Was the Western Hemisphere, so inaptly named in honour of an unreliable Florentine, really discovered by another Italian, the visionary Genoese? Schools books so taught, although legend indicates that Phoenician traders reached the coast of Brazil and unlettered Basque and Breton fishermen voyaged to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland at an earlier date. Certainly roving Norsemen explored the north-eastern coast some five centuries earlier and may even have penetrated inland from Hudson’s Bay. Quite possibly there were others, but in the dark centuries preceding the European Renaissance, it was not the custom to open the door to competitors. Not only were means of communication few and sporadic but finds and discoveries were jealously guarded.

The earliest ocean probings since the long-forgotten days of the Phoenicians were made by Portugal under the astute leadership of Prince Henry the Navigator, whose ardent desire was to stem the westward spread of Islam and replace the Crescent by the Cross, but who also shrewdly aspired to establish direct sea-borne trade with the prime sources of the exotic oriental products, to break the monopoly of the Italian merchant princes, to “short-circuit” both the Italian middle-men and the Arab traders of the Levantine ports.

Half a century later the visionary but persistent Genoese, the boastful Columbus, was similarly inspired by identical twin motives. His glib promises to bring back quantities of pearls, spices, and gold failed to impress the hard-headed Spanish court. His cause succeeded only when he gained the ear of that most devout sovereign, Isabel la Católica, zealously undertook to propagate the Christian faith, and promised to lead myriads of lost souls to Christ.

His discovery of the island outlyers of the Western Hemisphere stirred the imagination of a Europe slowly emerging from its long intellectual torpor, and
quicken the pace. He was soon followed by others whose prime interest was still a shortened sea route to fabled Cathay. When that dream died, still other adventurers followed—fortune-hunters, traders, and settlers—now interested in the riches of the New World itself. Thereafter came the gradual development on the soil of the Western Hemisphere of three distinct types of nation-building: the Latin American, the North American, and the Canadian. It is of interest to examine that diversity and its motivating causes, many of which had their roots deep in the mores of the European countries from which the resolute adventurers had set out.

II

Latin America

The salient characteristic of all Latin colonization in America was that it was initiated and fostered by the State, primarily for the benefit of the State, with the warm and potent co-operation of the Roman church. In the vast expanses from Colorado and California south to remote Patagonia, divided by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 into their respective spheres of influence, the founding of permanent settlements, each with padre and Christian mission, was actively encouraged by both Most Catholic monarchs. They and their devout but grasping subjects were animated by the selfsame conflicting motives that had inspired Prince Henry and Columbus: the eager quest for material riches and a burning ardour to carry the Christian Cross to all pagan unbelievers. It was John Oldham who paid the hardy Conquistadores this grudging but appropriate tribute:

Whom neither yawning Gulphs of deep Despair,  
Nor scorching Heat of burning Line could scare;  
Whom Seas, nor Storms, nor Wrecks could make refrain  
From propagating Holy Faith and Gain.

The feudal system was still strong in the Iberian peninsula: its absolute monarchs claimed to rule by Divine Right, and were the object of deep veneration; homage was paid to them by the court, the hereditary nobles, and the prelates of the church, who in turn exacted homage from all lesser men. The equality of man was an unheard-of doctrine, the worship of rank servile and universal.

Since all Latin colonization was inspired by government, it was natural that the political, fiscal, and ecclesiastical systems of the mother countries were bodily transplanted and imposed on their American colonies. Remote control of far-flung possessions was exercised through two proud Spanish viceroys, one at Lima who held sway from Panama south to Cape Horn, the other at Mexico City, capital of
New Spain, who ruled from Panama north to California, Texas, and Florida, including the Spanish West Indies; while Portugal exercised a similar but more tolerant control through a titled Governor-General installed at Bahia, later at Rio de Janeiro, over the enormous bulk of Brazil.

The Colonial Period endured for some three hundred years, internally peaceful under the iron hand of the conqueror, its calm broken only by pirates operating in the Spanish Main or by British raiders in search of booty, when the golden “doubloon” and the silver “pieces of eight” became famous in song and story.

