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THE ACADIAN RESPONSE TO THE GROWTH OF
BRITISH POWER IN NOVA SCOTIA, 1749-1755*

FOR INDISCREETLY NIBBLING the fruit of temptation mankind was first sent from Eden. The Acadians lost their earthly paradise¹ in 1755, but they were not expelled for tasting apples. Indeed, their deportation defies simple explanation, and its origins yet remain clouded, despite the efforts of scores of historians. Most accounts of the event have discussed the history of British policy in Nova Scotia, seeking there the roots of the expulsion plan. In doing so, however, they have viewed the disruption through British eyes alone, failing for the most part to see the 1740s and 1750s as the Acadians themselves saw them. Yet Acadian intransigence as well as British belligerence worked toward the deportation, and therefore the viewpoint of the Acadians during these years should also be examined if we are to discover how their own actions may have contributed to their downfall.

The Acadians were expelled ostensibly because they would not swear an unqualified oath of allegiance to the British crown. This they had persistently refused to do since their conquest in 1710, and when British colonial officials demanded it of them once more in 1755 they remained unyielding. It is therefore necessary to ask why they proved so adamant in the face of British pressure, especially in those crucial years after 1749. J. B. Brebner has suggested that, caught between two warring imperial giants and bound by tradition to the land of their forefathers, the Acadians refused the oath for three principal reasons:

In the first place they had no love of fighting, either against the Indians or against men of their own language and religion, and secondly, past experience led them to believe they might be excused from taking it again. Finally, they had been made genuinely fearful about the continuance of the free exercise of their religion. . . .²

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Faced with conflicting claims on their loyalty, the Acadians found themselves in a situation with which they could not cope. Lacking significant political experience as well as any understanding of the international situation, Brebner argued, they merely clung to the policy of neutrality which had served them well before.³

The Acadians' inflexibility, however, cannot be fully explained as a simple extension of their traditional attitude to British demands, nor as the consequence of political naivety, and while they both abhorred the prospect of fighting their kinsmen and feared for their religious beliefs, even these anxieties do not fully comprehend their predicament. For in the years after Halifax was founded the Acadians reacted to what they believed was a major assault on the cultural ramparts of their society. They felt that not just their political allegiance but their entire way of life was at stake. Long before 1749, as Professor A. H. Clark has recently shown, a new North American people had grown up in Acadia, forming a small but coherent nation with institutions mature and healthy enough to perpetuate its life on the peninsula.⁴ As this nation had been moulded, as Frenchmen slowly became Acadian, these people came to sense their own uniqueness; a collective consciousness grew amongst them. This social identity, the Acadians felt, was threatened by Britain's presence in Nova Scotia, especially after 1749, and more than any other influence, this conviction stiffened their resolve in the face of British coercion.

Before examining how the Acadians viewed the growth of British power in Nova Scotia after 1749, however, it is necessary to glance briefly at the earlier history of their relations with Britain's servants at Annapolis Royal. For twenty years after the conquest, a succession of Nova Scotian officials made periodic and equally unsuccessful attempts to force an unqualified oath of allegiance upon the habitants. Their replies were an index of the hopes and anxieties which they felt as new subjects of an alien king. Most often they urged that, by swearing such an oath, they would earn the wrath of their Indian neighbors. Frequently they volunteered to take an alternate oath exempting them from military service against France and her allies, at the same time promising not to serve against Great Britain. In this oft-repeated response can be seen the Acadians' very real fear of the local Indian tribes as well as a hint that perhaps they were keeping one eye fixed on Louisbourg, alert for any sign of a French return to Acadia. But most important of all, it suggests that they truly sought a neutral role in Nova Scotia, committed neither to France nor to Britain.

The question of the oath took on added significance after 1730. In September of that year, Nova Scotia's Governor Richard Philipps reported to Whitehall that he had succeeded in winning an unconditional oath of allegiance from all of his previously recalcitrant subjects. Brebner has suggested that, although Philipps probably received this submission from the inhabitants of the Annapolis Valley, he most likely gained it from the remainder by verbally exempting them from future military service.⁵ But although the true nature of the Philipps oath has long been debated, this question is largely immaterial. What is important is that both the Acadians and their governors thereafter came to believe that an oath with such a reservation had been taken. Thus, in the Acadians' eyes their neutral status in Nova Scotia was confirmed; they had satisfied the claims which Britain had placed on their allegiance and were therefore entitled to remain in their homes on the terms which they wished. Paradoxically, Philipps' solution to the problem of the oath had merely reinforced the Acadians' belief that they were of neither the French nor the British empires.

