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A Commentary on Books Five, Six, and Seven of
the De Trinitate of Saint Augustine of Hippo

Michael L. Carreker

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
September, 1992

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by Michael Lyons Carreker

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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To Lynne, Justin, and Mary Macrae.
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Abstract

The argument of this thesis is to show how Books Five through Seven of St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* provide the necessary logic for predication of the trinitarian life of God. The argument is introduced with an account of the entire argument of Augustine's work so that the reader may more easily grasp the place of these middle books. Through the commentary on Books Five through Seven, the Aristotelian categories of substance, relation, and act, move the predication of the Trinity as the revealed content of Scripture away from its habitual and customary predication toward a coherent logical view of the divine essence and the divine persons. In the course of Books Five through Seven the mind of the reader, as well as the mind of the Church, is formed into a logical mirror, reflecting the substantial relative act of the Trinity. By virtue of this logical purgation and renovation, the mind is prepared to move through its categorical predication toward a concrete likeness of the Trinity. The argument of the thesis concludes with a proleptic view of how the newly formed logical image must give way to a participation of activity or union as the very similitude of God.
Abbreviations

BA -- Bibliothèque Augustinienne

Henry-Hadot -- the texts of Marius Victorinus prepared by Paul Henry and Pierre Hadot in the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

PG -- Patrologia Graeca

N.B. The numbers in parentheses following each portion of text in the Commentary mark my own divisions. In order for the reader to find my divisions more conveniently within the sections of the Bibliothèque Augustinienne edition of the De Trinitate, a catalogue is given in the appendix before the Bibliography.
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Introduction

In order to propose and write a commentary on Books Five through Seven of the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine of Hippo, a reason must be given for singling these three books out of the treatise as a whole, and counting them worthy of special attention. Once this reason is established, the commentary must justify its place within it, lest the commentary appear a mere abstraction interpolated from without. The reason for this endeavor stems from the treatise itself which, I will argue, is a coherent argument.

Although this thesis is not intended as a commentary on the entire *De Trinitate*, but only on Books Five through Seven, these preliminary remarks on the structure of the complete work are necessary to grasp the place and importance of these three books. First then, we need approach the structure of the complete treatise beginning with a survey of the text itself, and having a conception of its coherence, proceed to a brief summary of other views of the structure, before we take up Books Five through Seven in detail.

Turning to the text we should note that Augustine himself offers us some initial help in discovering the unity of his argument. In his letter to the Archbishop of Carthage, Pope Aurelius, Augustine describes the occasion of his completion of the work in which he says,
"the subsequent books are linked to the preceding ones by a continuous development of the argument." The treatise itself possesses the coherent argument of its author. Furthermore, in Book Fifteen of the De Trinitate, Augustine himself gives a brief review of the argument through Book Fourteen, a review which is only abstract, which is to say, that as a survey of an argument which is a philosophical demonstration, the detail and subtlety of the argument cannot be repeated. Augustine is well aware that not every one who reads his treatise is able to follow it, for several reasons, and therefore, what is given in that summary are simply the highlights of conclusions, a select outline as it were of the entire course of the argument, which is accessible to the diversity of readers, but is admittedly not tantamount to the argument itself. What is crucial to mark here is the continuity Augustine intends. For our purposes, a still closer review of the fifteen books is needed in order to determine the philosophical structure and provide a rationale for a commentary on Books Five through Seven.

In Book I, Augustine begins his treatise with a declaration of his philosophical method. His work is written against those who out of a perverse love of reason despise the beginning point of faith. They begin in one of three ways: first are they who attempt to
measure the incorporeal by corporeal sensuality; second are those who wish to think about God according to the nature and affections of the human soul; and third is the endeavor of others who strive to transcend the whole of creation by means of an arbitrary predication which strips away any similarity between God and the sensuous or spiritual creature. These first two classes employ the method of analogy, one from the sensuous creature, the other from the human soul. The third class attempts predication by sheer negation and abstraction.

Augustine rejects these methods because they maintain a perverse love of reason, a confidence in the power of the human soul to circumscribe and name the divine. This is true even of the Platonic πρῶτος which once it is stirred to look within is capable of an ascent through understanding to the truth, even though it cannot abide there. For Augustine, the initium fidei has an object different from that of the Platonists. Although insofar as truth is concerned, the ultimate object of faith is the same for them both, the immediate view of faith for Augustine is focused форis on the historical presence of Christ, the Truth Incarnate. The mind is not itself capable of its own ascent to God, but must first be purged from its scattered defluxion into the world by the instruction of the Scriptures.
The *initium fidei* holds the Scriptures as the authority and principle of its knowledge of God and divine predication. Augustine establishes the intention of his argument on the basis of illumination. Divine illumination will transform faith in the Scriptural revelation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, into the understanding of the Trinitarian nature of God. Therefore, the argument is not simply for the faithful or against the unfaithful. Augustine will present a *ratio*, a demonstration of the content of faith, accessible to both Christian and pagan minds.

Quapropter adjuvante Domino Deo nostro suscipiemus et eam ipsam quam flagitant, quantum possumus, reddere rationem, quod Trinitas sit unus et solus et verus Deus, et quam recte Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unius ejusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intelligatur; ut non quasi nostris excusationibus illudantur, sed reipsa experiantur, et esse illud summum bonum quod purgatissimis mentibus cernitur, et a se propter eam comprehendique non posse, quia humanae mentis acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non fitit, nisi per justitiam fidei nutrita vegetetur. 9

The *ratio* involves two related parts. First, the *ratio* is the proof and experience of the mind in what is said, believed, and understood about the Trinity. Second, the *ratio* demonstrates the necessity of the beginning point of humble faith, which knows its own weakness, because of itself the mind cannot come to and abide in the knowledge of God as Trinity. The infirm mind requires
the nourishment of the *justitia fidei*.

Divine illumination is the course of what *dicatur*, *credatur*, *intelligatur*. The course of the argument then proceeds from the Scripture *foris* to the proving *intus*. This is to say that Augustine's argument places no confidence in the weakness of the human mind, rather the predication of the Trinity is accomplished by the divine life itself comprehending the mind in its own activity.

The doctrine of God as Trinity is first of all said (*dicatur*), which marks the beginning of the doctrine outside the knowing soul, and which is therefore understood to be given. The only way in which the divine may be truly known in its inner life is if the divine wills to reveal itself to a soul capable of receiving it. That reception means the doctrine is recognized as given and is believed (*credatur*).

Belief is the first form of the soul's reception of the doctrine, and it requires a certain coherent grasp of the revelation wherein the soul finds the repose of salvation. And in order for the mind to rest in its saving knowledge, belief demands both a purgation of the old habit of its thought, and the renovation of its thinking in categories appropriate to the given revelation. The final end of faith is to come to understanding.
When the doctrine held in faith is enabled to discover the essence of its object, which means that the revelation of the Trinity has been given a form for thought in categories, and the mind is enabled to look through and past the categories to the Trinity itself, the doctrine is understood (intelligatur). This is the purpose of illumination, namely, for the soul to come to the divine life which has revealed itself. The doctrine spoken, and believed, has no other goal than to seek and behold the face of God. The entire argument of Augustine follows this structure.

From the side of the wayfaring soul, the structure of dicatur, credatur, intelligatur, manifests itself in the divisions of the De Trinitate: Books I-IV as the interpretation of Scripture reveal the doctrine as dicatur; Books V-VII as the formation of the mind's categories rendering the Scriptural doctrine intelligible mark the doctrine as credatur; and Books VIII-XV wherein the mind goes beyond logical disputation seeking the very vision of the Principle of its own integral life demonstrate the doctrine as intelligatur.

As the argument develops, however, this structure does not remain the primary one. What embraces and allows this structure from the side of the wayfaring soul is the activity of the divine life itself which comprehends the mind's journey. Dicatur, credatur, and
intelligatur give way to the memoria, intellectus, and voluntas which is the Trinity. What is the end of the argument, therefore, is the ground of it, and the formation of the wayfaring soul as imago trinitatis is the discovery of the mind's beginning. That the unity of these two structures is seen actually together and in a dependent relation mirrors what the argument seeks to accomplish.

Having established the method which guides the work, Augustine begins his account of the doctrine as dicatur. That the revelation of the Trinity is spoken (foris) and is given for the purgation and renovation of the mind's thinking about God (intus) is made clear from the start when Augustine distinguishes the different ways of speaking about God found in the Scripture. First of all, the mind which has become accustomed to think of God analogically, either through corporeal things or through the spiritual creature, finds in the Scripture this manner of speaking about God, and thus the mind which is already scattered in defluxion meets the revelation of God according to this mode of knowing and begins its purgation from false predication to rise gradually toward divine things. But analogical thinking, because it begins from what is proper to the creature is strictly speaking improper to God, and so the Scripture
also, but rarely, predicates what is proper to God. What is said properly about God is difficult for the unpurged mind to contemplate, and so the Scripture speaks to the faithful as it were to infants. The *initium* is faith in the revelation of Christ in Scripture which provides the authority for divine predication, and grants the weak nourishment toward mature understanding. The purpose of the entire work then is not simply polemical, but rather an attempt to include whoever will accompany Augustine in following the command of Scripture, "*Quaerite faciem ejus semper.*"

Book I continues with the exegesis of texts showing the equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. These are first principally concerned with Christ, that he is both God and man, and therefore equal to the Father, but Augustine also considers texts which include the Holy Ghost in the equal divine essence. The doctrine of the Trinity is seen in a common activity which is intimated (*insinuatur*), says Augustine, to faith.

The remainder of Book I is devoted to texts which focus upon the person of Christ, how he is equal to the Father by sharing the divine essence, and how he is unequal to the Father inasmuch as he is man. The distinction derived from these texts between the divine and human natures of Christ is important for two
reasons. First, the trinitarian faith itself is shown to be the consistent teaching of Scripture, and second, the capacity and actuality of this knowledge in the human soul is seen paradigmatically in and through Christ himself. Christ is equal to the Father as God and less than the Father, and himself, as man. And so when Christ is said to deliver up the kingdom at the end of time to the Father, he also delivers the Kingdom to himself as a divine person. Augustine understands the divine and human natures in Christ to be preserved in their difference. As divine, Christ receives the adoration of those souls justified by the mission of his Incarnation. As man, Christ partakes of the contemplative vision himself. Moreover, by virtue of the Incarnation, the just possess their proper end in the contemplation of the Trinity.

Book I concludes with the expectation of the soul's knowledge of the Trinity perfected through the work of Christ. Christ has been shown to be the ontological and epistemological way of the soul to the Trinity. The mind has begun its journey in weakness, but now by virtue of the Scriptural doctrine, has been given a proleptic view of its final vision. And so the whole of the mind's pilgrimage through Christ to the vision of the Trinity is given in Book I, although only in the form of faith in revelation.
Book I offers a macrocosmic summary of the knowledge of the Trinity, given from God in Christ to man and returned to God as the just find their rest in the contemplation of the Trinity. Thus, Book I has given both a method of approach to the doctrine, and has viewed the Trinity and the soul's complete relation to it in Scriptural language.

Book II is concerned to speak of the doctrine and go forward in the argument *ab alio* ... *exordio* by taking a look at the Scriptural evidence of the inner life of the Trinity, the giving and receiving of the divine essence as divine persons, the ground for what is revealed, and declared in Book I. The argument continues from Scripture, with more difficult texts encountered, and the *regula* which Augustine follows in his exegesis is that established in Book I, wherein Christ is seen equal to the Father in the form of God, but less than the Father in the form of a slave or man. Augustine understands this *regula* to be nothing other than the consensus of the Catholic Church as it is expressed in the Creed.

Through an examination of texts which are not explicit in their reference to the divinity or humanity of Christ, Augustine finds a continuity of being and life. The Son is of the Father, not in his humanity but in his divinity. The Son has received life in himself as
the Father has life in himself, and the Son does only what he sees the Father doing, neither of which can be attributed to human nature or the realm of space and time. The Son receives this being and life from the Father. His essence is identical to the Father, immutable and immortal. In this way, Augustine says, we should understand the Son to be born of the Father. For the Father to give the Son life is for the Father to beget the Son, and for the Son to see what the Father is doing is for the Son to receive and possess the divine essence, that is, to be born. Their difference is not essential but only that the Father gives and the Son receives.

Still other passages of Scripture can be seen to refer to both the divinity and humanity of Christ inasmuch as they belong to his thought. As man, Christ presents himself as knowing all that he has been given by the Father to reveal to men, but as God, and in the integrity of his person, he knows what it is proper to the divine to know, because in his birth, in his reception of the divine essence, he receives the divine knowledge which is not other than the divine essence.

It is clear that the Holy Spirit is within this activity of the giving and receiving of the divine essence, because the Spirit is said to speak the truth of God not of himself but rather from what he hears the
Son speaking. Inasmuch as the Spirit receives from the Son what the Son has received from the Father, the Spirit is included in the divine essence. The Spirit is himself from the Father through the speaking and sending of the Son. He hears what the Son teaches, which means he receives the divine essence. At this juncture in the argument, Augustine defers the question of why the Spirit is not also called a son. He will return to this.

Given the equality of the Father and the Son and the Spirit in the giving and receiving of the divine being, life, and thought, Augustine considers their common glory and authority. The question of common authority involves the mission of the divine persons into the world for the salvation of mankind, a mission presupposing the divine knowledge and will, in which all the divine persons share, comprehending the whole of creation and human history. In all respects then, the divine essence, given and received from Father to Son and from Father through the Son to the Spirit, is the spiritual ground and priority for the soul's relation to the Trinity.

The subject of the mission of the persons occupies the final part of Book II. That the Son and Spirit are both said to be sent for the salvation of the soul does not require that their missions be identical in form. The Son who is eternal Word took human nature forever to
himself. The Spirit, says Augustine, did not assume human nature, but rather used creatures such as the dove and fire to manifest his coming. Neither Son nor Spirit suffered a diminution of divinity in his mission. Opponents of Augustine asserted a doctrine of the divine missions based, they claimed, upon an exegesis of the Scripture. Augustine disputes the presupposition of their exegesis, which focused in an erroneous view of spiritual substance, even of the soul. Some maintained that the Son and the Spirit had already visibly appeared in many forms to the Fathers of Israel, and such visible appearances marked an essential difference between the Father and the Son or Spirit, because for the invisible to change to the visible meant that it was essentially mutable and mortal, dying in one form and taking life in another. They maintained the Father alone was invisible, immutable, immortal. But their exegetical presupposition was flawed because, says Augustine, even the soul itself, while created mutable, is both invisible and everlasting; therefore, the mutability of spiritual substance is not due to visibility. Furthermore, the Word of God who is uncreated spiritual substance cannot become visible because his nature is eternal, invisible and immutable. The appearances cited by his opponents in the Old Testament are understood by Augustine to be the work of divine persons through creatures.
Book II imparts several conclusions to the argument: first, through the teaching of the Scripture, Augustine clarifies the trinitarian life of the giving and receiving of the divine being and thought from the Father to the Son and the Spirit as the principle for the illumination of the knowing soul; second, implied in this trinitarian life is a refutation of the third class of predication Augustine opposes in Book I which attempts to name God by sheer negation and abstraction; third, Augustine rejects the method of the second class of predication opposed in Book I by correcting his opponents' view of the soul.

With Book III, Augustine reiterates his utter dependence upon the illumination of God, and reaffirms the supremacy of Scripture in divine 35 predication. This is especially important to the argument here inasmuch as Book II has established the ground of the soul's ascent to the Trinity through the priority of the trinitarian life. Book III, following the conclusion that the Old Testament appearances of the divine persons took place by way of creatures, is devoted to an explication of the will of the Trinity in the nexus of the causes of created reality. The subject of Book III, brought about through considering the ministry of angels, raises the aporia of the relation of created substance to uncreated spiritual
substance. This follows upon the question of the divine missions which, given the conclusions of Book III, is fully addressed in Book IV.

According to the Scripture, angels serve the creative and redemptive will of the Trinity. This is to say that the divine reason extends to the whole of created reality, and every act is subsequent to reason and will as it falls within a divinely created nexus of causes. This is true of both the spiritual and the material; the rational and even the irrational are comprehended within the immutable will of God.

Creation itself comes to be through the ministry of angels. They are not themselves creators but rather agents of the occulta semina of all things which take their growth - their beginning, middle, and end - according to their eternal definitions in the divine mind. Even the power of the wicked angels is circumscribed by the divine will both through the more powerful angels and through the limit of nature which does not swerve from its given purpose. At every level, it is the divine will at work within: in the spiritual form of the occulta semina and their proper measure, number, and weight; or in the designs of angels or souls; all these depend ultimately upon the will and permission of God.
The principle ministry of the angels in redemption and in the effecting of the miraculous is therefore to make the message of God known in the visible and sensible realm where the soul is fallen. But the intention of the angelic mission is not to occupy the outward gaze in amazement but rather to turn the soul within to seek the spiritual life of God. Thus there is sought a return to the divine origin.

Book III has taken the priority of the trinitarian life discovered in Book II and shown the declension of the divine will in the spiritual and material creation. The divine knowledge and will which precedes all else has itself as the goal of its creation and redemption.

The means for the return of all things to their origin in the knowledge and will of the Trinity is the subject of Book IV. The means themselves are the divine missions, which may now be discussed fully since Augustine has ordered the relation of created to uncreated substance.

Book IV begins with an account of the soul's infirmity in relation to which there is no adequate means of mediation in the position of those who speculate about God in the fantasies of the imagination. The truth has appeared only in Christ. By virtue of the Incarnation, the believing soul drinks in the very truth of God which in its life is Eternity, Truth, and Love.
Book IV begins with this opposition between the infirm soul and the Trinity in order to establish the necessary mediation.

In seeking this life of God the soul is made aware both of its own infirmity and of the profound love of God for it, which strengthens the soul for its search, and is revealed in Christ. Thus the soul is comprehended within the divine will acting in the Incarnation. In order for the soul to participate in the divine life, it needed deliverance from the twofold death of body and soul. Christ, by virtue of his Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection, seen as one act, overcomes this twofold death, and the soul is saved through the concrete expression of the love of God.

This *coaptatio* of the one act of Christ over the twofold death of the soul leads Augustine to a discussion of the significance of numbers found in the Scriptures, which are understood to reveal a unity of providential will in the history of creation, and focusing in the redemption of Christ. The same unity of will is perceived in the correspondence between the many likenesses and foreshadowings in angels and holy men in the Old Testament and the one mission of Christ. For the sake of and toward this divine unity, the Son is sent to move the believing soul.

Over against the discussion of the mediation of
Christ, Augustine raises other forms of mediation. What appears to be a description of theurgy is condemned because it persuades men toward false affections. By attempting to manipulate the divinity with magical incantations, the soul is drawn down into the empirical and finite realm, which cannot strengthen the virtues of the soul to ascend to the realm of eternal truth. True mediation, Augustine argues, is in the sacrifice of the Incarnate Christ, body and soul, so that human nature is returned to the realm of spirit and anticipates its bodily restoration as well.

Besides the practice of theurgy, there are those who deem to have purified themselves to see the truth by their own strength. Their attempt presupposes that they go beyond creation, disallowing the salvation of the body, and negating their finitude, all of which Augustine calls sheer presumption. That the philosophers claim to know what they do not is evidence of the condition of the soul fallen and dispersed in a love of the finite. The soul then needs purgation. Incapable of its own ascent, the soul requires another to save it from its defluxion. In this way, Augustine understands the salvation of the soul to be concrete in its return; it will not abide in the outward fantasy of theurgy, nor is it nullified by philosophical abstraction; rather its return will be a renovation in
knowledge and love. This is to say that the soul never really exists apart from the objects of its thought and affection. Therefore, the beginning of the soul's return is by faith in the temporal historical Incarnation. The relation is concrete, but it is also purgative and instructive for it will serve to lead the soul to the realm of Spirit.

Ita ergo nos purgari oportebat, ut ille nobis fieret ortus qui maneret aeternus, ne alter nobis esset in fide, alter in veritate. 53

By means of the Incarnation, creation itself and what had been revealed to the Fathers of Israel, were all referred back to their eternal origin.

The remainder of Book IV is devoted to an exposition of the different senses in which the Word is said to be sent. And this sending is seen to be dependent upon the relation to the Father as origin of himself as Word. The Word is sent in three ways: to the Fathers of Israel through angels and holy men to prepare for his coming in the fulness of time; in the act of the Incarnation; in the advent of the Word in the believing soul. The Holy Spirit, then, is also sent to empower the soul in its pilgrimage by strengthening it with spiritual virtue.

In Christ then, the soul is returned to the unity of the trinitarian life whose will in the mission of the Incarnation and of the Holy Spirit has been to bring the
infirm and corrupt soul to the health and immortality of eternity. The soul is held there willingly in the object of its truth and love.

Taken together, Books I-IV supply the argument with that which is revealed of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Scripture, and therefore we have seen how the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are said (dicatur) to be the one true God and of one and the same essence. The entire coherence of the argument is already presented here in these books in the mode of Scriptural revelation. Book I anticipates the whole argument in the clarification of method, and an account of the equality of the divine persons and the course of salvation for the soul through the Incarnate Christ. Book II establishes the substantial ground for the argument in the truth of the priority of the trinitarian activity, the giving and receiving of the divine essence which is its life. Book III delineates the will of the same activity in the nexus of the causes of reality, the relation of created to uncreated substance, and the place of the soul. And Book IV presents the necessary mediation and provides the return of all things to the Trinity through the Incarnate Word.

With the end of Book IV, Augustine turns from a scriptural consideration of the doctrine to oppose heresy. In Books V-VII the argument expounds the
scriptural revelation in the mind of the Church so that what has been said (dicatur) of the Trinity is also believed (credatur). Such belief will require discrimination in the categories of mind.

Because this thesis is a commentary on Books V-VII, our remarks here will be brief. With Book V, the argument turns to logical predication of the revelation of the Trinity in Scripture. Logical predication serves both to refute heresy, especially Arianism, and to clarify belief, even that of the Cappadocians. Through a dialectic of the Scripture and the mind as potential knower, the categories appropriate to the Scriptural revelation are formed in the mind. In the categories of substance, relation, and act, the mind becomes a logical mirror of the trinitarian life, and draws nearer to its principle.

Book VI brings the logical mirror of the mind into sharper focus. The logical categories which have been compelled by the Scripture in the mind are now brought to bear on the Creed, and thereby the mind of the Church comes into the immediate purview of the argument. Insofar as the Scripture has been the guiding force behind the discernment of the categories, the Scripture remains of primary authority. The Creed confirms the Scriptural doctrine, taking the form of an inchoate categorical structure, but essentially the Creed remains
in the pattern of faith, and requires the same categories to render itself intelligible. Thus, Augustine advances beyond the mind of the Church, seeking a greater clarity of the doctrine. As in St. Hilary, the logical mirror becomes sharper as the account of the divine essence and the individuation of the persons is brought more into one view: what had been the problem of disparateness between the essence and personal distinction approaches a resolution.

The logical view of the divine necessity is concluded in Book VII. What Hilary approached in an attempt to see the essence and persons together is accomplished by Augustine, although at this juncture in the argument only in a logical demonstration. Through the place of the Son, the divine life of the Trinity is viewed in its substance, relation, and act, as an activity in which each of the persons is recognized as divine wisdom, and yet the Son is uniquely Word and the Holy Spirit is properly Love. The categories have enabled mind to be formed as a logical mirror, and the mind of the Church is also formed simultaneously inasmuch as with Augustine the disparateness of the divine essence and the singular properties of the persons are given a logical coherence. Prior to Augustine, the Church's predication had suffered from a logical inadequacy which either habitually mistook the
logical predication of nature for that of the supernatural, or recognized the inadequacy of this logic but could not overcome it. Now the mind is formed as a logical mirror, and the Scriptural doctrine has illumined the mind through categories appropriate to itself. This is how the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are believed (credatur) to be of one and the same essence.

With Book VIII Augustine makes still another transition in the argument. Having established the logic adequate to the Scriptural revelation, he puts logical disputation behind, and proceeds with divine predication 58 "... modo interiore quam superiora." With Books V-VII, he brings the divine essence and the individuation of the persons into one view, but only in a logical form which is a mirror of the trinitarian life and not its similitude. The mirror of predication leaves the mind at a distance from God because it merely reflects the Scriptural revelation. What is required in the remaining books of the argument and begins with Book VIII is that the mind approach God by becoming like God, transformed into a similitude of the trinitarian activity.

Having discovered the logical predication of the Trinity, Augustine proceeds, and if the reader cannot follow the strict philosophical argument he is encouraged to continue in the discipline of faith. Book
VIII turns to seek the Trinity itself, the immutable 59
truth, which has revealed itself in Scripture and formed
the belief of the church through the illumination of the
categories. But the immutable truth in the integrity of
its being cannot be equated to the mutable creature, and
so the mind seeks to discover the divine life by
understanding what God is not. Again, the argument does
not proceed by way of analogy.

The negative approach is not purely negative. When
time, space, and matter are pushed aside, it is not
simply to nullify created reality, but rather to discern
that without which the creature would not exist. And so
the method of approach is also not the sheer negativity
and abstraction of the third class of predication which
Augustine disallows in Book I. What is sought is the
measure and author of all finite goods, the True Good
which is the Being of God himself, without which there
would be no participating good, and no soul willing to
seek the divine good. It is then out of love for the
Good that the mutable soul cleaves to what is True.

It is here that Augustine turns the corner of his
argument and continues the method which has been so much
misunderstood. The primary fundament of the soul's
pilgrimage, the first step of its motion, is that what
one does not know one cannot love. The soul must know
the Good, even if only in an intuitive sense, before it
can seek union with the Good. But in this there must be great care, for faith may be mistaken and its love misplaced. The epistemological basis for the knowledge of the incorporeal Good is fully given, says Augustine, in the Incarnation of Christ. In Christ, the general conceptions of goodness, mediated to the mind through the categorical thinking of genera and species, are completely recognized and fulfilled.

Through the Incarnation comes also the revelation of the Trinity, which the soul is taught to believe and to love, but the knowledge of the eternity, equality, and unity of the Trinity has no place within the conceptual structure of genera and species. Therefore, the search for the Trinity begins with knowledge in the form of faith, and given the logical demonstration of Books V-VII, that informed faith now seeks a similitude of activity by which the Trinity may be known more truly and loved in the degree in which it is known. The logical books have provided a mirror, a logical purview, but now the soul striving in love to cleave to the very life of the Trinity, seeks a similitude by which it may be strengthened to know and love, to participate in that highest life itself.

In seeking a similitude, the soul is first in need of a conception of the divine activity. This is similar says Augustine, to the way in which the soul loves the
righteous mind. We possess the conception of righteousness as a universal idea, and even though we ourselves may not be righteous, through this conception we love a righteous man. There are two things distinguished, then, in the love of a righteous man: righteousness and love. These have first the nature of the spiritual. They are known not by empirical observation, but by their presence to the mind and the mind's discernment of them, and through them one loves a righteous man. Moreover, what is the decisive moment of this love of the righteous mind is the love of the form of righteousness, and what is even presupposed to the love of righteousness is the love of love itself. The motion to cleave to what is righteous is found in love. With love, Augustine comes upon a conception of the trinitarian activity. What is loved is always the good object of love. And love is always of someone and for something. Love, therefore, says Augustine, is that life which couples together, and this is true even in carnal loves. Here then is a conception of the Trinity in the three together; the lover, the beloved, and the love. But in seeking a similitude of the trinitarian activity, one must ascend beyond the carnal. The direction of the mind's search is within toward those things which are above. This is the point of departure for the rest of the argument.
Book IX begins with the reiteration of the purpose of the argument, which is to seek the Trinity in love. The soul seeks what it does not know concretely but only through Scripture and logic. Book VIII has given a vague conception of the Trinity in the image of lover, beloved, and love, but the argument must neglect the carnal and proceed through the inner gaze of the mind to seek God. What is known of the Trinity thus far is a "... Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum et unitatem aequalis essentiae." This is the logical conclusion of Books V-VII. Now we move from the relation of plural substances in the imprecise scheme of lover, beloved, and love, which is the conception of Book VIII, within the singular spiritual substance of mind itself. This is the first step away from carnal otherness.

In mind we find a correction and negation of the threefold image of love. For in the mind loving itself, while the lover and the beloved are related in giving and receiving love, because the mind is spirit, the lover and the beloved possess no proper difference. There are only these two, the love, and the lover who is also the beloved. Therefore, the threefold image of love is negated and the conception as the act of mind is not a similitude of the Trinity. Thus, having left the carnal because no similitude can be found there, and having found the image of love only a duality in mind,
the soul prays for illumination that a similitude may be found.

Upon reflection the soul is moved to consider what is the third moment in its self-relation, namely knowledge. The mind cannot love itself if it does not know itself. And such knowledge is not present to the purview of the mind until it moves to think itself. There is no empirical knowledge of mind discoverable in the sensible world. Self-knowledge and self-love are the activity of mind.

These three elements constitute mind; the mind, its knowledge, and its love. When these are perfectly self-related the mind is one and equal in its activity. But when the mind loves what is beneath it, as in the inordinate love of the body, or when the mind assigns to itself that love which is due to God, it consists in an imperfect self-relation. For to love the body more than itself is for mind to love itself less than it truly is, and to assign itself the love due to God is for mind to love itself more than it truly is. But when the mind loves itself as the mind truly is, it exists in a perfect equality and unity, which is to say that knowledge and love do not exist accidentally in mind but rather they are the mind.

To speak of the existence of the mind as knowledge and love is to begin to conceive mind as a substantial
relation. Mind as spirit does not consist as a whole of
diverse parts. When the mind knows itself perfectly, its
knowledge extends throughout itself, and the same is
true for its perfect self-love. In this way, when the
mind knows and loves itself perfectly, mind is nothing
other than the substantial relation of its knowledge and
love.

But this conception of the activity of mind, says
Augustine, is not the display of any particular mind,
but of the mind as it is known through the eternal forms
of truth. The mind is therefore not this conception at
this juncture in the argument, although through the
forms the mind perceives what it ought to be.

This is the motion the mind takes whenever it
thinks what is presented to it, as it has just thought
the substantial relation of mind itself. The eternal
reasons are the means for conceptualization of all
things, both corporeal images as well as the rational
and aesthetic good. By virtue of the eternal
illuminating forms, the conception is formed intus. It
is then the place of love to conjoin the mind to the
conceptual word which it conceives. The conception is
full and its union is love when the mind knows the thing
in its form, i.e., as it is in the truth. But when the
mind knows the thing only as it is merely a creature and
not as it is in the truth, which is to say the mind
does not refer the creature to its proper place in the truth but assigns it its own place as the object of the mind's desire, the mind is conjoined to the thing in cupidity. To know a thing in its truth is to rest in the love of it as such so that the conception and the word which is the birth or focus of the mind's purview are one and the same. To know a thing simply in its particularity is not to love but to desire it, and the conception is not the same as the word or focus of the mind, because the rest of the soul is not sought by the mind in the truth, but in obtaining the thing carnally.

In the mind's knowledge of a thing, in its moment of conception, the mind contains a *similitudo* of the thing known according to species. When the mind knows God, the nature of mind is drawn toward what is higher than itself, and insofar as the mind knows God, it becomes a *similitudo* of God. The mind is not equal to God because it is not the same nature, but it becomes like God. When the mind then knows itself perfectly through the forms, and by knowing, approves (*approbat*) itself, it becomes a perfect similitude of itself. The conception of itself is a perfect image and word of itself. Therefore, the mind begets its word equal to itself.

Love follows upon this conception. But, Augustine asks, why is love also not a conception of the mind
since it is brought forth in the mind. And this, he says, is important because it has to do with the question of the Holy Spirit in the divine activity. Mind is the image of God, and so by discovering what the love of the mind is, mind draws closer to the Trinity, the enlightened creature approaches the immutable light.

The argument has understood to this point that the mind is knowable even while unknown, but in turning its focus upon itself, mind becomes its own parent and brings itself forth into its own mental purview. It would seem then that the mind does the same thing with love inasmuch as the mind is loveable before it loves itself and by loving itself is the principle of its own self-love. The two, Augustine concludes, are different yet related.

The activity of mind, which Augustine now seeks to understand, having viewed the mind through the forms as knowledge and love, begins its inquisitio with the appetitus inveniendi. In seeking to know, the mind also desires to rest in its knowledge. This is to say that as inquisitio knowledge and love cannot be absolutely separated, and that before they become more actual in attaining their proper end, they are only their activity incipiently. Just as faith becomes understanding, so also the desire to know and rest in the known becomes will or love. The relation remains the
same inasmuch as one cannot love what one does not know, but these are inextricably related in their activity and they become greater in proportion.

There is now in the argument a conception of the Trinity in the threefold activity of mind; the mind itself, the mind's knowledge of itself which is its offspring, and the mind's love of itself. These three are equal inasmuch as the mind knows itself according to its being, and the mind loves itself according to its knowledge, and these three are one spiritual substance. Augustine has overcome the carnal images of the Trinity, and the duality of lover-beloved and love in the mind. Still the argument is incomplete, for the activity is not concrete in mind but rather the result of perceiving the activity of mind through the forms.

In order to draw near the Trinity, the mind must become like the Trinity. Illumination in the knowledge of the forms has brought the mind to see its own activity, but only abstractly, as the image of God. Book X continues the path of the mind toward likeness to God by considering the actual concrete state of the mind.

Augustine begins by restating the principle discovered in Book IX that the mind cannot love that of which it is entirely ignorant. In order to seek to know anything, the mind must possess some knowledge of what it seeks, some notion according to genus or
species, and when the mind finds that which it seeks, it knows that it knows, and loves what was sought as its own.

In seeking its own activity, the mind discovers that it is not absent from itself as it assumed, but rather is always present to itself and indeed assumes its self-consciousness. The mind knows that it lives and that it understands. Thus mind knows itself as a knowing activity, and has no need to seek itself as a knowing mind.

But if the mind already knows itself, why must the mind seek to know itself? Augustine answers that the mind needs to determine its own nature in order to see its proper place beneath the divine good and above that which it ought to rule. The mind has erred and brought about its own confusion by forsaking the good which is God and uniting itself to what is beneath it. Therefore, mind thinks of itself according to the images of its finite objects.

The distinction here has to do with what the mind thinks itself to be and what it knows. Because of its inordinate relation to inutilia temporalia, the mind thinks of itself in the categories of corporeal substance and accidents - brain, blood, atoms. But the mind knows, assumes, itself to be a living knowing activity. As long as the mind labours under this
mistaken thinking of itself, it is incapable of
discerning the truth which lies behind what the mind
already assumes.

The mind, therefore, is in need of discovering what
is other than itself. We may believe in the existence of
others, as in angels, or in the intention of a
particular man, but we cannot know these. When the mind
is led to know itself, it is not belief but rather
understanding which is the manner of its knowledge.

In seeking the similitude of the Trinity in the
mind, Augustine has come to the place where the mind is
seen in its concrete and indubitable activity. By adding
nothing to the mind, none of the categories of corporeal
substance, the mind knows that it is and that it
understands. The mind now does not think itself
according to images drawn from without, but all thinking
in that manner already assumes that the mind is and that
it knows. Some think, says Augustine, that the knowledge
and memory of the mind are accidental to it, and are
merely relations of the brain to its objects. When the
brain knows or remembers, it knows or remembers only in
relation to its objects. But to know the mind truly, one
must remove the external objects of the mind, and focus
on its own activity. Some, says Augustine, have doubted
the self-relation of the mind, but in order to doubt,
one must live and know what it is to doubt, remember
what is doubted, and intend to admit or address the doubt. All of these acts of the mind are prerequisite to the possibility of doubt itself.

The certainty of the mind's knowledge is in its own activity. Whereas some have thought the mind to be air, others the brain, others atoms, the indubitable knowledge of the mind is that it is, it lives, and it understands. The mind's activity is not an accidental relation to its objects, but rather the unitary substance of its own memory, intellect, and will.

Book X concludes by viewing this substantial activity of the mind through the categories discovered in Books V-VII. Memory is in itself life and mind and substance, but in relation to intellect it is memory. Intellect is in itself life and mind and substance, but in relation to memory and will it is intellect. Will is in itself life and mind and substance, but in relation to memory and intellect it is will. With respect to life, mind, and substance, they are each equal to one another, and therefore are capable of their distinct mutual reference.

This is seen in the concrete activity of the mind. For the mind remembers that it has memory, intellect, and will, and the mind understands that it understands, wills, and remembers, and the mind wills that it will, remember, and understand. Furthermore, the mind does
this in the whole of its activity, and each distinction of memory, intellect, and will includes and comprehends the others.

The argument of Book X has discovered in the mind a more concrete similitude of the Trinity, which it has determined through the ideal formulation of Book IX and understood through the categories revealed in Books V-VII. But this knowledge of what the mind is has been gained with difficulty, for the mind does not always think of itself in this way because what the mind knows and thinks is confused in the soul's preoccupation with inutilia temporalia. Book XI explicates this separation more fully.

That the mind is able at this juncture of the argument to consider its inordinate relation to the corporeal stems from the mind's concrete renewal. By virtue of mind both knowing and thinking itself, it distinguishes its own activity from its relation to what is beneath it. Prior to this, the mind's confusion with the finite has precluded a similitude of the Trinity, but now a concrete renewal takes place through a dialectic of the scriptural revelation and the knowledge of the mind gained through the forms. That renewal is at once both a purgation of the soul's inordinate relation without, and a formation of the similitude of the Trinity in the mind as the mind.
The mind is now in the position to consider its inner and outer life. The inner life is the self-relation of the mind in its memory, intellect, and will. The outer life is this same structure of the mind fastened onto its corporeal environment. The inner man has to do with understanding, the outer man with bodily sense. Because of the weakness of the soul and the bodily nature of man, the soul inclines toward the corporeal. To understand this relation, Augustine chooses sight, the highest of the senses, as his point of departure.

Sight contains three distinct but related substances; the sense object, the sense organ, and the relation of these two by the will. The sense organ is only potentially sensation, the eye is only potentially seeing, but when the sense object is brought by the will to the sense organ, the sense object informs the sense organ, and the seeing relation actually occurs. Thus the sensation of sight is the one unified activity of these three substances in relation. The activity itself is so unified that the distinction of substances is only inferred, but that it is inferred is certain, because the likeness of the form of the sense object remains in the sense organ even when the object is removed.

This relation which exists in sensation may also exist in a similar fashion within the mind itself. The
image, impressed upon the sense organ and received by
the memory, is united to the eye of the mind by the
will, and the relation of conception (cogitatio)
results. In this relation, however, there is no
diversity of substance as there was in the sensation of
sight. Conception is the relation of these powers of
mind itself, as sight is the relation of the sense
object, the sense organ, and the will. The mind,
therefore, selects and deletes particular images from
the memory at will. This is the power of the mind's eye
which distinguishes it from the memory which is the
storehouse of images. Indeed, this inner relation of the
singular substance of mind may become especially intense
in those who are asleep or mad or divinely ecstatic when
the activity of the memory, the eye of the mind, and the
will, lose their distinction and become virtually
indistinguishable.

Of these two activities, sensation and conception
or cogitation, neither offers a true similitude of the
Trinity. When man neglects the inner relation of the
mind in order to live purposively in the outer relation
of sensation, man lives wretchedly because he focuses
the powers of the soul on created goods instead of on
the uncreated Good which is God. Sensation, then, is not
a proper image of God because it does not have God as
its focus. Inasmuch as the soul seeks the good in this
relation with finite goods, it might be said to have a certain likeness to the image of God, but then this is the nature of all sin which seeks the lesser good over against the greatest good. The image of God is that alone which has nothing between itself and God.

The relation which is sight does not exhibit a parent and an offspring as is present in the Trinity in the relation of the Father and the Son. The informed sense does not proceed from the sense object, nor does the sense object proceed from the informed sense. However, the act of relating the sense object and the sense organ by the will does insinuate the Holy Spirit, but even here the insinuation is imperfect because the will is prior to the particular relation. If the will were to rest in sensation, this activity would be its end. But if the will subordinates the activity of sensation to the higher relation of the soul to God, then the will lives blessedly.

In conception or cogitation, in the relation which derives from the outer relation of sensation, the will unites the image of the memory to the focus of the eye of the mind. Even though this activity is within the singular substance of the mind, the memory is not a true parent, nor the eye of the mind a true offspring because both are prior to the conception.

It is also difficult to discern whether the will is
a parent or an offspring because the will is an equal
substance with the memory and the eye of the mind, and
the will proceeds from the memory and joins itself to
what is conceived in the mind's eye, thus presupposing
both. The activity of the mind in conception itself is a
multiplicity of these relations inasmuch as each new
thought requires a new image and the unity of the will
with the eye of the mind. Again, the powers of mind
change activity inasmuch as the eye of the mind may
divide or unite, multiply or qualify, the conception
received from the memory. In this act the will is seen
to proceed not only from the memory but also from the
eye of the mind. Error occurs when the eye of the mind,
according to its will, varies what is found in the
memory which is the limit and measure of all the forms
which fill the gaze of thought. The will, then, has the
power to turn the eye of the mind away from the memory,
or the memory away from sensation.

The argument has seen the will unite three
relations; the sense object and the sense organ, the
sense organ informed and the memory, the memory and the
eye of the mind. Moreover, the reality of false
cogitation is due to the power of the mind's eye and the
inclination of the will to collect and combine or divide
what it chooses from the memory. In all of this the will
is neither parent nor offspring.
In the separation of the inner and outer, the noetic and the corporeal relations of mind, Book XI has shown that cogitation and sensation have a certain likeness to the Trinity, but neither is properly the imago dei. Indeed the relation of sensation is also the direction of the soul in sin when the mind prefers created good to its inner relation to God. What is gained in Book XI is declared in the final chapter where the activity of cogitatio is seen as a vestige of the Trinity. In thought, the memory provides the measure of a thing as it exists there singly; the vision or mental focus is seen as the number or multiplication of that which is singly in the memory; the will which combines these into a unity is the weight or direction and achievement of rest. All things are seen to have this structure of measure, number, and weight, but especially cogitatio, the activity of the inner man in which now the argument focuses in order to find a similitude of the Trinity.

Book XII further discriminates the activity of the inner man. Cogitatio differs from the outer relation of sensation as we have seen above, and it also differs radically from imagination which, Augustine says, is the mere ability of the sentient soul to be related to its environment by remembering things indiscriminately perceived and to pursue or avoid them by way of appetite
or fear. Cogitatio is unlike mere imagination inasmuch as it is capable of committing certain things to memory, and of uniting and dividing according to categories whatever the memory contains. This categorical thinking is the judgement of the mind depending upon the eternal reasons above the mind but related to it.

Cogitatio itself is divided into two different but related activities; the relation of mind to the temporal world, the mind in its rational act, and the mind in relation to the eternal reasons. These two acts of mind, the sciential and the sapiential, are related inasmuch as the sapiential is the mind discovering the truth of the eternal reasons present to it, and the sciential is the relation of the mind to the external world wherein the discernment of the eternal reasons in the sapiential relation is brought to bear in practical activity.

Both of these relations are of the one substance of the mind. And whereas the sciential relation is a kind of trinitarian activity, it is the activity of the mind in its sapiential activity which is a true image of God.

The divine Scripture, says Augustine, claims that man is created in the image of the Trinity, not in the image of one person of the Trinity. The image is said to reside in man and then again in male and female. How this is understood is crucial to the argument.

Following St. Paul, and arguing against those who
maintained that the image of God was complete in three
human beings, especially in the family of father,
mother, and son, Augustine asserts that man is the image
of God while woman is the glory of man. This, he says,
does not contradict what is said in the book of Genesis
where it is said that God created man, and created them
male and female. This means that the image of God is in
human nature and therefore complete in each sex. Paul's
statement does not conflict because he refers to the
relation of male and female as it is figured in their
physical bodies. Man is the image of God and woman is
the glory of man inasmuch as man physically represents
the sapiential relation of mind to God which is the
image of God, and woman represents the sciential
relation of the mind to the external world. She, in the
story of Genesis, is the *adjutorium*. Paul's admonition
that men should pray with their heads uncovered while
women should cover their heads symbolizes, for
Augustine, the authority of the sapiential over the
sciential. Augustine is clear that this representation
is only bodily and that the image of God as the
sapiential mind is actually found in both man and woman
as human beings created in the image of God.

Ergo in eorum mentibus communis natura
cognoscitur; in eorum vero corporibus
ipsius unius mentis distributio figuratur.
The two activities of mind, sapiential and sciential, which are figured in the division of the sexes wherein their proper relation is understood, is now seen in the fall of the soul away from its archetype. The fall of Adam and Eve indicates the sciential relation of mind dragging downward mind's knowledge of eternal things. By loving its own power, the soul slides from the universal truth common to all men down into its own private relation to the external world, falling little by little, until like the beasts the good of the intellect is lost. This is to say that the superior activity of mind yields its will to the inferior, the sapiential to the sciential which wills not to relate its life in the world back to the creative Good but rather seeks created goods as its end. Therefore, the entire soul and every soul falls, and its two activities are brought down together into a relation to the finite from which it is unable to free itself by its own power.

But, Augustine says, the proper end of the soul is not in its outer life, but rather in the striving within toward the eternal. And when the sciential act of soul is conquered by love of what is eternal, it finds its proper relation to finite goods in the habituation of moral virtue. The proper end of the mind is in its sapiential relation to the eternal reasons which
provide for the judgment of scientia.

There are a few, says Augustine, who have realized this for themselves, but their vision was impermanent. Only a remembrance of this vision remains unless this transitory contemplation is achieved once again. With this, Augustine refutes the Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis and recollection as a possible explanation for this vision.

Having distinguished between the distinctive acts of the inner man in scientia and sapientia, and considered their necessary relation, it is easy to prefer sapientia as superior since it is the relation of mind to what is eternal and immutable. Therefore, the argument continues to seek the similitude of the Trinity in the sapiential act of mind. And given that the argument has discerned the fall of the soul into the relation of the mind to the world, there is need not only to pursue the sapiential relation of mind in order to find a similitude, but also to find a means of mediation and liberation to do so. These will be the task of Book XIII.

Book XIII advances the argument by showing how the powers of the soul in its fallen relation to finite and corporeal goods are reformed. Only through the mediation of Christ and the gifts which flow from him through the Spirit to the believing soul is this restoration
possible. In this way the mind is moved concretely toward a similitude of the Trinity by the recovery of its *scientia* and its proper relation to *sapientia*.

The dialectic of illumination between the mind and the compelling revelation of the Scripture continues. In the opening verses of John's gospel, Augustine discerns the wisdom which is the Word of God, through whom all things were made and which enlightens every man, and the fallen *scientia* of the soul. The return to *sapientia* is through faith. And faith begins when, in the historical temporal realm of *scientia*, John the Baptist appears. Faith is not the relation to John himself, for that he is a man is understood through the categories of human experience. Rather, faith is the relation of the soul to God through the preaching of John.

Thus, faith is the relation of the soul to the eternal through the historical and temporal. That John was sent by God was not empirically verifiable, but John's message could be appropriated by faith, and that faith, as a kind of knowledge, is known indubitably to itself in the heart of the faithful. Through the man, John, faith is the beginning of the soul's restored relation to God, which is to say that faith is proper to the realm of *scientia*, because faith begins where the soul is dispersed in the world, and its beginning leads
to the objective return of the soul within, self-
consciously, to sapientia. Faith, which is certain in
the self-consciousness of the believer, itself has a
common unity among believers because it has a common
object. Its object is related to the common will of all
men, which cannot be empirically discerned in each
individual but can be demonstrated by reason. That
common will of man has as its object to be blessed and
not wretched.

The reason why the ends of men differ even though
all seek blessedness is because they seek blessedness in
diverse ends; some in knowledge, some in pleasure, some
in other things. But blessedness is not simply the
individual seeking what he knows and wants. For one does
not will blessedness if what one wills is not true
blessedness, if one is mistaken in what he thinks
blessedness is. Contrary objects of knowledge and
pleasure mean contrary ends. To be truly blessed one
must possess what one wills and will according to the
truth. Thus a common will to be blessed is discerned in
man, even though in practice men will mistakenly.

In order for man to will rightly, man must have
faith because all good will, will which seeks the true
good, comes from God. And because man cannot in this
present life fully possess the good nor will infallibly,
in faith he awaits life in heaven where he will know God
face to face.

Philosophers had constructed ideas of blessedness, says Augustine, in order that they might live their lives according to their own pleasure and within their own power. But this amounted to willing what they could, because they could not have what they truly willed. They bore patiently whatever happened to them, even what they were unwilling should happen to them, in order to live according to their abstract will. But this, says Augustine, cannot be blessedness since when one is blessed, whatever he wills can be because he does not will what cannot be. And certainly every one who wills true blessedness wills immortality, and in heaven immortality both can be and is. Blessedness, therefore, is a state reserved for heaven in which according to a perfect will, what is willed can be and is.

Faith, then, claims the immortality of both body and soul, true blessedness, by divine authority. The immortal life of heaven can be for man because the Son of God was made man so that man might become the son of God by grace. This blessedness of the perfect will is held in faith as the end of the soul. Faith, therefore, has as its common object what man wills for blessedness.

The confidence of this faith is not found in the soul itself but in the redemptive love of God. Because of Christ who took human nature to himself in order to
suffer our evils and bestow his gifts upon us, our faith works by love toward God. And so even our faith is the of the Holy Spirit bestowing the gifts of Christ on us to move us toward blessedness.

The remainder of the argument of Book XIII focuses on the concrete formation of faith's object in the soul. First, there is the objective side of the doctrine of Christ's passion, and then there is the subjective side, what is appropriated by the soul through faith. This is the only means of mediation whereby the sciential relation of the soul to the world begins its return to God.

The objective work of the passion is seen in what it means that man is justified in the blood of Christ. First of all, the purpose of the Incarnation and Passion was known to the divine persons before the foundation of the world. We have here the same priority of spiritual will given in Book III. Through the justice of God, the inordinate relation of the soul to the world occurred, which was the sin of our first parents and the ascendancy of the dominion of the devil, which every soul embraced as an assertion of power, and which resulted in the death of body and soul.

The justice of God in Christ is seen in the manner in which the devil and spiritual death is overcome. It was not by sheer power, but by righteousness, that
Christ overcame him who had the power of death. In this, Augustine says, we understand righteousness to mean the proper relation of the will to the temporal world, ordered by the soul's primary relation to God whom the soul knows as its true end, so that it is the primary relation to God which governs the soul's power in the temporal. Thus righteousness precedes power, the knowledge of the true precedes the motion towards it as the good. The soul seeks this in its own life by the virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice, so that the soul will have power to act for itself against itself. In the will, rightly ordered, the soul longs for and anticipates true immortality in heaven.

