Friedenberg never wonders why people rebel. Rather, it's the reverse. His work begins with the question: Why don't people rebel in the face of massive social injustice? This paper is an attempt at a critical appreciation of this core theme which has evolved through his work over the years. There is a profound preoccupation, from his early work on schools to his later work on civil liberties in Canada, with the ways in which societies produce their well-socialized members, who apparently can become so docile and myopic, that they can be made to do the work of their own repression.

This is one of the most difficult problems in social theory. Traditional Marxism has tended to cast the issue into the residual category of "false consciousness" without asking how the ruling ideas of an era can be so effectively inculcated in the masses or, in turn, how such ideologies might be best punctured. Western Marxist thought, from Gramsci to the Frankfurt school, has taken a number of stabs at the question from which Friedenberg has borrowed; he has found especially valuable Herbert Marcuse's idea of "repressive tolerance." The liberal tradition assumes a "rational person" who consciously assesses the costs and benefits according to self-interest before taking action, while conservatives presume that order and respect for authority are right and natural. For both of these world-views, the problem of complicity simply falls out of sight. For Friedenberg, the dilemma ultimately takes a Nietzschean turn which arrives at and seems unable to go beyond a conception of *ressentiment*: "the impotent rage of the subject reacting to confinement who is forced to repress himself or herself in the interests of survival. *Ressentiment* is opposition cathexed into socially 'safe' channels . . . which thereby preserves the system of inequality."
The Subject of Domination/The Dominated Subject

There is a certain delight evident in the pages of *The Disposal of Liberty* with exposing the pretentiousness of power and the self-righteousness of the privileged. The reader of these pages is rewarded with the sharp eye which reveals the emperors with no clothes. Friedenberg abhors smugness, even apologizing now and then, lest his own remarks inadvertently display it. One is led unerringly toward the ridiculousness of the just-so stories and pious lies through which the powerful cloak themselves with the look of morality and altruism. When consumers boycott table grapes in support of striking farm-workers, the Pentagon buys them *en masse* to feed soldiers thereby making one major group of people support the landowners against another. Major corporations find it more economic to pour money into advertising shoddy products than into research for good ones. Ronald Reagan, while still governor of California, would turn Vietnam into a parking lot in the name of liberty and democracy. Here a little Marxian political economy is the antidote to the poison of official rhetoric. It peels away hypocritical talk about safeguarding the free world in Indochina when the state elite would, as Friedenberg points out, "force them [the Indochinese] off the land and into the cities where they would be compelled to serve as the proletarian base for the economic development of their country within the American imperial infrastructure."²

There is a sense here of Nietzschean "philosophy with a hammer." The text displays a thoroughgoing intent to hold people and institutions responsible for their actions; it burns away the shrouds and cobwebs which would obscure the Realpolitik. It is easy to conceive of a sequel to *The Disposal of Liberty* as little has changed a decade later. One could examine how contributors to pension plans prefer not to know how their pension money is earned through investment in South Africa. One could witness the smug pronouncements of churches who deploy God to do the work of sanctioning discrimination against lesbians and gay men. One might wonder about the deaths of fourteen thousand Nicaraguan schoolteachers, health care workers, and peasants who have died at the hands of assassins hired on American taxpayers' money, for here is a people who have deeply shocked the very rich by daring to throw them out in order to take control of their own lives. Such a work would, like *The Disposal of Liberty*, ring of the outraged laughter and pain of Nietzsche's Zarathustra peering into the nihilist abyss. But the machinations of elites are perhaps to be expected; their actions and delusions can be put down to self-interest. Running through Friedenberg's work is a deeper puzzlement about
how the subordinated masses are marshalled behind the machines of state and capital. Before Foucault talks of it in *Discipline and Punish*, there is a vision in Friedenberg’s later work of a disciplinary, carceral system encompassing schoolchildren, soldiers, and consumers. In the writings of the 1960s on youth and education, there is a simpler story to tell. The school system, in its socialization of the young into adulthood, vanquishes the spontaneity of youth. The job of the schools, so it seems, is to blunt the creative impulse and to integrate youth into social rationality, that “supremely alienating form of self-abuse.”

There is in the earlier accounts a relatively straightforward moral drama opposing youthful vitality to the regimentation and worn imaginativeness of adulthood. “The young . . . are more likely to look upon their feelings as a guide to what is good, and to view the demands of society and the expectations of others . . . as the problem.” Schools become the agents creating the bureaucratic citizen.

