through which the interests of foreign-owned mining companies and commercial farmers in Zimbabwe were being protected all while the Zimbabwean state's capacity was being narrowed. These policy impositions bore little consideration for the heightened economic and social demands emanating from growing unemployment and poverty. All of this occurred while capital and donor agencies clamoured for more economic liberalisation in Zimbabwe (Dansereau & Zamponi).

Approaching the millennium, two decades of failed post-independence development strategy, both an inward-oriented one and one externally driven, had produced an economic policy vacuum, growing debt, more stringent loan conditionalities, rising inflation, increasing poverty, unemployment and land hunger (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). This is not to mention that the ruling government owed it to their people to accomplish their mission to meet the people's demands for full independence, full sovereignty and the full benefits of national resources bestowed upon them by God (Mugabe, 2001). Suzanne Dansereau points out a simple yet painful fact: the government had failed to deliver on its principal promise of land reform for which the liberation struggle had been waged. Still a decade after victory a land resettlement scheme had not materialised (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). It is worth noting however that Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which essentially protected the interests of foreign-owned mining companies and commercial farmers, incapacitated the state with regards to land reform until at least 1990. Even then the terms upon which to proceed with land reform and resettlement plans thereafter, I would argue, remained strategically unclear and

wrought with insurmountable obstacles generated both internally and externally. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) describes the Lancaster House Agreement as playing a key role in halting the creation of a socialist state in Zimbabwe as the agreement was a neo-liberal power transfer document and the Lancaster House Constitution was a neo-liberal constitution. Ultimately, it was fairly clear that this agreement sought out to make Zimbabwe a neo-colonial state, not unlike other post-colonial African states.

Aside from an economic policy vacuum the nation lacked a vision, a sense of direction, developmentally speaking. Zimbabwe was suffering from what can be described as “a development deficit marked by a lack of economic growth and the absence of a clear trajectory towards recovery and a better future as well as uncertainty among people” (Moss & Patrick, 2004, p.21). Consequently, the Zimbabwean government faced mounting pressures on two main fronts by the end of the 1990s. Prominently, there was externally generated pressure to conform to the fundamentalist forces of neoliberalism, globalization and cosmopolitanism on one hand (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). Internal pressures, on the other hand, stemmed from a populace clamouring for the completion of an African nationalist project that would resolve the long overdue and overlapping national and agrarian questions. These issues stemmed from the sustained white concentration of control and ownership of national wealth and resources. Labour groups in particular were demanding that the state address mounting economic and social demands such as deteriorating real wages and deteriorating living conditions (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). Palpable frustrations over the development conundrum and ineffective government responses took the form of a wave of workers’ union strikes and stay-ways which were indicative of a looming crisis and fragmenting

consensus on all levels of society. This was clear evidence that, nearly two decades after independence, ZANU-PF's legitimacy and electoral base were showing signs of serious cracks. What began as expressions of dissatisfaction later morphed into resistance and eventually outright opposition. Opposition and resistance were matched with increased intimidation, violence and bans imposed on mass action so as to curb expressions of opposition (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). Growing discontent with the miscarriages of ZANU-PF's development policy eventually led to the formation of an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), initially comprising of members of civil society, student and workers union members, that sought to challenge ZANU-PF in the 2000 parliamentary election and establish themselves as an alternative to ZANU-PF.

The new political challenge posed by the growing popularity of MDC is evidenced by ZANU-PF's referendum loss over its proposed new constitution in February 2000. It had a destabilizing effect on the hegemony once held by ZANU-PF and thus swift corrective measures were initiated. As the ruling government grappled with, what had become a full-fledged political crisis and economic collapse, drastic measures were undertaken by ZANU-PF to retain a firm stronghold on political power and hegemony. These measures took the form of tightened security and limits on political freedom to discourage any opposition from mounting any considerable electoral challenge. Additionally, an extensive land reform program was initiated in which all but few white owned commercial farms were seized by the government for redistribution (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). I might add that, at this point, sheer desperation and frustration in the wake of deepened poverty, worsening living conditions and land hunger had spurred people, many claiming to be veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation war, to

undertake spontaneous land occupations of white commercially owned farms in certain parts of the nation. These land occupations were undertaken through the use of violence, harassment and intimidation by a combination of war veterans, unemployed party youths and other members of ZANU-PF (Chiumbu, 2004). The period in and around the parliamentary elections in June 2000 was marked by increased political violence, contested electoral results, farm invasions, lawlessness, abuses of human rights, militarisation of politics, authoritarianism and, most notably, the shrinkage of democratic spaces (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006).

During ZANU-PF's electoral campaign leading up to the presidential elections in 2002 it had become abundantly clear that the ruling party had all but shed any form of compliance with donor governance requirements. This was marked by a surge in nationalist anti-colonial rhetoric (Dansereau & Zamponi, 2005). Evidence would strongly suggest that ZANU-PF's claims that the nation was under siege from former imperialists were not completely unfounded. This evidence strongly indicates that the opposition party MDC was supported and funded by white commercial farmers, Britain and other Western countries (Bond & Manyana, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2003). Hence, ZANU-PF expressed a willingness to do anything in their power to safeguard national sovereignty. As a response, the government devised a radical pan-Africanist paradigm consisting of nationalist policies that advocated an indigenous Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans (Hwami, 2013). It was argued that the goal of indigenization and black empowerment policy was to give indigenous Zimbabweans control of the country's national resources which remained disproportionately under the control of European settlers during and even after colonial times (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007). This moment signals an important

departure from pro-Western and international aid backed socio-economic paradigms to an African anti-Western development framework embodied by the Third Chimurenga.

In a broad sense, the state of Zimbabwean development can be said to have been comprised of three overlapping narratives, namely: the dire need for a pan-African and Third World solidarity capable of surmounting renewed imperialist aggression; the breakdown of liberation struggle consensus; and the limitations of postcolonial development in the context of globalization (Raftopoulos & Phimster, 2004). Therefore in the discussion of Zimbabwe's development orientation spanning over two decades since independence, one observes a transition from a developmentalist state with an emphasis on social justice and welfare in the early 1980s, to one geared towards the demands of Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP) and neo-liberalism beginning in 1990, and finally, with the nativist turn beginning in the year 2000, a proposed transition from neo-liberal fundamentalism towards a more authoritarian nationalism with neo-liberal capitalist tendencies.

## **2.2 The Third Chimurenga: The Zimbabwean Nativist Revolution**

My usage of nativism will be based on its definition as “a socio-political position taken by those who consider themselves as native-born and followed by a policy favouring native-born citizens over immigrants” (Ekeh, 1975, p.623). Nativism can also be understood as a former colony's desire for a return to indigenous practices and cultural forms as they once existed in pre-colonial society. It arises most prominently within decolonisation discourses arguing for the recovery and promotion of pre-colonial indigenous ways of life in place of colonialism (Ashcroft et al., 2006). The nativist turn in

Zimbabwe might even be described as a pro-people swing in development policy indicative of a government conceding to demands by the populace for the radical resolution of the national and agrarian questions in a manner that was intended to be responsive to the developmental needs of the people. Others would argue that the authoritarian nationalist policies of the nativist revolution were intended to bolster the position of the ruling party while dismantling opposition support at home and abroad (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Hwami, 2013). Significantly, its Afro-radical nature represented an attempt to complete the nation building exercise, explicitly, without the support or interference of Western nations and global capital in the form of Western global financial institutions (Moyo & Yeros, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009c). The Zimbabwean nativist revolution that came to be known as the Third Chimurenga was conceived from Marxist, nationalist and African indigenous thought (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). This particular name was intended to signify the continuation of the liberation struggle and reflect the fighting spirit of resistance from the violent 1890s and 1970s uprisings against colonial rule known respectively as the First and Second Chimurenga wars of resistance.

The word Chimurenga in nationalist discourse, meaning revolt/revolutionary war or violent uprising, therefore symbolizes an ideological thread bound to the undying spirit of African resistance. The Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe was an extensive process of repossession of land by the majority local indigenes from the white minority commercial farmers. It was initiated by the ZANU-PF government on the 15th of July 2000 under the leadership of Robert Mugabe in order to repossess and redistribute land. At the heart of this scheme lay the land issue hence the Third Chimurenga is intimately associated with the Fast Track Land Reform Program (“Third Chimurenga”, 2016). In a contemporary

setting it is used by ZANU-PF nationalists as a rallying call to bring the projects of liberation and decolonization to their logical conclusion of achieving economic empowerment of the black majority population through the redistribution of land and indigenization of the economy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). The underlying philosophies of the Third Chimurenga can be understood through Achille Mbembe's "African Modes of Self-Writing" (2002a) and "On the Power of the False" (2002b) in which he develops the idea that Marxism and nationalism, as practiced in Africa in the twentieth century, gave rise to two narratives on African identity: nativism and Afro-radicalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ndhlovu (2013) suggest that nativism is a twin sister of Afro-radicalism. Mbembe (2002a) argues that the objective of the two discourses was to assert with finality the truth on what Africa and Africans are (theory) and also to chart what might or should be the destiny of Africa and Africans in the world (praxis). He asserts that such discourses entail the valorisation of African cultures and history (Mbembe, 2006). This is especially apparent with ZANU-PF's endeavour for autonomous development hailed as the Third Chimurenga, which I will discuss in further detail.

According to Mbembe (2002b), nativist and Afro-radical discourses of the self are "both projects of self-regeneration, self-knowledge, and self-rule. Self-knowledge and self-rule are justified in the name of autochthony" (p.635). I employ the term autochthony here to refer to a discourse in which identity and space are linked such that the speaker is able to establish a direct claim to territory by asserting that one is an original inhabitant, a son of the soil (Dunn, 2009). Nativist and Afro-radical discourses are often articulated and justified in autochthonic terms. Based on the argument of autochthony, "each spatio-racial formation has its own culture, its own historicity, its own way of being, and its own

relationship with the future and with the past. Each has its own certificate of origin and its own telos...the idea is that the encounter between Africa and the West resulted in a deep wound: a wound that cannot heal until the ex-colonised rediscover their own being and their own past” (Mbembe, 2002b, p.635). This pursuit of autonomy and self-determination, often under the banner of national sovereignty, is elevated to religious status by proponents of Afro-radicalism such as ZANU-PF. Rhetorically speaking therefore, while advocating economic emancipation I will look at the manner in which ZANU-PF Afro-radical ideology involves what Mbembe (2002b) argues is the refutation of Western definitions of Africa, for my purposes Zimbabwe, denouncing past and present injustices perpetrated by the West, while making concerted efforts to disqualify fictional Western representations of Zimbabwe with the intent to open up spaces in which Zimbabweans can self-define.

Mbembe (2002b) criticizes nativist and Afro-radical discourses as fake philosophies, such that, when given closer analytic attention they appear merely as repetitive dogmas and doctrines as opposed to being actual methods of interrogation. As a result they have been seen to contract and even impoverish conceptualizations and philosophical inquiries about Africa as a region. He is particularly critical of African cultural nationalism, in the form of nativism, as a response to neoliberalism, globalization and cosmopolitanism. Nativism, he argues, is a form of culturalism “actively lamenting the loss of purity” and it is characterized by a preoccupation with questions regarding identity and authenticity (Mbembe, p.629). As previously mentioned there is a clear fixation on the “malaise resulting from the encounter between the West and indigenous worlds” and thus “nativism proposes a return to an ontological and mythical Africanness”

(Mbembe, 2002b, p.629). Nativism and Afro-radicalism are based on a moral economy of good and evil consisting of superstitions centred on ideas of suffering and victimization in which the African subject expresses him- or herself in the world as a perpetually wounded and traumatized subject. In a sense, the subject's reality is perpetually defined by or in relation to the legacy of originary events such as slavery, colonization or apartheid and thus often draws upon this spirit of victimization (Mbembe, 2002b). In this light, nativist and Afro-radical discourses in Zimbabwe portray the Zimbabwean subject's reality as marred by the violence, past and present, perpetrated by the colonial Other in the form of the West and Western allies.

On the other hand, Austin Bukenya argues that indeed colonialism thoroughly and systematically denied Africans productive oracy, which is the ability to self-define, self-assert, negotiate relationships, claim rights and speak out in the event of their violation (Bukenya, 2001, p.32). The definitions of Africa and African destiny were confined to the exclusivist colonial public sphere. Thus public discourse in colonies took shape around colonial imperatives resulting in indifference to and marginalization of African concerns and experiences. African liberationist and nationalist struggles like the Second and Third Chimurengas can be understood as fighting, in part, for access to the public sphere, a domain in which Africans could assemble to freely articulate and deliberate their concerns and in so doing define their own destinies (Ndlovu-Gathsheni, 2008). In a post-colonial setting, nativism is a complex form of an ongoing process of decolonisation (Chen, 1998). As such, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) argues it is an attempt to bring African history, values and identities, common concerns and interests from the margins to the forefront of a vibrant public sphere. Furthermore, and useful for the purposes of this

study, he reconceptualises the public sphere as “not only a site for rational discourse debates and decision making but also a sphere within which issues of identities continue to be contested and deployed in particular ways” (p.4). According to him it is the crucial site in which African, in this case Zimbabwean identities and the public sphere are in ongoing processes of creation and re-imagination from perspectives including nativist perspectives.

This nativist struggle for autonomy represents attempts to transcend or remedy the past. Through the colonial experience, the African self has suffered alienation from itself resulting in loss of identities that require restoration; the property relations that led to dispossession necessitate struggles for land restitution; the humiliation, debasement, and nameless suffering and social death resulting from denial of human dignity present the need for an African Renaissance (Mbembe 2002a). Proponents of nativism often use it as or intend it to be a discourse of rehabilitation in defence of the African self, the humanity of Africans, a claim to its race, traditions and customs (Mbembe, 2006). As such, one can analyze the specific nativist policies that sought to instill a belief in the importance of asserting an authentic ethnic identity, policies favouring native-born citizens over immigrants, perpetuating native cultures in opposition to acculturation, and a defence of native-born people predicated on a hostility to foreign-born people.

Ndlovu-Gatheni (2006) does well to capture the form of nativist policies as they materialised in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government undertook a reformation of the predominantly white controlled judiciary system that was seen to be an impediment to the process of land redistribution; state intervention into the economy was enhanced as the means to empower the native African; concerted efforts were made to

create a powerful indigenous black middle class thereby placing ownership of the means of production in the hands of native and, ideally, patriotic citizens; citizenship was redefined in increasingly nativist terms in an attempt to resolve the native-settler binaries produced by colonialism; the economy was indigenized primarily through a fast track land reform programme; vigorous social and cultural engineering took the form of promoting patriotism and a national ethos as a defense mechanism against the encroachment of the ideas of globalization and cosmopolitanism; it was ever more apparent that the development paradigm adopted was unapologetically exclusionist in its nativist underpinnings (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). This paradigm which I refer to as the Third Chimurenga, is described by Hwami (2013) as “ultra-nationalist and autochthonic development” (p. 123). As I have hoped to demonstrate through the policies outlined above it involved what can be termed Africanization or indigenization of the nation’s natural resources in a manner that intended to facilitate the empowerment and participation of the majority of black peoples (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007).

Mbembe (2002b) maintains, given that Afro-radicalism is drawn from Marxist political economy, Afro-radicals lay claim to founding revolutionary politics that seek to break away from imperialism and dependence. It is no coincidence therefore that ZANU-PF, with its Leninist and Marxist espousals and revolutionary politics mobilized the idea of a dire need to break away from neocolonial and neo-imperial ensnarement through Afro-radical revolutionary politics predicated on anti-neoliberalism, anti-globalisation and anti-cosmopolitanism. Many authors have come to agree that the authoritarian nationalism undertaken by the government of Zimbabwe is in fact informed by the idea of nativism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; 2009a; Hwami, 2013). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008)

asserts that “nativism has continued to pulsate and reverberate within postcolonial struggles over determination and control of public discourse, ownership of the state, indigenisation of the economy, production of knowledge and taking control of the destiny of African societies” (p.2). Accordingly, I see the Third Chimurenga as ideal for critical scholarly analysis and explanation. The Third Chimurenga illustrates a terrain in which one observes the revival and advancement of the traditional liberation struggle of the previous Chimurengas in Zimbabwe. The Third Chimurenga was characterized by increasing verbal and physical attack on all other political forces in opposition to ZANU-PF that were deemed to be fronts for the re-colonisation of Zimbabwe. Drawing from the lessons of the past entailed a “frenzied recreation of the liberation discourse in very narrow, xenophobic, racist and nativist terms ranged against whites and those belonging to the MDC which was seen as a front for colonialism” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a, p.69). This period is further described by Brian Raftopoulos (2007) as one of reinvigoration of a virulent form of nationalism infused with racial discourse and “a selective rendition of the liberation history deployed as an ideological policing agent in the public debate” (p. 101).

Thus like all nativist revolutions, the Third Chimurenga was supported by an elaborate and strategically engineered, complementary cultural component consisting of music galas, annual commemorations of departed heroes, the re-definition of national days such as independence and heroes days and the re-definition of citizenship in non-civic terms. This was the propagation of what Terence Ranger (2004) coined to be “Patriotic History” (Willems & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008; Ranger, 2004; Bull-Christiansen, 2004). Concerted efforts were undertaken to forcibly inculcate liberation struggle history

on the nation in general, and the youth in particular, in a bid to cultivate what was intended to be a “Patriotic Citizenry” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008, p.70). The following section will unpack Patriotic History further so as to demonstrate how, through cultural producers in the form of public intellectuals and the media, the Zimbabwean government has shaped the ways in which the Zimbabwean public grapple with the highly contested, unresolved and incomplete national identity project which comprises culture and value systems (Chiumbu, 2004). Therefore I will focus on the discourses through which this “institutionalised process of exclusion and selective nationhood” (Chiumbu, 2004, p.32) is promulgated and articulated by the Mugabe regime and its key agents.

### **2.3 Patriotic History**

Patriotic History is a complex master narrative masterminded by President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF which entails the operationalisation of the memory of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle to the service of the nativist revolution and national politics. This occurred most prevalently between 2000 and 2004 (Tendi, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008). It has received coverage from various authors, most notably Ranger (2004) and Kriger (2006) as well as others such as Thram (2006), Tendi, (2008; 2010), Muwati et al. (2010) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012). According to Terrence Ranger (2010) the public history generally described as Patriotic History “assumes the immanence of a Zimbabwean nation expressed through centuries of Shona resistance to external intrusion; embodied by successive empires; incarnated through the great spirit mediums in the First Chimurenga of 1896-7 and re-incarnated by means of alliance between mediums and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerillas in the Second

Chimurenga of the liberation war” (p.505). ZANU-PF as the ruling party in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 has been led by Robert Mugabe, first as Prime Minister with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and then as President from 1988 after its merger with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and retaining the name ZANU–PF. Patriotic History intends to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition. It is insistently propagated through state-controlled media outlets. It is characteristically selective, epitomised by a “narrowing focus” (Ranger, 2004, p.215) and resentment of “disloyal” (p.215) historical questions. Furthermore, it seeks to invalidate academic historiography of nationalism and distorts the ideals of the nationalist movement.

The socioeconomic and political climate in Zimbabwe emerging out of failed post-independence development policy in the late 1990s was characterized by sky-high unemployment, hyper-inflation, unaffordable and often scarce basic foodstuffs, and fuel, collapsing healthcare and education systems compounded by a drought and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. These hardships fuelled civil unrest which, I would argue, pushed the ruling government to respond by cracking down on dissent in an attempt to reassert ZANU-PF’s hegemony and tighten its grip on the reins of power. On one hand scholars have suggested that Patriotic History arose in the midst of increasingly shaky national consensus precipitated by rapid economic decline and a populace disenfranchised by the ruling party’s authoritarianism (Tendi, 2010). On the other the ruling regime argues that Western interventionist policies following independence have been seriously compromising the notion of national sovereignty, particularly in the form of the politically liberal features of contemporary neoliberal globalization. Mugabe for example

very directly addresses the conflict between globalisation, cosmopolitanism and his nativist conception of Zimbabwean identity and culture, particularly, regarding the manner in which these forces come to shape discourses and practices concerning land. The Third Chimurenga and Patriotic History therefore are not only a response to socioeconomic crises but they are directly confrontational to the Western bogus universalism, which Mugabe depicts as denying a concrete history of global oppression (Ranger, 2004). Thus, according to ZANU-PF the Third Chimurenga and Patriotic History master narrative arose as a response to renewed Western imperialism.

In protest to the invasion and seizure of white-owned commercial farms starting in 2000, widespread politically motivated violence and human rights violations, Western business withdrew from the market in Zimbabwe, Western governments and agencies, the IMF and World Bank withdrew economic aid. The Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe. The EU imposed travel sanctions and freezes on the assets of Mugabe's associates. A crippling economic and a humanitarian crisis emerged from the combined effects of drought, HIV/AIDS and controversial government land reforms, no doubt worsened by the nation's increasing political and economic isolation in the international community. In this light ZANU-PF appropriated elements of national history and culture so as to galvanize support and delegitimize opposition. Patriotic History is the means through which ZANU-PF claimed to be "the progenitor and guardian of the post-colonial nation...the only authentic force with a sacred historic mission to deliver the colonized people from settler colonial rule" (Ndlovu-Gathsheni, 2012, p.1). In effect ZANU-PF repackaged history so as to depict itself as the "sole champion, past and present, of the independence and sovereignty of a country under constant attack from imperialist forces"

(Tendi, 2010, p.1). Thus, Patriotic History can be seen not only as complimentary to the nativist revolution that is the Third Chimurenga but as purposefully structured to serve the ZANU-PF's agenda for retention of power through "its relentless effort to convince the citizenry that the on-going crisis in Zimbabwe is a continuation of the liberation struggle," (Thram, 2006, p.75) over which ZANU-PF, and only ZANU-PF, is qualified to preside (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

As proposed by Hwami (2013) it is worthwhile to expose and investigate some official pronouncements that are representative of the theoretical standpoint of nativism as they are articulated by government officials and intellectuals thereby providing an ideological anchor to nativism in public. Nativism is useful for understanding the underlying thought process of Patriotic History discourse. It will also be worth paying particular attention to the truths about the notion of national identity one might term Zimbabweanness as articulated by ZANU-PF in nativist terms. There are important consequences produced by these utterances as they ultimately have a bearing on the issue of what Zimbabwe is or is intended to be, who Zimbabweans are and, also what might or should be the destiny of Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans in the world.

