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PACIFIC PACT

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TEN years ago, Australia and New Zealand agreed by the Canberra Pact to consult together for mutual security. The Japanese eruption from the north which might have overwhelmed them was a grim warning that danger was likely to continue and grow.

After the North Atlantic Pact was signed, in April 1949, the British Government, in common with other Commonwealth Governments, sounded the United States on the subject of creating a Pacific Pact. Washington was disinclined to embark on such a project, probably because there were at the time many imperious claims for dollar assistance from various parts of the world.

Things went from bad to worse in Southeast Asia, especially after Communist armies dominated China. It became possible that, unless the Western powers united to check Communism and restore law and order, there would be grave danger, not only to Australia and New Zealand but to many other countries. The main sea routes between India, Malaya, the Pacific Islands and the U.S.A. might be blocked; raw material supplies for the West might be cut off through direct sabotage, by seizure of European-owned enterprises and by slowing down of raw material production, particularly rubber, tin, oils and fats. This would upset the calculations on which the economic recovery plan for Western Europe was based, would hamper the Marshall Plan, and would handicap Britain, France and the Netherlands in fulfilling their obligations under the Atlantic Pact. Dislocation of the food-grain export system would cause grievous hard-

ship and possibly famines, especially in India. Fertile rice lands always allure the aggressor.

Early in 1950, the American attitude towards the Pacific problem changed, doubtless in realization of possible calamities. High American officers, after touring the Pacific, apparently felt that a crisis in the struggle between the U. S. and the Soviet Union was more likely to take place in Asia than in Europe, and that the main emphasis of U. S. global strategy ought to be shifted to Asia. An announcement was made by Mr. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, that his country would regard a move for a Pacific Pact "with sympathetic interest." Further progress was, however, blocked by the outbreak of aggression in Korea, and by the creation of a powerful coalition to quell it, not as a 'regional arrangement' but as an embodiment of United Nations authority.

Early in 1951, Mr. John F. Dulles, as the envoy of President Truman's administration, conducted negotiations with the Australian and New Zealand Governments for a triangular defence arrangement between them and the United States. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan was in the offing, and as this would necessarily involve Japanese rearmament in some degree, a mutual guarantee for combined action in case of need seemed a wise precaution. Without such a guarantee, Australia and New Zealand could not have been expected to welcome the Japanese Treaty. That Treaty and the Tripartite Security covenant, (ANZUS), were signed simultaneously by the three powers in September, '51. A mutual defence pact was also signed between the United States and the Philippines before the conclusion of the Japanese Treaty. A Mutual Defence Assistance agreement was earlier concluded between the U. S. A. and Japan.

The creation of these bilateral agreements, buttressed by the Korean Truce of 1953, might seem to imply that a foundation had been laid for a Pacific Pact to contain Communism in East Asia and the Western Pacific. But this is not so. The Western and Pacific Powers could never establish such a pact by their own initiative and through their own resources. The Asian countries concerned must first be united in desire for it, and in determination to defend it. The nations which signed the Atlantic Pact were (as President Truman said at the time) "united by a common heritage of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." The Pact gave formal recognition to those ties. No similar bonds yet link the Southeast Asian countries. Some of

their peoples have, as yet, small respect for common law which is the foundation of democratic government; and in consequence they have not evolved a tradition of democratic behaviour, or the unity of spirit which would enable them to support their governmental systems against underworld turbulence, religious and racial antagonisms, communist intrigue and other local ferments. Happenings during the past few years in the countries which were ravaged by Japanese occupation prove this.

The Anzus Pact, as formed, was not regarded by Britain as an expedient prelude to a concerted peace in the Pacific because it disregarded Britain's special relations with Commonwealth countries and her vital interests in Southeast Asia. Mr. Morrison, Foreign Secretary at the time, said in the House of Commons that the Pact "would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included." At the first regular Conference held, in Washington, under the Pact after the signature of the Korean truce, it was apparently decided that for the time being at all events no fourth Power should be admitted to the Pact. Any American treaty has to be approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and this consideration, coupled with the fact that Britain had recognized the *de facto* Communist government in China, doubtless influenced the decision.

