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**THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) ALLIANCE  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 1975-1990**

by

**Abillah Harrid Omari**

**Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

at

**Dalhousie University  
Halifax, Nova Scotia**

**1991**

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ISBN 0-315-71543-X

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
by Abillah Harrid Omari

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dated

1 Nov 1991

External Examiner  
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Examining Committee



DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

Date 19 November 1991

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Title THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) ALLIANCE  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 1975-1990

Department or School Political Science

Degree: Ph.D. Convocation February Year 1992

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## **DEDICATION**

*Kwa Wafundi na Mnyamuliwa  
Vava na Lipamba*

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## ABSTRACT

The Front Line States (FLS) alliance arose out of the Southern African colonial conflict to become one of the most important actors in regional conflict, conflict resolution and regional co-operation. The alliance expanded its membership in number from the original three (Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia) to seven (to include Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, in that order), as well as in scope of responsibilities. The liberation of Namibia, majority rule in South Africa and the fight against destabilisation became part of the alliance's agenda after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Using regionalism as the main approach—with regional security, general theories of international politics and political economy as its variants—it is argued that the alliance has experienced both rise (1975-1980) and decline (from 1980 onwards). In the first period it was becoming increasingly significant. However, in the second, external and internal factors set in motion the process of decline, especially in the 1980s. The latter process has been slow and has mainly been influenced by changes internal to member countries as well as at regional and global levels. Despite such decline, the members of the Front Line States alliance have significantly contributed to the change of the *status quo* in Southern Africa. Arguably, the region would have been different without this alliance in terms of economic, political and social development.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALC	-(OAU) African Liberation Committee
ANC	-African National Congress (South Africa)
ASEAN	-Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLS	-Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
BOSS	-Bureau for State Security (South Africa)
CAF	-Central African Federation/Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
CECAC	-Conferences of East and Central African Countries
CONSAS	-Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	-Congress of South African Trade Unions
EAC	-East African Community
ECA	-Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSA	-Economic Community of Southern Africa
FAPLA	- <i>Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola</i>
FLS	-Front Line States (of Southern Africa)
FNLA	- <i>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</i>
FPLM	- <i>Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
FRELIMO	- <i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
GCC	-Gulf Co-operation Council
GDP	-Gross Domestic Product
GNP	-Gross National Product
GRAE	- <i>Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exilio</i>
IOs	-International Organisations
ISDSC	-Inter-State Defence and Security Committee of the Front Line States
LLA	-Lesotho Liberation Army

<b>MNR or RENAMO</b>	<b>-<i>Movimento Nacional da Resistência de Moçambique</i> or <i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i></b>
<b>MPLA</b>	<b>-<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i></b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</b>
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>-Non-Governmental Organisations</b>
<b>NIDP</b>	<b>-New International Division of Power</b>
<b>NSMS</b>	<b>-National Security Management System (South Africa)</b>
<b>NSSM</b>	<b>-National Security Study Memorandum (US)</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>-Organisation of African Unity</b>
<b>PAC</b>	<b>-Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa)</b>
<b>PAFMECA</b>	<b>-Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa</b>
<b>PAFMECSA</b>	<b>-Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa</b>
<b>PF</b>	<b>-Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe)</b>
<b>PLAN</b>	<b>-People's Liberation Army of Namibia</b>
<b>PTA</b>	<b>-Preferential Trade Area (of Eastern and Southern Africa)</b>
<b>RMA</b>	<b>-Rand Monetary Area</b>
<b>RSA</b>	<b>-Republic of South Africa</b>
<b>SACU</b>	<b>-Southern African Customs Union</b>
<b>SADCC</b>	<b>-Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</b>
<b>SADF</b>	<b>-South African Defence Force</b>
<b>SAPs</b>	<b>-Structural Adjustment Programme(s)</b>
<b>SDRs</b>	<b>-Special Drawing Rights (IMF)</b>
<b>SNASP</b>	<b>-<i>Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular (Mozambique)</i></b>
<b>SSC</b>	<b>-State Security Council (South Africa)</b>
<b>SWANU</b>	<b>-South West African National Union</b>

<b>SWAPO</b>	-South West Africa People's Organisation
<b>TANU</b>	-Tanganyika African National Union (Tanzania)
<b>TAZAMA</b>	-Tanzania-Zambia (oil) Pipeline
<b>TAZARA</b>	-Tanzania-Zambia Railway
<b>UDF</b>	-United Democratic Front (South Africa)
<b>UDI</b>	-Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)
<b>UN</b>	-United Nations (Organisation)
<b>UNITA</b>	- <i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>
<b>UNSC</b>	-United Nations Security Council
<b>UNTAG</b>	-United Nations Transition Assistance Group (for Namibia)
<b>US(A)</b>	-United States (of America)
<b>USSR</b>	-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
<b>ZANLA</b>	-Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army of ZANU
<b>ZANU</b>	-Zimbabwe African National Union
<b>ZAPU</b>	-Zimbabwe African People's Union

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am heavily indebted to a variety of institutions and individuals for both moral and material support in the research and writing of this thesis. Their generous and sustained help made possible for me to undertake and complete this doctoral work.

I would like to sincerely thank the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan which kindly granted me a scholarship for my entire study period at Dalhousie University. I would also like to thank the Mozambique/Tanzania Centre for Foreign Relations for allowing me to go on a long study leave. Specifically, I would like to thank Mzee Anthony H. Hokororo, the then Director of the Centre, and Dr. Ibrahim S.R. Msabaha, the Director of Studies and Programmes. I would also like to thank the Ford Foundation and the Institute of International Education for their supplemental grant.

My thanks to the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Dalhousie University for generous grants that made my travel to Southern Africa possible. This work is partly the product of those trips.

Many people have contributed to this work. The inspiration to study Southern Africa dates back to my days in the Tanzanian civil service. I would like to thank Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga for exposing me to the Front Line States alliance, and Gen. Imran H. Kombe of the Tanzania People's Defence Forces who insisted that I needed to study and understand the region more. I thought I did understand the Front Line States alliance until one of its members, Mozambique, signed the Nkomati Accord in 1984. This Accord confused me and other analysts a lot. I only got a glimpse of what it meant during the First International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Arusha-Tanzania in 1985 which I helped to organise.



It served to reaffirm my commitment to study Southern Africa further. I began making arrangements to come to Dalhousie right in the conference room. I would like to thank all those from North America who presented papers at that conference for their views which, for the first time, challenged my alleged expertise and understanding of the alliance. They know who they are, and I thank them.

I would also like to thank all individuals and institutions who, in various ways, assisted me during my research trips to Southern Africa. In particular, in Zimbabwe, I would like to thank the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), energetic comrades at the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, and the High Commission of the United Republic of Tanzania.

My sincere thanks to all those who, for obvious security reasons, requested that they remain anonymous after granting me interviews. I reassure them that I will continue to keep my promise. Officials at the Embassies of the People's Republics of Angola and Mozambique, and the High Commissions of Zambia and Zimbabwe, all in Dar es Salaam, were very helpful. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and National Service in Tanzania and their respective specialised departments were very kind and helpful to me. My thanks to the *Daily News* (Tanzania), for allowing me to use its valuable Archives Library. Further, I recognise my old friend and colleague, Wence Mushi, and my namesake Omari the Librarian, for their tireless efforts to create order where there was none. CCM Sub-Headquarters in Dar es Salaam and the Head Office of the African Liberation Committee were very generous with interviews.

This work would have been impossible had it not been for co-operation I received during my entire period in the Political Science Department at Dalhousie University. The management, faculty, staff and the bulk of graduate students formed such nice and conducive "family" with which to work. I thank them all.

My special thanks to Prof. Timothy M. Shaw, my supervisor. He has been a source of inspiration and encouragement ever since we met in Tanzania many years ago. Despite his very tight schedule, he has managed to direct, supervise and relentlessly read this work in all its stages, including playing a role in administration and communication. Without him this work would have been different. Professor Shaw is himself a source of data on Southern Africa. He is more than *mwalimu* to me. My sincere thanks to Profs. Robert Boardman and Brian Crowley who, together with Dr. Shaw, constituted my thesis committee. They read and commented on various drafts of this work. I would also like to thank Prof. Andrew Heard for informally reading and commenting on it.


My thanks go to my immediate colleagues in the Department of Political Science. They helped me socially and academically. I greatly enjoyed working with David Black, Joshua Mugenyi, Comrade Larry Swatuk, and John Inegbedion.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Dr. Fatina Omari, and all our children, Asina, Wa-Fundi and Rehema. Their joining me in Canada inspired and encouraged me. I thank them for enduring my eccentric routines, their own cultural dislocation and other hardships. My thanks go to Mzee Wa-Fundi and Mnyamuliwa, my parents to whom I dedicate. Probably I will not be able to repay all those who were responsible for them during my absence. For now, I thank them all.

Of course, none of the individuals and institutions named above bear any responsibility for any error or fact encountered in this work. All of these, if any, remain mine.

**ABILLAH H. OMARI**

Map I: Southern Africa 1990



## Introduction

### THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) ALLIANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 1975-1990

This study investigates the rise and decline of the Front Line States (FLS) alliance of Southern Africa.<sup>1</sup> It offers an assessment and evaluation of the FLS alliance as a regional inter-state grouping in the context of Southern African regional conflict and co-operation between 1975 and 1990. The formation of the alliance in the mid-1970s represented one of the most important developments in contemporary Southern Africa. On the one hand, it was in line with the tradition of regional groupings in Africa. On the other hand, the alliance seriously challenged the *status quo* as it then existed, by actively participating in conflict resolution through supporting the liberation movements and calling for an end to *apartheid*. The FLS alliance constituted, therefore, a form of co-operation among Southern African independent and majority-ruled states intended to hasten the pace of change. It was itself, however, a product of a regional conflict, and its decline in the first half of the 1980s led to its essential demise by the early 1990s.

---

<sup>1</sup>The term Front Line States is used in this study to designate an inter-state grouping, institution, and, as defined in Chapter One below, an alliance. It is used in the text as Front Line States, FLS, alliance, Front Line States alliance or FLS alliance. Unless otherwise specified Front Line States (FLS) is used in its singular form. Its members are Angola (1976), Botswana (1975), Mozambique (1975), Namibia (1990), Tanzania (1975), Zambia (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980).

## THE FRONT LINE STATES 1975-1990

A fifteen-year period is adopted here so as to include both the period of the rise of the alliance: 1975-1980; and that of its decline: 1980-1990. Both patterns resulted from its attempts to achieve intended objectives and the problems or constraints encountered in the process.

The five-year period of the FLS' rise includes the time when the alliance was established. It evolved in the mid-1970s from several groupings which preceded it. Its rise until the turn of the decade also signifies the period and duration when it was becoming increasingly important and relevant in conflict resolution in Southern Africa. This period ran from 1975, when the alliance was formed from the remnants of the short-lived "Mulungushi Club", to 1980, when Zimbabwe became independent and its sixth member.

In this initial period, the alliance scored tremendous achievements. It managed to pressure two major liberation movements in Zimbabwe—the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—to come together, albeit temporarily, in the form of "united front"—the Patriotic Front (PF)—so as to make negotiations for independence possible. It was also during this half-decade that the alliance was mandated to work on behalf of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as working alongside Britain and the United States in the final stages of the protracted Rhodesian crisis.

The ascendance of the FLS alliance to prominence in the second half of the 1970s was more politico-diplomatic than it was military and economic. This is not to suggest that its politico-diplomatic achievements were not related to military capability and/or economic performance. These are related somewhat even if indirectly. The *problem* in Southern Africa especially in the period of the rise of the

FLS alliance was that different variables—ideological, political developments, politico-diplomatic, military and economic—could not easily be separated and identified. In fact, the region's problem was perceived then to be more political: it was assumed to mainly comprise the colonial question. It was in the latter period, the period of its decline, that clear demarcation lines developed among these factors.

Nevertheless, in the period between 1975 and 1980 the economies of most members of the FLS alliance were performing reasonably well, although far from spectacularly. Their military capabilities were still rudimentary but more promising than in the period of the decline. In short, during that first period, the members of the alliance were yet to experience problems of economic decay, debt and structural adjustment, let alone destabilisation, as Africa's serious development crises began in the 1980s decade. Together, these were the problems which they came to face in the second period, that of decline.

The concept "rise" is therefore used to describe a period of relative ascendance. Never before (or arguably since) had a group of African presidents come together in such a meaningful manner to have their impact felt and receive so much visibility and credibility as through the FLS alliance.

Relative to the initial period, the alliance began to show tendencies towards decline from 1980. Its primary objective—independence of Zimbabwe—had been achieved by then. The remaining problems in Southern Africa—Namibian independence and *apartheid*—looked like extended agendas for the alliance because of their increasing complexity. Destabilisation, unleashed with vigour against alliance members around the same time, compounded unfolding economic problems in almost every member country. The year 1980 constituted, therefore, a turning point when all the members of the FLS, old and new, began to redefine their national and regional policies. Given changing global and regional contexts, the alliance members

were increasingly becoming inward-looking. Some signed non-aggression pacts with their common enemy, South Africa. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980, to reflect the renewed need for regional economic co-operation, but also in part to advance the restructuring of its members' economies. Also featuring in the distinct post-1980 period were some regional peace initiatives taken by some leaders of countries outside the region as well as outside the framework of the FLS alliance itself, so eroding its influence.

### **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The FLS alliance is of interest in terms of history, policy and theory. Overall, its importance is exhibited by its achievements over the years. Undoubtedly, the course of events and the present power and other equations in Southern Africa would have been different without it. Also, the alliance occupies an important and unique theoretical position. It is essentially an informal international or sub-regional organisation which over time has become increasingly formal.

Despite this importance, the FLS alliance has not received enough scholarly attention. It is shown in this study that most Southern African studies have concentrated on relations between the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and its neighbours. It is also suggested that there has been a tendency to treat the alliance in general terms, or to single out particular members for study. Thus, very few studies have specifically addressed the FLS alliance *per se*. When they do so, they focus on particular aspects. Studies which look at the alliance in its totality—political, diplomatic, strategic, ideological and organisational—are hard to come by. Perhaps it is assumed that the FLS alliance is insignificant; therefore, what

it represents—its dynamism, limitations and prospects—are not important issues. These and other anomalies are discussed in this study.

This study is original in the sense that it is the first of its kind to look at the alliance in its totality over time and in an integrated manner. It explores and brings to the fore a grouping whose role and function have, in most cases, been overlooked by scholars, even African(ists). It thus seeks to fill the gap and add to the existing literature on Southern Africa, as well as to highlight the dynamics of this alliance by showing that an informal grouping can have both form and results. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will add to the store of knowledge on Southern Africa, with relevance to both international and development politics.

## METHODOLOGY

As will be shown in Chapter One below, this study adopts a variety of compatible approaches as well as modes of analysis because of the nature of its subject matter. Research techniques were broad-based. In addition to library material, archival research was undertaken in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Many interviews were conducted in these two countries with officials and informed individuals from all member states of the alliance. These were also supplemented by my previous experiences in regional affairs.

There are some obvious limitations to this type of research. The first is the nature of the subject matter itself. Talking with officials about the rise and decline of the alliance was at first problematic as most of them perceived the two key concepts in their generic uncritical sense; for them, the FLS was simply established and still in existence. Secondly, some officials hesitated to answer some questions due to the supposed secrecy surrounding the alliance itself. Most activities, and



indeed the records of the alliance where they exist, are classified "Top Secret", and they may not be formally declassified for some decades to come. This presents a formidable problem to a scholar, even a sympathetic national, researching the alliance. And the third problem concerned the official documents themselves. Some information they contain had to be corroborated by interviews with some of the involved officials. This is because some of the communiqués, for example, were issued to minimise speculation rather than to maximise information, bearing little resemblance to what actually transpired at the meetings.

All the above represent common problems which most researchers face. They become crucial, however, when a study is conducted in a new, unmapped area. Most of these problems were circumvented by the researcher's own considerable experience and knowledge of the region in general, and of the FLS alliance in particular. This is one instance where Africa's tendencies toward "know who" as opposed to "know how", even in non-personal dealings, proved very useful. At the same time this asset, which tended to offset other problems, brings in a danger of personal bias and emotion. This work was undertaken with that danger in mind, and efforts were made to rid the study of such tendencies by critically analysing each piece of data as objectively and critically as possible.

### **SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS**

This work is divided into three broad parts. Part I, *Southern Africa in Historical and Theoretical Perspectives*, is covered by two chapters. Chapter One situates the Southern African region in a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches. It also defines the Front Line States alliance in organisational and theoretical contexts. Also, this chapter surveys a wide range of literature in the interrelated fields of

international organisation, regional and sub-systemic studies, international politics, political economy, and international and regional security studies. These fields were canvassed in an attempt to arrive at a good description of the FLS alliance, and also to help explain the nature of continuing conflict and co-operation in Southern Africa.

The two major dimensions of the crisis in Southern Africa—conflict and co-operation—are addressed in Chapter Two. Both types of interaction patterns are traced historically, their main actors identified, as well as their role and contemporary developments.

The *Rise of the Front Line States Alliance* is covered in Part II, which also has two chapters. An attempt is made in Chapter Three to trace and explain the evolution of the alliance. This is essentially done by looking at the inter-state groupings established before it. This chapter also looks at why the alliance is the way it is, especially its informal character. The main structure of the alliance—the summit system—as well as a discussion about its only structure below the summit—the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)—are covered in Chapter Three.

Various relations, dynamics, and dialectics between the Southern African liberation movements and the alliance are discussed in Chapter Four.

The period of the *Decline of the Front Line States Alliance* is also covered by two chapters in Part III. Chapter Five looks at the one major factor which has been very much responsible for the decline of the alliance: the Republic of South Africa (RSA). In this, the RSA's policies toward\* its neighbours, especially its total national strategy in its various components, and how these have been directed against the members of the alliance and their effects, are discussed.

In addition to South Africa's total national strategy, Chapter Six identifies indicators and other factors in the decline of the FLS; these are both internal and external to the alliance.

Finally, a set of concluding remarks is offered. First, the conclusion outlines major findings of the study. Then it examines the framework that has supported various forms of explanation of conflict and co-operation in Southern Africa. And lastly it speculates on the future of the alliance by looking at its past. It includes possible different modes of co-operation for and projections about post-*apartheid* Southern Africa, based on the FLS' legacy.

**PART I**

**SOUTHERN AFRICA IN HISTORICAL AND  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

## Chapter One

# **SOUTHERN AFRICA: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to achieve two objectives. The first is to define the FLS alliance of Southern Africa in *organisational* context so as to have a clear idea of the type of institution being studied. And the second objective is to situate this study of the alliance in a firm *theoretical* framework so as to be explicit about the type of relations being discussed.

The nature and history of the FLS alliance particularly during its formative period, and also given its changing roles over time, have made this inter-state grouping adopt features from several types of institutional settings. So it is pertinent to define the FLS using a variety of institutional or organisational frameworks, as no single one would, on its own, define and explain it. Thus, definitions of fronts, international organisations and alliances, will be surveyed in an attempt to see which attributes of the FLS grouping fit into which institutional settings.

It is difficult for an analysis such as this to apply only a single approach or theory without recognising alternative genres. This is due to the complex nature of the problem in Southern Africa—conflict and co-operation—especially rapid changes in a variety of directions and also the changing roles of the Front Line States alliance over time. The alliance being regional (or sub-regional) in character, most relevant and compatible alternative approaches will also be regional. However, not all

elements in any one approach are necessarily valid and relevant to this case. It is, therefore, intended to benefit from the positive attributes of each alternative approach adopted. Thus, *regionalism* will constitute the main approach. Under it several compatible alternative elements will be surveyed, especially regional security and (regional) political economy approaches. Also to be included will be relevant features of general theories of international politics with their varied genres or roots. This is because in Southern Africa as elsewhere, the nation-state is still the primary actor.

## DEFINING THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE

The FLS grouping has been studied before and in a variety of ways.<sup>1</sup> Various scholars have described the grouping differently. Among the descriptions given to it are an organisation,<sup>2</sup> an alliance,<sup>3</sup> and a diplomatic coalition.<sup>4</sup> Yet, such studies

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<sup>1</sup>See Douglas G. Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa", in William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood, (eds.) *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 236-266; Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker, (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979); Willie Breytenbach, (compiler and editor), *The Constellation of States: A Consideration* (Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, 1980); Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (Bloomington, Indiana and London: Indiana University Press, 1979); J. C. Chipasula and K. Miti, "South Africa and its SADCC Neighbours", Twelfth Southern African Social Science Conference, University of Botswana, Gaborone (3-7 July 1989); Deon Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", *South Africa Forum Position Paper* Vol. 5 No. 18, (1982), pp. 1-8; Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa* (London and Bloomington, Indiana: James Currey, Catholic Institute for International Relations and Indiana University Press, 1986); Robert S. Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States: Experience and Prospects*, Adelphi Paper No. 180, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983); Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, (eds.), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, for Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1986), among others.

<sup>2</sup>See Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, "Alone Together: Regional Security Arrangements in Southern Africa and the Arabian Gulf", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Spring 1984), pp. 152-175.

<sup>3</sup>See William L. Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa", International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Arusha-Tanzania, (24-31 May 1985). Ronald T. Libby characterised the FLS as a small power entente. See his "The Front Line States of Africa: A Small Power Entente", University of Zambia, 18 May 1977 (Mimeograph). See also Carol B. Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985).

<sup>4</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, pp. 1-2.

have not categorically defined or situated the descriptions they have given to the FLS grouping in any broader theoretical framework. Moreover, thus far, most scholars have not bothered to describe analytically the entity they have studied.<sup>5</sup> As a result, any critical study of the FLS alliance is deprived of a solid theoretical starting ground. It is this lacuna which this chapter seeks to fill. It is proposed here briefly to go through some of the most important and relevant descriptions of the FLS alliance with a view to discovering some that satisfy the necessary requirements of this study.

#### **The Front Line States as a "Front"**

One way to achieve the first objective is to search in the title Front Line States itself. The key concept in the Front Line States is *front-line*. One conception behind the term front is that of a coalition, loose<sup>6</sup> or otherwise, and they also include non-state actors. Viewed as such, fronts seem to be temporary; and few endure after their primary objectives have been achieved. At the same time, fronts can be compared with interest or pressure groups. These are said to be created for the defence or promotion of a cause.<sup>7</sup> They are both protective and promotional.<sup>8</sup>

While this perspective can in part explain the recent decline in the importance of the alliance, it does not assist much in defining the grouping itself. This is because

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<sup>5</sup>Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, pp. 246-266; Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*.

<sup>6</sup>Jaster described the FLS alliance as "A loose coalition of Southern African countries", see his *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>Jean Blondel, *Voters, Parties and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics*, Revised Edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 14.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 160.



the alliance has, over the years, behaved as more than a mere front. It has been able to increase its membership from its original three in the early 1970s (Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia) to seven in 1990 (coming to include Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, in that order). Thus it has not covered all the relevant parts of Southern Africa. This suggests some ambiguities in the alliance as well as there being something more than a mere front to the front line alliance.

The term front-line also denotes a *battle-line*; an area of confrontation between two or more belligerents. This is one essence of the alliance and, perhaps, the most popular or immediate; a front-line in the struggle against colonial/White minority rule and *apartheid* in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as South Africa. However, there are two problems with this view. One is that, in terms of geographical proximity, which is essential to defining the front-line within this perspective, this particular one has been both selective and discriminatory in determining who should be included in (and therefore outside) its ranks. Over time and through its own genesis, the front-line has left out Zaire, Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. These should have been front-liners due to their proximity to White-controlled territories. This suggests something more specific or unique in the FLS alliance than mere geographical proximity as demanded by the notion of a true front-line.

The other problem is that of *conception*: whose front-line? After the formation of the FLS alliance, South Africa, the other primary and direct belligerent, used its vulnerable neighbours as its own front-line through which to defend the *laager*—*apartheid*—as Joseph Hanlon's *Apartheid's Second Front* has shown.<sup>9</sup> Over time,

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<sup>9</sup>Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*. See also Solomon Nkiwane, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa: An Historical Perspective", Dalhousie African Working Paper No. 13, (July 1988).

South Africa's own front-line has taken three different forms. First, it was a *triple alliance* between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, then the bastions of White minority rule in Southern Africa, intended to thwart the liberation process. Second, it took a form of destabilisation against FLS members, and even non-members. And third, South Africa realised a secure front through non-aggression treaties with some members and non-members of the FLS alliance, especially after the failure of its proposals for regional and economic collaboration such as the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) and Economic Community of Southern Africa (ECOSA).<sup>10</sup>

At the start of the 1990s, the FLS alliance may be declining in importance, a process which was set in motion in the preceding decade. Its exact position or definition as a front-line has, in most cases, been threatened or diluted by the actions of its own primary adversary. Therefore, although a key concept, front(line) is a rather loose and a less dynamic concept to satisfy the needs of this more formal and objective analysis.

#### **The Front Line States as an International Organisation.**

To some extent, the Front Line States grouping has behaved and operated like an inter-governmental institution albeit at the regional level.<sup>11</sup> According to Goodspeed, international organisations are modern systems created to further political and national security on the one hand, and economic and social welfare on

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<sup>10</sup>These are different expressions of the same idea in different epochs.

<sup>11</sup>For this classification, see Alvin LeRoy Bennett, *International Organisations: Principles and Issues*, Third Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 2.

the other.<sup>12</sup> He added that the development of political and national security involves organisation in the prevention and suppression of armed conflict, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>13</sup> A more traditional view on international institutions is that held by Farley. He indicated that such organisations are not a modern invention. Rather, they are as old as organised society: "Whenever interactions between political units, be they clans, tribes, city-states, become regularised or routinised, organisational structures tend to emerge."<sup>14</sup> Bennett added that international organisations, especially as adjuncts of the state system, play two major roles: to provide (i) the means of co-operation among states in areas which are advantageous for all, and (ii) multiple channels of communication among governments.<sup>15</sup>

The FLS grouping corresponds with Bennett's typology of inter-governmental organisations and the roles they play. It also corresponds with Goodspeed's purpose for which they are created, as well as with Farley's notion of structures emerging out of regularised interactions. These and other descriptions of international institutions have one element in common which tend to put the FLS alliance outside their framework, however: legal formalism.

According to Bennett's own typology, the FLS grouping *could not* be classified as an international organisation because it does not have a basic (legal) instrument stating goals, structures and methods of operation. Most of all, it is not established

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<sup>12</sup>Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organisation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 4.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>14</sup>Lawrence T. Farley, *Change Processes in International Organisations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1982), p. 17.

<sup>15</sup>LeRoy Bennett, *International Organisations*, p. 3.

by treaty.<sup>16</sup> And Farley's assertion that "the central concept in the study of international organisations has been the institution and the formal design of institutions reflected in constitutions or charters"<sup>17</sup> imposes further constraints on the status of the FLS as an international organisation.

The FLS grouping, therefore, exhibits some of the basic qualities—but not all—for it to qualify as an international organisation. For example, on the one hand, the grouping carries out its functions on a more or less continuous basis, has a voluntary membership for eligible parties, operates a summit system resembling a conference organ, and has a committee—the ISDSC—which has carried on continuous advisory and information functions.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, it is still essentially informal and has no charter or constitution, the basic requirement of the traditional definition of international organisation. This seeming dilemma compels a further search for more appropriate classifications.

#### **The Front Line States as an Alliance.**

At this point, it can be asserted, with some qualifications and modifications, that out of several other classifications the FLS most resembles an *alliance*.<sup>19</sup> This can be deduced from the literature on international alliances. One scholar in this field,

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup>Farley, *Change Processes in International Organisations*, p. 40.

<sup>18</sup>William L. Dowdy and Abillah H. Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Cooperation Among Weak States in the Persian Gulf and Southern Africa", International Studies Association Convention, London, (28 March - 1 April 1989).

<sup>19</sup>This classification takes into consideration the existence of the ISDSC and the way it operates, particularly its military and security elements. Thus the FLS alliance is, for example, more than an *entente cordiale*. I am grateful to Dr. Brian Crowley of Dalhousie University who, in a personal communication, introduced this term to me for comparative purposes.

Kalevi Holsti, postulated that governments which seek to construct such alliances assume that they cannot achieve their objectives, defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by mobilising their own capabilities: "They thus rely upon, and make commitments to, other states that face similar external problems or share similar objectives".<sup>20</sup> Holsti also emphasised the fact that common perceptions of threat and widespread attitudes of insecurity are the most frequent sources of alliances. This, more or less, is to restate Thucydides who noted that "mutual fear is the most solid basis upon which to organise an alliance."<sup>21</sup>

Another scholarly work worth examining in this context is by Osgood who defined an alliance as:

A formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force, in specified circumstances.<sup>22</sup>

There are several implications in Osgood's definition for small, weak Southern African countries, as well as loose inter-state groupings, like the FLS, namely; (i) the question of legal formalism, (ii) the exclusion from alliances of all states which have inadequate national resources, internal cohesion or coherence of national interests such that they cannot become effective allies, and (iii) emphasis on military security. The FLS grouping is not legally formal and binding; all its members have inadequate national resources, internal cohesion or coherence of national interests; and there is

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<sup>20</sup>Kalevi J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, Third Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 118.

<sup>21</sup>Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Translated and Introduction and Notes by R. Warner and M. I. Finley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), Book III, Para. 11, pp. 198-99.

<sup>22</sup>Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 17.

little emphasis on military security. All these points suggest that, accordingly, alliances are in most cases the business of the Great Powers, or groups elsewhere other than the members of the FLS.

These limitations notwithstanding, Osgood made one more important observation; that states enter an alliance conscious of the fact that their obligations to it entail surrendering part of their freedom or sovereignty.<sup>23</sup> This could be a major factor which has deterred the FLS grouping from concluding a formal type of an alliance, on the one hand; and it might suggest that the FLS is a unique type of alliance, on the other.

However, not all scholars of the traditional realist school tie alliances to legal formalism, although all emphasise military security as a determining factor. For example, Morgenthau was of the opinion that states can be in an alliance relationship without having a formal agreement. He gave the example of Great Britain and the United States who, for more than a century or so, refrained from concluding an alliance with each other. This was so despite the historical fact that the two acted as if they had a special relationship from mid-nineteenth to the first quarter of the twentieth centuries; i.e., well before the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). On the pre-NATO period Morgenthau observed that:

Their relationship during that period provides [an] instance of a situation in which nations dispense with an alliance. It occurs when their interests so obviously call for concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests, policies, and actions in the form of a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant....Not every community of interests calling for co-operation between two or more nations, then requires the terms of this be specified through the legal stipulations of a treaty of alliance ....It is only when the common

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

interests are inchoate in terms of policy and action that a treaty of alliance is required to make them explicit and operative.<sup>24</sup>

Morgenthau's explication implies that the Front Line States grouping can be considered an alliance, even though with some qualifications. Members of the FLS have not made firm a commitment to help each other in the event of war, although most of them have bilateral defence agreements. So military assistance between and among them is given at a bilateral level, but in the spirit of the FLS solidarity. Yet individual members of the alliance did assist active liberation movements militarily, especially in training, arms and some logistics. Definitely, the FLS is not a Great Power alliance, which is the concern of Morgenthau. Rather, it is a Small Power alliance. Thus, what is needed is to distinguish Small from Great Powers (or even Secondary Powers) in order to situate this alliance in a proper theoretical context; that is, *realpolitik* at *regional* and not at *global* level.

### **Small Powers and Alliances**

Rothstein defined Small Powers along European lines, as well as in strictly military terms:

A Small Power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by other states involved in international politics.<sup>25</sup>

This definition represents a useful starting point for this African case.

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<sup>24</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Revised Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 189-190.

<sup>25</sup>Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.

The present study can then benefit from the above traditional definition by inserting some factors unique to Southern Africa and, perhaps, the Third World, especially in the late-twentieth century. In this study, Small Powers that constitute the FLS alliance are states with the following attributes: they (i) generally suffer from inherited underdevelopment in varying magnitudes, including the related, contemporary problems of debt and structural adjustment, (ii) are heavily dependent upon external aid and assistance for financing minimum established programmes and essential food imports and other important requirements involving foreign exchange such as fuel, machines and machine parts, (iii) are incapable of maintaining external security when confronted by an overwhelming powerful military threat, and (iv) have governing structures which are threatened to varying degrees by internal sources of opposition of which external forces may take advantage.<sup>26</sup>

The assumptions of the traditional scholarship are generally not supportive of the potential for Small Power alliances. The factors outlined above to improve or enhance Rothstein's definition of Small Powers are also constraints that minimise the possibilities of their having alliances in the traditional sense. Liska acknowledged such pressures and was of the opinion that such alliances can serve to exacerbate existing conflicts rather than resolve them. With a tint of both ethnocentrism and perhaps orthodox political realism, he observed that Small Power alliances can be successful only when they have a Great Power or Secondary Power in them and/or are under the umbrella jurisdiction of a larger organisation like the United Nations

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<sup>26</sup>Adopted and improved from Libby, "The Front Line States of Africa".



(UN).<sup>27</sup> Such an observation has recently been echoed by Ispahani<sup>28</sup> and Ayoob.<sup>29</sup>

This realist perspective creates a dilemma for the FLS alliance. On the one hand, the alliance has no Great Power directly involved in it<sup>30</sup> and yet it has survived in its own ways. On the other hand, in its operations, especially in negotiating for independence of the remaining colonial territories, the alliance has more often found the influence and involvement of Great Powers useful, as shown in the cases of Zimbabwe and Namibia.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, and at a more general level, the FLS has shown that it is possible for small Third World countries to form alliances, mediocre though they may be, without the patronage of the Great Powers.

This lack of receptivity on the part of the traditional literature to the prospects for Small Power alliances has not hampered Third World countries in forming them. Indeed, they have formed a set of unique alliances, outside the umbrella of Big and

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<sup>27</sup>George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 49-57.

<sup>28</sup>Ispahani, "Alone Together", pp. 169-175.

<sup>29</sup>Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World" in Mohammed Ayoob, (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies From Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 18.

<sup>30</sup>Of course some members of the FLS, notably Angola and Mozambique, and most of the liberation movements were dependent on the Eastern bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, for various forms of assistance. The alliance itself never showed such a tendency.

<sup>31</sup>Some scholars have exaggerated FLS' reliance on external influence. See, for example, Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "The Frontline States in Southern African International Politics, 1975-1989", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Johns Hopkins University (1990), who stresses that, "...the ability of the FLS to meet their objectives is dependent on external participation in the subsystem."

Secondary Powers. The FLS appears to be one such unique Third World Small Power alliance.

However, it may not be appropriate to equate the FLS with other Small Power alliances in the Third World, such as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for two major reasons. One is the differences in the immediate external environment between them. The environments in the Gulf region and Southeast Asia have made it possible for their respective alliances to define security mostly in its military elements in the short and long terms, including some mechanisms for conflict resolution within them. The case is different in Southern Africa. When the FLS alliance was formed in the 1970s, security was defined as the long term *ideal* goal of total political liberation in the region; that is, structural change. The advent of destabilisation especially in the 1980s made the FLS define security to include short term defence against it.

The second and related reason is the nature of these two other alliances' military commitments. Thus, in view of its long-term security projection and its self-definition in a wider perspective, the FLS has made only quasi-military commitments to the active liberation movements. These have included the provision of safe rear bases, military and other training and transit facilities, and material and diplomatic support. Both the GCC and ASEAN have modest multilateral defence arrangements which enable their members to conduct joint military exercises (and for the GCC, military equipment procurement). Also both are under the strategic umbrella of the Western powers in general and the US in particular.<sup>32</sup> The FLS has none of these

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<sup>32</sup>For detailed discussion, consult Ispahani, "Alone Together", pp. 159-160; Sukh D. Muni, "Comments" to Ayoob, "Regional Security in the Third World", Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World*, p. 31; R. Nagi, *ASEAN: 20 Years: A Comprehensive Documentation* (New Delhi: Lancers, 1989), *passim*.; Robert O'Neill, (continued...)

attributes. Rather, there are bilateral defence agreements among some of its members, such as those between Tanzania and Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, and Mozambique and Zimbabwe.<sup>33</sup> In addition, both the GCC and ASEAN operate under treaties, while the FLS does not.

The FLS alliance is, therefore, unique. It is as different from Great Power as it is from the other Third World Small Power alliances. Thus, it requires a broader regional perspective as an adjunct to any theoretical location if it is to be properly understood.

### A REGIONAL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The study of the FLS alliance in the Southern African context cannot but be done within a regional sub-systemic perspective alone. It requires not only a multi-theoretical, but also multi-disciplinary approach, both within a regional

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<sup>32</sup>(...continued)

*Comprehensive Documentation* (New Delhi: Lancers, 1989), passim.; Robert O'Neill, "Regional Security and World Order in the 1980s", in Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World*, pp. 33-48; Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), especially Chapter one, pp. 1-37; Sheldon W. Simon, *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration* (Massachusetts and Toronto: D.C. Heath and Lexington, 1988), especially Chapter Four, pp. 65-110; and William T. Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), especially Chapters One and Two, pp. 13-88.

<sup>33</sup>When bilateral defence agreements have been invoked, as in the case of Zimbabwe and Tanzania sending troops to Mozambique, they have been acknowledged to have taken place in the spirit of the broader/multilateral FLS solidarity. However, such assistance would have been there in the absence of the FLS alliance anyway. In other words, such military assistance is not being given in the context of the FLS alliance. See, Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States".

perspective. There are several reasons for this. First, the nature of the *problem* in Southern Africa, of which the alliance is part. Relations in Southern Africa have two major and contradictory elements: co-operation and conflict. As long as these two elements are connected in a dialectical manner, they need to be studied together in a regional context.

Second, in this study the FLS is taken to be a *sub-regional* alliance, for, although it has a regional agenda, the area covered by its constituent parts falls short of what is customarily known as the Southern African region.<sup>34</sup> The membership of the alliance does not include all the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa. As pointed out above, Zaire, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho are not included despite the alliance's expanded membership over time. It can still be contended that SADCC is sub-regional too. This multilateral organisation of which the members of the FLS are part does not include either South Africa or Zaire. Such a sub-regional alliance requires a regional perspective.

And third, the FLS together with SADCC have regional agendas and commitments. It is therefore only a comprehensive regional approach that can go beyond the superficiality posed by these and other processes. Such a regional perspective will permit a search for wide-ranging multi-disciplinary concepts, variables, propositions, conjectures, hypotheses and theories that can best explain this alliance in Southern Africa.

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<sup>34</sup>Southern Africa region is hereby taken to include all the countries roughly south of the Equator, thus to include Zaire. In this sense, therefore, the area covered by the FLS alliance constitutes a sub-region. This differs slightly from most definitions which omit Zaire and Tanzania. See, for example, Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", *International Studies Quarterly (ISQ)*, Vol. 12 No. 3 (September 1968), p. 237 and Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence* (Berkeley, California and London: University of California Press, 1973), especially Appendix I, pp. 303-314.

### **The Front Line States: A Regional Sub-systemic Alliance**

The contention that the FLS is an alliance within a regional sub-systemic setting is supported by explications put forward by some systems scholars. For example, Thompson defined a sub-system as:

a component of a larger system with systemic properties of its own—i.e. a structure that is perceived by its observers to have elements in interaction or relationship and some identifiable boundaries that separate it from its environment.<sup>35</sup>

He also observed that regional sub-systems need not be geographical regions *per se*. Rather, sub-systems consist of the interactions of national elites, not the physical entities of political units whose interactions are observed to have more or less regional boundaries. In other words, Thompson emphasised two elements—proximity and interaction—as the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of regional sub-system.<sup>36</sup>

These elements are evident and present in the FLS alliance. There are in fact many other interactions in Southern Africa in addition to those by elites. Trade, culture, infrastructure, history, and smuggling, poaching and other parallel economic activities (i.e., informal sectors), and scholarly and other professional conference systems in Southern Africa, to mention a few, form regional sub-systems of sorts. A transnational regional civil society can be seen to be in the making.

The regional sub-systemic approach is advantageous in that other related approaches and perspectives relevant in the study of the alliance have a direct relationship with it. This approach is therefore compatible with related notions of

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<sup>35</sup>William R. Thompson, "The Regional Sub-Systems: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *ISQ*, Vol. 17 No. 1, (March 1973), p. 96.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 96.

front/alliance, and has already emerged as the dominant one in Southern African studies as it can be juxtaposed with a variety of modes of analysis.<sup>37</sup>

### **Regional Security Studies Approach**

One perspective related to regionalism which this study will explore and apply is that of regional security. Ayoob has defined this as an ideal type of regional order in which members of a particular sub-system are able to attain a form of "political *nirvana*" either by finding immediate acceptable solutions to their regional problems or "by sweeping them under the carpet." Such problems are not to re-emerge to haunt them for at least some time.<sup>38</sup>

However, Ayoob's definition assumes that the regional problems in question are readily amenable to accommodation and reconciliation. Rather, the problems in Southern Africa between the FLS alliance and SADCC on the one hand, and South Africa on the other, have tended to be fundamental. As such, they could not easily be "swept under the carpet". Even though, Ayoob's definition remains both useful and relevant.

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<sup>37</sup>See, for example, Olajide Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s* (London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*; Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report* (London and Bloomington, Indiana: The Commonwealth Secretariat, James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1989); Johnson and Martin (eds.) *Destructive Engagement*; Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Westview Press and Gower, 1987); Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.), *Co-operation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1976), among others.

<sup>38</sup>Ayoob, "Regional Security in the Third World" in Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World*, p. 3.

Yet, what appears to be a divergence between Ayoob's definition of regional security on the one hand, and the current situation in Southern Africa on the other, is not a contradiction as such. Rather, it is a confirmation of the difference between universal definitions or loose laws and categorical laws.<sup>39</sup> Some conditions have to be met before Ayoob's definition can describe a particular regional situation.

The essential conditions for this definition to be applicable, at least to Southern Africa, are: first, for the entire regional system in question to have resolved, in its broad meaning, including not only the *national question* and self-determination, but also the establishment and presence of acceptable internal governing structures; and, second, for it to be broadened to include specific circumstances pertaining to that region. First, then, Namibian independence in 1990 (Southern Africa's last colony) has not resolved the national question in the region once and for all. And second, in the Southern African region the question of security remains very broad as it includes "internal" wars in individual states. To a great extent, such wars mean that the legitimacy of some governments or regimes is questioned. They also mean insecurity in such countries which is normally treated as a problem of national security when in actual fact such wars threaten regime and, consequently, regional security. Logically, regional security is a sum total of national securities, as the latter are elements in the former. This also suggests that the concept of national security has to be defined in broader terms to include economic, ecological, environmental, democratic and other components, in addition to regime and political security.

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<sup>39</sup>David Braybrooke observed that, "...an inexact statistical law may not...differ from a categorical one in which 'etc.'—the *ceteris paribus*, or 'other things being equal' clause—allows for good deal of looseness in the fit between the law and observations." See his *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 22.

This, however, is not to ignore the external directedness of national or regional security in Southern Africa, nor is it to emphasise the traditional state-centric dimension of security as a concept. Rather, it is to underscore the gravity of internal/national security (including other types of security, such as food and economic), and the way it influences overall regional security or insecurity in Southern Africa; that is, interrelated political economies.

National and regional (as well as regime and economic) security in Southern Africa are inextricably intertwined. This has been realised by several students of the region.<sup>40</sup> Yet most of these (and other) studies tend to look just at South Africa's strategic policies toward its neighbours. Generally, such orthodox studies do not address the regional security role played by the FLS. This may reflect not only limited historical and empirical basis of strategic studies but also their state-centric orientation. Uncharacteristically, one such study even saw this alliance playing an opposite role at least for the RSA; i.e., that of promoting insecurity. This study, by a South African analyst and advocate, saw the alliance as a destabilising agent against *apartheid* South Africa.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>See, for example, Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, pp. 246-266; Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States"; Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa"; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*; Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States*; Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*; Nkiwane, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa"; James M. Roherty, "Beyond Limpopo and Zambezi: South Africa's Strategic Horizons" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, pp. 267-282; Larry A. Swatuk, "Security Through Development? Toward an Assessment of SADCC", Dalhousie African Working Paper No. 11, (July 1988).

<sup>41</sup>Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa".



There may be some justification for this South African centredness, in that most of the FLS alliance policies and strategies are reactions to those initiated by South Africa. This suggests that South Africa does play a pivotal role in regional policies and strategies. Nevertheless, there is no justification for some allegedly progressive studies to down-play the security dilemmas and problems faced by some members of the FLS alliance themselves.<sup>42</sup> On the one hand, this comment is made in relation to those studies which have mainly looked at the regional security role of the FLS alliance. On the other hand, it is related to those studies which continue to uphold the invincibility of the *apartheid* regime. Reviewing Johnson and Martin's book, *Apartheid Terrorism: Destabilisation Report*,<sup>43</sup> Vines observed that Southern African Studies have to begin to take into account change in the region. In his critique he noted:

The report's problem, and this is the controversy, lies in the paradigm this information is used to support. Johnson and Martin continue to believe in the colossus of the SADF which is sponsoring direct and indirect terrorism through surrogate groups throughout the Southern African region as a continuation of its 'Total Strategy'. Since this book is entitled *Apartheid Terrorism* their approach is predictable, but unfortunately for the authors, the recent changes within South Africa while compiling the report cannot fully support their thesis....It portrays SADF as continuing to be capable of extraordinary organisation and might, inspite of setbacks like Cuito Cuinavale [sic] in Angola where [it] found itself *humiliated* [and] confronted with a no-win situation, a lesson that has challenged the very foundations of South African military doctrine (emphasis supplied).<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>See, for example, Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*; Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa"; Ispahani, "Alone Together"; Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States*.

<sup>43</sup>Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*.

<sup>44</sup>Alex Vines, "Several Years Beyond the Leash" in *Southern African Review of Books*, Vol. 3 No. 5, (June/July 1990).

Vines also singled out Joseph Hanlon (*Beggar Your Neighbours*)<sup>45</sup> as a grand master of this established "radical" tradition. These are not the only simplistic scholars.<sup>46</sup> In reacting, Vines may have gone to the other extreme, but his exposé is useful because it is through the understanding of changes in the region and the individual constraints and pressures within the alliance that the regional security role (or the absence thereof) can be situated and adequately analysed.

Another problem pertaining to regional security is related to the definition and description of alliances as discussed above. This is the problem of tying security studies to global security concerns of the Big Powers and defining security minimally in terms of the presence or absence of war. Thus, a regional alliance such as the FLS is assumed to have fulfilled a security function not by any social, political and other developments it brings or promotes, but by the presence or absence of a regional multilateral military establishment. A comparative study of the GCC and FLS alliance identifies the former to have performed marginally better than the latter,<sup>47</sup> a thesis which cannot be supported by recent events in the Gulf region, especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.<sup>48</sup>

Although there is some truth in this traditional/established perspective, and that the Southern African crisis has escalated at times into a war situation, it is

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<sup>45</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*.

<sup>46</sup>See, for example, John Salaita, "Militarisation of SADCC as a Consequence of South African Total Strategy and its Socio-Economic and Political Implications", Research for Change Workshop, Harare-Zimbabwe (29 May - 2 June 1989).

<sup>47</sup>Ispahani, "Alone Together"; and Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa."

<sup>48</sup>Tow's study seems to have partially overcome this problem by defining security regimes in broad terms, and their achievements in social, economic, political and military terms. See Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World*, passim.

difficult to imagine how all security problems in the region can be solved over time in an exclusively military way. As things stand in Southern Africa, not all security threats call for military responses or solutions.<sup>49</sup> This study upholds the proposition that defence pacts in their traditional sense have to be looked at in terms of their capability to solve limited and short-term national and regional security problems rather than as *ultima* solutions for achieving sustainable regional security. As observed by Liska, in some cases such defence arrangements may serve to amplify security problems rather than providing solutions to them.<sup>50</sup>

To contend that there has been a war situation in Southern Africa is to concede that a regional sub-systemic perspective should include strategic studies as one of its components. Although essential, however, the classical study of strategy has its own problems. In its orthodox formulation, strategy has been defined in relation to war-terms explicated by Clausewitz.<sup>51</sup> Its emphasis on long-term projection, planning and marshalling of resources has been used to justify its conception of the Third World not in regional terms but most times in Big Power and East-West contexts.<sup>52</sup> Only a few studies of this nature have addressed the Third World. And when they do so, they tend to look rather exclusively at Big

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<sup>49</sup>See Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States."

<sup>50</sup>Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, p. 49.

<sup>51</sup>See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited with an Introduction by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), especially Book Three, pp. 241-289.

<sup>52</sup>See, for example, Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy and Politics: Collected Essays* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1980); Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987).

Power interests, i.e., dominance/dependency perspective which is less relevant than ever as the world is changing. In Southern Africa, the works of Crocker, Dowdy, Falk, Flournoy, Jaster, and Roherty,<sup>53</sup> have used this orthodox approach to a greater or lesser extent.

Thus, at the regional level, it is the strategic concerns of the dominant or strong power which attract scholarly attention rather than the strategies of the dependent or weak states. This is so even when the latter provide important inputs in the regional power and strategic equation. So, there are several studies on the genesis and impact of South Africa's total strategy,<sup>54</sup> while those on FLS alliance strategies are few, fragmented and, in some cases, apologetic.<sup>55</sup> In other words, there are more debates about the RSA than about the FLS.

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<sup>53</sup>Chester A. Crocker, *South Africa's Defence Posture: Coping With Vulnerability*, The Washington Papers Vol. IX, No. 84, (Beverly Hills, California and London: Sage Publications, 1981); Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa"; Pamella S. Falk, "Namibian Independence and the Cuban Presence in Angola: Third Party Involvement in Southern African Conflict Resolution", International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Arusha-Tanzania, (6-9 April 1987); Michèle A. Flournoy, "The South African Nuclear Threat: A New Variable", International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa, Arusha-Tanzania, (6-9 April 1987); Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States*; and Roherty, "Beyond Limpopo and Zambezi" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*.

<sup>54</sup>See, for example, Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "South Africa's Strategy in the Southern African Region: A Preliminary Analysis", Congress and Workshop on Development and Destabilisation in Southern Africa, Roma, University of Lesotho, (17-20 October 1983); and Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984), especially Chapter 5.

<sup>55</sup>See, for example, Chipasula and Miti, "South Africa and its SADCC Neighbours"; Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, "Introduction", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. xv-xxi; and Salaita, "Militarisation of SADCC States".

It is misleading to believe that it is only South Africa that has had a strategy in the region. The missing link between studies which focus on either South Africa or the FLS alliance is the continuous, complex and sometimes contradictory interaction between them. The two sets of strategies cannot really be studied in isolation from each other. It is the recognition of such dynamic interaction—no matter what the balance of forces over time—that makes a regional sub-systemic approach more fruitful and analytical.

### **General Theories of International Politics**

Used with caution, then, general theories of international politics can be useful in understanding the FLS alliance of Southern Africa; with caution, because the more this approach leans toward political realism of the Morgenthau school, the more it tends to miss the point by relegating the FLS alliance into an insignificant position in the Southern African region. This is so because orthodox realism would contend that the alliance does not possess the resources and power that matter compared with those of South Africa, thus ignoring external constraints or diversions as well as internal contradictions within the Republic which in most cases have shaped its regional policies; i.e., *apartheid* and its correlates.

Typically, most Southern African studies have taken the position that South Africa is the dominant regional power which initiates policies and actions, while the rest of the region is influenced by and reacts to such policies and actions.<sup>56</sup> This perspective is useful in so far as it provides an estimation of regional sub-systemic

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<sup>56</sup>See, for example, Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*; Crocker, *South Africa's Defence Posture*; and Roherty, "Beyond Limpopo and Zambezi" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*.

power ranking and configuration. Yet, if pushed too far, dominant regional power identification can jeopardise the analysis by complicating or disguising the regional power equation itself. This can be overcome by indicating the extent to which the presence of the dominant regional power is an asset or liability to overall regional security and development, and the extent to which such dominance has endured change over time.

Studies which have used this approach have identified a dominant regional power as a sub-centre or semi-periphery, thus showing some sub-imperial tendencies. The rest rotate around or respond to such semi-peripheries. In addition to South Africa, Zimbabwe's position in SADCC is sometimes identified as such a case.<sup>57</sup> However, history has shown that even when there is no dominant power of South Africa's magnitude, the presence of small but advantaged countries seeking to perform a role similar to that of a regional power can be detrimental to regional co-operation. This distinction among regional states may be even greater in a conflict situation. The favourable positions of Kenya in the defunct East African Community (EAC) and of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in the Central African Federation (CAF) are relevant examples. At present, it has been asserted that Zimbabwe dominates SADCC, which may have serious negative consequences:

The polarisation in industrial activity evident in the steep decline in Manufacturing Value Added in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia while Zimbabwe's share of SADCC MVA has increased is a threat both to the political and economic viability of SADCC itself and to the prospects for the harmonious development of intra-regional trade.<sup>58</sup>

On the one hand, the consequences of such histories have perhaps influenced the continuing tendency towards alternative, decentralised and flexible structures for

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<sup>57</sup>Larry A. Swatuk and Timothy M. Shaw, "Zimbabwe: Security for Development", Dalhousie African Working Paper No. 9, (July 1988).

<sup>58</sup>*SADCC Regional Economic Survey 1988* (SADCC, 1989), pp. 199-200.

the FLS alliance and SADCC, and thus regional studies themselves, on the other. This legacy may also contribute to the weaknesses of both states and regional studies, especially those which see regionalism with hesitation.

Yet, regional centres may also be crucial catalysts for regionalism. Despite that in Africa most such centres were imposed during the colonial era, they are now a *fait accompli*. Thus, Kenya in East Africa, Zimbabwe among SADCC members and South Africa in Southern Africa play such a role. They are more developed than the rest, and they attract most foreign capital and investment which finally catalyses regional development. The problem, however, is that neighbouring states have complained that regional centres are also centres of economic exploitation and domination. In so doing they have avoided the truth that they can only benefit from what they contribute to any regional arrangement. Strong, more developed, influential and integrated economies gain more from regional groupings than their weaker partners.

Since the nation-state is still the central actor that wields power and resources, political realism of sorts remains useful in a regional sub-systemic context, provided that the approach is carefully applied in conjunction with other compatible perspectives. For example, the 1980s witnessed some rearranging in the hierarchy of states in Southern Africa due to the incidence of structural adjustment and debt, internal wars and demands for increased democratisation, all of which have, in fact, reflected not only regional but global changes as well.

### **Regional Political Economy Approach**

Another component of any comprehensive regional sub-systemic approach relevant to the critical analysis of the FLS alliance in Southern Africa is political economy.

This perspective has the advantage of bringing together other relevant approaches into one single whole, as underscored by Shaw and Aluko:

The adoption of a political economy mode of analysis has advantages, relevance and nuance compared with either the traditional approach or its revisionist variant. It is employed...to enhance understanding of African foreign policy, to reflect current realities and trends, and to assist in intra- and extra-African comparison.<sup>59</sup>

In Southern Africa as elsewhere, it is practically impossible to distinguish issues which are purely economic from those which are considered political. This difficulty has also been observed by Staniland, who characterised political economy as a long-standing intellectual enterprise concerned with understanding the relationship of politics and economics.<sup>60</sup> Mittelman observed further that politics is not an autonomous sphere of activity: "In politics the critical issues are heavily economic."<sup>61</sup> These observations suggest further that it is difficult to separate purely security issues from the wider developmental concerns, and they become evident as the discussion moves from analysis to practice. Yet, at any given time, there is need for a certain amount of pragmatism to determine whether politics and/or economics are dominant.

