It has become curiously common for Shakespearian critics in the '70s not only to reprove, courteously or otherwise, their fellows for misplaced emphases or misinterpretations, but to ponder the insufficiency of the intellectual concepts and critical epistemology with which we all struggle to express the greatness of Shakespeare. Such stirrings about our basic methodology may be of unusual interest. Looking back over the past century, we see that every thirty years or so such breast-beating seems to occur, and it coincides with, or helps to produce (the status of historical causality is not meant to be in question here) some major redirection of understanding and interpretation. The work of a Bradley or a Wilson Knight come to provide a paradigm in relation to which readers and critics of the next generation must define their own responses. As we look back we can see criticism both growing from a particular historical matrix and doing so with unusual self-consciousness. In the past ten years, the cries for or the signs of a new Shakespeare criticism for our time have increased in intensity. But perhaps because like everything else, from moral systems to fashions in rock music, Shakespearian criticism in the seventies is irredeemably pluralistic, we have not produced anything as definitive as Shakespearian Tragedy or The Wheel of Fire. Indeed, many recent books and essays could equally well have been written under the tutelage of Bradley or Wilson Knight, nostalgia again being a ubiquitous fashion of our era—and along with nostalgia a loud clamoring for a return to what a recent commission appointed by one national association of English professors unabashedly termed the state of things "many years ago". Hence, for instance, although a collection of essays by the distinguished scholar Madeleine Doran comes as a welcome reminder of her dedicated and deeply felt engagement to Shakespeare, it is essentially retrospective, an exercise in civilised nostalgia, and hardly a pointer towards a Shakespearian criticism of our time. As Mark Rose puts it in a recent review, such studies make us uncomfortably aware that while our sense of reality has drastically altered,
most of our critical assumptions have remained static. "Positivistic historical and New Critical studies still appear daily," he bewails, "and the ennui they spread may result not so much from the feeling that it has all been said before—repetition has its pleasures—as from the sense of irrelevance: this kind of work no longer speaks to our sense of truth."

Yet criticism generally is unquestionably in an unusual state of ferment. Perhaps Shakespearians have largely sealed themselves off from many of the methodological revolutions of the past thirty years in sociology, psycholinguistics, or philosophy, but slowly the conflict and stimulus generated by our age's new intellectual paradigms are percolating into Shakespearian criticism. "For centuries," as Alan C. Dessen puts it, "the plays of Shakespeare have functioned as a Rorschach text wherein individuals and even entire cultures consciously or unconsciously have discovered themselves." We should expect, therefore, to see reflected something of our ontological insecurities, our flight from history, our nostalgia, our cultural pluralism, and—to take specific examples from criticism—our concern with the interrelations of language and reality, the status of language itself, and perhaps most pervasively, the omnipresence of the subjective, what variously has been termed the-reader-in-the poem, the implied reader, or audience-response criticism.

To survey a batch of recent Shakespearian studies is, interestingly, to find timid but nonetheless real echoes of such concerns. To explain why Shakespearian criticism should be so retrograde is a more difficult matter. Stanley Eugene Fish's Surprised by Sin: the Reader in Paradise Lost was published in 1967; in the past ten years, nothing has so challenged Shakespearian studies as Fish's book and subsequent works by Fish, Harold Bloom, or Paul de Man did Seventeenth-century or Romantic criticism. The important new journals of the past decade (such as New Literary History, started in 1969, or Critical Inquiry, started in 1974), have so far made little impact on Shakespearians generally. With few exceptions, discussions of developing, current, or future possibilities in Shakespearian research or criticism are timid, repetitive, and depressed. There is nothing in the theory of Shakespearian criticism to match even so conservative a piece of fictional theory as Wolfgang Iser's The Implied Reader (1974; first published in German 1972). We might smugly say, simply, that Shakespeare resists critical fads and we should just be content, as T.S. Eliot put it, with occasionally changing the ways we are wrong about Shakespeare. But my point is precisely this: that
although Shakespearian criticism changes more slowly, less self-consciously and above all, less self-critically, there are indeed signs of a revolution.