Ranger (2010) argues, Patriotic History is broadcast and enacted but not embodied in a book, such that it has to be lived, not read. Although there is no published Patriotic History text, the insistent public proclamation and enactment of Patriotic History has managed to undercut academic historiography and render academic historians irrelevant. The question then becomes, how is Patriotic History propagated in such a manner that it has been able to take hold in the minds and bodies of the masses? The gatekeepers of this institutionalised human subjectivity are arguably the intellectuals who

have skilfully formulated and articulated the Patriotic History master narrative. Its resonance and potency lies in their ability to draw on real, not imagined grievances emanating from the legacy of the colonial experience in a highly persuasive manner (Tendi, 2010). It is important therefore to give attention to these discursively powerful actors who can be referred to as authors of Patriotic History. They include, primarily, President Robert Mugabe, war veterans and Professor Tafataona Mahoso, media and political analyst and columnist. Mahoso spearheaded the weekly National Ethos programme on Zimbabwe Television (ZTV), which according to Ranger (2004) was described by unsympathetic commentators as “a televised version of Mahoso's Sunday Mail articles, designed to propagate a primitive and exclusivist nationalism that clearly fails to seize the popular imagination” (Ranger, 2004, p. 222). Other prominent nationalist intellectuals worth mentioning include the likes of Dr. Jonathan Moyo, former Minister of Information and Publicity; Dr. Vimbai Chivaura, TV panelist and University of Zimbabwe senior lecturer; Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, politician and political analyst; Professor Claude Mararike, of the University of Zimbabwe; Professor Sheunesu Mpepereki, of the University of Zimbabwe and Professor Godfrey Chikore of the University of Zimbabwe. These intellectuals have enjoyed unfettered access to the Zimbabwean public arena through which they have promoted ZANU-PF propaganda and defended Patriotic History (Tendi, 2010). President Robert Mugabe, the “keeper of patriotic memory” (Ranger, 2009, p.69) acts as the primary agent of this state-produced nationalist history. His publication “Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our Land is our Prosperity” (Mugabe, 2001) provides a useful, packaged insider’s perspective into the rationale behind the Third Chimurenga and contains documented Patriotic History

discourse, nativist and Afro-radical rhetoric promulgated by President Robert Mugabe himself.

#### **2.4 “Inside the Third Chimurenga”**

“Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our land is our Prosperity” (Mugabe, 2001) is a history manual used by The National Youth Service, introduced by the government in 2001, to propagandize youth militia camps. This was intended to be the basis for a compulsory National Service Scheme. It represents an endeavour to reach out to youth over the heads of their parents and teachers, all of whom are accused of having forgotten or betrayed revolutionary values (Ranger, 2004). The government believed that formal and informal learning institutions were becoming anti-government mentality factories and thus the function of the National Youth Service was to teach Patriotic History using war veterans as teachers, thereby enhancing skills, patriotism and moral education in youths (Chiumbu, 2004; Ranger, 2004). It was a pre-emptive measure taken to “prevent the youth from becoming certified slaves of Western neocolonialism... [It] will address the effects of the cultural nuclear bomb of imperialism that has deluded our youth of direction” (Mataire, 2002, para 2). After all, it was argued that the bulk of support for the opposition was coming from urban and peri-urban dwellers comprised of unemployed and frustrated youth, whereas support for ZANU-PF in the rural areas had remained largely unwavering (Mugabe, 2001).

Within it are a series of political speeches and public addresses made by President Mugabe through which he eulogizes ZANU-PF and the significance of defending Zimbabwe’s heritage and sovereignty, guided by the spirit of the armed Liberation

Struggle, in order to advance the historical mission of decolonizing Zimbabwe from neo-colonial ensnarement and imperial encroachment. Concurrently, he executes what Mazango (2005) refers to as a “discursive demolition of so-called enemies of the state” (p.43). These enemies have been deemed to be in opposition to the ideals of the Third Chimurenga and Patriotic History. The rhetoric within Mugabe’s (2001) publication draws from the heritage of the Liberation Struggle and thusly it is premised on four broad and overlapping narratives: land; sovereignty (the rejection of paternalistic Western interference in domestic affairs); race and; patriotism expressed in the juxtaposition of patriots and sell outs (enemies of the state). It is through these narratives, often articulated in nativist and Afro-radical terms, that ZANU-PF enunciates not only the national question of land but also sets out to construct a very particular national identity project. I then dedicate a subsection to the manner in which Patriotic History has been purposefully implanted into key national institutions.

#### 2.4.1 Land

The National Land Question, embodied by the Third Chimurenga is framed as “Hondo Yeminda” (our fight for land). This fight is rooted in the nation’s colonial experience as the principal grievance of the First and Second Chimurengas, “Land, Land was the cry,” Mugabe proclaims (2001, p.36). Yet land bears contemporary resonance in the continued fight for the resolution of land hunger. Land is understood as bearing the utmost importance as it has far reaching political, economic and cultural implications. As such Mugabe (2001) projects the land question “as the pillar of the revolution...indeed Land is the Economy and the Economy is the Land” (p.179). This slogan is an expression

of the economic logic that land reform is central to any transformation of the economy (Raftopoulos & Phimster, 2004).

Land possession is essential for economic empowerment, this cannot be overstated. Quite literally, as the title of the publication would suggest, “Our Land is our Prosperity.” Land is understood as more precious to society than gold or diamonds as it represents not only one’s home and wellbeing but also ones perpetual heritage and dignity (Mugabe, 2001). ZANU-PF undertook the historic mission of restoring rightful ownership of the land to the black majority. This land question extends beyond national importance, it bears regional significance. A lasting resolution to the national land question would signify the completion of the decolonisation process for Zimbabwe and the African continent as a whole (Mugabe). This is the pan-African appeal of the Third Chimurenga which represents a much larger, continental struggle against neo-colonialism. Land resettlement is the principle definer of the success of Zimbabwe. Therefore, according to Mugabe the national land question derives from struggles for national independence and sovereignty. The land reform program is “an economic correlative of the liberation struggle” the legitimacy and parameters of which ZANU-PF refuse to negotiate (p. 94).

Given that the Zimbabwean economy is predominantly based on agriculture, the colonial legacy of white dominated control and ownership of land is inextricably linked to asymmetrical relations of power unfavourable to the black majority. Consequently, the unresolved national question of land is the basis of conflict in contemporary Zimbabwe. Hence, “the land question is a political question” which the colonial court system in place is ill-equipped to resolve (Mugabe, 2001, p.110). It is argued that its resolution offers a

basis for peace, stability and other democratic rights, an end to the two-race, two-nation model that is a legacy of colonialism, by creating economic opportunities for everyone, particularly the black majority. It is believed that this economic transformation would translate into economic development (Mugabe). With great conviction therefore Mugabe proclaims that “the land is being delivered to its rightful owners, the Zimbabwean people...after all the land is ours: by birth, by right, by struggle” (p.118). The land-based Third Chimurenga is defended as striving to redress and reject an immoral and inequitable land system that is unjustifiable beyond racial imperial dominance. Mugabe further argues that the resulting vilification of the ruling party at the hands of Western sponsored local and international media and diplomatic campaigns, in the name of democracy, is a demonstration of their desire to preserve an unjust land system (2001). According to Mugabe, the compromise that was the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution set out to create and secure a neocolonial state, a neocolonial government and a “quisling President to secure the booty of colonial conquest of our country” (p. 70). By empowering the black majority, ZANU-PF seeks to challenge and dismantle a political economy that disproportionately favours the propertied white class and diminishes national sovereignty, sovereign rights to heritage and resources, chiefly land.

#### 2.4.2 Sovereignty

If the cry for land formed the basis of the liberation struggle, the goal of the liberation struggle, and struggles thereafter, is self-determination and sovereignty. This entails the pursuit of “the sovereign right to, access, control and use of natural resources which God in his infinite generosity gave us, the land, all that God gave us all who

belong to this land to use” (Mugabe, 2001, p. 37). Further, he posits that the rewards gleaned from the sweat and toil of working the land must belong to Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans. Mugabe places great emphasis on the conception of ZANU-PF as a populist party that strives to put the people first by acting and intervening on behalf of the people, where deemed necessary. The Party quite literally describes itself as “The People’s Party.” Mugabe states “our cause is just and steeped in people’s aspirations and we cannot go wrong” (p. 101). The Party’s work, proud in its faithfulness to Party principles, reflects “an undying commitment to improving the lives of our people” (p.73), people who they hope can at last savour the full meaning of independence. Thus the long term revival and survival of the Party is very much tied to the overall defense of the sovereignty of the people to whom they are solely accountable. That said, there is a resounding message that “Zimbabwe is under attack; our sovereignty is under fire from the very same imperialist forces which took it away from our forebears more than a century ago” (Mugabe, p. 70). Mugabe calls for the people to “be ready” and have the courage to “get back into the trenches” lest they surrender to the “same old foes” opposed to black majority rule, and intent on turning Zimbabwe into a slave nation (pp.71-72).

One of the greatest challenges to national sovereignty is that which is espoused in the form of Western liberal democracy. Mugabe is critical of the hypocrisy embedded within it as he queries “what lesson on democracy am I supposed to learn today from a continent and imperialist states that would give none to me and my countrymen during centuries of occupationist rule?” (2001, p.18). The hypocrisy lies in the fact that international bodies such as Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations demand democratic reform of national governments and institutions in developing countries, yet

do nothing to reform the undemocratic structures and practices existing within and perpetuated by developed countries. For Mugabe Western liberal democracy is regarded as an insidious form of paternalistic intervention into the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe bent on breeding divisive politics, inciting urban civil unrest, perverting institutions of governance and ultimately producing a constitutional crisis for the government of Zimbabwe. Mugabe outright rejects the bogus universalism espoused by the “counter revolutionary Trojan horse” (p. 88) that is, the MDC, arguing instead that the roots of genuine democracy in Africa derive from the anti-colonial people’s struggles whose goals champion civil liberties, national unity and black empowerment and participation.

The type of democracy that needed to be developed needed to be one for the people and not for an overseas audience (Mugabe). His message is clear, Zimbabwe has no intention of perpetuating yet another age of “hegemonic empires and conquerors” (Mugabe, p.28) for millennia to come. He urges fellow developing countries to stand up as a matter of principle and say, “no, not again!” (Mugabe, p.28). Sovereignty, like land, is defended and guarded jealously and unapologetically, as Mugabe declares “What is ours is ours, we take it because it belongs to us! We will not brook any interference from anyone! Down with British neo-colonialism” (pp.131-132). He calls for the people to exercise vigilance and patriotism lest they fall for “the tricks of the masters of deception who masquerade as champions of democracy” (p.107). The challenge confronting the ruling party is that of defending and extending the heritage of the people of Zimbabwe in an era of globalization. Mugabe contends that voting for ZANU-PF is the only way to ensure that Zimbabwe does not return to a dark pre-independence past rife with conflict, lawlessness and instability. Mugabe declares “Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans and only

Zimbabweans can work for its development. Indeed only Zimbabweans can defend its sovereignty which should never be taken for granted, and is a priceless heritage we owe posterity” (p.143-144).

### 2.4.3 Race and the Nation

President Mugabe and ZANU-PF seek to produce a remembered national identity using patriotic and collective memory in an attempt to shape national sentiment. They seek to “engage collective thoughts in reflection of the arduous, torturous, in fact bloody road we have walked to get to this day at our present national circumstances” (Mugabe, 2001, p.134). They wish to build a shared experience as a people that extends beyond the lived experiences of present and living generations. These experiences are vital to a sense of wellbeing and a sense of Zimbabwean national identity. It is argued, while nations are defined by geographical boundaries, their real essence lies in human actions and experience (Mugabe). The essence of nationhood lies in the historical struggle for the people, “great or small, rich or poor, literate or illiterate, royal or peasant in their march towards collective self-realization...as they struggle against each other to establish a common order and vision” (Mugabe, 2001, p.135). Narratives regarding land and sovereignty become more pronounced when intersected with race. Most markedly Mugabe proclaims, “This indeed is our land, our heritage, our sovereignty, for we fought and died for it! This indeed is our democracy, for we created it by defeating a heartless settler colonialism, which had occupied and marginalized us! This indeed is a black man’s country!” (p.136).

Race plays a central part in the nativist definition of the parameters of nationhood, belonging, citizenship and their accompanying rights and privileges. For example, with regards to the land issue, the white population, particularly white commercial farmers, are portrayed in direct opposition to the transformative change intended through the Third Chimurenga. This “propertied white class” (Mugabe, 2001, p.39) is said to be unappreciative of social justice and the value of sharing particularly given that the western nations, from which they derive, are in support of perpetuating injustice in Zimbabwe (Mugabe). They are described as “a white community with an imperious attitude, a community which never accepted defeat and the new political dispensation of majority rule” (Mugabe, p.40), one that is determined to facilitate “a continuation of Rhodesian socio-economic system” (Mugabe, p.41). ZANU-PF are intent on overcoming the white supremacist mentality that has stigmatized the black population as incapable of ensuring food security without the white man. Race also factors in to the interpretation of the international outcry and backlash arising from the proceedings of the land reform endeavour and political elections. Mugabe argues that Zimbabwe is being punished for trying to correct the effects, imbalances and injustices of the colonial past. He states “our crime is that we are black and, for America a condemned race” (p. 137).

#### 2.4.4 Enemies of the State

The threat of lurking enemies is made ever apparent. These enemies have been characterized essentially as British neocolonial machinators (Mugabe, 2001) or “imperialists and their local agents” (Mugabe, p.40) whom Mugabe argues are hell bent on the upheaval of the sovereign rights and claims of the people, their unity, their

collective self-esteem, heritage and interests. The enemy is believed to employ “cunning”, “trickery” and “fallacies” to “contaminate and confuse the people” with the lure of their “filthy lucre” (Mugabe, pp.73-77). Mugabe reflects that, in their long tradition, ZANU-PF has gained much experience dealing with and cleansing political rivalry. Defectors or “sell-outs” who betrayed the cause were labelled “Judas Iscariots” for the manner in which they resorted to “wiles and guiles” to infiltrate, penetrate and “mobilize cheque-books” to lead people astray.

ZANU-PF blames Zimbabwe’s development impasse and opposition to President Mugabe’s rule, on the West, led by Britain, her allies in the Commonwealth and European Union, and their “local lackeys” (Mugabe, p.103) the MDC and the white community in Zimbabwe (Mugabe). ZANU-PF argue that these Western Imperial interests are sponsoring opposition movements of workers, students, local civil society and non-governmental organisations within the country (Mugabe; Hwami, 2013, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). President Mugabe alludes to there being a much deeper ideology upon which to judge the MDC that lies beyond its “black trade union face,” its “youthful student face,” nor its “salaried black suburban junior professionals” (p. 88). According to him these are mere “human superficialities” that detract from the fact that the MDC is “immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule” (Mugabe, 2001, p.88).

White commercial farmers seen to obstruct land redistribution are branded as privileged, racist, enemies of the state for they have shown themselves to be loyal to “disgruntled Former Rhodesians” who are embittered or threatened by the land policy (Mugabe, 2001, p. 87). Mobilised by the white factor in the MDC, regional white

interests are said to have teamed up with the opposition “to forge a broad front against genuine reforms being championed by the ruling government (Mugabe, p.114). The Lancaster House Constitution had effectively scuppered any real chance for early land reform in the first decade of independence and the British government, as former colonial rulers, had failed to fulfil their obligations to return Zimbabwean land to Zimbabwean people. Mugabe postulates that “Anglo-Saxon bigots...glibly use the language of democracy to duck their colonial responsibility so they can prolong their evil control and ownership” of Zimbabwean land and resources (p.137). The Third Chimurenga, therefore, is defensible as a response to undermine delaying tactics of local and foreign white interests opposed to land reform. As a result, the people have effectively been “forced back into the trenches by the same enemy we fought during the liberation struggle who has confronted us in all forms of guises” (Mugabe, p.127) Hence, resistant white commercial farmers are seen as deserving of the state sponsored land seizures which the ZANU-PF aligned war veterans and youths were instructed to be unrelenting in pursuing.

President Mugabe (2001) lauds the role of ZANU-PF in the liberation struggle. It is described as “a Party with experience and markings of war”, an unsurpassable record, a proud history of liberating the country and forever changing the course of the country (p.71). Party members are depicted as dependable, unwavering “Patriots” in their commitment to Party policies tasked with the fight for the sovereignty of the people. ZANU-PF is shown to have “a proven record of service and understanding of the struggle” (Mugabe, p.72). He hails ZANU-PF allegiants, past and present, as “gallant sons of the soil” and “true sons and daughters” of the land of Zimbabwe who, by

supporting land reclamation, have shown the enemy that the issue of land is more than mere election gimmick (Mugabe, pp.71-72). Party interests are articulated as synonymous with national interests over which there can be no compromise nor any higher impulse or ideal. Given that ZANU-PF derives much of its comradeship from the Liberation Struggle, an assault on ZANU-PF is deemed “an assault on the very values of the Liberation Struggle” (Mugabe, p.119). Consequently, this can be deemed an assault on the nation. The destiny of the entire revolution encompasses the nation, heritage and values. Mugabe urges the people to stand firm and remain united as “unity remains the best defence and weapon against those bent on betraying us...Zimbabwe needs ZANU-PF and not the sponsored and unprincipled and counter-revolutionary political parties ( p.81). Mugabe proclaims “Zimbabwe ndeye ropa” (Zimbabwe came through bloodshed) (p.81). The bond of unity and solidarity is expressed and echoed in the slogans “Long Live our Struggle, Long Live ZANU-PF, Viva ZANU-PF, Pamberi ne ZANU-PF and Pambili le ZANU-PF” (Mugabe, p.76).

#### 2.4.5 Institutionalisation of Patriotic History

Public media are one of the key mediating mechanisms of modern day representation, and as such plays a very important role in facilitating political debate and the circulation of ideas and the formulation of public opinion (Mazango, 2005). ZANU-PF sought to secure and naturalize a remembered national identity and its hegemony therein by strategically and legislatively restructuring key national institutions, so as to diffuse and popularize its worldview to its target audience. This was done through print and broadcast media, including public addresses, through state rituals and public

memorialisation of past events, as well as a special curriculum in schools that equated political developments to an ongoing constructions of a national identity (Ranger, 2004; Chiumbu, 2004). An endeavour that arguably closely resembled mass indoctrination was mediated by government officials and public intellectuals loyal to ZANU-PF with special access to public media, education and political influence. As noted earlier these public intellectuals included University of Zimbabwe faculty members and academics with an extended reach, beyond their professional circles within academia, appealing to a much wider public audience. This allowed them to exercise their influence as political analysts and commentators thereby spreading the ruling party's dogma within the public sphere through their interpretation of history (Tendi, 2010; Hwami, 2013).

Hegemonic discourse has been represented in various forms in a manner most indicative of its intertextuality and pervasiveness. For example, a study by Manyawu (2013) found that ZANU-PF utilized promotional discourse of liberation movements in the form of catchy jingles on national radio and television in the early 2000s. Manyawu examined the discursive aspects of partisan songs as the strategy employed by ZANU-PF to persuade its audiences to adopt its ideology and enhance its own legitimacy and credibility. This was all made possible by the strategic use of folklorisation discourse which enabled ZANU-PF to appropriate national heritage and simultaneously discredit opposition (Manyawu). This strategy of folklorization sees MCC songs treated as a form of political oral tradition that is diffused through radio and television as the means through which a social-group, in this case ZANU-PF, is able to brand itself as the embodiment of certain ideas or values (Manyawu). Folklorization is a strategy through which ZANU-PF is able to entrench or perpetuate its dominance (Rogers, 1998). The

promotional jingles are an effective means through which ZANU-PF can present information in easily memorisable and digestible chunks that solidify the brand identity of the political party by allowing audiences to recall party slogans and by association politicians, their political programmes and values (Manyawu)

Manyawu describes this strategy as rhetorically appealing in its aggressive effort to spread Patriotic History. In particular the airwaves were saturated by the works of the ZANU-PF group Mbare Chimurenga Choir (MCC) who sought to enhance folklorization by capitalizing on politics of fear of alienation as the means to secure ZANU-PF hegemony (2013). Manyawu's (2013) study demonstrates how text, in this case lyrics, was used to enhance the power and dominance of one group over others. He argues that text is its material and tangible face and therefore "the lyrics of MCC songs are thus viewed as complex political texts located in a perpetual dialogue..." (Manyawu, p.73), which I argue is the mechanism through which ZANU-PF asserts hegemony. He finds that MCC song lyrics were representative of ZANU-PF ideology particularly in the common narratives within the lyrics. Narratives about land frame patriotic Zimbabweans and ZANU-PF as one and the same, in conjunction with the use of polarizing binaries which, as Hwami (2012) observes, create winners and losers, victors and vanquished, patriots and traitors. This shows the manner in which ZANU-PF is able to disparage alternative ideas, voices and organizations that clash with ZANU-PF's agenda. Therefore the Patriotic History master narrative equates patriotic Zimbabweans with purely ZANU-PF allegiance. Furthermore, it naturalizes the myth of citizenship by race, ethnicity and political affiliation. The ideal Zimbabwean is represented as black, first and foremost, loyal to ZANU-PF, and on that basis entitled to the land above all others (Manyawu,

2013). This doctrine was cemented by the passing of the Indigenization and Empowerment Act that defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as black and African (Government of Zimbabwe, 2007). To reiterate President Mugabe's standpoint "Zimbabwe belongs to the Zimbabweans, pure and simple ... white Zimbabweans, even those born in the country with legal ownership of their land, have a debt to pay. They are British settlers, citizens by colonization" (Amanpour, 2009).