This righteousness was actual in Christ who in giving himself over to the slaying of the devil, took the debt of man's death which Christ himself did not owe, and thereby administered the judgement of God. In this act of righteousness is seen the unique mediation of Christ. For it was necessary that the mediator be the God-man; because only God could act in perfect righteousness, refraining what he could have done in his power, and accomplishing by his perfect knowledge a fitting, true, and just redemption; and because only as man could he die. Thus in the humility of human nature, Christ was righteous unto death. His triumph over the devil was first in righteousness, and then in the power
of his resurrected life. Therefore, the justice of Christ, which also comprehends evil as an instrument of sanctification, is the means for the return of the soul from the sciential relation of carnal concupiscence to spiritual regeneration in which the powers of the soul are brought to their proper end.

Augustine summarizes the objective benefits of the Incarnation and the Passion: first, through the Incarnation, no intermediary lies between God and man who becomes the highest of creatures; second, the grace of God is seen in that man could be joined to God without any prior merit; third, man learns of the humility of God as well as man's own distance from God; fourth, man learns the justice of God in that the devil is conquered by the same rational creature whom he conquered; and fifth, the Incarnation itself proceeded through the humility of God and the faith of Mary. These constitute a summary of the objective benefits of faith, but there is also the subjective relation which faith is, and in which the soul has its concrete renovation.

Faith is a living knowledge of Christ who is the unity of scientia, in which he as man lives in the historical temporal world, and sapientia, which he is in the unity of his wisdom as the eternal Word of God. By grace these activities of mind are joined in the unity of his person. He is then the concrete beginning of the
soul in its purgation and renovation of scientia. The fall of scientia away from sapientia dragging sapientia down into the world which was figured in the fall of Adam and Eve is here overcome and restored to its integrity. By grace the soul is brought in faith into a union with Christ. Faith is the living relation, the kind of knowledge by which scientia is restored to sapientia. Thus the soul in its scienzial and sapiential activities is being concretely formed according to the motion wherein the divine life has conformed human nature into a union with itself.

Scientia ergo nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est. Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit, ipse de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam: ab uno tamen eodemque Christo non recedimus, "in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi". 148

This is the extent of the argument thus far, writes Augustine. All men desire blessedness, and blessedness necessarily involves immortality. The only way to blessedness is by faith in the one mediator, Jesus Christ. Faith in Christ is necessary if one would be freed from the sinful relation of the soul to the world. Christ is the means of the renovation of the soul toward God. This was also the subject of Book IV, but here the intention is to distinguish the scienzial from the sapiential and to see these restored in Christ.
The consequence of faith in the life of scientia is found in the renewed life of the soul in the world. Faith comprehends the virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice, and focuses these on the object of faith in blessedness, albeit in this life not without sin. Scientia is here brought into a renewed relation, and the mind moves more toward a similitude of the Trinity, but this restoration of the mind is not itself the image of God. The restoration of the sciential mind approaches the similitude of God more than a mere image of sense in the relations of memory, knowledge, and will, inasmuch as these relations in scientia also presuppose their essential activity in sapientia, and seek to order themselves under the relations of sapientia for their final blessedness in God. The activity of scientia is not the similitude of the Trinity because its focus, although renewed, is still that of faith. Now, given the concrete restoration of the sciential soul, enabled by faith in Christ, the mind may ascend, freed from its defluxion in the world, although not perfectly, and seek the similitude of God in sapientia.

Book XIV is devoted to the formation of the mind in its sapiential relation to God. Its wisdom is not the divine wisdom but a true wisdom secundum Deum, and it is not a wisdom already discerned, but which is being
152
formed.

Augustine has distinguished between the relation of the soul to the world in scientia, and the relation of the mind to God in sapientia. With the fallen relation of scientia restored by faith in Christ, the relation of the mind to God is now pursued.

Faith, says Augustine, is appropriate to the life of scientia because its relation to God involves the hope for blessedness, but when the soul is come into the blessedness of heaven, faith will pass into the memory as the soul enters the vision of beatitude. Because faith is itself mutable and temporal, it cannot be the proper image of God. The image of God must be immortal. And because the soul is immortal, the best part of the soul which is the image of God must also be immortal.

Faith, as we have seen in Book XIII, is a relation of the soul to God through the person and work of Jesus Christ. The kind of trinitarian image in this activity of soul is not sustained in the soul because the object of the mind's activity passes from the historical person and work of Christ to the divine life itself. The relation of the soul through the temporal ceases, and becomes in direct relation to the eternal. The mind passes from faith to sight forever. This relation of vision has been what the soul was created for, and
although it is fallen and the image which is itself is
vitiatied, the soul remained as it was created a *capax*
157 which by grace becomes a *particeps* of the Trinity.

The immortal character of soul was addressed
already, says Augustine, in Book X where the argument
concluded that the mind of man knows itself with
158 certainty. This seems true for infants also, for even
though the infant is unable to think himself because he
has not learned the symbols necessary for thinking, when
he matures and is capable of thinking the nature of
his own mind, that thinking will be found nowhere else
than in himself, and not as what was unknown but as what
159 was unthought.

The distinction between self-knowledge and self-
cogitation is of the utmost importance in Augustine's
argument. That this distinction is, has been shown in
Book X; how it is so now becomes the aporia through
160 *sapientia* is discovered.

The activity of self-cogitation is for the mind
nothing less than an incorporeal conversion. The
activity of mind is remembered to itself, and thus
thinks itself. As a man skilled in many branches of
learning brings only one of these into the purview of
his mind at a time, so the mind brings itself into
conception.

*Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit,*
intelligit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. 161

From this, however, one should not conclude that the mind was ignorant of itself prior to thinking itself. The mind was known to itself as those many branches of learning were in the memory of the skilled man even though they were not all the focus of the mind at the same time. The activity then is that of the mind begetting the conception of itself, and these are joined by love. By these three names, memory, intelligence, and will, a trinity of the mind is insinuated. But these names themselves are not enough to form a similitude of the Trinitarian activity.

Augustine asks in what way cogitation (cogitatio) pertains merely to intellect while the knowledge of a thing (notitia) which is in the mind even when it is not thought is said to pertain to the memory alone. If this were so the activity of the mind would be confined to the moment of cogitation because at that point the mind would begin to understand and love itself, but before this it was only a notion of itself in memory. In this way the mind's self-knowledge is reduced to a series of moments, which would divide and separate what is essentially undivided.

But just as a man holds the knowledge of different branches of learning in the memory and brings them into
the purview of the mind, so the knowledge of the mind's memory, knowledge, and love of itself is thought when it is brought into the mind's sight. Rather than an absolute temporal division, the mind is seen to possess both an atemporal or ceaseless activity, and the same activity following temporally. The mind always remembers, knows, and loves itself in the storehouse of memory, but it is not present openly to the mind until it is thought. The mind is neither simply its ceaseless activity nor its discursive temporal activity. Mind comprehends both.

It is in the unity of the mind that a trinitarian similitude is sought. The trinitarian image may be said to be present in the inner atemporal memory, but because a word of the mind is not without thought, the trinitarian image is better seen in the entire relation. An image of the Trinity is therefore grasped in the whole of the mind's self-relation: its ceaseless atemporal activity of remembering, knowing, and loving itself in the inner memory; this activity begotten into the purview of the mind's temporal sight; and the mind in the love of itself embracing both. This is the highest and noblest part of man, that than which only God is greater, and it is a kind of image of God, but not a proper image. Certainly this is the closest similitude of God discussed in the argument so far,
because its object is not drawn from without, nor is its object the image of what is drawn from without, nor is it the content of the sciential mind, nor is it the sciential life of faith ordering the virtues toward blessedness in God; rather, the activity of the mind, which from the time of its creation has not ceased, which is identical to its being, its essential nature, is its own object. The mind is not simply another object of its activity. Memoria is the complete essential activity of the mind and yet is not all that the mind is. Memoria requires intelligentia. Intellect takes on the character of memory but as verbum and cogitatio, and these are joined by voluntas. Here we see the concrete realization of what was only logically anticipated in Books V-VII.

While the mind is focused on itself, it is a kind of image of God, but not the imago trinitatis. In order for the mind to become this image, it must participate in God himself. God, and not the mind itself, becomes the object of the mind's memory, knowledge, and love.

Quod cum facit, sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit, seseque intelligit ac diligat, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, eumque intelligat atque diligat. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cuius ab eo capax est facta, et cuius particeps esse potest; propter quod scriptum est, "Ecce Dei cultus est sapientia", et non sua luce, sed summæ illius lucis participatione sapiens erit, atque ubi aeterna, ibi beata regnabit. 167
That the soul is enabled to seek God as the object of its activity is dependent upon the prior love of God seeking the soul. Only in this way is the disabled mind freed from its perverse relation to the world and purged as the image of God, when encouraged by the love of God, the mind remembers, knows, and loves him. In this the mind enters into a participation of God's own activity, which is fully actual only in heavenly vision. And so the only means for the soul to receive the blessedness of this participation in the Trinity is by grace. When the image of God, which cannot renew itself, is restored, the soul is reminded of the Lord, and the mind which is spirit begins in its reform according to the Spirit which God is.

Augustine is clear that this formation and renovation of the soul is nothing other than spiritual progress in the knowledge and love of God. The mind moves concretely in justitia, which is the true order of the soul in relation to God and creation, and in sanctitate, which is the soul, in accordance with its true order, living toward God. In this new life of the spirit, the soul "transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intelligibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritualia." The end of the soul's progress is the vision of the Trinity wherein the image is perfected as similitudo.
Augustine concludes Book XIV with a rejection of the scepticism he found in Cicero's Hortensius. Sapientia is neither uncertain, nor an abstract calculation. It is not a matter of practical outcome whether true or false. Cicero's doctrine, claims Augustine, is unfaithful even to the philosophical tradition. Augustine's argument has seen the concrete renewal of the mind toward a similitude of the Trinity. The renewal is an indubitable ratio, moved by the love of the God-man, whose grace enables the soul to move from slavish scientia through its restoration to wisdom in the self-relation of mind. Once this is understood, it is seen that sapientia is not merely the mind's self-relation, but the unity of mind's powers in memory, intellect, and will, focused upon God as he is upon himself, a true similitude.

The argument of the De Trinitate is not meant merely to discover a similitude of the Trinity, but to give a demonstration of how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are rightly understood to be of one and the same substance or essence. The argument has sought the Trinity through its restored image as the Principle of the integral mind. By an elimination or purgation of inadequate images in the previous books VIII-XIV the mind has itself been formed as sapientia secundum Deum. But now the argument passes beyond sapientia to the
Trinity in itself. This demonstration, however, is only a ratio understood by the contrast of likeness and unlikeness and is not the final vision of the soul. It is nonetheless a true demonstration which, for Augustine, is nothing less than the actual participation of the mind in the illuminative grace of God.

Illumination, as we have seen, takes two parts: first, there is the true knowledge of the Trinity; and second, there is union with the Trinity in act. The ratio is the means for those who believe to come to understanding. It is also the means for those who attempt to discriminate the truth by reason alone to be convinced beyond doubt so that they may begin again by faith in Christ and approach the Trinity in love. For each of these the entire argument is necessary in order to come to understanding.

Two related assumptions support the search for God in himself. The love of God compels and enables the mind toward himself, and God does this in order that he may be found. This, says Augustine, is clear from Scripture. But what does this mean? God cannot be found in such a way that he is comprehended by the mind. The truth is, because of divine illumination, the soul increases in its knowledge and love, it comes to true understanding, for the sake of seeking to understand still more. The argument has begun in faith and ends now in
understanding, and yet understanding also seeks.

With this confidence enabling the argument to continue, Augustine reviews the conclusions of the first fourteen books to show that they contain one coherent argument. Note that this summary is intended, as the context of Book XV makes clear, for both the faithful and the unfaithful. He concludes his summary,

Jam ergo in ipsis rebus aeternis, incorporalibus et incommutabilis, in quarum perfecta contemplatione nobis beata, quae nonnisi aeterna est, vita promittitur, Trinitatem quae Deus est inquiramus. 175

It is the Trinity which both Scripture and nature proclaim to be spirit, most powerful, righteous, 176 beautiful, good, and blessed. But how are these names which apply to the entire Trinity also a Trinity? How is the one God who is Spirit, whose essence is identical to his attributes and understanding, also three persons?

Names such as goodness, power, and blessedness, are not qualities of the substance of God, because in the simple essence of divine Spirit there is no distinction between substance and accident. Of twelve divine names, Augustine makes distinctions of higher and lower according to those which seem to contain and imply the others. Eternal, immortal, incorruptible, and unchangeable are summed up in eternal. Of living, wise, powerful, and beautiful, wisdom is chosen because when these are attributed to creatures wisdom is considered
the highest. And righteous, good, blessed, and spirit, are all implied in blessed. But this hierarchy of names does not indicate the Trinity.

Of these three, eternal, wise, and blessed, wisdom may be deemed the highest, because God is his own wisdom, for him sapere est esse. Book VII was the place in the argument in which Augustine shows that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are each and all the divine wisdom as they are the divine light. But how is this wisdom understood as Trinity?

The Trinity first began to reveal itself, says Augustine, in Book VIII. This does not mean that the doctrine was not revealed in the previous books, but rather that the biblical doctrine, and the subsequent logical formulation of the believing mind, are not the concrete understanding which the argument seeks. Indeed, the understanding which develops through Book XV is itself impossible without the preceding discussion. Book VIII, says Augustine, began the argument to consider the incorporeal mind as that created image through which its Creator might be known. In Book VIII, the highest Good is discerned as that on which all other goods necessarily depend. The good which the mind is therefore has its principle in the highest good which we have seen in Book XIV to be the wisdom which is the Trinity. This has been the task of books IX through XIV. Now in Book
XV Augustine can approach what it means for the highest name of the Trinity to be wisdom.

Aut vero putandum est, sapientiam quae Deus est, scire alia et nescire se ipsam, vel diligere alia nec diligere se ipsam? Quae si dici sive credi stultum et impium est; ecce ergo Trinitas, sapientia scilicet, et notitia sui, et dilectio sui. Sic enim et in homine invenimus trinitatem, id est, mentem, et notitiam qua se novit, et dilectionem qua se diligat. 181

The Trinity which God is is wisdom, the knowledge and love of wisdom itself. This is that Good, spoken of in Book VIII and discerned through the argument to Book XIV, on which the human mind depends and in which it participates.

Augustine's argument, therefore, has reached the point of God in himself. The divine wisdom which knows and loves itself is the principle of the highest image of the Trinity which was discerned in the sapiential relation of the mind to God. No similitude of the Trinity has been adequate up until mind's sapientia. From Book VIII until XIV and here, the argument followed a continual elimination of inadequate images as the mind was purged of its inordinate relation to the finite and renewed by the focus of its powers in memory, intellect, and will, upon God. Through the true similitude of sapientia, mind is able to see what it images in the wisdom which is Trinity.

And yet, immediately, given this sight of the
Trinity as wisdom's self-knowledge and self-love, Augustine moves to distinguish the likeness and unlikeness of the human mind from its principle. First, the powers which are finite mind are not all that man is, but rather exist in man who is body and soul. The divine wisdom is the Trinity simply. Second, the transparent simplicity and clarity of the divine mind is eternal whereas the nature of the human mind is constituted of moments temporally integrated. The human mind possesses its activity as the relation of moments which are in themselves deficient and require the others.

Itemque, in hoc magna distantia est, quod sive mentem dicamus in homine, ejusque notitiam, et dilectionem, sive memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem, nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam, nec intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam, nec amamus nisi per voluntatem. 185

In this Augustine recalls what was discovered in the argument from Book X to XIV, namely that the atemporal and ceaseless activity of the human memory in its own memory, knowledge and love, must come into the temporal purview of the mind in order to be thought. The will must also be engaged to maintain this relation. The human mind is not transparent or conspicuous to itself, as the Trinity is to itself. No one, says Augustine, would maintain that the Father understands neither himself, nor the Son, nor the Spirit, except through the
Son. If that were so, we would fall back into the position refuted in Book VII that the Father is wise through the Son. The divine simplicity is in contradistinction to human *mens* because only the divine is perfectly transparent to itself in its wisdom. The divine activity of wisdom is essentially memory, intellect, and will, and each of the divine persons is this equally and eternally. This distance between the divine wisdom and the human mind is great, and the infirmity of the human mind is such that it can hardly know itself. But the command of God to seek his face compels us and although, because of our infirmity we cannot look directly at the Trinity, we seek indirectly through the image of the mind which by grace is being renewed. We see *per speculum in aenigmate* and this means, says Augustine, that the speculation of the mind takes place in an image, for a mirror, *speculum*, reflects images. The image itself is an obscure figure, an *aenigma*. And as the argument has demonstrated, there is no higher nor clearer figure than the likeness which is the mind, although its obscurity requires labor to see through it.

The contemplative *via* by which the mind traverses so great a distance from itself to God is the true activity of mind. Augustine begins by delineating three ways of likeness. There is first the thinking of those
things in mind which are known so that they are uttered as inner words. These are prior to their expression in language as sound or symbol because they are identical to mental sight. To speak inwardly and to think inwardly are the same. Whoever can understand this, says Augustine, can see through the mind a likeness of the eternal Word of God born of the Father. The finite word comes forth from the memory, what is truly known and retained in memory is born as the thought of mind. It is crucial to recognize that this likeness is found only in the true activity of mind where what comes forth from the memory is identical to what is in itself true and resides in memory. What is in knowledge is in the word, and what is not in knowledge is not in the word. It is, says Augustine, tantamount to our Lord's exhortation, "Est, est; non, non". Moral rectitude requires rectitude of mind. But there is also a deeper significance. The true activity of mind reflects the relation of the eternal Word to the Father, for the eternal Word is what the Father is and is not what the Father is not. And so the likeness of the true activity of mind to the Trinity finds the ground for the epistemological truth of mind in the ontological truth of God. Augustine makes this explicit below. What is important here is the likeness of the mind to the Trinity in the relation of the word truly begotten from the memory. The secondary likeness
follows upon this. Given the relation of what is in memory to its word, there is also the priority of the word, the concept, to the work. The eternal Word is that through which all things were created. Similarly, there is no work of man which is not first spoken within the mind as word. This also is an instance of "est, est; non, non" in its practical or ethical form. Unless the word comes forth from the knowledge of how to live rightly, it is not a true word, the word is not an expression of the truth of the practical life held in the memory; consequently, the work is not according to the truth of right living but is mistaken and sinful. The tertiary likeness follows from these first two. Although a work necessarily presupposes a word, a word must not always issue in a work. The eternal Word could certainly exist without creation, as our words exist within the mind without any practical issue.

There are, then, these likenesses between the mind and the Trinity, but the perfection of the image which the mind is will not be reached before its vision of the Principle. The purview of the mind will not then be per speculum in aenigmate in any of its progressively transformed states, but rather directly seeing God as he is.

Before turning to consider some ways in which the mind is unlike the Trinity, Augustine addresses the
Academics who, he claims, contended that man could not know anything at all, either of sense impressions or of self-knowledge. What is certainly true, says Augustine and as he has discussed at length from Books VIII - XIV, is the indubitable knowledge of one's own living being. This has been "the point of departure from which the mind has moved through itself as an image to that upon which it necessarily depends. This knowledge of the mind, its powers and its Principle, dismisses this kind of scepticism. To make these comparisons of likeness and unlikeness between the Trinity and the mind supposes a certainty of knowledge derived both from revelation and the mind which the mind itself possesses, and which issues here as a true word begotten from the memory.

Augustine now pursues the unlikeness of the mind to the Trinity. The divine memoria, the Father, does not learn from the sensible or the testimony of others as the human mind does. Indeed, the perfectio of the Father does not gain the knowledge of creation by knowing it, but rather knows it and thereby creates it. Nor does his knowledge of creation differ once it is created. The essence of the divine memoria is a simplicity of wisdom and being.

Quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili, non est aliud sapere, aliud esse; sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse ... 195

But the human mind in its composition is the capacity
to acquire and lose knowledge. And, therefore, the
knowledge of the human memory born into mental sight is
unlike the divine Word, because the divine Word is in
all things equal to the Father, wisdom from wisdom,
esSENCE from essence. And yet the Father is not the Son
nor the Son the Father. Augustine shows here the
absolute ground for the law of non-contradiction, "Est,
est: non, non". For without any dissimilitude, the Son as
Verbum comes forth from the divine memoria and is equal
to it, all that the Father is and not what the Father is
not. The divine wisdom possesses as itself the absolute
stability of a being which knows the immutability of its
own perfection, and this is begotten as the Word. The
completeness of this relation is seen in the reciprocal
distinction of the knowledge of the divine persons.

Novit itaque omnia Deus Pater in se ipso,
novit in Filio: sed in se ipso tanquam se
ipsum, in Filio tanquam Verbum suum, quod
est de his omnibus quae sunt in se ipso.
Omnia similiter novit et Filius , in se
scilicet, tanquam ea quae nata sunt de iis
quae Pater novit in se ipso: in Patre autem,
tanquam ea de quibus nata sunt, quae ipse
Filius novit in se ipso. Sciunt ergo invicem
Pater et Filius: sed ille gignendo, iste
nascendo. 196

The divine wisdom is understood as distinct perceptions
of referential relations of the identical divine
essence. Each has the whole of the divine wisdom as his
object, and each sees all simultaneously in a complete
197
transparency of the divine mind to itself.
Although there is a likeness here in the mind inasmuch as our word is begotten from the memory, there is also a profound unlikeness. This is so because the human mind is capable both of mistaking what it knows to be true when it does not really know, and of lying. The eternal Word is incapable of this.

What, then, about the atemporal and temporal aspects of mind which the argument has discerned in Book X, asks Augustine. Is there a likeness of the divine Verbum in the atemporal activity of mind? No. The reason there is not is because the atemporal activity of mind does not produce a sempiternal word. To do so the ceaseless activity of mind would forever be the cogitation of the mind, which is not possible for human cogitation.

Perhaps then, says Augustine, the finite mind may be thought to possess an eternal word insofar as the knowledge of memoria is always potentially word. In this way, the word would be perpetual because it is always potentially in the purview of the mind. But this is really unlike the Trinity, concludes Augustine, because what has not been formed in the vision of cogitation cannot be called a word.

The unlikeness of the renewed mind to the Trinity is never altogether overcome. This is to say that the mind, although it participates in the vision of God,
never becomes God. The soul is not absorbed into the divine, even if its vision is held in one glance. The soul cannot become divine inasmuch as the divine is not itself *formabile* or in any way potential. The mind is given a participation in which it is formed in the vision. The divine has always been what it is and will ever be so.

Thus far the argument has addressed the divine wisdom, but only insofar as it concerns the Father and the Son. Through the *speculum in aenigmate* the mind has considered the relation of the divine mind to its Word, *memoria* to *intellectus*, and how the activity of deity is like and unlike its image. In order to complete the demonstration of the Trinity, the argument proceeds to consider the Holy Spirit. Reference is again made to the Scriptures which have compelled the argument, and guide the philosophical method.

The Holy Spirit is neither of the Father alone nor of the Son alone, rather he is the reciprocal love of both. Now the Scriptures, says Augustine, do not predicate this of the Holy Spirit explicitly, but make us labor to discern it. The Scripture predicates love of God. Does this mean each person of the Trinity, or the Trinity itself?

Augustine has already argued in this book that the whole of the divine essence is wisdom and that each of
the persons is this equally. This is true of love, *dilectio* or *charitas* also: "... *simul omnes una charitas.*" The divine essence is wisdom and love.

How then is the Holy Spirit particularly love? How is it that the Holy Spirit may be called Love as the Son is called Word, and as he from whom the Son and the Spirit proceed is called Father? Augustine responds that the manner of biblical predication is sometimes to call things by the same name in general and then again in particular, for instance, the Psalms, the Law, and the Prophets are all together called the Law. Again, the Word of God is called Wisdom, although the Father and the Son are each wisdom. Thus inasmuch as the Father and the Son are the divine essence, and God is Love, the Father and the Son are each the divine love. But the Spirit is particularly called Love, only not explicitly. This must be carefully discerned from Scripture because it is not anywhere stated but is seen from a number of passages.

From I John, Augustine reasons that because love is of God (*ex Deo*), and God is Love, then to say love is of God means that God is of God; "*Deus ergo ex Deo est dilectio.*" The question then becomes who of the divine Trinity is meant? Is it the Son or the Holy Spirit? The answer is found again in John's Epistle. Love among men indicates the presence of God abiding in men, and men
know that God abides in them because God has given them de Spiritu suo. Augustine concludes,

Spiritus itaque sanctus de quo dedit nobis, facit nos in Deo manere, et ipsum in nobis: hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipsa est igitur Deus dilectio ... Deus igitur Spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex Deo, cum datus fuerit homini, accendit eum in dilectionem Dei et proximi, et ipsa dilectio est. 209

And this, Augustine says, Paul also teaches.

Love, then, is the most excellent gift of God, and without it all other gifts of the Spirit amount to nothing because by love the soul is united to God. And so the Holy Spirit is properly called Gift. For through this Gift the mind's activity is brought into union with the activity of the Trinity.

Dilectio quae ex Deo est et Deus est, proprie Spiritus sanctus est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Dei charitas, per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas. 212

Moreover, Augustine shows that to predicate Gift as a proper name for the Holy Spirit is the abundant teaching of Scripture, so that when the gift of God is predicated one should not think of the gift as any thing other than the Holy Spirit himself. Therefore, as the Gift of God he is given to the soul, but as one person of the Holy Trinity he also gives himself.

At this juncture in the argument, Augustine makes it clear that the names of Love and Gift are properly predicated of the Holy Spirit, but in the same sense
that Wisdom is predicated of the Word. If the Holy Spirit were alone Love, then the Son would also be the Son of the Spirit because the Scripture calls him the Son of the Father's love. But this is contrary to Scripture which says that the Son is the only-begotten of the Father. This means that the Holy Spirit is not love to the exclusion of the Father and the Son, as the Son is not wisdom exclusively. For each of the persons is wisdom and love.

Augustine brings the importance of this distinction into focus by way of Eunomius who taught that the Son was born of the Father's will and was not of the Father by nature. In this way, says Augustine, the Son was considered accidental to the divine. This is of course the problem with the Neoplatonic theology, especially in its Plotinian and Arian forms. We address this in the following commentary. At our present place in the argument Augustine intends to make certain that the names properly ascribed to the persons do not obscure the identity of their divine essence. The relation of the Son to the Father should be understood to be will of will, just as it is wisdom of wisdom and essence of essence. Therefore, in saying that the Holy Spirit is properly named Love in the Scripture does not mean that he alone is Love.

Given that the Spirit is called Love according
to the testimony of the Scriptures, how he is understood to be properly Love is again seen through the speculum, in its likeness and unlikeness.

Through the speculum, the enigma we have discerned thus far is a memory and intelligence in mind like to the Father and the Son who are the divine memoria and Verbum. We have seen that the Word is all that the Father is, and that the finite memory possesses whatever comes into the intellect as cognition. Moreover, we perceive that a hidden understanding lies within the memory itself which can also be brought forth into the purview of the intelligence, and that the intelligence has memory within itself which is required in order for the intellect to return to the memory to think what it had left there while pursuing another 218 thought.

But this is not all that the mind is. The mind is also voluntas or dilectio, in which we discover not only the union of memoria and cogitatio but also that within voluntas itself there is memory and thought.

... ita dilectio quae visionem in memoria constitutam, et visionem cogitationis inde formatam quasi parentem prolemque conjungit, nisi haberet appetendi scientiam, quae sine memoria et intelligentia non potest esse, quid recte diligeret ignoraret. 219

Dilectio unifies the activity of mind, because it possesses also a memory and understanding by which it
remembers and knows what it binds together.

The three moments of finite mind - memory, intellect and will - are in one person. Each moment requires the other to complement its activity because each moment possesses a predominance. The person is neither any one of these nor all of these together. Memory is fundamentally memory, but has its own intellect and will. Intellect is predominantly understanding as the purview of mental sight and yet it is also remembers and wills. The will is basically itself but it is not without memory and knowledge. None can stand alone as the complete activity of mind. Each needs the others. And the person is not these three but possesses them. In contradistinction to the finite mind, that highest simplicity which is the nature of the Trinity is one God in three persons. In this there is a likeness of human mens to God inasmuch as the finite memory bears some resemblance to the Father, and the human intellect is something similar to the Son, and the mind's will approaches a correspondence to the voluntas which is the Holy Spirit. And yet there is also a manifest unlikeness. The Trinity which is God is a unity wherein the three persons - memory, intellect, and will - are each perfectly and immutably equal; however, in the image which is the mind, these powers are unequal and differ in strength among human beings.
That inequality of mind will not be overcome, healed, until its full restoration in the vision of the Trinity.

Once again in the argument Augustine addresses his readers. This knowledge of the likeness and unlikeness of the image to the Trinity is attained through the mind as *speculum* which knows its own weakness and inability. But the mind which follows the argument and knows itself, but does not believe itself to be an image, cannot seek its Principle in the Trinity. Apart from faith, the mind cannot discern itself as image of the Trinity. That is the stupefying character of sin. Without faith, the distance of mind from God as Trinity is unknown, and where there is no distance, there can be no mediation. In order for the soul to discover itself as image of the Trinity, it must come in faith to Christ.

With this, the *ratio*, the demonstration of the trinitarian activity, promised in Book I, is complete. What has been said (*dicatur*), and believed (*credatur*), is now understood (*intelligatur*). Moreover, there is need for those who have understood the argument, and do not believe, to begin again in faith. For the *ratio* is clear, the mind cannot come to the Trinity apart from the concrete presence of grace, the *justitia*, which enables the renovation of the sciential and sapiential love of the soul, and is the soul's through faith in
Through faith even those who are of lesser intellect are given the vision of God. And their blessedness is the enjoyment of the Truth seen most clearly and certainly. For the soul rests in the contemplation of the Trinity, seeing the very relations of the divine act.

Nec aliquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cernemus quare non sit Filius Spiritus sanctus, cum de Paræ procedat.

The soul which began in faith will have as its end an understanding of God himself. However, now we look through a speculum in aenigmate.

With the ratio complete, Augustine returns to the Scripture as the authority with which he began and reiterates the Biblical doctrine, especially as it concerns the Holy Spirit and his procession from the Father and the Son. Those who have not been able to look through the speculum to follow the argument through the mind to its Principle need in faith to study the Scripture, that by praying, seeking, and living well they may understand what they hold now in faith. And yet those who have been able to follow the argument, and understand, know the distance that remains for the mind to come to the Trinity. The course of illumination which has moved through the speculum has indeed been true and
cogent. But even the illumined mind, short of the final vision, cannot presently abide in the life of the Trinity.

And so Augustine ends this great work with a prayer. For it is in faith that the soul has discovered the Trinity revealed in the Scripture. And it is faith that has sought the face of God in the argument, laboring to understand what is believed by the Church. The infirm soul has been renewed in understanding God, and yet the fulness of restoration is yet to come. Augustine writes,

Domine Deus meus, una spes mea, exaudi me, ne fatigatus nolim te quaerere, sed quaeram faciem tuam semper ardenter. Tu da quaerendi vires, qui invenire te fecisti, et magis magisque inveniendi te spem dedisti. Coram te est firmitas et infirmitas mea: illam serva, istam sana. Coram te est scientia et ignorantia mea: ubi mihi aperuisti, suscipe intrantem; ubi clausisti, aperi pulsanti. Meminerim tui, intelligam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec me reformes ad integrum.

Now that we have given a brief overview of the entire argument of the De Trinitate, it is necessary to speak of the structure in more general terms, before we consider other positions. The structure of the work exhibits the doctrine which it treats.

First of all there is the course of the argument dicatur, credatur, intelligatur, which follows the path of illumination, and is the renewal and formation of the
mind through which as **speculum in aenigmate** the soul comes to an understanding of the Trinity itself. Books I-IV offer the doctrine in its revealed form, **dicatur**; Books V-VIII render the biblical doctrine intelligible in the formation of the categories of mind, **credatur**; Books VIII-XV move concretely through the mind in a formation of similitude through which the Trinity is seen, **intelligatur**. But this view of the structure is not in the end the primary one. What enables the course of illumination, purgation, and renovation is the Trinity, and the structure of the work exhibits this very thing. Each of the three sections is whole in itself and yet is related to the others. Books I-IV possess the full doctrine of the Trinity as **memoria**. The whole doctrine is there including the necessary mediation of Christ through whom man comes in integrity to the final joy of heaven. It is the whole of these books taken together which generates the logical apprehension of them in Books V-VII. Through the categories of substance, relation, and act, the whole of **memoria** takes on an **intellectus**. And there also the logical certainty of the argument requires an adequate mediation to achieve its finite formation. From Book VIII until XV the content of Scripture is joined together with the logical consideration to seek and achieve a concrete union of activity between the mind as
imago trinitatis and God, voluntas\dilectio. And again, the union of activity is not without the actual grace of renewing the mind toward wisdom. The work concludes in a recognition of the distance that remains between the Trinity in itself and the formed Image of the mind; however, that distance is not as we began in dissimilitude, but rather in the understanding and loving union of the restored image seeking to remember, know, and love the Trinity more and more. The structure of Augustine's De Trinitate is therefore an argument in which the wayfaring soul is taken up into the very activity of the Trinity by the grace of illumination, grounded in the mediation of the Word made flesh.

It is the position of this author that the structure of the De Trinitate is indeed as I have suggested, but as I have noted, the discovery of this structure is not mine but was made known to me through the seminal article of R.D. Crouse. After a close examination of the text itself, I support his conclusions. There may be some question about his interpretation of the argument in particular places, as for instance, in reference to VII.vi.12 where he speaks of the mind's formation in the image of the Trinity "as like in species to that which it knows", which given the account of the inadequacy of the logic of genera and species to the doctrine of the Trinity seems
inappropriate, but there is no mistake in the careful and brilliant summary he has made of the structure and method of the work.

Crouse's conclusions, unfortunately, have been neglected, as in the recent book of D.J. Merriell which addresses the influence of Augustine on the trinitarian doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. Merriell has proposed another view of the structure of Augustine's De Trinitate. His attempt is admirable insofar as he discerns a unified argument. But his determination of the structure fails. First, Merriell records that the De Trinitate has been divided traditionally into two basic divisions; a theological section (Books I-VII) and a philosophical section (Books VIII-XV), or, a Scriptural section (I-IV) and a rational section (V-XV). On the basis of these divisions, and the assumption that philosophy cannot begin with faith in Scripture, Merriell dismisses both alternatives, claiming that along with Books I-VII, VIII-XV also remain Scriptural and require faith. But his view is misguided. The assumption of such an opposition between theology and philosophy when applied to this work is anachronistic. Theology is for Augustine and the ancient world the highest form of philosophy. Instead of the traditional divisions, Merriell sees the work revolving around two difficulties; "how are we to understand that Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit work invisibly as one God, and yet play distinct roles within the created world?" and "how can we understand the distinction of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity since we cannot say that the Father or the Son or both have begotten Him?" These two difficulties are answered by an emphasis on the first in books I-VII, and on the second in VIII-XV.

Merriell considers the first seven books as a scriptural account of the divine missions in such a form that the equality and inseparability of the divine persons is presented to faith as an indivisible working unity. The question of the Holy Spirit is present but does not come into the forefront until Book VI where the Spirit is called Love. Merriell dismisses the position that books V-VII are a "dry, technical treatment of certain problems of theological linguistics raised by the Arians' objections to Catholic belief." They are rather the means whereby Augustine "tackles the heretics on their own ground: he uses traditional philosophical concepts (mainly Aristotelian) to demolish their supposedly rational arguments." In other words, the discussion of the categories is merely polemical, although what comes out of the polemic is the wonderful realization of the Spirit as Love in Book VI. Again it seems Merriell is mistaken. These books, while polemical, are also an integral part of the argument as
the formation of the _speculum in aenigmate_, what in Book VII becomes the _imago Dei_. They are compelled by the Scripture, and it is through the Scriptures that the categories are redefined and become essential to the argument as a whole. Although Augustine states at the end of Book IV that he now intends to dispute with heretics, and declares in Book VIII that he puts away disputing, it is clear that the argument of V-VII has included the orthodox as well as the unorthodox in a dialectic which forms the mind as _speculum_ and _imago_. And in this it is of the utmost importance to recognize that with Book Seven Augustine provides the conclusion for why the divine essence is _sapere_, and yet the Word is called wisdom in particular, which is crucial to understanding how in Book Fifteen the divine essence is _dilectio_, and yet the Holy Spirit is called Love in particular. Merriell is correct that these books mark a transition in the argument, but he misunderstands how.

To characterize Books VIII-XV as an attempt to find how the Spirit is distinct within the divine essence has its merit inasmuch as these books are concerned with the search for a similitude through which occurs the union of the mind concretely with the activity of the Trinity. As the similitude becomes clearer, so does the principle which it images. However, Merriell does not see adequately how the categories of V-VII provide for the
progress of the argument, nor how through these books
the mind is concretely purged in its sciential relation
to move to sapientia. Moreover, he misinterprets the
relation of what he calls the "habitual" level and the
"active" level of mind. The importance of their relation
is the continuity of activity in what the mind knows and
what it thinks, the atemporal to the temporal, which is
seen as both like and unlike the divine Memoria and
Verbum. The "active" cannot focus the thinking of the
mind upon its activity without the "habitual" as the
complete content of its cogitation.

Merriell's claim for the importance of Book XV for
the argument is also correct. But because he has
mistaken the categories of Books V-VII as merely
polemical, and cannot follow the course of the argument
due to his assumption about the opposition of philosophy
and theology, he cannot recognize that the ratio which
Augustine has sought from Book I is complete. The
argument does not end with a "collapse of his attempt at
an analogical elucidation of the divine Trinity." The
unity of the divine essence and the persons is seen as
the substantial relation of the divine memoria,
inlectus, and voluntas, the Trinity which is the
necessary Principle of the mind as speculum. This is so
even though this renewed relation itself involves
distance from the Trinity which the mind now knows and
loves, and continues to seek.  

The view of E. Hendrikx is more judicious. Hendrikx proposes four points which combine to constitute the method of the work: first is Augustine's knowledge of the doctrine derived from other writings of the church; second is his meditation on the Scripture; third is a psychological analysis of the human soul and grace as these are found in Scripture and the writings of the church, which give rise to analogies of the inner life of the Trinity; fourth is the place of dialectic and Aristotle's categories which, contrary to the view of his predecessors, enable a scrutiny of the content of revelation. But here as in other places, Hendrikx is quick to point out that Augustine uses these categories not as he did as a young man, "dans un sens rationaliste", but now according to faith.

Hendrikx understands the division of the work in two sections. Books I-IV demonstrate the dogma of the church through the Scriptures. Books V-XV constitute a speculative section. This second section is subdivided into two more parts: Books V-VII which treat the terminology of the doctrine are taken from current philosophical concepts and applied to the Trinity. Of these the most significant is the term "relation"; Books VIII-XV discover analogies in the life of the human soul, permitting a greater clarity of the mystery of the
inner life of God.

Hendrikx is tempted to see this structure, however, in terms of two different treatises, differing in their object and methods. Books I-VII would center on God, grounded in revelation, with its method that of theological reflection, and the other, Books VIII-XV centering on the human soul, grounded in psychological experience, with its method that of rational dialectic. But Hendrikx resists this by affirming the continuity of the earlier books with the later as the search of faith, the object of which is God the Trinity, the instrument for which is the human soul, and the method for which remains theological. But when one considers the rest of Hendrikx's analysis, one might think that his temptation was realized unwittingly. Books V-VII are summarized merely as defending the dogma of the Scriptures "contre les interpretations tendancieuses des heretiques". While in other places he discusses the historical significance of Augustine's adaptation of these categories, and supplying the Church with a categorical understanding of the doctrine previously unknown, these appear to have no necessary place in the final argument of the De Trinitate. The consequence is that the later books do seem in their "analogies" to be arbitrary projections of faith. Two defects result from such a view. First, although approaching it, Hendrikx does not see fully
enough how these middle books address the problem of subordinationism and modalism which he correctly thinks had plagued both the orthodox and the unorthodox until Augustine. Second, he is unable to see that by virtue of the categories the mind is formed as imago Dei and is therefore the proper via for the subsequent argument. Perhaps this is because he wishes to emphasize the place of faith and the concrete illumination of the search of faith. But his attempt is in fact counter-productive, because while in his own discussion he claims that revelation gives the philosophical categories "un sens nouveau et transcendant", he does not see quite clearly their necessity for the subsequent part of the argument. It is not correct to think of the categories merely as an immobile mirror which becomes a living relation, because they have in fact, as Augustine says at the conclusion of Book VII, formed the soul as imago Dei. These categories should be seen rather as a structural or logical preparation for spiritual motion toward God. The living relation is already established in the form of categorical knowledge, withdrawing the mind from the habit of a natural logic, and necessarily preliminary to the searching motion of love or union, which follows in the subsequent books.

What Hendrikx has seen clearly is that the argument does not end in a collapse as Merriell concludes.
Chapter One
Commentary on Book Five
Introduction

Book V marks a new beginning in the argument of the De Trinitate. This new beginning is concerned with the logical predication of the divine life, revealed in the Scripture, which Augustine has treated in Books I-IV.

Logical predication serves two purposes. First, the argument here, as in the whole work, is polemical. Augustine states in Book I that he writes to provide those who reject the doctrine with a ratio ... "aliquid unde dubitare non possint." Having presented the doctrine from the Biblical revelation in Books I-IV, he aims in the transition from IV to V, to confront and refute positions advanced by heretics. In Book VIII, following upon the presentation of the doctrine revealed in Scripture, and the logical predication of that revelation demonstrated in V-VII, Augustine begins to consider all that has preceded in the argument, "... modo interiore quam superiora ...". His modus interior is the gradual elimination of vestiges and images of the Trinity with each elimination coming closer to its Principle. With the conclusion of the work in Book XV, Augustine brings the argument begun in Book I to a close, and the polemical intention is fulfilled.
Polemics, however, are not Augustine's sole intention. There is a second and profound purpose which comprehends his polemic of the faith and compels the course of the work.

Augustine's comprehensive purpose is to seek the face of God, to know and enjoy now, as much as may be divinely granted, the spiritual contemplation of and participation in the Trinity, the soul's true and only blessed end. Augustine writes toward this end for every 7 faithful soul. Therefore, one should not view these two purposes of polemics and contemplation or participation as opposed. Their confluence has as its end the knowledge and love of God.

The ratio, the argument or demonstration, enables the concrete renewal of the mind for the faithful and unfaithful alike. For the faithful, the ratio is a spiritual pilgrimage moving from faith in the word of God as Scripture to an understanding of God the Word as Word of the divine mind whose relations of memory, intellect, and will constitute divine personality. For the faithful, the spiritual pilgrimage moves via Christ, as the coherent epistemological center of Scripture, into a participation in the divine life, a spiritual relation sustained by and within God the Trinity. For the unfaithful, the ratio provides at best a demonstration of the Trinity as Principle of mind, in
order that, with this ratio as a point of departure, the unfaithful may begin again, with faith in Christ, and partake of the spiritual ascent to the face of God through him. The same ratio suffices for both the faithful and unfaithful because, for Augustine, the reason of mind as spirit is both knowledge and love.

That Book V is concerned with logical predication means that the doctrine as Biblical revelation must be rendered intelligible to the mind's capacity. That the ratio is formed in the categories of mind means that the mind's capacity must itself be formed by the Biblical revelation. Thus the soul, as mind, draws nearer to its divine source and end.
Commentary on V.i.1.

Minc jam ... verum etiam infirmitatis meae. (1)

The problem of divine predication begins with the character of human language in which a disparity exists between what is thought and what is said. "Ea dicere", is to make predication of the Trinity in sensible words seen or heard. But "ea" are more appropriate to pure thought because, for Augustine, thought is spirit, and the thought of mind is consubstantial. What is known in its essence in memory and becomes present as object in intellect is unified by will. Although mind is capable of a multiplicity of unified thoughts, the unity of thought itself undergoes a necessary division in the multiplicity of sensible words. For Augustine, this disparity is between inner and outer words, the inner words of mind which are identical to mind's thinking, and the outer words of language, the mind's words seen or heard. The inner words of mind are the life of finite spirit which knows essences. The outer words of mind are the sensible manifestation of these, necessarily divided in quantitative syllables and subject to particular sounds or alphabets, all of which in themselves are incapable of the clarity of mind's own apprehension of essences. Therefore, "ea" are more appropriate to mind because they with mind are of the unified nature of
spirit outside sensible division.

Divine predication begins, then, with a turn of mind's purview away from the exteriority of language as sensible words toward the interiority of mind's thinking which, as spirit, partakes of the realm of "ea". The disparity between the sensible and the spiritual in human language remains as the first problem confronting divine predication. How is sensible word given the form of truth appropriate to mind?

The second problem of divine predication concerns the disparity in spirit between the mind and God. Mind's thinking about God is simultaneously a reflection upon itself, and the reflective knowledge of mind knows its own difference from God the Trinity. Mind knows, therefore, its own inequality with God and distance from him.

These distances were well known to Neoplatonism. Plotinus himself recognized the human soul as a composition of intellectual modes; the outwardly discursive which marked the soul's activity in the world of time and space, the intrinsically united or the apprehension of the divided in a single mental purview, and the essential unity of mind's thinking prior to its multiple realization. The finite soul thus reflected the divided hierarchy of divine hypostases. For Plotinus, this division in the finite soul was overcome only by
the gradual negation of these modes toward an *henosis* (______) with the self-willed activity of the One. The end of the Plotinian philosophy was the abstract idea of the individual with the One as the One by means of nullifying all self-consciousness.

Along with Plotinus, Augustine recognizes a dividedness of soul. But Augustine will not attempt to overcome these distances by negation. Rather, soul’s dividedness will be seen to be overcome in the reconstitution of soul, the *purgatio mentis*, or renewal of the mind’s faculties according to divine revelation. This will involve a new understanding of the Principle itself, and a new mediation as well. That multiple and divided language can together with their spiritual unity be held in one view is given its ground in the truth of the Incarnation.

The knowledge of how these disparities are overcome appears to Augustine through illumination. Given the distance between the mind’s own thinking and the Trinity, and given the disparity between the sensible words of human language seen or heard and the inner words of mind’s thought, Augustine dismisses the possibility of divine predication through an analogical method beginning with the human mind "*secundum humani animi naturam vel affectum*". Despite the distances, divine predication of the Trinity may be made.
On the authority of Scripture (*ut scriptum est*), in the words of St. Paul, the direction for Augustine's predication is *per speculum et in aenigmate*. What this means becomes clear through the argument of the rest of the work as the logical structure secured in Books V-VII gives way to the *imago trinitatis*. That Augustine begins with the authority of Scripture is of supreme importance. The logic of divine predication must issue from the self-revelation of God in Scripture, and because Scripture has said that God is seen *per speculum et in aenigmate*, Augustine begins with that *speculum*. In this way Augustine rules out an analogical method, and his point of departure becomes what God has spoken in Scripture. The ultimate principle of Augustine's method is that divine predication is possible only if the divine predicates itself. Augustine has already proposed this principle in Book I.

Quapropter adjuvante Domino Deo nostro suscipiemus et ipsam quam flagitant, quantum possumus, reddere rationem, quod Trinitas sit unus et solus et verus Deus, et quam recte Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius ejusdemque substantiae vel essentiae dicatur, credatur, intelligatur;

God predicates himself beginning with the Scripture, what is said (*dicatur*). Augustine, therefore, begins his argument in the *De Trinitate* by reviewing the doctrine of the Trinity according to the Biblical
revelation in Books I-IV. Dependence upon divine revelation involves three aspects. First, divine predication or thinking about God requires help (adjutorium) in order to understand correctly what this logical predication revealed by and of God is all about. For mind to understand (ad intelligenda) is for the distance between the mind and God to be overcome by the divine. Second, divine predication requires help in order to explicate (ad explicanda) what is understood for others. Thus, the disparity between sensible words seen or heard and the spiritual nature of mind must be overcome by the divine so that sensible words in their finite multiplicity truly express the unity of their division. Third, divine predication presupposes moral rectitude or the forgiveness of sins which, for Augustine, are the habit (consuetudo) of the mind's inordinate preoccupation with historical temporality wherein mind mistakes temporal for eternal ends. This infirmity of soul is not altogether eradicated from the mind seeking the Trinity it has not yet seen. Rather, mind's infirmity is self-consciously known along with the simultaneous will to seek. And so, divine illumination and forgiveness are required for the mind to discern its end, and predicate the divine whom mind pursues, confident in the divine will.
Ab his etiam qui ... non possunt. (2)

The primary relation of the mind to God, its will to know the trinitarian life upon whom it is utterly dependent for its predication, is succeeded by the secondary relation of the mind to other minds, of Augustine to the theological tradition of the Church and to his readers. That the Church held truth to be the common end of her common desire to know, and that the Church's members were to pursue this knowledge in the unity of charity is assumed everywhere in Augustine's theology. In particular, this charity takes the form of tolerance or forgiveness for what is lacking in intellectual ability whether on the part of Augustine himself, or on the part of his readers, or others who contribute to the dialogue. Inasmuch as the argument is addressed to those who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, Augustine's intention is to bring these also within the knowledge and love of the true God. Given the problem of consuetudo, the forgiveness of error is necessary because of the disability of intellect due to sin. Tarditas is not mere natural inability, but also acquired disability. Augustine is fully aware of the mind's capacity for increase in wisdom or decrease in folly. This is demonstrated in Book X where Augustine addresses the concrete focus of mind and the confusion
of its loves.

Augustine's dialectic, then, comprehends
philosophical conversation with both the faithful and
the unfaithful, in the unity of charity, in the spirit
of mind, with the Trinity as mind's true object and end.
The consequence of the formation of mind as *imago*
*trinitatis* at the end of the argument begets also a
formation of the mind of the Church as well.
Facilius autem ... esse metienda. (3)

Because of the disability of mind, and the disparity in intellectual apprehension among his readers, Augustine begins predication of the divine with a clarification of method. The common pursuit of truth requires a certain commonly held presupposition.

Both reason and faith, both the unfaithful and the faithful, should hold the axiom that God ought not to be measured by what is visible, mutable, mortal, or needful. To measure the divine by corporeal reality, or by the created soul, is the tendency of predication because the mind thinks, by virtue of habit (consuetudo), that spirit is identical with the created world. This consuetudo of predication is the consequence of the mind's will to make mutable creation the primary object or highest good of its affection. The mind confuses the mutable creation with its immutable Creator and is unable to distinguish between the character of spirit and the character of sensible particularity. Unless the mind is freed from its preoccupation with the sensible, the knowledge of mind is beset with the uncertainty of an empiricism which holds mutable appearances as highest reality.