It is clear in retrospect that the oath quickly became the central focus of all dispute between the Acadians and their British rulers. And as it did, the initial meaning of the issue soon became encrusted with layers of additional, symbolic meaning which grew, pearl-like, about that central irritant. In British eyes the oath promised to secure the ascendancy over the colony and its people which had eluded them. They saw in its acceptance victory over France and the integration of a troublesome colony into the imperial structure. Their subjects' persistent refusal to take the unrestricted oath seemed both the measure of their failure to achieve these ends and proof of the Acadians' continued affection for France. For the Acadians, themselves, the oath assumed even darker symbolic significance. It represented the dominion which an alien power held over them, threatening their cherished neutral status by foreshadowing combat against their French and Indian neighbors. More fundamentally, they considered the proffered oath an assault on the very foundations of their culture. It menaced their autonomy in Nova Scotia, chief guarantor of their cultural authenticity, and consigned them to the care of a heretic king. In such a crisis defence was vital and refusal became its citadel. This persistent rejection of the unqualified oath became the Acadians' symbol of their struggle for cultural preservation. Alternatively the Philipps oath represented the successful defence of their own cultural values; it embodied the affirmation of their unique folk identity. Ultimately it was because both sides in-

vested the oath with such added meaning that it became the source of serious dispute.

Certainly, by 1749 the Acadians had long felt threatened by Britain's presence in Nova Scotia, but while it might be thought that the fall of Louisbourg and related military activities had intensified their distress markedly, this does not appear to have happened.⁶ It was the founding of Halifax which pressed a new and greater weight upon them. Previously their concern had been aroused primarily by Britain's official presence on the peninsula, but with the arrival of Cornwallis and his peaceful army of colonists they were beset by an entirely new threat—British settlement. And although the new community was far from their own homes, it nevertheless loomed darkly on the horizons of their awareness.

On July 14 Cornwallis ordered the Acadians to take a new, unrestricted oath of allegiance within three months,⁷ reviving the issue which had lain dormant for almost twenty years. The Acadians' first response clearly demonstrated their alarm. Upon hearing the Governor's renewed demands, the three Acadian deputies who had attended him on his arrival temporized, proclaiming their fear of Indian reprisals and nervously asking what their people's future was to be.⁸ They were especially anxious to know whether they would still be permitted their priests. Two weeks later a larger deputation attended the Governor and his Council seeking continued religious liberty and exemption from bearing arms in time of war. The Council agreed to the former, provided that all priests obtain a licence from the Governor and swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown. It firmly denied the latter, however, thus requiring the Acadians to take the same oath which all of His Majesty's subjects took. In reply the deputies asked "whether if they had a mind to evacuate their Lands, they would have leave to sell their Lands and Effects."⁹ Governor Cornwallis bluntly refused them permission.

Two central concerns apparently dominated this immediate reaction to Cornwallis' renewed demands and the growth of British settlement in Nova Scotia. The Acadians' first thoughts were for their church, that central pillar of their social structure, as they sensed it to be threatened by the recent protestant intrusions into their homeland. Most likely their memories of Britain's attitude toward the church heightened these fears. Long before 1749 British officials were well aware that the church was the very warp of the Acadians' social fabric, and they deplored its influence. They considered it to be the primary source of continuing French influence amongst the Acadians, and therefore the major obstacle which prevented Nova Scotia's integration into the

imperial framework. The Acadians' French priests were singled out for special condemnation. By 1749 the Acadians, too, were well aware that their priests and religious institutions lacked British favour. In previous years the British had violently criticized the Acadian priests' activities on several occasions, and even though the habitants had often treated their priests cavalierly in the past, these attacks must certainly have unsettled them, for their clerics were the very foundation of their church. Thus, when confronted with the prospect of an alien, protestant settlement in their midst as well as a renewed assault on the Philipps oath with its vital, symbolic associations, they naturally feared for the safety of their cherished church; no doubt this response was nurtured by their religious leaders, too.

