THE SUPERSEDEDING OF DEMOCRACY

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I shall eradicate the thousands of years of human domestication. I want to see again in the eyes of youth the gleam of the beast of prey. A youth will grow up before which the world will shrink.

Adolf Hitler

The creaking wheels of history have to be oiled with blood.

Benito Mussolini

Kill and give no quarter ... Kodo, the great ideal of the Japanese nation, is of such substance that it should be spread and expanded all over the world, and every impediment to it brushed aside—even by the sword.

General Araki

During the nightmare of European dictatorships it was often lamented that the moral principles of previous civilization had become obsolete. But over vast areas of Europe the awakening from that nightmare, whatever else its consequence, has not reestablished those moral principles. They are as conspicuously overridden by the Powers "behind the Iron Curtain" as they ever were in Fascist Italy or in Nazi Germany. It was at least candid when those Powers refused to sign the U. N. Declaration of Human Rights, a document pledging fidelity to a moral system for which they had no respect and whose requirements they had no intention of fulfilling.

The term "People's Democracy" is favored in those countries, whose nomenclature as well as their constitutional arrangement comes to them, ready-made, from Moscow. But one looks in vain for the characteristics of genuine democracy in any one of those "Police States". What Hitler and Mussolini formally abolished has there been abolished with equal effectiveness, though with affectation of maintaining the traditional forms. Moreover, just as Fasct and Nazi changes years ago had their admirers abroad, describing them in Mrs. Charles A. Lindbergh's famous phrase as "the Wave of the Future", so too the Communist dictatorship of the present is extolled by foreign admirers as the beginning in Russia of a transformation that must become world-wide. The Dean of Canterbury's effort to show that it is Christianity at length revealed, after long misunderstanding and distortion, must be extremely amusing to the strategists at the

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Kremlin, however useful they find it for propaganda in certain countries.

Exactly as in the days of the acknowledged dictatorships, when Mussolini and Hitler made no such pretence as Stalin still makes under the modest title "Secretary" of his party, it is proclaimed that a "New Order" has come. Mr. John Strachey, whose *Coming Struggle for Power* was a manifesto for what Nietzsche called "transvaluation of the moral values", is but the outspoken representative in England of the purpose to supersede democracy that is hidden by others under the democratic formula. The change, we are constantly warned, must be faced, however reluctantly, by the conservative mind, remembering that no social advance in the past was ever achieved without shock of those wedded to tradition. As this newest of New Orders has such similarity in procedure to others we recall, it may be useful to review some stages of the propagandism that had at least a period of striking success for its now dishonoured predecessors.

I

The displacement of democracy was made in favor of what was called "The Principle of Leadership". *Duce, Fuehrer, Caudillo, Ataturk*, were terms signifying commitment of control to a Leader whom the masses should not criticize but follow.

Mr. Ward Price, who in the heyday of the dictators' power represented the London *Daily Mail* at dictatorial headquarters, disputed the correctness of the common contrast drawn between their systems and democracy. These leaders, he argued, had been chosen in true democratic manner by their respective countries, and invested with powers which the people desired them to exercise. True, those powers were exceptional (as yet) in character and in extent. But it was surely (on democratic principles) for the people of a country to decide, undisturbed by the criticism of any other country, what executive officers it would have and what functions it would entrust to them. Here is a truly remarkable passage, whose surprising character when published by an Englishman was intensified rather than relieved by the experience of the decade that followed:

The world is confronted by a new technique of government.
A great development in political history is going on before our eyes.
We should study it with open mind. The Fascist and Nazi Revolutions are too momentous to be judged with personal bias.
Outside their own countries, the men at the head of these régimes are called "dictators". That term is accurate in the
sense that their authority is supreme and overruling, but it does not mean that Hitler and Mussolini have subjected reluctant and resentful peoples to their will.

They are leaders who rose to supreme authority by embodying the national desire to escape from a condition of inferiority. Their functions are defined by the titles of Fuehrer and Duce which they bear. Both of them have the support and approval of a much greater proportion of their fellow-countrymen than have ever voted for the Government of any democratic State.

They came to power by constitutional methods. Mussolini was invited by the King of Italy to form a Government, and Hitler was appointed to the Chancellorship by the President of the German Republic. Each began his governmental career as the head of a Coalition Ministry. Parliament in each case handed over its controlling power to the organs of Dictatorship. This change of governmental method has expedited action and produced an abundant record of achievement.

