

TOPICS OF THE DAY

ELECTION UNCERTAINTIES: OUTLOOK IN SOUTH AFRICA:
THE IONA COMMUNITY: EARL LLOYD GEORGE

THE ONLY ELEMENT of certainty in our muddled domestic political situation is that a Federal general election, which may or may not clarify it, will take place some time before another winter begins. The short parliamentary session, which is now being held for the purpose of voting supplies for part of the current fiscal year, and the decision of Premier King to head the delegation which will represent Canada at the San Francisco Conference on world security, make it virtually impossible for the general election to be held before the end of June. But Mr. King has unhappy memories of the only election which he ever fought in July, the contest of 1930, which resulted in his ejection from office, and farmers resent the distractions of a political battle in August when their harvesting operations are at their peak. So political forecasters are now predicting that the verdict of the voters will be sought in the latter half of September.

Meanwhile the different parties are busily engaged in their preliminary preparations for the approaching campaign, and many nominations have been made. The Liberals are obviously committed to a very difficult defensive battle. As the result of the vagaries of their manpower policy, there has been an ominous erosion of their popular support in the English-speaking provinces, and episodes like the wholesale desertions of "zombies" drafted for overseas service and the disturbance at Drummondville, P. Q., have increased the dimensions of this erosion. They may hope that by polling-day the surrender of Germany will have eliminated conscription as the dominant issue of the campaign, and they will claim credit for the King Government as an efficient organizer of Canada's contribution to the triumph of the cause of freedom. They will also appeal for a fresh mandate to carry out a programme of social security, designed to ameliorate the lot of the plain folk of Canada, and great play will be made with the argument that no other party can provide a leader so experienced or so wise in international statecraft as Mr. King to represent us in the framing of the post-war settlement. But General MacNaughton, as candid Liberal papers admit, threatens to prove a very serious political liability to his new party, and his recent picture of himself as the martyred victim of an arrogant British High Command,

because he sought to safeguard Canadian interests against the consequences of their follies, was a blazing indiscretion. This must be very embarrassing to the rest of the King Ministry, because it concurred in his dismissal from the command of Canada's overseas army. Nor are intelligent Liberals very happy about the ardor, encouraged by that wayward politician, Mr. Mitchell Hepburn, of the *soi-disant* Communists, now styled Labor-Progressive, to join them in bonds of political wedlock. Nor is there any certainty that the voters of French-Canada can once more be shepherded safely at a general election into the Liberal corral, and there is a growing uneasiness in Liberal circles about the activities of that irrepressible demagogue, M. Camillien Houde, once more installed in the Mayoralty of Montreal. He has sworn vengeance upon the Liberal party for his long incarceration, and such is his popularity with the working classes that he is credited with the ability to elect eight or ten "Houdist" candidates on the island of Montreal at a general election.

The Progressive-Conservatives hope that in the English-speaking provinces they will be the beneficiaries of the odium which attaches to the Government for its piecemeal policy about conscription and its alleged subservience to the demands of French-Canada. They are counting, too, upon Mr. Bracken's prestige in authority upon agricultural problems to win many votes for them in rural districts. But they will have to clear away a certain confusion in the public mind about their economic and social programme, about which some of their leaders speak with discordant voices, and satisfy the country that they can provide it with an efficient administration as an alternative to the King Government. The C.C.F. party is thought by the political experts to have lost ground in recent months, but it has made many converts for its Socialist programme, and it will profit from the deep disillusionment of thousands of voters, who have no particular enthusiasm for that programme, with the two historic parties on the evidence of their recent records. The Social Crediters will remain a local faction, unable to win any seats outside their own bailiwick in Alberta.

ONE STRANGE FEATURE of this war is that the Dutch Africans have shown a greater enthusiasm for participation in it than any other of the non-British white peoples who are citizens of the British Commonwealth. Yet these Dutch people

of South Africa have considerable reason for cherishing a grudge against Britain and remaining indifferent to her fortunes. Most fair-minded Britons now regard the South African War of 1899-1902 as a rather discreditable episode in British history. It was a clear case of war being used as an instrument of power politics. Because a community of British people living outside the bounds of the British Commonwealth professed to have certain grievances, the whole might of the Commonwealth was employed to conquer two little Republics inhabited by simple farmers, and to bring them within the hoop of the British *Reich*. The policy pursued was almost indistinguishable from Hitler's absorption of Austria in the *Reich*, and it was opposed by every genuine Liberal in Britain.

