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DEALING WITH DUAL DESTABILISATION
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:

Foreign Policy in
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
1975-1989

by

Larry A. Swatuk

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

30 June 1993

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by LARRY A. SWATUK

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dated Mar 28, 1993

External Examiner

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to
Bianca, Olga, Njenze, and Benjamin Mugyenyi:
Children on the Frontline

and

Amanda Karen Shaw
without whose support and inspiration
the completion of this work would not have been possible
It is given to no human being to stereotype a set of truths, and walk safely by their guidance with his [or her] mind's eye closed.

-- John Stuart Mill

You better start swimmin' or you'll sink like a stone, for the times they are a changin'

-- Bob Dylan
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Abstract

Extant studies of the foreign policies of Southern African states have been dominated by opposing realist and dependency modes of analysis. As a result, virtually all studies of Southern Africa give at best only partial accounts of the cause(s) and effect(s) of "destabilisation" in the region. With the end of the Cold War and the imminent demise of apartheid, however, it is time to reevaluate approaches and reinterpret events in this troubled region.

This thesis critically examines the foreign policies of three of the smallest states in the region -- Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland -- over the 1975-89 period, a period most closely associated with South Africa's strategy of "regional destabilisation". BLS have long been regarded as "hostages" to apartheid with little scope for independent foreign policy-making. Realist analysis attributes this to a lack of power, particularly in relation to the "regional hegemon", South Africa. The dependency school, meanwhile, links this to the underdeveloped nature of their economies and the comprador nature of their elites. In this case, South Africa is viewed as a "sub-imperial power" or "outpost of monopoly capitalism". While each of these interpretations provides insight into the dilemmas facing all social formations in the region, they are unnecessarily opposed and over-simplified. In contrast, my political economy approach seeks to interrelate, rather than separate, notions of state and class, structure and choice. It is shown that BLS policymakers have actively and imaginatively pursued status quo-oriented foreign policies which have, for the most part, successfully minimised the negative effects of South African destabilisation. However, I conclude that this status quo approach will prove inadequate in meeting the fundamental post-Cold War challenge posed by the extension to the region of a new international division of labour and power.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa/Caribbean/Pacific Group (Adherents to the Lome Convention; associated with the EC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Advanced Industrialised Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank/Fund</td>
<td>World Bank &amp; International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basutoland Congress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEDU</td>
<td>Botswana Small Enterprise Development Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIP</td>
<td>Botswana Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (sometimes called Boleswa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Botswana Meat Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Botswana National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>Bureau of State Security (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>Botswana Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Development Corporation</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>Comparative Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CONAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Selling Organisation</td>
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<td>CUA</td>
<td>Customs Union Agreement (South Africa &amp; BLS)</td>
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<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of South Africa</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPRF</td>
<td>Export Pre-Financing Revolving Fund (SADCC)</td>
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<td>FAP</td>
<td>Financial Assistance Plan (Botswana)</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional De Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>GDL</td>
<td>Global Division of Labour</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HCTs</td>
<td>High Commission Territories</td>
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<td>HWP</td>
<td>Highlands Water Project (Lesotho)</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction &amp; Development (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IDL</td>
<td>International Division of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INM</td>
<td>Imbokodvo National Movement (Swaziland)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<td>LHDA</td>
<td>Lesotho Highlands Development Authority</td>
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<td>LLA</td>
<td>Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LNDC</td>
<td>Lesotho National Development Corporation</td>
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<td>MDIs</td>
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<td>MFP</td>
<td>MaremaTlou Freedom Party (Lesotho)</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan (BLS)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialising Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIDL</td>
<td>New International Division of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New International Division of Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Council</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Peoples' Democratic Forum (Lesotho)</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Para-Military Unit (Lesotho)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area (for Eastern and Southern Africa)</td>
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<td>PUDEMO</td>
<td>Peoples' United Democratic Movement (Swaziland)</td>
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<td>PWV</td>
<td>Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereenigeng (South African industrial triangle)</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance (also MNR)</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rand Monetary Area</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>South African Customs Union (also CUA)</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SIDC</td>
<td>Swaziland Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>SNL</td>
<td>Swazi Nation Land</td>
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<td>SWAYOCO</td>
<td>Swaziland Youth Congress</td>
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<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional Para Libertacao Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>URDF</td>
<td>Umbutfo Royal Defence Force (Swaziland)</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WUSC</td>
<td>World University Service of Canada</td>
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Map of Southern Africa
Map of Botswana
CHAPTER ONE

Dealing With Dual Destabilisation in Southern Africa:
Foreign Policy in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, 1975-1989

(1) Introduction

The study of foreign policy, which has lagged in the last decade, has been revived in recent years by a new focus on Third World states, with a leading role taken by specialists on Africa and the Middle East (Shaw & Aluko, 1983; Shaw & Aluko, 1984; Korany & Dessouki, 1984) ... The rising importance of economic considerations in all studies of the Third World has led some to approach foreign policy relations as merely a function of economics -- which may be accurate for some countries in certain periods. But others have continued to look at foreign policy as essentially a question of security concerns...

- David Wurfel & Bruce Burton (1991)

'Security' is a nebulous word. Like patriotism and motherhood it is hard to be against ... The word is usually used with abstract qualifiers: 'national security', 'international security' or 'regional security'. But this does not at all settle the question of what it means to say a nation, an international system or a region is secure. Who or what is it, actually, that is secure or insecure? And from whom or from what threats are they protected? ... [S]ecurity derives much of its ideological force from the myth that it is also the citizen who is secure ... Yet it may well be doubted whether State or ruling class security actually has anything at all to do with the safety and well-being of ordinary citizens.

- Robin Luckham (1983)

This thesis is about foreign policy. In particular, it concerns the foreign policy behaviours of three small, underdeveloped states in the Southern African region:
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). In a region marred by protracted, often Cold War-inspired, struggles for liberation and self-determination, BLS have long been considered "peripheral actors". Indeed, in the late 1970s, one observer stated that Lesotho "was scarcely in a position to have a foreign policy at all." (Clapham, 1977) This thesis directly counters the dominant perception, arguing, instead, that BLS foreign policies have been both active and imaginative in defence of elite-defined "national interests".

This thesis commences with a definition of foreign policy which interrelates notions of security and development and uses a radical political economic framework. In this way, I also challenge the dominant Realist and Dependency paradigms most often used to explain "Third World" foreign policies. My framework is characterised as "radical" for two reasons. First, it seeks to apply a neo-materialist analysis to the conduct and character of foreign policy, thereby challenging established Realist notions and referents of "security", "development", "foreign policy", and "the state", among others, particularly as applied to Sub-Saharan Africa. In this way I hope to build on Luckham's observations above about the importance of asking questions regarding "security and development for whom?" (cf Buzan, 1992; Korany, 1991; Vayrynen, 1990; also Chapter Two)

Second, it is also radical because it seeks to move away
from equally established structural and instrumental Marxist challenges to the Realist paradigm. It will do so by adopting a more critical theoretical approach which remains materialist but reintroduces both choice into policy-making and diversity into political economy. (Boggs, 1984; Braybrooke, 1985; Cox, 1983; 1987; Gramsci, 1981; Tooze, 1990; also Chapter Two) Though in agreement with the Wurfel and Burton quotation above, this thesis examines the interrelation of politics and economics from a structuralist perspective, while keeping central the Gramscian notions of "power", "hegemony" and "organic crisis". (Chapters Two and Three)

Countering the Realist paradigm, especially as applied to the Southern African region, is an important task. Focussing on the superstructural elements of inter-state relations obscures the underlying causes of instability in the region which derive from Southern Africa’s peripheral position in the global economy. It will be shown that policies which rely on state-centred definitions of security and development are leading all Southern Africans, elite and mass alike, toward heightened levels of insecurity in the 1990s.

But the Realist paradigm remains dominant in the region and in the literature. (cf Crocker, 1993; Gann & Duignan, 1991; 1981) When applied to the cases of BLS, its strength
appears both reasonable and logical. At independence, BLS were seen as three small, resource-poor, underdeveloped states dependent upon the Republic of South Africa for the bulk of their imports, exports, energy requirements, transportation equipment and networks, and technical expertise. (Kowet, 1978)

Given this scenario of dependence and underdevelopment, BLS were described as "hostages of apartheid" and, therefore, foreign policy "takers" not "makers". (Grundy, 1973; Halpern, 1965; Nolutshungu, 1975; Stevens, 1967) As South Africa's apartheid regime became dependent upon the use of force for continued race-based hegemony -- i.e. "regional destabilisation" -- this perception of BLS "helplessness" was reinforced. (Barber & Barrat, 1990; Hanlon, 1986; Johnson & Martin, 1986; cf Libby, 1987) As part of the so-called "inner periphery", BLS were particularly vulnerable to South African aggression. (Santho and Sejanamane, eds., 1991)

With regard to the region as a whole, foreign policy analysis and praxis during this time period focused on the wars in Angola and Mozambique; South Africa’s aggressive regional policy and the militarisation of its politics; the international sanctions movement; and Africans’ collective efforts against apartheid and for liberation. (Bender, 1987; Carter & O’Meara, eds., 1982; Commonwealth, 1986; 1989a; 1989c; Grundy, 1986; Johnson & Martin, 1986; Shaw, 1986a)
Given this state-centric, "high political" focus, events were interpreted as a polarised struggle between a racist RSA and an anti-apartheid united front. As the locus of this "united front", the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)\(^1\) became the centrepiece of most Western foreign aid and academic analysis. (Amin, et al., 1987; Johnson & Martin, 1989; Msabaha & Shaw, eds., 1986; also, Chapter Three)

Despite Realist calculations about "why South Africa will survive" (Gann & Duignan, 1981), at the end of the 1980s the "hegemon" seemed on the verge of collapse. At the opening of the 1990s, apartheid was abandoned as official state policy and ideology. The ruling National Party entered negotiations with the ANC and other formerly banned organisations with a view toward establishing multi-party democracy. South Africa also ended its war with Angola and provided for Namibia's peaceful transition to political independence. The urgency of this project stems from an economic crisis best symbolised by fifteen years of marginal or declining South African GDP growth. (Swatuk & Shaw, eds., 1991; also, see Chapter Three)

\(^1\) Now called the Southern African Development Community (SADC), SADC's ten member-states are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia (which joined at independence in 1990), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. More detailed discussion of SADC appears in Chapter Three.
(II) The BLS Foreign Policy Problematique: Main Questions for Investigation

Significantly, BLS have emerged from this period relatively better off, in terms of economic growth and political stability, than either South Africa or their SADC counterparts. (see Table 3.7) The reality of the post-destabilisation era therefore seems to run counter to Realist expectations: BLS appear "less vulnerable" than anticipated. How this could happen is a basic question for investigation here.

Botswana and Swaziland will be shown to have pursued over this time frame a similar, conservative, status quo-oriented foreign policy coupled with a relatively open, capitalist economic development strategy.² Lesotho's policy-makers deviated somewhat from this pattern, moving toward a highly aggressive anti-apartheid position during 1971-86. And, in the end, it took a 1986 military coup d'état to return Lesotho to its previous, pragmatic stance. (Swatuk, 1986; 1988a)

This apparent paradox of anticipated weakness but

² "Status quo" is not meant to imply stasis or resistance to change. To the contrary, BLS policy-makers throughout pre- and post-colonial history demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to adapt to significant social and economic revolutions in the region. Rather, status quo, as I use it here, means "defence of elite interests", which also means preservation of the social formation and the relations of production therein.
demonstrated strength -- particularly in the cases of Botswana and Swaziland -- raises a number of important questions to be addressed in this thesis. For instance, is this relative economic growth and political stability due to the pragmatic approaches of individual regimes? Are these trends sustainable in the longer, post-apartheid, run?

The reality of shared, rather than divergent, strategies for security and development also raises a number of important questions. For, it has been an increasingly common trend in regional studies to differentiate BLS on the basis of political representation and economic development. In this way, Lesotho has been regarded as the most unstable, least representative, least developed and most likely to desist as a sovereign political entity in a post-apartheid Southern Africa. Three coups d'état in the last 21 years and a dearth of indigenous economic enterprise support this interpretation. Swaziland is generally seen as more stable and more developed, although both of these trends are usually attributed to the repressive nature of the Dlamini aristocracy’s autocratic rule. In contrast, Botswana’s functioning multi-party democracy and expanding, modestly diversifying economy (diamonds, beef, beef-related manufacturing, copper-nickel matte, soda ash), have made it the "darling of the West". (interview with Bradley, Ottawa, 12 March 1990; this typology was also put forward by Reibel
in an interview at USAID, Maseru, 12 December 1989)\textsuperscript{3}

Further, extant studies of BLS foreign policy attach a subjectively-defined "motive" to their foreign policies based on these typologies. For example, Morgan’s (1982) description of Botswana as "the small but steady hand" in regional foreign policy is meant to impart a sense of pragmatism and good government. In comparison, Bischoff (1990) uses the term "Dlamini nationalism" to describe the motive force behind the aristocracy’s "self-centred" foreign policy. Thus, Swazi policy-makers are criticised for the same reason Batswana are praised: prudent defence of the status quo. The salient difference has little to do with the substance of foreign policy, but rather, Western perceptions of motive. Simply put, the West approves of Botswana’s style of government, whereas it disapproves of aristocratic rule in Swaziland. Ironically, the indiscretions\textsuperscript{4} of Lesotho’s dictatorial Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, were overlooked by Western donors and statesmen simply because it was

\textsuperscript{3} My case studies are ordered in this way, rather than in the traditional, but not altogether logical, "BLS" or "Boleswa" fashion.

\textsuperscript{4} Among the more salient of his indiscretions were the usurpation of power in a civilian coup d’état in 1970; his disrespect for and periodic exile of the Basotho King, Moshoeshoe II; and his creation and arming of a Basotho National Party (BNP) Youth League similar to the Swazi King’s elite force, the Gcina Regiment, but in defence of Chief Jonathan’s authoritarian rule, and in defiance of the monarchy.
politically correct to accept his anti-apartheid rhetoric at face value.5

Yet, my research will show that, to the contrary, differences in BLS foreign policy behaviour are ones in degree, not in kind. Some of the more important questions raised for investigation are, "What are the motive forces behind these status quo-oriented foreign policies?" "Do these policies have support within their respective social formations?" "How widespread is that support?" "Why did Lesotho's foreign policy alter so drastically in the early 1970s, taking it out of line with its ex-High Commission cohorts?"

Given this common foreign policy behaviour, each country chapter proceeds along a similar descriptive and analytical path in order to:

(i) describe the particular country's foreign policy;

(ii) locate the "roots" of that foreign policy; in other words, account for why BLS foreign policies tend toward conservatism and the status quo;

(iii) understand the forces behind that foreign policy's continuation or discontinuation by identifying the coalition within the social formation which leads toward (or away from) conservative, status quo-oriented foreign policies; and

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5 This was most openly revealed in the Swedish International Development Agency's decision to abandon its Swazi development programme because the monarchy refused to take a more overt anti-apartheid position. (SIDA document made available to me at Mbabane, 10 December 1989)
(iv) highlight the contradictions the particular foreign policy positions give rise to in order to assess the positive or negative impact of a status quo orientation on future BLS security and development.

Beyond examining and understanding comparative BLS foreign policy behaviours, this thesis also pursues two, more general, objectives. That is to say, it seeks to:

(i) reach some conclusions and/or generalisations about "Third World" foreign policy broadly defined; e.g. how typical is BLS foreign policy behaviour of other small, less developed states in the global capitalist system? and

(ii) make some suggestions as to perceived relevant future directions for both BLS and "Third World" foreign policies and studies in light of both the changing divisions of labour and power and my comparative case findings.

(III) Dual Destabilisation

Having newly emerged from South Africa’s "war against its neighbours", policy-makers in the region are confronted with another destabiliser: the extension of the neo-liberal agenda to Southern Africa. With the end of the Cold War, Western involvement throughout the Third World increasingly centres on issues of debt, democracy and economic structural adjustment. No longer able to play off rival super-patrons, Third World policy-makers are finding themselves with less room for independent agenda-setting and autonomous decision-making. Donor conditionality thus provides a shared context for policy-making in the 1990s. For most of Southern Africa’s black majority-rulled states, this is an unenviable
environment in which to fashion security and development policies.

Unlike South African-sponsored destabilisation, however, the theory and practice of economic liberalism, symbolised by World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IBRD/IMF or Bank/Fund) structural adjustment programmes, has come to affect all states -- including South Africa -- in the region. As the outward expression of the prevailing global orthodoxy, these programmes are less easily challenged than South Africa's largely-military threat. The extension of Western -- i.e. liberal-democratic/capitalist -- hegemony to Southern Africa is symptomatic of the deep, organic crisis of the region's political economy. (Cox, 1983; Davies & O'Meara, 1985; also, Chapter Three)

How the region, but BLS in particular, deals with the neo-liberal programme is a dominant theme in this thesis. One hypothesis might be that, given their relative success in dealing with South African destabilisation, BLS policy-makers will be equal to the task of confronting underdevelopment, especially now that apartheid is no longer a factor. However, I suggest that the simple acceptance of laissez-faire capitalist development strategies based on SAP will deepen rather than help lessen the region's underdevelopment. Moreover, this externally-imposed agenda is inherently destabilising not merely because it condemns, in perpetuity,
Southern African states to peripheral roles in the global economy. The neo-liberal agenda also undercuts extant social support networks, and heightens cleavages along, for example, class and gender lines.

In the absence of Cold War and anti-apartheid mythologies, structural adjustment seriously challenges regime definitions of "security" by revealing their interests as parochial and divergent from the needs of the masses. In this way, looking to the past for guidance is unlikely to be of much use to governing elites. Status quo-oriented foreign policies designed to accommodate the extension of liberal capitalism cannot ensure either regime or national security in the long term.

(IV) Security, Foreign Policy and BLS in Southern Africa: Some Comparative Background

As noted earlier, any analysis of the Southern African region focussing on BLS, be it materialist or realist, cannot fail to notice the overwhelming economic dependence of these states upon the Republic of South Africa. This dependence was deliberately cultivated by colonial, settler, and South African regime interests. Following the diamond strike at Kimberley in the late 1860s, colonial and settler struggles for hegemony led to the incorporation of indigenous kingdoms into the region’s developing capitalist economy. In spite of
British protection -- as High Commission Territories (HCTs) -- against direct Boer rule, BLS were subsequently developed as labour reserves for the growing South African mining industry. Traditional leaders were both coopted and coerced into recruitment positions. (Crush, 1987; Paton, 1991)

Botswana, Basotho, and Swazi Kingdoms each lost large tracts of fertile farmland to resource-hungry settlers and an expanding South Africa. In 1910, BLS were made members of a South African-dominated common Customs Union.\(^6\) This Customs Union was seen by South Africa as the first step toward formal incorporation of the HCTs into the Republic. (Landell-Mills, 1971) The question of incorporation remained a serious issue until the early 1960s.\(^7\) Little indigenous "development" took place until the 1950s. (Palmer & Parsons, eds., 1977; cf Steenkamp, 1991)

Swaziland, for example, had L1,000 in its treasury at independence. Lesotho has, to this day, but one kilometre of railway track. And, until the discovery of diamonds at Orapa, the government of Botswana was totally dependent upon British

\(^6\) Alternately known as the South African Customs Union (SACU) or the Customs Union Agreement (CUA), this treaty was renegotiated in 1969 and remains in existence today. Namibia, too, is party to this agreement. (see Chapter Three)

\(^7\) The combination of emerging continental pressures for decolonisation and international condemnation of the apartheid regime following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 forced Britain to reconsider the issue of independence for the HCTs.
aid for its recurrent expenditures. (Bardill & Cobbe, 1985; Booth, 1983; Parson, 1984) At independence BLS were part of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), with the Rand considered legal tender and freely interchangeable with local currencies.\(^8\) (Robson, 1967)

In spite of this systematic underdevelopment, at independence BLS state-makers shared one advantage not readily available to most Third World states. These poor states (therefore, in Buzan’s terminology, "weak powers") were, for the most part, ethnically and linguistically homogeneous (therefore, "strong states"). 150 years of struggle against superior forces in the region helped forge common Basotho, Batswana, and Swazi "national identities". The Mfecane,\(^9\) the "Great Trek",\(^{10}\) and the extension of

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\(^8\) Botswana left the RMA and now has the value of its currency, the Pula, pegged to a basket of international currencies. (See Chapter Six) Swaziland also has made some effort to delink the Emalangeni from the Rand; Lesotho has made no such moves. (See Chapters Four and Five)

\(^9\) The Mfecane is an Nguni term (Difaqane in Sotho) describing the great exodus of Southern Africans fleeing Zulu expansionism at the start of the 19th century. The Zulu threat is said to have led to "defensive nation-building" in many parts of Southern Africa, most notably among the Sotho and the Swazi, and, to a lesser extent, among the Tswana. (see Denoon, 1972, especially chapters two and three)

\(^{10}\) The symbol of Afrikaner nationalism, the Great Trek (1836–38) saw the mass migration of Boer farmers ("Voortrekkers") to the South African interior -- present day Transvaal and Orange Free State -- in the effort to escape the onset of British colonial rule at the Cape.
colonial rule and capitalist development throughout the Southern African region posed severe challenges to extant Kingdoms and less clearly defined or hierarchical social formations. This roughly 100 year struggle over land and labour saw the truncation of hitherto expanding Basotho, Batswana, and Swazi Kingdoms. That these Kingdoms survived at all is a tribute to the political and diplomatic acumen of their respective leaders. (see Appendix) As will be seen in the country case studies below, these successful strategies of coalition building through compromise and coercion of rivals by Kings and dominant Chiefs is a trend clearly discernible in BLS foreign policy today. (Denoon, 1972)

However, accommodation with the forces of colonialism and capitalism played itself out quite differently in each of BLS.

Batswana and Swazi leaders were especially successful in carving out a niche for indigenous elite interests in the emerging regional economy. In the case of the former, a corporatist alliance between settler, colonial and indigenous capital emerged in the creation of a beef-for-export oriented economy. (see Chapter Six) In the latter case, King Sobhuza II was successful in establishing an elite-run corporation known as Tibiyo TakaNgwane, which became most active in the post independence period. Given the agrarian nature of the Swazi economy, indigenous elite corporate investment focused
on agro-industrial enterprise, in addition to trade and services. (see Chapter Five) Unfortunately, elite interests were less easily served in the Basotho case. Following the Treaty of Aliwal North in 1869, Basotho were left with but a fraction of their former Kingdom, the remainder of which was the size of Vancouver Island. Of this, only 13% was arable. Moreover, of the three former High Commission Territories, Lesotho was the one most completely developed as a labour reserve. At independence, an estimated 50% of working age males, totalling over 150,000 people, were employed in the mines and farms of South Africa. Preservation of elite interests in this case, then, derived more from the preservation of the labour reserve economy than from the enticement and attachment to foreign capital investment within Lesotho. To this day, Lesotho manages to attract very little foreign capital. (see Chapter Four)

(V) Post-Independence Foreign Policy

Botswana and Lesotho attained independence in 1966; Swaziland in 1968. All three came to independence at a time when regional struggles for liberation from white minority-rule were on the rise. The horrible events at Sharpeville had given way to the Rivonia Treason Trials, the banning of the ANC and the imprisonment of some of its top leaders, most notably Nelson Mandela. Northern Rhodesia became majority-
ruled and independent Zambia in 1964. This provoked Ian
Smith's minority-regime in Southern Rhodesia to unilaterally
declare independence from Britain a year later. Britain
responded by taking the case to the United Nations Security
Council and seeking the imposition of sanctions. Liberation
wars were heating up in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa's
minority regime was seeking accommodation via "dialogue and
detente" with its majority-ruled neighbours. At the same
time, however, RSA policy-makers continued their support for
minority rule elsewhere in the region.

BLS, therefore, had the misfortune of having to make
security and development policy from a position of extreme
economic weakness within a hostile geo-strategic environment
dominated by white colonial and settler minority-rule.
Initially, then, their foreign policies were all geared
toward overcoming economic weakness and avoiding any
involvement beyond moral support in the liberation struggles
of the region. But as these struggles progressed, and
succeeded one by one, pressure from African states, the
international community, and attentive domestic publics --
particularly university students and opposition parties --
demanded more serious attention to multilateral goals, often
at the expense of national ones. How these three states
responded to the changing strategic landscape is dealt with
in the country chapters. Suffice it to say that neither
responses nor outcomes were uniform.

All three states place primary focus on the regional environment; after all, Basotho, Ngwato, Ngwaketse, Swazi, and Zulu, among other kingdoms, had engaged in "international" affairs long before Europe’s formal delineation of state boundaries. (Denoon, 1972: 25-42) And as their predecessors did during the Mfecane, post-independence leaders in BLS have consistently sought outside help to strengthen their respective positions in the regional environment.

Lesotho has followed a particularly tortuous path, having suffered three coups d’état and the deposition of King Moshoeshoe by military decree since independence. (see Chapter Four) Botswana has been much more stable, in part due to the late, post-independence discovery of valuable mineral deposits, particularly diamonds. This allowed the government of Botswana to share equally with the Anglo American Corporation in the profits of mineral exploitation through a jointly-owned company called Debswana. This, in turn, has created avenues for autonomous action as well as reinforced economic interdependence. (see Chapter Six) It cannot, however, explain Botswana’s relatively active foreign policy following Rhodesia’s UDI in 1965.

Swaziland has perhaps enjoyed the most consistent economic growth of the three, while facing an equally vexing
security environment. Like Botswana, Swaziland found itself sandwiched between two contending ideologies in capitalist South Africa and Marxist Mozambique, itself supportive of capitalism but also in favour of anti-racialism. Chastised roundly by the international community for its "good neighbour policy" toward RSA, Swazi policy-makers have nevertheless managed their regional and international security environments quite well, but, like Lesotho and Botswana, face major challenges at the national level.

All three countries have been shielded somewhat from changes in the NIDL by membership in the Customs Union, which guarantees access to relatively inexpensive but high tariff-protected South African manufactures, and a steady flow of foreign exchange (in spite of devaluations) into state coffers via a clearly defined share of customs revenues. (See Chapter Three) Coupled with extensive international aid and lending programmes, these states have not really felt the full force of the myriad devaluations their currencies have undergone since the late-1970s. (see Table 5.4) Further, diamonds in Botswana, numerous export commodities and crops in Swaziland, and water in Lesotho, as well as "footloose" companies "running" to BLS at the height of anti-apartheid sanctions, have helped buoy their economies throughout the difficult period of South African regional destabilisation and global recession.
But environmental degradation via both the above-mentioned practices, and increasing population pressures, combine with increasing debt problems and uncertainty about future relations with a post-apartheid South Africa, to pose ominous threats to the stability of these regimes and the societies over which they govern. (e.g. Abucar & Molutsi, 1993)

The ability to turn productive capacity into diverse economic enterprise, before sharpening domestic contradictions and international pressures overwhelm them, constitutes the major task for BLS policy-makers in the 1990s. Attention to these issues has been better dealt with by BLS, particularly Botswana and Swaziland, than any of the other SADC states, notwithstanding the limitations of South African destabilisation. Given the pressures of liberation struggles, the Cold War, diplomatic inexperience, and now debt and structural adjustment, their performance over the 1975-89 period is really quite remarkable. Whether these states can continue to prosper in the 1990s is another question, and one which this analysis will help inform.

(VI) Whose Security? Regime Survival and Dual Destabilisation

BLS foreign policies have been very active in the attempt to secure and extend the bureaucratic power of the state. (Ferguson, 1990: 267-275; cf Dutkiewicz & Shenton,
1986: 111; Morrison, 1993; Levin, 1991; and Mogyenyi, 1987) BLS policy-makers have been relatively successful in this endeavour; although the case of Leabua Jonathan suggests that the extension of state power via the exploitation of domestic, regional, and international environments is more delicate than one might think. (see Chapter Four)

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) under Seretse Khama (1966-80), and Quett Masire (1980-present), has been much more successful in regime maintenance. The same may be said for Swaziland's monarchy under the leadership of Sobhuza II whose death in 1982 touched off a protracted succession struggle which has since been resolved. Following his accession to the throne, Swaziland's new King, Mswati III, quickly returned to the policies of his predecessor. As will be seen, the difference between their success and the failure of Leabua Jonathan had less to do with South African destabilisation than it did with the deepening of capitalist development and the continuity of leadership in Botswana and Swaziland.

In brief, unlike Botswana and Swaziland, Chief Jonathan had little indigenous capital to protect and was therefore less inclined to submit to a foreign policy of accommodation toward South Africa when political events dictated that he become more confrontational. Those political events involved the BNP's election loss in 1970 to the more radical Basotho
Congress Party (BCP), headed by Ntsu Mokhehle, and Chief Jonathan’s subsequent civilian coup d’etat. In the effort to regain domestic legitimacy and curry international favour, Jonathan was forced to confront apartheid in a more systematic and substantive manner. (see Chapter Four)

BLS foreign policies have differed between states and over time, primarily because regimes must pursue different strategies in order to maintain power. Granted, like leaders everywhere, these state-makers prefer to maintain power with the legitimate consent and support of their populations. The persistence of apartheid in South Africa has provided them with an ideal reason to maintain domestic iron rule; the perception of Botswanan "democracy" notwithstanding. BLS are not atypical in this regard; all regimes in SADC have mined this moral vein for all it is worth. South African "destabilisation" proved a convenient excuse for failure and stagnation. At the same time, the myth of "development under difficult conditions" facilitated the extension of billions of dollars in aid and investment into these political economies. As this capital channeled through the state those close to it both prospered and strengthened their holds on the state.

(VII) Whose Development? Regime Survival and Structural Adjustment

In the absence of apartheid one might hypothesise that
these practices will be exposed; that corrupt rulers will be removed; democracy brought to these tiny countries; their civil societies allowed to flourish; and the region enabled to combat its peripheral position in the global division of labour. However, one could offer the counter-hypothesis, which seems intuitively correct, that instead of pooling resources to confront underdevelopment, most SADC policymakers will instead use the international division of labour as they used the regional division of power; i.e. as an excuse for accommodation with these superior forces in the interests of the status quo. In short, a new "bogey man" will emerge to replace apartheid in Southern Africa, i.e. structural adjustment.

The difference, however, is that structural adjustment — unlike South African "destabilisation" — is not "epiphenomenal"; rather, it is a manifestation of changes in the substructure itself. Whereas both South African and Bank/Fund-sponsored interventions have highly destabilising impacts on the region, especially among the powerless, SAPs are reflective of the dominant global capitalist ideology. (Cox, 1987; 1986) They are therefore less easily transcended. (see Chapter Three) Moreover, the conditionalities attached to these programmes tend to cleave these social formations along narrow, economic lines. So, whereas rich and poor had mutual interest in surviving South African military
aggression, survival strategies under pressure of economic liberalism are by no means mutually agreed to.

Given the end of the Cold War and the emergent cross-conditionality of "democracy", non-representative regimes like those in South Africa, Swaziland and, until March 1993, Lesotho are faced with the added pressure of sharing political power. (see Chapters Three to Five)

(VIII) Reconfiguring Foreign Policy: States and Civil Societies

Within these rather narrow parameters set largely, but not only, by Bank and Fund strictures, other variables, long-ignored, must be factored into the security/development equation. For instance, and with special relevance to BLS:

(i) the relevance of state formation and continuities in leadership. Traditions of pragmatic, "survivalist" (Denoon, 1972) diplomacy were present in each of BLS as far back as the Mfecane. Botswana and Swaziland have both been able to carry these traditions of statecraft in to the post-independence period, while Lesotho has not. This has had a profound effect on Lesotho's foreign policy since 1966.

(ii) externally-directed, primarily IMF-imposed policy based on "comparative advantage" which counsels more mineral exploration, more cash-crops, and more exports of all types, have been foisted on the SADC regimes. Some, like those in Botswana and Swaziland prefer to pursue their own de facto adjustment policies. However, how can such liberal economic policies be reconciled with the needs of a fragile ecology and an increasingly fragmented and unemployed polity - especially as the cross-conditionality of democracy comes to the fore? BLS have all pursued openly capitalist economic development, to the approval of the international donor community, but at risk of heightened contradictions within the
domestic social formation.

(iii) the traditional role of cattle and its long association with male gender dominance is a little explored element in BLS foreign policies. The continuing male desire for access to the means of production—largely still defined in terms of cattle—have made for strange bedfellows in BLS, all of whom have one thing in common: they are mostly men.

(iv) the articulation of the BLS social formations into the global capitalist system, a process which began with the opening of South Africa’s mines at Kimberley and the introduction of formal colonial rule, has helped a narrow group of individuals and families based largely on hereditary rule to emerge as the dominant fractions of the political class in these societies.11 Understandably, these classes have pursued pragmatic foreign policies which seek to preserve their positions at the commanding heights of their respective political economies. Nevertheless, linkages have emerged based on access to capital and encouragement of an indigenous bourgeoisie such that a wide range of classes (e.g. royalty; petit bourgeois; kulak; proletariat; and peasant) and categories of people (King/commoner; old/young; male/female) have come to depend for their livelihoods on regional and domestic stability and therefore conservative foreign

11 John S. Saul borrows Roger Murray’s concept of the "political class" to describe the nature and power of ruling groups in African states. The political class are those staffing the state at the most overtly political level—e.g. President/Prime Minister, cabinet, advisors, senior officials of the ruling party or politicised army, leaders and senior functionaries of opposition parties. This political class has the most immediate and potent access to the levers of state and therefore wield significant power in defining how the state will express itself and for whom. This class acts as a link between the state and the private sector, with a foot in both camps (i.e. bureaucratic and entrepreneurial). Saul states that this class is highly fractionalised along ethnic, tribal, ideological, and personal lines in addition to the production process itself. He states, "[It is] fractions based on these diverse grounds... which most often will be prominent in defining the character of petty-bourgeois politics." (1976: 37)
policies.

(v) however, the pressures of economic liberalism and structural adjustment are creating fissures along these formerly functional social lines. As opposition to growth-oriented government policies increases, divisions may be clarifying along class lines and therefore undermining extant social relations. The emergence of civil society -- i.e. "voice" rather than "exit" -- may be one consequence of these cleavages. But, as this thesis demonstrates, support for these types of associational challenges to the power of the political class are, at present, extremely weak.

These are some of the novel findings which emerge from the following comparative case, with broader implications for Third World foreign policy, both theoretical and political.

(IX) Structure of the Thesis

Given that this thesis is a comparative study of Third World foreign policies, following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two critically examines the theoretical literature on Third World foreign policy and makes explicit my own framework. Third World states face somewhat different security concerns than do Advanced Industrial Countries (AIC), foremost among them state-building and (under)development. (Job, 1992; Korany & Dessouki, 1991; Luckham, 1983; Sayigh, 1990; Shaw, 1992; Thomas, 1987) Given these preoccupations, it is clear that traditional Realist approaches to the study of foreign policy and security in the Third World are inadequate and new concepts and theoretical constructs are necessary if scholars are to arrive at (i) a
better understanding of the security/development problematique and (ii) policies that may help mitigate against the worst features of the NIDL/P (particularly structural adjustment and debt) as they impact upon weaker political economies. I suggest that this alternative framework is to be found in what might be called "radical political economy". This framework seeks to overcome the continuing preoccupation with diplomatic and strategic concerns, and move analysis toward the interrelation of state and class, structure and choice.

Chapter Three serves as an introduction to the region, examining in detail many of the issues initially raised in this introduction. It describes the dual sources of destabilisation identified above and suggests that one source -- South African destabilisation -- was itself partly the result of the other source -- the changing international divisions of labour and power. It suggests that over-attention to the former has left most states relatively ill-equipped to deal with the latter given the new post-Cold War environment.

Chapters Four, Five and Six, therefore, explore these issues in more detail as they pertain to the particular security/development policies of each of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. It should become clear in those chapters, that the major future threats to BLS national and individual
security will be located in the domestic environments, but
emerge because of their relative inability to insulate
themselves from the international environment, i.e. the
NIDL/P. Moreover, status quo-oriented policies, so successful
in dealing with South African destabilisation, are unlikely
to perform the same function vis a vis the neo-liberal
challenge to the regional political economy.

Each of the country chapters follows a similar format:
description of the superstructural, largely state-centric,
elements of BLS foreign policy (i.e. what and how) followed
by the substructural, both domestic and transnational,
elements of BLS political economy (i.e. why). Each chapter
concludes with an assessment of the overall foreign policy
position and extant security problematique of the particular
state under discussion.

Lastly, Chapter Seven concerns the implications of post-
1989 changes in regional and international political
economies symbolised by emergent pressures for political and
economic liberalisation in Eastern Europe and Southern
Africa. This chapter speculates on the conditions of a post-
apartheid South(ern) Africa and examines prospects for
corrected security and development in BLS. More importantly,
it highlights the importance of the structure of domestic and
regional political economies within the context of a changing
NIDL/P to any analysis of Third World state foreign policy.
This is made all the more important as the neo-liberal agenda continues to expand and impact unevenly within Third World social formations. In this context, "survival" and therefore both "security" and "development" are likely to be defined differently, depending on one's place within the social formation. In light of this observation, the experience of BLS provides a useful illustration of both Third World state and societal efforts to cope with changes at the margins of the global political economy.

(I) A Note on Methodology

This thesis marks the culmination of a decade's interaction with the Southern African region, particularly BLS. While most of my analysis stems from a thorough examination of secondary sources, it spans several disciplines (anthropology, economics, history, political science), sub-disciplines (foreign policy, international relations, comparative politics, development, economic history), and literatures (regionalism, civil society, strategic studies). It is augmented by the use of numerous primary documents -- particularly government, IFI, and NGO -- formal interviews, personal communications and experiences gleaned from travels on three different continents beginning in 1984. My initial contact with the region began in 1984 when I went to Lesotho on a short term, approximately six
month, contract to teach at the Lesotho Agricultural College in Maseru. While there I travelled widely throughout Lesotho and South Africa and gained many personal contacts during this extended peregrination. I worked on two CIDA and USAID projects in Lesotho in addition to my regular duties at the College. I also became friends with many Basotho who, in my subsequent 1989 visit as a Research Fellow at the Institute of Southern African Studies, had fortuitously moved on to many different, often very influential occupations in government and the private sector.

Thus, during my four months in the region in 1989, contacts initially made in 1984 proved invaluable in the later preparation of this thesis. During this second stint on the sub-continent I also travelled widely throughout the region, visiting Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, I was unable to get a visa into South Africa. Research in all these countries was facilitated by the extraordinary fact that three fellow graduate students and my supervisor were also in the region at this time. So, numerous connections had already been made which proved invaluable to my research.

Between these two journeys to Southern Africa I had the good fortune to participate in a UN sponsored conference on the future of Namibia in Havana, Cuba in February 1989. Again, my experiences there, including numerous personal
interviews assisted in fleshing out my own understanding and perspective on the region. Finally, an August 1991 visit to Geneva gave me access to UN and ILO documents and people whose importance to this thesis is most clearly revealed in Chapter Three.

Thus, the conclusions reached depend on a broad mix of primary and secondary sources, but are located within the subjective context of my critical theoretical framework; hence the claim to originality for this thesis.
CHAPTER TWO

Foreign Policy and the Third World: Critical Review and Alternative Framework

(I) Introduction

One of the most remarkable features of the post-World War II study of foreign policy is the scant attention paid to the general concept of foreign policy and the dimensions and categories into which it can be profitably arrayed ... [T]he need for defining foreign policy seems as inescapable as the neglect of it seems startling. In order to attempt to understand, explain, or forecast something, one must first be clear about what that something is.

- Charles Hermann (1978)

If the study of the foreign policies of underdeveloped countries is underdeveloped, the systematic analysis of their foreign policy decisions is not. It is simply non-existent.

- Bahgat Korany (Korany, 1984)

The type of future projected through a political economy form of analysis... may be contrasted with the limited insights derived from more traditional projections. Whilst it is clear that inter-state conflict will continue, we clearly need to go beyond orthodox notions to identify intra-state and transnational forms of struggle... The particular outcome of substructural economic change on superstructural political life can never be plotted with great confidence. However, to ignore the former by concentrating only on the latter is to prejudice chances of reliable explanation and extrapolation. Situating foreign policy within the problematique of international and national divisions of labour is difficult; but the advantages, even imperatives, of doing so are now clear and compelling.

- Timothy M. Shaw (1984)

There is a twofold purpose to this chapter. First, it serves as a critical review of trends in Third World foreign
policy theory and analysis. It will be suggested that the study of Third World foreign policies, while a legitimate enterprise, is better treated as a sub-field of International Political Economy as opposed to either Comparative Foreign Policy or International Relations. (Korany, 1986a; 1986c; 1991)

Second, I articulate a framework for analysis which derives from recent trends in the international political economy literature, specifically challenges to Realist definitions of security and foreign policy. While Realism remains the dominant paradigm in security and foreign policy studies, there is a growing realisation among scholars that it is largely irrelevant with regard to the dominant security concerns of Third World states. (Korany, 1991; Korany et al., eds., 1993; Luckham, 1983; Sayigh, 1990) Before proceeding to a discussion of Third World foreign policy, it is necessary to define what is meant by "foreign policy" and then discuss some of the major drawbacks of the dominant paradigm.

(II) What is Foreign Policy?

Definitions of foreign policy have gone through a number of phases as approaches have changed. While one approach tends to dominate over others at a given time in the historical evolution of the discipline, their time-frames as well as their degrees of salience tend to overlap.

As is clearly stated in the quotation from Hermann at the opening of this chapter, foreign policy has meant many
things to many people. For Korany, and contrary to Holsti (1987), this has not necessarily been a bad thing. Granted, "not only Third World foreign policy analysis, but also the general field of Comparative Foreign Policy seems to be still groping," argues Korany. But, he goes on to say that, if researchers are willing "to return to fundamentals, to take nothing for granted," then much past scholarship can be saved from dismissal. (1987a)

Clarity of terms and variables is particularly important here. I will outline briefly what Korany defines as the "what," "how," and "why" of foreign policy. Keeping these central assists in understanding the progress of the discipline as well as strengthening the comparative case here.

(i) **The What Question:** At a certain time not only was foreign policy output undefined, but the question was not really raised. The foreign policy to be explained was sometimes general objectives and strategies; at other times it was routine actions or behaviour (especially with the rise of events data), and in yet other cases it was decision, as with Snyder et al, Frankel, Brecher and the psychological school generally [see below]. A foreign policy can be all of these together, on condition that we are explicit about the distinctions. Indeed, being explicit about such distinctions can open a whole range of interesting questions about the different relations between the different components of the foreign policy output ... (Korany, 1986a: 22-23)

For Korany, a useful starting point toward understanding the "what" of Third World foreign policy is to distinguish between "role-conception" (i.e. foreign policy orientation) and "role-performance" (i.e. foreign policy behaviour and
decisions). (1986a: 23; cf Korany & Dessouki, eds., 1984; 1991) Ideally, the goal of Third World foreign policy has been the alleviation of underdevelopment and therefore the enhancement of national security. This has involved interaction with the international environment such that economic development is pursued as the key to satisfying all other wants and needs. For the sake of argument, then, one basic assumption is that foreign policy is made by governments in the effort to enhance the security of all individuals and institutions at the national level. This entails, in the Third World, a commitment to "development", meaning increasing the basic welfare of all citizens through the accumulation and distribution of capital, and to the preservation and strengthening of sovereignty, i.e. not only in avoiding or minimising the effects of outright military attack, but also committing sufficient natural and human resources to the complicated task of strengthening the aspirational and functional elements of the state.

Standing in the way of the realisation of this goal are the myriad threats which span five broad categories -- military, political, economic, societal, and environmental -- and levels -- individual, national, external. (Buzan, 1992) It is the task of policy-makers to sort through the security problematique and arrive at rational policy.

The "role conception" which usually emerges from this "insecurity dilemma" (Job, 1992) is an idealistic one: e.g.
support for Third World solidarity; the Non-Aligned Movement; an African Economic Community. The role conceptions put forward by BLS are typical of other Third World states: i.e. strong verbal commitments to multilateral security and development, particularly through membership in SADC. But behaviour -- "role performance" -- has tended to be much more pragmatic. In helping to separate substance from rhetoric, then, Korany's notions of role conception and performance are very useful starting points from which to address the questions "whose security would be served by policies based on role conception?" and "whose security is served by a state's role performance?"

(ii) The How Question: This is the crucial opening of the blackbox to anatomise the mechanism of policy-making: who does what, when, with or against whom. The importance of raising and hopefully solving the 'How' question should not be slighted, for - as Susan Strange rightly says coming as she does from political economy - "only by knowing the answers to the 'How?' questions, questions that will often involve mastering rather tedious and recondite technicalities particular to the subject matter, can one even begin to formulate the more puzzling 'Why?' question" ... (Korany, 1986a: 24)

In the cases of BLS, as with much of the Third World, the individual leader continues to play an important role in determining the direction and content of foreign policy; but less so than is generally thought to be the case. (see Zaffiro, 1993; cf Frank, 1974 and 1981) Indeed, and as will be seen below, while the individual leader, in concert with a few trusted Ministers tends to monopolise the formal decision-making process among domestic actors, other external
"actors" have come to dominate the policy-making scene in recent years. Foremost among these "new actors" are the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly the IMF and World Bank, whose classical liberal philosophy of free markets and limited state intervention has both conditioned foreign-policy and threatened regime and state stability in the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s. (Shaw & Swatuk, 1992)

(iii) **The Why Question**: The search for causality is the primordial and final objective both for understanding 'current affairs' or Third World foreign policies, as well as for foreign policy theory-building. In all sciences ... explanation is a complicated process. But strangely enough many foreign policy theorists have delved into this question from the start without specifying beforehand what type or component of the foreign policy output they were focusing upon. This might well be one of the reasons for the obstacles to present theory-building ... [R]ather than listing foreign policy sources across the board and leaving the reader to guess the independent/ dependent variable linkage, we should tailor the most potent determinant to the specific foreign policy output. (Korany, 1986a: 25-26)

For Korany, situating orientation and behaviour (i.e. the "what") as well as process (i.e. the "how") within the context of international political economy allows for a more nuanced understanding of the "why" of Third World foreign policy. I will return to this point in more detail below.

**(III) Foreign Policy and Realism: Power and Security**

The Realist view sees man¹ as a power maximiser, the

¹ And it is very much a "man's" view of the world. See, for example: Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases, Making Feminist Sense of International Relations*, (Berkeley:
state as both clearly identifiable and an extension of man, and the world system as a constellation of power-maximising states. It relies for its theoretical parsimony on vague, largely non-operational, and, to some, ethnocentric and wholly illegitimate concepts such as "power," "national interest," "rational actor," and "unitary state." For Kal Holsti, this model reduces foreign policy "to the problems deriving from the security dilemma." A definition of foreign policy common to their calculations would resemble the following:

Foreign policy is the range of external actions pursued by government officials acting in the name of the nation-state in an attempt to achieve certain rationally defined goals reflective of the national interest.

Inherent in this definition are the beliefs that states will remain the most significant actors on the international scene for the foreseeable future, that policy-makers act in the best interest of the state and its citizens, and that power - as both means and end -- is ubiquitous in inter-state relations\(^2\) and manifests itself most often as diplomacy or

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\(^2\) According to Morgenthau (1978: 29): "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power (continued...
war.\(^3\) However, foreign policy entails far more than the maximisation of power:

Although the model has the virtue of identifying a problem that all states face - and hence encourages comparative analysis - it is overly simplistic and fails to acknowledge many other types of problems that concern governments in their foreign relations. It can account for uniformity, but not for diversity. (Holsti, 1987: 25)

(IV) Overcoming Generalisation: Psychological-Perceptual and Bureaucratic-Organisational Approaches

The psychological-perceptual school, spear-headed by Brecher and Snyder, among others, sought to go beyond the generality of the Realist model without displacing its basic assumptions. However, in opening up the "black box" of the state, these scholars went to the opposite extreme. The decision-making framework confirmed Frankel's assertion (1963:1) that "[t]heoretically the environment of foreign policy is limitless, it embraces the whole universe".

Ironically, this resulted in "the quasi-exclusion of the

\(^2\)(...continued)
is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideals ... [W]henever they strive to realise their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.

\(^3\) Hedley Bull (1977: 162), for example, equates foreign policy with diplomacy and defines diplomacy as "the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means." For Bull, it entails, the search for international order, the avoidance of war, and above all, maintenance of the balance of power in the international system.
operational environment, the real world, which is replaced by
the decision-maker's perceptions of the world." (Korany,
1986c: 52) Due to the complexity of the operational
environment, Snyder was forced to rely on the role of the
individual. Brecher, too, tended to use the "attitudinal
prism" (in Snyder, "belief system") as a variable primus
inter pares: whatever could not be explained or
operationalised was deemed an aberration due to errant
individual behaviour.

The psychological-perceptual decision-making model was,
and still is, a popular one in the analysis of Third World
foreign policy. Coming as it did during the height of African
decolonisation, and the concurrent rise of numerous
charismatic leaders, one-party and even one-man regimes,
psychological reductionism seemed to fit perfectly both
within the context of African politics and personal rule, and
with the expectations of First World scholars, most of whom
were looking at Africa for the first time.

Moreover, the persistent use of this model in the Third
World is partly due to the inapplicability of those fashioned
with more complex political systems in mind. (Allison, 1969;
Halperin, 1972; Steinbruner 1974) Bureaucratic-organisational
models were deemed inappropriate for a continent where
political economies, let alone institutions, are more fluid
than fixed.

Yet, one could easily question their relevance to Third
World foreign policy on other grounds. In Allison's model, for example, the bureaucracy and other large organisations become both anthropomorphs, involved as "they" are in a political "tug-of-war," and overly central to the exclusion of other groups (religious, labour, women's) within and without (MNCs, IFIs, NGOs) the government and the territorial state. (Shaw & Swatuk, 1992; Korany, 1986a; 1986d)

Moreover, the bureaucratic politics model retained the billiard-ball model of international relations, assuming state autonomy to the indifference of the (often central) influence of sub- and supra-national social formations. In the Third World context, these are serious errors, for policy is increasingly being dictated to government officials from without as in the case of such "super-patrons" as the IMF and World Bank. According to Korany:

For if economic anthropology conceptualises patron-client relations within the small community, there is nothing to prevent us from considering patron-client relations as part of national/international linkages. In other words, the 'real patron' might be the external super-patron, whether he is the main decision-maker on arms in Washington, Moscow, Paris, or London, an executive of the IMF or the World Bank advising on food subsidies and exchange rates, or the head of a multinational company deciding on the level and whereabouts of its investments. Such a 'super-patron' is not a direct member of - but still a very real participant in - the state decision-making group." (1986a: 33-34)

The role of non-state actors within the state is also of increasing significance, especially in the African case. As the IMF and World Bank continue to press for "streamlined" states, there has been a corresponding increase in the number
of African NGOs and other associational groups seeking to fulfill roles of resource allocation and social justice traditionally left to or suppressed by the state. These are, in turn, becoming both more influential among the citizenry and threatening in the eyes of embattled regimes. (Bratton, 1989a; 1989b; Chazan, 1992; Fowler, 1991a; 1991b; LeMarchand, 1992)

Moreover, the model is both ethnocentric and largely concerned with strategic -- as opposed to economic or ecological -- crisis decision-making in complex industrial societies and therefore particularly inapplicable to the Third World case. (Korany, 1986c)

(V) Comparative Foreign Policy: Toward Theory?

The CFP school, most closely associated with Rosenau, attempted to fill the lacunae between classical, Realist generalisation, and decision-making particularism. That is to say, the goal of Rosenau and his cohorts was to create a framework comprehensive enough to facilitate cross-state comparison (thereby overcoming generalisation) but not so comprehensive as to paralyse application of the framework (thereby overcoming particularism).

In his then path-breaking "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy," Rosenau sought to construct both a hierarchy of broadly-based independent variables and a typology of states into which these regularised and recurrent patterns could be plugged and perhaps explained. Rosenau's pre-theory
was an analysis of the factors affecting foreign policy. In answering "why nations act", Rosenau focused on five, by now familiar, independent variables: idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic. (1966)

In spite of numerous, well-founded criticisms, the pre-theory was not without merit. First, the notion of "issue area" - i.e. influences on foreign policy may vary as issues vary - was innovative. It served to incorporate both the rational actor and bureaucratic politics models into a wider system of influences. Second, the concept of "penetrated political system" formally dispensed with the "billiard-ball" model of foreign policy-making, at least for some states. And third, it introduced comparative politics to international relations in the attempt to move toward a broader theory of foreign policy, in the process opening the way for eventual acceptance of the study of foreign policy as a legitimate sub-field in international relations. However, by the 1980s, the early optimism of this pre-theorising had given way to cynicism. Stated Rosenau, "Nothing in the pre-theory anticipated a world of mounting scarcities, faltering super-powers, collapsing economies, and pervasive breakdowns of authority." (1984: 251)

In summary, the Realist paradigm, with its misguided distinction between inter-state "high" and "low" politics, and corresponding pre-occupation with the former, failed to judge the degree to which economics and politics are
interrelated. In short, the context for foreign policy analysis, let alone prescription and projection, was wrong. (cf Korany, 1986a: 28-34)

(VI) The "Third World" and Foreign Policy Analysis

By the early 1970s there were upwards of 150 members of the United Nations (UN). Most of these "new states" were underdeveloped; many were former colonies of the imperial powers; all were "small" in terms of their places in the global divisions of labour and power; and all were determined to remain viable actors in the international system. Despite the numerous secessionist, irredentist, and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World, and despite the pre-eminent position developed for the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" and various comprador social fractions via colonialism and beyond, the focal point for international relations remained the state. Further, while transnational economic and other substructural relations both blurred conventional superstructural political boundaries and widened the parameters of foreign policy-making and analysis, the unitary state/rational actor model was nevertheless transported in toto to the Third World. (cf Higgott, 1985; Jackson & Rosberg, 1984; and Ayoob, 1992)

(VII) Focusing on the Third World: Zartman's Contribution

This Realist approach was applied in the now-classic
International Relations in the New Africa,⁴ by I. William Zartman. In the preface the author stated that he had attempted to use "notions of behaviourism, communications analysis, and decision-making" as tools of analysis as well as an historical approach in order to ascertain "what happened when and why." (1966: x) Zartman succeeded in providing scholars of Africa's international relations with a necessary point of departure. His in-depth examination of African internal decision structures and regional politics was both novel and seminal. (Shaw, 1983: 7-8)

Zartman's contribution was uniquely important in two ways. First, it provided the necessary first step for all serious studies of Africa's international relations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, his modernisation, Realist approach remains the preferred paradigm for a majority of African(ist) scholars in the North to this day. (cf Crocker, 1993; Gann & Duignan, 1991; 1981; Gibbon, 1992; World Bank, 1989)

That he considered examining African international relations on an intra-African (i.e. central) rather than Africa-global system (i.e. peripheral) basis helped lend credence to the viability of studying small, underdeveloped states. To that time and since, small state analysis usually

⁴ First published by Prentice-Hall (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.) in 1966, International Relations in the New Africa has since been reissued by UPA, further indication of its "classic" status.
discounted Third World states, arguing that they were mere pawns in an East-West chess game, largely or totally lacking in the objective resources of power, and/or victims of economic, geographic and geo-political determinism. His general approach was to deemphasise unequal, "neo-colonial", extra-African economic relations, choosing instead to focus on more equal, post-colonial, inter-African political relations. Indeed, his consideration of extra-continental, transnational linkages appeared in but a single sentence:

Different attitudes toward the metropole, predominant ties with a single European country, and the continual conflict between the desire to be modern and the effort to remain African all diffuse toward a common, distinctive way of life in face of external challenges. (1966: 160)

Even here, his orientation was toward increasing integration and cooperation with the metropole -- not self-reliance.

"Nation-Building," as a pre-condition for development (1966: 159), did not entail delinkage or any coherent plan toward South-South cooperation and industrialisation, but rather, the necessary evidence that an underdeveloped state was worthy of and had the capacity to handle increased foreign aid. In Zartman's view, mid-'60s "possibilities for aid were

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5 For example, Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, regarded the Third World as "politically empty spaces" until 1870 (1978: 357), as quite often "basker cases" thereafter (121), and lacking virtually all components of objective power (chapter eight). "[T]he periphery of world politics," he stated, "now tends to become one of its centres," not in terms of a rising "third force" in the global balance of power, but as "one of the main theatres where the struggle between the two superpowers is being fought out in terms of the control of territory and men's minds." (359)
insignificant" until such time that West African states increase their capabilities vis-a-vis economic growth, state power, and "a greater competence in controlling state behaviour and re-directing its attention." (1966: 145,158-59) This echoes the language and spirit to be found in the prevailing orthodoxy of present day Bank/Fund structural adjustment programmes and conditionalties; the negative impacts of which are central to this thesis. (Chapters Three to Seven)

So, the inability that Zartman classified as "characteristic" of intra-African foreign policy derived, in the main, not from Africa's worsening positions in the global divisions of labour and power, but rather from internal crises, overwhelming external, superstructural and environmental, constraints, and personal grievances displayed by African leaders. But like many of those having appeared after him, Zartman relied most heavily on the idiosyncratic variable to explain African foreign policies and behaviours. He attributed "conflicts and feuds" between West African countries to "personal reactions of pride or anger usually felt by the head of state." (in Korany, 1974: 71)

(VIII) Focussing on the Third World "Experience": The Uses of Foreign Policy

In 1972, Franklin Weinstein published "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: an approach to the analysis of foreign policy in the less developed countries". Clearly, his
frustration was with research like Zartman's which emphasised "idiosyncratic sources, especially the personalities and psychological problems of the top leader."

(1972: 356)

These studies are helpful in many ways, but in an important respect they are unsatisfying. They do not give us a clear picture of how foreign policy relates to the political and economic problems that constitute the essence of being a less developed country. (emphasis added) (ibid)

This is both a key point for Weinstein, and a major departure from past practice. The dominant approaches of the 1960s and 1970s relied heavily on the notion that states were interchangeable -- the so-called "black-boxing" of the state. Small states conducted foreign policy in the same fashion and for the same reasons as did large states but only on a smaller scale, and therefore with more limited aspirations. In an anarchical system governed by power, this left the small states, developed and developing alike, with virtually no freedom of choice in foreign policy decision-making.