This passage was written in 1937. Its sophistry about popular authorization of the dictatorships was like that now used by "fellow-travellers" with the Politburo of the Kremlin in the countries still free. That Mussolini and Hitler had more show than Stalin of being installed by popular vote, is historically clear. One remembers Bertrand Russell's argument at the close of the First World War, that disturbance of the imperial regime of Hohenzollern or Hapsburg would be "undemocratic", because Germany and Austria-Hungary had the sort of government that their people preferred!

Words lose their value for interchange of thought when they cease to bear a uniform, agreed sense. The word "democratic" had designated, by such agreement, that form of governing under which the ruler authorized by "the will of the people" is accountable to the people for his exercise of it. This meant that organs of expression—a Parliament, a Chamber of Deputies, a periodic re-electing or displacing of its official Chief Executive by votes—are available for the people to use. Of such machinery, however, the Fascist and Nazi chiefs prohibited the use, and in like manner its use is now prohibited in the U. S. S. R. To an American, an Englishman, a Frenchman, this is plain from the "single list," of candidates for election with leave only to vote "for" or "against", the absence of anything remotely resembling an "Opposition", the ruthless press censorship, the deterrent perils of even an attempt to hold a free election campaign meeting. Mr. Ward Price's wretched juggle with words, creating and exploiting a verbal confusion, reproduced the practice of the dictatorship

2. G. Ward Price, I Know These Dictators.
which a dozen years ago he undertook to justify. So did the campaign speeches of the 100 Communist candidates, every one of whom in the 1945 election the common sense of the British rejected. To argue that a people can democratically contract itself out of democracy reminds us that once there were speakers and writers not ashamed to argue that a negro might freely contract himself out of freedom. There is no civilized country whose jurisprudence will recognize as valid a negro’s bond by which he has enslaved himself, however “freely” (as in the “confessions” at Communist trials) he may declare his signature to have been written.

What proportion of the Italian or the German people desired at any time to make Mussolini or Hitler an autocrat, no one can say with any confidence; neither Italians nor Germans ever had the opportunity of voting on that matter under such conditions of freedom and safety as were obviously essential to the value of the result. That in Germany even after Hitler came into power there was a very large and formidable dissentient body, was obvious not only from refusal to allow a free vote but from the Gestapo’s action in throwing thousands into concentration camp as “politically unreliable”; the Gestapo might be taken as better judge of such a matter than Mr. Ward Price. That similar dissent existed in Italy, was no less plain from the invocation of German auxiliaries—at a time when Germany had sore need of all her troops for fighting service elsewhere—to act as garrison for Mussolini’s protection in Italian cities. No doubt, as the old saying runs, every nation has the sort of government it deserves, because in the end the people en masse hold decisive power to make and unmake their rulers. Mr. Ward Price’s method of analysis, however, would lead us to the absurd inference from this that every government that has anywhere existed has been a democracy! His autocratic patrons whom he so much admired, and whose gracious letters reproduced in his book showed their appreciation of his propagandist services, perpetrated many a verbal imposture, but none quite so transparent as his.

II

Most effective of the advocates who had the case for dictatorship to commend was Signor Rocco, the Minister of Justice in Mussolini’s regime.

His argument rested upon the assumption that wherever there is democracy, there will be debasement of civic spirit to a
spirit of competitive intrigue among individuals, each plotting for himself. Signor Rocco did not suggest that the individual citizen is at heart purely selfish; on the contrary he depicted the irresistible temptation of an evil form of government as having drawn men, by nature honest and even generous, into the shameful ways of the democratic political game. This game lends itself to the ingenuities of manipulation—as every organizer of “party strength” well knows. By degrees, like other intoxicants, the party-political drug forms a habit, and Signor Rocco appealed to the experience of every election agent in Italy to confirm his dark picture of what actually went on, under the pious formula of “seeking a mandate from the people”. He asked, might not the general approval of Italians that greeted the change from Democracy to the Principle of Leadership have been in truth the expression of an honest man’s desire when at his best to be protected against what he well knows to be himself at his worst. This is the sense in which the dictatorship is represented as an institution set up by the popular will. It is not only possible, every historian of morals and religion knows it as a familiar phenomenon, that men should voluntarily seek to be controlled; especially are they capable of such decision when they act en masse, requiring a sacrifice of individual liberty that each would separately resent but that each accepts as his share in a common self-denial. So understood, the attitude of Italians to their Duce and of Germans to their Fuehrer becomes the service that is perfect freedom. Signor Rocco naturally delighted in such contrasts as that drawn by Rousseau between “the general will” and “the will of all”. Or in the pregnant paradox of Hegel, “The people never knows what it wills.”

