The Great War gave France her last chance to complete the tropical Empire which she had hastily assembled during the Partition of Africa in the late-nineteenth century. The vast majority of Frenchmen, it is true, showed no desire to seize the opportunity; interest in the repartition of Africa was limited to the few thousand members of the parti colonial. French colonialists frequently bewailed the indifference of both government and public opinion to colonial affairs. This very indifference, however, gave them a decisive voice in the making of African policy, as indeed it had done in the decades before the War. On those occasions when the French cabinet was forced to concern itself with African war aims, it all too willingly abdicated control over their formulation to the colonial party.

The colonial party's effectiveness as a pressure group depended upon its ability to operate inside as well as outside the official structure of policy-making. Its most influential supporter within the government during the early stages of the war was Gaston Doumergue, minister of colonies from August 1914 to March 1917. Doumergue had been a member of the pre-war groupe colonial in Parliament. He had also been president of the Mission Laique, an organization devoted to the furtherance of the mission civilisatrice through the expansion of secular education in the Empire. Doumergue's imperial vision was centred on Africa: 'C'est dans le continent africain que nos intérêts les plus considérables sont engagés et que notre action s'exerce sur la plus vaste étendue.' And wartime cabinets, preoccupied with the Western Front, gave him a virtually free hand to determine African policies. Nor did Doumergue's influence end when he lost office in 1917. He was to re-emerge the following year as the dominant figure on the inter-ministerial commission charged with preparing French colonial objectives for the peace conference.
The colonialists also had allies among the permanent officials at the ministry of colonies. The most influential of them was the head of the African department, Albert Duchêne, ‘l’un des meilleurs et des plus anciens ouvriers de l’expansion africaine’. For much of the war, the ministry had neither the desire nor indeed the capacity to formulate a coherent policy for the repartition of Africa. According to one post-war Parliamentary report, the administrative chaos into which it had collapsed ‘serait de nature à provoquer, suivant le tempérament de l’auditeur, ou l’indignation ou l’hilarité’. But when at last the ministry began to define its war aims in 1917, Duchêne played the crucial part in drafting them.

The colonialists were much more eager to define their African war aims. In its first issue after the outbreak of war, the official journal of the Comité de l’Afrique Française, the leading African pressure group, declared: ‘Nous devons songer dès maintenant aux solutions coloniales de la guerre; aux répartitions territoriales qui la couronneront; . . . (aux) négociations qui suivront la guerre et (aux) vastes réorganisations . . . africaines qui en résulteront.’ But the colonial party also entered the war in a more than usually disorganized condition. It had been bitterly divided by the debate on the reform of the Algerian indigénat. Mobilization deprived its constituent societies of their supporters and their funds. Wartime censorship and shortages emasculated their propaganda. All colonial societies had to reduce their activity; some had virtually to suspend their operations. In fact, less than a hundred men took part in the attempts to draft an official set of colonialist war aims, and only a handful of them had a significant influence on the result. During the war, as before it, the policies of the parti colonial were determined by an inner circle of its leading members.

The repartition of Africa which most colonialists hoped for was to take two forms. The first could be stated quite openly: France would receive her ‘fair’ share of the German colonial empire, which in concrete terms meant the Cameroons and at least half of Togoland. The second required more circumspection. The existence of foreign enclaves which hindered the economic development of French West Africa had long been of concern to the colonial party and the government alike, and there had been several attempts before the war to obtain the Gambia in exchange for some fragment of the French empire in Asia or the Pacific. The war, it was hoped, would at last make it possible for France to create ‘un empire africain d’un seul tenant’ by acquiring British, Portuguese and Spanish—as well as German—colonies. Although the colonialists could not say so publicly, their ‘desiderata’ involved claims upon the Allies no less than demands upon the Enemy.
The colonialists realized that the disastrous beginnings of the war in Europe and the deadlock which then developed along the Western Front made any campaign for the repartition of Africa premature. They also had to worry about potential threats to the existing Empire, particularly about the possibility that the Japanese might be offered Indochina as the price of their participation on the Western Front. Doumergue, however, lost no time in preparing a French claim to German Africa. French and British troops from Dahomey and the Gold Coast invaded, captured and provisionally partitioned Togoland, all by the end of August 1914. By then the government had also sanctioned a joint expedition against the Cameroons—at his insistence and against the wishes of the General Staff. Still not satisfied, Doumergue next demanded joint action against German East Africa as well. Simply to consolidate the Empire was not enough, he told the prime minister: ‘Croire que notre domaine colonial suffirait pendant de longues années à notre force d’expansion, c’est méconnaître l’effort considérable accompli par nos industriels ... par nos colons (et) par nos hommes d’affaires.’

Although French troops were excluded from the East African theatre, Doumergue’s pressure paid dividends elsewhere. When the Cameroons in turn came to be partitioned in January 1916, the threat of a renewed French demand to participate in the East African campaign made the British government more than generous in its satisfaction of their West African claims. François George-Picot, a member of the colonial party and Doumergue’s chosen negotiator, asked for and immediately received nine-tenths of the colony. Neither he nor his minister knew how anxious the British cabinet was to ensure that they ‘made no claims to East Africa’. Had they known, Picot could have asked for all the Cameroons, and his British counterparts—who had orders ‘to abstain from any haggling’—would have given it to him. Doumergue was surprised and delighted at the outcome. As he told the Budget Commission, the agreement gave France ‘des territoires plus étendus que nous ne pouvions le prévoir ou l’espérer.’ The colonial party was equally delighted. ‘Cette délimitation’, said August Terrier, secretary-general of the Comité de l’Afrique Française, ‘est très avantageuse et dépasse même les espérances des coloniaux français’.