This characterization of the problem turned out to be a timely one, for the student movement which rose with the civil rights movements of the New Left, found a sympathetic proponent and vaunted Friedenberg as one of its own. This fortuitous turn of events helped bring Friedenberg, along with Paul Goodman and others, a certain celebrity.

In return, the upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s brought a changed tone to Friedenberg’s work. Whereas the earlier writings, while committed and controversial in their own right, nevertheless displayed a certain detached and academic voice, the later work forged a sharper, more critical, and systematic exposure of modern society. Throughout, there is always an engaging style but also a detectable move from a certain judiciousness which forged a balanced, if idiosyncratic, view toward a more incisive deployment of ironical wit. With this change comes a shift in moral parameters. The later work shows a new concern with the complicity of the oppressed in their own oppression. In a 1971 work, *The Anti-American Generation*, Friedenberg excoriates army youth with their “bovine refusal to consider the [Vietnam] war and their roles in it as a part of any underlying moral or political context, coupled with a high level of hatred and contempt for those who do.” And in an extended essay on R.D. Laing, Friedenberg worries whether schizophrenics are not deviants from social norms, but rather hyper-conformists who have taken social conventions too much to heart. They are “people who have tried to respond to other persons’ reality too much too early, and have become inextricably caught up in games that other people play.” By the early 1970s, with the New Left movements falling into disarray, problems of authority and compliance begin to look more complex.
Critique cannot be reserved only for elites when "the hand that pulls the lever on the voting machine also releases the bombs on the helpless villagers in the bombardier's path."9 "The basic flaw in the democratic process," Friedenberg concludes, "is not that the average man is incapable of intelligent participation in the affairs of the state. It is that he must be rendered incapable of doing so in order to prevent him from using his formal political powers to challenge the existing distributions of wealth and power."10 Youth are no less susceptible to this process than anyone else; the conventional Marxian faith in the working class offers little solace. For Friedenberg sees a "clamorous resignation" among Americans and the lower middle class figures prominently in this account as bearers of the "dog in the manger" attitude.11 There seems to be a certain mean-spiritedness to human nature. The wounded want not so much to join hands with their fellows but to lash out at their peers who might have found a little happiness.

This change of perception and hardened judgment occurs against the backdrop of the Nixon years. This was an era when the United States media put a great deal of effort into turning up working-class pockets of support for the state, successfully promoting the hard-hat into a symbol of patriotic Americanism, blind trust in the imperial state, and reactionary resistance to the aspirations of minorities. But there may be more to be said on the problem of why people do not rebel and why, in fact, they may hang on tenaciously to traditional social arrangements. There are dangers in stopping analysis at the point of moral judgment to blame the "masses" for failing to live up to intellectual aspirations. Analysis of the support base for the New Right, for example, reveals a more particular set of social contours. Reactionary social movements find a constituency among those displaced or damaged by modernity and whose anxieties become focused on the more visible symbols of modern society.12 For the Nietzschean motif which finds ressentiment behind the actions of the masses may, like the Marxist reliance on false consciousness, explain too little and fail to come to grips with the life-experiences of the many social components which make up the "masses." "Pot-busts, queer-bashings, and pornography-hunts will occur frequently and provide such public satisfaction in any society in which an anxious and industrious lower-middle class has achieved paramount political importance," Friedenberg concludes,13 endorsing an explanation which deserves closer scrutiny. Yet there are signs in the texts of the early 1970s that all is not lost; there remain fundamental incentives for at least some people to break through the system of domination. Perhaps as Marcuse suggests, there may be a "biological" substratum which pulls against the disciplined world."14 Radicalizing experiences and illicit pleasures
continue to break through the repressive ethic. Perhaps governments suppress drug experimentation and homosexuality with such fervour, especially among youth, because “they cannot permit its citizens . . . to have experiences . . . that diminish their alienation, put them in touch with their real feelings and perceptions of reality and free them from the shackles of bad faith and existential guilt at their complicity in their own alienation.”

It is no less the case today as 1980s have become an era when one must disavow any positive experiences, awakenings, or personal growth through hallucinogenic catalysts. Even consideration of the issues at stake becomes heretical in times such as these, as the Reagan administration identifies drug use as the primary social problem, as mandatory urine tests are imposed on workers and government employees, and voters in the 1986 mid-term elections are treated to politicians displaying urine samples.

