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THE PETERBOROUGH ELECTION: *the Success of a Party Image*

DESPITE THE DETERMINATION OF VICTORIOUS PARTIES to see in them the most sanguine of portents for future general elections, by-elections are suspect as indicators of political trends; they seldom illustrate more than the traditional mid-term slump in any government's popularity. In most instances a plethora of divergent factors makes conclusions drawn from by-elections something less than precise. The success of a small third party usually means nothing more than the presence of dissatisfaction with the two established parties, a dissatisfaction that is expressed on the assumption that the third party will not form the government and is hence simply an instrument of mid-term protest.

When this has been stated by way of a counsel of moderation it is possible, to a certain extent, to ignore these qualifications in assessing the Peterborough by-election of October, 1960. The vote was unquestionably a protest vote, but the fact that it returned a member of a party which does not yet exist in any official sense would imply that it was a special sort of protest.

From the point of view of the political scientist, this special protest vote is interesting, for it illustrates the response of the electorate to a party's "image" and, it is suggested, the attitude of the Canadian electorate at this particular time toward party images generally. It is also indicative of certain important factors in campaign techniques and, related to this, of a changing attitude on the part of the voter toward political campaigns.

One final generalization which may be drawn from the Peterborough by-election concerns the course that ought to be followed by the New Party and the degree and kind of labour participation that one can fairly expect in the New Party movement.

That there were special circumstances in the Peterborough by-election is not denied; these circumstances and the specific factors affecting the results will be dis-

cussed below. But that the lessons that can be drawn from this by-election have some applicability to the nation at large can be inferred from the fact that the Peterborough constituency is fairly representative in that, although the industrial-labour class is predominant, it also contains within its boundaries executive and managerial, agrarian and petit-bourgeois classes. For this reason it does not seem excessively inaccurate to generalize from this particular election.

The major issue was unemployment. The economy of Peterborough is an industrial economy with agricultural elements in the northern section of the constituency.¹ The health of the area depends to a very great extent upon the health of the large industrial plants in Peterborough itself; the level of employment has a direct effect on the city's prosperity and, naturally, on the prosperity of the surrounding rural areas. At the time of the election there were 3,000 to 3,500 unemployed in the area, including temporary lay-offs.² The Peterborough Unemployment Insurance Commission listed 2,545 unemployed persons registered and receiving benefits on September 29, and the *Peterborough Examiner* reported that there were 870 people in receipt of relief in August, a figure that included 175 heads of families.

It is not surprising, then, that according to a number of observers there was a genuine air of insecurity in Peterborough as a result of rising unemployment and the uncertain prospects of the approaching winter. The announcement by the Quaker Oats Milling Company of a projected staff reduction of 150 by January 1 and the subsequent laying off of 25 workers on October 14 contributed to this feeling. Throughout the period of the campaign, Canadian General Electric—the largest single employer in the area—was laying off workers spasmodically. On the assumption that their livelihood might be next to disappear, a number of families with savings were not making previously planned purchases. Conditions were clearly favourable for the party that could offer positive and energetic leadership and that could most successfully present itself as a genuine movement of protest and reconstruction.

Both the Liberal Party and the New Party used unemployment as the focus of their campaigns, but the New Party did so to greater effect. By taking a leaf from the Conservative book it was able to point out that the Liberals had started it all with "tight money". Then it was argued that the Conservative party had ignored election promises and had simply aggravated the situation. The New Party attempted to present the two traditional parties as slightly different versions of the same reactionary force in Canadian politics—as parties essentially devoid of positive solutions to the ills of the Peterborough and the national economy. Success in creating

the image of a really new political party by comparison with the old parties was aided in no small way by the inability of the Liberal and Conservative candidates to offer any solutions or leadership. For the most part the campaigns of the two parties consisted of that hoariest of election techniques: recitation of the party's past record in Canadian politics. One can surmise that the constant stressing by the Conservative candidate of the fact that national prosperity was at its highest level and that the national wage index was up some 10% was found more than slightly unpalatable in Peterborough.