A number of studies under review continue (somewhat tiredly and a little tiresomely) in the tradition of intellectual history derived from Lovejoy, Tillyard and Spencer in the thirties and forties. Robert G. Hunter examines the impact of Reformation theology on Shakespeare's tragedies, in order to consider "the drama as a result of Protestantism." A "necessary (though far from sufficient) cause for the ability of Elizabethans to write great tragedy," he argues, "was the impact on their minds of some of the more striking ideas of the Protestant Reformation." The crucial phrase is "impact on their minds." Too often—and this was true of both the Elizabethan World Picture and The Great Chain of Being—ideas have been treated as somehow separable from the minds that received, understood, or misunderstood them and passed them on. Hunter's book is unfortunately an example. His selection of texts is simply placed side by side with a reductive body of ideas, and he never raises the question of why or how certain ideas or groups of ideas become transmuted into the living fabric of drama. The power or "impact" of certain ideas, and the feelings associated with them, are what matters, not just the ideas in themselves. Intellectual historians tend to ignore that it is the incoherence or discontinuity of ideas that may make them urgent or attractive to a dramatist, a poet, indeed any ordinary person, not necessarily their coherence. Eric Fromm notes that "the influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the extent to which it appeals to the psychic needs in the character structure of those to whom it is addressed. Only if the idea answers powerful psychological needs of certain groups will it become a potent force in history". To insist, as Harold Skulsky does in another similarly-based study, on the "cognitive dimension" of ideas alone is to ignore the ways ideas are understood (or misunderstood) by the minds that receive them. It is also to ignore much that has happened in the understanding of history in the past century. Traditional intellectual history is based on the rationalist view of history as an object-in-the-world accessible to rational investigation, control, and causal explanation. One of the crucial intellectual revolutions overlooked by too many literary historians is the awareness of the perspectival nature of the historical process. As E.H. Carr observed, "the questions we ask, and therefore the answers we obtain, are prompted . . . by our values, i.e. by the categories through which we approach the facts." Collingwood, Croce, Ricoeur, Carr—indeed representatives
of diverse traditions of historiography—have revolutionized our understanding of history in the past century; yet the dimensions of intersubjectivity—between text and world-view, reader and text—are still too often glossed over by literary historians. Certainly, subjectivity of a kind is responsible for some of the more bizarre historicist interpretations in recent Shakespearian criticism, such as those of Frances A. Yates, who sees Shakespeare's late plays as propaganda for Rosicrucianism. In her book, not only are dates and other factual evidence confused or conveniently forgotten, but her argument depends on a virtual identification of analogy, possible influence, and provable connection. Of course, analogies between writers may often be more significant than direct influences. It is important, however, not to confuse the two.

A continuing weakness of studies of Shakespeare's so-called intellectual background, then, is an avoidance of the subjective reception of ideas. It is a weakness shared by a similarly reputable tradition of scholarship, the analysis of structure and theme, whether of the traditional thematic critics or studies of the neo-Aristotelian variety, such as Robert Y. Turner's recent book, which analyses the rhetorical techniques of Shakespeare's early plays without seriously raising the question of the effects of the patterns he isolates; even Leo Salingar's massive, indeed magisterial, study of the sources of Shakespeare's comedies, presents a Shakespeare who is a cultivated, knowledgeable craftsman, and yet one who lacks a deeply rooted, finally subjective, reason for his choices of form, theme or structural model. A study of sources and analogues as valuable as Salingar's certainly needs, ultimately, to be complemented by an intense awareness that style and form are ways not merely of organizing language but of embodying and calling forth the experience of the writer and his audience.

