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INSIDE NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1960-1993:
ETHNICITY, CLASS, STATE AND LEADERSHIP CONTRADICTIONS

by

E John Inegbedion

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
May, 1994

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- Psychometrics 0632
- Social 0451
Dedication

To the trinity of my existence: Ehiaghe, Arelosowho and Ekiomo
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Abstract

Nigerian foreign policy (NFP) has been subject to more debates than that of any other state in Africa or elsewhere in the South. These debates can be classified into realist-radical contending paradigms of NFP consisting of three approaches: realist socio-psychology, radical dependency and capability empiricism. The debates can be acrimonious, and the literature is voluminous and rich in its description of the events and issues.

The present study is revisionist. It is a longitudinal, comparative attempt (i) to systematically rethink the basic premises of NFP across issues and leaders in the period 1960 to 1993; and in the process (ii) to bring a degree of conceptual clarity and integration to the subject, its historical base and possible future directions. The substantive question is why NFP has remained a patchwork of reactions and inactions contrary to its asserted national role conception to lead Africa?

Contrary to the lack of power and dependency arguments in realist and radical paradigms, the central thesis is that a foreign policy capable of promoting this role conception has been willingly sacrificed in order to maintain the precarious balance between the North and South, within the bourgeoisie and among state actors, with the survival of Nigeria as a unit the priority. Nigeria's inability to design and implement a foreign policy in line with its attributes and role conception must thus be viewed as a function of elite interests and behaviour, and the misuse of available resources.

The crucial but paradoxical explanatory variable in this thesis is leadership. This explains why internal constraints have not rendered external action impossible, and accounts for why NFP has ranged from the innovative and proactive to the passive and reactive. It is concluded that, as long as foreign policy is not integrated with a coherent strategy of economic restructuring and political transformation, NFP is not likely to change. This is to say, its future can be seen in its past.
List of Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Ruling Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBN</td>
<td>Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economic Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGN</td>
<td>Federal Government of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMG</td>
<td>Federal Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNPP</td>
<td>Greater Nigerian Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDLP</td>
<td>International Division of Labour &amp; Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN</td>
<td>Manufacturers Association of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigerian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>Nigerian Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialising Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute for Policy &amp; Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISER</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute for Social &amp; Economic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>Nigerian Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Nigerian Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Republican Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Society of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Security Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUNs</td>
<td>National Union of Nigerian Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Peoples Redemption Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>United Bank for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>Unity Party of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAI</td>
<td>War Against indiscipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Women in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

Many institutions and individuals contributed in various ways to this dissertation. I owe each a debt of gratitude.

I appreciate the financial support from Dalhousie’s Faculty of Graduate Studies and the Research and Development Fund. The Department of Political Science offered me teaching assistantships, and, together with the Centre for African Studies and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, provided the intellectual environment in which to debate ideas and think through the thesis.

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It is difficult to imagine how I would have seen my way around the computer and navigate administrative labyrinths without the aid of Marilyn Langille and Susan Rolston. Thank you both.

Everything else I owe to my parents, Ehiaghe Akhaorele & Okinomo Inegbedion. They have always been there for me. I cannot ask for more.
PART I: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Map 1.1: 30 States of Nigeria, 1991

Economic Indicators:

Land Area: 923,773 km
Climate: Tropical (wet & dry seasons)
Population: 88.5 million (1991 census)
INTRODUCTION

Nigerian foreign policy (NFP) has been subject to more debates than that of any other state in Africa or elsewhere in the South (Korany & Dessouki 1991:13; Asobie 1990:3-4; Nweke 1988:40-41; Ogunsanwo 1986:110; Shaw & Fasehun 1980:571). As schematised in Table 2.1, these debates can be classified into realist-radical contending paradigms of NFP consisting of three approaches. For the lack of better terms, these are labelled as realist socio-psychology, radical dependency and capability empiricism. While the debates can be acrimonious, the literature is voluminous and rich in its description of the events of NFP.

The present study is revisionist. It constitutes an attempt to go beyond the extant debates and literature. It is situated in the domestic politics-foreign policy nexus in its investigation of the analysis and praxis of NFP.

Nigeria's economic and political disarray is no longer in doubt. The critical question now is whether and how it can be reversed. Table 1.1 below gives an overview of the disastrous state of the Nigerian economy, a consequence of the squandering and looting of the country's vast resources by the bourgeoisie - civilian and military (Graf 1988; Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985).

Especially in the prevailing new world (dis)order, foreign policy is the crucial instrument with which Nigeria can mitigate this economic and political disarray. With the Cold War over and apartheid formally abolished, Nigeria needs a new foreign policy thrust to replace non-alignment and anti-apartheid. Old political foci must now give way to urgent and long term issues of external debt negotiations,
structural adjustment conditionalities, access to new international credit, regional peacekeeping and security threats from toxic waste dumping in NFP praxis.

Table 1.1: Nigeria’s Current Economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Domestic Sector</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth (%)</td>
<td>Consumer Prices (% Change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) External Debt ($bn)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Debt</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>31.98</td>
<td>34.56</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td>27.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt/Service Ratio (%)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


n/a: not available
On the analytical level, NFP analyses and debates rarely address fundamental issues of methodology, explanation and theory. A critical area of this neglect is the domestic politics-foreign policy nexus. In both the orthodox and radical paradigms, NFP is portrayed as an autonomous sphere of activity from domestic politics. The debates and analyses hardly reflect the fact that foreign policy is more than traditional diplomacy, and the struggles for power and external military security.

As defined below, foreign policy serves equally as the key mechanism through which have-not states negotiate bilateral and multilateral aid and investment for internal political-economic development, and military aid for regime or state security. This comes out even in Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg's thesis on "Why Africa's Weak States Persist" (1982). The analysis equally suggests that foreign policy has enabled the weakest states to attract sufficient economic and military aid to survive, even permitting predatory rulers like Mobutu of Zaire to prosper.

NFP debates and analyses pay scant attention to the fit between proposition and evidence. While realists see NFP as a function of the lack of power, radicals appeal to dependency. But neither set of analysts revises proposition in light of evidence. In short, as shown specifically in the overview and critique of the literature in Chapter 2, issues of explanation, methodology and theory are rarely included in NFP analyses (Asobie 1990; Nweke 1988; Otubanjo 1986; Short 1980).
Femi Otubanjo best summarised this fundamental weakness in NFP debates and analyses when he stated in 1986 that:

After 25 years, the literature is quite overdue for a theoretical framework or more which will unite as well as simplify the complex categories in which Nigeria’s foreign policy outputs and behaviour are often located (1986:48).

This problem remains unaddressed in 1994.

The present thesis constitutes an attempt to systematically rethink the basic premises of NFP across regimes and issues and leaders in the period 1960 to 1993; and in the process to bring a degree of conceptual integration to the subject, its historical underpinnings and possible future directions. Chapter 1 posits my central thesis and explains the linkages between leadership - the key explanatory variable - and the forces of ethnic rivalry, the battle over state control and intra-class struggles within the bourgeoisie. It defines the key concepts, and outlines the data, methodology and theoretical perspective underlying the study.

The substantive issue which defines the analysis is the status inconsistency between Nigeria’s national role conception and the external behaviour of the state. The theoretical approach is critical political economy. Methodologically, the analysis is situated in a longitudinal, comparative framework.
CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUALISING NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
WHY DOMESTIC POLITICS MATTERS

The present study investigates why Nigerian foreign policy has remained a patchwork of reactions and inactions contrary to the national role conception - international image - to lead Africa. It is a longitudinal, comparative analysis of foreign policy in its interface with domestic politics in the period 1960 to 1993. The argument is that Nigeria's inability to design and implement a foreign policy in line with its attributes and national role conception, seen as the lack of power or dependency in extant realist and radical paradigms, must be viewed as a function of domestic politics and the misuse of available resources by leaders and the bourgeoisie.

In other words, NFP is embedded in the internal constraints of elite interests and behaviour. Nigeria's colonial legacy, the mode of incorporation into the world capitalist economy and the Cold War might have been prominent factors in the development of NFP orientation, but objectives and priorities are determined by elite interests and behaviour. This is the political reality of state-civil society interactions. This political reality largely accounts for the foreign policy inconsistency - the gap between the national role conception and external behaviour - of the Nigerian state. In terms of a working definition, the view of civil society adopted here follows that of Jean Cohen and Adrew Arato as the autonomous sphere of interaction distinct from the private domain of family life and separate from the state and the (formal) economy (1992.ix).
Like others, critical scholars assert that domestic politics determines how Nigeria is affected by and responds to external pressures (Graf 1988:236-237; Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988:3). William Graf may be mistaken in the belief that "foreign policy is the one ideological area relatively removed from domestic interest-conflict" (1988:237). It is the same Graf who argues that NFP is inseparable from the elites' concern "with producing consensus in regulating access to the troughs of state patronage" (ibid).

Graf is right, however, along with others such as General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigerian head of state, 1976-1979, Richard Joseph and Larry Diamond that elite interests and behaviour constitute the crucial explanatory variable in the economic underdevelopment and political chaos in Nigeria (Graf 1988:xiii; Obasanjo 1990:233-240; Joseph 1987; Diamond 1988) This is the proposition explicitly applied to foreign policy in the present study. Paradoxically, leadership emerges in the analysis as the crucial explanatory variable why internal constraints have not rendered external action impossible. This is explained below.

My central thesis is that foreign policy has been willingly sacrificed in order to maintain the precarious ethnic-political balance within the bourgeoisie and the state with the survival of Nigeria as a unit the priority. Leaders and policy makers freely admit this. For example, both Professor Ibrahim Gambari, foreign minister 1984-1984, and currently Nigeria's ambassador to the United Nations (UN), and Obasanjo agree that the country is a very tentative and uneasy balance between the Hausa-Fulani Muslim North and the Yoruba and Igbo Christian South, and
priority must be accorded its survival (Gambari 1992a:141; Obasanjo 1990:37).

This contrasts with the realist focus on the external (e.g. Aluko 1981:264-266; Nweke 1985). This survival from within is viewed here as a better indicator of the national interest and security. Like most African countries, the territorial integrity of Nigeria is threatened not so much from without but rather from within. In this view, attention to domestic fissions and fissures provides a more satisfying definition of the national interest as well as security than external military threat and aggression. I define and elaborate this below.

The thesis unfolds on two interrelated levels of analysis. On the one level, the focus is on why and how domestic politics constrains the national role conception and internal development - defined as economic restructuring and political transformation. On the other, as already noted, leadership is underlined as the key explanatory variable as to why such internal constraint has not rendered external action impossible. The thesis is premised on this domestic politics-foreign policy nexus.

On this premise, the struggles over resources between ethnic groups and within the bourgeoisie and among state actors tend to be inseparable from matters of foreign policy. These are control of oil rents, import licenses and foreign exchange allocations, external commercial linkages and government contracts. As a result, as analysts such as Shehu Othman (1986), Olajide Aluko (1981:261-264) and Stephen Wright (1981) lament, the elites have failed to agree on
what foreign policies we [Nigerians] intend to achieve, which areas we want to emphasize; how our trade policies support our industrial policies and vice-versa; how our trade and industrial policies support our foreign policies; and how agricultural policies are influenced by trade and industrial policies (Eleazu 1989:25).

To be sure, and this is where Graf is right, the elites do not disagree on "Nigeria's manifest destiny to lead Africa". However, this is just a common desire, as opposed to agreement on actual foreign policy strategy to achieve the goal (Ogwu 1986:45-51).

Nor is the state any more coherent than its behavioural agents - the bourgeoisie. As established below, the site of the class, ethnic and civil-military struggles, the state lacks the basis on which to develop and sustain a coherent foreign policy. Indeed, if there is such a thing as a typical Hobbesian state, Nigeria would top the list (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988; Joseph 1987; Graf 1988:149-179; Lubeck 1987a; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985). As Claude Ake expresses this widespread view, "Nigerian politics is warfare, a matter of life and death" (1988:28-33).

Ethnic rivalry, intra-dominant class struggles and the battle for state control mark this warfare. The dominant Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba elites have been so factionalised by the internal struggles for power that the bourgeoisie has failed to find on a common strategy upon which to base a coherent foreign policy. If elite interest and behaviour account for Nigeria's inability to act effectively in its region and internationally, what explains the variations in foreign policy over time and across issues and governments?
This is where leadership emerges as the key explanatory variable. As the case studies suggest, leadership accounts for why NFP has ranged from the innovative and pro-active to the passive and re-active. It provides insight into the differing foreign policy postures across issues and governments. As noted above, this is paradoxical, however.

On the one hand, the leader is much a part of the factionalised bourgeoisie and a state that has failed to amount to more than the sum of its ethnic parts. On the other hand, the leader is separate from both by virtue of his or her formal or constitutional roles. Hence, it is the extent to which the leader balances the one with the other that provides the explanations. The rest of the chapter develops the thesis of the study into a conceptual framework that (i) defines and explains the main variables: leadership, foreign policy, ethnicity, class and state; (ii) establishes the internal conditions in which these are operationalised; and (iii) provides an explanatory logic that relates the variables to NFP behaviour. The main objective is to capture the inner patterns and structure of Nigeria’s prebendal politics, and how its agents are constituted and interact.

This is necessary if we are to begin to understand how the existing rent seeking coalitions and relationships can be dissolved or restructured along economic and productive lines. There is a pervasive tendency in the extant literature to treat the Nigerian bourgeoisie according to how the analysts think it ought to behave rather than in light of the concrete interests at stake. This is the difference between substantive and procedural views of rationality. This is
explained below in discussing the methodology of the study. First, leadership.

Table 1.2 below lists the leaders and their foreign ministers examined in the study.

Table 1.2: Nigerian Leaders, Years in Office (Y/O) and Foreign Ministers, 1960-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Y/O</th>
<th>Foreign Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Abubakar T. Balewa</td>
<td>1960-1966</td>
<td>Dr Jaja Wachukwu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Aguyi Ironsi</td>
<td>1966-1966</td>
<td>None appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Yakubu Gowon</td>
<td>1966-1975</td>
<td>Dr Okoi Arikpo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generals Murtala/Obasanjo</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>Gen Joe Garba Gen Henry Adefowope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali'Uji Shehu Shagari</td>
<td>1979-1983</td>
<td>Prof Isaiah Audu Chief Emeka Anvaoku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohammadu Buhari</td>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>Prof Ibrahim Gambari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Ibrahim Babangida</td>
<td>1985-1993</td>
<td>Gen Ike Nwachukwu* Dr Rilwanu Lukman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Matthew Mbu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leadership and National Attributes

Political leadership is a relational concept. It defines the relationships between the leader and those over whom his or her authority is exercised. One can be more specific and relate leadership to the leader’s ability to steer the state and its institutions and the society in the desired direction.
Margaret Hermann proposes five main "ingredients of leadership" in analysing the relationships (1986:167-187). The present study emphasises two. One underlines the conditions under which the leader acts; and the other specifies the constituency whose support may be necessary for policy implementation.

Nigeria is a conundrum of class, gender, ethnic and civil-military struggles. The country gained political independence from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960 with a Westminster-style parliamentary system of government. Nigeria was touted by the West as a budding democracy ready for economic "take-off" to modernisation in the manner described by Walter Rostow (1964). It was also assumed that the country's attributes naturally put it in a position to become the regional leader in Africa.

Much has been written about Nigeria's attributes as the regional leader in Africa, and about how Britain and the United States (US) encouraged and exploited these for their Cold War policy (Cowan 1962; Coleman 1963; Phillips 1964; Idang 1973; Akinyemi 1974; Herskovits 1977-78, 1975; Wayas 1979; Young 1981; Watts 1987). Such attributes focus on Nigeria's population which the 1991 census put at 88.5 million, with a growth rate estimate of 3.2%. The country has vast natural resources. As agriculture declined from 97.3% of total exports in 1960 to 42.4% in 1970 to 1.8% in 1981, oil shot up, as seen in Table 1.5, in the opposite direction as the source of foreign exchange and state revenue.

Nigeria has the largest market in Africa, and next to South Africa, the largest army and gross domestic product (GDP). Graf states that during the oil
boom, Nigeria's GDP "is greater than that of the rest of Africa combined" (1988:xiv). In short, as the refrain goes, "Nigeria is the giant of Africa" (Economist Survey, 21 Aug 1993; Watts 1987:4).

The elites such as Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Dr Jaja Wachukwu, respectively president and foreign minister to be, embraced and cultivated this image unabashedly. Wachukwu and Azikiwe were on record long before independence that Nigeria had the "historic mission and manifest destiny to lead Africa" just by virtue of its attributes (Azikiwe 1961:63-65; Hansard, Jan 1960:54). It was in the context of this national role conception that Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the country's first prime minister, proclaimed Africa as the cornerstone of NFP (Olusanya & Akindele 1986:4).

Evidently, Nigeria's bombastic role conception did not emerge with the oil boom as Graf assumes (1988:236). It pre-dates independence. However, the role was prescribed by the West and accepted by Nigerian elites without a strategy to achieve it. But as with other countries, the real test is the fit between the national role conception and the external behaviour of the state (Holsti 1972; Zartman 1985:98). It may be easy to aspire to a status, but quite another to achieve it (Wright 1981).

This is the question posed in this study: why has the prescribed status not been achieved? As the thesis suggested above, foreign policy has been sacrificed to power struggles and the maintenance of the precarious balance between the contending North-South ethnicities. So much so that foreign policy was reduced
to a weapon in domestic politics as the civilians were consumed with power struggles in the First Republic, 1960-1966.

In January 1966, the military seized power in a coup d'etat. It ruled for the next 13 years, handing power back to practically the same old civilians in October 1979. This time around they performed even worse, as they looted the country to the ground. In consequence, the Second Republic lasted for only four years, 1979-1983, as the military once again terminated the experiment in democracy at the end of December in 1983.

The consensus is that the military has long lost its self-arrogated corrective mission. It has managed neither the economy nor politics any better than the civilians. It has become a de facto actor in the corruption and the ethnic-class struggles for power (Adekanye 1981). The termination of General Babangida's chequered transition to democracy programme by his erstwhile minister of defence, General Sanni Abacha, in November 1993, has only heightened the dangers of internal disintegration, and state, regime and individual security.

Recall that these and elite interests and behaviour constitute the main constraint on foreign policy action. Recall also that this is what makes leadership critical. However, as the case studies in Chapters 3 to 9 suggest, few leaders can be said to know what direction foreign policy should take, let alone how to design or implement an effective one.

General Gowon illustrates this well. Gowon stated in a speech on the country's role conception and policy on Africa in 1974 that "Nigeria has no
blueprint for achieving African unity; all we know is that it is a desirable goal and it is achievable" (Tobi 1981:5). In other words, policy is viewed by the leaders more as a matter of desires and grandiloquent speeches rather than well-conceived efforts to design and implement one.

In a similar vein, Satish Mehta concludes in his study of development plan design and implementation in Nigeria that most policy makers were unable to make the distinction between self-reliance and surplus cash. They simply equated the one with the other, viewing it as the ability to pay for projects with little or no foreign assistance (Mehta 1990:122). The same is true for technology transfer. Akin Adubifa (1993) shares with Tom Forrest the view that Nigerian policy makers see technology transfer simply as turnkey projects. They care less to know about design and fabrication, let alone maintenance (Forrest 1982:338).

To be clear, however, the view of leadership adopted in this study is far removed from the polemics of Allison Ayida (1990), Yusuff Maitama Sule (1989) and Chinua Achebe (1983), as it is at variance with that of Sam Oyovbaire and George Obiozor (1987). Oyovbaire believes that Nigeria lacks capable leaders because it is the one commodity that the country does not import (cited in Graf 1988:163). Both Ayida and Maitama Sule, and the same is true for Obiozor (1988:252-253), go along with Achebe in the belief that "The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership" (Achebe 1983:1).

There are two basic weaknesses in this assertion. First, it is simplistic and static. It is unable to capture a reality, described below, that is at once complex
and variable locally, regionally and internationally. Ghana is a good example.

Like the World Bank (1983a:62), it was usual in the early 1980s for analysts like Robert Price to harp on the soft and permeated state argument for Ghana’s near-economic collapse (1984:183). In the 1990s, however, Ghana has become the darling of donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs) as the state effectively manages structural adjustment under Jerry Rawlings’ leadership (Rothchild, ed., 1990). Jeffrey Herbst describes how Rawlings fundamentally changed the politics of allocation from rent seeking to the private sector and market forces in such a short time (1993:38-57). Even the UN went so far as to describe Rawlings’ efforts as revolutionary (1989:174).

Second, the argument ignores structure, and portrays the leader as a free agent. Leaders make history under conditions directly encountered (Shaw & Chazan 1982; Inegbedion & Shaw 1994). In other words:

Domestic conditions, including the internal balance of political groups and the degree of political stability or instability, are particularly important for their impact on foreign policy (Dessouki 1991:157).

Even those like Obiozor who cite the consensus that Nigeria’s class, ethnic, religious and political complexities constitute “irrepressible pluralism” with which the leader must confront, still manage to portray leadership in a vacuum (1988:252-253): the lack of fit between proposition and evidence.

Even if there were to emerge “a charismatic leader with an appeal transcending region or ethnic group”, as Graf envisions (1988:19), Nigeria’s federal character (FGN 1978:14) - euphemism for ethnic representation or quotas - will not
suddenly disappear (Obasanjo 1990:151-152). General Murtala's stint in power is an apt example (Chapter 5). The following section defines foreign policy and examines its interface with the internal precarious political balance.

**Foreign Policy as the Dependent Variable**

Foreign policy is a subset of international or external relations. The latter refer to the sum total of a country's transnational linkages (Shaw & Fasehun 1980:554), shaped not only by states and their inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), but also by civil society and non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious movements, etc.

In open societies external relations are actually conducted mostly by non-state actors. This is true for Nigeria. As Alaba Ogunsanwo explains (1986:21):

>a greater part of the interaction between Nigeria and the Western world was and is conducted essentially by private national and multinational enterprises and entrepreneurs.

While this may be so, it is important to note that the Nigerian entrepreneur is not one who seeks to create wealth from the joy and challenges of production in the Weberian sense. Mary Johnson Osirim defines the Nigerian entrepreneur most appropriately as "a person who begins and is ultimately responsible for the operation of a business (1991:29). Whatever the business, the owner's main interest is to make money here and now (Schatz 1977:94).

In the same vein, most analysts agree that the Nigerian bourgeoisie to which this entrepreneur belongs remains largely a comprador class (Graf
Onimode 1982; Turner 1980, 1977, 1976; Hoogvelt 1979; Osoba 1978) whose members "organize the access of foreign firms to local markets and raw materials" for a fee (Turner 1976:63). Like their African counterparts, the Nigerian bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs are interwoven into the international political economy and the state, as foreign policy serves to facilitate or restrict their external interactions.

Foreign policy - the dependent variable to be explained - is nowhere defined in the literature on NFP. This problem is not confined to NFP, however (Korany 1990:27-29; K. Holsti 1990:10-11; C. Hermann 1978). As Kim Richard Nossal states in one such review, the concept of foreign policy has been defined and used in so many ways that (1989:2):

it is seldom clear whether it refers to actions, goals, decisions, objectives, strategies, interests, orientations, initiatives, attitudes, plans, undertakings, or whatever.


The present study builds on James Rosenau. To paraphrase him, foreign policy is defined here as the behaviors through which states initiate, sustain and terminate efforts to realise what they deem to be their interest in the external environment (Rosenau 1971:43). It is crucial to note here, as alluded to above and elaborated below, that the Nigerian state is not an abstract and rational
entity that has a unity of purpose or the national interest. It is constituted by a factionalised comprador bourgeoisie with a fragmented class project and interests which largely determine what is initiated, sustained or terminated.

In essence, foreign policy has three dimensions: (i) what; (ii) how; and (iii) why. As we shall see in Chapter 2, not much has been written on how decision is made in NFP. Worse still, the question of causal relationship or why is foreign to the analysis and literature on NFP. It is the what that has received all the attention. It is the consensus that the literature is more useful for its rich description than for any theoretical contents (Asobie 1990; Nweke 1988; Otubanjo 1986; Short 1980).

Orthodox analysis portrays foreign policy as an external political activity. In this study, foreign policy is treated as both political and economic, and as an activity that is equally undertaken towards domestic goals. External debt negotiations and the structural adjustment programme (SAP) are specific examples of domestic goals and problems that have dominated NFP since the early 1980s. These are examined in Chapters 6 to 9.

Like foreign policy, national security, as noted above, is used in the study to mean more than its traditional definition as defence against external military threat and aggression. Neither is the concept synonymous with regime or state security. It is now well-established in critical analysis that for security to be meaningful in understanding developing countries, the concept must combine the domestic fissions and fissures with the external factors that kill, maim and do the people social, economic and political violence (Korany et al, eds., 1993; Job, ed.,
To be sure, this critical perspective on security remains inadequate because it is yet to integrate the differential impact that internal fissions and fissures have on women and children. Security from within must highlight the pervasive maldistribution of political power against women, the skewed and misallocation of economic resources and social values, and the militarisation of society against the popular classes, of which women and children represent the majority. In other words, the order of priorities and sacrifices - who is deprived of what in order to preserve existing privileges or pursue certain policies - is the core of security from within as it is of elite interest and behaviour as explanation for foreign policy.

In practice, foreign policy needs not begin with a grand design, more so in crisis situations. An example regards the fact that Nigeria had no clear policy on Southern Africa until General Murtala challenged the American-backed South African invasion of Angola in late 1975. As discussed in Chapter 5, this made Murtala a martyr on his assassination in February 1976; his leadership the yardstick by which Nigerian leaders have been measured. The next section establishes the internal political conditions or reality in which leaders and NFP must be analysed.

Nigeria's Political Reality

Robert Cox uses raison d'etat interchangeably with political reality. This refers to the prevailing situation in the society, as opposed to ideal conditions in which normative analyses are usually situated. More specifically, political reality denotes
"the effective content and limits of what a particular form of state does - of what is possible and what is excluded" from consideration (Cox 1989:41).

The struggles for power between the Hausa-Fulani North and the Igbo and Yoruba South define Nigeria's political reality. These constitute the conditions and parameters in which NFP is formulated and conducted. The origins of this reality are traced in Chapter 3 back to the differential impact of British colonial rule on Nigeria, and the consequent North-South development gap.

Suffice it in this conceptual scheme to focus on main conjunctures. The statistics culled by Frederick Schwarz show, for example, that during the negotiations leading up to the cobbling together of the federal state in 1952,

only 2% of persons more than six years old in the Northern Region were literate in Roman script (5.4% were literate in Arabic). The almost entirely Muslim provinces of Sokoto, Kano, and Bornu in the far North were 1% or less literate in Roman script, compared with 16% literate in Roman script in the Eastern Region, and 18% in the Western Region and Lagos. As late as 1951 there was only one university graduate among the Northerners, whereas there were hundreds of Yorubas, and Ibos and other Southerners with graduate and post-graduate degrees (1965:41).

Leaders from the South, especially Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chiefs Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro, had no doubt that education had earned them the meritocratic right to rule Nigeria (Mustapha 1986; Obasanjo 1990:183-201; Enahoro 1965:164-191).

The Northerners took the opposite view. As Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the Northern Region and leader of the Northern Peoples Party (NPC), stated, it was clear to the Hausa-Fulani that their chances of competing with the Yorubas and the Igbos for control of the state on merit was "exactly nil" (1962:110-112).
In fact, Claude Ake was not the first to describe Nigeria's North-South political struggles as a "matter of life and death". Ahmadu Bello used the same exact phrase to stress what he believed the Hausa-Fulani were up against in the battle for state power (ibid).

This explains why the Hausa-Fulani opted for ethnic representation, size and population as the basis for state power. As Table 1.3, Map 3.1 and the quote below indicate, these were the areas in which the North had the advantage, and it continues to do so (Takaya & Tyoden, eds., 1987; Mustapha 1986; Wilson & Lewis 1990; Agbaje 1992; Agbese 1992; Reno 1992).

Table 1.3: North-South Population Disparities (million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from Nigerian census figures.

Keith Panter-Brick describes this conflict as one of advantages: the North's sheer weight in size and numbers versus the South's sheer weight in skills and aggressive drive (1970:29).
David Laitin describes, in turn, how the same conflict of advantages shaped Nigeria's political struggles:

The South, ... in the course of the colonial experience, captured a large proportion of jobs in the civil service and in international commerce. It had a great economic and bureaucratic leverage in the "modern" sectors. The North, with its political cohesiveness and large population had, in the First Republic, captured political power at the center. Control over the State by the North was seen by northern interests as a counterweight to Southern control over the economy and bureaucracy (1981:3).

Evidently, almost everything that federalism was designed to reconcile became its very bane, as they coincided with and came to be reinforced by ethnicity, intra-bourgeois class struggles and the battles to control the state.

To be sure, the original conditions have been modified by intended and unintended consequences of bourgeois struggles, and by factors such as the civil war in 1967-1970, the creation of states, the oil boom and education expansion. However, it remains the case that the Hausa-Fulani have gone to great lengths to maintain the underlying socio-political status quo of size and population, just as the Yorubas and the Igbos have been equally determined to overturn it. The next section (i) examines why and how ethnicity, class and state are significant factors in this conflict of advantages; and (ii) the ways in which they intersect to constrain internal development, leadership and NFP.
Ethnicity and Class

Ethnicity is not fate. It refers to the subjective perception of some common historical origins, beliefs, norms, traditions and other values (Chazan et al 1988:102, Connor 1972). While realist and liberal analysts recognise ethnicity, radicals and critical scholars tend to dismiss it as a negative factor. It is often implied by the latter that, because colonialism might have invented it, and Nigerian elites use it for their political and economic interests, ethnicity must be shunned (Graf 1988:14-24). Many even reject it outright as an obfuscating and a mystifying concept (Gana 1981-83:63; Nnoli 1978:13). There are several analytical problems with this approach.

One, whatever the source of the pervasive discomfort with ethnicity, is does not cease being a force in Nigerian politics (Connor 1972:354-355). It is a problem that must be examined in its full manifestation. Two, the popular argument often used against the saliency of ethnicity that, for example, "neither the Yoruba nor the Igbo existed as self-aware entities before the colonial era" (Graf 1988:22), ignores two critical points. First, it forgets the basic fact that social awareness derives from comparison which depends, implicitly or explicitly, on some point of reference. Second, it fails to recognise political reality.

The crucial issue to address is the fact that the genie is out of the bottle, and not whether the colonial policy of divide and rule let it out. In short, ethnicity is real. Like class and gender, it is a significant dimension of Nigeria's political and economic struggles. Moreover, as Joseph argues, there is nothing that restricts the
rational pursuit of economic or political interest to class (1988:48-49).

Even the location of economic and industrial projects has been based on the pulls of ethnic and regional interests (Watts 1987:4-8; Forrest 1982; Onyemelukwe 1966:9-12. In fact, while it was only enshrined in the constitution in 1979, the North-South ethnic divide has served as the basis of the state since Nigeria was cobbled together in the early 1950s. Government, the civil service and the military are all based on ethnicity (Ekeh & Osaghie, eds., 1989; Bach 1989; Obasanjo 1990:151-152).

In short, whoever invented it, and irrespective of its use or abuse by the elites, ethnicity cannot be wished away. It is a part of the objective conditions that must be taken into account in analysing Nigerian politics and foreign policy. As Oyovbaire observes in Gramscian parlance, the tribes of yesterday may be dying, but the classes of tomorrow cannot be born, and in the interval a morbid range of phenomena is possible (1980:4-15).

Three, radical and critical analyses treat the bourgeoisie as monolithic. This ignores the fact, established above, that there are striking differences between the North-South elites. The Northern and Southern elites have, irrespective of their common class trajectory, different class origins and outlook on economic restructuring and political transformation.

Most of the relevant Hausa-Fulani political actors had claims to Moslem aristocracy. Their counterparts within the Yorubas "came from homes of peasants and petty traders - 79% for politicians, 80% for civil servants and 78% for
businessmen (Bangura 1994:264-265). There is no reason to expect less for the Igbos. It cannot be surmised that those among the Igbos with similar backgrounds to the Yorubas might even be higher, since the former had no concept of aristocracy, let alone royalty, before the attempts by the colonial state to impose the much-resented "warrant chiefs" on the people.

It cannot be doubted that this heightens the conflicting progressive and conservative approach to political and economic restructuring within the bourgeoisie, whether in the 1950s or in the 1990s. Then as now, the North seeks to preserve what the South wants to change. It is the conventional wisdom that in capitalist development:

Economic change often leads to a new configuration of the class structure, modifying relationships among social classes. Changing class relations affect the character of the state and its mode of intervention in the economy. Changes in state and class structure may subsequently result in modification of the ways in which a given economy is integrated into the world economy (Koo 1987:166).

In the "quite precarious and rent-seeking Nigerian political economy" (Callaghy 1993:490), such changes had been prevented mainly through the political allocation of import licenses ... Its manipulation could shift the wealth of the country from one point to another and could wipe out a business or create new millionaires overnight (Parfitt & Riley 1989:59).

Thomas Callaghy also cites a confidential World Bank report to the effect that the politics of oil rents has only shifted "from import licenses to bank licenses after the former were abolished" under SAP (1993:492).

In short, for the Nigerian bourgeoisie, the issue has been the balance of intra-class factions and the direction from which the contending North-South elites
seek economics or politics to change or control the other. And in light of (dis)advantages, it is not too difficult to deduce where the contending elites stand.

In fact, the on-going conflicts over privatisation and SAP underscores this. Discussed in Chapter 8, the Southern elites embrace privatisation with enthusiasm because they see in it the possibility of further entrenching their hold over the economy against the political domination which the old regime of economic and political controls gave to their Northern counterparts (Bangura 1989:7).

As the logic of structural adjustment involves profound change in the use and distribution of available resources from rent seeking to the private sector and production, this stands to tilt the balance of class factions within the bourgeoisie and the state in favour of the Igbos and Yorubas.

Just as with the conflict over meritocracy, discussed above, it is the opposite that would preserve the position of the Hausa-Fulani. Since the Northern elites had benefitted more from the old import-license regime and state regulation of the economy through access to political power, [the Hausa-Fulani took the reforms as] a plot by the southern ethnic groups, especially the Yorubas, to seize private control of public assets (Agbaje 1992:126-127).

To recall from the earlier quotes from Schwarz and Laitin, this is like deja vu all over again.

This is why one needs to go beyond the objective to the subjective conditions in evaluating the prospects for SAP to transform the Nigerian economy in any systematic manner. Seen in light of the objective conditions, Katharine Mosley is right that SAP provides Nigeria with a window of opportunity to restructure the economy from rent seeking to production (1992). Mosley fails to
consider, however, that the state cannot readily "seize the chance" given the politics of Nigeria's precarious balance.

The Hausa-Fulani find SAP and privatisation unacceptable in the 1990s as they did the solutions proposed by the Yorubas in the 1950s. Chief Awolowo proposed in the 1950s that each ethnic group or region be allowed "to move forward at its own pace, without being unnecessarily pushed or annoyingly slowed down by the others." (Awolowo 1960:164-165). Sir Ahmadu Bello countered that if Southerners were allowed to move at their own pace, there would be no place for Northerners in the future of Nigeria, as the Yorubas and Igbos would have occupied all available positions (Bello 1962:110-111).

Not much has changed in the subsequent decades in terms of meritocracy. It remains the case in the 1990s, as Ahmadu Bello insisted in the 1950s, that without ethnic guarantees, the North would be overwhelmed by the South with its sheer weight of skills and aggressive drive (ibid:110-113).

Debates about elites guarantees are, of course, not peculiar to Nigeria. Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillip Schitter conclude in their magnum opus that "elites dispositions, pacts and calculations" constitute a crucial explanatory variable in whether political transformation and economic restructuring occurred in Latin America and in the Iberian states of Europe (1986, Vol. IV:19, 48). As emphasised by Adam Przeworski, the crucial point in the argument is that no power bloc gives up its hold on power willingly. Whatever view the analyst holds, actors in the political struggles want to see a tangible "prospect of eventually advancing their
interest that is sufficient to incite them to comply with immediately unfavorable outcomes" (1991:19).

In the case of Nigeria, this is where ethnicity directly intersects with class without blurring ethnic identities and its modes of interest articulation and representation. Class is used here to describe a social aggregate occupying a common position within the structure of production, exploitation, power, wealth and status (Katz 1992; Dogan & Pelassy 1984:41-49; Wright 1989, 1985). Beyond the ethnic guarantees forced on the South by the North and its British ally as a precondition for independence - discussed in Chapter 3 - Nigerian elites have failed as a class to offer mutual guarantees to reduce uncertainties attending economic restructuring and political transformation.

Radical analysts view this as the lack of bourgeois hegemony (Ihonvbere 1985) while neoliberal institutionalises regard it as the lack of institutionalisation (Diamond 1988b). While this may be correct, it does not, however, constitute an explanation. It merely restates the problem (Sangmpam 1993:89; Przeworski 1991:81-82; Bratton 1989:421). The question is why does the Nigerian bourgeoisie lack hegemony, and its political institutions unable to take hold? The contending ethnic elites have failed to impose hegemony because they lack transformative incentives to offer each other. As already noted, the Nigerian bourgeoisie remains largely a comprador class.

It is essential to note, however, that there are some "important differences between investment, commercial and state compradors" (Biersteker 1978:150).
The commercial compradors are in the majority and well-known. Suffice it to say that in light of the definition of the Nigerian entrepreneur provided above by Osirim, these are the sets of elites who are not located in production and industry (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1989:93).

Dubbed "importers/exporters", these are merchants who buy and sell what Nigeria does not produce. They reproduce themselves or sustain their activities through state patronage - import licenses and foreign exchange allocations - in collusion with MNCs which provide access to the foreign goods and services. The Hausa-Fulani predominate in this category (Lubeck 1985).

State compradors comprise of bureaucrats and public officials who perform the administrative duty of organising access for MNCs and foreign firms into Nigeria, as well as procure the necessary import licenses and foreign exchange for their commercial counterparts. They also thrive on awarding inflated government contracts for kickbacks, known to have ranged from 10-25%. State compradors have also been known to engage in the import business, importing overvalued goods and services - needed or not (Obasanjo 1990:228-240; Turner 1976). In short, like their commercial allies, the privatisation of public funds and corruption serve as the mechanism through which state compradors prosper.

Given the potential transformative position which they are deem to occupy in Nigeria’s development, considerable debate surrounds the investment compradors (Biersteker 1987a; Iyayi 1986; Beckman 1985; Collins 1983; Forrest 1982). The latter term is reserved for local capitalists who are consciously engaged
in the process of industrial development through agriculture and production (Kitching 1987:27). The key question in the debate is whether they constitute the basis for a national industrial class neither synonymous with rent-seeking and political patronage nor subordinate to foreign capital.

It is not surprising, in light of their advantages, that the Southern elites dominate the ranks of the investment compradors in the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) enclave of the Nigerian economy. It is estimated that over 70% of this ISI is located in the Southern state of Lagos alone (Mustapha 1986:85-86; Lubeck 1985:26). Nonetheless, like the other two categories, the investment compradors rely on the state for foreign exchange allocations, albeit for raw materials import. However, the clear demarcation in who belongs to which category of compradors has, as Paul Lubeck notes, given the Southern elites the impression that the Hausa-Fulani have a place mainly in agriculture rather than in production and industry (ibid).

The key point in all of this is that, as in the rest of Africa, the Nigerian bourgeoisie did not evolve with the process of capitalist economic development, as in the industrialised West (Hyden 1983:198-200; Bayart 1991:57-59). It was rather a creation of colonial policy on the basis of political processes unrelated to economics (Sklar 1979). Not much has changed. Most analysts concur that the Nigerian bourgeoisie has yet to establish an independent economic base outside of the state (Madanugu 1982; Ekekwe 1986; Graf 1988; Joseph 1987; Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988).
In other words, the bourgeoisie continues to rely on the political process to reproduce itself. Thus as Graf points out in citing Ralph Miliband, it is political power ... which creates the possibilities of enrichment and which provides the basis for the formation of an economically powerful class, which may in due course become an economically dominant class (1988:18).

As Graf goes on to explain, this is "an inversion of the Marxian concepts of base and superstructure". It reverses the process in advanced capitalist states where economic strength constitutes the basis of political power (ibid; Sklar 1979).

This is the dilemma of economic restructuring and political transformation in Nigeria, manifest in the Nigerian state’s high ambivalent towards indigenous capital (Forrest 1986:5). On the one hand, the various National Plans are written in the language of productive investment and industrialisation. On the other, the Ministry of Commerce passes out import licenses for the same products in order to enrich the politicians, the commercial and state compradors as well as to maintain the ruling coalition and precarious balance between North and South (Lubeck 1985:22).

This determines what state policy or strategy the ethnic-class factions are likely to propose, support or oppose. This is where the state itself becomes the site of the class, ethnic and civil-military struggles, since those who demand change need the state as much as those who seek to maintain the status quo. This is why state autonomy or lack thereof becomes crucial.
State and Autonomy

The state stirs little controversy in its institutional and functional definitions - the Weberian and orthodox realist view of the state as a rational/unitary actor (Chazan et al 1988:37; Bratton 1989:409). It is in the realm of theoretical discourse and ideology that the concept becomes controversial. How so?

Since the seminal debate between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband in the 1970s, the key issue has been whether the state has relative or absolute autonomy: the neo-Marxist school views of Poulantzas (1969, 1976) and Miliband (1970, 1973) against the statist approach of the likes of Stephen Krasner (1978), Eric Nordlinger (1981) and Theda Skocpol (1981, 1985). The crucial question is whether the state can formulate and implement its policy preferences? This is an empirical question (Skocpol 1985, 1983; Badie & Birnbaum 1983). As a result, whether or not the Nigerian or any other state has relative or absolute autonomy cannot be determined a priori.

To determine the degree of autonomy, one must begin with the prior question: what is the state (Krasner 1984:224)? The state is defined here as the decision-making unit in which resides the authority to mediate and regulate social relations and preside over the appropriation and disposition of surplus value and available resources. This definition is based essentially on substructural economic, socio-political and gender struggles between and within classes and groups. These relationships and how they are regulated and maintained by economic and political forces create and maintain the specific raison d'etat (Cox 1989:40-41; Przeworski
In the specific African context, suffice it to say that the question has not been treated any differently. Rather than define the state, analysts take as the main issue whether the African state is overdeveloped (Saul 1974; Leys 1976), soft and suspended (Hyden 1983), patrimonial (Sandbrook 1985); weak (Migdahl 1988), or irrational (Bates 1988; Rothchild & Curry 1987). These do not exhaust the characterisations of the African state (Sangmpam 1993; Doornbos 1990; Fatton 1989; Osaghae 1989). But they all have a common weakness.

The weakness has to with whether the various typologies of the African state offer little more than description. As Roger Charlton points out, citing Michael Shafer, they tend "to be both static and at least somewhat tautological, in that outcomes define a state's attribution". Thus, they are "unable to capture a reality that is at once 'complex and variable, among issues and over time'" (1993:179).

Is the Nigerian case any different?