The Anglo-French negotiations of 1915-16, for whose success it could claim some credit, also stirred the parti colonial into action. As the London talks reached their conclusion, a group of colonialists in the Société de Géographie began to draw up the colonial party’s European and global war aims. Auguste Terrier was responsible for the formula-
tion of African desiderata. The report which he presented in June dealt only briefly with the German colonies. Terrier accepted the impossibility of making any serious claim to German East Africa, and he could hardly have asked for more in the Cameroons. Instead, he concentrated on the need to unify French West Africa by obtaining all the foreign enclaves between Senegal and Dahomey. The most important of these, of course, were the British colonies of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, for which he was prepared to offer French India and the French share of the New Hebrides Condominium. His colleague, Augustin Bernard, was ready to make concessions in the Middle East as well. Lack of global vision was never a colonialist failing.

Terrier hoped that the various colonial societies would undertake their own studies and then reassemble to draft an official 'cahier des revendications du parti colonial français'. He was also confident of the government's support. Both the ministry of colonies and the Quai d'Orsay, he declared, had been informed of the project and were fully in sympathy with it. Terrier's hopes were quickly disappointed. The cabinet as a whole had no intention of repartitioning the world with Britain while the very survival of France was at stake in Europe. Indeed, its policy was not to deal with colonial issues 'd'après un programme et des vues d'ensemble mais uniquement ... pour tenir compte des intérêts immédiats'.20 As the year wore on and the casualties on the Western Front mounted, the enthusiasm of the colonialists began to wane. 'Je dois ... avouer ... que, dans la situation pendante, j'ai bien de la peine à prendre au grand sérieux ces recherches hélas! trop académiques', one of their leaders confessed in December; 'du point de vue des applications pratiques prochaines, que nous avions en vue, je me suis un peu décourage.'21

By 1917 the colonialists were again on the defensive, this time against Italian demands for territorial compensation in the Middle East and Africa as the price of their participation in the war against Germany. Colonialist leaders debated the question at the end of March, rejected Italian claims for an enlarged sphere of influence in Ethiopia, the cession of Jibuti and the extension of Libya to Lake Chad, and decided to press their views directly on the government. Six weeks later, however, their delegation had still not managed to gain an audience. When the delegation finally saw Ribot, the new prime minister and foreign minister, on 23 May, they found him unforthcoming. Ribot, of course, was not about to sacrifice French interests; at St. Jean de Maurienne he had refused even to discuss Italian claims to Jibuti. But he was also
determined to avoid a public squabble with his Allies and therefore kept the colonialists on a short rein. He prevented them from organizing a campaign to protest against Italian pretensions or even from drawing up their ‘cahier des revendications mondiales’. The congress which Terrier had advocated and which Eugène Etienne, the colonial party’s elder statesman, had actually tried to summon after the meeting with Ribot had to be postponed, on government orders, ‘à cause des retentissantes revendications de la Presse et des Revues coloniales d’une puissance amie’.21

Once more, the initiative passed to the ministry of colonies. Ever since 1916 the governors-general of West Africa, most of whom had connections with the parti colonial, had been drafting their own plans for the reparation of the continent. Angoulvant’s programme included the exchange of Togo and Dahomey for the Gambia and Sierra Leone. Clozel hoped to pick up all the enclaves between Rio de Oro and Gabon—including Nigeria—for unspecified concessions elsewhere in the world. Van Vollenhoven proposed nothing less than the creation of a vast Anglo-French Federation, incorporating both French West Africa and the British colonies.23 The ministry itself considered all these proposals premature; it was still opposed to any general discussion of territorial exchanges until the war was won and the fate of the German colonies decided.24 But at least it saw the need to prepare the ground, and in October 1917 the minister set up a departmental commission de documentation coloniale to ‘réunir . . . tous les documents relatifs aux problèmes politiques coloniaux d’après-guerre’.25

As its name implied, the Commission de Documentation’s terms of reference were limited to the collection of information; it was not to act as a policy-making body, nor was there to be any publicity about its work. But Duchêne soon managed to enlarge its mandate. His voluminous reports were drafted quite deliberately to lay down the general lines of the African policy which France should pursue at a future peace conference—and were later used for this purpose.26 In tone, his reports were rather more moderate than those of his friend Terrier. All France could hope for, Duchêne maintained, ‘c’est que notre empire africain, dès maintenant assez large pour assurer l’avenir des générations qui vont suivre, se solidifie dans son ensemble, se fortifie sur certains points, d’une manière générale révise et améliore ses contours . . . ’27 In substance, his proposals were only slightly less ambitious. The additions to the West African empire were to include the Portuguese enclaves, most of Rio de Oro and, de facto if not de jure,
l'étranger, an important member of the 'Syrian party'. The Commission's rapporteurs, whom Fournol chose, included Terrier; Camille Fidel, secretary-general of the Société d'ÉtudesColoniales et Maritimes and the colonial party's expert on Italian colonial ambitions; Philippe Millet, 'very much in the inner circle of French colonial politics'; Henri Lorin, a future vice-president of the groupe colonial de la Chambre; and Robert de Caix, perhaps the most influential of the younger colonialist leaders. In effect, the Commission d'Étude was little more than a colonialist pressure group.