Dialogues with the Gay Movement

Homosexuality, too, is a pleasure without the legitimation of (re-)production, that threatens a breakthrough to authenticity. This measure of authenticity places Friedenberg in deep sympathy with some of the founding propositions of the early gay liberation movement. In 1974, Greg Lehne interviewed Friedenberg for Canada’s leading gay liberation journal, *The Body Politic*, where Friedenberg offered a number of observations which were to raise considerable consternation in the local movement. In an era when “the personal is the political” was a shibboleth of New Left movements, Lehne was particularly interested in the linkage between Friedenberg’s life-experiences and his philosophy.

Such a relationship is always a difficult one to explore. There is little point in reducing a complex argumentation to personal status by claiming that any particular position is held because its author is homosexual or Jewish or working class. Yet it is perhaps not unreasonable to wonder if being Jewish or gay or otherwise outside the conventional wisdoms and taken-for-granted knowledge of society, does not offer a unique vantage point from which to puncture hypocrisy and deflate complacency. Certainly there is no causal relationship, nor a lack of dullards and very conventional people among homosexuals. But then again, gay people are placed on the “wrong” side of a set of cultural signifiers of Judeo-Christian civilization and therefore, not unexpectedly, may develop an interest in examining or disrupting the unquestioned mind-sets which define family, text, and state. Some carefully argued research on what might be termed “homo-textuality” has recently appeared from George Stambolian and Elaine Marks in
reference to French literary writers. Paul Binding has developed such a hypothesis in examining the work of Federico Garcia Lorca as has Rivers on Proust. Albert Levi makes a good case for linking elements of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy with the manner of his sexual encounters with men. And Paul Goodman once recalled, "When Growing Up Absurd had had a number of glowing reviews, finally one irritated critic, Alfred Kazin, darkly hinted that I wrote about my Puerto Rican delinquents because I was queer for them." To which Goodman replied, "Naturally!" arguing that good writing flows from genuine interest in the subject and further lamenting, "it is a loss that we do not have the pedagogic sexual friendships that have starred other cultures."

When Lehne posed a similar question to Friedenberg, he responded, "I wouldn't doubt that... but I think it's dead wrong to be distinguishing sexual feelings from all other feelings," adding "I've never been absurd enough to suppose that any adolescent had any feelings of sexual attraction toward me." He concludes that the sexual feelings of adults should not be imposed upon adolescents. In the interview, Friedenberg also holds the gay movement up to his usual critical scrutiny, stating "all liberation movements I think are necessary, and none work" and "what is difficult to conceive of is a revolution which really liberates most of society." The following issue of The Body Politic contained an outraged letter to the editor signed by six gay liberationists accusing Friedenberg of "backward notions, ... an embarrassing display of intellectual shallowness on an issue which is so central to his being," and of being "a person elevated by the mechanisms of the ruling class to the position of intellectual authority." The letter writers objected particularly to Friedenberg's distancing of himself from the sexual love of adolescents, to his apparent claim that "straights are more oppressed than gays," to the implication that "some form of gay oppression is necessary," and to his skepticism of political action which seems to presume that the oppression of gay people would disappear without concerted action by a movement organization.

The shock expressed by the letter writers must be contextualized in the temper of the gay movement of the time. Still in its formative stages not five years from the Stonewall Rebellion, and feeling beset by enemies, there is a sense of betrayal in the liberationists that Friedenberg should include them in his skepticism. Feeling bereft of allies and defensive of a few hard-won gains, endorsement by intellectuals like Paul Goodman (who was regarded by the New Left as an enfant terrible grown up) was meaningful and desired. For the gay liberation-
ists, who sought to take Friedenberg among them, there is a sense of let-down in his failure to provide whole-hearted support.