Contradictions of Nigerian State Autonomy

Nigeria's move from reliance on agriculture to the collection of oil rents as the source of accumulation for the state and its comprador bourgeoisie is well-known (Egwaikhide 1988; Watts, ed., 1987). Tables 1.4 below shows the rate of oil price escalation with regional and international security crises beginning with the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. Table 1.5 indicates the extent to which Nigeria has relied on oil as its main export commodity and source of foreign exchange since 1970.
Table 1.4: International Politics & Oil Price Hikes


Table 1.5: Oil as % of Total Exports

Source: Economist Survey of Nigeria (21 August 1993:7)
By any account, Nigeria is a typical rentier state (Beblawi & Luciani, eds., 1987; First 1980; Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988; Graf 1988; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985; Schatz 1984; Turner 1980, 1977, 1976). Little or no direct productive input is involved in all rentier activities, especially oil. The capital-intensive nature of oil production is such that only a few workers are needed to generate the vast external rents. Even when the Nigerian oil industry was staffed to excess capacity in the Shagari period, it employed about 30,000 workers, representing 5%-6% of the work force in the formal wage sector (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988:69; Graf 1988:221). The state simply collects the huge rents, which the rest the population consumes through government subsidies and the privatisation of public funds by the bourgeoisie.

In short, the Nigerian state can be best described as the country's means of production (Graf 1988:225). Thus the battles to control rents can be seen as the relations of production in this rentier state. It is in this context that class needs to be viewed in terms of proximity to the Nigerian state. Members of the dominant classes all have numerous formal and informal access to state largess, whether or not they occupy state roles (Ek:jkwe 1986; Ohiorhenuan 1985:8-10; Gana 1981-1983:66-67). Moreover, not only does it collect and allocate rents, but the "state itself provides the main market for many commodities, and controls access to the supply of and market for others" (Turner 1976:63).

Nonetheless, it must be noted that, like other rentier states, Nigeria's dependence on oil rents is paradoxical. On the one hand, the reliance on oil
deepens Nigeria’s integration and dependence on the world capitalist economy. On the other, oil rents provide the state with financial autonomy as governments no longer depend on taxation nor direct appropriation of surplus from peasant agriculture. This enhances state autonomy not only from IFIs but also from domestic actors, increasing the capacity for economic restructuring and political transformation. If so, why has the state achieved neither?

Politics of Exclusion: Women and the Popular Classes

The state has achieved neither for two main reasons. First, it has excluded women and the popular classes from economic and political participation. The state lacks popular legitimacy due to the exclusionist policies of the various pre- and post-colonial governments and regimes. Take the case of women.

Women have been excluded from most access to the country’s resources. The statistics compiled by Susan James describe this in graphic detail. In Nigeria, women’s education and literacy rates are considerably below men’s, workload on average is twice that of men. Women provide 80% of the agriculture labour, and no longer own farmlands (as they did in precolonial times), 70% of petty marketing, 90% of the water transport, and 80% of fuel acquisition and use. Women in the modern industrial sector are mainly nurses, cooks, secretaries, and receptionists, and only 1% are in the top echelons of the bureaucracy in the public sector. Nigerian women have unequal (and in some cases no) rights of inheritance (James 1994:4).

If this is appalling, many more women may even be worse off due to regional, religious and cultural variations. In fact, women of the North only got the vote in 1979, and even then it was because of the battle waged by Alhaji Aminu Kano
against the feudal Hausa-Fulani male elites (Feinstein 1987:283).

Women remain at the margins of Nigerian politics (Parpart 1990; Okeke 1994; Mba 1982). One poignant example comes from the Murtala-Obasango regime. General Obasanjo states that when he assembled the Constitution Drafting Committee in 1976:

The objective was that the Committee should be a microcosm of Nigeria, consisting of people from all sections of the society, all walks of life, all shades of opinion, different political complexion and ideological bent (1990:20).

Yet, not one woman was included in the 50-member Committee. It is thus incontestable, to borrow the apt words of La Ray Denzer, that few Nigerian women have risen "above the female ghetto of women's organizations and political auxiliaries" (1992:218).

Moreover, Nigerian women are twice ghettoised as gender and class intersects. Women constitute a large proportion of the equally excluded popular classes. Non-governmental and -male organisations such as the Country Women Association of Nigeria (COWAN) and Women in Nigeria (WIN) have only begun the struggles for women's rights and gender equality (WIN 1985a&b).

Kunle Amuwo puts it very succinctly in relation to the popular classes in general that those who manage the state conceive of "public welfare merely as a process of periodic concession" to the masses who lack access to the state (1993:94). It was not different even in the 1970s when policy makers were under the illusion that "Money is not the problem but how to spend it" (Aremu 1990:136). No state policy in this nor any other period seriously addressed the needs of the

Rural development and peasant agriculture which determined and sustained the poverty levels of the masses were abandoned. Obasanjo’s Oparation Feed the Nation and President Shagari’s Green Revolution projects were schemes to enrich retired army generals and the commercial compradors (Tobi 1989; Ekwe-Ekwe 1985:619-622; ILO 1981). Central Bank of Nigeria statistics even show that the country spent an average of $1.5 billion on food imports in 1977-1985 (Onoh 1990:11-12). In short, time after time, the masses have been the first to suffer and always the last to benefit. Ironically, General Gowon lamented the fact that the majority of Nigerians had to starve in the midst of the oil boom after nine years in power during which his regime set the record for corruption (Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:11-12).

Evidently, the objective conditions of class struggles in Nigeria are as equally trenchant between the popular classes and the bourgeoisie as they are within the latter. The problem is that popular class struggles remain inchoate and economistic (Graf 1988:238-241; Feinstein 1987). Given successful general strikes as in 1964, 1971, 1975 and 1981, the working classes seem able to organise economically but not politically. Even so, the success of such actions suggest that the popular classes are a force in the elements that define the parameters of NFP.
Elusive Public Interest

The second reason for the Nigerian state's failure to use its financial autonomy for economic restructuring and political transformation intertwines with the exclusion of the popular classes and women. Unlike Indonesia, for example, one cannot pinpoint a development strategy or a faction of the bourgeoisie committed to the public interest. Neither the state nor its bureaucracy articulates societal preferences and transformative policies that do not immediately conform to the interests which sustain the status quo political and economic struggles.

Clearly this is needed if economic restructuring is to take place. Comparative analyses of Western industrialisation with late-industrialisation suggest that theatter was possible in the NICs of Asia and Latin America because of the roles played a coherent state and the bourgeoisie (Gerschenkron 1962; Moore 1966; Evans 1979; Deyo, ed., 1987; Haggard 1986, 1990). But in Nigeria struggles over rent allocation have been the norm.

In the rentier states of the Middle East politics tended to "fade away" with the oil boom. Examples include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others (Beblawi & Luciani, eds., 1987). The same is true for Jordan. In Jordan, "political quietism is an implicit precondition to the enjoyment of state largess" (Brynen 1992:83). The reverse has been the case in Nigeria.

Falola & Ihonvbere 1985; Schatz 1984; Williams 1980; Turner 1976). General Obasanjo states for the record that the Nigerian bourgeoisie ferments and perpetuates chaos because such conditions provide the elites with the cover, if they needed one, to privatise public resources like in Mobutu's Zaire (1990:228-240). Obasanjo gives as examples the contracts given by his military regime to the Dutch and Indians to rehabilitate the Nigerian Airways and Railways. These were terminated by the civilians in 1983 because the two operations had become efficient and left no room for massive corruption and brazen political interference (1990:238-239).

Valerie Kubli writes in this vein why it is often said, and Obasanjo (1990:228-240) and Oyovbaire concur (Graf 1988:247), that "in Nigeria not only do officials steal but stealing is official" (Kubli 1993:5). While the level of the disarray of the state has varied from one leader to another, that of Shagari is legend (Asobie 1988:74-77). Corruption in the Second Republic, 1979-1983, was such that, as Gavin Williams describes it, the "ethics of business penetrated politics, the ethics of politics penetrated business; and the ethics of the gangster penetrated both" (1980:47).

Shagari lost total control of the state (Joseph 1987; Diamond 1988; Adamolekun 1985; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985). More specifically, Joseph states that by 1983, the boundary between the state and civil society seem to have dissolved: public institutions had become as much a party to the struggles for gaining particular advantage as were the registered party organizations themselves (1991:181).

In short, the Nigerian bourgeoisie takes the state as the means for private
accumulation and patronage for one's ethnic group and clients. This is Joseph’s 

This is why policy debates in Nigeria hardly deal with specific ways to 
restructure the economy and transform politics.

Instead, the focus has been on sharing the "national cake", which nobody ever 
thinks about baking or enlarging (Obasanjo 1990:239-240). For instance, the 
overview by Adedotun Phillips shows that, along with countless revisions, no less 
than eight commissions on revenue allocation were set up between 1946 and 1980 
(1991). He goes on to note that the only two commissions that explicitly based 
their recommendations on economic development criteria were flatly rejected 
(Phillips 1991:104). This not only stunts the growth of internal capabilities, but it 
reinforces external dependence as it blocks rational economic development.

Sara Berry defines the situation as "explosive paralysis". However this may 
sound, it is not a contradiction in terms but an apt description of why the Nigerian 
state is not free to act either as an agent of the accumulating class or as 
an arbiter of class conflict, 
but can only reproduce class divisions, unproductive accumulation, and 
sectional conflict - and be rocked periodically by the resulting upheavals 

The maintenance of this explosive paralysis may aid to preserve the precarious 
political balance within the dominant classes, but it serves to block the 
transformation of the Nigerian bourgeoisie from a class-in-itself into a class-for-

itself.
The consequence is arrested class development. To be clear, the argument here is not that indigenous capitalist development is impossible in Nigeria. The rationality of the Nigerian state has varied with leadership. Assisi Asobie is on the mark on this issue: Gowon's regime represented a triumph of the compradors; Obasanjo's administration reflected the rise of the production-oriented national bourgeoisie; Shagari's government was the apogee of compradorism; Buhari's regime signaled a return to power of the national bourgeoisie; and Babangida's regime was a resurgence of the compradors (1988:73-74). Rather, the critical point is that the politics through which the compradors and the status quo is maintained place "special adversities" against rational economic development (Schatz 1984:53). As Michael Watts expresses the consensus, "the massive state indiscipline and bureaucratic irrationality that accompany corruption in Nigeria could not provide the groundwork for disciplined industrial or agrarian capitalism" (1987:18).

This is not to contradict the fact that many fractions of the bourgeoisie may belong to federal bodies and interest groups such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) or the Chambers of Commerce. The issue remains that the struggles within the bourgeoisie are shaped more by the pulls of ethnicity rather than the objective forces of capitalism and class (Agbaje 1992; Joseph 1987; Ake 1988; Ekekwe 1986; Biersteker 1987:268). This is equally the case among the investment compradors (Asobie 1988:74-77). The elites want to ensure, first and foremost, that they are not worse off as this or that ethnic group. In other
words, national class cohesion is viewed as secondary if one has no place it. Thus, as the Southern elites found themselves unable to effect economic restructuring and political transformation, at least they would ensure that the country's resources are being divided as equitably as possible across ethnic groups.

Earlier and recent events suggest in this vein that the Southern elites may have come to view Northern dominance as so total as to believe that it can only be overturned through the force of arms. Leaders in the South, Chiefs Awolowo and Enahoro, along with 28 of their followers, were convicted in 1962 on charges of plotting to overthrow Prime Minister Balewa (Jakande 1966). Junior army officers from the South not only overthrew Balewa in 1966, but he and Ahmadu Bello were murdered in the process. However, as shown in Chapter 4, state power did not reside for long in the South. As John Hunwick summarises it, the failed counter-coup against General Babangida in April 1990 was yet another attempt to overturn Northern political dominance by junior Southern officers (1992:4-5).

This is what makes Nigerian politics at once centripetally class and centrifugally ethnic. The bourgeoisie may be drawn together by the objective forces of class struggles and state formation, but it remains torn apart by the subjective pulls of ethnicity. In short, there hardly exists a common world-view or development strategy on which to base a coherent foreign policy.
Religion and Region

The present stress on ethnicity, class and state is not to say that religion and region are not important. Religion occupies a negative place in Nigerian politics and foreign policy. The extent to which Islam has been used destructively in the course of socio-political and economic struggles is well-known (Gambari 1992b; Ohadike 1992; Bala Usman 1987).

Since 1980 there has been at least one Islamic riot annually. Perhaps the most destructive were the Yan Tatsine riots in 1980 which left about 4,177 dead. Recently in April 1991, over 500 died in similar riots in Katsina and Bauchi (Gambari 1992b; Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series, 31 May 1991:10141). The country was engulfed in an orgy of violence in May 1987 when it was learnt that General Babangida had completed the campaign started by Sir Ahmadu Bello in the 1950s and 1960s to enrol Nigeria in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). And many students of NFP such as Adebayo Olukoshi (1990), Gambari (1989, 1992b), Olusola Ojo (1988) and analysts like Ali Mazrui (1988) would agree with Henry Bienen that "Islam in Nigeria continues to be contentious in both domestic and foreign policy" (1989:171).

However, the argument in the present study is that if the problem is thought through more critically, the potency of religion in Nigerian politics and foreign policy is foremost a function of ethnicity. This seems clear in how Islam is viewed and used differently in the North by the Hausa-Fulani and in the South by the Yorubas (Laitin 1986; Mazrui 1988). In short, class can explain why the Nigerian
bourgeoisie may be able to transcend ethnic politics in the long-run. In the short and medium term, ethnicity explains why it has not evolved from a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself.

**Nigerian Foreign Policy and International Dependency**

Just as with religion, the focus on domestic politics and leadership as a basis for explaining NFP does not minimises the acute global political and economic pressures against which it is formulated and executed. Rather, the argument is that systemic forces may inform us as to why Nigerian decision makers must respond to specific external stimuli, but not why the attending decision was taken. To ascertain why NFP has failed to effect internal and external changes which it is inherently capable, it is necessary to set it against elite interests and behaviour, especially the political insecurity of the Hausa-Fulani.

In other words, the present study seeks to go beyond the polemics of radical analyses and crude dependency (Graf 1988:246; Shaw & Aluko 1985:6). It is misleading to view the Nigerian state and bourgeoisie as passive victims of dependency. Dependency may serve to narrow the range of possibilities and choice for state managers and the bourgeoisie, but it does not determine NFP.

More than the majority of post-colonial states, Nigeria has had the capacity and resources - natural, human and financial - to find a pathway from the periphery of capitalism. As Callaghry rightly argues, Nigeria has no excuse to fail in its internal economic development nor foreign policy. Unlike most of Africa, the country has the resources it needs (1993b:106). This issue is taken up and
elaborated in the literature review in Chapter 2, as much of the evidence is presented there.

**Data**

Problems of data are a long-standing source of constraint for the analysis of Nigerian politics and society (Stopler 1966; ILO 1981; Watts 1987; Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU); Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 1982-1992; Mosley 1991; Nigerian NewsWatch, 13 Jan 1992). This study is situated within these constraints but without being unduly hindered by them.

The thesis is argued and its validity demonstrated based on the established facts so fully incorporated in the literature and undisputed by analysts of Nigerian politics and foreign policy. This is not to say that this evidence is interpreted uniformly in the contending realist-radical paradigms of Nigerian affairs. It is sufficient, as Christopher Stevens points out, that everyone agrees on the facts irrespective of the paradigm (1990:257).

Data for the present study combine secondary works - the extant literature on NFP and domestic politics - with primary sources. Much of the latter was collected in Nigeria from the author's base at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, in 1990/1991.

Primary sources include: (i) discussions with foreign ministers and policy advisors; data from (ii) parliamentary debates and documents, national development plans, statements and speeches by the FGN; (iii) reports and statistics on economics, politics and social affairs compiled by various international
political and economic institutions like the ECA, ILO, IMF and the World Bank; and (iv) reports from MNCs and Nigerian banks. Equally valuable are statistics from the OECD creditor cartels; namely the Paris and London Clubs.

Journals and magazines like Nigeria’s own West Africa provide excellent sources of primary data. This is a weekly published in London that covers Nigerian affairs in great depth. Africa Confidential monthly is another excellent inside source of data on Nigerian politics and foreign policy, so is the monthly African Research Bulletin. Other major sources of primary data include Nigeria’s plethora of national daily newspapers, and weekly and monthly magazines. These constitute very significant sources of reports and interviews with policy makers on NFP.

Methodology

Methodologically, the study is based on what James Caporaso defines as convergent operationalism (1991:52). The essence of this approach is to address the subject from multidimensional methodological angles, consistently and self-consciously.

It is the widespread view among analysts in the field that in order to render the study of foreign policy comparative, it is necessary first to agree on what the subject is about (Weinstein 1972; Hill 1977; C. Hermann 1978; C. Hermann et al, eds., 1987; K. Holsti 1990; M. Hermann et al, eds., 1994). One of the main questions here has to do with who selects the goal for analysis. As earlier noted, this is a long-standing issue in the rational choice debate. On one side is substantive rationality in which evaluation is based on goals selected by the
analyst. On the other is *procedural* rationality in which goals are selected by the object of analysis.

Korany's evaluation of the problem suggests that the latter approach to foreign policy analysis can more adequately provide the field with a robust theoretical base. In other words, analysts need to be
guided by what the country itself identifies as its own priorities ... rather than imposing his (or her) own premises and normative lenses (1990:33).

The present case study is situated within this procedural view of rationality, analysing NFP in terms of the interrelated goals of the national role conception and internal development in light of the behaviour and concrete interests of the elites.

The second of these angles is the long-standing debate over whether findings based on a single case study are sufficient to confirm or refute a given thesis. This is the N or how many case studies make a theory debate across comparative politics and foreign policy. Those approaching the problem from comparative politics include Adam Przeworski and Henry Tuene (1970), Harry Eckstein (1975), Clifford Geertz (1975) and Alexander George (1979). Engaging the debate from foreign policy are Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Stephen Krasner and Robert Jervis in the special issue of the *International Studies Quarterly* (29, June 1989). A recent theoretical and methodological contribution to this debate is by Ruth Collier (1993).

One side of this debate argues that the larger the N, the closer the findings will approximate the policy or behaviour under investigation. The other side counters that the smaller the N, the more in-depth the knowledge of the
phenomenon. In essence, the debate is about scope versus depth. As this debate remains inconclusive, the present case study seeks to bridge the two opposing sides by providing both depth and scope.

To start with, the investigation is designed as a crucial case study (Eckstein 1975; George 1979; Geertz 1975; Przeworski & Tuene 1970). Unlike traditional case studies, the crucial case study method does more than describe the phenomenon. It specifies how the crucial variables are linked. The objective to provide an explanatory logic - in this case the role of leadership in NFP as set within the confines of domestic politics.

Second, the present single crucial case comprises of nine mini-case studies, categorised as historical and contemporary cases. The cases were chosen because they are representative of typical instances of NFP. The historical ones are meant to serve to demonstrate the extent to which past experiences support the primacy of domestic politics thesis. A hypothesis should address past as well as contemporary cases.

The third of these angles is a longitudinal, comparative framework - intra-case. The study approaches the subject from a diachronic or historical perspective. It compares NFP - the single case - across the nine cases within it. This contrasts with the stages and phases - synchronic method - prevalent in the extant literature on and analyses of NFP.

It is by examining units at intervals over time that one can establish whether change is actually taking place, and at what rate (C. Hermann & East 1978:13).
To be sure, this does not make explanation any less difficult. Collier argues in this regard, and with particular implications for the present study, that the process of explanation in social science requires a difficult and painstaking contextual analysis and the teasing out of complex causal relationships (1993:27). This is why it is useful to draw on several conceptual literatures, and combine a qualitative and quantitative interpretation of data.

**Periodising Nigerian Foreign Policy**

To establish the context within which interpretation and comparison must take place, it is necessary to periodise the phenomenon analytically. In fact, only two analysts recognise such a need, although they do not go so far as to do so (Imobighe 1987:127; Olayiwola 1987:12). The three periods defined in the present study are based on the concept of resource availability. Most importantly, as outlined in Table 1.6 below, this mode of periodisation provides an objective reference point to compare and contrast leaders and foreign policy performances because it transcends the specific issue, personality and regime type.

The first period can be labelled the open door period. In this period, foreign aid and direct investment were stressed as the basis of internal development. As shown in Chapters 2 and 4, this was a key element in the Hausa-Fulani strategy to hold on to power and control the economic activities of the Southern elites who, as noted, were deemed to have a grip on commerce and the bureaucracy. This period lasted roughly from 1960 to 1970.
Table 1.6: Periodising Nigerian Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Plan Span</th>
<th>Plan Budget (N billion)</th>
<th>External Aid as % of Plan Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1962-68</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1986-??</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The five year development plan was replaced in 1988 by a three-year rolling plan.

The second period emerged with the end of the civil war and the rise of oil and gas as the basis for state revenue. To be sure, this overlapped with the first period in that it began in the late-1960s, and was marked by the oil boom in the 1970s. In this period leaders and policy makers assumed that Nigeria had virtually unlimited oil resources.

The three Plans - 1970-1974, 1975-1980 and 1981-1985 - were designed on the belief that money was no longer an issue. In fact, it was on the basis of such beliefs that international finance and its business community begun touting Nigeria as a country of unlimited investment opportunities: the Brazil of Africa.
(Evans 1979:308-314; Ate 1987:168-180). Needless to say the expectations crashed with the oil glut in 1981, the onset of Nigeria's economic and external debt crises.

By 1985 Nigerian leaders had to admit formally that the country was on the brink of economic collapse, and subsequently adopted SAP in July 1986. The third period had begun. In 1989, General Babangida finally removed the last vestiges of the NEPD in enacting the so-called New Industrial Policy. As explained in the Nigerian Ekobanker (1/4, 1989:18):

The Policy stipulates that major manufacturing areas such as petrochemicals, car manufacturing and computers which were formerly regarded as no-go areas in terms of foreign investment are now open to foreigners.

Thus, just as in the first, Nigeria is once again wide open to foreign aid and investment in this third period. The other major obstacle - in addition to the lack of a clear commitment by the state - as the recent Economist (27 August 1993) survey found, is the lethargic and corrupt Nigerian bureaucracy.

**Theoretical Perspective**

Most analyses of NFP "do not consciously subscribe to one perspective or another" (Asobie 1990:7). As noted at the very outset, this study is informed by critical political economy. The intellectual origins of this approach are familiar. These have been examined in many overviews of the literature (Caporaso & Levine 1992; Staniland 1985; Chilcote 1982). However, the strand adopted in the present study follows from Joel Samoff who defines political economy as
a theoretical framework that focuses on conflicts, that assumes that there are systematic connections among production, power, stratification and ideas, that asserts that outcomes are neither largely structurally determined nor largely the result of individual behaviour, that regards history as dialectical and contradictory, and that presumes that both the dialectic and the contradictions can be understood (1982:49).

While application may produce differing emphasis and research agendas (Wurfel & Burton 1991; Staniland 1985), critical political economy is as multidisciplinary in approach as it is multidimensional in focus.

This enables one to deconstruct domestic and international political-economic structures to reveal the interests being served by particular foreign policies (Braybrooke 1987). It shows how issues and actors are connected as units of analysis at the international and national - state and civil society - levels of analysis. This provides insight into how the forces of dependency and modes of production affect decision-making between and within states, classes and non-state actors. This is applied to each of the nine cases outlined below.

**Outline of Chapters**

The study consists of nine chapters in three parts. The two in Part I focus on concepts, theory and methodology. Chapter 1 has set out the thesis and the conceptual framework of the study. It defines leadership, foreign policy, ethnicity, class and state, and explains the relationships between these key concepts and variables. Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of extant analyses of and literature on NFP.
The three chapters in Part II deal with the historical foundations of NFP. Chapter 3 revisits foreign policy under Balewa. Chapter 4 concerns the impact of the Nigerian Civil War on foreign policy and national security under the Gowon regime. Chapter 5 examines how the Murtala-Obasanjo regime took NFP in the direction of the country's role conception.

Part III consists of four chapters. Chapter 6 examines Shagari's failure in Chad and Namibia. The next two focus on the military regimes of Buhari and Babangida and the external debt negotiations with the IMF. Chapter 9 is on Babangida's lead role in the ECOWAS military intervention in Liberia.

The Conclusion ties together the findings of the study in a theoretical synthesis. It draws some relevant policy implications of the analysis. Questions likely to inform the thesis of the study are suggested for further research.
CHAPTER 2

CONTENDING PARADIGMS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The present chapter builds on the thesis and conceptual scheme in Chapter 1. It offers a critical review which integrates the domestic political and foreign policy literatures on NFP. The focus is on the fit between proposition and evidence, and the failure to situate analysis in elite interests and behaviour in the realist socio-psychology, radical dependency and capability empiricism approaches within the two paradigms of NFP.

The chapter is organised in three main parts. The first situates NFP and its literature in the broader social scientific context of conceptual inquiry, methodology and explanation. Part two deals with the two contending paradigms of NFP and the three views identified therein.

Conceptual Inquiry, Theory and Methodology

As stated at the beginning in Chapter 1, the present study is not so much about the realist-radical political debates. Rather, the emphasis is on theory, methodology and conceptual insight. Each of the extant approaches to NFP is critically reviewed for its fit between proposition and evidence, focusing on the key concepts upon which it is based, the assumptions underlying the concepts, the class of statements which it hypothesises, and the nature of the relationships holding among all of these (Adekanye 1991:311).

Not only is this method consistent with my theoretical scheme, thesis and methodology, but it is the basis on which to evaluate any argument that purports to provide explanation.
While the literature on NFP is no doubt sophisticated, the analyses within it are "not guided by conscious and explicit use of foreign policy or international relations theories, models or paradigms" (Asobie 1990:3). As Assisi Asobie goes on to argue at length, students of NFP often present their analysis "as if no previous work has been done on the theme." Relatively few have an "appreciation for ... precision of thought and language." Still even fewer make a "distinction between that which is assumed and that which is empirically verifiable" (Asobie 1990:3).

The realist-radical debates are mainly over whose views are orthodox or radical (Shaw & Fasehun 1980). In all their foci, the debates and literature fail to address basic methodological and theoretical issues (Asobie 1990; Nweke 1988; Beckman 1985; Otunbanjo 1986; Short 1980).

Two typical examples illustrate this. First is the debate over what was then believed to be Nigeria's Newly Industrialising Country (NIC) status during the oil boom in the 1970s. Although both sides deemed Nigeria to be a NIC, they argued over whether it was "best characterised as ... a Newly Influential or a Newly Industrialising Country (Shaw & Fasehun 1980:556).

Second was the debate over the so-called Akinyemi doctrine of reciprocity in Nigeria's African policy, enunciated by the then external affairs minister, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, at the Kuru conference on foreign policy in April 1986. Typically, the debate was whether Akinyemi's views were orthodox or radical.
In short, the debates on NFP - as vigorous as they may be - and the literature - as voluminous and sophisticated as it is - exclude issues of theory and methodology. The literature is dominated by case studies that rarely have a theoretical and methodological context. In my view, the subject can develop coherently as a field of study only if sustained by an adequate conceptual framework. This is to say, if case studies are to be more than just sources of data and information, they must be placed within some general theoretical framework in which to assess their explanatory import.

Variables are rarely specified explicitly or applied consistently in the case studies, to start with. Criticisms do not even cumulate, in the second place. It is rare to find cases or analyses that beyond critique to actually advance some form of testable hypotheses. Students of NFP do not even build on their own critiques, let alone that of others.

Julius Ihonvbere is an apt example. In his critique of an earlier work by James Coleman (1963), Ihonvbere rightly observed that Coleman’s analysis had only provided a starting point in its attempt to specify six variables as crucial to explaining NFP. In Ihonvbere’s view, the six variables still needed to be ranked in terms of saliency (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988:193-194).

However, rather than build on this critique of Coleman and rank the six variables in his 1994 review, Ihonvbere now lists at least 36, and defined these as "underlying factors" in NFP. These range from Nigeria’s colonial history to a "high crime rate" in the country (1994:3-4). In short, this is a regression. Following
Przeworski and Teune, the present study is based on the view that the smaller the number of variables adduced, the clearer an explanation or hypothesis tends to be (1970:22).

This basis for this need for clarity lack at the present, however, even among those who show more than rhetorical concern for systematic analysis. Aforka Nweke is an apt example. However noble his aims, Nweke lacks the conceptual rigour to provide the necessary foundation. According to Nweke (1988:42):

A theory, as pointed out above, is synonymous both with an ideological or philosophical and with a hypothetical, deductive system, sometimes referred to as a model.

As Asobie rightly points out, Nweke introduces more confusion than provide conceptual insights (1990:7).


What is crucial to know about decision making can be summarised in three paragraphs. The decision making approach to foreign policy, following the seminal work by Richard Synder et al (1962), is a mode of analysis which seeks to elucidate the ways in which state actors make and affect decisions. The three
models generally identified are (i) the rational/unitary actor; (ii) the socio-psychological view; and (iii) the bureaucratic politics approach. As explained in Chapter 1, a fourth is the state-civil society model adopted in this study.

The traditional models have been well-treated in various overviews and critiques of the literature (Huebert 1993:63-183). In essence, theories of bureaucratic politics are an advance over the rational actor and psychological models. They show that many policy decisions are political resultants as opposed to rational choice outcomes (Paige 1968; Allison 1971). Even so, theories of bureaucratic politics are of limited application to post-colonial states like Nigeria.

The models focus almost exclusively on organisational interests and bureaucratic modus operandi. These factors are little developed in post-colonial states like Nigeria (Korany 1991; Hill 1977). Moreover, like realist approaches to foreign policy, bureaucratic politics is state-centric. It fails to capture the socio-economic and political pressures that can be applied on decision makers by civil society and external actors such as IFIs like the World Bank and the IMF. Decision makers are defined here as those with the authority to act on behalf of the society and commit its resources accordingly. And as noted above, the state-civil society perspective informs this analysis, as it incorporates the relevant elements of the others.

Whether the stimulus is internal or external, state actors, leaders and class factions take one of three courses of action in decision-making: (i) insist on one's own policy preference, (ii) accept a counter proposal, or (iii) compromise. Decision-
making in practice rarely follows any model neatly, however. As we shall see in the case studies, different constellations of interests or opposition produce different foreign policy responses. And as we shall also see, who compromises what to whom and when may largely depend on the issue, leadership, the character of the state and dominant class actors. Occasions for policy change occur when the tending interests realign in support of different aims.

Although Asobie provides nothing new in his review, he is right that NFP analysts are little familiar with these decision making models. This is evident in how Aluko (1983) and Gambari (1980) interpret bureaucratic politics. Bureaucratic politics is simply decision-making by bargaining and compromise among state actors and departments competing for influence. In the case of Nigeria, Aluko equates this with efforts by bureaucrats in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to sabotage state policy with which they disagree, in this case on Angola (1983:90).

Like Aluko, Gambari (1980a) confuses class and ethnic pressures from civil society with bureaucratic politics within the state. In the final analysis, he merely adopts the language of the model without its analytic content (Asobie 1990:41). As with Aluko, Gambari does not offer a better view of decision-making within the Nigerian state (Otubanjo 1986:58). Thus the "many gaps" to which Claude Phillips called attention in the early 1960s, and hoped would be filled as NFP analysis matured (1964:viii), remain in the subsequent three decades.
Not even the recent volume on the topic, mentioned in Chapter 1, fills this vacuum (Olusanya & Akindele, eds., 1990). To be sure, it is comprehensive. It contains 29 chapters written by a group of leading NFP analysts. However, the collection best reflects the lack of theory and methodology in NFP analysis. In the first instance, it has too many dated and patchy accounts of NFP decision-making. Examples include the chapters by Aluko and Sotunmbi. Second, for example, Sotunmbi’s chapter on Nigeria’s recognition of the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in late 1975 was not revised in light of the detailed insider account provided by General Joe Garba (1987).

Rationalising the Failure to Develop Hypotheses

It is thus ironic that Aluko attributes the lack of hypothesis and analytical rigour in NFP to the lack of data. Aluko contradicts himself on both counts. This is why.

Writing in the mid-1970s, Aluko went to great lengths to assure the reader that the (1977:163 & 188):

lack of access to government archives ... is not a serious problem because most of the centrally important aspects of NFP are available in published sources including statements of the Head of Government or State and his Ministers or Commissioners in international conferences.

In the Preface to his 1981 Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Aluko even went further to tell the reader that the 17 chapters in the volume were not just "a collection of approximations to the truth incompletely assessed on the basis of inadequate evidence." Aluko states categorically that:
I have been privileged to establish a close working relationship with most of the key decision-makers of NFP over the past decade. While this does not make me an insider in the sense that a practitioner is, it has made me more informed about the country’s foreign policy and its problems than a mere academic observer would be.

What more could he ask for, one is tempted to say.

However, it happened that when the literature on NFP was criticised for the lack of theoretical depth in international forums, Aluko turned around and argued that "there are not sufficient data to generate the level of hypotheses that are made in either the US or in the Scandinavian countries" (Aluko 1987:316). Evidently, this contradicts everything Aluko said about the availability of and access to data on NFP. This is quite confusing and misleading.

If access to data were the problem, then there is no reason why Prof. Gambari’s account (1989) of his service as General Buhari’s external affairs minister in 1984/1985 should not be a solid work of reference and substance in terms of analysis. Yet, as Prof. Rafiu Akindele, research director of the NIIA, concludes in his review, one is better informed about NFP in this period from West Africa magazine than from Gambari’s treatment of the subject (Akindele 1990:117-125). In short, the point of all of this is to show that Aluko’s argument is feeble. It does little more than rationalise the failure to theorise and generate hypotheses on the part of the students of NFP, and in keeping with counterparts and academic communities elsewhere.
Nigerian Foreign Policy and Academy

Situated in the larger context of the policy-academy debate in Nigeria, the rationales offered by Aluko can only serve to call into question the preparedness of the Nigerian intelligentsia to pro-offer policy-relevant research and advice. First, in the absence of theory, students of NFP have no way of prying into the object of their interest. Second, what kinds of advice can the policy maker expect from a foreign policy academy that lacks even basic hypothesis with which to discern relationships and patterns among discrete, and sometimes seemingly unconnected issues?

This is critical because those who engage these debates tend to be the very experts called upon by governments to formulate and conduct NFP. The failure, therefore, to recognise the usefulness of theory to one’s subject of expertise cannot but call into question the validity of such expertise. Thus as Chinua Achebe argues (1981:1-7) with support from General Obasanjo (1990), the academics are like the other comprador elites. The realists tend to merely support the status quo (Shaw & Fasehun 1980); while the radicals preach revolution and socialism (Oyovbaire 1980). Few in both groups are known for thinking fundamental problems through systematically. 1

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1To be clear, this view of the role of Nigerian social science in economic restructuring and political transformation is not to distract from the international recognition of its corps of practitioners. The latter compete with and excel among the best in the world. However, the critical point to note is that fitting into established structures and playing by other nations' rules in foreign lands and international organisations is not the same as the task to instill and reflect the desired behaviour in local practices and institutions.
Stephen Okecha refers, for instance, to the protest by radical academics at Nigeria's Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria against the US over the Reagan bombing of Libya in 1986. Okecha found the chant: "To hell with Coca-Cola imperialism. Nigeria must ban Coca-Cola now" quite amusing. But he was disappointed that, while Qaddafi was offering American oil workers fat bonuses not to quit Libya because of Reagan's bombing raids, Nigerian radicals were urging their government to ban US MNCs in the country (Okecha 1989:28).

None thought of the employment that US MNCs provided in the country. Nor did it occur to these academics that if Qaddafi was at war with Reagan but still did business with American MNCs and nationals, why not Nigeria. Thus, one must wonder whether the action was little more than the mere projections of feelings and wishes (Sil 1993). Bassey Ate calls it "irrational radicalism". It is one thing to argue that social science has a role in policy formulation. It is quite another for students of NFF to produce policy-relevant analyses (Ogunsanwo 1980:8-9).

Self-reliance illustrates this point well. Realist analysts do not treat this concept any differently from decision makers, as discussed in Chapter 1. In radical analyses the concept is usually equated with socialism whose benefits are here and now (Shaw & Fasehun 1980:568-571). The "fixation on what ought to be", as Ake himself notes, leads radical analysts to forget that self-reliance is a process (1981:viii). In the words of Cheryl Payer (1975:214), "self-reliance is not just a groovy thing to do, ... it is a deadly earnest matter of survival" (1975:214).
In other words, self-reliance is not a finished product to be imported in the manner which Nigeria imports almost everything it consumes. Self-reliance is a value to be produced; many of the benefits envisaged may be as distant and uncertain for those who need immediate attention the most: the masses. SAP is a critical example. Onimode best summarises this argument on how:

austerity programmes impose the burden of adjustment ... on the weaker and poorer groups and classes in society that contribute least to the generation of the crises, and are least able to bear the burdens imposed on them (1989:238).

In short, whatever its goals, self-reliance tends to impose the burden of its own process on those least able to bear it.

**The Need for Hypotheses**

In my conception and treatment of the problem, the issue is not so much the lack of data. What is missing and badly needed are hypotheses to systematise the available data. Without these how do we know whether sufficient data exist? How do we even know what data to look for in the first place?

Hypotheses are a method by which to ascertain areas of insufficient data. Hypotheses are like Rosenau's pre-theory (1971:95-149). They serve to order facts and concepts into meaningful patterns of observations.

Hypotheses serve as a guide any search for relevant data. Even if available data do not yet permit categoric statements about NFP, hypotheses would serve to (i) illuminate ongoing research; (ii) guide the search for new and relevant data; (iii) enable us to begin to detect patterns and relationships; and (iv) permit us to
develop more systematic research questions.

Little of this is possible, however, within the confines of one discipline. It is for this reason that the present analysis combine a wide range of conceptual literature for a critical insight into how systemic forces and domestic processes shape NFP. For, as observed in Chapter 1, NFP analyses largely ignore comparative politics. And those concerned with the latter rarely extend their analysis to the former.

Structural adjustment and the external debt crisis are a case in point. More than ever before, how these impact upon and alter the character of internal development and foreign policy brings into bold relief the relationships in question. These are examined in Chapters 6 to 8. The next sections focus on the three approaches. But first the contending paradigms.

**Contending Paradigms of Nigerian Foreign Policy**

Table 2.1 below schematises the main tenets of the contending realist-radical paradigms within which the analysis of NFP has traditionally been situated. However elegant this schema appears, it is not an easy task to fit NFP analysts neatly in either category since, as noted in Chapter 1, most analyses are hardly situated consciously in any particular theoretical approach. This becomes even more difficult as analysts incorporate terms from the rival paradigm (Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988:3; Nweke 1988; Shaw 1983:10). One finds Ogunsanwo's realist analysis, for instance, citing dependency claims (1986:13); while Ate leans on realist notions of power and to sustain his dependency analysis (Asobie 1987:126).
### Table 2.1: Contending Paradigms of NFP

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<th>Realist</th>
<th>Radical</th>
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<td>Theoretical associations</td>
<td>Realism/power politics</td>
<td>Political economy</td>
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<td>Level of analysis</td>
<td>Superstructure</td>
<td>Substructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode of analysis</td>
<td>State-centric</td>
<td>Multiple actors/interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theoretical assumptions</td>
<td>Independent actor</td>
<td>Dependent formation</td>
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<td>Primary process</td>
<td>Sub-imperialism</td>
<td>Semi-industrialism</td>
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<td>Primary issue-areas</td>
<td>Diplomatic/strategic</td>
<td>Economic/political</td>
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<td>Primary levels of interaction</td>
<td>Regional/continental</td>
<td>Global</td>
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<td>Ideology/strategy</td>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
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<td>Direction/projection</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Underdevelopment</td>
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<td>Expectation/prediction</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Contradictions</td>
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I now turn to the three approaches - **realist socio-psychology, capability empiricism** and **radical dependency** - within these two contending paradigms.
Realist Socio-Psychology

Whatever its inner variations, realist socio-psychological analyses of NFP are similar in most respects. They tend to be state-centric, treating the state as a rational/unitary actor. In this view, the state acts in the national interest. It is seen as having a set of ordered preferences against which the costs and benefits of alternative policies are calculated.

Realist analyses of NFP have a common deficiency as forms of explanation. With reference to Asobie above, the analyses are neither self-conscious nor self-critical. They lack precision of thought and language. They are rarely theoretical, methodical nor critical (Asobie 1990; Nweke 1988; Otubanjo 1986).

Notable are studies by eminent scholars of NFP such as Phillips (1964); Gordon Idang (1973); Bolaji Akinyemi (1974); and Gambari (1980). These studies all focus on the First Republic. They exhibit an impressive capacity for describing issues and events that affect Nigeria from regional and African unity to nonalignment to peacekeeping, decolonisation and apartheid. While they provide solid descriptions of internal pressures, little is done to draw inferences and provide explanations.

Variables are not defined, let alone specified. As a result, one finds each analyst describing concrete situations, conflicts and interests, while making references to Prime Minister Balewa's thought processes, social traits and psychology as explanations for NFP. Specific examples are in order here.
Like the others in this perspective, both Akinyemi and Idang conclude that NFP in the First Republic was a reflection of the prime minister's beliefs and "psychological make-up". NFP is said to be subservient to the West because Balewa was a devout Muslim and a feudal aristocrat with a conservative personality (Idang 1973:52-55; Akinyemi 1974:200). Without belabouring the point, the Prime Minister's psychological profile and beliefs tell us little or nothing on their own. As Otubanjo observes (1986.54):

It is a fact that Balewa comes from the conservative North; it is a fact that he is a devout Muslim, but where is the evidence of the transformation of these facts into factors?

Unless these facts are systematised within an appropriate mode of analysis, such conclusions provide little insight.

The Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran's radical fundamentalist theocracy and suicide squads are apt examples of why Islam and a conservative socio-psychological traits cannot be axiomatically equated with a moderate foreign policy (Ramazani 1985). Equally telling and self-explanatory on this point is William Zartman's "Explaining the Nearly Inexplicable: the Absence of Islam in Moroccan Foreign Policy" (1985). Evidently, those who regard Balewa's foreign policy as necessarily a function of Islam tend to confuse facts with factors (Otubanjo 1986:54).

Just in conclusion, as earlier noted, the analyses do not build on each other. Each analyst simply makes assertions but only to assume these to be an island of explanations. Aluko, for instance, does not question the conclusions by
Akinyemi, Gambari, Idang and others, even though these contradict his own. Hence, one finds aristocracy and Islam, which are said to have retarded NFP under Balewa in the early 1960s, becoming the force behind General Murtala in the mid-1970s.

Contradicting his earlier views on Balewa's subservience, Aluko now believes that Murtala stood up to the US in Angola because he "was a devout Muslim from an aristocratic family in Kano. He was tough, inflexible, strong-minded and aggressively intolerant" (1981:242). In short, while realist analyses provide thick descriptions, they offer no comparative, cumulative and systematic explanations.

**Capability Empiricism**

Like those within the socio-psychological view, capability empiricists describe events rather than ask questions about causal relationship between variables. Pauline Baker offers a useful overview of this approach (1984:76-97). It is basically a product of Nigeria's oil boom in the 1970s.

This perspective is adopted in commentaries and analyses notably by Aluko (1973); Gambari (1975, 1989); Jean Herskovits (1978, 1980); Joseph Wayas (1979); Oye Ogunbadejo (1980, 1984); Andrew Young (1981); and Gabriel Olusanya (1988). Given the ways in which these analysts describe NFP in the 1970s, it is as if the oil boom would last forever. Amechi Okolo echoes this core belief: "the virility and effectiveness of a nation's foreign policy is a reflection of the total buoyancy of her political economy" (1987:164). In this refrain, Nigeria had arrived.
Capability empiricists fail to ask whether Nigeria really had the economic capacity necessary for the virile and effective foreign policy which they painted. No doubt, Nigeria had surplus cash in the 1970s during the oil boom. However, surplus cash is not the same thing as economic strength. As Korany argues with reference to Adam Smith, cash is an ephemeral factor in foreign policy. To serve as a credible basis for external influence, cash needs to be transformed into the wealth of the society, political power and autonomy for the state (1986b:100).

