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Australian, Canadian, and Swedish Policies
Toward Southern Africa:
A Comparative Study of "Middle Power Internationalism"

by

David Ross Black

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the foreign policy roles and relevance of middle-sized Western states, or "middle powers", primarily on the basis of a comparative analysis of the policies of Australia, Canada, and Sweden toward Southern Africa during the 1980s. It argues that these policies, and indeed Western middle power foreign policies more generally, have manifested distinctive "internationalist" behavioural tendencies. Borrowing from the work of Robert Cox, it argues that this "middle power internationalism" has developed as a result of pressures operating on the state from three crucial "spheres of activity": the "world order", or international politico-strategic environment; "social forces" generated by the world political economy; and values, interests, and capabilities deriving from their "forms of state", or state-society complexes. However, the internationalist behaviour which issues from these pressures has been somewhat selective and inconsistent, focused in "niches" which are particularly suited to the interests and capabilities of the state in question. The empirical analysis of the three case studies -- Australian, Canadian, and Swedish policies toward Southern Africa -- demonstrates that these policies can be explained largely on the basis of similar internationalist interests and behavioural characteristics, in combination with distinctive individual and political cultural influences in each. It also supports an argument that in certain propitious issue areas, middle powers can play foreign policy roles of superficially surprising significance.

Part I explores the historical and theoretical underpinnings of "active internationalism" in middle powers. It also assesses the prospects for these states' internationalist tendencies in the context of a rapidly changing, "transitional" global order. Finally, it compares some key aspects of the international, regional, and domestic contexts within which the foreign policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden have been shaped.

Part II describes the Southern African context towards which the regional policies of the case study states were directed in the 1980s, and the several policy avenues open to extra-regional states during this period. It then assesses Australian, Canadian, and Swedish policy in several key dimensions: sanctions, diplomacy, development, and security. The thesis concludes with a summary of the main empirical findings and theoretical and analytical implications. It also discusses the irony that, while the magnitude and nature of contemporary global changes suggest that the characteristics associated with middle powers could be increasingly important, these same global changes may be weakening the capacity and inclination of Western middle powers, at least, to respond creatively to them.
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<td>ACFOA</td>
<td>Australian Council for Overseas Aid</td>
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<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>AGIS</td>
<td>Africa Groups in Sweden</td>
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<td>AIDAB</td>
<td>Australian International Development Assistance Bureau</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BITS</td>
<td>Swedish Agency for International Technical and Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>CAAA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (United States)</td>
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<td>CABBSA</td>
<td>Canadian Association for Black Business in South Africa</td>
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<td>CAPSSA</td>
<td>Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>Canadian Exporters Association</td>
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<td>CFMSA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
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<td>Cocamo</td>
<td>Cooperation-Canada-Mozambique</td>
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<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States (proposed by South Africa)</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CUSO</td>
<td>Canadian University Services Overseas</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Export Development Corporation (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPG</td>
<td>Eminent Persons Group (of the Commonwealth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front-line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola/National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique/Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement (Canada-United States)</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>IAWGSA</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution (includes International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPOD</td>
<td>Import Promotion Office for Products from Developing Countries</td>
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<td>ISAK</td>
<td>Isolera Sydafrika Kommitten/Isolate South Africa Committee (Sweden)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIEO</td>
<td>Liberal International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNR/Renamo</td>
<td>Movimento Nacional da Resistencia de Mocambique/Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTAP</td>
<td>Military Training Assistance Programme (Canada)</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement (proposed, Canada, United States, and Mexico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party (Canada)</td>
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<td>NERP</td>
<td>National Economic Recovery Programme (Zambia)</td>
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<td>NGI</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Institution</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIDL</td>
<td>New International Division of Labour</td>
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<td>NIDP</td>
<td>New International Division of Power</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>NORSAD Fund</td>
<td>Nordic-SADCC Fund</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative party (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>South African Airways</td>
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<td>SAACC</td>
<td>Southern African Aid Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policy (of the IMF and World Bank)</td>
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<td>SAREC</td>
<td>Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries</td>
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<td>SATCC</td>
<td>Southern African Transport and Communications Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATF</td>
<td>Southern Africa Task Force (Canadian Department of External Affairs)</td>
</tr>
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<td>SCAAP</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan</td>
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<td>SCFM</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique</td>
</tr>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>State Security Council (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDFUND</td>
<td>Swedish Fund for Industrial Cooperation with Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.S.</td>
<td>Total Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Congress (Zimbabwe/Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUSC</td>
<td>World University Services of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANU’s armed wing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

What prompts middle-sized, "Western" capitalist states to become actively -- sometimes extensively -- involved in the affairs of certain distant, underdeveloped, and deeply-troubled Southern regions? What are, or may be, the effects of their involvement in such regions? For example, can they make significant contributions to regional development and security; or is their involvement more likely to consist of "feel-good", posturing, or even counter-productive policies? Can we usefully generalize and theorize about such "middle powers" in a way that helps us to understand and explain their foreign policies? How is "middle power internationalism" related to the structures of their national, and the global, political economy? And in the fluid international environment of the late-twentieth century, can we expect the foreign policies of such states to be of increasing, decreasing, or unchanged importance in confronting the new opportunities and dangers of management and change, in developing regions and elsewhere?

These are the questions which animate this dissertation. They will be pursued primarily on the basis of a comparative case study of the policies of three reputed "middle powers" -- Australia, Canada, and Sweden -- towards one particularly interesting and troubled developing region -- Southern Africa -- during the 1980s. Thus, what follows may be divided into two broad, mutually-reinforcing elements. The first, primarily empirical, element consists of a comparative analysis of the Southern African policies of the three case study states. Richer and more illuminating individual country studies should be possible on the basis of focused comparisons among relatively similar states. Thus, it is hoped that the analysis and insights discerned in this fashion will be of interest and relevance to policy-makers and analysts in Australia, Canada, Sweden and elsewhere.

The second, mainly theoretical, element consists of an assessment of the utility of ideas concerning middle powers in international relations, particularly in light of
the evidence generated by the case study; and some clarification and development of those traditionally rather diffuse and unsystematic ideas. Can we discern common characteristics, and types of foreign policy behaviour, which may be usefully associated with a middle tier of states? If so, how do we account for, or "situate", these characteristics and behavioural patterns? And what do the "roles" associated with such states imply about their actual and potential policy influence or impact in developing regions specifically, and North-South relations generally?

This is clearly a broad and ambitious agenda. The result is bound to be in certain respects incomplete and unsatisfying. However, it may reasonably be expected that the benefits to be derived from this broad, dual agenda will compensate for the costs involved. Thus, while it is obvious that the comparative studies of Australian, Canadian and Swedish policies towards Southern Africa will lack the depth, breadth and detail of a single country study, the perspective and insights to be gained through comparison justify the approach adopted. Conversely, while the range of theoretical implications and conclusions which may be reached regarding middle powers will be somewhat inhibited by the emphasis placed on the fairly narrow case study chosen, sound theoretical progress should be clearly related to, and firmly grounded in, solid empirical investigation. Hopefully, this thesis can help us to understand one relatively small section of the middle power "puzzle" well, as opposed to offering a solution to much more of the puzzle with important sections missing, or pieces fitting improperly.

The Case Study (I): Southern Africa

Why the focus on policies towards Southern Africa? This focus is, to begin with, intrinsically interesting and important. Few, if any, developing regions have been more widely scrutinized and politicized within the international community. The immediate reason for this is obvious: the region has been dominated, economically and strategically, by the world's only constitutionally-racist regime -- that of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). Not only did the apartheid order which it created and defended for over four decades entrench and exacerbate racist patterns of
political, economic and social inequality within South Africa, offending the most basic and widely-held standards of human rights. In addition, it used its historical position of dominance within the Southern African region as a whole to advance its "Total Strategy" to defend, in Machiavellian fashion, its own racially-based system, often at enormous cost to neighbouring states. The 1980s -- the temporal focus of the case study -- were a tumultuous decade for Southern Africa. They began with the creation of the neighbouring states' Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and were marked by a rising tide of mass action within South Africa and South Africa's ruthless direct and indirect destabilisation activities beyond it. And they were immediately followed early in 1990 with concrete signs of the imminent demise of the apartheid era, and the possible beginning of a more peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole.

The international political consequence of these fundamentally moral considerations is that South and Southern Africa have gradually come to be seen as the "business" of virtually every national government, a great many international organizations, and numerous non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. Loud condemnations of apartheid and destabilisation, and vigorous statements of support for SADCC and its political predecessor, the Front-line States (FLS), were the norm in the 1980s. Yet, like other great moral issues in international affairs, the widespread elements of public consensus overshadowed important variations in interpretation and interests, contradictions in politics and policies both within and towards the region and, inevitably, considerable hypocrisy. In consequence, Southern Africa constitutes an interesting and important, though difficult, test of the substance and effectiveness of external states’ foreign policies. Beyond the inevitable mix of self-interests involved, we may rightly ask how much of the regional policies of Australia, Canada, and Sweden in particular have been seriously and sensibly concerned with promoting long-term development and security prospects in the region, how much was mere hyperbole, and how we can sort out the difference.
Another interesting dimension of the Southern African case concerns the extent to which numerous non-governmental and corporate interests have been involved in it. The growth of non-state involvement in international affairs has been rapid in recent decades, conspicuously in popular human rights-based issue areas such as this one. This thesis should make a small contribution towards a better understanding of this phenomenon.

This raises the related question of the wider applicability of the Southern African case. To what extent are conclusions regarding the nature of external state policies towards this region applicable to other regional settings? It is clear that, if for no other reason than apartheid, Southern Africa has been in important respects a unique international "conflict region". Various countries have justified atypical policy decisions towards it on the basis of the uniqueness of the situation created by the "apartheid regime". Many governments have been emboldened by the widespread international condemnation of South Africa to adopt unusually-outspoken and active policy positions.

Yet more broadly, many of the challenges faced by Southern Africa as a whole are readily recognizable in other developing regions. Powerful cycles of underdevelopment, inequality, poverty, insecurity and violence marked such diverse regions as Central America, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa through the 1980s. And although South Africa’s legally-entrenched racism may be unique, gross and systematic violations of human rights are not. Thus, Southern Africa has no doubt been a distinctive policy focus; but it is likely that many of the lessons learned and precedents set in formulating policies towards it will find echoes in other regional settings.

Partly out of a concern to render the lessons from the case study as generalizable as possible, and partly because the gaze of external observers is often fixed on the central drama of South Africa itself, to the neglect of the smaller, but still poignant dramas unfolding around the region, I will privilege the SADCC or non-South African dimensions of the regional policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden.
As a consequence of the SADCC initiative and the escalation of South Africa's regional destabilization activities, the RSA's neighbours received relatively more political and scholarly attention during the 1980s than in previous decades.

Frequently, however, emphasis was placed on their perceived status as innocent victims of the apartheid regime, overshadowing the diverse indigenous challenges and debates surrounding the struggle for development and security. And at the beginning of the 1990s, as the process of change in South Africa gathers momentum, SADCC and its member-states are once again being overshadowed and neglected. It is of course true that the future prospects for the region as a whole are inescapably intertwined with the prospects for change in South Africa. The case study will therefore treat the diplomatic and economic steps taken by Australia, Canada and Sweden in pursuit of such change. But it will not do so at the expense of careful treatment of policies towards SADCC and some of its member-states.

**The Case Study (2): Australia, Canada, and Sweden**

The decision to compare the policies of Australia, Canada, and Sweden was based on several considerations. First, all three have been frequently (though not unanimously) treated as typical "middle powers" throughout the post-war era.

Within this rather nebulous category, these three states reflect an interesting range of characteristics: one is European, one North American, and one Asian/Pacific (geographically at least); one is a very old and relatively homogenous national community, while the other two are comparatively new, "multicultural" settler states; one is a strategic neutral, while the other two have been members of of the broad Western alliance; their population sizes range from just over 8 million to 26 million, etc. Although in a broader sense, there are problems with the narrowness of this particular middle power sample -- all three, for example, have quite highly developed, state capitalist political economies, and are culturally "Western" -- they nevertheless constitute a sufficiently diverse group to be suggestive of the strengths and weaknesses of ideas regarding middle powers collectively.

Somewhat more prosaically, both Australia and Sweden have long been objects
of comparison amongst Canadians, characteristically in search of a better sense of their own place in the world. With regard to Australia, the many obvious similarities between the two societies -- historic, economic, cultural, political, etc. -- make it a natural, interesting and accessible object of comparison. And with regard to Sweden, many members of the Canadian left in particular, notably those concerned with Third World issues and policies, have long made rather wistful -- if often loose and unsystematic -- comparisons between Sweden's relatively "progressive" policies and our own. Thus, it is useful to compare the policies of these three states in a specific policy area.

Finally, and related to the previous consideration, the trio of Australia, Canada, and Sweden pursued quite active and high profile policies towards Southern Africa during the 1980s. The longevity and extensiveness of this "activism" varied; but policy-makers in all three devoted a considerable -- indeed surprising -- amount of time and resources to this issue area. It therefore seems appropriate to compare and assess the characteristics and effectiveness of these policies during this period.

The Focus on Middle Powers

Why, then, middle powers? There are at least three broad considerations which led to the choice of this theoretical and empirical focus. The first arises out of the confusions and difficulties associated with the middle power concept. Over the years, it has been used in a wide variety of sometimes-incompatible senses, usually in an intuitive and unsystematic manner. Indeed, one recent article began an application of certain middle power ideas with a strong consumer warning: "From the outset... let us note the degree to which we are extremely sensitive to the problematic, and often contested, nature of the notion of middle powers and...'middlepowermanship'". One observer recently suggested that given the confusion engendered by the use of this language, we would be further ahead by discarding it altogether, and developing new terminology for certain coherent elements of the middle power "idea". Yet the use of the language, and some of the forms of behaviour it has been used to describe, have clearly persisted. It therefore
seems important, in terms of international relations scholarship, to carefully sort out the different meanings and usages of the term, relate them to some of the most important traditions in international relations theory, and work towards a clearer and more compelling understanding of the ways in which ideas about middle powers may be useful.¹⁰

Second, certain of the characteristics and capabilities which have been associated with middle powers -- for example, a relatively strong internationalist (or even "humane internationalist") tradition, an aptitude for mediation and 'bridge-building' functions, the capacity for leadership in certain specialized "functional" areas, etc. -- imply that such states might be particularly sensitive to, and helpful in addressing, the development and security challenges faced in developing regions. It is, of course, also possible, and may too often be the case, that these ideas regarding middle powers may come to be self-serving and only remotely related to foreign policy realities. But, given the moral, political and economic urgency of confronting the deepening crises of too many Southern regions, and the likelihood that progress in doing so will require cooperation and collaboration among Northern and Southern interests, the possibility that middle powers may have a distinctive and important role to play in this regard requires serious investigation.

Finally, and more broadly, there is the question of the role of middle powers in promoting and managing change in the context of what many have described as a "post-hegemonic" and post-Cold War era.¹⁰ There is vigorous debate over the nature and implications of the many dramatic changes which have for some years been gathering momentum within the international system, but there is widespread agreement concerning certain fundamentals. Among these are the fact that interdependence and globalisation are pervasive and expanding; that the hegemonic Pax Americana and the East-West Cold War which together underpinned much of the post-war international political and economic order no longer hold; and that the leadership required to deal with the international changes and challenges which these two considerations imply must almost certainly come from a much wider range of
actors, likely operating to a significant degree through various multilateral regimes and structures. This has led several analysts to suggest that, given their supposed predilection for pragmatic and functional multilateralism and institution building, middle powers have the potential to provide initiative and leadership in fashioning new bases for world order. Yet conversely, some of the changes which are currently under way within the global political economy could easily be taken to imply an eroding role in international relations for the nation-state generally and for Western middle powers in particular. Given the tremendous importance of these contemporary dilemmas of change and leadership within the international community, a careful assessment of the potential middle power role in these areas seems imperative.

Organization

The dissertation is organized as follows. In part one, chapter two will review the historical development of ideas regarding middle powers, particularly in the post-World War II era; raise some of the problems associated with the use of this terminology; look briefly at how the middle power concept would be treated by several of the most important traditions in international relations theory; and suggest, in cursory fashion, a theoretical basis for explaining the persistence of "middle power internationalism", derived largely from the work of Robert Cox. Chapter three will address the political-economic structural basis for post-war middle power internationalism, and some of the contemporary challenges confronting Western middle powers: how are these states being affected by changes in the international division of labour, and by related challenges to societal coherence and state legitimacy? How are the relative positions and prospects of Northern and Southern "middle powers" (particularly the Newly Industrializing Countries or NICs) changing? And how may their foreign policy influence and effectiveness be altered by these changes and challenges in the critical years ahead? Recognizing that all states’ foreign policies are affected by distinctive domestic and international traditions and settings, chapter four will briefly review some relevant aspects of the post-war foreign
policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden, and the relevant domestic and international pressures faced by each, particularly as manifested in their policies towards developing regions.

In part two, chapter five discusses Southern Africa in the 1980s, addressing such elements as: the historical legacy of regional relations of integration and dependence; the impact of Zimbabwean independence, and the creation of SADCC; the mounting crisis of apartheid; and the related unfolding and demise of South Africa's "Total Strategy" towards the region as a whole -- in particular, the impact of destabilization. Chapters six, seven and eight will deal successively with the Southern African policies pursued in the 1980s by Australia, Canada and Sweden, looking briefly at their historical antecedents, and at the sanctions, diplomatic, security, and developmental aspects of each.

Finally, chapter nine draws together the conclusions and implications derived from the thesis. The relative similarities, differences, strengths and weaknesses of the Southern African policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden will be assessed. And some broader conclusions regarding the potential and actual roles of middle powers, both as illuminated by the case study and as they relate to the mounting challenges facing the contemporary global political economy, will be addressed.

The Argument

The basic premise of this dissertation, to be developed and assessed in the work which follows, is that the phenomenon and (importantly) some consciousness or idea of medium power has tended to produce foreign policies and foreign policy traditions with significant elements of commonality, including demonstrable components of what may be broadly described as "active internationalism". An understanding of this middle power internationalism helps us to account for the fact that countries like Australia, Canada and Sweden adopted active, outspoken, and in significant ways similar policy approaches toward Southern Africa -- a region in which none had particularly immediate economic or strategic interests -- during the 1980s. It will furthermore be argued that these policy approaches produced regional
policies which were, in spite of important variations, limitations and contradictions, of some (and somewhat surprising) importance and effectiveness in the ongoing struggle for change, security, and development in Southern Africa, illustrating middle power potentialities which have been, and may yet be, of value in certain other situations. Although the importance of these policies was often exaggerated by national politicians and bureaucrats -- a characteristic feature of much middle power thought and behaviour -- it was nevertheless real.

However, a full understanding of the Southern African policies of these three states requires the combination of such common middle power characteristics with distinctive features of the political economies and cultures, and international contexts and linkages, of each. Thus, in each case, an explanation for the particular policy initiatives and activities of the 1980s involves both attention to common Western middle power interests and behavioural characteristics, and the particular influence of key individuals, domestic pressures, cultural considerations, and international situations. Indeed, this will always be the case with regard to a category of states (middle powers) which is inherently diverse, and among which common interests and characteristics are in the nature of a residual category which has often been superceded by more immediate regional, economic and strategic pressures.

In addition, as noted above, the rapidly changing global political economy is creating both important new opportunities for, and constraints upon, creative and effective middle power policy initiatives in Southern Africa and elsewhere. The constraining factors, in particular, are becoming increasingly intrusive: eroding autonomy in the face of the increasing importance of international organizations and transnational capital; growing structural economic difficulties; and (related) widespread domestic political disaffection and crises are amongst the contemporary challenges facing Western middle powers specifically. Thus, whether the Australian,
Canadian, and Swedish governments will be inclined or able to build upon the positive aspects of their policies towards this and other developing regions in this changing and problematic context is uncertain.

This, broadly stated, is the setting for the investigations which follow.

NOTES


2. For example, Sweden's 1969 decision to extend humanitarian assistance to regional liberation movements was partly justified in this manner. See Tor Sellstrom, "Some Factors Behind Nordic Relations With Southern Africa", paper presented to SIAS/SADRA Conference on Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa with a Post-Apartheid Perspective, Harare, September 1988, 26. Similarly, Sweden's 1987 decision to impose a mandatory trade embargo on South African and Namibian products, and the Canadian and Australian decisions to impose more limited sanctions packages in 1985 and 1986, were in each case atypical policy decisions in light of these countries' long-standing opposition to sanctions, justified primarily on the basis of the unique evil and challenge of apartheid.


4. See, for example, John W. Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?", in J. King Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), 14; Annette Baker Fox, "The Range of Choice for Middle Powers: Australia and Canada Compared", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 26 (2), 1980; Bernard Wood, The Middle


8. Observation made by Robert Wolfe, Queen’s University, 15 May 1990.

9. Three recent collaborative studies have carefully tackled different aspects of the role of middle powers in the international system, and have consequently been of considerable interest and value in the preparation of this thesis. These are the "Middle Powers and the International System" project of the North-South Institute, directed by Bernard Wood; the "Middle Powers and Global Poverty" project, directed by Cranford Pratt; and the recent comparative study of Canadian and Australian foreign policy conducted by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal. However, the principals in these projects would doubtless agree that there is room for more work in this area. See Wood, The Middle Powers and the General Interest; Pratt, ed., Internationalism Under Strain, and Middle Power Internationalism (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); and Higgott, Cooper, and Nossal, forthcoming.

Chapter 2

Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on Middle Powers

The category of, and ideas about, middle powers are, as noted in chapter one, notoriously slippery and imprecise. This has led to obvious dangers for scholarly investigation. Analyses rooted in assumptions of a distinctive middle power "role" may often result in circular reasoning (e.g., state A performs mediatory roles because it is a middle power; state A is a middle power because it performs mediatory roles). Further, assertions of such a role, or roles, by nationals of various self-perceived middle powers may frequently be uncritical and self-serving in nature. Thus, any discussion of middle powers should proceed with an attitude of circumspection.

A certain amount of nuance, ambiguity, and imprecision is inherent in any notion of "middle", "medium", or "intermediate" power. Middle-sized states will in and of themselves only infrequently play major or decisive, and therefore easily identified and understood roles in international affairs; and such roles will often be overlooked due to scholarly and media biases towards a focus on "the greats". In addition, as noted by Carsten Holbraad, the notion of middle power (or its synonyms) has tended to be a relational (or contextual) concept. Those states or actors occupying the "middle ground" will vary depending on the context or issue area in question. For example, in a paper focusing on Australia and New Zealand entitled "The Elusive Essence of Size", Ramesh Thakur argues that:

i. In the global context, it is possible to describe Australia as a medium and New Zealand as a small or medium state;
ii. In the regional context, both Australia and New Zealand are major actors;
iii. In the trans-Tasman dyad, New Zealand is the smaller and Australia the larger actor.

Furthermore, some of the usages of the middle power notion, including several emphasized in this thesis, suggest that under certain circumstances, middle powers can periodically play leading roles in international affairs precisely because they are self-consciously medium (or non-great) powers; while under other circumstances, they
will, whether by necessity or choice, adopt the posture of a minor actor.\textsuperscript{5} Finally, and most concretely, middle powers have rarely succeeded in obtaining formal recognition of their status or forming sustained and effective coalitions, implying, superficially, that such a category is relatively insubstantial or even misleading.\textsuperscript{6} The ultimately ineffectual "Like-Minded Group" [LMG] of Western Industrialized States established in the context of the negotiations for a New International Economic Order [NIEO] may be viewed as the exception which proves the rule in this regard.\textsuperscript{7}

There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which the would-be analyst of the foreign policies of middle-sized states might deal with the middle power idea in view of its traditional ambiguity and imprecision. One may, on the one hand, conclude that its usage should simply be avoided for theoretical or analytical purposes. On the other hand, one may take the view (as I do) that, despite the difficult and ambiguous nature of the middle power concept, it nevertheless helps us to account for certain patterns of foreign policy behaviour in middle-sized states, and to identify certain important foreign policy potentialities, and therefore should not be ignored. John Holmes, the foremost exponent of the notion of "middlepowermanship", once wrote that it is hard to say precisely what a middle power is, but "I am for accepting this ambiguity rather than insisting on a logical clarification which would serve only to raise hornets, large, middle, and small".\textsuperscript{8} While sensitivity to the ambiguity associated with the middle power concept continues to be necessary, it is no longer acceptable for the student who seeks to study the role of middle powers as such to avoid a more systematic explication of his/her understanding and usage of the notion, even though hornets of all sizes may be raised in the effort. It is therefore to this task of explication, and more specifically to the pursuit of a sounder theoretical understanding of the persistence of "middle power internationalism", that this chapter is addressed.

Aside from its unsystematic nature, the traditional middle power literature has suffered from several shortcomings: an excessively state-centric focus; a related over-emphasis on international political system level determinants of state behaviour, to the
exclusion of other key determinants; and a tendency towards status-seeking and moralizing. Recent contributions to this literature have gone some distance towards addressing these shortcomings, through more systematic comparative investigations and (in some cases) a focus on national society-level determinants of middle power foreign policies. This chapter, together with chapter three, will attempt to consolidate and build upon some of these developments.

The general argument pursued in these two chapters is that a generalizable tradition of middle power internationalism in the post-World War II era can be understood theoretically as the result of a confluence of pressures and interests emanating from three primary "spheres of activity" (in Robert Cox's terms). These are: the "world order" (the international politico-strategic environment); "social forces" (generated by the world political-economy); and "forms of state" (the resultant of state-society complexes, embodying a country's main social forces, dominant values and ideas, and institutions). On the basis of these three sets of pressures, many Western states of middle-range capabilities have developed reasonably consistent "internationalist" approaches to foreign policy. Indeed, internationalism has frequently become part of the legitimizing apparatus of such states, among their "political classes" (or "attentive publics") at least. The more specific content of this internationalist approach is explored in this chapter through a historical review of the development of the middle power idea.

However, it should also be stressed that this middle power international activism has been somewhat selective. It has generally been focused in specific issue-areas where the distinctive capabilities and/or interests of such states can be deployed to advantage, where such activism may be particularly important to their international reputations, and/or where the associated economic, strategic or political costs of such activism are limited. In general, it is hoped that by developing a deeper theoretical understanding of this tradition, it will be possible to escape the circularity of argument which has plagued this concept.
1. Historical Development of Ideas Regarding Middle Powers

1.1 Pre-World War II Thought and Practice:

Briefly, it is possible to distinguish two main manifestations of the middle power idea in various pre-World War II inter-state and inter-community orders. The first is a more explicit, self-conscious and status-oriented usage; the second is a less self-conscious and more behavioural version. The second usage is the more interesting and important one for our purposes.

Notions of intermediate ranking, status, and roles arose in a relatively explicit sense in ancient China, India, and Greece, as well as various phases of European history prior to World War I. Similarly, in the inter-war period, Spain, Poland, and Brazil secured intermediate status as "semi-permanent" members of the League of Nations Council, although their motives, as "would-be great powers", inhibited their representatives from giving much thought to the roles and responsibilities of a discrete middle class of states.

Several observations arise from these explicit historical instances of middle power thinking and status -- real or desired. First, discussions of such states tended either to assume, or to be animated by, an ambition towards enhanced status, sometimes involving an explicit desire to "graduate" to the first rank of powers. Consequently, they tended to induce resistance from both the great powers in a given system, and from various small powers (who had to recognize and respect the pre-eminence of great powers, but had no desire to see their own status further reduced through the insertion of an intermediate tier of upwardly-mobile states). This concern with enhanced status, and the resistance of both small and great powers to it, was also manifest in the development of post-war thinking regarding middle powers.

Second, as in post-World War II thinking on this subject, many of these earlier claims to, and ideas about, middle power status posited distinctive and useful roles for these states within the prevailing international system. Frequently, their claims to enhanced status were rooted in assertions of the distinctiveness and usefulness of their roles. It was variously asserted, for example, that such states could have a
moderating and/or pacifying influence on principal powers; that they served as the "guardians" of the European balance of power; and that they were particularly concerned with international order, security, and peace. More generally, it may be seen from the kinds of roles cited above that, in Holbraad’s words, "...there was a marked tendency to invest such powers with a degree of moral superiority". While these generally flattering role conceptions presumably had at least a little validity, their often-moralistic and self-serving quality did little to increase the receptiveness of statespersons in great and small powers alike to middle power status claims. In post-war international affairs as well, this tendency towards middle power moralizing has sometimes been resented by larger and smaller states alike.

Thus, in their explicit manifestations, pre-World War II treatments of middle powers involved: an aspiration to enhanced status; arguments (generally unproved) that they could play distinctive and important roles in international affairs, often underpinning their status claims; a broader tendency to regard such states as being to some degree morally superior to other (particularly great) powers; and some resistance to, and resentment of, their aspirations and claims by both large and small states.

However, Robert Cox has explicated a second, less explicit and more behavioural, variant of the middle power idea in some previous European orders. Cox argues, for example, that the bourgeoisie of fourteenth-century Catalonia, in codifying the Consulate of the Sea and thus advancing the spread of maritime law, exemplified this middle power role. The Netherlands of the seventeenth century (and its native son, Hugo Grotius), in "nourish(ing) the law of nations", did likewise.

Both, he argues:

...were centres of moderate power on the scale of their times; each had ambition not for political-military dominance but rather for independence from more powerful neighbours; in both cases civil society was highly developed in relation to the apparatus of political rule; and both had a strong interest in a stable and tranquil environment as a condition for the pursuit of goals inherent in their civil societies.

In these examples, the states in question were centrally concerned with the task
of "promoting an orderly international environment" by expanding the body of, and adherence to, norms and rules of international conduct. In this sense, their international roles and interests were related to the role conceptions noted above: moderating and pacifying principal powers; in a sense "guarding" the balance of power (by working out ways to help prevent its breakdown); and evincing a strong concern for international order, security, and peace.

In order to have had both the capacity and the confidence to pursue their order creating and expanding goals with a reasonable expectation of success, the leaders of such states needed to have at least middle-range military and economic resources at their disposal, and had to be clearly cognizant of their capacity to influence specific international developments -- while being either unable or unwilling to attempt to impose their version of order as great powers would be more inclined to do. In this sense, they had to be clearly aware of, and confident in, their medium power and influence; yet they did not have to label themselves a middle, medium, or intermediate power, nor did they necessarily concern themselves with obtaining explicit recognition of some kind of intermediate status. This is a subtle, but important point: as we shall see, states can and have pursued middle power roles without necessarily viewing themselves as "middle powers".

Also, the leaders of such historical middle powers did not manifest the ambition to "graduate" to great power status often associated with explicit variants of middle power thinking. On the contrary, their international behaviour was predicated on the assumption that as non-great powers, they had interests in building orderly international structures which were often quite distinct from the interests of the great powers.

Thus, as described by Cox, this behavioural variant of the middle power idea was also, like the more explicit notions thereof, rooted in an assertion of the self-interest of the states in question. However, whereas the more explicit examples of middle power thought and practice discussed above reflected a narrower and more self-aggrandizing version of self-interest, in the sense of recognition and enhancement
of international status, the Catalanian and Netherlands cases reflect the pursuit of a broader and more "enlightened" self-interest, conceived in terms of "goals inherent in their civil societies" necessitating the fostering of a "stable and tranquil environment".

It is in these latter, less self-conscious and more dynamic examples of middle power behaviour that Cox identifies the antecedents of John Holmes's post-war notion of "middlepowermanship". However in practice, both the first, status-oriented and moralizing-prone version of the middle power idea and the second, behavioural variant have been present in post-World War II middle power thought and practice. In fact, the boundary between the two versions of this concept seems bound to be a fluid and uncertain one, as the more-or-less consistent and effective pursuit of order-promoting functions in international relations lends itself easily and naturally to moralizing and self-satisfaction amongst the leaders and opinion-makers of states which are so inclined. Thus, it may be virtually impossible to sort out when middle power statesmen and nationals are pursuing enhanced international status or gratuitously moralizing, on the one hand, and when they are sincerely seeking to promote peace and order in various spheres of international affairs, on the other, since they are likely in fact to be doing both at once.

1.2 Post-World War II Thought and Practice:

The explicit development of the middle power concept in the post-war era, subsequently popularized in the form of Holmes's notion of "middlepowermanship"\textsuperscript{16}, was largely a Canadian affair. Indeed, one of the problematic aspects of the concept in this era is its relatively limited currency outside Canada. Of necessity, therefore, this section focuses largely, though not exclusively, on the literature and debate in and about this country.

The idea that there was a distinctive middle power role in international affairs, and various conceptions of the nature and content of that role, developed in a piecemeal fashion in the first two to three decades following the Second World War. In Canada, it was rooted in the "liberal-internationalist" political philosophy shared by the main practitioners and practitioner-scholars of Canadian foreign policy, who in the
formative years of the post-war international system were engaged in planning for and creating the institutions of that system.\textsuperscript{17} It was in the context of the post-war planning process in Ottawa that the notion of a distinctive middle power role and status began to take shape.

In preparing for the new era, Canadian policy-makers were buoyed by the significance of the country's contribution to the war effort and (with Europe devastated) its relative economic strength.\textsuperscript{18} They were also reacting against the isolationism of the inter-war period and the planned dominance of the nascent United Nations by the great powers. In this context, they conceived the "functional principle" as their preferred basis for determining national representation and responsibility in emerging international institutions. Related to, though distinct from, David Mitrany's functionalist theory of world order, the essence of this principle was that effective participation in post-war international institutions, whether designed to perform peace and security, economic, or social functions, should be determined not by a country's aggregate size and (military) power, but by its capacity to make a constructive contribution "to the particular object in question."\textsuperscript{19} On this basis, it was argued, such states as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Holland, Mexico, Poland, India, and Sweden could be regarded "medium" or "middle" powers in terms of their potential contributions to international peace and security, and might therefore be accorded special consideration in the selection of non-permanent members for the UN Security Council. Furthermore, in certain specialized, non-military "functional" areas, they might appropriately take up leading roles. Not surprisingly, this principle was generally well received by other middle-sized states at the time; while at the San Francisco conference establishing the United Nations, the rights of the middle powers were championed (though with differing degrees of zeal) by Australia and Canada.

As it happened, most of the specific goals sought by the middle power advocates at San Francisco were either frustrated or had very little practical impact.\textsuperscript{20} However several aspects of this early post-war thinking are noteworthy for their more general implications. In the first place, like much of the pre-war
thought and practice discussed above, this thinking reflected above all an aspiration for enhanced status in international affairs, distinguishing the middle powers from the great mass of small states -- although this aspiration did not at the time extend, as in some earlier manifestations of the middle power idea, to a desire for graduation to great power status. In the second place, it reflected a desire to "rein in" the great powers, trying as far as possible to constrain the arbitrary exercise of their power. According to Holbraad, Australians in particular were resentful of the great powers' war-time leadership and their own exclusion from important consultations and decisions, precipitating their determined opposition to great power domination and their advocacy of the rights of smaller states at San Francisco. This search for ways to control and discipline great power behaviour, and thus maximize international security and freedom for middle-sized and smaller states, became a persistent theme of post-war middlepowermanship.

Third, the means identified in this early thinking for both achieving enhanced status and reining in the great powers were the emerging international organizations of the post-war era -- above all the UN, but also the Bretton Woods Institutions, the GATT, and (for Australia and Canada) the "new Commonwealth". These organizations were also seen by middle power advocates as the best available means to work for the maintenance of international peace and security -- a pre-eminent preoccupation of virtually all states at the time. This emphasis on, and affinity for, international organizations and the norms and rules they generate became a very important theme in the subsequent development of ideas about middle power internationalism.

Fourth, the functional principle upon which middle power claims and ideas were based has now been firmly established in practice as the basis for a range of international organizations and cooperative efforts -- although probably not because of its advocacy by Canadians in the 1940s. Functional bases of organization, representation and activity are likely to become even more important in the 1990s as the agenda of world politics is increasingly crowded with non-military/security (or
non-traditional security) issues; and states widely regarded as middle powers have in a number of these functional areas adopted leading roles. More recent instances of this type of middle power "leadership" (varying in importance and success) have included the negotiations for a new Convention on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s and '80s; the North-South "dialogue" in roughly the same period; the more recent work of the Cairns Group in the agricultural trade area of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations23; and, more broadly, the leading role of certain middle powers in the area of overseas development assistance (ODA).

And fifth, these early Canadian claims and ideas regarding middle power status and roles reflected a sense of responsible internationalism on the part of the people involved. As noted above, key policy-makers reacted to the isolationism of inter-war Canadian foreign policy by determining that Canada should take a responsible and active part in international affairs. This determination was not just idealistic rhetoric. Holmes, for example, asserted that:

(Canadian) internationalism...was based on a very hard-boiled calculation of the Canadian national interest rather than on woolly-minded idealism. It is a simple belief that Canadians could neither survive nor prosper in isolation in a fire-proof house because the rest of the world just wasn't going to let them be so lucky.24

Yet this sense of responsible internationalism, which many Canadians came to associate more generally with the role of middle powers in international affairs, also contained at least a hint of moral superiority:

(B)ehind the (Canadian) arguments (leading up to San Francisco) was the assumption, not always tacit, that middle powers could be trusted to exercise their diplomatic influence and military power in the interest of international society; that they were capable of being less selfish than great powers and more responsible than small states.25

Here, as in the two pre-war variants of middle power thought and practice discussed in the previous sub-section, we see again the persistent tension between a less self-conscious and more performance-oriented internationalism, on the one hand, and a more status-oriented and moralistic tendency, on the other.

With the launching of the United Nations, and the concomitant failure of the middle power advocates to secure practical recognition of their status as such, explicit
consideration of the middle power idea went into abeyance. Nevertheless, it has been argued that, as with Cox's examples of the Catalanian bourgeoisie and seventeenth-century Holland, the elements of a middle power role developed during this period in a more-or-less "natural" fashion, as a consequence of the characteristics and interests of such states and their societies, and the exigencies of the international environment with which they were confronted. One clear instance of this in the Canadian case was the emergence of the diplomacy or politics of constraint -- a development of the concern, noted above, with "reining in" the great powers. In the context of the Korean War in the early 1950s, Denis Stairs has argued that "Canadian officials felt it was essential to moderate and constrain the course of American decisions", and that "in attempting to do so, they acted in concert with other powers of like purpose, and their instrument was the United Nations itself". This use of their skills and standing in multilateral diplomacy and institutions in an effort to constrain and modify the behaviour of major powers came to be seen as a characteristic feature of the middle power role. Contemporary examples of the politics of constraint include the effort of the Cairns Group, led by Australia, to halt and roll back the agricultural subsidy war between the US and the EC, and to reform and strengthen the international regime for agricultural trade; and the efforts of Canadian and other diplomats in the run-up to the recent Gulf War to ensure that the prosecution of the conflict was "confined" (however imperfectly) within multilateral, UN parameters.

A more symbolic aspect of the post-war relationship of Western middle powers, in particular, to "super" and "great" powers was their desire to clearly distinguish themselves (preferably favourably) from these larger states on the world stage. This desire was intuitively rooted in both domestic and international political imperatives. One of the best and most obvious ways to do this was through the development of relatively close understandings of, and relationships with, various Third World states and leaders. This characteristic of post-war middlepowermanship clearly had some impact on the more recent development of middle power policies towards Southern Africa.
Among the most popular meanings to be attached to the middle power concept over the course of the late 1940s and 1950s was the idea that such states were characteristically suited for, and inclined towards, bridge-building and mediation within the international community. With the onset of the Cold War and the strategic polarization of international relations, Holmes argued that middle powers increasingly had mediatory roles "thrust upon them": in international "trouble spots" such as Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, and Indochina; in emerging international organizations such as the new Commonwealth; and "in a thousand ways seeking to reduce tension" within the UN. Indeed, in Holmes's view, the structural rigidities created by the nuclear stalemate of the Cold War "made" the distinctive mediatory role of middle powers: "Because of the awful power of the largest states and the global character of their interests (he wrote in the mid-1960s), middle powers can often act more safely and even more effectively than they can to reduce or solve contagious conflict". While such roles were most often conceived in relation to the East-West confrontation, there was also some tendency, of growing relevance in the '60s and '70s, to cast middle powers in bridging and mediation roles between North and South (a view which was particularly common in Australia).

The apotheosis of this active, mediatory variant of middlepowermanship came for Canadians with Lester Pearson's deft diplomacy during the Suez Crisis in 1956, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and out of which emerged the first large-scale UN peacekeeping force. In subsequent years, peacekeeping too came to be viewed as a characteristic middle power function, given their relatively strong military capabilities and resources (in relation to small states), combined with their relatively non-threatening international image and posture (compared with great powers). Indeed, the widespread popularity of this role meant that it eventually overshadowed most other aspects of the middle power idea in the popular imagination. It was arguably the combination of Pearson's role in the Suez crisis and the emergence of UN peacekeeping which altered the subsequent development of the middle power idea in Canada from the relatively "natural" and unself-conscious
pattern of the early post-war years to a status of orthodoxy and even "ideology" by the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{32}

These ideas about middle power interests and behaviour -- their affinity for international organizations, their desire to constrain great power excesses, their inclination towards mediation and bridge-building, their suitability for peacekeeping, etc. -- were all to some degree "feel good" and self-congratulatory notions, and were therefore happily reinforced and perpetuated by Canadian politicians and bureaucrats -- active and former -- in the 1960s and after. Nevertheless, they had (and have) some obvious basis in real life experience, and therefore sufficient credibility, to be worthy of investigation in the contemporary context.

Not all of the ideas about middle powers to receive attention in the post-war era were necessarily so "positive", however. One of the most common, and concrete, meanings attached to the middle power concept in this and previous eras, with limited applicability to either Canada or Sweden, was that such states are "regional powers" with significant capacity and influence in their own "subordinate systems", but little (generally-speaking) beyond it.\textsuperscript{33} Interest in this regional power role rose somewhat during the "detente" period of the late 1960s and 1970s, on the view that the decline in the breadth and pervasiveness of superpower confrontation created new opportunities for regional leadership by local notables. It may similarly be argued today that the apparent decline in American hegemony within the international political economy, and the likelihood that the post-hegemonic order will increasingly be structured on the basis of regional "blocs", creates new scope for regional powers. Whether this more "realist" regional middle power role is viewed as useful or threatening depends on the characteristics of the regional power in question, and one's own national or theoretical perspective: it may alternatively be perceived as regional "leadership" or "management" on the one hand, or "dominance" and "proto-imperialism" on the other.

Yet another characterization of the middle power role which was generally more implicit than explicit in this era, but was certainly critical and negative, is what
Wood groups together as the "negative roles" of free-riding, fence-sitting, or status-seeking. He cites Charles Kindleberger's 1981 argument that much of the dislocation in the world economy had been caused by the persistent tendency of small and middle-sized countries to "free ride" on the "international public goods" underwritten by the United States in particular -- a charge which has been paralleled in the international security sphere (in discussions of the "commitment-capability gap" in Canadian defence policy, for example). These types of analyses generally emanated from great power and/or realist sources. From this perspective, as well as that of more radical analysts, the moralistic tendencies of many middle powers, discussed above, have been read as substantively-empty status-seeking or posturing in world affairs.

The diverse, unsystematic, and often value-laden nature of this range of middle power role conceptions doubtless helps to account for the limited post-war currency of this concept beyond Canada. Even in this country, the orthodoxy and ideology of middlepowermanship increasingly came into question from the late-1960s, most conspicuously with Pierre Trudeau's call for more modesty and realism in Canadian foreign policy, his rejection of the traditional "helpful-fixer" image, and his argument that Canada was "more the largest of the small powers than the smallest of the large powers." Nevertheless, the idea of Canada as a middle power survived as the little-scrutinized "conventional wisdom" of Canadian foreign policy, and as the mainstream third of the increasingly-sterile academic "Power Question" debate (in which the characterization of Canada as a middle power was contrasted with "satellite" and "principal power" depictions, imposing a rigidity on the category which belied the subtlety and suppleness of Holmes's original notion of middlepowermanship).

Yet, in the fluid and uncertain international atmosphere of the late-1980s (now even more so at the outset of the 1990s) there was a modest rejuvenation of interest in the category and roles of middle powers. Four recent examples of this renewed interest have helped place ideas about middle powers on a sounder theoretical and
empirical footing, and therefore merit attention.38

2. Contemporary Restatements and Reformulations

These four recent treatments of middle powers are unified by a shared perception that the international community is confronted by rapid change and momentous challenge; that conventional sources of leadership appear unequal, on their own, to promoting and managing the processes of change now under way; and that based on some of their historic roles and not-insubstantial capabilities, middle powers have the potential to be an important source of leadership in this context, and hence require closer scrutiny.

Of the four, the most broadly-based and systematic is the North-South Institute's (NSI's) "Middle Powers in the International System" project. Its conceptual framework is set out by Bernard Wood in the lead paper on The Middle Powers and the General Interest.39 One of Wood's central preoccupations is with the problematic task of identifying middle powers: what characteristics determine the parameters of this category? He attempts to avoid the dangers of circular reasoning and moralising associated with some role-based definitions of middle powers by generating an "objective", GNP-based list of 33 middle power "candidates" from (formerly) Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern "camps". We will return to the problem of defining the middle power category in the next section of this chapter.

Wood then sets out a list of five potential middle power "roles", drawn from an historical review of the middle power idea, against which to test the international behaviour of the 33 candidates. Most of these are familiar from the preceding discussion in this chapter: regional or sub-regional leadership; functional leadership; stabilizing roles (i.e., separating, counter-balancing, or mediating amongst other states); negative roles (free-riding, fence-sitting, and status seeking); and what Wood designates as "Good Multilateral Citizenship" -- i.e., commitment to, and leadership within, multilateral decision-making fora. Each of these role conceptions except the first could be associated with certain aspects of Australian, Canadian, and Swedish
policies toward Southern Africa, and is therefore of some interest in this thesis.

Wood’s primary concern, however, is the middle power role within structures of multilateral cooperation, or "Multilateral Citizenship". His rationale for this emphasis is that, in light of increasing interdependence in international affairs, the accelerating pace of global change, and the resultant challenges of leadership in a "post-hegemonic" era, expanded and strengthened multilateral cooperation is required. Middle power coalitions across the traditional divisions of the post-war world are, Wood argues, a promising potential source of leadership in making such structures and regimes more effective. Hence, the case studies in the NSI project -- the role of middle powers in UN finances, in UNCTAD commodity negotiations, in the International Telecommunications Union, and at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament -- assess both the evidence for, and some of the obstacles to, a collaborative leadership role for middle powers within these multilateral forums.

Wood’s analysis, however, does not give sufficient attention to the underlying basis for either the hypothesized middle power commitment to multilateral cooperation, or the hoped-for development of middle power collaboration and coalitions across bloc boundaries. Traditional, state-centric arguments to the effect that it is likely to be in their interest "to pursue at least a generalized strengthening of multilateral decision making as one approach to reducing the disproportionate control of the oligopolistic major powers" are cited, and should not be underestimated. But the important domestic political-economic and cultural underpinnings for an active middle power role in multilateral organizations are not treated. And the formidable structural and political constraints on enhanced and sustained middle power cooperation and coalition-building, particularly across the North-South divide, are not given enough attention (although Wood does address some of these constraints directly in a subsequent article). The empirical evidence for the claim that middle powers are disproportionately committed to, and active within, multilateral organizations is reinforced by some of the analyses within the NSI project; but the basis (particularly domestically) for, and obstacles to, this and other manifestations of
middle power internationalism require more attention.

A more limited, yet intriguingly broad treatment (in theoretical terms) of the idea and potential of middlepowermanship in the changing global system is furnished by Robert Cox’s article, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order". Cox’s conception of the middle power role, inspired by John Holmes, is behavioural. It involves "a (state’s) commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system" in pursuit of "an environment within which their own interests and those of their populations could be pursued", and a capacity to contribute effectively to the pursuit of such goals. The pursuit of these ends subsumes Wood’s pre-eminent concern -- i.e., commitment to, and leadership within, multilateral forums -- within the context of the broader pursuit of expanded world order:

In modern times, the middle-power role...has become linked to the development of international organization. International organization is a process, not a finality, and international law is one of its most important products. The middle power’s interest is to support this process, whether in the context of a hegemonic order or (even more vitally) in the absence of hegemony.

In Cox’s view, the world community is currently in a process of transition to a new (possibly "post-Westphalian" and non-hegemonic) world order in which middle powers, given their order-building predilections, have the potential to play a vital part.

Cox’s treatment of the middle power concept reinforces and challenges our understanding of it in a couple of important ways. In the first place, as discussed earlier in this chapter, he argues that this model of middlepowermanship has manifested itself in various historical orders, citing as examples the Catalanian and Netherlands cases of the 14th and 17th centuries. Thus, on this understanding, the idea of a distinctive and substantive middle power role is more than simply an idiosyncratic and somewhat self-serving conception of post-World War II Canadian foreign policy, developed and propagated by its practitioners and analysts. Rather, it is a generalized role conception which is likely to be duplicated by other actors in this
and future world orders. In Cox's words, it is "a role in search of an actor".\textsuperscript{46}

This raises again the question of why a state chooses to adopt this role. Cox argues that the possession of middle-range capability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a disposition to play this role, which also depends on an ability to stand a certain distance from involvement in major conflicts, adequate autonomy vis-a-vis major powers, and "a commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system".\textsuperscript{47} But the critical factor would appear to be the basis for this commitment, which lies in the characteristics, values, and interests of the state in question, and the civil society within which it is embedded. Thus, system-level interests and positioning can only partly explain a predilection for the middle power role: interconnected state and societal considerations are, on Cox's reckoning, an even more crucial determinant. His analysis thus transcends the traditional state-centric focus of middle power thinking.

This is illustrated by his choice of Japan as the test case for the applicability of the middle-power thesis in the contemporary context. Japan, he acknowledges, is a "difficult case": indeed, to think of it as a middle power is "quite incongruous, if one's notion of middle relates to capabilities".\textsuperscript{48} And, in fact, Cox's case that Japan may play a middle power-type, order-building role in the creation of a new, counter-hegemonic and multi-level world order is not terribly convincing. But it is the basis for this argument which is of interest here: the emergence of such a role would be rooted in the development of a new dominant Japanese political culture, based on the revitalization of the already-quite strong citizens' movements "concerned both with global problems...and with local Japanese manifestations of the same broad issues".\textsuperscript{49} Capabilities and positioning are necessary to the performance of the middle power role, but interlinked domestic cultural and state characteristics and interests generate the will to do so on a sustained basis.

The third, "Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty" project is in some ways of particular pertinence to this thesis. Specifically, its focus is the role of
Western middle powers in North-South relations, within which Southern African policies obviously (though idiosyncratically) fall; and it is centrally concerned with the role of humanitarian considerations in the formulation of foreign policy -- an unavoidable aspect of policies toward Southern Africa in light of apartheid.

The setting for this project's investigations is the failure of the internationalist prescriptions of the Brandt Commission, involving a fresh assault on underdevelopment and a new dispensation in North-South relations, to have any significant policy impact. The reasons for this failure are several, but of particular pertinence to project director Cranford Pratt and his collaborators is the fact that the major industrialized powers never accepted (let alone acted on) the need for significant international economic reform. There was, on this view, a failure of political will and leadership on the part of these "great powers". This leads Pratt to an investigation of the nature and limitations of the "humane internationalism" which he argues is the necessary underpinning for a more determined and effective Northern response to global poverty, by focusing on the North-South policies of five Western middle powers in which this humane internationalism is arguably unusually strong, yet ultimately constrained and limited. Given their traditional relative responsiveness to Third World needs and aspirations, it is likely that such middle powers would play a central role in any renewed Northern effort to respond to Southern development imperatives; while a conclusion that their internationalism is strictly limited and increasingly constrained would be "all the more sobering".

Thus, this project is centrally and unapologetically concerned with the recurring and troublesome question of the extent to which the foreign policies of some middle powers are more responsive to, and reflective of, humanitarian values and concerns than most, particularly larger, states. The tendency of some to associate middle powers with relatively more humane behaviour has usually been decried: Holmes, for example, was critical the "moral arrogance [which] has crept into the concept of middle power." This is partly because the dominant realist paradigm in the post-war study of international relations viewed the intrusion of moral agendas
into international affairs as misleading and dangerous; and partly because, in the words of an Australian foreign minister, "Hypocrites are not only disliked, ... but -- if they are our size -- they are ignored." Yet Pratt argues that ethical or "cosmopolitan" values both can and should be given a high priority in international, and particularly North-South, relations. It is difficult to question this proposition in the abstract. But the questions of how and why these values should be stronger in certain categories of states than in others, without their slipping into smugness and hypocrisy, is much more problematic.

Clearly, states as such are not moral entities: to imply otherwise is to dangerously reify the state. But it is possible that ethical considerations may be more widely and strongly held, and hence more politically influential, within some societies and governments than others. Thus, even more strongly (and narrowly) than Cox, Pratt and his collaborators privilege domestic political cultures in defining and explaining the influence of their central concept -- humane internationalism -- in the foreign policies of the Western middle powers with which they are concerned.

The core of humane internationalism is "...an acceptance by the citizens of industrialized states that they have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose obligations upon their governments." In its application within Western middle powers to the 'Third World', humane internationalism has been based on three main features: an (often fragile) acceptance of new and wider obligations relating to global poverty; the melding of this perceived ethical obligation with what it sees as the real long-term interests of the rich countries; and the natural extension to the international level of the values and assumptions underpinning the strong network of welfare state programmes in these societies. Pratt further distinguishes liberal, reform, and radical variants of humane internationalism which have had different degrees of influence in the societies with which he is concerned (these concepts are discussed in chapter 4). He readily acknowledges that this dimension of their political cultures is strongly challenged by other influences -- particularly "international realism" -- and has therefore often not
been decisive in policy areas where it is relevant and appropriate (e.g., in trade and investment policies toward Third World states and products). But he makes a convincing case that it has been relatively strong and influential in these societies. Clearly, the presence of strong and well-organized humane internationalist attitudes and elements within a society will increase the propensity of its national leaders to adopt active and "progressive" policies toward Southern Africa.

Yet, in terms of our agenda of understanding the characteristics and roles of middle powers, this project has some significant limitations. The middle power label is attached intuitively to a small group of Western, advanced capitalist countries, the future relative capabilities and autonomy of which may be increasingly problematic in light of changes to global and national political economies (these same concerns obviously apply to the case study states in this dissertation, and are therefore addressed in chapter three). Its association with the concept of humane internationalism, which in this project is conceived and applied only in relation to Northern states, raises the issue of the extent to which variants of humane internationalism may be present and influential in Southern states, and indeed the extent to which Southern countries can be thought of as middle powers in a comparable sense. There is also the question of whether or not this humane internationalism mightn't be at least as strongly associated with "small states", and how much international influence it might have in this context (it is noteworthy in this regard that analysts in Denmark, Norway and Sweden -- three of the states on which this project focuses -- generally conceive of their countries as small states). Each of these difficulties relates to the more general problem of defining the parameters and characteristics of the middle power category.