In Southern Africa, economic, political, social, developmental, security and other issues are highly intertwined. They complement each other in mixed, varied, and changeable proportions. The FLS alliance, for example, started as a political

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<sup>59</sup>Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, "Introduction: Toward a Political Economy of African Foreign Policy", in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds.), *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 12.

<sup>60</sup>Martin Staniland, *What is Political Economy?: A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), p. ix.

<sup>61</sup>James H. Mittelman, *Out From Underdevelopment: Prospects for the Third World* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 13.



grouping to spearhead political liberation. Later, it was a motive force behind the establishment of SADCC, its instrument for economic liberation and development. A flexible or pragmatic political economy is the one approach able to explain this sub-regional transformation of spearheading political security on the one hand, and economic development on the other.

The political economy approach also looks at interdependence networks especially in its more Marxist and more modernisation varieties. For example, while political economy is able to situate regional bodies such as the FLS alliance and SADCC in proper perspective, it can also anticipate the impetus for wider regional co-operation in future which would include South Africa although not necessarily along the lines of the latter's proposals for the CONSAS and ECOSA.

#### **CONCLUSION: A CASE FOR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES**

The necessity of applying several compatible alternative approaches and theories is dictated by the nature of the long-standing and continuing interaction patterns in Southern Africa, of which the FLS alliance is part. Conflict and co-operation become more complex as each is analysed in detail and their internal and trans-national dimensions probed. As shown above, institutional and other frameworks for each assume a variety of forms, which are probably beyond the capability of a single approach or theory, however regional it may be. Sometimes to explain one component or form of each of the two interaction patterns would require a number of alternative perspectives and/or theories. Hence the need for several compatible approaches. Which one of these is dominant will mainly depend on the issue area and time period.

There are two main advantages of applying a combination of approaches in this study. The first is that alternative regional studies approaches enable the analysis to cover a larger area of ground, thus overcoming some of the constraints imposed by each single approach. And the second is that analysis will, therefore, benefit from the explanatory powers contributed by each approach. Together with insights from history, the study of the FLS alliance can thereby be more critical, explanatory, relevant, objective and predictive. These elements together constitute the claim to originality of this study.

## **Chapter Two**

### **REGIONAL SUB-SYSTEMIC INTERACTION PATTERNS: SOUTHERN AFRICA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Historically, there have been two major interaction patterns in Southern Africa: conflict and co-operation. Both patterns have been important both before and after the period under review, the 1970s and 1980s. It was in this particular period that the patterns became more distinct, capturing more attention and led to the creation of some major institutions. The process of change in Southern Africa has mainly been governed by these sub-systemic interaction patterns and also, to some extent, by global changes.

This chapter seeks to situate regional sub-systemic interaction patterns in an historical context. This is important for several reasons. First, the FLS alliance was formed during the period under review to reflect the intensity of conflict on the one hand, and the necessity or indispensability of co-operation, on the other. The alliance has, as a result, become one of the most important regional actors in both the regional conflict and the whole process of conflict resolution, as well as representing itself a form of co-operation. Second, an historical analysis helps to situate the alliance in perspective. It provides a background from which to understand the FLS from different angles, interests and views it represents.<sup>1</sup> And

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<sup>1</sup>In some cases the FLS alliance has been treated as a monolithic institution, implying that it does not have problems of differing interests and viewpoints which  
(continued...)

third, such an analysis is important and necessary in order to look at the problems of Southern Africa from an objective viewpoint. For example, some scholars imply inaccurately that relations between the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa and the Republic of South Africa have always been conflictual,<sup>2</sup> thus down-playing continuing co-operative interaction patterns. For analytical purposes, Southern African regional sub-systemic interaction patterns have been clustered into two groups: conflict and co-operation, recognising the continual dialectical links between the two.

### CONFLICT INTERACTION PATTERNS

In the 1970s and 1980s Southern Africa continued to experience both old and new forms of conflict. Wars of liberation, which were the remnants of the 1960s decade, were intensified, yet the apparent victories gained in Mozambique (1975), Angola (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980) were soon superseded by more internal conflicts. Another form came in destabilisation policies emanating from the RSA which affected most majority-ruled Southern African states (mostly the members of the FLS alliance). But such new forms of conflict did not entirely replace the old ones. For example, internal conflicts in the newly independent countries did not signify an end

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<sup>1</sup>(...continued)

in turn affect the nature or performance of the institution itself. See, for example, Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa"; Ispahani, "Alone Together", pp. 152-175; Hasu H. Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe" *Survival* Vol. XXX No. 1, (January/February 1988), pp. 38-58; and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, passim.

<sup>2</sup>This view is held, among others by, Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*; Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*; Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*; and Salaita, "Militarisation of SADCC States".

to liberation wars, as the Namibian problem dragged on (to 1990) and *apartheid* was until very recently the basic policy of the South African government. There were also differences in opinions and interests at the inter-state level among several majority-ruled states in the region.

### **Colonial Conflict**

The colonial problem is the oldest form of conflict in Southern Africa. By 1970, there were three basic colonial-cum-settler issues, each with distinct features. First, there was the Portuguese colonial empire in Southern Africa. Portugal was, by 1970, still holding Mozambique on the east coast and Angola on the west. Both these territories were administered by Portugal as overseas possessions which were allegedly part of it.<sup>3</sup> Several nationalist movements had sprung up in the previous decade and all of them had taken to armed struggle as a means to gain independence for their territories.<sup>4</sup>

Second, and differing from the rest, was the case of Rhodesia. This had been a self-governing British colony since 1923,<sup>5</sup> which together with Northern Rhodesia

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<sup>3</sup>Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule* (London: Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations, 1972), p. 4; and Allen Isaacman, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique" *Survival* Vol. XXX No. 1, (January/February 1988), p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, especially Part Five, pp. 185-296. According to his description, the MPLA was formed in December 1956 (p. 208), FNL in March 1962 (p. 229), UNITA in March 1966, and FRELIMO in June 1962 (p. 276).

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 145.

(now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) was forced into the unpopular<sup>6</sup> CAF between 1953 and 1964.<sup>7</sup> Anti-federation sentiments by nationalist movements in Zambia and Malawi led to its dissolution and to independence for these two territories in 1964. The minority White settlers in Rhodesia proclaimed their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965<sup>8</sup> and formed a regime whose leader, Ian Smith, precluded any possibility of majority rule.<sup>9</sup> As in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, nationalist movements were formed by the majority Africans. Again, by 1970, several such liberation movements were already involved in armed liberation struggle.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>The federation was unpopular and also contradictory because it was imposed; the larger market it created served the Southern Rhodesian economy more than that of any other member; and it was interpreted by Zambia and Malawi as the beginning of racial segregation as was the case in Southern Rhodesia. Also, some Southern Rhodesian Africans welcomed it because they thought federal laws would prohibit racial discrimination. Interview with Zambian diplomat, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).

<sup>7</sup>For some details on the CAF, see Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, especially Part Four, pp. 143-184; Reginald H. Green and Carol B. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. 262; and Patrick O'Meara, "Rhodesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa in Crisis* (Bloomington, Indiana and London: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 15-47.

<sup>8</sup>Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 13; Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 43-72; and the same article in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), *Frontline Southern Africa* (Peterborough: Ryan, 1989), pp. 57-99.

<sup>9</sup>Ian Smith is on record to have said: "I don't believe in black majority rule ever—not in a thousand years. I think it will be a disaster for Rhodesia." Quoted in Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 9.

The colonial problem in Rhodesia differed from that of the Portuguese colonies. In the latter, a single colonial power—Portugal—was identified by the colonised as the enemy. In the former there was an intermediary—a White minority regime—that had defied the authority of the colonial power—Britain—through UDI. The UDI regime was thus in *de facto* control, and Britain declined to intervene to restore its colonial status. This explains in part why the Zimbabwean liberation movements together with the FLS alliance and the international community at large put pressure on Britain to reactivate its responsibility<sup>11</sup> on the one hand, while some of the nationalist leaders inside Zimbabwe were eager to negotiate with the Smith regime, especially for the so-called "internal settlement",<sup>12</sup> on the other. The former wanted Britain to put pressure on the *rebels* to relinquish power, while the latter thought the rebels were important to any negotiation and arrangement towards majority rule, and consequently, independence.

The third problem was that of Namibia. Formerly a German colony, South-West Africa as it was known then, was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I.<sup>13</sup> But South Africa refused to recognise the UN's authority over the territory. Eventually, in 1966 it was ruled by the UN General Assembly that South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia.<sup>14</sup> As in the other

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<sup>11</sup>Colin Legum, *Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind* (London: Rex Collings, 1977), pp. 44-48, and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, Chapter One, pp. 1-11.

<sup>12</sup>For details on the "Internal Settlement", see *Africa Confidential (AC)*, Vol. 20 No. 8, (11 April 1978), pp. 5-6; and Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents (ACR) Vol. 11, 1978-79* (London and New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1980), pp. B975-B991.

<sup>13</sup>See Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, especially Part Three, pp. 109-141.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4; and Peter Manning and Reginald H. Green, "Namibia: Preparations for Destabilisation" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. 115.

colonial territories there was already armed liberation struggle in Namibia by 1970.<sup>15</sup> The international community had to fight hard to get South Africa to end its occupation of Namibia. In this case, South Africa can be regarded as having been the colonial power in Namibia alongside Portugal in Mozambique and Angola, and Britain in Rhodesia.

For the purposes of this study the trio—Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa—is considered to have been in a sort of a *triple alliance* to perpetuate colonialism and White minority rule in Southern Africa. The three regimes were in direct conflict not only with the majority of the people in their respective territories, but also with the majority-ruled states in the region, and more so with the FLS alliance.

The nature and extent of this conflict varied from one territory to another; so did the range of its active actors. There were three primary actors in the conflict: colonial/settler regimes, liberation movements and majority-ruled states. The trio of colonial and settler regimes were determined to fight the wars of liberation to the end, and they probably hoped to win. In all cases the colonial powers accepted negotiation as a basis for settlement only when pressure continued to mount on them or when there had been some substantial changes which directly affected them.<sup>16</sup>

The active liberation movements were the second set of primary actors. As shown above, the armed struggle initiated in the 1960s had gained momentum in the 1970s. The liberation movements tried as much as possible to get support inside

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<sup>15</sup>Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 136.

<sup>16</sup>For example, the coup in Portugal in 1974 made it imperative for that country to reconsider its colonial policies. For details, see Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 16; Tony Hodges, "Mozambique: The Politics of Liberation" in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa in Crisis*, p. 53; and Colin Legum, "Introduction: The International Dimension of the Crisis in Southern Rhodesia" in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa in Crisis*, p. 9.



their respective territories as well as from the rest of the international community. In most cases, the liberation movements were fighting to achieve independence by two major means but they would accept whichever came first. First, they were fighting to defeat their enemy physically in the battle-front, and then take over the territory and establish the variant of majority rule of their choice. And second, they were fighting to force the enemy to negotiate, agree on constitutions that protected the interests of both parties, and to work out transitional arrangements to independence.

The third type of primary actors in the conflict were some majority-ruled states of Southern Africa. These became more numerous and influential over time. Before the formation of the alliance, Tanzania and Zambia were already involved in Southern African colonial conflicts. So was Zaire. These countries are hereby regarded as primary rather than secondary actors because of the direct role they played. They were in principle committed to the cause of liberation. They also upheld the idea of armed struggle (in varying degrees). They were willing to help the liberation movements and bear the consequences of doing so. Largely, their involvement consisted of accepting refugees, providing material assistance, military and other training, transit facilities as well as diplomatic support for the liberation movements. This in turn made them experience harassment from the colonial powers including adverse intelligence operations, direct and indirect military attacks, and propaganda campaigns. They have also experienced heavy military expenditures, property destruction and high human tolls, as will be shown in subsequent chapters. Thus, Zaire provided a rear base for several of the Angolan liberation movements; Zambia to the liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa; and Tanzania to the main liberation movement in Mozambique.

Like the liberation movements, the majority-ruled states which supported the liberation struggle were determined to make use of two main options—armed struggle and negotiations. In this regard, Tanzania and Zambia were the architects of the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969<sup>17</sup> which identified and left both of these options open. The role of some of the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa as primary actors in the colonial conflict greatly expanded as time went on. Mozambique and Angola became independent in 1975. Together with Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania they formed the FLS alliance primarily to deal with the colonial problem in Rhodesia, Namibia and *apartheid* in South Africa in this order, as given by the Lusaka Manifesto.<sup>18</sup>

There also have been secondary actors in the Southern African colonial conflict: African and non-African. One of these is the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC). This body was established alongside and as a component of the OAU in 1963. It has had its head offices in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The OAU had given the ALC two major responsibilities: the establishment of a liberation budget to finance the struggle for African freedom, and the co-ordination of the struggle on a territorial and international basis.<sup>19</sup> The ALC has acted as a pool to

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<sup>17</sup>*Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series (ARB-PSCS)*, Vol. 6 No. 4, (15 May 1969), pp. 1371-72; Zdenek Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU* (London: Julian Friedmann, 1977), pp. 110-127; and for complete text, see, Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, Appendix II, pp. 315-323.

<sup>18</sup>This is the order in which the signatories analysed the situation in each of the territories, the way emphasis was placed and consequently the way in which the territories were liberated, implying anticipation and implementation of a dominoes scenario.

<sup>19</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, especially Chapter IV, pp. 45-63; and Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 8.

and from which assistance, particularly financial and military, was channelled and disbursed. On several occasions the ALC attempted to unify several movements in colonial territories into united fronts, but without much success. More often, the ALC was itself a source of misunderstanding and controversy in the OAU. Occasionally, questions have been asked whether or not the FLS alliance was replacing the Committee.

The ALC is considered to have played a secondary, as opposed to a primary, role, in the Southern African colonial conflict for three main reasons. First, its mandate has been broader than just Southern Africa. It is a continent-wide OAU Committee, and has had responsibilities in all the territories where there have been colonial problems: Western Sahara, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Djibouti, and Comoro, as well as Southern Africa. Second, its membership is also continental. Its membership has increased from the original nine,<sup>20</sup> to eleven, and then twenty one.<sup>21</sup> And third, there have been some cases where benefactors and donors have preferred to directly deal with the liberation movements and/or their host countries rather than through the ALC. This, however, has been another source of controversy.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>The original nine members were Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Uganda and Zaire. Later, Zambia and Somalia were added. Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 8.

<sup>21</sup>The members are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 52.

<sup>22</sup>See, for example, "Nigeria's...Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph N. Garba, presented a cheque for US\$ 250,000 to the delegation of Mozambique rather than to the OAU Liberation Committee", Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 133; also, "However, the amount channelled to the liberation movements by the OAU Liberation Committee is still less than the volume of aid they receive directly from OAU members and from friendly governments (continued...)"

Other secondary actors in this conflict have included countries and non-state actors outside Africa. The Eastern bloc countries were active in providing the liberation movements with almost all their arms, and with considerable financial and diplomatic support. They also provided some military training, particularly to commanders. The Eastern bloc also constituted, until recently, a source of ideological inspiration for the Southern African liberation movements. In varying proportions, the countries involved were the Soviet Union, (then-east) German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Yugoslavia and China. Cuba, however, needs a special mention here. In the first instance, it was, in most cases, a new-comer. Nevertheless, in addition to providing various types of support it distinguished itself by being directly involved in the Angolan conflict after that country gained independence in 1975. Cuba sent thousands of troops to help the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) regime consolidate its power against other liberation movements and to stave off direct military invasion of 1975/76 in which South Africa openly attempted to unseat the MPLA regime in favour of *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA).<sup>23</sup> The Cuban troops remained active in Angola up to 1990.

The governments of the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, and some of their respective Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), are also known to have

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<sup>22</sup>(...continued)

outside Africa", *Ibid.* p. 60. See also, "...if ZAPU continued to go directly to the Russians, and ZANU to China for military assistance, there would remain two separate armies...", Joseph N. Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering: Nigerian Foreign Policy 1975-1979* (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1987), p. 52.

<sup>23</sup>Zdenek Červenka and Colin Legum, "Cuba: The New Communist Power in Africa" in Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 10, 1977-78*, p. A109; and Marga Holness, "Angola: The Struggle Continues" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 81-90.

given various forms of assistance to the Southern African liberation movements.<sup>24</sup> This is quite unusual considering the Western countries' general negative attitude towards the liberation movements, and the armed struggle in particular. It perhaps reflects humanitarian/internationalist or internal ideals of those governments.

As a group, the major Western powers have played two secondary but incompatible roles in the Southern African regional colonial conflict. They have been the source of economic investment for the region as a whole, but more so to the settler regimes. It is logical to argue that economic investment, technology, military and other inputs were very important for prolonging the lives of the White minority regimes in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, Rhodesia and Namibia, not to mention the continued survival of the *apartheid* regime until the early-1990s.

And secondly, and somewhat contradictorily, Western powers have been involved in the conflict resolution process. The US and Britain negotiated with the FLS alliance, the Smith regime in Rhodesia and South Africa on the Rhodesian problem. They put forward the so-called Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia that finally became the basis for independence in Zimbabwe.<sup>25</sup> The two, together with Canada, France and the (then-west) Federal Republic of Germany constituted the

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<sup>24</sup> The bulk of outside aid to the liberation movements comes from the Scandinavian countries... Sweden has always been a leading supporter of the liberation movements, and the amount ear-marked for this purpose in the budget of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) for 1977-78 was £7 million—which is about double the amount the [Liberation] Committee received from OAU members.

Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 60.

<sup>25</sup> Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 37.

Contact Group, which attempted to negotiate Namibian independence on behalf of the UN.<sup>26</sup>

### **CONFLICT BETWEEN MAJORITY-RULED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

It has been shown above that South Africa had been a primary actor in the colonial conflicts as well as being a colonial power itself. These two roles led it into a continuing conflict with the growing number of majority-ruled states in the region on several fronts and issues. However, *apartheid* and destabilisation are the other major areas of conflict between the two: that is, internal and regional aspects of institutionalised racism. It should be noted that in general various conflict interaction patterns do not always act independently of each other, as the case of *apartheid* and destabilisation will demonstrate.

#### **Apartheid**

*Apartheid* has been characterised as institutionalised racism. In his now dated but still comprehensive book, Grundy observed that such racism is one major element responsible for the tension and conflict (as well as co-operation among core states and among some peripheral actors) in the international politics of Southern Africa. He then went on to provide a useful insight:

Racism...means the attribution of either normative qualities of superiority or inferiority, or immutable behavioural (as distinct from physical) differences, or both, to a 'statistical aggregate of persons who share a composite of genetically transmissible physical traits'. Racism

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

is usually associated with political power and logically includes the pursuit of policies based on these putative characteristics.<sup>27</sup>

The observation that racism is associated with political power (as well as economic privilege) was also echoed by Africa Research Group:

Apartheid starts from the premise that all power must remain in the control of the Whites. To maintain this, all other peoples must be separated from the Whites, except when they are needed for their labour. In South Africa every person is classified by race—that is, by the colour (or alleged colour) of his or her skin. The different racial groups are segregated from each other as much as possible. These two facts are the cornerstones of apartheid as a legal system.<sup>28</sup>

That *apartheid* includes entrenched beliefs and attitudes was summed up by Tambo, who defined it as:

The sum total of all policies and practices, stratagems and methods, beliefs and attitudes that have been marshalled and are being employed in an attempt to ensure and entrench the political domination and economic exploitation of the African people by the White minority.<sup>29</sup>

The UN also characterised *apartheid* as a crime against humanity and "...a gross violation of human rights...and a danger to international peace and security."<sup>30</sup>

*Apartheid* has been a policy unique to South Africa. However, over the years, it has also drawn enormous international concern although its immediate effects remained regional. The majority-ruled states of Southern Africa continuously condemned *apartheid*. They were instrumental in seeing the international isolation

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<sup>27</sup>Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, p. 2.

<sup>28</sup>Africa Research Group, *The Race to Power: The Struggle for Southern Africa* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), p. 5.

<sup>29</sup>Oliver Tambo, "Apartheid—the indictment" in Ronald Segal (ed.), *Sanctions Against South Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 15.

<sup>30</sup>Speech by the Secretary-General of the UN, cited by Joseph N. Garba, "A Statement before the Security Council Committee established by Resolution 421 (1977) concerning the Question of South Africa, 9 April 1984", in *The Crisis in Southern Africa and Our Duty* (United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 1984).

of the *apartheid* regime. Most important is the fact that most majority-ruled states in the region, especially the members of the FLS alliance, have in principle accepted and advocated the idea of liberating the people of South Africa from *apartheid*. They have, therefore, treated *apartheid* and the colonial conflict along similar lines. They have recognised liberation movements active in South Africa, and have provided them with sanctuary, rear bases, military and other training, transit, material and diplomatic support since their banning in the early-1960s. Such facilities were crucial until the early-1990s when the South African political struggle was once again largely internalised.

The banning of the African National Congress-South Africa (ANC) and other groups, and the imprisonment of the South African Black leaders including Nelson Mandela excluded any possibility of negotiations between the White minority regime and the Black nationalist movements, until the process of transformation began in the late-1980s and early-1990s. As in the case of the related colonial conflicts, armed struggle was declared by the ANC.

Thus, the two major actors—the majority-ruled states and the RSA—have been in conflict over *apartheid* for over twenty years. On many occasions, troops from the latter have been deployed in some of the former in attempts to liquidate the ANC and to force its hosts to abandon their supportive role. Thus an internal conflict was externalised and regionalised, and in so doing it gave rise to a new phenomenon: destabilisation.

### **Destabilisation**

There is a general consensus among observers and analysts that destabilisation was designed in the 1970s as a component of South Africa's total national strategy and



put into effect in the 1980s.<sup>31</sup> Only a few scholars trace the origins of destabilisation in the region to the seventeenth century when the Boers were coming to South Africa *en masse*. Prominent among such scholars is Solomon Nkiwane.<sup>32</sup> It is very likely that in his analysis of destabilisation, Nkiwane misses the point by going too deep into history, thus confusing colonisation with destabilisation. His analysis implies that destabilisation began with White settlement, which does not seem to be plausible.

At a more general or comparative level of analysis, destabilisation is a particular foreign policy tool that can conceivably be invoked by any state. It has thus been defined by Manley as "an orchestrated plan to bring a society to the very verge of chaos and paralysis."<sup>33</sup> In a more detailed form:

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<sup>31</sup>South Africa's total national strategy has been widely documented. See, for example, Chipasula and Miti, "South Africa and its SADCC Neighbours"; Crocker, *South Africa's Defence Posture*, especially Chapters 1 and 2; Robert Davies, "South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Accord Phase, March 1984 to September 1985", Maputo, 1986 (Mimeograph); Davies and O'Meara, "South Africa's Strategy in the Southern African Region"; Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", pp. 1-8; Deon Geldenhuys and William Gutteridge, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role in Regional Security*, Conflict Studies No. 148, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983); Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, pp. 140-44; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, especially Chapter 4, pp. 32-40; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, especially Chapter 2, pp. 7-16.; Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, Adelphi Paper No. 159, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980); Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States*; Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*; Johnson and Martin, "Introduction", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. xxi-xxxv; Johnson and Martin "Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid", Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Frontline Southern Africa*, pp. 1-55; and Salaita, "Militarisation of SADCC States", among others.

<sup>32</sup>Nkiwane, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa".

<sup>33</sup>Michael Manley, *Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery* (London: Third World Media Limited with Writers and Readers Publishing Co-operative Society Limited, 1982),  
(continued...)

Destabilisation describes a situation where some source either inside or outside a country—or perhaps two sources working in concert, one outside and one inside—set out to create a situation of instability and panic by *design* (emphasis in original).<sup>34</sup>

This general perspective is, however, widespread in its application. Among its notable examples are said to be Iran, Chile and Jamaica<sup>35</sup> in different periods and contexts.

This study uses the concept destabilisation in a more specific context—that of the relations between South Africa and its neighbouring states—and a specific *period*—especially in the 1980s.

Thus, in Southern Africa destabilisation is a systematic and conscious policy.

Patel has more accurately or correctly defined it as:

A complex of political, economic and military activities, separately and combined, short of formal declaration of war, used by South Africa against independent African states and states which should be independent but are illegally occupied by South Africa, such as Namibia. Thus South Africa's regional destabilisation policy is a policy of war by another name; it is an act of state terrorism by the apartheid state against its neighbours, complemented as it is by state terrorism inside South Africa against the people of South Africa. *It is, therefore, a purposive policy carried out in defence of the apartheid regime* (emphasis supplied).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>(...continued)

p. x; also quoted by Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege: Options for the Frontline States", *The Journal of Modern African Studies (JMAS)*, Vol. 26 No. 4, (December 1988), p. 552.

<sup>34</sup>Manley, *Jamaica*, p. 138.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>36</sup>Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe", p. 39. See also, "Destabilisation is generally considered to comprise all military and non-military measures short of open war and invasion", Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege", p. 552.

Patel's definition represents a compromise between scholars who argue that destabilisation should be distinguished from neutralisation,<sup>37</sup> and those who observe that it is targeted only against independent states.<sup>38</sup>

Thus defined, destabilisation is commonly taken to mean a series of actions taken by South Africa against its neighbours, which provoked conflict in response. However, when destabilisation is viewed as a component of South Africa's total national strategy it conveys a different and more specific meaning. Total national strategy was a result of Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha's emphasis on the narrow definition of the security of the South African state and was geared to resist what his administration conceived as a (communist) *total onslaught* on the regime. The onslaught was presented as having interrelated internal and external dimensions, under the direction of communist powers.<sup>39</sup> "Total national strategy" involved the mobilisation of South Africa's total physical and human resources "in a national endeavour to thwart the onslaught".<sup>40</sup> Destabilisation was framed in response to the alleged external dimension of the onslaught.

Viewed as such, destabilisation did and was designed to look like a defensive policy as well as a reaction on the part of the South African regime to offensive

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<sup>37</sup>Robert M. Price, "Creating New Political Realities: Pretoria's Drive for Regional Hegemony" in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard Sklar (eds.), *African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 73-77.

<sup>38</sup>Manning and Green, "Namibia" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 111-137; and Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, Chapter 6, pp. 48-53.

<sup>39</sup>Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 37; Geldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy" in Geldenhuys and Gutteridge, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa*, p. 16.

<sup>40</sup>Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 38.

actions by its neighbours and other external actors. This view conforms with Geldenhuys' conception of the term destabilisation, and the way it was applied by South Africa:

The destabiliser's primary objective is an avowedly political one. Essentially he<sup>41</sup> wishes to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state. They may or may not involve structural changes—in effect toppling the regime in power—*although that is not ruled out*, but certainly, would involve major changes in the target's behaviour....At the very least, the destabiliser demands a fundamental shift or reorientation in the target state's policy *vis-à-vis* the destabiliser (emphasis supplied).<sup>42</sup>

Geldenhuys went on to observe that in fact South Africa's neighbours were destabilising it by trying to promote fundamental change in two main areas; ending *apartheid* and ending South Africa's occupation of Namibia:

The provision of sanctuary to SWAPO and the ANC, together with the presence of Cuban and other communist forces in neighbouring states, represents attempts to destabilise the Republic. Similarly, black states' political and moral support for the so-called liberation movements, and their clamour for sanctions against South Africa and for its international isolation, are part of a concerted campaign to destabilise the country.<sup>43</sup>

In analysing Geldenhuys' formulation of destabilisation Hanlon observed that:

A key point of this formulation is that South Africa is justified in destabilising its neighbours even if they never directly interfere in South Africa's internal affairs, but only oppose apartheid, call for sanctions at the UN, ...have military help from socialist states *and call for an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia* (emphasis supplied).<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>This study disassociates itself from gender-related terms like "he" and "she" in reference to human beings or countries. They appear only in quotations from others.

<sup>42</sup>Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy" in Geldenhuys and Gutteridge, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa*, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", p. 4.

<sup>44</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 29.

The above debate or disagreement suggests that destabilisation is partly a two-way or action-reaction process. Although it would seem politically divisive and empirically excessive to argue that the members of the FLS alliance had ever destabilised South Africa, it would analytically be inaccurate not to recognise that South Africa had formulated destabilisation in part as a reaction to actions by its neighbours. On moral and humanitarian grounds it can be argued that *apartheid* and the illegal occupation of other territories are unacceptable. Scholars who view destabilisation as a one-way process whereby South Africa destabilises its neighbours<sup>45</sup> may have been influenced by such considerations. These have also taken into account the cost of the damage inflicted on South Africa's neighbours as a result of destabilisation.<sup>46</sup> However, analytically, moral and humanitarian considerations as well as costs of damage cannot obscure the fact that destabilisation in Southern Africa has been a two-way process in which each party to the conflict has suffered. But clearly, South Africa has definitely contributed more or endured less than its adversaries, at least in the medium-term.

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<sup>45</sup>Chipasula and Miti, "South Africa and its SADCC Neighbours"; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*; Johnson and Martin, "Introduction"; "Mozambique"; and "Zimbabwe", all in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*; Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*; Manning and Green, "Namibia" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*; Nkiwane, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa"; Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe"; Price, "Creating New Political Realities" in Bender, Coleman and Sklar (eds.), *African Crisis Areas*; Salaita, "Militarisation of SADCC States", among others.

<sup>46</sup>Various estimates of the financial costs have been documented. See, for example, *Children on the Front Line* (UNICEF: 1989); Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 10-12; and *The Financial Gazette*, Harare (20 October 1989).

## CONFLICT WITHIN GROUPS OF PRIMARY ACTORS

It would be an oversimplification to assume that each of the two groups of primary actors in the conflict discussed above—the majority-ruled states and South Africa—have always been homogeneous and cohesive. In the 1970s and 1980s each of these groups experienced internal conflicts which significantly shaped their behaviour toward regional conflict and co-operation. The nature and extent of these internal conflicts have varied from one country and one period to another, just like their effects.

The internal conflict in South Africa has mainly been shaped by *apartheid* policies. It has in most cases taken the general form of being between the minority White population and the majority Blacks. The scale of this conflict can be captured by several major indicators. One party to this conflict was constituted by several anti-*apartheid* groups. After the Sharpeville massacre of 1961<sup>47</sup> and the subsequent banning of anti-*apartheid* movements, several groups went underground and/or into exile. Prominent among these has been the ANC, whose several leaders were detained for many years. The ANC is important in this respect (and to some extent the Pan-Africanist Congress-PAC) because it formed a military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* ("the spear of the nation") to execute armed liberation struggle. On several occasions the ANC managed to infiltrate and sabotage several installations and inflict

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<sup>47</sup>For some details, see, Stephen M. Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), especially Chapter One, pp. 1-35; and Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley, California and London: University of California Press, 1978), Chapter Seven, pp. 212-256.

damage onto the state.<sup>48</sup> The South African regime's reaction was hot pursuit of the ANC in the neighbouring countries,<sup>49</sup> to tighten internal security through frequent states of emergency, and to destabilise what were considered to be the sources of support for its adversaries in the neighbouring countries, and other covert acts.

Those groups which did not go into exile were not passive, however. Several organisations or elements of South African civil society such as the churches, generally and Black separatist churches in particular, Black Consciousness Movement, United Democratic Front (UDF), among others,<sup>50</sup> continued with their anti-*apartheid* activities despite police repression. Most such groups and individuals conformed to what Anglin has termed "accommodation" as an option.<sup>51</sup>

There have been several results of this. One was the radicalisation of the entire South African society, especially the Black population, exemplified by the

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<sup>48</sup>See Legum (ed.), *ACR 1978-79 Vol. 11*, pp. B867-68, and B883-84; Jaster, *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, p. 10; and Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States*, pp. 19-21.

<sup>49</sup>Hot pursuit was also carried out as part of destabilisation. See Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*; and Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, among others.

<sup>50</sup>For detailed analysis on the UDF, see Jo-Anne Collinge, "The United Democratic Front" *South African Review III*, (1986), ed. South African Research Service (Johannesburg: Ravan Press), pp. 248-266. This Review has articles on other such groups as well. See also, Roger Southall, "Developments After COSATU's Formation", International Symposium on Surviving at the Margins: Africa in the New International Division of Labour and Power, Dalhousie University, Halifax (26-28 March 1991).

<sup>51</sup>Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege", pp. 555-59.

Soweto uprisings of 1976<sup>52</sup> and other boycotts and strikes. The other result has been the increased polarisation between the Whites on the one hand, and other populations—Blacks, Coloureds and Indians—on the other. The siege or *laager* mentality among the White population was also revived.<sup>53</sup> The most important result, however, was the increased militarisation of the *apartheid* regime especially in the early- and mid-1980s, in an attempt to cope with increased pressures.<sup>54</sup> In addition, there have been some divisions within the South African regime itself. These divisions have taken different forms at different times. Although not finely divided due to the nature of the Republic's political system, essentially, they have been between the so-called *verligtes* (doves) and *verkrampes* (hawks); the former representing the reformers and the latter representing the hardliners, particularly elements in the security establishment.<sup>55</sup> Interestingly, both camps have, in differing proportions and ways, defended the *status quo*. There has also been a conflict among

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<sup>52</sup>See, for example, Jaster, "The Legacy of Soweto" in his *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, pp. 25-27; and Alf Stadler, *The Political Economy of Modern South Africa* (Cape Town, Johannesburg and London: David Philip and Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 97-115.

<sup>53</sup>Nkiwane, "Destabilisation in Southern Africa".

<sup>54</sup>See Cock and Nathan (eds.), *War and Society*, Crocker, *South Africa's Defence Posture*; Philip H. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986); Jaster, *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*; Robert S. Jaster, "South African Defence Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military" in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds.), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on African International Relations* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 121-153; and Stewart Menaul, *The Border Wars: South Africa's Response*, Conflict Studies No. 152, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983), among others.

<sup>55</sup>See Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 61 and Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation*, pp. 267-69.



different Black ethnic groups in South Africa. Sometimes this conflict has come to the open as being between the members of the Inkatha Movement (later, Freedom Party) and the members of the UDF and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). More often, and especially after the release of Mandela in 1990, the conflict has appeared to be between Inkatha and ANC; as well as being between the Zulu people and the Xhosa.<sup>56</sup> This, in part, underlies the reasons behind the regime's conception of total national strategy and destabilisation policies discussed above.

Major internal conflicts in the majority-ruled states, especially in each member of the FLS alliance, have taken place in several countries including Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in varying degrees of intensity. In Angola, the internal conflict has been a remnant of the liberation war. The three major liberation movements—the MPLA, the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), and UNITA—had failed to come together in a united front and form a government of national unity despite various efforts towards that end.<sup>57</sup> At the time of independence, the MPLA had gained control of the capital, Luanda. The liberation war against Portugal was transformed into a civil war as all three parties

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<sup>56</sup>For a recent account, see Guy Arnold, "South Africa 1991: Year of Decision", *Africa Forum: A Journal of Leadership and Development*, Vol. 1 No. 1, (1991), pp. 20-24; Andrew Beattie, "Buthelezi's Bid for Power", *New African*, No. 280, (January 1991), pp. 9-11; and James T. Campbell, "Inkatha and 'Tribal Violence' in South Africa", *Programme of African Studies: News and Events*, Vol. 1 No. 2, (Fall/Winter, 1990), pp. 2-3.

<sup>57</sup>See Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 140-142; Geldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy" in Geldenhuys and Gutteridge, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa*, p. 18; Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, pp. 75-79; and Assis Malaquias, "Angola in the 1990's: Prospects for Peace", in Larry A. Swatuk and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1991), pp. 47-64.

fought for the control of the country. Specifically, the FNLA and UNITA fought against the MPLA separately and from different directions.

Fighting from the south, UNITA was later helped by South African troops after the latter decided to send an interventionary force into Angola.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the MPLA government brought in thousands of Cuban troops to help it consolidate and maintain power, thus introducing a new variable, as observed above. The Angolan civil war dragged on for over fifteen years after 1975, reaching a negotiated settlement in the early-1990s, following Namibia's independence and the decline of the Cold War.

The war in Angola has had an effect not only internally, but also in the manner in which that country related to other members of the FLS alliance and also South Africa, in the period under review. It also affected the progress of Namibian independence as will be shown in subsequent chapters.

The internal conflict in Mozambique was slightly different from that of Angola. Many accounts point out that the rise of the *Movimento Nacional da Resistência de Moçambique* (MNR)<sup>59</sup> is to be traced to the liberation war in Zimbabwe.<sup>60</sup> A group which had been created by security forces of the Smith

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<sup>58</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 143-48; and Holness, "Angola", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 73-109.

<sup>59</sup>Also known as *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO).

<sup>60</sup>Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: CIO Chief On Record* (Johannesburg and London: Galago and John Murray, 1987), especially Chapter Eight, pp. 135-152; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, especially Chapter 9, pp. 68-74; Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 1-41; Glenda Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo" in *JMAS*, Vol. 28 No. 4, (December 1990), pp. 603-619; Alex Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique* (London and Bloomington, Indiana: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1991); and Tom Young, "The MNR/RENAMO: External  
(continued...)

regime in Rhodesia for the purpose of dislodging Zimbabwean guerrilla bases in Mozambique was subsequently taken over by one of the South African security agencies which then revived and used it to destabilise Mozambique.<sup>61</sup> Implicit acknowledgement by South Africa of direct involvement with the MNR was made during the negotiations leading to and in the chequered history of the Nkomati Accord itself.<sup>62</sup> As will be shown later, the Accord failed to stop the war in Mozambique, which has, as in the case of Angola, dragged on into the 1990s. Although unlike Angola, there have been no extra-African troops directly involved in Mozambique, those from Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, including some by Lonrho and South Africa's "mercenaries", have been deployed at different times without much success in stopping or ending the war.<sup>63</sup>

The origin of the internal conflict in Zimbabwe was more or less similar to that in Angola. It was brought about by the tendency to have more than one liberation movement waging armed struggle. ZAPU was mainly supported by, and operated from Zambia; ZANU by and from Mozambique. The two movements had,

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<sup>60</sup>(...continued)  
and Internal Dynamics", *African Affairs: The Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 89 No. 357, (October 1990), pp. 491-509.

<sup>61</sup>The agency was Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). See Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. 13.

<sup>62</sup>See Nkomati Accord, signed between Mozambique and South Africa, March 1984, in Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*, pp. 279-283.

<sup>63</sup>Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. 8; and Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa", p. 52.

however, a long history of animosity and misunderstanding between them.<sup>64</sup> Efforts to unify them resulted in the formation of what others have termed a "marriage of convenience"—the PF—in 1976.<sup>65</sup> The two, however, contested separately in the elections which led to independence in 1980. ZANU emerged as the overall winner and formed the government. ZAPU, the loser, was disenchanted. Its leader, Joshua Nkomo, was later removed from government following the breakout of fighting in Matebeleland between government troops and some ZAPU followers.<sup>66</sup> (He has since returned to government). When Nkomo disowned those fighting under his name and party, the fighters called themselves Super ZAPU.<sup>67</sup> Subsequent South African involvement with Super-ZAPU has, however, been documented.<sup>68</sup> The internal conflict in Zimbabwe has some ethnic elements as well given that ZAPU has identified itself with the Ndebele, and ZANU with the Shona, ethnic groups.

A group of armed people, referred to as the *Mushala Gang*, led by Adamson Mushala, ravaged the south-western part of Zambia for almost a decade from 1973

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<sup>64</sup>Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 122-134; Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, Part Four, pp. 143-184; Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, pp. 180-183; Legum, *Southern Africa*, pp. 17-26; and O'Meara, "Rhodesia" in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa in Crisis*, pp. 28-47.

<sup>65</sup>Legum, *Southern Africa*, pp. 14-26.

<sup>66</sup>Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, especially Chapter 6, pp. 54-60; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 178-183; Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 50-63.

<sup>67</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 180.

<sup>68</sup>Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 12; and Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 180.

to 1982.<sup>69</sup> Several accounts indicate that Mushala and his group received military training from the South Africans, probably in Angola and Namibia.<sup>70</sup> Although this group was not as large as Super-ZAPU, MNR or UNITA, it did involve a section of Zambian troops being deployed.

In addition to the internal conflicts mainly of a military nature there also have been splits within the ruling parties and regimes, especially in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Internal conflicts outlined above are significant and relevant in a number of ways. First, they have forced the respective countries to channel resources into unproductive sectors of defence and security. Second, their intensity and duration show the minimal capability of the countries in question to deal with conflicts of a military nature, with or without external military assistance, despite heavy expenditures on defence. Third, they suggest that the legitimacy of the regimes in such countries is in question. Fourth, cutting across all the internal conflicts in Southern Africa is the external element, especially the involvement of South Africa in one way or another. And fifth, internal conflicts have contributed to the shape of bilateral inter-state relations in the region, multilateral co-operation and also the structure of institutions formed to promote regional co-operation and conflict resolution. Also internal conflicts have increased in part by drought, debt and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s decade (and beyond). These

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<sup>69</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 244; and Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>70</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 244. Johnson and Martin suggest that the Mushala Group was initially trained and equipped by the Portuguese in Eastern Angola, and that it was intended to be used along similar lines as the MNR was used by the minority regime in Rhodesia against Mozambique. South Africa is said to have inherited the group after the 1974 *coup d'etat* in Portugal. See Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 84-85.

have also served as agents of change in the region<sup>71</sup> and bases of civil societies/pluralist systems in the 1990s.

### **CO-OPERATIVE INTERACTION PATTERNS**

Conflict and co-operation are intertwined in Southern Africa; the two processes have coexisted over time. Sometimes conflict has acted as a catalyst for co-operation, while some forms of co-operation have caused conflict. Like conflict patterns, co-operation has appeared at various levels and forms and at different times. Only major forms of formal/inter-state co-operative interaction patterns will be considered here.

#### **Co-operation Among Majority-ruled States**

Two major forms of co-operation among the majority-ruled states can be identified in the 1970s and 1980s: bilateral and multilateral. This artificial classification serves some analytical purposes as otherwise the two modes of co-operation complement each other, each providing inputs to the other.

#### **Bilateral Co-operation**

The main types of bilateral co-operation among the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa can be identified as political, economic, and defence and security. It was the general conflict patterns in Southern Africa which made possible several sustained bilateral political relationships.

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<sup>71</sup>For details, see Chapter Six below.

Personal relationships between Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania helped to forge political links between their countries to promote and hasten the liberation process in Southern Africa. The two leaders consulted each other through *ad hoc* summits in and outside the then existing interstate groupings in the 1960s.<sup>72</sup> They also managed to convince leaders of other nearby countries to join them in the liberation process as well as to jointly initiate measures to the same end. For example, in the second half of the 1960s the two initiated a series of Conferences of East and Central African Countries (CECAC) which were multilateral in nature. Most importantly, the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania were the architects of the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa in 1969.<sup>73</sup>

Both Zambia and Tanzania related, albeit differently, to various liberation movements. Thus, Zambia was the rear base and headquarters of ZAPU and hosted the ANC until recently when it moved its headquarters back to Johannesburg (South Africa). The South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) also had its headquarters in Zambia before moving to Angola and thence home. On the other hand, Tanzania was the headquarters of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), in addition to hosting offices of almost all the liberation movements in the region, along with the ALC.

The then independent countries' relations with the liberation movements were to reflect the future patterns of bilateral relations in the region. For example,

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<sup>72</sup>ARB (PSCS), Vol. 6 No. 2, (15 March 1969), p. C1317; and Dunstan W. Kamana, "Zambia" in Douglas G. Anglin, Timothy M. Shaw and Carl G. W. Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers from a Scandinavia-Canadian Conference* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), p. 38; and Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 14.

<sup>73</sup>See Nathan Shamuyarira, "Tanzania" in Anglin, Shaw and Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa*, p. 18.

because of Tanzania's good relations with FRELIMO there has been co-operation between Tanzania and independent Mozambique in several fields; likewise between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as the former had good relations with ZANU. On the contrary, Zambia's historical relations with ZAPU somewhat affected what should otherwise have been good relations between Zambia and Zimbabwe (under ZANU government).<sup>74</sup> These may improve in future as a consequence of the early-1990s ZANU-ZAPU accord.

At another level, the region has witnessed close co-operation between countries which have had similar ideologies, especially between Mozambique and Angola. This has been the case at least for most of the period under review although there are signs that Marxism-Leninism and other hard-line positions are now slowly giving way to more pragmatism—from structural adjustment to peace talks—possibly leading to closer relations with other SADCC states.

There also have been several cases of bilateral economic co-operation. Although Southern Africa can be regarded as a single political economy centring especially on transportation and communications, transnational links, both corporate and informal, and labour, bilateral patterns can still be identified. Zambia and Tanzania have co-operated economically in their attempt to reduce economic difficulties for Zambia arising out of the latter's landlockedness and the vagaries of border closures with Rhodesia. Thus, in addition to Zambia's use of Dar es Salaam port, the two countries built a number of joint infrastructural projects. These include Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), Tanzania-Zambia (oil) Pipeline (TAZAMA),

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<sup>74</sup>See a detailed discussion in Chapter Six, below.



a joint haulage company and a highway,<sup>75</sup> all linking Zambia to Dar es Salaam port. These structures were alternatives for Zambia's south-ward routes. However, they have had a limited impact and are now being downgraded.<sup>76</sup>

Zimbabwe and Mozambique have been co-operating on the use of railways, roads and an oil pipeline between them and the ports of the latter. Botswana and Zambia have built a joint road across their short common border; while Botswana and Zimbabwe have joint road, railway and electricity grid projects.

Another type of bilateral co-operation among the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa has taken place in the field of defence and security. First, there has been co-operation between independent states and the liberation movements as shown above. Second, and related to the first, are bilateral defence and security agreements. Several that have been identified include the Tanzania-Mozambique defence agreement,<sup>77</sup> which made it possible for Tanzania to send troops to help

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<sup>75</sup>For details, see Kamana, "Zambia" in Anglin, Shaw and Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa*, p. 141; and speeches on, "The Tanzania-Zambia Pipeline", "To Plan is to Choose" and "The Tanzania/Zambia Railway", in Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo: A Selection From Writings and Speeches 1968-73* (Dar es Salaam and London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

<sup>76</sup> In August [1990] the Zambian government announced that traders could start using southern routes through South African ports to import and export essentials. The move was widely welcomed by the business community... Zambian businessmen know that South Africa provides cheaper and more efficient transport... This is seen as a covert way of lifting sanctions, without doing so officially.

Alan Rake, "South Africa Wants to Make Friends". *New African*, No. 280, (January 1991), p. 27.

<sup>77</sup>*Africa Report*, Vol. 32 No. 1, (January-February 1987), p. 67; Hodges, "Mozambique", in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, p. 78; Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. 35; (continued...)

the Mozambican government in its war with the MNR. This package included training as well. There is also a defence agreement between Mozambique and Zimbabwe whose practical application has included the latter's deployment of troops to help the Mozambican government, protect the "Beira corridor",<sup>78</sup> and make it possible for Britain to train Mozambican troops in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. One that has never in practice been invoked is the Tanzania-Zambia defence agreement.<sup>79</sup> It has yet to be seen whether the Zambian-Mozambican and Mozambican-Malawian security commissions (1989)<sup>80</sup> will materialise into a full-fledged defence agreements.

These and other patterns of bilateral co-operation among the majority-ruled states are important in that they determine the nature and type of multilateral co-operation on the one hand, and the areas of conflict arising out of co-operation, on the other. They also affect collective attitudes towards what has been described as their common enemy, South Africa.

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<sup>77</sup>(...continued)

and John M. Ostheimer, "Peacekeeping and Warmaking: Future Military Challenges in Africa" in Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker (eds.), *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 68.

<sup>78</sup>*Africa Report*, Vol. 32 No. 1, (January-February 1987), p. 55.

<sup>79</sup>See *Africa Report*, *ibid.* p. 67; *Africa South of the Sahara 1989*, 18th Ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1988), p. 1040; and Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States".

<sup>80</sup>See Vines, "Several Years Beyond the Leash".

### **Multilateral Co-operation**

As observed above, the nature of bilateral co-operation among several partners in Southern Africa has determined the structure of their multilateral co-operation and institutions. Most of the latter are quite loose, to reflect various conflicting views and interests. The most important institutions which have been formed in the 1970s and 1980s are the FLS alliance, SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA).

The FLS was (officially) formed sometime in 1976,<sup>81</sup> although ground-work for it was laid down some years before. By 1976 its members consisted of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. In 1980 they were joined by Zimbabwe, and Namibia in 1990. As will be discussed at length in the next chapter, the alliance was formed first to spearhead the independence of Zimbabwe, but latter it assumed responsibilities to hasten the liberation of Southern Africa in general; that is, to end colonialism in Namibia and *apartheid* in South Africa.

Although initiated by the members of the FLS alliance, SADCC has a wider membership and scope than the former. Formed in 1980, SADCC was an attempt to lessen its members' economic dependence on South Africa.<sup>82</sup> In addition to the members of the Front Line States (with Namibia as its newest member), the other members of SADCC are Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. In actual fact, SADCC reflects the nature of the Southern African political economy on the one hand, and

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<sup>81</sup>Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 62; and Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 14.

<sup>82</sup>Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Conclusion: Total Strategy in Southern Africa—An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978" in Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*, p. 256; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, pp. 18-19; and Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 19.

the centrality of transport and communications, on the other, as various studies have shown.<sup>83</sup>

The most recent of the Southern African multilateral institutions other than South African sponsored units is the PTA. It is intended to promote, harmonise, and regulate trade among its members. Formed in 1981, PTA is an Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) initiative and has a wider membership than SADCC. All members of SADCC (except Namibia) are members of PTA.<sup>84</sup> In addition, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda and Zaire are also members.<sup>85</sup> The PTA, however, operates in an area in which there are several bilateral trade agreements and joint ventures, and has not altered traditional trade patterns (e.g. trade relations with the RSA) much, as the examples of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Rand Monetary Area (RMA) below will show.

It should be noted that it is one thing to establish multilateral institutions but the way they function is a different matter. For example, both the direction and value of trade has changed very little among SADCC and PTA members, while

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<sup>83</sup>Douglas G. Anglin, "SADCC in the Aftermath of the Nkomati Accord" in Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*, pp. 173-197; Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 245-280; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, pp. 18-19; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 17-26; and Swatuk, "Security Through Development?"

<sup>84</sup>Angola joined PTA in August 1990. See *ARB (Economic Series)*, Vol. 27 No.8, (16 August - 15 September 1990), p. B10073.

<sup>85</sup>Hawa Sinare, "The Implications of the Preferential Trade Area for Economic Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa", in Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*, p. 157.

probably informal trade may have increased. This was also observed by SADCC Secretariat in its *SADCC Regional Economic Survey (1988)*, thus:

A pervasive feature of the regional trading pattern is the very limited volume of intra-regional trade. Most member countries conduct the bulk of their trade with OECD countries, though South Africa is also a major supplier of regional imports and a significant purchaser of exports from Malawi and Zimbabwe.<sup>86</sup>

This shows the position of the Southern African regional institutions against the aspirations of the countries which formed them.

**Table I**

**INTRA-SADCC TRADE 1981-1986 (SDRs MILLIONS)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Share in Total Trade (%)</b>
1981	448	4.7
1982	536	4.7
1983	495	4.5
1984	512	4.5
1985	417	3.8
1986	384	4.2

**Source:** *SADCC Economic Survey 1988* (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, 1989), p. 226.

As Table I shows, intra-SADCC trade represented an average of only 4.4 per cent share in its total trade between 1981 and 1986. More disturbing is the fact that even with that small share, its value has declined by 15 per cent from Special

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<sup>86</sup>*SADCC Regional Economic Survey 1988* (SADCC, 1989), pp. 219-220.

Drawing Rights (SDRs) 448 in 1981 to SDRs 384 in 1986. Zimbabwe, more centrally placed and economically developed than the rest dominates intra-SADCC trade; 10.8 per cent of its exports and 7.8 per cent of its imports in 1981, and 11 per cent of its exports and 6 per cent of its imports in 1986.<sup>87</sup>

Generally, trade flows were minimal in the first decade of SADCC existence. SADCC is perhaps instrumental in transportation and communications, especially in transit goods, but not trade within itself.

### **CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MAJORITY-RULED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA**

Co-operative interaction patterns outlined here are both bilateral and multilateral. Despite the regional conflict in which South Africa has featured as the most important actor and aggressor, most majority-ruled states have found it necessary to co-operate with South Africa either individually or multilaterally through collective institutions. At most times this co-operation has been historically rooted. Such co-operation has tended to be less political and more economic.

A complex situation had developed in Southern Africa over time. There has always been a desire on the part of South Africa's immediate and other neighbours to co-operate with it. This has been dictated by the economic realities of the regional political economy in which the South African economy is the strongest, symbolised by South African investment in the region. Economic convenience had been overtaken by political undesirability of co-operating with *apartheid*.

South Africa's aggressive initiatives and bully tactics have made its neighbours react (negatively) to most of its proposals for co-operation. For example, there was

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 224.

a relationship between South Africa's proposed CONSAS and the formation of SADCC.<sup>88</sup> First proposed by RSA in 1979, CONSAS was based on the assumption that in addition to Bantustans, Zimbabwe would become independent under pro-South Africa Bishop Abel Muzorewa and join it, thus obliging Zambia, Zaire and probably Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to follow suit.<sup>89</sup> This plan may have been jeopardised by ZANU's victory. As an institution, CONSAS was:

A regional political and economic alliance around South Africa. This proffered joint economic projects and South African development assistance, explicitly designed to lure regional states into non-aggression pacts with Pretoria.<sup>90</sup>

South Africa was more successful in historically rooted forms of co-operation while in some of the new forms it had to use the *stick*.

Botswana, a member of the FLS, is also a member of SACU, whose main architect is South Africa.<sup>91</sup> Earlier on Botswana was a member of the RMA,<sup>92</sup> another institution controlled by the Republic. These two institutions were formed when Namibia was South Africa's colony and Botswana's economy was an appendage

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<sup>88</sup>See details in Theo Malan, "The South African Black States' and Neighbouring Black Africa's Response to South Africa's Proposed Constellation of Southern African States", in Breytenbach (comp. and ed.), *The Constellation of States*, pp. 57-65.

<sup>89</sup>Dan O'Meara, "Destabilisation of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-87", *Background Paper*, No. 20, (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, June 1988).

<sup>90</sup>D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa", *South African Institute of International Affairs Bulletin*, (December 1979), p. 54.

<sup>91</sup>Rok Ajulu and Dianna Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland: Captive States", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 139-169; and Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, especially Chapter 9, pp. 81-90. Namibia also continues to be a member of SACU.

<sup>92</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbour*, pp. 89-90. Namibia continues to use the Rand as its currency and is therefore a member of the RMA.

to that of South Africa, and the former two had no choice but to join. The other countries in the region that are members of both SACU and RMA are Swaziland and Lesotho; they are also members of both SADCC and PTA, but not the FLS alliance. Zimbabwe has a trade agreement with South Africa, and the two continue to maintain trade missions with each other, but these function more like embassies.<sup>93</sup> This is in line with President Mugabe's conception of the economic relations between his country and South Africa:

Our view is that we should restrict our hostilities to what is political. We hope that South Africa will also recognise that we have left an area where relations can be harmonious—that is economic and trade area.<sup>94</sup>

Yet, despite their advocacy and condemnation of *apartheid*, some of the other majority-ruled states have also been co-operating with South Africa in the field of security. This has come about either as a means to avoid South Africa's military wrath or as a means to solve internal conflicts in which South Africa has had some part. Swaziland was the first to sign a non-aggression treaty with South Africa in 1982,<sup>95</sup> while Angola and Mozambique signed the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords in

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<sup>93</sup>At least the South African trade mission in Harare performs consular duties as well. One finds almost a kilometre long queues of Zimbabweans applying for visas to enter South Africa, especially near Christmas, mainly to shop and then trade. (Personal observation, November 1989)

<sup>94</sup>*Financial Times* (24 September 1981), p. 2, quoted in Anglin, "The Front Line States and the Future of Southern Africa", in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, p. 263 (note 53). Also, this corresponds to one of Anglin's options for the FLS—accommodation. See note 51, above.

