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ANNEXATION IN THE MARITIMES? THE BUTLER

MISSION TO CHARLOTTETOWN

Curious people milled about the wharves and warehouses of the waterfront district of Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, in the late summer of 1868. Eyes scanned the horizon where a ship had appeared, bearing men who might change the Island's uncertain future. The vessel was the United States revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, one of the newest ships in the paltry American fleet. She carried two twenty-four pound Dahlgren shell guns, and a thirty-pound Parrott gun, but this day they were covered. The *McCulloch* was on a mission of peace. Although the ship carried a crew of forty, the attention of bystanders fastened on one of the passengers.

The fat man stood by the *McCulloch*’s rail, the wind tousling his oily, thinning hair, which he wore long in the back. "His features were somewhat heavy; his complexion fair; his skin smooth and slightly flushed; his eyes were clear and bright, with a noticeable cast in the left one".1 Benjamin F. Butler's military eye evaluated Charlottetown's harbor and its approaches. It did not rival the New Orleans he knew so well, but it was a fine strategic harbor, perhaps the key to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the defense of Canada itself. A rare smile crinkled his corpulent face.

Islanders gathered at Lord's Wharf on Saturday, August 29, 1868, recognized the significance of Butler's visit. The man was no tourist come to enjoy the sun and sand of the tiny British colony. Captain James H. Meryman maneuvered the *McCulloch* to her anchorage, and the passengers disembarked. The visitors were escorted to Miss Rankin's, Charlottetown's most splendid hostelry. "Beast" Butler led the group, as chairman of a Select Committee of...
the United States House of Representatives to talk fish and trade with the Islanders. Other members were Congressmen Luke Poland of Vermont and James B. Beck of Kentucky. The prospect of a summer excursion to the Gulf of St. Lawrence brought a strange congeries of unofficial visitors as well.2

Although the visiting Yankees received a warm welcome from the people of Charlottetown, Ben Butler and his delegation presented profound implications for Prince Edward Island and the Dominion of Canada. The year 1868 saw growing tension between the United States and Canada regarding the fisheries of the North Atlantic and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Ominously for Canada, Butler represented the unruly mackerel fishermen of Gloucester, Massachusetts, in Congress. Canadians stamped Butler with the stigma of annexationist, but Islanders felt pleasure, not caution or concern, with the General’s arrival.

To categorize a mercurial politician like Butler is perhaps impossible but he shared many similarities with other Radical Republican politicians. The motives of Butler, Charles Sumner, Zachariah Chandler and other Radical expansionists were political and sectional. Their annexationist speeches always became most violent before elections. They aimed at winning the anglophobic Irish vote, and the support of special interests who would be helped by annexation, such as New England fishermen.3

Butler’s attitude regarding Prince Edward Island in 1868 indicates the false bravado of his annexationist rhetoric. But he long felt “the annexation or absorption of the Canadas is both necessary and inevitable for the future of the United States”.4 His constituents adored the General for the long verbal battle he waged against Great Britain and Canada for the benefit of the New England fishermen. Other men despised him. Abraham Lincoln said Butler was “as full of poison gas as a dead dog”.5 Annexationist propaganda, however, returned him to Congress year after year. “How long, O Lord, how long!” cried the belligerent General, urging heavenly intervention in the annexation of Canada.6

Annexation seemed only a remote possibility in 1868, but the flamboyant General’s trip to Charlottetown did threaten to undermine the fisheries policy of the Canadian government. In that year, Fisheries Minister Peter Mitchell supported a license system, whereby United States schooners could fish within the three-mile limit of the British North American provinces on payment of a fifty-cent per ton license fee. Most New England mackerel vessels evaded payment because the people of the Island, centre of the fishery, refused to
support Mitchell's policy. Prince Edward Island refused to join the Dominion in 1867 in spite of heavy pressure from Great Britain and the other provinces to do so. Islanders felt they had as much right to define and execute fisheries policy as did the Canadian government. British and Canadian attempts to force the Island into supporting the license system only intensified their efforts to find independent solutions to the peculiar economic problems of Prince Edward Island.

