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MILITARY POWER IN NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF MOTIVATION, GOALS AND UTILITY

By

Celestine O. Bessey

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Dalhousie University

December 1984
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>xlii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: Towards an Analysis of the Role of Military Power in the African Context</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power and the African Context</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection and Problems of Validation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I: Military Power and International Order: Global and Continental Dimensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: Military Power and International Order: A Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military as an Instrument of Statecraft in the Contemporary International System</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of and Debate Over Military Power</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relative Impact of Military Power Compared with Other Traditional Instruments of Policy</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: Military Power and International Order:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The African Dimension</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa in the Global System: A Geopolitical Appraisal</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Spiral and External Linkages</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Dynamics and Response: The Role of Military Power in the Foreign Policy of African States</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II: Military Power and International Order:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Definition and Instrument</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: The Conception of Military Power in Nigerian Foreign Policy</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Military as Instrument: Security and Crisis Management</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and External Determinants of the Use of Military Force</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Policy-makers and National Military Power</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: The Military Instrument in Nigerian Foreign Policy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Case Study Review</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Military as Instrument: Security</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Military as Instrument: Crisis Management</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: Restraints on the Use of Nigerian Military Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinants and Effects: An Overview</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Factors</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Factors</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX: Changing Strategic Parameters and Responses in Nigeria

New Dimensions in Threat Perception
The Armed Forces Modernisation Programme

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Military Instrument and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: The Future from a Minimalist Perspective

The Future of Military Power: Global and Continental Dimensions
Nigeria as a Regional Power
The Local “Military-Industrial” Complex
The Nuclear Option
Nigeria and Any PanAfrican Defence Force

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion: The Relevance and Impact of Military Power in Nigerian Foreign Policy

APPENDICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABSTRACT

One of the pre-eminent features of the 24 years history of Nigeria's post-independence foreign relations is the marked reorientation from a period of idealism and self-effacement to one of Afrocentric dynamism. The current posture is characterised by an increasing acceptance of a "realist" philosophy which views military power as the basis of diplomacy and of all contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of the state.

This study focuses on this development which dates from the end of the Civil War in 1970. It examines the actual and potential role of military power as one of the techniques or instruments of statecraft in Nigeria's external relations. As Nigeria aspired to a leadership role in black Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, attention increasingly focused on its armed forces. There is, however, a serious gap in the literature concerning the strategic role of the Nigerian military; that is, its instrumental role in foreign policy (compared, for instance, with the spate of writings on the "economic weapon" of oil).

Most of the published materials on the Nigerian military have focused disproportionately on different facets of civil-military relations; especially on the "nation-building" role of military institution rather than on the external aspects of military power. While taking cognisance of this develop-
ment within the Nigerian body politic, this thesis primarily attempts to situate the emergence of the military as a force in Nigerian politics within the context of its external aspirations and environments. In this respect, it examines the role of military power as an instrument of Nigerian statecraft within three geopolitical parameters: regional (ECOWAS), continental (Africa), and global (especially, as part of the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces.) The thesis situates the Nigerian case in the context of ongoing debates about the utility of force in global and African affairs and about the interrelationship of defence with foreign policy, especially in Africa.
Tables and Diagrams

2.1 African production and resources of certain raw materials.......................... 113
2.2 Some foreign military bases in Africa.................. 115
2.3 Intervention in Africa 1975-82.......................... 117
2.4 Arms imports of African States (1970-79)........... 119
2.5 Size of Armed Forces in African States............ 121
2.6 Military expenditures in Africa (1970-79)......... 123
5.1 A comparison of force levels, major weapon systems, GDP, defence expenditures and population of Nigeria with those of a number of other African countries in its strategic environment.................................. 316
5.2 Major Army weapons, 1983............................ 317
5.3 Major Air Force weapons, 1983....................... 318
5.4 Major Naval weapons, 1983............................ 319
5.5 Estimated SADF inventory............................. 320
5.6 S.A. Army major weapon systems in service........ 322
5.7 Some mineral resources of Nigeria reserve estimates...... 325
5.8 Defence expenditure in relation to total federal actual expenditures, 1970-84 in Nigerian Naira.................................................. 326
5.9 Recurrent expenditure allocations to defence and welfare programmes in the 1978/79 Federal Budget (in Nigerian Naira).......................... 327
5.10 Recurrent expenditure allocations to defence and welfare programmes in the 1979/80 Federal Budget (in Nigerian Naira).......................... 327b
6.1 Organization of the defence establishment of Nigeria, 1980........................... 412a
6.11 Security policy making at the nation-state level.......................... 412b
7.1 Gross regional products in Africa ................... . 516

7.2 Rank correlations of military production capability and economic indicators, 1979-80 .................... . 517
ABBREVIATIONS

ALC  African Liberation Committee
AOI  Arab Organisation for Industrialisation
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
DISAM Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FLN  Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
FLS  Front Line States
FMS  Foreign Military Sales
FNLA  National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO  Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNP  Gross National Product
ISS  The Institute for Strategic Studies
IMET  International Military Education and Training
LDC  Less Developed Countries
MAP  Military Assistance Programme
MPLA  Movimento Popular para Libertacao da Angola
MTT  Mobile Training Team
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCW  New Conventional Weapons
NIC  Newly Industrialising/Influential Countries
NIEO  New International Economic Order
NIIA  The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIPS</td>
<td>The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisational of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLISARIO</td>
<td>The People's Front for the Liberation of Saharan el Hamra and Rio de Oro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGMS</td>
<td>Precision-guided Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface to Air Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South-West Africa Peoples' Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completing this project required critical inputs at various stages of writing. In this regard, I am immensely indebted to three members of my thesis committee — Timothy Shaw (Supervisor), Dan Middlemiss (Reader), and Robert Boardman (Reader) — for their invaluable comments, suggestions and criticisms of the thesis draft.

My gratitude also to Tommy Imobighe of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria. His challenging questions and generosity in granting me access to his collections of unpublished conference materials on Nigeria's defence and foreign policy have been of considerable help.

Finally, I should like to express my sincere appreciation of the crucial advice of the Graduate Coordinator — Roger Dial — in moments of uncertainty. I am sure his flexibility and unique understanding of student problems will be much remembered.
INTRODUCTION

Towards an Analysis of the Role of
Military Power in the African Context

War has its own language but not its own logic...War is a continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz[1]

The frequency of violence both revolutionary and between succession states, and its latter-day spread to Africa, provide strong arguments for believing that it will increasingly be war as usual...as they settle their domestic problems of authority and gain the leisure and prosperity to devote themselves to external conflict. Against this it can be argued that many of the wars have been for the readjustment of territorial and other legacies of the colonial era, and are therefore a transitory phenomenon...It must be admitted, however, that this is merely a possibility that a hopeful eye might discern in the emerging political situation. The record so far suggests that frequent warfare will be the reality for some time to come. While this has often taken the form of insurgencies and guerrilla actions, there have also been a large number of conflicts exhibiting the full shape of twentieth-century conventional warfare with all the latest technological refinement.[2]

If, as often asserted, the study of the foreign policies of African states is underdeveloped,[3] the systematic analysis of their military or strategic policies (that is, the way in which military power is used by African governments in the pursuit of their security interests) is simply non-existent. As Claude Welch has succinctly noted in a different but related context—the 'nation-building' role of military power—it
as though the time has been too short for the historian to take note of instances in contemporary Africa, the phenomenon too narrow in geographic scope for the comparative sociologist to investigate, and the policy result too uncertain for the political scientist to examine.[4]

To be sure, as the phenomena of militarism in and militarization of African societies have intensified in the last decade, many commentaries and collective volumes have appeared on different facets of African security issues, decolonization, arms races, conflict resolution, foreign intervention, etc.[5] By and large, however, the 'search for a paradigm'--an inclusive attempt to comprehend the 'theory and practice of states' behaviour--which has characterized endeavours in the field of military studies in the West, is still an exception rather than the rule in the literature concerning Africa. It is as though the African scene is still an 'isolated frontier for field research, bearing little or no relevancy to issues of global dimensions.'[6] As a consequence, military-strategic policy phenomena, to paraphrase William Wallace, have been the 'unwanted step-children' of foreign policy and military sociology, 'assumed by both disciplines and properly studied by neither.'[7]

I am not suggesting here that the extant literatures on military sociology and foreign policy of African states have little relevance or bearing on the theory and practice of military statecraft in Africa. On the contrary, as an
academic pursuit, defence or strategic studies 'makes no sense considered apart from international relations and political science.'[8] Strategy, as John Garnett argues is not a discipline in its own right. It is a subject with a sharp focus—the role of military power—but no clear perimeter, and it is parasitic upon arts, science and social science subjects for the ideas and concepts which its practitioners have developed. It is perhaps worth noting that Herman Kahn was originally a physicist, Thomas Schelling an economist, Albert Wohlstetter a mathematician, and Henry Kissinger a historian.[9]

It follows from this observation that strategic studies is not just another academic pursuit—the more so 'because of its fraught subject matter than its methodology.'[10] It has, to borrow C. W. Manning's phrase, 'a focus but not a periphery.'[11] In the African as well as non-Africa context, therefore, strategic studies, both as academic pursuit and as policy-relevant activity, thrives best in the multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural milieu of international and comparative politics in particular, and of the social sciences and arts in general.

Its 'Janus-like quality' not only 'faces in two directions, it exists in two worlds.'[12] One of these is international politics, 'the world of the balance of power, wars and alliances, the subtle and the brutal uses of force and diplomacy to influence the behaviour of other states.' The other world is domestic politics, 'the world of interest groups, political parties, social classes, with their conflicting interests and goals.'[13] As Samuel Huntington suggests:
Military policy cuts clearly across the usual distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy... It is almost impossible to say which is the primary focus and which the constraint. It is neither primarily foreign nor primarily domestic. Instead it consists of those elements of both foreign and domestic policy which directly affect the armed forces.[14]

Viewed in these terms, it can readily be hypothesized that the setting of social relationships (civil-military, socio-economic, technology, culture, politics and geography) shape the patterns and parameters of the operation of national military forces in the international arena. On this view; the study of Africa's international relations, military sociology, political economy, history, comparative politics and political philosophy arguably constitute the backdrop for strategic analysis in contemporary Africa.

However, both in method and subject matter, the strategic analysis (unlike comparative politics or military sociology) of Africa remains a nascent field dominated by descriptive, though informative, analysis of local and interstate security issues intended, as one writer put it, 'to provide the reader with understanding of the most pressing security problems of African states.'[15] Systematic inquiry exhibiting the conceptual, theoretical and methodological sophistication and convention readily seen in the works of Thomas Schelling, Klaus Knorr, Samuel Huntington, V. D. Sokolovskiy, Yu. Mikhailov and Lomov, among others,[16] are yet to have a major impact
on security policy analysis concerning Africa. The 'golden age' of contemporary strategic thinking—involving the 'best and the brightest' in both West and East—is still a distant future horizon from the perspective of the 'African periphery.'

Nevertheless, the first section of this introduction examines the premises of strategic thinking in the African context to date. It sets the analytic parameters for this dissertation by focusing on the debate as to whether the established theories and categories for the analysis of international relations, especially those involving the use of military force, are appropriate and clarifying for Africa. In other words, does the theory and practice of military statecraft in Africa conform with or differ in essence from the dominant Western 'realist' perspective which views war as 'being rational, national and instrumental' in Rapoport's formulation? If the former assumption—fundamental compatibility—is correct (as I have argued below), then the conception and operationalisation of military policy in Africa arguably bears close affinity to the major tenets of Clausewitzian-Leninist political philosophy of war as a 'continuation of political intercourse by an admixture of other means.'[17] African military forces can then be seen as instruments of security and crisis-management par excellence (see Chapters Three to Nine for the Nigerian case analysis).
However, if the latter assumption—that 'Western definitions of acts of war, aggression or defence do not readily accommodate African orientations towards the uses of military force', as Aoda Bozeman, among others, have argued—[18]—is valid, then there exist fundamental 'incongruities between occidental theory and African reality.'[19] In such an analytic context, the conceptualisation and explanation of the value parameter of African officialdom on the vital issue of 'war and peace', as well as the behaviour of African militaries in existing and likely conditions, are more meaningfully seen in terms of certain historically-rooted 'psychocultural forms,' as manifested in 'warrior' and 'Jihadic' traditions,'[20] than in terms of established Western theories.

Thus because, as Rapoport explains, 'the nature of war is itself to large extent determined by how man conceives of it, and the general character of a nation's strategy is, in turn, determined by its philosophy of war,' an inquiry into the premises of strategic thinking (the value parameter governing the use of military force) among African states is, an indispensable starting point for a dissertation on the role of military power in Nigerian foreign policy.

The second section of this introduction focuses, then, on specifically methodological considerations, analytical approach and thesis design. As a case study of military
power in Nigerian foreign policy, it will be noted that the approach adopted falls generally within one of the six types identified by Arend Lijphart. "theory-infirming studies of single cases within a framework of established generalisations." [21]

The final introductory sections deals with 'scope of study' and the problems of data collection and validation experienced in the course of research in Nigeria, respectively. These problems, it will be asserted, are partly inherent in the nature of my research subject-area—the veil of secrecy that surrounds most national defence establishments, and partly resides in the atavistic and erroneous attitudes prevalent in the Nigerian public service, which are themselves informed and reinforced by popular internal sentiments or structures.

a) Military Power and the African Context

As used in subsequent chapters, the term military power generally connotes 'the capability of a nation to employ armed forces effectively in support of national objectives by exerting influences on the performance of other nations' or sub-national forces. [22] While this definition is central to the contemporary 'strategic paradigm' [23] it is, nevertheless, a historical truism that military power is also an 'extension of culture as well as politics, conditioned by time and place.' [24] As a consequence, the expressive use of military power in pursuit of policy objectives defies any simplistic universal definition.
It has been multi-dimensional and varied; it depends on the historical background, national traditions, economic bases, acute environmental problems, and the vigour of officer corps or castes in each case and period.

Such inescapable variations in military traditions have been at the heart of the controversy on Africa between military historians and political analysts (particularly those of the 'behavioural' persuasion) about: i) the relevance of current strategic theories and categories to the continent, and ii) the extent to which certain socio-logical forms in pre-colonial Africa are significant to the comprehension of the problems of contemporary militarism, that is, the rush to armaments, the intervention of military in politics, and increasing use of force as an instrument of prevalence and political power (see Chapter Two). These issues are fundamentally interrelated, since if the root and dynamic functioning of military state-craft in contemporary Africa is inextricably linked to the African past as Bethwell Ogot argues, then the relevance of existing strategic theories and conceptual categories to Africa is minimal. However, for reasons of analytical convenience, these two 'issue-areas' will be treated sequentially below.

First, the relevance of contemporary strategic theories and categories to Africa.[25] Perhaps one of the most
celebrated 'revisionist' critics of the established perspective on the 'structure of conflict and conflict management' in Africa involving the use of military force, is Bozeman.

Contrary to conventional assumptions upon which the contemporary literature on Africa's international conflicts management have been labouriously built, Bozeman argues passionately that 'Western definitions of acts of war, aggression or defence whether recorded by Grotious, Clausewitz, or twentieth-century theoreticians of the United Nations Charter' do not readily translate into the African condition.[26] As she put it in one of her many rhetorical passages,

Where does Africa belong in any of these systems of models, norms, and values? Does it belong at all? Modern conflict theories do not profess to be applicable to Occident societies only, yet they are obviously not constructed to fit African realities... Western typologies of violence, then do not readily accommodate African orientations towards the uses of physical force. Being the work of theorists in a highly literate civilization, they should, perhaps, not be expected to assimilate conceptions, images, and behavioural practices that evolved without the benefit of what we call "theory."[27]

Based on this and similar passages,[28] it is apposite to conclude that, for Bozeman elements of contemporary strategic paradigm (involving categories which deal with the nature of war, the theory of war, the interplay of theory and practice, the relationship between war and politics, the object of strategy, the relationship between the civilian and
Military leadership, the psychological aspects of war, battles, and tactics) have negligible bearing on Africa. Indeed, the converse is so for her the African perspective on 'war' and 'politics' is 'uniquely African as the manifestations of conflict and hostility to which they are addressed...resulting from something inherently systemic in African life and thought that requires exploration.'[29] Thus she contends.

It has been argued that there is nothing "uniquely new" about African patterns of violence. This conclusion is certainly tenable if the definitions for "coup d'etat", "civil war", or "international war", to give but a few illustrations, are sufficiently loose, and if each of these occurrences is viewed in isolation...from the peculiarly African milieu in which it is encountered....Nowhere else is the idea of the territorial state rendered in terms remotely comparable to those characteristic of modern Africa, nowhere is the line between the internal and external environment as hard to draw...Furthermore, no culturally distinct subsystem comes to mind in which resort to violence is as tenously linked to a validating ideology or master plan, as closely controlled by premodern beliefs in magic, and as unaffected by rules of the game as it is here. Reliance on laws of war or upon an all-African body of customs dealing, for example, with...the modes of ending military engagements, would thus be out of place here, all the more so as transitions from "war" to "no war", or from "no war" to "war" are made more lightly and informally here than in the civilization in which the "rights of war and peace" originated. Where fighting has broken out in modern Africa, it has therefore tended to be uninhibited, ruthless, and protracted...[30]
Bozeman's analysis clearly exhibits the misrepresentation that derives from the tendency prevalent among certain groups of scholars to apply classical anthropological categories to contemporary Third World (especially African) issues. This is particularly noticeable in the spate of literature associated with the 'sociological school' of war causation, one of whose leading exponents is Margaret Mead.[31]

As an anthropological treatise on pre-colonial war, Bozeman's Conflict in Africa undoubtedly constitutes a commendable effort. However, as a definitive contribution to extant literature on Africa's international relations, her effort can be largely discounted. The manifest preoccupation in her book--to explain contemporary behavioural patterns of African states through pre-modern norms--can only be considered an atavistic anachronism. The only significant result of this mode of analysis has been a range of prejudiced generalisations that in many ways recall the syndrome of 'arm-chair' anthropological speculations of the late-nineteenth century.[32] Such generalisations proceed largely from stereotyped conceptual prisms ('civilised', vs. 'uncivilized', 'primitive' vs. 'modern', etc) rather than from any explicit demonstration of the African reality as a 'unique type'.

Thus, contrary to Bozeman's assertions, the underlying assumptions and perspective of this dissertation is that the
nature and direction of evolving intra- and inter-state conflict and resolution in contemporary Africa involving the use of military force are in many ways reminiscent of the European model which she embraces as an 'ideal type.' Hence, "general 'modern' theories of conventional war deterrence ('if you wish for peace prepare for war'), the management of armed conflict, the control of arms competition, and the domestic mechanics and politics of defense preparation, are in one way or the other relevant to the African as other milieus.

Second, and related to the first 'issue-area,' the relevance of African past to the contemporary problems of militarism in Africa. As the extensive and expanding literature on militarism reveals, this debate is not simply reducible to an extreme form of 'academic parochialism' between historians and political scientists. Rather, it illustrates and highlights basic methodological problem in the social sciences: the radically different ways of evaluating the significance of antecedent events. 'It hinges,' as Rene Lemarchand explains, 'around conceptions of military history which have a long pedigree of mutual antagonisms, traceable to the writings of European military historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,'[33] that is, between those whose tendency was 'to connect the present battle with the long line of past
conflict' and those who would rather search for 'the ideal, constant and not time-conditioned laws of war.'[34]

In the African context, the significance of this controversy between 'historicists' and 'empiricists' in strategic analysis is demonstrated by the contrasting positions of Bethwell Ogot and Robin Luckham. The former has argued that he cannot accept as axiomatic the view that in dealing with contemporary African militaries and their roles in domestic or regional orders, he is dealing with 'an altogether new set of considerations,' for to do so would be to take for granted what needs to be established. As Ogot put it.

We are not likely to understand the nature and role of the military in post-independence Africa unless we study the nature and role of the military in pre-colonial and colonial Africa...Historians and other Africanists must go further and attempt to understand the dynamics of warfare in the colonial and pre-colonial periods before they can hope to understand why even the modern civilian regimes in Africa have to rely on the military for survival.[35]

While the logic and underlying assumption of this position cannot be discounted easily, the impression one gains, from the ten case studies in the volume edited by Ogot is of a mosaic collection of unrelated events. A veritable 'archipelago of Pagos-Pagos,' ranging from 'the violence of Tewodros' to 'the Maji-Maji War of 1905-1907' and the 'Girianama War.'

Thus, even should one sympathise with the editor's exhortation that 'historians and other Africanists must go further and attempt to understand the dynamics of warfare in the colonial
and pre-colonial periods as a prerequisite for comprehending contemporary developments involving the military in Africa, there is clearly little indication in this collection to suggest how this could be done.

Conversely, Robin Luckham's unconcealed cynicism toward argumentation such as Ogot's equally only confound the already bewildering nature and dimension of issues involved. In an obvious credit to Jonathan von Block's *The Future of War* (1898)[36], he asserted that, 'Historians have a knack of making the merely possible seem probable and the probable inevitable.'[37] So it is not surprising that some military historians have wondered, as one critic put it, whether the 'sweeping generalisations by some political scientists can bring us any closer to an understanding of the dynamics of the African military.'[38]

One observation is, nevertheless, apposite about these divergent positions: underlying the debate about the relevance of the 'African past' to contemporary issues of civil-military relations and strategy in the continent are fundamental problems of interdisciplinary research. These include:

1) the different approaches of historians, behavioural political scientists, and sociologists to the problems of evidence; 2) their contrasting notions of what constitutes an appropriate level of generalisation; and 3) their tendency to follow divergent modes of explanations.[39]
For example, with regard to modes of explanation, the tendency of behavioural political scientists is invariably toward 'functional correlations' while classical historians (with few exceptions) seek 'causal relationships.' Underlying the former's position is the often unstated assumption that while historical studies and historians may be able to explain how some sequence of events was possible, they are unable to demonstrate that it was necessary.[40] As a consequence, conceptual categories in the behavioural literature emphasize 'supportive factors,' i.e., elements which are 'conducive to' or 'contribute towards' coups or patterns in interstate conflict involving the use of military force.

The historians, in contrast, stress 'causal factors,' prime movers and temporal sequences, all of which suggest that 'historical events can be traced back in time to a more or less autonomous set of factors or circumstances.'[41] It is fairly predictable, therefore, that the gap between the two group of scholars in their analysis of African military systems and role in conflict management will remain wide. As one contributor to this debate put it, 'on both sides of the fence there are assumptions that rarely get examined, interpretations that remain open to dispute as to their relative merits, and banalities posing as theories.'[42]

Nevertheless, a commonsense appraisal of the debate
counsels a middleground position. While it would be clearly unrealistic or unproductive to attribute a historical dimension to every phenomenon related to African militaries (as Bozeman would) to assume on the other hand that such armies are inevitably modern and hence outside the pale of history would be just as unwarranted. On the contrary, military institutions and roles in Africa are products of a complex set of rapidly evolving relationships between historical circumstances and present conditions. As Edward Shils explains:

"Military organisation has little to do with the structure of traditional society, from which it is set off by its technology, most of its ethos, its organisations, and its training—all of which are either imported or followed foreign models... Yet it probably remains a fact that the military have a feeling not only for their own military tradition but for the traditional style of society as well. Hierarchic dignity, respect for superiors, solicitude for subordinates, solidarity, and conventionality produce in professional soldiers an attachment to the same phenomenon in civilian society. Their humble origins and their separation from urbane pleasures and indulgence sustain this sympathy.[43]

Thus, in the rank and file of African militaries (and to some extent in the officer corps, as the 'Amin syndrome' illustrates) the illiterate or semi-literate 'village man-turned-soldier' retains a connection with his rural environment, and brings into the armed forces many of the predispositions, attitudes, and even superstitions that are characteristics of the community from which he originates."
The significance of these pervasive primordial sentiments for the corporateness of African militaries and the utility of them as instruments of statecraft vary from one polity to another and continue to be a subject of considerable debate.[44].

Between the pre-colonial past and the post-independence present, however, the interface of Western cultural diffusion and physical presence cannot but have a degree of impact on the 'shared cultural heritage' of Africa. As a consequence, one cannot, unlike Ogot and Bozeman, remain in the ethnographic present and contend that the colonial period had very little lasting effect on African society.[45] The implication of these changes (resulting from the process of modernization) for conceptualisation and explanation of contemporary militarism in Africa is substantial, depending, of course, on the focus of interest. That is, whether one is interested in the multi-faceted subject of civil-military relations (the institutional characteristics and role-performance of the military in African societies) or in the equally complex and related question of strategy (units and uses of force in inter-state relations: decisions concerning the deployment, commitment and employment of military force as manifested in war plans, military alliance, force movements, declaration of war and the like).[46]

Since the primary focus of this dissertation is on the
latter, it would suffice to note here (as the disquisition from Chapters Two to Eight hopefully indicates), that the value parameter of African officialdom—products, as they are, of Western institutions and education—and the direction of strategic thinking in contemporary Africa enshrine in many respects cardinal tenets of the Clausewitzian-Leninist political philosophy of war. Thus, there is nothing (to use LeVine's phrase) 'uniquely new about African patterns of violence.'[47] This conclusion—as will be seen in the Nigerian case—is readily highlighted, first, in the increasing rapidity with which Pan-African normative ideals of the 1960s (see Chapter Five, section a) are either readily reconciled with or are submitting to a more benign 'realist' conception of interstate relations among policy-makers of African states. And second, in the quantitative and qualitative expansions of African military systems and the heightening rate of employing or threatening to employ them to advance definitive policy objectives in the last decade (see Chapters Two, Three and Four).

b) Methodology

One of the inescapable problems in the analytic literature in the social sciences is the dilemma involved in establishing a proper balance between theoretical rigour and empirical content. Simply stated, either one proceeds largely with detailed descriptions of the data on which conclusions
are based—and so acquire, as Stanislav Andreski put it, 'The
forbidding bulk of Frazer's Golden Bough', which drowns the
theoretical content—or one merely settles for illustrations,
and so become rather ethereal.[48] The latter caveat, as
several critics have noted, has been the bane of the behaviou-
ral persuasion in political science.[49]

Part of the methodological problem with which I was con-
fronted in the structural design of this thesis reflected
this persistent dilemma. I had either to abandon the 'pre-
tences' of a theoretical framework (Chapters One to Three)
and proceed directly into an informed analysis of the empiri-
cal material, or to consider a blend of theoretical sophisti-
cation with adequate empirical detail, and so partially avoid
the pitfall of having a reader 'wade through a morass of
empty verbiage or irrelevant details in search of theoretical
ideas.'[50] Perhaps the 'former approach would have satisfied
the cannons of the 'traditionalist' or 'classicist', it is,
however, not altogether without serious flaws when utilised
in defence or strategic analysis. Such an approach relegates
rather than profits from the significant theoretical advances
in this field since the Second World War. As A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown has noted in his forward to Andreski's Military Organi-
sation and Society (1968):

There is amongst social scientists a pre-
ference for facts over theories in the
belief that only factual knowledge is of
immediate utility in practical life. They ignore the fact well known to physical scientists that is purely theoretical investigations which ultimately lead to the most important practical results... The great advances of applied science and technology of the past three and a half centuries could not have taken place without the devotion of scientists to purely theoretical enquiries. And there can be no doubt whatsoever that is the wider application and the refinement of the method of comparative sociology that hold out the promise of a really scientific understanding of human society.[51]

In the field of strategy, the importance of theoretical insights as analytical tools is readily appreciated when one compares, for instance, the highly descriptive and historical disquisition of Barry Blechman et al., Force without War (1978) with the masterpieces that are Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence or Klaus Knorr's On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. The latter two studies, both of which came at the end of the 'exciting and fertile golden age' in strategic writing--1966--attempted to comprehend the theory and practice of the nuclear age and assess the use and utility of force.[52] Such endeavours, in my view, have amounted to more than 'verbose and pompous refurbishings of simple truths known since the days of Aristotle.' On the contrary, they set an unalterable foundation and precedent which subsequent analysts can ignore only to their own cost.

While it cannot be pretended that this dissertation in any sense approaches the standard of analytical sophistication found in the works of Schelling and Knorr it does, nonetheless,
aspire to utilise their methodological conventions as the organisational format for the topic under consideration. As Charles Pentland, among others, has noted, 'a methodology must needs relate to the problems or issues it sets out to resolve.'[53] It is conceded that the nature of the present topic does not preclude any given approach. However, the imperative of establishing a proper balance between theoretical rigour and factual content prompted the structural design adopted here, which gives preeminent consideration to theoretical exposition in the first three chapters as a framework to organise and analyse the often bewildering and contradictory array of empirical data presented in subsequent chapters. As an analytical technique, such an approach is hardly unusual. After all, as J. D. Singer has stated:

Models, paradigms, and conceptual schemes are merely intellectual tools by which we order and codify, that which would otherwise remain a buzzing welter...Our mission in both teaching and research is nothing more than an effective amalgamation of insight with evidence, and of substance, with technique. When one of the most eminent of our traditionalists describes his method as the art of "muster[ing] all the evidence that history, personal experience, introspection, common sense and...logical reasoning" make available, it is difficult to quarrel. But, it must be added that history, experience, introspection, common sense, and logic do not in themselves generate evidence, but ideas which must then be examined in the light of evidence.[54]

As a comprehensive evaluation of the role-conception and utility of military power in Nigerian foreign policy, this
dissertation falls generally within one of the salient analytical matrices identified by Arend Lijphart. 'theory-infirming studies of single cases within a framework of established generalisation.'[55] In other words, it seeks to establish 'an effective amalgamation of theoretical insights with evidence' based on contemporary Nigeria as the research-area. Both in terms of structural design and 'scope of study', therefore, this thesis deviates from the traditional theory-cum-selective case application. Such an approach would be appropriate in this context if Nigeria, like Libya or Tanzania, had pursued an activist policy of 'regional vigilantism.' On the contrary, aside from participating in peace-keeping operations (Congo in the early 1960s, Chad and Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s), the Nigerian armed forces have hardly been activated in a major combat rôle beyond their immediate borders. Reasons for this reside partly in military weakness (vis-a-vis minority forces in Southern Africa) and partly in conscious policy choice: that is, the declaration by previous Nigerian government that 'an invasion of a sister African country would be contrary to the charter of the OAU, and that Nigeria's neighbours had nothing to fear from its 'size and military might.'[56]

However, with the radically altered and expansive perceptions of threat to Nigeria's security in the post-civil war era, combined with the multi-billion armed forces modern-
isation programme (see Chapter Six), there has emerged in the late-1970s and early-1980s an extensive and vigorous internal debate on the policy role of the Nigerian armed forces. This continuing debate was both triggered and sustained by systemic challenges: decolonisation in Southern Africa, the massacre of Nigerians in Equatorial Guinea under Macias Nguema, Libya's involvement in Chad, and border disputes with both Cameroun (1981) and Chad (1983), leading in the latter case to a swift and punitive military action against Habre forces in the Lake Chad Basin (see Chapter Four).

This dissertation, represents therefore, an attempt to analyse and assess both the actual and potential role and utility of the Nigerian military as an instrument of foreign and security policy within the broad context of an extensive public and official debate. To this extent, the vast and complex subject of the domestic-role performance of the Nigerian military—the 'nation-building' role of military power—will receive attention here only to the degree that it provides explanatory and predictive insight into the major conditions or the relevant changes in parameters that govern the use and usability of the Nigerian armed forces as an instrument of statecraft.

c) Data Collection and Problems of Validation

One of the first impressions any reader will gain is the disproportionate reliance on secondary materials
compared with primary governmental publications. The major reasons for this should be immediately obvious to any student who has had the misfortune of trying to conduct research in Nigeria—especially in the field of defence and foreign policy. First, governmental policy documents or publications in this field are negligible beyond intermittent Federal Government news releases, *Official Gazettes*, the Constitution (1960-1979), and the annual budget. And second, although hardly unique to Nigeria, the atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the Defence and External Affairs establishments in Nigeria constitutes a formidable hurdle when it comes to arranging interviews (without of course acquaintances in 'high positions'). In the military sphere, the inescapable problem confronting a research student is, perhaps, best represented in a passage by the former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi:

> It is regrettable that ever since independence, there had been a tradition that there should be a veil of secrecy surrounding the size of the armed forces, the kinds of the equipment they possess, and perhaps the dispersal of this equipment. One must immediately concede that on the surface the reason for this veil of secrecy which is to hide from the enemy the disposition of the Nigerian security forces is indeed very plausible. But when we come to define the enemy, we in fact then discover that at least from the point of view of secrecy, we are defining the enemy in terms of Nigerians rather than in terms of non-Nigerians. There is no branch of the Nigerian armed forces where there are no non-Nigerians
either as technicians or officers or both. In effect, it is Nigerians who are kept in the dark about the Nigerian security forces rather than non-Nigerians. And herein lies the dilemma. Most of the foreign policy elite in important countries of the world know more about the Nigerian Armed forces that Nigerians themselves know.[57]

It is not surprising, therefore, that a graduate student from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, seeking an interview at the Nigerian Ministry of Defence was in 1982 detained on allegation of espionage! This lamentable circumstance notwithstanding, I should indicate on the positive side that completing this thesis would have been an impossible task without a visit to Nigeria. This is so because a considerable proportion of the source-materials utilized (official publications, conference and seminar papers, monographs, books, newspaper and magazine excerpts, periodical articles, etc.) are simply not available in Canada. In addition, my four months sojourn at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPS), provided me an excellent opportunity for informal interviews and discussions with a number of the high-level representatives from the armed forces and the civil service (especially the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs).[58] Furthermore, the project papers in the Institute's library by previous residents of this category (several of whom are occupying top decision-making positions in the present government) were particularly helpful both as an index to current defence and foreign policy planning in Nigeria and, at the same time,
revealing of the psychological assumptions and thought processes of some of the principal actors in policy formulation.

However, access to this rather wide variety of source materials (including extra-Nigerian sources) neither minimized the problems of validation nor of transforming them from a confusion of disjointed and sometimes conflicting clues into a well-ordered academic essay. For example, concerning estimates of force level and force strength of the Nigerian military, significant variation (in terms of accuracy, completeness and the political controversiality of issues) can be found between publications. In this regard, The Military Balance perhaps deserves special attention since it has long served as the standard reference source for various indexes of force levels and force strength for most national military systems. A chronological comparison of the figures indicated (from 1971-1983) reveals some startling discrepancies in the Nigerian military force levels and strengths which cannot be easily accounted for. Substantive alterations are made in listings of total numbers of forces, assigned capabilities of weapons systems ('on order', 'in storage', 'inactive', and other misleading terms) and methodological formulas without explicit evaluative criteria. It is not surprising, therefore, that this prestigious defence 'Think Tank' has in recent years come under fire as inaccurate and even as reflecting political biases ('editorialising some of its statistics,' or even
"cooking the books"). Explicit in these criticisms are demonstrable data inaccuracies and debatable assumptions in The Military Balance figures that can be illustrated by an examination of four main areas in the current methodology used to produce it.[59]

In an attempt to reconcile some of these statistical and evaluative differences, I compared and contrast various Nigerian (especially publications of the Institute of Army Education and Research) and non-Nigerian sources with information generated from questionnaires I circulated at NIPS and a number of other subordinate institutions in the Nigerian defence establishment (see Appendix One). Although most responses to the questionnaire were understandably guarded they nevertheless did provide dependable bases for the arguments and projections from Chapters Four to Eight.

In the discussion that follows, preeminent attention will be given to theoretical considerations in Chapters One, Two and Three, as a contextual framework for the case studies in Chapter Four. Chapters Five and Six are essentially follow-up from Chapter Four. The former endeavours to explains the apparent inconsistencies or 'puzzles' in Nigeria's military policy. In concrete terms, why have Nigerian decision-makers resorted to the military instrument in pursuit of security and foreign policy objectives at some times and places (see Chapter Four) but not others (e.g. Equatorial Guinea,
1974-1975, Angola, 1975-1976 and 1981-1983; and Rhodesia, 1979-1980), despite strong national sentiments in favour of such a response. It is my primary contention that the answer lies in certain operative factors (domestic and systemic) restraining the use and usability of Nigeria's military power in such circumstances.

The latter--Chapter-Six--dwells specifically on the military dimension of the current efforts underway to overcome core weaknesses in Nigeria's defence system, highlighted in Chapter Five as a preeminent restraining factor on the use and usability of its military power in continental trouble-spots. This is the multi-billion Naira armed forces modernisation and augmentation programme that touches upon all elements of Nigeria's military power.

Chapter Seven is essentially futuristic: a hypothetical attempt at conjecture about the future role and direction of the military instrument in Nigeria's foreign policy from past and current trends, within the context of relevant changes in both domestic and systemic (regional and global) parameters. And the conclusion, Chapter Eight is in essence a recapitulation and reflection on the analysis in the preceding chapters. While recognising the profound impacts and ramifications of Nigeria's unstable economic position on its military policy in immediate circumstances, the chapter concludes that grounds for projections about the future intensification of the role
of military power in Nigerian foreign policy are not altogether unfounded. Nigeria, to borrow Jean Herskovit's phrase, may be 'down but not out.'

One final remark may be proffered briefly here: the relevance of the present inquiry i) to other case-analyses of Nigeria's external relations and ii) to African foreign and development studies in general. As noted in the preamble above, strategy—the role of military power in international relations—'lacks integrity as a field of study, let alone as a discipline.'[60] Hence, a composite theory concerning the role and impact of military instrument on world affairs should be considered to be anchored in the theory of international politics and society, its structure, dynamics and functioning, and in particular in the theory of the state.[61]

The latter consideration—the theory of the state—involves the nature of the state as a social institution, its structures, and its internal and external policies (see Chapter Three, section b). In military strategic terms, this revolves, as Julian Lider suggests, around three corresponding components of the theory in question: i) the theory of the nature of armed forces as an instrument of social action and of its impact on social development, ii) the theory of the structural relationship between armed forces and other elements of the social structure, especially other institutions or mechanisms of the state, and iii) the concept of the function
of armed forces in the conduct of internal and external policy in peacetime as well as wartime.[62]

What these assumptions imply, first, for Nigeria's military policy is that this cannot be viewed independently of other elements of national power and influence (e.g., economic, socio-political, diplomatic, etc). To this extent, existing case studies on economic, diplomatic and other social factors affecting Nigeria's external relations may be considered complementary to the focus of this dissertation.[63]

And second, since Nigeria as a post-colonial state of recent origin shares the basic internal properties, foreign and security concerns and aspirations of most states in the region (see Chapter Two and OAU Charter Art. II), an analysis of its defence strategy necessarily derives insight and inspiration from extant foreign and development policies studies of African states.[64] This is partly so because Nigeria's defence strategy (a non-discipline) 'makes no sense' if considered apart from either Nigerian and African foreign policies studies or related disciplines. And in part it is so because Nigeria's primary strategic environment--Africa--, as suggested in Chapter Three, determines to a considerable extent the level of its defence needs and preparedness. It is in such terms that this and any other discourse on Nigeria military policy, both contributes to and is in turn informed by the current general literature on the foreign policy military sociology, and development strategy of African states.


19. Ibid., p. 28.


22. T. N. Dupuy, "Introduction: The Nature of Military Power" in The Almanac of World Military Power (San Rafael, California, 1980). For an excellent discussion of the dimensions and connotation of the concept of military power, see Klaus Knorr, The Power...

24. Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, pp. 73-76, Julian Lider, On the Nature of War (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977), and Rapoport introduction to Clausewitz, On War, pp. 11-80 For a less than convincing rebuttal of this thesis, see Colin Gray, "Strategy and Culture" in Gray, Strategic Studies - a critical assessment, Chapter 3.

25. For a valuable introduction to these strategic theories and categories, see Baylis et al, Contemporary Strategy, and Garnett, Theories of Peace and Security.


27. Ibid., p. 51.

28. Ibid., see especially Parts II and IV.

29. Ibid., p. 31.

30. Ibid., p. 30.

31. For example, by comparing the role of force among nations to the once-pervasive but now generally obsolete institutions of duelling, slavery and trial by ordeal, Magaret Mead mistakenly equates the mores of men in secondary social relationships with the security imperatives of states in the contemporary international system. Not surprisingly, therefore, she arrived at the simplistic conclusion that 'just as duelling and trial by ordeal went out of fashion when methods more congruent with the institutions and feelings of the period were invented, so the ingrained habit of war can be replaced by a better invention, provided that 'the people must recognise the defects of the old invention, and someone must make a new one.' Margaret Mead, "Warfare is only, an invention--Not a Biological Necessity", in Leon Bramson and George Goethals (eds.), War, Studies from Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology (N.Y.: Basic Books 1964), p. 274. For a critique of Mead, see Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), Vol. II.

32. See Bozeman, Conflict in Africa, Part II and IV.

34. Ibid., p. 262.


36. Johann von Bloch's rhetorical question, in The Future of War (1898), aptly sums up the reaction of most contemporary behavioural political scientists to the urgings of military historians "What is the use of talking about the past when you are dealing with an altogether new set of considerations?" As quoted in Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (London: Hollis and Carter, 1959), p. 27.


41. Gareth S. Jones, "History - The Poverty of Empiricism" in Robin Blackburn (ed.) Ideology and Social Science

42. Lemarchand, "African Armies in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives", p. 270.


50. Andreski, Military Organisation and Society, p. 3.

This periodisation is based on Ken Booth's appraisal of the development of strategic thinking in modern times. The opening period of what some analyst have characterized the "golden age" of contemporary strategic thinking is usually thought to have been 1956 to 1957, with the publication of W. W. Kaufmann's influential Military Policy and National Security or, the 'first best-seller' in the field of nuclear strategy, Henry Kissinger Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. See Ken Booth, "The Evolution of Strategic Thinking" in Baylis et al Contemporary Strategy, pp. 22-49.

For incisive critiques of the writings associated with this period, see P. Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deference (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), A. Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (N.Y. Harper and Row, 1965), L. Freedman, "Indignation, Influence and Strategic Studies" International Affairs 60, 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 207-209, and C. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy (Kentucky. The University Press of Kentucky, 1982), Gray has noted, for instance, that there are three main tasks facing strategists in the 1980s.

filling the lacunae in Golden Age literature, amending and correcting some of the commissions in that literature to accommodate new technologies, changing political conditions, and the experience of more than twenty years' practice, and directly refuting those popular and erroneous beliefs which have afflicted the understanding of strategic questions in the areas of deterrence theory, limited war, and arms control. An additional task, which logically should precede those specified above, is explicitly deploying the political assumptions which should guide inquiry in the field. (p. 188)

Judging from his argumentation and comments (e.g. that the Reagan administration 'offers a healthy contrast to the mind-sets of recent administrations', that 'international politics is a jungle wherein the strong and ruthless devour the weak'), Gray, unlike Green or Rapoport, for all intent and purposes captures the flavour of the so-called 'forward strategy school' whose writings in the 1950s and early 1960s were predicated upon hair-raising, 'hawkish' analysis of Soviet behaviour.

54. J. D. Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist: insight without evidence" in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.) *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, p. 76.


58. There were forty-one government officials and military personnel (Brigadiers, Air Commodores, Colonels) at the Institute (NIPS) in 1983 for nine months orientation course.


63. See, among others, James Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy" *African Affairs* 75, 300 (July 1976)
CHAPTER ONE

Military Power and International Order:  
a theoretical framework

The unstable, unregulated nature of the contemporary international system...make the capacity to wage war an indispensable instrument of national survival and of a just international order. Military power cannot, in the foreseeable future, be abolished, any more than conflict among sovereign states, of which it is a primary symptom and tool, can be abolished. Yet the immense destructive power of modern weapons makes war itself a highly volatile and potentially self-defeating instrument of policy. Therefore, the overriding task of modern statecraft is to restrain military power and control it for legitimate political ends.

Robert E. Osgood[1]

Only when one dares to engage in war, can one negotiate, and if one wants peaceful negotiations, he must be prepared against war.

Chou En-Lai[2]

One of the most persistent, and in many ways paradoxical, features of the contemporary international system is the 'security dilemma' that Herbert Butterfield sees as the 'absolute predicament' that 'lies in the very geometry of international society.'[3] It is persistent in the sense that this dilemma is as old as human society itself and has outlived the most imaginative experiments and designs to eliminate or to mitigate its impact if that should fail. It is paradoxical in the sense that the very measures invariably adopted by
state governments as the 'irreducible minimum of their survival' in the face of this dilemma often produce the negative result of aggravating the 'security dilemma.' Hence the spiral of international insecurity which, according to some contemporary theorists, has been further exacerbated by the inflexible images that it generates in the minds of decision makers both of their own intentions and of those of their counterparts.[4] This psychodynamic undoubtedly underscores one of the most spectacular, if tragic, phenomena in modern times: the arms race or, to use Richardson's category, the process of 'schimogenesis'.[5] This schimogenic process—or the 'action-reaction cycle' in arms acquisition—has been best summarized in the aphorism that 'one state's security is another state's insecurity.'

This chapter focuses primarily on the international use and usefulness of military power (that is, the conscious exploitation of military power as a rational technique for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives) as a contextual or analytical framework for subsequent chapters. In this regard, critical consideration will be given to the utility of military power as an instrument: i) of fighting international war ('coercive warfare' or 'compulsion'), ii) of making explicit threat (the 'manipulation of risk'), iii) of negotiation (as a 'bargaining process' or 'diplomacy of violence'), and
iv) of 'utility in nonuse' (peace-keeping). The first section (a) below briefly considers the interplay of war and politics—that is, the military as an instrument of policy—as a background to a more detailed examination of the extensive debate over the continued relevance of military power in section (b). The concluding argument in the latter is carried a step further in the final section, (c), in the form of a comparison between the relative impact of military power and other traditional instruments of policy.

a) The Military as an Instrument of Statecraft in the Contemporary International System

One inescapable and historically invariant consequence of the intractable 'security dilemma' alluded to above, has been the widespread view (among scholars as well as statesmen) that the world is an anarchy—a 'threat system'—in which force remains the ultima ratio: the basis of diplomacy and of contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of the state. As Michael Howard has argued succinctly:

The capacity of states to defend themselves and their evident willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of international negotiations is carried on.[6]

However, as will be argued in section (b) below, this perspective, although dominant, nevertheless represents but one of the alternative conceptions, explanations, and projections about the role of military power in the analytic literature. It is preeminently 'realist' in orientation, one
that derives from Hobbesian conceptions of the global arena in which the 'high politics' of military security frames and informs the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs.[7]

Against this dominant perspective is what Stanley Hoffmann has called the 'modernist' school of thought which, unlike the realist, assumes 'multiple channels of contact between societies, an absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role for the use of force.'[8] This modernist thesis—which became a prominent contender to the realist paradigm in the late-1960s and 1970s—is largely based on what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have termed the condition of 'complex interdependence.[9]

The existence of these competing paradigms on international interaction notwithstanding, the historical as well as contemporary prevalence of inter- and intra-national wars and military alliances have sustained the view that until the nation-state system is radically transformed and superseded by a different international order, then military power, and the capacity for armed coercion which it sustains, is likely to continue to play a significant part in international politics and conflict resolution.[10] As a result, in both theory and praxis, it has become fashionable to regard military power as but one of the multiple techniques of statecraft, taking its place alongside diplomacy, sanctions, propaganda, subversion, etc.
The classical, and in many ways the most celebrated (if controversial) definitive statement on this interplay between the military instrument and policy objectives is incisively expressed in the Clausewitzian aphorism that 'war is nothing more than a continuation of politics by an admixture of other means.'[11] While not denying in his exposition that war in practice can become 'something pointless and devoid of sense' [12] (that is, anything but a continuation of political intelligence), Clausewitz, nevertheless, insists on the centrality of the political element:

It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples, but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own.

We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means... In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise...?[13]

For Clausewitz, therefore, policy direction and control of war are paramount, irrespective of one's attitudes towards war's desirability. If policy creates war, the 'political object'--the original motive for the war--will thus determine
both the military objective to be reached and the amount of efforts it requires. Thus, in Clausewitzian perspective a conception of international conflict resolution in terms of 'military victory' versus 'political victory' would be a contradiction in terms. As he put it, 'there can be no question of purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or of a purely military scheme to solve it.'[14] When war is divorced from 'political life in our thinking we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.'[15] However, given that political objectives can range widely, 'it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation.'[16]

In contemporary context, the extent to which war can escalate or is allowed to approach that extreme ('war of extermination') is dependent not only on the needs of the political objective (e.g., as articulated in the NATO doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction--MAD--or its more limited 'counterforce' variants) but also on technological considerations. In this respect, (as will be argued in section (b) below), while the potential destructiveness of nuclear arsenals has engendered a condition of Pax Atomica between today's hostile formations--NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, for example--such a 'state of inhibited irrelevance' (to use Lawrence Martin's phrase)[17] has hardly infected the less developed
states of the so-called Third World (see Chapter Two for arguments concerning Africa). Nevertheless, the devaluation of the use of military force under the inhibiting shadow of the nuclear balance between the former category of states does not necessarily imply or portend the irrelevance of military power as an instrument of policy. On the contrary, although its mode of employment by these powers has undeniably undergone a major permutation, their increasingly expanding and complex defence systems now (at least so far) are justified in large part by their 'role in transmitting diplomatic signals, inspiring confidence in allies, discouraging foes, influencing crises and signifying degrees of commitment.'[18] In other words, between the superpowers and their allies (as distinct from between either parties and a third, e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Grenada, etc.) the actual uses of armed force have become and are increasingly likely to be 'latent, oblique, limited, and directed more to influencing political situations than to seeking a verdict in battle.'[19]

Thus, whether conceived in terms of its direct or indirect (e.g. 'atomic brinkmanship' and crisis management) employment, military power has become in the modern era the legally sanctioned instrument of violence which states use in their relations with each other, and, when necessary, in an internal security role. It forms the 'backdrop against which all diplomatic activity takes place,' and, as
William Kaufman has noted ruefully, 'it is not easy to see how international relations could be conducted, and international order maintained, if military power were totally absent.' [20]. Henry Kissinger explains why

It is an illusion of posterity that past international settlements were brought about entirely by reasonableness and negotiating skill. In a society of "sovereign" states, a power can in the last resort vindicate its interpretation of justice and defend its "vital interests" only by the willingness to employ force. Even during the period of seemingly greatest harmony, it was understood that a negotiation which failed did not return matters to their starting point but might call other pressures into play. The motive force behind international settlements has always been a combination of the belief in the advantages of harmony and the fear of the consequences of proving obdurate. A renunciation of force, by eliminating the penalty for intransigence, will therefore place the international order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible member. [21]

The underlying assumption in Kissinger's observation (as in the Clausewitzian 'political philosophy of war' of which Kissinger is but one of several contemporary exponents) is, of course, that military power 'is a purposive, functional thing'--one of the many instruments in the 'orchestra of power' which states utilise at an appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective policy objective or 'national interests.'

Such 'national interests' (although their conceptual
denotations are far from certain)[22] may concern military, economic, political or ideological values, of one kind or another. They may also concern intangible values, such as international prestige, as well as tangible objects, such as territory. Thus, to the extent that foreign policy objectives are outward-directed—that is, concerned with 'acquiring something of value coveted by a foreign actor,' then there are virtually no values of concern to states that do not 'directly or indirectly impinge on considerations of international military power' calculus. Conversely, in a defensive or non-acquisitive mode, the sheer imperative of preserving physical security—territorial integrity—from external intrusions (such as foreign intervention in civil wars, e.g. Nigeria, 1966-1970), has invariably entailed the expansion of national 'power of resistance' as a counter to such a threat (real or perceived).

This complex interplay between policy objectives and military power underscores the commonplace assertion in the literature that defence or security policy should reflect the fundamental assumptions and objectives of foreign policy and, when necessary, provide the means for their actualisation. Conversely, foreign policy objectives should be reflections of and be limited by the ability of the armed forces to give them a military underpinning. Seen in this context, disquisition into the behaviour of states (including empires) through
out recorded history highlights a wide variety of particular foreign policy purposes on behalf of which military power has been employed. [23] Considerations of space and brevity preclude an exhaustive typology of these foreign policy purposes here. [24] It should, suffice to note that they can be reduced to two categories. defensive or non-acquisitive goals, and offensive or acquisitive goals.

The former includes the 'protection of various assets and advantages that are part of the status quo.' [25] Foremost among the latter has been the conquest, for purposes either of acquisition or control of territory—whether valued for its population, economic resources, or military advantage. In short, the offensive goals have invariably involved the 'acquisition of various assets and advantages in a way that, through the employment of military power, revises the international status quo.' [26] As Klaus Knorr rightly concluded in his typology, 'in either case, whether used defensively or offensively, military power lends a measure of international freedom of action of the state involved.' [27]

In terms of mode of employment (that is, as different from but related to the typology of policy objectives) national military force has been used internationally for threatening, deterring or making war. The first two
categories, as noted above, have gained unprecedented currency among the dominant military powers of today as a result of nuclear weaponry and its associated sophisticated paraphernalia that have had a 'truly revolutionary impact on the face of war and on the usability of military power as an instrument of national policy.'[28] In this regard, 'military strategy', as Thomas Schelling has concluded, 'can no longer be thought of, as it could for some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory...Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.'[29] On this principle, the conscious fostering of the deterrent and crisis-management capability of national armed forces, not as an alternative but as an adjunct to their fundamental utility in full-scale war (if deterrence fails), has become the contemporary preoccupation of nuclear powers.

Regarding the latter category (war fighting, whether considered in its conventional or sub-conventional--revolutionary warfare--modes), the prevalence of wars in the post-1945 era, combined with the increasing scale of world military expenditures and the rapid expansion of national defence systems (especially among the LDCs)[30], clearly underscore the view that military power remains an important component in international interactions. Thus, seen in terms either of deterrent and crisis-management value or in terms of actual direct employment in conventional or revolutionary wars.
fare, military power provides the essential underpinning for political intercourse between states.

However, for a number of reasons to be stipulated in section (b), the unidirectional relation which made military power one of the instrumental means of foreign policy (as formulated by Clausewitz) has now ceased to be satisfactory, since it has been evident for some time that not all political goals can be translated into military strategy. Furthermore, it is also now apparent that in the relation between politics and strategy, instrumental means often became the terms of reference indicating possibilities for political action.[31] As a consequence, the Clausewitzian formula (his 'political philosophy of war') has ceased to be a valid starting point for a definition of the role of military power in international relations. This has become particularly so with the growing acceptance of the notion of strategic studies as a field of inquiry into all aspects (political, economic, social, cultural, ideological and technological variables) of defence policy and strategic planning.

Hence, in both theory and praxis, the use of military force as an instrument must now be situated in the more general context of foreign policy formulation. As Robert Osgood has suggested, 'military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilising the capacity for armed coercion--in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power--to support
foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means.'[32] In the words of Henry Kissinger, 'it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy.'[33]

Nevertheless, whether considered in the traditional unidirectional formulation of Clausewitz and Lenin or in the more expansive reconceptualization of the 'neo-realists' (Osgood, Kissinger, Earle, etc), the view that military power provides the essential underpinning or backdrop for international political intercourse--the premise for nearly all strategic thinking--has been widely challenged in recent decades. Given the increasing surge and tempo of this controversy (especially with the rise of organised, articulate and determined 'peace movements'), I intend in the next section to evaluate the perspectives (and the substantive issues involved) of the two principal academic schools of thought associated the divergent positions in this debate. The central question to be considered is whether military power in the present international order can serve the functions of security, domination, status, and influence for which it has been employed in the past.

b) Definitions of and Debates over Military Power

In a retraction from his earlier thesis concerning the use and usability of military force in contemporary interstate relations,[34] Knorr (as Hoffmann) pointed to two academic
schools of thought that have advanced diametrically opposed views. As he put it:

According to the modernists, growing international interdependence, as well as the enormous destructiveness of modern weapons, make international violence, less and less relevant to human aspirations,...According to the classical school of thought, these developments stressed by the modernist, which are observed rather than inferred, are merely surface perturbations. Fundamentally, nothing has changed. As long as autonomous states are militarily sovereign, force will remain the ultimate arbiter in the settlement of interstate conflict.[35]

Detailed examination and rebuttal of these theoretically divergent positions can be seen in the literature review by Knorr, Hoffmann, Martin, Tucker and Osgood, among others.[36] I will, therefore, restrict the evaluation below to a sort of 'second-order or parasitical exercise, (to use Charles Pentland's expression)[37] that sets out to 'cull out flaws and limitations' in the content, context and structure of given theoretical argumentation in the literature.

First, in general terms, an examination of selective writings[38] associated with both schools reveals disagreement not simply on different facets of an agreed 'world' but fundamentally also on different versions of it. These divergences are readily apparent in three major areas 1) the actors (the relationship between 'whole' and 'parts' in world politics), 2) processes (the possibility of reform or change), and 3) outcomes (their relationship to values and
political action).

Regarding the first issue-area, it is apparent that both perspectives embody a distinctive view of the global system. The 'classical' perspective—the politics of power and security—postulates a constant tension between the interests of states and the dynamics of the state system which creates an atmosphere of insecurity and the possibility of violence. In this light, the international system is an 'insecurity community' in which war is an ever-present 'contingent liability', and in which the axiom 'might is right' applies.

The 'modernist' perspective, on the other hand, enshrines a view of the world as a 'pluralistic-political system' within which there is a constant process of mutual and multi-lateral adaptation to events ('complex interdependence'). In this context, the international system 'explodes'. It becomes simultaneously more 'diffuse, penetrating new regions and activities' and more interconnected with linkages between a variety of actors. As Keohane and Nye, have suggested:

A system of 'mixed actors' creates the potential for a multitude of coalitions and balances, corresponding to the intersection of novel and existing issues and the absence of a clear or unified global hierarchy. Although it could be said that a global military hierarchy, based especially on nuclear weapons still exists, such an assertion becomes debatable in conditions where, firstly, nuclear weapons do not constitute a rational policy instrument, and, secondly, the proliferation of nuclear capacity threatens to complicate the picture and create new instabilities.[39]
Given this appraisal of the global system, the modernist theorists have argued that the core assumption of 'realism' about the international order—that there is an international hierarchy in which military might and economic capacity define the rank of any given state—is now at best an anachronism.

Regarding the second issue-area, and in conjunction with the first, the two schools differ on the possibilities for change or reform in the international system. While theorists of the 'classical' school admit the possibility of macro-political change as the potential of particular states grows or declines, or as a result of a war of global dimensions like the Second World War, they do not concede change in the dominant role of the state in general. In the modernist conception, the state becomes a variable capable of reformation or transformation and the global system itself is seen as demanding effective management.

Regarding the third issue-area, as a logical consequence of the first two, the 'classicists' and the 'modernists' diverge over the relationship between values and political action. The overriding concern of the former with 'political realism'—in which the 'sober and rational calculation of interests and capabilities' is a central activity and in which the means of action should be carefully matched to the demands of particular circumstances,—becomes the kingpin of political action.
While the need for sobriety and rationality is by no means denied by the 'modernists', a major importance is accorded to other values based on the possibility of progress and the development of new norms and conventions of behaviour. Given these divergent perceptions and definitions of the evolving global system by the two schools, it is to be expected that their articulation of the role of military power in it would differ sufficiently to be almost diametrically opposed.

Second, in specific terms, there is little doubt (as the 'modernists' have argued) that certain developments (technological, normative, and growing complex international interdependence) in the post-Second World War era have profoundly reduced the utility of national military power as an instrument of policy, compared with previous historical periods. Unfortunately, when viewed against the background of the contemporary era, hypotheses such as this are impossible to test and must be highly qualified. Since the root of modernist's scepticism about the continued relevance of armed forces as instruments of policy reside principally on the impact of modern military technology, this aspect of their argumentation will be carried a step further here as a reference point to evaluate the conflicting conclusions of both schools of thought.

Viewed from both historical and contemporary standpoints,
the use and usability of military power to secure policy objectives has been sensitive to variable conditions, of which the 'form of military force' is preeminent.[40] In this respect the terrible potentialities of thermonuclear technology have naturally and understandably (at least from system-level perspective) given rise to the fundamental existential question whether war is still to be seen as a 'continuation of policy by other means' or represents (in R. G. Collingwood's phrase) 'the breakdown of policy'--the modernist viewpoint.

It is hardly to be doubted that the certitude of immense destructiveness of thermonuclear systems (either directly on the target areas or globally through the 'green house' effect)[41] has created a novel situation that challenges the continuity of traditional functions of military power in international politics. Given the looming disaster of nuclear confrontation, and the inherent risk that even lesser military confrontations between the present dominant military blocs may escalate to this level, the 'employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object policy' has necessarily become so dangerous as to be unthinkable. This is especially so in relations between these powers, since their security concerns are so firmly interlinked with those of the international system as to make them virtually indistinguishable. Any major conflict between them (e.g. the
Cuban missile crisis), immediately takes on the character of a crisis for the whole system, particularly since it carries a destabilising potential for the balance between the two superpowers—a balance which in turn forms the 'underpinning of the stability and security of the current international system'.[42]

But it does not perforce follow from this argument, as the modernist theorists have proffered, that military power is deprived of all its traditional functions.[43] In other words, the effect of modern military technology have been, neither 'so radical, so simple, nor so novel' as the proponents of this school assert. Perhaps the primary deficiency of the modernist thesis lies less in its depreciation of the utility of war than in its failure to appreciate the subtle and varied role of military power short of war, roles trenchantly captured in T. C. Schelling's telling phrases: 'the diplomacy of violence,' 'the manipulation of risk,' and 'the diplomacy of ultimate survival.'[44]

Indeed, national military forces do not have to be actively employed to be 'useful.' One the contrary, the use of brutal military force, may represent the 'bankruptcy of military power.' That is, when a government actually resorts to military violence this is usually evidence of 'impotence of power': that its forces lack credibility—to deter attack,
or successfully impose a threat, or achieve an objective by the clever manipulation of military signals. Thus, as Tucker and Osgood rightly contend.

Whatever the utility or uselessness of actual war among the advanced industrial-technological states may be, every day demonstrates that the fearful prospect of war and the policies for using, deterring, controlling, and disarming armed forces in the shadow of this prospect play a decisive role in international politics. In many ways that role is more pervasive than in previous periods of history when war was less dangerous.[45]

Furthermore, it is patently illogical to argue from the fact that using the most powerful military weapon is likely to be mutually destructive, that the use of all kinds of military force is equally pointless. Such argumentation begs many questions. In the first place most international conflicts in the post-1945 era have not directly involved either the nuclear powers or nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, while setting limits to conflicts in the so-called Third World (the limits being determined by the superpowers' refusal to enter into direct confrontation over what are considered to be peripheral areas and issues), the stability of the central nuclear balance not only permits local (intra-state or intra-regional) conflicts in the Third World zone (e.g. Africa), but may in fact, as one analyst has noted, even encourage the eruption of such conflicts, 'partially as a way of letting off steam to help cool the temperature around
those core issues which are considered directly relevant and
vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the inter-
national system.[46]

In the second place, in a number of instances in which
a nuclear power has been directly involved in an international
conflict its protagonist has sometimes been non-nuclear, for
example, the United States and China over Korea, Taiwan and
the two strategic Islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the fifties
and, more recently, between Britain and Argentina over the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

In the third place, even where the parties in an inter-
national conflict have possessed viable nuclear options, the
possibilities of the political exploitation of military force
remain considerable. First, asymmetries in capabilities still
exist, as the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not
necessarily result in a situation of mutual deterrence or stale-
mate. This factor underlies the much-debated issue of the
credibility of British and French retaliatory nuclear forces
in relation to those of the Soviet Union. Second, even when
a nuclear stalemate exists (as between the Soviet Union and
the United States) there are still in principle certain out-
lets. One of these lies in such controversial warfighting-
strategies as the 'limited war' doctrine and NATO's nebulous
strategy of 'flexible response,' designed, as one of its prin-
cipal architects put it, 'to meet Soviet aggression across the
The principal disability of such doctrines (based as they are on the principle of deterrence-by-denial) is the much dreaded potential for escalation into an 'uncontrollable cataclysm.' If this happened then the pay-offs (in the language of game theorists) are hugely negative for both contestants.

This critique of the 'modernist' view concerning the impact of nuclear systems on the usability of military force does not necessarily support the classical postulate—that fundamentally nothing has changed in the role of military power compared with previous historical periods. The contemporary international system is obviously 'seized with accelerated and turbulent' change (technological, socio-economic, normative and political), much of which cannot be easily or lightly discounted as 'surface perturbations.' For example, the vigorous growth of transnational forces and organisations in the post-1945 era (combined with growing international interdependence) has unmistakably increased the mutual sensitivity and vulnerability between states on the question of war and peace. Perhaps, the current example is the Iraq-Iran war and the potentially adverse impact on the international financial market of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, since oil is now an acceptable collateral for loans and stock market exchange. The United States' declaration of its intention to keep the Strait open by force if need be only
reinforces this sensitivity.

Similarly, the normative devaluation of force as a means of settling conflict, engendered largely by the fury and carnage of the Second World War (especially the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), has significantly restricted both the legitimacy and use of coercion. Thus unlike previous historical periods, war is no longer unquestioningly accepted as 'natural, inevitable and legitimate', that is, without a sharp distinction between its aggressive and defensive use (see Chapter Five, section c).

These incontrovertible developments notwithstanding, the notion that the international system is a 'threat system in which military power is the ultima ratio is; still, of all influences on international relations and on foreign and defence policy-making, perhaps the most pervasive. What nevertheless has changed—as reflected in the writings of the 'renaissance' strategists alluded to above—is the way in which this intercourse between the military means and policy goals has been reconceptualised to integrate the 'whole arsenal of means of policy,' including economic, diplomatic, subversive and psychological instruments of power. This consideration carries logically to the final section of this chapter: the relative impact (to the extent that such computation of means is admissible) of military power compared with other traditional instruments of policy. Although seldom employed
independently of the other (that, for instance, diplomacy ends when 'the shooting starts'), the conceptual basis for the assessment of the relative impact of this array of instrumentalities exists in the ascendancy of one or the other policy means (or combinations of some) in concrete circumstances of conflict and crisis-management. This is so in part because the choice of means may depend not only on their availability to decision-makers, but also on their expected cost and efficacy.

c) The Relative Impact of Military Power Compared with Other Traditional Instruments of Policy

In any given conflict situation, complex power plays render the measurement of any one factor (policy means) in the process of conflict resolution extremely difficult, if not impossible. The reason, as Knorr has noted, is that in the pursuit of policy objectives, statesmen 'design and use a power package in which the various means of influence are proportioned and concentrated to best effect'. [50] For example, it is still debatable whether it was the threat of war or diplomacy (or both) that was crucial in the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A similar observation applies, at the African regional level to the process of conflict interaction between settler minorities and nationalist forces in the periods preceding the independence of Algeria and Zimbabwe.
Despite such problematic dynamics certain historically invariant observations (depending of course on the vitality of the issue for the parties involved) can still be made. First, the strength of coercive influence depends on the nature of the power base. In this respect, military power has tended to be superior to other forms of power (economic, political, subversive, etc.). In response to situations which are unyielding to pacific strategies, governments invariably give a premium to military force. Military force has, therefore, been the ultimate arbiter in the settlement of conflicts. It has been, as one analyst put it, 'taken as the kingpin of the interstate power structure, because there is normally no remedy against force except equal or superior counterforce.'[51] There is, for instance, no sense in threatening economic reprisals against an opponent invading one's territory, or for that matter over investing in diplomatic solutions against a repressive minority racial oligarchy (such as the Afrikaner regime in South Africa) whose definition of what constitutes 'order' is diametrically at variance with acceptable international norms.

And second, the extent to which different instruments of power are of unequal effectiveness also limits the substitution of one for the other. The major problem with techniques of influence other than military is their historically-proven ineffectiveness. This is preeminently the case
with the diplomatic instrument and with the various uses of national or collective economic power and propaganda to coerce influence foreign governments.

Diplomacy, defined as 'the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states...by peaceful means,'[52] is, under normal circumstances, the instrument usually employed in the conduct of international political intercourse. However, in several cases of serious and intractable conflict issues (inter- as well as intra-state) in the contemporary era (as in previous historical periods) this instrument has proven 'incomplete, indecisive, and inconclusive.'[53] Military power, or threat of it, therefore, sometimes remains the ultima ratio on a broad range of international issues. This is not to imply that military force is always a more reliable instrument of foreign policy whenever diplomacy fails to secure policy objectives. As one writer has noted:

It sometimes happens that when war cannot achieve the aims of foreign policy, the diplomats surface to the forefront once again in search of a political settlement. Even when war has achieved the aims of foreign policy, it is the diplomats who design the postwar settlement in the light of the military outcomes.[54]

This inescapable symbiosis between 'the power to conduct external relations and the power to prosecute war' is
perhaps best exemplified in the persistent Arab-Israeli conundrum. Furthermore, what strengthens the necessity for a mutually reinforcing relationship between the military and diplomatic means is not merely that war, as Ken Booth puts it, has become 'a deadly business,'[55] but also that in so far as both means lie at the root of the 'sovereign quality of a political community,' their exercise by governments are necessarily inseparable. Conflict resolution has in the contemporary era, evolved in essence into a 'dialogue between political and military minds.' A separation of the two, in the words of Kissinger, 'can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over-concern with finesse.'[56]

In much the same vein, the imposition of economic sanctions (national or collective) to coerce or simply to overwhelm or resist an adversary has, at best, been counterproductive, as highlighted by recent examples (e.g. NATO's embargo on 'strategic goods' to USSR and China in the fifties and sixties, US economic sanctions against Cuba, USSR sanctions against Albania; and the UN imposition of comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia following Unilateral Declaration of Independence).[57] These cases vividly highlight limitations in the effectiveness of economic power as an instrument of statecraft. Since the functional purpose of economic measures employed as power plays is either to
threaten or to weaken an adversary (through losses of income, unemployment, investment and economic growth). Its success depends on an internationally cumulative degree of monopolist and monopsônist control over world markets which a single actor or a combination of actors in an alliance seldom attains.

This observation applies equally also to the extensive, if less publicised, use of economic and military 'aid' and subversion by major powers as instrument of influence and prevalence against economically less viable and dependent states.[58] Most dependent or peripheral actors in the global system have developed and mastered—with varying degrees of success—a number of strategies to evade and reduce the potentially strangulating effects of economic sanctions and embargoes. Latin American states, for example, have taken special steps, since the mid-1960s, to expand their trade with European nations, Japan, and socialist countries; and this progressive diversification has given them greater freedom to risk the displeasure of the United States. The African experience varies, compared with other less developed regions, however, the predominantly agrarian economies of these countries arguably make them more vulnerable to manipulation through economic measures. Conversely, since the capacity of states to exercise influence through this means requires a highly developed infrastructural base,
the use and usability of the economic instrument by any one of the African states (or collectively by the OAU) is clearly inconsequential (see Chapter Seven for discussion on Nigeria).

Nevertheless, like the diplomatic instrument, the incomparable and historically demonstrable ineffectiveness of economic means relative to military power does not necessarily negate their functionality as a potent adjunct to other techniques of statecraft in certain conflict circumstances. Indeed, since, as most contemporary strategists are quick to point out, the difficult problems of national security policy are in the area where political, economic, and military factors overlap, it is no longer meaningful to view economic and military means as 'two incommensurables.' On the contrary, it can be argued that the utility of military power now depends to some extent on the utility of non-military means of international influence. The reason, as noted above, resides partly in the revolution in military technology and partly in the evolving condition of complex interdependence and the associated normative devaluation of war. As the stigma associated with the blatant use of force as a policy instrument gains prominence, those states with unquestionable military means at their disposal now more often than not, resort to diplomatic, economic and clandestine means of influence (e.g. the US in Central America and France in West-Central Africa). However, in overall terms, the extent to
which these techniques of influence can supplement the exer-
tion of military power let alone replace it altogether, is
clearly limited.