The Acadians' second concern, for freedom from bearing arms in time of war, also demonstrated the fear that once more their society's foundations were under siege. As was noted earlier, they had long considered themselves aloof from the imperial struggle for Nova Scotia and, since 1730, had understood that Britain acknowledged this status by exempting them from military service. This sense of detachment was clearly indicated by their almost universal unwillingness to support either French or British military activities in Nova Scotia during the War of the Austrian Succession. Their experience as bystanders during this conflict must undoubtedly have reinforced the belief that they were indeed neutral, and it also likely stiffened their resolve to remain so in any future conflict. In addition, as Britain garrisoned Halifax and France reoccupied Louisbourg after 1748, many Acadians must have seen renewed strife in the offing, and this likely strengthened this faith even further. In such an atmosphere, the neutrality so central to their communal identity must have become a dominant preoccupation for many Acadian habitants. Certainly this was quite apparent in their reaction to Governor Cornwallis' demand for an unrestricted oath.

Soon after these initial expressions of fear and alarm the Acadians circulated and signed a series of petitions rehearsing their grievances at greater length. The first, signed by 1000 persons, was presented to the Governor and Council on September 6, 1749, by a group of deputies. It cited the previous oath of allegiance sworn under Governor Philipps, proclaimed their past and continuing loyalty to the Crown, and then stated their complaints:

We believe, Your Excellency, that if His Majesty had been informed of our conduct towards His Majesty's government, he would not propose to us an oath which, if taken, would at any moment expose our lives to great peril from the

their lives. Another was the belief that, despite their French heritage, they were a distinct people; of neither the French nor the British Empire, they had an independent, neutral destiny to fulfill in the lands of their North American ancestors. It was these two primitive beliefs which were challenged when Cornwallis arrived with his settlers and plans. This was the essential source of the Acadians' unease.¹⁴

In a second petition, requesting aid from the King of France, the Acadians again rehearsed several of these same grievances. Attached to the Philipps oath, the petitioners were unwilling to accept the new, unconditional one proposed by Cornwallis. They charged that, in refusing their priests permission to acknowledge the Bishop of Quebec's authority, the British governor was trying to deprive them of their clerics. They further claimed that, by obliging them to make war, Cornwallis wished them to attack the Indians with whom they had long been friendly, a measure as unjust as it was beyond their power. They therefore implored the King to intercede on their behalf with George II by urging the latter to revoke the Nova Scotia Governor's recent orders, thereby preserving the Acadians' religious institutions and their exemption from bearing arms. Finally, convinced of the new colonial government's ill intent, they requested his aid in winning British permission to withdraw from Nova Scotia and in settling on nearby French lands. Thus this petition, too, reiterated the Acadians' fear that their church was in peril. In addition it once more expressed grave concern for the threatened loss of their neutral status. But only as a last resort, and certain "that the intention of the new English government is to embarrass them in their conscience"¹⁵ did they threaten to leave their homes for new ones in French territory.

A small group of Acadians sent a third petition to M. de la Jonquière, the Governor of New France, in December, 1749.¹⁶ It also complained of restrictions placed upon the free exercise of their religion and of the oath which would compel them to take up arms in defence of the British. In conclusion it too requested him to help them move to French territory. Like the others, this petition reflected the distress which the Acadians felt when they saw a new British settlement spring up at Halifax and heard the renewed demands of Governor Cornwallis. It was the reply of a people whose folk identity was being seriously challenged.

The Acadians' actions, as well as their petitions, betrayed their growing disquiet in 1749. Late in July the Abbé Le Loutre observed that "les habitants françois sont dans la consternation générale" and shortly thereafter some began

to leave Nova Scotia for French territory.¹⁷ Six or seven heads of Acadian families requested land on Ile Royale in August; others had moved to nearby Ile St. Jean.¹⁸ It was reported in September that

Le nouvel établissement que les anglois font à Chebouctou, le serment de fidélité qu'ils exigent des Acadiens et les persécutions qu'ils font à leurs prêtres déterminent plusieurs habitans de cette Colonie, à venir prendre des établissements en cette isle [Ile Royale] et à l'isle St. Jean, ou nous leurs avons promis toutes sortes de secours suivant les instructions du Roy. . . .¹⁹