The Snyder and Brecher frameworks were meant to be universal in scope; i.e. applicable across all states. Rosenau's pre-theoretical framework attempted to create typologies of foreign policy behaviour, incorporating considerations of developed/developing economies, as well as open/closed polities, thus ostensibly accounting for differences between states and thereby giving to his pre-theory a veneer of dynamism.

Weinstein was critical of these attempts. Rather, he concluded that Third World states were substantially
different from developed states and from each other. While Third World states share a common heritage of colonial exploitation, and overall weakness — thereby facilitating cross-state comparison within a "Third World" framework — such status and condition was deemed necessary but insufficient for explaining foreign policy. In other words, if underdevelopment was common to all, it could not explain divergence in Third World foreign policies, as Rosenau purported it could. (Mugyenyi, 1988: 9-10)

Weinstein's alternative was to have "a general hypothesis, using well-known, loosely-defined variables capable of being translated from one study to the next." (1972: 357) Further, he felt that it was better to explain foreign policy-making in the Third World from the concept of "uses". To Weinstein, the fundamental dynamic of foreign policy -- of all policy for that matter -- in LDCs was weakness: "Informed Indonesians see their problems as overwhelming and their ability to deal with them as limited." (p. 357) This simple assertion has since given way to a spate of studies which, over the last 20 years, have tried to redefine "security" in the Third World context. (cf Ayoob, 1992; Job, ed., 1992; Korany, 1991; Korany et al, eds., 1993; Sayigh, 1990; Thomas, 1987)

In order to overcome their problems, foreign policy-makers, according to Weinstein, tended to follow one of three options: (i) independence; (ii) development; (iii) overcoming
internal political competition. To him, while all three of these trends were present, one always took precedence over the others contingent upon long term international and domestic factors, the dominant attitude and perceptions of the nation, the idiosyncracies of the top leadership, and the issue area and degree of external penetration. (cf Acharya, 1992; Swatuk, 1993)

Weinstein's major contribution, then, has been one of ground-breaking; i.e. the questioning of old and new orthodoxies, and the foresight to offer not just critical evaluation, but an alternative framework as well. Moreover, by focussing on the Third World and questioning the applicability of "grand theory," Weinstein vindicated the area study approach, be it African, Southeast Asian, or Third World: "There does not seem to be any logical reason why theory-building cannot begin at such modest levels, close to the data, moving upwards as studies accumulate." (1972: 363)

(II) Toward Theory: The Foreign Policy of Development

Beginning in 1974, Korany, picking up where Weinstein left off, endeavoured to move the study of Third World foreign policy away from Realism toward International Political Economy. For Korany, the problem with the entire CFP approach is not that a sound theory is sometimes inappropriately applied; rather, this school's very conceptualisation of foreign policy -- with its various static and Euro-centric assumptions and categorisations -- is
misguided.

Even when applied to the same case, there is no guarantee that similar conclusions will be reached. Citing Brecher and Rosenau's separate treatments and contradictory findings of Israeli foreign policy, he concludes:

Given that Brecher and Rosenau have a cultural area in common and are pillars of the same "scientific" and behavioural school, might not this sheer opposition between the two theory-builders raise questions about the credibility of "foreign policy theory," and its capacity to offer clear guidelines and operational hypotheses to those who are interested in its application? (1986c: 42)

He later refined this point in a 1987 conference paper, subsequently published in 1991 (Wurfel and Burton, eds., 1991):

It has to be admitted that the American-based behavioural persuasion[‘s] ... overdose of jargon, its predilection for abstraction, and endless discussion of quantification and precision, led to excesses and an extreme form of methodologism. However, such excesses of a certain brand of theorising should obviously not push us to the other extreme of shunning all forms of conceptualisation and methodological rigour - thus throwing away the baby with the bath water. Indeed, stock-taking, sorting-out of basic theoretical propositions of foreign policy analysis and the evaluation of their relevance to Third World countries are themselves mandatory. Such endeavours are pre-requisites for - indeed could condition - any such advance in both foreign policy theory-building generally and the study of the foreign policies of Third World countries in particular. (1987a: 1-2)

Korany's initial attempts at theory-building (1974; 1976) involved development of a situation-role framework for foreign policy analysis. This, he felt, might remedy the lack of conceptual focus.
[The approach] is based on a sort of empathy, for it takes as its starting point the frame of reference of the Third World actors, focussing conceptualisation of their "situation" and attempts operationalisation of some specific components of this situation: (sub)systemic strain, position in a stratified international system, and national role conceptions. (1974: 90)

He believed that his model would achieve two much-desired ends: (i) it offers "a way to build upon the contributions of [past] approaches to foreign policy analysis, while helping to minimise their drawbacks" (ibid); and (ii) "through its emphasis on the actor's general orientation and type of commitments as well as his actions, attains a level of generality appropriate for both foreign policy frameworks and international system studies". (ibid, 90-91) In this way he builds upon Weinstein (1972), Good (1962), and others who see the LDC situation as at times overwhelmingly restrictive but not so as to dissolve into situational determinism.

In his later publications, Korany retains the situational-role aspect and combines it with a discrete event -- i.e. a "behaviour" or "decision" -- to help strengthen his focus, and therefore increase the relevance of his findings and facilitate cumulation. Unlike the decision-making models, a discrete behaviour is used not as an end in order to work backwards towards an understanding of process, but rather, as a beginning from which analysis of overall orientation, trends, departures, process, and perhaps future expectations can proceed:

Decisions are only one part of a country's foreign
policy. They can be the most visible, dramatic, and newsworthy events in this context, but they are by no means the totality of foreign policy. Decisions are discrete, easily identifiable, and delimited phenomena ... For purposes of analysis, their beginning, making, and terminating can be isolated from other events and assigned a date. A country's foreign policy, on the contrary, is a continuous, wider phenomenon, embracing general objectives, stated strategy, and a series of positive actions ... Whether representations of, or departures from, a country's foreign policy, decisions are best analysed as part of this amorphous whole. (1986c: 39)

Thus, decisions became for Korany the vital "what" from which to draw broader conclusions and/or understanding of both "how" and "why".

His 1984 effort with Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and contributors (subsequently revised and published as a second edition in 1991) was an attempt to act upon some of the criticisms reserved not only for Realist approaches to foreign policy analysis, but also for more recent Third World-oriented attempts which he found interesting, adventurous, yet somewhat uneven. Korany's 1983 review article entitled "The Take-Off of Third World Studies? the case of foreign policy", regarded the books under discussion as "collectively achieving great progress both for foreign policy theory building and for the study of Third World foreign policy:"

They have unearthed unorthodox sources of data and tackled the operationalisation of the foreign policy output. At the explanatory level, a systematic attempt to analyse how global asymmetries affect foreign policy patterns has been initiated both empirically and conceptually. Despite (or because of) the limitations of this
attempt, a political economy approach to foreign policy analysis is maturing. Insights about the foreign policy process have been systematised to liberate us from the blinder imposed by psychologism - the modern version of the great man theory of history. (1983: 487)

According to Korany (1983),

In view of th[e] absence of systematic findings, Clapham's concluding chapter does not have any empirical generalisations -- except his own -- to build upon. Clapham manages to do an admirable job, however. Although he is never far from the basic concerns of international theory, he is always close to the reality of Third World politics: problems of development, dependency, and identity, ethnicity and national integration, as well as the permeability and relative autonomy of the state. (ibid, 484-485)

Korany and Dessouki have attempted to make these types of improvements in their 1984/1991 collection, mostly with success. In Chapter One of both editions, entitled "A Literature Survey and a Framework for Analysis," they note the growing body of Third World foreign policy analysis that attempts to look beyond the idiosyncratic, toward structural aspects of the international and domestic systems. "The net outcome" being "the emergence of a new body of literature on what can be called 'the foreign policy of development.'" (1984: 7; 1991: 10) Before articulating their particular framework, Korany and Dessouki situate Third World foreign policy-making in terms of two dominant factors -- internal and international political economy:

(i) One common element of the new literature is the emphasis on domestic sources of foreign policy and on how the processes of modernisation and social change affect the external behaviour of developing countries.
(ii) An equally important element in the new literature is the emphasis on the political economy of an actor's position in the global stratification system. In this context, inequality becomes a core focus, for developing countries exist in a world social order characterised by inequality between states at the levels of socioeconomic development, military capability, political stability, and prestige. This results in the penetration of developing countries' decision-making processes from the outside, with external actors participating authoritatively in the allocation of resources and the determination of national goals. (ibid)

From this point Korany and Dessouki offer an interesting framework that attempts to distinguish between "role conception" and "role performance"; i.e. between "saying" and "doing", between "words" and "deeds." Both foreign policy orientation and behaviour are discussed in terms of (i) domestic environment (e.g. geographics, population and social structure, economic capability, military capability, and political structure), (ii) foreign policy orientation, (iii) the decision-making process, and (iv) foreign policy behaviour, (1984, 12-17) all of which are situated within an historical, international political economy context. Though the degree to which the contributors, in their individual country chapters, adhere to the editors' framework and perspective is uneven, the overall picture of Arab states' foreign policies is one far richer in conceptualisation and nuance than previous work. (cf Dessouki, 1991; and Delmejian, 1971) To Korany and Dessouki,

The most salient factor in the analysis of developing countries' foreign policies is their position in a highly stratified international
system where unequal exchange seems to entail important attitudinal and behavioural consequences. (1984: 325)

This is borne out in their chapter on "Arab foreign policies in the Global System" wherein Arab countries are described as being in a situation of modified dependence. (1991: 30-32)

Perhaps a more serious shortcoming is the editors' belief that domestic sources of foreign policy can be equated with perceptions of a unified elite operating in the national interest:

... Elites' perceptions of the structure of the global system, of the norms governing its functioning, and their position in it have greatly affected their foreign policy orientation of national self-assertion through non-alignment. ... When the foreign policy elite of a developing country perceives the world as hostile, intense political competition leads the country toward a foreign policy that puts independence first. A less competitive situation will permit a policy that accords priority to the search for foreign aid. (1984: 325)

Not only have Dessouki and Korany borrowed from Snyder and Brecher in their equation of national interest with policy-makers' "definition of the situation". They have also assumed a convergence of elite and mass interest. That is to say, solving various dilemmas, or resolving various paradoxes (aid/independence, resources/objectives, security/development) (1984: 8), necessarily connotes an elite commitment to the wider "national" interest. This is an error in judgement and, in my view, the major drawback of this edition.

It is for this reason that Korany and Dessouki are
unable to account for seemingly non-compatible verbal and actual behaviour in any way but the following:

In certain Arab countries, we ... find a gap between verbal articulation of goals and actual foreign policy behaviour. For example, Algeria, a revolutionary country that plays an active role in international channels on behalf of the Group of 77 and for the establishment of an NIEO, projects a Third World image. Yet, in the 1970s, its trade relations with the US increased, and its long-standing strong economic relations with Western Europe continued ... Related to incongruence in role conception and performance are sudden changes, zigzagging, and improvisation in foreign policy behaviour. In some cases, this is caused by despair at the gap between capabilities and objectives. In others, erratic behaviour is due to impatient leadership, incomprehension of the complexity of international politics, and the confusion between national dreams ... and objectives that must be related to operational capabilities. (1984: 328-329)

It seems to me that in contrast to Korany and Dessouki, "incongruences" between word and deed often are not incongruent at all but completely compatible behaviours directed at different audiences, and arising out of various societal interests (e.g. regime security) and alliances (e.g. class fractions). (Chapters Three to Six)

More recently, Korany (1991; 1986b; 1986c; and Dessouki, 1991), has rectified this shortcoming by reconceptualising both "the state" and the "national interest" to more closely fit Third World realities:

(i) It is mandatory to go not only beyond the individual as a level of analysis but also beyond the state, however monolithic and autonomous it may appear to be. Decision-making structures and national social processes must be conceptualised as part of a more general social organisation - i.e. as links in the global system chain.
(ii) Such national/international group linkages may also emerge when external groups attempt to shape the frame of reference and parameters of a given decision-making process. A multinational company, for example, might co-opt a particular group of national elites and socialise its members into following certain modes of thought, standards of living, values, and exogenous patterns of behaviour that serve as criteria for evaluating options and taking decisions. (1986c: 181-182; cf. 1991: 10; also, Cox, 1983)

Hence, the "state" in Korany's reformulation becomes not a group of decision-makers vested with authority, but rather, an organising concept whereby various social fractions vie for control of the most durable, yet permeable, of large, internationally legitimate social formations. And "national interest" thus becomes a constellation of self-interests which may or may not coincide with the desires of the majority.

Understanding Third World foreign policy, then, demands more than just opening up the black-box of the state but of Third World society as well. According to Korany and Dessouki:

[F]oreign policy is part and parcel of the general situation of the Third World and reflects the evolution of this situation. In this sense, the foreign policy process cannot be separated from the domestic political process. To understand a country's foreign policy, we have to open the "black box" of Third World society. The countries of the Third World are part and parcel of a world system; they are greatly affected by international stratification and inequality. Formal state sovereignty notwithstanding, a Third World society can be permeated, penetrated, and even dominated. (1991: 10)

(X) In Search of a Flexible Framework
In light of the inability of either realism or dependencia to adequately explain and therefore prescribe solutions to Third World underdevelopment, and given that some states' policy-makers have already seen some modest success in moving away from the margins of the global division of labour, it seems propitious to suggest an alternative framework for the analysis of Third World foreign policies. This recognises, of course, that "Third World" states differ in size and complexity, but most share a condition of pervasive insecurity. (cf Job, 1992; Buzan, 1991) That framework, I suggest, builds directly on Korany and Shaw (discussed below), among others, and is best characterised as radical political economy.

Before I define radical political economy, it is first necessary to say a few words about what is meant by international political economy, for "radical" political economy only holds meaning when juxtaposed to "traditional" or held in contradistinction with "status quo" approaches. Once having stated that my particular approach is "radical", I then need to describe why it is radical and therefore what is its essence.

For Martin Staniland,

The term political economy, used generically, refers to a continuing intellectual enterprise, a particular agenda, a specific object of theoretical ambition. Because political economy is an agenda rather than a method, there will always be a variety of theories of political economy. And because a variety of assumptions and values underlies such variety of theory, it may be
possible (indeed, it is very desireable) to criticise each theory: but it will never be possible to decide between them, to end the debate, and to remove the variety by purely logical means. (1985: 198)

Resolutions to the debate have been posited by Korany (1986a), Holsti (1991), and Shaw (1983; 1984; 1985; 1991a; 1992) among others, as well as Staniland, who states:

We can thus have radical or liberal political economy, the adjectives merely indicate an orientation. Whether either is any good intellectually depends on the logical rigour and the quality of evidence involved in its exposition. (emphasis added; 1985: 194)

Yet, Staniland does not stop there, for to have a theory that is intellectually satisfying is to have but half a theory.

Some theories (such as 'world systems' theory and some abstract forms of functionalism) are satisfying to intellectuals because they are so comprehensive and sophisticated; but it is exactly these qualities which may make them harder to translate into immediate, limited programmes of action. (ibid, 196-197)

Here Staniland is referring to the relevance of theory not merely to analysis but to praxis as well. World systems, Marxist, and dependencia theories all suffer from too high a level of abstraction. One of the major knocks against any form of materialist, neo-Marxist analysis has been its perceived alienation from practical application. As Staniland states,

It is certainly easy to share the irritation and bewilderment of an activist, or policymaker, who, on asking what should be done about the problems of Zaire or Mexico, is answered that their problems are products of the world capitalist system and must await the destruction or subjugation of that system. (1985: 192)
Yet, as we have most recently seen in Eastern Europe, neither is the deposing of a dictator (like Ceaucescu) or the leveling of an ideology (like Marxism-Leninism) sufficient for bringing about an end to structural inequalities. Thus, while solutions to underdevelopment require practical, value-laden theory, that theory must also exhibit a degree of abstraction and sophistication. Only in this way can it uncover the more intractable of sub- and super-structural variables, and perhaps offer a more viable and practical alternative to reductionist and systemic extremes. Hence the value of radical political economy, and the current radical trend toward the writings of Gramsci and Habermas, among others. (see, for example, Gramsci, in Bennett, ed., 1981)

A Gramscian analysis, for example, places its emphases on the dual role of politics and economics -- hence the "two revolutions". (Boggs, 1984) This construction of power recognises the dominance of substructural elements of global capitalism, involving not merely its expansion from the core, but also the extension of its ideology and values. It also perceives of the continuing relevance of political power, especially in the so-called "periphery" where the extension of capitalism, Western values and other interests is incomplete and constituted quite differently from the core. This "anti-determinism" allows for inroads in to policy-making, however rudimentary they may be. (see Chapter Three)

What, then, is radical political economy? Peter
Waterman defines "radical" in the following way:

[A] major characteristic of conservative African studies is that despite their frequent sophistication and elegance, their findings are banal and trivial. In this sense any work which ignores the superficial and epiphenomenal, which uncovers basic structures and root problems, can and should be considered radical. (1977: 14)

In this context, then, any study of foreign policy which questions the basic assumptions of the dominant Realist paradigm is to be considered radical. In a 1983 study, Shaw described the need for a more radical approach to the study of Africa's international relations:

[A]n examination of peripheral capitalist classes might seem to be of marginal interest to the study of African international relations. But if the sub-field is moving toward a concern for political economy and the future, then an understanding of sub- as well as super-structure is essential: the structural constraints on foreign policy "choices." If the field moves beyond dependence as well as beyond description and development, it may then be truly radical, at least according to Peter Waterman's definition of the term - "primary, fundamental, of the roots" - and so become compatible with a general movement in African studies away from orthodox perspectives and prescriptions. (emphasis added) (1983: 33)

Korany's perspective on "international political economy", parallels that of Shaw. Korany defines IPE as,

an umbrella integrative perspective to guide research priorities and prescribe a mode of data interpretation. The emphasis is put on its interdisciplinarity, potency of world hierarchy, and the influence of transnational networks on the decision-making process. 'Great men' and elites and their data are thus analysed, not as psychological atoms but as social phenomena. (1986a: 3)

For Korany, international political economy has five "defining characteristics" (ibid, 30-33):
(i) its emphasis that politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels are integrated and cannot be understood independently of each other;

(ii) its broad, interdisciplinary nature;
(iii) its emphasis on global hierarchy, but not in a deterministic "Frankian" fashion; rather, it recognises the primacy of the global dimension as a result of historical legacy and in contemporary forms (e.g. the IMF as "super-patron" and therefore real participant in policy-making);

(iv) its promotion of comparative social history, facilitated by recognition of internal/external linkages across political, economic, and social planes;

(v) its belief in methodological rigour combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques.

It is Korany's belief, and it is a belief shared by Cox (1986; 1987) and Shaw (1983; 1984; 1992), among others, that a radical political economy perspective is sufficiently flexible to facilitate the bringing together of different research findings in "really cumulative rather than criss-crossing" fashion. In other words, answers to what, how, and why questions of Third World foreign policy will be made more meaningful if each study, be it single case or comparative in nature, is undertaken from the perspective of radical political economy.

Shaw states that a radical political economy approach differs from a realist analysis of foreign policy in at least four ways:

First, its **LEVEL OF ANALYSIS** is substructural rather than superstructural. Second, its **MODE OF ANALYSIS** is critical and analytical rather than just descriptive. Third, its **METHOD OF ANALYSIS** is materialist rather than behavioural, concerned with modes and relations of production, with internal and international divisions of labour, and with the
identification of inequalities, contradictions and prospects of any new synthesis. And fourth, the IMPLICATIONS of such analysis are basic: radical change rather than reformism is considered to be essential if a history of dependence, underdevelopment, and vulnerability is to be transcended. In short, with its emphasis on "structure" rather than "contingence" ... a political economy perspective - whether it is bourgeois or Marxist - entails a rather fundamental assessment of Africa's place and potential in the world at the levels of both analysis and praxis. (Shaw & Aluko, 1984: 10-11)

In a 1983 monograph, Shaw elaborates on the relevance of a radical political economic approach to analysis of the African "condition":

The dialectic between economic marginality (substructure) and diplomatic centrality (superstructure) lies at the heart of the distinction between radical and traditional perspectives. For the latter bases its view of African power and influence - centrality - on national diplomacy and strategy: the "output" of indigenous regimes in a rather uncompetitive political order. By contrast, the former founds its position on African powerlessness and domination - marginality - on international production and exchange: the "input" into weak states in a highly competitive economic system. So an orthodox approach leads to assertions of African political power whereas a critical approach leads to assertions of African economic powerlessness. This dialectic between sub- and super-structure has, of course, profound policy as well as analytic implications, particularly in the semi-periphery. (1983: 25-26) (See Table 2.1 below)

And given the development of a post-Cold War "New International Division of Power," in addition to the existing and evolving NIDL, the myth of African political centrality seems more in question than ever before. So, in the African case, any analysis of foreign policy must take existing economic and increasing diplomatic marginality as its main
point of departure; recognising, of course, that these categorisations are not cast in stone, but can and are changing as global capitalism evolves and new political dispensations emerge out of the decline of the Cold War. The emergence of the NICs in Asia and pressures for democratisation and economic adjustments in Africa are instructive in this regard. (Wurfel & Burton, eds., 1991; Shaw & Swatuk, 1993)

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(XI) The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy

Moreover, this continuing but, in many cases, declining African "dependency" on Northern markets and capital, coupled with increasing reliance on Western policy prescription and advice has important implications for future foreign and domestic policy directions. Clearly, a few "states" are better placed than are most others to take advantage of changes in the international divisions of labour and power. As will be seen in our comparative cases below, the formal
economies of the BLS states have performed relatively well over the last 15 years, paradoxically benefitting both from their proximity to the apartheid Republic as a catchment area for South African trade and investment and from South Africa’s hostile policy of regional destabilisation. The latter serves to attract foreign physical, monetary and psychological resources to each of BLS, particularly in support of their regimes. But, as South Africa moves toward post-apartheid, future scenarios for BLS are quite different, and, perhaps, less optimistic than the Bank or the Fund might assume.

Given the ubiquity of (formal and de facto) structural adjustment conditionalities, and the widely varying economic capabilities of these three states to deal with the formidable challenges of development, liberal economic strategies are likely to lead to increased differentiation and fragmentation both within and between all states of the Southern African region.

The preoccupations of African leaders with debt, structural adjustment, and now the cross-conditionality of movement toward multi-partyism, have combined to reign in even the most modest of African aspirations. Thus Swazi and Basotho foreign policy-makers in particular face a new type of realism: post-apartheid and post-Cold War contexts leading toward pressures for multi-party democracy. (Cobbe, 1992)

So, a new generation of post-crisis and -adjustment
Southern Africans is beginning to move towards power, encouraged by dramatic regime changes elsewhere. Old assumptions about anti-imperialism and -apartheid, which served as legitimators of one-party leadership throughout Southern Africa -- Botswana being a special case -- have given way to revisionist notions of African capitalisms and user-pay fees. (Shaw, 1992) Nevertheless, resistance and response to adjustment measures have strengthened popular organisations, including cooperative, female, religious, and youth institutions, which have seized some of the "space" vacated by shrinking (in the case of Lesotho) or non-existent (in the case of Swaziland) state-sponsored social welfare programmes. (see Harris, 1993) "Civil society" has begun to flourish in some political economies, compelled by structural adjustments and emboldened by East European examples. (cf Holm & Molutsi, 1989; Lewis, 1992; Weisfelder, 1992)

Throughout the continent, not merely in BLS, new social relations have begun to emerge as social formations continue to change. For example, in Lesotho structural adjustment reforms have included streamlining state bureaucracies which in turn have threatened if not yet collapsed much of the middle class with its foundation in state-salaries rather than indigenous production. Further, structural adjustments in BLS have led to both a smaller and more fractionalised bourgeoisie, partly because of bureaucratic cuts and/or hiring freezes, but also partly because of declining sources
of new foreign investment. They have also led to a rising petit-bourgeoisie, both merchant-capital (with its roots in forex and the informal sector) and kulak (with its roots in the emergent IFI-emphasis on strengthening agriculture). SAPs and economic liberalism have also led to a threatened (due in part to decreasing industrialisation, itself due to the selling off of parastatals and other moves toward privatisation) and/or exploited proletariat (particularly women, as footloose corporate investment is wooed in each of the former High Commission Territories). But they have expanded the peasantry, as retrenched urbanites return to the land and states place increasing emphasis on agriculture and food self-sufficiency. And, perhaps most obviously, vast numbers of un- and under-employed continue to emerge irrespective of structural adjustment. But declining state-sectors and capital-intensive industry have exacerbated the problem.

These factors have combined with a novel foreign policy agenda -- debt, environment, gender, investment, technology -- to form the essential security/development problematique for the 1990s. As will be seen, all of these issues are present in the Southern African case. And, clearly, some individuals, groups, classes, families and genders are better prepared to deal with these issues than are the vast majority of Southern Africans.

These revisionist discourses embrace basic notions of
political economy, national interest, and state security — all of which are threatened in the New International Divisions of Labour and Power. In particular, as the state contracts so security is being redefined: from territory to presidency? from party to family? from economy to ecology? And in the absence of increased foreign assistance, exchange, investment, and technology, self-reliance may become an inevitability rather than a desiderata. The regional, rather than national or continental possibilities are promising, however, if informal sectors are liberated and encouraged so that small-scale, female-dominated exchange rather than large-scale, state or corporate trade becomes the centre-piece. Yet, as we will see in the following four chapters, regional states’ continuing reliance on "leading sectors" — e.g. minerals, agro-industry, hydro-electricity — and "comparative advantages" — e.g. cheap labour — serves to impede cooperation, and foster conflict, within and across social formations. In the next chapter I explore the nature of these regional relations in detail.

(XII) Conclusion

To briefly summarise my approach: A nuanced analysis of BLS foreign policies begins with an understanding of their respective positions within the global stratification system. That is to say, it interrelates their positions of economic dependency and political marginality. It does this in historical perspective. Understanding the process by which
each state was incorporated into the global divisions of labour and power helps identify the impact of colonialism and capitalism on extant social formations and on regional divisions of labour and power. This further helps identify the networks of power and interests within the newly created states and the region itself. An historical perspective also provides insight into state formation itself, and how the post-colonial juridical state differs from the historical, de facto one, if at all.

Given this logically consistent framework, specific questions arise which must be addressed in any analysis of BLS foreign policy: Were indigenous elites displaced or coopted by such a process? If they were coopted, do they control the domestic means of production and coercion? What kind of linkages and networks of accumulation and accommodation exist within and beyond the state? What are the dominant issues in regional and international political economies? What kind of strategies have been used by leaders to secure both state security and their personal positions at the apex of the social formation? Do they have the support of the people over whom they govern? How successful have leaders been in achieving their objectives, however defined? What kind of changes have been undertaken in foreign policy orientation and behaviour, if any? Given what is known about state formation, elite composition, regime legitimacy, and position in the international and regional divisions of
labour and power, what accounts for these changes and/or continuities in foreign policy? How successful are these policies likely to be, if continued, given the changing and flexible nature of the international divisions of labour and power? What kind of domestic and/or regional stresses and strains are likely to arise from a continuation or change in foreign policy behaviour? In the next four chapters these questions will be examined in detail.
CHAPTER THREE

Dual Destabilisation and Insecurity in Southern Africa: The Regional Nexus

(1) Introduction

Any study of Southern African foreign policies must consider the regional level of interaction; not merely as reflected in, say, Buzan’s (1991) "regional security complex" or Bowman’s (1968) "subordinate state system", but also as reflected in the historical development and incorporation of regional social formations into the global capitalist system. While the high politics of the region cannot be ignored, the attempt must be made to situate those relations and events within the wider, more far-reaching and historical context of global political economy.

Clearly, the region has been the primary focus for all states' -- especially the smaller states' -- foreign policies in the pre- and post-independence periods. However, it is the historical and continuing impact of the global system, particularly the extensions of capitalism and the Cold War to the region that have most seriously affected the course of Southern Africa's regional relations.\(^1\)

\(^1\) For my basic definition of the global system and the assumptions underlying its pre-eminent impact on the Southern African region, I take Korany and Dessouki's discussion of "The Global System and Arab Foreign Policy" as my point of departure. Rather than reproduce that section here, the
It is the central purpose of this chapter to illustrate the impact of the changing IDL/P upon Southern Africa's regional relations as a necessary prelude to my subsequent comparative analysis of BLS state performance within this unenviable context. This chapter is not merely a descriptive exercise, however. To the contrary, not only do I describe the nature of the crisis facing Southern Africa. I also suggest that South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation was, itself, symptomatic of an organic crisis facing the entire region; i.e. a crisis deriving from the increasing marginalisation of Southern Africa within the global political economy, and the concomitant increasing inability of political classes there to maintain hegemony based on past patterns of regional and global political economic interaction.

Stuart Hall defines "organic crisis" as follows:

Gramsci insisted that we get the "organic" and "conjunctural" aspects of the crisis into a proper relationship. What defines the "conjunctural" - the immediate terrain of struggle - is not simply the given economic conditions, but precisely the "incessant and persistent" efforts which are being made to defend and conserve the position. If the crisis is deep - "organic" - these efforts cannot be merely defensive. They will be formative: a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new "historical bloc", new political configurations and philosophies, a profound restructuring of the state and the ideological discourse which construct the crisis and represent it as it is "lived" as a practical reality;

reader is referred to that chapter, particularly pp. 26-32, in their recent book on Arab foreign policy (1991) as well as my discussions of Third World security in Chapter One and on radical political economy in Chapter Two.
new programmes and policies, pointing to a new result, a
new sort of "settlement" - "within certain limits". These do not "emerge"; they have to be constructed. Political and ideological work is required to disarticulate the old formations and to rework their elements into new configurations. (in Davies & O'Meara, 1984:68; cf Bennett et al, 1981; and Cox, 1983)

So, for South Africa, according to Davies and O'Meara,

By the end of 1976 the collapse of both internal and external dimensions of state policy in the context of heightened mass struggle and deep recession gave rise to ... an "organic crisis". (1984: 68)

In light of this discussion, Davies and O'Meara go on to state:

We would agree with Saul and Gelb then that the "reforms" of the [late-1970s-initiated policy of] "total strategy" represent precisely such a response to an organic crisis and attempt to reconstruct the political, ideological and economic conditions of stable capitalist rule. These policies did not simply emerge. They were produced out of deep political conflict within the ruling class and the consolidation under P.W. Botha of a new political alignment of class forces. (1984: 68)

For Davies and O'Meara, then, traditional, geo-strategic interpretations of events (e.g. total onslaught) and the policies emanating therefrom (e.g. total strategy) fail precisely because they focus solely on conjunctural factors, neglecting to peer deeper into the organic elements of crisis.

What I am suggesting, then, is that gradual and involuntary delinkage from the mainstream of the global capitalist economy has given rise to more serious forms of destabilisation and threat: not only continuing underdevelopment; but a "recolonisation" of the region by liberalist forces of global capitalism via structural
adjustment programmes imposed by the Bank and Fund on these debt-ridden economies.

In explication of this hypothesis, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a narrative of high political events in the context of South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation. Second, I examine the way in which the Black majority-ruled states responded to this challenge through the creation of SADCC.\(^2\) I suggest that the SADCC experiment failed to increase the security of any of its ten member-states, but its ideals of regional integration remain necessary in the context of a NIDL. Third, I also look at South Africa's deepening crisis of domestic political economy; suggesting that minority-rule was weakened by "total strategy", not merely because it was both expensive and repressive, but also because it forced most of the region's energies toward conflict and away from cooperation specifically when it was needed most, i.e. during the emergence and shaping of the NIDL.

Thus, by the end of the Cold War, I conclude, Southern Africa is more marginal to the world economy -- with debt and structural adjustment marking its major link to the economies of the North, and acting as the symbol for the region's

\(^2\) As mentioned in Chapter One, SADCC is now called the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Throughout this chapter the acronym SADCC will be used, since it has only been since 1992 that SADCC became SADC, and it was in the context of SADCC -- not a development community possibly incorporating South Africa -- that destabilisation took place. (See, "Building a Bloc", *Africa Report*, Jan-Feb 1993)
organic crisis. It will be with these conclusions in mind that I examine the foreign policies of BLS in subsequent chapters.

(II) South Africa and the Evolving Global Division of Labour

South Africa's hegemonic position in the region derives from its great economic wealth - particularly, diamonds, gold, and a wide variety of other minerals, including uranium - and the method by which these abundant resources were exploited. Following the mineral revolution of the 1860s and onward, lines of transportation and communication that had been developing slowly and haphazardly into the interior were strengthened and streamlined along a settler/colonial-axis. (Davidson, 1978; Freund, 1984) South Africa became a wide basin into which much of the region -- its wealth, its human and natural resources -- drained. In order to secure ready access to a large, exploitable pool of black labour, viable subsistence, barter economies were subverted and societies monetised through colonial/settler policy. Typical of centre-periphery (under)development, linkages not serving the interests of colonial or settler capital were avoided. As a result of this process, almost all indigenous social formations of the region experienced some form of land alienation, resource exploitation, and labour appropriation at the hands of white colonists/settlers. (see, for example, Denoon, 1984; Lipton, 1986) The result was not simply widespread social upheaval and attendant poverty among
indigenous groups; on the contrary, many indigenous groups, particularly chiefs, prospered during this period via cooperation with forces much stronger than they. (Paton, 1991) Nevertheless, poverty was widespread. According to Seidman and Makgetla,

The causes of ... pervasive poverty lay, not in the lack of natural resources, but the pattern of institutions imposed during the colonial and post-colonial era. In all but mountainous Lesotho [sic], white settlers had appropriated the most fertile lands adjacent to the transportation network that radiated out from the South African hub. Colonial taxation, credit and marketing structures geared to settler agriculture thwarted African efforts to develop modern farms. The importation of mass-produced manufactured goods undermined local handicraft industries ... (1980: pp. 237-238)

What emerged, over time, was a white-dominated South Africa whose powerful position in the regional political economy has been described as "sub-imperial". (Shaw, 1977) Clearly, this position derived not from the workings of a free market economy but from, initially, international and, later also, national capital's overt manipulation of the region's human and natural resources.

(II.1) SACU and "Sub-Imperialism"

Perhaps the clearest example of this "sub-imperial" position is the South African-created and -dominated Common Customs Union (SACU). Given SACU's continuing centrality to the economies of BLS and Namibia, and its renewed legitimacy as a "prototype" of broader, post-apartheid regional relations, it is imperative that something be said about it
at this point.

The SACU agreement was established in 1910 as a means to integrate the economies of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, into that of the larger, white-minority controlled, South African economy. (Robson, 1967; Landell-Mills, 1971; Collings, 1978; Guma, 1985; and Lundahl & Petersson, 1990) Extremely limited in scope, this initial agreement amounted to little more than a declaration of South African suzerainty over the region. As with the development of the BLS labour reserves, SACU was an historical agreement that over time came to impose severe limitations on these states' domestic and foreign policy-making capacities. Nevertheless, revenue flowing into these territories had a narcotic effect on state-makers who became addicted to this steady source of income.

A tariff was established, accompanied by the provision that the High Commission Territories conform to these laws as set by the Union. The Agreement also allowed for the free interchange of goods between the Union and the HCTs. Further, a small percentage of all customs and excise tax was to be shared amongst the HCTs. Under this initial agreement, Basutoland received .88575%, Bechuanaland .27622%, and Swaziland .14900% of total customs and excise revenue. In contrast, South Africa was to receive 98.68903%. (Robson, 1967: 474) At the time, this was felt to be an "equitable share of duties on goods passing through the Union to the
HCTs and vice versa". (ibid, 473)

Under pressure from the newly dependent BLS countries, South Africa agreed to a restructuring of the CUA in 1969. The primary issue was the weak trade-off on the part of BLS of marginal revenue and decreased administrative costs in return for a total lack of control in the direction of their respective economies. BLS wished to secure protection for their infant industries; unrestricted entry of their goods into the South African market; an increase in revenue, including adequate compensation for the loss of fiscal autonomy and the effects of a "dual economy"; and a provision for regular joint discussions concerning customs, excise and sales duties and other matters of fiscal policy. Botswana, in particular, was keen on a new arrangement which would allow it to profit from diamond and other mineral wealth, as well as from increased economic activity surrounding cattle exports to Britain and the European Community (EC). (see Chapter Six) South Africa, on the other hand, sought to maintain its dominant status over the Southern African economic region.

The actual concessions awarded were ones that would, on the one hand, allow South Africa to retain a relatively free

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3 The CUA has since been amended twice. Once in 1976 following the "oil shocks" of the early 1970s, and once in 1982. The 1982 amendment, however, has been blocked by the South African parliament. The movement toward post-apartheid virtually ensures both an unblocking of existing amendments and, in all probability, fundamental restructuring of the agreement.
hand regarding economic affairs. On the other hand, they reflected, albeit mildly, the desires of BLS state-makers for a more equitable role of the economic dice.

If the 1910 agreement accurately reflected the state of BLS political economies, so too did the 1969 agreement come to more accurately reflect subsequent BLS economic performance. According to Shaw:

The experiential divergence of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland apparent in the 1980s looked very different a century before in the 1880s, when Lesotho was still the regional breadbasket, Swaziland was open to settlement and just being "discovered", and Botswana was written-off as cattle-country at best, desert at worst; hence the sequence and style of their incorporation [into the regional political economy].

But as regional and global technologies and demands changed -- labour for mines and farms, metals and materials for new industries and now water and energy for sustained production -- so the ranking of High Commission Territories evolved to its current Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho hierarchy based on present and prospective levels of national production and accumulation. This was recognised belatedly in the 1969 renegotiation of the BLS allocation with South Africa in its Customs Union ...

... And such formal change is reflected in informal transactions, with consumers and job-seekers trekking to the relative affluence of Botswana, whose debt-free pula currency is now more attractive than South Africa’s devalued rand. Regional relationships thus reflect both global changes and national fortunes; domestic class formations and relations are inseparable from external technological, strategic, and economic directions. (Shaw, in Black et al, 1988: 1-2)

Benefits accruing from SACU to the weaker members have been the object of much scholarly debate. There are a number of clear drawbacks, however. For example, payments to BLS from South Africa are delayed interest-free for two years.
Any increase in the level of remittance deriving from a particularly good year is usually swallowed up by two years' worth of inflation and/or devaluation.

The creation of the Pula and Botswana's decision to opt out of the Rand Monetary Area has provided added stability and important decision-making capacity in this area. Unlike its former High Commission partners, however, Botswana had the added advantage of massive revenues from diamonds fuelling a "growth economy". In this case, then, the notion of an "independent" currency had some real meaning. (see Chapter Six) Swaziland has made some recent efforts to delink the Emalangeni from the Rand. But, to Swazi policy-makers, foregoing this consistent source of revenue seems a huge cost to an economy so closely linked to South African capital. (see Chapter Five) Finally, Lesotho, whose economic base is by far the weakest of the three, has also made some noise about delinkage. But fiscal policy there basically remains a function of South African economic performance and priority. (see Chapter Four)

Clearly, white South Africa benefited disproportionately from this and other unequal regional relationships. With the ascendance of the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party to power in the post-World War II period, much of this surplus capital was turned toward social reconstruction on a massive scale, i.e. apartheid. (Davenport, 1986)

As both domestic and external opposition to apartheid
and continued settler/colonial rule in the region increased in the post-1960 decolonisation period, the racist regime turned first toward cooptation of neighbours and "allies", and, only secondarily toward increasingly belligerent behaviour and militarisation as the preferred method for continued national and regional hegemony. In the face of changing national, regional and international environments, destabilisation came to be seen as apartheid's last stand. As P.W. Botha once told the international community: "do your worst".

(III) Southern Africa and the Evolving International Division of Power

South Africa's increasing belligerence culminated in its destructive regional policy of destabilisation. (To be examined in detail below.) This policy was both necessitated and facilitated, in large part, by changing conditions in the international political system. This is not to exclude the influence of regional events, however. For clearly, South Africa's policy-makers were responding, first and foremost, to changing conditions in the regional environment. Nevertheless, changes at the international level helped determine the nature of South Africa's response toward regional events. According to Bowman (1968), the subordinate state system (in Southern Africa as elsewhere) cannot be understood apart from events in and effects of the dominant system (which can be taken, in his context, to mean the major
Buzan defines this penetrative and interventional role as "overlay", meaning that one or more external powers move directly into the local complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic... The likely result of overlay is that the suppression of the local security dynamic, and/or protection against another external power, is gained at some, perhaps considerable, cost in entanglement with the larger security dynamic of external powers. (1991: 219, 220)

Whether one views the region from realist, idealist, or materialist perspectives, the conclusions are the same: Southern Africa, since colonial times, has been dominated by foreign imperial and capitalist concerns.

(III.1) From Colonialism to the Cold War and the First Wave of Decolonisation

With the decline of imperialism, the emergence of the United States and Soviet Union as the world's dominant powers, and the rise of the Cold War, Southern Africa -- along with the rest of the Third World -- came to symbolise a potential battleground of East-West ideological struggle. Emerging conflicts in the region, as seen through the parochial lenses of Western state houses, came to represent not legitimate struggles for self-determination, but micro-cosmic elements in a universal Manichean struggle. South Africa, regarded as an important ally during both World Wars and now against communism, was strongly supported by the West. (See El Khawas & Cohen, 1974; Minter, 1986)

As pressure for the region's decolonisation built in the
1950s and early-1960s, every effort was made by Britain to ensure the installment of moderate, conservative governments in power. Support was given to existing moderates -- like those in Botswana and Swaziland -- and, where none existed -- as in Lesotho -- were created with the assistance of British (and South African) capital.

South Africa and Rhodesia remained problems, however. While the West remained inclined to support South Africa as a "bastion of anti-communism" -- and, one might add, of "monopoly capitalism" as well -- the apartheid experiment, and the contradictions it engendered came to be seen as both morally repugnant and regionally destabilising. Meanwhile, Rhodesia, whose white minority had unilaterally declared independence in 1965 rather than face the loss of political power to a black majority, came in for the wrath of UN sanctions. Rhodesia continued to function -- even prosper for a time -- as a "renegade state", albeit with the assistance of a sanctions-busting white South Africa. (Swatuk & Shaw, 1988)

(III.2) The Second Wave of Decolonisation

The wars of liberation in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe coincided with the post-Vietnam, first-oil shock, continuing Cold War period. During this period, Western calculations were based on the belief that these wars were directed from Moscow (+/- Beijing) and that, above all else, South Africa should be given support to stem this tide of
revolution. The fall of Portuguese colonialism and the emergence of avowedly-Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique seemed to justify such a position. And US support for South Africa's 1975 invasion of Angola marked direct application of the so-called "Kissinger doctrine". (El Khawas & Cohen, 1974; Omari, 1992) Further, the continuing OPEC crisis reinforced US policy-makers' beliefs that South Africa remained an important centre of operations in the South Atlantic/Indian Ocean region. (Dowdy & Trood, eds., 1985)

Thus, Western support for South Africa in light of the above, and in spite of growing pressure for UN-sponsored sanctions against South Africa, facilitated the continuation of South Africa's hegemonic role in the region. And the Gulf crisis, which pushed gold over US $700 per ounce, helped offset the rising costs of both oil and domestic oppression. Western support, it is argued by some, was the crucial factor in South Africa's ability to resist change; without it, majority-rule also would have come to South Africa. (Danaher, 1986)

Here it can be seen that the dominant system is directly influencing the superstructural course of events in the subordinate system. There have been three further identifiable changes in the dominant, geo-strategic system, in addition to decolonisation and the Cold War discussed above. As will be seen, however, it is only the most recent
change -- i.e. the end of the Cold War\textsuperscript{4} -- which has exposed the nature of Southern Africa's crisis as "organic" in the Gramscian sense of the word.

(III.3) Carter, Human Rights, the Frontline States and "Total Strategy"

The coming of Jimmy Carter to the US presidency coincided with a period of detente in East-West relations and an emphasis on human rights in foreign policy. The Soweto uprising and the creation of sham-homelands in 1976 therefore served not only to galvanise internal and international support for liberation movements, particularly the ANC, but also provided the Carter administration with a focal point for its "human rights-based" foreign policy and the UN for its 1977 position on military sanctions.

South Africa therefore found itself pressured toward (i) domestic reforms, (ii) a pull-back from Angola, and (iii) negotiated independence for both Namibia, and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; i.e. toward detente. However, at the same time, the strategic map of Southern Africa was awash in Black independence victories. The Frontline States (FLS)

\textsuperscript{4} Which, from a Realist perspective, would be described as a change of systems -- i.e. from bipolarity to, perhaps, truer multipolarity -- as opposed to the other changes which took place within the existing bipolar system. (See, Waltz, 1986) From a radical perspective, however, the change might be described as a consolidation of hegemonic power within the existing but still evolving global capitalist system. (See Cox, 1983, for a discussion of the Gramscian notion of "hegemony")
association, created out of this changing strategic landscape, was the symbol of this "success".\(^5\)

Initially, however, this association was not perceived in so threatening a manner. According to Chipasula and Miti, the FLS association emerged out of Zambian Prime Minister Kaunda and South African Prime Minister Vorster’s attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution to Rhodesia’s crisis following the 1974 fall of Portuguese rule. (1989: 123) In October 1974, Kaunda and Vorster issued a joint communique entitled, "Towards the Summit: an approach to a peaceful change in Southern Africa". To Chipasula and Miti,

The states within the region saw Kaunda’s initiatives as a betrayal of the liberation cause since South Africa was directly supporting the Smith regime. The same hostility was to be expressed to the whole grouping by the rest of African countries when Botswana, Tanzania and Frelimo finally joined Zambia so as to formulate a united policy for negotiation with the Rhodesian government. To the OAU and the African states, talking to South Africa at a crucial moment when the white bastion appeared to be crumbling, was interpreted as capitulation. However, the grouping managed to convince other African states that they were play a crucial role in the liberation process and not jeopardising it. (1989: 124)

Finally, in April 1975, the group was given "formal recognition as an ad hoc committee of the Assembly of the Heads of States of the OAU". (ibid)

The security geography of the region had clearly changed. No longer was black-ruled Botswana the only state

\(^5\) The FLS is comprised by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe (which joined at independence in 1980.)
surrounded by hostile states (excluding its largely "technical border" with Zambia); white-rule Rhodesia, too, was now surrounded. (Henderson, 1990: 47) South Africa's minority-ruled regime also found its position a more precarious one after 1974.

According to Tsie, the 1960-74 period marked the "high point" for South African security and economic growth. (1989: 5) The period of dialogue and détente following on the Portuguese fall was but a brief interregnum; an attempt to capture as in amber a regional security arrangement that had already escaped South African control. Regional events became increasingly violent towards the second half of the 1970s with the South African invasion of Angola, the Soweto massacre, and increased guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia. Masses of refugees fleeing the various conflicts in search of safe haven in the region placed new stresses and strains on governmental capacities and inter-state relations. Numbers in Botswana, for example, swelled from 220 in the mid-1960s to 4,500 by 1976. (Rwelamira, 1990: 7) Southern Africa had become, in the words of one observer, "a vortex of violence". (Callaghan, ed., 1983)

South African policy-makers came to perceive the FLS as a fundamental challenge to continued minority rule in the region. So threatened were they that "total strategy" was concocted in the attempt to salvage minority hegemony. (Refer to Map 3.1 for a sense of this changing strategic landscape)

Source: Unblemished map taken from Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986); arrangement here, author original.
According to Barber and Barrett,

[the concept of Total National Strategy reflected [Prime Minister] Botha's view of security as the critical consideration in foreign and domestic policies ... Although Total National Strategy only emerged clearly as the basis of government policies after Botha became Prime Minister, the term had been used ... in public statements from the early '70s. It was the response to a perceived 'total onslaught' on South Africa, communist-inspired and orchestrated from Moscow, but to which other 'hostile' elements contributed, wittingly or unwittingly." (Barber and Barrett, 1990: 252)

For General Magnus Malan, "the total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is therefore also total, not only in terms of ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic, and technical areas." (in Grundy, 1986: 10) Again, according to Barber and Barrett,

[the 'total onslaught', as perceived by Pretoria, was directed against the 'free Western world' of which South Africa was a particular target, because of its strategic location, mineral wealth, highly developed infrastructure and strong economy; and because it posed a major obstacle to Soviet attempts to gain control of Africa. (1990: 254)

This assumption formed the cornerstone of South Africa's 1977 Defence White Paper (while Botha was still Minister of Defence); and after 1978, when Botha became Prime Minister, "total strategy" became operative.

Initially, total strategy favoured a policy of cooptation: e.g. changes to domestic, lease-hold regulations, especially in the "townships", in hopes of creating a propertied, business-oriented, Black middle-class; support
for independence elections in Rhodesia and monetary backing of a Black moderate political candidate, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, there; and support for a regional co-prosperity sphere, centred on South Africa as a regional "engine of growth".\(^6\) (Swatuk, 1987) With South Africa the dominant power in the region, this "Constellation of Southern African States" (CONSAS) would be dependent upon South Africa "economically, militarily and technologically." (Johnson & Martin, 1989: 2)

(III.4) Toward Destabilisation: From CONSAS to SADCC

It was not until shortly after 1980, however, that the use of coercive measures came to dominate total strategy. 1980 was a watershed year in regional relations for three interrelated reasons. First, Zimbabwe came to independence under the leadership of an avowed Marxist, Robert Mugabe. South Africa's preferred candidate, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, had been soundly defeated in pre-independence elections. Second, the independence of Zimbabwe marked the culmination of five years of activity on the part of the FLS. At independence, Zimbabwe became yet another radical member of that group --

\(^6\) The domestic portion of total strategy was called WHAM, i.e. "winning of hearts and minds." (see Grundy, 1986) It is interesting to note that this early project, based on a deepening of capitalism, is in many respects similar to that now pushed by the Bank and Fund: white privilege, as in Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, could be preserved through capitalism based on laissez-faire principles; and the moderate use of state power could extend the bourgeoisie, irrespective of colour, thereby increasing support for the status quo. (see Chapters Five and Six)
with Botswana the lone democratic and capitalist state --
whose activities now turned to the liberation of South
Africa.

Third, the nine majority-ruled states of the region
formed the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC), clearly rejecting Pretoria's CONSAS
proposal. According to the 1980 Lusaka declaration, SADCC's
mandate was fourfold:

(i) reduce economic dependence particularly, but
not only, on South Africa;

(ii) forge links to create genuine, equitable
regional integration;

(iii) mobilise resources to promote the
implementation of national, inter-state, and
regional policies; and

(iv) coordinate action to secure international
cooperation within a framework of "strategy for
economic liberation". (See, Msabaha & Shaw, eds.,
1986)

The original impetus for SADCC probably came from the
Frontline States (Thompson, 1985), although some see it as a
Western creation; i.e. something of a Marshall Plan for
Southern Africa. (Anglin, 1982) Following on the May 1979
Frontline Foreign Ministers' meeting in Gaborone where a
decision was taken to create an economic grouping, Frontline
Heads of Government issued the Arusha declaration of July
1979 formally establishing SADCC. From that point, Botswana,
or more specifically, Seretse Khama took the lead in SADCC,
chairing the April 1980 meeting at Lusaka "which formalised
arrangements, allocated sector responsibilities among nine
countries, and provided for a (now permanent) secretariat in Gaborone". (Morgan, 1981: 246)

Quett Masire, Botswana's Prime Minister following the death of Seretse Khama in 1980, stated that he saw SADCC as a "vehicle for promoting our struggle for economic liberation and cooperation". (ibid) Membership within CONSAS, on the other hand, would be tantamount to recognising the "independence" of South Africa's bantustans, a condition which had been particularly irritating to BLS. (Weisfelder, 1992) According to Tsie,

[The FLS, in anticipation of a genuine settlement in Zimbabwe, opted for SADCC rather than be drawn into an economic, political and military alliance with South Africa. The late President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, made it emphatic that his country could opt for the SADCC initiative ... In his support for the SADCC initiative he stated that: 'among genuine partners acting in agreed coordination there is nothing wrong with mutual dependence. It is the one-sided dependence of the weak upon the strong which destroys self-reliance, corrodes initiative and distorts development'. (1989: 8)]

Seen in this light, then, Zimbabwe's independence was key to the future of the SADCC states. It gave to the idea of regional economic cooperation beyond South Africa "a new kiss of life because of the strategic importance of Zimbabwe for countries like Botswana and Zambia". (ibid) Not only was SADCC to centre around the industrial power of Zimbabwe -- thus posing a threat, at least theoretically, to South Africa's hegemony in the region -- it also included as members those states previously considered most dependent
upon and/or aligned with Pretoria (i.e. Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland) -- thus giving the impression that Pretoria was losing control of its destiny.

For South African policy-makers, SADCC's mandate, though couched in economic terms, was clearly political. Thus, in light of the extended nature of this perceived threat, South Africa's militarily-oriented policy-makers saw regional destabilisation as, quite possibly, their last resort.

(III.5) Reagan, Thatcher, "Constructive Engagement" and Heightened Regional "Destabilisation"

In the presence of the Carter administration, however, destabilisation remained highly selective, even tentative. The earnest implementation of destabilisation thus could only be facilitated by another change in the international system. This change came at decade's end: i.e. the rise of the Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1981) administrations in Britain and the US, respectively, and renewed Cold War. Extended to Southern Africa, this meant policies of "constructive engagement" (which, in the US case, was basically a return to the Kissinger doctrine of containment of communism and modest domestic reforms), undertaken in spite of growing world popular opinion lobbying for sanctions and isolation. (See Danaher, 1986; Minter, 1986) Reagan's notions of an "evil empire" conveniently paralleled Pretoria's notions of "total onslaught"; understandably, each regime shared similar interpretations of recent changes in Angola, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe. Constructive engagement, then, appeared to mark white racist rule's salvation.

"Destabilisation" is an emotionally charged concept. The term is most commonly used to describe a somewhat regularised pattern of inter-state intercourse (diplomatic, military, economic) delimited in time (1975-1989) and space (Southern Africa). It is most often used to describe the regional component of a strategy (including tactics) pursued by the South African government in an effort to maintain and/or increase its state security vis a vis the majority-rulled members of the FLS and SADCC. It is also commonly used to describe the outcome of such a strategy. "Destabilisation", therefore, is usually seen as both means and ends of South African foreign policy. For example, according to Stephen R. Lewis,

[I]t covers everything from overt military action (only Tanzania among the nine SADCC [now ten] countries seems to have been spared), their support of armed groups opposed to the established governments (especially in Angola and Mozambique, but also in other countries), and interruptions of transportation arrangements and diversion of traffic through the SATS system. (in Bryant, ed., 1988: 63)

At the regional level, South Africa used a policy of "carrot and stick" involving a combination of economic and political incentives (cheaper transport charges, preferential trade arrangements, a proposed land deal with Swaziland) as well as diverse coercive measures (sabotage of SADCC infrastructural projects; fostering anti-government rebels in
Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe; direct military attack upon supposed ANC targets) to bring recalcitrant states into line. The result -- destabilisation -- according to Geldenhuys, was "a convenient and temporary means to other ends for Pretoria ... [Economic losses incurred by South Africa] could, however, be regarded from the destabiliser's viewpoint as an unfortunate but temporary necessity if he [sic] had a political objective beyond the instability." (in Barber and Barrett, 1990: 272) The political objective, to reiterate, was the maintenance of the status quo.

Barber and Barrett (1990), as well as Alex Johnson (1991) and Barry Buzan (1991) situate "total strategy" within the more generalised foreign policy framework of "the search for status and security". Deon Geldenhuys, who is generally considered the ideologue of total strategy, reinforces Barber and Barrett's generalisation: the destabiliser "wishes to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state[s] ... At the very least, the destabiliser demands a fundamental shift or reorientation in the target state's policy vis a vis the destabiliser." (Geldenhuys, 1981: 1) In other words, the use of economic, political, and military incentives or disincentives toward other states in the region is intended to increase their willingness to maintain economic links with South Africa (which SADCC sought to sever) and decrease their belligerence toward minority-ruled South Africa (demonstrated in their willingness to harbour
ANC cadres/refugees and/or otherwise assist in the so-called "liberation struggle for South Africa").

Destabilisation, for some then, is not an end in itself.

According to Barber and Barrett, destabilisation can be misleading if it is assumed that the policy was simply a defensive one of creating a buffer of unstable countries. Instability and deprivation on the borders could not provide a buffer of security, but rather a source of insecurity as the military were aware. The aggravation of instability – which already existed in Mozambique for economic and other reasons – was not therefore an end in itself. (1990: 272)

(III.6) Why Destabilisation?

Ever since Bowman’s 1968 study, South Africa has been regarded as the overwhelmingly dominant actor in the "regional sub-system." Lewis confirms Bowman’s central hypothesis:

South Africa dominates the region economically. With under 30% of the population, South Africa produces nearly 3/4 of the region’s GDP; and 2/3 of its exports (roughly US $18 to $24 billion in 1984); about half the South African total is gold, and nearly 7 per cent are exports to countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The majority of income arising in South Africa accrues to or is controlled by the minority white population of some 4.8 million. Thus, the 4 to 5 percent of the region’s population comprising white South Africans receive or control at least half of the region’s income – something of obvious importance in discussing the present realities and the future prospects of the region. (1988: 41; cf Hanlon, 1986; Johnson & Martin, eds., 1986; 1989; Stoneman & Thompson, 1991; SADCC, 1992)

Given South Africa’s dominant position in the regional political economy, one may be given to wonder why "destabilisation", especially of such magnitude as to have
cost the SADCC states something in the neighbourhood of "US $45 billion to the end of 1988" (Johnson & Martin, 1989: 10), or about US $65 billion today (SADCC, 1991: 1); i.e. "three times the total aid received" by the SADCC countries over the same time period (Stoneman & Thompson, 1991).

On the one hand, one might hypothesise that, at the beginning, South African foreign policy-makers never anticipated such a protracted, costly and deadly struggle. Hence, destabilisation was to be a limited foreign policy tactic with specific objectives. (Geldenhuys, 1981) On the other hand, however, one could see destabilisation as the logical outcome to heightening national, regional, and international contradictions, fostered, in part, by the rise to power of the so-called "securocrats" in South Africa, and the "Cold Warriors" in Washington.