Narratives of the liberation war in MCC songs act as a constant reminder of the ZANU-PF's "messianic leadership," thereby bolstering its credibility and legitimizing its claim to power and also naturalizing its mythical and irrefutable role as the deliverer of Zimbabwe's (Manyawu, 2013 p.77). While glorifying ZANU-PF, they explicitly negate and nullify the contributions of other subaltern groups in the struggle for independence (Tendi, 2010). These narratives are supported by ones that assert ZANU-PF hold on power as inevitable and portray the party as "a timeless and dominant fixture of Zimbabwean politics" through skillful use of combative metaphors and imagery of armed conflict (Manyawu, 2013 p.78). Manyawu argues that this has the potential effect of naturalizing political violence implicitly, due to its celebration of Mugabe's militancy as heroic and revolutionary. MCC songs also contain narratives that directly emphasise the futility of attempts to oppose ZANU-PF, particularly by the MDC, and by extension they limit the conceptualization of Zimbabwe's leadership to the President and his loyalists only. Additionally, these narratives generate symbolism by weaving together and deploying myths, legends and iconic figures of the past, to which people can easily relate, also aligning well with the ZANU-PF agenda (Manyawu, 2013). ZANU-PF has been able to strategically produce and reproduce a relatively easy means through which one can be

dispossessed of one's political identity and heritage for failing to satisfy the ideals of patriotic citizenship. This fear of alienation and ridicule is a demonstration of the disciplinary capacity of hegemonic discourse in operation.

Thram (2006) is particularly concerned with this appropriation of history and culture in what she calls music nationalism. This music nationalism represents a pervasive "propagandised patriotic history" woven into lyrics and used in frequently aired televised propaganda videos and media campaigns (Thram, 2006, p.75). Much like Manyawu (2013) she demonstrates the way ZANU-PF appropriated indigenous song/dance forms and the Chimurenga Music of the liberation war in the late 1960s and manipulation of historical memory to promote its ultra-patriotic message and rationalise its political programmes. More generally however, musical Government Galas are frequently organized to commemorate or mark special occasions and iconic figures involved in the nation's liberation struggle as well as promoting the ruling party's message through performances by groups who share the ZANU-PF's vision. These galas literally provided the stage upon which Patriotic History informed mass indoctrination can occur. They are particularly appealing due to their entertainment value. Thram argues, "what is clear is that music, in particular the Chimurenga songs of the Second Chimurenga, that were originally used to resist colonial oppression, is re-worked as propaganda intended to maintain the current oppressive regime's grip on political power. Music originally used to resist oppression was used in the service of oppression" (2006, p.86).

The efficacy of such a strategy of representation was held firmly in place by numerous pieces of legislation such as the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) 2001 gave

the Minister of Information unlimited influence over programming on Zimbabwe's Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) radio and television. The Public Order Security Act (POSA) 2002 limited freedom of assembly, movement and expression. The General Laws Amendment Act (GLAA) 2002 disenfranchised many Zimbabweans living outside the country. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) 2002 which severely restricted the activities of journalists and media institutions (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, 2002). It is through these laws that the government claimed to be guarding the nation's "communicative sovereignty" (Mazango, 2005, p.33). These stringent laws, though seen to impinge on democracy and freedom of expression, have nonetheless provided a platform for ZANU-PF sponsored local musicians to compose and disseminate music with liberation war themes and ZANU-PF's messages (Chiumbu, 2004). The process of restructuring public media institutions has led to the retrenchment of numerous editors and producers thereby purging the media of those who did not fit the ZANU-PF mold (Chiumbu). This has occurred in print media as well resulting in the closure of many private media institutions leaving state-controlled print media to freely churn out endless historical articles based on themes of land and the liberation war and heavily biased news coverage (Chiumbu). These laws have given ZANU-PF free reign to articulate their version of truly Zimbabwean culture values and identity and in the process have silenced alternative views and dissenting voices. The media as mediators of culture and value systems have been central to the formation of collective identity (Smith, 1980).

Other strategies of representing Patriotic History involved airing of programmes and documentaries about the liberation war and cultural documentaries, namely; Nhaka

Yedu (Our Heritage), National Ethos or New Farmer. These programmes outlined the ideals of Patriotic citizenship and were part of a campaign to expose perceived government opponents as “traitors”, “enemies of the state” and “stooges” of imperialism (Chiumbu, 2004, p.33). During the general election and presidential election in 2000 and 2002, not only were the masses bombarded with jingles and songs played on television and radio every 30 minutes throughout the day for a collective 18 month non-stop (Chiumbu, p.34) but television programming was deliberately loaded with cultural documentaries, documentaries on land reclamation and the liberation war. This is how the state controlled national broadcaster ZBC carried out its “Vision 30” mission which aimed to “provide world class quality programmes and services that reflect, develop, foster and respect the Zimbabwean national identity, character, cultural diversity, national aspirations and Zimbabwean pan-African values” (ZBC, 2001 as cited in Chiumbu, p.30). ZBC has conceptualised the nation on a racial basis in which the White race and the Black race stand as mortal rivals. Hence, whites were presented as Europeans who could only belong to Europe, therefore Africa was for Africans and Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans (Gandhi & Jambaya, 2002).

As expressed in “Inside the Third Chimurenga” (Mugabe, 2001) ZANU-PF’s rationale was that the opposition MDC party was believed to be more attractive to young, particularly urban voters (Bratton et al, 2004). Thus Ndou (2012) reiterates the notion that Patriotic History in many ways specifically targeted the youth as intended recipients of shared exposure to ZANU-PF’s historical account of the past. This was the means through which the post-independence generation, commonly referred to as the born-free generation, could be influenced to embrace hegemonic discourse. Even young musicians

were conscripted to the cause to spread “patriotic messages” through hip-hop music (Chiumbu, 2004, p.34). In addition to the Patriotic History taught in the National Youth Service, compulsory courses in it have been introduced at the university level to inculcate Patriotic citizenship in the university communities that were becoming hotbeds for resistance and opposition to the ruling party (Ranger, 2004; Hwami, 2013). Interestingly, however, Ndou (2012) points out that there has not been significant investigation into how effective these strategies have been for shaping the youth’s collective memory.

The measures taken to inculcate Patriotic History intended to ensure that the history of Zimbabwe was rewritten and accurately told to reflect the events leading to the country’s nationhood and sovereignty (Mugabe, 2001). The MDC is portrayed as existing in direct opposition to Patriotic History, as “a party lacking history and bent on reversing history” (Muwati et. al, 2010, p.3). The MDC, its leadership and supporters are said to have “escaped from history” whereas President Mugabe is represented as embodying Zimbabwean history and national values, most vocally by Professor Tafataona Mahoso. Thus, in a sense, “Zimbabwean history is therefore Mugabe and Mugabe is Zimbabwean History” (Chiumbu, 2004, p.33). As such, Zimbabwe is a prime example of the era of state produced nationalist history in contemporary Africa. In accordance with Ranger’s (2009) assertion, Zimbabwe epitomizes Alessandro Triulzi’s (2006) model through which, he argues, public history in conjunction with an ill-defined public memory has largely overcome academic explorations of the past. Most evidently this has occurred in the form of state rituals and public memorialisation of past events outlined above which are seen to prevail in the public arena “filling the fluid space which exists between memory and history with a disturbing asphalt-like cover of enduring cement” (Triulzi,

p.15). Based on this model therefore, ZANU-PF have indeed effectively deployed state-driven policies of memory to rewrite the national script and enhance unwritten norms of exclusion which set apart citizen from subject, free-born from bondage-bound, patriots from sell-outs. The propagation of Patriotic History by the state demonstrates how public history has become a powerful tool for political mobilization which has been difficult to challenge (Triulzi, 2006; Ranger, 2004).

## **2.5 Autochthony and the Symbolic Power of Patriotic History Discourse**

This particular rendition of the nation's history is pivotal to the Mugabe regime's hold on legitimacy, credibility and hegemony (Ranger, 2004). Kriger (2003) maintains that since independence ZANU-PF has presided over a half-built democracy within which it has instrumentalized liberation war history as a "legitimizing discourse" (p.5). This I would argue has given ZANU-PF a margin of freedom for unrestrained exercise of power. It has been argued that Patriotic History is used to justify acts of violence and supremacist arrogance in ways that flagrantly disregarded democratic order in the nation. It is a carefully planned and predictable ideological project embroiled in a battle over state control and the need to effectively quell alternative political views, parties and opposition civil movements. It churns out monolithic interpretations of history so as to maintain the ruling party's stranglehold on the highly contested notions of the nation, state politics and definitions of patriotism and heroism (Muwati et al, 2010). As such this historical authoritarianism is a political resource through which the ruling elite utilise liberation struggle credentials to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate others in competition for power and resources (Kriger, 2006). Most glaringly, proponents of

Patriotic History like Professor Mahoso dismiss accusations of misgovernance and human rights violations lodged against the ruling party citing that governance and human rights discourses are “totally alien and contemptuous to the history, experience and values of the vast African majority” (2008), further dismissing them as neo-liberal globalised rhetoric (Ranger, 2009). Thus ZANU-PF is able to call upon the language of autochthony to justify a claim for self-regeneration, self-knowledge, and self-rule. As Eze (2011) shows, this dismissal of universal moral principles is a common theme among African leaders who muster up culturally and morally relativist justifications to dispel the scrutiny of Western liberalism. Therefore Western liberalism is framed as a threat to autonomy and self-determination which are jealously guarded under the banner of national sovereignty the defense of which is used to justify totalitarian leadership and power.

ZANU-PF’s strategies are a combination of discursive and coercive elements as shown in the pattern of the ruling party’s violence and intimidation, vilifying characterizations of opposition parties as illegitimate, most pronounced around election time (Kriger, 2005). However, to over-emphasise a reliance on overt brute force would be to grossly understate other vital explanations and more subversive sources of power upon which Mugabe has drawn. I concur with Eze (2011) that there is a need to give greater consideration to cultural elements to explain President Mugabe’s and, by extension, ZANU-PF’s enduring and far reaching political influence. As such I develop the works of Dunn (2009) and Eze (2011) to show the potency of hegemonic autochthonic politics, nativism, narratives of victimization and symbolic power. Eze argues that Mugabe has been able to influence African political consciousness through keen uses of postcolonial

righteous anger. Eze argues that it is Mugabe's manipulation of history and symbols and his uses of postcolonial imagination which have effectively translated the memory of the colonial past into political capital.

Drawing on narratives of perpetual victimhood suffered at the hands of the remorseless West Mugabe has managed to establish his agency by appealing to two universal idioms, those of land and guilt. Through these idioms he claims his righteous indignation as the postcolonial subject who has realised his agency and must by all means resist oppression (Eze). As mentioned in earlier sections on Mbembe (2002a) he is able to refute Western definitions of Zimbabwe, denounce past and present injustices perpetrated by the West, while making concerted efforts to disqualify fictional Western representations of Zimbabwe and interference in Zimbabwean affairs. He opens up the space in which Zimbabweanness can be self-defined unimpeded. He is able to strategically position ZANU-PF as the guardian and key definer of Zimbabwean culture, belonging, history, the nation's way of being, and its relationship with the future and with the past. Staying with Mbembe (2002a), through the rhetoric of nativism Mugabe operationalises the discourse of autochthony which when understood within the context of Zimbabwe's colonial experience is synonymous with being in the right, juxtaposed with the evils of white imperialism. Thus he is able to appeal to a value judgement inherent in the binary distinguishing sons and daughters of the soil from others, namely white people in Zimbabwe, European settlers or the very least sons and daughters of European settlers. This is the manner in which the position of white other in Zimbabwe as the remnant of British settler-colonialism is entrenched as a foreigner, noncitizen, even an

imposter. This is juxtaposed with the perceived ethnic and cultural purity embodied by black natives of Zimbabwe, autochthons or true sons and daughters of the soil.

Ultimately white presence can only be interpreted as an interruption in the course of African history (Eze, 2011). This is the symbolic power through which black Africans can be judged as traitors or sell-outs if found to be sympathetic of whites, implicitly the embodiment of the West and its allies, ergo, traitors to the Struggle and Patriotic History. As Pierre Bourdieu (1991) demonstrates through the relationship between language, power and politics, the language used in autochthonic discourse is loaded with powerful symbols which evoke emotion, meaning and understanding, the agreement over which becomes instinctual to such an extent that it can be seen to abrogate reason. This consensus is a demonstration of the instinctive bonding that arises out of shared experiences, such as the encounter with European colonialism (Eze).

In this section I have sought to demonstrate ZANU-PF's ability to use language to "excite a near universal emotion", one that taps into "the id of Africa's collective mind" (Eze, 2011, p.99). Liberation Struggle credentials have, in a sense, been utilised to grant ZANU-PF license to act as "the authorized spokesperson" or "authorized representative" of the people (Bourdieu, 1991, p.109-111). Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History therefore are a representation of the ruling elite's manipulation of the power of symbols, in relation to which subaltern groups are defined. This "symbolic violence" is exercised by means of control of "structured and structuring instruments of communication" (Bourdieu, p.167). Thus, Eze argues, those who control the discourse arising out of common experiences ultimately control Africa's self-definition and power. It is no surprise therefore that autochthonic discourses have taken hold so strongly in

Zimbabwean political consciousness seeing as these discourses link identity and space (land in this case). As I have demonstrated both the national questions of both land and identity have been central to the nation building project yet, like the nation building project itself, they have remained highly contentious and frustratingly unresolved issues. The following subsection will highlight some of the very real problems relating to state-making and nation building to which Patriotic History and the Third Chimurenga speak. In many ways however there are serious issues particularly around nation building which ZANU-PF's autochthonic discursive hegemony has addressed poorly.

#### 2.5.1 Issues Addressed and Arising Out of Patriotic History Discourse & Chimurenga Nationalism

Autochthonic discourses deployed by ZANU-PF in the form of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism epitomise a response to the "ontological uncertainty around political identities within the postmodern/ postcolonial condition" (Dunn, 2009, p.114). Conversely, I use ontological certainty or security to refer to the stable and unquestioned sense of security of one's being from which one is able to form an assured sense of self and identity in relation to others and one's reality (Jackson & Hogg, 2010). These discourses can resonate deeply with populations longing for a sense of primal security in the face of uncertainty generated by various factors (Dunn). I believe such factors include the complicated ongoing process of decolonisation coupled with dealing with humanitarian and economic crises that have plagued Zimbabwean since independence. These factors have largely been responsible for generating ontological uncertainty around political identities. It is my intention to investigate how well Patriotic History and

Chimurenga Nationalism address ontological insecurity and nation building in postcolonial Zimbabwe. As an attempt at populist reformist policy the Third Chimurenga in theory speaks to the very real need to redress the colonial legacy of land hunger and poverty of the black majority through the advancement of their participation in socioeconomic development, greater access to economic opportunities granted through land ownership and the indigenisation of the economy and natural resources. It speaks to the desire to assert with finality sovereignty over the economy, the backbone of which is the land (agriculture). I would argue that in complementary fashion Patriotic History attempts to speak to the problem of an incomplete and contested national identity and nation building project, the unfinished business of demystifying Zimbabweanness. The nativist elements of Patriotic History represent a mode of thinking by African leadership and intellectuals whose desire was to rebuild their nations, recreating the African confidence and restoring the dignity that was destroyed by colonialism thereby recreating African creativity and agency as opposed to dependency.

The processes of state-making employed by Mugabe and ZANU-PF through Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism undoubtedly illustrate well Dunn's (2009) notion of the state-making process as consisting of "a double-move: producing ontological uncertainty (about identity, space, time and meaning) and positing the sovereign state as the solution to that uncertainty" (p.120). Accordingly, Mugabe and ZANU-PF's state making processes have relied on producing ontological crises; producing anxiety about order and welfare, uncertainty about territory and space, insecurity about identity and belonging. Thus, as Dunn states, uncertainty about political identities is inherently a part of the state making project. This generates what Žižek refers

to as national paranoia whereby the nation is intrinsically nervous about its completeness and authenticity (1989). This anxiety and disorder is seen to generate a desire for governmentality, and by implication clarity and order therein. Dunn's core argument is that in such contexts autochthonic tropes become a very attractive and justifiable option as they offer the population a sense of primal certainty and security. Autochthonous claims seek to offer a sense of security in the midst of shifting terms of political identity and the resulting scramble for political and economic resources that comes with state power. This has seen ZANU-PF redefine citizenship and belonging through the narrow and exclusionary terms of Patriotic History discourse. However, Dunn insists that this sense of security is illusory and fleeting given that the claims upon which autochthony rely are unstable and plastic. However, it is worth noting, Nyamnjoh and Geschiere (2000) find that, in spite of its very apparent lack of substance, the autochthony trope has the power to create some sense of belonging that goes above and beyond the specificity of ethnicity. While its sense of security is fleeting and illusory its appeal seems to lie in the fact that it appears very self-evident to those who employ it (Geschiere & Jackson, 2006). Autochthony relies on the claim to having been in a certain space or land first, a claim evident in Mugabe's declaration that Zimbabwe is "indeed a black man's country" (Mugabe, 2001, p.136). Based on the symbolic and literal importance of land to Zimbabwean identity one can see how autochthony finds resonance however it remains an insecure basis upon which to form identity. Autochthonic claims do little to resolve ethnic tensions among the black population, in fact the elitist restructuring of key social and political institutions to the service of ZANU-PF allegiants may even amplify tensions along ethnic lines to the detriment of national unity and consensus.

Autochthony seems to serve some of ZANU-PF's political purposes. Its apparent emptiness and plasticity makes it a discourse that is malleable when situations necessitate adaptable notions of the other (Dunn, 2009). When using the language of autochthony, it becomes relatively easy to shift the boundaries of political identity as well as facilitating the ease with which enemies of the state can be invented and reinvented at will. The autochthonic trope can be highly responsive to accelerated flows of peoples, ideas and images, the by-products of globalization. In this light autochthony can function as a useful tool for closure in the face the pervasiveness of globalization (Dunn). Some within the ruling elite camp might argue that ZANU-PF's deployment of autochthony is a response to new and improved neo-imperial schemes and machinations seeking to capitalize on the openness necessitated by the globalization of the Global South. Notwithstanding, Dunn makes clear that in practice the illusory nature of autochthony is continually exposed. Given that the notion of belonging is always relative it is virtually impossible to prove who exactly occupied a particular space first. Therefore, the trope is very slippery and unstable as one can easily be accused of being a "fake autochthon" (Dunn, p.122). This alone demonstrates the nervous nature inherent in the language of autochthony (Jackson, 2006). Zimbabwean political identities are no exception, they are wrought with contention, and jostles over legitimacy often manifest in the form of racism and tribalism. Thus those who deploy the language of autochthony are arguably all too aware of the shaky ground upon which they lay claim to truths hence the often coercive measures taken to bolster truth claims especially since the national identity project remains incomplete and wrought with contention.

Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism can be understood as explicit attempts to complete the mission envisioned by Chimurenga Nationalists at independence which was to achieve a dual process of state building (making of nation-as-state) and nation building (making of nation-as-people). However, while the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle is laudable for creating the nation-as-state it fails to effectively create the nation-as-people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Hence I argue that while performing the double-move of producing ontological uncertainty (about identity, space, time and meaning) on one hand, and positing the sovereign state as the solution to that uncertainty on the other, the sovereign state has failed to present itself as an adequate solution to ontological insecurity. I wish to demonstrate that Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism's over emphasis on inherently insecure and unstable autochthonic discourses and paradigms of victimization has stalled nation building. This is the case most manifestly in the manner in which they poorly address the following major issues; race relations and national unity which are compromised by the tendency to amplify racial and ethnic tensions; national and political identities which are made insecure by socially and politically polarizing binaries; ontological security and belonging which are made uncertain due to disenfranchisement of post-independence generations in particular; concentration and centralisation of wealth, leadership and power in a manner which fails to moderate excesses; violence in politics by naturalizing violent politics; modernization and institutional development in the sense that not all citizens have been made to feel accommodated by academic and political institutions in a mode of development and modernization that is thoroughly decolonized, peaceful and stable. The symbolic and discursive power upon which Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism draw have

powerful affective and psychological resonance so much so that they have been able to transcend generations. The ruling government actively strives for Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalist discourse to breathe anew in the minds and bodies of the youth and generations to come, through an emphasis on a shared history of violence, racism, colonialism and imperialism.

My core concern lies in the values and ethos produced, and no doubt reproduced, through the propagation of Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalist discourse. Therefore in the upcoming chapter I turn to the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu as a theoretical perspective from which to ask, while claiming to offer deliverance from the clutches of colonial and neo-colonial rule, have Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History managed to successfully generate a sense of belonging and a collective human subjectivity that affirms humanness and harmonious relationships that promote peace and stability? Further, has the ruling government been able to formulate a clear ideological direction and national vision with which to reconcile and negotiate increasingly diverse civil and political development interests, identities and concerns?

## CHAPTER 3      A HUNHU-UBUNTU THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

### 3.1 Coverage of Hunhu-Ubuntu

I will draw on the coverage of Hunhu-Ubuntu by various other scholars in an attempt to construct a working definition the philosophical concept of Hunhu-Ubuntu. I will incorporate my own sense of it, as derived from an experiential awareness of everyday discourse. I will also draw on noteworthy coverage from thinkers such as Stanlake Samkange and Tommie Marie Samkange (1980), Carole Pearce (1990), Mongobe B. Ramose (1999), Ronald Nicolson (2008), Patrick Sibanda (2014) and, Fainos Mangena (2012). While drawing on Vimbai Gukwe Chivaura's (2006a; 2006b) coverage of Hunhu-Ubuntu, I will take a critical approach to his work. As I wish to demonstrate in this section, Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy constitutes an ideal theoretical perspective from which to critique the ethics and values expressed through Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse, given that their proponents, namely Dr. Mahoso and Dr. Chivaura, often draw on the teachings of Hunhu-Ubuntu as expressed through *tsumo/shumo*<sup>1</sup> (proverbs) and other chiShona terms expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu particularly to highlight the blight of globalized Western culture. Some of the proverbs I introduce, translate and explain will be sourced from my own lived experiences whereas others will be sourced from a publication by Mordikai A. Hamutyinei and Albert B. Plangger (1987)<sup>2</sup>. It is the most comprehensive collection of Shona proverbs available

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<sup>1</sup> Note on usage. Terms, proverbs and expressions in chiShona and isiNdebele will be italicized henceforth and translated in parentheses or explained in text.