Early in 1954, it was reported that Prime Minister Churchill, who had never concealed his disapproval of ANZUS, had formulated an over-all plan for Pacific defence which would dove-tail the activities of four allied agencies already operating in the area, include the governments of the scattered powers concerned, open the door to France and the Netherlands with their Asian partners in Indo-China and Dutch New Guinea respectively, and set a basis for eventual cooperation with such countries as Japan, the Philippines and South Korea (but not Formosa), with which the U.S.A. has separate security treaties.

Suddenly, towards the end of March, the U.S.A. State Department invited Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the three associated States of Indo-China to join in some form of expression of a "united will" for defence of Southeast Asia. Canada was omitted, and also India and some other Southeast Asian countries. The new policy (known as "the Dulles plan") seemed to be the logical outcome of a "New Look" theory outlined by President Eisenhower in the summer of 1953 and expanded by Mr. Dulles in a series of utterances early in '54. He intimated that the U.S.A. would

stand aloof so far as possible from local wars and, while assisting native forces to repel local aggression, would place primary reliance on what he called "massive retaliation"—i.e. on atomic arms, sea power and air power.

Thailand welcomed the plan, and Mr. Dulles made a trip to London and Paris for discussions with the British and French Governments in the hope of fostering "unity of purpose" before the opening of the Geneva Conference on April 26th. His plan was coolly regarded by British and French authorities. A considerable section of French opinion was reported to be opposed to 'internationalization' of the Indo-China struggle. The British response (according to a communiqué issued at the time) indicated willingness to join in undertaking "an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defence. . .to assure the peace, security and freedom of southeast Asia and the Western Pacific," and expressed hope that "the Geneva Conference will lead to the restoration of peace in Indo-China". The implication clearly was that such "examination" should take place after the conclusion of the Conference, if then inevitable. Sir Winston Churchill was also reported to have stoutly maintained during the discussions that any collective policy should have for its aim "united defence", and not "united action."

Shortly afterwards, M. Bidault, alarmed by Viet Minh pressure on Dien-bien-fu, asked Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden in Paris whether a massive air contribution could be made. Sir Winston Churchill, on April 27th told the House of Commons that Britain was not prepared to give any undertakings about military action in Indo-China in advance of the results at Geneva. Mr. Dulles was deeply disappointed at the British attitude, and when Britain also declined to take part in a Washington meeting of prospective Asian Pact members while the Geneva Conference was in being, a definite rift developed in the U.S.A.-U.K. alliance. The British view was that questions as to membership of a NATO system in Southeast Asia, and methods to be employed, would be greatly influenced by what happened at Geneva and therefore should not be explored prematurely. Early in May, Britain suggested that conversations should take place in Washington in the existing five-power staff agency and these began early in June.

Meanwhile, the 'rift' was widened by ill-feeling and mutual recrimination. Britain was accused of a tendency to 'appeasement,' and the U.S. of unsound diagnosis of the over-all problem.

As the crisis developed, there was a loud chorus condemning "massive retaliation" because it seemed to imply that the first Communist move regarded by the U.S.A. as 'aggressive' would be met by the launching of World War III, a suicidal policy. Mr. Adlai Stevenson pungently remarked "are we leaving ourselves the choice of inaction or of thermo-nuclear holocaust?"

For obvious geographical reasons, the nuclear bomb could not be employed just as a tactical weapon in Indo-China. Communist China and Soviet Russia must soon become the targets. Any massive threat, intended to create an impression of relentless determination backed by inexhaustible power, must assuredly be regarded by an astute foe as mere bluff. Many people now feel that the use of the atomic bomb in 1945 against an already defeated Japan was an error which has had regrettable consequences.

At a press conference on April 7th Mr. Eisenhower commented on the strategic importance of Indo-China to the free world. He pointed out that Asia had already lost some 450 millions of its peoples to Communism, and asserted that the U. S. could not afford greater losses. If the fall of Indo-China involved also the loss of Burma, Thailand, the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia, like a row of dominoes, this would multiply the disadvantages the U. S. would suffer and would create a new geographical position turning the so-called island defences chain of Japan, Formosa and the Philippines, and threatening Australia and New Zealand to the southward.

