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# FEDERAL STRAINS WITHIN A CANADIAN PARTY*

UNITY IS A RALLYING CRY within the ranks of political parties everywhere; that it must be voiced so often and in so many different circumstances reveals some of the extent to which political parties are subject to internally divisive forces. To state, then, that Canada's major parties are peculiarly susceptible to quarrels over leadership is to direct attention to an unusual aspect of such disputes in this country—the dimension imparted to them by the federal system. Canadian parties do, of course, have difficulties analogous to those of parties in other countries, difficulties such as the disputes between Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan or between Harold Macmillan and Peter Thorneycroft. But equally noteworthy in Canada are the frequent public squabbles between federal party chieftains and the provincial leaders, their theoretical subordinates. A simple pairing of names suggests some of them: Mackenzie King and Mitchell Hepburn of Ontario, George Drew and Deane Finlayson of British Columbia, Lester Pearson and Ross Thatcher of Saskatchewan. Whatever may be the causes of leadership feuds, in Canada they are always likely to be complicated by the federal system which, with its plurality of independent centres of political power, makes country-wide party discipline more difficult to maintain than it is in comparable unitary countries.

Two subjects have been raised, party leadership and the impact of federalism on the party system; as yet, neither has been investigated systematically. This paper is designed to explore the fringes of these subjects by examining a particular case—the dispute between the federal and provincial factions of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association—and by looking briefly at several other quarrels between federal and provincial leaders. Factors isolated from these disputes lead to a concluding statement of ten general proposi-

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tions about the relationship of federalism to the party system. Special emphasis will be given to the peculiar problems of organization that a party faces in trying to operate at both the federal and provincial levels of the federal system.[1]

Quarrels within a political party can usually be traced to differences over policies and objectives, to conflicts of personalities and ambitions, or to differences in the perception of problems and their most appropriate solutions. It should be recognized, however, that these same differences impart vitality as well as discord to the system. The problem is to keep the expression of these differences within bounds, a task which becomes even more difficult if the party has an "open" tradition honouring healthy debate and the expression of diverse and even radically different viewpoints.

The course of debate and struggle within a party is analagous to an electrical system in which the leaders and clusterings of party opinion are represented by electrodes of varying capabilities. The party's *raison d'être* —its ultimate objective—is represented by the common field through which the electrodes interact. The system's activity depends upon maintenance of voltage differentials (i.e., opinion differences) between the electrodes, all or some of which are responsive to changes in the external environment. The organization's relative efficiency depends upon its ability to harmonize and integrate the different forces coursing through it. If the internal transmission and transforming facilities break down, the system's output of power is reduced. In most states the boundaries of the system are co-terminous with a single service area—the unitary state. But in a federation such as Canada there is a self-contained party organization within each province. This means that there is co-existing within the country whole series of similar parties which are frequently required to work together as national units. Attempts to combine these often disparate systems for the pursuit or maintenance of public office at the federal capital reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the overall integrating process.

Before considering a particular case, we should, perhaps, look briefly at the editorial-page model which rationalizes the two-fold concerns of a major Canadian party. According to the model, the Conservative party, for example, should be a unified, country-wide association of political activists who work through provincial sub-divisions to achieve their goals. While the party's objectives—of ideological formulation, popular persuasion, and attainment of office—may be prosecuted at two independent levels of government, the party sub-division chiefs, the provincial leaders, are usually seen to be hierarchically

inferior to the federal leader. The Progressive Conservative party in British Columbia does not always conform closely to the model.

The Conservative party has deep roots in the often rocky soil of British Columbia. The party's nineteenth-century attributes were those of trade and tariffs, of opportunity and opportunism, of damn-yankeeism and vision-eering, with nearly all these traits summed up in "what's good for business is good for B.C." These political attributes found ready acceptance in the primitive coastal society which featured mansions for imperial cast-offs, easy money for timber pirates and railway buccaneers, and cold beans or worse for down-on-their-luck Eastern and American gold-hunters. The Conservatives successfully promoted the colony's union with Canada in 1871 and enjoyed to the full the favour of federal voters for three decades.

