
J. A. Appleyard's *Becoming a Reader: The Experience of Fiction from Childhood to Adulthood* offers a developmental model of the reading process, tracing a path of the reading experience from the na"ïve and unreflective engagement of the preschool child to the thoughtful discrimination of the adult. The book consists of five chapters, one on each of Appleyard's posited stages of development: early childhood, later childhood, adolescence, college and beyond, and adulthood. At each stage, Appleyard captures the essences of the reader's psychodynamics so that, for example, the young child reads as "player," the older child as "hero and heroine," the adolescent as "thinker," the university student as "interpreter," and the adult as "pragmatist." Informing this developmental model are various psychological and literary theories in addition to Appleyard's own experience as teacher. Appleyard also proffers evidence from "real" readers: discussions of each stage of the reading process are accompanied by case studies and interviews. Holding together the entire structure of this far-ranging text is Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism*, with Appleyard attaching to four stages of one's reading development analogous literary modes of romance, tragedy, irony and comedy.

The concerns of this book will be most familiar to teachers of literature, whose work in the classroom has become more self-conscious than ever as new theoretical concerns alter the shape of literary studies. Happily, Appleyard is in the "grip" of neither Frye nor anyone else. Like his pragmatically conceived adult reader, Appleyard uses Frye's *Anatomy* because it works. An adherent of no particular theoretical school, Appleyard has read widely among many competing schools of thought, asking questions about the interests, needs, skills, experience, and training
of readers at different stages of life, all this in order to flesh out the hypothetical generic "reader" of current reader-oriented aesthetics. He manages to hold aloft at once a number of theories, examining and extracting the best and most sensible ideas before moving on. Although this excess of enthusiasm never seriously threatens to undermine his argument, it is a point well understood by Appleyard himself, who admits to trying to bring order to the diversity of views among contemporary theorists of reading: "This book, of course, is a sample of the impulse to find a systematic point of view that explains what seems like a mass of confusing evidence culled from the experience of reading and teaching" (152). *Becoming a Reader* is not a reductive analysis and does not strain for a "theory of theories." Appleyard stresses throughout that what one works for are "adequate" judgments and decisions about how we read. His tentative but always persuasive conclusions make his book as impressively modest as it is ambitious.

The young child, Appleyard says, has to learn to distinguish between fictional and pragmatic worlds, to recognize boundaries between them. Such recognition comes from learning the fictional conventions, which, once learned, permit the reader to be both spectator and participant. From the ages of six to twelve, children choose literature that allows them to imagine themselves as characters who, through their competence, solve all problems. These characters are the heroes and heroines of romance, a narrative structure that concretizes but ultimately controls anxiety and danger. The concern of adolescent readers, in the next stage of development, stems from the opposition between the liberating stretch of independence and the limitations imposed by adult society. They want fiction that will allow them to be spectators as well as participants, fiction that will make them think, observe and judge. As participants they want "involvement," chiefly that derived from representative models of possibility for the newly emerging adolescent self. Finally, they want realism, but their idea of the real is likely to be the weeded rather than the weeded garden, a narrative of suffering, even death, approximating the "newfound limits on their idealism" (109). Thus, the literary mode here is tragedy.

For academics, and especially teachers of literature, the most absorbing chapter is the one on the college-age reader. This reader, Appleyard argues, just leaving adolescence, does not actually see the text as text. Rather, the text is "transparent," the words and their arrangement
not yet a concern. The reason for this, Appleyard contends, is that readers come to the university already trained to accept the conventions of realism:

text transparency is not really a more natural way to read than any other, but we have been trained by our early reading to accept the techniques of classical realism as the normal state of things and to process them unconsciously. (129)

The reader at this stage must learn that the text is something constructed by an author, that it is an object "containing the full evidence of its meaning" (129), and that it is "constructed not only by the writer but also by the reader and by all the codes and cultural contexts they both depend on" (129-30). Irony, Appleyard feels, is the attitude most congenial to the university student; in both mental habit and literary form, irony is most compatible with the intellectual disequilibrium of the university experience.