Suffice it to say that capability empiricism is static as a mode of explanation. The debate about whether a virile foreign policy is a product of economic development is sterile. Nigeria has no choice but to develop both simultaneously. The question is the interaction between economic development and foreign policy, namely how they can mutually propel one another.

Capability empiricism does not grasp conceptually the historical process which any correlation between economic strength and foreign policy entails. The arguments are based on resources solely as these are manifested at a particular point in time. It is necessary to look beyond surplus cash and oil rents to examine the internal socio-economic and political processes through which economic strength is built.

Most studies of the domestic political roots of NFP concur that state efforts to encourage the growth of indigenous capital in the 1970s were derailed by the very elites they were meant to benefit. Most viewed the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (NEPD) of 1972 and 1977 mainly as an avenue to loot the

Many were in it for cash settlements. Obasanjo writes about how surprised he was to learn in 1977 that MAN and the Chambers of Commerce viewed as "pre-mature" the regime's policy to "move the NEPD from indigenization of share holding to indigenization of management" (1990:163). As argued in Chapter 1, this is the most critical consequence of the bourgeoisie's fragmented class project, and the conflicting views on economic restructuring and political transformation. To the Northerners, the Southern elites would occupy the management positions should the policy proceed. If the North cannot move, the South is going nowhere syndrome!

To be clear, this does not contradict the fact stressed by Paul Collins (1983), Festus Iyayi (1986) and others like Bjorn Beckman (1987:27) that there is a large and growing class of Nigerian capitalists teemed up with foreign capital. In fact, Wayne Nafziger (1977) and Sayre Schatz (1977) observed the same phenomenon almost two decades ago. However, it is not enough to merely cite the facts.

This ignores the underlying political reality or processes through which the potential is actualised. Schatz's is a typical example of analyses too eager to praise uncritically. In Nigerian Capitalism (1977), Schatz paints the elites and the state as nurturing economic development, only to dismiss the process as "Pirate
Capitalism" several years later (1984). But what made the elites and the state a band of pirates in the early 1980s that was absent in the mid 1970s?

Like capability empiricism, these observations are based on surface manifestations at a particular point in time. One needs to look beyond these to examine the underlying socio-political processes in which the experiment is being conducted. The issue is whether the indigenous capitalists in question can be defined as national industrialists, if they should no longer be seen as compradors, as Collins, Iyayi and Beckman argue.

Capital availability may be necessary but not sufficient condition for productive investment (Biersteker 1987b:255). As Paul Lubeck (1985:16) rightly points out in his overview of the subject:

Whether or not the increased financial control and money capital now in the hands of indigenous capital was invested in new forms of productive capital is an empirical question.

In other words, it is not so much about how rich Nigerians are individually - many are stupendously rich - but whether the so-called capitalist constitute a class of industrial bourgeoisie, neither subordinate to foreign capital nor synonymous with state patronage (Rapley 1993).

In the case of Kenya, for example, it is no longer doubted that such a class exists. As Steven Langdon concludes in his overview of the debate (1987:344):

It is agreed that a class of indigenous African capitalists has grown significantly since independence and has expanded its ownership of capital into industry in recent years.

Recent surveys support this (Himbara 1993:93-107; Herrington 1993:89-103).
Until such evidence is established for Nigeria, Collins, Iyayi, Beckman and others with similar views may be confusing their predispositions with empirical evidence. As Colin Leys points out in the Kenyan debate, analysts have the tendency to muddle the entry of investment compradors into manufacturing with the establishment of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie (1980). When completed, the study designed by Biersteker to "examine the scope and significance of local capital accumulation in Nigeria" (1987b:279n) may shed light on the problem.

To conclude this section, even if "economic buoyancy" were the basis for a virile foreign policy, Nigeria's basic economic strength cannot be determined from its oil cash flow, as most capability empiricists are wont to do. Such evaluation must be situated within the country's internal development. But if this approach is poor in articulating foreign policy with domestic politics, radical dependency fares little better.

**Radical Dependency**

In many respects, radical dependency marks a departure from the capability and socio-psychological perspectives. As Table 2.1 indicated, dependency is a total rejection of the realist mode and factors of analysis. This will become clear below.

Having said that, dependency does not provide us with any testable hypothesis on NFP, and those within the perspective who have anything of substance to say on NFP are few (Ate 1987; Shaw 1983, 1987; Shaw & Fasehun 1980; Shaw & Aluko, eds., 1983; Wright 1983; Falola & Ihonvbere 1987, 1988; Ihonvbere 1987; Olukoshi 1991, 1993). Like the other two approaches, it also fails to show how elite interests and behaviour constrain NFP. Similarly, its analysis
lacks a fit between proposition and evidence.

Indeed, it is argued that the fit between proposition and evidence tends to be of the least concern in radical dependency analyses of NFP. Contrary to what was claimed and depicted in Table 2.1, these analyses are actually situated at the level of the superstructure, conceptually and methodologically, just as with those in the realist paradigm. The rest is polemics.

Radical dependency takes the *rentier* state as its premise of analysis. But by its very definition, the rentier state fuses the substructure of economics with the superstructure of politics at the level of the latter. As shown in Chapter 1, the Nigerian state lacks a fundamental distinction between its economic and political roles. The state is the main economic actor and rent collector, and politics revolves around it. Little productive investment exists beside the oil industry and rent collection.

It was equally clear in Chapter 1 that while external rents make possible the financial autonomy of the Nigerian state from all indigenous classes and interests, those who act on its behalf have little political independence. In other words, the struggles to appropriate the oil rents within the bourgeoisie and state actors are quintessentially political. The struggles do not take place in the substructure since these have little to do with who produces what and who is taxed at what rate. The exploitation and taxation of peasant agriculture which served as the basis of accumulation for the bourgeoisie through the state in the 1950s and 1960s ceased in the early 1970s following the oil windfall. Even commodity exchange was
sustained by the ubiquitous political allocations of import licenses and foreign exchange.

In short, the struggles which radical analyses describe centre on who controls the state and allocates the oil rents. It needs not be stressed further that these take place at the level of the superstructure. They have nothing to do with production, let alone taxation. The dominant classes see themselves in these struggles simply as sharing the "national cake" by virtue of their ethnicity: entitlement.

The same is true for the dependency side of the realist-radical debate over whether Nigeria was newly industrial or influential. As Timothy Shaw points out, the evidence supports the realist interpretation. In his words, "Nigeria's claim to be a middle power [was] clearly stronger in terms of influence rather than of industrialisation" (Shaw 1983:139). Nigeria's role in the liberation of Angola and Zimbabwe and integration in West Africa are prime examples.

In other words, insofar as movement from the periphery to a NIC was measured in the share of GDP generated by industry (Evans 1979; Mittelman 1991:28-30), qualitative changes in Nigeria's underdevelopment were minuscule. Thus, the argument that the "neo-colony of 1960s is not the neo-colony of the 1970s" (Ate 1987:158-180; Ake 1985; Tyoden 1983:147-163) reflects political influence more than it does industrialisation. The changes in question were not rooted in the substructure - production and industry. These occurred at the superstructural level.
Even in 1993, ISI production averaged only 8.6% of the GDP. The highest ever recorded was 13% in 1982 (Stevens 1990). If so, in which substructure is the radical paradigm of NFP situated? This question equally applies when it comes to the fit between proposition and evidence on the argument over whether external forces or domestic politics explain the credibility gap between the national role conception and the external behaviour of the Nigerian state.

Dependency analyses remain firm, as noted above, on the view that NFP is a function of external forces. Yet, available evidence and even that presented by these analysts themselves contradict this. Take the most glaring examples.

Compared to most post-colonial states, Nigeria has had a greater level of natural, human and financial resources which combined to make international economic pressures and political constraints less confining. In the 1960s, the country attracted a great deal more external aid and direct foreign investment than most other African states (Ate 1987:71-94). In the 1970s little of aid was needed. The oil boom made available to Nigeria massive financial resources in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Peter Evans offers a comparative view of how Nigeria was seen by the international business community in the 1970s as the Brazil of Africa - a country with vast direct foreign investment opportunities (1979:308). Like Evans, James Mayall stresses how in the 1970s Nigeria became one of the very few developing countries which can contemplate an ambitious development programme irrespective of the aid climate, and without needing to fall vulnerable to pressures from the outside (1976:323).
In short, it was clear to the IFIs and other external actors in the 1970s that Nigeria wanted "near absolute freedom to determine its own policies without outside advice ..." (Ate 1987:174; Obasanjo 1990:231). In a similar vein, Shaw and Aluko quote Christopher Clapham who, like others, affirmed the widespread view that states with resources close or comparable to those of Nigeria have a "degree of independent action open to them" in foreign policy and internal development (1985:8).

Even Bade Onimode and Thandika Mkandwire are unequivocal in the Codesria-commissioned study on the failure of Technological Change in Nigeria that state policy, by omission or commission, ... accounted for much of ... why Nigeria, so richly endowed in manpower and natural resources and freed from the usual financial and size constraints, failed to set up the type of capital and intermediate goods industries that have historically proved crucial to accumulation and technological acquisition (1989:ix, 5; Onimode 1989:235-237).

The same is true for the oil industry as the elites have failed to develop a common world-view and strategy for it to serve as a basis for economic restructuring (Turner 1977).

In the 25 years that it has taken Nigerians to agree on awarding the contracts for their liquefied natural gas project, "Indonesia has built five" (Pedder 1993:9). In the same period, Indonesia has been industrialising while Nigeria's political economy has hovered at the brink of collapse. The two states' GNP per capita in Table 2.2 below provides one such contrast.
Table 2.2: Nigeria's Comparative GNP/Capita

Indeed, every comparative study of Nigeria and Indonesia suggests forcefully that the arrested development and economic crisis in the former are mainly a function of "inappropriate policy responses" to international-systemic pressures (Nyatepe-Coo 1993; Scherr 1989; Pinto 1987; Pesaran 1986; Taylor, et al., 1986; Rimmer 1985). In other words, internal distortions. This is why the "success stories of Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and Cote d'Ivoire" did not occur in Nigeria (Shaw & Okolo 1994:1-14; Shaw & Fasehun 1980:564).
Regionally in Africa, similar comparable evidence suggests that even less resource-endowed states have done far better in economic restructuring and development. Unlike the bourgeoisie in Nigeria, the dominant classes in Cote d'Ivoire chose to use their foreign policy to create an "economic miracle". In the same vein, Algeria was able to achieve a degree of oil technology transfer. Nigeria failed because of internal politics (Turner 1980).

In short, the point of citing this evidence is clear. If dependency analysts are concerned with providing explanations, the critical question that needs to be posed is: what exactly has the forces international dependency prevented Nigeria from doing internally and externally (Beckman 1982:13)? Leaders and the dominant classes failed to use the oil boom and financial independence from external actors for economic development not because of dependency but because of domestic politics.

Sophie Pedder puts it succinctly in her recent survey of Nigeria how:

It is hard to believe that only 14 years ago the most taxing question in Nigerian politics was how to spend all the oil money (Economist, 21 August 1993:4 - my emphasis).

The state collected over $100 billion in oil rents between 1973 and 1983 alone, much of which was mismanaged and/or embezzled. Even at the very time that the country's economy hovered at the bring of collapse, the World Bank did a study which, as Pedder writes, "reckoned that capital flight from Nigeria during the 1980s may have reached $50 billion" (ibid). In the same vein, Carol Lancaster provides other estimates showing that about $11 billion was taken out of Nigeria in 1985-

Graf is thus right in pointing out that dependency analyses of NFP and domestic politics are function of ideology rather than attempts to explain. The objective of dependency analysts, says Graf, has been "to generate a mobilising, counter-hegemonic ideology against the dominant notions of modernisation and capitalist development" (1988:227). Hence, they locate the empirical assessments of NFP in ideological preferences.

The Development of Nigerian-US Relations by Bassey Ate (1987) fits somewhat uneasily into this mode of analysis. This is so because it is the best work on NFP both in terms of analysis and data. However, because of the dependency ideological burden which Ate has assumed, his study too fails to take us far in the realm of explanation.

Shaw deems it necessary, for example, to revise earlier views of dependency (contrast Shaw & Fasehun 1980 with Shaw 1983b:212). But Ate fails to see beyond the idea that economic dependence and foreign policy autonomy are mutually exclusive. He even self-commissioned a chapter (Ate 1988:283-286) to counter Douglas Anglin's long-standing thesis (1964:147-163) that economic dependence does not foreclose foreign policy autonomy. The present study is in line with this thesis. As posited in Chapter 1, and shown in the case studies, what leaders do with such autonomy is the question.

Unable to ask this question, Ate finds it difficult to explain why Nigerian leaders acted with relative autonomy in the 1970s and confronted the US on
African issues while the economy remained as dependent as it was in the 1960s (1987:161-183). This failure to make a distinction between the ideology of dependency and the theory of dependent relations is much in line with Graf's earlier observation. All Ate could offer by way of explanation is that Nigeria enjoyed foreign policy autonomy in the 1970s because "officials and the public at large no longer perceived their economic ties with the United States in terms of dependence but rather of interdependence" (1987:3).

This only takes the definition of dependency from the measure of aid, trade and investment to public and official psychology. This makes NFP a little more than mood swings. This is very much akin to the critique of deterrence theory by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein in the aptly titled article: "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter" (1989). In other words, the proposition that policy makers and the public think, therefore they are no longer dependent does not fit the evidence of Nigeria's dependency. Dependency may be radical in its polemics but hardly in its conceptual and methodological dimension.

**Theoretical Synthesis**

It is fairly clear that none of the three approaches within the contending realist-radical paradigms of NFP provides satisfactory explanations. None relates to or is informed by the broader comparative foreign policy literature. They purport to apply this or that theory but without its contents. The present study pays particular attention to the fit between proposition and evidence. It is to this task that I turn in the case studies.
PART II: HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

Map 3.1: 3 Regions of Nigeria, 1953

NORTHERN
- Kaduna

REGION

WESTERN
- Ibadan
REGION

EASTERN
REGION

LAGOS
CHAPTER 3

PRIME MINISTER BALEWA REVISITED IN THE CONGO

As with subsequent cases, the present one is situated within the conceptual framework and critical review of the literature in Chapters 1 and 2. It examines Nigeria's participation in the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations in the Congo (ONUC) under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1961-1964. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first provides the socio-historical context for the Nigerian state and foreign policy. It outlines the internal structure of ethnicity, class, state and Balewa's leadership. The second examines the specific foreign policy issue: Nigeria's participation in the ONUC. This case has already been well-treated in the literature on NFP (Ohaegbulam 1982; Gambari 1980; Akinyemi 1974; Idang 1973; Phillips 1964). Balewa's involvement is examined only in sufficient detail to bring to the fore its theoretical import for the thesis of the primacy of domestic politics, and the leaders role within.

Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Leadership Struggles in Historical Perspective

Characteristic of Nigerian academy and society, the impact of British colonialism on the direction of Nigerian politics and foreign policy remains a subject of continuous debates. What is most pertinent to the present study is how

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colonisation shaped North-South ethnic, socio-economic and political cleavages. As noted in Chapter 1, the British were not neutral in the relations between the Hausa-Fulani and their Yoruba and Igbo counterparts; nor during independence negotiations. Officials in the colonial administration sided with the Hausa-Fulani whom they considered as "born rulers and racially superior". By contrast, the Igbos and Yorubas were called "negroids", and labelled as "brash and educated" because they were eager to rid themselves of British rule (Cronje 1972:2-9).

Much has been written about how British colonial policy shielded the North from both Western education and the South. Suffice it to say that when the Northern and Southern Nigeria protectorates were merged in 1951, and the three regions created in 1953, as seen in Map 3.1, the Igbos and Yorubas had acquired a greater degree of the trappings of modernisation than the Hausa-Fulani as a result of the development gap discussed in Chapter 1. Sir Ahmadu Bello and the Hausa-Fulani elites insisted that the South's demand for independence were premature, as the former were not in a hurry to see the British leave.

Needless to say, the Yorubas who formed the Action Group (AG) party under Chief Obafemi Awolowo were eager for the British invaders to leave. The same was true for the Igbos led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe in the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) party. While the populism of Mallam Aminu Kano and his Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) was considered a threat by the feudal NPC, NEPU itself was a minor actor on the national scene and in these ethnic and regional struggles (Ezera 1960; Coleman 1958; Schwarz 1965).
In the 1950s and 1960s, as in the subsequent decades, these ethnic and intra-bourgeoisie struggles were for the control of the federal state. As shown in Chapter 1, it was, and remains, essentially a conflict that pitched the North's political power - size and population - against the development and wealth produced in the South - economic power and education. In short, the Igbos and the Yorubas feared the "sheer weight" of the population and size of the Hausa-Fulani, while the latter feared the "sheer weight of the skills and the aggressive drive" of the former (Panter-Brick 1970:29). As argued in the conceptual scheme, and shown in each chapter, this is the basis of the North-South stalemate which ethnicity sustains.

Women and the popular classes across the country had little say in these debates. To be sure, those in the South went on strikes and demonstrations against the colonial state. However, they were all exploited to varying degrees by the elites in the North and South. Since the Marketing Boards were imposed in 1947, following World War II, the appropriation of the surplus from peasant agriculture served as the source of state - colonial and post-colonial - revenue and accumulation for the bourgeoisie. This was the case with all the three marketing boards in all three regions in the period.

World Bank data suggest that little was given back to the peasants or re-invested in agriculture. Even after operating expenses were deducted, the Marketing Boards still kept as much as 30% of net earnings of cocoa, palm produce and groundnuts from the farmers (Okowa 1985:71-88; Ekekwe 1985:53-
In other words, the bourgeoisie and the state embezzled the difference between what these crops fetched on the world market and what was paid to the producer.

To be sure, this does not absolve the World Bank itself. As Dupe Olatubosun, Tina Wallace, Gavin Williams and others who have studied this problem argue, World Bank projects in Nigeria have "not been directed to the first priority of small farmers, namely to produce sufficient food for themselves" (Coleman 1985:23-33). And as we shall see, little changed in the 1980s and 1990s.

Independence was granted in October 1960 after much delay by the North. Susan Cronje suggests that the British advised the Hausa-Fulani not to give up their political control of Nigeria because the Eastern region was rich in oil resources (1972). Indeed, the Northern elites threatened to separate in the 1950s until they realised that federal revenues were generated in the South, then as now (Bello 1962:110-148; Arikpo 1967:96-103).

Suffice it to say independence was achieved on terms set by the North. The Hausa-Fulani insisted that the federation be seen in terms of North-South as opposed to three ethnic groups with equal representation. The South caved in for two main reasons. One, the British insisted on unanimity among the three regions as a condition for granting independence (Tamuno 1970:567-570). Two, as argued in Chapter 1, the Southern elites believed that their educational and other advantages would compensate for short term political disadvantages. The
arrangement was, however, a coup for the North as the Hausa-Fulani nullified the triangular ethnic and regional equality which the Yorubas and the Igbo had believed to be the basis of the federation.

In Sir Ahmadu's words, it was necessary for the North to have powers to forestall "a sudden grouping of the Eastern and Western parties" from taking power (1962:229). In effect, the Hausa-Fulani got a veto, and became more equal than the Yorubas and the Igbo. In other words, instead of the three-way ethnic equality which the Igbo and the Yorubas had expected, the Hausa-Fulani turned the federation into a North-South ethnic divide. Within this, the North insisted on population, size and religious quotas as the basis for the federal government and institutions (Bach 1989:218-245; Mustapha 1986:81-96). As we have seen in Chapter 1, these were later institutionalised in the constitution of 1979 as the federal character, Nigeria's euphemism for ethnicity.

The NPC won the first federal elections held in 1959 (Pest 1963; Sklar 1962). Table 3.1 below shows the number of seats won by the main contending political parties. These then were the basis of Nigeria's social contract and the origins of the post-colonial state. The NPC formed the first federal government in coalition with the NCNC in October 1960 with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister. Dr Azikiwe was appointed Governor General, and subsequently President when Nigeria became a republic in October 1963.
Table 3.1: Party Standing in the 1959 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>North Seats</th>
<th>North %</th>
<th>West Seats</th>
<th>West %</th>
<th>East Seats</th>
<th>East %</th>
<th>Federal Seats</th>
<th>Federal %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 174 100.0 65 100.0 73 100.0 312 100.0

Source: Adapted from Kurfis (1983:173).

Ethnic-Class and North-South Power Struggles

Once the North got political power, it was assured of economic control of the county. To recall from the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, this puts a premium on the control of state powers. This is to say, so long as the bourgeoisie remains unproductive, it is largely through the control of state revenues that the dominant classes and their retinue could reproduce themselves. This is even more so for the commercial compradors who form the bulk of this bourgeoisie.

While Balewa was toasted as Prime Minister, the South elites did no hide the fact that they believed that the Hausa-Fulani were the least qualified to rule Nigeria. For example, the AG deputy leader and the Opposition’s external affairs critic, Chief Anthony Enahoro, stated that even
for a schoolmaster Balewa had a surprising inability or reluctance to develop an argument. Not even with the advantage of hindsight can I truthfully claim that I saw in him then Nigeria’s future Prime Minister (1965:00).

To Enahoro, the honour to lead Nigeria properly belonged to the likes of Awoiowo or Azikiwe. As Sophie Pedder found in her recent survey on Nigeria Economist (21 August 1993), this remains the general view in the South.

This is not to suggest, however, that the Igbo and Yorubas were united down South. Awolowo and Azikiwe could not even find a basis on which to discuss a coalition between the NCNC and the AG during the elections. Nonetheless, the objective conditions have been such the North-South ethnic divide has been clear.

Needless to say, Awolowo viewed himself to be the most qualified to lead Nigeria. In fact, the latter, just like the newbreed politicians discussed in Chapter 1, found it difficult to accept his electoral defeats. In the First Republic, he was convicted for plotting to overthrow the Balewa government by force of arms (Jakande 1966; Phillips 1964:62-67; Gambari 1980:10-11). Nor did Awolowo, as we shall see in Chapter 6, accept his defeat gracefully in the Second Republic.

This is not to say that the Prime Minister in the First Republic nor the President in the Second Republic was ever under any illusion that he was more qualified than Awolowo to govern Nigeria (Idang 1973:53-54). Much of this contradicts analysts like Idang who argues that it was a measure of Balewa’s calibre and ability that there was almost universal confidence in his capacity to lead Nigeria during the critical years immediately before and after independence (1973:52).

In fact, the unsystematised nature of the findings in extant literature becomes
pronounced in Idang's contradictory analysis. For example, while arguing the above, he presents evidence that not even political decorum prevented Azikiwe - either as Governor-General or President - from publicly criticising the NPC and Balewa as unfit to rule (1973:39-41).

Like Awolowo, Azikiwe believed that the British denied him the chance to lead Nigeria at independence (Phillips 1964:69-70; Gambari 1980:11-12). While it is true that the British prevented the South from attaining independence without the North, one must still ask: on what basis did the British deny Azikiwe Nigeria's leadership in 1960 when the NCNC won only 89 seats nationally in the federal elections of 1959 as seen in Table 3.1? In many ways, this reinforces the argument in Chapter 1 that the Southern elites viewed democracy as meritocracy. As we shall see in the contemporary cases, little has changed in the 1990s.

**Internal Structure:**
**Dependent Development and Foreign Policy**

Despite the ethnic-class struggles just described, the elites adopted, as discussed in the previous chapters, a capitalist dependent development as the strategy for economic development (Akinsanya 1983:145-184; FGN 1962:362; Balewa 1964:138). However, unlike radical African leaders like Nkrumah or Sekou Toure, the Nigerian elites, especially the Hausa-Fulani, lacked the relevant ideological convictions to question the prevailing international structure of North-South capitalist exploitation. Moreover, the Northern elites believed that their ability to compete with the Igbos and Yorubas depended on Western aid and capital, and
ties to Britain.

Self-reliance and the sourcing of raw materials locally were not considered as parts of this strategy. Rather, emphasis was placed on import substitution, secondary processing and final assembly. The Hausa-Fulani were more concerned with the internal North-South socio-development gap and power relations than with international North-South exploitation.

Data from Table 1.6 indicated that Balewa expected about 50% of the resources for Nigeria’s First Development Plan to come from external sources, mostly the UK and the US. In fact, Balewa believed so much in the stages of growth world-view that he even calculated that Nigeria needed roughly four development plans to take it to the point of economic take-off a la Rostow (1964:137-142). However, the ethnic-class struggles "led to considerable waste from duplication of plants and uneconomic location" of the various projects in the 1960s (Forrest 1982:325).

In the final analysis, the modernisation which the Prime Minister had hoped would erase the North-South development gap failed to materialise. Balewa held the view that the Nigerian federation was a temporary arrangement. He believed it would dissolve into a unitary state once the Hausa-Fulani caught up with the Igbos and Yorubas (West Africa, 3 March 1962:243). In other words, to Balewa, federalism and dependent development were transitional phases in Nigeria’s modernisation.
It was thus to hasten these transitions that Balewa directed his foreign policy efforts at securing external aid and direct private investment. Few analysts understand this, as many like Ogunsawo (1986) and Nweke criticise Balewa for placing "emphasis on economics as the sole determinant of national transformational and international influence" (1985:5). As noted above, the Prime Minister believed that this would level the playing field for the Hausa-Fulani with the Igbos and Yorubas. However, as argued in the previous chapters, this policy has only held the South back by blocking a rational state formation and national growth.

Intra-Class Struggles and External Role Conception

Debates over Nigeria's role in the continent and relations vis-a-vis African states were especially bitter. In this case, Balewa took a formalistic view and chose to base Nigeria's relations on achieved status as opposed to those in the South who preferred the country's prescribed status. Why was this so?

Ironically, the Northern elites rejected this ascribed status as the basis for Nigeria's leadership role in Africa. In Balewa's legalistic thinking, all states big and small were equal. Thus, according to Ate, the Prime Minister's struggles with Ghana to assert Nigeria's regional leadership were mainly a reaction to and a fear of Nkrumah's incendiary ideas "than any ambitious inclination to assume regional leadership by virtue of the nation's acclaimed status ..." (1987:131).

Even when Balewa insisted that Nigeria's draft must serve as the basis for the OAU Charter in 1963, it was essentially to counter the proposals by Nkrumah
(Aluko 1976:123). It was Balewa himself who said that:

If we conduct ourselves well and if we appear well-meaning to the countries of Africa, there is no reason why they should not give us our recognized position by virtue of our size and population, but it is not for us to go out to show to those smaller countries that we are big in size and population and therefore they have to come trailing behind us. I think that is a wrong thing to do (1964:80).

Recall, however, that in domestic politics, Balewa and the Northern elites based their right to rule on size and population.

These contradictions are hardly recognised in extant analyses. As noted in the previous chapters, most analyses simply situate NFP within the context of the analyst's normative world-view and policy preferences as opposed to political reality. Idang (1973:15-19) and Frederick Schwartz are examples. According Schwartz, Balewa's foreign policy has done little to inspire the Nigerian people or restore the pride which colonialism sucked away... [Therefore] placing faith in African solidarity and militancy would do much to develop a sense of unity and a sense of purpose which Nigeria's moderate course does not (1965:235).

This shows little understanding of the contradictions of the internal structure of NFP.

First and foremost, the Nigerian people did not share a common view of the national role conception. Second, in light of the divergent North-South views on the granting of independence, there was even no consensus in the country on whether the country was ready to manage its own affairs. Third, those elites in the North never shared the South's militancy.
Fourth, the Northern elites did not consider their pride to have been sucked away by colonialism. As noted above, the Hausa-Fulani struggled hard against the Igbos and Yorubas to prolong British colonial rule. Balewa even proposed in the United Nations that 1970 be set as the target date for a "gradual transition from colonial rule to independence" in Africa (Ajala 1986:127).

Like their Northern counterparts, the basis on which elites in the South projected Nigeria's leadership equally contradicted their domestic political views. Externally, the Southern elites ardently held to the view that Nigeria had the manifest destiny to lead Africa based on its size and population. But as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the Igbos and Yorubas railed against Hausa-Fulani dominance on the basis of size and population internally.

Down South, almost every organised group in civil society was an avowed critic of Balewa's foreign policy. In Parliament and in civil society, the Igbos and Yorubas simply made foreign policy a continuation of ethnic and political struggles. Even the NCNC - albeit in coalition with the NPC - was an ardent critic of the Prime Minister's foreign policy. Needless to say, this was true for Awolowo and the AG (Akindele 1990:26-32; Ohaegbulam 1982:8-9; Akinyemi 1979:25-26; Gambari 1980:95-112; Idang 1973:53-54).

So were groups like the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), the National Youth Convention, the Nigerian Trade Union Congress and the Zikist Movement. Nor were the newspapers in the South left out. Mostly outlets for their respective political parties and interests, these were the fiercest critics of NFP

Up North, the Prime Minister had Ahmadu Bello with whom to contend. Not only was the latter the Premier of that Region, but Bello was the leader of the NPC, Balewa's party boss. In fact, Bello designated Balewa as Prime Minister because the former was not willing to subject himself to the rough and tumble of federal politics in Lagos.

To further sour relations between the two, Balewa had to fight Bello's efforts to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state (Gambari 1980:95-112; Ojo 1988:140-144; Phillips 1964:82-84). In the end, Bello's campaign to enrol Nigeria in the World Muslim League failed. In what now seems as a precursor of the OIC saga mentioned in Chapter 1, Balewa warned that "It will be the end of happiness in Nigeria when religion is brought into politics" (Akinyemi 1974:103). Prescient indeed.

In sum, these ethnic, religious, class and power struggles provided the backdrop to NFP in the First Republic, while laying the foundation for the subsequent periods. This was the context in which Balewa had to send Nigerian troops to the Congo as part of the UN peacekeeping operation in 1960-1964. The next section examines how the internal structure of ethnicity, class, state and leadership factors shaped this test case for Nigerian leaders in formulating an independent foreign policy.
International-Systemic Challenges: Balewa in the Congo

In general, international support for NFP under Balewa was equally divided between radical and conservative states within and outside Africa. Radical leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Sekou Toure in Guinea dismissed Balewa as an imperialist stooge. With internal critics such as Enahoro and Awolowo, these radical leaders shared the view that Balewa was against political union and the formation of an African High Command because of his subservience to the West (Aluko 1976; Thompson 1969:77-81; Ate 1987:126-157). Haroun Adamu points out that Balewa gave little credence to these two issues, as dear to the hearts of radical African leaders as they were (Akindele & Johnson 1990:29).

In short, Balewa did not subscribe to Nkrumah's "radical" version of Pan-Africanism. The former held the view that the continent was not ready for a political union in the prevailing conditions of acrimony and mistrust among African leaders. In his view, such a union could only develop if there existed a code of conduct based on (i) respect for colonial boundaries; (ii) legal equality of all states; (iii) peaceful settlement of all inter-state disputes by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration; and (iv) non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Idang 1973:120).

Diplomatic relations were not established with the Soviet Union until 1963. As indicated in Chapter 1, Britain and the US were instrumental in creating Nigeria's role conception. Both gave Balewa flattering support at independence (Idang 1970:227-251; Ojedokun 1971:210-233; Phillips 1964:82-84; Bello
1962:111-120). Indeed, he was regarded as the voice of Africa in the West. Ate points out that the US even promised to support "Nigeria's effort to assume a position of leadership in Africa" (1967:72). In sum, the Prime Minister had more support in the West and in institutions like the UN and Commonwealth than at home in the South or in radical Africa.

However, if the Balewa government had hopes for a planned transition in external affairs in this Cold War period, these were shattered by the UN invitation to contribute troops to the peacekeeping operation in the Congo in 1960. This invitation or challenge to which Nigeria had to respond resulted from what began as an internal crisis in the Republic of the Congo barely a week after independence from Belgium in June 1960. Leaving aside the details of the mutiny by the Congolese security forces which unleashed the crisis, suffice it to note that the situation quickly deteriorated into a breakdown of political order.

The attempt by Moise Tshombe, the Premier of the Katanga province, to secede in July, aided by the re-invading Belgian troops, only served to complicate the internal power struggles between President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. With each claiming to be the supreme authority, Kasavubu appealed to the UN only to have the US respond, while Lumumba's counter-appeal to the Soviet Union to balance the US turned the Congo into an East-West affair (Lefever 1967:6-9). Soon the ONUC became less about peace and security in the Congo. It was turned into a Cold War battle ground by the Russians and the Americans and their allies.
Whatever the case may be, Nigeria had two separate decisions on two inseparable issues. Now that the country was independent, the first concerned the formulation of a sovereign response to the crisis - adoption of a foreign policy position. Second, but depending on the first, the leaders had to decide whether or not Nigerian troops would be deployed in the Congo as part of the UN peacekeeping operation.

To complicate the second decision, Nigeria's 8000 armed forces were under the command of foreigners. The Air Force was headed by a West German. Of the 300 officers in the Army, only 81 were Nigerians. Like the Army, the Navy was under the command of a British officer (Luckham 1971; Miners 1971). The Secretary to the Prime Minister, before he was forced to resign in 1962, was also British (Akinyemi 1974:39).

However, Balewa was less concerned with these sorts of questions. What preoccupied the Prime Minister was how to ensure that Nigerian policy was not seen as intervention in support of one faction or another in Congo's internal conflict. To show how he wanted other states to behave towards his government, Balewa declared loudly and clearly that (1964:101):

> We in Nigeria support no faction in the Congo. All we want in the Congo is that there should be peace and stability. We do not want people to interfere in our internal affairs. We do not want people to interfere in the internal affairs of other African territories.

However, as already noted, and as we shall see more fully below, opinion in the South had little to do with shedding light on the Congo imbroglio. In the North-South divide, groups in the South only sought to demonstrate that Balewa was
incompetent.

Notwithstanding pressures from the South, however, Balewa had his way. Even when he appointed the NCNC parliamentarian, Jaja Wachukwu, as Foreign Minister, Balewa elevated his Hausa-Fulani Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet rank to handle issues which the Prime Minister felt strongly about. By all accounts, Balewa personalised foreign policy to the extent that he did not involve the Cabinet in major decisions, let alone the Parliament (Ohaegbulam 1982; Gambari 1980; Akinyemi 1974; Idang 1973). As stated in the conceptual scheme, the leader has room for manoeuvre within the limits imposed by class and ethnic contradictions.

Moreover, to also recall from earlier discussions, Balewa and the Northern elites did not trust their Southern counterparts, not even those in the NCNC with whom the NPC formed the coalition government. Balewa served as his own foreign minister; the first time at independence until July 1961; and again after the 1964 federal elections until his murder in the January 1966 military coup d’etat, discussed in Chapter 4.

There is no evidence to suggest, however, that Balewa had clear objectives in the Congo beyond making Nigerian troops available to the UN. Balewa lost sight of the objectives. It was clear to Nigerian policy makers as others that the US was using the UN as an instrument to oust Lumumba from power and fight its Cold War battles with the Soviets (Akinyemi 1974:40; Gambari 1980:60). Balewa was also well aware that Congolese authorities murdered Lumumba in February 1961
in circumstances involving Hammarsjold, the American CIA and Lumumba (Dayal 1976).

Yet Nigerian policy was not reviewed. While Balewa might have been personally unhappy with the situation, he remained firm: that a policy review would constitute intervention in the Congo’s domestic affairs. In his view, it was not Nigeria’s place to tell the Congo whether or not the ONUC was serving US and Western imperialist interests.

Not even when Tshombe took the late Lumumba’s place as the Prime Minister of the Congo did Nigerian policy change. Balewa was content with merely having Nigerian troops in the ONUC. Even when it became clear that the ONUC and the UN itself had become a tool for promoting Western Cold War interests in the Congo, the Prime Minister still did not order a policy review. In contrast, Ghana, Guinea and several radical African states withdrew their troops in protest. Unlike Nigeria, these states did not let the principle of cooperation with the UN stand in the way (Akinyemi 1974:48-54).

**Resources and Nigerian Foreign Policy in the Congo**

Nigeria’s material contribution to ONUC was enormous. The country’s Foreign Minister, Wachukwu, chaired the UN Congo Conciliation Committee. Ohaegbulam (1982:123-126) details how Nigeria provided the Congo with police training and human resource development in many areas. Many "Nigerians with special skills in law, labour relations and civil service matters also went to help in the Congo" (Gambari 1980:56).
In more specific terms, Nigeria deployed 26.7% of its 8000 troop armed forces amounting to 63,617 man-months. The country's troop contribution was the third largest after India and Ethiopia in the 34-state UN force (Lefever 1967:158). Indeed, two Nigerian officers, General Aguiyi Ironsi and Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, who subsequently led or failed to lead the country, as we shall see in Chapter 4, served with distinction as UN force commander and chief of staff, respectively (Ohaegbulam 1982:110).

Like the armed forces, Nigerian Police Force units served in the Congo with flying colours. Comprised of 400 men and officers, the units made immense contributions to the maintenance of law and order during the crisis. The UN described them as "a pillar of strength, courage and discipline" (Ohaegbulam 1982:11-13).

In financial terms, Nigeria's involvement in the Congo, as Gambari notes, still remains the country's costliest operation abroad (1980:55). Ohaegbulam calculates the troop and other contributions at $45.4 million, excluding lives lost (1982:114-115). Estimated in Chapter 9, perhaps only the cost of General Babangida's intervention in Liberia is likely to surpass it. Yet, the Prime Minister received praise for Nigeria's efforts only from the UN and in the West. After all, he lent the needed African cover to Western imperialism.
Theoretical Synthesis

Whether or not one agrees with Balewa's policy in the Congo, it is clear that he viewed it mainly as an extension of the internal political struggles, and the regional leadership competition with Ghana. Even if Balewa had wanted to review Nigerian policy after the CIA involvement in the Congo crisis and death of Lumumba came to light, domestic opposition posed serious constraints. It would have amounted to admitting that he was wrong and/or incompetent.

Unlike what dependency and realist analyses would thus lead one to believe, the evidence does not suggest that the lack of power or resources accounted for NFP in the Congo. Nigeria's financial contribution to the ONUC was more than that of any other African state. In terms of troops contribution, the country came second only Ethiopia. Suffice to note that Ghana and other states who also depended on the West for foreign aid, trade and investment condemned the latter's role within the UN and in the Congo. Many even pulled out their troops in protest.

To recall the argument made within the conceptual scheme and shown in this chapter, the Prime Minister and the Northerners viewed their counterpart in the South and radical African states as the rivals, if not the enemy. To cooperate with the West and the UN in the Congo thus served to cultivate and reinforce the kinds of political alignments which they deem were necessary in such a hostile environment. There is little doubt about this.
The psychological approach only provides us with the facts. The analyses draw the wrong inferences. For example, Ogunsanwo (1986:12) and Gambari (1980:32) argue on the one hand that Balewa's foreign policy was "characterized by political and ideological naivety". On the other, the same analysts describe one event after another to show how Balewa sought to use foreign policy to contain opposition to his power in the domestic arena.

Indeed, Akinyemi states unequivocally that Balewa had a "shrewd perception of the relationship between his external policy and the ferocious domestic power struggle" (1974:xi). Yet, much like Ogunsanwo, Gambari and Idang, Akinyemi goes on to conclude that the Prime Minister's socio-psychological traits explain NFP in the Congo. The thesis that the motivating factor for NFP was Balewa's shrewd perception of the domestic political use of foreign policy in the need to contain internal opposition had got lost.

The same is true of the Prime Minister's leadership. While every analyst seeks to portray Balewa as weak, the descriptions of him and his leadership style tend toward the opposite. Even Gambari states in no uncertain terms that everyone had their say, but the Prime Minister had his way (1981:11-13). Balewa stood up to even Ahmadu Bello. In other words, how strong did Balewa need to be if he took on the South and stood his grounds against Sir Bello, and over religion for that matter?

This is why a systematic attempt to link proposition and evidence is the more appropriate mode of analysis. Chapter 4 continues this process.
CHAPTER 4

GENERAL GOWON AND CIVIL WAR FOREIGN POLICY

The present chapter NFP under the military during the civil war which ensued when Five Majors from the South sought to redefine the North-South ethnic and social contract, and end Northern political dominance by force of arms in January 1966. It is concerned not so much with the Nigerian Civil War itself, which lasted from July of 1967 to January 1970. The focus is on how General Yakubu Gowon's leadership shaped NFP in this period.

Section one deals with (i) the military overthrow of Balewa; (ii) how the putschists failed to hold the state together; and (iii) the rise and demise of General Ironsi. The second examines Gowon's civil war diplomacy and the struggle to keep Nigeria from disintegration from within. Section three discusses how (i) the war compelled foreign policy review; (ii) the redefinition of national security; and (iii) the role which Nigeria's new-found oil wealth played in these processes.

Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Leadership Struggles under the Military

The overthrow of Prime Minister Balewa on 15 January 1966 thrust the military from an instrument of state policy into the centre of Nigerian politics and power. By all accounts, the coup was a welcome relief across the country, but "more so in the East than in the West and in the South than in the North" (Dent 1970:81). While it is difficult to see why the Hausa-Fulani also welcome the coup, suffice it to say relief turned into grief in the North once it became clear that only non-Igbo
leaders were massacred by the Five Majors who staged the coup (Feinstein 1987:229-230).

In what has now become the norm, much of what the plotters had for a programme was little more than righteous indignation. With no clear, concrete ideas for social-political and economic transformation, the ten proclamations contained in the junta’s radio broadcast to the country by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu were little more than radical exhortations. These were presented as a list of crimes which politicians were no longer supposed to commit as opposed to a programme of action or vision (Dudley 1983:112-113; Gbulie 1981:72-73). Perhaps the ten commandments is a more apt description. In the end, the coup shed a lot of blood, cleansed nothing and changed little.

Instead, it created a great deal of chaos, and left Nigeria in confusion. It remains a subject of debate how General Aguiyi Ironsi got the Majors to hand over power to a bourgeois officer class.¹ Suffice it to note that Ironsi emerged from the confusion surrounding the coup as head of state. He attempted to rule by decree. With Decree No. 1, he suspended the Constitution, banned politics and set up a Supreme Military Council (SMC) in place of the old civilian government. Even then, Ironsi lost control of civil society as he did the armed forces (Dudley 1973:113-114; Cervenka 1971:27-38).

In short, Ironsi found that "the military and the political problem had by the middle of 1966 become inextricable, the one from the other" (Luckham 1971:298). Most of his decisions only further alienated the Hausa-Fulani. Ironsi surrounded himself with Igbos in a volatile situation where symbolism mattered a great deal. He dissolved the federal system of regions by fiat and imposed a unitary state. With the Unification Decree No. 34 of 24 May 1996, the federal and regional public services were merged to form a single National Public Service.

This act ignited the two volatile issues which almost led to Northern separation in the 1950s. The first concerns the basis for the control of political and economic power in Nigeria as discussed in the previous chapters. The unitary system which Ironsi introduced replaced the quota system once again by merit or achieved status. However, to recall from Sir Ahmadu Bello's argument from Chapters 1 to 3, the Hausa-Fulani considered it "political suicide" to compete with the South on merit.

The second is regional autonomy. The North's ability to control its civil service would effectively disappear in any unitary system based on the above criteria, which few Hausa-Fulani had. Thus, to the Northern elites, there was no need for further proof of the impending domination by the Igbos (Panter-Brick 1970:23-27; Feinstein 1987:220-236).

Northern troops and civilians descended on the Igbos whom were massacred in the tens of thousands, in what can be best described as ethnic orgy. As Alan Feinstein states pointedly:
The soldiers themselves were indulging in pogrom-like activities, and their unruliness in turn unleashed local savagery and hatred (1987:234). Ironsi met a similar fate when he was killed in a counter-coup on 29 July 1966. In his participant account, General Obasanjo states that the counter-coup against Ironsi had "two aims - revenge upon the East by the North and break-up of the country" (1980:6).