The party was never one to worry much about policy or ideology in the province.[2] Although members were summoned to policy-making conventions as early as the 1920s, the party has always stressed attractive leadership, good organization, and a balanced geographical appeal as the best route to the council chamber at Victoria. The party was given its provincial shape by Richard McBride, who became British Columbia's first partisan premier in 1902. Until that time, the provincial cabinet had been a coalition dedicated to the non-partisan principle of extracting as much as possible from Ottawa and concerned to keep the local community as healthy as possible for business.

To win the election of 1902 as a Conservative, McBride put together an assortment of personal supporters, existing federal associations, and a number of *ad hoc* legislative electoral committees. Many Tories protested McBride's conversion of the federal associations to provincial purposes, but his efforts to co-ordinate party campaigning found favour with Robert Borden, who was trying to reconstruct the Canadian party after Laurier's victories of 1896 and 1900. The fruits of victory soon provided solace for the protesting federal Tories, and all the more so because McBride's chief lieutenant, W. J. Bowser, employed his considerable talents and the advantages of office-holding to build a strong provincial organization. When Borden became prime minister, his supporters from British Columbia were indebted to McBride's provincial association for organizing their campaign.

British Columbia voters remained fairly faithful to the party until 1916, when the Conservatives were deposed from the provincial government benches. After twelve years in opposition, the party returned to office in 1928; there it

remained until 1933, when the Depression and political stupidity destroyed the party provincially. In the federal field, the Conservatives held the largest number of British Columbia seats from 1908 through to 1935, when they were reduced to only five of the sixteen parliamentary seats.

In the early 1930s, the provincial Conservatives found themselves leaderless, their ranks decimated, their association disintegrating, and their campaign machinery non-existent; the only Tories holding public office had made their way by their own energies. Provincial Conservatives wandered in the wilderness for some years, but by the end of the decade they had found new leaders and some legislative representation. Before either Dr. R. J. Manion or R. L. Maitland could remedy the party's weaknesses in the federal and provincial fields, the second world war had begun. At Ottawa, Manion was rebuffed in his proposals for a union government, but at Victoria the Liberals found it expedient after the 1941 election to take Maitland and his eleven Tory seat-mates into a coalition government. This created an embarrassing anomaly for the party. In the federal capital, the Conservative party stood as the champion of the provinces and in strong opposition to the Liberals. In the provincial capital, however, the Conservative leaders were committed to supporting a coalition cabinet in which they were junior partners to the Liberals.

British Columbia's political environment changed significantly during the 1930s and 1940s. Both the social outlook and the political allegiance of the people were shaped anew by the forces of depression, heavy immigration, and later boom periods. Many of the electorate that came to the fore at the mid-century lacked strong identification with either the Liberal or the Conservative party. Without family or community political tradition relevant to their new society, these people saw partisan politics in terms of either protest or simple opportunism; to the political environment of the pre-depression era had been added, as well, the yeasty elements of militant socialism and radical conservatism.

Both war and depression had long inhibited vigorous provincial government action. The dominant Liberals changed their leader, began wearying of their alliance with the Conservatives, and eventually expelled the Tory leader, Herbert Anscomb, from his provincial cabinet post. Neither Liberals nor Conservatives, in preparing for the 1952 election, showed much awareness of the new electorate. A resulting lack of sensitivity to the voting public was reflected in preparations for the 1952 election—preparations which consisted

chiefly in devising a mixture of voting schemes which would keep the socialists at bay. The C.C.F. was denied office, but the electoral jimmying resulted in the election of a Social Credit government led by a renegade Conservative M.L.A. whose party had twice rejected his bid for the leadership. The Conservatives were reduced by that election to four of the forty-eight legislative seats; the Liberals fared only a little better. In the 1953 election, Premier Bennett and his Social Crediters greatly improved their standing; the Conservatives were cut to one lonely member, and even he eventually left the party. Despite numerous by-election attempts and two more general elections, by the end of 1960 the Conservatives still had no representation in the legislature.