The adult stage of reading, for Appleyard, is characterized by choice. Adults know what to expect from a book and what kind of reading experience they want to have. The comic vision that Appleyard finds most suitable here is a function of the adult's understanding of the contradictions and imperfections of life and the knowledge that one's identity is not simply individual but social. Appleyard also uses comedy to capture the essence of his book:

Comedy reminds us that reading begins as a social activity, as an initiation into a community and into a communal vision of human life and of a world that can be envisioned and reenvisioned by the human imagination, and that a reader changes and develops through a dialectic of self and culture. (190)

In sum, Appleyard has written a solid book, addressing the questions of why and how readers change. It is a response to the need for a developmental view of reading and the absence of any analysis of the "psychological development that readers undergo across the whole life span from a literary point of view" (9). The one genuine soft spot in his argument is the failure to account for the very real differences among readers that derive from factors such as gender, class, and race. Appleyard is aware of the limitations of his argument and understands that his reader
is middle-class and mainstream. There is so much else of value in *Becoming a Reader*, however, that Appleyard’s achievements must be measured in terms of how far he has brought the concept of the reader and not the distance yet to cover.

Saint Mary’s University

Wendy R. Katz


The modern reader of Baudelaire, whether it be of his 1857 *Fleurs du Mal*, the posthumously published prose poems, *Le Spleen de Paris* (referred to by Edward Kaplan as *The Parisian Prowler*, the title of his 1989 translations) the earlier *salons* or even the personal and powerful, though often underprivileged 1887 notebooks, *Fusées* and *Mon coeur mis à nu*, tends, and is strongly encouraged by much contemporary criticism, to give weight to both the poet’s aestheticism and his irony. Thus is it that, at once conceptually and textually, the prestige of the transcendent, autotelic imaginary construct is honored and a poetics and praxis of textual interiority deemed centrally pertinent. What were held to be critical “lines of force” within Baudelaire’s work have thus been held to be disassembled, unknotted, by the deconstructive power of Baudelairian paradox, irony, “satanism” and aesthetic “dandyism.” Multidirectional and unstable irony becomes, in this way, an emblem of existential and literary intransitiveness, impotence, solipsism, or, at best, a sign of our (written or unwritten) multiple networking of irreducible—and, ultimately, unsayable—meanings.

There is much that is important in such perceptions, of course, and Baudelaire is only a central case in point. Yet Kaplan is right, I believe, to endeavor to remind us—cogently, in fine “debate” with fellow Baudelairians, and obeying not only intuition but critical pointers offered by Baudelaire himself—that, if irony, “cruelty,” “satanism” and sheer semantic or allegorical complexity cannot at all be neglected, the fifty prose poems of *Le Spleen de Paris* do retain what he varyingly calls a “unity,” a “stable foundation,” an “armature,” which demand our fuller
appreciation of the full intricacies of the aesthetic, the ethical and the "religious" logics at play—but, let it be stressed, for an ontological purpose: Baudelaire's entire life-project is at stake! Kaplan consequently goes on to unravel those essential ethical impulses of compassion, charity, simple humanity that drive not only much of Baudelaire's writing, but also Verlaine's (did not Oscar Wilde regard him as the greatest modern Christian poet?), Rimbaud's, Jules Laforgue's, Lautréamont's—even Mallarmé's (for anyone who might just have doubts, *Le Tombeau d'Anatole*, first published only in 1961, should dispel them in exemplary fashion). Baudelairian "ethics," of course, deconstructs itself all too easily, we might wish to argue, with much justification, for it points not merely to possibility, justice, love, choice, but equally to blockage, perversion, hasard and so on. But, then, this in itself is instructive, as is the consequent tendency to generate a counter-aestheticism, a movement away from solution-as-art. Kaplan ably demonstrates the pertinence of such shifting focuses. Baudelaire's "spiritual" quest is shown to work through the potential, and the inherent inadequacies, both of literature and moral, ethical "ideology," to a point where neither despair nor faith can satisfy, a point at the "limits of religious thinking," where tensional action and testimony persist as self-contestatory quest in some crucial "reverence for what is."