The fourth, and most recent, reformulation of the middle power idea is found in the several comparative studies of Australian and Canadian foreign policies undertaken by Higgott, Cooper and Nossal (see note #39). Like Cox (and Holmes), they adopt a behavioural approach to defining middle powers. Their primary concern is the nature of "middle power leadership". This concern is useful to this thesis in
several respects, two of which will be noted here. First, it highlights the fact that leadership in, or at least useful contributions to, problem-solving and cooperation-building in international affairs can be based not only upon the "structural (economic and strategic) power" emphasized in the realist tradition. It can also be exercised in "entrepreneurial" and "technical" forms, by middle as well as major powers. Within these parameters, Higgott and Cooper suggest a sequential typology of middle power leadership, progressing from acting as a catalyst, to a facilitator, to a manager of efforts at problem-solving and cooperation building. They show that these types of leadership have been manifested in some recent foreign policy initiatives by Australia and Canada, which they view as quintessential middle powers. They thus delineate some of the generic ways in which middle powers might contribute to change and development in Southern Africa, without having significant structural power in relation to the region.

Second, Higgott and Cooper highlight the propensity of middle powers to exercise issue-specific leadership in a relatively narrow range of "niches". Australia, in particular, is associated with a highly-focused, "discrete" and "heroic" approach to foreign policy, which they distinguish from the more "diffuse" and "routine" Canadian approach. But in both of these and other middle power cases it is clear that, contrary to the expectations of some of their citizens, such states cannot have a significant impact in an indeterminate number of issue areas. By marshalling their often-sophisticated diplomatic and technical resources carefully, however, they can have a significant impact in a smaller range of specific, propitious contexts. Southern Africa may perhaps be viewed as one such context during the 1980s.

However, in their early forms at least, the Higgott-Cooper-Nossal studies also do not go very far in pursuing the questions of why some middle-sized states (and not others) choose to exercise international leadership on a regular or consistent basis, and the extent to which the kinds of leadership behaviour they identify can be generalized beyond the two countries on which they focus.

In sum, while each of the four projects/authors discussed above significantly
advances the analysis of middle powers beyond its traditional unsystematic state, each leaves important gaps to be filled. Wood’s approach is the most extensive and systematic, but its state-centric focus gives insufficient attention to the influence of underlying political-economic pressures and constraints, and societal values and ideas, on the development of middle power roles. Pratt and company give careful comparative attention to domestic political cultures, but on the whole under-emphasize and undervalue the importance of international political and economic constraints. They also do not tackle a number of definitional issues raised by their use of the middle power label. Cox usefully relates world order interests to interests and ideas emanating from within individual civil societies in accounting for the adoption of the "middle power role" by certain states. But his idiosyncratic choice of Japan to test these ideas begs the question of how they might work in relation to more "traditional" post-war middle powers, leaving much empirical work to be done. The Higgott-Cooper-Nossal project begs further analysis of the broad underlying motives for "middle power leadership", and thus of its longer-term sustainability. It also inevitably leads to the question of the applicability of its ideas to other middle power "candidates". This in turn raises the question of which states are middle powers: what, in other words, are the parameters of the middle power category?

3. What is a Middle Power?

Exclusive reliance on role-defined characteristics in the identification of middle powers is, as the foregoing analysis suggests, hazardous. The list of potential middle power roles is sufficiently diverse that, without some qualification and explication, it does little to help us distinguish middle powers as such in any meaningful way. Analysts are exposed to the danger (noted above) of circular reasoning. States which have at various times been identified by analysts as middle powers on the basis of their apparent performance of middle power roles often do not identify themselves as such; while such characteristic roles may also be performed by states which seem intuitively to be, in fact, large or small states (as, for example, with Cox’s
identification of certain middle power tendencies in contemporary Japanese international relations, or New Zealand's regional leadership role in the South Pacific. Thus, there is some need to relate often subjective role conceptions to more objective measures of middle-range "capabilities" or "power."

Efforts to define such "objective" criteria are anything but straightforward, however. Power, composed of various tangible and intangible capabilities or power resources, has traditionally been defined along the lines of Holsti's definition: "the general capacity of a state to control the behaviour of others." In this usage, it is both a relational or behavioural concept, and an inter-state phenomenon. In classical realist and in some contemporary neo-realist formulations, power was ultimately related to military capabilities, or "the ability to wage war." Yet, while military power continues to be important (witness recent events in the Gulf), it is widely agreed that, given increasing interdependence and the overwhelming destructiveness of contemporary weaponry (nuclear and otherwise), the overall utility of force has been declining. Greater emphasis is being placed on economic bases and measures of power; and its effective exercise has been diffused towards a greater variety of actors and arenas. These developments imply that middle and small powers may, in certain areas or "niches", be able to have greater relative international influence.

Furthermore, there is a growing acceptance in international studies as a whole of what "radical" analyses have long asserted: i.e., that power in its economic dimensions is both possessed and wielded by national and transnational capital interests as well as states within the global political economy; and that this power has both relational and structural dimensions. This means that exercises in ranking states on the bases of power measurements are manifestly problematic and incomplete, leaving out structural and non-state sources of international power. These developments are addressed in chapter three.

Beyond this, it is important to note that it has always been possible, and may be becoming more so, to exercise influence in international affairs without necessarily exercising or even possessing superior tangible economic or military capabilities. The
terms power and influence have often been used in similar or even interchangeable ways in international studies; but the notion of influence has also been used to describe "the ability to affect the behaviour of an external actor without resort to superior military or economic strength" (emphasis added). This is a subtle but important development of the notion of power: it allows for the possibility that small and (especially) medium-sized states may affect the behaviour of more "powerful" actors, and thus at least periodically play a "disproportionately" important role in certain international situations, through superior knowledge, adroit diplomacy, building broad "consensual knowledge" and coalitions, moral suasion, etc. This understanding of influence is clearly related to Higgott and Cooper's argument regarding the importance of "non-structural" sources of leadership, and is essential to an exploration of the role of Western middle powers in Southern Africa.

Thus, efforts to objectively measure national capabilities and power are bound to be crude and incomplete. They are also, however, both unavoidable and useful for certain broad comparative purposes. Under these circumstances, the simplest and most inclusive indices may be the most useful. Several recent efforts at ranking state power have settled on a single indicator -- Gross National Product (GNP) -- as a simple yet inclusive measure, taking in "aggregate economic power, wealth and/or population size, and to a substantial extent, military potential".

Adopting this rough approach, however, still leaves us with problematic judgements concerning the determination of boundaries between categories of large, medium-sized and small states. Bernard Wood's NSI project, discussed above, demarcates a fairly broad and sensible listing of middle power "candidates", consisting of the thirty rank-ordered national economies below the six largest (the "great powers"), plus three additions for "regional balance". This listing seems, in Wood's words, "to capture all those (countries) which would likely be proposed as middle-power candidates according to any (or at least most) criterion". It is therefore the categorization adopted for basic orientation purposes in this thesis. Accounting for 65% of the world's population, about one-third of world GNP, and
Table 1

Mid-Sized Economies in the Modern World - Middle Powers
(in descending order of 1979 GNP)

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<td>1</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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* Consideration should be given to whether a regional grouping of this economic weight and cohesion should be assessed alongside individual states - note, however, Indonesia is already included.


over 40% of world trade, these states together are a manifestly weighty grouping. Apropos of this dissertation, Canada, Australia and Sweden are interestingly spaced within this group, although all within the top half.

Yet such a listing also clearly illustrates the difficulties involved in conceptualizing an analytically meaningful middle power grouping on the basis of any objective criteria. Aside from the anomalous inclusion of ASEAN, one could question the inclusion of: China, which for parts of the post-war era has been regarded as a virtual third "super-power" in politico-strategic terms; Italy and Canada, as members of the G-7; the former-East Bloc states, which for the next decade at least
will be preoccupied with traumatic internal reforms (aside from East Germany, which has ceased to exist); and South Africa which, as a "pariah state", has played an aberrant role in post-war international affairs.

More broadly, one must inevitably distinguish Northern and Southern (developed and developing) "middle powers" for many practical and analytical purposes. For example, although a formidable argument can be made that the real long-term interests of all middle powers (indeed, of all states and peoples) lie in undertaking the reforms necessary to facilitate the rapid development of Southern states, thereby creating the basis for a more peaceful and prosperous global system, it is clear that the level of acceptance of this proposition, and the urgency with which it is held, will vary significantly between Northern and Southern policy makers. Furthermore, regardless of the degree of consensus on this proposition, middle-sized states in the North and the South have substantially different structural characteristics and interests vis-a-vis the global political economy, which limit the degree of perceived commonality and potential cooperation among them. Although these structural and hence political differences are beginning to break down, both between and within Northern and Southern groupings, many obstacles remain. Finally, Northern states of all sizes have always had much greater relative human and financial resources at their disposal, and therefore greater capacity and different options in pursuing foreign policies in areas peripheral to their "core" interests (as Southern Africa is to each of Australia, Canada, and Sweden).

Ultimately, one's demarcation of the middle power category, and assessment of the role and relevance of such states, will be determined through the prism of one's theoretical "world view". The next section of this chapter therefore considers, in thumbnail fashion, four alternative theoretical approaches to an understanding of "middle powers", corresponding to the dominant "paradigms" in international relations during the post-war era.
4. Middle Powers and Theories of International Relations

4.1 Realism:

Realists, and their neo-realist descendants, view states as the basic unit in the international system. States operate within an environment which is viewed as fundamentally anarchic, and in which "the state of nature is a state of war". Their fundamental priority is therefore national survival, beyond which these essentially selfish units pursue various relatively narrow "national interests" (notably wealth and prestige). In pursuit of these priorities and interests, they seek to enhance and utilize national power as effectively as possible.

In such an environment, the pre-eminent challenge is the maintenance of stability and (ideally) peace. Responsibility in this regard inevitably falls to the most powerful states in the system; and the number of these states determines the system's structure at any particular time. Thus, realists have proffered both balance of power and hegemonic stability explanations for systemic structure, continuity and change. More recently, with attention shifting to the international political economy and the apparent decline of US hegemony therein, as well as to growing interdependence within the international system as a whole, many neo-realists have emphasized "international regimes" as sources of stability within individual sectors of international affairs. The foreign policy correlate of realism is statism, which argues that foreign policies are best explained in terms of the determination of the national interest emerging from quite autonomous state structures.

How would realists conceive of middle powers? In general, realists' emphasis on the system-shaping and management functions of great powers would lead them to make little distinction between middle and small powers, ascribing to both a minor and reactive role in international affairs. Insofar as middle powers are accorded a distinctive role, it would most likely be the "junior great power" role of regional leadership, management, or dominance. This would generally be viewed as a positive function, insofar as it contributed to the stability of the system as a whole.

Efforts on the part of middle powers to carve out independent foreign policy
stances involving strong public critiques of great powers and their management structures, and perhaps efforts to forge alternative ones, would generally be viewed as posturing, status-seeking, and free-riding on the stability underwritten by the major powers. There would (on the realist view) be circumstances under which middle powers could assist great powers in the maintenance of international peace and stability, by performing the "stabilizing roles" of separating, counter-balancing, or mediating among antagonists (actual or potential). But often, the most effective and responsible contribution they could make to international affairs would lie in the use of their not-insubstantial capabilities to actively and consistently support great power-led alliance and other management structures (in other words, by performing the roles of 'faithful ally' or 'lieutenant').

4.2 Grotian or Internationalist Theory of International Society:

A second "classical" theoretical tradition which is more hospitable to the idea of a distinctive and effective (though closely circumscribed) middle power role is what Hedley Bull terms the Grotian or internationalist tradition. Theorists in this tradition view international politics in terms of a society of states, or international society. Like realists, Grotians view states as the basic unit in international affairs, and inter-state conflict as a persistent reality. But they see this conflict as being limited by states' adherence to common rules and institutions of the society they form, rooted in certain basic common interests and values. International politics, on this view, "resembles a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive". Grotians thus see trade (or more generally, economic and social intercourse) as the most typical form of international activity, rather than war. Bull views the "effective institutions" of international society as: the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, the management system of the Great Powers, and war. Interestingly, he argues that the importance of general international organizations like the U.N. within international society has been overemphasized in this century.

Much of post-war Canadian thinking regarding "middlepowermanship" fits comfortably within this tradition. Practitioners and scholars such as Lester Pearson
and John Holmes took a classical state-centric view of international affairs and never really questioned the parameter-setting role of the Great Powers, adhering to the maxim that "Modest powers have to be content with modest influence, and their reach ought not to exceed their grasp". Whether or not Canadian policy-makers' estimations of this country's reach were accurate, and whether or not they engaged in excessive and debilitating self-limitation on the basis of what Holsti terms "the law of anticipated reaction" (primarily in Washington), are disputable. Within these parameters, however, key foreign policy makers took the view that middle powers had significant advantages and considerable scope to play a constructive role in international affairs. And the most appropriate orientation (in terms of broad Canadian self-interests) for this activity was towards the preservation and enhancement of the rules and institutions of international society. Canadian policy-makers (and those of a number of other middle powers) placed (and still place) somewhat greater emphasis than Bull on the importance of international organizations, and especially the U.N., within international society. But their emphases on the liberal international trading system, and on functional modes of organization and representation, clearly reflected the Grotian view of international activity as featuring potentially productive economic and social intercourse.

4.3 Pluralist/Interdependentist Theories:

Even sympathizers with the Grotian tradition expounded by Bull would now acknowledge that its elegantly spare formulation of the essence of international politics, and of its central actors and institutions, cannot provide an adequate accounting of the complex contemporary global system. A theoretical tradition which shares certain of its key assumptions -- e.g., an emphasis on shared interests, values, rules and institutions in international relations, and both the possibility and necessity of productive international intercourse and cooperation -- yet is centrally concerned with increasing complexity and diffusion of actors and power is the liberal, pluralist or interdependentist "school".

In keeping with its emphasis on the complexity of international affairs, this
broad school has yielded a diverse range of theories and sub-theories. Since the 1970s, however, it has generally evinced a shared concern with the expansion and consequences of "complex interdependence" in many (though not all) international issue areas. As conceived by Keohane and Nye, this condition, in its ideal type, has three main characteristics. There are multiple channels connecting societies (interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational). There is an absence of hierarchy among issues, with the old distinction between "high" (military and diplomatic) and "low" (social, economic, ecological, etc.) politics becoming increasingly irrelevant. Finally, the use of military force is generally absent.\textsuperscript{81}

These characteristics of complex interdependence have several important consequences for international political processes. First, the declining utility of force leads to a decline in the utility of linkage strategies. Consequently, outcomes of political bargaining increasingly vary by issue area. Second, with the decline of hierarchy between issue areas, the politics of agenda formation and control increase in importance. Third, the growth of multiple channels of contact between societies brings into question the realist assumption that states act in their own "national self-interest": the relevant question becomes, "which self and which interest?". And fourth, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is significantly increased, particularly through agenda-setting and coalition-formation, and as arenas for weak state initiatives and linkages.\textsuperscript{82}

An acceptance of these assumptions yields somewhat contradictory implications regarding the roles and relevance of middle powers. On the whole, they imply a potential, at least, for an increasingly salient and substantial role in processes of international management and change. Thus, middle powers may be able to use their diplomatic capabilities and facility with international organizations to play an important role in agenda-setting and coalition-formation. Further, they may be able to deploy their functional resources and capabilities to advantage as certain specialized issue areas increase in importance -- all in an environment in which the authority of the Great Powers, historically-rooted in their military preponderance, is reduced. The
reformist notion of humane internationalism emphasized in Pratt’s Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty project falls within this theoretical tradition (albeit at its leftward, social democratic extreme, and with important supplementary elements of the Kantian/globalist tradition). It does so in the sense that it stresses the essential voluntarism of international political activity (by emphasizing the need for political will to secure important reforms to the international economic system); the significance of shared interests and values within the international community, both between and across national communities; and the potential for expanding mechanisms of effective international cooperation in the North-South sphere. Indeed, interdependentist assumptions largely underpin the four contemporary middle power projects reviewed in section two.

On the other hand, some of the trends highlighted by this approach, if taken to their logical conclusion, imply a general decline in the autonomy and salience of states as actors in world politics, through the transfer of effective authority and, increasingly, legitimacy to international, transnational, and sub-national organizations and interests. It is likely that these developments may "squeeze" middle powers disproportionately, given the fact that their future prosperity is highly dependent on their adherence to strong international economic regimes and groupings, on the one hand, while they are more susceptible to internal cleavages and contradictions than many small states, on the other.83

4.4 Dependency and Neo-Marxist Theories:

This fourth and final approach is also an extremely diverse and, in important respects, internally conflicted one. Nevertheless, various "radical" political economy approaches are bound together by certain common ideas.84 First, the fundamental fact of global economic and political relations is its deeply unequal nature, structured in terms of relations of dominance and dependence both between and within states. This inequality is underpinned, at the most basic (sub-structural) level, by economic structures and relationships, especially vis-a-vis the fluid, powerful, pervasive and hierarchically-organized global capitalist economy (or international division of
labour). Political, social, cultural and ideological ideas and interactions, though often important, are essentially "superstructural".

In older and simpler dependency and world systems formulations, emphasis was placed on the inequalities inherent in relations of international exchange between the developed centre or metropole, and the underdeveloped periphery. As an inevitable consequence of the process of trade and interaction between North and South, in which metropolitan interests appropriated the economic surplus generated by the periphery, the development of Northern social formations implied the underdevelopment of Southern ones. This analysis produced an excessively simple formulation of class relations, with the "centre of the centre", or metropolitan capitalist interests and their allies, interacting with minority "comprador" (or collaborationist) interests in the South in a mutually profitable relationship, at the expense of the working classes in the North and especially workers and peasants in the South.

The obvious oversimplifications and empirical failures of this work sparked a neo-Marxist critique from the left. These critics argued that the key to understanding the development of social relations both within and between Northern and Southern social formations lies in an understanding of the modes and relations of production (versus exchange). At the international level, the focus has been on the increasing globalisation of production, capital, technology and services, captured in the notion of the "New International Division of Labour" (NIDL). And at the domestic level, neo-Marxist analyses have produced much more sophisticated and differentiated taxonomies of societal (class) structures and divisions, linked to the dominant mode(s) of production, and a renewed emphasis on the relationship between states and capital interests, and thus between politics and economics.

These theoretical approaches obviously yield very different ideas regarding the nature and roles of middle powers from Grotian or interdependentist approaches. In the first place, they require a clear and quite profound differentiation between Northern (particularly Western) and Southern middle powers. As integral components
of the global capitalist centre, the leading classes of Western middle powers share a fundamental identity of interests with their counterparts in the major capitalist powers, such that middle power state formations may truly be viewed as "sub-imperial" or, more crudely, junior partners in global capitalism. Insofar as the leaders of Western middle powers periodically adopt relatively "progressive" or "enlightened" policies towards developing areas, these are likely to be both functional to the broader interests of "imperialism" and misleading to 'progressive forces' in these areas, by creating the ultimately-false impression that some capitalist forces are strongly committed to their rapid development, and perhaps even to fundamental reforms of the global capitalist system. Claims to be dedicated to (for example) a significant improvement in the development prospects of "the poorest people in the poorest countries", or real democracy in South Africa and other developing areas, are likely to be treated with deep skepticism -- largely because conceptions of "true" development and democracy will be quite different for radical theorists than they are for liberal democratic political leaders.

The position of Southern "middle powers" is increasingly ambiguous from a radical political economy perspective. In certain respects, the broad interests of such societies are fundamentally different from, and competitive with, those of Western capitalist states. Thus, the kinds of fundamental changes to the international economic system which many in such societies have advocated are likely to be resisted by "the West", including its middle powers. On the other hand, the position of most Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) amongst Southern middle powers on what is left of the NIEO debate has become increasingly "conservative", as "they seek to join not jeopardize the OECD nexus". And in relation to Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) -- the so-called "Fourth World" -- NIC states and national capitals frequently aspire to regional domination and profitable forms of "South-South exchange" which may be viewed from a neo-Marxist perspective as manifestations of "proto" or "second-tier imperialism".

Within Western middle powers specifically, Marxian theorists emphasize the
ways in which state personnel and policies relate to the ideology and interests of the
dominant capitalist classes, either as relatively direct instruments thereof (the
instrumental formulation), or as relatively autonomous actors concerned with
enhancing their own legitimacy as well as fostering capital accumulation (the
structural Marxist view). Thus, for example, they would stress the ways in which
even policies with developmental and humanitarian potential (development assistance
policies being the quintessential example) come to be used for the economic and
political gain of dominant class interests.

I would argue that there are elements of "truth" in each of these broad
theoretical perspectives. Each privileges different aspects of the complex reality of
contemporary international affairs, as well as reflecting different "world-views" and
normative preferences. In this latter sense, each perspective has some potential to
"create reality", insofar as it affects the thinking and behaviour of the increasingly
diverse range of players in the foreign policy "arena". We may therefore expect to
find some echoes of each in the case studies in this thesis.

5. Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Middle Power Internationalism

Nevertheless, the central concern of this dissertation is with the extent to
which, and the ways in which, "middle powers" may sometimes play a distinctive and
surprisingly active and important role in certain international issue areas -- in
particular, Southern Africa. Implicit in this concern are a number of theoretical
assumptions. It implies, for example, that the realist conception of autonomous state
decision-makers operating on the basis of narrowly conceived "national self-interests"
is ultimately an unconvincing oversimplification; and that, in particular conjunctures,
there is increasing room for non-great powers to make substantive contributions to
international management and change. It also implies that, while the interests of
dominant capitalist classes emphasized by radical theorists will be influential in the
foreign policy making process, these interests are not necessarily incompatible with
effective internationalist policies; nor do they preclude other societal groups, and broader values and ideas, from having a significant policy impact, notably within Western middle powers.

The question is, why would some middle-sized states aspire to more or less consistently play an active internationalist role -- or at least claim such a role for themselves? Traditional post-war Canadian ideas regarding middlepowermanship generally took the view that decisions to perform middle power roles were generally both impelled and enabled by international politico-strategic pressures, interests, and opportunities, operating on relatively autonomous state policy makers. These policy makers were simply responding to the exigencies of a dangerous international system (although their willingness and ability to do so were also functions of their personal characteristics). Yet, as Pratt's notion of humane internationalism and radical political economy approaches imply, foreign policy behaviour cannot be adequately accounted for without reference to both international economic and domestic factors: economically-based social forces, various NGOs and private corporations, and widely-held values and ideas. Thus, to explain the persistence of various forms of state behaviour which may be broadly categorized as "middle power internationalism", this behaviour must be located in terms of international political, global economic, and domestic societal pressures and opportunities operating on state decision makers.

A particularly useful approach to doing this is suggested in the theoretical work of Robert Cox. Cox reconceptualizes the problematique of international relations in terms of the relative stability and change of successive "world orders" -- that is, "the particular configuration of forces which successively define the problematic of war or peace for the ensemble of states". The shape of a given world order is determined in relation to, and in conjunction with, two other "spheres of activity": forms of state derived from various state/society complexes; and social forces (both national and transnational) generated by the process of production (see figure 1).
On this formulation, a particular state (understood as the institutional manifestation of a given state-society complex) is acted upon by, and must respond to, pressures emanating both from the existing world order (or international politico-strategic system); and from the internationalized process of production and the national and transnational class formations it produces. But various states will also have some influence on the shape of the world order, and on processes of production both within the state and beyond it. The degree of influence they exert in this regard will obviously vary greatly, and change over time. Thus, the most powerful states may, through a combination of superior force (usually held in reserve), widespread acceptance of their own dominant classes' conception of social/world order, and the fostering of institutions to administer that order with a semblance of universality,
create a hegemonic world order more or less in their own image.\textsuperscript{90}

Middle-sized states cannot realistically aspire to impose their own notions of the ideal order (should they have them) upon the international system, or even parts thereof. But some may choose to contribute to the building of a more orderly world system in a 'lapidary' fashion: "building from the bottom up, stone upon stone, a structure that grows out of the landscape".\textsuperscript{91}

Why do some middle powers -- and not others -- make such a choice? The answer lies in the particular configuration of their own "historical structure", or state-society complex, reflecting the interaction of their material capabilities and the social forces which emerge therefrom, their dominant values and ideas, and their institutional structures (notably those of the state itself).\textsuperscript{92} Clearly, dominant class and state interests in some such middle powers have perceived their own interests to be served by a relatively peaceful and stable world order, and a stable and open world economy. However, the motivation underlying an active internationalist foreign policy is not simply that it may be functional from the point of view of the society's dominant classes, and its state structures and leaders, to pursue a more peaceful and orderly international system: their immediate self-interests might also be pursued in more narrowly self-serving ways. Rather, the decision to pursue constructive internationalist policies reflects the combination of these interests with the assertion of certain basic and widely held societal values and ideas -- for example, the desirability of reducing injustice and gross inequality; the desirability of reducing the incidence of violent conflict; and the value of organizing social life on a more regularized, codified and (ideally) democratic basis.

In this way, active or constructive internationalism also serves the useful function of helping to legitimate the state in question both vis-a-vis the attentive "political classes" of its own civil society, and (by underpinning an "enlightened" reputation) within the international society of states. It is important to the long-term survival and stability of any state regime that it be perceived to "stand for" something -- some set of values and some constructive role within the wider world -- amongst a
reasonably broad cross-section of its own population, and amongst the widest possible range of international political and economic actors. For many states of medium power, the values and roles which have performed this legitimizing and consent-inducing function, providing the cultural/intellectual "glue" between the state and its civil society, have arguably included the "middle power idea" that they are well-suited to promote international peace and order, and the various roles by which this idea has been pursued.

Conceived in this sense, middle power internationalism will to some degree mask and obfuscate certain underlying political and economic interests and power relations, both within and beyond the state in question. If these underlying interests and inequalities are particularly blatant, and if the internationalist values and roles asserted are manifestly rhetorical and hollow, middle power internationalism may degenerate through moralizing and hyperbole to outright hypocrisy -- a kind of "false consciousness". However, if the ideas and values it encompasses are to be effective over the long term, both in bolstering state legitimacy and in helping to promote a more peaceful and prosperous world order, they must be substantially credible and "real". Various societal groups dedicated to internationalist ideas and policies (eg., NGOs, liberal churches, and some labour unions) may play an important role in ensuring that middle power internationalism is more real than false, both by pressuring state policy-makers to give substance to the state's professed values and roles, and by working to broaden the popular constituency for them. But it should also be noted that most state personnel (both political and bureaucratic) need to feel that the state (and thus they themselves) performs and embodies certain important collective roles and ideas, both at home and abroad. Although in middle-sized as other states, "public servants" concerned with foreign policy will often be preoccupied with bureaucratic political machinations, statist self-aggrandizement, or the servicing of powerful economic interests, the roles and ideas associated with middle power internationalism need to be "real" for them too, for purposes of their own motivation and legitimization.
The language used to capture various aspects of what we have termed middle power internationalism varies from country to country. Thus, for example, the language of "middlepowermanship" is quite familiar in Canada, while an Australian foreign minister recently talked of that country's interest in being, and being seen to be, a "good international citizen". Several European countries of medium power in global terms, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark, are more inclined to view themselves as "small states" in juxtaposition with their European neighbours, and to use the term "like-minded" to capture their internationalist tendencies and aspirations. And "Third World" states which have periodically aspired to play middle power roles, such as India, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela, have been more inclined to use the language of "Nonalignment" to capture and justify these forms of behaviour.

These variations in language reflect different emphases in the interpretation and implementation of their internationalist aspirations. Nevertheless, there are also substantial similarities in the ways in which these aspirations are manifested, reflecting the often-similar kinds of pressures and opportunities medium-sized states confront within the international political and economic environments. Functional leadership in appropriate specialized organizations and regimes, a fairly consistent concern with the amelioration of international conflict through mediation and peacekeeping, a preference for working within and/or building multilateral organizations and coalitions, some inclination to work towards the reform of international situations which are unequal or unjust and therefore unstable, and a tendency towards moralizing and hyperbole -- these are some of the persistent internationalist roles widely (though not exclusively) associated with a middle power world-view.

Clearly, some middle-sized states in "power" terms (see Table 1) will not manifest middle power ideas and roles in behavioural terms. The foreign policies of South Africa and Iran (to cite two conspicuous examples) have been driven by quite distinctive and "anti-social" (in international terms) values and ideas, and are
therefore the virtual antithesis of "orthodox" middle power internationalism -- although this may soon change. Furthermore, it must be re-emphasized that all middle powers are subject to a range of stimuli and pressures besides those associated with this set of roles and ideas. These emanate from both domestic and international economic and political environments, as well as from politics within the state itself. Thus, the tendency towards middle power internationalism will generally be only partially and intermittently decisive in policy terms.

It is likely that, given both the imperatives to assert the values and ideas associated with middle power internationalism, and pressures to pursue other, more narrow interests in the formulation of foreign policy, middle powers will be inclined to strongly assert (indulge?) their constructive internationalist tendencies in policy areas where more immediate and "concrete" economic and strategic interests are not pressing. For Australia, Canada and Sweden, Southern Africa might be seen in these terms. The fact that none of them has particularly strong direct economic or strategic interests engaged in the region clearly enabled them to be particularly active, outspoken, and "internationalist" in their policies toward it. The consequences of this situation for the credibility and effectiveness of these policies is a matter to be taken up in the empirical chapters of this thesis.

6. Conclusion

In this broad treatment of the historical development and theoretical underpinnings of ideas about middle powers, I have tried to suggest several things. First, the middle power category has manifested itself in two broad, recurrent senses through various phases of world history. The first is as a relatively egoistic assertion of a right to enhanced status, and of special capabilities and a degree of moral superiority. The second is as a behavioural concern, rooted in the interests and values of the national civil society, with helping to build and sustain a more stable and prosperous world order. These two senses of the middle power idea have often been present simultaneously in the statements and actions of middle-sized states.
Second, the latter, behavioural sense of the middle power idea in particular has typically subsumed a number of potential roles or forms of behaviour which would tend to induce an active concern with North-South issues generally, and Southern African issues specifically. For example, a functional interest and capacity in the area of development assistance, a concern to work within and strengthen multilateral organizations, and a concern to "build bridges" within international society and ameliorate international conflict where possible are among stereotypical middle power roles which would tend to stimulate an interest in these policy areas.

Third, not all states of medium power will be inclined to play all or any of these middle power roles; and amongst those that are, their consistency and determination in doing so will vary. The determinants of their inclination to play such roles emanate both from interests, constraints and opportunities in relation to the international political and economic environments, and also (decisively) from the assertion of important shared interests, values and ideas rooted in their civil societies. The assertion of these shared interests, values and ideas also serves the important purpose of enhancing the reputation of the state vis-a-vis both domestic and international society. Thus, a proper understanding of the persistence of middle power internationalism requires careful attention to a combination of international, transnational and domestic considerations.

The foregoing analysis explores the basis for a more or less consistent middle power aspiration to play a constructive internationalist role. However, it begs the question of the international effects and impact of policies driven, in part at least, by this aspiration: to what extent, in other words, are such aspirations likely to be fulfilled in practice? The capacity and inclination of Western middle powers such as Australia, Canada and Sweden to play a constructive internationalist role has been, and will continue to be, shaped largely by their shifting opportunities and vulnerabilities in relation to the rapidly changing international divisions of labour and power; by related changes in the role and autonomy of states as actors in international affairs; and by their changing relationship with, and possible decline in relation to,
Southern middle powers or "NICs". It is therefore to a discussion of these issues that we turn in chapter three.

NOTES


3. Holbraad, 42.


5. David Baldwin has usefully stressed the issue-specific nature of power or influence, and the fact that certain qualities or resources may be of value in one specific issue-area or "policy contingency framework", but not in others. This insight is important to an understanding of why and how small and middle-sized states sometimes have a degree of importance in international affairs which belies their relative overall lack of "structural power". See David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies", World Politics 31 (2), January 1979.


8. John W. Holmes, "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?", in Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: CIIA, 1966), 16.
9. For more extensive treatments of middle power thinking and activity prior to World War II see, in particular, Holbraad, chapters 1 and 2; and Bernard Wood, The Middle Powers and the General Interest (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988), 5-9. See also Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order, International Journal 44 (4), Autumn 1989, 825-827. This sub-section is largely based on information and analysis contained in these sources.

10. The European contexts in which various middle power ideas arose were the Renaissance Italian city-state system; the era of the Congress of Vienna, during which Spain, Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands were periodically associated with second-tier positions in the state system; the German Confederation, wherein Hanover, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were accorded intermediate status, and the post-Crimean War period, in which Italy and the Ottoman Empire occupied an ambiguous intermediate position.

11. See Wood, 1988, 5-9; and Holbraad, 54.


14. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson referred to Canada as "the stern daughter of the voice of God", in reaction to Canadians' tendency to "see themselves as the self-appointed conscience of the world". See Bernard Wood, "Peace in our Time? A Canadian Agenda into the 1990s", Chief Executive Officer's Annual Statement for 1989-90, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1 (pre-publication version).


17. These men (as they all were) included Lester Pearson, John Holmes, Hume Wrong, and Escott Reid. See Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984), 3; Denis Stairs, "Present in Moderation: Lester Pearson and the Craft of Diplomacy", International Journal 29 (1), Winter 1983-84; and Stairs, "The Pedagogics of John W. Holmes", in Kim Richard Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Paradox (Toronto: CIIA, 1982). It is argued in section 4 of this chapter that their "liberal-internationalist" political philosophy was closely related to the "Grotian" idea of the international system as a "society" of states.
18. In international economic terms, Canada was, during this period, truly a major power, surpassed in aggregate terms only by the United States and a few war weary European states.


22. Holmes, for example, argued that "...insofar as it can be worked, the middle powers made the UN work." "Canada and the Crisis of Middle Powers", in Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 35.


25. Holbraad, 58.


27. See Higgott and Cooper. Besides Australia, the Cairns Group membership includes a number of traditional middle power "candidates" - e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, and Hungary.

28. The "middle power as intermediary" idea was particularly popular among Canadians, partly due to Churchill's description of Canada in 1941 as "the linchpin of the English-speaking world" in reference to its role as a channel of communication between the still-neutral US and Britain from 1939-41. See Blair Fraser, "Canada: Mediator or Busybody?", in Canada's Role as a Middle Power, 5-6.


31. Holbraad, 72.

32. See Paul Painchaud, "Middlepowermanship as an Ideology", in Canada's Role as a Middle Power.

33. See, for example, the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, The Role of Middle Powers in World Politics (Bonn, 1969); Holbraad, 72-74; and Wood, 1988, 19.


36. Cited in Nossal, 12. Trudeau’s argument was no doubt underpinned by the real relative decline in Canadian economic strength from the artificially lofty heights of the immediate post-war years.

37. See Hawes; and Cox, 1989, 824-825.

38. Three of the four are collaborative projects. In the "Middle Powers in the International System" project of Ottawa's North-South Institute, see Wood, The Middle Powers and the General Interest, 1988; Jock A. Finlayson, Limits on Middle Power Diplomacy: the Case of Commodities (Ottawa: NSI, 1988); and David Protheroe, The United Nations and its Finances: A Test for Middle Powers (Ottawa: NSI, 1988). In the Middle Powers and Global Poverty Project, directed by the University of Toronto’s Cranford Pratt, see Pratt, ed., Internationalism Under Strain (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Olav Stokke, ed., Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989); Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism, 1990; and Gerald K. Helleiner, ed., The Other Side of International Development Policy, the Non-Aid Economic Relations with Developing Countries of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: U of T Press, 1990). The third collaborative project, undertaken by Richard Higgott, Andrew Cooper, and Kim Nossal, concentrates on comparative analyses of Australian and Canadian foreign policy. Its central theoretical ideas are contained in Higgott and Cooper's "Middle Power Leadership in the International Order: A Reformulated Theory for the 1990s"; a collaborative volume is forthcoming. The fourth contemporary example of middle power investigation is Robert Cox’s 1989 article in the International Journal, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order". Interestingly, in all four examples, Canadians are principal investigators.

39. Wood’s conceptual approach is usefully expanded upon in his contribution to "the Middle Powers and Global Poverty" project, "Towards North-South Middle
Power Coalitions" (1990).

40. Wood, 1988, vii; see also Protheroe and Finlayson, cited above.


43. see, in particular, Protheroe’s study of Middle Powers and UN Finances; as well as Wood, 1990, 78-85.

44. Cox, 1989, 827 and 825.

45. Cox, 1989, 826.


47. Cox, 1989, 827.


51. Pratt, "Middle Power Internationalism and Global Poverty", in Middle Power Internationalism, 16-17.

52. Pratt, "Humane Internationalism:... ", 11-12. The five countries on which the project focuses are: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.


57. Some of these issues are also treated in the Middle Powers and Global Poverty project, particularly in terms of the effects of changing international processes and structures of production and trade, in Raphael Kaplinsky’s rich chapter on "Technological Revolution and the Restructuring of Trade and Production: Some
Implications for the Western Middle Powers and the Newly Industrializing Countries", in Middle Power Internationalism.


59. Cooper and Higgott, "Middle Power Leadership in the International Order...", 10.

60. At the time this thesis was being prepared, these studies were still in the process of being revised for publication, and had been read by the author mainly in the form of conference papers.


62. For brief but useful discussions of some of the concepts and problems associated with power and power analysis, see Wood, 1988, 12-17; and Nossal, 17-25.


65. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1977), 24-25; and Wood, 1990, 86.


68. Thakur, 15.

70. Wood, 1988, 18.


72. See Pratt, "Middle Power Internationalism and Global Poverty", 12.

73. See Krasner, *Structural Conflict*.

74. See, for example, Wood, 1990, 88-89.


77. Bull, 27.

78. Stairs, "Present in Moderation: Lester Pearson and the Craft of Diplomacy", 152.


80. Although they never overestimated the capacity and autonomy of the U.N. Holmes, for example, viewed it as a mechanism for institutionalizing the process of conflict resolution, rather than an end in itself: "not... a replacement for the balance of power, but a place in which power can be balanced or mustered more soberly."

81. Keohane and Nye, 24-25.

82. Keohane and Nye, 30-36.

83. Concerning internal cleavages and contradictions, Wood asserts that, "Well over half the members of the middle power group (no matter their particular political dispensation) have domestic political divisions - of ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional, ideological, economic, and other kinds - sufficiently serious to constitute inhibiting preoccupations and sometimes specific vulnerabilities in their international dealings." Wood, 1990, 92.


85. Pioneering work on this concept was done by Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialized Countries and Industrialization in Developing Countries, trans. by Pete Burgess (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). As discussed in chapter three, this "new" international division of labour continues to change quickly: a "neo-NIDL" (?!).


89. Cox, 1986, 220.


93. Evans, "Australia's Place in the World", 527.
In chapter two, I sought to establish, in historical and theoretical terms, the basis upon which certain middle-sized states have, with varying degrees of consistency, aspired to pursue "active" or "constructive" internationalist foreign policies. While both international pressures and opportunities, on the one hand, and domestic interests, values and ideas, on the other, were reckoned to have influenced such state aspirations, emphasis was placed on the decisive influence of the latter (domestic) considerations. In concluding, however, a distinction was made between the rhetorical aspiration to adopt such an internationalist posture, and the practical effect, in policy terms, which such aspirations have been given. Insofar as these aspirations have been effectively pursued by some middle-sized states during the post-World War II era, their capacity and interest in doing so has to be understood in relation to their changing structural constraints and opportunities within the global order, in both its economic and strategic dimensions.

Western middle powers such as Australia, Canada and Sweden, with all contemporary states, developed the main lines of their post-war foreign policies in the context of a global order distinguished by two dominant and interrelated features. The first of these, in the politico-strategic sphere, was the East-West Cold War; the second, in the politico-economic sphere, was the so-called "liberal international economic order" (LIEO). This global order, and in particular the LIEO, was basically hospitable to the broad interests of Western middle powers. Among such states, it gave rise to both an interest in, and (by underpinning their unprecedented post-war prosperity) the means to, work for its survival, expansion and adaptation.

The dramatic developments of 1989 and beyond, in Europe, the Soviet Union, Southern Africa, etc., signalled profound changes in the post-war global order. The roots of these changes, however, are much longer: indeed, they have been gathering momentum since 1974-75. They have created, and are continuing to create, a
substantially altered global structural context, re-shaping the foreign policy constraints and opportunities confronting all states. They certainly raise important questions regarding the continued capacity and inclination of Western middle powers to pursue active and effective internationalist policies, as well as the nature and content of those policies.

In order to assess the impact (actual and prospective) of the changing global order on the foreign policies of these states, we must first outline the structural position of Western middle powers in the post-war order during which their internationalist reputations and, to a significant degree, behavioural patterns were established. Why and how was it conducive to these developments? As some of these factors, particularly in the politico-strategic sphere, have already been discussed in chapter 2, emphasis will be placed on the politico-economic factors associated with the LIEO.

With this background, some of the central contemporary changes in the global political economy, gathering momentum since the mid-1970s, will be reviewed. Some of the resultant cumulative tendencies and tensions for Western middle powers will be noted. The possible effects of these tendencies and tensions on the internationalist dimensions of their foreign policies will be addressed.

Next, the impact of global change on the domestic coherence and legitimacy of nation-states -- the ways in which global change is linked to domestic disaffection with, and challenges to, the middle-sized state in particular -- will be discussed. Here too, some implications for middle power foreign policies will be considered.

Finally, the changing relative roles and significance of Western middle powers and Southern middle powers/NICs in the global political economy will be considered. Specific reference will be made to the African policies of two of the more conspicuous Southern "middle powers" -- Brazil and India. Assuming such states continue to gain international economic and political importance, how may Western middle powers be affected?

During a period which Cooper and Higgott have described as "an interregnum
in which an old order is undergoing a process of change into an as yet to be defined new one," it is impossible to predict how the changing global order will finally affect the international capabilities and behaviour of Western middle powers. In general, the impact of these changes is ambiguous: they create both new obstacles and new opportunities for creative and effective middle power internationalism. As befits a diverse and amorphous category of states, the responses of various middle powers to these obstacles and opportunities will certainly vary, depending largely on their political leadership and on the broader characteristics and responses of their civil societies in relation to the changing world order. Some "traditional" middle powers are likely to decline in prominence, while new actors will increasingly emerge to play some of the roles which have been associated with the middle power category. Here, it is appropriate only to raise various possibilities -- both positive and negative -- regarding the future relevance and content of middle power internationalism among medium-sized Western states.

1. Western Middle Powers in the Era of the Pax Americana

In chapter two, John Holmes's argument that the Cold War "made" the distinctive post-war middle power role, in its popular mediatory sense, was noted. The political, ideological, and strategic stalemate between hostile Eastern and Western blocs, each led by a superpower with overwhelming destructive capabilities, created both opportunities and incentives for the foreign policy practitioners of reasonably capable and credible middle-sized states to undertake various activities designed to mitigate "...political tensions and military conflicts (they) feared would spark a Third World War". These included various forms of mediation and bridge-building, peacekeeping, and efforts to constrain super and great powers through international organizations. They tended not to be open to larger (declining "great") powers laden with colonial and war-time baggage; while they often required a degree of stature and capability which inhibited their performance by smaller and "weaker" states.

What was not so clearly recognized at this time, however, was the extent to
which internationalist roles, amongst Western middle powers in particular, were also "made" by the liberal international economic order. The political significance of this order was for many years widely overlooked by mainstream analysts of international relations for several reasons, including the fact that the LIEO itself rested on and propagated the liberal ideological assumption that economics and politics could and should be largely separated, with the former managed according to social scientific criteria of efficiency. The problematique of the international economy was ideally viewed as primarily managerial rather than political, and thus beyond the ambit of foreign policy analysts and practitioners.

In fact, the LIEO was a deeply political construct, largely shaped and underwritten by American power, interests, and ideas. Cox refers to the period between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s as the Pax Americana, denoting a global order characterized by US "hegemony". In the strategic sphere, this order featured the creation of a network of US-guaranteed alliances in the non-Communist world designed to contain the Soviet Union and its allies ("global communism"). In the economic sphere, American hegemony underpinned the ideas and institutions at the heart of the post-war liberal international economy. The pursuit of multilateral free trade, regulated (‘depoliticized’) to the greatest extent possible on a legal-codified basis and facilitated and stabilized by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the GATT, were its hallmarks.

Although this LIEO reflected American ideas and rested on American economic strength and guarantees more than it did those of any other state(s), it nevertheless enjoyed considerable international support, particularly among advanced capitalist countries, based fundamentally on their governments’ calculations of their own broad "national interests". No category of states was more generally supportive of this international economic order than were developed capitalist (Western) middle powers. As a group, they tended (of necessity) to be strongly trade-dependent and highly specialized in economic terms. Thus, they were disproportionately vulnerable to outbreaks of mercantilistic protectionism amongst
larger and more self-contained states, and virtually devoid individually of economic leverage with which to counter such outbreaks. Consequently, an open, non-discriminatory, liberal international economic order, regularized and institutionalized to the greatest extent possible was, on the whole, their ideal scenario. Peter Katzenstein, writing about what he terms "small European states" which are, in global terms, middle powers asserts: "It is overstating the point only a little to argue that for ...(these) states international liberalization is ersatz patriotism".\textsuperscript{11}

The routes by which various Western middle powers became supporters of the post-war international regimes for trade and money differed, depending on their own historic patterns of economic development. Katzenstein's small European states -- including Sweden -- were probably the most historically unambiguous supporters of these regimes. By the time the post-war economic order was conceived, these states had long had political economies which were firmly internationally-oriented, with relatively low levels of tariff protection, high levels of exports and export specialization, and high degrees of import dependence.\textsuperscript{12}

The positions of Australia and Canada were less straightforward. Although these young states were strongly dependent on exports of their abundant primary resources, both had adopted strongly protectionist policies in their formative years designed to foster the growth of manufacturing industries on an import substitution basis. They had been severely affected by the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, and were therefore strongly supportive of regimes designed to preclude a resurgence of the disastrous protectionism of this period. Australia and Canada thus became active supporters, or "first followers", of the LIEO, although they continued to maintain higher tariff levels than most industrialized countries.\textsuperscript{13}

In sum, the governments of Western middle powers perceived the principles and institutions of the post-war economic order as serving their interests well. They therefore saw themselves as having a major stake in its survival and integrity. They, and their citizens, became actively involved in the institutions of this order, and in working for its reform and adaptation as it became subject to new strains and
pressures, particularly emanating from the emergent Third World.

The structurally-determined interest of Western middle powers in the LIEO clearly buttressed the "active internationalism" discussed in chapter 2. In the first place, as suggested above, it directly stimulated their active involvement in the institutions and regimes of this order -- a prime example of the multilateralism associated with the notion of middle power internationalism. Katzenstein noted in 1985 that citizens of the "small European states" had occupied the leading positions in the GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for more than half the time since the end of World War II. And as various trade restrictions (both visible and invisible) spread in the 1970s, they "could be counted among the persistent champions of a liberal international trade regime".\(^{14}\) In a similar vein, Higgott and Cooper argue that:

> When US actions in the late 1960s to increase the sales of its own produce threatened to destabilise the pricing agreement established under the International Grains Agreement (IGA)..., both Canada and Australia took on a greater burden of responsibility in an attempt to ward off total collapse of the system.\(^{15}\)

It doubtless often suited the US in particular to have the institutions and regimes of the LIEO led and defended by citizens of Western middle powers, thereby partially obscuring its own pre-eminent position therein. Nevertheless, the active involvement of the latter in these institutions and regimes was also a clear manifestation of their own direct and distinct structural interests.

In the second place, as noted by Katzenstein and others, there was an essential connection between an interest in maintaining a stable, liberal international economic order and efforts, emphasized by Holmes and others, to prevent or contain international conflict in an atmosphere of Cold War (i.e., between their concrete interests in the spheres of world order and of production, in Cox’s terms).\(^{16}\) One of the first casualties of a major international conflict would have been the relatively stable and open economic structures of the LIEO. Consequently, even if Western middle powers were able to avoid direct (military) involvement in such a conflict,
their broad economic interests and prosperity would have been severely impaired. Thus, their long-term economic and strategic interests were strongly interlinked.

Likewise, the means by which these twinned interests could be most effectively pursued were perceived to be essentially the same: the strengthening of international organizations designed to pre-empt or contain international disputes, and offering middle-sized and small states greater opportunity to affect the course of international affairs, whether economic or political. Thus it is not surprising that, as with the international economic institutions of the LIEO, leadership positions in such political/functional organizations as the U.N. and the Commonwealth were often filled by nationals of Western middle powers; nor is it surprising that their citizens played crucial roles in the conception and implementation of international peacekeeping operations. In both cases, these roles helped to preserve and stabilize an international order which was essentially hospitable to their states' and civil societies' political and economic interests.

A third, indirect but related, way in which the structural interests of Western middle powers in the LIEO (and in international political organizations) underpinned patterns of active internationalism was by nurturing habits, traditions and skills in the area of multilateral cooperation. As their practical experience with multilateral institutions and regimes grew, statesmen from these countries developed confidence in their ability to operate effectively within them; while their "attentive publics" found the notion that their countries were particularly good at multilateral diplomacy appealing. Multilateralism often became part of the "ideology" of their respective foreign policy traditions, encouraging in citizens of these states a tendency to conceive of solutions to international problems in multilateral terms. More controversially, it may be argued that this commitment to multilateralism at times became a convenient crutch for statespersons seeking to avoid difficult and controversial foreign policy decisions by arguing that smaller/middle-sized states could only act "effectively" on a multilateral basis.

Finally, the LIEO facilitated the development of active internationalism
amongst Western middle powers by underpinning their unprecedented post-war prosperity. The aggregate wealth and technological capabilities they developed during the post-war era were both comparatively abundant in global terms, and surplus to any reasonable definition of their domestic requirements. Western middle powers were thus enabled and encouraged to undertake quite "generous" and often unprecedented international commitments: voluntary financial support to functional multilateral organizations; observation and peacekeeping operations in international 'trouble spots'; and relatively large programmes of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Australia, Canada and Sweden in particular arguably had a head start in developing such "generous" internationalist policies and commitments, since each had emerged from World War II in relatively good financial and infrastructural condition (the first two due to their geographic isolation, and Sweden due to its successful neutrality).

Regarding ODA in particular, Western middle powers as a group generally came to devote a significantly larger percentage of national resources to development assistance, and to maintain aid programmes of significantly higher "quality", than larger industrialized states. The LIEO can be reckoned to have helped stimulate these tendencies in two ways: by underpinning the strong economic performances which gave them the means to develop such programmes; and by giving them a strong interest in ameliorating what Krasner has termed the "structural conflict" threatening the continued viability of this order. As Katzenstein bluntly puts it: "This (ODA) generosity betokens the unwillingness of the small European states to see the basic structure of the international economy disrupted by fundamental conflict between poor and rich states". Explaining the post-war development of middle power development assistance programmes solely on the basis of international structural factors is incomplete and inadequate. It does not explain the significant differences in the content and character of programmes; nor does it explain the fact that certain Western middle powers (notably Switzerland and Austria) have consistently devoted relatively small
percentages of GDP to aid. More complete explanations require the factoring in of the domestic context: the influence of various organized interests, values and ideas within the civil society in question, and within the structures of the state itself.\textsuperscript{21} Nevertheless, the development and importance of this foreign policy innovation (i.e. ODA) in the post-war internationalism of Western middle powers cannot be understood without reference to their structural interests and capabilities vis-a-vis the LIEO.

Likewise, the broader development and character of (Western) middle power internationalism in the era of the \textit{Pax Americana} was underpinned and shaped by such structurally-determined interests and capabilities. They were, in other words, a necessary though not sufficient condition for the emergence of these internationalist roles. How has Western middle power internationalism been affected by the various changes which have been under way in the international political economy since the mid-1970s?

\section{The Decline of the \textit{Pax Americana}: Implications for Western Middle Powers}

The causes of the (apparent) decline in US hegemony over the course of the post-war era, and its implications for the international political economy, are numerous, complex and controversial.\textsuperscript{22} To a substantial degree, the relative decline of American power (on which its hegemony ultimately rested) was historically inevitable. Its overwhelming post-war preponderance of economic and strategic power was an aberration, bound to be eroded as Western Europe and Japan recovered from war-time devastation, and as certain emergent Third World states asserted increasing control over key strategic resources (above all oil). Beyond this, there was a diffusion of power amongst various social forces within key states in both the developed and developing worlds, which loosened the foundations of the post-war order.\textsuperscript{23} It is also clear that America’s decline -- both real and perceived -- resulted in part from misplaced (sometimes disastrously so) policy decisions and actions by the US. Indeed, some have argued that the "decline" in American hegemony relates less
to any real erosion of its structural preponderance of power, than to the fact that it has misused, or been irresponsible with, that power.\textsuperscript{24}

In yet another sense, however, certain of the most important changes altering the relative capabilities and options of the US, and of all other states in the international system, over the course of the post-war period were built into the very design of the Pax Americana itself. The principles and regimes on which it was based set in motion profound processes of change in the organization of both global economic and political relations. Over time, these processes undermined the order which spawned them, and set the stage for the emergence of new patterns of global relations, with as yet-unresolved implications for Western middle powers. Two such processes stand out: the internationalization or globalisation of production, leading to the emergence of the so-called New International Division of Labour (NIDL); and the related internationalization of the state.

2.1 The Internationalization of Production:

The regimes for trade and money established in the early years of the Pax Americana were based on an exchange model of the international economy, featuring free trade among relatively discrete national economies on the basis of comparative advantage. By significantly increasing the ease and security with which goods, capital, and knowledge flowed across international boundaries, however, these regimes combined with the competitive spread of standardized systems and technologies of production to transform the structure of the international economy from one dominated by international exchange to one increasingly dominated by global/transnational production.\textsuperscript{25} In this new international division of labour, increasingly mobile capital and technology, largely controlled by transnational (versus national) corporations and financial interests, became ever more potent sources of both direct and structural power (i.e., the ability to organize the environment in which the exercise of direct power takes place). Disaggregated production processes were increasingly located in several different countries so as to minimize overall costs, with location determined by such considerations as local labour costs and the "business
climate" created by the host government. According to Higgott, whereas 'arms-length inter-country exchanges are characteristic of the international economy...(i)nter-corporate exchanges become more important in the world economy'.