The Spanish Conquistadores and the Portuguese Bandeirantes were bold, hardy, and imaginative in their untiring search for slaves and treasure. Their roving expeditions sought in vain for the Golden City of El Dorado, the seven Golden Cities of Cibola, and the Fountain of Perpetual Youth, yet they garnered rich rewards from plundering the Aztecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, Incas, and lesser tribes. Incidentally, it is to be regretted that intense bigotry impelled them to destroy many priceless relics and records that they considered pagan.

The European masters despised manual toil, and since they found the conquered tribes also averse to hard continuous labour, they imported numerous black slaves from Africa to work in the rich silver mines of Mexico and Peru, to till the soil of the sugar plantations, to serve as household and personal servants, and to toil in the placer mines and diamond fields of Brazil, all of which paid heavy tribute to national treasuries.

Downtrodden native tribes and imported African Negroes were equally regarded as chattels of the Latin master race. They laboured without salary, education, or hope of advancement. Submissive but often sullen and resentful, they had a life that was little better than that of beasts of burden. While becoming nominal Christians because they were so instructed, their imposed faith was seldom more than a thin veneer over their primitive tribal customs and beliefs.

Meantime, among their European masters, the seeds of dissension were beginning to multiply and bear fruit. During the whole long Colonial Period and throughout all Latin America under the remote control of despotic monarchs in Lisbon and Madrid, it was the custom to fill each and every important post in church or state from Europe. Nominees of king, court, or prelate were sent abroad to better themselves and to maintain undiminished the prestige and authority of the mother country. Such men had small regard for local sentiment or local interests, but they enjoyed and exercised broad powers. At the same time the possessions of
the church were enormous, and the political influence that it exerted through the
Inquisition was permeating and potent.

But a new influence was gradually making itself felt and demanding a larger
role in affairs of state. The proud Creoles—American-born offspring of European
parents, many of them descendants of the original conquistadores—increasingly re-

sented their exclusion from high office in the land of their birth. They controlled
trade and commerce, operated rich silver mines, owned broad haciendas and were
the masters and employers of the numerous working class. Angered by the arrogant
rule of imported officials, they sparked the revolt against Madrid, and brought to a
close the long Colonial Period in the Vice-Royalty of Lima.

When after many bloody affrays Bolivar triumphed in the north and San
Martin in the south, the Spanish civil officials followed the defeated regulars back to
Spain, and the new Creole administrations suffered accordingly. Disorder became
general when the strong experienced hand was withdrawn, and frequent conflicts
broke out over division of spoils and perquisites. Local jealousies, scheming polit-
icians, and the plots of ambitious generals resulted in the setting up of nine despoti-
dictatorships, each with superficial democratic trappings, in the former Vice-Royalty
of Lima.

In New Spain the so-called “liberating” process followed a different and un-
usual pattern. There a humble parish priest, Miguel Hidalgo, who had been con-
verted to the doctrines of the French Revolution, raised the standard of revolt against
privilege. The upper classes closed ranks, Father Hidalgo was quickly defeated and
executed, and an uneasy peace then settled over Mexico. Ten years later, as a sequel
to Spain’s deliverance from Napoleon, Madrid adopted a more liberal constitution,
and Mexico’s ruling group took alarm at the prospective loss of their special privi-
eges. They easily staged a successful revolt. Mexico still celebrates the “grito” of
the patriot Hidalgo as its lasting symbol of independence, but the “liberating”
revolt was actually reactionary, a protest against the imposition of liberalism.

Thus by various paths all of Spain’s great continental possessions had thrown
off the yoke of the mother country by the first quarter of the nineteenth century,
although the island colonies remained Spanish until the end of that century. The
liberating process varied greatly in the two former Vice-Royalties, but the result was
not greatly different. An autocratic foreign system had been evicted, only to be
succeeded by a number of states nominally republican but equally autocratic and
less experienced in government, without stability or continuity of policy. Small
politico-military groups in each new state now exercised erratic lordship over a vast,
sparsely-peopled land of illiterate peons and Indians still living a tribal life. The rigid colonial system was not greatly altered by the coming of independence. A relatively small selfish group of Creoles had taken the places of officials sent out from Spain, but the lot of the down-trodden majority was in no way improved. It was clearly not a society prepared for democracy, nor did it bear within itself the seeds of cohesion and united action.