Edward Kaplan's fine book is, in part, dedicated to Yves Bonnefoy, and it is fitting that his name be evoked here. Few writers have gone as far as this poet in helping us reach for a sense of the profound purpose of art and literature and their essential ontological, spiritual dimension. 

*Dalhousie University* 

Michael Bishop


The writing of history is a discourse. It is a "conversation of a community of intellectuals attempting to trace the historical ascent of the country" (5). It is also, as Taylor illustrates throughout this volume, a conversation between historians and a larger audience seeking information about their
past, affirmation of their identity and a sense of direction for their future. *Promoters, Patriots and Partisans* is a detailed study of the men who wrote the history of their communities, why and how they engaged in these often onerous and controversial endeavors, and what were both the intended results and actual influences of their work on their audience at large.

From the time the first promotional literature about British North America was published, in the mid eighteenth century, the past was consciously used by these amateur historians "to influence the present" and "to shape the future" (7). The earliest promoters, largely military and civil officers—British subjects abroad—wrote to convince Old World readers of the glorious future of their particular colony, while often protecting their own self-interest. Thus, problems of early settlement, past failures of colonial policy and the ignorance and in some cases follies of early colonists were overshadowed in most of these histories by the great potential of the land, and the inevitability of a glorious future.

The writing of those whom Taylor identifies as "patriots"—largely native born historians, of the second and third generation, reflected their somewhat differing attitudes and concerns and the changed political and social circumstances of their home. "Patriot" writers, like Thomas Haliburton or Peter Fisher were determined to defend their homeland, and to illustrate the progress their colony had made and its present civilized state. Maritime patriot historians began to forge a sense of colonial identity, based on the image of the yeoman farmer (which by its very nature excluded Acadian and natives, and ignored politics, class and religious differences). English Canadian patriot historians in Quebec had much more difficulty in asserting the progressive nature of their community. "The tenacity of French Canadians," Taylor writes, "defied all attempts . . . to impose a unifying identity based on the yeoman ideal" (115). Indeed, English-speaking historians of Quebec implicitly had to recognize the "duality" of Canadian history.

Those who Taylor characterizes as the "patriot" historians of Upper Canada had a quite different dilemma. Most of the histories that Taylor considers in "The Reform Challenge in Upper Canada" highlighted the growing dissension over the nature and exercise of colonial policy in the province. It was not until the completion of Lord Durham's report that Upper Canadian historians were able to integrate their stormy political past into the story of the inevitable coming of political reform. "Durham
made of British North American history a progressive battle on behalf of principle" (151). He also was one of the first to begin to fashion a "national" rather than regional, or local historiography.

Despite the writings of John Fennings Taylor and John Mercier McMullen, which extolled the inevitability of Confederation, and its promise for future greatness, Taylor shows that many Maritimers opted out of the "nationalist" school and its vision of the future. They turned, instead, to a "nostalgia for the past" (180) in an attempt to retain their unique identity in the midst of modernization. After 1870, the Maritimers' rejection of the centrist interpretation of "partisans" was paralleled by the emergence of a number of "pessimistic" historians who found the promise of the "patriots" both unrealistic, given the new political scandals and problems, and false.

As Taylor carefully chronicles, the history of English Canadian historiography was "plural not singular" (267). Canadians wrote from their own particular perspective, concentrating on provincial and regional development and not national unity. Even those of the "nationalist" school were merely projecting their local concerns on a broader canvas. And their attempts to assert that Canada was one nation of one people met continuing resistance from those on the periphery.

*Promoters, Patriots and Partisans* is more than just a study of the historiography of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Canada. Among other things, Taylor considers not only the question these amateur historians asked, but also how they carefully selected sources to support a particular point of view. Perhaps two of the best examples of this are the writing and impact of Longfellow's *Evangeline*, and the ongoing debate surrounding Henry Morgan's *Sketches of Celebrated Canadians*.

