

CURRENT MAGAZINES

Reno the Wicked: Mr. H. F. Pringle, in *The Outlook and Independent*.

The Economy Report: Mr. Harold Cox, in the *Contemporary*.

Britain's National Government: Editorial, in the *Review of Reviews*.

Alfred Loisy and the Death of Modernism: Dr. E. J. Dillon, in the *Contemporary*.

THE city of Reno must be an inspiring place. On a recent visit, Mr. H. F. Pringle was particularly struck by the tone of its general conversation—carrying the mind constantly back to first principles, and disdaining the casual makeshift with which other communities are content. The air seemed to be filled with an apostolic spirit, something like that of the Frenchmen of 1789. One heard everywhere about “personal liberty,” about “the inalienable rights of man,” and about the heroism with which these sanctities should be defended. Plainly, in Reno they recognize that eternal vigilance is the price of freedom, and that a society must go ever forward if it would even hold its ground. So of late they made diligent search for surviving anomalies—the heritage of a dark past by which their freedom was still limited—and in two matters they found a grievance still calling for redress. They observed (1) that their marriage laws were still unduly strict, and (2) that a tyrannical veto still obstructed the diversion of gambling. In what way, and with what success, Reno took up its crusade against these remaining evils, is set before us in Mr. Pringle's very suggestive article.

Elsewhere the proprietor of a gambling house must either carry on his business in secret or “pay for protection.” Until lately in Reno a certain well known club, devoted to this exciting pastime, had its premises in a basement, but those interested had little difficulty—if they observed due precaution—in gaining access to its facilities. Under the new law, however, gambling has become the most fashionable of the city sports. So the “Bank Club” has moved upstairs, and it has now a frontage of fifty-five feet on one of the main streets. Mr. Pringle describes how provision is made for every kind of gambling that suits the American taste, and how in the same neighbourhood other such clubs have sprung up like mushrooms. A great many buildings previously used as stores have been adapted to the purposes of the new industry. They are lined with Wheels of Fortune, roulette tables, dice tables, apparatus for faro, keno, and the like. On huge electric signs that burn from dusk till dawn, patronage is solicited, and every night the

clubs are thronged by all sorts of people—ladies, both old and young, constituting a great proportion. Thus notable has been the public response to privileges now legalized. No longer is the sporting impulse either forced to seek gratification in secret or frowned upon by intrusive moralists. Reno congratulates herself on having led the attack against those barriers by which mankind's freedom even in this twentieth century was being kept still incomplete. Yet another stronghold of ancient despotism has been overthrown!

Her next crusade was against the harshness of restriction upon what Goethe called "elective affinities." Reno's reforming pioneers noticed with indignation that though their city had long served as a rescue-home for those unhappily mated, even as Canada had been an asylum a century ago for fugitive slaves, the conditions of rescue had been made needlessly exacting. There was indeed quite ample latitude in the grounds held adequate for divorce, so that no one who desired release could well be refused. Like Barnardo's Homes, from which no really destitute boy or girl was ever turned away, Reno had kept open the door of escape for every fretful spouse. But, especially for persons in such condition, why impose a residence of six months to establish "domicile"? And why require the whole period of residence to be spent in the city of Reno? Divorce applicants, upon whom the nervous strain must be great, should surely be treated with a finer tenderness! So the new law provides that residence of six weeks shall be sufficient, and that the applicants may live anywhere within the limits of the State of Nevada. Mr. Pringle records an interesting suggestion that the Chamber of Commerce might organize a six weeks tour of the State, to begin on the day of filing the divorce application, and to end on the day when the decree should be ready. This, he says, though proposed, "will not be done, officially, this year." But much may be hoped from private enterprise.