In the spring of 1750 their desire to leave seemed to grow. In April and May deputations from the River Canard, Grand Pré, Pisiquid, Annapolis Royal and Minas all petitioned Cornwallis for permission to quit the colony with their personal effects.²⁰ During the summer, the New England surveyor, Charles Morris, reported that many Acadians from Pisiquid and Cobequid had deserted to the French.²¹ Years later, Moses Le Dernier, an old Acadian habitant who had co-operated with the British after 1749, also recalled this atmosphere of growing alarm. The Acadians, he reminisced, had

lived very peaceable until the year 1749 which Time the English began to build the Town of Halifax and to promote the Settlement of different Parts of the Province which alarmed the Acadians so much that many of them left their Farms and Interests and fled to the Island of St. John (which was then under French Government) where they were received with Applause and great Encouragement. . . .²²

But not all Acadians were this anxious to exchange British for French masters. Although some did so and many more likely considered it, the vast majority remained on their lands, no doubt precisely where they wished to stay. As the Sieur de Courville, a French officer at Fort Beauséjour, observed, "l'Acadien est extrêmement lent et paresseux. Il ne pouvait se resigner à abandonner totalement son bien."²³ They clearly demonstrated this unwillingness when the French placed their own demands upon them. Hoping to fortify a strong position from which to command the strategic isthmus of Chignecto, French officials had decided by 1750 to abandon the Acadian settlement of Beaubassin if military necessity required it. But when Major Charles Lawrence led a British force there in April of that year, the inhabitants proved loth to leave; therefore Le Loutre and some Indian followers put the town to the torch. Only then were many of its residents forced to cross the Missiguash River into French territory.²⁴ In 1752 the new governor of Ile Royale, the Comte de Raymond, also noted the Acadians' strong desire to remain on their

lands in an account of a meeting with a deputation from Minas.²⁵ A few of those who had left Nova Scotia in 1749 and 1750 even petitioned Cornwallis' successor, Peregrine Hopson, asking to be granted the Philipps oath, the free exercise of their religion, and neutrality so that they might return to their abandoned property.²⁶ Obviously, although the Acadians' sympathies probably lay more with the French than the British, they still placed their own cause above all other loyalties.

Failing to force the Acadians to take the oath, Cornwallis allowed the issue to lapse once more, and as a result Acadian life regained a semblance of tranquility. In November, 1751, he reported that their behaviour was better than it had been; he even held out the hope that in time they would become faithful subjects.²⁷ Governor Hopson also noticed their improved disposition when he assumed office in the following year. But he also recognized the apprehension which the Acadians felt when confronted with demands to take the oath. Therefore, soon after his appointment to office, he asked permission of the Lords of Trade to postpone the oath taking until a more convenient time.²⁸ In addition he urged "that I may not be directed to send out those [foreign protestants] we have to settle anywhere among the french Inhabitants, for I have sufficient reason to be assured, was that to be done, the latter would immediately quit the Province which, according to the temper they appear to be in at the present, they do not seem desirous of doing. . . ."²⁹ Far more aware of the Acadians' plight than either his predecessor or his successor, Hopson sensed their disquietude. He saw that they wished to remain in their ancestral home and believed that they posed no immediate threat. He also saw that an alien, protestant presence in their midst might alarm them into flight. Therefore, in his subsequent dealings with them, he chose the path of conciliation. For example, he and his Council, fearing that the Acadians might depart to French-held land for want of a curé, decided on two occasions to dispense with the oath of allegiance for priests who had refused to serve the Acadians if it were demanded of them. Furthermore, this policy of appeasement seemed successful. As Hopson remarked just before he returned to England, "since I have been here the French Inhabitants have behaved tolerably well tho' their apprehensions from the French and Indians have entirely prevented their taking any step to shew themselves attached to us."³⁰ His successor, however, was less inclined towards compromise.

Charles Lawrence replaced Hopson late in 1753. Despite the claims of his many detractors, he was not a cruel, unprincipled villain. He was es-

sentially an ambitious soldier, a career officer in the British army who hoped to win advancement through the performance of what he saw to be his patriotic duty. Acquainted solely with the Acadians who lived in the Chignecto region, he knew only those whose proximity to French Acadia and ambivalent conduct left them open to every British suspicion. Having had no other contact with these habitants, it is not surprising that he thought them to be a disloyal lot. Dedicated to the cause of British victory in Nova Scotia, and seeking recognition for his efforts, he had little time for the intricate niceties of Acadian neutrality.