More impressive to the general reader than the subtle reflections I have indicated is the account—which, of course, loses nothing in the telling—of how both Italy and Germany, under the parliamentary scheme so popular in Britain and France and the United States, exhibited a degrading blend of feebleness, negligence and corruption. Mussolini’s warning, at his entrance on Government, expressed the distinction in which all “authoritarians” delight. Commonly in their more reflective propagandist publications the dictators—both Fascist and Nazi—emphasized the Principle of Leadership as that further stage of political evolution to which the democratic experiment was a needful preliminary, rendering provisional service and making clear by its very breakdown whither the next stop in progress must lead.

Japan’s contribution to the argument, through such successive
spokesmen as General Araki, Matsuoka, Prince Konnoye, was expended chiefly on showing how the principle should be applied in the relation of State with State. The Constitution of the League of Nations refused to admit any such national leadership, and Japan from the first was plainly impatient at Geneva: impatient of a scheme under which her natural right (arising from her natural superiority) to dominate the Western Pacific was denied. Her later leaders, by whom the more slowly moving Matsuoka and Prince Konnoye were displaced, saw in the turmoil of the European war an opportunity for which they had not before dared to hope and which they could not bear to see pass unused. With a New Order so effectively challenging the democracies in Europe, the time had surely come for an assertion of the same in the East. Hence the famous proposal from Tokyo in the spring of 1941, that there be agreement on a triple world leadership—Japan to dominate the East, the United States to dominate America, Germany to dominate Europe. Of F. D. Roosevelt's reply to the suggestion that Japanese pillaging of China be facilitated by the United States, in consideration of Japanese willingness to facilitate the United States in the pillage of Latin-America, it is sufficient to say that it was worthy of his repute for terse and memorable diplomatic eloquence.

It was plain, however, that there were those even in the democratic States who thought there was much to be said for this account of democracy as "on the wane" and for this expectation that a "higher" sort of government would secure before long a firm hold upon the more enlightened countries. A "Fifth Column" would never have reached such formidable strength—in Norway, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in France—if it had consisted only of traitors whom a foreign enemy could buy. When Major Quisling told Norwegians, or Marcel Deat told Frenchmen, that democracy was obsolete and that a New Order was in sight, it was not the purchasable traitor alone that was moved to assent. What was the determining thought for others?

III

Democratic institutions furnish many opportunities of misuse, and one must expect many a wild venture on the dictatorial alternative when public patience is thus exhausted. The way was prepared for dictators by leaders of democracy turning into a game of selfish craft what had been established as a high public trust. Read again the American and French Declarations, on
THE SUPERSEDING OF DEMOCRACY

which two great enterprises in popular self-government were founded; then reflect on the habitual vote-getting procedure of a French or an American general election! Recall the familiar lament that "The best men won't go into politics"—the best men (so-called) being so intent on some personal ambition to be furthered in business or professional life that the country for which in war they are willing to die is refused their service of brain and character by which peace might be preserved. "Preventive Medicine" for the State demands, first and foremost, a better type of men in parliament, and what our generation has seen is the type growing steadily worse. Doctrinaire enthusiasts for democracy, who assumed that the exquisite machine they had made could be left to run itself, have had a grim awakening. No form of government needs more constant watchfulness, nor could any guess be farther from the truth than that which always seeks explanation of a disappointment in some fault of the democratic form. "What was wrong with French democracy", says the self-satisfied British or American politician, "was its absurd multiplication of parties." He congratulates his own country on the superior wisdom that has kept the two-party limitation, on the whole, so secure in Washington or London. In prescient anxiety over such a mood, G. K. Chesterton warned his countrymen that their relative freedom from the disorders of continental Europe was more an accident for which to be thankful than an achievement of which to boast. No doubt the multiplication of parties in France, as in the German Republic during its short life, was a contributing cause of failure; but this in turn had its source in a selfish preference of private interest over public duty that was not peculiar to politics in France, and that elsewhere found means of crafty intrigue no less dangerous to the State than the kaleidoscopic shifting of a French ministry. One recalls many a sombre reflection recorded in later life by keen British thinkers who had once been democratic enthusiasts. From Jeremy Bentham, for example, to Lord Bryce!