Conclusion

The central position in this chapter has been that despite arguments to the contrary (the 'modernist' perspective) military power—the capacity of states to affect the behaviour of other states by employment or the threat of armed coercion—remains one of the most distinctive features of world politics. Given the uneven global distribution of the relevant changes in parameters, the military as a foreign policy instrument has not been altogether robbed of its historic functions merely because of the revolution in military technology or because of the vigorous growth of transnational forces and complex international interdependence. Although war is no longer as acceptable a continuation of policy by other means as it once was, this Clausewitzian-Leninist dictum is not altogether obsolete.

The fading importance of some objectives with which the use of military power has been associated in the past does not mean that there are not other goals that may justify the use of military force. Several other traditional objectives have lost little, if any, of their urgency or legitimacy, either internationally or domestically. As will be seen in the next chapter on the African dimension these objectives
include, *inter alia*, deterrence of, and defence against, attacks on political and territorial integrity, disputes over established boundaries that are regarded as unjust by one side or the other (for example, Somalia and her neighbours and the unresolved boundary problem between China and the USSR), the protection or liberation of ethnically/racially related peoples, and, finally, intervention in civil war, either to support or help combat incumbent regimes.

The unresolved and potentially incendiary issues of the present are also a foretaste of the future. In this context, Hedley Bull has forewarned that:

As we contemplate the prospects for the 1980s, it is difficult not to feel that in the coming decade international politics will become more Hobbesian, led moderated by the institutions of international society, than it has been in the past...We face a world in which the adverse partnership between the Super Powers is disappearing, in which the revival of mercantilism has provided a new rationale for resort to force, in which military interventionism has made a remarkable recovery, the consensus about legal restraints upon resort to force is further eroding and the societies of the world are more willing to shoulder the economic and social burdens of armaments.[59]

It would be tempting to conclude from this prognosis that the modernist thesis about the obsolescence of military force suffers (to use Lord Acton's phrase) from 'multiple disorders.' However, some crucial aspects of this thesis cannot be lightly discounted: that the role of military force, at least in the strict sense of inter-state or
international war, is more closely circumscribed today than at any period before the end of the Second World War. This is so primarily because the range of political ends (aggregate values) war can serve has fallen sharply, while conversely the aggregate costs of resorting to it had escalated with modern military technology. Nevertheless, the Hobbesian view of the world as an anarchy in which violence is the ultima ratio—both to protect the state and to promote its interests in the face of opposition from other states—remains the conventional wisdom of most governments and peoples. This is especially so in the unsettled context of Africa in which the unresolved legacy of the colonial past combined with relentless covert and overt intrusion of extra-continental actors and forces (see Chapter Two), suggest that frequent warfare will be the reality for some time to come. International peace and security, as Morgenthau put it, is now more than ever the ideology of satisfied powers. [60]

The next chapter examines the validity of this thesis within the geopolitical context of the conflict spiral and external linkages in the African regional subsystem. It, therefore, provides the necessary transition from the system-level of (international) interaction (Chapter One) to the unit-level national outcome (Chapter Three).
NOTES


3. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (New York: Macmillan 1952). See especially the chapter on "The tragic element in modern international conflict". The 'Security dilemma' is at the core of the international theorising of political scientists. It is one of many variants of the 'state of nature' idea. For an excellent application of this concept to contemporary international politics, see Stanley Hoffmann The State of War (N.Y.: Praeger, 1965), Chapter Three.


8. Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices" Foreign Policy 12 (Fall 1973), pp. 3-42.


12. Ibid., p. 605.
13. Ibid., p. 605.
15. Ibid., p. 605.
16. Ibid., p. 81.
18. Ibid., p. 16.
26. Ibid., p. 10.


31. At the centre of the relationship between strategy and politics is the distribution of responsibility among decision-makers, i.e. between political and the military leaders. While this debate is as old as warfare, current analysis has made it one of the key problems of defence planning. See Davis Bobrow (ed.) *Components of Defense Policy* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965) and John Collins, *US Defense Planning* (Boulder: Westview, 1982).


34. Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*. For his retraction on the thesis advanced in this study, (i.e.; that the usability and usefulness of military force in interstate relations, compared with previous historical periods, had been diminished by several underlying conditions), see Knorr, "On the International Uses of Military Force in the Contemporary World" *Orbis* 21, 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 5-27, and Knorr, "Is International Coercion Waning or Rising?" *International Society* 1; 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 16-31.


41. For an incisive analysis of the 'green house' effect of thermonuclear fallout, see Carl Sagan et al. "The Climatic Effects of Nuclear War" *Scientific American* 251, 2(August 1984), pp. 33-43. For the revolutionary properties of nuclear weapons, see Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*.

42. This argument has been developed in Sisir Gupta, "Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World" *Foreign Affairs Reports* 17, 7-8 (July/August 1977) pp. 12-32.


56. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 422.


CHAPTER TWO

Military Power and International Order: the African dimension

...There has been a growing incidence of interstate conflict and an emphasis on military resolution of political differences. These conflicts, and African concerns with them, have provided the superpowers, as well as the former colonial powers, with opportunities for direct and indirect intervention in the region, something that African states feel powerless to prevent.

Bruce Arlinghaus[1]

Africa is at a most difficult and explosive stage of development. During the 1980s quarrels within one country or between hostile neighbouring countries are likely to erupt into violent conflicts...Such conflicts will affect not only the localities or countries directly involved, but in many cases also will provoke foreign intervention. This is not to say that Africa will be the passive victim of international power politics. On the contrary, African factions will actively seek foreign military and economic assistance to bolster fragile positions, as they have frequently done already...In short, the outlook for Africa in the 1980s is for continued internationalisation of predictable local conflicts.

Colin Legum[2]

As a continuation of the first, this chapter examines the changing role-conception and dynamic functioning of military power (as its validating neo-Clausewitzian political philosophy) as an instrument of statecraft in the context of relations among African states. Contemporary Africa constitutes in many ways a microcosm of the complex pattern and process of interstate relations (in terms of the traditional modes of cooperation, conflict, and indifference), which, as noted in the
opening chapter, have characterised the prevailing global order. The tremendous diversity presented by the ethnic composition, socio-economic structure, and physical characteristics of the continent has had far-reaching spatial consequences for the nature and spiral of intra-regional conflict and the role of military force in its resolution. As is readily seen in the 'raucous decade' of the 1970s, the diffusion of military capabilities and the decentralisation of initiative in threatening or using them have increased the chances for intra-regional armed confrontation.

While the roots of these conflicts are invariably local, the dynamics (including technologies) which fuel them are more often than not tied to regional and global rivalries as, for example, the ongoing battle for the control of Western Sahara. The logic of this linkage (between local, regional and global forces) resides in an historical and complex interaction between extra-continental interests and regional economic, political, and ideological imperatives. Low levels of economic, industrial and structural development pave the way for the rapid internationalisation of African conflicts, since most of these states have the capacity to initiate a war yet seldom the wherewithal to sustain it. This internationalisation of conflict in turn gives occasion/opportunity to super-power and middle-power (e.g. France and Cuba) geopolitical rivalry on the continent, thus, in turn...
sustaining domestic conflagration as in Chad.

Given this inexorable trend, analysis of the roles and limits of military power in the foreign and security policies of African states has perforce to be situated within the context of contemporary global conflict dynamics as these impact on the African subsystem. That is, the extent to which the basic structure of the international system, the degree to which it is sustained by ideological rivalry, and the relative instability of the states that comprise it set the contextual parameters for Africa's regional rivalries, defence build-ups, political instabilities, civil strife and decolonisation process in Southern Africa. Such a geopolitical perspective is arguably more productive for understanding, and predicting regional (Africa) conflict patterns involving the use of military force, than a purely intra-system functional or issue-based approach.[3] It, thus, becomes necessary, when examining the role dynamics of military power in conflict resolution in Africa: i) to explore the relationship between intra-regional and extra-regional (global) interactions (section a); ii) to relate such interactions to attributes of actors; to examine the relationship between interactions and conflict patterns (section b); and iii) to attempt to develop an issue-based typology of conflict dynamics and responses involving the military instrument (section c).

The next section, therefore, examines the prevailing nodes
of geopolitical judgements concerning the African subsystem as a necessary starting point for the appraisal of the role of military power in the relations of African states.

a) **Africa in the Global System: a geopolitical appraisal**

In analytical terms, geopolitics, as Raymond Aron explains, 'combines a geographical schematization of diplomatic-strategic relations with a geographic-economic analysis of resources, with an interpretation of diplomatic attitudes as a result of the way of life and of the environment.' [4]

In other words, the essence of geopolitical analysis is the relation of international political power (as manifested in diplomatic, economic and military interactions) to the geographic setting and to peoples' interpretation of the nature of this change.

Such a relationship is clearly complex; the 'geographical setting' is itself a multi-dimensional concept. It relates in part to the physical and spatial aspects of regions or states, such as terrain, climate, resources, demographic trends, and national boundaries; but in part it also involves factors related to cultural geography. The intricate interplay between the geographical setting and political power—such as the nature of regimes, military capabilities, regional power balances and alliances—has significant implications for the instrumental role of military power in intra-regional
conflict in Africa, as elsewhere. Recent developments in Southern Africa, the Horn, Western Sahara, and Chad all too vividly show this.\[5\]

The history of geopolitical thought has been reasonably well presented in the literature and will not be reproduced here.\[6\]. For the purpose of this chapter, however, it is necessary to specify the contemporary modes of geopolitical judgements as they apply to extra-continental perceptions of the nature and directions of conflict in Africa. Such an analytical framework is presently germane for the appreciation of conflict dynamics and for the role of military force in the policy of African states. This is all the more so to the extent that the military systems of Africa (as a result of economic and technological underdevelopment) require a high level of foreign inputs in terms of arms transfer, training, technical assistance and, in certain cases, operational direction in conflict situations.

The basic premises of contemporary geopolitical thinking invariably hinge on East-West relations: 'a long-term and inalienable struggle between the insular imperium of the United States and the "heartland" imperium of the Soviet Union.'\[7\] The interface between the power of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are the "Rimlands" of Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. These are generally considered by contemporary geopoliticians to be the focus of relentless struggle for control (or denial of control) by the Big Two. Thus Colin Gray
Ira's argued that the current Soviet 'build-up' of military and naval capability constitutes an historic bid for hegemony over the Eurasian-African Rimlands, and thus--by extension--for leverage against the rest of the world. As he put it:

Whether or not Soviet leaders and defense planners think in MacKinder's terms, Soviet actions--considered in the round--can be fully comprehended only in a geopolitical framework. The West undoubtedly will awaken to its danger, to the fact that the state of too many military balances, had been permitted to erode to its disadvantage, but such an awakening could well occur too late.[8]

Whether the U.S.S.R. is really striving for world hegemony or simply playing the power game (as is to be expected of a superpower) in the 'peripheries' of the 'world island' is clearly debatable. Suffice, however, to note that accepting a selective and simplistic interpretation of a profound and complex reality such as contemporary trends in East-West relations has led some strategic writers in the West to develop an almost paranoid interpretation of Soviet intentions.

This paranoia is clearly visible in the influential writings of Cold War warriors like Strauz Hupe and his colleague W. A. Kinter who both typify the kind of distorted cynicism characteristic of the so-called 'Forward Strategy School.'[9] Like his intellectual mentor--Nicholas Spykman--Gray's position about Soviet intentions may be elegant but it is apt to do violence to reality. The inherent dangers
and the palpable weakness of this line of thinking lie in two imagery and over-simplification. First, the danger lies in what Hans Speier has appropriately termed 'Magic Geography' or deterministic cartography. Since the earth is a globe (and every point is surrounded by every other point), the suggestive power of particular maps depends critically upon their centres. One can design maps to suggest almost any geopolitical hypothesis. In this respect, analysts such as Gray and Kissinger have tended to define geopolitical issues in terms that are compatible with their own ideological biases and organisational or partisan perspectives. [10]

And second, abstract geopolitical theorising which accuses the U.S.S.R. of aspiring to hegemony over the 'world island' inevitably engenders excessive simplification of a complicated set of international relationships. As one of the most indefatigable critics of this school, Stanley Hoffmann has noted:

> It neglects local circumstances, makes each crisis a test of resolve, sees credibility in the most limited stake, counts on a linkage which cannot work and has no substantial conception of world order other than a military balance. [11]

Hoffmann's stricture underlines the persistent divergence between sources of 'Third World' conflict and appropriate responses which has bedevilled American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era. In relation to the African conflict, the debate between geopoliticians and regionalists--or between
globalists and Africanists (as some analysts have characterised them), has centred around their assessment of the centrality of competition with the USSR and the role of force in it. On the one hand, the geopoliticalist focuses on Soviet power, the importance of regional balances, allies and the continuing centrality of military power (albeit through African proxies: South Africa, Zaire, Morocco and Egypt) in defending immediate American interests. On the other hand, regionalists point to the expanded agenda of world affairs and to multipolarity, complexity and diversity. The regionalists also emphasise the constraints on Soviet power, the intractability of many problems to solution by military power, the strength of indigenous nationalisms and the costs of alignment with African states which face multiple threats arising from contradictions in the domestic order (e.g., South Africa, Zaire, and Sadat's Egypt).

However, while, as argued below, adherence to the classical geopolitical policy paradigm is arguably dysfunctional to long-term United States interests in Africa, novel developments in superpower global rivalry in recent times have refurbished the combative posture associated with the intellectual legacy of established theorists such as Mackinder, Spykman, and the Soviet strategists A. M. Lagovsky and Marshall Sokolovsky. This new direction in geopolitical thinking—one with fundamental import for Africa—is most graphically articulated by Geoffrey Kemp through a "new
The 'cartographic imperatives' involved in this new map are seen by Kemp to comprise four basic elements, all of relevance to Africa:

1. The changing patterns of Western and Soviet basing rights throughout the world, in particular in the Indo-Atlantic region and the Mediterranean.

2. The diffusion of political, economic and military power to the less-industrial countries.

3. The increasing importance of resource inter-dependency for the Western world, the Socialist countries and the less-industrial countries.

4. The new Laws of the Sea which are drastically altering the map of the world's oceans, seaways, and chokepoints.

From the vantage point of such a map, two major factors bearing on Africa in superpower strategic calculus are readily visible. First, the centrality of the continent astride two pertinent major Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC)--the South Atlantic region covering an area from the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, West Africa, to the coast of Brazil, and the Caribbean-Mediterranean axis--has immensely increased Western concern about Soviet presence in it. This has been so far two reasons in particular: 1) security of oil-related traffic and 2) vulnerability to Soviet interception of logistical support for battle groups in the Indian Ocean theatre in the event of war. And second, as a 'store
House' of vital strategic minerals, Africa (as evident in orthodox Western academic literature and official policy papers) has increasingly become a strategic asset and one of the major pivots of Western (NATO) defence planning:[15] (See Table 2.1).

Thus, by dint of its centrality astride two SLOCs and its manifest resource and strategic potential, Africa is presently in the vortex of tension as the 'cold war' again spreads. This uncomfortable appreciation of Africa's 'Rimland' was recognised by the London Economist in September 1981 as the 'new scramble for Africa' (or levels for foreign troops in Africa, see Table 2.2). Admittedly, the salience of Africa in extra-continental geostrategic and policy projections is not fixed. However, the preeminence of the above two factors in the geopolitical assessments about Africa by the 'Superpowers' (and their allies) is unmistakable. This is highlighted in the continual debates over 'Africa policy' in major centres of global power. These are invariably partisan and ideological in overtone, as readily seen in influential academic literature, the media, and official government publications on both sides of the 'iron curtain.'[16]

The dominant Western orthodox literature (a product of the 'New Frontier' cold war dogma) is predicated upon hair-raising 'hawkish' analyses of Soviet policy in Africa, it invariably recommends toughness against the USSR.[17] This
literature has to be balanced against the liberal 'Africanist' perspective—represented by Albiniski, Zartman and Arlinghaus among others—which argues for moderation and circumspection in US and NATO policy toward Africa. [18]

Conversely, some aspects of Soviet literature concerning the role and objectives of 'imperialist' Western Africa are equally galling. [19] In general, it shares the increasingly dominant radical perspective (one no doubt influenced and conditioned by the persistent economic contradictions and frustrations deriving from direct and indirect countervailing forces to decolonisation in Southern Africa) of African scholars. [20]

Thus, from Soviet, as well as radical African perspectives, the paramount objective of NATO powers has been to preserve their historic economic, strategic and political dominance of the African subsystem through a combination of hegemonic and patronal policies (including direct and indirect support for settler regimes in Southern Africa, and for moribund dictatorships such as that of Zaire's Mobutu), essentially designed to keep the Soviet Union at bay. On this view, Soviet material and diplomatic support for African liberation, encouragement of OPEC-style cartels and other ranges of indigenization and nationalization measures constitute the antithesis to Western 'containment.' The latter sees in Soviet actions a maximal challenge to their own preferred models of functional and symbiotic relations with African
This contending and continuing 'globalist' perception of Africa held in the contemporary centers of World power, notwithstanding, evolving patterns of conflict spirals on the continent are revealing in one respect: Africa has become an integral part of the global geopolitical chessboard of the superpowers and their allies. This inexorable trend was manifested with elemental fury in the mid-1970s, when Africa became the scene of a heated confrontation which included elements of East-West rivalry (e.g., Angola, 1975-1976; and Zaire, 1977 and 1978).

However, as will be argued below, the image of Africans as passive victims or stooges of foreign powers in the pattern of the nineteenth century (conveyed by some Africanists)[21] is now clearly both simplistic and paternalistic, if not obsolete. The Byzantine complexity of post-independence politics of African states defies such a conclusion. As Colin Legum put it:

One of the mythologies of contemporary Africa is that the continent is the victim of exploiting foreign powers. But an objective analysis will show that this belief is a post colonial hangover from the days when Africa was indeed the passive victim of the major powers. The situation today is that foreign intervention recurs because African governments, individually or collectively, for their own interests, are ready to engage external support.[22]
Indeed, the increasing efforts of African governments to expand and improve their military forces and to then rely on them in coping with domestic and intra-regional problems belies such an assertion. Furthermore, as the recurrent cooperation of the conservative pro-Western Francophone 'axis' of Morocco--Senegal--Ivory Coast--Gabon--Zaire with extra-continental actors in regional crises demonstrates, African elites are in the throes of an ideological imbroglio. This only reinforces and sanctions the external presence which many others on the continent are inclined to consider dysfunctional to African interests. Clearly, foreign 'intervention' in Africa can no longer be seen exclusively as a systemic necessity (the Galtung model of 'topdog' powers and the 'underdog' powers). It is a venture that consistently receives active cooperation from states within the continent.

In the next section, the regional dynamics and 'local' or domestic factors which have fuelled prevailing conflict spirals and external linkages will be examined. It will be argued that the unresolved legacy of settler colonialism in Southern Africa has combined with ethnic fragmentation and ideological and personality differences among and between 'power elites' in African states to engender a volatile cockpit for intra-regional conflict which induces and paves the way for external intervention. The internationalisation of regional conflicts (domestic and interstate) also gives
vent to superpower geostrategic rivalry on the continent (e.g. Angola and the 'Horn of Africa'). Because of their divergent and competitive orientations, the superpowers almost invariably support opposing sides, thereby indirectly transferring their rivalry into local conflicts. And through the 'assistance' they render, they make their interests a factor in the genesis as well as the outcome of such conflicts. In other words, since internal or intra-regional wars in contemporary African may engender profound social change which is fundamentally unpredictable (and 'no situation is more threatening to nations than one whose outcome has become so uncertain as to have moved beyond their control'[23]) the superpowers are increasingly viewing it to be in their national interests (as well as the interests of their allies and clients) to ensure favourable results by intervening.

b) Conflict Spiral and External Linkages

The preceding consideration of the geopolitical current as a contextual factor in the dynamics of intra-regional conflicts in Africa is revealing in one respect: these conflicts involve both local and systemic (global) factors and linkages among them. Although movement from one level of analysis to another has been considered anathema by many analysts of conflict,[24] such shifts as noted in the preambles are necessary to understand the dynamics of influences
from several levels in contemporary Africa. Hence the focus here will treat conflict in Africa as an antagonistic situation in which influences from all levels interact over time. By identifying linkages among individual, societal and systemic variables, the dimensions and complexities of current conflicts can be highlighted. [25]

Within such a linkage framework, the immediate analytical task now is to isolate: i) the environmental variables (domestic and regional) that contribute to conflict development and ii) the systemic (geopolitical, factors) that sustain them. This will be followed by a conceptual synthesis and illustrations from persistent conflicts on the continent.

1) The Proximal Environment Variables

This set of environmental variables includes: long-term (contextual and convergent), medium-term, short-term and precipitating factors. [26] Generally considered, these variables range from settler colonialism, domestic fragmentation (ethnic pluralism) and fissiparous pressures towards secession to colonial legacies of arbitrary borders and configuration of elite power groups. The dynamics of such elite economic, political and ideological confrontation provide the context for foreign countries and corporations to intervene in what were, in origin, domestic or regional disputes. In analytic terms, as locus of external intervention in intra-regional conflict, this set of factors derives
its theoretical antecedent from the 'pull theory' first articulated by Thucydides in his classic, *The Peloponnesian War*. Thucydides argued that power lay behind all the reasons for the outbreak of this Peloponnesian conflict:

"...rival parties in every state-democratic leaders trying to bring in the Athenians, and oligarchies trying to bring in the Spartans. In peacetime there would have been no excuse and no desire for calling them in, but in time of war, when each party could always count upon an alliance which would do harm to its opponents and at the same time strengthen its own position, it became a natural thing for anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from outside."[27]

This 'pull theory' perspective refers the intervention stimulus back to actors operating in the target, thus creating a link between inter- and intra-state politics. It identifies four distinct parties and explains intervention in terms of ideological polarization at the systemic level which is exploited by 'local' parties to any conflict. The theoretical insights this approach provides into conflict spirals and responses in Africa become apparent when considered in relation to systemic dynamics at the global level.

ii) The Systemic Variables

The systemic or geopolitical variables (as suggested in section a, above) largely involve prevailing East-West maneuvering for ideological and strategic hegemony in the 'peripheries of the World Island.' In the African 'periphery', such hegemonic rivalry is currently manifested in
the practices of i) 'belligerent, combative competitive imperialism' between East and West on Africa, and ii) cooperative imperialism between West European and North American powers. Since prevailing perceptions on both sides of the 'iron curtain' are zero-sum, the expected outcome of the competition between these two forces is, thus, either the preservation of the status quo (the colonial incorporation of Africa into the global capitalist system) or realignment into the Soviet socialist system. In this regard, extra-continental intervention has increasingly focused on four interrelated geopolitical factors: strategic, economic, ideological and political.

In analytical terms, this systemic-factor approach (unlike the dynamic of 'local' variables) derives its theoretical underpinning from the 'push theory' of intervention. One principal exponent of this approach is Hans Morgenthau who argued that from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present, some states found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of others on behalf of their own interests and against the latter's will. Thus, unlike Thucydides, Morgenthau's formulation of interventionary behaviour concentrates on the motivation of the intervening, not target, actors.

To borrow a Hegelian aphorism—'the truth lies neither in the thesis nor the anti-thesis, but in the emergent synthesis that reconciles the truth of both'—considered
independently neither of the above sets of factors (and their theoretical conventions—'pull' and 'push' theories) can sufficiently explain the spiral of violence and external linkages manifested in Africa in the past couple of decades. However, when viewed as a confluence of factors relative to particular disputes, together they provide a sound basis for hypothesising about the increasingly ominous linkage pattern in intra-African conflict involving the use of military force. Seen in such terms, these seemingly divergent approaches in essence constitute different sides of the same coin and they both relate to the 'realist' school of thought which views military power as the ultimate arbiter or the backdrop of international political intercourse (see Chapter One).

On the one hand, the 'pull factors' as articulated by Thucydides, highlight three potent variables with considerable bearing on contemporary Africa: i) the basic structure of the international system; ii) the degree to which ideological rivalry sustains the structure; and iii) the relative instability of the nations that comprise the continental system. On the other hand, the 'push factors' as postulated by Morgenthau, underscore the motivational and bureaucratic aspects of interventionary behaviour of foreign powers towards Africa. And both aspects relate to the threat perception dynamics of the intervening state and have been considered (for example by George Modelski and Oran Young among others)
as the most crucial factors in post-Second World War cases of America's appeal to force.[31]

Within such a 'synthetic' framework, the complex patterns of conflict spiral and external linkage in Africa become readily explicable. Perhaps, the primary evidence for this contention lies in the fact that recent external involvement in the continent has focused on four explosive zones of conflict (see Table 2.3). These have ranged from Morocco in the North-West to the white laager of South Africa in the subcontinental tip, and from the Horn in the North-East to Central Africa and Chad to the West. In each case, the roots of the conflicts are local, but the dynamics which fuel the war are tied to regional and systemic rivalries. These complex interactions of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' variables in recent conflicts in Africa are perhaps best represented in the continuing crises in Western Sahara, Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Chad:[32].

In the case of Western Sahara, for instance, the conflict is regional in scope. Its root causes are local, yet the operative factors which perpetuate the war are tied to rivalries between Morocco, Algeria and Libya and the geopolitical interests of the superpowers. The long-term contextual variable is readily seen in the fact that for Morocco, Algeria and Libya the Western Sahara conflict is only the most immediate manifestation of a prolonged antagonism.
between different competitive political and economic systems. Western Sahara reflects a struggle between systems—a conservative monarchy and a capitalist economy in Morocco versus a reformist socialist-oriented system in Algeria and Libya. Thus, in many ways, the struggle for control of Saharan territory forms part of a larger geopolitical struggle for influence and dominance in northwest Africa.

The long-term convergent variables in the Western Sahara conflict include: colonial occupation, colonial border demarcation, and the rise of Sahrawi nationalism. The medium-term, short-term and precipitating factors involve the process of decolonisation, the continuation of irredentist claims by Morocco and Mauritania, and the separatist stance and ideological affinity of the Polisario with Algeria and Libya.[33]

The Western Sahara conflict is exemplary in revealing the pattern of causal dynamics in prevailing conflicts in the continent. Its origin reveals a complex spectrum of factors, largely the legacy of intractable historical circumstances and the unresolved present. However, as a result of contemporary geopolitical realities and the extensive dependence of African states on external economic and military patronage in crisis situations, other factors—superpower global strategy, access to mineral resources, and ideologies and alliances—have become common denominators in
the direction and resolution/perpetuation of this conflict. Such a configuration of factors underscores the dangerous spiral of linkage between local and systemic influences on conflict in the continent, especially when it involves divergent claims over disputed territory considered strategically important by the superpowers.

Apart from attempts in conflict studies to operationalize existing research categories with respect to Africa,[34] extant literatures on continental conflict seldom reflect the intricate dimension of variables highlighted above. In most cases, the pattern of argumentation, either explicitly or implicitly, reflects a primary preoccupation with partisan distortion which often is combined with self-serving propaganda to produce a good deal of misinformation and misperception. As a consequence, objectivity becomes the casualty to ethnocentric rationalisations. Arthur Klinghoffer's study of the Angolan melodrama, for instance, is just one of many examples of how partisan distortion easily triumphs over dispassionate academic analysis. Indeed, Klinghoffer's work on the Angolan crisis, inter alia, unwittingly helps to explain why policy decisions on Africa in Western capitals so often go wrong. In discussing Soviet policy, he counterposes an amicable view of Soviet intentions against a hostile view and offers his own discussion to synthesize the two extremes. As his conclusion clearly demonstrates, this dialectic can
be patently misleading, as the evidential items (e.g. the alleged large-scale Soviet arms supplies to MPLA in March-April 1975 and the canard that Nigerian troops were sent to Angola) are treated as having equal value, when many were concocted fabrications of a CIA misinformation exercise. Soviet arms and Cuban troops, for example, began flooding into Angola after Zaire, China, South Africa and the Americans became involved.[35].

In much the same vein, self-styled 'Africanists' such as Colin Legum, whose prolific writings on crises in the continent have become one of the most influential source-materials, have not altogether escaped the trap of such propaganda double talk about the roles and objectives of Western vis a vis the socialist powers. Thus, in his recent contribution to the 1980s Study Project on Africa, prepared under the auspices of the US Council on Foreign Relations, he found it, in the end necessary to extenuate the interventionary behaviour of Western powers in terms of Soviet 'adventurism':

Even if the major Western powers should wish to disengage from an interventionist roles in Africa, it is hard to see how their global interests will allow this to happen so long as the Soviets at least remain unwilling to match such Western disengagements.[36]

Legum's anti-Soviet sentiment undoubtedly in essence expresses the prevalent Western perceptions of Soviet policy in Africa. Further, it is clearly consistent with the
orthodox historiography of the cold war in which the United States and its allies are portrayed as simply reacting to Soviet machinations but never being the initiators. However, a contrary perspective is certainly plausible about most African 'flashpoints'. That the infatuation of the Euro-American bloc countries with preserving their economic and strategic dominance even through essentially Machiavellian means have only ensured Soviet leverage. As Arthur Gavshon explains with respect to Southern Africa:

A major Washington misjudgement was for years to arm and fund Portugal, fellow-member of North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), during the wars of liberation in the Lusitanian empire in Africa. This left the resistance movements with little option but to lean more and more on the east for help. Until Lisbon's authority collapsed, the Kissinger thesis that 'the whites' are here to stay in Southern Africa remained accepted wisdom in Washington. It was a basic blunder that contributed to the transformation of the political map of Sub-Saharan Africa.[37]

Judging from geopolitical preoccupations in the Reagan administration's policy toward Africa (which pays little—if contemptuous—regard to local realities), the costly blunder engendered by Kissinger's thesis is yet to be rectified. Indeed, the basic premise of Reagan's policy in Southern Africa, is based on the dubious assumption that there is little prospect of any successful revolutionary assault on the white laager. As one of the chief architects of the administration's policy—Chester Crocker—put it:
South African state is structured politically and organised militarily to withstand significant levels of unrest... The white minority possesses overwhelming firepower to sustain an administrative apparatus designed, if necessary, to break black organisation and seal off the black majority from the essentials of life.[38]

Hence, the rigmarole of 'constructive engagement' which in the words of Stephen Solarz, has been nothing but a 'rapprochement with racism.' In the final section of this chapter, I intend to examine in greater detail the responses of African states to unabated intra-regional conflicts and external linkages. While, as alluded earlier in the present chapter, diplomatic efforts have been an integral element in conflict resolution, among African states, particular attention will be paid here--in line with the overall thrust of the thesis--to military instruments of such statecraft.

c) Conflict Dynamics and Response: the Role of Military Power in the Foreign Policy of African States

African states--as earlier indicated--have been far from passive observers or victims of the events which unfold within and around them. On the contrary, the active diplomatic and military initiative of some state-actors in the continent has engendered a new and unprecedented dynamism in the regional environment. This is also a new direction which, as will be argued in the next chapter, reflects a greater willingness to integrate a 'realist' philosophy of statecraft into the nebulous pan-African ethos of 'good
neighbourliness.' On this view, the modest efforts of the OAU to resolve peacefully local conflicts do not necessarily reflect foreign policy failures of member governments. Rather, the benign disposition of many African states toward such regional vigilantism as that of Nyerere of Tanzania underscores the increasingly Clausewitzian persuasion (see Introduction) of African governments towards the use of military force: that 'war is nothing but a continuation of policy by other means' in Africa as elsewhere.

This developing thrust in the foreign policy posture of an increasing numbers of African states is readily visible in their efforts to enhance the operational capability of military forces and to rely on them in situations (domestic and external) which are unyielding to pacific strategies.[39] (See Table 2.4 and 2.5). It is also a tendency which, as noted by Henry Bienen and Claude Welch among others, transcends 'regime types' (e.g. the civilian-military and socialist-capitalist dichotomies), being instead the result of the prevailing rivalry in the continent. Such organisational task expansion of African military systems can readily be seen in the enormous military expenditures, increases in the number of men under arms, weapons imports (delivery systems) and debates about the initiation of nuclear programmes. For example, from 1950 to 1972 Africa as a whole imported major weapons to the value of $1.2 billion annually. By 1979,
however, continental tensions has pushed annual weapon costs up to .$15 billion (see Table 2.6).

The factors prompting and supporting this military expansion are varied and complex. Although their identification and analysis is beyond the scope of the present chapter (it would require a case-by-case study of state behaviour which linked actions and policies from the micro- to macro-levels of interactions over time), it should suffice to note that their roots and dynamics reside as much in regional instability as they are products of extra-continental geopolitical rivalry. The inevitable consequence of this regional/continental 'arms race' is the unprecedented and alarming scale in which increasing number of African states either resort to or threaten the use of military force to advance their respective interests and objectives, however defined, thereby further quickening the pace and level of escalation (see Appendix III). That is, while the correlation between arms-acquistion/weapon transfer and the outbreak of war in Africa cannot readily be said to be significant or positive (as critics of Richardson's school of thought have severally pointed out), it can, nevertheless, be argued that the rapid proliferation of highly sophisticated weapons in Africa may contribute to 'militaristic' tendencies and encourage some leaders of African states to think of military, rather than political means for resolving
intra-regional disputes.

Thus, like the major powers before them, an increasing number of African states now adopt vigilantist postures in regional disputes. Such postures involve direct military actions (Morocco, Libya, Zaire, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa), and indirect involvements in domestic strife by supporting rival factions to regimes in power. They are also acting, even more ominously, as important conduits for the financing and re-transfer of arms from extra-continental powers. As a result, the rate of the militarization of the continent has begun outstripping that of every other region outside the Middle East.

Concomitantly, African states are increasingly utilising military means in intra-regional and inter-state conflicts. In certain cases (as in Southern Africa) such responses (e.g. the commitment of the Front Line States to mutual defence) have become a precondition for national survival in the face of hostile challenge.[40] In other cases, they represent genuine efforts to counteract menacing external interventions in a civil order (e.g. Libya's response to imperial France in Chad) of a neighbouring state.

In this context, the application of military instrument in African foreign policy can be broadly divided into:

1. Regional vigilantism,
2. 'Subjective' security against regional pariahs: involving momentous levels of support for liberation movements.
in the Lusitanian empire and against albinocracies of Southern Africa;

iii. Collective security through peacekeeping, and

iv. Military force as the ultimate arbiter in interstate conflict involving divergent boundary claims and irredentist aspirations.

The first way in which the military has found expression in the policy of African states is through vigilantist activism. As defined by Rosenbaum and Sedenberg, vigilantism consists of:

Acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established socio-political order but intended by the violators to defend that order from some force of subversion... When individuals or groups identifying with the established order defend it by resorting to means in violation of these formal boundaries they can be usefully denominated as vigilantes.[41]

Under this definition, a number of responses by African states to systemic challenges can be so categorised. Regional vigilantism, for example, includes acts such as direct military intervention with the express purpose of either defending or overthrowing de facto government of a target state. Libya's intervention in Chad and Tanzania's incursion into Uganda fall under this category. Similarly, Morocco's role in the Shaba crises of March 1977 and May 1978, and Zaire's involvement in Chad (1982-1983) in support of Habre can also be considered acts of vigilantism. However, since the latter cases of intervention involved high-
level material (transport planes, financial offset, logistical support, etc) and diplomatic backing from extra-regional powers (notably, the United States, France and Belgium), they have been categorized as acts of proxy by some scholars that is, that they represent support for extra-continental interests cultivated for some African states' own immediate interests—Western Sahara (Morocco) and Shaba (Zaire).[42]

The second way (albeit indirect) in which military measures have been actively utilised by African states is as 'selective security.' This term selective security is preferred here to 'collective security.' The latter implies an arrangement whereby a community puts down any aggressor that might arise within its ranks. The former is designed for joint resistance to possible aggression stemming from a particular power, bloc or entity external to the community (e.g. NATO and WTO). While various proposals for a regional security system in Africa have so far not materialised (see Chapter Seven, section e) the relentless pursuit of a 'selective security' policy (through national liberation movements) against the remnants of Western colonialism in Southern Africa has preoccupied the OAU over the past couple of decades. During the struggles for the independence of Angola, for instance, African states acting in concert helped to legitimise Soviet-Cuban assistance to the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Current support for SWAPO, ANC and PAC by OAU states includes
military assistance—training, equipment, and logistics—and an active diplomatic front, which in the case of SWAPO has helped to counteract the high-handed attempt by the Reagan administration to gain international support (especially from NATO countries) for its anti-Cuban crusade.

The third recurrent way—and one with a potential for stabilisation—in which the military instrument has found expression in the policy of African states has been through the mechanism of peacekeeping. As noted in Chapter One, this involves a qualitatively different role for armed forces than the use of force entailed in the first two cases (vigilantism and selective security). Peacekeeping is essentially a 'utility in non-use' or what Dag Hammerskjold once termed preventive diplomacy, that is, a collective endeavour to isolate intra- and inter-state conflict (in Africa) from the nexus of cold war and regional animosities, while buying time for the conflict to be settled through peaceful mediation.[43]

In this respect, the recent Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (IAF) in Chad represents the first collective attempt at 'preventive diplomacy' by African states outside the framework of the United Nations. However, while untoward developments in Chad forced the evacuation of this multinational peacekeeping force, it will continue to be a subject of considerable debate about whether such an enervating experience constitutes a failure on the part of the OAU.[44]
Two observations are, nevertheless, apposite. First, the experience of the IAF raises a crucial question about the advisability of peacekeeping in an essentially praetorian condition (a highly fractionalized and violently politicized social order). As the experience of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has demonstrated, such a domestic order is anything but conducive to conflict-control procedures (negotiation, mediation, adjudication and enforcement actions) involved in peacekeeping operations. And second, the horrendous financial, administrative and logistical problems which confronted IAF in Chad raise the question of the readiness of African states for the taxing and complex operations involved in peacekeeping. For instance, logistical support for a peacekeeping mission can be a nightmare. It involves a wide-ranging expertise, encompassing the broad spectrum of engineering, medical, repair and maintenance, communications, transportation (including air transportation) and supplies.

Severe shortages of expertise in areas covered by this logistical spectrum in African states are widely conceded. However, as most commentators have noted, while such expertise does not necessarily remain outside the competence of African militaries, the question of political will of OAU members in support of peacekeeping remains doubtful. Indeed, it may be argued that IAF was more a collection of peace-
keeping forces, (an ad hoc arrangement with narrowly defined standards) rather than a collective effort (an integrated force with commitment less subject to independent national interpretations). Nevertheless, in operational terms, the debacle in Chad sets a controversial precedent which future OAU decisions concerning peacekeeping cannot ignore. As the former GOC of UNIFIL, Major-General Emmanuel Erskine commented. "It is encouraging that the OAU decided to go to Chad...If it fails because of mistakes, we will have to learn from them, why it failed and make the next peacekeeping mission better. It is better to attempt and fail than to do nothing."[46]

Finally, fourth, the expressive use of military power in the foreign policy of African states, has found its clearest manifestation as the ultimate arbiter in the resolution of inter-state conflict involving divergent boundary claims and irredentist aspirations. Perhaps the most graphic example here is the unresolved crisis in the Horn of Africa which has intermittently pitched Ethiopia against Somalia since the late-1970s. In recent months (sensitized no doubt by the incident along its borders with the Cameroon) the Nigerian government has acted with unusual swiftness to dislodge by military means the Chadian soldiers who occupied two islands in Lake Chad legally (under the tripartite settlement of 1976) within Nigeria's territorial water (See Chapter Four, section b).[47]
Conclusion

Given the intractability of factors which generate and fuel conflict and confrontation in the African regional sub-system (delineated above) and the potentiality for the internationalisation of these conflicts, the manifest use of military force as an instrument of statecraft by African policy-makers is bound to increase exponentially, especially as the age of detente is shading into a new era of cold war at the global level. This, however, is not to suggest that some of the salutory restraining factors—which, as noted in the preceding chapter, have engendered a major, if not dramatic, permutation in the conception of international war and in the utility of military force—do not apply to the African condition (as Adda Bozeman, among others, have argued). Indeed, there is reason to believe that African governments and elites have a genuine commitment to the notion of 'diminished legitimacy of war.' Such a notion is implicit in the ideals of Pan-Africanism; and has to some extent found institutional expression in the OAU, which has been instrumental on a number of occasions—via leading African statesmen—in bringing about a speedy termination of intra- and inter-state conflict.[48]

This notwithstanding, contemporary African governments do not seem to lack incentives (for defensive or offensive reasons) to consider force or to be militarily prepared for
executing that option. Several conditions peculiar to African states (as well as other Third World countries in general) fail either to restrain resort to military force or positively favour the generation of interstate conflict. Most African states are economically and technologically underdeveloped and hence untouched by some of the conditions which operate to deflate the value of war in the more industrialised societies (see the preceding chapter). As structures of quite recent origin (with the exception of a negligible few), endowed with potentially troublesome colonial boundaries, many African states may be said to confront today the sort of problems that preoccupied the states of Europe between 1750 and 1950. Furthermore, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out in his institutionalisation theory, their political and civil institutions (especially the conflict-resolving mechanisms) are still in the process of stabilisation or perfection. As a result, they seldom withstand the explosive discharges engendered by the breakdown of civil order (e.g. Nigeria, 1966-1970).[49]

In terms of future trends, therefore, four major issue-areas capable of generating the decision to go to war can still be abstracted as of crucial importance. First, there is the colonial legacy of arbitrary borders which, apart from major conflicts in Western Sahara and the Ogaden, have also drawn Nigeria into a menacing defence posture against
its neighbours (Benin, Cameroon and Chad).

Second, sometimes overlapping with the first, is the protection or liberation of ethnically-related peoples; that is, ethno-national reunification or irredentism. Third, apparently the one most productive of external intervention in the continent today, is the remnant of western colonialism in Africa: the racist albinocracy of South Africa and its unflagging hold on Namibia. And fourth, the final issue is intervention in civil strife, to either support or combat incumbent regimes. Libya's unabated involvement in Chad and Zaire's show of force in support of Habré's faction there are both bound to raise the prospect of intra-regional competition to influence outcomes in the domestic power struggle.

Tentatively, in the foreseeable future, as some African countries settle their domestic problems of authority and internecine conflicts to devote themselves to vital continental issues commanding some degree of consensus, the related problems of Namibian independence and settler colonialism in South Africa will top their agendas. Since the challenges posed for OAU Africa by the racist Afrikaner regime in South Africa cannot be confronted without adequate cognizance of the configuration of powerful extracontinental interests that help sustain it, the African states—especially those in Southern Africa—may have little
choice but to play the 'Soviet Card' to ensure eventual resolution of the conflict (see Chapter Seven).

Moving from global (Chapter One) and regional levels, the next chapter considers the particular Nigerian definition of the role of military power in foreign policy. It focuses on the theoretical parameters of strategic thinking in the Nigerian context, as an immediate framework for the empirical chapters to follow. Critical consideration will, therefore, be paid 1) to the military or security environment of Nigeria (both the physical geography and the balance of forces between Nigeria and its potential adversaries), as a determinant of security policy and defence needs, and 2) to the perceptions and dispositions of its policy-makers towards the use of force in the post-independence era. As such the chapter brings together regional (and global) question in a national context and so relates comparative and international issues to foreign policy and defence strategy in one state: Nigeria.
### TABLE 2.1

**African Production and Resources of Certain Raw Materials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>% of World Production (1974)</th>
<th>% of World Resources[a]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>South Africa (22%), Morocco (3%)</td>
<td>South Africa (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>Guinea (8%), Other (1%)</td>
<td>Guinea (26%); Cameroon (4%); Ghana (2%)[b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>South Africa (26%), Zimbabwe (8%); Madagascar (2%)</td>
<td>South Africa (71%); Zimbabwe (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt</td>
<td>Zaire (58%), Zambia (10%)</td>
<td>Zaire (18%), Zambia (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbium</td>
<td>Nigeria (6%)</td>
<td>Zaire (3%); Kenya (3%); Uganda (2%); Nigeria (2%); Other (2%)[b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>South Africa (61%), Ghana (2%)</td>
<td>South Africa (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>South Africa (41%); Gabon (10%); Other (4%)</td>
<td>South Africa (42%); Gabon (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>Nigeria (4%); Libya (3%); Algeria (2%); Other (1%)</td>
<td>Libya (4%); Nigeria (2%); Algeria (2%); Other (1%)[b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum</td>
<td>South Africa (49%)</td>
<td>South Africa (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>South Africa (14%); Niger (5%); Gabon (3%)</td>
<td>South Africa (16%); Niger (2%); Other (2%)[d]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>South Africa (46%)</td>
<td>South Africa (32%)[c]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2.1

[a] Resources are known deposits, whether economical or not at current prices and technology. Reserves are that portion of resources recoverable under present conditions.

[b] Reserves only.

[c] Production and resource figures for South Africa include Namibia (Southwest Africa).

[d] Figures exclude U.S.S.R.


TABLE 2.2
Some Foreign Military Bases in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Bases</th>
<th>Location Description</th>
<th>Installation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Port-Boet in Abidjan sub-burbs, Ivory Coast</td>
<td>air force facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>military facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>military facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>naval and air facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>multi-purpose use possibly including missile trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>military facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>communications facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>RAF Electronic/communication facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. A.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>pre-positioning of military materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>pre-positioning of military materials/military exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>military/communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>pre-positioning of military materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Owing Base</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Installation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>It is not confirmed if Soviet involvement in Ethiopia has led to the development of a military base in that country.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shaba area in Zaire</td>
<td>missile testing/communication facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENUE</td>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>INTERVENER</td>
<td>ORIENTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>pro-FNLA, UNITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rep of South Africa</td>
<td>pro-FNLA, UNITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba (with Soviet support)</td>
<td>pro-MPLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>pro-Zaïrean govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>pro-Zaïrean govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>pro-Zaïrean govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>pro-Zaïrean govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Horn</td>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>pro-WSLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>pro-Ethiopian govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>pro-Ethiopian govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>pro-Ethiopian govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>Polisario</td>
<td>anti-govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>pro-Mauritanian govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>pro-Chadian govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>pro-Acyl Ahmat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>pro-Ugandan govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>anti-Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>anti-govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>anti-govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>anti-govt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
### TABLE 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VENUE</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>INTERVENER</th>
<th>ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Rep. of South Africa</td>
<td>Destabilization, pro-MRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Pro-Goukouni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Pro-SSDF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Cuban troops remain in Angola, while South African incursions persist.

2. Abbreviations FNLA—Frente de Libertacao Nacional de Angola, UNITA—Uniao para e Independencia Total de Angola; MPLA—Movimento Popular di Libertacao de Angola, WSLF—Western Somali Liberation Front, Polisario—Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamr and Rio de Oro, OAU—Organization of African Unity; SSDF—Somali Salvation Democratic Front.

3. Since the FLNC (Front de Liberation Nationale Congolaise) apparently acted independently, and is comprised of Zairois, it is not listed as an intervener.

4. Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara is not listed as an intervention, as King Hassan was not intruding on one side or another of an internal dispute. His intent was not to affect the internal politics, such as they were, of the former Spanish Sahara, but to extinguish them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>625 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>261 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 (1977), 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde Island</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32 (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1215 (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equ. Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1100 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>2118</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42 (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>460 (1978)</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>120 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome, e Principe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
TABLE 2.4  

Arms Imports of African States, 1970-9 ($million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>Peak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>170 (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>204 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>171 (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22 (1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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TABLE 2.5

Size of Armed Forces in African States

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### Size of Armed Forces in African States

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1. Expenditures are in 1978 constant dollars.

2. GE=Central Government Expenditure.

NOTES


3. This is so because, as Phillips and Brams, among others, have suggested, in conflict interaction, different level attributes (e.g. individual, governmental, national, international, etc) relate to different behaviour at any other level. See W. Phillips, "The dynamics of behavioural action and reaction in international conflict" Peace Research Society Papers 17, 1971, pp. 31-46, and S. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System" in J. Rosenau (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1969).


13. Ibid., p. 3-5.


(Moscow: Nauka, 1968), and E. T. Tarabrin, The New Scramble for Africa (Moscow: Progress, 1974).


24. See J. D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", in Klaus Knorr and Sydney Verba (eds.) The International System: Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92. While Singer recognizes the importance of studies that integrate all levels of analysis, he explicitly cautions against moving from one level of analysis to another in a single research endeavour, "We may" he writes, "use one level of analysis here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study." (p. 90). This perspective is rejected here as unnecessarily delimiting.

25. Alternative methods are: i) chronological approach (an examination of regional conflicts occurring since independence), and ii) functional approach (an examination of a set of security issues--e.g. sovereignty, stability, solidarity, etc--that confront most African states. Both approaches share serious shortcomings in terms of explanatory and predictive relevance. Although they provide a 'degree of insight into the causes of conflict and would identify principal regional actors,' as bases for generalisations on the regional and extra-continental levels of conflict behaviour in Africa, the two approaches are arguably wanting. See John Collins, Foreign Conflict Behaviour and Domestic Disorder in Africa Eastern African Studies IV, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, October 1971.


30. Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or not to Intervene", *Foreign Affairs*, 45, 3 (April 1976) p. 425.'


33. See Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa*.


(Spring 1984), pp. 152-175, and Robert S. Jaster, 
A Regional Security, Rolé for Africa's Front-Line States 
experience and prospects, Adelphi Papers, No. 180, 

41. H. Rosenbaum and P. Sedenberg (eds.) Vigilantism 
application of this concept to conflict in Africa, see 
Ali Mazrui, The African Condition (London Heinemann, 
1980), Chapter 3.

42. See, for instance, Bassey Ata, "France in Central 
Africa - The NATO Dimension and Implication for Nigeria" 
Nigerian Forum, 1, 6 (August 1981), pp. 227-235. T. A 
Imobighe, "African Defence and Security: an overview" 
Nigerian Forum 1, 2, (April 1981), pp. 66-71, and 
Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa" Review 
of Political Economy, 24 (May-August 1982), pp. 55-84.

43. The use of this term is far from uniform in the litera­
ture. Leon Gordenker, for example, identifies preven­
tive diplomacy with independent diplomatic or political 
initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General or his 
representatives to forestall the worsening of inter­
national friction and to keep it off the agendas of 
other United Nations organs where it might become a 
cold war issue. Thus, he appears to exclude the field 
operation improvised for the Suez and subsequent crises. 
See L. Gordenker, The UN Secretary General and the 
Maintenance of Peace (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 
1967), pp. 76, 152. For a profound and comprehensive 
analysis of the concept of preventive diplomacy, see 
Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (N.Y.: Random 

44. See Michael Collins Dunn, "Chad: The OAU Tries Peace-
keeping", The Washington Quarterly 5, 4, (Autumn 1982), 
pp. 174-181; Col. Magoro, "Nigeria's Peace-Keeping 
Role in Chad", paper presented at the seminar on 
Nigeria and peacekeeping in Africa held in Kano in May 
1980, and Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, 

45. The peacekeeping effort had been preceded and followed 
by informal mediation by some OAU Heads of Government 
(see Appendix III).

46. Major General Emmanuel Erskine, "African Peacekeeping: 
best way to stabilise continents", Africa Now, May 
1982, p. 81.
47. See the July 1983 issues of Africa and the New African magazines (London). An appraisal of the vexing boundary problems which have bedevilled Nigeria's peaceful relations with its neighbours in recent years has been given in a special edition of the Nigerian Forum, Vol. I, No. 7 & 8, September/October 1981, pp. 7.


CHAPTER THREE

The Conception of Military Power in Nigerian Foreign Policy

It is understandable why it should be assumed so readily that a quest for security must necessarily translate itself into a quest for coercive power. Since security is being sought against external violence—coupled perhaps with internal subversive violence—it seems plausible at first sight that the response should consist in an accumulation of the same kind of force for the purpose of resisting an attack or of defeating a would-be attacker.

Arnold Wolfers[1]

Statesmen use war or the threat of war as an instrument of statecraft because they expect political utility from its employment. It is political utility precisely because resort to force is an allocative mechanism, because it is a major, though by no means the only basis on which the competition of states for various objects of value is settled...The aim of conflict resolution is to accommodate, formally or informally, the national wills and interests in a particular international conflict, and military force is a form of power that sustains will.

Klaus Knorr[2]

The basic analytical premise (and, indeed, the fundamental theoretical assumption) underlying the preceding discourse in the first two chapters has been that in a society of 'sovereign' states, a government can in the last resort vindicate its interpretation of justice or defend the 'vital interests' of its state only by the willingness to employ
force. Thus, as historical developments since the emergence of the modern state-system have proven, the phenomenon of coercive power has become the kingpin of the inter-state power structure because 'there is normally no remedy against force except equal or superior counterforce.'[3] Indeed, as argued in the opening chapter (section c), when unrestrained by political, legal, or normative considerations or, more often, by limited geographic reach, military power has tended to dominate other means of coercion.

On this view, Chapter One dwells on the overall global dynamics of military force as an instrument of statecraft: its nature, structure and mushrooming manifestations with the expansion of the national state system in the wake of decolonisation. It argues that despite the incontestable alteration in relevant parameters (albeit, unevenly distributed globally) and profound arguments to the contrary (the 'modernist' thesis), the use and usability of military force remains one of the most distinctive features of contemporary international order.

This conclusion also seems at one and the same time to be the most profound inference to be drawn from a survey of contemporary African experience (Chapter Two) and constitutes the basic supposition upon which an interpretation of African history can be constructed.[4] Chapter Two, thus represents a second level explanation and projection: a
subsystemic derivative of a global phenomenon and process.

The present chapter represents a third level (national), definition and explanation of this basic theme: the instrumental role of military power in African inter-state relations. It focuses on the theoretical parameter of strategic thinking in the Nigerian context as framework for the empirical chapters that follow. Judicious consideration will be paid, therefore, to i) the salience of Nigeria's military power as instrument of security and crisis management, ii) the internal and external determinants of the use of military force in Nigeria's foreign policy and iii) the perceptions and dispositions of its policymakers towards the use of force in the post-independence era. These considerations in general involve a critical examination of the specific functions, motives and determinants, as well as the dynamics, of military power in Nigerian foreign policy in the past couple of decades.

a) Nigerian Military as Instrument: security and crisis management

The complex relationship between the imperatives of national security, crisis management and military power, as argued in the opening chapter, stems primarily from the pervasive view that the international system—as a threat system—is anarchical. Thus military force constitutes the ultimate basis of 'diplomacy and of all contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of state.'[5] In this regard, the
expansion of national military power has been considered by most governments as indispensable to the preservation of the basic values on which their survival as socio-political entities rest (national security). Similarly, in terms of crisis management, considerations of military power have acted as counters in diplomatic bargaining so that in any serious dispute, diplomacy becomes a 'trial of influence and strength, including military strength even though it is also a test of wits and skill.'[6]

Both these 'issue-areas'--security and crisis management--are inextricably linked. On the one hand, since crisis management (or crisis diplomacy as some analysts prefer to call it) is by definition concerned with 'the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war,'[7] it paradoxically does contribute to the preservation of those values from which states' security policy derive their raison d'etre. On the other hand, by enhancing the defence component in foreign policy (military power), security policy provides leverage for policy-makers in crisis management.

This consideration notwithstanding, the 'power-security' hypothesis—which views capacity for armed coercion as the unalterable underpinning of contemporary international system—has definite limits in both theory and praxis, as the debate between the 'realists' and 'modernists' suggests
(see Chapter One, section b). This is all the more so since in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives (security or otherwise) statesmen often employ a combination of different means, both military and non-military. Nevertheless, in specific historical circumstances in which the military instrument has tended to dominate policy responses (as those noted in Chapters One and Two), the choice in every instance depends on a multitude of factors, including ideological and normative convictions, expectations concerning the psychological and political developments in the camp of the opponent, socio-economic factors and inclinations of individual policymakers. [8]

Translated into the African situation in general and the Nigerian context in particular, any consideration of military power as an instrument of security and crisis management is hampered by three ambiguities and two unknowns. The ambiguities concern the very notions of 'military power', 'security', and 'crisis management' as they apply to Nigeria in existing and likely conditions. The unknowns are: 1) the changing phases and postures of Nigeria in the African regional subsystem (see Chapter Seven, section b) and ii) the state of the international system in a future sufficiently close to make it relevant for present-day planning and sufficiently remote to allow for the crystallisation and implementation of new approaches and policies. [9]
First, then, the notion of 'military power' in the Nigerian context. The general definition of this term has been provided in the introduction but to advance comprehension here, some conceptual distinctions have to be made. Analytically, the phenomenon of power lends itself to two sharply different conceptions—putative and actualized military power. In the first conception, power can be seen to reside in the capabilities which permit the power to be effective (that is, in the armies, navies, and airforces that a state actor can hope to bring into play as means in a wide range of future situations). In the second conception, power can be seen to reside in, and be limited to, influence over the behavior of another actor in an interaction that is an 'encounter.' In this respect, military power, like economic power is relational and specific: it exists only in relation to other states in particular situations.

However, these two conceptions of military power although analytically distinct are in reality complementary. Actualized military power—an effect—results in large part from putative military power (quantified in terms of size, professionalism and striking power). Conversely, the effectiveness of the latter can be computed only in terms of an interaction-encounter—i.e. through war or the threat of war—or as a counter in diplomatic bargaining.

Viewed within this analytical matrix, the notion of
military power is both at once apposite and a misnomer in the Nigerian context. It is apposite when viewed in its immediate strategic or military environment--West Africa. Yet it is a misnomer when considered in the broader context of the African subsystem (for example, against such regional actors as Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco and South Africa). Indeed, it is an anachronism in the 'Third World' context; that is, when compared with the level of indigenous development of military technological potential and projectable power of countries such as Brazil, India and Israel (see Chapter Five). In putative military terms (that is, strength and potential), the Nigerian military establishment undoubtedly dwarfs that of her immediate neighbours, as, indeed, the rest of black Africa. However, the extent to which this putative military power can be translated into coercive influence (especially in terms of deterring provocative violation of its territorial integrity by Chad, Cameroun and Republique de Benin or of influencing domestic upheavals, as in Chad) is patently limited.

In the first place, the vertical defence pacts these states continue to maintain with extra-regional powers such as France, impose serious constraints on Nigeria's manoeuvrability in West Africa and 'impedes its natural emergence as a regional power.' Reviews of France's policy in West Africa since the 1950s support this conclusion.[11]
In the second place, the extent to which Nigeria's putative military can be translated into coercive influence against its smaller and weaker neighbours is constrained by: i) the inevitable hostile backlash against its carefully constructed strategy of 're-Africanising' francophone West Africa, and ii) the general likelihood in the event of war of massive (albeit indirect) intervention by regional actors such as South Africa interested in humiliating and curbing Nigeria's influence in black Africa[12] (see Chapter Seven, section a).

The uneasiness of consecutive Nigerian governments since independence about its potentially troublesome military environment partly accounts, perhaps, for their disinclination towards a policy of vigilantism compared, for instance, with Libya and Tanzania (see Chapter Two, section c). This has been so in spite of enormous public pressure on two different Nigerian administrations—the military government under Gowon and the civilian administration under Shagari—to initiate military action against Equatorial Guinea and the Cameroun, respectively. The former case was particularly tempting, since the section of the Equatorial Guinea involved—the island of Fernando Po—is of preeminent strategic interest to Nigeria.[13]

In sum, although the 'notion of military power' in the Nigerian context may be considered a misnomer (indeed an
anachronism) in the outermost of the 'three concentric circles' within which its security policy must operate, (see Chapter Six) it remains relevant in the immediate West African sub-zone—that is, the innermost of the three circles. However, Nigeria's ability to translate its putative military power into coercive influence even against the intermittent provocation of its neighbours has been substantially limited, first, by the possibility of extraregional military intervention, and second, by its self-imposed restraint, given, as the former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo put it, the dangerous precedent (in terms of conflict spirals in Africa) such a policy of retribution could set. Thus, as Nelson notes, 'these facts of relative weakness and strength have been a central influence on national security perceptions and policies since independence from Britain in 1960.'[14]

The second ambiguity in translating the 'power-security' hypothesis into the Nigerian context concerns the notion of security as applied to it in existing and likely conditions. As an analytical category in international studies the concept security has been problematic at best. The reason lies, first, in its ambiguity—both in its objective and subjective content—and second, in the demonstrable fact that as a defence and foreign policy goal, security is, in the words of Bernard Brodie, 'an infinitely expansible
concept': an ideology which legitimates a number of crucial trends in the post-World War II order.[15]

In traditional terms, security is often equated with the defence of the state against internal and external threats to its basic values. These include 'core' values, which are near constant and few in number, such as survival of the society and its population, political sovereignty, and territorial independence. A second value dimension is context-specific 'high-priority' values; these derive from ideologi-cal and/or material interests as defined by decision-makers at the time of a particular crisis (e.g. Nigeria's role in the struggle for liberation of Angola and Zimbabwe as an expression of its Pan-African ideals). Core values, by contrast, are shared by changing regimes and decision-making groups, as well as by attentive and mass publics, of the state under inquiry. In this respect, it is instructive to compare the conceptions of Nigeria's national interests articulated by two radically different administrations: the conservative, pro-Western Balewa civilian government of the first Republic (1960-66) and the dynamic, Afro-centric Mohammed-Obasanjo military government.[16]

However, although traditionally associated with the protection of this 'irreducible minimum' (to use Hans Morgenthau's phrase) of a state's interests vis-a-vis other
units and forces, the debate about the idiom of national security takes on a further dimension (and often becomes confused in the process) when the argumentation shifts from strategic premises to the interdisciplinary matrix of political and military sociology. The level of debate can be transformed from one focusing broadly on the conceptual assumptions regarding the conceptions of 'national security' concerns (involving abstract national goals, purposes, and priorities) to one focusing on the objects of security (that is, who or what is actually to be secured or preserved). In this context, three basic interrelated questions about security in Africa in general, and in Nigeria in particular, which seek to differentiate alternative levels and targets/objects of security have been posited in the literature.[17]

While these operational distinctions raise profound questions and cannot be dismissed lightly (given the prevailing conditions and realities in the continent. See Chapter Two), their theoretical import or relevance is pre-eminently methodological (in this case, the mode of analysis) rather than epistemological (substantive content or meaning). In other words, their relevance borders on the logical and methodological problems of devising/focusing on different questions about the same phenomenon (variation on the same theme), and seeking or adopting alternate or different analytical perspectives/approaches on the issue.
Furthermore, participants in security debates often tend to define issues in terms that are compatible with their academic orientation, ideological biases and/or organisational or partisan perspective. Recognition of the idiom in which security issues are cast and of the distinctive subcultures associated with participants to such debates helps analysts of security affairs gain insight into the dynamics of the security process and decisional outputs.

In keeping with the overall thrust of this dissertation, the position taken here is consistent with the mainstream of analytical assumptions in strategic studies. It recognises that different disciplines proceed from or enshrine a certain set of 'givens.' In these terms, strategic studies—or more appropriately the strategic paradigm—encompass certain 'givens': i) a legal entity—the state—as a unit of analysis, ii) an authoritative embodiment—the government—responsible for allocation of values both within and between it and other governments, iii) a 'threat' or 'anarchical' system—the nation-state system, and iv) a military power as the kingpin of the interstate power structure.

In the light of these characteristics, for the strategist and defence planner the question 'What is a state?' for instance, ceases to be a first order question and becomes a locational and conceptual question (a 'where' and 'how')
States are seen as 'authority structures', or 'gateways' mediating challenges, through a national sovereignty which functions so as to admit and domesticate certain forces, and to exclude other forces by strategies of rejection that entail legitimate violent sanctions.[18] It is in this domain of state sovereignty that the logic of war as politics finds its provenance.

Given this basic premise, the notion of security—from the standpoint of the 'disciplinary' matrix of strategy—measures, in an objective sense, 'the absence of threats to acquired values' of state and, in a subjective sense, 'the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.'[19] Thus in some ways security can be defined or computed by the threats which challenge it. As a consequence, the security policy of a state may be seen as 'that set of decisions and actions taken by a government to preserve or create an internal and external order congenial to its interests and values primarily (although not exclusively) through the threat or use of force.'[20]

There are, however, two major problems with this definition. First, just as it is a well-known fact that state governments differ widely in their assumptions about the international system and threat perception, it is also a demonstrable fact that groups within the same polity (especially in plural or segmented societies such as Nigeria)
may react differently to one and the same external situation. Hence, it would be simplistic to think of security policy only as a singular national policy, for it can also be a class or clique policy, since the values pursued in the external environment depend on the interests of those who have political influence.[21]

Second, defining threats to national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys, as Richard Ullman observes, 'a profoundly false image of reality.'[22] On the one hand, it compels or induces policy-makers to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers, that is, the non-military threats—economic, political and social—that promise to undermine the stability of many states (especially the LDCs) during the years ahead. On the other hand, it contributes to a pervasive militarisation of global and regional systems that in the long-run can only increase global insecurity. In these essential respects, the definition of threats to states' security in purely military terms may be considered dysfunctional, as it reduces their 'total security.'

It is on these and preceding considerations that contemporary 'strategic reformers' (to use John Lovell's category),[23] such as Richard Barnett and his associates at the Institute for Policy Studies, have argued that current security problems in international relations should now be
viewed as political issues set in a wider context of social relations between societies. This is so they contend because the setting of social relationships—including economics, technology, and human geography—shape the terms and parameters of states' security. Hence their call for an 'expanded agenda' of national security policy:

Security relations... must be understood in wider and subtler terms than the crude employment of violence... It requires the integration of military, economic, and political factors, not an approach that presumes the independence of these factors in shaping the exterior behaviour of other states.[24]

What this 'expanded agenda' of national security implies for most African states, including Nigeria, is that traditional conceptions of security discussed above—whether of the dominant 'realist' (state-centric) variant or of the alternative 'idealist' (system-centric) approach—represent what Mohammed Ayoob has termed the 'symptomatic level of the question.'[25] That is, in the Nigerian context, such traditional (preeminently 'Western') notions of security are merely reflective of the symptoms of much deeper or profound contradictions and problems in the African subsystem. The first of these concern the history and nature of the state formation (super- as well as substructural forms) in Africa as compared, for instance, to its counterpart in the West. And the second relates to the 'pattern of elite recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance' in Africa as com-
pared to the same processes in the developed states.[26]

Within such a context, critical consideration will have to be given to a spectrum of factors (both military and non-military, internal and external) in the determination, formulation and implementation of security policies of African states. In the Nigerian case, these entail, *inter alia*, addressing a complex set of interrelated issues in policy formulation and planning:

1) **social and economic questions of mass poverty and underdevelopment**, that is, the domestic (especially the divisive dynamics of elite-mass interests) and external factors generating economic dependence and underdevelopment;

2) **the mode of national integration**: designing a political framework which mitigates the problem of 'unequal citizenship' between dominant and minor ethnic groups. Such a political system (e.g., the multi-state federalism in Nigeria, from 1967) may help deflate fissiparous tendencies toward secession in many African countries (as currently the case in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Zaire's Shaba province) and arrest the threat to national security;

3) **interventionary diplomacy**, either individually (e.g., Nigeria's effort in Chad in the late 1970s) or collectively (through the OAU), to minimise and contain intra- and inter-state conflicts which spur the current arms race in the region and open new opportunities for foreign intervention and penetration through arms transfer (see Chapter Two, section b and c);

4) **intervention by extra-regional powers and forces** (especially mercenaries). Measures to be considered in this
category may entail decoupling African
defence and economic systems from
foreign entanglements, through viable
strategies of collective self-reliance
as the OAU Lagos Plan of Action
urges. [27] This in turn inevitably
involves terminating base rights and
facilities for extra-regional actors
and concentrating instead on functional
cooporation in intra-African defence
exchanges and partnerships rather than
on vertical alignments with foreign
military blocs. (See Chapter Seven)
and,

v) taking serious cognizance of South
Africa's strategy for survival: Its
destabilisation policy against the
'Front Line States' and its inexorable
tendency to exploit domestic
instability (e.g. the Nigerian civil
war) and interstate conflict in Africa
to its advantage. The threat posed
by South Africa to the rest of Africa
is, as Luckham notes, both unique
within the continent and also part of
the broader geopolitical imperatives
discussed in Chapter Two. It is
unique in that 'there is a permanent
threat from a state and military system
physically located on the African
continent itself; and that the threat
arises out of the irreconcilable anti­
gonisms inherent in the racist nature
of the South African economy and State.
And it is part of broader geopolitical
imperatives 'because of the special
relationship of South Africa to Western
capitalism, including the role of gold
in the international financial system,
the large Western investments in South
Africa and its mineral production.[28]
The security of any African state
(particularly Nigeria) cannot, afford
to ignore the commanding nature and
structure of the threat posed by the
South African Reich (see Chapter Seven,
section a).

The third ambiguity in relating the 'realist' hypo-
thesis regarding military power to the Nigerian context
concerns the notions of 'crisis-management.' While the general role-conception of Nigeria's military power as an instrument of security has raised (as discussed above) serious conceptual and substantive problems, its use and usability in crisis management is even more controversial. Part of the problem lies in the very nature of the crisis situation: it is 'intractable and far from amenable to precise manipulation and control.'[29] Further explanation for the lack of consensus may be found in the problem of diverging perspectives on the utility of military power as instrument of prevalence in situations that threaten the high-priority goals of a state. Yet, if 'manipulation and control' through the threat of force are central to crisis diplomacy (as most strategists contend),[30] then it is difficult to see how the leverage offered by coercion can be neglected in crisis resolution (see the next chapter).

As generally understood here, a 'crisis' may be thought of as 'an unstable sequence of interactions, of tacit or explicit bargaining moves, at an intense level of confrontation that increases the probability of international violence.'[31] Seen in the broad context of this definition, crisis management or crisis diplomacy is thus concerned:

On the one hand, with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected. The second aspect will almost
Invariably necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial risks. One task of crisis management, therefore, is to temper these risks, to keep them as low and as controllable as possible, while the other is to ensure that the coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective as possible in gaining concessions from the adversary and maintaining one's own position relatively intact. [32]

As generally implied in this quotation, central to the process of crisis management is the 'manipulation of risk' through the threat of military action as counter in diplomatic bargaining. Such consideration of military power is generally at the core of crisis diplomacy since, as Knorr explains: 'the aim of conflict resolution is to accommodate, formally or informally, the national wills and interests in a particular international conflict; and military force is a form of power that sustains will.' [33]

In a conflict between unequal actors—such as between Nigeria and its immediate neighbours—the threat to resort to force by the superior power constitutes one of the most potent weapons in the resolution of crisis. As Harold Nelson has noted about Nigeria 'the task of defending itself against external aggression has always been made easier by the fact that the country is surrounded by much smaller and weaker neighbours reluctant to bring their disputes with Nigeria to a more than occasional border skirmishes.' [34] That these 'skirmishes' have been extremely infrequent compared, for instance, with the incendiary nature of Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours, is largely attributable to
anticipation among Nigeria's immediate neighbours that it may resort to military strength in a serious conflict. Thus, to conclude in this instance that if the exercise of power requires 'manifest intention' then this mechanism allows the strong state (in this case Nigeria) to 'enjoy the fruit of power without deliberately wielding it.'