These developments have had contradictory effects on the power and roles of states in the making of national and international economic policy. On the one hand, all states (North and South) face increased challenges and responsibilities in managing the process of adjustment to the vicissitudes of this globalised economy. There is, in fact, a difficult process of "mutual structural adjustment" at work. On the other hand, given the steady accretion of economic power to transnational capital interests, the capability/power of states to meet these expanded challenges and responsibilities has arguably declined, "at least insofar as that power might represent the enacted capacity to enhance national autonomy of decision making or to negotiate the terms of national participation in the international division of labour".

In a related development, the constellation of social forces with which states must deal in working out their policies towards the changing global economy has become increasingly complex. To begin with, global production processes have encouraged the development of transnational social forces. Most impressive has been the development of what Cox terms the "transnational managerial class" which has gained strength, coherence and ideological influence in the context of the NIDL. At the other end of the class continuum, even as (indeed because) labour processes have become increasingly integrated and globalised through the disaggregation of production processes, the expansion of migrant labour, etc., Cox argues convincingly that "industrial workers and other subordinate classes have become (more) fragmented and divided".

These transnational social formations have been overlaid onto older national class interests and organizations, with the latter often having quite different (and increasingly defensive) concerns and agendas. In addition, a variety of nationally-based but often globally-oriented coalitions of what may be categorized as dissenters
from prevailing power structures have emerged and, in several cases, gathered strength: environmental groups, peace movements, NGOs concerned with international development, some church groups, women’s organizations, anti-poverty groups, etc. This incomplete listing of some of the extant and emergent social forces and organizations at least partly associated with the emergence of the NIDL indicates the great difficulties states face in accommodating (or choosing not to accommodate, depending on their strategy) the various components of their civil societies -- another dimension of the challenge of adjusting to the NIDL. Indeed, it is clear that state structures themselves have often been deeply internally divided in their responses to this challenge, depending on the components of the civil society to which the state organs in question are best connected and/or most beholden. These rising and multiplying social divisions have important implications for the coherence and legitimacy of national states which are explored in section three of this chapter.

How has the emergence of the NIDL impacted upon middle-sized Western states in particular? In broad terms, it has increased both the fact and the perception of increasing economic vulnerability and dislocation within these states. In objective terms, the highly-internationalized and trade-dependent Western middle powers have collectively lost market share in global industrial exports and employment to a rising elite of relatively low-cost ‘Third World’ NICs, and are, on the other hand, vulnerable to ‘side-swiping’ by larger industrialized states responding defensively to competitive pressures from the NICs and from each other. In subjective/perceptual terms, they lack the collective confidence of larger Western powers derived from their undeniable clout in the global political economy; while their sense of vulnerability as a very wealthy group of states is doubtless increased by an acute awareness of the amount they have to lose in relation to rising NICs.

It is important to note, however, that the global economy is continuing to change, particularly due to the impact of new systems and technologies of production. Raphael Kaplinsky has argued that the Fordist systems of mass production on which the NIDL was based, which he terms "machinofacture", are being superceded by a
new, more flexible and integrated production paradigm labelled "systemofacture". The implications of this new paradigm are wide-ranging, though uncertain. Its labour displacing characteristics, for example, are likely (in Kaplinsky’s view) to have a negative impact on the liberality of the international trade regime in the years ahead; while the new social relations of production it requires (involving the return of substantial decision-making responsibility and autonomy to workers) may result in its relatively rapid adoption by the more corporatist of Western middle powers, and a fillip to their economic competitiveness. The general point which needs to be made is that the "new" international division of labour is continuing to evolve rapidly, and that the global economy is continuing to produce both new challenges and opportunities for Western middle powers: their absolute structural decline is not inevitable, although their relative weight is likely to continue to recede.

How might the challenges and opportunities of this changing global economy affect the foreign policies of Western middle powers? A sense of vulnerability and dislocation may produce more reserved and defensive policies, as middle-sized forms of state (i.e. state-society complexes) become preoccupied with the divisive internal effects of economic change, and/or increasingly withdraw into traditional alliances or regional trading blocs. Alternatively, it may spark creative and innovative internationalist policies, as middle powers seek to meet the challenges of global economic change by promoting new collective responses. In Toynbee’s terms, stringent contemporary challenges may produce creative responses, resulting in the adaptation and "growth" of the community in question; or they may be too stiff, causing stasis and perhaps even "breakdown". The character (i.e., creative or defensive) of a particular state’s response to such challenges will likely be mixed, but its dominant tendency will in large measure depend on its success in building a consensus and marshalling resources within its civil society -- and on the nature of the consensus it is able to secure. This raises the question of the impact of global structural change on societal coherence and state legitimacy, to which we will turn in section three.
2.2 The Internationalization of the State:

Paralleling the internationalization or globalisation of production in the economic sphere during and since the Pax Americana was what Cox has termed the internationalization of the state in the political sphere. He describes it as:

the global process whereby national policies and practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international production. Through this process the nation state becomes part of a larger and more complex political structure that is the counterpart to international production.\(^\text{35}\)

In tandem with developments in the global economy, this political process of internationalization developed a momentum which has taken it far beyond its original conception. It now seems to be leading to the growing integration of many post-war nation-states within much larger political-economic "communities" (pre-eminently the EC), in turn contributing to the development of a substantially altered global order.

In the initial, "Bretton Woods" stage of this process, conceived in the 1940s and finally implemented in the late-1950s, internationalization involved a fairly modest compromise of national sovereignty in which governments (especially debtor ones) became accountable to international economic institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT), as well as to domestic electorates concerned with national economic performance and welfare.\(^\text{37}\) At a time when the dominant assumption was that liberal international economic exchange in the context of a stable world economy was a positive sum proposition for all participants such a compromise seemed entirely reasonable, particularly since states' capacity to fulfill the aspirations of their civil societies were presumed to be enhanced in the process. Insofar as these ideological assumptions and their policy implications came to be shared by state policy-makers through processes of consensus formation and osmosis, the internationalizing pressures on the state can be said to have also been "internalized" amongst many such policy-makers.\(^\text{38}\) These processes of consensus-formation and internalization were, and have remained, particularly strong amongst advanced capitalist countries\(^\text{39}\); the internationalization of the state has generally been a more coercive and externally-driven process for most Third World states, and has become more so with the onset
of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment policies and programmes (SAPs).

With the growth of global markets and production processes on the one hand and the onset of the prolonged world economic crisis and relative American decline from the mid-1970s on the other, the process of state internationalization both accelerated and became more ambiguous, as major states hedged their bets through the introduction of new forms of non-tariff trade restrictions and "strategic trade policies". The result of these somewhat contradictory developments is that state internationalization has increasingly been regionalized. Setting the pace has been the European Community. This organization, framed originally (interestingly enough) with the pre-eminent goal of keeping the peace in Western Europe, now seems to be evolving rapidly towards a fully integrated economy and (less certainly) political community. This process involves unprecedented compromises of the national sovereignty of the Westphalian state system. It is a process which may ultimately be further fuelled (but also could be threatened) by the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, with many economically-backward ex-Soviet satellites angling to attach themselves to the "common European home".

The spectre of a European "super-state" has sharply stimulated regionalising tendencies in other areas of the globe. The 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement is likely to become a continental free trade area including Mexico; and with George Bush mooting the notion of a hemispheric economic zone, may well become the core of an economic community of the Americas. In the Asia-Pacific region formal internationalization is not as advanced, but the development of a vibrant, integrated regional economy led by Japan (indeed, the most dynamic regional economy in the world) is underpinning the development of new regional organizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group, "which could ultimately provide the institutional framework for an Asian Economic Community". And in various regions of the Third World -- notably Southern Africa -- alarm over this growing trend towards Northern-dominated regional blocs is fuelling problematic but nevertheless promising efforts to expand regional macro-economic coordination and
harmonisation through inter-governmental organizations like SADCC, and has even sparked talk of regional political union(s). 42

Indeed, one of the most popular predictions amongst analysts seeking to divine the future shape of the global order is a world system consolidated into regional economic/political blocs. 43 Yet even amongst advocates of this view, few predict that this will be an unambiguous and exclusivist development: the globalisation of the economy is now so far advanced that a full-scale retreat into regional blocs would be extremely costly. More common are predictions of "managed and balanced" -- but still extensive -- exchange between blocs 44. And the pre-eminent institutions of the international economy -- the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT -- are far from obsolete, as indicated by the extraordinary, though crisis-ridden, efforts which have been made to revitalize and expand the scope of the multilateral trading system through the Uruguay Round of the GATT.

It is also essential to note that contemporary internationalizing/transnationalizing pressures on the state are by no means exclusively economic. Most conspicuously, environmental concerns have emerged as politically pressing and unambiguously transnational challenges facing the world’s political leaders and institutions. In addition, "cosmopolitan" issues of human rights, democracy, common security, etc. have increased in political salience and can no longer be treated as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of sovereign states. Both international and non-governmental organizations now make it their business to organize and exert real pressure on the world’s governments to meet global standards and join global enterprises to advance these causes -- not least in relation to South and Southern Africa.

The implications of these internationalising pressures for the foreign policies of middle-sized Western states are more ambiguous than they might at first appear. Assuming the global order is increasingly structured in terms of regional blocs (a safe but not certain prediction), one might presume that middle powers will increasingly have to compromise, if not completely surrender, their foreign policy prerogatives
and initiative to supranational organizations and/or dominant regional power(s). Particularly in Europe, even the traditional neutrals of the EFTA -- notably Sweden, in which the decision to stand aside from the main economic and strategic blocs of the post-war era was a major stimulant to its active and "progressive" post-war foreign policy -- are now lining up to join the EC colossus, presumably necessitating significant new compromises in their external relations.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, Kaplinsky concludes that:

These first-order regionalizing effects -- with their geo-strategic political alliances -- are likely to be the primary factors determining the external relations of individual middle powers. The political power of the "humane" lobbies in these countries, which were supported by sympathetic constituencies in the open period of the mature machinofacture era, is unlikely to be able to exercise the same influence over external relations following the regionalization of the early systemofacture period.\textsuperscript{46}

Under such circumstances, internationalist roles might increasingly fall to rising Southern states, not so tightly integrated with the cores of the respective regional blocs as Western middle powers and therefore better able to mediate between developed regional cores and Southern peripheries. This possibility is addressed in section four below.

On the other hand, pre-existing nation-states have not yet withered away (with the spectacular exception of East Germany), and are not likely to (at least formally) for some time to come. National governments, perhaps especially in the vulnerable middle powers, will likely be at pains to assert their continued relevance and distinctiveness in the context of increasingly complex regional/international organizational structures, in order to justify their continued existence. One of the ways in which they are likely to seek to do this is through the pursuit of a high foreign policy profile, perhaps most appealingly asserted on "cosmopolitan" issues such as the environment, human rights, democratic development, etc. There would be nothing particularly new in this for Western middle powers: Canadian efforts to carve out a "leading" role on Southern African issues in the 1980s, to cite one relevant example, can be at least partly seen as an attempt to distinguish Canada in the eyes of the international community from the US Administration in particular, and
its traditional Western allies more generally, even as it has drawn closer to those allies on many economic issues (notably through the Free Trade Agreement and the G-7).

In addition, it is significant that even the most advanced example of the internationalization of the state -- the EC -- remains firmly inter-governmental, at least at the present time. So long as this remains the case, it allows the smaller European states (i.e. European middle powers) to build shifting coalitions -- a skill with which they have developed some proficiency -- thereby retaining the potential to exert substantial policy influence within one of the main global actors of the late twentieth century. Such states can, in other words, actually multiply their international influence under propitious circumstances. Similarly, it may be that the addition of Mexico to a North American trade zone could actually allow Canada and Mexico in combination to exert a greater degree of influence with the United States than either could do singly, if they approach such a situation with creativity and imagination. These observations say nothing about how these middle powers might use these new sources of influence, of course: they merely suggest that the compromises involved in these particular processes of internationalization are double-edged, furnishing new opportunities as well as constraints. Also, the form which the new institutional structures take -- inter-governmental vs. supranational -- is very important in shaping the future policy options and opportunities of smaller and middle-sized community members.

In the final analysis, however, the opportunity to exert significant foreign policy influence, sometimes in important new ways, is of no consequence if the middle power in question has nothing distinctive to contribute -- i.e., if the process of ideological osmosis with bloc norms is so pervasive that policy-makers lose the ability to think for themselves; or if the particular state formation in question is so weak and internally-divided that it is unable to assert a substantial and effective presence within regional and global communities. This leads us, once again, to the issue of the impact of changing global conditions on the coherence and legitimacy of the middle-
sized state.

3. The Impact of Global Change on Societal Coherence and State Legitimacy

The previous section makes clear that state sovereignty, in Western middle powers and elsewhere, has been increasingly compromised from above. Both the strengthening of transnational capital interests and markets inherent in the globalisation of production, and the increasing influence of regional and international economic/political organizations associated with the internationalization of the state demand more of individual states' energy and attention, often at the expense of their perceived responsiveness to pressures emanating from within their own civil societies. If, as it is often and widely said, politicians are perceived to be increasingly remote from, and unresponsive to, their constituents, at least part of the explanation lies in the fact that the states they presume to govern are responding more and more routinely to pressures emanating from beyond their borders. This is bound to contribute to an erosion of the legitimacy of state structures and processes among their citizens.

But in addition, as noted in section 2.1, these pressures from above have contributed to the fragmentation and proliferation of social forces within various civil societies. With the ending of the 'Golden Age' growth phase of the world economy from 1974-75, the various social contracts which had sustained advanced capitalist countries through this era -- what Cox terms the "neoliberal historic bloc" -- began to disintegrate. The civil societies with which states have subsequently interacted have been increasingly divided and incoherent.

The globalisation of production has, it was noted, led to the emergence of transnational social forces, overlaid upon older national social classes and organizations. There has, in other words, been both a multiplication and a division of existing social forces within national forms of state. At the apex of emergent transnational social forces is Cox's "transnational managerial class", taking in international finance, transnational corporations, and international financial and
economic organizations such as the IMF, OECD, etc. National states have generally (though not unwaveringly) been particularly sensitive and responsive to the interests and ideas of this broad class, since the cooperation of its members seems to be essential to the pursuit of aggregate national economic growth, while a failure to meet their needs and expectations is often costly (in terms of lost investment, foregone access to new technologies, etc.). Indeed, Gill and Law identify signs of an emerging "transnational hegemony", involving banks, productive transnationals, highly skilled labour (distinguishable from nationally-based established labour and the growing body of non-established, 'flexible' labour), and governments.48

Yet, insofar as governments do seem to be increasingly responsive to the agenda of this comparatively small alliance of interests in the context of a less expansive and more uncertain world economy, those disparate groups which feel excluded from or threatened by this alliance/agenda will certainly feel increasingly alienated from the state, and its legitimacy will be impaired. These groups, too, are multiplying. They include not only embattled, nationally-based capital interests (or sectors) and established workers, and largely voiceless "informal" and unorganized workers (including many women, migrant workers and recent immigrants). In addition, they include the various, expanding groups of "dissenters from prevailing power structures" noted earlier.

Many of these "dissenting" groups also reflect and respond to processes of globalisation -- social, environmental, and technological as well as economic. Their concerns are generally not "new" -- are often, in fact, ancient -- though their rising political salience is comparatively recent. They are often concerned with issues and people whose challenges and grievances transcend national borders. Groups concerned with women's issues, environmental issues, peace and disarmament, international development, aboriginal rights, etc. often feel more sympathy with similar groups world-wide than with their own governments and national communities. This, too, will contribute to the delegitimization of the state -- particularly in (the many) cases where governments are perceived by such groups to
be unresponsive to their deeply-held concerns and aspirations.

In addition, however, processes of state delegitimization and societal fragmentation fuel the world-wide resurgence of sub-state ethnic nationalisms. In Canada, Europe, the Soviet Union, and many parts of the "Third World", for example, the perceived decline in the relevance and responsiveness of post-war "national" governments facilitates and encourages more widespread and vigorous identification by many people with historic cultural/national communities and their organized representatives. This development constitutes one of the most pressing contemporary challenges to the coherence of the post-war state system.

At the start of the 1990s, the governments of middle-sized Western states specifically are not coping very effectively with these various mounting challenges to the coherence of their civil societies and to their own legitimacy. Australia, Canada and Sweden are good examples. Canada -- always a problematic and "unnatural" polity -- is currently the most severely affected. The failure of the Meech Lake constitutional accord -- largely due to widespread feelings of disaffection and alienation among various groups and regions across the country -- has stoked the fires of sovereigntist sentiment in Quebec. And the armed stand-off between Mohawk Indians and the Canadian army in the summer of 1990 highlighted the tendency toward the breakdown of traditional Canadian coping mechanisms, based on peaceful, negotiated accommodations. But in Australia also, an August 1990 article in the national news magazine The Bulletin argued that, "Five months after a Federal election that plumbed the depths of voter disillusionment, Australians' despair with politics and the parliamentary process is becoming entrenched." "(N)ot only do the people now resent politicians", it goes on, "(they) have doubts about the system itself". And in Sweden, societal disaffection with the much-admired "Swedish model" has reached unprecedented levels. These developments must be understood in the context of the much more widespread challenges to the coherence and legitimacy of national communities and states outlined above.

Are these challenges unusually strong in Western middle powers? Certainly
not in relation to many Southern "middle powers" including, for example, Brazil, India, Nigeria and Indonesia. The range and intensity of domestic challenges to these states makes those faced by Western middle powers look almost trivial. Nevertheless, and despite the dangers of generalizing about such a diverse and amorphous category, it does appear that relative to both large and small advanced capitalist countries, the problems of societal coherence and governmental legitimacy facing middle-sized states tend to be more severe. Their openness, vulnerability, and sensitivity to international and transnational political and economic pressures remains considerably higher than that of large capitalist countries, exacerbating domestic social divisions and bringing more sharply into question their domestic relevance and responsiveness. And relative to smaller states, middle power "national communities" tend to be less closely knit and therefore more susceptible to societal division and incoherence (in this regard Sweden -- with its relatively ancient, small, and homogenous society -- is less vulnerable than either Australia or Canada).

Middle-sized state leaders may respond to these challenges of coherence and legitimacy in several ways, depending in part on the intensity and diversity of the particular challenges they face, and also in part on the quality and imagination of their national political leadership. They may attempt to consolidate and expand a transnationally-oriented power base, accepting that certain groups will be marginalized and alienated in this process and likely resorting to increased coercion to deal with challenges from the disaffected. They may react relatively passively, tying their fortunes more closely and automatically with those of larger regional powers and/or organizations, and perhaps in some cases acquiescing in the formal sub-division of their national communities. Or they may attempt to re-constitute state-civil society relations on a more inclusive and participatory basis -- inevitably concerned with, and responsive to, global trends and forces, but addressing them in a relatively consensual and pro-active manner. This last approach is, of course, both most appealing and perhaps most difficult to achieve and sustain.

In reality, these various responses are unlikely to be unambiguous and
mutually exclusive. In the context of a changing and unfamiliar global order, many state leaders and establishments are likely to go through (indeed, are in) a more-or-less prolonged period of ‘fumbling’ with various alternative policy responses.\textsuperscript{52} However, in determining the extent to which Western middle powers are capable of making a distinctive, useful and consistent contribution to international affairs, their ability to reconstitute state-civil society relations so as to restore and/or maintain a reasonably high degree of coherence and legitimacy (i.e., to successfully pursue the third response outlined above), both domestically and in the perception of the international community, will be of critical importance. This is so especially because one of their greatest foreign policy assets, and sources of influence, has been their generally favourable international reputations as relatively democratic, tolerant, open-minded and "generous" (broadly-conceived) communities. That these reputations masked numerous anomalies and inconsistencies in the post-war era is clear. Nevertheless, they were sufficiently credible to facilitate and buttress a high degree of foreign policy activism and effectiveness. Should these reputations be substantially undermined -- through increasing resort to coercive measures in relation to their civil societies, for example, or through too close and automatic an association with regional powers or blocs -- their capacity for foreign policy activism and effectiveness will be impaired.

Despite growing strains on societal coherence and state legitimacy national states, in their formal-institutional sense at least, will be with us for many years to come. However their relative importance, in relation to their civil societies, to each other, and to evolving and emerging international and transnational organizational structures is uncertain, though certainly changing in a number of different ways. In addition, some post-war states are sure to divide into two or more "sovereign" units, though the nature of the relationship between these "new" (often very old) units will vary.

How the Western middle powers of the post-war era will fare in this fluid process, and what effect it will have on their capacity to formulate distinctive and
creative foreign policies, will also vary. Similarly, the extent to which these foreign policies have an internationalist cast, and how such a cast might evolve in policy terms in the last decade of the twentieth century, is problematic. However, their ability to formulate and implement distinctive, creative, and effective internationalist foreign policies will be strongly dependent on their success in facilitating a fairly high degree of value- and interest-based cohesion and consensus within their civil societies, and on their (related) legitimacy and reputation in relation to their own societies and the international community.

Even if most or all of the post-war Western middle powers are reasonably successful in fostering a new state-society "social contract" and in maintaining or rejuvenating their national and international legitimacy and reputations, however, they are still likely to decline somewhat in relative weight and influence in the context of the emerging global order. The category of states which they are most likely to decline in relation to are Southern "middle powers" and/or NICs. It is therefore to a consideration of the relative capabilities and influence of these two broad categories of states which we finally turn.

4. Western and Southern Middle Powers: Shifting Relative Status?

As noted in section 2.1, it is clear that, in important aspects of the international economy (e.g. shares of world trade and of industrial output and employment), Western middle powers have collectively lost ground to a rising elite of Southern states over the last several decades. Furthermore, certain of these states have also developed substantial national military-industrial complexes, and/or positions of strategic and sometimes economic centrality, if not often dominance, within regional settings -- potential power bases which most Western middle powers lack. Examples of such "regional powers" include Nigeria, Indonesia, perhaps Egypt and, conspicuously, Brazil and India. These regional powers and some additional NICs (for example, South Korea and Mexico) are sometimes referred to as "rising middle powers".53 Harking back to the distinction made in chapter two between
behavioural and status-oriented usages of the middle power concept, these references tend to be status-oriented, referring to their leaders' and leading classes' desire to take their "place in the councils of the North", or to be seen as "representing an important world power". As noted in chapter two, more recent radical analyses have sometimes characterized these states as proto- or aspiring second-tier imperialist states (whereas Western middle powers would be seen as more purely sub-imperial).

However, while a few of the Asian NICs continued to make dramatic economic progress through the 1980s, this decade was a troubled one for many Southern regional/middle powers. Burgeoning burdens of debt, and the related rigours of IMF/World Bank SAPs have meant that in many of these countries, income disparities, abject poverty and social unrest have risen significantly. Increasing Northern protectionism has created new obstacles for the export-led development they have attempted, and been constrained, to pursue. In the context of world-wide (but particularly Western) public pressure to protect the global environment from further degradation, they have faced strong external pressure to forego the use of older and more environmentally-harmful production processes in pursuit of industrial expansion, to put a stop to extensive deforestation, etc. Thus, in certain broad and important ways, their global position (and their governments' positions domestically) remains -- indeed has become more -- fragile and vulnerable.

Yet paradoxically, it is also clear that these sources of weakness and vulnerability have in some ways enhanced their leverage in global affairs. The continuing (though receding) possibility of extensive debt default, particularly by the major Latin American debtors, confers on them considerable potential power over Western governments and financial interests. Similarly, the keen self-interest of Western states in securing a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of the GATT, including in particular a new agreement on Intellectual Property rights, gives the leading Southern states (or middle powers) increased bargaining power in "their" issue areas of agricultural trade, protectionist barriers such as the Multi-Fibre Agreement, etc. The sharply increased political salience of environmental issues for
all Western governments gives the NICs increased bargaining power in demanding the transfer of new, cleaner technologies and adjustment assistance in exchange for efforts to reduce environmentally harmful industrial and land use practices. And so on. Thus, even the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Southern middle powers underscore their growing structural importance and influence in the global political economy.

In their interactions with the states of other developing regions -- i.e., in their South-South relations -- leading Southern middle powers have evinced increasing determination and vigour in attempting to forge stronger political, economic and social linkages. Let us look, briefly, at the pertinent examples of Indian and Brazilian relations with Africa.

4.1 India, Brazil, and Africa:

India’s post-war diplomatic relations with Africa, and particularly with Southern Africa, have deep and principled roots. Mahatma Ghandi first launched his ‘Satyagraha’, or passive resistance, campaign in Natal province of South Africa. In 1946, India became the first country to raise the issue of South African racial discrimination at the U.N. -- an initiative which, despite its exclusive concern at the time with the position of Indians in South Africa, earned it considerable African respect. Also beginning in 1946, the Indian government severed trade links with South Africa and withdrew its High Commissioner, finally closing its South African mission in 1954. Thus, political relations with black Africa have had a sturdy moral foundation.56

India’s aid to the continent was given a sharp stimulus after 1962 when her strong diplomatic relations alone did not translate as expected into strong African support in the Sino-Indian conflict of that year.57 In 1964, New Delhi launched a programme of direct bilateral aid, including some to the newly independent countries of Africa, in addition to multilateral aid through the UN and the Commonwealth. She has consistently provided direct support (almost certainly including some military assistance) to Southern African liberation movements. Since 1975, the pace of Indian donor activities -- in finance, technical assistance, and other forms of aid (including
military training) -- has reportedly quickened throughout the Third World. The numbers are still not huge -- though given India's own development requirements, they are quite remarkable. The bulk of its bilateral support to Southern Africa, for example, channelled through the Non-Aligned Movement's AFRICA Fund, totals Rs. 500 million -- approximately US$ 33 million -- over three years. Because of foreign exchange constraints, most Indian aid is in kind. India has worked particularly hard at developing forms of aid and exchange involving large numbers of people -- for example, sending teachers, accountants, and other trained professionals to African states, and training African students and military officers in India. This, of course, bolsters social linkages and, it is doubtless hoped, economic connections between India and Africa. In general, the terms of Indian aid are not very flexible or generous: tying requirements are high, and aid is quite clearly oriented to the development of exports and other commercial relations.

These commercial relations are still quite limited, though India's African trade is expanding and of disproportionate importance because it involves otherwise-hard to export capital goods. It is bolstered by the large number of ethnic Indians involved in commercial activities in Eastern and Southern Africa. This connection is also important in developing the growing number of joint ventures between Indian interests and interests elsewhere in the South, including Africa. In general, as India's capitalist economy has developed, the Indian government has engaged in a vigorous search for overseas markets, some of the most promising of which, given the difficulty of competing with Northern products in their own markets, have been in the South.

By way of contrast, Brazil's early post-war diplomatic relations with Africa were conditioned primarily by its close ties with Portugal, which did not dispose it towards criticizing racism and colonialism on the continent. David Fig reports that in the two decades following the early 1940s:

Brazil continued to provide Portugal with diplomatic support in the UN and to vote on the side of South Africa's supporters when the Union government was attacked, principally by India, for its racist policies and continued
Commercial relations with South Africa were its most substantial link with the continent.

By the end of the 1960s however, Brazil's capable foreign policy makers, anticipating the collapse of the Portuguese empire and perceiving a need for access to Africa's markets and resources, began to craft a new policy approach to the continent. This involved distancing their country from Portuguese colonialism and apartheid South Africa, and stepping up trade initiatives with West African states. Brazil stressed its historical links with Africa and shared colonial history. The country was badly hurt by the first oil crisis of 1973-74, prompting it to redouble its efforts to expand trade links with oil-exporting African states in particular: above all Nigeria, but also, after its independence, Angola. When, following the Portuguese coup in 1974, Portugal's African colonies moved quickly to independence, Brazil's conservative military regime quickly recognized them, despite their Marxist governments. It rapidly extended various forms of assistance to the new regimes in Angola and Mozambique; and the Brazilian oil company Petrobras became the first foreign concern to explore for oil in Angola.

This Brazilian drive to expand trade and commerce with Africa -- part of a larger drive to expand economic linkages with the Third World, and thus to reduce its historical reliance on the American market -- was dramatically successful. The Third World percentage of its overall trade increased from 12.8 per cent in 1967 to 35.7 per cent in 1981. Exports to Africa alone increased from US $70 million in 1971 to US $400 million in 1977; and during this decade, its major "target" in Africa -- Nigeria -- became its second-largest Southern trading partner after Argentina.

The somewhat more successful efforts of Brazil to expand its Southern economic linkages versus those of India doubtless reflect its more developed and diversified economy: in relatively more cases, Brazilian goods and services could directly supplant Northern sources for African (and other Southern) interests. But both states have pursued expanded African economic linkages, and supporting
political ties, with greater vigour, greater (though varied) marginal success, and greater long-term growth potential than have Western middle powers. There are a number of reasons for this, including: cost advantages; growing Northern protectionism -- real or threatened -- which pushes Southern middle powers to aggressively pursue Southern markets; in some cases, greater willingness to meet local demands for participation in project operations, and greater familiarity with similar conditions of operation; and, on the Northern side, relatively mature and entrenched economic structures and patterns of exchange (emphasizing North-North linkages) which are often deeply resistant to change.

Whether or not these expanding South-South linkages are a positive new development, particularly from the perspective of African (i.e., LLDC or "Fourth World") partners, is controversial. Some analysts have pointed out that much South-South trade is as unequal as North-South exchange: manufactures are exchanged for raw materials, for example, or migrant labour. Shaw and Carlsson argue that: "...the whole egalitarian ideology of 'South-South' verges on mythology and is perpetuated only by Third World institutions which are themselves increasingly dominated by the NICs rather than the LLDCs". Carlsson's study of Brazilian-Nigerian trade between 1965 and 1979 shows that in neither its trade with Brazil nor that with its former colonial ruler -- Britain -- did Nigeria have the upper hand in its terms of trade, and those terms were only marginally better with Brazil than with the UK. In addition to what have been characterized as signs of 'proto-imperialism', however, there are clear elements of mutual benefit in these developing South-South economic relations.

Be this as it may, it is clear that these two prominent Southern middle powers have generally been relatively more enthusiastic, and more successful, in expanding their economic relations with African states than have Western middle powers. They therefore appear to be creating a firm basis for broader long-term foreign relations with African states.
4.2 Implications for Western Middle Powers:

In the context of a transitional -- more uncertain and competitive -- global order, how will the growing structural significance of Southern middle powers and NICs affect the relative foreign policy influence and behaviour of Western middle powers? In relations with distant, economically- and strategically-marginal areas of Africa, for example, will the latter tend to retrench and reduce their involvement, increasingly leaving the field to the "new influentials" of the South, along with the major (traditional imperial) powers of the North? More broadly, will the major challenges to the global political economy -- in security, finance, trade, the environment, etc. -- increasingly be worked out (in a more or less conflictual manner) between the major powers of the North and the South, with medium-sized and smaller powers in both being inevitably confined to marginal and supporting roles?

Though there is likely to be some movement in these directions, these trends are not inexorable and should not be exaggerated. Western middle powers retain important assets which can enable them to perform distinctive and sometimes useful foreign policy roles in relation to certain Southern regions and global challenges. They are still both rich and developed, which confers on them both some ability and obligation to become involved in issues and processes of development. They still have relatively sophisticated and versatile technical and bureaucratic capabilities -- indispensable in addressing the shifting challenges of global affairs. In the North-South sphere, they retain a measure of residual good will and trust among many Southern states of all sizes which, deserved or otherwise (and I will argue that it is at least partly earned), constitutes a distinctive advantage over Northern "great powers". They are, relatively speaking, non-threatening. On the other hand, they generally enjoy a degree of familiarity and access among Northern great powers which, though its value is often over-stated and is double-edged\textsuperscript{73}, is largely unavailable to most Southern middle powers.

To what effect may these retained assets be put in the closing years of the twentieth century? Much will depend on the extent to which more fluid and co-operative or, alternatively, polarized and conflictual patterns of international
interaction come to prevail. Both potentialities are clearly discernible. Bernard Wood and others have made the case that Krasner's dichotomized North-South "structural conflict" of the 1970s and early '80s has been breaking down, with many more common interests and bases for co-operation emerging between at least some states of both areas.\textsuperscript{74} A few potentially useful examples of carefully designed North-South co-operative ventures involving middle and small powers have emerged during this decade -- notably the Cairns Group of Fair Traders in the area of agricultural trade and, on a smaller scale and with more limited implications, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{75}

On the other hand, either of a persistently inadequate response to the continuing debt crisis, or a breakdown of the international trading system -- both quite plausible -- contain the seeds of a renewed round of North-South confrontation. Similarly, the (mainly Northern) world's brutally effective response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq, while receiving extensive official support at the inter-state level, also contains the seeds of future North-South conflicts.\textsuperscript{76} Leaving aside the debate over whether increased co-operation or sharpened contradictions will ultimately produce a more just, rather than simply more stable, world order, particularly for the poor of the South, it is probable that the distinctive assets of Western middle powers may be more effectively and widely utilized in a more co-operative versus conflictual global context. Should the latter prevail, there could be a strong temptation for such states to seek shelter under the protective wing of their strongest allies and/or regional bases (e.g. a "Fortress Europe").

Western middle powers are not mere passive by-standers in determining the extent to which co-operative or conflictual norms and structures dominate the process of change in the global political economy, however. Although their potential influence should not be exaggerated (by themselves or by others) they may, by the ideas they promote and by their actions (or inactions), periodically have some real influence on these developments, and on the character of North-South interactions specifically. They may indeed be able, in some situations, to perform their reputed
bridging function between North and South, should they choose to make the attempt.

This leads us, once more, to an emphasis on the importance of individual state decisions and actions, and on the dynamic political processes of interaction among state agencies and various groups within their civil societies which influence these decisions. All Western middle powers face formidable and in important ways similar contemporary challenges linked to powerful global forces, both economic and political (see section two above), which tend to induce more defensive and narrowly-realist foreign policy postures. Yet, as discussed in chapter two, state leaders and policymakers also have significant incentives, at least partly linked to their own quest for political survival and legitimization, to carve out distinctive and saleable foreign policy positions which do not simply respond to wealthy and powerful interests inside and outside the state, but "stand for something" -- some set of values, some useful place in the world. These incentives are all the more compelling given the mounting challenges to societal coherence and state legitimacy discussed in section three above. One direction in which such foreign policy positions might go is in a renewed and reconceptualized effort to bridge some of the differences between North and South -- perhaps on a more focused and issue-specific basis. The impact of such an effort, paralleled in a number of Western middle powers, could in certain places and situations be significant.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has raised a number of questions and scenarios, without attempting to finally resolve any of them. The empirical case studies which follow should, however, assist in the identification of some more specific implications regarding the present and future roles and capabilities of middle-sized Western states, in the North-South sphere particularly. In the meantime, a number of broad conclusions may be summarized from the foregoing discussion.

First, many of the specific post-war patterns and traditions of internationalist behaviour among Western middle powers reflected, and responded to, their interests
and capabilities in the context of a particular historical global order which was, for the most part, very hospitable to them. As developed, state capitalist, and "Western" states they were comfortable and prosperous in this order. It would therefore be a mistake to assume any kind of inevitable continuance of the same behavioural patterns and traditions in what is, and is still becoming, a substantially altered global order.

Second, two of the most important underlying changes which have been occurring at the world level -- the globalisation of production and the internationalization of the state -- would appear to hold out largely negative implications for the long-term prosperity, sense of vulnerability, and autonomy of Western middle powers. However, several provisos must be made. The forces and conditions inducing change are themselves changing, such that structural trends which have developed over the past twenty-five or so years may not hold in the next twenty-five. Further, while Western middle powers may respond to these challenges defensively, or even be overwhelmed by them, such challenges may also generate active, creative and imaginative responses (as challenging situations often have through history). Finally, the changing global order contains important new foreign policy opportunities, as well as constraints, for these states -- particularly in relation to the process of political internationalization.

Third, changes at the global level have fuelled growing challenges to societal coherence and state legitimacy -- challenges which are likely to affect medium-sized Western states more severely than either larger or smaller Western states, though less severely than many Southern states. The overall foreign policy influence and effectiveness of Western middle powers -- closely linked in the past to their relatively benign and positive international reputations -- is likely to be significantly affected by the nature of their responses to these challenges, which may range from a strongly elitist and coercive pattern, through a passive and dependent approach, to a relatively inclusive, participatory, and pro-active approach.

Finally, fourth, the structural importance, and foreign policy range and influence of Southern middle powers and NICs has increased over the past several
decades and, despite (indeed partly because of) the often-extreme difficulties they presently face, is likely to continue to grow. In relative terms, the global "weight" of Western middle powers has declined. Nevertheless, the latter retain important foreign policy assets which may allow them to periodically play distinctive, creative and useful roles, particularly in the resurgent and increasingly important North-South arena. Whether or not they actively pursue these opportunities, or (alternatively) adopt more defensive and insular policy postures will largely depend on the dynamics of individual state-society interactions, and resultant state initiatives. It is important to note, however, that there are self-interested reasons, of increasing relevance, for states to adopt the former, more activist, approach: the weight of self-interest is not all towards greater insularity and hard-nosed "realism".

NOTES

1. Categorizing these three states as "Western" is not beyond controversy. Of the three, only Canada can be viewed as unambiguously Western throughout the post-war era: Sweden’s neutral status placed it formally "between" East and West in strategic terms; while Australia’s geographic position is both Asian and southern. Nevertheless, the dominant European cultural roots of all three, and their developed, state capitalist political economies, justify the attachment of the Western label to them.


5. Holmes, "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?", 19; and chapter two of this dissertation, 17-18.

7. Other reasons for the neglect of global economic issues among scholars of international relations included: their quite natural preoccupation with issues of war and peace in the wake of World War II and in the face of the threat of nuclear war; and a long-standing disciplinary bias, particularly within the then-dominant realist school, towards viewing diplomacy and strategy ("high politics") as their central concerns, relegating economic and social issues to the status of "low politics".

8. Cox and others (notably Gill and Law) do not conceive of international hegemony in the traditional realist sense of dominance or 'power over'. Rather, drawing on the thinking of Gramsci, they view it as the product of a "fit" between power, ideas, and institutions, producing an order characterized by a large measure of consent. The power of the hegemon is usually kept very much in the background - although Cox argues that towards the social and geographic peripheries of a given order, the degree of consent on which it rests declines while the degree of coercion rises. This understanding of hegemony is a very useful one: specifically, the post-war Pax Americana cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the extent to which it rested, initially at least, on quite widespread ideological appeal and international support - particularly, though not exclusively, in the Western world. See Cox, Power, Production and World Order, 150, and chapter 7, 211-267; Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders...", 222-225; and Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital", International Studies Quarterly 33 (4), Dec. 1989, 476-477.


10. The notion of a coherent "national interest" has always been a problematic one. Clearly, any interpretation of the national interest will serve the particular interests of various groups, or social forces, within the boundaries of the state more than others; and the determination of the national interest by state actors is the product of an ongoing process wherein various forces both within and beyond the state exert influence upon it with varying degrees of effect. It is probably fair to say, however, that the Second World War generally imposed a measure of coherence on the notion of a discrete, collective national interest which carried over at least into the first few years of the post-war period, during which the regimes of the LIETO were conceived.

11. Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1985), 44. The states about which Katzenstein writes are: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

12. See Katzenstein, 81-86; see also Dezso J. Horvath and Donald J. Daly, Small Countries in the World Economy: the Case of Sweden (Halifax: IRPP, 1989), 15-24.

13. Richard Higgott has commented that Australia's recent vigorous efforts to defend the principles and institutions of multilateral trade liberalization have something of the character of "the deathbed repentance of a tariff junky".


17. In terms of domestic popular impact, the role of middle power statesmen within the U.N. was of particular significance. Two outstanding examples are Lester Pearson's diplomacy during the Suez crisis, and Dag Hammarskjold's role as Secretary-General of the U.N.


21. For a detailed and useful discussion of the various domestic political factors which shaped the aid policies of Canada and Sweden specifically, see Appavoo, "The Small State as Donor: Canadian and Swedish Development Assistance Policies, 1960-76", especially chapter 7.

22. See, for example, Cox, Power, Production, and World Order, chapter 8; R. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Conflict in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), part III; and Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony", International Organization 41 (4), 1987, for a sampling of eloquent contributions to this debate.

23. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, 278.

24. See Higgott, Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia, 32; and Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony".

25. See Higgott, 26-30, and Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 244-253.


28. Sanderson, 19.

29. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 359.

30. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 358.


32. For example, Cox argues that the persistent differences between the U.S. Executive and the Congress in their approaches to international trade issues - with the Executive being resolutely internationalist in the face of protectionist pressures from Congress - can be linked to the fact that transnational capital interests have privileged access to the Executive, while national capital interests have greater influence in the Congress. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 362.

33. See Raphael Kaplinsky, "Technological Revolution and the Restructuring of Trade Production: Some Implications for the Western Middle Powers and the Newly Industrializing Countries", in Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism, 114 and 125; Horvath and Daly, 35; and Higgott, 62-63.

34. Kaplinsky, 112-122.

35. For example, the increasing creativity and sophistication of Australian foreign policy during the 1980s may be related to its relatively high degree of structural vulnerability and decline - necessity being the mother of invention, as it were. See Higgott and Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building...", 18-22.


37. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 254.

38. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 256-257.

39. The process of internationalized ideological consensus-formation has been advanced considerably by such influential international agencies as the OECD and the Trilateral Commission. More recently, it has been advanced at the highest political reaches of the capitalist world through the preparations for, and annual meetings of,
the G-7.

40. See Higgott, 40-49.


44. Kaplinsky, 138.

45. See "Time to change the tune", and "Inner space", in The Economist, 18 May 1991, 52-54.

46. Kaplinsky, 139.


48. See Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital", esp. 494. The initiation and negotiation of the Canada-US FTA can be viewed in part as symptomatic of a historic triumph of transnational over national capital interests in relation to the federal government in this country.


50. See, for example, John Gray, "'Ungrateful’ Swedes eager to rid country of social democracy", The Globe and Mail, 14 May 1990; and Henry Milner, "Social democracy a model no more?", The Globe and Mail, 3 March 1990; and "Time to change the tune", The Economist, 18 May 1991.

51. As noted in chapter two, Wood argues that the middle power group (i.e. North and South) has a relatively high proportion of states which are intensely preoccupied with domestic and regional political and economic issues. See note 75.
52. See the argument of Lars Mjøset, "Nordic Economic Policies in the 1970s and 1980s", 412-413.


54. Riordan and Tollefson, 109; Dutt, 10.

55. See, for example, Dutt, esp. chapter one, "India in the Context of Theories of Imperialism"; and Georg Sorenson, "Brazil: A Newly Industrializing Country?", in Carlsson and Shaw, eds., Newly Industrializing Countries and the Political Economy of South-South Relations, 111-118.


58. Dutt, 40.

59. Much of this discussion is based on information obtained in an interview with an Indian diplomat in Gaborone Botswana, 21 September 1989.

60. Dutt, 63-68; and Badejo, 247.

61. See Badejo, 247; and Dutt, esp. chapter 7, "The Overseas Indian Populations".

62. David Fig, "The Political Economy of South African Penetration of Brazil: the Case of the Anglo-American Corporation", in Carlsson and Shaw, eds., 206.

63. There is a long tradition in Brazil of leaving the management of foreign political and economic relations firmly in the sophisticated hands of Itamaraty - the foreign office. See Sorenson, "Brazil...", 106.

64. Fig, 212.

65. See Fig, 212-213; also Jerker Carlsson, "The Brazilian Penetration of Nigeria Through Trade: A Case Study of South-South Trade Relations, 1965-79", in Carlsson and Shaw, eds., 193.

66. Riordan and Tollefson, 104.
67. Fig, 213; and Carlsson, 193.

68. The only-marginally successful efforts of Australia, Canada and Sweden to expand commercial linkages with Southern African states will be dealt with in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

69. See Sorenson, 117.


72. See Sorenson, 111-118. See also Dutt, on the case for Indian 'proto-imperialism'.

73. Small and medium-sized Western states may often be inclined to mute, or limit, their points of difference with major powers so as not to "over-burden" the familiarity and access on which they see their economic and strategic security as being largely dependent.

74. See Wood, 1989, 88-89. See also, for example, Shaw and Carlsson, and Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), on growing differentiation and hierarchy within the South.

75. See Higgott and Cooper on the former; the latter consists of the foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, meeting regularly to review and co-ordinate Commonwealth initiatives on Southern Africa. See David Black, "Middle Power Diplomacy and the Pursuit of Change in South Africa: Canada, Australia, and the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa", paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA, Vancouver, 20-23 March 1991.

76. See, for example, John Cruickshank, "One for all and all for what?", The Globe and Mail, 10 August 1990; and Geraldine Brooks and Tony Horowitz, "War in gulf leaves bitter legacy", The Globe and Mail, 2 Aug. 1991.

77. Cranford Pratt discusses the requirements for a "refurbished humane middle power internationalism" in the concluding chapter Middle Power Internationalism. Many of the requirements he identifies are derive from the critical and integrated relationship between this foreign policy goal, and the domestic political and policy implications of its pursuit. See Pratt, "Has Middle Power Internationalism a Future?", in Middle Power Internationalism, 155-166.
78. Kaplinsky's analysis of the profound changes which are taking place in the nature and implications of leading edge production systems and technologies - i.e., from "systemofacture" to "machinofacture" - is particularly salutary in this regard. See Kaplinsky, "Technological Revolution and the Restructuring of Trade Production...".
Chapter 4
Foreign Policy in Australia, Canada, and Sweden: Contexts and Characteristics

This chapter begins the transition in this thesis from the relatively broad and abstract considerations of the previous two chapters to a more concrete, empirically-grounded level. The premise of this chapter is that a full and proper understanding of any one dimension of a state's foreign policy -- in this case, policies towards Southern Africa -- can only be achieved with reference to the broad constraints, influences, and characteristics shaping its foreign policy as a whole. Foreign policy emerges out of a political, economic, social and cultural ‘seamless web’, in which initiatives which may appear to represent significant departures from previous patterns or traditions can be better understood when related to their broader policy contexts. It is therefore my purpose in this chapter to set out and compare some of the main features of the foreign policy environments of Australia, Canada, and Sweden -- global, regional, and domestic -- within which their Southern African policies in the 1980s were made.

The observations which follow are necessarily selective. They are also, in some cases, subject to rapid revision, reflecting the current pace of change in the global system as a whole. Certain articles of faith in the post-war context -- for example, that Sweden would not consider joining the European Community in view of its commitment to neutrality, or that no Canadian government would pursue the politically-suicidal option of free trade with the United States -- have been swept aside. The concern here, however, is to set out the context within which policies during the 1980s were framed, leaving aside for the moment the implications of numerous as-yet unfinished transformations.

The overall, and predictable, impression which emerges is that while Australia, Canada and Sweden share certain important characteristics, they are also subject to a wide range of divergent influences and pressures. Insofar as, despite these differences in their foreign policy environments, we are able to conclude in subsequent chapters that they have pursued policies towards Southern Africa marked
by certain broad and fundamental similarities, we should be able to give greater
empirical substance to the idea that their policies have been shaped by their positions
as global middle powers. However, we should also not be surprised to find, and
should be equipped to explain, that their Southern African policies are also marked by
some interesting differences.

1. Some Basic Characteristics -- Or, Massive Statements of the Obvious and their
Implications

At a high level of generality, it is clear that Australia, Canada and Sweden
share important characteristics. All three are historically "Western" in their cultural,
economic, and political roots and dominant values; all are predominantly European in
their ethnic/racial composition; all fall within the wide "middle range" of the world's
sovereign states in terms of both population and GDP; all are wealthy and developed -
- members of the elite economic "club" of Western industrialized countries, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and all are
situated toward the geographic periphery of the globe (Canada and Sweden to the
North, Australia to the South).

Yet at these most basic levels of size, society and history, these three states
also manifest clear differences. In terms of both physical and population sizes, the
differences are straight-forward. Both Australia and Canada are vast and sparsely-
populated countries (the second and sixth largest in the world); while Sweden, though
large and sparsely-populated by European standards, is less than one-twentieth the
size of Canada and one-seventeenth that of Australia, and more than seven times as
densely populated as either. In population, the three form a rough continuum, with
Sweden's population of 8.5 million being approximately half Australia's 16.3 million,
and one-third Canada's 26 million. These rudimentary geopolitical characteristics
filter into the foreign policy process in numerous ways, not the least of which is in
influencing the national self-images held by policy-makers and analysts. Thus
Swedes, for example, are inclined to describe their country as a small state;
Australians typically view their country as a small or (more commonly) middle sized power; while several fairly influential Canadians have argued that Canada is a major or "principal" power, while others favour "middle power" or "satellite" appellations (see section seven of this chapter).

Physical size has also contributed to differences in the societal (and hence political) diversity and coherence of Australia, Canada and Sweden. Given their vast territorial expanse, both Australia and Canada originally developed as several separate colonies, subsequently becoming federal states with strong regional identities and rivalries. In Canada, these internal divisions overlaid the historic French-English division, with French Canadians concentrated in the province of Quebec. Partly because of this confluence of provincial/regional and ethnic/linguistic divisions, regionalism/provincialism in Canada has been even stronger and more politically salient than in Australia.

Beyond these geographic and institutional cleavages, Australia and Canada were settler societies, and have therefore developed as immigrant-based and deeply multicultural communities. This is in addition to their original aboriginal inhabitants, the historic oppression and continued gross relative poverty of whom has had a significant, if at times deeply embarrassing, place in the debate over their Southern African policies. Both societies are much more ethnically and regionally diverse than Swedish society, organized as it is within a unitary state dominated by ethnic Swedes. As a consequence of large-scale post-war immigration, one million of Sweden’s 8.5 million people are now immigrants or have at least one immigrant parent, including migrants from other Nordic countries. Sweden has thus become considerably more multi-cultural. However, its multi-culturalism is not as pervasive or politically-salient as that of either Australia or Canada. Swedish politics is much more class-centred, as we shall see subsequently.

The political and foreign policy salience of these differing patterns of societal coherence/diversity should not be overstated. Nevertheless, they have had some effect on both policy content and process. For example, multi-culturalism has been
one of the values which Canadian policy-makers have attempted to project abroad; while Quebec's strenuous efforts to enhance its international personality in the 1970s sharply stimulated the expansion of Canadian aid programmes to Francophone African countries. Less directly, it is likely that Sweden's relative social cohesion and small population have together influenced the relatively consensual style of Swedish policymaking, in international affairs as elsewhere.

Finally, in terms of history, it is worth noting that Sweden is a very old national community, while Australia and Canada remain comparatively young ("Middle Aged" in John Holmes's terms, and in relation to the many "new" states emerging in the era of post-war decolonization⁴). The influence of this simple fact on foreign policy is largely indirect, but not unimportant. Thus, for example, Sweden, by virtue of its long history, has developed a relatively secure national self-identity -- having met, been influenced by, and overcome a wide range of historical crises and challenges. It may therefore be inclined to look outward with greater collective confidence, and to devote relatively more attention as a community to external challenges. This perhaps helps to explain the greater interest and involvement of the Swedish public and Swedish organizations ("popular movements" and NGOs) in foreign policy issues than is the case in either Canada or Australia.

Of the three, Australia is the "youngest" as a sovereign state. This fact, combined with its historic sense of geographic and cultural isolation -- a European outpost surrounded by threatening Asian "hordes" -- doubtless contributed to what came across through much of the post-war era as brashness covering for insecurity, and a self-imposed colonial mentality vis-a-vis Britain and the US -- in general, a lack of sophistication and maturity.⁵ These tendencies have arguably been substantially overcome in the 1980s, as discussed below.

Canadians, too, have struggled with the immanence of their colonial past in the making of their foreign policies, particularly towards the United States. The felt need to assert, clearly, loudly, and repeatedly, their sovereign independence in this relationship is in part symptomatic of this. However, Canadian foreign policy has
generally enjoy... subtlety and sophistication during most of the post-war era by which it was sometimes distinguished from Australian foreign policy. The relatively brief historical experience of the Canadian state has perhaps most significantly impinged upon Canadian foreign policy in the fact that Canadians have not yet been able (and may ultimately fail) to accommodate their country's deep cleavages and contradictions. By contrast, Sweden has long-since resolved these kinds of challenges to its integrity and viability -- in part by divesting itself of its imperial possessions (most recently Finland and Norway). And Australia -- in the absence of linguistic and economic divisions comparable to Canada's -- has fostered a "melting pot" type of collective identity. It seems inevitable that Canada's excessive preoccupation with self-definition and internal contradictions, absorbing too many of the country's best minds and too much of its political leaders' attention, will to some degree impair its ability to respond to external challenges.

2. International Organizational Linkages and Alignments

The basic characteristics noted above have had a primarily "background", conditioning influence on the foreign policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden. Much more prominent and direct have been their political, economic and strategic linkages within the international society of states. It is in this aspect of their international affairs that evidence of these states' "middlepowermanship" has most often been adduced. Representatives of each have expressed a strong rhetorical emphasis on, and commitment to, the international organizations to which they belong -- most conspicuously the UN. And each has demonstrated a penchant for multilateral approaches to international problem-solving -- although the consistency, techniques and motives with which this penchant has been pursued have varied.

Of the three, Canada's international organizational linkages are the most extensive: former External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has asserted that "No other major power has Canada's institutional reach", and political scientist John Kirton has
labelled Canada "the most well-connected country in the world." Indeed, the extent to which organizational memberships have become an end in themselves -- the goal being simply to gain "a seat at the table" -- rather than means to carefully chosen national ends, has been a subject of ongoing controversy amongst analysts of Canadian foreign policy. First among these organizational connections has been Canada's relatively extensive and dedicated involvement with the United Nations, exemplified by its disproportionate financial contributions to UN agencies, and its numerous contributions to UN peace-keeping operations (including, along with both Australia and Sweden, during the recent transition to independence in Namibia). Other significant organizational connections include: leading positions in la Francophonie and, of particular significance for Southern African policy, the Commonwealth; most recently, the Organization of American States (OAS); and in international economic relations, the OECD, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the GATT. In addition, and distinguishing Canada from most other middle power candidates, it is a member of the elite "G-7" Economic Summit.