In the final analysis, Ironsi did not venture into foreign policy. He was too embattled with internal conflicts during the seven months he struggled to hold on to state power.

**Things Fall Apart: Secession to Civil War**

Colonel Murtala Mohammed paved the way for Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon to emerge from the revenge upon the East as leader on 1 August 1966. The Northern officers by-passed Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, then next-in-line of command to Ironsi. Ogundipe was a veteran of the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo as well as a seasoned officer. However, he was rejected because the Northern soldiers demanded that one of their ethnic kind assume power. As we shall see in Chapter 8, General Babangida cited the very same reasons for robbing Chief Abiola of the presidency in June 1993.

Meanwhile, Obasanjo recalls how Ogundipe could not even get a sergeant among the marauding Hausa-Fulani soldiers to obey his orders. Two days later, Ogundipe was posted to London as High Commissioner to prop up the break in the military chain-of-command represented by the incident (Obasanjo 1980:6-7).
The military failed its very test as the only national or state institution that could overcome Nigeria's ethnic canker. The murder of Ironsi and the skip over Ogundipe to Gowon returned military and political power to the North. This shift in power was followed by a change in the direction of political and ethnic-class struggles.

Unlike in the preceding civilian period, there was a confounding factor this time. Not all the military elites in the South caved-in to the North, as was the case with the civilians in the 1950s. The Igbo Military Governor of the then Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, refused to recognise the authority of Gowon as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Not only were the stakes raised, but the conflict became both intra-class and inter-ethnic. Needless to say this presented a crisis of state from civilians to the military.

Indeed, the conflict was not unlike the socio-economic and political struggles among the civilians in the 1950s. The threat of separation was used by the various military factions to counter others' demands. Gowon only decided against pulling the North out of the federation on advice from the British High Commissioner in Lagos and the American Ambassador to Nigeria (St. Jorre 1972; Cronje 1972:17 & 351; Obasanjo 1980:146-147). As in the 1950s, as seen in Chapter 3, the British continued to have a say in the preservation of their artificial creation, Nigeria.

It has been well-documented how the efforts to find a political compromise, mediated by several African leaders, the OAU, Commonwealth and other interested international parties, failed. While it was uncertain where the Western
Region and the Yorubas stood, Ojukwu had no doubt where he wanted to take the Eastern Region and the Igbo. On 27 May 1967, Gowon announced the break-up of the former three regions shown in Map 3.1 into the twelve states depicted in Map 4.1 below.

Map 4.1: 12 States of Nigeria, 1967

There is no doubt that Gowon designed this twelve-state partition in the bid to undermine Ojukwu's territorial base and support. However, this only served to harden the latter's resolve. Ojukwu declared secession on 30 May, renaming the Eastern Region the "Republic of Biafra" (Aluko 1981:128-147; Cronje 1972).
Internal Contradictions and Policy Challenges

In terms of policy, and as with Balewa in the Congo, Gowon had two clear but inseparable decisions to make in response to the challenge presented by Ojukwu’s secession. First, what should the FGN’s response be? Second, what form should it take? However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Balewa had a rather firm control over his cabinet and foreign policy decision-making.

Gowon lacked such control by contrast. Moreover, his views on the crisis were diametrically opposed to the majority of his cabinet. However, Gowon continued to press for some negotiated settlement, in the belief that Ojukwu would renounce secession with concessions. Thus as Nweke notes, Gowon’s about-face as an advocate of One Nigeria caught many by surprise (1985:19).

Those opposed to Ojukwu also continued to advocate that the FGN launched a full-scale invasion of the Eastern region there and then to crush the rebellion. Obasanjo informs us that the hawkish elements within the Federal Military Government (FMG) such as (1980:14)

Murtala strongly felt that postponing the launching of an offensive against the East was postponing the evil day and making it bloodier and more costly when it came later.

While this rift between Gowon and Murtala was not patched-up until 1973, Nigeria’s civil war broke out on 6 July 1967.

The war ended with Nigeria intact when Biafra formally surrendered on 12 January 1970. How the war was financed and managed internally has been well-documented (Aluko 1981; Niven 1971:163-168; Uwechue 1971:23-33). On the
whole, it is estimated that over 1 million Nigerians lost their lives in the war.

In the 30 months which the war lasted, NFP focused on two particular issues. One was the need to secure arms from the external arena. Two was how to prevent the internationalisation of the war both politically and militarily. The Congo served as a reminder of what could happen if the superpowers were to make it a Cold War issue (Chapter 3). In short, the war was fought militarily - internally - and diplomatically - externally. The external dimension posed no less difficulty than the internal. Indeed, both were intertwined. The next section examines Gowon's civil war diplomacy to keep Nigeria one.

**International-Systemic Challenges: General Gowon, Britain, the US, the USSR and the INGOs**

External interests in and attitudes toward the Nigerian civil war were broad and varied. These can be broadly classified as state and non-state actors. The latter can be further sub-divided into international non-governmental relief agencies and organisations (INGOs) and local civil society groups within the various states, many of whom believed Biafra propaganda and the media portrayal of the war as genocide against the Igbos of Nigeria.

On the level of states, both Britain and the US claimed to maintain formal neutrality. However, the informal activities of the US became a major concern to

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the FGN. Although the Americans claimed to be neutral, Nigerians were not so sure whether the US was not aiding Biafra. The Lyndon Johnson administration placed an arms embargo against both the FMG and Biafra. However, it continued to aid those relief agencies who sympathised with Ojukwu's cause. In 1968, for example, the US gave eight cargo planes for the Biafra operation to agencies like the Vatican's CARITAS, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Joint Church Aid based in London, some of whom the FGN had accused of supplying arms to Ojukwu under the cover of relief supply (Stremlau 1977:286-308; Obasanjo 1980:147-149; Cronje 1972:226-239; Ogene 1983:62-101; St. Jorre 1972:220).

Unlike the Americans, the Soviets were fully committed to the FGN. In a bipolar context, the Soviets saw an opportunity to penetrate the largest country in Africa. To recall from Chapter 3, the Balewa government only hesitantly established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, Gowon was quick to point out, as Ogunbadejo notes, that the purchase of Russian arms should not be equated with Nigeria's political alignment with the Soviet Union. In spite of Soviet aid, the bourgeoisie was adamant that "Nigerian development could be attained only by remaining in the system of world capitalism" (Ogunbadejo 1976:76; Cronje 1972:252-280).

President Charles de Gaulle of France made no secret of his country's arms support for Biafra (Ogunbadejo 1976:14-32). This is what tends to make the French role in this war paradoxical.
Even at the height of the civil war, Nigeria had in 1969 a 24 million [pounds sterling] trade surplus with France; over the four years 1968-1971, the figure stood at 101 million, which showed that no other country provided Nigeria's balance of exchange with a comparable profit (ibid:23).

Portugal, China, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Ian Smith white minority government in Rhodesia also supplied Ojukwu with arms.

Within the OAU, Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia and Cote d'Ivoire recognised Biafra at various times in 1968. (Daddieh & Shaw 1986:61-86; Obasanjo 1980:152-158). More specifically, the Ivorien leader, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, even "committed some of his personal fortune on the side of Biafra". He saw this as his "chance to cut Nigeria to size" (Obasanjo 1980:155). While Benin and Fernando Po did not formally recognise Ojukwu, both rented out their territory to the INGOs to be used as relief and arms supply posts to Biafra.

Soviet arms and the OAU's political backing constituted the most solid support for the FGN. The OAU backed the FGN without wavering throughout the crisis. As stated in the FGN source cited by Stremlau (1977:346-347):

the OAU has been the strongest line of our defense and endeavors..., the organisation has helped beyond any doubt to contain the temptation of a number of African and non-African states to interfere in the current crisis.

The OAU passed a resolution in September 1968 enjoining "all member states of the UN and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria" (Kirk-Green 1971:328-329). Only Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia voted against the resolution, as they had recognised Ojukwu.
It was indeed this OAU resolution that made it difficult for states like Canada to introduce the war onto the UN agenda. Thus in a response to the Canadian government request for UN involvement in the Nigerian civil war in October 1968, U Thant, the Secretary General, stated that (Cervenka 1971:87):

If the heads of the African states have asked all members of the UN and all members of the OAU to refrain from any action likely to endanger the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria, I do not see how member states, or for that matter the Secretary General, can be actively involved.

Gowon even believed that, given the Cold War context, should the issues make it onto the UN agenda, the FGN had enough votes from the combination of the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Soviet bloc countries to defeat the resolution on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

This tacit agreement among states at the international level was, however, not binding on their respective civil societies and the relief NGOs. I take Britain as a particular example, given its so-called special relationship with Nigeria. In other words, Gowon expected the British to be more sympathetic to the FGN cause than most others.

However, the British government only agreed to supply Gowon with arms when the FMG needed them the least, and mainly because the Soviet Union had become totally committed to the federal side (Cervenka 1971:103-130; St. Jorre 1972). Civil society groups in Britain which supported Biafra had targeted the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, for "demonstrations, petitions, and vociferous lectures from the pulpit" for not condemning the FGN (Stremlau 1977:298). In
short, the British government had its civil society to contend with, whatever its tacit consent with other states to treat the Nigerian civil war as an internal matter.

The British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, informed Gowon specifically that so long as the FGN did not counter Ojukwu's propaganda about genocide, there was little Wilson could do for the FGN against public opinion. The majority within the Gowon cabinet wanted a similar policy though for entirely different reasons. It is interesting, however, that they all converged in the end to effect a change in Gowon's policy.

**Internal Pressures and Gowon's Civil War Diplomacy**

Gowon was much like Prime Minister Balewa in conducting Nigerian diplomacy. He preferred a low-key approach, and had a personal dislike for propaganda. Thus, Gowon had declined to counter Ojukwu's charge of genocide against the Igbos. He had insisted that the FMG should prosecute the war in "good faith" without propaganda.

In this vein, and for reasons that are difficult to fathom, Gowon believed that his British training as a gentleman would see him through the ordeal. In his own words: "in the end the truth will prevail" (Stremlau 1977:260-261; Cronje 1972:221). Gowon did not ask, however, whether such "truth" would prevail in time to save Nigeria from tearing itself apart - the objective.

Gowon did little more than complain even as "the aerial blockade of Biafra was decisively and openly defied by the relief agencies" (Stremlau 1977:283). It was believed that he failed to deal with these agencies because of the fear of
offending their publics, and the risk of antagonising the government whose support he so much sought. Thus, for nearly two years, Gowon resisted the advice of those within the FGN who wanted a tougher policy in dealing with Ojukwu and the relief agencies who were believed to have kept him going with food and arms (Stremlau 1977:336).

Even those who supported Gowon's view of the conflict as a family feud began to raise doubts as the war prolonged. In fact, the majority within the FGN complained that Gowon had given the Western INGO relief agencies too much latitude, allowing them to run arms for Ojukwu with ease. It got to a point where the Army Chief of Staff, then Brigadier Hassan Katsina, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Commissioner for Finance and Vice-Chair of the Executive Council, publicly criticised Gowon for handling a national crisis on faith. Negative public opinion had also begun to mount, fuelling the speculation that Gowon might be ousted for a more aggressive leader like Murtala (Stremlau 1977:336).

Nor did the serious complaints from field commanders of shortages and/or the obsolescence of weapons delivered to the warfront help Gowon's image as leader. The charges mounted as senior officers and civil servants were busy amassing wealth through the purchase of the obsolete weapons. Murtala was the one field commander who not only complained, but actually sought to change the situation.

It is shown in Obasanjo's account of Gowon's relationship with Murtala, how the latter took the law into his own hands whenever things were not going right.
In fact, Murtala is known to have stated publicly that Gowon "lacked the courage" to lead and prosecute the war in the most effective manner. Obasanjo says that Murtala was so incensed with the quality of the weapons his men had at their disposal during the battle for Onitsha in March 1968, that he went to Lagos where he himself "made an arrangement whereby the FMG had to take over the procurement of arms and equipment in Europe" (Obasanjo 1980:57).

Obasanjo describes more than Murtala’s style of taking charge, however. The former also portrays the latter to be insubordinate. One dramatic example of this was when Murtala simply took off to Britain for a vacation in the middle of the civil war without official leave from the Nigerian Army. Murtala was exasperated with Gowon’s handling of the war (ibid).

To be clear, few disagreed with Gowon’s laudable principle. Divisions within the FMG were not over the objective. Everyone agreed that the rebellion must be crushed. Rather, much of the disagreement was over strategy. The question which both the hawks and moderates were asking was why keep a principle that did not serve its objective?

Suffice it to say that, pressures from within the FMG and the British government led to policy change, albeit for different reasons. As the British Foreign Secretary, Francis Stewart, is quoted to have bluntly told Nigeria’s Chief Anthony Enahoro, then Gowon’s Minister for Information:

Look your propaganda machine is bloody awful. You know what we’re up against. What do you think of inviting observers, military men who would report publicly on the situation? (Stremlau 1977:266)
Stremlau goes on to say that Gowon sent his approval within 48 hours. In August 1968, the FGN formally invited the UN, the OAU, and Britain, Canada, Poland and Sweden to send teams to observe the FGN's conduct of the war. The various teams carried out their investigation between September 1968 and September 1969. In the final analysis, none came up with evidence to sustain Ojukwu's charges of genocide against the Igbos (Cervenka 1971:87-93).

The FGN engaged a public relations firm in Britain to put the Nigerian case across to the Western public (Cronje 1972:219-224). External Affairs and the Ministry of Information, while divided over which would be in charge, also ceased defending the war as purely internal, and went over to affirming to the world that Nigeria's sovereignty and unity were non-negotiable.

Gowon finally called the relief agencies to order in June 1969. New guidelines were established whereby the agencies had to end their night flights into the rebel enclave. Even the daylight flights were to be open for inspection. Of course, these agencies did not accept the new rules without efforts to appeal to public sympathy and their home governments.

In short, it became very clear to Gowon that he stood little chance of successfully prosecuting the war without these members of the cabinet behind him. In the end, as noted above, the FGN prevailed when Biafra surrendered.

This war is seen to be the most single important factor which had the most profound effect on NFP (Aluko 1977:185-187). It plunged the Gowon regime fully into the economy. The commercial classes and military elites found themselves
with greater corrupt access to state revenue and private accumulation. As is well-known, it was these classes of Nigerians who got the contracts for weapons procurement and supply of military uniforms, transport, housing, food and related items (Dike 1990:88; Biersteker 1987:258-259).

The war marked a turning point in the history of state-building in Nigeria. It was not only "a period of intense concentration on the domestic problem of keeping Nigeria one, but it was also a time when foreign policy assumed a hitherto unknown importance ..." (Polhemus 1977:44). It compelled policy makers to review foreign policy and redefine national unity and security. However, if the civil war marked a turning point in NFP, it is not at all clear that Gowon took this turn. This is the issue with which the next section is concerned. It begins with the role of oil in post-civil war reconstruction.

**Civil War Reconstruction: Oil and Class Struggles**

If internecine power struggles characterised socio-political and economic intra-class and ethnic relations in the 1960s, national political reconciliation, economic rehabilitation and social reconstruction were the challenge for the 1970s. Evidently, not only had the country gone over the brink, but the people were now quite sober, if not wiser and perhaps more politically mature.

Externally, the Western relief agencies noted above were given their marching orders. Those who offered assistance were told to "keep their bloody money" so that Nigerians could heal their wounds with little reminder of the evil the same NGOs did (Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:48; Ogunsanwo 1986:24).
Ogunsanwo describes at length how this policy displayed "a high level of maturity not seen anywhere in the Western world" (ibid:21).

Virtually to everyone's surprise, Gowon ordered that the federal victory would not be celebrated with show trials or war crimes tribunals. He insisted that the war produced "no victor, no vanquished". It has been noted how this was viewed with awe internationally as a unique "policy of clemency in recent history" (Gutteridge 1975:14). Oil played a part in this.

Oil had begun to play an important role in the Nigerian economy even before the war ended in 1970. Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971, and Table 1.4. showed what happened to oil prices after the October Arab-Israeli War. To recall from Chapter 2, the FGN collected over $100 billion in oil rents between 1971 and 1983. The oil rents gave the state and leaders financial autonomy from external actors and internal social classes. What Gowon chose to do with such autonomy, as argued within the conceptual scheme, became the question.

**Foreign Policy and National Security Review**

The Second National Development Plan 1970-1974 provides the basis to ponder the above question and analyse Gowon's post-civil war foreign policy. It is the best written expression of the regime's intention. In reference to Table 1.6, the incoming external aid component of the First Plan 1962-1968 was reduced from 50% to 25% in the Second. The Third Plan 1975-1980 did not even make mention of foreign aid, even though the country borrowed $2 billion in the Eurodollar money market in 1978 under General Obasanjo.
R.A. Akindele is quite correct that this "Plan remains one of the best prepared policy documents ever produced in Nigeria" (1986:59). It recognises explicitly the interrelatedness of internal economic development and foreign policy. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, this is what makes the internal structure of class, state and leadership central to NFP and its explanation. This is the locus of explanation for why Nigeria has failed in its internal economic development and external role conception.

As established in Chapter 1, oil and gas added reinforced Nigeria’s capabilities for economic restructuring and political transformation in the late 1960s through the 1970s to the early 1980s. It was generally believed, as Mayall, the World Bank, the IMF and others noted in Chapter 1, that Nigeria had finally got a basis on which to determine the external and internal direction of the country relatively independent of outside interference. Why did this not happen?

Paradoxically, oil transformed Nigeria both negatively and positively. On the positive side, this transformation, as noted above, involved the expansion of the bourgeoisie, federal and State bureaucracies and parastatals, and commercial linkages and ISI activities. On the negative side, it made those Nigerians in a position to transform the oil surplus into sustainable economic development into parasites. The NEPD is an example.

The NEPD had a laudable objective. It was to create and reinforce an indigenous capitalist class. However, as alluded to in Chapters 1 and 2, the Nigerian bourgeoisie was only interested in acquiring shares and political stakes
in existing MNCs in the country. In the final analysis, the objectives of the NEPD were corrupted and subverted by, paradoxically, the very elites who pushed for them and whom they were meant to benefit (Sanda 1982; Asobie 1988:29-76; Biersteker 1983:185-206).

Militarisation was another negative development in this period. The Armed Forces swelled from a mere 8000 men in 1960 to a force of 274,000 at the end of the war in 1970. 7000 of these were in the Air Force and 5000 in the Navy (Chapter 3). Unlike the Balewa period, the officer corps had also been completely indigenised with the ratio of officer to soldier based first on ethnicity (Cervenka 1971:133). Merit was secondary. However one looks at it, the military was, and remains, a drain on oil resources. It is also as corrupt as the civilian factions of the bourgeoisie.

Murtala believed, however, that with such a large army, "there was no reason why Nigerian soldiers should not go and fight in South Africa alongside the liberation forces, whatever the obstacle" (Sotunmbi 1981:16). However, in reality Nigeria was no match for South Africa militarily. Murtala's sentiments were thus translated into action in other ways discussed below.

**Gowon's Policy on Liberation and Integration**

Support for liberation movements was one of these. As noted above, national security became paramount given the ease with which France and INGOs like the ICRC and CARITAS got access to neighbouring countries as staging posts for their dubious relief missions to Biafra. The role played by the white minority and
apartheid regimes in Southern Africa in arming the rebels during the civil war also
was a part of this expanded view of security.

Unequivocally, apartheid South Africa and Ian Smith's Rhodesia had
become dangerous threats to national security and internal stability (Aluko
concluded that Nigeria must be at the forefront of supporting liberation movements
in Africa to eliminate the threat which the apartheid and other white minority
regimes in Southern Africa represented.

Unlike Balewa's moral approach, Gowon was forced to admit that there was
"no alternative to armed struggle and the use of force to liquidate colonialism in
Africa" (Olusanya & Akindele 1986:6; Ofoegbu 1979:60-61). This new policy and
the financial commitment involved elevated Nigeria to a prominent position
alongside the Front Line States in Southern Africa against the white minority
regimes and apartheid (Inegbedion 1991:157-180). Thus, much like under Balewa,
but not for competitive reasons with Ghana, the country once again became the
largest donor to the liberation cause in Africa. It is estimated that Nigeria
"contributed about US$5 million per year to the special fund of the OAU Liberation
Committee" under Gowon (Ate 1987:184).

In addition, but unlike the Balewa period, direct material, financial and
diplomatic support was also given to the liberation movements (Inegbedion
1991:157-180). Indeed, such support became another core element in Nigerian
policy on liberation in Africa. The liberation of Guinea Bissau owes much to this
assistance from Nigeria. Not surprisingly, as argued in Chapters I and II, the debates on the country's contributions have had little to do with theoretical clarifications for possible options. Rather, they have been about whether Nigeria gave enough (Ogunsanwo 1978:45) or provided too little assistance (Bala Usman 1979).

Concomitant with liberation in Southern Africa, Gowon championed integration in West Africa. It equally dawned on Nigerian leaders that national security was more than external military invasion, the realist conception. In the sub-region, as with other regions in the South, internal stability and economic development were integral to national security. So too were the conditions in the neighbouring states. It would be difficult for Nigerians to live in security if surrounded by chaos.

ECOWAS was the result of this new national cum regional security concern. It was conceived as a confidence building mechanism for economic integration and development, and security cooperation among countries in the sub-region (Okolo 1990:19-52; Bach 1983:605-623). Gowon's lead role against French hostility in founding ECOWAS is well-known (Ojo 1980:571-604; Bach 1983).

Suffice it to note here that once Nigeria took on the project after the war in 1970, the task was one of bringing its francophone opponents in line. Gowon accomplished this through cheque-book diplomacy and other forms of political and economic dispensations to states in the sub-region. Monetary incentives were given in some cases and economic projects sponsored in others (Ojo 1980;
Ogunsanwo 1986; Ihonvbere 1991). ECOWAS was formally established in May 1975. As shown in Chapter 10, this provided the basis for the West African intervention force in the civil war in Liberia, as well as a key instrument in Nigeria’s foreign policy in the sub-region.

**Foreign Policy and Economic Restructuring**

Few internal disagreements were generated by Gowon’s role in bringing ECOWAS to fruition or in Nigeria’s contribution to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, this was a period in which Nigerians thought money was no longer their problem. In this vein, as long as Gowon did not attempt to change the underlying structure of the North-South ethnic-class relations which led to the civil war, there seemed to be happiness in the land. At the time, this was not too difficult to do since the dominant ethnic-class elites believed that as long as each got its own share of the oil rents there would be little to disagree about.

Needless to say, the oil boom simply turned Nigeria into a society of importers and consumers. Little of the oil resources was put into productive investment. Agriculture was more or less abandoned. In particular, the policy makers, as argued in Chapter 1, failed to make the distinction between technology transfer and turnkey projects. Self-reliance was interpreted to mean surplus cash and a dose of nationalism.

Most of all, the state and its constituent classes were riddled with corruption. Under Gowon, policy makers were free to import one item or another for the government just to enrich themselves. One typical example, documented by Terisa
Turner, is the 1974 cement scandal in which Nigerian state officials, MNCs and the commercial compradors colluded in

ordering 20 million tonnes of cement, 16 million tonnes by the Ministry of Defence alone, a volume which at existing port capacity would have taken twenty years to unload (1976:68).

As we shall see in Chapter 6 to 8, even with SAP this type of collusion remains at the core of the Nigerian version of Peter Evans' (1979) triple alliance.

In terms of corruption, the Gowon regime set a record that was only broken by the Shagari administration, as we shall see in Chapter 7. The 1973 census was like a joke no one found funny. Gowon's attempt to host the Second World Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) was turned into a project to enrich those who got the contracts to supply one item or another. Even Gowon's twelve military governors were publicly ridiculed for their brazen corrupt practices, but he failed to remove them because of the fear that the morale of his men and the military was at stake if he did so (Feinstein 1987:275-276).

In any event, even though the Hausa-Fulani went to war in order to preserve the status quo, Gowon had a greater room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. However, it is the general view that he had little imagination. For example, Aminu Kano attested from their close working relationships, Gowon could execute a task well once it had been defined for him, but he rarely took the initiative (Feinstein 1987:271-282; Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:47-48).

Onimode quite correctly argues in this vein that the country missed a historic opportunity in Gowon's failure to capitalise on the "immense post-war
nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment [for] a radical restructuring of Nigerian society" (1982:204). As the World Bank in its review, Nigeria's Second Plan under Gowon was, like those before and after it, "in essence a program of public investment activities by project" (1974:23). Growth occurred, no doubt. But little or no qualitative structural transformation of economy and class relations followed. The growth resulted more from the movement of oil prices in the international market rather than in any productive investment.

Just as Gowon made no attempt to rationalise the internal relations of production, he did not use Nigeria's new-found wealth to actually renegotiate the country's relations with the Western states, especially the US and Britain (Ajala 1986:201). In spite of the most elaborate statement in the Second Plan about the need to redirect NFP, Gowon was bent on proving to the West that, while Russian arms were to be credited with the federal victory over Biafra, Nigeria had not become a radical state.

In fact, Gowon surprised observers when he made Britain the destination of his first foreign official visit after the civil war (Aluko 1981:55). Not even US President Richard Nixon's refusal to meet with him changed Gowon's views towards the US (Bach 1983; Akinyemi 1978). Under Gowon, Nigeria became hamstrung by what the former's Foreign Minister, Dr Okoi Arikpo, called "a common African policy on major international problems of the day" (Aluko 1977:172). In short, the country lost the leadership role it was grudgingly accorded in the OAU in the Balewa period (Mayall 1976:317).
Nor was Gowon’s performance any more inspiring vis-a-vis states in the South. He made foreign policy as he travelled. Resources were squandered during these external excursions, for which Gowon was most famous, in the manner of the profligacy of Nigerians. Gowon is well-known for dishing out Naira at each stop in Southern capitals. Examples include paying the salaries of civil servants in remote and far-away islands such as Grenada and funding projects in Papua New Guinea (Garba 1987; Aluko 1981:201; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985:92-93; Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:48-49).

In comparative perspective, Gowon had Balewa’s weak points but none of the latter’s strong ones. Both shared a moral approach to foreign policy. Second, neither of the two sought to confront Nigeria’s arrested class development. However, internally and within the OAU, everybody had a say, but Balewa had his way (Aluko 1976; Akinyemi 1974; Idang 1973; Phillips 1964). In contrast, Gowon epitomised the famous Nigerian way of maintaining the status quo through avoidance of critical issues, as discussed in Chapter 1. One apt example, treated in the next chapter, was the crisis surrounding Angola’s independence before Gowon was ousted in July 1975. Suffice it to say here that Gowon was content to underwrite OAU policies with no question asked about Nigeria’s interest (Garba 1987:16-17).
Theoretical Synthesis

Ethnic, state class, leadership and international-systemic pressures stand out in varying degrees as forces with which Gowon had to contend in NFP during the civil war. While international-systemic pressures were not overtly hostile at the level of states, civil societies in the West were critical. That is, while most Western governments went along with the traditional UN view that the war was an internal matter, their civil societies did not obey such logic.

In terms of leadership, Gowon’s style had little to recommend it. Few within his cabinet or in the country found it appealing. Initially, Gowon’s views on how the war should be conducted militarily and handled diplomatically accorded with those of his British mentors. However, as the war dragged on, internal pressures mounted. And in order to retain state power Gowon succumbed to internal pressures, and managed external pressures the best he could: muddle through. The state lacked an iota of coherence under Gowon. In the final analysis, the fact remains that Gowon failed, as Ajala correctly argued above, to use available resources to the maximum and desired effect.

As regards the class factor, Gowon supported status quo economic and political relations. He regarded it as his duty to preserve Northern dominance at all costs. In fact, to recall from earlier discussions, he was made leader for that very purpose. Just like President Shagari, as we shall in Chapter 7, Gowon believed in leaving things alone, letting everybody do as they pleased in the hope that there would be peace in the land. This was one reason why the NEPD was
so corrupted and perverted.

Few within the bourgeoisie hesitated to ally with foreign capital in order to sabotage the NEPD, even though it was meant to create a basis for an indigenous industrialist class. In fact, the ousting of Gowon was justified on the basis of such corruption, inefficiency and the highjacking of the decision making process by the commercial and state compradors.

This leads to two points in reference to dependency analysis and capability empiricism. Neither informs an adequate understanding of NFP under Gowon. Nigeria had the resources or a material base of leverage or power, and yet Gowon performed so dismally. Gowon left no lasting impression on NFP not because of aid, trade and investment dependence on the West, but because he supported the status quo. In other words, he came to power to aid the North to preserve its dominance and existing class relations, and went to war to do so.

Ethnic-class struggles for power led to this war, even though ethnicity became something of a dirty word for a while after the crisis and destruction. In short, the ethnic, state and North-South divide became subdued after the war, aided by the subsequent oil bonanza, which appeared to the bourgeoisie at the time to be unlimited in quantity and effect. The next chapter examines how Generals Murtala and Obasanjo performed under the same international and domestic conditions, namely continuing Cold War and high oil prices.
CHAPTER 5

GENERALS MURTALA AND OBASANJO IN ANGOLA AND CHAD

The objective in the present chapter is to isolate how the leaderships of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo shaped NFP in Angola and Chad in 1975-1979. Part one outlines the internal structure of class, state and Murtala’s leadership. Part two examines the foreign policy issue: Nigeria’s recognition of the MPLA in Angola; the conflict with Washington; and Murtala’s efforts to establish Nigeria’s lead in the OAU policy on Angola.

Part three outlines Obasanjo’s leadership and deals with his efforts to continue the search for an independent Nigerian policy in African affairs. The foreign policy issue is Obasanjo’s foray into the Chad crisis to define a role for Nigeria. Part four is the theoretical synthesis.

Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Murtala’s Leadership

As after the first military coup against Balewa in 1966, there was joy across the land when General Murtala Mohammed emerged as the new head of state following the ouster of Gowon on 29 July 1975. Even with his foreknowledge of the coup, Murtala still had to be prevailed upon to take the reins of government by the junta which deposed his predecessor. It was widely believed within the military that only he was capable of holding the country and the armed forces together, and of taking both out of the political morass into which they had sunk under Gowon.
True to the image painted by Obasanjo, and Kirk-Greene and Rimmer in Chapter 4, Murtala made his predominance a condition for accepting the offer to be head of state. He made it clear to the junta spokesperson, Brigadier Joe Garba, that:

If you are inviting me to be head of state, I'm not going to allow you to tie my hands behind my back [by collective decision making]. I must have executive authority and run the country as I see best (Garba 1987:xiv).

The junta gave in to his demands even though Murtala was asking for the same powers for which Gowon was allegedly deposed.

Having said that, the important point to note is that Murtala had established his predominance right from the very beginning. The new leader wasted no time in setting an agenda for the country. Sparing unnecessary details, Murtala took immediate action on all the domestic issues which had sent the Gowon regime into a state of lethargy. Aptly summarised by views from Aminu Kano (Feinstein 1987:281-282):

Murtala’s prompt action postponing the lagging ... FESTAC, cancelling the beclouded 1973 census results, appointing new Military Governors, and reconsidering a political program for a return to a civilian government, immediately removed most of the controversial issues and had a soothing effect on the nation.

He also applied the "shock" treatment to the bureaucracy which had become unwieldy and a law unto itself. When the purge was over, some 15,000 "deadwoods" had been retired or dismissed from the civil service (Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:12).
Like his military predecessors, Murtala ruled through a Supreme Military Council (SMC). However, he did not invite back into government the old breed politicians on whom Gowon had relied. Murtala chose instead to rely on the younger generation of officers who fought the civil war with him. In his view, these could relate directly to military toughness and command.

On assuming power, Murtala stated clearly that the country's human and material resources need not be a source of constraint, which Gowon did not have the courage to proclaim for fear that Nigeria might be seen as throwing its weight around. Unlike Gowon or Balewa, Murtala was already familiar with many issues and problems in NFP through his membership and participation in the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA). As Akinyemi observes, Murtala and Obasanjo were the first Nigerian heads of state to have been "previously involved in an institutionalized intellectual exercise in foreign policy" (1978:viii & 1984:5-6)

In contrast to Gowon's low key approach, Murtala adopted the view that Nigeria's resources must be employed not only to liberate Africa, but also to make the country visible in the world. Murtala held the view that Nigeria did not need the approval of external powers to take foreign policy decisions in the national interest (Eke 1990:28-70). In sum, the new leader was eager to chart a new course that sought to reconcile Nigeria's role behaviour with its role conception.

One of the foremost erstwhile analysts of NFP, Akinyemi, was chosen to head the NIIA and direct its research activities as the country's centre for foreign policy. It was perhaps as a sign of the importance his appointment that Akinyemi
had direct access to Murtala for policy input. Akinyemi was instructed to formulate new guidelines for NFP. In September 1975, the latter chose the esteemed Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the architect of ECOWAS and then Executive-Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), to chair a blue-ribbon committee of academics and senior military officers to review NFP (Garba 1987:14; Ogunesanwo 1986:40-49 & 116; Akinyemi 1979:154).

Unlike the chaos under Gowon, Murtala restricted decision-making in the new regime to an inner cabinet consisting of three other officers. These were Garba who took charge of external affairs after much persuasion; Obasanjo who was second in command to Murtala; and the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji M.D. Yusuf. Akinyemi served informally as advisor to this inner cabinet. Even within this exclusive circle, Murtala reserved for himself, as noted above, unquestionable powers to make decisions as he saw fit.

Similarly unlike Gowon who was held captive by the state compradors, Murtala by-passed Nigeria's traditional Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) because he found the latter's business as usual approach to foreign policy limiting. While the MEA housed the best and most educated crop of the Nigerian elites, it remained, nonetheless, the least progressive patronage unit of the country's political institutions. It has been said that its personnel spent more time chasing foreign exchange or forex than in performing their duties (Ogunesanwo 1980:3-5; Akinyemi 1984:6-8; Gambari 1989:24-26). In fact, Obasanjo once charged that NFP would be different if Nigeria's diplomatic corps devoted half the time spent on
"wining and dining" (Ogunsanwo 1980).

Murtala created three units outside of this corrupt foreign policy structure. One was set up within the office of the Head of State at Dodan Barracks. Another was located in the political department of the Cabinet Office. And the third was constituted around Akinyemi at the NIIA (Aluko 1990:219-224).

It was Murtala himself who identified key world bodies such as the Security Council, the International Court of Justice and other North-South forums in which Nigeria must be represented (Garba 1987:1-14). Murtala made it clear to Garba that he would not put up with a foreign minister who conducted external affairs at home. It was his view that if defending Nigeria's interest warranted it, "Garba should plan on spending one week out of every two abroad" (ibid:9).

Like his predecessor, Murtala re-affirmed Africa as the cornerstone of NFP. However, unlike Gowon, the former reversed Balewa's policy which barred liberation movements from operating in Nigeria. Murtala held the view that Nigeria had a particular responsibility to defend Africa's interests without equivocation (Ogunsanwo 1980; Kirk-Greene & Rimmer 1981:49). Not only were the liberation movements now free to conduct their activities in the country, but they were given all manner of assistance from the state to do so.

Unlike Balewa or Gowon, Murtala saw support for African liberation as the litmus test of Western policy in Southern Africa. The consensus opinion in both the radical and realist schools of NFP analysis holds that Murtala's zeal and sense of purpose on the issue was reminiscent of Nkrumah's vision of Pan-Africanism (Ate
Aluko states in his comparison of the two leaders that, whereas Gowon regarded support for liberation as merely one of his foreign policy preoccupations in Africa, Murtala viewed it almost as a "priority to which all other foreign policy interests must be subordinate" (1981:236). Murtala rejected the American view that African liberation was a Cold War issue. In his scheme of things, the problem was intrinsically African (Ate 1987:195).

International-Systemic Challenges: Murtala and the Contradictions of Africa Liberation Struggles

The latter problem forced itself upon Murtala in mid-1975. The foreign policy review ordered by Murtala was only partly under way when the civil war in Angola took a dramatic turn. As we saw in Chapter 3 with Balewa in the Congo:

If the new regime was hoping for a methodical and gracious transition from a leisurely and somewhat conservative foreign policy to a dynamic one as evidenced by the setting up of the Adedeji Committee, the Angolan crisis came as a rude reminder that foreign policy crisis is no respecter of domestic political pace (Akinyemi 1979b:175).

South Africa had invaded Angola on the side of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. This invasion not only further confused an already chaotic situation, but the new Nigerian leaders, as noted in Chapter 1, had no standing policy on the Angolan question.

Murtala inherited Gowon's policy as worked out at the OAU summit in Kampala, Uganda, in August 1975. Under the terms of the Alvor Accords worked out between Portugal, the OAU and the three warring factions, it was initially agreed that the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA would form a government of national
unity as the basis for an independent Angola. This was the OAU consensus under which Gowon operated in the belief that only a coalition government could avert a civil war and foreign intervention in Angola.

The new regime did not choose to abandon Gowon's policy. International-systemic pressures forced its reappraisal. As we shall see, however, the response was arrived at through domestic processes. In other words, the Murtala regime did not adopt its policy because it was dictated by some Western actors. Rather, the decision was taken because it was thought to represent the view of Nigeria's role conception in African liberation.

The fact-finding mission sent to Angola served as an avenue through which new developments could be independently assessed, and the individuals, groups and issues involved in the liberation struggles evaluated (Ogunsawo 1986:56; Ate 1987:192-193). In fact, Murtala's "desire to effect reconciliation among the three Angolan movements was so strong" that Garba "went to the extent of calling for a postponement of Angola's independence with a view to giving the OAU more time to work on reconciliation of all the liberation movements" (Ogunsanwo 1980:22; Garba 1975:14). Concrete evidence of South Africa's invasion of Angola on the side of UNITA, however, dramatically changed the situation.

Even though Murtala was caught unawares, he quickly assembled a group of experts to appraise and advise him on the problem. Meanwhile, his regime had moved to establish contact with the Angolans, both directly and through UN, OAU and FLS channels (Garba 1987:15-17). Even at this time, external affairs minister
Garba was shuttling between various African and Western state capitals searching for a diplomatic coalition in support of a government of national unity. Back in Lagos, the other members of the inner SMC - Obasanjo and Yusuf - consulted with the experts gathered. (Ate 1987:192).

Notable among such experts was Basil Davidson, the British historian, activist on Africa and authority on Angola. It was arranged for him to come down to Lagos to brief Garba. A series of African delegations were on hand to appraise the SMC on the Angolan situation. Unusual in NFP decision-making, but as both Davidson (1987:2425-6) and Garba (1987:21) concur, this informed opinion was central to Murtala's decision.

Details of the Angolan crisis and the turn of events in late-1975 are well-known (Marcum 1978). Suffice it to say that the Portuguese bailed out of the country in early-November 1975 abandoning the Alvor Accords. It was in the ensuing power vacuum that the MPLA, which had fought its way to the capital of Luanda formally declared Angola's independence on 11 November 1975.

**South Africa's Invasion of Angola as the Catalyst for Murtala's Recognition of the MPLA**

South Africa invaded Angola on the side of the FNLA and UNITA to repel the MPLA. In the Cold War line-up over the conflict, the apartheid regime was not alone, however. It was supported by Presidents Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. The American CIA coordinated the operations (Barber & Barratt 1990:186-196).
To Murtala and his colleagues in the SMC, this move was a replay of the external attempt to break up Nigeria during its civil war. Now two critical issues were joined. Not only was the newly-won independence of Angola at stake, but South Africa's military presence in Luanda was substantial, and posed a direct threat to Nigeria's security and territorial integrity (Ogunsanwo 1980:23). Pik W. Botha, then South Africa's Defence Minister, even boasted that: "If we take Luanda, there is nothing that can prevent us taking Lagos and even Cairo" (Wilmot 1989:385).

Whatever Botha’s intentions were, South Africa's military superiority on the continent made such threats real. To recall from Chapter 4, South Africa and Rhodesia supplied arms to the rebel side in the Nigerian civil war. This was not easily forgotten. It thus raised the concern that, if South Africa's invasion of Angola was not repelled, "it would only be a question of time before the adjoining states were gobbled up, and a direct threat posed to Nigeria" (Ogunsanwo 1980:23).

Perhaps the more troubling question was how to confront the apartheid regime. The most direct and effective course of action was to effect South Africa's withdrawal. However, as also noted in Chapter 4, Nigerian leaders had to contend with the fact that South Africa had superior military power and strategic reach (Ogunsawo 1980:136). In other words, it was akin to an invitation to commit suicide or risk a direct military confrontation with South Africa. Diplomacy was thus the preferred option.
However, the meetings with the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger - not known for his sympathy for the African cause - led nowhere. Contrary to Murtala's expectations, Kissinger's response did not even recognise that Africans had legitimate concerns over Angola. To the latter, it was simply a Cold War issue to be handled between the superpowers. The Americans were more concerned with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola than with freedom for the African people. Kissinger was particularly intent on preserving the white minority and apartheid regimes in the region (El-Khawas & Cohen 1976; Lake 1976).

**Nigerian-US Conflict over the Recognition of the MPLA**

Kissinger simply believed that once US views were known, it was left for the African states to toe the line. At least this was the message Lagos got. What Nigerian leaders did from there on became a matter of internal decision processes. In the words of the Foreign Minister, Garba, it was this challenge that "handed Nigeria the foreign policy issue that would catapult it to centre stage, and not just Africa's stage."

Nigeria's objective changed from getting the three warring factions to form a coalition to securing recognition for the MPLA as the sole and legitimate government of Angola. It was critical for Murtala that Nigeria be seen to act in conformity with its role conception as the leader of Africa.

Unlike Balewa or Gowon, Murtala did not hesitate to confront the Americans when the issue warranted it (Garba 1987). Indeed, he became as concerned with the decision to recognise the MPLA as he was about the manner in which it was
done. He wanted it to have "dramatic effect". This was exactly what happened when, on 25 November 1975, Nigeria announced its recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. What made the crisis and the subsequent decision equally crucial, as Garba notes, was the fact that it occurred at the very time Murtala wanted to give a new direction to NFP.

Given their Cold War perspective, the Americans were stunned. Zaire and Zambia, two US allies, which had opposed the MPLA were furious. In contrast, the decision accorded perfectly with Soviet policy. The Russians were therefore content to stay on the side-lines while Nigerian leaders did the MPLA's bidding.

The Murtala regime followed its diplomatic recognition with firm commitments of economic and military aid to the MPLA. As Garba recalls, the FMG made an "outright grant of $20 million to the MPLA" (1987:23). This was followed by a pledge of $100 million in aid. The FGN also gave armaments;

... military hardware from rifles to MIGs ... were sent in ever-increasing quantities ... and anyone, particularly in the MEA ... who asked about a quid pro quo for Nigeria's staunch support, was decisively overridden.

In addition, the MPLA government was "promised everything from C-130 aircraft to fresh meat, and we even took on the Gulf Oil Company on their behalf" (Garba 1987:31).

Murtala's active involvement in the crisis was further displayed by his early-December personal message to the people of Angola in which he confirmed the $100 million financial as well as materiel aid earlier pledged by the FGN (Olusanya & Akindele 1986:524). Relations between the two countries were to further
deteriorate over the manner in which the FGN had made the issue a cause celebre. The form letter sent by US President Gerald Ford to African leaders warning them against recognising the MPLA only added insult to injury.

The copy delivered to Nigeria was even "unsigned and unsealed from the US Embassy in Lagos" according to Garba (West Africa, 16 Feb 1976:199). Murtala was furious. He saw the US policy of linkage between Cuban and South African troop withdrawals from Angola as an imperialist machination and a "gross insult to Africans' intelligence" (Ate 1987:194).