The government of John A. Macdonald in Ottawa divided on the best means of bringing the Island safely into Confederation. Charles Tupper, Macdonald's key ally in the Maritimes, said, "I am quite satisfied that the project of forcing the Island into confederation would not be entertained". The Prime Minister preferred to wait until the 1867 elections took place on the Island, feeling a Confederationist majority would result. Alexander T. Galt saw things more realistically. Strategically, Galt felt Canada could not allow Island resources, such as the fisheries, to remain outside the Dominion's control. "There are several questions which affect so intimately the interests of all the Colonies—the fisheries for instance—that ought to be dealt with in some general principle", he warned an Island politician. "It is scarcely likely that they will be permitted to adopt a course adverse to that arranged between the Imperial Govt. and the Confederation".

By 1868, the "adverse course" threatened the delicate relations between Ottawa and Nova Scotia. Stewart Campbell, Member of Parliament for Guysborough, a fishing and trading region at the entrance to the Gut of Canso, reflected his constituents' concern over Island activities. During the life of the Reciprocity Treaty, 1854-1866, Guysborough prospered by trading with New England fishermen. Fishery regulations of the new Dominion made smuggling hazardous in Nova Scotia, and as a result the Americans set up their trading operation on Prince Edward Island. "I . . . believe that the violation is a matter of daily recurrence", wrote Campbell, "and that in fact the American fishermen on the coasts and in the Ports of Prince Edward Island are permitted as ample privileges as they ever enjoyed during the existence of the Reciprocity Treaty". Campbell reported to the Canadian government at the end of the 1868 fishing season that Island merchants sold Americans thousands of barrels in addition to salt, bait, and other fishing supplies. Warehousing of New England cargoes and refitting of American vessels had also become important in Island ports, according to the Nova Scotian. All these activities violated the Convention of 1818.
Peter Mitchell agreed with Campbell's gloomy assessment. He felt the time had come to take strong action against both Prince Edward Island and its Yankee allies. "The laxity and connivance of the authorities of Prince Edward Island", he said, "are calculated practically to defeat the Imperial measures devised for the protection of our fisheries". Mitchell and Macdonald also feared the anti-Confederation movement which was still powerful in Nova Scotia. That province's loss of trade as a result of the Island's schemes might endanger Confederation itself, according to the Minister of Marine and Fisheries: "In the present temper of that province an injury of this kind is naturally ascribed to the policy of the Dominion Government, instead of being attributed to the peculiar conduct of Prince Edward Island".

While Mitchell and his colleagues in Ottawa fumed about fisheries policy, those responsible for economic policy in Charlottetown also had problems. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty had been disastrous to Island business. The agricultural produce of the fertile Island found a ready market in industrial New England between 1854 and 1865. Exports to the United States fell from £120,928 in 1865 to £21,633 in 1866, while imports only slipped slightly. The cheap food that fed immigrant workers in New England mill towns during the Civil War now came from other sources. Stagnation gripped the Island economy, in spite of minor illicit trading with American fishermen. While Canada had been able to open some alternate markets after the collapse of reciprocity, Prince Edward Island had virtually no place to turn. Canadian farmers produced many of the same staples as did the Island. Prohibitive transportation costs and uncertain communication with Canada's population centres made the Dominion an unimportant market. The provinces to the west would export to the Island, but Canada would take few Island imports. In 1866, Canadian imports increased by £17,889, while Island exports to Canada grew by only £828. The imbalance of trade became even more pronounced in the following years. By 1869, Prince Edward Island seemed to have reached rock bottom. Island politicians, reflecting the high proportion of farmers in the electorate, believed Canada would never become a worthwhile market. The only hope seemed to be a renewal of reciprocity with the United States. The Island slowly strangled; there was no outlet for its farm produce; its population was being drained by the attractions of New England.

Islanders thought reciprocity would be a panacea for the colony. They hoped to achieve some form of reciprocal trade with the United States, either
with or without the cooperation of Canada. Like the Macdonald government, Island politicians hoped to barter their fisheries for privileges in the rich American market. When Fernando Cortez Beaman of Michigan introduced a bill for general reciprocity in the House in 1868, the Charlottetown Herald felt its success was simply a matter of time: “The folly of their Japanese policy of the past few years is becoming unpleasantly realized to them”.20 Island spirits raised even higher when Congress dispatched Ben Butler and his committee to Charlottetown.