It was Augustine's own journey of conversion which
taught him the nature of every soul's *consuetudo*, and the limits of all analogical method in divine predication. After many errors, Augustine was persuaded by Platonism to make divine predication, not analogically, as was the method of Manichaeism and Stoicism, and is rejected in Book I as the attempt to measure God by virtue of created things (Manichaeism) or by the arts and nature of the human soul (Stoicism), but by the logical movement from effect to cause, from creation to its Principle. In this, Augustine's Platonic vision of the truth was a vision of God as Principle, not a knowledge of God as he is in himself. It is this knowledge of God as Principle that Augustine begins with here, even though as we shall see this is only a provisional beginning which gives way to a demonstration later in the argument.

From the outset, Augustine opposes the first two kinds of predication enumerated in Book I, the measurement of incorporeal things by corporeal things, and the attempt to attribute to God what are the nature and affections of the human soul. Similarly, in Book VIII, when Augustine begins to seek the Trinity in its essential activity, following the logical determinations of Books V-VII, he rejects conceptions formed from corporeal bodies or the mutable soul. In both of these sections, as well as here, the attempt at predication of
the divine by the method of philosophical analogy is summarily dismissed. Divine predication begins with the great distance between what God is and what he is not. His life is immeasurably beyond all created nature — invisible, immutable, immortal, absolute.

Sed cum in his ... nondum capit. (4)

The consuetudo of the mind's sight precludes an adequate comprehension of both corporeal reality and the mind's own activity. Without a relation to its Principle as the measure of all things, mind cannot determine the relative place all things have, how finite particularity is joined to the soul, what the corporeal is and is not, how much the soul should love the finite and what the limits of the finite are. Moreover, mind cannot determine precisely what the place of mind is, what its true end is, what its own self-relation is. The answers to these questions are given their concrete form in Books X-XIV, but the logical preparation for those books is made here. The present question is, how, given this inadequate comprehension of finite reality, can the mind think those things that are above — divine and ineffable. How can mind in such a state think of God as Trinity? It cannot by virtue of its own powers. Therefore, divine predication of the Trinity necessarily requires a divine illumination of mind. Again, Augustine
knew this from his own experience. Augustine's vision had been only a vision, a vision of the truth to be sure, but one which left him fully conscious of the great distance between him and the truth. Furthermore, he sought to use this knowledge, arrogantly, in order to gain power and authority among men. In this way, he turned the glory of his vision toward a manipulation of finite ends to appear wise.

But the arrogance of mind's powers to achieve a knowledge of the truth cannot enable the mind's attempt to know God in himself. Even though the Platonic vision is a vision of the truth, it is only a vision of the truth as Principle and not of the truth as he is in himself - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And while the vision itself is true, it cannot prevent the soul's willful manipulation of its knowledge towards finite ends. The only means by which the mind discerns God as he is in himself is by God's illuminating grace which moves the mind to seek the face of God. And so, the image of the soul burning with desire to possess divine things refers to the illuminated and forgiven soul seeking its proper place in heavenly contemplation, as fire leaps up in its natural motion. Thus, illuminative grace should be seen as the divine act revealing the knowledge of itself as it is in itself, and enabling the will of mind to seek it as end. As we shall see
through the argument of Books V-VII, the soul is illumined, forgiven, and moved toward the knowledge of God through the one mediator, Christ. Christ is the object of faith and the means of the mind's ascent. It is in Christ that the argument will see the reconciliation of the divisions of soul, of outer and inner words and their unity, not dispersed through the mind's consuetudo.

Si autem hunc jam capit ... capaces sumus. (5)

Despite the disability of mind, brought upon itself by means of the consuetudo of soul, the mind may already grasp itself as its own object. If mind does, it does so by the actual presence of grace. Grace is the means for mind to direct itself to itself diligentiter. Augustine's logic begins, therefore, with the motion within the nature of mind itself. Mind is the speculum in aenigmate. Through the speculum mind will see the Trinity.

Reflecting upon itself, mind goes beyond sheer objectification and discerns that the distinctions of space or local motion are inappropriate to the objective attribution of mind. One finds there no quantitative form, no qualitative color, no local motion. Mind discovers its difference from the material qualities of bodies. Mind is, hence, free from bodily limitations,
and mind's freedom is the better part of human nature because of its capacity for wisdom, such as this self-conscious distinction of mind from body. This *capax sapientiae* is the distinctive character of the human *mens* as opposed to the human *corpus*. *Mens* is not contiguous with space and time; *corpus* is.

Augustine's logic is concise. And conciseness is appropriate because of the strict logical purpose of Books V-VII. The concrete demonstration of mind as that which *in natura nostra nihil melius invenimus* comes in the later books, especially IX-XII.

*Quod ergo non invenimus ... quod non sit.* (6)

The preliminary logic of discerning the character of the better part of human nature implies a preliminary, and fundamental, predication of the divine nature. The implication is clear. If the human mind, finite and conspicuous to itself, is differentiated from the limits of material corporeality, the divine nature, infinite and far above human understanding, cannot admit of material limits or local motion. This much is certain and the inquiry into divine predication is clarified.

The consequence of this fundamental implication is defined by way of Aristotle's categories. Augustine asserts that *Deus* is *bonus* without quality. Qualitative distinction is not true for the divine because quality
requires a material substratum. Moreover, the divine goodness is not what it is by virtue of habit, disposition, or capacity. To be either a substratum or to possess habit, disposition, or capacity would mean the divine is measured by what is mutable, mortal, or needful. But because the divine goodness is unique, there is nothing to which it may be said to be like or unlike. The preliminary logic follows from this beginning.

The divine goodness is also great but not in the sense of quantitative magnitude. If the mind is devoid of material limits, God is much more so. The divine greatness is beyond sheer magnitude, and is seen in the abundance of a Creator who creates without need of anything that is not himself. This divine goodness, then, great in its creative abundance, governs its creation without the vantage point of a material or temporal place. The divine governs by virtue of freely holding all things together, not by any disposition or condition imposed upon itself, but out of its own goodness. The divine is fully present to every aspect of its creation, without taking a place in it, for place itself depends upon divine governance. Time also depends upon the divine governance which limits place and local motion with eternity. Thus the divine goodness is a greatness, abundant in creation, maintaining all things
in its governance, sustaining all place and time, moving all change but never itself suffering change. These are the logical implications of the divine nature which is so much better than human mind which itself is superior to body. Augustine's delineation of the divine nature is a description of what must be said of the divine nature if one assumes its essential difference from created reality - mutable, mortal, needful.

This preliminary logic preserves divine predication from the fundamental error of thinking about God through categories proper to created reality. Here the categories are all qualified to place the divine at a distance, different from its creation. The categories are Aristotle's and they are all qualified, even 29 substance, which appears next in the argument.

Augustine's argument thus far has been to proceed per speculum in such a way as to eliminate fundamental error in thinking about God, and although his logical inference makes positive attributions of God, it makes only a preliminary beginning, not discerning omni modo ... quid sit. This preliminary beginning follows both upon Scriptural authority, which declares that God is seen through the speculum in aenigmate, and upon the actual presence of illuminative grace in the mind.
Commentary on V.ii.3.

Est tamen sine dubitatione ... misit ad vos" ? (7)

Careful not to predicate of God what God is not, Augustine does not hesitate to predicate being of God. Sine dubitatione, God is substantia, or better, essentia. Deus is essentia because the predicate esse names the activity of the divine nature. Just as wisdom, sapientia, is named from the activity of sapere, and as scientia is named from the activity scire, so also essentia stems from the activity of esse.

In this way, Augustine predicates the divine with this first and crucial category of Aristotle's philosophy, not on mere philological grounds, but because the predication is derived from the activity of God made known in revelation. God had told Moses, "Ego sum qui sum." and " You shall say to the sons of Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos." Augustine's predication is not mere philological abstraction, but grounded in illuminating grace.

With the predication of God as essentia, Augustine shows that the ground of his divine names is not the philosophical method of the Platonic vision which knows God only as Principle, but rather the revelation of God's own being in the words of Scripture. For Augustine to begin with essentia derived from Scripture alone and
not from the absolute difference between the divine and the created known to Platonic reason means that Augustine has cleared the way for his method of predication. What has been said of God in V.i.2. is not a full demonstration but a postulation based upon an immediate view of mind, required by Scripture, in order to avoid the errors of an analogical method. In V.i.2. Deus as essentia, which is known categorically in the manner assumed above is itself assumed so as not to begin as do Augustine's adversaries. Insofar as Augustine provides the initial limits for predication in V.i.2. here, on the authority of Scripture, he begins his demonstration.

The consequence of this method has been the actual motion of the argument per speculum. Scripture itself illumines the categories by means of which the mind moves through itself. Scripture, then, understood categorically, compels the formation of mind as speculum, and the argument is not constructed by way of analogy. Already, we see a relation between the Scripture as spoken (dicatur) and the mind as knowing what is spoken (credatur). Inasmuch as mind is formed as speculum, the relation between Scripture, outer words possessing the integrity of the revelation of the eternal, and mind, in its inchoate form as categorical speculum or inner words, is given a unity, a unity of
knowledge of the divine in the human.

Sed aliae quae ... quod verissime dicatur esse. (8)

Now Augustine distinguishes between the activity of God as ipsum esse and other essentiae. Other substances possess accidents through substantial change. They partake concretely of the various categories in V.i.2. from which Deus is differentiated. Their being is not the incommutable being of God because God's being is ipsum esse, that very activity from which the name essentia is derived. These other substances are not named Being Itself since their existence falls within the created order of relative being. That they change, or are even capable of change, means that they do not retain ipsum esse in themselves as themselves. They change and admit other names or at least possess their difference potentially. But the name essentia is most truly and properly predicated of God because esse is what God is, and distinct from all created reality, this esse cannot become anything other than what it is, nor need it. Its activity admits of no difference, actual or potential. On the basis of the Biblical revelation of what God is as Ego sum qui sum and Qui est, Augustine clarifies and gives a ground for the absolute difference between God and created reality, postulated at V.i.2.
Commentary on V.iii.4.

Quamobrem ut jam ... fidei nostrae adversariis ... (9)

Augustine continues the predication of the divine against the adversaries of the Christian faith. The great problem of divine predication which consists in the distance between an inner consubstantial unitive knowledge and the delineation of that knowledge in outer words seen or heard, and the further distance between the mind and that highest reality which mind names is common to Augustine and his adversaries.

For Augustine, however, this problem is overcome by the divine activity itself. The limits of predication are grounded in Scripture. Thus far Scripture has predicated God as ipsum esse which mind understands and is thereby formed as inchoate speculum. With this beginning, Augustine addresses opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity, namely, the Arians. Turning to the Arian doctrine, Augustine moves his own argument by accentuating their difference.

... inter multa quae Ariani ... Patris et Filii. (10)

The Arians assert one principle of divine predication. Whatever (quidquid) is said about God is predicated according to the category of substance alone. With Augustine, the Arians exclude the category of
accident when speaking of the divine. At this juncture, the reader might suppose Augustine and the Arians stand upon common ground. But one quickly recognizes their difference. The consequence of the Arian Principle is to introduce a substantial or essential difference between the Father and the Son. The substance of the Father is Unbegotten (ingenitum); the substance of the Son is Begotten (genitum). If whatever is said of God is said only according to the category of substance, then, ingenitum and genitum name two diverse substances.

Quibus respondemus ... Filius aequalis est Patri. (11)

In keeping with his method, Augustine scrutinizes Arian predication under the authority of Scripture. The outcome is to place the Arian view on the horns of a dilemma.

From the gospel of John, Augustine cites the proposition of Jesus, "Ego et Pater unum sumus." How will the Arians understand it? If whatever is predicated of God is predicated according to the category of substance, the Father and the Son are one substance, which the Arians dispute. If this proposition refers to another category of predication, the principle of the Arians (quidquid ... secundum substantiam) is nullified. Either way, the Arian presupposition is dismantled and ingenitum and genitum are not necessarily predicated
according to substance.

From the epistle of Paul to the Philippians, Augustine brings forth the same dilemma, and at the same time reaches the depths of Arian theology. How is the Son said to be aequalis? If not according to substance, the Arians will in effect admit another category of predication. Logically speaking, (Augustine's ergo), the Arians should relinquish ingenitum and genitum from their assumption, and therewith relinquish the assumption itself. But if, Augustine counters, the Arians should not logically relinquish their assumption, but hold on to it by sheer will (quia ... volunt), their predication will crumble underneath the substantial equality of the Father and the Son, revealed in the words of Paul. Therefore, Augustine has shown that ingenitum and genitum are not diverse but equal divinity, according to Scripture.

In accord with this method, Augustine has shown how the Arian principle of predication does not render the Biblical revelation intelligible. The Arian principle is a manipulation of philosophical categories imposed upon divine revelation. Its result is either illogical and unintelligible, which as predication is contradictory and stands in need of a proper formulation, or, it is the most pernicious assertion of sheer will, which ultimately opposes the authority of Scripture. For
Augustine, what is needed in either case for the Arians is for the divine to quarry and structure its own predication in mind, i.e., to renew the mind as speculum of the divine under the authority of Scripture. Hence, Augustine's own argument need continue, for he is only at the beginning, with the divine essentia, now distinguished from the Arian predication and method. It remains for Augustine to treat how the Father and the Son are to be understood as unum and aequalis.
Commentary on V.iv.5.

Accidens autem ... nihil mutabile aut amissible. (12)

Why does Augustine take up the category of accident? The Arians have not attributed accidents to God, and so this nexus in the argument is not a direct response to their position. Rather, the argument is moved by virtue of the authority of Scripture which thoroughly subverts the Arian principle of predication.

From Exodus 3:14, Augustine has predicated essentia, or, substantia of God. His essentia has been shown to be ipsum esse in contradistinction to all contingent being. In refuting Arian predication, Augustine has asserted the Biblical revelation of essentia, ipsum esse, as Father and Son who are unum and aequalis. Necessarily, the question follows as to how this is understood. Not only does the mere plurality of Father and Son present a problem for divine unity, the predicate aequalis itself implies the division of two who are equal. Hence, the argument must consider the category of accident.

In the Categories of Aristotle, which Augustine knew first hand, Aristotle said, "The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities." Moreover, Aristotle defined
equality and inequality as the most distinctive mark of
quantity. Since these definitions applied to
substances composed of form and matter, Augustine is
here in need of separating his predication from that
referring to finite created substance, a distinction he
had failed to make during his nine years as a
Manichaean. And so Augustine first addresses the
character of the "accidental". Thereafter, the argument
is prepared to continue with the Biblical predication of
unum and aequalis by way of the category of relation.

Accidens, understood either as inseparabilis or
separabilis, is improper to the divine substantia.
Inseparable accidents, accidents which inhere in
substances as peculiar to them, are always present in
substances because they contribute to their material
constitution. The black color of a raven's feather never
varies; it remains black as long as it exists. The
feather ceases to be black only when the raven sheds it,
or the raven itself dies, and then the feather, along
with its blackness, ceases to exist because the material
constitution of the feather is mutable and rots. God,
however, is absolutely distinct from all material
substance. As ipsum esse, he possesses no material
substrate; he neither changes nor is capable of change.
God is without inseparable accident.

With the example of a raven's feather, Augustine
addresses the categories of both quantity and quality. The quality of blackness requires the material quantity of the feather in which it inheres. Accidens as quantity and quality delineates a peculiar manifestation of a particular substance. In the raven's feather, the feather's matter as feather is qualified in its blackness which cannot be otherwise. The substance of a raven's feather, as distinct from the feathers of other birds, holds its peculiar quantity and quality within its definition. To speak thus in categories reflects the natural constitution of substance in a logical priority. Quantity requires substance or form in order to manifest itself concretely, and quality requires quantity as its material substrate. Therefore, God as ipsum esse is without constitution of form, quantity, and quality.

With separable accidents, Augustine introduces the capacity of some finite substances to admit of qualitative changes inasmuch as the substance itself undergoes change. A human being's hair may be black and then white, not because some thing - blackness - departs the hair and some thing - whiteness - arrives, as if blackness and whiteness were entities in themselves, but because the hair itself changes in its material qualitative distinction. The logical structure of mutable substance remains. Quantity requires substance or form, and quality requires both form and quantity.
Clearly, *ipsum esse* cannot admit of separable accidents since *ipsum esse* is immutable requiring nothing outside itself to complete itself. Therefore, divine predication includes neither inseparable nor separable accidents which pertain only to substances with material substrates. But, then, what of the spiritual entity of soul?

*Quod si* ... *quia omnino incommutabilis manet*. (13)

The question arises for Augustine whether or not accidents are proper to God as they are to the soul. The soul is itself a spiritual entity, devoid of a material substrate, but capable of change by increasing or diminishing its life in wisdom. As wise, the soul lives to a greater degree; as foolish the soul lives to a lesser degree, although continuing to live. Thus the soul has the capacity for qualitative change in its life, and this depends upon its participation in wisdom. However, capacity does not exist in God. No such change takes place in God, for as *ipsum esse* God abides in his perfect wisdom immutably. *Ipsum esse* has no lack which prompts it to look outside itself for completion in another. The soul, on the other hand, increases its life only inasmuch as it participates in wisdom. Augustine somewhat anticipates his argument here since, as we shall see, God is seen to be wisdom itself; wisdom is
i ps um esse. What Augustine has established thus far is merely the absence of accidents in God. Accidents are improperly predicated of him.
Commentary on V.v.6.

Quamobrem ... nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. (14)

The category of accident is not predicated of the divine nature because accident denotes mutability. An accident is that which happens to substance either by way of mutation of the substance itself or with respect to the relation of the substance itself to its environment. Nothing of this kind happens to God, and thus Augustine distinguishes between created substances and God the Creator. In created mutable things, whatever is not predicated according to substance is predicated according to accident, but always with respect to substances, since all things happen to substances. Created mutable substances alone possess the capacity in themselves for loss or diminishment or gain in quantity or quality. Moreover, substances change in relation to other substances which constitute their environment so that change occurs in friendships or propinquities, or in services, likenesses, etc. But because nothing changes in God, and nothing happens to God as it were in God's environment, no accidents are proper to God. However, Augustine refuses to be left with substance as the only proper predication of the divine, which the Arians maintained. The Biblical predication of Father
and Son as unum and aequalis now moves mind towards understanding.

Dicitur ... quia non est mutabile. (15)

The category of accident is improper to God; and yet, Augustine draws upon one of Aristotle's categories, defined in the realm of created substances as accidental, and attributes it to God. Ad aliquid, the category of relation, is properly attributed to God because it renders intelligible how the Father and the Son are unum and aequalis. First, ad aliquid in God is eternal and not temporal, and therefore is not accidental. The Son neither begins nor ceases to be Son. The Father neither begins nor ceases to be Father. Relation, then, when predicated of the divine is redefined from that necessarily temporal and mutable connotation inherent in creation. Second, the very names of Father and Son denote relation. If the names of Father and Son were predicated to each, respectively, with reference only to each himself alone — ad se ipsum — these names would be predicated secundum substantiam. But they are not so predicated. The Father is called Father because he has a Son. And the Son is called Son because he has a Father. There is a necessity to their relation. Father and Son are predicated only in relation to one another. A true alterity exists in God, and this
alterity is made intelligible by the category ad aliquid. Third, that which (quod) individuates the Father and the Son, which Augustine has not yet made explicit insofar as it need be the essentia of God, is eternal and immutable. Thus, Augustine has attributed relation to God, an eternal true alterity in God, which individuates the Father and the Son respectively. And so Augustine concludes here by predicating a diversity in God, not a diversity of substance, but a diversity of relation which is not accidental.

Augustine has made a crucial step toward a logical explanation of how the Father and the Son are unum and aequalis. By virtue of their relation, they are diverse but not in substance. Their alterity does not preclude their being unum. How Father and Son are aequalis is addressed below.
Si autem huic ... diversa igitur substantia est; (16)

Augustine has predicated substantia or essentia and ad aliquid of God. They are predicates proper to God, Father and Son, and are illuminated in mind through the revelation of Scripture. Ad aliquid has been distinguished from accidental categories and therefore is seen to be congruent with the one substance of the divine.

The category of relation is now scrutinized through the predication of the Arians. Arián theology could well accept the category of relation as proper to the names of Father and Son since Father and Son bear a necessary reciprocity whereas, they claim, Unbegotten and Begotten do not. The Arian argument would maintain that Ingenitum is not necessarily Pater. To be father does not mean one is unbegotten, only that one is a begetter. Indeed, in the course of human nature, fathers are begotten and in turn become begetters. On the other hand, unbegotten does not imply father because it does not imply son. Human fathers are not unbegotten, but God the Father is unbegotten. Therefore, not because of his relation to his Son, but by virtue of his different substance, is the Father said to be Unbegotten.

Thus, the Arians conclude that Unbegotten and
Begotten name diverse substances, for wherever God is predicated according to himself (ad se ipsum), he is predicated according to substance. Relation is reserved for that reciprocity between the Unbegotten and Begotten known as the relation of Father and Son. Unbegotten and Begotten are themselves absolute names, bearing no necessary reciprocity. For the Arians, these names are altogether diverse.

Scholars have attributed the source for Augustine's use of the category of relation to the Greek Fathers, especially Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, and to what Augustine gleaned from Aristotle in the Enneads of Plotinus, read in the translation of Marius Victorinus. While this line of influence may be correct, although we might include Augustine's own mastery of Aristotle's Categories, what is of primary interest here is not so much speculations about the line of influence but rather the comparison of doctrines. The Theological Orations of Gregory are instructive.

In the course of the discussion of the divine names, Gregory clarifies the relations of the Father and the Son to show both their equality and individuation. In doing so Gregory distinguishes between the divine essence and the divine hypostases in a way that becomes problematic if viewed from the whole of Augustine's argument. Here we will only introduce the
problem which Augustine will answer in the course of his work. The answer is not given in this logical section of Books V-VII until Book VII, and the full answer, of course, falls outside this logical section at the end of the work. In order to approach the problem we need look at Gregory’s doctrine of the divine essence, and then of the divine hypostases, and then at the disparateness of these, logically speaking.

For Gregory, the divine nature is ἀπειρός, unlimited and undetermined by anything other than itself. This aseity of God is most properly predicated in the name ὥν which was given to Moses from God. Even ὅ Θεός is not so essentially proper to God, if that name be understood according to a proposed etymology linking Θεός to burning (ἀθέλν) or motion (Θέλν) which, says Gregory, names God in relation to something else. The divine nature, ὥν, is wholly underived.

The relation of Father and Son is eternal in contrast to the temporal and changing relations of human paternity and filiation. Moreover, these names which correspond to those of the Unbegotten and Begotten, respectively, are distinguished from the divine οὐσία, the ὥν. Thus Gregory avoids the identification of οὐσία and ἀφιερώμενος by means of which the Arians had relegated the Son as ἀφιερώμενος to a subordinate ontological status. Augustine makes a distinction
similar to Gregory's in Book V, but he endeavors to solve the aporia Gregory presents. Gregory proposes that the names Unbegotten and Begotten be understood as proper to the divine life itself, differentiated from predication of the divine as principle of creation, in which the relation of creation to its principle names the divine improperly, according to its essence.

However, the distinction made between the divine essence and the hypostases is not complete. Gregory does not intend to predicate divine substance of the Father so as to preclude the Son and the Spirit from the divine essence and divine hypostatic individuation. The divine οὐρά and ἔννοια are common to the Father and the Son κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοιας, καὶ τὴν τῶν κατηγορίαν τούτων σύνθεσιν; they possess the same nature ὑμνιύμων.

Although the distinction is not utter, it is clearly present. The divine persons are distinguished from the divine ὑμνιύμων and given an individuation so as to confuse them neither with one another nor with creation, but to maintain their order as principle of all created order. The Father is ἀναρχομένων. The Son is ἀναρχομένων νεότητος. The Spirit is ἄρθρωσις προελθὼν. Their individuation is given a limit insofar as their order reveals a necessary relation. This is more adequately expressed in the relations of Father and Son.
The Son is from (ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) the Father; the Son is μονογενὴς not only as distinct from all created filiation but also in a mode peculiar to divinity μονοπάτεις. The mode of filiation is the ἄγος of the Father, as word is to mind. And this mode of filiation is not ἄγος simply because it is passionless, but because it shows a connectedness with and expresses the Father, as a definition expresses the word defined. The Son is a concise and easy showing forth of the Father's nature"... σύντομος ἀπόδειξις καὶ ἐποίησις τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φυσεως." The relation which the Son has to the Father is higher than all created relations and is therefore not the consequence of an analogous term lifted from and above its image. Because the relation of Son to Father is peculiar to the divine, and is revealed, this relation is the only justification for the knowledge of the Son as ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ and ὁμοούσιον. In this way Gregory does indeed give a unity to the divine essence and the divine relations insofar as the relations show forth the necessary origin and equality of the Son to the Father, a relation involving no disparity of divine nature or subordination in being, but a reciprocity of divine individuation. However, inasmuch as Gregory has not fully understood how the divine essence and the individuated hypostases are one, he leaves us with a disparate account. The divine
essence is itself wholly underived and self-sufficient - 
- *αφένσι* The hypostases, who are given an
individuated order, and equality of being, are
distinguished in their relations from the divine
essence, and asserted to possess it simultaneously. How
this is so is not made clear. Gregory approaches a
solution in his view of the *λόγος* as word of the divine
mind, and yet this is not the whole account. A passage
in which Gregory attempts to identify the hypostases
essentially and maintain their equality indicates the
unreconciled view of essence and
hypostases.

Here the divine nature seems understood in its
unity as one principle, the first cause. The hypostases
in which the divine nature is are given a timeless
relation to the divine nature or first cause from which
they are derived.

Another passage posits the Father as the principle
and unity of the hypostases so that the Father may be understood as the first cause or Θεός in the passage above.

"Ονόμα δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀνάρχω, Πατὴρ ὁ θεός ἡ ἄρχη, Υἱός· τῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἄρχης τρεῖς έλθειν· φύσις οὖσα τοῖς τρισὶ μία, Θεός. "Ευνοεῖ δὲ, ο Πατὴρ, ἐς οὐ, καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀναφερόντως τὰ ἔξης· οὐκ ὡς οὐναλείψαθαλ, ὅλῳ ὡς ἔξεσθαλ, μῆτε χρόνου διείργωτος, 48 μῆτε ὅλοματος, μῆτε συνάυσεως.

In either case, and in both, the hypostases are not given an activity uniting their divine nature and themselves in one view. The hypostases are subordinate either to an abstract divine essence, or to the Father as divine unity, or perhaps both, if these are the same. The activity of their order and return to their unitive source is unclear. Augustine will attempt to overcome this disparateness, while including the category of relation as explicating the Biblical revelation and thwarting the subordination of the Arians.

This logical disparateness in Gregory's theology is notable in his reluctance to predicate the category of relation to the name of Unbegotten, despite the identification of the name Unbegotten with that of the Father. Arian predication, as Augustine points out, also refuses to make Unbegotten a relative term. This
reflects, logically, the priority of the Father's substance over the other hypostases and the absence of a clear unifying activity. But it also reflects a logical incoherence, an inability of the theological mind to unify its categorical predication. For Gregory, Unbegotten must be differentiated from the divine essence in order to avoid the relegation of the name Begotten to a subordinate divine being. Unbegotten is not an essential name. Further, Gregory does not bring the name Unbegotten under the category of relation, by means of which the Father and the Son are given an equality and individuation. Unbegotten is not a relative name. Unbegotten, therefore, lies outside Gregory's own logical spectrum, neither essential nor relative. The divine essence, the divine relations, and the hypostases are not given a unified logical expression.

Arius, also, separated the predicate Unbegotten from the category of relation, but in order to disassociate the Father from the Son as co-essential. The Father is to the Son as Monad and Beginning of all, alone immortal and everlasting. Augustine knows the Arian tradition to include those who maintain the category of relation for the Father and the Son, but deny it of the name Unbegotten in a way similar to the distinction made by Gregory. Augustine will correct both positions under the Arian doctrine as logically
inadequate to the Scriptural revelation.

hoc si dicunt ... non ejusdem est substantiae. (17)

Augustine understands Arian theology to limit the category of relation to the Father and the Son while setting aside the names Unbegotten and Begotten as unrelated absolutes. Augustine finds the Arian logic wanting.

The Arians have failed to follow their logic through, and in this regard Arian theology and Cappadocian theology are logically similar. It is true enough that the names Unbegotten and Father, of themselves, do not imply one another. But does it follow that Unbegotten is not a term of relation? This question is only implied by Augustine at this juncture in the argument, but its implication arises by Augustine's insight concerning the name Begotten.

The Arians are afflicted by a wonderful blindness, Augustine says, because they cannot see that the name Begotten is nothing other than a predication according to relation. A son is necessarily begotten. To be begotten is fundamental to the definition of son. Therefore, as a son corresponds to a father, so does a begotten to a begetter. Begotten bears a necessary reciprocity to begetter. But, Augustine concludes, we are left with the difference between begetter and
unbegotten.

Begetter implies father, not unbegotten. As far as the Arians are concerned, their fundamental distinction between Unbegotten and Begotten remains intact, if only Begotten is shown to be predicated relatively. Unbegotten remains for them an absolute term, predicated of the Father ad se.

The assumed principle of Arian predication continues the same. Although they have been blind in their failure to recognize Begotten as a relative term, their assumption would maintain that if anything (aliquid) is predicated of the Father in himself (ad se ipsum) which is not predicated of the Son in himself, and whatever is predicated of the Father ad se ipsum is predicated secundum substantiam, as Unbegotten apparently is, then the Father and the Son are two diverse substances. The Arians have concluded rightly, that if the Father admits of anything in himself which the Son does not admit in himself, Father and Son would be different. Any attribution whatsoever which is true of the Father but untrue of the Son marks the entire substance of the Father and is lacking in the entire substance of the Son. The result is a formal distinction of being and non-being, the Father is peculiarly what he is and the Son is what the Father is not.
Cui versutiae ... igitur utriusque substantiae. (18)

Augustine views the Arian method of predication as cunning. It is cunning because the one thing (aliquid) which is predicated of the Father and not of the Son and which, therefore, separates them completely is the name Unbegotten. This name is understood to refer to the absolute substance of the Father, and is in no sense relative as is the name Begotten. Augustine refutes the Arian cunning in two ways.

First, Augustine returns to the authority of Scripture which moves the argument. He has already shown how the Father and the Son are unum by the category of relation understood as distinguished from its use as a predicate of finite substances, and therefore logically congruent with the eternal divine essentia. His argument continues within the strict limits of logical predication. Augustine begins again from the revealed Biblical predication of Father and Son as aequalis.

Arian theology is compelled to assert how the Son is equal to the Father. Is he equal by relation or in substance? The Son cannot be equal to the Father in relation because each has a peculiar relation to the other. The Father is only Father in relation to the Son. He is not Father in relation to himself. Each relation is proper to itself and is not simply interchangeable.
The Son, therefore, cannot be equal to the Father in relation.

Augustine clarifies this logical distinction of relation between the Father and the Son by comparison with the relation of friends or neighbors. Among friends one friend is an equal friend to the other if both love one another and share the friendship equally. The same is true of neighbors. In either case, friends or neighbors are interchangeable as friends or neighbors because they participate equally in what makes them friends or neighbors. The relations of Father to Son and Son to Father are not interchangeable. The Father is always Father and the Son is always Son. Hence the Father and the Son are not equal in relation. The logical consequence is that the Son is equal to the Father in substance, because, thus far in the argument, whatever is predicated of Father or Son, not according to relation, is predicated *ad se* --according to substance.

The Arian logic is inadequate to the guiding predication of Scripture. Augustine has shown that the categories of substance and relation render the Biblical revelation logically intelligible. Substance and relation satisfy what Scripture demands to be thought. Again, this is true only within the strict limits of logic. Augustine's argument must continue in order to
satisfy the whole demand of illumination. Next, Augustine turns to expound the true character of the Father's predication as Unbegotten.

*Cum vero ingenitus ... non secundum substantiam dicitur.*

Predication according to the authority of Scripture has compelled the argument to assert that Father and Son are equal in substance. What then of the name Unbegotten? One should understand Unbegotten in its true sense (*vero*), says Augustine, not as a predicate asserting what the Father is, but rather what the Father is not. When Augustine showed above that Begotten was a relative term and not an absolute term, this was implied; now, he makes it explicit. Again, the category of relation is crucial. When a relative term is negated, the term is not negated according to substance, but rather according to its positive categorical assertion, i.e., here, according to relation. To say, then, what Unbegotten is, what the Father is not, is to deny a term of relation. Unbegotten is seen to be predicated not according to substance but according to relation. Augustine proceeds to demonstrate his assertion. In doing so he destroys a formal distinction between Unbegotten and Begotten and brings the Father and the Son into a relation of essence.
 Commentary on V.vii.8.

Hoc exemplis ... non vapulat. (20)

Augustine now demonstrates two points. First, the name *ingenitus*, properly understood, means nothing other in divine predication than not-the-Son. Second, *ingenitus*, is a composite term indicating, in the manner of all logical negation, what is denied.

With respect to the name *ingenitus*, Augustine begins with a consideration of the name *genitus*. In divine predication what is begotten is the Son. The word Son necessarily denotes Begotten, and Begotten is without doubt essential to the name of Son. To be Begotten or to be Son, in the divine, are the same. *Ingenitus*, therefore, denotes not-the-Son, *non filius*.

At this point the Latin language presents a surmountable difficulty. Why does the church not say "*infilius*'? "Infilius" would mean not-the-Son, but Latin does not contain such a word. However, says Augustine, this should not deter us from understanding *ingenitus* to mean "*infilius*", because it is not the custom of language but the object of predication, in this case the divine nature, which determines what is predicated. "Infilius" is dispensable. What "*infilius*" would mean is perfectly conveyed by *non filius*, which is the same as saying *ingenitus* is conveyed by *non genitus*. That Latin
is inconsistent in its customary usage is clear. For example, *vicinus* and *amicus* are both relative terms but only *amicus* is negated by the prefix *in*. But inconsistency is finally of no account. What is of supreme importance is that the object of predication be given names that are appropriate to the understanding of the object as such, and this follows all the more properly for divine predication inasmuch as the principle of illumination begins with Scripture.

In order to see this more clearly and to establish the logical principle, Augustine dispenses with the word *ingenitus* in favour of *non genitus*.

Thus Augustine is able to pursue the meaning of the things themselves, and *ingenitus* as *non genitus* is brought under the category of relation. Augustine's logic is conformed to the revelation of Father and Son as *unum* and *aequalis*. Crucial is the recognition that the negative particle merely negates what is affirmed in the predication of relation and does not alter the substance of what is negated. What the Arian logic cannot see and what Augustine has demonstrated to be so, destroying the Arian assumption, is this logical principle. All the categories of being, when denied, are denied according to their peculiar property of being. Only the property of being asserted in the category is denied. If substance is indicated, then substance is
denied, if relation, then relation, and so on. This is true of all the categories of mind without exception.

**Et omnino ... negativam particulam voluerimus.** (21)

All logical predication is the affirmation or negation of being in categories. In this way, Augustine sets forth the structure of mind's thinking in categories which either are or are not. Substance is or is not. Quantity of substance is or is not. Quality of substance is or is not. At the basis, then, of all logical predication is the mind's affirmation or negation of being, understood categorically. It is this structure of thinking which is now clarified for mind so that mind can know its own essential structure. Again, this is the result of the authoritative Scripture compelling the mind, by the argument, toward a self-conscious activity of divine predication in which the mind as *speculum* comes to know both its own structure of thinking and the revealed life of its divine principle. It is this self-conscious activity which knows its own categorical structure that is lacking to the Arian and Cappadocian predication.

**Quae cum ita sint ... referatur necesse est.** (22)

Given the principle that mind thinks each category by affirmation or negation, Augustine shows how
ingenitus is to be understood categorically. Unbegotten is viewed by way of Begotten, as Augustine has begun above. Begotten means the same as Son in divine predication. The only Begotten is the Son. The Begotten or Son is necessarily related to the Begetter or Father, and therefore, is understood by the category of relation. To negate the Son, or the Begotten, which is to say non filius, or non genitus, is to understand by the negation of the category of relation. Just as Begotten is relative to Begetter, so is not Begotten relative to no Begetter. Each is a relative term in reciprocal correspondence. They do not indicate the category of substance. Logically speaking, the category of relation is comprehensive of what is affirmed or negated according to itself so that affirmation or negation does not fall outside the relation. The Arian attempt to make the Begotten and the Unbegotten into diverse substances is, therefore, shown to be illogical. The predications are diverse inasmuch as one is affirmed, the other negated, but they are predications within the one categorical property of relation. As Son refers to Father, and not Son to no Father, so Begotten refers to Begetter and not Begotten to no Begetter. This is necessarily so because of the reciprocal correspondence of relative being; therefore, the divine name ingenitus is a relative and not a substantial
predication. The Father and the Son are one substance in relation.
Commentary on V.viii.9.

Quaproter ... quia Trinitas unus Deus. (23)

Augustine has now discerned a guiding principle in divine predication which is the result of Scripture naming the Father and the Son as unus and aequalis, and understanding this biblical attribution through logical categories appropriate to that attribution. The principle concerns substantial and relative predication.

With respect to substantial predication, whatever is said of the divine substance ad se is said according to the category of substance. With respect to relative predication, whatever is said of relation to someone or something is said according to the category of relation. Whatever, then, is predicated of the Father, the Son, or the Spirit, ad se is predicated of the divine substance. For each is God, and all together are one God — unus Deus — not three Gods. Hence, all attribution of the divine substance is made of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, e.g., God is great; therefore, the Father is great, the Son is great, and the Spirit is great. They are not three greats but one great. Augustine concludes that wherever Scripture predicates an attribute of God, all three, Father, Son, and Spirit are understood, because they are Trinitas unus Deus.

At this point Augustine does not repeat his
conclusions concerning relative predication. He has already spoken of how Son is relative to Father and Father is implied necessarily in the definition of Son, as well as and most importantly for the argument thus far, understanding Begotten and Unbegotten as relative terms.

But thus far the argument has only the first logical principles of predication. What remains is for Augustine to clarify how the substantial and relative names are held together in one view. That view will entail a clarification of Biblical revelation which attributes certain acts to the Father, while attributing others to the Son, and still others to the Spirit. And again, the authority of Scripture will inform the logic. But before the argument moves on, Augustine must show whether or not any other of Aristotle's categories are appropriate to the divine nature. To move in this direction means that mind as speculum is scrutinizing all the categories of its thinking, with which it thinks whatever it thinks, in relation to divine revelation. Some initial remarks on why Augustine has chosen Aristotle's categories and not those of Plotinus or Porphyry begin below.
Thus far in the argument, Augustine has predicated substance and relation of God. Of the eight remaining categories of Aristotle, Augustine marks only one as proper to the divine nature, namely, act (ad faciendum). The explicit teaching of Scripture is that God alone can truly be said to act, or make. Therefore, act is predicated of each of the divine persons because of the power of the divine essence. The remaining categories are predicated of God only metaphorically (translate) and through similitudes (per similitudines). These are abundant in Scripture.

The result of Augustine's logic is that whatever is said of God's substance ad se ipsum is predicated in the singular. Inasmuch as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are each God, whatever is predicated of each of them ad se ipsum is predicated in the singular. This holds true also for the Trinity. One correctly says: God is great, the Father is great, the Son is great, the Holy Spirit is great, the Trinity is great. All of these are not multiple goods but the one good which is God. This is so because God who is all of these is absolutely simple; God's being and God's greatness are identical, one substance or essence, one greatness. Augustine calls this the divine essentia, which in Greek
is *suisid*.

Now we are in a position to say something about Augustine's use of Aristotelian categories, although this can not be seen fully before its demonstration following the course of the argument through Book VII, and then in its completeness on through Book XV.

We should begin our remarks about Augustine's choice of categories by dismissing the possibility of historical accident. Augustine knew both Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as the Neoplatonist Victorinus.

Augustine's preference for Aristotle's categories stems from their suitability for expressing Biblical revelation. While these categories cannot be applied directly to divine predication as we have seen above, three of these—substance, relation, and act, are understood to be proper predications, while the other seven may be predicated of the divine metaphorically. Substance, relation, and act have been shown logically to mirror the account of divine revelation that the Father and the Son are *unus* and *aequalis*, and that the divine substance creates all that is not itself. For Aristotle, the categories are both that which constitutes the being of natural or finite substance and the logical mirror of their activity. They are constitutive ideas found in natural substances, but they are also the principle of the mind's own thinking by
which natural substance is known in its particularity. Augustine has not yet shown how these categories of substance, relation, and act reflect the activity of the divine life, which is to say, how the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one Trinitarian life, but the Scripture thus far has compelled the argument to require only these categories as a logical mirror capable of revealed predication, and which will give way to an understanding of the divine activity as Trinity.

The categories of Plotinus and Porphyry are unsuitable for the logical reflection of the Scriptural revelation. For Plotinus, the activity of the One is beyond all categorical predication. Substance or being, rest, motion, identity, and difference constitute the activity of the $\text{νοῦς}$ beneath the absolute One. This categorical activity of $\text{νοῦς}$ which begins, grounded in being, moves to know itself by going forth into a formal moment of difference wherein it knows its own rest and identity. It is through participation in this multiple logical structure of the self-related activity of the $\text{νοῦς}$ that all other logical forms receive their constitution. The activity of the $\text{νοῦς}$, however, is not the highest of the divine hypostases because noetic activity requires a prior unitive principle. The $\text{νοῦς}$, therefore, is composed of discrete formal moments, multiple opposed forms of
being, which when taken together constitute its activity, but which when taken separately as the great forms are incomplete without the others. These categories of the _νοῦς_ are inadequate to Plotinus' first principle which is beyond categorical predication, a simple unitive will. In this, Plotinus follows closely the categorical structure of Plato's _Sophist_.

The categories of relation and act are not found in the _νοῦς_ of the Plotinian system, but fall rather to the third hypostasis of Soul through which the world of particularity comes into being. Relation and act, along with the remaining Aristotelian categories, are simply images of the great forms in the _νοῦς_, e.g., the category of relation is relegated to the materially divided alone. Nothing can be related to itself, just as the discrete formal moments of the _νοῦς_ are not integral but require participation in one another for their completion. On the whole it should be seen how the Plotinian system of descending hypostases assumes as its beginning point a unitive will beyond all noetic activity and multiplicity. The Plotinian categories, therefore, are inadequate to offer a logical mirror of the Trinity revealed in the Christian Scriptures. For Plotinus, the highest principle is a unity without multiplicity, and the knowing principle, composed of thinking and what is thought, is a united division.
needful of an outer and prior Unity. The Augustinian predication of relation, in contradistinction to the Plotinian view, is crucial to the distinction of Father and Son. Relation marks the inherent alterity of the divine substance or *essentia*. Even to call the first principle *essentia* is an unacceptable notion to Plotinus. The Plotinian One is beyond attribution.

And yet Plotinus is quick to point out how the One should be thought of, if it is thought of at all, i.e., if it is granted attribution, however improper such attribution finally is. When Plotinus does reluctantly make predication of the One, there is a remarkable similarity to the Augustinian doctrine, albeit there remains a decisive difference. The similarity is found in Plotinus positing the One as activity, *ēpexeilein*, an activity of will which while void of thinking and the need to know itself, embraces itself as what is beautiful, and loves itself as the lover and the lovely. What in Augustinian terms would call for the category of relation, at least the dual relation between the lover and the beloved, is found in Plotinus as an unitive activity of will so far beyond division, so far beyond any relation to another, so much in preference for the absolute individual, that it stands juxtaposed to the abstracted One as mere metaphorical predication.

Clearly, a decisive difference with Augustine
remains. The opposition in the Plotinian system between the One and the \( \text{voûs} \) which relegates the categories to the \( \text{voûs} \) and the \( \text{phuxî} \), is foreign to Augustine's logic, because it is incapable of the Scriptural presentation of the Father and the Son as \text{unum} and \text{aequalis}. The logic of the Cappadocians and the Arians bears a resemblance to that of Plotinus inasmuch as the Unbegotten is understood apart from the category of relation and holds a priority over the other hypostases. Arius' doctrine is much closer to Plotinus inasmuch as he views the Son as a product of the will of the Unbegotten. The Cappadocian logic approaches more that of Porphyry, the student of Plotinus.

Porphyry presents a more difficult comparison. While much of our comments on Porphyry must wait until Book VII and speculations concerning Victorinus, we should say here it is clear that the logic of Porphyry is unfitting predication of the Trinity. In the \text{Isagoge}, where Porphyry scrupulously avoids the question of whether or not his logical structure is identical with the structure of being, the primary genera are categorized as Genus, Difference, Species, Property, and Accident. The entire system postulates a continuum descending from what is more unitary, potential, and abstract to what is more divided, actual, and concrete. While these primary forms have a logical relation, their
structure does not follow the Aristotelian notion of substance as natural activity which is self-related and mirrored in the logical form of his work on the categories. This is to say that the structure as such has become abstractly formalized, i.e., given a logic which differs from its Aristotelian origins.

Consequently, the category of relation is not found in the definition of activity but is merely the logical reference between the higher and lower classes, i.e., between Genus to Species, or Species to Genus, etc. What marks their distinction is Difference, which reminds one of the doctrine of participation in Plato's *Sophist*. Relation, however, only suggests an abstract reference between what is more unitively and potentially present in a Genus and what is multiplied and concretely defined in a Species or its Particulars.

The Augustinian notion of substance and relation is not an abstract formal system. These are predications appropriate to the mind illumined from Scripture. Because these categories provide an adequate *speculum* for the Biblical propositions concerning the Father and the Son, Aristotle's categories and not those of Plotinus and Porphyry are attributed to the divine. Aristotle's categories are more suitable to the mind's understanding of the revealed Trinity because they are seen to reflect a living divine activity or motion, a
substance in relation, one God in three persons.
Dicunt ... tres substantias. (25)

The author of the "Notes Complementaires" of the Bibliothèque Augustiniennne claims that what Augustine intends to say here is that he is at a quandary as to what the Greeks intend in their distinction between οὐσία and ἡπόστασις. Is this all Augustine means here?

The argument thus far has sought not to concern itself with the customary usage of language but with the things themselves which are represented in language. The fact that the Greek usage of οὐσία and ἡπόστασις was changing during the Arian debates is not the sole reason for Augustine's quandary. Indeed, by the time of Augustine's composition of the De Trinitate, these theological terms were settled in the East. What is really at issue is the imprecise understanding of how the divine persons are the divine essence and yet retain their respective identities. This question arises logically now in Augustine's own argument, for he has determined that the categories of substance, relation, and act are proper to the divine, but how the Father and the Son are to be understood as the divine essence, i.e., how they are the divine substance in relation and act has not been fully answered. And so the question how
the Greeks understood *ωστά* distinguished from *κατά* arises logically. Augustine's argument is that Greek theology had not yet provided an adequate solution to this quandary, and this is evident in Book VI where it is Hilary and not any Greek father who holds the most advanced answer to this question.

The decisive word here is *interesse*. What is between the divine substance and the divine persons? The Greek predication had been traditionally (*consueverint*): "one substance, three hypostases," or in Latin translation "one essence, three substances." The problem with this predication has been shown above in the theology of Gregory of Nazianzus.

The position to which Augustine has come claims that each of the divine persons is worthy of the same divine predicate as is the whole of the divine essence or the comprehensive name of the Trinity. For in God it is not one thing to be and another to be great. These are identical in God. Inasmuch as each divine person is God, each is worthy of divine predication. How then are the divine persons who they are - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? They have been distinguished for thought through the logical categories of substance, relation, and act. But how the persons are the divine substance in relation, the divine activity, is not yet understood in the argument beyond Biblical assertions.
Commentary on V.ix.10.

Sed quia nostra ... sed ne taceretur. (26)

The custom among Latin theologians prior to Augustinian had arrived at synonymity between essentia and substantia; therefore, to translate the logic of the Greeks as una essentia, tres substantiae, was unacceptable. The Latin Fathers had settled on another distinction which affirmed the divine unity but was true to the distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit — una essentia, tres personae. But even here the logic was unclear.

The Latin Fathers had wanted to avoid the error of Sabellius who understood the divine persons to be mere historical modes of the one divine essence, having no true distinction. The Scripture said of the Father and the Son, "sumus unum", not "est unum". And so the Latin Fathers had attempted to give a name to this plurality in the divine essence, and they chose personae. But their choice was not the result of positive logical predication.

At this juncture Augustine makes two points. First, the weakness of human language always labors to find names appropriate for the divine. And second, the Latin tradition expressed this weakness insofar as it had not developed a positive logic whereby the plurality in the
divine could be understood. The Latins had merely wanted to avoid silence in their opposition to Sabellianism and to give some answer to the question of plurality in the divine essence. Despite this weakness, however, what is of crucial importance is what is common to all of these positions - Greek, Latin, Arian, and Sabellian; there is a continual necessity to make the Biblical revelation intelligible. Whether or not this is done correctly will mark true belief and salvation, which for Augustine is the actual and true knowledge and love of God.
Sicut ergo ... ore hominis potest. (27)

Augustine now begins to demonstrate the logical solution to the question of plurality in God. This question will continue to be worked out through the arguments of Books VI and VII.

The reason Latin theology refuses to predicate three essences of God, says Augustine, is because such a division, like the Platonic doctrine of participation, requires something higher or other by virtue of which a multiplicity is given a common predication. Augustine's example is the predicate - great. To say the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are three greats would mean that they participate in a greatness other than themselves. They, then, would not themselves be the highest greatness. But this, Augustine says, is the mode of existence for what is other than God, because God himself is not other than greatness, or goodness, or any other predication of him. Rather, God is greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence, etc. Whatever, then, is predication of the divine essence, ad se, is understood not figuratively, nor through similitude, but properly to be what God is. Therefore, we see that Augustine's predication of God proceeds through the categories of substance, relation, and act. The other categories of
Aristotle are predicated of God only figuratively or through similitudes. But what is predicated of the divine through the categories proper to God is itself understood to be proper to God. Thus to speak of the divine substance as great or good is to make a true and actual predication of the divine life. In this way the attributes given in Scripture are placed within the divinely revealed logic. The essential attributes of God are made intelligible through the category of substance.

Proper predication through the category of substance, not figurative nor by way of similitude, should be recognized as Augustine's modification of Platonism. To make predications of God's substance figuratively would mean that God is not truly his predications but is absolutely above them; in which case the predicates themselves are truly proper only to a lower existence, as in the doctrine of Plotinus where formal distinctions are true really only for the \textit{Vou\acute{s}} in participation of which all subsequent reality comes to be. The abstract activity of the One is actually devoid of such predicates.

Thus Augustine's demonstration of how the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are their divine essence begins with a clarification of the divine essence itself. The divine essence is its predicates. With this Augustine begins to show how these proper predicates are to be
understood according to the proper categories of substance, relation, and act, through which the persons Father, Son, and Spirit have been seen to be aequalis and unum.