Vice-President Nixon, speaking on April 16th, was reported to have said that the U. S. might have to send troops to Indo-China if the French ceased fighting there. His remark was interpreted in some quarters as a "trial balloon," to test the reaction of Congress and the public to that possibility. Outbursts shewed that strong opposition would confront any such proposal, in spite of the fact that the U. S. was, at the moment, bearing nearly 80% of the Indo-China war and was helping France with planes and material and non-combatant experts. Prominent members of both parties in Congress urged that the U. S. must not get involved with land troops in an Asian war; and public opinion positively rejected the idea of another Korea-like digression. The extension of America's strategic frontier to cover Japan, South Korea and Formosa had cost much treasure and the lives of many G.I.'s. At the end of April, the House of Representatives approved a military budget for the

next fiscal year reduced by about 5½ billion dollars compared with that of the preceding year. Therefore it would be hard to find even two or three divisions for a venture in the South Pacific. The President quelled apprehensions by definite assurances that the U. S. would not become involved in war in the Pacific without Congress approval. It thus became plain that no effective "united action" could be expected as a reinforcement for the French defence in Indo-China.

This revelation created a bar to Asian participation in a Defence Pact, particularly if India was to be left out. Further, President Eisenhower's press comments, and his 'row of dominoes' simile, conveyed the impression that the U.S.A. was primarily concerned to protect its own wide-flung strategic frontier. Other indications suggested that Asian States would be required to provide all front line forces for land combat. Hydrogen bomb experiments in the Pacific had aggravated racial mistrust. India's exclusion from the Pact scheme may have been due to her early recognition of China's Communist government; to Prime Minister Nehru's neutralistic policy; and to the impairment of India's relations with France and the U.S.A. for reasons which are well known. Mr. Nehru's attitude had been clearly unfavourable to the formation of a Pacific Pact for what he called "an anti-Communist crusade." A five-power Asian Conference was also in the offing.

The allies of the United States are always puzzled to know what agencies and interests exercise predominant influence over the formulation and steadfast pursuance of American foreign policy. Confusion seems to be created by too many voices saying different things—voices of the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet members, the Senators, the Congressmen, admirals and generals, and lastly, (expressed in many ways) voices of the people who are tenacious of their prerogative affirmed in Abraham Lincoln's immortal address. Mr. Adlai Stevenson has described it as "foreign policy by the platoon system."

It must be hard for diplomatists, pitted against the best chess players in the world, to exhibit the required tenacity, finesse and patience, if their moves have to be planned with constant regard to constitutional processes and domestic political reactions.

The mid-term elections of 1954, in which neither party secured obvious victory, since control of the Senate is precarious, illustrated the need for constitutional revision. A majority of

elected representatives cannot, today, bring about a dissolution at a critical moment in national history, so that the people's will may be ascertained afresh through emergency elections.

If, in a democracy, the aggregate of individual opinions is the voice of God, how are the citizens to gain full enlightenment on the tremendous issues involved, and how can their intelligence be shielded from the chicanery of party politics? Is it possible, at present, to appraise the weight of public opinion from its clamour volume directed at Senators and Congressmen individually? Ought not the people's verdicts to be elicited through specified channels by constitutional methods enabling a dissentient majority to supplant the discredited administration.

The attitude of comparative aloofness adopted by President Eisenhower during the electoral slugging match is a significant development.

An Asian Conference representing 75 countries was held in Delhi seven years ago and the leader of the Indian delegation then expressed the hope that there would be born "a clear, strong and enduring friendship among all the peoples of Asia." That hope was not realized. Disunity was revealed, and the horizon was shadowed, first by ideological bigotry and ancient differences between groups of peoples, and secondly by nascent rivalries between great powers in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Western exploitation of Asiatic countries was heartily denounced, but India's brilliant leadership of the Conference seemed to create some fear of her eventual hegemony—a revival of the "Greater India" of 2,000 years ago, whose art, culture and religions have left so many monuments in neighbour lands. The idea was evidently unpalatable to some of the border countries, and doubtless to the Chinese also.