Ironically, Taylor too has been forced to be selective in his history. By his very organization, Taylor is forced to limit his discussion of "promoters" to those eighteenth-century historians of the Maritimes. As a result, those English born Upper Canadians like William Smith, and Lieutenant Governor Gore who might be classified as "promoters" are considered within a general discussion of Upper Canadian patriot historians. Moreover, Taylor fails to even consider those native Upper Canadians—Ryerson, Canniff and others—who, like their Maritime cousins consciously wrote as patriots, to illustrate the emergence of a unique Upper Canadian identity and the significance of particularly the War of 1812 on the future of the colony. By perhaps tightening some of
the detailed analysis presented, and attempting to break away from the strictly chronological presentation, some of the links over time and locality could have been explored.

Of greater concern is that though Taylor is aware that all these authors "did not operate in an intellectual vacuum" (6), the cultural and intellectual influences on their work are never really explored. Certainly, Taylor does provide the reader with, in some cases considerable personal background on the authors in question, which help explain the limitations of their work. But there is no real attempt to place these men and their writing into a wider context, of the changing intellectual Anglo-American world.

Despite these deficiencies, Promoters, Patriots and Partisans is an important addition to our understanding of intellectual development of our own past. It also raises a number of questions about the writing of history which are forever current.

Royal Military College of Canada

Jane Errington


Yves Gingras is a Professor in the Departement d'histoire, Universite du Quebec a Montreal who has written a history of the development of Canadian physics as a discipline from its origins in the mid nineteenth century to the 1950s. Professor Gingras's book, the first of its kind, is based entirely on a detailed and careful scholarly study of the extensive set of available relevant documents. He chose to study physics because physicists constituted the first scientific community in Canada.

Postsecondary education in Canada until the late nineteenth century consisted largely of undergraduate instruction in the humanities and theology, provided by a few small colleges. Some of these colleges also trained students in law and medicine. Instruction in the sciences was provided in the classroom by men who did no original research and were unable to offer laboratory experience to their students. There were neither government nor industrial research laboratories.
Then the development of Canadian industry stimulated the establishment of engineering faculties which in turn demanded the teaching of physics, chemistry and mathematics. In Canada, "research in physics was a practice imported from Europe by J. J. MacKenzie and J. G. MacGregor at Dalhousie University in the late 1870s and, twenty years later, by H. L. Callendar at McGill." At the turn of the century, McGill took the lead in Canadian physics, due first to the remarkably generous financial support of the tobacco magnate William C. Macdonald and second to the appointment as Professor (1898-1907) of young Ernest Rutherford, who introduced research in the exciting new field of radioactivity, for which research he was awarded the 1908 Nobel Prize in Physics. Under Professor J. C. McLennan's leadership the University of Toronto became, after Word War I, Canada's top ranking institution in physics research. Until after Word War II only nine Canadian universities were active in scientific research and graduate studies.

Professor Gingras's thesis is that a national community in a scientific field emerges in three distinct phases. First is the emergence of research practice, as sketched above for physics in Canada. The second phase is the institutionalization of research. The third phase is the formation of a social identity, either disciplinary or professional.

The Royal Society of Canada was founded in 1882 "to promote learning in the Arts, Letters and Science." The First World War gave scientific research national importance and led to the creation, in 1916, of the National Research Council (NRC) to co-ordinate and support both academic and industrial research. The NRC quickly set up a critically important system of research grants for university faculty and scholarships for graduate students. In 1929, the NRC created another vital institution, the Canadian Journal of Research. The new journal quickly became successful, and now the NRC publishes thirteen separate Canadian journals of research, including the Canadian Journal of Physics, all with international reputations.

To complete Gingras's phase three, Canadian physicists had to establish a national society or association to provide the community members with a collective voice and a variety of services as individual members. At the end of World War II there were two distinct groups of physicists in Canada: the industrial physicists, who wished to create a professional association to provide themselves with power and influence comparable to that wielded by their engineer colleagues, and the
academic physicists, who sought the creation of a society with the apparently loftier aim of fostering the discipline of physics. At first the industrial physicists prevailed and the Canadian Association of Professional Physicists (CAPP) was founded in 1945. However, CAPP failed to gain the legal professional status it sought, the academic physicists gained the upper hand, and in 1951 CAPP was given new discipline-oriented goals and renamed the Canadian Association of Physicists (CAP).

