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EVERYONE knows, in a general way, that Mussolini's iron hand has descended upon the Italian newspaper press. What is not so generally known is the attitude of Italians to a measure of this Draconian sort. We know how such censorship would be received in England. Does it produce a like reaction in Italy? Mr. James Murphy's article casts a good deal of light upon this, and gives us much incidental knowledge of ways of life among people with whom we are too little acquainted.

The author tells us how, at the moment of writing, it was difficult to buy any Italian paper that was against the government. Anti-Fascists are numerous enough, but their organs are silenced. Some of their papers are seized the moment they come off the press. In Florence the plant of the Opposition journal has lately been burned down. In Milan one can see practically no newspaper at all except the Dictator's own. By decree, all such publications are under the control of local "prefects", and the prefect's tenure of office is absolutely dependent on the will of the government. A paper may be suppressed for such offences as "creating unjustifiable alarm among the population," or "inciting persons to commit actions calculated to lead to the intensification of class hatred." The prefect is sole judge as to whether these offences have been committed, and the prefect obeys Mussolini. One can imagine the rest.

But there has not been even a semblance of disguise for the ruthlessness of the Dictator's policy. A Fascist journal some time ago demanded nothing less than a general massacre of non-Fascists, and expressly defined the position of Mussolini as above all law. Here are its words:

Above and beyond all, Mussolini is the leader of a revolution which is still in progress. If he willed the suppression of Matteotti, his will was that of the leader of the revolution. He cannot be judged by ordinary tribunals. In such a case the judicial authorities would have to come to a halt on the threshold of the Chigi Palace.¹

Language of this sort might be held to call for interference on the part of the prefect. It might surely fall under the clause against "damaging the national credit at home or abroad." But no step has been taken against the paper, and it must be assumed that its policy meets with official approval.

What about "public opinion"? Mr. Murphy warns us, in the first place, that there is no such general interest in newspapers among Italians as among Englishmen. The total city population of the whole country is not as large as that of London, though Italy and Great Britain have about equal numbers of inhabitants, and it is the city dweller that everywhere devours the daily press. Thus, though Italian papers appear in as many varieties as British, their combined circulation does not reach two and a half millions. Their characteristics, too, are very different from those of the English journal. One sees in them little of popular appeal, except politics and death-notices. Horse-racing scarcely figures at all, or items "of interest to women" such as advice about shops and cooking and children. "Any Italian paper that might treat of these things would simply be laughed at." And there is seldom a "financial page," except one dealing with local ventures. The unification of Italy seems to be far from complete, for people in one province concern themselves little about what happens in another. "A Neapolitan, for instance, is quite as unconcerned about the story of a Venetian murder as an Englishman would be about some tale of wife-beating in Sicily."

For the country has really no metropolis. Officially, Rome is the capital, but Naples and Milan are both larger and more important as business cities, while as "cultural centres" Bologna and Florence count for at least as much. And the cities are so distant that by the time a paper from one reaches another its news is stale. So each populous spot in the provinces has its own press, interested almost exclusively in its own affairs.

Journalism in Italy, according to this observer, is in the main "political propaganda." Politics constitute a business, and each party has its own organ. Few of them can pay for first-hand news, and the Milan *Corriere della Sera* is the favourite "cow with the crumpled horn" for the rest to milk. Milan correspondents of

¹ Mussolini's headquarters.

the papers in Rome telephone the chief contents of the *Corriere* for republication in the capital. Under such circumstances it would be indeed surprising if the Mussolini censorship were resented as a like censorship would be resented in England. Liberty of the Press cannot be throttled except where it has had real active existence, and the idea of a "kept Press" has long since embedded itself in the mind of the average Italian journalist. The very notion of an independent paper is almost unintelligible on that soil. Hence Italian correspondents in London are in the habit of labelling the British newspapers with arbitrary tags when they wire the contents to Italy.