In international security relations, Canada was "a charter member of the Western camp". Sharing North America with the United States (a pervasive influence on Canadian foreign policy, addressed below), it was inevitable that Canada should work out a strategic accommodation with the Western world's post-war hegemon. This accommodation was formalized through NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence Command). Canadian officials were also, however, early and eager participants in the creation of NATO. In so participating, they were motivated in part by the persistent desire to create "counterweights" to the US, but also, apparently, by wider visions of collective security and "Atlantic Community". For Canadian policy makers, participation in NATO was a powerful symbol of their country's conversion from inter-war isolationism to post-war internationalism. And the early development of Canadian "middle power internationalism" was premised on its Western alignment: it was widely viewed as an alliance member which, by virtue of its comparatively non-threatening posture and
undogmatic thinking, could treat with "outsiders" from East and South. More recently, Canada became one of two non-European states (the other being the US) in the broadly-based Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Canadian spokespersons have placed considerable emphasis on this organization in adumbrating their ideas about "post-Cold War" Europe.\textsuperscript{11}

Australia's record of multilateralism in the post-war era is more chequered. At the formation of the United Nations in San Francisco and in the early years of the UN, the Australian Labour Party (ALP) government and in particular its Foreign Minister, Dr. H.V. Evatt, participated with missionary zeal, vigorously championing the rights of small and middle powers.\textsuperscript{12} Australia was elected as one of the first non-permanent members of the Security Council (putting some Canadian noses out of joint), and Evatt played a leading role in the UN's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With the election and subsequent dynasty of the deeply conservative Liberal-Country Party coalition from 1949 to 1972, however, Australia's enthusiasm for the UN, and for broadly-based multilateralism generally, waned. Australian foreign policy leaders, reflecting their country's sense of fearful isolation from Europe and the colonial legacy of an underdeveloped national self-identity, became overwhelmingly preoccupied with several related foreign policy priorities: virulent anti-Communism, the need for security in an insecure regional environment, and the consequent need to cultivate "great and willing friends" -- i.e., the UK and the US (with the latter increasingly predominating in Australian calculations). The government's attitude towards the UN soured noticeably in the wake of the Suez Crisis (the same crisis which became a popular symbol of Canadian middlepowermanship in this country); while its enthusiasm for the Commonwealth was dampened as it rapidly evolved into a predominantly Afro-Asian (i.e., non-white) organization.\textsuperscript{13}

During this era, the primary manifestations of Australian internationalism were in the security sphere. The Australian government persuaded a reluctant American administration to join it and New Zealand in creating the ANZUS Security Treaty;
was a founding member of the (largely ineffectual) Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); provided military aid to, and stationed armed forces in, Malaysia and Singapore for more than twenty years under the ANZAM arrangement; and sent troops to Vietnam in support of the US. This was a skewed and partisan variant of middle power internationalism.

With the election of Gough Whitlam’s ALP government in 1972, however, Australian foreign policy underwent a process of rapid change. Though the changes which eventually transpired were not nearly as dramatic or radical as the ALP’s pre-election rhetoric had led some observers to expect, they were overdue and helpful to Australia’s international image. Whitlam’s government "co-operated more effectively with the UN than an Australian government had since 1949" — partly in taking a much stronger and more critical position vis-a-vis South Africa and Rhodesia; developed a less knee-jerk, though still close, relationship with the US and expeditiously withdrew Australian troops from Vietnam; moved its main colonial possession -- Papua New Guinea -- rapidly to independence; and worked hard to improve relations with developing countries in its own region and elsewhere.

Under Malcolm Fraser, coalition Prime Minister from 1975 to 1983, the Australian government "re-discovered" the Commonwealth, taking an enthusiastic part in its major initiatives and finding, in the words of an Australian diplomat, that it was a good place "to strut the world stage" (as indeed succeeding Canadian Prime Ministers have found it). And under Bob Hawke’s ALP governments since 1983, there is a sense that Australian diplomacy has increasingly "found its feet" in the international arena, undertaking high profile multilateral initiatives in the GATT (the Cairns Group), in pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict; and in the Asia-Pacific region (proposing the nascent Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group) -- aside from its activities in relation to southern Africa.

Broadly speaking, Sweden’s international reputation is the most activist and "progressive" of the three -- a reputation derived in large measure from its activities within the UN system. However compared with Canada in particular, its
international "connections" are limited, in part due to the vagaries of history and geography, and in part due to deliberate policy choices.

Sweden has been a neutral state in international security affairs since the Congress of Vienna (1814-15). With the failure of Swedish-instigated efforts to establish a Scandinavian defence community in 1949, Sweden opted to maintain a policy of armed neutrality, while Norway and Denmark joined NATO and Finland adopted a posture of neutrality limited by the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Sweden's strongly-armed neutrality has been widely viewed as a crucial component of the stable post-war peace in the Nordic area -- the "Nordic Balance". By eschewing "entangling alliances" in peace-time, it dealt itself out of some of the key institutions of post-war international relations -- not only NATO but, out of a concern that its neutrality not be compromised, the European Community (although it has now applied for EC membership). On the other hand, neutrality has constituted a sturdy moral springboard from which to actively engage in international disarmament efforts, notably within the CSCE framework (for example, as host of the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures in Europe).

In the absence of strategic linkages, Sweden's involvement in the UN system and international economic institutions has been all the more energetic. Regarding the UN, Sweden's discretionary contributions have been larger, in proportional terms, than Canada's and it, too, has been one of the most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. It has been argued that Dag Hammarskjold's role as UN Secretary-General, beginning in 1953, was of particular importance in stimulating both Swedish identification with the United Nations and, more broadly, its tradition of international activism. During the UNCTAD negotiations for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s and early '80s, Sweden was one of the most committed and energetic advocates of substantial accommodation to G-77 demands for international economic reforms among the "Like-Minded Group" (LMG) of small and middle-sized Western states.
On the other hand, in the absence of significant colonial, geographic, or linguistic connections, Sweden lacks the organizational avenues for interaction with Third World states open to Australia and Canada through the Commonwealth, the OAS, la Francophonie, and the South Pacific Forum. It does have easy and useful functional relations with its immediate neighbours via the Nordic Council, through which it has participated in joint initiatives vis-a-vis Southern Africa. But most of the onus in its relations with developing countries and regions has fallen on the UN system and its own substantial development assistance programmes.

3. Structural Positions within the Global Political Economy

As discussed in chapter 3, the international organizational linkages noted above have been substantially underpinned by Australian, Canadian, and Swedish structural positions and interests within the global political economy. It was noted that these and similar developed, small and medium-sized economies share certain important structural similarities. They are relatively open and trade-dependent, and therefore extremely vulnerable to major power "tit-for-tat" economic conflicts (for example, the agricultural subsidy wars between the US and the EC). They have therefore been committed to strengthening the rules and institutions of the post-war liberal international economic order, so as to inhibit to the greatest extent possible damaging bilateral economic conflicts among major powers in which their unilateral influence is negligible. Similarly, they have generally been keen on organizations which aim to prevent or at least inhibit armed conflicts which, aside from their direct human and material costs, clearly disrupt and damage reasonably open global economic relations.

Beyond these broad tendencies and characteristics, however, Australia, Canada, Sweden and other middle-sized states manifest interesting variations in the process and pattern of their incorporation into the world economy. Of the three, Sweden's position is probably the most structurally sound. In common with Australia and Canada, its process of industrial development, as well as its present prosperity, were firmly grounded in its rich base of natural resources -- notably minerals and
forests. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, Swedish firms made a number of important technological breakthroughs, particularly in the engineering sector. Given the resolutely international orientation of the Swedish economy, they were able to parlay these developments into strong international growth and market positions. Large multinationals such as SKF, AGA, ASEA and Alfa-Laval trace their early growth to these roots. These and other strong Swedish MNCs have persistently demonstrated a strong capacity for technological innovation and structural adaptation to changing world market demands, buttressed by extensive labour market adjustment programmes which are in turn facilitated by a strongly "social corporatist" policy making environment. Another source of strength to the Swedish economy has been its relatively advanced and diversified "military-industrial" complex, underpinning the country's policy of armed neutrality.

The strong international orientation of the Swedish economy is reflected in the fact that both exports and imports account for more than 30% of GDP -- very high by international standards. It is also reflected in foreign investment: Sweden is the tenth largest foreign investor in the world in absolute terms, and the fifth most multinational country in terms of the ratio of foreign investment to GNP. In general, both trade and investment are heavily concentrated in developed countries. In 1987, only 7% of all Swedish imports and 10% of exports were traded with LDCs. Investment is slightly less skewed: in 1978, Latin America was the second most important recipient of Swedish investment after the EC, accounting for some 17% of all employment in Swedish subsidiaries -- although investment in this region stalled in the 1980s; while the Asian NICs have become a growing investment target. In both Swedish trade and investment, however, Africa's share is minimal (aside from some substantial investments in South Africa which pre-dated Sweden's 1979 ban on new investment there).

Of course, internationalization is also a source of vulnerability. Sweden is particularly sensitive to developments in the EC, which is the source of some 50% of its exports and imports (see section 4 of this chapter). In addition, it is dependent on
imported sources of energy. Imported oil accounts for approximately two-thirds of Swedish energy consumption which, as the Gulf War reminded us, may be an important point of vulnerability.  

Canada has the seventh largest economy among advanced capitalist countries and the ninth largest in the world -- a fact acknowledged in its G-7 membership. However, its economy is less balanced and diversified than Sweden's. The federal government's adoption, in the late nineteenth century, of the "National Policy" of high protective tariffs for manufacturing industries combined with extensive exports of internationally-competitive staple products helped to produce an economy characterized by heavy foreign investment in branch plant manufacturing enterprises, concentrated in the central Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The Atlantic and Western regions of the country were (and remain) heavily dependent on an inherently less stable staples base, though parts of the West are increasingly diversifying, largely on the strength of growing links with the Asia-Pacific region. These differing regional economic structures have fuelled alienation in peripheral provinces -- a perennial political issue. In addition, and notwithstanding forty years of steady trade liberalization in the post-war era, foreign (especially American) ownership has remained pervasive. In the early 1980s, Canada was the most penetrated country by foreign-owned TNCs among OECD member-states, with Australia second. Many Canadian manufacturers have remained relatively uncompetitive, the ramifications of which are now being felt with large declines in manufacturing employment.

Like Sweden, Canada is heavily trade dependent: exports and imports both constitute about 26% of GDP. However 74% of exports and 70% of imports are concentrated in the US market. Thus, the quest for geographic diversification of trade ("Third Options") has been a persistent theme in Canadian foreign policy, although it has generally been pursued half-heartedly in practice, and has been overshadowed recently by the signing of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Manufactures have become an increasingly important component of foreign
merchandise trade (65% of the total in 1988), although this figure is skewed by the fact that "the Canadian trade balance for manufactures is dominated by bilateral trade between automobile companies which have plants located both in Canada and in the United States". It is therefore difficult to conceive of a discrete Canadian national economy, separated in any meaningful way from the much larger North American (i.e. US dominated) economy, with or without the FTA.

Like Sweden, Canada's trade with LDCs is minimal: an average 9% of exports and 12% of imports over the decade 1973-83. While trade with the NICs, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, has been growing rapidly in recent years, Canadian trade with the developing countries of Africa remains "negligible". An interesting feature of Canadian trade with the Third World is that as of 1983 at least, more than 50% of its exports were primary products -- quite different from the conventional pattern of North-South trade.

Australia's structural position in the global economy is the weakest of the three. Like Canada, Australia's early development was characterized by extensive staples exports combined with the development of manufacturing for the domestic market behind high tariff walls. Also like Canada, this approach involved substantial direct state involvement in economic development through support for the activities of capital and/or state ownership of enterprise, sometimes termed "state capitalism" (the Swedish state has also been heavily involved in economic development, but generally more indirectly -- i.e., not through direct subsidization of, or in lieu of, private capital -- though there are important exceptions to this generalization).

However, Australia remained more protectionist vis-a-vis its manufacturing industries for a considerably longer period than Canada, only embracing trade liberalization vigorously in the 1980s. Largely for this reason, Australia, in common with most Third World states, remains heavily dependent on commodity exports (agricultural and mineral products) to, and capital imports from, advanced capitalist countries. While its performance in terms of manufacturing exports has improved, they were still only 26% of total merchandise exports in 1987. Not
surprisingly under the circumstances, Australian government and commercial sources now place heavy emphasis on the development of trade in services (though they are not alone in doing so).\textsuperscript{36} Australia's volume of trade is considerably smaller in proportional terms than that of either Sweden or Canada: in 1987, exports and imports both constituted about 14% of GDP. The direction of its trade has shifted significantly. While traditional markets in Europe and North America remain important (the EC, for example, was the source of some 16% of Australian exports and 23% of imports in 1987), Japan has become its single largest market, while trade with ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, China and Hong Kong has been expanding rapidly. Insofar as many of these states are still considered developing countries, Australian trade with LDCs is proportionately greater than is Sweden's or Canada's. However, trade with other regions of the South, and in particular Africa, is also "negligible", despite strong historic links with South Africa.

Aside from the composition of its trade, Australia shares another area of similarity with many developing countries: a huge and growing foreign debt, totalling over $A100 billion in early 1989. The Hawke government, in power since 1983, has pursued tight fiscal and monetary policies, and Australia's public sector now runs a small surplus; but private economic flows continue to produce aggregate deficits. Thus, despite the fact that Australia remains a very wealthy country in global terms, with a per capita GDP of US$ 17,100 in 1989, it is structurally vulnerable.

Indeed, as the world economy struggles through recession, serious structural problems have become common economic features, and multi-faceted political and foreign policy problems, for each of Australia, Canada and Sweden. Thus, as noted above, Canada's manufacturing sector is losing employment rapidly, while the federal government has been unable to control its massive fiscal deficit and is therefore losing economic capacity at a time when the country is facing serious problems of internal cohesion. And in Sweden, the great triumph of near full employment has paradoxically contributed to an economic/political crisis unprecedented in the post-war
era, rooted in stagnant growth, high inflation, and declining international competitiveness. As argued in chapter three, these separate "crises" should be viewed as manifestations of the difficult process of world-wide adjustment to a rapidly changing, ever-more globalised political economy.

3.1 Approaches to Development Assistance:

The relationship between international trade and investment and overseas development assistance (ODA) has been the subject of persistent controversy. Some have argued that ODA should be kept completely separate from commercial considerations; others that it can be effective only if designed to be coordinated with, and to complement, more equitable trade and investment policies; still others that aid inevitably reinforces patterns of structural dependence and is therefore fundamentally counter-productive. I do not intend to engage these debates, but merely to set out some dominant characteristics of aid policies in Australia, Canada and Sweden. Their approaches, while similar in some respects, form a fairly clear continuum from Sweden's large, solid and "progressive" programmes to Australia's relatively small and weak ones.

It has been argued that aid "is essentially a political activity". This is a useful starting point. However the political processes and influences -- both domestic and international -- by which aid policies are shaped will vary from country to country; and various economic, humanitarian, and more strictly political lobbies and motives will play more or less important parts. In Sweden, where both Cold War strategic allegiances and colonial economic and political ties were absent, foreign aid did not gain momentum until 1962, and "moral duty and international solidarity" were always front and centre in political justifications for it. These justifications appealed to deeply-rooted humanitarian values within Swedish political culture, rendered politically-influential through the activities of well-organized "popular movements". On this solid foundation, Swedish aid programmes developed a strong reputation for both quantity and quality. Sweden became the first industrialized country to reach the UN-set ODA target (first recommended by the Pearson
Commission) of 0.7% of GNP in 1974, and devoted 0.88% of GNP to ODA in 1987 -- one of the highest levels in the world. When, in 1984, the government tried to reduce its commitment to an aid target of 1% of GNI (Gross National Income), it was forced to back down by widespread public opposition, mobilized by groups which together constitute an influential aid lobby.40

This does not mean that Swedish aid is exclusively humanitarian in motivation. Sweden’s decisions to extend aid to North Vietnam, Cuba and Southern African liberation movements in the late 1960s and early ’70s, for example, emerged from intense domestic political debates. And Swedish ODA has also been bent to the service of domestic economic interests, though to a relatively small degree. Thus, Swedish critics have recently expressed concern over some increase in the "commercialization" of aid.41 On the whole, however, the politics surrounding Swedish aid policy have produced a programme which has remained relatively generous, recipient-oriented, and politically-popular.

The roots of Canada’s aid programme are longer, running back to the pioneering Colombo Plan formulated by Commonwealth countries in 1950, and indeed beyond it to the post-war reconstruction effort in Europe, in which Canada was a major player.42 The reputation of Canadian ODA has always been more ambiguous than Sweden’s. From the outset, it was "sullied" by partisan Cold War considerations (support for the economic development of Afro-Asian states being seen as one means of preventing them from "succumbing to Communism"43). Furthermore, Canadian policy-makers for years resolutely defended the policy of tying 80% of bilateral aid disbursements to the procurement of Canadian goods and services -- a policy which seemed to have as much to do with governmental interpretations of domestic public opinion as with the lobbying of big business.44 On the other hand, over the years Canada’s ODA also developed a reputation as a relatively large (around .5% of GNP through much of the 1980s), stable, even-handed and poverty-focused programme.45

The reputation remains ambiguous. On the positive side, the tying
requirement was reduced to 66 2/3% overall, and 50% for Sub-Saharan Africa, in the 1987 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) strategy document, *Sharing Our Future*. The document also made human resource development a "central priority" of Canadian aid, and announced a programme of decentralization with the potential, at least, to improve the responsiveness and efficiency of aid programmes (a potential which early indications suggest is in danger of going unfulfilled). On the other hand, there is concern over the still limited, but steady and unmistakeable commercialization of aid and, most obviously, large programme cuts contained in the 1989 and 1991 federal budgets. Interestingly, and in contrast with the Swedish experience, while Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a larger role (measured in terms of proportion of budgetary allocations) in the aid programme itself than do NGOs in any other OECD country, and while opinion polls continue to show strong Canadian public support for aid, the cuts did not arouse much effective public opposition. ODA proved itself a relatively soft target for budgetary restraint -- a dangerous reputation in uncertain economic times.

The Colombo Plan was primarily an initiative of the *Australian* government and its Foreign Minister, Percy Spender. While humanitarian motives received top billing in government statements at the time, T.B. Millar argues that Australian official aid was above all regarded as an instrument of diplomacy. This was in keeping with the Australian government's obsession with the threat of communism, and the search for tools to counter it. Millar, writing in the late 1970s, paints a picture of a programme which evolved in an overall atmosphere of public and political apathy:

(One does not get the impression, looking back over thirty years of aid giving, that Australia's aid was ever a conscious act of altruism, or that the electorate was taken close to the margins of generosity, or that aid was an expression of a defined policy with defined objectives. After Spender's initiative at Colombo, it just rolled on. It became a series of actions and reactions by public servants in the terms they understood. It was not directed, it directed itself; it was not evaluated, it simply evolved.

This widespread lack of interest helps to explain why Australian aid fell victim to vicious cuts in the mid-1980s, declining from 0.47% to 0.33% of GNP between
1986 and 1987. A very large share of Australian aid -- almost $A300 million of $A1023 million in total aid in 1987-88 -- goes to Australia’s former dependency, strategically-located Papua New Guinea; while on the advice of the Jackson Report on the aid programme in 1984, the remainder of bilateral expenditures have been increasingly concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region.49 While Australia’s overt tying requirements are not stringent, AIDAB (the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau) has estimated that 78% of its total aid expenditures are on goods and services sourced in Australia. Not surprisingly, Australian NGOs are relatively weak and underdeveloped, as is the AIDAB-NGO relationship -- though efforts are being made to strengthen both.50 For all this, the terms of Australian aid are quite generous. Nevertheless, Australia is simply not a very significant player in the politics of international aid beyond the South Pacific region.

4. Regional Situations

As discussed in chapter three, the global political economy is full of growing signs of regionalization. For each of Australia, Canada and Sweden -- relatively small states facing difficult structural challenges -- the need to be included in any developing regional political-economic bloc is an urgent one; while moves toward greater regional political-economic integration profoundly challenge their sovereign integrity, and perhaps ultimately their very raison d’être.

This said, the particular regional situations and challenges each faces differ substantially. For Australia, the challenge is to build itself into the future of a region with enormous and growing economic potential, but of which it is only tenuously a part. As suggested above, Australians spent a good deal of their history trying to ensure that they remained culturally and racially distinct from their regional neighbours.51 So long as their country continued to enjoy the benefits of the British system of imperial preferences, these cultural/racial goals were largely compatible with their economic interests. However, first Britain and then (to a more limited degree) the US began to draw back from their political and strategic commitments in
the region over the course of the post-war era. Britain joined the EC in 1971, marking the long-foreshadowed end of imperial preferences. Concurrently, Japan became the country's largest trading partner, and an increasing majority of its trade flowed to and from the Asia-Pacific region. Inevitably, Australians came around to the conclusion that their future lay in Asia.

Accordingly, for the past couple of decades, Australian governments have concentrated an increasing share of their international diplomatic and economic efforts within the Asia-Pacific region. Several instances of this have already been noted. The decision to concentrate aid resources in this area; the initiative producing the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group (APEC); and the extraordinary effort made in pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict are all examples. In a similar spirit, the need to expand links with Indian Ocean states has also been mooted, but has received less attention and resources.52

The transition to Asia-Pacific nation is not an easy or natural one, however. Apart from the small island states of the South Pacific, among whom Australia has long been viewed as a regional/sub-imperial power, with the responsibilities and resentments this entails,53 there remains a great deal of historic and cultural distance between Australia and its Asian neighbours. Many Australians remain ambivalent -- indeed resentful -- towards the large and growing Asian (and particularly Japanese -- the defeated former enemy) role in their economy. And Australians' high standard of living and "hedonistic" tendencies will not be easily accommodated with the relatively cheap and productive labour on which the industrial success of many of their Asian partner-competitors is based. Furthermore, it is clear that the Asia-Pacific region is much more heterogeneous -- economically, politically, and culturally -- than either North America or Europe, and that as a consequence, the progress and pattern of regional cooperation will be slower and distinctive, in only dimly predictable ways.

Canadians have always had an intensely ambivalent relationship with their elephantine neighbour. Their links with the United States have been, for many years, at once the major external source of their aggregate prosperity and security, and the
major threat to their identity and independence. The management of the relationship has therefore long featured attempts to pursue and integrate somewhat contradictory elements: "quiet diplomacy" and clear assertions of sovereignty; bilateralism and multilateralism; free trade and "Third Options". A successful Canadian foreign policy cannot neglect either strand.

Recently, Canadian foreign policy has tilted perceptibly towards closer bilateral relations with the United States, and greater involvement in the Western hemisphere of which it is the core. The FTA -- perhaps soon to be extended to Mexico; the long-deferred decision to join the OAS, inevitably entailing difficult and highly visible choices between support for the US and for Latin American states; the decisions to support the US invasion of Panama in the UN Security Council, and to quickly join the US-led military initiative in the Gulf -- all are viewed as symptomatic of this overall tilt. The degree to which greater Canadian integration, broadly conceived, with North America and the Western hemisphere reflects avoidable, and undesirable, policy choices, versus difficult accommodations to powerful structural forces, is a matter of intense controversy. Overall, however, any widespread perception of a consistent long-term tilt towards the United States will mainly hurt any Canadian government, both at home and abroad.

There has been something of the same ambivalence in the development of Sweden's post-war relations with the EC, although the Community still has nothing like the same coherence as (and is therefore less politically threatening than) the US. Clearly, Sweden's aggregate economic prosperity depends on its links with Europe: over 70% of both its import and export trade is with Western European states, of which over 50% is with the EC. The remainder is with the states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) -- now reduced to Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Austria and Switzerland (mainly countries which have had politico-strategic "special needs") -- which have free trade in industrial products with the Community.55

Until 1989, Europe as a whole maintained a shifting but stable balance, based
primarily on the Cold War cleavage between Eastern and Western blocs. The "Nordic Balance" was one element of this broader, heavily armed, European "peace"; and within it, Swedish neutrality was widely considered a key element -- a small but essential piece in this European politico-strategic puzzle. There was no incentive for Sweden to disturb the balance: its economy was prospering in the context of the EFTA-EC nexus, while its neutrality left it relatively free to pursue an active, outspoken and independent foreign policy beyond Europe.

Now the balance has been irrevocably shaken -- probably (though by no means certainly) to the long-term benefit of most Europeans -- and, as Sweden faces major economic problems, its quiet, stable relationship vis-a-vis the rest of the continent now appears untenable in both economic and political terms. A 1990 article reported that:

In a stunning series of recent policy about-faces, "the (social democratic) party leadership has said, 'Yes, there will be a bridge to Denmark; we'll build new highways around Stockholm; we'll accept nuclear power; we'll join the European community.' There's no end to it..."

Where this process of policy change, precipitated by broader European developments, will finally end is of course quite unclear at present; however there will certainly be significant ripple effects for Swedish foreign policy. What happens to Swedish neutrality, and what (should it be maintained) might it mean in the "new Europe"? What are the implications of change in the Baltic republics for the foreign policy of ethnically- and historically-close Sweden? Will the changes in Eastern Europe mean that Swedish aid is increasingly siphoned off from Third World recipients to try to help stabilize the economies and begin to heal the environments of states which are, after all, in Sweden's immediate neighbourhood? In general terms, it seems inevitable that a significantly increased share of Swedish attention, and resources, will be focused on Europe in the years to come. Already, private Swedish interests have been purchasing European assets at a greater rate than investors from any other country in the world.
5. Domestic Political Economies

It will be clear from the foregoing discussions that the political economies of Australia, Canada and Sweden have strong similarities. Each is a Western capitalist state with a high standard of living; each has traditionally had a relatively high level of government involvement in the economy (although the approaches to, and philosophies behind, this involvement have differed somewhat); each has historically instituted relatively extensive welfare state programmes (although these are increasingly coming under challenge); each has a strong staples base; and, while their economic profiles vary considerably, all have high levels of corporate concentration. Within these broad parameters, however, each country manifests important differences in the relative strength and composition of capital and labour, and in the degree to which centralized, corporatist approaches to public policy formation have been pursued.

Of the three, labour is strongest and most centralized in Sweden; and centralized, consensus-oriented, "democratic corporatist" structures of policy making have been highly developed. Over 90% of blue collar workers are affiliated with the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), which is in turn affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SAP) -- in power for all but six years since 1936 until its recent electoral defeat. 75% of white collar workers are also affiliated with two (non-partisan) trade union federations. In economic and social policy making, these labour representatives have interacted with the centralized representatives of Swedish business and government, in a policy-making process characterized by bargaining and compromise. Thus, class (in this organized form) is the most salient political division in Sweden and has, for the most part, been successfully accommodated. This approach to policy-making, and the strong impulse towards consensus-formation it embodies, has been extended to most major policy areas, including much of foreign policy.

The major elements of the "Swedish model" in economic and social policy have naturally been strongly influenced by the ideas of Swedish labour and the Social
Democrats, and have in turn influenced policy approaches in other areas. Full employment, wage solidarity in pursuit of the broader goal of social justice, and active labour market policies in support of these goals have been among the key elements of the Swedish model which, for much of the post-war era, enjoyed phenomenal success and widespread international admiration. In 1989-90, however, Sweden was beset by an economic cum political crisis for the second time in a decade (having weathered an extended crisis from the mid-1970s to the early '80s), reinforcing the view of one author that the modified Swedish model by which the previous crisis was overcome in the early '80s was less a compromise (as earlier agreements had been) than a (less stable) stalemate. Now, and recognizing that skeptics have often eagerly and prematurely predicted the imminent demise of the Swedish model, it may rightly be asked whether the historic corporatist model of centralized compromise still holds, or whether the country is headed towards a more conflictual era in relations between labour and capital, perhaps with a significantly weakened labour movement and SAP in the bargain.

The labour movement in Australia is also large and well established: 55% of employees are unionized, the majority of whom belong to Australian Council of Trade Union (ACTU) affiliates. Historically, however, Australian labour -- though linked with the ALP -- "had a limited conception of the role and goals of Labor governments", and was more interested in "consolidating its market position rather than extending non-market relations through the 'social wage'". Alan Fenna argues that in the years after Federation (1901), labour reached a modus vivendi with capital on which the subsequent pattern of insulated national development was based, including protective tariffs, 'White Australia', and compulsory arbitration for wage settlements. The complex arbitration system, reinforced by and catering to Australia's myriad craft-based unions, became part and parcel of the country's highly protected, regulated, and inflexible economic structure. Within these parameters, labour manifested only limited interest and influence vis-a-vis broader policy issues, including foreign policy (doubtless in part because of the ALP's general lack of
electoral success) -- although individual unions periodically had a direct, though short-term, impact in certain foreign policy areas through bans and boycotts. According to Millar, class lines are generally blurred and fluid: Australian society is imbued with a strong sense of egalitarianism.  

Under the ALP in the 1980s, steps have been taken towards a more formally corporatist pattern of economic and social policy making. The Hawke government engineered a labour-government-business 'Accord' at a National Economic Summit shortly after its election. Since that time, the Accord has evolved through several versions. However, organized labour does not seem to have had a significantly enlarged policy impact over this period. The ALP government, despite its rhetorical commitment to social democracy, has used the relative labour quiescence secured through the Accords primarily to move the country's policies in a neo-liberal direction, through trade liberalisation, deregulation, fiscal restraint, etc. There have been quid pro quos for labour, and some of its leaders still see some of the measures introduced under Hawke as steps towards the 'Swedenization' of Australian politics. But their influence to date has been limited.  

Such a judgement does not mean, however, that Australian corporatism has automatically or uniformly served the interests of capital, much of which, after all, benefited from protectionism -- though it clearly has served the interests of certain fractions thereof (notably transnationally-oriented elements).

Organized labour in Canada has been numerically and politically the weakest of the three, although it has not been without influence and is stronger than, for example, its counterpart in the US. The national party with which it is affiliated -- the New Democratic Party (NDP) -- has never held power federally, while Canadian capital interests have always had close and easy relations with the two "major" parties (the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives). Pratt has concluded that in Canada, "capitalist hegemony is secure", and that the country's relatively extensive social welfare system was built up as the result of "tactical concessions by a well-entrenched dominant class" in accordance with the country's dominant liberal political
ideology. More politically prominent in Canada than class divisions have been regional/provincial and linguistic divisions, underpinned by competing regional economic structures and interests. Because of these divisions, combined with the relative weakness of labour, the possibility of regular and effective corporatist policy making structures at the national level are remote. Corporatist approaches are more likely to be effected at the provincial level: indeed, economic and social policy making in Quebec has taken on a distinctly corporatist cast in recent years, while broadly corporatist ideas have been mooted in other provincial jurisdictions as well.

6. Domestic Political Cultures/Value Structures

Domestic political cultures and dominant value structures are closely related to the characteristics of domestic political economies sketched out above. The Swedish "body politic" is highly organized and centralized, in the sense that individuals are inclined to join various nationally-organized groups and to operate politically through them. "Popular movements" (co-operatives, temperance movements, religious organizations, solidarity groups, etc.), in addition to highly centralized trade union, business, and political party organizations, have been important political actors, notably vis-a-vis the Third World. This tendency, and the broader tendency towards corporatist patterns of policy making, are clearly mutually reinforcing. In addition, there is a strong impulse towards the pursuit of a national consensus on important policy issues -- also related to corporatism. Societal cleavages (fundamentally class cleavages) are assumed to be inevitable: the goal of politics is to narrow these differences and achieve workable national compromises. This does not mean that everyone agrees on the policy outcome, but that after a full and open debate, all major parties should at least be prepared to live with it.

Within this framework, certain dominant values have pervaded Swedish political discussion. One, noted above, is the emphasis placed on solidarity, both domestically and internationally. In particular, the notion of solidarity is central to
the thinking of both the trade union movement and the SAP, for whom international solidarity has been described as a "political credo". A second dominant value is reformism. The prerequisite for achieving consensus and compromise within society between potentially antagonistic class-based interests has been viewed as the pursuit of structural reforms, on a more or less continuous basis. A third widely held value, closely related to reformism, is activism: Swedish activists, through the ‘popular movements’, have been built into the mainstream of Swedish political life to an unusual degree.

Each of these values can be seen as feeding into a broader Swedish tradition of idealism. Moral and human rights issues have a high degree of political salience in Sweden. This idealist tradition was strongly reinforced in the post-war era by the country’s neutrality, which placed it outside of, and psychologically above, the Cold War. Yet at the same time, there is a strong streak of pragmatism or realism in Swedish political culture, giving to it a dualistic quality. Indeed both reformism and neutrality can be viewed as manifestations of this pragmatic streak, in addition to their relationship to idealism, insofar as they reflect practical responses, responsibly implemented, to potentially damaging external and internal challenges to the well-being of the society as a whole.

In relation to North-South issues, Cranford Pratt has identified three variants of "humane internationalism" (see chapter 2) which have been present, to varying degrees, within the political cultures of Western middle powers, along with a more narrowly self-interested realist tradition. "Liberal internationalism" "combines an ethical obligation towards the poor of the Third World, with a strong commitment to an open multilateral trading system". "Reform internationalism" combines the core elements of humane internationalism with the conviction that "an open international economic system operates to the disadvantage of weak and poor countries in persistent and significant ways", and therefore requires substantial reform. And "radical internationalism" emphasizes "an obligation to show solidarity with the poor of other lands", is hostile towards the ethics of capitalism, and is highly suspicious of the
policies of major Western countries and of the international capitalist system. In these terms, through much of the 1970s and '80s at least, reform internationalism predominated in Swedish political culture, with strong elements of both liberal and radical internationalism present and active.

**Canadian** political culture has been dominated ideologically by liberalism, in both its economic (i.e., faith in the efficacy of the market) and ethical (use of the state to provide security, alleviate hardships, and correct market excesses and failures) senses. It has also had, however, substantial minority traditions of democratic socialism and "toryism", and has in addition been highly subject to the influence of political ideas emanating from the United States, due largely to the extensive penetration of Canadian society by American media and culture. It has also been liberal in the sense that politics have been viewed in pluralistic terms, necessitating pragmatic accommodation among a wide range of competing interests -- an inevitable consequence of dealing with a country made up of so many divergent elements.

This latter idea has been reinforced historically by the dominant modes of Canadian political action. Given the diversity of regional, linguistic, economic, and societal divisions in the country, political success has traditionally required a relatively quiet, undogmatic, flexible, problem-solving approach, often termed brokerage politics. Within these parameters, there has been a commitment to ameliorating the difficulties of poorer groups and regions -- notably captured in the constitutional commitment to addressing problems of regional development -- though rarely with the vigour these groups (and often others) have seen as necessary. The process of brokering compromises has usually been an elite one. Since the 1960s, it has most often been located at the federal-provincial level in a process labelled "executive federalism".

Within these elite-driven parameters, certain values have pervaded the language of Canadian politics. Notions of tolerance, pragmatism, diversity (Canada as a "cultural mosaic"), decency and compassion have been evocative phrases, along with the themes of regional alienation and cultural dualism. Recently, however, the
appropriation of these terms by political elites, widely viewed as having done little to address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of various non-elite groups (First Nations, women, disabled people, Northerners, etc.), has contributed to the deep cynicism with which traditional Canadian political processes have come to be viewed.

In their attitudes towards the "Third World", Canadians have generally evinced a relatively high degree of compassion -- manifested, for example, in the generous response of government and people to Ethiopian famines and the support expressed for foreign aid in public opinion polls. But popular concern with Third World issues is inconsistent and, with the exception of a cadre of "Third Worldists" based primarily in NGOs, universities, and churches, does not usually extend to the view that structural reforms are required. In Pratt's terms, liberal internationalism is the predominant impulse in Canada, with a minority reform internationalist element and an even more marginal radical internationalist tradition.

It is always dangerous, as T.B. Millar notes, to generalize about 'national character' or 'style'. Australians, however, seem to be more amenable than most to this type of analysis, since they have projected a strong and distinctive set of attributes which have clearly coloured their politics. Australian society and politics are marked by brashness, outspokenness, candour. According to one author, Australian political culture is characterized by a 'rough house...larrikin tradition'. For much of its history, rich, temperate Australia seemed to many of its citizens already to have fulfilled most of its conceivable 'national objectives', and at the same time to be surrounded by threats to its privileged lifestyle. Consequently, Australian society was sometimes characterized as 'hedonistic', and frequently as conservative or status quo oriented.

All of this -- brashness, hedonism, an essentially selfish conservatism -- can be seen as symptomatic of a kind of collective cultural adolescence. However if in the past (and still to some degree) Australian politics have been pervaded by symptoms of youth, global forces of change and the sense of structural vulnerability which have beset the country in the 1980s appear to have contributed to a rapid and
sobering process of maturation.

Australian political culture has also been characterized by strong streaks of anti-totalitarianism and egalitarianism, of which the highly chauvinistic tradition of 'mateship' is symptomatic. Within this levelling ethos, differences amongst political parties have clearly existed, but have not been large. The ALP and the coalition parties do have different constituencies, but the limits to their philosophical differences are reflected in the tradition that, when in opposition, their job is to oppose as vigorously as possible, almost regardless of the policy issue in question.

Traditionally, as suggested in the discussion of foreign aid policies above, most Australians were little interested in developing countries except insofar as they appeared to threaten their own security and lifestyle. Nevertheless, there are many examples of individuals and groups within Australian society which have, over the years, manifested a strong interest in the 'Third World'. Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam (and his foreign minister Don Willesee), Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke are all examples of Australian political leaders who have been keenly interested in Third World issues -- notably Southern Africa. It may be hypothesized that the more recent political interest in South Africa is at least partly a reflection of the Australian value of egalitarianism, which South Africa has so deeply offended. Various NGOs, church-based organizations, etc., many affiliated with the umbrella Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), constitute a committed, though relatively small and weak, Third World lobby. Insofar as Australia has a humane internationalist tradition, it has had a strong streak of reformism. Australian governments have, for example, been more inclined than Canadian governments over the years to support wide-ranging international agreements to stabilize commodity prices, and the notion of 'special and differential' treatment for LDCs in agricultural and other trade areas. This tendency has doubtless been motivated in part by the similarities they share with LDCs in trade profiles and in their sense of structural economic vulnerability and victimization.

It should be added that, as the 1980s progressed, neo-conservative ideas and
ideology became more influential in each of Australia, Canada and Sweden -- part of an international trend spearheaded by the Thatcher and Reagan "revolutions", and by the demands of economic structural adjustment. Free trade and privatisation policies implemented by the Conservative government in Canada, similar policies (more vigorously implemented) from Labor in Australia, and tax reform from the SAP in Sweden all exemplified this continuing trend. It has naturally had some influence on the Third World foreign policies of all three, notably in terms of their support for the Structural Adjustment prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank.

7. Some Foreign Policy Themes and Issues

How have these various contextual factors played themselves out in the foreign policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden? A few brief comments are useful at this point, with more specific observations to follow in subsequent case study chapters.

Of all three states, *Australia* is the most unambiguously a "middle sized power" in terms of its dominant self-image. This is not surprising, given its sub-regional status as far and away the most powerful state in the South Pacific area, juxtaposed with its manifest weakness and vulnerability vis-a-vis the major actors in the international political economy: the US, Japan and the EC. In recent years, there has been considerable talk among Australian foreign policy makers and practitioners about the importance of a reputation for international responsibility; about "being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen"; about the important role in international affairs for "responsible, steady, middle sized powers", and so on. These themes are in keeping with the tradition of middle power "constructive" or "responsible internationalism" discussed in chapter two.

It has not always been thus. With certain exceptions (notably under Evatt), Australian foreign policy through much of the post-war era, particularly prior to the election of Gough Whitlam, showed little sophistication, and little real concern with the conditions of international society (i.e., little true internationalism) except insofar as they threatened the country's own narrowly conceived interests. Its primary
motives were defensiveness and fear. Its public diplomacy was, frequently, quite undiplomatic.\textsuperscript{86} Its Department of Foreign Affairs was, according to its former Secretary, Alan Renouf, hamstrung by its lack of appropriate authority and constant struggles with other jealously independent departments -- indeed it was, by the late 1970s, "in crisis".\textsuperscript{87}

The combination of Australia's weakening structural economic position and the strategic retreats of its "great and powerful friends" on the one hand, and the growing perception that its own diplomacy, though attention-grabbing, had been largely ineffectual and sometimes counter-productive, on the other, led to a process of "re-evaluation and re-thinking" in the early '80s.\textsuperscript{88} Renouf's \textit{The Frightened Country}, an extended critique of Australian foreign policy published in 1979, was probably influential in this regard, though the roots of this process may be traced back to Whitlam's attempt at foreign policy "modernization". Latterly, Australian foreign policy has manifested considerably more sophistication and strategic thinking.

Cooper, in describing the nature of this process in the international agricultural area, notes such characteristics as an increased emphasis on research, coalition diplomacy, and the need to establish \textit{bona fides}.\textsuperscript{89} Yet, as he goes on to point out, Australian diplomacy also retains much of its earlier character, including "a singlemindedness of purpose, an impatience to get results, and a propensity to risk-taking". Australian foreign policy practitioners retain a refreshing degree of candour and a propensity for "straight talk".

\textbf{Canadian} foreign policy commentators have been divided with regard to its appropriate international self-image. As noted in section one, while the middle power image has, for the most part, predominated, it has long been challenged by the view that Canada is a dependent or satellite state (primarily in relation to the US); while, since the mid-1970s, certain persistent advocates of the idea of Canada as "foremost" or "principal power" have emerged.\textsuperscript{90} As expounded in chapters two and three, I take the view that, in broad terms and for most purposes, Canada is most appropriately thought of as a middle power. Such a judgement is complicated,
however, by the fact that these labels are affected by different situational contexts, and Canada's situation is a deeply ambiguous one. Thus, proponents of the dependence/satellite view have historically emphasized the close integration of Canadian and US capital interests, and the fact that Canada has been, whether by choice or necessity, heavily dependent on the US for its wealth and security. Principal power advocates, on the other hand, have stressed Canada's insider status at the G-7 in particular, as well as at the Quadrilateral meetings (the US, Japan, EC, and Canada) in the international trade context, etc. Yet, while virtually no national politician or bureaucrat could conceive of foregoing the status which accrues from "membership" in these fora, it is interesting to speculate about the price that is paid, in terms of independence of thought and initiative, by being the smallest and weakest in the courts of the "great" -- and on what impact this may ultimately have on foreign policy "effectiveness".  

Within these broad parameters, certain themes have marked the practice, and mythology, of Canadian foreign policy -- themes which Stairs has argued have been strongly conditioned by Canada's domestic political culture (see note #71). These have included: an emphasis on practical, "functional" forms of representation and organization; a preference for "quiet diplomacy" (often seen by critics as symptomatic of satellitism); an emphasis on slow and often painstaking processes of confidence- and coalition-building; and, in broad terms, the pursuit (within liberal ideological parameters and from a Western perspective) of a more peaceful and prosperous world order, through pragmatic compromises among the diverse interests therein. Throughout much of the post-war era, and in particular in the late 1940s and '50s (sometimes termed the "golden age" of Canadian foreign policy), these themes were effectively pursued by what by most accounts was a particularly able foreign service. These practitioners helped to give Canada an international reputation as a steady, responsible, and principled state which, despite some contradictions, was not undeserved.  

The international reputations of non-great powers, more than most other
reputations, are both slowly earned and slowly lost. It is therefore difficult to tell from the "belly of the beast", as it were, what impact Canada's recent troubles have had in this regard. The spectacle of the collapse of constitutional negotiations in a welter of interest-based, regional and linguistic acrimony -- rooted at least in part in insecurities arising from the process of adjustment to changing global conditions -- and of a prolonged armed standoff between troops and Mohawk "Warriors" -- highlighting the country's historic failure to deal fairly with its original citizens -- has done the country's international reputation no good, however. Whether Canadians, and their political leaders, will now be able to face squarely and successfully the roots of these troubles, and thus re-anchor their country's international reputation, is an open question.

Although Sweden has, in global terms, "middling" economic and military capabilities, and has often displayed middle power behavioural characteristics, its dominant self-image is that of a small, non-aligned nation. Although Sweden has, in global terms, "middling" economic and military capabilities, and has often displayed middle power behavioural characteristics, its dominant self-image is that of a small, non-aligned nation. This reflects, above all, its position within Europe: relative to the continent's "great powers" -- Germany, France, the UK and, especially in the Cold War era, the USSR -- it has indeed been a small and vulnerable state. However, its position as the leading Nordic state -- a group which frequently collaborates and, together, has a weight (in population and economic terms) roughly equal to Canada's -- and its relatively confident and wide-ranging involvement in international affairs clearly set it apart from the majority of the world's truly small states.

Nevertheless, its small state self-image has fed into one of the dominant themes in post-war (particularly post-1960) Swedish foreign policy: that of 'active' foreign policy. As explained by Ole Elgstrom in 1983, "The word 'active' has been one of the most common catchwords in Swedish foreign policy debate during the last years. The concept carries a markedly positive value charge. To promise an active policy and active efforts has become comme il faut." Elgstrom links this concept with former Prime Minster Olof Palme's so-called 'small state doctrine': "Above all we stand up for the small states' right to independence in our statements". Foreign
policy activism is seen as a "preventive strategy": by being active in defence of small states' rights, and in particular those of developing small states, Sweden has hoped to strengthen, as an international norm, the idea that those rights (and thus its own) should be treated with respect; and that international affairs should operate, to the greatest extent possible, on the basis of widely recognized rules and institutions. The means for pursuing such an active foreign policy have included, on this view, strong support for the UN, active mediation between antagonistic countries and camps (East and West, North and South), the provision of foreign aid (in part "to annul a latent conflict risk, caused by the frustration and betrayed expectations of the poor"), and outspoken criticism of perceived violators of small states' rights (most famously vociferous criticism of US involvement in Vietnam).96

These elements of active foreign policy clearly fall within the strong idealist tradition in Swedish political culture, noted above. At the same time, other aspects of Swedish foreign policy -- notably its trade and defence policies, particularly in the European arena -- have quietly reflected the parallel, pragmatic or realist tradition. Internationally-oriented Sweden has carefully nurtured its reputation as a free trader, and worked hard at securing and extending free trade within EFTA and between EFTA and the EC. The Swedish government was for years very reluctant to adopt sanctions against South Africa despite unusually strong public pressure to do so, primarily because of concern over the precedent that would be set. It has not, however, hesitated to go along with other industrialized European states in disrupting free trade in agricultural products or textiles, despite the deleterious effects of such actions on developing countries.97 Similarly, Sweden's idealism has not taken a pacifistic form: defence expenditures have been quite high and conscription has ensured a relatively large pool of citizens with military training, putting the emphasis on the "armed" aspect of armed neutrality. Indeed, it may be hypothesized that, given the traditional Swedish penchant for compromise and social peace, an implicit foreign policy bargain was sustained through much of the post-war era, in which policies towards relatively peripheral Third World areas were left more or less
completely to the more radical/idealistic elements in Swedish society, in exchange for social peace on the more "practical" core concerns of European economic and security affairs.

**Conclusion**

It is clear from the foregoing that Southern Africa is not, and is unlikely ever to become, a "core interest" to Australia, Canada or Sweden in either strategic or economic terms. To many foreign policy analysts and practitioners, this fact leads to the conclusion that it is quite inappropriate to expend large amounts of diplomatic and economic capital on it. Alan Renouf captured this perspective nicely, arguing that there should only be two true goals of Australian (and, by implication, any country's) foreign policy: to preserve it from attack, or the threat thereof, and to safeguard its sovereign independence; and to advance its peoples' economic and social well-being. All other foreign policy goals should be subsidiary to these two. Not surprisingly, he later argued that:

(T)here is no good reason why Australia should be in the forefront of South Africa's critics (a fault of both Whitlam and Fraser governments). Australia must voice her distaste of apartheid and join in all reasonable efforts to end it. However, Australia has no valid ground for being one of apartheid's most vociferous critics. 68

This is an appealingly parsimonious, but oversimplified and ultimately misleading, perspective on foreign policy. In fact, the preceding observations also imply a number of ways in which an active Southern African policy has dovetailed neatly with the broader foreign policy influences and interests of Australia, Canada and Sweden. These include: their shared interest in, and commitment to, effective multilateral organizations -- notably the UN and the Commonwealth, in both of which Southern Africa has unavoidably been a prominent issue; their need, both internationally and domestically, to distinguish themselves from the major Western powers on which they have all been, to varying degrees, highly dependent; the presence in the political cultures of each of humanitarian values and lobbies of differing strength, which may (putting it cynically) be indulged with relatively little
political or economic risk through an active Southern African policy; and a genuine, if often remotely felt, enlightened self-interest in a more stable, peaceful and prosperous world order, to which the white minority regime in South Africa has been a clear obstacle.

But what were the characteristics and conditions of the Southern African region towards which policies were directed in the 1980s? And what avenues were available for external states, including Australia, Canada and Sweden, to make useful and/or politically appealing contributions to the goals of change, peace, and development in this region? It is towards these questions that chapter five is directed.

NOTES


2. Much of the statistical information in this section is drawn from the 1989 annual OECD Economic Surveys of Australia, Canada, and Sweden. Additional sources include *Australia in Brief*, Australian Overseas Information Service, Canberra, 1988; and a number of informative "Fact Sheets on Sweden" published by the Swedish Institute in Stockholm.


11. See Wolfe, 158-59.

12. See Millar, 156-158 and 386-387; and Renouf, 2.


14. See Millar, chapters 11--"The American Lifeline", 13--"Malaysia and Singapore", and 14--"The SEATO Region".


17. Confidential Interview, 19 October 1989.

19. Interestingly, from Renouf's Australian perspective, recorded in 1979, Canada and Sweden are the two middle powers which, above all others, have been able to "present (themselves) to the world as ...worthy, responsible, and principled member(s) of the international community...by displaying knowledge of other countries, appreciation of their problems and willingness to co-operate constructively, as far as (they) can, in solving both bilateral issues and important international issues". This assessment would no doubt bemuse some of the more trenchant critics of both Canadian and Swedish foreign policy! See Renouf, 535.

20. M. Donald Hancock, *Sweden, the Politics of Postindustrial Change* (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1972), 244.


24. See Protheroe, 6-10.


26. While the positions adopted by Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands in particular during the NIEO negotiations have generally been applauded among analysts sympathetic to the Third World, it has also been noted that their championing of compromise may ultimately have contributed to the failure of negotiations by sustaining the false impression amongst G-77 members that substantial Northern concessions were possible, long after it should have been clear that they were not. It has also been cynically suggested that their efforts might not have been so vigorous, given their own economic self-interests as advanced capitalist states, had they believed that the negotiations had a realistic chance of success. On the LMG, see Asbjorn Lovbraek, "International Reform and the Like-Minded Countries", in Pratt, ed., *Middle Power Internationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1990), esp. 62-65.


29. Magnus Blomstrom, "Sweden's Trade and Investment Policies vis-a-vis the Third World", in Gerald K. Helleiner, ed., *The Other Side of International Development* (Toronto: U of T Press, 1990), 177-184. The information in the remainder of this paragraph is drawn from this source.

30. Horvath and Daly, 2.


34. See Warwick Armstrong and John Bradbury, "Industrialisation and Class Structure in Australia, Canada, and Argentina: 1870-1980", in *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, Vol. 5*, 58.


43. Appavoo, 102; and Robert O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa", in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismail, eds., *Canada and the Third World* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1976), 103–104.

44. Appavoo, 323; and Real P. Lavergne, "Determinants of Canadian Aid Policy", in Stokke, ed., 69.


48. Millar, 377; see also all of chapt. 24, "Australia's Overseas Aid", 368-377.


50. Interview with AIDAB official, 10 November 1989.

51. Millar wrote in 1978: "...whatever the reasons or the rationalisations given, most Australians have for a century acted mainly from an unreasoned fear and hostility to support their governments in excluding all but a small number of permanent coloured settlers". Millar, 13.


54. Millar, 17.

55. Virtually all of the remaining EFTA states are now actively considering applying for EC membership. See "Inner space", The Economist, 18 May 1991, 53-54.

56. Nils Lundgren, chief economist of the state-controlled Nordbanken, quoted in Moore, "Swedish Bridges Coming Up".

57. Many of these questions and issues were suggested to the author, before the Berlin Wall came down, by Bo Huldt, director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in an interview, Stockholm, 25 September 1989. It is noteworthy that some Swedish assistance has already been allocated to help with the environmental clean-up in Poland.

58. According to Moore, in the second quarter of 1990, Swedish interests spent 5.6 billion European currency units (ECUs--US$ 8.6 billion) on 50 acquisitions within the EC. The next largest source of investment, the US, trailed Sweden by over one billion ECUs. See "Swedish bridges coming up".


61. See Milner, "Social democracy a model no more?"; and John Gray, "'Ungrateful' Swedes eager to rid country of social democracy", The Globe and Mail, 14 May 1990.

62. In fact, the development of the labour movement in Australia was unusually early by international standards; and the first labour government in the world was elected in Queensland in 1899. See Alan Fenna, "Corporatism and Class Politics in Australia: The ACTU-ALP 'Accord' in Comparative Perspective", paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec, June 1989, 11.

63. See Fenna, 12.

64. Millar, 17 and 45.

65. See Fenna for a good discussion of these issues. See also Andrew F. Johnson, "The Ideology of Canadian and Australian Welfare States in Transition", paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec, June 1989.


68. See Lovbraek, 33.

69. On this dualistic tendency in Swedish foreign policy specifically, see Cole, "Sweden's Security Policy in the 1980s".


71. The distinction between economic and ethical liberalism is used by Pratt in his "Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism", 49-51, borrowing from the work of Ronald Manzer, Public Policies and Political Development in Canada (Toronto: U of T Press, 1985).

72. This is Denis Stairs' theme in an article relating Canadian foreign policy to Canadian domestic political culture. See Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (4), December 1982.


74. Interestingly, the Australian government, in defending itself from charges that its own famine response was inadequate, argued "that as a proportion of GNP Australia's emergency aid to Africa was the world's second highest, after Canada's". The Age, 26 December 1984, cited in David Goldsworthy, "The Hawke Government and Africa: Hands Across the Indian Ocean?", in Australian Outlook 39 (3), December 1985, 139.

75. Although Pratt is not, on the whole, optimistic about the strength and future of humane internationalism of any variant in Canada, especially at the level of official policy. See "Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism".

76. Millar, 17.


78. See Millar, 17 and 433; Renouf, 15; Camilleri, 29.
79. Renouf, 14.


81. Renouf, 17.

82. Interview with AIDAB official, Harare, 10 November 1989.

83. See Cooper, 9, 13, 17.

84. Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 15 February 1989, "Australia and Africa: A Developing Partnership", 7; and interview with T.B. Millar, Director, Australian Studies Centre, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 20 December 1989. In addition, however, Australians have often perceived themselves as a small, minor, or victimized power in the context of the IPE, on the one hand; while Renouf notes (referring to an earlier period in Australian foreign policy) that, "So many Australian politicians fail to understand that Australia is not a great power and is barely a middle power". See Richard Higgott, *Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia*, 18; Cooper, 21-22; Renouf, 531-532.