An eleventh-hour appearance on the hustings by the Federal Minister of Labour to announce the awarding of a government contract to Canadian General Electric which would provide 102,000 man hours of work backfired when the New Party candidate pointed out that this meant only fifty jobs for one year and did not necessarily require any new hiring by CGE.³ The Liberal cause was dealt a blow on the same issue when their candidate described the contract as "a gigantic election bribe".⁴ The New Party pointed out in a subsequent advertisement that the best the government could do for Peterborough was fifty jobs and that the Liberals considered even this to be a "*gigantic* bribe".⁵ This instance is indicative of the failure of the Liberal and Conservative parties to come to grips with the economic and psychological situation in the riding, whereas the New Party seemed to have discovered what was sought by the electorate.

The unemployment issue was, like the "farm crisis", tailor-made for a radical party; and in an area depressed economically and psychologically it gave both impetus and respectability to a platform which called for a "drastic reorganization of the economy" and the institution of governmental planning agencies and public investment boards. These were proposals that neither of the older parties could make; hence they were forced back upon the offering of the vaguest sort of nostrums and recourse to the "record".

A second issue in the campaign was the "farm crisis". Although it was a secondary issue, the New Party organizers felt that it was significant enough for continuous attention in the campaign, and their success in the rural polls supports their view. As with all farm crises this was essentially the dissatisfaction of the agrarian element in the riding with declining farm income relative to increasing costs, the traditional anguished cry of all Canadian farmers. Again it was the New Party that dealt effectively with this agrarian discontent, linking it, with apparent success, to the question of the "overall mismanagement of the economy." Although the program offered the farmers was invitingly vague, in its more specific aspects it

involved greater governmental support for the farmer and control of the price structure. It was a frankly socialist solution, one that the Liberal or Conservative parties could not have offered; but it was a definite proposal.

The success of the New Party in the rural polling stations was undoubtedly aided by the existence of a Farmers' New Party Club in the rural districts of the riding. This club had been organized a year before the election by a Toronto organizer without the knowledge of the Peterborough CCF executive, largely because of the apparent unpopularity of the CCF party in that area.⁶ This may account in part for the startling success of the New Party in the rural polling stations⁷, although the fact remains that presence alone is not enough; there must be active support for the movement itself to bring out the vote.

If the issues in the election were such that the radical party of protest would benefit, so too were the candidates. Of the three, the New Party candidate was unquestionably the most attractive. It would be but a slight exaggeration to say that he was every campaign manager's dream of the "most available" candidate. Young, intelligent, a fluent speaker, active in community and church affairs, head of the history department in a local collegiate school and well-known and respected in the community at large, he attracted a considerable body of support on the basis of his personality alone. He was opposed on the one hand by an elderly retired school principal whose campaign slogan "Vote X, A Man of Action" was without evident appeal to the voters; and on the other by an insurance executive who urged that what Peterborough needed in Ottawa was a successful business man. By curious coincidence the three candidates personified the images of their parties that the New Party tacticians were eagerly attempting to foster. The campaign material and the candidates chosen by the Liberal and Conservative parties unwittingly assisted the New Party in projecting the desired images.

The New Party candidate was not the typical vituperator one has grown accustomed to expect from the left-wing movement in Canadian politics, nor was he a figure that could be associated with the *status quo*; rather he was a figure of responsible, and hence respectable, intelligent progressivism. It was felt by several people closely connected with the New Party campaign that their candidate provided the right sort of leadership for a broad spectrum of social groupings. As one union official put it, "He was a leader, not a shop-mate".⁸ His willingness to meet with any group and discuss any question⁹ was contrasted with the rather lame platform techniques and issue-dodging of the other candidates.¹⁰

The popularity of the New Party candidate made the task of mustering trade

union support less difficult than had been expected, and certainly the success of the New Party campaign was in large measure due to the strength and enthusiasm of the labour support thrown behind the movement. While the New Party is partially the creature of the Canadian Labour Congress, not all of the 13,000 or so trade unionists in Peterborough belong to CLC-affiliated unions. The largest single union in the constituency, the United Electrical Workers, is not only not an affiliate of the CLC but was expelled from that organization for its Communist associations. Support for the New Party was not restricted to the CLC affiliates, although all the locals that voted a levy of one dollar per member to support the New Party campaign were locals of CLC-affiliated unions.¹¹

Nor was the trade union support confined to financial donations. The headquarters machine was staffed largely with union organizers; a professional union political organizer managed the entire campaign. The core of the party's canvassing groups was made up of trade unionists. Party officials insist that the support was roughly divided between union support and the support of the other interested citizens; it does seem clear, however, that trade union support formed the backbone of party support in both funds and personnel. On election day 150 cars and drivers were at the party's disposal, many provided by trade unionists who had sacrificed a day's pay to further the cause.