These two extensions of "personal liberty" have, of course, been the object of considerable debate and of some disapproval. There are Puritans who object to both of them. But doctrinaire criticism from outside, by persons who have no knowledge of local circumstances, is quickly dismissed, and those who rank on the spot as "the best citizens" are enthusiasts both for quick divorce and for free gambling. Mr. Pringle quotes the district sheriff, the mayor, and a local Methodist minister, all of whom believe that the changes have brought moral improvement. They point out that hypocrisy has been eliminated, that the gambling habit everywhere prevalent had much better be practised openly than practised secretly, that a law notoriously violated should be frankly dropped lest the pre-

cedent encourage lawlessness in general, that the gambling in Reno is now of a straight and honorable kind because the "crooked" gamblers have fled to other States where they can work behind closed doors, and that if a little revenue is obtained from questionable practices, it is at least better for this to be used in the service of the city than for disreputable "sharks" to be personally enriched. The mayor thinks that free trial of games of chance will be the best method of reforming the roué through disappointment, and he has an interesting proposal that tubs of liquor should be placed at every street corner to solve in like fashion another moral problem. Equally provocative of thought is a reflection that comes to us from the sheriff: "Legalize what the people want, and you obtain better moral conditions in the community." That, surely, is among the most remarkable pieces of political wisdom we have had since the days of Aristotle.

Other advocates of the change adopt, it must be confessed, a different line of thought. They have dwelt upon the promise of the new law for *business* in Reno, and they seem to contemplate by no means the ultimate deterrence of the gambler, but gambling ever "bigger and better." When the bill was going through the legislature, they urged that another Monte Carlo might easily, and with great advantage, be created in Nevada. They point out that already the number of gambling clubs has been multiplied ten times, that the streets are thronged and the hotels are crowded by visitors who have come with money to spend and the mood to spend it. The business men, says Mr. Pringle, stand unanimously in support of this provision for open gambling. But their reasons are hard to reconcile with the moral argument of the sheriff, the mayor, and the Methodist minister.

It is contended, too, that the increased facilities for divorce have been a help to the higher at the expense of the lower morality. This change has rendered needless, and has consequently eliminated, the deceit and disguise of illicit amours, so that in Nevada love is once more idealized by the abolition of that rigid marriage which poets say must always debase it. But here again there are certain embarrassing coincidences, and the defenders of the new law are strangely at variance with one another. For it was known that the divorce court industry in Reno had of late years brought an annual revenue of \$4,000,000, and that while other parts of Nevada were suffering economic depression, the capital alone—thanks to this singular kind of business—was growing constantly more prosperous. No matter how the loftier aspects of the change might be emphasized by sheriff, mayor, or Methodist minister, the coarser-minded among

the legislators would often mention its commercial value as the real ground for Reno's marriage law policy, and it had become a jest that each year the new model in divorce was awaited with the same kind of interest as the new model in automobiles. Moreover, the last revision of the law, reducing the required length of residence from six months to six weeks, had followed immediately upon similar changes in the law of the States of Arkansas and Idaho. Those who professed to think that greater freedom of divorce would make divorce rarer in Nevada were confronted with the fact that most of its advocates recommended it on just the opposite ground. The competition of Idaho or Arkansas with Nevada's divorce court income must be met, they urged, by offering still better terms, requiring only forty-two days where their rivals required ninety. It was disquieting, too, for the reform party to be reminded that, since the change, applications in the courts of Nevada had been trebled!

There is one remaining point of lurid interest in Mr. Pringle's article. It is often said that the Puritanic rigour of the past is responsible for much of the sexual laxity of our time, and that under marriage laws more merciful to human weakness there would be less of the rebelliousness which now menaces the whole institution of the family. In particular, one has heard it urged that prostitution, which constitutes so dark a stain on the life of cities, would be less frequent than it is if the matrimonial bond could be more easily loosened. If this reasoning be sound, we should expect to find at least in this respect a wholesome atmosphere in Reno. But it turns out that Nevada is the only State of the American Union in which social vice is legalized. Moreover, contrary to the sagacity of the learned mayor, legalizing it has proved a stimulant rather than a deterrent. Mr. Pringle puts the point with great clarity: "Sheriff Trathen and the Rev. Dr. Case," he writes, "have not, as far as I know, publicly endorsed Reno's 'Crib,' where 300 prostitutes work in eight-hour shifts throughout each twenty-four hours. . . The 'Crib' from the outside has the appearance of a large stockade. There is a fence around it. Attention is called to it by the lights, and by the presence of a policeman at the entrance."