Something more promising is found in Richard Fly's concentrated study of what he terms "Shakespeare's repeated encounters with a medium that he perceives as capable, on occasion, of resisting his creative aspirations". He discusses Shakespeare's awareness of his "limiting medium" in a number of plays, arguing that "the well-intentioned traditional view of Shakespeare's artistry needs to be qualified by a more dynamic sense of his ceaseless engagement with his medium's expressive potential". Fly's emphasis on the "expressive in drama" points towards an increasingly fashionable critical concern with the critical use of theatrical experience, of which more later.
Probably the most influential book on Shakespeare in the past twenty years has been Jan Kott's *Shakespeare our Contemporary*. It is a measure of both Kott's development and perhaps a changed decade that his latest essay speaks more of *our* becoming Shakespeare's contemporary, but the trend his book embodied continues strongly. Wylie Sypher's study is a suggestive example. "Shakespeare's overwhelming comprehension makes him abidingly modern," he argues, "capable of perpetual resurrection in light of what we may increasingly 'know'." Sypher provides suggestive readings, in particular, of psychic discontinuity in *Hamlet*, of pathological expectation in *Macbeth*, and of entropic movement in *King Lear*. He brings art history, information theory, modern physics, Bergsonian psychology and Heideggerian philosophy to bear on the plays, and the results are always stimulating, if sometimes bizarre. Some years ago Wilbur Sanders reminded us that "material drawn from the dramatist's own culture has no more intrinsic claim to be regarded as relevant than material from our own, or some earlier culture... because what has to be established in each case is a mutually illuminating congruence of thought." Part of what we mean by genius is a quality of insight which gives precise meaning to feelings and ideas and their interconnections which may only be dimly perceived by contemporaries. We make ourselves most Shakespeare's contemporary, as the current phrase seems to have it, by paying close attention to the dynamics of our own era.

A number of recent studies attempts to combine aspects of traditional literary history with contemporary modes of thought. Giorgio Melchiori brings a stimulating combination of philological and sociological methods to the Sonnets, employing a number of highly formalized and quantifying techniques thereby hoping to provide "an effective antidote to the still flourishing tendency to read (the sonnets) as confessional and autobiographical poems." He combines some rigorous analysis of rhetorical and linguistic minutiae—grammatical functions, pronouns, connotations, for instance—with some speculative neo-Marxist economic theory. If his combination of extremes does not always work, his book is nevertheless perplexing and stimulating in its methodology and in its courteous impatience with the provinciality of so much native English criticism of Shakespeare. Michael Long also tries to link contemporary anthropological and metaphysical speculation with formal and thematic analysis. The most interesting aspect of his approach is his depiction of tragedy in terms of comic structure, but unfortunately much of his analysis becomes as reductive and, indeed, moralistic as the
traditional critics about whose views he expresses scepticism. He speaks at times of "Shakespeare's 'under-view' of the human world," a phrase that might have led him to, or might indeed be derived from, Raymond Williams' concern with "structures of feeling," but with the sometimes suggestive but often irritating dilettantism of what Terry Eagleton (another of Williams' Cambridge pupils) calls leftwing Leavisism, Long never really develops such hints with any depth or seriousness.9

Alan Dessen's book adds a third ingredient to traditional literary history and contemporary modes of thought, one that has probably become the most fashionable in the seventies, the test of the theatrical experience. A traditional hostility between Shakespeare-in-the-theatre and Shakespeare-in-the-study has often distorted our criticism. Notable exceptions exist, of course, such as the fruitful interaction of Cambridge-trained directors and the RSC at Stratford-upon-Avon, or the diverse theatrical-academic establishment at Canada's Stratford, in Ontario. Dessen tries to bring together what he terms "diverse constituencies"—the historians, the critics, the directors. Without "disparaging historian, critic, or director," he goes on, "I suggest that all three angles of vision are equally important." He attempts a difficult but valuable task in reconstructing the Jacobean theatrical experience of Shakespeare and points out how evocation—what Sidney termed "moving"—seems to have been primary. Tackling the traditional New Critical-Scrutiny approach of brooding over repeated images and metaphorical minutiae, he asks, pertinently, that we examine the extent to which such details are actually operative in performance. Quoting Kenneth Burke to good effect, he suggests that "we should watch for 'critical points' within the work, as well as at beginnings and endings. There are often 'watershed moments,' changes of slope, where some new quality enters." Unfortunately, Dessen's methodology is not given rigorous enough testing; his book meanders into a series of minor plays where his arguments about the affectivity of Elizabethan theatre is well proven, but where the greatness of Shakespeare's manipulation of his audience's response is unaccounted for.