The party was stronger in the federal field. Conservatives held three of the province's federal seats through the 1949 and 1953 elections, seven in 1957, and eighteen of the twenty-two in 1958. Little of this support could apparently be swung to provincial candidates despite some effort made by the three senior members of Parliament, Howard Green, Davie Fulton, and George Pearkes. The Social Credit premier had succeeded, first, in identifying his group as the party of progress—in contrast with the coalition parties—and, secondly, in polarizing provincial politics into "Social Credit or Socialism". Even worse for the Tories, Social Credit had captured not only their former electorate but a good number of their followers who had toiled previously for the Tories in the provincial vineyards. Indeed, some people even worked for Social Credit in provincial campaigns and for the Conservatives in federal campaigns. Why was the Conservative party in such a perilous state? The most significant reason, it may be suspected, was an ailment that can be termed "federal-provincial schizophrenia".

"Federal-provincial schizophrenia" is what Aristotle would probably call a degenerate form of the "right state" of a political party. Our model suggests this "right" form obtains when the same political organism functions with equal efficiency in both the federal and provincial areas of its responsibility. The schizophrenic forms of organization are probably more common in the Canadian provinces than is the efficiently operating, dual function type. To its great cost, the Conservative party in British Columbia manifested its schizophrenic tendencies in a violent public quarrel; the resulting public attention made the situation especially difficult to repair.

The quarrel turned, essentially, on two issues: how federal activity in the province should be organized and who should direct it.[3] Following the

provincial association's collapse in the early 1930s, federal work in the province was handled by a committee appointed by members of Parliament and other candidates. On coming to the federal leadership in 1942, John Bracken undertook to revitalize Conservative organization throughout Canada. Where a province had an effective Conservative party association, full responsibility was vested in the provincial leader. Where the party was notably weak, as in Quebec, a special organizer was named. British Columbia presented an unusual problem. An active provincial association existed, but its leaders were in coalition with the Liberals. An effective C.C.F. opposition was keeping the government on the defensive, and leading British Columbia Conservatives were frequently required to support or promote Liberal-inspired policies. To compound the problem, from Bracken's point of view, the provincial Tories tended to see the local picture in the same terms as did the Liberals and did not agree that there was any necessity for a thorough-going reorganization.

Deciding that a strong personal hand was needed, Bracken named Howard Green as his personal representative and gave him particular responsibility for all federal organization work in British Columbia. In practice, Bracken made the policy and tactical decisions and Green communicated them to the faithful in British Columbia. The then provincial leader (R. L. Maitland) accepted this arrangement, although his chief lieutenant, Herbert Anscomb, was angry at having to defer to Green or to anybody else in organizational concerns. Anscomb won the provincial leadership in 1946 but did little to improve the state of the party.

The coalition arrangement generated much internal party friction after the war. Anscomb and his close associates enjoyed many of the prerequisites of office and insisted on continuing with the coalition; they hoped thereby to gain both time and resources for rebuilding the party. But many other Conservatives thought that the coalition should have been terminated at the war's end. This group included the many who were out of favour with the gruff and sometimes arrogant provincial leader. More importantly, however, the dissidents also comprised returning veterans, older party workers who saw the organization degenerating, young party members eager for a change, and many party adherents who were concerned that the alliance with the Liberals was impairing the party's chances in the federal field. Liberal and Conservative party labels were not used during the 1945 and 1949 provincial elections, and the Conservative associations were ordered to work for the election of Coalition candidates no matter what their previous political stripe might have been. A sizable number of those discontented with Anscomb refused to par-

ticipate, especially in the 1949 campaign; most prominent of all the abstainers were the members of Parliament and their close associates and supporters.

The provincial leader was openly challenged at the 1950 annual meeting. The federal wing of the party, the Young Conservatives, and others discontented with Anscomb, supported W. A. C. Bennett in what proved to be that M.L.A.'s second futile bid for the leadership. After beating off Bennett's threat fairly easily, Anscomb went on to elect nearly all his own people to the association executive, and again sought to control all campaign funds and the selection of federal candidates. Drew, taking the advice of his M.P.'s, refused to accede either to Anscomb's insistence on full organizational control or to his demand that the organizer be dismissed. The organizer, Frank Barker, was accused by the Anscomb faction of having directed Bennett's unsuccessful drive for the leadership. Soon after the convention, Barker was summarily locked out of the provincial Conservative office and his files were thrust into the hall. With the approval of the federal group, Barker opened another office despite the provincial leader's strong objections.