The divine essence, what God is, begins to be seen by the mind through the categories which have been brought to mind by the Scripture and from the antique theologians. Augustine's demonstration is providing a logic for the doctrine of the Trinity previously lacking in the tradition. What has been shown concerning the categories is now the logical means through which God is seen. In this section Augustine has viewed the divine through the category of substance.
Quod autem ... bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia. (28)

However, there are other predicates given in Scripture which do not name the divine essence but rather the divine persons. These, says Augustine, are to be understood through the category of relation. The Trinity may be called great or good, or eternity, but the name Father is not a proper name for the Trinity. The Trinity is called Father figuratively in relation to the adoption of sons who are redeemed humanity. Neither Father nor Son is a proper name for the Trinity. And so neither of these names is predicated through the category of substance, rather only through the category of relation.

The name Holy Spirit, however, is different from the names of Father and Son and offers a more difficult categorical analysis, because it may be understood both substantially and relatively. Holy Spirit is a substantial name insofar as God is both holy and spirit. And while the name Holy Spirit does not itself imply relation as do the names of the Father and the Son, what is understood as that ineffable communion of the Father and the Son, who are both holy and spirit, is certainly understood relatively to them both. Understood in this relation, the Holy Spirit may also be named Gift
inasmuch as He proceeds from the Father and is said to
be Christ's Spirit. Relatively speaking, then, both
Father and Son are understood to be the Giver of this
Gift. The names of Gift and Giver imply a stricter
relation than is immediately understood from the name
Holy Spirit.

Augustine continues to develop his logic. In order
to say that God the Trinity is una essentia, tres
personae, one must make the logical distinction between
what is said of the Trinity essentially or
substantially, and what is said relatively of the
Trinity as three persons. In this way, Augustine moves
toward an understanding of how the Trinity of persons is
the divine essence.
Nec movere debet ... illic non potuit. (29)

Since the Holy Spirit is not a name which shows in itself a necessary relation, should that predication be made relatively? We have seen the difficulty in V.xi.12. where Augustine treats this name both substantially and relatively. There, its relative meaning is seen in the name Gift, because the Holy Spirit is actually of the Father and the Son according to Scripture.

Here, Augustine shows that the customary usage of language is not uniform, so that the character of relation may be inherent in a name even if the name does not indicate fully the reciprocal terms of the relation. If this is true for our customary usage, one cannot object to it in Scripture. An example is the word pignus, which also appears in Scripture. A pledge, says Augustine, refers to that of which it is a pledge, and a pledge is always of a certain thing. Thus, again, it is not a uniform customary usage of language that determines the argument, but rather an understanding of the things themselves. While the relation of the Gift to its Giver is a Biblical predication that is clearly reciprocal, the name Holy Spirit, properly understood, is also relative when referring to the ineffable communion of the Father and the Son, and is neither the
Father nor the Son, which is to say that the Holy Spirit does not participate in the relation that determines the respective names of Father and Son, but rather is consequent to it.
Dictur ergo relative ... vel tria principia. (30)

Augustine continues to delineate divine names understood according to the category of relation. By doing so, he more fully distinguishes the proper names of the three persons.

The Father is predicated relatively in relation to the Son. The Father is also called Principle insofar as all things are from him. The Son is relative to the Father, and his relation to the Father is also understood as Word and Image. In all his names which pertain to him properly, he is referred necessarily to the Father. None of the names proper to the Son are proper to the Father.

Augustine marks with greater precision the distinction between the divine persons in their mutual relation. However, insofar as he is Creator, the Son is also called Principle along with the Father, but this predication is not proper to him, it is derived from the contingency of creation depending upon him as divine essence.

The Holy Spirit, already called Gift, by Augustine, in his proper relation between the Father and the Son, is understood to acquire the relative name of Creator, or Principle, inasmuch as he produces spiritual gifts in
individuals within the church for the common good (ad utilitatem). It is the divine essence which abides in itself and yet works and produces that marks the divinity of the Holy Spirit. In this work (operatur) the Spirit, says Augustine, is certainly "in se ... manens" and "non... in aliquid eorum quae operatur, ipse mutatur et vertitur." This means that as divine the Holy Spirit is not changed or altered in himself by his production, which is altogether different from creatures who undergo change as they expend themselves in production.

To understand the divine as that which abides in itself and yet produces out of its power is common to Augustine and the Neoplatonists. (Their profound difference will be seen below.) The distributing activity of the Spirit (dividens) is according to his will. Each gift is proper to the character of its recipient. And the capacity to distribute such gifts as these is proper only to God. Thus we see that the relative predication of Creator or Principle is appropriate to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Each and all are the one Principle of creation which itself depends on the divine for its being and its differentiated faculties.
Commentary on V.xiv.15.

Ad se autem invicem ... et unus Dominus. (31)

The predicate Principle, however, also refers to the relations of the divine persons. The Father is the Principle of the Son inasmuch as the Father begets the Son. This is clear. And in making this distinction Augustine begins to draw out how the divine persons, thus far understood as relations, are understood as relations of the divine essence.

If the Son has the Father for his Principle, what of the Spirit? "Non parva quaestio est", says Augustine. Of course, the Cappadocians had argued for the procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son, even employing the notion of cause and effect. And while it may have been the intention of the Cappadocians to overcome the subordinationism of their opponents, their preference for thinking of the Trinity in terms of the economy of salvation, led them into the same problem. In this the Cappadocians share the subordinated economic structure of the Neoplatonists while striving to move beyond it.

If the Father is the Principle of the Spirit, the Father is not only the Principle of the Son according to birth, and of creation according to the act of creativity, but also of the Spirit according to the mode
of giving. With this, Augustine takes up the question which had long presented itself to the church: Why is the Spirit not a Son?

Augustine's distinction follows from Scripture. The Son is called Son because he proceeds from the Father quomodo natus. The Spirit is called Gift because he proceeds from the Father quomodo datus.

The Son is born as the only-begotten Son. While Christians are called sons of God, they are not born of the Father in Deo, that is, in the divine essence as the divine essence, but rather they are made sons, born into adoption, per Dei gratiam. The unigenitus filius is de Patre, and so the only-begotten refers necessarily to the Father from whom he is.

The Spirit is given. He comes forth from the Father but not as begotten. As given, the Spirit necessarily refers to the Giver as well as to those to whom the Spirit is given. The Spirit, then, is understood relatively to Giver and recipient. The Giver, says Augustine, is both the Father and the Son. The recipient is the soul who receives the Spirit as the salvation of God.

The reception of the Spirit is to be distinguished from the created spirit of the human being. While the human being receives the created spirit which constitutes the human as human, that Spirit which the
human receives as salvation is the divine person who sanctifies him. And so the Spirit may be said to be *noster*, says Augustine, insofar as he necessarily refers to those to whom he has been given.

The Gift, therefore, which is Given has as its Giver the Principle who gives him, and from whom he proceeds. Because the Spirit is given by the Father and the Son and no one else, they are understood as the one Principle of the Spirit. The Spirit is necessarily related to them as His origin.

The name of Principle, therefore, is predicated of God according to the category of relation. The Father is Principle of the Son he begets. The Father and the Son are one Principle of the Spirit proceeding from them. The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one Principle of creation.

Augustine has begun to answer the question of how the divine persons are the divine essence. The category of relation has thus far enabled him to see the relation of the Father and the Son, and the consequent ineffable communion of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit all within the divine essence itself. With respect to the Holy Spirit, the relation has also been established as Gift to created recipient insofar as the Spirit is seen as given by the Father and the Son to the soul for its salvation. It remains for Augustine to distinguish
more fully what these relations are; what begetting and
the ineffable communion are as the divine essence.

More generally, the relation is seen of the three
persons as God the Creator of contingent creation. This
general view is articulated in order to distinguish
inner relations of the divine from outer relations, with
the consequence that the economic view of the Trinity,
prevalent among Latins and Greeks until Augustine, is
being clarified through the inner relations. The nature
of this articulation provides the increasingly explicit
grasp of the necessity of the argument, that the inner
relations of the Trinity, made intelligible by the
Scripture compelling and forming the categories of mind,
are the ground and comprehending means for the mind's
salvific relation to God as renewed imago. This initial
view of the substantial relations of the divine essence
comprehends the relation of the soul participating in
them. The categorical mirroring of the Trinitarian life
becomes clearer as the logic constituting the mirror
becomes sharper.
Commentary on V.xv.16

Ulterius ... nullo modo dici potest. (32)

Augustine has need of better clarifying the status of the Spirit in God. He has spoken of the Spirit as the ineffable communion of the Father and Son, and of the relation of the renewed soul to the Spirit given to it. But to speak of the distinction of the Son and the Spirit as that of natus and datus is not enough, because these Biblical predications, inasmuch as they reveal relations in God, are far above created relations and need be clarified for thought. What is to be understood in the Biblical distinction between the Spirit as donum and the Son as unigenitus?

The Son is, has his being, in being born. His birth is his procession de Patre. That the being of the Son is given by the Father, and received by the Son is easily approached in the notion of birth.

It is not so easy to approach the notion of Gift, which the Spirit is, as it is the birth of the Son. A gift has a giver, and one to whom the gift is given, but the gift's being given does not constitute it as gift, because a gift precedes its being given inasmuch as a gift is within the possession of the giver. The question, then, for Augustine, is what constitutes the Spirit as Gift.
These questions arise: Did the Spirit exist before he was given, but was not yet a Gift? Or, was the Spirit already a Gift, before he was given, since God was about to give Him?

But before we proceed we should note here that Augustine's immediate purpose is not to address fully the divine relations in themselves. Even though the question concerning the Spirit is juxtaposed to the inner relations of the Father and the Son, the context of *donum* and *datus* or *donatum* falls in the relation of the Spirit as Gift to the regenerate soul. Later Augustine will be moved to consider how the Spirit is Gift *in Deo*, but here it is to establish the integral divinity of the Spirit above his mission to the soul. Thus, Augustine begins to elucidate the category of relation in reference to the Spirit, by the category of substance.

So then, the first question: Did the Spirit exist before he was given, but was not yet a Gift? Augustine clarifies this question by expanding it. If the Spirit does not proceed, except when he is given, and he would not proceed unless there be one to whom he should be given, how already was he substance (*ipsam substantiam*) at all, or at most, the substance which constitutes him as *donum*, if he does not exist unless he is given, as the Son does not exist unless he is born? What is
crucial here is to distinguish the elements of the question. To say that the Spirit is given, proceeds, to the soul, as the Son proceeds from the Father in birh to confuse inner and outer relations of the divine persons. If the Spirit's procession to the soul is what constitutes his substance, then the Spirit could not exist before his procession. His substance then would be the actual activity of procession from God to the soul, a kind of intermediate effusion akin to Plotinus' ψυχη, which is an eternal hypostasis but which forms the descending emanation of ideal reality finally into local motion and the realization of concrete discrete particularity in time. The Spirit's substance would be an outer relation only. While this outer relation is true inasmuch as the Spirit is the Gift given as salvation to the soul, the outer relation does not mark the Spirit's constitutive substance.

Now the second question: Was the Spirit already a Gift, before he was given, since God was about to give him. Again Augustine expands the question. If the Spirit is always proceeding from eternity, and proceeding ut esset donabile, was he not already Gift, even before there was one to whom he should be given? To say that the Spirit proceeds from eternity is to assume his nature as donum from eternity, although exactly how he is a Gift is not yet fully explicit. Moreover, to
understand the Spirit as eternal donum means that for him to proceed to the soul He proceeds eternally ut esset donabile. Therefore, the Spirit is Gift before he is given, or before there is one to whom he should be given, and his integral substance does not depend upon the contingency of creation but rather upon his own eternal character as donum.

Augustine has distinguished between gift and gift given as pertains to the Holy Spirit. In doing so he has shown how the Spirit is ipsam substantiam in his eternal procession as donum. What has been determined in the argument is the distinction of inner and outer relation, both clarifying these relations, which are not so carefully understood among the Cappadocians, and distancing the Trinitarian logic from the Neoplatonic system of hypostases.
Commentary on V.xvi.17.

*Nec moveat ... ligni dominus jam esset. (33)*

Augustine continues to distinguish the category of relation as it pertains to the Spirit. To speak of the Spirit as *donum* is to predicate an eternal relation. To speak of the Spirit as *donatum* is to predicate a temporal relation.

But how can the Spirit enter into a temporal relation if as God he is above all contingency? Augustine responds that this is like the relation of Lord and slave; one is not a Lord unless he has a slave, nor is one a slave unless he has a Lord. Does this, that he becomes Lord and has not always been Lord attribute an accident to the Spirit? Augustine denies that anything happens to God, as he has shown in V.iv.5.– V.v.6. Moreover, he says that to predicate *Dominus* eternally of the Spirit would be to predicate the creature as eternal. But how the Spirit may be understood as *Dominus* temporally is not yet explicated. First, Augustine considers the objection that *Dominus* does not involve a temporal relation at all.

Some would say that God is alone eternal and the name Lord is proper to him eternally. This is said by virtue of how time is understood vis-à-vis times. Times are mutable; however, times did not come to be in time,
because there was no time before times came to be. Times, therefore, were in God before they came to be in time. The Spirit, then, was Lord of times themselves before they came to be in time as time. This is to say that the Spirit is Lord of times as they are eternal forms.

To this argument Augustine replies, "quid respondit de homine, qui in tempore factus est ...?" That is, what does this position hold with respect to creatures capable of knowing and obeying God? The Spirit was not Lord of man before man as such was created. Furthermore, to do away with this controversy, Augustine adds, the Spirit could not be Lord of particular individuals except in time, for we just began to exist in our rational life. The relation of Lord and slave as spiritual, constituted as self-conscious knowledge and love or obedience requires creation of the creature in time, otherwise an eternal relation could be remembered. And so in some sense the name Lord happens to God ex tempore.

But perhaps even this is uncertain, says Augustine, because of the obscure question concerning the soul, i.e., what had been a philosophical query throughout the ages, namely, the immortality of the soul. Perhaps an eternal relation has been marred and forgotten. But if the question of the soul is too obscure, what of the
Spirit's relation to the people of Israel which certainly had an historical beginning. Or, what of the divine Lordship over this particular tree, or corn field. Whenever a particular creature is concerned, especially one that has no immortal knowing soul, the relation of divine Lordship must begin in time, for in this case no eternal relation of Spirit is possible. Whereas the Spirit may be Lord of the matter which constitutes a particular creature, he is not Lord of the particular creature until it comes to be in its material particularity.

Augustine has distinguished between inner and outer relations, relations in time and out of time. But what of the question of accident? How can this predication be made of God who cannot suffer any change whatsoever?

Quomodo igitur ... non sua. (34)

Given that relation is attributed to the dependence of creation upon God, and that in some sense the name of Dominus is predicated of God ex tempore, how is it that God may acquire a temporal predication if he is above all temporality? Augustine's answer hangs upon the reality of conversio, which is the mutation of the rational creature in melius. God acquires the temporal name Dominus insofar as the rational creature is converted to a self-conscious relation to God as source
and end. The category of relation mediates the knowledge of *conversio* through which the immutable divinity becomes the *Dominus* of the rational creature. Relation secures for thought the stability of the divine substance not by giving way before the eternal divine nature, but by bringing to it the renewed mind of the converted soul. God becomes the Lord of the converted soul.

Money is an image of what is substantially stable but receives other predications depending upon other things brought in relation to it, e.g., money becomes the price of a given item, or, a pledge of support of an endeavor.

The soul which is by divine providence and predestination changed in *melius* receives the accidental attribution properly. Regeneration means a soul concretely related to the divine and by grace made a son of God. God then becomes Father of the regenerate son, not because of any change in God himself, but because of the soul's concrete conversion. The relation depends upon what actually happens to the soul. The divine substance is identical in its love and predestinating will. Whether or not the divine is said to be angry or loving toward man has not to do with an emotional change in God, but rather with an intellectual and moral change in the mind. It is, Augustine says, as the sun which is
harsh to weak eyes but pleasant to strong eyes.
Conclusion to Book Five

The preliminary questions of Book V concerning the distance between inner and outer words, and the further distance between the mind and God has been given a logical mediation. Through the speculum, compelled by the illuminative grace of Scripture, the mind has begun to understand the divine substance in its Trinitarian relations of Father, Son, and Spirit. These relations have been given an understanding as act by virtue of the distinctions between inner and outer relations of Principle, that of God eternally in himself, and that of creation and redemption temporally in relation to the divine substantial identity. The speculum, itself, which mirrors the divine life, has been formed through the dialectic of Scripture as principle and the mind as potential knower. Thus, the mind has been renewed, or formed, according to the logic of the Scripture in the categories of substance, relation, and act, and in this way mind itself partakes of the mediation necessary to overcome the distance between inner and outer words and between the mind and God. The activity of knowing God as Trinity by means of these categories, structured and defined through the illuminative grace of Scripture, is the beginning of holding these diverse modes in one view. While only a logical structure, the speculum
offers true and concrete knowledge. For Augustine, this is to see God active in the Scripture, as Word, concretely renewing the soul toward God himself in God's image as speculum. Thus the mind is related to its divine principle through the Word as Principle. The diverse modes of what is said, and thought, and how this is eternally true in God have been given a logical unity in the categories of substance, relation, and act. The reader should recognize that this logical unity between the image of the speculum and its Principle is a logical expression of the Incarnation. The necessary corollary to this unity, held in its categorical trinitarian logic, is to see the Neoplatonic logic of Plotinus and Porphyry as incapable of it. The divisions of thought into discursive and unified hypostases, beneath a unitary principle as in the Plotinian hierarchy, or in the Porphyrian logic of descending genera and species, cannot hold together these different modes as one activity. Even the Cappadocian logic fails to accomplish this.

The illuminating Word, efficacious in the soul by the categorical renewal of mind, overcomes the divisions in the particular soul by a knowledge of who God is as Trinity and how the categories are and are not proper to him. Insofar as this unity of knowing falls within the soul and is seen comprehended and compelled by the
Trinitarian activity itself, drawing the integral mind into itself, this unity surpasses the Neoplatonic divisions. Although only in a logical form, this finitude is held within the infinite Principle. It remains for Augustine to demonstrate more fully how the divine essence is the divine relations and act of Father, Son, and Spirit in order for the speculum to acquire the imago trinitatis.
With the doctrine of the Trinity understood thus far through the logical *speculum* of mind, Augustine turns to consider the doctrine within the mind of the Church, which also involves the mind of pagan philosophers who themselves approach the same question concerning the nature of the divine. The logic of the *speculum* has provided the argument with the mediation of outer and inner words which when seen together provide a logical reflection of the Incarnation, as well we an intelligible structure through which the Trinity may be seen.

The motion of the argument proceeds from the illuminating grace of the Trinity itself, and now with Book VI the motion continues toward an understanding of how these categories are themselves reflective of the divine life. This means that the argument does not remain with the categories as such but advances through them to see the Trinity. In order to do so, Augustine, guided by the authority of Scripture, scrutinizes the faith of the Church as it is contained in her creedal formulation.

The Creed itself is the summary of the salvific
knowledge contained in the Biblical revelation. Its occasion is the opposition of a false categorical logic confronting the Church. While containing an incipient categorical understanding, the Creed maintains the standpoint of faith, and does not provide a logic which is adequate to the faith itself. However, just as faith is the relation of the Christian soul to the historical reality of Christ, and is the indispensable means for the ascent of the soul to spiritual understanding, so also the Creed is the point of departure for a categorical purview of the doctrine of God.

That the categories here measure the Creed indicates that the Scripture itself remains primary in its own illumination. That the Creed satisfies the scrutiny of the categories reaffirms its summation of the revealed faith standing opposed to a false categorical logic.

The intention of the argument is not to justify the Creed but to come to an understanding of God as Trinity. Augustine, therefore, must go beyond the Creed to the active mind of the Church. By the work of Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine will be moved to a vestigial comprehension of the doctrine which, while not itself categorically sufficient, is capable of advancing the argument by virtue of bringing the divine names and the divine essence into a certain unified view.
Aequalitatem ... non igitur erat tempus quando non erat Filius. (35)

The predication of God in Scripture continues to compel Augustine's argument. However, what has been discovered in the theological development of the church, especially in the conciliar disputes, is that the Scripture itself, while of supreme authority in the predication of God, is not alone perspicuous, and indeed requires a formation of categorical understanding. The Scripture is capable of being misunderstood as in the instance of Arius, and thus needs to be clarified in the mind of the Church. Augustine continues his predication within this development of categorical understanding.

Some, says Augustine, have been prevented from understanding the equality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, because of the Scripture, 1 Corinthians 1:24, "Christ, the Power of God and the Wisdom of God". They are not thought to be equal because the Father himself is understood to be not power and wisdom but the begetter of power and wisdom.

The question of how God is said to be the Father of power and wisdom has been crucial to the history of Christian thought. It concerns what Augustine has determined in the distinction between the divine
predicates of substance, relation, and act. What does it mean for God to be called the Father of power and wisdom so that Christ, the Son, is called the power and wisdom of God?

The current argument had arisen in the history of the church because of Arius' interpretation of the nature of divine filiation. All filiation for Arius occurs within the limits of time; therefore, for the Son to be begotten means "there was a time when the Son was not". Some of the orthodox countered Arius' notion of filiation by maintaining that, for God, filiation is outside of time in eternity so that the Father and his Son are equally eternal. Two arguments, one analogical and one logical, were used to defend this.

The analogical argument compared the filiation of the Son to the brightness of fire, a brightness which is born from fire and diffuses from it as long as the fire exists. If the fire were eternal its brightness would be also. Such an argument was common to metaphysical speculations. For instance, the derivation of the rays of light from the sun and their contemporaneous status with the sun is a metaphor Plotinus invokes for both the subordination and the eternity of the divine hypostases. This analogy of the fire and its brightness was enough, says Augustine, to move the later Arians to reject their mentor's claim that the Son was begotten within the
limits of time.

But the metaphorical argument of analogy was not enough to explicate the proposition of St. Paul, "Christ the power of God and wisdom of God". Those who opposed the Arians further advanced a logical argument.

If the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God and God is never without power and wisdom then the Son is coeternal with the Father. Furthermore, the conditional assumption of this argument is made certain by the authority of the apostolic writing. And since it would be madness to suggest that the Father was ever without power and wisdom, there was never a time when the Son was not. But even this logical attack on Arianism falls short and needs the correction of a more adequate logic, because the Arians could think of the relation of the Father and the Son as eternal but subordinate as in the metaphysics of Plotinus where the *Vodh* is eternally subordinate to the One.

Quae ratiocinatio ... vel commemorari adhuc possunt.

Augustine now places the logic of these orthodox who opposed the Arians next to the faith of the orthodox as it was expressed in the articles of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Their logic is seen to be inadequate to their faith; however, their faith remains
the measure, inasmuch as the common faith of the church is formulated within the common mind of the ecumenical council as the true creedal definition of the doctrine of God and salvation in Christ, what is revealed in the Scripture, is understood categorically, albeit only in an inchoate sense. For Augustine, the mind is compelled to a more precise categorical understanding of the content of its Creed just as it is of the content of Scripture which the Creed formulates. Faith comes to understanding through the categories of mind.

Given this logic, that the Father is wise not through himself but only through the wisdom which he has begotten, the creedal formula of the priority of the Father as the origin of the Son's divine essence is brought into question. How can the Son who is God of God and Light of Light be said to be Wisdom of Wisdom if the Father is wise only by the Wisdom begotten as Son?

The question concerns the distinction between the divine substance and the divine relations. How are the persons identical with the divine substance so that each is fully divine and yet each person is not the other? If the Son is identified with wisdom in such a way that the Father is not wise except by him, then what is the case for the other predicates of the divine substance?

If the Father is wise by wisdom begotten, why is he not also great by greatness begotten, and good by
goodness begotten? Why are not all the predicates of the
divine substance begotten, and equally, why are they not
all Sons?

The logic of those who oppose the Arians by these
arguments leads to the subversion of the creedal
formulation of the Father as the origin of the Son,
because the logic itself is not adequate to the faith of
the Creed nor its inchoate categorical understanding.
Augustine's initial response to this inadequate logic is
to turn to the category of substance and the nature of
its predicates.

It is not true to say that the Father has begotten
many coeternal Sons because the divine essence is given
a multitude of predicates. No one need believe that the
Father has two Sons because he is the Father of power
and wisdom. Rather, one should understand the divine
substance and the divine predicates to be absolutely
identical. The divine power is the same substance as the
divine wisdom. God's power and wisdom are one, because
the predicates of his nature are not accidental or
acquired in any form, especially through divine
filiation, nor are his predicates discrete forms of
being as in the _vούς_ of the Plotinian hierarchy of
divine hypostases. The substance of God is his
predictates.
Commentary on VI.ii.3.

Sed si non dicitur ... sed ambo simul Deus. (37)

The error of the orthodox logic is the failure to distinguish properly between substance and relation. The distinction of these categories in divine predication marks what is attributed to the divine essence, what is said of God or a divine person ad se, and what is attributed to the divine relations, what is said relative to someone or something. Augustine has already demonstrated this distinction in V.viii.9. The argument here, correcting the logic of the orthodox but not their faith, enables the mind, as well as the church, to draw nearer to an understanding of how the substance of God and the relations in God are one.

The logic of Augustine is clear. If the predication made of the Father relative to the Son is understood categorically, only the names Father, Begetter, and Principle come into view. These names mark what is said of the person of the Father in his peculiar relation to the Son and arise only out of this relation. All else predicated of the Father is predicated of himself in himself and mark him as he is the divine essence. This distinction is primary. Next follows the crucial step toward a perception of a unity of substance and relation as substantial relations. This involves the recognition
that, by means of begetting, the Father is Principle to
that which he begets from himself. Augustine has already
addressed this in clarifying the category of relation in
V.xiii.14., but here the relation is seen as the divine
act of begetting which is to give a concrete unity to
the Father as Principle of what is begotten from him as
Son. What is common to Father and Son is not their
relations but the divine substance which is given in the
act of begetting. In this way Augustine begins to bring
the categorical logic of substance, relation, and act
into a unity of activity. The consequence of this
logical distinction is to see the divine names which
predicate the divine essence as common to the Father and
the Son in their one substantial life.

If the relative names predicated of the Father,
along with the distinction of the Father as the
begetting Principle of the Son, thereby showing their
substantial unity, indicate the Father as origin of the
substantial relations of the divine substance, the
priority of the Father in the divine essence does not
obscure the equal possession of the divine essence.
Therefore, whatever is attributed to the Father in
himself as the divine substance, is necessarily
attributed to the Son and is always predicated of the
Father with the Son, or better, as Augustine says, in
Filio because he is substantially related to the Father,
and is not related to the Father abstractly as diverse forms of being. The Son is called great by the greatness which the Father has begotten in the Son as the Son. The Father is not greatness itself as it were a discrete form, but he is rather the generator of greatness.

Viewed from the side of the Son, we see the same distinction. The Son as he is in himself is called Son not with the Father, as if this were a shared attribute, but rather in relation to the Father. Hence, the Son is not great peculiarly in himself, but along with the Father from whom the Son received the divine greatness.

So then, the divine names are seen to be shared by the Father and the Son, and they are together one greatness and one wisdom. When making a predication of the divine substance, the Father is not understood to possess an attribute without the Son, nor does the Son possess a divine attribute without the Father. Augustine concludes that Deus is not the Father without the Son, nor is Deus the Son without the Father: sed ambo simul Deus.

By means of the categories of substance and relation, Augustine has given a clearer logic to the faith of the orthodox as it is contained in the Creed. This is more fully demonstrated below. And mind has begun to see through these categories that the relations of the divine substance may be seen in one view as the
activity of the divine life. Yet, much remains for Augustine to explicate fully the character of these substantial relations, especially in the understanding of the necessity of the divine activity in its own life. Augustine returns to the authority of Scripture towards this understanding.

*Et quod dictum est ... Deus erat simul cum Patre.* (38)

The beginning of John's gospel provides the Biblical ground for Augustine's incipient understanding of the divine substance as relations of essential activity. "In principio erat Verbum." means, says Augustine, that the Verbum was in the Father, and thus the two persons are distinguished in the Scripture but are seen substantially related. Or, if principio means simply "before all things", the next sentence of John's gospel clearly indicates their distinction in one substance. "Et Verbum erat apud Deum" is taken to mean that the Verbum is the Son alone and not the Father and the Son together, for the Father and the Son are not both one Verbum; the Son is Verbum as Image of the Father. Deum itself should not be understood as the Father alone but as the divine essence which is the Father and the Son. How this is so is not unfamiliar. It is understood that the soul is with man, that is, in man, even though the soul is not the body, and man is
both body and soul. The soul is with man or in man as a
distinct aspect of the composed totality. The soul and
body are diverse and yet are one in man.

Therefore, whether principio is the Father and the
Verbum as Son is understood to be in the Father as
origin, or, the Verbum is understood to be the Son with
Deum, that is, in the divine essence which is the Father
and the Son, the distinction of persons in one
substantial life is rooted in Scripture. Consequently,
the next sentence of John's gospel "Et Deus erat
Verbum" concludes that the Verbum, the Son, was Deus
simul with the Father. Augustine's use of simul here
emphasizes the coeternal substance of the Father and the
Son's life. Augustine has now begun to demonstrate the
substantial life of the Father and the Son, understood
through the categories, as grounded in the Biblical
revelation. The reader should keep in mind the whole of
the argument up to this point.

The categories, which Scripture has compelled and
formed in mind as the structure of mind's thinking, are
the means through which the mind understands both the
doctrine of the Trinity as the content of the Scripture,
and the subsequent tradition of the Church's reflection.
The mind, therefore, is given a self-conscious relation
to the content of its faith, and this illumination works
toward an appropriated understanding of the truth of
divine revelation. Thus, through this activity of the Scripture as the Word of God in the diverse modes of human language forming the categories of its own interpretation, the mind is being formed as speculum of the Trinity.

Itane ergo dicimus ... non secundum relativam. (39)

Given that the Scripture reveals the Father and the Word as simul Deus, wherein the Father is not God without the Son and the Son is not God without the Father, the question arises as to whether this substantial relation is a complex life constituted of the Father and his begotten—together. The purview of the categories is here required to discern the Creed, which measures this question, again under the authority of Scripture.

Given the simultaneous essential life of the divine persons, are the relations of this essence understood to be the complementary parts of the divine whole as body and soul are in man, or, in the language of the categories, is the Father the originative substance which produces its own inseparable accidental qualification which taken together with its origin forms the divine entity? Is it in this sense that the Father is the begetter of his own power and wisdom, and the Son is power and wisdom, and both together are at the same
time Deus? Is their unity and relation one of the divine essence coming to actuality in itself?

If the substantial relations were understood in this sense of a complex, what would the doctrine of the Creed amount to in which the Church understands the Son's begotten nature as God from God and Light from Light, that the Son is what he is by virtue of what the Father is, that the Father is in himself God and Light, and so the Son, begotten from the Father, is also God and Light?

There is an order professed in the Creed. Both the Father and the Son are not God from God, and Light from Light; only the Son is from God, namely the Father. Perhaps, then, says Augustine, in order to intimate and inculcate the coeternal life of the Father and the Son, the Creed states God from God and Light from Light and if there is anything predicated of the divine life in this mode it receives the same predication.

The point is this. The coeternal life of the Father and the Son means that both are the divine substance. To say God from God is the same as to say that what is not the Son without the Father, is from that which is not the Father without the Son, so that the Light which is not Light without the Father is from the Light, the Father, which is not the Light without the Son. Therefore, when God is said, which is not Son without
the Father, and from God, which is not the Father
without the Son, it is perfectly understood that the
begetter did not precede what he has begotten. There is
no priority of substance in the Father over against the
Son. Nor is the Son merely an inseparable accidental
qualification of the originative substance of the
Father. Nor, further, is the Father a generative
principle inadequate to the Son. Only that which is not
true of both of the divine persons at the same time,
only that which cannot be said illud de illo, that alone
cannot be predicated of them. The Word cannot be said
to be from the Word, since both divine persons are not
at the same time the Word. Only the Son is the Word.
Thus it cannot be said Image from Image nor Son from
Son, since both are not at the same time Image nor Son.
Indeed, this is the revelation of Scripture, says
Augustine, where the Son declares, "Ego et Pater unum
sumus." There it is revealed in the words unum sumus
that what the Father is, the Ego, the Son, is also. This
unity is predicated according to the category of
substance and not according to the category of relation.
To speak of illud de illo, is to refer to the inherent
order of the divine essence which both of the divine
persons are at the same time (ambo et simul), and thus
their substantial life is seen to be truly coeternal,
and the divine life is not thought of as a finite
substance in the process of development. In this way the creedal faith is seen through the purview of the categories under the authority of the Scripture. However, why the Father is Father and not the Son or Word is yet to be made clear. These substantial relations are first grounded in the category of substance which is their divine essence.
Commentary on VI.iii.4.

Et nescio utrum ... sicut tractatum est. (40)

The character of this one essence is now clarified, again under the authority of Scripture. Scripture does not seem, says Augustine, to predicate one essence of things with different natures. Things are diverse either by virtue of nature, or if there is a multiplicity of the same nature, by virtue of their differing perception or thought. For instance, the Scripture does not say that men are one because of their common nature; indeed, the Son commends them to the Father that they may be one as the Father and the Son are one. Inasmuch as Paul and Apollos are engaged in the common activity of conversion, they are said to be one. One plants and the other waters. They possess the same nature and the same goal for their labour. They are one in their common will. But they are not one strictly speaking; they are one in their commonly willed activity. The summary principle of predication here, then, is that one essence is truly predicable when nothing is added from without which would constitute the one either in nature or in thought. The one substance which divine revelation predicates, says Augustine, is understood to be the same nature and essence neither dividing nor dissenting; this one is neither multiple in essence nor thought.
When the one is predicated according to an outside qualification stating what, or in what respect, the one is understood, the diverse nature or differing thought is signified. For instance, soul and body are extremely diverse, but they are one as one man or one animal. They are established in the composite entity of man or animal. Again, according to the Apostle Paul, he who joins himself to an harlot is one body with her, not one strictly speaking, but one by the joining of the diversity of male and female, and so one body in this respect. Or again, he who adheres to the Lord is one spirit, not absolutely as God himself, but by the inherence and dependence of the finite spirit of man in the Spirit of God these two diverse natures are made one in spirit; however, they are identical neither in essence nor in thought.

There is a purpose for predication, says Augustine, in the record of the gospel of John, where the Lord speaks often of unity itself. There, unity is understood as that of the Father and the Son, or as that of the faithful, and these are connected. Nowhere does the Lord ask that the faithful may be unity itself. Rather, he asks that the faithful may be one as the Father and the Son are one. The unity of the faithful is like to that of the Father and the Son, and indeed is contingent upon it, but is not identical with it.
Therefore, the Scripture is clear in its revelation concerning the divine unity. Only that absolute unity of substance and thought is properly predicable of God, and it is that unity which is predicated of the Father and the Son -- one Deus -- great and wise, as Augustine has treated above. This unity of substance is, of course, altogether different from the Plotinian notion of an abstract activity of will which is the One of the divine hierarchy. There the elimination of all self-conscious relation is prerequisite to an approach to the One. Here, the unity of the divine substance is understood to be an identity of essence and thought. Augustine moves closer to an understanding of the divine as substantial relations.
Commentary on VI.iii.5.

Unde ergo major Pater? ... de substantia ejus dicuntur. (41)

The question then arises through the Scripture, given the substantial unity of the Father and the Son, in what sense is the Father greater than the Son? To speak of the Father as greater, is to say he is greater by greatness itself. Since the Son is his greatness, as that which is from the Father, the Son cannot be said to be greater than he who begot him, than his origin. Nor, however, can the Father be said to be greater than this greatness by which he himself is great, and which his begotten receives entirely and is thus the Father's greatness; therefore, the Father is not greater than the Son in any respect of his divine substance.

Augustine explains how this is so. The equality of the Father and the Son can only be an equality of essence, that by which each of the divine persons is, i.e., according to their being, for in the divine it is not one thing to be and another to be great, these are one and the same in the divine substance. The substance of God is identical with its predicates, and so the divine persons who are the divine essence are identical to the divine predicates.

If, for instance, the Father were greater than the Son by virtue of eternity, the Son would not be equal in
any respect. In this case how could the Son be equal? Would it be in greatness? Certainly, their greatness could not be equal if the Son were not eternal. And this is true for all the substantial predicates. For example, if the Son were equal in power, but not in wisdom, how could the Son, who would not have the divine wisdom to instruct his power, be equal to the Father whose wisdom is adequate to his power? Or, if the Son were equal in wisdom but not in power, how could the Son, who would not have the divine power to fulfill his omniscient will, be equal to the Father whose power is adequate to his wisdom? Therefore, it remains, says Augustine, that if the Son were unequal to the Father in any predicate, he would be unequal in them all. And so the Scripture shouts, Augustine concludes, "He did not think it robbery to be equal to God." (Phil.2:6). Therefore, the adversary of the truth, who is moved by the authority of the Apostle, is compelled to confess the Son equal to God, either in every way or in one way, for whichever he chooses, he will be shown that the Son is equal to the Father in all that is said concerning his substance.

Augustine has again shown that the divine substance is the Father and the Son, and whatever is said of the Father's substance is said of the Son's also. The divine substance does not admit of any accidental attribution, and equality is understood through the category of
substance, which is the divine unity.
Sic enim virtutes guae ... de animi fortitudine. (42)

The equality of those who are the divine essence, the Father and his only begotten, the Son, is seen through the example of the human soul. The example is a logical illustration, a demonstration grounded in the truth of divine equality revealed in Scripture.

The essence of the human soul may be qualified by the acquisition of virtues or powers. These powers have a relative dependence. Each requires the others in order to exercise its peculiar quality. And so they do not exist indifferently to one another, but rather contribute to a common qualification. Thus those souls which are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence, temperance, and justice as well. Clearly, if two souls were said to be equal in fortitude, but one excelled in prudence, their equality would be mistaken, for the less prudent soul would not possess the discrimination to exercise his fortitude as well as would the more prudent. Therefore, these who are unequal in prudence are necessarily unequal in fortitude. This interdependence applies to all the virtues of the soul, and this question concerns only the qualification of the powers of the soul and not the body. These powers are inherent in the nature of thought and will and not in
their instrument, the body. This is to say that the logical illustration is a demonstration proper only to the character of soul or spirit, that which possesses the capacity for the essential qualification of these particular virtues.

_Quanto ergo magis ... substantia ejus significetur._ (43)

And if the character of soul is such that it is capable of these virtues which are interdependent in its nature, how much more is the unchanging eternal substance of God who is, Augustine says, incomparably more simple than the human soul. The comparison focuses between the spiritual nature of the soul which is only a capacity and the utterly simple substance of the divine which is the simple unity of its own predicates.

The soul as capacity means that it is not the same for the soul to be (esse) and for the soul to be courageous or prudent, because the soul is not identical with its accidental qualification. The soul may exist without being either courageous or prudent. Indeed, it may have no virtue at all. But this is not so for the divine substance. In God, what is his being is also his courage or his justice or wisdom. No capacity for accidental qualification exists in God. His simple eternal nature is identical with his predicates. Thus the divine substance is understood to be a simple
multiplicity or a multiple simplicity, the eternal substance which is its predicates. And if the divine substance is understood in this way, the unity of the Father and his only begotten, the Son, as a unity of essence and thought, becomes clear.

Quamobrem ... est unius ejusdemque substantiae. (44)

The equality of the Father and the Son, revealed in Scripture and set forth categorically in the creed, is now seen explicated as an equality of divine predicates by virtue of the substantial relation of the divine essence which is itself identical with its predicates. The unity of the Father and the Son is none other than the divine essence itself.

This explication is possible only through the understanding of the category of substance, through which the eternal simple divine nature revealed in Scripture is made intelligible, and through which the creed as the summary statement of that revelation is actually understood. The conclusion of this equality of substance of the Father and the Son, understood thus far in the argument, is as follows.

The argument has brought us to two possibilities concerning the nature of substantial relations, and it is clear that although Augustine has made progress in this question there is much to consider in order to
understand these relations, to understand why the Father begets a Son. The first possibility in understanding these substantial relations is to view the phrase of the Creed, "Deus de Deo", as meaning the equality of essence in the Father and the Son, because of the essential derivation of the Son from the Father, and so to call each person God. But this derivation does not mark two Gods, says Augustine, but rather is understood as the divine unity itself. And so the simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity of the divine substance as the divine predicates is equally present in the Father and the Son as the Father and the Son.

Their unity is one of coherence (sibi cohaerent), like that which the Apostle describes when he speaks of the human spirit adhering to the Spirit of the Lord and becoming one spirit with him, but the coherence of the Father and the Son is much greater because in the divine life there is an altogether inseparable eternal union (connexio) of the divine persons in essence and thought. The divine coherence is a union of essence which has the order of Father and Son. The adherence of the human spirit to the divine Spirit is made possible only through grace. This is how one should think the phrase "Deus de Deo", says Augustine, unless one absurdly concludes that de Deo means from the Father and the Son at the same time.
The second possibility of thinking "Deus de Deo" is similar to that absurd conclusion, but not absurd in itself, by suggesting that the de Deo means the entire Trinity. This possibility arises out of the consideration that whatever is predicated of God, indicating the divine substance, is predicated of the Trinity itself. Because of the identity of the divine essence and the persons, this possibility comes to mind; however, it arises not because it is a sufficient explanation of the creedal form but because the nature of substantial relations is not yet clear in the argument. These possibilities of understanding indeed require a more diligent inquiry, Augustine remarks.

But whether one understands this phrase in the creed by the first or the second possibility, the argument has progressed sufficiently so that we may conclude that the Son is in no way equal to the Father if in anything pertaining to the predication of his substance the Son is found unequal to him. This is the conclusion of the demonstration grounded in the revelation of Scripture which stands as the authority before and after the argument. "Apostolus autem dixit aequalem." Therefore, the Son is absolutely equal to the Father and is of one and the same substance with him.
Commentary on VI.v.7.

Quapropter etiam Spiritus ... in vinculo pacis. (45)

Through the category of substance, Augustine has discerned the unity and equality of the Father and the Son. Now he includes the Spirit. It is important to note here that the argument does not proceed through an explicit recognition of the categories of relation and act which issued forth in Book V. These are assumed within a synthesis in the motion of substantial relations. This is to say that for the moment the argument focuses on the substance of the Trinity in its divine life or activity in order to show below that these relations and act are not other than this substance. In Book V, the relation of the Father to the Son and the relation of the Son to the Father was understood to involve the procession of the Spirit from them both as from one Principle. There the Spirit is understood to be eternal donum, the ineffable communion of the Father and the Son, so that the relations of Principle are in the eternal act of giving. Here the relations of Principle and the eternal nature of the Spirit as Gift, given in the act of giving, are assumed in the one view of the divine substance. In this way Augustine continues toward an understanding of how the essence and the persons are one.
The Holy Spirit consists in the same unity and equality of substance as do the Father and the Son. The Spirit is that ineffable communion between the Father and the Son. How this is so needs to be made explicit. But it is clear, says Augustine, that whether the Spirit is the unity or sanctity or charity of both, or whether he is unity because he is charity and therefore charity because he is sanctity, the Spirit by whom the two are joined is neither of those whom he joins.

It is in the Spirit as the Spirit that the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and the Begotten loves his own Generator. And this is their own activity; their mutual love is not something in which the Father and the Son participate, as if love were a higher activity of being of which the divine persons partake and overcome their difference. Their common activity of love is nothing other than the Spirit himself, proceeding forth from their very essence. Nor is the Spirit a Gift for the Father and the Son from anything superior to them. This, or their participation, would be to see the Spirit as the unitive love of Plotinus' One in which the finds both its principle of unity as well as its source of being. By virtue of their own property (suo proprio), their common activity of love, the Father and the Son preserve the unity of the divine essence in the bond of peace (servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis).
Hence, Augustine has shown the Spirit to be the substantial completion of the divine in the reciprocal act of love between the Father and the Son. According to the names of the Father and the Son and the Spirit, as they have been revealed in Scripture, Augustine moves toward an explication of the substantial life and unity of the divine relations. This is shown through their equality of substance in which the Spirit brings a completion to that which in its essence is already whole.

Quod imitari per gratiam ... Deus substantia est? (46)

The unity of the Spirit, the divine charity, is the absolute paradigm for the unity of the soul in God as well as the unity of souls themselves. The precepts to love God and one's neighbor is the total weight of the law and the prophets. The concrete bond is itself love which completes the divine life and brings finite creatures into relation to it.

The summary of this unity, says Augustine, is this. They are three. They are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. And these three are one Deus -- alone, great, wise, holy, and blessed. This unity is the concrete nature of the divine life. Our multiple and diverse lives are comprehended by this one life; therefore, our blessedness is from him and through him and in him. By
the gift of the Spirit himself among us, we become one, and with the Spirit we become one spirit because our soul is joined (agglutinatur) to him. Indeed it is the highest good for the soul to adhere to God in love, because those who fornicate away from him suffer destruction. The principle of unity, then, is love: first in God himself, and then in us in relation to God, and then in us among ourselves. The argument itself is the renovatio of the soul's knowledge and love.

Augustine makes this clear. The Holy Spirit, whatever it is, is something common to the Father and the Son because it is of the Father and the Son. Their communion, therefore, because it is of them is consubstantial and coeternal, and so it might fittingly be called friendship, but more aptly it is called charity, because friendship would pertain to that in which they are friends as if it were something other than themselves, but charity is the bond of the substance which they are. Augustine points out that the scriptural revelation concludes that charity is substance since God is substance and God is charity. Thus their unity is in their substance as love.

Augustine explicates his conclusion. Just as the substance of the Father and the Son is simultaneously eternal, so their substance is simultaneously great and good and holy and whatever else may be predicated of the
divine essence, for in God it is not one thing to be, and another to be good, for the divine nature is simply identical as its predicates. The logic follows then that the Spirit, inasmuch as he is of the Father and the Son is himself identical with the divine predicates; however, Augustine does not explicate his conclusion directly in this way. Rather, the argument moves in the direction of the Spirit as the Charity of the Father and the Son, which is to say that the identity of the Spirit with the divine predicates is taken up in his property as Love just as the Son is understood in his property as Wisdom. Already Augustine is bringing into view how the divine essence is this predicated substance which is these relations of the Father and the Son in act. But this is not finally clear. For the argument to this point only demonstrates the equality of this substance which proceeds from the Father and the Son as Love: the understanding of this substance in its activity, the question how this predicated unity and the act of its relations is held in one view remains.

Thus far in the argument we have seen how the Father and the Son are given a substantial unity by virtue of the Father begetting the Son. The Father begets the Son as his offspring equal to himself in the wisdom of the divine essence, and so the Son is his Father's wisdom, and both are the divine wisdom. This
has been understood through the revealed notion of
divine begetting. Now, insofar as the unity of the
substance of the Father and the Son, a unity of essence
and thought, is established through the divine
begetting, and is seen again in the common act of their
mutual love, the divine charity is understood to be
equal to the divine wisdom. For if in the divine
essence charity is less great than wisdom, then charity
would be inadequate to wisdom, and wisdom would not be
loved to the extent of its being. But since the love of
the divine is the common act of the Father and the Son
who are the divine essence in its simplicity, their
mutual love is necessarily adequate to the wisdom of
their divine substance. This equality of love to wisdom,
then, is true of the Spirit with respect to all the
divine predicates in that highest simplicity which is
the substance of God. Augustine concludes this section
within the categorical analysis with which he began, and
in this the explication of the divine substance to this
point is complete. Augustine writes, "Et ideo non
amplius quam tria sunt;..." Augustine understands that
the divine substance, which is itself perfect in its
attributes and is fully present in the Father and the
Son respectively, acts and fulfills its highest
amplitude in the reciprocal love of the Father and the
Son. Theirs is a completion of that which is already
perfect. Why this is so is not yet altogether determined. But that the divine substance is given another unity (connexio) in the Spirit as Charity with the perfect simplicity of the Father and the Son has been demonstrated. And so the divine substance is no more than these three: one, the Father, who loves him, the Son, who is from him; one, the Son, who loves him, the Father, from whom the Son is; one, the Spirit who is the love itself equal in the divine substance to those two who are his Principle. Finally, that the Spirit is equally and integrally divine is, Augustine declares by way of a question, the testimony of Scriptural authority. The Spirit is not nothing; the Scripture states, "Deus dilectio est". And therefore the Spirit, as dilectio, is the divine substance, because Deus is substance, ipsum esse, as shown in Book V, and Deus is dilectio.

It is useful here to discuss the character of this divine unity as Augustine has understood it thus far in relation to the tradition which has preceded him. Mellet and Camelot, in their "Notes Complementaires" remark that the understanding of the Spirit as Bond and Love of the Father and the Son is virtually peculiar to Augustine, having little precedence in the East and in the West.

The references and comments given by Mellet and
Camelot are helpful. In the East, as we have already noted, Gregory of Nazianzus understands the divine unity to reside in the priority of the Father from which the Son and the Spirit proceed and to which they return. For Athanasius, it is the Son who is the Bond between the Father and the Spirit. And Basil understands the Son to be the agent of unity between the Father and the Spirit. Mellet and Camelot conclude that this conception of the divine unity is linear, and this seems correct if by this they mean that the divine unity is understood by virtue of the economic activity of the Trinity in creation and redemption. The contribution of Epiphanius, though interesting, does not seem to have exerted any influence of thought upon Augustine.

This author would continue to argue that the reason for this linear or predominantly economic view of the divine unity is the failure of the Greeks to provide a logic through which the divine essence and the persons can be held in one view so that the divine substance be understood to be its own self-sufficient relations, independent of creation. Augustine is approaching this explanation of the divine unity here in Book VI. And the conception of the Spirit as Bond and Love is crucial to this development.