What endured was the tradition of the strong man, the cacique, together with the ancient doctrine that “to the victor belong the spoils.” The new native-born rulers proved no less exigent in the matter of perquisites than the foreign-born oppressors they had overthrown. But one quality they encouraged and carefully nurtured in the unthinking populace—an intense and unreasoning nationalism keenly sensitive to whatever their rulers chose to regard as foreign interference or dictation.

Portuguese Brazil followed a still different path toward independence. When Napoleon invaded Portugal, the royal House of Braganza was escorted to Rio by a British fleet and set up court there. When Dom Joao was called home after Napoleon’s defeat, he left behind his son Dom Pedro as Regent. Spurred on by ambitious Brazilian ministers, the young Regent defied Lisbon, proclaimed the independence of Brazil, and in 1822 was crowned its first Emperor.

Within nine years his autocratic conduct alienated his newly-emancipated subjects and forced his abdication in favor of his infant son. Beginning under a Regency, Dom Pedro II ruled wisely and peacefully for nearly sixty years, but lost the support of the great slave-owners when in 1888 he abolished slavery without compensation to the owners. Their resentment hastened his downfall. Dom Pedro had courageously insisted that the national army refrain from meddling in domestic politics, but the army, with civilian approval, forced his abdication. Brazil then adopted the trappings of a federal republic, similar to but more democratic than that of its Spanish American neighbours.

The history of all Latin American nations after attaining independence followed the same broad general pattern. With few exceptions it revealed a long tragic series of plot, counter-plot, stratagem, and betrayal, but it was marked throughout by a fixed determination of the ruling clique in each national capital to retain control of power and the national treasury. Despite the belated emergence of a vocal middle class, Latin America still remains a land of a few who are rich and privileged and a vast majority living at or near subsistence level—luxury for the few and grinding poverty for the many. Ambitious generals or suave political spell-binders have from
time to time seized the reins of power or have risen through specious election slogans to dominate the national scene, and then clung to office beyond legally-established limits, upheld either by largess to army chiefs or by shrewd manipulation of the machinery of office.

In the weakness or total absence of political parties the cacique naturally continued to be a vital factor. In Mexico, at no time did the warring factions recognize any party affiliation. They were Porfiriasts, Maderistas, Carrancistas, or Villistas, known only by the name of the chief they recognized. Normally the cacique began well, but temptation was great and exigent retainers numerous, although few have so brazenly regarded the national treasury as a mere personal perquisite as recently have Peron, Trujillo, Pérez Jiménez, and Batista.

To the humble peon remained the gift of caustic comment. Disillusioned and fatalistic, he tended to think a bad current government less burdensome than a "reforming" insurrection. He has told me, a sympathetic foreigner, that the "gato gordo," the fat cat in office, was probably preferable to the "gato flaco," the hungry cat which aspired to that office.

Should the "gato gordo" decide to retire, he customarily selects one from his personal entourage to succeed him and maintain his policies. Such becomes the "official" candidate, and if no dynastic insurrection intervenes, he is of course "officially" elected.

Military men have always loomed large in the national scene, but their role is becoming less decisive. The influence of the church has been declining since the early days of home rule, the fine old places of worship show signs of neglect, and new imposing structures are office buildings for government servants and the ornate residences of successful politicians. Organized labour under shrewd political direction is a restless and growing influence, and the student body in national universities has frequently spear-headed protest against established corrupt or illegal authority.

When one deals with politics or government, however, one deals with the least attractive facet of life among our Latin neighbours. Speaking as one who lived and worked for many years in different segments of Latin America furnishing electric power, light, and transportation at low rates to retarded communities, who negotiated personally with presidents in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, who was a friend of the redoubtable Pancho Villa, and who spent nine weeks in the wintry sierra as the lone hostage of Mexican rebels, I can stoutly affirm that officials and politicians are those least qualified to portray in true colors the normal way of
life in the pleasant Latin lands with their "simpatico" people. The upper classes are artistic, of broad culture, high-minded, true representatives of their proud Latin lineage; the lower classes are attached to the soil, fond of music and children, live a happy-go-lucky existence, are deeply fatalistic and fiercely patriotic, and so are easily led by facile rabble-rousers.