Earlier in the present decade, Michael Goldman made one of the first attempts at such a task. In Shakespeare and the Energies of Drama (1972), he announced that the critic should "seek a meaning for each play in the human significance of our response as audience, in the life it awakens us to, the awareness it builds upon." Goldman was one of the first contemporary Shakespearian critics to respond, however tentatively and without apparent awareness of the source, to the European
hermeneutical phenomenologists’ emphasis on what Paul Ricoeur terms “the here of my body.” “Above all,” Goldman argues, in dramatic experience, “there is a unique focus on the body. The play may rise in Shakespeare’s imagination and come home to our own, but it takes place between two sets of bodies, ours and the actors”. A play happens “between actor and audience.” A number of critical and, indeed, philosophical questions are skimmed over here. Goldman is aware of some when he qualifies his notion of the awareness of the body: “I do not mean something distinct from mind. Our heightened bodily awareness in the theater includes all our modes of consciousness. It is an awareness of the self in its fullest presence.”

Yet, as so often happens with the most promising of critical theories, inherent in the application of Goldman’s approach is not only a narrowness in his readings of the plays—his treatment of the romances is especially thin—but he too often takes refuge in reductionist “thematic” criticism unjustifiably narrower than the implications of his methodology would allow. More recently, addressing the 1976 World Shakespeare Congress, he took his analysis further, albeit in one particular direction. Looking at the plays as “compositions in the medium of acting” he pointed to the particular dramaturgical techniques employed by Shakespeare to draw out audience-response. He comments, in passing, that he sees now how the methodology of his earlier book might be extended—and four years after Shakespeare and the Energies of Drama (although paying such scant reference to it to suggest an unfortunate delay in publication), has appeared E.A.J. Honigmann’s study of seven tragedies in the light of “the dramatist’s manipulation of response”.

Honigmann’s book starts by somewhat timidly pointing to the new movement in Shakespearian criticism. He too attempts to “study the dramatist’s technical skills in guiding audience response,” and he brings a richness of expertise in textual editing and close, formal analysis to his awareness that “Shakespeare gave his unremitting attention to audience-response” in the making of his plays. Honigmann, too, seems concerned (without acknowledging or perhaps being aware of theoretical treatments of the subject) with the importance of subjective response not merely as the starting-point for understanding but as the act of understanding itself. He dismisses the traditionally static notion of character, pointing out how the plays are built on “fluctuations of feeling” within the audience, and that Shakespeare “often used impressionistic devices that leave the spectator in uncertainties.” He offers readings of the tragedies which draw out, suggestively, tactfully, elements of the audience’s involvement with the play—and yet, astounding—
ingly (almost as if unwilling to shake off the last vestiges of rationalist objectivity) he apologizes to his readers for what is clearly (and perhaps more than he acknowledges) the strength and innovation of his approach—that "a subjective note will sometimes intrude."

Barbara Mowat's study of the romances also successfully, but even more tentatively, voices a concern with our experience of the text. She takes up Philip Edwards' well-known challenge to critics to account for the miraculous ways the romances work upon their audience's sensibilities, and sensibly avoiding thematic reductiveness—"these plays say too much, too complexly, ever to submit gracefully to restatement"—she also turns to Kenneth Burke, and discusses the way the choice of literary form controls audience response. Shakespeare, she argues, carefully controls the engagement of his audience by a blend of comic and tragic forms, elements, and motifs, and she examines a number of the structural devices of the romance form. Like Goldman and Honigmann, she recognizes the affective dimension of the plays without allowing her concern to become explicit.

Slowly, belatedly, then, the ferment in criticism and critical theory that has motivated much of the most stimulating recent work on literature and linguistic structures has modestly poked its head over the fortress to gaze at the protected courts of Shakespeare. What David Bleich calls "the subjective paradigm" has clawed its way up the wall. The cultural pluralism of our time is about to invade.