The comment of Mellet and Camelot, following Schmaus, concerning the possible influence of Marius
Victorinus upon Augustine seems correct. In Augustine's *De Fide et Symbolo*, the reference to those who before him have found the Scripture to teach the Spirit as the mutual Love of the Father and the Son may indeed include the doctrine of Victorinus. In his third Hymn to the Trinity, Victorinus speaks of the Spirit as the *copula*, the *connexio*, and the *complexio* of the Father and the Son. But these similarities are by themselves not 87 enough. What must be determined is the similarity of their doctrines with respect to the nature of the relations of the divine essence. And this must wait until Book VII where the possible influence of Victorinus becomes clearer, as does the difference between him and Augustine. Before then we must see how Hilary contributes to the argument. Because Hilary also knows the Spirit as unitive of the Father and the Son, Hilary's *De Trinitate* provides Augustine with a necessary step in his own argument.
Si autem quaeritur ... modo vere simplex. (47)

The argument thus far has moved the reader to consider the unity of the divine substance as it is in the act of its relations. By the act of the divine begetting, and the common principle of the love of the Father and the Son, the divine essence is seen to have a unity which is nothing other than the divine attributes. Within these two acts the one perfect substance of God lives. Begetting is seen to be a real issuing forth of the divine attributes from the Father in the Son who is then seen to be identical to the Father essentially. The Son possesses the divine essence perfectly so that he is rightly said to be the power and wisdom of God. This act is in itself complete and whole. Next, the Spirit is understood to be the reciprocal love between the Father and the Son. This act is a connexio. The bond or love of the Father and the Son is their own common union of love, the one for the other, and this connexio cannot be other than the divine essence itself which the Father and the Son are. Love bonds the Father and the Son: the perfect and whole act of begetting is given another completeness, and the completeness of love is the absolutely perfect limit of the divine amplitude which knows or needs nothing else. The divine essence is
this substantial unity of the Father and the Son and the Spirit who are related as the acts of their essential life.

In this explanation of the divine substance, Augustine has made a beginning toward holding the substance and the persons in one view. The divine unity is brought into focus through the divine begetting and love; however, why there is a begetting and a mutual love is not yet seen. Inasmuch as the Son is called the power and wisdom of God, and the Spirit is named the Love of the Father and the Son, there is an indication of where the argument must lead, but has not yet attained. The question of why there is a divine begetting and love, absolute and perfectly ample, is the question of the divine necessity, why the divine is what it is in itself, why the predicates of God are these persons and these persons only. These questions are derived from the revelation of Scripture, and are capable of being answered only through the categories which the logic of Scripture demands. The Scripture has already moved the argument to consider the Son as the power and wisdom of God, and the Spirit as the love of God, and continues to compel the argument. The category of substance has comprehended the unity of the predicates, while the categories of relation and act have been assumed in discerning the life of this
substance.

The question of the divine necessity is now approached. Given the conclusions thus far, Augustine is faced with the question of how the substance of God is both simple and multiple. How are the divine predicates which are nothing other than the divine substance also nothing other than the divine persons? Which amounts to the same aporia: why is the substance of God these persons of the Father and the Son and the Spirit, and these persons only? Augustine addresses the question in two steps: first, how the divine substance is truly simple, and second, how the divine persons are understood to be the divine essence, and this especially through St. Hilary.

The simplicity of the divine substance is first set against the multiple nature of the creature in general, which, says Augustine, is in no way vere simplex. The difference is, therefore, between the Creator and the creature. The creature is understood through the example of the world as a whole of parts, extending even as far as finite substance, and furthermore, as a multiple complex which includes the spiritual creature of the soul.

Et prius corpus ... omnis autem creatura mutabilis. (48)

Generally speaking, body is a composition of parts,
wherein one part is greater than another, and the whole is greater than any part whatsoever. The created world is an example in which heaven and earth are parts, and these themselves are each constituted of innumerable parts. And always, these are less in part than in the whole. The world itself is customarily divided into two parts, heaven and earth, either of which taken alone is less than both taken together as the whole. Hence, characteristically, body is an actual composition of parts.

Furthermore, in each singular body there exists the distinctions of magnitude, color, and shape, peculiar to the body itself. And because these distinctions are peculiar to the finite body, the body may change in some of its distinctions while remaining the same in others. When, for instance, a body changes with respect to its magnitude, it may remain the same color and in the same shape. Or, when the color changes, it may remain the same in shape and magnitude. That there may be some distinctions that remain while others change is characteristic of the nature of finite body.

The creature as body, therefore, is both composed of parts and constituted of mutable distinctions. The body, as such, is demonstrably multiple.

And although the spiritual creature, as the soul
is, is more simple than the body, the soul itself is not simple. Unlike the body, the soul is not diffused throughout local space. For the entire soul is present to the whole body and to each of its parts at once. When something happens to a part of the body which the soul senses, the whole soul senses it, because nothing of the body lies hidden from the soul. The soul then is not divisible into parts; however, the soul remains capable of multiple and diverse powers and qualities.

Indeed, the soul is capable of a contrariety in its powers and qualities. For instance, it may be artistic or lacking in that ability. The soul may possess a piercing intellect or it may be reflective. It might suffer from cupidity or fear. It may be endued with happiness, or beset with sadness. The soul is a capacity to these contraries and as capacity may possess them all in varying degrees. And because these are contraries they are multiple, and the soul which is capable of them is therefore itself multiple. For inasmuch as the soul is the capacity of these, it may actually become any one of these at a given instant, and this again in varying degrees. The soul, therefore, says Augustine, is clearly multiple and not simple, because the simple is always what it actually is and never undergoes change.

That which is multiple changes, as does the body in its distinctions and parts, and as does the soul in its
capacity to become contrary qualities. It is, then, the character of the creature to change, and it does so by virtue of its multiple being. Now Augustine turns to consider the Creator.
Deus vero multipliciter ... omnino ipsum esse. (49)

Deus, the Creator, is, in contrast to the creature, a multiplicity of predicates, but not of parts; of divine attributes, but not of contrary qualities. That the divine is great, good, wise, blessed, and true, only those names which are appropriate to the divinity and not contrary to his nature, does not indicate a multiple being in God. Rather, what God is, is goodness, wisdom, and greatness. It is not one thing in God to be good and another thing to be wise and another thing to be. God's being is being itself, with no capacity of being, rather only an actuality of being, ipsum esse, which is not other than his predicates but are absolutely identical to his predicates. In this way God is understood to be simple in his nature and not at all multiple.

Again, Augustine has affirmed the nature of the divine simplicity as an identity of predicates and essence. This has already been accomplished above. But here the necessity moves us to the next aspect of the question: how are these predicates which are the divine essence also these persons and these persons only? Why, given a simplicity of predicates, is there a multiplicity of persons?
Nec quoniam Trinitas ... non simul ambo Pater sunt. (50)

The argument is not moved logically to think of God as triplex. Multiplicity in God is not distinguished through separate entities. For if this were so, one of the divine persons would be less than the sum total of them all. In this Augustine reaffirms the absolute unity of the divine substance. And yet the persons are not thereby obscured. Augustine continues to move toward an explication of the essence as the persons, but only insofar as the argument thus far is able to take him.

The argument is not yet able to speak of the Father alone or of the Son alone which is to say that the peculiar properties of the persons which distinguish them is not yet found -- non inveniatur. There has been some advance made in this direction in that the Son has been called the wisdom of God, being begotten of the Father, and the Spirit the bond of the Father and the Son, being their mutual love. These two predicates have given a glimpse of the identity of the divine essence and the divine persons. However, there is a clear understanding at this point of how the Father or the Son can never be spoken of alone.

The Father and the Son are always and inseparably together, and this by virtue of the unity of the divine
essence. Yet, their unity does not mark both as Father or both as Son. The Father and the Son are distinct with a mutual relation, that is to say, the Father and the Son are essentially in invicem. This essential relation is comprehensible only as the simple substantial being of God, ipsum esse, not the created being composed of parts and mutable.

At this stage in the argument, Augustine makes a comparison which is of profound importance, and one that has been both acknowledged and assumed throughout the argument. The simplicity and multiplicity of the divine substance in itself is compared to the sanctified relation of the finite spirit to God. In this way one may see how concretely the created spirit is made to inhere in the divine. This of course has been shown above where the soul is seen to inhere in the divine by divine grace. The unity spoken of there is one of spirit in which the human mind has been freed from its inordinate relation to the world and is being renewed into an integral relation to God. This inheritance is real. Therefore, the unity of spirit spoken of is one enabled and sustained by the divine itself. The formation of the mind in the categories compelled by the Scripture is the initial transformation of finite mind away from its improper relation to the world and into the life of divine Spirit. This is merely the beginning.
and the rest of the argument is needed to complete it, but that this is the end of the argument is clear. For the spiritual relation of the mind to God in its integrity is the overcoming of the distance which is inherent in the mind itself between its sensible words seen or heard and its inner thoughts as well as the mind's greater distance from the pure spirit of God. This is the argument of the De Trinitate through which the mind itself, formed as imago trinitatis, mirrors the divine life.

The real inheritance of the sanctified soul in God, then, is a unity of spirit with God, but not an absolute identity. It is a unity of relation which does not obscure the ultimate difference of nature. The Christian faith understands God alone to be the Trinity itself, although there are always holy spirits and souls inhering in the Trinity. The unity of spirit while true does not blur the distinctions of uncreated and created spirit. There remains a real multiplicity.

Augustine compares this real inheritance, this multiplicity of created spirit in God, to the multiplicity of persons in the simple unity of the divine. Although the simple unity of the divine essence is what the Father and the Son are, the Father remains Father and the Son remains Son. There is no essential separation of the Father and the Son in their
distinction, as there is between the sanctified created spirit and the immutable self-identity of the divine essence. Rather, they are distinct inasmuch as they are not both the Father, nor both the Son.

Without explicitly naming the category, Augustine has made this comparison, and clarified the distinction in the divine, by way of the category of relation. One is the relation of the finite spirit in God, the other is the essential relations of God himself. This multiplicity of persons, clarified by the distinction of their relations - one is Father and one is Son - is the unity of the substance of God. Now the argument must proceed to discern what this multiplicity of relations means as relations of the simple divine essence.
Commentary on VI.viii.9.

Cum itaque tantus ... Trinitas potius quam triplex.

(51)

Since the divine persons do not exist separately but are essentially one in the divine substance and are distinguished by their relations, each person possesses the entire substance integrally. What the Father is alone, or what the Son or Spirit is alone is the same as what these are together. If they were more together than alone, they would be triplex, a composite of separate entities. However, given the simplicity of their substance as spirit they are one.

Augustine contrasts this spiritual unity with that of the body wherein the joining of two bodies increases each body by the addition of the other. In Augustine's illustration, the unity acquired which becomes greater than its parts is that of the husband and wife whose union of substance is due to their complementary natures. Inasmuch as these bodies are intended for such a union, their complementary natures complete one another, a completion which each is by nature incapable of in itself. Their union is, therefore, a completion of bodily nature, so that a greater body, a whole constituted of two complementary parts, results.

In spiritual things, unity is different. When a
lesser is joined to a greater, as in the case of the
soul being joined to God, the soul becomes greater, but
only in the sense of becoming better. For in spiritual
things there is no mass by which the quantity of one is
increased by the quantity of another. The increase is
the inherence of created spirit in that which is greater
in every way. The inherence of the soul in God renders
the soul better, but inasmuch as the divine spirit is
itself absolutely perfect, God does not himself improve
from this unity. This is true for any spiritual
creature which inheres in God.

The spiritual inherence of the creature in God is,
then, altogether different from the complementary union
of two bodies. In the case of the latter, each body is
increased by the other. In the nature of spirit, only
the created spirit is made better, because the divine
spirit is itself perfectly complete and pure.

Therefore, says Augustine, while the equal Son
adheres to the equal Father, and the equal Spirit to the
Father and the Son, God does not become greater, or
better, because there is no spirit by virtue of which
the divine perfection increases, either as the divine
essence, or as the Father or the Son or the Spirit who,
each one, is the divine essence equally.

Thus far the argument has led us to understand the
simplicity and multiplicity of the divine as the
perfection of Spirit. The unity of perfect Spirit is distinguished from that of bodies which combine to constitute greater bodies. And perfect Spirit is also distinguished from created spirit which may be made to inhere in the divine spirit by grace, but is not in itself absolute. As Spirit, the Father is perfect, and the Son is perfect, and the Holy Spirit is perfect: there is no inequality between them. But because their perfection is not limited, either bodily, or by virtue of a capacity to increase in perfection from anything within or without them, their absolute perfection is common to them not as anything other than they are, but what they are, and what they are only. Therefore, each divine person is perfect Spirit, and Deus is perfect Spirit, because Deus is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. They are Trinity and not triplex.
Commentary on VI.iix.10.

Et guoniam ostendimus ... caput autem Christi. Deus". (52)

Augustine now turns to consider how the divine persons are who they are in their individuation. Thus far the argument has concluded that the divine essence is the absolutely perfect life of spirit which is nothing other than the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That these three only are the fulness of the divine life means that they each mark a distinction in the divine activity. Thus far the distinction has been understood in the activities of the divine begetting and the mutual connexion of love. How the Son as wisdom figures into the divine begetting is not yet clear. Here Augustine proceeds to discuss the individuation of the Father, and this discussion will carry over into the great aporia of the divine substance as the divine relations by way of St. Hilary.

In order to consider the predication of the Father, who is only the Father and not the Son nor the Spirit, Augustine takes up the question of whether the Father may himself be called God or this is reserved for the Father and the Son and the Spirit. We have already approached this question from the viewpoint of the equality of the divine essence, which is given by the
Father to the Son in the divine birth, and which is given again by both the Father and the Son in their mutual act of reciprocal love. Now that this equality of essence is established and the substance of God is seen to be a simple multiplicity of divine attributes in the perfection of Spirit, Augustine asks the question again in order to distinguish the Father, quia non nisi ipse ibi Pater. The opinion is put forward that the Father alone is not God but rather the Father and the Son and the Spirit together are alone God.

Against this opinion Augustine summons the authority of Scripture. His task is not to bring texts into the argument which clearly answer the problem, for such texts do not exist. Rather he offers texts which clarify the question, and because they are used by both Augustine and his adversaries alike, they are scrutinized through the progress of the argument thus far. Scripture compels the argument through the categories of mind.

In John 17:3, Jesus is seen addressing the Father whom Jesus names unum verum Deum. The Arians used this to deny that the Son is the one true God. According to the argument of Book V, the Arian position is untenable: the Father and the Son are unum and aequalis in substance. What John intends, says Augustine, is to show exactly what he says, that the Father alone is Deum.
This is done so that no one might conclude that when thinking about God one must think the three persons together in order not to think of them individually, since to think of them individually would be to think them less than God.

But if this passage asserts the divinity of the Father as God alone, what, asks Augustine, is the consequence of this testimony of the Lord? Are we to call each person of the Trinity God? Are all three together at the same time God? If these questions are affirmed, and Augustine has already concluded that each person is Deus and all together are Deus, is this the intent of the Lord's testimony that we simply understand the divine individuation from this Scripture, or is more required? What Augustine is addressing is how we shall think the divine individuation, what distinguishes one person from the others. There are many passages of Scripture which compel the same aporia. Of themselves, these passages are not perspicuous.

For instance, is John 17:3 meant to be understood so as to include the Son as the one true God? If this is so the meaning would be as if the wording were, "Ut te et quem misisti Jesum Christum, cognoscant unum verum Deum ". This would clarify the Son's divinity along with the Father, but would not explicitly mention the Spirit. However, Augustine continues, it would not be
necessary for the Spirit to be mentioned explicitly, because of the general assumption that whenever one thing adheres to another by so great a peace that these two are one, the peace which is the unity is itself assumed (intelligatur) although not explicitly thought. This is to say that especially in the being of God the Spirit as the "bond of peace" is always assumed when thinking of God. This is the case, says Augustine, when Paul apparently omits the Holy Spirit who should be understood when he writes, "Omnia sunt vestra; vos autem, Christi; Christus autem, Dei". The Holy Spirit is of course Christi and Dei. Another passage of Scripture which also assumes the Holy Spirit is where Paul says, "Caput mulieris, vir; caput viri, Christus; caput autem Christi, Deus". But this requires more discussion.

Sed rursus si Deus ... quod ipse solus est. (53)

The question concerning why these three divine persons are who they are, and only themselves, continues in the consideration of this passage of Paul above. If God is only these three persons together, how is God the Trinity the head of Christ? For if the Trinity itself includes Christ in order to be Trinity, how is the Trinity his head? The difficulty is this: to speak of Christ is to recognize his individuation, but how is he individuated if his head is a three person unity and one
person of that unity is already presupposed as his individuated person? Approached in this way, the divine persons are assumed in an unclarified distinction which is also unclear in relation to the Incarnation. Or the same difficulty may be put: is that which is the Father and the Son the head to that which is the Son alone? Approached in this way, the divine essence which is what the Father and the Son are is given a logical priority over the unclarified distinction of persons. In other words, what is clear at this point is not the distinction but the common essence. But then how can the common essence be the head of Christ since only the Son is Incarnate. As Augustine continues, he begins to answer this question. "Cum Filio enim Pater Deus," which is to say that these persons are the divine essence, a point he has already established, "solus autem Filius Christus est:" but the Incarnation is of the Son alone. This much is revealed and partly answers the question. Because only the Son is Incarnate, a distinction is required within the divine essence in order for this to be so. This is revealed in the Son's humility of being made flesh and declaring that the Father is greater than he. Thus the being of God itself is the unity of the Son with the Father, and so the head of Christ is not the head of divinity, which the Father and the Son are, but the head of the man, the mediator, who is the Son
Augustine's answer is incomplete. What he has partly determined is that the relation of the Trinity to the Incarnation of the Son leaves the Son in his unclarified divine individuation with the Father as the unity of the divine essence. The divine unity as Trinity is not the head of the Son as divine essence for the Son remains himself in the priority of the divine being that there may be the Trinity. The Incarnation of the Son as man, the mediator between God and man, is what depends upon the prior divine unity, that which is the Father and the Son, as head. And so there is no real priority of the divine essence over the divine persons. The logical distinction is held between essence and persons inasmuch as the two are not held in one view. There exists only the priority of the divine persons over the Son as man. But this is only part of what is the answer to the difficulty of how each divine person may be called God as Augustine makes clear in the following.

_Si enim mentem ... Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti._ (54)

Augustine has thus far concluded that the divine essence is the head of Christ as man. He illustrates this by reference to the constitution of the human being. And it is important to note that his illustration takes the form of a question indicating here a
speculation and not a conclusion. If the mind is the principle of the human substance (which is to say that the mind distinguishes man so that man is not merely living but also rational and spiritual being) so that the mind is as it were the head of the human being, how much more appropriate is it that the divine Verbum who with the Father is the divine being is the head of Christ the man. The assertion here is that as every human being possesses mind as the sine qua non of man, so much more fittingly does Christ as man have the divine being as Word and Father as the sine qua non of the Incarnation. The correspondence is correct but inexact. We have already seen how Augustine understands the human soul to participate in the divine life by grace to such a fulness that this inheritance may be compared to the natural life of the divine persons, and that this inheritance is possible because man's created spirit is like to the uncreated Spirit of God. However the relation of created and uncreated spirit attained by the grace of God does not destroy the distinction. The correspondence here is inexact for two reasons.

The first and most important reason Augustine recognizes is that Christ is individuated as man because of the Incarnation of the Verbum. When Augustine refers to the divine being of the Verbum with the Father as the head of Christ as man, he immediately qualifies the
assertion by conceding that Christ cannot be understood except insofar as the Verbum was made flesh. This means that the individuation of Christ as man focuses in the Incarnation of the Verbum. And so the Verbum is distinguished from the Father in the Incarnation of Christ even though this is not yet clear. That the Word is more fitting to the Incarnation seems evident given the likeness between the divine as Verbum and man as mens. But how the Father is distinguished from the Verbum as Verbum in the divine essence has not yet been clarified in the argument.

The second reason is a consequence of the first. Given the need for distinction between the Father and the Verbum in the divine being, there remains a lack of clarity with respect to the individuation of the human nature of Christ. To speak of the fittingness of the Verbum in the Incarnation requires that the divine nature and the human nature be kept distinct. Otherwise, the heresy of Apollinaris appears wherein the divine Verbum precludes the human mens of Christ. In order for the fittingness of the Verbum in the Incarnation to be understood, the divine life, which thus far in the argument is known in its essence and in its persons, but only abstractly, needs now to be understood in the concreteness of the divine activity which is the divine essence and persons held in one
view. Consequently, the distinction of natures in the Incarnate Verbum is seen. This weighty and indispensable consideration compels the rest of the argument.

Given this direction of the argument by means of which Augustine will seek to understand why God is these three divine persons and only these three, he concludes what has gone before. The argument has demonstrated the equality of the Trinity and one and the same substance. It has done so by virtue of the divine begetting and the reciprocal mutual love of the Father and the Son. Whatever way this question how the one is three develops, and Augustine has seen the more penetrating direction it must take, the highest equality of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is now understood.
Commentary on VI.X.11

Quidam cum vellet ... locis suis acquiescant. (55)

To think of the divine essence and the divine persons in one view is to think of the trinitarian life or activity. Why the divine persons are who they are and only these three is a question that admits of predicking properties peculiar to the Father, Son, and Spirit. In this way Augustine will show how the persons are each one God, and yet distinct, and once the distinction of the persons is given a certain clarity, the Incarnation of the Verbum takes on a necessary logic stemming from the divine being itself.

Augustine, therefore, turns to Hilary. In his De Trinitate, Hilary begins to work out what has only been implicit in the Church's doctrine of the Trinity to this point. How the persons are the divine essence is not clear in the theological speculations of the Fathers prior to Hilary. The Arian heresy thrived through his day because the relation of the Son to the Father had not been clearly thought. A beginning was made in the conciliar disputes and especially through the theology of Athanasius and the Cappadocians, and yet even these orthodox theologians were unable to bring a sufficient logic to their true belief. Hilary constitutes an advance but Augustine will have to go beyond him also.
In Book V we discovered how Gregory of Nazianzus attempts to avoid the subordinationism of the Arians, only to succumb to it. The hypostases of the Son and the Spirit are derived from the unitive essence of the Father to which they return. Their procession and return are unclear, and so their equality and distinction is obscure. A disparateness remains between the divine essence and the persons.

Athanasius had argued against the Arians that the essence of the Father and the Son is identical. The Son receives the divine essence from the Father by his being begotten, which is in no sense like that of human paternity and filiation. The Son is therefore the Word, Wisdom, and Power of the Father. The Son is like the radiance which comes forth from the sun but is not essentially different from it. Indeed, Athanasius considers the identity of the Father and the Son in the divine substance by way of the categories of Aristotle, although without the careful categorical analysis of Augustine. The Son is not a mere quality of the Father, as heat is of the radiance of the sun, rather he is essentially one with the Father in the simplicity of the divine substance. He is begotten not made.

Athanasius clearly establishes the equality of the Son with the Father but not by means of a logic adequate to reflect the divine being. His is a faithfulness to
the Biblical revelation. His theological logic remains implicit. And so the theology of Athanasius is tantamount to that of the Cappadocians. The divine unity has an ontological priority over the divine persons who are named and predicated according to Scriptural revelation. The divine essence and the divine persons are disparately conceived.

With Hilary, Augustine understands the Church to make a beginning in bringing the divine essence and the divine persons together. This may be seen in that Augustine claims to have read all that he could find written on the doctrine of the Trinity, but refers only to Hilary by name. That he does so here in the argument suggests an advance made in the doctrine by Hilary's work.

The distinction of the persons in thought requires that the persons be known according to their respective properties. Thus far in the argument, Augustine has understood the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit from the revelation of Scripture through the categories of mind compelled and formed by the revelation itself. The divine life has been seen through the divine begetting and the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The names of the persons are those derived from revelation: Father, Son, Wisdom, Power, Word, Holy
Spirit, Love, Gift, and these have been qualified insofar as their substance, relation, and act have been given a form for thought. The Father begets the Son who is the Father's Wisdom, Power, and Word. Insofar as the Father is the original source of the Son, the Father is the Principle of the Son. The relation of the Father and the Son which is nothing other than the divine essence as begetter and begotten, perfect in itself, is given a further completeness as the mutual love of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit who is the ineffable communion, the connexio, of the Father and the Son who as the original source of their love are the one act or Principle of the Spirit. It is clear that a distinction of the persons exists, and this is evident not only by virtue of their names, but also because the God-man Jesus is understood as the Incarnation of the Son whose peculiar property as Word seems more fitting for union with the rational life of man, than does the Father or the Spirit. Augustine has clearly discovered the substantial equality of the divine persons. How then is the Father in this divine substance distinct from the Son and the Spirit? How is the Son Wisdom, Power, and Word in such a way that the Father and the Spirit are not? How is the unity of the divine essence which is the persons also its activity?

In his De Trinitate, Hilary attributes properties
to the persons. Aeternitas is in the Father, species is in Imagine (the Son), and usus is in Munere (the Spirit). Augustine considers each of these in turn.

By Aeternitas Augustine understands Hilary to mean that the Father is himself the Principle of divinity, the origin of the divine essence which comes from him. Eternity has no Principle for itself, no origin to which it refers. Comparatively, the Son has the Father as Principle, as origin from whom the Son receives the divine life that he may be Son. As the Son, the begotten of the Father, he refers back to his origin and so is said to be coeternal to the Eternity who is his Father. That the Son is called Image also shows that the Father is that to which the Image corresponds, and since this Image perfectly reflects the being of the Father which he has received, the Son is said to be coequal to him. The Father does not refer to any origin or Principle, but the Son necessarily refers to the Father as his.

The Image is Species. By Species Augustine understands Hilary to mean a perfect view or appearing of the Father, the form of the divine eternity becoming explicit for the divinity itself, the moment of the divine self-knowing. The Image as Species is the pulchritude, the full congruence, equality, similitude, of the Father in which there is no disagreement, no
inequality, no dissimilarity but rather an identity with that of whom he is the Image. In this identity which shows itself in the Image there is the first and highest life. This is to say that the divine life revealed in the Image is nothing other than its own being, for in the simplicity of the divine being and life are identical. Moreover this simplicity of being and life is also thought. Being, life, and thought are all one in the Image so that the Image, this view or appearing of the Father, is actually the perfect Verbum of Eternity.

The divine Verbum, the divine being, life, and thought made explicit is therefore full lacking nothing. As the perfect appearing of the divine Eternity, the Word as Word is the Art of the omnipotent and wise God. Augustine understands the divine Word as divine Art necessarily to include the fulness of all living and immutable reasons, which are one in the Image as Species, who is one from the one with whom it is one.

In the Word as Art, God knows all things that are made through it. This knowledge is itself eternal and immutable, so that although times pass away and succeed one another, nothing is lost from the knowledge of God. This is so because God's knowledge of creatures does not follow their creation, rather creation follows upon his knowing it. Hence in the divine Verbum, the nature of
the divine Eternity and the knowledge of all creatures in their living immutable reasons becomes explicit.

Augustine understands Hilary to predicate an *ineffabilis complexus* of the Father and the Son. This Eternity, this being, life, and thought, which becomes explicit as Image or Word, is given a mutual inherent reference, a mutual knowledge not scrutinized by Hilary but only assumed as reciprocal between the Father and the Son. In this inherent reference there is an ineffable embrace (*complexus*) which is itself productive. For Hilary, says Augustine, the embrace is an utter enjoyment of love and joy. It is love, pleasure, felicity or blessedness, which brings a fruition to the immutable reasons of God now made explicit in the Word.

Hilary is keenly aware of the inadequacy of human language to speak of the divine and in this he is followed by Augustine. Both of these Christian theologians teach what the philosophical tradition fully understood in the distance between finite thought and the infinite. Here in Augustine's recounting of Hilary's predication, this obstacle of thought as language returns. When speaking of the divine life, the human must recognize the limits of predication, and yet it is precisely here that confidence is gained in predication because it is in the Holy Spirit that the created finds
itself linked to the immutable reasons of the Image of Eternity. Therefore Hilary calls the Spirit Usus.

The Holy Spirit is the sweetness (suavitas) of the begetter and the begotten. That sweetness, not itself begotten and so not a son, is itself productive, the fruitful overflowing (perfundens) of the vast abundance (largitate) and fruitfulness (ubertate) of all creatures according to their capacity in the immutable reasons of the Verbum. They are brought forth in the actuality of their providential order in which they all seek the restful existence of their appointed places.
Haec igitur omnia ... et beatissima delectatio. (56)

Hilary makes this predication of the Trinity, the Father as Eternity, the Son as Imago or Species, and the Spirit as Usus, according to the Scripture. His De Trinitate is not a theology of nature but rather a revelation of God himself. His use of analogies forms illustrations of what in principle is revealed and does not constitute the beginning of his theological method. The igitur which appears in the text here expresses the conclusions reached by Augustine based on the authority of Hilary.

Therefore, says Augustine, all that have been made by the divine Art, the divine Verbum, show in themselves a trinitarian vestige. For each thing possesses a unity, a form (species), and an order, corresponding to the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit. Whatever may be has a certain unity: it cannot be infinitely discrete. And so bodies have their natures as do souls. These also possess their respective forms which constitute their natural definition as in the figures or qualities of bodies and the doctrines or arts of souls. And each of these has its order relative to the others wherein it seeks or holds its place and time as in the weights and arrangements of bodies and the loves and delights of
souls.

Augustine understands the creation to reflect the life of the Creator as Hilary has shown from the self-revelation of God. It is fitting, as St. Paul taught, that God be understood through his creation. And so he may be understood as Trinity given the revelation of Scripture and the experience of creation. The correspondence to the Father and the Son and the Spirit in creation is found in the unity, form, and order of the created which is their being, definition, and relative order. The Father as the Eternal Being and Principle of the divine life is given a semblance in the unitive existence of creatures. The Son as the Image and Verbum of the Father in whom Eternal Being is made explicit has its vestige in the rational form of natural bodies and souls. The Spirit who is the ineffable embrace of the Father and the Son is dimly reflected in the relative order of created beings one to the other.

Again, it is important to point out that this correspondence is not simply a vestigial likeness but rather a derivation. "In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium, et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio." The Eternal Being is the origo, the Verbum is the Beauty, and the Complexus is the Delight, whose vestige as creation is the unity, form, and order of created beings.
Itaque illa tria ... et unum omnia. (57)

Augustine now returns to the question which has moved the argument to this point, namely, how each person of the Trinity is called God, and why these three persons are who they are and only these three. Hilary's trinitarian theology has made great progress in showing how the divine life as the divine persons may be seen in one view.

These three, says Augustine, "et ad se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt." Videntur is most probably to be translated "are seen" as in the sense of "understood", although inasmuch as we shall see that this demonstration is incomplete the translation "seem" is not altogether inappropriate. In either case what is of importance is that the persons are given a limit of properties which marks each one off from the other. The names of Father, Son, and Spirit, are found to possess a distinction of one towards the others. Hilary has focused upon the names of Eternity, Image or Word, and Use, and these are seen by Augustine as having a vestigial likeness in creation.

Although the persons are given limits of properties which mark them off from one another, they are not thereby strictly defined in nature. The persons do not exist in relation to one another as discrete forms of
being, as is the case of the Plotinian \textit{vous} which we shall address below, wherein one person would differ from another and lacking the nature of that difference would require some means of participation in the others for his completion. "... \textit{in se infinita sunt}" says Augustine, which means that each person fully possesses the whole divine nature. The divine substance is not divided in any way among the divine persons. Father, Son, and Spirit are each one wholly God and yet they are distinct, marked off by properties which render these three as the only divine persons who are not themselves interchangeable. When the three are thought, we are not to think of an aggregate being in which three are greater than one. Each person is the whole of the divine substance, and two or three are not in any sense whatsoever more divine than one. Augustine therefore concludes that the divine substance is simply these three so that each is in the other, and all is in each, and each is in all, and all are one.

Hilary has made an advance in the doctrine of God insofar as he has attempted to think the inherent distinction of the Father and the Son and the Spirit. For our purposes it is important to clarify this advance in relation to the Neoplatonic theology of Plotinus since Augustine knew of Plotinus, as well as in relation to the Christian doctrine before Hilary, so as to see
his contribution and the inadequacies of his doctrine, and the direction the argument must take.

Hilary's doctrine is trinitarian. Augustine knows Plotinus and Origen, but it is Hilary who provides the necessary advance in the argument.

In Book I of his *De Trinitate*, Augustine addresses those adversaries of the doctrine who despise the beginning point of faith, which for Augustine is the relation of the rational soul to the historical person of Christ. The third class of these is probably the theology of Plotinus whose first hypostasis is an unintelligible activity which manifests itself in a declension of divine being. That of the One is properly without predication, but Plotinus attempts to describe it as a unitive self-love or will whose fecundity is revealed in the emanation of the divine hypostases of and . The One itself is necessarily devoid of self-relation or self-consciousness because such a state of being would itself be multiple in the division of knower and known and thus not the highest divinity since it would require a prior unitive power to sustain it. The emanation of divine hypostases from the One is due to an abundance of power which is the outflow of an absolutely complete actuality. The and the are each one a totality in itself imaging the One in its self-
completeness and productive actuality.

The νοῦς is the first multiple from the One inasmuch as its activity is the motion of self-knowing which is also its life. The motion of its activity is the formal distinctions of the great kinds of being. The ground is Being itself which Moves forth into a formal moment of Difference thereby knowing its own Identity and Resting in its completeness. The self-knowing of its fullness is adequate to the production of the ὑπνηριά but is also aware of its absolute need for the unitive power of the One to sustain its division. The One therefore is known both in the activity of the νοῦς which is the production of the One, and in the reference of the νοῦς back to the One as its Principle.

The ὑπνηριά is the second multiple from the One and is constituted of the many actual forms of being which derive from the fecundity of the great forms of being of the νοῦς. These are known to its activity in their varied definitions, with each one known in its singularity. The being of ὑπνηριά is thus more multiple than the νοῦς, and its productivity in world soul becomes the divided relations of material being. The One is known again in its productive power although now more and more discursively and discretely than in the νοῦς.
This downward declension of divinity finds its lowest coherence in the souls of individuals. There the entire hypostatic hierarchy is reflected in the related moments of discursive and intuitive thought which itself requires a unitive power. And it is there in the souls of individuals that the most discrete effect of the One draws closest to It by means of a contemplative ascent through these levels of being finally to the One itself wherein all individuality is lost to the absolute Unity of the One.

Hilary's theology is close to that of Plotinus and yet decisively different. For Hilary to predicate the Father as Eternity, and the Scn as Species, and the Spirit as Usus is especially close to Plotinus' One, \( \nu \alpha \sigma \), and \( \psi \mu \eta \). Insofar as the Eternity or Father is seen in that he is himself without Principle, and the Species or Word is the explication of what is implicit in the Father both as divine and as the fulness of all living and immutable reasons, as the \( \nu \alpha \sigma \) is of the One, and the Spirit as Usus is the production of all creatures brought forth into their actual relations, as the \( \psi \mu \eta \) is to the \( \nu \alpha \sigma \), Hilary has followed the conclusions of Neoplatonic philosophy which apparently he knew firsthand. Before his knowledge of the Biblical and Christian doctrine he had concluded that the divine and eternal was one and identical.
Moreover, Hilary's lack of clarity with respect to the character of the resurrection of the body may indicate the residue of the Neoplatonic dispossession of human individuality in ἐνωσις but this is not clear. The differences between Hilary and Plotinus are crucial.

Hilary's predication of properties of the divine persons does not preclude their essential equality. Repeatedly, Hilary argues that the divine names name the nature: the Son is divine Son by virtue of the Father begetting him. Hilary is altogether clear that these persons are the substance of God although exactly how they are related is not clear beyond the names of Scripture. Hilary's first principle is trinitarian and not the unself-conscious activity of the Plotinian One. The equality of the divine persons means that the divine being, life, and wisdom of the Father is the Son's through his birth. The Spirit as ineffabilis complexus and suavitas of the Father and the Son is their equal enjoyment the one of the other. And so the inadequacy of the ἐνωσις to the One, and of the ὑποστάσεις to the ἐνωσις in the descending hierarchy of Plotinus is overcome by Hilary, not on the basis of what is necessary philosophically as Augustine will show, but according to revelation alone. This is so despite the wonderful common view of Plotinus and Hilary that understands the divine to include a unity which in one
way or another must involve thought and love and the higher logic of creation. However, their difference is so crucial that Hilary must oppose Plotinian Neoplatonism in the form of the Arian heresy which is theologically its equivalent insofar as the Arian hypostases are related as creative cause to created effect and are not equal. This is not to suggest a line of influence but rather a comparison of doctrines which in their various positions is known to Augustine.

Augustine chooses Hilary at this point in his argument because of his advance over the theological positions of Origen and the Cappadocians which may be viewed as the same in their economic and subordinative trinitarianism. Hilary attempts to give the inner life of the Trinity an order which brings the persons and the essence together. Their relations as Eternity, Species, and Complexus delimit themselves toward one another, and not simply in their creative or redemptive acts outwardly, while maintaining their divine substantial integrity. In the words of Augustine, "et ad se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt." Of all the Fathers, Hilary has come closest to seeing how the divine essence is the divine persons, which is to say why these three are who they are and these three only.

We have seen how Gregory of Nazianzus ultimately subordinates the Son and the Spirit to the unitive
activity of the Father. Origen whom Augustine knew had also done the same inasmuch as the Ἁγγείον had its source and end in the activity of the Father, which is to say that there begins an essential identity but then a falling away into the personal distinction of the Ἁγγείον. Origen, like Plotinus and their successor, Arius, understood the Father to be a complete activity, a unitive will which stands as Principle to all that comes after. For Origen, the Ἁγγείον is the eternal effect of the Father revealing what is hidden in the Father. The Ἁγγείον is first of all the wisdom of the Father, the logical expression of his activity, who has come forth from the Father like brightness from light by an act of the Father's will and power. This wisdom possesses all the forms of creaturely existence, receiving and reflecting all that is hidden within the original goodness of the Father. The Holy Spirit is worthy of divine attribution because he is present in the sanctifying act of baptism and is the active source of holiness in the souls of the regenerate. Thus the Holy Spirit is the means of the return of sanctified creation to God.

Origen constructs a hierarchy of divinity, a continuous font which flows from the original hidden goodness of the Father in the wisdom of the begotten Son
into the sanctifying activity of the Spirit. The peculiar acts of the divine are therefore understood through the acts of the persons in creation and redemption: the Father as Being is the Principle of being in all created things, the Son as Wisdom is the Principle of reason in all rational creatures, and the Spirit as Sanctifier is the Principle of holiness in all the sanctified. There is no inherent trinitarian activity. All proceeds from the will of the Father.

For Hilary, the divine persons have a limited mutual definition so that the divine essence is inwardly self-defined, which is determinative of the economic activity of the persons but is not identical to it. Furthermore, while the names Hilary chooses for this inward mutuality are not transparent as divine activity, there is implicitly a recognition of mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son which has a logical priority to the Spirit as Complexus. This will become explicit in Augustine's argument. Hilary fails to grasp this because of an inadequate logic, which Augustine has discovered as the necessity of Scripture compelling its own interpretation. Hilary's advance and the logic of substance, relation, and act, mark the argument for Book VII.
Qui videt hoc ... in saecula saeculorum. Amen". (58)

The consequence of Hilary’s teaching is that the Trinity is seen with greater clarity. And so one may now understand the Trinity either through the naming of the essence and persons as Hilary has done or through the speculum as Augustine has shown thus far. That Augustine does not see these as identical is important to the argument inasmuch as Hilary’s approach, while an advance over the Christian and Neoplatonic tradition which precedes him, would in itself be unable to proceed further.

Hilary had argued that his predication of the divine names was on the basis of revelation alone to such an extent that any other words than those found in Scripture were unsuitable and because Christians should be prepared to heed God’s revelation of himself. Augustine has taken another route insofar as the categories which are formed in mind are the result of Scripture itself compelling them. The understanding of the Trinity then is not through the names of Scripture alone but through the illumination of Scripture in mind, the mirror of the divine activity. For Augustine, the speculum is formed and gains clarity as the Biblical doctrine requires categories for its understanding. Hilary can go no further, because he does not know the
categories by means of which the divine essence and the persons can be thought as one. Augustine must go on with the argument because his aporia has been only partly answered. It is not clear how the Father is the origin of the Son, especially as Word, nor is there a foundation for their mutual enjoyment as Spirit without mutual knowledge. There remains a gap in the understanding of the essence as the persons. Augustine will overcome this by virtue of the categories and the faith of the Church as it is best expressed in Hilary.

The difficulty of Hilary's incomplete argument may be more profoundly seen in the absence of a concrete formation of the mind as *speculum* in its knowledge of the Trinity. Hilary's reluctance to make predications of the divine essence other than those names revealed in Scripture leaves the mind at the distance from the divine with which it begins. The divine names do not find a coherence in the categories of mind which reflect the absolutely coherent being and life of God. Because these names remain for Hilary simply revelatory, their function as illumination is less inasmuch as the mind itself cannot become a concrete mirror of the life of the Trinity. The Biblical names are not given a form for thought and in this sense the mind is unable to draw closer to the trinitarian activity. For Hilary, to go beyond the divine names seems impious. For
Augustine, it is necessary to go beyond the divine names and yet not to leave them behind because they themselves demand a logic as means for the formation of mind as imago trinitatis.

We may even go a step further and suggest that the inability of Hilary's theology to form the mind as distinct imago is seen in the unclear way in which he speaks of the individuation of the resurrected body both of Christ and of the Christian. In the consummation of all things Christ in his glorified body is thoroughly imbued with the divine so that Hilary speaks of Christ "passing over" into God, his body "vanishing" into pure spirit. Although it seems that Hilary's intention is to exalt the finite into the infinite, and not to destroy the finite, his inability to distinguish adequately the divine essence from the divine persons has its final effect in an obscure individuation of the resurrected body.

The end of Book VI has brought the argument and the reader to know the one God as Trinity, whether in the view of Hilary or that of Augustine's formation of the categories, and yet this knowing is only vestigial, it is not yet clearly presented to the mind how the divine essence is these divine persons and only these three. The question of how the Father is alone God, a question which involves the peculiar individuation of each divine
person and their respective being as the divine essence, remains for Book VII. What is required is that the categorical formation of Book V and the inherent mutuality of the divine persons in Hilary's *De Trinitate* be brought together. Augustine exhorts his reader to know God and give thanks inasmuch as the argument in its illumination has drawn the reader closer to a knowledge of God as Trinity. Those who cannot understand the vestigial doctrine need strive, he says, through piety to understand, and not resort to blind criticism. This *caecitas* was the spiritual pride of the Arians. These must strive through the submission of faith to see the vestigial understanding of the Trinity, that the Trinity is the One God from whom and through whom and to whom are all things. In the theology of those who preceded Augustine the economic work of the divine persons in creation and redemption has been in some sense seen, and now in Hilary there has been given a beginning in understanding what the ground of this economic Trinity is.
Conclusion to Book Six

The argument has moved now through the categories toward a perception of the divine life in itself. The activity of that life is seen first through faith, but then the inadequacy of a categorical logic to understand the faith appears among both orthodox and unorthodox, Christian and pagan alike. The Creed itself offers a true account of the faith while requiring the same categories Scripture demands for its explanation and defense.

The problem in predication has centered in a disparate view of the divine essence and the divine persons. Augustine's answer to this problem, through the guidance of the Creed, suggests that the life of God is somehow these divine persons, who are not themselves interchangeable but who are substantially related. The Creed teaches a continuity of life, which Augustine summarizes in the phrase *illud de illo*.

*Illud de illo* is the activity of the divine unity, and according to the Scripture, this unity is neither divided in essence nor dissenting in thought. The Father and the Son are equal in their divine nature which is itself perfect, and yet a completion to what is already perfect is seen in the mutual love of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit.
This unity of essence and thought and love in the divine which is the perfect life of the Father and the Son and the Spirit is viewed from two perspectives; substantial simplicity and substantial personality. The question focuses on how God is one simple substance and three persons, and why these three only. This is the question of the necessity of the divine life.

The simplicity of the essence of God, what has been shown to be an identity of essence, thought, and love, is understood as the life of perfect Spirit. All the divine predicates are nothing other than this Spirit, and the life of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit inhere one in another by virtue of this common spiritual life.

What individuates the persons within this perfect life of Spirit is the next logical question. To ask how the Father alone is God is also to ask what distinguishes him as Father and what exactly his relation to the Son is. Moreover, to speak of the Son as Incarnate is to inquire what marks the Son alone suitable for union with human nature. That the Son alone is *Verbum* offers an affinity between him and human nature, but what his name as *Verbum* means in relation to the Father and the Spirit who also are this simple identity of essence, thought, and love, remains unclear.

Hilary's *De Trinitate* advances beyond the
theological tradition of both Christians and pagans
inasmuch as he attempts to bring this simple essence and
these three persons together in one activity. Eternity,
Form, and Gift are first of all names which reflect an
inner life of the divine. These are respectively the
Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father as Eternity is the
origin of the divine which makes explicit its own
nature, and the formal being of creation, in the Image
or Form or Word who is the Son. The Holy Spirit is the
mutual embrace of the Father and the Son, the delight
shared between these two. The fulness of this inner
trinitarian life is seen in its productivity, through
the Spirit, of the formal being of creation already made
explicit in the *Species*. Hilary's advance is in this
inner ground of the divine life which is the Principle
at work in creation and redemption. In the words of
Augustine, the persons "*et ad se invicem determinari
videntur, et in se infinita sunt*." Until Hilary the
Church had been unable to articulate this inner
activity. And yet Hilary's doctrine is incomplete
inasmuch as he does not give a sufficient logic to
clarify the activity of the divine essence. His pious
preference for the exclusive use of Biblical names
renders the divine necessity opaque. If the Church would
avoid Neoplatonic subordinationism, the mind must
understand why the Son and the Holy Spirit are not
simply the effect of the Father's will. Augustine, therefore, is moved to bring the categories of Book V once again into the forefront in order to scrutinize the inner life of Spirit proposed now in the argument through Hilary.
Chapter Three
Commentary on Book Seven
Introduction

With Book VII, the argument pursues the question of the divine activity or necessity. Augustine had summarized the trinitarian theology of Hilary by saying the divine persons "et ad se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt". And so the argument seeks to discover what the individuation of the persons means, what their mutual delimitation is which would allow each one in himself to be called infinite. The creedal formulation held this aporia in the language of faith and, as the Scripture, required the logic of the categories discerned in Book V in order to be given an intelligible form. Composed in the language of faith, the Creed does not give an articulation of the divine necessity. Therefore, the argument returns to the Scripture as the primary authority in order to scrutinize this question set by the theology of Hilary.

The question of the divine necessity is focused in the Scripture, "Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God", which Augustine raised in Book VI to begin the consideration of the mind of the Church on the doctrine. The question now resumes to ask if the Father himself is his own wisdom or whether he is this through his Word.
The commentary brings the theology of Victorinus into the argument as an example of how this question would be answered if one understands the Father to be wise in the same way in which he speaks. The trinitarian theology of Victorinus, rather than that of Hilary, is chosen to provide the example because the trinitarian doctrine of Victorinus is more explicit, especially with respect to the naming and use of categories. It should be said, however, that their doctrine is similar.

The argument advances through the purview of the categories, asking the question of whether the Son and the Spirit are wise in themselves, and therefore seeks to show how the divine essence is wisdom and the persons are each integrally the divine essence. This is again in accord with the intention of the Creed, but the view of the divine essence and the relations goes beyond the Creed and begins to be seen in its necessity. Inasmuch as wisdom is usually predicated of the Son in the Scripture, although each is the divine wisdom, the path through which the divine necessity is approached now comes into sight. The Father is understood to be wise but not in the way in which he speaks.

The categories enable the mind to discern the doctrine, and in this there is an advance over the Church's predication in both the West and the East. Theological language had struggled to say something
about the Trinity in order to answer the question of what the three are. And to do this, the Church had employed the language of custom. In particular, the Church had recently resorted to the logical structure of genus and species but, as Augustine demonstrates, the language of genus and species is an inadequate logic for the doctrine of the Trinity. Porphyry's *Isagoge* is the example the author of this thesis includes to elucidate this logic and to suggest its influence on the kind of theology which Victorinus and Hilary represent. The Church had incorporated this logic, Augustine concludes, in order to dispute the claims of heretics, but since this logic has failed to satisfy the demands of revelation, Augustine prefers those categories which the Scripture has compelled.

The result of the argument and the consequence of this predication is to see the mind illumined and formed as a logical mirror of the Trinity. By virtue of a purgation of the language of custom which is the logical instance of a weak and sinful mind, the mind may be renewed in a logical image of God. However, if the reader is unable to follow the strict logic of the argument, Augustine exhorts him to accept the method of his argument, that the mind begin in its thinking of God by thinking of him as Spirit, and that the mind submit its predication to the self-revelation of the Trinity in
the Scripture. In this way the mind breaks forth from its own consuetudo, preparing itself for the timely illumination of God.
Commentary on VII.i.1.

_Jam nunc quaeramus ... essentia quae magnitudo._ (59)

"_Jam nunc_" Augustine takes up the problem of the divine necessity. The progress of the argument thus far has moved Augustine to seek more diligently why God is these three persons and only these three. Again the logic follows the path of illumination, which Augustine confidently assumes as the work of God himself (*quantum dat Deus*) speaking in Scripture and bringing the mind of the Church to understanding.

Hilary has asserted the ground of the Trinity known in the Incarnation and therefore in the creative and redemptive act of God. But Hilary has not given a sufficient logic for why the Father is Eternity and the Son is Form and the Spirit is Use. He has described an inherent mutual life between the three persons, but these names have not adequately revealed their activity. In the categories set forth by Augustine, Hilary has confused substantial and relative predications. While Eternity is a substantial attribute naming the entire divine nature, Form or Image and Use or *Complexus* are names predicated relatively; the Form or Image is of the Father and the Use or *Complexus* is of the Father and the Son. The logical result is a subordination of the Son and the Spirit to the Father. Augustine at this place in
the argument scrutinizes whether each divine person alone (singula quaeque ... persona) is able to receive divine predication per se ipsam, that is, essentially not relatively, or, whether the divine attributes may be predicated of the persons only when the entire Trinity is understood.

Augustine has already approached this aporia in Book VI where the discussion concerned first the unity and character of the divine essence as a spiritual unity of essence and thought which each of the persons is equally, and then the individuation of all the persons, beginning with the Father, where the Father is seen through John's Gospel to be true God such that the Son and the Spirit are not necessarily excluded. The Father is alone God, and the Scripture does not preclude the same predication of the Son and the Spirit, indeed it implies it; however, it has not become clear given that these are each God how they are distinct. That there is an important distinction within the divine essence is manifest in the Incarnation of the Word who is speculated to have a more fitting likeness to the human mens. And so the Scripture compels the argument toward an understanding of why the unity of essence and thought is these three. Hilary's treatise moves in this direction by attempting to bring the substance and the persons together, and although he fails, his doctrine is
an advance.

Here, the aporia is raised within the progress of the argument so that the categories are in the forefront. To ask the question whether or not the divine predicates may be made of the individuals in the divine essence is to ask upon what their respective constitution rests. Is each person the divine essence - great, wise, true, omnipotent, just -through and according to his essential nature? Or, is each person somehow dependent upon the others to complement him so that the divine predicates are named only of the Trinity together.