It is really tragic, and most unfortunate for the national economy, that level-headed, selfless, and patriotic citizens are so seldom represented in active politics. The truth is that they simply cannot stomach the corrupt and debasing features of the political scene, whose votaries have made it a lucrative and rewarding career; while the earnest amateur reformer, such as Madero, who ventures into politics with bright dreams of its purification is doomed to early political martyrdom, entangled in the web of the seasoned professionals who resent his well-meant intrusion.

III

North America

In marked contrast to the armed Spanish expeditions to the more southerly areas of America, the founders of the thirteen British colonies, spread-eagled along the narrow Atlantic sea-board from New England to Georgia, manifested no ardent missionary zeal to convert to Christianity the native tribes they encountered on landing; nor yet did they entertain bright visions of easily acquiring the accumulated riches of others. Since their landings took place a full century later than those of the Latins, probing explorations had amply demonstrated that the wealth of the more cultured Aztecs, Incas, and Mayas had no counterpart among the northern and more primitive tribes.

In the intervening period momentous changes had taken place in Saxon England, radically altering the character and scope of its emigration. The Reformation had come to England under the leadership of the sturdy hard-headed House of Tudor. English naval power had its genesis under the eighth Henry, and foreign exploration was encouraged by his House, in particular during the reign of the Virgin Queen who liked proudly to describe herself as "Mere English". Valiant sea-rovers such as Drake, Hawkins, Grenville, Frobisher, and Raleigh ventured boldly into strange seas and preyed upon the rich Spanish settlements. Their salty tales fired the imagination of the trading community, and soon the flag of St. George was carried into all parts of the world and opened new vistas to maritime trade.

It was early in the seventeenth century, in 1603, that the vigorous Tudors were succeeded by the romantic Stuarts, and with them it became the fashion to establish
permanent colonies, primarily for the propagation and extension of the mother country's trade. Just as the East India Company was formed to trade eastward by way of the Cape of Good Hope and “cut in” on the profitable monopoly in silks and spices enjoyed by the Portuguese, so the London (or Virginia) Company was organized to trade westward into the Americas to challenge the northward extension of Spanish power. England had at last become both trade conscious and colony-conscious but, unlike the Latins, the Stuarts chose to rely on controlled private enterprise.

Royal charters were issued granting exclusive trading and territorial rights within extensive and loosely-defined boundaries. This was the genesis of all the British colonies founded, and then operated over a period of years, as “charter colonies.” Even the famed voyage of the little Mayflower was financed by land speculators in London, and it was stress of weather which diverted the “Pilgrim Fathers” to the shores of New England, where they elected to remain.

While the early arrivals included deported law-breakers and rebels against established authority of church or state, in the main they were decent middle-class God-fearing Christians, not themselves free from religious bigotry. Although recruited by enterprising company agents, they were sturdy men unafraid of honest toil, intent on setting up new homes in the wilderness, confident that in due season, after initial hardship and discomfort, they could build a better life in strange lands and primitive surroundings.

There was another important difference from the custom of the Spanish conquistadores, who came in armed bands with devout spiritual advisers. The English settlers came in family units with wives and children. Where the Latins lived with the native women, and occasionally married them, the English valued neither the indolent male as a labourer nor the female as a bed-fellow. Where the Latins toiled in their fashion to convert to Christianity the indigenous tribes, the English settlers regarded all native Americans as shiftless, Godless heathen, children of Satan, whose souls were not worth saving. Where the Latins retained the natives as personal servants and for menial tasks, the English had no compunction about dispossessing them of lands and hunting grounds, pressing them steadily westward. Herein lay the great difference between Spanish and English colonization: the Latins came seeking treasure, the Anglo-Saxons to create it; the former remained to enslave and convert, the latter to disdain and dispossess; the former made of the native an obedient and docile servant, the latter was accustomed to say that “a good Indian was a dead Indian.”
The British Crown did not intervene directly in the operation of charter colonies, but regarded them as prime sources of raw material and profitable markets for the products of home industry. In time their increasing population and importance and the growth of their overseas trade not only with home ports but also with the West Indies and continental Europe, excited a keener interest and a desire for direct control. One by one, each charter colony experienced a change in status and became a "Royal Province" with a Governor appointed by and responsible to the Crown, each with its own executive staff. Representative local bodies were set up, but the Governor retained the power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve such provincial assemblies, with the right of veto over their legislative acts.