The significant point here is that the CCF, despite its close association with the labour movement in Canada, has never been able to draw support from Peterborough locals, CLC or otherwise, in the form of either workers or funds. The New Party, campaigning on what was essentially a CCF platform, succeeded where the CCF had failed.¹² The New Party association with the CCF was, in fact, recognized as a liability by the candidate and his campaign organizers, and as little mention of that party was made as was consistent with good party manners and due parental respect.

Unable to do any door-to-door canvassing, the New Party candidate concentrated on early morning visits to the factory gates to shake hands and chat with the workers changing shift. His obvious interest in the problems of the worker coupled with the highly competent mobilization of trade union support paid handsome dividends, for there was as much discussion of and canvassing for the New Party inside the plant gates as there was outside. There appeared to be a solid core of CCF-*cum*-New Party supporters in all the major factories, including the UEW-dominated GE plant. In the latter the New Party cause was abetted by the fact that the fellow-

travelling executive of the UEW was involved in contract negotiations and was thus unable to devote any time or attention to the election.¹³

The response of the trade unions in Peterborough clearly shows that, given a reasonable candidate and careful organization, not only the union executives but the rank-and-file will throw their support wholeheartedly behind the New Party where they would not do so for the CCF. The fact that the New Party is partially the creature of the CLC goes a long way toward explaining this reversal of previous left-wing movement fortunes in Peterborough. The strength and enthusiasm of the labour support would augur well for the New Party in similar constituencies.

If the New Party officials were surprised by the strength and enthusiasm of the labour support, they were amazed by the support from other areas of the community. The folk-lore of the campaign is filled with anecdotes similar to that relating how the treasurer of one of the larger firms in the city called in the plant union organizer to make a contribution to the New Party, so impressed was he with the zest and popular support given to the campaign. A more concrete indication of popular support can be found in the fact that 1500 New Party automobile bumper stickers were distributed during the campaign—the bulk of these to individuals who came, uninvited, to the committee rooms to get them. Following a television broadcast in which the candidate referred to the New Party publication *Study Paper on Programme*, 1000 copies were distributed to people coming to the committee rooms asking for copies. The campaign manager said that many people were turned away since the committee had only 1000 copies of the pamphlet.

As the *Peterborough Examiner* put it in a leading article on the day following the election, "There was nothing unbalanced about the New Party victory. It was spread over all the constituency and, judging by the supposedly Conservative districts won, over all income groups too." In the West Ward of Peterborough city, the middle and upper class residential district—traditionally the Conservative stronghold and, conversely, the CCF's weakest area—the New Party lost the ward by only 270 votes out of a total poll of 4131 votes. The New Party carried 12 of the 22 polling stations and won almost as many votes in that ward as the CCF had in the whole constituency in 1957 and 1958.

Some credit for this success must be given to the image projected by the New Party as a party of all the people and not simply as an instrument of one class opposing others. The persistent invitations to all sections of the electorate to participate in the establishment of a new political force, to participate in what the party propaganda urged was an historic occasion—the election of the first New Party

Member of Parliament—met with a remarkable response. The enthusiastic vitality of the New Party tended to enhance an already existing feeling that the older parties were sadly out of touch with the people. Of considerable significance was the conscious effort made by the party to make radicalism respectable by frequent reference to the prosperity and level of welfare in the Scandinavian countries and in New Zealand. According to the candidate, he tried to “stress human bonds and needs—rather than stress economic differences.” In this respect, the New Party campaign achieved a higher intellectual level than that of either the Liberal or Conservative parties. In his final television appearance the New Party candidate struck, by his own admission, “a highly intellectual” note while the newspaper campaign closed with what has been accurately described as a “very idealistic letter” which was in marked contrast to the final and blatant appeal for votes made by the two traditional parties. If the success of the New Party in the trade-unionist camp can be explained by the CLC association and the party’s concern with the unemployment crisis, its success in the West Ward, and others like it, can be explained by the consistent note of responsibility and integrity in the New Party’s campaign. The success of this technique was enhanced by the incredible mismanagement which marked the Liberal and Conservative campaigns.