The Commission was anxious to win business support for further territorial expansion. Personally convinced that France needed more colonies for her economic well-being, Doumergue expected the leaders of French industry and trade to provide him with the necessary arguments. He was sadly disappointed. The secretary-general of the Association de l'Industrie et de l'Agriculture Françaises, in his evidence to the Commission, declared flatly: 'notre domaine colonial est suffisant.' Only two chambers of commerce, Lyon and Rouen, sent representatives to the Commission's hearings, and neither of them made any mention of further expansion in tropical Africa. Even the Union Coloniale Française, the leading association of colonial businessmen, played only a minor part in preparing colonialist war aims. Although it spent much time discussing the effects of the war on colonial trade and on future plans for the mise en valeur of the Empire, it had still not discussed territorial changes when Joseph Chailley-Bert, its secretary-general, gave his evidence to the Commission in May 1918. Most French businesses in tropical Africa had little capital and restricted ambitions. They were also preoccupied with rivalries among themselves. Businessmen in Equatorial Africa, the least developed part of the French Empire, resented the more favourable conditions enjoyed by their counterparts in French West Africa. One of the major concerns of the Union Coloniale's Section de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française was to have the government prohibit members of the Section de l'Afrique Occidentale Française from buying up German businesses in the Cameroons, a right which they wanted to have reserved for themselves. Plans for the repartition of Africa owed little to the ambitions of French business.

The Commission d'Étude thus had to produce its own rationales for continued imperial expansion. Duchêne was made responsible for the African part of its programme. The policies he outlined were essentially the same as those he had elaborated in the Commission de Documentation, and they received general support. Indeed, Doumergue wanted to
state French claims much more boldly: ‘Nous devons, dans toutes les manifestations que nous ferons, dire que notre empire colonial est insuffisant et qu’il ne peut suffire à nos besoins.’ But Doumergue and the Commission were even more concerned by the threat of American opposition to anything which smacked of annexationism. France, they realized, could not afford to appear imperialist. Her claims to a share of the German colonies had to be justified in terms of her capacity ‘à les faire évoluer dans la voie de la civilisation’. For the same reasons, the work of the Peace Conference, where America was bound to play a leading role, would have to be limited to settling the fate of the German colonies. Anglo-French territorial exchanges, which could so easily appear ‘contraires au sens général de la paix’, would have to be negotiated secretly, outside the Conference, safely removed from the possibility of American interference.

Having permitted the colonialists to take over the Commission d’Etude, Simon finally allowed them to draw up their own ‘cahier des revendications’. In March 1918 Etienne again summoned his ‘groupe ment des sociétés coloniales’, this time with official blessing. But the exercise proved to be much less significant than it had been intended. Etienne’s groupement functioned largely as a channel for communicating the resolutions of individual colonial societies to the ministries and the Commission d’Etude. It prepared only one report of its own, and that was about Tangier. The seat of colonialist influence remained the official commission, which drew up its conclusions ‘en tenant compte des désirs des coloniaux’. These conclusions in turn became the policy of the ministry of colonies. Like many of his predecessors, Simon was won over to the colonialist cause during his term of office. The constant theme running through the programme which he outlined to the Quai d’Orsay in December 1918 was ‘l’unification définitive et complète de cet empire africain qui, aux portes de la mère-patrie, est une des plusfor tes garanties de puissance politique et de force économique pour les générations qui vont suivre’. Like the colonialists, Simon was determined to preserve the integrity of the African empire from Italian or other threats. Like them, he was determined to secure the Cameroons and as much as France could get of Togoland, and to incorporate them into the empire with full rights of sovereignty. His territorial policy was to ‘faire régner la paix française sur la totalité de l’ouest africain’, a phrase which he was inclined to interpret literally. Simon did not altogether rule out the possibility of acquiring the Gold Coast and Nigeria in return for adequate compensation. Eugene de
Peretti de la Roca, the sous-directeur d'Afrique at the Quai d'Orsay, was prepared to be more specific. If there were a real chance of picking up all the British territories in West Africa, he commented on Simon's proposals, France should not hesitate to sacrifice the Cameroons and her possessions in India, or to make the most sweeping concessions to the British in the Middle East. \(^{45}\) Thus by December 1918 it seemed as if the African objectives of the French colonial party had become those of the French government as well.

But the appearance was deceiving. The ease with which colonialist objectives seemed to be accepted by the government masked fundamental conflicts over priorities both within the government and within the colonial party itself. For many colonialists, the gains which mattered were not to be made in Africa but in the Middle East. 'Un surcroît de savanes tropicales et de Nègres', declared Robert de Caix early in the war, could hardly be compared in importance to 'L'affirmation de nos titres héréditaires sur les pays des Croisades . . .' \(^{46}\) For many others, like Philippe Millet, what mattered most was the consolidation of French power in North Africa. This was 'la nécessité primordiale' even for the Comité de l'Afrique Française. \(^{47}\) To achieve their objectives, some colonialists were even prepared to sacrifice the gains made in tropical Africa. Rober-Raynaud, the author of the groupement's report on Tangier, had earlier advocated the cession of the Cameroons for the Spanish zone of Morocco. \(^{48}\) In Millet's global geometry, most of the Cameroons was actually destined for restitution to Germany. \(^{49}\)

On the question of territorial exchanges between Allies, the attitude of most colonialists was one of increasing nervousness as they came to realize that the British Empire, too, might have territorial ambitions which she would seek to satisfy at the expense of France. 'On craint d'être dupe', Chailley explained to the Commission d'Etude: 'comme nous nous trouvons en présence d'aillés qui ont de grands appétits . . . chaque fois que nous nous trouverons en négociations, elles ne se tourneront pas à notre avantage.' \(^{50}\)