In a 1976 article in New Literary History, which is itself both sign and signified of the new wave, Bleich pointed to subjectivity as a fundamental aspect of the modern sensibility in a host of different fields. He instances Einstein and Bohr, Freud and I.A. Richards; one might add Croce in historiography, Tillich in theology, Merleau-Ponty or Ricoeur in philosophy, or Werner Pelz in sociology. The works of these, and others, are not passing fads—they point to something deepseated in the contemporary model of reality, to a clearing of "linguistic debris" of older, awkward models of our contemporary universe, and the adoption of the perspectival and relativistic as inherent in the nature of our experience. While, as Norman Holland puts it "many, perhaps most, literary critics clutch the old paradigm like a security cloth," gradually the new subjectivity has invaded criticism in the way that philosophy, psychology, linguistics, or sociology have been invaded. Traditionally, indeed comfortingly, described as a "humanistic" discipline, literary criticism is increasingly depicted as one of the hermeneutical disciplines, where objective knowledge is eschewed, and where the concern is with "knowledge by means of interpretation after the fact . . . the truth-value
of which is decided upon by the users of the language" and which rests upon the inseparability of knowledge and know, perception and perceiver. 15 "The thing which differentiates every enquiry about man from other types of rigorous questions is precisely the privileged fact that human reality is ourselves," in Sartre's words. 16 Each work of literature, like a biblical text, becomes an infinite and changing demand upon its audience, "an infinite demand," as Dufrenne puts it, "which wants a finite realization and which is realized each time the work is present for us." We bring to each encounter with a text a set of ever-changing horizons which overlap with the text's, and the essential critical task becomes not to "recover" the lost intention of its author or its first audience, but rather "to display before the text the 'world' which it opens and discloses." Goldman's emphasis on the theatre's relationship between "two sets of bodies" is a timid (or coincidental) reflection of Ricoeur's and Dufrenne's emphasis that our perceptions are apprehended in le corps vécu, the lived body, and that our aesthetic perceptions are largely responses to the aesthetic object's "ability to seduce the body." 18

Wolfgang Iser poses a crucial question to critics, readers, and spectators who try to establish definitive, intentionalist meanings. "If it were really true," he asks, "that the meaning is concealed within a text itself, one cannot help wondering why texts should indulge in such a 'hide-and-seek' with their interpreters; and even more puzzling, why the meaning, once it has been found, should then change again, even though the letters, words and sentences of the text remain the same." Clearly, as Iser and others have shown, meanings in prose fiction are not "concealed" within a text, but "generated in the act of reading." So much more is it the case with drama—with a literary structure designed, primarily, for acting out on a stage and within a spectator's experience. "Interpretation," writes Dwight Culler, "is not a matter of recovering some meaning that lies behind the work and serves as a centre governing its structure; it is rather an attempt to participate in and observe the play of possible meanings to which the text gives access." With Shakespeare, more than prose fiction, one would have thought that criticism long ago would have seen meaning as primarily arising in the encounter between reader and text—and have faced the central problems of affective criticism generally, such as how a work can have "a variety of meanings but not just any meaning whatsoever," as Culler puts it. Frank Kermode has noted that over the past few thirty years, such problems have gradually become "the central problem of Anglo-American literary theory"—and yet, as I suggest, so little has been made of them in Shakespearian criticism. 19
The most difficult problem in subjectivist criticism generally, and one which disturbs some of the books under review (especially those by Honigmann, Goldmann and, although to a lesser extent than it ought, Mowat) is one I mentioned at the start of this survey: how to deal with the level of feeling which accompanies or operates to evoke in our minds the pattern of ideas or ideology to which Shakespeare is responding or contributing. George Steiner comments that "to Shakespeare, more than to any other poet, the individual work was a nucleus surrounded by a field of complex energies." As readers, spectators, and critics we recognize the problem of what Hunter terms "impact", but Anglo-American criticism is notoriously weak in epistemological tools in this area. Facing a similar problem in sociology, Werner Pelz wrote that, quoting Heidegger, we have still "to find the proper words, will zur Sprache gebracht werden." He too points to the level of felt communication of poetry and art generally, and asks, in reconstructing the sense of a past age, how do we express our apprehension of the emotional level of experience? What terminology do we have? How are we enabled to share another's experience and not merely create another, external mode of description? He points to the Heideggerian (and generally Germanic) concept of Stimmung (mood) as determinative. Stimmung bestimmt, mood determines, he asserts, adding that no hard-headed British or French rationalist would ever have dreamed of assigning such constitutive importance to mood or humeur.