Another factor favourable to the New Party was the sympathy of the local newspaper, the *Peterborough Examiner*. In a one-paper city such sympathy can be decidedly influential. Early in the campaign the New Party was given the seal of approval:

. . . the New Party is not doctrinaire socialist; it will not be socialist for the sake of being so. It will be liberal and democratic in outlook and will provide the radical element in Canadian politics that has been missing for a long time.¹⁴

On the other hand it would be difficult to claim that this sympathy amounted to bias, for equal coverage was given to all party gatherings; indeed more space was given to the visits of national figures associated with the Liberal and Conservative parties than was devoted to similar excursions on the part of national CCF and New Party luminaries. The paper was scrupulously fair in its treatment of the issues and, on one occasion, provided a full page for the statements of the candidates regarding a series of articles published during the previous week discussing Peterborough’s economic prospects. It was significant that only the New Party candidate turned this opportunity to its own advantage while the Liberal and Conservative candidates fumbled it badly. The New Party candidate provided a rational—if radical—but non-partisan analysis of the economic issues and offered a series of solutions to the

problems raised. The Liberal candidate confined his argument to attacking the "Tories" and the CCF, while the Conservative candidate responded with "...a statement of what has been and is being done by the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker,"¹⁵ which ranged from the Trans-Canada Highway developments to the Bill of Rights. The specific problems of the Peterborough area were largely ignored by both Liberal and Conservative candidates. Perhaps the association of the Liberal and Conservative candidates with an existing body of policy precluded them from taking a definite stand which the New Party candidate, untrammelled as yet by an official body of New Party doctrine, was able to take. It should be pointed out, however, that his platform and analysis in this particular article contained nothing not already enunciated by the CCF or the CLC. It does not seem unfair to say that given the issues, the candidates, and the platforms, it would have been difficult for any reputable newspaper to avoid showing some sympathy for the New Party. The coverage of the election by the *Examiner* was in all respects a model of responsible journalism.

The management of the campaigns would also seem to have favoured the New Party; for while the New Party machine seemed to be on top of the campaign at all times, the Liberal and Conservative organizations moved from blunder to blunder, failing, above all, to recognize the prevailing attitude of the voters in the riding. This was indicative, perhaps, of their failure to have any effective means of determining "grass roots" feeling either in the party or out; or of a failure to have a party sufficiently broadly based to provide such an indication of popular feeling. Yet the Conservative Party is, numerically, the strongest party in the riding.

The Conservative newspaper campaign consisted almost entirely of large advertisements providing biographical information on their candidate, which by the half-way mark in the campaign had reached the point of saturation. Other advertisements and the bulk of the public pronouncements made by both the candidate and those cabinet ministers who appeared on his behalf, were confined primarily to the national successes of the Conservative administration. A classic blunder was perpetrated by the *Peterborough Review*, a weekly newspaper published by the president of the Peterborough Progressive Conservative Association. In the issue published the week before the election a prominent article pointed out that the election of either the Liberal or the New Party candidate would be tantamount to the "kiss of death" for Peterborough, since only a Conservative member would command attention in Ottawa. The others, if successful, would find that the government would turn a deaf ear to their pleas for succour for Peterborough.

The Liberal campaign, despite the wholehearted support of the national executive—if the size and frequency of newspaper advertisements and the appearance of a number of prominent national party figures on the hustings is any indication—was hampered by the poor platform showing of the candidate and by the negative approach of the campaign material. While at first sight one would assume that a negative approach would be the one most likely to capture the protest vote, the Peterborough by-election would seem to indicate the reverse. The refusal of the Liberal candidate to grapple with the issues totally nullified his slogans and did irreparable harm to his campaign. It would seem that the old slogans no longer have a place in the Canadian electoral scene; not, one suspects, because of an increasing awareness on the part of the electorate that they are largely meaningless, but rather because of a jaded appetite for the old-time style of campaign.