The “Beast” was a shrewd opportunist. He had succeeded at each of his careers: soldier, politician, lawyer, anglophobe, demagogue. It was in the latter role that he arrived at Charlottetown. Butler offered glib, attractive solutions to the problems of Prince Edward Island. As a contemporary said, “The hottest battles, the roughest weather, the most perilous adventures were pleasant for him, . . . in them he found his native element”.21

The rich fisheries of the Gulf of St. Lawrence lured Butler to Prince Edward Island in 1868. He had twin motives. In the first place, his bid for re-election in November was challenged by the Boston dandy, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., the candidate of Massachusetts’ codfish aristocracy. The newspaper publicity surrounding Butler’s trip to the Bay could not hurt his political chances. Second, Butler’s constituents would benefit if the Island fisheries were opened to Americans. Better yet, he might be able to promote the annexation of Prince Edward Island to the United States.

Early in the year Butler’s political ambition extended far beyond Gloucester. Butler clubs appeared—perhaps spontaneously—throughout the United States. They aimed at promoting the General’s Presidential candidacy. “Work on, work on my noble Sir and the laboring masses of our country will in time be appropriately grateful for your services”, wrote one typical admirer.22 “Now then, if you can do anything west, why not set the ball in motion and see how well it will roll”, advised one of his strategists in January.23 Butler did not disavow these advances until Ulysses Grant’s support appeared overwhelming. By April, Butler recognized Grant’s strength: “It is most certain that he will be our Candidate however much we may regret it. Thus we shall be obliged to support [Grant] for the good of the country. An unfortunate contingency in my judgement but unavoidable”.24 Newspaper editor George Wilkes, a close Butler ally, arranged a temporary truce in the Butler-Grant feud, and for a time the Massachusetts man eyed a place in the Senate.25

Butler perhaps instinctively recognized that his unorthodox financial views would have to gain wider favor before he could properly expect higher
political office. In the meantime, the fishing industry had to be kept loyal. The General, for example, arranged higher tariffs on French fish in response to the protectionist demands of Plymouth fishermen. Elias H. Derby, a Boston attorney, drew Butler’s attention to Peter Mitchell’s scheme to increase the Canadian license fee: “The act is designed to make us or rather the fishermen pay the new Canadian bounty of $4 [sic] per ton and to [kill] our Fisheries or coerce a new treaty and bring back Nova Scotia to the Dominion. Do not allow [Congress] to adjourn without having it . . . [do something].” Butler’s response reflected his faith in Derby. He asked the lawyer to draw up resolutions regarding the Canadian license policy which he could submit to Congress.

One of Derby’s ideas might have been reciprocity with Prince Edward Island. He became annoyed when Congress refused to strike against Canada: “It will [never] do to submit to such [acquisition] as the Canadian act. If we shew proper [effort] England will back out”. Butler recognized the shrewdness of Derby’s advice. He revealed his strategy regarding Prince Edward Island to the Bostonian in July: “You will see that I have endeavored to get reciprocity with Prince Edward Island as it would be an entering wedge to annexation”.

Congress frustrated Butler’s dream. His resolution urging reciprocal trade between the United States and the Island was sent to the Committee on Ways and Means, headed by reciprocity foe General Robert Schenck of Ohio. Butler told the committee that hundreds of American lives would be saved with the free use of Island harbors. Reciprocity would also be a bonanza for American fishermen, “allowing them full and free use of their harbors, and the best fishing grounds in the world, which now they are almost wholly deprived of”. Schenck feared geography meant Canada would bitterly oppose such a reciprocity agreement. “We may do this thing with this little Island and afterwards be ‘snubbed’ by being told that they had not the power to do this thing”. Schenck proved a remarkable prophet. The committee chairman arranged a compromise on July 25. A three-man delegation would travel to Prince Edward Island to gather information and would report its findings to Congress. The compromise passed, 62 to 40.

The House action brought conflict on the Island. W. H. Pope and The Islander launched an attack on the proposal for reciprocity: “The subject is one which involves Imperial interests. The fisheries around our shores are not ours, nor do we possess any right to alienate them”. The Charlotte-
town Patriot said Pope was only annoyed because Canada would not be included. "A favorite Confederation argument was knocked from under his feet". The Summerside Journal shared Pope's fears. "It is well known that to interfere with the relations of smaller and weaker adjacent countries with a view of obtaining, first influence, and then ascendancy over them, has ever been the policy of the American Government". The Journal sniffed an annexation plot. The anti-Confederate Patriot disagreed: "no shrewd Colonist would, we think, wish to come under the stars and stripes, so long as he could enjoy all, . . . the commercial advantages of a complete absorption in the Republic". The Examiner said Pope "seems to consider it as his peculiar mission to throw cold water upon a movement which has for its aim the revival of trade in our midst—a movement upon the success of which depends the future well being of every class in the community". Most Charlottetown newspapers also said Canada should not be concerned with the Island's bid for reciprocity; if Canada could negotiate a treaty, then so too could Prince Edward Island.

