IT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ARGUED that the primary concern of any nation is to ensure its own survival. For Canada, the desire to survive as a viable political entity, independent of the powerful republic to the south, and to make actual the tremendous physical potential of the country, has forced the federal government to be particularly concerned with immigration and immigration policy. However, because of periods of serious unemployment and because the Canadian people on the whole, in W. L. Mackenzie King’s famous words, “do not wish as a result of mass immigration to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population”, the Canadian government from 1945 to 1962 has carefully pursued a relatively flexible policy of restricted immigration.

As would be expected, when there was considerable unemployment, as in 1955, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1961, the immigration authorities, by reducing the number of immigrant visas granted, placed a severe check on the flow of immigrants. It is interesting to note that, with only one exception (1957), whenever the yearly average of the percentage of labour force unemployed climbed to over 4 per cent, the following year witnessed a sharp decline in the number of immigrants. But when there was a demand for workers, the authorities quickly removed many of the temporary restrictive barriers. During these years, all too infrequent in the last decade, the absence of restrictions made one member of Parliament remark, “If you put pants on a penguin, it could be admitted to this country.”

In spite of the evident great need for a much larger population, it would be irresponsible for any government in Ottawa to fly in the face of the opposition of the majority of Canadians by adopting a policy of unrestricted immigration. D. C. Corbett, in his authoritative Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Critique, has thus described the various forces which help to mould the government’s immigration policy:
A national government dealing with immigration policy is like a ship buffeted by contrary winds. Labour blows one way and employers another; French Canadians puff up a powerful blast against the prevailing English-speaking majority; various nationality associations exert their pressures; and a chill draught of prejudice against foreigners comes from some of the old stock. In these gusty waters the government must steer a course. Sometimes it may choose to use its auxiliary motors and go against the wind\(^6\) (103-104).

Even though French Canadians and labour have been traditionally opposed to any marked increase in immigration,\(^7\) during the past few years both groups have seen little to criticize in the government's immigration policy. Since most immigrants have been readily absorbed into the English-speaking milieu rather than the French, the French Canadians have been understandably afraid that in the not too distant future they may probably become an insignificant minority and consequently lose many of their jealously guarded rights. On the other hand, labour has been frightened by the prospect that immigrants, used to a lower standard of living, may be used by unscrupulous employers to force wages down. However, the restrictive yet flexible immigration policy of the Liberal and Conservative governments has aided immeasurably in allaying the fears of these two strong pressure groups.

From 1945 to 1961 inclusive, 2,099,641 immigrants came to Canada.\(^8\) The peak years were 1951 with 194,391 immigrants\(^9\) and 1957 with 282,184.\(^10\) Of the 2,099,641 immigrants, 625,235 were from the British Isles, 285,382 from Italy, 258,029 from Germany, 162,878 from the United States, 155,644 from the Netherlands, and 79,429 from Poland.\(^11\) Other smaller groups were the French, Yugoslavian, and Ukrainian. Until 1958, the yearly influx of British immigrants was larger than that of any other single national group.\(^12\) However, largely as the result of the profound and unfavourable reaction to emigration to Canada which swept Great Britain in 1957 and 1958, the number of British immigrants in 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961 was smaller than that of Italians.\(^13\) This reaction was largely precipitated by the Canadian immigration crisis of 1957. During that year over 110,000 British immigrants, the largest yearly number since 1913, landed in Canada expecting to be immediately absorbed by a dynamic and expanding economy. Instead they found themselves confronted by the gloomy prospect of unemployment and an abysmally low rate of economic growth. Many were forced to return to Britain, while others balanced themselves on the knife-edge of subsistence in Canada. It is not surprising that there was a loud outcry in Britain, especially in the sensational Sunday newspapers, and many Britons were convinced that Canada was no longer an attractive country for prospective immigrants. Moreover, during this same period, 1958 to 1961, be-
cause of the striking economic growth and development of northern Europe, the other traditional supply of European immigrants began to dry up. Even taking into consideration the general immigration slump, the number of immigrants from northern Europe declined radically, while the number from Italy, Portugal, and Greece continued gradually to rise.