The South African case is lucidly and extensively chronicled by Grundy (1986). For our purposes, and as the period is now over, suffice it to say that through the creation of an inner cabinet composed largely of the military joint chiefs, the Ministers of Defence, Law & Order, Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister himself, and through the creation of Joint Management Centres throughout South African society, Botha managed to institute a parallel bureaucracy -- i.e. a "National Security Management System" -- whose raison d'être was state security and maintenance of the status quo. And, as briefly mentioned above, specific domestic reforms
were designed and implemented to foster and coopt a Black middle class, as well as create two lower houses of parliament for Indians and Coloureds.

The results of this policy are extensively chronicled in the literature (Bardill & Sefali, 1985; Hanlon, 1986; Johnson & Martin, 1986; 1989) and need not be dealt with in detail here. The following from Hanlon (1986: 1) serves as eloquent testimony to the extent of South Africa's "war against its neighbours":

Since 1980, in the eight majority ruled states of the region, South Africa has:

* invaded three capitals (Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique) and four other countries (Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Zambia);

* tried to assassinate two prime ministers (Lesotho and Zimbabwe);

* backed dissident groups that have brought chaos to two countries (Angola and Mozambique) and less serious disorder in two others (Lesotho and Zimbabwe);

* disrupted the oil supplies of six countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe); and

* attacked the railways providing the normal import and export routes of seven countries (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe).

More than 100,000 people have been killed, most of them starved to death in Mozambique because South African-backed rebel activity prevented drought relief. Famine was used as a weapon of war. More than one million people have been displaced... In purely financial terms, the cost is immense... Over the five-year period 1980 to 1984 South Africa cost the region $10,000 million - more than all the foreign aid these states received in the same period... Thus the price of destabilisation is not
simply seen in the dead and displaced, and in the enlarged military budgets. It is also seen in lost development and reduced living standards. Furthermore they reinforce each other. Military action creates economic havoc. Economic havoc lowers morale amongst defence forces, and fosters dissatisfaction and a sense of hopelessness. The ordinary people of the region are suffering so that minority rule can continue in South Africa.  
(emphasis added)

Without doubt, ordinary Angolans and Mozambicans have and continue to suffer most at the hands of apartheid's regional reach; recently held elections in Angola having degenerated, once more, into civil war. (see Africa Today double issue on Angola and Mozambique, 1992; also, "Soldiers Battle for Food in Besieged Angola City", New York Times, 25 March 1993) Overall, and to this point in time, an estimated 1.5 million people died and millions more were displaced "in the original nine SADCC member countries". (SADCC, 1991: 13)

(III.7) Black Majority-Ruled States' Response: In Search of Security

In spite of its magnitude -- and the devastation in Angola and Mozambique being somewhat special cases (Huffman, 1992) -- for most observers in Southern Africa's majority-ruled states, South Africa's regional strategy of destabilisation was not a new departure. (See Nkiwane, 1988) It marked, rather, one rational if unfortunate policy choice by an embattled regime bent on preserving white privilege. That the so-called "securocrats" were in ascendance no doubt exacerbated the violent nature of this policy. In light of
the interventive and penetrative nature of the South African "threat", especially given the global context of Cold War bipolarity, it is perhaps understandable that Southern African states tended to define their individual options in one of three, "high political" ways: accommodation, dissociation, or confrontation -- "niche development" of another sort. (cf Grundy, 1973) Anglin outlines these options as follows (1989):

(i) **Accommodation** implies acquiescence, however reluctant, in the reality of South African regional hegemony and the inevitability of seeking reconciliation with Pretoria on whatever terms are possible. It involves a drastic adaptation of domestic and foreign policies to conform to the constraints imposed by subordination. At the same time, it may optimistically be assumed that any collaborative arrangement reached would still permit some scope for autonomy and dependent development, and possibly an opportunity to work peacefully within the system to reform apartheid.

(ii) **Dissociation** sees South African regional hegemony as posing an immediate and major threat to national survival. Preoccupation with this prospect leads to a rejection of both accommodation and confrontation, as both are perceived as compounding the primary danger. Salvation can only be sought in minimizing the scope and intensity of interactions with South Africa and simultaneously eliciting moral and material support from the international community.

(iii) **Confrontation** accords primary importance to the liberation struggle in South Africa. Only with the complete dismantling of apartheid and the overthrow of the Pretoria regime are regional peace and prosperity seen as possible. Confrontation shares with dissociation a commitment to disengagement from dependence on South Africa but regards it, not as an end in itself, but simply a preparatory step to full participation in the struggle.

As Anglin stated, "[t]he list is limited and the choices

SADCC has given some shape to these collective regional aspirations and an appearance of radicalism.

The SADCC states have long realised that their vulnerabilities lay in their economic weakness vis a vis the global economy and their economic dependence for a wide variety of essentials upon the RSA. SADCC's goal, therefore, came to focus on decreasing economic dependence upon the Republic and, therefore, lessening or removing the key lever with which a small fraction of white South Africa preserves both internal and regional domination. SADCC's strategy for security and development has thus far been the skillful playing up of its vulnerability vis a vis South Africa. It has therefore emphasised the political in order to gain attention to the economic, and quite successfully so, at least in terms of gross aid disbursements.

However, in spite of SADCC's limited successes, the timing of its formation served only to heighten South African policy-makers' sense of insecurity. Unlike other regional organisations moving toward integration during this time period -- e.g. European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association in Europe (EFTA), North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) in North America, a Japanese-led co-prosperity sphere along the Pacific Rim -- the RSA and the SADCC states were moving farther apart; each seeing the other as the major threat to regional security. In a sense, policy-makers were pushed in this direction: on the one hand, both
international opprobrium via sanctions and creeping regional liberation via armed struggle (see Map 3.1) no doubt heightened the senses of isolation and insecurity among the Afrikaner policy-making elite; on the other hand, the sense of impending victory over race-based rule in the sub-continent was palpable within Southern Africa’s black majority-ruled states. Even Swazi policy-makers, in the early-to-mid-1980s, were moving toward a more critical stance on apartheid. (see Chapter Five)

Moreover, the "role" to be played by SADCC statesmen in finishing the struggle against racial oppression on the continent had overwhelming support internationally and within the OAU -- "liberation", therefore, was sometimes touted even at the expense of both personal and national security; Mozambique’s 1975-84 policy of confrontation being a case in point. At the same time, however, the language of "liberation" was also used as an excuse for the denial of human rights, democracy, and a voice for civil society at the domestic level; the periodic closures of universities throughout the region being a case in point.

(III.8) Toward Post-Cold War and Post-Apartheid

The end of the Cold War brought this superstructural confrontation to a crashing halt, exposed the substructural insecurities of primary commodity-producing and export-dependent economies in a NIDL, and removed what little was left of white South Africa’s sense of regional security.
Joint US and Soviet pressure has since been brought to bear on the Southern African sub-system, insisting on peaceful resolutions to long-standing conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa -- i.e. again toward detente -- but not always with success. And, Bank and Fund cross-conditionalities -- being implemented with considerable "success"\(^7\) -- in pushing economic liberalism and political multi-partyism are creating a welter of anxiety in state-houses throughout the region. (see Martin, 1991; Saul, 1991)

In the end, who was made more secure? A brief look at both SADCC and South African economic performance over the course of the 1980s will reveal that of the eleven states of the Southern African region, only BLS have demonstrated any significant economic growth on a continuing basis. (UNDP, 1991) Yet, even in these countries, growth has been facilitated by acceptance of the present liberal economic orthodoxy; a philosophy which, I suggest, may be leading simultaneously to macro-economic growth, increasing insecurity within BLS social formations (see Chapters Four to Seven) and regional disintegration, as will be seen below.

Today, therefore, and in spite of macro-economic indicators, the entire region is in dire straits; military "solutions" not only killed thousands and displaced millions

\(^7\) That is to say, "success" in terms of implementation and not in outcome. Although, most recently the World Bank has been holding Lesotho up as a successful "strong reformer". (see Chapter Four)
(Huffman, 1992), they also served to exacerbate the structural deformities of these countries' political economies entrenched since colonial times. In other words, the focus on regional military confrontation has virtually sapped the capacities of Southern Africa's states to deal with continuing crises brought on by the region's declining importance in the global economic system; in Mozambique and Angola, for example, military spending was absorbing as much as 40% of total state expenditure by the end of the 1980s" (SADCC, 1991: 13): a diversion of scarce resources that could clearly have been better used elsewhere. (see Table 3.1) This has, in turn, heightened the domestic sources of instability. And now, Bank/Fund "rescue missions" have entered to squeeze them further.

(IV) The "African Condition" and SADCC Economic Performance

The Southern African region has not been exempt from the general crisis facing the continent. (Shaw, 1988; 1993) Africa has for long been a marginal force in the global economy. For example, in 1983, with roughly 500 million people (i.e. 10% of world total), Africa's gross continental product was merely three per cent of total world output. By the end of 1989 that had declined to less than one per cent. In comparison, the US, with five per cent of the world's population, produced roughly 35% of world output; and the EC, with a similar population, accounted for approximately 20%. (Salim, 1991: 63)
Table 3.1: SADCC and South African Military Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Spending</th>
<th>% of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given this existing marginality, Kuhne suggests that Africa is being further marginalised from the global economy. For example, "Africa’s share of global foreign investment has fallen below 2% from 5.5% in 1960. Africa, unable to compete successfully on the world market, is undergoing a process of deindustrialisation." (Weekly Mail, 18-24 January 1991: 9)

This continuing marginalisation is due to a number of factors: uncompetitive production structures; debt; political instability; low investment and capital flight; and unstable export earnings, to name some of the more important variables.

The collapse of commodity prices following on the twin-oil shocks of 1973 and 1981 and general global recession led to Africa’s well-known debt crisis. (see Table 3.2; on declining commodity prices, see *Africa Recovery*, December 1991: 31) According to the World Bank (1989: 20):
In the face of declining commodity prices, many African countries resorted to heavy external borrowing to sustain levels of expenditure made possible by earlier booms. Sub-Saharan Africa’s total debt increased from about $6 billion in 1970 to $134 billion in 1988. By the end of that period the region’s debt was about equal to its gross national product (GNP) and three-and-a-half times its export earnings. Roughly 70 per cent of total debt, including short-term commercial trade credits and drawings from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is at market rates.

At present, over 40 of Africa’s countries have resorted to IMF/World Bank structural adjustment reform packages in order to pay off their fast accumulating debts. Ironically, standard Bank/Fund reform package conditionalities -- e.g. deregulation, desubsidisation, devaluation, privatisation -- designed to alleviate the debt crisis via export-led growth have been undertaken amid rising protectionism in the North, declining commodity prices, and, since 1983, net capital outflows from the Third World to the core countries.

(Parfitt, 1990: 133; UNCTAD, 1989: 38)

In light of this most frustrating scenario, Adedeji stated:

Has our over-preoccupation in the 1980s with achieving external and internal financing and monetary balances at the expense of long-term development and transformation objectives not exacerbated our economic plight and circumstances? Have orthodox SAPs not been more of a diversion, when in actual fact what we should be worrying about is how to truly transform our economies structurally and become self-reliant?... Should we forego the pursuit of the goal of self-reliance, self-sustained development and national and collective self-reliance in preference to servicing our external debt and achieving balance of payments or budget equilibria -- goals that the most developed industrialised economies have never been
able to achieve on a sustained basis? Must we march
backwards with our dependency syndrome fully
intact? (in Asante, 1991: 171)

Africa’s economic crisis is well known and need not be
discussed further here. (World Bank, 1989; Adedeji & Shaw,
eds., 1985; Africa Recovery, various) The point to be made,

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Sub-Saharan Africa’s Debt Profile (US$ million)}
\begin{tabular}{l|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
\hline
Total debt stock & 56,285 & 116,083 & 143,531 & 173,737 & 175,836\
Long-term debt & 43,555 & 95,447 & 121,694 & 146,240 & 149,151\
Short-term debt & 9,697 & 13,607 & 14,266 & 20,895 & 20,329\
Debt to IMF & 3,033 & 7,030 & 7,571 & 6,603 & 6,356\
Interest arrears & 215 & 2,523 & 4,440 & 10,500 & 9,319\
\hline
Debt structure & & & & &\
\hline
Multilateral (%) & 18.8 & 24.5 & 24.7 & 25.0 & 25.8\
Bilateral (%) & 29.6 & 35.6 & 36.3 & 39.4 & 40.2\
Private (%) & 34.4 & 28.2 & 29.0 & 23.5 & 21.5\
Short-term (%) & 17.2 & 11.7 & 9.9 & 12.0 & 11.6\
\hline
Debt ratio & & & & &\
\hline
Debt/exports (%) & 97.1 & 325.0 & 359.8 & 329.5 & 340.8\
Debt/GNP (%) & 28.1 & 72.4 & 99.8 & 111.1 & 106.1\
Debt service/exports (%) & 10.9 & 28.3 & 21.9 & 19.1 & 20.5\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] = projected \hspace{0.5cm} *= outstanding obligations to IMF
\item[2] Interest payments and repayment profile \hspace{0.5cm} \^ = actual debt service
\item[3] Source: Africa Recovery, from World Bank, World Debt Tables 1991-92
\end{itemize}

however, is that Southern Africa -- including South Africa,
and no less than the rest of the continent -- has suffered
from changing international divisions of labour. And South
Africa’s policy of destabilisation has exacerbated its
region’s decline:

The loss of lives and human potential defies
quantification. Apart from the human suffering and
misery, the death of hundreds of thousands of
people, the rise in infant and child mortality, the
stunted potential from famine and malnutrition, and the lack of progress in, and in some cases the virtual disintegration of, education and health service delivery systems have immeasurably set back the development of Southern Africa. (World Bank, 1989: 23)

If Africa is marginal to the global economy, then Southern Africa, as a subregional grouping, is even more marginal. As can be seen in Table 3.3, "Southern Africa is responsible for a major part of the African continent’s productive activity," with SADCC (7.3%) and South Africa (21.5%) combining for approximately 28.8% of continental GDP. (SADCC, 1991: 8–9) In global terms, however, the contribution of the region is relatively insignificant, with SADCC/South Africa combined output approximating that of Finland. (see Table 3.4) Given this relative economic marginality, both SADCC and South Africa have been able to play upon their ideological differences to attract a disproportionate amount of international attention and assistance, albeit largely to destructive ends.

SADCC, as mentioned above, sought above all else to reduce its economic dependency upon both South Africa and the world system; to diversify its states’ economies, particularly toward coordinated industrialisation and

---

8 "Relative" because, while South Africa’s contribution to global product may be small, its disproportionate, if declining, control over known world reserves of gold, diamonds, uranium and a variety of other "strategic" minerals, has given it a standing in the international division of power far larger than its relative economic size which approximates that of Belgium. (see Gustafsson et al., 1989)
Table 3.3: Gross Domestic Product, 1989: selected comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>US$ millions</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>% of African GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADCC countries</td>
<td>27,210</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>80,370</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC &amp; RSA</td>
<td>107,580</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>266,130</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa excluding South Africa</td>
<td>293,340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>373,710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


complementary structures of production; and to forge a regional mentality and economy that would help move it toward self-reliance. In light of the continental crisis and regional destabilisation, it virtually goes without saying that few, if any, of these goals have been met.

Table 3.4: Southern Africa Combined GDP in Comparison with Other Countries’ and World GDP (1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>GDP (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of World GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>27,210</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>80,370</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC &amp; RSA</td>
<td>107,580</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>28,920</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>29,060</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>100,860</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>319,150</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>19,981,540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(IV.1) Decreased Dependence Upon South Africa

As can be seen in Table 3.5, intra-SADCC trade steadily declined in the 1981-86 period. And, while there is as yet no data available regarding the rest of the decade, comparative

And while SADCC state exports have increased over the same time period, these exports have not been with each other, but have remained, and indeed are increasingly extra-continental. (Stoneman & Thompson, 1991: 7) The reasons behind this increased dependence on external markets stem largely from the provisions of the structural adjustment policies that are rife throughout the region. Stressing "comparative advantage", SAPs have encouraged agricultural and raw material exports from each of the SADCC states. And,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SDR millions</th>
<th>% of total trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


as can be seen in Table 3.6, SADCC state exports remain overwhelmingly "unfinished".

So, intra-SADCC trade remains at approximately 4% of SADCC state totals, and has been declining throughout the decade. Moreover, if one excludes Zimbabwe from these totals, intra-SADCC trade drops to approximately one per cent.

(Stoneman & Hutchence, 1991: 3)
Table 3.6: Southern African Exports, latest available year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports (US$ mn)</th>
<th>Leading Exports (% share)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>oil (86), coffee (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>diamonds (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>wool, mohair (n.a.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>tobacco (50), tea (19), sugar (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>fish (44), nuts, fruits &amp; vegetables (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>sugar (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>coffee (26), cotton (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>copper (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>gold (19), tobacco (18), ferroalloys (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23,816</td>
<td>gold (40), manufactures (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(IV.2) Industrialisation and Manufacturing

However, SADCC was never intended to be trade-driven à la the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). To the contrary, in 1988 SADCC Executive Secretary Simba Makoni stated, "[T]he greatest single barrier to trade is lack of production. Hence our motto: Let production push trade rather than trade pull production." (Stoneman & Thompson, 1991: 8) Yet, as Stoneman and Hutchence clearly demonstrate, SADCC has failed to diversify into manufacturing. Of the US $3 billion in donor funds secured by 1990, fully $2.46 billion has gone into transportation rehabilitation and communications. Granted, these are indispensable infrastructural developments, without which SADCC stands no chance whatsoever of developing formal economies along regional lines. With regard to manufacturing and industry, however, by February 1989 SADCC’s industrial programme had managed to secure a mere $317 million of its
proposed $1.5 billion programme; $187 million of which was destined for a single project; the Mufindi pulp and paper mill in Tanzania. (Stoneman & Hutchence, 1991: 2)

In the face of such disappointment, by the end of its first decade SADCC was forced to "rethink" its industrial policy along private sector lines, effectively fitting it to the prevailing global orthodoxy. Yet, even with this new focus on private sector involvement, of the 16 projects proposed in 1990 totalling $23 million, only $6.5 million in funding has been secured, and all projects are in the trade promotion and support service areas. Moreover, none of these projects, nor the proposed Export Pre-Financing Revolving Funds (EPRFs) have explicit regional components. The reasoning here is clear: "any EPRF which was limited to exporting inside the region would have much greater difficulty raising financing from outside the region."
(Stoneman & Hutchence, 1991: 4)

Throughout the region, small internal markets and unequal income distributions have further limited competitive production for wider regional and global markets: highly subsidised and inefficient industries have long been producing for constricted markets. (Stoneman, 1991: 2) And,

9 The limited size of African markets are a very real hindrance to South-South or intra-regional trade. "Small markets are ... a hindrance to African economic development ... The effective demand of an African country of 5 million people is, according to the Economic Commission for Africa, about equal to that of an American city of 100,000." (Sandbrook, 1985: 18)
even here, SADCC itself is skeptical of aiming at regional economies of scale designed to satisfy the regional market:

[A]n integrated SADCC, even including South Africa, would constitute a small unit by global standards. Integration within Southern Africa cannot, therefore, be seen as a basis for inward looking policies; but rather in terms of enhancing capacity to become more competitive in an outward looking growth and development strategy. (1991: 28)

(IV.3) Forging A Regional Identity

In a recent position paper, SADCC itself recognises that "Southern African countries, including South Africa, already constitute a coherent and appreciably interconnected grouping, with a history of inter-relations and strong cultural and ethnic linkages." (1991: 35) And Southern Africa is one of the five regions of Africa recognised by the OAU. The significance of this point is that, in preparation for a continental African Economic Community, the Abuja Treaty suggests working toward regional integration as a necessary first step. (SADCC, 1991: 19) The SADCC position paper accepts the OAU position, but goes on to more forcefully declare: "[C]hanging domestic, regional and global circumstances have made closer economic cooperation and integration an imperative for SADCC member countries". (1991: 1) SADCC's most recent "transformation" into a "development community" seeking ways to strengthen ties with other existing regional groupings -- e.g. PTA, SACU -- in preparation for the entry, into SADC, of a post-apartheid South Africa is indicative of the speed and seriousness with
which this task is being undertaken.

The paper also highlights a number of areas for cooperation, with macro-economic policy coordination perhaps the most important. However, SADCC also recognises the numerous barriers to cooperation at both formal and non-formal levels. Chief among the non-formal barriers to cooperation are the legacies of colonialism and apartheid, which have led, according to SADCC (1991), Stoneman and Thompson (1991), and Stoneman (1991) among others, to embedded inequalities in the structures of production, in the terms of trade, and in income distributions at the regional and global levels. SADCC also includes "poor governance" as a "major non-economic barrier to development in Southern Africa". (1991: 34; 11) Stoneman and Thompson (1991: 4) also point to policy failures, not merely at the SADCC state level, but on the part of "international agencies and other aid donors, which have been involved in the region for almost three decades and thus must share the blame."

Given the above-mentioned and other numerous constraints, it is little surprise that the region has fared so poorly over the course of the 1980s:

Regionally, the overall growth rate in the 1980s has been negative in per capita terms, with only Botswana and (marginally) Swaziland and Zimbabwe showing positive figures... All countries in the region ... are heavily dependent on primary commodity exports. The failure of most of their industrialisation plans, caused by uncertain demand and protectionism in Northern markets, the debt crisis, destabilisation ... and by poor or over-ambitious planning, has led to a renewed emphasis
on primary commodity production, urged on by the World Bank and the IMF. Yet the terms of trade for African commodities have been falling... Most countries in Southern Africa are heavily in debt [see Table 3.7], with the regional total around $50 billion, of which South Africa accounts for nearly half. This is a small figure on the world scale, but it is large in relation to population or economic capacity to repay or service. (Stoneman & Thompson, 1991: 2,3)

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**Table 3.7: SADCC Social and Economic Indicators**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4,920</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>6,870</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>80.37</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>20,600</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nevertheless, Weisfelder (1991: 6-7) states that SADCC has not been without success, citing six elements:

(i) promoted the emergence of a SADCC mentality;

(ii) encouraged diversification of substantive bilateral linkages among members;

(iii) solicited considerable additional aid from external donors;

(iv) improved regional communications and transportation networks;

(v) created especially deep linkages with Nordic states; and
(vi) established itself as an essential participant in international deliberations regarding the political and economic future of Southern Africa.

These successes are not to be denied. Yet, as SADCC itself has pointed out, the regional "mentality" remains merely convenient to state-centric development policies:

Member states’ political commitment to mobilising regional resources for development is not in question. Indeed, the region’s record in sustaining its common institutions is unparalleled, at least, on the African continent. The challenge, however, is in respect of the capacity and institutions for mobilising resources for regional development projects... As long as national and regional programmes are seen to be separate, the latter will come last in the allocation of scarce resources. (SADCC, 1991: 31,32; also, interview with Charles Hove, Economist, SADCC Secretariat, Gaborone, 16 November 1989)

Of central importance to the SADCC project is the emergence of structural adjustment, both de facto and de jure, as the primary consideration in all SADCC state development policies. In spite of SADCC’s stated objection to laissez-faire economics (1991: 1), by the early 1990s the market has come to be regarded as the panacea to Southern Africa’s persistent economic problems. According to Stoneman, in the South African case,

[a]lready the market is being seen as the ‘answer’ to the market intervention of apartheid, but with no appreciation that markets deliver different results determined by the income and wealth distributions that they find, and that insofar as they change these distributions it is usually in the direction of greater inequality. (1991: 4)

As will be seen in the cases of BLS in subsequent chapters, market driven economic policies serve both to heighten
existing domestic contradictions, and to pit ostensibly cooperative states against each other in the search for foreign investment. Again, according to Stoneman:

[M]ost black people will remain miserably poor for the foreseeable future under orthodox economic policies, unless a sustained growth rate of the order of 10 per cent per annum can be achieved - a very unlikely possibility ... Orthodox policies will thus prove disastrous for all but the elites. To make a real impact on South Africa's problems requires imaginative and radical solutions ... [However], the new international dispensation, which seems likely to deny developing countries any freedom to experiment (or even to follow tested protectionist industrialisation policies), could result in [South Africa's] integration into a world market as a marginal and essentially stagnant supplier of primary commodities. (1991: 1)

(IV.4) Summary

In summary then, what SADCC and the world have seen with regard to Southern African regional development since 1980 has been disheartening. Energy needs, growing populations, and the myriad costs of persistent drought remain serious drains on already weak economies; intra-SADCC trade remains virtually non-existent, while individual SADCC state trade remains tied to the export of primary or only minimally-processed products; and material and capital investment in transportation and communication remains a battle to recover seriously deteriorated extant infrastructure -- despite a substantial infusion of foreign capital, and technical and material assistance.

Moreover, the imposition of structural adjustment policies, coupled with the coming end of apartheid means that
aid and new loans will still be forthcoming, but under increasingly stringent conditions; the social costs of which are likely to be very serious. Lesotho, for example, has virtually forfeited whatever little capacity for independent economic decision-making it had under the terms of its water-related structural adjustment programme. (see Chapter Four) As Stoneman notes,

[T]he conditionality associated with the aid will be strong, aimed at preventing a search for alternative solutions which if successful might set unwelcome precedents; most African countries now have so weak a bargaining position that a little aid will command a lot of conditionality. (ibid)

The implications, then, for Southern Africa’s future development are not promising. Indeed, what is suggested here is that prospects for a peaceful and prosperous Southern Africa are as bleak if not bleaker than they were under conditions of South African regional destabilisation; Bank/Fund hegemony condemning Southern Africa’s states to isolation in the region and marginalisation in the global economy; and their civil societies to slow rather than fast "deaths". (cf Fowler, 1991a; Lewis, 1992)

(V) South African Security: w(h)ither the hegemon?

If such is the SADCC case, what then of the RSA? Has the apartheid state therefore triumphed over its collective foes? Has it found "security" at the expense of SADCC-state "insecurity"? In this section, I briefly review changes over the past decade or so in South African economic performance
in the GDL. What will be made very clear here is something that is not always recognised: **South Africa itself is as (if not more) insecure and crisis-ridden than its neighbours.**

To some observers, a post-apartheid South Africa would serve as the regional engine of growth as, free from the debilitating domestic and international constraints brought on by enforced racialism, the Republic would wend its way toward NIC status. The World Bank, for one, sees this not as an option but an imperative:

According to the Bank’s national economic policy document ("South Africa: post-apartheid economic options") Malaysia is apparently the country to emulate, with Argentina and Zimbabwe cited as rather unbefitting prototypes. The low gold price and agricultural morass have put South Africa in a bind from which only manufactured exports can release it. (Bond, 1991: 18)

No doubt a post-apartheid South African economy would be somewhat stronger given the inevitable lifting of economic sanctions. But to think that an end to apartheid will lead to NIC or near-NIC status and provide immediate region-wide economic growth is to seriously under-estimate the structural crises facing the South African economy with or without the added burden of international sanctions and apartheid-oriented administrative costs. To highlight this embedded structural crisis I will look at South Africa’s economy in terms of recent macro-economic trends, minerals, manufactures, and money. The evidence emerging from this brief discussion suggests that the region is in for a shock come the dénouement of apartheid.
(V.1) Recent Trends in South Africa's Economic Performance

James Cobbe (1992: 9) provides a succinct overview of recent trends in South Africa's economic performance:

South Africa's economy has been performing poorly in overall growth terms throughout the eighties, with only brief spurts of growth around 1981, 1983 and 1988. The long-term trend in South Africa's growth record is distinctly downward: the average growth rate of output fell from 6% per annum in the 1960s to 3% per annum in the 1970s to only 1% per annum (implying declining output per person) in the 1980s to actual declines in the 1990s so far. (Standard Bank, 1992: 1) Real GDP has been falling since 1989, at about 0.5% per annum in 1990 and 1991. In 1992, output will probably fall by another half to one per cent, and the South African business community seems to believe that general economic weakness may well persist through 1993. (First National Bank, 1992: 1)

(V.2) Exploding the Myth of Post-Apartheid Economic Growth

Unfortunately, at a time when much the rest of the world was restructuring in the attempt to cope with rapid changes in the GDL, South African policy-makers were pursuing misguided policies dependent on twin myths. First, that South Africa's economy is a strong one, in fact the richest on the continent, and is hampered only by "total onslaught"; i.e. from regional terrorism and international sanctions. And second, post-apartheid South Africa will achieve NIC status in short order.

Preoccupation with destabilisation further masked these problems. As we will see, it was not, in the main, militarisation nor was it sanctions that created South Africa's economic problems; rather, it was an over-reliance
on raw materials as the central wealth creator in the economy.

(V.3) Minerals

According to Auret van Heerden of the ILO in Geneva,

The South African economy has been characterised by a 'boom-bust' cycle, expanding or receding according to external factors such as fluctuations in the international market price of its principal mineral and metal exports - gold, oil, coal, platinum, and the ferroalloys... The roller-coaster trend in the South African economy in the 1970s was largely defined by the two oil price shocks and two gold booms, leading up to a peak of industry output and employment in 1982. (van Heerden, 1991: 5)

Since then, however, the economy has been in a downward spiral, precipitated by the domestic uprisings that began end-1984 and culminated in what Shaw called the "turning point of 1985" when the Republic defaulted on US $12 billion in private bank loans and the Rand slipped to less than 40 cents US. (Shaw, 1991a: 3)

To use a rather tired but appropriate metaphor, "[m]ining is the bedrock on which the South African economy rests." (van Heerden, 1991: 18) In spite of the fact that manufacturing now accounts for a greater share of GDP (24.2% in 1989 versus 12.3% mining and 5.8% agriculture: van Heerden, 1991: 11), mining exports bring in approximately 70% of South Africa's total export earnings. Again, according to van Heerden, "Gold alone used to make up 40% of total merchandise export earnings, but its exports have slowly shrunk and it now accounts for about 33% of all export

This, however, is merely the tip of the iceberg; South African gold is in big trouble. To Ovenden and Cole, "South African gold is of increasing insignificance in the world economy." (1990: 6) This is due to a number of factors: (i) increasing costs due to deeper mines, higher wages, work stoppages, and lower yields (from 106 tonnes in 1970 to 681t in 1985 and 606t in 1989); (ii) grades are only 40% of their levels of 20 years ago; (iii) many other mines have been opened around the world, dropping South Africa's share of the non-communist world's gold production from a high of 79.1% in 1971 to 44.15% today; (iv) the price of gold has steadily declined since 1980 when it touched US $800/ounce to, most recently, US $375/oz;¹⁰ and therefore (v) gold has lost its unique role of hedge investment in times of crisis or inflation. For example, in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which led to a period of higher oil prices, few major investors turned to gold as an "inflation-proof investment medium":

¹⁰ Van Heerden noted that one 1990 Chamber of Mines estimate suggested that if gold slipped below US $350/ounce for a sustained length of time it would mean the immediate retrenchment of 80,000 miners. (in interview with the author, ILO Headquarters, Geneva, 11 August 1991) This scenario has, in fact, come to pass. While gold prices had risen to approximately US $375/oz by July 1993, they languored at US $330/oz for most of 1992-93. In response, South African producers have steadily retrenched foreign -- particularly Basotho -- labour during this period. (Matlosa, 1992; also, interview with Mohau, Seattle, 23 November 1992)
There were many other financial instruments to which they could turn, and which had the added benefit of paying interest, something which gold does not do. Bonds certainly offered a safer, interest bearing haven than gold, and even the money market was more attractive. Investors who had invested in D-Mark were 20% up on the last twelve months, and Sterling had risen 17%, whereas gold was up only 12.3%.

It is obviously too early to write an epitaph for gold, but its lacklustre performance in recent years suggests that the nature of the world financial system has changed. A wider range of very stable, interest bearing financial instruments now exists, and institutional investors are consequently holding less and less of their funds in purely speculative commodities like gold. (van Heerden, 1991; cf interview with Grey, 25.8.1991)

As stated above, these trends, should they continue into the longer term, suggest massive retrenchment of mineworkers, expatriate and South African, as many mines reach the end of their economic shelf-life.

(V.4) Manufacturing

And whereas exports of coal, ferroalloys -- ferrochrome, manganese, vanadium -- and platinum, but less so diamonds, "have improved strongly in recent years" the fact remains, these are all raw materials whose prices are subject to wide fluctuations. Moreover, demand for some of these "strategic minerals" may slowly recede as a result of the post-Cold War "peace dividend". Given gold's central importance as a forex earner, and the unpredictability of other mineral export contributions, then manufacturing exports must increase if South Africa is going to be able to service its debt (the interest payments of which total approximately R4bn/year or
10% of export earnings: Shaw, 1991a: 7) and maintain a surplus on the current account of its balance of payments. But South Africa's manufacturing production is heavily import dependent, and the country cannot afford these imports if it is to be able to meet its debt commitments. (van Heerden, 1991: 9)

South African manufacturing, according to van Heerden, is a "sorry story":

Measured by the index of manufacturing output, the performance of the manufacturing sector in the 1980s has been unimpressive, to say the least. The volume of production in manufacturing fell 12% from its 1981 peak to an index level of 94.9 in 1985 (1980 = 100), and only recovered to 104.8 by 1989. The volume of production in industrial chemicals was only 91.3; iron and steel basic industries had struggled back up to 101.1; fabricated metal products was 90.1; machinery was down to 77.6 and motor vehicles, parts and accessories to 84. The only sub-sectors to show meaningful growth between 1985 and 1989 were food, which stood at an index level of 120, and other chemical products, at 117.2. (1991: 11-12)

As stated above, South African manufacturing production is import dependent, which seems something of a paradox given nearly 70 years' commitment to policies of import-substitution. So, whereas import intensity (imports/GDP) was 25% in the 1920-24 period, in the 1984-88 period it was 28%. (Bank of Lisbon, cited in the Weekly Mail, 30 Nov - 6 Dec, 1990) While import substitution was successful in establishing South African "food, clothing, wood and wood products, and metals and metal products producers [which] now satisfy over 90% of demand," these are less capital and
technology intensive industries. "In the machinery and the motor vehicles and transport equipment sectors on the other hand, imports supply 52% and 30% respectively," areas involving the import of intermediate production goods. (van Heerden, 1991: 13) According to Stephen Gelb, during the 1950s and 1960s, it was mineral wealth which made it possible to pay for the necessary machinery imports. (Weekly Mail, 30 Mar - 4 Apr, 1990) While this growth model was successful for some 20 years (what Gelb calls "racial fordism"), by the first oil shock, the long-term trend in South Africa's GNP had already been downward.

The model's "success" in achieving growth brought its own problems, however. The emphasis on capital-intensive production methods meant, first, that employment rose, but slower than the overall labour force, so that unemployment also rose. Also, machinery and intermediate production inputs came to dominate imports, so that the ability to expand production was increasingly tied to balance of payments considerations.

By the start of the 1970s, there were already clear indications that these were becoming serious obstacles. But more immediate problems now arose. Changes in international financial arrangements meant that the prices of gold and other mineral export revenues, began to fluctuate wildly. For different reasons, import prices also began to rise. At the same time, and partially related to these international developments, there was a significant upward movement in black wage levels...

The model's strengths now became weaknesses - on the one hand, foreign trade and capital flows, and on the other, the interaction between wages, productivity growth and consumption patterns. Both destabilised overall growth, and began to push up production costs.

The result has been stagnation, declining investment and productivity growth. One index of
this is the transformation of the South African economy from one where "super-exploitation" yielded "super-profits" to one increasingly being abandoned as a locus of operations by multinational corporations, foreign and South African, because of poor profitability prospects. (Gelb, ibid)

This situation was helped along by the onset of international sanctions and massive capital outflows following on domestic political unrest and events in the mid-1970s and again in the mid-1980s. Hermele and Oden estimate that circumventing international sanctions cost the apartheid Republic US $3 billion annually until the late-1980s and the emergence of de Klerk: i.e. $1 billion each to circumvent oil blockade, arms embargo, and trade boycotts. (1988: 25)

Solutions to these economic problems were sought in three directions: first, via the creation of a Southern African co-prosperity sphere, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS); second, via production for export, i.e. the NIC option; and third, "inward industrialisation", or what some South African economists have labelled the "basic needs approach" (not to be confused with Basic Human Needs or BHN) to economic recovery. As stated above, the CONSAS option became a dead letter with the creation of SADCC. Nevertheless, for van Heerden potential did/does exist with each of the other two options. One serious constraint to the NIC option, however, lies in a "continuing raw materials mentality in the South African mining industry that has restricted creative thinking about alternatives to traditional mineral and metal exports." (van Heerden, 1991:
16) Van Heerden points out that few "downstream linkages between raw materials and finished products" have been forged (e.g. catalytic convertors manufactured from South African platinum in South Africa by South African companies) even after "forty years of diversified manufacturing activity, with ample finance and obvious markets... This is even harder to understand when one considers the highly concentrated ownership structure of South African industry that should facilitate synergies between mining and manufacturing." (ibid)

"Inward industrialisation," states van Heerden, "is a variation of an older development strategy known as the 'basic needs' approach." (ibid) This inward industrialisation places heavy emphasis on the provision of low-cost housing. These houses, for which there is massive need, would be constructed with labour-intensive methods and so would stimulate manufacturing output without increasing imports and so upsetting the balance of payments on the current account. It would be a kind of "trickle-up" approach. According to Simon Brand, Chief Executive of the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA),

The inward industrialisation strategy is designed to redistribute income, alleviate pressure points such as the housing shortage and unemployment, encourage home ownership, and promote constructive trading relations with the Frontline States. (ibid)

In many ways, the basic needs approach was a desperate reaction to the dual crises of international debt (and
therefore lack of investment capital and new money) and domestic unrest (i.e. appeasement through shelter) that peaked in the mid-1980s. According to McCarthy,

In the mid-1980s, a combination of developments in South Africa such as pessimism on export-oriented growth in the face of sanctions, insufficient opportunity for viable import-substitution, increasing capital-intensity of production, disinvestment, the restrictions on the availability of foreign capital and especially increasing black urbanisation... culminated in... "inward industrialisation". (1988: 20)

But inward industrialisation, like import substitution, is strewn with many pitfalls, especially at a time when the major trends in the global economy are toward aggressive export-orientation. For at least one observer, South Africa's salvation may lie in a combination of these two strategies, with South Africa's export market being the African continent itself. To Rob Davies, "[t]he markets of Africa will be of considerable importance to a future democratic, non-racial South Africa's efforts to become a significant exporter of manufactured goods." (in the Weekly Mail, 30 Nov - 6 Dec, 1990) Davies suggests further,

In a number of areas, South African technology is more appropriate for African countries than that from elsewhere. Neighbouring countries are also in a position to supply South Africa with a range of inputs essential for industrial development - from hydroelectric power and water resources to, in the medium to longer term, mineral products. (ibid)

This, however, suggests a hardening of present neocolonial relationships; something likely to be less easily resisted in the absence of apartheid and in the presence of debt and
Bank/Fund ultimatums. Nevertheless, South Africa’s presence in an enlarged SADCC/SACU/PTA is sure to be met with mixed feelings.

At present, Africa absorbs 10% of total South African exports (Europe 52%; Far East 25%; US 10%; South America and Australia 3% -- van Heerden, 1991: 24), but 32% of its manufactured exports. Given the high value-added on end products, Africa, in the absence of sanctions, clearly holds great potential as a market for South African goods.

For Hermele and Oden, sanctions imposed by the West have been instrumental in bringing about the near-end of apartheid:

[They] contribute significantly to reducing the options of the apartheid regime and push it into a situation where it simply cannot do what is needed: create employment, pay its debts, maintain apartheid rule, destabilise the region, and keep up the living standards of the white population. In essence, sanctions block the prospects of a viable capitalist cum apartheid road, and restricts the regime’s possibility to foster a black middle-class. (1988: 26)

(V.5) Money

While this may be true, it seems to me the de facto financial sanctions imposed by the international financial and corporate communities in response to the wrong-headed, race-based economic policies outlined in the Gelb quote above were far more instrumental in bringing about the present move toward constitutional reform than were the politically-motivated, economic and cultural sanctions imposed, often haphazardly, by Western states both unilaterally and via
international fora. Over 200 US-based MNCs, out of a total of 1000, divested or pulled out of South Africa altogether in the post-1985 period. More important, however, was capital flight. As testimony to the volatility and high-risk nature of the apartheid Republic, in spite of the Rand’s free fall, South Africa remained a net exporter of capital throughout the latter half of the 1980s. By the end of 1988, South Africa’s outstanding debt was US $20.6bn (or approximately 25% of GNP), down from $23bn in 1985, but in spite of having repaid $6bn between 1985-88. Inflation remains high (with the consumer price index at 15.3% in 1989 and 13.5% in 1990), government deficits hover around $5bn per year, security still gobbles up 20.2% of the government’s budget (this in spite of a 10% cut in real terms in the defence budget; the balance going, instead, to internal security -- van Heerden, 1991: 21), and the 1980s was the first decade in which South Africa’s per capita GDP actually declined. According to van Heerden,

Per capita GDP has been falling since 1975, with the exception of the boom years of 1980-81, and 1984. This reflects the unfortunate combination of high population growth and a consistent, long term negative growth trend in the economy. While GDP growth averaged 5.8% in the 1960s, it managed only 3.4% in the 1970s, and was down to 1.1% in the first half of the 1980s. As a result, South Africa was no richer, in per capita terms, in 1985 than it had been in 1967. (1991: 4; cf McCarthy, 1988: 5-6)

No doubt some individuals and groups within the South African social formation prospered -- albeit to widely varying degrees -- in such a chaotic climate. (Bond, 1992) Yet
continuing domestic violence coupled with widespread and increasing poverty -- within the Homelands and townships and increasingly among elements of the retrenched urban poor -- suggest that South Africa is unlikely to be an "engine of growth" for the region, post-apartheid and post-Cold War notwithstanding. To sum up, then, Shaw states:

In short, the apartheid economy is in structural crisis which liberalisation may exacerbate rather than resolve in part because of an inefficient and outdated manufacturing sector as well as moribund gold industry. (1991: 8)

Moreover, the last EIU Country Report South Africa for 1988 suggested, "[T]he compulsion to repay foreign debt and to avoid a new default over 1990-91 imposes severe limits on South Africa’s economic profligacy. The government operates, in that sense, as if it were under the tutelage of the IMF." (in ibid, 7)

The ubiquity of the Bank/Fund throughout the region cannot be denied. Some have even attributed Bank/Fund involvement in the region as a major catalyst for cooperative behaviour. For example, according to an editorial in Business Day (Johannesburg), there can be detected a "new realism and pragmatism in the attitude of the FLS to talking to South Africa on economic cooperation and development. There may be some keys to this trend - including the harder line being taken by the World Bank and the IMF toward Third World lending." (26.9.1989)
(VI) Redefining Destabilisation and Insecurity: Returning to the Substructure

In light of my extensive review of the region's political economy, then, it can be seen that security defined through military strength and the cultivation of allies has provided security to few, if any, individuals or groups in South(ern) Africa. Only those individuals wielding economic power -- e.g. Anglo American's 14 member board of directors -- have been secure in the South African milieu. It must be remembered, however, that this security is itself only relative. Anglo has not been able to stand still. Like a palm tree in a hurricane it has had to bend with the times. Unfortunately for most South Africans, this has meant diversification out of (South) Africa, not out of basic metals, and in to other areas and endeavours in the world; a situation that may heighten the security of de Beers' or Consolidated Gold Mines' or Old Mutual's directorate, but may in fact lessen the security of most South Africans.

So, like the SADCC states, South Africa faces a complex array of threats: from the international, regional, and national systems. All interrelate and hinge on South Africa's timing and process of continued incorporation into the GDL, as well as the policies pursued since that time in the attempt to strengthen the state relative to the emerging world capitalist economy. Unfortunately for the majority of South Africans, these policies were short-sighted and pursued in concern for the safety and security of a limited, white
minority population.

What should be clear from this overview is that a preoccupation with superstructure -- i.e. with the maintenance of race-based privilege -- and inattention to the embedded substructural weaknesses of the South African economy -- with its clearly "Third World" economic profile, producing raw materials and importing manufactured goods -- has not alleviated the weaknesses across South African society: the idea of the state is articulated with a privileged white minority in mind; the institutional expression legitimised by the idea thus has been apartheid, but it is a legitimacy through force, and not one finding common acceptance throughout South African society. Ironically, the South African government's answer to this "societal threat" only partially involved cooptation of that black majority (i.e. expanding the legitimate acceptance of the idea of the state); rather, it centrally involved the remaking of the physical basis of the state via the creation of the homelands!

South Africa, therefore, fulfills none of Buzan's criteria for a strong state: beyond an elaborate bureaucratic machinery enforced at the point of a gun, the South African state is indeed weak. (cf Roger Martin, 1987) According to Johnson:

South Africa has many of the attributes of a strong, legitimised state, but they are very narrowly diffused. If the commitment to the idea and institutions of the state was more widely
diffused, or corresponded with the physical basis of the state, then South Africa would be a strong state in Buzan's terms. But there is a hopeless confusion between the idea of the state and its physical base ... [Further] the confusions of the total onslaught/total strategy concept of national security illustrate the bankruptcy of a policy using the idea of national security on any other basis than that of an undivided state with common citizenship, and a strongly held, widely diffused view of the identity and purpose of the state. (1991: 159-60)

In contrast with orthodox approaches to understanding Southern Africa's regional crisis, then, my radical analysis, based as it is on notions of Gramscian "hegemony" and "organic crisis" earlier defined, provides the fundamental basis for understanding dual destabilisation: of military confrontation and economic distortion. Both South African destabilisation and underdevelopment (a form of destabilisation in its own right), then, are distinct yet related outcomes of similar processes. Ironically, however, it has only been with the end of the Cold War that such substructural factors have come to be widely acknowledged. And Bank/Fund strategies enforce reconciliation with rather than resistance to these substructural forces of destabilisation in the region.

(VII) Conclusion

What does all this suggest for security and foreign policy in Southern African studies and practice? By focussing on the paramountcy of the regional economic crisis -- a long-standing crisis of underdevelopment -- and illustrating how that crisis itself helps determine or
condition the forms and factors of other threats to security -- be they military, societal, political, or environmental -- I hope I have mounted a fairly persuasive case for a rethinking or, at least, reordering, of the security problematique, as it manifests itself in the developing world. Southern Africa, to paraphrase Shaw (1986: 4-5), is not sui generis; rather it is most certainly a comparable case of the security and development problematique in the South.

Given the end of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of three massive trading blocs -- all of which may possibly exclude sub-Saharan Africa (forcing the latter into de facto self-reliance) -- it is incumbent upon political leaders and members of civil society to move beyond the limitations of state-centric concepts of security toward a reconception which rests on a new regionalism and novel forms of South-South cooperation and exchange, particularly at the regional and/or continental level. Standing in the way of such schemes, however, are the dual destabilisations highlighted above: (i) South African military aggression and its post-apartheid residuals in the region; and (ii) Southern African economic marginalisation, best symbolised by the continuing problems of debt and structural adjustment. Both serve to divide the region and keep the North involved. In the post-Cold War world, however, this Northern involvement, I suggest, will not be as flexible or philanthropic as it was
in the earlier period: hence the consolidation of global hegemony in the region.\textsuperscript{11}

In my next three chapters I will look at how these broad regional and global dynamics have impacted upon the "periphery of the periphery": i.e. on BLS foreign policy and political economy. As stated in Chapter One, BLS have performed better than the rest of Southern Africa in macro-economic terms. They have done so by using their individual foreign policies to limit, and/or turn to their respect state's advantage, the effects of South African regional destabilisation. However, BLS policy-makers, by tying their political economies closer to both South African and international capital within the context of growing economic liberalisation, have exchanged short-term gains for heightened long-term problems. The recent emergence and persistence of this contradiction, as we will see, is more readily understood in the context of regime survival and cross-category linkages in Southern African social formations. As Cox notes (1983: 171), the extension and consolidation of hegemony at the periphery is "more laden with contradictions". And, I would add, less easily resolved.

\textsuperscript{11} According to Cox, "Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries ... Such an expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution. (1983: 171)
CHAPTER FOUR

Lesotho: Water, SAP, and Regime Security

(1) Introduction

As a small, underdeveloped enclave of its "powerful neighbour" -- South Africa -- Lesotho's foreign policy, like that of its former High Commission Territory cohorts, has of necessity been relatively pragmatic. Given Lesotho's historical development as a labour reserve of the South African economy, post-independence policy-makers have long recognized Lesotho's structural subordination in the regional political economy.\(^1\) Since the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1869, the imperatives of capitalist development in the region have infused all Lesotho-South Africa relations with issues of South African race-based hegemony, Basotho desires for self-determination, and the role to be played by the Monarchy, the Chiefs, and the political class therein.

In this chapter I seek to demonstrate that regime maintenance functions as Lesotho's main foreign policy.

\(^1\) Lesotho's dependence upon the RSA marks the extreme end of a trend generally discernible throughout the region. For example, Lesotho is highly dependent upon South Africa for the bulk of its trade. Moreover, 100% of this trade passes through the Republic; 100% of its oil and electricity needs are provided by the Republic; and an average of 95% of imports and 60% of exports came from and went to the Republic over the course of the 1980s (see Appendices in Hanlon, 1986; and Lewis, 1986).
objective. This is a goal similar to that pursued in both Botswana and Swaziland but differing in one fundamental respect. Like each of the latter states, Lesotho's foreign policy was centrally concerned with regional relations, and specifically South Africa. As with Botswana and Swaziland, regime maintenance was best facilitated by combining a strong verbal stand against South Africa while maintaining economic "business as usual". However, following his civil coup in 1970, Chief Jonathan was forced to adopt a decidedly more strident anti-apartheid position than his former High Commission neighbours in the effort to regain domestic legitimacy. Thus, deviation from the status quo created a cleavage between regime and civil society security needs not present in either of the other two cases: vigorous anti-apartheid policies bolstering the regime with international diplomatic and capital support but threatening the populace with heightening destabilisation (e.g. border disruptions; military incursions; possible miner repatriations).

So, while the Jonathan regime benefited in the short-run from South African destabilisation, Basotho civil society welcomed the military coup which removed him from power in 1986 and returned Lesotho-South Africa bilateral relations to "normalcy". Yet, Lesotho's increasingly friendly relations with South Africa, best symbolised by the largely South African-financed Highlands Water Project (HWP) treaty, points toward heightened insecurity for the Basotho social formation
as the Southern African sub-region moves toward post-
apartheid. As will be seen, unlike South African-directed
destabilisation, the conditions attached to the HWP --
specifically a Basotho-negotiated, South African-
underwritten, and IMF/World Bank-overseen structural
adjustment programme -- threatens to undermine the very
foundations of Basotho society.

Clearly, it was in the interests of all Basotho to see
an end to South African destabilisation. However, the budding
bilateral friendship undertaken in the context of structural
adjustment is likely to benefit only those elements of
society closest to the centre of power. For the majority of
Basotho, then, post-apartheid's "peace dividend" has ushered
in a new form of destabilisation which more closely
distinguishes between the needs of Lesotho's ruling elite and
the vast majority of its rural population. Ironically, the
Lesotho regime's increasingly laissez-faire approach brings
it more closely into line with the overtly capitalist
approaches to development pursued in both Botswana and
Swaziland. All three states face increasingly similar
threats, but not all are equally prepared to deal with them.
Lesotho's history of political discontinuity and sub-
structural deformity places it in a weaker position than
either Botswana or Swaziland.

I now turn to a brief explication of these handicaps of
political economy as prelude to discussion of Lesotho's
foreign policy during the destabilisation period. Here it should be noted that the same forces which led to Chief Jonathan's coup in 1970 and his displacement in 1986, underlie the heightening insecurity dilemma today, and differentiate it from Botswana and Swaziland: politicisation without political continuity; economic cooperation without economic diversification.

(II) The Handicap of Regime Discontinuity

To be sure, policy-makers in BLS have sought, through history and above all else, to maintain themselves at the apex of power within the social formation. But the pragmatism and continuity in Swazi and Batswana policy-making, which has facilitated regime maintenance and mass acceptance and/or acquiescence there, is lacking in the Lesotho case.

The Lesotho case differs from the other two in this important regard for two reasons. First, the continuity in traditional forms of leadership -- i.e. Kingship -- was broken at independence. In Botswana, Seretse Khama, titular head of the country's largest and dominant ethnic group, the Ngwato, assumed real power at independence as Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) leader and head of government. Botswana has, since 1965, operated as a one-party-dominant democracy, and witnessed a smooth transition of power from Khama to Quett Masire upon the former's death in 1980.

In Swaziland, King Sobhuza II combined parliamentary power with traditional leadership by leading his Imbokodvo
National Movement (INM) to power in freely contested, pre-independence elections. When Sobhuza overthrown parliament in 1973, he cited conflict with Swazi traditions as his motive. And while the transition of power from Sobhuza II to Mswati III was nowhere near as smooth as that in Botswana, Swazi politics remains, for the most part, government by Monarchical decree.

Lesotho, however, seems to have been a victim of bad timing. As independence neared, the Basotho King had not yet ascended to power, being both too young and at study in England. Lesotho politics was being overseen by the Queen Regent and a consortium of senior Chiefs known as the "sons of Moshoeshoe". When democratic elections were held, there were no strong personalities in place to assure pre-eminence of the Monarchy in Basotho politics. So, upon his return from England, Moshoeshoe II held no real power, having been assigned the titular role of Head of State.

Leabua Jonathan, head of the victorious Basotho National Party (BNP) and a minor Chief in the house of Molapo, came to power not merely as a political neophyte, but facing widespread domestic opposition from the very sources -- e.g. the Monarchy -- which may have helped him fashion a policy more in keeping with the pragmatic and successful legacy of Moshoeshoe the Great. Thus, when Jonathan undertook a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with South Africa, he became an easy target for the radical opposition; certainly an easier
target than would have been the King.

(III) Economic Cooperation without Diversification

Second, Lesotho differs from both Botswana and Swaziland in that its economy is virtually totally dependent on migrant labour; what might be termed a wasting asset, particularly in the context of the NIDL. While both Botswana and Swaziland have important complements of migrant labour in South Africa, each country has a modestly diversified economic base. The significance of this diversification has less to do with autonomous decision-making, and more to do with creating an indigenous class of capitalists interested in maintaining the regional status quo. The over-dependence on migrant labour has limited the ability of Basotho to acquire capital for investment within the social formation; while the absence of mineral reserves and arable land ensures that those with capital become little more than a trading or rentier class with parasitic tendencies -- i.e. dependent on the state for attachment to foreign aid projects, jobs, capital leakage, etc.

Basotho, therefore, remain highly vulnerable to changes in South Africa’s mining industry and, in something of the reverse of the Botswana and Swaziland cases, the rural and urban poor are, perhaps, more inclined toward the status quo than are those at the apex of governmental power. The Jonathan regime, in particular, derived much of its wealth and power from the linkages created by foreign aid, and the
cooptative capacity of such capital. (Ferguson, 1990)

Thus, Lesotho’s foreign policy has been less tied to either tradition or regional capital formation than either Botswana and Swaziland. Its radical deviation from the status quo in the 1970s and 1980s was, therefore, the result of the needs of regime maintenance, especially as the liberation struggle came to focus on South Africa. Nowhere were the social pressures for continuing cooperation at the political level as strong as they were in Botswana and Swaziland. I now turn to a discussion of these issues in the context of Lesotho’s foreign policy, particularly Lesotho-South Africa bilateral relations.

(IV) Lesotho-South Africa: Superstructural Realignments

Lesotho’s foreign policy has gone through two distinct phases and has since January 1986 entered a third which is still playing itself out. The first phase, from 1966-71, was characterised by verbal and economic cooperation between the two neighbours; hence, the policy of "good neighbourliness". The second phase, from 1971-86, was highly conflictful at both verbal and physical levels. This period reached its apex with Southern Africa’s first coup d’etat discussed in detail below. The third phase, 1986-, marked a return to the policy of "good neighbourliness" or "peaceful coexistence" with South Africa. This continuing political instability at both national and regional levels stands in contrast, as will be seen, to the relatively stable, indeed enhanced sub-
structural linkages since independence.

These trends in diplomacy have mirrored, for the most part, South Africa's ups and downs in the international system of states; South African policy-makers' attempts to maintain the status quo in the face of these external, as well as numerous domestic, challenges; and attempts by Lesotho's ruling BNP, particularly Chief Leabua Jonathan, to maintain power in the face of these conflicting and often overwhelming demands.

Judging from the following two statements, it would appear that Lesotho's present policy has returned to its cooperative early position. The first is taken from a joint communiqué issued 11 January 1967 by Leabua Jonathan, Lesotho's former and first Prime Minister, and former South African President John Vorster. The second is a statement to the nation made by Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya shortly following the military coup which deposed Chief Jonathan in January 1986. But, as I will suggest throughout this chapter, rather than a considerable realignment in foreign policy (cf Holsti, 1982), it marks instead the bringing into line of policy-makers' superstructural role conception with long-standing, society-wide, substructural behaviour.

(i) On fundamental issues we found ourselves in complete accord, more specifically on the fact that differences in political philosophy are no bar to fruitful cooperation. We both firmly believe in peaceful coexistence on the basis of equality, mutual respect,
and non-interference in another's domestic affairs.
   -- Leabua Jonathan (1967)

(ii) It is our commitment to normalize relations with South Africa and we shall do all that is humanly possible to achieve this objective. We espouse the noble principles of peaceful coexistence and good neighbourliness and we are prepared to demonstrate our sincerity whenever called upon to do so.
   -- Major-General Lekhanya (1986)

Some have called Lekhanya "a puppet of South Africa, and recall that it was a South African blockade of Lesotho ... which set the scene for his January coup." (Africa Report, Jan-Feb 1987: 61) Members inside the ruling Military Council have countered that "no price is too big for good neighbourly relations and that dialogue and negotiation are clearly demonstrating their superiority over disagreement and conflict." (Letsie, quoted in ibid) Lesotho's King Moshoeshoe II echoed this pragmatism:

   The first responsibility of the government is to safeguard Lesotho's territorial integrity and national sovereignty, to promote cooperation with friendly countries on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference. (ibid)

(IV.1) Phase I: "Good Neighbours"

The similarities with past policy are striking, as were domestic and international reactions to it. The first phase of Lesotho foreign policy, 1966-71, was characterised by a policy of peaceful coexistence, whereby Chief Jonathan exhorted the Basotho "to think of your stomachs". During this period Chief Jonathan visited with South Africa's Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Vorster, accepted both aid and
technical assistance from the Republic, and josted constantly with the OAU vis a vis the "acquiescence", if not outright collaboration, inherent in this policy. Moreover, Chief Jonathan and the ruling BNP were adamant in their stand on South African refugees; accepting them, but threatening to deport them to third countries should they engage in sabotage. Rather than pursue a policy of "political and diplomatic double-talk", Lesotho's policy during this period was "a strategy for survival." (Kotsokoane, 1969: 138) This placed Basotho foreign policy very much in line with early Batswana and Swazi positions.