86. Cooper cites some delightful descriptions of Australia's international agricultural diplomacy, including 'wild buffalo', 'bushranger', and 'bull in the China shop' diplomacy. See Cooper, 8 and 12.

87. See Renouf, chapter 13, "The Department of Foreign Affairs in Crisis".

88. Cooper, 12.

89. Cooper, 12-15. Other examples of the use of these techniques may be identified in Australia's attempts to help engineer a settlement in Cambodia and, as we shall see, in some aspects of its recent policy towards Southern Africa.


91. For a humorous and cynical popular view of Canada's summit status, see Allan Fotheringham, "Canada's fictional role at summits", *Maclean's* 24 July 1989.
92. This is a persistent theme in John Holmes's *The Shaping of Peace* (2 Volumes)—although it should in fairness be kept in mind that Holmes was himself one of this happy band of diplomats. It has also been a theme in a number of academic histories and biographies, and memoirs of those involved. See, for example, James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Vol. III: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: U of T, 1972); J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981); and Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2*.

93. See, for example, Renouf's comments in this regard from an Australian perspective, 6-7 and 535.


96. See Elgstrom, esp. 273; and Hancock, 248-255.

97. See Blomstrom, "Sweden's Trade and Investment Policies vis-a-vis the Third World".

98. Renouf, 532 and 1.
Chapter 5

Southern Africa in the 1980s: the Trauma of Change and Avenues for External Involvement

The decade of the 1980s in Southern Africa was framed by dramatic and much-celebrated changes, in each case portending even more important changes to come. In early 1980, Zimbabwe threw off white settler rule, electing one of two national liberation movements (ZANU-PF) as its first majority-ruled government. Shortly thereafter, the majority-ruled states of the region launched the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the avowed goal of pursuing economic liberation to underpin political liberation. White minority rule had been rolled back to apartheid South Africa and occupied Namibia.

In 1989, Namibia held pre-independence elections under UN supervision; and by March of 1990, it too had become independent under a government controlled by its "authentic" liberation movement (SWAPO). In February of the same year, South African State President F.W. de Klerk announced major steps towards a negotiated ending of apartheid, including the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the release of Nelson Mandela. These actions made the formal demise of apartheid inevitable, and held out the imminent possibility of the forging of more peaceful and prosperous regional relations, though the precise length, degree of associated violence, and outcomes of these processes remained highly uncertain.

In the interim, however, regional states and peoples became, for the most part, poorer and less secure.¹ The causes of this overall trend were several, and controversial. They certainly included domestic problems -- among them "serious institutional and policy weaknesses and failures, including poor management of national affairs, and low levels of public accountability in some cases".² While national governments cannot be absolved of their share of responsibility, however, their countries’ trials emanated primarily from factors largely beyond their immediate control, identified by Douglas Anglin as the "triple afflictions" of drought, debt, and
(South African) destabilization. Above all, destabilization caused severe human, economic, and environmental suffering and loss, to Angola and Mozambique in particular. These afflictions in turn raised major challenges for those external states which professed a desire to help advance change, development and security in Southern Africa.

This chapter sets out, in broad brush fashion, some key characteristics of the political and economic context towards and within which the Southern African policies of Australia, Canada, and Sweden were made. The picture which emerges is a complex one, involving a mix of conflict, particularly at the politico-strategic ('superstructural') level, and cooperation, especially at the regional economic ('substructural') level. To focus on either level exclusively is misleading. The chapter also sets out the main policy avenues open to external (particularly Western) states during the 1980s, implicitly suggesting that despite the ambiguous motives underlying their policies, there were ways in which they could usefully contribute to the processes of change, development and security in the region.

For reasons discussed in the introduction to this thesis, I have chosen to emphasize policies relating to SADCC and its member-states -- i.e., the region beyond the Republic of South Africa (RSA) itself. However, this distinction cannot be rigidly enforced. South Africa's influence (economic, political, strategic and social) throughout most of the region has been ubiquitous. It has long been recognized that the development and security prospects of most regional countries are deeply affected by their relations with the RSA, and should be enhanced by the ending of apartheid (although it does not necessarily follow that the ending of apartheid will usher in a regional millennium of peace and prosperity). Indeed, the considerable interest expressed by external states in SADCC and its members over the past decade, and SADCC's own genesis and organizational resilience, owed much to the presence of, and opposition to, apartheid South Africa within the region. Thus, among the most important ways in which external states could support the development and security prospects of the SADCC grouping were those designed to
help promote the ending of apartheid, and the creation of a non-racial democracy, in South Africa itself.\(^5\)

### 1. Historic Development of the Southern African Political Economy

The historic development of the present, turbulent Southern African political economy was shaped by the interplay of European-financed capitalist economic development; European colonialism, and in particular white settler colonialism and nationalism; and, more recently, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles of indigenous groups, liberation movements, and states. Underlying these relatively modern forces are, of course, ancient socio-cultural and linguistic affinities and rivalries among the region’s indigenous peoples -- i.e., various interlocking "ethnicities".\(^6\) These forces have created a coherent, though diverse, regional political economy and culture.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the "mineral revolution" in South Africa drew vast amounts of capital investment into the region, primarily from the London capital market.\(^7\) This investment stimulated the subsequent development of transportation, communication, farming, commercial, labour migration, and land use patterns forming the basis of the present-day regional economy, which was (and remains) in turn linked to the British and other Western capitalist economies through finance and trade. South Africa -- the starting and focal point for rapid capitalist development -- soon became the dominant world producer of diamonds and gold.

Mineral discoveries in the interior of the region, and the European obsession with uncovering a ‘Second Rand’\(^8\), drew capital and settlers into these areas, stimulating the construction of an efficient regional transport system. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century "railway boom" created the main elements of the region’s present transportation linkages, and strongly influenced subsequent European settlement patterns and urbanization (see map).

From the early twentieth century, African commercial agriculture went into decline throughout the region as colonial states began supporting European
commercial farmers, and their alienation of the best African land. Africans were displaced onto overcrowded 'reserves' and, by the 1930s, their commercial farming activities had been virtually destroyed. They were thus forced, purposefully, onto the European labour market, forming the basis for the region's extensive migrant labour system, particularly in mining, agriculture, and domestic employment.

From the 1930s onwards, South Africa was entrenched as the region's leading manufacturing centre. Rapid industrialization, especially after World War II, was driven as much by political as economic considerations. The Afrikaner nationalist state embodied in the National Party (NP) regime first elected in 1948 pursued a strong, diversified national economy via protection, parastatals, etc. The result was a highly-interventionist "state capitalism", in which a strong, racist state and strong, oligopolistic corporate interests cooperated in a system characterized by Shaw as having increasingly overt tendencies towards a racist form of authoritarian corporatism. While the manufacturing industries which emerged were often dominant by regional standards, they remained inefficient and vulnerable in global terms, contributing to the structural crisis of the South African economy in the 1970s and '80s. They thus became a source of South African "vulnerability interdependence" vis-a-vis SADCC states, as key South African manufacturing sub-sectors relied on exports to "Africa" (mainly Southern Africa) to achieve adequate economies of scale and earn vital foreign exchange.

From the late 1930s, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) consolidated its position as a secondary regional centre linked to, but potentially rivalling, South Africa as a focus for white settler colonisation, capital accumulation, and industrial development. The short-lived Federation of (Northern and Southern) Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-63) strengthened its status as the political, economic, and infrastructural hub of the "Central African" area, and stimulated further social interaction among the peoples of the area. Close connections were also consolidated with Portuguese Africa/Mozambique, through transport links and labour migration, and South Africa. Ironically, UN sanctions imposed during Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Southern Africa

Source: Apartheid Terrorism, the Destabilisation Report, xviii.
Independence (UDI -- 1965-80) initially stimulated unprecedented development and diversification in Rhodesian manufacturing, agriculture, and agricultural processing -- as well as even stronger trade and investment links with the RSA. Nevertheless, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe remained (and remains) heavily dependent on exports of primary commodities to Northern markets, especially in Europe.

Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and Angola were also regarded as colonies of settlement -- indeed as provinces of Portugal by their colonial rulers. Of Mozambique, Allen Isaacman has written that "From the outset, the most salient feature of Portuguese colonialism was the absence of development capital," affording South African and British investors "a strategic entry point from which they would dominate the Mozambican economy." The colony's economy depended on remittances from the wages of migrant labourers in South Africa, paid directly to the Portuguese colonial state, and on income from ports and railways servicing the export industries of South Africa and Rhodesia. At independence in 1975 under Frelimo, an avowedly Marxist liberation movement, most Portuguese settlers abandoned the country, leaving behind an impoverished and 93% illiterate population.

Angola -- a country of great potential, with a rich natural resource base including oil and diamonds -- was only tenuously linked to the emerging Southern African regional economy. In particular, and in contrast to Mozambique, its links with South Africa were minimal (see Table 1). Its primary link with the regional economy was the Benguela railway, or 'Lobito Corridor', connecting the coastal port of Benguela with the Zambian Copper Belt. Completed in 1929, it has been largely unoperational since 1975 due to civil war-related disruptions.

Similarly, Namibia (ex-South West Africa) had limited historic links with the region as a whole. Wrested from Germany during World War I, it was placed under South African control as a League of Nations Mandate territory. Administered as a de facto province/colony of South Africa, Namibia’s mineral-rich economy was tightly integrated with South Africa’s, but had minimal ties with neighbouring Botswana and the Central African states beyond.
Table I
Sources and destination of imports and exports of SADCC, 1985 (US$ x 10⁶)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SA (per-cent)</th>
<th>SADCC (%)</th>
<th>Africa (%)</th>
<th>DCs (%)</th>
<th>LDCs (%)</th>
<th>World Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola (X)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>482.6</td>
<td>2190.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>856.3</td>
<td>439.7</td>
<td>1318.9</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>97</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>58.9</td>
<td>225.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>302.32</td>
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<td>(74.7)</td>
<td>(23.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>(11.4)</td>
<td>133.6</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>149.6</td>
<td>255.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.63</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>56.02</td>
<td>88.02</td>
<td>174.3</td>
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<td>(14.8)</td>
<td>(32.1)</td>
<td>(50.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>(7.2)</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>246.7</td>
<td>182.4</td>
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<td>(51.4)</td>
<td>(38.0)</td>
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<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>64.9</td>
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<td>494.9</td>
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<td>(7.9)</td>
<td>(66.0)</td>
<td>(33.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe*</td>
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<td>106.5</td>
<td>153.6</td>
<td>511.6</td>
<td>264.0</td>
<td>798.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(64.1)</td>
<td>(33.1)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>(13.6)</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>350.7</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>624.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(14.8)</td>
<td>(56.1)</td>
<td>(21.7)</td>
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<td>Mean/total b</td>
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<td>173.5</td>
<td>293.6</td>
<td>3159.7</td>
<td>1221.0</td>
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<td>39.1</td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td>(70.4)</td>
<td>(27.2)</td>
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<td>397.2</td>
<td>2574.2</td>
<td>1437.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.4)</td>
<td>(60.6)</td>
<td>(33.9)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X and M stand for exports and imports respectively. The same applies in all rows.

* Imports are fob not cif.

b In column 1, the figure is a mean; the rest are totals.

Source: Data compiled by Chingambo from various sources. See "SADCC and South Africa", Round Table 308, 1988.
### Table 2

Basic country profiles in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km² × 10⁶)</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>GDP (US$ billion)</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4903</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Lloyd John Chingambo, "SADCC and South Africa", Round Table 308, 1988
2. Southern Africa Since Decolonization

In general, the region’s political boundaries were superimposed on the emerging regional economy through European colonial manoeuvring, as well as interaction with the then-Union of South Africa and indigenous leaders. For the most part, as in the rest of Africa, scant regard was given to pre-existing ethnic and linguistic divisions. The resultant post-colonial states were and are highly diverse (see Table 2), varying widely in territorial and population sizes, resource endowments, relative wealth/indebtedness, ethnic diversity, and professed ideology (although ideological distinctions have been dramatically reduced, largely due to the imposition of IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment prescriptions and conditionalities and, latterly, the demise of the Cold War).18

Despite sustained economic difficulties from the mid-1970s, and increasing international isolation, South Africa has clearly remained the dominant economic and strategic power in the region.19 That said, the degree of SADCC states’ dependence on South Africa, as well as the nature of their relations with the ‘apartheid state’, have varied dramatically (see Table 3). There is, in fact, a rather steep hierarchy among SADCC states in terms of their economic and strategic capabilities and condition. Chan distinguishes three categories of regional states -- ‘weak’, ‘revolutionary’, and ‘strong’ -- with reference to the 1978-88 period. In the first category he includes Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland -- the sparsely populated and landlocked former ‘High Commission Territories’. All became formally independent in the mid-1960s, but remained deeply dependent on South Africa. In 1969, they formalized a historic customs union arrangement with South Africa, together constituting the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).20 All three obtain more than 80% of their imports from or through South Africa; and all, but especially Lesotho, have relied on income from migrant labourers working in South Africa. To these three, we might reasonably add Malawi and Namibia as relatively ‘weak’ and vulnerable regional states.
**Table 3**

Estimates of SADCC dependence on SA in 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADE</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports to SA (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from SA (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of which are SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum production</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>A&amp;L</td>
<td>A&amp;L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Extra SADCC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport through SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant labour ('000s)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances as % of GDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of imports</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from SACU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total value</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of government revenue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of imports</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA tourists ('000s)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are in millions US dollars.

Note: A&L stands for all aviation and lubricants.

Source: Lloyd John Chingambo, "SADCC and South Africa", Round Table 308, 1988
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main Export</th>
<th>% Share</th>
<th>Three main Exports</th>
<th>% Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola (1985)</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Oil, Ref. petroleum</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liquified gas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (1986)</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Diamonds, Nickel/Copper Beef</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho (1985)</td>
<td>Mohair</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Mohair, Wool Clothing</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (1986)</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (1987)</td>
<td>Prawns</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Tea, Sugar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Prawns, Cashewnuts Petroleum</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland (1986)</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Tea, Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (1986)</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>Wood Pulp, fruit</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (1987)</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Coffee, Cotton</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe (1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Copper, Electricity Zinc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco, Gold Ferrochrome</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SADCC Regional Economic Survey, 1988
Yet amongst these superficially-similar states, there are also significant differences in relative autonomy and prosperity, derived from historic, geographic, resource endowment, and domestic political differences. Amongst the three ‘BLS states’, Lesotho is at one extreme. Completely surrounded by the RSA, it is the weakest and most vulnerable state in the region. Its vulnerability was graphically demonstrated in 1986 when, through a blockade of the country, South Africa was able to induce a coup displacing the troublesome regime of Leabuah Jonathan with a compliant military government. At the other extreme, Botswana has succeeded in maintaining a principled political distance from South Africa, allowing it to play an important role in the Frontline States (FLS) and SADCC; and, primarily through carefully managed post-independence diamond wealth, has become one of the "richest" states (per capita) in the region.

Southern Africa’s erstwhile ‘revolutionary’ states -- Angola and Mozambique -- were regarded by apartheid South Africa as particularly acute threats, due to their Marxist ideologies, their links with Soviet Bloc states and, perhaps above all, because they "introduced to the region the proven possibility of armed struggle’s success". They were also of peculiar economic and strategic importance to landlocked SADCC states because they contained the only non-South African outlets for extra-regional trade. This confluence of factors ensured that they became the pre-eminent targets of South Africa’s destabilisation activities during the 1980s, with devastating results (see section five).

Mozambique’s tragic decline through this period has been attributed by Isaacman to "a conjuncture of three sets of factors --a distorted colonial economy excessively dependent upon South Africa, a set of misguided or poorly implemented state and party policies, and, above all else, Pretoria’s aggressive economic, military and political offensive" (the weighting of these factors varies, depending upon the ideological predilection of the commentator). In Angola, the combination was different: as noted above, its economic links with South Africa are negligible, and its fluctuating but substantial foreign exchange earnings from oil allowed the government
to sustain its civil war effort without experiencing the social and economic collapse confronted by Frelimo. Nevertheless it, too, was drawn destructively into the regional politico-strategic equation through South Africa’s prolonged occupation of parts of its south, and support for the MPLA regime’s rival, UNITA; and as host, after 1975, to Namibia’s SWAPO. Between 1975 and 1989, it was also an arena for direct superpower competition. The USSR providing advisors and aid to the MPLA, and Cuba some 30,000 troops, while the US provided ‘covert’ military aid to UNITA. With the country devastated by conflict, all parties are now seeking paths to peace.\textsuperscript{24}

Socialism, if it survives at all in these two states, is in cold storage. Both are implementing IMF/World Bank SAPs, with their liberalizing menu of economic reforms, and both ruling parties are now committed in principal to multi-party democracy.\textsuperscript{25} There are certainly positive aspects of these reform packages; but the loss of much effective control to remote and unaccountable International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is lamentable, and the possibility of successfully melding onerous structural adjustment strictures with democratization has to be regarded with skepticism.\textsuperscript{26} Ultimately, with peace, Angola may yet become one of the region’s ‘strong states’, while Mozambique’s prospects, though improving, remain bleak.\textsuperscript{27} In both cases, the ‘revolutionary state’ appellation is probably of historical interest only.

The region’s ‘strong states’, in Chan’s taxonomy, are Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is now difficult to conceive of Zambia as strong by virtually any standard. Dependent on exports of a single, declining commodity (copper) for over 90% of its foreign exchange earnings (see table 4), the economic fortunes of this once-relatively prosperous state have tumbled precipitously since the drastic and sustained decline of copper prices in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{28} Accumulating a massive foreign debt, Zambia was forced to adopt an IMF/World Bank SAP in 1986. Its decision to break with the IMF in 1987 in the face of widespread domestic unrest, and subsequently to return to the IMF fold, further damaged the government’s credibility with international donors,
on whom it is now exceedingly dependent. Huge disparities in wealth, pervasive corruption, and mounting social disorder now plague Zambian society.

Yet particularly prior to Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Zambia and its recently-defeated President, Kenneth Kaunda, enjoyed considerable international moral authority as the heart and personification of the "free" states of Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{29} This image was strongly reinforced by Kaunda's decision to impose UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1973, incurring enormous costs which were only fractionally compensated for by international aid.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, a frequently overlooked causal factor in Zambia's current economic plight is the cost it incurred in support of liberation struggles in the region. Kaunda has periodically attempted to parlay his moral authority into diplomatic influence, through well-meaning but often poorly-conceived efforts to secure regional change through mediation. Through the 1980s, despite his country's problems, and what Chan has termed "his exaggerated nobility and posturing", he retained some residual respect on the international scene.

Since its independence, Zimbabwe has emerged as the strongest of the SADCC states, and beautiful Harare as a much favoured locale for foreign diplomatic missions and regional offices of international organizations. Its relatively developed manufacturing base and strategic location in terms of regional transport links made it the linchpin and prerequisite for the SADCC project, discussed subsequently. Indeed, one of the persistent \textit{sotto voce} fears expressed within SADCC was that, should it become an effectively integrated regional grouping, the bulk of the benefits could well accrue to Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{31} Nevertheless, Zimbabwe also faces mounting problems -- for example: chronic foreign exchange shortages; seriously inadequate rates of job creation; and growing popular dissatisfaction with the government's inability to deliver on the promised benefits of independence, juxtaposed with the growing wealth of the new black elite and evidence of corruption. Zimbabwe is also likely to be strongly challenged by the emergence of a post-apartheid South Africa, drawing off much of the international attention and goodwill from which it has benefitted.

Tanzania, the tenth SADCC member, has only relatively new and limited
linkages with Southern Africa. Geographically and historically a part of East Africa, it formed the East African Community with Kenya and Uganda shortly after independence. The EAC’s acrimonious demise strongly influenced the thinking of the country’s respected President, Julius Nyerere, concerning the conditions for success of African regionalism, and stimulated Tanzania’s increasing turn to the south. Its growing ties with Southern Africa were driven mainly by political considerations. They consisted primarily of its role as host and stalwart supporter of the major Southern African liberation movements; and the Chinese-financed Tazara Railway, completed in 1975, which linked Zambia with the port of Dar Es Salaam. In addition, Nyerere was chair of the Frontline States from its inception in 1976 until his retirement as President in 1985. Tanzania has retained some of the political influence built up within the region under Nyerere, but remains on its geographic and economic margins.

All the states of the region, including South Africa, have remained highly dependent on trade with the North. This trade consists for the most part of relatively unstable primary commodity exports, and higher value added secondary imports (see tables 1 and 4). As a corollary, SADCC states in particular still trade only a minimal amount with each other according to official statistics — although this data is not very reliable, and fails to capture the growing volume of "informal" exchange within the region. Furthermore, most regional states, again including South Africa, are to varying degrees constrained by external debt, and by the strictures of structural adjustment. Thus, there are a range of important bases upon which Western states and institutions have been in a position to exercise influence over regional states and institutions.

3. Prelude to the 1980s

Prior to the mid-1970s, much of Southern Africa remained stubbornly resistant to the decolonising "winds of change" sweeping through the rest of the continent. With the RSA, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Portuguese East Africa all
apparently firmly in white and/or colonial hands, South Africa’s white supremacist cordon sanitaire seemed secure. This was the view of the US Administration: a "confidential" National Security Council analysis of the region (NSSM #39) in 1969 concluded that "the liberation groups in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa would be unable, in each case, to overthrow the minority white regime".33 Among the formally independent states of the region, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were too weak and dependent to threaten the regional status quo. Interestingly, Larry Bowman, in his 1968 piece on "The Subordinate State System in Southern Africa", did not include Zambia in this system "on the grounds that its potential mineral wealth would successfully underwrite its strategy of disengagement from Southern Africa by a re-orientation of trade and economic links with East Africa"34 -- a hypothesis which proved excessively optimistic. In South Africa, the regional situation sustained foreign policy thinking which Chan has characterized as "naive and wishful".35

Pretoria, and Washington, had their assumptions shattered by the military coup in Portugal in 1974, rapidly followed by the independence of Mozambique and Angola under revolutionary liberation movements in 1975. The successes of Frelimo and the MPLA were inspirational to liberation movements elsewhere in the region, and to ideologically-sympathetic intellectuals, activists, and aid workers in Western states, who constituted a sympathetic transnational ‘solidarity’ coalition. But they were obviously alarming to the South African government and in some governing circles in the West -- especially Washington -- particularly when Cuban troops entered Angola in force immediately prior to its independence at the invitation of the MPLA regime (after, it should be noted, the South African Defence Force had entered the country).

South Africa’s reaction to the shattering of its regional assumptions was predictably confused and inconsistent. On the one hand, Pretoria accelerated an existing regional "detente" initiative, endeavouring to forge closer diplomatic and economic links with "moderate" black regimes. The highlight of this thrust was a
meeting between South African Prime Minister Vorster and Zambia’s Kaunda at Victoria Falls in 1975. This thrust was completely contradicted, and effectively ended, by the SADF’s ill-conceived invasion of Angola, beginning in August of the same year, aimed at preventing the MPLA from declaring independence in November. Thus began South Africa’s post-independence alliance with UNITA.  

Also through 1975, the American CIA was involved in covert operations in support of the anti-MPLA coalition, the revelation of which, in post-Vietnam America, precipitated the passage of the Clark Amendment banning military aid to anti-government forces in Angola without Congressional approval. The US Administration subsequently refused, however, to recognize the MPLA government; maintained its political support for UNITA; and repealed the Clark Amendment in 1985, legitimizing renewed military aid.

The SADF’s withdrawal from Angola in early 1976 in the face of combined Cuban and Angolan forces was a humiliating testament to poor policy preparation. Shortly thereafter, South Africa was rocked by a sustained township uprising set off by the Soweto Massacre; and in late 1977, it was for the first time subject to mandatory sanctions -- an arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council. This conjuncture led to soul-searching and re-evaluation in Pretoria, the most important product of which was the 1977 White Paper on Defence and its central concept of ‘Total Strategy’ to counter the perceived ‘Total Onslaught’ of South Africa’s Soviet-orchestrated enemies (see section five). This concept formed the basis for the subsequent pursuit of destabilization in the region; but prior to 1980, it yielded a more conciliatory approach. In 1978 the long-time Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, became Prime Minister and, shortly after taking office, proposed a "Constellation of Southern African States" (CONSAS). The CONSAS was to include the BLS states, Namibia, an independent but "moderate" Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the "independent homelands" and, as hegemon and patron, South Africa. More "radical" states could presumably be included, thereby benefitting from South African aid and investment, as and when they accepted norms of non-intervention in each other’s
(read South Africa’s) domestic affairs, and the Republic’s ‘legitimate’ security interests in the region. The scheme would have "...maintained and increased the economic dependence of neighbouring states, provided a security buffer, and given de facto recognition to the bantustans (‘homelands’) by their inclusion...". 39

The key to the CONSAS idea was the emergence of a cooperative, internationally-acceptable government of an independent Zimbabwe. In the wake of Mozambican independence, the liberation war in Zimbabwe intensified and the position of the white minority regime weakened. In addition to the power of example, Mozambique could now provide more secure bases for ZANU-PF’s armed wing (ZANLA); and the new government, in a triumph of idealism over pragmatism, imposed UN sanctions in March of 1976. 40 Cumulatively, international sanctions began to "bite", and international ostracization eroded Rhodesian resolve. In Mozambique, Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) fought back by creating the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo) as a cover for Rhodesian operations and a vehicle for disrupting road and rail links. Just prior to Zimbabwean independence, the CIO transferred responsibility for Renamo’s tutelage to the South African Military Intelligence, in collaboration with whom it became an effective and terrifying agent of destabilization. 41

The increasingly costly stalemate in Rhodesia was the backdrop to the difficult round of diplomacy which produced the Lancaster House Agreement in late December 1979, and the Zimbabwean independence elections of March 1980. This outcome was facilitated by a confluence of diverse interests: Britain, the Frontline States, South Africa, the Zimbabwean ‘Patriotic Front’ (ZANU and ZAPU), and the Commonwealth all saw significant advantages in, and made key contributions to, the settlement. 42 Pretoria subsequently poured large amounts of money into the election campaign of Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s UANC party in hopes of securing an electoral outcome favourable to its CONSAS plan. It (along with most international observers) was shocked by the eventual outcome: a sweeping victory for Robert Mugabe’s avowedly socialist ZANU-PF. Shortly thereafter, Zimbabwe joined with the other
majority-ruled states of the region in establishing SADCC -- a unanimous rejection of
the CONSAS in political terms, and an economic and political challenge to South
Africa.

The formation of SADCC, and South Africa's subsequent campaign of
destabilization against its neighbours, are the two predominant landmarks on the
regional political-economic landscape in the 1980s. They are the two key
developments enabling the scholar to treat Southern Africa beyond the RSA as a
coherent analytical field of study during this period. It is therefore to a consideration
of these two developments that I now turn.

4. SADCC: Challenge to South Africa?

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference was formally
launched on 1 April 1980. While its core was the Front-line States of Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe -- collectively engaged in,
and committed to, regional liberation struggles for many years -- it also incorporated
the "less reliable" independent states of the region (Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland)
in hopes of weaning them from their "errant ways" of cooperation with South
Africa. SADCC's proximate origins lay in the initiative of a small group of
sympathetic Europeans, on the one hand, and of FLS leaders -- particularly Kenneth
Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, and Seretse Khama of Botswana -- on the other.
Considerable attention has been given to the fact that Europeans played a key role in
launching the organization, particularly among radical analysts sensitive to evidence
of Western neo-colonial schemes and intentions. According to Ibbo Mandaza,
SADCC grew out of the "Southern African Aid Coordination Conference" (SAACC),
established in 1978 in London and staffed mainly by British citizens. The idea for
this initiative, and for SADCC, is credited to David Anderson -- the EEC
representative in Maseru.

Anderson and his colleagues, however, are described by Mandaza as
"philanthropists and/or liberals who had a long association with Africa and some of
its leaders. Their intentions, as he acknowledges, were not neo-colonial. Furthermore, the aspects of SADCC which are most often cited as serving Western interests -- its loose organizational structure, its emphasis on project cooperation and the solicitation of aid, and its preoccupation with strengthening existing transport and communications links originally created to service external (Northern) markets -- certainly reflected the interests and sensitivities of national leaders within the region, as well as those of outsiders. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the SADCC project throughout its first decade was the extent to which it retained the genuine and enthusiastic support of regional heads of state, in contrast with the experience of most other African regional organizations.

In its founding document, *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*, SADCC set out four formal objectives:

1) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
2) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
4) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.

The first two objectives were pre-eminent, and lay behind heady, if fanciful, talk of 'disengagement' and 'self-reliance' amongst SADCC members and their supporters. Yet these four goals subsumed a basic ambiguity: while SADCC spoke of reducing economic dependence both on South Africa and in general (presumably meaning the West), its goal of securing "international cooperation" to meet these aspirations implied an increase in dependence on extra-regional donor assistance, at least in the near term. Clearly, the organization's primary preoccupation was the reduction of dependence on the RSA specifically. There was, as well, a second basic ambiguity, relating to the purpose of economic disengagement in relation to the South African liberation struggle. While spokesmen routinely asserted that economic disengagement would reduce their vulnerability to South African pressure and allow more active support for the South African struggle, economic disengagement could also be taken
to imply "political disengagement and the effective abandonment of the liberation struggle". In practice, active support for the armed struggle in South Africa became unsustainable in the face of South African destabilization.

Compared with most other Southern regional economic organizations, SADCC's approach was distinctive in at least three ways: its organizational structure, its programme priorities, and its relationship with Northern donor states. First, in organizational terms, it was firmly inter-governmental, relatively decentralized and unbureaucratic, and (despite its second objective, cited above) fundamentally concerned with national cooperation versus regional integration. It was in this organizational structure that the reaction of key regional leaders against unhappy previous experiences with regionalism was most conspicuous. SADCC was framed with great deference to the sensitivity of recently decolonized states concerning their national sovereignty. Ultimate decision-making authority rested with the Summit of Heads of State, while effective authority was exercised primarily by a Council of Ministers (of Finance), both of which met at least annually. Responsibility for the coordination of individual sectors and sub-sectors was assigned to individual member-states. Thus, for example, Mozambique was responsible for transport and communications; Tanzania for industry and trade; Zimbabwe for food security; Angola for energy, etc. (see Table 5 for a list of SADCC sectors and sub-sectors). Sector coordination could be handled as the responsible country saw fit, varying from the relatively elaborate Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) in Maputo, to more typical "technical unit " within national bureaucracies.

An elaborate bureaucracy with supranational powers was deliberately avoided - a decision which suited both member-states and major donors. In 1989, the SADCC Secretariat (located in non-threatening Botswana), which is responsible for "the general servicing of the SADCC and...liaison with its specialized institutions", as well as functioning as an informal regional "think-tank", still had a core staff of under ten and a budget of under US $1 million. It should be noted that this minimalist institutional model was not unprecedented: it drew on member-states' experiences
TABLE 5

SADCC PROJECT FINANCING BY SECTOR (US$) MILLION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th># of Projects</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>Status of Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>308.14</td>
<td>291.55</td>
<td>94.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD, AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Research</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>103.79</td>
<td>91.44</td>
<td>88.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>397.98</td>
<td>356.07</td>
<td>89.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21.16</td>
<td>19.99</td>
<td>94.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>94.12</td>
<td>90.92</td>
<td>96.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>91.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Production and Animal Disease Control</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73.47</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>85.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilization</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53.91</td>
<td>50.15</td>
<td>93.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRY AND TRADE</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1271.91</td>
<td>1009.64</td>
<td>79.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.46</td>
<td>37.30</td>
<td>99.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINING</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73.38</td>
<td>66.27</td>
<td>90.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOURISM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>95.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>4719.6</td>
<td>4216.30</td>
<td>89.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>7182.81</td>
<td>6318.22</td>
<td>87.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1) The column Secured includes both local and foreign resources.
2) The column Negotiation refers to resources for which there is a clearly identified funding source and a high probability of concluding a funding agreement within a specified period.
3) The totals do not include completed or withdrawn projects.

with the FLS and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and emulated relatively informal regional economic organizations elsewhere -- notably ASEAN.

Second, with regard to its programme priorities, SADCC eschewed the market integration model pioneered by the European community and adopted (with little success) in a number of developing regions, opting instead for project cooperation in priority sectors with visible and relatively short-term "pay-offs". In general, Southern states' experience with liberal market integration (i.e., the classic free trade area-customs union-common market-economic union formulation) had been that, given their primarily North-South trade linkages and relative lack of intraregional trade and production complementarities, progress was painfully slow. Furthermore, insofar as regional trade diversion and creation effects did occur, they tended to cluster around regional "growth poles", exacerbating intraregional disparities and causing inter-state tensions and "premature politicization", leading ultimately to stagnation and/or collapse. Nowhere was this experience more keenly felt than in the East African Community.

SADCC was designed to avoid these pitfalls by emphasizing cooperation in concrete projects of "regional benefit" (i.e., involving two or more regional states) which could demonstrate the benefits of regionalism in a relatively short time frame, and thus foster organizational support among member states in an incremental fashion. From the outset, the organization's top priority was "the rehabilitation and further development of the region's physical infrastructure and service sectors of transport, telecommunications, civil aviation and energy." Unless member states were able to communicate and trade with each other and with the outside world without having to rely on South Africa, it was reasoned, SADCC's broader aspirations -- especially its desire to reduce dependence on the RSA -- would remain a pipe dream. Thus, in 1987-88 for example, projects in the vital transport and communications sector accounted for some two-thirds of the value of its "Programme of Action" (see Table 5). Critics have pointed out that these links were originally created to serve colonial North-South exchange, and that their rehabilitation and development could merely
In practice, South African-orchestrated destabilisation actually reduced the capacity of SADCC transport links to handle SADCC states' trade up to the mid-1980s, thus increasing their reliance on South African rail and port facilities -- precisely the opposite of what was sought. Whereas in the early 1980s some 50% of SADCC's extra-regional surface trade passed through South Africa, by 1986, the disruption of SADCC (mainly Mozambican) facilities had resulted in this amount being increased to 85%. By the end of the decade, however, this trend had been reversed, as SADCC projects to rehabilitate and upgrade the transportation "corridors" to Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Dar made significant progress. In particular, the Beira Corridor and port were substantially upgraded, and were being secured by Zimbabwean troops. In addition, a longer term project had been launched to investigate the rehabilitation of the Lobito Corridor through Angola. The challenge was increasingly one of maintaining this infrastructure, and maximizing its use.

Project cooperation has not been restricted to transport and communications. Substantial progress -- albeit on a smaller scale and with more limited implications -- was also made in other areas, such as energy interconnectors and agricultural research. However progress in industry and trade, upon which "equitable regional integration" will ultimately depend, has been negligible, and a consensus has gradually emerged that these areas cannot be tackled successfully without compromising SADCC's modus operandi -- that is, without compromising national sovereignty, in part through the creation of stronger regional institutions. This issue is taken up below.

The third, and most controversial, of SADCC's distinctive features was its explicit welcome of external donor involvement. According to Anglin, SADCC's members were convinced that the success of their strategy for economic liberation from South Africa required massive, sustained inputs of foreign aid. Consequently SADCC organized, from its inception, annual "Consultative Conferences" taking the form of "intimate dialogues between member governments and spokesmen of
‘cooperating’ -- that is, contributing -- governments and member agencies."\(^{55}\)

During these meetings national and international donor agencies are presented with sectoral lists of project proposals, generated by sector coordinators in consultation with member governments and approved by the Council of Ministers, which donors are "encouraged to support". Together, these sectoral project proposals constitute the SADCC Programme of Action which, by 1988, consisted of some 571 projects requiring $US6318 million in external funding (of which $US2675 million had been secured). These conferences have had the virtue of facilitating an unusual degree of donor cooperation, reflected in the number of SADCC projects which have been jointly undertaken and financed.\(^{56}\) While SADCC has made some effort to establish priorities among these programme elements, one of the major criticisms of its approach has been the extent to which donors have been able to pick and choose from "shopping lists" of projects, according to their own priorities. This criticism has been reinforced by the fact that, in deference to member-states' sovereignty, project agreements are struck with individual SADCC governments, rather than on a regional basis.

SADCC's distinctive features have been viewed by its supporters as indications of its essential pragmatism. This pragmatism has certainly been welcomed by donors, who have attended its consultative conferences faithfully and supported SADCC rhetorically, as well as devoting somewhat more resources to the region than they would have in its absence (though not, generally speaking, as much more as their rhetoric would suggest\(^{57}\)). It also served the political purposes of both donor and member states that aid to SADCC came to be widely regarded as a form of support for the struggle against apartheid -- donors because it was often a relatively "soft option" compared with imposing stronger sanctions, with considerable potential benefits for their own industries\(^{58}\); and members because it increased their own sense of common purpose and their appeal to donors. While this interpretation was not unfounded, its currency was certainly increased by its widespread political usefulness. It is noteworthy, however, that SADCC was not uniformly well received and
supported among major donors. Its strongest support came from the EC and some of its member-states, the Nordic countries, and Canada; while it received only qualified and contingent support from the US, very limited support from West Germany and Japan, and negligible support from either East Bloc (during its lifetime) or OPEC donors.59

The same distinctive, pragmatic features which both donors and SADCC member governments appreciated, at least in the organization's formative years, were the object of the radical critique of SADCC. Positing a fundamental alignment of interests between the imperialist West (led by the US) and South African state and capital interests, radical critics argued that attempting to reduce dependence on South Africa by relying on aid from Western donors was illusory.60 From this perspective, SADCC's popularity with many Western donors and its emphasis on transport routes leading ultimately to Western markets was particularly telling (although this interpretation is undermined by the differences among donor states and organizations -- the "imperialist camp" -- in their attitude towards SADCC). More widespread, and substantial, is the criticism that SADCC's weak and decentralized institutional structure has prevented it from asserting -- or indeed setting -- many of its own collective development priorities, and from tackling the crucial challenges of rationalizing regional production structures and developing intraregional trade. In this regard, SADCC's popularity among member states was clearly related to its loose structure, which prevented it from impinging on narrow state interests for broader regional purposes.61

SADCC members, and certainly the Secretariat, seem to have largely accepted the substance of the latter criticism, although they would view the issue more as one of sequence than of conception. From their perspective, it was entirely appropriate for SADCC to concentrate on infrastructure as a foundation for subsequent regional efforts, concomitantly building habits of, and commitments to, cooperation among member states (i.e., regional "confidence building"). Now, according to SADCC officials, it is necessary to focus on the optimal use of this infrastructure, requiring
new efforts in the "productive sectors". Since 1986, SADCC has been talking up the promotion of regional investment, production, and trade at its Consultative Conferences. It promoted the formation of national SADCC Business Councils and, in March 1989, launched a SADCC Regional Business Council. At its 1989 Summit, it initiated steps to give the organization legal status, implying the development of stronger regional institutions. Most ambitious of all, after extensive consultations, it adopted an elaborate "Industrial Development Strategy" in August, 1989. The strategy calls for the co-ordination of regional industrial production in a number of industrial groups (fifteen as of early 1990) in order to avoid costly and inefficient duplication; efforts to sub-contract production across national borders in order to distribute the benefits of regional production; gradual progress towards macro-economic policy harmonization, etc. Its targets, for growth in manufacturing production, foreign investment, and intra-regional trade, have been termed "overambitious" by one sympathetic observer, who nevertheless calls the document "a good starting point of an important process".

SADCC's work, in this and other areas, has certainly been complicated by the rapid pace of change in South Africa. From late 1989, when President de Klerk gave indications of a genuine commitment to reform, a rallying cry of "delinkage" from South Africa lost much of its political and economic appeal -- although the broad need to reduce dependence on South Africa, and to promote "equitable regional integration", will remain compelling in the post-apartheid era. Furthermore, developments in South Africa, not to mention Eastern Europe and the Gulf, mean it will be impossible for SADCC states to retain the same degree of donor state interest they enjoyed in the previous decade. And ultimately, the organization will have to grapple with the difficult task of integrating a post-apartheid South Africa, without being swamped by it.

In the final analysis, SADCC's concrete accomplishments have been limited; and member states are, with a few exceptions, weaker economically than they were when the organization was launched. Nevertheless, its achievements -- in attracting
increased development assistance to the region in an era of declining aggregate aid disbursements; in promoting infrastructural development and regional air and communications links; in facilitating regional military cooperation in the protection of the Beira Corridor and elsewhere in Mozambique, etc. -- have been important. Whether or not the SADCC project has succeeded in creating widespread or "grassroots" interest in regional cooperation is a matter of debate\textsuperscript{65} -- although the depth of such interest is surely limited. But in its very survival -- and thus its persistent defiance of South Africa's claim to be the indispensable regional hegemon, backed by ruthless coercive destabilization -- SADCC can certainly be judged to have made an important contribution to the demise of apartheid. It remains to be seen whether it can successfully adapt itself to a post-apartheid regional context.

5. South African Regional Destabilization

As noted in section 2, the South African Department of Defence responded in 1977 to the combined regional and domestic crises of the mid-1970s by advancing the concept of "Total Strategy" to combat the "Total Onslaught" of its enemies. Total Strategy (T.S.) posited a flexible and diverse response to this multifaceted and nebulous threat, involving the mobilization of the state's 'four power bases': political/diplomatic, economic, social/psychological, and security. According to Hanlon, the T.S. required four interrelated changes: "streamlining" (or "reforming") apartheid, to try to make it more palatable to key domestic and external interests without fundamentally altering its power structures; strengthening the military; supporting business and bringing it into partnership with the state; and creating a new regional policy (i.e., the CONSAS).\textsuperscript{66} All four were pursued, with varying (but ultimately insufficient) degrees of success. Of particular significance for regional states (aside from the goal of a new regional policy) was the strengthening of the military, and the "militarization" of South African governance through the creation and steady empowerment of the State Security Council (SSC) under the leadership of P.W. Botha.\textsuperscript{67}
As discussed previously, the regional dimension of T.S. was initially pursued "positively", via the CONSAS idea. Regional states' complete repudiation of this idea, symbolized by the launching of SADCC, forced another round of re-thinking in Pretoria (the RSA subsequently launched a truncated CONSAS with the "independent homelands"). The pause was also a function of an active phase in the negotiations with the Western "Contact Group" over Namibia, and the US elections in November of 1980. The election of Ronald Reagan was correctly interpreted in Pretoria as a substantial improvement in its international situation. Whereas the Carter Administration had been strongly concerned with human rights issues, including apartheid, the new Administration's foreign policy preoccupation was with the "global" confrontation with the USSR and its allies -- implying a softer line towards the staunchly anti-Communist RSA. Washington's subsequent adoption of the policy of "Constructive Engagement" with South Africa (advocating reform through 'friendly persuasion' of the 'reformist' white government) was a major enabling factor in the subsequent pursuit of destabilization.

Total Strategy became dramatically more coercive from the beginning of 1981. The destabilizing techniques adopted were diverse and flexible, in keeping with the theory behind T.S. They included propaganda, disinformation, and threats; diverse forms of economic coercion, or sanctions, styled the 'flexible squeeze' by Anglin; national surrogate movements, with indigenous roots and local strength of varying, but mostly shallow, depth; and periodic direct strikes by the SADF against targets in neighbouring states. Of particular strategic significance was South Africa's ability to dominate regional transport, allowing it (for example) to hold up shipments of oil or crucial capital goods to neighbouring states, raise the cost of SADCC exports by forcing them to use longer South African routes versus SADCC routes, and earn valuable foreign exchange from SADCC states in the process. Thus, as noted above, regional transport and economic infrastructure were major targets of both surrogate and SADF strikes, increasing (despite SADCC) regional states' dependence on the South African transportation network up to the mid-1980s. The two most efficient,
and extensively used, techniques of destabilization were the economic 'flexible squeeze' and the violent activities of local surrogates.

The broad goals of these destabilizing activities were not always clear-cut, and appear to have been the subject of persistent controversy even within the SSC. The most frequent publicly offered justification was "to prevent the neighbouring states from harbouring ANC and SWAPO 'terrorists' and to destroy the 'terrorists' in their lairs". This justification was for the most part specious, since South Africa's immediate neighbours did not dare allow ANC or SWAPO bases on their territory (although guerrillas did sometimes transit their territory, with or without their knowledge), and the RSA's terrorist 'targets' were usually the homes of non-military refugees and/or local citizens. Nevertheless, South Africa's coercive acts did serve a useful pre-emptive function -- i.e., pre-empting the possibility of ANC bases being established -- and served useful public relations functions at home.

A second goal might be described as the reassertion by coercion of the CONSAS ideal: the creation of a regional 'community' under South African hegemony, within which neighbouring states would be economically linked to (and dependent on) the RSA through joint economic projects, South Africa's 'legitimate security interests' would be acknowledged through formal security agreements, and (ideally) the "homelands" would be recognized as member-states. This broad goal implied the need to 'break' SADCC -- although consideration also seems to have been given to the possibility that SADCC could at some stage be hijacked, or co-opted, to form the basis for a CONSAS. Over time, this goal seems to have been viewed in practice as an increasingly unattainable ideal.

A third, more readily attainable (but pyrrhic) goal was to attempt to create security at home by creating chaos in recalcitrant neighbours -- i.e., replacing the old cordon sanitaire with a 'cordon of instability'. This goal had the acute disadvantage of drastically reducing the value of the neighbouring states in question as markets for South African investment and exports, consequently exacerbating the uneasy relationship between the state and various segments of the South African
business community,\textsuperscript{75} as well as inviting further punitive measures from the international community.

If Pretoria’s broad regional goals sometimes seemed confused during this period, part of the explanation lies in the fact that it varied both its policy goals and means between the various states of the SADCC region. Thus, the attempt to fit South Africa’s specific actions within a framework of coherent, over-arching regional goals is probably ultimately futile. Chan differentiates both between sub-group and individual state goals of South African regional policy. Thus, for example, he argues that with all of the ‘weak states’ of the region (i.e., the BLS states), Pretoria sought to demonstrate equivalence between them and the homelands, and to use them as "laboratories" and "demonstrators" for testing policies which might be used elsewhere in the region.\textsuperscript{76} At the same time, however, it pursued quite different specific policies in relation to each -- largely, it is important to note, because the BLS states themselves took different policy approaches, and had different capabilities, in relation to Pretoria. Thus, Pretoria eventually toppled the Lesotho government, and signed a secret non-aggression pact with Swaziland in 1982, but never succeeded in obtaining a formal non-aggression treaty with Botswana, despite tacit cooperation between the two states and South African threats and raids.

Similarly, Chan suggests, Pretoria sought to throw a military and economic ‘pincer movement’ around both of the region’s ‘strong states’ (Zambia and Zimbabwe) to isolate and contain them, and to heighten their economic dependence.\textsuperscript{77} Yet it was also more vigorous in its destabilization of Zimbabwe, particularly (though not only) through economic coercion, for a variety of reasons: Zimbabwe’s proximity to South Africa; its strategic importance to SADCC; its potential demonstration effect within South Africa as a successful multi-racial state; its potential as an alternative/competitive regional industrial centre; Pretoria’s view of Kaunda as a moderate with whom it might at some point find it useful to negotiate, etc.\textsuperscript{78}

The region’s erstwhile ‘revolutionary states’ were the primary target’s of
destabilization. As discussed in section one, this reflected a convergence of several considerations: their key strategic positions within the region and thus importance to SADCC; their potential demonstration effect in South Africa and Namibia as "Marxist" states born of successful armed struggle; and (in the case of Mozambique) a colonial history of intense dependence on South Africa, affording the Republic ready and powerful levers of coercion. In both cases, well-established surrogates -- UNITA and Renamo -- were already at hand. The former was a veteran (however duplicitous79) of the Angolan liberation struggle, with a regional popular base; the latter became, under South African guidance, a ruthless agent of destabilization which, over time, became increasingly self-sufficient, developing a life and interests of its own.80 Angola, where South Africa's economic interests were not implicated and in which SWAPO was based, was the one country in the region in which the SADF was directly and consistently involved. Indeed, it is a South African military setback (the failure to take the Southern Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale in the face of renewed Cuban engagement in the south of the country) which is widely viewed (particularly by radical analysts) as one of the crucial factors precipitating the subsequent negotiations leading to Namibian independence.81

South Africa's regional policy of destabilization went through a number of phases.82 It reached its high water mark in the first half of 1984, with the signing of the Lusaka Accord between South Africa and Angola (calling for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola's Cunene province, supervised by a Joint [Angolan-South African] Monitoring Commission) and, most importantly, the signing of the Nkomati Accord -- a formal non-aggression pact -- with Mozambique. Under the terms of Nkomati, Mozambique agreed to end its support for the ANC and expel all but official refugees and a small ANC diplomatic mission; South Africa agreed to stop supporting Renamo. The talks producing Nkomati were not limited to security issues: three parallel economic commissions met at the same time. Negotiated with the active involvement of US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, the two Accords were also billed as a triumph for Constructive Engagement.
P.W. Botha subsequently undertook a tour of several European capitals---a symbolic triumph in light of the RSA’s unwanted ‘pariah’ status; and South African spokesmen raised again the CONSAS idea, as well as the view that South Africa was a ‘regional power’ without whose involvement "no problems in southern Africa can be resolved...".83

Soon after, however, the bubble burst. It soon became clear that South Africa was not honouring the terms of either Accord. At home, township protests against P.W. Botha’s constitutional "reforms" (creating a tricameral Parliament with subservient Coloured and Indian Houses, but excluding the Black majority) escalated into a sustained uprising which received unprecedented international media attention. The entry of troops into the townships and the imposition of a partial State of Emergency did not quell the protests. The economy went a tailspin, substantially worsened by foreign firms disinvesting and foreign bankers’ refusal to make new loans; and in August 1985, South Africa defaulted on its international financial obligations. The country’s deepening political and economic crisis exacerbated differences between the State and the pillars of the business community. In September, Anglo-American chair Gavin Relly led a delegation to meet representatives of the ANC in Zambia---a move strongly criticized by the government.

Beyond South Africa, several of the Frontline States regrouped. Faced with renewed Renamo activity, the leaders of Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe met in Harare in June 1985, at which time Mugabe and Nyerere agreed to assist Mozambique militarily. Zimbabwe sent 5,000 (later 10,000) troops into Mozambique, primarily to protect the Beira Corridor.84 Just over a year later, Tanzania, too, sent troops into Mozambique at the latter’s request, where they remained for the next two years. And in 1987 Malawi, identified the previous year as the staging area for a major Renamo incursion into Mozambique, came onside under pressure from its neighbours and sent troops into Mozambique to protect railway workers repairing the Nacala line (its shortest extra-continental export route).
The international political situation, too, worsened for South Africa. In addition to the informal, private sector financial sanctions noted above, several states adopted partial sanctions unilaterally. In the fall of 1985, the Commonwealth adopted a mild sanctions package, and dispatched a "Group of Eminent Persons" (or EPG) to investigate the possibility of a negotiated end to apartheid, with a Commonwealth review meeting of their efforts set for six months’ hence. The sanctions dam looked as though it might finally burst.

The South African state’s regional response to this growing crisis stripped away the veneer of rhetoric claiming that its goal was a peaceful and cooperative regional constellation. In Dan O’Meara’s apt characterization, Total Strategy was reduced to Total Destabilization. In retrospect, however, the ‘massive escalation’ of coercive activity in the next two years, focused mainly in Mozambique and Angola, was a desperate and futile attempt to mask (not least in the minds of South Africa’s leaders) the inevitable collapse of a viable apartheid state. As Shaw put it in 1986, "Regional destabilization and sanctions constitute the denouement of South African ambitions, not their zenith".

Chief Jonathan’s government in Lesotho was toppled. The South African government cooperated with the EPG for several months, raising unexpected hopes, but finally induced the aborting of its mission with parallel raids on the capitals of Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe -- all Commonwealth members. The EPG subsequently concluded that "the South African Government is not yet ready to negotiate", and called for concerted international action as perhaps "the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War". The Commonwealth (minus Britain), and then the European Community and the United States Congress (overriding a Presidential veto) adopted new partial sanctions in the months that followed.

In Mozambique, it was reported that "MNR (Renamo) attacks are now carried out by concentrations of up to 500 trained, well-equipped and highly mobile men...The random terrorist attacks on the population have now escalated into regular
large-scale massacres of civilians, employing a savage level of cruelty". By now, however, it was also clear that Renamo had developed considerable autonomy, with the SADF retaining only limited influence over its activities. In Angola, a South African offensive in the south-east in late 1987 led to the ultimately-unsuccessful siege of Cuito Cuanavale. It is hardly surprising that widespread (and often well-founded) suspicion of Pretoria’s motives and intentions persisted throughout the UN-supervised Namibian election process (April-October 1989), during which time direct South African destabilization of neighbouring states declined; and that F.W. de Klerk’s assertions of the need for fundamental reform within South Africa following his accession to the State Presidency were greeted skeptically (P.W. Botha, after all, had initially been reputed to be a ‘reformer’). It is now clear, however, that by the end of the 1980s, overt destabilization as a regional policy had proven both unsuccessful and unsustainable.

It is extremely difficult to estimate the costs of South Africa’s destabilization efforts in the region during this decade. One comprehensive effort to do so -- Johnson and Martin’s "Destabilization Report" for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa -- arrives at the following "conservative" estimates: monetary costs (defence, damage, and lost development) of US$45 billion (more than twice all foreign aid to the region during the same period), including $22 billion in Angola and $12 billion in Mozambique; human costs of some 1.5 million lives lost, due to direct and indirect effects of war, and almost 4 million displaced from their homes, 1.5 million of which are international refugees; and unquantifiable psychological and ecological costs. Ultimately, it is impossible to know what the SADCC region would now look like in the absence of South African destabilization: some countries’ situations would probably be little different, while the progress of the Mozambican and Angolan "socialist projects" would have been interesting indeed. One of the more debilitating costs of destabilization has been that it allowed leaderships in regional states to use South Africa as a scapegoat for a wide range of problems, sometimes enabling them to avoid tackling their own internal failings.
and/or international structural difficulties. Nevertheless, it is clear that overall regional development and security prospects were severely damaged by this phase in South Africa's regional policy.

The RSA's regional policy also substantially complicated the policy dilemmas for external states. It threw up compelling new policy options -- such as security assistance to SADCC states -- and added weight to arguments for the sanctions which most Western states would just as soon have avoided, since South Africa quite clearly constituted a threat to international peace and security during this period. It is thus to some of the main policy options and issues for external states in the 1980s that the final section is addressed.