<sup>95</sup>Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 159-163.



1984. Lesotho is said to have signed such a pact after the 1986 coup,<sup>96</sup> while Malawi's security arrangements with South Africa are of longstanding.

In varied proportions, the majority-ruled states in Southern Africa have trade relations with South Africa. Investment relations are reported as far north as Tanzania.<sup>97</sup> Most investment and technical co-operation are in the fields of mining, industry, transportation, hotels and tourism and energy. Of political and economic significance have been labour relations. Almost all the majority-ruled states have had or continue to have labour relations with the Republic. The former supplies mine and agricultural (contract) labourers, and the latter pays the former a percentage of wages in deferred payments in foreign exchange.<sup>98</sup>

The most important component in this co-operation is, perhaps, the extensive transport and communications network. Railways and ports integrate most of the region into a network of dependence and interdependence so as to form one political economy with its centre in South Africa. Six of the ten SADCC members are land-locked. Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho depend on access routes to the sea through, and the ports of other countries, especially South Africa. A more complex case is that of Mozambique. Maputo harbour and the main railway line serving it were developed to cater for the industrialised Eastern Transvaal area of South Africa.<sup>99</sup> Its "Beira Corridor", comprising Beira port,

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<sup>96</sup>Confidential interview with a Front Line States Diplomat, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

<sup>97</sup>See Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 4.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 131-32.

railway, highway and an oil pipeline, was also meant to serve Zimbabwe, and Nacala port and railway, Malawi.

The relative efficiency and reliability of South African railways and ports compared to similar facilities elsewhere in the region have made them attractive. In addition, the Benguela railway has been made inoperative by the internal conflict in Angola,<sup>100</sup> while railways through Mozambique are unreliable as they have frequently been sabotaged by the MNR despite their rehabilitation and protection. The latter constitutes the main reason for the prolonged deployment of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique, to keep the respective Beira and Nacala "corridors" open. However, the situation has slowly been improving and foreign troops may eventually be recalled:

A ceasefire for the Beira and Limpopo corridors was agreed in December [1990] between the government and Renamo, the rebel movement. Under the accord Zimbabwean troops protecting the corridors from rebel attacks and sabotage are to be restricted to the corridors in return for a rebel promise not to attack the infrastructure. The Nacala corridor has been completely free of attacks for 18 months, apparently the result of an unofficial agreement, and has been open for Malawi traffic for almost 12 months.<sup>101</sup>

### **Transnational Relations**

Like inter-state relations, transnational relations in Southern Africa are also historically rooted. Such relations have been increasing over time. They have appeared in various forms. On the one hand, transnational relations have for the most part defied inter-state relations patterns. They have been more regional than

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<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>101</sup>Julian Ozanne, "Ceasefires Unlock Transit Route Doors", *Financial Times*, London (15 January 1991).

their counterparts. These take place among the majority-ruled states and also between them and South Africa.

Apart from capital, technology, labour and cultural exchanges, all of which have also entered the realm of inter-state relations, there have been flows of people, informal trade and also various activities of the NGOs. There have been cases where governments of the alliance's member states have said one thing while they themselves or their citizens do completely the opposite, especially in matters which concern relations with South Africa itself.<sup>102</sup> The fact that transnational relations have remained strong in Southern Africa has sometimes tended to undermine the importance of sanctions against South Africa, as President Mugabe's statement above implies. Generally, transnational relations can be an asset in the future if there is some political determination to transform present-day dependence into interdependence, between SADCC's political economy and that of post-*apartheid* South Africa, onto new forms of regionalism based on regional civil society as well as industry and infrastructure, facilitated by the current global diplomatic environment.

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the background to the past and present interaction patterns in Southern Africa—co-operation and conflict. However, these two

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<sup>102</sup> We are told of Zambia's determination to reduce its dependence on South Africa, untrue if you go into Lusaka's forex shop on Cairo road or see Livingstone's high street at dusk with all the Botswana lorries getting ready to drive down to Johannesburg. These are, of course, realities which are unpublishable if you wish to remain welcome in Zambia at present...

Vines, "Several Years Beyond the Leash". See also notes 93 and 94, above.

processes have created intricate networks of dependence and interdependence in the region such that clear demarcation lines as to where one ends and the other begins are difficult to find. The situation is such that a group of actors—state and non-state—who are in conflict on certain issues have co-operated in other areas. Also, actors who are on one side of the conflict are not free of conflicts themselves either at the level of bilateral relations or in their multilateral and institutional settings. Thus, rhetoric and realism, hypocrisy and revisionism have been the main features of conflict and co-operation in the region.

Most Southern African regional groupings such as the FLS and SADCC have featured strongly in all these pairings of conflict and co-operation. South Africa's use of *carrot* and *stick*, incentives and punishments, are symptomatic of the same process. As reformism and revisionism unfold in the 1990s, however, the members of the FLS may find co-operation with its historical adversary—South Africa—more inviting than conflict; although conflicts arising out of co-operation are inevitable.

This historical account of various interaction patterns in the Southern African regional sub-system sets a stage for the next focus of this study: the rise of the Front Line States alliance. What this chapter has done is to outline the circumstances which gave rise to the primacy of certain actors in Southern Africa, one of them being the FLS alliance.

**PART II**

**THE RISE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES  
ALLIANCE**

## **Chapter Three**

### **THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Unlike formally constituted international alliances the formation of the Front Line States was not a product of a negotiated inter-governmental agreement.<sup>1</sup> Yet the FLS alliance has evolved over time. Like any other inter-state organisation, the FLS alliance arose out of specific needs of the time (the 1970s) that reflected political, social and economic realities in the region. It was not intended to be either formal or legally binding. However, with time the alliance acquired some traits of formality. This chapter traces the evolution of the alliance up to its prominence as one of the major actors in Southern Africa, particularly in the second half of the 1970s. To be covered here by way of introduction will be: (i) country groupings related to and preceding the FLS alliance; (ii) factors leading to its formation; and (iii) its structure. This chapter marks a transition or diversion from treating the causes and consequences of the alliance; rather, it provides the comparative regional context for analysing, even evaluating its genesis and practice.

The four regional inter-state groupings under discussion—namely, the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central/Southern Africa (PAFMECA/

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<sup>1</sup>Such a purposeful negotiation usually culminates in a treaty, which also states the goals, structures and methods of operation. See, for example, Farley, *Change Processes in International Organisations*, pp. 17-18; and Bennett, *International Organisations*, pp. 2-3.

PAFMECSA), Conferences of East and Central African Countries (CECAC), "Mulungushi Club", and the Front Line States (FLS)—differed in size, focus, structure and leadership personalities involved, both among themselves and over time. In a comparative way, an attempt is made here to analyse reasons for these observable differences. A comparative study of such elements will assist in highlighting the nature of African international relations in the 1960s and 1970s which led to the proliferation of regional and sub-regional organisations on the continent, and hence to the distinctive character of its continental institution, the OAU. It will be shown, for example, that the latter is itself a product of differences among several African groupings, regional and sub-regional, and that its structure represented what those different blocs could agree on as the lowest common denominator. The OAU was in fact a compromise among the "Brazzaville Twelve" (1960), "Casablanca Group" (1961), and the "Monrovia Group" (1961).<sup>2</sup> It is through the analysis of such differences and/or similarities that the overlap at different times, between some of the groupings in terms of their membership and objectives, can be explained. Also, a degree of coexistence emerged among some of them. It is imperative that the discussion and analysis focus on explaining the interests, if any, served by such coexistence. This inevitably involves looking at whether there was any division of labour involved, the purpose it served and the form it took.

Much of the discussion and analysis presented in this chapter may appear at first to resemble the traditional, rather institutional and static approach to Africa's international relations characteristic of the 1960s, the first decade of independence.

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<sup>2</sup>For details on these blocs, what they stood for, and the differences among them, see Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, Chapter One, pp. 1-11; and Gino J. Naldi, *The Organisation of African Unity: An Analysis of its Role* (London and New York: Mansell, 1989), especially Chapter One, pp. 3-44.

However, there is a difference between such orthodoxy and the current project. The analysis presented here seeks to transcend mere superficiality of *description* by providing *explanations* for particular trends, which, in terms of the 1960s literature, would have been taken as given. It also attempts to evaluate those trends with the objective purpose of adequately and critically explaining the one institution which is the focus of this study; namely, the Front Line States. The trends in question represented a transition from idealism, symbolised by continentalism or pan-Africanism to a new realism of strong nationalism inherent in the regional and sub-regional groupings, and onto pressures for a new continental political dispensation in terms of increased democratisation, especially attempts to dismantle one-party state structures.

#### **REGIONAL GROUPINGS PRIOR TO THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

Four basic problems arise in any attempt to analyse the inter-state groupings which preceded the Front Line States in Southern Africa. First, the *contextual* problem: the formation and proliferation of regional and sub-regional inter-state groupings in Africa should be analysed in the context of the African political scene of the time. Southern African inter-state groupings are no exception. Sometimes the three major African blocs—the Brazzaville, Casablanca and the Monrovia Groups—addressed specific issues while at other times some issues were in fact responses or reactions to other groupings. Such differences have been a feature in the OAU itself, and the same applies to groupings in Southern Africa. Overall, however, the groupings constituted initial attempts to cope with Africa's post-independence problems, while the challenge of decolonisation featured in all of them.



Second, the *boundary* problem: some earlier groupings contained members from beyond what could reasonably be described as the area covered by the Southern African regional sub-system; for example, countries like Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.<sup>3</sup> This problem can be overcome by taking advantage of insightful treatises by Bowman, Shaw and Thompson.<sup>4</sup> In a variety of ways these scholars emphasised the need for flexibility in defining regional and sub-regional systems, as well as the need to abstract or separate issue-areas in terms of regional units.

Third, the *roles* and *objectives* of such groupings in relation to those of the FLS alliance: this study focuses more on common goals and objectives between predecessor groupings and the alliance, than membership in either. Thus, a grouping can be regarded as a predecessor to the FLS alliance if it had roles and objectives somewhat akin to those of the alliance, and operated in a similar regional sub-system.


And fourth, the *parallel existence* of several such groupings: this poses a problem especially when a new grouping is formed before existing ones are disbanded; with both the former and the latter having related objectives. As will be shown, however, in some cases the objectives may be similar or related yet the approaches may differ, while in others membership can overlap (see Chart I).

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<sup>3</sup>Roughly coinciding with an area covered by present-day Preferential Trade Area.

<sup>4</sup>See analyses by Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", pp. 231-261; Timothy M. Shaw, "Southern Africa: Co-operation and Conflict in an International Sub-System" *JMAS*, Vol. 12 No. 4, (December 1974), pp. 633-655; and Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem", pp. 89-117. However, for the avoidance of issue area distinction and in favour of the geographical definition of a regional sub-system, see Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, especially his compilation of Table 8, p. 114. If Grundy's regional systems perspective was as flexible as he purports it to be (p. 304, Appendix 1), then his Table 8 ought to have included at least the host, President Jomo Kenyatta, at the 1966 Nairobi summit. Grundy opts to leave out all those participants falling out of his arbitrarily defined geographical area.

**Chart I**  
**EVOLUTION AND OVERLAPPING OF SELECTED AFRICAN REGIONAL/SUB-REGION INTER-STATE GROUPINGS 1958-1985**



(Chart I continued)

Notes: \*\* Beyond 1985

**PAFMECSA:** Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa. Its membership (1962): Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Rwanda, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar.

**Brazzaville Twelve:** Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).

**Casablanca Group:** Egypt, Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Algeria (Provisional government).

**Monrovia Group:** Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).

**OAU:** Organisation of African Unity. Its membership: All African countries except South Africa.

**ALC:** African Liberation Committee. Its membership (from 1977): Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.

**CECAC:** Conference of East and Central African Countries. Its membership (1974): Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.

**"Mulungushi Club":** Its membership (1974): Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia.

**(Chart I continued)**

**FLS: Front Line States.**

**Its membership (1985):** Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, (Namibia 1990).

**SADCC: Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference.**

**Its membership (1985):** Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, (Namibia 1990).

**Sources:** (i) Zdenek Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU* (London: Julian Friedmann, 1977).

(ii) Richard Cox, *Pan-Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA 1958-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

Whereas regional and sub-regional groupings elsewhere in Africa (the Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia Groups) were formed by independent states, at least one grouping in Southern Africa—PAFMECA—was formed by independence-seeking nationalist parties. This partly explains why members of the latter did not feature in the former. It was only later, after several of its members became independent, that PAFMECA could be viewed in the context of Africa's regional and sub-regional *inter-state* grouping tradition, i.e., from trans- to international.

Thus several groupings did exist prior to the formation of the FLS alliance, groupings which had objectives somewhat like those of the alliance; that is, political and economic freedom. The recognition and discussion of such groupings emphasise the point that the FLS alliance had a long gestation period. It can also be speculated that the alliance may soon be superseded by civil society as a possible basis for "new" regionalism.

The two familiar stances of these groupings—armed struggle and diplomatic negotiation—have been complementing each other ever since. It was, therefore, not surprising for the OAU to reiterate and apply the principles of the late-1960s Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa to the South African situation twenty years later in 1989:

While extending our backing to all those fighting for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa—and this is a point over which there can be no bargaining—we have repeatedly expressed our preference for reaching a solution through peaceful means. We know that the majority of the people in South Africa and its liberation movements—who have been forced to carry arms—have also supported this position for decades and still support it.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southern Africa: Political Declaration Agreed at Harare", frequently referred to as "The Harare Declaration", *ARB-PS*, Vol. 26, No. 8, (15 September 1989), p. 9366.

Moreover, the recent "Harare Declaration" specifically called on the South African regime to co-operate:

These stances also represent a new challenge for Pretoria's regime to join the noble efforts aimed at putting an end to the *apartheid* regime, an objective to which the OAU has remained committed since its inception.<sup>6</sup>

What looks like wavering between the two stances can also be described as an attempt to cope with the ever-changing political environment in Southern Africa and outside. This tendency cuts across almost all Southern African regional and sub-regional inter-state groupings.

There were, then, essentially three such predecessor groupings, all of which built themselves on prior colonial or nationalist regional organisations: (i) the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, which was later changed into the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECA/PAFMECSA);<sup>7</sup> (ii) the Conference of East and Central African Countries (CECAC); and (iii) the "Mulungushi Club".

**Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa/Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECA/PAFMECSA)**

Pan-Africanism received a considerable impetus from Ghana's independence in March 1957. This provided renewed hope, strength and encouragement to all nationalist movements as some of the nationalist leaders of that time conceded:

From the formation of [the Tanganyika African National Union] TANU until 1961, our movement drew strength from the parallel struggles elsewhere in Africa. We regarded ourselves as part of a continent-wide movement for freedom, and triumphs such as that of

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<sup>6</sup>"The Harare Declaration", *Ibid.*, p. 9366.

<sup>7</sup>PAFMECA refers to this grouping in the period between 1958 to early-1962; while PAFMECSA is the same organisation in the period thereafter until its demise in 1963.

Ghana in 1957 heartened us and gave us renewed strength. We saw then that our struggles and our dreams were based on reality; Africa could get free.<sup>8</sup>

Ghana also hosted the first conference of independent African states a year after in Accra in April 1958.<sup>9</sup>

This conference was as significant to the future of regional groupings in Africa, especially PAFMECA, as was Ghanaian independence itself. The independent African states declared:

We pledge ourselves to apply our endeavours to avoid being committed to any action which might entangle our countries to the detriment of our interests and freedoms; to recognise the right of the African peoples to independence and self-determination and to take appropriate steps to hasten the realisation of this right;...to uproot forever the evil of racial discrimination in all its forms wherever it may be found...<sup>10</sup>

In one of their resolutions, they recommended that "...all Participating Governments should give all possible assistance to the dependent peoples in their struggle to achieve independence."<sup>11</sup> In Anglophone East and Central Africa this awareness and

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<sup>8</sup>Julius K. Nyerere, "Introduction" in his *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection From Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup>See Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 139; and Doris M. Hull, "Regional Groupings in African Unity" in Sebastian O. Mezu (ed.), *The Philosophy of Pan-Africanism: A Collection of Papers on the Theory and Practice of the African Unity Movement* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1965), p. 54.

<sup>10</sup>Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 139

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 141.

encouragement was harnessed and concretised in the form of a movement or organisation: PAFMECA.<sup>12</sup>

The Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa was formed at a conference in Mwanza, Tanganyika<sup>13</sup> in September 1958. It was a transnational organisation bringing together the leaders of the major nationalist movements. The Mwanza conference was attended by the members of Legislative Councils from Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, who were at the same time representatives of their respective nationalist movements, together with those from Nyasaland, and Northern and Southern Rhodesia.<sup>14</sup>

This first conference was notable for two major achievements: the signing of the Freedom Charter of the Peoples of East and Central Africa, and approving the Constitution of PAFMECA itself. Both the charter and the constitution emphasised the main concerns of the first conference of independent African states referred to above. For example, the Charter declared that:

Colonialism, the so-called trusteeship, and so-called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism, and white settlerism are enemies of freedom and can be eradicated only by African nationalism—virile and unrelenting....The right of self-determination is God-given and no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the destiny of others; that poverty, ignorance, ill-health and other human miseries cannot be satisfactorily eradicated under imperialism but only under

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<sup>12</sup>For more analytic discussion on the difference between Pan-Africanism as a movement and various regional and sub-regional nationalisms and alliances, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa; the Politics of Unity: An Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movement* (New York: Random House, 1967), especially Chapter Two, pp. 18-22.

<sup>13</sup>Tanganyika refers to the present-day Tanzania Mainland before its union with Zanzibar on 26 April 1964.

<sup>14</sup>For these countries' representation at the first PAFMECA conference, see Richard Cox, *Pan-Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA 1958-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 10.



self-government and international co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefaction.<sup>15</sup>

These and other declarations were again emphasised by the participants' intention to set up of the Pan-African Freedom Movement so as to "...establish in each territory, in East and Central Africa, a government of Africans on Pan-African lines."<sup>16</sup> These declarations are important in so far as they formed the basis for future one-party independent states, regional and sub-regional organisations.

The PAFMECA constitution reflected broad aims and objectives, namely:

(a) To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to rid East and Central African territories of imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation and social degradation by stepping-up nationalist activities to attain self-government and establish parliamentary democracy.

(b) To co-ordinate nationalist programmes, tactics, projects, and efforts for the speedy liberation of the said territories.

(c) To assist in the establishment and organisation of united nationalist movements in African territories through political education, periodic conferences, encouragement of inter-territorial African endeavours in all fields...

(d) To establish a joint East and Central African Freedom Fund.  
And,

(e) To champion non-violence in the African nationalist struggles for freedom and prosperity.<sup>17</sup>

These were not only broad but also ambitious objectives, given the time at which they were put forward. It can thus be concluded that the theme that ran through PAFMECA's charter and/or constitution was that of liberation or decolonisation of Africa.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

**Table II**

**PAFMECA/PAFMECSA CONFERENCES, 1958-1962**

<b>No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Participating Members</b>	<b>Main Issues</b>
1.	17-18 Sept. 1958	Mwanza (Tanganyika)	Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda.	-Establishment -Constitution -Charter of the Peoples of East and Central Africa -Decolonisation
2.	4-5 April 1959	Zanzibar	Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar.	-Appointment of full-time secretary -Unity among Zanzibari and Ugandan nationalist movements
3.	8-12 Sept. 1959	Moshi (Tanganyika)	Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar.	-Considered expanded membership -Boycott of South Africa
4.	24-25 Oct. 1960	Mbale (Uganda)	Congo, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Tanga-	-Admission of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into the East African Federation

(Table II continued)

No.	Date	Place	Participating Members	Main Issues
5.	January 1961	Dar es-Salaam	Congo, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Rwanda, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar	-Include participants from Southern Africa -Deplored inclination to violence in Southern Africa
5.	January 1961	Dar es-Salaam	Congo, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Rwanda, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar	-Tanganyika's independence in 1961 -Unity among nationalist parties
6.	14-15 Oct. 1961	Dar es-Salaam	Congo, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Rwanda, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar.	-East African Federation -Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia cannot get out of one federation into another
7.	2-10 Feb. 1962	Addis Ababa	Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar, BPU (Bechuanaland), SWAPO (South West Africa).	-Changed name to PAFMECSA -Changed constitution: independent countries to be represented by their governments
8.	28-29 Dec. 1962	Leopoldville	Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique,	-Unity among Ugandan and Zanzibari nationalist movements

(Table II continued)

No.	Date	Place	Participating Members	Main Issues
			Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Rwanda, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Urundi, Zanzibar.	-Commended Mozambican nationalists for uniting around FRELIMO

**Sources:** (i) Archives, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Sub-Headquarters, Dar es Salaam.

(ii) Archives, *Daily News* (Tanzania).

(iii) Richard Cox, *Pan-Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA, 1958-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

PAFMECA had a series of eight conferences before it was overtaken by the formation of the OAU in May 1963. Table II shows conference dates, participants and major issues discussed.

This table also indicates that there was a tremendous success in the members' endeavour to meet as frequently as the constitution allowed them,<sup>18</sup> given the constraints imposed by various colonial administrations.<sup>19</sup> Further, there was a slow but significant expansion of membership over time. PAFMECA was a movement which could adjust to the prevailing circumstances. Thus it changed its name and constitution so as to accommodate newly independent countries outside its original Anglo-phone region. PAFMECA/PAFMECSA emphasised non-violence in its members' struggles for independence. At one time it deplored the inclination towards the use of force by some nationalist movements in Southern Africa.<sup>20</sup> This is not surprising given that the movement drew inspiration from Ghana's successes,

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<sup>18</sup>See *The Approved Constitution of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa: Organisational Structure (I)* "...the Annual General Meeting to be convened during the month of August of every year." *Ibid.*, Appendix B, p. 84.

<sup>19</sup>In some cases, conferences were organised to take place in certain cities but the colonial administration refused. For example:

The 1959 Annual Conference was convened 17-20 August in Kampala ...Unfortunately, the Uganda Government banned leaders from outside the country from entering and the date and place had to be changed to 8-12 September at Moshi in Tanganyika.

Cox, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 27. The same happened when the Conference tried to convene in Lusaka in 1961; see *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 40.

in which emphasis was placed on Kwame Nkrumah's "positive action"<sup>21</sup> which compares favourably with agitations for civil society in Africa in the 1990s. There was also an over-whelming concern about unity among various movements in any one colonial territory. Attempts to unify nationalist movements cut across all regional groupings which preceded the FLS alliance and the alliance itself. Table II also shows that all the present-day members of the FLS alliance were once PAFMECSA members.

As noted above, PAFMECSA was overtaken by the formation of the OAU. Most of the ideals that it stood for were incorporated into the OAU Charter, especially the eradication of colonialism.<sup>22</sup> Cox has summarised this legacy, noting that some individuals would have wished to maintain PAFMECSA in a different form:

However, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity...threw PAFMECSA's future into uncertainty even though the one showed the way for the other. Kaunda and others, while recognising that its functions in the liberation of Southern Africa should be taken over by the OAU's Liberation Committee, still maintained their belief in its value. Kaunda [the last chair] went to

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<sup>21</sup>Nkrumah explained "positive action" as:

...the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in this country. The weapons of Positive Action are:

- (1) legitimate political agitation;
- (2) newspaper and educational campaigns and
- (3) as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence.

Kwame Nkrumah, "What I Mean by Positive Action", in his *Revolutionary Path* (New York: International Publishers, 1973), pp. 93-94. Also, see Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 32.

<sup>22</sup>See Article II (1) (d) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, reprinted as Appendix II in Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 228-235.

the final Conference prepared to dissolve PAFMECSA as it stood, but hoping to reconstitute it in another form. He noted that, 'It can still form the nucleus on which economic links are built without being a competitor to the OAU.'<sup>23</sup>

Although PAFMECSA's credo and objectives were maintained (albeit in a different form) it never transformed itself in this way.

Whereas most scholars agree that PAFMECSA was among the forerunners of the Front Line States<sup>24</sup> (implying that it foreshadowed SADCC and PTA), it is said that the presidents in forming the latter grouping paid little attention to the principles which governed the former.<sup>25</sup> This is because PAFMECSA dealt with the problems of classic metropolitan colonialism while the FLS alliance was a product of a special and complex type of settler colonialism, especially in Rhodesia.<sup>26</sup> Thus, there is an argument that the alliance would have been formed anyway, even alongside PAFMECSA.<sup>27</sup> This argument is given credence by the fact that the FLS was formed at a time when the OAU Liberation Committee was doing relatively good work, in addition to the presence of CECAC in the region during the same period.

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<sup>23</sup>Cox, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 2-3. However, PAFMECSA membership coincides roughly with that of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA).

<sup>24</sup>See Thomas M. Callaghy, "Zaire and Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, p. 66; Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States"; Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 14; Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa"; and Amadu Sesay, "The Roles of the Front Line States in Southern Africa", in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, p. 23.

<sup>25</sup>Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

### **Conferences of East and Central African Countries (CECAC)**

The series of Conferences of East and Central African Countries was initiated by some PAFMECSA members, especially Tanzania and Zambia<sup>28</sup> and was intended to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of PAFMECSA. It has been observed that CECAC members felt that the OAU and its ALC and associated bodies were too formal and broad institutions to cater for the particular and special needs and interests of the East and Central African countries.<sup>29</sup> This implies that CECAC members may have desired a more informal and intimate forum. Although they may have achieved such intimacy and informality—a special place to discuss matters of mutual interest—they were unable to restrict CECAC's membership to a few countries. Rather, this was a continental problem as there was an endless expansion in other OAU groupings as well. By the time of CECAC's ninth and last conference in 1974, its membership was equal to that of the ALC and slightly less than half of the OAU's total membership.<sup>30</sup> The desire for an informal and intimate forum was not reconcilable with such a large membership. This in part may have led to its dilution and perhaps dissolution.

Unlike PAFMECSA, but more or less like the Front Line States, and to some extent, SADCC, these conferences had no structure apart from the summit system. The lack of formal role and function of CECAC were explained by one of its

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid. However, other accounts suggest that CECAC was inspired by Tanzania and Uganda. See, for example, *ARB (PSCS)* Vol. 3 No. 3, (March 1966), p. A484.

<sup>29</sup>Confidential interview with a former senior government/party official, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

<sup>30</sup>In 1974 the OAU membership stood at forty-three, ALC seventeen, and PAFMECSA seventeen. For ALC and OAU membership, see Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 55 and p. 226-27, respectively.



founders and participant members. In his opening speech to the eighth conference, the then president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere said:

Our Conference of East and Central African States does not have to issue public policy declarations after each meeting. Our meetings do not have a structure[d] Agenda—still less a Secretariat. They are informal consultations on matters of mutual interest, and the publication of 'Declarations' or 'Manifestos' at the end of them may be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.<sup>31</sup>

Despite its focus on decolonisation, in practice CECAC dealt with broad but less specific issues. It could be that CECAC was unintentionally and unconsciously being involved in a division of labour between it, PAFMECSA and the OAU and ALC. Also, given its size, economic co-operation and development were the particular issues of common and mutual interest to all its members. Not only were most issues of liberation dealt with by the ALC, they were also considered sensitive and preferably left to a few countries, as the examples of the Mulungushi Club and FLS alliance were later to show. A large country grouping such as CECAC was valuable in this respect only in terms of broad policies, such as the Lusaka Manifesto (see below), but not on specifics of, for example, logistical support, military training and transit to freedom fighters. Thus, for example, the Foreign Ministers' preparatory meeting for the eighth conference (see Table III) formed five sectoral committees—agriculture, industry and energy, transport and communications, trade and travel promotion, and political affairs,<sup>32</sup>—more or less setting a precedent for SADCC. Perhaps this broad scope of issues made it attractive to a wider membership.

Table III shows that CECAC membership (which was not small to begin with) grew from twelve (1966) to seventeen (1974), with more than half coming from out-

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<sup>31</sup>*East and Central Africa Summit 1972*, Tanzania Information Service (Dar es Salaam, 1972).

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

Table III

## SUMMIT CONFERENCES OF EAST, CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES: 1966-1974

No.	Date	Place	Participating Countries	Main Issues
1.	31 March-3 Apr. 1966	Nairobi	Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia. Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. Total: 12	-Support OAU -Liberation of Southern Africa -Sanctions against Rhodesia -Refugee problem -Border issues
2.	12-14 Feb. 1967	Kinshasa	Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. Total: 11	- <i>Kinshasa Declaration</i> on .Liberation of Southern Africa .Enhanced security .Support to ALC and increased solidarity
3.	15-18 Dec. 1967	Kampala	Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. Total: 12	-Mercenary problem -Refugee problem -Nigerian civil war -Economic and technical co-operation
4.	13-16 May 1968	Dar es Salaam	Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. Total: 14	-Rhodesian crisis -Good neighbourliness -Attempted coup in Congo -Nigerian civil war

(Table III continued.)

No.	Date	Place	Participating Countries	Main Issues
5.	14-16 April 1969	Lusaka	Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. <b>Total: 14</b>	- <i>Lusaka Manifesto</i> on Southern Africa -Nigerian civil war
6.	26-28 Jan. 1970	Khartoum	Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. <b>Total: 14</b> Observers: OAU Secretariat	-Aid to liberation movements -Emphasis on armed struggle after Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia had rejected the Lusaka Manifesto -Regional co-operation
7.	18-19 Oct. 1971	Mogadishu	Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia. <b>Total: 14</b>	- <i>Mogadishu Declaration</i> with emphasis on armed struggle -Malawi's participation -Middle East
8.	7-8 Sept. 1972	Dar es Salaam	Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.	-Support for armed struggle in Southern Africa -Middle East -Regional co-operation

(Table III continued)

No.	Date	Place	Participating Countries	Main Issues
9.	31 Aug- 1 Sept. 1974	Brazzaville	<p><b>Total: 17</b>  <b>Observers:</b> ALC, Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, liberation movements, OAU Secretariat.</p> <p>Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.</p> <p><b>Total: 17</b>  <b>Observers:</b> OAU, SWAPO, ZANU.</p>	<p>-<i>Brazzaville Declaration</i> deploring delay of a united front among Angolan liberation movements</p> <p>-Political changes in Portugal</p>

**Sources:** (i) Archives, *Daily News* (Tanzania)

(ii) *Africa Research Bulletin (PSCS)*, Vols. 3-11 (1966-1974).

(iii) Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 114.

side the Southern African sub-system. With such a large membership, CECAC was liable to duplicate the work of other organisations such as the OAU and its ALC, especially given its emphasis on liberation. This same tendency was also exhibited in the relationships among the OAU, ALC and the Front Line States, especially in the late-1980s and early-1990s.

CECAC's wide membership invited criticism from the OAU that the former was becoming a clique within the latter. In response, it seems, two measures were taken. On the one hand, there was an attempt to involve both the OAU and ALC in the CECAC conferences as observers (see eighth and ninth conferences). On the other hand, an attempt was eventually made to define the work of CECAC, only towards the end of its life-span. Thus, the eighth conference reiterated CECAC's original intention—"private discussion of our ideas and our plans, and also of our problems or our reactions to other peoples' problems"—and went on to observe that "Our Conference was never intended to be—and has never become—a clique within the OAU."<sup>33</sup> Again, at the ninth conference an effort was made directly to link the work of CECAC with that of the OAU itself, thus pre-empting further allegations of competition or dilution:

East and Central African States Conference [is] an informal gathering, designed to assist the work of the OAU by strengthening positive relations between neighbours, and facilitating regional and sub-regional co-operation on an ad hoc basis.<sup>34</sup>

Table III also shows that there were at least two outstanding CECAC conferences which had a tremendous impact beyond its members and the life of the organisation itself, especially on Southern Africa. The fifth conference issued the

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>*ARB (PSCS)*, Vol. 11 No.9, (15 October 1974), p. A3355.

Lusaka Manifesto, which was later adopted by both the OAU and the UN.<sup>35</sup> This Manifesto provoked a debate on *dialogue*. And the seventh conference produced the Mogadishu Declaration, whose significance was partly to counter the controversy brought about by the Lusaka Manifesto, and partly to reassess the situation in Southern Africa. In this further reassessment, CECAC in Mogadishu concluded that the White minority regimes in Southern Africa had not only rejected the Lusaka Manifesto but were not amenable to negotiation. Thus, the Mogadishu Declaration emphasised armed struggle once again and so terminated the debate about dialogue, albeit temporarily. The "Manifesto" and the "Declaration", and in fact CECAC itself, are all important in that they laid a basis for the future alternative strategies of independent Southern African countries. Dialogue and peaceful settlement of the Southern African conflict were revived by the Harare Declaration (1989) as noted above, albeit in rather different post-Namibian independence, post-Cold War, and post-*apartheid* contexts.

### **The "Mulungushi Club"**

The "Mulungushi Club" was the most short-lived of the groupings preceding the Front Line States. It is also the least documented.<sup>36</sup> Yet, dating approximately from 1970 to 1974, this Club was the immediate predecessor to the FLS alliance. Its original four members were Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. In fact, it was more of

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<sup>35</sup>See, Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 116; Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 3; Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 14; and Sesay, "The Roles of the Front Line States in Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>36</sup>The few studies outlining the activities of the Mulungushi Club include Callaghy, "Zaire and Southern Africa", in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 61-86; Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola", in Legum (ed.), *ACR Vol. 8, 1975/76*, pp. A3-A38; and Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa"

a "club" for the respective heads of state than anything resembling an inter-state institution, thus comparing favourably with early FLS forums. For example, Uganda was no longer acceptable when Idi Amin replaced Milton Obote in a 1971 coup.<sup>37</sup>

Like the previous groupings, the Mulungushi Club also had its focus on the liberation of Southern Africa. Three main factors have been advanced to explain the formation of the Club and also its parallel existence with the CECAC. One was the frustration brought about by "contradictory" manifestos and declarations that emanated from CECAC, especially the debate between dialogue (and peaceful change) and armed struggle. One participant of the Club observed:

We were confronted with a problem of our own making. Our Lusaka Manifesto [1969] was an appeal to the White minority regimes and the Western powers. Active liberation movements accused us of frustrating their cause, which was at the same time, our cause. Our friends in Africa interpreted the Lusaka Manifesto as a rationalisation for having 'dialogue' and diplomatic relations with our very enemies. The Mogadishu Declaration [1971] was an attempt to rectify and/or reformulate the Lusaka Manifesto. Then, the dialogue champions reacted by not contributing to the Liberation Fund. CECAC was accused of being a clique within the OAU. Some of us thought that CECAC was a group too large to be effective. So we frequently met more or less like a 'club' to co-ordinate our efforts and to counsel the liberation movements.<sup>38</sup>

Yet frustration alone was not a sufficient reason to form another group with the present one still in existence. Why did leaders who felt frustrated not struggle to reform CECAC? In fact, of course, the Club had a much broader agenda. This is explained by two other factors.

There are two related accounts which explain this evolution and coexistence. The first account has it that the Club was originally constituted as a small informal

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<sup>37</sup>*Cf.* Uganda continued to participate in CECAC conferences despite its change of leadership in 1971.

<sup>38</sup>Confidential interview with former government/party leader, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

committee of "concerned presidents" to work out ways and means of implementing some sections of the Lusaka Manifesto that needed immediate action, and more so to monitor various responses and reactions—from the international community, White regimes in Southern Africa, and the liberation movements—and prepare counter reactions and responses. The need for this became apparent after the Mogadishu Declaration which upheld armed struggle less equivocally. The committee's role became even more pronounced as new events continued to unfold in Southern Africa.<sup>39</sup> This in part explains the Club's coexistence with CECAC, thus symbolising a form of division of labour between them.

Another account which is not very different from the first one is provided by Legum. According to him, the Club was formed by the leaders of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia—Nyerere, Obote and Kaunda, respectively—to plan their opposition to the British government's proposed resumption of arms sales to South Africa.<sup>40</sup> Although Legum did not provide further explanation for this assertion, the timing of the Club's formation and subsequent events give credence to it.<sup>41</sup> However, this does not explain Zaire's membership.

The inclusion of Zaire in the Club in 1973 is rightly conceived by Legum as "the most important change in the region's alliance system."<sup>42</sup> He indicated further

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<sup>39</sup>Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

<sup>40</sup>Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 3, 1970/71*, p. B173.

<sup>41</sup>Probably this coalition against arms sales to South Africa was in response to the then up-coming Commonwealth Summit Conference in Singapore. Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere and Obote were the most outspoken on the issue at that meeting. The latter was overthrown while attending. For further details, see Abillah H. Omari, "Uganda-Tanzania Relations 1971-1979: A Case-Study in Inter-African Relations", Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, (1980).

<sup>42</sup>Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 6, 1973/74*, p. B277.



that Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere were getting concerned about the situation in Angola where the ineffectiveness of the liberation permitted Portugal to move some troops to Mozambique. Thus, it is highly likely that Kaunda and Nyerere may have wanted to have President Mobutu among them, in part to have a hand in the Angolan liberation process,<sup>43</sup> given that Zaire was close to Angola. After all, Zaire was already a rear base to some of the Angolan liberation movements.<sup>44</sup> In turn, President Mobutu may have needed the Club's influence to lift the OAU's ban on the FNLA, which he favoured against the others, and if possible to moderate or withdraw its support for the MPLA.<sup>45</sup>

Table IV shows that between 1973 and 1974<sup>46</sup> there was stability in attendance at the Club summits. This table also shows an unprecedented frequency of summits compared to earlier groupings such as PAFMECSA and CECAC. This may be attributed to the advantage of having a small group of relatively close and "like-minded" presidents meeting. Also, like all other regional and sub-regional groupings, leaders of active liberation movements in Southern Africa were being

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<sup>43</sup>This was so, possibly to broaden to Club's credibility and the presidents' prestige.

<sup>44</sup>See Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 6, 1973/74*, p. B277.

<sup>45</sup>In August 1973 Kaunda and Nyerere agreed to Mobutu's request to support FNLA, without, however, withdrawing their support from MPLA. *Ibid.*, p. B277.

<sup>46</sup>Meetings began to be reported only when President Mobutu joined the Club. Yet there were still no communiqués or declarations issued to the public. This explains in part the Club's preference to meet in remote cities and away from the capitals (including Mulungushi in Zambia): as one official put it, "to move away from the media". Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

frequently invited to the Club summits.<sup>47</sup> Most of these features were carried over to the FLS alliance.

**Table IV**

**SUMMIT CONFERENCES OF THE MULUNGUSHI CLUB 1973-1974**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Participating Presidents</b>
February 3, 1973	Arusha (Tanzania)	Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere
May 31-June 1 1973	Kitwe (Zambia)	Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere
July 27-28, 1973	Lubumbashi (Zaire)	Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere
October 27-29, 1973	Mwanza (Tanzania)	Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere (and, for a few hours, Idi Amin of Uganda)
September 30, 1974	Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)	Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere

<sup>47</sup>Idi Amin invited himself to this summit meeting. For details, see Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, Vol. 6, 1974* (London: Rex Collings, 1974), p. B333.

**Sources:** (i) *African Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, Vol. 11, 1974.

(ii) Archives, *Daily News* (Tanzania).

(iii) Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, Vols. 3-6, 1970-1974*, (London: Rex Collings, 1970-1974).

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<sup>47</sup>See Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola" in Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 8, 1975/76*, p. A8, and *Vol. 6, 1973/74*, p. B333; and *ARB (PSCS)*, Vol. 11 No. 9, (October 1974), p. B3357.

Just before the Club disintegrated there was a brief attempt to transform it into something more concrete and formal. Leading officials from the ruling parties (and governments) of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia met in Dar es Salaam in mid-October 1974 to formulate avenues for increased co-operation. This would have led to an eventual long-term goal of federation. This was perhaps a possible goal of earlier groupings while at the same time it represented an attempt to consolidate elements of co-operation already achieved by the Club. However, no follow-up meeting was ever reported.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, that particular sub-presidential meeting was the last reported one to be related to the Club.

### THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE

As noted above, there was a degree of coexistence between CECAC and the Mulungushi Club. If the former was thought by the members of the latter to be insufficiently dynamic to cater for their needs, so was the Club itself seen to be so by the FLS alliance. Thus, the origins of the FLS can be found right inside the life of the Club. The alliance was thus formed before the actual disintegration of the Mulungushi Club. Its nucleus was the two presidents: Tanzania's Nyerere and Zambia's Kaunda. The other founding presidents were Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana and Samora Machel of the FRELIMO.<sup>49</sup> It is interesting to note two

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<sup>48</sup>See *ARB (PSCS)*, Vol. 11 No. 10, (15 November 1974), p. A3387.

<sup>49</sup>Samora Machel was a "full-fledged member" and not just as a leader of a liberation movement. This was because Mozambique had already attained the status of a transitional government following the Lusaka Agreement of 1974 between Portugal and FRELIMO. See Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola" in Legum (ed.), *ACR*, Vol. 8, 1975/76, p. A8.

things here. First, President Mobutu of Zaire was not included in the new alliance,<sup>50</sup> thus signalling a degree of realignment after the Mulungushi Club. And second, a series of alliance summits took place between 1974 and 1975 but went unreported. A partial explanation for this initial secrecy is that the FLS presidents are said to have contemplated making their new venture a secret. Thus, their first consideration was to form a formal but confidential alliance.<sup>51</sup>

The attempt to form a secret alliance does not explain why President Mobutu was left out from it after he had participated fully in the Club. Various officials have pointed out that Mobutu was simply "irrelevant" in the new alliance.<sup>52</sup> It can be speculated here that Mobutu's "irrelevance" to the new alliance may have been

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<sup>50</sup>President Mobutu was back in the process of conflict resolution at the end of 1980s, especially over Angola.

<sup>51</sup>Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990). However, the term "Front Line States" was being used loosely by journalists, academics and politicians, including the OAU during this initial period, to refer to states that bordered countries with White minority regimes. It was used to refer to geographical *proximity* and self-professed *role* in the liberation struggle in those countries. It did not refer to the FLS as an *institution*. It was also in this sense that Anglin was able to say, "technically Tanzania ceased to be a front line state in 1975 after the independence of Mozambique" in his "The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, p. 557, endnote 4. This same sense was used by the OAU. See, for example, "The Council of Ministers....Pledges continued support for the solidarity with all the Front Line States, particularly Zambia, which are subjected to constant economic and military provocations from the minority racist regimes in southern Africa"; Resolution CM/Res. 298(XXI) on Zimbabwe, adopted by the Twenty-first Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 17-24 May 1973, cited in Legum (ed.), *ACR, Vol. 6, 1973/74*, p. C10.

<sup>52</sup>A total of ten senior Tanzanian officials who held relevant government positions in 1974/1975, half of them now retired, were interviewed on this issue. Six said Mobutu was "irrelevant"; two said Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda did not "like" Mobutu. Two did not know why Mobutu was left out. Confidential interviews, Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Dodoma (April-June 1990).

influenced by a number of factors. One factor could be the then looming disagreements between Mobutu and the rest of the Club members over Zaire's support to FNLA, as pointed out in Chapter Two above. Another factor could be Zaire's continued support for dialogue after it was rejected by the OAU, and continued relations with South Africa (although these stopped short of diplomatic relations)<sup>53</sup> as well as Mobutu's rather close and controversial involvement with the US, which made him "unreliable". And also on a speculative basis, the availability of a new partner, President Machel of Mozambique (especially as FRELIMO was leading a transition government), could be another factor. This is so probably because Machel may have shown some willingness to support the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (the problem over which the FLS was immediately preoccupied). Thus Machel was more directly relevant over this issue than was Mobutu.

#### **Politics of Détente and Rise of the Front Line States Alliance**

In Southern Africa, co-operation as a means of conflict resolution has a long history. The FLS is but one of several inter-state groupings in which members co-operated while paying special attention to the liberation of the region. However, each of these groupings was formed in response to particular internal and external circumstances obtaining at any one particular time. Such groups were not necessarily direct successors of each other. In fact, as noted above, some enjoyed a parallel or overlapping existence. Thus, some specific factors led to the formation of the FLS alliance compared to its predecessors.

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<sup>53</sup>Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 117-121.

There is a consensus among scholars that the politics of *détente* in Southern Africa contributed considerably to the formation of the FLS.<sup>54</sup> There is a temptation, however, to equate dialogue with *détente*. It is commonly understood that the former was initiated by the Republic of South Africa as part of its "outward policy".<sup>55</sup> Dialogue was directly related to the Republic's efforts to break its international isolation by increasing its economic and diplomatic contacts, first in Africa, and then elsewhere. It did not focus on a single issue but rather on the entire spectrum of possible forms of co-operation. However, the debate over it had cooled off by 1973 after dividing the OAU into several camps—in favour, against and non-committed.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile, the countries in close proximity to the remaining colonial territories side-stepped dialogue. Thus, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia were increasingly encouraging, supporting and promoting violent nationalism in Southern Africa through the Mulungushi Club. Armed struggle was an antithesis to the whole idea of dialogue.

By contrast to the broad scope of dialogue, its successor, *détente*, focused on finding an acceptable and peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem. With its more limited goal and focus, it was also initiated by the RSA. Politics of *détente*

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<sup>54</sup>See Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, pp. 2-7; Legum, *Southern Africa*, pp. 14-17; Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa"; Sesay, "The Roles of the Front Line States in Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 20-24; and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, pp. 13-15.

<sup>55</sup>See, for example, Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, Chapter Four, pp. 118-151; Colin Legum, *Dialogue: Africa's Great Debate* (London: Rex Collings, 1972); Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa"; and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, pp. 15-17.

<sup>56</sup>Legum, *Dialogue*, pp. 6-7.

were sparked by the military *coup d'état* in Portugal in April 1974.<sup>57</sup> Independent African states both in Southern and elsewhere in Africa were counting on the change of government in Lisbon to bring positive changes in the Portuguese colonies in Africa as well. The new regime promised to institute such changes.<sup>58</sup> But for the remaining settler regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia these were threatening and negative changes. As Libby has noted:

The prospect of being faced with two newly independent Black African regimes [Angola and Mozambique] on South Africa's and Rhodesia's borders which were hostile to them understandably caused great concern within the ruling parties of Rhodesia and South Africa.<sup>59</sup>

Several other factors account for that concern. First, it was assumed in the Republic and Rhodesia that the new governments in Angola and Mozambique would be militant and hostile to White minority regimes, given the revolutionary nature of the MPLA and FRELIMO in opposition. Second, the facts that Angola shares a border with Namibia, and Mozambique with both Rhodesia and South Africa were clear signals that the two newly independent countries would become springboards for guerrilla activities against the remaining White minority dominated territories. Third, the success of the armed struggle in and the subsequent independence of Angola and Mozambique would become a reference point for all the liberation movements and independent African states in the region from which to draw

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<sup>57</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, pp. 127-148; Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa"; and Sesay, "The Roles of the Front Line States in Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 20-23.

<sup>58</sup>Portuguese colonial wars in Africa sparked off the coup. It was logical for the new regime to institute immediate changes. For details see Hodges, "Mozambique", in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, pp. 61-62.

<sup>59</sup>Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa".

inspiration and escalate armed struggle. And fourth, if such a domino-type scenario was to unfold, the weak link would be Rhodesia.

This was, therefore, the background against which détente was conceived by South Africa's Prime Minister, John B. Vorster, in October 1974.<sup>60</sup> He emphasised South Africa's need to "normalise relations with hitherto hostile neighbouring independent African states".<sup>61</sup> The actual stage for détente was set by Vorster's speech in the South African Senate in which he asserted that it was in the interest of African leaders to co-operate with South Africa in resolving the Rhodesian conflict peacefully, including the possibility of them signing non-aggression pacts with his government.<sup>62</sup>

It is thus plausible to assert that détente was initiated by South Africa as a measure to save Rhodesia from the effects of armed struggle and to avert its spill-over into Namibia and the Republic itself. It was also a means through which South Africa could extend a hand of goodwill to the neighbouring independent African states in the region and elsewhere. This need became more apparent after the demise of the preceding dialogue exercise. South Africa was assuming the role of a peace-maker; i.e. defending *apartheid* through Southern Africa. Thus both dialogue and détente were regional extensions of the Republic's internal politics. Neighbouring African states responded negatively and determinedly to this further initiative or diversion by forming the FLS alliance.

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>This interpretation is provided by Libby, Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>ARB (PSCS), Vol. 11 No. 10, (15 November 1974), p. C3387; also cited by Libby, "The Frontline States of Africa".



### **The Zimbabwe Connection**

After the coup in Portugal and the certainty of independence for Angola and Mozambique, the Rhodesian conflict provided the essential ground for some African states in Southern Africa to consult each other and advance co-ordinated policies. This consultation was important for a number of reasons. First, the leaders of such countries had to assure themselves about the frankness and seriousness of Vorster's offer to spearhead the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rhodesia.<sup>63</sup> Second, it was important for Kaunda and Nyerere to involve other leaders who were relevant and willing to involve themselves in the Rhodesian problem. Thus, Samora Machel, leader of FRELIMO<sup>64</sup> and Sir Seretse Khama, president of Botswana became involved. And third, and perhaps most important, was for these four leaders to do something about the lack of unity among different Rhodesian nationalist movements. As one participating leader of the FLS alliance during this formative period put it:

We did not want a situation where Vorster was serious and able to pressure Ian Smith to accept the principle of majority rule, while the independent African states were divided in our attitude toward such positive initiatives. We also wanted to avoid providing Smith with a pretext to ask, 'whom do I talk to, a mob of nationalists/terrorists?'<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Leaders of independent Southern African states were aware that South Africa had a sizable influence on Rhodesia following UN sanctions and the mounting pressure of guerrilla activity. The problem was, perhaps, how to tap and utilise that influence. This may be the reason why they responded so quickly. However, the same leaders have found it difficult to trust any South African leader. By 1991 member-presidents of the FLS alliance were not sure whether changes promised by President Frederik W. de Klerk are irreversible.

<sup>64</sup>Samora Machel was then just a leader of FRELIMO, as the transitional government was led by Joaquim Chissano. Also see note 48, above.

<sup>65</sup>Confidential interview with former government/party leader, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

The thesis here, then, is that there is a *relationship between the formation (and decline) of the FLS alliance and the Rhodesian conflict*. As this study will show, the period between 1974 to 1980 (when Zimbabwe became independent) was the period when the FLS alliance was most active and outward-looking: the period of its rise.

### **Organisational Structure of the Front Line States Alliance**

The Front Line States is partly informal and partly formal in its operations. There is also a distinction to be made between what its founders said was to be and what the alliance has done in practice. The way it was formed depicts the informality alluded to in Chapter One of this study. This includes the absence of a charter or constitution, headquarters, secretariat, or even the keeping of records. Basically, this is the way its founding members wanted it to be: a *consultation forum*.<sup>66</sup> A brief discussion about why such an "informal" alliance was preferred is in order here.

One main factor may have been some of the alliance's members' bitter experiences in other largely economic regional or sub-regional organisations in which they were junior partners. Thus, the experiences of Zambia in the CAF, Tanzania in the EAC, and Botswana in the RMA and SACU may all have generated wariness toward formal institutions. These have tended to make most FLS members prefer either formal bilateral arrangements or, occasionally, decentralised multilateral institutions (when the latter were formed). It can thus be argued that such hesitancy about "legal formalism" and its negative consequences has been taken care of—for example, in SADCC—by its decentralised structure.

Yet, it is difficult to say that the FLS alliance is wholly informal simply because its founders said so, or because it has not had the organisational structure

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

expected by alliance and international organisation theorists.<sup>67</sup> Over time, the alliance has shown an inclination which in analytic terms can be considered to be "formalised", especially in terms of its range of activities. First, the initial activities and roles of the alliance were legitimised by the OAU and backed by the UN, in the sense that both institutions recognised its activities, appreciated, encouraged and upheld its decisions.<sup>68</sup> This implies legality and formality of sorts. In fact, the alliance was an instrument through which Britain and the United States put their proposals regarding the Rhodesian problem,<sup>69</sup> thus broadening the basis for legitimation and implanting elements of formalism, at least in the short-term and over a specific issue.

And second, the existence of at least one known, albeit obscure, structure below the summit of heads of state and government—ISDSC—which is advisory (and recommendatory) to the summit, is by itself an indication of the tendency towards being formal. Yet, there have been at least two unsuccessful attempts to transform the ISDSC into a full-fledged multilateral defence pact.<sup>70</sup>

Thus, the FLS alliance has only two semi-formal structures which can provide a basis for its analysis and practice. These are its summit system and the ISDSC, to which the discussion now turns.

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<sup>67</sup>See discussion of this in Chapter One, above.

<sup>68</sup>See Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 62; Libby, "The Frontline States of Southern Africa"; and Sesay, "The Roles of the Front Line States in Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, p. 23.

<sup>69</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 62; Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, pp. 45-92; and Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 14.

<sup>70</sup>One attempt was made in 1976 and another in 1983. Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (November 1989 and May 1990).

### **The Summit System**

The summit is the main organ of the alliance. Any analysis of the Front Line States would be incomplete without a discussion of its unique summit system. Appendix I gives a chronology of all reported alliance summits from 1976 to 1990.

Yet, there is a certain amount of flexibility in the alliance summit system not found in most organisations. Summit meetings are convened by any member's president who has an issue to raise. This privilege has been extended to the leaders of active liberation movements. Apart from acting like any other member-president, the chair also convenes those which are a follow-up of previous meetings. What would constitute an agenda in other organisations is determined by who convenes the meeting, and who is also given the first opportunity to speak.<sup>71</sup>

There has been a strong tradition for the member-presidents to attend the summit meetings in person.<sup>72</sup> Frequently, these are also attended by some invited guests. This has been more of a rule than an exception for the leaders of the active liberation movements. However, who else gets invited to the summits depends on what is going to be discussed.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party sub-headquarters, Dar es Salaam (April and May 1990).

<sup>72</sup>If the president is not able to attend then a senior cabinet minister or senior party official represents him.

<sup>73</sup>See Appendix I. For example, the 26-27 August 1977 summit in Lusaka was attended by Andrew Young, then US Ambassador to the UN, and David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary; the 22 January 1982 summit in Lusaka was attended by President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya; and the 22 November 1986 summit in Gbadolite (Zaire) was hosted and attended by President Mobutu Sesse Seko. Nigeria has occasionally attended FLS summits. In fact Nigeria has been treated by the FLS members as an *associate* or *honorary* member until mid-1980s. Thus, Shehu Shagari, then president of Nigeria attended the 16 April 1981 summit in Luanda, the 11 September 1981 summit which he himself hosted in Lagos, and the 22 January 1982 summit in Lusaka.