Unfortunately for Canada, what H. L. Keenleyside has referred to as "the red thread of tragedy"—Canadian emigration to the United States—has been woven in the post-war period into the fabric of the Canadian immigration problem. From 1945 to 1958 some 425,000 Canadian citizens, in addition to over 40,000 returning citizens of the United States, emigrated to the neighbouring republic while only 121,276 immigrants from the United States crossed over to Canada. What was particularly distressing for Canada was that many of the Canadian emigrants to the United States had received either valuable technical training or university educations. This "haemorrhage of brains", although detrimental to the struggling Canadian nation, was to be expected as long as the propinquity of the United States, its higher standard of living, and its greater variety of occupational opportunities combined to produce a potent drawing power.

Immigration Policy of the Liberal Government, 1945-1957

The main outline of the immigration policy that the Liberal government was to follow consistently until its defeat in 1957 was pronounced by the Prime Minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, in a debate in the House of Commons on May 1, 1947:

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy . . . . With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a "fundamental human right" of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy . . . . There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large-scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. Any considerable Oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations.

This statement, which came to be regarded as the "classic formulation" of the
Liberal government's views on the general subject of immigration, was written not by King but by his able secretary, John W. Pickersgill.\textsuperscript{21} Pickersgill and Walter Harris, who were intimate friends, and both of whom became Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration after the department was created in 1950, were responsible for moulding Liberal immigration policy both before and after 1950.\textsuperscript{22} It can be stated virtually without qualification that from 1947 to 1957 their immigration policy was the immigration policy of the Liberal government.

Even before King's general statement of policy, the Liberal government had taken important steps to encourage limited immigration of Europeans. By January, 1947, Orders-in-Council had been passed by which the following categories were to be admitted as immigrants:

1. The wife or husband, unmarried son, daughter, brother, sister, father, or mother, widowed daughter or sister with or without married children under 18 years of age, the orphan niece or nephew under 18 years of age, of any person legally admitted to and resident in Canada who was in a position to receive and care for such immediate relatives.

2. An "agriculturist" having sufficient means to farm in Canada.

3. An "agriculturist" entering Canada to farm, sponsored by an immediate relative who was a successful farmer and able to support such an immigrant and establish him on a farm.

4. A farm labourer entering Canada to engage in assured farm employment.

5. A person experienced in mining or lumbering entering Canada to engage in assured employment in one of these industries.\textsuperscript{23}

The government had considered it expedient to respond to the persistent pressure from close relatives of potential immigrants, and from farmers and owners of mining and lumbering industries who were in desperate need of labourers. Everything possible was done by the government to ensure that the five classifications of immigrants would not become public charges.

The year 1947 also witnessed the admission of the first displaced persons to Canada from the various refugee camps in Europe.\textsuperscript{24} From 1947 to 1954 a total number of 165,697 displaced persons arrived in Canada.\textsuperscript{25} In dealing with the displaced persons' problem, the government provided free transportation for the European refugees within the general framework of a commendable program which consisted of two main parts, the Close Relatives Plan and the Group Movement Plan.\textsuperscript{26} Under the Close Relatives Plan, special efforts were made to facilitate the entry into Canada of displaced persons who had relatives in Canada who were will-
ing and able to sponsor the refugees. Under the Group Movement Plan, the displaced persons, instead of being sponsored by Canadian residents, were selected by special government agents who took into consideration the manpower needs of the Canadian economy. Indirectly, these D.P.'s, as they came to be known, were sponsored by the government.

By 1949, the year before the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was finally created, Canadian immigration policy had been given definite form and substance. There were three main categories of persons who could be admitted to Canada as immigrants, provided of course that they were healthy law-abiding men and women who were not in favour of "force or violence against organized government." The first and "most-favoured" group included British subjects from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and citizens of Eire, the United States, and France. Such persons were to be admitted "if they can satisfy the immigration officers at the port of entry that they are in good physical and mental health; they are of good character; and they are not likely to become a public charge." This regulation meant, in effect, that anyone from these countries, with good health and no criminal record, could enter Canada as an immigrant. The second general category was that of close relatives of Canadian citizens or persons legally admitted to and domiciled in Canada. The third category contained those citizens of "non-Asiatic countries" who were "agriculturists", miners, or lumbermen coming to "assured employment." The only Orientals to be admitted to Canada were wives, and unmarried children under eighteen years of age, of Canadian citizens. To ensure further that the bulk of immigrants to Canada would come from British Commonwealth countries, the United States, and Northern Europe, most of the Canadian immigration offices were established in these countries, and most of the immigration propaganda was concentrated there as well.