Moreover, there is an ingenious system under which the real owners of a journal escape responsibility for the opinions it expresses. There is a sort of trustee, known as "the responsible manager," a man of straw from whom damages cannot be recovered in case of libel, but against whom all legal action must be taken. He can be sent to jail, but has no money to pay. It is, in truth, his chief business to go to jail from time to time when a case goes against the paper. Having paid a man to act as victim, the owner employs editors, reporters, and general collaborators who say just what they will—in the direction favoured by the interest they serve—without any restraint at all. "Billingsgate would blush to hear the epithets that are the current coin of the Italian political journalists." They call one another liars and thieves, knaves, rascals, dogfish, and abuse even the Courts to their hearts' content. In such a situation, restraint of the press by government, or dictation to it from Mussolini's headquarters, is not likely to produce any great shock to the public mind. But, what a situation!

CAPTAIN Stephen Gwynn, whose contributions to THE DALHOUSIE REVIEW have been so much valued, writes in *Foreign Affairs* on the topic "Ireland, One and Divisible."

It would be a great mistake, he says, to suppose that the Irish are not one people. For every Irishman worth his salt prides himself on being as good an Irishman as any other, Unionist or Nationalist, Protestant or Catholic. In this respect, then, if in no other, there is unanimity. And in the struggle of the last years both North and South may be said to have won. For the South has got self-government, and the North has had its way in refusing to come under a parliament in Dublin.

But there are sharp differences. During the Great War, says Captain Gwynn, Mr. De Valera announced the proposal that,

in the united self-governing Ireland, Ulster should have a status like that of Quebec in Canada. There was at one time a real chance that this scheme might be adopted. Apart from religious hostilities, what Ulstermen chiefly opposed was allowing control of their business life to pass to "the representatives of a population which has no instinct for the industrial type of society." Protestants in Ireland believe themselves to be industrially more efficient than Catholics, and to be so because they are Protestants. Waiving the denominational explanation, this writer agrees that Ulstermen are in point of fact more efficient. So they will not transfer to an all-Ireland parliament the powers of central taxation and military control over the northern area. The Free State accepts this refusal as one not to be overcome. But difference arises as to what shall be included in the exempt northern area.

Many northern Unionists have assured Captain Gwynn that, during the first weeks after the publication of the Treaty, opinion in the North was tending towards an abandonment of representation at Westminster and acceptance of full representation in a central Irish parliament, reserving—of course—autonomy for local affairs in the northern legislature. What killed this spirit of conciliation was the attitude adopted by Mr. De Valera and his friends in the Dail. One speaker after another there justified acceptance of the Treaty as just a stepping-stone to complete separation. There followed the Republican campaign of lawlessness and outrage.

We are reminded how President Cosgrave and his government dealt very firmly indeed with these "Irregulars". But their suppression, and the compensation for the harm they did, have been very expensive. Taxation is very high in the South, and discontent consequently fierce. So it is plausible to argue that the Free State will not be able to hold its ground against Republican opposition, and in face of this it is hopeless to propose a forcible transference of unwilling persons from the North to a southern jurisdiction. Yet some extremists declared that under the Boundary Clause of the Treaty they must bring within the Free State not only the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone, but Derry city, and the southern parts of the counties of Down and Armagh!

The Boundary Commission is now at work. What report will it bring in? There are several possibilities. It may be that the Commissioners will report for mere "minor rectification", and that Ulster will say "That is what we always meant." If Mr. Cosgrave should accept this, he will be faced by a ferocious Republican clamor. With a Labour government at Westminster, this

would probably be followed by the return of a Republican majority in the Dail. "But with Tories in the saddle at Westminster, putting Republicans into power will seem more serious. Nobody in Ireland wants a renewal of fighting, and fighting might come of that." If, on the other hand, the Commission reports for large transfers of territory, to which Ulster would not agree, it seems to Captain Gwynn probable that Sir James Craig will resign office and take his part in leading the northern resistance.

Supposing the British army withdrawn, what would be the respective chances of the two sides in an armed struggle? It is a horrible question, but how should we have to answer it? Ulster's forces are well organized and well commanded. A large proportion of the rank and file have been soldiers, and the leaders are men who had experience of the European war. The Free State army, too, has its element of veterans from the battlefields of Europe. "But the Free State troops have no single officer accustomed to handling troops on a large scale in actual war, because for political reasons they refused to employ those who offered, or were willing. Also, they have no experience of artillery work." Captain Gwynn thinks that recourse to arms is improbable. "Nobody", he says, "talks of it, except some Ulster politicians who did not see fighting abroad."