The summit meetings themselves are not rotational among the member-states as the more specific ISDSC meetings are supposed to be.<sup>74</sup> Again, where the meeting takes place depends on which member convenes it, the issue at hand, the prevailing security situation and the opportunity to meet which may have just presented itself. This flexibility, which has been derived from the small size of the alliance, has made it to appear less institutionalised. In addition, summits have taken place in the capitals of the member countries and other cities,<sup>75</sup> and even outside the alliance countries.<sup>76</sup>

There is no uniform procedure for summit meetings. Likewise, there are no hard rules governing closed sessions,<sup>77</sup> press conferences and communiqués at the end of them. And there have been few occasions when proceedings were recorded verbatim.<sup>78</sup>

However, the emphasis on considerable flexibility tends to obscure the formal elements in the alliance. Moreover, the alliance has enjoyed the longest existence

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<sup>74</sup>See Table IV.

<sup>75</sup>Cities other than capitals of the alliance members which have hosted summits include Arusha-Tanzania (one summit), Beira-Mozambique (one), Mbala-Zambia (one), Nampula-Mozambique (one), and Quelimane-Mozambique (two). Only one summit has been held in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana. See Appendix I. Cf. Mulungushi Club, note 45, above.

<sup>76</sup>For example, Belgrade-Yugoslavia, 6 September 1989; and Gbadolite-Zaire, 22 November 1986. Also one FLS summit was held in Lagos on 11 September 1981 (see note 73, above).

<sup>77</sup>Assistants and/or Foreign Ministers have attended some closed sessions but not others. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (April 1990).

<sup>78</sup>One known case was the 29 April 1984 FLS summit in Arusha-Tanzania which discussed the effects of the newly signed Nkomati Accord. However, the transcripts remain classified as Top Secret. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

in the history of international groupings of this nature in the region. Frequent, though *ad hoc*, meetings imply some routinisation which, together with what Braybrooke would call "settled group rules"<sup>79</sup>—such as heads of state and government attending summits in person whenever possible, and attending them at short notice whenever necessary—imply the existence of agreed-upon rules and norms, albeit unwritten.

It will become evident that the summit system differs in some respects from its subordinate organ, the ISDSC. It is to these differences, the *modus operandi*, and the role of the latter that the discussion now addresses itself.

#### **The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee**

This is a committee of the FLS. Despite its obscurity, it has been implementing the decisions and resolutions of FLS alliance summits over the last fifteen or so years. To say that the alliance performs a crucial regional security role<sup>80</sup> is at the same time to underscore the importance of and role played by the ISDSC.

The alliance's regional security role can, for analytic purposes, be divided into two interrelated sub-roles: to co-ordinate (i) the liberation process, and (ii) FLS defence and security. In terms of the former, the alliance's main asset has been the active liberation movements (see Chapter Four), while the target has been colonial/White minority regimes. And in terms of the latter, the alliance's own security has included the active liberation movements, individual and collective FLS' support to

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<sup>79</sup>In fact Braybrooke calls them "settled social rules". See his *Philosophy of Social Science*, especially Chapter One, pp. 1-19.

<sup>80</sup>See, for example, Anglin, "The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa", in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, especially pp. 259-265; Ispahani, "Alone Together", especially pp. 154-55; and Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, pp. 33-43.

them, and the alliance's own defence and security at two levels: bilateral and multi-lateral. The ISDSC has featured prominently in both of these sets of sub-roles on regional security.

The ISDSC, which is essentially a ministerial committee, was formed in 1975;<sup>81</sup> that is well before the alliance came into the open in September 1976. In fact, the committee is more formally structured than the summits of the heads of state and government of the FLS alliance. The committee meets twice a year and/or as necessary.<sup>82</sup> Its meetings are preceded by officials' meetings, comprising the chiefs of the specialised services.<sup>83</sup> The heads of the military wings of the active liberation movements are also invited to both officials' and ministerial meetings. The committee breaks into three sub-committees for defence, state security, and public security, which later report to the regular plenary sessions.<sup>84</sup>

The ISDSC formulates short and long-term strategies on how to speed-up the liberation process and how to co-ordinate the alliance's defences against destabilisation. This has been done by continuously defining and assessing the

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<sup>81</sup>Ministers involved are those in charge of defence, state security, and public security. Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (April and May 1990).

<sup>82</sup>Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (April and May 1990), see also Table V.

<sup>83</sup>These are Chiefs of Defence Forces, of Intelligence and/or Security Services (where these are separate both chiefs attend), of Police Forces, and of Immigration Services. Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

<sup>84</sup>Both ministers and officials sit in plenary sessions. Confidential interviews with senior officials, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

Table V

**INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE MEETINGS  
1975-1989**

No.	Date	Place	Participating Members
1.	August 1975	DSM*	Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
2.	January 1976	Lusaka	Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
3.	August 1976	Lusaka	Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
4.	September 1977	DSM	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
5.	23-24 August 1979	DSM	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
6.	12-13 January 1983	Arusha Tanzania	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, ALC (Executive Secretary)
7.	14-15 July 1983	Nyanga Zimbabwe	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, SWAPO
8.	20-21 February 1984	Maputo	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, SWAPO, PAC
9.	15-16 July 1984	Luanda	Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, SWAPO
10.	19-20 November 1986	DSM	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, SWAPO, ALC (Executive Secretary)
11.	11-20 November 1988	Maputo	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, SWAPO
12.	10-11 May 1989	Lusaka	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, SWAPO



(Table V continued)

No	Date	Place	Participating Members
13.	2-3 November 1989	Gaborone	Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, ANC, PAC, SWAPO

**Note:** DSM\* - Dar es Salaam

**Sources:** (i) Confidential interviews  
(ii) Archives, *Daily News*, (Tanzania).

security situation in the region.<sup>85</sup> Once in a while the sub-committees may be asked to carry out classified missions and operations.<sup>86</sup> The committee thus constitutes the practical and functional arm of the FLS alliance.

Several things can be noted from Table V on the record of the ISDSC meetings. First, Angola was a late-comer on the committee. This is because it joined the alliance in 1976, one year after its independence.<sup>87</sup> Second, the Kingdom of Lesotho is shown to have been a member of the ISDSC for just two years, and

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<sup>85</sup>One important item in the Committee meetings is for each member delegation to give a review of the security situation of its country since the previous meeting as a way to exchange security information. The chiefs of military wings of active liberation movements also give progress reports. Sometimes the Executive Secretary of the ALC is also invited to give a report as well.

<sup>86</sup>These remain classified and confidential. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (April 1990).

<sup>87</sup>The reasons for this delay are given in Chapter Six below.

attended a total of four Committee meetings. This is surprising given that Lesotho is not a member of the FLS alliance. The reason given for this apparent anomaly is that the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan was becoming increasingly militant and anti-*apartheid* in the early 1980s, so it needed support from members of the FLS. One way to support Lesotho was to accommodate it in the alliance somehow.<sup>88</sup> This perspective is partly supported by the fact that Lesotho does not appear on the list of committee's participants after the 1986 coup that overthrew Jonathan's government. The third important thing to note from Table V is that there has been an attempt to rotate the hosting of the Committee meetings which has gone alongside rotating the chair.<sup>89</sup>

And the fourth important observation one can make about the ISDSC is the secrecy surrounding it. In fact, the issuing of a communiqué to the press at the end of the meeting depends on the discretion of the host country. Yet any communiqué so issued is meant to avoid media speculation rather than simply to provide the public with information.<sup>90</sup> Also the communiqué is meant to send a signal to the

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<sup>88</sup>This is the general reason advanced. However, it does not explain why Lesotho was accommodated in a more security oriented and sensitive Committee than in the FLS summit itself. A more plausible and technical reason could be Lesotho's geographical location inside the RSA being a good intelligence gathering ground for the FLS against the latter. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

<sup>89</sup>Some gaps in time are explained in terms of the unwillingness of the would-be host to convene the meeting, usually for security reasons, as happened in May-June 1987 when Botswana cancelled the meeting at the last moment due to threats of attack from South Africa. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es-Salaam (November 1989).

<sup>90</sup>It is said that the committee meetings usually issue two separate communiqués: one, which is a true reflection of the proceedings is for the committee itself; and another different one is issued to the press, bearing little or no resemblance at all to the other. Confidential interviews with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign  
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enemy that "these guys are serious".<sup>91</sup> Conversely, unlike the alliance summits, the Committee has an elaborate system of keeping records.<sup>92</sup>

It is the opinion of this analyst that without the ISDSC the Front Line States would probably not have only taken a different shape, but also it would not have performed a regional security role the way it has done so far. This does not imply that such a security role has been performed without problems or constraints;<sup>93</sup> rather, it is to emphasise that the FLS summits do not perform this regional role on their own without any supportive organ as previous studies had implied.

## CONCLUSIONS

In line with one of the conceptions of international organisation as a *process*<sup>94</sup> there were several regional inter-state groupings prior to the formation of the FLS. Southern Africa, like any other region, has been in the process of organising. The regional and sub-regional groupings have, of course, not been completely similar to

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<sup>90</sup>(...continued)

Affairs and a Front Line diplomat, Dar es Salaam and Harare, respectively (November 1989).

<sup>91</sup>Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).

<sup>92</sup>The host member takes the chair of the committee and provides the meeting's secretariat. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).

<sup>93</sup>These are discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

<sup>94</sup>See Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation*, Third Revised Edition, (New York: Random House, 1964), especially Chapter One: Introduction, pp. 3-14.

each other. Each was conceived depending upon the prevailing and objective circumstances obtaining at the particular period.

The main concern of this chapter has been to outline those predecessor groupings that are relevant to the study of the FLS alliance. In so doing, the discussion has attempted to draw out some similarities and differences among this set of groupings. What has featured most is that all regional and sub-regional groupings outlined were concerned with the liberation of Southern Africa in its broad sense, which has also been the main preoccupation of the alliance. The existence of one regional grouping did not preclude the existence of another at one and the same time. Thus, the parallel existence of such groupings has been another feature symbolising both the divisions of labour among them as well as divergent interests of the leaders involved. It is, therefore, not surprising now to see the FLS alliance existing alongside, say, SADCC.

It is also interesting to note that the proliferation of inter-state groupings in Africa generally, and in Southern Africa in particular, represents in a sense a recycling of some ideas from one era to another, and from one grouping to another. For Southern Africa, the idea of inter-state groupings dates back to 1958 as shown. Since then, variants of organisations have appeared. Their common feature has been the propensity to organise at the level of *high politics*, that is, at the level of heads of states and government, with no enduring, functional and structured organs below it. Even where the attempts are made to create functional organs as in the case of EAC and SADCC, "high politics" are still the dominant feature. This, as will be shown in Chapter Six, has serious consequences. However, the proliferation of the groupings means that the urge to co-operate is there, except that there has been some hesitancy for the countries to bind themselves to more demanding, more structured and functional groupings than those they have agreed to so far. It is that

strong tradition of organising at the inter-state (and "high politics") level which is underscored here.

While the tradition of organising can generally explain the formation of the FLS, a particular factor leading to its creation was, however, the challenge posed by Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Essentially, the opportunity for what initially appeared to be a peaceful resolution of conflict presented itself, of which each side to the conflict took advantage. *Détente*, together with other factors, provided the independent Southern African states with an impetus to organise themselves in a way different from earlier groupings. Their response was the formation of the alliance.

On structure, it has been argued that the FLS is organised along both informal and formal lines. Originally conceived as an informal alliance—an image which its members like to project—over time, it has become increasingly formal. The legitimisation it has received from the OAU, United Nations and some Big Powers has increased both its respectability and formality. In addition, the routinisation of FLS summits and the formation of a specialised, though advisory and functional, Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, makes the alliance more formal than informal in character. Such formal elements have increased with time, even when the alliance has shown tendencies to decline in importance, although not necessarily suggesting a cause-effect relationship.

It has been observed that out of several roles played by the FLS alliance, regional security has been the most important. The alliance's main organ performing this role besides the summit is the ISDSC.

Thus the FLS alliance arose in the mid-1970s out of specific conditions which obtained at the time. The resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe was the concern of every founding member. Zimbabwe's independence promised immediate economic, political and even social relief for all of them. As it turned out, however, the security

that was anticipated to come with Zimbabwe's independence was itself precarious. Hence the need to maintain the alliance, not just in terms of prolonging its life, but once again to fulfil its other original obligations. Thus, the FLS assumed a role in the liberation of Namibia and in ending *apartheid* in South Africa, as well as in coping with destabilisation among its members. Needless to say, the vigour with which the alliance dealt with the Zimbabwean problem was not only a reflection of members' political, diplomatic, and in some cases military, commitments, but also of their economic capability in the second half of the 1970s. Within certain limits, most members of the alliance could somehow afford this increasingly outward policy necessitated by prevailing regional circumstances. As the remaining chapters will show, this capability declined enormously as their economies began to stagnate and further decline from the outset of the 1980s, in an era of post-Zimbabwe liberation and proliferating structural adjustments, even ahead of post-bipolarity, recession and the new international division of labour and power.

## **Chapter Four**

### **SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

It was shown in the previous two chapters that (i) the Southern African liberation movements were together one of the most important primary actors in regional interaction patterns, and (ii) the FLS alliance was formed to steer and accelerate the regional liberation process. The nationalist movements were important in both regional co-operation and conflict. Since they were products of specific processes of colonialism, White settlerism and racial discrimination<sup>1</sup> they related to such regimes in conflictual ways, and to the majority-ruled independent African states in co-operative terms.<sup>2</sup>

As elsewhere, liberation struggles in Southern Africa passed through various stages. In the process the nationalist movements, their erstwhile supporters as well as adversaries were, in varying proportions, transformed. It is a particular part of this transformation that this chapter seeks to analyse; namely, the relationship between

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed description of the types of colonial, White settler and minority rule, see Chapter Two, above.

<sup>2</sup>For details on conflict and co-operation, see Chapter Two, above.

the liberation movements and the FLS alliance. This transformation required both sides to complement and support each other. Thus issues of dependence and inter-dependence between them, and also the degree of compatibility of their respective strategies will be discussed.

The argument is that, although the two sets of actors—the liberation movements and the FLS alliance—co-operated with and complemented each other, in practice their relationship was not necessarily devoid of friction, conflict and disharmony. However, such problems were overshadowed by successes on various fronts of the liberation struggles. Also, the extent of co-operation among both these groups of actors determined ensuing inter-state, bilateral and sub-regional relations.

### CONCEPTUALISING LIBERATION STRUGGLES

Decolonisation, liberation and armed struggle are three central elements in the conceptualisation of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Decolonisation is the reverse process to that of colonisation. It arises out of a colonial situation, a subject which has been treated extensively by others.<sup>3</sup> Decolonisation refers to the

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<sup>3</sup>Georges Balandier, for example, enumerated five characteristics of the colonial situation, namely, (i) the domination imposed by a foreign minority on grounds of racial/ethnic, cultural inferiority; (ii) domination linking radically different civilisations; (iii) a clash between mechanised and industrialised and non-mechanised "backward" society; (iv) the fundamentally antagonistic character of the relationship between these two societies resulting from the subservient role to which the colonial people are subject as "instruments" of the colonial power; and (v) the need, in maintaining this domination, to resort to "force", and to a system of pseudo-justifica-  
(continued...)



process whereby the colonial power disengages from the colony through a peaceful constitutional transfer of power from the former to the latter. In practice, this process was in most cases less than peaceful and far from smooth. Nevertheless, decolonisation was the means through which most African countries achieved their political independence. There were but a few exceptions, which included Ethiopia and Liberia (which were not colonised in the classical sense of the term), Algeria, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique, South Africa,<sup>4</sup> Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

In this set of territories, constitutional and peaceful means of power transfer and/or sharing were impeded by the outright resistance of the colonial/White settler minority regimes. Thus a different or particular type of "decolonisation" took place, commonly referred to as "liberation", a process which was more radical and less predictable than decolonisation. In certain respects the liberation movements were different in White settler states from nationalist political parties in orthodox colonies. The distinction between the two types cuts through *modus operandi* and attitudes to international politics as Shamuyarira has suggested:

Liberation movements are not ordinary political parties in the sense that the word 'party' is known and used by social scientists today.

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<sup>3</sup>(...continued)  
tions and stereotyped behaviours. See his "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.), *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 54-55.

<sup>4</sup>South Africa has had a different kind of "colonialism", settler or internal, as explained in Chapter Two. That country is included here because *apartheid* unleashed several, ongoing liberation struggles against it.

Liberation movements use violence to achieve their political objectives, and they are committed to the complete overthrow of the existing political system. Ordinarily, a party seeks power by peaceful means, within the existing political system.<sup>5</sup>

So, whereas in general political parties and decolonisation advocates are "reformist", liberation movements are "revolutionary" in so far as they seek fundamental and systemic change.<sup>6</sup> This distinction was also recognised by some of the practitioners themselves:

Liberation is to us not simply a matter of expelling the Portuguese *or any other colonial power*: it means organising the life of the country and setting it on the road to sound national development. Taking political power out of the hands of the [colonial powers] is a necessary condition for this, since [they] have consistently opposed social progress and have encouraged only those economic developments which could benefit a small, almost entirely foreign élite (emphasis supplied).<sup>7</sup>

Also, the question of violence was crucial, although far from being generally spontaneous as Franz Fanon had hoped.<sup>8</sup> The difference between decolonisation and liberation was also reflected in the difficulties of "decolonising" target colonial/White settler minority regimes, in divisions within the OAU and debates in Africa about imperialism, neo-colonialism, dependence and self-reliance in the 1960s and beyond. As a result, one-party states and "state socialisms" were the prevalent

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<sup>5</sup>Nathan M. Shamuyarira, "A Revolutionary Situation in Southern Africa", *The African Review*, Vol. 4 No. 2, (1974), p. 172.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>7</sup>Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, Introduction by John Saul (London: Zed Press, 1969, 1983), pp. 219-220.

<sup>8</sup>Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), especially Chapters on "Concerning Violence" and "Spontaneity", pp. 35-147.

paradigm in 1960s to 1980s but not after. This difference had a profound impact on the progress of liberation itself.

Violence and the revolutionary ideology of the liberation movements tended to divide their very sources of support. On the one hand, and understandably so, the colonial/White settler minority regimes (and most countries in the West) viewed members of the liberation movements (and more so their guerrilla fighters) with dislike; as "terrorist" insurgents even before they resorted to armed struggle.<sup>9</sup> The threat of a new social and economic order led most Western countries not to support the liberation movements. To have done so would have been tantamount, in a period of bi-polarity and Cold War, to supporting "communism" and thus committing suicide as far as their economic interests in Southern Africa were concerned. As pointed out in Chapter Two, above, Scandinavian countries were exceptions. On the other hand, the majority-ruled African states, whose support for the liberation struggle was supposed to be immediate and crucial, were themselves divided on the question of violence and peaceful change as indicated in the previous chapter's discussion about Lusaka, Mogadishu and Harare declarations. For this and other reasons, the ALC was not as effective as was expected.

The Eastern bloc countries of the time supported the liberation struggle as long as it opposed imperialism and capitalism, and promised to build socialism—the

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<sup>9</sup>In a way, the use of the word terrorists neatly divides the opponents and supporters of the liberation struggle", Shamuyarira, "A Revolutionary Situation in Southern Africa", p. 159, note 1. For an extensive use of the term, see among others, Menaul, *The Border Wars*.

new social and economic order. In fact, almost all important liberation movements in Southern Africa espoused one form of socialism or another. This constituted at least in part a response to material assistance and ideological inspiration they received from Eastern bloc countries. Thus, there was an aspect of assumed one-party (state) and socialist direction after victory.

The most important and interesting phenomenon in the liberation process was the advent of armed struggle as a form of organised violence. Initially, this represented a form of pressure on the colonial/White settler minority regimes to agree on the principles of majority rule, self-determination and independence. When all avenues for negotiations were blocked, either by banning the nationalist movements and imprisoning their leadership or by ignoring such principles, armed struggle became the primary, strategic means available to the liberation movements. The successes of such armed liberation struggles in Algeria and elsewhere, especially in China and Cuba, became reference points for those in Africa. However, such reference points were actually tactical rather than total successes. The sustenance and successes of such "revolutions" differed from place to place as indicated in current revisionist literature. There has indeed been an on-going retreat from such legacies almost everywhere, encouraged by SAPs ideology and conditionalities. Most revolutions in Africa and elsewhere maintained their original potency only for short periods despite labelling themselves "peoples" or "socialist" or "popular" republics.

Armed struggle was encouraged by some independent African countries at the time, while some condemned it as violence and, instead advocated a peaceful

approach to decolonisation.<sup>10</sup> As the rest of this chapter will show, the liberation movements had a difficult time with both those countries which advocated armed struggle as well as the ALC. The criteria for recognition applied by the ALC to the movements, for example, have been described as imprecise<sup>11</sup> mainly because they were amenable to subjective interpretations. One of these was demonstrated (military) "success" in the field.<sup>12</sup> According to Grundy, this criterion was probably the most important although it was loosely applied "to include not only military success but a broadly based popular following, particularly in territories where fighting has been either limited or non-existent."<sup>13</sup> This was a form of direct support to armed struggle by the ALC. There are also indications that those movements which had not launched armed struggle were encouraged to do so by the ALC; according to Gibson, it was *sponsored*, or imposed. In other words, armed struggle was not necessarily indigenous or authentic and may not have been considered

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<sup>10</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup>See Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, p. 194.

<sup>12</sup>The other two criteria were (i) willingness to co-ordinate efforts by establishing common action fronts, and (ii) political and ideological reliability. See *Ibid.*, p. 194; and Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity* p. 46. See also "ALC aid is supposed to go only to the approved organisations with the touchstone being military activity directed to the liberation of the particular territory". See Gwendolen M. Carter, "Challenges to Minority Rule in Southern Africa", *International Journal*, Vol. XXV No. 3, (Summer 1970), p. 494.

<sup>13</sup>Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, pp. 194-95; and Yashpal Tandon, "The Organisation of African Unity and the Liberation of Southern Africa" in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1972), p. 253.

feasible by some of the movements. Describing initial developments within SWAPO, for example, Gibson noted that:

After the disappointment of 1963, when hopes of easy victory over the White supremacists were dashed, the SWAPO leadership adjusted its tactics. Taking advantage of the sponsorship of the ALC, SWAPO began training the guerrilla forces.<sup>14</sup>

Of course, the response was not always positive. For instance, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) was *invited* by the ALC to train its freedom fighters but it declined:

When the [OAU] was founded, SWANU welcomed the new body, but declined to create a military force under the sponsorship of the ALC. Rather,...[the leadership] ridiculed the growing battalions of other liberation movements and predicted that in time they would become a headache to the OAU and the movements themselves, in so far as the political situation did not permit the use of these freedom fighters in combat against South Africa.<sup>15</sup>

The imprecise nature of recognition to the liberation movements noted by Grundy and Červenka had no immediate effect on the new trend of shifting from the reformism of the political parties to the armed struggle of the liberation movements. The latter was accepted and encouraged by the ALC, which at times was so enthusiastic it did not always wait to be asked to assist. However, this militant enthusiasm of the ALC apparent in the mid-1960s and early 1970s was not to last long as it was soon confronted by financial and organisational difficulties.

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<sup>14</sup>Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 135.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

Important as they were and are in understanding the dynamics of Southern Africa, then, the concepts of liberation and armed struggle also added more confusion to an already complex situation. The existence and application of these concepts divided various elements in the regional and international community in terms of who supported whom, when and why, even determining future relations, causing shifting balances of coalitions throughout the 1970s and to date; i.e., a diversion of attention and resources from internal struggles to international diplomacy.

### **LIBERATION MOVEMENTS' STRATEGY**

Most African liberation movements were formed as interest/advocacy groups for the advancement of Africans, mostly centred on urban-based workers and professionals and a few intellectuals.<sup>16</sup> So they began like most of the continent's nationalist groups as associations of particular social and ethnic groups or regions within one territory. Later on they took on a more national/territorial character. This, together with other factors such as political, personality and ideological clashes, explains in part the proliferation of several or many political parties and liberation movements in some territories and the difficulties of forming united fronts.

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<sup>16</sup>Gibson observed this in almost all the African liberation movements he studied. See *Ibid.*, *passim*.

At the beginning, especially after World War II, the strategy of the liberation movements was not very different from that of the classic nationalist parties. Then, they were quite prepared to negotiate and work within the existing colonial system. It was the adamancy and indeed the indifference of the colonial/White settler minority regimes which compelled the movements to resort to armed struggle.

This armed struggle became their main strategy especially in the 1970s. It represented a show of determination on their part against the colonial/White settler minority regimes. Since conventional warfare was unthinkable, due to unequal military strength between the two which was always tilted in favour of the colonial/White settler regimes, only through guerrilla warfare could they exert enough pressure. It was defined by Huntington as a "...form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places."<sup>17</sup> Not satisfied with this purely military, and so incomplete, definition, Grundy added two dimensions to it. The first is that in addition to the tactical there is a strategic advantage as well:

Thus, the whole rationale of those who utilise guerrilla warfare...is the steady physical and psychological deterioration of a numerically and materially superior enemy by a series of numerous small encounters, until such time that the guerrilla forces decide to escalate or raise the level of warfare to more conventional proportions.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "Introduction: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy", in Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Movements, 1941-1961* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. xvi, also quoted in Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview* (New York: Grossman, 1971), p. 25.

<sup>18</sup>Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, p. 26.



In other words, it is not the intention of such fighters to remain guerrillas for ever. In Southern Africa, however, change from guerrilla status to conventional armies as well as from liberation movements to political parties typically occurred on the eve of (Namibia and Zimbabwe) or after (Angola and Mozambique) independence. And the second additional dimension contributed by Grundy is the political element in the guerrilla strategy:

There are political ramifications of this strategy. The successful employment of guerrilla warfare is ideally accompanied by a high degree of political as well as military organisation, involving large numbers of people, concerned with political mobilisation, participation, and indoctrination...Guerrilla warfare...contains the organisational wherewithal to structure a governmental apparatus once victory in the field is assured.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, both military and political components are essential. Their proportion or ranking is difficult to determine. However, it would seem that their mixture depended at any time upon both operational and political situations in the target territories and rear, as well as global conditions, especially at the height of the Cold War. Thus, the military option was given priority when the total situation dictated so, and *vice versa*. In general, the definitions by both Huntington and Grundy are not very different from that of Mao:

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is the weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies [its] territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, *as the Portuguese did to Angola and Mozambique, for example*, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to [the

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

enemy's] progress and may be used to advantage those who oppose [the enemy]. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy (emphasis supplied).<sup>20</sup>

Part of the liberation movements' initial thinking was that if the colonial/White settler minority regimes accepted negotiations while armed struggle was in progress, then the former would negotiate. As will be shown later, however, this became a source of misunderstanding between the liberation movements on the one hand, and some of the independent African countries, on the other.

In order for the armed struggle to succeed, the liberation movements needed safe and strong rear bases for military and other training, retreat and numerous other facilities, which was provided mainly by members of the FLS alliance, and to some extent, the ALC. It was there that the liberation movements mobilised and recruited for military training and operations, especially among the refugees. The rear was also crucial for transit and infiltration into target territories so that guerrilla fighters could engage in combat and sabotage activities. These and other facilities, such as diplomatic support, could only continue to be available if the liberation movements and the host countries were on good terms.

The liberation movements' effective combat and sabotage activities in the target territories caused a series of reactions from their adversaries directed to the host countries. These came in several forms, including pre-emptive attacks on suspected guerrilla bases, direct hot pursuits and sabotage to vital installations.

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<sup>20</sup>*Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, Translation and introduction by Samuel B. Griffith II (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978), p. 40.

In an answer to the question, "Is Africa a strong enough rear for the wars of liberation in Southern Africa?" Shamuyarira documented a number of cases that show both the weaknesses of that rear and retaliation by the adversaries:

The border states of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville), provide public and private sanctuary of various kinds for the liberation movements....But, as the wars advance deeper into Southern Africa, these states face the prospect of retaliatory attacks. The Uhuru Railway...has been sabotaged in a number of places...Nearly a hundred Zambians have lost their lives in the Zambezi river valley in 1971/72 as a result of landmines planted on Zambian roads by Rhodesian and South African security forces. Two very important Zambian bridges—a road bridge at Luangwa river on the road to Malawi, and a railway bridge on the Benguela railway to Lobito Bay in Angola—were once blown up. Oil tanks near the copperbelt town of Ndola were also blown up in 1967. Sabotage and retaliation has and is taking place.<sup>21</sup>

This same trend is also found in the post-independence period in the form of destabilisation. These and other types of reactions did not cause an immediate rift between the liberation movements and their hosts although they necessarily involved a diversion of the increasingly scarce resources of the latter, especially on defence and security. In one way or another, as the rest of this chapter will show, effective military activity in the target territories increasingly affected the relations between the movements and their hosts, hosts with South Africa, United States, Soviet Union, Britain, etc.

One form of effective military activity which necessarily and immediately affected such relations was the liberation movements' own sabotaging of installations in the target territories which were also life-lines of their hosts. On several occasions

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<sup>21</sup>Shamuyarira, "A Revolutionary Situation in Southern Africa", pp. 175-76.

UNITA blew up parts of the Benguela railway, which was one of Zambia's (as well as Zaire's) important outlets to the sea, closing it from late-1970s to early 1990s. This jeopardised relations between UNITA and Zambia.<sup>22</sup>

The strategy of the liberation movements progressed from populism through nationalism, radicalism, armed struggle and/or negotiation. It was the last, often protracted phases—those of armed struggle and/or negotiation—which were particularly crucial in the liberation movements' relations with the independent African states of Southern Africa, especially the members of the FLS and also future forms of post-White settler political economies.

#### FRONT LINE STATES' STRATEGY

The Front Line States' liberation strategy can be analysed at two broad levels, individual and collective. These were not necessarily always compatible. Each individual country's strategy was based on a combination and changing mixture of its principles of foreign policy, relations with the liberation movements, immediate and long term threat and security perception, economic considerations and the nature and position of national leadership in the African revolutionary-reactionary continuum,

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<sup>22</sup>For details, see Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 262; Carter, "Challenges to Minority Rule in Southern Africa", p. 489; Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, p. 222; Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, p. 210; and Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict* (London: Julian Friedmann, 1974), p. 165.

the sum total of which can vaguely be described as short- and long-term "national interests".<sup>23</sup> Also, the alliance's liberation strategy was, to a certain degree, influenced by changing global contexts, such as the attitudes and involvement of the super-powers, nature and extent of foreign aid, debt, oil prices, and in recent years, structural adjustment programmes.

In varying proportions, individual members of the FLS alliance believed in the purposes and principles of the OAU Charter, especially "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa" and to exhibit an "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories which are still dependent."<sup>24</sup> In addition to this OAU ideal, most members of the alliance included the liberation of (Southern) Africa in their foreign policy principles, particular examples being Tanzania and Zambia in the period from the mid-1970s to end-1980s, thus symbolising a coincidence of national and continental interests.

Tanzania has had as one of its fundamental principles of foreign policy "...to support the movement for African liberation and freedom from racist

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<sup>23</sup>The term "national interest" is applied here in its more general sense, not necessarily the way it was applied by Morgenthau or his critics. For a traditional application of "national interest", see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Chapters One and Thirty-Two. For Morgenthau's critics, see Alexander C. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander C. George (eds.), *Change in the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), among others.

<sup>24</sup>See Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, Articles II (1) (d), and III (6), in Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, Appendix 2, pp. 229-230.

oppression."<sup>25</sup> Other pronouncements by the leadership, ruling party and government insisted on this principle, even to the extent of redefining the then ruling party, TANU, as a liberation movement. Thus:

Revolutionary political parties in independent African countries, such as TANU, are still in fact liberation movements....For Tanzania it must be understood that the imperialist enemies we are confronting are British imperialism, Portuguese colonialism, the racism and apartheid of South Africa and Rhodesia. For historical, geographical and political reasons these imperialists will be ready to attack us whenever they have an opportunity.<sup>26</sup>

Also, Tanzania emphasised that its duty was to support liberation once such a struggle was decided upon by the people themselves. These policy statements were usually backed-up by (limited) actions.

Like Tanzania, Zambia incorporated the liberation of Africa in its foreign policy. Pettman observed that Zambia faced some identifiable and urgent security threats from outside its borders especially in its immediate region, Southern Africa.

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<sup>25</sup>Other principles are the policy of non-alignment, support for world peace through the United Nations, belief in and support for African unity, and good neighbourliness. For details, see *Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs*, Address by the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere at the Tanganyika African National Union National Conference, 16 October 1967 (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism), and also, "Policy on Foreign Affairs" in Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa*, pp. 367-384. On Tanzanian foreign policy in Southern Africa, see Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy: The Proportions of Autonomy" in *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, No. 307, (July 1988), pp. 276-292.

<sup>26</sup>"Mwongozo wa TANU/TANU Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidating and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania, and of Africa, 1971" in *The African Review*, Vol. 1 No. 4, (1972), pp. 1-8, para. 4 and 7. See also Nathan M. Shamuyarira, "Introduction", in Nathan M. Shamuyarira (ed.), *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), p. ix.

Anti-colonialism, for example, was, according to Pettman, just one among other factors shaping the perceptions of Zambia's leadership:

Zambia's present weakness combines with [then] recent, and still vivid, memories of colonial humiliation and a tendency to interpret an advance of colonial forces in one place as a threat to all Africa. So Zambia's leaders feel obliged to support the nationalist movements against Portugal and South Africa in spite of the obvious dangers of retaliation. This is not to imply a moral or 'ideological' commitment, since Zambia shares borders with all the colonial regimes of Southern Africa and feels its own security directly threatened by their continued existence, and especially South Africa's attempts to extend its influence in the region.<sup>27</sup>

Pettman implied then that (i) moral and ideological commitments were rather marginal and insignificant, while (ii) geographical position of sharing borders with colonial/White settler minority regimes was more important in shaping Zambia's foreign policy. This assertion is not very convincing, however, considering that Malawi also has a long border with Mozambique yet had "cordial" relations with the Portuguese authorities during the liberation struggle. Also, in the case of Zambia, a single factor—geographical location—cannot explain trends in its foreign policy over time. Rather the latter reflected an interplay of several factors including the leadership, moral and ideological. Anglin and Shaw observed that President Kaunda sought to reconcile his moral commitment to the liberation process with the constraints arising from his humanist values. They also described Kaunda's morals as having contributed to his regime's foreign policy stances, though not implying their dominance:

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<sup>27</sup>Pettman, *Zambia*, p. 71.

Despite successive, shattering disappointments, [Kaunda] persisted in his faith that man's inherent decency would eventually shine through. As the country's central decision maker, his dominating personality and humanistic world view powerfully conditioned the substance and style of Zambia's external behaviour...Morality he saw as the foundation of foreign policy, nonracialism as a prerequisite for peace within and between states, and justice as the key to international co-operation. It was a remarkably enlightened outlook for the strong-willed father of a nation caught in the eye of the gathering Southern African storm.<sup>28</sup>

Kaunda's regime was, however, among those few which were consistently committed to the cause of liberation of Southern Africa through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

Another factor which determined individual countries' strategy of liberation was the way each related to the liberation movements. This was determined by a number of other factors. First, was the host country's view of the liberation movement in question. A vague criterion of "authenticity"<sup>29</sup> was ascribed to some but not all the liberation movements; i.e., to those which allegedly had assumed a national character as opposed to displaying a tribal/ethnic, regional or sectional orientation, "the authentic representative of the people".<sup>30</sup> This criterion was also subjective and could easily be manipulated, often by international associations or pressures, especially when it involved choosing from several, almost equally strong movements. As will be shown later, authenticity was one of the criteria used by the ALC as well. The second factor was the personality of the leadership of the

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<sup>28</sup>Anglin and Shaw (eds.), *Zambia's Foreign Policy*, p. 11.

<sup>29</sup>"Authenticity" means ascription "of the sole legitimacy of the movement in the territory". See Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, p. 186.

<sup>30</sup>Confidential interview with an official of the African Liberation Committee, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).



movements, and the way it was conducting the liberation struggle. Personality clashes among leaders were common at various levels: intra- and inter-movement.<sup>31</sup> The presence of internecine leadership struggles within any movement led to two types of responses; first, the host country showed its own preferences and second, it tended to reduce its support. The clashes between Holden Roberto of the *Govêmo Revolucionário da Angola no Exílio* (GRAE)/FNLA, on the one hand, and Agostinho Neto of the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, on the other, and the way recognition and support were problematic among Angola's independent neighbours, testify to this.<sup>32</sup>

In addition, the liberation movements' overall ideology *vis-à-vis* that of their hosts also determined the latter's view and strategy. For example, movements which advocated Marxism-Leninism right from the beginning, as did the MPLA, found themselves getting little support from some of the neighbouring countries, such as Zambia, especially in the period of bi-polarity. The latter was fearful, for example, about the introduction of a Cold War element into Southern Africa. At the same

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<sup>31</sup>A good example of this was shown by FRELIMO, probably before, but certainly after the assassination of its first president, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969. See Uria T. Simango, "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, Vol. 2: The National Liberation Movements* (London: Zed Press, 1982), pp. 125-27; FRELIMO, "On Uria T. Simango", *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28; and Samora Machel, "Internal Corruption", *Ibid.*, pp. 128-130.

<sup>32</sup>FRELIMO did not have this problem with its major host, Tanzania, partly because it was already a united front. Nevertheless, Tanzania's leaders had influenced the outcome of the leadership struggle described in note 31, above. Confidential interview with a senior FRELIMO official, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

time, President Kaunda frequently used the threat of an ideological war in the region, as the liberation movements were increasingly turning to the East for arms and other forms of assistance, to cajole the West into helping them.<sup>33</sup> This amounted to exploitation of "non-alignment" for regional purposes.

It appears that there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the members of the FLS that determined which liberation movement to support. This is so despite the importance of such a selection on future relations in the region, as will be shown in Chapter Six. "Authenticity" provided a general criteria for African as well as non-African supporters of the liberation movements. However, this could be ascribed and/or withdrawn depending upon other factors outlined in this chapter (for example, quality of leadership and military progress). Also, another important factor was that non-African supporters had a considerable influence on the members of the FLS alliance in determining which liberation movement to support. This was particularly evident in Angola, where the Soviet Union and Cuba, through military assistance, changed the direction of support of individual members of the FLS away from a number of liberation movements and a government of national unity to the MPLA government.

A third factor which determined the behaviour of the members of the alliance were the movements' own strategies as well as some of their tactics. Just like other relations between the two, this tended to differ from time to time. In particular, the tactics used by the liberation movements became crucial in the phase of armed

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<sup>33</sup>Pettman, *Zambia*, p. 71.

struggle. Examples of this included the effects of retaliation and hot pursuit by the target territory, and the sabotage of vital installations, which were also life-lines of the hosts as described above. Whereas, close encounters in the form of conventional combat were untenable from the point of view of guerrilla tactics, sabotage and ambush were easier to perform; yet these were not often the preferred tactics on the part of the host countries.<sup>34</sup>

And lastly, there was a general incompatibility between the theory of *protracted war*, as explicated by major guerrilla warfare theorists which some of the liberation movements espoused to some extent, and the attainment of *quick victory*, which was attractive to the host countries. Grundy observed that the Chinese and Algerian wars in particular had a significant influence on the conduct of liberation wars in Africa:

Increasingly, African leaders are beginning to realise that victory will not be easy, that wars will be protracted—indeed, that guerrilla forces can use time to their own advantage. The level of comprehension and dedication to the time variable does not appear to be as advanced in Africa as it had been in China, but it is becoming more crucial to

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<sup>34</sup> The practical difference between conventional and guerrilla warfare, strategies and tactics were very crucial in determining the way the TPDF [Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces] was going to assist in the liberation of Mozambique. Our army [TPDF] was, by 1964, being reconstituted along conventional lines. We thought we were to train FRELIMO in conventional warfare and they were going to apply it. We were wrong. It was not until we had some of our officers trained in guerrilla warfare that we understood and indeed appreciated its application and why conventional combat was in most cases not feasible.

Confidential interview with a retired senior army officer who was involved in training FRELIMO, Mtwara-Tanzania (April 1990).

guerrilla planning there. One guerrilla regional commander in Angola has said: 'This is a war of the will. It took the Algerians seven years before the French gave in. We are just as determined.' Another stated: 'We will never be able to match the Portuguese man for man. But we can make a lot of trouble until the politicians find a settlement. And we can wait. Time is our best friend.' Expressions of this view can be located with increasing frequency.<sup>35</sup>

Grundy went on to explain why the idea of protracted war gained currency. He thus enumerated five "tactical as well as strategic realities": (i) realisation that guerrilla warfare is only a preliminary but important stage on the road to the use of other military techniques; (ii) virtues of extending the struggle while keeping the level of military confrontation low so as to exhaust the enemy psychologically and physically; (iii) the comprehension of the value of fighting experience and in assessing the time to move into larger scale warfare; (iv) the hard lesson of self-reliance despite the importance of assistance from abroad; and (v) politically, to forge a common national consciousness in the shared experience of extended military struggle.<sup>36</sup>

There are two observations which can be made about the theory of protracted war in general, and in Southern Africa in particular. The first is the truth behind it. There is no doubt that under some conditions a weaker adversary can benefit from protracted war; i.e., if it can use time and other resources, such as international support for itself and growing internal and external opposition to the enemy, to wear

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<sup>35</sup>Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 68. These conditions, however, are similar to those propounded by Mao. See "On Protracted War", in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 187-267.

down a stronger adversary. However appealing this may appear, there is no guarantee that in the course of protracted war the adversary may not itself be further weakened relative to the enemy. This was emphasised by Mao Tse-tung, the main proponent of protracted war, when he called for the "correct" tactics in order to ensure victory during the Chinese revolution:

In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China's advantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result that there will be a continual change in the difference in comparative strength and hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stage is reached, a great change will take place in the balance of forces, resulting in the enemy's defeat and our victory....From all this it follows that our war cannot be won quickly but can only be a protracted war.<sup>37</sup>

The second problem is that in practice it is difficult to distinguish between purposeful or intentional and consequential and/or imposed protracted war. In the former, there is a pre-determined intention to wage a protracted war. In the latter a protracted war is dictated by circumstances. It is difficult to distinguish the two because most liberation movements in Southern Africa, as will be shown below, may have taken the waging of a protracted war as a necessary part of the armed liberation struggle, regardless of the circumstances. On the whole, advocating a protracted war constitutes good military as well as political strategy in so far as it prepares people

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<sup>37</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War", in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 135-37.

for such a war should the need arise. Moreover, protracted war minimises the danger of underestimating the enemy.<sup>38</sup>

There is also a possibility that the leaders of some liberation movements in Southern Africa were taking the theory of protracted war, especially as it was advanced by the Chinese revolutionaries, in a literal way, meaning simply the opposite of quick victory. Yet it is beyond imagination that if it had been possible for the Chinese people to get victory, say in 1940, they would have waited to 1949, simply to appear to wage a protracted war. The difference between the Chinese revolutionaries and the Southern African liberation movements in this regard is that the former based their theory of protracted war on objective conditions, yet were prepared for quick victory if such had been possible:

Not only we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favour of driving the 'devils' out overnight. But we point out that, in the absence of certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists only in one's mind and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war, and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and earlier these conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened...<sup>39</sup>

On the contrary, the Southern African liberation movements rejected the notion of quick victory not because objective conditions did not allow it, but rather

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 133-34.

on the basis of their rejection of neo-colonial solutions to colonial problems. On further critical analysis, however, it appears that popular talk at the time about protracted war among Southern African liberation movements looked like resignation or desperation of sorts, coming out of the fact that victory was hard to attain. Once again, this was realised by Grundy when he said: "Increasingly, African leaders are beginning to realise that victory will not be easy..."<sup>40</sup> To some extent, talk about protracted war was a means to rationalise failures.<sup>41</sup> This can be expanded by observing that none of the liberation movements which talked about protracted war ever gave it a time-frame. Also, all of them, including those which upheld the virtues of protracted war, seized the first opportunity to negotiate an end to hostilities when the adversaries showed any signs of agreeing to do so. Despite these problems, there were considerable discussions about protracted war in Southern Africa. These may have been related to the then-prevailing myths about "state socialisms".

FRELIMO is a good case of a movement which in principle applied the theory of protracted war in Mozambique (as well as, of course, Angola as Grundy indicated). Its liberation war was not very prolonged in fact, although FRELIMO leaders purport to have prepared for such an eventuality. Thus, Mondlane observed that:

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<sup>40</sup>See note 35, above.

<sup>41</sup>"We discovered protracted war in the course of the war itself. If the enemy had said, 'you are independent, do not fight', we would not have dragged on." Confidential interview with a former FRELIMO combatant, now a member of Central Committee, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

The longer the struggle lasts, the more evident becomes its popular basis, the more support flows to FRELIMO, and the more confidence there is in FRELIMO's ability to succeed, while the less confidence the allies of Portugal have in her own prospects. As the struggle progresses, material aid for FRELIMO increases, while FRELIMO becomes itself more formidable. Thus every victory adds to our chances of winning yet further victories and reduces the ability of the Portuguese to counter our activities.<sup>42</sup>

Given that FRELIMO fought for a little more than a decade, the same line of thinking may be said to apply now to the MNR which has been challenging the FRELIMO government from 1980 to date. Mondlane went on further:

Paradoxically, the fact that the war will be drawn out in this way may in the long run be an advantage to our ultimate development. For war is an extreme [form] of political action, which tends to bring about social change more rapidly than any other instrument; and in... Mozambique, rapid social change will be essential after independence ....This is why we can view the long war ahead of us with reasonable calm.<sup>43</sup>

Whether Mondlane (and others) meant every word spoken or was simply rationalising the long period the struggle was taking, such statements had some important implications. To the hosts, it would seem it did not matter much whether independence was obtained through armed struggle or negotiation provided it was achieved quickly. This conflicted with the theory or ideology of protracted war, and thus represented a form of conflict between hosts and the movements. Also, were it possible, quick victory was preferred by hosts so as to avoid the consequences of prolonged wars of liberation. The argument by protracted war protagonists was that

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<sup>42</sup>Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, p. 146.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 219.



a lot of time was needed to prepare people for new social and economic order. Quick victory would result in neo-colonialism as was the case with those countries that became independent through constitutional means.<sup>44</sup> Interestingly, almost all Southern African countries, including all ex-guerrilla states are now undergoing SAPs and multi-partism, both of which are antithesis of the "revolution".

The relationship between quick victory (which was hypothetical in most, if not all instances) and "neo-colonialism" represented another form of conflict between host countries and the movements. This relationship, in fact, brought to the fore the whole debate about liberation having limited objectives of political independence (including universal adult suffrage), on the one hand, and total social transformation of society, on the other. Thus, even in countries which were considered "radical" and "militant" such as Tanzania, statements like the following were common:

Tanzania was fighting for one-man one-vote in Zimbabwe. Once that objective was achieved, it would not care less whether the people of Zimbabwe elected Nkomo, Mugabe, Muzorewa, or Sithole, to be their ruler. That will be a matter for Zimbabweans themselves. It was not for Tanzania to decide what kind of social system the people of Zimbabwe chose to live under, as long as they were free to make their choice....[If] Tanzania, and other African countries were enjoying neo-colonialism, what was wrong with Zimbabweans and Namibians doing the same?<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>For a substantive explication of this, see Shamu-yarira, "A Revolutionary Situation in Southern Africa". See also, "We want to destroy completely the system of oppression and exploitation of our people", FRELIMO, "To the Portuguese in Mozambique" in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, Volume 3: The Strategy of Liberation* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 156.

<sup>45</sup>Statements by two Tanzanian officials quoted by Shamu-yarira, "Tanzania" in Anglin, Shaw and Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa*, p. 21.

Whether backed up by moral considerations or geographical position or both, short- and long-term threat and security perceptions shaped the liberation strategy of individual members of the FLS. Thus, apart from the embarrassment and distaste of having colonial territories across the border, the colonial/White settler minority regimes were perceived as a real security threat to individual independent Southern African countries, especially the FLS. The foreign policies of the latter had often shown hostility toward colonialism and White settler minority rule. Also, these policies were not empty threats; rather, they were backed by (albeit limited) actions—support to liberation movements—which had short-term economic and social, as well as long-term and strategic implications.

On the one hand, then, the presence of refugees, liberation movements and guerrilla support—training, transit, logistics—constituted an economic and social burden on the FLS. In most cases, this meant having armed forces beyond the "normal" requirements. Also, once in a while, it called for the deployment of troops along borders with the colonial/White settler minority territories. Once set in motion, liberation wars were clearly a military threat to the countries that were hosting the liberation movements.

On the other hand, there were some longer-term and strategic implications. In the case of Zambia, for example, its transportation and communications life-lines mostly passed through and were controlled by hostile territories, especially to the end of the 1970s. There were not many options to get out of this problem. A more permanent and secure solution involved assisting the nationalist movements in

anticipation that once they had assumed power in their respective territories they would reinforce co-operation rather than conflict. This option in fact brought mixed results; cases in point were early relations between Zambia and newly independent Zimbabwe and how independence in Angola and Mozambique quickly degenerated into internal wars.

On the strategic considerations and long-term implications of supporting the liberation movements, Tanzania presented an interesting case. It was not part of or directly affected by Southern Africa's transportation and communications political economy; its policy-makers preferred to explain their country's involvement in the liberation process in moral terms. When probed, however, some of its strategists have explained Tanzania's involvement especially in Mozambique from the time of the liberation war to date in strategic terms:

Tanzania considered itself to have bordered South Africa along the Ruvuma River as long as Mozambique continued to be a Portuguese colony. By helping FRELIMO to liberate Mozambique we were pushing our border with South Africa further south. That was our conception then and it has remained the same in the MNR era. A stable and friendly government in Mozambique is one headache less for us.<sup>46</sup>

This could be one among various reasons why Tanzania clung to the FLS after Anglin had considered it to have ceased technically to be a member.<sup>47</sup> What looks

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<sup>46</sup>Confidential interview with a senior army officer, Defence Forces Headquarters, Dar- es Salaam (November 1989 and June 1990)

<sup>47</sup>See Anglin, "The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, note 4, p. 557. See also Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, p. 20.

like far-fetched strategic reasoning has some credibility when the rationales of Zimbabwe's and Malawi's deployment of troops to Mozambique are considered alongside those of Tanzania. Such strategic reasoning (as shown in the above quotation) is more analytically convincing than the way some other scholars have attempted to situate Tanzania's involvement in the independence of and indeed in the continuing crisis in Mozambique. Frangonikolopoulos, for example, recently explained it in general terms—"Although the threat to Tanzanian security was, and is, real, support for liberation movements has been a continuing theme in Tanzanian foreign policy"<sup>48</sup>—without showing the country's actual concerns over the last twenty or so years.

And lastly, the nature of national leadership in the independent countries also contributed in shaping individual liberation strategies. As shown above, there were some strong moral considerations associated with the concept of liberation. Yet not every national leader was convinced that it was a moral issue. In addition, there was a desire among leaders in Tanzania and Zambia to project themselves at a regional and continental, as well as national, level.

Claims to regional and continental leadership especially by Nyerere of Tanzania were received with both praise and ridicule. On the one hand, Shamuyarira has illustrated the link between Nyerere's national leadership and his commitment to the liberation struggle. He has also portrayed Nyerere as a continental leader:

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<sup>48</sup>Frangonikolopoulos, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy", p. 286.

To talk of Tanzania is really to talk about its illustrious president since independence, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, who is passionately committed to the liberation of Southern Africa as a milestone on the long road to African unity. By his long presidency, and shrewd handling of international and domestic affairs, and his firm commitment to the goals of liberation and unity of Africa, he has established himself as the major voice in Africa today, especially on Southern Africa. His speeches raise the moral issue clearly and starkly, and even convey the impression that he is the keeper of the African conscience when he frequently says 'Africa says', or 'Africa accepts' or 'rejects' this and that proposal.<sup>49</sup>

On the other hand, Garba has portrayed Nyerere's continental and regional leadership, as well as his commitment to liberation, as self-imposed:

Then, as now, Nyerere sees himself as the *guru* of African liberation. Never mind that with Mozambique's independence in May 1975 [sic], his Front-Line State status had changed from geographical to metaphorical.<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, this status was very important in a divided continent. It reinforced further the notion of strategic implications, especially for Tanzania, although it would seem it offered leadership without resources when compared to Nigeria's involvement in Southern Africa; the latter was accompanied, at least as far as General Garba was concerned, by financial and material assistance, as discussed below.

The collective FLS liberation strategy can be divided into two broad and interrelated levels in addition to national struggles: regional and continental. Regionally, there were efforts by founder members of the FLS to appear as a cohesive regional force. As noted in Chapter Three, this was evident in the

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<sup>49</sup>Shamuyarira, "Tanzania" in Anglin, Shaw and Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa*, p. 15.

<sup>50</sup>Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, p. 20.

formation of various regional inter-state groupings whose main concern was the liberation of Southern Africa. There was a slight difference between the alliance's liberation strategy and that of preceding regional groupings. This lay in terms of emphasis, changing times and unfolding events. For the most part, however, the FLS alliance followed a middle-of-the-road type of strategy between armed struggle and diplomatic negotiation, thus engendering some ambiguities. This position was a product of, and symbolised by, the Lusaka, Mogadishu, and Harare declarations, referred to in Chapter Three.

The alliance's regional posture emanated from and reinforced the continental strategy; that is, from the OAU and ALC. This is due to the complex relations that existed between the alliance on the one hand, and the OAU and ALC, on the other. The responsibilities of each side were not clearly stated, but each avoided overstepping into each other's territory, given that all the FLS are members of the OAU and all of the alliance's founders are also on the ALC, except Botswana.

It is through adherence by the FLS of the ideals of the OAU and other continental organisations that the former was more or less in conflict with the liberation movements. An example of this was the tension brought about by the Lusaka Manifesto mentioned earlier. The liberation movements felt betrayed by this Manifesto, but were cautious in their criticism. That the movements did not openly oppose the Manifesto was probably due to the fact that the two countries which presented the original draft—Tanzania and Zambia—were the ones which were

supporting them to a greater extent than the rest of its signatories. This is also implied in Shamuyarira's observation:

However, the ten liberation movements organising armed insurrection in Southern Africa are opposed to the document. They view any suggestion of achieving independence by discussion as prejudicial to the present state the struggle has reached, and, at best, an attempt to seek for a neo-colonial solution that will create even more acute problems. However, without exception, the liberation movements have refrained from campaigning against the document. There is hardly any reference to it in their propaganda pamphlets.<sup>51</sup>

This alleged fear of "neo-colonialism" is less convincing when put in a historical perspective with what has transpired in Southern Africa subsequently.<sup>52</sup> As shown in this chapter, independence in most countries that waged armed struggle was in fact a result of both fighting and negotiating. The latest instance of this has been the ANC of South Africa which has agreed to suspend, at least conditionally and temporarily, its military operations in order to negotiate:

We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations.... Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.<sup>53</sup>

The conflict between the liberation movements and the FLS over strategy, like most of their differences, remained at a very low and usually covert level. This is

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<sup>51</sup>Nathan M. Shamuyarira, "The Dangers of the Lusaka Manifesto", in de Bragança and Wallerstein (eds.), *The African Liberation Reader*, Vol. 3, p. 88.

<sup>52</sup>That neo-colonialism was not that distasteful, see quotation in note 45, above.

<sup>53</sup>ANC's Draft Declaration put to the OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southern Africa, in *ARB-PS*, Vol. 26 No. 8, (15 September 1989), p. 9364.

because both actors had a common objective—total liberation—however vaguely defined, such that they could not afford to let minor or secondary conflicts distract them. Also there was a substantial amount of interdependence among them. Therefore, each side refrained from magnifying or escalating the conflict. These factors are explained in detail below.