Thousands of people living in South Africa now have vivid memories of the last South African War, of the burning of thousands of farms and the horrors of the concentration camps, into which Boer prisoners and women and children were herded. So the South African Dutch could almost be pardoned if they had lent a sympathetic ear to the efforts of the late Premier Hertzog and Dr. Malan to keep the Union out of the war. A certain element of them did listen to these leaders, and still object to South Africa's belligerency, but a substantial majority of the Dutch have shown a surprisingly ardent zeal for the prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion. It is estimated that half of the members of South Africa's armed services bear Dutch names, and, while this record of enlistment is not proportionate to the numbers of the Dutch element in the population (which is 60% of the total), it is extremely creditable under the circumstances. Moreover, many of the South African military leaders who have won special distinction in the war are Dutchmen like Generals Pienaar, Brink, Ryneveld and De Villiers.

It is therefore a pertinent question to ask how it comes that the South African Dutch, who have grievances of much closer origin in time against the British than have either the French-Canadians or the Southern Irish, have shown a much greater enthusiasm for the war than these other two races. To this question several answers can be given. In the first place, the Italian Empire which Mussolini had built up in Africa was regarded with sincere apprehension in South Africa; there was a genuine fear that if Axis powers prevailed, the Italians would proceed to recruit and arm with Germany's help a huge army, which they would use as an instrument for expanding their Empire southward. Accordingly, South Africa had a direct

interest in freeing Africa from the menace offered to it by Italian Fascism. Secondly, the South African Dutch have always retained a sentimental affection for Holland, the land of their forbears, and many of them were filled with indignation over Germany's wanton invasion of that country and her brutal treatment of its inhabitants. So racial sympathy impelled thousands of Dutch Afrianders to contribute to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

But these two motives might have exercised little influence on the attitude of the South African Dutch, if there had not existed among them a group of enlightened leaders who saw the folly of perpetuating any racial fissure and labored tirelessly to heal it. Among these leaders Field-Marshal Smuts has pride of place, but equally zealous in the same cause have been his able lieutenant, Mr. J. H. Hofmeyer, the Treasurer of the Union, and the late Colonel Denys Reitz, who died recently as the occupant of the post of South African High Commissioner in London. These able men and their associates never ceased to argue to their compatriots that the British, when they had the upper hand, had accorded the Dutch race very generous treatment, and that since South Africa's best hopes of peace, security and prosperity lay in her partnership in the British Commonwealth, she was in honor bound to accept all the obligations of the partnership. If there had existed able leaders of French-Canadian and Irish blood, who had exerted themselves to give their compatriots this kind of political education, a very different story might have been told about the attitude of French-Canada and Eirè to the war. But the mass of the French-Canadians and Southern Irish rarely heard any challenge to the case that they were fully justified in abstaining from giving any support in war to the British, because the latter were just as deeply infected with the doctrines of arrogant Imperialism as the Germans ever would be. Such teachings were responsible for what seems the almost unintelligible apathy of the mass of the French-Canadians and Southern Irish towards the war, and it is an immense calamity for both that no contrary view was effectively presented to them.

ONE OF THE MOST interesting institutions in the world to-day is the Iona Community, founded some years ago by the only titled clergyman of the Church of Scotland, Sir George F. Macleod, Bart., and more should be known about it in a

country which has such strong ties with Scotland as Canada has. Iona, or Icomkill as it is called in Gaelic, is a little island in the Inner Hebrides lying south-west of Mull; it is $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles long by $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles broad, and its area, of which one-third is under cultivation, is 2,200 acres. It was on this little island that St. Columba landed in 563 A.D., and establishing a monastery, laid the foundations of Christianity in Scotland. His monastery developed into the most famous centre of Celtic Christianity, and was the mother community of many other monastic houses from which missionaries were sent forth for the conversion of Scotland and to which came students for centuries from all parts of North Britain. After St. Columba's death his relics rested there until they were removed to Ireland in the 9th century. Pilgrims came to die on the island, so that they might lie in its holy ground, and bodies of illustrious personages were brought to it for burial.