But financiers expect a peaceful solution. The Customs frontier and the two separate fiscal systems are very inconvenient, while the present military establishments are a crushing burden. There is a genuine desire for unity,—far stronger than the desire, for example, in parts of the South for a republic. And if the notion of a separate Republic were given up, Ulster might well agree to a central parliament, so long as she were allowed to keep control of her own tax system and of her fiscal relations with Great Britain. The southern resolve to enforce knowledge of Gaelic is a difficulty. This has been declared the national language. "Yet there is scarcely one person in a thousand throughout Ireland who cannot speak English, and scarcely one in ten who can speak Irish easily." The obstacles to union, in Captain Gwynn's view, are in the main "ideals, symbols, pretences or pretensions, and prejudices." They are obstinate. But once the Republican idea is definitely given up in the South, these may be expected to adjust themselves under the compelling force, not of arms, but of practical convenience, and that innate Irishism which is northern as well as southern.

One notes that this article in *Foreign Affairs* was written before the recent and most encouraging victory in elections made the chance of the De Valeristas against the Treatyites appear far less serious than had been supposed or feared. Let us hope that the obstacle of a Republican idea is indeed passing.

A SHORT time ago, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, of Smith College, created considerable amusement by reopening "the problem of war guilt," and issuing a revised list of precedence in responsibility for the horror that began in August, 1914. It will be remembered that Germany was adjudged by this impartial investigator to have been visited with relatively undue blame, Austria and Russia being rather the chief culprits.

But according to the same alert mind, as expressing itself in *Current History*, no such thing as "guilt" exists anywhere in the world at all. This old delusion of the theologians is said to be now out of date, for "the act of a criminal is as inevitable as that of a clergyman or a missionary." The earlier enterprise of Professor Barnes seems then to have been rather superfluous, for there is little point in distinguishing degrees of that which in truth does not exist. No doubt, however, our bright young guide would reply that he has to conform himself to current forms of speech. Though there is no guilt, there is such a thing as "anti-social behaviour" which society—acting, of course, under the same fatal determination that governs individuals—will do its best to repress. If Professor Barnes from time to time drops back into conventional language, he may take refuge in the defence of Bishop Berkeley: "In these matters it is right to think with the learned, but to speak with the vulgar."

The special case which has called for a statement of the "learned" view is that of Leopold and Loeb. We are told that "orthodox clergymen"—whom Professor Barnes seems to dislike particularly—have denounced a benign Chicago judge who was just trying so far as possible to adapt anachronistic criminal jurisprudence to humanitarian considerations. The Chicago murder, it appears, was quite explicable. Its cause was indeed obvious to expert psychiatrists. Does the reader want to know just what this was? In the case of Leopold, it was "a compulsion neurosis which seemed headed toward a paranoid psychosis," while Loeb was in "the initial stages of a dementia-praecox psychosis." And there had been another case which, for our illumination, Professor Barnes has to quote. A man in Los Angeles killed his nine wives, because he "was suffering from a compulsion neurosis created by over-compensation for his inferiority complex generated by a physical defect." One wonders whether this last may be the verdict of new psychology on the German case. A nation can hardly have a physical defect. But if it wants more colonies or more trade, becomes enraged because some other nation has been more successful in these pursuits, and thus simply cannot restrain itself from declaring war, what is this

but "compulsion neurosis," "over-compensation" and "inferiority complex"?

The reader is invited by Professor Barnes to look into the history of ideas on this subject. Such history is said to reveal how criminal conduct was attributed at the earliest times to diabolical possession, and how the next stage of theory was that of Free Will, said to have been originated by Greek metaphysicians. No reference is given to any sources for this knowledge, and I venture to say that Professor Barnes will find it impossible either to quote assertions of Free Will by Greek philosophers, or to show that the idea of diabolical possession is the earliest account of criminality. Our historical trip carries us next at a bound across some twenty-four centuries to Cesare Lombroso, with whose doctrine of the "born criminal" a qualified sympathy is expressed. It has for Professor Barnes the great attraction of being thoroughly determinist, but the famous doctrine of *stigmata* is admitted to have the weakness of diagnosing criminality among the innocent and failing to diagnose it among the vicious. One may be permitted to think that this is a real drawback.