The 1952 provincial election was a disaster for the Conservatives, and Anscomb resigned; a protégé, Deane Finlayson, came out of the ensuing leadership contest with a comfortable lead over the candidate of the federal wing (A. L. Bewley). Finlayson also sought to control federal organization work but was told that he would first have to demonstrate some competence both in the field and at the polls. He continued to insist on his "rights" as provincial leader. Finally, in 1954, to report the occasion from Finlayson's viewpoint,

> After years of frustration, after failing in every means including the changing of leadership in the province and the changing of presidents; after promises of cooperation that were never kept, after dismemberment of the party and what appeared to be a deliberate effort to emasculate the party so it could no longer be a factor in provincial politics, the Executive decided upon drastic action. It moved a motion of non confidence in the National Leader on July 17th (1954).[4]

The provincial leader urged the necessity of approving his executive's motion. He charged that Drew had had secret dealings with various party opponents, that Drew was arrogant and dictatorial, and that Drew and his organizers had made a "saw-off" deal with Social Credit to the effect that Drew's group would keep out of Social Credit's way in British Columbia in return for Social Credit agreement not to oppose federal Conservative candidates. The federal party leaders in the province were "agents of malice and misery", Finlayson said, and he went on to predict that within two years Drew would be

supplanted as national leader by John Diefenbaker. Angry debate filled the air for several hours, charges were hurled freely, and individuals were slandered on all sides. Eventually, a ballot was taken. The federal leader stood condemned by an announced vote of 40 to 24. The party's three M.P.'s jumped to their feet and stalked from the room followed by twenty-one supporters, several of them in tears and all of them enraged.

During the weeks that followed, Conservatives ranged themselves defiantly into two antagonistic camps. The party's bitter internal strife was fully reported and exposed for all the voters to see. On the one side were Provincial Leader Finlayson, most of the executive of the provincial association, and some constituency association officers. On the other side were the members of Parliament, the Young Conservatives, and the other riding-association executives. Newspapers reported the dispute as a simple personality clash between Drew and Finlayson. The provincial leader's charge that the federal leader was denying him his rights as provincial leader and acting like a dictator seemed to accord with Drew's public image and was generally accepted outside the party. Many of those supporting the federal leader justified doing so on grounds that the provincial executive had acted unconstitutionally and had thereby gravely injured the party. Chiefly, however, it would seem that they supported Drew because they refused to relinquish to an untried provincial leader and his friends the full control of the party's federal organization, an organization built largely through the efforts of such men as Leon Ladner and the three M.P.'s, Green, Fulton and Pearkes. Formation of a separate organization to deal with all federal affairs was announced soon after the Vernon meeting.

The fight was a public one and many bitter words were exchanged as first this Conservative and then another held press conferences. During the month of July, 1954, newspapers reported almost daily incidents evidencing the split. An editorial in *The Vancouver Province*, headed "Suicide at Vernon", expressed a commonly held view of the affair:

> So far as the public knows, the vote at Vernon was based on nothing but the charge that George Drew and his federal party supporters were interfering with the provincial politicians. There was no major issue of policy. It was strictly a domestic row over the kitchen sink.
>
> By resolution, George Drew stands condemned, not because he failed in matters of national policy, but because he butted in on Mr. Finlayson, the seatless leader of a seatless party.[5]

Throughout the constituency associations, an ever-widening gulf be-

came evident as supporters of both sides sought to put their group on record in support of either Finlayson or Drew. Those members of the constituency associations who found themselves in a local minority on the leadership loyalty question sometimes sought help from the headquarters of either faction to set up a new association, but more often they simply quit active party work. Premier Bennett claimed that large numbers of disaffected Tories were joining his Social Credit "movement". In August, the federal group began reorganizing in earnest; the three M.P.'s divided responsibility for the province between themselves, established the Federal Council, and sought to ensure the loyalty of all the federal constituency associations. The executive of the Canadian association recognized the Federal Council as having sole responsibility for federal work in British Columbia.