Several times the monastery was plundered and burnt, and the monks massacred by Viking sea-rovers from Norway. In the 11th century, when it had become the seat of a bishopric of the Hebrides, King Magnus III of Norway placed it under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Trondhjem. But this association was dissolved, and in 1203 a new monastery and nunnery were established by Benedictine monks. Later the cathedral church of St. Mary was built, and about 1507 the island became once more the seat of the Catholic Bishopric of the Isles. But its days of glory ended with the victory of the Protestant party in Scotland at the time of the Reformation, and in 1561 the Convention of Estates was led by religious rancour to order in a spirit of vandalism the destruction of the monastic buildings. However, the tower of the cathedral and a portion of the walls were left standing, and after some restoration work had been carried out, the ruins were conveyed by the Eighth Duke of Argyll to a body of trustees.

In modern times Iona enjoyed repute as one of the holy places of Scotland, and was visited every summer by a stream of tourists, but it filled no influential rôle in the religious life of the country until George Macleod addressed himself to the fulfilment of a long cherished dream of reviving its old influence. He comes by his religious fervor honestly, for the Macleod family of Morven has been giving eminent ministers to the Church of Scotland for a century and a half, and he is the grandson of the most famous of them, the Rev. Norman Macleod, long minister of the Barony Church in Glasgow, who was in his

day and generation the acknowledged leader of the Church of Scotland and was well known in Canada as the result of a sojourn here. He was given an English education at Winchester and Oriel College, Oxford, and during the last war he served with great distinction in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, winning both the Military Cross and the French *Croix de Guerre*. Retiring with the rank of captain, he decided to follow a family tradition and enter the Church of Scotland. So he qualified for its ministry by studies at Edinburgh University and the Union Theological Seminary in New York, and chose, as his first field of activity, missionary work in lumber camps in British Columbia.

Returning to Scotland, he served as assistant in a well-known church in Edinburgh until, in 1930, he undertook charge of Govan, one of the largest parishes in Glasgow. Including as it did a large part of the shipbuilding and dock area of the city, it had few people except wage-earners, many of them very poor, living within its bounds, and it contained a good many slums. But George Macleod, by the saintliness of his life, his fine gifts and his disinterested devotion to the interests of his flock, made religion a living force in Govan, and became immensely popular with every class of its residents, including the numerous Irish Catholics.

He was one of the foremost leaders in the public life of Glasgow, when in his 43rd year, in 1938, he inherited from his father, Sir John Macleod, a prosperous chartered accountant, who had sat in Parliament as a Conservative, both a baronetcy and a comfortable fortune. So he felt free to embark upon the experiment which he had long contemplated. Retiring from his charge in Govan, he moved to Iona and proceeded to organize a religious community of Scottish Presbyterians, modelled with adaptations suited to their creed on the monastic establishments which have long flourished under the aegis of the Church of Rome and, in lesser degree, of the Anglican Church. It has two avowed objectives, firstly the dedication of its members to the task of making the ideals of Christianity order the life of the people of Scotland, and secondly, the restoration of the ancient cathedral church of St. Mary.

This community on Iona, founded by Sir George Macleod, has now fully justified his hopes. Upon its membership the scarcity of accommodation imposes a limit and every year

scores of applications for admission to it are rejected. The members of the community lead very simple lives on very plain fare, and they are expected to contribute, as long as they are in residence, some labor to the restoration of the cathedral. It has become a favorite place of retreat for ministers of the Church of Scotland, who want a rest from arduous labors, and many youthful aspirants for its ministry go to Iona to sit at the feet of George Macleod before they seek a pulpit of their own. But laymen also are cordially welcomed, and some places in the community are always reserved for humble toilers, some of whom have employed their skill as artisans to very useful purpose in the rebuilding of the cathedral, while some members have come from places as far distant as New Zealand. Moreover, every year the community is visited by hundreds of interested people who come away impressed by its idealistic atmosphere and the genuine value of the work being accomplished by it. It is now counted almost a mark of grace in Scotland to have been a member of the Iona Community, and its influence for good is spreading far and wide. Its founder, George Macleod, will as long as he lives remain its dominating spirit, loved and respected by all who know him, and he may end his days as the most distinguished member of the famous family of preachers to which he belongs.