The French were already firmly established on the St. Lawrence. When the home countries were at war their colonies also were at war, and since the tribes were in general treated kindly by the French and harshly by the British, they naturally became the allies of the French and the evil scourge of the British settler.

Meantime, by the middle of the eighteenth century the royal provinces had risen from small beginnings to a substantial measure of prosperity (blessed as they were with a fertile virgin soil, abundant stands of excellent timber, the harvest of coastal waters, and the wild life of the forest). They built staunch square-riggers and sailed them on the seven seas. But since the home government continued to regard them as feeders to industry at home, local factories and industries were openly discouraged. Here arose one grave cause of discontent.

Another arose when troops sent out to aid the colonists against the French and Indians, themselves strangers to forest warfare, chose to regard with derision the seasoned but undisciplined colonial levies. The sound advice of the latter was treated with scorn, with great resulting loss to British arms and prestige. But perhaps most important in alienating the respect and affection of the colonists, just as took place with the proud ambitious Creoles in the Latin colonies, was the senseless invidious distinction asserted by those born "at home" vis-à-vis those born overseas. A mild stigma seemed to attach to the latter, a tendency that could also be observed many years later in India, during the last days of the British Raj. In one word, which implied a vague but definite status of inferiority, they were merely "colonials."

While hostile French power remained entrenched on the St. Lawrence, the British settlers in America held firm in their allegiance; when British arms removed that threat, however, they felt free to vent their latent displeasure. At this very time the home government decided that the colonies should in fairness bear
some part of the cost of war, and proceeded to enact sundry measures such as the Molasses Act, the Mutiny Act, the Stamp Act, and the tax on tea, to all of which the colonies strenuously objected. Taxation without representation super-imposed on an earlier widespread resentment, coupled with the final disappearance of the French menace, brought on open rebellion.

Established as a single self-governing entity through the patient genius of Washington and his able contemporaries, following on the adoption of a liberal attitude in London, the states initially found themselves in serious financial difficulties. But the same vibrant enterprising spirit which had built up the original colonies triumphed over all obstacles and became frankly imperialistic; having fought a war to gain separation from an empire, they themselves became an empire in all but name. Hardy American-born pioneers pushed boldly into the western wilderness, dispossessed the native tribes, squatted on their lands, and carved out new homes beyond the Appalachians. Shrewd timely purchases from needy European despots secured Spanish Florida, the enormous undefined French territory of Louisiana, and years later Russian Alaska. Unprovoked invasion of the settled Canadian provinces was sharply repulsed, but they were more successful on the southern border. Infiltration won Texas and an aggressive land-grabbing war the immense northern domains of Mexico from Colorado to California. Infiltration on the west coast and the insolent threat of "54° 40' or fight" won from an apathetic Britain the great Oregon territory and pushed the northern boundary to the forty-ninth parallel from the Great Lakes to the Pacific. Thereafter, since territorial expansion no longer governed national policy, the restless genius of this enterprising people shifted to consolidation, to trans-continental railway construction, and to industrial and mining development.

Rapid industrial progress and the immense extent of virgin unpeopled lands now available induced a strong and swelling stream of immigrants from all European countries, many fleeing from oppression and persecution just as had the original British colonists. But curiously enough, in a land where all men had been proclaimed free and equal, the immigrants were not regarded as equals until they had "taken the oath"; in the meantime they were "wops," "limeys," "dagos," "greasers," or "hunkies." The mere taking of "the oath" was assumed to effect some highly beneficial change in the inner man, and new arrivals from Europe—but definitely not from Asia and Africa—were put under pressure to swear allegiance as soon as it was legally possible to take the oath. The American people have always—as they
still do—made a fetish of conformity, of standardization, while at the same time retaining not a little of Puritanic intolerance.

For many years the United States preened itself for being a gigantic “melting pot,” into which went the man of inferior status, the alien, and out of which came, at least in theory, a standardized red-blooded American citizen. In recent years, due perhaps to lesser immigration and its reduced impact on the native population, less is heard of the famous “melting pot.” It is true that certain Italian immigrants have imported and kept alive a branch of that vicious society, the Mafia, and some Irish immigrants continue to nourish an ardent affection for the Emerald Isle from which they or their forebears were once happy to escape. These, however, are potent but isolated exceptions.