The 1954 Conference, of five Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo, was an interesting sequel. Some dissonances, as at the Delhi meeting, were to be expected, particularly because Pakistan (unborn in '47) was now vigorously represented. But the Ministers' communiqué of May 2nd did clear up ambiguities and revealed substantial community of outlook on immediate problems. They definitely pinned their hopes to the Geneva Conference as the prime factor for the restoration of peace in Indo-China, and called for agreement by all the countries concerned to prevent recurrence of hostilities with the aid of U.N. good offices. They viewed with grave concern, and called for

prohibition of mass destruction weapons and particularly the hydrogen bomb. They indicated their abiding distrust of colonialism in all its subtle forms and urged that France should declare the complete independence of the Indo-China States. They favoured the representation of China in the United Nations. On the subject of Communist ideology, they declared their faith in democracy, and stated their determination "to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, *anti-Communist or other agencies.*"¹

This is a valuable side-light on the Southeast Asian situation and exposes the inherent weakness of the Dulles plan. Indian leadership is indispensable for any South Asian league to resist Communism. But India's outlook today is less rosy than in 1947. The young Republic is doing wonders, but it has a hard row to hoe. There are complicated internal problems yet to be solved: Communism is rooted within the country: Red China has absorbed Tibet, and looms over Nepal and eastern neighbours: the Himalayan bastion is imperilled: the treaty concluded with China marks contraction of India's sphere of influence: and lastly, India's relations with Pakistan are strained over the Kashmir problem and other matters. Indian statesmanship is, and has need to be, far-sighted and cautious. Unfolding events may some day impel India's rulers to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Communist encroachment, but in the meantime there is no likelihood that India will take part in any scheme for military opposition to Red China. If Mr. Nehru, besides withdrawing from Congress party leadership, were to abdicate office as Prime Minister (as he seems to wish) political chaos might follow in India.

On July 21st agreements for cessation of hostilities in Indo-China were signed at Geneva, vindicating the beliefs and policies of those who had shunned premature 'united action'. A Commission composed of delegates from India, Canada and Poland was appointed to supervise implementation of the truce and connected measures.

France's grim struggle of 7½ years was ended by the partition of Viet-nam; many worthy ambitions and valiant hopes were shattered, and hard-built enterprises torn down; the harvest of indecision and error was reaped and Communism surged forward to a new and pregnable military demarcation line, but the West salvaged defense resources and gained respite.

1) Italics added.

In view of the changed strategic position, the U.S.A. and Britain decided to "press forward with plans for collective defence." Representatives of eight countries concerned were invited to meet at Manila, and a Treaty establishing a South-east Asia treaty organization (SEATO) was signed there early in September. The Treaty relates to areas in which the interests of the member States are vitally concerned, and also covers Cambodia, Laos and Free Vietnam. A Northern Pacific area, including Formosa, Japan and Korea, is not affected by the treaty.

Each member nation recognizes by the treaty that aggression against any of the others would endanger its own peace and safety, and engages to meet the common danger "in accordance with its own constitutional processes." There was a statement of understanding by the U.S.A. (but not by the other member nations) that "aggression" meant Communist aggression. If any treaty area is threatened in any way other than by armed attack (by subversion, civil war, coup d'etat), the members are to consult immediately on measures for the common defence. They are to cooperate in developing economic measures to promote progress, and a Council representing all members is appointed to implement the treaty and provide for military and other planning. In order to allay suspicions of a possible 'neo-colonialism', a "Pacific Charter" was signed, binding members to "strive earnestly by every peaceful means to promote self-government and independence."

Unfortunately, SEATO is but a frail bulwark against feared dangers. Asian countries in jeopardy are not united in desire for a pact and in determination to defend it. India is definitely recusant, for intelligible reasons, and Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon follow her lead. Exclusion of Japan and the Northern Pacific area, though inevitable, is very nullifying. The U.S.A. secures no aid for the defence of Formosa.² The loose-knit covenant lacks the automatic action provisions of NATO. There is no prospect that a standing army will be embodied with a unified military command. The U.S.A. can only launch direct military aid (except in defence of the Philippines) after Congress has granted sanction. Other member nations do not possess ample reserve forces.

2) The U.S.A. signed later a unilateral pact with Nationalist China for the mutual defence of Formosa, the Pescadores and the West Pacific islands under U.S. jurisdiction.

In the absence of any military strength basis, the pact has been commended on the dubious ground that it "laid a legal base for dealing with Communist aggression by infiltration and subversion."