<sup>2</sup> Note on usage. Proverbs in chiShona and isiNdebele that are not cited are taken from my own experiential knowledge and are interpreted accordingly.

thus far. The significance of the philosophical concept of Hunhu-Ubuntu is that it resonates deeply within contemporary discourse and human relations in Zimbabwe, most commonly finding expression in proverbs. Although it has tended to appear more manifestly in the village societies of ancestral homes where intimate kinship networks have more prevalently remained intact, it transcends urban-rural spatial divides informing conduct in everyday Zimbabwean society.

Proverbs are much more than just “condensed assertions about the shared experiences of a people in history over a period of time” (Mandova, 2013, p. 101). The collections of Shona proverbs, upon which I will draw, will function as embodiments and enforcers of desirable human conduct which reflect the interests enshrined within a community’s common moral position. Proverbs serve a central role in the socialization, preservation, transmission and authentication of moral code and reflect a philosophical concern with social justice, obligation and responsibility (Masaka & Tompson, 2013). Proverbs have social origin therefore they act as a conduit through which both collective experiences and central attributes of Hunhu-Ubuntu are expressed simultaneously. This includes but is not limited to a celebration of mutual social responsibility, mutual assistance, trust, sharing, unselfishness, self-reliance, caring and respect for others. Thus as a common medium for the expression of collective wisdom, proverbs are often deployed during commentary on current happenings. Usefully, they provide insight into a culture’s underlying value system (Mandova, 2013). In many cultures it is widely held that experience is the best teacher. Likewise, among Bantu language speaking peoples there is an immense appreciation of the reservoir of knowledge that is elder wisdom. Proverbs allow elders to “capture the truths of their experiences in symbolic and

figurative language in order to teach the young and inexperienced what to expect in life” (Chimuka, 2001, p. 34). This is what Gombe (1995) suggests is the pedagogic and judiciary function proverbs possess. Often one finds a proverb preceded by the phrase *vakare vanoti* (our forebears would say) which is indicative of the timelessness of valuable lessons gleaned from knowledge and wisdom of the past that is passed down from generation to generation through the teachings of proverbs. Much of their imagery comes from observations of human relations, the animal kingdom and nature in general. These idioms are pregnant with metaphorical meaning in both their literal and figurative interpretations. As such they are widely applicable in a range of varying contexts and come in many variant forms.

By incorporating proverbs and what I understand to be expressions of Hunhu-Ubuntu I will attempt to demonstrate its sociopolitical significance in relation to Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalist discourse and the nation building project in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Historically, Hunhu-Ubuntu was the fundamental spirit and ethos of ancestral village societies anchoring what was, or was intended to be, a socially cohesive shared human subjectivity that affirmed humanness through harmonious relationships which sought to engender peace and order for the wellbeing of society, including strangers and passersby (Mandova & Chingombe, 2013; Chimuka, 2008; Konyana, 2013; Ramose, 1999). It is not difficult to see, as Mano (2004) argues, why some Africanists might easily romanticise pre-colonial African societies as characterized by more stable and humane relations within rigidly defined and uniform cultures, than what was imposed by colonialism. However, African societies were not rigid and homogenous, they were based “on multiple identities, with loosely defined and infinitely

flexible custom” which facilitated “adaptation so spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived” (Ranger & Hobsbawm, 1983, p.247). Therefore, Mano warns that there are dangers inherent in uncritical idealisation of the past. To illustrate this point Terence O. Ranger contends that the colonial legacy in Africa left behind two ambiguous bodies of invented traditions. The first body of invented traditions, imported from Europe, continues to have a heavy influence on the ruling class culture in Africa, whereas the second is that of traditional African culture which was re-invented during colonialism. Ranger warns that those who uncritically seek a return to original African culture are ironically faced with the risk of embracing a set of colonial inventions (Ranger & Hobsbawm). This is especially the case in the postcolonial era as new national models of social interaction are constructed by postcolonial institutions striving for traditionally rooted ways of organizing individual and community life (Mano). It is with these considerations in mind that I proceed cautiously with my understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu particularly given that my approach is one from the Shona-Ndebele cultural perspective. Thus I will attempt to avoid falling into the trap of seeking a romantic return to an authentic Zimbabwean culture as if acculturation is not worth taking into serious consideration. While claiming to seek a departure from the legacy of colonialism using intensely anti-Western discourse I would argue that ZANU-PF’s nativism has indeed unwittingly embraced invented traditions by attempting to aggressively revive and perpetuate what they believe to be an indigenous culture.

### 3.2 False Views/ Myths and Misconceptions

In keeping with the above arguments I acknowledge that I am grappling with some contentious concepts, of which the Shona and Ndebele cultures are an example. In this section I briefly attempt dispel the notion that Shona and Ndebele cultures are homogenous and uncontroversial in the usage of the terms. The origins of the terms continue to generate debate however it is largely held that the term Shona in particular is not an indigenous name for any Zimbabwean people. Some argue that it was used to label the Rozvi people, originally by the Ndebele and later adopted by Europeans (Beach, 1980; Mutswairo, 1996). Historically, it had derogatory connotation when used to describe the original inhabitants of the land that is now Zimbabwe. It was later legitimized by a South African linguist Doke who used the words Shona and Ndebele to conflate the linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a diverse range of groups of peoples with no single cultural or political identity (Tatira, 2010; Mazarire, 2009; Alexander, 2006). Shona identity is a homogenization of people variously described as vaNyai, abeTshabi, Karanga or Hole (Mazarire, 2009). Others use the term Shona to designate a collection of dialects spoken throughout and around Zimbabwe, namely Zezururu, Karanga, 'Manyika, 'Korkore, Ndau and Budya (Beach, 1994; Mutswairo, 1996; Ranger, 1983; Mashiri, 1999). The term Ndebele, equally manufactured, is a homogenization of identities such as Kalanga, Nyubi, Venda, Tonga, Tswana, Sotho, Birwa and Lozwi into a broad Ndebele identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009b). The languages of the Shona and Ndebele people understood as aggregations of various identities and dialects are known as chiShona and isiNdebele respectively.

Nonetheless there is a persistent and common misconception that reduces Zimbabwean to its most numerically dominant groups, the Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities, often understood as uniform within themselves and often portrayed as historically antagonistic. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a) argues that contemporary ethnic tensions should be understood more as a product of recent histories than remote pasts. Zimbabwe is a far more complex, multi-ethnic society encompassing Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Shangani, Sotho, Tswana, Hlengwe, Tonga, Nambya, Venda, Nguni, Kololo and other smaller groups of peoples (Ndlovu-Gatsheni). Consequently, Zimbabwean society is multi-lingual. Its languages include chiShona, isiNdebele, Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga, Sotho, Dombe, Xhosa, Tonga of Mudzi, Venda, Shangani, Tshwawo, Tswana, Barwe, Sena, Doma, Chikunda and Chewa (Hachipola, 1998). ChiShona and isiNdebele have become the most prominently spoken languages alongside English which is recognised as the official language. Therefore, Zimbabwean society is a “complex and plural society inhabited by various people including racial minorities, all of whom speak over eighteen different languages” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, p. 190).

It is argued that precolonial identities produced by historical processes of migration and settlement were more social and moral in their nature than solid and political (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). Ranger et al. (1993) argue that prior to colonialism African societies exhibited qualities of “pluralism, flexibility, multiple identities; after it African identities of tribe, gender and generation were all bounded by the rigidities of invented tradition” (p. 63). Thus colonialism went beyond merely inventing identities, instead re-inventing pre-existing ones, rigidifying and politicizing them in various ways to various ends (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). This colonial legacy of citizenship premised

on ethnicity (Mamdani, 1996) has created a precarious environment within the postcolony, an environment in which nationalist actors must negotiate an intricate nation building project. It is an environment in which I believe a better understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu can inform a nation building project that is pluralistic, flexible and more open to multiple identities than rigid ethnic citizenship. In the upcoming section I attempt to construct a working definition of Hunhu-Ubuntu.

### **3.3 A Working Definition of Hunhu-Ubuntu**

I formulate my definition of Hunhu-Ubuntu with a complex multi-ethnic social milieu in mind, grounding my understanding in the largely presumed notion that the Bantu language speaking people of Southern Africa have similar conceptions of humanism not unlike Hunhu-Ubuntu. Thus as a system of thought I believe Hunhu-Ubuntu exists in similar conception in many other neighbouring African languages. However, it varies in name and modification within given social, historical and economic contexts. I proceed cautiously carrying the hypothesis that what is said of the Shona may well be true of the Ndebele with regards to their understanding of ideal conduct (Chimuka, 2008). This hypothesis is formed from a sense that there are common ideas shared across fluid community lines.

I understand Hunhu-Ubuntu to be the foundation of one's identity and sense of self which are moulded by ethical teachings passed down generationally, upheld and extended through enculturation and socialization in accordance with the common moral position the community. It acts as the guiding spirit through which one situates oneself as an individual within the community, and informs the manner in which one should

conduct oneself and relate with others. As a system of thought, values and beliefs it shapes how one feels connected to and relates with experiences past and present, people past and present and all other things in the cosmos. Human life according to Hunhu-Ubuntu is understood as a never-ending process of being and becoming. As a philosophy of social life therefore, Hunhu-Ubuntu is part of one's meaning making process intended to help one to navigate the universal human experience. Such that the lived experience of human beings involves birth, growth, vicissitudes of emotions and life experiences, and ultimately death. Its function is to produce self-assured individuals who embody the spirit of rectitude, sharing and harmony. This finds expression through an active consciousness of humanness towards others, an awareness that one's actions preserve or diminish the dignity of those who have lived before oneself, as well as those with whom one lives presently. These actions will also have implications for posterity. Ultimately Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy enjoins empathetic and respectful human relationships intended to cultivate environments in which human life and human dignity are affirmed and upheld as the only pathway towards sustained harmony, peace, balance, love, justice and prosperity.

Samkange and Samkange (1980) emphasize that Hunhu-Ubuntu is derived from three maxims, firstly "To be human is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish respectful human relations with them; if and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life and finally; the king owes his status, including all the powers associated with it, to the will of the people under him" (pp.6-7). This, the Samkanges say, was a principle deeply embedded

in traditional African political philosophy. The virtues and values drawn from these maxims seek to generate a Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness that pervades and shapes moral, legal and political spheres in attempt generate a harmonious social order. My account of Hunhu-Ubuntu is an attempt to promote a consciousness that effectively expresses these maxims. These maxims not only shape my understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu but I believe they cover the overarching set of values around which communities can and should rally. It is my intention to show that they provide a useful basis upon which to critique and respond to the shortcomings of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism.

Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy is the wellspring from which flows the ontology and epistemology of the Bantu language speaking people of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ramose, 1999). It has been broadly defined as an African worldview or a form of African humanism. Chivaura (2006a) claims that indigenous peoples of Africa share a common religion, history, ancestral philosophy of life, death and culture. These are what he believes to be the sources of human development. Furthermore, he argues that they have the same concept of god and view of the universe. Accordingly, their societies are structured in similar ways, predicated on principles that seek to enable African people to coexist with nature and live in harmony with all things in the universe. Unlike Chivaura (2006a), rather than to boldly assert the claim that there exists a general African worldview I put forward Hunhu-Ubuntu as a representation of one worldview shared by particular Bantu language speaking peoples in Southern Africa, the isiNdebele and chiShona language speakers. Chivaura's approach seems to resonate with the Afro-radical usage of Hunhu-Ubuntu that seeks to build upon a Pan-African sentiment upon which ZANU-PF draws. While useful in some parts Chivaura's definition does tend to

make sweeping generalisations about a common and superior African consciousness frequently juxtaposed with Western ideology and civilization presumably to further advance and bolster the agenda of Patriotic History.

Hunhu (or, in some dialects, Unhu) a term in chiShona whereas Ubuntu is the equivalent term in isiNdebele and the other Nguni languages of Southern Africa (Rukuni, 2012b). Given the interchangeability of Hunhu and Ubuntu, for the purposes of my study the hyphenation of Hunhu-Ubuntu will be used to also symbolize a coming together of the ethnically diverse Zimbabwean people, Bantu kin. By doing so I am making an explicit statement for kinship and solidarity rather than entrenching Shona dominance and perpetuating political cleavages. Therefore, my approach is explicitly in pursuit of coexistence and cohesion. The philosophy Hunhu-Ubuntu is not unique to the Shona nor the Ndebele, neither is my coverage or account exhaustive of the philosophical system. I aim to provide an example of how Hunhu-Ubuntu manifests within the particular context of post-colonial Zimbabwean society. Hunhu-Ubuntu is based on “humaneness, a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that individuals and groups display for one another...” (Mangaliso, 2001, p.24) thus it forms that basis for the consciousness that informs social interaction with others. It has been described as collective personhood and collective morality in the fullest and noblest sense (Pearce, 1990; Nkomo, 2011, Nziramasanga, 1999).

Ramose (1999) argues that Hunhu-Ubuntu is a living philosophy such that there is a recognition of the continuous oneness and wholeness of the living, the living-dead and the unborn. It is passed down from one generation to another mainly through oral tradition. In its nature it possesses pragmatic and flexible characteristics that make it

useful for applications as a code of conduct in various facets of human life (Konyana, 2013). Hunhu-Ubuntu generates an ethos and societal attitudes that influence day to day lives, structure acceptable behavioral patterns, and establish parameters within which one can either be qualified or disqualified as *munhu/umuntu* (being human) (Mandova, 2013). Thus one who qualifies as *munhu-umuntu* can be said to be exhibiting the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu, an essence of personhood attainable and maintainable through one's communally constructive actions and social interactions.

The following sections will be used to elaborate my understanding of the dimensions of Hunhu-Ubuntu in conjunction with how it is captured by other authors as supporting evidence. On one level, I believe it represents a tradition of moral thought characterized by a particular ideal of human interactions and social relationships expressed through humanness towards and with others. Therefore, Hunhu-Ubuntu can be understood on the level of the individual and his/her relationship to the community and vice versa. I will then go on to dedicate a section to showing that the lifeblood of a functioning philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu comes from reciprocity, solidarity and relationality. Finally I will show that Hunhu-Ubuntu is actively cultivated and transmitted through continual processes of enculturation and socialization as an active process of being and becoming rather than being an inherent and permanent quality.

### 3.3.1 Humanness

Hunhu-Ubuntu at its core is humanness towards and with others. It is determined by whether or not one's human relations generate societal well-being (Pearce, 1990). It must be actively cultivated by all. Although I must concede that the English language

does not truly capture the rich figurative and layered meaning of chiShona and isiNdebele aphorisms they nonetheless give key insight into the values of Bantu language speaking people. Humanity is captured in the aphorism *munhu munhu nekuda kwevanhu - umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (a person is a person through/because of other persons) and therefore personhood is achieved through other persons. To put it differently “A human being is a human being through the otherness of other human beings” (Van Der Marwe, 1996). These maxims underline the often taken for granted importance of relatedness, dependence and interdependence to humanity. The concept of otherness (other human beings) helps to prove one’s humanity. It implies relationship and therefore, one’s ethical maturity is measured by the manner in which one relates with others (Chuwa, 2014).

The immaturity of early childhood is understood as marked by an absence of moral function and thus the transformation into the personhood status in later years is marked by a widened ethical maturity (Menkiti, 1984). Without this ethical maturity one cannot be considered a well-cultured, morally self-conscious being, in the Hunhu-Ubuntu sense. Thus, those who fail to attain hunhu/ubuntu are looked upon as children even in their adulthood” (Makuvaza, 1996, p. 76). Hence Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness is considered a sign of moral maturity. Through Hunhu-Ubuntu one is enjoined to be tolerant of plurality and difference; diversity of perceptions, perspectives and practices and thus individuality, to do otherwise would be to deny one’s own humanity (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru & Makuvaza, 2014). Intolerance therefore can be considered a sign of moral immaturity. Hunhu-Ubuntu indeed demonstrates a peoples concern with spiritual development which is philosophical and ideological. The content of one’s personality, which is moral and ethical, is a reflection of one’s ability to make value

judgments, and act accordingly, for the betterment of the community as a whole (Chivaura, 2006). I would argue that it is a moral autonomy of sorts.

My understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu is that it appeals to the sense of humaneness in humanity. It is synonymous with expressions of compassion, fraternity, fellow feeling, benevolence, consideration, understanding, forgiveness, tolerance and above all goodness. These qualities are just a few of the many qualities that make us human. Thus Hunhu-Ubuntu is a reflection of perfectible standards of humanity. The moral ideal of Hunhu-Ubuntu is the embodiment of the truest version of the category of human which is a model standard of rectitude. Paradoxically speaking, I acknowledge that one exists as a human by classification yet true humanness comes to be recognized and measured by one's closeness to the goal of ideal moral embodiment of Hunhu-Ubuntu. The more one lives up to the model standards of Hunhu-Ubuntu the more human one is considered to be. "The *nhu* in *hu-nhu* or *ntu* in *ubu-ntu* refers to one's physical existence as a thing with no values attached. *Hu-* and *ubu-* indicate values or being in general. People who lack *hu-* or *ubu-* attached to them are mere *-nhus/- ntus* or things, 'Havana hunhu' (they lack human content). It can be said of such people, 'Imhuka dze vanhu' (they are mere animals)" (Chivaura, p. 232).

In this worldview possession and exhibition of the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu, or Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness is what sets us apart from other animals governed by base instinct. Hunhu-Ubuntu instills the capacity for reflective self-evaluation, a characteristic possessed by man, lacking in animals. People are considered more dignified than other animals, hence the proverb *munhu-munhu haenzani nembwa* (a person is a person, he/she cannot be compared to a dog) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.33). Deviation from

moral goodness or conduct, or failure to uphold the common good of the community constitutes a socially determined negation of one's own humanness. Therefore it is the responsibility of the community to ascribe or dispute one's Hunhu-Ubuntu status. By failing to exhibit one's moral autonomy, it is said *arasa hunhu* (one has discarded one's humanity). This is often the case when one is adjudged to have behaved in a manner that is beneath one's dignity which from a Hunhu-Ubuntu perspective I understand to be indivisible from the dignity of one's community. Transgressions from the norms and values of society are often met judgementally with the expression *hausi hunhu ihwohwo/ Ayisbobuntu lobu* (this is not a display of humaneness, in chiShona and isiNdebele respectively). Community members would then disdainfully inquire *munhu here?* (is he/she a person?), in a sense, "is this expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu?"

The essential function of Hunhu-Ubuntu in the spiritual sense of human development is to restrain the overpowering and instinctual urges in one's physical being and transform human behaviour into conscious spiritual action imbued with the values of moral and ethical purpose outlined in the teachings of African ancestors. It is the spiritual content of one's personality that is the truly human, it is moral and ethical (Chivaura, 2006a). The goal of Hunhu-Ubuntu morality is to advance *munhu* (human being) to transcend simply being human by classification to instead actively exhibiting and exercising ones moral consciousness to the benefit and preservation of the cosmos. This is an individual equipped to achieve the grand goal of self-realization. As such the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu has much to do with informing not only one's character but also one's purpose. Therefore, *munhu ane hunhu* (a human being truly embodying humanness), is a well-cultured, morally self-conscious being seen as endowed with a disposition to act

virtuously, in an exhibition of virtuous behaviour or *tsika dzakanaka* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions), the society's perception of ideal behaviour. This pertains to values customs, norms and traditions gleaned from customary knowledge which are fundamental to community life. The word *tsika* here is rich in symbolism, I take it to be a mark of humanness. Mangena and Chitando (2011) explain that *tsika* means "to put your foot mark on top of another's" (p.235) to literally follow in someone's footsteps. In my interpretation this means that in all things and at all times one must literally lead by example for those who follow in one's footsteps will heed the very same example set before them for better or for worse. Thus we are united by assimilating the values, customs and traditions of our ancestors that encourage us to foster togetherness and do good deeds. Therefore one must be seen to emulate their example by practicing good manners and conduct. Hunhu-Ubuntu and *tsika dzakanaka* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions) are inextricably linked. Together they are intended to instill humanness within the individual, a cognitive disposition that is reflective of the societal value systems, one that emanates from a spiritual maturity and ethical consciousness that informs value judgements.

### 3.3.2 The Individual and Community

Within the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu the individual and the community are intertwined, one must be understood in relation to the other. Accordingly, the individual is defined as a representation of, and accountable to, the people from among whom he/she comes. A child who is born to the community is said to be the responsibility of the community and not just its parents alone. As such one's identity is conjoined with a much

larger social identity and consequently an individual's role is multifaceted (Samkange & Samkange, 1980). One's behaviour and conduct must be seen to uphold the virtues that strive to maintain harmony and the spirit of sharing among society. The value placed on community cannot be overstated when it comes to defining persons and enabling persons to self-realise and self-actualise. This is achievable through good social relationships. An individual's conduct is deemed good if it satisfies the requirements of the community's conception of an individual's Hunhu-Ubuntu or *hunhu hwemunhu* (a human being's humanity/humanness), the perceived standard of moral consciousness that is befitting a well-cultured human. Communal expectations are negotiated dialogically so as to generate consensus capable of establishing a common moral position that best reflects the interests of the community as a whole. This dialogue is often mediated by elders regarded as custodians of moral, epistemological and ontological wisdom (Mangena & Mukova, 2010). Therefore the community is not only a starting point for moral responsibility and Hunhu-Ubuntu ethics but it acts as a key enforcer and upholder of them. Hunhu-Ubuntu provides a communal mindset for ethical decisions. It is the responsibility of the community to sanction commendable behaviour for its members. A communal emphasis on moral responsibility means that an individual wrong-doing has a ripple effect on the community as a whole. In a Hunhu-Ubuntu sense an act of injustice or indignity perpetrated by an individual on another is an indignity felt not only by the other and his/her community, but it constitutes a loss of the humanness or personhood of the perpetrator and by extension it compromises the dignity of his/her community. The dignity of the individual is one with that of the community.