There may have been collusion between Butler and an Island merchant before the General's party arrived at Charlottetown. That city's Chamber of Commerce met on July 21, four days before the Butler mission was authorized by Congress. Prominent at the meeting was Isaac C. Hall, an American fish merchant long resident in Charlottetown. The meeting urged immediate negotiations with the United States, leading to reciprocity. The Charlottetown Herald reported the idea was Hall's: he had suggested the reciprocity plan to Butler.

Hall's advertisements dotted the Prince Edward Island press. He promised to supply fishermen with everything from foghorns to pickles. "He also possesses superior facilities for Inspecting, Packing and Shipping Mackerel, Herring Codfish, &c. . . . The highest price paid for all kinds of FISH". Certainly it would have been in Hall's interest to renew reciprocity, or at least to allow Americans the use of Island port facilities. Lieutenant-Governor George Dundas told his government after the Chamber of Commerce meeting, "I did not deem it right to hold out the slightest hope, that Her Majesty's Government would sanction any arrangement of this kind, which did not include the other British North American Provinces".

A similar meeting in August resulted in a memorandum from the government to Dundas asking Britain to agree, "that the question of granting the privilege to American Fishermen to fish on the Coasts and in the waters
of this Island should be left to the decision . . . of the local Government and Legislature".41 The Lieutenant-Governor correctly told Attorney-General Joseph Hensley that the fisheries were an imperial matter, and a colony could not negotiate a treaty with a foreign nation. But Dundas did approve an exchange of information on trade and other topics between the government and the Butler committee, a serious mistake on his part.42 According to one historian, Dundas “was so embarrassed by the whole affair that he went on a visit to Halifax and remained there until the delegation left Charlottetown”.43

Rather oddly, the Colonial Office saw nothing wrong with the approval of informal talks between the Butler committee and the Island government. “The politicians of this little Island become rather presuming”, noted one bureaucrat. “I apprehend that Lieutenant Gov Dundas’s answer should be entirely approved”.44

While Dundas lurked in Halifax, the Canadian government faced a grave predicament. Mitchell’s policy of protecting the Canadian fisheries to force a new Reciprocity Treaty would be destroyed by unilateral action by Prince Edward Island. Using the Island as a sanctuary, New England fishermen could roam at will in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This idea certainly entered Butler’s calculations as well. Canadian fisheries policy could only succeed with the cooperation of all the provinces. An iconoclastic government in Charlottetown could, as the Butler mission indicated, pull the rug out from under Macdonald and Mitchell.

Lord Monck told Macdonald that if Dundas “knew his business he can give but one answer to Gen. Butler”. Monck advised the Prime Minister to ignore Butler and let London deal with Prince Edward Island. The Governor-General also correctly predicted that if Dundas made errors in judgement when dealing with the Americans, it would “strengthen the argument on Imperial consideration for getting P. E. Island into the Union”.45 Apparently Monck’s plea found a receptive listener. A week later he wrote Macdonald: “I am glad that you agree with me about Gen Butler’s affair. I saw Rose on Saturday and I think I succeeded in convincing him that we ought not to touch the matter”.46

While Canada pondered its strategy, Butler prepared to leave for Prince Edward Island. The British Minister to Washington, Sir Edward Thornton, warned the Foreign Office that Ben Butler was up to no good. Thornton’s main point was that Butler only intended to bolster his election campaign. “I have no doubt that General Butler will take the opportunity of fomenting
any feeling of disaffection which may exist in this island", Thornton continued, "or of a desire, if such there be, of annexing itself to the United States". Thornton characterized Butler’s strategy with precision. The approaching campaign was foremost on the General’s mind. “There are symptoms of a lively time this fall”, wrote a Salem man to Butler. “However, there’s time enough yet, and I have great faith in your own power of swaying the masses”. Men, money, and a keen sense of the public temper soon brought Butler into a commanding position in the race.