Professor Gingras's book belongs on the shelves of anyone interested in the early history of science in Canada. However, physics in Canada continued to evolve in important ways after 1951. The first of thirteen subject divisions of CAP was formed in 1955, the first CAP summer school took place in 1957, the CAP national office was established in 1969 and only during the last few years have women been entering the physics field in Canada in significant numbers. I hope Professor Gingras will write, eventually, a second volume on physics in Canada from 1951 to 2001.

*Dalhousie University*  
*Donald Betts*


Much philosophy and literary criticism in our day reflects an interpretation of Nietzsche which has been dominant in France in recent decades. This interpretation emphasizes Nietzsche's sense of the contingent conditions of reason, and his affirmation of those conditions even at their most arbitrary. Reason is seen as a mask for an imposition of power, or perhaps as the play of contradictory drives and desires. But in either case reason and its world both alike are lost, and the only thing left to affirm is the endless freedom of the soul. This is Nietzsche's vision as interpreted by authors as different from one another as Derrida and Foucault. There is, however, a deeper and more interesting side to Nietzsche, and this has to do with his insistence that the freedom and power of the soul have a continuing relation to what is rational, ordered, and unambiguous.
Leslie Thiele, a political philosopher teaching at Swarthmore College in the United States, goes some way toward correcting this imbalance in recent Nietzsche scholarship. He sees in Nietzsche's affirmation of an indeterminate freedom the possibility not only of formless free play, but of a more concrete sense of reason and discipline. Nietzsche's ultimate insight, according to Thiele, is not merely that the traditional hierarchies between reason and instinct, art and life, history and politics, and so on, involve repression and must be dissolved, but that the undervalued terms of these hierarchies can only be willed in relation to, or as another form of, the "higher" ones. Thus, for example, all instincts in Nietzsche's view are rational, or rather reason is the relation of contradictory instincts to one another. "A tensioned order is the goal," Thiele comments, "and to this end leadership is found indispensable. In the soul, no less than in art, in ethics, and in politics, *laisser aller* is a mark of decadence and a recipe for dissipation" (63).

This ambition to master chaos is what Thiele calls a "politics of the soul." His book is an account of the various incarnations and ideals of Nietzsche's "heroic individualism," an explanation of this complex thinker's life as a philosopher, artist, saint, educator and solitary. It turns out, however, that Nietzsche stands beyond these ideals even as he reached for them. The famous "overman" (*übermenschen*) Thiele sees as something approximating divine self-affirmation, but

the higher man is no god. As long as he remains a suffering mortal, as long as his apotheosis remains limited to the elusive and illusionary Dionysian moment, he remains imperfect, a nongod, man. (192)

The overman is forever struggling to pass from the imperfect finite self-consciousness to the perfect infinity of lived experience.

A deep problem arises when Thiele insists that this struggle should not be confused with "historicism" and "relativism," but then admits that Nietzsche's attempt to escape these "nihilistic forces" was "tragic" (219). This would not be the result if anything in Nietzsche allowed us to reconcile lived experience with self-consciousness. But Thiele argues that the ideal of the overman makes any such reconciliation impossible. What else does this mean but that Nietzsche's ideal is the dissolution of the given rational world into the infinitely open experience of the soul? But then reason and its world have no truth from the standpoint of
Nietzsche’s self-contemplation, his self-affirmation, and thus we have "nihilism."

Thiele for his part seems to think that Nietzsche’s loss of "skeptical probity" (225) was inevitable. Far from being on both sides of every hierarchy, Nietzsche was torn apart by the opposition between finite and infinite, reason and instinct, humanity and divinity. Thiele immediately concludes that between Nietzsche’s ideal and the reality of reason and law there is an unbridgeable gulf. But does this not abandon Nietzsche to the unrealizable ideal of the aesthetic construction of the soul as a work of art? This is a disappointing conclusion to a book which endeavors to say something more about Nietzsche’s work than that it celebrates the freedom and power of the self. If Thiele were less concerned with the various stages of Nietzsche’s life and more mindful of his subject’s broader philosophical context, he might have explored farther the difficulty of connecting the notion of an utterly self-related freedom to other notions of political and philosophical thought that Nietzsche felt constrained to keep. We still await a commentary which will move from abstract conceptions of traditional hierarchies to a more concrete sense of how Nietzsche’s work is related to the past, so that we might understand where the notion of a pure untrammeled freedom comes from, and why this freedom is inextricably bound up with the rational constraints it wishes so fervently to undo.