In retrospect, the movement writers seem to miss the irony and subtlety of Friedenberg’s argument and misperceive his sympathy for them. They misread Friedenberg’s analysis that homophobia springs from the bad conscience of heterosexuals arising from their own self-mutilation and self-oppression at the behest of the carceral state. For Friedenberg’s ironic remarks on the self-abnegation of heterosexuals and the ways in which societies feed off the repression of erotic energies, the liberationists read a denial of the oppression of gay people and an affirmation of its necessity. In this sense, heterosexuals may be “more oppressed” than gay people, but these comments hold cold comfort for heterosexuals who turn out more self-alienated and complicit in their own repression. Also springing from this analysis, is a view that the understanding of the roots of sexual oppression and its alleviation must run far deeper than the lobbying power of movement organizations. Marcuse’s sense of a one-dimensional society absorbing opposition through repressive tolerance runs through Friedenberg’s commentaries of the time. As Friedenberg says, “repressive tolerance is my favorite kind of repression—although not my favorite kind of tolerance!”

But the liberationists may be right in suspecting a pessimism born of the closetry of the 1960s and Friedenberg’s diffidence towards sex may follow from his claim “I dislike writing about sex because I know very little about it from personal experience.” (Goodman, on the other hand, reveals a very active and ongoing sexual interest in “Memoirs of an Ancient Activist,” arguing for sexual promiscuity on the grounds that far from being shallow, “the chief human use of sex . . . is to get to know other persons intimately, and that has been my experience.”)

There is perhaps a coming out process evident in the later writings of the 1970s. In 1978, Friedenberg says “the great and continuing achievement of gay liberation is to limit the state’s ravages and maintain vigilance against it; and for this all honor to it.” While Friedenberg mentions to Lehne in 1974 that his move to Canada was unrelated to Canada’s decriminalization of homosexuality, in 1980 he allows that leaving the United States had to do with his perception of the American tendency to withdraw rights from “almost any person who might actually need its protection,” a perception shaped by a gay sensibility. “As a lifelong though diffident homophile, I had known as much without asking,” he wrote. In the 1980s, Friedenberg is no longer being interviewed by The Body Politic, rather he is writing reviews for it on gay studies conferences. The diffidence and tentativeness are gone; there is a subtle shift from presenting the gay world from
the “outside” to viewing it from the “inside.” In a review of an international gay studies conference held in Amsterdam in 1983, Friedenberg looks back nostalgically at the Gay Academic Union conferences of the early 1970s in New York, contrasting their “celebratory quality” to the more disappointing academic jousting of the Dutch who have the luxury of believing that they live in a “not especially hostile milieu.” Even homosexuality, it seemed, can be tamed and routinized. In the end, however, his assessment is unqualified: “I have never dared hope to live to see the day when such a conference could be held, and I had come largely to explore the meaning of being gay with new friends and to celebrate that fact.”

And two years later in the Sociologists’ Gay Caucus Newsletter, he reports on the Sex and the State conference held in Toronto in 1985 as “the most stimulating and enjoyable Conference I have ever attended during 50 years... a real combination of high quality research... with a real sense of celebration of our common condition as gays and lesbians.”

The Deferential Canadian

Nowhere in Friedenberg’s work is the role of ressentiment and the search for authenticity more problematic than in Deference to Authority. When Friedenberg turns his critical acumen toward Canada, something goes awry. Whereas The Disposal of Liberty was an insider’s critique of the United States, Deference to Authority is fundamentally an outsider’s view of Canada—indeed a highly American view of Canada which finds Canada wanting by U.S. standards, thereby paradoxically reproducing the lines of authority traditional in academic writing where the powerful view the powerless. Friedenberg offers the metaphor that Canada is rather like the “wife” of the United States, being both protected and controlled by it, and like Professor Higgins, he laments, “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?” With Seymour Martin Lipset and so many other Americans who sought to sum up Canada, he cannot quite forgive Canada for abstaining from the American Revolution. Canadians “decided not to seek the risks and responsibilities of revolution and self-rule” and this final cause has supposedly founded the Canadian character. Ressentiment is, as we have seen, the final sin in Friedenberg’s world and, it seems, Canadians have more than the usual dose of it. “Envy and resentment are strong forces in nearly every culture,” he contends, “but they are especially strong in Canada, where openly aggressive behaviour is discouraged rather than rewarded.”

Canadians more often remember resisting the United States invasion in the War of 1812, one of hundreds of little imperial wars that the
United States has waged in the name of freedom and democracy whether the putative benefactors of U.S. "largesse" liked it or not. The "deferential Canadian" thesis stands up only by ignoring the Canadian tradition of resistance and by refusing to mention: the Winnipeg General Strike, the March on Ottawa, the Regina Manifesto, the Quiet Revolution, and the not-so-quiet rise of Québécois nationalism. If the book had been published a year later, it might have included the massive gay mobilization around the 1980 Toronto bath raids. (One bright spot in the book is mention of the spunky, low-budget film *Outrageous!*). But instead, the Canadian character rides on an anecdote from an unnamed professor about Canadian students' complacency on the lack of a Miranda rule in the country.