Nor was the government's approval of a forward policy in Africa as firm as it appeared. It was relatively easy for the ministry of colonies to champion such a policy; its choice of priorities was limited by its sphere of competence, which did not include North Africa or the Middle East. These areas were the responsibility of the Quai d'Orsay, where Peretti's influence on the overall determination of priorities was relatively slight. \(^{51}\) Simon's proposals, moreover, were by his own admission both imprecise and incomplete. Nowhere did he stipulate the concessions he
would make to establish his *Pax Gallica* in Africa. This was not surprising, given the fact that his *Commission d'Etude* had already resolved not to surrender any essential part of the Empire. And since even such imperial relics as St. Pierre et Miquelon were considered essential, the scope for global bargaining was limited indeed.\(^52\) The concessions Simon was prepared to offer in Africa—the cession of the Lower Niger leases and concessions in Wadai, on the Congo-Nile watershed or the Bornu frontier—were not the stuff of which big deals are made.\(^53\) More seriously, Simon and his advisers assumed that the British were anxious enough for territories like *Inde Francaise* to become the ‘demandeurs’ in any negotiations and thus give France a certain tactical advantage.\(^54\) These assumptions could hardly have been more mistaken. Although the British government did consider the possibility of territorial exchanges, its ‘desiderata’ often included territory which the French were determined never to give up, just as its ‘assets’ included territory which the French did not want.\(^55\) Nor were the British likely to co-operate in hoodwinking the Americans. The end of the war revived all their old suspicions about aggressive French imperialism and led them to favour close co-operation with America to check excessive French appetites.\(^56\)

Ultimately, the extent of colonialist influence depended, as it had always done, on the chaotic nature of French colonial policy-making. The French cabinet as a whole never discussed colonial war aims; instead, their formulation was delegated to the ministry of colonies. The ministry in turn delegated the responsibility to a commission made up of civil servants, parliamentary leaders and former cabinet ministers. Its conclusions were then accepted by a minister who had no previous experience of colonial affairs and openly admitted his commissioners’ superior competence.\(^57\) In part, this constitutionally bizarre procedure reflected a traditional absence of effective cabinet control over colonial policy. In part, it also reflected Clemenceau’s indifference to the Empire. But while the prime minister’s indifference allowed the colonialists a decisive voice in the formulation of African war aims during the war itself, it placed those aims in some jeopardy at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau at the end of the war was a virtual dictator, dominating his cabinet—and the country—in a way unparalleled by any other political leader of the Third Republic. His priorities at the Peace Conference virtually began and ended with the security of France’s eastern frontier and his tactics were, in consequence, to ‘faire des concessions à Wilson et aux Anglais sur toutes les questions qui n’intéressent pas notre frontière pour pouvoir ensuite se montrer intransigeant’.\(^58\)
The implications of these tactics for Africa were quickly apparent. The fate of the German colonies was the first territorial question to be discussed at the Conference. Well briefed by his officials, Simon put the case for the annexation of Togo and the Cameroons, and put it very well by all accounts. His prime minister simply overruled him. When President Wilson insisted that sovereignty over the colonies must reside with the League of Nations, Clemenceau agreed with only a token show of reluctance. In a matter of minutes the careful work of Simon’s officials was undone. The minister of colonies, who had clearly not been consulted beforehand, was speechless. The colonialists were more vocal, calling on each other to demonstrate against the decision and showering resolutions of protest down on the government. Even Doumergue felt compelled to make his criticisms public. But their agitation had not the slightest effect.

Once Simon and his officials had recovered from the shock, they made the best of a bad situation. Unable to prevent Clemenceau from accepting the Mandate principle, they tried to nullify its practical consequences. Their new strategy was to ensure that ‘dans les faits sinon dans les mots, la France (saura), sous le couvert d’une souveraineté médiate et déléguée, exercer au Cameroun et au Togo un pouvoir immédiat et direct’. When the form of the new Mandate system was discussed, they strove to enhance the Mandatory’s freedom of administrative action and to limit the powers of the League as far as possible. In public, and in his negotiations with the British, Simon even maintained that Togo and the Cameroons would not become Mandates at all. In particular, he argued that the Council of Four’s decision to make their final disposition the subject of a joint Anglo-French recommendation placed them in a special category, outside the formal Mandate system although subject to its general principles. As he explained to Parliament when submitting the colonial clauses of the Peace Treaty, ‘nous prétendons administrer sans mandat, mais dans l’esprit du mandat’.

In general, the French had some reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Peace Conference. Although Simon’s casuistry failed to impress the British, he and Lord Milner were at least able to agree upon the territorial attribution of Togo and the Cameroons. The joint recommendation which they submitted in July 1919 confirmed the Cameroons agreement of 1916 and modified the Togo agreement of 1914 so as to give France the port of Lomé and all the railway lines. Although the nature of the colonies’ future administrative system remained in doubt, the French were eventually given the right to recruit
troops and to use them outside the territories in the event of a general war—the only African question of vital importance to Clemenceau and the one on which he stood firm. Reassured by Simon’s explanation of the Mandate, Parliament—and the colonial party—welcomed the Peace Treaty. ‘Nulle péroration ne pouvait être meilleure’, commented Le Temps on Simon’s speech; ‘le traité de paix consolide et achève l’empire colonial de la France.’

The Peace Conference also confirmed the territorial integrity of the African empire. Immediately after the Armistice, renewed Italian claims to Jibuti, Ethiopia and the Libyan hinterland had again thrown the colonial party into a panic. But at least Clemenceau’s policy of conciliating Britain and the United States did not extend to the Italians as well. In May the Council of Four did set up a commission to examine Italy’s African desiderata, but Simon, the French representative, remained absolutely firm in his refusal to offer anything more substantial than minor improvements to the Libyan border. On this question too the colonialists mounted their best orchestrated propaganda campaign of the Conference. Eventually, the Italians had to give way. The Agreement of 12 September 1919 modified the Libyan border so as to give the Italians the Ghadames-Ghat-Tummo caravan route, a concession which the colonial party had always been willing to make. Jibuti and French Somaliland, however, remained French.