University of King’s College

Kenneth Kierans


In 1888 Henry James wrote: "I delight in a palpable visitable past. . . ." A Place in History is an invitation to enter a past we can touch with our eyes. The book is the result of a recent exhibition celebrating twenty years of acquiring documentary art by the National Archives of Canada. It comes at a very interesting time.

The last twenty years in Canada have witnessed an unprecedented diversification of approaches to our country’s history. William Acheson has noted that the 1960s were "a period of discontinuity." The decade
saw the importation of European methods, subjects and themes which were used to question the work of earlier generations of historians. The application of "scientific" methodologies, borrowed from such disciplines as economics and sociology, gave rise to an attitude that was essentially modern; one that came to dominate not only academic research in the 1970s, but also to have a significant impact on public history as well. And this "new history" found popular forms in the alternate collective plays of the 1970s, as well as in historic parks that emphasized the everyday life of settler and soldier. Yet, this growing historicism in Canadian life also spawned a popular history industry (the Berton/Newman phenomenon, for example) which turned back to the heroic and literary stances that were dismissed in the 1960s. Further, writers such as Atwood, Findley, Gibson and Ondaatje formulated yet other approaches to the past that had in them an anti-modernist impulse that has come to be identified as postmodern. The most fascinating paradox here is that historicism itself is one of the cornerstones of the postmodern.

The acquisition policies of the National Archives of Canada must, of necessity, have been influenced by this variety of attitudes to the past during the last twenty years. In his introduction to the book, Jim Burant discusses the recent history of these policies. He acknowledges that "a broad definition of 'documentary' has been essential in order to respond to the requirements of changing historical trends. . . ." As well as this, specific developments, such as the proclamation of the Cultural Property Export and Import Act in 1977, have enabled the National Archives to repatriate works of art. A substantial portion of the works in this book were acquired after the passage of this legislation.

A Place in History presents its selections in four subject/chronological divisions. The first covers interpretations of aboriginal peoples from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and is of particular interest in a period of rising attention to this subject by academic historians, material historians and anthropologists. The second section, "Artists in a New Land," highlights the work of amateur artists, many of them soldiers or women. The images consist primarily of views of expeditions, settlements, economic activity, entertainments and domestic life—subjects of interest to social historians of the nineteenth century. The third section contains portraits. While seeming, perhaps, the most traditional form of documentary art in the book, this section is a useful source for historians of costume and literary historians who will find here a portrait of Frances
Brooke, the author of the first Canadian novel, and of Major John Norton, the model for Richardson's *Wacousta*. This section contains the work of professional artists as does the final section, "Art as a Record of the Twentieth Century," where the work of commercial artists as well as fine artists is featured. Subjects from labor to political history are illustrated here.

If *A Place in History* documents "how we have seen ourselves over three centuries . . .", it also documents how changes in attitudes towards the study of history in the last two decades, and the resulting preoccupation with the past, have enabled the National Archives to expand, and perhaps to define, its documentary art collection. This growth of public concern has inevitably led to controversy, some rooted in the debates of the 1960s, but expanded and more public in the 1990s. The recent furor over the Royal Ontario Museum's exhibition *Into the Heart of Africa* (1989/90) prompted curator Jeanne Cannizzo to defend her strategies in presenting the way we view the past. The notion of shared participation by producer and consumer of history—one which began to surface in the seventies, for example, in the theatre—is essentially a postmodernist stance. This approach is shared by writers of fiction who persuade the reader to produce the synthesis suggested in their work. Even an academic historian such as Morris Edstein, in his book *Rites of Spring* (1989), has challenged boundaries of form to a degree that makes his work acceptable only if understood as postmodern. Yet, in visual art, the trick of drawing the viewer into the frame is an old one. As we exchange wistful glances with Frances Brooke during our tour of *A Place in History*, we realize that the visitable past, which increasingly surrounds us, is still a comfortable place in which to seek to adventure.

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