In a crisis (e.g. the Nigerian-Cameroun crisis of May 1981) the manipulation of military threat is often calculated to engender a change in an adversary's perceptions as the crisis proceeds, and so to produce a 'kind of quick learning process through which risks and resolve are reevaluated.'[35]

The threat itself may be substantive (that is, specific and precise such as an ultimatum) or inferential (vague and implicit).[36] As will be seen in the next chapter, the Nigerian posture during the border conflict with Cameroun involved threat of the former category, backed by troop deployment on massive scale. It was a prima facie case of coercive influence resulting from asymmetries in the military capabilities of the actors involved. Such a manifest case of 'negative sanction' involving threat of military reprisal, as some Nigerian defence analysts have been quick to assert, may have had a sobering impact on neighbouring states to the North and West. In other words, Nigeria's successful employment of a threat of military action (against Cameroun in May 1981) may in the short-term have averted similar
provocation from armed forces of neighbouring countries and so enhanced Nigeria's reputation for readiness to resort to coercion when vital security interests are at stake.

In addition, to be analysed in Chapter Four under the rubric of crisis management, there are also those instances of 'crises of domestic political consensus' in which the Nigerian military acted as a stabilizing force through peacekeeping. This was the case in the Congo (now Zaire), as part of the United Nations Force (1960-1963); in Tanzania (1964), in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL (1978-1983); and in Chad (1979 and 1981 to 1982). Such experiments in crisis diplomacy involved the introduction of a contingent of Nigerian troops (independently or as part of an international force) into trouble spots to stabilise and isolate an exploding military situation until the bases of a more durable settlement could be established. The primary logic of crisis management in this respect, therefore, is to provide the disputing parties with a buffer zone behind which it is hoped they will negotiate.

However, as will be argued below, such an interventionary response in crisis management by multilateral agencies often tends to undermine the real value of negotiation, since the sense of urgency which might otherwise have led the parties to a negotiated settlement no longer exists. In the Congo, Lebanon and Chad, the combatants utilised the
interim to reorganize and augment their firepower in preparation for inevitable showdowns. Nevertheless, such experiences in crisis management involving 'preventive diplomacy' do not in themselves negate the imperative of peacekeeping in conflict resolution. They only highlight the limited extent to which the contemporary international system will accommodate such initiatives.[37]

This, in a nutshell, is the root of the intractable problems that bedevil 'preventive diplomacy as an approach to peace,' which is invariably exacerbated in a domestic context (such as in the Congo; Lebanon and Chad) by the existence of unrestrained and mutually hostile sub-national factions bent on achieving parochial goals through the force of arms.

In the final analysis, judging from the experience of UN endeavours in this field, it may be hypothesized that some conflicts are manageable in the immediate term or future, and others are not. The empirical evidence for this is that some of the peace-keeping operations undertaken in the past twenty-four years (such as the ONUC, 1960-1963, and UNTEA, 1962) can be considered as successfully concluded, the causes of the conflict having been contained at the time. Others can be said to have led to either temporary settlement (UNIPOM, 1965) or to stabilization of the status quo (UNMOGIP, UNYOM, and UNFICYP). But as Inis Claude aptly
concludes: the value of peacekeeping 'lay more in its preventive than in its therapeutic action. It can help to keep the peace so long as the contending parties are prepared to give priority to the stifling rather than the free expression of their tendency to conflict.'[38]

Nigeria’s experience in crisis diplomacy through peacekeeping—as will be seen in the next chapter—substantiates Claude’s conclusion. In the Congo (now Zaire) and Tanzania where centrifugal and mutinous tendencies were sufficiently arrested by the introduction of peacekeeping forces to allow negotiation, conciliation and mediation to prevail, a degree of normalcy was restored. In the internal imbroglios of Lebanon and Chad, where armed and intractable factional strife sustained by powerful external interests (both regional and extra-regional) have combined, repeated efforts at crisis management through peacekeeping have so far been unproductive.

In light of the foregoing analysis, and in keeping with the primary focus of this chapter, it may be pertinent to ask what tentative conclusion may be reached about the relevance of military power as an instrument of security and crisis management in the Nigerian context? The answer lies in the definition of the nature of threat by which the Nigerian state may be confronted in existing and likely conditions (as perceived by its decision makers). Since threat manifes-
tation and threat perception (the TP/TM Model) [39] are not constants. Certain challenges to the security of Nigeria may only be amenable to equal or superior counterforce. Thus, the Biafran secession which threatened the disintegration of the Nigerian state could only be suppressed by feats of military force.

Externally, the imperative of sheer deterrence against constant diplomatic irritations and violent territorial infringements by elements of the armed forces of neighbouring states (Chad, Cameroun, and Republique de Benin) may require limited coercive responses such as the recent engagement of units of Chadian forces in the Lake Chad basin (see Chapter Four). Furthermore, developments in Nigeria's military or strategic environment may unalterably require military preparedness. This, in the perceptions of its policy makers and defence planners, has been the inescapable lesson of French security policy in West Africa noted above. It also underlays the alarm with which Nigeria's key security elite views Gaddafi's 'Sahelian design'—especially following the impressive performance of his Islamic Legion in Chad and the announcement of a Libyan-Chad 'merger.' [40]

Nevertheless, as previously noted, threats to Nigeria's security can no longer be satisfactorily defined in military terms alone; but they could also be seen in the overall context of socio-economic and political factors and forces.
which threaten to undermine the national order. These factors and forces, as theorists of 'neocolonialism' remind us, are not in essence amenable to the use of national military power. In this respect, excessive defence spending (see Chapter Five) in the name of national security may paradoxically come to defeat its own ends. Clearly, while it is in theory indisputable that the level of military preparedness considered adequate for defence or deterrence is a function of the nature of the potential security threats faced by a nation in the ever-changing internal and external environment, a balanced determination of these threats is also of vital importance to rational defence planning and posture. As is evident from the spate of articles and official policy papers (see Chapter Five) on the national defence expenditures debate since the late-1970s, there is little consensus in Nigeria's official circle and attentive public as to the nature and degree of the threat to national security. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has in response been a bifurcated tendency—maximalist versus minimalist positions—on this issue in the Nigerian press, academic journals, and official policy papers.[41]

In the final analysis, this debate about Nigeria's security situation, and the appropriate policy responses involving national military power cannot be separated from the broader question of national interest and foreign and
defence policy planning. As noted in the preamble to the first chapter, the security and foreign policies of a state are inextricably linked. The former invariably reflect fundamental assumptions and objectives of the latter, and when necessary, provide the means for their actualisation. Conversely, foreign policy objectives characteristically reflect, and are often limited by, the power base (ultimately expressed in the quantity and quality of military capability) of a state, which gives them substantive underpinning. In the next section, therefore, a brief attempt will be made to situate the 'power-security' debate (that is, the debate about military power as an instrument of security and crisis management in Nigeria) within the broader context of domestic and external determinants of the use of Nigeria's military power as an instrument of statecraft.

b) Domestic and External Determinants of the Use of Military Force

In analytic terms, consideration of the internal and external determinants of a state's use of military force is part of a broader systematic inquiry into its sources of foreign and security policy. As a consequence, these determinants are more often than not treated as the 'unwanted step-children of political systems,' assumed by both (foreign and defence policy studies) and neither properly or adequately analysed by either.[42] Furthermore, such an inquiry is also inescapably subject to the same gamut of strictures and
problems that has so far bedevilled endeavours to develop a universal theory of foreign policy behaviour. These caveats notwithstanding, the use of military power as an instrument of statecraft is seldom a haphazard phenomenon. To this extent it may be influenced by certain domestic and external factors/determinants which, although analytically distinct, cannot be completely understood in isolation from the other. Nigeria is not an exception in this regard. As understood here, the term "determinant" implies a set of factors which converged to trigger a state's use of force. In reality, however, these antecedent and situational variables may or may not operate as contributory factors to the actual use of military force. What follows, therefore, is a general consideration of these factors in the light of Nigeria's experience.

National military power, as posited in the opening chapter, can be used externally for threatening, deterring, war-fighting, or peacekeeping. It can be employed coercively in order to either influence the behaviour of opponents or alter or preserve the status quo. Ideally, the frequency and intensity of states' applications of military power in pursuit of one or a combination of these objectives are functions of their capability and intentions—viewed within the general context of foreign and domestic political objectives and constraints. However, in specific circum-
stances (see Chapter Two, section c), the military response provoked by external stimulus is invariably conditioned by a set of antecedent factors/determinants that predispose a society or regime towards a military reaction. In contemporary parlance of strategy, it is these factors that constitute the political and cultural component in the military potential of states.

These domestic antecedent factors may be categorised according to the way in which they are produced as either direct or indirect. They may also be classified according to the way they function as either long-term or short-term. They may further be codified according to the way in which they expedite the use of force as either anticipatory or reactive. Four such antecedent factors with relevance to the Nigerian condition are noted here in brief.[44]

The first involves certain psycho-cultural dynamics which predispose a society towards the use of force externally (and also internally). This 'attitude complex,' which more or less favours a military response to international situations of conflict, has been evident in the old martial ethic (warrior and Jihad traditions) associated with the diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria, especially with the dominant Hausa-Fulani.[45] The latter were the 'fighting tribes' from which the British recruited the bulk of the infantry for the Nigerian Regiment of the Royal West African
Frontier Force (RWAFF). The extent to which relevant impacts of historical experience may have dissipated this old martial ethic among the Nigerian population (as Ali Mazrui has contended) [46] is highly debatable. If anything, the events of the civil war, and the unprecedented tantrum of the Nigerian public following the killing of five Nigerian soldiers on routine border patrol by Camerounian gendarmes, are clearly indicative of the population's underlying propensity to mobilise and use military strength in conflict situations. Such a disposition toward the use of force is not alien to Nigeria's social ethic, it parallels in many ways the 'cult of violence and of aggression' which several writers have associated with the 'American way of life.' [47]

The second antecedent factor is public disposition to support the foreign and defence policy of government: to accept it as authoritative and hence binding, simply because it is seen as the prerogative of the government. For example, in Nigeria the public's attitude toward the acquisition and use of military force had been largely benign until the mid-1970s, as this 'issue-area' was considered the legitimate domain of the government alone. However, increasing public awareness since the late 1970s—especially as a result of media coverage of the 'Gun or Gari' controversy—has engendered groundswell discontent about the direction of government policy concerning defence (see
Chapter Five). Not surprisingly, therefore, support for the relatively horrendous (in terms of the percentage of the federal budget) military expenditures under the Shagari administration tends to accrue from groups who expect to derive personal or corporate advantages. This generally holds true for the Nigerian military establishment, who benefit in terms of career interests, professional relevance, and social prestige. It also holds true for business interests that derive profit from logistics-related supplies. Conversely, the most articulate detractors of the government's defence policy are to be found in the attentive publics (especially in academic and media circles) who consider the current military build-up an affront to egalitarian and social ideals.

The third antecedent factor involves differences in political systems frequently associated with the potential for generating and using military power in the literature. As Kenneth Waltz has incisively articulated in *Man, the State, and War*, one of the most potent sources of theories about military conflict is the idea that a state's form of government influences its propensity to use force. Thus, Quincy Wright has argued that:

Absolutistic states with geographically and functionally centralized governments under autocratic leadership are likely to be most belligerent, whereas constitutional states with geographically and functionally federalized governments
under democratic leadership are likely to be most peaceful.[48]

Seen in the light of Wright's argumentation, it may be contended that certain legal and constitutional aspects—some 'explicit and some general—of Nigeria's presidential system and multi-state federalism, were quintessentially less supportive to the use of military power than the military dictatorships they supersede and preceded. The 'War Provisions' of the civilian constitution, for instance, expressly prohibited the President from declaring a state of war between Nigeria and another country 'except with the sanction of a resolution of each of the Houses of the National Assembly' (Article 5, 3a). Furthermore, in a move to deny a Nigerian President the manoeuvrability which several United States Presidents have used to commit troops abroad without a formal declaration of war, the Constituent Assembly added Section 5 (3b) which stipulated:

...except with the prior approval of the Senate no member of the Armed Forces of the Federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside the Federation.[49].

Moreover, while the Nigerian President held most of the powers of initiative and was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the National Assembly retained financial veto through budgetary control (that is, appropriation and authorisation of funds for military operations).

In practice, however, such constitutional and legal restraints on the Executive—as the American experience amply
demonstrates—were so easily circumventable that they were effective only under very unusual circumstances; i.e., when the President's use of force was extremely unpopular. In Nigeria's limited experience with the presidential system, Shagari resisted near unanimity in the National Assembly for punitive military action against Cameroun in May 1981, in the teeth of popular pressure while sanctioning, two years later (June and July 1983), a limited military action against Chadian forces in the Lake Chad basin without prior approval from the Legislature. Such dialectic of inaction and action simply underscores the relative importance of the personality variable and of perceptions in foreign and defence policy decision-making: it serves to confirm the observation of R. V. Denenberg that:

...when threatened with external dangers, the complex system of checks and balances reverts to a tribal dependence on the warrior chief.[50]

In the military-strategic domain, the power of war or peace (irrespective of the political system) in the contemporary international order tends to rest in the 'unfettered hands' of heads of government, and the 'man who holds the trigger inevitably gives the orders.' If in theory differences in political systems per se impinge on the propensity to use force, historical records do not provide adequate comparable data to establish such an association conclusively.
The fourth and final, domestic antecedent factor is the occasionally irresistible pressure of the military establishment itself. As several theorists[51] of civil-military relations have noted, in essentially praetorian polities such as Nigeria, the jingoistic attitude of the military is often a force with which to reckon by civilian policy makers in periods of inter-state conflict. This is, however, a double-edged sword, since external ventures without the support of the military can topple a government, while undue restraint in situations unyielding to pacific strategies could invite an adverse response from the military.

A balance sheet of the Nigerian military (in and out of government) is on the whole inconclusive. As previously noted, Gowon's administration (1966-1975) astutely resisted public pressure for military action against Equatorial Guinea--following the massacre of Nigerians on the island--as inconsistent with the precepts of the OAU. Similarly, Shagari successfully withstood the tempestuous reaction of the defence staff, favouring instead a diplomatic solution to the Nigerian-Cameroun border crisis (May 1981). Perhaps the administration's apprehension that such restraint may be interpreted by the military as inexcusable appeasement (with incalculable consequences for its survival) elicited the subsequent decision in June 1983 to permit a military response against Chadian forces in the Lake Chad basin.
From a decision-making perspective, however, these domestic determinants are not in themselves sufficient explanatory and predictive categories for the use of military force. If, as noted in the opening chapter, government behaviour in the international arena is a function both of perceptions of environmental situations and of predispositions brought to perception, then the significance of the various antecedent factors analysed above depends on developments within the strategic environment. These two determinants (internal and external) may either reinforce or conflict with each other, and policy-makers may also entertain more or less correct assumptions about the properties of such contingencies. Nevertheless, as Knorr has aptly noted, 'the stronger the preexisting attitude (antecedent factors) presses for a particular course of action, the more it will have its way even when environmental stimuli are weak or confusing, or vice versa.' [52]

In the Nigerian context, this means that the various domestic determinants are not in themselves sufficient to trigger a military reaction. Linkages between antecedent and situational conditions in its strategic environment have to be considered irreducible essentials in the calculus of such a reaction. Specifically, developments within Nigeria's strategic environment with bearing on its security have been primary situational determinants in its use or threat to
resort to the military instrument in the post-independence era. These include, inter alia: i) The violation of its territorial "threshold" by armed forces of neighbouring states (in particular, Cameroun and Chad); ii) acts of external aggression unacceptable to its policy makers (e.g. the attempt by foreign mercenaries to overthrow the government of neighbouring Benin); iii) the need for military stabilisation through peacekeeping (Tanzania, in 1964) or through peace-enforcement (as in the Congo in the early 1960s), both of which were considered essential to peace and security in Africa; and iv) developments in Southern Africa in the late-1970s (particularly in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), when the process of decolonisation escalated with 'elemental fury.' In an impressive volte face from the attitude and perception of Prime Minister Balewa of the First Republic, two subsequent heads of Nigerian military governments (Gowon and Obasanjo) aggressively canvassed the OAU on the imperative of a Pan-African Force 'against the racist and imperialist' domination of African territories.

Accordingly, while rejecting the idea of a multi-purpose continental force, General Gowon argued at the Rabat Ministerial Conference of the OAU in 1972 for a specific functional Task Force to be deployed in Southern Africa (see Chapter Seven, section e). In a similar vein, the head of the successor military government, General Obasanjo in his
valadictory speech to the OAU, called for the establishment of a 'truly Pan-African Force', urging in the process that 'the problem can no longer be shelved and must be squarely faced.'[53] As one Nigerian scholar has noted:

There were manifold reasons for Nigeria's spirited advocacy for the formation of an African High Command, a shift in its declared foreign policy. For one Nigerian leaders had come increasingly to perceive the continued existence of Portuguese colonial rule and white minority governments in Africa as a threat not only to Nigeria but to Africa. Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia were alleged to have supported Nigerian secessionist during the civil war. Logic and the rhetoric of the Gowon and Obasanjo administrations on African liberation dictated support for the creation of a force that might serve to eliminate these regimes.[54]

These developments within Nigeria's strategic environment have, in diverse ways, generated a greater appreciation of the relevance of the defence component in its foreign policy, and have accordingly been considered part of the external stimuli that provoke or threaten to provoke a military reaction on the part of its decision-makers. In the next and final section, a concise review of Nigeria's policy-makers' attitudes and perceptions about the instrumentality of military power in Nigerian foreign policy will be considered as a background and transition to the fourth chapter. The logic and relevance of such a review can be readily appreciated from the literature on political psychology about the dynamics of personality variables in policy-making.[53]
In a nutshell, this analytical perspective takes as its premise the incontestable fact that many of the decisions made in an official capacity are not merely products of bureaucratic, organisational, domestic, and external imperatives and constraints, but also products of the individual's personality. In other words, policy derives both from the requirements of 'high office and from personal conviction and individual experience', the difference lying principally in degree or relative potency of the two variables. As one theorist of this field explains: 'the individual, far from being a mechanism manipulated by forces such as the 'national interest' or 'power relationships,' is a significant independent factor in the decision-making process. His perceptual screen, his emotions, his personality, and his social background are all independent variables that may affect a nation's foreign behaviour.' [56]

While the variability in relative potency of personality factors in defence and foreign policy between the civilian and military governments of Nigeria cannot be denied, the personalised nature of foreign policy decision-making under Balewa, for example, has had as much impact (adverse) on the production and use of military power as it had in the military era (significant)—the latter based as it were on complete fusion of legislative and executive powers.
c) Nigerian Policy-Makers and National Military Power

One of the pre-eminent features of the history of Nigeria's foreign relations is the marked re-orientation from a period of conservatism and self-effacement to a more dynamic posture from 1960 to the present. The latter is characterised by an increasing acceptance of a 'realist' philosophy which views military power as one of the bases of diplomacy and of contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of the state. As will be appreciated below, this development in Nigeria's foreign policy posture is not entirely haphazard; neither is it part of a syndrome of 'aggressive negritude' as some critics have contended (e.g. the tirade of a British Conservative MP following Nigeria's nationalisation of BP shares at a height of the 'Rhodesian Crisis').

On the contrary, the increasing acceptance of this essentially Clausewitzian precept as a 'value parameter' by Nigerian policy-makers derives from a complex set of rapidly evolving relationships between historical circumstances and present condition. It has been an end-result of domestic tumult as well as untoward developments in the African continent since the early 1960s (that is, a response to distinctive conjunctures of forces). Unprecedented levels of foreign intervention in the Nigerian Civil War (especially of France, Portugal, South Africa and defunct Rhodesia), the Portuguese invasion of Guinea, the radical changes of decision-makers, the search for greater intellectual...
foundations in foreign policy, the remarkable increases in Nigeria's revenue, and the crisis in Southern Africa, have, in many ways, generated a greater appreciation of the relevance of the military component in the foreign policy of Nigeria[57]. And with these changing parameters of strategic thinking in the policy-making circle have proceeded the parallel expansion of the military instrument through a military modernisation and augmentation programme that touches upon all elements of military power (see Chapter Six).

As this development in the history of post-independence foreign policy of Nigeria also coincided with changing regimes and actors at the helm of power, a clear picture of this evolving posture may be appreciated from specific examination of individual Nigerian policy-maker's attitude and perception of the instrumentality of military power in statecraft. This examination may in turn be divided into two broad categories: the pre-civil war era (1960-1966) and the civil war and post-civil war era (1966-83). The former era corresponds to the administration of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the latter era spans three administrations: the Gowon Government (1966-1975), the Mohammed-Obasanjo Government (1975-1979), and the Shagari Government (1979-1983). Each will be considered briefly in turn.
i) Balewa Era (1960-1966)

As has been implicit in the preceding analysis, 'attitudinal prisms and elite images' which condition foreign policy decisions are generally part of the psychological environment and are, therefore, subject to change over time with the shifting dynamics of the operational environment of a decision-maker. Furthermore, the relationship between attitudinal and perceptual variables, official policy and international behaviour of a government, is not always symmetrical. 'States', as Nazli Choucri reminds us, 'do not always behave in accordance with their declared policies, nor are their actions necessarily congruent with dominant attitudes and perceptions.' [58]

Thus, while Balewa's conservatism and pacifist inclinations cannot be denied, it may, nevertheless, be a prejudgment to say whether, given relevant changes in the operational environment, his perception of the relation of forces in the international system would not have altered dramatically and with it his attitudes toward the production and use of military power. However, this reservation about the durability of a conservative streak in Balewa's policy over time notwithstanding, it can be concluded from specific policy behaviour of the Balewa's government that his thinking about the role and utility of military power in international relations was at best naive and at worst malign.
First, his commitment to maintain a largely ceremonial Army for internal and border duties was consistent with, and predicated upon, his virulently anti- 'realist' ethos: that is, his avowed rejection of the view that power (as ultimately expressed in military capability) constitutes the basis of all contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of states. As a consequence, by 1966 the Nigerian military ranked as one of the smallest (10,500) and under-equipped war machines in the continent (see Chapter Six). Such an attitude and policy toward the development, maintenance and use of military power as an instrument of policy by Bala was contrasted markedly with the perceptions of the high status and role of Nigeria in the post-independence Africa by a significant section of the government functionaries and informed publics alike.[59] That is, given Nigeria's geographical expanse, human endowment, and political pluralism (parliamentary and federal rule), its 'manifest destiny' is to exercise leadership on the continent. It may, nevertheless, be argued that while this widespread self-image and role-conception of Nigeria were not altogether unpopular with Bala (as suggested by his responses to Nkrumah),[60] his perception of the functionality of military power in the resolution of vital African issues hardly accorded with this dominant 'realist' precepts (see Chapter One).
Second and related to the first, Baledwa's aversion to military power as an instrument of statecraft was clearly evident from his vehement opposition to Nkrumah's proposal of a continental defense system (an African High Command) to keep 'the imperialist invaders at bay' (see Chapter Seven, section e) [61]. Most attempts to explain Baledwa's stance on continental defense have shifted between the personality factor and his 'naive and legalistic conception of international processes.' [62]. In addition to these considerations, however, must be noted the underlying conflicting conceptions of international and regional order, two different views of historical processes, and two variant visions of the future between Baledwa and the foremost advocate of Pan-African Force: Nkrumah. Furthermore, domestic capability factors—the fragile political system and the serious limitations imposed by an essentially dependent and neo-colonial economy—may also have partly contributed to Baledwa's cautionary inclination.

Nevertheless, since Nigeria's foreign and defense policy was largely formulated and rigidly controlled by the Prime Minister, his attitudinal and perceptual prism—particularly his incurable dislike for all types of radicalism and militancy—has to be considered as a major factor in his administration's derogation of military power as an instrument of statecraft. In the final analysis, it was a
policy marked by neglect rather than by conscious promotions of the military option, and an inclination towards quiet diplomacy rather than international or regional vigilantism. This period of uncertainty and self-effacement which characterised Nigeria's foreign policy posture came to an abrupt end at the beginning of 1966 with the assassination of Balewa in a military coup. However, as will be argued below, the policy approach of his protege (Shehu Shagari) in the Second Republic, despite significant alteration in both domestic and external (regional and global) environments and the rhetoric of a *jihad* against the 'evil of apartheid', was in some ways reminiscent of this initial post-independence era.


The overt intervention of the Nigerian military in politics injected into the national arena a corpus of decision-making elite whose Afro-centric activism and ideals underscored the unmistakable reorientation of Nigeria's post-independence foreign relations from the Balewa period of quiet diplomacy to the more dynamic and uncompromising posture of the military era, which later saw its climax in the subsequent Mohammed-Obasanjo administration. However, the differences between the two eras centred less on substantive policy departures than on style and means: especially the greater appreciation of the military component in foreign policy by the Gowon administration. This became
visible at several policy levels. [63]

First, the unprecedented augmentation of the capability of the Nigerian military during and after the Civil War—which may have resulted in part from the corporate interest of the Nigerian military establishment—reflected a general concern of the policy elite that (as a later head of state put it) 'our dynamic foreign policy posture can only be credible if we have a well-equipped and disciplined defence force capable of defending our territorial integrity and national interests.' [64] As a consequence, the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the Nigerian military (especially Air Force and Navy) became a matter of great urgency after the Gowon era. For example, by 1975 the Nigerian Navy had grown from its 1967 level of 1,500 to 6,500 personnel and the Air Force from 1,000 to 7,500. In terms of operational requirements, both services acquired new frigates and long-range fighters, respectively. The NAF, which by early 1970 had thirty-three combat aircraft, expanded to about sixty by mid-1972. [65] (See Chapter Six).

Second, the shift in attitude of the new policy elite towards the instrumentality of military power was also demonstrated by its aggressive commitment to revolutionary force as the only viable means of change in 'colonial Africa.' Unlike the ambivalence which characterised the Balewa era, the predominant 'mind set' of the successor government was
that the survival, security and independence of Nigeria cannot be assured as long as any part of Africa remains under colonial rule, or an apartheid regime.'[66] As Gowon declared at the OAU summit at Addis Ababa in September 1970:

'We know from experience that in opposing colonialism and racialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, we are serving the cause of our own freedom and independence.'[67] Part of the reason for this position has been noted above: the intervention of the racist and imperialist states of South Africa, 'Rhodesia' and Portugal in the Nigerian Civil War, in a calculated attempt to balkanise the country. It was also due partly to the developments within the international system which convinced the new administration about the determination of the former imperial powers to preserve their economic and strategic dominance in Africa.[68] (See Chapter Seven).

This new direction in the military policy of Gowon's administration became unquestionably obvious in its radical departure from the policy guide of the Balewa government concerning a regional defence system in Africa. At the 1970 OAU Summit, Gowon also castigated what he called 'the evils and the plots of the forces of colonialism, racism and oppression to divide us', and ended with the assertion that we have no choice but to commit ourselves wholly to the struggle against racial oppression.'[69]
Accordingly, the Nigerian delegation presented at the 1972 Rabat Ministerial Conference, a modified version of Nkrumah's proposal for a regional defence force--an African Task Force--to be deployed in Southern Africa to:

a) assist African liberation movements based, and trained, in neighbouring African countries; and

b) participate in the militant armed struggles for the total liberation of Southern Africa.[70]

As previously noted, the reasons for such a departure from the Balewa era involved a combination of internal and external developments which has become obvious even to the most conservative circles in Nigeria. As Gowon declared:

The forces which impede the freedom and independence of Africa and which at the same time seek to undermine our achievements remain very formidable...They will never leave us alone to develop our natural and human resources to our advantage. They will forever want us to waste our time and energy in negative pursuits.[71]

This new inclination toward radical assertiveness in the Gowon administration was undoubtedly reinforced by the post-civil war economic prosperity which the oil boom engendered. The heightened basis of national economic power (in terms of international liquidity, see Chapter Five) as a result of the oil revenues increased the confidence and means of the administration to pursue a new, active and effective policy within the continent and to influence the decisions of extra-regional powers. The 'finest hour' of this policy
was the early Muhammed-Obasanjo era.

iii) The Muhammed-Obasanjo Era (1975-1979)

Although the militancy of the Muhammed-Obasanjo government far outstripped the assertiveness of both its predecessor and successor, the tough rhetoric of this administration was not accompanied by any drastic or fundamental change in the use of Nigeria's military as an instrument of policy compared, for instance, with Libyan vigilantism (see Chapter Two).

However, given the celebrated purposefulness of General Muhammed, it may be hypothesized that such restraint on the part of the Nigerian leadership in this period was more a consequence of the limited 'striking power' of the Nigerian military rather than conscious policy choice. Such a limitation was not insurmountable, however, (given astronomical oil revenues) and, judging from the Angolan episode, it is not unthinkable that had the 'tough, inflexible, strong-minded and aggressively intolerant' Muhammed survived, the Nigerian military would, perhaps have been drawn into a defensive operations in Mozambique or Zambia at the height of the Rhodesian crisis in the late-1970s.[72] As one analyst of this era has noted:

Muhammed held the view that there was no reason why Nigerian soldiers should not go and fight in South Africa alongside the liberation forces, whatever the obstacles. From this incident it was obvious that Muhammed as Head of State would not hesitate to push
Nigeria into a confrontation with South Africa if the situation were to arise.[73]

Indeed, the unprecedented commitment of this regime to a military solution in situations unyielding to pacific strategies, was highlighted by the announcement of the Chief of Army Staff, T. Y. Danjuma, in June 1977, that the government would be prepared to send troops to assist the freedom fighters in order to speed up the collapse of the 'albinocracies' in Southern Africa. However, since undoubtedly the new level of radicalism and militant assertiveness—as well as the tacit encouragement of the radicals and left-wing elements in the country—had General Muhammed as its prime mover, it was not entirely surprising that, his premature death, coupled with the slump in oil revenues, renewed restraint and caution in Nigeria's defence and foreign policy posture. It was, perhaps, the latter realisation that prompted Alaba Ogunsanwo's observation in his critique of the Muhammed-Obasanjo foreign policy performances, that:

Bold foreign policy positions and stances are hardly sustainable for a considerable period without domestic infrastructural underpinnings which form the solid foundation for such policies. Long-term pursuit of national interests is facilitated through the availability of policy options that decision makers may resort to. The degree of manoeuvrability depends to a large extent on a country's dependence on the external environment for the life-sustaining resources that are needed...[74]
The creation, maintenance and use of armed forces on which Nigeria's foreign and security policy partly rest, requires a concomitant expansion in the primary foundation of its national military power. Economic and technological resources. To recall the analysis in section (a) above, economic strength constitutes the basis of two components of putative military power in Africa as elsewhere: mobilized or ready military forces and military potential (from which additional military capabilities can be derived). While, as Timothy Shaw has noted, 'the ineluctable progress towards semi-peripheral capitalism' (towards a more industrialized economy dominated by an ever-changing balance of fractional forces among national, transnational and bureaucratic bourgeoisies or capital) has profoundly altered the economic basis of Nigeria's military power, persistent fluctuations in this essentially monocultural economy have imposed serious limits on the use and usability of force as an instrument of policy. The realisation of this paralysing factor on Nigeria's foreign and security policy posture no doubt underlies the feverish debate about the viability of the present industrialisation strategy initiated under the Fourth National Development Plan.

A comparison of these two initial eras (1960-1966 and 1967-1979) suggests an element of continuity as well as discontinuity. There has been an undeniable element of
continuity in terms of fundamental policy objectives, as Ogunbadejo and Aluko among others have argued. However, in terms of policy means—the primary focus of this dissertation—the two eras exhibit significant departures or discontinuity, especially in terms of appreciation of the military component in foreign and security policy.

These differences in style and means, while not unrelated to the fortuitous augmentation of national economic base as a result of considerable oil revenue, is, nevertheless, to be seen more in terms of the incommensurable dissimilarity in personalities and 'mind-sets' of the leadership in the two periods. In this respect, there are sufficient grounds to hypothesize that a Balewa (or his successor in the Second Republic) at the helm of power in 1975-76 would have reacted differently to South Africa's incursion into Angola. However, although the military interregnum between the two civilian eras strengthened in many ways (see Chapter Six) the defence underpinnings in Nigerian foreign policy, it will be contended below that the Shagari era did not necessarily represent a return to 1966 ante. This contention is supported by the unabated level of defence expenditures (see Chapters Five and Six), the revanchist posture toward unruly neighbours (see Chapter Four), and the intensification of support for liberation movements in Southern Africa.
iv) **The Shagari Era (1979-83)**

Despite the obvious differences in personality and foreign policy posture between the second-civilian administration and its military predecessor, the emergence of a 'gentle, patient and cool-headed' leadership in the person of Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic was not accompanied by a depreciation of the military component in Nigeria's foreign policy as was widely expected. Instead in line with the NPN Manifesto,[77] there was a continued emphasis on and enhancement of the 'military underpinning' of Nigeria's foreign policy. This undiminished trend in policy posture under Shagari was succinctly represented by Aminu Tijjani and David Williams:

> Inspite of the growing criticism of the deficiencies of military rule, there has been, since the soldiers handed over power, no sign of the expected civilian criticism of the high proportion of the Federal budget devoted to defence, still the highest single item in the 1981 budget. Nigerians seem to feel that they have a duty to match their political important in Africa and the world with military strength...more money is being spent on equipment and training, and the President has promised that Nigeria's defence system will become "the best in Africa" and "comparable to the best in the World." A modernized and well-equipped force "can be expected to discharged creditably and positively the task of defending the largest Black nation on earth; and only such a force can give adequate credibility and expression to Nigeria's strong foreign policy posture." This is an attitude which "radicals" as much as "conservatives" agree.[78]
Thus, unlike his counterpart and political superior in the First Republic, the military instrument was far from regarded as an anomaly by Shagari. Instead, the president's response to critical situations (such as the Nigeria-Cameroun border conflict of May 1981) was a judicious combination of 'carrot and stick'—a threat of military reprisal if diplomacy failed to yield a mutually acceptable solution. However, unlike the Muhammed-Obasanjo era, the second civilian president will, perhaps be remembered for his 'low-key style of quiet diplomacy' reminiscent of the Balewa's Republic. As one reviewer of the foreign policy performance of the Shagari administration has aptly noted, 'some people greet the mention of Nigeria's foreign policy during the last four years with a derisive What foreign policy?' There is obviously some nostalgia behind this view, which glances backwards in time to the 1975 struggle in the OAU over recognising the MPLA and General Murtala Muhammed's positive role. There was also the strong position the Obasanjo government took on the French and Belgium intervention in Shaba. Some consider these to be high points from which the NPN has descended into uncertainty.'[79]

In overall terms, however, this brief review of the inclinations of successive Nigerian policy-makers towards military power as an instrument of policy is suggestive of fundamental differences of style and means rather than substantive
departure in policy objectives. Unfortunately, space precludes a detailed comparison, evaluation and explanation of the complex mechanics (personality, organisational, societal-socio-economic and political-- and systemic variables)[80] underlying these differences. Such a disquisition would necessarily entail an additional chapter.

However, viewed in conjunction with the domestic and external determinants of the use of Nigeria's military as an instrument of foreign and security policy discussed in section (b) above, it should suffice in my judgement to elicit a tentative conclusion. Considered both in terms of the crucial distinction between a state's role conception (that is, its world view, or orientation, general policy commitments to and plans for action) and its role enactment (that is, its actual international behaviour), significant differences exist between periods, reflecting not only relevant changes in parameters (domestic and systemic) but also the personalised nature of leadership, combined with the relative degree of latitude in decision-making afforded the foreign policy elite. In this regard, apart from the uncertainties and naive slipshodness which characterized the formative years of the Balewa era, the role definition (as different from the role enactment) of the military instrument in Nigerian foreign policy has been remarkably consistent with the Clausewitzian or 'neo-
realist' tradition in international politics (see Chapter One).

There have been among the policy elite wide-ranging perceptions of the military both as the basis of national security and as instrument of prevalence in situations unyielding to pacific strategies, as in the Lake Chad basin in summer 1983. Explicitly in the form of threats or implicitly through silent calculations, considerations of Nigerian military power have acted as counters in diplomatic bargaining (e.g. Nigeria-Cameroun border crisis in May 1981). Given the current reorganisation and expansion of Nigeria's military capability (Chapter Six) it is to be expected that such a trend in strategic thinking among its decision-making elite will heighten rather than diminish, especially with the return of the soldiers to power in late-1983.

In the next chapter, case studies involving the application of the theoretical substructure of the preceding analysis will be considered. Specifically, the role of the Nigerian military as an instrument of security and crisis management will be evaluated in the light of developments in Nigeria's strategic environment between 1960 and 1983. In this respect, Chapter Four may be considered essentially an extension of the present chapter, albeit with a greater focus on empirical details.
NOTES


10. See Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington: Heath, 1970), Chapters One and Two.

12. For an exposition of this view, see Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), especially Chapter 17.


17. The three interrelated questions are: first, is African/Nigerian security to be understood as the security of Western capital and resource interests? This, as noted in the second chapter, has been the predominant theme of Western strategic writings about Africa. Second, does security in Africa/Nigeria connote the security of African/Nigerian state(s) and the regional subsystem to which they belong? And third, is security in Africa/Nigeria to be equated with the security of the existing ruling classes within African/Nigerian state(s), or with that of the masses or both? (See Robin Luckham, "Regional Security and Disarmament in Africa" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 3-5, and Bruce Arlinghaus, (ed.) African Security Issues (Boulder: Westview, 1984).


19. Wolfers', Discord and Collaboration, p. 150. For the different connotations of the term "security", see Alastair Buchan, War in Modern Society (London: C.A. Watts, 1966), Chapter One, Section III.

For example, the domestic critics of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact of 1960-62 saw it as a clever design "to enhance the capacity of the pro-British Hausa-Fulani leaders to dominate the rest of the federation indefinitely".


In the context of the African subsystem, Robin Luckham, for instance, has argued that the position of African countries in the international division of labour has had far-reaching consequences for their national security: 'their ability to plan development, their political stability and indeed their ability to actually pay for their own defence.' As a result, he contends, any enumeration of security priorities for African states would thus have to include: 'effective bargaining strategies in North-South economic negotiations, the price and output policies of OPEC and similar organisations of Third World and African producers; control of the activities of the major MNCs; and development policies aimed at building the self-sufficiency
within national economies'. See Lückham, "Regional Security and Disarmament in Africa", pp. 5-6. Also see his exposition on the constraints on security planners of LDCs concerning arms acquisition: that is, 'that even the decisions a country takes on defence—what weapons it buys abroad for instance, how much and from whom—are closely related both to its development policy and to its earning of surpluses from the international economy', Robin Lückham, "Armaments, Undevelopment and Demilitarisation in Africa", Alternatives 6, 2 (July 1980), pp. 179-245. See also B. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1984).


30. See Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, Schelling, Arms and Influence, and Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age.


37. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, has argued that the image of the United Nations which guided the founding fathers of Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco suffered from a huge discrepancy between the pluralistic international system it postulated and the international system that emerged from World War II. See Stanley Hoffmann, "International System" in Goodrich and Kay, International Organisation: politics and process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).


39. See T. A. Imobighe, "Analysis of Threat within the African Context," Indian Journal of Political Science, 40 4, (December 1979), pp. 632-650. Imobighe establishes the dual role of threat dynamics in military strategy by a simple analytical model: "Threat Perception/Threat Manifestation Model (TP/ TM Model). This model clearly shows that threat serves not only as a guide to defence planning, but also a potent influence on foreign policy decision-making. Furthermore that the determination of the potency of any threat—whether it is first, second, third or fourth degree threat—also "depends on the extent to which it is backed by a 'capability' and the 'will' to act". Ken Booth has offered an alternate formulation on this basic theme:

"Threats can be conceived as a level-of-analysis problem. Once they are conceived in this way, a number of confusions subside. There are two fundamental levels to contemplate in threat assessment...the first level is that of the foreign policy analyst; the second is the level of the contingency planner. The former is concerned with strategic analysis of a more political type, and with probabilities about the other nation's behaviour. At the second, lower (theatre) level, concern is with military contingency planning and strategic analysis of a more technical character: attention is directed at what the other nation can do. At the strategic level, intentions are very important; they are of less importance at the theatre level..."


44. For a detailed analysis of these antecedent factors, see Knorr, *Military Power and Potential*, Chapter 5.


59. A graphic example of this self-delusion is perhaps the widely ridiculed statement by Nigeria’s first Minister of External Affairs—Jaja Wachuku: “Our country is the largest single unit in Africa...we are not going to abdicate the position in which God Almighty has placed us...the whole black continent is looking up to this country (Nigeria) to liberate it from thralldom”. House of Representatives Debates, January 1960, column 54. For a theoretical review of the changing perceptions of Nigeria’s status and stature in the global system (albeit, from a political economic perspective: i.e., 'the intimate, dialectical interaction of political and economic forces'), see T. Shaw and O. Fasehun, "Nigeria in the World System: alternative approaches, explanations and projections" in T. Shaw and O. Aluko (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 205-235.


61. Balewa ignored the Ministry of Defence pre-summit memorandum which said Nigeria would submit a draft treaty to the May 1963 founding summit of the OAU proposing cooperative defence arrangements among African states. See Ministry of Defence Memorandum No. 1, 00161/213, 26 April 1963: Cooperation for Defence Preparatory Committee for the Addis Ababa Summit Conference. The relevant portion reads: ...on the subject of cooperation for defence, I now understand that the decision is for a draft treaty to be submitted by our delegation to the forthcoming meeting in Addis Ababa.

62. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 120.

63. This relatively greater appreciation of the defence component in foreign policy by successive military regimes (compared with their civilian counterparts of the First and Second Republics) in Nigeria cannot be explained purely by the institutional characteristics and proclivities of the military institutions. In his seminal appraisal of the African subsystem, Henry Bienen has, for instance, concluded tentatively that
"If there is a military mind or a military disposition in foreign policy matters, it is hard to fathom it. Militaries in Africa have not been more willing to use force across borders than civilian regimes. Somalia committed forces to the Ogaden and Amin's Uganda to Tanzania, both so did Tanzania to Uganda and Morocco to Mauritania. Nor can we conclude that militaries in power necessarily could more easily dispatch troops abroad than civilians. The latter would have to have military compliance, but so would military rulers. The Nigerian military considered sending troops to Zambiland during the Zimbabwe struggle. Elements within the military leadership opposed this." Henry Bienen, "African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors" International Security 5, 2, (Fall 1980), pp. 185-186.


66. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 46.


68. For example, the British government's refusal to take disciplinary action against the rebel government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia following UDI in 1965; the World Court ruling in favour of South Africa's annexation of Namibia (1966), and the invasion of Guinea by Portuguese forces in 1970).

69. See the text of Gowon's address to the third Afro-American Dialogue meeting in Lagos in March 1971, the Morning Post, 10 March 1971.

70. Gowon rejected the proposal of African High Command as originally formulated by Nkrumah, arguing that: 1) African states lack confidence in one another, and 2) African armies had different traditions and training. Pressures from his colleagues in the Nigerian Military, especially from Murtala Muhammed, did not change his mind. Muhammed's thesis was that the African High Command will represent a new level of African commitment with enough credibility to scare away capitalists and undermine South Africa. See Ofoegbu, The Nigerian Foreign Policy, Chapter 5.
71. The full text of this address is reproduced in Morning Post, 25 June 1971.

72. Instead Muhammed's successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, dispatched a squadron of Nigerian Air Force planes to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, from where they carried supplies to the Patriotic Front forces based in Zambia and Mozambique. The reason for this new phase of commitment by Nigeria in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was highlighted by Obasanjo in his address to the OAU summit in Khartoum in 1978:

We have always maintained that it is only through the armed struggle that the Zimbabwe impasse can be speedily resolved. Even if a peacefully negotiated and acceptable settlement were possible, it is only through the pressure of success on the battlefield that Ian Smith would be induced to the negotiation table. Thus while we are firmly committed to the armed struggle, we have never closed the doors to the possibility of a political settlement. We believe that there should be a place for all Rhodesians, African as well as white in an independent Zimbabwe. (From the text of General Obasanjo's speech of July 27, 1978, as issued by the Embassy of Nigeria in Washington, D.C.)


76. The Fourth National Development Plan, an ambitious document that proposed the investment of N82,000 over five years, has so far revealed the crippling myopia in the National Economic planning bureau. Like its predecessors, it erred grossly on the side of optimism. For example, the GDP was estimated to rise from N36.1bn (1977 factor cost) in 1980 to N51.1bn, implying an average annual growth rate of 8.3 percent in real terms, foreign exchange reserves were to rise from N5,357m. in 1980 to N9,148m. in 1983 before starting to decline, while gross national savings at current prices

77. In its manifesto, the NPN committed itself to:

- Prosecute with vigour programmes of training, equipping and reorganisation of the Army, Navy and Air Force to ensure the emergence of a modern, disciplined well-trained, professionally high-quality, and fully equipped force. In doing so, (i) care will be taken to ensure that proper balance in arms and men is maintained between the needs of internal and external security; (ii) to ensure that the nation's security is not endangered and our national power does not decline due to poor military preparedness, (iii) planning will seek to ensure harmony between defence needs, foreign policy and national economic development especially industrialisation. See Nigerian Year Book, 1980 (Lagos: Daily Times, 1981), pp. 21-22.

78. Tijjani and Williams, Shehu Shagari, p. 33.


CHAPTER FOUR

The Military Instrument in Nigerian Foreign Policy:

case studies application

It is high time, therefore, that those who provoke her unnecessarily learnt that they cannot forever ride on Nigeria's leniency. Nigerian neighbours have been adequately warned and President Shagari should not hesitate to mount a swift and punitive military action against any country that again tries to violate Nigeria's territorial integrity. Unless and until this is done, there may be further attempts by others midgets to test Nigeria's resolve and willingness to act swiftly in defense of her vital interest and honour.

Punch (Lagos)[1]

I understand these feelings and do not question the patriotism of those who are in favour of Nigeria adopting an aggressive posture towards those who provoke us. However, I think that our reaction to these events should, rather, be judged against the background of the principles of our foreign policy, our prominent membership in the OAU, our leadership and mediatory role in Africa and the continental and global repercussions of any hasty reaction to conflict situation between us and our neighbours with whom we share common heritage and destiny.

President Shehu Shagari[2]

The foregoing analysis and evaluation of the conceptual and policy parameters and determinants of the use and usability of Nigeria's military power as an instrument of security and crisis management highlights both the relevance
and limits of this policy means in the dynamic condition of its strategic environment. This chapter examines through selective case studies the methods—threatening, deterring and war-fighting—in which Nigeria's military power has been exercised to fulfil the foreign and defence policy functions from which, as argued in the preceding chapter, it derives its raison d'être. The conditions for possessing the ability to meet these functions and challenges, as well as the structure, magnitude and institutional parameters of Nigeria's defence establishment will be the related subjects of chapters five and six respectively.

a) Nigerian Military as Instrument. Security

National military forces—as contended in Chapter Three—can and have been employed in a variety of ways to promote states' security. They have been employed coercively in order to influence the behaviour of opponents or in order to alter or preserve the status quo by the sheer military feat of attack or defence. Two pertinent case studies in the latter category involving the Nigerian military will be examined in this section while an evaluation of its role in the former category will be considered in the next section under crisis management.

The first of the two case studies to be considered in this section involves the inner of the three 'concentric circles' of Nigeria's security boundaries: the Nigeria-'Biafra' war. The importance of this conflict lies not only
in its being the first expressive use of Nigeria's military power on a massive scale to prevent the dissolution of the Nigerian state, but also highlighted the vulnerability of post-colonial states to outside influences and pressures. The latter factor in turn signified a third: the inescapable linkage between the first, second, and third 'concentric circles' of Nigeria's security environment. This become ominously clear from the magnitude of foreign intervention in the conflict, with the unmistakable purpose— in the case of France, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia—of expediting the balkanization of the Nigerian state as part of the process of dominating a divided continent.

The next case study involves the second circle of the Nigerian security boundary—the repeated encroachment on Nigeria's territory by elements of the armed forces of neighbouring states which have necessiated on a number of occasions the use of military force to dislodge or preserve the status quo.[3] Of central consideration here will be the confrontation in the Lake Chad basin between the Nigerian and Chadian armed forces (April–June 1983).

Both of these incidents in Nigeria's immediate security environment are similar to the extent that they represent from a decision making perspective—a military response to situations unyielding to pacific strategies. Such a response, as noted in Chapter Three (section c), manifestly
highlights the value assumption (realism) of Nigeria's policy-elite in the post civil war era; one that views war not as an expression of insanity or madness (Balewa's 'mind-set'), but as an 'act of applying and distributing military means to fulfil the ends of policy'.[4] On this view, it follows logically that the application of military force to suppress the 'Biafran secession' or to dislodge Chadian forces from two strategic islands in Lake Chad, does not constitute a defeat for diplomacy. On the contrary, it represents as Clausewitz wrote, 'a continuation of policy by an admixture of other means.'[5]

1) The Nigeria-'Biafra' Conflict

The circumstantial imperative which precipitated the ill-fated secession of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria has been so extensively documented as to not warrant a detailed analysis here.[6] Suffice to note that underlying the entire melodrama was a complex set of socio-political-cum-constitutional questions which have beset a great number of countries in their formative years. Preeminent among these are two pivotal, if conflicting, tendencies inherent in the process of national integration in plural societies such as Nigeria.

One is constitutional: the question of federalism versus confederalism.[7] The other is socio-cultural: the principles of macro- versus micro-nationalism.[8] Both sets of centrifugal propensities in the body politic of plural
systems are inextricably related. Federalist tendencies invariably appeal to the principle of macro-nationalism, while confederalism, enshrines the aspiration of sub- or micro-nationalist forces.

By arguing elegantly and persuasively at Aburi (January, 1967) that 'it is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move more closer and perish in the collision,' Ojukwu was in effect advancing the cause of sub-nationalist forces in the Eastern region for autonomy within a confederal union. As John de St. Jorre has rightly noted about the Aburi Conference:

Ojukwu's strategy was to bring back a concrete agreement on something as near to a confederal system of government as possible... He came to Aburi to rewrite the Nigerian constitution and largely succeeded. [9]

The theoretical underpinning of Ojukwu's position was unmistakably informed by the principle of micro-nationalism, which, as noted above, asserts the prerogative of ethno-national groups to establish for themselves a new sovereign entity (statehood) should they adjudge their survival as a people to be at stake. Thus, one of the official government publications of the 'Republic of Biafra' later stated:

The state is not an inflexible structure which is absolute, irrespective of prevailing circumstances, but an affirmative framework whose primary aim is the collective welfare of its people, and which should adjust itself with preponderating circumstances in order to maintain its ability to achieve its aim. When, there-
fore, new conditions arise which are a negation of the happiness and well-being of the people of a country, it is not only justifiable but imperative and obligatory that these people should establish for themselves a new nation which assures their welfare, and should set for themselves new territorial limits to correspond with this new nation. This is the choice, the decision, Biafra has made.[10]

The significance of Ojukwu's move to 're-write the Nigerian constitution' at Aburi was not lost on Gowon and Federal bureaucrats in Lagos. As the latter stated in a rejoinder to Ojukwu's post-mortem news conference on the 'Aburi Accord':

the day we say confederation, it would be goodbye to Nigeria, since confederation meant a willing grouping together of independent sovereign states.[11]

The conflicting and, in many ways, diametrically opposed positions between the Federal and the Eastern governments on ways to handle the fallout from the horrifying carnage of 1966 in the North inevitably resulted in a stalemate. With the stalemate followed a drift at the governmental level and a new upsurge of bitterness below. As one writer later put it, 'Aburi was to die on the vine. The civilians had tried to produce a solution of their own (the Ad Hoc Conference in September, 1966) and failed, the soldiers had now, similarly, made an attempt and they also were to fail.'[12] In this condition, the use of force—Gowon's ultimate sanction—became unavoidable, if the disintegration of the
The decision itself to use force was a product of a combination of factors—domestic and external. The first of the domestic factors involved serious and mutually reinforcing misjudgements. The belief in Lagos that the East would not secede and the expectation in Enugu that Gowon would accept the *fait accompli* once the East seceded, given the withdrawal of key military personnel (mainly Ibos) from the Nigerian army. Gowon and his advisers hopelessly underestimated both the mood and the strength of secessionist forces in the East. It was his mistaken belief that, despite tough rhetoric, Ojukwu would in the final analysis accommodate himself to the new political design (multi-state federalism) for Nigeria and override pressures for secession which did not have the support of Eastern minorities. This glaring misperception of the intent and determination of Ojukwu and his colleagues may no doubt have contributed to Gowon's reluctance to initiate a preemptive action which some of his military colleagues were urging after the collapse of the 'Aburi Accord.'

The second set of domestic factors which triggered the military option was military-institutional and bureaucratic. The military-institutional factor pertains to the enormous pressure on Gowon from his colleagues in the military (especially, the late Murtala Muhammed) to preempt secession of the East, by force of arms.[13] This pressure was further
exacerbated by the intransigence and apprehension of Federal civil servants in Lagos who entertained little illusion about the ultimate objective of the Ibo-dominated Eastern government.

Commenting on the 'Aburi conundrum,' John de St. Jorre has, for example, noted that:

Meanwhile, the Federal civil servants in Lagos were passing a cold and critical eye over the document the soldiers had brought back so triumphantly. The more they read the more appalled they became for, whatever they thought of the integrity and intentions of Ojukwu and the Eastern military they had no doubts that their own former colleagues--top Ibo civil servants, like Francis Nuokedi, Pius Okigbo, and Cyprian Ekwensi--having lost all were hell bent on secession and would use the Aburi accord to further that end. They immediately wrote a devastating memorandum, punching holes through virtually every clause of the agreement, spelling out its unworkability, how it would lead to the break-up of the Federation, and adding a few gratuitous political ideas of their own.[14]

Thus, when the 'die was cast' five months later and the East finally seceded, these bureaucrats (many of whom originated from the Eastern minorities) became a major lobby for coercive action against Ojukwu and his colleagues. Such pressures from the minority communities in Lagos (both within and outside government) was not altogether unexpected. Since a successful secession of the East--as Obafemi Awolowo warned--would almost certainly have resulted in the dissolution of the federation,[15] the spectre of institutionalised
domination which minority ethnics dreaded could have become inescapably real. Conversely, the implementation of multi-state federalism would, as they rightly perceived, correct the burden of unequal citizenship which the minority groups has to bear in the First Republic. As A. H. M. Kirk-Greene succinctly noted:

...there was little reason to expect the minority leaders to let slip this chance to secure recognition of status denied them during the years of parliamentary opposition, political persecution, nugatory alliances with dominant Southern parties and open resistance that had been their lot over the previous decade.[16]

The determined assertiveness of minority groups constituted but only one facet of the larger public pressure on the Supreme Military Council to use force when peaceful persuasion and economic sanctions failed. Thus, P. Unongo has observed in this respect that:

An account of the events after Aburi until the East's secession five months later, a period which witnessed an irreversible lunge towards war, without some attempt to convey the feeling of the time and the attitudes of the ordinary people is like eating a dish of Nigerian pepper stew without the pepper. It was one of those rare, emotional times in history when it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to distinguish the roles of leadership and the led; first one, then the other seems to be making the running until events themselves appear to assume a terrible weight of their own and plunge everyone into the dark abyss.[17]
The call for military action against the East from the public emanated to a considerable extent from the North, alarmed by now in part by the prospect of inheriting a predominantly agrarian and landlocked economy in the event of the disintegration of the federal experiment. As a consequence, at a meeting of the Northern Emirs and leaders of thought a resolution of 'truly revolutionary character' was adopted. It stipulated, in essence, that:

1. The North is irrevocably committed to the creation of more states whether or not they are created elsewhere, as a basis of stability in the North; and

2. The Supreme Military Council should deal effectively with the defiance to its decision by the Governor of the East.[18]

This resolution, among other things, left Gowon and his colleagues in no doubt about what was tolerable to Northern elite and public opinion, since it in effect castigated the indecisiveness of the Supreme Military Council. As the resolution put it:

this failure and laxity on the part of the Supreme Military Council has tended to invite public ridicule and contempt of the council's decisions by the radio, the press and the politicians...[19]

Since any hope of maintaining a unified front by the Supreme Military Council against the Government of the Eastern region depend on the unreserved support of Northern and Western elites, the resolution in effect strengthened the determination of Gowon to use force against the secessionist
forces. Finally, developments in the international arena with profound bearing on the crisis within the country also reinforced the Supreme Military Council's decision to use force. Among these were i) the arms embargo by NATO countries against Nigeria, and ii) the undisguised and blatant intervention by France, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa on the side of the secessionist forces. Both developments considerably strengthened the resolve of Ojukwu and his colleagues and were seen by the Supreme Military Council as an affront which, if successful, would set a dangerous precedent for Africa in terms of giving impetus to secessionist forces who may find in 'Biafra' a model of viable ethno-national revolt to emulate.

In sum, therefore, the decision by the Federal Government to arrest the dissolution of the Nigerian federation by force of arms was the result of an intractable existential dilemma with which a number of post-colonial states in Africa have had to contend (Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire, etc.). From the viewpoint of the Supreme Military Council, the decision to use force was not simply the 'opposite of persuasion,' but a response to the limits of persuasion. Coercive violence, in this regard, was 'not simply the antinomy of peace, but a response to situations which are unyielding to pacific strategies...'[20] The war which resulted from the failure to reach a compromise lasted for two and half years, involving armed confrontation and horrendous loss of life on
a scale then unprecedented in black Africa. [21] That the federalists finally succeeded in subduing the secessionist forces owed more to superior military potential (the mobilisable resources of Nigeria in terms of infantry personnel, economic resources and purchasing power in the international market) rather than to any decline in the will to resist of the 'Biafran camp.' [22]

The next case study examines the use of military force against Chad and its significance in terms of Nigeria's defence posture. It will be noted that despite occasional provocations from neighbouring countries (Republique de Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroun) in the 1970s, this was the first time Nigeria resorted to its military instrument to preserve the status quo. Considering its previous declaration of a policy of 'good neighbourliness' (i.e. that Nigeria's neighbours had nothing to fear from its size and military might), does this incident initiate the beginning of a less tolerant attitude and posture on the part of Nigeria?

ii). Nigeria-Chad Conflict

Nigeria's resort to coercive violence to dislodge regiments of Chadian forces from the Island of Kinsara (April 1983) was a timely reminder of the chequered and potentially explosive situation on its highly amorphous frontier. The incident in the Lake Chad basin was preceded by another incident on the north-western border (Sokoto State) where troops from the Republic of Benin occupied several villages on the
Nigerian side of the frontier in April 1981. This incident drew a bitter reaction from the Nigerian public, but unlike the subsequent development in the Lake Chad (April-July 1983) did not result in a confrontation.

The Lake Chad basin had been identified as a potential flashpoint by Nigerian policy makers since the early 1960s. As a consequence, Nigeria initiated a collaborative venture (the Lake Chad Basin Commission--CBC) with Niger, Chad and Cameroun, to oversee the administration of their zones of convergence in the Lake basin (1962). A treaty--'Convention and Statute Relating to the Development of the Chad Basin'--was formalised and signed in May 1964, empowering the Commission to:

- prepare general regulations which, on approval by member-states, would be enforced by the Commission,
- to collect, evaluate and spread information,
- to recommend plans for joint projects and research,
- to maintain liaison between member-states,
- to formulate common transport and navigation rules, staff regulations, and administrative codes;
- to settle disputes after hearing complaints, and
- to prepare a budget which can be raised by member states through contribution.[23]

Like a number of other experiments in interstate cooperation in Africa, the Commission eventually lapsed into
obscurity owing principally to the evolving political climate in the region; especially to domestic crisis and instability in Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Thus, with the machinery (CBC) for resolving conflict in the Lake basin paralysed through neglect, it was only a matter of time that serious infringement of the vital interests of any one party drew a hostile response from other. This was the case in April to July 1983 when the Nigerian Government of Shehu Shagari unleashed its military forces on Chad on the latter's armed forces occupation of two strategic islands in Nigeria's territorial waters.

According to an official government news release in Lagos, serious fighting broke out (between April 18 and 24) when a patrol of 24 Nigerian soldiers sent to protect Nigerian fishermen on Kinsara Island came under unexpected attack from Chadian forces loyal to Hissene Habre.[24] Nine Nigerian soldiers were reportedly killed and the rest compelled to withdraw. Following this incident, the Nigerian theatre commander launched a combined air and seaborne assault against Habre's forces in the Lake Chad basin. The assault was intended to dislodge Chadian forces from the Islands they occupied, but as Africa Confidential noted:

There are indications that some junior Nigerian commanders near Lake Chad are not only trying to regain lost ground but to advance beyond the recognized border-points, to prove their mettle. ...It is widely recognized that the army has suffered from a sense of
frustration since OAU peace-keeping duties in Chad. During the Chad episode it was under strict political orders not to protect the Goukouni Weddeye administration against Habre's troops because this would have amounted to OAU 'interference'.[25]

The first phase of the fighting was officially ended on May 7, with the visit to Lagos of an official delegation from Chad, only to resume with elemental fury the next month, June.[26] This confrontation, as the London Economist observed, shows how difficult it can be 'to halt even the most pointless conflict.' Lake Chad, a huge area of shallow water and swamp, can vary in size between 4,000 and 9,000 square miles, according to the water level. It includes hundreds of islands (some of which appear and disappear) on which fishing communities live. The Nigeria-Chad border runs through the middle of the Lake, and there is a dispute about its exact line.[27]

However, as noted above, Nigeria's response to this particular incident cannot be understood or judged in isolation from earlier provocations involving its Eastern and Western neighbours (Cameroun and Benin). Institutional (military, legislature, and civil service personnel) and public (media, university students, trade unions and the masses) reactions to these 'unwarranted provocations' made it almost impossible for President Shagari to eschew the use of force in the Lake Chad Basin incident. As the Africa Research Bulletin notes:
Some newspapers have accused his government of once again being "spineless" in the face of "aggression", particularly unwelcome comment during the run-up to Nigeria's elections in August.[28]

Such an accusation was apparently directed against the strict operational limitation imposed on the generals in the conduct of the reprisal campaign against Habre's forces. As reported by Africa Confidential[29], following the latest coup in Nigeria, the political handling of the border battle with Chad infuriated nearly all senior officers involved and may have expedited the overthrow of Shagari's administration. It is not surprising that one of the ring-leaders in the coup--Major General Babangida--disclosed that the coup was first planned for July 1983, that is just after the cessation of hostilities in the Lake Chad basin.[30]

While from a purely military standpoint, the frustration of the officers can be understood, it has to be remembered that war as Clemenceau is reputed to have said, is 'much too serious a matter to be left to the generals.' It has been one of the distinguishing traits of the 'military mind'--the 'groupthink' factor--in conflict situations that operational imperatives tend to dominate all other aspects of policy. In this respect, General MacArthur's defiant comment in relation to the Korean stalemate--that 'in war there is no substitute for victory'--touches a responsive chord in most, if not all, military establishments.[31]
Nevertheless, if war is too deadly a business to be left to the generals, it is also much too serious to be left to the politicians. What is, therefore, required as Henry Kissinger has persuasively argued, is a 'dialogue between political and military minds.' As he puts it:

...a separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military policy to become identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an overconcern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are, in the area where political, economic psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely military advice."[32]

There is substantive evidence to support the view of a lapse in 'dialogue' between military and political elites during both the border crises of May 1981 (with Cameroun) and April to June 1983 (with Chad). The reason was, perhaps, primarily organisational. As the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Shagari had the constitutional power to 'determine the operational use of the Armed Forces,' subject, of course, to the provision of section 167 (4a) which empowered the National Assembly to amend the 'powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.' However, the President was required under section 131 of the constitution to seek advice from the National Defence Council on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity
The National Defence Council consisted of the President (Chair), the Vice-President, the Defence Minister, Head of the combined Armed Forces, and the Heads of the three services—the Air Force, the Army and the Navy. One significant omission was the Minister for External Affairs—Ishaya Audu. As was anticipated and forewarned by a number of Nigerian foreign policy scholars, this omission was to create avoidable divergences in crisis management between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Defence Establishment. It became fairly obvious from decision-making process during the two border incidents involving Cameroun (May 1981) and Chad (April to June 1983) that it was the Ministry of External Affairs rather than the National Defence Council, which became the dominant bureaucratic agent in the resolution of the conflicts. The military establishment's perception and position on the operational environment tended to be ignored or relegated. Given the potentially volatile and unstable (praetorian) civil-military relations in Nigeria, it was to be expected, as was reported at the time that a 'secret' meeting of senior officers, including Buhari, decided after the 'border fiasco' that the army would not support Shagari politically.

Despite such lapses in coordination among 'political and military minds' during the Lake Chad basin conflict, it is still to be commended that the Shagari administration's
skilful combination of 'stick and carrot' approach effectively contained the fighting before it escalated into senseless conflagration with incalculable consequences for the policy of 'good-neighbourliness' which Nigeria had carefully cultivated and formalised in the ECOWAS treaty. If the barrier was broken, there was no way of knowing the consequences and future ramifications of invading Chad. Yet the decision to use force against Habre's forces, arguably, underscores a new trend in Nigeria's defence policy posture towards its midget neighbours: a policy of measured response based on a compelling need for deterrence and restraint, if future armed infringements on its territory are to be effectively contained.

In the next and final section of this chapter, the role of the Nigerian military as an instrument of crisis management will be examined. As noted in the preamble to the present chapter (and consistently argued in the three preceding chapters), the utility of national military forces as instrument of security does not only reside in their expressive use (war making). They can also be employed coercively in order to influence the behaviour of opponents or in order to alter or preserve the status quo in the process of crisis diplomacy. However, as will be seen below, the function of military power in crisis situations, crucial as it is, cannot be exaggerated especially in a regional subsystem such as Africa, which is usually considered to be exceptional in its
development of the 'third basis' of security the definition of norms of behaviour reducing external threats from both within and outside the region.[36] The personality of leaders, the freedom of action they have in the national arena, and their bargaining skills are also important determinants of the outcome of crisis.[37] The latter factor—bargaining skill—is obviously crucial in the manipulation of threats, tacit or explicit, of impending military action.

Two major categories of case studies in crisis diplomacy or management will be considered below. First, at the interstate crisis-management level: the Nigeria-Cameroun border crisis of May 1981 in which consideration of military force (on the part of Nigeria) acted as a counter in the diplomatic bargaining that followed the killing of five Nigerian soldiers on routine border patrol. And second, at the regional-global crisis-management level: the interposition of contingents of Nigerian troops, either independently (as in Tanzania, 1964 or in Chad, 1979) or as a part of an international peacekeeping force (the Congo, 1960 to 1963, Chad, 1982 and Lebanon, 1978 to 1983), to help stabilise and seal off an explosive military situation until the bases of a more durable settlement can be established. The focus of analysis in this second category will be on Chad, since, unlike the Congo and Lebanon cases, Nigeria played a dominant role there both at the decision-making level and in the actual conduct of the peacekeeping operations.
b) Nigerian Military as Instrument: crisis management

i) Nigeria--Cameroun Border Crisis (May 1981)

The border crisis of May 1983 was--as widely reported--precipitated by the killing of five Nigerian servicemen on a routine border patrol by Camerounian gendarmes at Ikang on the south-eastern border of Nigeria. This incident highlighted some of the tension that has existed on the frontier between the two countries since the early 1960s. Part of the border problem had been to devise a mutually acceptable solution for controlling a frontier which until 1961 was no more than an administrative demarcation point between the Eastern region of Nigeria and the West Camerouns which had been mandated to Britain after the First World War. The UN-organised plebiscite of 1961 resulted in a 'reintegration' of the West Camerouns into the Republic of Cameroun. Conversely, in the north near Lake Chad, under a similar plebiscite, the people of Adamawa opted for association with Nigeria.

Thus, while the causes of the May 1981 incident were not recent, and details remain unknown,[38] the location permits a reasonable assessment of the circumstances which surround the tension in the area of the Nigeria--Cameroun frontier. The disputed area involves about 168 square miles of territory which was part of Nigeria until October 1961. It was
the continual border clashes in this area which flared-up in May 1981 and almost resulted in a war between Nigeria and Cameroun.[39] Initial speculation about the crisis touched on an alleged discovery of oil by Cameroun in this region at the very southern end of the frontier (around the Rio del Rey). However, from the Nigerian perspective (corroborated by incidents since the early 1960s), it is the movement of fishermen, especially Nigerians from Cross River State who have been frequently harassed by Camerounian patrols, that engendered the tension in the area and set the stage for the forceful response following the incident of 16 May 1981.

The handling of the crisis itself by the Shagari administration was to a considerable extent a classic case of crisis-management, involving a skilful combination of diplomatic bargaining and threat of coercive violence. Despite the jingoistic public outrage, the Nigerian government desisted from arbitrary retaliatory measures, while at the same time, impressing upon Cameroun (through an ultimatum and troop deployment) its determination 'to take actions it considers appropriate to protect the lives and properties of Nigerian citizens', if its demands were not met.[40] The eventual compliance of the Ahidjo government in the Cameroun with Nigeria's demand--compensation for the families of the victims and an apology--may be ascribed to a number of factors highlighted in Klaus Knorr's crisis model cited in
Chapter Three, section a

Preeminent among these were, first, Cameroun's estimate of the cost (financial, international loss of face, domestic political weakness etc) of complying with Nigeria's ultimatum. These costs were in the final analysis tolerable compared with the second factor: its estimate of the costs of defying Nigeria's ultimatum. These involved the calculation that Nigeria would actually execute the threat if defied (given its military capacity to do so and the unprecedented level of public outrage in Nigeria), and the probable consequence in terms of material and human losses. It was fairly obvious to the Camerounian authorities (as was confirmed to me in a number of interviews in Nigeria) that annexation of the disputed area was one of the ultimate objectives if retaliatory action had to be taken. A third factor was Cameroun's bargaining position and skill relative to Nigeria. The bargaining skill of a government is an important determinant of the outcome of crisis, that is, whether it 'ends in peaceful adjustment, or unresolved deadlock, or causes the eruption of military hostilities.'[41] Thus, one obvious strategy of the Ahidjo government was to endeavour to defuse the crisis through the passage of time by:

a) protracted negotiations (for example, acknowledging the incident while delaying response until its investigation was completed); and

b) offering minimal concessions to induce Nigeria into commitments that would make Cameroun's compliance with its ultimatum unnecessary (for example, Cameroun's
proposal for a joint commission of Inquiry into the incident).

As a justification for this proposal, the Ahidjo government spoke of 'several negative incidents'--involving alleged kidnapping of eight Camerounians, including a government official in January 1981--about which it never received a satisfactory explanation from Nigeria.[42]

Nigeria's rejection of this proposal (on the grounds that it had never worked in the past, apparently a reference to the defunct Permanent Joint Boundary Consultative Commission) drastically reduced the Ahidjo's government room for manoeuvre and increased the pressure for compliance. In the final analysis, it was arguably the second factor--Cameroun's anxiety or anticipation that Nigeria might resort to its military strength if its demands were ignored--that prompted its eventual compliance with the ultimatum. Such anxiety was not without reason, since Nigeria's military buildup in the disputed zone continued unabated throughout the crisis.