The aporia takes into account each of the persons and not just the Father or the Son or the Spirit. What is new to the question of why these three persons and only these three are the Trinity is that it is now discerned through the categories of essence and relation by way of the progress of Hilary's advance in bringing the essence and persons together albeit with this categorical inadequacy. If the names Eternity, Form, and Use are themselves categorically incompatible because the first is essential and the following two relative, or, if the names Father, Son, and Spirit are all relative, what constitutes their essential nature, a common essence somehow related, or the relations simply?

This question of the substance of God and the
persons, which is progressively approached through the argument, comes to be out of Scripture. What contains the first four books of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, what guides the argument in a logical dialectic in books five through seven, what grounds philosophical vision and comprehends it in the last eight books, is the revelation of God in Scripture. Scripture is fundamental to the method and argument of Augustine, and his doctrine cannot be understood without the recognition of its moving force. And so here as we return to a categorical logic of mind, Augustine writes, "*Hoc enim quaestionem facit,quia scriptum est: Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam:*".

Augustine addresses this question first from the perspective of the argument set forth by the orthodox mind of the Church as we have seen in VI.i.1. Their argument was that the Son is the power and wisdom of God such that the Father is wise and powerful by that which he begot, and because God is never without his power and wisdom, the Son is eternally begotten of the Father. Augustine followed this logic by asking if all the divine attributes were Sons by virtue of their being begotten, which would mean that power is a Son and wisdom is yet another Son. But none of the orthodox could affirm this. Moreover, according to the divine simplicity, which Augustine has just addressed in
VI.vii.8, all these predicates are understood to be the one divine substance so that Wisdom and Power also possess whatever other attributes are divine: when one is mentioned, all are assumed.

Given this divine simplicity, the question becomes whether the Father alone is wisdom — and Augustine makes the individuation as clear as possible here — *ipsa sibi ipse sapientia*, or the Father is wise in the manner of his speaking. By speaking, Augustine means the begetting of the Word eternally from the Father, not created reality where words in the form of spoken language go forth in sound and pass away out of sound, come to be and are not. The Word equal to the Father was with God (*Deus*) and was God and through this eternal Word all things were created. In this Word the Father speaks himself (*dicit se ipsum*) — eternally and incommutably, but in speaking himself he is not duplicated, because in his speaking the Father is not the Word who is himself the Son and Image of the Father. And so the Father is distinguished from the Word coeternal to himself, by means of which he utters himself, and therefore the Father in speaking is not understood without the Word. The question then concerns whether the Father is wisdom and power in the same way that he speaks the Word. If so, wisdom is in the same way that the Word is, and power is in the same way that
wisdom and the Word are, which is to say that the Word
and wisdom and power are the same identity, and are all
predicated relatively as are the names Son and Image.

The consequence of this logic begins with the
conclusion that the Father is not alone powerful or wise
but is this with that very power and wisdom which he
begot in and as the Word he speaks. The progress of this
logic swallows the other divine attributes and even the
divine essence as well. For if the Father is great by
the greatness which he begot, and it is not one thing to
be great and another to be God, then his greatness, is
not his alone but is his in his begotten. Thus the Son
is the deity of the Father. Because it is not one thing
for the Son to be and another to be God, the Son is the
essence of the Father as well as his Word and Image.
The end of this logic focuses in the dissipation of the
Father. For, with the exception that he is Father, which
is only to say that he has the name Father, he is
himself not anything except insofar as he has a Son.
Thus, not only is his predication as Father which is
said relatively to the Son because he has a Son, but
also that he is in his individuation, that he exists in
himself at all, is because he has begotten his own
essence. If the divine attributes are the divine
essence, then any predications of the Father as his
through the Son render the Father's divine essence
derived. We are left in the argument with the speculation of whether the Father begets his own essence, just as he begets his own greatness and power and wisdom.
Commentary on VII.i.2.

Haec disputatio nata est ... dominus ad servum: (60)

The argument (disputatio) is compelled by Scripture. Augustine employs the natural image of birth to convey the necessary relation between the Scripture as revelation and the argument formed in mind through its illumination. There is an integral giving forth of the content of the doctrine in that form which is appropriate to faith, and the mind receives this as the apostolic word which must then be given a form for thought. The opposing positions derived from Scripture are not manipulations of an obvious meaning, but rather attempts at understanding, unless once shown to be wrong pride precludes a reformed view.

The Scripture itself by virtue of its divine predication provides the limits (angustias) of its analysis. The language of divine predication (ineffabilia fari), is therefore guided by the limits of revelation, which are themselves understood through the categories of mind appropriate to these limits.

The limits Augustine has thus far discerned from the Scripture, "Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam" are these: either Christ is not the power and wisdom of God in which case the apostolic word is opposed; or, Christ is the power and wisdom of God but his Father is
not the Father of his own power and wisdom, but this in itself is impious and resists the apostolic word because the Father would not be the Father of Christ who is the power and wisdom of God, which is to say that there is no natural co-inherence in the relation of the Father and the Son but rather a disparateness; or, that the Father is not powerful by his own power and wise by his own wisdom which would render the Father's very being derived from outside himself - however it is derived - but this as a logical consequence is too bold for anyone to admit; or, it should be understood that it is one thing for the Father to be (esse) and another for him to be wise so that he does not exist by that by which he is wise, which is the actual state of the created soul, at one time wise and at another time unwise, and thus the Father would be a mutable and composite nature and not the highest and most perfect simplicity; or, that the Father is not anything with respect to himself, but that he is Father and that he is at all is predicated relatively to the Son, in which case the predication of the Father depends upon his relation to the Son.

It is this latter position which presents the most reasonable view thus far of the necessity of the divine essence and its relations. In this the apostolic testimony is claimed, a natural co-inherence of the Father and the Son is preserved, the Father's own power
and wisdom is his natural Son and not derived from outside, and the Father and the Son remain coeternal and immutably simple. But is this position logically tenable?

The difficulty focuses through a series of questions. If the Father both in name and essence is predicated relatively to the Son, how are they of the same essence when the Father is said neither to be essence nor to be at all with respect to himself but only in relation to the Son? The answer to this quandary asserts the unity of their essence inasmuch as *ipsum esse* is not the Father's with respect to himself but is in relation to the Son, the essence the Father begot, and by which essence the Father is whatever he is. In this way the unity of essence is a dependence of relation, and the logical consequence is that neither the Father nor the Son is anything with respect to himself but only by virtue of their mutual natural relation (*uterque ad invicem relative dicitur*). Here the divine being is these relations simply so that there is no originative and constitutive essence within them but each depends upon the other for his predication, and their common ground, other than their relation, is unknown and unsaid: in other words, they are abstractly related, and their unity is in abeyance.

Given the inadequacy of abstract relations,
Augustine moves quickly to consider the constitutive essence as residing in the Son. He begins with the notion that the Father alone is predicated in every respect in relation to the Son, in which case the question arises as to what if anything may be said of the Father in respect to himself. Would he be essence itself? But if whatever is said of the Father is predicated relatively of the Son, then the essence of the Father is the Son just as the Son is the power and wisdom of the Father and this as he is the Word and Image of the Father. The logical result means the Son is not a relation dependent on the Father but is himself the constitutive essence of the relation. The Father is not essence but the begetter of essence so that he is not with respect to himself but is by virtue of the essence which he begot, just as he is great by greatness which he begot and all those divine attributes whatever they may be which are predicated of the Son in the simplicity of the divine being. Thus the Son while not originative is constitutive of the essence and of all of the divine attributes of the Father; therefore, the Son is properly predicated power, wisdom, Word, and Image with respect to himself alone.

Here Augustine reaches a logical limit. What is more absurd, he says, than that an image be predicated according to itself? An image reflects or imitates
another. And so the category of relation is required to clarify the aporia. However, before we continue with Augustine's argument, it is instructive to consider the doctrine of Victorinus who may very well be responsible for the position Augustine reports above wherein the Father begets his own existence identical to his power and wisdom.

It is no wonder that the doctrine of Victorinus was considered obscure and difficult even in his own day. His remarkable exegesis of Biblical revelation through the accomplishments of Neoplatonic philosophy, which he assumed to be theologically congruent with Christian metaphysical speculations, is a supreme challenge to understand. For our purposes we will address his doctrine as it is possibly influential on Augustine's argument. It is appropriate to consider Victorinus here inasmuch as his theological writings may be seen as an advance over the progress of Hilary, who had attempted to bring the divine essence and the names of the divine persons into one view. That the Scripture names Christ as the power and the wisdom of God enables Victorinus both to defend the doctrine of consubstantiality and to gain clarity of the trinitarian substance. When speaking of the activity of the divine, Victorinus refers to this Scripture which Augustine has cited, 1 Co.1:24, "Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam", in a number
of contexts which are instructive in discovering the
doctrine of Victorinus.

For Victorinus, the consubstantiality of the Father
and the Son is seen in the activity of the divine,
wherein esse, which is identified with the Father and is
at rest, causes the being of the ἄγας who moves
himself as the act and manifestation of the Father's
power and wisdom. The Father is originative being which
proceeds in the substance of filiation. There is no
essential division because the progression is from
potency to act, from being to life and thought. The
Father and the Son are therefore consubstantial
in their one essential activity.

Consubstantiality, by virtue of the activity of
being, is seen again when Victorinus addresses the final
delivering up of the kingdom by Christ to the Father.
There the order of subjection is first by the Father who
delivers, by begetting, the kingdom to the Son who as
begotten being receives his being, and thereby the
kingdom, from the Father. In order for the kingdom to be
returned to the Father it must be formed through the Son
or ἄγας who is the power and wisdom of God. Thus the
progress of the kingdom from God and back to God is by
way of the activity of the being of the Father and the
Son.

Again, the consubstantiality of the Father and the
Son is viewed through the Son as the power and the wisdom of God. Victorinus uses the illustration of sight, the act of vision, which is the moment of the potency of vision residing in the organ of sight coming to actual seeing, as an example of the divine activity. The Father is like the potency of vision, at rest and quiet, but containing all the natural inherent power for sight. From the potency of vision issues forth visio which as the unigentia is in motu and actione. What is in act is foris the divine potency but is essentially from it, and so the act is the operation of the potency and they are both ὅμοοοτζος.

... sic igitur et virtus et sapientia dei ipse deus et est totum quod simplex et quod unum et unius et eiusdem substantiae et :imul ex aeterno et semper et a patre, qui sui generator est existentis... Isto modo, sive ἄγος est Iesus sive lumen sive refugentia sive forma sive imago sive virtus et sapientia sive character sive vita, ὅμοοοτζος apparebit ἄγος et deus, pater et filius, spiritus et christus. 134

The attempt of Victorinus to defend the ὅμοοοτζος through the divine activity is seen in the development of being which is first at rest, in potentia, but full, so that what comes forth from being at rest is being in motion and act, like the capacity of vision coming to actual seeing. Victorinus does not carefully discriminate between divine names at this point. Light and life and Jesus and ἄγος and form and power and
wisdom are all identical in their motion from potency to act. Victorinus is so emphatic on the consubstantiality of this activity that he speaks of the Father as "sui generator est existentia". While discussion on this difficulty must be delayed for a moment, it should be noted here that Victorinus understands the person of the Father to be originative of the divine essence but leaves the constitutive element to the Son. The reader will recall that the third class of those whom Augustine opposes at the outset of the De Trinitate are those who maintain the Principle to be auto-genous. Classes one and two employ an analogical method, moving from creation and the soul respectively, to make predications of the divine, but the third class offers the abstraction of a self-creating Principle. Is this the case with Victorinus? He is clearly intent on avoiding the disparate conjunction of the divine essence and the divine persons into which the orthodox and unorthodox alike fell, and which Hilary wished to overcome. But whether or not Victorinus clears this hurdle by way of an activity of consubstantiality wherein an inactive and restful being begets its own life and form must wait briefly for a conclusion in order to examine more texts.

A lack of clarity concerning the divine names does not abide in Victorinus. He attempts to bring a distinction to the persons within the activity of the
divine substance wherein the substantial names are given a propriety in accord with the personal names. Citing I Co.1:24 again, Victorinus understands the Son to be the manifested power of God, who exists first in the Father as his being and then comes forth as power and wisdom through which all things are made. The Spirit, who is also in the Father with the Son, as being, and proceeds with the Son, is the perfection of those things made through the Son and is therefore also called wisdom. As power, the Son is eternal life, a perfect cognoscientia who is named perfect life because of his reflexive knowledge, knowing both what and from whom he has come forth. His eternal life as manifested power is seen to be derived from the pre-eternal life of the Father who produces the Son by his own will (iussezione).

This passage is important to our argument for three reasons: first, there is the suitability of particular names for the respective persons; being and pre-eternal life for the Father; perfect life, power, and wisdom for the Son; and wisdom for the Spirit. This is not an exhaustive catalogue for Victorinus as we have seen, but it indicates a distinction of divine attributes among the persons; second, these distinctions follow an activity and this is clearly seen in the Son gaining perfect life by virtue of his reflexive knowledge of the Father and the Father's being; third, in the tradition
of Neoplatonism both pagan and Christian, the Son is thought to be an effect of the Father's will. And so while the Father does not enjoy the explicitly reflexive knowledge of the Son, there is a fulness of the divine being attributed to the Father which renders him capable of willing the Son, which is to say that the divine activity is somehow present already in the Father.

Another passage allows us to see how Victorinus works out this divine activity, and this is very helpful in discerning the intention of Augustine at this juncture in his argument. Victorinus maintains the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son and the Spirit while asserting a personal alterity as well,

Habemus ergo secundum ordinem permissu dei et patrem et filium θυγατέρας et θυγοῦρα secundum identitatem in substantia. Una enim substantia spiritus. Is ipsum esse est. Ipsum esse autem et vita et intellegere est. Ista tria in singulis quibusque et ideo una divinitas et unum quod omne, unus deus, quia unum, pater, filius, sanctus spiritus, secundum potentiam et actionem solum apparente alteritate, quod deus in potentia et in occulto motu movet et imperat omnia ut in silentio, ἀνάγεται autem filius qui est et sanctus spiritus, voce confabulatur ad generanda omnia, secundum vitam et secundum intelligentiam substituentia ad id quod est esse omnibus. 137

The divine activity is one substance of being, life, and thought which itself is a motion of spirit, moving from a hidden and full potency into act. Potency and act are the general categories through which the substance of
the divine and the alterity of the persons are held together.

This motion from potency to act is from a full potency of being, life, and thought to the explicit act of being, life, and thought. The activity of the divine is seen to take on a predominance of divine attributes wherein the whole of the divine essence is in the Father according to a predominance of being, and the whole of the divine essence is in the Son according to a predominance of life, and the whole of the divine essence is in the Spirit according to a predominance of thought or wisdom. The activity of this respective predominance is necessary in order to complete the substantial act of the Trinity. We refer to several texts to establish this doctrine.

These first texts show the hidden being of the Father as the fundamentum of predominance. Being is the ground of the divine moving to know itself. In the divine, says Victorinus, being is living and living is thinking. Thinking is itself reflexive upon being. I quote these lengthy passages because they provide so clearly the kind of doctrine which Augustine must benefit from and overcome.

Sed nos, cum de aeternis loquimur, aliud vivere accipimus, hoc est ipsum scire quod vivas. Scire porro hoc est quod intelligere. Ergo scire intelligere est et scire quod vivas, hoc est vivere. Id ergo erit
intellegere quod vivere. Quod si ita est, ut unum sit vivere et intellegere, et, cum unum sit esse quod est vivere atque intellegere, substantia unum, subsistentia tria sunt ista. Cum enim vim ac significantiam suam habeant atque ut dicuntur et sint, necessario et sunt tria et tamen unum, cum omne, quod singulum est unum, tria sint. Idque a Graecis ita dicitur: ἡ μίαν ὑποῖας τρεῖς εἶναι τὰς ὑποῖας. Hoc cum ita sit, esse ut fundamentum est reliquis. Vivere enim et intellegere ut secunda et posteriora, ut natura quadam in eo quod est esse velut inesse videantur, vel ex eo quod esse quodammodo ut extiterint atque in eo quod est suum esse illud primum ac fontanum esse servaverint. Numquam enim esse sine vivere atque intellegere neque vivere atque intellegere sine eo quod est esse iam probatum est. 139

The nature of the divine life is a being which both lives and thinks, and these three attributes are themselves the whole of the divine life since in order to live it must be and to be and live in the fulness of the divine is to know itself as being and living. Without these three, the divine life would not be. The order is clearly given, and being is seen as the fundament and fountain of life and thought which are second and posterior but inherent and preserved in being as necessary to its forthcoming activity.

In another passage, Victorinus characterizes this predominance of being, life, and thought, by way of understanding the identity of divine names but especially the direction of divine motion.

δέντρον ergo in omnibus, in eo quod est esse et vivere et intellegere; item in eo
quod uterque Χριστου et Πνευμα est; item in eo quod imago et imago; dictum est enim: ad imaginem nostram; et in eo quod lumen et lumen; et in eo quod verum lumen et verum lumen; et in eo quod spiritus et spiritus; et in eo quod motus et motus; sed pater motus quiescens, id est interior et nihil aliud quam motus, non motione motus, filius autem motione motus est, uterque tamen motus; item uterque actio et opera; uterque vita et uterque a se habens vitam; voluntas et voluntas eadem; virtus; sapientia; verbum; deus et deus; deus vivus et deus vivus; ex aeterno at ex aeterno; invisibilis et invisibilis ... 140

The activity of being, life, and thought, is seen in the identity of divine names but also in the direction of motion which begins as the Father who is nothing other than motion but is quiet and unmoved. This is again to see the fundament of being as potency, in repose, and hidden. The Son is motion which is moved. And so the direction of the activity moves from potency to act, from an implicit fullness of the divine being to an explicit manifestation of that being formed as the Son. The coherence of the divine life is its motion.

The activity of this divine motion may be understood more clearly as necessity. And it is the character of this necessity which will mark the crucial difference between Victorinus and Augustine.

Victorinus understands the divine life to be spirit. As we have seen, the activity of this spirit; being, life, and thought, is a motion from a full potency identified with the Father to the actual
manifestation of all that the Father is as the Son. Victorinus understands this motion as a progression toward reflexive or self-conscious thought, which has led Hadot to suggest that this is tantamount to the Neoplatonic doctrine of procession and conversion. In this two aspects need to be considered: first, how this motion is explicitly a development of existence; and second, how this is seen as necessity. Thereafter we may consider why this kind of doctrine is opposed by Augustine and thereby grasp its place in Augustine's argument in Book VII of the De Trinitate.

That Victorinus understands the divine life to give itself existence is undeniable. He writes,

In istis igitur tribus spiritus substantia. ergo, quoniam spiritus, non diviso spiritu, quippe unus cum sit in tribus. Sed natura potentiae et actionis, una cum sit existentia patricta, et ipsam quod est esse habente, tria sese generantia, substituta sunt omnipotentia. Neque igitur praeexitit existentia -- pater enim suae ipsius substantiae generator et aliorum secundum verticem fontana est existentia -- neque scissa est, ipsa existente, et existentia et potentia in eo quod est esse in unoquaque istorum trium iuxta maiestatem omnem et omnipotentiam et omnibus modis perfectionem quae semet generet, ipse se substituentum, a se se moventem, se semper moventem, consubstantialem, simul poterat, ipsum hoc quod sic est esse et ipsum quod est esse patre dante. 143

Victorinus maintains the consubstantiality of the divine by virtue of its self-giving being. While each of
the divine persons is said to generate himself by possessing the divine omnipotence, there is a logic of derivation which begins with potency. Identified with the Father as being itself, this potency pours forth like a fountainhead and gives being to the Son and the Spirit. And so the potency of being is the source of spirit, and the nature of divine spirit is this motion from potency to act. As we have seen above, Victorinus does not hesitate to call the Father the cause of the Son who in turn is the Image and Form of the Father. This relation of cause to effect is not simply the same as in the realm of the finite, for as we have seen in this most recent passage, Victorinus wishes to assert an independence for the self-generation of the Son and the Spirit. The connection is better understood in another passage where the Father as being is said to be the cause of the Son as species. In this way the Son defines the Father as his Image. Therefore species defines this potentiality of being which originates as the Father and is given to the Son. The divine spirit is then a development of being, from a full potential being to an actually defined being, an eternal motion from being to life to thought.

Victorinus knows this spiritual activity to be infinite and above all created being. One could claim that his doctrine of predominance, properly understood,
is basically the same as the culmination of Augustine's work on the De Trinitate. But there is this crucial difference, that what is necessary for Victorinus as a development of the potency of spirit is for Augustine the procession from what is already fully actual. One must be very careful here, because there is a great similarity between Augustine and Victorinus both of whom inherit the Christian and pagan Neoplatonic tradition, and one could abstractly make the same claim of a fully actual Principle for Plotinus and Origen whose Principle wills the Son or \textit{Vos}, and whose activity is ultimately a procession and conversion of the divine life. However, the crucial difference is present as appears now in Book VII of Augustine's argument. What Augustine must overcome is both the absolute separation of the Principle from the second hypostasis and the character of the first Principle itself somehow requiring the procession of the second, without denying the necessary unity of the Trinity.

Victorinus maintains a necessity in the motion of God, which is a progression toward self-knowledge through the begetting of the Son as Word, Image, and Form. Although the Father is a full potency of being, life, and thought, according to the predominance of being, the movement outward of the wisdom of the Father is equally important for both the self-consciousness of
the Father as well as for the explicit formation of the logic of creation.

Quoniam autem diximus unam motionem et eandem et ἀδιάβροχος et sanctum spiritum, ἀδιάβροχος in eo quod vita est, sanctum spiritum quod est esse cognoscentiam et intelligentiam esse, quoniamque diximus id ipsum esse vitam et cognoscentiam, et quoniam diximus motam in prima motione intelligentiam -- istic enim ordo naturalis et divinus: potentia cum sit, necesse fuit intelligentiam ad suimet ipsius cognoscentiam moveri -- natus est filius, ἀδιάβροχος qui sit, hoc est vita, virtute patræa generante intelligentia hoc quod est esse omnium quae sunt veluti aeternum fontem. 147

The hidden and implicit substance of the Father in its being, life, and thought, necessarily moves to know itself, and it does so in its begetting of the Word who is the full divine Vita because of its actual reflective knowledge of the Father and the Father's being. Thus the Father comes to know himself through the generation of the ἀδιάβροχος. The motion of the Father and the Son taken together reveals the moment of knowing, which is the maturation of life, in the Son. For Victorinus, the development of the divine potency of spirit is the necessary begetting of the self-consciousness of the Father in the Word. In the terms of the aporia which Augustine has offered, we may conclude that for Victorinus there is an identity in the divine of speaking and of being wise. In this way the Word is the wisdom of God. The development of the divine life, its
necessary motion, may be more clearly seen in the
categorical divisions of the divine names. Arguing for
the doctrine of the \textit{\underline{\alpha}υ\nu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\upsilon}\upsilon,\ Victorinus writes
against the Anomoeans, citing Basil of Ancyra whom he
also brings into the argument. The question has to do
with whether or not any category, including substance,
is appropriate for predication of the divine. As we
have seen in Book V of Augustine's \textit{De Trinitate}, some
Arians presupposed that only the category of substance
was proper to the divine. Augustine has argued for the
categories of substance, relation, and act. Victorinus
contends,

\begin{quote}
Vos qui substantiam negatis in deo, quamquam
a Basilio vincamini, et tu, Basili, qui
substantiam confiteris, utrique vestris
vocibus \textit{\underline{\alpha}υ\nu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon}\upsilon confitemini. Nempe
dicitis deum et eundem dicitis lumen, eundem
spiritum. Qui dicit ista, substantiam dicit
dei. Nam qui dicit patrem vel omnipotentem
vel bonum vel infinitum et talia, non
substantiam sed qualitatem dicit. Item
filium dicitis \textit{\underline{\alpha}γ\omicron\upsilon\upsilon}, lumen, spiritum, et
ista substantiam significant. Rursus cum
dicitis deum de deo, verum lumen de vero
lumine, argumentum timoris Basilii tollitis,
ne sit superior substantia ex qua duo sint.
Si enim de deo Deus et lumen de lumine, utique
patris substantia substantia filii est, quia
ipse deus pater ipse substantia
est, de qua substantia filius, \textit{\underline{\alpha}γ\omicron\upsilon\upsilon},
lumen, spiritus. Etenim, cum dicitur filius,
item salvator, item Iesus Christus, secundum
qualitatem, non secundum substantiam dicitur.
Sic reliqua vel patri dantur vel filio. Ergo
substantiam fatemini. Vos autem certe Basilio
credite, qui eadem de deo et de christo dicit,
lumen, deum, spiritum, \textit{\underline{\alpha}γ\omicron\upsilon\upsilon}, et substantiam
confitetur. 151
\end{quote}
The predications of the divine which Victorinus employs are certainly very interesting in relation to the history of theology. We cannot examine that history in detail here; however, a few remarks are appropriate for us to explicate the argument of Augustine.

Arguing against the Anomoeans, Victorinus points out the use of categorical distinctions in their theology. They claimed that substance could not be attributed to God because it was not found in Scripture. The Arians whom Augustine opposes asserted that whatever is predicated of God is predicated according to substance, and therefore if there were any qualitative distinctions between the persons, those distinctions indicated an absolute difference in substance. Augustine's account of the Arian position in V.iii.4 of the De Trinitate speaks of accidental and not only qualitative distinction, embracing the whole categorical logic of Aristotle and not just the category of quality. Augustine concludes that substance, relation, and act, — redefined according to what must be true of the divine being — are proper predicates of the divine life. All other accidental categorical names, including quality, are proper only to created substance. The Anomoeans had rejected categorical names altogether, but Victorinus claims that categorical thought is really present in their predication as well as in their opponent, Basil of
Ancyra. The Arians had distinguished the substances of the divine persons by virtue of admitting accidental or qualitative difference. Victorinus himself accepts substance and quality as proper to the divine, disagreeing with the Arians in their conclusions but taking on a categorical logic with which he refutes the Anomoeans. As we have seen, Augustine rejects any accidental or qualitative distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. To follow this logical disagreement is to understand the profound difference in doctrine.

Victorinus places the divine names in categorical divisions. Names that reveal the divine substance are God, light, spirit, and Ἀόρατος. The Anomoeans and Basil of Ancyra both use these same predications. Names that reveal qualitative distinction are Father, Omnipotence, Good, Infinite, Son, Saviour, and Jesus Christ. It is unclear exactly why Victorinus would make these distinctions. Even the more general categories of being, motion, rest, identity, (which are present explicitly) and difference (which is present implicitly) that govern the activity of the divine movement from potency to act do not clarify these distinctions. One should expect his substantial names to include God, Light, Spirit, Omnipotence, Good, Infinite, and in his own scheme even Ἀόρατος, all according to the moment of potency, which are
given an explicit Form in the begetting of the Son and are thus common to them. Father, Son, Saviour, and Jesus Christ should fall within the category of quality which would be to look at the divine activity from the side of personal difference. But this is not what we find. Rather, there is a mixture of what Augustine would call essential and relative names. At this juncture in Victorinus' treatise, the substantial names are viewed in relation to the Creed, but even the Creedal formulation of deum de deo and lumen de lumine wherein there is an explicit derivation of the divine being cannot account for placing ἄγεν under the category of substance.

It is certain that Victorinus' categorical logic is partly derived from Plotinus, inasmuch as the Plotinian theology of the divine νοῦς, structured through the activity of the great forms of being, motion, rest, identity, and difference, but itself inadequate to the wilful act which is the divine One, is what informs the divine activity of the Trinity as Victorinus understands it. However, the character of this activity is understood also through a categorical logic which Plotinus relegates to the lower aspect of the hypostasis of Soul, namely - quality. Hadot answers the question of how this noetic motion is introduced into the Trinitarian activity along with the category of quality
by drawing our attention to the Stoic influence mediated through the metaphysics of Porphyry. Our view is that this course of influence seems probable especially given the predication of quality in the first principle whose inherent motion is from being to life to thought. The categorical logic of Victorinus as applied to the Trinity stems from categories derived from Plato's *Sophist*, and from Aristotle's *Categories*, mediated through the Stoics, Plotinus, and Porphyry. The trinitarian activity of being, life, and intellect certainly has its precursor in the *enous* of Plotinus. But that this named activity is predicated of the first principle is probably gleaned from Porphyry, although here one must not neglect the profound impact of the Christian Scriptures on the theological tradition. Whether one argues for the influence of Plotinus or Porphyry, Augustine strongly disagrees with the kind of trinitarian theology presented by Victorinus.

The disagreement focuses on the nature of the activity itself. For the Principle to give itself existence by way of coming to a knowledge of itself, for the Father to be wise in the way he speaks, is to think of the divine through a categorical logic more appropriate to finite substance as in the Stoic logic and the unfolding of the Stoic monism. Although
Victorinus asserts the spiritual character and eternity of the divine substance, the motion from potency to act seems to reflect a state of being which requires a prior principle for its constitution, like that of the Plotinian *vôus* for the One. In discerning the necessity for the divine will to have priority over the divine power, Plotinus corrected this Stoic inadequacy, but then it was left to Porphyry to explicate that will as spiritual activity.

This motion from potency to act, the motion of being to life to thought, is at the same time close to Augustine's doctrine and yet decisively different. The reader will recall that in the *Confessiones* of Augustine, in the last three books, Augustine discerns the life of the Trinity to consist of being, thinking, and willing, which is not so very far from Victorinus' understanding of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as being, life and wisdom, wisdom and will. For both of them the Son is the intellectual offspring of the Father and the Holy Spirit is both the return of the divine to itself as well as the source of creation. For both the Father is the originative source of the divine. Indeed Victorinus calls the Father the cause of the Son. For both there is a predominance of the divine activity in each person according to his place in the life of the Trinity. And for both there is the claim that each
person is the whole of the divine essence. The profound difference between Augustine and Victorinus is in the character of the divine motion or necessity.

From the perspective of Augustine, the kind of trinitarian theology which Victorinus maintains renders the Son constitutive of the Father. The motion to self-knowledge in the self-generation of the Son completes the Father who cannot have the fulness of life which self-knowledge brings without the potential wisdom in himself coming to the outward form of the Son as Word. While the Father for Victorinus is a full potency, hidden, and at rest, to which the divine activity wills to return having come to a knowledge of itself, it is a fulness which is incomplete, and the necessity of its motion is to bring it to actuality.

Augustine's understanding of the divine life is a very different necessity. This may be seen in that Augustine's understanding of the trinitarian life as being, thinking, and willing, discussed in the Confessiones, undergoes a refinement in the argument of the De Trinitate which sees this being, thinking, and willing, as the purely spiritual life of memory, intellect, and will. In Augustine's doctrine the begetting of the Word is not through a necessity for the divine to come to the knowledge of itself. The Father as the divine memory already possesses self-knowledge: he
as the divine essence is his own wisdom. The begetting of the Word is the necessary offspring of the Father's already complete self-knowledge. In this way the Word proceeds from the Father as the full conception of the Father's intellective being. The Father is both originative and constitutive of the Son who receives the whole of the divine being as its full intellectual conception. But this is to compare these doctrines in their totality. Now we need return to the argument of Augustine to see how his doctrine develops. His argument continues through discerning the categories which are sufficient to the revelation of God in Scripture. The categories of Victorinus intend to secure the doctrine of the  δύο θεότητοι derived from Scripture but cannot. At best, his categorical logic offers an explanation for derived spiritual being coming to actuality. Applied to God, his logic ends in a unitarian and not a trinitarian view of God. Nevertheless, it is Victorinus who marks the greatest advance in the theology of the Trinity before Augustine by bringing the divine essence into a coherent activity which as the motion of the divine spirit is nothing other than the divine persons.

Returning to the argument of Augustine, we recall that Augustine has reached a logical limit in speaking of the Son as image of himself. An image is an image of another. And so the logical limit arises that if the Son
is an image of another, the name Image is predicated relatively to that which he images. The same may be said of the name Word. A word is an expression or definition of something. It is relative to what it shows forth or delimits. Therefore the names Image and Word are seen to be relative to another, the Father, and not to the Son himself. Augustine distinguishes the names Image and Word from Power and Wisdom as those relative from essential. By the category of relation, Augustine eliminates the identity and confusion between relative and essential names. Image and Word require a principle and a thing expressed. Power and Wisdom do not of themselves necessarily imply an other, rather they are names of essential act. The Father then is not wise by the wisdom which he begot because he cannot be predicated relative to wisdom nor can wisdom be predicated relative to him. The category of relation, as Aristotle taught, holds a necessary reciprocity of 160 terms. Thus, Father is not relative to wisdom or power, nor is wisdom or power relative to Father. Power and Wisdom are then essential names for the Father and the Son.

Given that Augustine's working interpretation of the Scripture, "Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam", which posited that all that is said of the Father is said relative to the Son, is now modified by
separating relative from essential names, the question remains concerning the name of essence itself. Is the Son as essence predicated relatively of the Father? If so, essence itself is not essence, or even though essence is predicated, what is really understood is relation. An example of this, says Augustine, is when the name lord is predicated, essence itself is not indicated. The name lord necessarily refers to a slave and so the name lord is thought through the category of relation. When however the name man is said, the category of essence is thought because the name refers not to another, but to himself. Predication may be distinct then between essence and relation, as when a man is called lord, the man himself is understood as essence; that he is a lord of a slave is thought through the category of relation inasmuch as that name necessarily refers to another, and the name of slave refers reciprocally to lord. How then is the predication of essence proper to the divine life?

hoc autem unde agimus ... et utrumque una substantia.

In the exegesis of 1 Co.1:24, the identity of essence and relation has obscured the understanding of the divine names. If essence is predicated relatively, then essence itself dissolves and is not thought. Properly understood, every relative predication assumes
the category of essence inasmuch as whenever an essence is predicated relative to another, the essence is something regardless of its relation. Augustine gives us several examples of this principle.

When one predicates man as lord or slave, horse as a beast of burden, and money as a pledge, man, horse, and money are predicated of themselves as substances or essences. That they are respectively lord or slave, a beast of burden, and a pledge are predicated relative to another. The priority of categorical understanding must begin with essence because without the ground of essence there is no identity which may be thought relative to another. If man, horse, or money were not at all, then their relative predications of lord or slave, beast of burden, and pledge would be meaningless. This distinguishing of categories which is the necessary structure of mind's thinking now considers the question of in what sense essence is predicated of the person of the Father. The reader will recognize the movement of the argument forming the mind categorically as mind thinks the Biblical revelation. Victorinus had blurred the distinction of essence and relation in his understanding of the divine essence of being, life, and thought, coming to self-knowledge. The divine essence for him is an activity which develops from potency to act; the Son is necessary to the completion of the
Father. Augustine has shown the categories of mind unreconciled with the doctrine of Victorinus.

Augustine argues here for the priority of essence before relation.

Quapropter si et Pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relative dicatur ad aliquid.

Logically speaking, before the Son is predicated relative to the Father, the Father must be. But to say that the Father is aliquid is not the same as to say that he is the integral divine essence. Victorinus had said that he is a full divine potency of being, life, and thought, but the Father required the Son for his own self-conscious realization. Augustine, therefore, must make clear the nature of this necessarily prior essence. Augustine begins with an example showing how this is not so for the Father, after which comes the positive demonstration.

The divine essence is not predicated of the Father in the way that a quality is predicated of a substance. When one considers something that is coloured, colour refers to the coloured thing. Colour is not predicated of itself because colour is not a substance, but rather a quality of a coloured substance. Even if the coloured thing is identified by reference to its colour, what is predicated of itself is the body of the thing. Colour is an accidental quality whether separable or inseparable.
Therefore, one should realize that this way of predicking quality of substance is unsuitable to understand the essence of the Father. Rather, one should begin by understanding that whatever is predicated, i.e., whatever the *aliquid*, the Father, is, without which he could not be relative to the Son, is predicated in relation or in reference to the Son. How that relation is understood is deferred for now, but that the *aliquid* is relative to the Son means that it cannot be thought of qualitatively. For quality inheres in a substance; relation requires a referential reciprocity of substances.

That the Father is *aliquid* which is predicated of himself and is the ground of predication in relation to the Son is seen to be necessary in that the very same Son is spoken of with respect to himself, and to the Father, when the Son is called great greatness and powerful power with respect to himself. This is certainly the case inasmuch as all the interpretations of 1 Co.1:24 recognize the attribution of the Son as himself inherently possessing the power and the wisdom of God - however he possess it. Moreover, the Son is also called the greatness and power of the great and powerful Father by which the Father himself is great and powerful - however he possesses them. All this is to say that the Father's predication as *aliquid* must be
congruent with the Son's predication which, according to Scripture, is both essential and relative, in order that the Father may be said to be relative to the Son. Therefore, the Father and the Son are both understood through the category of substance. Quality is not sufficient to establish the substantial integrity of the Father or the Son. With this conclusion Augustine has eliminated the theological position which would render the divine activity like a finite substance undergoing qualitative change. The Father and the Son must each be substantial in order for there to be a mutual relation and necessary reciprocity, and the Father and the Son must be one substance if their relation is one of natural derivation. However, what is clear to this point is not how the Father is to be understood as the divine essence which is in relation to the Son, but that essence is attributed to him not through the category of quality but of substance. For Victorinus, the names of the persons were distinguished by the category of quality which, following Hadot, shows the influence of the Stoic activity wherein the quality of the substance is manifested in its motion from a full inherent potency to explicit act. But for Augustine it is logically impossible that quality be the ground for individuation. And if qualitative development is the end of the divine motion, then, as we shall see, the true distinctions of
a Trinity are destroyed.

Sicut autem absurdum est ... sed illa eum genuit. (62)

Augustine now demonstrates that the essential nature of the Father is also itself wisdom. This is made clear by a contrast of the character of finite substance which undergoes qualitative change and the character of the divine substance which is itself absolutely simple in essence. The contrast is by way of understanding created and uncreated substance.

Augustine enters into a strict categorical analysis at this juncture in the argument. That he considers the reality of forms both independent of and constitutive of creation is made clear in Books VIII and IX of the De Trinitate. Here the categories, which are Aristotle's, are assumed in their formal nature and are the logical means for mind's contrast of created and uncreated substance. What is important to say about the categories as forms at this place is that they are understood in three senses. First, the categories themselves are not simply and absolutely independent. They are the structure for thought, related among themselves, and in their relation constituting a unitive logical substance. While each category is a whole for thought, each has a logical dependence upon the others beginning with substance. We have seen this in the priority of
substance before relation. Second, this same categorical structure is seen as the natural development of created substance - its formal character, growth, life, reproduction, death, and so on. Third, as we have discovered in the argument of Books V and VI, once the categories are redefined they offer a mirror of the divine activity. Substance, relation, and act, are alone found proper to the divine essence. The categories, then, are the unity of pure thought and the actual life of created being. When speaking of created and uncreated substances here Augustine has these senses of the categories in mind.

It is absurd, writes Augustine, to say that whiteness is not white. The definition of whiteness as qualifying form necessarily includes what it means to be white as opposed to another colour. In the same way as whiteness requires white, wisdom must include what it means to be wise. Wisdom includes in its definition the act of being wise. And so whiteness is predicated white to itself and wisdom is predicated wise to itself, which is to say that both whiteness and wisdom are realities which transcend their particular instances in created reality.

Whiteness and wisdom are both intellectual realities, but they are not both of the nature of eternal ideas. While their intellectual nature is
similar and may be compared, whiteness is a mere form, a species of the category of quality which itself depends upon substance for its being. Wisdom is the nature of God. Augustine therefore leaves their likeness to show their unlikeness, and thereby to demonstrate how the essence of the Father is also itself wisdom, and is not a created substance which admits of accidents.

Considering a created substance which is white, Augustine says that the whiteness of the body is not its essence. The body itself is essence and the whiteness is the quality of the body. It is called a white body. Its constitution is not simple; "cui non hoc est esse quod candidum esse." This created substance is a composition wherein its form is one thing and its colour another, and neither of these is in itself; considered as one thing and another, substantial form and quality are abstractions. Rather, both are in a certain mass which is neither the form nor the colour but is formed and coloured. Augustine understands created substance in the manner of Aristotle's finite primary substance in which one discovers in abstraction a material substrate given its identity by virtue of its formal cause and dependent accidents. Created substance has as itself both a material individuation and the constitutional logic of the categories which do not exist simply in themselves but are this activity related to their natural existence
Wisdom is separate from this relation of the categories, although the knowledge of wisdom is mediated to the soul through them. True wisdom possesses itself in its own activity (*sapientia vera et sapiens est, et se ipsa sapiens est*). And yet there is a comparison between the soul's participation in wisdom and the relation of quality to substance. A soul is wise by its participation in wisdom, but if this soul should act foolishly again and suffer folly, while it changes for the worse, wisdom remains in itself unchanged. The soul which participates in wisdom but changes out of a preference for what is not wisdom is like the body which is white because it admits of whiteness, but when the body changes into another colour, whiteness in that body (*candor ille*) ceases to be altogether. Whiteness, in this case, like wisdom forsaken by the soul, is only potentially present. And so for the soul, to be wise is a quality which the soul may enjoy by participation in wisdom.

There is a difference, of course, between the necessary relation which the categories are in their creative activity and the participation of the soul in uncreated wisdom. The categories are present in their constitutive causal power whenever a substance exists.
The accidental categories may change in that substance, for instance, a white body may become a black body, the accidental categories depending upon substance may change into their contraries as long as the substance itself abides. This is the constitutional character of natural substance. Wisdom itself is above this relation. However, the comparison is true insofar as the soul may participate in wisdom and thereby itself be qualified as wise, but its participation in wisdom is not according to its categorical nature, strictly speaking, for it may prefer folly and still exist. We shall see that participation in wisdom is for the soul an act of the grace of wisdom itself. At this point in the argument, however, what is important is to see that the soul is wise by its being qualified as a body is qualified by colour. With this made clear, the contrast of created and uncreated substance is seen. The Father is not wise because he is qualified by a wisdom outside himself.

We have seen that the character of natural substance is a composition, it may admit of contrary qualities. But this is not so for the Father. For if the Father who has begotten wisdom becomes wise by the wisdom he begot, the Son becomes a qualitative difference of the Father and the Father is not the simple divine essence. If the Son is the qualitative change of the Father's being into a wise being, then,
"neque hoc est illi esse quod sapere". Moreover, if the Son renders the Father wise, the Son is nothing more than a mere quality of the Father and cannot be his offspring by nature. Therefore, if the Son is a mere quality of the Father, the Father and the Son will no longer be the highest simplicity, which is to say, they will no longer be divine.

But this conclusion is unacceptable. If the Father and the Son are an activity no different than created substance, they also are subject to the abiding causal forms and wisdom itself is in principle apart and above the Father whose participation in wisdom would be his begetting of the Son. This is contrary to the entire revelation of Scripture.

The conclusion that the Father begets the Son as his wisdom and is thereby qualified by the Son is rejected because the divine essence is necessarily simple, "hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere". And if the divine essence is simple, as has been demonstrated, the Father is not wise through the wisdom he begot. Moreover, if the Father is wise through the wisdom he begot, the Father himself did not beget wisdom, but wisdom completes, constitutes, begets, the Father.
Quid enim alius ... eadem ibi sapientia est quae essentia.

The problem with the Father begetting his wisdom comes into even clearer focus. If this is so, wisdom becomes the constitutive principle of the Father. The divine simplicity means that for God esse is sapere: therefore, by this which God is, he is wise. The divine essence, what constitutes the divine being, is absolutely identical with the divine wisdom.

Augustine understands this as the principle of the divine being which he delimits by the word causa. Whatever the causa is that the Father is wise, the very same causa is that he is at all. In the divine simplicity, wisdom and being are identical so that if the Father is wise by the wisdom he begot, the Father also exists by the wisdom he begot. Indeed, if the Father becomes, he cannot become anything except by being begotten or made. But what is more insane, Augustine asks, than to say that wisdom is in any way the mother (genetricem) or ground (conditricem) of the Father. The Father does not become as does created substance. He does not participate in something other than himself. He is unbegotten. Wisdom is neither the constitutive nor the originative principle of the Father, for he is ipsum esse, and because of the divine simplicity, he is also sapere. The Father's wisdom is
not derived from anything outside himself. Indeed, the Father is originative and constitutive, beginning with his only begotten Son. This is the coherence of the divine being which the Creed teaches.

Therefore, says Augustine, the Father himself is wisdom, and the Son is called wisdom just as he is called the light of the Father. Because of the divine simplicity, the Son receives the entire divine nature from the Father. He is, as the divine nature begotten, light from light, and yet they are one light. In the same way as the Son is light from light, he is also wisdom from wisdom, and yet they are one wisdom. As one light and one wisdom they are one essence. Inasmuch as the predication of wisdom necessarily includes the activity of being wise, and the predication of potency the activity of being able, and justice the activity of being just, so the predication of the Father as essence includes the activity of ipsum esse. The divine simplicity, the nature of the divine being which the Father begets in the Son, is the identity of the divine essence, which is among other attributes, wisdom.

Augustine has now shown how the Father is himself wisdom. The consequence of this demonstration is that the Scripture, "Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam", cannot be understood such that the Son is a quality of the Father or the originative and
constitutive essence of the Father. Augustine has proven through the categories that the Father is *aliquid* to which the Son is in relation. This *aliquid* is nothing other than the divine essence which is the divine wisdom.

But here the question becomes more profound. Even if the categorical logic of Victorinus is inadequate, and the Son should not be thought to be a quality of the divine, nonetheless Victorinus also knows the Father himself as the divine essence to be the divine wisdom, albeit in the mode of a hidden potency. For him, being, life, and wisdom constitute the divine substance and each of the divine persons possesses this divine essence according to the distinction of predominance. The Father, therefore, is being, life, and wisdom according to the predominance of potential being in its fulness. Wisdom is the inherent developing end which once explicit is the means for a self-conscious return to the supremacy of being. But although Victorinus understands the spiritual character of the divine being in his notion of predominance, his categorical logic fails him and this is nowhere more evident than in his identity of wisdom and *Advs*. Augustine has shown the Father to be wisdom because of the simplicity of the divine substance. Now he must show how the wisdom of God is not his Word. The Father is not wise in the same manner in
which he speaks.

As the argument continues, the reader should be aware that what guides the analysis of both natural and divine substance is the purview of mind through the categories. It is the categories which provide a unity of perspective, but this is not because they are abstractly related to natural and divine substance. Rather the categories are the logical structure of substance itself, reflecting the very life of the divine, which is above all categories, and constitutes the eternal and created, intellectual and natural.
Commentary on VII.ii.3.

Pater igitur et Filius ... ostendimus ista relative dici.  

Augustine has shown how the Father and the Son are simultaneously the divine essence because of the divine simplicity. They are one essence, greatness, and truth. The Father is himself wisdom because he is the substance of God. Through the language of the Creed, the Father is seen as the originative and constitutive principle of the Son who derives his essence, light, and wisdom from the essence, light, and wisdom of the Father. They are this one substance. But here the distinction is pronounced. Although the Father and the Son are the identical divine essence, the Father and the Son are not both the divine Word.

The name Word denotes a reference. As the name Son refers to Father and does not refer to himself, so also the name Word refers to him whose Word it is. That which constitutes the name of Son as a name of reference is the same as that which constitutes the name Word as a name of reference. While the Father and the Son are both one light, they are not both one Son or one Word.

The distinction that Augustine makes here is of profound importance. Victorinus had said that the name Word is a substantial name. Each of the divine persons is the Word according to his respective place of
predominance. As the Father speaks the Word, the Father's hidden wisdom becomes explicit and moves toward self-consciousness. For Victorinus, the Father is wise in the same manner in which he speaks because of his attempt to bring the divine essence and the persons into one activity. But his categorical logic fails him. Augustine does not understand the Father to speak the Word in the same way in which he is wise, although Augustine also wishes to hold the essence and the persons in one view.

For Augustine, the Father and the Son are not both one Son or one Word. That by which the Word is predicated as Word is not that by which the Word is predicated as divine wisdom (non eo Verbum quo sapientia). Word is not predicated of the Son ad se, but rather relatively to him whose Word it is. And Wisdom is predicated according to essence. This categorical distinction means that the Word is indeed himself wisdom according to his derived divine essence, but that he is Word is according to his relation to the Father whose Word he is. Understood relatively as Word, he is also Son and Image. Even if he were called wisdom begotten he would be understood in relation to another, to wisdom begetting. The relative sense remains exclusively with the name begotten by which also Word, Son, and Image are understood. The essential or substantial sense remains
for all other names, including wisdom. Wisdom is an essential name, says Augustine, and is predicated of itself and not in relation to another because wisdom itself is wise by its own activity and requires nothing other. To say that wisdom is wise by its own activity is to say that wisdom is, and the being of wisdom is its sapiential activity.

The conclusion of this distinction of categories is that Augustine understands the Father and the Son to be simultaneously one wisdom because they are one essence. The Son derives his wisdom from the Father in his deriving his essence from the Father. There is an origin and continuity: "sapientia de sapientia, essentia de essentia". Wherefore, it has become logically clear in the argument that in saying the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, one is not forced to conclude that the Father and the Son are different in essence. These names of Father, Son, Unbegotten, Begotten, manifest relations and not essence. These names are at once one wisdom and one essence inasmuch as in the divine simplicity esse is sapere. But the Father and the Son are not at once Word or Son because these names are predicated relatively, in reference and opposition one to the other.
Cur ergo in Scripturis ... utique non est Pater. (65)

Augustine has shown the identity of the divine essence and the divine wisdom through the analysis of the categories. The question arises as to why the Scripture speaks so seldom of the divine wisdom except to show that it is begotten or made by God. The answer is of crucial import to Augustine's argument.

The Scripture, Augustine says, speaks of wisdom as begotten or created. Begotten wisdom as Word is that through which all things were made. Created wisdom is created in men when they are converted and illuminated toward that wisdom which is begotten. In this sense Christ is created wisdom ins far as he was made flesh. How this is so for man has been treated in Book IV, and in its logical mode is being formed here and below.

The reason why the Scripture does not speak at length about wisdom is that wisdom itself is that which is the end for the mind, that which the Scripture compels the mind toward. The Scripture is the guiding revelation but is not itself the end of the mind's contemplation. Augustine presents this by way of a question which presents a means or occasion for the mind's illumination and formation. The intention of revelation and illumination is that the mind itself be
moved to commend and imitate the divine wisdom and thus be formed as its image. We have already seen how the Scripture compels the mind to think the doctrine of the Trinity in categories adequate to the revelation of the Trinity. The structure of the categories is that through which mind may think the trinitarian substance. At this point in the argument, the question why the Scripture does not speak directly at length about wisdom except to say that it is begotten or made is because the Scripture is compelling the mind toward its own formation as the substantial image of divine wisdom. Through the revelation of Scripture, understood by way of the categories, mind becomes created wisdom.