Sporadic attempts at reconciliation were made, but without much apparent effect. The provincial association did not match the activity of the Federal Council in organizing, and although the Finlayson group claimed large numbers of supporters and carried on a vigorous press campaign, little that was tangible appeared to result. In March, 1955, the provincial wing published what it called *A Factual Documented Statement of the Conservative Party's Position in British Columbia and Some of the Reasons for the Motion of No Confidence in the National Leader*. This publication, which was widely distributed, presented a series of statements, letters, and parts of letters, tracing the difficulties back to 1942 and Green's appointment by Bracken. The statement purported to demonstrate that Green had sought undue power for himself in opposition to the only legally constituted association, and that the two federal leaders had systematically supported Green's attempts to divide the party. The publication reiterated the association's claim to be the sole legitimate embodiment of the party in British Columbia and attacked the federal wing for setting up the Federal Council. The charge of "a saw-off with Social Credit" was repeated and was made a formal resolution of the provincial officers. In the provincial election held a year later, 1956, the Conservative share of the popular vote stood at an all-time low. Virtually every newspaper's interpretation of the vote attributed the Tories' dismal showing to the internal party split.

Much debate in British Columbia swirled about the institutional manifestations of the central party within the province, that is to say, the post of

personal representative of the federal leader and the Federal Council. Both institutions require examination.

The designation of a personal representative began with John Bracken, was continued by George Drew, and—with some modification—by John Diefenbaker. Considering the controversy about the post, it was somewhat surprising to discover that so slight was the importance attached to the post by its holders that they were unable to recall with certainty exactly who had held the appointment during what years. The representative's duties were always vaguely defined and his powers were even less definite. All four of the people who held the post have agreed, however, that the primary function was that of funneling reliable information to and from the federal leader and the local organizations. From the time of the coalition government, the federal leaders were never convinced that much credence could be placed in situation assessments made by persons working closely with the Liberal party or by an association long accustomed to co-operating with the Liberals and essentially unchanged since the coalition. It was primarily to fill this gap in information that personal representatives were appointed.

Formation of the Federal Council did not at first supersede the personal representative's work, for the Council was more concerned with associational work and less with the divination of popular feeling. But as the Federal Council largely completed its task of building loyal party groups in every constituency, the Council's president assumed the additional task of obtaining information as well. Diefenbaker utilized the system he inherited in British Columbia but began to supplement information supplied by the Council with that of other advisers.

The Federal Council of British Columbia was not unique in the country-wide scheme of Conservative party organization, a consideration that received acknowledgement neither from the Council's opponents in the province nor from the press in its discussions of the party divisions. In 1959 the national organizer, Allister Grosart, gave the Federal Council an outline of party structures in other parts of the country. Quebec had a federal association overseeing three regional associations and "more than seventy-five riding associations, most of them fairly new". Manitoba had been organized on a strong federal-constituency basis after a coalition provincial government had resulted in the atrophy of many Conservative groups in the provincial ridings. Grosart said that the separate federal association was to be maintained in Manitoba until the provincial organization had been rebuilt and the two fields of work could be divided under one jurisdiction. A federal council was to be organized in

Newfoundland in 1960. Grosart emphasized that no problems resulted wherever there was a strong provincial association and that separate federal organization was usually unnecessary. This situation was believed to obtain in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The federal organizer did not report on Prince Edward Island and noted that there were provincial but no federal associations in Saskatchewan and Alberta.

In other parties and in other situations, federal cabinet ministers have often been the party's effective chieftains within a province ruled by an opposition party. Where the party forms the provincial government, it seems safe to assert that the premier has had full control over all organizational work within the province—unless he has specifically declined interest in the federal work, as, for example, Ontario's Leslie Frost was thought to have done.

Today, ten years after the Vernon resolution condemning the federal leader, reconciliation has been effected between the two factions. The Federal Council has been disbanded, the two offices merged, and the provincial leader made responsible for all federal organization in the province; during the federal and provincial election campaigns of 1963 the most thoroughgoing co-operation of the two wings was evident to press observers. Without detailing the transformation, it may be well to suggest a few of its significant aspects.