Despite the virulent (and in certain cases grossly uninformed and irresponsible) criticism of the Shagari administration's conduct of the crisis,[43] the President's refusal to permit, as he put it, 'any hasty recourse by us to military response in these situations until all diplomatic persuasions had failed'[44] was no doubt a commendable display of statesmanship. Such restraint had less to do with the 'spine-
lessness in the face of aggression as his domestic detractors charged, as a compelling cognizance of the 'classic constraint', which Nigeria, as an aspiring regional power would increasingly be called upon to live with. As one commentator rightly argued then:

Objective military analysis shows that Nigeria has the capacity to punish Cameroun militarily and can, if it chooses easily annex Cameroun territory with impunity. President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria was right in concluding that this line of action will serve no useful purpose bearing in mind Nigerian national character and African policy. Shakespeare's wise counsel that "it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant" is very appropriate and tends to support President Shagari's wisdom in exercising restraint and his reluctance to use Nigeria's military power against midgets like Cameroun.[45]

A military response to such provocation may undoubtably have engendered a sobering effect on Cameroun's military in the short-term. However, the long-term political fallout (especially if Nigeria had unilaterally annexed the disputed area) in terms of future ramifications for ECOWAS (see Chapters Three and Seven) is difficult to foresee. This notwithstanding, the imperative of national security (the protection of life, property and economic resources of the country) may in the long-run necessitate limited punitive measures as was recently the case in the Lake Chad basin. In a condition of tenuous civilian control over the military and widespread indiscipline among members of armed forces (as is
presently the case in many African countries), absolute adherence by Nigeria to the provision of international law relating to the non-use or threat of use of force in relations between states may be costly mistake. [46]

Mere public outrage and official government warning failed to deter elements of the Beninois armed forces from occupying Nigerian villages in Sokoto State (April 1983) or impressed Habre's forces in the Lake Chad basin (April-June 1983). In this respect, one cannot but sympathise with editorial sentiment expressed in Punch (Lagos), that, 'it is high time, therefore, that those who provoke her unnecessarily learnt that they cannot forever ride on Nigeria's lenience...' Unless and until this is done, there may be further attempts by midgets to test Nigeria's resolve and willingness to act swiftly in defence of her vital national interest...' [47]

Nevertheless, while subsequent events since 1981 have generally vindicated this editorial position, the inherent dangers of the logic of such argumentation call for circumspection. For example, since—as extensively argued in Chapter Three—it has been in Nigeria's security interest to expedite the demise of the French strategic presence in West Africa, a retaliatory defence posture on the part of Nigeria may only compel these countries to seek the protective umbrella of France as never before. The bilateral defence
accords which France signed in the early 1960s with francophone black African states (except Mali and Guinea) remain in operation in many countries. These accords afford France the right to 'intervene' at the request of the local government.[48]

The final case study in this section examined below is the peacekeeping function of the Nigerian military ('utility in non-use') as an instrument of crisis management. As already noted above, the primary focus will be on Chad, where the role of Nigeria was prominent, compared for instance, with its more marginal participation in both ONUC (the Congo) and UNIFIL (Lebanon).

ii) Chad and Pax Nigeriana

The civil disorder in Chad which surfaced in the mid-sixties as a revolt of the muslim North against the Southern Christian-dominated central government of Ngarta Tombalbaye had by the late 1970s stalemated into a fearsome contest for power between the two dominant wings of FROLINAT (Front for the Liberation of Chad): FAN and FAP. Allied to these two opposing factions (in a shifting pattern of alignment and realignment) were and still are other splinter groups, which, as will be seen below, have so far grossly complicated and confounded any hope of a coherent and comprehensive peace plan for Chad. These maverick groups include Mouvement Pour la Liberation du Tchad (MPLT) led by Abubakar Aburahaman.
Others are the Algiers-based wing of FROLINAT led by Abba Sadiq, the Peoples Liberation Army led by Mohammed Abba and the FROLINAT 'Vulcan Force' led by Acyl Ahmat.[49] It was in the context of this domestic imbroglio—with its regional and extra-regional linkages—that Nigeria intervened diplomatically in 1979 to reconcile the warring factions and restore civil tranquility in Chad.

Nigeria's intervention—involving its armed forces in a peacekeeping role—came in two stages. The first stage was initiated in 1979-1980, when the military administration of Olusegun Obasanjo, acting independently of the OAU, arranged several conferences for the warring parties in March, April and August 1979, resulting in the Kano and Lagos accords. The second initiative (and the more controversial of the two) came after Libyan intervention in Chad 1980-1982. This was coordinated at the OAU level, ostensibly to revitalize the peace process based on the Kano Accord; but in actual fact it became an anti-Gaddafi exercise with incalculable consequences for the restoration of peace in Chad. The two stages coincided with changes of regimes and actors in Nigeria with inevitable policy consequences for Nigeria's position on Chad.

The first stage of Nigeria's crisis diplomacy on Chad involved the dispatch in 1979 of a 'neutral force' contingent of the Nigerian military to Chad as part of the Kano Accord
of August 1979. This neutral force was to ensure:

a) demilitarisation of N'Djamena and the surrounding district up to 100 km;

b) control of the Chadian Air Force;

c) security of all important Chadian personalities,

d) enforcement of ceasefire; and

e) free movement of civilian population through Chad. [50]

For reasons to be seen below, the Nigerian contingent had to be withdrawn with the resurgence of civil strife following the breakdown of the Transitional National Union Government under the presidency of Goukouni Weddey. [51]

The second stage of the peacekeeping operation, as already noted, was coordinated at the continental OAU level following Libya's intervention. While undoubtably an OAU operation, Nigeria's inputs— in terms of decision-making, operational planning, deployment and command— was unmistakably immense. The decision to replace Libya's Islamic Legion with an Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (IAF) was made at a Nairobi meeting under OAU auspices in February 1982. It called for:

a) A ceasefire to go into effect no later than 28 February,

b) Negotiations between GUNT and FAN to begin no later than March 1 under OAU auspices in a country other than Chad,

c) A provisional constitution to be agreed upon during the month of April.
d) Legislative and presidential elections to be held between May 1 and June 30, and

e) Withdrawal of the Inter-African Force on June 30, with an elected President of Chad now presumably in place.[52]

By March 1982 nearly 4,000 troops (to grow to 6,000) of the Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (from Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal), under the command of Nigeria's General Ejiga, were patrolling Chad in pre-assigned 'operational areas.' Much like its predecessors, however, the IAF was compelled to leave in June in the wake of Habré's (FAN) onslaught and eventual capture of the capital, N'djamena.

In retrospect, the failure of the two peacekeeping operations in Chad raises a number of fundamental questions (both political and logistical) about the feasibility of such ventures which although they may have been forseen by their planners, were largely ignored. As noted in Chapter Three section (a) the success of any peacekeeping operation is inescapably dependent upon the readiness of the contending parties 'to give priority to the stifling rather than the free expression of their tendency to conflict.'[53] Chad's political maze--the existence of competing and mutually hostile armed factions--and regional and extra-regional dynamics which fueled the war, hopelessly nullified the prospect of generating a consensus on which the success of 'preventive diplomacy' through peacekeeping could be predicated or guaranteed. This conclusion is readily borne out in any
dispassionate post-mortem evaluation of the experiences of the two peacekeeping forces so far deployed in Chad (1979-80 and 1982).

In the first round of the peacekeeping operation, exclusively involving a Nigerian military contingent, the Habre-Weddeye and French factors became the decisive variables in the eventual failure of the implementation of the Kano Accord. Obviously dissatisfied with an arrangement (for domestic political reasons) which instituted his mortal enemy (Boukounni Weddeye) as the head of the Transitional National Union Government, Hissène Habre (Defense Minister and head of FAN wing of FROLINAT) eventually torpedoed—with undisguised French backing—the implementation of the Accord. Clearly aware of Nigeria's strategic objective in Chad—to secure the withdrawal of the 1,200-man French military presence—France not only hardened Habre's resolve to sabotage the series of accords on Chad in which Nigeria was the main architect, but also created problems for Nigeria's peacekeeping Force in Chad in 1979. According to Colonel Magoro, the commander of the Nigerian contingent:

The arrival of the Reconnaissance Battalion offset the French supremacy of ground troops and unleashed a wave of shock and panic. The French were left asking questions, such as, what do the Nigerian want? Is it the oil or uranium in Chad? They never believed we were there to see to the return of peace and harmony in a sister African country. They hurriedly brought in their heavier armoured vehicle, the Panhard.[54]
As noted in Chapter Three (section a), the French have reason to worry about Nigerian's military presence in any neighbouring states. Since the intervention of France on the side of the secessionist forces during the civil war (1967-70), Nigeria's policy makers have set as their primary objective the reduction of French influence in West Africa as a sine qua non of Nigeria's own national security. In any case, Habre's defection from the transitional government and open rebellion against Weddeye, with French military aid and logistic support radically altered the domestic political and military balance, thus compelling the withdrawal of the Nigerian 'neutral force.' Conversely, the transitional government under Weddeye, according to the Chadian Minister of Interior and Security Alhaji M. Sahid, had no alternative than to invite the Libyans under the longstanding defence agreement between the two states.

Much like the first initiative, the failure of the second attempt to create through peacekeeping a conducive atmosphere for political and social normalisation in Chad only highlighted the futility of such endeavour in the malign context of interrelated domestic quagmire and external complicity. In this respect, four pertinent factors which foreclosed any possible success for the inter-African peacekeeping venture may be briefly noted here.
First, the various factions in Chad were in an alliance under GUNT (the National Unity Government) only for tactical reasons which were not sufficient to sustain a strong central authority. Second, the conflict in Chad once internationalised became an appendage of regional as well as extra-regional interests and feuds—hence the network of American, French, Sudanese, Egyptian and Saudi Arabian participation in re-establishing Habre who was known to oppose Libya.

Third, Libya's intervention (on the invitation of Weddeye) and the subsequent announcement of a 'merger' provoked the hostile response of otherwise relatively non-chalant states such as Nigeria.[55] The 'merger' proposal refurbished the spectre of a Pan-Islamic Sahelian empire 'stretching from Chad to Port Sudan' in the minds of Gaddafi's detractors.[56] This signally undermined Weddeye's credibility and dependability as head of GUNT, and unleashed the chain-reaction of events and forces that led to his overthrow by Habre.

And finally, fourth, the conception and implementation of the peacekeeping operation itself left much to be desired. From the beginning, the IAF was more a collection of peacekeeping forces than one collective peacekeeping force; that is, an ad hoc arrangement with narrowly defined standards instead of an integrated peacekeeping regime with commitment less subject to independent national interpreta-
tion. Although nominally under the command of General Ejiga, the participating forces remained under the direction of their respective national defence establishment (Zaire, Senegal, Nigeria) instead of the OAU. This made a collective response to the changing internal environment difficult. As a consequence, from the outset the IAF was deployed without securing a ceasefire and pledged neutrality; so it stood by until Habre captured the capital N'djamena on 4 June 1982. No sooner had the capital fallen than the contributing states started to withdraw their troops. Thus, the OAU endeavour in Chad was defeated by the same forces that called for it in the first place.[57]

The debacle of the two peacekeeping experiments in Chad, in both of which Nigeria had been crucially involved raised a fundamental question about the propriety of such an approach to crisis management in the African context, that is, the suitability or advisability of peacekeeping as opposed to peace-enforcement (UN's approach in the Congo). Given the conflict dynamics in Chad, it is arguable that if the IAF was to accomplish its objectives, it should have been partial to the Transitional Government (endorsed by the OAU) against Habre's dissent. Like Tshombe, such a display of 'manifest intention' by the IAF would, perhaps, have forced Habre and his patrons to compromise. However, giving the paucity of resources available to the OAU, and the Byzantine nature of
African regional politics, the likelihood of securing even a limited consensus for any enforcement action was patently bleak. This was especially so, since with the stigmatising of Weddeye as 'Gaddafi's--hence Soviet--'agent', by the U.S., France, and their regional surrogates--Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia--, Habre's forces (FAN) came to enjoy lavish military and logistical support from the U.S. This was channelled through the 'Sadat Trail' (the East-West road across central Chad from the Sudanese oasis of al-Fashir) to the advancing Habre's forces by French and American intelligence officers. With such firepower at his disposal and the certainty of a sanctuary in Sudan, a UN-style enforcement actions, as that against Tshombe's forces in the Congo, would have been a formidable task for the IAF in the difficult and inhospitable terrain of Chad.

Conclusion

As an overall conclusion to this chapter, while the use and usability of the Nigerian military as an instrument of statecraft--security and crisis management--have been reasonably established in the preceding case studies, the frequency and effectiveness of their role in future contingencies remain a subject of speculation. Their salience will necessarily depend on a number of fundamental factors--domestic and regime stability, economic vicissitudes, and shifting regional and global dynamics--to be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter Five, therefore, represents an attempt to grapple with a question of central theoretical and empirical importance: why have Nigerian policy makers resorted to the military instrument at some times and places but not in others? In other word, why did the Nigerian government, for example, resort to military force against 'Biafra' and against Habre's forces in the Lake Chad basin and not against Equatorial Guinea, Republic de Benin, Cameroun or, for that matter, in support of the MPLA in Angola, despite enormous public pressure in favour of such intervention. Is there a pattern in Nigeria's appeal to military power such that one theoretical hypothesis can explain both the use and the more frequent non-use of the military instrument?

These questions are of major importance to any endeavour to understand or anticipate the future responses of Nigerian decision-makers in crisis situations. One primary consideration resides in the restraint factor (assuming that statesmen behave more or less rationally). The general hypothesis here is that several restraints have each combined to prevent Nigeria's resort to military power in a number of circumstances. For analytical purposes, these restraints will be grouped into two categories: domestic and systemic. The former includes a range of internal capability factors: military, socio-economic and political. The latter concern a set of systemic constraints (including what one analyst has termed 'the radius of effective military action'),[58] which may or not
inhibit resort to coercive measures depending on the circumstances of the particular situation. Given the historical cases examined in the present chapter, it will be argued that in terms of relative potency, the restraints on the use of Nigeria's military power generated by its weak military-industrial base and monocultural economy are perhaps paramount. These considerations constitute the focus of the next chapter.
NOTES


7. Confederalism as a constitutional concept refers to a 'loosely knit union' of basically sovereign states, formed usually for mutual defence and/or economic benefit. As a result unanimity is the catch-word in all decisions on all matters which affect them all, each state reserving the right to secede from the confederation. Federalism, on the other hand, entails that constituent parts or states surrender much of their sovereignty to the central authority; unanimity is not a precondition for joint actions and there is no provision for secession. The U.S.A., for example, began as a confederation and eventually became a successful federation. Perhaps, the only extant 'confederation' today is the E.E.C.

8. The principle of micro-nationalism asserts that what makes a nation is not the size of its population but its potentialities, the homogeneity of its people and the possibilities of a synthesis of its components in all their aspects. As a consequence, in the African context, ethnicity remains a viable and valid basis for statehood. Macro-nationalism, on the other hand, posits the possibility of constructing enduring political
relationships out of distinct ethnic collectivities of precolonial Africa. It rejects the introspective tendencies inherent in micro-nationalism and seeks ethnic amalgamation and supranational political unity as the only viable basis for survival in the world in which only 'heavy-weights' prevail. In the African context, therefore, macro-nationalism is generally associated with Pan-African aspirations. It has its roots, as Gordon Idang notes, 'deep in the historical contacts and the socio-cultural similarities among African peoples and is based on the sense of racial affinity (blackism) that sharing a common colour gives--though the shades of colour show a wide range.' Gordon Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 25. For a detailed analysis of shades of nationalism in Africa, see Festus Ohaegbulam, Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977) and Boyd Schafer, Faces of Nationalism (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovish, 1972), Chapters 9 and 10.


15. In his address to the meeting of Western Region leaders of thought at Ibadan on 1 May 1967, Awolowo evaluated the crisis in the country and made a number of recommendations which were then embodied in a resolution adopted at the meeting. The resolution states inter alia: 'If any Region secedes, 'the Federation as we know it shall cease to exist and Western Nigeria shall automatically become independent and sovereign'. African Research Bulletin, London 31 July 1967, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 77.

Briefly considered, the war developed through roughly five main phases:

a. **Phase One** (July 1967 to August 1967). "Police action" against Biafra and the invasion of the mid-west region by Biafran forces.

b. **Phase Two** (August 1967 to October 1968). Full-scale military operations against Biafra. Fall of Enugu, Onitsha, Calabar, Port Harcourt.


22. This contention is based on the invariant observations of most Nigerian field commanders and foreign journalists covering the war from inside 'Biafra.' Writing from his diary entries of 1969, John de St. Jorre, for instance, noted from interview with the Commander of the First Division—Mohammed Shuwa—that he, 'like most of his senior officers, does not think the Biafrans will suddenly collapse and surrender, German-style...In contrast with the out-of-touch view of the civil.
servants, diplomats and armchair pundits in Lagos, most of the officers I speak to up here have both a healthy respect for the Biafran's fighting capacity and some understanding of their motivation and will to fight...." St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, pp. 263-264.


30. Major General Babangida, now Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army, in an interview with Agence France Presse. See the editorial of West Africa, 30 January 1984, p. 195.

31. Admittedly, the exact meaning of Mac Arthur's statement has since been a subject of controversy. If, as some would claim, the General meant that 'prolonged and frustrating pseudo-negotiations that the enemy uses as a delaying tactic can be avoided by defeating him unequivocally, or at the least by establishing a clear military ascendancy and showing a readiness to use it,' then his perception was remarkably accurate. However, all the contextual indications are that Mac
Arthur was displaying a typical impatience, characteristic of a commander used to total involvement, for total victory: 'of carrying home the war to the enemy' and, in so doing, dictating rather than negotiating a settlement.


33. See M. Ofoegbu, "Foreign Policy and Constitution-Making: the degrees of inclusion and exclusion" and R. Akindele, "External Affairs and War Power under the Draft Constitution" both in Bolaji Akinyemi (ed.) *Foreign Policy and the Constitution* (Lagos: NIIA, 1979), pp. 30-52. Commenting on the exclusion of the Minister of External Affairs from the National Defence Council, Akindele, for example, wrote:

> If war is diplomacy by other means, as Clausewitz has correctly stated, it is rather difficult to understand why the Minister for External Affairs, charged with the statutory duty of assisting the president to formulate and implement foreign policy, has been excluded from membership of the Council (p. 48).

What is, however, impressive about the entire Lake Chad Basin episode was the quickness and decisiveness with which the politician Shagari dictated the limit of what was acceptable to the General. Thus reminding them that 'the subordination of the political point of view to the military, would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war, policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse.' Clausewitz, *On War* edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 598. Put differently, 'War' according to Clausewitz, 'has its own language but not its own logic.'


36. As noted in Chapter Two, countries within the African regional subsystem have sought to enhance their security in three principal ways: the creation of military forces sufficient to deter external threats or to beat
them off should deterence fail (e.g., Ethiopia and Nigeria); adherence to alliances (primarily bilateral) which supplement national capabilities (e.g., 'francophone countries' and France; Angola with Cuba), and the definition of norms of interstate behaviour which diminish or remove external threats. For discussion on the latter, see Chapter Five, (section b).


38. According to the Nigerian Minister for External Affairs, Ishaya Audu, the incident took place on the Nigerian side of the border separated from the Cameroun by the Ata Akate River. On the 15th of May, 1981, while returning North West of the village at Ikan following a night patrol duty, a platoon of Nigerian soldiers and five support boats were fired upon by a Camerounian support boat coming in the opposite direction. Five Nigerian soldiers, including a commissioned officer were killed in the first support boat and three seriously injured. The Camerounians fled from the scene. This account was neither confirmed nor denied by the Cameroun government. See West Africa, 2 May 1981, pp. 1149-1150.


41. Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, p. 110. See also Young, The Politics of Force, especially Part III.

42. West Africa, 8 June 1981, p. 1271.

43. See Daily Times, 1981 (Lagos), May 20, 26, 27, 30, 1981; Punch (Lagos), May 20, 21, 23, 1981; Daily Sketch (Ibadan), May 20 and June 3; and Nigerian Herald, May 29 and 30, 1981.

44. As quoted by Nnadozie Nwosu, "Africa's Border Wars—the Cameroun provocation and Nigeria's restraint", p. 923.

45. Ibid., p. 922.
46. See, for example, Claude Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: myth and reality", in Welch (ed.) Civilian Control of the Military: theory and cases from developing countries (N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1976), and David Goldsworthy, "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa", African Affairs, 80, 318 (January 1981), pp. 49-74.


51. Details of the unfolding conflict in Chad can be found, inter alia, in the contemporary issues of West Africa (London), Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Now (London), and New Nigerian (Lagos).


53. Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 319.

54. Magoro, "Nigeria's Peacekeeping Role in Chad", p. 10.

55. Libya's intervention in Chad was, in essence far, from inconsistent with the Lagos and Kano Accords which had the support of the OAU. As Tommy Imobighe rightly argued:

There can be no doubt that Libya's military intervention on the side of Goukouni's government was in order. Libya was invited
by the legitimate authority established in Chad in accordance with the Lagos Accord of August 1979. What Libya has done is to help in establishing the legitimacy of the accord and thus save the OAU from another embarrassing situation...Habre is still poised for action and the French are still prepared to back him if only to ward off the humiliation they suffered in the hands of Libya. T. Imobihe, "Libyan Intervention in Chad Security Implication for Nigeria", Nigerian Journal of International, Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2, (January and June 1980), p. 26.


Africa Confidential, Vol. 20, 23, 14 November 1979, p. 6. The 'merger' phobia was clearly blown out of proportion by the Western media. The communique between Chad and Libya merely alluded to the consolidation of the alliance between the countries (that is, the defence treaty of June 1980). It also states 'that the frontiers between the two countries will be opened' and affirms the continuation of (Libyan) support for the fraternal Republic of Chad in order to ensure the freedom and independence of its people and to eliminate the remnants of agents of reaction which cooperates with colonialism inside and outside the country'. See Alex Rondos, "What Libya-Chad 'merger' means." West Africa, 19 January 1981, pp. 97-99.

From available information, the Nigerian government's opposition to the so-called 'merger' was highly unpopular in some academic and official circles. The position of the later, was succintly represented by Sam Oyovbaire, who argued that:
Attempts to terminate the French factor in the political economy of Chad as Gaddafi assisted in doing ought to have been applauded by Nigeria. Indeed, it is an irony of Nigeria's African policy and its national security that it is Libya and not Nigeria that brought about the current state of affairs in Chad in favour of Goukoni Weddeye.


58. Ayuba Kadzai, Nigeria's Global Strategy (Lagos, NIIA, 1976), p. 8. The "radius of effective military action" essentially denotes the problems and costs of transmitting power over space. This 'loss-of-strength gradient' (to use Kenneth Boulding's phrase) appears to have been decisive in the decision of the Obasanjo administration not to send Nigerian troops to Zambia in 1979 at the height of the Zimbabwe conflict (see Chapter Five). To that extent, geography and distance remain important components in Nigeria's military policy. For an excellent analysis of this factor in strategic planning, see Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: a general theory (N. Y.: Harper, 1962), pp. 230 ff; and Jeffery Record, The Rapid Deployment Force (Washington, D. C.: Corporate Press, 1981), Chapter Three.
CHAPTER FIVE

Restraints on the Use of Nigerian Military Power

To provide sensible war plans based on actual capabilities of a state and in accordance with foreign policy objectives that are themselves both sensible and prudent poses one of the most difficult tasks of statecraft. A foreign policy objective beyond a state's capacity inevitably establishes requirements that military planners cannot meet.

Fred Greene[1]

There is an urgent need to define national goals, to determine their costs, to estimate the resources that will be available in the 1980's, and based upon the relationship between goals and available resources to draw up a scheme of national priorities. Foreign policy objectives must be brought into balance with the resource capabilities of Nigeria. To set objectives or to assume certain foreign policy first and then strain resources and distort domestic priorities in order to meet their concomitants in terms of military capability is to set the cart before the horse.

O.S. Kamanu[2]

As suggested in the conclusion to Chapter Four, the central focus of this chapter is on a question of major theoretical and empirical significance for Nigeria's defence and foreign policy posture. This is the restraint factor, which, as already noted, provides the conceptual and theoretical bases for understanding or explaining the apparent
contradiction of 'puzzle' in Nigeria's security policy. In specific terms, the restraint hypothesis attempts to answer the inescapable question why Nigerian decision-makers have resorted to the military instrument -- in pursuit of security and foreign policy objectives -- at some times and places but not others (see Chapters Three and Four). Is there a pattern in Nigeria's appeal to military power such that a general proposition can explain both the use and the more frequent non-use of the military instrument?

It is my primary contention in this chapter that one possible explanation of this seeming contradiction frequently highlighted in recent literature on Nigerian foreign policy[3] resides in the profound restraints on its policymakers (assuming their will to act in support of policy objectives). The general hypothesis in this context, therefore, is that several restraints have each combined to inhibit resort to Nigeria's military power in a number of circumstances - (Equatorial Guinea, 1974-75; Angola, 1975-76; Rhodesia, 1979-80) in which national sentiments, policy objectives and principles dictated such a response. As is the case with the precipitants or determinants of the use of Nigerian military power (examined in Chapter Three, Section B), these restraints can be classified according to their sources as internal or systemic. They can also be categorized according to the way in which they are generated as either direct or indirect. Furthermore, they can be concep-
tualised according to the way they inhibit the use of national military power as anticipatory or reactive; long-term or short-term. [4]

For reasons of analytical clarity, the disquisition below proceeds with three broad sub-sections: (i) thematic overview (determinants and effects); (ii) internal factors; and (iii) systemic factors. The last two sub-sections examine in greater detail issues highlighted in the first. The focus will be on two basic issue-areas: military-institutional factors, and socio-economic and political factors. The former involves the capability factor of the Nigerian military as it relates to its strategic environment (that is, the 'three concentric circles of Nigeria's security boundaries'). The latter includes a range of domestic and systemic constraints -- political, economic, social and psychological -- which may or may not inhibit resort to coercive measures, depending on the vitality of the issues and the climate of public opinion (see Chapter Four). In line with the general thrust of this dissertation, it will be asserted that these restraints on the instrumental use of Nigeria's military power represent prevalent tendencies which affect, but do not determine, governmental behavior. Actual or manifest behavior is always subject to a host of particular circumstances, and the use of military force does not of course vary greatly in this respect.
Determinants and Effects: an overview

In the appraisal of the 'modernist' versus 'realist' debate on the continued relevance of military force as an instrument of statecraft in the contemporary international system (Chapter One, Section b), three major issues were highlighted and examined in terms of their potency as restraining factors on the use of military force. These include the impact of the constantly changing dynamics of modern military technology (particularly nuclear weapons and delivery systems), complex interdependence (the growth of transnational forces and international interdependence), and the normative devaluation of force as a means of settling conflict. As indicated in Chapter Two, Section c, the first two factors are almost exclusive attributes of the industrial civilisation of the 'North' (as represented especially by the two formidable alliance blocs of NATO and Warsaw Pact), whose defence and foreign policy concerns are so firmly interlinked with those of the international system as to make them virtually indistinguishable.

This conclusion bears considerably less relevance for the utility of military power as an instrument of statecraft in the LDCs in general, and the African context in particular.[5] Several conditions singularly unique to this category of states fail to restrain resort to the military instrument or positively favour the generation of interstate conflict within this group (see Chapter Two, Section c).
The theoretical significance of this condition of multiple disorders and underdevelopment for the use of military force in Africa has been extensively analysed in Chapter Two. Unlike the industrially-advanced regional systems of Europe and North America, escalation of intra-regional conflict in Africa is structurally delimited by the relatively frail underlying socio-economic and technological fabric (the primary foundation of national military power). Within such a context, and given the weak linkage between the security of African states and central issues of global security in the nuclear age, short term war as an instrument of policy, whether for domestic or external reasons, is still a realistic option for many regimes. Conversely, given the stalemate in the central balance, wars by proxy (within defined limits) in the African subsystem appear to be a realistic, even attractive, option for superpower decision-makers (e.g., Nixon-Ford and Reagan carte blanche for South Africa's invasion of Angola).

A corollary of this argumentation is inescapably thus: that wars, whether internal or intra-regional, within and among states of the African regional subsystem -- as indeed in the broader context of 'Third World' states -- may be considered 'permissible' by dominant powers as long as they do not threaten to draw these powers into direct confronta-
tion with each other. [6] Hence, in terms of source and dynamic functioning, restraints on the use of military force by this group of states may be considered qualitatively different from those which discourage or operate to deflate resort to international violence among the industrial countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As Klaus Knorr has succinctly argued concerning the use and usability of military force in the LDCs:

... in their case, no special disincentive arises from the expectations about the cost of military conflict that obtain among the nuclear powers. As long as war is sure to be fought by means of conventional armament, the leaders of the non-nuclear countries do not share the syndrome of fears stimulated by the risks of nuclear war. They do not partake of any nuclear balance of terror. In this very important respect, therefore, they are not affected, at least directly, by some of the recent changes in the nature and utility of war. [7]

But if, as noted above, the predominant factors -- nuclear weaponry and complex interdependence -- which have made war 'unthinkable' among major industrial powers do not necessarily transfer into the African context, the same argument is not equally applicable to the third factor: normative devaluation of force as an instrument of national policy. Thus, as Mazrui and Zartman among others, have argued, Africa is considered to be exceptional in its development of a 'third basis' of security: the definition of norms of behav-
ior reducing threats to the stability of the states from both within and outside the region.[8] In this respect, three such norms — highlighted by Zartman in his 1967 article and Mazrui in his *Towards a Pax Africana* — are particularly instructive. The first is that 'intra-system solutions are preferable over extra-system solutions' — a logical derivative of the principles of non-alignment. It can be hypothesized in this regard that in a situation of military weakness and dependence (vis-a-vis extra-regional actors) general acceptance of this norm in the 1960s and early 1970s enhanced regional security by reducing the degree of external involvement (often by invitation) in African conflicts.[9]

A second norm is that territorial irredentism through the force of arms is not an acceptable policy alternative. And the third, prominent in the OAU Charter, is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The latter, of questionable propriety from the outset given the widespread lack of regime legitimacy in many African countries, was to become a thorny issue in intra-regional affairs in the 1970s (Tanzania's involvement in Uganda) as it was in the 1960s (Nkrumah's Ghana versus its francophone neighbours and the recognition of 'Biafra' by a number of African states). Its prominence in the OAU Charter was apparently based upon several implicit judgements with respect to the effect of military or subversive interference on the basic values of the target state: that interference both
prolongs and intensifies the conflict which provoked it, increasing the number of casualties and refugees and the level of physical destruction in the target environment; that it thereby jeopardises economic development; that it erodes national sovereignty; and that it is politically destabilising. As a consequence the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 to remove a regime widely considered an embarrassment in the region met widespread condemnation and received only minimal support at the Monrovia OAU summit later in the year. [10]

Taken together, however, while these three 'core norms' reflected, and to an extent governed, state behaviour in OAU Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s, it is nevertheless to be noted that the increasing incidence of intra-regional conflict and external intervention in Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s is indicative of a profound erosion of this normative basis of interstate relations in this region. [11] S.N. McFarlane, for example, has convincingly argued — partly as a rebuttal of Bolaji Akinyemi's assertion that the OAU, rather than seeking to resolve conflicts, strives to insulate them from 'non-African factors' — that the increasing number of interventions in this period not only reflects but fosters the erosion of previously accepted norms, for, in the absence of a 'supranational authority' capable of enforc-
In his analysis, the author argues that compliance is based on mutual interest and the expectation that others will comply. For this reason, he contends:

> It is legitimate to question whether the conventional characterizations of inter-African relations in terms of principles such as the non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, general acceptance of the territorial legacy of imperialism, the commitment to pan-Africanism, and multilateral conflict resolution are still valid, and, if they remain so, how long this will last.

One aspect of this erosion of the normative basis of interstate relations in the evolving dynamics of African politics, is the apparently greater willingness of regional actors to augment their operational military capabilities under the military assistance program (MAP) of extra-regional actors. Another aspect is the greater tendency of regional actors towards vigilantist activism (see Chapter Two, Section 0). The consequences of these shifting parameters in regional politics have been a veritable conflict spiral, as each violation of these norms challenges the expectation about compliance. As the latter becomes increasingly untenable, it is to be expected that regional actors will move further towards seeking other means of guaranteeing their security and pursuing parochial interests. This seemingly inexorable trend is in turn undoubtedly greatly amplified or exacerbated by crippling and fundamental sources of regional
disorder and adverse systemic condition; that is, on the one hand, by the effects of weak state structures, fragile domestic political institutions, lack of societal consensus, distorted economic development and lack of regime legitimacy, and on the other hand, by the way in which systemic variables (particularly the renewed and viciously combative ideological conflict between the superpowers) impinges once again on the core values of the African states. As explained in Chapter Two, given certain continental and global conditions, these two sets of factors -- domestic and systemic -- create an environment of insecurity and instability in which interstate rivalries, encouraged as they are by the policies and actions of extra-regional forces, are relatively easily transformed into overt military hostilities.

Shifting from global and regional to a national level of analysis, it is to be contended below (Section c) that normative restraint as a controlling factor in Nigeria's defence and foreign policy behaviour has been considerably diluted since the 1970s. This is the unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from any review of the perceptions and attitudes of Nigerian policy-makers towards the use and usability of national military power as an instrument of policy in Africa (see Chapter Three, Section c). The prime example of this departure from the position of excessive concern for the normative stipulations in the OAU Charter (a departure partly expedited by the refusal of OAU Chairperson Moi, to grant
Nigeria's request for an investigatory commission about the use of military violence was the forceful responses of the Shagari administration to the border crises involving Cameroun and Chad in May, 1981 and April-June 1983, respectively (Chapter Four, Section b). This constituted a clear volte face from the Obansanjo administration's pious, if incomprehensible (to many), reactions (i) to the proven massacre of Nigerian nationals in Fernando Po (Equatorial Guinea) and (ii) to Tanzania's decisive action against the decrepit and xenophobic dictatorship of Idi Amin. On the former case, the administration resisted public pressure to pacify and annex the island of Fernando Po, despite persuasive strategic and demographic arguments in support of such action. The rejection, as Alaba Ogunsawo explains, was based on the grounds that it would amount to an invasion of a sister African country, contrary to the charters of the OAU and the UN and previous Nigerian declarations to the effect 'that Nigeria's neighbours had nothing to fear from Nigeria's size and military might'.[14] Such a position is clearly in accord with the second normative principle cited by Mazrui and Zartman: 'that wars of conquest were not acceptable policy alternatives'.

In the latter case -- opposition to Tanzanian invasion of Uganda -- the administration's position was avowedly based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the implied assumption that 'any people
have a right to remove their government when it becomes tyrannical; but this is not a right extended to the government of another state, no matter what pretext it put forward in such an exercise'.[15] As debatable as this argumentation might be in the context of Amin's Uganda, the administration's pronouncement was vigorously articulated by then Head of State, General Obasanjo, in an address to the OAU summit in Liberia in July 1979:

We saw our duty as being to condemn, to warn, and to bring whatever pressure we could bear on the constituted government of Uganda to curb its excesses and return to the path of morality and decency. We never saw it as our duty, and we did not see it as the duty of any other country, to forcibly effect a change in the government of another country on the grounds that we do not agree with the ideology, style or morality of that government and under any smoke screen. Such an intervention creates a dangerous precedent in African inter-state relations, the consequences of which are unimaginable.[16]

In the context of this dogmatic preoccupation with the normative precepts of the OAU Charter, which the Obasanjo administration tended to share with its predecessors, the proclivity of the successor government towards force -- arguably more out of frustration than choice -- serves to reinforce MacFarlane's prognosis. However, while a demonstrable difference can be established in practice about the extent to which policy considerations have been guided by 'the non-
conflictual rule-governed character of inter-state relations in Africa between the Shagari administration and its predecessors, a clear distinction has to be made about the precepts and applicability of these normative guides to OAU Africa and the albinocracies of Southern Africa.

In this regard, Nigeria's drive since the early 1970s in support of bona fide indigenous governments in Angola and Zimbabwe short of military action is to be ascribed less to normative considerations than to military impotence. Indeed, with the possible exception of the Balewa era, Nigeria's position on the role of military force in the decolonization of Southern Africa has been remarkably consistent. On this view, General Murtala Muhammed's declaration that 'there was no reason why Nigerian soldiers should not go and fight in South Africa alongside the liberation forces, whatever the obstacles',[17] was, and still is, revealing of the prevailing climate of opinion in the officer corps of the Nigerian military, as several interviews by the writer confirmed. The ultimate driving force behind this sentiment is perhaps psychological. In the words of the late Tom Mboya: "The liberation of Southern Africa is essential, not only for its own sake, but also for the African in the eyes of the world -- and also in African eyes too ... As long as any part of Africa remains under European rule, we do not feel that Africans will be regarded in the right way".[18] Thus, in principle, Nigeria's commitment to a military solution --
the basis of the Gowon and Obasanjo administration's proposal for a Pan-African Task Force -- in Southern Africa is unquestionable. However, Nigeria's actions so far -- reliance on diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions (e.g., against Britain over Zimbabwe), logistical and financial support for liberation movements -- falls short of a full scale defensive or offensive military action and is primarily a consequence of certain domestic and systemic restraints in Nigeria's operational environment.

These restraints, as already noted, are partly military, and partly socio-economic and political. A detailed examination of these factors constitutes the subject-matter of the two sections below. For analytic reasons (albeit critically cognizant of their contextual convergence or linkage) these restraints on the use of Nigerian military power are classified according to source -- internal and systemic -- while their influence dynamics -- direct or indirect; long-term or short-term; anticipatory or reactive -- will be highlighted as the examination of the variables proceeds. Conversely, the current effort underway (armed forces modernisation and its military-industrial adjunct) to grapple with and relieve these paralysing constraints on the production and use of the military instrument will be considered in the next chapter.
b) **Internal Factors**

Generally considered the use and usability of national military forces (either for threatening, deterring or war-fighting) is a function (i) of how military capabilities of possible opponents compare quantitatively and qualitatively in military effectiveness; (ii) of the stakes involved in a clash of interests; (iii) of the skill of statesmen and military leaders; (iv) of the propensity of governments and generals to accept risks and to behave rationally; (v) of the character and strength of domestic political support; and (vi) of normative, political and legal restraints.\[19\] But it is also a function, it may be added, of the 'technostructure' (to use Galbraith's terminology) of the state in question since, as O.S. Kamanu has argued, 'ultimately the military capability of any state is a function of its economic and technological level of development'.\[20\]

Critical deficiencies in any one or combination of these 'issue areas' -- especially in the vital economic and technological base -- may seriously undermine the use and usability of national military power as an instrument of statecraft.

As Samuel Huntington trenchantly explains:

The most distinctive, the most fascinating, and the most troublesome aspect of military policy is its janus-like quality. Indeed, military policy not only faces in two directions, it exists in two worlds. One is international politics, the world of the ... subtle and brutal uses of force and diplomacy to influence
the behaviour of other states. The principal currency of this world is actual or potential military strength: battalions, weapons, and warships. The other world is domestic politics ... . The currency here is the resources of society: men, money, material. Any major decision in military policy influences and is influenced by both worlds. A decision made in terms of one currency is always payable in the other. The rate of exchange, however, is usually in doubt.[21]

This observation highlights, in a nutshell, the persistent dilemma and pivotal source of the current discrepancies between Nigeria's foreign and defence policy posture and its projectable military power (see Chapter Three, Section a). Its principal 'currencies' in both worlds, of its security or military policy -- on the one hand, 'battalions, weapons, and warships', and, on the other, skilled manpower, money, and material -- are grossly overvalued. It shares with the great majority of the LDCs the constraints of 'military policy dynamics in the contemporary context of peripheral capitalism'.[22] Nigeria's basic problem in conducting an effective 'military policy', therefore, resides in or is reflective of its relatively frail underlying socio-economic and technological fabric. In the disquisition below, primary consideration will be given to three dominant internal restraint factors -- military capability, socio-economic and political -- besetting the use and usability of Nigeria's military power as an instrument of policy.
1) Military -- Capability Factor

Since the crux of defence or security policy is the relation of force to national purposes, military capability, by definition, constitutes a fundamental direct restraint on a state's use of force. Thus, from the decision-maker's standpoint, any consideration of the Nigerian military as an instrument of national policy hinges inescapably on how it compares quantitatively and qualitatively in operational effectiveness with possible opponents. That is, the capacity and the viability of the Nigerian armed forces to function adequately as an instrument of statecraft cannot be computed in isolation; it must need relate to the strategic environment (both the physical geography and the balance of forces between Nigeria and its potential adversaries), strategy and tactics, and available technology.

As will be seen in the next chapter, however, given the variability of factors involved -- organisation, doctrine, equipment, leadership, training, experience and morale, all in a condition in which contingencies are hard to foresee -- such a comparison of national military capabilities is extremely difficult to establish with a high degree of certainty. As Knorr has succinctly noted:

Many people believe that armies and navies are military power, or that great national wealth is economic power, and they are inevitably puzzled when, in real
life, superior national power, so defined, fails to coerce a weaker state, or when the superior power gets bested by an inferior one.[23]

A more realistic approach, therefore, of determining or assessing the comparability or readiness of the Nigerian military establishment to meet the challenges of its security role and mission is to integrate both national capability and intentions, and to do so within a broad picture or framework of its foreign and defence policy objectives and posture. The justification for this approach becomes clearer once a distinction is made between maximalist and minimalist definitions of role and mission, between 'conjecture' and 'prediction', between major and minor issues, between 'behavioural' and 'technical' surprise, and between actual and potential capabilities, in Nigeria's defence planning and goals.[24] Within such a context, the question of Nigerian military capability ceases to be a first-order question (a 'what is' question), and becomes a locational and conceptual (doctrinal) question (a 'where' and 'how' question). In short, seen in a slightly different light, the capability factor of the Nigerian military becomes a question of the inherently variable interconnection between the character and structure of national military power and the parameters of strategic doctrine. The latter, as Kissinger splendidly notes, defines:
The likely dangers and how to deal with them, to project plans for attaining them. It must furnish a mode of action for the circumstance it defines as "ordinary". Its adequacy will be demonstrated by whether these events do in fact occur and whether the forces and procedures developed in anticipating them are adequate to deal with the real challenges.[25]

Viewed in such terms, considerations of Nigeria's military capability assume a further dimension beyond a simplistic and static quantitative comparison between its overall force level and striking power and those of its potential adversaries (especially, South Africa, and, as some commentators would assert, Libya).[26] It becomes preeminently a situational and doctrinal question; that is, how the perceived threat (from these countries) is manifested and whether the forces and procedures developed in anticipating them are adequate to deal with the real challenges'.[27] Hence, strictly speaking, Nigeria's military power exists only in relation to particular other nations and regarding particular conflict situations.

For example, given the perceived threat posed by apartheid South Africa to Nigeria's security (see Chapter Three), the fundamental imperative for its defence planners becomes essentially that of determining, on the one hand, the nature and situational conditions in which this threat might be manifested (direct or indirect), and, on the other hand, the priority structure (offensive or defensive) for dealing with
such challenge. Thus, if South Africa's threat to Nigerian security is rated indirect (such as its support of secessionist forces during the civil war or aiding any of the neighbouring states in a military showdown), then it would be appropriate to conclude that in terms of military capability, Nigeria is presently adequately prepared to 'furnish a mode of action for the circumstance it defines as ordinary' (see Tables 5.1 to 5.4). As Harold Nelson has observed, 'Although South Africa possesses well-trained and equipped armed forces, it is some 2,000 miles from Nigeria — well beyond the range of its ability to sustain a protracted military operation'. [28]

Conversely, if South Africa's threat — for contingency reasons — is deemed direct (such as a retaliatory submarine attack on Nigeria's oil-facilities, for aiding the liberation forces in South Africa), then Nigeria's capacity to deter or beat off such a threat — especially its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability — is still to be considered minimal. Nigeria's oil installations — the country's economic life-blood — are vulnerably concentrated along the coastline, a situation that led the Nigerian defence planners in the 1970s to expand the Navy significantly at the expense of other services (Table 5.4). It should be noted, however, that even for a major military power such as the United Kingdom, absolute protection for its coastal installations (e.g., North Sea oil platforms) is an impossible task. Pre-
venting or deterring an attack on these installations by a
hostile power inevitably thus resides in the credibility of
its retaliatory power.

In terms of the priority structure for dealing with
South Africa's threat, however, the enormous restraint
imposed by the current level of Nigeria's military capability
is readily visible when a shift of focus is made from defens­
ive to offensive strategic option. In the former case, as
noted above, the primary 'radius of effective military
action' is essentially Nigeria's territorial threshold or the
'innermost circle' of its security environment. Within this
sphere the totality of Nigeria's putative military power
(both actual and potential) becomes the preponderant factor
in resisting threats to its national security. In the latter
case -- offensive strategy -- the cost of 'transmitting power
over space' (the 'loss-of-strength gradient', to use Kenneth
Boulding's phrase)[29], the physical geography of Southern
Africa, as well as the defensive and offensive capabilities
of the South African military necessarily become cogent fac­
tors in any decision by Nigeria to use force. It is on this
consideration that one may legitimately argue that the cur­
rent (actual) force capability of Nigeria -- its military­
industrial base and its externally projectable military power
-- is hopelessly inadequate (Table 5.2).
However, even within this problematic context of offensive strategic option, a distinction has to be made between minor and major commitments. The former may involve logistical aid and operational support for the liberation movements. A cardinal example was the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) logistical operation from Tanzania in support of the Patriotic Front forces based in Zambia and Mozambique, at the height of the war of independence in Zimbabwe (1978-80). In this respect, as John Ostheimer and Gary Buckley have noted, the growing air mobility of NAF transport command -- two squadrons of nine C-130 Hercules aircraft, six C-47 transports, 12 F-27 friendship transports, twenty DO-27/28 utility aircraft, and six CH-47 Chinook helicopters -- are presently adequate to support such ventures. For example, the nine C-130 Hercules aircraft (range 4,000 miles) are each capable of carrying up to either 90 fully equipped combat troops or several light and medium military vehicles or artillery pieces, while the six CH-47 Chinook helicopters are each capable of carrying up to forty combat troops.[30]

It is, nevertheless, in terms of a major role commitment -- either as part of a Pan-African Task Force or independently in a Cuban style interventionary role in Angola -- that the profound restraint imposed on Nigerian decision-makers by current capability of its military forces can readily be appreciated. In quantitative terms, this can be seen in the trifleness of the striking power of Nigeria's armed forces
vis a vis South Africa. For example, against South Africa's 313 combat aircraft, Nigeria can at present mobilise only 45 support fighters and interceptors (with 18 Jaguars on order); against the former's 250 main battle tanks (Centurion and Olifant), Nigeria currently commands 100 T-55, unspecified number of Vickers and 50 Scorpion light support tanks. The balance of forces of both countries' major naval systems are fairly equal. However, since in an offensive role the attacker has to expose himself to damaging counter measures (as the recent British campaign in the South Atlantic clearly indicated) and, ceteris paribus, requires several times as many men and resources, the current naval strength of Nigeria can hardly be considered adequate for the purpose of establishing a clear military ascendancy over South Africa in the Namibia theatre, for instance.

In qualitative terms the peripheral designation of Nigerian defence system can be readily seen in the rudimentary or nascent nature of its military industrial complex (see Chapter Seven, Section c). This is manifest in the type of weapons produced (assault rifles, armoured cars and support vehicles, bombs and ammunition), the level of defence industrial production capability, and the age of technology — 'vintage' and 'intermediate' military components and systems rather than the 'advanced', 'lead-edge', or 'critical' technologies manufactured in the industrialised countries. Furthermore, since organised R and D (Research and Development)
is a crucial determinant of national technological capacity. Its continued relegation in Nigeria's defence planning in favour of 'quick-fix' solution — licensed production and systems assembly — can only undermine independent decisions concerning the use and usability of national military power. In this regard, assertions such as Col. Oduwole's (the Deputy Director of the Armoured Corps of the Nigerian Army) that 'national self-defence is too important to be subjected to the whims and caprices of foreign states' is rather cold comfort.[31]

This notwithstanding, the combined effects of these paltry qualitative indices of Nigeria's overall military capability is generally inconclusive when viewed in the context of the prevailing technology in its strategic environment. At any given period, a country's selection of the appropriate level of military technology is more realistically determined by, inter alia, the form of warfare in which it believes it is likely to become engaged rather than by an a priori definition of what ought to be the contemporary standard of sophisticated military technology. Since the African Subsystem constitutes the critical focus of Nigeria's defence planning, the so-called 'intermediate' technology (the 'currency' of Third World military systems) rather than the 'advanced' technologies of the arsenal of industrialised powers, is quite appropriate.[32]
In the above context, the 'vintage' notation of the Nigerian military delivery systems does not necessarily put it at a disadvantage vis-a-vis its major adversary -- apartheid South Africa. On the contrary, although benefitting considerably from the west transfer of military technology from the West (especially the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy as well as Israel), South Africa's defence industries are, for the most part, producing technologies that were researched, designed, and developed thirty years ago. The Mirage F1AZ/111 C2, Impala II and Canberra bombers which constitute the most important components of South African Air Force, are basically products of 1950s technology. For example, the Mirage ground attack fighter, equipped with the French designed EUD Aida II radar and fire control system, has only limited all-weather capabilities and only moderately effective air-to-air ordinance delivery equipment (compared with the Nigerian air force MIG-23 Foxbat, Alpha jets and, soon to be delivered, Jaguar deep penetration strike aircraft). Furthermore, although having one of the best military-industrial outlays on the continent, the level of dependence on foreign input is still inordinately high (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). For instance, although South Africa's Ratel infantry combat vehicle is usually cited as 'indigenous' product, critical components of this vehicle (such as the turret, diesel engine, gears, transmission, wheel systems, electronics, optics, and 90 mm...
gun) are either imported or produced by foreign companies in South Africa. Keeping these companies operational in the face of the rising challenge to the legitimacy of the regime and the socio-political order could be a herculean task in the future.

In the short-term, however, one cannot escape the historically invariant conclusion that despite these pervasive shortcomings in South Africa's military-industrial complex, its growing domestic capability for weapons production has -- unlike Nigeria -- reduced the level to which complete dependence on foreign sources hinders its manoeuvrability and independence in defence policy. As has been widely noted in the literature, arms transfer from developed to less developed countries have created a new form of dependency.[34]

This dependence, as Marek Thee has argued:

Inevitably ... contributes to the establishment and consolidation of a patron-client relationship. Modern arms require high technological know-how, maintenance capabilities, and a developed infrastructure. As technology is making fast strides, and its mainstay rests with the great powers, those receiving the arms become dependent for a long time on the flow of spare parts, technical assistance, and training. This process is reinforced by parallel economic pressures.[35]

Some LDCs have sought to circumvent the pernicious consequences of this 'patron-client relationship' either by an aggressive commitment to domestic production of major weapons
systems (albeit with foreign technical assistance as the cases of South Africa, Israel, Brazil and India) or by an explicit policy of diversifying their sources for arms to ensure reliability or dependability and reduce supply vulnerability. As will be seen in the next chapter, while Nigeria's mode of arms acquisition had in the 1970s emphasized the latter, the trend in its defence planning in the 1980s (with the completion of the Steyr and Fiat plants in Kano and Bauchi, respectively) is unmistakably in the former direction. However, the resurgence of the mercantilist ethics and the infatuation with Western markets in the Shagari era (as reflected in the most recent major weapons acquisition for the Nigerian armed forces) has significantly undermined the extent to which the strategy of diversification can enhance Nigerian government's independence in decision-making concerning the use of force.

This inherent contradiction in Nigerian defence policy and planning has been the recent focus of controversy in academic and media circles as the two quotations below succinctly highlight:

...the steps a poor country like Nigeria could take to deter or repel military attacks from a great power are by no means clear. To begin with, given the prevalence of neocolonial economic ties in Africa the most plausible potential threats would come from the Western powers who have vested economic interests to protect -- all members of the NATO alliance -- the same countries that sup-
ply Nigeria with a large proportion of its military hardware. In a showdown with any of them the others would put an immediate embargo on the shipment of arms and spare parts to Nigeria. To hope to deter attacks through the massive purchase of arms from these same powers is a costly delusion.[36]

Since Nigeria buys largely from the West, her ability to prosecute a war may have to depend on Western support. Since any threat to Nigerian territory would, most likely, come from a country supported by one of the Western countries, one wonders to what extent the country would be able to satisfy her security requirements.[37]

This fundamental flaw in Nigerian defence planning, berated above by Kamanu and Vogt, has been compounded in the Second Republic by the unpublicised presence of a large number of British instructors at the new Defence Staff College of Jaji. Since in recent times foreign military advisors have become instruments of subversive diplomacy as they have been used by their home states to penetrate host state security systems and to infiltrate its armed forces (e.g., the United States and Allende's government in Chile), the virulent disapprobation about the British instructors presence at the Staff College from the Nigerian public (the media and university dons) cannot be dismissed lightly. This is particularly so, given the extensive links and cooperation between the British Intelligence Service (MI5) and its South African counterpart (BOSS).[38]
This disquieting consideration notwithstanding, unless and until fundamental changes are initiated in Nigeria's pattern of arms acquisition, the presence in the country of foreign military advisors is almost foreordained by governmental policy. The efficient operation of sophisticated modern military hardware requires industrial infrastructure and competent technical manpower. Given the present low level of maintenance capabilities (exacerbated, as I was told in an interview with a Colonel in the Ordinance, by a massive exodus of highly skilled personnel into the civilian sector),[39] underdeveloped infrastructure, and generally nascent level of technological know-how, the acquisition of sophisticated weapons entails dependence upon the arms supplying state for technical advisors and training instructors. Such dependence may of necessity continue, as the need to keep up with the changing dynamics of military technology and gadgets ties the 'recipients indefinitely to the apron strings of the suppliers'. Along with such a dependence is the inescapable erosion of the ability to respond independently to challenges in the security environment.

As a state whose military power critically depends on externally acquired weapons systems, Nigeria arguably cannot exercise independent initiative on matters relating to war and peace as suppliers retain veto power through their ability to withhold vital supplies. Since arms transfer has become one of the most handy instruments of persuasive or
coercive diplomacy, the promise or initiation of arms supplies or its reduction, stoppage as well as the provision or denial of spare parts, ammunition, ancillary supplies, training or technical assistance can all be used and routinely utilized as political leverages for controlling or shaping the policy of recipient states. This was the bitter lesson the Federal Government of Nigeria had to endure at the onset of the civil war; it was also the unforgettable lesson of Argentina during its recent confrontation with Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Such an enervating condition is not altogether lost to an increasingly vocal circle of the Nigerian officer corps, especially the retired ones. [40] Neither are the noxious consequences of dependence upon foreign sources for arms unamenable to mitigating strategies. [41] Since, as Vogt has plausibly argued, any threat to Nigerian security would, most likely, "come from a country supported by one of the Western countries", Ayuba Kadzai's proposal of reliability (in political terms) as the pre-eminent principle and guide to arms acquisition deserves serious consideration. [42] This principle clearly underlined the pattern of arms acquisition of some of the most operationally capable and effective armed forces on the continent: Libya, Algeria and Ethiopia under Mengistu Mariam (see Chapter Six, Section c).
Beyond this consideration, however, while in the immediate term the flimsiness of Nigeria's projectable military power constitutes a fundamental restraint on its use of force beyond its borders in a major engagement role, for all intents and purposes Nigeria's military potential (that is, the capacity to expand or improve existing military forces) has to be seen as an integral and decisive factor of its putative military power. With a GDP of approximately $70 billion, Nigeria has the latent capacity to rival the striking power of any potential adversary on the continent, including South Africa.\footnote{43} This, as noted in Chapter Four, was the case during the civil war when operational requirements necessitated optimal expansion (qualitative and quantitative) of the federal armed forces from 8,000 in 1966 to 250,000 by 1970.

Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next chapter, just how much and how quickly Nigeria can augment its military capability under the 'fog of war' will inevitably depend, among other things, on (a) the strength of its economic base at the given time, (b) its trained reserves, (c) its industrial capacity, political control, technological skill, and (d) its internal communication and preplanning for mobilization. These variables constitute critical domestic socioeconomic and political underpinnings for the production and use of military force. Their paltriness (underdevelopment)
in any polity (such as Nigeria) may seriously restrain the use and usability of military force as an instrument of policy. This will be the focus of the next two sub-sections.

11) Socio-Economic Factors

Since the production, maintenance, and use of armed forces requires a variety of goods and services, competing social and economic demands -- especially in a developing and sometimes democratic polity such as Nigeria -- set definite limits to decisions concerning the use of military force as an instrument of policy. The opportunity costs of generating and employing the military, as Knorr has succinctly argued, equal the alternative uses of productive capacity (labour, technology, natural resources, real capital -- in the form of factories, power dams, communications networks, inventories of material, educational establishments, etc.) that have been forgone. The reason, will be seen in the next chapter, is that military or security policy -- the relation of force to national purposes -- inescapably hinges on structural decisions involving the procurement, allocation, and organisation of the men, money, and material which ‘go into the strategic units and uses of force’. In a condition of limited resources -- especially in foreign exchange reserves -- such an allocation invariably engenders fundamental conflicts between those purposes which relate to the achievement of security objectives and values (in the case of Nigeria,
inter alia, the decolonisation of Southern Africa and the liquidation of apartheid in South Africa) and those which relate to the achievement of domestic goals -- economic development, inexpensive government, low taxation, political stability, and social welfare.

Seen in the above context, if increased effort is made to augment the fighting capability of national armed forces in a stagnating economy, such as Nigeria's since 1982 -- then the compression of civilian consumption, investment, and non-military public expenditure would tend to be politically harder, especially with a population of over 80 million, and a phenomenal and menacingly high birth rate of approximately 3.7 per annum. The reason for this compression, as Ogbemi Omatete has observed, is that:

The military expenditure in a country where all the equipment is produced within that country and the personnel are trained within goes directly into the national economy. The expenditure circulates within the country, producing multiplier effects ... . In Nigeria, however, and countries like Nigeria, where all the equipment is imported and most of the high-level personnel are trained in foreign countries, a high bulk of the military expenditure is outside the country ... . The Nigerian intellectuals maintain that such spending depletes the small foreign exchange needed for development and results in a negative multiplier effect.[45]
In latent terms, however, the Nigerian economic base appears at first glance to be impressive and should be able to support a well-equipped, mobile and virile defence force without the concomitant risk of compromising basic development programmes. The country is endowed with a variety of industrial minerals (see Table 5.7) and its agricultural potential is obvious from the number of years Nigeria relied on agriculture both for domestic consumption and export. Its wide energy base—oil, gas, coal and hydroelectric power—is abundant and potentially supportive of a vibrant industrial economy. In short, as Jean Herskovits observes, Nigeria appears to have 'the economic base to classify as a significant regional power'.[46] Nevertheless, this seemingly encouraging picture by itself is misleading for a number of reasons.

First, the transformation of national economic potential into usable resources is not an automatic process; it depends critically on interlocking administrative, scientific and technological skills, the sine qua non of modern industrial states which so far has eluded Nigeria's inept and hedonistic officialdom.[47] These skills of labour and management are integral to any efficient and fruitful implementation of the series of aborted national development plans initiated in the country since independence in 1960. Administrative skill, for instance, is required in making the numerous and complex decisions concerning strategies and targets of industrialisa-
tion. In Nigeria, as in other LDCs, the operative criteria for such planning are the need to diversify the economy and create an irreversible dynamic towards self-sufficiency in basic industrial sectors, thereby breaking the paralyzing cycle of dependence on external sources. Although for a post-colonial state like Nigeria, satisfying these criteria can be extremely difficult in a global capitalist environment, problems have been undeniably compounded by organizational incompetence, the 'cult of mediocrity', and petty- and large-scale graft, all of which have become the norm for government operation rather than as the occasional exception. This deep and ubiquitous problem in the Nigerian body politic may be considered the most fundamental obstacle to national development. For, as Robert Heilbroner has justifiably argued, economic development -- that is, 'the deepening flow of incomes and the widening flow of production' -- is itself dependent:

On the presence of an "economic" population: of production-minded farmers, industrial workers, enterprising factory managers, helpful government officials. So long as these do not exist, economic development cannot commence on a broad base.[48]

In the Nigerian context, nothing short of a pervasive social transformation will suffice: a wholesale transformation of habits, a wrenching reorientation of values concerning
time, status, money, work; an unwrapping and rewaving of the fabric of daily existence itself'. [49] These transformations are ultimately a function of how motivational resources are structured and managed. For any such a social reorientation to take place, a precondition must be the replacement of regimes based on a perpetuation of the status quo (e.g., Balewa and Shagari administrations of the First and Second Republic) by alternative regimes 'audacious enough to unleash social change'. This is all the more urgent in an elitist, and partially semi-feudal, social order such as exists in Nigeria, confronted as it is simultaneously (rather than sequentially, as in Europe or North America) with the horrendous problems of modernisation within the context of ethnic fragmentation, political instability and vindictive international 'regimes' (such as the IMF and multinational corporations). [50]

And second, a corollary of the preceding consideration is that Nigeria's low-level industrial capability (especially in the vital areas of machine production and related infrastructural systems) has largely negated the substantive bearing of its economic potential on its capacity to produce and use military force as an instrument of policy. However, this relatively fragile industrial base would have been less damaging to the effort currently underway to upgrade the conventional capability of the Nigerian armed forces if the huge spinoff in foreign exchange earnings from oil production...
had continued over time. As the cases of Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iran (under the Shah) demonstrate, the balance-of-payments position and reserves of international liquidity (gold and foreign exchange) impinge on the military economic potential of states.

The ability of a country to run a substantial import surplus -- on the strength of either large holdings of foreign currencies and gold, or borrowing power -- permits it, for a time at least, to accelerate the buildup of military strength accordingly. In this respect, the astronomical increase in Nigeria's foreign-exchange reserves from 1973 to 1981 as a result of the oil bonanza saw a step-level increase in defence expenditures (see Table 5.7).[51] Conversely, the traumatic decline in Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings following worldwide recession and increased conservation -- especially in the West -- plus the vigorous entry into Western markets of non-OPEC oil producers such as Britain, Mexico and the Soviet Union, compelled a cutback on the five-year defence procurement plan valued at N6.4 billion adopted under the Shagari administration.[52]

One of the profound and inescapable consequences for Nigeria's security policy of the above factors -- frail socio-economic and technological fabric --, has been a noticeable discrepancy between its foreign policy posture and actual behaviour in crisis situations. For example, when in 1978-79 President Kenneth Kaunda requested the interposition-
ing of Nigerian military forces between Zambia and 'Rhodesia' at the height of the conflict, economic and financial considerations compelled the Nigerian government to respond in the negative. The projected cost of the initial operation (transporting troop and equipment to Zambia) was estimated at N32m ($48m). The additional cost of approximately N ($3.5m) a day to maintain the troops in a combat environment exceeded the country's financial capacity, given the enormous budget deficit and contending social and economic demands.[53]

For Nigeria's underdeveloped and primarily 'monocultural' economy, the paralysing effect of a protracted involvement in combat in Southern Africa would clearly have been catastrophic for its foreign exchange reserves in the absence of remedial measures. Such measures might involve, inter alia, curtailing other types of external outlays; that is, merchandise imports, tourist and pilgrimage expenditures, etc. But given a population of over 80 million and the incurably expensive taste of the Nigerian elite, it is difficult to imagine (especially in its 'democratic' setting of the past four years) such measures being implemented without a serious backlash in the almost hedonistic society of contemporary Nigeria.[54]

The preceding analysis of two of the major sets of restraints -- military capability and socio-economic factors -- on the use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of statecraft is necessarily incomplete without appropriate cognisance of
the relevant superstructural variables -- in this case the political determinants -- which may or may not restrain the use of force. In any immediate sense -- whatever the ultimate motivations at work -- it is through the political process and through the decisions of government that resort to military force or war comes about. Hence in order to comprehend fully the bearing of socio-economic factors on military strength (that is, the relation between the two sets of factors discussed above), it is also vitally important to recognise the impact of the political foundation of national military power and policy. For example, political determination underlies the structural decisions concerning the procurement and allocation of a proportion of national manpower and other resources to the military sector 'which go into the strategic units and uses of force'. This determination of the resources available to the government and the 'authoritative allocation' of those resources among 'military, domestic and foreign purposes is, indeed, the crux of national policy'.

The determination of the magnitude of the military effort, while undoubtedly reflective of both the structural and strategic components of defence planning, is ultimately rooted in the political process.[55] As Huntington incisively explains:
Military policy is not the result of deductions from a clear statement of national objective. It is the product of competition of purposes within individuals and groups and among individuals and groups. It is the result of politics not logic, more an arena than a unity...

It is this political determinant as it operates to restrain the use of military force in the Nigerian context that will be examined in the final section of this recognition and categorisation of internal restraints below.

111) Political Factor

As noted in the preamble to the section of this chapter on internal factors, the use and usability of national military power as an instrument of policy critically depends not only on the prowess of a country’s military establishment, but also, inter alia, on the skill of statesmen, the character of domestic bases and the shifting dynamics of moral, political and legal restraints. These elements generally constitute the political component of the military potential of states, which may or may not influence the use of military force in pursuit of national objectives. The operative conditionals in this political chemistry necessarily revolve around two pivotal factors. One is the nature of the poli-
tical system: the idea that a state's form of government will influence its propensity to use force. The other is the dynamism of leadership. As already noted, the latter is considered an elemental requirement for making potent interlocking structural decisions -- political, economic, technological and military-strategic -- on which the generation and use of military strength vitally depend.

On the first question, one of the recurrent analytic assumptions in the international relations literature is the notion that the nature of the political system impinges on a state's capacity to utilize the instrument of coercion in pursuit of national goals.[57] Thus, in the light of Wright and Tocqueville's argumentation (see Chapter 3, Section b), it may be inferred that certain legal and constitutional aspects, -- some explicit and some general -- of Nigerian parliamentary democracy and the presidential system of the First and Second Republics (1960-66; 1979-83), stand as direct restraints on its utilization of the military means as instrument of prevalence in crisis situations. The restraint dynamics in this context -- unlike the first two factors analysed above -- are basically anticipatory or reactive. As Barry Buzan explains:

**Anticipatory restraints are those which operate before a use of force occurs. They influence decision-makers to reduce**
their capability for using force, or not to initiate a use of force, or to use less rather than greater intensity of force. Reactive restraints come into operation only after a use of force is underway. They influence decision-makers to stop a use of force, or to reduce its intensity or duration, or not to implement a planned increase in intensity or duration.[58]

In the Nigerian Second Republic, for example, such anticipatory or reactive restraints involved constitutionally entrenched checks and balances in the presidential system: the 'war provisions' which expressly prohibited the President from declaring a state of war 'except with the sanction of a resolution of each of the Houses of National Assembly' (Article 5, 3a); the legislature control over funding for military operations (financial veto); and the legislature impeachment power over deviant Chief Executive.

Conversely, the logical adjunct of such reasoning is, of course, that military regimes in Nigeria (both past and present), characterized as they are by a centralised decision-making apparatus (the Supreme Military Council) and the overbearing presence of a 'warlord', are likely to be most belligerent in response to adverse environmental stimuli. If these deductions hold true in theory (that is, within the narrow logical parameters from which such speculations have so far proceeded), then the record of post-independence...
Nigeria has been inconclusive, as the review of its policy-makers' perceptions and policy responses in crisis situations (Chapter 3, Section c) attest.

Indeed, at the general level of analysis, such theorising about the influence of political regimes per se on the use of force has been unimaginative and empirically barren (with few exceptions): proceeding as they are from ideological predispositions and ethnocentric rationalisations rather than from any explicit general theory of human behaviour, and supported only by an inadequate, impressionistic, and quite fragmentary body of evidence. Furthermore, the dominating position and influence of Chief Executives in the domestic power spectrum — their social characteristics, motivations and attitudes, power ascension patterns, interpersonal interactions, and tactics of control — considerably reduces the extent to which differences in political regimes per se impinge on both the frequency and intensity of a state's resort to military force. Viewed in these terms, as Klaus Knorr rightly observes, 'On the basis of our limited knowledge, it is probable that such associations are not strong, that is to say, that their effects, if any, are overshadowed by other differences'. [59]
But if, as argued, differences in political systems regularly associated in the literature with the potential or frequency of a state's resort to force cannot be empirically validated, the same argument does not necessarily apply to military power. It is indeed in this domain — the relative incompetence of successive Nigerian leadership since independence — that the fundamental restraint problem besetting ability to 'relate force to national purposes' hinges. Thus, Chinua Achebe, in a recent anatomy of the pathology of Nigeria's social order has asserted:

Basically, the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership ... the only real experience of leadership Nigerians ever had was the Murtala Muhammed phenomenon which produced a temporary quantum change in the social behaviour of Nigerians, and demonstrated that miracles can happen ... Nigeria is not beyond redemption, all it needs is the right kind of leadership.[60]

Achebe readily, and plausibly, traces this leadership vacuum back to a 'seminal absence of intellectual rigour in the political thought of our founding fathers' — a tendency to pious materialistic wooliness and self-centered pedantry'.[61] One consequence of this dismal indecisiveness has been the prevalence of political feudality or what is popularly known to social anthropologists as the 'cargo cult mentality' in post-independence Nigeria. That is, the belief
that 'without exertion a fairy ship will one day dock in
their harbour laden with all the goods they have dreamed
of possessing'.[62] It may thus be concluded, in the light
of its chequered history since 1960 and particularly the last
four years, that Nigeria, as one commentator put it, 'is over
politicised and undergoverned'.[63]

The relationship between the leadership factor -- as a
component of political determinants for generating and using
the military instrument -- and the skills (administrative,
scientific, technological, etc.) involved in producing mili-
tary strength from inputs in the society is not incidental.
On the contrary, the annals of history are replete with
instances in which leadership -- whether of monarchs, oligar-
chies, ministers, or military leaders -- accounted for super-
or technological and military strength of states. Thus, the
prodigious achievements of Japan after the Meiji revolution
of 1868, of the USSR after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917,
of Israel after 1948, and Cuba after 1958 in the fields of
military and industrial technology are largely attributable,
among other things, to vibrant and superb leadership of their
respective founding fathers'. The reason for this is pre-
eminently, as E.S. Quade has noted, that 'the process of,
turning resources into ready military strength is not only a
technical problem. It is also a political and administrative
Indeed, as the actualization of putative military power crucially depends on the will, manifest or presumed, to use force (see Chapter 4), so economic and administrative resources do not generate putative power without the will and leadership to build national strength. Without leadership and will, there may be power potential in terms of economic resources and administrative capabilities as in contemporary Nigeria, but there can be no significant military power, putative or actualized. As already noted, since technological advances and economic development (especially in an essentially neo-colonial polity such as Nigeria) critically depend on how motivational resources are structured and managed, government and elite direction in collection and allocating 'social energies' and their choice of priorities remain a key factor.

It is in the context of this first level consideration -- rather than the alleged nature of the political system per se -- that the political factor as a restraint on the development and use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of statecraft is to be construed. The persistence of what Achebe has termed the 'cult of mediocrity' remains in this regard the fundamental obstacle bedevilling the transformation of Nigeria's economic, social and industrial potentials into suitable military capabilities.
of studies in defence management and planning[65] have conclusively shown, the transformation of resources — men, money and material — into actual or ready military power can be effected with more or less skill depending on leadership. The greater the astuteness of the leadership, the more military strength will be derived from allocated resources (e.g., Cuba under Fidel Castro). Or, to put it differently, the magnitude of inputs required for producing a desired level and type of military strength depends on the efficiency of the transformation. It is a matter of leadership and administrative competence — a component of national military potential — which an aspiring regional power such as Nigeria must first cultivate. Technical advances and the administrative efficiency — a far cry from the 'sluggish red-tapism' of the Federal bureaucracy — of the defunct Biafran Republic within a short span of three years are clear evidence of this thesis, even in the condition of infrastructural backwardness of the region (Eastern Nigeria) in the 1960s.