Nigeria convened the First Extraordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in January 1976 in response. In what has become his now famous charged speech, the Nigerian leader argued that the OAU must recognise the MPLA as the sole legitimate government of Angola. In his view, UNITA and the FNLA had betrayed their country by joining forces with apartheid South Africa and American imperialists (Polhemus 1977:52). Murtala intensified Nigeria's diplomatic efforts to secure international recognition for the MPLA.

Ogunsanwo sets the record straight that, contrary to radical opinion in the country and elsewhere, Murtala did not see the conflict as the "beginning of a general anti-American campaign" (1980:27). Unlike Gowon or Balewa, Murtala sought to demonstrate his regime's independence (Garba 1987:26-28). In this vein, not even African leaders were spared. For example, Murtala was so incensed on learning that President Kenneth Kaunda colluded with South Africa against Angola that he summarily cancelled a $200 million loan to Zambia a few hours before
Kaunda was due in Lagos to collect the cheque. Murtala simply gave the order that the Nigerian High Commissioner in Lusaka informed Kaunda that the visit was off (Ajala 1986:202).

Suffice it to say, those like Davidson who criticised Nigeria's initial support for a broad-based government of national unity in Angola later conceded that, despite its chequered genesis, Murtala's decision "marked the threshold of a sovereign Nigerian diplomacy" (1987:2426). In the same vein, Garba concluded that in spite of its imperfections, ... the policy was the right one. It provided the first litmus test of our new approach to Nigeria's foreign relations (1987:34).

As the Nigerian Sunday Times put it back then, the Angolan decision was "singularly the most daring and responsible foreign policy decision taken by the Nigerian government since independence" (Ajala 1986:201).

In short, it can be said that nothing establishes the legitimacy of a policy like success! It was only a matter of time before the rest of Africa recognised the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. It took the US almost 20 years to do the right thing when President Bill Clinton finally recognised the MPLA government of Angola in April 1993. In the final analysis, James Polhemus is quite correct, and Stephen Wright (1981) would agree, in the view that

Angola was a success for Nigeria because a timely abandonment of the policy of national unity placed Nigeria on the winning side at a time its when winning was by no means inevitable (1977:60).

It could not have been otherwise. In foreign policy, the success of any decision depends on the international environment.
This is to say, since time and chance intervene between a decision and its outcome, the important thing is to take what was believed to be the correct decision at the time. This underlines the point about the need to always keep the objectives in view. In contrast to Murtala, Balewa, as shown in Chapter 3, tended to extol the principles while neglecting the objectives. The same was true for Gowon (Chapter 4).

**Leadership and Resource Availability**

Nigeria’s recognition of the MPLA demonstrates clearly one instance of the role of leadership in decision-making (Inegbedion & Shaw 1994). Unlike no leader before or since, Murtala retained control of the decision making process. He sought the opinion of experts and trusted advisors to help form as accurate a picture as possible of the immediate problem. Murtala is the only head of state yet who had an explicit definition of the problem and the objectives sought. It was the first time that a Nigerian leader did not make foreign policy as he went.

With reference to class and state, the Angolan decision suggests how much room for manoeuvre the leader has within Nigeria’s arrested ethnic-class development. Contrary to the *a priori* conclusions by Sotunmbi (1990), factional class struggles and external oil interests were not represented in the decision making process. The role of civil society actors on the decision was marginal.

It is clear from the testimony by Garba that outside input was by invitation only. In fact, the secrecy with which the policy was made in itself constitutes part of the lingering aura surrounding Murtala’s decision to recognise the MPLA. Tunde
Agbabiaka puts it most succinctly when he writes: "What made Mohammed a national hero was his leadership style: bold, decisive and pan-Africanist" (1986:334).

Only Aluko appeared to hold the view, in support of the MEA, that the Angolan decision as a "serious error in judgement" (1983:89-90). Others like Akinyemi (1984:6-8) and Garba (1987) even argue that the decision would have had more impact were it not for the lack of cooperation from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Needless to say, the MEA was against Murtala's new foreign policy direction from the very beginning. This was a ministry whose bureaucrats shared the American propaganda that the MPLA was communist. This meant that Nigerian leaders could not safely rely on normal diplomatic channels in their campaign on the side of the MPLA.

Moreover, it made the undertaking more expensive in both diplomatic and materiel terms. Indeed, Aluko suggests that the MEA sabotaged the implementation of the decision because the bureaucrats disagreed with it (1983:89). However, to recall from Chapter 2, Aluko mistook this for bureaucratic politics.

Externally, the paradox of Nigeria's economic dependence on and political relations with the US was revealed dramatically in a manner similar to that of Gowon during the civil war. Recall how, on the one hand, France supported Biafra politically and militarily, while on the other hand, Nigeria's oil trade surplus with France increased from 24 to 101 million pounds sterling over the civil war period.
In the same vein, we find that Nigeria's oil exports to the US increased by about 50% at the height of the Angolan conflict in 1975/76 (Ogunsanwo 1980:45). In fact, Nigeria became the second largest oil supplier to the US behind Saudi Arabia with a market share of 17%, and ahead of Canada with 15% (Price 1978:19; Polhemus 1977:44). Perhaps more critically, its share of the US oil imports represented "some 60%" of Nigeria's total oil exports at the time (Garba 1987:29).

The Nigerian bourgeoisie panicked, more so the commercial factions and plutocrats. The fear of losing their source of economic status and reproductive mechanism was duly communicated to Murtala by the bourgeoisie. Garba explains:

On the last Sunday in January, Murtala called me to his house, handed me a hand-written letter, and said, "Read it; I want your reaction." I saw it was from Mallam Aminu Kano ... Its contents surprised me. It was careful, thoughtful, and incisive analysis of our Angola policy, ending with the injunction that by all accounts we have proved our point, but had in some ways overdone the revolutionary bit; and that it was time for Murtala to start being a statesman and think about the national interest. Nigeria was a large country, with a large population, and its long-term interests must not be jeopardized. Murtala should now begin to think about fence-mending, and as first step, should send me to Washington to talk to Kissinger about the whole Angola affair. Aminu Kano had known Murtala from childhood and so could not only write to a Head of State this way but be taken seriously by him. In two days I was on my way to Washington (1987:29).

What makes this most interesting is that this plea came from Mallam Aminu Kano, supposedly the most radical civilian leader within the Nigerian bourgeoisie.

Equally important, it indicates, vis-a-vis the types of argument encountered in Chapter 1 by Achebe and others, the parameters of leadership in Nigeria's arrested class development and ethnic contradictions. Even for Murtala, dominant interests constituted the parameters of action. If on the basis of the note from
Aminu Kano Murtala tossed out his well-thought out policy without even a review, then the leader can act with relative autonomy so long as the dominant ethnic-class factions do not deem their interests or position to be threatened. This was the case with the imposition of austerity measures under Shagari and Buhari, and the adoption of SAP by Babangida, as we shall see in Chapters 6 to 8.

However, given the above, it is doubtful whether Murtala’s policies were as progressive as both realist and radical analysts alike seem to believe (Garba 1975; Gambari 1980a; Ogunsanwo 1988; Ihonvbere 1991). For example, Gambari argues that Murtala was able to pursue "progressive policies towards the rest of the world" because the latter equally pursued "corresponding domestic policies" (1980a:27). Yet, it seems clear from the above that the so-called progressive policies did not question existing ethnic and class relations. Nor did they seek to rationalise the state and political relations of production. Moreover, those who label these policies progressive do not ask: progressive for whom?

More specifically, Murtala did not embark on any social transformation project. Nor did he engage in any economic or class restructuring. Not even Nigeria’s arrested ethnic-class development came up for debate. To borrow the words of Gus Liebenow, Murtala governed, like his predecessors and successors, "assuming that the solutions which must be applied are more technical or technological and do not require a basic shift in ideology or a restructuring of the society" (1986:252). In short, Murtala was a nationalist, not a class revolutionary.
Viewed in this light, what Gambari and others view as "progressive policies" hardly touched the lives of ordinary Nigerians. To briefly recall, Murtala cancelled the perverted 1973 census and postponed FESTAC. He replaced the twelve state governors and created seven more states. He moved the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja. These measures or policies either created positions and/or replaced a set of elites like Gambari with similar elites: the circulation of elites. It seems clear therefore that only those within the ranks of the bourgeoisie stood to gain from the policies in question.

In short, this conception of progressive policies has the circulation of Nigerian elites written all over it. As argued in Chapter 1, the majority of Nigerians were even worse off during the oil boom, when unprecedented resources flowed into state coffers. It is like a joke that the putschists, led by Lt. Col. Suka Dimka, who sought to overthrow Murtala accused him of going communist (Ihonvebere & Shaw 1988). However, it can be assumed that since Dimka and his coup co-plotters only wanted to restore Gowon, they preferred the unhindered access to the state treasury which the chaos and anarchy under the latter provided.

Murtala was assassinated on 13 February 1976 in Dimka's failed coup just described. However, his legacy to the country has endured. Murtala's "style is still the only yardstick most Nigerians use to measure the success of those who aspire to lead the restless nation" (Agbabiaka 1986:334).
General Obasanjo: The Murtala-Obasanjo Regime

General Obasanjo, second in command, took charge of the state on the assassination of Murtala, but only because he was forced into it. In Obasanjo's words, to rule Nigeria was Not My Will (1990). In his broadcast to the country, Obasanjo stated that: "I have been called upon against my personal wish and desire to serve as the new Head of State" (West Africa, 23 Feb 1976:233).

If Obasanjo were a politician, it can be said he was being modest. With regards to the military, however, one must wonder if the Nigerian army was so politicised that General Obasanjo had the choice of taking command when Murtala had fallen. There is little doubt that such an act would call for a court-marshall in non-political military establishments.

Of course, one is well-aware that Obasanjo might have hesitated in taking command because of the Brigadier Ogundipe saga. To recall from Chapter 4, Obasanjo recounted how Ogundipe was prevented from taking command over General Ironsi’s slain body, even though he was next in line, because Northern elements within the military had vowed that only one of their kind was acceptable as leader. However, Obasanjo pledged not to deviate from the Murtala agenda. The former staged the FESTAC lavishly in 1977. He kept religiously to the timetable to return the country to civilian rule in 1979: Nigeria’s Second Republic. As we shall see in the next chapter, this occupied the commercial bourgeoisie and the plutocrats who were plotting the pillage of Nigeria in the guise of constitution making.
Seen in light of the framework in Chapter 1, it may be little surprising that Obasanjo was able to give generous incentives to local manufacturers in form of protection for their industries and reduced duties on imported raw materials. Towards the end of military rule, a decree provided up to eight years of protection for local industries against imports (Garba 1987:202).

However, as Garba goes on to argue, Obasanjo did not ... compel those industries to locate and utilise local raw materials as a matter of policy. Nigerian manufacturers exploited it to their full advantage and to the detriment of the country. Prices of locally manufactured goods went up, with the result that smuggling became a way of life (1987:202).

The next section examines Obasanjo's foray into Chad.

**Struggles for Influence in Chad**

Chad and Nigeria have a lot more to do with each other beyond the cultural affinities of their peoples. The economies and security of both countries are interwoven (Bassey 1984:209-218). Like neighbouring Niger, and as a landlocked country, Chad relies greatly on Nigeria's domestic transportation system to move vital goods and supplies from the coast inland. Such supplies are carried on the latter's railways from Lagos to Maiduguri where they are then transported by road to their destinations in Chad.

Ever since General Felix Malloum overthrew President Ngarta Tombalbaye in April 1975, Chad had seen little peace, security or development. The warring factions and the various splinter groups are difficult to decipher. Perhaps the main faction was the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) under Goukkouni
Weddeye. His rival, Hissen Habre, broke away from FROLINAT to form the Armed Forces of the North (FAN). Malloum remained in charge of what was left of the Chadian army.

Yet another faction of the FROLINAT was the Third Army. It was later renamed the Movement for the Liberation of Chad (MPLT). There was also the United Front of the South led by Lt. Col Wadal A. Kamougue, former head of the Chad gendermarie. Still another was the Volcan Force under Ahmet Acyl. In total, at least 10-12 factions staked a claim in the power struggles in Chad.

In this chaos, governments were often a coalition of warlords who sought to subdue the other faction(s) rather than achieve a durable peace. While the leaders of the warring factions all advocated a government of national unity, none wanted to see the other(s) as leader on a normal basis. As we shall see in Chapter 9 in case of Liberia, each truce was used to rearm and regroup forces for the next offensive.

Moreover, during the Cold War, Western involvement only complicated the prospects of finding a workable and lasting solution. As in Southern Africa in the case of Angola, Britain and the US were more concerned with the international balance of power against the Soviet Union and less with the specificities of Chad and its development problematic. France was particularly interested in retaining Chad as a part of its power status. The French were thus not at all reluctant to use

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1One attempt to make sense of the chaos in terms of factions and splinter groups is "Chad: The A to Z of Factionalism", **Africa Confidential**, 14 Nov 1979: 4-7.
any means to contend with and keep out Qaddafi who had territorial ambitions in Chad, and interest in the uranium-rich Aozou strip.

Needless to say, this created enormous security problems for Nigeria as the fighting spilled over. Border clashes were frequent. As we shall see in Chapter 9, the refugee influx into Nigeria from the Liberian civil war paled by comparison to Chad.

Perhaps more than anything else, Qaddafi's involvement posed the greatest concern for Obasanjo (Haynes 1990:58-73; Ogunbadejo 1986; Vogt 1981:140-141). Militarily, the civil war experience, discussed in Chapter 4, made Libya's presence in Chad a force to contend with, in terms of Nigeria's redefinition of both national and regional security. Most of all, there was the fear that Libya's brand of Islamic fundamentalism could engulf the volatile religious situation in Nigeria.

In this context, Obasanjo's foray into Chad can be seen, in light of the criticisms by Wright (1981:1685-7), Aluko (1981b:9-10) and others as an attempt to develop a more credible base for involvement in the sub-region. Nigeria's decisive break came when Obasanjo successfully negotiated the release of two American pilots held hostage by the Third Liberation Army. As with the various factions in the Chad conflict, the Third Army sought desperately a source of external funding and arms supply.²

²On which African country supported and acted as an arms conduit for which faction, see "Chad: Who is Winning", Africa Confidential, 14 March 1979: 5-8.
Suffice it to say, the Third Army was "generally reckoned to have been financed by Nigeria and the American oil company, CONOCO" (Africa Confidential, 23 May 1979:5). This transfer of mutual economic interests between Nigeria and its oil MNCs to the realm of foreign policy facilitated Obasanjo's participation and influence in the search for an African solution to the civil war in Chad (Thompson & Adloff 1981:151). Sparing tedious details, Obasanjo succeeded in arranging a ceasefire between the national army and Habre's FAN in March 1979. His "offer to send a peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire" and host a peace conference in Nigeria were equally accepted (ibid:113).

This was how Nigeria became entangled and assumed its mediatory role in the Chad civil war. The country hosted a series of peace talks in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A total of four Accords were signed - 2 in Kano and 2 in Lagos - before Obasanjo handed over power to President Shagari in October 1979. It has been noted that each of the accords, "with minor variations, was similar to its predecessor: none worked" (Africa Confidential, 22 Aug 1979:4). There are several reasons why.

To start with, all the self-appointed foreign conciliators or meddlers did not have a common interest in a stable political order in Chad (Thompson & Adloff 1981:90). Obasanjo believed that Nigeria should be sole mediator in the conflict. He even managed to exclude Libya and France from the first two Kano peace talks. In consequence, the latter states sought to undermine the integrity of the new coalition government agreed on in Kano I. This is not to say that France and
Libya were allied against Nigeria. The two were as much against each other as they were against Nigeria. Each had its own reasons for wanting Nigeria's mediation efforts to fail.

Qaddafi, like the French, was only willing to support the faction amenable to his dictates (*Africa Confidential*, 22 Aug 1979:4-6). Thus Libya was less concerned with a government of national unity in Chad than who was in charge of such an arrangement (*Africa Confidential*, 31 Jan 1979:6-7, & 14 March 1979:5-8). Franco-Nigerian rivalry in the region is well-known. Although the French saw Obasanjo as the lesser of the two evils with Qaddafi, they still did not want Nigerian efforts to succeed where theirs had failed. The last thing the French wanted to do was to leave Nigeria in charge.

It has been shown that France sabotaged the Nigerian peacekeeping operation for this purpose (Vogt 1981:145-152; Ogunsanwo 1980:67-70). Nigeria was forced to withdraw the 800 troop peacekeeping force it had sent as a part of the ceasefire agreement. Obasanjo was "particularly irritated that an African government should reject Nigerian services as a peace-keeping force in favour of soldiers from France" (*Africa Confidential*, 22 Aug 1979:5).

As already noted, the other three Accords were only as successful as the first. This goes to show that external forces can only impose artificial stability. Real peace and security can only derive from the sort of legitimacy accorded by those in the domestic political economy.
However, some analysts claim that, while the efforts were not a success, they at least showed, as we shall see in Chapter 9 with the case of General Babangida in Liberia, that Nigeria had the capability to be effective, if properly planned and used. According to Tom Imohighe:

the decisive manner in which the 1979 operation was carried out single-handedly by Nigeria was unique. This time she undertook the operation without any logistic back-up from external quarters (1987:138).

It has equally been noted that "Kano I was an undeniable success for Nigeria inasmuch as Obasanjo had succeeded as arbiter and conciliator for Chad where the OAU had failed" (Thompson & Adloff 1981:113). However, as we shall see in the next chapter, Shagari failed to build on this "success".

Theoretical Synthesis

Clearly, the Murtala-Obasanjo regime appears to be the first attempt to outline a coherent foreign policy agenda, and to define for the citizens and others what Nigeria stood for. The leadership factor in this case was unmistakable. In contrast to Aluko and the many others examined in the previous chapters, however, it was not because Murtala belonged to the Northern aristocracy nor his Islamic faith. In fact, such an argument contradicts Aluko's own thesis on the determinants of African foreign policy in which he stated that (1977:10):

Where the rulers are militant and socialist in outlook, and where they are of humble birth without wealth such as Dr. Nkumah, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, Colonel Gaddafi, one can expect a radical foreign policy stance from their countries. But where the rulers are conservative, with aristocratic background, such as King Hassan of Morocco, or with plenty of wealth such as President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Tolbert of Liberia, one can expect a moderate, cautious foreign policy.
Moreover, we need to recall from Chapter 4 how Aluko compared Murtala to Nkrumah in the most favourable terms.

In my view, Murtala performed admirably because he was a strong leader. This trait was evident in his conflicts with Gowon during and after the civil war, as we saw in Chapter 4. Moreover, as Akinyemi pointed out above, Murtala and Obasanjo were already involved with the intellectual community in debating NFP. Thus, they had some ideas about foreign policy and in what direction Nigeria's should be moving.

In short, unlike the other leaders, both Murtala and Obasanjo had some specific ideas on the direction in which NFP should be NFP headed. Resources or the capability was available to aid this re-direction. That is, resources do not in themselves determine foreign policy. But they can certainly aid it.

In the case of the Murtala-Obasanjo regime, oil resources were central only insofar as there were clearly identified with defined objectives. To draw from the data in Table 1.6, similar resources were available under Gowon. Yet, NFP under the latter left no lasting impression. Gowon failed to apply available resources in the way Murtala did (Ogunsanwo 1980; Onimode 1982; Ajala 1986).

With reference to ethnicity, class and state, the Angolan decision suggests that the leader has room for manoeuvre against international-systemic pressures and within Nigeria's socio-economic and political contradictions. However, the leader's ability to so manoeuvre is what s/he has brings into the job. This can be either experience or resolve, as with the case of General Buhari in Chapter 7.
In the final analysis, unlike Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo believed in cooperation when necessary but not necessarily cooperation. Like the Nigerian civil war, the Angolan decision marked a major turning point in NFP. Unlike Gowon, Murtala took the turn. Obasanjo hesitantly assumed leadership when Murtala was assassinated and passed it on to Shagari. The next chapter looks at how Shagari was equally unable to match Nigeria's resources with the country's national role conception.
PART III: CONTEMPORARY CASES

Map 6.1: Nigeria's 19 State Structure, 1976
CHAPTER 6

PRESIDENT SHAGARI IN CHAD AND NAMIBIA

The focus in the present chapter is on NFP in Chad and Namibia the Second Republic, 1979-1983, under the leadership of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This coincided with the period when Nigeria was supposed to have had more money than its leaders knew what to do with in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The chapter is organised in four main parts. Part one outlines the internal structure of state, ethnic and class struggles, and Shagari's leadership. Part two examines the foreign policy issue: Nigeria's leadership role in the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. Part three deals with Shagari's attempt to revise NFP on the Namibian question.

**Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Shagari's Leadership**

Civilian rule was restored in Nigeria with fanfare on 1 October 1979. The transfer of power from the Murtala-Obasanjo regime after thirteen years of military rule to the elected civilian presidency of Shagari was most welcome as a renewal of Nigeria's manifest destiny. The hand-over had the appearance of a new dawn. Internally and externally, it was generally seen as the long-awaited deliverance of Nigeria from its chaotic and violent past towards democratic development and the fulfillment of its role conception as the natural leader in Africa.

Internally, however, the underlying socio-political arrangements in the Second Republic differed little from those that led to the demise of the First. The
two Republics simply mirrored each other. When General Obasanjo lifted the ban on formal party politics in September 1978, more than forty sundry groups and associations vied for recognition as political parties to contest the 1979 elections. In the end, Nigeria's corrupt and partisan Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) registered five, all of them a mere re-incarnation of their earlier selves in the First Republic (Adamu & Ogunsanwo 1983; Kurtis 1983).

If anything, only their labels had changed. Many of those who pillaged the country under the late Balewa and Ahmadu Bello in the NPC in the 1950s and 1960s had now only regrouped as the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. The AG was renamed the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) still under the firm control of its old leader Chief Obafemi Awolowo.

Those in the former NCNC recamped as the Nigerian People's Party (NPP) led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. Mallam Aminu Kano merely rebaptised his NEPU as the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). The only new entrant to the power struggle in the Second Republic was the Greater Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) under the dispensation of Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim.

Even though Shagari and Waziri were new as party leaders, neither was, however, a "newbreed" politician. Both men served as cabinet minister in the 1950s and 1960s. Shagari had served under Balewa as Parliamentary Secretary, Minister of Establishments and in other capacities since 1959. Waziri was Minister of Health before succeeding Dr Jaja Wachuku in the Economic Development portfolio, when the latter replaced Balewa in External Affairs in August 1961.
In short, the patterns of political struggles in the Second Republic were identical to those in the First. Only the economic base of the struggles has changed from the appropriation of the surplus from peasant agriculture and the pillage of Marketing Boards in the 1950s and 1960s to oil rents in the 1970s and 1980s. With perhaps the possible exception of Aminu Kano, none of the political leaders offered a fundamental vision of economic restructuring and political transformation.

Ethnic polarisation was again dominant the political struggles. Northern scions like Shettima Ali Monguno, for example, found it an insult to be offered the vice-presidential ticket in the UPN as Awolowo’s running mate. In the latter’s words, the Northern elites "thought it was an affront to offer them the post of Vice-President. They all thought it was their birthright to be Number One and so they spurned my offer". The UPN leader’s "keen efforts to recruit respected Igbos ... met with similar results" (Joseph 1987:124). In short, the 1970s and 1980s essentially reflected the Islamic/North-Christian/South ethnic divide, and the rivalry, mutual suspicion and mistrust between the Igbos and the Yorubas which characterised Nigerian politics in the 1950s and 1960s (Chapters 1 & 3).

To be sure, there was more to Nigerian politics in the Second Republic than ethnic factors. There was also the central issues of securing access to the state through which the elites sustained and reproduced themselves. There were, for example, many Yorubas who would not join with Awolowo because the latter tended to have firmer control over his coalition.
Joseph examines the common charge, citing Chief Adisa Akinloye, one of Awolowo's prominent critics, that the UPN leader (1987:123) more or less formed his own party and put himself as the leader. There happens to be some who resent anybody lording it over them. Maybe if he had called people together and said "let's talk", things might have been different.

Not only did this statement come from one of the Yoruba heavyweight politicians, but it describes Awolowo's *modus operandi* quite accurately. However, it conceals more than it reveals. It conceals the fact that there were ethnic, regional and religious barriers to negotiations in the NPN.

Similar questions of access to the state and spoils of office also explain why Aminu Kano was by-passed for Shagari as the NPN leader. Otherwise, it was generally assumed that with Sir Ahmadu Bello out of the way, Aminu Kano was the most qualified politician to lead the North in its determination to hold on to federal power (Feinstein 1987; Joseph 1987:131-133). But as in the 1950s and 1960s, Aminu Kano's populism and abhorrence for corruption did not endear him to the Hausa-Fulani and the NPN in the 1970s and 1980s. The NPN rejected Aminu Kano because, in his own words, "I don't give largesses" and the "top NPN people didn't want the masses" (Feinstein 1987:294-295).

In order to retain control, the NPN had an unwritten policy during its formation which ensured that the presidential slot was reserved for the Moslem Hausa-Fulani. Southerners and Northern Christians were told to join the NPN locally at the state level, but "not at the top" (Feinstein 1987:194-295. Not even Chief Moshood Abiola, the richest aspirant, got the NPN top post for all his money.
Nor did Chief Olushola Saraki, also a wealthy contender, but a Southerner. In short, Akinloye and his ilk were attracted to the NPN by the promise of pillage and the spoils of office. This they could get through the NPN system of zoning other positions on the basis of ethnicity (Joseph 1987:137).

Little of the above description is meant to suggest that the parties were monolithic entities. Nor is it assumed that their leaders had absolute control over their alliances and ethnic power brokers. Even though the various parties remained united in their maleness, ethnicity, region and religion, there were open divisions and other centrifugal tendencies.

While all the leaders allowed women no participation in the high echelons of the parties, cleavages tended to be more pronounced in the Hausa-Fulani dominated NPN. These were based mainly on generation, educational achievement and the differing basis of social and political mobility between the old guards of feudal aristocrats and the new breeds in technocratic niches of the modern economy and politics. The latter were more educated, and occupied positions of influence in the private and public sectors of the political economy including the military.

Moreover, even though the new breeds were groomed by the old guards, those who emerged in the Second Republic were drawn into federal politics under different economic and social conditions. Later known as the "Kaduna Mafia", this Northern cabal entered into federal politics in full force during and after the civil war as state functionaries, policy advisors, arms merchants and contractors and
suppliers to the government (Takaya & Tyoden, eds., 1987; Othman 1984; Dike 1990:88-89; Obasanjo 1980:15). In essence, the new breeds were "less dependent on the patronage of the traditional rulers to advance their careers or [acquire] positions of political and social influence" in the country (Joseph 1987:133-136).

In the final analysis, the NPN succeeded in recruiting a broad, cross section of the ethnic, regional and religious factions of the comprador bourgeoisie tenuously held together by the promise of patronage and payoff. Shagari and the NPN won the 1979 elections with a plurality of votes across the board as shown in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1: Party Standing in the 1979 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats Won in:</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House of Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNPP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 95 | 449 | 100% |

Even those minority ethnic groups and leaders like Joseph Tarka and his Tiv people who opposed - even at the pain of physical torture and detention - the Hausa/Fulani domination in the 1960s saw the NPN as offering access to the state and oil rent - the national cake - in the Second Republic. Much like the Tivs, other minority ethnic groups were delivered by their respective leaders to the NPN for similar payoffs (Ujo 1987:97-112; Joseph 1987:148-150; Diamond 1983:31-47).

Just as in the First Republic, the Hausa-Fulani NPN wanted a broad coalition government under Northern leadership. Much as then, Awolowo rejected the offer out of hand. He even went to court to challenge the interpretation of Shagari's victory (Graf 1988:115-132). Only internal party pressures in the PRP and GNPP prevented Aminu Kano and Waziri from joining the NPN coalition (Africa Confidential, 3 Feb 1982:3-4, & 15 Dec 1982:2-4). In the end, only Azikiwe accepted Shagari's offer. In other words, the Second Republic was a replica of the First: a federal coalition government dominated by the Hausa-Fulani with Azikiwe's party as the junior partner, and Awolowo in opposition.

However, as earlier noted, the coalition was essentially an alliance for national pillage. The only thing its members had in common were the expectations for strategic proximity to the state treasury for government contracts and the allocation of import licenses and foreign exchange. An apt example was the N100 million contract given to the British Bi-Water Shellabearer in 1980 to build water plants for some 45-50 villages and towns in Niger State (West Africa, 12 Aug 1985:1638).
When this project was proposed during the Obasanjo regime by Niger state water board in 1979, it was costed at N15 million. When Shagari took over, the same project was inflated to N60 million by the same water board. When approval came from Lagos, it "was given for over N90 million" (Obasanjo 1990:229). To make matter worse, 95% of the contract was paid up front (West Africa, 12 Aug 1985:1638). Even worse, only five bore holes were drilled at the time the company left Nigeria when Shagari was thrown out of power in 1984.

One other example is sugar. Just like other essential commodities only members of the ruling parties and those few connected to them had the licenses and quotas to import sugar. As was often the case, this product was hoarded. Under Shagari the price of sugar in Nigeria rose from 200 to 1,000 pounds sterling a ton. In this period, the price had fallen to 160 pounds in the international market. In other words, the cheaper sugar got on the world market the more expensive it became in Nigeria (West Africa, 19 Aug 1985:1685-6).

This may partly account for why the Shagari government had an industrial policy only on paper. As earlier noted, the Shagari coalition was essentially that of the commercial compradors, both in the government and in the NPN. Thus as Enwere Dike points out: "It was these commercial classes which dominated the state in the Second Republic. The Shagari regime could not possibly transcend their commercial interests" (1990:97). This is why the Ministry of Commerce negated the Ministry of Industry. While the latter was charged with encouraging local capital in production, the former passed out import licenses for the same
products in order to enrich politicians and maintain the ruling coalition.

Shagari allocated over $2 billion to his Green Revolution programme in 1980. Needless to say, as noted in Chapter 1, the bulk of the funds went to retired army generals and the rest of the absentee farmers within the bourgeoisie. The latter are those who engaged in farming because there were state or World Bank funds to be had. These usually went back to trading once such funds ran out.

In short, by any account, the Shagari government took the plunder of Nigeria to a new height never before imagined, even for a rentier state. This administration remains the most corrupt that Nigeria has to date. To cite Ali Mazrui (1986:15):

The resources of the nation were, to all intents and purposes, deemed to be the private hunting ground of those in power and their supporters. Lucrative contracts for trade or construction were handed out on the basis of personal consideration. Foreign exchange was privately allocated and arbitrarily distributed. Millions of dollars and naira disappeared into private accounts of key figures abroad.

Many have been equally blunt in saying that under Shagari, "the wrong people were ruling wrongly" (Beckett 1987:110). Others like General Theophilus Danjuma, retired Chief of Army Staff, have even gone so far to say that Shagari and the "NPN had the largest gathering of the worst human beings that Nigeria could produce" (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985:219).

As argued in Chapter 2, this is the kind of evidence that makes it difficult to see why Schatz believed that "the dominance of NPN, with its ability to have attracted an increasing degree those from all ethnic groups who wanted ‘a share of the national cake’" as constituting a "traumatic process of the formation of a
bourgeoisie that is truly national rather than regionally or ethnically based" (1984:56). What broader public interest did this coalition of pillage serve? To recall also from Chapters 1 and 2, if there were ever any boundaries between the private and the public in Nigeria, they disappeared under Shagari.

Even those much closer to the scene like Sonni Tyoden repeat this claim for whatever reason (1989:20-21). Moreover, Schatz seems to detect no contradictions between this view and the very argument that the bourgeoisie was a band of pirates. Or what does Schatz mean by pirate capitalism?

In sum, suffice it to say that the magnitude of this pillage has been well-documented in various post-mortem of the Second Republic from the left, right and centre of the academic spectrum (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985; Adamolekun 1985; Ayeni & Soremekun, eds., 1988; Joseph 1987; etc). These are summarised sufficiently here to provide the socio-political context in which Shagari’s foreign policy in Chad and Namibia took shape.

**International-Systemic Challenges: Shagari, Libya, and the West in the OAU Peacekeeping in Chad**

The idea to set up an African peacekeeping force in Chad first became an issue at the special economic summit of the OAU held in Lagos in April 1980 noted earlier. As usual nothing came of it. However, the anarchy in Chad reached a point where the OAU was forced to call an emergency meeting in December 1980. Held in Lagos, the OAU concluded, as always, that an African solution to the Chad problem was preferable to external intervention.
Whether or not the OAU actually planned to act became academic once exogenous events were forcing all concerned actors to respond. The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and the head of Chad's GUNT Goukouni Weddeye announced on 6 January 1981 that their two countries had decided to merge. The neighbouring states were stunned, as the three key Western powers - the US, France and Britain - along with Nigeria were caught off-guard.

Just as in the case of Angola, the US simply viewed it as a Cold War issue, more so now that Ronald Reagan had replaced Carter as President in January 1981. Reagan defined Qaddafi as a Soviet stooge in the former's ideological warfare with the communist bloc. Needless to say, the former had long been seen as an arch enemy of the West by France even before Libya intervened on the side of Weddeye in Chad.

In fact, France revived the proposal to replace Libyan troops in Chad by an OAU force with a "promise" to pay the cost of the operation and provide the necessary logistical support (Sesay 1991:12). The French were not acting alone, however. As Guy Martin noted, France was "acting ... not merely in the defence of her own national interest but also as a proxy 'gendarme' for the West in general, and for the USA in particular" (Martin 1990:41).

Zaire, Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin were slated to participate in the peacekeeping operation. Nigeria was to provide the bulk of the force at 8,000 troops. Coming a distant second was Senegal with 2,000 men. Some 1,500 troops were expected from Cote d'Ivoire. The others were to each
provide 600 men (Sesay 1991:11-13; Martin 1990:43). In the end, three of the six
countries pulled out even before the force assembled. The number of forces
expected from those staying on were also to be drastically reduced. While the
figures vary from one source to another, Nigeria's contribution was cut from 8,000
to about 2,000 troops. Senegal was now to provide something in the order of 600-
900 men. Zaire was somewhere in between (Sesay 1991:12-12; Martin 1990:43).

Moreover, if the OAU planned for a leisurely deployment of its troops in
Chad, the sudden pull-out of Libyan forces in early November 1981 shattered such
hopes. Libya's move caught all the actors by surprise at the same time that it
"created a security vacuum" which left the OAU-backed GUNT/Weddeye
administration at the mercy of Habre's FAN forces (Sesay 1991:12). It was thus
under chaotic conditions that the OAU troop deployment began in early-December.
The force was placed under the command of the Nigerian General, Geoffrey Ejiga
(Bukarambe 1983:54-55; Sesay 1991:14-20).

However, the states that made up the Force had different objectives. Moreover, just as in Liberia a decade later - Chapter 9 - the troops were deployed
in the hopes that the combatants would receive them as brethren, lay down their
weapons and sue for peace in free and fair elections that were yet to be fixed. The
Force was also supposed to assist in bringing the warring factions together as a
national army.
Shagari in Chad: Foreign Policy without Objectives

Even though the OAU Force in Chad was under Nigeria's command, all the main actors involved with it had an objective except Shagari. In contrast, the Western powers had set goals. Both the US and France wanted Qaddafi out of Chad. As Tom Imobighe notes, the French had an immediate reason to go after Qaddafi because of the "humiliation" that they suffered at the hands of Libya in 1980 (1980:26). The Western powers used the various factions in the Chad civil war in achieving their goals, as in the case of Zaire in 1977 and 1978 - Shaba I & II. In other words, the leaders of the warring factions in Chad were seen merely as instruments of policy in the Cold War. Qaddafi, as we have seen in Chapter 5, wanted to install a pliant regime in Chad and annex the Aozou strip.

Shagari went into Chad without any clear objectives. He had little or no understanding of the issues involved, let alone their implications. In fact, it was as if Nigeria knew nothing of what was going on. For instance, Shagari was not even aware of the agreement to deploy the OAU Force supposedly under Nigerian command. As Sesay states (1991:13):

Whatever the reasons for signing the agreement in Paris may have been, ... many Africa states felt sufficiently concerned and embarrassed to convince the OAU Chairman, Arap Moi of Kenya, to get Weddeye and the Organization to sign another agreement in Nairobi on 28 November 1981.

The country's Vice-President, Alex Ekwueme, only made a fool of himself in saying that "the OAU sold itself cheaply to France and degraded the true meaning of African unity" for signing the Chad peacekeeping operation agreement in Paris (Sesay 1991:13). The question is: where was Shagari or Nigeria?
To be sure, as seen in the previous chapters, none of Shagari’s predecessors articulated a specific Nigerian doctrine of regional security. However, as shown in Chapter 5, Obasanjo was active and consistent in the attempt to advance a Nigerian framework for addressing the Chad imbroglio. While the accords signed under his auspices failed to bring a durable peace to Chad, Libya and France were forced to recognise that Nigeria had a legitimate interest and role in Chad. As both Sesay and Martin note, the OAU had accepted the Obasanjo accords as offering the best prospects for achieving a settlement that would restore peace and stability to Chad (Sesay 1991:10; Martin 1990:42).

This leadership role in the OAU was completely reversed under Shagari. Every statement made on this crisis by the NPN Senate Majority Leader, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Alhaji Jallo Waziri, amounted to a repudiation of Nigeria’s lead role in the OAU, and specifically on Chad. In one typical instance, the Senator stated that the "Lagos Accord is subordinate to OAU decisions. It is now the OAU policy that is being pursued in Chad" (Nigerian Forum, Feb 1982:493.

Nor was Shagari’s Foreign Minister, Prof. Audu, any better informed on the issues. A West Africa editorial put it succinctly that, "Audu does not see the trees for the forest" in foreign policy (1 Nov 1982:2815) In short, like Gambari’s Theory and Reality (1989) discussed in Chapter 2, one is better informed on NFP through the pages of West Africa magazine than what these foreign ministers have to say or write about it.
Indeed, as Sam Oyovbaire's (1980:19) comments on the Libyan intervention in Chad, and Nigeria's reaction to it suggest:

it is an irony of Nigeria's African policy and its national security that it is Libya and not Nigeria that brought about the current state of affairs in Chad in favour of Weddeye.

Without re-enacting the peacekeeping fiasco, suffice it to say that the OAU Force stood by while the rival FAN rebel forces of Habre sacked the capital of Ndjamena in June 1982, overthrowing the supposedly OAU-backed GUNT and its leader Weddeye (Sesay 191:7-26; Martin 1990:37-47; Bukarambe 1983:50-58).

It was President Shagari who stopped the OAU Force from preventing the fiasco. General Ejiga had recommended to Shagari that the OAU force be authorised to impose peace on the warring factions to save the incumbent regime from being overrun. Ejiga assured the President that even though the OAU force level in Chad was considerably less than originally planned, Nigeria alone had sufficient force to impose peace on the warring factions.

Shagari rejected the idea totally. In fact, according to Africa Confidential (8 June 1983:8) and West Africa (2 April 1984:746), Ejiga was subsequently placed under strict political orders not to protect the Weddeye administration against Habre's troops because this would have amounted to OAU "interference".

Hence, as already noted, the OAU Force stood by passively while Habre sacked Ndjamena and overthrew Weddeye.

Not even pressures from then Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida, helped to change the policy. As the latter expressed his frustration:
Look at a simple thing like the whole damn policy on Chad. It was dictated to [Shagari] by some people outside Nigeria. We would provide the expert advice but nobody would listen (West Africa, 2 April 1984:746).

Of course, this is not to suggest that the President should have caved-in to his military commanders. Chad was a political problem, and not a military issue. Indeed, this is a case in point why the military should be subject to political authority. Nonetheless, the question of what were Shagari's political objectives in Chad remains.

President Shagari's argument that protecting the GUNT would have "amounted to OAU interference" in Chad's internal affairs was simply baseless. In the first place, as earlier discussed, the OAU signed an agreement with Weddeye to protect the GUNT, organise elections and oversee the implementation of the other aspects of the peace accord. The non-NPN members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had even warned the President much earlier that France and the US were only using the OAU force to achieve their anti-Qaddafi policy.

Many like Senator Salihu had told Shagari at least as early as February 1982 with "sufficient evidence" to show that the US and France were backing Habre and his FAN rebel forces for onslaught on Ndjamen from the Sudan (Nigerian Forum, Feb 1982:472-473; Bangura 1989b:136-138; Ate 1987:234). As Senator Salihu pleaded with the President:

Now that we are in Chad, we must behave as we did in Angola. We must give our support to the side that in our view has the interests of the Chadian people and of the African people (Nigerian Forum, Feb 1982:475).

Salihu even called for Shagari to declare Nigeria's support for the incumbent
regime - as Murtala did in Angola - to against the better-equipped Western-backed Habre's FAN forces from sacking the GUNT. In fact, it has been suggested in radical analyses that Nigeria colluded with the US to overthrow Weddeye because Shagari was courting Reagan's economic favour (Ate 1987:221-240; Bangura 1989-133-140).

**Resource Availability and Foreign Policy**

Yet, from the very evidence within which these dependency conclusions are reached, it is difficult to see how the lack of material leverage as opposed to leadership was responsible for Shagari's fiasco in Chad. As earlier noted, even the media was more informed than the Nigerian foreign policy establishment under Shagari. The specific example of this was the OAU-Wedddeye agreement to send a peacekeeping force to Chad which was signed in Paris in November 1981 without Shagari's knowledge, even though Nigeria was supposed to command the force.

Domestically, the President had no problems in getting Senate approval for his policy. The request to send Nigerian troops to Chad was passed almost without a debate (Nigerian Forum, Feb 1982:491). This notwithstanding the fact that the President was not clear on what the role of troops would be.

In contrast, Qaddafi had a good grasp of the Cold War politics involved in his adventures in Chad, and responded to the West accordingly. To cite Imobighe once again (1990:26):
Libya was invited by the legitimate authority established in Chad under the Lagos Accord of August 1979. What Libya has done is to help in establishing the legitimacy of the accord and thus save the OAU from another embarrassing situation.

However, Qaddafi deemed it prudent to make a tactical withdrawal to avoid a clash between Libyan forces and the Western-backed OAU Force deployed in December 1981. Similarly, no sooner had Libya withdrawn, and France aided Habre into power, the West abandoned Chad and left the OAU to its own devices (Imobighe 1987:137-139; Tyoden 1989:113-115; Ate 1987:235).

Nor does the evidence suggest that Shagari's failure in Chad was due to a lack of resources. Nigeria had adequate resources in this period and for the Chad operation. Shagari simply failed to convert them into foreign policy initiatives or desirable national outcomes in the Second Republic. Even though Shagari was a globe-trotter like Gowon, he lacked any well-defined foreign policy objectives just like the latter.

The Murtala-Obasanjo regime bequeathed billions of dollars in oil rents to the Second Republic. Nigeria had an external reserve of over $10 billion when Shagari was sworn-in on 1 October 1979. As a result of the second oil boom, the price of crude oil rose from $20.94 in 1979 to $36.95 in 1980 to a high of $40 a barrel in early-1981. In fact, only Nigeria's Bonny Light Crude - labelled the champagne of crudes - attracted a higher price at $44 a barrel. And production was steady at 2.1 million bpd in this period before the oil glut.