It should be recognized that there was, and still is, some genuine conviction that the federal and provincial functions of a party can be prosecuted most efficiently by separate organizations; this was indicated in surveys of the constituency presidents made in 1958 and again in 1964. Most party workers, however, believed that a public façade of unified party activity was essential, and so it would appear—especially wherever party work is seen in ideological terms such as "the promotion of conservative principles and philosophy in all aspects of government".

The passage of time, the resignation or death of certain embittered individuals, and lack of success at the provincial polls eventually dissipated the provincial faction's resolution. The provincial leader, Finlayson, sought election a number of times but was unable to win a seat in either the Legislative Assembly or the House of Commons. He was confirmed as provincial leader by only a narrow margin in a 1958 challenge to his position by Desmond Kidd, whose bid was plainly sponsored by the federal wing. Selection of a new federal leader was significant for the provincial situation. Diefenbaker

was generally thought to have given aid and comfort to Finlayson in the quarrel with Drew, and it was Diefenbaker rather than Fulton, the British Columbia member of Parliament, who received the votes of provincial association delegates to the leadership convention. But while the new federal leader was on good terms with Finlayson, he did not disturb the organization of responsibility for federal work in the province. For their part, the Fulton-Green group constituted for the 1957 and 1958 general elections a campaign committee that included prominent members of the provincial faction. Members of the federal wing won election to the provincial executive while three of the M.P.'s succeeded to cabinet posts at Ottawa. Finlayson, after another provincial election shutout in 1960, resigned his post in despair. After a period in which the provincial leadership was deliberately left vacant, the Federal Council disappeared into a reconstructed provincial association. Within it were constituted two parallel committees, one charged with provincial responsibility and the other with federal duties. After helping to effect these changes, Federal Public Works Minister Fulton answered an almost unanimous draft to become provincial leader. One respected newspaperman reported from the 1963 leadership convention that "even the most cynical delegate agreed that due to the Fulton touch a bitter split between federal and provincial wings of the party was dead, buried and soon to be forgotten". Later, he commented that "in the long run, final healing of the . . . split may prove to be a more significant development politically than Fulton's tumultuous election as leader of the provincial Conservatives".[8] Head-table guests at the final luncheon included both Deane Finlayson and Herbert Anscomb. The new executive elected at the convention was composed of members who had not been associated with either of the two former factions.

As a summary of political difficulties in British Columbia, a few salient points should be noted:

(1.) During the 1940s the Conservative party as a whole was embarrassed by the anomaly of being in active alliance with the Liberals at the provincial seat of government and being in active opposition to them at Ottawa. (2.) In the immediate postwar period, an organizational resurgence in the federal sphere was in marked contrast to the antebellum attitudes of the provincial leaders. (3.) The established provincial faction was challenged unsuccessfully four times by leadership candidates enjoying the support of the federal wing. (4.) While the dispute appeared to involve nothing more than the status of the provincial leader, the question embraced both the shape and control of all party organization in the province as well as the selection and

final approval of candidates for both federal and provincial contests. (5.) Even in the depths of electoral despair, the provincial faction maintained a firm grip on the only legal Conservative association and with it was able to censure the federal leader. (6.) During the 1950s, the federal faction was always better able to raise election funds than was the provincial faction; this situation further embittered the provincial partisans, but it does not seem to have been a significant factor contributing to the party division. (7.) No aspect of the quarrel seemed to derive from differences over policy. (Can we attribute this to the lack of office-holding by the party, or does it simply confirm our impressions about the group's rather slight ideological commitment?) (8.) Not until one of the two factions was able to attain public office were its representatives able to assimilate the other group.

This study has concentrated on British Columbia. While other students of Canadian politics will recall similar conflicts, perhaps particular attention might be directed to two. The first concerns the Ontario Liberal party during the 1930s. Then, as is well known, the Liberal leader, Mitchell Hepburn, was engaged in a long and violent public quarrel with the federal leader, W. L. Mackenzie King. That neither King nor Hepburn could tolerate the other's personality seems to be well agreed, but were there not other causes underpinning the dispute? An inquiry into that situation might well cast further light on the impact of federalism on Canadian party life.