Meantime, while America was becoming a vast and powerful industrial complex, its citizens were becoming steadily more materialistic in outlook, making a god of financial success, concentrating on mass industrial production and superficial mass education, sceptically distrusting the motives of others, naively convinced that their own were pure and unstained. Subscribing to the slogan “my country, right or wrong,” they are an emotional people, readily swayed by spurious slogans. For examples, “Remember the Alamo,” the wiping out of a band of infiltrators entrenched in a Mexican convent on Mexican soil; “Fifty-four forty or fight,” a brazen attempt to deny to the Canadian provinces all access to their Pacific sea-board; “Remember the Maine,” the sinking of an American warship in Havana harbour by internal—not external—explosion; “Remember Pearl Harbour,” a disastrous naval defeat which might have been turned into victory if Washington—having broken the Japanese secret code—had informed Hawaii of the movements and location of the Japanese battle fleet.

The whole free world is today acutely suffering from the colossal mistakes of 1945 because an American president, ignorant of European conditions and haunted by an inherent distrust of British policy, felt that the way to get on with Stalin was “to give him what he wanted.” Nor can mankind readily forget the slaughter of Hiroshima, when to terminate quickly a successful war against an Asiatic nation, America deliberately opened a Pandora’s box and committed the greatest atrocity in all recorded history.

Standing comfortably on the side lines for more than two years in each World War, and prospering mightily thereby, it had been possible for an American president of some thirty-five years ago to retort crisply, when questioned about life-saving
loans to needy nations shortly to become allies in a common cause, "They hired the money, didn't they?"

But the past thirty years have witnessed a revolutionary change, a full swing of the pendulum. In domestic affairs, this country once so boastful of individual initiative has moved decidedly to the left and adopted many socialistic devices that were formerly regarded with scorn. It has become a welfare state, a democracy trending towards demagoguery, a land where the consumer is frequently sacrificed to the special interests of capital or labour, a land where the old Puritanism flourishes side by side with a new wantonness, a civic slackness, a loss of discipline, an evasion of the written law. In similar fashion the American attitude in foreign relations has radically changed: loans and gifts are passed out with a lavish hand, many being genuinely altruistic, others based on the naïve belief that friendship can be purchased. Much of this has gone to retarded nations dominated by unscrupulous politicians who have in consequence been able to postpone or neglect highly desirable and constructive internal economies. Backward nations formerly self-supporting have by such policies been converted into mendicants, when what is needed is the development of native initiative and of a pride in national accomplishment, so that the backward can be trained to stand solidly on their own feet. Except in western Europe, the net result has been to enrich a few politicians and their favoured friends, with little benefit to the under-dogs, the unlettered, and the needy, whom it was honestly designed to elevate and improve.

In the United States, as in Latin America, politics has increasingly become the preserve of budding and ambitious lawyers. A strange malady appears to afflict those entering public service, for while the majority of the citizens are sensible, hard-headed and practical in their own affairs, foreign policy has become confused, vacillating, and contradictory, completely ignoring the obvious fact that other nations and peoples are by no means exact replicas of their own, a false belief possibly induced by a meretricious teaching of national history.

A great American has recently said, "With the supermarket as our temple and the singing commercial as our litany, are we likely to fire the world with an irresistible vision of America's exalted purposes?" Although frequently misled by political spell-binders, military sabre-rattlers, and a powerful but far from omniscient press too often intentionally "slanted," their inherent virtues are great and many. Perhaps their salient fault is a total failure to see themselves as others see them. As Robbie Burns would say, they lack the "gift."
Canada

The history of Canada reveals a development differing greatly from that of either the sun-drenched Latin colonies or the later British settlements enjoying more equable climatic conditions on the North Atlantic sea-board. It is true that New France was initiated as a trading venture into the St. Lawrence under a charter company which Champlain in the early years of the seventeenth century strove to encourage and expand. It is also true that after the failure to promote colonization of “The Company of One Hundred Associates” under the aegis of Cardinal Richelieu, it was taken over in 1663 by the French Crown and became a royal province modelled after a province of France. That also happened at a later date to the British charter companies to the south, but there the parallel ceases.