NAZI GERMANY, WEAKENED by a series of military reverses which have cost her irreplaceable casualties and the loss of two of three great arsenals of her war machine, Silesia and the Saar Valley, is caught in the stranglehold of a ring of powerful and well-equipped allied armies. She has not yet acknowledged the defeat which stares her in the face, but the final phase of the war in Europe has obviously been reached. Her enemies, having conquered all her territory west of the Rhine and east of the Oder, have pushed strong forces across both these formidable water barriers, and have such a mass of offensive power at their disposal that their penetration into the very vitals of the *Reich* should proceed rapidly. In the past the High Command of the *Reichswehr* has shown remarkable resourcefulness in coping with adversities, but it cannot make bricks without straw. Supplies of munitions and equipment, when expended or lost, can no longer be replaced in the necessary volume, and the growing disposition of large groups of German soldiers to

surrender a key point without putting up a serious fight indicates that the army has at last become infected with the pessimism and demoralization which had previously gripped a large part of the civilian population of the *Reich*. When the Gestapo is murdering the families of soldiers who surrender at the front, and boys of 14 are being sent into the firing line, the military power of Germany is obviously well nigh exhaustion, and the pool of reserves is now so low that the defence of one menaced sector can be buttressed only by weakening another sector. So Mr. Churchill's guarded prediction, that the organized resistance of the German army would collapse "before the summer ends or even sooner", seems fully justified.

It has been forecast that after the leaders of the German army make formal surrender, bands of Nazi fanatics will maintain a guerrilla warfare in mountainous regions like the Bavarian Alps or the Black Forest. But, while such desperadoes might cause trouble for some time, they could not hold out indefinitely without the sympathetic cooperation of the rest of the population, such as the French Maquis enjoyed. Observers who have studied the attitude of the inhabitants of the conquered portions of Germany report that they are completely cowed, and would give no encouragement to continued resistance. So the prospect is that the Allies will have on their hands at no distant date a completely beaten Germany, whose rescue from anarchy and misery will present them with as difficult problems as the defeat of her armies. All accounts of internal conditions in Germany offer a picture of mounting chaos accompanied by widespread hardship and suffering. Most of her larger cities have been devastated by aerial bombardments; as many as 25 million people are reported to be homeless; the transportation system is disorganized, local administrations have broken down in many communities, and famine and serious epidemics of disease have begun to show their head. The disintegration of the once highly organized structure of German society is proceeding apace, and it will not be checked until hostilities cease. Even then a very baffling situation will confront the Allies. The sinister Nazi regime will disappear suddenly, and its leaders will be lucky if they are not torn to pieces by the people whose ruin they have accomplished. But its disappearance will leave a vacuum, since Hitler and his crew have so effectively suppressed all opposition, and prevented the growth of any underground resistance movement, that there is no material available for the creation of fresh national authority with which the Allies could

deal. So there seems to be no alternative for the Allies but to assume without delay complete responsibility for the government of Germany, and give her people every possible assistance in building up a new structure of administration.

There will remain Japan as the sole survivor of the evil Fascist triumvirate, and on the surface she possesses resources for continuing the struggle for some time ahead. But her people lack the Germans' stubborn powers of endurance, and there are already signs of a wilting morale among the crowded populations of her great cities, now that they are being subjected to destructive assaults day after day by the American Air Force. Moreover, there is one vital difference between the political situations in Japan and Germany. In Germany there is no alternative to the Nazi regime whose leaders have vowed never to surrender, but in Japan there has continued to survive an opposition to the war lords who now rule the roost in Tokyo. It includes some influential elder statesmen and younger politicians, numerous leaders of the financial and business communities, and a group of the more intelligent soldiers. These men have always thought Japan's entry into the war as Germany's partner a very dangerous adventure and, once it becomes plain that Japan has been left to fight single-handed against the combined power of the United Nations, they will argue that prolongation of the war in the Pacific will result only in Japan sharing her partner's fate and coming to complete ruin. Accordingly, if, after the collapse of Germany, the fortunes of the Pacific war continue to be adverse to Japan, the moderates might muster enough popular support to oust the war lords from office and proceed to negotiate the best terms of peace that they can secure. Therefore it is not impossible that the whole world may be freed from the nightmare of this terrible war before another winter arrives.