In the final weeks of the campaign the Liberal organization wasted much valuable time and energy on a matter that was not, and indeed would never be, an issue in the campaign: the alleged partisan bias on the part of the Board of Broadcast Governors in connection with the use of certain films in the Conservative television campaign. It was a serious error in tactics, for it gave the impression that the Liberals were more interested in opposing the Conservatives than in solving the problems of Peterborough. This approach contrasted with the consistently positive approach of the New Party.

The success of the New Party campaign was obvious, and this despite an inadequate canvassing organization, the inability of the candidate to do any personal canvassing, and a limited budget. By beginning their campaign early in September with a series of educational broadcasts and advertisements, and by organizing labour support at the same time, the New Party effectively met what was expected to be the main point of attack by the other parties: that the candidate was running for a party that did not exist. The party very clearly did exist in Peterborough and gave clear notice that it meant business.¹⁶ According to the candidate, the New Party eschewed slogans and spot announcements and concentrated instead on a “continuous barrage of thought-provoking advertisements and television and radio talks” on the assumption that to be taken seriously they would have to campaign in a serious vein.

While the campaign manager felt that the radio broadcasts were of slight value, he felt that the television appearances were most important. The party also made very effective use of the correspondence columns of the local newspaper with results surprising to themselves and the newspaper itself. The campaign of “letters-to-the-editor” was initiated by supporters of the New Party—but not, it is reported,

by anyone actively or directly involved in the campaign—but once begun it gathered momentum without any further stimulus from the party supporters until at its height the New Party letters were outnumbering the Liberal and Conservative letters by six to one. The *Examiner* commented in mid-October that at that time the number of letters received exceeded the total number of letters received during the 1958 general election. This in itself is an indication of the interest shown in the New Party in an area which had never given more than 2800 votes to a CCF candidate and in which, at the height of the CCF resurgence in 1953, gave that party fewer votes than it ever received before or since.

The conclusions on campaign techniques that can be drawn from this cursory examination of the Peterborough by-election seem fairly obvious. These conclusions and those that follow are all related to the central problem of projecting the right image of the party.

In the first place it is quite clear that care must be taken in the selection of candidates to ensure that they, as persons, will adequately represent the image the party wishes to project. Although this appears too obvious to deserve mention, the Peterborough experience indicates that too little attention was paid to this aspect of the campaign by the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Whether the New Party choice was more the result of luck than of good management is difficult to determine, but even so the fact remains that, however it was made, it was clearly the right choice. How a political party is to find the right candidate is another question, for frequently the problem has not been one of finding the right candidate but one of finding any candidate. The choice of the right candidate—assuming that there are several available—is of much greater importance in a by-election than it is in a general election, where attention is focussed on the leader. And the choice must be consistent with the image that the party is attempting to foster.

In the actual business of campaigning it is also clear that the presence of the candidate in person, assuming that he has been carefully selected, is of inestimable value in propagating the desired and desirable image. His presence at the factory gates and on the public platform, on the door-step or in the living room, brings the election and the campaign into focus for the voter in a manner which cannot be duplicated by any other techniques.

A careful and reasonable newspaper campaign which is based less on the "12-point banner" and more on a thoughtful presentation of issues and proposals would seem to do more to present the image of a positive force than any number of fluorescent pink posters pasted on derelict buildings and shabby hoardings. The corres-

pondence columns deserve attention, for the application of the right sort of stimulus can often provoke a wide discussion of the issues and provide an opportunity for the party to deal with the more specific questions raised by the writers.¹⁷ It would also appear from the Peterborough experience that as an influencing medium television is of far greater importance than radio.

Again it seems too obvious to point out that the candidate who gives careful attention to local issues and local feeling, while showing an awareness of their relation to national problems, is the candidate most likely to succeed in a by-election. The careful cultivation of local sympathies and interests and the consistent linking of local problems to the national and international scene, as contrasted with the impression of indifference to local problems shown in the Conservative campaign, gained much support for the New Party.