6. External States and Southern Africa: Avenues for Involvement

There has long been some tendency among radical scholars to lump "the West" (including Japan, Australia and New Zealand) together as a coherent entity having fundamentally common interests and strategies vis-a-vis the South. This is largely a legacy of the cruder variants of dependency theory, with their notions of largely undifferentiated Centres and Peripheries. Concerning Southern Africa there has been a supplementary tendency (noted above) to posit a fundamental alignment of interests between "the West" (or "imperialism") and "apartheid South Africa". Thus, for example, Samir Amin wrote in 1987 that "It is idle to hope for differences to emerge in the strategies pursued by the various partners in the imperialist system". With regard to Southern Africa, he asserted that:

...it remains the case that the regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, like those in other frontline states (Tanzania and Zambia) remain 'rather unreliable' in the eyes of the West. Hence the West has considered it positive and useful -- for itself -- that South Africa has...carried out destabilizing acts of military aggression .... These are complemented on the economic level by the destabilizing aggression of the IMF, acting for the global account of imperialism, turning the weaknesses and errors ...of local policies to advantage. The results of this strategy, aimed at establishing openly neo-colonial regimes, are not at all disappointing for imperialism.91

It is clear that "the West" (in its various state and corporate guises) has had certain elemental common interests, including the continued viability of capitalist
trade and financial regimes, and the broad strategic goal of "stability" (not necessarily coterminous with peace), in Southern Africa as elsewhere. Nevertheless, within these broad parameters, there are important differences of interest and approach, both within and between Western states, which are played out in their foreign policies. Amin himself implicitly acknowledges this in the Southern African case when he makes the statement that, "...most donors, with the notable exception of Nordic countries, have ideological or commercial interests to promote in any collaborative effort with the SADCC" (italics added -- no explanation is given for this curious qualification).

At the heart of this dissertation is the idea that Western middle powers will often adopt broadly similar, 'internationalist' approaches to foreign policy issue areas -- including Southern Africa -- which are essentially distinguishable from the various policies of major Western powers. In order to test the validity of this idea, and to assess the extent to which extra-regional middle power activities (whatever their degree of similarity) have mattered in Southern Africa, it is necessary to set out and evaluate their activities in several of the crucial policy avenues, or dimensions, open to external states in the 1980s. Several of these (closely related) policy dimensions are described below.

6.1 the South African Dimension:

Section 4 illustrates that, aside from being an emotionally-charged focus of policy in its own right, the efforts of external states to help foster fundamental change in South Africa itself also had, and have, very important implications for the security and development prospects of SADCC states. The ending of apartheid and (ideally) the emergence of a new, multi-racial and democratic political and socio-economic dispensation in the RSA will not solve the many problems of regional states, but it is a vital prerequisite for their solution. During the 1980s, there were two main avenues through which external states could try to exercise a direct influence on the process of change in South Africa.

1) **Sanctions:** Defined by Margaret Doxey as "penalties (short of armed intervention)
threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target's failure to observe international standards or international obligations", sanctions (and in particular economic sanctions) are an old and extensively debated policy option with regard to South Africa. Beyond the arms embargo in 1977 and older measures adopted by a number of Southern states, however, very little was done about sanctions until the mid-1980s. Since the major Western states -- particularly the UK, the US, West Germany, and Japan -- were the RSA’s major economic partners, their resistance to sanctions up to (and, with the qualified exception of the US, during) this period sharply limited the economic impact of any sanctions measures adopted. Furthermore, when a number of Western states did adopt partial sanctions, other countries -- in Asia, Europe, South America, and indeed Africa -- took up a good portion of the slack. Considerably more painful to South Africa than trade sanctions were the various ‘unofficial’ financial sanctions imposed by banks and other investors. Nevertheless, the growing normative consensus in favour of trade sanctions, promoted strenuously by various domestic and transnational interest groups, Southern African states, and others, arguably had a substantial psychological and political impact among white South Africans, notably within the business community. It also meant that a willingness to impose sanctions (and the specific measures imposed) came to be widely regarded as an important test of the credibility of a state’s commitment to the struggle against apartheid. In addition, sanctions were one of the major issues in diplomatic relations between extra-regional and SADCC states.

It is important to note that, as implied above, the goals and impact of economic sanctions are not limited to economic penalties in the target state. They are often aimed at domestic and/or broader international audiences, and they may operate in a variety of non-economic as well as (or indeed instead of) economic ways: psychological, diplomatic, political, and/or military. Obviously, the same is true of non-economic sanctions: for example, sport sanctions were among the most psychologically effective actions vis-a-vis white South Africans, as I shall argue in chapter six.
2) "Positive Measures": These are various programmes of aid and financial assistance, from states, NGOs, and international organizations, to "victims of apartheid" and groups working for change within South Africa (and, prior to its independence, Namibia) itself. They have included: assistance to anti-apartheid organizations; programmes for the training and education of non-white South Africans; legal and humanitarian assistance for political prisoners and their families; assistance for community projects in non-white areas; measures to counter censorship and propaganda; and measures to promote inter-racial 'dialogue'. Beyond the RSA they have included programmes of assistance to South African refugees, often administered by the ANC or PAC, in Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, and elsewhere. Development assistance to SADCC has also sometimes been viewed as a "positive measure", but is treated separately here.

In contrast with sanctions, positive measures have received relatively limited attention or scrutiny. This is in part because much anti-apartheid work was devoted to securing the widest possible boycott of things South African, while positive measures would in some cases be regarded as contradicting this thrust; and in part because they were often regarded (in some cases correctly) as means of attempting to deflect or dodge pressure for sanctions. Because the emphasis in this thesis is on policies impacting upon the SADCC area, positive measures are not analyzed in the case studies which follow. Nevertheless, they deserve more attention than they have received, aimed at assessing their effects and effectiveness, not least because of their potential applications in other contexts, as well as their potential significance in laying the groundwork for Western states' relations with a post-apartheid South African regime.

6.2 The Diplomatic Dimension:

Closely related to the policy options noted above have been diplomatic efforts to forge closer relations with SADCC states, promote change in South Africa, and create international consensuses and coalitions extending the moral and practical influence of pressure for change in South Africa and support for SADCC. This can
be done by working quietly within international fora to create compromise agreements; by setting clear examples or establishing precedents for others to follow; or (often most effectively) through combinations of both. Obviously, most states will usually prefer diplomatic means for pursuing foreign policy ends, because they are usually the least costly technique of statecraft available. For years, Western states argued that diplomacy (or "persuasion") alone was the most effective means for pursuing fundamental reform in South Africa, largely because they feared the possible costs, and risks, to their own economic and strategic interests of alternative techniques.\(^9\)

Diplomacy may be a particularly valuable tool for middle powers, in Southern Africa and elsewhere. Whereas on their own, such states have limited weight in the international community, by using their (sometimes formidable) diplomatic capabilities and connections to good effect they may, under favourable circumstances, help to induce the formulation and implementation of quite important international initiatives. As a corollary, it should be noted that middle-sized (and small?) states may also be particularly amenable to the influence and initiatives of international organizations, acting autonomously through their Secretariats. Thus, with regard to this case study, there was an interesting reciprocal relationship between the Commonwealth Secretariat, on the one hand, and Australia and Canada, on the other.

As with sanctions and positive measures, states’ motives in undertaking diplomatic initiatives are invariably mixed. They may be directed as much (if not more) at domestic audiences, international audiences, or indeed towards broader "international milieu"\(^1\) or world order goals as they are at the stated policy target or objective.

6.3 the Developmental Dimension:

In a region such as Southern Africa -- among the world’s poorest -- development issues are truly ‘high politics’. But in addition, as noted above, the efforts of SADCC states to reduce their dependence on South Africa through infrastructural and economic development, and to promote "equitable regional
integration", came to be widely viewed during the 1980s as an important element in the struggle against apartheid, and thus directly relevant to SADCC states’ peace and security as well as development prospects. Consequently, the efforts of external states in support of SADCC’s development "project", and of development in its member-states, became an important foreign policy issue during this period. This policy dimension had (and has) two components.

1) **Development Assistance:** There is a broad (though disputed and weakening) consensus that well-conceived and implemented ‘overseas development assistance’ (ODA) programmes have the potential to substantially enhance prospects for prosperity and security, both in developing regions and in the global political economy as a whole. There is also widespread agreement that Western ODA programmes have often failed to fulfill this potential, largely due to the effects of "mixing motives", which may seriously undermine the developmental effectiveness of these programmes. Thus, in assessing the ODA policies of Australia, Canada, and Sweden in Southern Africa, we must be sensitive to both the quantity and the quality of their programmes (and indeed the different definitions of "quality aid"); and to the various motives and interests which lay behind these programmes.

2) **Commercial Linkages:** It is clear -- notably to SADCC itself -- that ODA programmes alone cannot generate and sustain long-term development in Southern Africa. North-South commercial (i.e., trade and investment) relations have often been exploitative, and are therefore controversial and potentially harmful to this and other regions of the South. Nevertheless, expanded and diversified trade opportunities, joint ventures and other forms of responsible foreign investment, transfers of technology, etc. are necessary to broaden and strengthen the region’s economic base. While these forms of exchange can, and should, be expanded on a South-South basis (recognizing that, as noted in chapter 3, South-South exchange may be just as exploitative as North-South exchange), more extensive and equitable commercial relations with ‘Developed Market Economies’ (DMEs) are still indispensable. Regardless of the future role of South Africa in the region, the success
of SADCC’s long-term plans (especially its new Industrial Development Strategy) will require the involvement of Northern "partners".

From the perspective of SADCC states, increased and diversified trade and investment links with distant, middle-sized countries such as Australia, Canada, and Sweden have significant advantages over deepened relations with bigger states and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) on whom they are already heavily dependent. Such links are also necessary to underpin stronger politico-diplomatic relations over the longer term. There are, however, substantial obstacles to the development of these relations, including mutual ignorance, shortages of foreign exchange, and entrenched patterns and habits of economic activity. It is therefore important to assess the efforts of these three middle powers to develop stronger commercial links with Southern African states during the 1980s.

6.4 The Security Dimension:

Finally, given the severe, though uneven, impact of Pretoria’s destabilizing policies discussed above, it is hardly surprising that security assistance to various SADCC states, but particularly Mozambique, became an important policy issue in the period under review. In addition to the politico-strategic and humanitarian issues involved, there was the eminently logical point that it verged on futility to devote large amounts of development assistance to SADCC infrastructural projects, only to have those projects rendered inoperative by SADF and/or surrogate sabotage. There was, in other words, a straightforward (if rather callous) case to be made for protecting one’s investment.102

Security assistance became an issue of considerable symbolic as well as practical importance. While East Bloc states had long provided military support to some of the governments and liberation movements of the region, many Western states -- in particular the three examined here -- became squeamish and hesitant at the prospect of furnishing even ‘non-lethal’ security assistance (eg., clothes, spare parts, fuel, radios, etc.). Others -- particularly Britain, which was the most openly intransigent of all Western states on the sanctions issue -- were quite forthcoming in
this area. This raises the issue of whether there were inhibitions which can be generalized to Western middle powers as a group which came into play on this issue.

7. Conclusion: the Problem of Perspective

Southern African issues and policies have inspired deeply emotional and value-laden responses. Thus, in addition to the alternative theoretical perspectives and expectations concerning the international role(s) of middle powers discussed in chapter 2, the Southern African policies of such states have generally been interpreted through the prism of strong normative perspectives, which may in turn be influenced by one or other of those theoretical perspectives. It is useful to take note of two dominant normative perspectives on policies towards Southern Africa.103

The first may be termed a globalist or governmental perspective -- i.e., the perspective of the foreign policy professionals and the politicians responsible for Australian, Canadian, Swedish, and other states' policies towards Southern Africa. This normative perspective is generally underpinned theoretically by some combination of realist/statist and international society assumptions. From this often 'official' perspective, a country's policy performance is measured primarily in relation to that of other states -- particularly those states with whom it is most closely aligned, or its most important international 'peer group(s)'. Thus, for example, Canadian policy will usually be measured in relation to Western states generally, and G-7 states particularly. From this perspective, Canada may be judged to have a relatively 'progressive' or 'leading' policy towards the region, having devoted relatively more resources to it than most of its primary reference group, and having gone further in terms of sanctions. From this perspective, too, it will be judged as important that the Canadian Prime Minister persistently raised the Southern African issue with his G-7 colleagues, advocating stronger international action, even though little of real substance emerged from these representations. Finally, those holding this perspective will be very sensitive to the competitive position of their country in the international political economy. Thus, they will be keenly aware of new competitors (for example,
from Asian NICs and near-NICs) taking advantage of any sanctions their country might have imposed to expand their market share in South Africa, and will be hesitant to allow this process to proceed any further than necessary.

A second dominant perspective may be termed a regionalist or solidarity perspective. Taking a position of solidarity with oppressed and ‘progressive’ states and groups struggling for ‘meaningful change’ (often some form of socialism) in Southern Africa, this perspective is often (though not exclusively) theoretically grounded in the broad tradition of radical political economy. It emphasizes the deep structural problems of Southern African political economies emanating in the first instance from colonial development and exploitation; the egregious moral offense of apartheid and racism as it has been practised in the region, and of destabilization in SADCC states; and the culpability of Western corporations -- and the governments with whom they are aligned -- which have profited from operations in apartheid South Africa and occupied Namibia. From this perspective, the policies of one or another Western state might be strong relative to its peers, but (through most of the previous four decades) deeply inadequate in terms of the needs and imperatives of the majority in the region. During the 1980s, some commentary from this perspective took the position that anything short of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, substantially increased development and security assistance to SADCC states, and alignment with (or even ‘recognition’ of) the ANC and SWAPO was insufficient.

Both of these perspectives are in a sense ‘real’: they speak to different real world conditions and constraints. Both must be taken into account by the analyst of external states’ policies towards Southern Africa. But neither is in itself sufficient. ‘Globalists’ cannot be allowed self-congratulations about their policies without being prodded to take fuller account of the shortcomings and inadequacies of these policies in relation to the compelling needs of many Southern Africans, both before and particularly after formal processes of political "change". And ‘regionalists’ need to take account of the subtle constraints and opportunities of timing, coalition-building, etc. which are often the prerequisites of an effective foreign policy, particularly for
middle-sized states. In the case studies which follow, these caveats will be applied.

NOTES


4. See, for example, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, the Destabilization Report (London: James Currey, 1989).

5. SADCC, and its supporters in Western academic and NGO communities, argued consistently during the 1980s that support for this grouping should be viewed as a complement to, and not a substitute for, sanctions against South Africa. See, for example, Joseph Hanlon, SADCC and Sanctions (Brussels: International Coalition for Development Action, January 1989), 35-38.


15. Isaacman, 16; and Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, 31.


18. Stephen Chan has argued that the foreign policies of Southern African states are not in fact ideological. They are, he writes, "united on extremely pragmatic lines: on what can be defended, for how long, with what international help, and for what final, though distant, aim." This understates the initial ideological differences among these states, but has become an increasingly accurate characterization. See Chan, *Exporting Apartheid*, 32.

19. According to one source, in 1985, the RSA accounted for over 70% of total regional GDP, well over half its transport infrastructure, and 79% of its installed electricity generating capacity, with one-third of its people. Simon S. Brand, "Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Continuity or Change?", Paper delivered at a colloquium held from 8-13 July 1989 in Lausanne, Switzerland under the
auspices of the Institut De Hautes Etudes en Administration Publique, 8-11.


23. Isaacman, 15.


30. See Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, 77-100.


32. SADCC Regional Economic Survey 1988, 226.


36. A third participant in the liberation struggle, the FNLA, disintegrated after the failure of this thrust to dislodge the MPLA.

37. See Johnson and Martin, 138-139, for a summary of these events; see also Chan, *Exporting Apartheid*, 19 and 55.


40. The cost of this step to the fragile Mozambican economy has been estimated at $US 510-550 million, mainly in lost port and rail revenue. See Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, 35; and Chan, *Exporting Apartheid*, 48.


44. Mandaza, "SADCC:...An Overview", 8-9. See also Anglin, "Economic Liberation...", 685.

45. Obviously, there is a theoretical possibility that all national leaders within the region were co-opted, knowingly or otherwise, as comprador elements in a neo-colonial project; but this seems practically unlikely. See Mandaza, "SADCC:...An Overview", 9.


48. In addition to Nyerere's unhappy experience with the more "orthodox" integration scheme of the East African Community, Kaunda of Zambia had been among the African opponents of the settler-driven Central African Federation.

49. Interview with Charles Hove, Economist, SADCC Secretariat, Gaborone, 15 September 1989; Meyns, 208-211; and Anglin, "Economic Liberation...", 692-695.

50. In this regard, it diverged from the more ambitious market integration scheme of the largely-overlapping "Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States" (PTA), which developed more slowly and with a lower international profile than SADCC, but may now be gaining stature. How -- indeed whether -- these two organizations may eventually be harmonized remains an interesting problem for regional states. On the PTA, see Anglin, "Economic Liberation..."; Yash Tandon, "SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA): Points of Convergence and Divergence", in Shaw and Tandon, eds., Regional Development at the International Level, V. II: African and Canadian Perspectives (Lanham: UPA, 1985), 113-131; and interview with Dr. Ramsamy, Head of Trade Division, PTA, Lusaka, 5 Dec. 1989.


55. Anglin, "Economic Liberation...", 697. In 1989, the SADCC Consultative Conference in Luanda drew 26 cooperating governments, and 19 international organizations.

56. Canada, for example, cooperated with Brazil, Britain, the EC, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the US and others in the various SADCC projects it had supported by 1989. See "SADCC: CIDA Programme Update" (Hull: CIDA, 1990).
57. See J.C. Chipasula and K. Miti, "SADCC and External Aid", paper presented at the 12th Southern African Universities Social Science Conference (SAUSSC), University of Botswana, Gaborone, 3-7 July, 1989; and Ann Walraet, "The Belgian SADCC Policy with Special Reference to the Belgian Debt Relief Initiatives", paper presented to the Conference on SADCC: Problems and Prospects of Regional Political and Economic Cooperation, Gaborone, 3-6 October 1989.


59. See Anglin, "Economic Liberation...", 698. See also Cooperating Government Statements in the proceedings of Annual Consultative Conferences -- for example, Productive Sectors, Engine of Growth and Development, proceedings of the Annual Consultative Conference held in Luanda, People's Republic of Angola, 1st - 3rd February, 1989 (Gaborone: SADCC, 1989). Hanlon has argued that the "clear division" in Western attitudes toward SADCC can be accounted for by the relative strength of their economic links with South Africa. This is, in my view, an inadequate explanation. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 25-26.

60. See, for example, Tandon, "SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area..." 126-127; and Derrick Chitala, "The Political Economy of the SADCC and Imperialism's Response", in SADCC, Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa.


62. Interview with Charles Hove.


65. See Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 87; and "SADCC: the Second Decade...", 5-6.

66. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 9 and 13. The idea of Total Strategy was drawn from the thinking of French General Andre Baufre.
67. See Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 13-16; and Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 9-10. O'Meara notes that between 1977-78 and 1986-87, the military budget more than tripled. Dan O'Meara, "Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987", CIIPS Background Paper No. 20, June 1988, 2. One of the more significant early reforms of F.W. de Klerk was the dismantling of the SSC, and the "re-civilianization" of governance.

68. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 23-25.

69. See, for example, Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, 5-6 and 72-75; and Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege: Options for the Frontline States", Journal of Modern African Studies, 26 (4), 1988, 552-554.

70. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 32.

71. It should be added, by way of qualification, that both Zambia (at an earlier stage) and Angola did host SWAPO bases from which they launched their military activities in Namibia.

72. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 31-32; Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, 3; Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 108.

73. Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 30.

74. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 32.

75. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 13.

76. Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 25.

77. Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 29-30.

78. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 243-254.


81. See, for example, Marcum, 160-169.

82. See Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, 27-66; and Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, 6-9.
83. Statement by Pik Botha, South African Foreign Minister, cited in Hanlon, 
Beggar Your Neighbours, 41.

84. Chan, Exporting Apartheid, 84-85.

85. O'Meara, "Destabilization of the Frontline States...", 5-6.


88. O'Meara, "Destabilization of the Frontline States...", 6.


90. Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, 10-12.

91. Samir Amin, "Introduction", 4, and "Preface", 3, to Amin, Chitala and Mandaza, eds.


93. The option of covert or overt military intervention in the Angolan civil war is not considered. During the 1980s, this policy option was the preserve of the superpowers, Cuba and South Africa itself.


97. This broad point is stressed by both David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985), esp. 63; and Doxey, International Sanctions..., esp. 90-97. See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Domestic Politics and International Sanctions:
Australian and Canadian Reactions to Tienanmen", paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, 2-4 June 1991, for an interesting and skeptical discussion of the idea that the purposes of sanctions are often pre-eminently related to domestic politics.


99. See Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 8-29, for a useful discussion of various techniques of statecraft.

100. The distinction between "possession" and "milieu" goals of foreign policy is drawn from the work of Arnold Wolfers, and applied to Swedish foreign policy by Bo Huldt. See his Sweden, the United Nations, and Decolonization (Lund: Scandinavian University Books, 1974), 28-30.


103. See the discussion of this general argument in Larry A. Swatuk, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Namibia: ‘Continuity’ versus ‘More of the Same’", in Swatuk and Shaw, eds.

Chapter 6

Making the Most of Marginality:
Australian Policy Towards Southern Africa, 1984-1989

The Southern African region has never been of more than marginal economic or strategic concern to Australia. Certainly, of the three states compared in this thesis, Australia has had the least extensive official and commercial linkages with the region as a whole. Yet paradoxically, Australians’ social and cultural ties with 'white' South Africa, in particular, have been historically close; and despite the progressive estrangement of official relations between the South African and Australian Governments over the past two decades, these societal contacts have remained quite extensive.¹

During the critical period between 1984 and 1989, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government of Prime Minister Bob Hawke developed a relatively active and high profile foreign policy towards the region. It promoted some interesting and useful initiatives in relation to South Africa itself, aimed primarily at building broadly-based international pressure for the dismantling of apartheid through negotiations. In doing so, it displayed a sound sense of diplomatic opportunity and timing, with elements of what Higgott and Cooper have termed "discrete", "entrepreneurial" and "heroic" leadership,² and its Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers a dash of showmanship.

Yet its involvement in Southern African affairs took place within strict limits, defined above all by Australia’s weakening structural position within the global political economy and consequent shrinking public resources; and, related to this, the Government’s increasing preoccupation with its Asia-Pacific ‘neighbourhood’.³ The result was that in its aid policy towards the Southern African states which were potentially most seriously damaged by the broadly based international sanctions the Government sought to promote, its performance was weak and inconsistent. While it significantly improved this performance towards the end of the period under review, its involvement in the region beyond South Africa remained shallow and
In this chapter, it will be argued that despite its economic and strategic marginality in Southern Africa, the Australian government was able to formulate its policy towards the region in a way which served both useful international and domestic political purposes. In particular, it used this policy as a means of signalling, to both the international community and its own domestic community, Australia's continuing efforts to exorcise its racist and conservative past, and its determination to participate within the international community as a "good international citizen" acting on the basis of its core liberal democratic values. Further, it will be argued that this case illustrates how a middle-sized state can, with creative policy-making and diplomacy in a discrete and propitious issue area, parlay limited resources into a policy of significant international impact.

The temporal focus of the chapter -- 1984 through 1989 -- spans the period between the start of the sustained township uprising in South Africa which stimulated the rapid rise in the international salience of the Southern African region during the 1980s; and the Kuala Lumpur Summit of Commonwealth Heads of Government, which immediately preceded the start of the current, fragile process of change in the RSA. This focus has the advantage of political coherence, since from 1983 to the present (i.e., 1991), Australia has been continuously governed by the Bob Hawke-led ALP. It also covers a period of re-evaluation and reform of the Australian aid programme, stimulated by the release of the "Jackson Report" in 1984, which had significant ramifications for aid to Africa.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the historical and societal underpinnings of Australian policy towards Southern Africa. It then reviews and analyzes policy in each of the four main policy dimensions set out in chapter five: sanctions against South Africa; diplomatic involvement in the region, and efforts to organize pressure for change; developmental efforts (in both aid and commerce) to strengthen the states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and to support their cooperative project to reduce dependence on South
Africa; and security assistance, particularly to Mozambique. It concludes with an explanation of the overall policy approach which was developed during this period, and a summary of its impact and usefulness in contributing towards long-term change, development and security in the region.

1. Historical Underpinnings of Australian policy

Historically, Australia’s links with Africa were by-products of its mostly loyal membership of the British Empire/Commonwealth. Until the decolonization of Commonwealth African states beginning in the late 1950s, its connections with the continent were almost exclusively with South Africa. Millar has commented that:

White South Africans had much in common with Australians: European pioneers in a vast, temperate land in the southern hemisphere, with a Westminster form of government and, until 1960, a common head of state. South Africa was (also) a fellow Dominion at imperial and Commonwealth conferences.  

More recently, an Australian diplomat suggested that it would be difficult to find two peoples so similar, broadly-speaking, as Australians and English-speaking white South Africans.

Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies found the changes in the Commonwealth from the late 1950s uncongenial. Unlike Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who was instrumental, however inadvertently, in precipitating South Africa’s departure from the organization, Menzies (who, Millar says, "deplored apartheid") favoured South Africa’s continued Commonwealth membership as a Republic, and "regretted both (her) going and the manner of her going". At the UN, Australia voted until 1959 with a shrinking minority against consideration of South Africa’s apartheid policies, on the grounds that however discreditable they might be, they fell essentially within South African domestic jurisdiction.

The Australian Government’s early reluctance to support UN and Commonwealth scrutiny of South Africa’s domestic affairs, and its reticence in joining the swelling chorus of condemnation of South Africa, were influenced by its own domestic and colonial policies. Until the mid-1960s, Australia’s policies towards
the country's Aborigines, its colonial administration of the UN Trust territories of Papua and New Guinea, and its racially restricted ("White Australia") immigration policy all contained well-known elements of racial discrimination. The government naturally did not want these policies to become the object of sustained international scrutiny. By 1966, most explicitly racial legal provisions had been removed; and by the mid-1970s, these changes had been consolidated and were being advertised abroad.\(^\text{10}\) But the racial attitudes which had underpinned these legal structures, and the conditions which they helped to create (above all for Aborigines) were slower to change. So, too, was Australia's international reputation as a relatively racist society. Subsequent policies toward Southern Africa have been framed in the shadow of this racialist history. Paradoxically, this same history, combined with the close social linkages between Australia and white South Africa, arguably heightened the psychological impact of Australian actions against South Africa.\(^\text{11}\)

Economically, South Africa was historically Australia's largest African market. Beyond Africa, however, it was a small market in both relative and absolute terms.\(^\text{12}\) This was largely because their economies were (and remain) structurally very similar, and thus to a significant degree competitive. Both economies developed along similar, settler colonial lines, and have remained heavily reliant on exports of raw materials and semi-processed goods, and imports of capital and modern consumption goods. In a number of products, such as coal, wool, iron, manganese and fruit, they have been major direct competitors.\(^\text{13}\) Thus, economic sanctions against South Africa involved rather different implications for Australia than they did for most other OECD states -- Canada being a partial exception.\(^\text{14}\)

With regard to black Africa, the changing composition of the Commonwealth in the late 1950s and early '60s did little to alter the fundamental disinterest of the conservative coalition government -- in power from 1949 to 1972 -- in this part of the world. It supported the Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (CAAP -- supposed to be analogous to the Colombo Plan, which Australia had spearheaded) but made only a small contribution towards it. Following Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) in late 1965, it refused to participate in the Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia in Lagos in early 1966, on the grounds that the conference constituted intervention in Britain's affairs. In general, it followed Britain's lead on this issue, including support for UN sanctions, which affected only a small amount of bilateral trade. It continued to sell wheat to the territory, however, justified in terms of a 'humanitarian' loophole in the relevant UN resolution. Of the six newly independent states in Southern Africa, all of which were Commonwealth member-states, it established a High Commission in only one -- Tanzania -- which was more East than Southern African in orientation.

With the election of Gough Whitlam's ALP Government in 1972, Australian foreign policy towards the 'South' generally, and Southern Africa specifically, underwent a rapid overhaul, aimed at projecting a more sympathetic, liberal, and humanitarian international image. J.A. Camilleri suggests that "opposition to racialism at home and abroad was to be the keystone of the Labor government’s efforts to establish closer links with the countries of the Third World." Domestically, Whitlam officially ended racial discrimination in immigration, introduced reforms aimed at improving the position of Aborigines, and accelerated progress towards the independence of Papua New Guinea, achieved in 1975. At the UN, Australian delegates adopted much stronger stands against South Africa, the white minority regime in Rhodesia, and Portuguese colonialism in Africa. The Whitlam Government ended wheat sales to Rhodesia, decided not to allow any racially selected sporting teams to enter or pass through Australia, and expressed a willingness to go along with UN economic sanctions against South Africa -- so long as they were imposed multilaterally. In 1974, the country became one of the very few Western countries to join the UN Council for Namibia; and in 1974-75, it allocated a small but symbolically-significant amount of humanitarian assistance to Southern African liberation movements, channelled through UNICEF. Concurrently, the Government adopted a more favourable attitude towards the "new" Commonwealth, and expressed a much higher degree of interest in black Africa.
While many of these changes were essentially cosmetic, they created an image of substantial change.\textsuperscript{18}

Somewhat surprisingly and disarmingly, the conservative Liberal-National Party coalition government of Malcolm Fraser, which replaced the Whitlam Government in 1975, pursued similar Southern African policies. In general, Alan Renouf has characterized Fraser’s approach to foreign policy as combining "...hard line conservatism on East-West issues with quite radical liberalism on North-South issues. Violently anti-Russia and generally strongly pro-America, Fraser was also very supportive of the aspirations of Third World countries, highly critical of racism and a strong believer in the British Commonwealth".\textsuperscript{19} Fraser's motives on Southern Africa specifically combined genuine anti-racism with the strategic goal of forestalling escalating racial conflict in the region, which he viewed as almost certain to drive the eventual black-rulled regimes into the Soviet camp. He thus set himself up as a champion of "enlightened capitalist" and Western interests.\textsuperscript{20} Fraser's outspoken stand against apartheid led to a period of bipartisanship in Australian policy, subsequently making it almost inconceivable for the relatively left-wing Hawke ALP Government to be less activist in relation to the region. After his electoral defeat in early 1983, Fraser continued to play a major role on Southern African issues, both in the Commonwealth context and in Southern African debates within Australia.

The Fraser Government discontinued the indirect support for regional liberation movements initiated by its predecessor. But it also worked hard to strengthen bilateral contacts with Southern African states. Fraser and his government played a significant role, through the Commonwealth, in the diplomacy which eventually produced the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1979-80, significantly enhancing the Prime Minister's reputation as a proponent of progressive change in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{21} Restrictions placed on contacts with South Africa under Whitlam were maintained and, in some cases, strengthened. Most importantly, and in keeping with Fraser's strong support of the Commonwealth's 1977 Gleneagles
Declaration on Apartheid and Sport, the government tightened restrictions on sporting contacts between teams from Australia and South Africa. This proved distinctly unpopular with a substantial majority of Australians who, besides being very enthusiastic about long-standing Australian-South African sporting rivalries, apparently viewed it as unfair to place the burden of the government's anti-apartheid stand almost solely on the backs of athletes.

Thus, in framing its policies toward Southern Africa following its election in 1983, the ALP government was haunted by historical, structural, and cultural legacies. Historically, it was haunted by the country's racist past. It sought to demonstrate to both international and domestic audiences Australia's exorcism of this past through its anti-apartheid policies; yet it was also inhibited by sensitivity to the continued strain of bigotry in Australian society, and the persistent structural inequality of Aborigines therein. Writes Richard Leaver:

This is not to say that the contemporary Australian practice of race relations is either morally or legally equivalent to apartheid. Rather, the South African issue relates to Australian society like the image that individuals obtain of themselves from a distorting sideshow mirror; the features and details are warped out of all proportion, but the overall picture is none the less recognisable. For this reason the fight for a more rational and effective anti-apartheid policy is linked to the domestic issue of aboriginal rights.

In terms of economic structures, the competitive nature of the Australian and South African economies in several key areas laid the government open to charges that its support for sanctions was a thinly-disguised effort to advance its own narrow self-interests by attempting to undermine South African competition. This was so even though the actual effects of sanctions were detrimental to Australian interests, albeit minor. Finally, in cultural terms, Australians' close affinities with white South Africans made sport sanctions particularly controversial. Furthermore, largely due to these cultural affinities, Australia became a much favoured locale for white South African emigration -- the second largest, after Britain, in absolute terms -- as the crisis in that country deepened. This flow of migrants was naturally a sensitive and somewhat controversial one. In the event of a dramatic deterioration of conditions in South Africa, it could yet become a major practical and political problem for the
2. Sanctions against South Africa

Much of the debate on sanctions against "apartheid South Africa" ranged around the goal, or slogan, of "mandatory and comprehensive" economic sanctions. As implied in chapter 5, this emphasis oversimplified the sanctions issue, obfuscating the numerous forms sanctions may take and ways they may operate. Like most sanctions, Australian measures against South Africa had multiple purposes and audiences -- notably in international organizations and at home as well as in South Africa. Furthermore, while the economic effects of Australian sanctions against South Africa were, indeed were bound to be, very limited, the psychological impact on white South Africans of some Australian sanctions, both economic and non-economic, was likely substantial. Thus, an analysis of the impact of these sanctions highlights the need to assess influence on a contextual, or issue-specific, basis.26

While Australia clearly lacked conventional economic and strategic "power resources", or "structural power", in relation to the RSA, its close societal and historical connections with South Africa gave it issue-specific importance which belied these conventional measures. In this section, I will distinguish between Australian economic sanctions, and the more specific bans on air links, sporting connections, and diplomatic/consular services, in terms of their impact and importance.

As noted above, Australian governments going back to the Whitlam years had supported mandatory sanctions in principle, so long as they were imposed multilaterally ideally through the UN Security Council. Commentators had long noted that this was an easy stand to take, given the certainty that mandatory sanctions would be vetoed by the UK, the US, and possibly France. Under Hawke, Australian policy on unilateral economic sanctions remained cautious. The Government was not prepared to follow the lead of the Nordic states, for example, whose escalating sanctions against South Africa led, in 1987, to a mandatory trade embargo.

According to Higgott and Acharya:
Its desire to be seen 'doing the right thing' in the eyes of the international community was constrained by the arguably more important political needs to avoid a major domestic row and minimize impediments to the business community's activities in the absence of concerted international action.  

This assessment highlights two broad domestic constraints, as various sanctions options were initially considered in 1985. First, in broad terms, public opinion polls suggested that a majority of Australians opposed trade sanctions, and indeed sport sanctions as well. And second, the business community, like business communities in all OECD states, opposed governmental interference with its South African economic links. Doubtless underlying both of these considerations in the government’s calculations were Australia’s growing economic difficulties, manifested above all in its ‘towering’ foreign debt. At a time when the ALP Government was asking for popular cooperation in implementing stringent austerity measures at home, it was difficult to contemplate unilateral sanctions measures involving even quite minor economic costs to Australians.

Nevertheless, the Hawke Government’s policy on sanctions against South Africa departed from previous Australian practice in two significant ways. In the first place, the Government took an active and indeed leading role in efforts to formulate a broadly-based multilateral sanctions package through the Commonwealth, rather than simply mouthing its eagerness to go along with the crowd when the crowd was finally ready to move (see section 3 below). In the second place, it was prepared to lead, however gingerly, by example, adopting a mild sanctions package prior to the Nassau Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 1985, which presaged the measures taken in "The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa" at the Summit itself. Similarly, it pressed ahead with implementation of the sanctions agreed upon at the August 1986 Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting, or "Mini-Summit", even though Margaret Thatcher refused to do so, and Zambia and Zimbabwe subsequently decided they could not do so. This 1986 Commonwealth sanctions package arguably had some influence on the packages adopted soon after by the US Congress and the European Community.
Australia's economic sanctions against South Africa were thus largely coterminus with the Commonwealth's partial sanctions package, and roughly comparable in scope to Canadian sanctions. With the addition of the measures agreed at London in 1986, they included bans on: air links; new investment or reinvestment of profits (voluntary); South African agricultural exports; the promotion of tourism in South Africa (voluntary); all new bank loans, public and private (voluntary); iron, coal and steel purchases from South Africa; government assistance to investment and trade with South Africa; and government contracts with majority-owned South African corporations. In addition, they included the withdrawal of consular facilities in South Africa for all but Australian nationals and nationals of third countries.  

32 Unofficially, Australian corporations imposed their own "sanctions", motivated largely by declining profits and loss of confidence. Whereas 24 Australian companies operated in South Africa in 1985, only 7 companies, employing 745 black workers, remained in 1989. Stated Australian Code of Conduct Administrator Ron Bannerman: "The importance of the Australian commercial presence in South Africa is, in practical terms, close to nil...".  

33 Given the similar and often competitive structures of the Australian and South African economies, South African politicians and commercial interests, among others, were quick to accuse the Australian government of having a 'hidden agenda', and of 'perverse morality', following Hawke's role in formulating the 1986 Commonwealth sanctions package. For his part, Hawke denied having made any calculation of the advantages of sanctions to Australia.  

34 Nevertheless, it was clear that, while sanctions would involve some diminution in Australian-South African commercial relations, the adoption by South Africa's major trading partners of similar embargoes had the potential to produce significant gains in Australia's international market share in commodities such as coal and agricultural products. This led Richard Leaver to argue in an interesting and imaginative policy piece that, rather than being defensive and embarrassed about this situation, the Australian government would be better advised to 'take the bull by the horns', as it were. He argued for a strategy of
"conscious market capture", using diplomatic channels to attempt to secure a larger portion of the RSA’s share of world commodity trade by advertising Australia as an ‘ideologically pure’ and politically stable supplier of these commodities. This strategy could be supplemented by using any windfall profits to lead in the development of a "compensation" package for the most seriously affected Frontline States.35

These strategies made sense, of course, only if there was a chance that bans on appropriate commodities would be implemented stringently, and on a broad international basis. In fact, with partial sanctions adopted only in a very patchy fashion,36 it is difficult to tally up the costs and benefits of sanctions to Australia. In bilateral trade, Australian sanctions contributed to a relatively small five year decline in exports to South Africa, and a somewhat larger decline in imports from the RSA (see table 1). More broadly, sanctions against South African commodities were not imposed extensively enough to yield significant international gains for Australian producers. Indeed, an Australian diplomat claimed that the Government’s own analyses showed Australia to be a net loser from sanctions. He pointed out, for example, that in coal -- one of the main commodities where the country stood to gain -- partial international sanctions meant that South African coal was dumped on the world market at reduced prices, helping to drive down the world price to the net detriment of Australian producers.37 In a separate, but politically sensitive, case, it was alleged that “politics” (surrounding sanctions) killed a large potential Australian wheat sale to South Africa in mid-1986.38

Overall, it is clear that the direct economic impact of Australian sanctions against South Africa was very minor. However, as suggested above, it is also likely that, given the close historic relationships between the two countries, Australia’s decision to impose partial sanctions, and its vociferous advocacy of international sanctions pressure, had a significant psychological impact on white South Africans. Certainly, the vigorous diplomatic and propaganda efforts undertaken by the South African government in Australia suggest that it was very sensitive to Australian opinions and actions.39 In this respect, certain specific sanctions measures were
Table I

Australian Trade with South Africa, 1985-90
(value, percentage share of total trade, and growth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$A (Millions)</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-86</td>
<td>137.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-87</td>
<td>154.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87-88</td>
<td>151.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88-89</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89-90</td>
<td>118.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Year Growth</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are in Australian dollars; $A1 = approx $C 0.89

Source: "Direction of Trade, Australia, 1988-90", Australian Trade with Countries and Country Groups and Regions Central Statistics Section, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

N.B: No attempt has been made to determine what percentage of changes in trade volumes are attributed to partial sanctions, vs. alternative factors such as loss of business confidence, changed commodity prices, etc.

particularly effective.

Among these were the restrictions placed on consular services in South Africa. From 21 November 1986, the Australian government (like its Canadian counterpart) stopped issuing visitor and other temporary entry visas (e.g., student visas) in South Africa. The only exceptions were "compassionate, humanitarian and national interest circumstances where such visits are consistent with Australia’s policy of opposition to apartheid (e.g., visits by South African anti-apartheid leaders)." Interestingly, the
restrictions did not extend to the processing of migration applications. Given the high volume of visitors between the two countries, these new restrictions doubtless had a significant impact in reinforcing in the minds of South Africans the growing international isolation they faced, even amongst their closest historic allies, as long as apartheid policies persisted.

Similarly, the ban on air links between South Africa and Australia, which went into effect on 31 October 1987, not only imposed a financial penalty on South African Airways, but directly inconvenienced large numbers of mainly white South Africans (as well as substantial numbers of Australians). The "Wallaby Route" (South African Airways [SAA] to Australia) had one of the best seat utilisation ratios in the world, carrying 68,000 passengers in its best year, 1982. While SAA was still able to offer passengers connecting service to Australia via Hong Kong, Taipei and Singapore (no air transport sanctions in these centres!), the added time and inconvenience involved was bound to have a significant psychological impact on South African travellers. Ironically, the fact that Zimbabwe ultimately decided not to impose a ban on air links with South Africa meant that the Australian ban had the secondary effect of providing some financial benefits to Zimbabwe. The best route for travellers between South Africa and Australia was to take the SAA connecting flight from Johannesburg to Harare, linking up with the Qantas flight to Australia. Zimbabwe benefitted financially from the travellers channelled through Harare on this basis, and the fees for landing rights associated with this route.

Finally, sports-mad white South Africans were profoundly affected by international sport sanctions. The effect was particularly acute where their fiercest traditional rivalries were concerned -- i.e., with Commonwealth rivals Britain, New Zealand and Australia, and in the team sports of cricket and rugby. This point of vulnerability among white South Africans gave the actions of the smaller members of the old, "white" Commonwealth disproportionate impact. The South African government was prepared to go to extraordinary lengths in an effort to maintain these linkages, even in watered-down "rebel" form (a second-rate Australian rebel cricket
tour in late 1985 relied on secret South African government funding of $A3 million, for example\(^2\). This issue cut both ways, of course: many Australians, too, were 'dead keen' on sporting rivalries with South Africa, and Australian government policy of strongly discouraging these links, extending back to the Whitlam years, remained unpopular with a majority of voters.\(^3\) Controversies over sport sanctions were a regular staple in the Australian press, and the government was vulnerable to periodic embarrassments over sportspersons joining rebel tours in defiance of official policy.\(^4\) Nevertheless, no Australian government paid a significant electoral price for its policies in this area, from which they derived some real clout in the anti-apartheid struggle.

3. Diplomatic Efforts in Support of Change

The Australian government's diplomatic presence in Southern Africa is limited. During the 1983-89 period, it maintained small High Commissions in Zimbabwe and Zambia, while closing its High Commission in Tanzania. Its maintenance of full diplomatic relations with South Africa was relatively uncontroversial at home, in contrast with the situation in Canada,\(^5\) although the government did withdraw its Trade Commission in 1985 (some seven years after Canada had done so) and, as noted above, reduced its consular services. These limitations, along with the obvious consideration that sanctions required the participation of the major Western powers to have much economic impact, led Australia to concentrate its diplomatic efforts in support of regional change in multilateral organizations: the UN and, especially, the Commonwealth.

At the UN, Australia used its position as a temporary member of the Security Council in 1985 and 1986 as a platform upon which to make a strong pitch for mandatory economic sanctions. Indeed, it is not coincidental that, in October 1984, shortly before the election for non-permanent Security Council seats, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden placed Australia's "unequivocal" opposition to apartheid as an "evil doctrine (which) depends on injustice and fosters violence" at the top of his speech to
the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{46} Without impugning Hayden's sincerity, it may be noted that remarks of this type 'played well' at the UN. Once on the Security Council, the Australian government responded to the imposition of the state of emergency in South Africa by voting for two resolutions calling for sanctions measures against the Republic -- one voluntary, the other mandatory. In both cases, it diverged from its two historic "great and powerful friends", Britain and the US, who abstained on the former resolution and vetoed the latter. The resolution calling for voluntary measures was co-sponsored by France and Denmark, and it was reported that Hayden "appeared angered that France had stolen the march on Australia in sponsoring action against South Africa."\textsuperscript{47}

Later, in a speech before the General Assembly in November of 1987, Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott signalled a subtle shift in policy on the delicate issue of the armed struggle in South Africa. Stating that while Canberra did not condone the use of force and violence, "it will not condemn (blacks) for so doing", he asserted that "it would be surprising if those who were repressed failed to take a determined stand against their misguided rulers".\textsuperscript{48} In the same speech, he rebuked the US and Britain for 'indirectly assisting apartheid' by their opposition to sanctions. This new position on the issue of violence set off a firestorm of controversy at home, particularly when the it was defended in even stronger terms by Bill Hayden. Said the Foreign Minister: "I hope I'd have enough courage to fight back (against the South African regime)...I may not have but I hope I would. And in certain circumstances that can justify murder in defence of basic rights or to try to get a free society".\textsuperscript{49} While the impact of this policy shift beyond Australia is questionable, it was a fairly bold departure in diplomatic language by the standards of members of the Western bloc.

More significant than its hardening rhetorical stands at the UN were the Australian government's diplomatic efforts to advance multilateral pressure for change within the smaller and more informal confines of the Commonwealth. These efforts were focused, vigorous, and quite strategically-sophisticated. They also contained
elements of the "heroic", in Higgott and Cooper's terms: they were often highly personal[-ized and politicized, and involved intensive effort on discrete topics. It is in this Commonwealth diplomatic domain that we can accurately speak of Australian policy effectively using marginal resources to encourage international initiatives with quite broad potential implications.

Prior to the 1985 Nassau CHOGM, the Australian Government completed a review of South African policy. Besides settling on several mild sanctions, it decided to pursue two main diplomatic thrusts. These were, in effect, for the establishment of an "eminent persons group" to pursue the possibility of a 'peaceful' negotiated transition in South Africa, and for the establishment of an "expert group" to investigate possibilities for more sophisticated and concerted international financial pressure. In subsequent diplomatic efforts, the government pursued these two ideas with considerable consistency and determination.

At Nassau, the Commonwealth as a body, in the face of Margaret Thatcher's (at this point still inchoate) opposition to sanctions, developed a 'two-pronged' strategy. This strategy involved the unanimous adoption of a mild package of punitive 'measures' against South Africa, and the creation of a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) "to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue (between the government and the 'true representatives' of the black majority)." A smaller follow-up meeting (the 1986 Mini-Summit) was provided for to review the work of the EPG and, if necessary, decide upon further actions against South Africa. Most observers were not optimistic that the EPG would succeed in stimulating such a dialogue. But if it did succeed, so much the better; and if it did not, particularly on account of Pretoria's failure to cooperate, the case for broad international sanctions would be greatly strengthened. Other Commonwealth leaders would then have a good chance of manoeuvring (or 'entrapping') Britain into supporting an expanded sanctions package, with a potential 'snowball effect' vis-a-vis the European Community and the US.

In the event, the EPG came much closer to success in facilitating a process of
dialogue than most observers expected, but was ultimately stymied by Pretoria. Nevertheless, its subsequent report commanded widespread international attention, and made an understated but compelling case for sanctions. Similarly, the leaders represented at the subsequent Mini-Summit, including Bob Hawke, failed to persuade Mrs. Thatcher to agree to their partial sanctions package. However, their actions, and indeed the representations of EPG co-chairs Malcolm Fraser and Olusegun Obasanjo, had some impact on the subsequent partial sanctions package adopted by the EC, and the stronger and more important package implemented by the US Congress.

It is never easy to apportion responsibility for Commonwealth strategic thinking: part of the organization's genius is that it allows several national leaders to claim credit for any given initiative. In the case of the Nassau Summit, a number of key leaders — among them Canada's Mulroney, India's Ghandi, Zambia's Kaunda, Zimbabwe's Mugabe, and the Commonwealth's Ramphal, as well as Hawke — cooperated effectively on South Africa. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that credit for the EPG idea, and much of the strategy built around it, belongs with Australian foreign policy-makers. Certainly, Hawke was widely credited in the Australian press with having originated the EPG idea. This does not guarantee the accuracy of this interpretation, but was in itself a significant public relations accomplishment from the Australian government's point of view.

It should also be noted that the Hawke Government's nomination of Malcolm Fraser as Australia's representative on the Group, and its eventual co-chair, was clever politics on several levels. Domestically, the nomination of this recent political enemy by the ALP Government appeared a generous gesture on an important moral issue. At the same time, it served to highlight the growing rift within the ranks of the Opposition coalition over South Africa, as those right-wing elements which had quietly opposed Fraser's strong stand against apartheid re-asserted their views. And internationally, while Fraser's 'bull in a china shop' style was a mixed blessing, his unimpeachable conservative and pro-Western credentials made him, on balance, an effective advocate of change among white South Africans, and for
sanctions with US and European legislators.

As noted above, Margaret Thatcher refusal, on Britain's behalf, to participate in the further development and implementation of a Commonwealth sanctions package frustrated the initial Australian/Commonwealth strategy for action against South Africa -- though it did not render it pointless or unimportant. At this stage, neither Australia nor Canada -- the two key "white" advocates of strong Commonwealth action -- were eager to plunge ahead unilaterally with additional, marginally important, sanctions, thereby becoming increasingly exposed and isolated within their Western state "peer group". Nor, on the other hand, were they, or the rest of the Commonwealth, willing or indeed politically able to suspend their South African activism, thereby appearing to have capitulated to Margaret Thatcher. Consequently, new ways of "keeping the pressure on Pretoria" were sought. The primary vehicle chosen was the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, chaired by Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.

In general, this initiative failed to produce any major new breakthroughs in the international struggle against apartheid. It did, however, sponsor some useful research, and kept a high-level political focus on the issues and opportunities involved in promoting change in the region. It thus helped to deepen an international normative consensus on the need for continued sanctions pressure until genuine negotiations, leading to the dismantling of apartheid, were under way. The Australian role on the Committee was, for the most part, subsidiary to that of the Canadians, who had considerably greater financial and diplomatic resources at their disposal for the Southern African issue, and had established an (increasingly difficult to sustain) position of leadership on it. The Australians, however, marshalled their limited resources in consistent pursuit of action on a single, strategically-important sub-issue: financial sanctions.

The Australian Government's emphasis on this area of South African
vulnerability can, as noted above, be traced back to its internal policy review of mid-1985. At the Vancouver CHOGM in 1987, Hawke successfully pushed for a commitment to initiate an "expert study" of South Africa's links to the international financial system. At the first CFMSA meeting in Lusaka in February, 1988, Foreign Minister Hayden produced a position paper prepared by an economist in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet which "enabled the Australian delegation to assume the initiative in development of a Commonwealth plan 'to isolate South Africa from sources of international finance it badly needs'". Subsequently, a committee of officials from Australia, Canada and India developed these issues in a detailed study, and the Australian government sponsored its re-writing and publication as a paperback, launched by Prime Minister Hawke during the CFMSA's Canberra meeting. Thus, the Australian Government was primarily responsible for making the push for stronger financial sanctions the centrepiece of the CFMSA's work, and hence for giving this theme a higher international political profile, and placing the issues involved on a stronger intellectual footing.

However, this Australian/CFMSA strategic initiative had some significant limitations. Above all, neither Australian nor Canadian banks were major players in relation to South Africa, limiting Committee member-states' direct influence in matters concerning the RSA's international financial relations. Thus, despite representations from the CFMSA to South Africa's major creditor banks in Europe and the US in advance of crucial debt rescheduling negotiations in 1989, Pretoria was able to score a propaganda coup against the Commonwealth when it announced a rescheduling agreement, albeit on tough terms and for a limited amount of its total debt, just as the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM was getting under way. Even after this partial setback, however, the Australian Government maintained its focus on this theme, proposing, and providing seed funding for, a small research centre for the study of the South African economy and international finance in London. While the need for new sanctions against South Africa now seems redundant, this Centre can potentially create a Commonwealth comparative advantage in understanding South
Africa’s international financial linkages and needs -- an advantage which may, furthermore, be of some value in helping to facilitate a successful transition to majority rule, and the crucial process of development in the "new South Africa".

In sum, neither the EPG idea, nor the emphasis on financial sanctions championed by the Australian government came to fruition in the way their originators would have ideally hoped. Nevertheless, they were both quite imaginative initiatives on important issues, with broad potential international implications. By focusing its bureaucratic energies and capabilities on this pair of initiatives, the Australian Government was able to make good use of its limited resources to have a significant, indeed disproportionate, diplomatic impact on the development of Commonwealth policy towards South Africa. Not unimportantly, it was also able to heighten its own profile on this issue, both internationally and at home.

4. The Developmental Dimension

While the Hawke Government arguably had a disproportionately significant diplomatic impact, through the Commonwealth, on the South African issue, and while the psychological impact of some Australian sanctions was quite potent, the range of its effective involvement in regional affairs remained limited. This is most clear in its inconsistent efforts to assist in the development of South Africa’s majority-ruled neighbours -- the member-states of SADCC. This section investigates two main aspects of this "developmental dimension" of policy: official development assistance programmes; and the development of mutually-beneficial trade and investment linkages.

4.1 Development Assistance:

As discussed in chapter five, member-states of SADCC were susceptible to being used by South Africa as economic "hostages" in its battle to forestall international sanctions. Furthermore, they were seriously (though differentially) affected by South Africa’s direct and indirect destabilisation activities through the period under review. Thus, it was both logical and ethically appropriate that
substantial development assistance programmes to SADCC states, and particularly in support of SADCC's regional efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa and promote regional economic "integration", came to be widely regarded as the essential corollary of a strong anti-apartheid policy position (indeed, for many states, as a possible 'soft' substitute for the hard decisions associated with sanctions). This logic was particularly compelling within the Commonwealth, to which 7 of 9 SADCC states belonged.

The Australian aid performance in Southern Africa during this period was conditioned by two main factors. The first was an exhaustive review of the aid programme, leading to substantial reforms. The so-called "Jackson Report" was released in March of 1984 (see note #5). With regard to Africa, its most important recommendation was that the Australian aid program be given "a firmer geographic and sectoral definition which narrows the geographic focus for bilateral aid principally to Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and which aims to concentrate on fewer, larger projects." On this basis, it was recommended that Africa be relegated to the lowest category of the eligibility framework, meaning that it should not be eligible for project aid, Development Import Grants, or country programming. The report stressed that this did not mean Australian aid should be withdrawn from Africa: training, technical assistance and research support, food aid, humanitarian assistance, 'Head of Mission Discretionary Aid Funds', Development Import Finance Facility funding, and NGO support should continue to be provided. Nevertheless, it clearly implied that for aid purposes, the continent should be firmly and consistently placed in a low priority position.