In view of the swift march of military events, it was very satisfactory that the Conference which President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin held at Yalta in the Crimea resulted in their harmonious agreement about most of the pressing problems of the world, and produced a better crop of definite decisions about important issues than did their earlier meeting at Teheran. It was a great gain from the Yalta Conference that unbroken unity was accepted as an indispensable condition for success in the building of a new order of the world and other complicated tasks of peace. An agreement was also reached about the post-war treatment of Germany, and it

was thus admirably summed up by Mr. Churchill to the British House of Commons:

The Allies are resolved that Germany shall be totally disarmed, that Nazism and militarism in Germany shall be destroyed, that war criminals shall be justly and swiftly punished, that all German industry capable of military production shall be eliminated or controlled, and that Germany shall make compensation in kind to the utmost of her ability for damage done to the allied nations. On the other hand, it is not the purpose of the Allies to destroy the people of Germany, or leave them without the necessary means of subsistence. There will be a place, one day, for Germany in the comity of nations, but only when all traces of Nazism and militarism have been effectively and finally extirpated.

The pretentious claims of the clique of reactionary politicians who dominate the Polish Government in London were given their quietus, and a sensible agreement, which commands the approval of everybody except these gentry and some British Tory friends, was achieved about the conditions under which and the frontiers within which a strong, independent and democratic Poland can begin to write a new chapter in its history. On some questions there seems to have been a reversal of the decisions taken at Teheran. At the meeting held there, different spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, the Balkan Peninsula and the Mediterranean area were assigned to Russia and Britain, with the United States assuming partial responsibility in some countries like Italy. But events in Poland, Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia have revealed the imperfections of this system, and part of the declaration made by the three leaders after the Yalta Conference alters it. Under its terms the Three Great Powers reaffirm the right, guaranteed to all peoples in the *Atlantic Charter*, to choose their own forms of government and therefore

to foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist . . . the peoples in Europe to establish conditions of peace . . . to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population . . . to facilitate the holding of free elections.

So henceforth the three major powers will assume a joint responsibility for all phases of the processes of liberation and reconstruction in the rescued countries. But events in Romania have aroused some disquietude about the faithful observance

of this principle by the Russians, whose pressure openly exercised was a large factor in the elimination of the Tadescu Ministry and its replacement by a Leftist Administration, headed by M. Groza, the leader of the National Democratic Front.

In plans for post-war collaboration for the maintenance of peace and security, very encouraging progress was recorded at Yalta. The declaration of the three leaders proclaimed their determination to build upon the foundations laid at the earlier Conference at Dumbarton Oaks an organization for world security embracing at first the 50-odd United Nations and later all the nations of the world. It will be an organization largely modelled on the League of Nations, but it will be greatly strengthened by inclusion of the United States, and its members will be pledged explicitly to employ force in case of need against both evil doers and the planners of evil. One very thorny problem—the question of voting procedure in the projected Security Council—was left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks, but at Yalta a satisfactory agreement about it was reached. It was also decided that France and China should be associated with the “Big Three” as conveners of the General Conference of the United Nations, which opens at San Francisco on April 25 for the purpose of reviewing the plan of the security organization. But General De Gaulle and his government, whose sensitiveness has become proverbial, were deeply offended by France’s exclusion from the Yalta Conference, and have refused to act as sponsor for the San Francisco Conference, on the ground that they must be free to criticize decisions in which their concurrence was not asked.

The Yalta Conference only made a beginning with solutions for the crucial problems of the world, and it evaded the main economic issues which may well dominate future international conferences after the fighting ends. But the political issues must be settled first, and there seems now a fair prospect that at San Francisco they will be tackled realistically. In the initial stages of the Peace there must be leadership by the Three Great Powers who have been mainly responsible for the salvation of democratic freedom, and it is a matter for solid satisfaction that they have authorized a tentative plan of considerable merit. But in that plan there is one fundamental weakness, namely, that its proposed procedures are simply the machinery of international collaboration. The actual evolution of the policy which is to govern its operation—and particularly the policies of the Three Great Powers themselves—must remain