### **THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FLS ALLIANCE AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS**

The liberation strategies of the FLS alliance and the liberation movements were in most respects similar, except where, as pointed out earlier, some contradictions existed. This is especially so in terms of their objective: the total liberation (of Southern Africa). This was an umbrella concept which bound the two groupings together into the 1980s, although each had its own substantive yet compatible definition: the movements were allegedly working towards more comprehensive systemic transformation, while the hosts were concerned with more traditional and limited political independence. The difference between the two was not fundamental, however. Viewed thus, one would have expected the relations between the two to be harmonious. In order to analyse their relations meaningfully and objectively, however, one major question has to be answered: what did each seek or need from the other?

Overall, the liberation movements and their leaders were interested in power *vis-à-vis* both, White regimes and each other (where there were more than one).



Specifically, they desired to get two important things from the FLS. The first of these lay in the nature of overall response: fair treatment was central to them, for that was why they were formed. Their desire to be treated as equals by the independent African states was first expressed in 1963 during the summit that established the OAU. Wallerstein noted that the movements asked for two items from that summit: being treated as equals and the formation of the ALC.<sup>54</sup> He noted further that the movements were never in fact treated as equals, yet the ALC was created.<sup>55</sup> According to Červenka, the request for "associate membership" was met by granting them observer status, so allowing the representatives of recognised liberation movements to participate in OAU conferences but without the right to vote.<sup>56</sup>

It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether the movements received fair treatment by the Liberation Committee or not. What is clear is that they were not members of this committee; instead, they were accredited and responsible to it.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Wallerstein, *Africa, The Politics of Unity*, p. 154.

<sup>55</sup>The ALC was not created just because the liberation movements said it should be. However, their very existence was a factor encouraging its formation.

<sup>56</sup>Červenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, p. 16.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 46.

Usually, the leaders of some of the movements<sup>58</sup> attended the FLS summits. There was no clear-cut policy on this on the part of the alliance; some attended them on a permanent basis, such as President Machel, while others did so on an *ad hoc* basis, such as Presidents Tambo and Nujoma.<sup>59</sup> Also, as observed in Chapter Three, the leaders of some armed wings of the liberation movements were invited to address the meetings of the ISDSC.<sup>60</sup> However, as was the case with the alliance summits themselves, their status was not defined in relation to this Committee either; there were just some informal settings.

The critical issue shrouded in this ambiguity of not defining status was that of state sovereignty. This was not a new question for either the liberation movements or the independent African countries. Historically, the evolution was set in motion by the seventh PAFMECA conference which changed the name and constitution of the grouping, adding that independent countries were going to be represented by their governments.<sup>61</sup> PAFMECSA was thus the first test case where independent countries were to sit, discuss and deliberate with liberation movements as equals. However, that grouping did not last long enough to show how this might have worked. On the one hand, it seems that independent African countries were

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<sup>58</sup>Especially Oliver Tambo, the late Samora Machel, Sam Nujoma, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo of the ANC, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZANU, and ZAPU, respectively.

<sup>59</sup>See Appendix I.

<sup>60</sup>Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO addressed a Committee meeting held Luanda, Angola, 15-16 July 1984. This was an exceptional case. Personal observation.

<sup>61</sup>See Table II in Chapter Three, above.

jealously guarding their sovereignty. On the other hand, the members of the FLS may have chosen not to define their alliance's relationship with the liberation movements in order to avoid controversies and misunderstandings, despite some explanations to the contrary,<sup>62</sup> i.e., not to anticipate outcomes in the territories with more than one movement.

At another level, the liberation movements were anxious to secure support—material, moral and diplomatic—as well as countries which could offer a firm rear base. In most cases these could only be countries which were both independent and adjoining home territories. In the period following 1975, the case of UNITA has been an exception for a number of reasons. First, it was fighting against a recognised government of formally independent country. Second, it had its *de facto* rear base for most of the 1980s in Namibia, a South African colony. And lastly, it was receiving support from the very powers which were thought to be in the fore-front of thwarting the liberation process, including South Africa and the United States. By contrast, typically the rear usually consisted of countries which were willing to play such a role, including bearing any consequences. These included most of the FLS.

Thus, the liberation movements were constantly conscious that their immediate sources of support needed to be handled with care. They were aware that they could not push the issue of equality too far without jeopardising the already

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<sup>62</sup>"The leaders of the authentic liberation movements were being prepared or 'interned' to take their positions as full members in the FLS summits." Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es-Salaam (May 1990).

existing sources of support and hospitality. They had, therefore, to play a tactful balancing act that ensured sufficient independence for themselves and at the same time maximised their sources of support. This was important because the alliance also wanted to serve as a gatekeeper to other mainly non-African supporters as well, although it did not always succeed in this.

Conversely, there are three factors which may explain what the members of the FLS alliance wanted from the liberation movements. The first is the desire to change the *status quo*. There is some truth in Grundy's explication that the liberation movements were among the host countries' instruments of foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> This is true in so far as the latter countries used the former to promote change in the target territories. However, explanation has to go beyond seeing the movements as mere instruments. It has to be emphasised that the instruments themselves were animate and conscious, and the change they sought to bring about was purposive. On the one hand, then, it was change that would benefit both the instrument and its user. In this sense, the user-instrument description becomes less convincing. On the other hand, the desire for purposive change may have gone beyond the attainment of immediate self-determination and independence to suggest a hidden *quid pro quo* on the part of the hosts.

The notion of a *quid pro quo* as a second factor to explain what the members of the FLS wanted from the liberation movements can be controversial; and, at best, it represents a tentative estimate. In part, this is so because no scholarly work exists

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<sup>63</sup>Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, pp. 205 and 211.

on it so far. Most scholars have over-shadowed this issue with notions of morality, national interest and internationalist responsibility on the part of the alliance or other countries which helped the movements.<sup>64</sup> This is more so among decision-makers themselves.

By way of analogy, some aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy, often regarded as an "associate" member of the FLS alliance (see Chapter Three), can throw some light on this issue of *quid pro quo*. The debate concerning its recognition of, and according to African standards, *massive* financial and matériel assistance to the MPLA government in Angola, is a case in point. In their attempt to analyse critically this subject Inegbedion and Shaw have, in a recent paper,<sup>65</sup> avoided delving too far into what Nigeria expected in return. They nevertheless provide insightful clues through their numerous quotations in which on various occasions the issue of *quid pro quo* is touched upon. In fact, the question of what Nigeria expected in return is answered first indirectly and then directly by a leading actor who was very involved

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<sup>64</sup>Shamuyarira, for example, glorifies the role played by Tanzania in the liberation process without, however, indicating what that country wanted in return. See his "Tanzania" in Anglin, Shaw and Widstrand (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa*, pp. 15-32. In the case of Zambia's commitment to liberation but without a *quid pro quo*, see Anglin and Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy*, especially Chapter Six, pp. 234-271. For a treatment of the FLS as a collectivity, but also with the element of a *quid pro quo* missing, see Sesay, "The Role of the Front Line States in Southern Africa" in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 19-40. Thus, Grundy (cited in note 63, above) went a step forward by at least pointing out that the liberation movements were *sometimes* used as instruments of foreign policy.

<sup>65</sup>E John Inegbedion and Timothy M. Shaw, "The Decision and Debate Concerning Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA in Angola" in Charles F. Hermann, Margaret Hermann and Joe Hagan (eds.), *How Leaders Affect Decision Making* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, forthcoming).

in the issue at the time, the then Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs, General Garba. He answered indirectly by indicating what Nigeria did:

Once we accorded recognition....an outright grant of twenty million dollars was made to the MPLA Government; military hardware from rifles to MiGs, supplies from clothing to composite rations, were sent in ever-increasing quantities. Nigeria's 'radicals' and slumbering political correspondents had a field day, and anyone, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, whose perspective reached beyond dramatic effect in the immediate days ahead, and who asked about *quid pro quo* for Nigeria's lavish support, was derisively overridden.<sup>66</sup>

As noted earlier, by African standards that was a huge assistance package which at the time put Nigeria on a par with some non-African supporters of the MPLA, such as the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Also, Garba outlined what Nigeria did not get, thus joining those outside the decision-making circles who sought or suggested a *quid pro quo*; and he therefore answered the question directly:

I kept remembering that one of the reasons for removing Gowon from office had been the squandering of Nigeria's resources in such far-away lands as Grenada and Guyana, paying civil-service salaries and balancing recurrent budgets—with no return, economic or political, for Nigeria. Now, here was twenty million dollars in cash going to Angola without even a discussion of what Nigeria might gain, or even what uses it might be put. Some might argue *contrary to the norms of international practice* that to think of a *quid pro quo* from a country fighting for survival verges on the immoral, but two years later, no one could pin down a 'normal' Angola to any firm bilateral agreement. Indeed at the first appearance of the MPLA Government at the OAU Summit in Mauritius in July 1976, Nigeria's name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries to which they publicly paid tribute for assistance in achieving their independence (emphasis supplied).<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, p. 23.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

Morality versus *quid pro quo* represents an interesting dichotomy. In fact, in this case, the two concepts tended to supplement each other, each providing an input for the other. Nigeria may, perhaps, have initially thought largely in terms of moral obligation to assist a needy African country confronting Africa's traditional enemies. Yet when even a "thank-you" note was not immediately forthcoming Nigeria began to retreat to a *quid pro quo* position. A minimally expected and acceptable return probably would have been for Angola to acknowledge and appreciate (in public) Nigeria's role as a "big brother" able to rush financial and matériel assistance. Elsewhere, Inegbedion has implied that Nigeria's recent overtures in Southern Africa are essentially economic:

It is therefore imperative that Nigeria approaches more consistently the Southern African problematic beyond the political and the diplomatic. Economic co-operation with SADCC countries and the FLS is a necessary foundation for acting in concert with these states against outside aggression. The type of joint ventures with Angola on petroleum operations can be encouraged in other fields with other states in the region and in the continent.<sup>68</sup>

If this is true, then it confirms what Nigeria has been looking for in Southern Africa over the years: a *quid pro quo* for its involvement. In the case of Angola, "special" bilateral relations would have been appropriate for Nigeria even before joint petroleum operations.

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<sup>68</sup>E John Inegbedion, "Nigerian Policy in Southern Africa: Frontline or Rearguard Actor?" in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, pp. 157-180.

The incompatibility between mores and *quid pro quo* is not new. From his realist perspective on global power politics, Morgenthau saw that there are instances where the former are used to justify the latter, including immoral actions:

Writers have put forward moral precepts that statesmen and diplomats ought to take to heart in order to make relations between nations more peaceful and less anarchic... But they have rarely asked themselves whether and to what extent such precepts, however desirable in themselves, actually determine the actions of men. Furthermore, since statesmen and diplomats are wont to justify their actions and objectives in moral terms, regardless of their actual motives, it would be equally erroneous to take those protestations of selfless and peaceful intentions, of humanitarian purposes, and international ideals at their face value. It is pertinent to ask whether they are mere ideologies concealing the true motives of action or whether they express a genuine concern for the compliance of international policies with ethical standards.<sup>69</sup>

The same things could be said, in varying proportions, of the FLS or its individual members at the regional level. Whereas Nigeria's assistance to the MPLA government could be measured, that of the FLS to the liberation movements could not easily be so evaluated. It involved loss of life and great human suffering on the part of alliance members. Moreover, even quantifiable portions were typically not subject to discussion or their amounts disclosed among the alliance members themselves:

We of the FLS do not ask how much each contributes to which liberation movements. Occasionally the FLS may ask all its members to increase our contributions but no details are given or needed. This

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<sup>69</sup>Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 236.



has been fundamental to our relations among ourselves and those with the liberation movements.<sup>70</sup>

It can, therefore, be supposed that there were other considerations in the assistance of individual members of the alliance to the movements in addition to mere moral obligations. These include, first, a desire to have close and stable bilateral relations once the liberation movements came to power. Nigeria would have said "not to expect a kobo from us"<sup>71</sup> if Angola's indifferent future behaviour had been known in advance. No country offers assistance to another expecting to reap hostilities and/or abuses. Second, the alliance's assistance was a way of initiating the liberation movements into a new role, namely that of assisting others in similar situations once their countries become independent, thus producing a domino effect.<sup>72</sup> In other words, FLS members were moulding the liberation movements according to their own image. And thirdly, their assistance was a way of preparing the movements for integration into the expanding alliance. The countries which became independent after the alliance was formed could be said to have gained that status under "FLS alliance tutelage". They automatically became members of the FLS, with the exception of Angola, whose membership was delayed,

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<sup>70</sup>Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (May, 1990).

<sup>71</sup>This is allegedly a Nigerian response to Prime Minister Eric Gairy of Grenada. See Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, p. 176. A "kobo" is the smallest Nigerian currency denomination, a hundredth of the "naira".

<sup>72</sup>Cf. statement in note 62, above.

while in any event the influence and assistance of the former to the latter was minimal.<sup>73</sup>

In practice, therefore, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and recently Namibia, plus the delayed case of Angola, have not only become members of the FLS (and for Namibia, SADCC); they have also, and interestingly for this analysis, generally acted courteously and supportively, at least in the early days of their independence, towards the rest of the alliance. However, this does not preclude differences of interest and opinion among the FLS, particularly given the range of regional and global changes of the early 1990s.

### THE RELATIONSHIPS

Following the above discussion, it is difficult to characterise relations between the FLS alliance and the liberation movements in unequivocal, clear-cut terms. Rather they cut across various spheres which call for a number of analytical concepts. At one point, for example, the alliance could be accused of having shown traits of paternalism toward the liberation movements. It was shown above that the OAU members refused to regard the latter as equals, offering them associate membership and later settling for observer status. The FLS alliance did not disassociate itself

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<sup>73</sup>For details on this delay, see Abillah H. Omari, "Angola and Namibia: Beyond the Capability of the Front Line States", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, pp. 133-155. See also Chapter Six, below.

from this position. If the movements' participation in FLS summits was a sign of equality of sorts, it should also be noted that in fact the alliance's state members were more equal. The latter could, at will or under pressure from elsewhere, especially through South African inspired non-aggression treaties, expel and ban any of the former from their countries. Likewise, members of the FLS trained and supplied logistics primarily to their own "preferred" movements under the vague notion of authenticity. Also, the movements themselves were careful not to antagonise their very sources of immediate support.<sup>74</sup> Incidentally also, the host countries shared some of the embarrassment caused to SWAPO and ANC over charges that they detained and tortured their own people, or incidents of lawlessness while in exile, a phenomenon cutting across all the liberation movements in Southern Africa.<sup>75</sup> At best this was a relationship between supporter on the one hand, and the supported, on the other.

Such a relationship could be described as one of dependence. At one level this was unidirectional; the movements dependent on the members of the FLS. At another level, however, it was a temporary but purposive dependence. On the one hand, it surely prepared the way for an institutional "interdependence" when target

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<sup>74</sup>The host country had a final say, and some vacillated in their support from one movement to the other, as in the case of Zambia's relations with ZANU/ZAPU and MPLA/UNITA. For details, see Chapter Six, below.

<sup>75</sup>See, for example, *ARB-PS*, Vol. 26 No. 7, (15 August 1989), p. A9338; *Focus*, Cape Town (July 1989); *The Star*, Johannesburg (27 October 1989) and *The Weekly Mail*, Johannesburg (29 September - 5 October 1989). Other accounts point out that the allegations were South African generated. See *Sunday Mail*, Harare (19 November 1989).

countries were independent, as was symbolised by the FLS alliance and SADCC. On the other hand, Front Line States solidarity, socialisation and cohesion came in advance and in anticipation of majority rule in the Republic, and even the latter's intrusion on the systems of the former, signalling the end of dominoes.

### **THE "THIRD FACTOR"**

Any analysis of the relationship between the Southern African liberation movements and the FLS alliance would be incomplete if it did not indicate that the latter had in some cases advocated, and encouraged the roles played by a series of third parties. Such third parties were countries or other agencies external to the FLS alliance and/or to Africa. These state and non-state actors participated in different aspects of the liberation process and conflict resolution at different times, for a variety of reasons.

Thus, the Great Powers—in this case the US and Britain—were considered by the FLS alliance as vital to the negotiations which led to Zimbabwean independence through the so-called Anglo-American proposals.<sup>76</sup> In this category, the Soviet Union has also been the chief supplier of arms to the liberation movements and provided some diplomatic support, especially at the UN. Also, despite the relegation of dialogue, South Africa featured prominently in the initial stages of negotiation for Zimbabwean and Namibian independence. Furthermore,

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<sup>76</sup>The Anglo-American proposals formed a basis for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. See Patrick O'Meara, "Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: Guerrilla or Political Settlement?", in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, pp. 38-39.

despite the alliance's objections to any *linkage* between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Namibian independence, UN Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435) of 1978 could only be implemented—so making Namibia's independence a reality as well as advancing promises of peace to Angola—after pressure had been exerted by both the US and USSR and also South Africa.<sup>77</sup> This was partly made possible by what Shaw has called the New International Division of Power (NIDP).<sup>78</sup> Swatuk has recently summarised one of the implications of this for Southern Africa thus:

The decline of the Cold War has led the super powers to disengage themselves from the region; there is nothing to be gained from war by proxy, from propping up economically and sometimes morally bankrupt client states and/or insurgency groups. So, given this, neither South Africa as a regional 'Western' power backed by the United States, nor Angola, Mozambique or an ANC-led South Africa as a 'viable socialist alternative' backed by the Soviet Union makes any sense. Thus, the region is increasingly left to find its own regional solutions.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>Culminating in a Tripartite Treaty (Cuba, Angola and South Africa). For details, see Armando Enralgo and David Gonzalez, "Southern Africa and its Conflicts: The African Policy of the Cuban Government", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, pp. 117-132 and Cf. Malaquias who argued that the New York Accords were not working, in his "Angola in the 1990s", *Ibid.*, pp. 47-64. See also, Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Road to Gbadolite: Great Power and African Mediations in Angola", University of California, Davis, 1990 (Mimeograph).

<sup>78</sup>See Timothy M. Shaw, "South and Southern Africa in the New International Division of Labour: Prospects for 1990s", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, pp. 3-20.

<sup>79</sup>Larry A. Swatuk, "Introduction", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, pp. xiii-xxxi.

All these state actors have served as third parties or a third factor in Southern Africa with the blessing and encouragement of some or sometimes all members of the FLS.

In addition, both International Organisations (IOs) and (I)NGOs have been instrumental—Commonwealth, Socialist International, World Council of Churches (WCC), etc. On the one hand, it can be said that the FLS co-opted and co-operated with any organisation, country or countries which, in its view, showed some support for and capability to hasten the liberation process and conflict resolution in Southern Africa.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, relations between third parties and host countries do not fall into finely discernable categories. Thus they have ranged from dependency and/or mutuality arising from international divisions of labour and power, down to bipolar views of regional conflicts.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Southern African liberation movements have been important actors who worked in concert with others to transform the region from colonial/White settler minority domination to independence and majority rule. It was the existence of both colonial and settler rule and the nationalist movements that necessitated the formation of the alliance itself.

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<sup>80</sup>The FLS alliance has been doing this since its early days. According to Legum: "Nyerere is said to have given [Kissinger] the reply...: 'We want two greatest sources of power on our side—God and Kissinger'." Legum, *Southern Africa*, p. 32.

Relations between the two—the FLS and the liberation movements—were not always smooth or harmonious. There were some frictions although not to the extent of thwarting the liberation process itself. These were mainly differences in focus and emphasis between armed struggle and negotiations. At the same time and in most periods, success on various liberation fronts, be they diplomatic or armed struggle, or independence in one or other territory, tended to overshadow such frictions. This was as important to the success of the liberation process itself as it was for the existence and indeed credibility and solidarity of the FLS alliance. It was important to appear to be united and cohesive. In other words, there was much more behind and within such relations between the movements and the alliance, on the one hand, and within each of these sets of actors, on the other, than the type of relations that were exhibited on the outside—i.e., of solidarity, complementarity and compatibility of strategies and common goals, harmony and interdependence.

This chapter has emphasised that to a large extent two basic strategies—armed struggle and diplomatic negotiation—were used by the liberation movements in a complementary and supplementary manner. This was not very different from the tactics of the FLS alliance. To both, armed struggle was a direct result of the initial failure of, or the colonial/White settler minority regimes becoming adamant about, diplomatic negotiations. It has been shown that in most cases negotiation was a very important element for instituting ceasefires and transitional arrangements.

With the exception of Angola,<sup>81</sup> this has been a feature of the sequence of events in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia and currently in South Africa. Any differences between the movements and the FLS lay in terms of articulating each of the two—armed struggle and negotiation—especially in their emphasis, coherence and policy form, either as parallel to, or divergent from each other.<sup>82</sup> It can be concluded that in varying proportions both the movements and the FLS alliance saw the two strategies—armed struggle and diplomatic negotiations—as complementary to each other. However, diplomacy became more crucial in the 1990s given both regional and global changes, especially within the NIDP.

The leaders of the active liberation movements attended some of the alliance's summits. They did not demand a specific status or a definition from the FLS as they previously did from the OAU. In turn, the alliance did not attempt to define their status either. Thus, the relationship between the two was multifaceted and ambiguous, with elements of paternalism, dependence and interdependence.

This chapter has shown the difficulties related to assumptions, hypotheses, theories, approaches, and above all, the paradigms involved in any attempt to define such complex relationships over time. Various elements discussed here have been

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<sup>81</sup>Here, the transitional government collapsed before the date of independence. For details, see John Marcum, "Angola: Perilous Transition to Independence" in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, p. 190.

<sup>82</sup>This debate is revealed in various declarations, over two decades, from the Lusaka Manifesto 1969 to Harare Declaration 1989. See also debate over ANC's abandonment or temporary suspension of the armed struggle and the way it tended to divide that movement, *Sunday News*, Tanzania (12 August 1990); and *ARB-PS*, Vol. 26 No. 8, (15 September 1989), p. 9364.



important and the ensuing relationships could be classified as parental or mutual, dependence or interdependence depending upon the issue.

However, two primary conclusions can be drawn from the relations between the FLS and movements in Southern Africa. First, it is hardly conceivable to expect international (and in this case transnational<sup>83</sup>) relations to be purely harmonious. Generally, disadvantage of one type of relation is compensated by advantages from the other. And second, the alliance, unlike other regional and continental organisations, has always tried as much as possible to accommodate and therefore harmonise its relations with the movements.

Despite good working and supportive relations between the FLS and the movements, this chapter has shown that third parties have also been important in Southern African conflict resolution, especially to the FLS alliance. Indeed, they have been courted and encouraged whenever they have shown potential to make a difference between stalemate and progress. This is reflective of Africa's marginal role generally, and of the alliance in particular, in the global system.

Finally, public co-operation between the alliance and movements, the claims of victory and successes by both, and even assertions of solidarity between the two, have obscured the frictions between them. As a result, every final victory— independence/majority rule—has been accompanied by the incorporation of such a country into the FLS (and SADCC).<sup>84</sup> This has overshadowed frictions or conflicts

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<sup>83</sup>That is, cross-border relations among states and groups other than governments.

<sup>84</sup>Apartheid-free South Africa may be different from the rest, or *sui generis*.

in those organisations and instead present a picture of solidarity. Whatever relations that ensue, especially at a bilateral level, may involve a carry-over from the past—during the liberation struggle<sup>85</sup>—onto sentimentalising of Southern African struggles by the old guard in the face of new realities. Thus, the nature of the relations between alliance members and each of the Southern African liberation movements during the liberation phase, on the one hand, and those between the FLS and the movements, on the other, have been important variables in shaping future bilateral and multilateral relations; hence they affect and may even determine the solidarity or lack of it within the FLS itself into the 1990s, especially given the new international division of power and so absence of established constraints.

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<sup>85</sup>See Chapters Two and Six, this study.

**PART III**

**THE DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

## Chapter Five

### **SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY**

When war is not war? Apparently when it is waged by the stronger against the weaker as a 'pre-emptive strike'. When is terrorism not terrorism? Apparently when it is committed by a more powerful government against those at home and abroad who are weaker than itself and whom it regards as a potential threat or even as insufficiently supportive of its own objectives.

*Julius K. Nyerere*<sup>1</sup>

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The above quotation summarises the emotional tone and the mood of frustration of the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa as regional interaction patterns increasingly came to consist of conflict than co-operation in the 1980s. It also underlines the dominant characteristic of South Africa as the regional actor, a dominance which has, over time manifested itself in several ways. Due to its *apartheid* policies, South Africa has been a pariah of sorts. The application of its economic and military preponderance in the region has made the Republic look and act like a regional bully, ruffian or even leviathan.

Looking at the history of the region in the last half a century, and extracting from the bulk of the literature on it, there is no doubt that South Africa's regional policies have been systematic and coherent. Co-operation, patronage and conflict

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<sup>1</sup>Julius K. Nyerere, "Foreword", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. vii.

have characterised these depending upon (i) the behaviour of the target state/regime, and (ii) the short- and long-term needs of the Republic's state/regime rather than political economy or its peoples. In some respects, however, regional conflict interaction patterns have assumed a typical action-reaction dichotomy rather than reflecting a structure of regional hegemony, i.e. South Africa is not always and in all cases so dominant, probably because of drawbacks of *apartheid*.

To contend that South Africa's regional policies have been systematic is also to acknowledge the primacy of one of the major policies which has governed Pretoria's regional relations—total national strategy. This chapter briefly analyses factors leading to the formulation of that strategy: its rise and fall from mid-1970s to 1980s. To do so it is necessary to situate the Republic's perception of its regional security, as total national strategy has been described variously as *total response* to *total onslaught*.<sup>2</sup> It will be shown that one particular aspect of that strategy—destabilisation—has been widely used and most effective; it also happens to be the most documented element.

In addition, this chapter attempts, without diluting their general impact, to clear up some lingering misconceptions apparent in the literature about *militarisation* and destabilisation. The chapter, therefore, sets a stage for the next, by simply indicating that South Africa's policies were substantially responsible for the decline of the FLS alliance (as well as its rise); that is, the regional hegemony has, over time, had a negative impact on regional development. It will also be shown that there is no consensus among scholars and observers on the nature, dynamics and effects of the Republic's total national strategy.

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<sup>2</sup>According to South Africa's own perception.

## TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

It is intended here to elucidate two salient elements related to South Africa's total national strategy: (i) its formulation and (ii) its definition. Frankel, for example, has observed that South African military thinking was, and possibly continues to be, heavily influenced by a French strategist, André Beaufre.<sup>3</sup> However, Frankel's only substantive evidence for this assertion is that Beaufre's works are read in staff colleges in the Republic.<sup>4</sup> Much as this strategist has been an advocate of total strategy, the current security doctrine in the RSA does not necessarily put Beaufre's influence above that of others. Frankel may have equated the title of one of Beaufre's books, especially *An Introduction to Strategy With Particular Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*, with South Africa's own formulation of total national strategy.<sup>5</sup> Whatever influence such general, external thinkers may have there are also local conditions which national strategic planners have to take into consideration. National strategies, including that of South Africa, are more indigenous than foreign, contrary to Chan's suggestion.

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<sup>3</sup>Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, pp. 46-70.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. André Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy With Particular Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*, Translated by R. H. Barry (New York: Praeger, 1965), especially Chapter One; with Clausewitz, *On War*; Gray, *Strategic Studies*; B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Second Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1976); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), *Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Utility* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976), and *Strategy*; and Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), among others.

What is a national strategy? The *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* distinguishes between military and national strategies. The former is defined as:

...the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policies by the application of force, or threat of force...,

whereas the latter is:

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, national strategy is more comprehensive and more encompassing than the more narrowly-defined *military* strategy. This is more so after Malaysia, Korea, Vietnam etc., as military has become but one component in a broader policy. Such a national strategy is similar to what is termed in South Africa as the total national strategy.

### Origins of Total National Strategy

There is a general consensus among students of the region that total national strategy was formulated from the mid-1970s as a response to both internal and external pressures faced by the beleaguered White regime in South Africa, and coinciding with the rise of the FLS.<sup>7</sup> Such pressures were not mutually exclusive and, in fact,

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<sup>6</sup>Quoted in Russell F. Weigly, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. xvii and also in Luttwak, *Strategy*, p. 240.

<sup>7</sup>See, among others, Chan, "Foreign Policies in Southern Africa", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, pp. 8-125; Chipasula and Miti, "South Africa and its SADCC Neighbours"; Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978", *Journal of Southern African Studies (JSAS)*, Vol. 11 No. 2, (April 1985), pp. 183-89; Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*, passim.; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, pp. 32-40; Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe", pp. 39-59.

reinforced each other. Internally, total national strategy was necessary to deal with an ever-increasing wave of activism and militancy particularly in the urban areas (townships), especially as the country was increasingly becoming ungovernable. Defiance, strikes, demonstrations and boycotts partly culminated in the Soweto uprisings of 1976<sup>8</sup> among others. This was further exacerbated by sabotage and other activities (of a military nature) by the South African liberation movements, especially the ANC (and to some extent, the PAC). These internal pressures, which were threatening the very base of *apartheid* system, could not be completely or forever contained by the Republic's many *apartheid* laws, states of emergency or military might. In part, this was due to the way internal were linked to external pressures.

As discussed in Chapters Two and Four, the tide of liberation struggles which was sweeping across Southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s was of major concern to South Africa. The coup in Portugal in 1974 and subsequent independence in Angola and Mozambique, and armed struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia all made South Africa look for ways and means either (i) to stop the liberation process where such was erroneously conceived to be possible (such as in Rhodesia and Namibia) or (ii) to curb its spill-over into the Republic. Three main factors were associated with this growing "threat": (i) the rise and increasing intensity of the liberation struggles themselves, (ii) the advent of "Marxist" regimes in the neighbourhood—Angola and Mozambique—and the possibility of two others—Namibia and Zimbabwe—and, (iii) the growing interest and involvement of communist bloc powers, especially Cuba and the Soviet Union, in Southern Africa. Together, these helped to shape South Africa's threat perception in terms of total onslaught.

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<sup>8</sup>Stephen Chan, "Apartheid and Foreign Policy: A Chronology", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, p. 5.



It is important to note that of these several external developments, perhaps the Republic's own military involvement in Angola, especially in 1975/76, may have shaped the dominant military aspects of strategy. According to Legum, that particular South African intervention and its subsequent defeat at the hands of the *Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola* (FAPLA) supported by thousands of Cuban troops shattered the myth of military (and hence racial) superiority which the Republic had enjoyed in the region since the turn of this century. In his lengthy and in some cases value-ridden description Legum observed that:

For SA, the Angolan affair was possibly the most traumatic in its history since the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century. It was the first time the SA army had been committed to fight in an African war. The operations in Rhodesia were of a completely different order—there the SA were fighting alongside white Rhodesians in limited operations against poorly-armed guerrillas; in Angola they were fighting alongside Africans [UNITA] against forces equipped with modern weapons and well-trained Cuban soldiers. Because the SA's role was principally that of supporting inadequately-trained and armed African troops, and because they did not commit their substantial mechanised and air forces into battle, they were fighting well below their true strength. The outcome was humiliating defeat for *themselves and* the side they had chosen to support. For the first time in modern history, White SA soldiers ended up as prisoners of war in African hands—a complete reversal of what SA had come to expect....The failure of the whole enterprise left the SA regime without a single crumb of comfort—and by contrast, the morale of black SA opponents of apartheid was boosted (emphasis supplied).<sup>9</sup>

However, this rather simplistic/stereotypical description of the South African involvement in Angola is flawed for several reasons. First, Legum suggests that South Africa had a limited objective: that of supporting UNITA. In fact, South Africa had a much broader objective, that of confronting the total onslaught whereby Angola was but only one case. In Angola, the objective included unseating the Marxist MPLA government in Luanda. It seems Legum was equating an underestimation

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<sup>9</sup>Colin Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers", in Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 35-36.

of the enemy forces—which was not deliberate on the part of the South African Defence Force (SADF) planners, as exhibited by their sending of an inferior force—with a limited objective. And second, Legum's observation that SADF "were fighting below their true strength" is not supported by later events. This was not the last defeat for South Africa in Angola. It was again humiliated even more significantly in another major defeat in Cuito Cuanavale early in 1988.<sup>10</sup> The first defeat should have served a lesson for future military adventures. Besides, it is inconceivable that South Africa's frequent attacks, including several occasions of physical occupation of not insignificant parts of Angola's territory, were meant to achieve only limited objective.

Despite such flaws, Legum makes a very important observation that the 1975/76 (and subsequent) South African defeats were historic. It was partly such defeats which necessitated rethinking on how best to confront the now evident onslaught. This may have contributed substantially toward the formulation of a total national strategy.

The Republic's initial response to its perceived external threat manifested itself in a series of interrelated policies, the major ones of which were dialogue, *détente*<sup>11</sup> and CONSAS. The application of any one or a mixture of these did not immediately constitute a national strategy, however, even when coupled with a military aspect, as was the case in Angola. They only constituted what Davies and O'Meara have termed "formative action".<sup>12</sup> This is because such proposals were

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<sup>10</sup>See Kenneth D. Kaunda, "Foreword", in Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. xvi.

<sup>11</sup>*Détente* was shattered after the 1975/76 Angolan debacle. See Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers", in Legum and Hodges, *After Angola*, p. 36.

<sup>12</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", p. 184.

attempted individually, outside the framework of a well-articulated policy by a well-formulated machinery to carry-out or implement them on a permanent basis. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s the stage was set for a total national strategy.

When such a strategy was finally formulated it was presented in a White Paper on Defence in 1977 in which several aspects were outlined. Davies and O'Meara elaborated its salient elements:

In the 1977 Defence White Paper—the document which top military commanders first publicly laid out and called for the adoption of their 'Total Strategy'—it was argued that the mobilisation of economic, political and psycho-social as well as military resources was necessary to defend and advance the interests of the apartheid state both at the internal and regional levels. More specifically, the White Paper identifies the need to 'maintain a solid balance relative to neighbouring and other states in Southern Africa. At the same time it called for 'economic action' and 'action in relation to transport services, distribution and telecommunications' to promote 'political and economic collaboration among the states of Southern Africa'.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, to a large extent the Defence White Paper of 1977 spelt out clearly the components of the strategy. And, after the defeat in Angola, the military option became only one component out of several outlined.

However, what is clear in both the formulation and execution of the total national strategy is the central role of the military, thus giving rise to the further or undeniable militarisation of the *apartheid* state, a process which has tended to dominate scholarly work and debate on Southern Africa in recent years.<sup>14</sup> What is

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<sup>13</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", p. 189. See also North-South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy: Toward Economic Recovery and Development in Southern Africa*, A Report of the North-South Roundtable Consultation in Juliasdale, Zimbabwe, December 1-3, 1988 (Islamabad: North-South Roundtable, 1989), p. 17.

<sup>14</sup>See, among others, Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, passim.; Crocker, *South Africa's Defence Posture*; Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*; Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for African Front-Line States*, his "South African Defence Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military" in Foltz and Bienen (eds.), *Arms and the African*, pp. 121-153, and also *South Africa and Its Neighbours*; Patel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe"; and Menaul, *The Border Wars*.

meant by militarisation, and whether or not as a process it helps in explaining South Africa's internal and external behaviour, are important questions. Militarisation is also dialectical in the sense that there has been a certain amount of it in the FLS countries in response to South Africa's.

### **Militarisation Process in South Africa**

Although it is difficult to differentiate between various types of militarisation—of decision-making, politics, bureaucracy, ideology and image—it is still important to spell out which parts of South African society and especially of the state have been militarised, to what extent, and for what purposes. Thus, militarisation can be defined as a process by which the military is incorporated into decision-making processes and other spheres on a continuing, non-controversial basis which under other conditions would have been purely civilian domains. This includes ideology which supports, as well as acceptability of, such tendencies. Grundy has described this process in the Republic:

...the armed forces, or more accurately the security establishment, has positioned itself at the centre of power. The South African Defence Force (SADF) is no longer simply an instrument for policy implementation. It is an active participant in policy-making. Not merely in military matters, but in wider security issues, both domestic and external, and even in matters concerning the homelands or bantustans, and economic and foreign policy, those associated with a military perspective have gained the ascendant.<sup>15</sup>

So, at first glance, militarisation, at least at the level of decision-making in matters which have military elements, is not unique to South Africa. It is a trend commonly found in some countries in similar conflict situations as South Africa, namely, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel, South Korea, Yugoslavia, etc. What is unique is the extent of

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<sup>15</sup>Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*, p. 1. This, however, is also exemplified by the recent revelations of the military's covert actions, discussed in Chapter Six, below.

this involvement, and more so the "self-positioning" of the military at the centre of power. These are unique elements, given that South Africa basically has a civilian somewhat, "democratic" (within the White tribe), albeit *apartheid*, constitution.<sup>16</sup>

In terms of explanation of this rise of militarisation, there is a consensus among scholars that, in addition to the general situation of perceived and actual threat to the Republic's polity, the leadership changes of 1978 were very much responsible.<sup>17</sup> These involved, first, the assumption of power of Pieter W. Botha as prime minister and later state president from John B. Vorster, and, second, the elevation of Gen. Magnus Malan from Chief of Defence Forces to Minister of Defence. However, the most important element in this transition was the reorganisation and restructuring of the state's decision-making which symbolised the Botha era. It seems that P.W. Botha's many years as minister of defence contributed to his admiration of the military's organisational efficiency, which he emulated and instituted throughout his own "civilian" administration. In other words, it was not direct but "militarisation" via civilian advocates. Geldenhuys pointed this out in very clear terms:

The key to understanding the reorganisation is P.W. Botha himself. In his many years as Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha became well acquainted and impressed with the management system operating in the South African Defence Force. It appeared far more dynamic and effective than the system employed in the public service generally. As Defence Minister P.W. Botha established a reputation as an able administrator and he probably not merely learned from but also contributed to Defence Force Management practices.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>It would not be so strange to see militarisation of decision-making if South Africa had a military government.

<sup>17</sup>Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978" in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, pp. 189-193; Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 90; and Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*, pp. 1-18.

<sup>18</sup>Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 90.

Consequently, what was merely a component in the White Paper on Defence (1977) during the Vorster era—total national strategy—now became official state policy.<sup>19</sup> In addition, there was a reformulation of the Cabinet Committees which had been in place since 1972. They were now streamlined from six to four. The general characteristic of this reorganisation was the diminution of the Cabinet.<sup>20</sup> The most important of these was the State Security Council (SSC); which arose out of a carefully formulated National Security Management System (NSMS).<sup>21</sup> The SSC not only towered above the rest, but it was also the formulator and executor of the Republic's security policy, as well as being the caretaker of the total national strategy.<sup>22</sup>

The significance and indeed the preponderance of the SSC did not rest solely with the numbers of the military personnel on it. Rather, numbers are important in so far as they are a necessary indication and condition towards the whole process of militarisation. This is because any country which has some form of security council/committee or another has to include the military. The real significance of the military lies in the manner in which it influences decisions, particularly the shaping of threat perception so as to make it appear that every problem in society is of a

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<sup>19</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *JSAS* Vol. 11 No. 2, (April 1985), p. 189.

<sup>20</sup>Stephen Chan, "Foreign Policies in Southern Africa: is a New Epoch Possible? 1988 and Beyond", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, p. 126; and Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *Ibid.*, p. 192.

<sup>21</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *JSAS*, Vol. 11 No. 2, (April 1985), p. 193.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 192. See also "The Secretariat of the SSC is certainly considerably larger than any of the others, consisting of about 45 people in 1983", Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, p. 92.

military nature and so needs a military solution. Davies and O'Meara summarised this militarisation of issues and values by the early-1980s:

In effect the SSC is now the primary decision making body in the South African state. Its statutory responsibility is to advise the government on the formulation and implementation of 'national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic'. This is wide enough to, *and it does in fact* embrace virtually every area of government internal and external activity. In practice, the SSC concerns itself with and manages the total range of policy strategies of the state. Under the Total Strategy, everything deemed to be connected with security of the state falls under its purview—from foreign policy to the price of bread (emphasis supplied).<sup>23</sup>

Thus, this in large part helps to explain the holistic nature of security threat perception by the South African regime especially in terms of a total onslaught which it considers to call for total national strategy.<sup>24</sup>

Having established that it is the extent of what the military did in and through the SSC rather than its mere presence that explains militarisation, it is also important to discuss another element related to the extent of militarisation in South Africa: national data or resources on defence, especially numbers in the armed forces and defence expenditures. It is also instructive to observe that ideology and secret police both inside and outside the Republic play important roles to reinforce militarisation.

Figures in Table VI show that the Republic is overwhelmingly superior in terms of total armed forces, gross national product (GNP) and defence expenditures at least in the period in which militarisation was ascendant, 1976/77 to 1980/81. At the same time, the most important item here seems to be GNP; this is, the one factor which supports the other variables. It is clear that, when destabilisation began to be

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<sup>23</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa", *JSAS*, Vol. 11 No. 2, (April 1985), p. 193.

<sup>24</sup>Just like the rest of the Third World, and given uncertainties of under-development, there is in South and Southern Africa a disposition to define security in its totality; that is, everything that affects human life becomes part of this broad security.

**Table VI**  
**REGIONAL RESOURCE AND EXPENDITURE COMPARISON 1976-1986**

COUNTRY/VARIABLE	YEAR									
	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86
<b>ANGOLA</b>										
Population (m)	5.40	6.10	6.30	6.60	6.70	6.85	7.00	7.18	7.80	8.00
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	30.00	31.50	33.00	40.00	32.50	33.00	37.50	37.50	43.00	49.50
% increase	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Est. GNP (\$ b)	5.00	4.80	4.80	21.20	-19.0	1.50	13.64	0.00	14.67	15.12
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ b)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.66	n.a.	n.a.	4.00	4.19
% increase	n.a.	0.10	0.10	0.10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.75	0.80	0.78
As % of GNP	n.a.	n.a.	0.00	0.00	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-54.3	-2.50
	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20.00	18.61
<b>BOTSWANA</b>										
Population (m)	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.81	0.90	0.98	0.92	0.98
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
% increase	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Est. GNP (\$ b)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.30	0.40	0.40	0.61	0.95	1.10	1.05
% increase	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	33.33	0.00	52.50	55.72	15.79	-4.55
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ millions)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	22.00	29.00	27.00	27.00	27.00
% increase	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	31.80	-6.90	0.00	0.00
As % of GNP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.50	4.83	2.84	2.45	2.57
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>										
Population (m)	9.00	9.65	9.87	10.12	10.17	10.61	11.50	12.65	12.00	12.32
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	10.00	19.00	21.20	24.00	24.30	26.70	21.60	12.65	15.65	15.80
% increase	90.00	11.58	13.21	1.25	9.88	-19.1	-41.4	23.72	0.96	



(Table VI continued)

	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86
Est. GNP (\$ b) & increase	n.a.	n.a.	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	2.80	2.95	2.95	3.01
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ millions) & increase	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.00	0.00	6.25	64.71	5.38	0.00	2.03
As % of GNP	n.a.	20.00	110.0	12.00	18.00	20.00	19.00	20.00	20.00	21.00
	n.a.	n.a.	450.0	9.10	50.00	11.11	-5.00	5.26	0.00	5.00
	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.69	1.13	11.76	6.79	6.78	6.78	6.98
<b>TANZANIA</b>										
Population (m)	15.57	16.00	16.52	16.98	17.50	19.12	19.00	20.50	20.50	21.30
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	14.60	18.60	26.70	51.70	51.85	44.85	40.35	40.35	40.35	40.35
& increase	27.40	43.60	93.60	0.30	-13.50	-10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Est. GNP (\$ b)	1.90	1.90	2.90	3.37	3.90	3.90	4.90	5.27	5.51	5.54
& increase	0.00	0.00	52.64	16.20	15.73	0.00	25.64	7.55	12.45	0.54
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ millions)	7.00	7.00	14.00	14.00	31.00	18.00	18.00	32.00	31.00	31.00
& increase	0.00	100.00	0.00	121.4	-41.90	0.00	77.77	-3.13	0.00	0.00
As % of GNP	3.68	3.68	4.83	4.15	7.85	4.62	3.67	6.07	5.63	5.60
<b>ZAMBIA</b>										
Population (m)	5.07	5.24	5.40	5.73	5.73	6.02	6.00	6.20	6.60	6.80
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	7.80	8.50	14.30	14.30	14.30	15.50	14.30	14.30	14.30	16.20
& increase	8.97	68.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.39	-7.74	0.00	0.00	13.29
Est. GNP (\$ b)	2.50	2.50	2.20	2.32	2.54	2.80	4.18	3.52	3.38	2.64
& increase	0.00	-12.0	5.45	9.48	10.24	49.29	-15.8	-3.97	-21.9	-21.9
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ millions)	8.00	31.00	31.00	31.00	39.00	39.00	62.00	n.a.	33.00	n.a.
& increase	287.50	0.00	0.00	25.80	0.00	58.97	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
As % of GNP	1.27	12.40	14.10	5.76	4.97	6.04	3.55	n.a.	2.89	n.a.

(Table VI continued)

	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>										
Population (m)	6.53	6.75	6.99	7.22	7.30	7.67	7.50	8.00	8.30	8.50
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	9.20	9.55	10.80	21.50	13.50	34.00	63.00	41.30	41.00	42.00
% increase	3.80	13.09	99.07	-37.2	151.8	85.29	-34.5	-0.73	2.44	
Est. GNP (\$ b)	3.60	3.40	3.10	4.00	3.30	3.30	5.08	6.24	5.78	5.78
% increase	-5.55	-8.82	29.03	-17.5	0.00	53.93	22.83	-7.37	0.00	
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ b)	0.13	0.16	0.24	0.40	0.44	0.44	0.56	0.34	0.56	0.24
% increase	23.07	50.00	66.00	0.00	0.00	27.27	-39.3	69.70	-57.2	
As % of GNP	3.61	4.71	7.74	10.00	13.33	13.33	11.02	5.45	9.69	4.15
<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b>										
Population (m)	26.23	26.91	27.58	28.06	28.80	29.03	29.50	26.10	26.80	29.00
Tot. Armed Forces ('000)	51.50	55.00	65.50	63.25	86.06	92.70	81.40	82.40	83.40	106.4
% increase	6.80	19.09	-3.93	36.04	7.73	-12.2	1.23	1.21	27.58	
Est. GNP (\$ b)	34.60	31.70	43.80	43.77	54.30	54.30	81.10	71.67	70.94	64.50
% increase	-8.38	38.17	-0.07	24.06	0.00	49.36	-11.6	-1.02	-9.07	
Est. Def. Expend. (\$ b)	1.50	1.90	2.62	2.23	2.56	2.56	2.76	2.77	2.94	4.27
% increase	26.66	37.89	-14.9	14.79	0.00	7.81	0.36	6.14	45.24	
As % of GNP	4.34	6.00	5.98	5.10	4.71	4.71	3.40	3.86	4.14	6.62

Source: *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976/77-1985/86).

carried out on a wider scale in 1980/81, South Africa's GNP was almost twice as large as that of the combined total of the remaining parts of the region, and probably the gap is increasing due to SAPs, devaluations, etc.

Table VI also shows that various increases/decreases in individual FLS country's security expenditure can be explained separately. The total armed forces in Mozambique, for example, increased by 90 per cent between 1976/77 and 1977/78, from 10,000 to 19,000, probably due to restructuring of the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FPLM) from a guerrilla to a conventional army. Likewise, those of Botswana rose by 100 per cent between 1979/80 to 1980/81: a formative period for a country which did not have an army before 1977. These factors are not substantially explained by Johnson and Martin.<sup>25</sup>

South Africa had an increase of 36 per cent in the number of its total armed forces between 1979/80 and 1980/81. This is a big increase given that the increase was only seven per cent between 1976/77 and 1977/78. The 1979/80-1980/81 increase becomes spectacular due to the fact that it was a further addition to a huge number already unmatched by any of South Africa's neighbours, and that its economy was growing only slowly at the time. This increase portrays a different picture when viewed against other variables, however. South Africa has the largest population in the region, and in 1980/81 the ratio was 313 people per soldier compared to 225 people per soldier in Zimbabwe during the same period. Also, during the same period South Africa's defence expenditure increased by only 15 per cent compared to the 50 per cent increase in Mozambique. South Africa's defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP was five per cent in 1980/81, compared to 13 per cent in Zimbabwe in the same year.

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<sup>25</sup>See Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, passim.

Looking at the situation from another angle, South Africa's defence costs have been falling as a proportion of total government expenditures since 1977. In that year, defence consumed 18 per cent; in 1981 17 per cent; and in 1985 it was down to 14 per cent.<sup>26</sup> "South Africa hardly looks extended" observed Grundy when he compared it with the 1982 figures for Israel (41 per cent) and South Korea (35 per cent), the two countries which have been under comparable "pariah" security situations to South Africa.<sup>27</sup> So, a 36 per cent increase in the number of total armed forces (in one year) is the only indicator in Table VI to suggest the degree of South Africa's militarisation against that of other countries in the region. Nevertheless, this indicator is not comprehensive or authoritative enough.

These defence budgetary elements do not, therefore, on their own, support the militarisation theory, as increased military expenditure occurred in the FLS also. Militarisation is a process which has to be sought and evaluated along a number of variables. In addition to the preference of the then President Botha for the military organisation system, the dominance of the military in decision-making, especially the SSC, and the general (albeit relative) growth of the Republic's total armed forces and defence expenditures (and defence expenditure as a percentage of the GNP), it should be added that the conduct of South Africa's regional policy, including the role of secret police, etc., has shown tendencies towards militarisation. This is also confirmed by the fact that, of all the components of the total national strategy, regional destabilisation by the South African state has been its most preferred form of operationalisation, its most dominant response which is/was most painful to its victims.

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<sup>26</sup>Grundy, *The Militarisation of South African Politics*, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 20.

## SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL POLICY

The most important and observable element of South Africa's policy towards Southern Africa has been destabilisation. It was suggested in Chapter Two that there is a possibility of it being at least in part a two-way or dual process in which each party to the conflict has had its share, although the magnitude of each actor may not be the same. An attempt is made here to show the extent to which destabilisation has been an action-reaction in the conduct of international relations in Southern Africa albeit in a lopsided manner. This entails looking at what each side—the Republic and the FLS and other majority-ruled countries in the region—wanted from each other.

### **The Front Line States: Change of *Status Quo***

It has become something of an African tradition to resist any externally-imposed *status quo*. This has been the case ever since colonialism appeared on the continent. In the case of Southern Africa, it was shown in Chapter Three that various inter-state and other groupings were formed before and after the OAU whose main concern was the liberation. Countries which became independent took it upon themselves to help others. It was also shown in Chapters Two and Three that South Africa was itself regarded as a colonial power due to its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its collusion with Portugal and the rebel colony of Rhodesia to perpetuate colonialism/White settler minority rule; and, that it itself was a target of liberation movements due to its *apartheid* policies. It was partly because of this "south-ward" pressure that the Republic perceived of total onslaught that needed total response—total national strategy.

That the members of the FLS alliance and others, were helping the liberation movements in the region was perhaps perceived by South Africa as the initiation of hostilities and interference in its internal affairs. Thus, hosting refugees, and training, arming and transiting freedom fighters, including the ANC, which were to facilitate the collapse of *status quo*, were perhaps the primary physical behaviours in the action-reaction scenario. These have, of course, included supporting international sanctions and the continued diplomatic isolation of South Africa. Despite their expected consequences—reactions from the adversary—such actions have continued through to Namibia's independence and the unbanning of the ANC and its (temporary?) suspension of the armed struggle.

In what sense, then, were the members of the FLS alliance provoking the hostilities to which the Republic reacted? On the one hand, any country which has its neighbours supporting its "dissidents" is bound to complain about such actions as interference and provocation. Portugal and Rhodesia did complain just as South Africa has done, including intimidating such supporters. One example was that of complaints by Portugal against Zambia despite the latter's efforts to restrain the activities of the liberation movements it hosted.<sup>28</sup> These were general complaints about any country which assisted the liberation struggle, especially by hosting the liberation movements.

The members of the alliance may therefore be seen to have made destabilisation a two-way process *only in this limited sense*. In so doing, however, they (and others) were only fulfilling their *moral* and *international* obligations. They never expected or deserved the punishments and reactions they received in response. The

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<sup>28</sup>See Douglas G. Anglin, "Confrontation in Southern Africa: Zambia and Portugal", *International Journal*, Vol. XXV No. 3, (Summer 1970), pp. 506-7. For complaints by South Africa and Rhodesia, see Pettman, *Zambia*, Chapter Five, pp. 52-201.

involvement of the FLS in the liberation struggle as part of their international obligations thus calls for further elaboration.

The FLS and other neighbouring countries of South Africa are members of both the OAU and the UN. As shown in Chapter Four, the purposes and principles of the former stipulate eradication of colonialism and emphasise total emancipation of the continent. This means that the actions of the members of the alliance were legitimised and legalised by Africa's continental organisation. Although there is hardly any compensation for it, apart from ever-increasing numbers of promises and declarations of support,<sup>29</sup> the members of the alliance were reinforcing OAU purposes, principles and resolutions against colonialism and *apartheid*. This point was also emphasised by the former president of Tanzania and first chair of the FLS alliance, Julius Nyerere:

The real offence of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe—and any other countries within reach of South African power—is their existence as proudly independent African states. As such they have the temerity to back up the demand of the Organisation of African Unity for an end to *apartheid*. They dare to demand world action against the cancer of *apartheid* and to succour those who flee from its persecutions.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>See, for example:

The OAU undertakes to provide every assistance requested by the governments of Angola and Mozambique in order to secure peace for their people...[and to] provide every possible help to the frontline countries to enable them to withstand Pretoria's campaign of aggression and disruption and maintain their backing of the people of Namibia and South Africa.

"The Harare Declaration, 1989", *ARB(PS)* Vol. 26 No. 8, (September 15 1989), p. C9367.

<sup>30</sup>Nyerere, "Foreword", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. xi.

Without delving into various contradictions inherent in the UN Charter,<sup>31</sup> especially between prohibiting and allowing interference in a state's "internal" affairs, it suffices to say that the members of the FLS alliance were acting within the stipulations of the UN as well. Although the alliance members have mainly been left on their own to face the consequences of upholding UN positions, as is the case with the OAU, at least the very endorsement—that assisting liberation movements is not equivalent to military (or any other) interference in a state's internal affairs—helps to absolve them of any wrong-doing; or, more specifically, of provoking destabilisation. This is very much implied in Macfarlane's discussion:

The General Assembly has to some extent weakened the traditional prohibition on assistance to insurgent groups by calling upon member governments to assist national liberation movements and by maintaining that their struggles are matters of international rather than domestic jurisdiction. This is an extension of a justification of intervention in terms of the right of self-determination *and independence* which is of long standing. The General Assembly has failed to define precisely what disputes fall into the category of wars of national liberation, but, judging from the body of its resolutions... three kinds... may be included: struggles against colonial rule;...those against apartheid; and those against 'foreign occupation' (the General Assembly views Namibia and also Palestine in these terms) (emphasis supplied).<sup>32</sup>

Macfarlane observed further that:

In addition to calling upon states to support, materially and morally, movements involved in these struggles [for national liberation], the General Assembly has attempted to prohibit assistance to governments which are the targets of wars of liberation (*such*) as were Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa (emphasis supplied).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>For an extensive, see Neil Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper No. 196, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 23-24.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 23.