The Scripture itself as written words is inadequate to wisdom as simple eternity because all words which are spoken are multiple in time and sound. Even the process of human cogitation is a composition of moments. The eternal Word speaks to us of wisdom, of the Father and himself, writes Augustine, by illuminating. Insofar as illumination takes place through the record of Scripture, Scripture itself has a mediating role and is expressive of the Incarnation, a unity of eternal truth written in a diversity of literary forms, including a multiplicity of true propositions; however, the Scripture cannot be the activity which wisdom is. Rather, Scripture is the instrument of wisdom for
illuminating the mind, returning mind to wisdom, and thereby making the mind into created wisdom. The character of wisdom and its created image is explicated in the succeeding chapters.

By illumination Augustine means revealed knowledge of the divine essence and the divine persons. Augustine quotes St. Matthew's gospel where the revelation of the Father and the Son of the Father is through the Son. This, says Augustine, is the Son's act as Word. As created words reveal both themselves in their sound or written form and that notion which they convey, so also the Word of God Incarnate reveals both himself and his Father by virtue of their common essence. The revelation is not only of a multiplicity of persons in God, but also of the divine nature which the Son as Word is. For as Word Incarnate he reveals both his own essence and the Father's essence: he is what the Father is, namely, the identity of wisdom and essence. As Son he does not reveal the Father in his individuation except to say that he, the Son, knows the Father. In this way the revelation is of a relation of divine persons. The Son cannot reveal the Father in his individuation because he is not the Father. But as Word the Son reveals not only that the Father is, and that he knows him, but also as the Eternal and Incarnate Word, he reveals what the Father is by virtue of being his identical
essence and wisdom.

Et ideo Christus ... et habitavit in nobis. (66)

As the identical essence and wisdom of God, Christ is the power and wisdom of God. The Son derives the divine essence from the Father as the Creed states, and in this the guiding account of Scripture is clear. The Father is the fountain of life and light who gives life and light to the Son. As God is light in whom there is no darkness, so also is the Word light who was with God and is God and through which, the Scripture says, man is illumined. The Word is neither corporeal light nor created spiritual light but rather the very principle of illumination. Therefore, as the divine light and the principle of illumination, the Word is sapientia from the Father, just as he is light from light.

The Father is the originative essence and wisdom, and he is by himself this same essence and wisdom. The Son or Word has derived this very same essence and wisdom from the Father and is himself the divine essence and wisdom at the same time with the Father. Both are at once the same light, the same wisdom.

Augustine has demonstrated that the Father and the Son are the one divine substance by means of common essential names: power, wisdom, light, life. There is a continuity of essential derivation from the Father to
the Son. But there is also another category of names which reveal something else. Those names show an opposed relation: Father, Son, Word, Image. The Father is not wise in the same way that he speaks, for he is wise by essence; Word is not his essential name, rather it is a name in relation to him as Father. What then is the character of that relation?

Augustine begins to unravel this aporia again by the guiding light of Scripture. It is the Son, and not the Father, who was made wisdom, righteousness, and sanctification for us. The Word, and not the Father, was made flesh and dwelt among us. Within the limits of time we return (convertimus) to him so that we might abide with him in eternity. It is the Son as Word, and not the Father, who is made flesh and is the created wisdom given to us for our return to God. The Son is therefore distinguished from the Father in his salvific mission as Incarnate Wisdom. In this way Augustine begins to define the character of the relation of the Son to the Father, but the question arises why, given their essential identity, the Son and not the Father is made Incarnate Wisdom.
Commentary on VII.iii.5.

Præterea igitur ... ipse primatum tenens". (67)

Given that in Scripture, wisdom is spoken of as Begotten, created, and Incarnate, Augustine concludes that when the Scripture mentions wisdom either itself speaking or when something is said concerning it, the Son is especially understood (insinuatur). This order - Begotten, created, Incarnate - is the base and fulcrum for the direction of the argument and the understanding of the relation of the Son to the Father.

At this point in the argument, Augustine refers to the Son by the name of Image. He does this because he has in mind that the Son is the Image of the Father in all the divine attributes especially wisdom. The Son as Begotten Wisdom is the Image of the Father.

In considering the Son as Wisdom and Image, Augustine encourages the reader not to depart from God. We, he says, are also the image of God, and we have as our exemplum the Son who is the Begotten Image. As begotten he is equal to the Father by nature, but we are made by the Father through him. Our image, he writes, is illuminated by the light and so we are created wisdom. The Son is the light illuminating, and because he illumines he is wisdom, and the principle of created wisdom, requiring no exemplum for himself. The Begotten
Image does not imitate anyone going before to the Father (praecedentem aliquem ad Patrem); there is no intermediate figure or principle upon which the Son depends for his relation to the Father. The Begotten Image is never in any way separable from the Father because he is the very being which the Father is. We who shine as created wisdom imitate him who abides as eternal wisdom. We follow him who forever stands as wisdom unchangeable. We strive toward him as eternal and unchangeable wisdom by walking in him who through humility became our temporal way, Incarnate Wisdom. In him as Begotten Wisdom made Incarnate we have our eternal abode.

What does Augustine mean by the predication of the Image as exemplum? The following portion of text is not easy to discern but is decisive to the argument. First of all, Augustine says that the Begotten Image shows himself an exemplum to the pure intellectual spirits, who have not fallen through pride. This exemplum is "in forma Dei et Deo aequalis et Deus".

In the Confessiones, Augustine understands the angelic heavenly Jerusalem or heaven of heavens to be a unified intellectual creature, formed in the eternal Word, united to God by the Holy Spirit, having the vision of God all at once, face to face, without time, and without mediation. This is the pure created wisdom
of God which contemplates the Trinity itself. In the De Trinitate this same vision is understood to be the final rest of the redeemed soul.

Ibi veritatem sine ulla difficultate videbimus, eaque clarissima et certissima perfruemur. Nec aliiquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cernemus quare non sit Filius Spiritus sanctus, cum de Patre procedat. 167

The vision of the Trinity is a vision of the divine relations themselves, the Trinity in its being and activity. It is the divine relations seen from the "place" of the Son as Image which Augustine addresses here as the exemplum given to the angelic spirits.

"In forma Dei" refers to the Image as the divine substance itself. The Son of God, Begotten of the Father, is all that the Father is in his essential predication, though he is neither the Father nor the Spirit. As Word or Image he is the identical nature as the Father and the Spirit.

"Deo aequalis" refers to the Image through the divine relation, and distinguishes the Father and the Son within the divine essence. The reader will recall that in Book V Augustine refuted the predication of the Arians by way of the category of relation which enables the mind to think of an alterity within the divine essence itself, an alterity which is an equality of substance. The Father begets his Son, the Image, so that
they are one and equal divinity.

"Deus" names the completion of the already perfect divine essence given from the Father to his Image by begetting him. In this relation the Son, from whose "place" in the divine relations we view the divine activity, unites with the Father in the mutually bestowed and received Gift of Love who is the Holy Spirit. The same Love which is shed abroad in the hearts of men is first of all the eternal ineffable union of the Father and the Son in the divine activity. Only the Father and the Son may be said to act, to give, in this way which is the proceeding of the Holy Spirit. Deus alone can give the Gift of Love.

This vision of the divine relations from the "place" of the Son, which is given to the angelic spirits, is spoken of in the De Genesi ad Litteram as an exemplar of conversion and formation. The divine activity itself, seen in the Word coming forth from the Father and returning to the Father in giving the Holy Spirit is the paradigm for the creature returning and abiding in God. Because the image which we are is obscured by the impurity of sin and the penalty of death, we cannot look upon the divine relations as do the pure intellectual spirits. But in order that we may, the Image shows to us who are fallen, "idem exemplum redeundi" in his Incarnation. Before addressing
the Incarnation, the words *idem* and *redeundi* require some explanation.

"Idem" should be translated either "the same" or "at the same time". "At the same time" could be understood to mean that the Word is an exemplar to both angelic and fallen man simultaneously. The question then becomes what is the nature of the example. As we have seen, the example which is the showing forth of the trinitarian relations is given to the angelic spirits. Perhaps what is intended here is to give another example to fallen man, an example of returning (*redeundi*), which is the example appropriate to fallen man and is the mission of the Incarnation. Or, what seems a better interpretation is that "idem" means simply "the same". This is to say that the exemplar of the trinitarian relations seen from the "place" of the Word and given to the pure intellectual spirits is itself a returning (*redeundi*). The Begotten Wisdom is begotten forth from the Father and as the equal divine being embraces, or returns, to the Father in the embrace of the Spirit, their mutual and reciprocal Gift of Love. This exemplar of returning to the Father also takes place in the mission of the Incarnate Wisdom who, having accomplished the Father's will, returns to his eternal abode albeit with the particularity of his own assumed humanity. In this way the Incarnate Wisdom leads created wisdom to
the very vision of God in which he as Begotten Wisdom embraces the Father in the Holy Spirit. To translate *idem* "the same" then gives a better correspondence between the Image, the divine Begotten Wisdom, who does not fall away from God, and created wisdom, both as unfallen angelic spirits and as those who having once fallen away are restored to a true image of the divine by virtue of the Divine Image himself who is begotten as Incarnate Wisdom, who returns to his eternal Father, and who as we shall see gives the Spirit to restored created wisdom so that we might cling to God by and in him who is Love.

Therefore, the same example of returning is given to all creatures according to their mode of existence so that each is encouraged to their common proper end. The Image is an example above to those who see God as their true end in contemplation. Below he is an example to those who wonder at the manhood of Christ, the Incarnate Wisdom, who is the means of their return within the soul to seek the eternal Word of God. To the strong he is an example to persevere. To the weak he is the example to grow strong. For those who are about to die he is an example not to fear. And to the dead he is an example of the resurrection. He is an example of returning to the Father to all those who are able to know his example.
Quia enim homo ... sicut lumen et Deus. (68)

The return for man is only possible through the mediator, God made man, because only through the mediator is man able both to know God who is man's blessedness, and to follow him in his return to God. Therefore, Augustine encourages his readers to love and inhere in the Image who is Incarnate Wisdom that they may return to God their blessedness, and they do this by the charity diffused in their hearts by the Holy Spirit. In this way mind becomes created wisdom as the reader is invited to partake of the same example of returning, first by knowing the Father through the relation of the Son, and then by seeking that embrace of the Father in love which is his with the Son and is given to the faithful by the divine Gift who is the Holy Spirit.

It is no wonder, therefore, says Augustine, that when the Scripture speaks of wisdom it speaks of the Son. Because of the exemplum which the Image (Begotten Wisdom), equal to the Father, offers to us, an example of returning by way of becoming Incarnate Wisdom, that we may be reformed as created wisdom, the Scripture itself becomes the means of knowing the exemplum. Since it is through knowing the exemplum and following him that the mind lives wisely, the Scripture intends us to understand the Son when it speaks of wisdom, even though
the Father as the divine essence is also wisdom.

Augustine has shown in the argument how the Father and the Son are the one divine essence simply, and yet they are also distinct in a continuity of derivation. The Father is the originative and constitutive essence of the Son who is the Father's Word and Image. The Son as Word and Image is wisdom from wisdom and essence from essence, in forma Dei, Deo aequalis, and Deus. But it is the Begotten Wisdom who becomes Incarnate Word and Image both illumining fallen man and enabling him to return to God. And it is the Gift of God who as love enables the faithful mind to inhere in the Word and Image and follow him. There is now in the argument the distinction of the divine persons, known logically in their divine being and activity through the categories of substance, relation, and act, and given a propriety in the economy of salvation. The divine being and relations are therefore held in one view.

But this distinction is only logical. It remains for the rest of the work to demonstrate the necessity of the activity itself. The argument continues presently to understand how the Spirit is one wisdom with the Father and the Son, and then to clarify the accomplishments of Augustine's logic in relation to that logic which preceded his.
Commentary on VII.iii.6.

Spiritus quoque sanctus ... Filius et Spiritus sanctus. (69)

The categories have enabled mind to see the unity of the divine essence and activity logically speaking. Thus the mind has been formed or illumined, primarily through the perspective of the Son as Incarnate Wisdom whose revelation is found in the record of Scripture. Now the same categories are the structure through which the Holy Spirit is understood. Augustine begins to consider how the Spirit is the same divine wisdom as the Father and the Son through two ways of predication: first, as charitas; and second as essentia.

When one thinks of the Holy Spirit as Love completing the already perfect divine essence by joining the Father and the Son, and then joining the soul to God the Trinity, one considers the act of the divine essence, how the divine being is consummated in love, and how he is then the means as love for the redeemed soul to inhere in God. This follows the predication of the Scripture that Deus is charitas, a name given to the entire divine essence. This act, says Augustine, is identical to the divine wisdom because the Scripture also calls the divine essence lumen. So then, the Holy Spirit as lumen and charitas is the divine essence and is understood to be the divine essence with the Father
and the Son from the viewpoint of the name charitas, which is to say that he is the act of the divine wisdom embracing itself. His act as love is the eternal moment realized as himself between the Father and the Son. Thus to look at the Spirit from the name of charitas is to look at his essential act, the personal property which is his according to his moment in the whole divine life. That he is charitas means that he is essentially Deus who is sapientia, but that he is understood as conjungens the Father and the Son means that his being as divine wisdom is realized in love.

Or, one may understand the Holy Spirit to be the divine wisdom because the essentia of the Spirit is singularly and properly named Deus, and Deus is lumen which is sapientia. That the Spirit is properly called Deus is the clear teaching (clamat) of the Scripture through the apostolic author who writes that the redeemed soul is the temple of God in which the Spirit of God dwells.

Moreover, Augustine continues, "What is sapientia except spiritual and incommutable light?" There is the sun which is corporeal light, and there is the spiritual creature, angelic and human, which is certainly mutable. But only the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are each immutable spiritual light, and yet they are as the divine essence one spiritual light, which is to say they
are each one wisdom and yet one divine wisdom.

Thus whether one thinks of the Spirit as the charitas of the Father and the Son through the category of act, or whether one thinks of the Spirit as Deus through the category of essence or substance, each predication enables the mind to see the Holy Spirit as the divine wisdom with the Father and the Son.

Therefore, says Augustine, because of the divine simplicity, because ibi, which is to say in the realm of the divine, esse is sapere, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the one divine esse or essentia. And because ibi, esse is Deum esse, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God.

Augustine's ergo is especially important here. The argument has come to a logical conclusion in Book VII, which concludes by way of examining Augustine's logic in relation to that of the preceding theological history. That the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are each one understood to be divine Wisdom has been understood through the categories. The initial question was raised how Christ is the power and wisdom of God. The answer has been to see the divine persons and their activity in one view of the divine simplicity, what is ibi where esse is sapere.

How this is so Augustine does not explicate fully at this place in the argument. What he has shown to this
point is the divine life of wisdom and love seen through the categories of substance, relation, and act. These categories have enabled mind to see the divine persons and the divine essence in one logical view, but this is not itself enough. What is required in the later books is to see this logical necessity as a necessity of the life of Spirit, which will mean that the Trinity itself will be mirrored in the mind whose logical categories will give way and become the image of the self-relation of the divine mind.
Commentary on VII.iv.7.

Itaque logeundi causa ... dicit esse nec Filium. (70)

At the beginning of Book V, Augustine introduced the problem of divine predication. To speak of divine things, which are themselves wonderfully beyond human capacity and weakness, manifests a distance between God and the mind as well as between the mind's ability to articulate its predication of God in the outer form of language, words spoken or seen. These things are in themselves ineffable, i.e., inappropriate, to the limits of human thought and expression. And yet Augustine has entered upon an argument which seeks to overcome this distance by means of the mind illumined through the categories of substance, relation, and act. What is in itself inappropriate to human thought is formed in mind through the guidance of Scripture wherein mind is conformed to the Scriptural revelation of the Trinity. Through this categorical understanding, mind is becoming created wisdom, and the explication of this categorical understanding marks the overcoming of the distance involved although only logically.

The Catholic faith had already begun to overcome this distance in order that the faithful might say (fari) something in the outer words of language about the Trinity which could by no means be defined by the
dialectic of the mind (quod effari nullo modo possimus). To say something meant to give an intelligible form to faith. And so the Greeks had predicated the Trinity, one essence - three substances, and the Latins, one essence or substance (the Latin West had taken these two 172 to mean the same thing) - three persons. Augustine understands these formulae to be necessary in order to give some intelligible answer to the question of what the three are, but he also claims that these answers are obscure. They are useful insofar as they make an attempt at predication of what the true faith wishes to say concerning how the Father is not the Son nor the Spirit, but in themselves they are unsatisfactory.

Cum ergo quaeritur ... nomine dici possunt. (71)

The obscure content of the predication of the Trinity reflected the unclear logical predication of the Church, which had focused its understanding through the customary use of logic in the divisions of genera and species. Some in the Church were already aware of how 173 this logic was inadequate, but it nonetheless was the ὁμοιωματικόν of logical predication among Christians and pagans alike and came to be focused in the Ἐπικογγε of 174 Porphyry.

The first person plural of this text should be understood to refer to the mind of the whole Church
since Augustine has already made mention of "our Greeks". The custom of Christian predication had stemmed, says Augustine, from the necessity to answer the question what the three are. Notice how Augustine leaves the question open in drawing upon both neuter and masculine, feminine forms (quid tria, vel quid tres). The method employed to answer this question was to apply the mind to find a logical name either in the category of species or genus. But this categorical structure could not present to the mind a satisfactory answer because the supereminence of divinity exceeds the faculty of customary language even in its highest eloquence. The distances between the mind and its language and the mind and God are real. The multiple and sensible form of language is more discrete and transitory than is the inner thought of the mind whose substance while finite and temporary is more unitary and abiding especially insofar as the mind participates in the truth. But even the spiritual character of mind and its partaking of the truth is not at all tantamount to the simple and eternal being of God. Augustine demonstrates the inadequacy of this customary language by considering the structure of logic in genera and species, which carries the argument through VII.vi.11.

To distinguish Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is certainly to know first of all that they are three. But
when one names them, one calls them according to the plural form of species. By species then, they are three men. Or, one may name them according to the category of genus in which case Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are understood to be three animals. The special name of man is appropriate to these three because they are as the ancients defined man - rational and mortal - as opposed to other animals which are irrational and mortal. Or, as the Christian Scriptures are accustomed to say - three souls - by which name the better part of man is predicated for the whole.

Another example is seen in distinguishing three different horses by their three different owners - mine, yours, and another's. But when they are named by species they are three horses, and when they are named by genus they are three animals.

The same logic is used if we differentiate an ox, a horse, and a dog. These are three particular things, but when we ask what they are, a name according to species is insufficient to contain all three because they are not three oxen, nor three horses, nor three dogs. They are three animals. Or, one could rise to a higher genus and name them three substances, or three creatures, or three natures.

The principle of this predication is this. Whatever is said in a plural number by one name according to
species may also be said by one name according to genus. But the transposition of these is not true. All things which are said by one name according to genus are not said according to species. Augustine gives us this example. Three horses which is a name of species we also call three animals which is a name of genus. We call a horse, an ox and a dog three animals or substances by their generic name. But we cannot call them three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs because these signify special names which are each one different from the other. And so the logical principle here is that things although plural are called by one name because these share commonly that which is signified by their name. What is within the category of a particular genus and is shared by all things of that genus, as in the case of a horse, an ox, and a dog as three animals is not shared on the level of species because of the admission of a difference to each of these, which separates whatever else they hold commonly. So then, what is present in the lower species is contained in the higher genus according to an undifferentiated unity. But in the logical descent into species, the generic unity undergoes a differentiation separating that unity so that one name is unsuitable for their common definition and predication.

Insofar as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have commonly
that which man signifies, i.e., they are rational and mortal, they are predicated three men. A horse, an ox, and a dog have commonly that which signifies an animal, and so they are three animals, as are men, but they are irrational and mortal and so while they are animal by genus, they cannot be man by species. Furthermore, three particular laurels are also called three trees, because each one is a laurel by species and a tree by genus, but none of them is animal. And while a laurel, a myrtle, and an olive are three distinct species, they are also three trees by genus, and while not animal, they are three substances or three natures, which could also be said in a superior genus with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, a horse, an ox, and a dog. Even three stones, which are neither animal in any sense nor are they alive, are called three bodies. A stone, wood, and iron are also called three bodies and any other appropriate generic names such as substance.

The logic of genus and species embraces the whole of named substances. The order is clear in the examples Augustine gives us. Superior genera such as substance or nature subsume animal, tree, and body underneath them as their species. In turn these species are genera to their species: animal to rational mortal man, and to irrational mortal species as horse, ox, and dog; tree to laurel, myrtle, and olive; and body to stone, wood, and
iron. These species find their final division in particulars, such as man to Abraham, Issac, and Jacob, or laurel to three particular laurel trees.

What is common to these names enables a common special or generic name. What distinguishes them either by genus or species is what is uncommon to them, their difference.

*Pater ergo Filius ... inter hominem et Deum.* (72)

Augustine now demonstrates how this logical structure is inadequate as a means for the mind to seek the Trinity. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three. Given the logic of genus and species the question becomes what the three are, and what they possess in common.

Their commonness is not in that which the Father is so that between themselves they are in turn Fathers to one another, as is the case of the mutual association of three friends. In the Trinity, only the Father is Father, and he is not the Father of two but only of the unique Son. Nor are the three all Holy Spirits, for while all are holy and spirit, the proper predication of the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God who is neither the Father nor the Son but the Gift of both.

They are three (*tres*), but what are they? If we say three persons, the common name by which they would be
understood according to species or genus is person. But where there is no diversity of nature, says Augustine, a plural number is named by a genus in the same way that it is named by a species. For what separates genus from species is a difference of nature. Augustine's example is that a laurel, a myrtle, and an olive tree, or a horse, an ox, and a dog, are not named by the category of species such as three laurels, or three oxen. Their respective difference of nature requires that they be named by genus; three trees, and three animals. But in this case where we consider the Holy Trinity and find there is no diversity of essence, it is proper that these three be named by species, but there is no such special name. When we turn to the category of genus the name person is appropriate inasmuch as man is also named person, even though so much lies between man and God. But how is it that the name person is common to man and God when there is so great a distance between their respective natures?

Augustine continues the argument below. At this point he has found no proper name of species for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. He has, however, found a generic name which requires more scrutiny.
Commentary on VII.iv.8

Deinde in ipso generali ... unam essentiam vel substantiam.

Augustine now considers the difficulties that arise from the predication of the Trinity in this way. The logical category of genus is predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in the name of person, because that which person is is common to all three. But if the guiding factor in this predication is commonness, why are not the three called three gods, since all three are equally divine, each one God? On the other hand, if the three are not three gods, because by the ineffable conjunction of their equal and common divinity they are one God, why are they not also understood to be one person, since to be person is common to each of them as well? The reason is not perspicuous through the logic itself.

Nor is the reason clearly given in the Scripture. It is true that the Scripture which guides Christian predication does not call the three three gods, but then neither does it call them three persons. Perhaps, then, says Augustine, it is on account of speaking and disputing, as in the conciliar arguments, that we predicate the three three persons, in which case it would not be because Scripture says three persons, but
because Scripture does not contradict such predication. For we cannot predicate the three three gods because Scripture does indeed contradict it when it says, "Audi, Israeł; Dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est". But then the exegetical principle that predication is allowed if Scripture does not contradict it leaves us with the possibility of calling the three three essences, because although Scripture does not say this, neither does it speak explicitly against it. Essence then, would be predicated of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit according to species or genus: according to species as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men because what it is to be men is common to them; if not by species, then according to genus as three horses are called three animals, three laurels are called three trees, and three stones three bodies. Why then are the three not called three essences since the Scripture does not contradict it?

Finally the question assumes a theological form, probably assuming the philosophical tradition, both pagan and Christian, which understood the first principle to be one, and emphasized the divine unity over any inner distinction. It was perhaps on account of the unity of the Trinity that the three are not called three essences. But why then are they called three substances or three persons, instead of one
substance and one person, if they possess the divine nature in common and the concrete unity of the first principle is the supreme divine name. For as the name of essence is common to them and they are each one called essence, so also is the name of substance and person common to them. This theological answer is of itself insufficient to account for the church's naming of the Trinity. The Latins had said, one essence (or substance) - three persons, while the Greeks had said one essence - three substances. What the Latins had meant by person the Greeks had meant by substance. In both cases, it was necessary to predicate these names of the divine unity. Augustine describes this predication as customary (consuetudinem) language, which not only suggests human and cultural tradition, but also the inherent weakness and finitude of the mind.

Therefore, the categorization of the Trinity in genus and species has fallen short in three ways. First, the logic itself, the very structure of genus and species, cannot comfortably explicate the doctrine. Second, the Scripture does not sanction it explicitly, and to leave room open for contradictory names by invoking an exegetical principle which allows for whatever is not explicitly forbidden only confuses predication. Third, the theological understanding of the divine unity has not precluded the distinction of plural
names for the Trinity, nor is it congruent with the logic of genus and species.
Commentary on VII.iv.9.

Quid igitur restat ... quanto magis Deus? (74)

The conclusion of these approaches to the naming of the Trinity, in which neither the logic of genus and species, nor the predication of Scripture, nor the theological tradition is able to account for the Church's predication, leaves Augustine with an historical necessity. These names were born out of the necessity of speaking against the plots and errors of heretics. His explanation of the theological history is profound.

Augustine's treatment of the history is seen in language which reflects the activity of thinking. What he understands here is the collective mind of the church and finally his own contribution to it. He begins with the necessity of speaking which is compelled by heretical predication. This speaking is the necessary offspring (parta haec vocabula) of the dialectic within the church which proved the collective mind of the church against the schemes and errors of heretics. It was, says Augustine, the attempt of human weakness (humana inopia) to bring forth (proferre) what this human weakness holds about God its creator. The movement was from the secret inner mind (quod in secretario mentis) to its conceptualization (pro captu) to common
human understanding (hominum sensus). This is of course the same distance Augustine has already mentioned between the inner language of mind and the outer form of language in words spoken or written. It did not matter whether the conceptual offspring was through faith or a kind of understanding. In either case, human weakness feared to call the three three essences. On the other hand, the same collective mind was reluctant not to recognize the real distinction of the three, and therefore could not embrace the unitary modalism of Sabellius. The mind of the Church would not commit itself to either a tritheism or a unitarianism, but its predication was logically incomplete, and therefore its understanding inchoate.

The profundity of Augustine's analysis here comes in the way in which he characterizes the incipient activity of the Church naming God as the activity of a weak and finite mind, albeit collective, in relation to its Creator. Augustine's own relation to this history is in the form of a recollection, which he builds upon and criticizes.

What had been gleaned from Scripture concerning God the Trinity was certainly clear and compelling to be believed. The mind of the Church drew it together as it were a collection of separate but indubitably coherent threads (et aspectu mentis indubitata perceptione
perstringitur). God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the Son is not who the Father is nor is the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son.

The question which concerned the mind of the church was how to hold the divine unity and the distinction of the three together in one view. When the church asked what the three might be called, the Greeks said three substances, and the Latins three persons. Their common intention, according to Augustine, was that no diversity of essence nor an abstract singularity be understood of the Trinity. Rather, the church understood God to be the unity of one essence and the Trinity of three substances or persons. Augustine allows a common meaning for substance and person through the intention of the church's predication. As we shall see, neither substance nor person is an altogether satisfactory name.

By bringing the logic of his present argument to bear upon the intention of the church, Augustine offers a refinement. Substance, Augustine says, should not be thought synonymous to what is intended by person, because if for God, esse is the same as subsistere, God cannot be predicated three substances as he cannot be predicated three essences. For God esse is identical to subsistere. This is like saying that for God esse is sapere so that just as God is not three essences so also he is not three wisdoms. And God cannot be called three
essences because for him to be God is for him to be. His essence and his identity are absolutely the same, and so it is impossible for him to be called three essences which would be tantamount to three gods. His essence and substance are identical.

Augustine's own logic is reintroduced here to dispute logical confusion. It might be said that for God it is one thing to be and another to subsist, as it is one thing for God to be, and another to be Father, or Lord. But if this is so, then substance has become relative. For that which is is predicated of itself, as is esse of God. Father and Lord are predicated relatively, as Augustine has shown, Father to Son and Lord to servant. If esse is predicated of God as himself, but substance is said relatively, as Father or Lord, then substance will not be what substance truly is. Substance which is derived from subsistere means the self-identical thing which is itself. Substance does not require a reciprocal necessity for its identity, but rather is what it is for itself. Relation on the other hand depends upon the ground of substance without which the thing cannot be related to another. If substance becomes relation, there is no ground to support the relation, no thing which may be said to be related to another. Therefore, if for God esse and subsistere differ, then substance is relative just as the Father
begetting and the Lord having a servant.

But substance is not relation, because just as essence comes from esse, so also substance comes from subsistere, and every thing which subsists does so for its own sake (omnis ... res ad se ipsam subsistit).

The nature of created substance is that upon which all other categories depend. And if substance is the category for that which in creation is for its own sake, how much more is this true for God? For Augustine, the divine esse means the divine substantia.
Commentary on VII.v.10.

Si tamen dignum ... quam tres substantiae. (75)

The question arises, however, whether this comparison of created substance and the being of God is worthy of God. Properly speaking, substance is understood to be that in which there are those things which are said to be in a subject. In this, Augustine repeats what he has already discussed before, namely, that the other categories of being depend upon substance as their ground, and they do not exist apart from this dependence either in nature or in their formal being. In created substance, for instance, colour and shape are in a body which, because it subsists, is a substance. Colour and shape are not themselves substances but exist in a substance. If either the colour or the shape ceases to be, the substance itself remains, because its substantial being does not consist in that colour or shape. Rather, the particular manifestation of that colour or shape depends upon the substantial body. For this reason, Augustine says that it is mutable things and not simple things which are properly called substances.

If God is likewise predicated a substance, something must exist in him as it were in a subject. If this is so, God would not be simple. His attributes
would not be identical to his being. But this is an abominable thought, says Augustine. To say that God is the subject of his attributes is to say that he is not his own goodness, greatness, or omnipotence, but that he is merely their subject. The divine being and the divine life would be disparate.

It is manifest, therefore, that God is called substance improperly. The name substance is a more common form (usitatiore) of expressing what is meant by essentia, which is truly and properly predicated of God. Perhaps, says Augustine, essentia is properly predicated of God alone, because he alone is truly immutable being.

Again Scripture is the guiding principle of predication. God revealed this predication of essentia as his own name to his servant Moses; "Ego sum qui sum" and "Qui est", so it is this predication which stands as the supreme authority. But this authority must be given an intelligible form, and the customary use of the word substance is inadequate for this purpose insofar as it is proper to created things, and not to God. Augustine views the Scripture, therefore, through the categories which the Scripture itself has compelled, so that whether one uses the proper name of essence, or the improper name of substance, each name is predicated according to this category and not relatively. The structure of genus and species is not employed. For God,
esse is subsistere, and so God the Trinity is one essence, and it seems better to say three persons rather than three substances.
Commentary on VII.vi.11.

*Sed ne nobis ... cum tres esse fateremur?* (76)

Now Augustine addresses the name of person, lest his argument seem to favor the Latin position. The Greeks already had the means for saying person. Just as they had said three substances or three hypostases, they could also say three persons or three *ὑποστάσεις*. But they preferred three substances, perhaps, says Augustine, because of the custom (*consuetudo*) of their language.

The name person presents its own difficulty. The same logic (*ratio*) in divine predication which identifies *esse* and *subsistere* or *esse* and *sapere*, also identifies *esse* and *persona*. The logic is that of Augustine's argument.

If *esse* is said of the divine essence (*ad se*), but *persona* is said relatively, then we say three persons as we speak of three friends, or propinquities, or neighbors all of which have a necessary reciprocity between themselves. Augustine has argued clearly for the necessary relation of Father to Son and Father and Son to the Spirit. But to say that the name of person is a relative term is incorrect. It would not do to call the Father the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and the Son. Person
is not anywhere predicated in this way, because the name person does not signify a necessary reciprocity. When the person of the Father is said, nothing other than the substance of the Father is meant. Person is not a relative name, it is an essential name. What the essence of the Father is, not that by which he is Father, namely his relation to the Son, but that by which he is at all, is his person. Just as the Father is called God, or great, or good, or just, so also he is called person. The being of the Father and his attributes, including the name of person, are absolutely identical.

Thus Augustine has employed the logic of his argument to criticize the Latin name persona. The categories of substance or essence, relation, and act which account for an intelligible coherence of the divine essence and the persons together renders the name of person an essential and not a relative name. The traditional logic is therefore inadequate as Augustine demonstrates in a series of questions.

If person is an essential name, why do we not call these three at the same time one person, as we predicate them one essence and one God? Rather, we say three persons, while we are careful not to call them three essences or three Gods. The reason, says Augustine, stems from the historical necessity not to remain silent when the Church is asked what the three are. The Trinity
must be given an intelligible signification to satisfy the inquiring mind, that the mind may rest in the revelation of God. The question of what the three are is then not simply the occasion of what comes to be understood as the plots and errors of heretics, but rather also the formation of the mind in relation to the Trinity as its image. This is the importance of Augustine's contribution to the logic of the doctrine. How the traditional logic is inadequate to this formation of mind continues below.

Nam si genus est essentia ... pro his naturam dicebant. (77)

In order not to remain silent the Church has predicated God one essence three persons. The name essence seems preferable to substance and the name person is itself difficult inasmuch as it is properly an essential name. This becomes evident when the Church's predication is viewed from the logical structure of genus and species. Some think, Augustine says, that this logic is adequate to the names of the Trinity. Unfortunately, Augustine does not name those he has in mind.

The logic itself is again shown to be improper to the doctrine so that the predication Augustine has inherited from the Church has arisen by the necessity of speaking to the inquiring mind in customary language.
rather than the categories which Augustine has found compelled by Scripture. The importance of this is that the Church has had no explicitly adequate logic to explicate its faith until now.

If genus is essence, and substance or person is species, then, putting aside what Augustine has concluded above, it would be appropriate to call the three three essences as they are called three substances or persons. This follows the course of customary predication as in the case of three horses (species) being called three animals (genus). Each category requires the plural. The logic cannot say three horses one animal, and so it is not, according to this logic, three persons one essence. Augustine makes this clear below. If however the names of substance or essence are not predicated according to species, so that the divine persons do not share a commonness as do three men in the special name of man, but rather the divine persons are thought of only in an abstract particularity, still the logic is capable of saying three individuals, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and three essences. This is so with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who are three individuals, but as they are three men according to species, which is in this case disallowed, so also they are three souls according to genus. Given then that the three, the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit are discussed somehow within the logical structure of genus, species, and individuals, why do we not say three essences as we do three substances or persons? Augustine leaves off his conclusions above to show yet another inadequacy of this logic.

If essence is genus, that which is one essence already does not possess (habet) species. As for instance if the genus is animal, one animal already does not possess species. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence. The point here is that by modifying the genus as one, there is a particular unity attributed to the genus which renders it a quantitative individual. In order for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be three essences, they need to share the commonness of what it means to possess their essence. The essence itself must be potential to its particular individuation, for once it itself is individuated, its potential division is eliminated.

The same is true for species, if one thinks of essence as species. The species is the source of that commonness which individuals possess, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob possess that commonness which is man. If the divine essence is species, then the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit possess the commonness of deity. But what does this mean? It is certainly not the case that
the species is one, one particular deity, as if it were one particular man, which is subdivided into three divine persons, as if one particular man could be subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Species is only potentially its individuals. If the divine essence were one, it would be individuated already, as in the case of a particular man. Why therefore would the divine essence which is already one be subdivided into three substances or persons?

The problem with species and genus is now seen in the particularity of the divine unity. Augustine will address this later on, but thus far he has pointed out that what is already one does not admit of division. The Church has said that there is one divine essence (or substance), and three substances or persons. According to the structure of the logic of genus and species, that which is prior to the division of individuals is only potentially that division. Genera and species differ in the limits of their potentiality but they are not the unity of an individual which has no potential for further division. For the Church to say that God is one means, in terms of genera and species, there is no potential multiplication of deity into other unitary gods.

At this point Augustine attempts to think the Church's formulation in the older language of nature.
Perhaps what is meant by substance and essence, which have only recently come into use in divine predication, expresses the thought of the early Latin Fathers who spoke of the divine unity as nature. Perhaps as we say that a certain three men, of the same sex, of the same constitution of body, and of the same mind, are one nature, so also this is what the Church means by three substances one essence, or three persons one substance or essence.

Non itaque secundum genus ... tanguam imaginibus corporum.

Genus and species do not express what was meant by one nature. Rather, one nature meant a common and identical (eamdemque) material. Augustine's example is three statues made of gold. We would call them three statues, one gold, but not as if the gold were genus and the statues species, nor as if the gold were species and the statues individuals.

The reason is this: the commonness of a genus or a species is found in its selfsame definition, which is potentially species in the case of a genus, and individuals in the case of a species. Neither can extend outside of its limited potency or definition to that which is not contained within it. For instance, the definition of man as a species contains all men in the
same definition, but that definition does not contain anything which is not man qua man. When gold is defined, not only statues but also rings and anything else made of gold pertain to that gold, even gold to itself if nothing is made from it. Gold is not always individuated as statues, nor are all individual statues necessarily made of gold. Statues are not intrinsic to the definition of gold and are not therefore in relation to gold as individuals to species. This is true in the relation of genus and species as well. No species extends outside the definition of its genus. Horse is a species of animal, and there is no horse that is not an animal. But not every statue is made of gold. Statues may be silver or wood. Therefore, three statues one gold cannot be thought of as the relation of individuals to species or species to genus.

Thus we have seen how the older Latin use of the word nature, understood as a common and identical material, is not proper to the logical structure of genus and species. Now we turn to the notion of nature as a common and identical divine matter. It is clear that the Church's attribution (dicimus) of the Trinity as three persons or substances, one essence and one God, is not understood to mean that three certain things subsist out of one matter, even if whatever the divine is is explicated in three.
To think of the divine persons as derived from a common matter would be to place the divine essence as one thing, above and prior, and the divine persons as another thing, below and secondary, like gold which is prior to statues made of it, and which are different things. The Church has scrupulously avoided this thought and her language reflects this avoidance, says Augustine, inasmuch as the church claims three persons of the same essence (ejusdem essentiae) or one essence, but not out of the same essence (ex eadem essentia).

The example of three men one nature does not correspond to the trinitarian three persons one essence. For while it can correctly be said three men one nature, or three men of the same nature (ejusdem naturae), it may also be correctly said three men out of the same nature (ex eadem natura), because three other men in addition could exist out of the same nature. But this is not so for the Trinity since in the divine essence there is no other person besides the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, nor is there the potentiality for another. Moreover, in created reality (in his rebus), one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man. In equal statues made of gold, there is more gold to be found in three together than in one. The common nature found in a plurality of those who possess it is given a quantitative difference.
But this is not so in the simplicity of God where the essence of the Father alone is neither greater nor less than the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together. Each is equal to the other and all to each.

But, says Augustine, to think of the simplicity of the divine essence, which is to think of the Trinity as spirit wherein there is no quantitative difference, is beyond the perception of the natural man (animalis homo non percipit). The purview of the animalis homo is that of custom, the consuetudo of the human mind which is not only finite but weak due to sin, and cannot think spirit because its sight is bound to the sensible. It is this habit of mind which thinks of God only according to nature, i.e., mass and space, either less or greater, in the fantasy of mind's imagination. And so for Augustine, the implication is that even in the mind of the church the consuetudo of the mind has obscured divine predication.

We pursue the juxtaposition and opposition of this consuetudo to the faith and understanding of the mind of the Church in the final chapter of Book VII which marks the last part of this division of Augustine's argument; however, a few remarks concerning the logic of genus and species and the Church's predication are in order before the conclusion.

The logic of genus and species had not been long in
use in the Church's predication, says Augustine. Although, he does not name them, Augustine recognizes certain Greek theologians who have thought of the trinitarian doctrine according to this logical scheme. And while we do not know for certain that the teaching of Porphyry influenced these unnamed theologians, we are probably not far off in assuming his influence, since his opposition to Christianity, and his theological genius in its own right, were enormous and well known. One should remember that it was Victorinus' translations of Porphyry which were available to the West and Augustine.

Two of the greatest Greek theologians, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whom were well versed in Neoplatonic speculations, employed this logic of genera and species while maintaining its inadequacy. But it was perhaps not so much the intrinsic unsuitability of the logic which made it inappropriate for divine predication as much as it was their own insistence, as was the case with Hilary, that the divine nature could not be properly spoken of in human language because of the difference between the immutable and infinite being of God and that of the created soul. Their determining authority for predication was the Christian Scripture.

That the logic itself was unsuitable for divine
predication may have been indeed suggested by its chief advocate, Porphyry. In the very first paragraph of the *Isagoge*, Porphyry avoids the question of whether or not the structure of logic is identical with metaphysical reality: "whether genera and species exist in themselves or reside in mere concepts alone; whether if they exist they are corporeal or incorporeal; and whether they exist apart or in sense objects and in dependence on them."

Augustine assumes that those unnamed theologians who use this structure to understand the doctrine of the Trinity maintain at least a metaphysical correspondence between the divine life and the logic, if not an identity. As Augustine has shown above, the logic cannot be properly applied to the Scriptural revelation. The structure of genus and species cannot itself reflect the unity of the divine essence, that God is one and incapable of essential division, and that this absolute unity is also three who are not each other. Perhaps it would be useful to look briefly at Porphyry's *Isagoge* in contrast to Augustine's own logic, and then to speculate about the influence of Porphyry's logic on the theological position of Victorinus, who, we have suggested, may represent a position Augustine opposes in the course of Book VII.

The structure of genera, species, and individuals
as Porphyry conceives it begins with the unitive source of genera which are potentially the whole subordinate multitude beneath them. Therefore, the highest category of this logic is in its essence the possibility of those many things which derive their essential character from it. That potency is then given a sharper definition by virtue of the mind's assembling and dividing through the categories of species, difference, property, and accident. Species are ordered under genera which name their essence, and beneath species are individuals. This hierarchy can become elaborate in the multiplication of species wherein other species are subjected under them in which case the higher are related to the lower as genera to species and the lower to the higher as species to genera. While the ten categories of Aristotle are named as the ten primary genera, the category of relation enters into this hierarchy as the relation of multiple actuality to potential unity, of genus to species and species to genus. Individuals, which are potentially contained in species, are composed of characteristics which can never be the same for another. Thus the whole hierarchy is seen to descend from a unity in itself, a full potency, into those species and individuals which are potentially within it. The declension of definition is mediated by the category of difference which explicates
the species as either essentially other, that is to say the essence itself is changed, or only qualitatively other, maintaining an identity of essence. An example of essential difference is the addition of rational to the genus of animal. An example of qualitative difference is that of movement of what is previously at rest. Essential difference provides for the downward explication of genus to species, while qualitative difference marks only what happens accidentally to an essence. The progression of either essential or qualitative difference is a development of what is only potentially prior. This is why it is necessary to perceive the genus as a potency possessing difference inasmuch as it contains within itself what is in actuality contradictory. The genus animal, for instance, possesses both rational and irrational. Porphyry makes a crucial point in his logical scheme when he compares genus, which is prior and potential, to matter, and difference, which is contained in the potency of genus but is secondary, to form. Property occurs in the definition of species. And accident names what comes into being and passes away, principally in individuals.

Augustine has shown that this logical scheme, which Porphyry will not commit to metaphysical speculation, is inappropriate to the revealed doctrine of the Trinity. The common essence which is the divine being is not
potential to a personal division but is already actually individuated, and this individuated unity is nothing other than three persons. Augustine's own logical scheme, which he determines is compelled by Scripture, views the trinitarian being as a substance or essence which possesses a self-relation and act. These categories allow the divine unity a form for thought, a unity that does not create its consciousness in its activity, but is a relation of being which is not a declension into something other but is the priority for its own act. The category of substance provides the logical ground of the divine being which is identical to the divine attributes. The category of relation is the logical means for discerning personal distinction in this substance without altering it in se. The category of act is the way in which this logical form of substance and substantial relation is given a completion wherein the divine being and the persons are seen in one view. In Augustine's logical scheme there is no priority of potency, rather the beginning point is an integral actual substance whose relation and act leave itself unaltered, absolute, and perfect. Augustine clearly thinks that a logical structure similar to the Isagoge of Porphyry cannot mirror the full activity of the life of the Trinity as it is revealed in the Scripture. Augustine's conclusion will prefer his own logic.
instead.

It may be that the Porphyrian logic influenced the thought of Victorinus, and therefore by addressing this logic, applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, one finds the logical system which informed the theology of Victorinus, or the theology like his which makes the Father speak the divine Word as his wisdom. The structure of genus and species begins with the unitive source of the genus which is potentially the whole subordinate multitude beneath it. In the Trinitarian scheme of Victorinus, the Father is a full potency, hidden, and at rest. The movement of this potency into actuality is the self-motion of the Son who is the explicit form of what the Father is potentially. The Father is being, life, and thought, according to the predominance of potential being, not nothing, but the full activity, as it were of the Plotinian One, in the first moment of the triadic activity suggested to Victorinus by Porphyry. According to Victorinus, the begetting of the Son is the formation of the Father's potent being so that the divine essence which is light, spirit, and \( \lambda \upsilon \gamma \alpha \varsigma \) takes on the qualitative distinction of Father and Son. The essential names and the qualitative names remain mixed in Victorinus, and this follows the confusion of essential attributes in
the Stoic's conception of the inner life of a substance. In the logic of genus and species, the defining principle of difference takes on two modes; that of essential difference of species wherein the distinction of rational and irrational serve as an example, and that of qualitative difference in which the essence differs only according to mode or manner as in the case of something moving from rest to motion. It is qualitative difference which Victorinus intends in the divine motion from Father to Son because the motion is from implicit being, life, and thought, to its explicit form in the Son who subsists in the divine activity predominantly as life and who is therefore understood by Victorinus to be of the same substance as the Father but only qualitatively distinct. Victorinus certainly does not wish to suggest that the Son's difference from the Father is substantial and so the inner being of the Father is no different from that of the Son but differs merely by virtue of the qualitative distinction of rest and motion, potency and actuality. The further delineation of the logical scheme of genus and species may be seen in the relation of the Son as the form of all that the Father is to that of the Spirit which as the full explication of divine wisdom and will is the distributor of what is only potentially present in the Son to the whole of creation. In this way the motion of
the divine life follows the logic of downward descent from genus to species and from species to individual. But Victorinus certainly understood this trinitarian motion to be one activity in itself and not simply a downward motion. The explicit life of the Son marks the coming to self-knowledge of the divine and its completion in the Spirit's knowledge and will of the multiplicity of the divine form returning to the source of itself in the hidden rest of the Father.

The logic of the Isagoge seems compatible with the theology of Victorinus. It is a logic which in its emphasis moves from the implicit self-contradicting potential to the actual definition and creation of that potency in a self-identical multitude.

How this downward logic must begin might be conceived either as necessity or abundance. The logic seems to indicate a necessity inasmuch as the priority of potency in an implicit form can only come to explicit definition by virtue of its descent. The potential multitude in all its elaborate hierarchy cannot realize itself free of implicit contradiction without its formation in difference and definition. And so in its move to reach the individual, composed of characteristics which can never be the same for another, the logical descent fulfills itself and the necessity is come to its end. This is what happens to the
trinitarian activity of Victorinus wherein the full potency of the Father necessarily moves in the self-propelled motion or begetting of the Son to know himself as the source and plentitude of his own actual self-conscious life and will. The activity must be viewed as a necessity distinct from that of the Plotinian One which as an abundance of implicit activity, willfully turned within, falls away into the self-consciousness and multiplicity of eternal but divided hypostases.

Augustine's logic seeks to make the revelation of the Trinity recorded in Scripture intelligible, and so for him it is the outer Word of Scripture which provides the limits in relation to the logical forms present to mind, and it is the dialectic of mind which discerns this relation by the grace of illumination. All other logical schemes are subject to this theological method. The conclusion to the logical section of the De Trinitate follows.
Commentary on VII.vi.12.

Ex qua immunditia donec purgetur, ... (79)

In his conclusion to the logical section of his work, Augustine addresses the need for purgation. Purgation is required because of the impurity of the animalis homo who fails to think of God as he truly is, and consequently asserts a mistaken predication. The distance between the soul and God is not overcome because the soul cannot think of God truly and cannot therefore distinguish either itself or creation. What the impure mind thinks is a confusion of the sensible and the spiritual. The mind is entangled in an empiricism, actually a willful empiricism, and predicates of God what is proper to created reality in terms of mass, space, and the images of corporeal bodies. Augustine refers to this impurity of mind in Book X as a consuetudo, a habit or custom of mind's purview, in which the corporeal is mistaken for the spiritual, and from which the mind must be freed if it is to know the truth of itself, the sensible, and God who is spirit.

Augustine raises this consuetudo in the midst of his argument concerning logical predication. The inadequacy of those who had thought of the Trinity according to the notion of the divine nature as divine
matter stems from the inability to think of God apart from the fantasy of the imagination wherein the images of sensible forms, mass and space, cloud the spiritual purview of mind. For the Latin Fathers there was an identification of the corporeal and the spiritual reflected in their logical predication of God.

The same consuetudo seems also present among those unnamed theologians who identify the logical structure of genus, species, and individual with metaphysical reality. For that structure, which Porphyry wishes to remain abstractly logical by avoiding its identification with metaphysics, categorizes the natural world, and therefore cannot explicate the divine unity which is three persons. To some degree this is recognized already by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa who find the logic of genus and species unsuitable for divine predication. If this logic is behind a theological conception of God (as we have suggested may be the case with an account of the divine activity like to that of Victorinus) granting a priority to the fulness of potentiality which then moves to the actuality of itself, there is need to separate the divine from the natural in order to see their relation clearly. The logic cannot serve as a mirror for the divine Trinity because of its inherent ambiguous character.
... credat in Patrem et Filium ... digne vereque dici potest.

Until purgation takes its final effect, there is the beginning point of faith. The way out of the mind's confused and willful relation to the temporal is to believe in the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost as the one God, who is his attributes, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, maker of all things visible and invisible, and whatever else may be said worthily and truly about him in accordance with the human faculty. The reader will recall that at the beginning of Book Five the divine essence was assumed in these attributes as spirit in order that the logical argument not begin with an analogical method which of itself cannot overcome the distance involved in divine predication. Augustine is now able to see these attributes simultaneously with the Trinity because of the Scripture compelling the categories of substance, or essence, relation, and act in the mind. Predication may proceed from the human faculty because it is the result of the logical argument that this predication is ultimately from the divine Word of Scripture formed in the human mind, and is not mere analogy.

At this point in the argument Augustine moves toward a most important conclusion to this logical section. The faith of the church is now seen through the
categories Augustine has discerned. We are not concerned merely with saying something of the Trinity because of the occasion of heretics, rather we are in a position to have faith formed by the revelation of Scripture made intelligible through the categories.