Despite the varied, though limited, number of options in its foreign policy behaviour Lesotho continually opted for a pro-South Africa stance. Beyond the limited capacity of the newly independent Basotho state to act otherwise, the fact that South African (and British) campaign assistance helped Chief Jonathan defeat Ntsu Mokhehle and the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in the 1965 pre-independence elections certainly pushed Jonathan in this direction (see, Swatuk, 1986, especially chapter three). Cordiality reached a peak in 1970 when, after Chief Jonathan's coup, Vorster issued a statement saying that South Africa's attitude toward Lesotho was unchanged, "since it was not for her to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state." (ABRRBA 1970: 73)

Chief Jonathan's 1970 "civilian coup" was prompted by the defeat of his conservative BNP by the radical, pro-Pan
Africanist BCP, led by Mokhehele (see Macartney, 1973). The electoral defeat was deemed by many observers to have been an outright rejection of Chief Jonathan's policy of peaceful coexistence; an embarrassing political position that had reaped little, if any, economic benefits beyond the Maseru-Leribe peri-urban corridor (ibid; also, Libby, 1987: 135-143).

Somewhat ironically, then, South Africa's strongest show of support, which helped sustain the BNP's position in the short run, served also as a signal to the BNP that, if it were to survive in the long run, it would require the political support of the Basotho people, which meant some distancing from South Africa.

(IV.2) Phase II: the march toward destabilisation

The second period, from 1971-86, documented by Ajulu (1985), Hirschmann (1972, 1979), Sejanamane (1987), and Swatuk (1986), among others, was one of increased verbal hostility coupled with numerous "concrete" moves antagonistic to South Africa. Among these concrete moves were increased material support for refugees, diversification of sources of aid and trade, the scrapping of a planned exchange of diplomatic representatives with RSA, the dropping of "dialogue" as the preferred means by which to bring about an end to apartheid and, in the early 1980s, the active pursuit of closer diplomatic and economic ties with countries from the East Bloc.
Some regarded this active opposition to apartheid "diplomatically courageous", earning Chief Jonathan the attention, even admiration, of the international community: tiny Lesotho, geographic and economic hostage to the apartheid Republic, was nevertheless willing to take a confrontational stand. (Magubane, 1983) When he was deposed in 1986 many saw this as the culmination of a long battle and the ultimate victory of South Africa's policy of destabilisation (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986; O'Meara, 1986).

Others, however, were not inclined toward such an analysis. Given the widespread domestic support for the coup, one might legitimately ask, who was made more secure by such a confrontational foreign policy? It is clearly revisionist to argue that few, if any, Basotho were made more secure. Granted, this confrontational stance secured Chief Jonathan's position as Prime Minister in the short-term in spite of heightening domestic contradictions; but, it was a tenuous hold dependent on the fostering of a myth: that Chief Jonathan was acting in the best interests of "national security" and, under the conditions of destabilisation, was performing admirably. Yet, in pursuit of what proved to be his personal security, Chief Jonathan managed to alienate both the South African regime and Basotho civil society; i.e. the same two sources Batswana and Swazi leadership correctly identified as most important to long-term regime and national security. (see below) A brief look at his fall from grace is
warranted at this point.

(IV.3) South African Destabilisation and Lesotho's Search for External Supports

As discussed in Chapter Three, when the Southern African strategic landscape began to change most dramatically with the fall of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique in 1974/5 and South African policy-makers embarked upon "total strategy", BLS came to be perceived by South African policy-makers as a double threat to continued minority rule: (i) as "hostages" of apartheid, any verbal and/or concrete moves critical of RSA could be construed by the anti-apartheid movement as a sign of weakness and therefore vulnerability on South Africa's part; (ii) as states "behind the lines" in the liberation struggle, BLS could serve as bases for ANC operatives and/or conduits for aid and materiel support to the ANC within RSA.

"Destabilisation" as directed toward BLS therefore sought to limit diplomatic dissent and prevent active support for the ANC. South Africa's policy-makers sought to achieve such aims via the selective use of "carrots" and "sticks". In the case of "carrots", South Africa dangled general aid and investment, a renegotiated Customs Union Agreement, support for the HWP, and a clamping down on Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) activities launched from Homelands within the Republic and directed toward the BNP. "Sticks" included delays in Customs Union payments, the withholding of goods bound for
Lesotho and in transshipment through South Africa, the threatened repatriation of Basotho mineworkers, and military action both direct and via surrogate forces. According to Mugyenyi,

In its apparent selective use of "carrots and sticks", the South African regime divides the independent states in the region into three broad categories: (i) conservative states which are seen as real or potential collaborators; (ii) states considered most vulnerable; and (iii) states whose political systems, ideologies and development strategies are seen as constituting the most fundamental challenge to the apartheid system. (cf Davies & O'Meara, 1985: 26-34) Swaziland remains a striking example of the first category to which South Africa offers "carrots" in return for collaboration and cooperation, while Angola and Mozambique have been subjected to a relentless "stick" in the hopes that "total strategy" might transform them from category (iii) countries to category (ii) and perhaps eventually to category (i). (Mugyenyi, 1988: 15)

Both Lesotho and Botswana tend to be classified as category (ii) states; i.e. "most vulnerable". (Ajulu, 1985) But, as I hope to make clear, they are not so far from category (i) as it may seem. From the point of view of a state-centric analysis, Botswana and Lesotho may appear as "vulnerable but combative" and Swaziland as a clear collaborator. Going beyond state-centric analysis toward a more critical understanding of BLS social formation, however, reveals that "collaboration" and "conservatism" have also been common characteristics of Basotho and Batswana policymakers in the Southern African milieu throughout history. These traits, as will be seen, are not limited to Swazi policy-makers; nor should they be viewed so negatively, the needs of the liberation struggle notwithstanding.
(IV.4) From "Anti-Communism" to the "National Interest"

The end of colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique provided Chief Jonathan with further opportunity to distance himself from past policies. During this period, Lesotho policy-makers undertook a somewhat tentative turn toward the East. Historically, Chief Jonathan had been a staunch anti-communist. And, given that pre-coup BNP support came from conservative Chiefs and the Catholic Church, this move was initially regarded with surprise.

Following Mozambican independence, Lesotho's Minister of Commerce and Labour, Joel Moitse, paid a visit to Maputo to discuss possible ways "of improving the conditions of migrant workers in the South African mining industry. This was significant because the two countries then provided the bulk of migrant workers for South Africa." (Sejanamane, 1987: 229) Formal diplomatic relations were subsequently established. This paved the way for Chief Jonathan's official 1978 visit to Mozambique. According to Sejanamane, "Lesotho's Maputo embassy opened other avenues of cooperation with the East with which Lesotho had had no links. In this broader sense, the move towards Mozambique was very important". (ibid)

Though both Botswana and Swaziland took similar positions during this time period (see Chapters Five and Six), South African policy-makers took a marked exception to Lesotho's actions. The Republic responded with a number of "destabilising" moves of its own. (see below) And while many
of the more conservative members of the BNP were
uncomfortable with this position, most regarded the
independence of Angola and Mozambique as a watershed in
regional relations. To them, realpolitik necessitated this
changed position.

[Then] Minister of Foreign Affairs, C.D. Molapo, in
a speech to students at the University of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland argued that FRELIMO’s victory
in Mozambique had changed the whole character of
regional relations and that Lesotho had to take
this into consideration in its foreign policy.
(Sejanamane, 1987: footnote 59, 244-45)

In spite of reservations expressed by his uncle, the Foreign
Minister, and by South African policy-makers, Chief Jonathan
stated that "the national interest" was to be "the only
catch-word" in Basotho foreign policy.

The efficacy of this new policy was clearly demonstrated
when, in February 1977, "Lesotho was invited ... to become
the sixth member of the Frontline States that opposed the
white minority regime in Southern Africa." (Magubane, 1983:
363)

(IV.5) The Utility of International Fora: The UN, OAU and NAM

Throughout the 1970s, Chief Jonathan used international
fora to harangue the RSA and improve his own image. For
example, when Chief Jonathan first raised the issue of the
"conquered territories" in 1974, it was largely for domestic
consumption. The issue of reacquiring territories lost to
South Africa at the turn of the 19th century is particularly
important to Lesotho. But when South Africa granted the
Transkei "independence" in 1976, this unilateral granting of sovereignty to what the world regarded as "sham homelands" became an international incident.

Chief Jonathan characterised the effects of Transkeian "independence" as causing acute economic and political hardship for the people of Lesotho. If Lesotho were to recognise its new borders with the Transkei, this would be tantamount to willing participation in and support for grand apartheid. Since Lesotho would never do such a thing, then the establishment of these borders was the same as a South African partial-blockade. In an effort to force Basotho recognition, South Africa stopped subsidising exports of wheat and maize to Lesotho. Chief Jonathan responded by renewing, in 1977, Lesotho's claims to the conquered territories.

Unlike Botswana and Swaziland, the loss of virtually all of its arable lands to the Boers rendered Lesotho unviable as a sovereign entity. It therefore became the perfect labour reserve. (see below; also, Weisfelder, 1992, for an extended discussion of "land hunger" in BLS) While the land issue has never been resolved, Chief Jonathan continued to use international fora to dramatise Lesotho's difficult geopolitical position. Beginning in 1977, Lesotho hosted a number of important international gatherings: the 1977 meeting of the Joint Committee of the ACP/EEC Consultative Assembly; a 1978 UN symposium on human rights, focussing
mainly on Southern Africa; and three of the first eight SADCC summit meetings. Clearly, the international community came to regard Lesotho as an appropriate place from which to demonstrate their abhorrence of apartheid.

Chief Jonathan also attended numerous international meetings beyond the region at which he harangued the RSA. For example, following the 1978 UN symposium on human rights, Jonathan travelled with Mozambique’s President Machel to the Non-Aligned Movement’s summit in Havana in September 1979. While there he added to South African ire by publicly condemning "the pestilential system of Apartheid". (Magubane, 1983: 364; Aga, 1988: 575) According to Magubane,

When Chief Jonathan returned from Havana, he received a stern warning from Prime Minister Botha, who publicly told him: 'You are playing with fire if you allow Cubans to enter your country. Don’t push things too far.' (1983: 364)

Yet, in September 1980, "Charles Molapo, then the Lesotho minister of foreign affairs, criticized the South African plan for a 'constellation' of mutually dependent states in Southern Africa at the UN general assembly". (Aga, 1988: 575) More significantly, during that same year, Chief Jonathan chose to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (see below)

(IV.6) South Africa Responds: Support for the LLA

Pretoria began to perceive the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) as a potential tool for bringing Chief Jonathan back into line. The LLA was formed by a disaffected Ntsu Mokhehle
who had fled to Botswana in 1974 following the failure of an attempted coup d'état. Mokhele chose to launch the aborted coup after splitting with the G.P. Ramoreboli faction of the BCP. Ramoreboli and his supporters chose to accept Chief Jonathan's offer of a minority block of seats in a government of "national reconciliation."

Mokhele, on the other hand, established bases in Botswana and Zambia -- though this was later denied by the governments of both countries -- and sent the BCP youth wing for training under the auspices of his old allies, the South African Pan-Africanist Congress. In 1979 he announced that the LLA, the military wing of the BCP, had launched an armed struggle for power (Weisfelder, 1981: 221-256).

Numerous terrorist attacks were undertaken during 1979-82 by the LLA from its forward base in the South African homeland of Qwa Qwa. According to Southall, this indicated that the South African authorities were turning a blind eye to Mokhele's activities, not because they were eager to see a mobilised BCP seize power, but because they had become increasingly irritated by Jonathan's anti-apartheid initiatives and hypothesised that the destabilisation of the conservative BNP government would lead to its becoming more appreciative of the protection that encirclement by the Republic and its de facto support could offer. (Southall, 1982: 3)

Numerous bombs were exploded in and around the capital throughout 1980-1982. A sustained mortar attack was directed at the Lesotho PMU (Police Mobile Unit) on the night of 8 October 1981. Another mortar attack was reported at Qaba on 12 October and a number of PMU were killed and injured in an
attack on a police station in Butha Buthe District on 31
October (Southall, 1982: 6-7). Two bomb attacks, one that
destroyed a car owned by the West German ambassador and the
other which inflicted heavy damage upon the United States
cultural centre, led one observer to speculate:

These various incidents were taken by some observers as
indicating a switch in tactics by the LLA, having
previously largely confined itself to attacks on
strategic targets (such as fuel depots, power lines,
police stations and the homes of government
politicians), it now appeared to be opting for civilian
targets in a more open terrorist campaign. From this
perspective, the attacks upon the US cultural centre and
the West German Ambassador's car were designed to step
up external diplomatic pressure upon the Jonathan
government from influential aid donors to agree to the
holding of elections under Commonwealth or OAU
supervision. (Southall, 1982: 6)

The immediate effect could not have been more different,
however. Despite the numerous explosions, few people were
injured and the damage to infrastructure was limited as well.
Therefore, one might legitimately conclude that the direct
threat in terms of loss of life to those closest to the
centre of power was minimal. This afforded Chief Jonathan the
opportunity to crack down on opponents within Lesotho in the
name of public safety and extend state control; thus
strengthening the evidence in support of the regime
maintenance hypothesis. The Police Mobile Unit, under
Lekhanya, served as the main tool of repression which
Southall described in 1982 as "[w]idely feared by local
people, and reputedly operating increasingly independently of
civilian control." (ibid, 5) The PMU was implicated in but
ultimately never formally charged with a number of gruesome murders including the editor of the opposition daily Leselinyana la Lesotho, Edgar Motuba; Odillon M. Seheri, former permanent secretary to the King with whom he was suspected of organizing a new political party; and Michael Ramorothele, a member of the BCP and associate of B.M. Masilo, chairman of the Lesotho Council of Churches who was abducted but escaped. (ibid, 4-6)

Chief Jonathan deflected attention from himself and the BNP by claiming that such actions were only possible because South Africa was harbouring the LLA and permitting it to operate from South African soil. That South African support was vital to the continued operation of the LLA is unquestionable; and similar South African actions elsewhere in the region tended to galvanize international donor support for Chief Jonathan's embattled regime. Jonathan therefore successfully externalised the issue by linking it to the continued presence of apartheid in South Africa.

Also during this time, threats to the security of those closest to the centre of power became more real: between May and August the Minister of Works, Jobo Rampeta, and the Secretary-General of the internal wing of the BCP, Keonyama Chakela, were assassinated; an attempt was also made on the life of Minister of Agriculture Peete Peete; and an attack was carried out on the Prime Minister's residence (ibid).

A different sort of threat to regime security also began
to manifest itself at this time. The donor community began to press its concerns over the undemocratic, even "anarchic" (Weisfelder, 1992), nature of government; aid, it seemed, might become conditional on a return to multi-party rule. In response, Jonathan sought to calm the donor community by reviving his intention to hold elections in the "near future".

(IV.7) The 9 December 1982 Invasion and International Support

Chief Jonathan was able to postpone his answer to these demands, however. For, on 9 December 1982 "between 50 and 100 South African commandoes raided Maseru, killing 42 people, of whom about 30 were ANC members but the rest Lesotho citizens." (Southall, 1982: 6) According to Ajulu,

> Although a military success, the raid was a political disaster for Pretoria. It provoked a storm of international condemnation, even from its closest allies such as the UK and the US. (1985: 128)

This direct South African incursion, which followed shortly upon the assassination of Chakela, effectively finished off the LLA as a legitimate alternative to Chief Jonathan. Chakela was the former Secretary-General of the external wing of the BCP. He split with Mokhehle in 1977, claiming at the time that the LLA was working closely with South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS). He returned from exile to Lesotho under the BNP's general amnesty of 1980 and confirmed all previous allegations in an interview with The Vanguard (Roma, Lesotho, June-Sept 1980).
In the aftermath of the December 9 raid, Chief Jonathan renewed his commitment to ANC refugees, stating that they would be given the same rights and privileges as all other refugees in Lesotho registered with the UNHCR (£8,500 in 1982) and as under the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. He also reiterated that they were not allowed to use Lesotho as a launch site for attacks upon the RSA. The UN Security Council responded by unanimously condemning South Africa's action as a "flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho". The Secretary-General then appointed a mission to Lesotho in order to ascertain from the government the type and amount of assistance it would require in order to strengthen Lesotho's capacity to receive and maintain South African refugees ... Ten projects costing approximately US $46 million were presented as falling under this criterion. (Sejanamane, 1987: 214-215; for full details see idem, 204-228).

To the international community, the Maseru raid capped a long series of events undertaken by South Africa specifically to destabilise Lesotho. In effort to "do something" about apartheid, US, Canadian, Nordic and European Community assistance, for example, increased dramatically. In 1983, pledges totalling the improbable amount of $224 million were made -- more than double 1982 net Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements. As can be seen in Table 4.1, ODA dropped for the first time ever in 1982 to US $89.7 million, mostly in response to the chaotic domestic events of the previous three years. Clearly, the South African attack
served to renew donor support for Lesotho in spite of the undemocratic nature of Jonathan's regime, and its ubiquitous mismanagement of donor funds. (see below, also Wellings, 1980; 1982; Woodward, 1982; Ferguson, 1990).

---

**Table 4.1: Official Development Assistance to Lesotho, US$ millions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Disbursement of ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-73 avg.</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-77 avg.</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-80 avg.</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>101.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>101.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>107.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Due largely to political rather than developmental considerations, aid began to sink to pre-1983 levels, settling back around $85 million in 1986. Nevertheless, this still placed a significant amount of capital in the

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2 There was an interesting debate within the donor community vis-à-vis support for BLS in the late-1989 period. Some took the position that money spent in Lesotho was money wasted, and that, despite the authoritarian nature of Swazi monarchical rule, CIDA funds would be better directed there. On the other hand, Sweden's IDA decided to pull out of Swaziland on the basis of politics and focus its efforts more directly in Lesotho. Clearly, political considerations were primary in this decision to allocate aid. Britain's position was somewhat different and presaged the post-Cold War trend toward the imposition of economic conditionalities on recipient countries based on IMF/IBRD criteria. Aid in the British case during this period tended to depend less on grants and more heavily on market demands and decisions. (interviews with Mathias, WUSC, Harare, 11 November 1989; and Reibel, USAID, Maseru, 22 December 1989)
hands of the BNP and its organisational network, extending to it both international legitimacy and the means by which to suppress domestic opposition.

(IV.8) Further Involvement With the East

In May 1983 Chief Jonathan visited China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the USSR and several Eastern European countries. Full diplomatic relations were subsequently established with Nicaragua, China, and the DPRK in addition to those already undertaken with the Soviet Union. In turn, diplomatic links with Taiwan and the Republic of Korea were severed. (ASS 1988, 577) These diplomatic moves contrast sharply with those made in Swaziland during this time period, but are quite similar to those in Botswana. (see Chapters Five and Six) The official reasoning behind these links was similar to that offered in response to worries over mid-1970s relations with Mozambique. According to Peete N. Peete, then acting Prime Minister:

[T]he government's new position ... [establishing] diplomatic relations with the two big powers was done in order to enhance national security. Peete went on to emphasise the big power status of these two states and their permanent membership of the Security Council. Further, he argued that neither China nor the Soviet Union had a stake in the continued existence of apartheid as they did not have any investments in South Africa. Therefore, he argued that it was most likely that they would stand by Lesotho in the on-going crisis in Southern Africa. (Radio Lesotho broadcast, May 1983, related in Sejanamane, 1987: 230)

Chief Jonathan provided further justification for this "Non-Aligned approach" at a celebration marking the fifth
anniversary of Lesotho-USSR diplomatic relations. According to a report in *Lesotho Weekly* (15 February 1985),

Jonathan emphasised the fact that four of the five permanent members of the Security Council then had resident missions in the country and as such would be able to 'obtain first-hand information on Lesotho as a completely encircled country'. He went on to express his hope that the permanent members of the Council would act as a window through which the UN system would see the Lesotho situation as it really was. (in Sejanamane, 1987: 230-231)

(IV.9) A Step Too Far: From "Sham" Elections to Coup d'État

South African policy-makers were not so easily convinced of these motives, however. In June 1984, Radio Lesotho reported that South Africa was withholding a shipment of arms Lesotho had procured from East Bloc countries. Chief Jonathan responded that these weapons were necessary for Lesotho's defence and were not intended to threaten South Africa in any way. (This mini-crisis coincided with my first visit to Lesotho, and is recounted from personal experience.) South Africa was adamant in its refusal to release these weapons.

Chief Jonathan, however, had other motivations for securing their release. As defined by the ruling elite, Lesotho's deteriorating security situation was marked not only by frequent border disruptions, LLA and SADF incursions, the threatened repatriation of migrant labour and other forms of South African destabilisation. It was also marked by increasing threats to regime security.

Donor pressures for a return to democracy were revived in mid-1984. Yet, the Jonathan regime, in spite of its
enhanced stature at the international level, was, in the eyes of ordinary Basotho, no more legitimate in 1984 than it was in 1970. This illegitimacy was confirmed when Jonathan held sham elections in 1985 which "returned" the BNP to power, having "won" all 60 seats in the legislature. To Sejanamane, the "election exercise left the country terribly divided ... Jonathan's 'victory' was for all intents and purposes a hollow one; indeed, it was counterproductive in terms of security." (1987: 256)

Jonathan was forced to depend for his political survival on the oppressive hand of the BNP Youth League. The Youth League, as stated earlier, was a heavily-armed personal guard which, according to one eye witness, "operated above the law, and in disregard for human life". (confidential interview, Central Bank of Lesotho, 9 September 1989) According to Sejanamane (1987: 256-257),

[The Youth League] was neither controlled nor trained by either the police or the military. Moreover, the Youth League came to operate above the law, increasingly taking over police jobs and thus increasing the level of mass alienation and resentment of the government's high-handedness ... [They]... began to challenge the established forces [i.e. the army and police] for supremacy, even going to the extent of excluding the latter from access to a newly completed government office building complex where, among other things, the Prime Minister's office was located ... By the end of the year it was clear that Jonathan had lost control ...

At the same time, South Africa's domestic situation began to worsen. The renewed state of emergency, involving the banning of numerous groups, and the widespread use of
force, led to an influx of South African refugees to Lesotho. On 20 December 1985, South African forces once again invaded Lesotho in pursuit of ANC operatives, killing nine people. In response, Lesotho's policy-makers chose to follow their established pattern of presenting their case to the Security Council. Yet, on this occasion, following a 30 December UN condemnation of the Republic, South Africa chose to impose a total blockade of Lesotho. It seemed, for Chief Jonathan, that "the jig was up". After a series of negotiations with Pretoria, Lesotho's military effected Southern Africa's first coup d'etat on 20 January 1986. (see O'Meara, 1986)

Following his overthrow, the international community decided to stick with the new ruling "coalition" whose power was vested jointly in the Military Council and the King. No demands were made at this stage for political reform and/or a return to democracy. However, economic conditionalities came to restrain both foreign and domestic policy in the post-coup period as Lesotho's policy-makers, through RSA intermediation, negotiated an IMF structural adjustment package in return for significant loans -- and increased aid -- to help finance the Highlands Water Project (HWP). (see below)

Significantly, few of the most powerful individuals and organisations had been affected by the deposition of Chief
Jonathan. The military, the King, the parastatals, the ministries, and the civil service — i.e. the central elements of the political class — were basically untouched, save for the brutal purging of those closest to Chief Jonathan (Landrapport, 20-21). Specifically, former Ministers Desmond Sixishe and Vincent Makhehle were abducted and later murdered on the night of 15 November 1986. Both were ardent supporters of Chief Jonathan, of the BNP Youth League, of the BNP’s turn to the East, and, except for Chief Jonathan, were the most outspoken vis a vis the apartheid Republic (Africa Report, Jan-Feb. 1987: 63). These killings followed the mysterious deaths while in detention of two of Lekhanya’s military opponents, Brigadier B.N. Rametsekhoale and Col. Sehlabo Sehlabo. According to one report, "[l]oyal to Jonathan, the men were detained shortly after the January coup. Both died within days of their arrest" (ibid, 64).

3 According to SIDA’s Landrapport of December 1990, "When King Moshoeshoe II assumed power by a non-violent coup d’état in January 1986, he kept all legislative and executive powers for himself as an absolute monarch. Thus, there was no real change in the power structure compared with the earlier regime under Leabua Jonathan. Popular support for the king was based on a hope of the democratisation he stated that he would like to introduce... The same centralised, undemocratic government persisted, contrary to popular hopes at the time of the coup in 1986... [T]he existing power base of the Lesotho government [i.e. military force] was retained... The ministers, principal secretaries, and military leaders remained in power, as before the coup. The only new appointments were of two relatives of the king, Lieu.-Col. Thaabe and Sekhobe Letsie, and Minister of Planning Michael Sefali, from the University of Lesotho. These were presumably chosen for their loyalty to the monarch. All public servants, including army employees, stayed on in office. The exception to the rule of no expulsions was the armed BNP Youth League." (Landrapport, 21)
Beyond these high profile purges, the coup changed little else; Lesotho's structural position as a labour reserve within South Africa was thus preserved (see below). This, as I seek to demonstrate in subsequent sections, was in the perceived best interest of a broad coalition of Basotho transcending class and category. However, as in Botswana and Swaziland, that the ruling elite benefited most from such a situation is naturally due to their close proximity to the means of production and coercion.

(V) "Security" from a Superstructural Perspective

In summary, at a strictly superstructural level, security during the 1971-86 was not enhanced for the majority of Basotho. Chief Jonathan's policy of confrontation with South Africa led to loss of life, property, and opportunity for many Basotho. International supports via development assistance served only to increase personal insecurity for most Basotho while enhancing security for those closest to the state apparatus; and, for some of whom, this "security" was fleeting, if not illusory.

International involvement served to (i) further entrench a bureaucratic elite; (ii) exacerbate politico-military confrontation between South Africa and Lesotho; (iii) help fund the transformation of the Police Mobile Unit into a para-military force; (iv) allow Chief Jonathan to create and arm the BNP Youth Wing which acted as a quasi-terrorist force throughout the country; (v) legitimate regional confrontation
in terms of inter-state, anti-racist coalitions at a time when the region might have been seeking ways to increase cooperation to deal with changes in the global division of labour; and (vi) help create a system of patrimonial control based on the extension of jobs and "development" to supporters of state control by an unelected BNP.

Foreign policy during this period, then, was clearly designed to maintain the regime in power and to support the interests of that element of the political class most closely tied to the use of state capital. Lesotho's changed position during this period reflected Weinstein's (1972) observations regarding the "uses" of foreign policy in small, developing states. According to Weinstein, in order to overcome their problems, policy-makers tend to follow one of three paths: independence, development, or overcoming internal opposition. (see Chapter Two) In Lesotho's case, all three could be served by a more hostile stance toward South Africa. In the case of independence, Lesotho's anti-South African rhetoric could help dispel the belief that it was little more than a "glorified Bantustan" and Chief Jonathan little more than KwaZulu's Gatsha Buthelezi; in terms of development, increasing Western concern over apartheid could be effectively exploited to draw aid and trade to Lesotho which would normally not be forthcoming; and in terms of overcoming internal opposition, a strong anti-apartheid stand would usurp a position previously championed solely by the BCP,
while increased aid would allow Basotho state-makers to extend their control into the rural areas of Lesotho, areas which had strongly supported the BCP in 1970 (see Ferguson, 1990; cf Dutkiewicz & Williams, 1987; and Dutkiewicz and Shenton, 1986).

Clearly, Chief Jonathan's BNP was reluctant to give up its situation acquire; overcoming internal opposition, therefore, could be seen as the dominant variable in explaining this changed foreign policy position. It also helps explain why Lesotho's foreign policy, for a brief period, moved so far out of line with the more pragmatic approaches in Botswana and Swaziland in spite of the equally, if not more, overwhelming substructural constraints. (Swatuk, 1986; cf Johnson, 1967: 6; Huntington, quoted in Clapham, 1977: 9; Salmore & Salmore, 1978)

However, once narrow, regime interests transcended the broader coalition's interests, the coup became a way of reasserting the status quo. Since South Africa's minority regime interests were also served, in the immediate term at least, by maintenance of the status quo, it thus became relatively easy to effect the coup and hide behind popular Basotho support for regime change.

Some might argue that, in the face of continuing South African regime commitment to apartheid, the region had to be torn down before it could be built up; constructive engagement having been near-universally condemned as a
preserver of racial domination. (Davies & O'Meara, 1985) But the simplistic contrast of nation-states on opposite sides of a liberation struggle centred on race glosses over the political economic realities of the region. Interests and inter-linkages are much more diverse and complicated than this simple, Realist picture suggests. Chief Jonathan and the BNP saw their control over the state and the commanding heights of the economy enhanced with the help of the international donor community over the period of destabilisation.

This stands in contrast to increasing insecurity for the majority of Basotho. This dichotomy manifested itself in increasing instability in state-civil society relations (see, "Lesotho" in A88, various 1983-89). This was in part facilitated by the international community’s political desire to support anti-apartheid Lesotho: "development" did not come; nor did "security"; only increased bureaucratic control and confrontation with key elements of civil society -- particularly the church and academics (see Edgar, 1989; also based on personal experiences, September-December 1989).

In the next section I examine the increasing post-colonial but particularly post-1986 substructural cooperation between Lesotho and South Africa which suggests not only Lesotho’s policy-makers’ commitment to regime security first, and Basotho security only second. But also that the status quo, however non-productive in the global division of labour,
is actively supported by many Basotho, across class and other socio-economic and socio-political categories. Moreover, these interests are historically developed, building on pre-independence social formation.

(VI) Substructural continuity: security for hegemony?

In Lesotho... politics, foreign policy, and labour export are virtually synonymous. (Paton, 1991:186)

It is commonplace in academic and policy-oriented writing on Lesotho to begin by citing the "extreme nature of Lesotho's economic dependence on South Africa," a dependence which "has been exhaustively described in the literature." (Cobbe, 1991: 19) Central to this dependence has been Lesotho's evolution "from granary to labour reserve" over the course of the last 120 or so years. (Lye & Murray, 1980; Murray, 1981)

Beginning with the diamond strike of 1869 at Kimberley, and subsequent colonial and settler needs for land and labour, Lesotho was systematically subjugated to the needs of the emergent capitalist, industrial economy in South Africa. This long and involved history -- from war with the Europeans and loss of arable land to South African/British collaboration toward creation of the labour reserve -- has been extensively chronicled in the literature but remains little concerned with foreign policy and international relations analysis. (e.g. Ashton, 1967; Bardill & Cobbe, 1985; Cobbe, 1982; Keegan, 1986; Kimble, 1978; Leys & Murray,
1980; Murray, 1981; Palmer & Parsons, 1977; Tangri, 1993; and Weisfelder, 1977)

A reinterpretation of this literature along foreign policy and International Relations lines will provide the context within which we can begin to see the emergence of various networks of "interdependence" within the region leading toward status quo-oriented regional foreign policy. Most particularly, the extension of elite control, first via the chiefs and later via state-makers, whose "power" within Lesotho stands in stark contrast to Lesotho's increasing "vulnerability" in the sub-continent and beyond, has been best served by such a foreign policy orientation, but is not without its supports in civil society. At this point I turn to an historical look at the creation of the labour reserve, and the early entrenchment of elite and mass interests in this direction.

(VI.1) From Granary to Labour Reserve

At independence, Lesotho's ruling BNP, a conservative, pro-chieftancy force, inherited the reins of a system already well-entrenched in the regional division of labour. British colonial efforts to develop Lesotho as a labour reserve were very successful and coopted the Chieftancy in the process. Thus, there began a period of consolidation of a political class in Lesotho whose close proximity to the means of production and coercion allowed for petit accumulation in the pre-independence period and more concentrated accumulation
via control of the state in the post-independence period. Though the creation of this political class was the direct result of capitalist penetration of the pre-capitalist Basotho economy, this elite class, or, what Ferguson terms "category", overlay without displacing other significant categories in Basotho society - age (old/young), gender (male/female), social status (chief/commoner), economic status (employed/unemployed), etc. Interests in the continuation of the status quo tended to cut across typical class lines, as mentioned above. It also paved the way for the emergence and persistence of neo-feudal and neo-patrimonial relationships based on proximity to the state. Policy-makers tended to be male chiefs who provided urban employment opportunities to their kin and maintained strong ties to the village with its attendant belief in the near immutable value of cattle and the Catholic church (cf. Edgar, 1986).

With the chiefs long profiting from Lesotho's position as a labour reserve in the regional political economy, it is not surprising that little was done to attempt changes at independence. This is not to suggest any nefarious doings on the part of pre- or post-independence Basotho leaders. Certainly, colonial administrators and Basotho chiefs had conspired to fix, in capitalist amber, Lesotho's role as a labour reserve. But individual Mosotho, as value maximisers, had long freely chosen -- albeit within strictly limited
parameters -- to journey to South Africa for labour and participation in the region's money economy. (cf Cobbe, 1992) Had the chiefs chosen not to participate, evidence, especially from Swaziland, suggests that the creation of the labour reserve would have proceeded apace -- without the chiefs, and most likely via their forceful displacement. (see Crush, 1987, especially chapters three and four)

Available evidence, however, suggests that Basotho chiefs were quite willing collaborators. Paton, for example, citing a memo from a British government representative at Johannesburg, states, "Chiefs opposed a system which excluded them from the collection of taxes and their resulting cut." (Paton, 1991: 191) And for those chiefs less-inclined toward collaboration, the temporary extrusion of Basotho (and Swazi) miners during the Great Depression, when "the Union asked both ... to halve the number of their labor migrants to the Union", provided them with a poignant example of the threat of permanent extrusion and what little they could do about it (ibid: 192-93). Compliance with British and Boer demands, then as now, was both voluntary and unavoidable. Both the Swazi and Batswana experiences reinforce such conclusions.

From these early roots, remittances from migrant labourers -- especially mineworkers -- have become ever more essential for the continued functioning of the Lesotho state. In fiscal 1965/66 remittances totalled R4,395,000 or just slightly over 11% of the total GNP. (Grundy, 1973: 61) In
1966/67 this figure rose to 16% of GNP (Trollip, 1981: 23); by 1977/78 it was 40% (Lye, 1982: 4); and over the course of the 1980s wage remittances "averaged about half of GNP and 70 per cent of foreign exchange earnings." (Landrapport, 1990: 6)

In addition to providing a substantial proportion of government revenue, the continued pattern of migrant labour provides a number of other tangible benefits to the governors of Lesotho: (i) access to foreign exchange; (ii) depoliticization of that element of society -- young, radicalised, working class, males -- which is potentially disruptive to the continued rule of the political class -- which is primarily older, conservative, bourgeois, and male. It therefore also provides (iii) male security across all classes - from increased wages to miners to increased imports meaning increased CUA revenues for the government; and (iv) the incorporation and entrenchment of the "developmental cycle" -- from young, employed migrant who tends to purchase cattle as stored-value to older, unemployed rural household head who tends to sell that stored-value in order to survive in the village -- as a "tradition" of village life. (Ferguson, 1990) These latter two are more indirect regime supports, since they become, over time, equated with conservative Basotho "cultural norms and traditions."

So, migrant labour removes from Lesotho those very individuals which have tended to be most critical of
government policy. Moreover, inattention to viable alternatives to migration ensures that migration remains an essential outlet for Basotho males, and thus, paradoxically, acts to coopt them.

Perhaps most importantly to the average Mosotho, however, is the centrality of migrant labour remittances to household income. Estimates of migrant labour remittance contribution to total household income, especially, but not only, in the rural areas, vary quite widely. According to one Swedish study, "11% of household income derives from cash cropping; subsistence farming accounts for 24%; migrant remittances make up 31%; and other wages and salaries 16%." (Landrapport, 1990:8) A widely cited but oft-criticized World Bank report conducted in the early 1970s reported that, in 1970, rural households derived approximately 42% of their income "from labour in South Africa", with labour in Lesotho contributing roughly 10%, and farm income (i.e. agriculture and livestock) contributing the rest. (World Bank, 1974: 42)

Ferguson’s detailed study (1990) of rural incomes as part of a general household survey of Mashai village in 1982-83 reinforces these findings. And, while migrant labour numbers and opportunities are presently decreasing (Weisfelder, 1992; see Table 4.2), like pre-independence Lesotho, individual Mosotho -- and increasingly males -- continue to see migrant labour as a rational economic choice, especially given the radical decline of agriculture since the
1920s as a viable employment option; granted, choices are limited, but the tendency to regard Lesotho as a dormitory among working age males, and as a place of retirement among older males is deeply ingrained in village life. The commitment to migrant labour, then, cuts across class lines but in an increasingly gender-specific way, as both the political class and working class (both of which are male dominated) have economic stakes, however divergent, in its continuance.

Table 4.2: BLS Migrant Labour in South Africa, 1987-91, selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>144,421</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>125,934</td>
<td>122,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>20,100</td>
<td>20,100</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>15,926</td>
<td>15,663</td>
<td>22,255</td>
<td>22,589</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reluctance to attempt changes in this system appears as a rational short-term decision by miners and policy-makers alike; and it was this fraction of Basotho society which formed the core coalition in support of the removal of Chief Jonathan once domestic violence and the rhetoric of sanctions and miner repatriation reached levels felt to be intolerable.

In the long-term, however, defence of the status quo is increasing insecurity in two ways. First, at the political class level, as policy-makers put off difficult decisions while mine resources dwindle, the prospect of large numbers
of retrenched miners, the continual lack of employment options, and the concomitant political instability it would cause looms large on the horizon (see Post-Apartheid Lesotho, 1990). Hence, the National Union of Mineworkers' (of which the Basotho contingent is the largest and most highly politicised) recognition that permanent settlement of and South African citizenship for Basotho migrants in a post-apartheid South Africa may be the most pragmatic option in potential future Lesotho-RSA relations. (Matlosa, 1992; Weisfelder, 1992)⁴

Second, at the level of the working class, miners continually invest in cattle as a source of stored-value beyond the reach of women which therefore, and historically, acts as something of a post-mine employment pension fund for men and their families. This "investment", which is seen as more stable than money because it is both bound by tradition and less easily disposed of, in turn continues to denude an

⁴ Matlosa points out that retrenchment has begun in earnest: While approximately 103,000 Basotho were employed on COM mines in 1990, "in 1991 this figure was reduced quite considerably" to 89,000. And he goes on to state, "According to my interview with the Managing Director of TEBA (Maseru Branch), there is a likelihood of further reduction of 10,000 Basotho miners by the end of 1992." (1992: 15) Cobbe states that these levels of retrenchment coupled with increasing population means that "in the late seventies there were about 10 people in Lesotho for each miner, and already there were many who had no access to migrants' earnings. In 1992, there are about 15 people in Lesotho for each miner, and clearly there are many more who have no access to migrants' earnings." (Cobbe, 1992: 8)
already severely over-stocked and over-grazed environment.\(^5\) Attempts to move Basotho toward perceiving cattle as a cash-crop have failed precisely because they fail to see the primary connection between male miner unemployment and cattle as stored value (Ferguson, 1990: especially chapter five).

(VI.2) From Labour Reserve to Granary?

Lesotho thus faces serious threats to the land from the continuation of present policy; a policy state-makers are little inclined to change. In spite of continuing land degradation, and its declining contribution to household income, agriculture continues to be touted as a panacea "if only it were better managed" (interview with Jeeter, USAID, Maseru, 12 December 1989; cf World Bank, 1974; also, see Table 4.3).

The sector has been in decline since the turn of the century, not because it is increasingly unproductive or

\(^5\) Where the Botswana case differs is in the number of large-scale farmers and ranchers capable of production for the export market. According to Morrison (1993: 43): Despite Botswana’s vast expanse of geography, elite interactions were nonetheless significantly colored by the fact that out of an already small total population (roughly one third of a million in the mid-1950s), sizeable cattle wealth rested in the hands of a few individuals, most of whom lived in the eastern part of the country ... Hence, while the cattle sector and national politics touched the lives of almost every citizen of Botswana at the time of independence, control at that time and later lay with a tiny number of individuals, black and white, whose respective prospects for increased production and continued power remained bright. (see Chapter Six)
mismanaged, but because of the pressures of increasing population, over-grazing, and continuing commitment to traditional practices having more to do with migrant labour than agriculture itself (see, Ferguson, 1990, parts III & IV):

As a proportion of GDP, in current prices, agriculture has plummeted from around 50% in the early 1970s to 21% in 1984 and an estimated 16% in 1988 ... In normal years the food deficit has averaged between 25% and 40%, but, as a result of recurrent drought throughout the 1980s, that deficit has often reached 60% (Financial Times, 4/10/1989; also, Table 4.3 below).

This compares with similar experiences in both Botswana and Swaziland, but not for entirely similar reasons. (see Tables 5.2 and 6.2 in Chapters Five and Six below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (US$ millions)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(VI.3) From Labour Reserve to NIC?

If agriculture has steadily declined, then manufacturing development has steadily increased since 1966, although its growth has slowed since 1986. (Cobbe, 1992: 5) From a virtual zero base at independence, where it contributed 0.7% to GDP, manufacturing is now a significant contributor to GDP in Lesotho. (see Table 4.3) Lesotho National Development
Corporation (LNDC) -supported projects now number 68 employing approximately 9,000 Basotho. This falls pitifully short of the number of jobs required to accommodate the 20,000 new job seekers that enter the market each year, most of whom are "absorbed" by the rural and informal sectors. Significant limits to manufacturing growth in each of BLS stem, in part, from the provisions of the SACU agreement. Given SACU’s continuing relevance to each of my case studies, it is imperative that something be said about that agreement in this chapter.

(VI.4) Manufacturing For Export

Being tied in to the Customs Union Agreement places direct limits on those very elements that are ostensibly "development’s" first priority: industry, transport, energy, employment, and secure food supplies. All are limited via the creation of an import-oriented society which views Lesotho as a dormitory community and not a centre of production, and in terms of the curbs placed on the establishment of local industry.\(^6\)

---

\(^6\) The CUA, while ostensibly providing for the protection of infant industries (Article 6), stipulates that no industry may be established that may jeopardise the viability of established industries (Article 17); industries that are naturally located in the more developed South African economy. That Lesotho was forced to back down on a number of industrial initiatives - e.g. automobile and television assembly plants in the early to mid 1980s - is testimony to the strength of South Africa’s position. The CUA creates a type of cognitively (as opposed to "natural" via the free operation of the market) induced cumulative causation. That is, South African government policy ensures that capital will follow capital, thereby
Lesotho's recent, relative success with its export promotion strategy, spear-headed by the LNDC, is due more to "the threat of sanctions in South Africa" than anything else, and, thus, has been tacitly condoned by South African policy-makers. According to one senior official at LNDC:

"Many of these companies had markets they wanted to keep [in South Africa]. Therefore, they were forced by circumstances to look to other options. BLS compete strongly for these with each other. Our advantage has been the low cost of labour. This was the case until April '89 when we had a 51% increase [in the minimum wage] and this now brings us close to Botswana and Swaziland. But our productivity is said to be good, our attending to maintenance problems of LNDC-owned buildings has been prompt, and Maputsoe [industrial site] is a convenient connection with Durban from Johannesburg. (interview with Moji, LNDC, Maseru, 12 December 1989)

As can be seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below, the percentage of foreign ownership and foreign markets in the manufacturing sector is high, with a great deal of investment coming from RSA particularly since the signing of the HWP and SAP agreements. (see also, Tangri, 1993)

As can be seen in Table 4.6, revenue from the CUA consistently provides a significant proportion of Lesotho government finance. (cf Tables 5.7 and 6.4, and Figure 5.1 for comparable data on Swaziland and Botswana) According to SIDA,
The revenue to the government of Lesotho has been some 17% of the value of all imports. Between 1983–84 and 1985–6 more than 60% of all government revenue derived from Customs Union receipts. During the following two financial years customs revenue fell, and since 1986–87 it has been about 59%. (Landrapport, 1990: 36)

---

Table 4.4: Degree of Foreign Ownership in Companies Operating in Lesotho, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho-owned</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho/Foreign-owned:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho/RSA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-owned:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA or RSA/Other</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>5,558</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,728</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Table 4.5: Markets of Companies Operating in Lesotho, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho only</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho/RSA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho/Other foreign</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA only</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA/Other foreign</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign, outside RSA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,728</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

Given the limits of an almost non-existent domestic market and South African protectionist tendencies, Lesotho policy-makers have been forced to look seriously at manufacturing for export as the main wealth creator in the economy. The general perception among aid donors in Lesotho is that the LNDC has fashioned a very good investment plan.
Table 4.6: Government Receipts, Maloti Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Receipts</td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td>301.3</td>
<td>310.7</td>
<td>385.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>245.8</td>
<td>274.2</td>
<td>299.4</td>
<td>357.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Receipts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>161.1</td>
<td>144.3</td>
<td>157.4</td>
<td>193.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Tax</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Tax</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tax revenue</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lesotho offers potential investors an investment package which typically provides finance, an equity position, physical plant, tax holidays of varying lengths, and a government sponsored skills training grant which covers up to 75% of the wage bill during the training phase. According to one high ranking official at USAID-Lesotho, between 1977-89, 51 manufacturing companies set up shop in Lesotho. Also, in 1989 an Overseas Private Investment Council (OPIC) mission brought 30 investors to the region; 7 came to Lesotho, with 2 ultimately investing. Significantly, Botswana received "the lion's share" of investment. (interview with Jeeter, USAID, Maseru, 12 December 1989)

Reflective of their relatively similar positions in the NIDL, Botswana and Swaziland have emerged as Lesotho's major competitors for foreign investment over the course of the 1980s -- not the RSA. (see Chapters Five and Six) All are vying for investment seeking access to South A
US markets; each offers a similar incentive package to potential investors. (see, for example, Whiteside, ed., 1989)

Investment, significantly, has come from the Asian NICs -- e.g. Korea and Taiwan -- in addition to South Africa. These Asian sources reflect not only historical linkages developed in support of Western foreign policy during the 1960s, but the new realities of a changing IDL, and a shared capitalist orientation.

According to Steve Kluk of Morija Textiles, "Lesotho is on the march ... The government has the correct attitude to supporting industry and private enterprise and they are prepared to cut red tape." (Financial Times, 4/10/1989) As part of the general mid-'80s exodus, Morija Textiles moved from Durban to Lesotho in mid-1987. One might question how long the march will last, however. Most of these companies have come to BLS as sanctions-breakers; they remain "footloose" (Allen, 1992), and, in spite of their short-term contributions to increasing GDP, their presence in Lesotho leaves many observers cold since they do not begin to address the structural problems of the labour reserve economy. (See, for example, Harris, 1993)

According to Jaime Reibel, USAID's Private Sector Development Officer, Lesotho's "huge employment problem is growing worse" as the number of school leavers increases each
year. Further, since many of these enterprises setting up in BLS are what Reibel labels "phantom businesses" -- i.e. "cut and sell operations which sew on one button before being shipped to foreign markets" -- they are not teaching transferable skills. (interview with Reibel, USAID, Maseru, 22 December 1989) With the end of apartheid, or with a change in the conditions of the labour force, many domestically employed Basotho are likely to find themselves much as they were prior to the mid-1980s' anti-apartheid disinvestment campaign: unskilled and unemployed (interview with Moji, LNDC, Maseru, 18 November 1989).

Reibel also points out that the direction in manufacturing in Lesotho, as in Botswana and Swaziland, is toward capital intensive enterprise -- a logical response to the competitive international market -- so the mid-term trend will likely be toward fewer employment opportunities. Reibel, for one, feels that emphasis should be on establishing backward and forward linkages around agriculture: "from input, to storage, to product, to marketing." (interview with Reibel, USAID, Maseru, 22 December 1989) However, given its pitifully small economic

7 The EC alone in 1988 was involved in support for 38 primary and secondary school projects in Lesotho. See, Lesotho and the European Community, (Maseru: EC, April 1988).

8 For example, a 51% government-imposed increase to the minimum wage in April 1989 rendered Lesotho less competitive relative to Swaziland and Botswana (the latter choosing, instead, to crack down on labour instead of give in to similar demands; see Chapters Five and Six).
base and natural resource endowment, Lesotho stands much less chance for success here than does either Botswana or Swaziland. (see Chapters Five and Six) Most observers agree that an over-emphasis on manufacturing for export is unlikely to provide Lesotho with a strong base for employment; nevertheless, all foreign aid organisations and local interests support this pattern.

(VI.5) The Healing Power of Water?

The Basotho government, as well as its underwriters, contend that one means of decreasing Lesotho's asymmetrical dependence upon the Republic, and concomitantly creating elements of interdependence, is the Highlands Water Project (HWP). South Africa's core Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Verenenging (PWV) industrial triangle is water-poor, whereas Lesotho is water rich. The HWP intends to divert the natural Southern flow of water toward the Northern Free State and Transvaal via a series of dams and tunnels. Upon completion, the project will guarantee a 70 cubic metre/second supply of water to South Africa. The HWP agreement promises to provide an initial extra but potential replacement source of revenue for the government should the mines close or Basotho leave (Southall, 1991). To Basotho policy-makers, then, the HWP must appear as something of a "windfall", for it ensures a steady source of revenue and hence a justification for the continuance of Lesotho as an independent state no matter what post-apartheid South Africa may look like. (These ideas are
based on two confidential discussions at the National University of Lesotho, 14 September 1989; and the Central Bank of Lesotho, 19 September 1989)

The direct benefit to Lesotho is the royalty of about $90 million annually from the South African government, increasing with time. Virtually doubling the revenue of the Lesotho government, this source would ease dependence on the CUA as the primary source of locally derived revenue, but also increase that revenue via increased demand for project-related imports. The treaty, signed on 24 October 1986, had controversial origins, coinciding as it did with the South African blockade and subsequent coup. According to one perspective:

South Africa has long shown its interest in exploiting Lesotho’s water resources. The next best alternative would cost more than twice as much for South Africa. The economic blockade and violent intervention of 1985/86 have been mentioned as methods used by the South African government and its security forces to prevail upon the Lesotho government to sign the agreement, since the urgency to start the construction of the project increased every year from the South African perspective. (Landrapport, 1990: 33)

While this is not the only interpretation, it is clearly the most sympathetic toward the Lesotho government.

Near-total governmental and donor support would seem to suggest otherwise, however. The most often mentioned potential spin-off industries from the HWP are aqua-culture (e.g. fish farming) and tourism emerging from the creation of the Katse Dam, agro-industry, brick- and pipe-making and other construction enterprises. Also of central importance is
the prospect that the HWP will enable Lesotho "to satisfy 50\% of [its] own needs of hydro-electricity" (interviews with Moji, LNDC; Jeeter, USAID; and Snyder, all 12 December 1989). At its peak the project is expected to provide 6,000 to 9,000 unskilled jobs for Basotho. Clearly, expectations are great. According to Michael Sefali, former Minister of Manpower, Planning and Economic Development,

[T]he dependency scenario is changing here. We are going to generate electricity. [T]his is now accepted as a SADCC project. We will reduce our dependence on South Africa[n] [electricity] by 70-80\% with this. Combined with other new projects this will reduce further. At present we directly import 95\% of our electricity from South Africa." (interview with Sefali, Ministry of Manpower, Economic Planning and Development (henceforth MEPD), Maseru, 18 November 1989)

At present, the mini-construction boom deriving from the HWP has fuelled GDP growth over the last five years. The LNDC conducted a study of potential spin-off industries and has gone ahead with a small number of them, specifically, the production of aggregate (i.e. crushed stone). To quote one official, "We have the rock here; the whole country is nothing but rock." (interview with Molefi, LNDC, Maseru, 17 November 1989)

(VI.6) Water, Structural Adjustment, and Bureaucratic Inertia

The LNDC has expressed some concern with the implementation of proposed projects, however. According to one senior official,

There are problems with SAP. The World Bank and IMF
have a strong advisory -- policy-wise -- role, and it becomes very difficult when you say you are going to put up industry to compete with South Africa. We want to protect our infant industries. South Africans go to great lengths to protect 'their' market, but we are constrained under the provision of SAP (interview with Moji, LNDC, 18 November 1989).

Others have expressed concern with the potential impact of SAP, especially on the rural and urban poor. (see below)

The World Bank and Lesotho negotiated a structural adjustment programme for the period 1988/89 to 1992/93. The programme was agreed to largely to assure those investing in the HWP that their funds would not be mismanaged. The main components of this programme were, for Lesotho:

(i) a series of measures to restrain the growth in public spending and to raise revenues;

(ii) initiatives to raise efficiency in the public services and para-stat[al] organizations;

(iii) reform of the land tenure system; and

(iv) measures to stimulate private investment and savings (Landrapport, 1990; CBL, Annual Report, 1988)

Like many African countries, Lesotho has been reluctant to abide by the guidelines set down in its SAP. The programme was initiated at the time of the implementation of the fourth Five Year Development Plan. According to Sefali, there is no inconsistency with IMF/Bank needs and the needs of the Lesotho economy, i.e. agriculture and industry. Past plans were concerned with social and physical infrastructure. It is now time to concentrate on the productive sector. In plan and programme this is centre stage: decrease the need to import food; increase industrial development (interview with Sefali, MPED, 18 November 1989).
But, Sefali continues, "implementing the programme is not a painless process," because at the heart of it is the need to control government expenditure in order to reduce a large and still growing budget deficit. (ibid) Freezing civil service pay and recruitment, and limiting spending to less than $100 million/year were all goals of the second year of the programme. None were met, according to officials at the Central Bank of Lesotho (confidential interviews, December 1989). In an economy riddled with patronage, nepotism, and corruption, and where the majority of the population active in the formal sector is employed by government, the cuts in spending are sure to be readily felt. For Sefali, "children, women, schools, the sick are all affected. We are trying to find measures to cushion this effect." (interview with Sefali, MPED, 18 November 1989) To other observers, Sefali's comments are meant purely for public consumption. In the event of government cutbacks, social, particularly rural, services will likely be the first to go. (confidential interview, National University of Lesotho, 21 November 1989)

According to an official of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA):

One new development that is much discussed in donor and university circles in Lesotho is the actual decrease in real wages and risk of higher unemployment resulting from the strict implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme. There is also a risk of further government centralisation, and reduced focus on social development. There will be cutbacks in district- and village-based state employees paid on a daily basis, in order to keep public spending low. Since these are in social sectors, such as health, agricultural extension
services and education, the deterioration in social conditions under way will worsen further. (*Landrapport*, 1990: 45)

The implication is that policy-makers, under structural adjustment, are beginning to devise strategies to protect their various parastatal organisations and linkages to state power. Expendable are those services, resources, and individuals at the periphery; e.g. those district- and village-based civil servants mentioned above. Ironically, and much in keeping with notions of etatisation, privatisation and cuts in government spending are likely to increase state control by streamlining an otherwise unwieldy network of power relations.

Williams points out that past developmental practice has resulted in the creation of a vast network of linkages tied to a centralised state:

Since their origins in the colonial period, the project of "development" itself [along with] the "development community" which has grown up to implement it, has instigated, legitimised and benefitted from the process of "Etatisation". Within the "development community", whatever disagreements there may be about particular policies and institutions, L'Etat is internationalised and multilateralised. (Williams, 1985: 11; cf Dutkiewicz & Shenton, 1986: 111)

Ferguson warns that this extension of state power does not necessarily mean increasing capacity on the part of policy-makers to have their own way. To the contrary,
resources of its population in the sense of the "bio-power" model. The state does not "rationalise and centralise" power relations, as Foucault ... would suggest. It grabs onto and loops around existing power relations, not to rationalise or coordinate them, so much as to cinch them all together into a knot.

The "developmental" state, then, is a knotting or a coagulation of power. If we can speak of the "development" apparatus as part of the process of "etatisation", that can only be a way of saying that it is involved in the distribution, multiplication, and intensification of these tangles and clots of power. (Ferguson, 1990: 274)

As the SIDA quotation above (Landrapport, 1990: 45) suggests, however, structural adjustment may facilitate an untangling and ultimately strengthening of remaining "knots" of power; something of a black hole effect where disparate energies collapse in upon themselves to form a massive -- i.e. relative to the rest of society -- concentration of power at the core. These "knots", therefore, will tend to form around those individuals and institutions most closely aligned to the centre of state power. In Lesotho, the Kingship, the major ministries, the LNDC, the Central Bank, the LHDA and the military (i.e. the political class)⁹ are likely to survive and prosper under structural adjustment. Evidence of the likely struggles for hegemony within and across the limited sectors of Lesotho’s political economy are

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⁹ It is interesting to note that, in spite of being deposed in a 1991 coup which brought General Ramaema to power, Lesotho’s former leader, Major General Lekhanye was courted as a potential political candidate by both the BNP and the BCP in the run-up to Lesotho’s March 1993 democratic elections. He subsequently ran and was defeated as a BNP candidate. (interview with Mohau, Seattle 23 November 1992)
already visible, especially vis-a-vis the HWP.

The HWP is perceived as one long-term means of easing the short-term pain of structural adjustment. Lesotho, according to Sefali, wishes to avoid "the Danish disease [where revenue from] the oil boom was used for recurrent expenditure." (interview with Sefali, MPED, 18 November 1989) The implication is that, when the boom ended, so did revenue. The government then had to borrow to maintain its expanded, oil-dependent, programmes. For Sefali, "the sales from water will be channeled toward a development fund, not to ordinary recurrent expenditure." (ibid)

But past experience within Lesotho, and especially from Swaziland (Mugyenyi, 1988), suggests problems in the offing. First, who will control the Fund, and therefore the direction of resource allocation? The post-Sobhuza struggles over the royal Swazi corporation, Tibiyo TakaNgwane (see Chapter Five), suggest a HWP-based development fund will be a major source of power; perhaps the primary source of power in a post-apartheid Basotho political economy. Struggle for control of this fund is sure to be highly conflictful. Already, the creation of a separate ministry, and a Lesotho Highlands Development Authority responsible for the project has led to problems of priority, jurisdiction, and, ultimately, hegemony. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, this bureaucratic infighting has raised questions among the major international donors as to whether Phase II of the
project will be undertaken.\textsuperscript{10}

Jess Snyder, Director of USAID-Lesotho, highlighted some of the other troubles brought to the surface by SAP.