The importance of an individual to the community as a whole rests on the recognition of the individual's positive contribution towards the sustenance and overall wellbeing of the community (Mangena, 2012). Societal common good is the primary concern of Hunhu-Ubuntu ethics hence the expression *munhu ane hunhu ndiye anodikanwa navamwe vanhu munharaunda* (a person with good morals is always accepted by other people in the community). Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy emphasizes communitarianism through a collective moral consciousness. However, this is not intended to stifle individualism or individual self-determination, as is commonly presumed by authors such as Louw (1998). It is however unclear whether or not Hunhu-Ubuntu communitarianism is inimical to individualism. To my understanding Hunhu-Ubuntu is respectful of particularity and individuality and as such it does not promote oppressive conformity and loyalty to the group. Evidence that Hunhu-Ubuntu is respectful of individual autonomy is shown by its demand for consensus and its dialogical nature. Hence the saying *kutaurirana kuwirirana* (dialogue precipitates harmony of opinion). The notion of *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion) comes from *wirirano* (consensus) the pursuit of which demonstrates an intent to strike a delicate balance between one's individual autonomy and the role of society in one's personal life. One's uniqueness and personal opinions are valued greatly as part of the process of constructing a collective moral consciousness since *munhu* (the human being/ individual) is a reflection of *vanhu* (the people/community). Therefore, Hunhu-Ubuntu is simultaneously individualistic and collective, the significance of the former is determined by its outcome for the latter.

The individual is not simply swallowed up or opposed by the community, in fact the individual is perceived as a unique centre of shared life (Shutte, 2001). Communalism is not, and should not be sought to the detriment of the individuality, however the pursuit of individuality must incorporate the welfare of the society thereby bringing honor and pride to the society (Mandova, 2013). Hence it is said *kuva netsika dzakanaka dzinoumba hunhu nokupa munhu mutsigo, chinhu chinoyemurwa navazhinji* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions mould ones moral consciousness and instill integrity within an individual, this is desirable and admired by the community) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.36). Thus Hunhu-Ubuntu is structured on an emphasis of collectivism and social morality.

Hunhu-Ubuntu underscores the significant role of human mutuality and interdependence in the community whereby the self is understood in relation to, and in need of an-other and vice versa (Chuwa, 2014). The aphorism “no man is an island” finds expression in the proverb *munhu chete akazvizvara kana kudonha kudenga ndiye anoti haana basa nemunhu, anozvionera* (persons who have given birth to themselves or have somehow dropped from space are the only ones who can say they exist for themselves) (Shujaa & Shujaa, 2015). The idea expressed here is that one cannot be human by oneself. It is only when one assumes responsibility towards others, that is to say, when one fulfils one’s obligations and duties towards others, that one is transformed from the thing status of lacking human content to the personhood of *munhu* (being human). Within Hunhu-Ubuntu there is an emphasis on the notion of mutual understanding, such that members of society must actively appreciate the value of diversity and human difference. Persons are required to know and understand others within a multicultural environment.

The self, according to Hunhu-Ubuntu, cannot exist without an-other hence the saying *kuti munhu vanhu* (for one to be considered a human being, it rests on how you are perceived by/ relate with other people). As Battle (1997) demonstrates, personhood happens through other persons, other beings make us human which is a manifestation of a natural proclivity towards togetherness, family and fellowship as expressed through networks of interdependence. This shows the corporate nature inherent in the life of Bantu kin best articulated in the quote “whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group and whatever happens to the group happens to the individual. The individual can only say ‘I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am’” (Mbiti, 1969 as cited in Khapagawani, 2006, p. 332). This is the illustration of this idea that one’s humanity is affirmed as and when one affirms the humanity of others and vice versa.

### 3.3.3 Reciprocity, Solidarity and Relationality

I believe the three elements of reciprocity, solidarity and relationality demonstrate Hunhu-Ubuntu in practice. They are the glue that binds the individual and the community engendering a community sentiment. Hunhu-Ubuntu strives to foster reciprocity of care, a sacred duty and assumption of ethical responsibility that it is bound to individual/ universal human rights (Kamwangamalu, 1999). Hunhu-Ubuntu is both a state of being and becoming, both of which are anchored in reciprocity of care (Broodryk, 1997). Self-realisation is only achievable through others, specifically through reciprocal relationships involving the cooperative exchanges of privileges intended to facilitate the self-realisation of others. Thus the identity of the individual is built on one’s reciprocal social relationships with other beings. Thus Hunhu-Ubuntu morality is premised on human

relationships, ideally life affirming, mutually beneficial, reciprocal relationships which are the foundation for harmony. These same reciprocal relationships work towards achieving the equilibrium necessary to sustain the ecosystem, integrity of the biosphere and the cosmos (Richards, 1980).

Through solidarity Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy strives to facilitate an environment in which there can be agreement or unity in feeling or action in pursuit of a collective vision premised on mutual support. Solidarity is cultivated not only by acting in ways that are mutually beneficial but it is also a matter of positively tempering attitudes, emotions and motives that foster the sympathy necessary for assisting and accommodating others thereby fulfilling ones ethical obligations to the wellbeing of others. Hunhu-Ubuntu prizes discipline, morality, self and social consciousness, and altruism. For example, the proverb *murombo munhu* (even a pauper is a human being) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.33) is used to designate our indiscriminate ethical obligations towards the poor and less fortunate in affirmation of their Hunhu-Ubuntu, their human dignity and personhood, in the process affirming our own. Hunhu-Ubuntu as collective morality is recognisant of the inherence, inalienability and inviolability of human dignity. Hunhu-Ubuntu value judgements determine whether something is right if it is something that connects people together, whereas what separates people is considered wrong. Hence Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy places great emphasis on actions and interactions that generate cohesive and harmonious outcomes for the community. While determining right and wrong is largely a function of historical, social, economic, traditional and cultural contexts, the objective of harmony in society can only be achieved

through mutually favourable human interactions which demand solidarity as an essential component of Hunhu-Ubuntu.

The saying *hupenyu mutoro* (life is a formidable challenge) is used to express the notion that in life one may encounter burdensome challenges. Based on Hunhu-Ubuntu values, one should never have to bear this load alone. The notion of solidarity is a reflection of the realisation that a cooperative approach is essential to overcoming hardship and bringing about the flourishing of society as a whole. Thus, Hunhu-Ubuntu seeks to cultivate cohesion or strength through unity known as *humwe* (cohesion/oneness). To be human therefore is to be in participation with others respecting human life, respecting others, respecting human dignity, showing compassion, an awareness of the needs of others, kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendliness. Thus, there is great value placed on reciprocity, ethical responsibility and an interconnected common humanity (Hpanyengwi-Chemhuru & Makuvaza, 2014).

The epitome of mutuality, interconnected common humanity is what I mean by relationality. It is captured in a fine everyday example highlighted by Chaplin (2014). I use it here to show the subtle and undervalued ways Hunhu-Ubuntu informs social interactions. He uses the example of a greeting in chiShona: *Mangwananai, mamuka sei?* (Good morning, did you sleep well?), to which one would respond: *Tamuka mamukawo* (I slept well if you slept well) and; *Masikati, maswera sei?* (Good afternoon, how has your day been?), to which one would respond: *Taswera maswerawo* (My day has been good if your day has been good). In other words, the example illustrates that we are so connected such that if you did not sleep well, or if you were not having a good day, how could I sleep well or have a good day? This kind of greeting would apply to a stranger

one met on the road as well as a friend or family. This expresses the relatedness underlying Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy such that the wellbeing of the self is, or should be, contingent upon the wellbeing of all others and therefore it is within the best interest of the self to ensure that all others are well. Hunhu-Ubuntu is a process through which one's personhood is socially constructed with the intention that one will recognize that the personhood and well-being of others is deeply connected with and indivisible from the personhood and well-being of the self.

#### 3.3.4 Enculturation and Socialization

Hunhu-Ubuntu is transmitted to members of society through active and ongoing processes of enculturation and socialization. However, Samkange and Samkange (1980) would appear to suggest that Hunhu-Ubuntu is limited to Bantu language speaking peoples. Equally so, Chivaura (2006a) states that the words *munhu*, *umuntu*, *Ubuntu* and *Hunhu* are also used to mean black people and their values. *Bantu*, *Vanhu*, *Abantu* are plurals and therefore would mean black people collectively (p.230). Chimuka (2001) rightly observes that such notions may easily pass for an essentialist conception of identity as some human beings may be excluded from *vanhu/abantu*. As I noted earlier however, the personhood or humanness of a community member seen to deviate from expected moral conduct can be called into question when it is inexpressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu. Hence one's conduct can be adjudged to not be befitting *munhu*. From my understanding of the social construction of Hunhu-Ubuntu, being *munhu* indeed means more than the biological being. In contrast to Chivaura's (2006a) usage of *munhu* to signify humanness in the Hunhu-Ubuntu sense as reserved for those of Bantu origin or of

black skin, my usage of the term *munhu* is used to simply mean being human. Chivaura's usage may be a reflection of the standpoint from which he dismisses Western civilization as inferior to African civilizations. He articulates African nationhood on the basis of blackness arguing that as "the cradle of civilization" the African race is the "founding of the races" (National Ethos, 9 February 2002 as cited in Chiumbu, 2004, p.33). My usage however does not necessarily suggest that one is automatically, let alone permanently, endowed with the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu by virtue of being black or of Bantu descent. One can be *munhu* (human being) while lacking the humanness of Hunhu-Ubuntu hence the term *munhu asina hunhu* (a human being without the spirit of humanness). Therefore, it is important to recognise enculturation as the ongoing process through which one works towards becoming and maintaining a model standard of rectitude as enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu. Even children, with the absence of moral function in their childhood, must undergo the transformation into the personhood status. They have their moral maturity cultivated through socialization along the lines of Hunhu-Ubuntu norms and values in order to instill Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness.

As I have attempted to show, Zimbabwean society is a mix of ethnic groups, languages, and cultures, a product of historical processes of migration and settlement. It is important therefore to show how Hunhu-Ubuntu deals with the notion of foreigners, a notion I believe Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalism have been too rigid to accommodate. Chimuka (2001) argues that foreigners not cultured in Hunhu-Ubuntu would never be considered *vanhu* (human beings) in the social and moral sense of the term. However, and most importantly, I share his belief that "there was nothing precluding someone who might appear different from the rest of the Shona from being

socialized as *munhu*” (p.32). Similarly, Sibanda (2014) argues that from an Africanist perspective “a white man can only have *hunhu/ubuntu*, over and above his perpetual humanness, if and only if he measures up to African traditional expectations hence such expressions as “*Murungu uyu anehunhu/ Umlungu lo ulobuntu* (this white person is a well-rounded, respectable and upright human being)” (p. 26). A white person without *hunhu/ubuntu*, according to Sibanda, is not conceived as human in the African sense, which I would stress is equally the case for a black person without Hunhu-Ubuntu. ZANU-PF’s conception of Hunhu-Ubuntu appears to have a tendency to preclude non-blacks from being socialised into Hunhu-Ubuntu which I believe is one of the major obstacles to resolving the question of national identity and national unity. Rather than depending on essentialism, I advance the process of socialization of children and new members of Hunhu-Ubuntu to involve making them aware of the vices in the world which must be avoided at all costs. Instead they are encouraged to actively cultivate Hunhu-Ubuntu virtues which are essential to building and maintaining harmonious and prosperous community life.

Virtues to be upheld include but are not limited to truthfulness, humility, love, compassion, self-control, forgiveness, mercifulness, sufficiency, trustworthiness, strength, courage and industriousness. Others highlighted are respect for human life, respect for others, human dignity, compassion, an awareness of the needs of others, kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendliness (Gelfand, 1973). Nziramasanga (1999) adds, responsibility, honesty, justice, trustworthiness, courage, diligence, tolerance, hard work, integrity, a cooperative spirit, solidarity, hospitality, devotion to family and community welfare. Vices are detraction, lying, pride, covetousness, revenge, hatred,

ingratitude, negligence, aggressiveness and selfishness (Gelfand, 1981). It has been my attempt to develop an understanding of the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu which demonstrates that it is not committed to essentialist notions of identity nor oppressive conformism as Chivaura's (2006a) might suggest. Although Hunhu-Ubuntu is an attempt at identity and differentiation (Chimuka, 2001), I wish to emphasize its purposefulness for fostering peace and stability which necessitates the ostracization of deviants from Hunhu-Ubuntu conduct as they are deemed a threat to harmony. My understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu is that foundationally it is concerned with generating life-affirming reciprocal relationships that uphold and protect human dignity so as to engender harmonious coexistence within the cosmos. I understand the expressions *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) as a primary key to Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy which aims to facilitate a life in which one can live in harmony or in concord with the people and things in one's surroundings. It derives from a set of related principles I will identify in the following section. Hence I will develop the idea that *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) is bolstered by *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry). These are the major principals necessary for the creation of the fundamental conditions upon which to build and strengthen prosperous communities and nations.

### 3.4 Expressions of Hunhu-Ubuntu

#### 3.4.1 *Kugara hunzwana*

For the purposes of my critique I develop *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) as an expression of Hunhu-Ubuntu. Such expressions have been shown to be useful by scholars such as Chimuka (2008), as a conception of social cohesion. He uses it to demonstrate how a strand of African tradition, Shona tradition, has understood and utilized intra-personal relationships in the creation of stable political communities characterized by harmony and peace. His concern is with how African societies have maintained intra-group cohesion so as to keep their political communities intact. From my understanding *kugara hunzwana* comes from the concepts of *kugarisana* (to live harmoniously) and *kunzwana* (to listen to/ feel for one another). Thus when put together as *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) it is used to express the idea that in order to live well together in harmony as a group, group members must have the capacity to empathize, understand and share the experiences and emotions of other members of the group respectfully. Similar to my conception Chivaura (2006a) suggests that coexistence is cultivated from the principles of harmony, peace, balance, love and justice arguing that a violation of any principle will unleash chaos, disorder and conflict among things in the universe.

*Kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) can be understood simply as aiming to promote mutual coexistence which, from a Hunhu-Ubuntu perspective, emanates from not only *kugarisana* (living together harmoniously or cordial coexistence) and *kunzwana*

(mutual respect and understanding for one another), but also the following major values: *kugamuchirana* (tolerance); *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship); *kudyidzana* (mutual responsibility) and; *mushandirapamwe* (co-operation) (Chimuka, 2008; 2001).

Additionally, I include the following values I believe to be expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu which I will employ in my critique: *rudo* (love/caring) and *kubatana* (unity/togetherness) in pursuit of *humwe* (cohesion/oneness), *kuwadzanisana* (to reconcile/ conciliate anew/ reconciliation), *kurondorodza* (discourse at length), *kutaurirana* (dialogue), *kuvhunzana* (consultation) useful for censoring *kumanikidza* (coercion/intimidation), *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion), *rushingiriro* (patience), *shungu* (ambition/determination/zeal), *hugovi* (generosity), *mvumo* (consent), *wirirano* (consensus), *kuzvirereka* (to be humble), *kuzvibata* (to be self-restraining), *kutsiga* (to have integrity or incorruptibility) from which flows *kuvimbika* (reliability) and *hururami* (rectitude or honesty), useful for expunging *huori* (corruption) and promoting *hunaku* (goodness), *maturo* (dignity/ the state of being worthy or honorable), *chiremera* (embodiment of the quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect) and *hunyororo* (humility). I argue that *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual respect and understanding) demands *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) in order to promote the major values above and expunge the vices that detract from the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu. These concepts are just some of the major values that are expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu upon which I will draw in chapters 4 and 5.

My approach is grounded in the notion that Hunhu-Ubuntu is the basis of ethical sociopolitical conduct in Zimbabwean society. Centrally, my concern is for resolving the problem of nation building through the creation and promotion of a harmonious political

community that is inclusive and reflective of a multiracial and multicultural social order. I operationalize *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual understanding), *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) to critique the efficacy of Patriotic History Discourse and Chimurenga Nationalism for generating sustained social cohesion, peace and stability given that they form the foremost paradigm shaping Zimbabwean political consciousness and political communities. I investigate to what extent this paradigm is expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu moral consciousness that seeks to promote sustainable coexistence cultivated from the principles of harmony, peace, unity, balance, love and justice.

#### 3.4.2 *Kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *Kushanda Nesimba* (hard work/industry)

The Shona-Ndebele are known for gleaned education from overcoming adversity, this finds expression in the proverb *kukurukura hunge wapotswa* (you can only tell the tale when you have survived it). I use it here to express the notion that “there is no education like adversity” (Disraeli, n.d), a notion I believe lies at the heart of *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness). It emphasises the importance of history, learning from and applying the lessons from past experiences, as the past informs the present which will ultimately shape the future. Zimbabwe has a lengthy history of pre-colonial and postcolonial conflict. Yet time and time again, against insurmountable odds, and seemingly never-ending crises, Zimbabweans have persevered. They are known to possess the capacity for a quality known as *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) which is synonymous with *rushingiriro* (patience). The continued relevance of Hunhu-Ubuntu

is a shining example of this resilience, an undying spirit that resides in us all yet for the moment exists only as potential. It is a dormant force that if harnessed consciously could contribute immensely to the completion of the nation building project.

The aphorism *kupfuma kunowanikwa nedikita* (prosperity is found in sweat) teaches that industry is the gateway to prosperity. From a Hunhu-Ubuntu perspective it illustrates that the aim of human life is to promote one's happiness or wellbeing and the flourishing of society as a whole through *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) which is synonymous with *shungu* (ambition/determination/zeal). I use it to argue that industry is one of the major values of Hunhu-Ubuntu with the intended goal of producing hard-working, physically and mentally healthy, self-sufficient and self-reliant communities. Physical and mental health necessitate "the availability of adequate life-sustaining and life enhancing resources such as food and tools as well as stable and peaceful environments" (Chimuka, 2001, p. 33). I believe these resources and environments can only be cultivated and maintained through *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry), through *mushandirapamwe* (co-operation) with the ultimate goal of achieving *humwe* (cohesion/oneness).

### **3.5 Crediting Hunhu-Ubuntu spirit in Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism**

Although the shadow of colonial legacy looms large over the political consciousness and development prospects of Zimbabwe, in many ways Zimbabwe is further ahead than most former colonies in terms of reclaiming its development agenda. The Third Chimurenga for example was a signal of intent, a loud one at that. It was one

that proclaimed Zimbabwe had no intention of continuing to be part of the West's sphere of influence. It did well to defy what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) refers to as the disciplining forces of globalisation and neoliberalism and the neo-colonial status quo. It strove to dispel hegemonic perceptions of African development policy as docile and subservient to the needs of the West. While far from perfect, the biggest success of the Third Chimurenga has been restoring ownership and control of the land to its rightful owners. It has laid the groundwork for Zimbabwe to assert its right to development. Fanon (1963) states, "For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity" (p.44). As part of an ongoing process of decolonisation, the Third Chimurenga has taken the necessary initial strides towards restoring the dignity of the black majority. The saying *chisi chako, masimba mashoma* is used to teach, and can be interpreted as, "you have little control or authority over that which is not your own." Historically the people of Zimbabwe have jostled for a say in the orientation of their nation's development which had long been aligned with the interests of the white settler minority population and imperial interests abroad. It has been by no small effort that the land and natural resources have been reclaimed by their rightful owners. This could not have been possible without *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry). This is captured in a ZANU-PF commissioned skit broadcast frequently on television and radio in the early 2000's proclaiming jubilantly "*taane minda murambe makashinga!*" meaning, "we now have land, stay strong!"

However, the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu warns against complacency. This is reflected in the teaching *matakadya kare haanyaradzi mwana* (you cannot always be

satisfied by yesterday's feast, it will not pacify a hungry child today) (Hamutinyeyi & Plangger, 1987, p.140). I use it to suggest that too easily, Zimbabweans have found contentment in simply getting by, reveling in the nostalgia and regional significance of the accomplishments of a romanticised recent past, some only symbolic, failing to recognize the reality that there still remains much work to be done by and with our leadership whomever one perceives them to be. A danger inherent in Patriotic History discourse and Chimurenga Nationalism from the perspective of Fanon (1963) is that as a romantic valorization of anti-colonial struggle they can be used to pacify the people through promotion of worshipful remembrance of a struggle for independence. This can go as far as to eclipse active development in the present such that nostalgic emphasis on the achievements of the Liberation Struggle can distract from very immediate development shortcomings. The labor of the Third Chimurenga is yet to truly come to fruition as is often suggested. Many people including war veterans and people of lower socioeconomic status remain landless and without economic opportunity for advancement. This is arguably a by-product of the assumption that the reclamation of the land would automatically translate into prosperity and economic development, which essentially undermines the industry aspect outlined in Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy. Given that prosperity and economic development cannot simply be willed into existence *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) is the gateway towards creating the availability of adequate life-sustaining and life-enhancing resources such as food and tools which are essential for stable and peaceful environments.