About arguments such as I have outlined above, proceeding from men in responsible public positions, one may best say what Flaubert said about apologies for democracy—that they shame the human mind. They have attracted notice, of course, in the humorous journals, but there is an aspect of the situation which makes the serious publicist forget its comedy. This article in *The Outlook and Independent* is one of a large number which have appeared

of late, dealing with the marriage law. One is struck by the fact that they come from writers and are published in papers hitherto uninterested in this subject. What used to set a problem only to such magazines as *The American Mercury* can now stir *The Church Times* to cautious and troubled reflection. The reason is not far to seek. Both in number and in character the recent divorce trials have roused even the most conservative English mind out of its wonted complacency. An epidemic always furnishes good copy for the press, and the "few isolated cases" of an earlier generation have now grown in England to a volume by which the legal practitioner is overwhelmed. Dissolution of a marriage used to be so rare, and the parties to it seemed such odd exceptions to the decorum of British family life, that it figured as little in the newspapers as an outbreak of beri-beri. But, with a rush, the situation has altered. It was in 1857 that the first divorce court was set up in England, and fifteen years afterwards the annual number of decrees granted by it was no more than about 165. Our latest statistics show 3,396 in a single year. And at least equally disturbing is the acknowledged manufacture of deceptive evidence,—the construction of a case such as will comply with legal requirements and thus extort a decree from a court morally certain that the whole procedure was collusive.

The controversy has thus passed into a new stage, in the older countries as well as in the younger. It has become difficult for many even to reconstruct in thought the problem as it presented itself to the Victorians. Very remote are the days when advocates of innovation had to shelter themselves behind the words of the Puritan Milton:

Whoso prefers Matrimony or other Ordinance before the
Good of Man and the plain Exigence of Charity, let him profess
Papist or Protestant or what he will, he is no better than a
Pharisee.

Remote seem even the days of the last Divorce Commission, when the acceptance of such additional grounds as hopeless insanity or inveterate alcoholism was urged upon British Commissioners who listened with an incredulous frown. Obstacles of all sorts have been swept aside, and in England too the procuring of a divorce by anyone who wants it has become no more than a question of a little knowledge of law, a little finesse, and a little social effrontery. The change is seen best of all in the attitude of judges and leaders of the Church. Many a decree is now pronounced with a bitter comment from the Bench on the means by which it has been obtained, but also with a frank admission that no remedy against

such manoeuvring is in sight. In ecclesiastical conferences it is pointed out that the new social order is a *fait accompli*, that efforts to enforce the old law or to impose a sharper one would be alike in vain, and that it remains only to appeal to religion as a deterrent where legal facilities are open and the sentiment of the community does not forbid. The most interesting of concrete proposals is that the civil and the religious marriage ceremony should be kept altogether apart, that vows of indissoluble union should not be presented to any except those deliberately desirous of committing themselves so, and that for the rest the civil contract should be avowedly terminable in law, as it has become terminable in practice, by mutual consent.

This proposal, emanating from churchmen, does not indicate any weakening of religious conviction about the sanctity of marriage in the minds of those who advocate it. Nothing could be further from the truth than to suppose that their ancient dogma on this subject, like their other ancient dogmas, has been "modernized" away, and that here is just one further example of adjusting the creed of the Church to intellectual progress. Not that they might mitigate, but rather to accentuate, difference have they urged this formal separation of the religious from the civil marriage. That remarkable publicist, the "Gentleman with a Duster", used to argue that not only was the divorce court a humanitarian and philanthropic institution, but its existence was a constant reminder that the religious marriage belongs to a level of human life by no means attainable by all. He agreed with Coleridge that the provision of a drab ceremony before the Registrar, for those to whom that expressed all that marriage meant in their case, was "reverential to Christianity", because it discouraged the unworthy from taking those sacramental vows. The passage, which exemplified Mr. Begbie's incisive style at its best, deserves to be quoted:

It seems to me the very height of blasphemy that people who marry without the noblest conception of love in their souls should approach the altar of God and there make vows which only the sweetest purity can consecrate and only the most religious virtue can hope to keep. Far better that the fashionable marriage of our times should have no more religious pretensions than the hiring of a piano or the engaging of a bedroom, and that as soon as the unhappy couple have come to their senses, and realise that to live together in daily communion of mind and soul is an intolerable torture, they should be set free to make, if not a wiser choice, at least another shot.¹

1. *The Glass of Fashion*, p. 142.

But this proposal of two kinds of marriage, a higher for those worthy of it, and a lower for those not worthy, is regarded with misgiving even by some writers in deep sympathy with the purpose it is meant to serve. No one is more finely contemptuous than Dean Inge of the psychopathic rant about free love. But Dean Inge cannot see how this twofold scheme would be possible. Writing about it recently, he drew attention to the amazing consequence which would follow if the marriage service of the Church were to imply reprobation of persons legally married. What an anomaly would be seen in a National Establishment flouting the social order of the State which had established it, and branding as sinners those who had infringed no law of the land! One may point out, however, that Dean Inge's personal courage, though he serves in a State Church, has often proved adequate to such a strain, and that from the Deanery of St. Paul's we often hear fierce fulmination against those whose conduct he thinks very evil, though they have kept within the four corners of statute. He has even, from time to time, arraigned "the Socialist Government"! Moreover, to suggest that a State Church dare not refuse its *imprimatur* to whatever regulations of family life may be made from time to time by the secular authority seems a sad declension from the spirit of the Church Militant.

The case reminds one of a somewhat similar controversy that took place not long ago, when Cardinal Bourne reproached the Anglican bishops for their readiness to compromise on birth control. Dean Inge's defence of the Lambeth pronouncement on that subject¹ helps one to understand the rising indignation in a Prince of the Roman Church. Lambeth, says the Dean, recognized that public opinion on birth control had changed, and that the movement had "come to stay"—as shown by the drop in the birthrate during half a century in England and Wales from 36 to 16.3 per thousand. Economic necessity required that the population should thus continue to be reduced, and the only real alternative to birth control was the practice of abortion. With this in mind, Dean Inge justifies the bishops for choosing the lesser of two evils. To Cardinal Bourne, on the other hand, there is something utterly disgraceful in this picture of the Church conducting a crafty retreat from moral positions which the spirit of the age has rendered no longer tenable. He will entertain no such maxim as that of the sheriff in the county in which Reno is situated: "Legalize what the people want." And in the loftier claims which he thus makes for the Church, one cannot but see something at least a little closer to the apostolic tradition.

1. In his *Atlantic Monthly* article, December, 1930.

But although Dean Inge's objection seems insufficient, there are objections of more weight urged by other writers against this project of a higher and a lower form of marriage. Account must be taken of the psychological effects of such a change, and beyond doubt one effect would be to present casual attachments as normal, while a permanent bond would figure as the fad of certain eccentrics, meaningless except for those who cling to old superstition. The late Sir Arthur Conan Doyle used to say that the sole opposition to divorce was "theological", founded altogether on "texts in the Bible", and Mr. Chesterton aptly replied that he might as well say the brotherhood of man had no basis except the verses in *Genesis* about common descent from Adam and Eve. "Millions of peasants and plain people all over the world", wrote this mordant critic, "assume marriage to be static, without having ever clapped eyes on any text".¹ Nor should it be necessary to argue again the sociological case for the institution of the family, and to point out how this institution has been wrecked wherever divorce has become easy and frequent. In this as in other fields the State is a great educator, and its code of laws goes far to shape the social conscience, —for, as acute old William Godwin said, its commands and sanctions, its usages and ceremonies are with us all the time, exerting pressure as unnoticed and yet as constant as the air we breathe. Hence it is surely very inexpedient that what the State desires to commend as the family ideal for everyone should by its own legislation be made to appear as the peculiar preference of "cranks". The problem of what is sometimes called social surgery is much complicated by what complicates surgery in general—it is so hard to be sure that in making one change which is wholesome you have not unwittingly made others which are dangerous or fatal. And though the truth will doubtless come out at the inquest, one would prefer, both in personal and in social therapeutics, to ascertain it a little sooner.