What actual effect did the immigration regulations have upon the ethnic composition of the immigrants arriving in Canada during the period from 1947 to 1952? It was in 1952 that it was decided to introduce a New Immigration Act and Regulations to replace the often cumbersome and inconsistent system of passing frequent Orders-in-Council to adapt current policies to the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1910. In 1947, 65% of the immigrants were from the United Kingdom, 13% from the United States, 8% from Poland, and 4% from the Netherlands. In the following year, almost 40% of the immigrants were from the United Kingdom and 60% from Continental Europe. In the latter group there were 13,915 Poles, 10,417 Netherlands, 10,141 Ukrainians, and 4,351 Lithuanians. In 1949 only 28% of the total number of immigrants was British, while 71% came from
Continental Europe. In 1950 and 1951 the number of British immigrants continued to fall to 20% and 18% of the total, while the number of immigrants from Continental Europe rose from 67% in 1950 to 76% in 1951. In both these years as well as in 1949, the Poles, the Netherlanders, the Italians, and the Germans were the most numerically important groups from the Continent. In 1952, 29% of the immigrants coming to Canada were from the British Isles and 69%, mainly Germans, Italians, and Netherlanders, from the Continent.

In 1952 a new immigration bill was introduced in the House of Commons in place of the old Act. The bill was carefully examined by a Special Committee of the House made up of thirty-four members, and it was proclaimed on June 1, 1953. Regulations set up under the new Act were embodied in Order-in-Council P.C., 1953, 859, passed on May 26, 1953. During the prolonged debate on the immigration bill, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Mr. Walter Harris, reiterated the basic fundamentals of Liberal immigration policy that King had enunciated in May, 1947:

It would be just as well for me to re-state the policy of immigration to which I have referred on every occasion that I have presented a report to the house. That policy is to admit to Canada in numbers not exceeding the absorptive capacity of our country and without altering the fundamental character of our people, such persons as are likely to contribute to our national life . . . . In regard to the question of planning and the countries of selection, I wish to assure the house that every effort is being made to increase the number of immigrants from the United Kingdom and France . . . . We also had a large intake of people from the northern European countries which in the past have contributed a good type of immigrant, who have readily become integrated into the Canadian communities in which they have made their homes.

It is noteworthy that, in this speech and in others, Mr. Harris placed a great deal of emphasis upon integration rather than upon assimilation, a marked change from the immigration policy of the pre-war period. The Liberal government believed that its policy of integration would recognize and respect the various cultural contributions that people from diverse ethnic backgrounds could make to the Canadian nation. For the great majority of the immigrants, however, there was little difference, if any, between assimilation and integration.

Under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1953, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was given the power to limit or prohibit the entry of immigrants for any of the following reasons:

(i) nationality, citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of origin;
(ii) peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property;

(iii) unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social, industrial, educational, labour, health, or other conditions, or requirements existing, temporarily or otherwise;

(iv) probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their admission.

The Minister was given extensive discretionary power, and by interpreting these clauses in various ways he could easily control the influx of immigrants into Canada regardless of the existence of regulations which provided for the admission of certain categories of immigrants. These categories were enumerated and described in Order-in-Council P.C., 1953, 859 and further amended in P.C., 1956, 785; these Orders-in-Council were passed in pursuance of Section 61 of the Immigration Act. These vitally important regulations contained in the Orders-in-Council provided for the entrance of the following immigrants:

20 (a) a person who is a British subject by birth or by naturalization in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, or the Union of South Africa, a citizen of Ireland, a citizen of France . . . or a citizen of the United States of America if such a person has sufficient means to maintain himself in Canada until he has secured employment therein;

(b) a person who is a citizen by birth or by naturalization of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland or who is a refugee from a country of Europe, if such person undertakes to come to Canada for placement under the auspices of the Department or, if the Department has given its approval thereto, for establishment in a business, trade, or profession or in agriculture.