In the general area of commercialization of agriculture and how to proceed we have become involved in a three way turf battle between the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and LNDC, especially regarding marketing and marketing intervention. The FAO, meanwhile, is looking at parastatals or 'government facilitation', transition between present agencies [e.g. movement away from a state-run abbatoir, and removal of royal marketing board prerogatives in milk and eggs], and a complete transfer to the private sector. (interview with Snyder, USAID, 22 December 1989)

Snyder pointed out that while commercialisation was not solely the Ministry of Agriculture's jurisdiction, historically it "had some input in traditional areas like farmer training". The Ministry of Trade and Industry, on the other hand, is keen to facilitate backward and forward linkages centred around commercial agriculture which, Snyder says, "is the way to go."

However, this, then, gets one involved in issues of land tenure and land allocation where "[t]he LNDC remains the only

\textsuperscript{10} Some of these ideas are based on discussions I had with Chris Whann, Richard Weisfelder, Ngosa Mohau, and James Cobbe at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, 22 November 1992. In a late-March discussion with Weisfelder, it was unclear to either of us what effect the recent change of government would have on these issues. The March elections resulted in the BCP's winning every seat in the legislature; ironically, then, Lesotho's return to democracy was marked by a house of assembly without an opposition party. Given the "old faces" in Lesotho's "new" democracy, however, Weisfelder was inclined toward a pessimistic forecast of continued cronyism under the BCP government headed by Ntsu Mokhehle.
organization that can deal with land allocation problems." (ibid) But the Ministry of Trade and Industry feels involving the LNDC directly in investment is "like mixing apples and oranges." The LNDC is involved in "packaging" -- finance, equity, negotiation, physical plant -- so as to attract potential investors not otherwise interested. However, the LNDC, according to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, is not good at dealing with potential investors not wanting a package deal. According to one official, "Many groups would rather go into business without going through the LNDC, but the problem of dealing with the land laws remains."

(confidential interview, Ministry of Trade & Industry, Maseru, 12 September 1989; confirmed in an interview with Snyder, USAID, Maseru, 22 December 1989)

The World Bank, moreover, has been talking of creating a separate body which deals "only with land and as a disinterested party"; i.e. land allocation leading toward reform a la the Botswana model. (interview with Snyder, ibid; cf Chapter Six) This, of course, and as Ferguson so expertly demonstrates (1990), is naive in the extreme.¹¹

¹¹ Snyder highlights some of the myriad problems facing structural adjustment: "[T]he decision-making capacity is not there because we are forced to work through both traditional and modern institutions; and the use of cattle and the land tenure system have destroyed agriculture only because Lesotho poorly manages resources (cf Ferguson, 1990; also, above). Leadership is successfully looking at these policies for the first time -- i.e. the Council of Ministers and the King -- and are attempting to reorient agriculture, education, and the protection of Basotho rights. Difficulties remain in defining 'productivity'. Difficulties also lie with the 'brain drain' to
Nevertheless, the prevailing regional climate toward donor-dictated structural adjustments is not likely to be avoided, especially in the post-Cold War period.

Aside from its monopoly in dealing with land allocation problems, one aid official complained, "the LNDC is too aggressive; there exists a need for an institution that can do it in an objective way." (confidential interview, USAID, 12 December 1989) But the LNDC has treated commercial enterprise as its own fief. Ministers have flown off to Europe ostensibly to "seek investment"; calls have come through to the foreign exchange division requesting that "x" amount of foreign currency be made available to "y" minister; no questions are asked (based on personal experience).\footnote{Jaime Reibel identifies similar constraints operative in Swaziland: "There is little synergy between sectors ... There may be more strength in the short term by introducing organisations to each other. Here we have a form of feudalism, therefore everywhere we find people defending their political bases. Some organisations [e.g. Co-op Lesotho] are not legitimate, but are used to foster their own, often personal interests." (interview with Reibel, USAID, Maseru, 21 December 1989)}
The results are not always positive:

There are many things they [LNDC] and [Director] Monyake find themselves locked into and later tend to worry about. [The problem is that] sometimes it is just the Minister of Finance and Tom Thabane and they're off with some scheme involving just one or two people. Sometimes these 'investments' turn out to be very expensive as Lesotho-borne investment (interview with Snyder, USAID, Maseru, 22 December 1989).

Hence, pressures from foreign donors for the disaggregation and privatisation of the LNDC following the Swazi example which mixed state with private (indigenous and foreign) capital -- a move strongly supported by the Bank and Fund. (see Chapter Five)

"Investment" in the era of structural adjustment seems to be serving two purposes. On the one hand, "investment" centring in and around the HWP is extensive, foreign -- particularly South African -- and tightly regulated. On the other hand, bureaucratic inertia continues unabated outside the HWP. Here, this means little foreign investment and a great deal of patronage, corruption, and failed projects. To be sure, continuing military rule contributes to this "inefficiency". High-ranking civil servants in the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs in Lesotho echo each other's complaints about personalistic decision processes: "Sometimes directives come down from the Military Council and we have to drop whatever we are doing to accomodate these demands". (confidential interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 October 1989)

In such a situation corruption reigns, creating a neo-
patrimonial society (Clapham, 1985) and the countless knots of power already identified by Ferguson.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, according to one official, USAID was "in for the long haul", the need to be seen to be constructively engaged against apartheid in the region, apparently outweighing the costs of economic assistance. (interview with Jeeter, USAID, Maseru, 12 December 1989)

CIDA representatives throughout Southern Africa, perhaps less restrained than their US counter-parts due to public perception of a "forward-thinking" Canadian policy in the region (Black, 1988; Swatuk, 1987), were more critical of their country's commitment to Lesotho, the latter's status as a "hostage of apartheid" notwithstanding. Yet criticism did not translate into action; CIDA, too, was in for the long haul. In the one case where an aid organisation withdrew support, as did SIDA in Swaziland, the reasons given had little to do with project failure and everything to do with the Swazi government's unwillingness to be overly critical of RSA. (SIDA document made available to me at Mbabane, 10 December 1989)

\textsuperscript{13} One might reasonably argue that corruption and mismanagement are key elements of the trend toward "etatisation" (Dutkiewicz and Shenton, 1986). That is to say, "mismanagement" of development projects during the Jonathan regime served as a relatively successful way for members of the ruling elite to manage capital accumulation and extend state control to the hinterland (see, for example, Wellings, 1980; 1983; Woodward, 1982; Ferguson, 1990): the domestic corollary of regime maintenance-oriented foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the decision to go forward with the Highlands Water Project buoyed donor spirits, for it was a tangible project with very tangible ends. And the post-Cold War period has led foreign donors toward a reassessment of their basic assumptions about aid to Lesotho. At present, key donors have already begun to address these long-standing problems via cross-conditional political pressure for "democracy", which parallels the SAP programme.

(VII) Summary of Substructural Linkages

In the case of Lesotho in Southern Africa, it is clear that dependence rather than interdependence has increased throughout the 1980s. Historical linkages with South Africa -- e.g. SACU, membership in the Rand Monetary Area, assorted and extensive services, migrant labour, informal transnational flows of families and goods -- have combined with new ones -- particularly HWP and SAP -- to both heighten South Africa's influence and limit Lesotho's capacity for autonomous decision-making. True, all considerations of foreign policy begin with the question "What of South Africa?"; but all policy decisions vis a vis the economic substructure suggest accommodation, even collaboration with the apartheid Republic. Structural adjustment furthers that collaboration and fosters increased South African economic penetration. The days when CIDA could successfully press for local content, as it did on Botswana's behalf in the case of the Shashe project (see Chapter Six), are long past;
"comparative advantage" and "market forces" now dictate the
direction and degree of input from preferably private
investors.

In this unenviable context, Basotho policy-makers have
acted to preserve their interests; in most cases this has
meant the attempted obstruction of donor demands, in defence
of familial rather than national interests. If national
security should also be served by such a strategy it is
perhaps coincidence rather than conscience that has brought
it about.

These interests, as I have suggested above, are not
limited to the political class, however. They also extend
across a variety of categories including migrant labourers
and village and district council chiefs, all of whom are
served by Lesotho’s position as a labour reserve within
Southern Africa. Lesotho is not unique in this confluence of
interests in cordial relations with South Africa; as will be
seen in Chapters Five and Six, a similar situation obtains in
both Swaziland and Botswana.

(VIII) How Secure Is Lesotho?

In the early 1970s, a USAID study concluded:

The principal supplier of food, oil, energy and
manufactured goods is also the Republic of South Africa.
Should the Republic, for political or economic reasons,
be unable or unwilling to continue its economic role in
Lesotho, the consequences for this tiny nation could be
catastrophic. (1971: 1)

In the 20-odd years since the completion of this study,
the opposite has taken place, and, under the conditions of economic liberalism, has in fact been encouraged; And, in spite of current praise from the Bank and Fund as a successful "strong reformer", the consequences for Lesotho ultimately may be no less catastrophic. For Basotho policymakers, the proven course lies in ready recognition that amidst all the turbulence of regional and domestic political events, regime survival is dependent, first and foremost, on a firm anchoring of Lesotho to the South African-dominated regional economy. The Basotho political class, like the pre-independence Chieftancy before them, have fostered this parasitic dependence throughout the post-colonial period. Examination in this chapter of continuing commitments to the CUA and RMA, to the absence of policy to decrease dependence in the areas of migrant labour, transport, power, and import/export relations, and the recent conclusion of the HWP suggest that they have prospered throughout the 1980s in spite of South African destabilisation.

Indeed, as suggested above, destabilisation also provided an opportunity to extend state control within the country. By verbally striking out against RSA and its apartheid system, Chief Jonathan was able to regain the international legitimacy lost when he aborted the 1970 elections and decided to retain power indefinitely. This international legitimacy translated into capital and technical assistance which, as illustrated throughout this
chapter, enabled various fractions within the ruling BNP to extend control and hence enhance their individual security within Lesotho.

Clearly this was a dangerous game, for Chief Jonathan and the BNP never regained the domestic legitimacy forfeited by their 1970 actions. Indeed, Chief Jonathan’s subsequent heavy-handed form of control and cooptation served to further divide the populace and alienate the state from civil society throughout the period of BNP rule. When South Africa imposed a total economic blockade of Lesotho on 30 December 1985, what should have served as a rallying point for both the government and the people became, instead, the occasion for a complete political breakdown. According to one observer,

[I]f any lesson can be learned from the demise of the Jonathan regime, it is that the police-garrison state does not secure national integrity even in times of crisis. Rather, a cooperative domestic environment is a vital element of national security policy. A regime which lacks moral and political authority is unlikely to rally its populace in support of its programmes, especially when there may be short-term costs involved ... Toward its end, the Jonathan regime was so divided that it was unable to mount any coherent strategy for alerting its allies throughout the world for assistance in its crisis ... The different arms of the regime were much too preoccupied with their collective survival as units to bother about Jonathan or even the security of the state. (Sejanamane, 1987: 266)

To Sejanamane, parochial, class interests displaced the needs of the state. However, I would argue that the "needs of the state" were never central in the post-independence Basotho policy-making process. To briefly review, the break with traditional rule at independence pitted the King against
the regime at a time when Chief Jonathan also faced strong opposition regarding his policy of peaceful coexistence. Had Moshoeshoe II been invested with real power rather than a titular role, he may have been able to call upon tradition in the effort to legitimise a pragmatic foreign policy. Chief Jonathan, on the other hand, lacked both the legitimacy and political acumen to preserve this most delicate of policies.

Following his civilian coup, then, Jonathan faced only one option -- to take a more forceful position against the apartheid Republic. This he was able to do because (i) he needed to regain both domestic and international legitimacy; and (ii) having no extensive regional economic interests to defend -- in contrast to the already growing Swazi and Basotho capitalist classes -- he was relatively free to challenge South Africa. Indeed, the more forcefully he challenged the apartheid regime, the more capital he found at his and his party's disposal via international support.

Regime maintenance in Lesotho, then, had few of the economic ties which bound it both to South Africa and to its own civil society.

On the other hand, since so many different categories and classes within the Lesotho social formation benefited from favourable relations with South Africa -- from migrant labourers and migrant labour-dependent households in the rural countryside, to major elements of the political class -- it would seem to me that it was in the interests of most
social fractions that Chief Jonathan be deposed and the "integrity" of the state be preserved. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, however, "integrity" in this case means preservation of the labour reserve. And while those groups at the commanding heights of polity and economy benefit most from relatively cordial economic relations with RSA, it might be argued that those at the bottom of the political, social, and economic ladders had more to lose via the disruption of those relations. The Swazi and Batswana cases seem to reinforce this conclusion. (see Chapters Five and Six)

Does this mean that Lesotho is more secure as the region moves toward post-apartheid? I would argue that it is not. Empowered individuals in Lesotho, especially those that find themselves in one or more of the following categories -- male, chief, descended from royalty, employed in the formal sector, employed as a migrant labourer, dependent upon the income of those employed in the formal and migrant sectors -- have had a vested interest in the preservation of the labour reserve. Some prosper and many survive in this system, despite apartheid and despite destabilisation. Yet few have given any serious consideration to the question, "what happens when the mines close?" Few anticipated the earth-shaking global and regional changes at the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990. Fewer, still, recognise the fundamental challenge to the status quo now posed by changing divisions
of labour and power, and demonstrated by labour retrenchment, SAP conditionalities, and pressure for democratisation.

Retrenchment of Lesotho's miners has already begun in earnest. (Matlosa, 1992; see above) But perhaps a post-apartheid South Africa will accept the permanent settlement of existing Basotho miners and their families. This will alleviate some of the domestic pressure that would accrue from total retrenchment. Cobbe suggests that the costs of permanent settlement to post-apartheid South Africa would be minimal at best:

Even if half the population of Lesotho was to move to the Republic, which is probably more than would, it would only amount to about a three percent increase in the South African labour force, or little more than one year's natural increase of that labour force, so the economic impact of the move would be relatively trivial in a long run sense. (1992: 18)

Further, many are beginning to suggest that Lesotho integrate with post-apartheid South Africa (interview with Thabo Mbeki, Wolfville, N.S., 16 November 1986; Southall, 1991). But this, of course, will depend on the character of both the transition process and the regime there; few will wish to settle in or integrate with a potentially anarchic society.

Certainly those closest to the centre of power will remain wedded to the notion of a politically independent Lesotho; constant revenue from the Highlands Water Project will see to that. And, as suggested above, South African policy-makers may face more pressing domestic concerns. For
Lesotho, South Africa's need to provide employment for the black majority may lead to the extrusion of Basotho labour on the mines; and toward what Cobbe labels the "RSA protectionist" model. (1992: 12) This could then increase the insecurity of the social formation.

It is often said that the Southern African region is rich in resources and that it has the potential to be the engine of development for the continent if its member states could just cooperate. Recent SADCC documents suggest that cooperation is imperative. (SADCC, 1991; see Chapter Three) Indeed, the rapid move from a "coordination conference" toward a "development community" - from SADCC to SADC - is testimony in this regard. Fragmented polities and externalised economies, each fending for itself, are no basis for regional prosperity. Yet getting beyond individual, class, and category interests satisfied in the short-run by commitments to mineral extraction (in South Africa's and Botswana's cases), cash cropping (in Swaziland's and South Africa's cases) and the movement of labour from the regional hinterland to the core (as in BLS's cases) seems next to impossible. But collectively these amount to a fallacy of composition, with each individual pursuing what is best for him or herself within a deteriorating socio-economic context.

SAP encourages this trend toward "state-centric" comparative advantage, all the while pushing toward a "minimalist" state. At the same time it seeks to undermine
those elements of Basotho political economy -- e.g. marketing boards, patronage appointments, free educational and health services, all within the context of neo-patrimonial relations -- which act as social stabilisers, however uneconomic they may be. Ironically, the World Bank regards the continued economic growth demonstrated by a "strong reformer" like Lesotho as yet another of its "success stories" in African structural adjustment. (statement made by P.M. Landell Mills, at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, 21 November 1992) Yet Cobbe (1992) provides clear evidence that Lesotho’s economic growth had already begun to slow by the time SAP was signed. As in the case of Botswana and mineral development, Lesotho’s recent economic growth is fuelled by a construction boom tied to the expansion of the Highlands Water Project. And while water, unlike diamonds or soda ash, is a replenishable resource, the social dislocation and ecological damage caused by the project thus far has served only to heighten conflicts within the Basotho social formation. Peri-urban violence is but one consequence of the HWP, as Basotho fight among themselves for scarce and temporary jobs at and around the dam sites. (interview with Mohau, Seattle, 23 November 1992)

As Lesotho returns to multi-partyism in a post-apartheid region, the domestic social formation shows few signs of the stability necessary to maintain democracy. Retrenched miners, displaced peasants, and sacked civil-servants have been added
to a land already deeply eroded and increasingly over-
populated by cattle and people, and a state long divided over
ideology, the role of the monarchy, and its historical
relationship with apartheid South Africa. Nevertheless, all
eyes are fixed on the prize of state power, however
diminished or unviable it may become.
CHAPTER FIVE

New Departures or Deft Continuities?
The Political Economy of Swazi Foreign Policy

(I) Introduction

In assessing Swaziland's foreign policy generally, but over the destabilisation years particularly, most analysts have been quick to criticise what they perceive to be a narrow definition of "security"; i.e. defense of the status quo. In Swaziland, the status quo is equated with a number of unsavoury elements and alliances: (i) the preservation of pre-capitalist social relations which keeps the majority of Swazis subordinate to and in a neo-feudalist arrangement with a powerful and unassailable monarchy (Booth, 1983: 131); (ii) the careful nurturing and extension of various historical alliances with international and settler capital which have not only ensured the continuance of aristocratic political power but also have facilitated the emergence in the post-independence period of an aristocratic petty bourgeoisie (Daniel, 1989: 11); (iii) the open defense of elite interests, most disreputably in alliance with South African capital, against the forces of "liberation", particularly the ANC, in Southern Africa (Daniel, 1983: 8); and (iv) the suppression of democracy and civil society within Swaziland, occasionally assisted in this process by colonial Britain and
racist South Africa (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 54; Bischoff, 1990).

In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate that such criticisms and characterisations of Swazi foreign policy and political economy are overdrawn. A more nuanced approach to the political economy of Swazi foreign policy will reveal, as it did for the case of Lesotho in the previous chapter, that while the Swazi security *problematique* has most certainly been defined primarily in terms of "regime survival" and has successfully been served by pursuit of the *status quo*, the policy has much wider domestic support than is commonly perceived.

As in Lesotho, and as will be seen in the case of Botswana in Chapter Six, a broad spectrum of people from all social classes (royalty, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry) and social categories (young, old, male, female, royal, commoner) derive short-term benefits from maintenance of the *status quo*. And since Swaziland, in both macro-economic and human development index terms, has prospered over the destabilisation years this enhances support for present policy. However, and as will be seen below, whether Swazis themselves think this experience will prove useful in dealing successfully with newer and longer-term challenges in the post-*apartheid* and -Cold War eras depends very much on their particular place within the social formation. As in Botswana and Lesotho, those closest to the centre of power feel
relatively well-prepared to face the challenges of the 1990s. Those at the margins, meanwhile, have little time to entertain such fanciful questions; their immediate circumstances dictating their prospects for survival.

(II) Superstructural Developments: Three Phases of Foreign Policy

As with its ex-High Commission cohorts, Swazi foreign policy is preoccupied with regional political economy. This preoccupation pre-dates apartheid, which Swazi policy-makers view as an external challenge similar in scope and severity to those posed in the past by Zulu and British imperialism. (Denoon, 1972) Unlike Lesotho and Botswana, however, Swazi foreign policy, both in its conception and behaviour, has been sceptical of the liberation struggle as defined and practiced by most OAU member-states. Swazi policy-makers have preferred to take a narrowly state-centric approach to foreign policy, shunning adventurism and refusing to make alliances based on race. Swazi leaders have been highly pragmatic, following the Realist dictum, "we have no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests". And, as interests and interventions have varied over history, Swazi policy-makers have been more than willing to make periodic adjustments; careful, however, to never stray too far from the "permanent interests" defined by the ruling monarchy.

Like Basotho foreign policy, Swazi policy since
independence has gone through three relatively distinct phases, or periods, each delineated by a shift in orientation toward its powerful neighbour, South Africa. The first period, 1968–75, can be seen to have been marked by conservatism, yet not without sympathy toward African unity and liberation from colonial domination. Swazi policy-makers were ahead of their Basotho counterparts in this regard. Following the pre-independence elections, the ruling Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), which was really only the monarchy by another name, coopted the pan-Africanist forces of the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP), later adopting many of their policy positions. The SPP was composed mainly of a petit bourgeois social fraction wedded to the liberation struggle in terms of race, but, given their capitalist interests, not in terms of class. And since the INM shared these views, cooptation was relatively easily facilitated. (Winter, 1978; also, below)

The second period, 1976–81, corresponds to the gradual shift in focus and concentration of the liberation struggle: from continent to region to South Africa alone. When it appeared that the "dominoes were due to fall all the way to the Cape," (Mugyenyi, 1988: 19) Swaziland's foreign policy orientation shifted to the "left" to draw it more into line with the forces of liberation: the OAU, FLS, and SADCC. According to Daniel (1989: 12):

This shift in Swaziland's role in Southern Africa was a response to the new regional power equation ... which
had thrown the government in Pretoria onto the defensive. The forces of liberation were seen to have reached, and to be crossing, South Africa’s borders and King Sobhuza II was responding to these changes.

Yet, Daniel goes on to argue that "the ‘move to the left’ by Sobhuza II... was really an aberration, a response to the momentary illusion that apartheid was about to be swept away." (ibid: 14) However, as will be seen below, this response was much more than an illusion; it was, among other things, a carefully articulated response to recent disappointments in Swazi-South African relations - i.e. not merely a reaction to regional events beyond Swazi control. Moreover, the ‘move to the left’ was merely one element within Swazi foreign policy. While this period may have seemed to have been dominated by radical proposals and approaches, there were enough continuities and conservative decisions taken to suggest that the Swazi policy-making elite were not deviating from the "grand strategy" of Swazi foreign policy outlined by Vilikazi:

In the troubled Southern African context, Swaziland [sic] seeks to maintain social and political stability at home and to insulate itself as far as possible from the impact of events in neighbouring countries. (1982: 288)

The third period, 1982-present, marked a shift back to the conservative right. Yet, like the 1968-75 period, it was not without its radical elements.

What I hope will emerge in the following brief review of Swazi foreign policy during each of these periods is a sense of some choice on the part of Swazi policy-makers. Swazi
policy-makers have chosen to collaborate with forces more powerful than they throughout Swazi history. But this collaboration suggests more than total subordination. Rather, Swazi foreign policy, because of its underlying consensus and strength - i.e. the social and economic bases of relative power - exhibits a great deal more coherence than Basotho foreign policy, for example; Chief Jonathan’s policy of confrontation being a case in point.

Swaziland, less dependent on both South Africa and migrant labour than Lesotho, has been able to translate its relative economic strength and diversity into independently arrived at policy choices that often conflict with the expressed needs of South African capital and/or ideology. Granted, integration into the regional and global capitalist economies has narrowed the choices; but they are choices nonetheless. And while Daniel argues along these lines, I tend to disagree with his conclusions: a close examination of Swazi foreign policy shows a serious desire to retain its political independence and enhance independent politico-economic choice, albeit within a conservative, capitalist context.¹ I will now turn to the evidence which supports

¹ According to Daniel, "While there is probably little of significance which the BLS countries can do to extricate themselves from the mesh of South African economic domination, there is little evidence that Swaziland seriously wishes to do so." In support of this he cites Swaziland’s silence over the 9 December 1982 SADF raid on Maseru, while "Botswana and Lesotho were unequivocal in their condemnation." (Daniel, 1983: 13) Anecdotal evidence from Lesotho suggests that there may be more to the story than is
such contentions.

(II.1) The Roots of Swazi Foreign Policy: Protecting "Swazi" Interests

Swaziland's leaders have a long history of collaborating with stronger forces in the effort to derail potential threats or to strengthen their power and position within the Swazi social formation in particular and in the region generally. According to Daniel and Vilane, by the 1860s the Swazi state had "established a tendency to ally itself with powerful imperialist forces in the region as part of a defensive strategy against its then principal adversary, the Zulu state." (1986: 55) Bonner concurs, going even further to claim that the 19th Century Swazi state was the "principal collaborator of Southern Africa." (1983: 155; cf Crush, 1987: 13; and Bonner, 1977: 126-56)

The main object of this collaboration, Crush contends, was "the retention of political independence until 1895 when the country finally came under the control of the Kruger Republic." (1987: 13) But Booth's characterisation seems more nuanced and forthright: what Mswati I had sought, and, one might add, all monarchs since as well, was "wealth, diplomacy, and security." (1983: 12) Security in this

commonly revealed. Many residents in the Upper Thame area that was raided by the SADF suggested to me that Chief Jonathan was forewarned by the RSA and told things could be far worse if he did not ensure Basotho acquiescence in the operation. (Personal communications, May-Sept 1984).
connection refers not to the integrity of the state, but to the integrity of its ruling class - the monarchy - and its ability to accumulate wealth. Race was never a factor in Swazi diplomacy. Thus, Mswati I, for example, was not above the sale of Swazi land to whites in order to achieve these ends. (Halpern, 1965: 94,95)

One might hypothesise, then, that beyond mere "independence", or "defense of Swazi borders", the primary security objective of Swazi rulers throughout history, and like monarchies everywhere, has been to maintain their hegemony within Swazi society. The link with the preservation of independence was that, in order to maintain power and privilege, the particular social formation which facilitated this "process of primitive accumulation" had to be defended. (Levin, 1984: 6)

Defense, in the early period of state formation was facilitated by the very organization of Swazi society: the cooptation of rivals and the extension of Dlamini rule via the creation of the institutions of the chieftaincy, age regiments, and numerous "traditional" ceremonies, all of which were tied in to the dominant mode of production (agro-pastoral), facilitating its reproduction. Moreover, through the creation of a quasi-democratic forum, the public meeting or libandla, all adult males gained the right to air

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2 Similar forums exist in traditional Basotho and Batswana society. In Lesotho they are called pitso and, in Botswana, kgotla.
grievances, often concerning the behaviour of chiefs, with the Swazi king being the final arbiter in all cases. Thus, while the king generally favoured his chiefs, this limited form of "populism" served to extend the loyalty of commoners to the king within the social formation. This is not to suggest that Swazi society was fully integrated, harmonious, or democratic. To the contrary, many parts of the kingdom were beyond the direct control of the aristocracy; and the daily life of commoners, particularly women, was far from threat-free. Nevertheless, the point I wish to make is that the fruits of Swazi society were more widely shared than is normally suggested in the literature. And the desire to forge a united front vis a vis foreign intruders (e.g. Zulu, Pedi, Boer) was both more widespread and historically rooted than is generally understood or portrayed in the foreign policy literature.

Clearly, then, the mere call to defend "Swaziland" in the face of numerous challenges may have been necessary (in terms of nationalist "myth-making"), but it could not have been sufficient to preserve the Swazi state for 150 years prior to protectorate status under the British; Swazi people, or, at least, key segments of the population -- e.g. aristocracy, chiefs, headmen, traders, petty commodity producers, men in general -- must have a sufficient stake, however small, in the system in order to defend it so consistently and vehemently. That Swazi royalty had a
significantly larger stake in the system should not obscure this point.\footnote{This unconventional theme runs through Booth's introduction to Swaziland (1983).} And while the context for foreign policy making was about to be forever changed via penetration of the capitalist mode of production into Southern Africa, the tradition of Swazi realpolitik in defence of elite interests, and indirectly supported by rank and file Swazi has carried on toward the end of the present millenium.

(II.2) Pre-Destabilisation and Quiet Conservatism: 1968-75

According to Bischoff, Swaziland's foreign policy in the early post-independence period was guided by two interrelated elements: traditional authority's (i) expanding alliance with multinational capital; and (ii) historical relationship with its former colonial overseer, Great Britain. (Bischoff, 1990; cf. Daniel, 1983; Daniel & Vilane, 1986)

As with its ex-High Commission counterparts, Swazi leadership was initially reluctant to take active positions on global issues, preferring instead to concentrate on domestic and regional (i.e. Swazi-South African) affairs. At the behest of Britain, Sobhuza II began to articulate foreign policy positions in line with Britain and other Western allies' thinking. To Bischoff, Swaziland, with its colonial heritage and monopoly capital penetration, could not help but become pro-Western in orientation:

[S]ince with the resolution of the anti-monopolist
debate, settled in favour of the monopolists, the
general absence of ideological links with other African
or Third World states, the inability to enter into
relations with the socialist community of states and the
general absence of a coherent social and ideological
plan of development, the economic concerns of the
export-based economy came to dominate Swaziland's
foreign policy. It is in this way that Swaziland came,
also in a political sense, to involuntarily follow a
pro-Western line of policy. (1990: 192)

And given that traditional authority in this period was well
served by conservative and pro-capitalist positions, the
extension of this policy stance to the world stage - e.g. in
support of anti-communism; in support of reform and dialogue
rather than revolution and conflict in the Middle East
(Bischoff, 1990: 267, 302; Booth, 1983: 128) - made perfect
sense to King Sobhuza.

Yet it seems to me this tendency to portray Swaziland as
little more than a lackey of Western imperialism and Swazi
leadership as a comprador element in global capitalism is
exaggerated. Swazi "diplomacy", with its collaborationist
and conservative tendencies, existed long before independence
was granted in 1968. A relatively integrated Swazi social
formation under Dlamini domination had been in existence for
close to 130 years prior to independence; i.e. since Mswati
II, the greatest of the Swazi warrior kings, had brought
disparate elements of the region under unified control.
Moreover, that this policy had widespread support is not a
fabrication, neo-Marxist and anti-monarchical criticisms

[Through its overwhelming support for the INM in the
pre-independence elections] [t]he Swazi rejected radicalism and pan-Africanism as the basis of national policy. They voted for moderate policies that would ensure coexistence with their white neighbour.

This is not to suggest that the Swazi were mere puppets of apartheid. To the contrary, "they rejected both apartheid and radicalism; otherwise their rejection of incorporation into South Africa is meaningless. The policy of coexistence was dictated to them by their political and economic circumstances." (ibid) In other words, and as with Botswana below, Swazi leaders were clearly pro-capitalist and felt their economic interests to be best served by the removal of all forms of radicalism. Apartheid, while abhorrent, did not threaten the hegemony of Swaziland's monarchy within the social formation; nor did it threaten its emerging, post-colonial indigenous capitalist base. It was therefore more palatable than socialist, albeit non-racialist, pan-Africanism. Even Daniel (and Vilane), a constant critic of Swazi leadership, is willing to acknowledge this autonomy of interest and practice. In a 1989 publication, Daniel states:

There has been a long historical continuity in the accommodative position adopted by the Swazi ruling class towards imperial capital... [T]he relationship has been mutually beneficial providing a satisfactory rate of accumulation for international capital while ensuring, under colonialism, the political survival and modest prosperity of the local royalists. (1989: 3-4)

In his earlier collaboration with Vilane, they state, "[T]he relationship with South Africa is not a product of geopolitical factors or structural dependence, nor a response to South African coercion or offers of handouts." (1986: 66)
To the contrary,

Pretoria’s power does not create the situation where these states have of necessity to side actively with it against the forces of liberation ... [T]he relative autonomy of local ruling classes ... has to be stressed in order to explain the position of the Swazi state. (Daniel, 1989: 3)

Given the historical development of Swazi ruling elite autonomy of interest -- albeit exercised within daunting politico-economic structural parameters -- post-independence Swazi foreign policy can be seen not as a new beginning exercised by neophyte state-makers but as the continuation of a long articulated and entrenched foreign policy position.4 This preservation of traditional authority and interests can be clearly traced throughout Swazi history (see below) as well as post-independence foreign policy practice.

In the 1968-75 period, Swazi foreign policy continually took a middle position. Indeed, given the radical nature of the liberation struggle at the time, Swaziland was initially courted by both Britain and the US as a potential moderator in the attempt to preserve Western interests in the region. A 1970 State Department representation to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated:

Swaziland ... deserve[s] the special attention we have sought to give [it] in our African policy. Here are ... Africans living in the shadow of South Africa and seeking to maintain their political and economic independence ... Despite [its] proximity to South Africa

4 A tradition present in Botswana under the post-independence continuation of Bamangwato dominance, but lacking in Lesotho given the relegation of the monarchy to a titular position. (See Chapters Four and Six)
... [it is] seeking to retain freedom ... [It] need[s] outside help and encouragement to do so. (in Bischoff, 1990: 236)\(^5\)

According to US Congressman Charles Diggs, quoted in the

*Times of Swaziland*, 14 February 1975:

> When the story of liberation in [S]outhern Africa is written there will be a special chapter in it for Swaziland [in which King Sobhuza II would take his place] together with those who have been courageous enough, notwithstanding unfriendly surroundings and economic pressure. (in Bischoff, 1990: 268)

During this period, when British political power in the region was being displaced by US influence, Swaziland’s commitment to "multi-racialism" and "strength in moderation" made it an attractive target for US foreign aid and trade. (Bischoff, 1990: 236; Booth, 1983: 128; Maasdorp, 1991: 228)

In exchange for enhanced access to the US market, Swazi policy-makers gave Swaziland’s support to US policy elsewhere in the world. During the early 1970s, Swaziland, like Lesotho and Botswana, established diplomatic, aid, and trade relations with Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea. Yet, wishing to retain Swaziland’s "neutralist" or "non-aligned" status, Swazi policy-makers shied away from an outright condemnation of communism in spite of pressure from Taiwan (Bischoff, 1990: 314); roundly criticized Britain for its inaction in

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\(^5\) Swaziland, at the time of this statement, was competing with South Africa for the US sugar quota. The US subsequently terminated its sugar agreement with South Africa because of apartheid and Swaziland, whose main port at the time was Lorenzo Marques, was the main beneficiary, seeing its quota increased to 30,000 tons, "an increase of 22,881 tons over its previous allocation." (See the discussion in Bischoff, 1990: 234-237)
the Rhodesian crisis while refusing assistance to Zambia following Rhodesia's border closure (ibid: 255); and gave official recognition to the PLO without abandoning Israel (ibid: 322-23, 326-27). Swazi policy makers justified this last move not in terms of a historical need for the recognition of national liberation movements but merely in "that it is in keeping with the traditional values of the Swazi society that everybody has an inalienable right to be heard." (Bischoff, 1990: 326-27)

Each of these moves, far from being, as Bischoff (1990: 322) suggests, "contradictory", is aimed at the preservation of Swazi interests as defined by its ruling elite. Faced with powerful opposing forces in the region (race, class, ideology) and in the world, Sobhuza II decided to steer a pragmatic middle course: opposed to racism but in support of capitalism; in support of capitalism but not willing to condemn communism given the emergence of a self-conscious and proclaimed socialist regime on its border, and through which Swazi goods had to travel to get to its main port at Maputo; in support of US foreign policy in the Middle East -- including fortuitous Israeli support and training for its Gcina Regiment -- but in need of a steady supply of oil given Arab policy toward the West and UN sanctions toward South Africa.

In each case, Sobhuza managed to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of Swaziland's smallness and vulnerability in both regional and global terms, while, at
the same time, enhancing the capacity of the regime to maintain itself domestically. The use of both Israel and the Arab states to enhance Swazi regime security is testimony in this regard.

(II.3) Liberation and Destabilisation: 1976–81

As the strategic landscape began to change, from the late-1970s onwards, however, the Swazi security problematique became more complicated. Super- and great-power interests had relegated the "wisdom" of King Sobhuza II to the sidelines, taking on a more interventive role for themselves without reducing the tendency toward violence. A Marxist government in Mozambique, sympathetic and supportive of the ANC in South Africa and ZANU in Rhodesia, posed a serious threat to traditional authority in Swaziland. And a seriously threatened minority regime in South Africa was beginning to act like a cornered cat, aggressive and willing to demonstrate just how far it was willing to go in order to survive.

Swazi policy-makers were initially inclined toward a continuation of a relatively conservative stance toward changes in the region. As with Lesotho and Botswana, Swazi policy-makers supported Kaunda's detente initiatives toward South Africa; supported a coalition government in Mozambique; initially supported the Western-backed FNLA in Angola and only offered diplomatic recognition to newly-independent Angola under the MPLA after 40 other African states had
already done so. (see Bischoff, 1990: 273, 437, 486-87, 492-93, 495; Chazan et al., 1992: 361-366) Clearly, Swaziland and Botswana's geo-strategic locations helped determine the pragmatism of their initial approaches.

(II.4) Swazi Frustration and Tentative Moves to the "Left"

Three significant events in 1976 served to weaken Swazi-South African political relations: (i) the failure -- indeed insult -- of the proposed "land deal"; (ii) the Soweto massacre; and (iii) the formal independence of the Transkei. Each of these issues bears elaboration.

The issue of land is significant to BLS since each constitutes part or parts of significantly broader kingdoms, and all three have substantially larger Botswana, Basotho, and Swazi populations living in South Africa than within their respective states. Swaziland and Lesotho (see Chapter Four) have periodically raised the issue of land and the renegotiation of present boundaries with RSA. King Sobhuza II has long sought the reincorporation of both the Kangwane homeland and the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu. Both belong to South Africa and are the result of the bantustan programme first devised by the Tomlinson Commission in the 1950s.

At the time, the Tomlinson Commission recognised the need to consult the Swazi king regarding the creation of a Swazi bantustan. However, the Commission was operating under the then rational assumption that Swaziland itself would at some point be incorporated into South Africa. By 1966,
however, incorporation was a dead letter. Yet the Bantustan scheme was revived and discussions were held with King Sobhuza II in 1970 and 1971.

Sobhuza and South African policy-makers were working from antithetical assumptions: Sobhuza in the hopes of the eventual creation of a "greater Swaziland"; Pretoria in the effort to give "the Bantustan creation process a greater degree of legitimacy amongst the [Si]Swati speaking population." (Bischoff, 1990: 370; see, also 366-370, 373-382)

Sobhuza’s dream of the reunification of Swaziland with its alienated territories came to naught when Ingwavuma was absorbed by KwaZulu and Kangwane was established as an independent bantustan led by Swazi chiefs who were by no means united on the issue of incorporation into Swaziland. (Bischoff, 1990: 380) Smarting from this rebuke, Sobhuza responded with uncharacteristic harshness following events in Soweto and the conference of "independence" upon the Transkei in 1976. Under Sobhuza’s guidance, "Swaziland began a process of bringing its foreign policies more into line with those of the OAU and the so-called Front Line states." (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 62)

Following the **Soweto massacre**, Sobhuza visited the FLS and "called on them to strengthen the OAU in order to bring about the total liberation of Africa", stating:

A new and vigorous approach to the problems of peace and war is needed. The time has come when the destiny of
mankind should cease to hang so dangerously on the aims and ambitions of great powers. (in Bischoff, 1990: 384)

And, finally, in October 1976, the King addressed the UN General Assembly on the issue of the Transkei Bantustan's independence, coming down forcefully in favour of non-recognition. "Any violation of this collective commitment [toward non-recognition] by any member states," Sobhuza said, "will be seen as a betrayal of not only the fighting people of South Africa, but the entire continent." (ibid) Sympathy was expressed toward the sanctions movement; the ANC was permitted "a recognized political presence in Swaziland" (Daniel, 1989: 11) even though Swazi policy makers knew the ANC to be using Swaziland as a "staging point" (Mugyenyi, 1988: 19); and, in early 1977, a trade agreement was signed with then socialist-oriented Mozambique. (Bischoff, 1990: 385, 386)

(II.5) Back Toward Middle Ground

Each of these actions suggests a Swazi foreign policy not merely reacting to larger events in the region, but being taken when real, direct, and monarchy-defined interests were at stake. Nevertheless, as the liberation struggle intensified, becoming increasingly violent, Swazi foreign policy made a number of pragmatic shifts back toward middle ground. These moves were made because Swaziland, sandwiched between Mozambique and the RSA, found itself literally and metaphorically in the middle of the struggle.
And, one could speculate, by stepping back from the more emotional, confrontational path chosen by both Chief Jonathan in Lesotho and Samora Machel in Mozambique, Sobhuza managed to avoid South African manipulation of Swazi dissidents, frustrated at the monarchy's 1973 unilateral decision to abolish parliamentary democracy at the first sign of popular participation. (See Levin, 1991) Hence, the particular imperatives of regime survival -- i.e. "Dlamini nationalism" — ensured that South Africa would not be pushed toward support for "liberation" armies along the lines of the LLA in Lesotho or RENAMO in Mozambique. Of course, the imperatives of regime survival in Lesotho necessitated a more radical decision.

In spite of the triumph of pragmatism over idealism, events in Swaziland became increasingly violent and seemingly beyond Swazi control. Given the enormity and variety of interests involved in the liberation struggle, even a cautious Sobhuza could not insulate Swaziland from the increasing complexity of regional events; thus revealing, perhaps, the true nature of Swaziland's "smallness" and

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6 This is Bischoff's term: "Dlamini nationalism, centred around the institutions of the Swazi nation state, notably its monarchy, arose as a response to internal colonial domination." Bischoff uses the term Dlamini nationalism "to distinguish it from rival currents of nationalism among the Swazi people." (1990: 14) According to the ideology of Dlamini nationalism, "the monarchy was to assert the need for unity in development and to identify itself as a patriotic unifying force expressing the needs of the people in development." (ibid, 90)
"vulnerability".

In 1978, for example, the ANC and PAC clashed inside Swaziland. In 1979 the former used Swaziland's eastern front as a staging area for attacks on SASOL and the Voortrekkerhootge military barracks. (Daniel & Vilane, 1986:63) Also in 1979, 6,000 Swazi-speaking refugees from South Africa crossed the border into Swaziland. (Phillips, 1988: 30) Along with the many legitimate refugees were a number of liberation fighters, some of whom were bearing arms. Given this scenario, South Africa's security arm, BOSS, began to violate Swazi "sovereignty" with impunity in a series of "search and destroy" missions. Understandably, Swazi policy makers were made very nervous by these developments. According to Senzenjani Tshabalala, Swazi Minister of the Interior,

As far as South African refugees are concerned, Swaziland faces the prospect of being turned into a battlefield between South Africa and the liberation movements. We have no problem when people come to our country and then want to leave and go somewhere else. The problem begins when these gentlemen come back to the country carrying arms and they are harboured by local Swazis. Our neighbour then finds out where these people are hiding, attempts to take them away, and Swaziland becomes a battlefield. (in ibid, 31)

According to one Swazi observer, "We are caught between a real and valid desire to remain independent, which means being neutral, and a gut feeling of solidarity with our South
African brothers and sisters.⁷ (in ibid, 33) MNR attacks on the rail line between Swaziland and Maputo cemented Swazi policy makers' convictions that if Swaziland was to remain independent steps had to be taken to insulate Swaziland from the forces of revolution and counter-revolution. Swazi policy was to be guided by "truth not emotions" (Bischoff, 1990: 481); this meant the establishment of the Umbutfo Royal Defence Force,⁸ the establishment of an Immigration Squad, the coordination of Swazi security policy with South Africa, especially in the Swaziland-Ingwavuma border area (the precursor to the 1982 formal agreement), and, from 1977, the decision to pursue an alternate route to the sea for Swazi goods via Richards Bay (ibid: 393-405).

This policy position found precedent in many earlier

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⁷ This parallels anecdotal evidence garnered in both Botswana and Lesotho where many individuals, while expressing support for the ANC, often qualified their comments and justified their country's behaviour with the rejoinder, "What can we do?" (various personal communications, May-Sept 1984, Sept-Dec 1989)

⁸ The original gazette on the establishment and command of the URDF, issued early in 1977 stated: "There is hereby established the Umbutfo Defence Force, which shall consist of all or any of the following units, namely, the Swaziland Army, the Swaziland Air Force and the Swaziland Navy, and which shall not exceed such strength as may from time to time be determined by the King in consultation with the council, and they shall rank in precedence in that order." In January 1979, the Defence Force came under the sole control of the King. (The Times of Swaziland, 4 January 1979) The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was also created in 1977, also in response to refugee flows and (UDI-Rhodesia) border incursions: in both cases, the establishment of a defence force came not in response to direct South African pressure, but from other (former) settler-dominated societies.
official statements such as that made by Swazi UN Ambassador, Z.M. Dlamini, to the UN press club on 29 May 1970:

We did not struggle for independence to commit suicide. Swaziland did not interfere with South Africa and South Africa reciprocated. (in ibid: 441)

Clearly, King Sobhuza felt that if Swaziland was to guarantee its existence, it would have to help itself, no matter how collaborationist it appeared to the outside world. Indeed, to assess Swazi foreign policy on the basis of these moves alone is to ignore the equally liberal moves made at the end of 1979 and in to the early 1980s.

In November 1979, Sobhuza appointed a reformer, liberal, and relative outsider in terms of the royalist power structure, to the post of Prime Minister. According to a Southern Africa DOSSIER report,

[P]rior to his appointment, [Prince] Mabandla [Dlamini] had not been openly involved in Swazi politics, but managed a sugar plantation. His appointment was thus seen as the bringing in of a figure untainted by the existing corrupt system. (1983: 3)

In addition to his appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into corruption at the domestic level -- a very popular move with the general populace at the time -- Mabandla instituted a number of key reforms at the international level. While some feel that many of these changes are due solely to the energy and vision of the new Prime Minister (e.g. Daniel & Vilane, 1986; Daniel, 1989), others, recognizing the overwhelming dominance of the King in Swazi politics, suggest that such moves could only have been
made at his behest. (Southern Africa DOSSIER, 1983)⁹

In any event, significant steps were taken in the direction of support for the liberation movement. Swaziland, in 1980, joined SADCC instead of CONSAS; a severe blow to the South African project given favorable developments in South Africa-Swazi security relations. (see Chapter Four) Mbandla managed to improve relations with Mozambique such that Samora Machel paid Swaziland a visit in early 1980. Shortly thereafter, Swazi security forces detained and expelled a number of MNR agents said to be recruiting members among Swaziland’s Mozambican migrant labour force. (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 62) And, in April 1981, Mbandla hosted a meeting which brought Samora Machel, Chief Jonathan, and Botswana’s Quett Masire to Mbabane for talks on each state’s common security problematique. This led to the issuance of a communique which Daniel and Vilane state is "probably unique

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⁹ Bischoff offers evidence that would seem to support this latter contention although it relates not to the liberal policies instituted by Mbandla, but Swaziland’s refusal to contemplate sanctions against South Africa. In defense of Swazi Foreign Minister R.V. Dlamini’s statement vis a vis sanctions, the King is reported to have stated: "[T]hey - [i.e. those in the National Council opposed to the Swazi position on sanctions] - should have known from the boldness with which [Minister R.V. Dlamini] presented the statement, that he was expressing the country’s stand with the full backing of those in authority." (Bischoff, 1990: 481) While it is known that R.V. Dlamini was an adversary of Mbandla’s and was appointed in part to offset the influence of the liberal position in government, it is not known whether Mbandla was directly opposed to this position. Given Mbandla’s open support for free markets and little state intervention in the economy, however, one could deduce that he, too, opposed sanctions. (see below)
in Swazi history by being critical of 'attempts by South Africa to destabilise her neighbouring black-rulled states.'" 
(1986: 63) While this form of finger pointing is probably unique in Swazi-South African relations, the tenor of the communique is not much different from those issued by King Sobhuza in 1976/77.

In the effort to bring Swazi policy back in to line with South African white minority security concerns, the possibility of a land deal was resurrected by Prime Minister Botha in the House of Assembly in 1979, and later pursued in earnest in 1981. (Hanlon, 1986: 93, 94, 96) The prospect of the return of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland was a "long-standing dream of the Swazi ruling class." (Mugyenyi, 1988: 21) It was also the biggest "carrot" South Africa could or would offer any of the neighbouring BLS states in return for "collaboration and cooperation". (ibid) According to Daniel and Vilane, South African policy-makers were exploiting an old ambition of Sobhuza's:

A successful consummation of the deal would for Sobhuza reunite the Swazi people and climax a reign which had seen Swaziland regain its political independence and Swazi ownership of its domestic land resources significantly redressed. (1986: 63)

The land deal never went through. "In a rapid sequence, the Rumpff Commission was dissolved ... [and] South Africa informed Swaziland that the transfer would not proceed without express consent of the relevant bantustan leaders." (Mugyenyi, 1988: 22; also Bischoff, 1990: 409-424) Some
observers felt the failure of the deal was due to the opposition it faced in South Africa -- from white conservatives, liberal critics, and bantustan leaders (ACR, 1986: B849). Others suggested that South African policy-makers never intended for the deal to succeed; rather, it was purely a means by which to trap Swazi policy-makers into signing a formal security pact with the RSA. Once achieved, previously muzzled opposition was allowed to drive the deal to a dead end. (Mugyenyi, 1988: 22; Hanlon, 1986: 94; Bischoff, 1990: 424) Yet, as Daniel notes,

[I]f [South Africa] wanted to secure these objectives it is hardly necessary to take so drastic a step as ceding territory to get a pliable client like Swaziland to fall into line with its wishes. (1983: 14)

This suggests that the tabling of the land deal by South Africa may itself have been an over-zealous response by an embattled regime frustrated by recent regional events, particularly the independence of Zimbabwe and the successful establishment of SADCC; i.e. what were perceived by the "hawks" in Pretoria as successful moves against South Africa's policy of "divide and rule". Given the current conjuncture, the white regime could not afford to appear to lose a pliable client like Sobhuza. This also suggests that a carefully articulated Swazi policy was not merely successful in the preservation of Swazi independence, but was nearly successful in the acquisition of independent access to the sea; a position far from simple collaboration, but one which threatened the SADCC coalition and was therefore to be
condemned by those sympathetic to the liberation struggle.

(II.6) Cooperating to Avoid Further Destabilisation: 1982-1989

The proposed land deal came quickly to be overtaken by events. As mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, in February 1982 King Sobhuza II signed a bilateral security agreement with South Africa. This accord was intended to, combat terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively as well as [secure South Africa's and Swaziland's] right to call upon each other for such assistance and steps as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate the evil. (Ajulu & Cammack, 1986: 60)

Six months later the King was dead and there commenced a violent and complicated struggle of succession not untypical of other periods in Swazi history, but one which threatened the very stability Sobhuza worked so hard to create. 10

According to Hanlon, South Africa's renewed ascendancy [after the 17 February 1982 signing of the security accord] was not due simply to Pretoria's carrots and sticks. Equally important were the intense internal conflicts which plagued the country after Sobhuza's death. (1986: 103-4)

At stake were both the wealth and security of the ruling elite who, in the ensuing struggle, tended to align in one of two camps:

[In one camp were] those sections of the Swazi 'traditional' aristocracy and petty bourgeoisie with an

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10 For a full analysis of these events, see, for example, Southern Africa DOSSIER, 25 March 1983 (Centros de Estudos Africanos, Maputo); and Mugyenyi, (1988: 23-24).
existing stake in the capitalist sector through such institutions as Tibiyo [TakaNgwane]. [In the other camp were] those sections of the Swazi petty bourgeoisie supported by a minority of the 'traditional' aristocracy favorable to capitalism but themselves without such an institutional stake. (Southern Africa DOSSIER, 1983: 4)

The former, 'traditional', camp was led by Dr. Sishayi Nxumalo, Director of the royalist-owned corporation Tibiyo TakaNgwane, Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi, spokesman for the "Swazi nation" on the Boundary Commission; the latter, more 'modern', and less closely aligned camp was headed by Mabandla and Prince Gabheni, Minister of Home Affairs. "The Deputy Prime Minister, Senator Ben Nsibandze, [was] also said to have been broadly in favour of Mabandla's policies, although not openly aligned with him." (Southern Africa DOSSIER, 1983: 5) The inherent conservatism of the traditional camp's members prompted them to be more forthrightly supportive of closer links with South Africa, given South Africa's dominance of the Swazi economy (see below). The modernist camp tended to be much more cautious in its support of South Africa, as is evident in the policy positions taken by Swaziland under Mabandla's Prime Ministership (albeit with the blessings of King Sobhuza).¹¹

¹¹ "Traditionalist" and "Modernist" are mainly terms of convenience, but with some element of descriptive truth to them. The modernists were "modernizers" in the sense that they sought increased access to political and economic power; in most cases they were commoners or marginal royals having achieved some status in parliament and wealth in petty bourgeois endeavour. The "traditionalists" were mainly aristocrats and important chiefs. Thus, having already secured access to power and privilege, they sought to preserve it and limit the inclusion and influence of the
Mabandla was ousted from power on 18 March 1983 by Mfanisibili. But his influence had clearly been on the wane for some time prior to his sacking. During much of 1982 the Swazi security police had lobbied for the expulsion of the ANC from Swaziland. While Sobhuza was still alive, this crackdown was prevented. But "[h]is death removed that obstacle, and the Maseru raid provided the pretext."

Under the guise of "protecting" the lives of ANC members and innocent Swazi citizens, those who comprised the organised infrastructure of the ANC presence in Swaziland were rounded up and shortly thereafter most agreed to leave "voluntarily" to Mozambique ... [The ANC presence thus became] a mere shadow of what it was. (Hanlon, 1986: 16)

Clearly, the pro-ANC Mabandla was helpless to prevent the crackdown. Swazi silence in the aftermath of the raid, especially when compared with the April 1981 Mbabane meeting of BLS and Mozambique and subsequent denunciation of South African destabilisation, provides further evidence that the Mabandla faction was in retreat. It also highlights the abiding nature of Dlamini "realpolitik" -- internecine struggles over power could not be avoided; but regional struggles not directly affecting the basic interests of the Swazi political class were to be avoided at all cost.

However, all was not well with Swazi-South Africa relations in the mid-1980s. Hanlon suggests that the sacking

modernizers. Both factions, however, were clearly capitalist in orientation. According to Muyenyi, "the two factions differed only in degrees, not substance, in their dealings with South African and foreign capital." (1988: 23)
of Nxumalo at Tibiyo and the subsequent allegations and evidence of widespread corruption by the Mfanasibili-led faction may have been the catalyst for South Africa to scotch the land deal. (1986: 105; cf ASS 1989/90, 977) The "recklessness" of Mfanasibili could not be tolerated by South African policy-makers whose interests would be better served by a "stable, traditional monarchical system", irrespective of his pro-South Africa position. (Mugyenyi, 1988: 23)

Eventually, the Mfanasibili-led faction was dislodged, with its leaders ending up in jail. (For a more detailed account, see ASS 1989/90, 975-976) The reassertion of traditional interests over the recklessness of Mfanasibili is quite comparable to the displacement of Leabua Jonathan by the forces of tradition and state-sponsored accumulation in Lesotho. Mugyenyi suggests one such scenario:

The structuralist imperative of the state triumphed: the eventual subordination of the Mfanasibili-Msibi faction was broadly determined by internal social and state power structures; i.e. the state, being above the interests of individual class factions, was reasserting and reorganizing the overall interests of the ruling class in Swaziland within the matrix imposed by external factors. (1988: 24)

As in Lesotho, the impetus for a change in government was not Swaziland's foreign policy position, but rather its internal domestic turmoil, the continuation of which neither leading class fractions in Swaziland nor the ruling white
minority in South Africa could bear. Similarly, the reassertion of a conservative foreign policy position was necessitated by the escalation of violence by revolutionary forces of the ANC and MNR within Swaziland and the potential destabilising effect which counter-revolutionary retaliation from either South African or Mozambican forces would have upon the Swazi social formation.

Clearly, elements of the ruling elite would have more to lose, in material and power-political terms, in the event of heightened conflict. However, the majority of the Swazi population was also bound to suffer. Swazi policy makers often pointed to the havoc wreaked in Mozambique as the price to be paid for idealism; with one million dead and displaced in Mozambique by the mid-1980s, the argument for neutrality was a persuasive one.

In the wake of Mozambique's signing of its own Nkomati Accord with South Africa, Swaziland announced to the world the existence of a similar pact agreed to two years earlier.

In the eyes of the Swazi state, Nkomati legitimated its collaboration with apartheid and the existence of its own security arrangement with South Africa was revealed

12 And, as in Lesotho, "scenes of jubilation" among the general populace "greeted the dismissals [thus] reveal[ing] the widespread resentment at the manner in which the two former ligogo members [i.e., Mfanasibili and Msibi] had abused their power." (ASS 1989/90, 976)

13 The MNR staged raids on Swazi cargo bound for Maputo in March, July, and September of 1984, as well as launched a number of attacks into Mozambique from hideouts in the Swazi mountains. (Hanlon, 1986: 97)
... A virtue was made of the fact that the Swazi accord predated Mozambique's by two years - an attempt to curry favour with Western government's who were lauding the "courage and realism" of Mozambique's leaders. (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 63-64)

Also in 1984, Swaziland began to take a hard line on issues of sanctions and disinvestment:

[T]he Swazi foreign ministry was articulating a position on issues like sanctions and disinvestment indistinguishable from its counterpart across the border while appealing to the world to "give South Africa a chance to sort out its problems. We have been really impressed by what South Africa has been doing for the last years trying to improve conditions in this part of the world ... [South Africa is] on the right track as far as we are concerned". (Daniel, 1989: 13)

As if to prove its point, Swaziland allowed South Africa to establish a trade mission in Mbabane in 1985. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Nassau, Bahamas in 1985, Swaziland was the only state of the Commonwealth to align itself with Britain in opposing sanctions. According to two observers, "Not even Malawi went so far as to associate itself with the Swazi position." (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 65)

And at the 1985 SADCC annual meeting held at Mbabane, Swazi policy-makers defended their position.