We can only hope that vigilance against infiltration methods may be somewhat stimulated by the mere existence of the treaty, and that living standards in the areas may be raised by the economic measures contemplated. Mr. Nehru was reported to have denounced SEATO as "not only wrong but dangerous," apparently on the ground that it tended to disrupt the Geneva agreement and to reverse the process of Asian liberation from foreign imperialist control. The 'colonialism' complex is, unfortunately, still strong and deters Asian peoples from entering into agreements with the great powers for military protection, especially if the erection of military bases on their territory by foreigners is likely to follow. Similar psychological reaction is likely to be caused by the formation of economic aid bases which are staffed by foreigners and may create the impression of being political outposts. Redistribution of land by local rulers is the prime need, coupled with tactful aid by Colombo Plan and similar agencies for modernization of agriculture and industries. It has to be remembered that a group of peoples, plunging into independence through self-determination, may not achieve stability as a veritable sovereign state unless what President Roosevelt called "the periods of preparation and training" have been successfully completed: *preparation*, by the dissemination of education, and by planning for social and economic betterment: *training*, through the practice of more and more self-government in the various steps leading to complete state-hood. If internal solidarity is lacking, there will be small appreciation that 'interdependence' of neighbour states is essential for prosperity and for survival.

The strategic implications of the South Pacific position are very serious for the freedom-loving nations. A new phase has opened in the quest for world peace and it is necessary for the allied powers to evaluate the situation carefully before framing their over-all policy, China is advancing towards the highwater marks of ancient dominion, and her rulers seem to regard it as a natural and predestined retrieval. Intention to 'liberate' Formosa has already been trumpeted: Burma, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan may all be within the retrieval orbit; there is a threat from Tibet to Ladakh, north-east of Kashmir. Ten millions of 'overseas Chinese' (Nanyang) have

established themselves in the threatened countries and acquired wealth and influence. They could be a powerful advance guard for Communist incursion.

Enthusiasts for freedom and human dignity have clamoured that 'self-determination' should be licit for all peoples now under tutelage, however immature, disunited or unversed in the rudiments of democracy they may be. The hard lesson is being learnt, that premature independence opens the gates to discord, tyranny and Communist subversion.

Indonesia is torn by dissensions and in jeopardy as a defence post against Communism. A second meeting of the five Asian premiers was held there in December, and an ambitious plan was then launched for a later Asian-African Conference to which delegates from Communist China and Japan should also be invited. Such a Conference would quicken opposition to SEATO, and create disturbing repercussions in Africa. Japan's new era dawns bleakly. How will she regain economic and military strength, and what will be her response to Communist, or neutralist, solicitations?

The discussions between Chou En-lai and Mr. Nehru at Delhi resulted in the enunciation of five "peaceful co-existence principles" (one being 'non-aggression'), and these may appear in the Preamble to China's new Constitution. Would the Western powers be wise to accept this profession at its face value?

Unfortunately, it was discounted by China's later actions. Hostilities against Nationalist-held islands were stepped up, and in November Peking, after receiving a stern warning from Mr. Dulles that America would defend Formosa, announced the conviction and incarceration of 13 American prisoners-of-war for espionage. This action was reprehended by the U. N. Assembly, and the Secretary-General was deputed to intervene personally on the prisoners' behalf at Peking.

But in spite of their outrageous and deplorable behaviour, the rulers of China must be fully conscious of reasons why the country needs an interval of assured peace:—the hideous danger of a world-wide conflict, the lesser danger from renewal of past 'war-lord' troubles, the urgent need to digest revolution gains, to deal with disastrous flood damage, and to weld together in grateful loyalty the 600 million population of the country. Time may also be required to stave off dictation from Moscow, to define future relations with Russia (especially as regards border areas), to estimate how Chinese philosophy may ulti-

mately remould Marxian tenets, and finally to procure much needed commodities through revival of reciprocal trade.

On the other hand, the fact that Communist ideology has proclaimed 'world revolution' as its goal creates a grave obstacle to enduring 'peaceful co-existence' with any Communist country. Soviet Rulers have directed forceful propaganda against all forms of 'religious prejudice', and have tried with considerable success to present a spiritual challenge to organized religions. So long as Communist nations adhere to this programme, and continue to infect neighbour peoples with their lunacy, there can be no ending of the cold war. The issue upon which the fate of man, his brotherhood and his civilization must depend is whether he retains or discards faith in GOD (by whatever name he may be known), as the supreme source of justice, truth and love. Any compromise on this issue would lead us all down the slippery path to destruction.

From what has been made public about the latest (October) agreement between Russia and China, it appears probable that Chinese social life and State control are being regulated on orthodox Soviet lines, and that the two countries are bound in close military alliance for their mutual security and for attainment of their respective ambitions. Special emphasis was laid upon Japan's present subordination to the Western powers; and in general the terms of the agreement seem incompatible with assurances of peaceful intent.