In the very first book of the *De Trinitate*, Augustine states his intention to give a demonstration (ratio) of how the "Trinity is the one and only true God and how the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are rightly said, believed, and understood to be of one and the same substance or essence." What is said is found in the first four books as the revelation of the doctrine in Scripture is expounded. What is believed is now coming to a definition by means of what is said in Scripture, discussed in the first four books, being made intelligible through the categories discerned in Books Five – Seven. Understanding is the effort of the rest of the work, wherein what is believed is seen necessarily true. Thus, Augustine has seen the reader through a renovation of the mind, a logical form of belief which must itself come to understanding. Divine predication is not sheer response to the questions raised through heretics but is also and primarily the endeavor to see the face of God.

The object of faith at this point in the argument is the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as the divine
essence - alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, and so on. There is no priority of the divine essence before the persons or of the divine persons before the divine essence. The logic of substance, relation, and act, has enabled the divine persons and the divine essence to be seen in one view.

Neque cum audierit ... Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. (81)

Therefore, when one hears that the Father alone is God, one should not think the Father separate from the Son or the Spirit, nor they from him because each, with the Father, is integrally alone God, and they are also together one God. The divine unity of essence and the three persons cannot be divided or ranked, and so they are one essence without degree, parts, or diversity. Nor must the individuation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be obscured in the divine essence. For the names of the persons are not interchangeable. The name of Word is predicated only of the Son and not of the Father or the Spirit. And the name of Gift is predicated only of the Holy Spirit, and not of the Father or the Son. The individuation of the persons revealed in their peculiar names admits a plural number in the one divine essence. The means by which predication is made simultaneously of the one essence and the individuated
persons is the categorical structure Augustine has discerned in the argument. Augustine's text to support his contention is John 10:30, "Ego et Pater unum sumus." The words unum and unum sumus indicate the divine essential identity and are understood through the category of essence or substance. The plural number is revealed in the word sumus, one the Father, another the Son, and these are understood through the category of relation. Augustine cites another verse of Scripture to show that sometimes the plural number is indicated without mention of the essence, as in the case of veniemus and habitabimus which again have to do with the category of relation through which the names of Father and Son are understood in the words "Ego et Pater".

Again, still another passage of Scripture is recalled to show how the plural number is sometimes even almost hidden, as when in Genesis, God says, "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram". "Faciamus" and "nostram" indicate the plurality within the divine essence and cannot be understood without the category of relation (et nisi ex relativis accipi oportet). For the Scripture does not say that gods made man, nor that man is made "ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum". Man subsists as the image of God: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, because God is Trinity.

It is important to follow the course of the
argument closely here. Augustine has enabled the Trinity to be viewed through the categories of substance or essence, relation, and act. Now when the Trinity in the Scripture is considered in its plural number by way of the category of relation, the purview of the mind is also given an understanding of itself through the Biblical doctrine. This is the case for the course of the entire argument because, as we saw in Book Five, the mind cannot approach the Principle of its own life if it has no inkling of its own inferior status. Because the argument does not proceed analogically, the discovery of the nature of the mind and its relation to its Principle is simultaneous with the discovery of the Trinity.

Therefore, in this last chapter of the logical section of Augustine's work, when the plurality of the Trinity is considered, man as his image is also considered. This not only fulfills the requirement of the argument in this logical section but provides for the rest of the work wherein the Trinity will be sought through its image, formed here as a logical mirror, in order to discover its adequate Principle.

The present moment in the argument focuses on the category of relation, which provides not only for an understanding of the plurality of God but is also the basis for a relation of the soul to the Trinity. Augustine makes it clear that the image of God which the
soul is not made altogether equal to God, since as image was not born from God as the Son was born from the Father, rather man as the image of God is unequal to God because he is the created image. In this sense, in order to be a sign of his creator, man is created ad imaginem so that man is the image itself.

But in order to signify his Creator, man must imitate the activity of his Creator. This is what Augustine understands the image to mean. Man is not created equal to the divine essence but resembles God by a certain similitude. And to speak of a certain similitude means that the image approaches God by an activity similar to him who is the life of the divine persons in their reciprocal knowledge and holy love. Man is the created image insofar as he approaches this divine activity, not through intervals of space, but by the similitude of knowing and loving the divine life. The contrary activity of approach to God through similitude is to fall into distance from God through dissimilitude, through an activity which does not seek the divine life. Creation ad imaginem, therefore, has to do not merely with an abstract image but with an image seeking to imitate the activity of that which it images. Ad imaginem refers to a relation of activity between the created and the Creator.

The phrase ad imaginem had been thought by some to
mean that man is created according to the divine image of God, according to the eternal Son or Image. But, says Augustine, another passage of Scripture clearly states that man is the image, not according to or after the image. The reason Augustine does not think that man is made only according to the Image of God the Son who is the Image equal to the Father is because the Scripture says *ad imaginem nostram*. Man has a different relation to God than does the Son to the Father. The Son is by nature born equal in essence to the Father. Their equality, as we have seen in Book V, is not by relation, for one is Father and the other is Son, but by essence. Their relation depends upon this equality and identity of substance, and is a natural derivation. The created soul is unequal in essence to God and is therefore not only unequal to the Son but to the whole of the divine essence (*et ideo nostram*), who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relation of the created soul to God then is not that of the Son to the Father, because the soul is not equal in essence to the Trinity as the Son is to the Father. The relation of the soul to the Trinity is that of the created to Creator and therefore approaches God by a certain similitude. It is, says Augustine, like the nearness or similarity which is not of place but of imitation, meaning an imitation of activity. Man is the image of God insofar
as he imitates the reciprocal knowledge and love of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

This imitation of the divine life is the end of the re-formation and renovation of the mind in its approach to God. "Ad hoc", says Augustine, the Scripture admonishes the Christian to undergo a re-formation of the mind, and to become an imitator of God as beloved sons. The imitation is of the Godhead, not of the Son alone, but it is as beloved sons that the imitation of the Godhead is formed. The image is made new according to the image of the Creator. The image is of the whole of the Trinity in knowledge and love, approached through a likeness of the Son's place within it, and so the re-formation of the mind is this same activity reflecting the inner knowledge and love of the divine persons who are the Creator.

The argument has now come through the categories of substance and relation to view the essential unity of the Trinity and the plurality of the essence as revealed through the Scripture. While not explicit, the category of act has been implied in the exposition of the Scriptures here inasmuch as the Christian is exhorted to approach God as beloved sons. The proper consequent to correct knowledge in the true image is the approach of love. But this is only implicit here for although the category itself has been made explicit in the argument
of the logical section the reality of act formed in the mind is the task of the later books wherein the mind seeks union with its Principle. These categories have replaced the Church's attempt to speak of the Trinity in the logical structure of genus and species, matter and form, and to go beyond the dictates of mere disputation to greater theological clarity. And not only has the mind of the Church been shown a more positive approach to understanding the doctrine, but the mind of the faithful reader who is able to grasp the new logic has undergone a renovation of its own knowledge, a movement away from the consuetudo of its predication, and thereby drawn closer to its Archetype. And so the inner mind of the reader has been formed to understand the outer revelation of Scripture through these categories. They are formed in the mind as the mirror through which the Biblical teaching is viewed, and they constitute the renovation of the mind in a logical beginning for faith's journey toward understanding. This logical argument is not the only way to understanding, however, says Augustine, and with this he concludes his logical section. There are in the Church different levels and modes of comprehension, as for instance that of Augustine and his own mother who together, in the famous vision at Ostia, approached the vision of the Truth from very different perspectives; he from the rigorous
demands of a philosophical odyssey, she from a simple, devoted, and sometime superstitious religious piety, but both having accepted the authority of the revelation of God in Christ, entrusted to the Church. And so Augustine continues his dialectic on the doctrine of the Trinity including all the minds of those who will read his work, both pagans and Christians, those with intellectual ability and those without.

There is the possibility, Augustine says, that one involved in the necessity of disputation would prefer a predication of the divine plurality whereby one word, as substance or person, may be used to answer what the three are. The abstract requirements of such predication would leave aside the more involved theological attempt for which Augustine has argued by way of the category of relation and relative names, i.e., assuming the whole of his argument concerning the categories and the Scripture. Augustine concedes this abstract predication, but with a crucial twofold provision.

First, if one predicates a plurality in God as three substances or three persons, this predication must free itself from the insuetudo of thinking of God either as a material ss or through intervals of place, as did some of those who framed the language of substance and person, so that no degree of dissimilitude within the divine be imagined, and there be neither
confusion of persons nor any distinction of inequality. This is to say that God is Spirit, and predication of the divine essence and the persons must from the outset conform to the nature of Spirit. Second is the principle of method. Abstraction will not do in predication of the Trinity, and so if one cannot seize the argument by the rigors of intellect, one must hold tenaciously to faith, submitting to the revelation of God in Christ, until one is illumined to understand. If this twofold provision is accepted, then predication will avoid ascribing to God what he is not, and wait upon him to enlighten the heart with his own names.
Conclusion to Book Seven

With Book Seven, Augustine has come to a logical conclusion concerning the divine necessity. The divine persons are seen together as nothing other than the divine essence, and this one view is enabled by the categories of substance or essence, relation, and act.

Each of the divine persons is understood to be the divine essence which is also the divine wisdom, and the individuation of the persons does not depend upon the development of an essential necessity. This means that the Father is not wise in the same way in which he speaks, but rather that the divine Word is the Begotten Wisdom of the Father, distinguished from the Father, not essentially, but only by virtue of relation to the Father as his Word and Son. The Father is in himself Wisdom, and the begetter of Wisdom.

The divine necessity as activity is not altogether clear at this juncture in the argument. There is only a logical demonstration. However, a glimpse of the divine life is seen by way of the Son and the Spirit. The Son is himself an exemplum redeundi, who is the divine substance itself (in forma Dei), who is related to the Father as his Image (Deo aequalis), and who acts in bestowing the divine Gift of Love on the Father (Deus).

The Holy Spirit is understood to be divine wisdom
along with the Father and the Son, because he is named Love, which is both a proper and an essential name.
First, he is properly the charitas of God because he is the essential act of the divine wisdom realized in love.
Second, the Spirit is understood to be the divine wisdom, because his essentia is called Deus, and Deus is Wisdom or, in the Biblical name, Light. The Spirit then is individuated within the divine wisdom by virtue of his act as charitas and his essentia as God. It is crucial to remember that Augustine has concluded that in God esse is sapere, and so the Spirit's being is wisdom as the act of unitive love. The categories have enabled a logical demonstration of the divine activity but its full view as divine necessity must wait for the final eight books.

The logical demonstration is an advance in the Church's understanding of the revealed Trinity. What had appeared as predication was an attempt to satisfy the inquiring mind when it asked what the three are, and to answer those whose logic or want of logic would amount to heresy. The language of the west and the east cannot be justified by the customary structure of logic in genus and species, nor is such a structure appropriate to the Biblical revelation, because it remains clouded by an habitual view of thinking which mistakes the
material for the spiritual. Logical demonstration requires a purgation of mind's habit in order that the mind may be renewed as the image of God. The categories Augustine derives in his argument are those compelled by the Scripture, and are therefore the work of illumination. Inasmuch as the mind has followed the course of the argument, it is formed as imago dei.

The logical section of the De Trinitate does not come to a close without including even those readers who are unable to comprehend it. The formation of the mind which has included the mind of the Church will also embrace those who are not given to theology, but their participation in the revealed life of God still demands a purgation of their own peculiar consuetudo. All who would come to know the true God who is Trinity must think of him as Spirit and self-revealed in Scripture.
Conclusion

In his article entitled, "The Negative Theology of Nous in Later Neoplatonism", A.H. Armstrong describes the development of language predicated of the divine by the later neoplatonists as negatio negationis, which is not toward "total negativity or super-affirmation or higher synthesis, but to fruitful and illuminating silence before that for which the mind is not big enough, that which is absolutely beyond us." Armstrong reminds us that it is a strong current of neoplatonic thought which doubts the task of divine predication, the classic text for which is the philosophical digression in the Seventh Platonic Letter. The trend toward a negatio negationis is paradigmatically seen in Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus which incorporates Plato's Letter, and which Armstrong quotes, "For the finding did not belong to a speaking soul, but to one keeping holy silence and lying open to the divine light; it did not belong to a soul moving with its own motion but to one which keeps a kind of silence: for since the soul is not naturally adapted to grasp the substances of the other things by a name or a limiting definition or epistemic reasoning, but only by a direct intelligence, as he says himself in his Letters, how could it find the substance
of the Demiurge in another way than by immediate intelligence? But how, when it has found in this way, could it express its vision by nouns and verbs? For discourse which moves in composition is unable to present the simple nature which is like the One... But if finding belongs to the silent soul, how could the talk which flows through the mouth suffice to bring to light what we have found?" Nevertheless, Armstrong continues, philosophers continued to use inadequate epistemic reasoning as a spiritual exercise, having as its end self-transformation, final enlightenment, liberation. Logic itself was the means to a discovery of the inadequacy of language, and hence to the negatio negationis.

Augustine provides a different view of the place of logic in divine predication. He is fully aware of the distance that exists between what is spoken in language seen or heard and what is thought in mind, and the further distance between the activity of mind and eternal truth; indeed, this is the aporia with which Augustine begins Book V. But Augustine's logic is formed, as E.Hendrikx has said, in "un sens nouveau et transcendant." The categories of Books V-VII are the formation of the speculum as imago, that logical structure through which the mind may think the Trinity
and itself. The *speculum* is first of all an adequate reflection of the divine self-revelation of God in the Scripture. The Trinity is coherently thought as it is gathered from the totality of the Biblical presentation. But this coherence is at the same time the formation of the mind itself in only those categories which satisfy the Biblical presentation of the Trinity.

The categorical formation of the *imago* is therefore not simply an instrument of philosophy, as Porphyry's *Isagoge*, nor as the older theologians of dogma suggested, a rationalizing of Christian faith; it is the renovation of the mind, the collection of the mind's powers in relation to the illuminating grace of God, constituting a new logic for divine predication. Augustine clearly improves the logic of the Fathers before him as well as that of the heretical and pagan authors. His position is that by the grace which flows from the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, the mind may be freed from its natural and habitual logic, which can make predication of God only improperly in the natural structure of genera and species, and be constituted first in a logic and then an activity proper to the divine. In this way, Augustine does not use logic as Armstrong understands the later neoplatonists to do, as a mere spiritual exercise to accomplish the destruction of language wherein the soul is reduced to an awful
silence. Nor is his endeavor an inevitable failure because of the finitude of faith as Merriell and Hill have maintained. The formation and renovation of the mind as speculum actually overcomes the distance with which the argument of Book V begins, the distance of predication, speaking of divine things (dicere ea). The compelling force of the new logic is the activity of God himself in the revelation of the Scriptures in relation to the historical and temporal purview of faith. Through the Scripture and the illuminating presence of inner truth, the forms of thought which having looked within we discover in Book VIII are always present to the mind, the mind may withdraw its habitual focus through natural logic and be renewed toward the very life of God. Logic in this way is not dismissed but rather provides the way for a union of activity. It is the divinely given structure through which the mind may come to understanding as a knowing and loving similitude of the Trinity. Books V-VII provide logically for the entire argument what takes place in the later books, namely the restoration of sciential knowledge toward sapiential activity. There, in faith, the mind is taken up from its inordinate habit of knowing in the world to focus upon the mind, which left to itself is not a similitude of the Trinity, but requires the Trinity as its object in order for mind to become a true
similitude. Similarly, the logic which Augustine draws from Aristotle was not originally intended to speak of divine things but rather of natural substance. Through divine revelation, these categories are discerned and partly reformed. Augustine's determination of categories proper to the divine life is therefore not analogical, because the structures of both Aristotle and Porphyry are clearly unsuitable in and of themselves. They require divine revelation and illumination to reform them. But in this Augustine's "use" of the categories should not be understood to be abstract and opposed to faith. They are rather, as R.D. Crouse has characterized the whole of Augustine's theology - the conversion of ancient philosophy.

The Arian logic, which Augustine addresses in Book V, and the logic of the Orthodox which we find in the course of Books VI and VII are both inadequate to the Biblical revelation. At least for some the deficiency of their logic was apparent to them, while others were sceptical that any predication could be made of God other than what appeared in Scripture. For some of these, as in the case of Arius and Gregory of Nazianzus, there resulted a theological impasse, a disparateness between the divine essence and the divine persons. Others, for instance, Hilary and Victorinus, attempted to resolve this difficulty but could not. The inability
or reluctance of their logical formulations could not hold the essence and the persons in one view. By virtue of the logic taken from Aristotle which in its renewed sense is adequate to the Scriptural revelation of the Trinity, the essence and the persons are seen to coincide, and the mind is formed as imago. As imago, the distance of divine things from the mind, and the mind's own activity from its language seen or heard is overcome. That which is the means of human thinking, the natural categories, is taken up in its renewed sense into mind as the very structure of its activity which is itself the image of the divine Trinity. Through this logical structure the mind will seek and become a similitudo of God. The new logic is nothing other than the mind in its fundamental essence turning from the world and being formed toward God.

The distance overcome is the distance of predication. Augustine will not proceed in silence or to silence. Through the Incarnate Word, the soul confidently knows the eternal love of the Trinity for it, and the place which the soul as imago seeking similitudo enjoys. The mediation for the soul is Christ, who as the Eternal Wisdom become flesh is in Book VII the example of the distance overcome. There it is primarily logical. The Incarnate Wisdom himself is the source and means of predication. Later
this is concretely worked out in Book XIII where Christ is shown to be our unity of *scientia* and *sapientia*, and therefore the way of reformed *scientia* to *sapientia*. This knowledge and love of the Incarnate Wisdom in its mediation becomes the transforming knowledge and love of the mind and soul.

That *scientia* and *sapientia* are together renewed is of radical importance. In its logical and fundamental sense this begins in Book V where *scientia* as the categories is discerned through what the Scripture compels. Not all the categories of nature, but only those of substance, relation, and act, may be properly predicated of God. The Plotinian philosophy cannot bring the categories of the hypostasis of soul, that of discursive reason, to divine predication. Indeed, these are inadequate even for the predication of the divine mind, a more unified reason, which is in turn incapable of the unitive activity of the One. For the soul to achieve an Φύσις with the One as the One, the soul must divest itself of the discursive and intellectual. For Augustine, the relation of the soul to the world need not be destroyed, only converted and reformed. The mind itself is formed by the discernment of the categories, those which are proper to God and those which are improper to him but not to his creation. In its turn toward the life of the Trinity, the mind
comprehends these categorical distinctions as a unity of the categories of *scientia* and *sapientia*.

Book VI brings this new categorical formation of *scientia* to the faith of the Church. The mind now turned toward the Trinity through the categorical structure of substance, relation, and act, can think the Church's faith, which is not nullified but gathered up by the categories into an intelligible contemplation of the Trinitarian life. In this the mind begins its formation as *sapientia*, which in the later books is the focus of the mind's powers on God himself. The logical form of *sapientia* begins its formation at this juncture in the argument through the question of how the divine essence is the divine persons, why the substance of God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and only these three. While Hilary is exemplary in attempting to answer this aporia, he cannot summon an adequate logic to do so.

The formation of logical wisdom continues and concludes in Book VII. Having turned toward the Trinity itself in the doctrine of Hilary, the categories enable the mind to gaze upon the Trinity. Mind does not now simply dispense with its relation to the sciential realm in the form of the Scripture, or in the creedal formulation of the Church's faith. These are held together with the categories, and through the categories
these focus and form the purview of the mind upon God. The divine itself which has not to this point appeared in the unity of its essence and persons, is given a logical coherence. Through the categories of substance or essence, relation and act, the Father is understood to be wisdom by virtue of the divine essence and not in the manner in which he speaks. The trinitarian relations are viewed through the place of the divine Word, and this logical vision is understood to be the result of the illumination of that same Word who as the Image of God is Begotten Wisdom. By means of the Begotten Wisdom become Incarnate, the mind herein undergoes its own formation as created wisdom.

The integrity of the mind in its sciential and sapiential form is only logical. The later books demonstrate how this logical image becomes an ever more concrete similitude of the trinitarian activity. In these logical books, Augustine has overcome the distance of predication. Divine illumination has formed the mind, and the mind of the Church, as a logical image. Once this image is formed, Book VII concludes with an account of how the previous language of the Church was logically inadequate, although her theology was formed through the revelation of Scripture, and how the mind may now view that revelation of the Trinity as an intelligible whole. Silence is not the effective end
of Augustine's logic. Because the Trinity is understood to be an essential unity of wisdom and love which, through the Incarnation of Begotten Wisdom, includes the soul in the highest participation of its activity, the logic of the divine enables the transformation of mind from image to similitude. The distance between words written or heard and the inner words of mind, that between the sciential and sapiential relation of logic, and the further distance between the mind's sapiential logic and the trinitarian necessity are overcome. These both establish and give way in the argument to the concrete realization of the mind as similitude or imago trinitatis.

In overcoming the distance of predication, however, not all distance is overcome. There remains the distance of the argument itself, namely the progressive formation of the logical image as concretely knowing and loving partaker of the Trinity, which is the task of Books VIII-XV. And then there remains for the imperfect but ever increasing similitude to come into the union of the loving vision of the Trinity, wherein the only distance that will remain is that of the Trinity and its perfected but finite similitude and participa. But that the distance of predication is overcome means that the present and final relation of the mind to God is not silence but praise. And both the Christian tradition
along with its Neoplatonic sojourners are forever transformed.
Endnotes to the Introduction

1. It must be said from the outset that my discovery of the unity of this argument began with the seminal article of R.D. Crouse. My own investigation of Augustine's *De Trinitate* has confirmed his position. See R.D. Crouse, "St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*: Philosophical Method," *Studia Patristica*, XVI, (1985): 501-510.


3. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV.iii.4,5. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the *De Trinitate* are to the Bibliothèque Augustinienne edition.

4. *De Trinitate*, I.i.3; I.ii.4; VII.vi.12; VIII.iv.7; XV.i.1.

5. *De Trinitate*, I.ii.1. These three opponents may very well be those with whom Augustine identified his own thought during different periods in his life: the first are the Manichaens; the second the Stoics; and the third the Platonists, perhaps Plotinus in particular. For a careful analysis of Augustine's sojourn through these positions see Colin Starnes, *Augustine's Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of Confessions I-IX* (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1990), 89-211.

6. Crouse, "Philosophical Method", 9. Predication of this kind leaves either anything or nothing said about the divine.

7. This is Augustine's own account of his prideful vision in *Confessions* VII. Plotinus understood the soul to be


9 *De Trinitate*, I.i.i.4. (BA, 15, 94). By means of his own literary criticism, E. Hill disallows that Augustine reveals the structure of the De Trinitate in this passage. See his "St.Augustine's De Trinitate ..", 280.

10 This structure was pointed out in a seminar given by R.D. Crouse at the Classics Department of Dalhousie University in 1973. Seminar notes of Tony Bassett.


12 Thus the argument intends "... aliquid unde dubitare non possint." *De Trinitate* I.i.i.4., (BA, 15, 94). The argument ends with the same intention "... ratione jam demonstrare debemus." *De Trinitate* XV.i.i., (BA, 16, 420).

13 *De Trinitate*, I.i.2.
14  I.i.3.
15  I.iii.5. (BA, 15, 96).
17  I.vi.13.
18  I.vii.14
20  I.viii.15 - I.x.20.
21  I.xii.25; I.xii.28; I.xii.31. The careful distinction of the two natures in Christ may be contrasted with Hilary's doctrine of the resurrected body. See p.266 of the commentary.
22  De Trinitate, I.xiii.31., (BA, 15, 180).
23  I.vii.14; II.i.2.
24  II.i.2.
25  II.i.3.
26  ibid.
27  II.ii.4; I.xii.23.
28  II.iii.5.
29  II.iv.6.
II.v.7. – II.v.9.

Ibid.

II.v.8. – II.v.10.

II.v.10. – II.vii.12.


III.i.2.

III.i.2. – III.i.5.

III.i.6.

III.ii.7. – III.iv.9.

III.iv.9. – III.ix.17.

III.x.20. – III.xi.26.

IV.i.1.

IV.i.3. – IV.ii.4.

IV.i.3.

IV.ii.4. – IV.iii.6.
45 IV.iv.7. - IV.vi.10.

46 IV.vi.10 - IV.ix.12.


49 De Trinitate IV.xv.20. This may very well be Plotinus. See Confessions VII.x; De Civitate Dei XIII.xix.

50 De Trinitate, IV.xv.20. - IV.xvii.23.

51 IV.xviii.24.

52 Ibid.

53 IV.xviii.24. (BA,15,400).

54 IV.xix.25,26.

55 IV.xx.27 - IV.xx.29.

56 IV.xxi.30. - IV.xxi.31.

57 IV.xxi.32.

58 VIII.i.1. (BA,16,26).
VIII.i.2.

VIII.ii.3.

VIII.iii.4,5.

VIII.iv.6.

Ibid. See note 73.

VIII.iv.7. - VIII.v.7.


VIII.vi.9.

VIII.vi.9.-VIII.vii.10.

VIII.vii.11. This was the fallacy of theurgy.

VIII.viii.12.

VIII.x.14.

IX.i.1. (BA,16,74).

IX.ii.2.

IX.iii.3. This is Augustine's correction to the unitary activity of Plotinus' One. But many have missed the necessity of knowledge before love, e.g., R.Nicole, who mistakes the trinity of love in Book VIII for

74
IX.iv.4.

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IX.iv.5.

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IX.iv.6.7 - IX.v.8.

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IX.vi.11. - IX.vii.12.

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IX.ix.14. - IX.x.15.

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IX.xi.16.

81
IX.xii.17.

82
IX.xii.18.

83
Ibid. Augustine does not approach the notion apparent in Victorinus, which Hadot points out, that the will precedes knowledge. See P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 Vols., (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1968) Vol.1, 477. See also De Trinitate XV.xxvi.40.

84
De Trinitate, IX.xii.18.

85
X.i.1.

86
X.i.2. - X.iv.6.
87
X.iv.6.

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X.v.7.

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X.vi.8.

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X.vii.9. - X.ix.12.

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92
X.x.13,14. Booth sees this activity of the mind as Augustine's adaptation of Aristotle's knowing activity of soul in which the mind becomes the object of its own thought, mediated perhaps through Plotinus. Booth, "St. Augustine's ...", 487.

93

94
X.xi.17,18.

95
X.xi.18.

96
X.xii.19.

97
XI.i.1.

98
XI.ii.2.

99
XI.ii.3,5.


XI.v.8.

XI.v.9.

XI.vi.10.

XI.vii.11.

XI.vii.12.

XI.viii.12.

XI.viii.13,14.

XI.viii.15.

XI.ix.16; XI.x.17.
XI. xi. 18.

XII. i. 1. - XII. ii. 2.

XII. iii. 3.

XII. iv. 4; XII. v. 5.

XII. vi. 6, 7.

XII. vi. 8.

XII. vii. 8, 9.

XII. vii. 10 - XII. viii. 13. cf. De Geneal Ad Litteram, III. xxii. 34

De Trinitate, XII. vii. 9. - XII. viii. 13.

XII. viii. 13. (BA, 16, 236).

Ibid.

XII. ix. 14. - XII. xi. 16.

XII. xii. 17.

XII. xii. 18, 19.

XII. xiii. 21.

XII. xiv. 22, 23.

XII. xiv. 23; This of course was also Augustine's own experience. Confessions, VII. x-xvii; X. xl-xl.
128
De Trinitate, XII.xv.24.

129
XII.xv.25.

130
XIII.i.1.

131
XIII.i.2

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XIII.i.3.

133
XIII.i.4. - XIII.ii.5.

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XIII.iii.6.

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XIII.iv.7.

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XIII.v.8.

137
XIII.vi.9.

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XIII.vii.10.

139
XIII.vii.10. - XIII.viii.11.

140
XIII.ix.12.

141
XIII.x.13-14.

142
XIII.xii.15.

143
XIII.xii.16.

144
XIII.xiii.17.
XIII.xiv.18, XIII.xv.19.


XIII.xvii.22. - XIII.xviii.23.

xiii.xix.24. (BA.16,336).

XIII.xx.25.


XIV.i.1.

XIV.i.2.

XIV.i.3.

XIV.ii.4.

XIV.iii.4.

XIV.iii.5.

XIV.iv.6.

XIV.iv.7; X.x.14,15.

XIV.v.8.

XIV.vi.8.

Ibid.

XIV.vi.9.

XIV.vii.9.

XIV.vii.10.

XIV.viii.11.

XIV.xii.15. (BA,16,386).

XIV.xii.16. - XIV.xiv.20.

XIV.xv.21.

XIV.xvi.22.

XIV.xvii.23. - XIV.xix.25. (BA,16,410). An excellent account of the concrete motion of the soul from scientia to sapientia is that of David J. Hassel, "Conversion - Theory ..." 383-401.

XIV.xix.26.

XV.i.1; I.i.3; I.ii.4; VII.vi.12; VIII.iv.6. This is contrary to the thesis of Daniels who thinks Book XV begins another discourse. See 92ff. of my "Introduction", and Donald Evert Daniels, "The Argument of the De Trinitate" (Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia, 1976), 119-145.
174 XV.ii.2. - XV.iii.3.
175 XV.iv.6.
176 Ibid.
177 XV.v.7.
178 These are the conclusions of Books V and VI especially with respect to the categories of substance and quality (V) and the character of simple Spirit (VI).
179 XV.v.9.
180 XV.vi.9.
181 XV.vi.10. (BA,16,446). This structure in the soul of objective knowledge and subjective desire images the Son's birth as "beholding" and the Spirit's procession as "enjoying" in XV.xxvii.50.
182 The unity of thought and its objects, and the consequent knowledge of mind as its own object is an Aristotelian theme. See Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology In Islamic and Christian Thinkers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 1-35.
184 De Trinitate XV.vii.11.
185 XV.vii.12. (BA,16,448).
187 XV.viii.14. - XV.ix.16
188 XV.x.17.
189 XV.x.18.
190 XV.x.19.
191 Matthew 5:37.
192 XV.xi.20.
193 XV.xi.21.
194 XV.xii.21,22.
195 XV.xiii.22. (BA,16,486,488).
196 XV.xiv.23. (BA,16,488,490).
197 Ibid.
198 XV.xiv.24.
199 XV.xv.24.
200 XV.xv.25.
201 XV.xv.25. This should be remembered in relation to the argument of Book VII where the kind of theology which Augustine opposes has the idea of a developing potency. Somers is mistaken in thinking the verbum formabile is the true image of the Trinity in the mind. H. Somers, "Image de Dieu et illumination divine," Augustinus Magister, 3 Volumes (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954-1955) Vol.I, 460-461.
203

XV.xvii.27.

204

Ibid.

205

XV.xvii.28. (BA,16,508).

206

XV.xvii.29.

207

XV.xvii.29. - XV.xvii.31.

208

XV.xvii.31; (BA,16,504). I John 4:7,8.

209

XV.xvii.31. (BA,16,508,510)

210

Ibid. Romans 5:5.

211

XV.xviii.32.

212

XV.xviii.32. (UA,16,512). This completion of the relation of the mind to God in a union of activity is seen here concretely expressing what in Book VII appears under the category of act.

213


214

De Trinitate, XV.xix.36.

215

XV.xix.37.

216

XV.xx.38.

217

XV.xx.39.

218

XV.xxi.40. Augustine has shown how the Father must possess his own intelligence in order to be wise himself
and this is necessary to the essential wisdom of God. See XV.vii.13. - XV.viii.14.

219

XV.xxi.41. (BA.16,534). This is an explicit answer to the question raised in Book IX of whether the will precedes knowledge. See IX.xii.18., p.31 of my Introduction, and endnote 83.

220

*De Trinitate*, XV.xxii.42.

221

XV.xxiii.43.

222

XV.xxiii.44.

223

XV.xxiv.44. That Augustine recognizes the absolute need of mediation in approaching God in himself is true to his Platonism both before and after his conversion where he knows the region of dissimilitude. It is only through Christ as the via that this distance is overcome as the soul recovers itself as *imago*. See *Confessions* VII.x. and X.xxvi-xxix.

224

See p.4ff of my Introduction, and my Commentary on Book V, p.96-98.

225

*De Trinitate*, XV.xxv.44.

226

XV.xxv.45. (BA.16,544).

227

XV.xxv.45. - XV.xxvii.50.

228

XV.xxvii.49.

229

XV.xxvii.50.

230

XV.xxviii.51. (BA.16,564).

231

See Crouse, "Philosophical Method", p.508, and
Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII.iv.7.- VII.vi.12., and my comments p.238-283.

232  

233  
See Crouse, "Philosophical Method", p.501-506, 509-510. In this Merriell follows Schmaus and Hendrikx. See also Crouse "'In Aenigmate Trinitas'..."p.53-58, and p.4,5 of my Introduction.

234  
Merriell, 19 ff.

235  
Merriell, 24 ff.

236  
Merriell, 21.

237  
Merriell, 21,22.

238  
*De Trinitate*, V.i.1. Merriell fails to see the connection here with the *speculum* he addresses in his comments on Book XV. See his, 31,32.

239  
*De Trinitate*, VII.vi.12.

240  
See VII.i.1., where the rest of the argument is said to be based on the conclusions of V-VII.

241  
*De Trinitate*, IV.xxii.32; V.i.1; VI.i.1; VI.x.11; VII.iv.7 - VII.vi.11; and my comments on these sections.

242  
See endnote 215.

243  
Merriell, 28,29.

244  
See my Introduction, 53-58.
Merriell, 31.


Hendrikkx, BA, Vol.15, 14-17.

Vol.15, 17,18.

Vol.16, 7,8.

Vol.16, 7.

Vol.15, 32-42.

Vol.15, 22-42. This is especially true of Books V-VII.


Vol.16, 15. See my comments esp. on VII.iv.7 to the end.


256

257
Hill, 277-286.

258
Hill, 280.

259
Hill, 281-282.

260
Hill, 280.

261
Hill, 283.

262
Augustine, De Trinitate, VII.iii.4,5.

263
De Trinitate, V.ii.1.

264

265
Daniels, 146.

266
Daniels, 146,155.

267
Daniels, 146.

268
Daniels, 147.

269
Daniels, 148.

270
Daniels, 148,149. Augustine, De Trinitate, I.ii.1.
271
See 23-82 of my "Introduction".

272
Daniels, 155.

273
Ibid.

274
See Augustine, De Trinitate, XV.xxiv.44.

275
Daniels, 155.
Endnotes to Chapters One-Three

1 Books I-IV offer a complete account of the doctrine as it is seen through the Scripture and according to the regula fidei. De Trinitate I.ii.4.; I.vii.14.; I.xi.22.; II.i.2.; IV.xxi.32. All references to the De Trinitate are to the Bibliothèque Augustiniennne edition.

2 De Trinitate I.ii.4. (BA,15,94).

3 IV.xxi.32.

4 VIII.i.1.


6 De Trinitate I.i.3.; I.iii.5.; I.ii.4.; IX.i.1.; XV.i.2.; Confessiones XIII.v.

7 De Trinitate I.i.3.; I.ii.4.; VIII.v.7.; XV.i.1. E. Hendrikx rightly claims the argument is not mere polemic. See his "Introduction" to the "Bibliothèque Augustiniennne" edition of the De Trinitate, vol.15, 10,11, and James Doull, "What is Augustinian Sapientia?" Dionysius XII (1989) 62-63.

8 XIV.xvi.22. As we have seen in the Introduction, 45-63, the Incarnation is the objective means for the subjective renovation of the powers of the soul. See

9 The character of cogitatio is found in Book XI of De Trinitate.

10 This is the argument of the later books, especially Books X-XV. See my Introduction, 32-80. We include this here to make clear what the distances are which Augustine discovers.

11 Enneads V.1, especially V.i.10,11,12.

12 De Trinitate I.i.1.

13 I.i.4. (BA,15,94).

14 In the De Trinitate see I.i.3.; XV.ii.2.; XV.iv.6. In the Confessions X, and in the City of God X.

15 Augustine addresses this problem of sin as habit of the mind when he wishes to consider the essential character of the mind. Before he can predicate the mind as spirit (XIV.xvi.22), he must first differentiate between what the mind knows and what the mind thinks itself to be. The full course of this discussion continues from Books X-XIV, but see especially X.v.7 - X.6.8.

16 Ibid.

17 De Trinitate XV.xii.21.

18 I follow here the argument of C.J.Starnes who gives an account of Augustine's Scepticism as influenced by but


20 Starnes, "St. Augustine and the Vision" 112.

21 *De Trinitate* I.i.1.

22 *De Trinitate* VIII.ii.3.

23 This distinction of the absolute, self-sufficient, nature of God and the dependence of creation is never destroyed, even in the soul's vision of God "face to face". See XV.xxiii.43. For Augustine's opposition to the philosophical method of analogy, see Crouse, "Philosophical Method", 501-510.


26 *Confessiones* XIII.ix.

27 See endnote to Conclusion - 8.

28 For a comparison see Aristotle, *Categories* 2b 15-20; 8b 25 - 11a 20; and Porphyry, *Isagoge* P.12.24 -P.13.5.

29 How this is so for Aristotle does not fall within the limits of this thesis. For a succinct account see J.A. Doull, "The Christian Origin of Contemporary Institutions," *Dionysius* VI (1982): 142-147. Edward
Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology In Islamic And Christian Thinkers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-25.

J. Pelikan sees Augustine’s argument of the divine essence as *ipsum esse* as grounded in an a priori philosophical axiom. This author sees his predication as first Platonic, derived from the argument of conversion in Confessions, and then giving way to the authority of the revelation of God to Moses as recorded in Scripture. See J. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), vol.1 of The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago, 1971), 296.


Categories 6a 25.

Confessiones IV.16.


This is so for the later Arians. Arius himself rejected the notion of relation because he thought it destroyed the conception of the divine monarchy. See Arnou, 271.
36  See endnote to Conclusion - 34.

37  For another view see Prestige who views the Augustinian and Cappadocian doctrines of the Trinity as amounting to the same thing; however, he credits the Greeks with a more subtle, philosophical, metaphysical approach in contrast to Augustine's psychological approach. G.L.Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: SPCK, 1952) 235-237.

38  Theological Orations PG.36:125,128.

 PG.36:80.

 PG.36:89,169.

 PG.36:89,95,96.

42  The equality of the Spirit, and his divine individuation, is simply asserted by Gregory and it is not shown in the Theological Oration concerning the Holy Spirit how his relation is necessary within the divine essence. (For the same point on Basil see J.Pelikan, 214-215.) What is shown is his place in the divine economy. Doull sees this as the general direction of Gregory's trinitarian logic. See J.A.Doull, "The Christian Origin of Contemporary Institutions. Part II: The History of Christian Institutions," Dionysius VIII (1984), 94ff.

43  Theological Orations, PG.36:128,129.


45  PG. 36:141,144.

46  The development among Greek theologians toward an understanding of the divine activity is first with Gregory of Nazianzus. E.Hendrikx, "Introduction", 
vol. 15, 60.

47
PG. 36:149.

48
PG. 36:476.

49
This is also in Basil. Prestige, 242ff.

50
Doull concludes that the relations in the Capadocian logic of the Trinity result in a subordinationist scheme reminiscent of Plotinian or Origenic Neoplatonism, Doull, "The Christian Origin..." 94–95. See Gregory, Theological Orations, PG. 36:80, 89. E. Hendrikx recognizes that Gregory's use of the category of relation is not in order to predicate the divine, but rather as a polemic against the Arians. See his "Introduction", 15–16.

51

52
Torrance reminds us this is already a principle of predication for Athanasius. Torrance, 24.

53
This means that the logic must become concrete in the mind rather than external and abstract, and the concrete formation of the mind is the course of Augustine's argument. On Augustine's place in the development of theological logic, see Doull, "The Christian Origin. Part II," 97.

54
The category of act arises in the argument not only in the predication of God as the Principle of Creation, but also in the act of the divine substance which as the argument unfolds to show is nothing other than the completion of its relations. See Augustine, De Trinitate VI.v.7 – VI.vi.8., and my commentary, 213–224.

55


Enneads VI.1-3, 7, 8; V.3.10, 11, 15.

Sophist 248a-259b.

Enneads VI.1-3, 7, 8; especially VI.3.3-28.

Enneads VI.9.2, 3, 5.

Enneads VI.9.6; VI.9.2; VI.8.13.

Enneads VI.8.13, 15, 16, 20, 21. The preference for an absolute individual devoid of relation to another is found in Plotinus' description of the One as μίας to itself. Enneads VI.8.16. (Loeb).

Compare the arguments of Books VIII and IX of the De Trinitate. See also Hankey, God in Himself, 92, 93.

Isagoge p.5.8ff. On the structure of Aristotle in Porphyry see Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic, 41-43.

On this relation between the Scripture and the categories see de Margerie, 138.
67  Note 36, p.585.


70  See endnotes 60-63.


72  e.g., Enneada V.3.12.


79 Augustine is aware that his logical correction is for both the orthodox and unorthodox, *De Trinitate* VII.iv.9-VII.vi.12. See also I. Chevalier, "La theorie augustiniennne des relations trinitaires," *Divus Thomas* 18 (1940): 341,342.


81 Enneads VI.1-3,7,8.; V.3.10,11,15.

82 Augustine has already made this clear in V.xvi.17.

84 See also De Fide et Symbolo IX.19,20.; I John 4:16.


86 Ibid.

87 For another view see Paul Henry, "The Adversus Arium," 45-47.


89 See Augustine, De Trinitate V.xvi.17.; VI.iii.4.; VI.iv.6.

90 There is a question here of whether ostendimus should be understood in the present or past tense. While the past tense seems appropriate given the individuation of the Father and the Son as having an order within the divine life which each shares equally, this author would rather choose the present tense indicating the progression of the argument toward an understanding of the Father as distinct from the Son by personal properties which distinguish the divine activity as a whole. This means that a fuller account of the individuation of the Son and the Spirit will necessarily accompany that of the Father.

91 Doull, "The Christian Origin. Part II," 78-103. Also see endnote 77.


E.g., Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.8.

Augustine, De Trinitate, IV.18.24.


VI.8.15-21.

V.3.13.

V.3.15,16.


V.3.16,17.

V.3.16.

V.1.7.

V.1.10.

V.1.10; V.3.17.
108

109
XI.40–43, 49.

110
I.21; II.5; II.11, 12; II.20.

111
Chevalier, 341, 342.

112
See Chapter One, pp.129–137.

113
Origen, *De Principiis*, I.ii.2–6. On subordinationism in Origen and how the persons of the Godhead and their external works were connected, see Gerald Lewis Bray, "The Patristic Dogma" in *One God in Trinity*, ed. Peter Toon and James D. Spiceland (Westchester: Cornerstone, 1980) 55–57. See also J. Dillon who, despite ancient views to the contrary, does not think Origen’s doctrine was essentially subordinationist. J. Dillon, "Origen’s Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic Theories" in *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press), 19–23.

114
I.ii.3.

115
Origen, *De Principiis*, I.ii.4, 11.

116
I.ii.6.

117
I.ii.9.

118
I.ii.2, 3.

119
I.ii.13.

120
I.iii.2.; I.iii.5.
121
I.iii.5-8.

122
I.iii.8.

123
Hilary, *De Trinitate*, I.18; II.21; III.22.; V.21.

124
This is true throughout the argument and is explicit at the end of Book XV where the entire argument of Augustine is once again submitted to the primary authority of Scripture as governing the mind's journey to understanding. See XV.28.51.

125
Hilary, *De Trinitate*, XI.40-43,49.

126
See end note 77.

127
Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI.iv.6. - VI.ix.10.

128

129
Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI.i.6.

130

131
Did Augustine read the *Adversus Arium* of Marius Victorinus? While there is no direct evidence, it seems distinctly possible. Augustine knew the *De Viris Illustribus* of Jerome as early as 397, and Jerome mentions the treatise of Victorinus explicitly. This fact taken with Augustine's statement that he read all that he could on the doctrine (DT I.iv.7) renders the connection between these two great thinkers possible. The following argument of this thesis shows how the theology of Augustine overcomes the kind of doctrine which Victorinus held. I understand Victorinus as a very important transitional figure in the history of trinitarian thought. See Mellet and Camelot, "Notes Complementaires" in the Bibliothèque Augustinienne

134

I.40.19-23, 32-35 (9-35), (Henry-Hadot 127,128). See also I.41.42-50; I.47.16-39. Hadot draws our attention to the probable influence of Plotinus and Porphyry who both used the illustration of sight as an example of consubstantiality. Hadot sees the analogy more forcefully used in Porphyry, "La sensation, et specialment la vision, est ... pour Porphyre, un mouvement de l'âme se tournant vers l'exterieur, sans pourtant sortir d'elle-même." See Marius Victorinus, *Traites theologiques sur la Trinite*. P. Henry and P.Hadot, Sources chretiennes, vol. 68,69, (Paris: 1960) vol.II. 821-822. Vision is later also used to describe the activity of this consubstantiality as that of being, life, and thought. Being is tantamount to visual potency, life to the act of vision, and thought to the act of knowing what one sees. See note 138. As for the names cited to demonstrate the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, Hadot shows Victorinus is familiar with the arguments concerning the divine names by virtue of his using both scriptural names and those which were current through the historic councils and the latest synodical debates. Hadot, Vol.II. 799-802.

135


136

*Adversus Arium*, I.56.21-35. Hadot sees here a reciprocity of consubstantiality in two states but in the order of potency to act, "... intérieurité du Fils

137

**Adversus Arium, I.59.1-12.** (Henry-Hadot 159). Hadot comments that the distinction is "entre l'order de la substance, où règne l'identité, et l'order de la puissance opposée à l'acte, où se manifeste l'altérité." (Vol.II., p.876.)

138


139

**Adversus Arium, III.4.29-46.** (Henry-Hadot, 198-199)

140


141

**Adversus Arium, I.55.1-18.**

142

See Hadot on **Adversus Arium, III.5.1-31.**

143


144

**Adversus Arium, I.51.1-19.**

145


146

See my Introduction, 60-79.

147

**Adversus Arium, I.58.1-11.** (Henry-Hadot, 157)

148

**Adversus Arium, I.58.1-11; III.4.29-46.**
149
See also I.41.42 – I.42.41.

150
**Adversus Arium**, II.10.2-20. M.Clark understands the
Arians here to be the Anomoeans. See her Marius
Victorinus, 212, note 50.

151
**Adversus Arium** II.10.1-20. (Henry-Hadot, 185,186).

152
See endnotes to Chapters One-Three – 77.

153
Mary Clark, "A Neoplatonic Commentary," 31; and
endnote 57.

154
Plotinus, Enneads VI.3.16-20.

155
P.Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 Vols. (Paris 1968)
I, 23ff. Mary T. Clark, "Introduction", Marius
Victorinus, p.7ff.

156
P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 Vols. (Paris

157
R.Crouse, "'In Aenigmae," 61.

158
It is not correct to characterize Augustine's
theology of the trinitarian activity as static. In books
five through seven, the activity is seen logically in
the categories of substance, relation, and act, and even
this cannot be said to be static especially given the
naming of the Spirit as ineffabilis communio; but the
logical gives way in the later books to the spiritual
and memoria, intellectus, and voluntas, are certainly
activity. Interestingly enough, Augustine does in fact
call the divine life "motion" in De Civitate Dei
XII.xvi. For a different view, see Antoon A.R.
Bastiaensen, "Augustin et ses predecesseurs latins
chretiens", in Augustiniana Traiectina (Paris 1987) 54.

159
**Adversus Arium**, I.58.1-11. See Mary Clark,
"Introduction" to Marius Victorinus, 16, where she says,
"Hence the Son is essential to the Father."

161 This example is also used by Aristotle. See endnote 160 above.


165 For Augustine's understanding of the eternal reasons created eternally in the wisdom of the *Verbum*, see *Confessions* XI.Vii-ix.

166 *Confessions* XII.xiii; XIII.v.; XIII.viii.

167 Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV.xxv.45. (*BA*, 16, 544).

168 I.vii.14; XV.xvi.25, 26; XV.xxiii.44.

169 V.iii.4; V.iv.5; V.v.6; V.vi.7; V.vii.8.

170 XV.xxvi.46, 47; XV.xxvii.48; V.xiv.15; V xv.16; V.xvi.17.


172 Hendrikx, 35.

173 Gregory of Nyssa, *Quod Non Sunt Tres Dei*; Basil of
Caesarea, Ep. 38.3,4; 52.1. See Jaroslav Pelikan, 220ff.

174

175
This is of course the fundamental problem in divine predication with which Augustine begins his logical section of the De Trinitate V.i.1.

176
This has been our understanding, in the preceding chapters, of Plotinus, Origen, Gregory of Nazianaus, Hilary, and finally Victorinus. For an account of the historical development see Doull, "The Christian Origin. Part II," 81-103. See also de Margerie, 139; J. Pelikan, 221.

177
Augustine understood that he was correcting the tradition. Hendrikx, 7,8,14,22. Seeberg, 240.

178
Hendrikx, 33,34.

179
See endnote 161.

180
De Trinitate VII.i.2. See my commentary 311,312.

181
See endnote 163 and De Trinitate VII.i.2.

182
Hendrikx, 7,8.

183
Perhaps Augustine has Gregory of Nyssa in mind. See Quod Non Sunt Tres Dei.

184

185
See endnote 173.

186
Ibid.

187

188
Porphyry, Isagoge, P.2, 10.

189
P.2, 20.

190
P.6, 7.

191
P.5, 15; P.6, 18.

192
P.7, 20, 25.

193
P.8, 20; P.9, 1.

194
P.9, 5.

195
P.11, 1-5; P.14, 20.

196
P.15, 7.

197
P.12, 12-20; P.17, 10.
198
P.12,25ff; P.17,10.

199
See endnote 131.

200

201
P.Hadot, p.232.

202

203

204
See endnote 201.

205
Augustine, De Trinitate, X.v.7.- X.viii.11.

206

207
140-142.

208

Faith in Christ as revealed in Scripture is the beginning point of the entire argument. Augustine opposes the adversaries of faith's object which is the Incarnate Word. See the Introduction to this commentary, 3.

209

Endnotes to Conclusion


2 p.32.

3 p.34.

4 p.35.

5 p.34-36.


8 R.D.Crouse, " In Aenigmate," 53-62, esp.62. The question of whether this is also Aristotle's doctrine, whether Aristotle understands the categories to be proper to the divine in some sense, cannot be addressed here. See Hankey, God in Himself, 91,92. Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic, 1-25.

9 See endnote 141 to Chapter Three.

10 Augustine, De Trinitate, VII.iii.5.

11 See the Introduction, 51-52.

12 De Trinitate, XV.xxviii.51. Lossky understands the difference of Augustine's approach from that of the
"negative" tradition. See Lossky, 575-581.
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