[I]t was no surprise to hear the Swazi Prime Minister deliver to the Council of Minister's meeting of SADCC in Mbabane in January 1985 an unabashed defence of his government's cooperation with South Africa. Before a forum dedicated to reducing the region's dependence upon South Africa, he concluded with the words "today I want to make it clear there is nothing wrong with our policy." (ibid, 66)

Indeed, in characteristic Swazi fashion, Swazi policy-makers hoped to gain for themselves short-term benefits from the international sanctions movement similar to those
benefits -- e.g. the sugar deal -- gained in the early 1970s. (Mugyenyi, 1988: 21) And, as will be seen in the discussion below, it appears that they have benefited a great deal.

Since the ascension of Mswati III to the throne in April 1986, "unnecessary" anti-ANC and pro-South Africa rhetoric has been cut to a minimum. At the same time, however, a major police operation prior to Mswati III's coronation resulted in the arrest and/or expulsion of "a number of ANC members, illegal Mozambican immigrants and criminals." One might speculate that this "sweep" was undertaken equally in preparation for the attendance of South African President P.W. Botha. (AAB, 1990: 977) And while this might suggest increased collaboration, the Swazi government was quick to respond aggressively to South African raids in June, July, and August 1986:

Following the armed South African raid into Swaziland in August 1986 ... Prime Minister Sotsha Dlamini's condemnation of the Pretoria government's "illegal act of aggression" comprised the first-ever public attack on South African policies by a Swaziland government ... The Swazi government directly accused South Africa of the outrages and called upon the Pretoria regime to "desist from violating our sovereignty and to respect Swaziland's commitment of peace." (AAB, 1990: 976,977)

Predictably, Swaziland has played both sides of the fence in regard to recent changes in South Africa, with Mswati III allowing the ANC an official presence in the country while also calling South African President de Klerk, "South Africa's and the region's best hope for a peaceful future." (AAB, 1992: 973) One might speculate that these
diplomatic alms are not merely reactive. Indeed, in the run-up toward a post-apartheid era, Swaziland has already renewed its quest for land and a Swazi port at Kosi Bay, a condition many Swazi policy-makers regard as key to their future capitalist economic development; a situation which helps us understand the ready rapprochement with the ANC sought and achieved by Swazi policy-makers. (see below)

Clearly, the substance of Swazi foreign policy has not deviated from the path of tradition: pragmatic in approach, conservative in scope.

At this point it is necessary to leave the narrative of superstructural events and explore the evolution of substructural factors in Swazi collaborative foreign policy and political economy. If Swazi diplomacy benefited the few over the many in the pre-independence period, it has, since independence, increased the number of beneficiaries as a way of both bolstering the independence of the Swazi state and a means of gaining support for continued Dlamini rule. As to whether this state-centric, liberal economic approach to security and development is sustainable in the longer term, however, remains to be seen.

(III) Capitalist Penetration and the Evolution of Collaboration

The discovery and subsequent exploitation of diamonds at Kimberley in the 1870s signalled that pre-capitalist relations stood to be overtaken by capitalist penetration.
And the reemergence of Boer hegemony in the Transvaal after 1881 threatened the very existence of Swaziland and of the monarchy itself. Swaziland therefore became a serious target for the exploitation of land and labour.

Unlike Lesotho, the articulation of the capitalist mode with the pre-capitalist mode of production involved not merely the capturing of Swazi labour for the mines, but the widespread settlement on and acquisition of Swazi land by English and Boer settlers. This somewhat parallels the Bechuanaland experience, but to a much more serious degree; much of Swaziland, not merely pockets of it, was both arable and mineral rich.

Accommodating diverse interests without compromising the integrity of the Swazi social formation and therefore the tributary state’s means of primitive accumulation posed a severe challenge to the monarchy. (Booth, 1983; Crush, 1987: 135-136; Daniel, 1983; Muyenyi, 1987: 266; Paton, 1991: 211) Clearly, Swazi options were circumscribed. Sobhuza’s strategy was to align with the British against the Boers who, under Kruger, saw Swaziland as all that stood between a greater South African Republic and the sea. The trade-off was a severe one, however. In return for continued Dlamini hegemony, the Swazi state was partitioned to accommodate colonial and settler needs, with the Swazi themselves being limited to 37 per cent of the land.

Significantly, however, the colonial administration
ensured that "every royal homestead, chiefly homestead, royal
cattle post, and royal burial ground was included within the
reserves", and that the monarchy retained the power of land
allocation on what came to be known as Swazi Nation Land
(SNL). (Neocosmos, 1987: 92)

King Sobhuza II was aware that for Dlamini dominance to
continue, the aristocracy would have to adapt more fully to
the intrusion of the capitalist mode of production: they
could not survive on capitation fees and taxes alone; they
would have to develop their own material base of support. As
early as the 1930s, King Sobhuza II had made known his

openness towards economic development and new forms
of organisation in order "to make the people
energetic". He did not oppose the principle of
administrative and judicial reform being necessary
in order to allow capitalism to develop in the
country. What he objected to was seeing his
political sovereignty and the economic security of
the royal household removed. (Bischoff, 1990: 87-
88)

Rather than oppose capitalist penetration, then, King Sobhuza
sought to channel it through his royal family, thus making
the latter an indispensible element to capitalist economic
growth. Hence, regime security was to be facilitated through
cooperation with rather than opposition to the forces of
capitalism. This alignment of indigenous, settler, South
African and colonial (particularly capital) interests, again,
parallels the experience of pre-independence Botswana. (cf
Morrison, 1993; also, Chapter Six below) The coming of
independence only strengthened the monarchy's hand.
[At independence] control over the state apparatus ... considerably strengthened their hand. State-directed accumulation was thereby ensured not to run counter to, but rather to complement comprador accumulation. (Levin, 1984: 14)

(III.1) Tibiyo TakaNgwane

The King found the opportunity to prove himself a worthy ally of monopoly capital when, following a series of strikes in 1962-63, culminating in a "general strike that shook the monarchy and the whole edifice of international/settler capital" (Mugyenyi, 1987: 270), he invited British troops in to restore order. Sobhuza's reward -- albeit after protracted negotiations which delayed the proposed date of independence by two years -- was control over all mineral rights "in trust for the Swazi nation". To help administer the royalties derived from mineral rights, the King created Tibiyo Taka Ngwane (henceforth, Tibiyo; literally, the "bowels of the nation") in 1968. Tibiyo's "official" role is to raise the living standards of the Swazi people while preserving

the customs and traditional institutions of the Swazi people so as to prevent the rapid disillusionment and instability which has followed from their rapid breakdown in other parts of the world. (Hanlon, 1986: 104)

At its inception, the King stated,

[I]t is in the best interests of stability and the promotion of harmonious relations between the different races of this country that the material welfare, standard of living and education of the people, should be advanced as rapidly as possible, so that the Swazi people become equipped to play their proper role in the development of Swaziland. (Barclays, 1989: 63)
And, while *Tibiyo* is administered by a committee of seven "senior Swazi citizens" appointed by the King to "give effect to the royal decree" (*ibid*), it is, in fact, "a private company" accountable to no one but the King. (Levin, 1987: 166) Some go so far as to say it is "a source of exclusive accumulation for the royal family and a material base of considerable social mobility." (Daniel & Vilane, 1986: 58) The King soon realised "that more finance was required than royalties and mineral fees could provide."

(*Levin, 1984: 14*)

*Tibiyo* embarked on a policy of joint investment with foreign capital and the acquisition of shares in major companies ... The cash flow that followed enabled *Tibiyo* to enter the field of land purchase and development. Despite the fact that at an ideological level the land purchased is said to be "held in trust" for the nation, the relations of production and exchange prevalent on such land are those of capital. (*ibid*)

*Tibiyo* has thus been able to successfully penetrate what prior to independence was an exclusively settler and international capital dominated mode of production. So, rather than stand at odds with the comprador elements within Swaziland -- i.e. the "dominant class" made up of foreign and settler bourgeoisies\(^1\) -- as did many of Swaziland’s

---

\(^{14}\) See, especially, Winter, 1978: Settler capital was involved in smaller estates production - sugar, citrus, cattle - and medium-sized farms - cotton, tobacco, maize, vegetables. It also dominated commercial activities in urban centres, tourism, medium-scale manufacturing and composed the rentier class. (1978: 34) International capital, which was essentially British and South African in origin, was involved in sugar (CDC; Lonrho); wood pulp (Courtaulds; CDC); minerals (Anglo American; Turner & Newall); pineapples (Libby's); meat
African counterparts who chose to use state power to displace and/or take over multinational and settler capital, Swazi rulers chose to join forces and thereby assure themselves the necessary material base upon which traditional political authority could be reproduced.¹⁵ (Daniel, 1989; Bischoff, 1990) According to Daniel and Vilane,

Tibiyo has spread its net vertically through every sector of the economy, establishing a solid, albeit junior, partnership with foreign capital. Dividend payments from these joint ventures have become its largest single source of income. (1986: 58)

By 1981, Tibiyo had accumulated funds totalling "E46,071,573 and reported income for 1978/9 was E9.4m of which E9.3m accrued from dividends." (Levin, 1984: 14) This kind of accumulation is a far cry from the mid-1960s' L70,000 per annum the royal family was earning through the Swazi National Fund. In 1989 Tibiyo was reported as having the following investments (Barclays, 1989: 63):

Joint-ventures projects:
Havelock Asbestos Mines (SD) Ltd.
Ubombo Ranches
Royal Swazi Sun

products (Imperial Cold Storage; Anglo American); tourism (Rennies; Southern Sun); finance (Barclay's; Standard); and retail trade (OK Bazaars). By the early 1980s, Tibiyo had investment in virtually every one of these enterprises. (ibid) And, since the mid-1980s, Tibiyo and Swazi-state delegations have been sent to Asia in search of further investment. (interview with Lim, Windsor, Ontario, 31 October 1992)

¹⁵ A similar process took place in Botswana where traditional, corporate, and colonial interests -- largely centred around the commercialisation of cattle -- hammered out a corporatist alliance in the pre-independence period. (See Morrison, 1993; also, Chapter Six)
Mhlume (SD) Sugar Co.
Royal Swaziland Sugar Corp. Ltd. (Simunye)
Tibiyo Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd.
Roberts Construction (SD) Ltd.
Simunye Plaza (Pty) Ltd.
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Pty) Ltd.
Swaziland Brewers Ltd.
Inyoni Yami (SIS)
Tibiyo Frasers (Pty) Ltd
Langa National Brickworks (Pty) Ltd.
Dvokolwako Diamond Mines
Maswati Colliery
Unitrans (SD) Ltd.
Royal Swazi National Airways Corporation

**Direct investment:**
Tibiyo Dairy Farm
Sivunga Estates
Swazi Observer
Sihoya Estate
Jubilee Printing & Publishing (Pty) Co.

Clearly, Sobhuza's strategy was a success in so far as Dlamini nationalism was concerned. *Tibiyo* provided a strong material base for the monarchy, helped deepen the character of the Swazi economy beyond merely extractive industries, and provided sources of employment and investment that would not otherwise have been available to the average Swazi.

Beyond *Tibiyo*, direct use of the state -- through the initiation of rural development projects and the creation of parastatals like the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) and the recently privatised Swaziland Industrial Development Corporation (SIDC; see below) -- has furthered the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class highly supportive of status quo oriented security and development policies. According to Muyenyi,

The accumulation process has ... resulted in rapid expansion of the working class and the emergence of
an indigenous Swazi middle class. The latter has arrived with its own economic interests and agenda that have complicated power sharing at the national level. (1987: 283)

State power has also been used to attract development assistance. ODA levels for Swaziland over the 1980s have averaged around US $65 million. (See Table 4.1 for a comparison with Lesotho) Of these totals, capital assistance (loans, grants, food/commodities) has always made up roughly two-thirds. According to one official:

I think we should give up capital aid, but the home office says no. NGO aid is the best aid: UNV, Cansave, Red Cross, family planning through MANTOC are very effective. (interview with Gibson, British High Commission, Mbabane, 7 December 1989)

In regard to the trend in the 1980s toward conditionalities attached to aid, the same official remarked: "Everything used to be aid; now everything is exchanged for cash or on credit." (ibid)

The cumulative effect has been a (relative) dissemination of wealth and increase in opportunity for many Swazis who did not have such material wealth or opportunity prior to independence. In sum, Muyenyi states:

Through "rural development" programmes and building the material base for the Swazi rulers and petty bourgeoisie, the state has initiated and facilitated rapid solid differentiation which has in turn led to a steady process of class formation amongst the indigenous Swazi. [However], natural resources have been diverted to the promotion of the aspiring "middle class" and the ruling clique at the expense of achieving basic needs for the majority of Swazi. (1987: 276-77)

According to Maasdorp (1991: 218), this outcome is to be
applauded:

King Sobhuza had defended the Swazi against the colonial powers and had won the support of the people as a political nationalist. But he was also an economic nationalist - he did not want the Swazi Nation to lose control of economic resources (especially land and minerals) and be subordinated to foreign leadership. He also did not want to jeopardise stability; he was aware that foreign investment had led to a growing gap between haves and have-nots, and he took the lead in promoting Swazi participation in business as well as urging that Swazi be trained for managerial positions and that reasonable wages be paid.

However, while the alliance with international capital was probably unavoidable and therefore necessary for the preservation of the Swazi social formation in any form, it may prove ultimately destabilising to Dlamini rule. As will be seen below, and as with both Lesotho and Botswana, laissez-faire capitalist development is creating perhaps irreconcilable fissures within Swazi society; fissures that heighten the insecurity dilemma for elite and mass alike. I now turn to an examination of recent trends in Swaziland's economy as a necessary prelude to discussion of the heightening contradictions within the Swazi social formation.

(III.2) Overall Economic Performance

Since 1986, the Swazi economy, like its Basotho and Batswana counterparts, has been enjoying what many observers have termed a "mini-boom". (ARB, 16 Oct-15 Nov, 1990: 10154; de Vletter, 1989: 144; see Table 5.1 below) The "boom" has seen Swazi exports increase by 38% over the 1985-87 period which put the current account into surplus for the first time
since 1980. (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1989: 11) Real GDP grew by 8.8% in 1986, the first year of the "boom", after having grown only haltingly in the four previous years. This upward trend continued, with real GDP growth estimated at 5% in 1990-91. (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1988: 9; Abecor Country Report, 1991)

This "boom" has been the result of a combination of five factors: (i) world prices; (ii) increased export volumes; (iii) depreciation of the value of the Lilangeni (plural: Emalangeni); (iv) foreign investment; and (v) government policy. I will briefly look at each of these factors before concluding with an overall assessment of Swaziland's security and development policy and prospects for the 1990s.

Table 5.1: Swaziland’s GDP by Sector

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>60,014</td>
<td>65,206</td>
<td>64,901</td>
<td>102,500</td>
<td>114,577</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crop Production On SM</td>
<td>9,251</td>
<td>8,491</td>
<td>9,585</td>
<td>11,733</td>
<td>24,846</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crop Production On 17F</td>
<td>20,020</td>
<td>21,308</td>
<td>24,759</td>
<td>29,745</td>
<td>66,141</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Agriculture</td>
<td>21,063</td>
<td>21,340</td>
<td>18,731</td>
<td>20,042</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>5,940</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>6,416</td>
<td>5,343</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (Excl. Iron Ore)</td>
<td>12,720</td>
<td>11,710</td>
<td>11,246</td>
<td>11,207</td>
<td>10,227</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>92,996</td>
<td>93,952</td>
<td>93,474</td>
<td>82,280</td>
<td>169,079</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>18,851</td>
<td>18,395</td>
<td>14,867</td>
<td>13,385</td>
<td>14,806</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale, Retail, Hotels &amp; Restaurants</td>
<td>41,611</td>
<td>43,510</td>
<td>46,303</td>
<td>44,918</td>
<td>46,010</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>23,103</td>
<td>22,812</td>
<td>24,657</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Insurance, Real Estate etc.</td>
<td>26,332</td>
<td>29,930</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>25,981</td>
<td>27,165</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupied Dwellings</td>
<td>15,088</td>
<td>18,547</td>
<td>16,140</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>16,227</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>71,822</td>
<td>68,810</td>
<td>75,601</td>
<td>74,190</td>
<td>79,900</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>5,726</td>
<td>6,676</td>
<td>7,080</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP At Factor Cost</td>
<td>486,161</td>
<td>487,323</td>
<td>415,107</td>
<td>425,724</td>
<td>463,300</td>
<td>186.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) | 3.3% | 3.2% | 8.4% | 2.0% | - | 2.6% |

| GDP Per Capita ($)        | 674 | 651 | 831 | 645 | 680 | - | 6.8% |

Source: Department of Economic Planning & Statistics
(i) **World Prices:** As stated, prices for key Swazi exports have been particularly buoyant since 1986. For example, prices for woodpulp have risen dramatically in the last four years. In 1984, Swaziland exported 170,349 metric tonnes of pulp which earned E58,530,000. This can be compared with 1988 when Swaziland’s volume of exports rose only marginally to 176,000 m.t. but returned more than double 1984 totals: E130,865,000. *(Central Bank of Swaziland, 1989: 33)* Prices for Swaziland’s central export, sugar -- which now accounts for @ 50% of Swaziland’s foreign exchange earnings and employs @ 30% of the total private sector labour force *(de Vletter, 1989: 144)* -- also continued an upward trend. More important than world prices for sugar, however, is export volume.

(ii) **Volume of Exports:** Under the provisions of the Lome convention, Swaziland’s sugar (and now beef, which it started exporting to the EC in 1989) is exported to Europe at a price guaranteed above world market value, and at a volume established by special quota. The effect of such an agreement is nothing short of a windfall gain for Swazi producers. For example, in 1988, Canada imported 241,825 tonnes of Swazi sugar (50% of the total Swazi volume for export) for which it paid E72,596,000. In contrast, the UK imported only 88,360 tonnes, but paid E104,107,000. Further to this, by virtue of its guaranteed price/quota under Lome, Swaziland is free to export as much sugar as it can harvest without too seriously
affecting export revenues by flooding the market. Aside from sugar, Swaziland, between 1982-86, saw agricultural production on SNL increase at an annual real rate of 27%. And while this rate declined somewhat in 1987 due to poor maize and cotton harvests, 1988 again marked spectacular growth, largely due to a bumper cotton crop. (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1988: 29) Cotton is Swaziland’s main dry land crop and, some have argued, its most important cash crop as it is the one most widely grown by petty commodity producers on SNL. "There are over 12,000 small farmers, who in 1988 produced some 60 per cent of the total crop, which was valued at E15.6 million." (Barclays, 1989: 29)

In spite of this impressive growth, Swaziland’s trade deficit widened sharply again in 1988, to E222 million. According to one report,

All the main import categories recorded substantial growth, but overall there was a more rapid expansion of purchases of industrial inputs in the form of chemicals and inedible crude materials. (Africa Quarterly Report, July 1990: 11; see also Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below)

Swazi policy-makers argued that this widening trade deficit was due not merely to depreciation of the Lilangeni which makes all imports -- from consumer goods to oil and extensive industrial inputs -- more expensive, but to industrial expansion, particularly the upgrading of the main Matsapha industrial site.16 And given the widespread demand for

16 A second industrial estate is being developed at Nhlangano.
serviceable sites by willing foreign investors, the deficit, policy-makers argued, was temporary. (see below) Their explanations seem to have been borne out since the balance of trade deficit is reported to have narrowed to US $15 million in 1989. (Abecor Country Report, May 1991)

Table 5.2: Swaziland's Structure of Exports

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>140.6</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit &amp; Vegetables</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat &amp; Meat Products</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned Fruit</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawdust</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Exports</td>
<td>110.7</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>331.0</td>
<td>329.7</td>
<td>331.6</td>
<td>375.3</td>
<td>418.0</td>
<td>378.2</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Growth Rate: -2.3% 2.4% 12.0% 63.4% 16.3% n.a. n.a.

Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics

Note: * Provisional

Table 5.3: Swaziland's Structure of Imports

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Live Animals</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>110.7 9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages &amp; Tobacco</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.9 2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Mineral Materials</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.2 1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals, Fuel &amp; Lubricants</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>129.4 10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal &amp; Vegetable Oils &amp; Fats</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.3 0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; Chemical Products</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>63.4 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures Classified by Materials</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>127.0 11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; Transport Equipment</td>
<td>157.6</td>
<td>173.6</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>154.7 27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufactures</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>103.5 6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Commodities</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>119.1</td>
<td>224.0</td>
<td>152.5 17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500.1</td>
<td>627.0</td>
<td>661.5</td>
<td>729.0</td>
<td>609.2</td>
<td>706.7 100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Growth Rate: 11.4% 6.4% 5.5% 10.3% 10.9% 12.1% n.a.

Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics
iii) **Depreciation:** In his 1986 budget speech, Swaziland’s Minister of Finance stated:

The most important single feature of our monetary system is ... our membership of the Rand Monetary Area, and ... members will be aware that negotiations have been in progress with our partners in the area (Lesotho and South Africa) with a view to removing the legal tender status of the rand in Swaziland. This measure alone will not involve a change in the one-to-one relationship between the lilangeni and the rand, but it will give us more flexibility to meet whatever challenges the future may bring. *(Barclays, 1989: 49)*

This decision was taken in response to the precipitous fall in the value of the Rand over the course of the 1980s, especially in the 1984–85 period. (See Table 5.4 below)

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**Table 5.4: Exchange Rate of the Lilangeni, 1978–87**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>2.191</td>
<td>2.269</td>
<td>2.035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EIU Country Profile, 1988–89, Swaziland, 69.*

Depreciation of the Lilangeni has had contradictory effects upon the Swazi economy. On the one hand, depreciation has kept Swazi exports highly competitive with other producers for the world market, and is therefore a positive factor in export growth. On the other hand, depreciation has had a negative effect on the costs of servicing Swaziland’s debt. According to the Department of Economic Planning and Statistics,
Debt service payments on external public and publicly guaranteed debt have grown at an average rate of 40% p.a. over the last five years to over E100 million which largely is a reflection of the depreciation of the Lilangeni since 1984. (1989: 17; see, also, Table 5.5 below)

As can be seen in Table 5.5, growth in Swaziland’s public and publicly-guaranteed debt between 1986/87 and 1987/88 was 4.5%. According to the Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, this "is insignificant, considering the previous years’ growth rates ranging between 12% (1986/87) and 53% (1983/84)." (ibid, 16) And, according to a Standard Chartered Bank report,

The debt service ratio has declined from 10 per cent in 1985/86 to 5.8 per cent in 1988/89 and foreign reserves amounted to 22 weeks of import cover at the end of 1989. In his budget speech finance minister Dlamini noted that the "constraints to future development are not lack of finances, but physical and institutional capacity." (Africa Quarterly Review, July 1990: 11)

Table 5.5: BLS Long-term debt and its ratio to GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Debt Outstanding</th>
<th>% of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>278 282 425 658 109.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>12 76 172 289 4.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>45 204 278 273 15.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unlike most of Sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter Three), Swaziland’s debt, like that of Botswana and Lesotho, remains manageable. And while Swaziland only became a member of the IMF in 1990, the Fund "has always given Swaziland a clean
bill of health." (interview with Patrick, Ministry of Finance, Mbabane, 7 December 1989) 17 More worrisome than debt and depreciation, however, is the lack of control Swazi policy-makers have regarding fiscal policy; hence the decision to delink the Lilangeni from the Rand and to peg it to a basket of currencies based on the US dollar as Botswana has done. 18 (see Section V below)

(iv) **Foreign Investment** and (v) **Government Policy**: Since independence as well as before, governmental policy in Swaziland has always favoured foreign investment. Indeed, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter, the aristocracy has survived in Swaziland precisely because it adapted to capitalist penetration by joining with it. But it was not until very recently that the Swazi state sought to attract and direct foreign investment with any coherent plan in mind. At best, the Swazi government's economic policy was "hands off". This is clearly illustrated in the following speech to the House of Assembly by former Minister of Finance, Leo Lovell, on the eve of Swazi independence:

> If Swaziland were to step out of line, to be the

---

17 Swaziland's total long term debt has risen steadily since independence, from $37 million in 1970 to $204m in 1980 and $273m in 1987. Total debt expressed as a percentage of GNP for the same years is 33%, 38%, and 46% respectively. Total long term debt service as a percentage of GNP has risen from 3.1% in 1970 to 5.2% in 1987; as a percentage of exports it has risen from 2.7% in 1980 to 6.1% in 1987. (World Bank, 1989: 256-57; Table 5.5)

18 At present, the Lilangeni remains at par - indeed interchangeable - with the Rand.
only country which tried to control the profit being sent to the investor, then people will invest in every country but Swaziland ... There are no special plans to encourage the reinvestment of profits ... there should be no restriction on the transfer of profits made in Swaziland by an external investor. (in Bischoff, 1990: 167)

Fifteen years later, Prime Minister Mabandla described government’s role in the economy as "largely limited to providing the physical infrastructure needed for private enterprise to flourish and it is intended to keep it that way." (Times of Swaziland, 12 August 1982) With Swaziland’s decision to join the IMF, accepting the obligations of the Fund’s Article VIII Sections 2-4, this position has now been formalised.

This unabashedly pro-capitalist position has yielded positive results for many Swazi:

Despite its small size ... non-resource foreign investment over the past 20 years or so [i.e. 1968-89] has probably exceeded, both in relative and absolute terms, that of the other countries in the Southern African region (excluding South Africa). (de Vletter, 1989: 143)

This does not mean that Swaziland is without serious problems, however. Until the mid-1980s, investment tended to be of two types: (i) large-scale capital investment, primarily in mining (iron-ore, asbestos, tin, coal, and recently, diamonds) and agro-industry (forestry, woodpulp, sugar and pineapple plantations); and (ii) medium- to small-scale investment that came in search of access to other markets (SACU, EEC, Commonwealth), and/or a highly favorable investment climate, and therefore quick profit. The latter
were classically "footloose" companies involved mainly in manufacture for export and the employment of women (e.g. in television assembly, footwear, textiles). (Harris, 1993; de Vletter, 1989)

In the early 1980s, Swaziland faced increased pressures from oil shocks and global recession. Further, attempts to cope with these and related problems -- e.g. rising inflation, lack of economic growth -- were limited by, on the one hand, the profile of the Swazi political economy itself, and, on the other hand, growing political instability in the region. Attempts to diversify Swaziland’s economy through industrialisation were stymied by South African determination to subsidise similar developments in the bantustans.

According to de Vletter,

Some of these firms, such as the television and radio assembly plant, and smaller concerns (e.g. carpets and cutlery) were victims of competition arising from, or the attractions of, industrial incentives offered by South African homelands. (1989: 145; cf ABB, 1990: 979)

Moreover, SACU provisions concerning protection of infant industries often proved hollow in the face of South African tariffs on necessary inputs; use of the veto to block new industries; threats of delay in payment of revenue, etc. (cf Daniel, 1985 and Maasdorp, 1991 on the demise of a Swazi fertilizer factory in the mid-1980s; and Hanlon, 1986: 81-90)

Clearly, South African policy-makers were responding to increased pressure, particularly sanctions and disinvestment, from the international community. So, Swazi policy-makers, in
spite of the careful cultivation of RSA capital and state interests, bore the brunt of South Africa's "real" interests, in spite of an official foreign policy of cooperation with Swaziland. Hence, the Swazi decision to support constructive engagement rather than oppose it.

In the early 1980s, Swazi policy-makers discovered the perils of footloose industry. Many of these companies responded to South African incentives and moved their operations to the nearby bantustans. Some observers have speculated that South Africa's policy in this period was designed not merely to foster credibility for bantustan "independence", but also to punish BLS policy-makers for their collective "move to the left". (see Bischoff, 1990) Whatever the reasons behind this policy, in combination with global trends the effects were immediately visible. "Over the period 1981-84, almost 6,700 jobs (11.6 per cent of formal sector employment) were lost." (de Vletter, 1989: 145) In response to these developments, on 10 May 1984 Swaziland's Minister of Commerce stated:

Over the past few years we have learnt a number of expensive and sad lessons. We have come to realise that stable industrial growth has to be resource-based and that footloose firms are easily wooed away by financial incentives. (in ibid)

Swazi policy-makers set out to encourage investment for resource-based, export-oriented industrialisation in a more systematic way. At the same time, however, "footloose" companies were not to be discouraged. By August 1985 many had
already begun to respond to disinvestment pressures from the international community. Some that had gone to the Transkei following bantustan investment incentives now sought to return.\textsuperscript{19} Swazi decision makers, however, tended to regard this type of investment more as a short-term gain. Economic planning could not be set up around this type of investment as "it could leave just as quickly as it came." (interview with Patrick, Ministry of Finance, Mbabane, 7 December 89)

Rather, long term investment was to be sought from companies wishing to take advantage of (i) well-entrenched agro-industry -- thereby establishing important forward linkages in the economy; and/or (ii) unexploited natural resources and therefore large capital investment. To facilitate this process the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland was replaced by the Swaziland Industrial Development Corporation. SIDC is a private corporation in which the Swazi government is the major shareholder. According to a report in \textit{Africa Contemporary Record 1987} (B867):

The new institution is worth c. E30m and has been

\textsuperscript{19} According to de Vletter, "A recent analysis of new foreign manufacturing firms establishing in Swaziland since September 1985 found that, of the 15 or so new firms, at least six were Taiwanese and another six were South African, and that half the firms were involved in the making of clothing or textile products." (1989: 146) Further, in de Vletter's survey of "footloose" corporations, conducted in 1986, he points out that of those firms that responded to his questionnaire (31 out of 70), two-thirds were South African or held joint ownership with South African capital (17 and 3 respectively). (ibid 148)
inaugurated with participation by the West German Development Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the Dutch Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation and Barclays and Standard Banks. According to the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Derek von Wissell, the new company "will invest only where commercial viability is expected, although the availability of loans on preferential terms will obviously widen the scope of its activity."

That SIDC is a vast improvement over NIDCS, or any other parastatal in which bureaucratic procedure is hampered by the pecadillos of traditional rule, is readily acknowledged by the donor community. Whereas important ministerial decisions can be overturned simply by an appeal to the King (interview with Patrick, Ministry of Finance, Mbabane, 7 December 89), the SIDC stands outside such constraints. According to a member of the EC mission to Swaziland, "When you do business with Tibiyo you travel a greasy road; with the SIDC it is a concrete path." (interview with O'Cuneen, EC Head of Mission, Mbabane, 7 December 1989)²⁰

Since 1987 the Matsapha industrial estate has been upgraded to accommodate new companies. According to a report in the Times of Swaziland entitled "Growth boom dawns",

²⁰ However, administrative and political obstacles remain legion in Swaziland and continue to frustrate the donor community. In the mid-1980s, responding to a warning from the IMF that its "accounts were a shambles", the Swazi government contracted an economist from the EC to help "bring things together". But getting one's accounts in order did not improve the tendency toward non-cooperation between Ministries, the continuing lack of reliable data, the duplication within the system, and the unending bureaucratic "red tape". (See, Levin, 1987: 163; Ayee, 1984: 77-84; also, personal communications, 5/7/8.12.89; cf Selwyn, 1975)
A favourable combination of political factors and preferential tariffs for locally manufactured products in lucrative Western markets inspires an almost unprecedented aura of confidence in the industrial sector in the Kingdom ... Proof of the renewed interest of industrial investors in coming to Swaziland can be seen in the booming development at Matsapha industrial area, the country's best developed industrial site. "The Matsapha industrial estate is booming," enthuses a senior official of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism ... "Far more new investors have been coming in than in previous years, particularly export-based (oriented) manufacturers." (25.2.1987; see, also, "Matsapha is centre-stage", ibid)

While many of the firms which have set up in Swaziland since 1987 are the footloose type (manufacturing, among other things, clothing, industrial gloves, zippers, footwear, and laces: see, de Vletter, 1989; Harris, 1993), many others fit the preferred business profiles previously outlined. For example, the much-heralded relocation of Coca-Cola with an initial minimum investment of E15 million complements Swaziland's sugar industry, as does the 1989 establishment of the Candy World factory. The National Textile Corporation of Swaziland, also established in 1989, has the capacity for "producing the equivalent of 3,220 tonnes of high grade polyester cotton yarn per annum for the knitting and weaving industry." (Barclays, 1989: 39). De Vletter (1989: 146) states that, in contrast to the "striking" scarcity of forward linkages identified by Selwyn in 1975, "it is becoming more difficult to distinguish between 'footloose' and 'resource-based' investments." He cites the following as evidence of Swazi success in attracting more stable forms of
investment:

Neopac (cardboard packaging; inputs from pulp mill), Swazi Pine and Wood Master (furniture manufacturers; inputs from saw mills), Beral Brake Linings (inputs from asbestos mine), Swazican (fruit canners, who in addition to their own pineapples, process citrus from other plantations), and Swaziland Bottling Co. (sugar from local mills). Future investment plans with linkages include: textiles and knitwear (cotton from the ginnery), sewing-machine bobbins and cable drums (wood) and tissues and cardboard rolls (pulp). (ibid)

Table 5.6, seen below, illustrates the success Swaziland, Botswana, and Lesotho have had in establishing forward (and backward -- e.g. Swazi brickworks established at Mpaka which takes advantage of high-grade clay in the area and also provides for the relative construction boom that is underway at Matsapha) linkages in their economies. Moreover, this has been accomplished at a time when the rest of the region has had great difficulty in attracting foreign investment. Given the number of relocations from South Africa, it seems valid to assert that much of this growth is due to destabilisation. That Swazi policy-makers have responded to this opportunity and been able to attract companies willing to use Swazi raw materials and therefore render them somewhat less than "footloose" is a credit to their initiative. This may be contrasted with Lesotho, for example, which has far fewer natural resources to draw upon; and Botswana, whose manufacturing value added (MVA) is almost solely the result of new canning facilities for Botswana
beef.21

In terms of natural resource exploitation, two industries in particular are worth noting. First is the joint state-Tibiyo owned Simunye sugar mill which became operational in the later 1980s. The estate began with operations 60% mechanised in the first year of production; a development of which the IMF was initially very critical given Swaziland’s high unemployment rate, professed commitment to labour-intensive industry, and the relatively inexpensive wage rates paid to cutters. Simunye has now phased out mechanical harvesting altogether, however. According to a recent report in Africa Research Bulletin, "[p]roduction topped 500,000 tonnes in 1986, but has averaged 450,000 tonnes or so for the past three years (ARB, 16 Oct-15 Nov, 1990: 10155)

The second development worth noting is the establishment of a new coal mine at Maloma with Danish support. Barclays recently reported (Africa Quarterly Review, July 1990: 11):

Carbonex Ltd., a company formed by Denmark’s Giersing Rose and Superfos, together with the local company, Inyatsi Construction is now carrying out a feasibility study into the mining of high quality coal. Carbonex expects to make an investment of more than E30 million to establish an underground mining operation that will produce some 300,000 tonnes of saleable anthracite annually, adding a projected E20 million to exports. The operation is

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21 The EC’s technical advisor to the Minister of Finance credits the Minister himself, rather than SIDC, with the successful expansion of manufacturing in Swaziland. (interview with Patrick, Ministry of Finance, Mbabane, 3 December 1989)
likely to become the first mining sector investment not dominated by South African capital.

According to a May 1991 Abecor Country Report, development of this mine, which began in 1991, would help offset the negative economic impact of the early 1991 closing of the exhausted Havelock asbestos mine. (ibid)

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**Table 5.6: Manufacturing Value Added 1970/87**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MVA (US$ millions) (constant 1980 prices)</th>
<th>Rates of Growth (% p.a.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>1247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>2395</td>
<td>3247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** SADCC Regional Economic Survey, 1988, 182.

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**(IV) Conclusion: Substructural Constraints and Sharpening Political Contradictions**

In reviewing such seemingly positive economic developments over the last five years or so, the Swazi government itself is quite cautious of longer term prospects. (ARB, 16 Oct-15 Nov, 1990: 10155) A 1989 EIU country report is less equivocal in its assessment:

On the surface, the Swaziland economy appears to be buoyant and viable. Success in developing export oriented agro-industry means that the country no longer features as one of the world’s 25 least developed countries... Nevertheless, many of the features of an underdeveloped economy are present, and economic development has been uneven and
distorted. The country is highly dependent on a single export crop - sugar - and external economic structures and trends. (1989: 69)

These economic problems are intricately related to political developments and hence to the question of "security and development for whom?" As stated at the outset of this chapter, Swazi policy-makers have throughout history equated "state security" with "regime security". In periods of acute regional political crisis, state and regime security do tend to overlap; hence, the functional utility of Swazi conservative foreign policy in the post-independence period. But at the same time, such an approach merely postpones more deeply-rooted domestic threats to the overall stability of the Swazi social formation. The aristocracy has worked since independence to coopt some of the more identifiable threats to the stability of the Swazi social formation and hence to Dlamini dominance. To briefly review the process: (i) Tibiyo provided the aristocracy with a highly profitable material base of support; (ii) embourgeoisement coopted the budding petit bourgeoisie; (iii) expanding economic productivity - facilitated by deepening links with South African capital, state-directed development programmes, and foreign assistance - coopted the peasantry and migrant laborers by giving them a stake in the capitalist mode of production; and (iv) overall economic growth at a time when much the rest of the region was in decline earned the approval of the international capitalist community while stifling critics at home.
However, as South Africa moves toward post-apartheid, Mozambique toward an end to civil war and a new beginning with liberal economic and political programmes; and Lesotho toward multi-party democracy, Swaziland's long-standing support for the status quo is coming more and more into question. While there can be no doubt that Swazi foreign policy has prevented Swaziland from becoming part of the bloody battleground for majority rule in South Africa, there can also be no doubt that the few have benefited over the many from such a policy position; "trickle-down" has not always trickled too far down. Support for the status quo may no longer be tenable when the visible, political part of it is so evidently changing. The dilemma facing Swazi policymakers in the 1990s is a difficult one: how to simultaneously maintain Dlamini control -- which requires quite rigid and authoritarian structures, i.e. "traditionalism" -- and economic growth -- which may require fundamental transformation of a land tenure system which to this point in time has facilitated that control.

In assessing prospects for Swazi security and development in the 1990s one must consider the interrelationship of six fundamentally important issues, all of which arise out of Swaziland's continuing commitment to laissez-faire economic development and pragmatic inter-state relations in a changing regional and global political economic environment: (1) external penetration and control of
the economy; (2) the trend toward monocropping and capital intensive development; (3) growing unemployment and the need for migrant labour opportunities; (4) vagaries of climate and eroding environment; (5) the liberal economic philosophy of the Swazi ruling elite; and (6) the political contradictions -- e.g. questions of democracy and private property hinted at above -- arising out of issues (1) through (4). Each of these issues will be given brief attention.

(IV.1) External Penetration and Control

Mineral development in Swaziland is representative of the limited cause for optimism in recent growth trends. Much of Swaziland's "mini boom" is the result of South African capital investment. (Indeed, the coal mine at Maloma is the first mineral operation not to be controlled by South African capital.) This new investment is to be added to an already existing domination of the Swazi economy -- outside agro-industry which itself is dominated by British capital -- by South African capital. And this South African capital domination can be added to the existing dominance of South African macro-economic policy over Swazi "decision-makers".

Government revenues have long been dominated by Customs Union receipts (see Table 5.7); industrial policy is restricted by the provisions of SACU; monetary policy is in the hands of South African decision makers -- Swaziland "imports" both South African inflations and devaluations and is often forced to follow suit when, for example, in 1989
South Africa decided to increase general sales tax. It is
defenceless when South African policy-makers decide to
withhold payment of Customs Union receipts. The decision to
delink the Lilangeni from the Rand is a small step toward
trying to deal with this lack of autonomy.

To this point in time there remains a confluence of
interest between Swazi and South African capital. Indeed, one
might argue that Swaziland’s official position -- i.e.
condemnation of racial oppression but open support for
laissez-faire capitalism -- is akin to that long espoused by
former Anglo American director, Gavin Reilly. (cf Daniel &
Vilane, 1986) Yet, continuing political unrest in South
Africa has placed very real strains on this "ideology of
capitalism", so much so that Swazi policy-makers have sought
viable alternatives to continuing economic subordination. At
present these alternatives -- a de jure delinked but de facto
interchangeable Lilangeni, sales and company taxes designed
to offset budgetary dependence on Customs Union receipts --
pale in comparison to the inter-linkages.

Swazi policy-makers keenly await the formally
anticipated negotiations over land with post-apartheid South
Africa, believing that an extension of Swaziland to the sea
will provide it with the necessary opportunities to delink
from the Customs Union Agreement: i.e. the fanciful notion of
Swaziland "as the next Hong Kong". Some rumours even persist
of the creation of a "little Philippines" with an American
Table 5.7: Swaziland's Major Components of Government Revenue

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue &amp; Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Customs Union Receipts</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>130.4</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>116.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Company Tax</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Personal Income &amp; Grants</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sales Tax</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Revenue</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Grants</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue &amp; Grants</td>
<td>185.3</td>
<td>212.3</td>
<td>244.8</td>
<td>255.1</td>
<td>337.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recurrent Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>110.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods &amp; Services</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies &amp; Transfers</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt Interest</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Recurrent Expenditure</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>170.5</td>
<td>217.7</td>
<td>235.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Capital Expenditure

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Net Lending</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cap. &amp; Net Lnd.</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>50.3</td>
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</table>

Total Expenditure & Net Lnd

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Surplus (Deficit)</td>
<td>-19.8</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
<td>-49.5</td>
<td>-21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Financing (Net)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Financing (Net)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>-27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(IV.2) Monocropping and Capital Intensive Development

The Swazi economy generally, like its mining industry, is tending toward capital-intensive development. This means that Swaziland's economy, like its ex-High Commission counterparts, continues to grow while, at the same time, unemployment is becoming an ever more serious problem. This results, in part, from global trends, so Swazi policy-makers are not solely to blame. Nevertheless, the lack of job opportunities for many young Swazis, juxtaposed to the great
wealth evident on plantations and enjoyed by many in the ruling elite cannot be ignored. Moreover, this contradiction has been sharpening over the course of the 1980s, and is becoming one of the focal points for student unrest. (*Africa Watch Report*, April 1991: 97-107)

The economy is also becoming increasingly dependent on a single crop, sugar, for its export revenue. Sugar provided 39% of total foreign earnings in 1985 and this percentage is said to be increasing. (*EIU Country Profile*, 1989; *ASS*, 1990) The dependence on sugar, a primary commodity whose price and sales are highly variable given changing tastes in Northern markets, is particularly worrisome. Fortunately, the world price for sugar has been relatively stable for the last five years, and the Lome agreement ensures a fairly steady source for exports and revenue.

However, buoyant commodity prices and high demand are slow to benefit the majority of Swazi. As with business everywhere, competitiveness depends on efficiency, which means either increasing mechanisation or labour-intensity at very low wage rates. Sugar is dominated by foreign capital which freely repatriates profits; employs cheap Mozambican migrant labour; and is slow to develop forward linkages in

22 Of eight commodities exported by African countries - i.e. copper, gold, aluminum, coffee, cocoa, sugar, cotton, rubber, and oil - only one, sugar, has experienced a price increase over the last twelve months. Sugar's price has rise by about 4% over the period 1991-1992. (*Africa Recovery*, August 1992: 31)
the economy. Even where government intervention has helped ensure enhanced job opportunities, as in the case of Simunye, wage rates are so low as to be exploitative. Sub-subsistence wage rates, coupled with seasonal employment at best make the sugar (and citrus and cotton) plantations potential "hotbeds" of labour unrest. The over-abundance of cheap labour and the lack of other employment opportunities may still serve to keep labour relatively docile, however.

(IV.3) Migrant Labour and (Under)Employment

In Chapter Four we saw how central employment opportunities for migrant labour and remittances are to the Basotho economy, especially to the reproductive capacity of the rural household. In Lesotho, the general unproductivity of the land, the vagaries of climate, the negative impact of cheap South African imports via the Customs Union, the persistence of communal forms of land tenure, and the lack of formal sector employment opportunities ensure that the Basotho will continue to view migrant labour, particularly to the mines of South Africa, as both a fundamental necessity and attractive "option".

In Swaziland, while the numbers of migrants are not nearly so high (see Table 4.4) as they are in Lesotho, given the difficulties of job creation in the former, migrant labour is no less important. Moreover, this comparable importance is of relatively recent vintage. For example, whereas Lesotho already had 78,000 migrants in South Africa
in 1908, Swaziland had just 8,000. And, while Lesotho’s complement had risen dramatically to between 155,000 - 200,000 by 1966, the number of Swazi migrants had actually declined to 6,000 in 1967. (See, Ashton, 1967: 162; Leys, 1982: 14; Woodward, 1982: 175; Paton, 1991: 224; and Waitzenegger et al, 1970: 412-44)

As stated above, Swaziland faces an unemployment crisis. And while job creation has remained relatively buoyant since 1986 (i.e. 1986: 4.4%; 1987: 6.8%; 1988: 6.3%)²³, in absolute terms, the number of Swazi added to the overall population -- @3.0% per annum -- far outstrips the number of jobs being created. More alarming, for un(der)employed Swazi especially, is the fact that "[e]xpatriate workers accounted for 16% of agricultural employment in the economy in 1986 and 13.3% of skilled agricultural employment." (SADCC, 1988: 236)

Swaziland is somewhat an unusual case in that it experiences simultaneous labour outflows and inflows. Historical flows of Mozambican migrants to Swaziland during Portuguese colonial rule, brought in to work on sugar plantations, is further illustration of the Swazi ruling elite’s willingness to deal with inter-state issues irrespective of race or other domestic criteria, in so far as

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²³ There are some wild discrepancies in data. The quoted statistics are drawn from the Department of Economic Planning and Statistics excerpted in Barclays Business Guide to Swaziland (1989: 22). However, the Central Bank provides somewhat different figures for 1986 (91,621 employed; 7.5% increase) and 1987 (94,737 employed; 3.4% increase). (See Annual Report 1987/88: 39).
it serves their political and economic interests.

Crush (1987) illustrates the early battles between settler farms and South African mines for Swazi labour. And, up until 1976, Swazi were as likely to migrate to jobs within Swaziland as they were to go to South Africa. However, the rapid rise in mine wages in the latter in the mid- to late-1970s made it the workplace of choice. Paton (1991: 227), citing Doran (1977: 29), provides a compelling illustration. In 1970, South African mine wages averaged E176 per year as compared with Swazi urban working wages (E467/year) and Swazi rural income (E32/year). By 1976, however, while Swazi real rural income had remained the same, and real urban income had risen only slightly, real mine income in South Africa had risen by a phenomenal 287%. So, whereas the 1970 mine/urban income ratio was .38, by 1976 the same ratio was 1.26. From this, Paton concludes, "The political significance of jobs abroad was now rivalling their economic importance." (ibid)

In 1976, of over 30,000 total absenteees, 21,000 Swazi were employed on South Africa's mines. Ironically, this was "causing labour shortages at home, where they still enjoyed the best employment alternatives of any national group of migrants abroad in the region." (Paton, 1991: 227; cf Doran, 1977: 8; de Vletter, 1982: 116) Rather than place restrictions on the number of Swazi allowed to migrate, the government chose instead to increase the number of Mozambican migrants into Swaziland. In this way, it was able to please
both settler and international capital which were desperately short of labour, as well as native Swazi keen on high paying South African employment. The Department of Labour announced a policy of "free labour mobility" making it clear to the Chamber of Mines that it was free to recruit as many Swazi as it wished. (Paton, 1991: 228) The reasoning behind this policy was twofold.

[First], "[t]he sacrifice of the best jobs for many Swazi - in order to supply more laborers to the worst-paying domestic sectors [i.e. plantation labour] - was politically unacceptable both domestically and vis a vis Pretoria." (ibid: 233)

[Second], Swaziland’s rulers were probably very tempted to restrict migration abroad at times, but were leery of ex-South African migrants’ active political dispositions. It would not have been prudent to restrict the access to work in South Africa of their political opposition’s strongest potential base, even though it would lower wages and increase laborers’ numbers at home. (ibid: 228)

The ruling elite were handsomely rewarded for their laissez faire attitude. According to Paton,

Such careful bargaining - compared to the bitter confrontations over labor flows in which Pretoria was embroiled with Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho - earned the Swazi monarchy Pretoria’s enduring support. Swaziland emerged in the second half of the 1980s as the trusted supplier whose cohort was rapidly increased to its highest stable level in history. (1991: 230)

And, unlike earlier struggles over Swazi labour, the main importance of migrant labour was no longer revenue for the ruling elite; rather, it was "the provision of jobs to the growing crowd of unemployed." (ibid) Given the dearth of alternatives, it is clearly in the best interest of both
governing elite and migrant labour (and their dependants) that these flows be protected. And, in the context of regional destabilisation, "such careful bargaining" vis a vis migrant labour can be seen as the economic correlate of Swaziland's security pact made with South Africa. Similar deals have been struck by Botswana and Basotho policy-makers vis a vis their respective complements of migrant labour. (see Chapters Four and Six)

However, in the context of South Africa's move toward post-apartheid, the possibility of retrenched Swazi labour and the concomitant social disruptions it would create pose very real threats to regime security there.

(IV.4) Climate and Environment

Declining prices, widespread damage caused by cyclone Domoina which struck in January 1984, and the worst drought "in living memory" have led to seriously declining returns to investment in the agricultural sector. The drought has affected "one-third of Swaziland's cultivated area". Given that agro-industrial areas are fairly well insulated (but not immune) from the effects of drought, this means that nearly half of SNL is being seriously affected. In other words, those least capable of withstanding the effects of drought, are those being most affected. This is partially reflected in the statistics for maize production between 1985/86 and 1986/87, the latter being a year not of drought, but one when the rains merely came late. In 1985/86, 58,276 hectares of
maize were planted on SNL yielding 126,629 tonnes. However, in 1986/87, 57,579 ha. were planted yielding only 87,206 tonnes. Statistics for cotton were equally alarming. (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1988: 29) Reports indicate that Swaziland required food imports of between 60-66,000 tonnes in 1992 alone. (Times, London, 9.3.1992; Africa Recovery, August 1992: 25)

During the destabilisation years, few starved or were killed in Swaziland. The UNDP reports that Swazis had access to an average 105% of their daily calorie requirements available to them during 1984-86. (UNDP, 1991: 145) Food aid and/or farm inputs were available to most Swazi throughout the 1977-89 period, especially those located on or close to RDAs. Moreover, the traditional social support network ensured that everyone had enough to eat. Swazis are not new to the effects of drought, disease, and other climatic mishaps, which have recurred through history. Like people everywhere, they are willing to take the necessary steps to provide food for themselves and their families. Yet, in times of acute economic distress, conflict over social organisation tends to heighten. The continuing drought in Southern Africa further threatens Dlamini rule. And, unlike Botswana, the Swazi ruling elite can not draw on diamond revenues or heightened levels of foreign aid to appease the peasantry.

(IV.5) Economic Philosophy
At a time when most of Sub-Saharan Africa has been forced to accept IMF and IBRD structural adjustment cross conditionalities in return for new loans, Swaziland has long been structurally adjusting. Depending on one's analytical perspective, the "clean bill of health" regularly given Swaziland by the IMF and mentioned above is either to be seen as a very positive sign (the modernisationist position as supported by, for example, Maasdorp) or a very negative one (the neo-Marxist position as supported by Daniel). For example, the modernisationist position might take the following position:

By African standards Swaziland can be considered something of an economic success story: the mean economic growth rate since independence has exceeded that of population, so that real per capita incomes have increased; consumer goods are widely available even in the remotest rural store; educational and health standards have improved as has physical infrastructure; recent research suggests that there are no clear rural-urban income differentials; and foreign investment has found the country relatively attractive. (Maasdorp, 1991: 235)

Maasdorp goes on to state that "there is a debit side", noting disparities between rich and poor, the trend toward monocrop dependency, and increasing numbers of "absolute poor". But, on balance, one might argue, as does Maasdorp, Swaziland has done quite well for a very small country in a very difficult region during a very difficult period. (ibid)

Neo-marxists are less inclined to see any improvements, focussed as they are on the general inequities of the capitalist system writ large. To wit, unless the capitalist
system is transformed altogether, any benefits to Swaziland are bound to be transient in nature and limited in scope. (Daniel, 1983; Davies et al, 1985; Daniel & Vilane, 1986) And if one focuses on selected indicators of human development, the radical perspective can be supported. (see Table 5.8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>BOTSWANA</th>
<th>LESOTHO</th>
<th>SWAZILAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop'n Below Poverty Line: 1980-88</td>
<td>51 (total)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 (rural)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate: 1989 (deaths per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46 (water)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 (sanitation)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(IV.6) Political Contradictions

The evidence presented in this chapter seems to support Maasdorp in the short-term, but points toward serious contradictions that are now being exposed as apartheid rule in South Africa is coming to an end. To this point, the ruling Dlamini aristocracy has been well-served by a conservative foreign policy and laissez-faire capitalist approach to accumulation (i.e. pursuit of the status quo). I have tried to illustrate how the aristocracy has coopted all sectors of the population toward the status quo. These sectors have, in turn, allowed themselves to be coopted for
survival or for profit.

In macro-economic terms, Swaziland has prospered during a period in regional political economic relations when others, particularly Mozambique, have suffered greatly for their, or their leaders’, purported principles. Moreover, Swaziland now finds that Mozambique, after 15 years of civil strife, is moving toward the established Swazi position, forced, not only by South African destabilisation, but by donor conditionalities. (cf Mittelman, 1991) Now that all states in the region are marching in lock-step to the tune of structural adjustment conditionalities, there would seem to be little reason for Swaziland to change course now.

But prolonged student unrest, leading to the creation of two movements for democracy -- PUDEMO and SWAYOCO -- hunger strikers, increased unionisation, and even criticism from the chiefs, suggest that not all may be well with a structurally adjusted political economy. (Levin, 1991) Many young Swazis have made their point clear: it is time for popular participation in government. And given that "multi-party democracy" has become a cross conditionality among international donors, the demands of Swazi students are not to be taken lightly. Authoritarian Lesotho's recent moves toward multi-partyism, and democratic Botswana's continuing "love affair" with the international community, are twin testimonies to the strength of donor demands.

The challenge for Dlamini rule is to democratise itself
without sacrificing its position at the apex of the Swazi social formation: how to facilitate democratic government without giving up power. This sounds paradoxical, but it is possible. Swaziland may look to neighbouring South Africa for answers: the transfer of political power, coupled with the maintenance of economic hegemony. Reproduction of Dlamini hegemony is facilitated through Tibiyo and countless other private holdings. Hence, the monarchy might consider stepping aside and assuming a titular role. Of course, this is easier said than done; the history books are littered with accounts of many less-well entrenched monarchs who have refused to forego political, let alone economic, power.

Those in pursuit of democratisation, however, have ill-considered the prospects of an end to monarchy and the existent land tenure system. In the present climate of global economic liberalisation, privatisation, etc., an end to the present land tenure system could conceivably lead to a repetition of the 1907 partition, only this time through the market. In the absence of monarchical authority many ordinary Swazi may find themselves as did their forebears -- i.e. as squatters on someone else’s land. The increasing marginalisation of Botswana’s peasantry is also instructive in this regard. (see Chapter Six)

This does not resolve the issue of structural adjustment and increasing impoverishment. Under Swaziland’s de facto structural adjustment policy, the poor are left to fend for
themselves, with only the weakest of safety nets. Holding this net, on the one side, are the "traditional" mores of Swazi society previously identified (interview with Mulalo, UNDP, Mbabane, 9 December 1989; cf Levin, 1991; Vilane, 1986). On the other side of the net are a wide assortment of NGOs operating independently, or in concert with government and each other to improve the lot of the rural poor. Bischoff (1990: 191), for one, is very critical of such an approach, claiming it is palliative rather than productive. And while others, such as Levin (1991: 18-19), may feel confident in claiming that "[t]he prevailing mood in the country suggests that Swaziland's political future could be based on a constitutional monarchy with a multi-party electoral system", this does not address the sub-structural pressures confronting the Swazi social formation.
CHAPTER SIX

Botswana: A Brief Window of Opportunity

(I) Introduction

Botswana's post-independence transformation from colonial backwater to Africa's fastest growing economy is a "success" story not to be denied. All conventional indicators of "human welfare" and "economic growth" show marked improvement in the macro (economic) performance of the Botswana economy, a deepening of its material base and a spreading of the generated wealth throughout Botswana society. (see Table 3.7) Moreover, Botswana has managed to maintain a functioning, multi-party democracy throughout its 26 years of independence; a situation unheard of in post-colonial African political economy. (Good, 1992; Harvey & Lewis, 1990; Stedman, ed., 1993) Perhaps most remarkable of all, is the fact that these achievements have come in the face of extremely hostile regional geo-political and international politico-economic contexts.

Botswana's "success" is not an unequivocal one, however. In this chapter I seek to demonstrate that while pragmatic approaches to security and development have thus far paid substantial dividends to both elite and mass, "pragmatism" in the form of a neo-classical approach to capitalist development is ultimately destabilising. The liberal
commitment to capitalist development throws up contradictions whose potential negative consequences for the Botswana social formation are more far-reaching and long-lasting than South Africa's policy of regional politico-military destabilisation. As will be seen, this path to economic "development" serves to heighten internal contradictions between, for example, the needs of elite and mass, market and environment, and burgeoning human population and limited carrying capacity of the land. In this way, I suggest, Botswana's recent and relative economic "success", like that in both Lesotho and Swaziland, is being accompanied by serious costs. And these costs, if left unattended, will threaten not only the long-term prospects for Botswanan democracy, but the very existence of the social formation itself. (cf Good, 1993; and Niemann, 1993)

(I.1) "Success", Foreign Policy, and Security

Part of Botswana's success is due to the way in which the country's leadership has defined and approached its security problematique. At independence, Seretse Khama and his "new men" (Picard, 1987), found themselves as governors of a state which shared borders with two hostile, racist regimes. The regime to the north -- Rhodesia -- found sympathisers among Botswana's white settlers in the Francistown region. The regime to the south -- South Africa -- had created a homeland for Setswana speakers along the border with Botswana which included the former administrative
centre for Bechuanaland at Mafekeng. Fully two-thirds of all Setswana speakers found themselves resident not in independent Botswana, but in the Boputatswana bantustan, which gained nominal independence along with the Transkei in 1977, in the first round of homeland "self-government". Thus, in addition to being surrounded, except for its "technical border" with Zambia (Hanlon, 1986), by hostile sovereign and renegade states, newly independent Botswana, historically and currently little more than a transport corridor, inherited juridical borders that did not reflect the reality of regionalism in Southern Africa. Weak, surrounded, and penetrated, Botswana’s leadership chose a pragmatic course which clearly defined the security problematique in realist terms.