EVENTS have moved fast in England since last July, and the Report of the Committee on National Expenditure—cited in general as "The Economy Report"—seems to belong already to an almost distant past. But so much of the later development is to be understood by facts which that document first marshalled in a systematic form, that it is still serviceable to have it summarized and discussed by so lucid a thinker and so concise a writer as Mr. Harold Cox. Since the demise of *The Edinburgh Review*, we have missed the special contribution which he used to make in his own incisive style to debate, and perhaps those cross-bench qualities

1. G. K. Chesterton, *The Superstition of Divorce*.

which rendered him ineffective in the rough and tumble of politics are not the least requisite just now for calm analysis of our public enigma.

Mr. Cox regards this document as "perhaps the most valuable of the many parliamentary reports that have appeared in the past few years". It was issued by a group of men with wide experience in finance and administration, who had been selected to advise the Chancellor of the Exchequer regarding possible economies. For economy it was generally known that there was urgent need, but how great was the need—and likewise the opportunity—was not realized until the Committee reported. Mr. Cox, reflecting on events since the close of the War, distinguishes the period 1921 and 1922 as marked by a genuine effort to economize. During those years, he says, some very big reductions in expenditure were made. But by 1925 this healthy disposition had faded, politicians were catering to the public for votes by promise of large outlay, and by 1928 there was a definite rush to spend. For 1928-9 the expenditure was about three and a half billion dollars; for 1931-2 the estimate was still higher by three hundred millions! The deficit confronting the Chancellor was some six hundred million dollars on the budget for the current year. No wonder recourse was had to an Economy Committee.

Comparing the areas of expense, the Report finds that the main items of increase have come under the general heading "Social Services"—i. e., such projects as old age pensions, widows' pensions, health and unemployment insurance. These four, taken together, cost in the current year the immense sum of about half a billion dollars—more than twice as much as in 1924-5. Another field of rapid rise was the grants for poor law, and for health and mental deficiency work. These have been trebled in cost to the State, while roads, housing and education have also made increasingly grievous drains.

But the heaviest burden of all has been the Unemployment Fund which, Mr. Cox tells us, is now quite accurately called the "Dole", because it has long ceased to be supported by premiums of insurance, and has become a charge on the public purse which can be met only by immense borrowing. Government after Government since 1920 had undertaken heavier and heavier liabilities to the unemployed, and their critic does not scruple to accuse them of motives very remote from genuine philanthropy. A consequence has been that the Dole now provides relief far above what was held adequate a few years ago, and the Committee in recommending a reduction of 20 per cent remarks that even then—in view of the lowered cost of living—benefit would be on a higher scale than in

1925. What would have happened in Labour circles if so drastic a cut as this had been made in the Dole can be guessed from the hurricane which has greeted the timid commencement ventured by the Coalition.