It is here that the importance of close contact with that elusive entity "grass roots opinion—or feeling" is seen most clearly. It is of considerable importance in the vital process of establishing and projecting the party image. The Conservative and the Liberal campaigns in the Peterborough by-election give the impression that these two parties were totally unaware of the thoughts and feelings of a large portion of the electorate, that they were out of touch with the very people they were asking to support them. Unquestionably the ossification of party structure that such a disability implies was a cause, in no small measure, of the rapid downfall and deterioration of the Liberal party after the 1958 general election. One could argue that the success of the Conservative party in 1958 was not due to a lesser ossification as much as to the fact that it presented the only acceptable alternative, the CCF image being an essentially negative one as opposed to a positive and constructive image. The success of the New Party in Peterborough was due in part to its success, by dint of careful organization, in assuming the proportions of a movement of positive protest rather than a party of negative protest. It stimulated popular expression of grievances and desires and fed on these throughout the campaign. The ease with which it was able to do this was perhaps the result of its recent establishment in the riding and the consequently close attachment and relationship with that very "grass roots opinion" mentioned above.

It seems extremely important that a party, whether seeking a protest vote or not, establish a firm point of identification not only of policy but of attitude. The current feeling of restlessness in Canadian politics stems from the electorate's increasing awareness of party policy and attitude. As the awareness of party similari-

ties increases, the electorate will tend to turn to that political group which offers not only positive identity but a positive and identifiable attitude toward government.

Although the New Party does not officially exist, it succeeded in establishing itself in the Peterborough area as a distinct and positive political entity. In short it would seem, in by-elections at any rate, that the voter is more inclined to give support to that candidate and that party which presents him with a distinct and positive point of view. This need not be a view consisting of detailed and specific proposals, but it must be more than the too familiar arguments based on the other party's failure to do this or that, or those which consist, in the main, of a catalogue of the party's past virtues. The voter is looking for leadership.

All this is part of the party image. The importance of establishing the party image, and of establishing the right image, cannot be over-emphasized. That the New Party could succeed in Peterborough on a platform based almost exclusively on doctrines and policies espoused by a party which at no time ran better than a poor third in any Peterborough election is sufficient testimony to support this point of view.

The success or failure of the image in its appeal to the electorate will depend upon what the electorate desires in a party image, and in this sense the image of the party must depend to a great extent upon the assessment by the party of the feeling of the times. This assessment can be made with accuracy only if the party is in close and constant contact with its grass roots. It has been suggested that during the Mackenzie King era the image which found acceptance was the managerial image which was later modified by Louis St. Laurent as a paternal-managerial image.¹⁸ It may be assumed that the Progressive Conservative party succeeded in 1958 because the desired image was one of a nation-building leadership as typified in the public personality of the leader, of a positive force in Canadian politics.¹⁹ It can then be inferred, given the continuing debate on the problems of American influence and control, given the current unemployment situation and the general economic "sag", and given the failure of the Conservative government to fulfil the promise of the *Novum Organum* of the 1958 campaign, that the desire for positive direction and leadership has been perpetuated if not aggravated. The success of the New Party in Peterborough would seem to demonstrate that once freed from the "damaging image of a party that is excessively rigid in doctrine, out of date in its . . . economic policies and stultifyingly class conscious",²⁰ it was able, by presenting a new image, to capitalize on this strong desire for positive leadership while still remaining within the radical bounds of Canadian socialism.

The influences cited earlier in this paper played a vital role in the success of the New Party; but the necessary catalyst that unified these influences, and that provided, if you prefer, the spark that fired the enthusiasm of over 46% of the voters, was the *new* image presented by the New Party. It was the image of a positive radicalism that avoided attacking any elements of the social system; instead it emphasized its unity and the interdependence of its elements. It linked together the interests of the worker, the farmer, the small business man with the whole of Peterborough society, and on the larger scale, with the whole of Canadian society. It was a positive programme, for it called for no destruction of existing social structures but rather for the building of new edifices on old foundations. It did not have that aspect, which dogged the CCF, of being the tool of one or two particular "have-not" groups, determined to level social structures. At a time when it would seem that the Canadian electorate still yearns for the realization of that vision of "the true North, strong and free" once offered to them but as yet far from realization, that party will succeed which most effectively provides the image of progress and leadership. Radicalism, if it is given a positive image, may appeal to the Canadian voter as an acceptable alternative to the hesitant liberalism of the Liberal and the Conservative parties.