Some $25 billion accrued to the country from oil rents in 1980 alone. And in terms of external debt, the country only owed $1.8 billion at the time. The debt
service ratio was only 1.8% (CBN 1990:38; Aluko-Olokun 1989:193-194; Chiorhenuan 1989: 210-211; Husain 1987:27-38). In short, in four years, Shagari had more resources than all the preceding administrations combined. The Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985 represented this optimism. The Plan was designed as if the oil boom was going to last forever. It envisaged spending over $100 billion in the plan period 1981-1985. The FGN was expected to provide 86.0% of this amount for public sector projects. Only 14.0% would have been provided by the private sector (CBN 1991:2-3).

This is what makes it difficult to see how it is that the lack of "a material base of leverage" in Nigeria's diplomacy would account for Shagari's failure in Chad, as dependency analyses suggest (1987:223; Bangura 1989:133-140; Ihonvbere 1987:267-283). In my view, we first need to specify the problem and broadly assess the amount of resources required. Without this, there is no way of knowing if and when adequate material resources for the necessary leverage exist.

Shagari himself stated that Nigeria "maintained the OAU peace-keeping force all through". If so, what material base of leverage was needed in Chad which was not available?. After all, Nigeria provided the bulk of the equipment and forces. Shagari even paid for the upkeep of the Zairois and Senegalese force. Indeed, the FGN paid the total cost of the operation in the amount of $107 million (Imobighe 1987:138; West Africa, 2 April 1984:746).

France and the US reneged on their promise to pay the cost of the operation. The UN did not respond to the OAU's appeal for financial assistance.
And the OAU was not in any financial position to cover the expenses. As the Director of Political Affairs at the OAU, Mamadou Bah, reveals, once the Western powers reneged on their promise, the OAU could only raise $400,000 out of $162,298,500 budgeted for the operation (1980:90:99).

Interestingly, Senegal and Zaire still deducted the little they spent on their forces from their annual dues to the OAU. If Nigeria were to follow this example, Foreign Minister Professor Ibrahim Gambari said in 1984 that the country "would not pay anything to the OAU for the next 40 years" (West Africa, 2 April 1984:746). In short, Shagari's performance in Chad was more a problem of political leadership rather than material resources.

This was not limited to the external arena, however. The President was forced to introduce a series of austerity measures in 1981 after the collapse of oil prices. Even a formal Economic Stabilisation Act was enacted in April 1982 after the bourgeoisie failed to curb their excesses. However, much like everything else under Shagari, this met with little success. Shagari was simply too weak a leader to implement it.

Structural adjustment loan negotiations with the IMF were stalled because Shagari viewed the devaluation of the Naira as political suicide. Trade arrears were mounting. GDP had further declined by 4.4% from 2.0% in 1982. The budget

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deficit was over $8 billion, more than 50% of total expenditure for 1983. The current account was also in deficit. In 1983, $3.5 billion more was added on to the $6 billion or so recorded in 1982 (West Africa, 9 Jan 1983:55).

The comprador bourgeoisie even insisted that "the country should withdraw from OPEC, increase oil sales unilaterally and in this way generate sufficient foreign exchange to finance imports" (Graf 1988:161). The economy was equally a mystery to Shagari's Finance Minister, Victor Masi. The latter told a London audience in 1983 that "it is remarkable how, against all the predictions of disaster, the Nigerian economy has managed not to collapse" (West Africa, 26 Sept 1983:2215). The Minister did not seem to connect such predictions with the manner in which the economy was being mismanaged and looted. Masi believed that such unflattering predictions were to disparage Nigeria, the giant of Africa.

However one views the situation, then, Shagari's failure must be seen as an inability to define foreign policy objectives with which to match available resources. It is more the case, as Ate goes on to argue, that whatever interest or consensus existed between Nigeria and the US on African affairs was not ... translated into a coherent and consistent policy by Shagari. The actual policy behaviour of the Shagari regime was clouded by ambiguity and characterized by an uncertain commitment to any definite goals. Whatever action was taken, it was with great hesitancy as an afterthought and often in a reactionary fashion (1987:234).

In other words, President Shagari's fiasco in Chad went hand in hand with economic disarray at home. This was essentially what happened in the case of Namibia.
Shagari on Namibia

Shagari's attempt to articulate his government's policy on Namibia was perhaps the most condemned policy of any leader in Nigeria. It was like a bolt of lightening had hit Nigerians, and indeed the rest of Africa, when Shagari echoed Reagan's linkage policy in Southern Africa. He actually suggested "in 1983 that Cuban troops should pull out of Angola and be replaced by an OAU force (Ogunsanwo 1986:102; Ihonvbere 1987:274). The President was quickly reminded, however, that Chad was an OAU fiasco led by Nigeria. It was feared that, just as in Chad, Reagan had planned to use an OAU force as cover to overthrow the MPLA government (Ate 1987:230-235; Bangura 1989b: 140; Ihonvbere 1987:274).

Without exaggeration, Shagari regretted having publicly espoused this policy. The President devoted a whole section of the "Annual Patron's Dinner Speech at the NIIA in December 1983 to repair the damage. This is part of what Shagari said:

I wish to take this opportunity to clarify a misconception concerning our attitude towards the so-called "linkage" which we in Nigeria had persistently rejected. It was presented quite erroneously that Nigeria had advocated a replacement of Cuban troops by African troops. The fact was that at the 1981 meeting of the Front Line States in Lagos we lamented the inability of the OAU to concretise the long standing idea of an African Defence Force to assist members-countries whose security may be threatened. The absence of that Force has necessitated the invitation by Angola of an extra African Force. [Africa needs such a Force], which has nothing whatsoever to do with the linkage of Namibian independence with the presence of Cuban troops (Nigeria Forum, Oct/Dec 1983:1241-1242).

Suffice it to say that no one listened.

Shagari was overthrown soon thereafter on 31 December 1983. In sympathy, General Obasanjo believes that
Shagari did not court power .... He was pushed into power by those who wanted to make use of him and he was unfortunately too weak and somewhat ill prepared for the trappings of political power to check the abuses of his power by those who made use of it (1990:175).

The last straw was the blatant manner in which Shagari and the NPN stole the 1983 elections, at the cost of over $4 billion (Falola & Ihonvbere 1985; West Africa, 6 Feb 1984; Graf 1988:157).

Theoretical Synthesis

However one evaluates NFP under President Shagari in the Second Republic, and on the particular cases of Chad and Namibia, it is clear that the main factor was the lack of leadership. The elites were too busy plundering the country to even raise questions and be concerned with these issues. Of course, there was a great deal of criticism in the media, but the Nigerian presence in Chad was not opposed. Rather, the criticisms were directed at how Shagari botched the whole affair. As has just been noted, elite opinion - the attentive public - was strong in condemning Shagari for even suggesting that an OAU force replace Cuban troops in Angola.

Shagari’s failure had little to do with the lack of resources, as dependency analyses would suggest. After all, Nigeria paid for the whole operation. Rather, it was the combination of a lack of leadership and concrete objectives. The level of resource availability under Shagari was greater than all the previous regimes combined. In fact, in comparative terms, it took the combination of France, the US and their African allies like Nigeria to dislodge Libya and Qaddafi from Chad. Libya had far fewer resources compared to Nigeria.
The difference was that Qaddafi had a foreign policy objective; Shagari had none. Whatever his rhetoric might have been, the policies which Shagari actually pursued reflected little of Nigeria's external role conception nor aided internal economic development. The next chapter examines how the military junta which ousted President Shagari managed the situation.
The present chapter examines how General Buhari grappled with Nigeria’s near economic collapse, the external debt crisis and debt negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank, the London and Paris Clubs, and sundry uninsured Western banks and creditors in his 20 months in power, January 1984 to August 1985. It consists of three parts. The focus in part is on the internal structure of ethnicity, class, state and Buhari’s leadership. Part two deals with the debt negotiations. Parts three and four explain how the internal and external conjuncture of forces constrained Buhari’s search for a viable alternative to the IMF.

Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Buhari’s Leadership

Unlike the hand over of power to civilians in October 1979, internal and external views on the return of the military in January 1984 were diametrically opposed. In the West, the coup was seen as the demise of democracy in Nigeria (Ogunsanwo 1986:76-79). By contrast, the ouster of Shagari and the NPN received the widest support internally. Both had become so discredited that “Nigerians from all walks of life seemed to vie with one another in praising the coup and condemning” them (Beckett 1987:89).

The country was in chaos. The price of oil had collapsed, and the economy had been pillaged to the verge of collapse during the Second Republic. External debt mounted. Nigeria’s traditional sources of bilateral political and economic
support - the US and Britain - had elected leaders who were very hostile to Nigeria’s anti-apartheid campaign and rhetoric of non-alignment in the Cold War. In short, Buhari took over a state on the brink of economic collapse and political anarchy, with little external support.

To make matters worse, Buhari seized power, like all past putschists in Nigeria, without any distinctive strategy or policy to restructure either internal economic development or foreign policy. The pious hope that the regime would produce a quick fix evaporated when Buhari simply fell back on Shagari’s Economic Stabilisation Act of April 1982 (Chapter 6). Even with an able second-in-command in the person of General Tunde Idiagbon, the regime’s legitimacy derived more from the anti-politics of those factions of the bourgeoisie who were marginalised by the plunder under Shagari than any intrinsic appeal which either he or the military might have had.

Characteristically, he suspended the Constitution, banned politics, dissolved the National Assembly, and ruled by decree through a SMC like Murtala. Contrary to what Nigerians have come to expect of a corrective military regime, Buhari did not pledge himself to a return to civilian rule. Even public debates on the question were banned (West Africa, 5 Aug 1985:1579).

Like Murtala, Buhari wanted to clean house. The regime’s first act of domestic policy was the rounding up of over 500 politicians, comprising a veritable Who’s Who in the Second Republic, on various charges of pillage and other nefarious activities described in Chapter 6 (West Africa, 11 June 1984:1024-5).
Like Murtala, Buhari instituted public probes against the deposed members of the previous ruling elites. They were tried in closed military tribunals with special powers to recover illegally-acquired assets, and to pass sentences that could not be appealed in the civil courts.

Considerable attention was also paid to combating armed robbery and criminal activities like drug trafficking which had come to characterise and compromise Nigeria's international image. The death penalty was re-introduced for armed robbery, and extended to cover offenses such as oil theft, currency and drug trafficking, and economic sabotage. Interestingly, state security entered into Nigeria's political lexicon for the first time. With the promulgation of Decree No. 2 the regime introduced offenses which it termed crimes against state security.

Decree No. 4 turned out to be the most infamous act of Buhari's SMC. It was to outlaw, according to the regime, falsehood against the state.\(^1\) In place of Shagari's "ethical revolution", which existed only on paper, the regime passed Decree 6 which declared War Against Indiscipline (WAI). The Buhari regime was bent on instilling a sense of public duty and discipline (Graf 1988:149-179; Ekwe-Ekwe 1985:610-625).

Much like the preceding regimes, these draconian measures were not directed at restructuring the Nigerian political economy. The coup did not question

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\(^1\) Two journalists were each sentenced to 12 months in jail under this decree (West Africa, 11 March 1984:489). The decree was similar to the one passed by Prime Minister Balewa in 1962 to bar the press from scrutinising his emergency measures. Nor was it too different from that enacted by General Obasanjo in 1976 to check against critical questioning of the Murtala record.
the basis of the existing ethnic, class, economic and socio-political relations (Graft 1988; Ake, ed., 1985; Ihonvbere & Shaw 1988). Questions about class privileges, property relations, political and economic participation by women and the popular classes were not raised.

Graf and others show that the various decrees passed by the SMC merely maintained rather than changed the status quo. No serious efforts were made to offer a coherent mobilising ideology for "revolutionary transformation". The emphasis was on "probity, efficiency, proper management and law and order" (Graf 1988:153). The question is whom were these meant to serve?

Indeed, it is widely believed that the Buhari coup was executed to preempt a more radical strike from within the junior officer ranks against the status quo. The coup was also seen to be as much a part of the North-South political struggles as it was an intra-military fractional ascendence. In the former case, the coup served to preserve the inner political dominance of the Hausa-Fulani within the established bourgeois domination of the national political economy.

The discredited state officials and politicians from the South were dealt with more harshly by the regime than those from the North. While many Northerners were only put under house arrest, few Southerners escaped 20 year prison terms. In fact, this led Southern elites like ex-head of state, General Obasanjo, to say publicly that the Buhari coup only sought to perpetuate Northern dominance rather than "correct" the ills of the system. Instead of the expected North-South balance, Southerners held less than 1/3 of the seats in Buhari's SMC. Similar patterns of
appointment were followed in other governing bodies (Othman 1989:135-140; Ekwe-Ekwe 1985:518-621; Graf 1988:166-169).

While the regime correctly emphasised agriculture as the engine of Nigeria's development and ability to feed itself, the programme had an ethnic bias. It was geared mostly towards the Northern elites, even if, as noted in Chapter 1, the Hausa-Fulani tended to dominate in this sector. It was Buhari's belief that the Hausa-Fulani did not gain nearly as much from the NEPD as did the Southern elites (Olukoshi 1990:131). It was also skewed against peasant agriculture. (West Africa, 3 Sept 1984:1817; Lubeck 1985). Just as with the Obasanjo and Shagari projects, the funds were directed at elite farmers and retired army Generals like Obasanjo and Shehu Yarida as opposed to peasants producers (Ekwe-Ekwe 1985:621-622). However, in contrast to the Obasanjo and Shagari projects, Buhari put in place a scheme to encourage, if not force, industry to source raw materials locally (Andrae & Beckman 1987; Synge 1989).

The unintended consequences of this policy on decision-making and relations within the bourgeoisie were critical. To begin, those factions of the bourgeoisie in ISI and commercial-industrial agriculture became the direct beneficiaries of state revenue allocation. This meant that the very traders, commercial tycoons and plutocrats whose rent-seeking interests had dominated the state and decision making under Shagari, and whose positions Buhari intended to protect, were to be marginalised. This served not only to deepen the political contradictions among the various factions of the bourgeoisie, but it also heightened
state-civil society and civil-military relations.

**Regional Pressures and Policy**

The regime was so preoccupied with these internal contradictions that regional matters were seen as and diverting irritants. The most dramatic example of this was the closure of Nigeria's land borders on 23 April 1984. This decision was taken in order to introduce new currency notes so as to render the old ones, which had been smuggled out of the country by their billions during the Second Republic, useless.

Despite representations from the states affected by this unilateral act, the borders remained closed throughout Buhari's time in power. Buhari believed that Nigeria needed the peace to attend to its external debt and internal economic crises. In this view, smuggling, drug and currency trafficking and the nefarious activities across these porous borders were deemed a threat to national security and economic recovery (Gambari 1989:53-54).

Somewhat paradoxically, it is on this basis that Buhari's claims to being an offshoot of the Murtala regime may not be too far-fetched. In contrast to Gowon or Obasanjo, for instance, Buhari's views of Nigeria's position in the IDLP and role in Africa were much closer to that of Murtala (Chapter 5). Thus it is interesting to note that Obasanjo came out openly against Buhari's claim to be an offshoot of the Murtala regime (Graf 1988:167).

In this vein, Buhari's foreign policy views reflected a demand for relative autonomy from external powers. Like Murtala, the former had a notion of Nigeria
first. On Nigeria’s role on the continent, Buhari insisted that where the national interests of Nigeria conflicted with those of our neighboring states in particular and African countries in general, there would not be an automatic yielding to the latter (Gambari 1989:34). It must also be noted, however, that despite similarities in world views, Murtala and Buhari differed as regards approach. The former had a broader Pan-Africa perspective on matters. By contrast, the latter tended to be restrictively and inflexibly nationalistic. As with Gowon during the civil war, Buhari believed that Nigeria had been forced to focus on internal problems. To be sure, the regime did acknowledge the linkages between the domestic political economy and external relations in its statements and speeches. When it came to practice, however, it ignored the regional dimension and focused globally, the direction of Nigeria’s dependence.

**International-Systemic Challenges: General Buhari and the IMF**

Buhari’s first inclination was to continue the negotiations with the IMF, which had begun under Shagari, for a $2.5 billion balance of payment loan and support in external debt rescheduling with Nigeria’s Western creditors. Initially, the former’s emphasis on fiscal discipline and austerity on seizing power generated tacit agreement within the ranks of Nigeria’s private and public creditors to continue the discussion of refinancing some $4.5-7 billion - depending on whose figures - in

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2 The maximum Nigeria was entitled to borrow increased to $3.3 billion with the new IMF quota revision which was to come into effect in January 1984 (West Africa, 20 Feb 1984:374-375).
short-term trade arrears which began under Shagari in April 1983 (Dike 1990:107). There was optimism within Fund and British circles that, being a military dictator, Buhari was more likely than Shagari to repress popular resistance to an IMF SAP. As long as Nigeria serviced its external debts, democracy was secondary on the British and IFIs's agenda.

Indeed, Buhari had began to implement many of the Fund's prescriptions but only insofar as these fitted into his own approach to the crisis. These included massive public sector retrenchments, tax hikes and cuts in social services. The regime imposed user fees on various basic social services like health and education or at least on what was left of them (Olukoshi, ed., 1991; Bangura 1989:177-190).

The lack of foreign exchange to finance machinery, spare parts and raw materials imports had already forced many of the country's assembly plants to close down. Imports of luxury goods were even affected. Statistics supplied by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) suggest that this drastic import compression led to a severe decline in average capacity utilisation from 73.3% in 1981 to 30% in 1984 and 37.1% in 1985 (Sanusi 1988:37). Foreign exchange and import licence allocation were brought under strict controls. In short, with the exception of the defence budget, the regime's deficit and budget cuts were drastic.

Table 7.1 below outlines the main elements of these cuts. It compares cuts in expenditures and deficits made by Buhari in 1984 with those in 1983 under Shagari against IMF advice or wish.
Table 7.1: Budget & Deficit Reduction Plans - 1983/1984 (Naira/billion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983/Shagari</th>
<th>1984/Buhari</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>IMF Wish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>-40.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-47.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It was mainly on the question devaluation, liberalisation, privatisation and ending petroleum subsidies that Buhari parted ways with the IMF. Buhari was only mildly willing to compromise on privatisation. For one, he was against privatisation because the Southern elites were argued to have benefited more than the Hausa-Fulani from the NEPD in the 1970s, and were better placed once again to take advantage of any such programme in the 1980s. Thus, in his 20 months in power, Buhari only went so far as to privatise two dairy operations and one abattoir to Northern political interests (Olukoshi 1990:117-118).

When the regime re-opened formal talks with the Fund in February 1984, the SMC insisted on retaining intact state-led direction and controls over the four key areas noted above (West Africa, 16 April 1984:815, 14 May 1985:1010, & 30 Dec 1985:2678; Biersteker 1986). He proposed to the IMF that the parastatals be commercialised rather than wholesale privatisation. This is not to suggest, however, that Buhari was ideologically incompatible with the IMF.
Nor did he seek to delink Nigeria from the international capitalist system. Rather, it was a question of national pride. The SMC railed against the IMF because the latter failed to make an exception. Buhari was indignant that the IMF was trying to treat Nigeria like any other African country. In other words, as we shall see below, the SMC was fighting to keep state controls over the national economy internally. To recall from Chapters 1 and 2, such controls were vital to preserving the ethnic-class status quo or precarious balance.

Equally crucial, the regime was unable to design a viable alternative policy to the IMF. As already noted, Buhari lacked a distinctive economic policy. He merely fell back on Shagari's Economic Stabilisation Act, which had ceased being relevant to the crisis even before it was implemented.

One apt example of this is devaluation. When Buhari finally conceded on devaluation at the resumption of talks in September 1984, it was only insofar as this did not involve more than a 30-35% gradual slide over two years; even so, this was only to bring the Naira to par with the US dollar. But by the time the SMC had come to agree on this, the IMF had back to its original position of 60% devaluation. This was the "shock therapy" that the IMF had insisted on from the beginning (Biersteker 1986:102-103).

It is not certain why the IMF suddenly changed its position. Two ideas can, however, be entertained. First, as Matthew Martin argues, the Fund imposed tougher conditions the longer it took African debtors to submit to structural adjustment (Martin 1991:33). Second, as we shall see below, it is possible that the
IMF was contemplating making some concessions to the SMC on other conditionalities. Were the latter to be the case, it would relate to another point also made by Martin, namely that the Fund wanted to put the squeeze on the regime, after it had mistaken Buhari's enthusiasm in implementing the measures that accorded with his views for total acceptance of IMF prescriptions (1991:29).

Whatever the case may be, however, one thing is certain: the FGN-IMF talks foundered on the issue of devaluation. To Buhari, it was a question of national pride and the logic of Nigeria's dependence on oil. This is what Buhari said:

The way the IMF sees it, if we devalue our exports would be cheap, imports would be dearer. If so, the effect on Nigeria is irrelevant because we hardly export anything other than oil which is dollars and which is subject to currency fluctuations, so devaluation doesn't make sense .... On the cost of imports, we need cheap imports because our essential raw materials for our industry are mostly imported from the US and Europe so we don't want to make it expensive. If we make it expensive our end product would be more expensive, and inflation will go up again, so the argument against devaluation in Nigeria is real, and we hope the IMF will see it that way (Olayiwola 1986:130).

This did not happen. For the IMF, it was a matter of ideology as opposed to the specific conditions of the Nigerian economy. The next section examines how the SMC grappled with the search for alternatives to the IMF.
Buhari's Search for Alternatives to the IMF

To start with, the SMC harboured no illusions that talks with the Fund were going to be smooth. Before Buhari seized power, the IMF's core conditionalities - removal of subsidies, especially on petroleum, devaluation, liberalisation and privatisation - had already come up against opposition when the Shagari government first initiated the talks in April 1983. Thus, even before the regime reopened negotiations with the IMF in February 1984, Buhari knew what he was up against, and ideas about possible alternatives were already being floated.

The SMC tried five different strategies none of which proved viable, singularly or in combination. These were (i) loan request from Saudi Arabia; (ii) bilateral negotiations with creditors; (iii) OPEC oil production quota increase; (iv) counter-trade; and (v) increasing the debt service ratio. To be sure, as we shall see in Chapter 8, there were divisions within the SMC over which policy should or should not be adopted.

The first strategy adopted by the SMC was to draw on the N1.6 billion balance of a loan of N2.0 billion which Shagari sought from the Saudis in 1983. Hence we find that even before the talks with the IMF recommenced, Buhari had sent Idiagbon to Saudi Arabia to renew Nigeria's request for the loan (Gambari 1989:32-33; Bangura 1989:103). This strategy failed because, as discussed below, the IMF and the US derailed it.
Bilateral settlements - something akin to divide and conquer - constituted another strategy tried continuously by the SMC. However, this succeeded only in attracting a minor consortium of uninsured suppliers to reschedule some $2.5 billion in trade debt arrears in early April. In fact, as Thomas Biersteker points out, these uninsured creditors were forced to "drop their insistence that Nigeria reach an agreement with the Fund because many among them were concerned about whether they might ever be repaid" (Biersteker 1986:17).

By October, the private and public sector creditors in the Paris and London Clubs had rejected all the SMC’s offers for debt rescheduling without a formal agreement with the IMF. Members of both Clubs refused to either reschedule credit arrears or open new lines of credit for Lagos. As alluded to earlier, the Fund had also worked through the US to effectively block Buhari’s loan request to Saudi Arabia (Martin 1991:17; Bangura 1987:104; Biersteker 1986:19; West Africa, 15 Oct 1984:2069-71).

The regime’s third strategy involved increasing oil production in the hope of earning more foreign exchange for debt servicing (Dike 1990:109). The SMC was bent on getting OPEC to increase Nigeria’s production quota. Prof David Tam-West, Buhari’s Energy and Petroleum Minister, launched a public relations campaign within OPEC while lobbying the Saudis specifically. If forced to make a

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3To present the various Western actors as one against Nigeria is not to equate a harmonisation of interests with a harmony of interest. One account of the cracks that can exist among these actors is given in Robert Devlin, Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially pp. 227-229.
choice between his country and OPEC, he said, "I will go for the happiness of Nigeria before the happiness of OPEC. Only a surviving Nigeria is relevant to OPEC" (West Africa, 16 July 1984:1437; Gambari 1989:33-34).

Leaving aside the politics of the issue, suffice it to say that OPEC acceded to the FGN request in July. It increased Nigeria's oil production quota by 100,000 bpd to 1.4 million bpd in August, and by another 50,000 bpd to 1.45 million bpd in September. This led to the widespread view that Nigeria took on OPEC and won.

Ernest Wilson, for example, states that Nigeria exploited its "infamous weak link status, and realized perhaps it could transform its very weakness into a bargaining chip" (1989:113). Does this really constitute a major victory for Nigeria? OPEC remains a Third World cartel struggling to survive imperialist machinations to tear it apart. In my view, the IMF was the entity to take on. Scoring points against OPEC did not serve the same purpose as concluding debt negotiations on Nigerian terms with the Fund.

Nonetheless, Nigeria had problems in selling its oil. One, the oil market had been over supplied. Two, as elaborated below, President Reagan had drastically cut US purchases of Nigerian oil. This is the context in which to situate Buhari's strategy four - counter-trade.

Table 7.2 below presents an overview of the five deals which the regime negotiated between September 1984 and June 1985.
Table 7.2: Buhari's Counter-Trade Deals, 1984/1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date Concluded</th>
<th>Value ($m)</th>
<th>Barter Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Sept 1984</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Volks car kits, Sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>May 1985</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Peugeot car kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>May 1985</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Capital goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>June 1985</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Fiat car spares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>June 1985</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Palm oil*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The bartering of crude oil for palm oil is one indication of how much the country's agriculture has declined. Nigeria was the main exporter of palm produce in the world until the providential oil boom in 1973/1974 (Stevens 1990:281).

Counter-trade was adopted in September 1984. As Buhari stated in an interview (West Africa, 5 Aug 1985:1593):

We don't have the money, but we have the alternative, and counter-trade is the alternative. It was a deliberate thing ... and it has brought a lot of relief to us.

However, whatever its benefits, counter-trade was not a policy of choice. It was adopted as a matter of survival as opposed to a well-thought out development strategy or import policy. Given the lack of oil buyers and the severe shortage of foreign exchange, counter-trade represented no more than a stop-gap measure for acquiring goods the country could not otherwise afford to import at all, especially

Even so, the deals were not without controversy, internal and external. First, the value of the deals was minuscule compared to the level of imports during the Shagari government. Internally, critics raised questions about the value the country was getting, "whether it made sense to exchange oil for consumer goods instead of for projects from which future generations might benefit" (West Africa, 5 Aug 1985:1594). Second, even those who got the oil barter contracts opposed the system for reasons of profits. They discovered that counter-trade "threatened their ability to sell to the highest bidders in the world oil market" (Ogwu & Olaniyan 1989:93).

Externally, OPEC worried about over-production and the integrity of its price structure, while Nigeria's traditional customers protested about unfair treatment based on price discounts said to be associated with the deals (West Africa, 10 June 1985:1152). The British and the IMF were fuming. On their part, the former were concerned, as we shall see below, with losing their position as Nigeria's major suppliers of imports. For the latter, counter-trade took away the basis on which to monitor and calculate Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings for debt service to Western creditors (Parfitt & Riley 1989:73; West Africa, 10 June 1985:1152).

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4This debate was even led by the Energy Minister himself, Prof. David Tam-West, Perspectives of the Nigerian Oil Industry (Lagos: Gold Medal Lecture, 16 Aug 1985). See also "Reluctant Counter-Trader", West Africa, (5 Aug 1985: 1594); and Larry Diamond, "Nigerian Update", Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1985-6: 330-331).
More significant, if the counter-trade deals proved successful, the SMC might be subject to less pressure to accept structural adjustment on Western terms and IMF conditionalities. In fact, as Martin stresses, the Fund and many OECD governments were diligent in quashing any initiative likely to prove a viable alternative to the IMF. In this view, any such alternatives, especially from debtors, might constitute a dangerous precedent. It was liable to lead to a loosening of the Western grip over the political economies of many Third World countries.

This becomes even more challenging when the OECD-controlled IFIs and their states deal with nationalists like Buhari. They found it irritating that the SMC insisted on declaring publicly that its counter-trade deals constituted an alternative to the IMF. It even got to a point when the Nigeria's conflict with the IMF became a source of regime pride. Whenever the talks stalled over devaluation, "either Buhari or Idiagbon would publicly boast of how well they had done without 'borrowing a kobo' or a cent from the IMF (West Africa, 23 Dec 1985:2678).

The regime also received rave reviews in the media, praising Buhari on managing to steer the economy back from the verge of collapse, and his efforts in debt servicing, relying solely on national resources and initiatives (West Africa, 14 Jan 1985:47, & 28 May 1984:1103). These can be summarised with specific examples from Graf:

After a year in office the Buhari government had increased federally collected revenue by 14% ..., doubled the country's foreign exchange reserve, reduced the overall budget deficit from N6.2bn to N3.3bn, decreased imports by 11.4%, increased exports by 25.3% and honoured all medium- and long-term debts (1988:162).
What is critical here is not that revenue was generated; this had depended on the movement of oil on the international market since the early-1970s. But, rather, that the revenues were actually accounted for, unlike during the Shagari administration.

It is also worth noting that the positive economic results achieved by Buhari were nullified by the political consequences of the very measures that brought them about. As the data in Table 7.1 and the discussion surrounding them suggest, the results were achieved by the removal of subsidies on basic needs and services, retrenchment, budget cuts, tax hikes, import compression, strict foreign exchange and export licence controls.

It is, however, possible, though uncertain, that the deal with Brazil and the possibilities it represented for the Buhari regime were crucial factors in the IMF’s new-found willingness to be flexible. Whatever the case may be, it was about this same time, as reports suggested, that the IMF hinted at making “concessions” to Buhari on trade liberalisation and the removal of the petroleum subsidy (West Africa, 28 Oct 1985:2255; Biersteker 1986:19). This was presumably in exchange for a 60% devaluation. Obviously the SMC did not find the offer palatable.

General Buhari unveiled what constituted the regime’s fifth strategy in his 1985 budget. Along with a wage freeze, tax hikes and continuous austerity measures, the SMC raised the country’s debt service ratio to 44%. This move was not unrelated to the assumption that, if Nigeria serviced its debt religiously, the IMF and the creditors might be moved to sympathise with the new regime. Such expectations failed to materialise for two reasons.
One, as already noted, it mattered little to the Fund whether the social costs of Buhari’s adjustment policies were as pernicious and inhumane as were the formal structural adjustment programmes imposed on other countries. Thus, the IMF was not diverted from its rigid ideological position. Two, and relatedly, the London and Paris Clubs refused to even negotiate with the regime, let alone open new lines of credit for Lagos (West Africa, 6 Aug 1984:1565; Bangura 1987:102-103). The two Clubs insisted that Buhari signed an agreement with the IMF before even talking about debt rescheduling negotiations.

There was yet another conditionality. Both Clubs adopted a policy of equal treatment for all Nigeria’s creditors. Termed comparability, the club members adopted the position because they believed that the uninsured creditors who settled some $2.5 billion on the SMC’s terms, as earlier discussed, capitulated under pressure. One can also add that it effectively limited how the SMC employed its strategy of divide and conquer.

Perhaps it is too much to expect any of the major OECD states - Britain, France and the US - to come to Buhari’s aid in their bilateral relations with Nigeria. In fact, as Nigeria’s principal creditors within the two Clubs, bilateral relations became another source of pressure on the SMC. The next section examines the bilateral involvement of these external state actors in ensuring that the regime did not circumvent the IMF.
Buhari's External Rejection and Internal Denunciation

Before discussing the specifics in this section, it is necessary to briefly recall the nature of the global political economy - systemic conditions - under which the Buhari regime struggled to circumvent the IMF. It is needless repeating that the collapse of oil prices and the continued glut precipitated Nigeria’s external debt and internal economic crisis. It has also been noted earlier in this chapter that the search for alternatives by Third World debtors was generally regarded by Western creditors and the IMF as likely to create a dangerous precedent if allowed to succeed.

The bilateral aspects of these relations and conflicts, as noted above, only increased the pressure on the SMC to accept the IMF. As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, Britain and the US were hardly supportive of Buhari for throwing the pliant Shagari out of office. As noted at the outset of the present chapter, they viewed the ouster as bringing about the regrettable demise of democracy in Nigeria although Nigerians celebrated it.

Not even the authoritarian character of the Buhari regime gained it support from the US and Britain. As already noted, Nigeria was unlike Zaire or Liberia whose leaders used the favoured Western communist bogey to appeal for aid and support in their repression. Buhari’s repression was not seen to be in the service of either Western or Reagan’s policy of "containment". Rather, as we shall see below, the regime directed its repression against its domestic political opponents for its own purposes. Moreover, General Buhari rejected Shagari’s deference to
Western policy in Southern Africa contrary to Thatcher and Reagan's expectations.

Thus, even if Britain and the US were inclined to sponsor Nigeria's negotiations with the IMF under Shagari, there was certainly no apparent basis on which to do this for the Buhari regime. Unlike Carter in the 1970s, Reagan had no sympathy for Third World aspirations. Indeed, his foreign policy sought to destroy such aspirations, and reassert US supremacy (Marchand 1994:294-295; Lubeck 1985). Nigeria was specifically targeted. To recall, the N1.6 billion loan originally expected from Saudi Arabia was blocked by the IMF and the Reagan administration.

Reagan's policy to slash US purchases of Nigerian oil followed, and this served to deepen Nigeria's external debt and internal economic crisis. It is no secret, according to Gambari, that Reagan's decision to cut US purchases of Nigerian oil was in retaliation for the SMC's "total opposition to apartheid and the US' linkage and constructive engagement policies" in Southern Africa (Gambari 1989:134). As Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, Gambari's immediate successor as Foreign Minister, explained, Reagan's retaliatory policy reduced US purchases of Nigerian oil to a trickle, from $11 billion under President Carter in 1979-1980 to $2 billion in 1984-1985 (West Africa, 20 Jan 1986:118).
This is the paradox of the oil weapon. It cuts both ways. In other words, oil is a double-edge sword.

Even then, as indicated above, there is no evidence to suggest that the Buhari regime actually put into practice the linkages it discovered to exist between the domestic political economy and external relations. The case of the border closure treated at the start of the chapter is a pertinent illustration.

Suffice it to recall that Nigeria's ECOWAS neighbours found Buhari's border closure after the currency notes exchange in April 1984 unbearable (Gambari 1989:51-59; West Africa, 3 Sept 1984:1770). Beyond the sub-region, however, the US, the French and the Libyans were also interested in having the borders re-open. Indeed, according to Gambari, even President Reagan showed more than remote interest in seeing them opened.

It is already noted that General Buhari was not another Shagari ready to adopt Reagan's views on African affairs. Concessions were nonetheless made to the US over the border closure. While the Americans had preferred Lagos port, the SMC allowed the US to "use the facilities in Port Harcourt as well as Calabar to convey supplies, petroleum, and relief materials through (Nigeria) to their destination in Chad" (Gambari 1989:53). The Buhari regime did not suggest any linkages of its own. In short, there was no quid pro quo. All one learns from the

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5It is utterly disappointing that Peter Olayiwola's work, *Petroleum and Structural Change in a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 151-152, which purports to treat the role of oil in Nigeria's development only glides over these contradictions.
very Foreign Minister in charge, Gambari, is what Nigeria might have done after
the fact (Gambari 1989:134-135).

Suffice it to say that, given the so-called "special" relations between Nigeria
and Britain, Thatcher was the most hostile of the OECD leaders to Buhari's
demands for SAP on his terms. The same was true for the British private sector.
And, as already indicated, not only was Britain Nigeria's largest supplier, but about
60% of the FGN debt was owed to British firms.

In fact, many of these firms depended so much on their business - legal and
illegal - with Nigeria that the Buhari regime's policy sent the Johnson Matthey Bank

The crackdown on corruption after the Buhari coup was a major factor in
sealing the fate of some of JMB's over-extended borrowers and ever.tually
JMB itself.

Ironically, only the intervention of the laissez faire Thatcher government saved JMB
from collapsing. Even then, JMB was only one of the several British firms that
faced bankruptcy because of the Nigerian debt crisis, and Buhari's efforts to
separate bogus from genuine businesses and claims.

Relations between Buhari and Thatcher only deteriorated after the abortive
Dikko, desperately sought by the SMC, personified the pillage of Nigeria under
Shagari. It can be said that Anglo-Nigerian relations even sank lower as Buhari
retaliated on every move Thatcher made against the regime. It even got to a point
where the Nigerian leader threatened to cut all trade links with Britain, if the British
did not get the IMF to soften its conditionalities (Calloway 1989:326). The threats got the SMC nowhere.

Like Britain and the US, France rejected all talks about rescheduling without an IMF agreement. However, France's search for short-term national advantage did not prevent it from signing a counter-trade deal with the Buhari regime. To be sure, this does not mean that France broke ranks with the two OECD creditor cartels. The point to note is that the action theoretically strengthened Buhari's view of counter-trade as a strategy in resisting the IMF and both the London and Paris Clubs. However, the various counter-trade deals signed by the regime had not matured, as indicated above, before Buhari was ousted.

Evidently, none of the regime's strategies offered a viable alternative to securing external resources and debt rescheduling without signing an agreement with the IMF. The regime faced more powerful opponents with the necessary resources to back up their bid to ensure that Nigeria's political economy remained under Western domination. However, these external machinations were only one component of Buhari's failure.

The other is the lack of internal support. In other words, the external debt crisis was a matter of foreign policy as it was a problem of internal development. This totally contradicts Aluko's argument that General Buhari "had no flair for foreign policy. His main concern was with domestic issues - the revival of the economy, tackling corruption and the promotion of the oil industry" (1990:224) The revival of the economy and the sagging oil industry were as directly internal as
external. Aluko fails to recognise this because his view NFP is orthodox diplomacy. My argument in the following section suggests that domestic politics was perhaps more crucial in the regime's failure to find a viable alternative to IMF.

Internal Contradictions and Buhari's Foreign Policy

It was noted at the beginning of the chapter that Buhari's coup only served to preserve the status quo as opposed to advancing structural transformation. This is to say, the military did not act as a force for change. Rather, as noted in Chapter 1, the coup was executed to prevent what was generally believed to be an imminent putsch by radicals in the junior officer ranks.

If so: why did the SMC rise against the various factions of the bourgeoisie? Conversely, why did the latter not support the regime's goals?

Various factions of the bourgeoisie agreed with the Buhari regime in its opposition to the IMF and 60% devaluation. What many opposed were the regime strategies in managing the crises (Ogene 1988:68-81). Buhari was tending to make rent seeking no longer profitable. But the compradors elites insisted on keeping their links to the international system open irrespective of its consequences for the national economy. Of course, as compradors, these links were key elements in their self-reproduction.

Characteristically, various members of this class expected fundamental social changes at the same time as wanting to retain intact existing privileges and the status quo. How then does change occur? Indeed, this is the crux of the contradictions and conflicts.
The strategies adopted by Buhari in managing the crises disrupted the prevailing modes of non-productive accumulation, speculation and subsidised consumption by which these classes reproduce themselves. As seen in the previous chapters, it matters less whether these were commercial, traditional, professional or political elites. Few had resources to maintain their class positions and privileges beyond what they extracted from the state, albeit differentially, depending on proximity to the corridors of oil rent allocation.

As in other African countries, women and the popular classes were hit the hardest. Not only was the state the largest employer of lower class labour as it was that of the bourgeoisie, but as argued in Chapter 1, women and the popular classes have been always the first to suffer and the last to benefit. In sum, the more both classes relied on the state, the less immune their members were to the effects of the regime’s austerity measures.

In many respects, this indicates the central role still played by the state in class formation and struggles. However, while the regime’s policies were less liable to change the class positions of the lower classes, it had the tendency to place special adversities against the strategies through which tycoons commercial compradors reproduce themselves. Not only did this curtail the circle of parasites on oil rent, but General Buhari was undeterred by the plight of those about to lose out in the bourgeois intra-class struggles and his new ways of doing things.
West Africa made this very point in its lead editorial of 14 January 1985 at page 47:

It would be wrong to suppose that the purpose of government is entirely served by the provision of efficient management for the economy. One of the things that has been largely ignored by Buhari is politics. It seems reasonable to state that the military administration has not involved itself in the politics which its role in government makes necessary.

In short, Buhari was not known for his role as a negotiator or a consensus-builder. He considered politics as a luxury within a political economy on the verge of collapse.

Thus, as his detractors like General Babangida claimed, Buhari "was uncompromising" (Othman 1989:140). Paradoxically, as shown in Chapter 5, these were the very traits most admired in Murtala. In contrast, the similar traits partly contributed to Buhari's downfall.

Perhaps this different reception had to do with the nature of the issues and the interests at stake. As evident in Chapter 5, Murtala's policy on Angola directly threatened few interests among the dominant classes. On the other hand, Buhari's policies were in part designed against the excesses of factions of the bourgeoisie. Few of the visible culprits were spared (Graf 1988).

Viewed within the primacy of domestic politics, this shows the limits and conditions posed by ethnic, class and state forces on foreign policy. It is the widespread view, as Graf explains, that Buhari resorted to force because he lacked the sort of "brokerage and balancing skills" which military leaders like Gowon possessed (1988:163). In a similar vein, the regime's Foreign Minister, Gambari,
argues that in order to retain power: "Governments have tended to pursue a coalition strategy, and have avoided antagonizing major groups, whether regional, ethnic, religious, or ideological" (1989:212). Buhari did not.

In the conceptual scheme in Chapters 1 and 2, this was specifically linked to the precarious internal balance which has immobilised economic and political transformation. This is what Sara Berry referred to, in the quote in Chapter 1, as "explosive paralysis". The question is how to diffuse it.

This question is as intriguing for decision makers as for analysts. Gambari, Graf and the West Africa editorial cited above are apt examples. On the one hand, these analyses imply that the politics of immobilism is required to give Nigeria a semblance of internal stability. On the other, the analysts inform us that the system cannot continue if the country is to develop and realise its external role conception. Again the question is how to get from one to the other, as clearly shown in Chapters 1 and 2.

General Buhari insisted that his austerity measures must remain in place "as long as it takes us to put the economy on a sound foundation." Evidently, the regime was firm on the need to smash the "carefree and careless way of life" of the bourgeoisie, which the latter had sought to protect at all costs. In short, those who prospered under political chaos fought to retain the status quo. Like in Mobutu's Zaire (Sender & Smith 1986:76), and as was the case in the Shagari period (Chapter 6), such chaos provides the ideal environment for plunder and pillage.
It is thus not surprising that, other than those who stood to profit from Buhari's agricultural projects, there was hardly any professional group not eventually pitted against the SMC in resisting change. The regime was locked in stiff struggles with students over the introduction of user fees on education and the banning of NUNS. The doctors went on strike for better working conditions and more pay, and also for the regime's banning of their medical associations (Bangura 1987:104-105).

To recall from earlier discussion, similar conflicts went on with past politicians over long prison terms, and the investment compradors over import licenses and credit compression. In fact, the plutocrats and the commercial classes who relied on import licenses and government credits under Shagari were hit the hardest. Due to foreign exchange shortages, imports fell from $15 billion in 1980/1981 to less than $8 billion in 1984/1985 (Olukoshi 1989:224).

Unlike the other groups, however, the struggles with workers over the wage freeze, retrenchment and various anti-labour decrees were laden with threats. As the regime stated:

This administration will not tolerate irresponsible and recalcitrant behaviour among the country's workforce. In the face of the downturn in Nigeria's economy, we cannot afford the loss of productivity arising from indiscipline and disruption caused by strikes (Olukoshi 1989:230).