Thus, what all this means is that the actions of the members of the FLS alliance—to condemn *apartheid*, to demand and reinforce change in the *status quo* and to assist various liberation movements—are within the legal limits of the United Nations. In this broad sense, based at least on that part of international law governed by the UN, the members of the alliance were, by their supportive actions, *not* destabilising South Africa, which would reasonably or necessarily provoke a *legitimate* reaction. There are, of course, continuing debates on the differences of degree of destabilisation between the Pretoria regime on the one hand, and its neighbours, on the other.

This is contrary to two assertions by one advocate and proponent of destabilisation. In his pioneering article, "*Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa*", Geldenhuys first suggested that the destabiliser—South Africa—was simply protecting its legitimate national interests:

A further difficulty is that destabilisation means different things to different people: what for a target state (i.e. the state which is, or perceives itself to be, subjected to destabilisation by another) constitutes destabilisation, may for the 'offending' state represent no more than the legitimate protection of its national interests.<sup>34</sup>

This is not convincing in the light of the above explication, also given that *apartheid* is internationally condemned, having been classified by the UN as a threat to international peace and security in 1961 and ever since.<sup>35</sup>

The other assertion is that the members of the FLS were in fact destabilising South Africa. This was argued by Geldenhuys thus:

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<sup>34</sup>Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", p. 1. See also his "Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option For South Africa", in Deon Geldenhuys and William Gutteridge, *Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role in Regional Security*, Conflict Studies No. 148, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983), p. 12.

<sup>35</sup>Chan, "Apartheid and Foreign Policy", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, p. 4.

The provision of sanctuary to SWAPO and the ANC, together with the presence of Cuban and other communist forces in neighbouring states, represent attempts to destabilise the Republic. Similarly, black states' political and moral support for the so-called liberation movements, and clamour for sanctions against South Africa and for its international isolation, are part of a concerted campaign to destabilise the country.<sup>36</sup>

This is not only redundant and superfluous but, together with the first equally extreme Machiavellian assertion (above)—"the end justifies the means"<sup>37</sup>—they tend to justify a false argument: that the members of the FLS alliance were destabilising the Republic and that the latter was just reacting in its "national interest".

In terms of what the FLS wanted from South Africa, it is clear that it was self-determination and independence for Namibia plus also an end to *apartheid* inside the Republic and any attempts to regionalise it; that is, a change in the *status quo*. What, then, did South Africa want from the FLS alliance?

The basis of South Africa's regional policy was rooted in regional dominance. Any attempt to diminish or reduce such dominance in any way, was considered to constitute a security threat to the Republic. This comprises several items. The first one is the *political-ideological*. The Republic has been struggling to rationalise that *apartheid* is good or at least not bad.<sup>38</sup> Together with this, it has emphasised that *apartheid* is an internal policy and, therefore, is an internal affair. As a result the Republic has been forcing its independent neighbours to acquiesce in *apartheid*. In other words, South Africa has said that racism and White minority rule should be

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<sup>36</sup>Geldenhuys, "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", p. 4.

<sup>37</sup>"So let a prince win and maintain his state: the means will always be judged honourable, and will be praised by everyone", Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince, A New Translation with an Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 71.

<sup>38</sup>See discussion in Chapter Two, above.

accepted alongside *apartheid*, colonialism in Namibia as well as Bantustanisation. It would seem that since the Republic was seen by the international community as a quintessential pariah state, as exhibited by a series of measures against it,<sup>39</sup> it has consistently endeavoured to regain its place in the international community. This process was to begin at home through Bantustanisation, and move slowly outwards through dialogue, détente and CONSAS. When the regional as well as internal response was negative, persuasion gave way to coercion. It was now "condone *apartheid* or else!" This is partly what destabilisation is all about in political-ideological, as well as diplomatic-strategic, terms.

And the second item is *economic* dominance. This is an area which has received much scholarly attention just like destabilisation.<sup>40</sup> However, the existing literature on economic relations in Southern Africa rightly focuses on the networks of dependence and interdependence. While such networks are very important in understanding the intricacies of the Southern African political economy, they are, on their own, insufficient to explain South Africa's urge for dominance on the one hand, and the majority-ruled states' desire for interdependence rather than perpetual

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<sup>39</sup>For example, the UN General Assembly began to consider *apartheid* as an international issue in 1952; recognised it as a danger to international peace and security in 1961, the same year as South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth. In 1962 the UN General Assembly set up Special Committee Against Apartheid. In 1974 South Africa was suspended from the UN General Assembly and excluded from UN activities. For details on many of these and other measures, see Chan, "Apartheid and Foreign Policy", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, pp. 3-7.

<sup>40</sup>See, among others, Chipasula and Miti, "South Africa and Its SADCC Neighbours"; Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 245-280; Timothy M. Shaw and Edward Leppan, "South Africa: White Power and the Regional Military-Industrial Complex", in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 251-277; North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*.

dependence, on the other. And this is where most studies on Southern Africa fall short.

However, the two—political-ideological and economic dominance—are rarely put together or juxtaposed. Their proportional mix and application as well as their concentration, are discussed in Chapter Six, below.

**Table VII**

**SOUTH AFRICA'S AND FLS ALLIANCE'S SHARE OF REGIONAL WEALTH:  
1988/1989**

<b>Country</b>	<b>GDP US\$ bns</b>	<b>GDP per capita \$</b>	<b>% Regional Share</b>
Angola	4.05	470	4.01
Botswana	1.14	990	1.13
Mozambique	2.55	210	2.53
Tanzania	4.57	250	4.53
Zambia	2.03	410	2.01
Zimbabwe	5.55	620	5.49
<b>Total FLS</b>	<b>19.89</b>	<b>330*</b>	<b>19.695</b>
South Africa	81.10	1850	80.30
<b>Reg. Total</b>	<b>100.99</b>	<b>686</b>	<b>100.00</b>

\* Calculated from a total GDP of US\$ 19.89 billion and an estimated population of 60 million.

**Sources:**

- (i) North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy: Toward Economic Recovery and Development in Southern Africa* (Islamabad: North South Roundtable, 1989), p. 16.
- (ii) The World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1988, 1989, 1990).

It is an undisputed fact that South Africa is the economic giant in Southern Africa. Table VII shows that in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for example, the Republic had US\$ 80 billion in 1988/89 compared to a total of only US\$ 20 billion for the members of the FLS alliance. In other words, South Africa, with a population of 32 million, had 80 per cent of the regional wealth while the members of the FLS alliance, with a total population of approximately 60 million, enjoyed only 20 per cent. The ten countries that comprise SADCC together enjoy a total of US\$ 24 billion GDP.<sup>41</sup> The members of the FLS alliance had a GDP per capita of only US\$ 330, compared to South Africa's GDP per capita of US\$ 1850. It is also a fact that regional dependence networks, especially those of the majority-ruled states on South Africa, are historically rooted.<sup>42</sup> Thus, the two—a large share of the regional wealth and historically rooted dependence—have significantly affected the Republic's planners and decision-makers not only in terms of thinking about ways and means of perpetuating existing dependence but also to virtually *enslave* the region economically. A vivid example of the latter is Lesotho, a country which is totally surrounded by South Africa. That country is not allowed by the

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<sup>41</sup>The "Ten" are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For figures, see North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*, p. 16.

<sup>42</sup>See some aspects of this in Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 139-169; Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 245-280; Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, especially Chapter Two, pp. 28-82; Kenneth W. Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance", in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, pp. 291-312; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, passim.; Timothy M. Shaw, "Southern Africa: Dependence, Interdependence and Independence in a Regional Subsystem", in Shaw and Heard (eds.), *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa*, pp. 81-97; North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*, among others.

Republic to stock oil even for four months; that is, about 120,000 barrels.<sup>43</sup> Lesotho had already by 1983 built storage tanks for the purpose, yet South Africa refused to allow them to be filled. This oil enslavement was reported by *Africa Confidential* thus:

Lesotho (1,000 b/d) is clearly most vulnerable to a cut-off of oil supplies from South Africa. Not only is the country open to sabotage attacks, but the South Africans are able to squeeze the oil import route to reduce supplies. Algeria has offered to provide Lesotho with oil for a four-month stockpile. Storage tanks have already been constructed. So far South Africa has refused to allow the oil to be sent on to Lesotho.<sup>44</sup>

Probably Lesotho ought to have asked permission from South Africa to build its storage oil tanks first even before working out a deal with Algeria. However, by so doing Lesotho would have diminished its state sovereignty, which is what South Africa prefers.

Whereas, therefore, South Africa has gone beyond enjoying simple dominance, what the FLS alliance, and indeed the entire SADCC membership seems to have done is to attempt to pull-back, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s from enslavement designed by their adversary. Since interdependence is not South Africa's immediate goal, SADCC countries have tried in their own ways to assert some degree of economic independence. Whether by so doing SADCC has perpetuated its historically rooted dependence, is another matter. The argument here is that South Africa was not satisfied with, and wanted to go beyond, its neighbours' dependence on it. The latter thus objected to dependence by creating SADCC and continued to condemn *apartheid*. This in part explains why SADCC projects have

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<sup>43</sup>This is according to *Africa Confidential (AC)* estimates. See "Southern Africa: The Oil Weapon", *AC*, Vol. 24 No. 7, (30 March 1983), pp. 1-2.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

been targets of South Africa's destabilisation. What will happen to these if the ongoing positive changes within South Africa succeed remains speculation.

As an important component of total national strategy, destabilisation has used all the resources and techniques within South Africa's power. The success or failure of destabilisation has very much depended upon its objectives and the nature of the targets. Much as this study argues that destabilisation has contributed to the decline of the FLS at a general level, it has also engendered mixed results at specific levels. So the changing character of targets and the presence or absence of optimum conditions for destabilisation in them have determined its failure or success.

### OPTIMUM CONDITIONS

As a set of policy actions, destabilisation thrives where there are optimum receptive conditions. These can be divided into three categories. The first is the existence of soft-spots in the *body politic* which can be identified, expanded and later used by the destabiliser. So the presence of groups willing to be employed as instruments of destabilisation is very important. Sometimes such groups are used unconsciously. Even if they are created after the decision to destabilise has been made, such groups still need to exploit certain cleavages and weaknesses in the "body politic" to justify their existence. In this category such groups are political, at least in their external appearances.

The first example of one such group is the MNR in Mozambique. Its origins are too well-known to be repeated here.<sup>45</sup> This group has survived mostly due to

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<sup>45</sup>See documentation on the origins of the MNR by Isaacman, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique", p. 21; Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, "Mozambique: The Nkomati Accord and Beyond", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 1-41; and Flower, *Serving Secretly*, pp. 135-271.

its ability to take advantage of various basic political problems in Mozambique. These have included the centralisation and concentration of political power by a small group within the FRELIMO Central Committee, and frequent purges in the party and army.<sup>46</sup> Poor economic policies which caused low production especially in the rural areas created a situation whereby displaced rural workers and some peasants were "willing" or "forced" recruits of the MNR.<sup>47</sup> This necessitated a slow reversal of policy onto structural adjustment of a dramatic kind:

At the Fourth Party Congress in 1983 FRELIMO announced several steps aimed at reversing the economic crisis. Whereas the prior Congress was primarily concerned with establishing state control over strategic sectors of the economy, new policies were introduced to reverse this tendency by decentralising power and resources. In a characteristically self-critical assessment, FRELIMO's leaders acknowledged that heavy-handed statism was stifling local peasant initiatives and grassroots impulses. Instead of continuing to privilege Eastern European-style state farms, President Machel declared that 'the family sector in the countryside warrants immediate priority'.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, the government adopted a militant, deterministic and uncompromising approach in dealing with the MNR once that problem came into the open, especially after Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Thus there was a prefer-

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<sup>46</sup>The purges in the party and army, especially during their transformation, provided the MNR with some of its most important recruits such as Alfonso Dhlakama and Andre Matzangaiza who formed its first (Black) leadership. Mozambique disbanded most of its guerrilla units, forcing many "freedom fighters" into retirement and began to organise a conventional army, the FPLM. The Party was also restructured to reflect its Marxism-Leninism, in which it became the vanguard. So, many lost membership. For details, see Isaacman, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique", pp. 21-22; and Keith Middlemas, "Independent Mozambique and Its Regional Policy", in John Seiler (ed.), *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 217-227. For the most recent accounts, see Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique"; Vines, *RENAMO*; and Young, "The MNR/RENAMO".

<sup>47</sup>Isaacman, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique", pp. 20-21, and Middlemas, "Independent Mozambique and Its Regional Policy", in Seiler (ed.), *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, pp. 217-221.

<sup>48</sup>Isaacman, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique", p. 21.



ence for military solutions to a problem which is heavily political,<sup>49</sup> at least until the late-1980s.

The other example is that of UNITA in Angola.<sup>50</sup> Although there are differences in their histories, UNITA and MNR have certain characteristics in common. They have, for quite some time, been called rebels or simply *bandidos armados* by the respective governments of Angola and Mozambique, which precluded any negotiations with them.<sup>51</sup> They have both been supported by South Africa and, therefore, were willing and conscious tools of destabilisation. UNITA and MNR have also survived due to the nature of political systems in both countries which, at least until recently, never contemplated allowing opposition parties to exist.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>"Once you label someone a rebel, and more so a *bandido armado* [an armed bandit], it is difficult to turn back, face reality and negotiate as we are now doing. *Bandidos armados* are criminals, while rebels need to be crushed". Confidential interview with a senior Mozambican government official, Dar es Salaam (June 1990). For the preference of military solutions to problems which are also political, see Omari, "Angola and Namibia", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Seven. See also Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique", pp. 616-18.

<sup>50</sup>See, among others, Holness, "Angola", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 73-109; Marcum, "Angola" in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, pp. 175-198, and his "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Angola", in *Survival* Vol. XXX No. 1, (January/February 1988), pp. 3-14; Roger Martin, "Regional Security in Southern Africa: More Angolas, Mozambiques or Neutrals?", in *Survival* Vol. XXIX No. 5, (September/October 1987), pp. 387-402; Douglas L. Wheeler, "Portuguese Withdrawal From Africa, 1974-1975: The Angolan Case", in Seiler (ed.), *Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup*, pp. 3-21.

<sup>51</sup>See Omari, "Angola and Namibia", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*.

<sup>52</sup>There is now apparently some willingness in both countries to institute multiparties. In fact Mozambique has a new constitution already. For details, see Karl Maier, "Out-maneuvring Renamo: The Motives Behind Mozambique's New Constitution", *Southern Africa: Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM)*, Vol. 4 No.5, (February 1991), pp. 11-12; "Mozambique Will Allow Opposition Parties", in *The New York Times* (2 August 1990), Section A, p. 14; "Mr. dos Santos said that Luanda had made...the decision...to transform its nominally Marxist-Leninist Government into one with multiparty system", in Kenneth B. Noble, "Angolan Leader Gloomy on Talks", (continued...)

While the cases of MNR and UNITA are the most evident, somewhat similar situations existed in Lesotho (Lesotho Liberation Army-LLA)<sup>53</sup> and Zimbabwe (Super-ZAPU).<sup>54</sup> A unique case among all these groups was perhaps that of the "Mushala Gang" in Zambia,<sup>55</sup> which was also supported by South Africa.<sup>56</sup> Yet despite the ravage caused, the latter completely failed to secure either a stronghold or support from the people, support which was necessary for its continued existence. It would seem that the creation and support of this group was intended to cause cleavages in the Zambian "body politic", not to take advantage of them, as there were probably none. Otherwise, prominent cleavages in Zambian politics are mostly a result of economic pressures as exemplified by the recent rise of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy.

The second category is destabilisation directed toward economic infrastructures. Although this is a separate type, it is not exclusive in the sense that the political groups discussed above are used in this mode of destabilisation as well. What is important about it, and why this category is treated separately here, is that

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<sup>52</sup>(...continued)

in *The New York Times* (2 November 1990), and "Dos Santos on Pluralism", Speech by President José Eduardo dos Santos to the Opening Session of the Extraordinary Session of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Workers' Party, 25 October 1990, *SAPEM*, Vol. 4 No. 2, (November 1990), p. 6. For a more insightful treatise, see Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments", *JMAS*, Vol. 28 No.3, (1990), especially pp. 439-449.

<sup>53</sup>For details, see Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 139-151, and Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, pp. 71-72, and his *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 107-129.

<sup>54</sup>For details, see Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, pp. 72-74; also his *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 178-183; Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 50-72; and Patel "Regional Security in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe", pp. 43-51.

<sup>55</sup>See Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 12.

<sup>56</sup>See details in Chapter Two, above.

it is related to, and in fact is part of, the entire Southern African political economy and regional network of dependence. In this mode, vital/strategic installations are sabotaged. The most vulnerable have been infrastructures which can, with increased efficiency, reduce the majority-ruled states' dependence on South Africa. In the 1980s, main railways, ports and oil pipelines were primary targets. These have included the Benguela railway, Nacala corridor (port, railway and road) and the Beira corridor (port, railway, road and oil pipeline). Even the railway which originates in Maputo but essentially serves the industrialised Transvaal area of South Africa has not been spared. Unlike the direct challenge to political systems, economic infrastructures are more vulnerable and receptive to destabilisation, mainly because they do not need to be created and propped-up by the destabiliser and cannot be fully guarded. In addition, it is in transportation and communications networks that regional dependence is most entrenched, evident and real.

The third category is military intimidation, direct and indirect attacks directed to selected targets. This again has been carried alongside the other two categories. Thus, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have been targets even when they are known not to have even a few minutes' capability to resist South Africa's military actions. As Chan has observed:

South Africa has intervened militarily in Botswana, Lesotho [and Swaziland]. This has been to 'punish' some policy over-sight of the state concerned or, in pursuing alleged ANC personnel, to cause a great deal of collateral damage as discouragement against the state hosting, even temporarily or unknowingly, ANC personnel.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Chan, "Foreign Policies in Southern Africa", in Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid*, p. 24. See also, Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 144-151.

Also, Angola has been a victim of South African invasions and occupations, while Mozambique has also been in a state of war since 1980. Zambia and Zimbabwe have not been spared.

These three categories are interrelated and -connected in mixed proportions. On the one hand, they show that the majority-ruled states are very vulnerable in relation to South Africa. Where such vulnerability did not exist, some was created as already shown. On the other hand, the categories show how difficult it is for the FLS or its individual members to have been destabilising the Republic in return even if the alliance had decided to do so, along the lines of the latter's destabilisation of the former. Thus, in an attempt to coerce every country in the region to acquiesce to its wishes, South Africa has managed to define regional security on its own terms.

## CONCLUSIONS

In formulating total national strategy the South African state was allegedly responding to total onslaught unleashed from outside its borders. The minority Republic was, by so doing, suggesting that its problems were mostly externally instigated, thus overlooking the fact that its external problems were initially internally-generated by its own *apartheid* policies. Once formulated, the total national strategy had a tremendous impact throughout Southern Africa. Although it had many components, the most effective has been destabilisation.

The significance of total national strategy, as this chapter has shown, has been three-fold. The first was an attempt to redefine regional security, in which case each of the adversaries had its own definition. To South Africa, regional security meant to force submissiveness and compliance on other regional actors; while, to the majority-ruled countries, regional security meant regional freedom, independence,

*apartheid-free* Southern Africa and continued (albeit limited) defiance of the regional leviathan. How the latter have succeeded is discussed below in Chapter Six. The second was that total national strategy in its various components unleashed an action-reaction type of international relations in Southern Africa. And lastly, in trying to implement total national strategy, South Africa encountered various responses from the target countries.

This chapter has also attempted to transcend some of the limitations in the existing literature on Southern Africa. It is thus shown that militarisation is not necessarily the mere presence of military personnel in decision-making agencies of the state, the country's military strength, ever-swelling defence budgets or the propensity to use military options. Rather, this study suggests that militarisation is a *process* and so has its own origins and life as well as value system. While it is located in the decision-making machinery of the government, it depends on the amount of influence which the military personnel have in shaping threat perceptions so as to make them appear militarily important. This departure from the traditional literature is also seen in the analysis of destabilisation. In isolating and exploring various positions, this chapter has shown that destabilisation may, and then only to a limited extent, be looked at as a two-way or dual process, of an action-response type.

The argument suggested above—that total national strategy has had a tremendous impact in Southern Africa—will be expanded below to suggest that it was significantly responsible for the decline of the FLS alliance despite the latter's efforts in turn to design responses and counter-strategies.

## **Chapter Six**

### **THE DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

After the rise, the decline of the Front Line States alliance is the second major theme of this study. It was shown in Chapter Three that the alliance experienced a period of rise, albeit short, in the 1970s, and that throughout the 1980s decade it began to decline. It was also suggested in Chapter Five that the components and especially the effects of South Africa's total national strategy on the alliance represented an important but just one factor among several which contributed to its decline. This chapter seeks to explain the general decline of the alliance especially after 1980.

Although the terms rise and decline were described in the introductory chapter above, it is emphasised here that the latter has been gradual, and in some cases disguised. This is important for two main reasons. First, the alliance still exists despite the asserted decline, although not necessarily in its original form. Added to this is the fact that a new member, Namibia, has recently joined it.<sup>1</sup> And second, the gradual decline tends to deprive the analysis of the easy categorisation of "long-term and immediate" causes traditionally used to describe and explain events such as wars or coups.

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<sup>1</sup>Following independence in March 1990, Namibia became a member to both SADCC and FLS alliance.

Since the alleged decline has occurred over a long period of time, its *indicators* are located first. These are trends and changes in the behaviour of the alliance that looked like a departure from its long-standing objectives which also helped to diminish its importance, relevance and capability.<sup>2</sup>

Also to be discussed will be *factors* leading to the decline. These are more specific than the indicators. These factors are expected to portray the alliance's internal dynamics, thus exposing the real, true and hidden picture of it over and above its apparent external solidarity.<sup>3</sup> The two together—indicators and factors—are interrelated, and will elucidate the type of constraints on, and options for, the FLS throughout its history.

Finally, this chapter will discuss whether or not there have been some lost opportunities on the part of the alliance which, if utilised, would have minimised constraints and increased available options.

The argument in this chapter is that the achievements of the alliance have been limited or minimal or both. The alliance has faced numerous constraints which have resulted in its decline. It has not been able to maximise its options as a result of such constraints.

### INDICATORS OF DECLINE

What shows the decline? Such measurements cannot be precise; they are only approximations or estimates. This is due to the nature of the institution under study

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<sup>2</sup>See the discussion of decline in the Introduction, above.

<sup>3</sup>That is, beyond the superficiality of FLS solidarity.

—officially informal, but increasingly formal in practice.<sup>4</sup> However, this does not in any way dilute the analytical and explanatory power of such indicators, provided that such estimates are clearly articulated and situated.

There are at least three ways to situate such tentative indicators, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The first is to look at the origins of the alliance and its self-professed role and compare these with its actual practices and achievements. The advantage of doing so would be the possibility of quantification by comparing the two—the original role on the one hand, and behaviour, on the other. However, this is impractical because the alliance's original role was never categorically stated. As explained earlier, this was due to its informal nature and the initial attempt to make it secret.<sup>5</sup> When its roles and objectives became public, at least at the time when the FLS summits began to attract some attention, they were not only vague but also all-encompassing, engendering a number of possible interpretations.

Thus, initially formed to speed up the resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe, the alliance ought to have disbanded by 1980 when that country gained independence. By the same token, the alliance's continued existence implies a transformation and an expanded agenda. The other and wider role became the total liberation of Southern Africa. Yet, according to the argument presented in this chapter, problems and constraints on the alliance indicate that it was slowly abandoning such a role in the 1980s. So, looking at the origins of the alliance alone is problematic due to the vagueness of the role which it supposedly assigned itself.

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<sup>4</sup>See the discussion of this in Chapter One, above.

<sup>5</sup>See Chapter Three, above.



The second way is to follow closely and analyse very critically the roles of the FLS as conceptualised and explicated by students of the region. An example of this is Sesay's work.<sup>6</sup> He identified four broad roles, namely, (i) the continental/pan-Africanist; (ii) the internationalist; (iii) the legitimist/unifying; and (iv) the bridge-building/intermediary.<sup>7</sup> It is suggested by such role identification that to determine whether or not the alliance has declined, each of these roles would have to be analysed individually or in conjunction so as to see how much each has been achieved over time. This appears to be an impressive and possibly time-saving procedure. But it does not guarantee satisfactory results either. The utility of role identification is, in this instance, hampered by the very absence of a solid base—what the alliance said was its role—in the absence of any charter or constitution to which to refer. Thus, Sesay's analysis is also tentative as he admits himself:

The roles were determined by reading the speeches of the leaders of the front line states; however, because of limited time and other constraints, the exercise was not as comprehensive as *would have been if the FLS alliance was a formal alliance* (emphasis supplied).<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the stated constraints, the roles as identified by Sesay are all-encompassing and not necessarily FLS-specific. Most regional groupings in Southern Africa and elsewhere in Africa which preceded the alliance, as well as the OAU and its ALC, have claimed all or some such roles. This suggests that the usefulness of role analysis is at best only partial.

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<sup>6</sup>Sesay, "The Role of the Front Line States in Southern Africa", in Aluko and Shaw (eds.), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, pp. 19-40.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 40 (note 10). Besides, the speeches were those of individual leaders addressing audiences other than the FLS summits. Where they have been issued, communiqués of the FLS summits do not state roles.

The problems inherent in role identification and role analysis suggest the use of an alternative methodology. Therefore, this study looks at what took place historically. An example of this would be the role of the alliance in Angola and Namibia.

### **Angola and Namibia: new responsibilities**


The Front Line States alliance was initially formed to pressure and negotiate for Zimbabwean independence.<sup>9</sup> Informal but official organisations such as the FLS can be as dynamic as their formal counterparts. Although the alliance is informal in style, with its activities restricted mainly to the level of the heads of state and government, or "high politics", it did not disintegrate once its primary objective was achieved. Historically, it is the character of all organisations, including inter-state ones, to change form or content, or both, at certain stages of their existence. The argument here is that while the FLS maintained its form—its informal character—it changed its attitude once new and unavoidable responsibilities were added to it. The problems in Angola and Namibia were to become more complex than the crisis in Zimbabwe. The more they did so the more the alliance could not cope with them. In turn this exposed its incapability to handle complex issues, thus becoming an indicator of its decline.

There are several factors that can explain the alliance's relative ineffectiveness in Angola and Namibia. One factor is historical: Angola and Namibia were not part of the "mainstream" of Southern African political economy. The alliance's founding members—Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia—were and are bound together by several historical factors. All are former British colonies which achieved

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<sup>9</sup>See Chapter Three, above.

Map II: Southern Africa: Communications and Transportation Routes



independence constitutionally and are members of the (British) Commonwealth; and Botswana and Zambia are land-locked and looked mainly to the east and south for transportation and communication routes to the sea through Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa.<sup>10</sup> It can be argued further that the early incorporation of Mozambique into the alliance had partly to do with the imperative of regional transportation and communication, as shown in Map II. In addition, Angola has been economically less dependent on South Africa than the rest of the members of the FLS (except Tanzania),<sup>11</sup> as shown in Table VIII.

As the South African-led "triple alliance" (with Portugal and Rhodesia) was increasingly becoming unpredictable and vicious in the mid-1970s, Botswana and Zambia struggled to get access to routes to the sea which were more secure and less expensive. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe was then, as it continues to be today, the hub of various spheres in the Southern African political economy. The centrality of Zimbabwe explains the involvement of its independent neighbours in its liberation struggles. Likewise, the early incorporation of and concern over Mozambique by the FLS can be explained in terms of its viability as a regional and an alternative exit to the wider world.

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<sup>10</sup>However, the closure of the Benguela railway line (which runs through Angola) since 1976 to date has enormously affected Zambia. Its importance to Zambia can be seen from shifts in the volume of traffic. In 1972 Benguela handled 122,000 tonnes (13%) of Zambia's total imports and 166,000 tonnes (38%) of total exports, via rail. It handled only 5,000 tonnes, and 6,000 tonnes of total imports and exports via rail in 1981 and 1983, respectively. What looks like some flexibility on the part of Zambia regarding its use of the Benguela was achieved at an enormous economic cost. See Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 247. I am grateful to Prof. Douglas G. Anglin for some of the ideas regarding constraints on Zambia of the closure of the Benguela railway. (Personal communication, March 1990).

<sup>11</sup>Angola's economic dependence on South Africa is minimal, and is limited to diamond mining controlled by the latter and electricity supplied to Namibia from the Ruacana/Calueque hydro scheme. See Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 30.

Table VIII

**SADCC'S ECONOMIC (AND TRADE) DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA**  
**(1985-1989)\*\***

Country	Exports (%)		Imports (%)	
	1985	1989	1985	1989
Angola	0	0	0	0
Botswana	8	8.4*	81	85.1
Lesotho	40	42.0*	97	97
Malawi	7	8.8	40	33.6
Mozambique	3	3.15*	12	12.6*
Swaziland	37	38.85*	83	87.15*
Tanzania	0	0	0	0
Zambia	1	0.7	21	23.4
Zimbabwe	10	9.5	18	24.9

Notes: \* Adjusted by additional five per cent.

\*\* Calculated as a percentage of world total of exports and imports of each country.

**Sources:**

- (i) Stephen Chan and Lloyd J. Chingambo, "Dependence in the Region", in Stephen Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 135.
- (ii) International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1989* (IMF, 1989). Figures for Botswana and Lesotho not given.

Conversely, there was minimal pressure on the part of the founding members of the alliance to get involved in Angola and Namibia. There were no strong historical or economic links between the former and the latter.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Except for minimal relations between Angola and Mozambique, both being former Portuguese colonies, and through the *Confêrencia das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (CONCP), a weak and loose Lusophone (continued...)

Historically, therefore, the latter pair were simply territories on the other side of the continent as far as the alliance's founders were concerned. This contention is exemplified by the way Angola was included in the FLS and the way the Namibian problem was connected to that of Angola.

One interesting question is why Angola was initially isolated by the alliance's founding members until late 1976 when the latter officially came out into the open.<sup>13</sup> This is significant in that the framework for the FLS had been laid down already, yet without Angola. The one year time lag between the formation of the alliance and the incorporation of Angola sheds light on the latter's isolation.

President Machel of FRELIMO was already a member of the FLS even when Mozambique had a transitional government between 1974 and 1975; by contrast, Agostinho Neto of the MPLA, was not.<sup>14</sup> One reason for this might have been that the liberation struggle in Mozambique was both more mature and more certain to succeed than in Angola.<sup>15</sup> More important could be the fact that, in the former, the "front" (FRELIMO) was the only recognised movement claiming authentic representation of the people,<sup>16</sup> while there were three different nationalist

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<sup>12</sup>(...continued)  
"Commonwealth". For details on CONCP, see Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, Part Five, pp. 185-296.

<sup>13</sup>See Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States"; and "Rhodesian Plan: African Presidents' Objections", in *Africa Report* Vol. 21, No. 6, (November/December 1976), p. 23.

<sup>14</sup>This was, of course, before the FLS alliance had a generalised policy of inviting the leaders of the liberation movements.

<sup>15</sup>This, however, cannot explain the attendance of Oliver Tambo of the ANC of South Africa, and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO at the FLS summits in the 1980s.

<sup>16</sup>See the discussion about authenticity in Chapter Four, above.

movements in Angola, each claiming exclusive representation.<sup>17</sup> Efforts by the OAU and individual African leaders to unify these three movements were not successful.<sup>18</sup>

By March 1976 all but one member of the FLS alliance—Zambia—had recognised the MPLA government. Zambia continued to call for a government of national unity among all three movements even when it was evident that the MPLA had prevailed over the rest.<sup>19</sup>

The divisions within the OAU, which delayed the recognition and admission of Angola into that organisation, together with Zambia's non-recognition of the MPLA government, tended to isolate Angola from the mainstream of the alliance. The latter was eager to be recognised by and work on behalf of the OAU and, in the process, legitimise itself.<sup>20</sup> It could, therefore, not risk including in its ranks a government whose recognition was in dispute. Likewise, the alliance could not have included Angola in it when one of its founding members, Zambia, had yet to recognise the MPLA regime. These two factors worked together to isolate Angola from the FLS.

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<sup>17</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Malaquias, "Angola in the 1990s", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Three.

<sup>18</sup>Marcum, "Angola", in Carter and O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa*, p. 190.

<sup>19</sup>Reasons for Zambia's decision may never be fully known. It can be estimated that its attachment to UNITA may have been instrumental, as was Zaire's relationship with the FNLA. Cf. Jaster's assertion that "The Zambian leadership has been sympathetic to Jonas Savimbi and...UNITA...and took a long time to recognise Angola's MPLA government", in his *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 38.

<sup>20</sup>This was important given that earlier groupings such as CECAC and the "Mulungushi Club" were accused of usurping the roles and functions of, and, bypassing the ALC. Confidential interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

How then did Namibia become an aspect of the Angolan problem? This calls for a discussion of the "linkage" politics in which some extra-regional forces were involved. Before then, it is instructive to speculate on the significance of the relationship between Angola and Namibia for the FLS alliance.

If Angolan independence had been a peaceful, orderly process without outside intervention, the FLS would have used that country as a significant spring-board from which to promote a quick resolution of conflict in Namibia, especially after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. SWAPO had cordial relations with the MPLA, such that the former was allowed to use Angolan territory as the rear base in its armed struggle.

Between 1976 and 1980, only Angola of the alliance members was of immediate practical military value to SWAPO. A symbiotic relationship had developed between the two. On the one hand, not only did Angola provide SWAPO with a viable rear base, but also the former was within easy proximity of the latter's target territory. The former was also willing to assist. On the other hand, having suffered several occupations by, and many direct and indirect military attacks from South Africa, Angola thought of an independent Namibia as strategically important in terms of providing a buffer against direct South African attacks, as well as a squeeze on UNITA.<sup>21</sup> This symbiotic relationship was very crucial especially in the 1970s as Zambia, for example, was still too embroiled in propping-up one of Zimbabwe's liberation movements, ZAPU, to be of any immediate military value to SWAPO. Furthermore, Botswana's vulnerable position, right in the "mouth of the *apartheid* monster", is well understood despite its long border with Namibia which

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<sup>21</sup>This idea was in part confirmed by a senior Angolan diplomat with a military background in a confidential interview, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).



would have been an asset to SWAPO. It was during that time in the late-1970s that some observers characterised Botswana as a "Reluctant Front Line State".<sup>22</sup>

As from 1976, South Africa was attempting to expel SWAPO guerrillas from their bases in southern Angola, while simultaneously assisting the forces of its protege—UNITA. The Cuban troops, called in specifically to help the MPLA government against the South African invasion<sup>23</sup> were already playing a controversial role. The success of the Angolan government army—FAPLA—against South African troops would have given SWAPO's military wing—the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)—a free hand and strength in Namibia. By contrast, for South Africa, Angola was a buffer against SWAPO's activities in Namibia and possibly against the ANC as well, only if UNITA was in power in Luanda. Thus, a new variable—the presence of the Cuban troops—had been introduced which complicated the equation further.

It is judicious to assume that the situation in Angola would have been different had it not been for the presence of these Cuban troops. What appeared at first to be a temporary interventionary force soon developed into an extended requirement for the very survival of the regime it had set out to assist come to power. The 1975 South African invasion of Angola that triggered the Cuban involvement was not an isolated event or the only one. Rather, it was just the beginning of a long series of many to come.<sup>24</sup> As the situation became more and

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<sup>22</sup>AC, Vol. 18 No. 15, (22 July 1977), pp. 3-4.

<sup>23</sup>This has been discussed in detail by Entralgo and Gonzalez, "Southern Africa and Its Conflicts", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Six.

<sup>24</sup>For recent detailed accounts of South Africa's military operations against Angola, see Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 138-149; and *The Front Line States Destabilisation Calender*, (Harare, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre).

more complex it appears that the FLS began to separate the problems in Angola from those in Namibia so as to avoid issues in Angola rather than simply stating that the two issues were separate. This was because the problem in Angola had intensified, especially its military (intervention) dimension, both Cuban and South African. It was beyond the alliance's diplomatic (and limited military) offensive as shown in other conflict situations, especially that of Zimbabwe. Also, some of the members of the FLS were not willing to become directly involved in Angola. As a result, the alliance found itself increasingly losing the momentum it required in order to have a hand in resolving the Namibian problem as well. This is mainly because the alliance had to focus its operations somewhere. Since this was not possible under the circumstances, yet the alliance did not want to appear to abandon the regional liberation struggle, it began to regard and treat Angola and Namibia as international problems needing some international solutions.

These regional events were taking place at the height of the Cold War era. Because of this, the United States could not be disinterested while a Soviet "ally", Cuba, was directly involved. This was even more so especially after the US government had earlier-on taken a stand which, among other things, would not allow any White regime in Southern Africa to be overrun by the "communists".<sup>25</sup> This not only introduced "linkage" as another variable, but it also led to the role of the Cuban troops in Angola being substantially expanded, their stay greatly prolonged and their role ever more controversial. In other words, incapability or "fall" of the FLS was related to pervasive bi-polarity at the time. With the new international division of power, the alliance may not have declined so quickly.

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<sup>25</sup>See "Option Two" in Mohamed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.), *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39* (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1976), pp. 105-9.

Was this linkage real? There are several ways of looking at the presumed linkage between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Namibian independence. The first is to examine the position of Angola in any such linkage especially after the Cuban troops had been introduced. To the regime in Angola, the problem was straightforward, although far from simple. The survival of the MPLA regime was at stake as long as the problems which prompted it to seek external military assistance were not resolved. These problems were: (i) consolidation of independence; (ii) South Africa's direct and frequent attacks on as well as invasion of Angola's territory; (iii) the commitment of both South Africa and the US to support UNITA; and (iv) the use of Namibian territory by the SADF as a staging ground for more attacks on Angola as long as South Africa continued to occupy that territory illegally.<sup>26</sup>

The fourth factor above relates to SWAPO and explains its relations to the MPLA. Also it implies that Angola was the breeding ground, and so was itself partly responsible for the linkage politics upon which South Africa and the US were to capitalise.

On the one hand, South Africa took advantage of the situation which it helped to precipitate: it refused to withdraw its troops from Angola until the Cubans did likewise; it was openly determined to continue assisting UNITA until Angola ceased to do the same for SWAPO, in addition to making UNITA a tool of destabilisation; and, perhaps the most profound of this set of actions, it refused to withdraw from Namibia as long as Cuban troops remained in Angola. As can be seen, South Africa's position and conditions were directly opposite of those put forward by

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<sup>26</sup> See Malaquias, "Angola in the 1990s"; and Entralgo and Gonzalez, "Southern Africa and its Conflicts", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapters Three and Six, respectively.

Angola. However, most of South Africa's demands were mere amplifications of US stands on the problem.

On the other hand, the latter, the main proponent and supporter of constructive engagement in Southern Africa,<sup>27</sup> also incorporated linkage into its policy, not necessarily because it developed it, but because there were some indications that the two problems were linked through the presence of Cuban troops; that is, Angola and Namibia were closely linked. While some doubts can be cast on this assumption, what is clear is that the US translated "linkage" into a policy-relevant form.

Once established, the implications of the linkage, especially the way it was coherently articulated by South Africa and supported by the US, were quite clear to Angola and SWAPO as well as the FLS alliance. One serious implication was that the linkage was insisted on by a super-power with interests in Southern Africa. So the international community could not ignore it. The linkage only fell short of direct American intervention in the region.<sup>28</sup>

The second implication of the linkage was its contribution to a further delay in Namibian independence. Initially, the hope for a speedy and workable solution was considered to be embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435) of 1978.<sup>29</sup> The "Contact Group", formed to speed up the process at the time,

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<sup>27</sup>See "Option Two" cited in note 25, above.

<sup>28</sup>For discussions on various and different forms of US involvement, see Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 138-39; and John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), passim.

<sup>29</sup>David R. Black and Timothy M. Shaw, "Namibia in the 1990s: Lessons From and Implications for Southern Africa", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Four, pp. 65-91.

failed, partly because it was not in the interest of its dominant member, the US, to retreat from its assertion of linkage.

Yet finally, as a third implication, it is important to underline that the solution in Namibia, delayed as it was, came about, at least in part, once the linkage was acknowledged; and Angola (in concert with Cuba) agreed to the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

These three implications together confirm the contention that the problems of Angola and Namibia were, by the turn of events, made to appear related. Thus, the linkage appeared to be more real than apparent.

The other way to look at such linkage politics is to see the reactions of Angola and its colleagues in the FLS alliance. These were at best mixed. On the one hand, the former insisted that there was no linkage, and expected the alliance to uphold its position.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the latter did not have a coherent collective policy toward Angola and Namibia or the linkage. Each member had its own policy.<sup>31</sup> Collectively, the alliance regarded Angola and Namibia as international problems.

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<sup>30</sup>This, it did, as shown by various statements, such as: "Frontline Leaders Urge Support for Namibia", *The Herald*, Harare (17 November 1979); Tim Chigodo, "Keep Cuba Out of it—Frontline", *The Sunday Mail*, Harare (5 September 1982); "Fighters Assured of Full Support", *Daily News*, Tanzania (1 May 1984); Communiqués Issued by the Summits of the Front Line Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique (15 September 1985); Luanda, Angola (8 April 1986); and Arusha, Tanzania (4 September 1984); "Apartheid Doomed", *Daily News*, Tanzania (24 September 1985); and President Quett Masire's statement, in *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/7762/B/7 (1 October 1984), among many others.

<sup>31</sup> There was fear among almost all the members of the FLS alliance that the Cuban troops were used in part to assist SWAPO in its fight for independence in Namibia. Much as this fear is unfounded, the rest of the alliance members were secretly talking of 'Cubanisation' of the region. As a result the alliance left Angola alone, fearing to get entangled in the so-called Cold War. Amidst that crisis Angolan government knew who its real friends in the region are.

Confidential interview with an Angolan diplomat, Dar es Salaam (April 1990).

Some of its members may not have favoured this turn of events on that side of the continent,<sup>32</sup> especially the involvement of South Africa, the US, Cuba and, on occasions, Nigeria and Zaire as well, which reduced its role and influence over any eventual outcome. Yet, the alliance may have felt that such involvement by others was a blessing in disguise for two main reasons. First, this was a situation which by itself the FLS was incapable of rectifying beyond diplomatic rhetoric. And second, external involvement rationalised its earlier position that the problem had taken on an international dimension that needed an international solution.

Thus there was a lack of congruence between individual FLS members' perceptions of preferred reactions to external intervention in Angola and the stand of the alliance. There are some explanations for this divergence. First, Angola's membership in the FLS alliance: the alliance's collective support was limited to upholding Angola's sovereign right to invite Cuban troops, although such collective support ran contrary to some members' individual foreign policy principles related to non-alignment.<sup>33</sup>

The other explanation could be the general mood that then prevailed in Africa regarding external interventions, especially the discrimination by the US, which saw Cuban intervention as more dangerous than the same by France or South Africa. As the then chair of the FLS alliance, Tanzania's former president, Julius Nyerere reacted:

**We want to make it clear that we reject the right of Western European countries to dominate Africa, just as much as we would reject attempts by Eastern bloc countries... We do not deny the principle that any**

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>At least no FLS member openly condemned Angola as President Kaunda of Zambia had President Machel of Mozambique over his Nkomati Accord. Probably also, fear of "Cubanisation" of the region contributed to this reticence. See note 32, above.

African state has the right to ask for assistance either military or economic, from the country of its choice. On the contrary, we assert that right. Angola, Ethiopia and Chad, Zaire and all of us have the right. It is not for the East to object when Djibouti asks for assistance from France. We do not deny either that all African governments can be threatened by a few malcontents, possibly financed by external elements, even while they are fully supported by the mass of their people. In such circumstances a government surely is justified in seeking assistance to overcome a temporary crisis...<sup>34</sup>

As can be seen, Nyerere's statement avoided spelling out the linkage. Instead, it indirectly denied it by emphasising the right of any African government to ask for any type of assistance from anywhere.

Two observations can be made at this juncture. First, it would seem that the African countries ought to have emphasised the continent's inability to confront intervening foreign troops should the latter decide to extend their stay, as noted by Jaster: "The blunt public warnings by Nigeria's Foreign Minister that Cubans must not 'overstay their welcome' in Africa is a view shared by most Front-Line leaders."<sup>35</sup> And second, the alliance's total rejection of linkage is not wholly convincing. Indeed, Angola unconsciously contributed to its disarray or contradictoriness. The alliance could not consider Angola and Namibia as international problems, connected to each other, and at the same time reject linkage. Instead, it would have been logical for the FLS to reject linkage *not* on the premise of its absence, but rather as a *dangerous precedent*; for there was no guarantee that it would not be repeated elsewhere under either similar or different situations for reasons which favoured more peaceful, extra-continental interests.

Thus, problems over Angola and Namibia were one of the most evident indicators of the disarray and related decline in the importance of the alliance. This

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<sup>34</sup>*Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Monthly* No. 83 (July 1978), p. 29.

<sup>35</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 36.

is so despite its diplomatic effort at an international level to keep these issues alive through its constant reminders to the international community that UNSCR 435 formed the basis of a settlement of the Namibian problem. At a more practical level, Angola and Namibia became, in a sense, added responsibilities to the alliance which it had not anticipated. It may have been assumed that Angolan independence was to set the stage for new efforts to liberate Namibia, assumptions about a domino-like sequence. It was the unfolding of foreign interventions that made the alliance less willing and able to be directly involved, either at the level of negotiations or in the speeding up the resolution of the conflict by militarily assisting the MPLA government, as some members of the alliance had been doing for Mozambique.

As alluded to above, given unavoidable linkage, the more the FLS regarded the Angolan problem as an international one, the more it forfeited its right to have a hand in the Namibian problem. In the end, the alliance was hardly a credible force. The only salvation for it was that the solution in Namibia came through the implementation of the UNSCR 435 although that was only possible after an agreement had been reached under which the Cuban troops withdrew from Angola. Thus, the alliance won on UNSCR 435 but lost on linkage.

At another level, the more the FLS said the Angolan problem was an international one, as was that of Namibia, the more it alienated Angola, thus making the latter's membership more symbolic than real. The linkage problem was not the only one for the FLS. Another one came when some of the alliance's members signed non-aggression pacts with the Republic.

### **Non-Aggression Pacts**

The...tacit rule is that the [FLS] must enforce Nkomati-like security rules in their own territories, even if they have not signed a mutual non-aggression pact with Pretoria. That is, the [FLS] must not



intervene in South Africa's domestic affairs, and they must not allow their territory to be used for military attacks upon South Africa by the ANC or the PAC.<sup>36</sup>

This rule—an extension of total strategy assumptions—has been effective, and Southern Africa had to live with it, now for more than a decade. A series of non-aggression pacts between the Republic on the one hand, and some independent Southern African states<sup>37</sup> on the other, has been a crucial feature of the regional landscape, both political and strategic, that has stimulated intellectual and political debate.<sup>38</sup> Non-aggression pacts were initiated by South Africa and were secured on a regional scale. Although only two members of the FLS alliance signed such pacts—Angola and Mozambique—two more, Zambia and Zimbabwe, behave in some cases as if they had signed them. By so doing the latter two seem to have joined Malawi and Zaire who are not "captive states"<sup>39</sup> yet have had cordial relations with South Africa. Also, the successful extraction of compliance through such pacts, because that is what they amount to, has enabled South Africa to implement, through other means, its earlier proposals that had been formally rejected—CONSAS, the "co-prosperity sphere" and ECOSA<sup>40</sup> in different issue areas.

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<sup>36</sup>Chris Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Role of Third Party Mediators", *International Journal*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, (Spring 1990), p. 347.

<sup>37</sup>Such as Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland.

<sup>38</sup>An international conference on peace and security in southern Africa was convened in Arusha, Tanzania in May 1985. The theme was Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord. For details, see Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*.

<sup>39</sup>"Captive states" refer to those countries which are heavily entangled in their dependent relationship with South Africa, dependence which is historically and geographically determined. The term refers to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. For details, see Rok Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 139-169.

<sup>40</sup>All these are expressions of the same idea in different epochs. For a chronological description, see Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 1-5.

Despite the multiple and changing roles of the FLS it can be assumed, at least at a theoretical level, that its ideal role, function and objective was that of *conflict resolution*, used here in the way explicated by Jaster and Brown.<sup>41</sup> Both imply that conflict resolution on the part of the alliance means taking sides and, in one form or another, taking active participation. This is explicit in the case of Jaster, who observed that:

By sponsoring and supporting national liberation groups, the Front-Line States have waged war indirectly on the white minority regimes, most of the time managing not to become directly involved in the fighting.<sup>42</sup>

Brown went a step further to conclude that in fact this was the most rational option for the alliance and the rest of the groups interested in seeing an end to conflict in the region:

What policies should third parties adopt in Southern Africa? The logic ...is that third parties should not seek to manage the regional conflict, if by management is meant promoting grounds for co-operation and accommodation among the existing parties to the dispute. Instead, the only viable strategy is to promote resolution of the conflict, which is here taken to mean choosing sides and working to eliminate apartheid. For...there can be peace and stability in Southern Africa only if there is majority rule in South Africa. This is the logic for sanctions against South Africa and...economic and military support for the SADCC states *and the FLS alliance*. It is also the argument against constructive engagement or any other policy whose premise is that accommodation among existing parties to the regional conflict is possible (emphasis supplied).<sup>43</sup>

Thus, this has been the historical role and function of the FLS alliance: to pool its resources with the nationalist movements against colonial and White minority rule. With the advent of destabilisation, its role was supposed to be extended to

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<sup>41</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 33; and Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa", p. 358.

<sup>42</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 33.

<sup>43</sup>Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa", p. 358.

include concerted efforts to fight against it. However, the signing of non-aggression pacts with South Africa implied that: (i) the RSA had managed to impose a *de facto* regional security regime, and (ii) the alliance had limited resources to offer to its troubled members which were insufficient to deter such pacts. These twin elements —RSA's hegemony and FLS insufficiency—were also evident in the nature of the pacts themselves.

Brown has observed that the bargain offered in all Nkomati-like pacts was that South Africa would stop destabilisation, if the signatories will oust the ANC, PAC, and SWAPO from their territories.<sup>44</sup> The foundation on which South Africa based its security relations with its neighbours was a provision in the Nkomati Accord:

Recognising the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states;... The High Contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or airspace to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.<sup>45</sup>

This Accord went on to list some (eleven) provisions which concern steps to be taken by both governments regarding the ANC and MNR.<sup>46</sup> Of greater significance was the manner in which the Accord and other such pacts were to be implemented and observed rather than their modality. For, they were quite one-sided, biased in favour of South Africa, as Brown observed:

Pretoria sets the rules: the rules are binding upon the SADCC [and the FLS] but they are not binding upon South Africa. Pretoria has found

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>45</sup>For a complete text of the Nkomati Accord, see Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 323-24; and Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa*, pp. 279-280.

<sup>46</sup>Msabaha and Shaw (eds.), *Confrontation and Liberation*, pp. 280-81.

it useful to negotiate explicit rules of mutual non-aggression, both for international propaganda purposes and to define explicitly the regional status quo, but it has never considered itself bound by the explicit rules of its own making.<sup>47</sup>

As a result, despite dictating the terms of a *de facto* regional security regime, the Republic continued to assist the MNR in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. Thus, a set of crucial questions for the FLS included; (i) the alliance's position regarding such pacts; (ii) whether the enemy was no longer common; and (iii) the implications of the pacts for FLS solidarity.

Based on alternative analytic approaches several answers arise to these questions. Non-aggression pacts, especially those between Angola and Mozambique, were supposedly an immediate solution to destabilisation. Both pacts were considered necessary for the survival of national regimes, at least in the short-term. To the Angolan regime, the 1984 and 1988 agreements constituted a contribution to the ending of the state of war in the country. However, such accords were agreed upon at the expense of the ANC and SWAPO (the latter more so with the Lusaka Accords of 1984), the main concerns of the South African state. To the Mozambique administration, the Nkomati Accord (1984) was meant to salvage the country from total collapse. As in the case of Angola, this was done at the expense of the ANC. In both cases the ANC was an affected party which was quite vulnerable.

Under this imposed regional security regime, the ANC (and to some extent SWAPO) were equated with the MNR and UNITA, as all came to be impliedly classified as dissidents: the extension of RSA's own perceptions onto regional opponents. In reacting in the passive way it did, the alliance was implying that the solution to its problems was found in evicting the liberation movements from member countries. This is one indicator of the decline of the FLS.

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<sup>47</sup>Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa", p. 349.

Such non-aggression pacts arose, as far as Angola and Mozambique were concerned, as a result of the alliance's inability to assist its vulnerable members. The little assistance which was available was in terms of diplomatic support and, to a lesser extent, military; the latter more so in Mozambique than Angola. It is implied here that the involvement of the alliance was becoming restricted to assisting the liberation movements, and so was less and less available for independent governments.

The Nkomati Accord instigated a debate among FLS presidents in the mid-1980s. For example, a communiqué issued by their summit following the signing of Nkomati stated:

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord ...They expressed the hope that the South African Government will *for the first time in history* live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilisation of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits. They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and diplomatic *and less military* support for the ANC...(emphasis supplied).<sup>48</sup>

This communiqué, like most others, does not show what transpired during actual FLS deliberations. It appears conciliatory towards the Accord, but it does not wholly conceal some misgivings as indicated by the supplied emphasis.

President Machel rationalised his government's action by saying that Mozambique needed a breather in the war. Surprisingly, he termed the Accord a "victory", because his government managed to extract a deal from the enemy. This was counteracted by President Kaunda, himself a broker to the Lusaka Accords (between Angola and South Africa) in disagreeing and pointing out that it was a

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<sup>48</sup>Communiqué issued by the Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Arusha, Tanzania (29 April 1984).

defeat for Mozambique, the alliance, and independent Africa as a whole.<sup>49</sup> What would have been a mediatory position was taken by the then chair of the alliance, President Nyerere. He observed that he understood and sympathised with the circumstances which led to Nkomati. Yet he also attacked Nkomati somewhat. This was reflected in both the FLS summit and in his opening speech to the subsequent Joint Socialist International/Front Line States. In the latter he first observed:

After, and only after, the border states were felt to be sufficiently weakened, South Africa changed the emphasis of its policies. Its offer of co-operation on its own terms was renewed, with the clear alternative of continued South African attack. Whether South Africa's neighbours would have entered into any such arrangements or Non-Aggression Pacts in the absence of economic and military pressure is a hypothetical question.

In so doing, Nyerere tried to explain some of the circumstances, but he still had some reservations. It would not have been a hypothetical question if Nyerere had been convinced that such pressures made Mozambique sign the pact. He also identified some of the profound implications of signing the Nkomati Accord:

There is a further question which will confront European socialists and other anti-apartheid groups outside this continent. How should you respond when African states sign [Non-Aggression] Agreements with the South African Government or receive its leaders? For your own people will doubtless ask why Europe should be more uncompromising than Africa; why should you urge a Trade Boycott, for example, when some African states continue to trade with South Africa? I think the answer is quite clear: *what* a victim of persecution does is not an appropriate guide to what his sympathisers *should do* (emphasis in original). A man under intolerable pressure may have no alternative but to make what terms he can to stop his children dying from bullets or starvation. *That is exactly what Mozambique has done.* That is no excuse for the safe and the well-fed giving support to his oppressor.