The second conflict concerned the Liberal party in Saskatchewan during the early 1960s. This problem would appear to have issued in ideological terms primarily because of a tactical situation. In seeking to overthrow Saskatchewan's C.C.F. government, the Provincial Liberal leader, Ross Thatcher, carefully cultivated a strong right-wing "look" for his group, an attitude in notable contrast with that of the federal party. The right-wing provincial group organized the 1962 federal campaign in the province, but only one M.P. won election. "Mr. Pearson evidently found the Thatcher attitude unacceptable", reported Charles Lynch, because following the 1962 election, "the national Liberal leader ordered a change."[9] Dean Otto Lang of the University of Saskatchewan built a new organization that excluded the provincial leader's group and, when the 1963 election was announced, set about his task without consulting Thatcher. The result seems to have been that the provincial officers did little but look on with amusement while Dean Lang's forces battled futilely with those of John Diefenbaker.[10]

Whenever leaders of the same party are caught quarreling in public, both supporters and commentators are wont to reduce the matter to a problem of differences in personality and to assert that the dispute lacks substantive content. This, for the leaders' part, may well be the most acceptable public face to put on the dispute if they are unable to deny its existence. The personality explanation has the attraction of simplicity and credibility, and it helps to reinforce Canadian reluctance to see important differences of principle as significant factors in the country's political life. Expressed as a general thesis, this explanation holds that federalism as such does not make an important difference to the leadership of the major parties, and that quarrels within them arise chiefly from natural jealousies and personality incompatibilities, just as they do in the parties of unitary states.

This thesis is, however, inadequate. While some of the internal disputes in Canada's federal parties do result from clashes of personality, something more than one man's inability to get along with another is required to split a party and range its members into factions. The divided organizational arrangements which manifested the Conservative split in British Columbia persisted for more than a decade and through three different pairs of federal and provincial leaders. It is, of course, reasonable to suggest that personality differences may trigger a dispute which rends a party in two. But if that division endures within a two-party or multi-party system, then we must look beyond the personalities for deeper conditions which themselves might have split the party eventually. Here we will probably find clues to the fissiparous forces which federalism attempts to contain.

Standing as something of an antithesis to the "personality" theory is the "party brokerage" theory. According to this idea, the successful party in a federal state serves as a broker or middleman between the provinces, which have diverse and often contradictory policy claims. Inter-factional quarrels are said to be reflections of these internal policy contradictions as the national party seeks to work out programme compromises which are acceptable both to those primarily oriented toward the provinces and to those oriented toward the country as a whole. The validity of this theory is dependent upon finding substantive policy content behind the internal party disputations. While we do not have to disagree with the assertion that Canada's major parties very seldom display coherent and consistent philosophies or policy orientations, there is enough truth in the statement, and so little evidence of policy differences in the British Columbia conflict, that the brokerage explanation is also unsatisfactory.

A synthesis of these ideas may be more serviceable. It may be put this way: The Canadian outlook favours, and, indeed, sometimes requires, politics of pragmatism rather than of policies or ideology; internal party disputes represent, from time to time, conflicts of personalities, attempts to reconcile divergent provincial policy demands, and problems resulting from the often disparate organizational needs of two groups within the party, the one group seeking federal victory and the other seeking victory at the provincial capital.

So little do we know about the relationship between federalism and our political parties that it would probably be prudent to conclude with a series of "questions deserving further exploration". But few people seriously wish to add to their lists of unanswered questions. Consequently, some of the general propositions suggested by this study will be outlined instead. If this course seems incautious, it should be noted that the propositions are themselves cautiously phrased.