His opponent, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ran as an independent with support from conservative Republicans and the Democratic party. The famed author was a strict conservative in a largely working-class district. “His frigid manners made it difficult for him to let himself down to the level of his own class, much less to mingle with the masses”. Butler on the contrary appealed directly to the workers. Songs carried Butler’s message to the people. One stanza from “The Essex Cause” appealed to the fishermen:

Lo, on their slippery decks, astir,
The daring crews who man
The fishing smacks of Gloucester,
And the coasters of Cape Ann!
Themselves as free as the wind-blown sea,
Of the many and not of the Few,
Each one of them fights for equal rights
And equal burdens too.

The appeal to class consciousness was even more explicit in “The Butler Campaign”, a rollicking song to the tune “Bonnie Dundee”:

To the Salem Convention, ’twas Dana that spoke,—
There are taxes to pay, or the banks will be broke;
So let each millionaire who loves money and me,
Deposit his vote for myself as M.C.

Come, fill up my purse; come bring up my men;
Count out your ballots—vote frequently then;
Open your check-books—let money flow free;
Hurrah for the Bondholders! Dana, says he.

The lyrics were funny, but the contest was grimly serious and the trip to Prince Edward Island became important to Butler’s election strategy. While Dana was not a strong opponent, his backers had plenty of money at their disposal. This could be significant in a close election in Reconstruction Amer-
ica. More frightening for Butler's followers, however, the powerful war hero, Ulysses S. Grant, secretly intervened in the Congressional race against Butler. Grant's advisers in his bid for the White House, with the approval of the Republican National Committee, gave General Judson Kilpatrick two hundred dollars a day for aiding Dana's campaign. Kilpatrick spoke to large crowds in the Essex district about Butler's bizarre Civil War career. 52

Ben Butler did not behave like a worried man fighting an election when he arrived at Charlottetown. The General was at his oily diplomatic best when dealing with the proud Islanders. Mornings were spent in negotiations between the Butler committee and the Island government, headed by Attorney-General Hensley. Discussion centered on a memorandum prepared by Butler and submitted by the committee. In brief, Butler proposed nearly total reciprocity in natural products between the Island and the United States, while New England fishermen would pay a token license fee for access to Island waters and ports. Products of American factories would pay a tariff of ten percent, and there would be slight restrictions on free entrance of Island fish in United States markets. The Islanders suggested minor modifications, but they seemed pleased with the proposal. 53

While negotiators made steady progress in the morning sessions, Butler reserved the afternoons for social occasions. He showed the other side of the demagogue's coin as he toured the Island and showered praise on its people. On Tuesday afternoon after his Saturday arrival, for instance, the Butler committee boarded carriages, provided at government expense, and travelled the dusty red road to St. Dunstan's College on the outskirts of town. Butler must have considered the Massachusetts political benefits as he met the Bishop in the formal sitting rooms of the new college. 54

The social highlight of the mission was a glittering déjeuner Wednesday afternoon before the Americans began their journey back to New England. Friendship between Americans and Islanders was sealed at the social event, when both sides indulged in an orgy of flattery. "We have never listened to more elegant, chaste and temperate speeches than were those of our American visitors", reported the Charlottetown Examiner. "It was monstrous to suppose that the jugglery of statecraft could convert such genial companions, such kindly disposed neighbors, into deadly enemies seeking to destroy our lives and to ruin our country". 55 Hensley praised the Republic, Butler glorified Queen Victoria, and James Beck turned on his Kentucky charm to admit "he was quite unprepared to find such women as they had found in this out-
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of-the-way corner of the world”. The Islanders loved the flattery. According to Hensley, “they had been treated by the Congress of the United States almost as if they were a strong nation”. Reciprocity seemed nearly certain.

The hours, spent in mutual praise with good drink, passed quickly. Twilight neared as the company joined voices in “Auld Lang Syne”. “General Butler and his party then went on board the Hugh McCulloch, which immediately weighed anchor and steamed down the harbor”. The Americans were pleased with the Island hospitality and the evidence the government felt committed to reciprocity. Whatever informal arrangements the men made at Charlottetown are not known, but the Butler committee considered its trip an unqualified success. In the General’s words, the trip “proved to be a very pleasant and I trust successful expedition”.