The second main conditioning factor was that, in the context of stringent government austerity measures formulated in response to the Australian economy's growing structural problems, the aid programme fell victim to draconian cuts. As noted in chapter 4, aid expenditures declined from 0.47% of GNP in 1986 to 0.33% in 1987, and have not recovered subsequently. It is telling, though not surprising, that there was relatively little public opposition to these cuts, given the fact that
Australian public and governmental support for, and interest in, international development assistance has historically been limited. The juxtaposition of these cuts with Jackson's recommendation for greater geographical and sectoral focus in the aid programme meant that Africa was particularly hard hit: the Africa section in the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) was scrapped; and aid to the SADCC region plummeted from $A24 million in 1983-84 to $A10.2 million in 1985-86.

The contradiction between the precipitous decline in aid to Africa, including Southern Africa, and the Government's escalating involvement in, and political commitment to, promoting change in the RSA was not hard to spot. Nor did it go unchallenged, at home and abroad. The Jackson Report had based its recommendation that there be no project aid or country programming in Africa on three main arguments:

1. that Australia lacks the resources, and especially the administrative capacity, to carry out worthwhile bilateral programs of project aid in Africa...;

2. that since Africa is heavily aided by multilateral agencies and by major European and North American donor states, Australia can withdraw its very small-scale project aid in good conscience;

3. that in terms of Australia's own interests, Africa is not important. Australia's political, strategic and economic interests require rather a concentration of attention on the East Asian and Pacific regions.

In the domestic debate which ensued, advocates of a stronger aid presence in Africa, including NGOs, some specialized business interests, and a number of academics, took these arguments on and added some counter-arguments of their own. They argued that the essential humanitarian logic of aid made it impossible for a rich country to stand aside in good conscience from the poorest of all continents. Further, Australia shared many of Africa's environmental conditions and challenges. Its highly developed skills in land and animal husbandry, food production, erosion control, forestry, water conservation, grain storage and pest control -- all areas of importance to Africa -- meant that relatively small Australian projects had the potential to achieve high degrees of quality and effectiveness, and to have important demonstration
effects. This line of argument dovetailed with an argument based on economic self-interest: given Australian comparative advantages in these areas, and the large multilateral aid contracts in play in Africa, Australia should be facilitating the involvement of its own commercial enterprises through a significant aid presence on the continent.

Finally, these advocates marshalled a series of rebuttals to the argument that aid to Africa did not efficiently serve Australia’s strategic and political interests. They argued, for example, that many African states are part of the Indian Ocean littoral, which the Australian Government regards as important to the country’s security and well-being; that aid to African Commonwealth states strengthens the useful Commonwealth connection; that aid to Southern African states, and especially SADCC, underpins Australia’s well-established political commitments in that region; and that high-quality aid to Southern Africa would enhance Australia’s standing amongst Third World governments generally, while continued erosion would, conversely, hurt the country’s international reputation.70

Ultimately, the logic of the Government’s high-profile political commitment to the region, and of Commonwealth politics in particular, led to a restoration of previous assistance levels to Southern Africa, and then a substantial increase. Immediately prior to the first meeting of the CFMSA in Lusaka in January 1988, the Cabinet increased the size of its regional aid programme to $A100 million ($A15 million, $A35 million, and A$50 million in successive years — see attachments 1 and 2 for programme description).71 The programme grew slightly to $A110 million for the 1990-93 period.

The fact that such a significant increase was carved out of a shrinking pie at the specific behest of the Cabinet reflects the political priority the Hawke Government had come to place on Southern Africa. Nevertheless, it was insufficient to make Australia anything more than a minor player among SADCC donors, while the erratic path of the Australian aid programme doubtless reduced the political credit it received for this decision among SADCC and donor states.72 Furthermore, the rapid
increase in the size of the programme with minimal support capacity on the ground in
the region created considerable administrative problems in dispersing the aid both
quickly and effectively. The forms of aid (more than 70% commodity assistance,
food aid, and training) were clearly shaped largely by the requirement of speed and
administrative ease of dispersal; considerations of careful and innovative project
design necessarily received short shrift.

Finally, while the Southern African aid programme is assured through 1993, it
is worth noting that the forms of aid involved would facilitate a relatively easy
withdrawal at short notice. As the process of reform proceeds in South Africa, and
as the logic of a deepening Asia-Pacific focus continues to gain force in Australia, it
is difficult to imagine AIDAB building upon its current programme in the region to
develop a firm long-term presence there.

4.2 Commercial Linkages:

One of the main reasons why there is little incentive to consolidate a
significant aid presence in Southern Africa, or indeed in Africa as a whole, is the
very limited extent of Australian trade and investment links -- both actual and
prospective -- in the region (see, for example, Table 2). As noted in chapter five,
while the often-exploitative nature of such links between developed and developing
countries is widely recognized, it is also now widely agreed that long-term
development in SADCC states and elsewhere in the South cannot happen without
expanded trade opportunities, investment, and technology transfers from the "North"
(including, figuratively, Australia). Furthermore, from the SADCC perspective,
expanded trade and investment links with interests from countries like Australia may
well be preferable to deeper reliance on bigger countries and multinational enterprises
on whom they are already deeply dependent.

The Australian Government, too, has been interested in, and has made some
efforts toward, expanding commercial ties with Southern African states beyond South
Africa. Nevertheless, as the statistics in Table 2 indicate, trade links in particular
remain very limited, and the trend lines (conditioned as they are by the impact of
TABLE 2
Australian trade with SADCC States, 1987-1988 to 1989-90
(A$'000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports 87-88</th>
<th>Exports 88-89</th>
<th>Exports 89-90</th>
<th>Imports 87-88</th>
<th>Imports 88-89</th>
<th>Imports 89-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9,490</td>
<td>9,831</td>
<td>9,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>5,544</td>
<td>8,678</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nambia</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>4,029</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>4,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>3,853</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>1,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7,589</td>
<td>6,796</td>
<td>12,344</td>
<td>179,730</td>
<td>8,585</td>
<td>8,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21,624</td>
<td>20,901</td>
<td>26,916</td>
<td>199,752</td>
<td>27,452</td>
<td>27,534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Direction of Trade, Australia, 1989-90"

economic crisis and structural adjustment in most Southern African states) are often negative. Of the SADCC states, the Australian Government has predictably viewed Zimbabwe as having the greatest potential for expanded commercial links. As of late 1989, two trade missions in each direction had been undertaken in the previous couple of years. Most significantly, a high-level Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) delegation had travelled to Australia in January, 1989. In the words of an AIDAB officer, there had been "a lot of dust stirred up", with expressions of interest on both sides, but progress was slow. In particular, it was being frustrated by mutual ignorance, and by the acute shortage of foreign exchange which has bedeviled Zimbabwean economic development in recent years. On the whole Australian
government officials were guardedly optimistic, citing in particular the prospect of a number of Australian mining companies investing in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, with Zimbabwe constituting the best prospect, the potential for significantly expanded economic ties with other parts of the region must certainly be regarded as unpromising.

It is interesting to speculate on how this situation might change as trade and investment is promoted once more with a post-apartheid South Africa. Whether Australian interests have the potential to expand their involvement in South Africa in this context, and to use such strengthened relations as a springboard for expanded economic ties with the rest of the region -- indeed, the degree to which the rest of Southern Africa will in fact benefit from the RSA's renewed international respectability and potential attractiveness to foreign economic interests -- are highly uncertain questions at this time. It should be noted, however, that the Australian and South/Southern African economies will remain, to a substantial degree, structurally similar and competitive. Under the circumstances, there is unlikely to be a substantially enlarged Australian economic presence in the region.\textsuperscript{74}

5. Security Assistance:

The point to be made here is a simple one. Despite the fact that the South African-supported activities of the ruthless "Renamo" (MNR) insurgency in Mozambique were causing immense human suffering through the mid- to late-1980s, as well as considerable damage to transport and communications infrastructure largely financed by foreign donors and crucial to SADCC states' efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa, the Australian Government remained very reluctant to provide security assistance to Mozambique specifically, as well as to other regional states subject to destabilising activities.\textsuperscript{75} This was so despite requests for this type of assistance from Mozambique, and a growing international consensus on its logic and desirability, advanced in part by a special report to the CFMSA on the security needs of the Front-Line States prepared by the former co-chair of the EPG, General
Obasanjo.\textsuperscript{76} The Australian Government's position on this issue was in sharp contrast to that of the Commonwealth's \textit{bete noire} on Southern Africa, the Thatcher Government of Britain, which had long provided substantial programmes of military training and assistance to Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other regional states. It also differed from the more forthcoming policies of several other European states, including Spain, Portugal, and France.\textsuperscript{77} But it was quite similar to the position taken by other "like-minded" middle powers on Southern Africa, such as Canada, the Nordic states, and the Netherlands. Eventually, the Australian Government climbed gingerly and tardily aboard the "non-lethal security assistance" bandwagon, coming up with a $A1.25 million package of telecommunications equipment and English language training for Mozambican telecommunications staff, specifically linked to the Obasanjo report. The announcement of the package asserted that:

\begin{quote}
As well as addressing Mozambique's country-wide security warning needs against insurgents the equipment would be used for normal telecommunications purposes serving the rural economy and assist humanitarian relief coordination. The equipment could also generate commercial prospects for Australian companies...\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

This was hardly a major commitment to the security needs of hard-pressed Mozambique!

The one clear exception to the Australian Government's resistance to involvement in the security affairs of the region was its commitment of 309 army engineers to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. This role in the expensive and high-profile UN-supervised transition to independence in 1989-90 -- at $US416 million, a cadillac among UN peacekeeping/supervisory operations -- was the upshot of a standing commitment dating back to 1979.\textsuperscript{79} The Australian role in this difficult, but ultimately quite successful, operation was doubtless a useful one. It was also the kind of uncontroversial, internationally-sanctioned commitment which appeals to the governments of states like Australia which are interested in projecting an image of "good international citizenship". It is not surprising that Canada and Sweden also pursued, and played, significant roles in this operation.
6. Explanation and Analysis

It is useful to relate the Hawke government's Southern African policy to its general foreign policy approach. In recent collaborative work, Andrew Cooper and Richard Higgott have noted that, whereas Australian foreign policy has traditionally been characterized by bluster, impatience, and over-zealousness, under the Hawke government, it grew in strategic sophistication and effectiveness, while retaining strong elements of showmanship. More specifically, in Southern Africa as in other issue-areas, the government demonstrated a propensity for a discrete and focused, "niche" approach to foreign policy; and a facility for the pursuit of foreign policy as a 'two-level (i.e., international and domestic) game'.

The Hawke Government's propensity for niche playing is clearly illustrated by several high-profile initiatives: the Cairns Group in the GATT; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative; the Cambodian "Red Book"; the pursuit of a 'comprehensive environmental convention' for Antarctica; and the pursuit of an international Chemical Weapons Convention. The logic behind this approach is clear: Australia can potentially have a much more significant impact, and maintain a higher and (ideally) more positive international profile, by carefully marshalling its limited, but often sophisticated, diplomatic, bureaucratic, and technical resources and capabilities in pursuit of a few important (to both Australia and a range of other states) initiatives. This seems an eminently sensible approach for a developed middle power. With regard to Southern Africa -- itself a "niche" in the broad sweep of Australian foreign policy concerns -- Australia focused on "sub-niches" which enabled it to have a significant impact at a time when (as its regional aid policy demonstrates) it wished to limit its resource commitments in this area. Both the diplomacy surrounding the EPG initiative, and particularly the pursuit of stronger and more consistent action on financial sanctions, can be seen in these terms.

With regard to the 'two-level game' aspect of Australian foreign policy, particularly as the international agenda has become increasingly crowded with what used to be viewed as 'low politics' issues -- economic, environmental, human rights,
etc. -- it has become clear that most foreign policy issue areas will have international and domestic audiences and ramifications. Sophisticated foreign policy making requires sensitivity to, and an ability to utilize opportunities in, both internal and external contexts -- and to recognize the inter-connections between the two. In the Southern African issue area, Australia's deepening involvement was stimulated in the first instance by external pressures -- above all, the uprising in South Africa and Pretoria's draconian response, to which the "international community" was bound to respond; and more specifically, the imperatives of Commonwealth politics, where the very survival of the organization likely depended upon the vigorous pursuit of fundamental change in the RSA. In this connection, the Hawke Government doubtless realized that it could enhance its international reputation and score useful political points -- in pursuit of a seat on the Security Council, for example -- by taking a strong stand against South Africa. There were, in addition, broader and rather more high-minded international motives involved as well, which are discussed below.

On the domestic front as well, however, the Government was able to play the Southern African issue to its partisan political advantage. Public opinion polls did show that a majority of Australians opposed specific aspects of the government's policy towards South Africa in particular, notably on sport and trade sanctions. This fact, combined with the opposition of the business community to sanctions, clearly constrained the range of sanctions measures the Government was prepared to consider. It was also doubtless clear to the Government, however -- as it had been to the Fraser and Whitlam Governments before it -- that its electoral fate did not hang on its Southern African policies. In Michelle Grattan's felicitous phrase, "South Africa policy is among the caviar of political issues: the next election will be decided on the bread and butter: tax, the economy, and industrial relations."

Beyond this broad calculation, furthermore, it was clear that this issue could be turned to useful partisan purposes. Within the ALP, a strong anti-apartheid/pro-Front-line State policy was a unifying factor. It appealed to the Party's core
constituency in the large labour movement, the liberal churches, internationalist
NGO's, etc., and put Hawke -- responsible for domestic structural adjustment reforms
unpopular with much of this constituency -- "in the...rather rare position for him of
being in tune with his party organization." 84

On the other hand, the South African issue-area afforded the Government
opportunities to sow disunity within the Opposition. Hawke was doubtless aware of
this potential when he appointed Malcolm Fraser as the Australian representative on
the EPG -- the cynic might even see this mischievous partisan motive as pre-eminent.
The Opposition periodically display embarrassing public divisions over the South
African issue, 85 and South Africa became the object of some crackling partisan
exchanges. When, for example, the Government made it clear that it "understood"
and would not condemn blacks' resort to violence, John Howard, the Opposition
Leader, asserted that the Government was defending the indefensible and "deserves
the contempt of all Australians'. But Mr. Hawke accused Mr. Howard of being a
'moral pygmy' over South Africa and contrasted him unfavourably with the former
Liberal Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser". 86

Underlying this political gamesmanship, however, lay more fundamental and
substantial concerns with the image and reputation of the Australian state -- in other
words, with the potential for Australian policy towards Southern African to enhance
the legitimacy, broadly conceived, of state and government. In this regard, Southern
African policy clearly fell within Gareth Evans' explicit preoccupation with
Australia's "being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen". 87 This
particular issue-area was especially pertinent to Australia's pursuit of international
legitimacy because of the country's own history of racism. The Government arguably
perceived a continuing need to signal to both the international community, and to its
own civil society, its rejection of this racist past, by continuing to publicly exorcise
the ghosts of this past. A strong stand against apartheid, and in support of apartheid's
regional opponents and victims, was an excellent way of sending this signal.
Conversely, to have failed to engage this issue would have been to run the risk of
sending the opposite signal: that Australia still tacitly sympathized with white South Africa, and that racist ghosts still stalked the land.

This subtext of Australian policy, in which values and 'enlightened self-interest' were inextricably intertwined, may also be read as a two-level game. On the one hand, the signalling of Australia's rejection of racism and its determination to be a 'good international citizen' by taking a strong and active stand on South Africa was clearly aimed at several international audiences. Notable among these was the Commonwealth audience, but it was also likely directed towards the important Asia-Pacific regional audience, which doubtless remained sensitive to vestiges of Australian racism, and the wider UN audience. In addition, however, it may be suggested that the government's signalling on this issue aimed to appeal to attentive domestic audiences (or "political classes"). Here, it is useful to distinguish between public opinion on specific policy questions, and more general popular perceptions of Australian leaders' role in world affairs. For although a majority of Australians may have opposed specific trade and sport sanctions measures, there is circumstantial evidence that many also liked -- indeed expected -- their national leaders to play roles as world statesmen: tackling the British Prime Minister on an issue of principle, for example, and 'strutting the world stage' at Commonwealth meetings.88 The same general expectation, and source of domestic appeal and legitimacy, can be seen in the cases of other Western middle powers, including Canada and Sweden.

One student of Australia's South African policy, Dave Cox, has suggested that the Government's policy served another, related domestic purpose: that of continuing to educate Australians on the need to rid their country of racism.89 Australian leaders can be under no illusions concerning the strong streak of racism which continues to exist within their society. They are also highly sensitive to charges of hypocrisy with regard to South Africa, based particularly on the poor conditions in which most Aborigines continue to live.90 South Africa offered the Government a way of raising public consciousness on racial issues, and underscoring the unacceptability of racialist thought and action, in a non-threatening way: i.e.,
indirectly, in a situation which did not immediately impinge on Australian issues and sensibilities. This is no substitute for attitudinal change and policy reform at home, but it may well have helped to reinforce domestic policy priorities.

There is a third level, beyond the international community and domestic society, at which I would argue that Southern African policy performed a legitimizing function. This is the level of the state itself, specifically among key political leaders and decision-makers. Many political leaders, particularly (though not only) in democratic polities, have attempted to use their positions to pursue some moral purpose(s) in post-World War II international affairs. The morality involved has of course been selective and limited, and the line between ethical motives and egoistic self-aggrandizement an uncertain one. But the desire to use a position of political leadership to make a constructive contribution to the global community has nevertheless been quite common, notably among leaders of 'like-minded' middle-sized and small states. It may be seen as part of the self-legitimizing apparatus of a national political leadership. During the mid- to late-1980s, seizing opportunities to 'take a stand' on 'the greatest moral debate that is going on'91 -- i.e., South Africa -- was one of the most accessible means available to political leaders to fulfill this need for moral purpose, particularly when they led relatively distant states with limited vested interests in the RSA. To neglect or dismiss this ethical motive is to miss a major driving force behind Australian -- and indeed Canadian and Swedish -- policies towards Southern Africa during this period.

Thus, in explaining Australian policy towards Southern Africa, it is important to incorporate the personal engagement and commitment of key political leaders and policy makers -- notably the Prime Minister, Foreign Ministers Bill Hayden and Gareth Evans, and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Stuart Harris.92 Similarly, it was necessary to reckon in the personal views and commitments of the conservative, Malcolm Fraser, and the social democrat, Gough Whitlam, in explaining the earlier emergence of a more activist and "progressive" Australian policy towards Southern Africa. But these personal roles should not be
seen simply as a chance succession of idiosyncratic approaches which happened to be more or less consistent on this issue-area: rather, they should be related to the broader need for moral purpose and personal/public legitimacy among Australian (and other) political leaders, for which South and Southern Africa has been a compelling, accessible and cost-effective vehicle.

What, then, was the impact of Australian policy towards Southern Africa during the 1984-89 period? With regard to the immediate challenges of promoting development and security in the region beyond South Africa through effective programmes of development and security assistance, Australia was, and remains, a minor player. With a shrunken aid budget and an increasing Asia-Pacific preoccupation, there is little reason to expect any change in this situation, despite the substantial relative increase in aid to the Southern African region from early 1988.

But it is also clear that the development and security prospects of the region as a whole will be considerably more significantly affected by the process and course of change in South Africa itself than by the activities of donor states in relation to the SADCC area. And it is in helping to advance the process of change in the South Africa (and Namibia) that Australian activities can reasonably be viewed as having had a significant, though marginal, impact. Australia’s economic and strategic leverage vis-a-vis South Africa was small but, given the close societal linkages and historical affinities between the two countries, the psychological impact of its sanctions, particularly in the sport, air, and consular areas, was probably substantial. Australian sanctions highlighted for white South Africans the inevitability of increasing isolation from those societies whose company they most valued so long as apartheid persisted. The Australian Government obviously tread a fine line here, given its own history of racism and the continued structural inequality of the Aborigine population; but, as noted above, this very situation helped to drive the Government’s South African policy, viewed as a means of signalling its rejection of this past and the values which lay behind it.

Furthermore, through its focused and consistent Commonwealth diplomatic
efforts, the Hawke Government was able to increase both the impact of the Commonwealth on this issue, and the profile and credibility of its own anti-apartheid policies. Ultimately, both the EPG initiative and the push for stronger financial sanctions were substantially "failures", on their own stated terms. But in the broader sense of helping to deepen the growing international normative consensus on the need for rapid change in South Africa, the need for sanctions pressure to help produce this change, and the specific means by which this pressure could be effectively brought to bear, both initiatives -- but especially the former -- had some real influence.

Thus, Australian policy towards Southern Africa during this period underscores the broader argument that, with sound strategic thinking and careful marshalling of resources in a propitious issue-area, middle powers whose stake and leverage might appear marginal on conventional measures can in practice have a significant impact. Notwithstanding the gamesmanship and hyperbole associated with some of the Australian debates on this issue, and the distinct weaknesses of the aid and security assistance aspects of its policy, the Hawke Government demonstrated significant measures of both commitment and sophistication in framing its Southern African policy.

NOTES

1. Indeed, with considerable white South African emigration to Australia through much of the 1980s, societal connections have arguably been reinforced. As of 1986, there were 36,000 mainly white South Africans living in Australia, concentrated primarily in Sydney and Perth. See, for example, Philip Derriman, "Apartheid's rich refugees: joining the chicken run", The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 Jan. 1986; Alison Goldberg, "South Africans look after their own", Financial Review, 6 Feb. 1986; and Sheryle Bagwell and Jenni Hewett, "Well-off, White, and heading here", Financial Review, 10 Oct. 1986.

3. See, for example, Higgott, Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989), esp. 7-8.

4. A consistent theme of Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has been that one of Australia's core groups of national interests are "those involved in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen". See Evans, "Australia's place in the World", Australian Foreign Affairs Review 59 (12), Dec. 1988, 527.


8. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 186. J.A. Camilleri has written: "(Menzies') insensitivity to the aspirations of the non-white Commonwealth led (him) to oppose at the 1960 Commonwealth Conference any criticism of South Africa's continued administration of its mandate in South-West Africa. This stand, together with his untiring efforts to prevent South Africa's exclusion from the Commonwealth, cast Australia in the role of arch-defender of the South African cause." Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: The Jacaranda Press, 1979), 26.


10. See Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 304-316 and 378-385; and Millar, South African Dilemmas (Canberra: Department of International Relations, ANU, 1985), 66-68.


12. For example, in 1974-75, 1.1% of Australia's total exports went to South Africa, and 0.5% of total imports came from South Africa. Australia has usually run a healthy surplus in bilateral trade. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, appendix D,


16. The information in this paragraph is drawn largely from Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 363-364.

17. Camilleri, 89.


21. Just how important the Commonwealth, and Fraser, were in the transition is a matter of some controversy. Renouf, for example, plays down the importance of the Commonwealth role, giving most of the credit to the British and Americans -- although he does credit Fraser and Australian diplomacy with making a useful contribution to the outcome. See Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, 139-143. On the other hand, Commonwealth scholars and observers such as Stephen Chan and Derek Ingram credit the Commonwealth, and particularly its then-Secretary-General, Sonny Ramphal, as well as Fraser, with key roles in the outcome. See Stephen Chan, The Commonwealth in World Politics (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988), 35-46; also, author's personal discussions with Chan, Canterbury, 26 Nov. 1990, and Derek Ingram, London, 31 Nov. 1990. More radical scholars have pointed out that the Lancaster House Agreement, on which the independence settlement was based, placed stringent restrictions on the new Zimbabwean government which inhibited it from launching the kind of transformative
project which the deeply unjust legacies of the country's settler colonial history made desirable.


23. This point is made by Dave Cox in a draft chapter of an M.A. thesis for Flinders University in Australia, entitled "Resetting Policy: March 1983-July 1986". Cox cites the following media sources: "South Africa sport ban opposed", Canberra Times, 17 March 1983; and a Morgan Gallup Poll survey published in the Bulletin, 22 March 1983, wherein 77% of those interviewed felt that Australian and South African sporting teams should be allowed to compete against each other.


28. On trade sanctions, polling results published in The Age in mid-1985 showed that even on the relatively innocuous statement that the Australian Government "Should work for an international ban on trade with South Africa", 35% of those surveyed were in favour, 51% were opposed, and 14% were undecided. Leonard Radic, "Most oppose move to end South Africa trade links", The Age, 16 July 1985.

29. Indeed, this community resisted even the adoption of a voluntary Code of Conduct similar to those adopted in the US, EC, and Canada nearly a decade previously. "Business group gives thumbs down to code on apartheid", The Age, 14 June 1985.


35. See Leaver, 31-39.


39. See, for example, Mark Forbes, "Australia remains South Africa's secret target", *National Times*, 18-24 July 1986; and the weekly "columns" (in fact, paid advertisements) by South African ambassador David Tothill in the *Weekend Australian* beginning in early 1989 -- for example, "It's the Squeaky Wheel that gets the oil", *Weekend Australian*, 4-5 Feb. 1989.


42. Forbes, "Australia remains South Africa's secret target".

43. When tennis player Pat Cash decided to play in the South African Open Championships in 1987, for example, a poll showed both an extraordinarily high degree of public awareness -- 9 out of 10 people polled were aware that he was playing in South Africa -- and that 65% of those polled approved, while only 25% disapproved. "65 pc back Cash on S Africa trip", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 Nov. 1987.

44. For example, just prior to the start of the Canberra meetings of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa in August 1989, it was revealed that six Australian rugby players had been invited to join an

45. An Australian diplomat pointed out that this was at least partly because the Australian government never threatened to close its embassy, as Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, in threatening to "sever relations absolutely" at the UN in 1985, implicitly had. Confidential interview, Ottawa, 7 Feb. 1990.


53. This Commonwealth strategy is discussed in Chan, The Commonwealth in World Politics, 72.


55. See, for example, A.E. Pijpers, "South Africa and European Sanctions Policy", in Philip Everts and Guido Walraven, eds., The Politics of Persuasion, Implementation of Foreign Policy by the Netherlands (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), 317, on the influence of Commonwealth actions on the EC's admittedly weak sanctions package. With regard to Commonwealth influence on U.S. policy, a senior Commonwealth official has argued that Fraser and Obasanjo had a substantial impact in U.S. Congressional hearings on sanctions against South Africa. Confidential

56. See, for example, Gregory Hywood, "Hawke confident of Fraser group success in Sth Africa", Financial Review, 23 April 1986; and Loudon, "S Africa signals move for ANC peace talks", Weekend Australian, 26-27 April 1986. Dave Cox's scholarly analysis supports the view that Hawke's diplomatic role in formulating Commonwealth strategy at Nassau was an important one. Cox, chapter three, "Towards Credibility: July 1985-July 1986".

57. See, for example, Grattan, "Bipartisan policy in tatters as rifts widen coalition", The Age, 30 July 1985.


62. See Ovenden and Cole, Apartheid and International Finance. See also "Speech by the Prime Minister, Launch of Apartheid and International Finance, Canberra, 8 Aug. 1989".

63. It may be suggested that the Australian government's sensitivity to, and emphasis on, financial vulnerability/sanctions grew out of its own ongoing experience of grappling with financial vulnerability and debt.

64. "South Africa", Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade, 60 (10), Oct. 1989; "Report of the LSE Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and


67. Interview with official of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), Harare, 10 Nov. 1991; Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 368-377.


69. Cherry Gertzel and David Goldsworthy, "Australian Aid to Africa", in Eldridge, et. al., eds., 117.

70. See Gertzel and Goldsworthy; see also Stewart Harris, "Why Australia can't afford to neglect Africa", Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Jan. 1988, and Sally Loane, "Hayden walks tightrope on aid to Black Africa", Times on Sunday, 17 Jan. 1988.


72. This small and inconsistent aid programme helps to account for the perception of one Australian diplomat that Australia did not have much influence or access with the Zimbabwean government -- "perhaps less than we might...expect". Confidential interview, 24 Nov. 1989.


74. On the other hand, the strengthened social linkages between Australia and South Africa as a result of increased white South African emigration in recent years could facilitate expanded commercial ties between the two countries. How this will affect the broadly-based development prospects of the region as a whole remains questionable, however.


80. See Cooper, "Like-Minded Nations/Contrasting Diplomatic Styles…", for a discussion of the changing character of Australian diplomacy, as manifested in the international agricultural issue-area. See also Higgott and Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round", paper presented to the annual meeting of the ISA, Washington, D.C., 13 April 1990, 20, on the process of "self-criticism and re-evaluation" amongst Australian foreign policymakers.

81. For a discussion of Australian foreign policy as a ‘two-level game’ in the Asia-Pacific context, see Higgott, Cooper, and Jenelle Bonnor, "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: an evolving case-study in leadership and cooperation building", International Journal 45 (4), Autumn 1990, 847.

82. Higgott and Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership in the International Order", 12-17; and Gareth Evans, "Pragmatic, principled foreign policy", speech to the National Press Club, Canberra, Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade, 60 (9), Sept. 1989, 512-515.


84. Grattan, "Hawke’s hard road…".

85. See, for example, Patrick Walters, "Lib breaks ranks on Sth Africa sanctions", Sydney Morning Herald, 23 Sept. 1986.

87. Evans, "Australia's place in the world", 527.

88. Confidential interview with an Australian diplomat, Harare, 24 Nov. 1989; Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy, 190. There is a considerable tradition of Australian political leaders pursuing roles as world statesmen. Examples include Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference following World War I; Foreign Minister Evatt, particularly in the immediate post-World War II period; and Whitlam and Fraser prior to the Hawke government. The pattern is sufficiently strong to suggest that such a role reflects the aspirations of, and has appealed to, Australian political culture.

89. Personal correspondence with the author. Dave Cox is from Flinders University in Australia: he is not to be confused with David Cox of Queen's University.

90. See Leaver, 38; and Nicholas Rothwell, "After Tambo -- What?", Weekend Australian, 11-12 April, 1984. The same charge can, of course, be levelled at the Canadian Government, with a comparable degree of (in)accuracy.


92. The widely-respected Harris was credited with formulating the intellectual basis and justification for Australian policy towards South Africa during the mid-1980s. See Stuart Harris, "South Africa, An Australian perspective", Current Affairs Bulletin, March 1986, 4-12.
ATTACHMENT 1

AUSTRALIA'S AID PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA - HIGHLIGHTS

Mozambique is the Program's largest recipient with an allocation of A$18.5 million over three years, of which A$11.6 million is food aid sold in Mozambique with the proceeds used to fund projects in agriculture. A further A$5.4 million will be used to provide Australian telecommunications equipment to rural areas in Mozambique.

In addition to Mozambique, food aid is being provided to Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia; the total cost is A$22.5 million. This assistance provides support for these countries' balance of payments and makes revenue available for priorities in their development budgets.

A supply of commodities such as Australian manufactures and materials for sale to private sector companies in manufacturing, agriculture and mining is the main feature of Zimbabwe's A$17.3 million aid program. The proceeds are used for irrigation projects.

A Commodities Assistance Program (CASP) totalling A$36.6 million over three years is being implemented in six African countries. In a further five countries, where CASP is used by the public sector, equipment and materials are channelled directly into agriculture, transport and communications, and, in the case of Tanzania, A$4.9 million for port equipment. Under CASP 29 tenders have already been let for the supply of Australia-sourced commodities. The supply of a multi-purpose drilling rig in Botswana costing A$904,760 has been the largest single contract let to date.

An important element of the national programs in all SADCC countries is training, predominantly at tertiary level in the disciplines of agriculture and transport and communications. Over the three years ending June 1990 the total number of trainees in Australia will increase from 37 to 190, at a cost of A$8 million. Currently there are 130 trainees in Australia. AIDAB is also assisting the secondment of Australians to work as employees of Ministries and other public organisations in six of the nine countries. There are currently 39 Australians seconded under this scheme, which will cost A$5.2 million.

Approval has been given to implement three major village level projects at a cost of A$2.1 million. These projects in Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are assisting in agriculture and health in rural areas. A further A$3.4 million is available to Australian non-government agencies for this purpose.

Regional aid programs worth A$11.2 are assisting economic coordination between SADCC countries as well as providing economies of scale and reducing dependence on South Africa. An important component of this regional aid is an education development program, Phase One of which was completed last year at a cost of A$1.8 million. Phase Two which will cost A$7 million has been recently designed by eight permanent heads of Southern African Education Ministries during meetings in Australia. Other SADCC regional programs include a regional grain management training program, assistance in bunker grain storage, rehabilitation of landslips on the Tanzania-Zambia railway and support for SADCC's food security secretariat.

DAR-ES-SALAAM
ATTACHMENT 2

AUSTRALIAN SOUTHERN AFRICAN AID PROGRAM
1987/88 TO 1989/90

ALLOCATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td>5 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>2 912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>7 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>18 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAZILAND</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>6 166</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
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NGO VILLAGE LEVEL PROJECTS

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<td>SADCC/REGIONAL/OTHER</td>
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FORMS OF AID

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<tr>
<td>FOOD</td>
<td>22 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING (BILATERAL &amp; REGIONAL)</td>
<td>13 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAFFING ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>5 018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO PROJECTS</td>
<td>5 489</td>
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<tr>
<td>BURSARIES, PROJECTS FOR SAPSAN</td>
<td>8 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER (INCLUDING SADCC CONSULTANCIES)</td>
<td>8 131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DAR-ES-SALAAM
Chapter 7
Progressive Conservatism?
Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa, 1984-89

Canadian involvement in Southern Africa under Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative (PC) Government, first elected in the fall of 1984, attained a degree of depth, breadth, and consistency significantly exceeding that of its predecessors, and belying the region's marginal place among Canada's core economic and strategic concerns. In the heady days of 1985 and 1986, the Mulroney Government disarmed the most ardent critics of Canada's previous Southern African policies, breaking with long-standing Canadian foreign policy principles to impose limited economic sanctions against South Africa, sharply differing with its most important allies over regional policy, and boldly foreshadowing more dramatic steps to come. Subsequently, as it fell short of the expectations it had itself created, the government came in for some strong criticism at home, and from some representatives of the "democratic forces" in South Africa itself.¹

On balance, however, this Canadian government -- more commonly associated with an unprecedented level of intimacy in relations with the United States, a Defence White Paper premised on obsolescent Cold War assumptions, etc. -- was driven by its key foreign policy leaders to maintain a 'consistent and high level' focus on Southern Africa throughout the period under review. Furthermore, notwithstanding the limitations and periodic embarrassments associated with this policy thrust, it played a useful role in helping to stimulate broadly-based international pressure for change in the region, and in supporting the efforts of SADCC to build a viable, anti-South African regional economic organization.

How is this superficially surprising policy thrust to be explained? A number of external and internal factors -- the township revolt in South Africa and Pretoria's destabilization policy in the region; the weakening structural position of the Southern African economy within the changing global division of labour, and related changes to
Canadian corporate interests therein; and the expanding role of Canadian NGOs in policy implementation and formulation -- all came into play.

However, in accounting for the specific nature and content of the Canadian policy approach, two broad variables stand out. The first is what Kim Nossal, drawing on the ideas contained in James Rosenau's 'pre-theory' of foreign policy, has treated as the 'idiosyncratic variable' -- that is, the specific characteristics and interests of key foreign policy leaders, in particular Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. Significantly, Linda Freeman, operating within a structural Marxist approach emphasizing the 'relative autonomy' of the state within a capitalist social formation, arrives at a similar conclusion regarding the key role of the (increasingly isolated) Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in driving Canada's Southern African policy during this period. However, as discussed in chapter 6, this 'idiosyncratic' element may in fact be generalizable, reflecting political leaders' need to have some moral purpose, and thus reinforce their personal and public legitimacy.

The second crucial element, however, underscored by the comparative approach adopted in this thesis, was the broader international political context created by the Southern African "crisis", to which the government responded with behaviour quite characteristic of an "internationalist" Western middle power. Thus, Bernard Wood's argument -- that "it is...quite possible that under the circumstances of 1984 and subsequent years, a Trudeau government or any other Canadian government would have come to adopt similar approaches by dint of the pressures and expectations inherent in Canada's middle-power roles" -- is only slightly overdrawn.
1. Historical Underpinnings of Canadian Policy

Canadian involvement in Southern Africa developed on the basis of four primary points of contact: political and economic links with South Africa; Commonwealth-induced diplomatic and inter-personal links with black African leaders; development assistance programmes in majority-ruled African states; and societal linkages through the activities of NGOs, solidarity groups, etc.

Canada's historically friendly, though marginally important, relationship with (white) South Africa was the oldest of these. Like Australian-South African links, it was rooted in ties of Commonwealth kinship, wartime alliance, loose alliance links in the context of the Cold War, and commercial relations. The latter were of particular significance since, after 1945, South Africa became one of Canada's ten most important international markets, though it remained a small one in absolute terms. The importance of Canadian-South African trade was enhanced, from Ottawa's perspective, by the fact that Canadian exports to South Africa contained an unusually high percentage of relatively sophisticated end products, while South African exports to Canada consisted largely of primary products. Thus, the profile of Canadian trade with South Africa was that "of a mature, successful manufacturing economy -- a profile which, in general,...is not reflected in Canadian trade relationships."  

Also like Australia, Canada had a history of maltreatment of its minority aboriginal population, and shared with many other societies widespread racist attitudes. These less savory characteristics doubtless helped to determine the government's adoption, particularly prior to 1960, of a narrow, legalistic interpretation of the prohibition on interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states contained in article 2 (7) of the UN Charter in its public attitude towards apartheid. However, partly because Canadians did not feel the same sense of immanent threat which white South Africans felt in relation to black Africans, and Australians felt vis-a-vis Asians, Canadian governments did not maintain comparable overt legal disabilities towards non-white groups, nor was public discussion of racial
issues as frequent or as shrill. Canada’s able diplomats in this era also recognized the potential explosiveness of racial and colonial issues in the context of Cold War ideological competition. They were thus careful to cultivate good relations with, and were sensitive to the priorities of, emerging Afro-Asian countries -- most conspicuously India, which was the first country to raise the South African issue at the U.N. in 1946. Thus, Canada evaded the racist reputation with which Australia was widely tagged. Nevertheless, Canada’s treatment of its aboriginal peoples, in particular, has periodically been juxtaposed with its increasingly outspoken criticism of South Africa’s racial policies, causing Canadian governments considerable discomfort.

The second basic point of contact between Canada and Southern Africa consisted of relatively close and sympathetic interpersonal connections among heads of government and diplomats, forged through the Commonwealth. As a succession of African territories achieved independence and joined the Commonwealth from 1957, helping to transform it into a predominantly ‘Third World’ body, the dedication of Canadian foreign policy leaders to its survival and viability led them to take a much greater interest in African issues than they otherwise would have. The tempo and intensity of subsequent Canadian involvement in Southern African controversies was driven largely by its dedicated involvement in the Commonwealth. Further, the close personal relations between Canadian and African Commonwealth leaders seemed to result in these African leaders regarding Canada’s Southern African policies more favourably than their actual content often warranted.

The Commonwealth connection also shaped the development of the third major point of contact between Canada and Southern Africa -- relatively substantial aid programmes in the majority-ruled states of the region. Canada’s earliest aid programmes in Africa were in Commonwealth states, beginning with Ghana in 1958, and expanding to several other countries with the creation of the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan (SCAAP) in 1960. The development of substantial aid programmes in Southern African states, other than Tanzania, came
somewhat later -- mainly after 1970.

There is a long-standing debate over whether the motives for Canadian aid programmes, in Southern Africa and elsewhere, were primarily political, economic, or humanitarian. In fact, "statist" political motives, commercial goals, and humanitarian impulses have all influenced the development of Canadian ODA policy. However, the humanitarian dimension of Canadian aid programmes in Southern Africa helped to reinforce a relatively positive image of the country there. Furthermore, the growth of these programmes became a source of Canadian leverage and influence with regional governments.

Increasingly, Canadian aid in Southern Africa, from both private and governmental sources, was also channelled through various non-governmental organizations: church groups, development organizations such as Oxfam and CUSO, etc. These burgeoning groups combined with solidarity organizations and a number of scholars to form the backbone of the fourth main point of contact between Canada and the region, a relatively small but vocal and committed "Southern African constituency" within Canadian society. While this constituency did not have a significant direct impact on the development of Canadian policy towards the region, over time and in conjunction with similar coalitions in other Western countries, it did have some effect on the context within which policy was made, and the agenda to which policy makers had to respond.

The prominence of the Southern African issue area in Canadian foreign policy generally rose and fell due to the combined stimulus of two factors: developments in the region itself, and the imperatives of Commonwealth politics. Thus, for example, South Africa became a prominent issue in Canadian politics in 1960 and 1961, as a result of the 'Sharpeville Massacre' in South Africa and, subsequently, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's key role in precipitating that country's departure from the Commonwealth. Diefenbaker's role was regularly invoked by the Mulroney Government to support its own latter-day involvement in regional affairs.

Similarly, Prime Minister Lester Pearson (in contrast with Australian Prime
Minister Menzies) became deeply involved in the Commonwealth politics surrounding the white minority regime's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in late 1965. In this context, the Canadian government broke with its strongly-held opposition to economic sanctions, helping to fashion a compromise which involved the imposition of escalating sanctions measures. However, this departure did not signal a change of heart on the efficacy and desirability of sanctions so much as the unavoidable outcome of Pearson's efforts to defuse pressure from Third World member-states for stronger action against the 'rebel regime', including the threat of military force, and thus to preserve the Commonwealth. Subsequently, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who had earlier disparaged Canada's reputed 'helpful-fixer' role in international affairs, played a key role in forging a compromise at the 1971 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore which enabled the organization to survive a major controversy over renewed British arms sales to South Africa.

In general, successive Trudeau governments between 1968 and 1984 were not terribly interested in Southern African affairs. Nevertheless, there were periodic flourishes. For example, as a result of discussions at the 1973 CHOGM in Ottawa, the government took a controversial decision to provide indirect humanitarian aid to regional liberation movements, through NGOs. Aid to majority-ruled states grew significantly, and new High Commissions were established in Zambia in 1973, and Zimbabwe shortly after independence in 1980. Canadian diplomacy played an important role in the creation of the Commonwealth's 'Gleneagles Declaration on Apartheid and Sport', adopted at the 1977 CHOGM, which was a landmark in the development of the international sport boycott. However, Canada's motives in so doing probably had more to do with efforts to assure the success of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games than anything else. Later in 1977, following the Soweto upheavals and Steve Biko's death in detention in South Africa, as well as the adoption of a mandatory arms embargo by the U.N. Security Council, the government took what in terms of previous Canadian practice was a significant departure. It
announced a series of measures designed to ensure that "Ottawa no longer would use taxpayer's money to promote economic relations with South Africa, although trade and investment would be permitted to continue." In practice, these measures fell well short of even this limited goal, their impact being more symbolic than real. They did set an important precedent, however, recognizing for the first time that the pursuit of social justice in Southern Africa sometimes required interfering with the pursuit of 'normal' commercial relations. Finally, from 1977, the Canadian government was a member of the Western 'Contact Group' (or 'Gang of Five'), along with the US, the U.K., West Germany, and France, which attempted to broker an internationally-acceptable independence settlement for South African-ruled Namibia.

During their last term in office from 1981-84, however, the Trudeau Liberals evinced, if anything, a waning interest in the region. Preoccupied with a deep recession and intense federal-provincial disputes, they appeared to be increasingly determined not to interfere with Canadian commercial interests in South Africa and Namibia. The government placed a very narrow interpretation on the economic measures adopted in 1977, prompting one veteran observer to assert six years later that "government policies which seek to register Canadian opposition to South African racism are weaker today than they were in 1977." Enforcement of both the letter and spirit of the arms embargo, which Canadian governments had supported since 1963, appeared haphazard and half-hearted. By 1982, the Contact Group was dormant, stymied by South African intransigence and increasing US unilateralism under the Reagan Administration's new Southern African policy of "Constructive Engagement". Yet Canada's membership in the Group continued to be invoked by the government as justification for declining comment in debates and abstaining on resolutions concerning Namibia in the UN General Assembly.

Thus, when the Mulroney Government came to power in the fall of 1984, there seemed little reason, based on recent history, to expect a more activist Canadian policy towards Southern Africa. Indeed, given the new Prime Minister's foreign policy emphasis during the 1984 election campaign on "anti-Sovietism and pro-
Americanism", and the Conservatives' general opposition to government intervention (presumably including sanctions) in the operations of private enterprise and 'the market', "it would have been logical (writes Redekop) to expect an explicit endorsement of the policy of constructive engagement emanating from Washington and also from London". In a similar vein, Linda Freeman argued in 1985 that:

Given the interlocking network of Canadian, American and South African corporations and their relationship to the power structure in Canada, it is likely that the Mulroney government and the private sector will remain part of the alliance of Western capitalism which has profited from and defended the apartheid system in the past, part captive, and part active, agent.

2. Sanctions Against South Africa

As noted above, post-war Canadian governments were deeply resistant to sanctions generally, and economic sanctions in particular, in Southern Africa and elsewhere. Redekop's 1977 analysis identified five specific considerations underlying this position. First, the health of the Canadian economy was highly dependent on foreign trade. More specifically, the need to diversify trade to non-US markets, and the need to increase the percentage of secondary manufactured exports in total trade, strengthened governmental resistance to sanctions against South Africa. Second, the government wished to avoid setting precedents which it feared could lead to domestic pressure to impose sanctions against other states. Only sanctions mandated by the U.N. Security Council would avoid this problem of 'moral selectivity'. Third, it was felt that the foreign policy benefits to be derived from an endorsement of sanctions would be minimal, and ephemeral, at best. Fourth, sanctions were considered to be ineffective in bringing about the desired changes, particularly if imposed unilaterally or by only a small number of states. And fifth, the government viewed sanctions as "unenforceable".

These 'practical' considerations were justified ideologically by liberal assumptions regarding the positive effects of increased international economic exchange and growth. These, it was long assumed, would promote dialogue and create inexorable pressures for the reform of the apartheid system. There was, on
this naive and often self-interested view, an essential complementarity between the objectives of economic growth, social justice, and peaceful change. The fact that several decades of expanding trade, investment and growth had done nothing to erode the racist political, economic and social order in South Africa helped to undermine the credibility of this view in the 1970s; but it continued to have influential adherents, particularly within certain sectors of the state and the business community. Canada’s general opposition to sanctions -- extending, it should be noted, to refusals to accede to American pressure to join embargoes against China in the 1950s, and Cuba in the 1960s and ‘70s -- led one observer to characterize Canadians as the "Phoenicians of America. Their ships and their cargoes go where there is business to be done." This approach, it should also be recalled, was typical of Western middle powers as a group: Australia and Sweden, for example, both shared Canada’s trade dependence, support for the GATT, and consistent opposition to sanctions.

There were, as noted above, a few limited exceptions. There was the arms embargo, which had affected only a small trade and was sometimes less than vigorously enforced. Sport sanctions, wrote Anglin, were "one area in which the Canadian government has taken a firm, consistent and constructive stand...". They were considerably easier for Canada to adopt than for Australia, Britain and New Zealand, however, since the sports which were most important to South Africans -- especially rugby and cricket -- were not popular in Canada. And there were the limited economic measures introduced in 1977. Despite the minimal practical impact of these measures, they were of some real longer-term significance in that they represented an official acceptance of the argument that the South African situation was unique, and implied that any subsequent escalation of measures against South Africa would involve stronger economic sanctions. They thus breached the government’s principle of consistent opposition to non-Security Council sanctions.

Under Mulroney, this principle was well and truly rejected in the specific case of South Africa. Thus, in a speech to the House of Commons on 13 September 1985, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark asserted:
It is...part of our duty to make clear to South Africa that Canada is prepared to invoke total sanctions if there is no change. As a general principle, we believe that diplomatic and economic relations should exist even though governments disagree... We fully recognize, however, that Canada has a responsibility to provide both moral and practical leadership. The government of South Africa should have no doubt that we will invoke full sanctions unless there is tangible movement away from apartheid.

The story of the Canadian government's adoption of escalating partial sanctions against South Africa has been well told elsewhere, and need not be recapitulated in detail. With the South African townships in revolt, the government launched an in-depth policy review in early 1985. In early July, Clark announced a mild sanctions package, building on the 1977 measures. In September, following the imposition of a State of Emergency in South Africa and in anticipation of the upcoming Nassau CHOGM in October, he announced several additional sanctions measures. Again, their practical impact was limited, as Clark himself acknowledged. They included, for example, a voluntary oil embargo, concerning which he noted that "Our sales in this area have been limited in the past. This measure is being taken now to ensure that Canada does not become an alternative source in the future." Similarly, the embargo on air transport affected only a few charter flights, while ruling out the possibility of reciprocal air service in the future. Nevertheless, these steps were symbolically significant, coming as they did from the Conservative government of a G-7 member-state. Like the Australian measures announced in August 1985, they presaged the mild package of Commonwealth "measures" adopted at the Nassau CHOGM.

The high point of the Mulroney government's sanctions policy was rhetorical. It came with Brian Mulroney's speech to the UN General Assembly on 23 October 1985, in which he stated that,

My government has said to Canadians that if there are not fundamental changes in South Africa, we are prepared to invoke total sanctions against that country and its repressive regime. If there is no progress in the dismantling of apartheid, Canada's relations with South Africa may have to be severed absolutely.

This commitment, restating that made earlier in the House of Commons by Clark, caused considerable excitement both internationally, particularly among African states,
and at home. In retrospect, it must be regarded as a misstep, fuelling expectations which the government was bound to find extremely difficult to fulfill, and which might not even be useful in the difficult task of creating pressure for change. But from the perspective of the domestic ‘Southern African constituency’, Mulroney’s statement provided leverage in efforts to ensure that there was no easing of government pressure on South Africa, and that policy makers were constantly challenged to adopt new initiatives which could stand in lieu of the absent comprehensive sanctions.

Following the report of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, Mulroney was prominent at the August 1986 London Mini-Summit in pushing for the extended sanctions package which was eventually agreed upon without Mrs. Thatcher. The Canadian government subsequently implemented these measures (see chapter 6, section 3). This was to be the high water mark of Canadian momentum on sanctions, however. The few subsequent steps taken consisted of useful, but essentially minor, fine tuning of existing measures: tightening the ban on government contracts with majority South African owned companies, for example, and extending the ban on sales of high technology items to private sector end-users in South Africa.35

Canadian sanctions are summarized in Attachment 1 -- "Canadian Action on South Africa". This Attachment also includes a summary of "positive measures" taken by the Canadian government, including various forms of assistance to "victims of apartheid", a $C1 million ‘Canadian Action Plan to Counteract South African Propaganda and Censorship’, and a $C1.6 million ‘Dialogue Fund’ "to promote dialogue among South Africans about a non-racial future". Although these positive measures are beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that some of the most creative and useful Canadian initiatives after 1987 were in this area. Although not ‘big ticket’ items, many initiatives in this area clearly "made a difference" to specific groups working for change on the ground in South Africa.36

Concerning sanctions, Attachment 1 clearly shows that Canadian steps remained quite limited, especially when juxtaposed with the Prime Minister’s earlier
## CANADIAN ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA

### TRADE RELATED

- No Canadian government promotion of trade with South Africa.

### IMPORTS

- Mandatory Bans on:
  - all agricultural products
  - uranium
  - coal
  - iron products
  - steel products
  - arms from South Africa
  - steel products
  - iron products

- Voluntary Ban on:
  - agricultural products
  - arms from South Africa
  - steel products

- Termination of Canadian governmental aid to South Africa:
  - Canadian government aid to athletes in South Africa
  - Termination of Canadian governmental aid to South Africa (provided by the Export Development Corporation)
  - Assistance to refugees in neighboring countries through multilateral agencies.
  - A $1.8 million Dialogue Fund to promote dialogue among South Africans about a non-racial future.

### EXPORTS

- Mandatory Bans on:
  - all arms and munitions of war
  - high technology and other sensitive equipment such as computers, to any end-user
  - Voluntary Ban on:
    - petroleum and petroleum products

### OTHER ACTIONS

- Voluntary ban on sales of Krugerrands
- Ban on all air links with South Africa
- Discontinued Export Market Development grants for South African market
- Discontinued insurance to Canadian exporters to South Africa (provided by the Export Development Corporation)
- Voluntary ban on tourism promotion to South Africa
- Terminated Canadian government contracts, grants, contributions and sales to South African majority-owned companies
- Terminated toll-processing of Namibian uranium
- Terminated Canadian government procurement of South African goods and services (limited exception for CIDA and Canadian Embassies activities in Southern Africa.)

### OTHER ACTIONS

- Canada's policy governs all sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa. This applies to sport contacts between Canadians and South Africans at professional and amateur levels and in individual and team sports no matter where these contacts might occur, i.e. in Canada, in South Africa or in a third country.

### SPORTING CONTACTS

- Capped trade credits to South Africa, and requested Canadian banks to make loan rescheduling terms as short as possible.
- V - Established a Code of Conduct for Canadian companies in South Africa.
- Suspension of training of military personnel from the Front Line States.
- Restrictions on contact between officials of the two governments.
- Cancellation of non-resident accreditation to Canada of South African diplomats (in particular, Science, Labour, Mining and Agriculture attachés).
- Maintain an Anti-Apartheid Register for Canadians to publicly demonstrate their opposition to apartheid.

### SOURCE

Source: Department of External Affairs, Canada, Feb. 1990
UN flourish. A number of measures -- for example, the ban on tourism promotion and the ban on new bank loans to South African interests -- were voluntary. While Joe Clark argued that voluntary action had the virtue of demonstrating the depth of societal consensus on South African policy, it had the distinct disadvantage of opening the way for periodic embarrassing derogations from official policy.\(^\text{37}\) Some of the sanctions adopted arguably helped the Canadian economy more than they hurt it: for example, the ban on South African wines could not have been unwelcome to the Niagara and other Canadian wine industries; and the ban on the sale of Krugerrands, in Canada and elsewhere, helped sales of the Canadian gold Maple Leaf.\(^\text{38}\)

In comparison with other countries, too, Canadian sanctions were not the most stringent. While Canadian initiatives generally anticipated, and thus "led", the actions of most other Western states, they were in several cases surpassed in scope by the actions of those other states. Specifically, Nordic countries (excepting tiny Iceland) imposed mandatory embargoes on virtually all merchandise trade between mid-1986 and mid-1987\(^\text{39}\); while the US Congress's October, 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) marginally exceeded Canadian sanctions in scope and enforceability. In addition, several Third World countries had long since imposed stringent sanctions against South Africa -- most notably India, which had severed trade links in 1946 -- although these sanctions were certainly not without anomalies.\(^\text{40}\)

Why this apparent loss of momentum on sanctions? Several suggestions have been offered, elements of which must be combined for a complete explanation. One factor, highlighted by John Saul, was that the pressure for action, which had been generated by the uprising in South Africa in 1984-85 and the massive media attention it had received, had slackened by 1986 as a result of the repressive effects of the State of Emergency, including stringent media censorship.\(^\text{41}\) It should therefore not be surprising that, after 1987, the Canadian government placed particular emphasis on efforts to counteract South African propaganda and censorship.