Lawrence took office eager to resolve the question of the oath, and although he ignored the issue for a time, his attitude toward the Acadians' conduct grew increasingly stern. In the fall of 1754 he issued a proclamation forbidding the masters of boats to carry corn on their vessels without written permission from the Governor, later extending the order to include all grains.³¹ In doing so, he hoped not only to prevent the Acadians from trading with Britain's enemies but to foster their trade with Halifax. Further to these ends he forbade the inhabitants of Minas to use their boats and canoes in the spring of 1755. Soon after, in preparation for the forthcoming Anglo-New England attack on Fort Beausejour, he also ordered the Acadians to surrender their guns and pistols. Once more thoroughly alarmed by the growing weight of British authority, the residents of Minas, Pisiquid, and River Canard again petitioned the Governor:

It appears, Sir, that your Excellency doubts the sincerity with which we have promised to be faithful to his Britannic Majesty.

We most humbly beg your Excellency to consider our past conduct. You will see, that, very far from violating the oath we have taken, we have maintained it in its entirety, in spite of the solicitations and the dreadful threats of another power. We still entertain, Sir, the same pure and sincere disposition to prove under any circumstances, our unshaken fidelity to his Majesty, provided that His Majesty shall allow us the same liberty that he has granted us. We earnestly beg your Excellency to have the goodness to inform us of his Majesty's intentions on this subject, and to give us assurances on his part.³²

Once more the Acadians responded to an apparent British threat by asserting their claim to the Philipps oath.

The Council at Halifax hastily summoned the petitioners before it, reprimanded them for their audacity and impertinence, questioned them about the validity of their allegations and ordered them to take the oath.³³ When, after a night's contemplation, they refused to do so before consulting those

whom they represented, the Council then imprisoned them. This action prompted petitions from several Acadian settlements, all protesting the habitants' past faithfulness and their resolve to take no other oath than the one which their forefathers had sworn. The positions of both sides now hardened; the deputies who had presented these most recent petitions were called before the Council and asked to take the unrestricted oath. They too refused and were also ordered into confinement, and as the Council's minutes state, "as it had been before determined to send all the French Inhabitants out of the Province if they refused to Take the Oaths, nothing now remained to be considered but what measures should be taken to send them away, and where they should be sent to."³⁴

Any account of the Acadian expulsion must acknowledge that the Acadians themselves helped bring about their own ruin. This is not to say that British officials played no part in the drama, for their decisions and actions set in motion the series of events which led ultimately to the tragedy. The Acadians merely reacted to each new circumstance which confronted them. But what has long been ignored is that the pattern of their response was dictated by their own beliefs and values; it was rooted deep in the collective consciousness of Acadian society, in its primal sense of communal identity. Even by 1710, when Port Royal fell to the British, the Acadian people had come to feel strong bonds of affection for their adopted land; they believed themselves to be a distinctive people, dwelling in a quiet corner of North America, remote from the international quarrels which raged about them. In their new British governors they saw a grave threat to the religious and cultural traditions upon which their society was founded, and the oft-demanded, unrestricted oath became the primary symbol of this menace. Similarly, in Acadian eyes the Philipps oath became the chief guarantor of their own way of life after 1730. When the British founded Halifax in 1749 in an atmosphere of growing international tension, the Acadians reacted with alarm. The growth of British settlement and the renewed requests for an unconditional oath seemed an assault on some of their fundamental socio-cultural beliefs. In the first place, it appeared to be an attack by the hereditary foes of Catholicism on the religious values so central to Acadian social and intellectual life. Secondly, it challenged the neutral self-image to which the Acadians clung. Dismayed by the growing British threat, they tried to defend their challenged values as best they could, but they were able only to take refuge behind the frail shield of the Philipps oath. Ultimately it afforded them no protection against Governor Lawrence's determination.