Contrary to practices current elsewhere in the New World, the early French arrivals fought no wars of extermination with the Hurons and Algonquins, the native tribes they found sparsely inhabiting the country, nor did they endeavour to enslave them. Indeed it was the friendship of Indian tribesmen that enabled the French freely to penetrate the continent as far as the Rockies and the mouth of the great Mississippi and later, although greatly inferior in numbers, to repel repeated British attacks from the south.

The French colonial leaders included men of vision, patriots thirsting to explore the unknown, dreaming of continental empire; neglected by a corrupt and pleasure-loving court at home when the realization of that dream was still possible, their colony was later transferred by conquest and ratifying treaty to the British Crown, which equally failed to realize its latent possibilities. Regarded as a snowy waste of savages and fur-bearing animals by a Britain deeply involved in European politics, it was the last of the American nations to achieve its destiny, the Cinderella of the New World. Its survival and attainment of the stature of a great transcontinental entity has been due to a variety of unrelated happenings, imperfectly appreciated as to ultimate effect at the time they occurred, and in part fortuitous.

It is true that far-sighted French leaders in New France built a chain of forts that stretched from Quebec to the Ohio and along the Mississippi and were intended to confine the British colonies to the narrow sea-board. Nevertheless, immigration to the St. Lawrence valley from northern and western France was slight, the French court was self-centred, and her naval strength was allowed to decline. At Utrecht in 1713 she was obliged to give up her claim to Hudson’s Bay, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia “within its ancient limits.” Retaining Cape Breton, she then construc-
ted a powerful fortress at Louisbourg. Final defeat came after the ill-fated D'Anville expedition and the founding of Halifax, when during the Seven Years' War the bastions of Louisbourg and Quebec fell before the assault of Wolfe's regulars, and France at the Treaty of Paris in 1763 formally renounced all claim to Acadie and New France. It is to be noted that British settlement began in Nova Scotia only in 1749 and in Canada after 1763.

It was during the negotiations in Paris that the prospect of a British Canada hung in the balance when those who preferred sugar to snowy terrain seriously proposed the re-cession of New France in exchange for the small French islands in the Caribbean.

 Eleven years later, Parliament in London passed the so-called Quebec Act, which extended the boundaries of the Province of Quebec to the Ohio and the Mississippi, established French civil law, and confirmed the Roman Church in its ancient privileges. Unknowingly, they had saved Quebec to the British Crown: when the Revolutionary War broke out in the following year and colonial levies with Benedict Arnold invaded the new province, capturing Montreal and laying siege to Quebec, they were confident that the French stock would rise and throw off the British yoke; but the inhabitants remained quiescent, faithful to their true allegiance. British consideration for the defeated race paralleled that extended by the early French arrivals to the primitive tribal inhabitants one hundred and fifty years earlier. It had its reward.

At least equally important in its effect was the harsh treatment given to those planters in the rebellious British colonies who refused to become rebels—the so-called Tories who remained loyal to their mother country. Britain, according to Woodrow Wilson, freely granted full independence to the colonies when, disheartened by the loss of their French ally and in financial difficulties, they had least expected it. Had the now exultant colonists shown similar magnanimity to the loyalists domiciled among them, the latter would presumably have remained in peaceful possession of their properties and in time been smoothly absorbed into the budding nation. But persecution and eviction stiffened their resolution and impelled them to trek northward, seeking new homes in the unpeopled forested areas of Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. It was these United Empire Loyalists, still smarting from American injustice, who helped to turn the scale when in 1812 the United States wantonly declared war on a Britain engaged in a death struggle with Napoleon, and sent her armies into Canada. It is true that they captured and burned York, now Toronto, the provincial capital, in due reprisal for which outrage
a British general later burned the Capitol at Washington. Without the presence and stout resistance of these United Empire Loyalists in support of the few regulars available, opposition to the invaders would have been slight in the Niagara peninsula, and all of Canada west of the Ottawa might easily have fallen to American aggression.

Thus Canada was twice saved from absorption into an expanding and belligerent American Union—once by the passive resistance of the French stock during the Revolutionary War, and again by the staunch resistance of the evicted Loyalists in the senseless War of 1812. The aggressive Americans had unwittingly, by their severity, made possible Macdonald's dream of a Dominion stretching from sea to sea; but not without one more narrow escape.