We must concede the post mortem conclusion of Arthur Nwankwo, although one of the fiery apologists for the Biafran cause, that:

If we can for a minute free ourselves from the emotional chains of the main issues of the war, we will admit to ourselves, if to no one else, that Biafra was the first ship of state to sail the
sea of nationhood on a completely indigenous motor ... . And we must admit that there are things in the structure of Biafra that Nigeria in particular and African countries in general can emulate to their benefit. Nigeria can establish something parallel to Biafra's Research and Production Unit to tackle specific problems of the society ... .[66]

The Research and Production Unit (RAP) staffed by Biafran scientists, was responsible for the design of petrol distillation gadgets, home made rockets, self-detonating anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines (Ogbunwe) and even produced such items as toilet soap and brandy.[67] Some of these products underwent rapid and continual improvement during the civil war and played a vital role in sustaining Biafra's resistance. There is no gainsaying, as Nwankwo contends explicitly, that if Nigeria's goal of developing a viable military-industrial base is ever to be consumated, both the short and long term panacea resides in harnessing its growing army of scientist and technicians. This in turn depends inexorably on a 'quantum leap' in leadership and administrative competence, and the necessary value revolution -- a wholesale metamorphosis of habits dysfunctional to industrial culture -- which only such leadership can unleash. It is as a value dynamic -- dedicated and purposeful govern-
ment and patriotic, resourceful and industrious citizenry — that the Biafran legacy constitutes an irrepressible challenge even to the most vituperative of its critics.

The next and final section below dwells on the systemic dimension of the restraints on the use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of policy. The raison d'être of this consideration — as will be argued below — derives from the widespread convention in the analytical literature on the foreign policy of developing countries, that while the external behaviour of this category of states may be explained in terms of their projection of domestic factors and forces into the international political scene (primarily in response to situational stimuli, opportunities and challenges), it is also unalterably conditioned and delimited by countervailing systemic forces. In this respect, therefore, systemic factors constitute an irresistible framework — in terms of restraints — for Nigeria's military policy.

c) **Systemic Factors**

The logical extension of the argument of the preceding paragraph is clearly that, while in terms of source and analytic convenience, restraints on the use and usability of Nigerian military power may be broadly divided into internal and systemic factors, such a division is necessarily obscured
By existential and phenomenological convergence of the parameters of its domestic and international behaviour. Because of this demonstrable convergence (as seen in the extent to which the current economic crisis in the country has compelled a muted response to the adverse developments in Southern Africa compared with the late 1970s), the external influences on Nigeria's military policy are no less crucial to its content and style than are the military policy determinants that derive from the domestic environment (see Chapter 3, Section 6). Thus, as Aluko, Ogunsanwo, Shaw and Stremlau,[68] among others, have argued incisively, the great vulnerability of a post-colonial state such as Nigeria to outside influences and pressures has presently conspired to render the conventional distinction between the external and internal dimensions of its foreign and security policy almost meaningless. Within this context, external or systemic factors unalterably become an integral component of Nigerian military policy, which may or may not restrain its resort to coercive power, depending on the force of situational challenges and the stakes involved in a clash of interests.

As is to be expected, these systemic factors vary considerably in their intensity or degree of impact on the decision-making process concerning the propriety of Nigerian military power as an instrument of policy in different circumstances. Three of these systemic variables will be considered in terms of their relative potency in the light of
the past and possible crisis situations analysed in Chapter Four. These include: (1) the restricted legitimacy of war (normative restraint) both at the global and regional levels, as expressed in what is often nebulously called 'world public opinion' and in Pan-African notions of 'good neighbourliness'; (2) the possibility of external intervention in support of the opposing actor, as was the case during the civil war; and (3) the irreducible dilemma and cost of conquest: 'victory is not success'.

1) Normative Restraint

The variable impact and implications of the normative devaluation of force as a policy alternative in the African subsystem for Nigerian defence policy has been examined in Section (a) above, and will not be reiterated here. The global dimension and influence (on the usability of Nigeria's military power) of this growing phenomenon remain to be analysed — 'world public opinion' — which even contemporary dominant powers (such as the US and the USSR) can now ignore only at a price of inevitable isolation. Defined abstractly, the term 'world public opinion' encompasses opinions that react to events the world over and are, in part and to a degree, interconnected ... resting on a strong and expanding technological foundation'. [69] The indispensable prerequisite of restraint engendered by the wrath of aroused world
opinion is that the state and government in question perceive or anticipate adverse opinion and that they are sensitive to its consequences.

However, in view of recent developments at both global and regional levels (see Chapters One and Two), it is to be expected that the effective weight of the sanction resulting from world public opinion varies considerably depending on a host of circumstances and the power status of the state involved. It is this variability which marks it with "vast uncertainty, and which lends chance, vagueness and relative weakness to the sanction."[70] Although this observation holds true in contemporary international crises involving major powers (and their core allies), for a less developed and dependent country such as Nigeria, in the event that adverse opinion turns out to be strong — as was the case during the civil war — the reality of its pressure is apt to be appreciated with great immediacy, thus undermining its capacity to sustain effective application of military force in pursuit of national objectives. Depending on the circumstance, this incapacitation may be consequent upon two systemic backlashes: (a) embargo on arms, munitions and spare parts, and (b) political and diplomatic isolation.

First, as discussed above in Section (b), to the extent that Nigeria deploys military systems that are externally acquired and serviced — because the requirements to use them
exceed those achieved in the overall level of its civilian economy — then its capacity to utilize military force diminishes if the arms suppliers judge such a course of action inimical to their strategic or geo-political interests. This has been one of the potent lessons for Nigerian defence planners and policy-makers from the experience of the civil war. As noted in Chapter Four, both the US and Britain — at the time the traditional arms suppliers to Nigeria — in conjunction with their allies in NATO imposed total embargoes on weapons sales and ammunition for arms purchased before the war.[71]

The implications of this sobering experience (although not altogether uncircumventable given Nigeria's potential to 'exploit' the opportunities presented by the 'Cold War') inevitably sensitises its decision-makers to the 'costs' imposed by adverse 'world public opinion' when considering a military alternative to diplomacy or economic sanction. Admittedly, these 'costs' are uncertain to predict, hard to estimate at the moment of decision and, besides, may only become evident (in political terms) over the longer run. Nevertheless, as Vogt, Ate and Imobighe have rightly argued (see Chapter Six, Section b), since any decision to use military force by Nigeria will be most likely directed against a country supported by one (e.g., France and the Francophone West African states) or all of the Western coun-
tries (e.g., apartheid South Africa), the probability of hostile backlash by these countries — arms embargo — becomes an irreducible dilemma which any Nigerian government cannot safely ignore. In any case, however, since as previously suggested, the willingness of any government to accept the risk of military action is dependent upon the value of the object at stake, the restraint of world public opinion on Nigeria's military policy may be an insufficient deterrent when its 'core values' are involved.

Second, adverse and virulent 'world public opinion' — especially if it involves a large proportion of attentive and influential publics in OAU Africa — may result in the political and diplomatic isolation of Nigeria, thus profoundly undermining its strategic and economic objectives in continental affairs (ECOWAS in particular). This has been the cardinal lesson of Libya in Chad and it is also a spectre that would probably had confronted the administration of Shagari if Nigeria had forcefully and unilaterally annexed the disputed territory with Cameroun in May 1981 (see Chapter 4, Section b). From this view, if Nigeria flagrantly flouts an internationally sanctioned restraint on military aggression (discussed in Chapter One, Section b), it may, in the event of success, gain the object of military action and in addition perhaps inspire increased respect for its military prowess; but it may also tarnish its non-military reputation —
especially its mediatory role in intra-African conflicts—and provoke attitudes of suspicion and hostility that, over the longer run if not immediately, will become organised politically, and perhaps militarily as well. The psycho-political and philosophic underpinning of this endemic 'schizophrenic' or hostile action-reaction cycle in contemporary state-system has been most graphically stated by Knorr:

... the respect a nation enjoys—respect for acting properly, with sensitivity to internationally widespread moral standards, and with sobriety and restraint in resorting to military power—is a precious asset in foreign affairs. It is an asset that assists in holding and gaining allies, and generally in promoting a favourable reception for its diplomatic initiatives. In this respect, international politics is no different from national politics. Success in politics depends considerably on how a person is able to relate himself to others, and an excessive power drive may impoverish this relationship by depriving it of elements of confidence, admiration, sympathy, and even affection from which much political influence may be derived. So it is with states in the international arena. Respect earned in, and bestowed by, the outside world is not an asset a government should be eager to squander.[72]

The nemesis of Nkrumah's fiery anti-colonial rhetoric which the CIA misinformation campaign against him exploited to arouse the morbid fears and horrid antipathy of Ghana's francophone neighbours is a classic example of Knorr's disquisition:[73] While Nkrumah's prognosis of the future
developments on the continent (especially his thesis on neo-colonialism) is in retrospect amply substantiated, his relentless and laudable endeavours to forge a continental front through viable and credible political, economic and military structures only succeeded in provoking the untutored animosity of his parochial, gullible and conservative colleagues in the Monrovia -- Brazzaville Group countries. For instance, the former Camerounian head of state -- Ahidjo -- stated in a remark clearly intended for Nkrumah at the OAU Cairo summit in 1964 that: "I should like to state ... that, for the present at least, the most serious threat to our states is that of subsidized subversion tele-guided from other African states ..."[74] Since most Francophone African heads of states like Ahidjo were, and are still considered to be, proteges of France whose countries have extant defence agreements with the latter, it is to be expected that French specialist force d'intervention will likely play a support role in any conflict in which they are involved (see Chapter 2, Section b). It is this fact of the probability of an intervention by extra-regional actors in intra-African conflict that constitutes the next set of systemic restraints to the use of Nigerian military power.

11) External Intervention

The theoretical conventions (the 'pull' and 'push' factors) and the geopolitical imperatives of this escalating
phenomenon in the African subsystem have been examined exten-
sively in Chapter Two. Briefly considered from the stand-
point of intervening actors, intra-regional conflicts in
Africa threatens the status quo and as a consequence either
generate anxiety among those powers whose economic and stra-
tegic interest are mortally at stake (in this case, the
former imperial powers of NATO bloc countries) or present
novel opportunities for new arrivals on the scene (such as
the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact). For the
former group in particular, since wars on the continent are
preeminent catalyst of social change which is fundamentally
unpredictable, their concern for the preservation of the
status quo is generally to be expected, as no situation is
more threatening to nations than one whose outcome has become
so uncertain as to have moved beyond their control.[75] The
use of military force by Nigeria, whether to punish and
subdue irritable neighbours or in pursuit of a wider security
objectives (such as the decolonization of Namibia or the
liquidation of apartheid) shares these uncertain and unpre-
dictable properties and is, therefore, bound to provoke a
direct or indirect counteraction from extra-regional powers
whose interests will inevitably be affected.
Nigeria's so-called francophone neighbours -- Cameroun,
Chad, Niger, Benin -- maintain a variety of defence accords
with France, providing for French military advice, training,
arms and operational assistance in the event of conflict with
a third party (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 7, Section e).[76]

The continuation of this series of accords which ensures French strategic, economic, cultural and political dominance of its former imperium is in turn anchored on the survival in power of the 'assimilated' successor elite of these countries which contemporary French strategic policy in the continent is designed to protect. Thus, as Arthur Gavshon has noted:

By the start of the 1980s French military domination of most of francophone Africa was complete. A network of inter-locking agreements placed garrisons or 'training missions' of varying sizes in twenty-two countries (including Zaire); authorised France to intervene in certain cases against external aggression or internal disorder; provided for base facilities in eleven territories, two of them not yet independent.

In addition:

Ever since 1964 a highly-trained, specialist force d'intervention had been available in Southern France to serve at short notice as a mobile reserve. Its mission was to deal with any emergency that might arise in Africa. The Eleventh Airborne Division, complete with paratroop, marine and infantry and artillery brigades, had seaborne, amphibious and armed elements, plus about 200 aircraft at its disposal .... The existence of this out-of-sight force was not secret to francophone and other African governments. Its importance lay in the deterrent effect it was to exercise on would-be trouble-makers, for France's capacity to deal swiftly with sudden crises in Africa was plainly enhanced by these crack units.[77]
The possible intervention of these forces in any conflict involving Nigeria in the West African sub-zone has become a pivotal factor in Nigeria's military environment and defence planning since the civil war. As suggested in Chapter Three, stemming the spread of Nigeria's influence in West Africa -- an influence calculated to undermine and counter the pervasive French presence -- has been a first order goal for the French government. Consequently, from past and recent records; the French, it is evident, have experimented with various strategies aimed at undermining the emergence of Nigeria as a formidable regional power centre around which indigenous interests can coalesce in relative security and autonomy.[78] One of these strategies -- balkanization -- was forcefully dramatised during the civil war, when massive French material, mercenary and diplomatic support sustained the secessionist forces till the end of the war. As the former Head of State, General Obasanjo -- a divisional commander during the civil war -- put it:

French interest in the civil war was both political and economic. They had always been, and still are worried about Nigeria's influence in the so-called 'francophone African countries'. It was, therefore, in their interest to cut Nigeria to size by dismembering her and reducing her influence in francophone Africa where France maintains a special, political, economic and military interest.[79]
The inescapable conclusion from this direction of French policy toward Nigeria is the ease with which France could exploit adverse 'world public opinion' (against Nigeria) in the event of a military engagement, to intervene on the opposing side -- especially if the latter is a regional client state. However, it thus appears that despite this inexorable trend, France's role as a broker in the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroun border crisis is also indicative of its anxiety and caution not to jeopardise the growing profitable trade and investment relations with Nigeria. Such a consideration is, nevertheless, not absolute, and the Nigerian defence planners understandably view France as one of the major factors within which to contend in any decision to use military force.

At the continental level, external intervention as a restraint on the use of Nigerian military power becomes even more problematic, given the intractable complexity and janus-like nature of African politics and condition: A condition that sometimes sees such strange-bedfellows as Tanzania, South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia and Zambia in the secessionist camp during the Nigerian civil war; or, for that matter, Zambia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and United States sanctioning South Africa's intervention in Angola while at the same time, castigating Soviet-Cuban intervention as a new and potentially unmanageable form of imperialism. It is this shifting pattern of alignment and realignment and the powerful extra-
regional involvements they portend that constitute a profound restraint to any decision to project Nigeria's military power beyond its borders.

As noted in Chapter Three, apart from Nigeria's declared policy to activate its military option against mercenary adventurism in neighbouring states that solicits its intervention (e.g., Nigeria-Benin Defence Pact and the ECOWAS Defence Protocol), one other theatre of conflict in which Nigeria may in future become involved in a major military engagement role is Southern Africa. Any such future operation, either independently (in a Cuban-style involvement) or as part of a Pan-African Task Force to protect the Front Line States against the ravages of the South African albinocracy, will arguably meet either direct or indirect resistance of the West -- especially the United States. This potent fact is not lost to Nigerian policy-planners, as the variety of papers presented at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (Nigeria) suggest. The reason is that the requirements of real security for the NATO powers and Nigeria are fundamentally incongruent. Hence, their respective conceptions of regional security in Africa must be incompatible. As Ogunsanwo has incisively argued in respect to US-Nigeria relations:

When one of the countries being considered is a superpower with worldwide interests and commitments and the other is a regional power whose primary
environment and area of interest involve Africa, then there is more room for conflict: the superpower is likely to have a universalistic and strategic conception of issues, events and policies which on many occasions is bound to distort the real situation on the ground and render unnecessarily more complicated otherwise straightforward issues. It was this type of strategic conception of the world that made inevitable the clash between the United States and Nigeria in 1975/76. Inevitable because of the 1969 Kissinger memorandum on US strategic interests in Southern Africa which, in effect, saw the future in terms of the cooperation between the racist regime in Pretoria and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, with the illegal regime in Rhodesia roped in. This was seen as the only configuration of forces which could perpetually guarantee Western interests in the area.[82]

Given the existing ideological and strategic parameters of United States foreign policy toward Southern Africa (as espoused particularly by the conservative circles in the U.S., the Republican Party, and the Pentagon), the explicit — as different from the present de facto — policy commitment by the U.S. to the survival of the white laager in the event of the escalation of the liberation struggle in the future cannot be lightly discounted. The doctrinal and normative redefinition of the problems of Southern Africa, combined with the growing defence relations between Pretoria and its Western allies of the NATO bloc countries, forewarns of the direction and nature of US response to any future Pan-African
challenge (in which Nigeria may be involved) to what one Nigerian, Head of State constantly referred to as 'this shame of Western civilisation.[83]

This concern, about possible US intervention in South Africa, among others, was vividly highlighted by Obasanjo in a paper on the African High Command presented at the April 1972 conference of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs in Zaria. The implication for Nigeria's military strategy toward the liberation of Southern Africa, he argued, is 'to mobilise the guerrilla factions to make life impossible for the whites in South Africa, while at the same time, forging a collective defence force (a Pan-African Force) to protect neighbouring African States against the incursions of the 'imperialist' forces of settler minorities in Southern Africa'. Later in his valedictory speech (1979) to the OAU as Nigeria's Head of State, he reiterated his call for the establishment of a 'truly Pan-Africa Force', reasoning that 'the problem can no longer be shelved and must be squarely faced'.[84] Obasanjo's analysis and prognosis about extra-regional involvement in Southern Africa as one of the major obstacles confronting Nigeria and OAU Africa in their quest to liberate South Africa has been corroborated by his Egyptian counterpart, Brigadier Farouk Abou-Ellez. In an inter-
view with New African Abou-Ellez cautioned that the 'manpower may be there but Africa must not forget that South Africa is not alone':

The situation will be similar to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The United States would support South Africa against a larger African force -- a force that could not depend on the Soviet Union. The Russians give only defensive support. Spare parts and other supplies would be a major problem. We Egyptians are speaking from experience.[85]

Given the twin assumptions underlying the whole thrust of US global foreign policy (that revolutions in the Third World are products of Soviet expansionism and that military force is the only means to defeat them successfully) this anticipation of US involvement in South Africa as a major restraint on the use of Nigerian military power is understandably plausible. The 'cartographic perception' of Southern Africa has changed radically in the eyes of American defence planners and policy-makers since the mid-seventies following Cuban intervention against South African forces in Angola. Washington has since become exceedingly restive about what General D. Graham called the 'Soviet masterplan to elbow the West out of Africa'[86] -- a view consistent with the ultra-conservative political ideology and practice of the current administration.
In line with this manifest preoccupation of the American officialdom, apartheid South Africa — as its Nazi Third Reich mentor in the 1930s — is now explicitly seen as an essential bulwark against the advance of Soviet power. Conversely, in congressional hearings and official policy pronouncements the liberation movements — the ANC, PAC and SWAPO — have been 'red-listed' as instruments of Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa. In the recent past, this cold war dogma has met with scepticism in the immediate post-Vietnam era. But given the time-lapse, the increasing conservative trend in the Western world, and the considerable means for manipulating domestic opinion and portraying their act as legitimate which these governments possess, South Africa, as one commentator put it, 'can readily become another El Salvador'.[87]

Finally, the variable and intractable restraint which systemic pressures exercise on both the frequency and intensity of the utility of the Nigerian military as a 'rational, national and viable' instrument of policy does not reside only in normative considerations or the interventionary tendencies of extra-regional powers, but also fundamentally in the increasing 'cost of conquest'. Figuratively speaking, 'victory', as Bernard Brodie reminds us, 'is not success'. 
iii) The Irreducible Dilemma and Cost of Conquest: "Victory is not Success"

The 'costs' of conquest in this context, have considerably less bearing on the financial and economic burdens — that is to say, the opportunity costs of allocating to the military sector of society of various resources manpower, skills, raw materials, land, and capital — discussed in Section (b), above, but more on the political and diplomatic fallout previously alluded to. As already put forward in the preceding chapter (Chapter Four), one reason why successive Nigerian governments have in the past desisted from a blatant policy of regional vigilantism (even when situational stimuli and domestic pressures dictated otherwise) has been their previous declarations to the effect that their neighbours had nothing to fear from Nigeria's size and military might. In this respect, reversion to an essentially punitive or revanchist security posture, while it may inspire increased respect for Nigeria's military prowess by its occasionally unruly midget neighbours, can also pose incalculable political and diplomatic problems by tarnishing its non-military reputation and provoking or intensifying existing attitudes of suspicion and hostility singularly evident during the civil war.[88]
These political and psychological backlashes — in terms of foreign distrust, hatred, and revengefulness — that may result from a *lex talionis* policy of retaliatory coercive violence may be damaging to Nigeria's endeavours in two crucial areas. First, to its efforts to strengthen current institutional frameworks for subregional and continental cooperation—ECOWAS, Chad Basin Commission, the Niger River Commission, and the OAU — and induce implementation of the resolutions of their respective charter. Second, a policy of vigilantism may irreparably undermine Nigeria's regional reputation as mediator in intra-African conflicts — either independently or under the auspices of the OAU. This role has been increasingly evident — if not altogether successful — in its diplomatic interventions in the Tanzania - Uganda conflict (1979), Somalia - Ethiopia war over the Ogaden (1978-79), Angola - Zaire conflict (1977; 1978), Western Sahara (1979-); and in Chad (1979-).

From these basic considerations, one conclusion is generally apposite, that to the extent that the Nigerian decision-makers are aware of the damaging consequences of 'diplomacy of violence' and the 'idiom of military action' against neighbouring countries (see Chapter 4), such an awareness may constitute fundamental restraint to the use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of statecraft. However, such a conclusion assumes regime-rationality in all circumstances (as often the case in the mainstream theory of policy choice...
and pursuit).\[89\] Since rationality of behaviour is a question of more or less, not of either/or, and its manifestation in reality is bound to diminish as circumstances change — degraded by factors of personal character or by such adverse circumstances as time pressure, fatigue, anxiety and so on — it is well-known fact that governments (especially when acting through bureaucracies) do not act with perfect rationality. This, as noted in Chapter Four, may explain why President Shagari — despite his earlier reluctance during the Cameroun - Nigeria border crisis of May 1981 — sanctioned the use of military force against Chadian forces in the Lake Chad Basin when confronted with institutional and public pressures (especially the military, bureaucracy and members of the legislature) and an unrelenting and intemperate media.

The central problem here is that the policy-maker is not a unitary actor. In most crisis-situations, Shagari had to reconcile his own evaluation of options with that of his advisors who may have expressed conflicting perceptions and value commitments at large in society. In the ill-fated presidential system of the Second Republic (1979-83), the very role of the Chief Executive requires openness to this kind of political process that is the mechanism through which decisions become that of a national coalition. As the various critics of Allison's bureaucratic model of the decision-making process have pointed out,\[90\] if the aggregated demands on policy of a sufficiently influential coalition are
unrealistic in view of conditions in the operational environment and the supply of policy resources, then the Chief Executive may resort to various means — persuasion, bargaining, and coercion — in order to diminish if not remove inconsistencies; he may, nevertheless, end up with a compromise policy that more or less deviates from the requirements of rational choice.

Conclusion

As posited in the preamble, the central concern of this chapter revolves around a pivotal set of interrelated factors (domestic and systemic) which impact on Nigeria's military policy: the complex and extensive array of restraints on the use and usability of Nigeria's military power as an instrument of policy. These restraints, as noted above, essentially represent prevalent tendencies which affect, but do not determine government behaviour. In the crucial issue of 'war and peace', actual or manifest behaviour of any government is always subject to a host of particular circumstances. Considerations of honour and atavistic forces of nationalism may sometimes override rational 'cost-benefit' calculation (e.g., Tanzania's response to the provocation of Amin-Uganda; and the Anglo-Argentine war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands).
Thus, as Huntington has succinctly argued, military policy (i.e., 'the relation of force to national purposes') is not always the result of logic but politics: 'more an arena than a unity'.[91] Any theory or hypothesis, therefore, that tries to reduce a reality as complex as the range of restraints on the use of Nigeria's military power analysed above to single causative factors -- socio-economic, military, political or 'world opinion' -- may be elegant in its explanatory simplicity, but it is apt to do violence to the known facts of Nigeria's recent history. In other words, considered independently, these restraint factors cannot be said to represent trends that are insurmountably strong and universally coherent in Nigeria's decision-making process concerning the use of force.

Seen in general terms, however, and based on the disquisition and observations in Chapter Four, the following conclusion is arguably pertinent. The potency of any one set or combination of these sets of restraints (domestic and systemic) on any Nigerian government's decision to resort to armed coercion may depend on the vitality of the issue to its security but also on the actor in its strategic environment involved. If the actor involved is any one of Nigeria's midget neighbours, then the decision to use or not to use force will be predicated less upon the factor of military capability than on diplomatic or political ramifications for Nigeria on the continent. Conversely, irrespective of the
vitality of issues involved, Nigeria's military response to a powerful regional (e.g., Libya or South Africa) or extra-regional (e.g., France in West-Central Africa) adversary would be subject to a host of internal (e.g., military capability, outlay of international liquidity etc.) or external (e.g., sanctions on weapons and munitions supply) restraints which may paralyse the political will of its decision-makers, as was the case with the situation in Zambia in 1979.

Nevertheless, as will be amplified upon in Chapter Seven, given Nigeria's enormous economic, scientific and technological potentials -- assuming will and competence at the leadership level -- these pervasive restraints (especially its frail infrastructural base) are not a fixed constant but subject to change over time. In hypothetical terms, for example, if the present commitment of its decision-makers to build a viable military-industrial base by the end of the century yields the expected result (see Chapter Seven, Section c), then Nigeria's exercise of independent initiative on matters relating to war and peace will arguably be less subject to adverse systemic forces than is currently the case. This scenario, although not altogether inconceivable will of course depend, as suggested in Section b above, on a range of intervening variables.

The next chapter dwells specifically on the military dimension of the efforts underway since the mid-1970s to overcome the core weaknesses highlighted in the foregoing
analysis: the armed forces modernization and augmentation programme. The examination and evaluation of fundamental structural decisions underlying and informing this programme will be made within the context of the changing strategic parameters and policy responses briefly touched upon in Chapter Three, Section a. Primary consideration will be given in this regard to major policy decisions concerning organizational reforms, personnel, equipment and armaments. The current and projected endeavours toward the expansion of domestic defence industry through a combination of indigenous research and development of appropriate/intermediate military technologies and collaborative agreements on basic systems production with foreign agencies operating in the country will be examined in Chapter Seven, Section c.
### TABLE 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>CHAD</th>
<th>CAMEROON</th>
<th>LIBYA</th>
<th>NIGERIA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>4,850,000</td>
<td>9,200,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>82,000,000</td>
<td>26,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>550 m</td>
<td>$6,813 bn</td>
<td>33.05 bn</td>
<td>$70.789 bn</td>
<td>$71.668 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>51.7 m</td>
<td>$78.639 m</td>
<td>$709.22 m</td>
<td>$1,214 bn</td>
<td>$2,769 bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Level (Man-power)</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>82,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55'</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>150-200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:**
- The Almanac of World Military Power (California, 1983)
### Table 5.2

**Major Army Weapons, 1983**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Estimated in Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored Fighting Vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55 Main battle tank</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scorpion light tank</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saracen armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saladin armored car</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML-60-90 armored car</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox scout car</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vickers MK 3 MBT</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steyr 4K-7FA APC</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHAG Piranha APC</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm guns (towed)</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm guns/howitzers (towed)</td>
<td>Britain, Italy</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76mm guns (towed)</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm guns (towed)</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antiaircraft Guns</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSU-23-4 23mm guad (self propelled)</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm; 40mm</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. - not available

*Total artillery inventory believed to exceed 250 pieces.*

### TABLE 5.3

**Major Air Force Weapons, 1983**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Estimated in Inventory</th>
<th>Estimated on Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighter Bombers/Fighter Interceptors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21-MF</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-17</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Jet</td>
<td>WG/France</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transports/Liaison Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130H Hercules</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-27 Mark 400</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-28</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC-11A Gulfstream II</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.280 Skyservant</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.27</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-31 Navajo</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7-222</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO-105C/D</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA.330 Puma</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alouette III</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westland Whirlwind</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 300</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Chinook</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trainers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21U</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-15UTI</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulldog 123</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-29 Delfin</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jet</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA-2 Atoll air-to-air³</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**n.a.** not available

1 Federal Republic of Germany

2 Can be equipped and used for counterinsurgency warfare

3 Equips MiG-21s

WG. - West Germany

TABLE 5.4
Major Naval Weapons, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Date(s) Completed</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Estimated in</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
<th>Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fritates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEKO 360 type (with Otomat SSM Aspide SAM)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria class</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosper Thorneycroft MK 9-type (with Seacat SSM)</td>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vosper Thorneycroft MK 3-type</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast attack craft (missile armed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lurssen S-143-class (with Otomat SSM)</td>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combattante IIIB-class (with MM.38 Exocet SSM)</td>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brook Marine-type large patrol craft</td>
<td>1974-1977</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford class large patrol craft</td>
<td>1955-57,1961</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abeking and Rasmyussen type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large patrol craft</td>
<td>1973,1976</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal patrol boats</td>
<td>1978-81</td>
<td>Britain, Italy</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hovercraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR type roll-on, roll-off 1300 landing ship (tank)</td>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft (tank)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Federal Republic of Germany
2 One vessel built in Britain for Nigeria Navy, 1961, others purchased from Royal Navy, 1966-68.
3 Some in inventory, some on order.

# TABLE 5.5

**ESTIMATED STAFF ARMS INVENTORY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landward air defence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage F.1AZ</td>
<td>ground attack fighter</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>32 delivered in parts from France, rest manufactured in SA, planned requirement 100+, equipped with EMD Aida II fire control system and laser range finder; a priority for Atlas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage F.ICZ III CZ</td>
<td>interceptor</td>
<td>25+</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>16F.ICZ delivered '74/5 and more being manufactured in SA. Armed with R530 and R.580, Magic air-to-air missiles, IIICZ now uses as trainers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage IIIBZ, D2</td>
<td>two-seater trainer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>3 BZ delivered early '60's; 3DZ del. '65/6, 13 D2Z del. '72.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage III RZ and</td>
<td>tactical reconnaissance</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>4 RZ and 4R2Z del. from France; 16 R2Z to be manufactured in SA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage III EZ</td>
<td>ground attack fighter</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>20 del. '66/6; 18 manufactured in SA, armed with Nord A5-20/30 air-to-surface missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL-13B Sabre Mk6</td>
<td>fighter</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>16 del. from Italy '67; 10 del. in parts '67, 40 del.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC Canberra</td>
<td>strike-reconnaissance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7 del. '74/5; 15 del. in parts '75, '50 manufactured in SA '76, 50+ on order for completion '78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala MB</td>
<td>two-seater basic</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>Italy/SA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326K Mk1</td>
<td>trainer</td>
<td>122+</td>
<td>Italy/SA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impala MB</td>
<td>ground attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326K Mk2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buccaneer S Mk 50</td>
<td>maritime strike</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>del. '65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Shackleton</td>
<td>reconnaissance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>del. '57, recently resparred, equipment updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR Mk3</td>
<td>maritime patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. 166 S Albatross</td>
<td>coastal patrol and light transport</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9 del. from Italy '69, 9 del. '73/4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Base</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sqn</td>
<td>Mirage F1AZ</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sqn</td>
<td>Mirage IIICZ/MIRZ</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Intercept/Recon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sqn</td>
<td>Mirage F1CZ</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sqn</td>
<td>Impala II</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sqn</td>
<td>Impala II</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sqn</td>
<td>Impala II</td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sqn</td>
<td>Impala II</td>
<td>Ysterplaat</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sqn</td>
<td>Impala II</td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sqn</td>
<td>Cessna 185</td>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sqn</td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sqn</td>
<td>Super Pterodactyl</td>
<td>Bloemfontein/Swartkop</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sqn</td>
<td>Alouette</td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sqn</td>
<td>Alouette</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sqn</td>
<td>Puma</td>
<td>Swartkop/Durban</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sqn</td>
<td>Viscount/HS125/404lin</td>
<td>Swartkop</td>
<td>VIP transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Flt</td>
<td>Westland Wessex</td>
<td>Ysterplaat</td>
<td>Anti-submarine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sqn</td>
<td>Buccaneer</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sqn</td>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>Ysterplaat</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Sqn</td>
<td>P1665 Albatross</td>
<td>Ysterplaat</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sqn</td>
<td>C130/C160</td>
<td>Waterkloof</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Sqn</td>
<td>Shackleton</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Sqn</td>
<td>Kudu/Bosbok</td>
<td>Swartkop/Potchefstroom</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Sqn</td>
<td>Bosbok</td>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Sqn</td>
<td>Cessna 185</td>
<td>Potchefstroom</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 Sqn</td>
<td>DC-4/C-47</td>
<td>Swartkop</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 Advanced Flying School</td>
<td>Mirage/Sabre</td>
<td>Pietersburg</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 AFS</td>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 AFS</td>
<td>Alouette</td>
<td>Ysterplaat</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: *Air Forces of the World* (Salamander; London, 1979)
**TABLE 5.6**

**SA Army-Major Weapon Systems in Service**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TANKS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centurion Mk10</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Delivered from UK, Jordan and India (via Spain). Believed to be on order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkava</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>Believed to be on order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMX-13</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>80 (approx)</td>
<td>Sales unconfirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>(Believed to be used for training purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comet</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>(Believed to be used for training purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armoured Cars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard AML-245/60</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>800+</td>
<td>Manufactured under licence in SA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard AML-245/80</td>
<td>Fr./SA</td>
<td>400+</td>
<td>Manufactured under licence in SA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forret</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>460 delivered 1963-9, almost obsolete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armoured Personnel Carriers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saracen</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>700 delivered 1956-66, almost obsolete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CommandoVI50</td>
<td>US/Portugal</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>320 believed ordered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-113A1</td>
<td>US/Italy</td>
<td>150+</td>
<td>400 ordered via Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratel</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>In service since, 1977; still in production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARTILLERY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-pounder (88mm)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>112 delivered 1951.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexton s.p.g. (88mm)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>180 delivered 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.7 Priest s.p.g. (105mm)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>World War II issue, rebuilt in SA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm FG</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Still in production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 inch (140mm)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>World War II issue; being replaced by 155mm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M109 s.p.g. (155mm)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td>Delivered 1976.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 155mm</td>
<td>SA/Canada</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>Being manufactured in SA with Canadian technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17 pounder</strong> (76.2mm) <strong>UK</strong> 100 234 delivered 1956.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>106mm Recoilless Rifle</strong> US ? 234 delivered 1956.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENTAC ATG</strong> France 120 138 delivered 1955-6/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Milan AT Missile</strong> Fr./FRG ? To replace ENTAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>22mm 204GK</strong> Switzerland ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>35mm twin K-63</strong> Switzerland ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>40mm L-70</strong> Sweden ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.7in. (88mm)</strong> UK ?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAAF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cactus/Crotale</strong> Fr./SA 30+ Initially manufactured in France, now in production in SA. Delivered via Jordan 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tigercat</strong> UK 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lockheed C-130B Hercules</strong> heavy transport 7 US del. from US '63.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lockheed L-100</strong> heavy transport 15 US civilian equivalent of C-130B, del from US for &quot;civilian purposes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transall C-160</strong> heavy transport 9 Fr./FRG del. from France '69/70.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Douglas C-47 Dakota</strong> medium transport 30 US del. from US '50's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS 125 Merlin IVA</strong> light transport 4 UK del. from UK early 70's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utility/Liaison/Light</strong> Aircraft Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cessna CE-185</strong> light transport and reconnaissance 16 US del. from US '60's.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cessna 185 Skywagon A".30i Boobok

light transport and reconnaissance 12 US del. from US '70's.
forward air control; tactical reconnaissance light transport casualty evacuation

designed and manufactured in SA based on Boobok.

Helicopters

Alouette II and III (EL-313 and ST-316)

light air support 110+ Fr. 7 II's del. from France '62; 54 III's del. '65/6;

SA-330 Puma

air support 40+ Fr. 20 del. '70/1; later orders unconfirmed.
medium transport 15+ Fr. 16 del. '70/1; later orders unconfirmed.

Westland Wesp

light maritime support 12 UK del. from UK '66-74.

SA-341 Gazelle

light support 2 Fr. 74 del.

JSQ:

30 US Vampire trainers; 74 Rockwell; T-6 Harvard trainers; 1 BAC Viscount transport; 5 Douglas DC-4 transport.

There have been allegations that the SAAF also has the following:

40 Lockheed F-104 G, Starfighter; 50 F-51D Cavalier; 25 Agusta Bell 205 A Iroquois; 12 Lockheed P-2 Neptunes; Pucara F/A 1A.58.

SOURCES:

DE'S Market Intelligence Report (US, 1976); Air International (UK, May 1976); IISS, Military Balance (UK, annual); Sean Gervasi "The Breakdown of the Arms Embargo against SA" (Congress testimony, US, 1977); Michael Klare, "How the US equips South Africa's military", Baltimore Sun (US, 19.2.78); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Register (Sweden, annual).
TABLE 5.7

Some Mineral Resources of Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Known Reserve</th>
<th>Probable Reserve</th>
<th>Possible Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil</td>
<td>Million Tons</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
<td>Million Cubic Mtr</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Million Tons</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>Million Tons</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorium</td>
<td>Thousand Tons</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbite</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassiterite</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 5.8

Defence expenditure in relation to total federal actual expenditures, 1970-84 in Nigerian N.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total actual expenditures</th>
<th>Total expenditure on defence</th>
<th>Defence as % of total federal expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>928,417,812</td>
<td>314,314,094</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>1,417,138,022</td>
<td>285,895,214</td>
<td>20.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>1,740,289,870</td>
<td>370,253,698</td>
<td>21.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>2,167,728,504</td>
<td>420,162,573</td>
<td>19.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>5,259,702,729</td>
<td>532,918,838</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>9,730,028,137</td>
<td>1,166,699,421</td>
<td>11.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>2,800,000,000</td>
<td>597,857,007</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>2,900,000,000</td>
<td>520,000,000</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>7,420,422,990</td>
<td>1,111,222,790</td>
<td>13.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>11,331,000,000</td>
<td>928,244,000</td>
<td>10.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5.9
Recurrent expenditure allocations to defence and welfare programmes in the 1978/79 Federal Budget (in Nigerian ₦)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue heads</th>
<th>Share of Federal Budget</th>
<th>% of total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Defence</strong></td>
<td>597,857,007</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>19,711,170</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>27,714,430</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Education</strong></td>
<td>779,362,610</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and social welfare</td>
<td>81,021,350</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources</td>
<td>2,193,620</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>48,281,370</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C All others</strong></td>
<td>1,243,858,443</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,800,000,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1978-79, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1978, pp. xxxix-xl. These were the round figures given by the Head of State in his Budget Speech. They are therefore slightly different from the real estimates summarised on pp. 3-4.
TABLE 5.10
Recurrent expenditure allocations to defence and welfare programmes in the 1979/80 Federal Budget (in Nigerian £)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Heads</th>
<th>Share of Federal Budget</th>
<th>% of total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Defence</td>
<td>520,000,000</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>34,347,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>27,638,750</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Education</td>
<td>326,076,020</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social welfare</td>
<td>97,176,930</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour, youth and sports.</td>
<td>63,349,110</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work and housing</td>
<td>105,625,590</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C All others</td>
<td>1,725,786,400</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,900,000,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES


5 South Africa may constitute the only possible exception in the African regional subsystem, for the simple reason that in terms of its ideological origins, its pattern of colonisation in Southern Africa, the organisation of its society and polity, the composition of its elite, its links with powerful European and American constituencies and the intensity of one superpower's commitment to its external security (see the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Memorandum 39), South Africa is European state located in Africa. Therefore, South Africa in practice is linked directly to issues of systemic security, which is not the case with any other African state.

The most substantive evidence for this conclusion is the horrendous level of US military technology transfer to South Africa initiated under the Kennedy administration and the presence of NATO military and intelligence infrastructures at Simonstown and Walvis Bay. South Africa does not threaten as yet to become an area of direct superpower confrontation as in the Middle East. However, as the direction of Reagan
administration's policy clearly indicates, when the nationalist struggle escalates to what is considered dangerous proportions, the United States would likely make explicit what has all along been an inherent pivot of its South Atlantic defence posture: the incorporation of South Africa into the U.S. vision of systemic security. See U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, edited by Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned Africa Scholars; The Apartheid War Machine (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980); and B. Ahmad, South Africa's Military Establishment (N.Y.: U.N. Unit on Apartheid, 1972).

For details of this argument and case studies demonstrating its validity, see Mohammed Ayoob, (ed.) Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (London: Croom Helm, 1980). See also Sisir Gupta, "Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World" Foreign Affairs Reports 177-8, July/August 1977. Mohammed Ayoob advances a number of other secondary factors which lead the superpowers to tolerate and, quite often, encourage conflicts in the Third World. These include (i) keeping the arms industry of the developed world in business, pay for a substantial proportion of R and D investments, and help recycle petrodollars into developed economies, (ii) provide convenient testing grounds for new weapons systems which can be improved upon in the light of combat experience; (iii) provide an ideal condition for testing the threshold of opponent's tolerance of political and military encroachments; (iv) provide opportunities for 'linkage' between issues, 'thereby allowing a superpower which finds itself in a disadvantageous position in one context to choose another point, where it is more favourably placed, to put pressure on its adversary; and (v) provide one way of ensuring access to strategic raw materials, such as oil and minerals which are considered essential for the security of the superpowers and their vital allies.


9 Serious infringements of these normative principles have been apparent even in the 1960s, although on a minimal scale compared with the 1970s. The reliance of Francophone countries on French military power, a reliance which includes the basing of several regiments of force d'intervention, made nonsense of these countries commitment to the first normative precept cited by Zartman (see Table 5.3, in Chapter Two). Moroccan pressure on Mauritania and Somali irredentism in East Africa may be cited as examples of infringements of the second of these norms, while the recognition of 'Biafra' by Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast is a cardinal example of the violation of the third in the 1960s. Zartman's analysis should, nevertheless, be seen in the context of his analytical premise; he was not unaware even at the time of writing of the existing contradictions between policy ideals and manifest or actual behaviour in OAU Africa.


11 For a comprehensive analysis of these conflicts and external linkages, see Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981). See also G. Challand, The Struggle for Africa (London: MacMillan, 1982). The latter is more of a journalistic treatise than a scholarly study deserving of serious attention.


13 MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security in Africa", p. 64. These policy ideals could only have persisted and become dominant over time if OAU Africa had successfully developed into a 'Security Community'. It may be argued, however, that the multiple disorders in this region preclude such a possibility in existing and likely conditions in the near future.

15. Ibid., p. 55.


18. As quoted by Mazrui in Ali Mazrui and Hasu Patel (eds.) Africa: the next thirty years (Sussex: Julian Friedman, 1974), p. xii.

19. For a detailed exposition on these themes, see Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1975), Chapters III and V.


24. For these and similar conceptual distinctions and their implications for strategic analysis, see Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning (Princeton University Center for International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 35, Nov. 1968), pp. 10-15; and Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (N.Y.: Holmes and Meier, 1979), pp. 113-116.


26. Although Nigeria's neighbours (including Ghana) had been considered occasional nuisance, at no time have they been seen as posing a mortal threat to Nigeria's security as do apartheid South Africa and France for that matter (see Chapter Three).

28 Nelson (ed.) Nigeria: a country study, p. 239.


31 Daily Times (Lagos), editorial, November 19, 1982.


Of an original complement of about eighty in 1976, about sixty British Loan Service Personnel continued to serve in 1980 at Jaji training senior and mid-level army and air force officers. At that time, a British officer served as the deputy commandant at the Staff College. These instructors were estimated in 1978 to cost Nigeria the equivalent of about US $2 million a year. See T.A. Imogbighe "African States and Defence Agreements with Foreign Powers: the negation of non-alignment", (presented at the International Conference on the Non-Aligned Movement, held at the NIIA, Lagos, January, 1980).

An interview with one of the twelve Army Colonels at NIPS KUEU, March, 1983. For reasons of discretion his name cannot be indicated here.

I gained this impression from a discussion with a retired Nigerian naval officer in Lagos (April 1983). He was very much in agreement with the criticism expressed by Kamanu and Vogt above (see page 23). He, however, felt that as long as the NPN was in power there was not much the military command can do to correct the prevailing dysfunctions.


As the GDP is an index of a country's aggregate resources, so the composition of output reflects the structure of capacity. The composition of the national product is determined by the three conditions of supply -- manpower, natural resources, and man-made resources (capital and technology) -- and by the structure of demand.
However, as statistical data permitting an international comparison of the economic capabilities of countries, the GDP is a very rough, and far from accurate, indicator. Such quantitative comparison encounters several conceptual and statistical difficulties. Its result, therefore, has to be accepted only with caution and reservation. For an analysis of these problems, see Irving L. Horowitz. *Three Worlds of Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), and Ian M. Little, *Economic Development* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1982).

Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), Part IV: "Economic Capacity for War", pp. 163-271. Knorr's position no doubt represents the conventional wisdom in defence analysis. As the literature debate in this 'issue-area' indicates, the empirical analysis of the mutual relationship between defence and the economy is a complex exercise. As a consequence, the opportunity costs of defence are not so clear-cut that one may simply infer that expenditure on defence entails a net withdrawal of the corresponding amount of resources from economic circulation. The reason is, of course, that defence expenditure itself produces both beneficial (e.g., the participation of the Nigerian Army Engineering Corp in 'civic action' programmes and the development of local government areas) and detrimental effects upon the civil economy.

While most analysis of the impact of defence expenditures on the economy in LDCs generally seem to corroborate Knorr's thesis, there have, however, been significantly important departures (Benoit, Kennedy, Weidenbaum, and Ahmad). Emile Benoit's study, for example, employs econometric analysis in the form of stepwise regression estimates for all the core variables based on 44 LDCs between 1950-1965. His conclusion was that:

The big surprise of this study was the finding that the evidence does not indicate that defence has had any net adverse effect on growth in developing countries ... The crucial evidence in this matter was the finding that the average 1950-1965 defence burdens (defence as a per cent of national product) of 44 countries was positively, not inversely, correlated with their growth rates over comparable time periods, i.e., the more they spent on defence, in relation to the size of their economies, the faster they grew -- and vice versa. This
basic correlation was strong enough so that there was less than one chance in a thousand that it could have occurred by accident (p. 19). Emile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973).


Ogbemi Omatete, "The Security of the Nigerian Nation" in Joseph Okpaku (ed.) *Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood* (Westport: Greenwood, 1972), p. 295. The relatively high defence expenditure in the late 1970s and early 1980s (25.3 percent of the total Federal Budget in 1978/79 and 18 percent in 1982/83) in the face of competing social and economic demands triggered the 'Gun or Gari' controversy in the Nigerian press, involving decision-makers, academics, retired military professionals, and the public. As one of these critics -- Ikenna Nzimiro -- recently wrote: "In spite of the changes in the objective situation, the illusion of great wealth and great power status persists among Nigeria's ruling elite even against a background of mounting social problems -- progressive impoverishment of the masses, a collapsing educational system, an escalating crime rate, a deteriorating physical environment and infrastructure in the cities, acute housing shortages, food scarcities, spiralling inflation, etc. The illusion of greatness also appears to be the major motivation of those who advocate the pursuit of military power. (Ikenna Nzimiro, "Militarization in Nigeria: its economic and social consequences" *International Social Science Journal*, 35(1), (1983), p. 138)


See, Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu; Fourth Dimension, 1983), and Arthur Nwankwo, Nigeria: The challenge of Biafra (Enugu; Fourth Dimension, 1980). In Achebe's reckoning, and one unreservedly shared by the writer, "The Trouble with Nigeria is Simply and Squarely a Failure of Leadership".


Ibid., p. 54.

Nigeria is in many ways a microcosm of the profound and multiple problems of modernization in historically conditioned social order beset by complex systemic pressures. As Cyril Black explains:

The modernization of Europe and of North America was spread over several centuries; in general, one issue or one crisis was dealt with at a time. In the modernization of non-Western parts of the world, however, the problems of the centralization of authority, national integration, social mobilization, economic development, political participation, social welfare have arisen not sequentially but simultaneously. The "demonstration effect" which the early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then exacerbates frustrations.

See also, Colonel M. Nassarawa, "The Impact of Nigeria's Economic Development on the Nigerian Armed Forces, 1960-81" (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Nigeria, 1982).

Cf. Juan De Onis International Herald Tribune, 16 January 1981. De Onis quotes President Shagari as saying that Nigeria was 'being forced by world events to reassess its security and defense expenditure'. In view of the substantial shortfalls in oil revenues and cutbacks in government expenditures across the board, it is unclear whether these targets have been or will be met. By 1983, Nigeria's oil revenue, which provides 90 percent of its foreign-exchange earnings, dropped more than 50 percent from its 1980 peak, from $22.4 billion to $9.6 billion.

However, inspite of this downward trend, the relatively high percentage of defence expenditures (in terms of the overall budgetary allocations) are indicative of the continued emphasis on the upgrading of the operational capability of the Nigerian military. On Nigerian defence spending, see Federal Government Budget (Lagos: Ministry of Finance, 1982-1983); Walter Isaacson, "Arming the World" TIME Magazine 26 October, 1981, p. 32; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1963-1973 (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975).

Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 229, footnote 20.

Three conditions tend to put Nigeria as an LDC at some disadvantage compared with the DCs, and these asymmetries increase its vulnerability to the exertion of military and economic power. One is the high proportion of primary products in its exports. As a class, such exports tend to fluctuate in price and in volume more than do exports of industrial goods. This fact -- often combined with a low price-elasticity of supply (with the possible exception of oil) -- makes export receipts more unstable and causes a weakness when export proceeds slump. This effect is reinforced, secondly, by the additional fact that the exports of Nigeria are concentrated, that is, involve fewer commodities, than the exports, say, of Canada. Finally, even though Nigeria's export earnings from oil increased tremendously in the past decade, it tends to have smaller foreign exchange reserves in relation to import than do the industrialised
countries. For the analysis of these global asymmetries, see Michael Michaely, Centralization in International Trade (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1975), and June Flanders, The Demand for International Reserves Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 27 (Princeton University, 1971), especially pp. 12-17, 34-42.


57 For a critique of this argument and related literature and theorists, see Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: a theoretical analysis, (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959).


61 Ibid., p. 24.


63 Jean Herskovits, "Dateline Nigeria: democracy down but not out", Foreign Policy, 54 (Spring, 1984), p. 181.


The Research and Production Unit also initiated the tradition for adaptability and improvisation which marked the Biafran resistance. For example, coconut milk was substituted for conventional brake fluid. A mixture of diesel and grease served as engine oil. Eroded engine parts were remoulded and put into use again. Worn-out tires were retreaded. Motor mechanics constructed new engines from scraps. See Suzan Cronje, *Nigeria and the World* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972), and Thomas Biersteker, *Distortion or Development?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).


Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, p. 61. There is, however, as many analysts have pointed out, no single word opinion, but rather various opinion sections that are 'conditioned by a number of possible factors: the interests and position peculiar to particular countries, the influence of government, party affiliation, class position, images of the outside world engendered by past experience, various spectacles which stereotypically distort view, and so on'. Furthermore, it is the elites -- the politically active, informed, and relevant strata in each society -- that participate in world opinion. The masses of populations do not often care much about international affairs, and this indifference, as Cantril and Free have observed, is especially pronounced in the developing societies, where the problem of illiteracy, information accessibility, and preoccupation with immediate daily challenges are paramount. See, Hadley Cantril and Lloyd Free, *Hopes and Fears for Self and Country*, supplement to *AmericanBehavioural Scientist*, VI (October, 1972), and Einar Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, (1965), pp. 39-62.


Table 2.2 and 2.3 (Chapter Two) and Appendix 5.

"Gavshon, *Crisis in Africa*, p. 175.


Ojukwu, the Biafran leader, recalls seeking three kinds of assistance from de Gaulle during this period: "arms, recognition to neutralize international support for Nigeria and mercenary training to help build our forces". He insists, however, that prior to September 1968, the only substantial help from France was in connection with the recruitment of approximately fifty mercenaries, who 'played a critical role in restoring Biafran morale following the evacuation of Enugu'. Foreign analysts generally support Ojukwu's contention that the mercenaries provided only a brief psychological advantage to the Biafrans, and that they quickly outlived their usefulness. See, A. Mockler, *Mercenaries*, (London: Macdonald, 1970); F. Oyewole "Scientists and Mercenaries", *Transition*, 48 (1975), pp. 59-65; and O. Ojukwu *Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts* (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1969).


81 See, Brigadier H. Hananiya, "Nigeria's defence policy against South Africa" (SEC-1, 16); Brigadier, B.A. Idiagbon, "Strategies for Liberation of Southern Africa" (SEC-3, 12); and Cdre. A.A. Aikhomu, "An Appraisal of South Africa's Naval Power and her Influence in the Strategic Cape Route" (SEC-4, 08), National Institute Library, Kuru, Nigeria.


83 According to a recent report by a Quaker Organisation in Washington, the gradual scale-down of arms transfer to South Africa under the Carter administration was dramatically reversed when Reagan came to power and announced his policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. Twenty-nine separate export licenses were issued during Fiscal Years 1981-83 for military related systems. That is, the building blocks of modern weaponry such as: fire control, guidance and auxiliary military equipment and military and space electronics. See, Military Exports to South Africa (Philadelphia: Friends Service Committee, 1984).

It may be argued, however, that the Reagan administration is simply making explicit what has been the pivot of US/NATO strategy for the South Atlantic/Indian Ocean theatre since the Kennedy-McNamara era: i.e., the de facto incorporation South Africa (along with Australia, Brazil and Argentina) into the vision of NATO's systemic security. Recommendation 102 of the 198-72 NATO Assembly instructed the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) to develop contingency plans for the defence of the Cape Route. Current and projected cooperation between NATO and South Africa on hemispheric defence include: (i) Naval operating rights/status-of-forces agreements (Simonstown, Durban, Walvis Bay); (ii) Overhaul-maintenance-repair agreements (Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban); State-of-the-art technology upgrade of Silvermine and its incorporation into USN's Naval Ocean Surveillance Information System (NOSIS); replacement of the Shackleton force; SAN acquisition of frigates; SADF acquisition of a strike fighter optimized for the maritime environment; and reverse flow of technology from ARMSCOR. See Patrick Wall (ed.) The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World, (London: Stacey International, 1977); The 1979 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply (Pretoria: Department of Defence, 1979 and 1982)." South

84 Daily Sketch, July 24, 1979.


87 For a detailed consideration of this issue, see Celestine Bassey, "American Strategic Intervention: Past, Present, and Future -- An Anticipation of US Future Role in South Africa Conflict" (unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1981).

88 A number of West African leaders have been as uneasy as France about the growing military, economic and political influence of Nigeria and, as a consequence, threw in their lot with the secessionist camp during the civil war. Thus, as General Obasanjo, the former head of government, has written in his memoirs about two of these countries -- Ivory Coast and Gabon -- that:

Apart from persuading France to come out more determinedly in favour of 'Biafra', late in 1968, President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast committed some of his personal fortune on the side of Biafra. President Houphouet-Boigny has a pathological fear of Nigeria and Nigerian influence on the West African sub-region. For this reason, he devised the thesis of the inviability of large Federations ... . Ivory Coast, like Gabon, provided staging posts for incoming and outgoing traffic for 'Biafra', especially for military hardware. Both countries jointly provided military training facilities for all ranks of 'Biafran' military and paramilitary forces. They provided administrative and professional training facilities for rebel officials and refuge for the 'starving children'. Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, p. 155.
The theory of policy choice and pursuit is most vividly articulated in the rational model of decision-making. In this model, the actor is rational if he is a value maximizer. That is, if he identifies courses of action appropriate to the achievement of his goals, evaluates these courses both in terms of expected costs and gains and in terms of probability of success, and selects the one that indicates the greatest net gain of valued things. However, as Allison has noted, 'Perfect rationality requires not only an unstinting search of possible policies but also perfect information on the probability, costs, and gains of various outcomes'. Since these requirements can only be met more or less imperfectly, in reality, the perfectly rational actor may at best 'satisfies' rather than maximizes. See, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).


Huntington, Common Defence, pp. 2-3.
CHAPTER VI

Changing Strategic Parameters and Responses in Nigeria

Our dynamic foreign policy posture can only be credible if we have a well equipped and disciplined defence force capable of defending our territorial integrity and national interests.

President Shehu Shagari [1]

In assessing the capability of the Nigerian defence establishment, it is essential that one should not confine such assessment merely to an exposition of the size and content of the arsenal of the military. Such assessment must, of necessity, include an evaluation of the defence establishment's ability to perform the professional functions normally associated with the armed forces. These functions include the protection of the security boundaries of the state and the provision of the military base for the country's operations in the international arena.

Margaret Vogt [2]

Seen in the overall context of Nigeria's security objectives (as defined in Chapter Three), the preceding consideration of potent restraining factors on the use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of policy is revealing in one major respect: the incongruity between its declared policy goals and the operational ability of its defence institutions to provide the means for their actualisation. In other words, viewed in terms of the inexorable dynamics of 'chal-
Tackle and response' (as formulated by Arnold Toynbee) and the 'Law of Military Development'[3], it may well be concluded that while expanding perceptions of threat since the end of the civil war (1970) have enlarged commitments, upgrading of military means has generally lagged behind policy objectives.

The magnitude of this mismatch between security aspirations and military capabilities is reflected in the huge disparity between extant and projected weapon systems level of the Nigerian armed forces on the one hand, and the balance of potential adversary forces in its military or strategic environment on the other hand (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1).

Since at any given point in time, capabilities limit the range of choices which are available to decision-makers, this inadequacy in force levels has neutralised to a great extent for some period the projection of Nigeria's military power into troublespots (e.g. Angola and Zambia -- 'Rhodesia' frontier).

The correction of this condition constitutes the primary motivation of the armed forces modernisation and augmentation programme that touches upon all elements of Nigerian military power: its size and composition (in terms of balance or allocation of resources to the three military services, and within these services); quantity and performance of equipment or hardware; logistical reach, or range; capability of performing sustained, active operations; mobilizable resources
and productive capacity; leadership and doctrine; communications and control; military intelligence effectiveness; and manpower quality in terms of skill, training, physical stamina and morale[4]. The operative criteria (as stipulated in official policy speeches)[5] are the needs to meet the capabilities of potential adversaries and to economise resources. Satisfying these criteria may be extremely difficult in a complex, dynamic domestic and external environment with reference to future contingencies that necessarily have 'uncertain identities and properties'. And, as noted in the previous chapter, this fundamental difficulty in military planning has been magnified in recent years by the rapidity of change in the relevant environments. Accelerating external military presence in the continent (euphemistically captioned the 'new scramble for Africa' by the London Economist[6]) and unrelenting military buildup by apartheid South Africa (largely a consequence of the transfer of Western military technology, expertise and financial credit) have made the specification of options by Nigerian defence planners very risky, and rendered available choices quite unattractive.

This chapter is at once a review and a critique of the major facets of the Nigerian armed forces modernisation programme within the operative context ('the goal-oriented guidance') of the new dimensions in threat perception and the strategic parameters which guided Nigerian military planning
since the Civil War in 1970. The major focus, therefore, will of necessity centre on the structural decisions concerning the procurement, allocation, and organisation of the men, money, and materiel which sustain the units of Nigeria's military force and the strategic or use decisions concerning the commitment, deployment, and employment of these forces, as manifested in military alliances (e.g. ECOWAS defence protocol and the yet to be instituted Pan-African Task Force), war plans and force movements. But first I will offer an examination of the operative variable (the threat-dynamics) which condition the programme decisions concerning the strength of the Nigerian military forces, their composition and readiness, and the number, type, and rate of procurement of their weapons.

a) New Dimensions of Threat Perception

As suggested in Chapter Three, section (b), the threat-factor constitutes a major dynamic in military strategy and force planning. This is particularly so because any security decisions inevitably hinge on the threat perception and definition of the relevant strata of policy-planners of the state involved; and how the 'threat-issue' is defined for decision may well influence what the decision is. It is in this respect that the analytic conceptualisation and visualisation of the international system as a 'threat system' (some would prefer to call it the 'war system') impinge upon and to a
Considerable extent determine the magnitude or level of national military effort. As Knorr has rightly noted 'the degree to which a state mobilises potential obviously depends upon the international situation, the challenges and opportunities it is perceived to present, and relevant means-end calculations, as perceived by government and other leaders and that part of the public that takes an interest in and has some influence on foreign affairs' [7].

Since the nature of the threat confronting different countries varies widely over time, whether considered objectively or subjectively the determination of the resources available to the government and the allocation of these resources to military purposes is also bound to vary considerably. Thus if, on the one hand, for a given state the threat to its security is considered primarily military and external (e.g. Angola vis a vis South Africa), then the expansion of national 'power of resistance' assumes a mortal importance. The reason, as argued in Chapter One, section (c), lies primarily in the fact that the extent to which different forms of power are of unequal effectiveness also limits the substitution of one for the other. As Oran Young observes, 'there is no sense in threatening economic reprisals against an opponent invading one's territory' [8]. However, if on the other hand, the threat (as perceived by the decision-making elite) is primarily internal and socio-
economic in nature, then the 'search for perfect security' through massive military build-up may ultimately only 'defeat its own ends'.

This complex, variable and evolving dynamic between threat perception/threat manifestation and the expansion or regression of national military power is clearly evident in the development of Nigeria's military systems[9]. In the pre-civil war period (1960-1966), an introspective security concern and posture resulted in a largely ceremonial army of 10,500 by 1965[10]. The recurrent expenditure on defence varied just below 4.5 percent of the total Federal and Regional budgets between 1959 and 1966, though it rose in money terms from about £4 million in 1959-1960 to nearly £8 million in 1965-1966[11].

Conversely, the drastic alteration in the perceived threat to Nigeria's security — largely the function of traumatic civil war experiences and continental developments which shattered the naive optimism of the immediate post-independence era of the early 1960s — engendered unprecedented commitment to the qualitative and quantitative expansion of its military forces (see Chapter Five, Tables 5.2-5.4). This expansion marked and was in turn sustained by the incorporation of the West African subzone and the continent at large — especially Southern Africa — into Nigeria's vision of systemic security. Thus, judging from policy statements and the current direction of its foreign and
defence policy planning, it may be valid to assert that the "territorial frontier" no longer constitutes the exclusive radius of security concern as was clearly the case in the First Republic (1960-1966). On the contrary, unlike the prevailing attitude, perception and complacency which characterised the security posture of the Balewa administration, the dominant 'mind set' in Nigeria's governmental circle since the civil war has been well-expressed by the former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, that:

the survival, security and independence of Nigeria cannot be assured as long as any part of Africa remains under colonial rule, or an apartheid regime.[12]

As a consequence of above developments, the parameters of Nigeria's security boundaries may now be conceptualised in terms of three concentric circles. The inner of these is the territorial threshold: the protection of the life, property and resources of the state from internal and external subversion. The protection of this frontier, as Margaret Vogt has argued, constitutes the single most important preoccupation of the Nigerian military and as such presents the 'most basic of the functional duties of the military establishment'[13].

The second circle consists of the ring of the countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin) that surround Nigeria's borders. The major consideration in this respect is that Nigeria's national security is the 'best enhanced if these
countries are kept free from intervention by any other power be it African or extra-continental\[14\]. Thus, Tommy Imobighe has argued that the existence of a foreign military presence in any one of the neighbouring countries creates a situation whereby the Nigerian defence establishment has to take into consideration the power potential of an extra force in its defence calculus\[15\]. It was for this reason that the Chad-Libya merger was (rightly or wrongly depending on one's perceptions) declared unacceptable by the Shagari administration.

Initially, partly because the Libyan intervention displaced French influence (and partly because of failure of the Kano Accord of 1979 to restore peace in Chad) the Nigerian government's reaction was one of nonchalance. At an emergency OAU summit held in Lagos to discuss the development in Chad following Libyan intervention, the Shagari administration refused to support a 'specific and pointed' attack on Libya. However, the announcement of a Libya-Chad merger in January 1981, which came after the bloody religious riots in the city of Kano (in which Libya's involvement was groundlessly alleged), engendered a reappraisal of the policy of the Nigerian government toward Libya's involvement in Chad. Nigeria's security concern was heightened by the realisation that a Libyan mechanized infantry force of 7,000 to 8,000 men and over fifty tanks had been deployed close to Nigeria's Northeastern border\[16\].
The outermost circle of Nigeria's security frontier encompasses, first then, the Economic Community of West African States, and second, the rest of the continent of Africa as this is affected and conditioned both by intra-regional and extra-regional (global) processes of intervention interaction (e.g. cooperation, conflict, and other issues. See chapters Two and Three). The range of Nigeria's security has unmistakably expanded since the late 1960s as i) a result of untoward experiences during the civil war and ii) its increasingly evolving international interest in the seventies. According to the Federal Government White Paper of March 1976, the proximal interests of the country (defined by former Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, as sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity) are best served by limiting the political, economic and military activities of non-African actors in Africa[17]. This consideration explains why French activism in West-Central Africa (see Chapter Seven) has been a constant source of attention by and irritation to Nigerian governments.

In overall terms, this expansive and elemental reformulation of Nigeria's security environment (a consequence of both domestic fissure and systemic pressures) elicits certain fundamental conclusions about the nature of current military thought or strategic thinking in Nigeria. These are:
1) preventing a deterioration in the geographic and military status-quo in the neighbouring countries (that is in the second of the three concentric circles of Nigeria's security boundaries);

11) complete decolonization of the regional subsystem of Africa;

and

111) the liquidation of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, not just because it demeans the humanity of the black race, but more so because the South African Reich -- as a result of its strategy for survival -- threatens the existence of Nigeria as a national and regional entity.[18]

It is to be expected from this schematic representation of the basics of Nigeria's military and foreign policy posture that their accomplishment resides, among other things, in the development of 'usable military power' (as explained by Henry Kissinger, Bernard Brodie and Klaus Knorr)[19]. Since a chosen design of military forces and equipment had consequences for the range of alternative foreign and security policies available to decision makers, the largely 'light infantry' force of about 272,00 by 1973 (a product of the civil war) provided limited military options for the kind of missions envisaged in the reformulations of Nigeria's security and foreign policy objectives outlined above. This realisation set both the tone of the widespread debate and the 'goal-oriented guidance' about the military's reorganisation and modernisation programme which has become a thorny issue
in Nigerian military circles and body politic since the mid-1970s[20]. The review of this exercise, and the conceptual, administrative and strategic inputs which guide the spectrum of options and planning, will be examined in the next section.

b) **The Armed Forces Modernisation Programme**

From an institutional viewpoint, there are three essential aspects of military establishments. One involves organisation: how forces are raised, trained, and identified. A second is related to doctrine: how forces will fight, and how to conceive of war itself. And the last is the nature of the instrument, as driven by changing technology: the weapons and the supporting systems of war[21]. As prerequisites for a modern, efficient and effective 'war machine', none of these facets can be separated and improved upon in isolation.

A modernisation programme which concentrates on 'firepower' augmentation (the weapons and the supporting systems) to the exclusion of or minimal regard for both organisational reforms and doctrinal innovation in response to challenges in the military environment can produce unpleasant and unnecessary surprises or setbacks in a combat condition.

For example, it is the purpose of military doctrine (strategic and tactical) to guide procurement, organisation, and operations, and to do so on the basis of certain assumptions about the character of enemy planning and the nature of
the strategic environment in which military forces would operate in time of war. As the French — and the Arabs after them — have learned in three major confrontations with the Germans since 1870, the failure to develop adequate and comparable operational doctrine, 'that gives life to both men and equipment', in response to changing circumstances may lead directly to battlefield failure, including, as in the case of France in 1940 and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967, prompt and complete defeat. As one writer put it, 'German operational innovations simply outpaced the ability and willingness of French planners to adjust.'

It has been on the basis of such extensively documented military disasters and strategic failures, that doctrinal paradigms — as they inform and guide organisational adaptation, task expansion, and procurement of weapon systems — have been one of the central pivots in defence planning. As a consequence, in modern military thought, the crux of any armed forces modernisation programme necessarily spans the three basic facets of military establishments: organisational structure, doctrine, and instruments. The determination of the magnitude — its tempo, its direction, and its consequences — of any modernisation effort hinges inescapably on two foundations of national military power (assuming the viability of the economic base). These foundations, as noted in Chapter Five are: the political determination to generate and use military strength, and the administrative
skills or managerial competence involved in producing military strength from the inputs available from society. The crucial elements of skill in this respect are those in the armed services (the defence staff planners) and in civilian bureaucracy (the Ministry of Defence) concerned with the generation of military strength.

Given the complex nature of modern warfare, and the imperative necessity to economise (in the face of competing national demands), administrative skill is required in making numerous interlocking and crucial decisions: contingencies to be prepared for in light of opposing adversary forces; the overall force structure; the distribution of military manpower over different armed services; the most efficient combinations of men, training, and machines; the composition of weaponry; and the size and composition of military spending[25]. As Knorr has noted, 'how well this task is performed greatly affects the usable military power that is generated'[26].

However, as the Nigerian case-study below will hopefully corroborate, designing military forces and equipment from given resources is anything but a perfect art; it is inevitably affected by factors other than the imperative of missions to be prepared for and the selection of the 'cheapest set of alternative means toward performing them effectively'[27]. Apart from the central administrative problem of 'making good choices regarding an uncertain future',
bureaucratic manipulation, strategic accounting errors, and self-centred orientations of individuals representing conflicting interests, can make defence planning a fickle activity, 'something far removed from the precise base-line for planning which dedicated empiricists would like'[28]. As Ian Campbell has noted about the demobilisation of Nigerian army personnel in the 1970s, personality differences, procedural and substantive disagreements (between the conservative status quo oriented Defence Minister, Bissalla, and the radical, flamboyant Chief of Army Staff, Danjuma), coupled with vigorous opposition from the among the officers and other ranks, resulted in the exercise being initially conducted 'with no clear and coherent rationale or criteria'[29]. Linked at first to the purge in the public services in 1975, and dangerously politicised in the dispute about control of the army after 1979 (with the imminent return to civilian rule), the demobilisation scheme remained restricted in scope and under the broad supervision of the government (see section ii below).

Before proceeding to analyse in detail the armed forces reorganisation and modernisation programme -- its problems, challenges, and prospects -- it is pertinent to recall the why of the exercise before the what and how. That is, the state of the Nigerian armed forces by 1975 (which provided the raison d'être of the exercise) and the stipulated goals of the scheme are a necessary starting point for the critique that follows.
i) Motivation and Goals

At the onset of the massive military reorganisation and demobilisation exercise in October 1975, former Head of State Obasanjo, then the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, noted that 'our concept of a credible force is to have the right type of forces blended with the right type of weapons and adequate communications and transport'[30]. This pronouncement represented in many ways a belated, if determined, effort to confront what had by then become to Nigerian defence planners an intolerable catch-22 situation; that is, the recognition that in neither economic nor military terms could the country continue to accommodate or afford indefinitely the burden of a relatively large, immobile and poorly-equipped defence establishment, while at the same time being critically aware of the potential political and social consequences of a large-scale demobilisation in a 'tight job market'[31].