NOTES

1. For an account of the Acadians as driven from their garden of plenty see Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, *Evangeline: A Tale of Acadia*, (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1903).
2. John Bartlet Brebner, *New England's Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), 205.
3. *Ibid.*, 180.
4. Andrew H. Clark, *Acadia: The Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 371-80.
5. Brebner, *op. cit.*, 93-97.
6. Barry Morris Moody, "Paul Mascarene, William Shirley and the Defence of Nova Scotia, 1744-1748", (unpublished Master's dissertation, Queen's University, 1969), ch. V, *passim*. Moody indicates that the conciliatory Mascarene, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, helped to foster a relatively peaceful atmosphere amongst the Acadians by blunting New England's imperialistic thrust into the region during these years.
7. Proclamation, 14 July, 1749, Thomas B. Akins. ed. *Selections of the Public Documents of Nova Scotia*, (Halifax: Charles B. Annand, 1869), 165-66.
8. Cornwallis to the Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State, 23 July, 1749, *ibid.*, 563-64, and Minutes of the Executive Council of Nova Scotia, 14 July, 1749, *ibid.*, 166-67.
9. Minutes of the Executive Council, 31 July, 1749, *ibid.*, 168-69, and 1 August, 1749, *ibid.*, 170-71.
10. Minutes of the Executive Council, 6 September, 1749, *ibid.*, 172-3.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. Although none of the Acadians' petitions stated so explicitly, it is also possible that they feared losing their cultivated lands. Governor Cornwallis declared on 14 July, 1749, that the habitants were not to possess land in the colony unless they accepted the unrestricted oath (Proclamation, 14 July, 1749, *ibid.*, 165-66). This revived a long standing point of issue between the Acadians and the British. Since 1713 the Acadian population had expanded greatly and had brought much new land under cultivation, without benefit, however, of government survey or grant of title. British officials were loth to permit such unregulated expansion and on more than one occasion forbade it. (For example see Lt. Governor Mascarene to the Deputies of Chignecto, 11 January, 1742, *ibid.*, 115-118, and Minutes of the Executive Council, 7 August, 1740, C. B. Fergusson, ed., *Minutes of His Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal*,

1736-1749, (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1967), 29. It is therefore likely that this issue also fanned the Acadians' fears after the founding of Halifax.

15. Akins, *op. cit.*, 233-34.
16. Request of 125 persons, December, 1749, Placide Gaudet, "Acadian Genealogy and Notes," *Report Concerning Canadian Archives for the Year 1905, Canada Sessional Papers, 1906*, no. 18, vol. II, appendix A, part III, 301-02.
17. Le Loutre au Ministre, 29 juillet, 1749, *ibid.*, 283.
18. Deherbiers et Prevost (ordonnateur) au Ministre, 15 aoust, 1749, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), MG1, C11B, vol. 28.
19. Desherbiers et Prevost au Ministre, 10 septembre, 1749, *ibid.*
20. Minutes of the Executive Council, 19 April, 1750, Akins, *op. cit.*, 185, and 25 May, 1750, *ibid.*, 188.
21. "Representation of the Relative State of the French and English in Nova Scotia: transmitted by Surveyor Morris to Governor Shirley, 1750-51", PAC, MG 21, E5, British Additional Manuscript series, 19069, ff. 56-60.
22. Moses LeDernier "Account of the Acadians and Indian Tribes of Nova Scotia. . .", *ibid.*, 19071.
23. [Louis-Leonard Aumasson, Sieur de Courville], "Memoire du Canada" *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour 1924-25*. (Ls—A. Proulx, Imprimeur de Sa Majeste le Roi, 1925), 104.
24. *Ibid.*, 100.
25. Le Comte de Raymond à M. Rouille, ministre de la marine, 24 novembre, 1752, *Les derniers jours de l'Acadie, 1748-1758: Correspondances et memoires. Extraits du port-feuille de M. Le Courtois de Surlaville, Lieutenant Générale des Armées du Roi. Ancien Major des troupes de l'Île Royale*, mis en ordre et annotés par Gaston du Boscq de Beaumont (Paris: Librairie historique des provinces, Emile Lechevalier, 1899), 72-73.
26. Minutes of the Executive Council, 27 September, 1753, Akins, *op. cit.*, 203-05.
27. Cornwallis to the Lords of Trade, 3 November, 1751, PAC MG11, CO217, vol. A43.
28. Hopson to the Lords of Trade, 10 December, 1752, Akins, *op. cit.*, 197.
29. Hopson to the Lords of Trade, 16 October, 1752, PAC, MG11, CO217, vol. A49.
30. Hopson to the Lords of Trade, 1 October, 1753, PAC, MG11, CO217, vol. A54.
31. Proclamation, 17 September, 1754, Akins, *op. cit.*, 219-20, and Minutes of the Executive Council, 5 October, 1754, PAC, MG11, vol. B7.
32. Minutes of the Executive Council, 3 July, 1755, *ibid.*, 247-48.
33. *Ibid.*, 250-55.
34. Minutes of the Executive Council, 28 July, 1755, *ibid.*, 266-67.