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<sup>49</sup>This open attack on Nkomati was made at the FLS summit cited in note 48 above. Confidential interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (May 1990). The same attack was repeated in his speech to the Joint Socialist International/Front Line States Meeting, Arusha, Tanzania (4 September 1984) as indicated below. Personal records and observation.

On the contrary, it is an indication that they were giving him inadequate support beforehand...(emphasis supplied).<sup>50</sup>

All this shows, however, that there was no unanimity among the FLS presidents of the time regarding non-aggression pacts. For the first occasion in the history of the alliance, debate among its presidents about the crucial issue of Nkomati was taken outside the ante-rooms of state houses, beyond the framework of the alliance. Hot exchanges and disagreements among some of them were evident at the conference of the Socialist International held in Arusha-Tanzania in 1984,<sup>51</sup> i.e., "externalisation" of FLS discourses leading to its own vulnerability.

Non-aggression pacts can also be described in terms of established ambivalence among some members of the FLS alliance where confrontation goes alongside accommodation as well as co-operation. As noted in Chapter Two above, this is not surprising, as it stands as a unique feature of Southern African regional conflict, as Brown also notes:

One of the most striking features of the Southern African conflict and one that distinguishes it from many other conflicts around the world, is the extensive ties that continue to exist among the adversaries. South Africa may be at war with its neighbours, but it continues to trade with them, to allow the more-or-less free movement of people across its border, and even to talk with its adversaries at the official and ministerial level.<sup>52</sup>

Brown observed further that there is a tendency by South Africa's neighbours to accept partially what is embedded in the Republic's total national strategy; i.e. rejecting the stick while accepting the carrot.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>Julius K. Nyerere, "Opening Speech to the Joint Socialist International/Front Line States Meeting", Arusha, Tanzania (4 September 1984).

<sup>51</sup>Personal observation; also as shown in the quotations above and notes 49-50, above.

<sup>52</sup>Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa." p. 347.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

Thus, while non-aggression pacts are indicative of the decline in the salience of the FLS alliance, they also reflect the continuing pattern of co-operation and accommodation in the region. However, the pacts have been particularly distracting to the alliance's credibility as a source of inspiration and as a foundation of a new regional order that is free from colonialism, White minority rule and *apartheid*. The alliance was founded on the premise that its members would jointly confront their common enemy. By signing pacts with this enemy the several FLS signatory members were implicitly recognising that their enemy was no longer common and/or no longer so threatening.

### **The New Front Liners**

Another indicator of the decline of the FLS alliance was the appearance of new "front-liners" in the issues which lay primarily within the domain of the alliance. Despite their participation in the CECAC summits of the 1960s and 1970s, and despite their contribution to the liberation struggles in Angola, the presidents of Kenya<sup>54</sup> and Zaire<sup>55</sup> were not included in the FLS when it was formed in 1975.<sup>56</sup>

However, significantly, in the late-1980s the leaders of Kenya and Zaire once again reappeared on the Southern African scene. The Kenyan leadership was involved in arranging and negotiating for talks about a settlement between the Mozambican government and the MNR, despite the former's support for the latter. This is especially curious given that the MNR had its first African office (outside

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<sup>54</sup>Jomo Kenyatta, the late president of Kenya unsuccessfully attempted to unify the three major liberation movements in Angola. See Marcum, "Angola", p. 190.

<sup>55</sup>Zaire hosted the FNLA and GRAE, and, in the early period, the MPLA.

<sup>56</sup>This was so despite Mobutu's membership and participation in the short-lived Mulungushi Club. See also Chapter Three, above.



South Africa) in Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>57</sup> Another interesting feature is that Kenya was working in concert with Zimbabwe in that exercise.<sup>58</sup> This suggests that both Kenya and Zimbabwe had been playing equally controversial roles: Kenya by hosting and supporting the MNR, and Zimbabwe by sending troops to aid the beleaguered FRELIMO government. Were this protracted peace initiative to succeed, considerable credit would accrue to Kenya while some leading members of the FLS alliance (Zimbabwe and Tanzania) might be blamed for promoting discord by sending troops to Mozambique regardless of their strategic interests there.

At the same time, on the other side of the continent, Zaire managed to convince the two warring parties in Angola—MPLA and UNITA—to convene in Gbadolite (Zaire) for a summit meeting in June 1989. This meeting was significant in a number of ways: (i) it represented the culmination of almost two years' efforts by Mobutu to solve Angola's intra-state conflict; (ii) it was attended by twenty African leaders or their representatives, thus providing Mobutu with the prestige he needed to counter his record of human rights violations, especially in the US, his primary defender; (iii) it made it possible for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, to shake hands with the Angolan leader, José Eduardo dos Santos, thus elevating UNITA from a position of non-respectability to one of legitimacy and even a certain credibility which it previously lacked; and (iv) it arranged for a cease-fire agreement (albeit short-lived), thus opening new avenues for extended reconciliation.<sup>59</sup>

The argument here is that current peace initiatives in both Angola and Mozambique were not only multilateral as described above; but also they were taken

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<sup>57</sup>See Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 147.

<sup>58</sup>*The Herald*, Harare (17 November 1989). See also *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi (19 April 1991), p. 36.

<sup>59</sup>For details see Rothchild and Hartzell, "The Road to Gbadolite".

*outside* the framework of the alliance. This is very important to underscore as it shows that the FLS was sidestepped and superseded, thus indicating and accelerating its decline.

However, this apparent rise of the new "front-liners" requires explanation. First, it needed someone outside the alliance, devoid of the "groupthink" syndrome,<sup>60</sup> to break the cocoon. This someone had to contend with the reality which the FLS' "inner group" had all along been avoiding: to (i) openly acknowledge the existence of UNITA and MNR as somewhat credible political forces,<sup>61</sup> and (ii) recognise the feasibility of negotiation as an instrument for peace. Thus, Kenya and Zaire went beyond the short-sightedness and partisanship of Angola and Mozambique (and more so of the FLS alliance itself), of regarding the MNR and UNITA as mere *bandidos armados* with whom no one was prepared to negotiate.

That the non-FLS African countries have been encroaching into domains which had formerly been those of the alliance, and to a considerable extent successfully so, is an indicator of the diminution of the latter's importance. However,

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<sup>60</sup>Janis defined "groupthink" as:

...a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.

Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, Second Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 9.

<sup>61</sup>Some scholars believe that the MNR or UNITA have no support at all in the countries in which they operate. Thus, they believe in a purely *military* solution to problems which are also heavily *political*. This is the line of thinking continuously taken by governments of Angola and Mozambique and the entire FLS (until recently), and is strongly upheld by Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, and also in their *Apartheid Terrorism*. For details on the difficulties of militarily dealing with groups of this nature, see Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique"; and Abillah H. Omari, "The Front Line States in Southern Africa: Limits of a Small Power Entente", Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies, Carleton University (May 1989).

such encroachment is neither new nor unacceptable to the alliance. As discussed in Chapter Three above, the leaders of Kenya, Zaire and Nigeria have all participated in some FLS summits and their contribution to peace initiatives in Southern Africa was appreciated. It has been a tendency of the FLS alliance, revealed particularly in the instances of Angola and Namibia, to work along with anybody as long as that speeds up the resolution of conflict. What is unique in the contemporary peace drives by Kenya and Zaire is that they have taken place outside the framework of the FLS alliance system altogether.

Whereas the FLS alliance's dependence on non-front-liners was disguised in the case of conflict resolution, there is one specific area—that of economic development co-operation—where it has been institutionalised. The formation of SADCC, to which the discussion now turns, showed both dependence on external financing for its projects and as a factor advancing the declining importance of the alliance.

#### **Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)**

There are several ways of looking at SADCC in relation to the FLS. First, the initiative to create it came from within the alliance.<sup>62</sup> SADCC has, therefore, been regarded as the latter's economic arm to spearhead economic liberation. In addition, it was created as a counter to South Africa's proposal for CONSAS.

The other way of looking at SADCC is that its creation symbolised the admission as well as realisation on the part of the alliance of certain realities. First, FLS and SADCC realised that Southern Africa was one regional political economy in which co-operation and interdependence were essential. However, due to South Africa's hegemonic policies, they could at least benefit from co-operating among

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<sup>62</sup> See "[President Sir Seretse] Khama Urges Frontline Economic Community", *Daily News*, Tanzania, (4 July 1979).

themselves. This pragmatic position was summed up by the late president of Botswana and mentor of SADCC, Sir Seretse Khama:

Our goal is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce dependence on South Africa. We seek to overcome the fragmentation of our economies and, by co-ordinating our national development efforts, to strengthen them. The basis of our co-operation, built on concrete projects and specific programmes rather than grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic institutions, must be the assured mutual advantage of all participating states.<sup>63</sup>

Second, there was a realisation that the political liberation which the alliance was pursuing was meaningless and tenuous if it was not backed by economic liberation,<sup>64</sup> especially in the key infrastructural sector of transportation and communications.

And third, and perhaps most important, was the timing of the creation of SADCC itself. Negotiated in 1979 and established in 1980 to coincide with Zimbabwe's independence and membership, SADCC indicated something of a retreat towards an inward looking stance for the alliance. It symbolised a step down from "high" to "low" politics. After many years of liberation struggles and declining economies, the year 1980 symbolised a turning point in that although the problems of Namibia and *apartheid* in South Africa were far from resolved the alliance

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<sup>63</sup>Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, April 1980, quoted in *International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Canada), Briefing Paper*, (June 1985).

<sup>64</sup>At least at the theoretical and rhetorical level. This idea was expressed by the late Sir Seretse Khama:

As long as the political situation in Southern Africa remains what it is, South Africa would be too happy to continue its exploitation of neighbouring African countries in the hope that they would be lured by her economic power to join the so-called constellation of Southern African states along with its puppet regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

See "Khama Urges Frontline Economic Community", *Daily News*, Tanzania (4 July 1979).

members needed to do something for themselves if they were expected to continue contributing to the cause of regional liberation. Besides, independence in the newly independent Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had quickly degenerated into internal strife that exerted additional stress on the alliance.

Thus, there were a number of initial dilemmas and inconsistencies within the FLS alliance over the creation of SADCC, some of which have never been solved. For example, was SADCC replacing the FLS? The debate within the alliance resolved to keep it as it was so that it could deal with those problems of a diplomatic, political and military nature; i.e. destabilisation and political liberation.<sup>65</sup> This was mainly due to the greater scope of SADCC's membership which overlapped with that of the alliance, as the following series of maps shows. SADCC's membership reflected more the Southern African political economy than the political like-mindedness and commitment exhibited by the alliance.


There was also an attempt by the founding members of the FLS alliance to perpetuate the alliance's exclusiveness, not only for symbolic purposes,<sup>66</sup> but also due to what has been described as the "sensitivity" of some of the issues with which

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
<sup>65</sup>It is said that Prime Minister (now president) Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe proposed to dismantle the FLS alliance so as to let SADCC, which he also suggested should be made more formal and institutionalised than it is, function more efficiently. These suggestions were rejected by Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. Confidential interview with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, and a Zambian diplomat, Dar es Salaam (June 1990).

<sup>66</sup>For a discussion on symbolism and how it is part of, and the way it influences, politics, both national and international, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), especially Chapter One, pp. 1-21; and Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), especially Chapter Six, pp. 174-225.


Map III: Southern Africa: Front Line States in 1975



Map IV: Southern Africa: Front Line States in September 1976




Map V: Southern Africa: Front Line States in 1990





Map VI: Southern Africa: Front Line States and SADCC Membership 1990



it had to deal.<sup>67</sup> There was, therefore, a contradiction between the FLS' membership and that of SADCC. It was meaningless to create an economic organ exclusively for the FLS and yet there was fear of folding the alliance into SADCC. As the maps partly show, this was a contradiction between the exclusiveness and like-mindedness of the alliance and the strength in numbers of SADCC. Much as the strength in numbers was an asset to the alliance, like-mindedness was more important due to its politico-strategic nature. Non-FLS countries were accommodated in the more functional SADCC.

To some extent, the creation of SADCC reflected a realisation, at least in part, that the alliance by itself had become less dynamic. This was mainly due to the fact that regional conflict was rapidly changing from what was traditionally believed to have been an exclusively politico-diplomatic-military dimension to increasingly taking a more challenging economic dimension; i.e. transposition of "high" and "low" politics.

As discussed above, SADCC was partly a response to the CONSAS proposal, which was perceived to entrench dependence. The contradiction, however, is that SADCC was created around the same time as destabilisation was beginning to take its toll, especially on economic infrastructures. While destabilisation was partly a response to SADCC's creation, it worsened the situation further, as most SADCC members' economies were already in the process of decline. That regional conflict was increasingly acquiring an economic dimension, which neither members of the FLS nor those in SADCC could ignore, is shown by "lost economic growth" attributed to destabilisation. This amounted to approximately US \$ 4,000 million between 1980

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<sup>67</sup>The FLS summit system as well as the ISDSC were based on secrecy and entailed exchange of vital information on the enemy, and also military operations by the liberation movements. Confidential interview with senior government officials, Dar es Salaam (November, 1989).

and 1988, higher than "extra defence spending" (US \$ 3,310 million) and "direct war damage" (US \$ 1,610 million),<sup>68</sup> as will be discussed below.

### **FACTORS LEADING TO THE DECLINE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE**

In addition to these more general indicators there are also specific factors that can explain the decline of the alliance. These will be categorised into two major groups. First there are those factors which are *external* to individual members as well as to the alliance as a whole. And second, there are those factors which are *internal*. Both sets do sometimes overlap.

#### **External Factors**

Among the external factors, the collective policy of constructive engagement contributed significantly to the decline of the alliance. Constructive engagement, as then understood, was essentially the Reagan Administration's policy towards Southern Africa:

The US response during the massive destruction of the region has been a policy called 'constructive engagement' which seeks, through an unending shuttle by State Department negotiators, to give appearance of positive motion where there is none and, in reality, while playing for time. The US engagement in Southern Africa has been anything but 'constructive'. Its linkage policy stands in the way of Namibian independence;...it is now directly involved in trying to overthrow the Angolan government; its 'mediation' in Mozambique has done nothing to decrease the level of that war; and it has introduced the spectre of superpower conflict...into a region which craves nothing more than peace and development. Its sole success has been in allying itself with Pretoria against the region.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, p. 35.

<sup>69</sup>Johnson and Martin, "Introduction" in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. xix.

However, it would be an misleading to assume that constructive engagement as pursued by the Reagan Administration was only of its own formulation, as observed by Johnson and Martin, and other scholars. In fact, that Administration refined the policy ideologically reflecting its own orientation towards Southern Africa. By contrast, Rikhye saw constructive engagement as having no prior connections:

Constructive engagement, as formulated by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker, was intended to produce two results: (i) a negotiated Namibia settlement, and (ii) reforms within South Africa beneficial to blacks [sic].<sup>70</sup>

Two observations can be based on this quotation. One is that it is hardly possible to believe that the US ever envisaged voluntary reforms within South Africa beneficial to Blacks. This is not in line with earlier or later US positions on the matter. Likewise, a negotiated Namibia settlement was to be on terms favourable to South Africa, for that was the meaning behind constructive engagement. To say otherwise is to both misinterpret history and miss the point.

The other observation is that Chester Crocker, like others in the Administration he represented, "rediscovered" constructive engagement in his shuttle diplomacy. He can at best be taken to have been an instrument through which constructive engagement was presented in a structured policy form.

There has been a failure by students of the region, then, to situate constructive engagement historically. The same failure is carried forward by not relating "linkage" to constructive engagement. Scholars who think along this line include Falk, who observed:

Mineral rich—particularly in uranium, copper and diamonds as Africa's fourth largest mineral exporter—and strategically located in South West Africa, Namibia quickly became a high priority in US

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<sup>70</sup>Bhalinder Rikhye, "Rapporteur's Report", in Nosakhare O. Obaseki (ed.), *Southern African Peace and Security: Foundations for the Future* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1984), p. 19.

foreign policy and an object of the "Reagan Doctrine" to stop communism internationally. The real shift in US policy toward Namibia and South Africa came with the new policies of the Reagan Administration beginning in 1981. Because of the stated policy of "constructive engagement" several members of the administration, including one of the intellectual formulators of the new policy toward South Africa, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and his State Department aide, Gerald Garlucci, saw greater opportunities for negotiations and dialogue with the South Africans.<sup>71</sup>

Falk implied that this policy, the mineral agenda and the mission of rolling back "communism" as well as constructive engagement were new. But they were not so.

On the contrary, at best, the Reagan Administration "rediscovered" constructive engagement. Its foundations and origins really date back to the Nixon era. It was shown, in Chapter Three above, that the Lusaka Manifesto (1969) was directed mostly to the West. Even so it still did not meet America's purported standards because it did not denounce violence and armed struggle once and for all.<sup>72</sup> And because of that, around the same time the Lusaka Manifesto was published, the then US Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger, commissioned a study on Southern Africa (through National Security Study Memorandum 39—NSSM 39).<sup>73</sup> However, the US government was not eager to put into effect the recommendations suggested by the Kissinger Study immediately, at least not until sometime later when the Reagan Administration discovered their usefulness to American policy toward Southern Africa.

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<sup>71</sup>Falk, "Namibian Independence and the Cuban Presence in Angola". Another misinterpretation of Crocker's role is provided by James V. D'Amato, "Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign Policy" Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of South Carolina (1988).

<sup>72</sup>For a detailed discussion, see Omari, "Angola and Namibia", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Seven.

<sup>73</sup>See El-Khawas and Cohen (eds.), *The Kissinger Study*, p. 76.

The contents of NSSM 39 were not known to Lusaka Manifesto signatories or the would-be members of the FLS alliance for over five years, until sometime in 1975.<sup>74</sup> However, its scenarios were as disturbing as was its analysis of the Southern African situation. The US determination to uphold White supremacy in the region in perpetuity was vivid and clear. Possibly this is where and why Johnson and Martin *et al.*'s observations miss the point. The premise of the NSSM 39 Option Two stated:

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies...Our tangible interests *which are more important than the plight of blacks* form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost...We would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and their hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states (emphasis supplied).<sup>75</sup>

This policy and attitude had a number of implications. First, it paved the way for the "linkage" of the Reagan era as shown above, which changed the course of events in Southern Africa tremendously as well as contributing to the decline of the FLS. Second, it gave legitimacy and support to White minority regimes in Southern Africa. Third, it assigned a new role to South Africa, that of mediator in Rhodesia.<sup>76</sup> And fourth, and perhaps the most significant implication, was its facilitating the formation of the FLS,<sup>77</sup> thus advancing SADCC.

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<sup>74</sup>This is implied in a letter from Lawrence Hill, the publisher, to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, reprinted in *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

<sup>76</sup>For details, see Omari, "Angola and Namibia", in Swatuk and Shaw (eds.), *Prospects for Peace and Development in Southern Africa in the 1990s*, Chapter Seven.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*; see also Chapter Three, above.

Constructive engagement played a dual or dialectic role then. It facilitated the formation and the decline of the FLS alliance. It also meant continued US support to UNITA, both overt and covert. Together with the linkage which the US introduced, it meant more and more isolation of Angola by the FLS alliance and less and less involvement of the latter in the Namibian problem. Therefore, constructive engagement which was directed towards Angola and Namibia, and rationalised destabilisation in the region, was also an extra-African factor which contributed to the decline of the FLS alliance.

South Africa's policies toward its neighbours, especially those grouped under the rubric of "destabilisation", constitute another factor which led to the decline of the FLS alliance. Destabilisation was tactically planned and programmed such that it is difficult to generalise its extent and impact in the region as a whole. This is because each target country was destabilised according to its geographical location, internal antagonisms, political and regime stability or instability, its military capability, its dependence on South Africa and many other considerations. The use of one or a mixture of these varied from one country to another. Brown observed this in terms of the *form* of South Africa's intervention, which:

...when it occurs, is related to the nature of South Africa's ties to the particular state: purely military where South African economic interests are absent; more economic to the extent that South African economic interests are present. This rule in some respects is merely stating the obvious fact that economic destabilisation measures are unavailable in states such as Angola with which South Africa has no economic ties. Beyond this, however, this rule suggests both the opportunity and the difficulty created for Pretoria by South Africa's extensive economic links to the SADCC states. These links provide Pretoria with a far more discriminating set of foreign policy instruments than is provided by brute military force, but at the same time they mean that South Africa has to be careful not to harm its own interests when it intervenes in a SADCC state.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Brown, "Regional Conflict in Southern Africa", p. 348.

Table IX

**ECONOMIC COSTS OF DESTABILISATION AND WARFARE TO SADCC  
1980-1988 (US \$ MILLIONS)**

<b>1980-1984 Head</b>	<b>SADCC Estimate</b>	<b>Green and Thompson</b>
Direct war damage	1,610	1,610
Extra defence spending	3,060	3,310
Higher transport, energy costs	970	970
Smuggling (looting)	190	190
Refugees (including internal displaced persons)	660	660
Export loss	230	550
Boycotts, embargoes	260	260
Loss of existing production	800	800
Lost economic growth	2,000	4,000
Trading arrangements	340	590
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,120</b>	<b>12,940</b>

Adjusting through 1988, on a basis consistent with the original estimates:

	<b>SADCC</b>	<b>Revised</b>
<b>1980-1984</b>	<b>10,120</b>	<b>12,940</b>
1985	7,000	7,000
1986	8,000	8,000
1987	9,000	9,000
1988	10,000	10,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44,120</b>	<b>46,940</b>

**Sources:**

- (i) UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilisation and Warfare on Children in Southern and South Africa*, Third Edition (New York: UNICEF, 1989), p. 35.
- (ii) Reginald H. Green and Carol B. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions", in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), p. 272.



This "discriminating set of foreign policy instruments" was symbolised by a sequence of action, intervention, destabilisation, threats and intimidation against its neighbours. This, of course, involved occasional destabilisation of infrastructures that served South Africa itself, especially those in Mozambique.

Several studies have shown that the costs of destabilisation to SADCC states are enormous.<sup>79</sup> As Table IX shows, costs vary depending on the source, method of calculation and variables used. For example, the methodology applied and its problems and shortcomings are explained in detail in the UNICEF Report<sup>80</sup> and the Green and Thompson's article.<sup>81</sup>

These differences and problems have contributed to some inconsistencies in the data. For example, SADCC estimates for 1980-1984 are lower than those of Green and Thompson. However, SADCC estimates for 1985-1988 are the same as the revised figures for the same period. There were no reasons given for this, other than the UNICEF Report explaining the sharp increase in the estimates. This was attributed to escalation of conflict, the rising defence bill, cumulative output losses and inflation.<sup>82</sup>

Green and Thompson's figures are higher than most others. However, those who came out with slightly lower estimates have rationalised them, as Johnson and Martin have noted:

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<sup>79</sup>Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict", in Johnson and Martin (eds.) *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 271-73; Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, passim.; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, Appendices One and Two, pp. 265-276; North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*; and UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, among others.

<sup>80</sup>UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, Annex A. pp. 35-38.

<sup>81</sup>Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict", Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 271-73.

<sup>82</sup>UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, p. 35.

Estimates as to the cost to the Frontline States vary, and because human costs are inestimable, figures tell but a part of the story. Nevertheless, calculations of the cost of defence, damage and lost development now begin conservatively at US \$ 45 billion to the end of 1988, and some costs are still missing from this equation....In addition, South Africa's regional wars have cost 1.5 million lives since 1981 and, as with the cost estimates, the figure may be much higher.<sup>83</sup>

In fact, UNICEF came out with an estimate of its own:

In sum, the 1980-1988 regional GDP loss from South Africa's war of destabilisation and aggression is of the order of US \$ 60 billion in 1988 prices. That is over twice preliminary estimates of 1988 GDP. For 1988, output losses are of the order of US \$ 10 billion or 40 per cent of achieved GDP.<sup>84</sup>

Thus, the figures in the table do not show every aspect of the costs involved. In addition to what has been pointed out above by Johnson and Martin to be shortcomings, there are those aspects which cannot be quantified and are difficult to document. These include the emotional aspects of destabilisation, incapacity of the countries to feed themselves even in situations where weather is favourable, citizens' negative attitudes toward their governments even when the latter are doing all they can to cope with war and other situations, plus general fear of the future, to mention but a few.

All these are negative aspects which cannot generate security and/or development. There is, therefore, more to the effect of destabilisation than the told story so far. In the circumstances, it is difficult to document every feeling, every detail. In an attempt to describe the horror of destabilisation, several people have come up with telling words. For example, President Kaunda, the current chair of the alliance summarised some of the costs of destabilisation in the following words:

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<sup>83</sup>Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. 10. Cf. Green and Thompson's figure at approximately US \$ 47 billion in Table IX, and UNICEF's estimate of US \$ 60 billion, UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, p. 38.

<sup>84</sup>UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line*, p. 38.

What is taking place in the Frontline States under aggression by apartheid is the same as one Jumbo jet filled with frontline children crashing without survivors every day!!... It is impossible to put a human or economic cost on such total loss of young life. How do you calculate the value of a lost arm, or a lost leg, cut away ears and a mutilated nose, lips and plugged out eyes and annihilated eye-sight of living people? How do we calculate the loss of our war-traumatised people who will never again be able to play a normal role in our societies which they would otherwise have played if not stopped in their tracks by apartheid aggression? In Mozambique alone, as many as six factories to produce artificial limbs have been set up to assist those mutilated by war...Angola, today, has the highest per capita number of limbless people in the world...<sup>85</sup>

Another significant element of these hidden costs of destabilisation is that they are considered as achievements by South Africa rather than negative results. This was pointed out by the North South Roundtable:

The [South African] security strategy has created insecurity, coupled with a political strategy to undermine the capacities of the Frontline states and the SADCC region to govern, and to be seen to be able to govern. This hampers their capacity to raise investment and development assistance by projecting an image of political and economic instability.<sup>86</sup>

This is true in so far as it has been *apartheid's* strategy to uphold White supremacy in the region. The intention was to show that Black governments bring chaos and are not able to govern. This again was echoed, as shown above, by the NSSM 39, especially its Option Two.

One aspect which needs to be stressed here about the quantified costs of destabilisation is that, in addition to telling the truth, they are also subject to different interpretations. For example, the most common interpretation, and

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<sup>85</sup>Kenneth D. Kaunda, "Foreword", in Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. xiii

<sup>86</sup>North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*, p. 19.

Table X

**DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL BUDGETS IN SELECTED FRONT LINE STATES  
1980-1988 (US \$ MILLION)**

Country/Item	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>Angola</b>									
Govt. Exp.	2198.0	2647.6	1676.8	1840.1	2473.7	2626.4	2380.6	2352.6	-
Def. Exp.	700.8	604.7	604.9	771.1	1059.8	1147.0	1094.9	1088.1	-
% of Exp.	28.6	32.2	33.6	40.1	45.8	43.8	43.1	42.7	-
Add. Exp.	507.4	561.5	514.9	675.0	944.2	1016.0	964.3	960.7	-
<b>Botswana</b>									
Govt. Exp.	591.6	562.2	446.1	554.0	611.8	530.3	884.0	1185.2	1441.6
Def. Exp.	32.8	31.2	22.9	25.9	26.4	21.9	36.9	83.3	85.1
% of Exp.	5.6	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	7.0	6.0
Add. Exp.**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Mozambique</b>									
Govt. Exp.	435.1	490.7	516.0	542.4	543.4	590.3	1041.3	316.5	344.6
Def. Exp.	136.4	162.4	183.9	207.2	243.2	253.8	305.7	144.2	136.0
% of Exp.	31.0	33.0	36.0	38.0	45.0	43.0	23.0	46.0	39.0
Add. Exp.	62.4	79.0	96.2	115.0	150.8	153.5	177.0	126.1	79.3
<b>Zambia</b>									
Govt. Exp.	-	-	-	-	829.4	674.2	715.9	610.6	1020.0
Def./Sec. Exp.	-	-	-	-	82.6	61.7	56.1	77.5	153.1
% of Exp.	-	-	-	-	10.0	9.0	7.8	12.7	15.0
Add. Exp.	-	-	-	-	41.1	28.0	20.3	47.0	102.1

(Table X continued)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>Zimbabwe</b>									
Govt. Exp.	2466.0	3075.0	3812.4	3147.1	2724.0	2320.5	2914.0	3266.8	3325.4
Def. Exp.	470.0	478.1	496.3	438.8	294.9	311.2	414.2	477.1	496.3
% of Exp.	19.0	15.5	13.0	14.0	11.0	13.5	14.0	14.5	15.0
Add. Exp.	228.6	223.5	305.7	281.5	158.7	195.2	268.5	313.8	330.0

Notes: \*\* - Regarded as normal, averaging 5% per year; Govt. Exp. - Government Expenditure; Def. Exp. - Defence Expenditure; % of Exp. - Defence as percentage of Expenditure; Add. Exp. - Additional defence expenditure above 5%.

Source: Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report* (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat and James Currey, 1989); various pages.

justifiably so, has been to emphasise lost revenue and development; additional defence and security expenditures; and costs of destruction and reconstruction.<sup>87</sup>

Table X shows some of the defence costs, including those beyond what is internationally considered to be normal; that is, five per cent per annum of the national budget.<sup>88</sup> In some cases defence expenditures have gone as high as 40 per cent of national budgets (as in Angola and Mozambique). But still, the figures in the table do not show the amount of stress faced by the armed forces of these countries. This stress is also reflected in the society in general. For example, looting (not that one carried out by South Africa, computed by Green and Thompson) which is a result of bad logistics has been widely reported among the FPLM soldiers in Mozambique, such that the rural population cannot distinguish between the government soldiers and the MNR.<sup>89</sup> In other words, the rural population, and indeed the entire affected population, can no longer distinguish between war and crime.

Moreover, although some countries do itemise their official costs as defence/security (as in Mozambique and Zambia), one item which is not shown in Table X is the growth and expansion of intelligence and (state) security organs in the region. In recent years this has included the rise of private security establishments as well. The former are normally hidden under the labels "armed forces", "security" or "constitutional" expenditures. Like everywhere else, the budgets of such

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<sup>87</sup>See Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, Chapter Sixteen, pp. 116-121; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, Chapter Twenty One, pp. 259-263; Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 159-163; and North South Roundtable, *Total Response to Total Strategy*, pp. 22-40.

<sup>88</sup>See this standard in Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. 43.

<sup>89</sup>Confidential interview with a Tanzanian army officer who served in Mozambique, Dar es Salaam (May 1990). This was corroborated by a Mozambican official as a "possibility", in a confidential interview, Dar es Salaam (May 1990).

establishments are classified, and in Southern Africa these are shown under "special operations" or simply as "over expenditures" of other departments such as the treasury or state house. Such expenses can be confidently estimated to have grown alongside defence expenditures. This so far includes South Africa as well.

That budgets were used to conceal security expenditure is a process that went on regularly.<sup>90</sup> Extreme cases include the way funds were secretly channelled from the then Bureau for State Security (BOSS) to the Department of Information to enable the latter to launch the so-called "clandestine information campaign abroad" to counter international propaganda offensive against South Africa—the propaganda onslaught. The exercise culminated in the "Muldergate" information scandal of 1977/79, which led to the resignation of state President John B. Vorster.<sup>91</sup> Also, there have been some recent allegations that SADF set up a covert unit, Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), whose duty *inter alia*, was to act as a "hit squad" against the opposition, including financing the Inkatha Freedom Party against the ANC, thus fuelling ethnic turmoil and killings. This partly contributed to the recent downgrading of the SSC and scrapping of the Joint Management Centres, by President Frederik de Klerk,<sup>92</sup> and the demotion of General Malan, the defence minister.

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<sup>90</sup>For details, see Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, pp. 71-79, and Grundy, *Militarisation of South African Politics*, especially Chapter Two, pp. 19-33.

<sup>91</sup>For details, see Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, pp. 84-89; Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Frontline Southern Africa*, p. 9; and Thompson, *Challenge to Imperialism*, pp. 167-68.

<sup>92</sup>See "Editorial", *The Weekly Mail*, Johannesburg, Vol. 5 No. 47, (8-14 December 1989), p. 12, and Vol. 6 No. 7, (2-8 March 1990).

However, it is possible that intelligence and security establishments may indeed have expanded to reflect the changing reality in Southern Africa.<sup>93</sup> The most significant aspect of this expansion, whose justification is debatable and even questionable, is not the budgetary implications alone or merely the scale of their operations, especially their counter-intelligence branches, but rather the degree of their penetration into society as a whole. This, which sometimes includes psychological "warfare", has been reported to have resulted in the harassment of civilians, and more so of rural populations, given that sometimes the operators in such agencies are deployed alongside the army. An example of this is the Mozambican *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular* (SNASP)—the security establishment. There have been allegations that, in an effort to extract information about the MNR from the people, SNASP operators have tortured their very sources of information. As a result, "what cannot be achieved by FPLM is achieved by SNASP".<sup>94</sup> This not only shows how disappointing some of these establishments are; but it also reveals their expansion, which has entailed them being deployed into areas which, under normal circumstances, would have been the responsibility of the army's combat intelligence branch.

An alternative interpretation or approach would be to assess the constraints and stress of the costs and figures on the FLS itself as these represent a drain on the coffers of the individual FLS countries. These had an impact on the alliance in the

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<sup>93</sup>Interview with an official, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).

<sup>94</sup>"SNASP boys are notorious. In fact the rural people do not any more distinguish them from the FPLM soldiers. SNASP has tarnished a good name of the army." Confidential interview with a Mozambican government official, Dar es-Salaam (June 1990). This may also reflect inter-service rivalry, but the picture is clear.



sense that it began to be inward-looking. This was foreseen by Jaster in the mid-1980s when he observed:

Indeed, it appears likely that the notion of the Front-Line States as a cohesive group working closely together towards a common regional objective (as was the case in the Rhodesian conflict) will gradually fade. There are several reasons for this. First, no other crises in the region are likely to bear either the same high degree of urgency, with so much at stake for several member states, or to produce as high a degree of Front-Line unity. Second, other problems, mostly domestic, *such as internal wars, debt and structural adjustment*, seem likely to take priority over regional issues. This is already happening in Zambia and Tanzania, whose leaders have been the driving force behind previous Front-Line initiatives, and in Zimbabwe (emphasis supplied).<sup>95</sup>

Thus costs of destabilisation do not stand alone. They go together with the vagaries of structural adjustment programmes, debt and natural disasters as shown below. What is missing in most analyses is that the cost of destabilisation is also *the cost of sustaining the ideals and principles of FLS solidarity*. This is exemplified further by the military and security aspects of destabilisation. In other words, South African destabilisation was functional for the alliance. The two need to be approached in a dialectic manner.

One other objective of destabilisation was to put the members of the FLS on the defensive. This was intended to reduce their capability to continue supporting the liberation movements by making the whole exercise very costly to them. This objective was achieved by South Africa in most of the 1980s, first through a series of non-aggression pacts, and second, by the heavy social, psychological and economic costs of destabilisation. Hence the rise and fall of destabilisation is a factor leading toward the decline of the alliance and a possible rise of other forms of co-operation.

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<sup>95</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 36. This was also corroborated by a number of officials, especially in Tanzania, who saw the trend to becoming inward looking in the country's Southern African policy especially after 1985, although it was mainly attributed to the change of leadership. Confidential interviews, Dar es Salaam (April-June 1990).

What was once considered a "common enemy" is no longer so, and all the members of the alliance have reduced their tempo and rhetoric about liberation. Instead, alliance members began figuring out simply how to cope with destabilisation. This was symbolised by some of them sending troops to Mozambique (Zimbabwe and Tanzania) and by attempting to bring peace (Zimbabwe in Mozambique).

Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and debt are another set of external factors but which have an internal basis.<sup>96</sup> Together the two have devastated most Southern African economies so that most regimes are under pressure to liberalise, democratise or relinquish power altogether. An example of this was an almost successful coup attempt in Zambia at the turn of the decade:

By June 1990 the pressure on the economy and people led to widespread rioting and demonstrations against...reforms and against the government. The unrest was capped by an attempted military coup in early July. These events point to the essential dilemma for a heavily indebted country that is trying to meet the conditions of the IFIs [International Financial Institutions] for readmittance to the international financial system, while facing a crumbling political consensus at home.<sup>97</sup>

Economic pressure which catalyses such political demands leads all nations' attentions to shift inward and less and less outward.<sup>98</sup> The alliance's solidarity cannot endure when some or all of its members are politically inward-looking due to such economic crisis. This has been a feature since the outset of the 1980s. In

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<sup>96</sup>For the discussion on the internal basis of structural adjustment programmes, see Abillah H. Omari, "False Start? Structural Adjustment and African Political Economies", *The Dalhousie Review*, Vol. 68 No. 1/2, (Spring/Summer 1988), pp. 24-36.

<sup>97</sup>Marcia Burdette, "Preface", in Roger Young and John Loxley, *Zambia: An Assessment of Zambia's Structural Adjustment Experience*, Revised Edition (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1990), p. vii.

<sup>98</sup>As shown in note 95, above.

other words, political extroversion and economic constraint brought about by adjustment conditionalities do not go together.

**Table XI**

**TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT OF SADCC COUNTRIES 1984-1987 (US\$M)**

Country	1984	1985	1986	1987
Angola	1,024	1,403	3,071	n.a.
Botswana	395	363	358	518
Lesotho	142	178	186	241
Malawi	898	994	1,113	1,363
Mozambique	1,231	1,442	3,156	n.a.
Swaziland	253	276	232	293
Tanzania	3,047	3,374	3,955	4,335
Zambia	3,933	4,491	5,299	6,400
Zimbabwe	2,030	2,119	2,480	2,512

n.a. - not available

**Sources:**

- (i) *SADCC External Debt Study, 1988* quoted in *SADCC Regional Economic Survey 1988* (SADCC, 1989), p. 61.
- (ii) The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 252-53.

Table XII

## FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN IN SADCC COUNTRIES 1980-1987

	Debt to GDP Ratio			Debt-Service Ratio*		
	1980	1986	1987	1980	1986	1987
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Angola	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Botswana	18.0	36.2	29.3	1.7	4.3	3.7
Lesotho	9.7	29.2	15.0	1.3	4.2	4.4
Malawi	61.0	89.0	38.9	21.2	52.9	23.3
Mozambique	n.a	80.2	78.0	n.a	274.7	n.a
Swaziland	28.0	47.2	30.3	2.6	9.0	6.1
Tanzania	49.6	92.5	61.2	10.5	15.1	21.1
Zambia	90.3	356.5	223.1	17.8	7.6	13.6
Zimbabwe	13.2	32.4	32.2	2.6	19.9	30.5

\* Ratio of debt-service payments to exports of goods and services.

n.a. - not available

## Sources:

- (i) *SADCC External Debt Study (1988)* quoted in *SADCC Regional Economic Survey 1988* (SADCC, 1989), p. 62.
- (ii) The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington D.C., 1989), pp. 256-57.
- (iii) United Nations Development Programme and The World Bank, *African Economic and Financial Data* (New York and Washington D.C.: UNDP and The World Bank, 1989), pp.89-93.

Table XI shows the amount of external debt for SADCC countries. SADCC's debt has grown from US \$ 13 billion in 1984 to US \$ 20 billion in 1986, an increase of over 50 per cent in three years or "over half their combined gross domestic products".<sup>99</sup> Inflation was also high. However, there are some problems of dealing with such "total debt" figures as they do not indicate what the borrowed money was used for. It is important to show the breakdown (although it is difficult to get this) given that Third World regimes continue to accumulate debt at the same time that their economies continue to decline.

It can be speculated that in most Third World countries, whose defence expenditures exceed the normal five per cent of national budgets, much debt is in one way or another related to military expenditure. Borrowed money may not directly be used to purchase arms or sustain defence establishments. Rather, some sectors that need borrowed money would have possibly used locally-generated foreign exchange for imports had it not been that twenty to forty per cent of it had gone into military spending. This was also noted by Dommen and Maizels:

The principal negative effect of using additional resources for military purposes (ignoring external aid) would seem to be that necessarily less is available for investment and production in the nation as a whole. This effect, where significant, would tend to be particularly important if military expenditure has a high import content, thus reducing the share of capital goods and immediate products required for civilian investment.<sup>100</sup>

They also note the difficulty of getting credible military expenditure estimates in the Third World, suggesting further that debt figures may be related to military expenditures, especially on two grounds:

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<sup>99</sup>Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege", p. 550.

<sup>100</sup>Edward Dommen and Alfred Maizels, "The Military Burden in Developing Countries", *JMAS*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (September 1988), p. 378.

(i) Military assistance: this may be hidden by donors under anodyne budget headings, while recipients may dispense with recording military grants or include the repayments of military loans with the rest of debt-service figures *thus exaggerating the debt stress situation*; and

(ii) Foreign-exchange manipulation: governments, especially if they control marketing boards or nationalised industries, may fail to record some exports and use the corresponding foreign exchange to pay for secret military imports (emphasis supplied).<sup>101</sup>

These situations apply to Southern Africa as well. Almost all the members of the FLS (including Botswana, which was forced belatedly to establish an army) fall into this category. Thus, debt in both SADCC and FLS is to some extent rooted in member countries' defence spending, mainly in response to destabilisation. Also, the severity of debt is not shown by the figures of total amounts. Rather, it is revealed by the debt service ratio, as shown in Table XII.

The FLS has also been affected by current global changes. One of these is the thawing of the Cold War which in part advanced a solution to Namibia (and Angola). The tacit super-power understanding which made possible the implementation of UNSCR 435 in 1989 had an impact on the alliance. It signified that the latter could not achieve what it wanted, if by so doing it stepped on the preserve of the super-powers. This recent shift in bi-polar relations has been positive in terms of the resolution of conflict in Southern Africa, at least for the time being. At the same it emphasises the powerlessness, and in fact decline, of the FLS alliance.

Another aspect of this new trend, is the global tendency toward democratisation unleashed in Eastern Europe in 1989. Several members, especially Angola and Mozambique, had been accepting some ideological inspiration from Eastern Europe, which included among others, state or Stalinist structures, while others—Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe—had assembled variants of socialism

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<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

(and humanism). Others were receiving huge amounts of aid, especially military and security, which now they have to do without.<sup>102</sup> Recently, there has been enormous pressure to dismantle the one-party state in all the FLS countries (except Botswana which has always practised formal multi-partism). If implemented over time, the new generation of leadership which this democratisation will likely produce may not necessarily conform to the old norms and values, which for years acted as the foundations of the alliance. Thus even if it survives current regional changes and realignments, the FLS may find itself moving from an alliance of one-party states to a more transnational regional civil society as well as towards "internal democracy".

### **Internal Factors**

Prominent among the internal factors affecting the alliance has been the *national question* in the individual member countries. This question is invariably associated with a country's security—both national and regime. In Southern Africa, it is this which distinguishes one form of conflict from another.

Although it is normally conceptualised at an inter-state, and in a traditional realist sense at the systemic level, in Southern Africa, as in most parts of the Third World, regional security can be discerned at both levels—internal and external, intra- and inter-state. This is in line with Ayoob's explication of the concept:

Despite the rhetoric of many Third World leaders, the sense of insecurity that these states—and, more particularly, their regimes—suffer from emanate to a substantial extent from within their boundaries rather than from outside. This does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are not. But the 'mix' of internal and external sources of threat to these state structures, and particularly to their regimes, is quite often heavily weighted in favour of internal sources. Moreover, external threats quite often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within state boundaries and, in many cases,

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<sup>102</sup>For a recent account, see Anglin, "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Development", pp. 431-455.

Table XIII

## PATTERNS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Country	Form of Conflict	Timing of Conflict	Type	Manifestation	External Element
Angola	Ethnic, party, ideological, civil	Pre/post independence	Dissidence	War	Present
Botswana	Clan	Pre/post independence	Mixed	Inter-clan rivalry	Present
Lesotho	Monarchy vs government	Post independence	Dissidence	Sabotage/coups	Present
Malawi	Repression/succession, ethnic, regional	Post independence	Dissidence	Succession	Present
Mozambique	Ethnic, racial, party, ideological, civil	Pre/post independence	Dissidence	War	Present
Namibia	Ethnic, racial, party	Pre/post independence	Mixed	—	Present



(Table XIII continued)

Country	Form of conflict	Timing of Conflict	Type	Manifestation	External Element
South Africa	Racial, ethnic, constitutional	Historical	Dissidence/liberation	Inter-ethnic inter-racial regional international	Present
Swaziland	Succession	Post-independence	—	Succession	Present
Tanzania	Union, national, political	Post-independence	Dissatisfaction	Secession	Present
Zambia	Ethnic, party, regional	Pre/post independence	Dissidence	Insurrection, coup attempts	Present
Zimbabwe	Ethnic, racial, party, ideological	Pre/post independence	Dissidence	War, inter-ethnic, inter-party rivalry	Present

would be quite ineffective if internal threats and domestic fissures did not exist within Third World societies.<sup>103</sup>

The "mix" of internal and external dimensions of security threats is also evident in Southern Africa. Table XIII shows that the external element is present in all FLS. Most present-day conflicts in the region are carry-overs from the colonial and settler period. However, the most important of them are those which are transformations from wars of national liberation—Angola, Mozambique, and to some extent, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The relationship between a country's security and the national question was also inferred by Ayoob:

The term regional security...[assumes] that the regional states would have succeeded in successfully managing, if not totally eliminating, problems that create frictions and antagonisms of ethnic, communal, sub-national or socio-economic character within these states themselves, thereby eliminating intra-state tensions as likely sources of inter-state conflict between or among regional states.<sup>104</sup>

As shown in Table XIII, these problems have not been solved in Southern Africa. In fact, there are two related trends in the region. Internal frictions and antagonisms have given rise to inter-state, even international, conflicts; in most cases the external element elevated the internal conflict. Also, the external element has attempted to create friction even where it does not exist. The former is reflected in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, while the latter is related to Botswana and Zambia.

The nature of conflicts under discussion—ethnic, communal, sub-national or socio-economic—is not restricted to heterogeneous countries alone. Conflict is also present or has been instigated in countries which are homogeneous ethnically,

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<sup>103</sup>Ayoob, "Regional Security in the Third World", in Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

communally, sub-nationally, and socio-economically as well. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (commonly referred to as the BLS), exhibit this feature. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a nation is: "A distinct race or people, characterised by common descent, language, or history, usually organised as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory".<sup>105</sup> By this definition, the BLS are the only *true* nation-states in the region. Yet, they still exhibit the same types of conflicts as the rest of Southern Africa, as Table XIII shows. Where ethnic animosities are absent, clan conflicts have been encouraged.<sup>106</sup> And where clan conflicts were difficult to implant they were substituted by conflict between the monarchy and the government,<sup>107</sup> problems of succession,<sup>108</sup> and in some cases dissidents groomed by others as in the case of the LLA.

Wherever it is found, the national question implies that a group (or groups) question(s) the legality, representativeness and legitimacy of the government in power. Such a group or groups make their own demands to either share power or act as an alternative government by seeking to unseat incumbent regimes. Common to the impacts of all such groups in Southern Africa has been to make their respective countries ungovernable. Generally there has been a rise of ethnicity both

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<sup>105</sup>*The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Third Revised Edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970). p. 1311.

<sup>106</sup>South Africa allegedly created the "Bamangwato Democrats", and "argued that President Quett Masire was not the legitimate successor to the late President Seretse Khama (who had been a tribal head as well as a government leader)". See Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 225.

<sup>107</sup>This refers to Lesotho and Swaziland. For details, see Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 107-122; Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, pp. 139-169; and David R. Black, Joshua B. Mugenyi and Larry A. Swatuk, *Foreign Policy in Small States: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Southern Africa* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1988).

<sup>108</sup>As in Swaziland and, to a limited extent, Botswana.

in the RSA and FLS as an adjunct of democracy, symbolising a transition from race and/or class to ethnic struggles in the 1990s.

The unresolved national question represented most frequently as internal wars has been a factor in the decline of the FLS. The alliance's ideal of regional security in its totality—total political liberation, economic independence and development, containment and destruction of *apartheid*—could not, in the past as in the present, be achieved under those conditions. On the one hand, it is implausible to think and talk of the alliance's goal of regional security while a modicum of internal security has not been achieved. The members of the alliance have always contended with problems of internal security, which include lost development, wars and famine. On the other hand, internal security in most Southern African countries is tied to the external dimension. It is the sum total of national securities, free of their external elements, that could form a regional political *nirvana* of sorts, with profound, positive, development implications.

The FLS found little justification to go ahead with the idea of regional security beyond the diplomatic rhetoric. This is because all members' presidents realise the presence of serious security problems in their own countries. This notwithstanding, at least some of members have been forced to assist each other militarily, thus diminishing their would-be capacity to confront the collective regional foe—*apartheid*. Like *nirvana* itself, regional security in Southern Africa has not only remained elusive, it was more or less unattainable under the then prevailing conditions. This is mainly due to the manner in which the internal is dialectically linked to the external dimension of security. Both security dimensions need to be addressed together. However, the national question as it has existed, especially so with its external linkages, contributed in part to the decline of the alliance.

One of the attributes of the alliance which has given it strength is also ironically a factor, internal to itself, promoting its decline. This is its informal character. The alliance began as an organisation based on, among other things, personal relations and friendship between Khama of Botswana, Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania. It grew in numbers by incorporating Machel of Mozambique, Neto of Angola, Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Nujoma of Namibia, in that order. Any organisation modeled along personal links at the leadership or "high politics" level runs the risk of diluting its original vigour, and more so its continuity, should leadership changes occur. Although the region has not experienced successful *coups d'etat* (with the exception of Lesotho which has experienced two, one in 1986 and another in 1991), it has, despite the prevalence of the one-party state,<sup>109</sup> seen a high level of leadership turnover. Three (Khama, Neto and Machel) have died in office, while only one (Nyerere) stepped down. The chair of the alliance has changed but once, from Nyerere to Kaunda. Even if the incoming leaders have continued to uphold the original spirit of the alliance their priorities may not necessarily tally with the original Khama-Kaunda-Nyerere conception, especially given the continuously changing politico-strategic environment both regionally and globally.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, there is no common charter or structure to refer to. This

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<sup>109</sup>With the exception of Botswana, which historically practices a multi-party system, Namibia and to some extent Zimbabwe, which was forced to uphold the practice of multi-parties at least for the first ten years of independence as guaranteed by the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement, all the rest have been one-party states. However, there are debates and promises in all the FLS countries on change towards formal multi-party systems.

<sup>110</sup>Recently, Anglin predicted that the era of "political stability", "political survivors" and "smooth succession upon death or voluntary retirement may conceivably be nearing its end". See his "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments", p. 440.

has contributed to the decline of the alliance as much as it has eroded the initial trust among its member presidents.

At an analytic level, the emphasis on informal structure by the FLS presidents shows some hesitancy about more formalised structures as was discussed in Chapter Three, above. This hesitancy was also implanted in SADCC.<sup>111</sup> In addition to the factors that account for such preferences (Chapter Three), the hesitancy has also some roots in the FLS not being a monolithic bloc.

Thus, the alliance appears in form as a cohesive group. Yet in content it is essentially a transnational solidarity grouping exhibiting a large degree of diversity. Its member states differ in colonial and national histories, and in the nature and extent of White settlement. This has permeated through to the post-independence period where there have been differences in political ideologies and national development approaches. As a result, attitudes toward each other differ. Some examples and explanations of this can be given.

First, there was a tendency by the members of the FLS alliance to support one and not the other(s) where there were more than one liberation movements. Where this resulted in "backing the wrong horse", subsequent relations were far from cordial. Zambia, for example, supported Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU at the expense of Robert Mugabe's ZANU. Together with some past legacies, especially those of the CAF on the part of Zambia,<sup>112</sup> as well as some strategic-economic considerations on the part of Zimbabwe, this all resulted in independent Zimbabwe moving closer to Mozambique than to Zambia. The relations between Angola and Zambia can be

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<sup>111</sup>See note 63, above.

<sup>112</sup>The CAF drained revenue from Zambia and Malawi to expand production in Rhodesia", Green and Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Destructive Engagement*, p. 262.

explained along similar lines.<sup>113</sup> Also, for quite some time Zimbabwe supported the PAC more than the ANC, for various reasons.<sup>114</sup> There are even allegations that the ANC's military organ, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* was mobilised to fight against ZANU's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) instead of Rhodesian government troops.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, all these fights were taking place despite the old Moscow alliance of nationalist groups. However, what this has meant in practice is that whatever comes out of the FLS summits is taken by observers to be the result of collective effort while in fact the apparent product shrouds differences. It is contended here that those differences have worked toward the decline of the alliance.

And second, the FLS seems to operate within differences of strategic interest. Despite the alliance having goals common to all members, approaches and tactics to achieve them differ from one member to another, as do intentions and interests. Thus, when it comes to implementing agreed-upon resolutions, national priorities as well as strategic interests take precedence. This was also noted by Jaster who observed:

Each President enjoyed a substantial, if not total, mandate to conduct his country's foreign affairs; and each wanted the freedom to act (or not to act) in accord with his perception of his own country's interests on any given issue or initiative. Hence the co-operating mode of the Front-Line States became one of *ad hoc* summitry...[where] no votes were taken and issues were decided by informal consensus. Disagreements were simply allowed to stand. Moreover, although normally a summit would reach agreement on a general conclusion or line of action, seldom were individual leaders tasked with any

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<sup>113</sup>As discussed above on Angola's delay in joining the FLS alliance. See also, Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 6.

<sup>114</sup>Reasons include ANC's cordial relations with ZAPU, and to avoid South Africa's military wrath by supporting the weaker liberation movement, the PAC.

<sup>115</sup>See Thandeka Gqubule, "Young Lions' Lie Buried in Frontline States—Returnee", *The Weekly Mail*, Johannesburg, Vol. 6 No. 18, (18-24 May 1990).

particular actions. Rather, each was left free to take whatever individual initiatives he felt would help attain the agreed objective, or take no action at all (emphasis in original).<sup>116</sup>

For such reasons, Mozambique has received more FLS military and other assistance than Angola (especially from Tanzania and Zimbabwe), while Angola has largely been left to fend for itself, Soviet and Cuban assistance notwithstanding. That assistance was given not because Angola was a member of the alliance. This is again in line with Jaster's observation:

Angola has not only been bearing the brunt of the Front-Line States' support to SWAPO but she seems to have received almost no military assistance and very little economic help from SWAPO's other Front-Line supporters. In May 1980 Angola's Foreign Minister called on the Front-Line States to take on more of the burden of supporting SWAPO which 'is falling almost alone on Angola costing many lives and...[millions] of dollars.' Other Front-Line States have expressed a readiness to extend diplomatic support to Angola and SWAPO but they have so far seen little need to provide direct military support and little need to provide material aid.<sup>117</sup>

It was also pointed out in Chapter Five above, that even this military assistance to Mozambique by Tanzania and Zimbabwe (and also Malawi) has other explanations, both economic and strategic, beyond mere FLS (or SADCC as in the case of Malawi) solidarity. Such solidarity has not been invoked in military terms where alliance members have fewer strategic or economic interests as in the case of Angola.

Thus it seems that within these and other individual/national preferences, each FLS member has its own vision of the role, even utility, of the alliance, which may be quite different from the others. This diversity of interests has worked to diminish the significance of the alliance to some of its members (and would-be members) as well as to the outside world, especially in the post-bi-polarity period.