The Nigerian armed forces had grown more by accident than by design during the civil war, from approximately 8,000 in 1966 (after the withdrawal of personnel of Eastern origin following domestic upheaval) to about 272,000 in 1972. 'Its growth', as former Chief of Army Staff Danjuma, put it, 'was not based on any strategy. It was just dictated to us by the battlefield needs of the war'[32]. Such a step-level expansion of the armed forces within a span of three years would present a formidable problem for any army as it inevitably reduces the level of the professionalism -- its
corporateness, expertise, skill, discipline and experience[33]. This was even more so in the Nigerian military, in which these basic prerequisites of military effectiveness and cohesion were already seriously impaired with the disintegration of the military command into what Mazrui characteristically termed 'militarised ethnicity' during the traumatic months of January to September 1966[34]. Indeed, as a result of the bloody coup (January 1966) and counter-coup (July 1966), the Federal armed forces had virtually no officers of any seniority or experience when the civil war broke out in July 1967. The Army, for instance, was able to muster about only 184 officers (out of a total of 507 by December 1965) and subsequently had to resort to unavoidable promotion of NCOs to meet the operational need of an expanding force[35]. As Robin Luckham ruefully observed:

In some respects the Nigerian officers of this story are like the heroes of the Greek tragedy. Their hubris in entering politics so violently brought the wrath of the gods upon them -- unlocking further terrible conflicts over which they could have little control, and in which so many of them were destroyed. [36].

Expressed in military terms, the actual strength of the Federal armed forces, after almost three years of war and two years of reorganisation and voluntary retirement, was approximately as follows in 1973:
The Army with a total strength of 262,000 comprised three infantry divisions, three reconnaissance regiments, and three artillery regiments. It was basically a 'light infantry' force, with proportionately absurdly limited firepower and combat support vehicles (Saladin and 20 AML-60/90 armed cars; Ferrett Scout cars; Saracen APC: 25-pounder, 76 mm, 105 mm and 128 mm guns);

The Navy (5,000) consisted of one ASW frigate, two corvettes, three P-6 torpedo boats, six seaward defence boats, and one tank-landing craft (MK.4);

The Air Force expanded from 1,000 in 1966 to 7,000 in 1973. It possessed thirty-eight combat aircraft: 6 IL-28 medium bombers, 12 MIG-17 fighter-bombers, 10 L-29 Delfin and 10 P-149 D armed trainers. Other aircraft included 2 MIG-15 trainers, 6 C-47, 6 Fokker F-27 Friendship tots; 20 DO-27/28 Comm aircraft; 8 Whirlwind and Alouette helicopters[37].

Overall, the uncoordinated and overexpanded federal forces had all the makings of a 'paper tiger', and of marginal utility or usability in terms of externally projectable military power. Crucially absent in its organisational structure were such indispensable specialist units as para-troops and armoured formations, marine amphibious assault force, or a search and rescue squadron in the Air Force. Although in the latter case the strategic and operational value of the MIGs and Ilyushins proved to be one of the decisive factors in the war, they are, nevertheless, essentially combat aircraft from the 1950s and patently inadequate for any future role in Southern Africa, for instance. Under-
standably, the conditions under which the three services had expanded to meet the exigencies of the civil war precluded a systematic and phased development of such specialist units. However, these extenuating circumstances were no longer an excuse for the distressing state of the armed forces by 1975.

It was in the context of this unsalutory condition of the military -- to a great extent the result of the widespread apathy, indecision and equivocation of the leadership -- and the attendant dissatisfaction that the modernisation programme emerged in the mid-1970s as the primary focus of defence planning. The prime mover of this process was, of course, the emergence of a new set of 'radical' military officers into policy-making roles following the overthrow of the decrepit and moribund regime of Gowon. The operative guidance of the exercise has been, as its chief architect General Danjuma -- the former Chief of Army Staff -- explained, the 'synthesis between the requirements of the combatant and specialists units admitting the need for greater mobility and armaments'[38]. Given the confines of the existing budgetary allocations, this could only be achieved by 'substituting fire-power and mobility for excess manpower'[39]. Thus, Danjuma maintained, 'Nigeria could not afford to keep her army at its present size, because to arm and equip the existing divisions with sophisticated weapons would absorb sixty percent of the country's national income'[40]. Between 1975 and 1983, therefore, the impera-
tive necessity to economise resulted -- as will be seen below -- in major structural decisions directed toward achieving maximum military worth from a given volume of inputs. Broadly considered, these complex programme decisions concerned the strength of the military forces, their composition and readiness, and the number, type, and rate of acquisition of their weapons. In turn, these programme decisions presupposed a broad range of related decisions concerning the procurement, allocation, and organisation of the men, money, and material on which force levels and readiness crucially depend.

The various elements -- men, money, material and organisation -- of this programme may conflict with each other, as Danjuma has noted. Obviously, a major action in any one area of programme implies demands upon the other areas. A decision, for instance, to augment the 'fire-power' and mobility of the Nigerian armed forces may inevitably imply policy decisions on the budget (increasing capital expenditures on weapons and support systems either by raising the total military budget or reallocating resources from other services), on personnel (extensive demobilisation, such as the reduction of army personnel from 262,000 in 1973 to 120,000 in 1983, and Navy personnel from 8,000 in 1980 to 4,000 in 1983);[41] on material (changes in procurement and base construction policies), and possibly on organisation (enhancing the position of the armoured division in the Army, for instance, or establishing relative parity between two pre-
visually secondary services—the Navy and Air Force—and the Army within the overall defence organisation). These structural decisions and the major policy alternatives which they entail—their complex interrelatedness and tradeoffs—will be the subject of the final section of this chapter.

ii) Major Policy Alternatives

As is evident from a variety of sources—Presidential addresses, Ministerial lectures, presentations by senior members of the armed forces, media commentary and interviews[42]—the armed forces modernisation scheme represents a major programme that touches upon all elements of Nigerian military capability. This, as previously alluded, involves fundamental structural decisions in four critical areas—organisation, personnel, equipment and armaments, and research and development—designed to improve the quality, firepower, and manoeuvrability of the three services while reducing the Army's personnel strength. Among these structural decisions are:

a) Organisational decisions concerning the methods and forms by which Nigeria's armed forces are organised and administered;

b) Personnel decisions concerning the number, procurement, retention, pay, and working conditions of members of the military services;

c) Material decisions concerning the amount, procurement, and distribution of equipment and supplies to the armed forces; and
d) **budgetary decisions concerning the size and distribution of funds made available to the armed forces.**

These structural categories as pointed out above are by no means exclusive issue-areas. They are interdependent; a major policy action in any one area demands compensatory or harmonious adjustments in other areas to ensure equilibrium in force planning and readiness. However, for analytical reasons, these four facets of the modernisation scheme, their problems, challenges and prospects will be considered sequentially below.

**a) Organisational Reform**

The rapid, uncoordinated and spasmodic growth of the military during the civil war had made organisational reform an integral and indispensable prerequisite of the modernisation scheme. Four of the basic issues involved were:

i) the composition of the military command;

ii) the nature and scope of demobilisation;

iii) the creation of specialist formations; and

iv) personnel retraining.

**Military Command**

The composition and distribution of authority in the high command were, like the issue of demobilisation, among
the more sensitive and intransigent problems in the reorganisa-
tion exercise to confront the Gowon administration in the
immediate post-civil war era. The root of these resided
essentially in the difficulty of striking a new balance among
the various military constituencies. The first set of con-
stituencies involved the unconcealed mutual antagonism
between the 'task specialist' and 'social specialist' of the
Nigerian military. The former refers to the division com-
manders (such as Adebunle, Mohammed, Obasanjo, Bissalla and
Haruna) who bore the brunt of the fighting in the course of
which they distinguished themselves as candidates for higher
positions in the military hierarchy. The latter's primary
responsibilities were political and social: presiding over
the Federation in the capacity of either federal or state
ministers. [44]

The second set of constituencies spans the first and
corns ethnic distribution in the high command. By 1970
officers from the 'Middle Belt' had reached the top of all
three divisions of the Army, while the representation of
officers from the dominant Yoruba and Hausa constituencies
(who tended to be better qualified and technically trained
than their Middle Belt counterparts) dominated the support
units (Engineers, Medical, Signals, Transport and Ordnance)
and Army Headquarters, Lagos.

With the expected return to civilian rule, first in
1976, then in 1979, the centrifugal aspirations and collec-
tive/corporate interests of these constituencies became a major obstacle to reorganisation. As Ian Campbell observed:

The leadership of the services had undergone substantial modification in the course of the civil war. Reputations fluctuated during the protracted campaign and some of the changes of command, imposed by Lagos, left a long legacy of bitterness. The war also produced marked discontinuities in career patterns and these, in turn, affected the cohesion of the officer corps. Most striking, but not untypical, was the promotion of Yakubu Danjuma and Martin Adamu. Both were middle-ranking officers at the start of the war, distinguished themselves in the hard-fought Enugu sector and ended the war among the de facto leaders of the army. Many junior officers also won accelerated promotion, further eroding existing differentials and overturning established routines. With a new generation of leaders thus brought near to the top of the military hierarchy, there arose the problem of reconciling their expectations with those of other, more senior officers.[45]

The potentially destabilising implications of these divergent aspirations and expectations engendered a paralysing inertia, indecision, and equivocation in the military hierarchy under Gowon. This crippling condition which bedevilled general public perceptions of military reorganisation and demobilisation in the post-civil war era (as stipulated in the Second National Development Plan initiated in 1970) was supplanted only after the 1975 coup which, among other things, saw the retirement of the 'social specialists' who owed their promotions to political consideration rather
than to functional competence. The concomitant emergence of such 'task-specialists' as Mohammed, Obasanjo, and Danjuma to top command positions set the stage for the sweeping organisational reform and demobilisation exercise between 1975 and 1980.[46]

**Demobilisation**

Allied to the issue of the composition and reform of the military command was the exceedingly urgent and thorny question of demobilisation; that is, the drastic reduction in the size of the army from a quarter of a million to around a hundred thousand. This concern—as noted by Chief of Army Staff Danjuma in 1975—had become an imperative for the express reason that 'about ninety percent of the already substantial defence budget was absorbed by salaries alone, leaving little for the purchase of modern armaments or the replacement of obsolete and damaged equipment'.[47] Furthermore, a reduction in the total army personnel would also assist the endeavour to 'provide urgently needed barracks and other amenities', while the retirement of veterans, the rehabilitation of the disabled, and the transfer of skilled non-combatants, 'would facilitate early and phased resumption of normal recruitment'.[48]

Although from a military and policy standpoint such considerations were generally indisputable and overdue (as suggested by the unequivocal support of the divisional com-
manders), demobilisation, nevertheless, proved to be an extremely sensitive and hazardous issue, as of the abortive but bloody Dimka Coup of 13 February, 1976). The fissiparous and potentially explosive undercurrent—ethnic and factional centrifugence—which delayed implementation between 1970 and 1975 was unmistakably real; any 'appearance of discrimination against any section whatsoever was likely to precipitate civil as well as military unrest'.[49] The Gowon administration—not unmindful of the riot in 1946 that characterised the demobilisation of Nigerian personnel from the Royal West African Frontier Force[50]—became disinclined towards reductions. The army, Gowon stipulated, was to be slimmed to 150,000—the combat units to be reduced by one-third with proportionately 'smaller reductions in the support services' but this 'would be achieved mainly by encouraging voluntary retirement'.[51] Gowon's restraint was no doubt a result of seething discontent and disaffection among junior officers and other ranks, who saw the exercise as a 'witch-hunt'—'unfair and ungrateful treatment of those who sacrificed their lives to keep the country one'. Three principal dissatisfied groups in this category were generally discernible at the time.

First, there were the approximately 70,000 servicemen of Western origin (i.e., mainly Yoruba) recruited during the war and with no long record of military service. A considerable number of these were college and university graduates
enlisted from jobs in the government or the public service to fill the vacuum created by the departure of officers of Eastern origin (especially in the Army Corps of Engineers, Signals, Ordinance, Medical, Education and the Air Force). However, given their professional backgrounds, it may be argued that there were fewer hurdles in the way of their reintegration in civilian life, and that they suffered least from large-scale and rapid demobilisation.

Second, there were the veterans who had re-enlisted at the onset of the civil war, especially in the First Division, and 'contributed greatly to the success of the federal campaign'.[52] On the eve of their congress in January 1976, the Nigerian Federation of Ex-Servicemen cautioned the government that 'if it were not vigilant it would confront a lot of problems during the exercise'.[53] The prevailing sentiment among this group of 'dissatisfied' was that 'the fact that they had volunteered in large numbers, in a time of national crisis, and had fought well and bravely throughout the war' was an effective, sufficient and compelling reason for being retained on payroll—an argument that drew the sarcastic comment of the Chief of Army Staff Danjuma that the Nigerian Army was 'almost the only army in the world where serving soldiers died of old age'.[54]

The continued presence in the army of veterans long after the civil war was an affront to rational manpower policy, as they held up the resumption of normal recruitment,
blocked avenues of promotion and reduced efficiency of the force. Indeed, many of the veterans were privates over thirty years of age who had less mobility and more health problems than military service required. Figures on the age and physical fitness (as well as ethnic composition) of Nigerian soldiers are not made public but military exercises conducted in the mid-1970s were reportedly characterised by a good number of veteran servicemen unable to perform satisfactorily because of ill-health, advanced age, and inadequate medical care. Despite serious misgivings, both within and outside the military, the skilful and determined action of the new leadership resulted in the retirement of veterans from the services. By March 1977, Danjuma announced that 5,000 ex-servicemen had been demobilised and that 10,000 more were to follow soon.[55]

The final problematic group targeted for retrenchment was soldiers from the Middle Belt, who by 1975 accounted for up to 80 percent of army manpower according to one estimate.[56] Largely unskilled, with few educational qualifications, and consequently with limited prospects of suitable civilian employment, their retirement presented a formidable problem to defence planners. But to prevent the armed forces from becoming the fiefdom of one ethnopolitical group or another, their reduction was considered a prime necessity in keeping with the principle that 'the composition of the
officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces of the
Federation shall reflect the Federal character of Nigeria'
 promulgated in the First Republic'.[57]

By 1980—despite a groundswell of discontent within the
military—the reduction of the army personnel from a peak of
272,000 in 1972 to 130,000 was an accomplished fact. The
politicisation of the demobilisation issue and widespread
public criticism (considering the impact on the Federal bud-
get of the large military establishment) had made it a thorny
problem in civil—military relations, one that could no longer
be ignored.[58] However, despite widespread debate and vilifi-
cation, the issue for Supreme Headquarters after 1970 was
not so much the desirability of demobilisation per se, but
that of developing a consensus on operational criteria (e.g.,
optimum military size, military manpower model, etc.), deter-
mining categories, apportioning cuts and distributing off-
limits without provoking accusations of ethnic favouritism,
professional jealousy, or discrimination on any other
grounds. In polities where the factors of time and experi-
ence have allowed the perfection of conflict resolving mech-
анизms and the consolidation and internalisation of irrevoc-
able precedents (Europe and North America, for example) such
post-war challenges can be more readily confronted without
jeopardising the entire system. However, the mortal ramifi-
cations of such an exercise in a praetorian society such as
contemporary Nigeria—characterised as it is by a high degree
of politicisation of social forces and institutions—necessitated circumpection. To a certain extent this vindicated Gowon's apprehension and equivocation.

Nevertheless, under the judicious and imaginative scheme developed by its chief planner, T.Y. Danjuma, the demobilisation process was irreversibly implemented after a short delay following the abortive coup of middle-rank and junior officers in February 1976. As he put it, 'we would be setting a booby trap for the civilian government if we refuse to face the problems of demobilisation squarely and find solutions to it before the handover'.[59] The prime objective of the exercise, as Danjuma intimated in December 1975 was to create a proper balance in the entire defence system in each of the following dimensions:

1) the size of the armed forces;
2) the rate of personnel turnover;
3) the distribution of ranks; and
4) the proportion of civilians in the defence establishment.[60]

Such an organisational objective no doubt reflects a particular manpower model which has been adopted by a number of European countries—France, West Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia, for example. This model consists, briefly, of a relatively small (in terms of the overall population) professional force—set at 100,000 by Danjuma—made of volunteers.
and equipped with the most advanced and powerful weapons, and a complementary and much larger reserve force. As the emerging trend in the 1980s indicates (e.g., the Nigerian Navy has been reduced from 8,000 in 1980 to just below 4,000 in 1983-84 to allow for a further increase in delivery systems) such a model which is clearly designed to combine the capabilities of a highly mobile and proficient volunteer force with the massive manpower supply of a large reserve force may well be on the way to becoming the dominant form of military manpower system in Nigeria; that is, the dominant model of personnel decisions concerning the number, procurement, retention, pay, and working conditions of members of the Nigerian armed forces.

Arms of Decisions: specialist formations

One of the glaring structural weaknesses of the Nigerian armed forces by 1975 was the virtual absence of indispensable specialist units such as armoured and paratroop formations in the Army, amphibious assault force in the Navy, or reconnaissance and Search and Rescue squadrons in the Air Force. By 1982, however, this structural flaw had been remedied with the formation of one armoured division (comprising four armoured, and one mechanised brigade); two mechanized divisions (each with three mechanised brigades); and one composite division (consisting of one airborne, one air portable, and one amphibious brigade).[61]
As noted in Chapter Five, the striking and projectable power of these elite arms have been greatly heightened with the acquisition of main battle tank and support systems, additional Super Hercules transport aircraft (C-130H-130S) and a variety of smaller aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, the amphibious assault capability of the marine arm has been enhanced by the further acquisition of two tank landing craft (LCT) from France and two modern roll-on, roll-off type tank landing ships (LST) built to Nigerian specifications in West Germany. These ships constitute the core of an amphibious assault force having the ability to transport armour, men, and equipment anywhere on the West African coast. This was clearly demonstrated in 1978, when the Nigerian navy transported to Lebanon a battalion of army contingent and support vehicles that served with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The sea mobility was designed to complement the air mobility provided by the Air Transport Command—a capability that could display the country's military power over a considerable distance, as Nelson has noted:

The Transport Group's ability to project military power beyond national borders has strengthened Nigeria's regional and international influence. Unlike the situation in other air force units, these aircraft were well-maintained and well-operated by Nigerian technicians and pilots. The C-130s have been used for a variety of tasks,
including ferrying personnel and equipment around Southern Africa in support of the Patriotic Front guerrillas during the Zimbabwe civil war.[62]

A more recent example was its operation in support of the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1982: transporting troops and support systems and maintaining logistical supplies. However, as in other arms of the services, certain organisational and maintenance problems have remained. The diversity of equipment (both horizontal and vertical, in terms of sources—Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, the Soviet Union and the U.S.—and compatibility of interoperability) has combined with severe shortage of skilled maintenance technicians and humid climate to produce a logistical nightmare. Not surprisingly, therefore, less than half of the army's vehicles were reportedly operational in mid-1987, and their readiness rate was possibly as low as thirty per cent (see below under 'material procurement').

**Personnel Retraining**

A related major facet of the military modernisation programme was that of personnel retraining. While demobilisation is primarily a quantitative issue, affecting post-war armed forces, training is primarily a qualitative problem affecting the degree of professionalism of the forces—their corporateness, skill, expertise, and dedication to common goals. As noted previously, the military coups of 1966 and
the wartime expansion left a legacy of indiscipline and shattered military professionalism. Training for the thousands of officers recruited during the war (a considerable proportion of them recruited from among the NCOs—warrant officers, staff sergeant and sargeants) was based on emergency courses of three or four months duration. For many of these officers, this remained the only training they had received by 1975.[63]

One of the first order priorities of the modernisation programme, therefore, involved a parallel effort to 'clean up' the armed forces—beginning with the purge of some 216 officers on grounds of indiscipline and incompetence—and a major retraining and evaluation scheme for all battlefield commissions. As part of this policy, the Nigerian Army Command and Staff College (NACSC) was set up at Jaji (near Kaduna). To improve leadership quality, a conversion exercise—which entailed a reassessment of each officer's intellectual and military potential on the basis of a series of examinations and practical tests—was improvised by the Chief of Army Staff towards the end of 1975. As he remarked to the first intake at the college: 'We made a lot of command and staff mistakes in the course of fighting the war'.[64]

Although the conversion exercise was unpopular among many of those officers affected—'veterans of the civil war who were now to be judged by criteria which were unfamiliar and there—
fore suspect—it, nevertheless, provided a reliable basis for
pruning of incompetent elements from the officer corps of the
Army.

The NACSC has since undergone institutional task expan­
sion to include instruction for Nigerian Air Force officers—and those of other Commonwealth countries, including Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe—under the supervision
of British and Soviet flight instructors. Two programmes are
currently offered: a course for senior officers conducted
twice annually, and a year-long course for officers of the
rank of major. The principal objective for the Nigerian
military has been to standardize staff procedures, and to
ameliorate situations where Nigerian officers trained abroad
(about 4,000 a year in the Soviet Union, United States,
Britain, India, Australia, Canada, and West Germany) returned
to Nigeria with little overall knowledge of Nigerian
armed forces operational planning. The NACSC (along with the
Naval training schools at Lagos and Port Harcourt) is cur­
rently intended to upgrade, and eventually to supersede
training abroad for Nigerian military officers. [65]

As a complementary development (for officers of junior
rank), the Nigerian Defence Academy, which opened at Kaduna
in 1964, is being modernised and raised to Technical Univer­
sity status, thus underlining the new emphasis on the quality
rather than quantity of the officer corps. In his maiden address at the Defence Academy in 1980, President Shagari stated that:

"It is the intention of this Administration not only to maintain it as a tri-service institution but to give impetus to the hopes and aspirations of the first civilian administration that established the Academy and supplement the efforts of the previous military administrations towards transforming it into a technical university of the armed forces. The challenge of modern weapons and sophisticated military hardware dictates that as would-be managers of new weapons and equipment, military officers must be well educated and kept abreast of continuing technological advancement. It is hoped that the first intake for the degree programme should commence training in 1982. With the establishment of the university, the naval and airforce cadets will no longer have to go abroad to complete their training thereby reducing to the barest minimum the number of personnel that have to go abroad for training."

Prior to this development, the Academy had provided basic training and military education courses on short-service (six months) and on regular (thirty months) bases to approximately 2,500 officer cadets by 1979. Military cadets in the regular course train for a duration of thirty months at Kaduna before being commissioned as Second Lieutenants, but navy and airforce cadets generally spend their final year in specialised training elsewhere—usually abroad in India, Britain, Soviet Union and the United States. For example, in
1980, 428 Nigerian cadets and officers were dispatched for training in the United States under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes. In addition, in the same year, a U.S. Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) visited Nigeria on a cooperative venture to train Nigerian naval officers (at the Naval Training School at Lagos and Port Harcourt) as hydrographic engineers under a Nigeria-financed programme to join those hydrographic engineers previously trained in the United States.[67]

To complement the initial phase of training (30 months) for the military cadets, twenty-four army training centres were established in 1978 to provide instruction to about 25,000 officers and men. Upon completion of this training, personnel involved are subsequently assigned to operational units for advanced tactical training at regimental levels. Similarly, the Navy has established complementary training schools for qualified officers at Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar and at a newly completed base in Bendel State. The Air Force training schools are sited in Kano, Jos, and Kaduna, where clear skies year round and low humidity facilitates pilot training and aircraft maintenance.

There can be no gainsaying that the foregoing emphasis on comprehensive training for armed forces personnel in the military modernisation programme has considerably restored and improved the professionalism—expertise, corporateness and dedication—of the Nigerian military compared to the
parlous condition of the early 1970s. Indeed, standard ratings for high combat efficiency (the simultaneous conduct of command-and-staff, troop and specialised exercises), psychological—morale—and—physical qualities of armed forces personnel employed in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have been introduced into all branches of the Nigerian military services. As a recent Nigerian Armed Forces training manual states:

When we speak of the combat power of the Armed Forces, we at times reduce this concept to their armament and technical equipment. However, this is not the only source of combat power. Of themselves, weapons, and military equipment do not determine the success of combat operations. What is important is in whose hands they are. We know that man was and remains the decisive force in war. Neither a ship, nor a plane, nor a tank—nothing is so formidable for the enemy as a soldier who has high combat morale and military expertise, who is capable of skillfully employing weapons and equipment and using their combat properties to the full extent to defeat the enemy and win victory. [68]

The extent to which these qualities—high combat expertise, morale, endurance of trials of war, and an ability to maintain combat activeness and an unshakable will to win under the most difficult conditions—can presently be said to obtain in Nigeria's defence establishment as a result of the intensive conversion exercise, training and education of military personnel since mid-1970s is clearly subject to speculation. They certainly cannot be determined a priori,
that is, without the aftermath of actual combat engagements. Nevertheless, case-evaluation reports of recent large-scale annual military exercises and manoeuvres of Nigerian armed forces (designed to heighten the personnel field, aerial and naval training) suggest a high degree of combat coordination and mastery of fundamental operational art and tactics—reminiscent of some of the singular performances of the Third Marine Division during the Civil War. Such complex exercises permit the creation of instructive situations, facilitate practical checks of operational-tactical calculations and serve as a good basis for investigating intricate current questions covered by combat and command training schedules.

However, if, as argued above, adequate manpower training and acculturation in 'military ethic' remains a decisive factor on war, their (personnel) actual performance cannot be separated from the nature of the instrument (equipment). This is why the constant development of weapons and combat equipment complicate the process of training and educating personnel, present increasing demands on officer corps and make the improvement of existing methods of conducting warfare necessary. The effectiveness of operational training, as well as the level of the combat might of the armed forces depend inescapably, therefore, on the nature and quality of the instrument.
Institutional reform and personnel retraining are only but two related facets of the modernisation programme. The ability of any national armed forces to provide a military underpinning to a country's defence and foreign policy objectives depends crucially also on the nature of the instrument, as it is driven by changing technology: the weapons and the support systems of war. It is in this regard that in the 1980s, if not in the 1970s (largely because of the immediate and pressing problems of providing accommodation and personnel retrenchment) that material decisions concerning the amount, procurement, and distribution of major weapons systems to the armed forces became the centerpiece of the modernisation scheme.

According to official sources, these essentially involved two principal policy focuses: i) direct acquisition of major weapons platforms (such as ship, aircraft, and tank) and weapons (missile, gun, and torpedo), and ii) import-substitution industries for weapons production, which combine assembly of imported sub-systems (the initial phase in the mastery of military technological know-how by developing countries) with indigenous research and development of new weapons. The latter will be examined in a greater detail in Chapter Seven, section c (the 'local military-industrial complex'). Suffice to note in passing, however, that in order to reduce the present inordinately high level of depen-

dence on foreign sources for equipment, maintenance and modification, the Fourth National Development Plan called for the expansion of Nigeria's defence industry. For this purpose, the 1981 defence budget allocated N19 million of the renovation of the Defence Industries Corporation (DIC).

Established in 1964 by the West German firm of Fritz Werner, this factory was designed to proceed gradually from the production of small arms and ammunition to complex weapon systems. However, as a result of the domestic upheaval of 1966-1970, the industry subsequently fell into disrepair and obsolescence when the predominantly Ibó defence scientists fled for the East where their skills were utilised in the Research and Production Unit of Biafra with singular results.

As the projected pivot of Nigeria's 'military-industrial complex' in the 1980s and beyond, DIC presently has the dual role of overseeing private operations aimed at manufacturing defence-related equipment while at the same time, conducting research into new weapons for the armed forces. Among the private companies involved are the Austrian firm of Steyr Daimler Puch and the Italian Fiat company, established in 1979 as a joint venture with Nigeria to manufacture armoured personnel carriers (APC) and armoured fighting vehicles (AFV). Others are Leyland Vehicles of the UK (British Leyland's truck and bus division) and Daimler-Benz of West Germany. The latter two plants are expected to manufacture military vehicles, using locally-produced truck cabs, and
pressings[71] Since the impact of this military-industrial development on the capability of the Nigerian armed forces is largely long-term (subject unavoidably to current structural limitations — austerity — on the defence budget), the primary focus of this section will be on the procurement agenda involving direct major weapons acquisition, while an evaluation of present and projected development in the military-industrial sector will be made in the next chapter.

The material programme concerning the procurement and distribution of weapons systems to the Nigerian armed forces may be examined from two interrelated standpoints. The first is both quantitative and qualitative: an assessment of weapon platforms so far acquired and their heightened effect—if any—on the operational and projectable power of the armed forces. The second, and related, standpoint concerns the compatibility or divergence between arms acquisition patterns and political purposes. In other words, whether policy considerations (security and foreign policy objectives) guide or follow current structural decisions involving arms procurement for the Nigerian military. As will be amplified upon below, such 'goal-oriented guidance' is of crucial importance for a militarily dependent state.

A state whose military power critically depends on externally-acquired weapon systems—as noted in Chapter Five—can seldom exercise independent initiative on matters relating to war and peace as suppliers retain veto power.
through their ability to withhold the vital replacement of arms and spare parts in conflict situation. As Vogt has forewarned: "...the ability of Nigeria to prosecute a war depends largely on the co-operation of foreign suppliers, and since Nigeria buys largely from the West, she may experience a repeat-performance of what happened during the civil war when the United States and Britain refused to deliver equipment that had been ordered."[72]

But first, an evaluation of the inventory of weapons systems deliveries to the Nigerian armed forces. Significant structural changes and adjustment in defence allocation in favour of weapons procurement were major highlights in defence planning under the Shagari administration.[73] The Fourth Plan (1980) allocated over N7 billion--out of overall projected capital expenditures of N70.5 billion--for military equipment over five years in an effort to make Nigeria's military, in the words of President Shagari, "an effective force second to none in Africa and comparable to the best in the world ... to defend the largest black nation on earth".[74] Accordingly, the period spanning the Second Republic (1979-83) witnessed a profound and concerted effort aimed at heightening the combat capabilities of the armed forces.

The Navy, as previously alluded, was given first priority in the modernisation programme--a result of 1) the vulnerable concentration of oil facilities along the coastal
zone; ii) the increasing nuisance of piracy and smuggling; and iii) the imperative of transporting military personnel and material abroad for peacekeeping (e.g., Lebanon) and related missions. In order to carry out these 'three-in-one' functions, Nigerian naval planners under Rear Admiral Aduwo moved effectively in the late 1970s and early 1980s to translate these policy objectives (operational tasks) into forces of a particular size and composition. The Naval establishment was streamlined from 8,000 in 1980 to 4,000 three years later, and a massive systems platform scheme (capital ships and support vessels) was launched which brought total naval vessels strength to approximately one hundred and twenty-three. These include nine new missile-armed capital warships and six fast attack crafts (see Chapter Five, Table 5.4). In addition, the Navy further planned to acquire mine-sweepers and supply vessels to sustain protracted operations at sea. In February 1982, a naval air wing was also formally commissioned by President Shagari. It is expected that 'when it reaches its full development, it will be equipped with helicopters and other aircrafts and will have pilots fully trained to operate these aircrafts'. As a consequence of this buildup, the Nigerian Navy has, in quantitative terms, surpassed other navies in the regional subsystem in both delivery systems and firepower, as Nelson observed:
Headquartered in Lagos, the Chief of Naval Staff—Rear Admiral Aduwo—in 1981 commanded a modern fleet spearheaded by corvettes and large patrol craft. Measured in numbers and types of vessels, the Nigerian fleet was believed to be the largest in Africa—including South Africa's. [78]

However, despite this significant augmentation of naval power, the inexperience of Flotilla Commanders, coupled with shortages of technical personnel and the non-existence of major ship repair and refitting facilities (under construction) have hindered its effectiveness. These reservations notwithstanding, the Navy's widely complementary role in support of major amphibious operations (Bonny, Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar) during the civil war has made its current senior officers amongst those with some combat experience in the continent. Their joint training and exercises with their counterparts in other Commonwealth countries (Britain, India and Australia) have also helped to create and sustain a significant degree of professionalism in the Nigerian Naval officer corps.

Equally, to enhance its indigenous maintenance capability, several infrastructural facilities for ship repairs (at Lagos, Port Harcourt and James Town), started under the military government of Obasanjo, were nearing completion by 1983. These include a ship assembly and building plant, as well as three dock repair yards for both public (the Nigerian National Shipping Line) and private ships. [79]
Similarly, the Army—the traditional core of the Nigerian defence establishment—received a massive infusion in offensive arsenal from the late 1970s (see Chapter Five, Table 5.2). As noted above, in 1979 armoured strength was boosted when deliveries of Soviet T-55 battle tanks commenced. This was followed by the procurement of the latest British main battle tank, Vickers, along with a license for parts production. The new Army inventory also includes several armoured personnel carriers (APC), heavy artillery pieces, and howitzers of British, Soviet, Italian and Swiss manufacture, and an all-weather surface-to-air missile system (SAM). However, although this diversity in sources has insulated the Army from the whim of any one supplier, heterogeneity of equipment combined with shortages of skilled maintenance technicians in ordnance have constituted a formidable logistical problem for division commanders.

The Air Force, the weakest link in the Nigerian defence triad, is presently in the process of modernising its aging strike force. Unlike the Transport Command, the Strike Group before 1981 suffered unavoidable neglect as budgetary considerations necessitated structured and incremental planning. In the late 1970s, the tactical squadrons of the Strike Group comprised thirty Soviet MIG-21 supersonic fighters, equipped with Atoll air-to-air missiles and several IL-28 medium jet bombers, as age, attrition, and poor maintenance exacted a heavy toll on the older aircraft (MIG-15s and MIG-17s). Their
operational outdatedness (compared for instance with Libya's MIG 23, 29, and 31 or South Africa's Mirage F.1AZ and F.1CZ/IIICZ) made their replacement necessary.

As reflected in the 1981-1983 budget proposals to the National Assembly, Nigeria was in the international market for a new fighter aircraft to replace aging MIGs. Leading candidates were the Anglo-French Jaguar, the French Mirage 2000, and the FX export variants of United States F-5 or F-16 fighters. From recent indications, the air force planners apparently settled for the Anglo-French Jaguar II—a deep penetration aircraft, equipped with a single tow missile launcher and night sight which is better armoured and more manoeuverable than its predecessor, Jaguar I. Eighteen to twenty of these aircraft are scheduled for initial delivery. The choice according to the Sunday Times (Lagos) was made on grounds of performance and the possibility of a joint venture with India on spare parts production. In addition, twelve French-German-produced Alpha-Jets (delivered in 1981-82) are to serve in trainer and ground-attack roles. Plans have also been underway since 1981 to establish an aircraft industry with Brazilian and Indian assistance (see Chapter Seven, section c).

However, despite this significant amplification in the striking power of the Nigerian armed forces, one fundamental drawback has loomed dangerously in policy decisions concerning the pattern of arms procurement. This is the apparent
indifference of Nigeria's defence community' [81] (in the Second Republic) to the potentially paralysing consequences of current schizophrenic tendencies between its foreign policy aspirations and its military policy concerning patterns of arms acquisition. As Vogt, among others, has persuasively argued:

It is very apparent that the Nigerian defence establishment is not operating with an awareness of the political objectives of the country, in other words, there does not appear to exist a serious political direction for the armed forces to follow. This accounts for the increasing dependence of the defence establishment on these same countries that are most likely to challenge the country's leadership aspirations. For example, Nigeria not only buys military equipment from France, but also plans to develop the uranium extraction industry with the cooperation of a French company. One is not here advocating a policy of boycott of economic interaction with France ... What one is in fact concerned with here is the political direction which should shape the acquisition patterns of the armed forces. The military should reflect concern for the political aspirations of the state in their procurement pattern.[82]

Indeed, a cursory appraisal of defence contracting under the Shagari administration (unlike its military predecessor) reveals a curious, but explicable (military and political elite with profitable connections to Nigerian-based Western companies and consultancies), relegation of the political component in military forecasting.[83] Under the conditions
created by contemporary configurations in international power (dominated as it is by the two major military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the successful exploitation or utilisation of military power as an instrument of policy by economically and militarily dependent states—such as Nigeria—resides in the extent to which procurement patterns, strategy, and force planning are brought into focus with overall policy objectives (see Table 6.2). In other words, the selection of the correct direction in arms procurement and the adoption of soundly based decisions with respect to policy objectives constitute the crux of viable defence planning. The basic task—indeed the critical factor—for Nigeria is, therefore, to recognise the trend and the logic in the evolution and correlation of forces in its military environment thus making it possible to minimise uncertainty (‘friction’, to use Clausewitz’s category).

This inescapable prerequisite for military effectiveness in industrially backward countries of the Third World is the direct consequence of existing ‘patron-client’ international dependencies: a ‘reciprocal, durable, and sometimes personalised relationship between states commanding unequal resources of status, and power’. [84] The crucial characteristics of this lopsided ‘interdependence’ are asymmetrical resources and mutual, if often disproportional, flow of benefits.

In specifically military terms, for the dependent party such patron-client relations evolving from arms acquisitions
and economic links invariably entail greater sensitivity to the desires of the superior power in the calculus of military policy. As Knorr rightly contends:

Whatever the configuration of the international power structure implies for the great powers, it looks quite different from the perspective of the small and weak states, affording little freedom of international action and uncertain security from aggression. Their usually narrow margin of safety demands vigilant prudence. (Only the strong can hope to "muddle through").

Many of these countries...have equipped themselves in large part with very modern weapons and gear. To that extent, they are deploying military systems that they are incapable of producing themselves and that they find often difficult to employ to full efficiency because the requirements to use them exceed those achieved in the overall level of their civilian economies.[85]

From these basic premises, two consequences arguably follow for the great majority of developing countries. One is that military confrontation involving them is bound to be remarkably short, if entered into without massive and continuing outside support (in money and material) as is the case with the four Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. The reason is obvious: given the ferocity of contemporary battlefield engagements there is a tendency for the belligerents to run quickly through stocks of weapons. The other consequence is the critical dependence of these countries on arms supplies from the developed states. As already pointed out, this is
apt to be rather precarious, because suppliers may restrict or embargo further deliveries when the need is most urgent. The implication of these two conditions (in terms of policy decisions) is that the economically and industrially less developed states such as Nigeria are not when considered as military powers 'as sovereign as are the more developed nations, and they are incapable of protracted warfare without reverting to more primitive modes, as they do when engaged in civil war'.[86] These two conditions diminish somewhat the utility of military power for the states involved.

Thus, because politically non-aligned, unrestricted by ideological affinities or special security needs, and unintimidated by close geographical proximity to a superpower, Nigeria in theory can switch from one military source of weapons to another with relative ease. However, in practice, as the example of Egypt presently highlights, even with one of the relatively advanced military-industrial complexes (in continental terms), such freedom of action is very constrained in fact.[87] It is in this respect that the current weapons acquisition strategy for the Nigerian armed forces (exhibiting diversification only within the same power bloc—NATO) is at best inconsistent with experience or at worse counter to Nigeria's Afro-centric security and foreign policy aspirations, as a number of Nigerian defence critics have noted.
This puzzling contradiction exhibited by decisions concerning the procurement of weapons systems for the Nigerian armed forces was one of my major research focuses while in Nigeria (see introduction). In guarded discussions and interviews with senior members of the armed forces and defence analysts at both the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (Kuru) and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Lagos), I was left with the impression that, although apparently satisfied with Soviet equipment, the quality of performance, attitude, and competence of Soviet technicians and instructors was a constant source of irritation of the Nigerian military establishment. For example, some of the MIG-21 supersonic fighters originally delivered in 1974 were not in service in 1980 because of maintenance problems and lack of spare parts. Moreover, two of the aircraft had been lost in crashes with Soviet instructors aboard—not an unusual occurrence in training missions. Another cited example is that of the T-55 battle tanks, delivered in 1979. The Third Armoured Division of the Nigerian Army, under the command of then Brigadier Buhari (the present Head of the Military Government), reportedly had problems with Soviet technicians who were unable to put into running order the T-55 tanks that had recently been delivered from the Soviet Union.
As a result of this dissatisfaction the Nigerian government requested a reduction of the total number of Soviet military advisers from forty to five. However, this explanation of the significant shift in the pattern of arms acquisition and military cooperation (training of personnel) from the 1970s is hardly to be considered satisfactory. As in the first Republic, this change of direction is more suggestive of the inevitable decision-making consequences of the changing dynamics in the domestic elite under the Second Republic (1979-83). The civilian elections again brought into power conservative and essentially pro-Western politicians (Shagari, Audu, Abubarkar, etc.)—products of Western institutions of learning and professional exposure—whose anti-socialist sentiments were not altogether concealed. As one perceptive writer has succinctly argued:

> When the military elite of any country studies abroad, it learns far more than merely how to use the latest radar equipment or how to fly the latest jets. It also learns the foreign policy, values, attitudes, and perceptions of the country providing that training.

It is not surprising, therefore, that one American observer of the Nigerian scene commented during the ill-fated Second Republic with apparent satisfaction that, 'Nigerian military and civilian officials reportedly looked with favour upon the United States military establishment—not only for
its organisation, equipment, and tactical capabilities, but also because of the traditions that have kept it out of American politics'.[93]

The attitude and policy orientation of the Nigerian 'power elite' in the Shagari era stood in contrast to its more nationalistic non-aligned predecessor—the Muhammed/Obasanjo government (see Chapter Three, section c). The policy direction of the successor regime (1984-) to the Shagari administration is presently unclear. Given the changed socio-economic conditions and the cautious, reformist, and conservative direction (to the extent that this can be established from policy statements, regime decisions and media interviews so far given by dominant members of the administration)[94] of policy planning since January 1984, it may be hypothesised that no fundamental or radical alteration in the defence programme will be made in the short-term.

Finally, the overall magnitude of the military modernisation effort (in terms of force level and force strength) crucially depends on budget decisions concerning the size and distribution of funds made available to the armed forces. As noted in passing in Chapter Five (section b), the determination of the defence allocation and its distribution among different armed services (airforce, navy, army, etc.) in the face of competing national demands was—along with demobilisation—one of the most controversial issues in Nigerian national planning in the late 1970s through the 1980s.
The recurrent debate in the Nigerian press—involving decision-makers, academics, retired military professionals, and the public—about the rationale of the present level of defence spending is a palpable reminder of the continued condition of 'disequilibrium' between the dominant goals of domestic policy, on the one hand, and security and foreign policy objectives, on the other, since the end of the civil war in 1970. During the thirteen years since the end of war, defence was absorbed an average of 18 percent of the Federal budget (see Chapter Five, Tables VII-X). This has undoubtedly imposed limits on the resources available to other competing interests and demands in society.

Conversely, the tremendous upsurge in demand for other social needs (agriculture, education, health, industry, communication, etc.) had by late 1970s unleashed an unprecedented groundswell of discontent and controversy about priorities in national planning and resource allocation. As a result, the magnitude of the defence effort became a key issue in the new pattern of fiscal politics, focused upon the allocation of resources between the military and non-military sectors of the society and among the various purposes of government. Thus, unlike the civil war period when military needs became overriding, taking more than 35% of the Federal budget, each administration since 1970 has had to balance an uncomfortable equation in which the major elements were:
1) **domestic schemes** for agriculture, housing, highways, education, health, etc., loosely identifiable as serving the welfare purposes of the country;

11) **foreign programmes**, including expansion of diplomatic missions (from six in 1960 to eighty-two in 1980), military-strategic commitments (e.g., aid and logistical support to liberation movements, and peacekeeping in Chad and Lebanon), loosely related to the goals of diplomacy and security;

111) **tax limitation and reduction**, justified in terms of private consumption and investment; and

1v) **balanced budgets**, justified during the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s by a number of goals, including the prevention of inflation and the reduction of the national debt related to the value of fiscal integrity.[96]

These four elements constitute the primary underpinning of the 'Gari versus Guns' controversy (the Nigerian variant of the guns or butter debate) which profoundly influenced budgetary decisions concerning the size and distribution of funds to the armed forces. As seen from the direction of this debate, there were persistent tendencies—despite the interdependence of the budgetary components—either to treat each segment in the equation separately, 'something to be considered on merit without reference to other goals,' or to assume that one goal was of overriding importance and must have absolute priority over the others. For example, a
number of critics of defence spending (Adekson, Kamoru, Okadigbo, and Uche) have conveyed the erroneous impression that domestic needs could be met independent of security needs—that an absolute limit existed on what the economy could afford for defence—despite the lesson of the civil war era. [97]

Conversely, institutional and public defenders of relatively high defence expenditures (Akinyemi, Haruna, Imobighie, Kadzai, Sobowale, among others) often seemed to underestimate pressing domestic needs engendered by the 'revolution of rising expectations'. [98] They assumed that the requirements of security were absolute and that the only legitimate limit on their fulfillment was the physical capacity of the economy. In other words, the general tendency among this group of analysts was to balance the 'requirements' of security against economic capability rather than against 'requirements' derived from legitimate but competing expectations of government and society.

However, in practice, no single element—the absolute requirements of security or the absolute limits of the economy—could determine by itself the level of defence effort necessitated by the armed forces modernisation programme. Neither do spurious charges—disguised as a dispassionate policy critique—such 'Bayo Adekson's Military Extractive Ratio (MER) thesis [99] contribute significantly to under-
standing the complex farrago (of sometimes confusing and confounding contradictions) of issues involved. As Adekson himself explains:

The military has for some time now been the government...and with this the legislative function as we know it ceased, while open party politics was prescribed. The implication of the latter—for fiscal policy was that the military, as an interested and the more organised sector, was also the sole judge of how much went to it vis-a-vis other competing sectors, such as, agriculture, education, health, labour, and community development. Nor were auditor generals' offices permitted to function effectively in monitoring how a given defence ministry spent its allocations. Besides, even if they did not want to, soldier-rulers often found themselves compelled by the logic of the situation to satisfy members of their profession with increased donatives and benefits, whatever the economic conditions prevailing in the wider society...I submit that the foregoing state of affairs invariably resulted in a skewed budgetary distribution in favour of the military.[100]

It is hardly to be disputed that a number of elements in the domestic political economic constellation may have a significant effect on military expenditures; in this case the characteristics of leadership and the processes of recruitment and tenure maintenance. In this respect, it may be hypothesised that the military as the dominant actor—the 'sole judge' of the allocation of societal values—in the period 1966-1979, ensured a disputable degree of resource allocation to defence. All decisions regarding military
policy, including the shape of the defence budget, were taken within the Supreme Military Council (SMC) that served as the FMG's (Federal Military Government) chief executive body. Adekson's explication, however, fails to explain continued defence spending hikes under the civilian administration (1979-83) with a qualitatively different and more complicated budgetary process.[101]

A more informed analysis, therefore, of the determination of resources available to the military government and the allocation of these to military, domestic, and foreign purposes, has little to do with self-aggrandisement of military 'power-elite', 'compelled by the logic of the situation to satisfy members of their profession with increased donatives and benefits, whatever the economic conditions prevailing in the wider society'.[102] Adekson's thesis (popularised by the Nigeria media in the late 1970s) was basically defective. He utilises fragmentary and circumstantial evidence and a fallacious conceptual apparatus (Military Extracative Ratio) to produce a highly biased view of the military era. To this extent, he failed to appreciate the dynamics of a developing national defence system in a praetorian polity. He also ignored the fact that the drastic changes in Nigerian foreign and security policy since the civil war (see section a, above) reflected the altered position of Nigeria in a
regional subsystem deeply unsettled by pressures of decolonization, regional rivalries, external intervention, political instability and civil strife (see Chapter Two).

Hence, an alternative conceptualization and explanation of the high level and rate of fiscal outlay for defence was, and still is, in part the consequence and requirement of building, to use Shagari's words, a 'well-equipped, mobile and virile defence force' on a meagre legacy (at the time of independence) within a short span of time, to meet systemic challenges. It was also partly a result of the military-institutional imperative of providing infrastructural facilities and support (barracks, logistical bases, training centres, airfields, defence industries, etc.) for a military that had expanded more by accident than by design from 8,000 in 1966 to 272,000 by 1972.

This functional conceptualization notwithstanding, the inevitable impact of high defence expenditures on social and economic sectors cannot be minimized or ignored. The implication of this concern has been a rationalization which maximizes the utility of available resources without sacrificing either efficiency or competence. In other words, there was a concrete trend under the Shagari administration toward defence planning which sought to create a 'proper balance between recurrent budgetary expenditures (salaries
and overhead costs of military personnel) and capital expen-
ditures (on equipment, support systems, and R&D
schemes).[104]

Thus, unlike the decade of the 1970s when, according to
former Chief of Army Staff, Danjuma, 'only about 10 percent
of the budget for the armed forces has been going on equip-
ment while the remaining 90 percent on salaries and emolu-
ments of the personnel'[105] legislative intervention during
the Second Republic resulted in a significant diversion of
funds for military hardware (N7 billion designated for the
fiscal period of 1980-85, under the Fourth National Develop-
ment Plan). This was possible, as noted above, largely
because of the determined and extensive demobilisation exer-
cise conducted under the Muhammad/Obasanjo administration.
This trend is apparently continued under the present military
administration, as the approved Federal Budget of this fiscal
year suggests.[106] However, the extent to which the current
level of defence spending can be maintained in future will
depend (as argued in Chapter Five, section b), first, on
Nigeria's balance-of-payments position, as it is affected
especially by the volatility of the oil market; and second,
on the extent to which the present and future government is
able to satisfy competing national demands: namely, social
welfare and development plans for industrial expansion.[107]
Conclusion

The phased and planned modernisation of Nigerian armed forces which began in the mid-1970s is still in the process of completion. Although beset by major problems and challenges (severe shortages of semi-skilled and highly skilled manpower and substantial shortfalls in oil revenues which prompted cutbacks in government expenditures across the board) considerable progress has been made in the targeted areas. Both vertical and horizontal reforms of the military organisational structure have been largely accomplished. The vertical reforms involved the composition of military command, demobilisation, creation of specialist units, and personnel retraining. The horizontal reforms concerned the 1976 army reorganisation from the wartime three-division arrangement (where each division's area of responsibility ran east to west) to the current north-south, four division structure deployment pattern.

This north-south structure is expected to insulate division commanders (and their units) from primordial regional rivalries. However, operations under the current system have been impeded by overextended lines of communication and problems relating to military geography (operating in areas that encompass a wide variety of terrain). To overcome these difficulties and increase operational effectiveness, the army decided in 1981 on a further reorganisa-
tion that would modernise and reconstitute the four divisions and make each responsible for a quadrant of Nigerian territory.

Similarly, the Air Force has been reorganised into a Training Command and a Tactical Command. The latter has under its direction the Strike Group, the Air Transport Group, and the Support Group. The Ground Training Group and the Flying Training Group are organised under the former. To improve air defence capabilities, plans have been under way for an integrated air defence system. That being considered would include a radar network, a new communications system, new jet fighter aircraft and a surface-to-air missile system (Roland II and Blowpipe have been delivered).

The Navy, in turn, has been reorganised into a Western Naval Command based at Apapa (Lagos), including the Naval Training School Complex, and an Eastern Naval Command based at Calabar (Cross River State). A separate and independent Flotilla Command, which had blue water and expeditionary responsibilities also operated out of Apapa base, but eventually destined to be headquartered at Koko in Bendel State; however, in 1981 it was incorporated by the other two commands. The 6° east meridian separates the operating areas of the two Commands (Eastern and Western), each comprising units responsible for seaward defence. In addition to Lagos and
Calabar, the Fleet also operates major bases at Port Harcourt and Burutu, near Warri, which are to serve as major training centres.

Apart from the extensive personnel retraining and demobilisation exercises, a considerable amount of hardware has been acquired by the services although, as noted above, certain organisational and maintenance problems remain. As Nelson has observed:

After a concerted reorganisational effort since the mid-1970s, the size of Nigeria's army had been reduced by nearly 50 percent, and efforts were under way to improve the combat capabilities of its field units. The air force was adapting to operational manning of its modern weapons by Nigerian pilots and technicians rather than by foreign contractors, and the Navy was adjusting to its enhanced mission of protecting the country's vital coastal and offshore oil resources. All of the services were gaining proficiency in the new equipment that had been added to their inventories...

Nevertheless, bureaucratic problems (for example, how to decentralise administrative efforts within the military command without loss of central direction and how to cope with the self-centred orientations of Service Chiefs pursuing conflicting interest), financial waste and fraud, and desertion of skilled personnel—who find the slow pace of upward mobility in the armed forces too uncomfortable—have combined to inhibit judicious co-ordination of the modernisation.
scheme. As to its overall impact so far on the projectable and operational capabilities of the armed forces, any assessment would be largely speculative and hypothetical, since Nigeria has not been involved in any major war since 1970.

However, conceived in the traditional modes in which national armed forces have been employed as an instrument of statecraft—threatening, deterring, warfighting and peacekeeping—it cannot be doubted that the Nigerian military by 1983 is in considerably better shape than in 1975. The significant increase in its naval and air transport capabilities has boosted Nigeria’s ability to inject troops into troublespots (e.g., Chad and Lebanon) for peacekeeping and related missions (assuming economic and financial advisability). The increasing mobility and fire power of its ground forces have considerably improved the army’s ability to deal decisively with unruly neighbours on its borders (e.g., the operation in Lake Chad Basin against Habre forces in April-June 1983). Nevertheless, the paucity of the strike group in the Air Force (combat fighters) coupled with the relatively limited striking power of the Army (compared, for instance, with Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa) precludes any independent major operational engagement by the Nigerian armed forces beyond its immediate security environment in the near future. As one analyst has aptly noted:
Most Nigerian leaders readily admit that their army is in no condition to initiate a military solution to South African racism. They fully recognize the military superiority of South Africa. But the widely shared attitude is that if white control has not ended by that future time when Nigeria has developed the economic strength and military process to do something about it, then Nigeria will lead the armed struggle. It remains to be seen how near that time is, objectively speaking. [110]

In overall terms, the policy impact (in terms of projected ability and decisiveness of the armed forces to provide the means for actualisation of foreign and security policy objectives) of Nigeria's military modernisation programme as an ongoing process can be measured only in a relative manner. In the final analysis this is again subject to critical analytical and policy distinctions highlighted in Chapter Five: that is, those between 'necessity' and 'choice' between 'maximalist' and 'minimalist' definitions of role and mission, between 'conjecture' and 'prediction', between major and minor issues, between 'behavioural' and 'technical' surprise, and between actual and potential capabilities, in Nigeria's defence planning and policy goals. As one analyst recently put it:

Armed forces are never totally developed or underdeveloped; instead, they are found adequate or inadequate for deterring credible threats to the security of a nation and for defending its interests when such deterrence fails. Measuring adequacy is difficult since it must be
determined relative to the military development of plausible threats and cannot be absolutely measured even in time of war. Given the interrelated nature of the military and society, wars may often be lost for purely political, economic, or social—rather than military—reasons.[111]

Seen in such terms, it becomes a problematic, if not simplistic and sterile, exercise to prejudge the operational effectiveness—decisiveness in attaining policy goals—of the Nigerian armed forces at the present stage in the modernisation process. While certain variables of the programme analysed above which contribute to or enhance operational ascendancy are amenable to quantitative statistical measurement others are not. The former include: i) force structure (the size, organisation, and composition of the armed forces), and ii) weapon platforms (quantity and quality of arms). The latter involve: i) sustainability (the capacity of the organisation and culture to absorb, operate, maintain, and support equipment and personnel, and ii) readiness (a measure of the ability of the force to carry out its assigned missions, both in terms of deterrence and defence).[112]

Considered together, these factors—as they are ultimately manifested in human resources (technical skills, leadership, morale, unit cohesion), logistics (supply and maintenance), mobility (rapid movement of troops and equipment, projection of power outside state boundaries), firepower (weapon systems), manpower (number of personnel under
arms, level of organisation), and command and control (communications facilities and administrative expertise)—constitute major determinants of the operational effectiveness of national armed forces. Deficiencies in such components of military power may adversely affect both the micro-competence (the ability to operate and support modern weapons) and macro-competence (the ability to organise and manage forces for military ends) of defence establishments.

In the Nigerian context, the question as to whether the capacity of its armed forces to provide military underpinning for the realisation of policy objectives has improved considerably as a result of the modernisation and augmentation programme is necessarily contingent upon the nature of systemic challenge and actor(s) involved. Tentatively, however, there is sufficient evidence from annual military exercises and manoeuvres, combat in the Lake Chad Basin, peacekeeping duties in Chad and Lebanon, and logistical support operations in Southern Africa in the past five years to indicate considerable improvement in the decisive prerequisites for high combat effectiveness and readiness of the Nigerian military.[113]

Nevertheless, as Norman Dodd has rightly noted, crucial problems remain affecting both the micro- and macro-competence levels of the Nigerian armed forces. These are: 1) the tendency of social objectives to override strategic considerations as criteria for top command position; 11)
insecurity of the regime 'which leads to distrust of independent power centres; and certain attitudes and mindsets which arise out of the traditional culture'; iii) persistent problems of building a reliable logistics system; iv) broadening repair and maintenance programs; and v) 'continuing difficulties with developing the capacity to absorb and operate complex systems'.[113]

As the foregoing analysis suggests, Nigerian defence planners are not unaware of these problems, although finding solutions to them resides in the degree of development in the economic, educational, social, political and cultural spheres. As Raymond Aron put it: 'An army always resembles the country from which it is raised and of which it is the expression'.[114] As will be amplified upon in the next chapter (section b), the extent to which the ongoing modernisation programme produces the desired result in Nigeria's 'power of resistance' will depend, among other things, on the transformation of its socio-economic, technological and cultural fabric. Such a transformation is a *sine qua non* for sustainability and force readiness as well as the generation of a viable 'military industrial' base which is indispensable for the 'relation of force to national purposes'.

The next chapter—the last of the major chapters of this dissertation—is, therefore, essentially 'futuristic': designed to examine salient issues in Nigeria's defence and
foreign policy planning within a stipulated context of probable global and regional environments. These issues include contemporary and future calculations and constraints concerning Nigeria's status and role as a regional power; and expectations, realities and constraints concerning domestic military-industrial base and nuclear option. Finally, the strategic implications of the present for programmes—that is, use decisions concerning the deployment, commitment, and employment of Nigerian military forces, as manifested in military alliances (ECOWAS Defence Protocol, and the proposed Pan-African Task Force for Southern Africa), foreign and security policy declarations and objectives—will be examined as one set of significant indexes for the future direction of strategic thinking and defence planning in Nigeria.
TABLE 6.1
Organization of the Defense Establishment, 1980

National Defence Council
- Army Council
- Naval Council
- Air Force Council

President

Minister of Defence

National Security Council

Chief of Defence Staff
- Deputy Chief of Defence Staff

Nigerian Defence Academy

Command and Staff College

Chief of Naval Staff
- Flotilla Command
- Western Naval Command
- Eastern Naval Command

Chief of Army Staff
- One Division
- Two Division
- Three Division
- Four Division
- MIBATT III Lebanon

Chief of Air Force Staff
- Support Command
- Tactical Command
- Training Command

Air Transport Group

Ground Training

### TABLE 6. II

**Security Policymaking at the Nation-State Level**

#### A. Internal
1. Population size composition, etc.
2. Resources
3. Economic development, agriculture, industry, skill of labor force, trade and commerce, research and development, etc.
4. Governmental structure and regime politics, civil-military relations, inter-service rivalry, bureaucratic politics, etc.
5. Religion, ideological, social, ethnic, linguistic cleavages, etc.

#### B. External
1. Geo-political setting
2. Global and regional security systems, distribution of military power, alignments and alliances, actors, nation-states, international organizations, transnational groups
3. Global and regional economic systems (dependent, independent, inter-dependent) domains, monetary, trade, investment, resource distribution, etc.
4. Adversary relations and issues

#### Response of Elites to Input Factors: Formulation and Execution of Security Policies

(Intervening Phase)

1. Assumptions about international system and security arrangements
2. Definition of military threats to nation-state and elite interests and values, external and internal
3. Military doctrines formulated to respond to threats and to pursue opportunities by threatening and using force
4. Force levels and weapons systems organized and deployed to implement doctrines of use and threat
5. Announced strategies to allies, adversaries, and internal population
6. Resource development and allocation
7. Marshaling of internal support
8. Political control of the military establishment
9. Alignment strategies and arms control policies, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral

#### Impact of Security Policies on Environment

A. Processes
1. Access to strategic resources
2. Transfer of arms
3. Dispatch of personnel
4. Finance of Third State defense efforts

B. Outcomes
1. Local, regional, and global conflicts
2. Internal regime support or change
3. International security agenda

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NOTES


3. As formulated by Toynbee, the concept of 'challenge and response' represents the inexorable dynamics of change (in form of growth) and stagnation (in form of breakdown) in the 'rise and fall of civilisation'. Two variables are specified in Toynbee's hypothesis: the presence of a creative minority in a given society and an environment which is neither too unfavourable nor too favourable. Of the five challenging stimuli Toynbee examined from his study of twenty-six civilizations of the past, two were physical—'hard country'—and three nonphysical—those emanating from the external environment. A successful response to these challenges—'etherialization'—generates growth; failure marked a process of degeneration and emergence of a 'dominant minority'. See Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, (Abridgement of Volumes I-IV, by D.C. Somervell), (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 60-139.


5. See the collection of speeches of the former president—Shehu Shagari—under the title "The Armed Forces Serve the Nation" in Ji-jjani and Williams (eds.), Shehu Shagari, Chapter 12.

6. The Economist, 19 September 1981, p. 44.


Miners, The Nigerian Army, Chapter Six.

Figures from Accountant General's Annual Reports, as presented in Miners, ibid., p. 251. By contrast, Ghanaian recurrent defence expenditure under Nkrumah, for example, had already reached £9 million by 1963, taking over 10 percent of the budget. These differences in the level of defence spending between Nigeria and Ghana no doubt reflect the fundamental personality and policy disparity on the role of military power in intra-regional affairs between the conservative, and almost pacificist, Balewa of Nigeria and his dynamic and uncompromising counterpart, Nkrumah of Ghana (see Chapter 3, Section c).


As explained by Kissinger, Brodie and Knorr, the concept of 'usable' military power is qualitatively different from 'actual' or 'available' military power. Military power can in fact be actual, it can be available, and yet still not conceivably, or credibly, or rationally usable in relation to certain objectives. For example, the utility of nuclear weapons—with their cataclysmic destructive power—lies essentially in 'nonuse'—deterrence. Similarly, at the conventional level, a country, such as Nigeria, may possess a large military establishment, but the composition, structure, and paltriness of its offensive capability may render its usability in future contingencies (as presently in Southern Africa) unlikely. See Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper, 1957); Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (New York: MacMillan, 1973), Chapter Nine; and Knorr, The Power of Nations, Chapters Three and Five.


An 'institutional' perspective or viewpoint implies that the study of military systems requires an analysis of the 'organisation of military forces and the manner in which they are used in the pursuit or the avoidance of conflict'. See Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: essays in the institutional analysis of war and peace, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), especially Part II, "Comparative Analysis of Military Institutions". Also see the collection of articles on military reform and defence planning in Orbis 27, 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 245-300.

Since any national armed forces cannot be expected to train and equip equally for every conceivable contingency without seriously foreclosing their prospects for success in any particular set of circumstances, rational military planning, therefore, entails that an endeavour be made to narrow the range of scenarios against which a military establishment must prepare to 'those that are either most likely to occur or those deemed to be most threatening to the national interest'.
In the process, estimates are, and must be, made about such variables as the effectiveness and impact of new battle-
field technologies, the probable duration of a future conflict, the direction of enemy doctrine and planning, and the manner in which enemy operations are likely to develop. Unfortunately, as Bernard Brodie has noted, 'doctrine is not often as open to innovation and reform as one would like'. Once adopted, 'doctrine tends to take on a life of its own, frequently hanging on long past the time when its strategic and operational assumptions have become passe'. For these and related discussion on military doctrine see Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes" in Klaus Knorr (ed.) Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 263-306; Steven Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War", International Security Review, 7, 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 245-268; Kevin Lewis, "Dealing With the Unexpected", Orbis, 27, 4 (Winter 1983), pp. 839-847; and G. McCormick, "The Dynamics of Doctrinal Change", Orbis, 27, 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 266-274.


24 Record, "France 1940 and the NATO-Center 1980", p. 68.


26 Ibid., p. 122.


28 Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, p. 117.

29 Campbell, "Army Reorganisation and Military Withdrawal", pp. 82-86.


32 See the summary of Danjuma's interview on Radio/Television, Kaduna (RTK) programme, 'Meeting Point', in Daily Times, 13 December 1975, p. 5.

The coup of January 1966 resulted in the deaths of nine officers, seven of them in the rank of Lieutenant-colonel and above, and 24 officers were imprisoned. The death toll in the July 29 counter-coup was even more disastrous for the army: a total of 43 officers perished. See Zdenek Cervenka, *The Nigerian War, 1966-1970*, (Frankfurt: Bernard and Graefe, 1971), Chapter One.

The resulting departure en masse of officers of Ibo origin to the East, and the paralysing effect of this exodus on one of the vital support units has been succinctly described by Obasanjo. See Obasanjo, *My Command*, (London: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 26-28.


*Daily Times*, 13 January 1976, p. 5.
41. See, inter alia, Tijjani and Williams (eds.), Shehu Shagari, Chapter 12, "The Armed Forces Serve the Nation", pp. 333-344; Alhaji Akanbi, "Technology and National Defence Capability-Policy Options", (paper presented by the Minister of Defence at the NIIA, 1982); W.I. Aleyideino, "Modernization of the Armed Forces of Nigeria", (Kuru, November 1982); "Nigeria's Armed Forces", New African, October 1979, pp. 29-30; personal interviews with some senior members of the armed forces at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, and at Bonny Camp, Lagos, in April 1983 (see the section on data collection and validation in the introductory chapter).

42. For a theoretical amplification on these structural categories, see Huntington, The Common Defense, Chapter One; For the Nigerian case study, see Aleyideino, "Modernization of the Armed Forces of Nigeria" and Col. S. Balogun, "Command and Control: a case study of military organisation in Nigeria", (SEC-4, National Institute Library, Kuru, 1982).

43. For a detailed consideration of the distinction between 'task specialist' and 'social specialist', see Norman Dixon's analysis:

As a 'task specialist', a leader's prime concern is to achieve the group's ostensible goal; in the case of the military, defeating the enemy....In his capacity as 'social specialist', however, a leader's main function is to preserve good personal relations within the group, thereby so maintaining morale as to keep the group in being. In the military milieu the function of a successful social specialist, would prevent mutiny and reduce such symptoms of low morale as absenteeism, desertion, sickness and crime. Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London: Futura, 1983), p. 216.

44. Ian Campbell, "Army Reorganisation and Military Withdrawal", p. 60.

45. The swift and clinical action taken by Murtala Muhammed to rid the military command (as well as the civil service) of the brazen and decrepit elements, while exceed-
ingly endearing to the public, was, however, not without an unsettling and potentially explosive impact on the military, as the abortive coup led by Lt. Col. Dimka (February 1976), demonstrated. Thus, Keith Panter-Brick has noted:

The enforced removal of Gowon, the compulsory retirement of the most senior officers, the rapid elevation of the new Chief of Army Staff, and the appointment of many young and middle ranking officers to senior posts in government and the armed forces, all tended to erode the corporate unity of the army. The promotions exercise, overlapping as it did an ill-timed and badly-presented programme of army retrenchment, found the commanders and the leaders of the new administration occupying an extremely exposed and delicate position. Ethnic tensions, service rivalies and personal animosities began once more to surface at every level of the army hierarchy.

Keith Panter-Brick (ed.), Soldiers and Oil, (London: Billing Ltd., 1978), p. 92. Although Panter-Brick's observation is inherently flawed in its selective exaggeration, the seething discontent within the military establishment prior to the abortive coup lends it a measure of authenticity.


52 Obasanjo, My Command, p. 72.

In 1975, three weeks after the removal of Gowon from office, he issued a long press release on 'Tasks before the new administration', which included some incisive comments about defence expenditures and the imperative of demobilisation:

The effectiveness of an army, as an offensive and defensive force, does not necessarily consist in the number of troops nor even essentially in superior weapons. It consists basically in its discipline, morale, and efficiency.... Nigeria now has the largest army in Africa south of the Sahara; and we spent 40 percent out of total recurrent expenditure for 1975/76 on 270,000 men and women in army uniform.... The reorganisation of the army, as I understand it, must be a multi-faceted problem of discipline, morale, and efficiency.... But a drastic reduction in the number of troops as well as the strengthening, retraining and re-equipping of the remaining troops as also an essential part of the reorganisation, and evidently more in keeping with our overall and long term national interest...1975, pp. 12, 13, 21, 29) and continued ibid., 22 August 1975, pp. 7, 12, 21, 23.


64 New Nigerian (Kaduna), 9 June 1976. See also Lindsay Barret, Danjuma: The Making of a General (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1979), p. 75. For a catalogue of these mistakes, see Obasanjo, My Command, especially Chapters 2 to 10.


66 Tijjani and Williams (eds.), Shehu Shagari, pp. 337-338.

67 Nelson, Nigeria, pp. 268-269.


70 By 1975, 50 percent of army personnel, for example, was accommodated in temporarily requisitioned quarters, which contributed to the straining of relations between the army and civilians as the intermittent riots pitching civilian against unruly military personnel in Cross River, Lagos and Ogun states attest. To improve the situation, the barracks-building programme started under Gowon's regime, was accelerated by Muhammed and Obasanjo.


72 Vogt, "Nigeria's Defence", p. 79.


74 Tijjani and Williams (eds.), Shehu Shagari, p. 33.

75 The operational tasks constitute the 'three-in-one' functions of the Nigerian Navy. The properties of this trinity is defined by the three characteristic modes of action by which navies carry out their purposes: namely, the military, the diplomatic, and the policy functions.


77 *Daily Times*, (Lagos), 15 February 1982.

78 Nelson (ed.), *Nigeria*, p. 262.


81 The concept of 'defense community' is related to but different from 'security community' alluded to in Chapter Five. Its realm of focus is preeminently national defence policy formation: policy inputs, strategy and force planning. Conceived in terms of structure and function (structural-functional analysis), the concept of defense community comprises four elements: a) the participants--those who are 'attentive to and undertake to influence policy outcomes from inception through execution; b) the channels--the interactive processes. Within the community, both formal and informal, from which policy emanates; c) the constraints--the political, strategic, economic, and social constraints which impact on the process; d) the functions--the policy decisions 'resulting from community functioning' (defense policy, strategy, force planning) see, James M. Roherty (ed.), *Defense Policy Formation*, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), Chapter One. This concept also has a general applicability to most African states other than Nigeria.


83 Military-strategic forecasting is concerned with the character and means of conducting future wars that may occur, the forecasting of the military objectives, missions, actual plans, and overall composition of the armed forces of individual countries and coalitions. Since, as noted in the preceding chapter, the degree to which a state mobilizes military potential obviously depends upon the international situation, the challenges and opportunities it is perceived
to present, and relevant means-ends calculations, as perceived by its decision-makers, it is not difficult to see that military-strategic forecasting is inseparably with and, in turn, influences forecasting of the world political situation. This last constitutes the inescapable political and ideological component of military planning.