Ben Butler returned to Massachusetts to win an election. He gave his campaign workers new energy when he told the press of the mission’s success. His initiative, Butler indicated, might save the New England fishing industry. The General easily won the Republican nomination at the district convention late in September. A week later, Butler heard that another Civil War general, George H. Gordon, “the mouthpiece of Gen. Grant”, was planning to rally Dana’s troops with malicious tales of Butler’s tactics during the Peninsula campaign. A German-language newspaper in Baltimore scorned such opposition: “The Dana movement against Butler is of conservative hue and emanates from the same clique, which would have liked to prevent Sumner’s reelection, but this ring has no hold within the people”. The newspaper predicted Butler would win by five thousand votes.

Butler exceeded the prediction, defeating Dana by nearly ten thousand votes in early November. His Island trip had worked to perfection. With victory, Prince Edward Island and reciprocity became a peripheral matter again for the ambitious General. Islanders wondered about the sudden silence from their Massachusetts champion. Isaac Hall’s son, Charles, wrote Butler plaintively in January, “I hope that the Reciprocity scheme is not forgotten”. The General exuded optimism, but over the long term. “Our reciprocity legislation is by no means forgotten and we hope soon to see it a success. What is known as the short session of Congress is not well calculated to give time for its development but I think it is sure to come”.

The lame-duck session of Congress did pose problems, but it was a weak excuse. “There is no more danger of the ratification of that treaty than of
yourself being struck by lightning", Butler told Edward Hamilton. While he spoke of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, Butler’s remark reflected his hostility to Britain and her colonies. His introduction of the Select Committee’s report on March 2, 1869, came one day before the session ended and the lame ducks migrated from Washington. Its timing alone made the report simply pro forma. Reciprocity would certainly be useful to Butler’s purposes; it might even promote annexation. But it was certainly not a project worth fighting through Congress, especially not in the confusion, the turbulence, the excitement of Reconstruction politics in Washington.

Butler told Congress reciprocity would benefit both the United States and Prince Edward Island. Cheap food would feed the workers of New England who produced the manufactured goods that would be bought on the Island. The profits would be largely American. The fisheries were the most important element of reciprocity, according to the General. The “wrongs” of 1818 would be righted by access to the inshore fisheries and ports of the Island. Butler also implied that reciprocity would destroy Canada’s policy of protecting the Gulf fisheries. The only threats in Butler’s report to Congress were between the lines. The General praised Charlottetown’s harbor, noting that “a harbor so easily fortified, and so safe, would be exceedingly valuable to any power seeking to control the bay and river of St. Lawrence”. With Canadian-American antagonism rising over the disputed mackerel fisheries, it was possible for Canadians to see an annexationist United States waiting “to control the bay and river of St. Lawrence”.

Butler’s report rather frightened Sir Edward Thornton. “Your Lordship will easily perceive the desire which is betrayed by the tenor of this Report”, the diplomat warned Lord Clarendon, “not only to enter into isolated and distinctive commercial relations with that island, but even to detach it and Nova Scotia from the rest of the Dominion of Canada”. Thornton’s anxieties were misplaced, however. Few people in Congress even cared about reciprocity in 1869, certainly not reciprocity with tiny Prince Edward Island which would benefit only a few New England fishermen. Butler’s report was quietly accepted and ignored. There is no evidence that the General really cared. While the concept of annexation was not dead, Butler had more important political fish to fry.

NOTES

2. The account of Butler’s arrival is based on the *North Star*, 1 September 1868, in Charlottetown *Patriot*, 3 September 1868; Charlottetown *Herald*, 2 September 1868; and Charlottetown * Examiner*, 31 August 1868.

3. The main proponent of the view that Republican expansionists were primarily motivated by political goals is Joe Patterson Smith, in the following works: *The Republican Expansionists of the Early Reconstruction Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1933; “American Republican Leadership and the Movement for the Annexation of Canada in the Eighteen-Sixties”, Canadian Historical Association, *Report*, 1935, pp. 67-75; and “A United States of North America—Shadow or Substance? 1815-1915”, *Canadian Historical Review*, XXVI (June, 1945), pp. 109-118.


18. Although the Charlottetown Herald, 3 June 1868, inflicted with rampant boosterism, said trade in 1868 was much improved over the preceding year.