Industry is indeed one of the tenets of Hunhu-Ubuntu whose goal is self-reliance which is predicated on the ownership of natural resources and the land by and for the

people to whom they rightly belong (Mandova and Chingombe, 2013). Hence some of the tenets of Hunhu-Ubuntu are reflected in ZANU-PF's push for self-reliance, self-sufficiency, independence and autonomy. Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness involves recognizing the fact that the greatness of an individual is predicated on the improvement of society as a whole. This is reflected in the proverb *nzombe huru yakabva mukurerwa* (a big bull is a result of being nurtured) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.72) which is used to teach that great people or great things are a product of mutual efforts, care and nurturing of other people, they do not simply develop on their own. I use it to point out the fact that the moral maturity enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu does not develop on its own, it too must be actively nurtured. In order for Zimbabwe to develop into the great self-reliant and morally conscious nation envisioned by its forefathers and the founding fathers of the postcolonial state Hunhu-Ubuntu must be actively cultivated by all through an industrious group effort. The proverb *chara chimwe hachitswanyi inda* (one finger cannot crush a louse) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.254) is used to warn that individualism is not good in some circumstances, it can also be elaborated as "one person cannot do all things alone." I use it here to suggest that if Zimbabwe is to emerge from its development impasse there is a dire need for ideological diversity and efforts that are industrious, collaborative and more open to pluralism.

Patriotic History as an ideology of decolonisation can be understood as an attempt by ZANU-PF, on behalf of the Zimbabwean people, to assert productive oracy, the ability to self-define, self-assert and claim rights, by replacing a tainted Eurocentric history. However, Tendi (2012) argues Patriotic History is fettering and becoming glaringly unsustainable (2010); Hwami argues that it has failed to unify the nation; Thram (2006)

argues that it is culturally offensive; Mazango (2005) argues that it is stifling democracy which Chiumbu (2004) echoes in a call for reform of media regulations and legislation; furthermore, Mangena (2014) argues that not only is it breeding unethical values and practices in the media but it is creating social and political polarization. I argue that presently there exists a philosophical quagmire in Zimbabwe which is symptomatic of the debilitating cognitive legacy of colonialism which has produced parochial and inimical thinking that is removed from ancestral knowledge systems such as Hunhu-Ubuntu and has stalled decolonisation and development.

I acknowledge that Hunhu-Ubuntu relates to the majority's social experiences and that it was also part and parcel of African liberation structures during the struggle. However, I argue that although the discourse of Hunhu-Ubuntu was prominent feature in the intended framework of the nation building project on the eve of independence, the discursive shift that was the Nativist Turn represented an ideological deviation. I hark back to official text of a public address to the nation made by then Prime Minister Elect Mr, Robert Mugabe on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 1980 shortly after his party won historic democratic polls. In it he expressly states that the main concern of the ruling party at independence was "to create an instrument capable of achieving peace and stability" in an effort to bring about progress (1980, p.1, in NewsDay, 2014). Thus I use it not only to demonstrate an ideological deviation on the part of ZANU-PF from their ideology in the 1980s as compared to that of the year 2000, but in part it is useful for analysing how successful Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism have been as an alternative to the 1980 policy of National Reconciliation in fostering peace and stability. Furthermore I wish to demonstrate that the language of the policy of reconciliation in some ways

reflects some of the key features of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy that need to be reinvigorated.

Therefore, in my Hunhu-Ubuntu informed critique in the following chapter I will argue that Patriotic History discourse and Chimurenga Nationalism have been problematic in their treatment of the following issues related to nation building; race relations and national unity, national and political identity, ontological security and belonging, leadership and power, violence and politics and lastly modernization and institutional development. I attempt to make a case for Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy as useful for informing virtuous and inclusive governance and capable of positively orienting Zimbabwean political consciousness. Hunhu-Ubuntu will be the theoretical perspective from which I shall critique the ethics and values expressed through Chimurenga Nationalism and Patriotic History discourse given that the proponents of that discourse often draw on the teachings of Hunhu-Ubuntu as expressed through proverbs. I wish to argue for, and demonstrate the potency of, the reinvigoration, reinvention and advancement of Hunhu-Ubuntu-informed socio-cultural and ethical values, as a way of life and as a reservoir rich in knowledge. I wish to demonstrate the social value of Hunhu-Ubuntu through a critique that draws on proverbs which I understand to be ethical teachings of moral conduct, to borrow Chivaura's (2006a) phrase. I argue that Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy offers the possibility of a thoroughly decolonized modernization, in a manner better suited to accommodate the centrality of a rich cultural heritage within the definition and articulation of Zimbabwe's development agenda and challenging nation building project.

## CHAPTER 4 CHALLENGING PATRIOTIC HISTORY AND CHIMURENGA NATIONALISM FROM A HUNHU-UBUNTU PERSPECTIVE

### 4.1 Race Relations and National Unity

Zimbabwe's colonial experience has left the issue of race unavoidably and dangerously politicized in the postcolonial struggle over power, resources and a sense of belonging. As a result the rhetoric of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism are eerily reminiscent of the native-settler two-race model of the colonial era given that they dichotomize the nation into two races: indigenous Africans and European whites. The nativism inherent in the discourses of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism epitomises what Frantz Fanon (1963) referred to as the pitfalls of national consciousness and intellectual laziness of African nationalist projects. What can be observed is that "from nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism and finally to racism" (p.56). Describable as a metamorphosis of African nationalism it is characterized by a departure from civic and pluralist imaginations of an African nationalist project (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlovhu, 2013). What has taken hold in the form of Patriotic History instead is a call for unity mobilized around racism as opposed to a progressive and meaningful unity with a common purpose in mind. In its extreme form Patriotic History has the tendency to breed fear and prejudice thereby amplifying racial tensions and further prolonging and complicating an already delicate national building project. I stand firmly in the belief that "resistance to oppression is not" nor should it be, "necessarily resistance to the humanity of the oppressor, it is resistance to the system that made his exercise of power possible" (Eze, 2011, p.98).

Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness is useful here for challenging the legacy of the colonial system of oppression which has been reinvented frequently in the postcolonial state to oppress dissenting voices. Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness is the means through which the dehumanizing elements of both the colonial legacy and postcolonial responses to it can and should be done away with. They should be purged from the psyche of African thought. Racist and chauvinist discourses enacted on the bodies of the white population and/or other racial or ethnic minorities through violent acts demonstrate an extreme intolerance of difference that is in violation of Hunhu-Ubuntu values and moral maturity. The proverb *tenda dzose pwere, hapana asiri munhu* (accept all infants, not one of them is not a human being) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.407) is intended to warn against discrimination and prejudice as all people and all lives are of value. This is reflected in an adage used by Rukuni (2012a), “*yemura zvisikwa zvose zvaMwari; zvose zvinoera* (celebrate and respect all of the Creator’s works)” (p.85). Additionally, the aphorism *chitende chinorema ndechine mhodzi* (a heavy calabash is one with seeds) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.36) teaches that it is more the inner quality than the outward appearance which determines the value of something or someone. One such inner quality is that of compassion which is synonymous with love. The spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu admonishes us to be loving, *kuva nerudo* (to show love) to one another. This finds expression in the saying *mombe inonzva inoinanzvawo* (an ox licks the ox that licks it) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.50). This proverb encourages mutual affection, suggesting that love tends to be mutual. Therefore, in order to be loved one must also be loving. I argue that like racism and hatred, love can also be taught, especially since *kuziva ambuya huudzwa* (you come to recognize your

grandmother/mother-in-law after you are told about her) (Hamutiyeyi & Plangger, 1987, p.4) it is used to mean “all that one knows one was taught” hence wisdom and love come from others as does hatred and racism. Hatred and racism must be exposed as the unnatural constructions they are since human beings have a natural proclivity towards togetherness, family and fellowship. There needs to be critical deconstruction of the colonial legacy of essentialist thought, anger and enmity.

As Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy teaches, to deny the humanity of others is in turn a denial of one’s own humanity. Hatred and racism are the gateway to attitudes that disregard respect for the value of human life and human dignity. As one is socialised into racism one can be socialised into a positive racial self-consciousness through the teachings of Hunhu-Ubuntu which are intended to engender *kugarisana* (living together harmoniously) or cordial coexistence which Chimuka (2001) argues is a precondition for peace, stability and flourishing of the whole society. Hunhu-Ubuntu can be used to inform a process of unlearning of prejudices which are the legacy of colonial thought. These often unquestioned prejudices should be replaced by cohesive and positive human interaction brought about by encouraging *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding and respect for one another). Hunhu-Ubuntu teaches that antagonism and hatred are impediments to understanding and progress in the community. This is captured in the proverb *kuvengana hakupi nyaya, nyama inodyiwa yaswera pachoto* (hatred brings no reward, meat is eaten after it has spent a day on the fire) (Hamutiyeyi & Plangger, 1987, p.117). The message here is that, in order to bring about peace and harmony people must thrash out their differences by taking time for frank discussion or *kurondorodza* (discourse at length). It is often said *kutaurirana kuwirirana* (dialogue precipitates harmony of opinion). Without

*kutaurirana* (dialogue) there can be no *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion) hence nationalism predicated on racism and enmity is unlikely to yield sustained peace and stability.

I would argue that Zimbabwe has only managed to achieve a semblance of the nationalism envisioned at independence. Notions of patriotic citizenship have tendency to resemble an appeal to a weakened and hollowed out version of unity, a fictitious unity so to speak. This is because the African nationalism envisioned by Chimurenga Nationalists at independence should have ideally achieved a dual process of state building (making of nation-as-state) and nation building (making of nation-as-people). However, while the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle is laudable for creating the nation-as-state it failed to effectively create the nation-as-people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). According to Miller (2000) what should have ideally arisen from the nation-state project was a good political community whose citizens are actively engaged in deciding their common future together. Bound together by ties of national solidarity, they discover and implement principles of justice that all can share, and in doing so they respect the separate identities of minority groups within the community. This has not been the outcome of Zimbabwean nationalism. The failure to create the nation-a-people is one of the major reasons why peace and stability have been fleeting and why the public sphere and political landscape in Zimbabwe have remained combustible and conflict prone.

The miscarriage of the nation building project has much to do with the complicated matter of abandonment of the 1980 policy of National Reconciliation which was arguably an unavoidable consequence of breaking away from the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. By the year 2000 it had become exceedingly and abundantly clear

that The Lancaster House agreement was insidiously neocolonial and needed to be done away with completely. The policy of National Reconciliation fared no better as it too was fatally flawed. It demanded reconciliation without justice since it upheld colonial power relation asymmetries, particularly white ownership of land. Subsequently the white minority continued to wield economic dominance (Mawondo, 2009). It was seen as a betrayal of the ideals of the Liberation Struggle. It lacked reciprocity as the white population did not share the realisation that there was need for reconciliation nor did they view Africans as equals let alone acknowledge any wrongdoing. It was never a real effort at reconciliation as it only served to affirm the indispensability of the minority white colonial settlers (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru, 2013). Thus the year 2000 signalled not only a departure from the Lancaster House Agreement but subsequently the abandonment of the policy of reconciliation of 1980 which was replaced by the exclusionist politics of Patriotic History (Tendi, 2010).

There can be little doubt that in their constitution the National Reconciliation policy and Lancaster House Agreement were doomed, however the unfortunate consequence of their failure was to leave a philosophical and policy vacuum as to what would inform peace and stability in a fractured society. Since independence Zimbabwean development has been seriously compromised by a stalled nation building project and a lack of consistent and coherent discourse on the matter of national unity, particularly racial and economic equity. Efforts continue to be made to foster peace and stability through offshoots of the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) established in 2009 to reconcile those involved in pre-election and post-election violence in the early 2000s. I would argue that an organ like ONHRI was long

overdue and the uphill task of repairing relations within the nation would have been more manageable immediately after independence had policies been directed towards creating civic and pluralist imaginations of nationhood rather than an overemphasis on attaining and maintaining power. In the midst of heightened power struggles presently it may likely be plagued by partisan agendas. Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru (2013) argues that it is already weakened by the fact that it is composed of partisan individuals who were the very same perpetrators of political atrocities dating as far back as 1980. Others argue that it had already failed by the time of its dissolution in 2013 because of its top-down structure, unclear mandate and the reluctance of ZANU-PF representatives to accept responsibility for violent acts in which they were implicated (Mbire, 2011). Going forward any organ for national healing and reconciliation must of necessity be robust, holistic and pluralistic in its membership if it is to be just, effective and representative of the concerns of victims of political atrocities. Furthermore, its code must be enforceable and binding and therefore it requires commitment and backing from the government. I express doubt however as to whether the political environment bred by Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism can accommodate a robust process of reconciliation given that it would inevitably be in direct confrontation with the legitimacy of the ruling government. Therefore more critical attention must be paid to the cracks in the legitimating discourses of the government if counter discourses are to engender healing and reconciliation.

The philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu has much to offer to a national healing and reconciliation policy or body that would unite both the victims and the perpetrators of political violence in Zimbabwe. There was once a time when Mugabe (1980 as cited in

NewsDay, 2014) called for all people to join him “whether you are black or white...in a new pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery” (p.3). Hunhu-Ubuntu informed reconciliation, while encouraging forgiveness, should recognise that it would be a fatal error to attempt to grant forgiveness and urge people to forget before the truths about crimes are acknowledged, hence the process of healing must of necessity be dialogical, slow and arduous if it is to be lasting and meaningful. Acknowledgement of crimes and recounting of truths are just one the first of many necessary steps before any compensation, reparations or healing can even begin to be a conceivable reality. Thus the people and their leaders must be open to the idea of *kurondorodza* (discourse at length) and demonstrate *rushingiriro* (patience) that shows *kushinga* (perseverance) to see the process through to its full completion. National healing and nation building are challenging processes that cannot simply be willed into existence. They demand constant negotiation hence the people and leadership must have *shungu* (ambition/determination/zeal) demonstrated through *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/steadfastness) by actively and consciously working towards healing and building the nation. It is essential that the philosophy informing a collective nation building project capable of promoting national healing be one that is pluralistic and inclusive of which, sadly, Patriotic History is neither. Hence without *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding and respect for one another), *kugarisana* (living together harmoniously or cordial coexistence) remains elusive.

The difficulty lies in the fact that in its very selective conception Patriotic History is far from tolerant nor is it open to questioning, negotiation nor re-examination. It marginalises other histories and subaltern voices and subsequently their contributions to the destiny of Zimbabwe are muted. Its authoritarian and absolutist nature undermines dialogue hence it may be ill-suited as the basis of a harmonious collective vision. Some historians argue that it is not representative of the diverse experiences of the Liberation Struggle precisely because it is dogmatic and parochial. It may even be argued that the leadership of the Liberation Struggle interpret criticism as ingratitude for their sacrifices made during anti-colonial struggles (Fanon, 1963). Patriotic History discourse appears to sheepishly cling to righteous anger in a manner that scuppers any progression towards reconciliation and justice. A true show of altruism and *hunyoro* (humility) as enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu would be, first and foremost, to be conscious of relationality epitomised by the fact that one is “diminished when others are humiliated, diminished when others are oppressed, diminished when others are treated as if they were less than who they are” (Tutu, 1999, p.31). It is on this basis that forgiveness can occur recognizing the idea that “to forgive is not just to be altruistic...it is the best form of self-interest. The process of forgiving does not exclude hatred and anger. These emotions are all part of being human.” (Tutu, 2010, para. 2). What matters most, as Tutu illustrates is that the depth of one’s love is shown by the extent of one’s anger. According to him remaining in a state of perpetual hatred and anger locks you in a state of victimhood, making you almost dependent on the perpetrator. Forgiveness then in a sense liberates the human being from being metaphorically chained to the perpetrator through victimhood. Therefore rather than to be consumed by hatred and anger one must aspire to transcend the social ills and

narrow mindedness engendered by harboring such sentiments by being willing and open to the idea of *kuwadzanisana* (to reconcile/conciliate anew/reconciliation) through political will and effort. Only then can *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding and respect for one another) be realized. In so doing Zimbabweans can move closer to the ideal moral embodiment and maturity of Hunhu-Ubuntu which I believe is the path to healing the wound in the nation's soul.

According to Chimuka (2001) for the Shona life was inconceivable in a 'nyika' (territory, more commonly country) without *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding). I would argue that peace and stability enshrined within *kugarisana* (living together harmoniously or cordial coexistence) are impossible without consciously embracing and promoting *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) receptiveness and acceptance of others, and *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship). The spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu has the potential to cultivate an awareness "that we remain human in so far as we treat other human beings, black, white, yellow and others as human beings" (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru, 2014, p.11). *Kuwadzanisana* (to reconcile/conciliate anew/reconciliation) must be understood as an essential component to any process of national healing or integration, it is the very foundation for building a peaceful and stable democracy. Reconciliation is the only viable option, it cannot be leapfrogged or set aside to give priority to other political or economic interests. If continuously done poorly it can undo the nation building project entirely. It would be foolish not to use Hunhu-Ubuntu to repair the damage of half-hearted attempts at national healing and reconciliation. Furthermore, if applied correctly the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu can better accommodate hybridity and intermixture of races and cultures as they manifest in contemporary Zimbabwean society thereby moving

beyond racist and essentialist binary thinking. Tolerance and reconciliation need to be backed by concrete legislation that firmly enforces laws preventing racial discrimination, hatred and vilification. This is especially important given the relative ease with which racially motivated enmity arises out of the discursive power of Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalist discourse. *Kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual understanding) demands amicable race relations in order to produce lasting national unity.

#### **4.2 Nation and Political Identity**

Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy is useful for overcoming the naturalized myth of citizenship by race, ethnicity and political affiliation inherent in Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism. However, political identities in Zimbabwe, the formation of which involve questions of citizenship, rights and belonging, are highly insecure and highly unstable. Much like the sense of social cohesion enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu Mugabe once implored, “let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, color or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty” (1980, p.3 as cited in NewsDay, 2014). However, Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism tend to be divisive in the manner in which they have firmly institutionalized identity politics involving alienation and exclusion through their reliance on socially and politically polarizing binaries. From a Hunhu-Ubuntu perspective this generates divisiveness which is considered wrong because it breeds enmity in social relations and produces a discordant society in which national and political identities are perpetually nervous. Discourses of patriotic citizenship are used to normalize politics of

fear to generate loyalty around the ZANU-PF worldview. If anything this resembles an aggressive and chauvinistic assimilation rather than a secure national identity in which one feels part of a cohesive whole. A Hunhu-Ubuntu informed national identity should strive for *kubatana* (unity/togetherness) in pursuit of *humwe* (cohesion/oneness). This is brought about by *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding), *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) and *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship). Hence the saying *kuturika denga remba kubatana* (to put a roof onto the walls of a hut needs joining hands). I use this proverb to express the notion that a peaceful and stable nation building project will remain elusive as long as individuals fail to unite in common effort with common interests at heart. In this sense I believe Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism fail to provide a clear ideological direction and national vision around which the people of Zimbabwe can rally, reconcile and negotiate increasingly diverse identities.

Through Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy however, *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding and respect for one another) necessitates that members of society must actively appreciate and respect the value of human difference, diversity of perceptions, alternative perspectives and practices (Chimuka, 2001). The public sphere needs to be opened up to encompass expressions of diverse identities, opinions and perspectives without fear of repression and persecution. From this appreciation flows *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) and *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship). I use *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) in its literal sense here to mean to be receptive to and accepting of others. This is an ability to tolerate differences in opinions or behaviours with which one may not necessarily agree. This is in recognition of the fact that mutual understanding and harmony of opinion and feeling may more often than not be a challenging goal to fulfill however tolerance from a Hunhu-

Ubuntu perspective accommodates the capacity for members of a society to agree to disagree as a means of conflict resolution. Disagreement should not justify disrespect for human dignity or human life as has often been the case with politics in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Without *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) plurality in Zimbabwe is an impossible dream and monolithic ideas, essentialism and binary thinking will continue to reign supreme.

I believe a sense of nation as a cohesive whole requires *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion, used here to also mean harmony of feeling) and *wirirano* (consensus) without which the nation of Zimbabwe as an aggregate of multiple identities, histories and cultures is destined to fail. The spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu is one of *mushandirapamwe* (co-operation) or working together, believing that *varume ndivamwe, kutsva kwendebvu vanodzimurana* (men are all the same, when their beards burn they help each other extinguish the fire) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.39). This proverb is used to illustrate the communal spirit of *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship) and solidarity that is celebrated by Hunhu-Ubuntu values when confronting challenges that threaten the existence of a people. The challenge I refer to here is that of resolving the national question of identity. With a better understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu there is the potential to cultivate a more secure and productive notion of nationhood that is less reliant on essentialist and autochthonic tropes to construct a national identity. There should be an appeal to a much larger and more flexible shared human subjectivity, one that is determined by one's conduct and not one's age, race or political affiliation. A Hunhu-Ubuntu informed national identity is less likely to breed resentment. I would argue that the oppressive conformity demanded by Patriotic citizenship makes it difficult to

generate a community sentiment in the nation that would engender respect, empathy and compassion for its members, even those who may not necessarily toe the line. This is because the dictates of patriotic citizenship are not accommodating of divergent political views or opinions that fall outside the purview of the ZANU-PF worldview.

The spirit of community within Hunhu-Ubuntu ultimately strives to instill *kudyidzana* (mutual responsibility) which I would argue is a key component of national identity. A national identity built around *kudyidzana* (mutual responsibility) has the capacity to cultivate a public spirit that promotes a willingness to do things that seek to enhance the wellbeing of society as a whole. Within the narrowness of the Patriotic History paradigm there is a noticeable scarcity of anything suggesting ZANU-PF's intent to modernise, or reconstruct or recreate a welfare agenda which was a popular feature of its rhetoric in the 1980s. This would suggest that Patriotic History style patriotism may not include socialism (Ranger, 2004). Hunhu-Ubuntu however promotes mutual responsibility as expressed in the proverb *usayeuka pwere waminya* (it does not show any sense of responsibility and honesty if you start being generous only when you have satisfied your own needs) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.48). I use this proverb to directly address the culture of elitism rampant in Zimbabwean which Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism not only fail to address but in many cases even amplify. This culture is fueling greed, individualism and *huori* (corruption) and in the process undercutting the moral foundations of community. On the contrary, the spirit of selflessness and mutual responsibility is captured in the concept of *hugovi* (generosity). It is key to harmonious and mutually responsible social relations as it is firmly held that *kupa kuturika* (to give is to bank) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.48). This is intended

to mean that when one invests in the welfare and wellbeing of other members of the community, it can ultimately be mutually uplifting for the collective. Thus a Hunhu-Ubuntu informed national identity should outline the qualities that a person is expected to have as a responsible member of the community and the nation. The full realisation of the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu emphasizes the centrality of inclusiveness by engaging members of the community in active dialogue, in mutually beneficial and reciprocal exchanges. This is the necessary first step towards building a caring nation, with the capacity to recognise democratic values and create a social justice system that is based on equality, non-racism, non-sexism and human dignity (Chaplin, 2006).