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<sup>116</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, p. 34.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.



## **A LOST OPPORTUNITY?**

For an organisation like the FLS which has faced many constraints in its history many things can be termed lost opportunities. Of particular relevance here is the military aspect of the alliance. This is an area which has not received much scholarly attention for several reasons. First, the military equation in Southern Africa has always been tilted in favour of South Africa, leaving the alliance in an insignificant position from the analytic point of view. Second, there has been less ability on the part of the alliance to attempt to match South Africa's military capability. And third, the alliance has been taken by analysts to be more politico-diplomatic than military. Still, some commentators have suggested that the powerlessness and indeed the weakness of the alliance results from its lack of a military component. Thus, the failure to have an explicit military organ can be taken to be a lost opportunity which may have contributed to its decline.

### **Multilateral Defence Organ Dimension**

It was shown in Chapter One (above) that the FLS may be a unique type of Third World alliance which differs from most others by having no military component. It was, at the same time, shown that the ISDSC of the FLS is the institutionalised functional apparatus below the summit which co-ordinates defence and security. Very few students of the region have appreciated this uniqueness of the alliance. Jaster is among those few who have observed that:

How, then, are the Front-Line States to be perceived? Is it... 'more a slogan or label than an operational phenomenon?' Or should it be seen as something real and more lasting? Less than an alliance, certainly but more than a temporary, single issue coalition?<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

Thus, any evaluation about whether or not the absence of a military component is a lost opportunity has to take into consideration the unique nature of the alliance itself.

There has been a tendency over the years to equate the FLS with other Third World similar organisations, especially the GCC and ASEAN,<sup>119</sup> despite differences in the operational environments between them and the Southern African region. Both Dowdy and Ispahani, drawing inferences from the GCC, have argued that the ineffectiveness of the FLS alliance is due to the absence of a joint defence force. Indeed, the former has forcefully argued for the creation of such an organ for the FLS.<sup>120</sup> Yet it is most likely that neither of them had any knowledge of the existence of the ISDSC,<sup>121</sup> as neither mentioned it at all. If they did they would have known that there had been two unsuccessful attempts to transform it into a full-fledged multilateral defence pact.<sup>122</sup>

There are several factors to be considered here in terms of the relevance of such a multilateral defence organ. The first is the *purpose* which a FLS joint defence force might serve. Theoretically, and at a very broad level, the joint force would be used to deter direct South African attacks. However, this is countered by a number of technical as well as other considerations. These were partly summed up by Jaster:

A practical obstacle to joint military activity is the lack of standardisation of training, weapons or doctrine among the national

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<sup>119</sup>See Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa"; Ispahani, "Alone Together", pp. 152-56; see also discussion in Chapter One, above.

<sup>120</sup>Dowdy, "Militarisation of the Indian Ocean Region and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa".

<sup>121</sup>Having learned of its existence Dowdy finally retreated from his position in our joint paper, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States".

<sup>122</sup>See the discussion in Chapter Three, above.

armies. Moreover, since in most cases they are newly-established forces which have yet to be moulded into effective national armies, joint activities would risk the weakening of discipline and efforts to instill a sense of nationalism.<sup>123</sup>

Jaster also observed some constraints pertaining to political will to indulge in multilateral military activities:

At the foreign policy level, these states would be extremely reluctant to commit any of their forces to a joint command which could involve them in hostilities that they might otherwise have been able to avoid. This is particularly the case with regard to actions against the only perceived military threat to the region, the Republic of South Africa. These states know that they are militarily weak and vulnerable and that, even acting in concert, they are no match for the SADF. Any gesture, such as joint manoeuvres, which South Africa would almost certainly view as being directed against her, is quite simply out of the question for a long time to come....It would be more difficult, [for example], for the Front-Line States to agree on a joint action in the case of, say, a right-wing coup in Zambia or the coming to power of an aggressive military government in Tanzania.<sup>124</sup>

These and other problems such as poverty and poor infrastructure as well as the preference for "high politics" as opposed to functional co-operation, were noted but down-played by Dowdy and Isphani. In fact, the main obstacle in the two previous attempts to have a defence pact was described as fear of pre-emptive attack by South Africa.<sup>125</sup> There also have been press reports that the South African government, which was never happy with the establishment of the FLS alliance, was also displeased with the creation and functioning of the ISDSC. It is reported that there have been several attempts to thwart the activities of this Committee, especially the

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<sup>123</sup>Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line states*, p. 37.

<sup>124</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 37 and 39.

<sup>125</sup>Confidential interview with a senior military officer, Ministry of Defence, Dar es Salaam (November 1989).

smooth convening and conduct of its meetings.<sup>126</sup> So, the fear of pre-emptive attack was, accordingly, quite well-founded. However, considering the on-going regional changes, especially in the Republic, the relevance of a multilateral defence organ to post-*apartheid* Southern Africa is questionable. It cannot be ascertained at this time whether or not South Africa will continue to be a threat. Much will depend upon the way that dominant regional actor behaves in the near future.

The second factor is that all those constraints addressed in this chapter, which made the FLS appear to decline, have constituted *an uncondusive environment* for the functioning of a multilateral defence pact among its members. It can be said that the same reasons which make the FLS a unique alliance do also preclude the possibility of it embracing a formal multilateral defence pact. For example, trust and national pride of each member are important but contradictory elements in any multilateral defence organ. In the case of the FLS, some members have gone to the extent of having armed military clashes with each other which just fell short of war. For example, Botswana troops clashed with those of Zimbabwe inside Botswana. This sad episode was described as follows:

The Botswana army clashed on November 8th [1983] with intruding Zimbabwean troops and came under heavy fire,...A statement by Botswana's defence force commander...said the Zimbabwean forces withdrew when Botswana reinforcements were sent in....Botswana troops on follow-up operations found that six village huts in the area

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<sup>126</sup>These have included (i) subjecting various delegations (especially that of Lesotho when that country was a member of ISDSC between 1983 and 1985) to unnecessary and unexplained delays at its airports; (ii) Botswana and Lesotho could not host Committee meetings (so far Botswana has hosted only one); (iii) at one of the meetings the national flag of a member country disappeared mysteriously at the conference table; and (iv) the use of proxies: for example, an Angolan delegation flying through Malawian airspace to Dar es Salaam to attend a Committee meeting on 18 November 1986, received orders to turn back, an episode which provoked a diplomatic uproar against Malawi.

Confidential interview with a Zimbabwean diplomat, Dar es Salaam (April 1990), and personal experiences. For a detailed account on the Malawian episode, see "SADCC Protests to Malawi", *Daily News*, Tanzania (26 November 1986).

had been burnt down and all residents disappeared....Following the incidents along Botswana-Zimbabwe border an emergence meeting of the Botswana-Zimbabwe defence and security commission was held in Bulawayo on November 10 [1983].<sup>127</sup>

The troops of both countries were clashing when there was already a joint defence and security commission in place. This and other breaches of trust, even when they occurred accidentally, can cause enormous problems in even contemplating a multilateral defence pact.

The third factor to take into consideration is that, despite the current situation in which the FLS does not have a joint defence force, the very fact that members are in an alliance, and several have bilateral defence agreements, puts fear into some countries in the region. At one time the FLS presidents had to declare that "Front-Liners Won't Attack Malawi".<sup>128</sup> This followed a series of mini- and other summit meetings between and among them to discuss ways and means of impressing upon President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi the need to stop assisting the MNR. In fact, the late President Machel was killed while coming from one such meeting; this time to convince President Mobutu not to allow his country, Zaire, to be used as a conduit for arms to Angolan government opponents.<sup>129</sup> The very fact that the FLS had to dispel rumours of militarily venturing into Malawi means that there was a possibility for joint action (although not necessarily against South Africa), and, such possibility

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<sup>127</sup>ARB (PSCS), Vol. 20 No. 11, (15 December 1983), pp. C7031-32. See also *Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (KCA)*, Vol. XXIX No. 11, (November 1983), p. 32480.

<sup>128</sup>*Daily News*, Tanzania (17 October 1986).

<sup>129</sup>See Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique", in Johnson and Martin (eds.), *Frontline Southern Africa*, p. 41.

constitutes a *deterrence* of sorts.<sup>130</sup> It is questionable whether present-day Malawian policy changes regarding the MNR is related to this, however.

Fourthly, deterrence is reinforced further by both bilateral defence arrangements within the alliance and occasional FLS statements reaffirming *joint action* should the need arise. This can be said to constitute deterrence at the level of rhetoric. Statements like "Frontliners Resolve to Tighten Defence",<sup>131</sup> and also, according to Anglin, that of the FLS summit in March 1982 which resolved:

To reinforce their co-ordinating action of defence in order to *stop* the racist regime of Pretoria from continuing its acts of military aggression and economic sabotage against the free and independent states of the region and to *force* it to withdraw its occupying forces from the People's Republic of Angola (emphasis in original),<sup>132</sup>

have helped on some occasions to instil a sense of belonging although at the practical level such statements are bluffs.

What, then, can be made of all this? Given that there were attempts to establish a joint defence force within the FLS alliance, and given that internal problems facing individual members have roots in both internal and external environments, it cannot be ascertained that by not having a multilateral defence pact the alliance lost an opportunity. It has been argued in this study that although most problems facing the alliance appear to be of a military nature their actual bases are

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<sup>130</sup>It was widely believed then, with some degree of credibility, that the FLS were going to coerce Malawi by using non-diplomatic means. These are said to have included an economic squeeze on transit trade, increased support to Malawian dissidents spread throughout Southern Africa, and a little military scare. Confidential interviews with senior officials in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam (June 1990). According to Anglin, "...threats of dire economic and possibly military reprisals by the Frontline states forced Banda to cease and desist [supporting the MNR]". See his "Southern Africa Under Siege" p. 557.

<sup>131</sup>*Daily News*, Tanzania (21 November 1986).

<sup>132</sup>Anglin, "The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa" in Dowdy and Trood (eds.), *The Indian Ocean*, p. 263.

political. This, in part, means that the structures of both the FLS and the ISDSC are quite compatible with the alliance's own definition of regional security. The move, albeit slow, from the FLS to SADCC may be a realisation of this. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that the regional crisis is multi-faceted and not confined to the military aspect alone.

Writing about multilateral defence pacts for the Third World, especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, may be incomplete without pointing out the inadequacies of some of them. The GCC, for example, established in the course of, in response to, and, in anticipation of the results of the Iraq-Iran war,<sup>133</sup> represents an indicative case. What the GCC members feared and guarded against is what finally happened. It has been suggested that Iran was more feared—"the perceived threat of contagion of the anti-monarchical Iranian Revolution"<sup>134</sup>—than Iraq. Yet it was finally Iraq that invaded and completely overran a GCC member, Kuwait. However, between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the so-called "American-led coalition" reaction in mid-January 1991, the GCC was not invoked, mentioned or given a chance to respond by itself. What was originally conceived as the GCC members' motto regarding their relationship with the US—of "go away a little closer",<sup>135</sup>—implying an attempt to militarily become self-reliant, has drawn the region back into the very centre of America's military orbit, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>133</sup>Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States", and Ispahani, "Alone Together", p. 155.

<sup>134</sup>Dowdy and Omari, "A Comparative Study of Security Co-operation Among Weak States".

<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

It is realistic to assume, however, that the FLS alliance, which has all along tried to avoid getting into a super-power orbit, is not only quite secure with its present arrangements, but will be even more comfortable in the future given the continuously changing contemporary scenarios in the region.

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has demonstrated that most of the tendencies pointing toward the decline of the FLS are rooted in the alliance itself and in its politico-strategic environment. The indicators of, and factors in the decline, have both been external and internal to the alliance. However, none of them by itself has been sufficient enough to seriously undermine the alliance and contribute to its demise. Rather it has been the sum total of all the indicators and factors working together that has caused the decay. Which order of forces depends on mode of analysis, which state, what time-period etc. Even though the decline discussed in this chapter is not total, it is palpable and undeniable. Yet, despite the discussed odds the FLS alliance continues to exist albeit in changed form and circumstance.

Also, it has been argued that what some scholars have claimed to have constituted a lost opportunity on the part of the FLS alliance—especially the absence of a multilateral defence force, and unwillingness, if not hesitancy, on the part of its members to form one—is not so in fact. The reasons for its absence are rooted in the unique nature of the alliance itself. Moreover, it may become even less necessary in a post-*apartheid* Southern Africa. However, this emerging fact, is working in concert with both, indicators and factors, to make the FLS what it is today—a declining entity.



Although the alliance has been an important feature in the Southern African conflict, conflict resolution and co-operation from 1975 to date, it was more so during its period of ascendancy from 1975 to 1980. With the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 priorities and attitudes began to change to reflect new regional and global realities. Not only was its creation tied to the crisis in Zimbabwe but also as shown, a number of other factors began to undermine its vigour from 1980. Its decline is likely to speed-up in the rest of the 1990s given the contemporary conjuncture of forces.

## Conclusions

### FUTURE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The [OAU *Ad Hoc*] Committee [on Southern Africa] constitutes a veritable staff headquarters in the struggle against *apartheid*.

President *Denis Sassou Nguesso* <sup>1</sup>

If we have been unfriendly to South Africa, it has been because of the abominable policies of *apartheid*. As soon as they abolish *apartheid*, I tell you, Zambia will be the first to propose that South Africa should be accepted in the OAU, should join the PTA and SADCC and South Africa should be with us when we preside over the ending of the Frontline States.

President *Kenneth Kaunda* <sup>2</sup>

Regional Development is of decisive importance to Southern Africa. The eleven states of Southern Africa have a combined population of more than 100 million. The region is endowed with valuable natural resources and has the potential to become one of the most prosperous regions in the world. However, the nations comprising the region divided for so long by colonialism, wars, conflicts and racial strife, will have to join forces, work together and plan together. If we succeed in this, our region should be able to realise the common aim of a better future. If we work together, we will succeed in obtaining active involvement by Europe, the United States of America and other developed countries in the developing economies of the Southern African region.

President *Frederik W. De Klerk* <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*ARB-PS*, Vol. 23 No. 8, (September 1986), p. 8176.

<sup>2</sup>Kenneth Kaunda, "I am Prepared to Bow Out", an exclusive interview with Veronique Edwards of the BBC, *New African*, No. 280, (January 1991), p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>Address by State President, Mr. Frederik W. De Klerk, at the Opening of the Third Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 1 February 1991 (Pretoria: Bureau for Information, February 1991), p. 24.

## OVERVIEW

The above quotations suggest that there has in recent years been an accelerating and irreversible process of change in Southern Africa. That process, partly pioneered by the FLS, has resulted in the alliance's completion of its life-cycle. The OAU has, since 1986, technically withdrawn its mandate from the alliance. Its current chair, President Kaunda of Zambia has been, at the beginning of 1991, ready to invite South Africa to join regional organisations as well as to the ceremony to *dismantle* the alliance. On his part, President De Klerk of South Africa has expressed his own vision of post-*apartheid* Southern Africa. The statements by Kaunda and de Klerk give rise to a degree of optimism that a solution to regional conflicts is near. In different ways the two presidents have high hopes that a final solution can be achieved and Southern Africa can move from confrontation to co-operation, underdevelopment to development.

Yet one can still retain some scepticism about such statements, especially as they have been heard, albeit in different tones, in the past. The difference between then and now, however, is that at least the present statements are associated with tangible actions and events. They appear not to be the usual rhetoric hidden in diplomatic obscurity although they remain just projections about the near future. This is important to emphasise because the main pillars of *apartheid* are in reality still in place, and the FLS is still in existence.

However, a new chapter in the history of Southern Africa does seem to be unfolding. This is so despite the long period of time it has taken to arrive at the present juncture where, for example, the ANC *negotiates* to end *apartheid* through *constitutional* means as opposed to armed struggle, and does so legally from inside the Republic. This long process of change has been the subject matter of this study.

The study is, therefore, timely, original and "unorthodox", i.e. it does not always accept established intellectual traditions as givens.

### **The Setting**

This study set out to investigate, assess and evaluate the FLS alliance of Southern Africa in a regional context, mainly focusing on conflict, conflict resolution and co-operation. Various approaches and/or theories have been used all of which have been useful depending upon the issue area to which they were applied. The apparent dominance of the regional systemic approach is due to the regional nature of the subject. Constraints and biases imposed by the use of a single approach were, in this way, overcome.

## **MAJOR FINDINGS**

### **Co-operation for Conflict Resolution**

In terms of the findings, this study has shown that the FLS was a product of both conflict and co-operation. These two interaction patterns have characterised the conduct of international as well as transnational relations in the region. However, no clear-cut or lasting inter-state alignments have evolved because some actors may be in conflict in certain areas while they may co-operate in others.

That the FLS was partly a product of a regional *conflict* is because colonialism and White minority rule provided the impetus for the FLS presidents to come together. And that it was a product of *co-operation* is because its formation did not represent the first time the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa grouped themselves together to promote their interests. They have done so before. The members of the alliance were following that tradition.

The study has also shown that inter-state groupings preceding the FLS had similar objectives. They mainly centred around the liberation of Southern Africa. The differences between the two sets of inter-state groupings were shown to have been in the articulation and coherence of their policies, and the fact that the alliance was more issue-specific than its predecessors. Thus the FLS has endured the longest, and has become the most significant. At the same time, the creation of one inter-state grouping did not preclude the establishment of another, with more or less similar objectives. The parallel existence of several inter-state groupings concerned with different aspects of liberation at different times has been a feature of Southern Africa. The creation of SADCC alongside the FLS follows that same tradition.

However, the alliance has been noted throughout this study for its feature, unique among African regional inter-state groupings (mostly in Southern Africa), of being originally informal in its operations but also over time exhibiting formal tendencies, as well as its being organised at the level of "high politics". It was also argued that if the alliance has performed a commendable regional security role, then the only known structure below the summit—the ISDSC—has been its functional/operational organ in that role.

#### **The Front Line States Alliance's Relations with the Liberation Movements**

This study has also evaluated and analysed the relationship between the alliance and another very important actor—the liberation movements. It was concluded that the relationship between the two actors was mainly symbiotic, as both sought to challenge and change the *status quo*. Despite this, however, there were some uneasy relationships between them, mainly centring around where emphasis should be placed between armed struggle and negotiations. It was noted, especially in Chapter Four, that the conflict between the two strategies—armed struggle and negotiations—was

essentially one of timing; when to negotiate and when to intensify armed struggle. In general the two strategies complemented each other, although in most cases (except in Angola) independence/majority rule was achieved, at least in the final stages, through negotiations. This is also currently taking place in South Africa itself between the *apartheid* regime and major liberation movements.

It has also been argued in this study that, despite the symbiotic relationship between the FLS and the liberation movements, and given that there were times when the two had an uneasy relationship, the former never attempted to define its relationship with the latter. Rather, it was left vague and open to different interpretations. A general criterion of "authentic representative of the people" was ascribed to liberation movements of the alliance's choice. Also, some discrimination was exercised in inviting the leaders of the liberation movements to attend the FLS summits. Appendix I shows the way such leaders were or were not invited.

The other observation is that the relationship between individual members of the FLS and particular liberation movements greatly determined and continues to influence the nature of inter-state relations in Southern Africa once the movements form governments in their respective territories. Thus, it has not been a matter of choice that Zimbabwe has been politically closer to Mozambique than it has been to Zambia. This legacy of liberation struggle has determined the nature of FLS solidarity and performance into the 1990s.

### **The Front Line States Alliance Relations with South Africa**

In the course of implementing its objectives—that is, to change the *status quo* and promote security and development in the region—the alliance unleashed reactions from its regional foes; initially, all colonial/White minority regimes. This study has concluded that it was partly such reactions, particularly from South Africa, that set

in motion the whole process of decline in the FLS. One form of South African reaction was the formulation and implementation of its total national strategy. It is argued in this study that this strategy, especially its demise, has been a very important factor, although not the only one, leading to the decline of the alliance in the 1980s. The same policy can be said to have weakened South Africa itself as it provided the *raison d'être* for the continued existence of the opposing alliance. Thus, total national strategy weakened each party to the conflict to differing degrees and at different times.

It was also observed that, in the formulation of this national policy, South African strategists assumed and insisted that the Republic's security threats and problems were always externally instigated. Such a projection affected the FLS alliance, where the threat was assumed to emanate from and was allegedly maintained with the help of the communist powers. It thus down-played the internal causes for South Africa's internal conflict, namely *apartheid*. It is argued in this study that in so doing, and by recognising its own power in addition to its urge to dominate and patronise the region, South Africa was attempting to define regional security on its own terms. Thus the South African regime was, according to such a definition, expecting total regional submissiveness to its policies. Anything short of that was unacceptable and was interpreted as a signal toward the implementation of total onslaught; thus a form of conflict. The FLS alliance was opposed to this.

The alliance continued to work for an *apartheid*-free Southern Africa, and was therefore defying the *apartheid* regime. Hence, the frequency of action-reaction type of international relations in the region. However, the confrontation that ensued and the responses of each party to the regional conflict have, to some extent, been cautious. This, together with the historically-rooted networks of interdependence (and dependence), has tended to confirm that Southern Africa is one regional

political economy in which a problem in one of its components affects other components as well.

In order to counter the so-called total onslaught, total national strategy depended mainly on the military. Thus, the militarisation of the South African state has been very topical in the 1970s and 1980s. This study has argued that despite the preponderance and dominance (within certain limits) of South African military power, the militarisation of any state, especially of South Africa, involves not merely the presence of military personnel in the decision-making agencies of the state, nor the total military strength of that country compared to others. Although these are important contributory factors to militarisation, this study has concluded that, first, militarisation is a process which has to be located at the level of decision-making; and second, and perhaps most important, what determines its presence or absence is the amount and extent of influence which the military is able to exert in shaping the country's threat perception so as to make even illusions appear to be real, as well as anything (and consequently everything) to appear to be of military significance, implying an ideology or paradigm of sorts. It was also indicated that by this observation this study differed substantially from other Southern African studies on the subject.

A similar departure was taken with respect to the conceptualisation of destabilisation, a component of South Africa's total national strategy. It has been shown that scholars have two clear-cut and opposing positions on destabilisation. The majority have upheld the view that destabilisation has been designed in South Africa and directed toward its neighbours. From this perspective, the South African state is the aggressor, and its neighbours are the victims. Few, particularly South African academics, stand by the alternative position that South Africa was simply reacting to destabilisation by its neighbours; the Republic was just a victim trying to



defend itself. This study concluded that it is difficult to completely absolve the members of the FLS and other neighbours of South Africa on destabilisation. Accordingly, destabilisation is *basically* South African in origin, and is clearly directed toward its neighbours. Also, and only in a *limited* sense, it is a two-way phenomenon, of an action-reaction type. This limited sense was seen in terms of South Africa's reactions to its neighbours' attempts to change the *status quo*, which in turn seriously affected the Republic. This view was qualified, however: if destabilisation is seen as a two-way or dual process, then South Africa has had a larger share in it than, perhaps, all its neighbours combined. The Republic has engendered more action than reaction while its neighbours have indulged in more reaction, sometimes including bewilderment and helplessness, than action.

#### **The Front Line States Alliance's Decline**

This study has dealt extensively with the factors leading to the decline of the FLS. It has been demonstrated that these are rooted in the alliance itself, and more so in the politico-diplomatic environment in which it has been operating. It was argued that the factors contributing to its decline have been both external and internal to it. However, none of these was determined to be more dominant, thus contributing more to decline than the rest. It was concluded that it was therefore the sum-total of all the discussed factors working individually, severally and/or in concert that made the alliance what it is—a declining entity.

It has been shown that this decline is relative and in terms of the alliance itself. It was *not* intended to compare the FLS with other actors such that the rise of one entity would presuppose the decline or fall of another, and *vice versa*, as

Kennedy's work, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, suggests.<sup>4</sup> This study has conceptualised the decline of the FLS alliance in terms of its own successes and failures, relevance and significance, over time. It has thus been argued that during the period of rise the alliance (especially its individual members) was outward-looking, most often resembling an offensive or militant stance. Much of that vitality waned during the period of decline, thus reducing the alliance to an increasingly insignificant position as most of its members, and even the alliance itself, began to be inward-looking, less militant, and more and more defensive. This inward-lookingness is itself a product of several other factors, the most important being regional changes, structural adjustment conditionalities and global changes.

#### **Nature of the Alliance**

This study began by defining the Front Line States as a unique African alliance. It was observed in Chapter One that it is possible for the Third World to form FLS-type of alliances that have no military components, and lack the tutelage of either super, great or middle powers or international organisations such as the UN; this is so despite the alleged requirements of traditional alliance theory as explicated by, for example, Liska, Osgood and Rothstein.<sup>5</sup> Despite this possibility, and given the example of the FLS, there are several observations which can be made on the limits and practice of such alliances.

The first is that the uniqueness of the FLS is exhibited primarily at the level of the alliance theory. In practice, and in terms of its objectives, it was not the first

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<sup>4</sup>Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), especially Introduction, pp. xv-xxv.

<sup>5</sup>See Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, passim.; Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, passim.; and Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, passim.

inter-state grouping among the majority-ruled Southern African states. The difference between it and its predecessors lies mainly in terms of currency, relevance, composition, leadership, diplomatic power and the legitimation and recognition it received.

The second observation is that the alliance (and also the liberation movements), within certain limits, found it useful to work in conjunction with third parties or "non-frontliners", be they leaders of African countries, or super, great or middle powers, especially in the course of negotiations. These were courted and encouraged whenever it was thought they could contribute something positive through their influence.<sup>6</sup> It was shown that this process is continuing, to include negotiating for peace between different factions that are at war in independent countries (Angola and Mozambique) and to bring *apartheid* in South Africa to a final end. This has led to some contradictions, though. On the one hand, the FLS has always shown some determination to avoid being patronised. On the other hand, the very fact that of late negotiations by non-frontliners have largely been conducted outside the framework of the alliance system has also symbolised tendencies towards its decline.

Finally, as a third observation, the same uniqueness may have helped the alliance to achieve a certain amount of flexibility. This was realised by its lack of a multilateral defence organ, which in turn contributed significantly to a lower level of

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<sup>6</sup>This assertion recognises not only the complex nature of any mediation but also its various requirements in terms of who is capable and acceptable to mediate when and why (eg. the roles of Zaire in Angola, and Kenya in Mozambique). For some insights on the theory and requirements, see Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), *passim*, and I. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution", Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 299-319.

internationalisation or globalisation of the Southern African conflict by making it more regional. This conclusion takes into account the fact that once in a while the alliance has characterised some regional conflicts as international problems needing international solutions, as was the case of Namibia. It is emphasised here that the absence of a multilateral defence organ within the alliance has enabled it to be directly involved in the process of conflict resolution, the conflict being substantially military in form, without itself being directly drawn into it. Probably, such involvement could not have been avoided if the alliance had a viable defence organ. Thus, whatever alliance members have contributed toward each other militarily has been done by invoking their respective bilateral defence agreements contracted outside the framework of the alliance, explanations to the contrary notwithstanding.

### **The Waning Paradigm**

This study has shown that the process of change in Southern Africa has produced mixed results. As more countries were being liberated, regional security was increasingly becoming precarious and unstable. The liberation and independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe degenerated into further instability. Namibia may have escaped that due to the timing of its independence, the year 1990 being a turning point; this is particularly so in view of the waning of the Cold War. However, one aspect which became clear, especially as the 1980s decade was closing, was the speedy erosion of the very foundation on which the FLS was based. This is evident in three broad issue areas: (i) Namibian independence in 1990, (ii) *apartheid*, and (iii) destabilisation. The last two are, however, still at issue. Nevertheless, their intensity has been reduced as a result of continuing reforms and changes in South Africa. The three aspects had together acted as the glue for the FLS especially in the 1980s.

There are three main issues from which to draw some conclusions on the effect of the variables on the removal of this glue. The first is that all three—Namibia, *apartheid* and destabilisation—were maintained mainly by South Africa's military might, although sometimes the variables themselves had some economic, political, strategic and ideological dimensions. The military aspect was the most painful, the most dominant. Despite this dominance, however, the SADF experienced some military reversals, especially in Angola, more or less along the lines of its earlier defeat there in 1976, as shown in Chapter Five. President Kaunda noted that, "Apartheid suffered historic defeat in Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988. The defeat triggered the *apartheid* military retreat in the region".<sup>7</sup> Although far from being a phenomenon of the mid-1970s and mid-1980s South Africa's military might has begun to reveal some vulnerability. This may have helped to bring about positive change: first, in terms of strategic and tactical rethinking, some adjustments in the military doctrine inside the *apartheid* war machine itself, as well as in the administration; and second, in the Republic's relations with its neighbours, i.e. decline in the salience of militarisation.

The second issue is that colonialism, *apartheid* and destabilisation had for years served as rallying points for some members of the FLS which brought about internal national cohesion and, to some extent, regime stability. Most problems of a security nature were explained, sometimes justifiably so, in terms of colonial, *apartheid* and destabilisation machinations. These three helped to put in place and maintain some states of emergency, especially in Zambia, and to some extent in

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<sup>7</sup>Kaunda, "Foreword" to Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. xvi.

Zimbabwe.<sup>8</sup> Vines has also commented on this phenomenon in a critical review recently:

The image of external threat from South Africa has in the past been encouraged by the Frontline State governments as a domestic weapon to try to deflect critical attention from their internal problems such as corruption, economic decline, and the growing calls for political pluralism. It is therefore hardly surprising that the issue of South African destabilisation becomes mixed up with domestic myth-making. A current example is the Zimbabwean government's maintenance of nationwide state of emergency, although it is really only needed along the Mozambique border. Its justification [was] the threat of continued South African destabilisation, although, with events of 1990 in South Africa, this is greatly reduced...<sup>9</sup>

Vines may have overstated the case, perhaps by mixing cause and effect, but the message is clear. The state of emergency in Zimbabwe has since been lifted but it continues in Zambia<sup>10</sup> despite efforts toward democratisation. Thus, in addition to checking what was commonly termed in the FLS countries as *apartheid's* "grand designs", such emergencies served mostly to ensure regime survival.

And the third issue is that recent developments in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, especially peace and transition processes in these countries, may have worked in concert to reduce the viciousness of both *apartheid* and destabilisation.

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<sup>8</sup>Another view is that the state of emergency in independent Zimbabwe was a continuation of that under the UDI regime. But it was frequently challenged on the basis that it was vague, being inadvertently applied to the entire country while lately only the area along the country's common border with Mozambique justified it; no foreigners were ever detained under the law; and as a result it was mainly used internally as a political tool. Confidential interview with a Tanzanian diplomat, Harare, Zimbabwe (November 1989).

<sup>9</sup>Vines, "Several Years Behind the Leash".

<sup>10</sup>For Zambia's state of emergency, see "...President Kenneth Kaunda announced a state of emergency in Zambia and said that he had made regulations providing for the imposition of curfews...", *KCA*, Vol. XV (18-25 December 1965), p. 21135; and Bizeck J. Phiri, "The Rise and Demise of Liberal Democracy in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia: A Reflection", African Studies Seminar Series, Dalhousie University (15 November 1990). That the state of emergency is still in place, see Neil K. Katongo, "Give us a Break, President Kaunda", Letters, *New African*, No. 280, (January 1991), p. 4.

Although there are no guarantees yet that such processes are not irreversible,<sup>11</sup> it still can be projected that for the time being the regional actors in Southern Africa have realised the importance of accommodation and negotiation as opposed to confrontation.

As a process, however, the dilution of the context that supported regional conflict in Southern Africa, probably began with the negotiations that led to the Nkomati Accord in 1984. As shown in Chapter Six, this was perhaps the starting point in that the commonality of the enemy—South Africa—among the members of the FLS was directly questioned. This waning of the policy paradigm has had far-reaching consequences for all regional and even extra-regional actors. For example, the need for the continued existence and maintenance of the alliance in its present form is questionable. This has been echoed by the OAU which has, since 1986, withdrawn the mandate it once bestowed upon the alliance to handle Southern African affairs, as shown in Chapter Three, and proceeded to create its own *ad hoc* committee on Southern Africa, i.e. onto parallel FLS, *ad hoc* and peace meetings in Harare and other cities. As if to discredit the historical role of the FLS the committee was described as "a veritable staff headquarters".<sup>12</sup> Also, the alliance

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<sup>11</sup>This is echoed in recent statements from both the FLS and OAU in their debate on sanctions: "The Frontline leaders...accordingly agreed to maintain sanctions until Mr. De Klerk's changes became 'profound and irreversible'", Gerald L'Ange, "Africa's Sanctions Dilemma", in *The Star*, Johannesburg (4 March 1991), and "There was need to maintain global consensus on the isolation of South Africa until there was evidence of irreversible progress towards the total dismantling of apartheid", *The Herald*, Harare (8 February 1991).

<sup>12</sup>See note 1, above.

itself has begun to seriously rethink its position regarding sanctions,<sup>13</sup> although usually these were expected to be imposed by others.

### **FUTURE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE IN PERSPECTIVE**

Having analysed the rise and decline of the FLS in Southern Africa, what then can be concluded? Could its absence have altered the contemporary situation in the region? This is a crucial question, yet it has no direct or easy answer. Instead, it raises a number of responses, some of them contradictory.

In comparative terms, conditions in the Front Line States countries have not been better despite the establishment of the alliance. Individual members as well as the alliance itself have continued to operate in a high threat environment. Alliance members have operated in a region which, to some extent, has been an object of super-power interest and rivalry, especially before the end of the Cold War in the late-1980s. Moreover, the establishment of the alliance did not alter the fact that its members are weak Third World countries trying to survive at the margins. The alliance has also not been able, neither did it attempt, to bridge disparities and dissimilarities among its members with respect to, for example, regime types and national interests. In fact, some members continue to experience less internal cohesion. This has threatened regimes in power and the well-being of the countries

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<sup>13</sup>This, so far, remains controversial, and the debate over what point should sanctions against South Africa be lifted, continues. See, for example, Gerald L'Ange, "Africa's Sanctions Dilemma", *The Star*, Johannesburg (4 March 1991); "OAU Urges West not to Drop Sanctions", *The Herald*, Harare (8 February 1991); and "Front Line in Crucial Summit Over Latest South African Developments", *Ibid.*, (6 February 1991). Recently, the European Community went ahead to lift sanctions despite some resistance from the OAU and the ANC. See "EC Lifts South Africa Sanctions: De Klerk Rewarded for Efforts to end Apartheid", *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto (16 April 1991), p. A8.



as well. The dilemmas inherent in lack of regime and national interest similarity, let alone internal cohesion, were at times transmitted on to the alliance itself. The latter has survived with a very low level of collective institutionalisation.

When such factors are taken into consideration the picture is a rather gloomy one; that is, the existence and presence of the alliance has not altered Southern African realities much. In some cases the existence of and membership in the alliance may have exacerbated some of the problems. Destabilisation, for example, was directed against alliance members who were implementing FLS' objectives, such as supporting the ANC. In turn, destabilisation brought about insecurity and eroded national cohesion.

At the same time, however, much has changed which can be attributed to the establishment and functioning of the alliance. Slowly and through its member presidents' diplomatic skills the alliance took off in 1975 to become a significant factor in Southern African regional conflict and conflict resolution. The victories in Zimbabwe (1980) and to some extent Namibia (1990), the alliance's continued opposition to *apartheid* and destabilisation, and its efforts to delink through SADCC, are all mile-stones which can be attributed mainly to the alliance.

In short, the power equation in Southern Africa would not have been what it is without the FLS. That the region has changed considerably in the last fifteen or so years is partly due to the alliance. This study has shown that most of the FLS' successes were achieved amidst problems, pressures and constraints—national, regional and extra-regional—some of which set in motion the very process of its decline. Yet the alliance has survived in its own ways as an institution and has helped tremendously to change the *status quo*.

What, then, is the future of the alliance? There are basically two important questions related to attempts to so project. The first relates to *futures* analysis itself. And the second is the place of the FLS within such futures analysis.

### **Futures Analysis**

At first glance, such analysis looks like mere hypothesising about and probable mystification of the future, especially in regard to its speculative qualities. This holds true if the future is looked at only in terms of what it is without situating it in terms of its past and present. Futures analysis becomes meaningful only if some conventional wisdom is taken into consideration—to invoke the past in order to predict the future, and as Babu once noted, "To know the future we must look into the past and present";<sup>14</sup> Also, Vansina's title of one of his recent papers tells all; "A Past for the Future?" Writing about Africa's cultural history, Vansina observed: "Indeed the past conditions the future and so one must present an outline of the relevant past before the present can be understood and the future discussed".<sup>15</sup> Another scholar noted that, for reasons of national development, continental cohesion and global order, Africa's future needs to be known, debated and

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<sup>14</sup>Abdulrahman M. Babu, "Postscript" to Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), p. 316, cited in Timothy M. Shaw (ed.), *Alternative Futures for Africa* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. vii.

<sup>15</sup>Jan Vansina, "A Past for the Future?", *The Dalhousie Review*, Vol. 68 No. 1/2, (Spring/Summer 1988), p. 9.

planned.<sup>16</sup> This implies both the utility and significance of futures analysis. Past and continuing Southern African studies have taken futures analysis seriously.<sup>17</sup>

Although its predictive power may appear to be low, Southern Africa, which has a troubled but very rich past, can benefit from futures analysis. This is because this region, like any other, has to cope and attempt to keep pace with rapid national, continental and global changes. Southern Africa, like any other Third World region, has to redefine its place in relation to the international divisions of labour and power, rapidly changing ecological environments, demands for democratisation processes, new roles for civil society, and prospects for regional security, co-operation and development; this is especially so in the structural adjustment, debt, and post-Cold War and post-*apartheid* era. The FLS alliance as a constituent part of Southern Africa has to address these same problems.

#### **From Confrontation to Confidence-building**

For analytic purposes, although the future of Southern Africa is clearer and brighter, that of the FLS itself can now be said to be quite uncertain. Its bases have been eroding slowly ever since 1980 and throughout the entire subsequent period of its decline. If its future is to be seen or calculated from its past then the alliance has accomplished its objectives, especially when South Africa completes the ongoing process to dismantle *apartheid* and achieves majority rule. Although it is difficult to provide a time-frame for this, what is certainly clear is that over-seeing the total dismantling of *apartheid* has, since 1986, ceased to be the responsibility of the

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<sup>16</sup>Timothy M. Shaw, "Introduction: The Political Economy of Africa's Futures", Shaw (ed.), *Alternative Futures for Africa*, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup>The works of Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa*, and Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States*, are examples.

alliance. Rather it has now become the responsibility of the OAU and other states and actors, mainly due to their interests inside the Republic itself. In this sense, it can be concluded that the continued existence of the FLS alliance is already based on borrowed time—a moribund institution.

Yet the FLS presidents continue to meet in the same old spirit. This symbolises some unwillingness on their part to disband; or they may be thinking of transforming their alliance. Recent remarks by President Kaunda, the alliance's chair, which hinted about disbanding the FLS,<sup>18</sup> were only expressions of a single member president, albeit, the chair. Only time will tell. After all, institutions should be disbanded when they outlive their usefulness. Alternatively, FLS presidents may wish to keep the alliance as it is at least for the time being for sentimental and symbolic purposes.

However, when the present form of the FLS is weighed against the region's future preoccupations, especially those of building a resemblance of peace and development out of the traumas of both war and economic crises, it does not seem to auger well at all. If this is the case, then the alliance's membership has to come to match at least that of SADCC. This will be a transition from "high politics" to functional co-operation. If the mentality of confrontation has only changed slightly within the FLS, thus signifying the need to compete with South Africa in the future, the alliance may find itself becoming increasingly irrelevant in regional affairs as well as not being able to compete. In fact, this may only accelerate and magnify the present-day marginalisation of the alliance and its members.

It would seem, therefore, that the future of the alliance, and more so of its members, both old and new, lies in new forms of co-operation and accommodation

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<sup>18</sup>See opening quotation, note 2 above.

in the region. Although it is difficult to change the historically-rooted networks of dependence overnight, it can be asserted that much needs to be done, especially at the politico-diplomatic level. Whether in the form of an expanded FLS embracing all the SADCC membership plus South Africa or in any other form, it would appear that all the region's actors need to develop one form or another of confidence-building measures. This is of crucial importance after generations of mistrust, suspicion, aggression, animosities, and even more so in terms of lost opportunity and development. Thus, both sides—South Africa on the one hand, and its neighbours on the other—have to be meaningfully involved in this.

All regional actors need to conceive of and realise a new future which constitutes as complete a break from the past as possible; where confrontation is replaced with co-operation, destabilisation with stabilisation, and dependence with interdependence; i.e. onto regional civil or transnational society, through forms of confidence-building. One way to do this is to purposefully open up their countries, invite and accommodate as many official and non-official visits as possible, hold as many conferences as possible at various levels—governmental, non-governmental, and private, as well as scholarly, and exchange as much information in as many fields as possible. Media and other existing institutions,<sup>19</sup> which for a long time were think-tanks as well as propaganda channels, can now promote accommodation.

With time, regional actors will discover some trust and sincerity about each other which were lost in the phase of conflict. Above all, there is need for new

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<sup>19</sup>Such as radio and television, newspapers, magazines and journals most of which have been quoted in this study, and institutions, particularly those which are research oriented: Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Southern African Research Series, Southern Africa Political Economy Series Trust, Mozambique/Tanzania Centre for Foreign Relations, Institute for Race Relations, South African Institute of International Affairs, South African Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, several Defence Colleges; to mention a few.

realism, pragmatism, revisionism and political will to co-operate. The present day FLS can still play a role in that process of confidence building.

Southern African countries need to move collectively from the present state of individualism onto regional civil society and political culture rooted in interdependence and co-operation. This is possible if all of them agree that they have common problems and that they face a common future, given global recession and SAP conditionalities. For the members of the FLS alliance in particular, there still could be some hope beyond decline, provided some pragmatism is exercised in terms of exploring new avenues of co-operation; i.e. beyond the presidents. The African agenda of democratic development offers promising prospects for Southern Africa as well notwithstanding its mixed legacy and the current structural adjustment conditionalities.

## **Appendix I**

### **CHRONOLOGY OF FRONT LINE STATES ALLIANCE'S SUMMITS 1976-1990**

**1976**

**7-8 February: Quelimane, Mozambique**

*-Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

-Decided to support the Joint Military Commission for Zimbabwean liberation movements formed three months earlier in training camps.

**25-26 March: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; Abel Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo*

-Discussed the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe, following the breakdown of the so-called constitutional talks between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo.

**29 July: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda: Khama on a state visit to China*

-Reviewed the current liberation struggles in Southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe.

**5-7 September: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Agostinho Neto of Angola for the first time*

*-ZANU (Robert Mugabe), ZAPU (Joshua Nkomo), SWAPO (Sam Nujoma), and ANC (Oliver Tambo)*

-Met to decide whether confidential information brought to them by *Henry Kissinger's* envoy following his meeting with *John Vorster* in Zurich offered enough to justify support for the American initiative.

**26 September: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

-*Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

-Officially became the Front Line States for the liberation of Southern Africa

-Hailed the people and fighters of Zimbabwe for Smith to accept the principle of majority rule

-*Mugabe, Nkomo*, representing ZANU and ZAPU, respectively, agreed to form a united front: the Patriotic Front

-Called for Geneva Conference.

**17 October: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*; *Neto* did not send a representative

-*Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

-Called on Britain to assume its obligation as the colonial power in Rhodesia.

**7 November: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

-*Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Discussed provocations and aggression against Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola by South Africa and Rhodesia, and reaffirmed their total commitment to support armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

**1977**

**9 January: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*



*-Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

-Announced the exclusive recognition of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe.

**17 April: Quelimane, Mozambique**

*-Neto, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, and Botswana's Vice-President Quett Masire*

*-Mugabe attended*

-Reviewed Soviet President *Podgorny's* offer of military and other support

-Discussed how to strengthen the PF and defend Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana against incursions by the Rhodesian army.

**21 July: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Mugabe, Nkomo*

-Discussed the problem of disunity in the PF.

**26-27 August: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Andrew Young (US) and David Owen (Britain)*

-Discussed the Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia, especially the question of dismantling the Rhodesian army.

**23-24 September: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

-Met to discuss their reply to Anglo-American proposals for Zimbabwean independence

-Agreed that the proposals "form a sufficient basis for further negotiations between the parties concerned".

**1978****11 June: Luanda, Angola**

-*Neto, Nyerere, Kaunda; Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique), and VP Masire (Botswana)*

-*Nujoma*

-Reviewed the situation in Southern Africa and reaffirmed that Africa could solve its own problems without the intervention of NATO powers.

**31 August: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Neto, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; VP Masire (Botswana)*

-No leader of liberation movement invited

-To receive and discuss a report on the secret meeting in the previous month between *Ian Smith* and PF co-leader, *Nkomo*. That secret meeting was also attended by the Nigerian Minister for Foreign Affairs, *Joseph Garba*, a senior Zambian government official, and had the blessing of President *Kaunda*.

**4 September: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; Neto* did not send a representative

-*Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

-No details were given.

**8 October: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

-Leaders of the liberation movement not invited

-Met to discuss Zambia's decision to reopen rail links through Rhodesia.

**1979****3 March: Luanda, Angola**

-*Neto, Khama, Machel, Kaunda; Vice-President Aboud Jumbe (Tanzania)*

*-Nujoma attended*

*-Analysed the situation in Southern Africa and matters relating to the struggle for the liberation of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia*

*-Condemned Idi Amin's (Uganda) invasion of Tanzania.*

**6 April: Nampula, Mozambique**

*-Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Noted absence of Neto, Khama*

*-No leader of the liberation movement was invited*

*-Discussed the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.*

**8-9 April: Dar es Salaam**

*-Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; VP Masire (Botswana)*

*-Neto did not send a representative*

*-Mugabe, Nkomo attended*

*-Exclusively devoted to unity between ZANU and ZAPU.*

**29 April: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Neto, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda*

*-Mugabe, Nkomo, Nujoma, Tambo*

*-A follow-up of the 8-9 April summit on unity of PF.*

**17 October: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; Neto did not send a representative*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

*-No details given.*

**24 November: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-No details given.*

**1980**

**10 January: Beira, Mozambique**

-*Dos Santos* (new president of Angola), *Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, VP Masire*

-*Mugabe, Nkomo*

-Discussed Britain's violation of the cease-fire in Rhodesia

-Referred to the deployment of Rhodesian forces to border areas as endangering peace and security in the region

-Gave the chair mandate to co-ordinate necessary action to ensure the creation of an "authentically free and democratic Zimbabwe".

**26 February: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

-*Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda; Dos Santos* represented by *Paschal Luvuallu*, a member of MPLA politburo

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Praised the PF for their adherence to the terms of the Lancaster House agreement in the face of repeated provocations

-Condemned SA for its declared intention to intervene in the event of a PF victory in the elections

-Summit meeting held on the eve of the three-day pre-independence polls in Rhodesia

-Held in camera.

**2 June: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Dos Santos, Khama, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe* (his first as a leader of Zimbabwe)

-*Nujoma* and a representative from Nigeria

-To shift focus from Zimbabwe to Namibia

-Discussed SA attacks on Angola and the harbouring of Mozambican anti-government rebels by SA.

## 1981

### 17 February: Lusaka, Zambia

-*Dos Santos, Masire* (new president of Botswana), *Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma* attended

-To review the current situation in Southern Africa

-Condemned South Africa for its continued training of dissidents from Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia

-Condemned SA raid on Maputo (July)

-Reaffirmed their faith in the Contact Group despite the failure in July of the Geneva Talks on Namibia.

### 16 April: Luanda, Angola

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Shehu Shagari* of Nigeria. Foreign Minister *Mangwende* represented *Mugabe*

-Discussed current political developments in Southern Africa, especially Namibia

-Summit coincided with an 11-nation tour by *Chester Crocker*. The summit was intended to formulate common stand on *Crocker's* proposals.

### 11 September: Lagos, Nigeria

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe, Shagari*

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Discussed the invasion of Angola by South Africa.

**1982****22 January: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nigeria's Shagari, Kenya's Moi attended*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

*-To work out a strategic response to the Namibian independence proposals put forward by the Contact Group.*

**6-7 March: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Tambo, Nujoma*

*-To review and discuss the situation in Southern Africa, especially Namibia.*

**14 June: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Tambo, Nujoma*

*-To agree on a common stand on the latest Contact Group proposals on Namibia*

*-No other details given.*

**1983****21 February: Harare, Zimbabwe**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

*-Rejected proposal to link the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia.*

**12 May: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-FLS Foreign Ministers attended*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

- Demanded withdrawal of South African troops from Southern Angola
- Condemned *apartheid* destabilisation
- Rejected linkage in Angola and Namibia
- Reaffirmed continued support to liberation movements.

**1984**

**29 April: Arusha, Tanzania**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

- Reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa
- Reasserted their conviction, and that of the OAU, that total liberation of Africa is essential for the security of all Africa and in particular, of the FLS
- Noted that the international implications of the problems which the liberation movements were grappling with, also required international diplomatic and political activity
- Exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord, and expressed opinions that South Africa will live up to the commitment to stop destabilisation of Mozambique.

**20 October: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Moi of Kenya attended*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

- Initially, to attend Zambia's tenth independence anniversary on 23 October
- Condemned South Africa for its brutality and called on the international community to give practical support to freedom fighters to eliminate *apartheid*.

**1985**

**8 March: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

-Reviewed the current situation in Southern Africa

-Denounced the Nkomati Accord as a failure because Pretoria had violated it right from the beginning.

**18 August: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Held in camera, no details given.

**15 September: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

-Condemned the state of emergency imposed on the people of South Africa

-Called for immediate lifting of the ban on ANC and for the release of *Mandela* and others

-Paid homage to *Nyerere* for chairing the FLS

-Decided that *Kenneth Kaunda* will be the new chair of the FLS.

**1986**

**August: Luanda, Angola**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Mwinyi (new President of Tanzania), Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Denis Sassou-Nguesso (OAU chair) and Ide Omarou (OAU Secretary-General)*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*



-Reviewed the prevailing politico-military situation, especially the resumption of military activities by the SADF in Angola.

**12 October: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Machel, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Reviewed the current situation in Southern Africa with particular reference to the critical state of the situation in Mozambique caused by the success of the MNR to extend its operations, and also in Angola

-Sought means and ways to make Zaire and Malawi reduce their assistance to bandit groups and divert their trade traffic away from South Africa due to impending sanctions to be imposed by the FLS.

**19 October: Mbala, Zambia (mini-summit)**

*-Dos Santos, Machel, Kaunda, Mobutu*

-Asked *Mobutu* not to assist bandit groups in Angola

-Discussed how to convince Malawi not to assist bandit groups

-Discussed how Zaire and Malawi can divert their trade traffic from South Africa before the FLS imposed sanctions against South Africa

\*On the way back *Machel* was killed in a plane crash.

**28 October: Maputo, Mozambique**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe, Marcelino dos Santos (representing Mozambique)*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

-Met after *Machel's* funeral to review the situation in Southern Africa.

-Blamed South Africa for *Machel's* death

-Pledged increased support for Mozambique

-Criticised the US for supplying arms to UNITA

-Criticised France and other Western countries for allowing *Savimbi* to visit their countries.

**22 November: Gbadolite, Zaire**

-*Dos Santos, Chissano* (new president of Mozambique), *Kaunda, Mugabe, Mobutu*

-Leaders of liberation movements not invited

-Discussed ways of reducing regional trade dependence on South Africa

-Examined regional co-operation in reorganising transportation system, especially the possibility of reopening the Benguela railway.

-Discussed ways of reducing bandit activities in Angola and Mozambique.

**21 December: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Meeting after the FLS's defence and security ministers' meeting in Dar es Salaam in November

-Reviewed the politico-military situation in Southern Africa

-MNR activities and the assistance it was receiving from Malawi were the main focus

-Pledged additional military assistance to Mozambique

-Discussed problems of imposing sanctions against South Africa.

**1987**

**April : Luanda, Angola**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Discussed measures to develop and strengthen alternative routes to the sea before sanctions are imposed by the FLS.

**July: Lusaka, Zambia**

-Met after the joint FLS-OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee summit

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo* and a representative from PAC (invited for the first time)

-Zambia and Zimbabwe reported that they had not felt it feasible to sever their air links with South Africa.

**September: Maputo, Mozambique**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Repeated its appeals for international support for its members and liberation movements in their struggle against *apartheid*

-Condemned continued destabilisation, aggression and state terrorism promoted by South Africa against the FLS.

**1988****25 March: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Reviewed the situation inside South Africa, Angola and Mozambique

-Called on the South African regime to negotiate with the genuine liberation movements fighting for freedom in Southern Africa

-Condemned linkage and praised the Cuban internationalist forces for aiding the people of Angola in their struggle against South African invasion.

**16 July: Maputo, Mozambique**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Preceded by SADCC summit meeting

-No details were given.

**8 August: Luanda, Angola**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma attended*

-Reviewed the current situation in Southern Africa

-Commended the Cuban military assistance to Angola

-Commended Angola's peace initiatives.

**27 November: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

-Held in the wake of two agreements signed at the UN in New York in the previous week between Cuba, Angola and South Africa for independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola

-No details were given.

**27 December: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo*

-Reviewed the situation in Southern Africa, especially Angola

-Called on the United States to cease its support for UNITA.

**1989**

**8 March: Gaborone, Botswana**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Tambo, Johnson Mulambo (Chair, PAC)*

-The first summit to be held in Botswana

-Condemned SA's machinations in the Namibian elections

-Regretted that UNTAG force has been scaled-down despite repeated FLS and OAU protests.

**21 March: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma*

-Met following the 12-nation OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southern Africa

-No details were given.

**6 April: Luanda, Angola**

-*Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

-*Nujoma, Tambo*

-Reviewed the current situation in Southern Africa, especially Namibia

-Noted that FLS offer to send a battalion each to Namibia to beef-up UN troops monitoring the country's final march to independence was aimed at filling a dangerous security vacuum that has already led to unnecessary loss of life; and regretted UN's refusal to accept the offer.

**9 August: Lusaka, Zambia**

-*Dos Santos, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe; Masire* sent a delegation to represent him

-Met to review the situation in Southern Africa and prepare a report for the OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southern Africa

-Gave full support to *Chissano* in his effort to bring peace to Mozambique

-Commended *Mobutu's* initiative to negotiate between UNITA and the Angolan government

-*Kaunda* briefed the summit of his intention to meet *F.W. de Klerk* in Livingstone, Zambia, on 28 August (before *De Klerk* became president of South Africa).

**6 September: Belgrade, Yugoslavia**

*-Dos Santos, Chissano, Mwinyi, Mugabe*

-No details were given.

**16 November: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma*

-Reviewed the latest developments in Namibia and current developments in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

**1990****22 January: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Dos Santos, Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda, Mugabe*

*-Nujoma, Alfred Nzo (acting president of ANC) and some ANC ex-detainees*

-Met at the request of the ANC to map out the basis for ANC-South African government negotiations

-Closed session, no details were given.

**18 March: Lusaka, Zambia**

*-Masire, Chissano, Mwinyi, Kaunda; Dos Santos, Mugabe did not attend*

*-Nujoma, Nzo*

-OAU Chair, *Hosni Mubarak*, OAU Secretary General, *Salim A. Salim* attended

-Met to formulate an agenda for 19 March 1990 OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee that was to review latest developments in Southern Africa

-ANC briefed the summit on its conditions for negotiations with the South African regime.

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