In a more roundabout way, the Conference settled the question of Anglo-French territorial exchanges as well. Although the general colonial negotiation which the French expected Britain to initiate never took place, the two powers were able to resolve their dispute over the Wadai-Darfur frontier. Ironically, the agreement deprived France of one of her few African bargaining-counters, but nobody seemed to notice. By the summer of 1919 the colonial party’s enthusiasm for territorial exchanges had vanished. By 1920 it had disappeared from the government too. In February the new minister of colonies, Albert Sarraut, considered the possibility of reviving the pre-war negotiations over the Gambia, and rejected it. The British enclave was simply not worth the effort any more. Sarraut was prepared to examine any British proposal ‘dans une esprit de bonne entente’; but, he concluded, ‘l’intérêt restreint que nous y trouverons est insuffisant pour nous pousser à prendre la position de demandeur’.

The Conference, however, failed to resolve the problem of the West African Mandates. The new partition of Togo could not come into force until the British government had ratified it, which the government per-
sistently neglected to do.\textsuperscript{74} The formal handover did not take place until October 1920. Meanwhile, Lomé and the railway stayed under British control and, according to French reports, were deliberately run down.\textsuperscript{75} More seriously, the British also refused to budge on the Mandate principle. Once France had been given the right to raise troops, they argued, there was no reason why Togo and the Cameroons should not become B class Mandates in exactly the same way as German East Africa.\textsuperscript{76}

As the British attitude became clear, the French colonialists resumed their campaign for the outright annexation of the German colonies.\textsuperscript{77} Their pressure now was likely to be more effective than it had been the year before. They had the support of Parliament, where the groupe colonial, which reformed after the 1919 elections, soon became the largest single group in the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{78} They no longer had to contend with Clemenceau, who retired in January 1920 after his unsuccessful bid to become President of the Republic. The new President, Paul Deschanel, was a colonialist of long standing.\textsuperscript{79} The new prime minister, Alexandre Millerand, was at once much less of a dictator than his predecessor and much more sympathetic to the Empire. More importantly, the colonialists still had a friend at the Rue Oudinot. Before his appointment as minister, Sarraut had in fact briefly succeeded Etienne as president of the groupe colonial. When taking leave of his followers, he had assured them: 'À côté du contrôle officiel, (je) réclame le contrôle amical du groupe.'\textsuperscript{80} Nor was the assurance altogether platitudinous. Within a month of his appointment, Sarraut was warning the Quai d'Orsay about the strength of colonialist feelings on the Mandate question and the need to give them some satisfaction.\textsuperscript{81} In June he publicly reaffirmed Simon's contention that Togo and the Cameroons were not Mandates at all.\textsuperscript{82} Privately, he urged Millerand to settle the matter during his next meeting with the British at Spa, if necessary by making sacrifices in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{83}

But Sarraut was fighting a losing battle. Millerand had more important business to discuss at Spa,\textsuperscript{84} nor was he likely to surrender the Middle Eastern gains which he had made at San Remo just three months before. The Quai d'Orsay was already moving towards an acceptance of the Mandate principle, and even Sarraut was ready to settle for a 'C' Mandate as a last resort.\textsuperscript{85} In the end, of course, he had to accept the 'B' Mandate which the British had always insisted upon. But the difference was less significant than Sarraut feared. The joint proposal which Britain and France submitted to the Mandate Commission in December 1920 satisfied his demands in substance if not in form. Within certain
limits, the Mandatory power would have the right to apply her own legislation and to ‘constituer ces territoires en unions ou fédérations douanières, fiscales et administratives, avec les possessions avoisinantes relevant de sa propre souveraineté ou placées sous son contrôle’. In March 1921, without waiting for the Mandate Commission’s final decision, the French government formally assumed administrative powers in Togo and the Cameroons, fixing their status by Presidential Decree. The colonialists, whose concern over the question was now much less than Sarraut himself imagined, accepted the settlement with relief. ‘Le Cameroun et le Togo sont donc définitivement confiés à la France’, commented L’Afrique Française, ‘... ces anciennes colonies allemandes (entrent) dans la vie de nos colonies d’Afrique. Elles y resteront.’

The disposition of the German colonies rang down the final curtain on the attempt to repartition Africa. Although ideas about a deal involving the Gambia continued to be floated from time to time, nothing ever came of them. The end was anticlimactic but not surprising. Simon and those colonialists who shared his extravagant ambitions were men living in the past. The dream of a vast African empire was a relic of the nineteenth century, the product of an age when the old diplomacy of imperialism still held sway. In a new world ‘made safe for democracy’ and a new age of ‘open diplomacy’, it had more than a faintly ridiculous and disreputable air. But if the failure to repartition non-German Africa reflected the new realities of international relations, it also reflected the traditional concerns of French foreign policy. In 1919, as so often in the past, France had to choose between her imperial ambition and her need for European security. In 1919 the choice was clearer than ever. The future threat from Germany would come on the eastern frontier, not in West Africa, and to guard against it France had to have the support of Britain and the United States. Clemenceau’s decision to sacrifice everything for adequate European guarantees may have been tactically risky; strategically, it was obviously sound.