APPENDIX

Comparison of rural and urban support in Peterborough for the CCF and the New Party:

| | 1957 | 1958 | 1960 |
|--------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| Urban | 1524 | 1479 | 9945 |
| Rural | 363 | 408 | 3263 |
| Totals | <u>1887</u> | <u>1887</u> | <u>13,208</u> |

Party support in Peterborough since 1935:

| | 1935 | 1940* | 1945 | 1949 | 1953 | 1957 | 1958 |
|-------------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Prog. Cons. | 6342 | | 10949 | 10981 | 13206 | 16598 | 19032 |
| Liberal | 8027 | | 8181 | 10738 | 10218 | 8301 | 7254 |
| C.C.F. | 3071 | | 2512 | 2804 | 1747 | 1887 | 1887 |
| | | | | | | | <u>28163</u> |

*No CCF candidate nominated.

CCF strength in the House of Commons:

| | 1935 | 1940 | 1945 | 1949 | 1953 | 1957 | 1958 |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|------|------|------|
| | 7 | 8 | 28 | 13 | 23 | 25 | 8 |

Results of the 1960 by-election in Peterborough:

| | | |
|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|
| New Party | 13208 | (rural: 3263; urban: 9945) |
| Prog. Cons. | 10240 | (rural: 2947; urban: 7293) |
| Liberals | 5393 | (rural: 1502; urban: 3891) |
| | <u>28841</u> | <u>7712</u> <u>21129</u> |

NOTES

1. In the 1958 election there were 26577 voters listed in urban polls and 9639 listed in rural polls. Thus roughly three quarters of the population in the riding is in what are officially classed (by the Chief Electoral Officer) as urban polls.
2. This is necessarily a rough estimate, as the labour markets for which information is available do not correspond to the electoral constituency.
3. *Peterborough Examiner*, October 26, 1960, p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Peterborough Examiner*, October 27, 1960, p. 6.
6. And no doubt partly because the Peterborough CCF was in any case so emaciated as to be almost defunct. At the time of the nominating convention in Peterborough there were five "active" members of the CCF in the area.

7. The New Party lost three of the seven rural polls. One was predominantly Indian, and gratitude for the franchise may have played a part. Another was described by a New Party organizer as consisting "mainly of trappers anyway"; the relationship of the fur trade to the Conservative party escapes me.
8. With one interesting exception; see footnote 13.
9. It is significant to note that all previous CCF candidates had been members of trade unions. The New Party candidate is not; he is, however (or was?) a member of the CCF party.
10. At one meeting the Liberal candidate answered "No comment" to a question about the Newfoundland labour legislation: a suicidal tactic in a strong union centre. Both the Liberal and the Conservative candidates refused to appear before a meeting of the Peterborough Unemployed Workers' Union. The reason for refusal given by the Conservative was that he had not received any information about the Peterborough situation from Ottawa.
11. Over fifty percent of the party funds were raised in this way. The funds raised through the \$1 per member levy by the Steelworkers' local at Outboard Marine and the Machinists at Raybestos Inc. alone amounted to \$1175. The remainder of the campaign fund was made up by donations made at the nominating convention: \$1304 from 200 people; \$300 supplied by the Ontario CCF, plus the \$200 deposit which was returned, and voluntary contributions made by interested persons at the party committee rooms. The campaign cost approximately \$4500.00.
12. See Appendix for previous election results in Peterborough.
13. At the one UEW meeting addressed by the New Party Candidate, his manager felt it imperative that he leave immediately following his address to eescape the obvious question respecting his stand on UEW membership in the CLC. The candidate spoke and escaped.
14. *Peterborough Examiner*, September 2, 1960, p. 4.
15. *Peterborough Examiner*, October 11, 1960, p. 4.
16. Not surprisingly the Liberals still used this criticism, and looked ridiculous as a result.
17. The thoughtful and completely non-partisan reply of the New Party candidate to a letter in the *Examiner* from a young girl, recently turned twenty-one, who was asking for guidance in the selection of a suitable representative undoubtedly gained him and his cause considerable sympathy. I have been assured that it was not a "put-up job". Even if it was, it was a brilliant stratagem.
18. J. M. Beck and D. J. Dooley, "Party Images in Canada", *Queen's Quarterly*, Autumn, 1960.
19. In this respect it is interesting to note the absence in the Conservative Party campaign of any significant or consistent reference to Mr. Diefenbaker.
20. *London Times*, cited in Beck and Dooley, *op. cit.*, p. 432.