Botswana’s main threats, as with those facing Lesotho and Swaziland, struck at the integrity of the Batswana social formation. Externally, the very existence of the state was challenged by politico-military threats from South Africa and Rhodesia. Internally, the weakness of Botswana’s economic base, and the lack of indigenous control over what little physical plant and capital investment did exist, brought into question the capacity of the social formation to reproduce itself without handouts from the international community. Clearly, at independence, the Botswana state was less coherently formed than that of either Lesotho or Swaziland. Botswana is a large, mostly arid territory, with a small,
rural, uneducated, ethnically mixed and spatially segregated population. Faced with an incredibly harsh climate and an equally forbidding geo-strategic situation, Botswana policymakers found little room for manoeuvre at independence.

In such a situation, it is hardly surprising that the Botswana political elite pursued regime-survival oriented foreign and domestic policies. Molutsi (1988), for example, argues that Botswana's political elite has pursued a pragmatic, pro-capitalist path of diplomacy and development in order to foster its own interests to the detriment of the increasingly pauperised and marginalised majority; similar arguments having been made by, for example, Daniel vis a vis the Swazi monarchy, and Sejanamane, vis a vis Chief Jonathan, in Lesotho.

Granted, the laissez-faire approach has had some serious side-effects, which will be discussed below. In general, though, Botswana's security and development policies, like laissez-faire Swaziland's, have met with widespread domestic approval. Botswana has been blessed with surplus capital so that the government has been able to spread the wealth around. Indeed, the majority of Batswana have fared relatively well under the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) since they were first elected in 1965. The government has been clever in attracting foreign aid and using a pragmatic diplomatic approach to mollify both the West and its dangerous neighbours. Its efficient allocation of foreign aid
resources and favorable treatment of foreign investment have made Botswana the "darling" of the Western donor community.¹

The regime has been careful not to alienate South African capital, in fact entering into numerous agreements and joint ventures with South African firms in the areas of minerals, services, manufactures, etc. The government has emphasised negotiation over confrontation, sought to increase Botswana's complement of foreign labour in the Republic, and fostered embourgeoisement at home. At every step both multinational and national capital have been supported by government. In turn, the governing elite have been well rewarded by these sources of capital.

(I.2) Contrasting Analyses

Botswana is not without its problems, however. The radical critique of it is similar to that levelled at Swazi policy makers. Perhaps most devastatingly and consistently put forward by Colclough & Macarthy (1980), Molutsi (1987), Parson (1977, 1983) and Tsie (1989), this perspective acts as an important foil to otherwise almost uniformly optimistic modernisationist perspectives. The neo-Marxist perspective regards Southern Africa as an integrated region whose various

¹ This may be contrasted with both Lesotho and Swaziland, where (i) the inefficient allocation of resources, coupled with (ii) forms of government increasingly unattractive to Western donors (i.e. military in the case of the former and monarchical in the case of the latter) increase the likelihood that each will receive less aid in a post-apartheid Southern Africa. This, therefore, may heighten regime insecurity.
parts are characterised by uneven development fostered by capitalist penetration and exploitation of both human and natural resources. In Botswana's case, this perspective takes colonial neglect and the deliberate incorporation of the protectorate into the regional political economy as a labour reserve as its point of departure. (Murray & Parson, 1991)

The colonial government's later support for the BDP, to the exclusion of more radical pan-Africanist-oriented parties, and Khama's unbridled support for economic and political liberalism are seen as evidence of the emergence of a *comprador* elite.

Given this capitalist alliance, the radical perspective is unconvinced of Botswana's economic "success". Instead, it sees any such "success" as narrowly defined within Western capitalist parameters, and narrowly distributed among a few already privileged groups in Botswana society: the bureaucratic bourgeoisie; settler and other large cattle owners; petty agricultural commodity producers; and multinational capital, which some critics define as the "grande bourgeoisie". (Kostiuk, 1984; cf Morrison, 1993)

The modernisationists (e.g. Henderson, 1974; Lewis, 1993)\(^2\) applaud Khama's initial and Masire's subsequent

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\(^2\) States Henderson: "The importance of ideological argument and political rhetoric is frequently underestimated. If reference is made back to the ideological struggle between nationalism in South Africa and the forces of liberalism as represented by the African National Congress, it can be clearly shown that the liberalism of the ANC and the statements that it made were one means whereby
realistic assessments of Botswana's limited prospects for self-generating development and hence express support for the mineral- and meat-led export strategy. Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, criticise him for pursuing a course which enriches the few at the expense of the many. Molutsi (1988) and Segoma (1989), for example, illustrate how a "cattleocracy" has instituted policies which have dispossessed peasants of land, thus further marginalising them, rather than helping them acquire the means for their own reproduction. Moreover, the capital-intensive development of Botswanan minerals has to this point in time provided the means by which Botswana's ruling elite can offer palliative care to the rural poor, but cannot ensure their reproduction, let alone increased standard of living, in the long run. (see, for example, Moorsom & Cliffe, 1979; Segoma, 1989; Booth, 1992)³

³ Bischoff, for example, has made the same argument against capitalist development in Swaziland. Regarding the allocation of aid in the rural areas, he states: "Apart from

international interest in South Africa was maintained... Furthermore, the strength of liberal ideology in the Southern African situation should never be under-valued. It is frequently forgotten that liberalism in Southern Africa is in the mind of the Nationalist Party a revolutionary philosophy." (1974: 40,41) This perspective again begs the question raised by Swazi policy-makers' performance in the last chapter, viz is a commitment to non-racialism enough, or must liberation involve relief from the capitalist mode of production? (i.e. the "radical nationalist" perspective) The "pragmatic" response from both Swazi and Batswana policy-makers to this criticism, however, is the same one presently directed at the ANC in South Africa: "If we desire to replace the capitalist mode of production, what will we replace it with?"
As with the Swazi case, neither of these analytic positions has a monopoly on truth. A more nuanced analysis falls somewhere in between these polar perspectives. Thus, the modernisationist/Realist perspective contributes at least two important points. First, Botswana’s policy-makers have managed to minimise the damage done to both property and person from Rhodesian UDI and South African destabilisation. The comparative and unhappy experiences of Mozambique and Angola are instructive in this regard. Second, they have simultaneously managed to turn Botswana into Africa’s most consistently growing economy. This they have done at a time when most countries on the continent have been sinking under the weight of debt and structural adjustment. (see Chapter Three)

The neo-Marxist critique highlights a number of important caveats, however. First, this success is likely to be short-term and unsustainable much beyond the life of the diamond mines. So, long-term growth prospects do not look as promising as the experience of the first 25 years. Botswana faces serious challenges to both long-term growth and expanding human welfare. Minerals are a depleting, non-renewable resource; the cattle industry is threatened both by environmental change and degradation of the land; Botswana’s beef quotas are by no means assured beyond the present Lome

raising a small elite cadre of cotton farmers it did, on the whole, come to accept the purpose of aid on SNL as ameliorative..." (1990: 191)
agreement; export-oriented, capitalist economic development is vulnerable to both changing external terms of trade and internal relations of production. Moreover, increasing numbers of cattle and people, the latter of which are living longer and making ever more demands upon the state, place extraordinary stresses upon the natural and administrative environments. (See, for example, Moorsom & Cliffe, 1979; Molutsi, 1988; Parson, 1984)

Botswana's policy-makers recognise these facts. (Harvey, ed., 1981; Harvey & Lewis, 1990) Far from the unwitting, easily manipulated compradors described in the radical critique, such policy-makers have chosen to proceed with caution knowing full well that the "African success story" can easily turn to failure. The ready nine per cent devaluation of the Pula in the wake of the 1981/82 slump in diamond prices is illustrative of such an approach: careful channeling of capital investment in productive sectors of the economy mixed with the provision and extension of basic social services into the rural areas. (Quinn et al, 1988; Lewis, 1993: 20)

Contrary to what the radical critique says, however, there is widespread support for this approach among Botswana. And unlike most African countries, Botswana are able to express this support through the ballot box. The BDP's consistently high percentage of votes (between 70-80%) and seats (from 28 out of 31 in 1965 to 31 out of 34 in 1989)
over the course of six elections is testimony in this regard. (Bernard, 1990: 4-5; see Table 6.1) The question remains, however, will "pragmatic" capitalist development yield the same beneficial results for the stability of the social formation as have pragmatic, status quo-oriented, high-political decisions?

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**Table 6.1: Electoral Results in Botswana, 1965-1989**

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electeurs inscrits</td>
<td>188950</td>
<td>156533</td>
<td>236848</td>
<td>243483</td>
<td>293571</td>
<td>367069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrages exprimés</td>
<td>140789</td>
<td>76858</td>
<td>64011</td>
<td>134496</td>
<td>227756</td>
<td>250487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taux de participation électorale</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voix obtenues par les partis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>113168</td>
<td>52518</td>
<td>49047</td>
<td>101098</td>
<td>154863</td>
<td>162277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFP</td>
<td>19964</td>
<td>9329</td>
<td>4199</td>
<td>9983</td>
<td>14961</td>
<td>10891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>6491</td>
<td>4601</td>
<td>3086</td>
<td>5813</td>
<td>7288</td>
<td>6209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10410</td>
<td>7358</td>
<td>17324</td>
<td>46550</td>
<td>67513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indépendants</td>
<td>1166 (a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1411 (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3036</td>
<td>2186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre de candidats présentés par les partis sur le total des circonscriptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indépendants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre de sièges obtenus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31 (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indépendants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Comprètent les 377 voix obtenues par le BFP de la tendance Mokopane.
(b) résultats du Botswana Labour Party (BLP) et du Botswana Freedom Party (BFP).
(c) En raison d'irrégularités, la circonscription de Mochudi emportée par Ray Mokomo (BDP) sera soumise à une nouvelle votation décidée par la Cour de Justice.

**Source:** Bernard, 1990: 5.
The congruence of state and regime security defined in terms of defence against South African destabilisation has allowed policy-makers to put off dealing with these more sub-structurally embedded contradictions, at least so far. Because of its geographical position as a "road to freedom", Botswana has faced a more sustained politico-military threat than has either Lesotho or Swaziland. Nevertheless, this unenviable geo-political position helped create a confluence of interest between elite and mass which might not otherwise have emerged or played itself out as it did. But, as in the rest of the region, a gradual move toward post-apartheid will unmask those cleavages previously hidden by the mutual need for state survival and shared perception of the South African "threat".

In Botswana, post-independence state-making and security have been more closely related than in either Lesotho or Swaziland. Botswana policy-makers have chosen a capitalist path to development. But, will the combination of liberal economics and politics provide national security and development to Botswana? The evidence above suggests that analysts are deeply divided on this issue, in part because of changing regional and global political economic configurations. At this point, it is necessary to turn to a fuller exposition of these issues and events, in order to better assess this question.
(II) Superstructural Continuity: Botswana's Foreign Policy

Botswana's foreign policy since 1948 has been centrally concerned with events in the regional sub-system. Like Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana has involved itself in wider international issues mainly in order to enhance its own position in the Southern African region.

Coincidental but contradictory events coupled with extant economic dependence have made Botswana's policy-makers both more cautious yet also more determined to distinguish themselves from the apartheid Republic than either Lesotho or Swaziland. 1948 is seminal in Botswana's history because it marked, on the one hand, electoral victory for the Nationalist Party and the codification into law of South Africa's apartheid structures and, on the other hand, the interracial marriage of Seretse Khama to a white British woman, Ruth Williamson. The subsequent furor in South Africa, Rhodesia, Britain and even among many Batswana chiefs and Bechuanalnd settlers forever colored Seretse Khama's perspective of race-relations in the region.

Anti- (as opposed to Swaziland's stated policy of "multi-") racialism was to be a centre-piece of post-colonial Botswana's political philosophy. Further, Khama's subsequent ban from the Protectorate and the British Labour Party's active if unsuccessful intervention on his behalf proved educative in terms of international diplomacy and democratic governance. (see Henderson, 1990; Picard, 1987) Forced to
relinquish his chieftainship as a condition of return to Bechuanaland, Seretse Khama foresaw his participation in post-colonial politics as the most viable means for expression of these anti-racial, democratic, capitalist ideals.

Another set of contradictory events key to Botswana’s post-independence history occurred in 1965. In March, the BDP won Botswana’s pre-independence elections, garnering 80% of the vote and 28 of 31 seats in the legislative assembly. The pan-Africanist Botswana Progressive Party won the other 3 seats and gained 15% of the popular vote. (Bernard, 1990: 4-5; Table 6.1) Following closely on this event, however, was Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November. While the winds of change were sweeping colonial regimes off the continent, the settler societies in Southern Africa were determined to stay. Clearly, newly independent Botswana, with 80% of its population living along a narrow strip of arable soil, cleaved by a single Rhodesian-owned railway in the Eastern part of the country, faced a complicated security situation. Already known as a conduit for refugees escaping from post-Sharpeville and -Rivonia South Africa en route to Zambia and beyond, Botswana was now host to a more permanent settlement of refugees and Black-nationalist rebels from Rhodesia.

This refugee traffic heading toward sanctuary within or freedom beyond Botswana, and, following UN sanctions against
the Smith regime, the increased importance of the railway bringing goods from South Africa to Rhodesia, marked Botswana as a "life-line" to opposing forces in the sub-continent: status quo versus revision. The ensuing confrontation between rebels and regimes has meant that Botswana has been "destabilised" by both South Africa and Rhodesia since independence. This contrasts with Lesotho and Swaziland, both of which received favorable treatment from South Africa in the early post-independence period. Botswana sought to play the same "good neighbourliness" game as Lesotho and Swaziland, but its geography dictated that it be more centrally involved in the liberation struggles of Southern Africa. So the destabilisation "period" of the late-1970s/80s marked not change but continuity in the regional security situation of Botswana. According to Tsie, destabilisation was not new; what was new was the "ferocity and intensity" of the attacks. (1989: 1) Given Swaziland and Lesotho's more extensive integration with South Africa, their foreign policy relations were already more structurally determined than Botswana's, even by the early 1920s. But the discovery of diamonds at Orapa in 1967 and prospects for their exploitation with South African assistance dictated caution in Botswana-South Africa high political relations.

(II.1) Pre-Independence Security and Foreign Policy

Prior to independence, BLS faced the common threat of incorporation into South Africa. According to Henderson,
If, today, members of the South African security forces are planting bombs, or threatening raids, then, over 30 years ago, the South African government was still campaigning for direct control of the administration and of the entire political future of the country. (1990: 27)

But while the 1948 Nationalist Party victory virtually ensured BLS self-government, subsequent events at Sharpeville in 1960 and Rivonia two years later alerted BLS to the fact that post-independence regional relations would not be entirely cordial, their economic dependence upon South Africa notwithstanding. The change in ANC tactics from compromise to confrontation complicated this relationship. BLS served, albeit unwillingly, as forward bases for guerrilla attacks launched upon RSA. And the legacy of Jameson's 1895 raid from the north at Pitsani was not forgotten by Afrikaners worried about their own security situation. (Dale, 1988: 6)

While still a Protectorate of the British crown, Botswana became the road to the "freedom ferry" at Kazangula and a favored route for weapons and freshly trained ANC guerrillas returning to South Africa from Zambia. By 1963, the Bechuanaland Protectorate felt compelled to pass the Prevention of Violence Abroad Act. This was meant to assure South African policy-makers that Bechuanaland's pre-independence government did not approve of violence as a means for change. The act was also designed to empower the Protectorate's police force in their attempt to control the movement of "terrorists" within Bechuanaland.
(II.2) Finding One's Footing: 1965-69

Unfortunately for Seretse Khama, his pre-independence position was not viewed sympathetically by the newly formed OAU. Indeed, Khama's Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was regarded as a lackey of status quo colonialism, in contrast to the pro-Pan-Africanist forces of the Botswana Progressive and Botswana Independence Parties (BPP and BIP, respectively). At the 1965 OAU meeting in Accra, Khama's pro-negotiation/anti-violence position vis-a-vis both South Africa and Rhodesia was met with hostility. Independent Africa viewed BLS as little more than bantustans. Khama is said to have returned to Gaborone and remarked, "[W]e will be nothing outside until we are something inside." (Henderson, 1990: 43)

Clearly, gaining understanding for its position from a "radical" OAU was not going to be easy. Yet, given the precarious state of Botswana's social formation at independence, expectations should not have been so high. Chipasula and Miti, for example, point out that the domestic context for newly independent Botswana's future foreign policy and political economy was disheartening to say the least: at independence in 1966 Batswana policy-makers ruled in conditions of (i) extreme poverty, (ii) near-total economic dependence upon RSA, and (iii) virtual geographical isolation. (1989: 120) One should add to this list, (iv) the weakness of the human resource base, which for the most part
was rural, parochial, and uneducated (Henderson, 1990); and (v) the harshness of the climate, whose periodic and often prolonged droughts ensure that Botswana regularly imports up to 60% of its staple food requirements (Colclough & Macarthy, 1980; Cornia et al, 1987).

Most indicative of Botswana’s limited capacity was the fact that the government’s three main sources of revenue at independence came from (i) migrant labour remittances; (ii) SACU revenue; and (iii) British grants-in-aid. Clearly, newly independent Botswana’s capacity for active support of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa was extremely limited.

Few countries have come to political independence looking less viable. Indeed, in a 1972 article, Hill saw fit to question whether Botswana’s independence was "myth or reality". (Hill, 1972: 55) For Hill, the question was rhetorical: Given the lack of human and natural resources, skeletal physical infrastructure, and thoroughly penetrated political system, "independence" meant little more than the right to sit, vote and beg in international fora. (cf Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Dale, 1988) It is little wonder that Botswana in the early post-colonial period found itself, moreso than even Lesotho or Swaziland, most often compared to South Africa’s bantustans. (Henderson, 1974: 38)

Yet, Botswana was not without support. External grants-in-aid from Britain provided essential budgetary support until the SACU Agreement could be renegotiated to provide
Botswana with a more equitable share of customs and excise revenues, and an internally derived source of governmental income. (see Chapters Three & Four; Morrison, 1993: 39-40) British guidance regarding Botswana's early extra-regional foreign policy helped draw its former Protectorate into the Western political orbit, and toward new sources of foreign aid and investment. Britain also provided an important demonstration effect for Botswana's educated and newly emergent policy-making elite. In particular, the near-decade Seretse Khama spent in England after World War II provided a complicated yet necessary political education for the heir to the Bamangwato chieftaincy. (see Henderson, 1990; and Holm, 1988) While one should not make too much of the role of the individual in the making of foreign policy, Khama's role was disproportionately large in a country where the number of educated individuals with experience in high level decision-making at independence was less than a dozen. (cf. Picard, 1987)\(^4\)

In the wake of Accra, Khama set down four main goals for Botswana foreign policy (Chipasula & Miti, 1989: 122; Dale, in Parson, 1984: 104):

(i) to seek and establish allies among other African majority-ruled states;

\(^4\) Boyce states: "Of twenty-three 'new' Commonwealth states represented at the [1970] Singapore conference [on diplomatic organisation], only four ... were supporting foreign offices with more than fifty diplomatic staff. Several establishments were well below twenty - ... Botswana (three) ... Lesotho (six) ... Swaziland (seven)."
(ii) to avoid the impression that Botswana condoned apartheid;

(iii) to acquire a diverse and consistent supply of foreign aid from international donors; and

(iv) to increase international visibility through active participation in international fora.

The goals of foreign policy were part of a broader strategy of modernisation; hence foreign policy’s interrelationship with development. Khama defined these goals in terms of: (i) rapid economic growth; (ii) sustained development; and (iii) social justice. (Government of Botswana, 1984)

Given events at Accra and the severity of and Botswana’s central position in regional geo-politics, it is significant that Khama chose to establish one of Botswana’s first four embassies in Lusaka, Zambia. Equally telling were the placements of the other three: in London, Washington, and at the UN in New York. These moves were paralleled by similar ones made at independence by both Lesotho and Swaziland. The Zambia link, however, was critical to Botswana; the technical border, and subsequent diplomatic representation, served important symbolic purposes given Botswana’s geo-political position.

These moves established Botswana’s ideological predisposition as pro-capitalist, if not outrightly pro-Western. But subsequent decisions to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, Taiwan, and Kenya, Western allies all,
clearly pointed in this direction. The non-choice of South Africa is equally significant. If Botswana was to establish an identity separate from South Africa and from the South African bantustans, then refusal to recognise the apartheid Republic in spite of its overwhelming economic dependence was a significant decision. (Black, 1988: 70; Henderson, 1990: 43)

The later 1960s saw three important events which would forever transform Botswana’s role in the sub-system. First, in 1967 diamonds were discovered at Orapa. The deal struck with De Beers would provide the Botswana government with 15% of profits. (This was later renegotiated to 50%. See below) Second, in 1968 Kenneth Kaunda paid a state visit to Botswana. According to Henderson (1990: 44),

The visit of Kaunda to Botswana in 1968 ... and his offer of the hand of friendship from Black Africa greatly encouraged Seretse in his search for regional support that went beyond Lesotho and Swaziland.

Third, in 1969 the Customs Union was successfully renegotiated to provide for a more equitable share of the duties accruing to the smaller member states. Rather than a fixed percentage (see Chapter Three above), revenues became

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5 Morgan, on the other hand, states "Botswana’s foreign policy is not ideological and is quite independent." (1981: 247) And while he, along with other observers like Henderson, would point to Botswana’s attempt at maintaining a "two China policy", and establishing diplomatic relations with the Non-Aligned Movement, Cuba, and the Soviet Union as evidence of this "independence", it does not alter the fact that Botswana’s policy makers are avowed capitalists. (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 200)
contingent upon exports and imports passing to and through member states; as Botswana grew, so, too, would revenue. (See Hudson, in Harvey, ed., 1981)

Thus, what looked like an extremely bleak picture at independence was gradually, even surprisingly, transformed into one of more optimism. This optimism was initially quite cautious given the persistence of minority rule and the implementation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia. Nevertheless, Botswana policy-makers, particularly Seretse Khama, felt confident in taking a more active role in regional affairs. According to Morgan (1981: 247), this "active" foreign policy was characterised by a move from "risk avoidance to risk taking".

(II.3) A Delicate Act of Balance, 1969-1979

Events in the decade to follow continued to move in Botswana's favour. In April 1969, the Lusaka Manifesto, which was jointly sponsored by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, endorsed armed struggle as a legitimate means of bringing about majority-rule in the region. (Tsie, 1989: 3) More importantly for the BLS states, verbal commitment to the goals of the Lusaka Manifesto provided a way of supporting the liberation struggle -- without having to actively engage in it beyond support for refugees -- and, hence, "detente" with the OAU system. (Henderson, 1974: 40-44; ACR 1970, 1970: C41)

Botswana thus began a delicate balancing act: supporting
liberation by playing host to a growing refugee community, while at the same time warning guerrillas not to use Botswana as a springboard for attacks into either South Africa or Rhodesia. At the March 1970 annual meeting of the BDP at Molepolole, Khama stated,

Botswana cannot allow herself to be used as a springboard for violence against minority regimes. Our task is to insulate ourselves from the instability their policies provoke. We must assert our independence while asserting the principles of human freedom and dignity. (in Carter & Morgan, eds., 1981: 89)

This position was identical to that taken up by Lesotho and Swaziland. However, having neither defence force nor formal defence strategy, Botswana could do little to inveigh against either terrorist attacks or South African/Rhodesian "hot pursuit". (see Dale, 1988; Hodges, 1977; Tsie, 1989: 19)

Meanwhile, Seretse Khama made a personal representation to the UN Security Council regarding Botswana's support for sanctions against South Africa but its own inability to impose them. Botswana, he said, was a "special case." (Henderson, 1974: 42) Khama was persuasive, for, shortly after this statement, Botswana received its first World Bank loan, had its position formally accepted by the other African members of the UN, had Khama's speech read into the Congressional record of the US House and Senate, gained US financial support for the Bot-Zam highway, and had the Americans post a black ambassador to Gaborone accredited to BLS. (ibid) So, like Swaziland and Lesotho, Botswana's
policy-makers proved capable of successfully playing off the interrelated regional and global balances of the time.

In 1969, Botswana had the first of its five successful post-independence tests of democracy. Although only 54.7% of those eligible actually voted (Table 6.1 above), four parties gained seats in the legislative assembly with the BDP again taking the lion's share (i.e. 24 out of 30). At a time when coups and life-presidents were already proliferating throughout the continent, Botswana's fragile, non-racialist democracy, sandwiched between its two racist and undemocratic neighbours, clearly appealed to Western powers, long before "multi-partyism" became de rigour. This undoubtedly assisted Botswana in attracting Western aid. According to Henderson,

By clever reasoning, Botswana's vulnerability became its strength and its honest poverty a virtue. It provided an opportunity for Western governments to commit themselves to positive but peaceful action for change in Southern Africa. (1990: 45)

Henderson suggests that international perceptions of Botswana changed markedly over the first ten years of independence. As external attention came to focus more critically on South Africa in the 1970s, Botswana was coming to be seen as a "small, dynamic and plucky state taking its stand on major issues up to the very limits available to it." (1974: 42)

Important events followed rapidly upon each other during most of the 1970s. In 1971, diamond production commenced at Orapa. One year later, Botswana established a diplomatic
mission at the EC in Brussels. Britain’s entry into the Community led to hard bargaining on the part of Botswana to secure an European export market for its beef. (see the variety of contributions dealing with cattle and the beef industry in Botswana in Harvey, ed., 1981; also, Morrison, 1993) This lobbying was successful. Also, in 1972, the Shashe project commenced with the signing of an agreement between the government of Botswana and a consortia of international capital to develop copper-nickel mining operations at Selebi-Pikwe. (see Gaolathe and Lewis in ibid) These three events served to strengthen and somewhat broaden Botswana’s economic base, and lessen its overall dependence upon RSA.

Seretse Khama scored an important diplomatic breakthrough with his state visit to Dar es Salaam in 1973. According to Henderson (1990: 47):

Nyerere, during the state visit referred to Seretse as a ‘fighter, a tight-rope-walker, and an expert football dribbler all rolled into one.’ Nyerere also explicitly recognized that it would be foolish to ask Botswana to commit suicide by providing bases for the liberation movements.

The timing could not have been more appropriate, for, one year later, with the fall of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, Botswana’s security situation became much more threatening.

(II.4) Botswana and Destabilisation, 1979-1989

Botswana’s security situation became increasingly uncontrollable. Seretse Khama’s leading role in the FLS trod
"dangerously close to the outer limits of Pretoria's tolerance for dissent from vulnerable and dependent neighbours." (Black, 1988: 73; see Chapter Three) The number of refugees flowing into Botswana had grown to approximately 800 per week by November 1977. Whereas there were approximately 2,500 refugees registered in Botswana in 1974, by 1979 that number had grown to 23,000, most having come from the Matabeleland region of Rhodesia. (Chipasula & Miti, 1989: 127) According to a 1977 article in *Africa Report*,

A United Nations mission, sent to Botswana in February to investigate aid requirements in view of the deteriorating security situation on the Botswana-Rhodesia border, reported on March 28 that the Smith regime had staged 53 separate border incidents since 1966 - most of them during the previous year [i.e. 1976]. (Hodges, 1977: 39-40)

By June 1977, "Rhodesian border violations then totalled over 100." *(ibid, 40) Batswana policy-makers created the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in reaction to these events. However, at its inception the BDF comprised 300 troops, 140 of which were deployed to guard 500 miles of the Rhodesia-Botswana border between the Kazangula and Limpopo rivers. *(ibid, Dale, 1988: 5)

In spite of the creation of the BDF, Batswana policy-makers still preferred negotiation to violent confrontation. And, while realist analysis would suggest that Botswana's "weakness" vis-a-vis South Africa is the basis for such policy, (Grundy, 1973) a more critical analysis would identify a basic confluence of capitalist interests at the
heart of cooperation. (Kostiuk, 1984) As with Swaziland, the Botswana ruling class favoured non-racialism (hence reform) not anti-capitalism (i.e. revolution). From this perspective, destabilisation would be better characterised as "a contradictory relationship between two ruling classes with sharply differing perceptions of how the region's future ought to be shaped" (Tsie, 1989: 2); that is, race-based versus non-racial capitalism. The presence of Harry Oppenheimer, who has long articulated a similar position, at the funeral of Seretse Khama in 1980 is indicative at a visceral level of the affinity between South African capital and Botswana's ruling class. (see below)

This tendency toward cooperation manifested itself in a variety of often contentious ways in the late-1970s and early-1980s. Khama supported negotiated settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia in 1978. The BDF was used to conduct systematic searches of ANC refugee houses in Gaborone in May 1977, and a governmental decision to segregate South African student exiles from Botswana classrooms was taken in the same year so as to prevent the "radicalisation" of local students. (Hodges, 1977: 41)

As Zimbabwe neared independence, however, Botswana policy-makers perceived a shift in the regional balance of power. Once again, Botswana found itself caught in the middle of the shifting regional context. If, prior to Zimbabwean independence, Botswana had been sandwiched between status quo
powers, it now stood between the last of those powers, South Africa, and a trio of revolutionary ones, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

The decision to create and support SADCC to the exclusion of South Africa and its CONSAS ideas, was the most serious of Botswana’s post-independence risk-taking foreign policies. (see Chapter Three) For SADCC was an organisation dedicated to decreasing South African hegemony in the region, and so ran directly counter to white South African interests. Moreover, SADCC contradicted the needs of the apartheid state at a time when policy-makers there felt particularly vulnerable in terms of regional security. To South African policy-makers, this was a move not to be tolerated. Botswana thus became a target for South African destabilisation.

In 1980/81 Botswana suffered a number of fuel disruptions. Given that most Batswana and their livestock get their water from diesel-powered boreholes, fuel oil can serve as an effective tool of statecraft. (Tsie, 1989: 14) In 1983/84 Botswana had its beef exports cut to the RSA. In 1984, the latter delayed payment of the former’s share of Customs Union receipts. The minority regime also made periodic threats regarding the non-provision of refrigerated wagons for Botswana beef exports to the EC. Throughout the 1980s, South African forces crossed in to Botswana territory with impunity in search of ANC operatives. On most of these occasions, people have ended up kidnapped, killed, wounded,
and/or had property destroyed. (see Tsie, 1989: 18-22; Hanlon, 1986: 220-223; Johnson & Martin, 1989)

The three most often cited attacks upon Botswana nationals and South African refugees are those which occurred on 14 June 1985, 19 May 1986, and 28 March 1988. (For complete descriptions of these events, see, Dale, 1987; ARB, 15 April 1988: 8801) Following each occasion South African policy-makers stated their intentions to be the ferreting out of South African "terrorists", not the invasion of Botswana. According to Dale, in the wake of such destruction, it is unlikely that Botswana policy-makers were much concerned with "military nuances." (1988: 10) It was also clear that, in the case of the latter two attacks, policy-makers in Pretoria were playing to domestic and global constituencies.6

One motive for these attacks, in addition to those claimed, was the acquiescence of Botswana to a security accord similar to those signed between South Africa and Swaziland (1982) and Mozambique (1984). (see Chapters Three and Five) Whereas the Swazi ruling elite capitulated quickly to South African demands, that in Botswana refused to sign a

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6 On the night of 14 June 1985 South African commandoes struck into Gaborone killing 12, wounding 6 and demolishing 4 houses. They recovered "arms, documents, and a computer." (Dale, 1987: 79) The 19 May 1985 attack was part of the triple invasion of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At this time the SADF pinpointed five houses in the Mogaditshane area. One person was killed, and three were wounded. The attacks coincided with the visit of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group to RSA. The 28 March 1988 attack in Gaborone resulted in four dead. It occurred 24 hours prior to an important by-election in Randfontein.
security agreement stating,

The South African government which is at war with its own people, wants Botswana to do what it cannot do itself. With all its military might even South Africa cannot stop its enemies getting through to Johannesburg or Durban. (Statement by former Foreign Minister Archie Mogwe, in Tsie, 1989: 24)

The BDF had been steadily increasing its numbers (to 3,100 ground troops supported by 150 air force personnel by 1988), and budget (absorbing 2.7% of GNP and 5.1% of central government expenditure in 1985) since its inception in 1977. But it had its hands full with the swollen numbers of refugees and the skirmishes along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border. There was no doubt that it was inadequately prepared to do the kind of job South African policy-makers and military personnel envisioned for it. Given this incapacity then, the political costs of openly acquiescing to a security pact with the apartheid state would be unnecessarily burdensome: if events of the past 30 years were anything to go by, South Africa was likely to violate Botswana's sovereignty with or without a formal security accord. Indeed, the Swazi-South Africa accord merely formalised what had been taking place for a number of years.

Batswana policy-makers instead invited South Africa in to Botswana in order to conduct a joint search for ANC cadres much as Kenneth Kaunda had done years earlier. (Dale, 1988: 7) They also passed the National Security Act of 1986 which was tantamount to a declaration of a state of emergency. According to Dale,
The Masire government ... secured the passage of the 1986 National Security Act which referred to "foreign agents" in the country and imposed tough prison sentences (up to thirty years) for a variety of offenses, with the accused bearing the burden of proving his or her innocence. This draconian measure did not sit well with many Batswana...

(1988: 7)

Probably intended as a sop to South Africa in lieu of signing a formal defence agreement, this and other measures mentioned above failed to convince the South African regime of Botswana's good intentions. Indeed, Masire even replaced Archie Mogwe with Dr. Gaositwe Chiepe as Foreign Minister in 1984, in the hopes that, according to one observer, "with her success in driving hard bargains as minerals minister, she would be well able to stand up to Pretoria." (Hanlon, 1986: 222) More likely, Masire felt that Chiepe's close contacts with South African mining capital would help smooth out Botswana-South Africa political relations.

Such was not to be the case, however. Shortly after Pik Botha seemed to ease off on the pressure for a formal pact, asking instead that Botswana merely expel the ANC, the RSA launched its 14 June 1985 commando raid on Gaborone. This attack came in spite of the fact that Botswana had complied with his wishes by transferring seventeen members of the ANC on to third countries. (Hanlon, 1986: 223)

As anticipated, however, Botswana was able to turn these events into an international cause celebre. Following South African and Botswanan representations to the UN, the Security Council passed resolution 568(1985). According to Dale,
Praising the Botswana Government for its refugee policy, the Council resolution condemned the South African raid and insisted that South Africa pay Botswana reparations for the raid, and requested that the Secretary-General appoint a mission to ascertain the amount of damage Botswana suffered and to determine how best to help Botswana meet its security needs with regard to its refugee population. (1987: 84)

As noted in the previous three chapters, South Africa continued with its policy of regional destabilisation but with decreasing effectiveness. Botswana, on the other hand, weathered the destabilisation storm, including a tortuous period in Botswana-Zimbabwe relations.

In Zimbabwe’s early post-independence period, a still-radical Prime Minister Robert Mugabe accused Khama of giving sanctuary to super-ZAPU rebels, and support to Joshua Nkomo. The arrival of the latter in Botswana in March 1983 exacerbated these problems. In June 1984, Mugabe stated, "there seem[s] to be elements in the BDP itching for a fight and who want clashes with Zimbabwe." (quoted in Tsie, 1989: 23) In addition, these policies raised criticism from Frontline and OAU states. As South Africa’s focus of destabilisation moved away from Zimbabwe toward Angola and Mozambique, Botswana-Zimbabwe relations improved. (see Thompson, 1985; Hanlon, 1986; Johnson & Martin, 1986)\(^7\)

Perhaps as testimony to the BDP’s diplomatic successes during this period, successful elections were held in 1985

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\(^7\) The later pair have, since 1987, been party to a bilateral trade pact. (Interview with Bena, Zimbabwe High Commission, Gaborone, 16 November 1989)
and 1989. But, while the BDP continues to hold a vast majority in the house of assembly, the opposition, particularly the BNF, has steadily increased its percentage of the total vote. This suggests that all may not be so well with the Botswana social formation. Having emerged from the destabilisation period intact, how secure is Botswana? What threats will it face in the future and how severe are they likely to be? Have the last 26 years of independence left Botswana's ruling elite better equipped to deal with threats to come? To gain a fuller understanding of these issues, it is necessary to turn to a discussion of Botswana's economic base.

**III. Substructural Continuities: Capitalism, Development, and Increasing Insecurity**

The pragmatism in Botswana's foreign policy carries over into domestic policy, with the former deliberately used to assist the latter. This cautious approach to state-making reflects government's prudent attempts not to be overwhelmed by regional and/or global events. Given the nearly unbroken history of cycles of drought, disease, and destabilisation, coupled with periodic economic windfalls (gold in the 1860s, diamonds a century later), Botswana policy-makers see it to their advantage not to get too optimistic or pessimistic over the present turn of events. (cf Good, 1993 and Niemann, 1993)

Botswana's economic growth and hence the very viability of the present social formation is purely a post-colonial
phenomenon. While there is a revisionist movement afoot which suggests that the Bechuanaland colonial administration began a systematic if modest development programme as far back as the 1930s (Steenkamp, 1991), most realist and radical studies of Botswana's colonial history suggest that Britain's role was one of near-total neglect. (Parson, 1984; Colclough & McCarthy, 1980; Picard, 1985; 1987) Indeed, a simple glance at British grants-in-aid to the protectorate reveals the extent to which Britain sought to (i) make the administration of the protectorate self-supporting; and (ii) maintain a certain degree of distance since eventual incorporation into the Dominion of South Africa was envisioned. In 1956/57 -- i.e. the year of Seretse Khama's return to the protectorate from England -- British grants-in-aid were a mere L140,000. By 1961/62 -- i.e. post-Sharpeville and "winds of change" -- grants had risen to L1 million. At independence in 1966/67 they were L8.564 million. This rapid rise of capital transfers in the 1960s reflected Britain's belated attempt to turn the protectorate into some sort of viable state by independence. (Picard, 1987: 102)

At independence, Botswana was one of the world's 25 least developed countries, having a per capita GNP of approximately US $75. In 1964, only 73,000 out of a total population of 580,000 were in formal employment, with an estimated one-third of these being outside the protectorate as labour migrants. (Murray and Parsons, 1990: 167) A
prolonged drought between 1961-66 had killed one-third of Botswana’s cattle, its main source of wealth and household reproduction. Yet, this dismal picture was nothing new. By the 1890s, east coast fever, anthrax, rinderpest, and drought had decimated virtually the entire cattle population and all food crops, and driven most able-bodied Basutoland into migrant labour. (ibid, 161) Moreover, the imposition of the hut tax in 1899, the collection of which earned traditional chiefs a 10% commission, the import of consumer goods from South Africa, and the increasing demand for labour on South African mines helped cement Basutoland incorporation into the regional capitalist economy. (Kostiuk, 1984: 62; Parson, 1984)

Throughout history, Botswana had been coveted as a potential source of minerals, a missionary road, and a dumping ground for blacks. (Kostiuk, 1984: 62) By independence, Botswana had been reduced to little more than a labour reserve and a transport corridor. (Parson, 1984)

**III.1 Pre-Independence Social Differentiation**

Not everyone within Basutoland society suffered from this condition, however. The series of ecological disasters and colonial, settler and South African interventions helped some to prosper while others became worse off. According to Moorsom and Cliffe, "economic stagnation" fostered "social conservation". That is to say, traditional rulers were able to maintain and in some cases augment their social and economic standing by virtue of their control over (i) land
allocation; (ii) tribute labour via age-regiments; (iii) stray livestock; (iv) the use of serfs and squatters; and (v) native treasuries which they often used as their "own personal accounts." (1979: 37; cf Picard, 1987: 52; Molutsi, 1988: 41; Murray & Parsons, 1990: 165) Many peasants, on the other hand, saw migrant labour as their only means of household reproduction beyond the subsistence level.\textsuperscript{8}

With each succeeding natural disaster (e.g. drought, rinderpest), human-made intervention (e.g. the demand for labour, the choking off of Botswana petty bourgeois development by colonial/settler conspiracy), and technological innovation (e.g. the introduction of the plough, oil-powered boreholes), those at the top of the social hierarchy became ever more capable of surviving, adapting, and prospering while those at the bottom were more marginalised. (Moorsom & Cliffe, 1979: 36-38) Clearly, "the tendencies towards class polarisation and social inequality now evident [in Botswana] have long historical roots." (ibid, 38)

\textbf{(III.2) Accelerated Growth and Social Differentiation}

Botswana's post-independence experience is similar to that of Swaziland, with "old tendencies being accelerated

\textsuperscript{8} In spite of these long traditions toward migrant labour and conditions of drought and economic failure, the "myth" of pre-capitalist economic self-sufficiency in Southern African societies is a persistent one. See, for example, Murray and Parsons, 1990: 161.
while new forces have entered the stage." (ibid) The immediate post-independence period was characterised by a combination of careful government and favourable climate. Good weather led to large harvests and the growth of the rapidly commercialising cattle industry; the SACU renegotiation helped fuel public sector expansion; and the discovery of copper-nickel matte at Selebi Pikwe, diamonds at Orapa, and the aggressive courtship of mineral-related foreign investment had numerous spin-off effects -- increased employment, construction, capital investment, Customs Union revenue, and a surplus in Botswana's balance of payments. Moreover, the development of an efficient civil service served as a further attraction to foreign capital.9 More than any other factor, however, the discovery and exploitation of diamonds helped sustain this early period of growth and has since carried Botswana through the more difficult decade of the 1980s. Thus, by the 1980s, a scant 15 years beyond independence, Botswana had been transformed from a "potential real estate annex" (Dale, 1988: 3) into an "African success story" (Allen, 1987): According to Black, "Botswana has progressed rapidly and impressively ... leading the world in 1986 with an 8.5% increase in GDP. It has

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9 This is to be contrasted with the dualism of the Swazi system wherein the state bureaucracy is paralleled with and interfered by the monarchy at every turn (see Chapter Five); and the extensive patronage, corruption, and meddling of the monarchy and various chiefs in the affairs of the bureaucracy in Lesotho. (Chapter Four)
extended its paved roads from a total of 5 km at independence to over 2000 km in 1986". (1988: 63) Further, life expectancy has risen from 46 years in 1960 to over 60 years in 1990. The infant mortality rate has dropped from 14.5 per 1,000 live births in 1971 to 11.5 per 1,000 live births in 1991. The daily calorie supply as a percentage of total requirements has increased from 89% in 1964-69 to 96% in 1984-86. The numbers of doctors and nurses has risen dramatically since independence, as has primary and secondary school enrollments. (Southern African Economist, August/September 1990: iii) Formal sector employment has increased from roughly 20,000 in 1960 to 62,000 in 1977, 122,000 in 1985, and 182,000 in 1989. (ibid; Sekgoma, 1989: 30)

A firm commitment to capitalist development in the liberal, individualistic economic tradition, however, has made it increasingly difficult for Botswana’s poor to take advantage of post-independence economic growth. For example, Moorsom and Cliffe (1979: 41-42) point out that in 1971 it was estimated that the average household needed to produce 20 bags of grain and possess 20 cattle for "adequate subsistence". However, surveys showed that of all landholders, 62% owned less than this. (cf Quinn et al, 1988: 5; Picard, 1987: 221) While the rural poor have come to regard migrant labour as the principle means where "marginalised peasants could escape their impoverishment," the top 3% of the rural population have become a "cattle
aristocracy." (Moorsom & Cliffe, 1979: 42, 39) It is this group of individuals, coupled with an emergent "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (Black, 1988: 68) who have been best placed to take advantage of post-independence governmental development policies.10

And though it is this group which profits most and is therefore most supportive of Botswana's conservative foreign policy orientation, like Lesotho and Swaziland, this foreign policy has widespread support in the country. Such cross-class and -category support is due not only to the collective desire to avoid the dangers inherent in the region's geopolitical situation, however. This support also comes from the web of economic interests that have developed historically within the Botswana social formation: migrant labourers are as supportive of the systematic pursuit of the status quo as are members of the petty and bureaucratic bourgeoisies, and the kulak class of big farmers and cattle ranchers. (Morrison, 1993)

Unlike Lesotho and Swaziland, where "acquiescence" in government policy may mean many things, and this hypothesis is at best suggestive, in Botswana five electoral victories for the ruling BNP offer some concrete evidence that there is

10 Good (1993: 1-2) points out that contrary to other rapidly developing countries -- e.g. Singapore, Taiwan -- "income distribution in Botswana lately ... has been changing in favour of the rich. On the Government's figures, the income going to the top 20 per cent rose over the period 1974-75 to 1985-86 to 61 per cent, while that which went to the poorest 40 per cent fell from 12 to 11 per cent."
widespread popular support for government policy. Situating Botswana's conservative foreign policy approach within this nexus of economic interests is perhaps more instructive in helping us understand the nature of Botswana's position as a "peace-broker" in the region than is an over-simplified focus on inter-state relations.

(III.3) Coalition Building in Support of the Status Quo

Also like Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana policy-makers have worked hard to build a coalition in support of its "vision" of and direction for the national political economy. Policy-makers have explicitly connected security and development issues in the attempt to construct a viable social formation. Pragmatism, which we have seen to be at the heart of Botswana's foreign policy approach, also characterises policy-making at the domestic, developmental level.

Perhaps no economic tool has drawn a tighter net around the Batswana populace than development aid and planning.\footnote{Murray and Parsons (1990), and Harvey and Lewis (1990) provide excellent, comprehensive overviews of Botswana's development plans and performance. The level of foreign aid to Botswana has steadily increased since independence. Recently, aid has increased from US $135.5 million in 1984 (i.e. prior to the beginning of South Africa's most recent crisis) to US $238.7 million in 1987. According to the UNDP, "[a] major portion of the assistance has continued to flow to the following sectors: natural resources, humanitarian aid and relief, education, and transport and communication." (UNDP, Development Cooperation, Botswana, 1987 Report, Gaborone, November 1988: 1)} Foreign aid, initially, and mineral-based government
revenues, latterly, have been channeled into a series of
well-publicised and oft-criticised development programmes.
These "tentacles of capital" have extended into every corner
of the state, strengthening and broadening the coalition of
vested interests in present BDP policy directions.

   No doubt Botswana's democratic and capitalist
orientations are behind most, if not all, of this support.
The influence of major donors like the EC, Britain, and
France, all of whom have "friendly and profitable relations
with South Africa ... reinforces major capitalist interests"
in Botswana. (Saunders, 1982: 116; also, interviews with EC,
British High Commission, UNDP, and USAID personnel in each of
BLS, various Sept-Dec 1989)

   Each of these capital interests came together in a
powerful demonstration of the dominance of capitalist
economic philosophy and its expanding web in the Shashe
copper-nickel mining project. There, a consortia of
international capital (AMAX of the United States, and Anglo
American of South Africa), combined with Botswana Government
and international multilateral (World Bank) and bilateral
(Canadian) donor assistance to finance the construction of
the Selebi-Phikwe mining complex. And while the mine
continues to be unprofitable, its importance to ordinary
Batswana cannot be underestimated. This can be seen in the
phenomenal growth of the urban population there: from zero in
Selebi-Phikwe is now the third largest urban area in Botswana, behind only Gaborone and Francistown. (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 35) Total mining sector employment (i.e. including all mining centres) in 1986/87 was 7,500; a small number, granted, but the growth of manufacturing, construction, services, transportation and communications, and government employment that have grown up around this sector is quite large. (Midterm Review of NDP VI, 1988: 22) Moreover, the number of rural Botswana these wages are supporting is larger still. Clearly, the number and variety of interests in support of capitalist development in Botswana, and, by extension, South African capital investment, constitutes a significant portion of the total population. Hence, the broad support for "pragmatic" foreign policy, especially vis à vis South Africa.

(III.4) Heightening Contradictions Within the Coalition

Major threats to the long term security of Botswana have emerged in the wake of the apparent successes in state development strategy. Like the Swazi, Botswana policy-makers sought to use their leading, in this case mineral, sector as the fundamental means for expanding all sectors of their economy. "Mining for development" became a popular catch-phrase in the late-1960s and 1970s. However, and as with the Swazi case, policy-makers felt Botswana's myriad problems could be addressed with a classically modernisationist approach. Surplus capital was to be pumped into productive
and preferably private enterprise which was seen as "the proper engine of economic development". (Murray and Parsons, 1990: 173) Given this focus on private enterprise, it is understandable that post-independence development policy favored a small, already privileged strata of Batswana society: the chiefs, the educated, the propertied, the cattle owners.

Idealist and socialist criticisms notwithstanding, Botswana policy makers sought to use newly acquired state power to facilitate the growth of an indigenous middle class, long frustrated by colonial and settler policy. (Ettinger, 1972)\textsuperscript{12} The strategy followed was similar to that pursued by the Swazi monarchy: (i) creation of indigenous bureaucratic and petty bourgeoisies through state support for trade, manufacturing and heavy industrial sector development; and (ii) expansion of the kulak class via extension services, land reform, and capital. Unfortunately, this bias toward

\textsuperscript{12} Murray and Parsons (1991: 161-162) state, "Khama III ... started a royal trading company in 1910 and used it to ensure that 'tribal' state revenues benefitted from the cattle trade ... But Khama's very success in diverting trading profits and labour into his own country from abroad proved to be his downfall." The choking off of this nascent petty bourgeoisie is similar to experiences in Lesotho and Swaziland. Swazi and Batswana elites, however, were eventually able to persuade colonial and settler capital to work with them to create an indigenous capitalist class. (cf Chapter Five) This contrasts with Lesotho, where foreign capital stood to make a profit only through the export of Basotho labour. Nevertheless, Basotho elites were successful in attaching themselves to these interests and forming what Weisfelder termed an "organisational bourgeoisie". (1981: 231-232; see also Chapter Four)
leading sectors left the peasantry on the margins of the development process.

Initial investment leaned heavily toward mineral development; specifically the Shashe project, in association with foreign capital, for the exploitation of copper and nickel, and, shortly thereafter, the exploitation of diamonds at Orapa. Expansion of the mineral sector fuelled a construction boom as not merely mines but whole towns were created from scratch. Further, the exploitation of coal reserves and the development of locally-generated thermal power, pushed forward by CIDA, added to this boom. (Lewis, 1981) Since most of this construction began after the successful renegotiation of the Customs Union Agreement, increased imports also meant increased revenue from the common customs pool. Seretse Khama’s desire to achieve self-sustaining recurrent government revenues by the early 1970s had therefore become a reality. Coupled with increased levels of foreign aid, Botswana’s development programme began in earnest. (See Dahl for an overview, 1981: 6-9)

So, by 1972/73 "Botswana achieved a ‘second independence’: it ceased to require a grant-in-aid from the British government to balance the recurrent budget." (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 53) In the foreword to NDP II (1970-75), Seretse Khama somewhat modestly stated, "mining and the resources we expect to accrue from mining activity have transformed our economic prospects." (in Murray & Parsons,
Anchored firmly in the philosophy of capitalist development, the foreword to the plan nevertheless acknowledged "that the greatest challenge" was rural development, and the development process would "not favour the wealthy and deprive the poor." (Murray & Parsons, 1990: 174) Though "mining for rural development" remained the catchphrase of the 1970s (Picard 1987: 236), the development strategy was unmistakeably "trickle down": mining would be the leading sector, but resources would not be transferred irresponsibly. Picard suggests that this emphasis on rural development was a mere sop to traditional leaders and the peasantry.

(III.5) Recent Economic Performance

Botswana's numerous, state-supported social improvements stem from mineral-based development, particularly in the growth of diamond exports. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the percentage contribution of the mining sector to total GDP went from zero to 47% in the period 1966-86, helping to offset the precipitous decline in both agricultural production and agriculture's contribution to GDP.¹³

¹³ According to Harvey and Lewis, agriculture as a percentage of total GDP has fallen continuously since 1966: from 39% in 1966, to 24% in 1976, and 4% in 1986. (1990: 32) The decline in relative contribution to GDP is not merely due to the meteoric rise of mineral production, however. Harvey and Lewis also point out that, in constant 1979/80 prices, agricultural production first rose from P24 million in 1965/66 to P98 million in 1972/73, but has declined ever since, falling to P50 million in 1985/86. (1990: 72) These figures, one must point out, do not include the negative
The dramatic increase in diamond exports is tantamount to digging foreign exchange out of the ground:

The economic rents accruing to the owners of the mineral rights are, in effect, a gift from nature. To the extent that these rents arise because of the sale of the resources in international markets, the gift comes in the form of freely convertible foreign exchange, which can be used for any purpose. Thus, the rents accruing from diamonds, to the government of Botswana have the same economic effect as a unilateral transfer of funds (not a loan) from a bilateral or multilateral agency, with no strings attached as to use - no specified projects, no division between recurrent or development budget, no limitation on the source of the imports of goods or services, etc. (Lewis, 1981: 15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade &amp; Hotels</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 32

Revenues deriving from diamond exports have risen from P3 million in 1970 to P243 million in 1982 and P2,253 million in 1987.¹⁴ (See table 6.3 and Graph 6.1) The percentage impact of drought in the post-1986 period. (see below; also Quinn et al, 1988: 10-13)

¹⁴ The incredible increase in diamond sales registered between 1982 and 1987 was due to a one-off sale of the Debswana stockpile. According to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, "In mid-1987 Debswana and DeBeers agreed to a sale of the diamond stockpile which Debswana had built up during the diamond market recession of 1982 to 1985. In exchange for the stockpile Debswana received a substantial
contribution of diamonds to total Botswana exports thus rose over this time period from 14.8% (0.7% of total CSO sales) to 52.0% (18.9% of CSO sales) and 84.8% (43.7% of CSO sales) respectively.  

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**Table 6.3: Botswana’s Diamond Exports: Relative Importance in Botswana and World Markets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total exports (Pula million)</th>
<th>Diamond exports (Pula million)</th>
<th>Diamonds as percentage of total Botswana exports</th>
<th>CSO diamond sales (US $ million)</th>
<th>Botswana exports as percentage of CSO sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>184</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>2552</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>2598</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>2723</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>1472</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>2557</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987(a)</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>2253(b)</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>3070</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a. Preliminary.
* b. Includes sale of accumulated stocks.

**Source:** Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 121

Diamond revenues have therefore fuelled growth in all sectors of the economy. As seen in Table 6.2, the percentage cash payment together with 20 million shares in DeBeers, or 5.27% of the enlarged share capital... These extra values are once-only, and the values of GDP and exports will revert to their normal values in 1988." (The Midterm Review of NDP VI, Gaborone, September 1988: 5)

15 The Southern African Economist (Aug/Sept 1990: vii) reports that total exports for 1989 were in the neighbourhood of P3.7 billion. Diamond exports in 1989 were P2.8 billion or roughly 80% of total exports.
contributions of manufacturing, government, and trade and hotels to total GDP have all remained relatively constant since 1966 in spite of the dramatic growth of mining. This is indicative of their mineral-fuelled expansion. Overall GDP increased eleven times in the twenty years since independence; i.e. from P118 million in 1966 to P1,316 million in 1986. Per capita GDP grew from P191 in 1966 to P1,144 in 1986 despite rapid population growth.

Graph 6.1: Value of Exports: 1980-89


While this growth has meant a dramatic rise in imports (from P468 million in 1980 to P2.1 billion in 1989: Southern African Economist, Aug/Sept 1990: vii), exports have risen at
an even faster rate: an average of 19% per annum over the course of the 1980s for imports and 34% per annum for exports. (Ibid) Unlike the rest of (Southern) Africa, Botswana has no domestic debt and its balance of payments surplus has risen from 3% of GDP in 1979/80 to roughly 15% of GDP in 1988/89. Further, its international reserves have risen from P255 million in 1980 to P5.2 billion in 1989, or the equivalent of 30 months of import cover (Southern African Economist, Aug/Sept 1990: vii); also, see Graphs 6.2 and 6.3)

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![Graph showing Botswana's Balance of Payments from 1980 to 1989](image)

**Source:** Southern African Economist, Aug/Sept 1990: vii.

Increased imports have also meant increased revenue from the Customs Union, which, along with mineral revenues and non-mining income taxes, continue to be the main sources of government revenue. (See Table 6.4) Customs revenues
Graph 6.3: Botswana’s International Reserves: 1980–1989


increased from approximately P104 million in 1981 to P174.8 million in 1986/87 and were projected to increase to P272 million in 1990/91, but to decrease thereafter to P225.3 million by 1992/93. (Midterm Review of NDP VI, 1988: 31; Barclays, 1987: 17, 19)

Botswana policy-makers have been very prudent, to say the least, regarding development fund and recurrent expenditures. For example, according to Murray & Parsons, only 4.4% of domestic development expenditure went toward rural development programmes between 1979-85. (1990: 170) The bulk of development fund and recurrent expenditure is directed toward the creation of an "enabling environment" for private sector, and complementary, profitable government
Table 6.4: Projections of the Government Budget (P million at 1985/86 prices)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Custom Revenue</td>
<td>174.0</td>
<td>194.2</td>
<td>214.0</td>
<td>231.4</td>
<td>257.2</td>
<td>280.4</td>
<td>325.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Excise Revenue</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>207.2</td>
<td>221.7</td>
<td>250.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Revenue and Grants</td>
<td>426.6</td>
<td>358.8</td>
<td>399.3</td>
<td>405.4</td>
<td>406.2</td>
<td>416.4</td>
<td>431.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Revenue</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL REVENUE AND GRANTS</td>
<td>1506.6</td>
<td>1457.9</td>
<td>1559.3</td>
<td>1651.7</td>
<td>1739.9</td>
<td>1799.3</td>
<td>1899.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent Expenditure</td>
<td>407.7</td>
<td>531.0</td>
<td>600.6</td>
<td>673.8</td>
<td>747.0</td>
<td>829.6</td>
<td>919.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Programme</td>
<td>370.7</td>
<td>544.2</td>
<td>601.9</td>
<td>691.4</td>
<td>686.0</td>
<td>668.2</td>
<td>666.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Paid</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Lending to Parastatals</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>814.6</td>
<td>1166.4</td>
<td>1339.0</td>
<td>1365.3</td>
<td>1510.3</td>
<td>1580.1</td>
<td>1580.6</td>
</tr>
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BUDGET SURPLUS (+) or DEFICIT (-)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(as % of Expend.)</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and/or parastatal expenditure:

In deciding which activities to expand at a faster rate, Government will give the highest priority to those projects and activities that, although they compete with the private sector for resources in the short run, are complementary with and stimulate private sector development in the medium and longer terms. (Midterm Review of NDP VI, 1988: 30)

So, infrastructural (e.g. roads, water resources, thermal-electric power), human resource (e.g. education, health) and private/parastatal (e.g. mining, export-oriented manufactures, job reservation and creation, expanded slaughter capacity and upgrading of Botswana Meat Commission investments) development have absorbed the bulk of government spending and policy planning. This is further illustrated in
the NDP VI focus on "Major Development Initiatives". These involve governmental expenditure on projects deemed to be of such a magnitude and importance to Botswana that together they would have the potential to help move the economy beyond the development plateau we are now heading into. (*Midterm Review of NDP VI*, 1988: 6)

Examples of some of these designated MDIs are (i) the major initiative in serviced land, "aimed at addressing the serious shortage of serviced land for residential, commercial, and industrial use" (*ibid*, 7); (ii) the Gaborone International Hotel; (iii) the new tannery; and (iv) the possible establishment of a diamond cutting industry in Botswana. (*ibid*)

Again, the government role would be one of facilitator:

Most of the initiatives would have a limited government involvement in the long run, and would not create a future call on government's recurrent expenditures. Rather, Government's role in the special initiatives would be largely to promote and stimulate the private sector's new activities ... In [the cases of the tannery and diamond cutting industry], the projects themselves would be self-liquidating and the role of Government is essentially that of providing the catalyst to mobilise private sector resources. (*ibid*)

This focus on expansion of existing leading sector development coupled with encouragement of new investment has drawn much criticism from radical academics. For critics like Molutsi, Cliffe & Moorsom, Colclough & McCarthy, and Sekgoma, among others, not only does present governmental policy by-pass the needs (principally, access to the means of production) of the bulk of the population (i.e. the
peasantry), it exacerbates existing trends toward class differentiation by providing incentives and supports to leading class fractions: specifically, international capital (or, the grande bourgeoisie), urban petty and bureaucratic bourgeoisies, and the kulak class of big farmers and ranchers. And as these class fractions expand their wealth, they do so at the expense of the peasantry: exploiting their labour, alienating them from the means of production - i.e. land, cattle - and intensifying their poverty. Their expanded wealth also strains the environment: by expanding cattle-holdings beyond sustainable limits; by fostering migration to crowded urban areas thus straining already limited services and jeopardising water and land resources. It is not so much specific governmental policies to which these critics object, but the general capitalist philosophy driving Botswana’s development policy.