Hunhu-Ubuntu has much to contribute to a patriotic mission that champions civil liberties, promotes national unity while advancing black empowerment and participation for all. This is essential if there is a common citizenship to be forged out of diverse identities otherwise peace and stability will remain impermanent. A collective effort led by cultural custodians, academics and key intellectuals is necessary to bring about a coming together diverse histories and experiences to formally demystify Zimbabweanness. Any conception of Zimbabweanness must not be rooted in the problematic terms of political affiliation. I would argue that until national identity is divorced from partisan agendas nationhood will remain illusory, political and national identities will be in a constant state of paranoid unrest and a collective vision and ideological direction will be impossible. Zimbabwean national identity thus will remain susceptible to the whims of political opportunists. The inflexibility of ZANU-PF's autochthonic stance on national identity may suggest that as the descendants of the revolution who have upheld the mandate of the Liberation Struggle since independence,

their ideology may purely and simply be inherently ill-equipped to accommodate pluralism.

### **4.3 Ontological Security and Belonging**

ZANU-PF rightly recognizes the potency of harnessing the minds and bodies of younger generations as central to the nation building project. Youth in particular are deeply involved in employing autochthony tropes and the use of violence becomes the means to secure political identity by emphasizing and reaffirming loyalties and allegiances regarding questions of national belonging (Dunn, 2009). A clear example of this is the Zimbabwean government's National Youth Service as well as the mobilisation of youth militia to the service of the more coercive and violent elements of the Third Chimurenga in which the youth militia are recognised as war veterans for their contribution to the land restitution endeavour (Kriger, 2006). The proverb that comes to mind here is *chirere chigokurerawo* (nurture it and it will nurture you in the future). It emphasises the importance of nurturing mutual caring in the younger generations so that in future they too will care of their elders as they were cared for. I use it here to stress the importance of nurturing a sense of patriotic responsibility in the youth given that they shall one day inherit the nation. After all "the Youth of a nation are the trustees of Posterity" (Disraeli, 1845 as cited in Ewald 1883, p.74). Paradoxically however, the national identity politics of Patriotic history and Chimurenga Nationalism, intended to create a sense of belonging, have a tendency to both wittingly and unwittingly disenfranchise certain groups within society, specifically sections of the born-free post-independence generation who may not support ZANU-PF. They occupy a complicated

position in Zimbabwe's contemporary history. Some might suggest that many of them, particularly in the urban areas, fail to identify with ZANU-PF's righteous anger and call for Patriotism because they are emotionally, temporally and spatially removed from the atrocities of the colonial rule. Others would suggest that they have been bewitched by globalized Western values and have betrayed Patriotic History and their cultural heritage Hunhu-Ubuntu, contrastingly some youth and members of the born-free generation may readily identify with the instinctive bond arising out of the shared colonial experience.

Nonetheless, the manner in which Patriotic History governs the political identities of the born-free in Zimbabwe who have not pledged allegiance to ZANU-PF generates a highly insecure and highly unstable sense of ontological security, belonging, citizenship and its accompanying rights. As stated earlier I use ontological security to refer to the stable and unquestioned sense of security of one's being from which one is able to form an assured sense of self and identity in relation to others and one's reality (Jackson & Hogg, 2010). As Fanon (1963) argues "the state, which by its strength and discretion ought to inspire confidence and disarm and lull everybody to sleep, on the contrary seeks to impose itself in spectacular fashion. It makes a display, it jostles people and bullies them, thus intimating to the citizen that he is in constant danger." (p.165). The born-free who do not identify with the ruling party are perpetually barraged with accusations that they lack revolutionary values and therefore are more susceptible to the lure of Western values and ideas. They are ridiculed as likely unpatriotic sell-outs by simple virtue of being born after the liberation struggle and being open to a divergent political opinion thus their political identities are in a constant state of flux. In effect, it marginalizes them in the public sphere by making their political identities appear dubious. It also inhibits

their agency by dispossessing them and those to follow of their cultural heritage and identity effectively casting them into an ontological wilderness of cultural and historical dislocation. Rukuni (2012b) argues that younger generations in the diaspora in particular are suffering the effects of cultural and historical dislocation and as a result they are incapable of forging a true sense of self and identity let alone a contribution towards advancing African development.

The proverb *ziva kwawakabva, kwaunoenda husiku* (know where you have come from, for where you go there is darkness) can be translated as a warning to travellers to know the path from which they have travelled lest they should get lost and need to find their way back home. It is used here to illustrate the importance of knowing one's roots, one's history and one's culture without which one is lost in the world, unable to form a true sense of self, wandering aimlessly in a void of ontological darkness. Individuals who are alienated from their history and culture, essentially deprived of their agency, are thus more likely to harbor feelings of anomie and may even more readily identify with Western culture than their own given the pervasive reach and appeal of globalized Western ideas and values. Such individuals are less likely to concern themselves with the development and destiny of Zimbabwe. Therefore, rather than generating paranoia and ontological insecurity by ostracizing and ridiculing non-ZANU-PF aligned members of the born-free post-independence generations, it should be the role of the state to give the population in general, and the youth in particular a greater sense of ontological certainty and security as they embody the destiny of the nation. A Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy is all too aware of the need to inculcate a firm sense of self in relation to the community by internalizing *tsika dzakanaka* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions)

in the younger generations in order for the future of tomorrow to be a harmonious and peaceful one. Hence I reiterate *kuva netsika dzakanaka dzinoumba hunhu nokupa munhu mutsigo, chinhu chinoyemurwa navazhinji* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions mould ones moral consciousness and instill integrity within an individual, this is desirable and admired by the community) (Hamutinyeyi & Plangger, 1987, p.36). I argue that an individual with *tsika dzakanaka* (good manners, good behaviour and/or moral conventions) is one with ontological security and therefore is empowered with the agency to be a positive contributor to society.

Sadly, people in general and parents in particular “have expressed distress about the moral decadence that seems to have set in and was running through all the strata of society. A loss of discipline and sound human, cultural and religious values are major concerns of the society” (Nziramanga Commission Report, 1999, p.63). I would argue that this is the product of a failure on the part of the ruling government to formulate and put into practice a clear and stable moral philosophy basis with which the born-free generation can form a firm sense of self, one that is not synonymous with ZANU-PF loyalty. This highlights the need to continue to work diligently towards formulating a clearer, reinvigorated conception of Hunhu-Ubuntu as was attempted by Samkange and Samkange (1980). It is important that future generations are equipped with the necessary tools to situate themselves within the imagined community that is the nation through knowledge and appreciation of its diverse histories and multifaceted roles. Presently Patriotic History leaves any member of the born-free generation who does not identify with Chimurenga nationalist ideology in a perpetual state of paranoid disorientation, not knowing whether or not they truly belong, whether or not they meet the requirements

demanded of true sons and daughters of the soil. I believe that a firm sense of self-assurance or ontological security comes from knowing that one belongs to a greater whole, a nation and not a singular political party. It is essential that the cycle of ontological insecurity experienced by the born-free is ended if they are to ever achieve a stable sense of self-identity.

This is especially important since, *patsika gumbo remberi, ndipo panotsika reshure* (the hind foot follows the front foot). This expresses the notion that more often than not posterity will exhibit the same attitudes and uphold the same norms and beliefs as their ancestors. In a manner of speaking, “the apple does not fall far from the tree”. In recognition of the continuous oneness and wholeness of the living, the living-dead and the unborn, I use it to suggest that the mindset and values emerging from the Patriotic History paradigm will shape the political consciousness and societal norms of posterity. For example one will become attuned to casting oneself in the perpetual mode of victim, as Patriotic History discourse often does, and this has the potential to become an intergenerational self-fulfilling prophecy. Critically I, like Eze, recognize the pitfalls of “African leaders’ penchant to cast Africa in a perpetual mode of victim” of the West (Eze, p.101) especially since the “paradigm of victimization” runs the risk of being exploited by postcolonial opportunism. In essence victimization narratives involve re-inflicting the trauma of the wound in the soul and propagating a paranoid and intellectually paralyzing fixation with the gaze of the West. This has the undesirable effect of cementing the image of the Zimbabwe’s development conundrums as the result of its hapless victimhood at the hands of the cruel West thereby allowing leadership to feign responsibility for perpetuating development crises. Zimbabweans would come to be

perceived as perpetual victims who have failed to overcome their disadvantages even having attained the hard-won gift of political independence.

If cultivated within society Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness offers the opportunity to heal this wound by restoring dignity, agency. It offers the potential means for rediscovering our own past and securing our own being and sense of belonging, taking full responsibility for our own actions and destiny. Hunhu-Ubuntu conscious citizens have the potential to better cope with transnational identities and global citizenship with a positive sense of self-worth and a strong and secure sense of identity. Born-free generations need to be empowered beyond being either mere political pawns or outcasts. Like Sibanda (2014) and other proponents of Africanism I argue that the principles of Hunhu-Ubuntu can and should provide the framework for citizenship education. Hunhu-Ubuntu should indeed be incorporated into Zimbabwean national curricula as early as pre-school, extending to university levels and should be part of a process of deliberate citizenship education so as to inculcate Hunhu-Ubuntu values. This essential if it is to be made a ubiquitous discourse used to inform a pluralist project of human development. It is critical that the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu undergo a rigorous process of demystification by clearly laying down standards or parameters for the enculturation process of Hunhu-Ubuntu if it is to become a transparent and formalized process with the capacity for enculturation and socialization. Importantly, official record and formalization processes of Hunhu-Ubuntu should be carried out cautiously so as to maintain its African identity and not lead to its perversion by making it sound European or American (Sibanda, 2014). Ter Haar, Moyo and Nondo (1992) criticize traditional African belief representations such as Hunhu-Ubuntu of being not only vague and

mystified but for failing to be deliberately transmitted to children through formal means. Much of the historical and cultural experiences of Bantu language speaking groups tend to be retained only as oral tradition, proverbs are a good example, and then sadly these experiences are lost over time as community elders die if not actively passed down. They need to be preserved whether in written or audiovisual form through a process of formalisation which is only possible through further scholarship and investigation into the concrete forms in which Hunhu-Ubuntu exists on the ground in everyday life in Zimbabwe. It is of crucial importance that the formalization of the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu be done in conjunction with elders as advisors who are granaries of African cultural and historical wisdom to in order to provide a more comprehensive account of cultural heritage and history in Zimbabwe.

#### **4.4 Leadership and Power**

Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy offers a pragmatic approach to politics and leadership. It strives to guard against vices associated with authority and power such as the more totalitarian and absolutist elements that have arisen out of Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalism in practice that have been detrimental to peaceful and harmonious coexistence. My work has attempted to demonstrate that there are dangers inherent in the unfettered control of and access to symbolic power of history and its idioms which can lead to the fetishization and abuse of power (Eze, p.103). Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism have a tendency to concentrate wealth and centralise leadership and power in a manner which fails to moderate excesses of power and threatens the reciprocal balance between leaders and those they lead. For Hunhu-

Ubuntu to take hold as praxis it must first and foremost be seen to emanate from and be embodied by leadership. The spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu recognizes that true authority or power only exists when legitimacy has been conferred to leadership by those being governed, through *mvumo* (consent) and not *kumanikidza* (coercion/intimidation). The following proverbs are a testament to this fact, *ishe vanhu/ nyika vanhu/ushe varanda* (it is the consent of a ruler's subjects which confers the rulers their authority, a ruler is his subjects); *ushe ukokwa kunavamwe* (chieftainship is by invitation from others) (Mandova, p.107); *ushe hauzvitongi* (chieftainship cannot rule itself) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.304). They are used to emphasize the idea that the power of leadership is only meaningful within a collective when it is used to improve the wellbeing of the collective. Thus there must be mutual reciprocity between rulers and those whom they govern this is facilitated by *kurondorodza* (lengthy discourse).

Mandova and Chingombe (2013) understand these proverbs as being reminders to leadership that decision-making processes are not a unidirectional or one-man processes. *Kukanya hurangana* (mixing milk and sadza calls for approval by others) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.325) expresses the notion that any action done in the interest of the public is best done consultatively otherwise the outcome of the act may not be appreciated by those whom the act affects. The nation building project should ideally involve an endless cycle of consultation and negotiation if it is to truly inspire a shared national sentiment and vision. The emphasis on consultation in governance is intended to guard against authoritarianism (Mandova & Chingombe, 2013). Concurrently, according to Ramose (1999) traditional African constitutional thought abhors absolutism because it goes against the belief that the authority of the ruler is made valid by the fact that it is

legitimized by prior discussion and agreement between the ruler and the ruled. Therefore my understanding of Hunhu-Ubuntu teachings is that they censure against absolutism and totalitarianism which have a tendency to lead to fetishization and personalization of power.

According to Chimhundu (1980) the concept of *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual understanding) is demonstrative of the fact that Hunhu-Ubuntu conduct is guided by the need to avoid excesses. Thus moderation, especially in leadership, is needed to cultivate good behaviour that betters society. A noticeable concentration of wealth and power is often reflective of a self-serving elitist project which can have the effect of amplifying and aggravating tensions along racial, class and ethnic lines. Over-centralisation, absolutism and neopatrimonialism (use of state resources to secure loyalty of the general population) inherent in Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism have led to the politicization of public and private goods in a manner that is both dangerous and incompatible with economic growth and social welfare. Eze (2011) states critically, “having inherited power from the colonial master, the postcolonial subject has gone on to fetishize it, manipulate it in ways that suit him, obeying no rules at all, because he apparently now embodies them, thanks to his immediate access to the symbolic power of history and its idioms” (p.103). As a result the mission of building and directing Zimbabwean development is one that can easily be monopolised by political opportunism and directed towards the service of partisan agendas, or it can be hijacked and led astray by rogue political elements. According to Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy excesses of power and wealth can be avoided if leadership is a true reflection of the will of the people. This is brought about by

*kuvhunzana* (consultation) which enables *kutaurirana* (deliberation) after which one can work towards *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion). Above all the proverbs call upon African leaders to urgently prioritize their subjects and to serve them with justice.

The tendency to suffocate the public sphere with partisan ideology and shrink democratic spaces is characteristic of Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism. This limits the freedom of Zimbabweans to express themselves in matters concerning their very existence as a people. Thus lengthy discussions, encouraged by the philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu intend to create the conditions in which societies have the capacity to build *wirirano* (consensus). The proverb *chaitwa chisina ranga chinopfuka* is used to warn, and can be translated as, that which is done without consensus is doomed (Mareva, 2015, p. 123). From the perspective of Hunhu-Ubuntu *kugarisana* (coexistence) is not possible without *wirirano* (consensus), *mvumo* (consent), *kuwadzansana* (to reconcile/ conciliate anew) and *kubatana* (unity/togetherness) in pursuit of *humwe* (cohesion/oneness). Hence a nation building project that is premised on alienation, exclusion and closure is one that is arguably ill-fated. Post-colonial governmental systems in Zimbabwe have witnessed the capacity for consensus and reconciliation being greatly diminished. Consensus necessitates that inalienable individual rights and freedoms of expression, association and movement are upheld. In his speech on the eve of independence Mugabe (1980 as cited in NewsDay, 2014) made clear that the ruling government would recognize “the fundamental principle that in constituting a government it is necessary to be guided by national interest rather than strictly party considerations” (p.2). The constitution, enforced by the ruling government would declare certain civil rights and freedoms as fundamental to be upheld to the fullest extent

possible. However while preaching freedom and liberty some elements of legislature informed by Patriotic History, particularly in the media, appear to preserve colonially inherited absolutists structures which are repressive and clash with the freedoms and values enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy that are necessary for peace and stability.

Leadership that is truly representative and functioning in the service of the aspirations of its people has leaders who exhibit the capacity for *kuzvirereka* (to be humble). Hence the proverb *gudo guru peta muswe kuti vaduku vakutye* (big baboon, put your tail between your legs so that the young can respect you). This is usually directed at elders and people in positions of authority to suggest that if they are to be respected by their followers they should conduct themselves in a dignified manner that is exemplary of Hunhu-Ubuntu values primarily, *kuzvibata* (to be self-restraining/self-restraint) and *kutsiga* (to have integrity or incorruptibility) from which flows *kuvimbika* (reliability) and *hururami* (rectitude or honesty). As Zimbabweans we appear overly concerned with the watchful gaze of the West and shifting blame elsewhere or, more recently, we are too busy “Looking East” to the Chinese for solutions to our own failings. I argue that the solution lies primarily in realigning our moral compasses. “Individual introspection is fundamental to the development of the qualities of Hunhu-Ubuntu” (Sibanda, 2014, p.2). Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness is built on reflective self-evaluation and is therefore useful for safeguarding against unethical values and practices and moral decay. It is useful for expunging *huori* (corruption) which has manifested as a general lack of moral integrity and focus among the people of Zimbabwe can be seen in the manner of conduct in business and politics in particular (Nzirasanga Commission Report, 1999). Hunhu-Ubuntu promotes *hunaku* (goodness) which is a necessary step towards replacing a

growing acceptance of the cultures of impunity and indifference to corruption on all levels of society with a culture of mutual accountability and integrity.

C.S Lewis states that “integrity is doing the right thing even when no one is watching” (n.d). In order for *kutsiga* (integrity) to be a part of Zimbabwean political consciousness at all times and in all places, nationalist discourses need to be more dialogical, open to critical, consultative and participatory democratic processes which are explicitly collaborative in their orientation fostering accountability in order to avoid naturalizing attitudes and behaviors that go against humanity and human dignity. This is especially important since *chisi hachiyeri musi wacharimwa* (the consequences of bad behaviour are not immediate, but they will come) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, 1987, p.399). I use the proverb *rine manyanga hariputirwe* (that which has horns cannot be concealed in wrapping) as a warning that social ills that are perpetuated by individuals no matter how well concealed will eventually come to light and can have destructive outcomes for the collective as a whole. If the richness of values of Hunhu-Ubuntu values are cultivated they could contribute to an enrichment of not only moral character but also civilization (Chimuka, 2001). In essence a nation building project informed by Hunhu-Ubuntu must embrace and uphold the belief that *kutaurirana kuwirirana, kuwadhanisana kugarisana, kugarisana kunzwanana* (deliberation precipitates harmony of opinion, reconciliation is the pathway to cordial coexistence and living together harmoniously is a product of mutual understanding). I propose a greater emphasis on community leadership roles as a decentralized means of promoting moral goodness and conduct within society. There is greater need for the recognition of mutual accountability, expressed within

Hunhu-Ubuntu communal relations, that values the dignity of the individual as indivisible from that of the community.

While striving for human perfectibility Hunhu-Ubuntu societal norms are recognisant of the inherent imperfection of *vanhu* (human beings), even *vanhu vane hunhu* (human beings with Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness) make mistakes. As such conflicting parties are often blind to their own faults and this is reflected in the proverb *munongedzo hauzvinongedzi* (the index finger does not point to itself) (Chivasa & Mutswanga, 2014, p. 686). This is used to express that “a person rarely blames himself. All people point to the mistakes of others leaving their own blunders untold” (Hamutyineyi and Plangger, 1987, p. 204-5). To further illustrate this common occurrence I use the proverb *maronda asiri ako anonhuwa* (wounds other than your own stink) (Hamutyineyi & Plangger, p.118). In its graphic imagery it points to a tendency in human beings, in this case leadership, to glaringly overlook their own defects and point out those of others. For example the ruling government and the West have historically locked horns in what is arguably a clash between ZANU-PF’s autochthonic cultural nationalism and globalized universal moral principles of Western Liberal democracy. This has seen the deployment of discourses of sovereignty and rights to development by ZANU-PF to combat the double standards of a Eurocentric universal democratic model imposed upon developing nations by global institutions. Thus while acknowledging that the West perpetuates structural injustices within its own back yard and through its exercise of power in the global economic order, I urge African governments to embody *maturo* (dignity/ the state of being worthy or honorable), to be of more elevated mind and character by exhibiting *chiremera* (embodiment of the quality or state of being worthy of

esteem or respect) in their authority at a local level by showing *hunyororo* (humility) enough to accept criticism and acknowledge when policies, even those devised with noble intent, have for whatever reason gone array and are no longer expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu.

To illustrate this I draw upon the expressions, *kutadza kuri muvanhu* (every human being makes mistakes); *hapana asingatadzi* (no man or woman is free from blunders); *munhu wese anokanganisa* (mistakes are common) and the proverb *kuposha ndokwavanhu* (to err is human) (Chivasa & Mutswanga, 2014). Leadership should strive to emulate traditional leadership roles which intended to engender love from which should flow peace and then prosperity, followed by creative freedom and happiness which would beget greater love (Rukuni, 2012b). This is expressive of *mutungamiri ane hunhu* (a dignified leader) embodying good disposition, good of human behavior. I do however emphasize once more that the power and authority of leadership is not unidirectional. Collectively the people have a responsibility to be active agents of development and transformative change. They must exercise their rights to vote wisely and it is the responsibility of their leaders to ensure that this process is free of duress. It is within the power of civil society actors to act in the spirit of *humwe* (oneness) by drawing strength from *kubatana* (unity/togetherness) in numbers recognizing that the orientation of the nation's development and, ultimately, power lies in the hands, minds and bodies of the people. It is within the power of the people to exercise their agency to extend and defend their freedoms of expression by generating counter hegemonic discourses capable of critically challenging Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism and exposing their shortcomings. Acting en masse through the legal means and through dedicated

scholarship is the only way to produce informed citizens who are socially and politically conscious. Such citizens would then have the capacity to moderate excesses of power by challenging and dismantling absolutist structures, demanding transparency and accountability. After all, the leaders should ideally serve as representatives of the will and aspirations of the people given that their authority rests on the people's *mvumo* (consent). I firmly believe that leaders are a product of those who they lead. Hunhu-Ubuntu can only emanate from leadership if those who choose leadership themselves aspire to embody the model standard of *hururami* (rectitude) that is expressive of Hunhu-Ubuntu. As much as Hunhu-Ubuntu is a process of being and becoming so too is leadership.