(c) a person who is a citizen by birth or by naturalization of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, or of any country of Europe or of a country of North America or South America if such person is the husband, wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, as well as the husband or wife and the unmarried children under 21 years of age of any such son, daughter, brother, or sister . . . of a Canadian citizen or of a person legally admitted to Canada for permanent residence who is residing in Canada and who has applied for any such person and is in a position to receive and care for any such person; or

(d) a person who is a citizen of a country other than a country referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) or in section 21, if such a person is the husband, the wife, or the unmarried child under 21 years of age, the father . . . over 65 . . . the mother . . . over 60 . . . of a Canadian citizen residing in Canada who has applied for and is in a position to receive and care for any such person . . .
The government of Canada having entered into an agreement with the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Ceylon with respect to the admission to Canada of 300, 100 and 50 persons annually from such countries, respectively, the landing in Canada of persons from any such country is, notwithstanding section 20, limited accordingly to such numbers of persons, respectively, and in addition to the husband, the wife, or the unmarried child under 21 years of age, the father . . . over 65 . . . the mother . . . over 60 . . . of a Canadian citizen residing in Canada who has applied for and is in a position to receive and care for such person.

It is evident that these regulations were intended to emphasize the fact that Canada wished to attract white immigrants, particularly from “white” Commonwealth countries, the United States, and Western Europe. In reply to a question about racial prejudice in the regulations, Mr. Harris bluntly stated that “in the light of experience it would be unrealistic to say that immigrants who have spent the greater part of their life in tropical or subtropical countries become readily adapted to the Canadian mode of life which, to no small extent, is determined by climatic conditions.” The basic prejudice against coloured immigrants underlying these regulations clearly reflected the strong prejudice against widespread coloured immigration which was and is still prevalent throughout Canada.

The granting of a large degree of discretionary power to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was unavoidable. It must be remembered, nevertheless, that the minister, acting as a member of the cabinet, was and is ultimately responsible for his actions to the Canadian electorate.

Under J. W. Pickersgill, who succeeded Harris as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1954, the number of immigrants coming into Canada dropped from 154,227 in 1954 to 109,946 in 1955, and then rose sharply to 164,857 in 1956 and 282,164 in 1957. In each of the years 1954, 1955, and 1956, the number of immigrants from Great Britain was approximately 30% of the total, while the number from Continental Europe was roughly 67% with the bulk of these latter immigrants coming from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. However, in 1957 there was a significant change in the ethnic composition of the immigrants: 40% of the immigrants, or 112,828, came from Great Britain and only 55% came from Continental Europe. The Suez affair, together with an unprecedented wave of immigration propaganda in Britain, was largely responsible for this exceptionally large influx of British immigrants.

Two perplexing and significant problems confronted Mr. Pickersgill during his sojourn in office—the Hungarian refugee question of 1956, and the general immigration crisis of the following year. Pickersgill believed that unless the Hungarian
refugees in Austria were encouraged to settle in the countries of the West, many of them would be compelled to return to their homeland and thus provide "the Communists with the greatest victory they could ever win." Consequently he decided towards the end of November, 1956, to admit as many Hungarian refugees to Canada "as want to come and for whom we can provide transportation." All the existing immigration barriers were suddenly removed for the Hungarian refugees. By the last week of December, however, the immigration doors, which had been pushed open under the glare of much publicity, were surreptitiously closed by an embarrassed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Why had Pickersgill revoked his "open-door" policy? It appears that tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the Liberal government to stem the flow of Hungarian refugees. The source of the pressure was the government of Ontario—the richest and largest province where most of the refugees intended to settle—organized labour, and the French-Canadian press. There is some evidence to suggest that the time was propitious to sacrifice a suitable immigration "scape-goat" to appease the wrath of not only a growing number of unemployed in Canada but also of an influential and vociferous minority which maintained that too many immigrants from Continental Europe were being admitted to Canada.