(1.) Canada's major parties do not fit the model of unified country-wide parties with hierarchically inferior provincial sub-divisions; major party supporters do not exhibit the necessary degree of commitment. (2.) Both the structure and the internal operation of a major party resemble that of the Canadian system of government. The sovereignty of provincial party units is as real and extensive as that of the provinces with respect to Ottawa. (3.) Just as the virtual independence of a provincial government's policy-making depends to a considerable extent on its provincial resources, so the effective control of provincial organization by the local officers depends upon the local unit's political resources in comparison with those of the central party; such resources are considered to be size and commitment of membership, financial capabilities, quality and appeal of leadership, and, of course, electoral success. (4.) Party organizers must deal with three types of active members: those whose political interests are primarily oriented in provincial terms, those whose interests find primary expression in central-government goals, and those whose interests are multi-faceted or else are concentrated on some aspect of political life comprehending both spheres of government—such as the attainment of ideological objectives or general governmental power for the party. (5.) A party's policy objectives and organizational requirements in the federal and provincial arenas are often quite different, but both sets of leaders must rely in large measure on the same relatively small group of people and on the same resources for their field work. (6.) The interests and energies of the party machinery within one province cannot be converted readily and with equal

efficiency to both federal and provincial objectives. Attempts to treat the party as if it were readily convertible impose almost intolerable stresses on the organization, stresses which may be expected to become manifest in difficulties between the party leaders. (7.) The public or private character of the expression and resolution of internal party differences is a reflection of the leadership skills and institutional machinery with which the groups are endowed, and of the party's electoral morale. (8.) Even where a provincial party organization is controlled by relatively ineffectual persons, if they are determined in their leadership, representatives of the central party can undertake "corrective" action only at considerable risk. (9.) The provincial party is a highly-charged organism, with many internal stresses and tensions, which must be capable of frequent integration with as many as nine others of similar nature to produce a country-wide mechanism focussing its power on system-wide problems. (10.) The pattern of authoritative relationships between central and provincial party groups will depend upon whether public office is held by one, neither, or both of the two party groups. These relationships will also be affected by the nature of any "rehabilitative" process through which an out-of-office party faction may be going and by the degree of ideological and policy solidarity between the central and the provincial units.

## NOTES

1. Numerous points of similarity and differences between the Canadian and American situations will suggest themselves; it did not seem desirable to bring them within the scope of the present paper.
2. Much of this section of the paper is based on the writer's M.A. thesis, "The Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia: Some Aspects of Organization", which was accepted by the University of British Columbia in 1960.
3. Reliance for the information of this section was placed on an extensive series of personal interviews and on newspaper and Conservative party files. The sources are detailed in the M.A. thesis cited above.
4. [Allan J. McDonell, ed.] *A Factual Documented Statement of the Conservative Party's Position in British Columbia and Some of the Reasons for the Motion of No Confidence in the National Leader* (Vancouver, 1955), p. 20.
5. *The* [Vancouver] *Province*, July 20, 1954.
6. All four men were interviewed at length. Howard Green was the first representative appointed, but, except for times of election campaigning, his duties were largely performed by Leon J. Ladner. In December, 1951, Lt.-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, V.C., was named as George Drew's personal emissary to whom all federal party matters in British Columbia should be referred. A.

Leslie Bewley assumed the task in the late spring of 1953. Ladner remained intermittently active through these years. When the Federal Council was formalized in December, 1954, it chose Ladner as president, while Bewley worked on Drew's behalf until April, 1956. Drew did not name another representative, and the Federal Council president (Ladner) performed the task both for him and for Diefenbaker, who succeeded Drew in the winter of 1956.

7. This information on the other provinces was taken from Grosart's memorandum, which was on file in the Federal Council (now provincial association) offices in Vancouver.
8. Tom Hazlitt, "Fulton's Political Miracle", *The* [Vancouver] *Province*, January 28, 1963.
9. "Sask. Liberals in strange family squabble", *The* [Vancouver] *Province*, March 15, 1963. See also Don McGillivray (Southern Ottawa Bureau), "Thatcher no star in Ottawa", *ibid.*, May 25, 1964.
10. Little assistance from the federal Liberals was evident in the party's successful campaign against the C.C.F. government of Saskatchewan in the spring of 1964. After the swearing in of Premier Ross Thatcher, Professor Norman Ward reported: "Even Liberals are not sure where their party stands. Those interested in the federal scene are frankly nervous about whether the province is on the verge of another King-Hepburn fiasco." "Saskatchewan in 1964: Which Thatcher Won the Election?", *Canadian Forum*, XLIV, June, 1964, p. 56.