Bentham said of the British parliamentary system that representatives must always be expected to seek their own interest first, and that the problem of democratic constitution-building was thus to contrive means by which public service might be extracted from the jaws of private greed. It was a figure worthy of the founder of British Utilitarianism, and his proposal that constituents should keep constant watch upon the conduct of

M.P.'s, with power to "recall" them for failure in duty, had an unpleasant resemblance to his scheme for a "Panopticon" jail, in which every prisoner would be at all times under the Superintendent's eye. One must not take over-seriously a writer whose gift of mordant satire so often led him into saying much more than he meant. More disturbing to enthusiasm is the sad note that crept in old age into the writings of Lord Bryce:

I am not sufficiently enamoured of my own opinions to seek to propagate them, and have sought to repress the pessimism of experience, for it is not really helpful by way of warning to the younger generation, whatever relief its expression may give to the reminiscences.

And again:

As respects progress in the science and art of free government, experience has established certain principles that were unknown to those who lived under despotism, and has warned us of certain dangers unforeseen by those who first set up free governments. But when it comes to the application of these principles, and the means of escaping these dangers, the faults that belonged to human nature under previous forms of government have reappeared. Some gains there have been, but they have lain more in the way of destroying what was evil than in the creating of what is good: and the belief that the larger the number of those who share in governing, the more there will be of wisdom, of self-control, of a fraternal and peace-loving spirit, has been rudely shattered.

Here is but tepid encouragement, from a veteran democrat!

It should be frankly granted that the democratic system of government is not best for all peoples. It involves certain prerequisites that only certain peoples exhibit, and the effort to establish it—especially as a sudden change—for a different type of people is doomed to disaster. That most liberal of nineteenth century British thinkers, John Stuart Mill, insisted on this, eighty years ago. Representative government, he said, requires a minimum of average intelligence, knowledge, public spirit, and it requires no less vitally the desire to live under such a regime. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, a nation (like a person) unsuited to the responsibilities of self-management had best be under guardianship. It is thus no mere meekness towards other races, no mere selfishness of British, French, Dutch "imperialists", that prompts demur to radiant expectations from recent "democratic"

change in India, in Indo-China, in Indonesia. Germany may well prove unfit by the temperament of her people for the self-governing institutions of Britain and America; the experiment of the Republic of Weimar was not encouraging. Japan's trial of the forms of the West issued before long in the reaction so tragic for the Far East. Not, as in Tsarist Russia, "Dictatorism tempered by Assassination", but Democracy frustrated in the working by frequent military coups d'état was the method of Japanese government for many years. Besides these flagrant and scarcely disputable cases of break-down, there are some on the borderline of fair controversy. Whether Spain, Portugal, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Greece can fulfill the prerequisites for democracy, and should be thought to have temporarily forfeited it only by a disastrous accident, or whether theirs was a fundamental unfitness, may be debated with much persuasive force on either side. The dictators apparently contended that democracy demands from average human nature more than average human nature can anywhere fulfill. This is, however, the old sweeping denunciation of "the people" or "the mob" that a despot always uses in plea for his despotism. It is like the calumniating of the poor, which Bentham called a device of the avaricious to cover "with a varnish of system and reason" their own refusal to help. Far more evidence can be quoted to show that it was the spirit of docile subservience that incapacitated the proletariat of certain countries for a form of government requiring robust individual self-respect. Does this recommend, in their cases, as a second-best resort, that system of "wholesome inequality" that Mussolini demanded for "all mankind"? One is tempted to feel that the dictators' low estimate of the spirit of their own countries was confirmed by such patient tolerance inside Italy and Germany of a regime that the observer outside regarded with loathing and contempt. As the Duce himself remarked, when leaving Austria to her fate in 1938, those without spirit to fight for themselves have small claim that others should intervene on their behalf.

Some States that tried, during a comparatively short period, the democratic system as an experiment showed in very defective degree the familiar talent of a seasoned democracy, such as the British or the American, for union of freedom with order. That even while least mature they could find improvement in such a system as Mussolini and Hitler imposed, one needs no very detailed knowledge of Italian or German qualities to deny with

confidence. That there have been situations in the growth of States when an autocracy or an oligarchy was at least the most desirable transitional regime is plain from the record. What bearing, however, has this upon the contention that democracy, for even those States that have exhibited its most successful working, is a form of government soon to be advantageously superseded? That the movement in Europe initiated when the States-General declared France a Republic a century and a half ago should be regarded as now spent, and that a Higher Order is in sight?