The burden of what Professor Barnes has to say is that there should be no such thing as "punishment" for anyone, because no one can help being as he is, but that those called "criminals"—that is, the anti-social—should be examined for defects, physical and mental, by a Board of physicians, psychologists and psychiatrists. Treatment should then be prescribed to fit each individual case. Some that clearly can never be cured should be permanently segregated or painlessly put to death. No doubt some scheme of differentiated treatment is perfectly sound. But it is deplorable that Professor Barnes should have mixed a shrewd piece of advice, which sorely needs to be given, with mere rant about crime as disease, about the universal law of necessity in actions, and about the uselessness of punishment. It is this kind of thing that brings psychiatry in general into unmerited contempt.

IN a recent issue of the *Century* Mr. Clarence Darrow—the counsel for Leopold and Loeb in the Chicago case—sets forth that view of the nature of crime on which, we must suppose, his own advocacy rests. Mr. Darrow is well known as an expert in getting verdicts of acquittal for his clients, and that he knows the way to work upon an Illinois jury has been demonstrated again and again. In this article, however, he is not addressing an Illinois

jury for a verdict, but reflective readers who wish to understand crime. A different task, and one calling for different qualifications, as his "argument" abundantly shows!

For Mr. Darrow there are only two possible views about human action. Either man is simply a machine, or else his movements are an unintelligible breach of Nature's Law of Causation. The first of these views is that of "every scientist"; the second is held by superstitious theologians and metaphysicians, two groups which this critic appears to identify. Since then, to all enlightened thinkers, man is just a highly complicated machine, it follows that all his actions—crime among the number—must result from the joint forces of heredity and environment. Thus under no circumstances can he deserve either credit or blame. He does that to which he was fatally determined. One may infer that to use the word "good" about George Washington, while the word "bad" is used about Mr. Darrow's clients, Leopold and Loeb, is to be misled by religious or metaphysical credulity. All three alike acted under the irresistible compulsion of a nature they inherited and the circumstances amid which they were brought up.

What, then, becomes of our theory of punishment? "Society punishes those whom it hates, and any fanaticism, religious or social, claims its victims by the thousands. Death is administered because organized society hates, and gets joy in killing the ones it hates." But Mr. Darrow holds that the practice of punishing has been comparatively ineffective to stop crime. He quotes in illustration the long series of crimes—some two hundred different varieties—for which the death penalty was once exacted, and reminds us how futile were such methods to deter. So he concludes his article with the general inference that we should seek out and remove the causes which lead to crime, rather than rely upon "rending and destroying in anger and hate."

It was George III that Macaulay once described as hating poets, atheists, and metaphysicians, without any careful discrimination of differences among them. Mr. Darrow is of similar mind. If his argument is really correct, then those Courts which apply the death penalty to all sorts and conditions of men are fulfilling the inevitable law of their nature, just like the lynx-eyed critic who—with pathetic inconsequence—thinks the judges are to blame while the criminals are not! He repeats the old foolishness about the proved ineffectiveness of punishment, as illustrated during the period of a capital sentence for hundreds of offences which nevertheless continued to prevail. The truth, as every real historian knows, is that the power of punishment to deter

depends not so much upon its intensity as upon the certainty of its being inflicted, and that the procedure of a hundred years ago failed because detection was so feeble rather than because sentences were so severe. If it is true that there are now as many murders committed each year in the city of Chicago alone as in the whole of the United Kingdom, may not the well-known dexterity of lawyers like Mr. Darrow suggest part at least of the cause? The case was put in a nutshell by a cartoon in *Punch*, depicting Cain just after the murder of Abel. Caressing his club, the first murderer soliloquises thus: "Now for a first-rate lawyer, and a couple of insanity experts."

WHAT is happening to the Herriot government in France? Few writers in the magazine press have a keener discernment in this field than Mr. Sisley Huddleston, who so long represented London newspapers in Paris.