Many of Friedenberg's complaints about the state of Canadian civil liberties anticipate the new constitution proclaimed two years after the publication of *Deference to Authority*. To be sure, it will take a decade or more of court rulings to determine the effectiveness of the constitutional remedies but, at least on the face of it, the 1982 Constitution provides an effective Charter of Rights and Freedoms, offers a Miranda rule, and creates a separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature, as well as abolishing writs of assistance and double jeopardy. Undoubtedly, this is not enough. Censorship boards, the police, and the prison system continue to exert arbitrary and abusive power and there remains a great deal of room for improving civil liberties in the nation. But are these laws and practices enough to make a case for a Canadian personality?

The problems with *Deference to Authority* flow from the lack of recognition of the differences between the Canadian and American state systems and the different implications of being an imperial nation or a component of an empire. Friedenberg complains that Canadians "accept a governmental structure under which liberty cannot be guaranteed because they are highly ambivalent about personal freedom and because they genuinely believe that government is designed to be an instrument for advancing the general welfare, and is not, in principle, anything to fear." This Whiggish view, that all repressive power flows from the state is a view guaranteed in American society by the plutocracy which controls the mass dissemination of ideas, which thereby deflects public view from the exercise of capital. Freedom tends so often in American political philosophy to be defined as opposition to the state and, in turn, identified with the power exercised by entrepreneurial capitalism. So deep is this semiotic opposition, that freedom of the press itself is typically defined in the United States as the ability to criticize the government while capitalist ownership of all the major channels of mass communication is taken for granted. This
was especially clear in the intense American reaction to proposals before the United Nations for a "new information order" which were interpreted by the American press as an attempt by governments to control journalists, without recognizing the problem of the ideological hegemony exercised by the American press over the rest of the "free world." The structure of power itself, then, guarantees this peculiar definition of freedom. The capitalist monopoly over the mass media in the United States not surprisingly almost never critically examines the effect of major corporations on the American people. Advertisers are inviolate. Corporate directors are never examined on the decisions which result in the economic devastation of neighborhoods, cities, and entire regions of the United States while presidents can be sunk by the media because of their occasional personal clumsiness (in the case of Gerald Ford) or because of their tardiness in rescuing a handful of CIA agents from the wrath of the Iranian people.

Nations in the American orbit who find their oilfields drained away by U.S. corporations, their diets occupied by Coca-Cola and McDonalds, and local cultures replaced by Sylvester Stallone movies often turn to government as the sole bulwark against foreign domination. Canadian reactions are not unlike those of Latin Americans who turn to the state in order to affect national development and contain the depredations of U.S. multinationals. The distortions of a colonized economy have tended to push Canadians toward reliance on the state for a high proportion of professional employment, for research and development funding, and for cultural protection. Joel Novek points out that

a survey conducted in the United States in 1978 on the employment patterns of 1976-77 bachelors graduates shows a much stronger trend toward commercial sector employment. The commercial sector accounted for 57% of all employed graduates as opposed to 40% in Canada. A major difference lay in the key sectors of manufacturing and trade which employed 15% and 14% of all American graduates, respectively, approximately double the proportions for Canada . . . . Canadian industry with its heavy component of foreign ownership, imports of technology-intensive products and services, and exports of raw materials simply has had only limited demand for the highly qualified manpower our universities have been turning out . . . . In the absence of significant industrial demand for highly qualified manpower, the public sector served as employer of the first resort for Canadian graduates. 33

With manufacturing and trade largely owned by foreign corporations, the research, legal, and other ancillary professions associated with head offices, remain outside the country.

Imperial economies such as that of the United States provide all without state initiative. Derision of cultural nationalism is easy
from the perspective of a nation which has never had to worry about—and finds entirely unimaginable—the problem of cultural domination. With economic control centralized in New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, both Anglo-Canadians and the Québécois typically look to the state to do what every capitalist state must do, that is, to pay the human and ecological costs incurred by industry. Where this is complicated by foreign control, the state has more repair work to do. In the United States, where advanced capitalism has produced the goods, making Americans among the richest of all people, the perceived threat is much more external and military and in that realm, the United States has constructed the most formidable lethal apparatus in the history of humanity.