Surveying current Shakespearian criticism, we might ponder some of Pelz's points. Part of Honigmann's tentativeness and his apology for his subjectivism, come from an unwillingness to indulge in metacriticism and so face the theoretical implications of his subjectivist stance. As Benjamin Whorf pointed out long ago, different languages not only grow out of different experiences, but may also define and delimit our capacities for experience. Shakespearian criticism has not yet learned to take the language of feeling seriously, nor to face feeling as the poet's primary mode of entry into the world. Such concerns have become standard in much recent continental aesthetic theory: Derida has written of the interweaving of what is purely linguistic with other modes of experience, Merleau-Ponty has explored what he terms the sens émotien-nel as the fundamental revelation of the human condition; Ricoeur speaks of feeling as the primary manifestation of our relation to the world, the expression of that which constantly restores our complicity with it. The closest Anglo-American criticism has come to such concerns is probably, perhaps surprisingly, in the neo-Marxist criticism of Raymond Williams, who speaks of an age's "structures of feeling" and struggles to find a methodology to discuss them.
he goes on—and we might add, most crucially within art of the affectivity of Shakespeare's—we are enabled to perceive, feel, and "imagine, thereby entering a realism that would otherwise have remained closed to us." It is by virtue of our imaginative capacity that we dwell within the "claim and call of Being."

A serious and detailed attention to the claims of feeling evoked by literary texts, a recognition of the contingency of every historical stance towards a text, and a willingness to explore a theory of the phenomenology of imaginative experience—such would seem the directions in which the best and most significant Shakespearian criticism of our generation points. That its pointers are as yet tentative is probably a matter for patience rather than antagonism. Kirby Farrell's idiosyncratic book is perhaps the most hopeful amongst those recent works under review. Farrell's starting-point is where our generation's surely must be—with Shakespeare's works as "acts of 'magical' praise," as "means of evoking wonder from the audience." He argues that we must, as Shakespeare did, learn to take the essentially "magical" quality of language seriously. Shakespearian commentary, he rightly points out, has traditionally been a didactic, reductionist pursuit. Instead it should release our suppressed awareness that our "wishes, fears, ideas and visions may be as real as external phenomena, and be able to influence them." Farrell's book is perhaps too rhapsodically impressionistic for the sceptics to take seriously. We do need such enthusiasm, what we might term a poetics of exhortation, but at this time we require, as well, an unusually self-conscious pursuit of what we as readers, lovers, and teachers of Shakespeare are in fact doing.

Of course, ultimately, it is our experience of Shakespeare that determines. As Murray Krieger sums up, in another of the Harvard essays, "a theory of poetry must begin by being adequate to Shakespeare, if it is to be adequate at all." It is Shakespeare, he goes on, who is the ultimate test of a literary theory. "How can Shakespeare not be treated?" he asks, as the model poet? When we hear "critics speak of the absence and the emptiness of language, surely the claim that the word can be made utterly present—a claim supported by a poet—whose works everywhere invite reverence for the potentiality locked in language—must constitute one of the few healthy signs for the future of criticism." If a Shakespearian criticism for our time remains to be written, it is such hortatory sentiments and their implications that point us in the right direction.


20. George Steiner, "Why, Man, He Doth Bestrade the Narrow World Like a Colossus," *NYTBR*, April 19, 1964, 4-6, 53.