The pattern of arms acquisition by the Nigerian defense establishment between 1967 and 1979 unmistakably reflects this political reality (a consequence of Nigeria's bitter experience during the civil war following American, British and French embargoes on arms and munitions for the Federal forces). Conversely, weapons procurement in the Second Republic (1979-83) arguably suggests a return to the pre-civil war (1960-66) acquisition patterns, since Soviet sources have been virtually ignored since 1980 in defense contracting involving major weapons systems—fighter aircraft, ships, tanks—and support systems. To the extent that policy statements under Shagari administration may be taken for granted, Nigeria's Afrocentric security and foreign policy orientation and commitment (e.g., participation in a Pan African Defence Force for the Frontline States of Southern Africa) has not changed substantively, the return civil war ante policy of exclusive procurement from the West is at best risky. The reason of course is that no Western government, however, sympathetic to the plight and brutalization of Africans by the fascist South African albinocracy, would in practice sanction its weapons being used for their liberation. For an incisive analysis of military-strategic forecasting, see Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, 1975); Charles Hitch, The Direction of Defense: principles of decision-making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); and Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning, (Princeton University Center for International Studies; Policy Memorandum, No. 35, November 1968).

In reality, unlike the ideal model or formulation of the concept of patronal power and leadership, the relationship between patron and client states may also be based partly on coercive power and/or loyalty. This holds true of the Soviet bloc in eastern Europe and of the United States position vis-a-vis Latin America. For an excellent analysis of international political clientelism, see Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Gerald Garvey, "The Political Economy of Patronal Groups", Public Choice 1 (Winter, 1970); pp. 27-41; Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development", Comparative Politics, 4 January 1972, pp.


Ibid., p. 111.


There were four Bragadiers, two Air Commodores, and twelve colonels at the institute in 1983 during my sojourn as a research assistant in the Research Department of the Institute. Also present were senior officials from the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, among others.


Nelson, Nigeria, p. 269.

Military policy is in equilibrium when: a) no sharp conflict or asymmetries exist among the dominant goals of domestic, defence and foreign policies; and b) no major alterations in policy are taking place. As explained by Samuel Huntington among others, this theory does not presuppose a mechanical or deterministic alternation of equilibrium and disequilibrium. It simply holds that 'at any given time military policy is a response to both its external and internal environments'. If these environmental conditions are stable, a policy equilibrium may emerge; if not, disequilibrium prevails. See Huntington, *The Common Defense* Part IV, pp. 197-283; Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), Chapter I; and Michael Hobkirk, *The Politics of Defence Budgeting*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1983), Chapter Two: "Can Theory Help?"

For these 'issue-areas' in the budgetary outlay see issues of *Federal Government Budget*, (Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1975-83).


Adekson defines his MER concept as 'that proportion of national wealth more or less forcibly appropriated to and unproductively utilized by the military members of society at any given time'. How this 'proportion of national wealth' can be determined is, however, not clear in his disquisition. On the contrary, the Chief of Army Staff under Gowon administration, Brig. Hassan Usman Katsina, that 'the defence of a country is not a commodity to be measured in pounds, shillings and pence'. As Adekson himself noted: 'order and defence, as political values, do not lend themselves to easy economic analysis, quantification, and assessment, in a way that economic 'development, for example, does', p. 52.
429


Under the civil administration (1979-1980), the defence budget was prepared annually by the Ministry of Defence in close consultation with the military high command and the president and was submitted to the National Assembly for approval—a process that was neither automatic nor speedy.


Bruce Arlinghaus has noted in the latter regard that military development is not an unconstrained process. It is limited by available resources and the necessary balance between military and other needs. It is at this point that the greatest political and economic risks are taken—forced upon decision makers by circumstances beyond their immediate control'. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 55.


110 Ostheimer and Buckley, "Nigeria", p. 291.


CHAPTER SEVEN

The Military Instrument and Nigeria's Foreign Policy:

the future from a minimalist perspective

In the past, especially until August 1975, Nigeria's style lacked dynamism and action. It elevated low-profile into a virtue, and low-keyed personalities into heroes and saints. It failed to respond correctly to the needs of Africa, and could not offer leadership in action and thought which Nigeria's human and material endowments demanded from Nigeria in the context of Africa and the Black race. New thoughts on Nigeria's foreign policy should therefore aim at achieving dynamic style and action-orientation in the conduct of foreign policy. These imply that the makers of Nigeria's foreign policy should: (1) cultivate the sense of moment and timing which will enable them to seize initiatives correctly particularly on African affairs, and sustain such initiatives; (2) avoid vacillation; and (3) sell the country's postures and decisions "aggressively" using all the means available to Nigeria.

Ray Ofoegbu[1]

...Therefore during the next decade Nigeria must adopt a low profile. It is less costly and yields greater dividends than a tough and inflexible approach. It has to be remembered that one of the remarkable post-war developments in the international scene is that military and economic force has limited utility value. Indeed, it can be counterproductive. The same is true of the tactics of bullying and confrontation. More tangible results can be achieved through close consultation, co-operation and sen-
sitivity to the feelings of the leaders and people of other states. Therefore a low profile in the 1980s will surely be in the interest of the country.

Olajide Aluko[2]

Any evaluation and critique of the instrumentality of military power in Nigerian foreign policy would be essentially incomplete without an attempt at conjecture about future direction from past and current trends. This is particularly so in a condition of changing dynamics in its operational environment (both domestic and systemic) which may either provoke activist and forceful responses to regional challenges (as was the case in the late-1970s) or compel more introspective postures and muted policy behaviours. The latter is currently the case in terms of adverse developments in Southern Africa which threaten one of Nigeria’s fundamental policy goals: the eradication of colonialism, racism, and apartheid from the continent.[3]

Either trend in governmental perceptions and definitions of Nigeria’s policy response is bound to have implications for the role-orientation of the national armed forces and defence planning. However, unhappily, despite the researches, projections or forecasts of new futurologists,[4] neither subsequent developments in internal environment (capability factors relating to the industrial and economic infrastructures and military strength) nor concomitant policy
responses can be predicted with much certainty. So this chapter in essence dwells on specific salient 'issue-areas' in Nigeria's military statecraft, within the context of probable regional and global environments of the nineteen eighties and nineties. The first section, thus establishes the contextual framework—possible changes and directions in relevant global and continental parameters—of Nigeria's future military policy and defence planning. This is followed by a reasoned evaluation (to the extent that this, possible) of Nigeria's status within the regional subsystem (based on capability considerations) which may or may not affect decision-makers' perception of what role it should play in future crises. The third section examines policy choices concerning the structural underpinning affecting the operational capability of Nigeria's armed forces: the local 'military-industrial complex'. The two final sections consider, respectively, current debates, proposals and probable policy directions concerning (i) 'the nuclear option' and (ii) alliance commitments (ECOWAS Defence Protocol and any Pan-African Defence Force).

a) The Future of Military Power: global and continental dimensions

As the extensive modernist versus realist debate of the 1960s and early 1970s (examined in Chapter One) corroborates, academic projections about future direction, role, and
usability of national military power as an instrument in the contemporary international system can, in the words of Immanuel Kant, "become a trap for the overbold and the unwary". The myriad difficulties of forecasting future roles for national military instrument of statecraft are fairly obvious.

Given the overall complex of reality involved, and the formidable problems of computing global and regional distribution of the relevant changes in parameters, such a futuristic exercise is, at best analytically tentative, prescriptively quixotic, and, in certain cases, a dangerous misdirection of effort. Since national military systems and their employment are intended to achieve national policy objectives in the international arena, their usability and effectiveness are always conditional on particular circumstances. Considered abstractly the three main referents of this proposition—national armed forces, policy objectives, and international/regional arena—concern realities that are, first, interdependent, second, highly complex, and third, subject to change over time. It may be further hypothesized that change in any one reality is apt to impinge in a complex manner on the others.

To put it differently, whether national military forces and their operational doctrines contribute to the achievement of national security and policy goals, and the extent of any contribution, depend upon the nature of foreign and defence
policy objectives as well as on the properties of the international arena and the suitability of military systems and their use. In short, the continued utility of national military power is a function of their suitability to both policy and international environments, since successful military policy and performance—whether in the role of deterring, threatening or war making—demands that capabilities, objectives, and environments are properly reconciled. The complex interrelatedness of these variables, and their inescapable impact on national policy concerning the use of military force, can be more than illustrated; it can also be explained (see Chapters One and Two).

However, the question of paramount importance to this chapter is whether the contemporary international system—dominated as it is by considerations of security that make national militaries an indispensable instrument of policy—will continue indefinitely? Or is the system of nation-states (and nascent international regimes) in a 'revolutionary process of change' that is making war, national military power, and security concerns obsolete? While recent events in human history—engendered by the inexorable and constant dynamics of social and technological parameters—have profoundly undermined convenient assumptions that 'things will be as they are in the present', recent research on projection and forecasting has failed to reduce the essential unpredictability of future trends and events. Arguably, the introduc-
tion of such imaginative techniques and instruments as the Delphi Technique, gaming, simulation and increasingly sophisticated computer systems in policy planning have constituted a major departure from past practice of reliance on sheer judgment, yet their usefulness can be exaggerated.[5]. Projection from recent trends—on which these techniques operate—is at best an indication of what is possible. It would be problematic enough to identify all the variables—political, military, economic, social, ideological, cultural, demographic, technological, etc.—that have affected systemic transformation in the past, and might conceivably do so in the future. It is almost impossible to measure properly these dynamic factors.[6]

Although the 'behavioural revolution' in the social sciences since the late-1950s has considerably sharpened the methodological basis of observation relating to relevant future trends, and sometimes even allows us to 'measure' (attach weight to) them in a rough fashion, trends are affected by other forces in ways and with strengths that are impossible to predict. These difficulties are inherent in any desire to predict events that are essentially unique. For example, at the global level, hardly any of the European statesmen or their defence planners predicted prior to 1939 profound systemic changes (configuration and outcome: nuclear bipolarity, the emergence of socialist China, decolonization, the concomitant decline and subordinate sta-
tus of such former imperial powers and Britain, France and Germany) wrought by the Second World War and the atomic and thermonuclear revolutions. The 'watershed event' (to use E.H. Carr's phrase) itself—World War II—as historians constantly remind us, was not unconnected with the unforeseen rise of Nazi Germany, German rearmament, and the rise of Japan as a dissatisfied and militarily-aggressive power.

A more glaring and recent example, at the regional level, of the 'hopelessness of prediction' or conjecture[7] about the future was the sudden collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa in the mid-1970s and the tremendous and step-level impetus it gave to decolonization in Southern Africa. The dramatic nature of this event (engendered by the coup in Portugal in 1974 which followed a series of costly military setbacks for the Portuguese military command in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau) became only too obvious from the pessimistic (in some cases derisive) writings and projections in the early 1970s about the prospect of liberation in Southern Africa by the year 2,000.[8] These writings (some of which specifically disputed the possibility of independence in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe by the end of century) now stand as monuments to academic orthodoxy and misperception constituting in the words of Mazrui, 'an onlooker's separation from the demands and processes of active revolutionary struggle'.[9]
Despite these demonstrable difficulties in forecasting future developments both at the global and regional levels, it remains the indispensable—and indeed urgent—task of national defence planning which guides a state's military policy, to anticipate expected politico-military environment five, ten, or fifteen years hence, within which resort to military force might occur. This process involves, inter alia, making informed conjectures and assumptions about future contingencies: the probable nature and properties of the international system and configuration of international power, future opponents and capabilities, and the future possible impingement of dominant military alliances on extraregional conflicts; estimates of such variables as the effectiveness and impact of new battlefield technologies, the probable duration of a future conflict, the direction of probable enemy strategic doctrine and planning, and the manner in which threats to national security are likely to develop.[10] Taken together these variables constitute the politico-military environment of national security policy, which inescapably affects the relation of military power to national purposes. Assessments (erroneous or correct) in turn form the bases or assumptions underlying national defence and foreign policy postures. Such assessments also provide the 'scientific data' for doctrinal developments
which, as noted in Chapter Six, provide 'the goal-oriented guidance' for military procurement, organisation, and operation.

The tentative assumption and analytical position regarding the future of the military as an instrument of policy, both at the global and regional levels, offered in this chapter are preeminently minimalist. While not altogether disputing the 'modernist'/'idealist' argument about the profound and emerging transformation in the mode of relations between states—which, according to analysts of this school of thought, make military force 'less and less relevant to human aspirations'—it is to be contended here that those developments (see Chapter One) stressed by modernists are secondary perturbations—dependent rather than independent or controlling variables—in the rise of what John Herz has aptly described as the 'new territoriality'.[11] In other words, barring a major catastrophe such as a cataclysmic confrontation between the superpowers, the international system will remain in the foreseeable future essentially state-centric. So too will the security imperatives which presently frame and inform international transactions although, as argued in chapter three, they must now be understood in wider and subtler terms than the crude employment of military force. The international system will thus remain 'divided against itself'. As Kenneth Waltz reminds us, it is, and will still be, a 'self-help system'.[12]
The logical derivative from the foregoing is that as long as autonomous states are militarily sovereign, force will remain the ultimate arbiter in the settlement of interstate conflict. Since this is the inherent dynamic of the contemporary international system, resort to force by governments in situations unyielding to pacific strategies becomes a 'systemic necessity' and, hence, inescapable, unless the system itself is essentially transformed. It is in this context that the conceptualisation of 'war and peace' as opposite sides of the same coin, whose causal foundation rests on competing nation-state units, by such eminent theorists as Raymond Aron and Hans Morgenthau is to be understood.[13] For example Aron's postulate of relations among states as consisting of the 'alternatives of war and peace', is invariably based on his assumption that a 'political unit claims the right to take justice into its own hands and to be the sole arbiter of the decision to fight or not to fight'.[14] His supporting argument (as Morgenthau's) is equally obvious from his massive treatise: that since statesmen, acting in pursuit of their national interests, operate in an anarchical international environment (distinguishable from a national environment by the absence of authoritative political institutions, legal systems, and commonly accepted standards of conduct) war is almost inevitable. Put differently, war is the natural, logical and perhaps almost inevitable relationship among 'communities' which, in the absence of a supranational
governmental entity, reduce their political relations to a
competition (as well as cooperation or indifference) for
prevalence with an 'admixture of firepower'.

From this perspective, two hypotheses concerning the
future of the military instrument in statecraft—at both
global and regional levels—may be established. First, a
system of competing national units carries the risk of mili-
tary force. And second, military force, as manifested in
war, is a means not an end in itself, however justified in
the name of the beliefs and values of nation-states. In this
regard, it is not surprising that the use of military force
or the threat of its use is often fired by that 'false and
malificent religion'—the ideology of nationalism.
Nationalism, as Toynbee rightly notes, 'provides the symbols,
values and beliefs in devotion to which modern people every-
where, cling to unlimited and restricted sovereignty and
thereby make it impossible, thus far, to make even a modest
beginning in the direction of limited world government which
could put an end to power politics and international anar-
chy'.[15]

The policy corollary of Toynbee's observation is of
course that to ensure their survival as sovereign units,
states must make the preservation or improvement of their
'power of resistance' a principal objective of their foreign
policy. This transformation into policy consideration of
what is in itself a mere consequence of the international
system as a 'threat system' follows less from an abstract conception of praxis as critics of realism are often quick to assert. On the contrary, such a behavioural tendency on the part of governments, irrespective of status, ideological persuasion or political system, attests to the profound security concerns which continue to remain rooted in the very nature of the international system. Traditionally, this goal has been pursued through 'balance of power' policies and collective security measures (military alliances) which, inter alia, sought to preserve the status quo by preventing (or neutralising) the rise of hegemonic powers. The dynamic of action in this respect remains the consideration that because of the difficulty of achieving peace through international law and organisation, or even by means of world government, it is necessary to devise other arrangements for the management of power.

Thus, both the balance of power and collective defence systems approaches are said to furnish important regulatory devices to prevent any one nation or group of nations from achieving hegemony.[16] This policy trend was as much a feature of pre-1945 Europe as it now is of contemporary international system dominated by two formidable military power blocs. It is also arguably an emerging tendency in a regional subsystem such as Africa, given the explosive combination of such unsettling factors as: (i) the spread of the cold war into the 'African periphery', (ii) rising defence
expenditures, (iii) regional rivalries, (iv) economic collapse, (v) political instability, (vi) civil strife, (vii) moribund dictatorships, and (viii) vestiges of colonialism in Namibia and South Africa. These seem to mark an irreversible trend towards regional vigilantism and realpolitik rather than the primacy of 'intra-system solutions' based on normative considerations. As John Burton aptly concludes: 'There is probably no greater common factor than the assumption that states depend for their existence upon power, and achieve their objectives by power, thus making the management of power the main problem to be solved'.[17]

Seen within this analytical framework, it may thus be speculated that, both at global and continental levels, military power will in the future, as at present, continue to be a crucial factor in structuring international relationships. The high aggregate level of world expenditures on military forces supports this assumption. For example, by 1983 world military spending was running at about $410 billion yearly or nearly, '$1 million a minute--about 500 percent more than the 1960-1970 average'.[18] In regional terms, Africa's rate of militarization outstripped that of every other region outside the Middle East in the 1970s. By 1983 continental tensions and rivalries had pushed annual weapons costs up to $20 billion. As argued in Chapter Two, such a high rate of defence spending among African countries is indicative of the inexorable tendencies on the part of an increasing number of
governments to achieve a significant level of military strength from a relatively meager foundation; to advance their interests and objectives against real or potential adversaries.

Given this unabated and combative trend toward 'militarisation' (an extension of military influence to civilian spheres, including economy and socio-political life) and 'militarism' (the rush to armaments, the growing role of defence establishments in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of political power etc.) at both regional and global levels, the paramount challenge for Nigeria—as a political entity with definite foreign and security policy objectives—remains to augment its military option while exercising circumspection in its use. As noted in the preceding chapter, such a policy direction has become virtually an article of faith among decision-makers since 1966 as clearly evident in an official statement by the former President—Shehu Shagari—in 1981, that 'a modernised and well-equipped force can be expected to discharge creditably and positively the task of defending the largest Black nation on earth; and only such a force can give adequate credibility and expression to Nigeria's strong foreign policy posture'.[19] One astute observer of the Nigerian polity has noted in this regard that:
Nigerians seem to feel that they have a duty to match their political importance in Africa and the world with military strength. The recent apparent threat to West African countries from Libya's activities in Chad has strengthened this view; and, however, unrealistically, in the future they see a showdown with South Africa.[20]

Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing any systematic discussion of the future role of military power in Nigeria's foreign policy is: (i) how to draw the necessary distinction between what is desirable and what is possible, and (ii) the possibility of confident prediction about the anticipated politico-military environment (the three 'concentric circles' of Nigeria's foreign and security policy environment, discussed in Chapter Six), five, ten, or fifteen years hence, within which Nigeria's military power might be activated in crises.

The first of these two considerations necessarily involves accurate balancing of objectives and commitments—such as preventing a deterioration in the geographic and military status quo in the neighbouring states and the total liberation of Africa—within the overall context of its current and projected capabilities (see section (b), below). Policy objectives may be desirable but unrealistic in terms of given national capabilities and hence court failure. They may be unrealistic because the military and non-military means of international prevalence available to the Nigerian government
are insufficient to produce desired policy results, such as the 'total decolonisation of Africa' (Namibia and South Africa); or, because employing Nigerian armed forces in certain ways is inappropriate in certain conditions to a particular policy goal, such as restoring normalcy to Chad through peacekeeping (see Chapter Four). However, for a number of reasons—elaborated in general in Chapter One, section c—it is far from easy to calculate the relevance of military means to the achievement of certain policy objectives. It is far from easy to foresee precisely because the 'relevant realities and their interaction are complex'; because the total problem must for purposes of decision-making, 'be decomposed into manageable parts'; and because 'the results of these analyses must be brought together and sensibly integrated for proper decision-making'.[21]

Part of the reason for the failure of the two Nigerian peacekeeping operations in Chad—indepedently in 1979 and as part of the OAU Force in Chad in 1982—was due to overestimating the receptivity of the various domestic factions, or, more appropriately, underestimating the delimitations imposed by the 'farrago of confusing and confounding contradictions' in the Chadian polity about such peacekeeping operations (as opposed to peace enforcement—the Libyan approach). According to one member of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in the Muhammad/Obasanjo era—Olajide Aluko—the majority of representations from the academic community was
clearly against such an undertaking, citing the Congo (1960-63) and Cyprus as persuasive examples. [22] However, having committed itself in the Lagos and Kano Accords to dispatching a neutral force to Chad to separate the warring factions, the sentiment in the Supreme Military Council was clearly in a different direction.

The second consideration concerns future developments in Nigeria's primary politico-military environment—the African subsystem—which impact on its security interests and, as a consequence, may necessitate the employment of national armed forces either coercively in order to influence the behaviour of opponents or in order to alter or preserve the status quo by sheer military feat; or, furthermore, providing the mechanism for interventionary or 'preventive diplomacy' (peacekeeping) for intra- or inter-state conflict, where such an endeavour may be considered appropriate. This environment necessarily encompasses three basic properties to which I turn next: (i) situational conditions which may provoke a military reaction; (ii) probable opponents; and (iii) probable allies.

1) **Situational Stimuli**

Regarding the first category, two probable scenarios, involving two subzones with preeminent concern for Nigeria's policy planners—West and Southern Africa—may be posited. In the West African subzone—ECOWAS—it may be speculated
that a deterioration in the geographic, military and political status quo in any neighbouring country—with inevitable spillover effect for Nigeria, in terms of refugees and armed incursions into border towns etc.—may in future prompt an interventional military response on the part of Nigeria. It, therefore, makes a considerable difference whether or not those countries on the immediate strategic horizon of Nigeria—enfeebled as they are by increasing poverty—will be rent by civil strife and so susceptible to direct and indirect aggression such as French interventionism or mercenary adventurism which in the past has affected such West African countries as Benin, Chad, Guinea, Togo and Nigeria.

The latter development—mercenary adventurism—has been of cardinal concern to successive Nigerian governments, as the Nigerian-Benin defence accord in 1979, following the abortive attempt by a company of mercenaries of French and American origin to overthrow the socialist government of Kerekou, attests. However strenuously denied by the countries involved, a survey of the pattern and mode of operation of the numerous instances of mercenary involvement in Africa is revealing in one vital respect: that mercenarism has become an adjunct of the 'Third Option' force (covert operation) at the disposal of extra-continental powers seeking to ensure favourable outcomes in areas of vital economic and strategic importance to them.[23] As Jonathan Bloch has rightly noted, 'if one reason has to be sought for the increase in their use
it lies in the changed balance of power in the post-colonial world: today unofficial means have to be used to change the situation in former dependencies'.[24] This observation points to the geopolitical underpinning of an increasing mercenary menace in contemporary Africa.

CIA recruitment, for example, of American and European mercenaries to fight in Angola in 1975-76, was part of an overall strategy of the Nixon-Kissinger administration to influence the outcome of the conflict in the West's favour[25]. In much the same vein, the British government ignored the massive recruitment drive for mercenaries from among British elite forces for Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Air Force, for instance, alone was reckoned to contain 400 Britons and a British company--Airwork Services--maintained it throughout the UDI period. Recruitment from Britain took place at all levels but the mercenaries were drawn primarily from the Green Howards, Royal Green Jackets, Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines, all closely associated with the British SAS. The bulk of these mercenaries constituted the Rhodesian SAS C squadron, which was responsible for 'Operation Hurricane' in which 250-300 women, men, and children were shot, shelled and napalmed to death in Mozambique in early 1979.[26]

Nigeria's doctrinal response--articulated by the Obasanjo government in 1979 following the Benin episode--was to declare mercenarism, as well as other forms of external acts
of subversion, a 'grave threat' to be met by superior counterforce. In this respect, article 16 of the ECOWAS Defence Protocol may be seen as providing the legal and normative basis for Nigeria's military response to such contingencies should its assistance be requested by its fellow member state.[27]

In Southern Africa, South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and perpetuation of apartheid within its boundaries are two interrelated factors perpetrating regional conflagration that may in future draw Nigeria into a defensive military operation in support of the Front Line States. Despite the current sigh of relief widely expressed by Western commentators and policy makers following the Nkomati Accord and the temporary cessation of hostility in the Namibian-Angola theatre (the later predicated upon the implementation of the UN resolution concerning Namibian independence), it would be exceedingly fatuous to expect any degree of future stability in the region within the context of prevailing 'settler colonialism' in both South Africa and Namibia. As one perceptive writer recently concluded:

"The objective of regional stability in Southern Africa will remain a chimera unless the phenomenon of racial rule in South Africa is effectively dealt with. Since neither the international situation nor the configuration of political forces within South Africa suggest that a significant movement away from white supremacy..."
is imminent, one can expect a lengthy period of instability and resultant tension within and among the states of the region.[28]

Indeed, the current hysteria of optimism expressed in the Western media—reminiscent of similar wishful thinking in the early 1970s—can only be considered as disinclination to absorb the bitter lessons of recent history. Disinclination in this case is reinforced, as Hugh Tinker rightly notes, by the 'Kith and Kin factor and because of their economic investment in South Africa and their tacit, implicit acceptance of the right of white people to rule'.[29] On the contrary, there is little reason to believe that the continuation of the draconian racial order in South Africa and the annexation of Namibia as the fifth province of the white laager would provide a permanent basis for peace in the region. Seen in this light, the present accord between South Africa and Mozambique and cessation of hostilities between the former and Angola, to the extent that they affect the logistical bases of ANC-PAC and SWAPO, can only be considered transitory developments that merely postpone the inevitable.

Barring peaceful transformation in the South African albinocracy and independence for Namibia, therefore, future developments within that region (such as the wanton massacres of Africans as in Zeerust in 1957, Sekhukuneland in 1958, Pondoland in 1959, Sharpeville in 1960, Soweto in 1976 and Sobeking in 1984 and renewed South African military pressures
against neighbouring states) may eventually translate the proposal for a Pan-African Task Force into reality, in which an economically revitalised and militarily capable Nigeria would inevitably play a vital role (see section (e) below). Such a future scenario is not altogether spurious, as many Western analysts readily contend.[30] As reflected in South African defence literature and in the organisation, training, doctrine, equipment and deployment of its military forces, this is a scenario that has been a subject of considerable debate in South Africa's 'defence community' and reflected in its defence planning.[31] Despite a defensive pronouncement on the theatre level by the apartheid regime, existing South African military doctrine calls for a 'dynamic' mobile defence, which would include local brigade- and division-level armoured counter-attacks and deep-penetration air raids over 'enemy concentration' and logistical infrastructures. In the maritime sector, amphibious operations and strike missions by naval vessels are also planned. As one analyst put it:

Pretoria's perception of a conventional military threat focuses primarily on the black African states of Southern Africa. However, South African spokesmen speak often of a military threat from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and sometime mentions Nigeria as a state that could become a major concern in the future... South African security and foreign policy planners have to be concerned with the
future when economically strong and politically viable African states might develop the capability to launch a credible attack on the white redoubt to their South. [32]

Ironically, the very development—the Nkomati Accord—recently hailed by Chester Crocker as a victory for Reagan's policy of 'constructive engagement' may well engender the necessary momentum towards institutionalisation of a collective defence system for Southern Africa. [33] This could well be the countervailing consequence of the widespread feeling of humiliation and resentment in Black Africa towards any development signalling an accommodation with fascist South Africa. It is in this respect that the dynamics of events in Southern Africa could in future generate disenchantment in the so-called Front Line States resulting in the emergence of more radical and uncompromising regimes through military coups d'état. As the Middle East precedent (in the states of Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Iran) has demonstrated, such a hostile dialectic cannot be ruled out in conditions of mortal systemic threat, fuelled in this context by the brazen American policy of 'constructive engagement' and the increasing involvement of international pariah-Israel. [34] In other words, as one recent commentator put it, 'there is little reason to believe that whatever incremental moderation of
policy has been achieved by the recent accords, it is anything more than a temporary adjustment on the part of Mozambique and Angola'.[35]

11) Probable Opponents

Regarding the second category of variables in Nigeria's politico-military environment, it obviously makes a difference whether the two powers considered the most threatening to the cohesiveness and survival of Nigeria as a political unit—France and South Africa (see Chapters Three and Six)—will engage in indirect as well as direct aggression. Alternatively, whether the present trend towards reciprocal accommodation and mutually beneficial economic relationship between Nigeria and one of these powers—France—may become paramount. As suggested in the last chapter, the pervasive and tenacious involvement of France in West-Central Africa had been widely seen by Nigerian policy planners as constituting a direct affront to its national security and also impeding 'the growth of the country's political, economic and cultural interests in the region'.[36]

Furious French resistance and economic blackmail of 'francophone' West African countries in the early 1970s nearly aborted Nigeria's effort to create the politico-economic and military institutional base—ECOWAS—for the transformation of prevailing regional neo-colonial structures and power relations. As Paris rightly perceives, the emergence of
Nigeria as the regional power centre around which indigenous interests can coalesce in relative security inevitably expedites the retrenchment of the neo-colonial structures of the French 'commonwealth' and the progressive development of autonomous systems of power in the 'new sovereign region'. Since French economic interests entail its strategic presence in West-Central Africa—invoking, as in the past, blatant military intervention and undisguised manipulation of midget states—the antagonistic relationship between Nigeria and France is arguably bound to continue in the foreseeable future. In this respect—as the developing consensus between the Buhari and Gaddafi administrations over Chad portends[37]—if Nigeria's military power reaches its projected level by the end of the century, military cooperation between it and other African states with similar interests in stemming French influence in the region cannot be totally discounted.

In much the same vein, it is to be expected that the systemic threat to Nigeria originating from apartheid South Africa (see Chapters Three and Six) will become even more ominous in the future, as the survival imperative pushes the white laager into a malign 'continental strategy' entailing for targets of geographic distance, such as Nigeria, an essentially Sun Tzunian strategy based on 'extraordinary and
indirect force' ('Chi').[38] As James Roherty, one of the laager's staunchest apologists in American academia, has noted:

> RSA strategists...feel compelled to reject 'enclave options' and to reach out to 'our continent' not alone by dint of geographical propinquity, but out of sober realisation that the fate of the Republic cannot be extricated from the fate of the continent as a whole.[39]

Clearly the emergence of Nigeria as the most uncompromising anti-apartheid state in the continent in the 1970s has resulted in its incorporation into the South African sphere of systemic security. Given both physical distance and limited logistical reach, the mode of South Africa's military policy toward Nigeria will in the foreseeable future remain essentially indirect: exploitation of internal and external fissures (between Nigeria and neighbouring countries, for example), coupled with intensive propaganda and 'image-building' activities directed at the Nigerian populace, among others. For South Africa, the unalterable goal in this regard has been to undermine the legitimacy of the Nigerian government's anti-apartheid cause among its own people, weaken domestic support for the budgetary sacrifices necessary to provide the military means, and erode the will to aid both the Front Line States and liberation movements in Southern Africa. Under these circumstances, South Africa's current (and arguably long-term, barring the introduction of
Nigerian troops into the region) strategy toward Nigeria can be seen as preeminently in the Sun Tsu tradition of 'chi' or extraordinary and indirect force. Unlike 'cheng', or normal and direct force, the former Tsu conception is applied extensively to weaken an opponent to the point where only a minimum of ordinary force is required to topple it.[40]

Thus, from the South African perspective, if the 'Nigerian state' is carefully neutralised with its domestic environment no longer 'in harmony with the leadership aspirations', there will in fact be very little need for a future military confrontation to overcome any threat posed to the albinocracy by Nigeria. This conceptualisation of the direction of South Africa's strategic thinking concerning Nigeria is generally in keeping with its grand strategy highlighted by the 'Muldergate' affair. It is also an aspect of its defence planning (the 'a la carte strategy') confidently articulated by official representatives of the laager in recent times. For example, Foreign Minister Pik Botha, in a discourse before parliament on 17 September 1981 asserted that 'the gravitational power...of our geographical propinquity' and 'economic imperatives' would lead to consolidation in Southern Africa, but that this could only be one aspect of a 'total, national strategy' which must, perforce, take account of the entire continent and its ocean flanks. South Africa, he continued, must 'establish its credibility and status' as a necessary, acceptable and, indeed, desirable
partner for other governments on the continent ... with a little realistic assessment by Nigeria and certain adjustments by South Africa, these two important African countries could become a bulwark, in the real sense of the word, against foreign intrusion on our continent'. [41]

This theme of grand strategy (which in effect directs attention away from the dominant motif—colonial struggle—of African perceptions of apartheid South Africa to a xenophobic geopolitical perspective on regional conflict), to the extent that it is taken seriously in Nigeria or any other African state can only be aptly construed as a figment of Afrikaner imagination. Benign projections in orthodox Western literature concerning future conflict configurations between South Africa and the rest of black African states notwithstanding, [42] the prevalence and continuation of the racist ethos and survival dynamics of 'settler colonialism' in the laager ensure the paramountcy of conflict rooted in diametrically opposite national interests between Nigeria and South Africa. From the viewpoint of Lagos, the South African 'Reich' is a 'captive state' in which the African majority are literally condemned to perpetual servitude to the economic and social welfare of the dominant white minority. The depth of this feeling among the Nigerian policy-making elite is evident in the following extract from a speech by a former head of Nigerian government at the 1976 OAU summit on Angola:
Mr. Chairman, when I contemplate the evils of apartheid my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every true blooded African bleeds. When we talk of these evils we are assured of the sympathy of the Western countries but when we call for sanctions to end this shame of Western civilisation, suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes more convincing a consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans.\[43\]

That the conflict dynamics generated by the apartheid syndrome and Afrikaner expansionism will in the future continue to be a salient feature of Nigeria's politico-military environment is incontestable. The form of the South African albinocracy nearly eliminates any chance for a fundamental peaceful transformation of existing relations between the dominant white minority and the African majority. The functional dynamics of institutional parastatals and differential incorporation based on race in contemporary South Africa was clearly supportive of this conclusion.

The maintenance of such 'corporate' dominance now constitutes the raison d'être of the continental-cum-hemispheric strategy of the laager. The major short-term objective of this strategy, as widely alluded to in South African sources, is the 'neutralization' or what P. Thandika Mkandawire has referred to as the 'Malawinisation', of the Front Line States through a combination of diplomacy of violence ('forward defence'), economic leverage and destabilisation poli-
cies. The expected result is 'to render her neighbours neutral in respect to efforts that would foster and direct change within South African systems'.

The hemispheric dimension, on the other hand, assumes the 'congruence of US, Latin American, and South African interests' (vis-à-vis the Soviet Union), and has as its principal goal the de jure incorporation of South Africa—as Israel—into the United States' vision of global security, through the creation of a parallel structure to NATO in the Southern hemisphere: the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation involving Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. The expected result in this case—which complements the continental strategy—is 'to obtain Western acquiescence in white minority rule, and concomitantly to avoid pressurisation for change in South Africa's domestic sociopolitical system. While for the apartheid regime this objective remains a distant dream the impetus and legitimisation given to its policies in the region by the Reagan administration has further heightened its hope of success.

For Nigeria (as well as OAU Africa in general) this 'systemic anomaly' in Southern Africa forebodes one inescapable conclusion: the pariah state of South Africa will remain in the indefinite future a major antagonist and potential source of destabilisation in its politico-military environment. How Nigerian policy-makers since 1970 have endeavoured to mobilise regional resources through a collec-
tive defence system—PanAfrican defence force—to deal with this long-forseen cancer in Africa will be examined in the final section of this chapter.

iii) Probable Allies

Regarding the final category of factors in Nigeria's politico-military environment, it certainly makes a difference in the future to Nigeria's military policy whether ECOWAS and the OAU crumble or retain a degree of consensus on crucial regional issues. For example, the unqualified support given to the Nigerian position at the OAU Summit on Angola in 1976 by the majority of African states (despite the determined effort to the contrary by the American government under President Ford), provided the normative basis for Nigeria's diplomatic offensive to legitimize Cuban involvement and defeat South Africa. As one analyst has argued:

The proposal for closer inter-African diplomacy is more than a sentimental contribution to the quest for the elusive goal of African unity...An integrated and co-ordinated approach to African diplomacy, involving joint action by a combination of regional or sub-regional states would, on the other hand, be more likely to generate greater diplomatic impact. It is therefore significant, in this respect, that West Africa's Nigeria participates jointly with Southern Africa's front-line states in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Namibia problem. Such common action enhances African credibility, strengthens the African...
position and puts maximum pressure on South Africa and the Western-Contact Group engaged in the drawn-out Namibian negotiations. [46]

Judging from the current furor within the OAU over the Chad and Western Sahara crises, it may be speculated that this institutional mechanism binding Nigeria's potential allies in any intra-regional conflict is in disarray if not disintegration as grave economic conditions, political imbroglios and extra-regional pressures deepen. Indeed, as the fairly high level of agreement exhibited in the literature suggests, the combination of extracontinental effects and intracontinental developments does not bode well for a significantly improved African future.

Analytical support for such an unpropming appraisal derives from two sources. The first is essentially extrapolative: the conventional wisdom regarding the ineluctable linkage of the past, present, and future. The second source of empirical evidence, linked to the first, concerns developments in five major areas of intra- and inter-state relations, at least on direction, if not on the degree, of trends: national integration, state action, elite control, Pan-African cooperation, and the frequency and intensity in recent years of conflict spiral and external linkages. While the aggregate effect of these multiple centrifugal pressures on the functioning of the OAU cannot be lightly discounted, it is equally true that history is full of surprises.
Thus, continued pressure from the white laager to the South combined with frustration over Namibia and foreign intervention (such as initiated by France and Belgium during the Shaba crisis of May 1978) could yet in the future as in the past galvanise the faltering OAU into a defensive action (including legitimization of military action by any member or group of member states). As Sammy Buo has rightly noted: 'Although the African group of states is also rife with contradictions of one sort or the other, what binds the group together is stronger than what divides it and this is an adequately valid reason for African states to place the highest diplomatic priority on cooperation between and among themselves in crisis conditions'.[47] Such cooperation and opposition by a group of African states (Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya), as discussed in Chapter Two, dissuaded France and its Western allies from sponsoring the so-called Pan-African force of regional proxies in the wake of the Shaba episode of May 1978.

It is in the above context that the future utilisation of the military option by Nigeria in regional conflict has to be predicated upon the overt or tacit diplomatic (and in the case of Southern Africa, collective military) support of probable allies in the continent, as was the case during the civil war of 1966-1970. The emerging consensus between Nigeria and Libya over Chad[48], is already imposing serious operational constraints on French military forces there; as
its casualties mount in the face of attrition. Should such cooperation develop and mature in future, especially within the institutional context of an ECOWAS defence force or a broadly based continental defence system, then the feasibility, frequency and utility of the military option in Nigerian foreign policy may increase proportionately, assuming the political will, heightened offensive capability of the Nigerian armed forces, and sound economic base.

However, since any future military response by Nigeria to systemic challenges cannot be isolated from the prevailing climate of opinion at the global level (especially the attitudes and perceptions of weapons-supplier states), the political direction and strategic configuration at the international level—including the kinds of intervention from outside that may be launched in support of regional clients—become part of the contextual calculus determining resort to military force. As Timothy Shaw explains:

Conflict resolution and political liberation in the African continent, and regional-integration and political cooperation in West Africa, bring Nigeria up against a variety of extra-African interests and institutions: super and great powers and a range of international and transnational organisations are also involved in such issues. East-West conflicts and intra-Western tensions as well as corporate and religious concerns are all reflected in such ostensibly 'African' issues. The interrelatedness
of global and regional factors can be seen in Nigeria's several African roles: in continental, southern African and West African issues.[49]

Nevertheless, it has been the primary contention and argument of this dissertation—as evident in the case study analysis in Chapter Four—that in crisis situations involving vital national interests and concerns, the decision to use or not to use force by the Nigerian government is less subject to adverse systemic normative influences and pressures than to considerations of national capabilities and costs. In this regard, it may be hypothesised that the primary determinants of Nigerian military policy reside preeminently in domestic capability factors. In other words, the utility and usability of military power as an instrument of Nigerian statecraft will depend on the difference between aggregate national values (as expressed in policy goals and objectives) and aggregate national capabilities. This in turn presupposes the emergence of Nigeria as a de facto regional power with a viable socio-economic base and local 'military-industrial' complex, both of which, as argued in Chapter Five, constitute the primary foundation of military statecraft. The rest of this chapter will, therefore, be devoted to an examination of these salient issue-areas in Nigeria's defence policy and planning within the speculative context of a regional power ten, fifteen or twenty years hence.
b) **Nigeria as a Regional Power**

The regional-cum-middle power model, with which Nigeria has been identified in the literature on Africa's international relations,[50] subsumes a wide variety of variables, the totality of which constitutes the 'essence of national power' and influence. These include, in quantitative demographic, material and geographic terms, such static and dynamic factors as population; economic endowment; strategic location; territorial expanse; military capability; and institutional organization and leadership. In behavioural terms, the distinguishing characteristics of a regional/middle power include broad but often geographically-delimited interests and commitments; mediation in intra-regional conflicts; assertiveness in world politics through multilateral and regional organisations; economic and diplomatic influence; non-alignment; and degree of freedom of political manoeuvring in the global arena.[51]

Based on these variegated indices (substructural and superstructural as well as behavioural) it would be apposite to contend in the African regional context, as Timothy Shaw observes, that 'there has been emerging, since 1975, a certain hierarchy and inequality of power attributes among African states'.[52] Nigeria arguably belongs to that group of evolving 'middle powers' in the international/regional system which, as Shaw puts it, 'possess a range of national attributes which distinguish them from the majority of
A cursory comparison (see Table 7.1) of the total population, total armed forces, the estimated GNP and infrastructural base of sub-Saharan African states (with the exception of apartheid South Africa) clearly substantiates this fact. With a gross national product greater than that of all other Black African countries combined, coupled with its significant human resources (qualitative and quantitative), territorial expanse of 356,669 square miles and military strength, Nigeria may rightly be considered primus inter pares in black Africa.

However, despite this incontrovertible and potentially formidable convergence of capability properties and infrastructural base of Nigeria vis-a-vis other states in the subsystem, the extent to which these constitute or portend significantly increased power and influence (as opposed to mere status and stature) in the continent is highly debatable. As noted in Chapter Three, the phenomena of coercive and non-coercive power and influence cannot be merely equated with the domestic attributes of states in the global system.

In the context presently discussed—the military as an instrument of prevalence in interstate relations—because coercive power limits the conduct of an actor subjected to it, influence—adaptation of one actor's behaviour in compliance with, or in anticipation of, another actor's demands—can be seen to reside in the capabilities that permit the power-wielder to exercise effective pressures of
threats. But power can also be seen as identical with, and limited to, the influence/prevalence over the behaviour of the target actor that is actually achieved. On the first view, 'power' and 'influence' are something that powerful states have and can accumulate. On the second view, power and influence are effect, that is, the leverage actually enjoyed in an interaction. In other words, on the first view, power and influence result from domestic capabilities that an actor can hope to bring to bear in a broad range of future contingencies. On the second view, power and influence are 'created and shaped' only in a particular situation; their measure is the amount of prevalence that is actually achieved.[54]

While there has been a tendency among orthodox writers and laymen to see power and influence in the former terms—reposing in capabilities which permit strong threats to be made—most theorists today—especially of the revisionist persuasion—conceive of them as prevalence actually achieved. Thus, Charles Reynolds has argued that the 'power' of the United States at any given moment is not 'a quality, or state, but is evaluated in terms of the achievement of specific aims.' Hence an inability to secure policy objectives in Indo-China over the late-1960s is 'a better indication of its power than a hypothetical capacity to destroy the world or its opponents. In short, power is as power does'.[55] Viewed within this analytical context, to take or to possess as
axiomatic that Nigeria is 'powerful' and 'influential' in regional affairs because of certain objective factors of the Nigerian state—population, location, territory, resources and military capability—is logically unsound and politically untenable. Such a commonly-held assumption by Nigerian and non-Nigerian scholars and decision-makers[56] alike is undoubtedly a reflection of widespread misperceptions and intellectual pitfalls rooted in three principal 'errors of evaluation' identified by Morgenthau.

The first of these errors discounts the relativity of power 'by erecting the power of one particular nation into an absolute'. The second takes 'for granted the permanency of a certain factor that has in the past played a decisive role', thus overlooking the dynamic change to which most power factors are subject. And the third imputes to one key factor a decisive importance to the neglect of all the others. Put differently, as Morgenthau explains:

The first error consists in not correlating the power of one nation to the power of other nations, the second consists in not correlating actual power at one time to possible power at some future time, and third consists in not correlating one power factor to others of the same nation.[57]

Thus, although Nigeria's relative strength and singular role in continental affairs over a variety of issues (such as Chad and ECOWAS regionally and Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia,
South Africa and Western Sahara continentally) in the last decade have enhanced the country's status and stature considerably, it is nevertheless neither empirically proven nor behaviourally foreordained that this new activism necessarily elevates it to the 'immortal rank' of power and influence of dominant regional actors such as Brazil and India.

Two major reasons may be adduced for this scepticism about Nigeria's middle power position. The first follows from a balance-sheet of its experience in conflict diplomacy since independence in 1960. The second is rooted in internal capability factors (structural as well as superstructural) in the short- and long-term futures. This is because Nigeria's fragile and depression-prone socio-economic and industrial base profoundly impacts on policy considerations concerning the use of military power in crisis circumstance. This in turn is exacerbated by institutional disarray and turmoil following each successive regime—a symptom of the persistent praetorian condition which possibly might be aggravated in the short-term by a variety of significant structural conditions that cannot be readily or incrementally alleviated.

Regarding the first observation—the 'score-board of success in conflict diplomacy as an index of Nigeria's power and influence—the record has been undeniably mixed. On the surface and measured against the scale of effort and investment in the 1970s and early 1980s, it seemed Nigeria has
registered more frustration than success in regional conflict diplomacy and management. Instances of apparently successful exertions—such as those in support of MPLA in Angola in 1975-76 and of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in 1978-80—have been overshadowed by the failure of peace-missions in (a) East Africa in 1979 (Tanzanian invasion of Uganda), (b) Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden), (c) Chad (between Habre and Weddeye forces), (d) Western Sahara (between Morocco and Mauritania on the one hand, and Polisario and Algeria, on the other), and (e) the border dispute between Angola and Zaire following the Shaba crisis of 1978.[59]

One explanatory hypothesis for this apparent asymmetry of success and failure is that in the former cases—Angola and Zimbabwe—'success' was due considerably to the 'fortuitous combination of favourable, regional and external conditions. In both instances, the involvement of the hated regional pariah—apartheid South Africa—and the clandestine activities of Western powers (particularly the U.S. and Britain) in a manner considered inimical to African interests generated unprecedented consensus on the part of several African and non-African states which eventually ensured a positive outcome. In the latter case, polarisation within the OAU coupled with unremitting external involvements precluded any possibility of successful Nigerian initiatives. Together, these instances perhaps constitute a cautionary
signal to its decision-makers that Nigeria's power, like that of all other actors, is limited. This is all the more so for a developing polity, one whose international actions and internal formations are significantly constrained by its place in the world system.\[60\]

Regarding the second observation, if as argued above 'power' and 'influence' are relational properties, it is, nevertheless, an inescapable fact of the contemporary international system that a state's capacity of coercive or non-coercive influence depends on its particular power base. This is so because power generated in an interaction between unequal actors resides in the relation. In other words, it results from asymmetries in the capabilities and needs of the actors involved. The essential inequality lies in the superior actor both being able to resort to positive or negative sanctions while at the same time being in a position to neutralise whatever damage might result from the weak actor's countervailing strategies. Knorr has noted in this respect that 'an actor with ample resources, able to satisfy the urgent needs of others, is in a position to capitalise on this inequality and acquire power over the needy actor'.\[61\]

Thus, as a major industrial power, France, unlike Nigeria, has exerted considerable influence in West-Central Africa through hegemonial domination of its former colonial dependencies. The basis of this power and influence over 'francophone Africa' is rooted in the integration of these
client states into a network of neo-colonial dependencies sustained by French economic and military power. One evidence of this domination and prevalence is monetary. Another prominent indicator of French power and influence is military. This involves the large presence of French military personnel on French-controlled military bases, and the deployment of these forces for interventionist purposes in the region. As-Daniel Bon and Karen Mingst have noted, 'certainly, these are all critical pre-requisites—in fact, manifestations—of the extreme political leverage that France wields in these countries'. That France can make and unmake regimes from Libreville to Nouakchott without suffering serious prohibitive costs exposes its actual political, economic and military power and influence in the region.

Conversely, Nigeria, although indisputably primus inter pares in black Africa because of its material and human endowment, is hardly yet in a position to replicate even a semblance of French political clout in the sub-continent due to its essentially underdeveloped and dependent economy. Since, as argued in Chapter Five, the conversion of putative or basic capabilities into forms (e.g., military forces and developmental aids) that make them directly usable for the exercise of power is highly contingent on a number of intervening factors (domestic and systemic), Nigeria's endowment with the elements of strength that constitute national puta-
tive power and influence is obviously an important, but not a
sufficient, leverage for regional prevalence. The transform-
ation of its relatively immense resources into usable bases
of influence will inescapably depend on its emergence as the
de facto regional power, centre around which indigenous
(African) interests and actors can coalesce in relative
security and autonomy. This necessarily involves developing
the technological, economic and military capacity to satisfy
the urgent needs of other states in the region through com-
plex horizontal and vertical links: financial, technical,
trade, investment, developmental aid, military cooperation,
etc. Only such a complex penetration through exchange trans-
action asymmetries capable of manipulation—denying valuable
markets, preempting sources of supply, disinvestment, or
reduction of developmental aid—can generate for Nigeria the
basis of coercive and non-coercive power and influence in
black Africa. Arguably, the absence of this irreducible
minimum (at least until the ideals of both ECOWAS and the
Lagos Plan of Action become a reality) for a systemic power
play underscore, for example, the singularly unsuccessful
attempts by Nigeria to halt the outrageous killings of former
national leaders in the wake of the Rawlings and Doe coups in
Ghana and Liberia, respectively. In both cases, Nigeria's
imposition of an embargo on petroleum products was bound to
have limited coercive or deterrent value because of the
availability of alternative sources of supplies.
Similarly, Habré's volte face on the Nigerian-sponsored Kano and the OAU peace accords for Chad may have been less likely if his estimate of net costs of resistance favoured compliance. In the event, the Shagari's government's refusal (much as its predecessors) to consider peace-enforcement/suppression action (the Libyan approach) as a logical alternative to stabilization through peace-keeping (as suggested by the generals) had the inevitable consequence of lowering the stake-threshold for Habré in terms of making the response of the OAU Force in Chad predictable.65

In the immediate term, Nigeria's aspiration to become, as Olatunde Ojo put it, "the industrial heart of West Africa with all the political power that it may bring, not only within Africa but also in the world at large", is patently bleak. As Peter Evans aptly observes, the structure of the Nigerian economy is:

In many ways more suggestive of the period of classic dependence than of the current period of dependent development in Brazil and Mexico...Except for the oil industry, which is a classic enclave, Nigeria is primarily an agricultural country. The manufacturing investment it contains is a fraction of that which international capital has chosen to locate in Brazil and Mexico. Yet, the international business community is beginning to discuss Nigeria the way they discussed Brazil at the beginning of the seventies—as a potential member of the 'semi-periphery'.66
Nigeria's evolution into a de facto regional power will unalterably depend on the rapidity of the transformation of its national economy from what Shaw has characteristically described as 'an oil-extraction and commodity-production base' into a 'self-reliant' and productive industrial economy. This will in turn depend on fundamental reorientation in structural and value parameters through comprehensive corrective strategies such as those currently being attempted by the new military government. However, despite the widespread pessimism and projections of some dependency scholars,[67] to admit the existence of multiple dysfunctions in the socio-economic order of Nigeria is not to foreclose the possibility of evolutionary change. As Biersteker and Schatz, among others, have acknowledged, Nigeria's potential for generating an indigenous economic and industrial base through structural reforms and intermediate technology is considerable. The former, for example, has reasoned that:

The presence of necessary conditions for feasible indigenous production in Nigeria and the demonstration of local capabilities during the civil war suggest that feasible alternatives to the multinational corporation exist in Nigeria. These alternatives would not necessarily provide a superior product or a greater output than the multinationals, at least at the outset. But the example suggests that whatever losses might initially take place in economic terms would probably be smaller and short-term than predicted by neoconventional writers and would be compensated for by immediate gains in terms of technological innovations and employment effects.[68]
Indeed, an interim report issued by the OECD Development Centre on the development of low-cost or intermediate technology is largely supportive of Biersteker's conclusion. The ingenious technical designs and managerial competence in the former Eastern Region ('Biafra') of Nigeria during the civil war was cited as a case suggesting that isolation can have positive effects on the development of technology, and notably on a society's ability to rely on its own inventive forces.[69]

First, many industrial establishments were kept operational after the exodus of their expatriate managers. Spare and replacement parts were 'machine-tooled locally, as ingenious cannibalisation and mechanical miracles' substituted for the dearth of imported parts.[70]

Second, more significant, new intermediate production technologies were developed and employed in indigenously organised firms even as the war progressed. Alcoholic beverages such as Biafra Gin and Biafra Brandy were distilled to replace whiskey, gin, schnapps, and liqueurs. Toilet articles, antimalarial drugs and pharmaceuticals such as chloroquine were also produced.[71] Even more important, intermediate technologies were developed in the field of food production, notably the salt-manufacturing plant at Uzuakoli and the mechanisation of gari processing (dehydrated cassava, a staple food throughout West Africa, whose preparation is very elaborate due to the presence of prussic acid in untreated
raw material). The latter achievement of Biafran scientists and technologists of the Research and Production Unit (RAP) was all the more revealing, since, as the OECD report noted, it was 'accomplished after numerous unsuccessful attempts to develop a large-scale production technology had been made, both in Nigeria and in other countries during the twenty years preceding the Nigerian Civil War' [72].

Third, an extensive weapons research and production programme was initiated on a broad scale, also utilising intermediate technologies based on local innovative capabilities. These include the construction of armoured vehicles along with a variety of guns, ammunition, land mines, rockets, grenades, stand-cannon, even aerial bombs [73].

The Biafran defence industry also reactivated damaged weapons captured from federal forces and copied and mass produced some of their latest equipment. As Frederick Forsyth has noted, perhaps the most famous (and the most feared by the federal forces) of these weapons was the Ogbunigwe or 'mass destroyer' developed by Biafran scientists and engineers.

With a killing range of 200 yards (covering 90 to 180 degree arc), this remote-controlled land-based system is normally capable of destroying a company of attacking forces, thus considerably heightening the tactical position of the defence.
And fourth, and most significant—perhaps (since petroleum refining, is generally considered among the ‘highest’ technology industries) was the demonstrable capability to refine petroleum and related products by Biafran scientists and engineers, on a large scale, in numerous and widely distributed locations, and without the assistance of expatriate technicians or direct supervision.[74] As the sea, air and land blockade of the federal forces tightened around ‘Biafra’, these petroleum products from locally designed plants kept essential transport and military machines moving throughout ‘Biafra’ until its final collapse in 1970. As one observer described it:

The Biafran refiners, many of them trained in the Port Harcourt plant, effectively set up refineries under wartime conditions. They undertook research to improve quality and extend the range of products. These efforts went some way towards dispelling the myth that refining technology was beyond the immediate capacity of Nigerian.[75]

Although these unprecedented achievements, in black Africa in a short period of three years (1967–1970) were largely ignored by the comprador bureaucratic and self-aggrandising elite (fuelled as it was by ethnic jealousies) which dominated critical federal policy planning agencies in the 1970s, comprehensive measures designed to utilise and expand indigenous technological and innovative capabilities now constitute the centerpiece of the new Nigerian strategy
on industrialisation based on the policy of self-reliance. The magnitude of the current effort—succinctly described by Adedeji as 'increasing substitution of factor inputs derived from within the system for those derived from outside'—is evident in the proliferation of scientific and technological planning and policy-making bodies. These include the various R&D establishments under the Ministry of Science and Technology.

However, while these endeavours may be considered an impressive beginning in the African context, the actual spin-off for the Nigerian economy—both in terms of the translation of research into practical application and the necessary multiplier effect—will depend on the extent to which extant organisational and attitudinal problems are confronted and resolved. Apart from critical factors influencing the output of R&D units (co-ordination, finance, underutilization and misuse of science and technology manpower for activities not relevant to S&T development), incisively analysed in the Nigerian context by Babatunde Thomas, Ibrahim James, O. Teriba and M. Kayode, among others, fundamental social and psychological problems remain (see Chapter Five, section b). To the extent that these can be overcome and the present concentration on the development of indigenous capabilities supplemented by vertical technological transfer generate a viable socio-economic and industrial base, the ineluctable growth of Nigeria into a de facto regional power (invariably
assumed by its dominant scholars in the field of foreign policy) may readily translate into reality. Otherwise, Nigeria's sobriquet as a 'problematic power' may outlive even the most pessimistic of projections in the current literature.

The next section considers specifically the military dimension of Nigeria's current effort at developing a technological 'power base' noted above. This is the establishment and expansion of a local 'military-industrial' complex as a necessary foundation for Nigeria's military power.

c) The Local 'Military-Industrial' Complex

The ambiguities of the term military-industrial complex (MIC) necessitates clarification from the outset.[78] As used here, it simply denotes the existence in a country of an integrated military-industrial firm (MIF), which may be defined as any organisation that acts as a supplier of basic inputs to the defence establishment.[79] Various analyses of such a firm in the context of developing countries (LDC defence industries) have generally sought to determine its characteristics, relationships, environment, available strategies, constraints, and the like.[80] Because of its essentially rudimentary nature in Nigeria, the case-analysis below will centre generally on motivations and goals; infrastructural and organisational support and potential; and current strategies, problems, challenges and prospects.
As noted in Chapter Six, the acquisition and expansion of local arms production capacity, with the view, according to a former Defence Minister, to reduce and eventually eliminate our dependence on foreign manufacturers and suppliers of military weapons and equipment, emerged as one of the ‘cardinal pivots of Nigeria’s defence planning in the late seventies through the eighties.’ In this regard, the primary motivation for the establishment of defence-related industry in Nigeria, as in most LDCs, has been national security, aggravated in this case by its experience during the civil war (1966–1970). As one analyst has suggested:

The danger of dependence on foreign arms suppliers in crisis-time can be summarized as implying the possibility of being cut off from suppliers altogether, or being cut off from the supply of spare parts and other related equipment; and thus becoming subject to foreign political influence or blackmail, deemed unacceptable by a given national government.

Accordingly, in order to minimize the dependence on foreign sources of equipment, the military modernisation programme under the Fourth National Development Plan (1980) called for the expansion of Nigeria’s arms industry. As currently envisaged, such an expansion presently underway will integrate over time major facets of defence production in developing countries, based on a strategy which combines assembly of imported sub-systems with indigenous research and
development of new weapons. These facets include maintenance and overhaul facilities for the service and repair of imported arms, gradual domestic production of components (either under license or through co-production, co-development or copying), modifications in systems manufactured under license, and production of domestically designed and tested systems such as was undertaken in Eastern Nigeria during the Civil War.[83]

To this end the 1980-81 defence budget allocated ₦19 million for renovation of the country's Defence Industries Corporation (DIC), while considerably more money has since been channelled into the corporation to meet its expansion.[84] Set up in 1964 as a joint venture between the Nigerian government and the West German firm of Fritz Werner, the DIC is expected to 'act as overseer for specifically-set up private economic ventures related to defence equipment', but also to conduct research into new weapons for the armed forces. Two plants so categorized are already operational in Bauchi (Steyr Daimler Puch of Austria) and Fiat of Italy in Kano. Other subsidiary companies include Leyland vehicles of the UK, and Daimler-Benz of West Germany. According to the former director of the DIC, Brigadier David Jemibewon, local production of some basic components for weapons and military vehicles have been stipulated as a high-priority objective for these companies.[85] Systems currently under production include armoured personnel carriers (Steyr), military and
special range vehicles (Fiat), while plans are reportedly in place for the assembly of main battle tanks at the Steyr plant in Bauchi.[86] Furthermore, the Leyland plant in Ibadan is expected to assemble Land-Rovers using locally-produced chassis, truck cabs, and pressings. The version being considered (101 Forward Control Military Land Rovers), apart from its proven tactical value for support units, can also tow a range of artillery pieces (such as the 105 mm), guns (e.g., the Wombat recoil-less anti-tank gun) and missile platforms (e.g., Rapier SAM systems), all currently in service with the Nigerian Army. Also part of the production-inventory is the British Shortland armoured patrol car MK3 and its APC model (SB.301), both of which consist essentially of modified long-wheel-base land Rover chassis with an armoured body.

Two other major arms of the military-industrial triad involve proposed ship-building and aircraft industries.[87] The latter is still largely on paper, although negotiations with Brazil and India have been underway since 1979 for the establishment of a possible Nigerian aircraft industry as part of a $3 billion trade deal.[88] Given the current trend in joint ventures between the two countries, what is rather likely is a coproduction/codevelopment aeronautical programme with India which has developed its own jet fighter HAL HF-24 Marut as well as building British Gnat MK1 fighters and Soviet MIG21 fighters under license.
In the former case—ship building—several infrastructural facilities (ship assembly and building plant as well as three dock repair yards) started under the military government of Olusegun Obasanjo are nearing completion. These are intended to set the foundation for the development and expansion of marine engineering, repairs and refitting of the growing armada of naval and commercial (Nigerian National Shipping Line) vessels currently in service.[89]

Beyond this cursory notation of motivation and present infrastructural base of Nigeria's nascent 'military-industrial complex', however, the vital question (for short- and medium-term projection and evaluation) is inescapably thus: is Nigeria capable of sustaining large and diversified military industries as official policy pronouncements invariably assume? From a hypothetical standpoint, and concerning intermediate rather than advanced or lead-edge technology, the answer is arguably in the affirmative. Nigeria seemingly possesses the combination of socio-economic preconditions (financial resources, a large military, and a sizable pool of trained manpower) for a viable military industry. Although, as previously suggested, the conversion of such putative resources into actualized power is highly contingent on a number of intervening variables, Nigeria's endowment of these 'socio-economic sources of national military-industrial capabilities' place it in the rank of potential LDC weapons producers. What remain problematic are those two other foun-
lations of national military power: the political determination to generate a military-industrial base and the crucial elements of administrative and management skills involved in producing military strength from the inputs drawn from society.

This argumentation is generally consistent with findings (Neuman, Peleg, Wulf, Haokavy, etc.) [90] which establish a significant correlation between factors of scale and military-industrial production. The hypothesis here is that although political factors may indeed be important stimulants (as in the case of Israel and South Africa) or constraints (as in the case of Egypt after the Camp David accords and Iran subsequent to the 1979 revolution), determining both the initiation of and the short-term success or failure of LDC military production efforts, in the long-term it is factors of scale that account for the quantity and quality of industrial production and the ultimate success of national defence industries.

For example, Neuman's analysis of 26 LDC producers reveals relatively high and positive correlations among size of military, GNP, and military industrial capability across arms producers (see Table 7.2): #

What emerges within the Third World from these data is a hierarchically shaped arms production system based largely on factors of scale. Generally, for each region countries with the largest populations, producing the highest GNP, and
Given the obvious and unavoidable deficiencies in the data-base (especially the exclusion of such cogent factors as leadership and will) the validity of Neuman's empirical analysis may be deemed suspect. As Knorr has rightly noted: 'the actualization of putative power crucially depends on the will, manifest or presumed...Without will, there may be power potential in terms of technological, economic, and administrative capabilities, but there can be no power. This will can either be inspired by deliberate response to a specific international situation or be rooted in preexisting attitudes'.\[92\] Such a consideration is no doubt important in explaining, for example, why some states produce arms while others do not. Or why even among the industrialised countries some states support large and diversified military industries while others do not.

This reservation notwithstanding, general and qualitative considerations derived from research such as Neuman's lead to acceptance of the original hypothesis establishing a positive correlation between factors of scale and military-industrial production. The existence of a large military to
provide an adequate domestic market, combined with sizable national income and population to support the necessary industrial infrastructure, significantly affect a state's long-term ability to produce major weapon systems as well as the quantity and sophistication of these products.

What this conclusion essentially implies in the context of Nigeria is that, given an adequate time-frame, organisational competence (required in making numerous interlocking decisions), enlightened and determined leadership, proper allocation of existing resources and fundamental reforms of existing structures along functional lines, the development of a viable and sustained 'military-industrial complex' is a distinct possibility. Nigeria, as noted in section (b) above, possesses both the structural and material prerequisites to develop into a major military and industrial actor in the region. However, such a transition is not ineluctable but highly contingent on a number of intervening factors, both national and systemic.

At the national level, these potent intervening factors include: a) retention and productive use of available manpower (research scientists, engineers and technicians) in the various institutions supportive of the development of defence industries;[93] b) the extent to which national policy-makers are committed to the development and expansion of the crucial determinant of national technological capacity in the modern era: organised Research and Development (R&D); c) the pro-
portion of national revenue devoted to basic research, since
technological innovation tends to flourish in proportion to
national revenue devoted to basic and applied research, and
to the rewards innovators receive for achievement;[94] d) the
parallel or concomitant development of economies of scale,
since the production of 'building blocks' of modern defence
systems within a single economy largely depends on the compon-
sition of national output, and the structure of productive
capabilities behind it; and e) the degree to which present
and future Nigerian governments succeed in eradicating perva-
sive social and institutional inertia and erroneous values
(e.g., the low status until recently accorded research scien-
tists in the general culture of the Nigerian society) ini-
mical to scientific enterprises. In concrete terms, there is
an imperative for some radical institutional shifts in values
from the traditional ascription to legitimacy based on the
principles of meritocracy, efficiency, productivity and
reward, supportive of industrial culture:

Until this radical shift in value is
effected, science and technology research
work may not attract the right calibre of
citizens and the vertical transfer of
technology may be deprived of one of its
central elements: human resources--
research scientists, engineers, techni-
cians, managers. At a time when the
cascading brain drain to Europe, North
America, Asia has deprived Nigeria of
approximately some 50,000 professionals
and executive grade personnel, some real
financial incentives might have to be introduced to stave the tide of the mass exodus of qualified scientists, engineers, technicians and managerial executives and to retain existing ones. [95]

At the global level, crucial factors relating to technological transfer remain. The difficulty of access to military technology by Nigeria is not only occasioned by a weak local science and technology system, but also by economic need and pressures to protect relevant know-how in the industrialised countries (the potential sources of military and industrial technology). [96] However, as competition intensifies among the dominant weapon-exporting countries (exacerbated by the aggressive entry into the international market of relatively inexpensive systems by NIC arms producers—Argentina, Israel, Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Korea and Taiwan) there is an increasing, if not inexorable, tendency on the part of these states to enter into co-operative ventures with potential LDC manufacturers, through various 'offset arrangements': licensing, coproduction, codevelopment, 'off-shore assembly' etc. [97] As Neuman aptly observes, 'European manufacturers have accepted these arrangements as part of the price of doing business...Judging by the plethora of agreements, both the Europeans and the Third World are finding the marriage of their mutual needs in the defense sector to be compatible'. [98]
Nevertheless, despite this emerging disposition on the part of arms producing states the extent to which Nigeria can successfully exploit existing opportunities may depend on its development of appropriate negotiating skills, its strengthening of relevant policy instruments, and the effective use of bargaining power and political will. Finally, the rapidity with which Nigeria achieves significant domestic capability in the military-industrial sector will also depend on degree of access to international credit and finance. In this regard, the continuation of the present paralysis engendered by the combination of slump in the oil market and IMF preconditions for finance may turn out to be the most formidable barrier to Nigeria's dream of self-sufficiency in defence acquisitions.

These critical intervening factors notwithstanding, even if Nigeria emerges successfully as the 'Brazil' or 'India' of Black Africa in the military-industrial field, certain pertinent questions which continue to bedevil most LDC arms producers remain. These include: a) the question of dependence: would the shift from imports of weapons to imports of technologies to build weapons merely change the form of Nigeria's dependence and represent a new instrument through which industrial producers exert leverage over its policies?; b) the question of military effectiveness, and c) the question of economic return. The first consideration is particularly
worrisome, since besides engine and avionic systems, Nigeria will of necessity depend indefinitely on external sources for critical electronic components concerning new battlefield technologies: precision guidance, remote guidance and control; munitions improvements; target identification and acquisition; command, control and communication; and electronic warfare.[99]

Since these questions are more relevant to the political economy of Nigeria's defence acquisition strategy, they cannot be satisfactorily examined here. Suffice to note, however, that, as is the case with other issue-areas, the question of meeting defence needs through indigenous production is complex and problematic. Even if military criteria and sound economic principles cannot be seen as rational bases for any decision to develop a local 'military-industrial complex' in Nigeria as critics proffered, political or prestige considerations may prove too overriding to ignore.[100]

The next section examines one of the most widely debated and salient issues in Nigeria's defence policy and military statecraft: the debate about the nuclearisation of its defence system in response to adverse systemic developments.

d) The Nuclear Option

The nuclear option controversy which surfaced in Nigerian policy, media and academic circles in the late-seventies and early-eighties, was again a clear indication of
the importance increasingly accorded the military underpinning in Nigeria foreign policy planning.[101] This is all the more so in the orbit of nuclear diplomacy, given Nigeria's earlier commitment in the nineteen sixties and early-seventies to the declaration of Africa a 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' (no nuclear tests, bases, storage or transport) by the United Nations General Assembly (1965 and 1974).[102] The complex socio-economic, bureaucratic and intellectual constituencies which underscore the current volte face (in terms of changing perceptions and outlook for nuclear policy decision-making of the 1980s and 1990s) have been examined elsewhere.[103] In line with the stipulated parameters of this dissertation, the brief critique below focuses on the politico-strategic context of Nigeria's decision concerning the acquisition of a viable retaliatory nuclear capability: political/military incentives, and infrastructural feasibility and prospects.

1) Incentives for Acquisition: a question of security or status?

Advocates of the nuclear option for Nigeria have invariably advanced two fundamental reasons: status and security. In the first category--status--perhaps the most forceful argument has been advanced by Ali Mazrui in his 1979 BBC Reith Lectures. Possession of nuclear arsenals, he contended, invests states in contemporary international system not
only with supreme military force, but also with international status and political power. In this context, the existential question which arises is whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 'designed to minimize the number of countries that have a nuclear capacity, and ultimately intended especially to discourage Third World countries from going nuclear', could not conceivably be regarded as an extension of the 'old philosophy of imperialism as a monopoly state of warfare'?[104] Mazrui answers in the affirmative: 'those who insist on monopolising nuclear know-how for themselves, he contends, are heirs to Pax Britannica, seeking to end tribal wars in distant lands while arming to initiate world wars from their own heartland'.[105] Africa, he urges, should 'give up the idea of promoting itself as or nuclear-free zone...and estimate the chances of at least a continental consortium within Africa of nuclear energy, linked to a strategy of developing a small nuclear section in the military establishment of Nigeria for the time being, and in Zaire and black-ruled South Africa later'.[106]

For Mazrui as well as other exponents of this view,[107] nuclear proliferation constitutes a 'process of military democratization':

> It seeks to break monopolies in weaponry in the hands of the northern warloads. Nuclear proliferation also seeks to break secret societies based on forbidden nuclear knowledge under the control of the West and the Soviet bloc.[108]
Thus for Nigeria in particular, and for black Africa in general, joining the 'nuclear club' should be seen not as dangerous misdirection of effort from the current imperative of economic development, but as per force a 'new initiation, an important rite de passage, a recovery of adulthood' in a world preeminently framed and informed by security relations.