Of the Committee's other recommendations some have already been put into effect, though in general to less than the degree of severity which the Report suggested. For example, it advised a *minimum* cut of 20 per cent in the salaries of school teachers, adding that in view of the advance in teachers' incomes since the war, this would leave them more than twice as well off as they had been before 1914. The Committee did not believe that any important economies could be effected in the National Defence Services, unless and until a step forward were taken in international disarmament, but it supported the plea that—when practicable—a better distribution be made of the burden of Imperial defence among the various Dominions which share in its advantage. Further proposals of the Report were that the load of unemployment relief should be made more tolerable by the inclusion of certain further groups—the so-called “black-coated classes”—in compulsory insurance, that in secondary schools (corresponding to “high schools” in Canada) a larger proportion of the cost should be met from fees charged to parents, and that a halt be called to at least two enterprises of enormous costliness in which the Committee profoundly disbelieves—the provision of more and more housing and the initiation of public works by loan or grant from the State as a “social service”. Mr. Cox endorses here the scathing criticism in the Report:

Several of the roads that are now being driven through rural districts are not in the least degree needed, and often they are a disfigurement to the beauties of the countryside. Similar considerations apply to the big schemes that have been sanctioned for electricity development. Where further facilities for the supply of electricity are needed, the electrical companies can safely be left to make the necessary extensions. The State financed schemes are being pushed ahead, regardless of cost, and it is more than probable that many of them will never yield a financial return.

For such cold and searching scrutiny of what he would himself call sentimentalism (when he does not call it by a far more opprobrious name) there is always a place, and Mr. Cox—like Malthus, a century ago—must be heard with respect even by those who most dislike his opinions and his attitude. Perhaps those to whom he is most objectionable have most need to hear him. But he injures far more than he helps his case, as Malthus too did, by a certain relentless vividness of example. Messrs. Maxton and Cook will

read with glee this sentence of comment on State subsidy for eliminating slums: "If the State is to pay for the working man's house, why not also for his trousers?"

DR. E. J. DILLON'S article in the *Contemporary* deals with a recent publication of extraordinary interest in the field of autobiography,—the *Memoirs* of Alfred Loisy. The name suggests, of course, and immediately, another volume—Renan's *Souvenirs*; but there is a long interval of quality between the two. Dr. Dillon indicates this beyond any chance of doubt when he remarks that Loisy's work might with advantage have been shortened. It runs to three portly volumes—a mistake such as Renan would never have made.

Reminiscent works, however, may be of great merit, though they will not bear comparison with *Souvenirs de ma jeunesse*, for Renan set in France, as Cardinal Newman set so similarly and yet so differently a few years earlier in England, a pattern which hardly anyone can rival. Moreover, the keenest interest must attach to a faithful record, by the leading Catholic Modernist, of his own experiences in the stirring drama of a quarter of a century ago. While his books are well known to all scholars, Alfred Loisy's personality is still too much in the shadow, and he is discharging a debt to coming generations by leaving an autobiographic portrait. Thirty years ago, in the religious world of Europe, he was the observed of all observers. But when his name was on every lip, when his theological writings circulated faster than the best sellers of contemporary French fiction, when the revolution he had started in the most closely knit of all Churches was the topic of the hour, tourists who went to look for him were amazed to find a simple parish priest in a remote village of Champagne, best known to his immediate neighbours by his remarkable success in raising poultry.

Dr. Dillon describes these memoirs as not merely a contribution to ecclesiastical history, but also a superlatively interesting "human document". They are occupied in the main, of course, with a picture of the struggle first in Loisy's own soul and later against his official superiors, as his growing disbelief in the cardinal doctrines of the Church embarrassed him more and more in fulfilling the duties of the priesthood. As he kept a copious diary, preserved most of his correspondence, and made copies of the letters he himself wrote, he is unusually well equipped for autobiographic work. One wonders why he took such pains, at so early a date. Doubtless, like Renan, he soon realized that both a biography and a legend would collect around him.

It is interesting to learn from these volumes that the earliest desire of this leader of heresies was for a calling in life as remote as possible from controversy. He came of a long line of peasants, and was born in a little hamlet containing only between two and three hundred inhabitants. What he particularly wanted was to be a farmer, and a farmer he would have been, but for a physical weakness which seemed to forbid such strenuous work as ploughing, reaping and haymaking. His aptitude for scholarship, however, soon revealed itself, and a boy who was doomed to be rather a chronic invalid all his life was thought to have made the right choice when he went to a seminary for the priesthood. One is surprised to read in these memoirs that he was advised, and indeed directed, by those in charge of his education to take lectures on Semitic Languages from Renan at the Collège de France. Whether such liberality was indiscreet, or whether the same result would have supervened in any case, no one can tell. But it was the stimulus imparted by Renan which made Loisy an enthusiast for Biblical Criticism.