At another level, the colonial party’s less than wholehearted support of territorial exchanges to enlarge the African empire was a reflection of the shift which had taken place in its global priorities since 1898. In the aftermath of Fashoda, the colonialists were the first to realize that the drive for a tropical African empire had been an aberration, diverting energies away from the proper areas of imperial concern in the Mediterranean and North Africa. By the end of the war the reordering of colonialist priorities was virtually complete. What most members of the colonial party, and certainly the most influential ones, hoped to gain
from a victorious peace was Middle Eastern sphere of influence centred on Syria, and a Morocco freed from its 'hypothèques internationales', incorporating Tangier. It was to these objectives that they directed most of their efforts and sought to direct the policies of the government. It is by their success in these areas that the extent of their continued influence upon the formulation of French imperial policy must ultimately be judged. But that is the subject for a book rather than an essay.91

NOTES


3. Doumergue served as juge de paix in Indochina and Algeria from 1888 to 1893 and described himself as 'un vieux colonial aimant les colonies parce qu'il les a habitées et connues', speech to the Mission Littée, 22 Nov. 1903, Revue de l'enseignement colonial, Jan.-Feb. 1904. Like most Radicals, however, he remained suspicious of colonial expansion in the 1890's. His real conversion to colonialism dates from his unexpected appointment as minister of colonies in the Combes cabinet of 1902-5.


5. L'Afrique Française (henceforth A.F.), Feb. 1919. Duchêne joined the Comité de l'Afrique Française immediately after the war.

6. One official did produce a report on the question in March 1915, but he dealt only with the Belgian Congo and the future of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Schefer, 'Éventualité d'un remaniement territorial de l'Afrique, 5 Mar. 1915, Archives Nationales (Section Outre-Mer) (henceforth ANSOM) 1045 AP 4.


9. See: Reclus, L'Allemagne en morceaux (Paris, 1914). Reclus accepted the probability that the other German colonies would go to Britain, the Dominions and Japan. This division of the spoils, according to the Dépêche Coloniale, 27 Feb. 1915, 'répond dans ses grandes lignes aux espoirs des coloniaux français'.

10. The history of these negotiations in 1906-12 can be followed in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (henceforth AE) Grande Bretagne, N.S. 23 and 24.

11. cf. A.F., May 1915: 'De même que nous avons des stratégies en chambre... et des diplomates bénévoles qui refont déjà la carte de l'Europe de demain, de même la pensée de quelques coloniaux trop pressés... formule dès maintenant la carte de l'Afrique future.'


13. Minister of Colonies (henceforth M.C.) to Minister of War, 11 Aug. 1914; Etat-Major de l'Armée, Note a/s d'une opération sur le Cameroun, 15 Aug. 1914; idem, Note pour le Ministre, 28 Aug. 1914, Archives Historiques de l'Armée, Section Outre-Mer, A.E.F.
Cameroun. The General Staff wanted West African troops to be reserved for Morocco, in order to free the Moroccan regiments for service in France.


16. Minutes of the Budget Commission, 28 Mar. 1916, Archives Nationales (henceforth AN) C 7559. Doumergue had originally favoured a provisional condominium over the Camerouns, convinced that Britain's military superiority in the area would give her the lion's share in any partition of the colony.


18. Although prevented by censorship from mounting a public campaign, the colonialists were nevertheless able to exert considerable pressure behind the scenes. Doumergue used this pressure to help justify his claim for most of the Camerouns; Picot in his negotiations also 'expropriated on the discontent in French colonial circles with the Quai d’Orsay as to its alleged neglect of French colonial interests'. Doumergue to M. A.E., 13 Feb. 1916, ANSOM 1044 AP; Nicolson to Grey, 19 Feb. 1916, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers (henceforth FO) 371/2597.


22. The events summarized above are more fully discussed in Andrew & Kanya-Forstner, 'The French Colonial Party and French Colonial War Aims', loc. cit., pp. 91-3.

23. Angoulvant to M.C., 16 Oct. 1916; Clozel to M.C., 15 Mar. 1917; Van Vollenhoven, Note, 22 Sept. 1917, ANSOM 1045 AP 3. Clozel had been a member of the Comité de l'Afrique Française before the war; Angoulvant became one in November 1918. Both sent copies of their proposals to the Comité. Van Vollenhoven was much less well disposed to the colonial party. The purpose of his proposal was: '1) obliger les coloniaux français à présenter des solutions qui ménagent à jamais la bonne entente entre la France et l'Angleterre; 2) combattre aussi bien chez les coloniaux anglais que chez les coloniaux français la folle pensée d'exclure l'Allemagne de l'Afrique.' Van Vollenhoven to Cambon, Personal, 20 Sept. 1917. AE A Guerre 1501.


25. M.C. to André You (directeur politique), 9 Oct. 1917, ANSOM 3254 AP 6. The minutes of the Commission's proceedings are to be found ibid.

26. Duchêne prepared a total of thirty-four reports on every aspect of the African programme. Most of them dealt with territorial questions, and all were headed 'Modifications Territoriales'.


28. eg. M.C. to M.A.E., n.d. (June 1917), ANSOM 1045 AP 1; 'Si ce principe (des nationalités) était admis . . . les conséquences qui en résulteraient au moment où des remaniements territoriaux seraient envisagés à la fin de la guerre pourraient être des plus considérables. Dès maintenant mon Département . . . ne peut que présenter sur cette doctrine les plus expresses réserves . . .'. The ministry of colonies was equally put out by Lloyd George's pledges and Wilson's proclamation of his Fourteen points in January 1918. M.C. to M.A.E., 22 Jan. 1918, ANSOM 1045 AP 4.


31. Minutes of the Commission d'Etude, 11 Feb. 1918, ANSOM 97 AP.

32. Duchêne and Etienne sat on the Commission by virtue of their position as former ministers or undersecretaries of state for colonies.