Spaniards from Mexico were first to explore the Pacific Coast, but Russian traders had been in Alaska since 1741. British claims to the coast intervening between Mexico and Russia were based on the coastal explorations and mappings of Captains Cook and Vancouver, a continental crossing by land twelve years before the exploit of Lewis and Clark, and a chain of trading posts from Russian Alaska to the mouth of the Columbia; in 1825 she had signed a convention under which Russia agreed not to intrude or make any claims south of 54°40' north latitude.

In the 'forties of the last century an American demand was put forward for the entire coast-line north to Russian Alaska. The loudly-voiced slogan was “Fifty-four forty or fight.” Rarely has a more imperialistic demand been put forward. If it had been granted, this bare-faced claim would forever have denied the Canadian provinces all access to their own Pacific coast-line. But cooler councils prevailed and the Ashburton Treaty of 1846 fixed the international boundary at the forty-ninth parallel, a compromise unpopular to both sides—to the British because it alienated the Oregon Territory, and to the Americans because it limited their extravagant and baseless pretensions.

The Canadian provinces had fared badly in dealing with southern pressure. But Joseph Howe, writing in 1851, countered the British belief that what was left to her was an area of relatively worthless territory: “Great Britain up to this moment controls one-half the continent, I believe the best half; not the best for slavery, or for growing cotton and tobacco, but the best for raising men and women.”

The provinces progressed slowly and through constant struggle with bureaucracy in London, at different rates of speed, from representative to responsible government, which was hastened in the Canadas by the abortive rebellions of Papineau and Mackenzie and in Nova Scotia by the eloquence of Joseph Howe. Con-
federation, which came in 1867, owing so much to the drive and tact of Sir John A. Macdonald, was given impetus by the termination of the War between the States, the demonstration that strength lay in union, the presence of thousands of tough unemployed campaigners on the southern border, and finally the threat of the Fenian Raids. With the later accession of the remaining provinces of British North America, the process of growth from a small French fur-trading company through vicissitudes at times painful and uncertain to a great independent transcontinental power was now geographically complete. A country long regarded by Britain as an area where she could strike at her enemy France, and thereafter by the United States as a plum ripe for the picking, could no longer be taken for granted by either, although linked to the former by history, to the latter by geography; to the former by sentiment, to the latter by economic and business ties. Having secured her political independence from Britain, she is now in danger of losing her economic independence to the United States.

The past has given her its prejudices, often deep-seated and stubbornly retained; the present its deplorable trend toward conformity, standardization, and adherence to a set pattern, attitudes so beneficial in industrial operations but so soporific in human relations. Her political growth has not paralleled her material progress. Patriotism and national pride have not developed pari passu with that in either Latin America or the United States, perhaps because the land is so broad east and west, so narrow in effective depth north and south. Thinking is parochial and provincial rather than national. Centrifugal forces are not absent. The Maritimes caught up to their commercial disadvantage in the wide net of Confederation; Quebec with its traditions; Ontario with its loyalists; the prairie provinces with their throng of newcomers; the Trans-Rockies, a world of its own facing the Orient—these are not yet effectively welded into a national unity, not yet thinking as a Canadian nation.

Although the rebellious British colonies had widely different interests and outlooks, yet they found leaders capable of reconciling those local interests and building pride in a national entity. Sir John produced a political union, but Canada has yet to find a leader capable of producing a union of minds.

Canada is rapidly becoming Americanized, to the point that what America does today Canada will probably do tomorrow. As the United States, with increasing welfare legislation and federal controls, progresses on the road to State Socialism, so similarly does Canada.

The Soviet Union, moving in the opposite direction, has confounded the world with its national unity and its astounding material progress which, despite
wide-spread devastation in two great wars, has been effected in one-half the period that has elapsed since Confederation. The harsh methods at first obligatory in a disorganized society were deplorable, but we cannot fail to acclaim her accomplishments in recent years. How have they been realized? By making their Communist belief a religion for the masses, a kind of "new Calvinism;" by inculcating the prime factors of dedication and discipline, both sadly lacking in a complacent and self-satisfied Canada. It is late, but not too late, for the emergence of some inspired leader to "sound the loud timbrel" in a call for national dedication, national discipline, national unity.