IV

In the circles of *Duce* and *Fuehrer* there was no lack of insight into the spiritual sources from which democracy draws its strength. They knew that methods of violence—the rubber truncheon and the brass knuckle, the Munich Brown House and the Isles of Banishment—would serve but for a time. It had always been so with despots, however they might exploit for a season the opportunity of some special discontent. If the passion of freedom was to be cast out for more than a very brief period, a new passion—not mere forcible restraint of the old—must be invoked. Hence their campaign to re-glorify the State, to provide in it a new object of worship for those whose traditional worship must be banned. None realized better than the dictators how deep is the reverential instinct in man, how intense the longing for some object of devotion higher than the devices that he is conscious of having arranged for his own comfort, how the great religions have been built on just this foundation of faith in what transcends human contrivance and human argument. The recent, and superficially amazing, passage from the "Internationalism" of the Russian revolutionaries in 1917 to the Soviet Imperialism of the present (with new National Anthem displacing the *Internationale*, and Stalin's devout tribute to "great Tsars of the past") exemplifies this common element in all developing dictatorships. Cannot the mystical State be made to furnish the needful postulate of the divine? First, obviously, accounts of the State in more prosaic, makeshift, disparaging terms must be cleared out of the way. Of these, the Rousseau doctrine terms about a "contract" had been, historically, the most seductive. Its fault, in the dictatorial analysis, has been its lowering of the State to the office of a mere agent for preserving and extending "happiness". Happiness, obviously, was the condition of an individual, and for Rousseau the individual was the end, the
State was but a means. It seemed to follow that whatever was disagreeable in the means (for example, the restraint imposed on each person's free choice) should be kept at the minimum adequate for the end. Such bargaining with the State was denounced by a Nazi or a Fascist orator, very much as an English Puritan might have denounced bargaining with God. It is denounced in Moscow now as "Trotskyism" or the sedition of Ukrainian "Kulaks".

To conceive the State as the devout Puritan conceived the Law of God, and a Duce or a Fuehrer as its High Priest, is indeed the mental attitude that "authoritarianism" requires. By the spirit of the French Revolution, ideas the very reverse of this had been spread throughout Europe and even far beyond Europe. It was needful for the dictatorial purpose either to discredit them altogether or to show—after the manner of Mr. Ward Price (whom Mussolini so complimented as a true friend of Fascism)—that in the authoritarian, much more than in the parliamentary, State the "real" or "fundamental" will of the people expresses itself.

Nothing is easier than to exhibit with an emphasis, if not with a fertility of picturesque metaphor, comparable to that of the great anti-democratic satirists from Plato to Thomas Carlyle how the determination of policy by the vote of the whole public may often thwart the true public interest. The demagogue, we were warned in an immortal passage of the Republic, is an artful sophist, but the greatest sophist of all is demos itself, with limitless contrivances for self-sophistication. Counting men's heads in a plebiscite, said an eloquent paragraph in Latter-Day Pamphlets, cannot be expected to disclose any elusive truth about the Universe, unless either the Universe or the heads of men have undergone recently some far-reaching change. But if our records are rich in exposure of the inadequacies of democratic discernment and of the facilities for demagogic imposture, have we so completely forgotten the record of tyrannies as to confer upon a Communist dictator rights that a long succession of despotic predecessors had abused in turn?

The central mystery of this contention about a New Order lies just here. Whence the simple-minded trustfulness with which intelligent people, Italian and German, delivered themselves over to a despotic control that—if we may learn anything at all from such ventures in the past—would in all probability be misused

9. Republic, VI, 492.
on an enormous scale? It was idle to reproach them for their docile submissiveness: with the Gestapo in Germany, and a German Gestapo hired for a like purpose to operate in Italy, there was no hope for revolt by an unarmed population. But that it did not occur in time, to those invited to stretch out their necks for such a halter, that no immediate material advantage could be worth running so deadly a risk—this is the marvel that one proposed explanation after another has but served to deepen. Only to those resolved somehow to justify autocracy can the flippant epigrams about democratic incompetence and corruption serve the purpose for which they are repeated. Every Englishman, every American, every Canadian knows well that the service of his country does not fail to attract—especially at difficult and dangerous times—by the routine process of democratic choice, highly capable and faithful Ministers. At moments of justifiable irritation, because Ministers have failed in something that he thinks should not have been beyond them, or have yielded to some temptation above which he thinks they should have been able to rise, he will characterize them in language of lurid vigor. As he reads the story told by Mr. Hilaire Belloc, even as he reads many a spicy paragraph in Mussolini's Autobiography about the crooked ways of Italian politicians, our English or American or Canadian citizen will exclaim: "That is just the sort of thing I have seen happen—it is the curse of our politics." To suggest, however, that as a remedy one might risk, under grandiose advertising titles such as "The New Order", what was watched in operation during these too many years in Germany, in Italy, in Japan, will appear to the intelligent reader, in countries still free, like a proposal from Bedlam. And he wonders, uneasingly, how Germans, Italians, Japanese came to take that appalling risk, from whose tragic consequence the one hope of their best people was hope for overwhelming defeat of their own country's forces by land, on sea and in the air. In Byron's words, they should surely have known what fruit would spring from such a seed.10 Why did they set it? Or allow it to be set? Because, it may be said, they preferred the thrill of cruelty and class-domiance and the expectation of ever-recurring war to the dull dead-level of peace and equality and mutual considerateness. A Nazi or a Fascist might have said, like the cynic in The Cenci:

I am what men call "hardened"
Which they must be in impudence,
So to revile a man's peculiar taste.

10. Childe Harold, IV.
THE SUPERSEDING OF DEMOCRACY

And although thus temporarily peculiar, it was extolled as the coming taste for progressive people! The "wave of the future" we were told, was bringing in this invasion of old habits of thought, this "transvaluation of values". Concern for personal freedom, love of peace even at sacrifice above war even as gain, enthusiasm for truth and good faith, the sense of personal dignity that will neither exhibit subservience nor exact it—all this was to shrink into the category of vulgar taste, to which a Herren-volk would pay no respect. In these matters the pattern of life would be re-set: what Nietzsche called Neue Moral would come in, under leadership of Germany, Italy and Japan. The more progressive of other countries were expected to follow the example, the less progressive to be disciplined into submission! Corresponding cant about the Communist New Order is, now, amazingly current.

What is to be said about this forecast, that the qualities we have been accustomed to admire as virtuous will lose their appeal? That the wave of the future is to sweep away the disinterested pursuit of truth, which has so far refused all State dictation—Nazi, Fascist or Communist—to the man of science, and will establish in its place an organized propagandism for the beliefs' prescribed by dictatorship after the manner set forth to scientists at the Heidelberg anniversary of 1935? To ask for argument that such predictions are incredible, and that such moral transformations are impossible, is like asking for reasons why mankind should, and probably will, remain rational. There is quotable evidence, alas, for the darker expectation, in the one case as in the other. But not yet enough to make one despair. Still less is there enough to make one content with such despair of solution as if it were cancelling of our problem.

There is indeed charm of its own for certain minds in the conception of superseding the drab monotonous regime under which all men are free and equal, with a regime of tingling excitement, in which a select few direct a multitude no longer free. Particularly when such reformers take for granted their own place in the directing, not the directed class. They enjoy analogies for the human species from the superiority and inferiority of breeding in horses or dogs. The unquestionable fact that some human beings similarly surpass other human beings in natural endowment supplies them with a basis for the pleasant inference that the more highly endowed (among whom they include themselves) should have uncriticized disposal of the life and fortune of the less endowed. Not seldom a quasi-scientific color is given to the argument by appeal to the Evolution of Species. Darwinism was
in high favor, for example in Japan, for the suggestiveness of its account of "Natural Selection" and for the hint so easily drawn from it that the prowess of the Japanese in war showed them thus "selected" by "Nature" to rule other races of the East.

The pseudo-philosophic publications setting forth this "ideology", with varying degrees and types of ingenuity—from Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* to Mrs. Lindbergh's *Wave of the Future*—depend for their effects upon a trick in argument like that of platform conjuring. While the interest of the audience is diverted to something else, furtive substitution is made of one element for another in the material on the platform. In the dialectical showmanship of the publicists from whom I have quoted, the inference at the close has no more than a verbal—though often, for the uncritical reader, a deceptive—resemblance to what the argument really proved. Stress is laid, for example, on the need for an open mind, not merely in dealing with detail but in dealing with fundamental values. We are warned to keep before us the likelihood that great changes in world order must soon be faced, and the certainty that these will at first seem shocking, as change in life's foundations has always seemed to those who had to make it. It is not only a sound, it is also a salutary reflection, but it authorizes no such inference as the one suggested in dictatorial centres of which Moscow is now the chief. This "lesson from the past" that moral shock no less than other kinds of shock must never so alarm us as to make us futile obstructers of a New Order, is there used to procure uncritical acquiescence in whatever wild innovation the physically powerful may prescribe!