33. De Caix was originally chosen to prepare the report on Japanese colonial ambitions but was prevented by other commitments from completing it. The task was then given to Felicien Challaye.
34. Minutes of the Commission d'Etude. 18 Mar. 1918, ANSOM 97 AP.
35. Ibid. 16 May 1918.
37. Minutes of the Commission d'Etude. 17 Feb. 1919, ANSOM 97 AP.
38. Ibid. 8 July 1918.
39. Fournol. Rapport Général sur les Travaux de la Commission . . ., 30 Sept. 1918; Doumergue to M.C., 13 Nov. 1918, ANSOM 96 AP; M.C. TO M.A.E., 5 Dec. 1918, ANSOM 1044 AP. This too was the policy advocated for the Comité de l'Afrique Française. The Comité called for the Anglo-French negotiations to be completed before the Conference even assembled. Etienne and Jonnart to M.A.E., 18 Nov. 1918, AE K-4-1 (1).
40. Hulot to Cordier, 4 Mar. 1918, Institut de France (henceforth IF), Cordier MSS 5461. Etienne summoned the groupement 'd'accord avec le ministre actuel, M. Henri Simon'.
41. Etienne to M.C., 13 Jan. 1919. IF Terrier MSS 5911. The resolutions of the individual societies are to be found ibid. Several organizations, however, sent their resolutions directly to the ministries. cf. Besson (president, Société des Etudes Coloniales et Maritimes) to M.C., 16 Nov. 1918, ANSOM 1044 AP; Etienne and Jonnart (president, Comité de l'Afrique Française) to M.A.E., 18 Nov. 1918, AE K-4-1 (1). The Commission d'Etude also tabulated the resolutions and sent them to the ministries. Fournol to Audibert, 7 Feb. 1919, ANSOM 96 AP; Fournol to Gouût, 7 Feb. 1919, AE Océanie 6.
42. Minutes of the Commission d'Etude, 17 June 1918, ANSOM 97 AP. The phrase was Doumergue's. Doumergue also noted that the Comité de l'Afrique Française's resolutions were 'à peu prés identiques aux nôtres'. Ibid. 25 Nov. 1918.
43. In 1924, Simon was to become president of the groupe colonial in the Chamber of Deputies.
44. Simon to M.A.E., 17 Dec. 1918, no. 304. ANSOM 1044 AP. Simon's policies were outlined in a series of ten despatches, numbered 301 to 310. Each was accompanied by reports from the Commission de Documentation, the Commission d'Etude, or special memoranda, usually drawn up by Duchène.
45. Note de la sous-direction d'Afrique sur les questions à régler avec les puissances étrangères . . ., 7 Jan. 1919, AE Tardieu MSS 55.
47. A.F., Nov. 1918. Millet's views were outlined in a long memorandum, 'La Paix Coloniale et Maritime', 2 Dec. 1918, AE Tardieu MSS 55. In addition to being colonial editor of Le Temps, Millet at the time was also chef-adjoint of the Minister of Marine's civilian cabinet, and he enjoyed the confidence of André Tardieu, one of Clemenceau's chief lieutenants. See: Crowe, Minute, 27 Jan. 1919, FO 608/175.
48. Simon to M.A.E., 17 Dec. 1918, no. 306, ANSOM 1044 AP.
49. Millet was afraid lest French resources be stretched too thinly. He was also worried about Germany's lasting hatred if she were totally deprived of her colonies.
50. Minutes of the Commission d'Etude . . ., 16 May 1918, ANSOM 97 AP. The view was also held by Millet and Camille Fidel.
51. cf. Observations a/ s de la Note de la Sous-Direction d'Afrique, 16 Jan. 1919. AE Tardieu MSS 55: 'Il est permis de se demander si l'avvenir de la Gambie, de la Sierra Leone, de la Côte d'Or, de la Nigéria, peut être mis en balance avec celui de la zone d'influence très étendue que nous reconnaissons l'accord franco-britannique (the Sykes-Picot agreement) et dont nous aurions à abandonner la majeure partie.' Syria was much more important to the Quai d'Orsay than Africa.
52. Doumergue to Simon, 13 Nov. 1918; same to same, n.d. (11 Mar. 1919), ANSOM 96 AP.
53. Note sur les compensations pouvant être offertes en Afrique à l'Angleterre, 11 Dec. 1918; Simon to M.A.E., 17 Dec. 1918, no. 304, ANSOM 1044 AP.
54. Doumergue to Simon, 13 Nov. 1918, ANSOM 96 AP. This too was the view of Peretti at the Quai d'Orsay. Note de la sous-direction d'Afrique . . ., 7 Jan. 1919, AE Tardieu MSS 55: 'L'Angleterre a intérêt à solliciter de nous la cession de quelques parties de notre domaine colonial. Cet intérêt est supérieur à celui que la France peut avoir à obtenir la cession des parties du domaine colonial anglais.'
55. eg. Meinertzhagen, 'Military Policy Governing the Repartition of Africa', 1 Feb. 1919, FO 608/219. Meinertzhagen compiled a list of British 'Assets' and 'Desiderata', to each of which he attached a numerical value. Among the former he listed a favourable settlement of the
Wadai-Darfur frontier (40 points), which the French were prepared to offer the British; among the latter he listed the cession of Jibuti (70 points) and the elimination of French influence from Ethiopia (20 points).