Supporters of the government’s approach to economic development remain unapologetic, however, arguing that socialism and central planning have failed, bringing untold hardship to the peoples of Southern Africa; Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and, to a lesser extent, Zambia, are their preferred cases in point. (confidential interviews, Kwaluseni, 5-7 December 1989; Gaborone, 16 November 1989) Government spokespersons, themselves, argue that their approach to development planning, like their approach to foreign policy, is based in realism, not idealism. For
example, in his 1987 budget speech, the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Peter Mmusi, stated that employment creation and rural development were to be added to the existing goals of national development: rapid economic growth, social justice, economic independence, and sustained development. He cautioned, however, that, while "government’s policy was to take advantage of the wide range of possibilities that the country’s mineral wealth has opened up,"

... we have done [this] in a disciplined fashion, within a coherent system of economic planning. This maintenance of discipline even when times are good, will hold us in good stead for the future, when we may be operating in more difficult conditions than in recent years." *(Barclays, 1987: 14)*

Botswana’s policy-makers are well aware of these difficult conditions. In the mid-term review of NDP VI, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning highlighted numerous constraints to growth: the lack of formal sector employment versus growth in the labour force; overall population growth; fluctuations in commodity export prices; unfavorable movements in exchange rates; drought; debt; and geopolitical security considerations. *(Midterm Review of NDP VI, 1988: 1-45)*

**IV The Insecurity Dilemma: Substructural Constraints and Sharpening Social Contradictions**

In many ways, Botswana’s security problematique resembles that facing Lesotho moreso than that facing
Swaziland. The latter’s more favorable climate and geographical location bode well for a post-apartheid future, at least relative to the futures for Botswana and Lesotho.

(IV.1) Manufacturing

As discussed in Chapter Five, Swaziland’s manufacturing base is both more diverse and more favorable to labour intensive employment, however poorly paid it may be, than that of either Botswana or Lesotho. And its geographical position close to the Indian Ocean suggests lower marketing costs and more competitive prices for Swazi goods. In Botswana’s case, the prospects for increased manufacturing are poor. As Murray & Parson point out, Botswana faces "almost insuperable barriers to manufacturing." In 1966, manufacturing contributed merely 8% to total GDP (GDP being a mere P118 million). In the attempt to create a manufacturing base, the Botswana Development Bank, Botswana Small Enterprises Development Unit, Botswana Development Corporation, and the Financial Assistance Policy, were established through the 1970s and early 1980s. Many of these have since been brought together to form the Division of Integrated Field Services. The importance placed by Botswana policy-makers vested in manufacturing to Botswana’s future economic growth should not be underestimated, despite its present small contribution to GDP. According to Harvey and Lewis,

[T]he absence of large new mining prospects, and
the various problems of livestock and arable agriculture, meant that the continuation of economic growth in Botswana depended to a considerable degree on the manufacturing sector. (1990: 159)

With the assistance of FAP, BEDU, and the like, 155 new companies were established between 1981 and 1984. This compares favorably with the 104 companies established from 1966-81. (Murray & Parsons, 1990: 190) However, Murray & Parsons report that of all the licenced manufacturing companies established in the 1981-84 period, only 32 reported employing more than 10 people. Formal employment in the private sector was reported to be 71,600 in 1986/87, up from 53,800 in 1981; i.e. less than 3,500 jobs created per year. (Midterm Review of NDP VI, 1988: 23) Over the same time period government and parastatal employment had risen from approximately 31,600 in 1981 to 58,500 in 1986/87 (ibid).

Thus, government accounted for approximately 71% of all formal sector employment, and was the most dynamic sector as well, adding approximately 4,500 employees per year.

These meagre increases, however, pale in comparison to the number of job-seekers entering the labour market each year. According to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,

Even assuming that employment in the informal sector has grown by 6,000 per year over the past three years, total employment growth (i.e. formal sector employment growth plus informal sector employment growth) would not have been sufficient to absorb the increase in the labour force. With 13,550 additional jobs each year, there would still not be enough new jobs for the increase in the
labour force. In non-drought years, the agricultural sector might be able to create employment opportunities for at least a portion of the remaining increase in the labour force, but in recent years drought has been reducing employment opportunities rather than creating them. Thus even during this period when total formal and informal sector employment has grown significantly, unemployment and underemployment have continued to grow. (*Midterm Review*, 1988: 10-11)

Harvey and Lewis point out that as much as 40% of the manufacturing increase in Botswana Meat Corporation products, and upwards of 50% of all other manufacturing is due to increased domestic demand. (1990: 166-67) They conclude from this that

[f]urther rapid growth of manufacturing depended therefore on increasing import substitution and, since the domestic market would always be relatively small, on increasing manufactured exports. It was thus essential for manufacturing in Botswana to be competitive internationally. Success in import substitution was not enough on its own to ensure ability to export, because of the natural protection provided by distance and the different quality and marketing problems of selling in export markets.

Clearly, one strategy Botswana policy-makers have employed is to take advantage of their proximity to both South Africa and Zimbabwe to export largely South African or Zimbabwean products, but which meet specific value-added requirements, to other markets in the region.\(^{16}\) (interview with Bema, Zimbabwe High Commission, Gaborone, 16.11.89; also, confidential interview, Botswana High Commission, 1989)

\(^{16}\) This may be negatively affected by the recent reciprocal trade agreements concluded between Zimbabwe and South Africa and Zambia and South Africa. (See Shepherd, 1993)
Harare, 15.11.89) Further, because of the history of South African restrictions upon and embargoes of Botswana beef and other products, often in the effort to protect South African producers and in contravention of the Customs Union Agreement, Botswana policy makers have sought to avoid similar actions in future by maintaining a very open and inviting investment climate. (see, for example, Martin, 1989: 45-65; Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 168, 171-77) Again, the emphasis is on liberal capitalist development:

Private enterprise will only be interested in investing in Botswana if there is a profit to be made ... and if they are allowed to export their profits if they wish to do so. These conditions the government accepts. The government’s policy will be, in the case of every proposal [by investors for added incentives], to examine the balance of advantages to Botswana; the costs and benefits will be studied, and decisions made on that basis alone. (Transitional Plan, 1966: 6-7)

The best way to stimulate the creation of opportunities [for Botswana] is to provide incentives and support to the private sector; the Government’s own activities must not starve the private sector of resources ... increased participation by Botswana must be achieved through positive incentives; the displacement of non-Botswana interests should not be sought at a cost of the reduction in employment opportunities for Botswana. (NDP 1985-91: 64; both quotations from Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 168)

Botswana policy-makers have been very aggressive in the pursuit of new investment, both externally via, for example, more liberal exchange controls (Southern African Economist, Aug/Sept 1990: vii) and internally, via, for example, unflinching control over labour and therefore the costs of production:
The biggest strike in Botswana's history took place in early November 1991, at the same time as the South African national anti-VAT stayaway. According to various estimates, between 15,000 and 60,000 government and parastatal manual workers downed tools for two weeks to demand a living wage, paralysing activity in various sectors throughout the country. The government declared the strike illegal, dismissed over 15,000 industrial class employees, and rejected a 154% increase demanded by the Manual Workers Union, the major section of the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU). (*Southern Africa REPORT*, March 1992: 22)

This high-handed treatment of labour is similar to recent Swazi crackdowns on student demonstrators (see Chapter Five). It also contrasts with the 1989 decision by Lesotho's government to raise the minimum wage which, according to one expatriate, put Lesotho at a comparative disadvantage in the attempt to attract foreign investment, especially *vis a vis* Botswana. (see Chapter Four) Moreover, Botswana labour's increasing outspokenness, in spite of its status as a labour-aristocracy in a country hard pressed to provide employment to its citizens, seems indicative of the onerous conditions under which workers labour in order that business become internationally "competitive".

**IV.2 Agriculture: Scratching for Handouts**

Cycles of drought and disease have made accumulation a difficult process. For those few Batswana who practice subsistence agriculture, intermittent rainfall has forced them into patterns of shifting cultivation: i.e. "chasing showers". (Molutsi, 1989: 42) Though 80% of the population is classified as "rural", agriculture by 1986 contributed only
4% to GDP, and, in 1987, 6% to rural incomes. (Quinn et al., 1988: 6; Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 32; also, see below)

Botswana's limited ability to create formal sector employment -- irrespective of its "meaningfulness" -- in both the manufacturing and mineral sectors poses a serious threat to the long-term stability of the country. This is a threat more or less shared by both Lesotho and Swaziland, although the latter, as already stated, seems better placed to significantly increase its manufacturing base. Unlike Lesotho, with its traditional migrant labour outlet, and Swaziland, with its relative ability to sustain the peasantry on Swazi Nation Land, Botswana has few outlets for its un(der)employed and marginalised individuals. Endemic drought and the de jure and de facto privatisations of grazing land have forced many peasants either to migrate to the towns of Botswana and/or South Africa in search of work, or to remain on the land, marginally employed by large cattle owners, or working for government hand-outs.

Aside from largely freehold agriculture in the Southeast, around Baroleng, and in the Tuli Block area, Botswana cannot produce enough food to feed even a small fraction of its population. According to one estimate, crops provide approximately 6% of total rural incomes. And, even in non-drought years, one-half of all foodstuffs consumed must be imported. (Quinn et al., 1988: 7) This puts Botswana in a somewhat ironical position of being less vulnerable to
drought than its Southern African neighbours since crop loss is limited. (ibid) According to Quinn et al, in 1983, of 83,000 households surveyed, fully 85.7% (70,250) produced no crops at all while another 9.6% (7,840) harvested less than 250kg in total. (1,500kg is estimated to be necessary to meet household needs.) (1988: 11) These statistics corroborate those offered by Cliffe & Moorsom which pointed out that, in 1971, 62% of rural households produced less than the necessary minimum for their own subsistence. Thus, roughly 54% of rural households were forced to depend on wage labour to augment their rural sub-subsistence production. (1979: 41, 42)

Drought is the major contributor to the lack of crop production in Botswana. According to the Midterm Review of NDP VI, "since 1960 there have been two major droughts in Botswana and only one uninterrupted period of five years of good rainfall." (1988: 84) Yet, the same review suggests, optimistically:

Over time, the subsistence [sic] subsector will progressively become smaller compared to the commercial subsector. Commercial cattle and crop production (both small and large) will rely increasingly on modern highly productive technology and management methods, and the bulk of the nation’s agricultural output will be produced predominantly by an enlarged and highly efficient commercial subsector. (ibid, 83)

Granted, this statement came on the heels of a break in the drought cycle that saw good rains for the first time in six years. However, it also failed to anticipate the subsequent
four years of drought (1989-1992) that have since reduced Botswana’s meagre agricultural base even further. (Times, London, 9.3.92; Africa Recovery, August 1992: 25)

Government has been forced to divert a large amount of its development expenditure toward drought relief. A variety of programmes established in the early 1980s -- e.g. Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee, Early Warning Technical Cooperation, supplementary feeding programme for children, Labour Based Relief Programme, and the Agricultural Relief Programme -- successfully combatted the worst effects of drought. (See Quinn et al., 1988: 13-20; Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 300-305) However, all programmes, like the Agricultural Relief Programme which was tantamount to giving farmers seeds and paying them to plant them even though there was next to no chance of producing a crop, failed to address a contributing factor to drought and crop failure in Botswana: the expansion of commercial cattle farming.

(IV.3) Cattle, Power, and the Environment

Perhaps most indicative of the long-term threats to security facing Botswana is the expansion of cattle ranching and the "attack on the Kalahari". Overgrazing and peasant land-alienation, as pointed out above, are problems of increasing seriousness in Botswana. The Midterm Review, however, devotes but two short paragraphs to the former and nothing to the latter. (see, also, Good, 1993) More than anything else, this is indicative of the nexus of power in
Botswana. As in Lesotho, cattle serve a dual role in Batswana society: as economic investment and symbol of political power, each reinforcing the other. And, as in Lesotho, cattle provide the point of intersection for numerous groups normally antagonistic toward one another; groups whose only other unifying characteristic is gender: cattle owners are men. Access to cattle in Southern Africa has evolved through many different routes, with migrant labour providing the means by which commoners were first able to break away from the demands of chiefs and Kings.

As was demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, varied but long-established routes to the means of status and production -- i.e. cattle -- created a complex web of vested interests in Southern Africa. The status quo, therefore, was favored by groups as divergent as Basotho and Batswana migrant labourers, on the one hand, and Presidents and Kings on the other hand. Hence my assertion that, from a substructural perspective, the support for conservative foreign policies was widespread despite apartheid and destabilisation. At the same time, however, this conservatism, taken to mean substructural as well a superstructural continuity, is inherently destabilising. Nowhere is this more clearly in evidence than in Botswana.

Mineral-based development has facilitated the growth in both cattle and human populations. However, access to the former is being limited to wealthy class fractions; i.e.
those individuals in and around state power. The vast majority of the population is therefore cut off from the means of production, land and cattle, and forced to work for sub-subsistence wages within Botswana, or in the Republic of South Africa. Reasonably waged jobs, like those in South Africa’s mining industry, are limited and likely to further contract. At the same time, a cattle population close to 3 million must be sustained on land ravaged by drought and exacerbated by the unwillingness of powerful cattle owners to restrict grazing areas.

As the Batswana population increases due to improved medical, educational, and other services, the pool of un(der)employed continues to increase. Capital-intensive mineral development provides government with the necessary revenue to meet as yet limited expectations, but minerals are a wasting asset. One estimate puts Botswana’s diamond reserves at 125 years. (Lewis, 1981) Moreover, how long international investors and government will be willing to sustain unprofitable mines like the copper-nickel matte complex at Shashe is questionable. By 1984, the latter project’s accumulated debt was P750 million. (Murray & Parsons, 1990: 187) Copper prices dropped by 40% in 1975 and have yet to recover; in 1987 they were still 20% below 1974 levels. Nickel’s price has fluctuated over the last 15 years or so; its 1987 price was only 20% above that of 1974. (Harvey & Lewis, 1990: 139; on Shashe generally, see 137-48;
and, for fluctuations in commodity prices, see World Bank, 1989; also Africa Recovery, December 1992: 31)

Government has demonstrated, in the case of diamonds, a ready willingness to restructure the economy at the first sign of danger. During the diamond crisis of 1981–82 when prices fell dramatically, the government of Botswana instituted a de facto structural adjustment programme without the assistance or prodding of either the IMF or World Bank. Wages were frozen, the pula was devalued by 20%, a sales tax was imposed on non-essentials, interest rates were increased, and the government cut both capital and current expenditures. (Quinn et al, 1988: 8–9) According to Quinn et al:

Botswana could have chosen to delay the adoption of its adjustment measures or could have adopted less stringent measures ... By adopting stringent adjustment measures while the economy was still healthy, the government minimised the potential consequences of any of these events. (1988: 10)

However, adopting structural adjustment measures when still able to cushion the effects on the most vulnerable sectors of the economy -- e.g. the peasantry and the urban poor -- is something quite different from closing down unprofitable mines and possibly destroying two of the fastest-growing towns in the country. Nevertheless, given the wasting assets of copper and nickel, the prospect of a massive retrenchment is probably not so far beyond the realm of possibility.

(V) Conclusion: An Ostrich with its head in the sand?

In an advertisement for BGI Tanning Company (Pty) Ltd.
of Botswana, an ostrich appears with its head out of the sand, eyes wide open above the caption "We've nothing to hide..." (See Southern African Economist, Aug/Sept 1990: xiv) One wonders if this may not be an appropriate metaphor for policy-making in Botswana. On the one hand, planning appears to proceed carefully, policy-makers seemingly fully aware of the many shortcomings of Botswana's economy. Clearly pressures are building at many levels within the Botswana social formation, with no clear solutions and seemingly no real options other than the careful husbandry of capital resources.\textsuperscript{17} Results from five democratically held elections show support for present policies, but from a shrinking active electorate. (see Table 6.1 above) Perhaps "success" in this context hinges upon a post-apartheid Southern African regional division of labour. Botswana's steady support for SADC(C) would seem to suggest that it does. The free flow of goods, labour, services, and capital within a greater Southern African region may reduce population pressures as Botswana "exports" its economic and ecological migrants, and increase productivity as Botswana would be better able to exploit it position as the regional nexus between two -- and potentially three, including Angola

\textsuperscript{17} The Midterm Review of NDP VI is a classic example of this type of planning, with a variety of different scenarios laid out based on different contingencies. However, it remains wedded to neo-liberal capitalist economic assumptions which begs the question whether this commitment to the status quo - for how much change is really possible via trickle down economics? - is not ultimately debilitating.
industrial powers.

However, there remains the issue of the web of the status quo; i.e. those individuals who survive, some of whom even prosper from the present organisation of the region's political economy. Would they be willing to restrict their abilities to accumulate wealth even if the links with environmental decay and peasant impoverishment could be forcefully demonstrated? At the same time, would Botswana policy-makers and others tied to the state and access to capital via their "nearness" to the centre of power, be willing to give up their positions in a restructured regional political economy?

To both questions I would have to answer "no". The most likely scenario is that of maintenance of the status quo; i.e. of an ostrich with its eyes wide open but ever ready to plunge its head in the sand at the nearest sign of danger. This is quintessentially regime survival masquerading as democratic development.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Comparative Foreign Policy, BLS, and Third World Futures

(I) BLS in Theory and Practice

In Chapters One and Two, I highlighted the emerging literature on Third World foreign policy and the utility of a radical political economy framework in explaining behaviour. Throughout this thesis I have tried to emphasise the twin concerns of Third World foreign policy-makers as outlined by Korany, Shaw, and others:

(i) **domestic system concerns**: for example, modernisation and social change leading to problems and issues of development, dependence, identity, ethnicity, class, gender and national integration.

(ii) **international system concerns**: inequality and, in the African case, increasing marginality in the NIDL/P; permeability of the state and penetration of the decision-making process by external actors.

Clearly, these factors interrelate, and change over time, affecting policy-makers' capabilities and interests. An important point made in this thesis is the need to distinguish between aspiration and behaviour in Third World foreign policy. My approach, which examines the substructural linkages -- particularly class and gender -- within and between social formations, has emphasised the difference between verbal commitments to "national security" or "collective security" on the one hand, and the actual pursuit
of regime maintenance and political class interests on the other hand. However, I also attempted to show how fragile social formations within a regional division of labour develop cross-class and cross-category interests, largely in pursuit of the status quo.

In this way I have gone beyond structural Marxist analyses which emphasise class formation and conflict to highlight, instead, other salient coalitions and contradictions that emerge in Third World societies. As noted by Gramsci, the extension of capitalist and Western ideological forms of hegemony to the periphery is a distorted and incomplete process. Alliances therefore do not emerge solely on the basis of class; rather, class consciousness and inter-class conflict are but two elements among many in explaining, among other things, Third World foreign policy behaviour.

What remains clear, however, is that those at the apex of the social formation attempt to control the pace and direction of events around them. "In defense of the national interest" as an explanation of Third World foreign policy behaviour remains unenlightening from the substructural point of view. While cross-class and -category alliances can develop in the name of the "national interest" -- e.g. in defence of migrant labour and cattle -- notions of "national interest" obscure other rifts within the social formation hidden by defence of the status quo -- e.g. increasing
exploitation of women, landlessness of peasants, and oppression of labour.

And while incorporation at the margins of the global capitalist system is the fundamental starting point for African foreign policy-makers, it is a necessary but insufficient condition for explaining the behaviour of Third World states; i.e. since dependence is a condition common to all, it cannot explain divergent foreign policy behaviours. (Mugenyi, 1988)

(I.1) Pragmatism and the Status Quo

Clearly, as seen in my three case studies, the historical legacy of the particular social formation -- particularly its struggle for self-determination and the kind of hierarchies which developed in defense of the state and out of the dominant mode of production -- is of paramount importance in understanding foreign policy behaviour. So, while Korany and Dessouki are correct in their characterisation of Third World "foreign polic[ies] of development", the role assigned these social formations in the global capitalist system by dominant external forces, in interaction with pre-capitalist modes and relations of power and production give rise to different approaches to and notions of "development".

Indeed, in the Batswana case, development has been defined in terms of economic and political modernisation through capitalist development. The Swazi case differs in
that capitalist development has been similarly pursued but it is overlaid with pre-capitalist concerns of the preservation of absolute monarchy. Conservative foreign policies help serve these interests. And, in the context of destabilisation, also appear to serve the interests of the average Motswana or Swazi.

Contemporary Lesotho's foreign policy, as we have seen, differs from both Swaziland and Botswana partly because of (i) its historical role as a labour reserve in the regional capitalist system; and (ii) the quality of its leadership. Unlike Botswana and Swaziland, Lesotho was never settled by white farmers. Rather, its lands were taken from it. The effects of "land alienation" on Lesotho's foreign policy in the post-colonial era were twofold. First, with the country reduced to a quintessential labour reserve, those at the "commanding heights" of the Basotho economy remained a parasitic class, extracting "tribute" from migrant labourers, and dominating the trade and service industries through their access to the state and donor assistance. There was little indigenous capital accumulation; accumulation that, in Botswana and Swaziland, made for shared corporate interests and conservative foreign policies, tied as it was to international -- especially South African -- and settler capital. (cf Weisfelder, 1981: 231-232)

Second, as a labour reserve, the majority of Basotho were both absent for the better part of the year and highly
politicised as a result of their direct exposure to apartheid and race-based capitalist exploitation. Ordinary Basotho faced a contradiction: continued opportunity to work in South Africa versus support for the liberation struggle.

This politicised majority was unique to Lesotho. In Swaziland, a carefully cultivated adherence to "traditional rule", coupled with a near-subsistence peasant existence, made for a quiescent, agrarian based, populace. In Botswana, the post-colonial "tradition" of developmental support -- e.g. the extension of water, schools, health services -- for rural peoples has fostered a largely depoliticised population. Steady support for the BDP but low levels of voter turn-out in the rural areas are testimony to the equally low level of expectations in Batswana rural society. (see Weisfelder, 1992 for a lucid comparison of political cultures)¹ Only in the urban areas have Batswana and Swazi come to approximate the radicalised Basotho, but their numbers are considerably smaller. This has allowed policymakers there to pursue status quo-oriented foreign policies with only limited opposition; the majority within these

¹ Holm and Parson disagree in their interpretations of this phenomenon. While Holm's analysis tends to support my own, Parson perceives of this quiescence not as complacency or satisfaction with BDP supports, but rather, as alienation and marginalisation from the political process altogether. (This point was made to me in a conversation with Holm, Seattle, 23 November 1992.)
social formations benefiting from a lack of "disruption".\(^2\)

Unlike Botswana and Swaziland, then, post-colonial Basotho leadership faced a difficult situation: How to maintain cordial relations with South Africa and thereby ensure continuing demand for migrant labour without appearing to be a lackey of capitalist exploitation. Chief Jonathan's early cooperative foreign policy seemed eminently rational. It clearly reflected South African and Basotho economic interests and recognised the gross disparity of power between the two states. Moreover, it paralleled closely that of both Sobhuza and Khama. But the sheer numbers of Basotho nationals -- approximately 200,000 -- living directly under the conditions of apartheid capitalism could not accept such a position. And, as stated in Chapter Three, Jonathan could not fall back on the hereditary power and legitimacy obtaining to Sobhuza and Khama to carry it off. Once it became clear that a more forceful stand against apartheid had to be taken, he had already forfeited domestic legitimacy, and would be forced to rule with an iron fist until deposed in 1986.

Ironically, his successors have faced similar problems. Having learned nothing from history, the ruling Military Council under Lekhanya proceeded to replicate the earlier policies of the Jonathan regime: acquiescence to South Africa coupled with increasingly authoritarian rule at home. It

\(^2\) Both Levin (1991) and Daniel (1984) see this as "false consciousness" on the part of the Swazi peasantry.
remains to be seen how the recently-elected BCP government will react to these forces in Basotho and regional political economy.

(II) Southern African Futures in the Post-Apartheid Era

(II.1) Global Hegemony and Organic Crisis

If a radical political economic approach -- with its focus on dependency, economic weakness, and political class self-interest -- can assist in explaining a state's foreign policy behaviour, then it may have some utility in suggesting directions for future foreign policy. As the world moves toward post-industrialism, globalisation of production, and the flexibilisation of labour, the raw materials-producing regions of the world face an increasing security problematique. That is to say, under-capitalisation and under-utilisation of existing industry, decreasing commodity prices and global demand, and widening unfavorable terms of trade are not leading to a de facto form of South-South cooperation and self-reliance like that thought desireable by both the ECA and OAU. To the contrary, Southern Africa's states remain firmly tied to the North. The primary linkage, however, is a distressing one: debt repayment and economic structural adjustment.

As highlighted in Chapter Three, the extension of this global capitalist agenda to the region has fostered an organic crisis throughout the region. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the presence of gold, diamonds, oil and communism
helped delay recognition of this crisis. In other parts of the Third World, the "threat" of communism fostered economic growth through US support for "Western" security. The NICs and Japan are cases in point.

In Southern Africa, however, the characterisation of "total onslaught" leading to "total strategy" resulted not in US-enforced peace, but US-supported confrontation and repression throughout the region. The issue of race-based hegemony complicated matters. Unlike other parts of the Third World, Western security interests were muddled by abhorrence of apartheid. The region, therefore, came in for mixed support. This is nowhere more contradictory and counter-productive than in US support for the Frontline States and SADCC on the one hand; and for constructive engagement and UNITA on the other hand. As a result, the region's resources increasingly came to be used for heightened militarisation and in military "solutions" to high political problems that might have been resolved through diplomacy. (Chapter Three)

Thus, at a time when more resources may have been available to deal with problems of underdevelopment -- industrialisation, sustainable development, food security, regional complementarities of trade, more equitable resource and income distributions -- regional relations became even more divided, and those with the wherewithall to do so, became ever more protective of their own, parochial interests. And, given the nature of the South African
"threat", this "survivalist" strategy common to SADC policy-makers came to be supported both by international donors and internal social fractions. Destabilisation therefore acted as a focal point for national and regional "solidaristic" myth-making.

However, the opportunity for a concentrated attack on these issues may have by-passed the region. The post-Cold War world has not only revealed the extensive and heightening problems of primary product producers such as those found in Southern Africa; it has also led to decreasing Western interests in the amelioration of those problems. No longer can SADC or South Africa call on West or East in the name of anti-communism or anti-apartheid/capitalism. It has been pointed out recently that there is only one superpower in Africa now and it is the US. Moreover, it is the chief representative -- both as a bilateral donor and as the major actor in both IMF and World Bank foras -- of a liberal economic agenda that has, to this point in time, exacerbated domestic tensions and widened inter-state economic non-complementarities of trade.

As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this thesis, the extension of the liberal capitalist agenda globally, with its emphases on privatisation, deregulation, devaluation, desubsidisation, and comparative advantage has seriously threatened many Third World states, BLS among them. Ironically, however, BLS have been held up by Bank/Fund
representatives as "successful" states operating within the dominant paradigm. But, as I have attempted to show, "success" in terms of economic growth has led to numerous other problems at the level of the individual social formation: e.g. desertification around Batswana boreholes; crowding and decreasing production on Swazi Nation Land; violent conflict over jobs directed at ex-patriate entrepreneurs and fellow Basotho in Lesotho. (see, for example, Abucar & Molutsi, 1993; Levin, 1991; and Tangri, 1993: 231-238) In other words, the "logic" of comparative advantage has led to a heightening tragedy of the commons throughout the region, as the rich get richer through the exploitation of both human and natural resources.

(II.2) Regime Survival and Liberal Hegemony

Leadership in all three states has accepted the dominant ideology, and tolerated the penetration of their states and the loss of autonomous decision-making capacity so long as they have been able to partake in the accumulation process. Somewhat understandably, each state's marginal position in the global economy has led its leadership to pursue regime survival, or, in Dutkiewicz and Shenton's terms, "etatisation". Khama, Jonathan, and Sobhuza have all successfully exploited their weak positions vis a vis the apartheid Republic at global fora, and used international assistance to extend the reach of the state.

Yet, in the context of structural adjustment, states
have been forced to "down-size" by, for example, retrenching
civil servants, dismantling or eliminating parastatals and
marketing boards, and removing subsidies for education,
health, and food, among other things. In short, the global
"market" is meant to replace the state as the chief allocator
of scarce resources in society. In this way, those at the
centre of power have come to look and act more like predators
and active collaborators, than -- as they have sought to
characterise themselves -- weak and exploited Third World
prey.

This situation is most apparent in Lesotho where an
"ossified and gerontocratic" elite remains in power, the
recent elections having ushered in not a new generation of
policy-makers but a septuagenarian member of the political
class. Given the context of the NIDL/P it is likely that
Mokhehle will be as accepting of externally-imposed political
and economic conditionalities as were his predecessors.
(Weisfelder, 1992a) In Botswana and Swaziland, elites have
been able to avoid similar processes because of somewhat
recession-resistant economic growth -- given diamonds in the
former, sanctions-related manufacturing in the latter, and
Lome provisions in both -- and not overly ambitious
development programmes. They have, therefore, not had to deal
with all of the measures attendant in formal IFI-supported
structural adjustment packages. At the same time, however,
policy-makers in both states have, on occasion, readily
undertaken *de facto* adjustment: the radical devaluation of
the Pula, and the willing privatisation of the Swaziland
Development Corporation being cases in point. Nevertheless,
"tradition" and autocratic rule in Swaziland, and surplus
diamond revenues in Botswana, have allowed the extension of
bureaucratic control to continue relatively unencumbered by
external conditionalities.

This differs from the Lesotho case where, as seen in
Chapter Four, SAP was an unavoidable element of the Highlands
Water Project. And, as suggested in that chapter, SAP’s
effects have extended beyond mere budgetary considerations,
to shake the entire structure of bureaucratic power in
Lesotho, leading toward what I call the "black hole effect"
of narrowing but increasingly concentrated bases of political
and economic power.

(II.3) Regional Integration

In spite of these individual state-based approaches to
economic development, leaders in all of Southern Africa’s
states acknowledge that Africa’s marginalisation makes
regional and continental integration ever more important. As
pointed out earlier in the thesis, the region’s exports are
dominated by primary commodities and hence lack the necessary
complementarities for intra-regional trade. In Chapter Three
it was stated that intra-SADCC trade, excluding Zimbabwe-
SADCC, was less than 2% of the total. Moreover, issues of
debt and its repayment have pushed the SADCC states further
apart; indeed, into competing with each other for scarce foreign investments and markets.

Nevertheless, in mid-August 1992, SADCC governments signed the Windhoek treaty which changes the organisation from a loose standing conference of ten states to a formal regional integration scheme -- i.e. from SADCC to SADC -- that will focus on the harmonisation of trade and monetary policies and will by definition force the states to adhere to prescribed treaty provisions as is the case within the EC. (SADCC, 1992; Shepherd, 1992) Two questions remain unanswered, however. First, how do deeply indebted, structurally adjusting states, competing with similar products for similar markets, move toward regional cooperation and development? Second, what is the role of SADC within a post-apartheid Southern Africa?

With regard to the second question, it is SADC's hope that South Africa will, at some point, join the Community. On the other hand, the PTA and South Africa have ambitions of their own which are not completely compatible with SADC ideals. South Africa may be compelled to "go it alone" by signing a series of bilateral trade accords as they have recently done with both Zimbabwe and Zambia. And, in the African context, Nigeria and Kenya are likely to be more important markets for South African manufactures than any of SADC's member-states. With regard to the PTA, SADC has had basic philosophical differences with the Association. While
the former has sought to liberalise trade in the region, SADC has countered that "production should push trade, rather than trade pull production." (SADCC, 1991)

Reflective of the extension of the global orthodoxy to the region, however, is SADC's seeming capitulation to PTA and IFI thinking. Indeed, as highlighted in Chapter Three, SADC has failed in its attempt at integrated production. There have been few foreign takers in SADC's industrial strategy. However, there is considerably more support for liberalised trade. In this context, then, South Africa becomes a crucial link for regional economic growth. Without post-apartheid South Africa's participation in a regional integration scheme, there is little prospect of remaining SADC and/or PTA members developing any significant transnational economic backward and/or forward linkages. As stated, the issue remains unresolved and debt and economic liberalism are likely to keep the region more divided than united in the near future.

The implication for BLS and other regional state foreign policy, then, is of continued support for the status quo and defence of the political class within their respective social formations. For civil societies in the region, however, the status quo looks less inviting. While present BLS policymakers, and members of the political class, are likely to retain their positions at the apex of society, albeit with minor variations, well into the 21st century -- diamonds,
cattle, Tibiyo, sugar, and water forming the basis of continued hegemony -- civil society and the "uncaptured" peasantry are likely to face ever heightening security problems. (see below)

(II.4) "Acute Conflict" and the Politics of Structural Adjustment

Laissez-faire economic growth policies are creating myriad frictions within BLS social formations. Manufacturing for export is leading toward desertification and peasant landlessness, as well as worker unrest and the politicisation of labour in Botswana. While surplus capital has allowed the state to mask problems in rural areas, the long-governing BDP's loss of control of two of four town council seats (Lobatse and Jwaneng) and the only city council seat (Gaborone) to opposition parties points toward heightening urban unrest. (Bernard, 1990: 17-19; cf Southern Africa REPORT, 1992)

Manufacturing for export has also led to violence in Lesotho, as urban unrest has focussed on Indian shop-keepers, and Korean footwear and textile manufacturers. (Tangri, 1993) In the Maloti Mountains, as well, Basotho have fought each other as displaced individuals have congregated around the HWP infrastructure in search of work. In both Lesotho and Swaziland, footloose industries continue to exploit female labour. And while violence toward women takes many different forms, the "incomplete proletarianisation" of female labour
has led to new forms of structural and conjunctural violence. That is to say, women who have escaped from oppressive "traditional" Swazi and Basotho homesteads to the workplace, often find the move temporary as they are retrenched once footloose industry moves back to South Africa, to the homelands, or out of the region altogether. These women then face the unenviable choice of homelessness in the urban areas versus a return to their previous station in life: i.e incomplete emancipation. (This point was made in conversation with Harris, Seattle, 21 November 1993)

(II.5) The State and the Informal Sector: "Exit"

As SADC states move toward a more limited role vis a vis civil society -- what some say is more reflective of their equally limited capacities to accumulate and redistribute wealth in the NIDL -- informal sectors, including trade in goods, services, capital and labour, are likely to expand in a new, post-Cold War, post-apartheid division of labour. (cf Chazan, 1992; and LeMarchand, 1992 for contending perspectives on the precise meaning of "civil society") Thus, while the prospects for formal integration at the regional level remain hampered by state-by-state SAP conditionalities and inter-state competition, informal trade thrives in spite of myriad devaluations and trade liberalisations. (cf de Soto, 1989; Sandbrook, 1985)

At the same time, growing populations and their demands upon the state for protection from a renewed Southern African
"state of nature" are combining with external donor conditionalities to move the region toward multi-party democracy.

(II.6) Democracy and Civil Society: "Voice"

In both Lesotho and Swaziland, activists on university campuses have lobbied for change in this direction and were met with varying levels of force. And, in spite of Lesotho's recent democratically costituted change of government, the socio-economic basis for multi-party democracy remains elusive. Mokhehle's recent silence regarding the BCP's pre-election proposal that Lesotho integrate with South Africa is reflective of his party's absolute legislative power. Moreover, it suggests that a return to democracy does not mean an end to patronage and corruption in the Lesotho case. Lessons from the Swazi case, where a reformist Prime Minister, Mabandla, was turned out of office, in part due to his desire to end official corruption are also instructive in this regard.

Swaziland, too, faces pressures for democratisation. As discussed in Chapter Five, a frustrated bureaucratic

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3 The stresses of dual destabilisation upon civil societies in Southern Africa were most apparent during my four months there at the end of 1989. Student demonstrations and university closures occurred in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Labour strikes took place in each of BLS and Zimbabwe. And, in Lesotho and Swaziland, student, faculty, and church groups began to demonstrate in favour of multi-party democracy; their efforts were matched by rumblings of a "democratic" cross-conditionality among aid officials.
bourgeoisie has found temporary, if somewhat strange, bedfellows in a radicalised youth and conservative chieftaincy. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie is keen on removing its major obstacles to becoming a national bourgeoisie: the monarchy. In the Swazi case, those wielding political power are unlikely to relinquish it easily. (Weisfelder, 1992) And in neither case is civil society strong enough to pose a threat to existing social relations.

Recent events in Lesotho support this assertion. Among BLS, the Basotho are the most thoroughly politicised. However, the limited strength and independence of Basotho civil society is clearly reflected in the recently released electoral role. While the prospect of a return to democracy gave rise to numerous groups in civil society -- women's, labour, youth, pro-chieftaincy and pro-monarchy, to name but a few -- their "flowering" was short-lived. Only the Peoples' Democratic Forum (PDF), a new political party started by faculty at the University of Lesotho, managed to get itself onto the electoral role. And while it fielded candidates to contest about half of the seats in the legislature, it is the pre-1970 coup faces that once again dominate the political scene: the conservative BNP, the radical BCP, and the pro-monarchy MaremaTlou Freedom Party (MFP). (interview with Weisfelder, Toledo, 12 March 1993)

This unhappy outcome reflects recent studies on civil society and NGOs in Africa (Bratton, 1989a; 1989b; Chazan,
1992; Fowler, 1991a; 1991b; LeMarchand, 1992; Lewis, 1992; and Shaw, 1990b). In spite of some early optimism, most analysis now recognises that beyond the Church few groups are able to marshall the resources necessary to represent and protect their limited interests, let alone challenge for power in open elections. (Fowler, 1991a: 60; Tangri, 1993)

Even those elements of civil society wishing to remain apart from the state face cooptation. African NGOs -- e.g. market associations, informal sector trading groups, rural cooperatives -- seeking independent solutions to the myriad problems thrown up by structural adjustment, find themselves courted not necessarily by the state, but by the international donor community. (Fowler, 1991a; LeMarchand, 1992) But the forces seeking to coopt them -- e.g. the various development banks -- are representative of the dominant paradigm's extension to the region; i.e. the very forces which necessitated their emergence and attempted exit in the first place.

Civil society faces a somewhat different challenge in Botswana. In contrast to Lesotho, Botswana seems even less likely to give rise to the kinds of associational groups which might give voice and force to marginalised elements in society. To the contrary, pluralism in Botswana means "voice" for the political class. And while their interests may differ in very real ways, the basic philosophy of laissez-faire is never questioned. As was illustrated in Chapter Six, there is
active repression of those elements of civil society perceived by the political class to be a threat to its ability to accumulate. "Democracy" in this case, is but a velvet glove hiding the heavy hand of the state over labour -- i.e. the NIC model of development.

(III) Third World Issues and Strategies in the NIDL/P

Many of the issues now coming to the fore in BLS -- democracy, the role for civil society, economic liberalisation, the environment and the informal sector -- are clearly discernible throughout the Third World. Some states have been better able to deal with these contradictions than have others; hence the formative typologies of NICs, near-NICs, Fourth and Fifth Worlds. (Shaw, 1990a) But most states remain clearly "Third World", i.e. at or near those same margins to which they were relegated in the primarily post-industrial revolutionary period. This marginalisation within the context of expanding liberal economic and political orthodoxies is creating pressures upon regimes throughout the Third World. Most have attempted to maintain the status quo by accommodating these pressures; Latin American "democratisation" being a case in point.

But, as I have tried to show in the Southern African case, accommodation with substructural forces -- unlike the largely successful strategies undertaken to limit the negative effects of South African destabilisation -- are
self-defeating in the longer-run. "Accommodation" to the forces of the substructure means acceptance of the neo-liberal paradigm. This involves a combination of open economies, "comparative advantage", and streamlined state structures. But, as my evidence suggests, for primary product exporting economies, "comparative advantage" is no advantage at all. Further, streamlining the state means unravelling the myriad knots of power and patronage that have sustained BLS social formations in the past. One might hypothesise, then, that domestic contradictions will increasingly manifest themselves as class cleavages. This is because laissez-faire economic development in the periphery not only pits workers against owners. In tandem with structural adjustment, it also undermines those cross-linkages in society that hindered development of identities and conflicts based on class.

The OAU/ECA and SADC all recognise these factors; hence the continuing logic of South-South cooperation and regional economic integration based on fairer terms of trade. But, as I have also tried to show in this thesis, policy-making at the state-level -- i.e. foreign policy behaviour -- does not for long take into account larger, regional or continental ideals -- i.e. foreign policy aspirations, the torrent of summit communiques notwithstanding. To the contrary, policymakers seek regime maintenance first and foremost. And in the context of a post-Cold War, post-industrial NIDL/P, this practice is undermining many former successful alliances that
spanned classes and categories. The contradictions within and between states are being ever more sharply drawn, with Bank/Fund "solutions" only speeding up the process.

Forces throughout the Third World are aligning between civil societies and global orthodoxies. Extant regimes and political classes are attempting to cushion the impact and guide the direction of the global capitalist process in order to maintain power. Civil societies, in many cases newly emergent but highly fragmented, are ultimately united in opposition to the trend toward SAPs and widening intra-societal economic disparities. Job losses, trade and student union bans, welfare cuts and homestead displacement typical of competitive capitalist policies in the NIDL are helping to galvanise these disparate groups.

Yet, what civil society awaits is a new champion. As suggested above, some have looked to NGOs, labour, church and other grassroots organisations for answers. I am not optimistic about Third or Fourth World futures. To be sure, the present conjuncture marks the beginning of a new history -- not its end -- of intra- and inter-societal struggles for survival and self-determination. This scenario suggests an ever-widening chasm between regime and civil society definitions of and approaches to "security" and "development". In this way, then, BLS are not sui generis, but a typical comparative case in Third World foreign policy and political economy.
APPENDIX

Historical Summary of BLS State Formation from the Difaqane to Independence

In approaching this summary of the past 150 years in BLS history, it is important to note three interrelated trends: (i) population movement; (ii) state formation; and (iii) the extension of monopoly capitalism to the sub-continent. With regard to population movement, migration and the ensuing struggle over land and labour is a defining characteristic of 19th and 20th century Southern African history. The expansionist tendencies of Shaka's Zulu Kingdom in the early 1820s, coupled with the mass migration of Afrikaner farmers into the interior of the sub-continent, placed incredible stresses and strains upon extant social formations. Subsequent encroachments upon these small but growing Kingdoms by British and Ndebele challenged them further. Some groups chose defensive strategies for survival; others learned from the Zulu and adopted more aggressive approaches. The Batswana are a clear example of the former; the Swazi of the latter; and the Basotho fall somewhere in between.

The second discernible trend follows from the first. In attempting to cope with these various challenges, Basotho, Batswana and Swazi leaders employed a variety of strategies to strengthen their emerging Kingdoms. State formation had two components, one domestic, the other external.

With regard to external strategy, all three Kingdoms -- the Bamangwato under Sekgoma I and Khama III, the Basotho under Moshoeshoe I, and the Swazi under Dlamini I, Sobhuza I and Mswati II -- employed complex alliance strategies, always careful to placate the strongest power in the region. With regard to internal nation building, these Kings sought to coopt rivals, place their sons in strategically important chiefdoms, and share the wealth. According to Murray and Parsons (1991: 160):

The characteristic type of state formation in pre-colonial Southern Africa, from Toutswe (900-1200) and Great Zimbabwe (1200-1400) onwards, is normally known among historians as the MAFISA system. MAFISA refers to cattle which were lent or loaned in trust from patron to client, in return for tribute, services, and allegiance. Hence, the MAFISA system is not improperly sometimes translated as "cattle-feudalism".

This is not to imply autocratic rule on the part of these leaders. To the contrary, each Kingdom developed a form
of democratic governance whereby adult males in each
country were able to voice their opinions in a
public forum on a wide variety of matters. Naturally, the
Kings controlled the agenda; but, given the hotchpotch
character of their populations --- each having absorbed a
number of different ethnic groups --- the strengthening of
these social formations depended very much on keeping rival
chiefs pacified.

But, these early successes were cut short by the
discovery of gold and diamonds in various parts of Southern
Africa. To be sure, there were already substantial pressures
placed upon these Kingdoms by European expansion. But the
extension of monopoly capitalism --- the third trend --- as a
result of these mineral-strikes in the latter part of the
century forever altered their development trajectories: from
expansion and self-definition to contraction and servitude.
European demands for land and labour thus transformed these
budding Kingdoms into stunted labour reserves.

Lesotho

1786 birth of Moshoeshoe
1818- Zulu expansion: the Mfecane: Hlubi, Ngwane, Ndebele
flee Shaka’s rule
1820 Moshoeshoe made village headman at Butha Buthe
1822-24 siege of Butha Buthe by the Tlokwa; Moshoeshoe
flees with several hundred followers to Thaba Bosiu
1828-31 Ngwane, Ndebele and Tlokoa raids
1820s migration to West of Lesotho by Kora and Khoi
1833-34 8,000 Rolong settle; enter into peaceful
coexistence with Moshoeshoe’s followers
mid-1830s Moshoeshoe has 25,000 followers: from
Chiefdom to Kingdom
1833 seeks out assistance from European Missionaries;
Paris Evangelical Mission established at Thaba
Bosiu
1836-38 Great Trek
1841 Moshoeshoe appeals to British for protection
1845 seeks rapprochement with Boers through land
concession: establishment of Maitland Line
1848 British sovereignty over Orange and Vaal River
areas
1849 establishment of the Warden Line boundary; Basotho
borders shrink substantially
1851-54 numerous skirmishes with Boer and British settlers
1854 British transfer government of area to Boer
Republic of Orange Free State; border dispute not
resolved
1859  Moshoeshoe establishes Law of Trade by which no foreigner can gain title to Basotho land
1865–68  war with Boer Republic
1868  Basutoland annexed to British crown; becomes a High Commission Territory
1870  diamonds discovered at Kimberley; mining town springs up over night; massive infrastructural projects to develop road and rail begin
1870  death of Moshoeshoe; Letsie I becomes weak successor
1870–77  boom years in Basotho economy: grain harvests and exports high; 15,000 work passes issued for South Africa; Basotho work almost equally on diamond mines, railway works and farms
1871  annexation to Cape Colony; Treaty of Aliwal North further limits borders: Boers recognise Basotho boundaries east of the Caledon River
1872  hut tax accepted in cash only
1880  Cape administrataion doubles hut tax; proposes land auction to whites; and orders Basotho to surrender arms
1880–81  Basotho defeat Cape in Gun War in spite of L3 million expenditure; disarmament proclamation subsequently repealed
1884  London accepts direct rule of Basutoland
1880s  boom ends: economic depression brought on by a combination of drought and new tariff policies in Boer Republics
1891  Leretholi succeeds Letsie; rinderpest epidemic kills ninety per cent of Basotho cattle
1903  Basotho National Council formed; Laws of Leretholi established
1905  Letsie II
1910  Union of South Africa established; customs union between BLS and RSA formed; provision made for future incorporation of HCTs into South Africa
1910  Basutoland Council formed with restricted membership: Paramount Chief plus 94 members nominated by him and five nominated by Resident Commissioner; promotes cohesion of Chieftainship
1913  Griffith succeeds Letsie II; Griffith becomes Catholic
1919  Lekhotla la Bafo established: commoner-dominated political organisation
1920s  increasing economic disparities between chiefs and commoners; expansion of chiefs through "placing system"
1920s–30s  drought, depression and famine
1935  Pim Report recommends indirect rule; reform of chieftainship including drastic reduction in numbers, limits to the number of chiefs able to hold court, and salaries established
1939  Seeiso succeeds Griffith but dies in 1940; Queen Regent takes over as heir is in infancy
1952  formation of Basutoland Congress Party; merges with Lekhotla la Bafo in 1957; mostly educated protestants
1958  BNP created out of alliance of lesser chiefs and Catholic teachers
1960  Sharpeville Massacre; incorporation becomes a dead letter
1963  formation of Marematlou Party
1960  elections to district council result in BCP victory
1964  Moshoeshoe II returns from schooling in England to take up role as paramount chief; a series of intrigues seek to keep him from ascending to throne; Chief Jonathan along with the Queen Regent are implicated
1965  general election to national assembly results in surprising BNP victory; some suggest that anti-communism and universal suffrage (i.e. including women) result in upset of BCP;
1966  Lesotho comes to independence as a constitutional monarchy; the King is unhappy with his titular role as head of state; his relationship with Jonathan remains sour throughout the post-colonial period

Swaziland

1815  Sobhuza I succeeds Dlamini I; faces threats from Ndwandwe in South
1820  Sobhuza I shifts Chiefdom to Lobamba; expands in North and West against Pedi; this is made possible by Cape pressure upon Zulu
1836  Mswati II succeeds Sobhuza I
1844-63  apex of Swazi military power: Kingdom expands as far North as Southern Zimbabwe, east into Mozambique, and west into the Transvaal; creation of age regiments; search for cattle and slaves annexed by South African Republic; borders changed; thousands of Swazi become residents of Transvaal; Mswati II determined to maintain control over remaining Swazi
1870  control demonstrated after diamond strike at Kimberley when few Swazi leave for mines; recruitment attempts fail
1868-75  succession struggle
1875  emergence of Mbandzeni who, according to Stevens (1967) is described as "a weak and depraved chief, much given to 'white man's liquor'."
1876  Swazi-Boer alliance against Pedi-Zulu-Shangaan
1878  Swazi-Boer alliance against Pedi
1879  Swazi-British alliance against Zulu
1879  gold discovered in Northeast Swaziland which leads to numerous concession hunters so that, by the 20th c. the "whole country was covered so two, three or even four deep by concessions of all sizes and for different purposes." (Stevens, 1967)
1880s  Mbandzeni concessions to Boer and British settlers to farm, exploit minerals and to trade; what Crush (1987) terms the "descent into anarchy"
1881/84 Pretoria and London Conventions set boundaries with newly sovereign Transvaal
1886  gold discovered in the Transvaal
1890  joint British/South African Republic commission investigates Swazi concessions; SAR seeks hegemony over Swaziland in return for British domain over Bechuanaland
1891  Bunu succeeds Mbandzeni
1892  Transvaal Republic suzerainty over Swaziland
1890s  rinderpest epidemic and famine break Swazi unwillingness to work in mines
1895  Swaziland comes under Transvaal administration
1899-1902  Anglo-Boer War; ends Transvaal suzerainty over Swaziland
1899  Bunu dies
1899-1921  Queen Regent Labotsibeni replaces Bunu
1904  less than 10,000 cattle left in country as result of drought, etc.
1906  Swaziland becomes a High Commission Territory
1907  Land Partition Proclamation: 37% of country left to Swazi; rest allocated to British Crown and to settlers (freehold and leasehold)
1908  formation of Zombode Party which seeks to buy back land
1903-1916  in spite of periodic droughts, cattle numbers climb to over 200,000 because of migrant labour earnings; migrant labour provides some autonomy for young men
1921  Sobhuza II; establishes homestead in Sophiatown
1930s  Sobhuza II systematic attempt to revive Swazi tradition and repurchase Swazi lands
1944  Native Land Resettlement Scheme
1946  Lifa Fund established for repurchase of lands; reacquire 268,000 acres of land by 1968 but hold back from general populace
1953-56  Tinkhundla system of government established
1960  Swazi Progressive Association constitutes itself as a political party, the Swaziland Progressive Party; establishes links with Pan-Africanist movements on continent
1962-63  formation of Swaziland Democratic Party (a liberal-democratic party; the Ngwane National Congress (a pan-Africanist populist party); and Mbandzeni-National Convention Party and the Swazi Freedom Party (both pro-monarchist)
1962-63  series of strikes results in crackdown assisted by
British troops and mass arrests of the NNLC and trade union leadership

1964
King creates political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement which gains support of settlers

1968
Monarchy gains monopoly of all mineral concessions and mineral revenue from British crown en route to independence; creates Tibiyo TakaNgwane

1968
Swaziland comes to independence under the monarchy which swept all seats in the pre-independence elections

**Botswana**

1820-60s
Botswana develops into a series of eight principal tribal groups, each with its own hereditary chief; the three principal groups are the Bamangwato (35%), Bakwena (15%), and BaNgwaketse (15%); the Bakgatla constitute 8% of the population and four smaller groups total 12% - Baroleng, Batlokwa, Bamalete, Batawana

1820s
During Difaqane Botswana develops as a trade route to North which later becomes known as the "Missionaries road to the North"; Ndebele raids from the North, the inhospitable nature of the land to the West and increasing migrations in search of land from the south work to galvanise existing groups into coherent social formations; Sekgoma I ensures Bamangwato security by accepting Ndebele overlordship to the Northeast and paying tribute in exchange for being left alone

1866
gold discovered in Tati area

1875
Khama III assumes Chieftaincy of the Bamangwato; like Griffith in Lesotho, he, too, embraces Catholicism

1880
Tati Company establishes itself with land concessions from Ndebele Chief Lobengula

1881/84
Pretoria and London Conventions fix borders between Bechuanaland and Transvaal

1884
though British considered Bechuanaland the "abode of anarchy, filibustering and outrage" (Stevens, 1967), the establishment of a German colony to the west and pressure from the South African Republic to the South forces their hand; Britain deliberately sets Bechuanaland's eastern boundary to the east of the missionary road

1885
Sechele, Gaseitsiwe and Khama, as Chiefs of three dominant Tswana groups, entice British with land if will establish Bechuanaland as a protectorate

1885
granted protectorate status

1889
creation of the British South Africa Company;
Rhodes seeks control over Bechuanaland
1893 Rhodes conquers Ndebele with some help from Khama
1895 Khama, Sebele and Bathoen go to London to protest BSAC intentions
1899 five tribal reserves established; rest becomes crown land unless held by settlers (three more reserves follow in early 20th century)
1904 Lobatse, Gaborone, and Tuli blocs, Tati District and Francistown constitute European settlements; located along fertile Northeastern portion of Bechuanaland
1923 death of Khama the Great (Khama III)
1926 Tshukedi Khama comes to power as Chief Regent; heir apparent Seretse Khama an infant at this time
1932 first mining concession negotiated with BSAC
1934 Native Proclamation: chiefs’ power limited
1944 Seretse Khama to Oxford
1948 Seretse marries Ruth Williamson over protests from Whitehall, Pretoria, Salisbury, and his uncle Kgolata endorsed Seretse as rightful chief and accepted "the white queen"
1950 Seretse exiled from protectorate
1952 Seretse deprived of chieftainship; Tshukedi also exiled "while the chieftainship is in suspense"
1955 Bamangwato refusal to discuss mining concession with British unless both Khamas present
1956-57 Khama renounces chieftaincy, returns to Bechuanaland; mineral exploration agreement signed with Rhodesia Selection Trust
1958 Legislative Council formed
1961 first elections in council
1965 pre-independence elections; Chieftainship Law passed which allows the Resident Commissioner to remove a chief and appoint his successor following a judicial review
1966 independence under a BDP majority
1969 Customs Union renegotiated; general elections held
1970 Chieftainship Act gives President ability to remove a chief from his position at his own discretion
1971 Orapa diamond mine begins production
1973 Selebi-Phikwe copper-nickel mine opened
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Professor Datta, Director, National Institute of Development Research and Documentation, 7 October
Mr. Philip English, Project Officer, Economic Policy, IDRC, 6 October
Mr. Charles Hove, Economist, SADCC Secretariat, 21 October & 16 November
Mr. Ted Makgekageae, Director, Radio Botswana, 23 October
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Mr. Douglas Funk, Regional Field Director, WUSC, various
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Mrs. Bela Katamzi, EC, PMO, 9 December
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Ms. Mokonze, External Assistance Unit, technical & other, 10 December
Mr. R.G. Mennon, 10 December
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