As early as 1974, Friedenberg contrasted Canadian “smugness” and “respect for authority” to the United States which was “a great deal more free” and “much more punitive.” But it won’t do to celebrate the violence of American society and to prefer public vandalism to Canadian caution because Canadians lack the initiative to steal public phone books. Nor will it do to pronounce Canada unfree because liquor stores are owned by governments and businesses are closed on Sunday in some provinces.

Much of the evidence for American freedom comes from decisions made by the Warren court. There is little sense of the historical transitoriness of this era in American history for the Warren court came out of the New Deal and only in the postwar period began to reverse almost a century of segregation. The Warren Court was sustained by almost two decades of civil rights activities, pressed above all by black Americans. In the 1980s, with the legacy of the Nixon and Reagan years, the court returns to its traditional role as guarantor of privilege. In the summer of 1986, it could not see its way toward a civil liberty which the French have taken for granted since 1800 by ruling that the state continue to have the right to criminalize the sexual conduct of consenting adults in private. It has failed to attained a level of liberty thought minimal by Jeremy Bentham. The rather too rosy portrait of civil liberties in the United States, used as the measure of Canadian compliance with authority, could use an antidote such as Robert Goldstein’s seven-hundred-page Political Repression in Modern America.

The disappointment of the political pilgrim marks Deference to Authority. Friedenberg arrived in Canada in 1970 at the height of the U.S. ravages of Indochina and the Nixonian “dirty tricks” directed against domestic opposition. The American romance with Canada has long relied upon the country being a blank slate—blank because of
American ignorance about it—upon which a tolerant and peaceable land could be sketched. Canada for many Americans is an alter ego, "just like us," as Americans are so wont to say about Canada, but "different" in its civility. Canada usually turns out to offer an unexpected set of differences and similarities. For Friedenberg, Canada is too little like the United States after all, with its avoidance of conflict, and too much like the United States with its state repression and its own skeletons in the closet. As well, Friedenberg's image of Canada is complicated by another significant opposition. The 1960s are indelibly associated with Americananness in his writings and the 1970s with Canadianness. With the restive 1960s contrasted with the quiescent 1970s, Canadian "deference" is inevitably magnified. What would the book look like, had it been published in 1980 by a Canadian social critic who had lived in Canada during the 1960s but in the United States during the 1970s? Perhaps it is time to stop comparing Canadians with Americans. More fruitful might be comparison with Mexico as both countries, in the words of Pierre Trudeau, have the experience of "being in bed with an elephant." Or comparisons might be drawn with Poland, Finland, or Austria in their attempts to survive with a colossus at their doorstep. Canadians and Australians may have more to learn from each other with their similar heritage than have Canadians and Americans.

In reviewing the Terry Fox story as a Canadian cultural icon, Friedenberg remarks:

Courage, resourcefulness, and fortitude in the continuing struggle with hostile natural forces is one of the most deeply rooted and justly honored Canadian traditions . . . . The story of Terry Fox thus expresses to an extreme degree the perception of tragedy as an impersonal, technical problem to be confronted by primarily private rather than social or political means.

No doubt Canadians, Americans, and a good many others continue to need to be held responsible for their actions, to quit making excuses, and to realize their own, even personal, roles in making social injustice operate. Canadian nationalists, for example, raise the cry of foreign domination not to explain away compliance, but to call on Canadians to take mastery over their own destinies. It is an inherent trait of the competitive individualist ethic of advanced capitalist societies to deflect social ills into technical, managerial, and individual forms of problem-solving, thereby saving the social relations of power and economy from critical scrutiny and possible disruption. It is only through the work of social gadflies that the larger picture comes into view and a step forward can become possible.
NOTES

6. I confess that this theme is a preoccupation of my own work in *The Survival of Domination*.
10. Ibid., 75.
11. Ibid., 60, 113.
15. R. D. Lang, 98.
20. Ibid.
30. *Deference to Authority*, 114.
32. *Deference to Authority*, 99.
34. Lehne, 17.
35. *Deference to Authority*, 156.
40. “Among Men, Among Women,” 118-120.