56. 'Eastern Committee, 2 Dec. 1918 (Smuts comments),' Smuts to Walter Long, 28 Nov. 2928, cited in W. R. Louis, *Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies* (Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 119-20: ‘France may be our great problem, and therefore it seems to me that we must try to make friends with America.’ Curzon summed up the prevailing attitude best: ‘A good deal of my public life has been spent in connection with the political ambitions of France . . . in almost every distant region where the French have sway . . . Their political interests collide with ours in many cases. I am seriously afraid that the Great Power from whom we have most to fear in the future is France, and I almost shudder at the possibility of putting France in such a position.’ *Ibid.*, p. 119, n. 7.

57. Minutes of the Commission d’Etude, 11 Feb. 1918, ANSOM 97 AP.


61. Paul Bourdaries and Camille Fidel were particularly active in rallying the opposition. Bourdaries had resolutions passed by the *Ligue Coloniale Française* and by the *Société des Études Coloniales et Maritimes*, of which he was vice-president. Fidel had the same resolutions passed by the *Congrès National Français*. Doumergue’s criticisms appeared in *Le Soir*, 7 Feb. 1919.

62. Application au Togo et au Cameroun du Mandat de la Ligue des Nations, n.d., ANSOM 1044 AP Mandats; see too: Note pour le Ministre, Directions générales sur le mandat colonial, ANSOM 1046 AP.

63. The minutes of the Mandate Commission’s proceedings are to be found in ANSOM 1046 AP.


66. The ministry of colonies was very pleased with the agreement, as were the colonialists. Note pour le Ministre, July 1919, ANSOM 1046 AP; *Le Temps*, 14 July, 22 July 1919; *D.C.*, 17 July 1919.

67. Minutes of the Council of Ten, 30 Jan. 1919; Minutes of Heads of Delegation, 9 Dec. 1919, 10 Jan. 1920, *F.R.U.S.* III, p. 803; IX, pp. 541-4; P. H. Kerr to Lloyd George, 16 July 1919, Lloyd George MSS F 89/3/1: ‘. . . he (Clemenceau) openly said that the organization of large black forces was the only method by which France could maintain her military strength in view of the dwindling of the French population.’ Clemenceau had formed this conviction soon after becoming Prime Minister in November 1917 and had thrown the full weight of his authority behind the recruitment of African troops for service on the Western Front. See: M. Michel, ‘La genèse du recrutement de 1918 en Afrique noire française’, *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer*, LVIII, no. 4 (1971), 433-48.


69. As in 1916-17, Camille Fidel was the most energetic in his denunciations of Italian ambitions. *A.F.*, Jan.-Feb. 1919; *D.C.*, 28 Jan., 14 Feb. 1919 (resolution of the *Ligue Coloniale Française*, passed on Fidel’s initiative); 18 Mar. 1919 (Fidel’s lecture at the *College Libre des Sciences Sociales*).


71. All the elements of the colonial party took part in the campaign. This time, their members on the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber also joined the agitation. See: Minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 13 June, 25 June 1919, AN C 7491.
72. cf. A.F., May-June 1919: 'Quant aux questions de rédistribution africaine entre la France et la Grande Bretagne dont il a été beaucoup question, il ne semble pas qu'elles aient l'importance ni même actuellement la précision qu'on a souvent indiquées.'

73. Sarraut, Aide-Mémoire, 10 Feb. 1920, AE Inde E. 101.2.


75. Note pour le President du Conseil, 9 May 1920, AE K-4-1 (IV).

76. Foreign Office to Cambon, 13 Feb. 1920, ibid.


79. Deschanel was a member of no less than thirteen colonial societies, including the Comité de l'Afrique Française, and a founder-member of the groupe colonial de la Chambre.


82. J.O. D.P.C., 29 June 1920: 'Mon honorable prédécesseur a pris position très nettement sur la détermination du mandat. Cette position, je la garde... Je ne change pas la position qui a été prise par mon prédécesseur.'

83. Sarraut, Aide-Mémoire, 1 July 1920, AE K-4-1 (IV).

84. Millerand later claimed that he had in fact raised the question of Togo and the Cameroons, but there is no evidence in the available records that he did so.

85. Sarraut, Aide-Mémoire, 1 July 1920, AE K-4-1 (IV): 'Si cette thèse (full sovereignty) ne pouvait prévaloir finalement, il serait désirable d'adopter un type de mandat analogue au mandat C...'

86. A.F., July 1921. The draft version of the clause was: 'La Puissance mandataire aura pleins pouvoirs d'administration et de législation sur les contrées faisant objet du mandat; ces contrées seront administrées selon la législation de la Puissance mandataire, comme partie intégrante de son territoire.' Peretti to Gött, 10 Dec. 1920, AE K-4-1 (VI).

87. As late as November 1920 Sarraut maintained: 'L'opinion publique française aura peine déjà à accepter le principe du mandat...; il sera malaisé de lui faire admettre que le mandat qui nous sera confié ne garantit pas au moins l'incorporation à titre définitif du Togo et du Cameroun dans notre territoire. A vrai dire, j'attache une grande importance à ce que soit tenu compte de cet état particulier de l'opinion française.' Sarraut to M.A.E., 12 Nov. 1920, AE K-4-1 (V). At the same time, however, L'Afrique Française claimed that the two most important outstanding 'revendications coloniales' were the retrocession of Mauritius and the acquisition of Britain's share of the New Hebrides Condominium.

88. A.F., June 1921.

89. See: Governor-General, French West Africa to M.C., 5 Dec. 1928; M.A.E. to M.C., 30 Jan. 1929, enclosing Fleuriau to M.A.E., 16 Jan. 2929. ANSOM S17 AP 15.


91. French war aims in the middle East and North Africa, and the role of the colonial party in their formulation, will be discussed in a monograph which we are currently preparing.