No sooner had Pickersgill washed his hands of the Hungarian refugee problem than he was faced by an even more difficult and potentially controversial issue. The rate of unemployment continued to rise ominously during the early months of 1957, but the number of immigrants, especially those from Britain, rose remarkably as the months passed. Pickersgill found himself on the horns of a dilemma. He knew "damned well that the flow of immigrants was too big for Canada to digest", but he also believed that if he "tried to stop the flood of British immigrants it would be the finish of the Liberal party in many Anglo-Saxon constituencies." Political considerations tended at first to outweigh what he considered to be best for the country, but in April, 1957, Pickersgill was finally driven to issue a directive "that no [open class] visas were to be issued that would be valid after July 31." Moreover, in the same month, at a meeting of senior immigration officers, he announced that 1957 would be the last year of large-scale immigration to Canada, and that it was necessary immediately "to organize for an entirely different phase of immigration in which greater emphasis than ever will be laid upon sponsored immigration." Such a policy, he argued, would lead to "the gradual decline of the recruiting of immigrants who have no connection with Canada." But before Pickersgill was able to implement this change in policy his government was defeated by the Conservatives. It should be carefully noted, however, that the
immigration question proved to be of little political consequence during the election campaigns of 1957 and 1958.

Immigration Policy of the Conservative Government, 1957 to 1962

From 1957 to the end of 1961 the Conservative government's immigration policy cannot really be distinguished from that of its Liberal predecessor. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 8, 1960, in reply to the Conservative Minister of Citizenship and Immigration's statement on Conservative immigration policy, J. W. Pickersgill dryly observed:

As for the statement of the general principles upon which our immigration policy is based, the honourable lady [Mrs. Ellen Fairclough, the Minister] might just as well have saved herself the trouble of original composition and read the excellent statement which Mr. Mackenzie King made in this house on May 1, 1947, because she has not deviated in any single particular that I can discover from any aspect of that statement . . . . [I]t is understandable that I should take a little satisfaction in the fact that the government has, substantially, found nothing to improve on . . . what they found when they entered office.51

Even though they had been somewhat critical of the Liberal government's immigration policy, especially in 1956 and 1957, the Conservatives, soon after assuming control of the government, made it quite clear that only after a careful examination of "immigration legislation, policy, and administration" would any change be made in the "basic principles upon which to build a national immigration policy."52

During the short period between the Conservative election victories in 1957 and 1958, E. Davie Fulton served as Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Fulton announced that after July 31 "not only . . . open placement immigrants would no longer be issued visas but even those applied for in the categories of relatives would not be issued visas unless they were assured of employment."53 Mr. Fulton explained his action by stressing that he was only continuing his predecessor's policy. Taking everything into consideration, the temporary "stop-order" was absolutely necessary.

On January 30, 1958, in a debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Fulton endeavoured to justify his government's restrictive immigration policy:

It would be a disservice to Canada and to the cause of immigration generally if any government were to embark upon a program of bringing in immigrants carelessly without regard to the fact that when they reach Canada they can only enter into competition with those already in Canada in a tight employment market . . . . For us to continue carelessly and without regard to the consequences to bring in large numbers
who would inevitably compete in the employment market at this time would be a disservice both to those whom we bring in as well as to the cause of a steady immigration program that is supported by the people of Canada. . . . I do not believe it is advisable to make changes in immigration laws or policies just for the sake of making changes, because this is a subject matter of tremendous importance.54

Under the Conservatives, as a result of the bleak economic situation in Canada which was in sharp contrast to the economic prosperity of northern Europe, the number of immigrants steadily declined from 282,164 in 1957 to 124,851 in 1958, 106,928 in 1959, 104,111 in 1960, and 71,689 in 1961.55 Some knowledgeable observers are of the opinion that during the next few years the yearly inflow of immigrants will be steady at approximately 70,000 unless the economy takes a sudden turn upwards.56

It was not until June 9, 1960, almost two years after she had become Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, that Mrs. Ellen Fairclough significantly enlarged on Mr. Fulton's general statement of January, 1958, regarding immigration. The first woman Cabinet Minister informed the members that her department was "now approaching the point where we should be able to offer to the house specific proposals which will translate desirable principles into legislative form."57 She then went on to state her immigration policy, which differed only in one important particular from that of her Liberal predecessors. Mrs. Fairclough clearly intimated that a new selection criterion, based primarily upon the skills of the immigrant, would be introduced.