the central problem of world security. This is still in beclouded state. Many of the lesser powers are suspicious that the "Big Three" or the "Big Five", if France and China join the sacred inner circle, will have the rest of the world at their mercy, and France will have numerous supporters among the smaller nations for criticisms which her representatives may direct against the Dumbarton Oaks plan and for amendments which they may suggest.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE is dead, and lies buried amid the hills of his beloved Wales. He will have an assured place in Britain's roll of eminent statesmen, but a certain deficiency in the finer moral qualities will keep him on a lowlier pedestal than men like Cromwell, the elder Pitt, Peel, Gladstone, and controversy will long continue about the exact value of his services to his country. He could, however, lay undeniable claim to two distinctions. He was the first Welshman, since Henry Tudor won the Crown on Bosworth Field, that the English permitted to guide their destinies. He was also the first genuine man of the people to attain the high office of Prime Minister of Britain; all his predecessors except Disraeli were either aristocrats or members of wealthy families, and Disraeli came of middle-class Jewish stock.

It was the successful employment of his fine vein of Celtic eloquence in denunciation of the South African War of 1899-1902 and in agitation for social reforms which brought Lloyd George first to nation-wide notoriety and to Cabinet office in 1905, and he remained a radical reformer all through his active political career, which lasted more than forty years. In the field of social reform he took up the torch which Joseph Chamberlain had cast aside when he quarrelled with Gladstone over Home Rule in 1885, and it was the ascendancy which he achieved in the councils of the Liberal party from 1906 onwards which galvanized it into producing a broad programme of social reforms. He had a large share of credit for giving the British people old-age pensions, labor exchanges, a system of unemployment insurance and other measures which made a belated beginning with remedies urgently needed for the evils and injustices of an unregulated industrialism, and which alleviated the poverty and squalor then habitual for millions of British workers and their families. His programme of social reform involved a famous battle with the House of Lords, and it was a curious

finale to the career of a politician who was such a vehement critic of the Lords and one of the chief architects of the curtailment of their powers of veto that in the closing months of his life he should accept a peerage.

The third phase of his career saw him in a new rôle as one of the most energetic organizers of his country's war effort in its first struggle against German militarism. When as the result of dissatisfaction with the Asquith regime he was elevated to the Premiership, he reached the pinnacle of his power and fame. He was just as effective as Mr. Churchill has been in this war in fortifying by his eloquence the nation's spirit to maintain the struggle through very dark hours; he imparted vigor, initiative and imagination to the direction of British war policy; and he made a very material contribution to the winning of the war by forcing Haig and other British Generals much against their will to accept the plan of a Supreme Command for the allied armies. His contribution to the peace settlement was less satisfactory, but, when he fell from power in 1922, he could show a very creditable record of useful service to his country in peace and war, and it is upon this record that his fame will rest.

There is also a debit side to his balance sheet. His mercurial temperament was responsible for an instability of character which led him into unfortunate courses. The Marconi affair was at the best a deplorable indiscretion, and after the First War disturbing revelations about the bartering of titles for campaign funds exposed Lloyd George to the charge that he was unprincipled and was lowering the standards of British public life. It was his lot to earn the distrust of the great majority of the Conservative party, of a very large element of his Liberal brethren, and of the rising Labor party, and as a result, when he was still in the prime of his powers, he found himself without a political following. Although he was, as an independent member, a very formidable critic of governments, he ceased to exercise any serious influence upon the policies of Britain.

It was personal distrust of Lloyd George and his ways that was responsible both for the break-up of his Coalition Ministry in 1922 and for the deep internal feud in the Liberal party, whose persistence prevented its recovery of its former strength. Able Conservative leaders like Lord Birkenhead and Lord Horne, who wanted to keep the Coalition alive, always maintained that its termination was an immense calamity, because a revival

of partizan controversy under a weak Conservative Ministry enfeebled British policy during critical years when the seeds of the present war were being sown. Furthermore, if it had been possible to reunite the factions of the Liberal party, it might have been strong enough to remain the second party in the state, instead of having to sink to the rôle of an ineffective minority party. But the Labor party, which supplanted it as the official opposition, was never able in the decades between the two world wars to convince the voters that its leaders could be trusted for any long period with the guidance of the fortunes of Britain. If there had existed a strong Liberal party, which could have offered the British the prospect of a competent alternative administration, they would never have entrusted their destinies so long as they did to the hands of palsied and purblind Tory leaders like Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. They have lived to rue their folly, but they can blame Lloyd George for destroying the power of the Liberal party, which under a happier outcome might have averted the terrible calamity of a second bloodbath for the world.

J. A. STEVENSON