If this is so, and if we must conclude that present-day rulers of Russia and China have no intention of abating their aims of world domination, why is it that Mr. Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill have tentatively blessed the idea of 'peaceful co-existence'? The answer was given by Sir Winston when he said that the fearful consequences of the hydrogen bomb "go even beyond the difficulties and dangers of living side by side with the Communist States." Widespread recognition of this might lead to solution of world problems "in a manner which would avert the mass destruction of the human race, and give time, human nature and the mercy of God their chance to win salvation for us." The masses of people in all countries are doubtless "kind, decent folk who wish to live their lives in neighbourly fashion with their fellow men." If we mean to uphold, against Communist atheism, our belief in a divine Creator as arbiter of the world's fate, we must follow the Golden Rule of neighbourly duty in our relations with Communist and non-Communist nations alike. We must be ready to extend help and

sympathy and collaboration in every matter that may assist economic and cultural development and favour the chance of enduring peace. In Churchill words, "it is our duty, patiently and daringly, to make sure whether there is such a chance or not." As a preliminary, unanimity ought to be attained as regards the eventual enrolment of China in the U.N., and as regards the interim neutralization of Formosa.

But if Western powers are responsive to a 'non-aggression' overture, a prime pre-requisite is that their military power should be manifest. While also disclaiming aggressive intent, they must bid from strength and not create the illusion that they are tendering surrender. Unfortunately, the latent strength of the allied powers is not demonstrable at present. Hopes for the creation of a world-state security force are blighted. American ground forces are to be progressively reduced. Capacity for 'massive retaliation' is not alone sufficient, though that must loom in the background. Ample sea, land and air forces, inspired with a true fighting spirit in defence of their countries must be maintained in the highest state of efficiency. Bomb research, experiment and amassment must be diligently continued. Military power is indispensable, whether the object be to court peace or to ensure survival. A Chinese proverb says:—Sometimes one must offer stones, to persuade others to shew their diamonds."

Although it is possible that World War might start at any moment through a 'flash incident', such as the Soviet destruction of an American plane off Hokkaido in November, there are nevertheless grounds for believing that neither Russia nor China desires to provoke such war in the near future.

Both countries have serious political and economic problems, and have to reckon with the anger and disillusionment of misgoverned peoples. They just hope, through an interval of peace, to placate internal discontent and to make substantial gains by skilful diplomacy and psychological pressure. Aggressive action on remote frontiers to facilitate expansion may be entrusted to apparently irresponsible guerilla bands.

The Soviet comradeship which glowed in the early days of Stalinism has faded with the emergence of new class distinctions and bureaucratic arrogance. The people are embittered by privations and hardships. Tyrannies never endure for long, however massive their structure and however lurid their course may be. There is a divinity which shapes the destiny of mankind and swings the balance, at hazardous moments, in favour of those who are inspired by a true belief. A godless creed is bound

to wither away, so that humanity shall survive and ascend in the scale of creation. In Russia, insulting attacks on churchgoers and the clergy are already being discouraged as only serving to 'intensify religious prejudices'. The outlook for long-awaited 'top level' talks is a little brighter, but the Paris agreements on W. Germany have yet to be ratified. Contact without conflict is not an end but a means—of averting the 'great tribulation'. Whichever side first achieves true spiritual awakening will win.

The purification of our part of the world's civilization would contribute greatly to the collapse of Communist ideology in all lands. We are sadly aware that, even in Christian and democratically governed countries, Communist doctrine can create a threat to political stability and national unity. Doubtless, the contamination is stimulated artfully by external propaganda agencies, but it will not be overcome merely by measures of quarantine and repression. Men's minds become susceptible to evil infection when the standards of their social and political life are decadent, and when revolt gathers against materialism, corruption and degeneracy. For men despairing of their own environment and suffering from frustration and fancied oppression, Communism presents the vision of a faith which, though God-less, offers them the hope of re-moulding the world as soldiers in a mighty army. They welcome regimentation, believing that it will level social differences and enrol all alike as servants of the State.

He who would redeem errant brethren must first cast out the beam in his own eye. The citizens of an infected country must need demonstrate in their private lives, in their social relations and in their governmental system, by deed as well as by word, a true democracy which reflects the basic unity of our spiritual convictions.