23. E. J. Sherman to Butler, Lawrence, Mass., 8 January 1868, ibid. Volume 42 of the Butler Papers includes many letters in a similar vein.


25. Wilkes to Butler, Washington, 12 April, 14 April 1868; Butler to Wilkes, draft, Washington, 2 May 1868; Wilkes to Grant, copy, Washington, 6 May 1868; Grant to Wilkes, copy, Washington, 19 June 1868; Jonas H. Finch to Butler, Boston, 14 April 1868, Butler Papers, vol. 43.


27. Derby to Butler, Lynn Beach, Mass., 16 June 1868; ibid., vol. 43.


29. Derby to Butler, Boston, 9 July 1868, ibid.

30. Butler to Derby, draft, Washington, 14 July 1868, ibid.

31. The Congressional debate was published in Prince Edward Island, Journal of the House of Assembly, 1869, Appendix D. See also Resolution of the United States House of Representatives, 23 July 1868, enclosure in copy, Robert Hodson to Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, Charlottetown, 20 December 1868, Governor-General's Correspondence Concerning the North Atlantic Fisheries, G 21, No. 130, vol. 1 (a), Public Archives of Canada.

32. Charlottetown Patriot, 30 July 1868.

33. Summerside Journal, 30 July 1868, in Charlottetown Patriot, 6 August 1868.

34. Charlottetown Patriot, 6 August 1868.

35. Charlottetown Examiner, 7 September 1868.

36. Charlottetown Herald, 5 August 1868; Charlottetown Examiner, 31 August 1868; Charlottetown Patriot, 12 September 1868.


38. Charlottetown Herald, 5 August 1868.
44. Minute by Elliot, Colonial Office, 10 September 1868, on Dundas to Buckingham, Halifax, 27 August 1868, C.O. 226, vol. 104.
46. Monck to Macdonald, Ottawa, 8 September 1868, ibid. Sir John Rose, Canadian Minister of Finance, was the prime mover in what was hoped would be new reciprocity negotiations with the United States. See David M. L. Farr, “Sir John Rose and Imperial Relations: An Episode in Gladstone’s First Administration”, Canadian Historical Review, XXXIII (March, 1952), pp. 28-30.
53. Memorandum of the Butler committee, with notes by Joseph Hensley, enclosure in Hodgson to Buckingham, Charlottetown, 20 December 1868, G 21, No. 130, vol. 1 (a).
54. Charlottetown Patriot, 3 September 1868; Charlottetown Herald, 2 September 1868.
55. Charlottetown Examiner, 7 September 1868.
56. The dejeuner speeches are printed in the Herald, Extra, 23 September 1868. Reports are also available in the Herald, 9 September; the Examiner, 7, 14 September; and the Patriot, 3, 5, 10, 12 September 1868.
57. Charlottetown Patriot, 5 September 1868.
58. Butler to John P. Foley (New York Tribune) and J. Macfarland (Philadelphia Inquirer), draft, Gloucester, 8 September 1868, Butler Papers, vol. 43.
59. Gloucester Telegraph, 15 September 1868, in Charlottetown Patriot, 19 September 1868. On the other hand, the Boston Advertiser, 6 October 1868,
Patriot, 22 October 1868, called Butler’s mission a cheap election gimmick.

60. Caleb Cushing to Butler, Washington, 29 September 1868, Butler Papers, vol. 44.

61. “Anti-Grant Radical” to Butler, Boston, 5 October 1868, ibid.

62. Baltimore Wecker, 19 October 1868, translation in ibid.

63. For Butler’s lack of enthusiasm for reciprocity after the election, see Butler to W. T. Gleason, Middlesex Quarry Company, draft, Washington, 16 November 1868; Gleason to Butler, Portland, Conn., 3 October 1868; Butler to William A. Buckingham, draft, Washington, 30 December 1868; Buckingham to Butler, Norwich, Conn., 26 December 1868; Butler to Thomas Rupell, draft, Washington, 12 December 1868; Rupell to Butler, Boston, 10 December 1868, ibid.

64. Charles W. Hall to Butler, Charlottetown, 19 January 1869; Butler to Hall, draft, Washington, 2 February 1869, ibid., vol. 45.


68. For the reaction of the British government to the Butler mission, and the Prince Edward Island response to the collapse of reciprocity, see Bolger, Prince Edward Island, chapter IX.