As Mazrui unreservedly put it:

For the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria should move toward making itself a nuclear power --unless steps are taken before then by the world as a whole to put an end to nuclear weapons universally. The development of a nuclear capacity by Africa's largest country is probably a necessary precondition if Africa's diplomatic marginality is to be ended. Nigeria should follow the example of its fellow giants--Brazil in Latin America and China and India in Asia--and pursue the goal of a modest nuclear capability. My own reasons for urging such a capability have nothing to do with making Nigeria militarily stronger. My ultimate desire is that the world as a whole should be militarily safer. Only when the Western nations and the Soviet bloc discover that they cannot keep the rest of the world from engaging in the nuclear "dream" unless they themselves give up nuclear weapons will the world at least address itself to the fundamentals of human survival.[109]

As earlier suggested, this status-cum-diplomatic consideration advanced by Mazrui is only part of the overall complex of reasons proffered by proponents of the nuclearization of Nigeria.
Security constitutes the other imperative: the nuclear option for Nigeria is a necessary counter to the developing threat of a nuclear blackmail from the South African albinocracy. [110] In a recent overview of 'Africa and the Bomb', Sammy Kum Buo alluded to this growing concern among policy planners as well as the informed public in Africa:

Just as French nuclear tests in the Sahara in the early 1960s may have provoked Africa's anti-nuclear diplomatic efforts, South Africa's frenzied pursuit, in the 1970s, of a nuclear-weapon capability may now be responsible for Black Africa's seemingly more favourable attitude towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Black African countries. Proposals have therefore been made for Nigeria, in particular, and Black Africa, as a whole, to acquire nuclear weapons, not only to face what is seen as a racist South Africa's nuclear threat to the rest of Africa but also to enhance Africa's diplomatic clout. [111]

On this view, South Africa's intensive nuclear programme over the past couple of decades, combined with its avowed strategy for survival (see section (a), above), poses a mortal threat to Black Africa. In this regard, Nigeria's nuclear option is viewed in terms of its assumption of leadership in a common front ('Continental African Security Community'—CASC) against the perceived peril from the white laager.

As a pariah state which combines the 'disadvantages of pygmies and paranoids along with more visceral and unremitting opposition by its regional enemies and isolation from
most of the rest of the world', South Africa arguably has the clearest incentives to increase its military power, the shortest technical distance (in the African context) to go to build a bomb, and the least to lose in doing so. Under the pretext of the 'Atoms for Peace' programme, South Africa has received extensive inputs in terms of the technology, facilities (reactors) and expertise, from Western countries—notably the U.S., U.K., France and FRG—for its nuclear development schemes.[112] As a consequence, it is now generally assumed that South Africa has the capacity (especially with its Israeli connection) to produce nuclear explosive devices, however primitive.[113]

Although for the foreseeable future, its limited capability in delivery technology puts Nigeria outside the direct orbit of South Africa's 'nuclear blackmail', the latter's current interest in battlefield or theatre nuclear delivery systems—such as nuclear artillery (e.g., the American 155 MGS Howitzer presently assembled in South Africa), battlefield missiles (e.g., Cactus), aerial bombs and air-to-ground missiles (for its Canberras, Buccaneers, and Mirage)—brings neighbouring African states into striking distance. Among other things, the apartheid regime (as part of its 'forward defence' strategy) apparently hopes either to forestall any eventuality of these territories becoming bases for a future
Pan-African Task Force or to frighten these governments into desisting from supporting the liberation movements (PAC and ANC).

It is on this ground, above all else, that current advocates of a nuclear option for Nigeria conceive its utility: a nuclear 'balance of power' between Nigeria and Boer South Africa. Former Nigerian President, Shagari expressed this position in his address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York: 'Nigeria will not allow Africa to be subjected to nuclear blackmail by South Africa...it reserved the right to do whatever she could to protect herself if racist South Africa persisted in acquiring nuclear weapons to threaten the continent'.[114]

It cannot be doubted that the underlying concern—i.e., contemporary developments both in the global and regional arenas—expressed by proponents for the nuclearisation of Nigeria is growing. This is especially so, as Frank Barnaby—the director of SIPRI—has noted, because the present countries in possession of nuclear arsenals have repeatedly rejected the call 'to assure the non-nuclear-weapon parties of the NPT that the weapons they have renounced would not be used against them'.[115] However, it is logically unsound to equate the mere fact of existence of nuclear weapons in a given country with claims to relative status and security. For Nigeria in particular, and other LDCs aspirants in general, the problem is essentially one of credibl-
ity. That is, even if Nigeria successfully develops its nuclear option—either through expensive independent exertions or the 'shop around' approach—the likelihood of its employment is minimal.

In the first place, the present and medium-term future target of Nigeria's nuclear defence option (apartheid South Africa) is over 85 percent non-white and it is unlikely that any Nigerian government would willingly imperil the lives of the great majority of South Africans even in the face of extreme provocation from the Afrikaner regime. Such a consideration alone deprives Nigeria of one of the cardinal elements in deterrence relationships—intention. Credible deterrence is primarily a function not only of capability but also of the estimated intentions of a nation's leadership to use the military potential at its disposal. In other words, while South Africa's tactic of cultivating irrationality through nuclear weapons acquisition may have the intended psychological effect on neighbouring states, similar effort on the part of Nigeria to create a condition of 'mutual alarm' or mutually assured retaliation cannot but have a 'hollow ring'.

And in the second place, given the present and foreseeable level of technology in Nigeria, the problem of the gap between test detonation of a bomb and the 'weaponisation' and delivery system costs of meaningful nuclear weapon status would remain. In India, these costs provoked resistance to a
full-fledged bomb programme inside the military establishment, which feared a drain on funds for conventional weapons. Several domestic opponents of any weapons-related nuclear programme in Nigeria had this factor in mind when they counselled that 'we should handle this growing nuclear obsession with care':

the apparent strength of our economy is illusory; the kind of confrontation we envisage with any outside power (in the light of our present foreign policy) is not likely to be settled by resort to nuclear weapons but conventional (army, airforce and naval facilities and weaponry); the technology for production of nuclear weapons is very expensive and complicated and depends on a developed educational and technical base. For the rest of this century we may not be able to master it and produce an effective weapon. To direct several billions of naira as India is doing leaving 90 per cent of the population in deprivation is unjustified and indeed socially criminal.[116]

It may, therefore, be concluded on the basis of the above observations that the incentives argument—security and status—in the Nigerian context constitutes at best a misguided preoccupation of the 'new bureaucratic and intellectual constituencies'—research scientists, the diplomatic service, political and military elite—which as Robert D'A Henderson has pointed out, have 'emerged in favour of a stronger emphasis on the nuclear factor' in Nigerian decision-making.[117] However, as argued in the previous chapter, in the final
analysis policy decisions in this, as in other areas of the national defence planning, may not be entirely governed by the 'limits of rational action'. The central problem is that in Nigeria, as no doubt in other countries as well, governmental organisations have their own competing interests. In their desire to protect or increase their influence, size, and budget, they are likely to oppose policy choices that reduce or jeopardise their missions and instead lobby for courses of action apt to promote 'organisational prosperity'. It is in this context that a number of domestic detractors in Nigeria have viewed with increasing alarm the undisguised attempts of the nuclear scientific community (associated with the atomic energy commission) to combine with military, bureaucratic and industrial interests to push the frontiers of their research well into the military realm. Since Nigeria, as Moji Amoda has noted, 'fits into the category of those who have nominal programmes but with the future potential to expand them,' it is, therefore, appropriate to assess the future possibilities and prospects for Nigeria in this nuclear domain.

11) Prospect

Despite countervailing efforts to control proliferation by international regimes, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the technical information required to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive device is now
quite readily available, as is the necessary expertise.[120] This trend has been considerably heightened in recent times by the increasing commercialisation of nuclear technology and research/production facilities under the so-called 'Atoms for Peace' clause of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which explicitly commits (Article IV) the nuclear powers to aid the non-nuclear weapons states in 'development of peaceful nuclear energy capabilities, including the fullest possible exchange of equipment'.[121] As a consequence (as the cases of France, India and perhaps South Africa, clearly demonstrate), acquisition of nuclear weaponry has now become a by-product of a 'peaceful' nuclear programmes and delivery systems the by-products of 'peaceful' space programmes. In terms of both money and manpower, a national nuclear force can now be acquired at relatively low cost, as technological advances (especially in laser enrichment) and the burgeoning market for nuclear materials and technology outside the framework of any NPT regime render existing international safeguards largely ineffective. The Indian nuclear explosion, for example, cost about $500,000, including the cost of the plutonium and the preparation of the test site.[122]

For a relative newcomer to the field such as Nigeria, such a 'civilian route' to weapons acquisition might prove to be particularly attractive. First, experience from civilian utilisations may facilitate the construction and operation of clandestine facilities for bomb production (e.g., Israel and
South Africa). Second, the establishment of a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful programme creates a permanent weapons base or option for changing regimes in Nigeria, thus enhancing policy calculations and planning for future contingencies. And third, proceeding via the 'civilian route' or under 'civilian flag' may reduce the political costs that might be incurred by the acquisition of a nuclear fuel cycle reactor (reprocessing plant) designed specifically for military purposes. Since the development of nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons hinges ultimately on political considerations (e.g., backlash from the international community, which may not be easy to predict and could potentially be severe), the use of civilian fuel cycle elements as intermediary steps in the development of bombs offers the best possible route.

Although at present Nigeria is unlikely to have an operational nuclear reactor prior to the 1990s, it can readily purchase components for a small natural uranium reactor producing about 20kg. of plutonium-239 a year (more than enough for two atomic bombs) secretly on the open market for a cost of less than $20 million. As the Taiwan and South African examples show, the same can be done in the field of reprocessing technology: a small chemical reprocessing unit could be clandestinely acquired and run by the military. Since considerable deposits of uranium are already
known to exist in Nigeria (in Benue, Niger, Sokoto, Cross River, and Bauchi states), it would not be too difficult to obtain fuel for a reactor.

Beyond these fortuitous circumstances, however, formidable problems remain to be overcome if the present or future government of Nigeria decides to press on with a nuclear programme. First, given the paucity of national technological and related skills in this field, considerable sums of money may be needed to recruit foreign expertise (possibly from India, Pakistan, Brazil or Egypt) to staff available facilities and support infrastructures. Even though Nigeria's personpower in this area has been growing steadily in the last decade (with many trained scientists opting for the bigger 'pies' of Europe and North America), as Henderson has noted, 'for the near future, Nigeria will lack enough highly-trained nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians to support a modest nuclear research programme'.[124]

Second, given the current paranoia in the industrial West about an 'Islamic' or 'Black' bomb, even as these states demonstrate a remarkable tolerance of a 'Jewish' or 'Boer' bomb, it is to be expected that Nigeria's attempt in the future to secure the essential prerequisite (access to a commercial reprocessing plant or a uranium-enrichment plant) for the production of nuclear weapons will be an uphill task. Already its ongoing negotiations with the West German Kraftwekunion (KWU) and the Canadian government for the 450
megawatt medium-sized and 600 megawatt Candu reactors, respectively, have been linked to strict IAEA safeguards (including supervision, inspection, and return of spent fuel rods) over all of Nigeria's nuclear installations.

However, these domestic and systemic hurdles, notwithstanding, the future possibilities and potentials for Nigeria in the field of nuclear energy and weapons acquisition are considerable. If unforeseen adverse regional developments compel a major national nuclear programme, Nigeria can pursue a 'shop around' approach for production collaboration with current LDCs which are not parties to the NPT. Future non-NPT suppliers (such as India and Brazil) with compelling reasons—the need to become more competitive or to counteract great powers—could be possible candidates.

Nevertheless, the current emphasis placed upon the development of the country's conventional military power as well as its domestic 'military-industrial complex' reduces the probability that available resources will be channelled into such a costly venture. The preoccupation of successive Nigerian government and regimes since the mid-1970s with improving the armed forces' efficiency, modernizing its conventional firepower and creating a regional mobility for its forces supports this order of priorities.

Thus, given its dubious strategic value to Nigeria in existing and likely conditions, the pressing problems of the armed forces modernization and augmentation programme com-
manding immediate attention; and the nascent technological base and political inertia, it is to be expected that the nuclearisation of Nigeria's defence system will continue to receive low priority in national planning. Even if apartheid South Africa successfully tests and deploys its nuclear arsenal, it would still be far from certain that Nigeria would respond in a similar fashion. Rhetoric notwithstanding, any policy response by Nigeria to nuclear threat from South Africa, has to be predicated upon the calculations and perceptions of the Front Line States governments. The reasons are fairly obvious.

First, as suggested above, these states are the most likely to be affected by South Africa's nuclear blackmail, since its existing capability in delivery systems (bomber command) necessarily delimits the penetration and striking distance of its forces beyond their immediate strategic environment. And, second, should Nigeria eventually develop an atomic or nuclear device, operational imperatives concerning its 'radius of effective military action'—that is, the capacity of its military services to 'transmit power over space'—necessitates forward positioning in Southern Africa. It is not altogether certain that any one of these FLs governments will find such an offer inviting enough to risk the possibility of a preemptive strike by a fiendish regime whose domestic and international policies have so far been anything but rational. In the final section of this chapter,
considerations will be given to one of the most immediate and salient, if problematic, issues in Nigerian defence policy and planning, identified in chapter three: its role in any regional collective defence system.

e) Nigeria and any Pan-African Defence Force

Both the rationale and the changing attitudes of successive Nigerian governments (from Balewa to Shagari), as well as the substantive propositions so far put forward concerning a collective defence system for Africa, have been briefly discussed in Chapter Three, section (c).[125] What, therefore, remains is to appraise Nigeria's role in any such regional arrangement to deal with security crises within or around Black African states.

As is evident from the extensive debate within and outside the OAU on this topic[126], recent proposals in the seventies for a regional defence system invariably envisage a synthesis between Nkrumah's old idea of an African High Command designed 'to keep imperialist invaders at bay' (the concept of selective security) and the Morocco-Senegalese sponsored continental peace-enforcement/peacekeeping mechanism (the concept of 'preventive diplomacy') designed to 'put the African house in order'. The objectives of this newly-proposed Pan-African Task Force, as Ofoegbu succinctly explains, are: 1) to assist in restoring intraregional peace; 11) to keep extra-continental powers and foreign adventurers out of purely African affairs; and 111) to
generate first an African response to African problems and establish the urgent institutional mechanism to counter the increasingly ominous South African military pressure on 'Front Line States'.[127]

However, owing to the continued and paralysing 'foot-dragging by the OAU on the formation of a continent-wide African defence force',[128] there has been a significant reorientation in both thinking and planning from continental to sub-regional levels, with the expressed hope that such an approach would eventually 'spill over into other regions of Africa, constituting both core and example for a continental security system'.[129] Tenous arrangements now exist in West Africa (ECOWAS Defence Pact) and in Southern Africa: the rather informal and limited operation of the new six-nation—Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—'Front Line 'system'.[130] Nigeria is presently a nominal member of the later and the 'backbone' of the former. Although its role in both groups is presently considered a sine qua non for their viability and credibility (since as Sammy Kum Buo has noted, 'in Black Africa as a whole, only Nigeria and to some extent Ethiopia, have the equipment, expertise and experience for a serious contest with the colossus to the South'), it is arguably only in the institutional context of ECOWAS that Nigeria's role in a multilateral defence structure be meaningfully considered in the immediate term.
1) **ECOWAS defence pact.**

At least in theory, if not in reality so far, the inauguration of the 'protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence' at the May 1981 summit of ECOWAS in Freetown, Sierra Leone, establishes both the organisational parameter and political momentum toward the integration of ECOWAS armed forces into a collective force.[131] As envisaged by the treaty, military contingents from the armies of the member states will constitute the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC) under a Force Commander. The AAFC are, *inter alia* expected to conduct joint military exercises designed to enhance their organisational effectiveness and response in crisis situations.[132]

The operational and political direction of the Forces is to be overseen by a supreme organ (the Defence Council of ECOWAS), comprising the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states, through a subordinate apparatus—the Defence Commission—consisting of chiefs of defence staff. In addition a Deputy Executive Secretary for Military Affairs is to be attached to the ECOWAS Secretariat in Lagos. His functions are to include 'updating plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiating joint exercises, preparing and managing the military budget of the Secretariat, and studying and making proposals to the Executive Secretariat in respect of matters relating to personnel and equipment within his jurisdiction'.[133]
In terms of institutional task and role, three types of major crisis-area have been identified in the protocol: 1) aggression from a non-member state (Articles 6 and 10); ii) conflict between member states (Article 17); and iii) internal conflict in a member state (Article 19). In the first case, military action is anticipated if judged expedient by the Defence Council. In the second case, interventionary diplomacy and peace-keeping are envisaged. And in the third case, a necessary distinction has been made between external involvement (such as mercenary adventurism) and domestic insurrection. While a collective response is judged appropriate in the first context, the treaty rules out military intervention in the latter.

Viewed within the existing parameters, AAFC must necessarily be considered significant and unprecedented achievement in regional experimentation in Black Africa. Indeed, extant frontier and political disputes in West Africa (e.g., between Mali and Upper Volta, Ghana and Togo, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Cameroon) and the increasing incidence of mercenary adventurism have made a collective approach to crisis-management in the region imperative in the face of OAU paralysis. As one analyst has noted, 'The memories of the 1970 Portuguese aggression against Guinea and the more recent mercenary invasion of Benin, the overall need to enhance stability in ECOWAS member states—incessantly beset
by military coups and civil strife—contributed to the high priority which West African leaders apparently accorded to the establishment of a defence pact. [134]

As the dominant economic and military power within the West African sub-zone, Nigeria's commitment and role in the development of the defence institution of ECOWAS is undisputably paramount. Apart from being the single largest donor to community finances, only its forces presently have the combination of mobility, equipment and operational experience required by contingencies stipulated in articles 6 and 10 of the protocol. Conversely, both the national security and geo-strategic interests of Nigeria, as contended in Chapter Six, would be advanced if such a collaborative trend was sustained. As Aluko has rightly observed:

For security reasons Nigeria does not want to be surrounded by small countries that are heavily dependent on extra-African powers, especially France, for their military, political and economic survival. It is firmly believed in Nigeria that as long as there are clients West African states closely tied to European powers Nigeria's own security cannot be assured. Such states can be either manipulated against Nigeria or used as a staging ground by foreign powers who wish to cause disaffection and confusion in the country. The experience of the last civil war when Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) was used briefly in 1969 for airlifting arms and relief supplies to Biafra brought home this point to the Nigerian leaders more clearly than ever. [135]
Furthermore, as operational imperatives in any collective
defence system require a certain degree of standardisation,
 interoperability and rationalisation, it is not altogether
inconceivable that the nascent 'military-industrial complex'
of Nigeria might in future provide a less expensive alternative
to extra-regional sources, especially if the current
foreign exchange crisis facing these countries continues.
Already for reasons of proximity and the relative availability
of the Naira (compared with the dollar or franc), Nigeria
is increasingly becoming the source of a range of industrial
products (especially cars and trucks assembled in Nigeria, as
well as vital raw materials from the iron and steel complex
at Ajaokuta).

However, while for both Nigeria and Black Africa, the
necessity of creating an irreversible dynamic towards a continen-
tal security community—as argued elsewhere[131]—through
instituting regional planning mechanisms technically
essential for the politically desirable task of coping with
Africa's 'flashpoints'—cannot be doubted, fundamental reservations still persist as to the feasibility of such an
arrangement either at present or in the future.[137] The
major problems (rooted in the multiple disorders and the
Byzantine nature of African politics) bedevilling such a
collaborative venture can readily be seen in West Africa.
Besides the obvious structural problems (economic dependence, technological underdevelopment, organisational incompetence,
military weakness), ideological factions, vertical links with extra-regional forces and powerful inter-personal animosities among leaders raise serious questions about the ECOWAS Defence Pact ever developing into a genuine multilateral defence force. [138] This scepticism is reinforced by the non-ratification of the Pact by several members since its declaration in 1981. Thus the question remains, whether there is sufficient harmony of interests within the Community to sustain such an endeavour.

It is evident from extensive publications on ECOWAS that opinions on this question differ markedly. Nevertheless, the conventional 'problem-oriented' approach through which the issue of African regional defence has been analysed has to be qualified by recognition of the fact that 'human institutions do sometimes and to some extent evolve in unwilled directions, violating the intentions and confounding the expectations of their founders and operators'. [139] As Claude has noted in relation to international organisation in general:

the course of its development may be determined less by the consciously adopted plans of the governments which participate in its functions, or the officials who serve it, than by the cumulative influence of day-to-day pressures and case-by-case directions. [140]
Viewed in these terms, the question as to whether ECOWAS armed forces would successfully merge into a regional system can best be answered by reference not to ECOWAS's Charter or sociopolitical realities, but to the unpredictable properties (political, ideological, psychological, technological, and economic features) of future regional and global arenas.

In concrete terms, the emergence of a viable Pan-African defence system (continental or regional) will depend, among other things, on the extent to which African states can evolve a) into relatively separate subsystems regionally, b) foreign policies nationally. In other words, African states must eventually demonstrate the capacity to 'enjoy foreign policy autonomy as a group or groups and to accept the disciplines of foreign policy grounded in external realities as individual actors'.[141] In the sphere of defence policy and planning, this consideration will necessary involve a gradual shift in focus from vertical defence partnerships (e.g., defence treaties with France) with extra-regional powers to horizontal intra-African defence exchanges and cooperation. It is not at all certain whether such measures would follow or await solutions being found to the pressing structural problems of economic dependence and technological underdevelopment. It should be noted, however, in sum, that the successful implementation of plans relating to collective economic or strategic self-reliance in isolation from the prevailing political environment in Africa is utterly unrealistic.
Basic choices of development strategy are always political as well as economic, and they cannot be implemented in isolation from the transnational and political fabric of the given milieu. In other words, functional collaboration of the type envisaged by the Lagos Plan is not viable without a high degree of mutual trust, substantial faith in the permanence of the joint economy and at least a fundamental base of common socio-political aims which regional security mechanisms can arguably generate.

In overall conclusion to this chapter, it is to be expected that military power will remain an integral part of the range of instrumentalities of Nigeria's foreign policy. Its use and usability will, however, continue to be subject to a range of domestic and systemic conditions whether industrial, infrastructural or nuclear questions are being treated. The next concluding chapter is, essentially a recapitulation of the central argumentation of this dissertation, based on the changing patterns of Nigeria's military directions and constraints.
### Table 7.1

**Gross Regional Products in Africa** *(billions of 1975 constant dollars)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West Africa[a]</th>
<th>East Africa[b]</th>
<th>Central Africa[c]</th>
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<td>42.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Saint Helena, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Togo.

[b] Burundi, Comoro Island, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mauritius, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda.


[d] Cape Verde Islands, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Correlations: Military Production Capability and Economic Indicators, 1979-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Correlation Coefficients (Kendall's tau)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Land Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Size of Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GNP per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. N of professional &amp; technical workers[b]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

The regional data base includes 22 countries in Latin America, 7 countries in South Asia, and 14 countries in the Far East. These regions were analyzed because they contained the largest number of arms producers: 9 in Latin America, 3 in South Asia, 10 in the Far East. (In 1979-80 the Middle East had 2 arms producers; sub-Saharan Africa, 2; North Africa, none). The three regions displayed above also contained the most complete data (exceptions are noted below).

"All Arms Producers" consist of the 26 LDC arms producers worldwide, ranked according to their comparative arms production capabilities.

*continued*
In all data bases there were countries with equivalent military production capabilities. This is particularly true for the regional breakdowns, where there were many countries with no military-industrial experience. There were, therefore, a large number of tied rankings. For this reason, Kendall's tau rank correlation was used in preference to the more common Spearman rank correlation. However, the more sophisticated statistical treatment cannot make up for this weakness in data; computations should be considered only approximations.

Consistent with Spearman rank correlations, the relationships indicated by the tau coefficients are:

- $1 = $ perfect ranking agreement on both variables
- $-1 = $ perfect negative association
- $0 = $ independence, no relationship

*Correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the .001 level with a two-tailed test.

**Correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 level with a two-tailed test. The null hypothesis of no relationship can be rejected.

***Correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level with a two-tailed test. The null hypothesis of no relationship can be rejected.

****Correlation coefficients are not statistically significant at the .05 level. There is not sufficient evidence presented by these data to enable us to reject the null hypothesis.

- b. $N = 21$ for Latin America; information not available for Haiti. $N = 6$ for the Far East; information not available for China, Vietnam, Burma, Taiwan, N. Korea, Kampuchea, Laos, and Mongolia. $N = 20$ for total arms producers; information not available for Bangladesh, Burma, China, Nigeria, N. Korea, and Taiwan.
- c. $N = 4$ for South Asia; information not available for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Bhutan.

continued
Table 7.2

d. N = 7 for Far East; information not available for China, Kampuchea, Laos, Mongolia, N. Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. N = 21 for total arms producers; information not available for Bangladesh, China, Nigeria, N. Korea, Taiwan.

NOTES


5 The Delphi Technique involves categorization of probable alternatives by a group of experts. Results may be 'fed back' to the members, possibly repeatedly, in order 'to clarify agreements and disagreements'. However, while this technique may generate possible future scenarios on which inter-subjective consensus of the participant experts may be said to obtain, these results depend considerably on the competence of the inputs (i.e., the participants) and may turn out to be far off the mark.

Similarly, gaming and simulation may produce interesting possibilities, but the quality of the results is often no better than the inputs. The crucial limitation resides in the problematic task of identifying and measuring the variable conditions determining unique events. For a critique of these techniques as they relate to military planning, see Oskar Morgenstern et al, Long Term Projections of Power: political, economic and military forecasting, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1973); and Yu. V. Chuyer and Yu. B. Mikhailov, Forecasting in Military Affairs: a Soviet View, (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1975).

For epistemological reasons, the term 'conjecture' is preferred in this context to either 'prediction' or 'forecast'. Both 'prediction' and 'forecast' denote high-confidence projection (apodictic statement) which is normally unattainable in the field of international relations in particular, and in the social sciences in general.

Conversely, conjecture is 'reasoned inference from admittedly defective evidence'. That is to say, as defined by Morgenstern and Knorr, among others, 'to conjecture is to form an opinion or judgment on what is recognized as inadequate information'. It is distinguished from tacit intuitive judgment (prediction) by two essential elements: competent use of such evidence as there is, and the use of explicit reasoning. In other words, conjecture may be regarded as a 'low order' prediction, 'distinguished by an awareness of the impossibility of high confidence prediction on a vast range of matters.

In the field of military-strategy, by stressing conjecture, the analyst is clearly admitting to the impossibility of predicting future developments, behaviour, and even capabilities of probable opponents. For the various distinctions and amplification upon these conceptual categories, see Robert Ayres, Technological Forecasting and Long-Range Planning, (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1969); and Klaus Knorr and Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning, Policy Memorandum No. 35, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1968.


For an elaboration on this theme, see Morgenstern et al., Long Term Projections of Power; and Cheyev and Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs: a Soviet View.


Ibid., p. 8.


This and related information can be found in SIPRI yearbook for 1983, World Armaments and Disarmament, (Stockholm), p. 207.

Tijjani and Williams (eds.), Shehu Shagari, p. 335.

Ibid., p. 333.

Knorr and Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning, p. 7.

Aluko's comment in a verbal rejoinder to criticism of a paper ("Nigerian Foreign Policy in the Year 2000") he presented at the seminar on Africa's Future at the African Studies Centre, Dalhousie University, May 1981.

As an international pariah, few governments would formally admit to any association with the 'Dogs of War'. Indeed, most countries have in theory enacted laws banning the recruitment of their nationals as mercenaries. See, for example, the United States Neutrality Act and the British Foreign Enlistment Act (1870).

These Acts are, however, riddled with loopholes and have never been taken seriously by either governments. According to the United States Justice Department, the Neutrality Act "basically requires that the individual take an oath of allegiance to foreign government before a violation occurs"!
Similarly, in the British case, as Lord Diplock, the chairman
of the commission of inquiry set up by the British Government
in the wake of the trials, imprisonment and execution of
mercenaries in Angola in 1976, comments:

During the 106 years that it (the Act)
has been upon the statute book, there has
never been a prosecution, let alone a
conviction for an offence in connection
with illegal enlistment or recruitment.

See Ward Churchill, "US mercenaries in Southern Africa:
the recruiting network and US policy", Africa Today, 27, 2,
1980, 21-46, and A. Mockler, The Mercenaries, (London:

24 Jonathan Block, "The Dogs of War Exposed", Africa Now,

25 See John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, (London:
Futura, 1979); and also "The CIA and the Violent Option",
Africa, 85, September 1978, pp. 52-55.

It was in response to this instrumental use of mercenar­
ies by extra-continental powers that the OAU's convention on
mercenarism declared as 'grave threat' the activities of
mercenarism to the 'independence, sovereignty, security,
territorial integrity and harmonious development of member
states'. The conviction further states that the crime of
'mercenarism' is committed by any individual, group or asso­
ciation, representative of the state or the state itself who,
with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-
determination, stability or territorial integrity of another
state, practices any of these acts:

1) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains,
promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of
mercenaries;

11) Enlists, enrolls or tries to enrol in the said bands;

111) Allows the activities to be carried out in any territory
under its jurisdiction or in any place under its
control or affords facilities for transits, transports
or other operations of these forces.

See Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record,

26 See Africa, 55, February 1976, pp. 65-68.


29 Hugh Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order, (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 132. Tinker's assertion is corroborated by the magnitude of military-related technological transfer to South Africa from NATO bloc countries to buttress the discredited albnocracy and by the overt and tacit support it has consistently received from the same source in the United Nations.


33 This perspective has been underlined by a number of commentaries by African writers. See, for instance, Peter Enahoro's editorial in Africa Now, 38, June 1984; and Ad'Obe Obe's article in West Africa, 3490, 9 July, p. 1390.

34 The Reagan administration's policy of 'constructive engagement' has as its centrepiece the objective of countering Soviet influence in Southern Africa through a 'positive and reciprocal' relationship between Washington and Pretoria. In the view of its leading spokesmen such as Chester Crocker, the basis for such a co-operative relationship exists in a set of interests which the two countries presumably share:

1) dealing effectively with the Soviet threat, i.e., preventing any further significant expansion of Soviet influence in Southern Africa, and, concomitantly, removing the Cuban troop presence from Angola;

11) rebuilding stability in Southern Africa (essentially American-cum-South African imposed sub-regional order such as envisaged by the Kissinger National Security Study Memorandum 39);
111) utilizing South Africa's central economic role in the region as the foundation for 'regional economic development' (Pretoria's sub-imperial dream of regional supremacy within a constellation of Southern African States).

See Chester Crocker, 'Memorandum of Conversation, 15/16 April, 1981', reprinted in Counter Spy (August-October 1981); p. 52.

For the growing Israeli-South African military alliance, see James Adams The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984). Israel has either supplied or facilitated South African production of patrol boats, fighter planes, a guided missile corvette, the Gabriel missile, and a gun capable of firing a nuclear shell. Israeli military advisers, as noted by the author, have also been active for the past ten years advising their South African counterparts on 'how best to control SWAPO and African National Congress freedom fighters.' Israeli-made products have been extensively deployed to counter guerilla penetrations in the operational areas: night sights, microwave protection and detection systems, electronic fences, barbed wire, and anti-personnel mines.


38 Sun Tzu's disquisition on war is based on a very different understanding of its nature from the prevailing Clausewitzian tradition. In the key passages in Chapter 5 of his Treatise, entitled 'Energy' (which is the Chinese word meaning 'force', 'influence' and 'authority') Sun Tzu theorizes that there are essentially two types of force: 'chi', or extraordinary and indirect force, and 'cheng', or normal and direct force. Victory, he asserts, 'comes when the two are correctly correlated'. Thus extraordinary, or indirect, force is applied extensively to weaken an opponent to the point where only a minimum of ordinary force is required to topple him. Hence his aphorism: '...use the normal force to engage, use the extraordinary to win', (p. 91).

In other words, in Sun Tzu's tradition, the outcome of conflict is determined not only by the skilful manipulation of violence by the general and political leaders once the war has broken out (as Clausewitz assumes), but also by the
"years of preparation preceding the confrontation". Thus the level on which Sun Tzu's 'war' is fought is not only on the battlefield, but in the preceding peacetime, and the object is not the use of military violence, but the undermining of the legitimacy of the opponent's cause among 'his own people'. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 32.


40 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 77.


42 See Bissel and Crocker (eds.) South Africa into the 1980s; and Gann and Duignan, Why South Africa will Survive.

43 For the full text of Muhammed's speech see, A Time for Action, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information, February 1976.


Shaw in his literature review associates this dominant perception of Nigeria's status and role in Africa with the traditional 'realistic' approach which he criticises as lacking in profundity:

The traditional perspective is not only rather complacent; it is state-centric, static, superstructural and less heuristic...it is neither theoretical nor predictive; it seeks to describe and understand rather than to explain and project. Within this dominant, traditional paradigm the major concerns are with foreign policy success (or failure), activism (or change). Debate within it is limited largely to the degree and direction of national influence and to the bases and amounts of power. Work within the orthodox school is largely concentrated on current affairs—chronology, ideology, regime changes, crisis diplomacy and domestic factors. It accepts and contributes to Nigeria's new activist African
policy and overlooks most constraints and contradictions. Although a few scholars within this mode recognize the dichotomy between continental influence and global dependence, awareness of substructural factors is minimal.


A closer examination of Shaw's reviews and differences highlighted reveal, however, that his literature classifications—'realist', 'idealist', and 'radical' approaches and projections—are less obvious than assumed. They are basically variations on the same theme, with the so-called radical genre (as articulated by Ake, Nzimbio, Osoba, etc.) focusing primarily on substructural forms (the frail and vulnerable economic foundation of Nigerian national power, which the 'traditionalist'/realist' undoubtedly recognize—see Aluko, "Nigerian Foreign Policy in the Year 2000") as a fundamental constraint in an independent and assertive foreign policy on the part of Nigeria. One cannot, therefore, help feeling that Shaw and other dependency writers, to use less graceful terms, have stretched the 'transnational paradigm' of Keohane and Nye in the Nigerian context almost to the point of making into a straw man the argument from 'penetrated, complex and dependent economic systems' such as Nigeria.

It is clearly desirable in the Nigerian case to recognize, as James Rosenau put forward, an 'aggregation' and 'disaggregation' of interests and behaviour based on 'issue-areas'. If, as Shaw contends, substructural forms constitute the primary determinant of Nigerian foreign policy behaviour, then it becomes impossible:

1) to explain its severe conflict with the West over Angola, for instance; or

2) to argue that its decision-makers can design and implement a military policy independent of and diametrically opposed to the geo-strategic interests of Western powers. Either assumption would be empirically intenable.

An alternative conception, definition and projection of a middle/regional power's— as a 'subimperial state' (the dependency mode)—status and role has been advanced by Shaw:

A subimperial state exists at the 'centre' of the periphery; it is a client-state that is able to exert dominance in one region of the Third World. Thus, it can exploit the process of regional integration while at the same time remaining dependent on a greater, metropolitan power. A subimperial country exerts a regional hegemony akin to the global dominance of an imperial power, but at a subsystemic level. It plays an important intermediate role in a sphere of influence by dominating a region while still being subordinate to major actors as the centre of global feudal networks.

Timothy M. Shaw, "Kenya and South Africa: 'subimperialist' states", Orbis 21, 2, (Summer 1977), p. 376. If Shaw's definition and projection are taken literally, then the possibility of Nigeria developing into an independent and de facto regional power is illusory. However, as I have argued later in the chapter, there is no reason why Nigeria cannot in the foreseeable future utilise its enormous material resources to push through the development of its internal economic structure and emerge as a more independent actor in the subsystem.

Kenneth Grundy has stressed the potential for the growth and development of sufficient strength for such a middle power to break away from its dependence situation: 'This mini-empire, far from being an object of derision and scorn, may eventually challenge a core-state, at first in regional terms...and then conceivably in even broader terms'. Kenneth Grundy, "Regional Relations in Southern Africa and the Global Political Economy" in M. DeLancey (ed.) Aspects of International Relations in Africa, (Bloomington: African Studies Program, Indiana University, 1979), Chapter Three.

52 Timothy M. Shaw, "Inequalities and Interdependence in Africa and Latin America", Cultures et Developement 10, 1, (January 1978), p. 29.

53 Ibid., p. 29.

54 For an evaluation of the concepts of power and influence, see, inter alia, Karl Deutsch, "On the Concepts of Politics and Power" in James Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, (N.Y.: Free Press, 1969); M.
This widespread assumption that Nigeria is Africa's great power was one of the foci of a blistering attack by one of Nigeria's leading novelists—Chinua Achebe; see the chapter entitled "False Image of Ourselves" in Achebe The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1983). For the changing bases—population and federation in the 1960s to oil and industrialisation in the 1970s—of this recurrent assumption, see Shaw and Fasehun, "Nigeria in the World System: alternative approaches, explanations and projections", pp. 206-208.

Perhaps, the best example of this institutional/organisational disarray with the resultant discontinuities in the operational mechanisms for carrying out the objectives of the established policies, can be seen in the area of science and technology. Following the overthrow of the Gowon administration in 1975, the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) established in 1970 to 'formulate explicit national policy on science and technology' was abolished. The NCST was later superseded (January 1977) by the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA). However, like the NCST, the NSTDA was short-lived. In October 1979, the new civilian government established a new Ministry of Science and Technology to supersede the NSTDA. As D. Babatunde Thomas laments:

Changes have been too frequent in the institutional framework and organisational mechanisms for the promotion of science and technology development. Not enough time has been allowed to elapse for a useful assessment of the effectiveness of one framework before a replacement is instituted. Among the consequences of the indiscriminate changes in institutional structures is a lack of cohesion in technology policies and their instruments, and limited impact on local technological capacity. Although there has been some degree of continuity in the overall policy purpose, changes in insti-
tutional framework have been accompanied by changes in the personnel responsible for policy interpretation and execution. Coherence and stability of policies and their instruments, and a timely flow of information on the performance of various instruments in order to generate a clear knowledge of the shortcomings, problems and appropriate solutions for improved effectiveness, are vital requirements in strengthening local S-and T capacity.


64 Bon and Mingst, "French Intervention in Africa: dependency or decolonization", p. 13.

65 In a recent conference on Chad organised by the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA), the Nigerian force commander in Chad, Maj. General Ejiga, argued that Nigeria had enough troops in Chad to impose peace on the...
warring factions, and that 'recommendations were made to President Shehu Shagari to use the force to effect that purpose, but he refused'. See West Africa, 2 April 1984, p. 746.

Nigeria unquestionably had sufficient 'fire power' to prevent Habre's Force Armee du Nord (FAN) from recapturing N'Djamena in violation of the OAU resolution, if Shagari had so decided. However, as argued in Chapter Four, given Chad's political maze and powerful external influences (France and the United States) which sustained Habre's military machine through bases in Sudan, it is doubtful whether such a policy (Pax Nigeriana) was either politically advisable or military sound at the time.


Ibid., p. 242.


87 See "Nigeria to Assemble Ships" Daily Times 27 February 1979; S.B. Peter, "Nigeria's Defence Establishment" Nigerian Forum 2, 12, (December 1982), pp. 914-920; and Jemibewon, "Development of Nigerian Defence Industries in the 1980s and beyond".


93 See Ibrahim James, "Impediments to Vertical Transfer of Technology in Nigeria", pp. 1114-1116.


97 For an analysis of these various modes of arms transfer, see Ibid.; Uri Ra'anan et al. (eds.) Arms Transfer to the Third World: the military buildup in less industrial countries (Boulder: Westview, 1978), Chapters 4 and 5; and Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development: a study of transnational military production, international transfer of military technology and their input on development, (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1980).


99 The complex variegatedness of these new battlefield technologies can, for example, be seen in the domain of guidance technology (seeker guidance, precision positioning and correlation guidance). This includes laser designation, electro-optical, infra-red seeker, radar homing, radar area correlation, distance measuring equipment, microwave radiometer, and satellite position fixing. For the descriptions and characteristics of these systems, see Weapons Technology: a survey of current developments in weapons systems (London: Brassey's 1975). Current and emerging guidance and other battlefield technologies are also surveyed in more detail by Gen. I.I. Anureyev, et al., Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet View); translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (1973); James Digby, Precision-Guided


105 Ibid., p. 122.

106 Ibid., p. 135.


113 This assumption was heightened following a US intelligence report in 1980 of a probable South Africa--Israeli test of a nuclear device in the Southern Oceans (between South Africa and the Antarctica). Although for political reasons, the Carter administration preferred ambiguity to
outright confirmation, it was, nevertheless, revealed in a British television programme, "World in Action", that South Africa obtained previous to the incident, 300,000 shell casings capable of delivering a two-to-three kiloton nuclear device with the connivance of American officials in the Pentagon. See Thomas O'Toole, "New Zealand Confirms Mystery Atom Test" The Guardian Weekly (Manchester) 25 November 1979, and "SA Ships in Zone of Suspected N-Blast", The Guardian (London) January 31, 1980.


This tendency toward elite (bureaucratic, institutional, policy etc.) coalitions, bargaining and competition on issues of national security was clearly apparent in the laissez faire politics in The Second Republic. The issue concerning organisational task expansion and funding for the Atomic Energy Commission was raised by a member of the finance committee of the National Assembly at a Conference on science and Technology (NIPSS, Kuru, 14-17, March 1983) and immediately became a subject of passionate debate. Among those present were the Federal Minister of Science and Technology, the Director Of Budget (T.A. Akinyele); the current Minister for External Affairs (Ibrahim Gambari), a naval Vice-Admiral, an Air Commodore Brigadier Sami Sami (MOD), three professors of Engineering (ABU, Bendel State University, and Ife University), the head of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of PRODA, Enugu.

121 For a critique of NPT resolutions, see Asok Kapur, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s" International Organisation 36, 3, (Summer 1981), pp. 535-555. Richard Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-proliferation" Foreign

122 Barnaby, "Can Nuclear-weapon Proliferation be Prevented?", p. 9.

123 Lodgaard, "International Nuclear Commerce", p. 23.


127 Ofoegbu, The Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 94.


129 Ibid., p. 136.


Intermitent military exercises between Nigeria and Republique de Benin and between Ghana and Upper Volta have since been conducted on annual basis.


Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, pp. 13-14.

Bassey, "Collective Amnesia or Perpetual Debate", pp. 73-103.

See, for example, Femi Otunajo, "Ideology and Military Integration in Africa", Current Research on Peace and Violence, 3 (3-4), 1980, pp. 216-228.


Ibid., p. 11.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: the relevance and impact of military power in Nigerian foreign policy

Our collective and individual future, then, will inevitably be shaped by us, whether we choose inaction and passivity, regression and romanticism, or action, imagination, and resolve. Men cannot escape their historical role by merely denying its existence. The question is, therefore, not whether (Africans) will shape their future but how they will shape it.[1]

Strategy depends for success first and most, (sic) on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means. The end must be proportioned to the total means, and the means used in gaining each intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the value and needs of that intermediate end—whether it be to gain an objective or to fulfill a contributory purpose.[2]

As stipulated in the introduction, my primary purpose in the preceding chapters has been to analyse and comprehend the theory and practice of Nigerian military statecraft, within the broad context of the extensive and vigorous debate in the 1970s and 1980s on the policy role of the expanding and modernizing military establishment of Nigeria. It remains to recapitulate the central argumentation in the foregoing analysis and to summarize and highlight some of the observations, contentions and conclusions that emerge from this essay. In addition, based on the salient issues considered in Chapter
Seven, an attempt will be made to hazard a few informed guesses as to the future direction of Nigeria's military policy, as this might be shaped by systemic challenges, domestic capabilities and various constraints.

First, at the conceptual level, consideration of Nigerian military power as an instrument of security and crisis-management is fundamentally hampered by two ambiguities and one unknown (see Chapter Three, section a). These conceptual problems stem partly from the conditional nature of the instrumentality of military power as it applies to Nigeria in existing and likely conditions, and partly from the general ambivalence and nebulous posture of the Nigerian state in regional and world politics.

Nevertheless, it has been my basic contention that for Nigeria, as is the case with most countries, the pivotal link between the military instrument and the imperatives of national security and crisis management is a direct consequence of the nature of contemporary international system as a 'threat system'—a competition of units 'in the kind of a state of nature that knows no restraints other than those which the changing necessities of the game and the shallow conveniences of the players impose'.[3] In this respect, the development and expansion of national 'power of resistance' has been widely viewed by the Nigerian policy-makers since the civil war era as the sine qua non for the preservation of basic values on which the country's survival as a socio-political
entity rests. Similarly, in terms of crisis management, considerations of military power have acted as counters in diplomatic bargaining, so that in serious disputes, diplomacy became a 'trial of influence and strength, including military strength even though it is also a test of wits and skill'.[4]

Seen in such terms, Nigerian military power (as the case study analysis in Chapter Four demonstrates) has featured severally (with a varying mix of diplomacy and economic sanctions) in the post-independence era as an instrument of security and crisis management. It has been employed coercively in order to influence the behaviour of opponents (Equatorial Guinea and Cameroun) or in order to alter or preserve the status quo, either by the sheer feat of attack or defence (e.g., against 'Biafra' and Chad) or through peacekeeping/peace-enforcement actions (the Congo-now Zaire—and Tanzania in the early 1960s; Chad and Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s).

Second, and parallel to the first, at the level of defence decision-making and planning, there has been a definite and qualitative change in perceptions and attitudes among Nigeria's policy elite towards the use and usability of national military power as an instrument of policy. This marked re-orientation in 'value parameter' concerning force has arguably coincided with, indeed been expedited by, changing domestic capabilities, systemic challenges, and regimes: from the conservative and highly introspective period of
Balewa (1960-1966) to a more dynamic and assertive era of Mohammed/Obasanjo (1975-1979). The latter is characterized by an increasing acceptance and cultivation (see Chapter Three, section c) of a 'realist' philosophy which views military power as 'but one of the many techniques of state-craft, taking its place alongside diplomacy, economic sanctions, propaganda and so on'.[5]

This development, eminently symbolised by the Afrocentric activism of the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration (or even by the less tempestuous, albeit unprecedentedly revisionist, posture toward unruly neighbours of the Shagari government), has been neither haphazard nor transient. On the contrary, it derives from a complex set of rapidly evolving relationships between recent historical circumstances and present conditions (both domestic and external). It has been an end-result of internal tumult as well as untoward events in the African continent since the early sixties. For instance, the unprecedented levels of foreign intervention (especially of France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa and the defunct Rhodesia) in the Nigerian civil war, contributed to a dramatic alteration of threat perceptions (and definitions) held by Nigeria's policy-makers of their country's security. Nigeria's security (that is, the protection of its basic and 'context-specific', values) has since been inextricably linked to the elimination of colonialism in Southern Africa and to the containment of French influence in West Africa. In other
words, judging from the direction of Nigeria's foreign and
defense policy planning since the civil war, it may be valid
to assert that the 'territorial frontier' no longer consti-
tutes the exclusive radius of security concern as was clearly
the case in the First Republic.

Thus, unlike the prevailing attitude, perception and
complacency which characterized the security posture of the
Balewa administration, the dominant 'mind set' in Nigerian
governmental circles since the civil war has been that the
survival, security and independence of Nigeria cannot be
assured as long as Southern Africa remains under treacherous
settler and colonial regimes sustained by powerful external
interests and forces. As a consequence, it has now become
integral to strategic thinking in Nigeria to view the coun-
try's security boundaries in terms of three interrelated
concentric circles (see Chapter Six, section a).

Third, with this amplified redefinition of threat to the
security of Nigeria, coupled with the questionable claim of
the country to be the dominant power in Black Africa (see
Chapter Seven, section b) came a magnified 'role-conception'
and 'organisational task expansion' for its military estab-
ishment in foreign policy. Thus, unlike in the First Repub-
lic when the roles of the armed forces were conceived largely
in terms of ceremonial and internal security duties (besides
limited involvement in peace-keeping operations), the emerg-
ing pattern of Nigeria's military policy in the 1970s and
1980s envisages active and vigorous involvement for the defence establishment in regional affairs.[6] Two policy statements by high ranking officials in the late 1970s and early 1980s attest to this trend. The first was the announcement in 1977 by then Chief of Army Staff, T.Y. Danjuma, that in order to speed up the collapse of the white regimes in South Africa, the government 'would be prepared to send troops to assist the freedom fighters'.[7] And the second was the reaction of Ishaya Audu, then Minister of External Affairs, to Washington's veto of the UN resolution condemning South Africa for its attack on Angola in September 1981:

There is definitely a feeling Africa should participate in the defence of Angola. There is a feeling that if Cuba is in the position to help, then, Africa should be even more in a position to help. As far as Nigeria is concerned, if asked, Nigeria would look at it objectively.[8]

For this and related reasons (discussed in Chapters Three and Six), it may thus be argued that the salience (in terms of role-conception) of military power in Nigeria's foreign and security policy has undergone a step-level change from the 'anti-militarist' proclivity of the Balewa era. For over a broad range of regional issues, the military instru-
ment is now viewed as the **ultima ratio**: one of the bases of diplomacy and of contractual obligations beyond the boundaries of the state.

In this respect, the major preoccupations—indeed, the basic components—of Nigerian defence policy and planning since the mid-1970s have been: a) armed forces modernization and augmentation that touches upon all elements of Nigerian military power with the aim of improving its efficiency, enhancing its conventional firepower and creating a regional mobility for the special units (see Chapter Six, section b); b) intensive material and diplomatic support for the liberation movements, including, in the late 1970s, the deployment of the Nigerian Air Force Transport Command in Tanzania to provide logistical support to the Patriotic Front forces based in Zambia and Mozambique. At present Nigeria is actively coordinating operational planning between the ANC and the PAC through its military mission in Harare; and elements from both liberation movements and SWAPO are also receiving advanced tactical training in the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna; and c) pursuit of a strategy of collective defence through regional and/or continental coordination and cooperation. As argued in Chapter Seven (section e), Nigeria's principal objective in this regard has been to create, both at the continental and regional levels, a 'collective security' mechanism that can provide 'African solutions to African conflicts' and thereby limit foreign pene-
tration and control. However, the extremely low-degree of ideological consciousness in the OAU-system as regards the real value of a regional defence mechanism, combined with the deepening dependence (militarily, economically, technologically and politically) of most African countries on the major industrial powers, has so far made the actualisation of this strategy a hopelessly unequal task.

Nevertheless, since the failure of a collective ideological awareness regarding regional security is itself accentuated, above all, by dissonance in national ideologies of development, it is not altogether improbable that intensification of current contradictions in the global capitalist economy might engender increasing acceptance of strategies for collective self-reliance in economic as well as security-related issues. To this extent, the OAU Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the inauguration of the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence may well strengthen the ideological and political bases of a collective strategy of providing 'African solutions to African conflicts'.

Finally, while there has undoubtedly been a fundamental re-orientation in both the role-conception and organisational task expansion for the military in Nigerian statecraft, the actual/potential use and usability (that is, policy operationalization) of the Nigerian military instrument remains constrained by certain structural deficiencies in its domestic environment. These, as discussed in Chapter Five,
include a frail socio-economic and technological base, the limited strike power of its armed forces—a consequence of its nascent 'military-industrial complex' and its declining reserves of international liquidity (foreign exchange) resulting from a glut in the oil market, itself a consequence of OECD countervailing strategies against OPEC. Assuming the vitality of any threat to Nigeria's security interests, the latter factor—the state of Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves and balance-of-payments since 1981—has probably become a key influence on the actual employment of the Nigerian military as an instrument of national policy (either for warfighting or peacekeeping) beyond its immediate borders. The case of the Zambia-'Rhodesia' crises of 1979 suggests this conclusion (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, in March this year, the Minister of External Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, announced that Nigeria may not participate in any future peacekeeping in the region until the OAU repays the ₦80m—($107m) incurred through a similar operation in Chad (see Chapter Four).[9]

As case studies of Libyan vigilantism in Africa and Iraqi activism in the Middle East suggest,[10] the ability of a country to run a substantial import surplus—on the strength of either large holdings of foreign currencies and gold, or borrowing power—permits it, for a time at least, to accelerate the buildup and use of military strength. Nigeria's armed forces modernization programme (purportedly
intended to make its defence system 'the best in Africa and comparable to the best in the world' (see Chapter Six, section b), involving more than ₦6.4 billion in capital expenditures on major weapons platforms—planes, tanks and naval vessels—was essentially predicated upon continued accumulation of foreign exchange earnings from oil production, estimated at 2.5 million barrels a day at $40 a barrel. There is no doubt that if such a huge spinoff from oil production had been sustained over time, Nigeria, like Libya or Iraq, would have significantly upgraded its conventional military capability, and with overriding confidence pursued a combative Afro-centric military policy.

Given the ramifications of Nigeria's diminished economic position ('the most significant development in Black Africa in the decade', as one analyst put it,[11] grounds for optimistic forecasts about the future direction of Nigeria's military policy are necessarily diminished. In the immediate term, Nigeria is likely to continue to face formidable internal difficulties, and these problems will inescapably have an impact on its ability to function as a regional power. As Ogunsanwo has noted, 'bold foreign policy positions and stances are hardly sustainable for a considerable period without the domestic infrastructural underpinnings which form the solid foundation for such policies'.[12]

However, while intractable domestic problems may limit the choice of means available to Nigerian decision-makers, it
is also to be expected that, to the extent that they are of unequal effectiveness (thus limiting the substitution of one for the other), the role of military power in Nigerian policy will still expand, as regional conflict and foreign intervention intensify.

This extrapolation of defence policy planning trends in the country is in accord with the undiminished level of defence spending and the continued commitment of the government to build a viable 'military-industrial' base by the end of the century while at the same time expediting deliveries of major weapons systems to the armed forces. As a senior political advisor to President Shagari, Chuka Okadigbo, once noted: 'People tend to think that as a result of the glut in the world oil market, Nigeria will have to jettison its foreign policy. This is naive. A temporary situation should not be considered a permanent situation'.[13]

Indeed, as the great depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s engendered the Keynesian revolution in the Western capitalist economies, so the prevailing assumption in the country that Nigeria's economic problems are amenable over time to fundamental structural changes and comprehensive developmental strategies based on national 'self-reliance' is not altogether fatuous. 'Nigeria', as Pauline Baker explains, 'still has reasonable options. With oil reserves of about 2.5 billion barrels, a large market potential, and a reputation as an underborrowed country whose political impor-
tance cannot be ignored, Nigeria has the capacity to pull through this crisis just as it pulled through the civil war. What is less certain is the political impact that these conditions will have internally and the willingness of the general population to pay the price of recovery.\[14\]

Ultimately, of course, what is needed to sustain an effective military policy--independently or as part of a collective regional defence system--is the progressive development of a technological base of power by Nigeria. Such a self-reliant economic, industrial and financial base is the sine qua non of a strong military force, and the inescapable prerequisite for Nigeria's emergence as an autonomous centre of power in the regional sub-system of Africa: the ultimate goal of its foreign and defence policies and plans.
NOTES


9. This assertion of the primacy of fiscal considerations as a determinant of the generation and use of Nigerian military power as an instrument of policy by no means underestimates the potentially troublesome or adverse impact of systemic factors and forces (see Chapter Five, section c). Regarding Nigeria's participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the OAU, the government has apparently reconsidered its position since the March policy pronouncement by the Minister of External Affairs, see *West Africa*, 3476 (2 April, 1984), p. 746.


APPENDIX I
A SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
AND INTERVIEWS IN NIGERIA (1982-1983)

A. The Nigerian Military: Structural Problems

1. From the perspective of a non-military professional, there has been a curious discrepancy between budgetary allocations for defence in the past decade and the projectable/striking power of the Nigerian military (e.g., the number of combat aircrafts, tanks, etc.). Would you care to comment?

2. There has been much allusion in Nigerian newspapers, magazines and journals of recent to the armed forces modernization programme. Apart from organizational reforms and personnel training, it may be assumed that one of the major focus of the programme are weapons and support systems. Has there been any qualitative or marked reorientation (as in Brazil through the 1960s and 1970s, for instance), from the 'direct purchase' policy that was clearly visible during the civil war and after, toward the development (ultimately) of a viable infrastructure for an independent (although selective) weapons base? In other words, how would you best describe the current mode of weapon acquisition for the Nigerian Military?
3. The Nigerian Military has been invariably described as a "light Infantry" force by foreign commentators. The basis for this comment is fairly obvious, deriving substantially from the literal interpretation of data derived from The Military Balance (IISS Publication). In recent years, however, the figures and analyses presented in The Military Balance have come under fire as inaccurate and even as reflecting political biases (John McCaughey, "Defense's Prestigious Think Tank", Defense Week, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 7, 1980). In view of these demonstrable shortcomings in this data source, would you still share the predominant "light infantry" assessment of the Nigerian Military?

B. The Nigerian Military as an Instrument of Policy

1. The prevalence of military coup in the African continent (as elsewhere in the so-called "Third World" Countries) has been the source of warning against simplistic application of clausewitzian precept to African countries in the literature on Civil-Military relations. This raises, first, the question of the degree of civilian control over the military in Africa, and, second, the extent to which the military accepts "political" definition of their external role. How absolute is the
compatibility of purpose between the political and the military institutional definition of external role (regional and continental) in Nigeria.

2. What may be construed to be the primary motivation and goal of Nigeria's role in ECOWAS Defence Force. Can one foresee a development toward a "Security Community"?

3. The Nigerian government has consistently declared its intention to participate in any regional defence system ('Pan-African Task Force) in the 1970s. Would you consider this declaration one of the fundamental underpinnings of Nigeria's security policy and defence planning in the 1980s and beyond?

4. What in your opinion are the basic internal and external obstacles to the development of a viable "military-industrial complex" in Nigeria?

5. Would you consider the recent threat of coercive violence against Cameroon an indication of a less tolerant defence policy posture on the part of Nigeria towards its neighbours?
**Appendix 2**

A Summary of African conflicts and the role of the OAU in their resolution or management, 1975-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/countries Involved</th>
<th>Conflict type</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Role of the OAU</th>
<th>Outcome as of June 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria/Morocco</td>
<td>Territorial/Liberation Movement, Algerian support for the Polisario and independence for Western Sahara.</td>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>Attempted mediation on several occasions. The last attempt was December 1979 in Monrovia when the ad hoc Committee on Western Sahara met.</td>
<td>Liberation war continues. Algeria continues to support Polisario.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria/Mauritania</td>
<td>Territorial/Liberation Movement, Algerian support for Polisario and independence for Western Sahara.</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>Attempted mediation on several occasions but unsuccessful.</td>
<td>Resolved. Coup in Mauritania in 1978 brought pro-settlement government to power. It renounced claims to its own section of the territory in favour of independence in 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola/Zaire</td>
<td>Subversion/Intervention</td>
<td>1975-1978</td>
<td>Very minimal</td>
<td>Conflict resolved bilaterally through diplomatic channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/countries involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Role of the OAU</td>
<td>Outcome as of June 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>External intervention-Mercenary invasion</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>OAU fact-finding mission to Benin:</td>
<td>Resolved. Invasion beaten off by Benin army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin/Togo</td>
<td>Border dispute</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Resolved through bilateral diplomatic negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad(1)</td>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Substantial. Peace-keeping force earmarked but not yet mobilised.</td>
<td>Unresolved. War continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad/Libya</td>
<td>Military intervention Libyan support for rival nationalist faction led by Goukouni Weddeye.</td>
<td>1978-80</td>
<td>OAU committee set up to mediate and ensure Libyans' withdrawal.</td>
<td>Resolved problem. Accusations continue of Libyan support for Goukouni by Hissene Habre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/countries involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Role of the OAU</td>
<td>Outcome as of June 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea</td>
<td>War of recession</td>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>War in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana/Togo</td>
<td>Subversion, border clashes, and refugee problems.</td>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>OAU 8-man mediation committee met in Freetown successfully proposed a peace formula.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya/Egypt</td>
<td>Border clashes</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Quiescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania/Upper Volta</td>
<td>Boundary dispute</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Resolved through bilateral mediation efforts of President Toure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/countries involved.</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Role of the OAU</td>
<td>Outcome as of June 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique/Rhodesia</td>
<td>Border incursions by Rhodesian soldiers in pursuit of freedom fighters.</td>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>Limited to diplomatic condemnation of Rhodesia and moral support for Mozambique.</td>
<td>Resolved through Zimbabwean independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria/Chad</td>
<td>Border clashes, incursions by Chadian soldiers, dispute over fishing rights.</td>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial bilateral resolution in 1976, but clashes continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda/Tanzania (1)</td>
<td>Sporadic, border clashes and ideological/personality conflict.</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>OAU mediation by Secretary General, plus personal initiatives of other members.</td>
<td>Remained Quiescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda/Kenya</td>
<td>Murder of Kenyan citizens border tensions, and refugees.</td>
<td>1978-78</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Resolved bilaterally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia/Rhodesia</td>
<td>Rhodesian military incursions and raids on nationalist camps.</td>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>Moral and diplomatic support for Zambia and condemnation of rebel government forces.</td>
<td>Resolved through Zimbabwean independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/countries involved</td>
<td>Conflict type</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Role of the OAU</td>
<td>Outcome as of June 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Conflicts are here defined to include civil wars, boundary and border disputes, personality and ideological conflicts, and external military interventions.

** As of June 1980

Appendix 3

Ecowas Defence Protocol

A/SP3/5/31 PROTOCOL RELATING TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON DEFENCE

PREAMBLE

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES:

RECALLING Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which calls upon all Member States to refrain in their international relations from resorting to the use of threats or force either against the territorial integrity or the independence of all States in any manner that is incompatible with the aims of the United Nations or from interfering in the internal affairs of other States;

RECALLING Article 8 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which calls upon Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right to an independent existence;

RECALLING Article 8 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which calls upon Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right to an independent existence;

RECALLING the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on 22nd April 1978, in accordance with which Member States resolved not to use force as a means of settling their disputes.

CONVINCED that economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security are ensured in all Member States of the Community;

CONSIDERING that Member States belong to the same geographical area,

CONSCIOUS of the serious continuous threats of aggression on the African continent in general and their own countries in particular,

CONSCIOUS of the serious risks that the presence of foreign military bases on the African continent may constitute as support forces to external aggression;

FIRMLY RESOLVE to safeguard and consolidate the independence and the sovereignty of Member States against foreign intervention;

CONSCIOUS of the fact that external defence of their states depends entirely on each sovereign state, and that such a defence will be more effective with the coordination and pooling together of the means of mutual assistance provided by respective Member States within the framework of this Protocol;

DESIRING of maintaining the ties of friendship existing amongst Member States and of strengthening their cooperation in all fields on the basis of quality, mutual interests and respects;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS

Article 1

Within the context of this Protocol, 'Treaty' means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;

'Treaty' means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;

'Community' means the Economic Community of West African States;

'Community' means the Economic Community of West African States;

'Authority' means the Authority of Heads of State and Government as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty;
"Member State" or "Member States" means a Member State or Member States of the Community;

"Executive Secretary" means Executive Secretary of the Community as defined in Article 8 of the Treaty;

"Aggression" means the use of armed force by any State against the sovereignty and territorial integrity or political independence of another State or by any other manner incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and OAU;

"Assistance on Defence" means all military and (material, technical and personnel).

CHAPTER II
OBJECTIVES

Article 2
Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community.

Article 3
Member States, resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.

Article 4
Member States shall also take appropriate measures such as specified in Articles 17 and 18 of the present Protocol in the following circumstances:

a) In case of armed conflict between two or several Member States if the settlement procedure by peaceful means as indicated in Article 5 of the Non-Aggression Protocol mentioned in the Preamble proves ineffective.

b) In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community. In this case the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or States concerned.

CHAPTER III
INSTITUTIONS

Article 5
The institutions for the implementation of this Protocol shall be:

The Authority
The Defence Council
The Defence Commission

SECTION I - THE AUTHORITY

Article 6
1. The Authority on the occasion of the annual ordinary meeting of ECOWAS shall examine general problems concerning peace and security of the Community;

2. The Authority may also hold extraordinary sessions on defence matters where circumstances so require;

3. The Authority shall decide on the expediency of military action and entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces.
of the Community (AAFC);

4. Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member States.

SECTION II - DEFENCE COUNCIL

Article 7
1. A Defence Council of the Community shall be established by the Authority.

2. It shall consist of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States. However, in cases of crisis, the Defence Council shall be chaired by the current Chairman of the Authority and it shall be enlarged to include any other Minister from Member States according to the circumstances. The Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of military matters shall be in attendance at meetings of the Council.

Article 8
1. The Defence Council shall meet on the convocation by its Chairman to prepare the items of the Agenda of Sessions of the Authority dealing with defence matters.

2. In an emergency, the Defence Council shall examine the situation, the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used.

Article 9
In case of armed intervention the Defence Council assisted by the Defence Commission shall supervise with the authority of the State or States Concerned, all measures to be taken by the Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for the intervention are made available to him. The actions of the Force Commander shall be subject to competent political authority of the Member State or States concerned.

Article 10
At the end of the operation, the Defence Council shall write a factual report to be addressed to the Authority.

SECTION III - THE DEFENCE COMMISSION

1. A Defence Commission shall be established by the Authority and shall consist of a Chief of Staff from each Member State.

2. The Defence Commission shall be responsible for examining the technological aspect of defence matters.

3. The Defence Commission shall establish its Rules of Procedure especially in respect of the convening of its meetings, the conduct of the business and the implementation of duties as assigned to it by the Defence Council.

CHAPTER IV
ADMINISTRATION

Article 12
1. The Defence Council shall appoint a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the Executive Secretariat for a period of four.
years renewable only once.

2. The Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) shall be a senior serving military officer.

3. He shall be in charge of the administration and follow-up of the decisions taken by the Authority and in accordance with the present Protocol and under the authority of the Executive Secretary.

4. He shall update plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiate joint exercises as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 13 below.

5. He shall be assisted in the discharge of his functions by the necessary staff members and personnel as determined by the Defence Council.

6. He shall study and make proposals to the Executive Secretariat in respect of all matters relating to personnel and equipment within his jurisdiction.

CHAPTER V

MODALITIES OF INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE

Article 13

1. All Member States agreed to place at the disposal of the Community, earmarked units from the existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention.

2. These Units shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).

3. In order to better realise the objectives set forth in this Protocol, the Member States may organise, from time to time, as may be approved by the Authority, joint military exercises among two more earmarked Units of the AAFC.

Article 14

The Allied Armed Forces of the Community shall be under the command of the Forces Commander-appointed by the Authority on the proposal of the defence Council. He shall be entrusted with powers that are conferred upon him by the Authority.

He together with the Chief of Defence staff of the assisted country, shall be the Joint Chief of Defence Staff of the Allied Armed Forces and shall be responsible for the implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority. He shall have at his disposal all necessary means of defence.

Article 15

1. Intervention by AAFC shall in all cases be justified by the legitimate defence of the territories of the Community.

2. It shall therefore be carried out in accordance with the mechanism described in Articles 16, 17 and 18 below.

Article 16

When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of the Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the
Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. This request shall mean that the Authority is duly notified and that the A.A.F.C. are placed under a state of emergency. The authority shall decide in accordance with the emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 6 above.

Article 17
1. When there is a conflict between two Member States of the Community, the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority shall decide only to interpose the A.A.F.C. between the troops engaged in the conflict.

Article 18
1. In the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from outside, the provisions of Articles 6, 9 and 16 of this Protocol shall apply.

2. Community forces shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal.

CHAPTER VI
SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Article 19
The implementation of this Protocol shall be supplemented by additional Protocols.

Article 20
1. Undertakings devolving from the provisions of this Protocol shall not be interpreted as being against the spirit of Conventions or Agreements binding one Member State to another third State or States; provided such Conventions and Agreements are not in conflict with the spirit of this Defence Assistance.

2. Nonetheless, a Defence Agreement concluded with some other State shall be denounced by the Member State concerned as soon as such other State shall have been identified by the Authority as an aggressor against a Member State.

3. Member States shall undertake to end the presence of foreign military bases within their national territories as soon as the Community is in the position to meet their requirements in matters relating to defence.

CHAPTER VII
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 21
Any Member State which accedes to the Treaty automatically accedes to this Protocol and to the Protocol of Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on the 22nd April, 1978.

On the other hand, any Member State signatory to this present Protocol and having ratified it, or having acceded to it, becomes party to the above-mentioned non-Aggression Pact.

Article 22
Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.

12. Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive-Secretary who shall communicate them to
other Member States no later than thirty days after the receipt of such proposals. Amendments or revisions shall be considered by the Authority after Member States have been given one month's notice thereof.

Article 23

1. Any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Protocol shall give to the Executive Secretary one year's written notice. At the end of this period of one year, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a party to the Protocol.

2. During the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, such a Member State shall nevertheless observe the provisions of this Protocol and shall remain liable for the discharge of its obligations under this Protocol.

Article 24

1. This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally at the signing by the Heads of State and Government and definitely after ratification by not less than seven (7) signatories, in accordance with the Constitutional Laws of each Member State.

2. This Protocol, as well as all instruments of ratification, shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary which shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register it with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as the United Nations (UN) and any other Organization as the Authority shall decide.

3. The Present Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIGNED THE PRESENT PROTOCOL

Done at Freetown this 29th day of May 1981 in single original in the English and French languages both texts being equally authentic.
Appendix 4

Major African conflicts since 1945.

Malagasy revolt against French

Kenya war of independence (Mau-Mau revolt) v. Britain 1947-48 50,000 dead

Algerian war of independence v. France 1952-60 15,000 Kenyans and 600 security forces killed.

Sudan civil war, North v. South 1954-62 17,456 French killed, 51,800 French wounded. Officially 141,000 Algerians killed Unofficially about 1m.

Bamileke revolt in Cameroon (put down by French) 1955-72 Est. 500,000 killed and a million became refugees.

Congo (Zaire) civil war with mercenary involvement 1957-62 20,000-plus killed

Angolan war of independence v. Portugal and Mozambique war of independence v. Portugal 1960-67 126 UN soldiers killed Congolese dead estimated between 50,000 and 100,000.

1961-75 5,256 killed and 6,878 wounded were the official Portuguese losses in these two wars

Eritrean war against Ethiopia 1961 80,000 estimated to have died on both sides,

Guinean war of independence v. Portugal 1963-74 PAIGC losses less than 1,000. Portuguese lost 1,084 killed and 6,000 wounded (officially)

Zimbabwe war of independence v. British/Rhodesian govts. 1964-80 20,000 killed on both sides.

Namibia war of independence v. South Africa and South Africa v. Angola 1966- 2,000 killed and 3,000 wounded since 1975.
Chad civil war
Biafra - Nigerian civil war
Western Sahara war of independence v. Spain v. Mauritania and v. Morocco
Angolan civil war - MPLA/FNLA/UNITA
Libya/Egypt border war
Ethiopia/Somalia/Ogaden war
Tanzania/Uganda war

1966 25,000 killed or more.
1967-70 Between 600,000 and 1m believed to have died on both sides.
1973-76 No figures
1975-76 20,000 killed on all sides.
1977 No figures
1977-78 30,000-50,000 killed on both sides.
1978-79 4,100 soldiers and civilians killed on both sides.

Appendix 5

Foreign Powers Having Defence Agreement with African States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Country</th>
<th>Nature of Agreement</th>
<th>Total No. of Countries</th>
<th>African Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Bases/missile trials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon and Central African Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Military/Communications Bases</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kenya, Mauritius and Botswana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia, Senegal and Zaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>Missile Base</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>People's Republic of Congo, Guinea, Angola, and Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5. Tantinen, Dale R. op cit., p. 11.
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