The regime engaged the market women over levies, and demolished stalls that were erected without the proper permits. Only the rural populations, given their traditional inability to organise nationally, were not directly involved in the state-civil society struggles for autonomy.
The conflict with the press was equally fierce. It has already been described how the regime attempted to muzzle the press with Decree No. 4. Othman notes the widespread belief in some national media circles that the press was not given credit "for preparing the mood for the soldiers intervention and vociferously welcoming the coup" (1985:1845-6).

The Triumph is one apt example. It specifically called for the overthrow of Shagari after the 1983 elections were stolen by the NPN (ibid). In short, the point of all of this is that, just like other groups, the media were protecting their own interests and expected accolades for doing the job. The mood turned bitter when the regime treated the press just like any other interest group.

In the final analysis, what the foregoing analysis shows is the order of priorities and sacrifices posited in Chapter 1; that is, who was going to be deprived of what in order to pursue certain policies. This indicates how far Buhari was willing to go in suppressing opposition to his foreign and domestic policy.

**Theoretical Synthesis**

As with Shagari in the preceding chapter and Babangida in the next, this is one of the cases in the present study in which the ethnic, class, state, leadership and international-systemic factors come out most clearly. Buhari's policies had an ethnic slant to them. This was shown clearly in the regime's attempt to favour the Hausa-Fulani in resource allocation, project design and privatisation.

It also had a clear class element. Vis-a-vis the domestic forces, the regime simultaneously alienated the bourgeoisie as it antagonised the popular classes.
However, General Buhari had no strategy to cope with the ensuing resistance except the kind of repression, arbitrary arrest and detention that invited protest and condemnation from human rights groups internationally. It is not surprising that the civil-military relations doyen, J. Bayo Adekanye (1991), dubs the Buhari approach to containing the fallout "sloppy authoritarianism".

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Buhari made efforts to use the financial autonomy of the state to give it some economic and political independence, notwithstanding the regional or ethnic bias. The Buhari regime had preferences it intended to pursue. It envisaged agriculture as the engine of Nigeria's industrial development. In consequence, the regime took on both the bourgeoisie and popular classes.

General Buhari's determination suggests that, unlike both the Gowon and Shagari periods, conscious attempts were made to wrench the levers of government and state from the stupefying clutches of the commercial compradors. Of course, this was a function of the leader. That is, Buhari's leadership contributed immensely to the determination of Nigeria's response to the IMF.

By the same token, and to recall from the conceptual scheme, the case also shows the limits imposed on such leadership by the internal structure and contradictions. Evidently, the lack of internal support deprived Buhari of a necessary condition within which to better manage and sustain his conflicts with the IMF and its Western directors. This is not to say that such domestic and or dominant class support would have been sufficient in this particular case. But it
was certainly necessary.

Paradoxically then, the reason why the Buhari regime failed in its nationalist objectives had to do with the nature of the internal structure and domestic processes. To repeat, the debt crisis was much a problem of foreign policy as it was a matter of internal development. And Buhari was caught in the cross-cutting pressures of external demands and internal resistance to his crisis management strategies.

Internally, the strategies introduced by the regime in managing the crisis conflicted with the traditional expectations from civil society. Externally, General Buhari's inward-looking approach and nationalist outlook alienated external actors as it had antagonised domestic groups. This approach - by implication a demand for relative autonomy from the forces of imperialism - was not the sort of defiant behaviour rewarded by the very creditors, imperialist governments and agencies it was attacking.

Evidently, it brought the wrath of the Fund, OECD states, and the Paris and London Clubs on the SMC, and circumscribed NFP. However, this is not to say that the regime ceased to be active in African affairs. This is what Buhari's Foreign Minister, Professor Gambari, has to say on Nigeria's recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1984 (1989:98-99):

Of all the Buhari administration's endeavors in the external realm, the decision to recognize the SADR and seat it as a full member of the OAU probably enjoyed the most popular support. It was happily reminiscent of Murtala's courage and vision in recognizing the MPLA and ensuring its membership in the OAU. Although the times were different, for a brief moment it seemed as if, diplomatically at least, Nigeria was born again.
With no intention to detract from the accomplishment, Gambari's account of it is a gross exaggeration. This is why.

It may well be the case that the recognition of SADR enjoyed the most popular support within Nigeria. It is, however, hardly reminiscent of Murtala in Angola. It entailed no political nor financial cost of any kind (Pazzanita 1993:187-225). Moreover, it lacked the sense of crisis that there had been in the case of the MPLA. In short, the recognition of the SADR and the MPLA cannot be compared on the level which Gambari suggests. This only gives the policy an aura which it did not possess.

General Babangida's intervention in Liberia, examined in Chapter 8, is perhaps more comparable to the Angolan imbroglio. Meanwhile, the next chapter compares and contrasts how Babangida managed the debt crisis and negotiations with SAP after ousting Buhari in a palace coup in August 1985.
The present chapter extends the analysis in the previous one. In comparing and contrasting the Babangida and Buhari regimes, it examines the former's relations with the IMF, the World Bank and the London and Paris Clubs creditor cartels. Part one discusses the domestic politics of ethnicity, class, state and Babangida's leadership. The second examines the debt negotiations. Part three assesses the impact of these on foreign policy and vice-versa.

Internal Structure: Ethnicity, Class, State and Babangida’s Leadership

General Babangida ousted Buhari in a palace coup on 27 August 1985 because the two disagreed on policy direction. The coup did not alter the ruling faction within the military nor change class and civil-military relations. Neither was Babangida a newcomer to coup-making in Nigeria. No coup had succeeded in the country since Gowon was eased aside in July 1975 without his involvement or knowledge. Indeed, Babangida helped Buhari to power in January 1984 the same way Murtala paved the way for Gowon in July 1966.

Characteristic of coup leaders, Babangida gave a litany of legitimising speeches for ousting Buhari. As the former stated in his coup broadcast (West Africa, 2 Sept 1985:1791):

The principles of discussion, consultation and cooperation which should have guided the decision-making process were disregarded soon after the government settled down in 1984.
As alluded to in Chapter 7, Babangida went on to say in the same broadcast that Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his attitude to issues of national significance. Efforts to make him understand ... only served to aggravate this attitude.

Needless to say, as we have seen in Chapters 5 and 7, these were the very traits most admired in Murtala. Moreover, Babangida was the architect of the Buhari regime which proclaimed itself to be an offshoot of Murtala’s.

Babangida and Buhari clashed over whether defence spending for arms production or agriculture should serve as the primer for Nigeria’s late industrialisation in contrast to Buhari, who opted for commercial agriculture, as discussed in the previous chapter, Babangida favoured arms production-led industrialisation a la Brazil (Othman 1989:138-140). This conflict only intensified as Buhari categorically rejected the IMF loan in February 1985 (Chapter 7).

Unlike Buhari, Babangida viewed the loan as the way out of Nigeria’s economic crisis (West Africa, 2 Sept 1985:1792). In the latter’s view, since Buhari had adopted about 80% of the IMF conditionalities, there was no reason not to accept the whole package for the relief it was expected to bring.

Counter-trade was also a major issue of contention in the Buhari regime (Chapter 7). Those that accepted Babangida’s side of the story blamed “the loss of Nigeria’s regular crude oil customers to counter-trade policy” must be placed on Buhari’s shoulders. It was claimed that those who negotiated the deals profited from them immensely (Othman 1989:139). Those in the former camp were no less incensed over the latter’s allocation of 44% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings
to external debt servicing. Also to be noted was the division over the long jail terms meted out to the Second Republic politicians who pillaged the country (Chapters 6 & 7).

This is not to say that either Buhari or Babangida had a distinct economic policy on seizing power. Like the former, the latter seized power not to restructure class, state nor property relations, but to pre-empt what was generally believed to be an impending putsch by junior officers (Graf 1988:155-156).

**Babangida's Human Rights Mantle: How to Legitimise the Illegitimate?**

Internally, Babangida presented himself as the human rights leader, the opposite of Buhari. Armed a disarming smile, the former repealed the obnoxious decrees that were enacted under the latter. Decree No. 4 was repealed with immediate effect. The two journalists jailed under its provisions were given state pardon. Many of the politicians detained for pillage were released. Even some of those already convicted were released or had their sentences markedly reduced. The various civil society groups proscribed by Buhari were unbanned. One after the other all the issues that were considered taboo under the old regime were thrown open to public debate.

Political debates once again assumed their status as the popular pastime. The new regime took the lead. It set up the National Political Bureau to design the Third Republic; the Kuru Conference on foreign policy for the year 2000; and as we shall see below, the IMF loan debate topped the list.
The ubiquitous NSO - Buhari's state security apparatus - was disgraced and disbanded. Babangida even renamed the SMC the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), all in order to distance the new regime from the old. Babangida took steps to rectify the North-South and Muslim/Christian imbalance in composing his cabinet and other high government bodies. The new leader took the title of President - the first for a military ruler in Nigeria.

WAI was discredited without much thought. The new Minister of Information and Culture, Lt. Col. Anthony Ukpo, condemned WAI and described "discipline as a state of the mind, either you have it or you don't" (West Africa, 25 Nov 1985:2459). In short, Babangida took the mantle of the "human rights" leader (West Africa, 9 Sept 1985:1843; West Africa, 17 Feb 1986:332-333). In what is best described as a "return to the carefree, careless way of life we used to live", which Buhari sought to change, even if by default, Babangida prepared the ground for accepting the IMF loan which his predecessor had rejected categorically.

**Intra- and Inter-Class Contentions in the IMF Debates**

In fact, it was the widespread view that the Babangida "coup represented the triumph of the advocates of a free market over the forces of state control and regulation" (Olukoshi 1991:166; Gambari 1989:6; Bangura 1989:105ff; West Africa, 30 Dec 1985: 2677-8). As seen in the West in this report by Michael Holman (Financial Times, 1 March 1989):
President Babangida’s bloodless coup in August 1985 was widely and warmly welcome. It was clear that he would take the IMF medicine, and keep Nigeria in the Western camp. But he was also seen as the last bulwark between a conservative economic and political programme and younger officers who might adopt radical measures.

The appointment of Dr Kalu I. Kalu as Finance Minister only served to reinforce this view. Not only had Kalu served with the IMF, but he was a known advocate of the IMF loan. Just as the IMF had, he even listed the advantages of the loan (Nation Concord, 23 Sept 1985:1ff). While Kalu’s campaign for the loan struck the right chord with the international financial community anxious to see Nigeria reach an agreement with the IMF, it was, however, too much for many sections of the public who called on Babangida to remove Kalu as Finance Minister (Punch, 7 Oct 1985:1).

So intense was the public pressure to reject the IMF loan that the AFRC was forced to declare a national debate on the issue barely a week after the Babangida coup. To recall from Chapters 6 and 7, the mood in the country had been against the loan even during the Second Republic. Babangida threw the issue open to public debate on the belief that, because Buhari was against the IMF loan, the AFRC would certainly carry the people with it. In fact, the move was generally seen as a public relations exercise in an "an effort to carry the Nigerian public with it in a decision it was determined to take" (West Africa, 14 Oct 1985:2141).

To simplify matters, the cross-section of the non-rural population that animated the debate has been classified into three broad, non-cohesive or

In the second were non-bourgeois classes in charge of delivering services from the private and public sectors of the economy to the consumers. The argument here focused on material interest. The third tendency combined the radical intelligentsia, and groups like the NLC, Women in Nigeria (WIN), and national students movements. Issues of class were prominent in this tendency. It is important to note, however, that even though these tendencies were animated by differing, if not contradictory interests and calculations, they all converged in the end to reject the IMF as the merchant of pain and sorrow.

The loan, it was argued, would cause suffering on a scale never before seen in Nigeria. Indeed, acceptance of the loan was generally equated with a "recolonisation of Nigeria". In short, in the course of the debate, it was clear that the cross-section of the interests involved were against the IMF loan. The voices of the prominent Nigerians, industrialists and those from the MNCs who argued in
favour of the loan were drowned out.¹

Paradoxically or intentionally, this attempt to mobilise the public through debates served to diffuse those leading interest groups mobilised against the state under the Buhari regime. Thus, one cannot but recall the ever-present fear, already discussed, of a radical-young officer fraction in the military waiting to strike in the midst of popular discontent to seize power for itself. This was attempted in January 1966, as we have seen in Chapter 5; but it was also tried again in April 1991. In other words, populist military coup examples such as Ghana or Burkina Faso were constant reminders of what could happen in Nigeria, calling for vigilance on the part of the bourgeois officer corps (Adekanye, ed., 1989; Bienen 1989:53-73).

Whatever the case may be, it took Babangida little time to decide that the public mood was not moving in the direction in which the AFRC had hoped. The debate was still raging when the AFRC declared a state of National Economic Emergency on 1 October 1985. This was to last for 15 months. However, Babangida’s frustration was unmistakable. In his words (West Africa, 7 Oct 1985:2077):

I must stress in no unmistakable terms that with or without the IMF loan facility, all of us must make hard choices involving great difficulties and requiring sacrifices from everyone and every sector, including the Armed Forces.

For a General who described himself as the "human rights president", Babangida’s

¹Who said what in this debate has been compiled by Q.F. Coker, IMF and Nigeria: A Select Bibliography 1960-1985 (Lagos: NIIA, n.d.), pp. 29-94
measures made those of Buhari pale by comparison. Where the latter imposed a wage freeze, the former decreed pay cuts.

The Armed Forces were to take pay cuts ranging from 2.5% for recruits and corporals to 20% for the ranks of brigadiers and above. This was soon followed by pay cuts for the civil service ranging from 2% at the bottom to 15% at the top. Not even the argument that the "working classes" could ill-afford such cuts, nor the threat of a general strike deterred the regime.

In actual fact, the deductions were hardly seen as a solution to the debt crisis. Only a total of N50 million was expected to be generated from the wage cuts in the 15 month emergency period. The policy was meant to send a message to the public of what to expect if it returned a no verdict on the IMF loan. In the Finance Minister’s view, it was a "symbolic" gesture to show the regime’s willingness in tackling the problem in a serious manner (West Africa, 18 Nov 1985:2407-8).

In the final analysis, neither the debate nor the popular rejection of the IMF loan resolved any of the issues, internally or externally. Internally, there was still the shortage of foreign exchange for raw materials and other imports. If the Babangida style provided a space for Nigerians to return to the way they were in the socio-political arena, such was not the case in the economic sphere without increased oil revenue. Oil exports had declined from a peak of $25 billion in 1980 to less than $6 billion in 1986. Needless to say, there were no prospects for the regime to earn adequate foreign exchange from other sources for such purpose.
Internationally, the AFRC was in no better situation. In fact, it was in a dilemma. The London and Paris Clubs, as already discussed, had refused to drop their cross-conditionalities. As before, they insisted on not rescheduling Nigeria’s debts until the AFRC reached an agreement with the IMF. The IMF was also quick to remind the new regime, no sooner had Babangida declared a public debate on the loan, that 60% devaluation of the Naira must be seen as the basis of any deal (Punch, 24 Sept 1985:15).

The counter-coup plot against Babangida in the middle of December 1985, however, served to strengthen the latter’s position internally and externally. Internally, it produced a surge of renewed support for Babangida. This further increased the basis of the regime’s legitimacy. It provided the AFRC with a basis to take draconian measures with little resistance within the military and in civil society. It also allowed the AFRC to conflate regime security with Buhari-like austerity measures with no challenge (West Africa, 6 Jan 1986:5-7). In other words, faced with similar conditions as Buhari, it was only a matter of time before Babangida’s human rights mantel was put to the test.

It has been noted how Babangida interpreted the public rejection of the IMF as a commitment to a "homegrown" SAP, "no matter what pains are involved" (West Africa, 6 Jan 1986:5-7 - my emphasis). These were soon known when Babangida’s intentions were made front and centre of the 1986 budget. The only question was which classes suffered the pains?
The budget, titled "economic reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance", brought together many of the ideas scattered through the regime's past statements and speeches. In terms of specifics, it imposed on the private sector a surtax ranging from 5% to 15% of profit, depending on the size of the firm. In the regime's view, this was spreading the pains of adjustment. In the same vein, and as a token of concession to public opinion, Kalu was redeployed as Planning Minister. Babangida replaced him with Dr Chu Okongwu in the Finance Ministry.

On the crucial issue of raw materials importation, the budget envisaged raising installed capacity utilisation to 55%. It set a 30% limit for debt service. It also imposed a general 30% import levy on non-essential items (West Africa, 13 Jan 1986:52-54).

More controversially, the budget was a proto-IMF SAP. In it Babangida had conceded all the four main conditionalities to the IMF which Buhari had rejected. In fact, devaluation, which had prevented FGN-IMF agreement during both the Shagari and Buhari periods, was central to the 1986 budget. The Naira was to be "floated" - euphemism for devaluation. The first step towards this was taken almost immediately when the Naira was pegged at parity with the US dollar that January.

Second and third, privatisation and liberalisation were to be embarked upon. The AFRC accepted as imperative a reduction in the role of the state in the economy; eliminate import licence controls; and begin a process of deregulation. Fourth, and with effect also from that January, the regime removed 80% of the subsidy from petroleum (West Africa, 13 Jan 1986:52-54).
Nigerians were stunned. In this context, why Babangida conceded to the IMF inspite of the public rejection is an important question. It is little known, for example, that the Fund and Bank invested time and effort in lobbying to persuade domestic groups, well-placed individuals and "allies in the FGN" that structural adjustment was necessary, and only feasible on IMF terms (Martin 1991:30ff). It is not certain, however, whether Babangida himself was one such highly placed individual.

Whatever the case may be, Babangida was under the illusion that if concessions were made, the IMF and the West would offer much needed resources for the management of Nigeria's external debt and internal economic crises. The budget was thus a signal to the Fund and to Nigeria's creditors that not much had been lost with the public rejection of the IMF. Babangida was more concerned with how his budget was received in Western capitals than in Nigeria. The FGN got the message, says the United Bank for Africa (UBA), that the missing link for debt rescheduling was an agreement with the IMF (1986:1).

Efforts to sell the budget to Nigeria's international creditors saw the regime's first Foreign Minister, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, criss-crossing London, Paris and Washington starting in January 1986. Akinyemi believed that his Kissinger-like shuttle across Europe was the "diplomatic face" of Babangida's economic decisions (West Africa, 13 Jan 1986:55, & 20 Jan 1986:117-118). It was the beginning of the so-called economic diplomacy - the search for new lines of credit to Lagos and the rescheduling of Nigeria's external debts.
Leaving aside tedious details, Akinyemi’s shuttle on the Lagos-London-Paris-Washington axis had by March led to a tacit support for Nigerian efforts at adjustment. Although the private sector creditors criticised the 30% ceiling on debt service, the British government, according to its then Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, gave its support to the measures contained in the Babangida budget. Since about 60% of Nigeria’s external debt was owed to British interests, the other creditors followed suite (Martin 1991:161).

Negotiations began in April, and SAP was adopted in July. While it was initially meant to last for two years - July 1986 to June 1988 - SAP remained in place when Babangida was forced out of power in August 1993. The next section examines the politics of Nigeria’s SAP. After eight years, it remains unclear whether SAP was home-grown as Babangida claimed, or whether it resulted from economic diplomacy as Akinyemi portrayed it.

**Nigeria’s SAP: The "Home-Grown" Illusion**

Everyone would agree that Nigeria’s SAP was a carbon copy of the traditional IMF SAPs. It is generally asserted that, even though it was touted as homegrown, the IMF and the Bank had a lot to do with its design (Bangura 1989b:177-178; Adefulu 1991:47). In this vein, most cite the interview which Okongwu, who replaced Kalu as Finance Minister, gave to *West Africa* (13 Oct 1986:2145):

> World Bank and the Fund have worked with us collaboratively on the SAP and its elements, and they have reviewed and approved SAP. The monitoring process will begin, but we shall monitor it in collaboration with the Fund.
Beyond these impressions, however, no one seems to be sure what exactly the IMF or the Bank had to do with it.

World Bank and IMF actual involvement suggests a lot more than the working together that Okongwu portrayed above. It can be said that the invisible hand of the Fund designed the SAP. The original SAP had little or no local content. How so?

Nigeria's adjustment proposals, as outlined in the 1986 budget, were made on the basis of what Babangida believed would satisfy the IMF. They were based on Fund beliefs and World Bank research, and not on an independent evaluation of the Nigerian economy. In fact, as a comparison of World Bank and FGN studies on the Nigerian economy in my Bibliography suggests, Babangida and the AFRC knew far less about the national economy than the IFIs and the country's creditors did.

Once a tacit agreement was reached in February 1986, the only question was how long it took to agree on the modalities of the programme under Nigerian covers. The Bank's suggestion to aid the AFRC to actually draw up a programme suited to Nigeria was effectively rejected by the IMF. Not only had the Fund taken the lead in these matters, but in the particular case of Nigeria, the IMF insisted on providing the advice if the FGN wanted to be seen to design its own programme (Martin 1991:49-50). In fact, it was no secret that the IMF people had a very low esteem of the Nigerian bureaucracy and decision making process.
It was thus with IMF approval that the Bank and its Resident officer in Lagos, Ishrat Husain, did more than convey Fund advice to the Babangida regime (Husain 1987:28). Mosley notes how the Bank "helped to assemble the interministerial committee which designed the SAP" (1991:230). World Bank involvement was equally "vital to completing the draft in two months and making it more acceptable to the IMF" (Martin 1991:49). IMF officials minced no words: "Left to itself, the FGN drafting and approval process might have taken forever" (ibid).

The Okin Committee more or less provided the cover for the exercise. In many respects, this draft process, as suggested above, had little to do with primary negotiations over a SAP suitable to Nigeria. The IMF merely used the language of the Babangida budget to "deepen and tighten" the measures which the AFRC must take. It is thus little surprising that Nigeria's SAP went further than what was generally believed to be traditional IMF packages, as the AFRC had already adopted the IMF language. In other words, once Babangida had conceded to the IMF in his 1986 budget, the drafting process was mainly about details; namely the conditions under which Nigeria was to implement the conditionalities.

Put differently, unlike Buhari's nationalist stance, negotiations with the Babangida regime were more like IMF and Bank lobbying sessions to get the AFRC to accept Fund SAP sooner rather than later. In fact, the only advice the hired foreign consultants and expert groups offered to the FGN was how to conform with IMF demands. This angered many FGN officials who had been led
to believe by their own government that the AFRC had a say in designing Nigeria's SAP (Martin 1991:29-30).

General Babangida's expectations were shattered. As noted earlier, he was under the illusion that employing Fund language to outline the FGN adjustment intentions was enough for an IMF seal of approval for debt rescheduling with the London and Paris Clubs of creditors. On the contrary, the Fund insisted that a standby agreement, 60% shock devaluation, the signing of orthodox IMF performance evaluation criteria were unavoidable. The two Clubs agreed on these cross-conditionalities.

The question this raises is two-fold. One, either Babangida did not understand what the traditional IMF SAP entailed. Two, he did, but only made the concessions on paper to get past the IMF hurdle for debt rescheduling, and then back to business as usual. Either way, suffice it to say that, like the SMC, the AFRC found no viable option without recourse to the IMF. As Martin points out, the Americans insisted on an IMF agreement (ibid).

It was the World Bank Vice-President, Ernest Stern, who suggested the political compromise that soften the political blow which the IMF rejection represented for Babangida. Stern came up with the idea whereby Nigeria reached an agreement with the IMF but did not draw on the loan. The IMF initially rejected this idea. First, it wanted to be tough on the "unreliable FGN". Second, decision makers within the Fund were concerned with setting a precedent by showing such flexibility (Martin 1991; West Africa, 28 April 1986:864).
This is not to say, however, that the IMF did not make, at the request of its Western directors, political concessions to African states like Sudan or Zaire. In fact, as one Fund source explained, "we were lucky to get 50 per cent of what we wanted" from Sudan and Zaire (Martin 1991:53). Why was Nigeria not accorded similar treatment in the same political climate? As one IMF official put it, "there was no political pressure from anywhere to do for Nigeria what we did for Sudan and Zaire" (Martin 1991:85-86).

In fact, the opposite was the case. As we have seen in Chapter 7 in the case of Buhari, Britain, France and the US worked against the FGN. Similarly, the London and Paris Clubs of creditors insisted on an IMF seal of approval before any talks on debt rescheduling. Moreover, contrary to the above view, the Fund was against Nigeria adjusting without recourse to the IMF. As we have seen also in Chapter 7, the IMF worked through the US government to block Buhari's attempt to secure funds from Saudi Arabia.

Little of this changed during the negotiations with the Babangida regime. Babangida's so-called economic diplomacy had little effect. Evidently, the FGN had lost its ranking in terms of international credit rating. And Nigeria lacked the strategic importance for political considerations like Sudan or Zaire.

Devaluation is one specific case in point. Nigeria was not treated differently from any other African state in negotiating the technicalities of devaluation. Although Babangida had declared boldly in his budget the need to float the naira, it appears that he had hoped to persuade the creditors that the FGN did not need
to submit to the IMF regime. Moreover, having accepted the public verdict over the IMF, to be seen to devalue the naira under Fund directives was politically damaging.

The political face-saving formula in this case, which also came about through the intermediation of Stern, was the idea to have a two-tier system of foreign exchange market (SFEM). The first tier market was reserved for government transactions like debt service, and payments to international organisations. It was also to be used for the settlement of import arrears for which letters of credit had been obtained before SFEM came into effect, and public sector procurement (Omoruyi 1989:29-34). In this way SFEM was to provide Babangida with the political camouflage for devaluation on IMF terms (Omoruyi 1989:49; Osagie 1988:71-87).

Initially, the plan was to operate the markets separately for 6 months, merge them and abolish it in nine months. In fact, they were merged to form a single foreign exchange market (FEM) only in July 1989. In turn, this not was abolished until March 1992, but with disastrous consequences.

These were the specific compromises which allowed Babangida to introduce the SAP in July 1986 while the negotiations with the IMF were on-going. As can be expected, the private sector groups "argued for very high tariffs and/or import prohibitions for their products and negligible tariffs for imported raw materials" (Robertson 1992:193). It is already noted that the Fund and its Western directors viewed the FGN as unreliable. The same people who earlier applauded
Babangida's ousting of Buhari now began to question his willingness to implement IMF conditionalities, and whether or not he would buckle under domestic pressures.

The IMF thus insisted that the FGN first put the agreed conditionalities in place before a seal of approval was given for debt rescheduling. This meant that opposition from dominant and popular classes and groups had to be overcome before the SFEM was finally introduced in late-September 1986 (West Africa, 15 Sept 1986:1914-5; UBA 1986:2-3). The marketing boards were effectively abolished in December 1986 with hardly any resistance from any quarter. For, as shown in Chapter 1, elites in the South were not really into agriculture; and many in the North engaged in it only when there were state and World Bank funds.

Clearly, it cannot be denied that these negotiations, even though they were about performance evaluation criteria and monitoring, were difficult and troubled. The Western financial community, the major OECD states and policy makers at the IMF were convinced that "Without Babangida, (Nigeria's SAP) would never have happened" (Martin 1991:40). It is fairly clear that SAP was anything but home-grown. Even the AFRC came to the table already promoting the IMF position.

The IMF view of Babangida's role in Nigeria's adoption of SAP is interesting, however, for what it says indirectly about Buhari. One, it can mean that Buhari was indeed his own man, as he flatly rejected the IMF conditionalities for a loan. Two, and by the implication of one, IMF pressure can get some leaders to toe the line
but not others. The limits of international-systemic pressures?

On his part, Babangida insisted that "Nigeria has no viable alternative to structural adjustment" (West Africa, 14 Aug 1989). By 1987, the consolidation of trade arrears into medium and long term debt had increased total external to $28.7 billion from $13.1 billion in 1985 (EIU 1992:47). Moreover, as earlier noted, the IMF debates under Babangida were anything but a search for alternatives. Thus, according to Akinyemi's successor, General Ike Nwachukwu:

NFP strategies should aim at facilitating support measures with the international system for our domestic economic policies (West Africa, 25 July 1988:1343).

The President and his Foreign Ministers all claimed that this enabled Nigeria to reschedule its debts and gain access to new lines of credit (FGN 1989:219). Was this the case?

**Economic Diplomacy and SAP: Babangida's Two-Level Game or Two-Level Deceit?**

The success which the regime claimed in attracting new resources and rescheduling old debts was dubious. At best the claims constitute a causal inversion. This is why.

It may be true that World Bank programme lending to Nigeria between 1986 and 1990 totalled $1.1 billion (Mosley 1991:230). In addition, FGN figures show that the British pledged $100 million as a special grant to bridge the resource-gap in the 1989 budget. Pledges by Japan and other OECD states are also cited (1989:219). Nigeria was able to reschedule some portions of its $34.5 billion external debt on three occasions since the end of 1986. And if the $3.4 billion debt
buy-back agreement reached between the Babangida regime and the London Club in 1992 hold, Nigeria's external debt stock might have been reduced by this amount (EIU, No.1, 1993:25; Lancaster 1992:92; EIU, No.3, 1992:15). Talks were also under way with a myriad of Nigeria's uninsured debtors.

However, the success in attracting new resources and the rescheduling of old debts can only be partly credited to the so-called economic diplomacy. The IMF, major OECD states, the London and Paris Clubs have stated right from the beginning that they were willing to talk about new credits and debt rescheduling only if the FGN fulfilled their set conditions. This was exactly what happened with Nigeria's adoption of SAP (Ogene 1988:76-77). That is, as we have seen in the SAP negotiations, the diplomacy was again over technicalities such as when to release how much.

Even then, not all signatories to the agreement lived up to their side of the bargain. It was part of the understanding that Nigeria would not draw on its IMF stand-by loan. As discussed above, it was negotiated as insurance against default by the FGN. However, Nigeria's creditors in the London Club insisted that the country draw down its IMF stand-by loan because Babangida did not hand over the oil windfall from the 1991 Gulf War, estimated at some $5 billion (EIU, No.4, 1992:12; African Business, Jan 1991:28). In their view, the regime now had oil money from which to meet its repayment obligations. And as we shall see in Chapter 9, it was widely reported that Babangida used the Gulf War oil windfall to finance the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia.
Like the London and Paris Clubs, the IMF also got tough with Babangida. When the last 15 month stand-by agreement with the FGN expired in April 1992, IMF officials made it clear that the Fund "was unwilling to do business with the Babangida administration". IMF sources insisted that the Fund preferred "to await the installation of the next government" (EIU, No.4, 1992:12).

Of course, it is logical and possible that Babangida had adopted SAP only to get IMF blessing for debt rescheduling, and then back to business as usual. If that was the case, it would contradict the president's original position to settle with the IMF on SAP. If not, this would suggest that the President knew little or nothing about what he was getting into when he came to power in August 1985 declaring for the IMF loan.

In consequence, if Babangida had intended on playing a two-level game, he succeeded only in deceiving the external actors and his domestic constituencies. This has only caused SAP to be distorted along the fault lines of ethnicity and class pressures within the bourgeoisie and civil-military relations.

**SAP and the Comprador Bourgeoisie**

Dominant class and ethnic pressures and civil-military politics have blocked the full implementation of SAP. This can be seen in the amount of *slippage* which occurred in its implementation under Babangida. This is particularly so in state subsidised activities in which the various comprador factions of the bourgeoisie have a stake as the mechanism for self-reproduction.
Subsidies on fertilisers are one prime example. Babangida could not remove subsidies from this commodity because it involved a concession to industrialists and farmers: the groups whose support was essential if the SAP were to have any base of political support (Mosley 1991:231).

Even then, one needs to recall the comparable situation under Buhari, that the so-called farmers and industrialists were just a faction of the comprador bourgeoisie.

The activities of foreign exchange speculators were more critical. Babangida did not deregulate the foreign exchange market (FEM) until March 1992, five years behind schedule. The reasons were simple: foreign exchange speculation served to line the pockets of powerful members of his government and many within the various factions of the bourgeoisie (Callaghy 1993:492-493).

Like every other issue, however, Babangida believed that such pressures were reason enough not to act according to the agreement with the IMF and the SAP timetable. In other words, unlike Buhari, Babangida was immobilised by divisions within his cabinet. In the latter’s words from an interview (West Africa, 19 April 1992), FEM was not abolished because

Each school of thought held strongly to its position and we had a stalemate. So what we did was to instruct the Central bank to keep manipulating the naira without saying so.

Needless to ask what is the role of the leader? Babangida even went on to say in this same interview that FEM was not abolished until there was nothing else to do under IMF pressure.
Of course, only currency speculators and traffickers, and the shady banks set up to exploit the situation benefitted. In fact, only the banking sector has recorded astronomical growth since SAP was introduced in Nigeria in July 1986. Located mostly in kiosk-like offices in Lagos, the number of banks in Nigeria have more than doubled from 56 in 1986 to 120 by July 1993. This was in addition to numerous finance houses, mortgage institutions and community banks (West Africa, 22 Aug 1993:1449, & 14 April 1991:524).

Despite pledges to the contrary, Babangida failed to balance a single budget in his eight years in power. In fact, this was one of the major sources of contention between the AFRC and the IMF. Deficits and extrabudgetary spending were the bane of the regime (West Africa, 4 Oct 1992:1614; Newswatch, 13 Jan 1992:20-28). General Babangida had in place an elaborate system of slush funds called "dedicated accounts". Revenues from 100,000 barrels oil per day used for replenishing these accounts were exempt from going into the state treasury (Africa Confidential, 18 Feb 1994:1).

It was only in September 1992 that the regime finally succumbed to IMF and World Bank pressure to set up a committee to monitor government receipts and expenditures. The fact that such a monitoring system had not existed allowed the regime to by-pass many of the IMF and World Bank SAP conditionalities on government spending. For example, about $2.7 billion in oil revenues are said to be unaccounted for in 1992 alone (EIU, No. 4, 1992:16; Economist, Nov 1993:93). Nor were auditors able to trace what happened to over $1 billion at the state-
owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Africa Confidential, 18 Feb 1994:1).

It has also been revealed that several members of the regime hurriedly struck an oil deal with Belize when it became evident that some interim arrangements would have to be found to break the impasse. The oil deal was to net those who signed it about $18 million. Babangida himself was part of this corruption web. Reports abound about how oil money financed his construction, mass media and banking interests (Africa Confidential, 13 Aug 1992:8, & 27 Oct 1993:8; Reno 1992).

Needless to say that this elaborate corruption system only served to undermine internal and external confidence in SAP and the economy. Equally as perplex as President Shagari's finance minister in 1983, Victor Masi, Babangida stunned the world in March 1993 when he revealed to the Daily Times (28 March 1993) of Nigeria that:

I have kept on asking my economists why it is that the economy of this country has not collapsed until now. What is it that is keeping it up. I still have not found the answer.

How can one fault banks for insisting on 90-day deposits in this climate? As the Managing Director of Nigeria's International Merchant Bank, Alhaji Bashir Tukur, confirms: "Nobody can take such risks in Nigeria because even three months sometimes is long. Things can change" (West Africa, 22 Aug 1993:1449).
Privatisation and Ethnic Politics

Privatisation, supposedly another cornerstone of SAP, has equally fallen victim to corruption and Nigeria’s political logic. In 1988, the government begun a process to commercialise or fully privatise them supervised by the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) headed by Alhaji Hamza Zayyad (Reno 1993; Agbaje 1992; Agbese 1992; Wilson & Lewis 1990; Odife 1988; Ubeku 1987). As Zayyad states, the enterprises were "riddled with corruption, nepotism, ineptitude, mismanagement and downright thievery" (Agbese 1992:340). It is thus not surprising, as Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, Chief of General Staff, and Chief Olu Falae, Secretary to the Federal Government, point out that about $30 billion of state funds were disbursed to parastatals between 1980 and 1985 alone, for only a return of less than $1 billion (Reno 1993:72; Agbese 1992:341).

Callaghy and Ernest Wilson echoed the London Financial Times at the time in labelling the privatisation programme as "the most radical in Africa" (1987:197). As we shall see below, this was premature. Callaghy and Ernest, like Schatz, were simply too eager to praise uncritically. Callaghy’s latter reflections thus better describe the situation: "As with all things in Nigeria, the proof was in effective implementation - or rather the lack thereof it. The old political and rent-seeking political logic were far from dead (1993:491).

It is known too well that the growth of parastatals in Nigeria was mainly a function of the politics of sharing the national cake. There are no precise figures on how many the federal and state governments owned. It is estimated, however,
that the FGN alone owned about the 180 parastatals (Oke 1990:38). These essentially gave the dominant classes more access to oil rents. The focus here is on the privatisation process itself.

Not only did the exercise become a fierce battle within the bourgeoisie in its North-South ethnic divide, but it also turned into an object of inter-class struggles (Agbese 1992; Olukoshi 1990). As argued in Chapter 1, the Southern elites fully support privatisation because they see it as a basis to strengthen their hold on the economy and increase their political position. The Northern elites, by contrast, consider it as a strategy to take away their control of the import/bank license regime and erode their hold on state power. They vehemently denounced it as "a plot by the southern ethnic groups, especially the Yorubas, to seize private control of public assets (Agbaje 1992:126-127).

In consequence, what was supposed to be a critical element in economic restructuring and political transformation is now being distorted to fit the North-South ethnic stalemate. The Hausa-Fulani demanded that state governments in the North be allocated federal funds to purchase these enterprises for "ethnic balance" between the North and the South. Thus, rather than allow Southern elites with the finances and perhaps the experience to efficiently manage the parastatals to acquire them, the Babangida regime politicised the process to allow the Northern states to buy and hold these enterprises in trust for their indigenes (Agbese 1992: 348-351; Agbaje 1992:126-127; Reno 1993).
In short, a process that was supposed to usher in a new dawn remains very much like the old one. Ironically, this call was supported by the TCPC chair himself, Zayyad, who was quoted above as saying that these state enterprises were corrupt and riddled with nepotism (Agbese 1992:349-350; Reno 1993:72). However, this was not a new policy. Recall that General Buhari adopted a similar view (Chapter 7).

Evidently, the relationships within and between the state and dominant ethnic-class factions remain in the 1990s what they were in 1950s, when the federation was put together. The Northern elites have done about anything to prevent economic restructuring and political transformation. Every leader from Balewa in 1960 to Babangida in the 1990s encountered this problem. None confronted it frontally, however.

Thus, the centrality of domestic politics as the ethnic-class status quo has been preserved by state power in preventing the necessary conditions for a rational economy to take hold or operate. As argued within the conceptual scheme, not only do such distortions delay, if not block, the emergence of productive investment associated with an industrial bourgeoisie, but also retards the growth of those forces that are known to have championed the cause of democracy elsewhere (Chapter 1). This is why one cannot connect NFP to economic strength without knowing its domestic politics.
Theoretical Synthesis

It is fairly clear from comparing and contrasting the Buhari and Babangida regimes that explanations for NFP need to be sought from a wider set of factors than dependency or international-systemic pressures and constraints alone. Clearly, these were present and acute. However, it is difficult to understand why, how and under what conditions these shaped NFP without taking account of the internal structure of ethnicity, class and state factors, and leadership roles and capabilities.

These factors were significant in shaping both Babangida's and Buhari's relations with the IMF and Nigeria's international creditors. Buhari's policies had an ethnic slant to them as did those of Babangida, especially as regards to privatisation. Vis-a-vis domestic forces, both regimes simultaneously alienated the bourgeoisie as they antagonised the popular classes.

Ethnic and intra-class pressures within the bourgeoisie turned Babangida's SAP and agreement with the IMF into what can be called a two-level game. Babangida made international deals which he could only implement nationally by making agreements or side deals with powerful interests. In other words, unlike Buhari who stood his ground against the IMF and internal opposition, the Babangida regime tried to satisfy both sides of his international and national opposition.

In the process, the Babangida regime distorted SAP to fit the internal ethnic-class status quo. That is, as with Buhari, Babangida did not have a policy or strategy to cope with the ensuing resistance. Like Buhari, Babangida resorted to
the kind of repression, arbitrary arrest and detention that invited all sorts of protest and condemnation from human rights groups both internationally and domestically. Thus, even though Babangida rode to power and sought popular legitimacy as a human rights leader, he left office as the worst defender of human rights in Nigeria history.

However, Buhari lost power because he insisted on economic restructuring, and failed to pursue the traditional coalition strategy. In other words, he did not avoid antagonizing class, ethnic, regional and professional interest groups.

Like Gowon and Shagari, Babangida made minimal efforts to use the financial autonomy of the state to implement SAP and his transition to democracy programme. Unlike Buhari, Babangida was adept at the bankrupt politics of keeping everyone happy, while nothing changes. The consequences were disastrous.

Unlike Buhari, Babangida was captured more deeply in the web of politics and ethnic-class struggles. Buhari was ousted because he sought to force changes. Babangida appeased the status quo, but only by blocking possible changes. Thus, it is interesting that those at the IMF, as noted above, believed that Nigeria adopted SAP because of Babangida.

In terms of leadership and the primacy of domestic politics, this suggests that, short of the types of military or physical occupations the US carried out in places like Panama and Grenada or Iraq in Kuwait, external forces need internal allies if they are to succeed. The IMF, the US and Britain were unable to have their
way under General Buhari because the latter refused to cooperate. But they had their way with Babangida because he made the choice. What's more, Babangida deposed Buhari to do so. In the next chapter, I examine how Babangida's leadership and the end of the Cold War or bipolarity shaped Nigeria's role in the ECOWAS military intervention and peacekeeping in the civil war in Liberia.
CHAPTER 9

GENERAL BABANGIDA IN LIBERIA

The on-going ECOWAS intervention in the civil war in Liberia in August 1990 is a historic event, if not the event of the century in Africa’s international relations. It embraces international law, foreign policy, international and regional organisations and others aspects of the relations between states and non-state actors. The focus in the present chapter is on Nigeria’s role under General Babangida’s leadership, May 1990 to August 1993.

The chapter is organised in five main sections. The first provides a synopsis of the ECOWAS mediation efforts in the civil war. Section two discusses the ECOMOG intervention. Sections three and four deal with the diplomacy of the intervention and domestic opposition in Nigeria. The problems of financing ECOMOG are examined in sections five and six.

Nigerian-Liberian Relations

ECOWAS is not the first attempt at regional cooperation and integration in West Africa. As shown in the special issue of the *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies* (1963), efforts at integration in the sub-region go back decades before ECOWAS. However, the establishment of ECOWAS in May 1975 owed more to Nigeria’s initiative and General Gowon’s cheque-book diplomacy than perhaps the desire of 16 West African leaders to form an economic community for integration (Ojo 1980).
Nor was the development of Nigerian-Liberian relations a post-ECOWAS phenomenon. Prime Minister Balewa and President Tubman of Liberia led the Monrovia Group of conservative states against the Casablanca Group of radical leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana during the formation of the OAU in the early 1960s. Indeed, the former got its name from the fact that its first meeting was held in Monrovia, capital of Liberia, in 1961.

Sergeant Samuel Doe's coup d'état in April 1980, in which he lined up and shot his civilian predecessors, caused a major rift between the two countries. From
then on President Shagari sought to make Doe a pariah in Africa. He refused Doe’s Foreign Minister admission to the OAU economic summit in Nigeria that April where the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted. Shagari was equally adamant that Doe himself be turned away the following May at the ECOWAS heads of state summit in Lome, Togo. In the same vein, Shagari was steadfast against Doe succeeding President Tolbert as OAU Chair (Nwokedi 1992:10-11).