Obviously we cannot simply go ahead and bring to this country everyone who may wish to migrate, without regard to possible effects on our Canadian people or on the immigrants themselves. . . . We shall do our best to admit as immigrants individuals and families who are personally suitable and who have the required background and training to become worthwhile citizens . . . . The key to our immigration policy will be the consistent application of proper selection standards designed to bring the best possible settlers to Canada. I am sure all Canadians would agree that once these standards are established they should be applied consistently to all who seek admission to this country, except where the admission of the immigrant is based on compassionate grounds or on close relationships.58

On January 19, 1962, Mrs. Fairclough proudly issued a statement regarding new immigration regulations.59 The most important provision, Section 31, which the minister described as the "core of Canada's immigration policy", replaced Section 20 of the former regulations. Section 31 placed primary stress upon education, training, and skills as the main consideration of admissibility, regardless of the country of origin of the applicant:
If a person can qualify on these [above] grounds and has sufficient means to establish himself in Canada until he finds employment, or, alternatively, is coming forward to approved employment . . . he or she is admissible, subject only to the normal requirements of good health, good character and so forth. This means that any suitably qualified person, from any part of the world, can be considered for immigration to Canada entirely on his own merit, without regard to race, colour, national origin or the country from which he comes.

Furthermore, subsection (c) provided for the admission of a much wider list of relatives, not only of Canadian citizens but also of those persons who have been admitted to Canada for permanent residence. There was, however, one important qualification to the new so-called "non-racial" regulations. Section 21 of the old regulations, which limited the annual number of immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to 300, 100, and 50 respectively, in addition to a very restricted list of immediate relatives of Canadian citizens, was still considered to be "in full force and effect" until a new quota agreement has been reached with these countries. This glaring contradiction of the "principles of equity and justice" which Mrs. Fairclough maintained were at the very heart of the regulations was the result of a real fear that without such a barrier there would be an unprecedented influx of suitably qualified immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

The new regulations have been greeted with little enthusiasm even by the staunchest Conservatives. Most observers are reserving final judgment until they see how the Department of Citizenship and Immigration implements the new policy; theory is one thing, practice another. Nevertheless, if the new regulations are consistently applied according to the letter and the spirit of the law, a significant step forward will have been taken in Canada's policy of immigration.

NOTES
4. David Croll made the statement.
CANADA'S IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1945-1962 299

7. Corbett, 18-23, 7-17.
12. See Canada Year Book for these years.
16. See the Canada Year Book published during this period.
22. Ibid. "I always discussed immigration policy with Walter Harris and he with me. He never made any policy changes without consulting me... ."
24. Ibid., 1948-9, 173.
25. Ibid., 1955, 165.
27. Ibid., 1950, 181.
28. Ibid., 132.
29. Ibid., 1948-9, 173.
30. Ibid., 179.
32. Ibid., 1951, 145.
34. Ibid., 1954, 162.
35. Ibid., 1957-8, 170.
36. Ibid., 172.
38. Canada Year Book, 1959, 176-177.
39. Ibid., 1957-8, 172. It is interesting to note that clause (iv) specifically refers to assimilation rather than to integration. Perhaps this is why A. R. M. Lower has argued that "this scholastic attempt to draw a line between 'integration' and 'assimilation' will fool no one, least of all the immigrant" (A. R. M. Lower, "The Growth
44. Quoted in J. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June, 1957 (Toronto, 1959), 45.
45. Ibid., 47.
46. Ibid., 47-50.
47. By July, 1957, some 33,000 Hungarian refugees had been admitted to Canada.
49. House of Commons Debates, August 23, 1958, 4033. An “Open-class” visa is one granted to an unsponsored immigrant.
50. Pickersgill, Statement Regarding Liberal Immigration Policy.
52. Ibid., 4711.
53. Ibid., January 15, 1958, 4057.
54. Ibid., 4057-4059.
58. Ibid., 4712-4713.