He has been telling readers of the *Contemporary* that the French Premier in the closing days of last year suddenly undid all the good work he had achieved for conciliation. For without any discussion with Germany, and without giving the Germans any chance to refute the charges upon which the contemplated action was based, M. Herriot and Mr. Austen Chamberlain agreed to "prolong the occupation of the Cologne bridge-head and zone."

There had, beyond doubt, been breaches of the disarmament part of the Treaty. Mr. Huddleston acknowledges this. But he points out that M. Herriot had been made aware of these breaches long ago, and that since then he had delivered effusively optimistic speeches about the excellence of the German settlement. For six months he had been proclaiming friendship with Germany, only to reverse his attitude all of a sudden, without additional evidence, without reading or even receiving the detailed report from the Commission of Control. It is alleged in his defence that he was during those months creating a favourable atmosphere for the application of the Dawes Plan. But his abrupt change to a mood of exasperation has given the appearance of bad faith to his earlier speeches, and has brought upon him the reproach of being just "another Poincaré."

Not only the Germans, but the pacifists of France have lost their belief in him. And there was an unfortunate coincidence of dates. Mr. Huddleston reminds us that January 10th was not only the date fixed for evacuation of the Cologne zone, but also the date on which the commercial arrangements set up by the

Treaty were to expire. So the Germans had a chance to retaliate. They could declare a tariff war. Moreover, the decision reached by the Allies had the look of a return to the Ruhr policy. For it is only through the Cologne zone that communications with the Ruhr can be maintained, and M. Herriot seems to be condoning what he not long ago so strongly denounced.

This critic is by no means certain that German breaches of the disarmament bargain left any course open to the Allies except the one they took; but he thinks the credit of M. Herriot for consistency has been much impaired. His action has strengthened those parties in his own country which were most critical towards him on other grounds. For instance, Alsace-Lorraine had grievances against him already. That area, governed for half a century under German laws, is a sort of "hyphen between France and Germany." But the Herriot government has resolved to assimilate it to French usage altogether, particularly in its educational and school system. Its schools are of the kind called "confessional",—that is, they are Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. The inhabitants may choose what type of religious teaching their children will receive, but they must choose some one of these three varieties. They like this arrangement, and dislike very strongly that "secular", one-type. school system which French Radicals have been trying to impose. So M. Herriot on this question, as on regulations regarding the religious orders, is in sharp conflict with the Clericals. These may be trusted to make the most of his other faults.

Again, he has suffered for his recognition of Soviet Russia. Mr. Huddleston thinks he did right in this respect, but admits that some of the surrounding circumstances were "unsavoury." With the new Russian Ambassador there arrived in Paris "a number of persons who are undoubtedly undesirable." The Red Flag was run up at the Embassy, to the strains of the *Internationale*, sung by a Communist crowd, and accompanied by a band. About the same time a French officer who had been condemned for desertion and for correspondence with the enemy returned to Paris to demand a new trial, and "his advent was the signal for a great Communist push."

All this helps the attack of the Opposition. Already M. Herriot is being ridiculed as another Kerensky, whose weakness is preparing the way for a Red revolution. And the counter-agitation by government supporters against the peril of French Fascism has been ineffective. Equally futile and unwise was the government enquiry into an alleged scandal about the use of election funds. M. Herriot's friends aimed a blow here at the Conservative Op-

position, but failed to show any illegality that it had committed, while it came out incidentally that one group of business interests singled out for attack had contributed to the election fund of a Minister in M. Herriot's own cabinet!

An interesting point in Mr. Huddleston's summary of the situation is his emphasis on the instability of French Premiers. During the last thirty-five years only three Prime Ministers of France reached, or nearly reached, the end of three years of office. No Premier can sufficiently reckon on staying in office for more than one year. The result is that after a few months Ministers become discouraged, feel that their political life will soon be over, drop their best projects, and "wait for the end." On the whole, Mr. Huddleston regards M. Herriot as having put France on the right path in international relations, but as having—partly by his faults and partly by his merits—combined serious forces in antagonism to his government. And he declares that M. Caillaux, having come back to Paris, is perhaps on his way back to power.

H. L. S.