General Buhari had no time for Doe, and little for ECOWAS. It was not until Babangida seized power that Nigerian-Liberian relations improved. Babangida lavished aid on Doe while Nigerians suffered. Not only were promises of economic assistance made, but General Babangida gave Doe a cash grant of about $1 million for the University of Liberia, and even "offered to buy Liberia's debt of several millions owed to the African Development Bank" (Nwokedi 1992:11). In the same period Babangida successfully mediated the conflict between Liberia and Sierra Leone (West Africa, 13 July 1987:1364). The two leaders are even known to have signed agreements for Nigeria to purchase iron ore from Liberia (Africa Confidential, 20 April 1990:1-2): the spirit of ECOWAS!

The Liberian Civil War and the Contradictions of Collective Security in ECOWAS

Like the formation of ECOWAS itself, the intervention under investigation owed more to Babangida’s initiatives and Nigeria’s finance than a consensus by West African leaders to stop the carnage or prevent Charles Taylor from his planned takeover of Liberia. It was on Nigeria’s initiatives that ECOWAS leaders endorsed
setting up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) at their 13th summit in late May 1990 in Banjul, the Gambia. Although the SMC was based on the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted in 1978, the idea very much resembled the Standing Committee on Mediation which General Obasanjo proposed to the OAU Heads of State and Government at their 14th Summit Conference in July 1997 in Libreville, Gabon. In Banjul the SMC was given the mandate to mediate conflicts among the 16 states of ECOWAS (Article 4 of the SMC Mandate).

Ghana, Mali, Gambia, Togo and Nigeria formed the nucleus of the new committee. Sierra Leone and Guinea served as observers. Membership in the SMC was set to be reviewed every three years. Ostensibly, Liberia was its first test case.

Details of how Sergeant Doe shot his way into the Executive Mansion in Monrovia on 12 April 1980 massacring President Tolbert and seizing power from the ruling Americo-Liberian oligarchy, and the counter-coups and the ethnic and class struggles thereafter are well-known (Adibe 1994; Inegbedion 1992, 1994; Wippman 1993). What is most important for the present analysis is the why and how the civil war in Liberia got onto the ECOWAS sub-regional security agenda and within Nigeria’s purview. And it suffices to say that the civil war begun when Charles Taylor invaded Liberia in December 1989 to avenge his fellow Americo-Liberians and seize power for himself (New Africa, Oct 1992:11-13).

When Taylor invaded Liberia from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire in December 1989, he had no ideological differences with Samuel Doe. He never crusaded to make Liberia a better managed, more secure, or more socially just and equitable nation-state. On the contrary, he has merely aspired to avenge a personal vendetta.

The patterns of the atrocities that followed suggested that the war polarised Liberians along ethnic lines: the Krahn and the Mandigos versus the Gio and the Manos while the "American-Liberians" sought to re-establish their domination over the "African-Liberians". Taylor was not alone, however. He had external support from within the sub-region from Doe's sworn enemies: Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d'Ivoire and Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso.

Cote d'Ivoire served as sanctuary and arms conduit for Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Like Taylor, Houphouet-Boigny sought vengeance on Doe. The Tolbert ruling family in Liberia and the Ivorien leader were related by marriage (Ac'be 1994; Inegbedion 1994).

Houphouet-Boigny was also father-in-law to Compaore. The latter provided Taylor with training facilities and military bases in Burkina Faso. Indeed, Compaore admitted in a recent interview that his support for Taylor included seconding regular Burkina soldiers to Taylor's rebel outfit (West Africa, 10 May 1992:756; Africa Confidential, 14 Sept 1990:8). Muammar Qaddafi in Libya is known to have financed Taylor's war (Africa Report, Jan/Feb 1991:27-30, & Nov/Dec 1990:17-20).

Sadly for the Liberian people, none of Taylor's external sponsors wanted the conflict resolved peacefully. It can only be concluded that in their desire to avenge
Tolbert and make Taylor president, the Ivorian leader and his son in-law, Compaore, turned a blind eye to the carnage in Liberia.

Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Dauda Jawara of the Gambia, then ECOWAS Chair, and Babangida opposed Taylor (Guardian, 24 April 1992:9; West Africa, 7 Oct 1990:2578). As Babangida and Jawara revealed in separate interviews, both regarded the civil war in Liberia as a matter of sub-regional security. As both concur:

If Charles Taylor, with the support of ... mercenaries from other countries in the sub-region, were to come into power by force, one can imagine the implications it would have for sub-regional stability (West Africa, 2 Dec 1990:2895).

It is said by Christopher Clapham that Babangida even offered to send Nigerian troops to aid Doe against the NPFL when the going got tough in May 1990, "but was urged to opt for a diplomatic solution through ECOWAS" (1994:81).

It can be argued that since Nigeria had no security policy on ECOWAS, at least not one that was known publicly (Bassev 1987), the offer to Doe was General Babangida's view of Nigeria's role conception. Babangida believed that whether Nigerians liked it or not, "Nigeria has military responsibilities in the West African sub-region and Africa as a whole" (West Africa, 11 March 1985:489). Did Babangida put this to the test in Liberia?

Can it be that, unlike Buhari who closed the country's borders to ECOWAS, Babangida saw in the Liberian civil war an opportunity for Nigeria to articulate its proclaimed regional leadership. Recall from Chapter 6 that Babangida, as President Shagari's Chief of Staff, sought to impose a ceasefire on the warring
factions in the Chad civil war in 1982. And however one addresses the above 
questions, there was no doubt that conditions for external intervention were 
present in Liberia.

The Futility of Mediation

However, the case of Liberia "demonstrated the central conflict which prevents 
closer security and economic cooperation" in the sub-region (Kraus 1994:270). 
Just as with Murtala and the OAU on Angola, ECOWAS was split for and against 
Babangida's efforts to negotiate an orderly transition of power from the discredited 
Doe regime to a government of national unity (Akabogu 1991:78-82; Aderiye 

Liberia's inter-faith council of churches tried with no luck. No agreement was 
reached at the ECOWAS June 1990 meeting in Lagos, Nigeria. The one convened 
by the SMC in mid-July 1990 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, also achieved nothing. 
The ceasefire and peace proposals tabled by the SMC were summarily rejected 
by Taylor. The latter was categorical that the "NPFL was not in peace talks for any 
interim government or for any peace-keeping force in Liberia" (James 

The rivalry between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire for influence helped matters 
little. As noted in Chapter 4, Houphouet-Boigny even went so far as to commit 
some of his personal fortune in support of the break up of Nigeria in 1967 to 1970. 
And in this particular case, he regarded Liberia as his own backyard in which 
anything Nigeria did was considered meddling. In short, these two leaders had
differing reasons of their own for becoming involved in Liberia. And it soon became clear how futile it was to achieve a political settlement without making Taylor the president.

By the third week of July, the rebel forces had overrun almost the entire territory of Liberia. Only Monrovia and its Executive Mansion - Doe's fortress - were yet to be taken at the time. Yormie Johnson, Taylor's erstwhile senior commander but now the leader of a splinter group - the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) - held only a military base in Caldwell just outside Monrovia. Although Taylor himself did not succeed in taking the state house, his NPFL forces had captured 12 of Liberia's 13 counties.

This only served to harden Taylor's resolve for total victory. He insisted that Doe resign there and then. His camp within ECOWAS also reckoned that he had won the fight to be president on the battlefield (*Nigeria ThisWeek*, 1 Oct 1990:13; *Africa Confidential*, 24 Aug 1990:8). Like the on-going horror in Burundi, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the three warring factions in Liberia simply turned the civil war into a slaughter of the others' ethnic groups.

The human casualties and the atrocities committed by the warring factions can only be described as horrendous. One of the most widely reported mass slaughters occurred that July when AFL soldiers killed over 600 persons taking refuge in St. Peter's Church. When it captured the port of Buchanan, Taylor lined up and shot at least 200 unarmed civilians. Even more horrendous atrocities continued throughout the period under investigation.
In short, the world watched as Liberia tore itself apart. As General Emmanuel Erskine (*Africa Forum*, 1/1, 1991:27), veteran commander of UN peacekeeping operations, noted at the time:

> With the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, it is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of that country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.

The overthrow of the Joseph Momoh government in Sierra Leone in April 1991 and the ensuing civil war, for example, resulted from the invasion of that country by bands of Taylor's mercenaries (*Inegbedion* 1992).

Calls for US intervention by the European Community and from within Liberia were rejected by the Americans. Everything Johnson did - even seizing American citizens as hostages - to provoke US intervention failed. Even the march on the US Embassy in Monrovia organised by the Liberian churches to appeal to the Americans came to nothing (*Akabogu* 1992:73-77; *Africa Research Bulletin* - Political Series - 30 Sept 1990:9841).

When the US Marines came ashore in Monrovia on 5 August, it was only to evacuate American citizens. The Bush administration even refused to entertain the idea of sending American troops for peacekeeping duties in Liberia. Evidently, Liberia now lacked any intrinsic significance to the US at the end of the Cold War. It was only its status in the old, bipolar Soviet-American strategic competition that had made Liberia important. Now that the US was the only superpower, Liberia had ceased to be of priority.
This was especially so after the US became embroiled in rebutting Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. While the world lined up behind the US against Iraq to contain threats to regional peace and security in the Gulf, similar threats in West Africa were ignored by the international community. Indeed, Babangida stated in his Foreword to the *Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG* (1992) edited by Margaret Vogt that:

[while the] nightmare was unfolding, the rest of the world, though saddened by its gory details, was seemingly so pre-occupied with developments elsewhere [Kuwait] that it was not persuaded to commit either human or material resources to the Liberian cause.

The same was even true for the OAU. In the words of Guy Arnold: "The OAU did nothing" (1992:24) Indeed, as seen in Chapter 6, the OAU relied on Nigeria's financial resources for its involvement in such conflicts.

General Babangida reconvened the SMC in Banjul as the US Marines were evacuating American citizens in Monrovia. Members of the SMC emerged from a two day closed-door meeting on 7 August with the proposal outlined at the marathon session in Freetown in July formalised as a peace plan. Just as a footnote, the US build up for the Gulf War started the next day (Calleo 1992:56).

The ECOVAS peace plan contained three key recommendations: (i) an immediate ceasefire and the deployment of a peacekeeping force; (ii) the setting up of a broad-based interim government of national unity (IGNU) - which leaders of the warring factions were barred from heading; and (iii) the setting up of a committee to organise national elections - in which heads of the IGNU and the warring factions were ineligible to run. The peace plan was initially estimated to cost about
$50 million, to be implemented over a twelve month period (Africa Research Bulletin - Political Series - 15 Sept 1990:9801).

The SMC based the peace plan on the view that Doe was as much a part of Liberia's problem as were the two rebel leaders, Taylor and Johnson. In the interview earlier cited, Babangida stated that members of the SMC reached the conclusion that:

There was a government [Doe] that had lost its credibility to govern, and we have some warring factions [Taylor and Johnson] that held the nation, the society and the people hostage. There was virtually a break-down of everything in Liberia (West Africa, 7 Oct 1990:2578).

Hence, the SMC wanted Doe to resign, and for Taylor and Johnson to accept the ECOWAS peace plan.

Like earlier attempts, however, the latest efforts failed once again. It became crystal clear that Houphouet-Boigny and his son-in-law, Compraore, were not about to accept any plan that did not make Taylor the president of Liberia. Nor were Babangida and Jawara willing to see Taylor assume power in Liberia through what they described above as a brazen take-over.

In the final analysis, by late July 1990 Liberia had become a "situation which cried out for someone to come in and stop the carnage" (Rivlin 1991:8). ECOWAS did so. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr Abbas Bundu, echoed Babangida when he explained to an audience at the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, that Liberia (West Africa, 8 March 1992:386):
was a problem from which everyone else was running away. If everyone else was running away from the problem, the leaders within the sub-region felt that they had a responsibility to the people of Liberia, and indeed to the wider international community to try and find a solution to the problem.

This was the conjuncture of forces in which ECOWAS intervened in Liberia with Nigeria in the lead.

**ECOMOG in Search of Peace to Keep**

ECOMOG landed in Monrovia on 24 August 1990 under the command of General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana. It was originally composed of about 4000 naval and ground forces from Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria. Togo and Mali, both members of the SMC which put together the peace plan, reneged on their commitments to send troops (James 1991:131-132).

ECOMOG ran into all kinds of military difficulties when it landed in Monrovia. First, there was no peace to keep. Second, the troops had no orders to engage the rebel forces. ECOMOG was deployed on the belief that once the troops landed in Liberia, the three warring factions would cooperate. But events quickly proved how naive such assumptions were.

Unlike Johnson who literally guided ECOMOG into port of Monrovia, the NPFL fiercely opposed it (Aderiye 1991:104-111). According to Taylor, Babangida kept Doe in power: "Doe murdered our people for 10 years. Washington and Nigeria must take responsibility for this. Where did Doe get his weapons from?" (Nwolise 1991:63). In short, Taylor believed that Babangida was in Liberia to deny the NPFL the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.
Taylor boycotted the all-Liberian National Conference which elected Amos Sawyer as head of Liberia's IGNU in Banjul on 30 August 1990. Once again Nigeria's hopes for a peaceful, political transition of power evaporated. To make matters worse, Johnson captured Doe at the ECOMOG headquarters on 9 September 1990 with no opposition. Just as UN troops watched as Patrice Lumumba was dragged to his death in Katanga in 1961, "ECOMOG soldiers stood by as more than 70 unarmed AFL and Doe's security men were killed" by INPFL rebels before Johnson himself captured Doe (Africa Confidential, 12 Oct 1990:5).

Less than twenty-four hours later Johnson had butchered Doe himself in the most brutal manner imaginable, recording every minute of it for television. However, even though Doe lost power and died in the same manner in which he acquired it a decade earlier - violently - the way in which it happened seriously damaged ECOMOG's credibility as the force to restrain the warring factions and guarantee security (Africa Confidential, 20 Sept 1990:1; Aderiye 1991:118).

Moreover, expectations that Doe's demise would bring the civil war to an end were shattered. Harry Moniòa, Doe's Vice-President, who might well have stepped in as the next in line, escaped instead to Guinea, fearful for his own life. With the government in disarray and the country in chaos, state power fell into abeyance. The slaughter only intensified as the AFL or its remnants vowed not to surrender the Executive Mansion to Taylor.
With Liberia sinking further into the abyss and ECOMOG's image in tatters, Nigerian leaders took the decision on 14 September 1990 to change course. The first priority was to halt the human slaughter, secure Monrovia and create the necessary conditions for emergency relief to begin. The ECOWAS intervention mandate was now broadened to include "peacemaking". This meant separating the warring factions, and imposing a ceasefire on Taylor and his NPFL forces if need be (Nigeria ThisWeek, 1 Oct 1990:10-12).

The Nigerian General Joshua Dogonyaro was appointed to aid Quainoo implement this new mandate. A week or so after Dogonyaro was appointed, Babangida relieved Quainoo of all field command duties. The latter was "promoted" to force commander and posted to ECOMOG headquarters in Freetown. By 23 September, Dogonyaro had effectively assumed full command over all field operations. It was the view in Lagos that Dogonyaro would be more amenable to Nigeria's lead role in ECOMOG.

Subsequent to this unilateral change of its command structure, Babangida placed ECOMOG under permanent Nigerian control. Two factors prompted the broadening of the ECOMOG mandate and the appointment of Dogonyaro. The first was the need to shore up ECOMOG's image which, as noted above, crumbled when Johnson captured and subsequently slaughtered Doe. The second, as we shall see below, had a lot to do with internal criticisms about how Babangida was footing the ECOMOG bill without command.
Meanwhile, the diplomatic row which erupted over Nigeria's unilateral change of commanders was only managed by Babangida's leadership and resolve. Leaving aside the details, suffice it to say that Quainoo did not take his demotion lying down. He tried in vain to get Rawlings to withdraw Ghanaian troops from ECOMOG (Inegbedion 1992).

Dogonyaro began by revoking Johnson's status as a non-belligerent who welcomed ECOMOG with open arms. When the history of ECOMOG is written, General Dogonyaro will undoubtedly receive pride of place in it. For present analysis, two quotes suffice to highlight his efforts to stop the carnage in Monrovia.

The first is from the Nigerian Newswatch. It reported back in 1991 that when Johnson tried to violate the restrictions imposed by Dogonyaro on all the warring factions,

ECOMOG reacted promptly and pushed him and his men back to base, and with a warning never again to move a step beyond his base or into town without permission. This swift move earned immense respect for ECOMOG. Although Johnson has complained in several places against Dogonyaro for 'making me a prisoner in my own country', he has not disobeyed this standing order since then (Adisa 1991:268).

Taylor and his forces were treated similarly. Dogonyaro adopted the view that to be effective, ECOMOG must be respected by all the warring factions.

Within three weeks, the General had secured Monrovia for emergency relief for the "estimated 50-60 people dying daily from hunger, dehydration and related diseases" (Africa News, 12 Nov 1990). In fact, as the second quote from Africa Confidential suggests (24 Jan 1992:1), the media soon became taken in with how Dogonyaro's
belligerent approach to threats of continued violence in the Monrovia area by Charles Taylor and Yormie Johnson halted the widespread killings and general lawlessness in the city within a short time of his taking charge. Until then there was no peace to enforce, let alone keep.

**ECOMOG and Peace-Enforcement**

General Dogonyaro’s routing of the NPFL forces in Monrovia and intentions forced a political confrontation between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. This finally brought the anglophone-francophone and political divisions within ECOWAS fully into the open. Taylor and his camp were incensed that ECOMOG was pushing the NPFL away from the seat of power in Monrovia.

Compaoré even charged that ECOMOG had no mandate to intervene in Liberia, let alone push Taylor out of Monrovia. However, the battle with ECOMOG acted as the catalyst for the new-found willingness in the Taylor camp for a ceasefire. ECOWAS convened its first extraordinary summit meeting at the insistence of Compaoré in Bamako, Mali, in late November 1990. Even though Babangida did not welcome the meeting initially, he could only delay but couldn’t stop it from taking place. Three major issues were thought to have been decided at the summit.

First, Taylor signed a ceasefire. Second, and in return, the SMC agreed to remove the clause in the peace plan which barred rebel leaders from standing for elections. And third, a Committee of Five was formed under Cote d’Ivoire, billed as the political equivalent of ECOMOG.
Babangida also made another important concession to the Taylor camp. In the bid to show goodwill and allay the fears of Houphouet-Boigny that Nigeria had no territorial ambitions in Liberia, Babangida replaced Dogonyaro as commander of ECOMOG. Those inside and outside Liberia who wanted ECOMOG to crush the NPFL forces were, however, disappointed. Many complained that "politics had come into play" (Adisa 1991:253).

On the other hand, many in the Nigerian military were concerned as to whether such action would not run contrary to the objectives of the ECOWAS peace plan, to induce the warring factions to lay down their arms and vie for power in "free and fair" elections. It was feared that a military defeat for the NPFL would be seen as Pax Nigeriana, as Taylor, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso had sought to portray ECOMOG (Africa Confidential, 24 Jan 1992:1).

**Nigerian Diplomacy and ECOMOG**

Like Murtala in Angola, and Obasanjo in Chad, Babangida's lead role in the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was a test of Nigerian diplomacy, internationally on the continent and within the sub-region. The then OAU Chair, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, was solidly behind Babangida. He praised Babangida's efforts in Liberia in glowing terms. The OAU Chair stated publicly at every opportunity that Africa would be a different continent if each sub-region had a Nigeria willing to put its resources in support of peace and security. As Museveni revealed to Margaret Novicki in an interview: "I am the one who encouraged Babangida to go into Liberia" (Africa Report, July/Aug 1993:15).
The OAU Secretary-General Salim A. Salim followed Museveni, and stood firmly behind the ECOWAS plan (Obasi 1992:344-348). To Salim, ECOMOG was "a very bold and very significant decision, an attempt by a group of African countries to say, Yes, we care about what is happening in our neighborhood." (Gambari 1991:132). The UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar followed the OAU lead, and was reported to have "wished ECOWAS success and confirmed that the venture would not need Security Council approval" (West Africa, 7 July 1991:1076).

Notwithstanding, General Babangida's new Foreign Minister, Dr Rilwanu Lukman, and Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, General Buhari's erstwhile Foreign Minister, and now the Nigerian Ambassador to the UN, were specifically charged with ensuring that the ECOWAS plan encountered no opposition in the Security Council (Akinjide 1991:3090-1). This was to guide against earlier attempts by Côte d'Ivoire, then one of the African representatives on the Security Council, to prevent Liberia from being discussed in the Council (West Africa, 22 March 1992:448).

ECOWAS' plan already had US support. The then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, had stated on 17 June 1990 that the Bush administration regarded the Liberian civil war as an internal matter in which it was unwilling to get involved. Thus, the Americans must have been glad to see Nigeria lead ECOWAS for that purpose, as the US Department of State made clear in its 30 June 1990 release on Liberia. As Cohen testified before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
Whatever one feels about the armed intervention of ECOMOG forces, we can state that their ability to open up the port of Monrovia and their pacification of much of the city allowed us to arrest the starvation of that city (US Dept. of State release, 27 Nov 1990).

The British and the Germans followed the American example in voicing their support the ECOWAS peace plan (Obasi 1992:348).

France was the only major Western exception. It is not clear what specific role the French played in derailing ECOMOG because of Nigerian leadership. One can only surmise from reports that France did not support Nigeria's lead role in ECOMOG. In this vein, Jon Kraus notes that "the persistent efforts of France and its Francophone African allies, Cote d'Ivoire especially, to resist any increases in Nigerian influence, ... greatly impeded ECOMOG's mission" (1994:270).

Nigerian efforts to bring Cote d'Ivoire formally into the peace process and on side were relentless. It is thus no great surprise that over 20 meetings were held, and six peace accords signed under the auspices of Houphouet-Boigny in both his home town of Yamoussoukro and villa in Geneva. However, none succeeded in getting Taylor to disarm his forces and accept the ballot box option (Nwolise 1991:271-311).

Taylor broke each agreement at will, and refused to stand for elections. He also became very adept at portraying ECOMOG as a partisan force and an aggressor. The NFPL would attack ECOMOG, wait for a counter-attack, and then turn to the world to complain about how ECOMOG had not been neutral. As already noted, Taylor tried unsuccessfully to overrun Monrovia with the intention to capture the Executive Mansion once and for all. Nonetheless, as we shall see
below, that General Babangida pushed Yamoussoukro VI through in the ECOWAS Cotonou Agreement of July 1993 as "the best framework for peace in Liberia."

Domestic Opposition to Babangida in ECOMOG

Domestic opposition to Nigeria's lead role in Liberia was swift and furious back in August 1990. Nigeria ThisWeek reported that in the beginning most groups "chided Nigeria for contributing much, but doing little to direct real action in the spirit of being the regional leader" (1 Oct 1990:12). But when Babangida took control of the operation the following September, the same critics now charged, as aptly summarised by Ihonvbere, that:

only the OAU had a mandate to carry out the intervention, that the ECOWAS treaty made no provision for a group such as ECOMOG, that the intervention ought to be preceded by an agreement between all warring parties, and that Nigeria's rush to intervene was based on President Babangida's personal friendship with the late Samuel Doe (1991:530).

As with Balewa in the Congo, many civil society groups opposed Nigeria's role in Liberia mainly because they were against Babangida internally. Notable among these were the Nigerian Union of Journalists; the Nigerian Union of Students; the Nigerian Civil Liberties Organisation; WIN; the Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association; and the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights.

It goes without saying that the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was concerned with the interest of the working class. The NLC was of the view that the resources being expended in Liberia could be put to better use internally for its members:
We scarcely need to emphasize that Nigeria’s involvement in the military mediation [in Liberia] will no doubt place on us enormous economic and military responsibilities at a time when more hands should be on deck to help turn our crisis-ridden economy towards healthy growth (Obasi 1992:334).

Evidence of opposition from within the military may be drawn from reports that some army officers were concerned lest the defence budget be squandered in Liberia (Africa Confidential, 24 Jan 1992:1-2).

The criticisms forced the Babangida regime to mount an intensive media campaign to defend Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG (Obasi 1991:336-341). Inadvertently, the campaign was greatly aided by Taylor. The latter’s execution of two prominent Nigerian journalists - Krees Imodibie of the Guardian and Tayo Awotusin of the Daily Champion - ensured this. This shattered the public’s image of Taylor as the Liberian messiah or revolutionary. It provoked the Nigerian media to take a closer look at Taylor’s series of atrocities.

Suffice it to say that the shift in domestic opinion began with the very press which was the source and advocate of the most virulent attack on Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG. Just to summarise what others have documented so well (Obasi 1992:341)

between 1990 and mid 1992, the Nigerian public and media perspectives on ECOMOG had changed substantially. The earlier doubts as to the wisdom of the mission had given way to a widespread conviction of its validity.

This is not to say, however, that there were no longer voices calling for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops. Many groups and individuals still insisted that the operation was too expensive no matter how noble the intentions.
Financing ECOMOG

Unlike the US that made about $10 billion in profit in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, Nigeria has borne the financial burden for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. Initial Nigerian materiel and troop commitments back in August 1990 were in the order of 80% of the total. These only increased as the intervention was prolonged. Table 9.1 below gives a rough estimate and composition of ECOMOG as of March 1993.

Table 9.1: ECOMOG Troop Composition, March 1993*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops in ECOMOG</th>
<th>National Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>11900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>9700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>94500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total        | 11250          | 146350         |


Mali had only a token presence of six officers after much pressure. Moreover, as Shagari had to do in Chad (Chapter 6), Babangida also paid the expenses for other participating states, in this case, the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Vivian Derryck estimates that Nigeria spent more than $350 million in the first two years of the ECOMOG operation (Africa Report, Jan-Feb 1993:71). Even others like Yinka Tella (African Guardian, 21 Sept 1992:21-26) and William Keeling (Financial Times, 27 June 1991) believe that the operation must have cost something in the order of $3 billion out of the $5 billion oil windfall from the Gulf War.¹ To recall from Chapter 8, these were the billions of dollars that the IFIs and the London and Paris Clubs wanted Babangida to surrender in debt payments.

It is also possible to compare ECOMOG to other operations for reliable estimates of its cost to Nigeria. For instance, the Senate leader in Second Republic, Chief Olusola Saraki, stated in his briefings that "Nigeria spent $1 million per day to maintain her troops during the Chadian operation in 1982" (Guardian, 24 April 1992:9). To recall from Chapter 6, the troops in question numbered only 2000. Similarly, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) established by the Security Council in September 1993 has a personnel strength of 651 with an annual tag of $69 million (Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 Feb 1994:16).

International support for ECOMOG has been more diplomatic than financial. Only the Americans are known to have contributed the operation. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George E. Moose: "In addition to almost $29 million in support for the regional peacekeeping, the United States has provided almost $260 million in humanitarian aid for victims of the conflict, far more

¹Nigeria has also suffered the heaviest casualties. According to ECOWAS records, about 90% of the 209 ECOMOG troops killed or missing in action as at January 1992 were Nigerians (African Concord, 10 August 1992:20-21).
than all other donors combined" (US Foreign Policy Bulletin, 19 May 1993:41). Neither Britain, France, Germany nor Japan is shown to have made any financial contributions to ECOMOG. As noted above, the UN gave valuable diplomatic support. The Security Council reaffirmed its position that the ECOWAS plan offered the "best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict."

**ECOMOG and Nigeria's Regional Status**

Like Murtala in Angola, Liberia was thus a test of Babangida's resolve and Nigerian diplomacy. The international polarity and the contending forces might have differed, but the diplomatic approaches were similar. Murtala's recognition of the MPLA split the OAU down in the middle in late 1976. Yet Nigeria forged ahead. The other states came around.

In Liberia, Babangida also chose not to be held hostage to consensus and the bogeyman of anglophone-francophone divide in ECOWAS. As Arnold points out, "a point has to be reached when it is better to sacrifice unity for a principle than to cling to a meaningless unity whose price is total inaction" (1992:24). In other words, there was no point in waiting for a consensus to form on the basis of a compromise likely to derail the ECOMOG initiative.

President Nicephore Soglo of Benin, as ECOWAS Chair, confirmed this at the special meeting held in Abuja in November 1992 to consider Taylor's mid-October blitzkrieg on Monrovia. As noted above, Soglo was upset that Nigeria had taken over ECOMOG. But according to Babangida, "the cost of failure in Liberia [was] just too great to contemplate for the sub-region" (West Africa, 22 Nov
This may not be unrelated to Arnold's view that "though ECOMOG may not have covered itself in glory at least it represented a responsible attempt" to stop the carnage and civil war in Liberia (1992:24). Some disagree, however. Thomas Weiss and Kurt Campbell, for example, see ECOMOG as a "fiasco" (1991:460).

That noted, whether Babangida's successors will approach the Liberian imbroglio with similar resolve is another question. It is clear, however, that Nigeria initiated and held ECOMOG together from August 1990 until August 1993 when Babangida was forced to resign. And to be sure, the course of events in Liberia still depend on the sub-regional, regional and international conjuncture of forces. But as argued in Chapter 5 with regards to Murtala, and as seen here with Babangida, the first step lies in the initiative: fortune favours the daring.

It is important to take what was believed to be the most appropriate response at the time to the external stimulus. It is then left to time and chance to intervene between a decision and its outcome. As well-stated by the Africa Confidential:

The involvement of the Nigerian military in Liberia ... has demonstrated quite clearly that it now has greater confidence in its ability to influence events outside Nigeria's borders.

This suggests, as did President Shagari's fiasco in Chad, that the capability may exist, but its transformation from potential to actual has a lot to do with leadership and political will.
Theoretical Synthesis

Nigeria has a long record of active peacekeeping duties in Africa. The case of Prime Minister Balewa in the UN's ONUC in the Congo in the early 1960s was discussed in Chapter 3. General Obasanjo's efforts at peace-making and peacekeeping in Chad in the late 1970s were examined in Chapter 5. This was followed in Chapter 6 by a look at the fiasco created by President Shagari at the head of the OAU Force in Chad in the early-1980s.

However, none has been as extensive, directly sustained and controversial as Babangida's lead role in the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. The intervention was not a purely military affair. It was undertaken to achieve a political objective. Moreover, even if a military solution was possible, Babangida did not view it as desirable. The intention was partly to prevent a civilian from sacking a military regime through guerrilla warfare. The effect of such an act, it was assumed, would be difficult to predict. It may invite all sorts of pseudo-revolutionaries.

Thus, like his predecessors, Babangida had room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, and on issues that posed no direct threats to the interests of the dominant classes. In other words, as with the other cases, within the parameters of internal contradictions, leadership accounts for a large degree of the differential performance among Nigerian leaders. The leader can act with relative autonomy so long as the dominant actors do not perceive their interests or position to be at stake. The theoretical synthesis of the study follows in the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION

The main objective of this thesis has been to investigate within a longitudinal, comparative framework why NFP has remained a patch work of reactions and inactions contrary to its prescribed national role conception to lead Africa. My task has been to (i) rethink the basic theoretical premises of NFP and the fit between proposition and evidence in the three approaches identified in the contending realist-radical paradigms; and in the process (ii) to bring a degree of conceptual clarity and integration to the subject and its analysis.

The status inconsistency between Nigeria's national role conception and the external behaviour of the state defined the substantive issue of the analysis. The analysis demonstrated the interface between domestic politics and foreign policy, bringing to the fore the critical role which internal constraints play in the formulation and conduct of NFP.

The thesis was argued on two compatible, interrelated and reinforcing levels of analysis. On the one level, it showed why and how domestic politics served to account for Nigeria's inability to effectively influence events regionally and internationally. It was shown that this inability which realist and radical analysts attributed to dependency and the lack of power must be viewed more accurately as a function of domestic politics and the use of available resources.

On the other, leadership emerged as the key explanatory variable as to why internal constraints did not render external action impossible. However, the approach to leadership adopted in the study differed from extant orthodox polemics
which describe Nigeria's problem as "simply a failure of leadership". It was shown that this traditional lament tended to be static, as it hardly captured the complex and variable socio-economic and political realities. The following sections synthesise how the leaders performed in managing foreign policy, available resources and state formation.

**Leadership and Foreign Policy**

In all of the nine cases examined in the study, the analysis led to conclusions which contradicted the lack of power/material base of leverage on which the realist-radical paradigms of NFP have been based. In Chapter 3 it was shown that Nigeria fell behind only Ethiopia both in manpower and financial contribution to ONUC in the Congo in 1961-1964. It was made very explicit in Chapter 4 that during the oil boom in the 1970s Gowon contributed as much as $5 million annually to the OAU Liberation Fund, at the same time that direct material and financial support were given to the various liberation movements. Chapter 5 showed equally that in 1975/1976 Murtala secured international diplomatic recognition for the MPLA at a cost of over $200 million.

The evidence presented in Chapter 6 centred on how President Shagari spent close to $110 million on the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1980/1981, only to produce a fiasco. It was found in Chapter 8 that Babangida still dished out millions of dollars in aid to the Frontline States and liberation movements in Southern Africa even while the country hovered at the brink of economic collapse. And finally, it was estimated in Chapter 9 that Babangida must have spent close
to $2.1 billion for the highly controversial and still continuing Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil war.

Each of these cases suggested clearly that radical and realist analyses failed to relate proposition to evidence in offering the lack of a material base of leverage or power as explanation for NFP. The assertions were found to be too broad, and hardly testable. The purpose for which Nigeria was deemed to lack leverage or power was never specified, and no concern was shown for matching the evidence and with the proposition.

Chapters 4 and 5 perhaps showed most clearly this argument in the thesis that if resource or power were the critical factor, Generals Murtala and Gowon would have performed in similar, if not predictable ways. The same was true for the other leaders, irrespective of the period and issue. It can even be argued that it is performances such as that of Murtala in Angola that build, if not confer, power.

To recall from Stephen Wright’s argument in Chapter 2, the material bases of the foreign policy of African states like Ghana under Nkrumah or Tanzania under Nyerere paled by comparison to those of Nigeria. Not only were these leaders more vocal than powerful, but NFP analysts hardly make mention of the lack of a material base of leverage in comparing Balewa and Nkrumah.

The same was true for Shagari, and the Buhari and Babangida regimes, examined in Chapters 6 to 9. In each case, what seemed to matter most was the ability of the leader to match available resources to foreign policy goals within internal constraints.
Leadership is crucial for the reasons discussed in each chapter. It serves to account for the differences in foreign policy performance. Leadership stands out when one contrasts NFP under Murtala and Obasanjo in Angola and Chad with Shagari also in Chad against Buhari and Babangida vis-a-vis the IMF and Nigeria's international creditors. Even then, neither Murtala nor Obasanjo confronted dominant interests and the excesses of the bourgeoisie frontally. Instead, they created parallel foreign policy structures to those which existed within the traditional state apparatus. This was clear in Chapter 4.

It was only General Buhari who sought, albeit it began by default, to introduce the kinds of internal political and economic policies which did not immediately correspond to the preferences of dominant ethnic and class interests. This was the only time that Nigeria has had to confront the contradictions of an embryonic "developmental state": how to implement incentives for transformative investments, at the same time lowering the social costs involved in the process? In Chapter 7 this was linked to reasons why Buhari failed, as the dominant class factions fought hard to retain the status quo. This was what Babangida's counter-coup achieved. In short, internal constraints need to be stressed.

Internal Constraint and Leadership

Internal constraint is the proper context in which leaders make formulate foreign policy. In Chapters 1 and 2 this was expressly linked to the fact that most issues in NFP were directly related to ethnic and regional struggles for resource allocation within the bourgeoisie. These were external commercial negotiations, government
contracts, foreign exchange allocations, export quotas and licenses. As shown in Chapter 6, the struggles around who got what became heightened in the Shagari administration as it was dominated by the commercial compradors. In Chapters 7 and 8 it was shown that during the military regimes of Babangida and Buhari, the struggles were equally intense as the Yorubas and Igbos welcomed the government's privatisation policy while the Hausa-Fulani were dead set against it.

In fact, the view of Nigerian politics presented in this study, and noted specifically in Chapter 8, suggests that the Abacha coup against the interim government of Chief Ernest Shonekan was to preempt the South from gaining federal power. General Babangida claimed to have nullified the June 1993 election of Chief Moshood Abiola as the third civilian head of state because elements within the Northern faction of the military vowed not to accept a Southerner as president and commander-in-chief. It was clear that, if the Northern interests did not intervene through the military, the democratic struggles were going to produce a president from the South, no matter the outcome.

The head of the interim government, Shonekan, came from the South. Chief Abiola, who challenged Shonekan's legitimacy, on the basis of the June elections, also came from the South. Similarly, the intervening forces - groups like the Movement for Democracy, Campaign for Democracy and the Human Rights League - in these South-South struggles for power and the presidency were also from the South.

In short, without the Abacha intervention, the South was poised to take the
presidency through the ballot box, for the first time in Nigeria’s history. In the study this was explicitly related to the argument that class can explain why the Nigerian bourgeoisie may be able to transcend ethnic politics in the long-run. In the short-run, however, ethnicity explains why the bourgeoisie has not evolved from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself despite the huge financial resources which accrued to the state in the 1970s and early 1980s and 1990s.

State and state formation are directly connected with this issue of leadership. It was shown in each chapter and on every issue how these are utterly interpenetrated. The argument was that even though the Nigerian state may have financial autonomy, it lacked an independent political base. Its decisions were tenous at best. Thus, the degree of the autonomy of the Nigerian state depended largely on the calibre of leadership.

In other words, one cannot approach the Nigerian state with an a priori definition of autonomy. Whether the Nigerian state has relative autonomy greatly depends on the period to which one refers. In this view, class struggles and state formation in Nigeria can combine three notions of the state - instrumental, relative autonomy and state capitalism - within the context of the general theoretical debates examined in Chapter 1.

Reasons for each of these three concepts can be seen from the use which the Nigerian bourgeoisie made of the state. It was clear from the analysis that the bourgeoisie and state actors viewed and used the state as the main instrument for personal accumulation and ethnic patronage. To recall, this is Richard Joseph’s
popular notion of prebendal politics. In many respects, this conforms with the Marxian conception of the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie. Thus, it is not surprising that instrumentalist analyses of the Nigerian state predominate in the literature on domestic politics and foreign policy.

It was equally clear from the analysis that the Nigerian state has financial autonomy from its domestic base and forces. Of course, as stressed in the study, what the leader does with such autonomy is another question. It was shown in Chapter 3, for example, that Prime Minister Balewa personalised the state and foreign policy decision making to such an extent that the state had no legitimacy neither in the South nor outside the circle of those whose instrument it was. In short, it can be said that the state had no bearings in this period.

In Chapter 4 it was also clear that in the Gowon regime, the state lacked an iota of coherence beyond the crisis to keep the country from disintegration. Decision makers and state actors and even the bureaucrats did as they pleased, especially between 1970 and 1975. General Gowon failed to call anyone to order for fear of a revolt. Although he had so many resources, yet little was accomplished in either domestic or foreign policy. To put it bluntly, the state was in utter disarray in this period.

President Shagari only took the disarray and corruption to their highest levels in the Second Republic, 1979-1983. It was argued in Chapter 6 that Shagari made no effort whatsoever to halt the privatisation of the state and the public treasury by the dominant classes. The state largely disappeared during the Shagari
administration. It was concluded that, in Chad as in Namibia, the major constraint on NFP was Shagari's lack of clear objectives and leadership.

General Babangida and his regime ranked with Shagari and Gowon in the pillage of Nigeria. Babangida was generally touted as an astute politician for the manner in which he dribbled his military and civilian counterparts from 1986 to 1992. However, it was clear in Chapter 8 that his public persona rested on a system of corruption that led Nigeria to its present brink of economic and political collapse. In short, as argued in Chapters 5 and 7, and as already stated above, only the Murtala-Obasanjo and Buhari regimes sought to rationalise the state and create for it some room for independent action. In other words, the financial and theoretical autonomy of the Nigerian state can be translated into reality, given leaders like Murtala and Buhari. Or, as the saying goes, "fortune favours the brave".

Lastly, even though it has no political independence from the bourgeoisie, the Nigerian state nonetheless intervenes in many aspects of the economy, society and politics. It intervenes on behalf of capital in general, as it struggles to promote the particular cause of local capital - notwithstanding North-South ethnic contradictions. This is in line with the third notion of the state, namely state capitalism. Once again, how far this goes and with what purpose and effect depends on the leader.

In essence, the above synthesis stresses the fact that the autonomy of the Nigerian state cannot be assessed by a single issue in one period or under one
leader. It has to be compared and contrasted across leaders and issues and periods. This is one critical issue on which further research is needed. It is very important to clarify the contradictions between the state’s need to create a capitalist class capable of productive investment, and the difficulty in rationalising economic relations. This is intimately linked with policy.

**Retrieving Future Policy in the Past**

The main inference that compels itself from the thesis is that the present and short-term future of Nigerian foreign policy will be more like its past. A great deal depends on how the precarious internal balance is maintained. Overcoming the inertia of the present ethnic, economic and political immobilism requires some extraordinary leadership and dominant class factions determined to effect the desired change. In short, the manner in which the precarious ethnic-political balance has been maintained militates against a fundamental foreign policy change, as it does socio-economic restructuring.

Even if policy change was forced to occur in periods of crisis, it may be difficult to implement and maintain. SAP and privatisation under the Shagari government and the Buhari and Babangida regimes are apt examples. The same can be said for Murtala’s policy reversal on the note from Alhaji Aminu Kano, discussed in Chapter 5.

Viewed in terms of such conditions, four interrelated options can be identified which face Nigeria and its explosive paralysis. One, secession remains very much an option, even if the calamities of the civil war in 1967 are still fresh
in most minds. Excision is another term that has been added as an option to break the North-South stalemate. For example, had Major Gideon Orkar succeeded in toppling Babangida in April 1990, the former had intended to excise the deep North, as noted in Chapter 1. The chances of a civil war erupting were high should this have come to pass.

Two, the country can disintegrate. Yugoslavia and Lebanon are examples, with the splinters groping for separate identities, and no force able to represent the centre. Three, Nigerians can adopt the Czechoslovakia option, and negotiate a peaceful separation. However, even if these three options stare Nigerians in the face, the problem remains, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, that these would be raised as ominous spectres in order to avoid discussing them as real possibilities.

The final fourth option is perhaps more attainable with no bloodshed or destruction. This is to couple Northern agriculture to ISI in the South. The conditions for this already exist. As shown in the study, the two regions already have a comparative advantage in these respective sectors. If a coherent policy were worked out around Northern agriculture and ISI in the South and pursued diligently, the Hausa-Fulani would be joined with their Igbo and Yoruba counterparts in mutual self-transformation and late-industrialisation. General Buhari tried to institute such a policy with little support.

Thus, if past experience, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, is any indication, one cannot be confident that the dominant classes will willingly do so. Perhaps the only way the bourgeoisie can be forced to pursue an integrated class project is
through the Callaghry option that:

Nigeria be cut off from ALL external flows - IFI, donor country, Paris or London Club rescheduling, medium term bank lending, direct foreign investment, equity purchases via privatization, etc. until real learning at the elite and mass levels takes [hold]. I do not mean net inflow; I mean no inflow as any inflow still gives the illusion of an external escape route (1993:106).

This prescription sounds draconian. However, from everything that has been said, it stands the best chance of forcing real changes as Nigeria has the resources it needs.

In the meanwhile, the automatic recognition of Nigeria as the leader of Africa will become increasingly tenuous the more South Africa is seen to rid itself of apartheid (Okolo & Wright 1994:141-144). However, Nigeria’s corps of international civil servants and diplomats can still help to maintain the country’s name on international stages and fora. As noted in Chapter 2, this has been a main component of Nigeria’s international image.
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# Nigerian Newspapers and Magazines

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b) Unpublished Sources

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Conference Papers