#### **4.5 Violence and Politics**

Ideally there should be a thick dividing line between colonial administration and post-independence African governmental systems (Mandova & Chingombe, 2013). However, Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) suggest that there is an element of path dependency that links the institutional and political strategies of colonialism with those of post-colonial states. I would argue that post-colonial African institutions continue to harbour the toxic incentives, attitudes and tendencies that were so heavily entrenched within the fundamental makeup of their colonial origins. When it comes to politics for example African governance systems still possess a colonial tendency to naturalize political violence and intimidation. Furthermore, these tendencies are indicative of the symbolic and ideological thread bound to the undying spirit of African resistance most vividly captured in the violent and combative nature of Chimurenga nationalist discourse. Like Fanon (1963) I would argue that resistance to colonial rule during the Liberation

Struggle was of necessity violent resistance needed to dissolve absolutist structures of colonial rule. Indeed violence was perhaps an unavoidable by-product of decolonization given that colonization itself was inherently violent. Nevertheless violence was intended be a temporary solution. However violence and intimidation strategies celebrated in Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism, once originally used to resist oppression, have been called upon to the service of repression in the Zimbabwean political landscape most notably in the politically violent period shortly after independence and between 2000 and 2008. This can be juxtaposed with the fact that Mugabe (1980 as cited in NewsDay, 2014) once argued that peace and stability would only be possible if the whole of Zimbabwe as a “national community” were to feel “a definite sense of individual security on the one hand and have an assurance of national peace and security on the other” (p.1). Instead what is worryingly becoming the norm is a highly paranoid and highly insecure national community that breeds hostility amongst its own members and finds expression through violence.

My major concern is in line with that of Dunn (2009), whose attention is drawn to the all too intimate relationship between autochthonic discourses and violence and thusly I will be critical of how well suited autochthony discourses are for the purposes of nation building, lasting peace and stability. Dunn suggests that there are three reasons why autochthony discourses are frequently accompanied by violence. Firstly, the ever apparent plasticity and illusory sense of certainty and security they offer necessitate violence as the means to bolster truth claims. Acts of violence are part of the performance of identity and thus are both an act of empowerment and one of bolstering truth claims. Secondly, autochthony discourses are closely associated with violence because they are

reliant on narratives of victimization. Drawing upon Patriotic History for example, public intellectuals have produced a version of public history that inculcates historical narratives of violent victimization within the collective memory. As a result they have been able to use this memory to justify acts of violence and closure towards non-autochthons, specifically the white population framed as European settlers or at least the sons and daughters of European settlers. As I have hoped to demonstrate, ZANU-PF youth militia have clearly been at the centre of what Dunn terms the reactivation of old imaginaries of revolution, national liberation, anti-imperialism and nativism combined in opposition to globalization. These imaginaries have been used to legitimize acts of violence against supposed aliens and invaders, acts which only beget cyclical narratives of justifiable autochthonous revenge stemming from remembered atrocities and anticipated atrocities (Marshall-Fratani, 2006). Thirdly, state-making processes performed by multiple actors are inextricably linked to violence which manifests in multiple forms. This involves decoding and recoding space as well as identity construction involving binaries of insiders and outsiders, natives and strangers (Dunn). As I have demonstrated above these acts of violence can be symbolic or they can be played out on the body of victims as Appadurai (1998) would suggest. This is all a part of the pursuit of social order inherent in the state-making process in which autochthony discourses and narratives of victimization reign supreme.

In my opinion, political actors in contemporary Zimbabwe too often and too easily turn to violence to bolster state-making processes and in attempts to forcefully harmonize opinions. These violent tendencies are an indication of the diminished respect for the power inherent in people whether in a family, community or society to engage in

meaningful dialogue as enjoined by the spirit of Hunhu-Ubuntu (Nafukho, 2006). Insightfully, Rukuni (2012a) argues that African governments grappling with nation building are “building the house backwards” (p.41). He explains, “Governments in Afrika are struggling to put a roof on the weak and crumbling walls and foundations of the nation state. Instead of increasing their efforts to first lay a strong foundation, they show no interest in building or strengthening the institutions of family and community” (p.41). State making processes predicated on autochthonic tropes are fundamentally unstable because they are dependent upon violence to bolster dogma and maintain legitimacy. The legitimizing missions of Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalist discourses have necessitated the invention and reinvention of supposed legitimate targets for political violence (Mugabe, 2001) thereby justifying violence. The expression *nyika haitongwe nezvibhakera* (the country cannot be governed by fists) is used to warn that brute force is an unsustainable form of governance. It goes without saying therefore that violence is against the Hunhu-Ubuntu ideals of harmony and cordial coexistence. It fails to generate *ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship) and compassionate human relationships that are respectful and affirming of human life and human dignity.

It is also said *mhosva haitongwi nekurwa* (disputes cannot be solved through violence). As such, Mandova and Chingombe (2013) point out that leaders in traditional societies were not expected to use violence nor to intimidate disputants in the administration of justice. Hence the saying *mhosva haitongwi nepfumo* (a case is not settled by a spear). Similarly, the proverb *dare harivengi munhu rinovenga mhosva* (the court does not hate a person but the crime) further emphasized the importance of fairness and impartiality when settling disputes (Chivasa & Mutswanga, 2014). These aphorisms

were used to guard against violence and ensure that rule of law was seen to preside over all matters of justice at all times. Mugabe (1980 as cited in NewsDay, 2014) once proclaimed that “only a government that subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral right to demand of its citizens obedience to the rule of law” (p.2). Some might argue that the government sanctioned violence shortly after independence, at the height of the Third Chimurenga land seizures and frequently around pre-election and post-election times in the early 2000, has served to intentionally normalize a culture of violence and lawlessness as an expression of civic and even governmental insecurity. This has the potential to escalate into all out civil war from an otherwise passive and patient people as frustrations and discontent are increasingly expressed through acts of violence. I would argue that any ideology fit for building a nation must be purged of an inherently violent nature if it is to bring about sustained peace and stability.

Political violence must be met with greater intolerance. The time has come to move away from the heritage of violent politics necessary during the Liberation Struggle instead towards democratic, deliberative and dialogical discourse in an appreciation of the humanism of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy. I argue that the violent tendencies within Patriotic History and Chimurenga nationalism are symptomatic of an incomplete nation building and national identity project arising out of failure to generate *wirirano* (consensus) and *kuwirirana* (harmony of opinion), an under appreciation of *kuvhunzana* (consultation), *kurondorodza* (discourse at length) and *kutaurirana* (dialogue/ deliberation). This has produced highly insecure truth claims which rely on violence, *kumanikidza* (coercion) instead of *mvumo* (consent). A true understanding of *kugara hunzwana* (living well together in cordial coexistence requires mutual understanding) and

*ruwadzano* (peaceful fellowship) recognizes that violence is incompatible with lasting peace, harmony and stability. While Hunhu-Ubuntu is to a degree nativist in its conception it offers a more flexible and accommodating ethos that is far less prone to violence.

The challenge falls upon Zimbabwean civil society actors to be courageous and critically engaged citizens who will stand up for their own rights and those of others in solidarity as allies by challenging cyclical violence that, from the perspective of Hunhu-Ubuntu, not only dehumanizes its victims and those who perpetrate it, but also those who stand by idly and silently. It is once again essential that counter hegemonic discourses and practices are formulated in political landscapes and the public sphere. They must not be combative or inimical but instead progressive, democratic, justice based, restorative and reconciliatory, rooted in non-violence and Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy. It is essential that these counter hegemonic discourses are embodied in a robust commission capable of enforcing retroactive measures with the fairness and impartiality of the law in order to account for past acts of political violence. This could end the cycles of naturalized violence and injustice that are upheld by impunity and voicelessness thereby opening up spaces for the acknowledgement of crimes and truths so as to effectively mete out justice. I would argue that political violence is often a short-cut taken to by leaders who demand the obedience of the masses. However this is not demonstrative of *rushingiro* (patience), *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) nor *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) found in *mutungamiri ane hunhu* (a dignified leader). The proverb *moto mushoma ndiwo unonyautsa muto* (it is a low fire that warms the soup) teaches that in the long run persuasion is more effective than command (Hamutyineyi &

Plangger, 1987, p.40) this is especially if leaders are to secure a following through non-violent means without requiring *kumanikidza* (coercion/intimidation).

#### **4.6 Modernization and Institutional Development**

African states like Zimbabwe continue to be reliant on “the colonial legacy of institutions that were never originally intended to serve the majority of Afrikans” (Rukuni, 2012b, p.140). For example, Fanon (1963) argues that it is often the case after independence that the institution of the political party has struggled to function as a two-way transmission of ideas connecting the masses with the leadership. Instead it has functioned in top-down manner dictating the behaviour and the attitudes to be held by the people. This is epitomised by the dictates of patriotic citizenry and Patriotic allegiance. While acknowledging the popularity of ZANU-PF among the majority of Zimbabweans, some might argue that political parties in general in Zimbabwe are masterminded by intellectuals and the bourgeoisie and have become “a screen between the masses and the leaders...a means of private advancement” (Fanon, 1963, pp.170-171). This is instead of being an organ capable of formulating a unifying collective national vision and aspirational collective goals. Government and the political party in Zimbabwe, in their current forms, exercises power in a manner that is unidirectional. This negates the reciprocal relationships enjoined by Hunhu-Ubuntu between leaders and those whom they lead which are intended to foster accountable and truly representative government.

Politics have been seen to preside unrestrained over social, economic and cultural spheres of life with problematic effect, particularly at the expense of family and community leadership. For example, the land reform and redistribution policy of the

Third Chimurenga will only be truly successful all-round if it is seen to be benefitting the black majority as a whole, and in particular the marginalised and land-hungry, as opposed to the mutation of elitist personal embourgeoisement it has arguably become. There is much work yet to be completed if land justice is to be realised hence achieving land justice demands *kushinga* (perseverance/steadfastness) and *rushingiriro* (patience), as well as *shungu* (ambition/determination/zeal) expressed through *kushanda nesimba* (hard work/industry) not to mention *kutsiga* (to have integrity or incorruptibility) and *hururami* (rectitude or honesty). Otherwise indigenisation of the nation's natural resources will merely be what Fanon (1963) refers to as a transfer into native hands of unfair advantages, which are a legacy of the colonial period. Land justice is incompatible with an elitist project of concentration of land ownership and wealth.

Proponents of Hunhu-Ubuntu rightly bring attention to the need for the values reflected in institutions like schools and political parties to cohere with the cultures they serve. It would appear to me that the schools privilege Eurocentric history and culture and political parties remain rooted in the ideology of colonial administration. Therefore, neither institutions are structured in a manner that adequately serves the needs, interests and concerns of the Zimbabwean people. Cultural coherence demands that citizens should feel accommodated by such institutions, whether academic or political. They should be welcoming and familiar as opposed to exclusionary and alienating (Enslin, 2010). This is important because cultural coherence “both aids individuals’ sense of identity and hence agency, and helps limit individuals’ range of choices to a manageable level so as to prevent their development of anomie” (Levison, 1999, p.31). This idea of cultural coherence should be seen to inform the nation building project and sociopolitical

institutions alike. Cultural coherence is only achievable through a democratic approach (Enslin, 2010), hence Hunhu-Ubuntu can contribute a dialogical component to the democratization agenda in Zimbabwe. Western-style democracies have indeed managed to attain liberty however the precedence given to the economy as the primary measure of development has been detrimental to humanism (Makgoba, 1996). As such the resulting imbalance has precipitated national crises on the matter of how a democratic model is to be adapted or evolve in order to achieve harmonious balance.

Any conception of Hunhu-Ubuntu, whether informing democracy or education, in Zimbabwe must be seen to explicitly accommodate the issue of pluralities of race, culture and language. Public deliberation as reasoned agreement is central to legitimacy in liberal democracy (Benhabib, 1996). While Zimbabwe may not live up to the American and European ideal liberal democracy, the democracy that is Zimbabwe continues to flounder when it comes to democratisation. At best it is a half built democracy. The concept of *kutaurirana kuwirirana* (deliberation precipitates harmony of opinion) found in Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy for example can be useful for facilitating just one of many fundamental egalitarian values that would allow the ruling government of Zimbabwe to further democratize the public sphere. This is just one of the examples of the fundamental values and goods a government and society must be committed to promoting and protecting in order to be truly representative of the will, concerns and desires of the people it serves. An equitable and egalitarian approach is absolutely essential lest the reinvigoration of the notion of Hunhu-Ubuntu mutate into an elitist project. Hunhu-Ubuntu informed democratization can open leadership up to criticism and foster greater

accountability thereby moderating fetishization, personalization and abuse of power by instead generating leadership with a capacity for reflective self-evaluation.

It is necessary therefore to reinvent and democratise politics in general and the institution of the political party in particular as both have harbored a destructive colonial legacy of totalitarianism and absolutism. I argue that the moral foundations of community have seriously been compromised by the values arising from the political consciousness and social order produced by Patriotic History and Chimurenga Nationalism. Much like Rukuni (2012b) I propose the strengthening and reinvention of traditional institutions of family, extended family and village communities based on the humanistic values of Hunhu-Ubuntu. What I mean by this is I recognise the viability of giving greater precedence and input to the contributions of informal institutions and networks as offering possible frameworks and blueprints for the principles upon which to build the nation involving, but not limited to, Hunhu-Ubuntu informed reciprocity, relationality and solidarity. Informal institutions are the sites in which there can be intergenerational exchanges and reverse mentorship capable of harmonizing experience and wisdom of elders with the passion and enthusiasm of youth (Rukuni, 2012b). If given greater centrality these institutions have much to offer in terms of making the nation-as-people from the ground up through culturally coherent, dynamic and modernized institutions. These institutions can be the means for engraining and nurturing Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness that seeks to produce an effective and ontologically certain citizenry with the capacity to thrive and prosper both locally and in a global environment.

The complexity of the processes of decolonization and modernization are demonstrated by the fact that they remains wrought with contradiction especially

conflicting narratives of anti-Western discourse juxtaposed with a heavy reliance on Western ideas. Patriotic History discourse takes a culturally relativist standpoint against Western Liberal Democracy in its defense of national sovereignty, culture and the right to development. However, the ruling government, with its socialist DNA, exhibits neoliberal capitalist tendencies in its domestication of the culture of capitalism and forceful implementing of neoliberal privatization and marketization policies and principles. At the same time however it adheres to an authoritarian style of government intervention in the ultra-nationalist Chimurenga Nationalism. This is arguably symptomatic of a schizophrenic mode of incomplete decolonisation that attempts to facilitate modernisation without slipping into Westernisation. Arguing in defense of an endogenous approach to development ZANU-PF affiliate Chivaura (2006b) declares, “For us to attain true human development in Southern Africa in ways that do not compromise our sovereignty and dignity as African people we must shun dependence on foreign ideologies, however attractive and magnanimous they may appear. We must turn to our indigenous worldview and wisdom as our conceptual framework” (p.223). Further, he uses the aphorism *mudzimu weshiri uri mudendere* (a bird’s soul is in its nest) to underscore that there are is more than enough indigenous knowledge and wisdom available locally to produce true and endogenous human development in both a spiritual and material sense.

I agree absolutely that there is an underutilised reservoir abundant with indigenous wisdom and knowledge forms such as Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy which would be more culturally and historically appropriate to development in Zimbabwe given that it relates to the majority’s social experiences. However it would be parochial

thinking to completely shun the potential contributions of exogenous approaches to development. There is a need for borrowing from other cultural paradigms, Western, Eastern or otherwise, as suggested by Rukuni (2012b). Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy is dynamic enough to open up the public sphere to encompass much broader variety of ideas, interests, and concerns. This is truly expressive *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) which will likely engender peace and stability through an appreciation of pluralism. The defense of the national sovereignty should rest on *humwe* (oneness), the strength found in *kubatana* (unity/togetherness). I understand this to be a kind of synergy of the people of the nation and their ideas. I believe this is more likely to generate social, economic and political viability. I address this issue in the following section in a discussion about cultural purity.

#### 4.6.1 Decolonization and Addressing the Myth of Cultural Purity

The philosophy of Hunhu-Ubuntu faces the necessary challenge of finding balance if Zimbabwean society is to achieve peaceful coexistence. Adeyemi and Adeyinka (2003) recognize the need to strike a balance between African and Western knowledge forms by merging their respective good aspects. In similar vein Rukuni (2012b) sees value in borrowing from other cultural paradigms, for example, Western civilizations' highly action-oriented drive for advancement particularly in science and technology, Eastern civilizations' cultural and spiritual philosophy of continuous improvement, all in combination with humanistic Afrikan philosophies built around familial and communitarian relationships. Hence any conception of Hunhu-Ubuntu should recognise that cultural and intellectual exchanges can offer strength through

unity found in *humwe* (oneness) by embracing plurality. It is not my intention however to suggest that these various cultures are unique and distinctive, however it is important that any conception or application of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy value the importance of transculturality, a concept used by Wolfgang Welsch (1999).

Unlike multiculturalism, transculturality teaches that cultures are interconnected and often borrow from each other such that it is impossible to talk about a culture as enclosed. Since there are foreign elements within cultures resulting from cross cultural contamination cultural purity is negated (Eze, 2011). Bhikhu Parekh (2002) asserts that although cultures constitute systems of meaning for a particular group this does not mean that they cannot be understood by others from without. This is where I see the value of the transmission of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy through enculturation and socialisation. While some Africanists like Makgoba (1996) have argued in defense of Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy's uniqueness I do not perceive it to be distinct or unique to the African experience alone. Samkange and Samkange (1980) at least acknowledge, "It does not follow that certain traits / attributes which are readily identifiable with ubuntu / hunhu cannot be found among other peoples who are not of Bantu origin" (p.77). It is conceptually and practically associated with a long and profound tradition of humanist concern, caring and compassion, also prominent in western thought (Enslin, 2010). Thus arguments suggesting that Hunhu-Ubuntu is unique would be to perpetuate a parochial thought process.

Concurrently, from a South African standpoint regarding Ubuntu, yet equally applicable to the Zimbabwean case, Ramphele (1995) asserts that "the refusal to acknowledge the similarity between Ubuntu and other humanistic philosophical

approaches is in part a reflection of the parochialism of South Africans and a refusal to learn from others....We have to have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems in this country, nor are we likely to invent entirely new solutions” (p. 15). It is important to bear in mind that flexibility is key to the survival of cultures and philosophies like Hunhu-Ubuntu particularly in a global era with pervasive cross-cultural interaction. Adaptation and redefinition therefore are the processes that enable cultures to survive (Eze, 2011). In this vein a reinvented and reinvigorated Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy must of necessity be dynamic. Zimbabweans must realise how dependent their cultures are on other cultures and with that knowledge, as Eze suggests, they must respond to reality in a positive mind-set of to contribute towards increasing the sum total of humanity. This would be far more rewarding than attempting to prove that African cultures are superior and can exist insulated from others ZANU-PF intellectuals would appear to suggest in their aggressive promulgation of Patriotic History discourse and Chimurenga Nationalism. It is necessary therefore to not only clarify the concept of Hunhu-Ubuntu but to advance a reinvented, formalized and modernized conception of it that is dynamic and encompassing of the global epistemological spectrum of values, behaviours, ethics and norms to arrive at a multicultural definition of humanness (Sibanda 2014; Rukuni, 2012b).

## Chapter 5 Conclusion

I have attempted to demonstrate the centrality and power of history and culture within Zimbabwean governmental principles in the postcolonial era. My interest has been in history in the form of Patriotic History discourse and Chimurenga Nationalism and the ethos that has emerged from them as the compass that informs people about the values and destiny of the nation of Zimbabwe. I have hoped to emphasize the need for historians and elders to be drawn in from the margins to work together with leadership in a collaborative endeavour to undo the damaging effects of a monopolized political, historical and cultural discourses. I believe Hunhu-Ubuntu philosophy can help mediate the rifts between political autonomy achieved through the Liberation Struggle, the economic autonomy still yet to be fully realised and the moral autonomy which has been seriously compromised by an over-emphasis on the economic and the political in lieu of the human and cultural. In essence it is my hope that my discussion will contribute towards rehabilitating and decolonizing the mode of material and spiritual development by placing greater significance on the development of a paradigm that flows from a reinvigorated spirit of humaneness found in Hunhu-Ubuntu consciousness. Others before me such as the Samkanges (1980) have inspired my desire, thirty-six years later, to continue to build upon their ideas of making a Zimbabwean indigenous political philosophy ubiquitous discourse.

A watershed moment is dawning in the Zimbabwean political landscape with the inevitability of succession on the horizon. It presents an opportune moment to usher in an evolutionary discursive shift. I believe that a Hunhu-Ubuntu informed development paradigm can open up Zimbabwe's development agenda to the dynamism of fresh minds

and bodies. Particularly, the born-free generation must assume responsibility for the nation's destiny and equip themselves to work collaboratively and inclusively towards creating a framework for a nation building project that is peaceful, stable and sustainable. Like Mandivamba Rukuni (2012a) I urge all Zimbabweans *teverai Hunhu-Ubuntu, ndiyo nzira huru yeupenyu* (regard Hunhu-Ubuntu as a way of life) for it can illuminate the path towards harmony, peace, balance, love and justice. Hunhu-Ubuntu is powerful and resonant, better remembered than forgotten.

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