A feature of this very interesting account of the *Memoirs* is the stress Dr. Dillon lays on the proof they give of a very early drift in Loisy's mind towards the negative views he ultimately reached. According to his critic, he was already well on the way long before he suspected it, and the entries in the diary certainly indicate that some degree of heresy had planted roots a long time back. But as so often in autobiographies, notably in that of Loisy's colleague in the Modernist Movement, George Tyrrell, it is very hard to judge how far the account given by the writer long afterwards from memory can be trusted as a picture of his youthful moods. One is so strongly tempted in old age to read into the remote past those features which would make a symmetrical whole with the living present, and thus show a personality consistent from beginning to end. It implies no conscious bad faith, or effort to mislead the reader. The autobiographer has already misled himself. It is a perfectly natural process, for—as the Hibernian aphorism has it—there is a deal of human nature in man.

One thing for which the reader will look in vain in Dr. Dillon's article, as in many another article on this subject by men of Dr. Dillon's views, is a serious facing of the question—who was to blame in this Loisy episode? We are told of the "bad faith and chicanery" in many of his adversaries; of the "noble purposes, rare perseverance and inexhaustible resourcefulness" which characterized Loisy himself. But what is nowhere considered is how a man of his knowledge and judgment could have expected other treatment for such opinions than that which they received, or how he could fairly

think himself aggrieved because a sharp corrective was applied to the grotesque anomalies of his position. To discuss whether Pope Pius X was justified in excommunicating that group of priests of whom he was leader is mere waste of time. The question is not whether Loisy and his friends were right or wrong in their New Testament criticism. Still less is it whether they were sincere. A writer in the *Peuple Francais* indeed ventured to accuse him of having sold himself to a Jew and a Protestant, just as Renan had been accused, by men with the same sort of mind, forty years earlier, and as the champions of Dreyfus were accused in 1899. Such are the refuse and garbage of controversy. But, right or wrong, sincere or insincere, it was plainly impossible that men should remain priests of the Church after they had depicted the figure of the Founder as mainly mythical and His career as that of a Jewish fanatic.

If any further vindication of Pius X was required, it was forthcoming in the subsequent history of the insurgent chief. Loisy passed into lay life at the Collège de France, where he now commends to his students what Auguste Comte used to call "the Religion of Humanity". Gone is every vestige of his old Christian creed. The priestess in Plato's *Symposium* declared that there are certainly gods, but that they live a life peculiar to themselves, about which man can know nothing. Loisy is not so sure as that priestess. He thinks it indeed possible that there is some Power behind the universe, the source of its moral beauty and order. One thing, however, he does know—that with this Power man has no concern! He bids us pay all our adoration to Humanity, insisting that in truth nothing but Humanity was ever really worshipped, though often in ignorance, by the devotees of any religion on earth. Like Comte, Loisy would have this homage rendered to the spirit of the race amid quasi-devotional surroundings, on certain days of the year which recall the record of some great national heroism—days suggestive of a Joan of Arc or a Nelson. To this effect he expressed himself in the book called *La Religion*, published seven years after he had been excommunicated. The papal diagnosis does not seem to have been astray. Whatever one may think about the general drift of *Pascendi Gregis*, its compiler at least guessed whither Loisy was moving. It was no case for compromise. The battle was à outrance. And Dr. Dillon's suggestive title, *Alfred Loisy and the Death of Modernism*, recognizes with which side victory lay. What it does not recognize, however, is that there is a Modernism which is all the surer to survive when such counterfeits of it as that proposed in *L'Évangile et l'Église* have been exploded.

H. L. S.