Kim Nossal highlights limitations inherent in the gradualist, "instrumental"
sanctions strategy chosen by the government. On this analysis, the government decided from the outset on a strategy of escalating, partial coercive measures rather than the "grand gestures" of severing diplomatic relations or total trade sanctions, holding in reserve the threat of implementing these grand gestures at some 'appropriate' future date. Escalating partial sanctions were designed to have instrumental effects on South Africa itself, but also, more importantly, on South Africa's major Western economic partners (and Canada's G-7 partners), influencing them to adopt the same strategy of escalating sanctions. It was hoped that, in this way, a sanctioning coalition with real clout could be marshalled. Consequently, Canada's sanctions strategy was intimately connected with its diplomatic activity on Southern Africa (see section 3).

Problems arise however, as Nossal notes, when neither of the targets of one's instrumental strategy respond as they are supposed to. Specifically, neither did the South African government initially show signs of modifying its policies in response to Canada's (and others') limited sanctions pressure, nor did most G-7 leaders appear at all receptive to the Canadian approach, so that Mulroney's continued pitches to them began to look to some like a waste of precious political capital. This left the Canadian government with the possibility of moving unilaterally towards the adoption of "grand gestures", which it was very reluctant to do. But why was it reluctant to do so? Nossal's suggestion - that the logic of coercion would eventually force the Canadian government to confront the possibility of using armed force against South Africa -- does not seem realistic.

Linda Freeman, while recognizing these external factors, has emphasized factors within the Canadian state itself. Specifically, she emphasizes the divergence between an aggressive anti-apartheid view emanating from an increasingly isolated Prime Minister and his Office, and the opposition to Mulroney's Southern African "adventurism" which predominated within the Department of External Affairs (including, to a degree, Joe Clark), along with the outright opposition of some MP's within the Conservative cabinet and caucus to a strong anti-South African policy. It
should be added that the Departments of Finance and Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) -- both major players in the bureaucratic hierarchy -- remained consistently opposed to economic sanctions, not least against South Africa. This interpretation is similar to that offered by former U.N. Ambassador Stephen Lewis after stepping down in 1988.\textsuperscript{44} The Prime Minister, however, had shown himself to be quite willing and able to assert his views on this issue prior to 1987, over any bureaucratic and caucus misgivings, and could certainly have done so again, had not other pressures counselled a slowdown on sanctions.

One factor which has been widely recognized, but underemphasized, is the simple fact that, by late 1986, the Canadian government had taken most of the significant steps which could be implemented without significant domestic political costs or risks. Most of the major elements of trade which remained -- notably imports of strategic metals used in making specialty steels and low-cost dissolving pulp used in the operations of a Cornwall textile mill, and exports of sulphur, mainly from Alberta\textsuperscript{45} -- could not be eliminated without risking significant, sectional costs, quite possibly resulting in significant direct employment losses. This is where the essential marginality of South Africa in Canadian policy calculations comes into play. There was certainly an element of bluff in corporate estimates of employment losses from sanctions. Nevertheless, it was improbable that any Canadian government would have been prepared to run such specific and politically-potent risks in support of its policy towards distant South Africa. Indeed, virtually no Western state, including the activist Nordics, adopted sanctions measures involving specific, sectional employment losses among their own electorates, as shall be seen in chapter 8. This appears to have been a rigid bottom line for most international sanctioners in the 1980s.

Thus, recognizing that there were additional, relatively low-cost sanctions measures which could have been devised with some imagination and foresight,\textsuperscript{46} there was nevertheless nothing terribly surprising about the loss of sanctions momentum by 1987. This loss of momentum did, however, make claims by
government leaders to some extraordinary degree of moral leadership on this issue -- such as Mulroney's claim at the 1989 CHOGM that at the Nassau meeting in 1985, he "looked around and saw no one else" doing anything about apartheid\textsuperscript{47} -- galling.

What, then, was the impact of Canadian sanctions policy? As with Australia, bilateral Canadian-South African trade was a small fraction of each other's total, though Canada's trade with South Africa was somewhat larger than Australia's.\textsuperscript{48} Following the high water mark of Canadian sanctions -- the imposition of the second-stage Commonwealth sanctions following the 1986 Mini-Summit -- the value of Canadian exports to, and especially imports from, South Africa declined precipitously in 1987 (see Table 1).\textsuperscript{49} Subsequently, there were regular controversies concerning the significant fluctuations (mainly upwards) in the value of bilateral trade, which created more heat than light concerning the nature and impact of sanctions.\textsuperscript{50} Increases in the value of trade led some to question the integrity of Canadian sanctions, and to gain the impression that they were not being effectively enforced. However, although there were a small number of anomalies in the imposition of Canadian sanctions, they seem on the whole to have been conscientiously enforced. Changes in the value of bilateral trade generally reflected new methods of accounting by Statistics Canada, and increases in the world price of key commodities (such as strategic minerals) which were not sanctioned; the volume of total imports from South Africa -- the primary target of Canadian sanctions -- appears to have declined as intended.\textsuperscript{51}

Nevertheless, the direct economic "hurt" experienced by South Africa as a result of Canadian economic sanctions was very limited -- a pin-prick compared with the United States' partial sanctions, for example.\textsuperscript{52} Once again, however, the impact of sanctions must be conceived more broadly. In terms of the psychological impact of Canada's sanctions policy, and its policy towards South Africa more broadly, it appears that they caused intense perturbation in Pretoria.\textsuperscript{53} There was something of the same feeling towards Canada as that felt towards Australia, though perhaps less acutely. Canada, too, was a Western country and former fellow Commonwealth
Dominion -- the kind of country South African whites wished to consort with; and
Canada, too, had its own history of racism towards a minority aboriginal population,
so that South African resentment was fuelled by a perception that Canada was being
hypocritical. Also like Australia, Canada’s non-economic sanctions, like the ban on
consular services, had a significant psychological impact amongst white South
Africans.54

Furthermore, the fact that Canada -- a staunch US ally and G-7 member led by
a Conservative government -- became a strong advocate of sanctions, and supported
this position with practical steps during the mid-1980s, did matter in terms of building
(admittedly limited) momentum on sanctions during this period. Insofar as the partial
sanctions adopted by most Western countries in the mid-1980s and, more importantly,
the credible threat of stronger measures to come helped precipitate the current round
of changes, Canada’s sanctions policy must be regarded as having made a significant
contribution towards this situation. It is noteworthy that, although progress towards
the Prime Minister’s 1985 UN commitment had largely stalled by 1987, the Canadian
government -- and especially Mulroney and Clark -- never wavered from their
commitment to the view that sanctions were an effective instrument of change, and
should be maintained and strengthened until clear evidence of change was apparent.

To the extent that Canadian sanctions policy helped create international
sanctions momentum during the mid-1980s, it did so in tandem with Canada’s
multilateral diplomatic efforts. It is therefore to this policy dimension that the next
section is addressed.

3. Diplomatic Efforts in Support of Change

Canada’s diplomatic presence in Southern Africa is relatively extensive,
certainly in comparison with Australia’s. Among SADCC states, it has High
Commissions in Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and (since 1990) Namibia; while it
now has small "Offices of the High Commission" in all other SADCC states except
Angola and Swaziland. Following CIDA decentralization in 1989, the Harare post
Table 1

Canadian Trade with South Africa 1983-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports ($C'000s)</th>
<th>% of Imports</th>
<th>Exports ($C'000s)</th>
<th>% of Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>194,143</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>165,764</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>221,830</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>201,871</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>227,734</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>152,660</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>328,991</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>151,529</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>100,166</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>102,629</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>124,519</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>205,959</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>100,070</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, *Summary of Canadian International Trade* (Annual)

became the second-largest mission in the "developing world" after Delhi. Canada's missions in the region were largely concerned with development assistance issues, but were also useful in facilitating the government's multilateral diplomatic activities.

Canada's maintenance of full diplomatic relations with South Africa itself became quite controversial, particularly after the Prime Minister's 1985 threat to sever them. A number of anti-apartheid activists argued for the complete severance of diplomatic ties, reflecting the isolationist strategy of the sanctions movement, and the perceived illegitimacy of the 'Pretoria regime'. However, while the Canadian mission could have been downgraded from a full embassy with little loss of function (as the Swedish mission was), a quite widespread consensus gradually emerged that the small staff of the Canadian embassy, including its very able ambassador, was in fact performing a useful function in supporting a diverse range of groups working for change within South Africa, and in profoundly aggravating the South African regime.55
Beyond the region itself, one the persistent themes in post-World War II Canadian foreign policy has been the extensiveness and utility of Canada’s international organizational "connections" (see chapter 4, section 2). It is not surprising, therefore, that a central element in the Mulroney government’s Southern African policy was the use of its diplomatic connections to try to build broadly-based multilateral pressure for negotiated change in South Africa.

Some aspects of the government’s UN activities have already been noted. There was, of course, the Prime Minister’s 1985 speech to the General Assembly. More routinely, there was the presence of former Ontario NDP leader Stephen Lewis as UN Ambassador from 1984 to 1987. Lewis’s eloquence and transparent commitment to African causes did much to enhance the profile of Canada’s Southern African policy at the UN, while his views clearly reinforced the development of a more activist Canadian policy in the mid-1980s. With regard to the Namibian issue, by the time the Mulroney government took office, the Western Contact Group (C.G.) was completely inactive, and mainly an embarrassment. When a diplomatic settlement was reached in late-1988, however, paving the way for a UN-supervised transition to independence on the basis of Security Council Resolution 435 (the C.G.’s long-standing settlement proposal) the Canadian government became an energetic participant in the process, citing its role in helping to formulate the original Resolution in justification.\(^5\)

There were, it should be noted, clear political interests and payoffs at the UN served by Canada’s adoption of a more activist Southern African policy during this period. Aside from the broad benefits of an enhanced image with the UN’s Third World majority, this policy was cited as one of the specific explanations for the overwhelming support given by Third World states to Canada’s successful candidacy for the UN Security Council in late-1988.\(^5\)

However, like Australia, and in keeping with the historical pattern of Canadian policy towards Southern Africa, the primary locus of Canada’s diplomatic efforts in pursuit of change was the Commonwealth. According to Stephen Chan, the
Commonwealth Secretariat during the tenure of Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal (1975-89) operated on the assumption that if they could get two of the ex-"white dominions" onside, they could generally isolate and 'outgun' the British. Both Canada and, since Whitlam, Australia were willing to play the Secretariat's game. But Canada, as an original supporter of a strong Secretariat and the largest and richest of the ex-dominions, was regarded as the "natural ally" of the Secretariat. Under Mulroney (and Clark, a Commonwealth enthusiast), the Canadian government once again became a central participant in the formulation of Commonwealth strategy on Southern Africa.

Prior to the Nassau CHOGM in October 1985, Mulroney dispatched Bernard Wood, then Executive Director of the North-South Institute, as his personal emissary to the leaders of Commonwealth Frontline States. The purpose of this mission, according to Wood, "was to introduce his (Mulroney's) new government and underline its commitment on this issue and its recognition of the special stakes, and insights of the front line states". In sending such a special emissary, Mulroney also by-passed the more cautious ideas and instincts which dominated External Affairs. At Nassau itself, "Prime Ministers Mulroney and Ghandi were called upon to play key mediatory roles with Mrs. Thatcher in achieving the agreements that were managed."

At the London Mini-Summit the following summer, it became clear that Mulroney, Hawke, Ghandi, Ramphal and the Commonwealth Frontline State leaders in attendance (Kaunda and Mugabe) were in cahoots on a collective strategy to win Mrs. Thatcher over to support for a partial sanctions package. Thus, the package proposed was designed to be easily implemented by, and thus "marketable" to, Britain and South Africa's other major Western economic partners. Responsibility for the origins of this specific Commonwealth strategy is, as suggested in chapter 6, virtually impossible to disentangle; but it clearly accorded with the Canadian government's own ideas. It did not, of course, work as hoped, due to Mrs. Thatcher's intransigent stand. But it did, as noted previously, help build momentum towards the
adoption of partial sanctions by the EC and the US Congress.

Injected into this cycle of Commonwealth meetings was Mulroney’s triumphant January 1987 visit to Zimbabwe, during which he also met with the Presidents of Zambia and Botswana. Mulroney was the first Western leader to travel to Zimbabwe, and his visit was accorded a very high degree of importance, reinforcing close personal relations between Mulroney and Mugabe and Kaunda. It was of particular importance to Mugabe in light of his falling out with the US, and inability (in the face of Cabinet and other domestic opposition) to come through on his Mini-Summit commitment that Zimbabwe would impose Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa. With respect to the latter, Mulroney repeated his view, originally expressed at the Mini-Summit, that the West should bear primary responsibility for putting sanctions pressure on South Africa, and that the Frontline States should not be expected to endanger themselves by so doing. He also expressed the view that he "understood" the ANC’s use of violence in its struggle against Pretoria, although Canada could not itself support its use.62

All of this helped to artificially inflate African perceptions of Canada’s ability to intercede effectively on their behalf with its G-7 partners, and willingness to act unilaterally in pursuit of change in the region. This is not a new problem, as Anglin has observed:

African states...look to Canada to exercise leverage on their behalf in Washington and London (though not in Paris). Their hopes in this respect, though not entirely misplaced, appear excessively optimistic... Ottawa recognizes that its reservoir of influence in major capitals is limited, and tends to husband its diplomatic credit for the occasions that really count, few of which are direct African concerns. In this respect, it is excessively cautious. Just as Africans are inclined to inflate Canadian powers of persuasion, so Ottawa characteristically underestimates them. Opportunities exist here for more realistic assessments of Canadian potentialities by both sides.63

While the Mulroney government was generally less cautious in its efforts to influence its major allies on Southern African issues than its predecessors, its capacity to do so remained more limited than African states thought it to be. This fuelled some disenchantment with Canada’s role in the latter part of the decade.

In October 1987, Canada hosted the biennial CHOGM in Vancouver. By this
time, the division between Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth over sanctions was entrenched, and there were some acrimonious exchanges surrounding the meeting, generated primarily by British press briefings. In terms of Canadian policy, the meeting had two particularly significant outcomes. The first was the product of what Stephen Lewis has termed an "electric moment" at the Conference, in which Mulroney took on Thatcher over South Africa. The upshot was that, despite some disenchantment among other Commonwealth governments with Canada's declining enthusiasm for new sanctions over the next couple of years, Mulroney's own anti-apartheid credentials remained largely unsullied (Freeman takes a similar position in arguing that the loss of momentum in Canada's sanctions policy could not be blamed on the Prime Minister, but rather on the forces within the state arraigned against him). The second was the striking of the eight-member Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), with Joe Clark as chair, 'to provide high level impetus and guidance in furtherance of the objectives' of the Okanagan Statement on Southern Africa and Programme of Action.

The CFMSA became the primary vehicle for Canada's Southern African diplomacy over the next two years. With Joe Clark in the chair, there was also a shift in the locus of Canadian political leadership on this issue, with Clark taking over primary responsibility from Mulroney (who, by this time, was thoroughly embroiled in domestic political controversies). Clark's approach on this issue was less emotional and flamboyant, and certainly more cautious, but no less personally dedicated. The Department of External Affairs' Southern Africa Task Force (SATF) shared the bulk of responsibility for the bureaucratic and organizational management of the CFMSA process with the Commonwealth Secretariat's International Affairs Division, in a relationship which combined both cooperation and competition.

The four meetings of the Committee between Vancouver and the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM in 1989 were often troubled for Clark and for Canada. The Commonwealth was now in a difficult situation on sanctions, which were the litmus
test of a sincere anti-apartheid policy among anti-apartheid activists and much of the popular press. Britain -- the only state with real economic clout vis-a-vis South Africa -- had made its position clear, and declined to participate on the Committee; and the Frontline States, who were among the most vocal sanctions advocates, had understandably decided that they could not impose sanctions themselves. This essentially left Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as the only states which could impose even marginally effective new "Commonwealth" sanctions; and this, for reasons discussed above, they were increasingly reluctant to do. Thus, the four CFMSA meetings served to focus attention on sanctions "backsliding", particularly by Canada -- the most outspoken and conspicuous of the ex-white Dominions on the Southern African issue. At the second meeting in Toronto, for example, Canadian officials attempted to focus attention on South African censorship and propaganda -- an important issue, as noted above, given the crucial role of the media in creating the popular basis for stronger Western measures against South Africa. This focus was criticized, however, by other members of the Committee and in the Canadian press as an attempt to "deflect" attention from the "real" issue of sanctions. And at the third meeting in Harare, Clark was as discomfited as South Africa, due to revelations of a jump in the value of Canadian trade with South Africa, unsubstantiated allegations of Canadian arms trading with South Africa by the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, and especially a $C600 million Bank of Nova Scotia loan to South African-controlled, Luxembourg-based Minorco. These controversies led Margaret Doxey to speculate on whether Canada might move "to shed its role as chairman of the Foreign Ministers' Committee" after the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM.

In the final analysis, the Committee had no spectacular accomplishments. Yet, as suggested in chapter 6, it did focus regular, 'cross-cutting' (i.e. North-South), high-level political attention on the Southern African issue at a time when there was some danger of it slipping off the international agenda; and it reinforced the growing international normative consensus on the effectiveness of, and necessity for, continued sanctions pressure, notably in the financial area. Furthermore, Clark himself
ultimately seemed to emerge from this process having earned the respect of his colleagues, and with his reputation enhanced.\textsuperscript{72}

I have suggested that a major reason for the importance attached by Southern African and other Commonwealth leaders to Canada's regional policy was its membership of the elite "Summit Seven". Canada was somewhat naively regarded by these leaders as their voice in this 'Council of the Mighty' -- their best hope for swaying the crucial G-7 members towards a stronger stand against South Africa (including sanctions), and in support of SADCC states. Thus, much of the impact of the Mulroney government's Southern African policy derived from this Summit status. Yet, the actual effect of Canadian representations on this issue within the Summit serves to highlight the limitations on the weakest in the Court of the strong, and a paradox of medium power: while it confers considerable potential capacity for influence, if one tries to exercise this influence too much or too often, one's capacity for influence may be significantly impaired. There is, in consequence, a tendency towards 'self-policing' in Canadian foreign policy, based on a concern to marshall Canada's real but limited influence strategically.

As discussed above, the Canadian government initially hoped to use its G-7 connections to instigate a truly powerful sanctioning coalition; and to his credit, Mulroney persisted in raising South and Southern Africa at the annual Summit meetings (right up to the most recent Summit in London). For his troubles, these issue-areas were explicitly addressed in the "Chairman's Summary on Political Issues" -- the least important in the hierarchy of Summit Documents -- of the 1987 Venice Summit, the 1988 Toronto Summit, and the 1989 Paris Summit. This was an accomplishment, of sorts. Yet despite John Kirton's view of Summit texts as "not just pious expressions of passing politeness from preoccupied politicians but documents that matter in the real world of politics and economics at the national, international and global level alike",\textsuperscript{73} it is difficult to view these brief references as having any significant weight in the development of pressure on South Africa. Certainly, there was no mention of sanctions, which was hardly surprising given the
by now well-established views of Mrs. Thatcher, Presidents Reagan and Bush, and German Chancellor Kohl.

With most of the other leaders' views clearly diverging from Mulroney's, there was some apprehension in government circles that his persistent advocacy on Southern Africa could become a waste of Canada's precious political capital in this rarefied forum. Furthermore, according to Nossal, it was reported that some of the other leaders viewed Mulroney's willingness to advocate a complete break with South Africa in 1985 as a sign of diplomatic immaturity and lack of realism, a perception which might, if reinforced, endanger his limited capacity for influence on other issues. The weight of this kind of "peer pressure" was surely substantial, strengthening the hand of those within the government arguing for a more restrained approach to regional policy. These types of considerations led Freeman to argue that what she dramatically describes as the "collapse" of Canadian policy began with the Venice Summit.

There is one final aspect of Canada's diplomatic involvement in Southern Africa which should be briefly addressed. This is its relationship with the liberation movements which have played such a significant role in several regional states: Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa itself. Canadian governments, along with those of Australia and most other Western countries, historically had difficulty working out a satisfactory relationship with these important regional actors (the Nordic states, and especially Sweden, were exceptional in developing close links with these groups). By the time the Mulroney government took office, the main remaining liberation movements were SWAPO of Namibia and the ANC in South Africa. Its relationship with them continued to cause controversy.

Historically, the close links between various liberation movements and East Bloc countries, their often radical ("scientific socialist") socio-economic programmes, their pursuit of armed struggle, and their problematic juridical status (neither conventional political parties, nor national governments) all contributed to the remoteness of Western relations with them. Calls from anti-apartheid activists for
"recognition" of these organizations were beyond the pale, even for the "progressive" Nordics. One formula, recognizing their significance and providing some support for their cause without conferring official recognition or support for the armed struggle, was the provision of "humanitarian assistance", often channelled indirectly through NGOs. Both Australia and Canada launched small programmes of this type in the mid-1970s, as noted above\(^7\); but both subsequently discontinued this support -- Canada during the short-lived Clark government in 1979. Under the Mulroney government, debate over whether or not to provide humanitarian assistance continued, with the government finally providing funding for only one of five projects proposed by CUSO (an ANC "creche" in Lusaka).\(^8\)

In August 1987, following Mulroney's trip to Zimbabwe but prior to the Vancouver CHOGM, the Canadian Prime Minister became the first major Western leader to meet ANC President Oliver Tambo. However, this breakthrough was perhaps less of a step forward than it should have been as, according to critical commentary, Tambo's reception was "cool and low-key" or even "churlish", and "both Mulroney and Clark went out of their way...to state that the issues of violence and Communist affiliation were stumbling blocks for additional Western (and Canadian) support for the ANC".\(^7\)

Given this history, what is to be made of Clark's claim in May, 1989 that "I do not think there is a country in the world that has a more productive relationship with the African National Congress than Canada does...a relation that we have put in place"?\(^8\) The claim is surely exaggerated. But there are signs that the Canadian government, under the Mulroney/Clark stewardship, did in fact develop a much closer and more effective relationship with the ANC in particular, as well as several other "progressive" and "democratic" South African groups. One key diplomat claimed, for example, that the ANC's International Affairs Secretary, Thabo Mbeki, and Joe Clark had met frequently through 1989, and developed an "extraordinary personal chemistry".\(^8\) More broadly, it seems that the Commonwealth's CFMSA process, in which meetings began with testimony from various internal and external leaders of the
democratic struggle in South Africa, contributed to a much closer mutual understanding between these people on the one hand, and the Canadians and Australians, in particular, on the other. Certainly, the fact that the CFMSA, with Clark in the chair, was particularly receptive to the arguments of the ANC's Mbeki in deciding to maintain Commonwealth sanctions at its meeting in London in February 1991 implies a new level of closeness in Canada-ANC relations. It will be interesting to watch how this relationship develops in a future, post-apartheid (and post-Joe Clark) situation.

4.1 The Developmental Dimension - Development Assistance

Canada's Southern African policy in the 1984-89 period was quite balanced, in the sense that its relatively advanced and active positions on sanctions and regional diplomacy were accompanied by a reasonably large, stable, and well-regarded regional aid programme. Implicit recognition of this policy balance, as well as the importance attached to Canada's Southern African policy during this period, was provided by the fact that although Canada is truly a "middle power" among regional donors (running between 6th and 10th on the SADCC donor 'league table'), Canadian representatives were asked to "lead off" the SADCC Consultative Conferences in 1987 and 1988, and to "clean up" (i.e., close) the 1989 Conference.

Canada's aid programme has been its most important link with most SADCC states. Canadian aid disbursements in Southern Africa, though medium-sized amongst donor states, had nevertheless become reasonably large and stable by the 1980s. In 1988-89, for example, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) bilateral ('government to government') disbursements in the region totalled $C158.5 million, with $C129 million allocated to programmes in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique, and $C30 million earmarked for SADCC programmes. In addition, aid funds were transferred to regional states through various other channels (NGOs, the International Development Research Centre [IDRC], Humanitarian Assistance, Petro-Canada International, etc.),
so that total Canadian aid expenditures were substantially larger (see Table 2). While

### Table 2

Total Canadian Aid Disbursements in Southern Africa, 1988-1989

(In Millions of Canadian Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gov't to Gov't</th>
<th>Other*</th>
<th>Total (Country to Country)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>11.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>16.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>25.61</td>
<td>34.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>41.11</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>45.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>31.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>23.16</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>27.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>124.24</td>
<td>89.27</td>
<td>194.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CIDA Annual Report, 1988-89, Table M, "Total Disbursements by Country for 1988-89 (CIDA Funds plus others)", 103.

* Includes: Canada Fund (mission administered funds); Institutional Cooperation; domestic and international NGOs; CIDA-INC (Industrial Cooperation); International Humanitarian Assistance; Food Aid; International Development Research Centre funds; Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation.

** Excludes funds transferred via International Financial Institutions and other Multilateral Organizations (e.g., the UN, the Commonwealth)
the aid budget as a whole was sharply cut in the April 1989 federal budget ($C360 million from the then-projected budget of $C2.8 billion), Southern African programmes were largely shielded from these cuts, indicating the political priority the government placed on the region\(^85\) (ODA was cut again in the 1991 budget, as noted below).

Of particular significance was CIDA’s early and strong support of SADCC. In 1983, prior to the election of the Mulroney government, the Canadian government decided to create a separate SADCC desk and programme within CIDA, making Southern Africa an institutionalized ‘region of concentration’. Thus, Canada (along with Sweden) was one of the first major donor countries to allocate resources to SADCC as a regional entity, over and above pre-existing bilateral programmes.\(^86\) This step represented a new level of commitment to this young regional organization, and an expression of confidence in its approach, at a time when a number of major Western donors (notably the US, but also West Germany and Japan) were treating it with caution and/or skepticism, and (in the case of the US) trying to modify its priorities and approach.\(^87\) Anglin and Godfrey suggest that the new SADCC programme was also important in the subsequent development of Canadian policy, in that some Canadian policy-makers were now directly exposed to, and concerned with, the destabilisation of Mozambican infrastructure.\(^88\)

Canadian disbursements for the SADCC programme climbed steadily to the present annual level of $C30 million, and in 1988, Joe Clark committed Canada to a further increase to $C40 million over the subsequent five-year period -- although with recent cutbacks, it is unlikely that this commitment will be honoured. The growth of the SADCC programme, it should be noted, was encouraged by the fact that much of SADCC’s emphasis was on large infrastructural projects in transportation, communication, energy, etc. -- areas with potential for large donor contracts, and in which Canada had some comparative advantages (see Table 3).\(^89\) One sign of CIDA’s conscientious attempt to support SADCC priorities -- specifically the goal of reducing economic dependence on South Africa -- is the effort it put into increasing
Table 3

Number and value of CIDA’s Approved SADCC Projects, By Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th># of projects</th>
<th>Approved Budget ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>197.256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "SADCC, CIDA Programme Update" (Hull: CIDA, 1990)

the value of goods and services procured outside the RSA, and shipped via SADCC (i.e. non-South African) ports for purposes of the aid programme. This value increased 372% between 1986 and 1989, according to CIDA.90

According to a SADCC official, CIDA, the Nordic countries, and the Commission of the European Community (as distinct from EC member states) have been particularly receptive to, and supportive of, SADCC’s approach.91 This suggests the possibility that certain states and organizations are, by their nature, particularly receptive to multilateral/regional approaches to international problem solving. Certainly, it is not surprising the EC would be drawn towards exercises in regional multilateral economic cooperation.92 But neither is it surprising that Western middle powers, such as Canada and the Nordics, were also sympathetic to
such an approach, given their own predilection for multilateral organization and problem-solving. In sum, insofar as SADCC became a credible regional organization and an important component of regional states' effort to promote change in Southern Africa, CIDA made a significant contribution to these developments.

It is not possible to assess in any depth the content of Canadian aid policy in Southern Africa during this period. Here, I will discuss only two key aspects of it, reflecting larger debates concerning Canadian ODA. These are aid quality, and the changing role of NGOs in Canadian development assistance.

As noted in chapter 5, it is self-evident that measuring the quantity of aid without assessing its quality, or effectiveness, is not very meaningful. As one veteran Canadian development worker observed, a failed development project is not just wasted money and opportunity, but can have serious negative effects in developmental terms.93 An in-depth assessment of aid quality quickly enters the vigorously contested realm of development theory, and what constitutes "development", as well as how (if at all) aid may foster it. Without engaging these debates, however, a few general comments on the quality of Canadian aid in Southern Africa may be made.

First, it has obviously not been uniform: there have been some very useful and highly regarded projects, and some which have worked out badly.94 One key factor in shaping the overall quality of a specific country programme is the calibre and continuity of the support staff ‘on the ground’. In Botswana, for example, where there has been only one CIDA officer at a time, continuity, and quality, have tended to suffer.95 It would thus be desirable, in developmental terms, to discontinue some of the small programmes in the region, particularly in relatively prosperous countries like Botswana, and consolidate resources elsewhere; but this has not happened, largely due to political concerns with Canada’s image and reputation in the region.

Second, certain broad policy changes initiated as a result of policy review processes in the 1980s96 held out the potential, at least, to significantly improve the quality of Canadian aid. These included making human resource development (‘HRD’) a central priority in the Canadian aid programme (something which is easier
to do on paper than in practice); and reducing aid tying -- the long-standing bete noire of Canadian development analysts -- from 80% of bilateral aid to 50% in Sub-Saharan Africa and "least developed countries" elsewhere. This latter change led to substantially higher levels of CIDA procurement in SADCC states.

One particularly controversial policy change with implications for quality was an initiative to substantially decentralize both personnel and responsibility for aid administration and policy to four regional field offices in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, including one in Harare for the SADCC area. As a result of decentralization, the personnel of the Canadian mission in Zimbabwe increased from 16 Canadians and 21 locally-engaged staff to 43 Canadians and 80 locally-engaged staff during 1989. The programme was aimed at improving "the effectiveness and efficiency of Canadian aid by adding...capability 'on the ground' to help to identify and respond to local needs and use local resources, as well as to permit more flexible aid management decisions." However, decentralization proved difficult to conceptualize and costly to implement ($C250 million over five years). Furthermore, just as it was being launched, the 1989 federal budget made significant aid cuts. The juxtaposition of the expensive decentralization programme with these cuts, along with the chaos generated by the move in the field, sparked widespread criticism and cynicism concerning the plan. Nevertheless, the programme retains the potential to facilitate a more effective aid programme. The worst case scenario would be for decentralization to be abandoned before it has been given a chance to fulfill its potential.

A related question to that of the quality of Canadian aid specifically is the extent to which the aid policies of small and middle-sized donor states were qualitatively different from those of major (often ex-colonial) and super-powers. The fairly recent 'Middle Powers and Global Poverty' project produced evidence of the relatively high quality of aid programmes in selected "like-minded states"; while interviews in Botswana revealed a widely-held impression that middle powers, such as the Nordics and Canada, had relatively more humanitarian aid policies which were
less "outrightly political". One must be cautious, however, in assessing the extent to which, and ways in which, such differences are generalizable, as opposed to mere reflections of a natural suspicion of the most powerful states in the world. This is an issue which will be revisited in the conclusion of this thesis.

Finally, stepping briefly out of the time-frame of this chapter, it must be noted that resource commitments for development assistance are eroding, in Canada and throughout the OECD. In Canada, cuts in 1989 and 1991 are fuelling significant changes in the content and organization of Canadian development assistance, and must surely bring the government's commitment to development in the South sharply into question. Among the most important changes in the aid programme is an increasing emphasis on linking development assistance to World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which, as briefly discussed in chapter 5, have been deeply controversial. Aid to Southern Africa is of course being affected by these changes -- as it will be by the changing regional situation. Concurrent, limited but accelerating trends toward aid 'commercialization' have reinforced concerns over the future direction of Canadian aid.

The second issue warranting special attention is the changing role of Canadian NGOs in Southern African aid programmes during the 1980s. There has historically been a tendency to romanticize these 'grassroots' and 'philanthropic' organizations. The Canadian government, for its part, has been a "world leader" in matching and supporting the efforts of these organizations, such that in 1988-89, domestic NGOs and NGIs (Non-Governmental Institutions) received some $C280 million in government funding. These numerous and diverse organizations have become important vehicles for Canadian development assistance in Southern Africa. Increasingly, as CIDA's administrative person-years were cut back while its programme expenditures continued to grow, they took over more of the responsibility for the delivery of CIDA programmes. The trends toward greater emphasis on SAPs and NGOs are not unrelated: International Financial Institutions and official aid agencies are increasingly looking to NGOs to help deal with the social costs of the
structural adjustment prescriptions they have been advocating. In general, as their size and responsibilities have grown, NGOs have become less 'grassroots' in character, and more bureaucratic; but many retain a comparative advantage in implementing small-scale, community-oriented development projects.

With its growing size and role in programme delivery, the NGO sector gradually increased its ability to influence development, and foreign, policy. In Southern Africa, this was most evident in its role in encouraging, and assisting, the government to fill a number of official policy lacunae. For example, up to the mid-1980s, the government had no significant aid (let alone political or commercial) links with Mozambique and Angola, except indirectly through regional SADCC projects. Its bilateral links in the region had been based upon Commonwealth connections, although some more radical analysts also suspected that the Marxist ideological orientations of the Mozambican and Angolan governments had inhibited Canadian relations with them. Yet, as discussed in chapter 5, these two states were at once the foremost victims of South African destabilization, and the keys to SADCC efforts to decrease its transport and communications dependence on South Africa. Mozambique, in particular, was viewed by Commonwealth Front-line States as critical to their economic and security prospects, and the Commonwealth became an important stimulus for greater Canadian involvement in that battered country. But Canadian NGOs also played a key role in the development of a substantial Canadian presence there.

A visit by a joint government/NGO delegation in early 1987 led to the creation (with active CIDA encouragement) of an 18-agency Mozambique Task Force, which developed an integrated $C7 million programme in Nampula province known as Cooperation Canada Mozambique (COCAMO). Subsequently, in early 1988, the government established a C$6 million bilateral aid programme for Mozambique. By 1988-89, Mozambique was the second largest recipient of Canadian aid from all sources in the region (see Table 2).

Similarly, later in 1987, a Canadian delegation visited Angola, the upshot of
which was the creation of a 26-member NGO coalition which launched an integrated aid project -- "Programme Angola". This marked a new plateau in Canadian involvement in Angola, although the Canadian presence in this promising country has remained very limited.\textsuperscript{107} And in newly-independent Namibia, a much smaller consortium of Canadian NGOs, led by Oxfam-Canada, took the lead in developing an integrated agricultural, health, education and housing programme in the impoverished northern part of the country, amounting to $C10 million over five years.\textsuperscript{108}

In addition, Canadian NGOs, particularly operating through the Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa (IAWGSA), have become a credible and fairly effective lobby on Southern African issues more broadly. According to one experienced NGO worker, Joe Clark was quite receptive to the ideas of NGOs, and they had some real effect on certain aspects of Canadian policy.\textsuperscript{109}

In the ‘big scheme’, however, this growing influence, important as it may be to certain corners of Southern Africa, remains confined to the margins of Canadian foreign policy as a whole. Furthermore, the effectiveness of NGOs as a political lobby is to some degree self-limiting, due to the fact that they are an intensely pluralistic community, often with very different development philosophies and priorities which may sometimes breed a certain lack of respect for each other’s approaches. Consequently, NGO cooperation will always be difficult, and collaborative initiatives will vary significantly in effectiveness.

In sum, notwithstanding some disturbing contemporary trends in Canadian ODA, its policies and programmes in Southern Africa during the 1980s evolved in ways which enhanced its credibility and influence among regional states. They also made a useful contribution to SADCC’s emergence as a relatively effective vehicle for regional economic cooperation, and a force, however limited, for economic and political change in the region. Indeed, the positive impacts of Canada’s Southern African aid programmes during the 1980s, both for Canadian foreign policy and, more problematically, for the countries of the region, highlight the shortsightedness of recent cutbacks.
4.2 Commercial Linkages:

Canada's trade and investment links with SADCC states are substantially larger than Australia's, but are very limited from both the Southern African and particularly the Canadian perspective (see, for example, trade figures in Table 4). Significantly, despite Canada's limited sanctions against South Africa, and increasing efforts, encouraged by SADCC, to promote commercial relations with SADCC states, Canada's trade with all SADCC states has remained smaller than its trade with South Africa, excepting 1987 -- the first year in which sanctions were imposed (see Tables 1 and 4). Thus, the economic basis for sustained political relations remains weak; and there is a real possibility that with continued erosion of the aid budget, Canada's interest in SADCC states will also erode. The economic effects of the transition in South Africa on the region as a whole will be critical in this regard.

Nevertheless, during the late 1980s, the Canadian government and private sector undertook increasing efforts to promote commercial relations with SADCC states. Bearing in mind the caveats in chapter five concerning the potential dangers of North-South economic ties, these efforts may contribute to the forging of new, mutually advantageous commercial links.

The obstacles to such links are formidable. On the SADCC side, government "red tape", often erratic treatment of foreign investment and, above all, pervasive shortages of foreign exchange have been among the genuine constraints on the growth of commercial relations even with the most promising markets in the region, such as Zimbabwe's. In addition, the significant constraints on intra-regional economic relations have certainly inhibited extra-regional interest in SADCC economies. These are all problems which SADCC and its member-states have been actively, though slowly, addressing -- not least under the pressure of market-oriented SAPs. In Angola and Mozambique, these obstacles have been compounded by the tragic disruption and destruction of much of both countries' economic and social infrastructures.

On the Canadian side, the most formidable obstacles have been the limited
Table 4  
Canadian Trade with Southern Africa, 1985-89  
($C'000)  

**EXPORTS**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>1,248</td>
<td>4,772</td>
<td>4,169</td>
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<td>6,955</td>
<td>5,830</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>3,818</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>3,748</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>5,001</td>
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<td>6,531</td>
<td>18,385</td>
<td>20,474</td>
<td>10,958</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,368</td>
<td>26,821</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1,474</td>
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<td>18,876</td>
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<td>18,801</td>
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<td>11,374</td>
<td>7,370</td>
<td>8,791</td>
<td>21,120</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90,535</td>
<td>103,366</td>
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**IMPORTS**

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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>42,428</td>
<td>122,119</td>
<td>82,765</td>
<td>88,776</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>1,637</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>2,416</td>
<td>778</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>1,840</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>9,491</td>
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<td>3,704</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>16,945</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>228,516</td>
<td>155,646</td>
<td>152,512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, *Summary of International Trade* (Annual)
knowledge and exposure of Canadian entrepreneurs to Southern African markets. This has been compounded by the fact that Canadian businesspeople are, for the most part, cautious and conservative. This is illustrated by Canadian attitudes toward Angola -- the most economically promising country in the region, but also the country most seriously affected by civil war and South African intervention. Whereas other countries which lack historic knowledge of and experience in Angola -- for example, some of the Nordic states, Brazil, Spain and France -- are reported to have been quite imaginative in seeking ways to establish a foothold in the country in anticipation of the potentialities of peace, Canadian businesspeople, and the government, have tended to be more cautious, waiting for the conflict to be resolved before attempting to deepen their involvement.\footnote{111}

During the late 1980s, however, more vigorous efforts were undertaken to overcome these obstacles. In Angola, for example, Canada's Export Development Corporation (EDC) established a $C30 million line of credit for the Angolan state oil company, Sanangol, which is open to separate small projects in related fields (eg., telecommunications). And a June 1989, Angolan Trade Mission to Canada drew considerable interest.\footnote{112} The Angolan government was reportedly very interested in expanding trade links with Canada, both because it possessed useful expertise and technology in areas of importance to Angola, such as transport and communications, energy and agriculture; and because the Angolans hoped Canada could help it to foster improved links with the United States, which still has not recognized the MPLA regime.\footnote{113} This latter Canadian advantage is slipping away, however, with the demise of the Cold War, the US-brokered Namibia-Angola settlement of December 1988, and the imminent possibility of a lasting resolution to the Angolan civil war.

With regard to Zimbabwe, a Canada-Zimbabwe Joint Economic Commission was created as a result of Prime Minister Mulroney's January, 1987 visit, although it had met only once by the end of 1989.\footnote{114} However, the most imaginative and promising Canadian initiative on the economic/commercial front during this period
was the Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa (CAPSSA) in Harare, undertaken by the Canadian Exporters Association (CEA) with support from CIDA's Industrial Cooperation Division (CIDA-INC). Established in the spring of 1988, it did not get going in earnest until nearly a year later, with the arrival of an energetic Canadian Executive-Director. Its purpose is to promote and initiate industrial linkages between companies in the SADCC region and Canada -- a process described as "analogous to computer dating". Among its more imaginative features was the creation of a "Board of Advisors" consisting of 10 prominent Zimbabwean businessmen, which meets monthly and effectively plugs CAPSSA into centre of the Zimbabwean private sector. By the spring of 1990, it had facilitated three commercial agreements between Canadian and Zimbabwean firms, with some twenty others under negotiation; and it had coordinated and sponsored visits to Zimbabwe by eight Canadian companies during the first three months of the year. As an aside, it should be noted that CAPSSA's Harare base and preoccupation with Zimbabwean opportunities highlights one of the main hazards of private sector-driven North-South commercial linkages: their tendency to polarize in the relatively more developed "poles" of the Southern region in question.

There was also a parallel initiative in South Africa itself -- the Canadian Association for Black Business in South Africa (CABBSA). It was "designed to assist the private sector in the black business community create links to white business as well as industrial linkages with Canadian firms". Treated with justifiable skepticism when it was created because it seemed to play into the Botha government's "reform" strategy of fostering a black middle class with a vested interest in the (white) South African state, CABBSA now has the potential to be a small but useful source of expertise and support to black companies heading into the probable "mixed economy" of the post-apartheid era. CEA officials now see the two initiatives as complementary, with the possibility of fusion in the future.

Thus, the Canadian government, with the CEA, undertook some fairly imaginative new initiatives to try to foster stronger long-term economic links with
Southern Africa during this period, in keeping with the avowed goals of SADCC. Nevertheless, these initiatives are oriented towards relatively small and long-term gains at best; the economic basis for future politico-diplomatic relations remains very limited.

5. Security Assistance

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Canadian policy towards Southern Africa during the mid- to late-1980s was the question of providing "non-lethal security assistance" to SADCC member-states, particularly Mozambique. Like its Australian counterpart, the Canadian government was initially deeply resistant to this form of assistance, despite its compelling logic in light of direct and indirect South African destabilisation, and growing international political pressure -- notably within the Commonwealth -- for its provision.\(^{118}\) And when a new initiative for increased assistance of this type was finally launched, it was announced in a manner seemingly designed to attract as little attention as possible.\(^{119}\)

Canadian military/security assistance was not without precedent in Africa. A Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) had been in place since 1961, offering training in Canada to military personnel from Commonwealth African states; and from 1965-70, a much more elaborate programme had been implemented in Tanzania, costing some $C15 million over five years. However, this programme was not very satisfactory for either country: Matthews writes that "both parties were glad to see the agreement come to an end."\(^{120}\) In November 1986, SADCC Executive Secretary Simba Makoni, during a visit to Canada, requested that his hosts provide non-lethal security aid to SADCC member-states; at the 1987 CHOGM, Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal called for more active involvement by Commonwealth states in this area; and at the Toronto meeting of the CFMSA in August 1988, General Obasanjo’s report on the security needs of the Frontline States called for Commonwealth states to provide various forms of non-lethal security assistance.\(^{121}\)

In the face of these and other arguments and appeals, the Canadian government
remained unmoved.

Finally, in September 1988, it almost surreptitiously announced a programme of $C2 million annually in security assistance, to be disbursed by CIDA for use in securing the Nacala and Limpopo railway lines in Mozambique. This money was spent on clear-cutting bush along the tracks, watches and uniforms for soldiers guarding the rail lines, a couple of land-cruisers for the Mozambican railway company, and the like. Shortly thereafter, MTAP funding for Southern African military personnel was trebled, to a total of $C3.27 million in 1990 (see Attachment 1).122 These developments were of course welcome to Southern African states (Robert Mugabe was largely responsible for "breaking" and publicizing this new initiative). But in contrast with Canadian action on sanctions, diplomacy, and development, they had a distinctly minimalist quality: i.e., doing the minimum necessary to remain consistent with Canada's political commitments vis-a-vis the region.

This approach to security assistance begs two questions. First, why was the government so reluctant to become involved in this area? And second, why did it finally change its mind? Concerning the first question, officials in the Department of External Affairs had argued that "the Canadian people and Cabinet" were "very worried" about Canada getting involved in security assistance.123 Insofar as this amorphous explanation had some real basis, it may be situated in the deeply held aversion in Canadian political culture to the use of violence in settling political disputes. Government officials and politicians, it seems, believed that this domestically-based value would be uncritically applied by most Canadians to the Southern African context in the form of a broad view that Canada should not be involved in "supporting violence". This dimension of Canadian political culture was firmly reinforced by the popular mythology concerning post-war Canadian foreign policy that Canada's purpose, or vocation, in international security affairs was that of peacekeeper, and that nothing should be done to compromise this vocation. (This mythology also underpinned the most widespread objection to Canada's involvement
in the recent Gulf War.) It is characteristically present, this thesis suggests, in several other Western middle powers as well.

Why, then, the shift? Mainly international political considerations eventually led the government to conclude that the benefits from taking this policy departure outweighed the domestic political risks associated with such a small-scale programme. Freeman argues that it was aimed primarily at bolstering Canada's successful bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, asserting that "many Third World countries had let it be known that their support for Canada's bid was contingent on further Canadian action on southern Africa." This new initiative on security assistance undoubtedly was designed partly to support the Security Council bid, although the extent to which Freeman's explicit quid pro quo was at work is questionable. More generally, it can be interpreted as a form of "appeasement" to those supporters of stronger action against apartheid, both internationally and at home, who had been so enthused by Canada's aggressive South African policy, but who were becoming increasingly critical of its failure to move firmly towards the Prime Minister's 1985 commitment to 'sever relations absolutely'.

On balance, however, like Australia, we are left with a picture of an activist policy with strict limits, perhaps the most rigid of which was a profound reluctance to develop a strong programme of security assistance.

6. Explanation and Analysis

Despite such gaps and limits, Canadian policy towards Southern Africa from 1984-89 manifested a degree of activism and commitment unprecedented in post-war Canadian foreign policy. Whatever one thinks of the specific content of Canadian policy during this period, it cannot be denied that the region consistently occupied more of Canadian foreign policy makers' time and energy than it ever had previously. How are we to explain this new activism?

It bears repeating that the primary stimulus for Canada's (and other countries') increased activism came from events in the region. Both Pretoria's draconian
response to the urban uprising in South Africa, and the increasing tempo of destructive destabilisation in SADCC states demanded a policy response, exceeding in toughness previous policies. These regional conditions stimulated a related development facilitating new departures in Canadian policy: a large-scale flight of foreign (including Canadian) banks and firms from South Africa, "on grounds of basic loss of confidence as well as political embarrassment". Between 1985 and 1989, the number of Canadian companies operating in South Africa declined from 17 to 4, employing only a few thousand workers. However, this trend was not only linked to the political unrest and uncertainty of the mid-1980s, but also to a considerably longer-term structural decline of the South and Southern African economy within the "new international division of labour". Thus, for example, the number of Canadian firms in South Africa had already declined from 36 in 1981. The upshot of all this was that while such Canadian private sector organizations as the Canadian Exporters Association persisted in opposing economic sanctions of any kind, they were less vigorous in pressing their argument; while a number of specific, important Canadian corporate interests had shed their stake in South Africa. In other words, the government faced a more permissive environment vis-a-vis Canada's loose "dominant class" interests in formulating policy towards the region.

Amongst other groups and interests at home, government policy was set within a generally supportive but permissive environment. Canadian "public opinion", confronted with poignant media images of unrest and oppression in South Africa, nevertheless appears to have trailed, rather than stimulated, government policy departures. Unlike Australia, Canada's major political parties were unanimous in support of sanctions against South Africa; indeed, the Liberals and the NDP became increasingly critical of the government's failure to proceed towards severing relations 'absolutely'. The Southern Africanist constituency took advantage of the "moment" in the region to press their case for stronger action forcefully; yet the policy changes which occurred cannot be directly linked to this advocacy, since Southern Africanists had been making a similar case for years. Furthermore, the members of this
constituency were generally not supporters of the Tories, so that there was no obvious political pay-off in responding to their demands. Within this constituency, however, I have suggested that NGOs did enjoy a somewhat larger role in policy formulation, as their role in programme implementation grew. This was most significant in policies toward the SADCC states -- particularly Mozambique, Angola and Namibia.

In accounting for the specific character and elements of this new Canadian policy, however, there is widespread agreement that the role of individual policymakers was crucial (see notes #2 and 3). Initially, particular emphasis was placed on the Prime Minister's "passionate", "visceral" and "gutty" opposition to apartheid. In addition, it has been noted that Mulroney's primary concern as a politician is people, in the sense of loyalty to trusted friends and allies. Thus, his warm personal relationship with Kenneth Kaunda, Robert Mugabe, and the staunchly anti-apartheid Rajiv Gandhi all substantially reinforced his commitment to an activist regional policy.

However, as Mulroney's preoccupation with Southern Africa declined from 1987, Joe Clark also demonstrated a deep (according to some foreign service opinion, much too deep) interest in the region. Although more cautious (i.e., conservative!) in his policy approach, notably on sanctions, Clark "deliberately and systematically devoted an extraordinary amount of time" to this area, such that one member of External Affairs' Southern Africa Task Force termed it "an incredibly lucky unit". Clark was responsible for advancing Canada's regional policies in a number of small but significant ways. These two principals were supported by a strong cast of players committed to an activist Southern African policy, including Stephen Lewis, High Commissioner to London Roy McMurtry (who was vigorous in advancing Commonwealth initiatives), Ambassador to Zimbabwe Roger Bull, and Prime Ministerial "special envoy" Bernard Wood. It has been pointed out that in the second half of the period under review, most of this supporting cast left the Southern African stage, allowing traditional centres of resistance to sanctions and Southern African 'adventurism' to regain some ground. These included much of the senior
mandarinate of the Department of External Affairs, as well as the Departments of Finance and Regional Industrial Expansion.

Nevertheless, there remained a considerable amount of continuity in Canadian policy towards Southern Africa at the practical (as opposed to the rhetorical) level. Furthermore, there was much in the actual content of Canadian policy which manifested not only the influence of key individuals, but approaches and behaviour quite characteristic of Western middle powers in the post-war era. Thus, the second key variable in determining the specific shape and content of Canadian policy was its position as a middle power in relation to this issue, and the behavioural tendencies and expectations emanating from this position.

This can be clearly seen if Canadian policy changes are related to the changing international normative context surrounding the Southern African issue. While the policy departures undertaken by the Mulroney government have been characterized as a "radical transformation" in relation to the "traditional approach of postwar Canadian governments", they were not nearly so radical in relation to this shifting normative context. By the mid-1980s, the UN Security Council had adopted a mandatory arms embargo; the Canadian government had, in 1977, transgressed its own principle of imposing no unilateral economic sanctions, albeit in a very limited fashion; and the Scandinavian countries had moved to restrict or end new investment in South Africa, with Sweden adopting a statutory "Prohibition of (new) Investments in South Africa". Thus, it was clear that any international response to the Southern African crisis of the mid-1980s would involve unprecedented pressure for new economic (and other) sanctions. Since the Canadian state's image as a relatively "progressive" Western middle power constituted a significant source of influence vis-a-vis Third World states and of legitimacy at home, and since middle powers have generally been relatively sensitive and responsive to shifting international normative contexts, it is not surprising that the Canadian government demonstrated a new receptiveness to sanctions at this juncture.

Furthermore, there was a widespread (and correct, as it turns out) perception
in this period that South Africa was finally approaching its 'end game'. This end
game could be more or less violent, with more or less serious threats and disruptions
to international security relations and the global economy. It was entirely in keeping
with Western middle power interests and approaches to act positively to try to ensure
that this transition was relatively more peaceful and controlled, and relatively less
violent and disruptive. There was, in this connection, a related perception that the
broad interests of 'the West' depended on responding forcefully and effectively to the
imperatives of change in South Africa. Said Joe Clark:

If we betray the future of a multi-racial South Africa, our ability to sustain
reasoned dialogue with the developing world will suffer. Our morals will be
judged hollow, mere cant disguising greed and self-interest.... The search for
a realistic global dialogue on those issues where the very survival of the West
requires co-operation with the Third World will be dealt a severe blow.¹³⁷

This was similar to Malcolm Fraser's "enlightened capitalist/Western" view of the
need for the West to take strong action in support of change in South Africa. And if
the major Western states appeared either ignorant of, or oblivious to, this need,
middle powers had to try to prod them in this direction.

A more specific, though related, middle power behavioural characteristic was
an active concern with the care and feeding of international organizations. In
particular, even more than their Australian counterparts, Canadian political leaders
have been devoted to the development of the multi-racial Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth was a place where they were undeniably important, and could forge
useful contacts with a diverse range of leaders whom they would otherwise have little
contact with. During the mid-1980s, it was clear that an attempt to split the
difference between Margaret Thatcher and 'Third World' Commonwealth member-
states over the issue of apartheid was not possible, and that to tilt towards Thatcher
might fatally rend the organization's fabric, as well as damaging Canada's relatively
progressive reputation. Consequently, while confronting the British Prime Minister
was bound to be uncomfortable, the best interests of the Commonwealth clearly lay in
standing with its overwhelming majority, which Mulroney (and Hawke) predictably
enough did.
It was characteristic, also, of middle power behaviour that Joe Clark in particular chose to "specialize" in the Southern African issue (or "niche"), viewing it as one in which "Canada could make a difference". Finally, it was not surprising that, having staked out a relatively aggressive and isolated position, Canadian policymakers became increasingly nervous about how this policy might affect relations with their major allies, and increasingly sensitive to the possibility that it could cost them "too much" political capital, impairing their effectiveness on other issues. In this way, a process of self-policing gained force.

How much did it matter that the Canadian government adopted the regional policies that it did during this period? It did not matter nearly as much as the Canadian Prime Minister, among others, would have us believe. But as a G-7 member sprinting out to set an example on sanctions in 1985 and 1986, the Canadian government helped to build momentum towards the limited sanctions which were eventually adopted by most Western states. By diligently chairing the CFMSA process, it helped to maintain a high-level focus on South Africa, and reinforce the need to maintain sanctions pressure, albeit amidst growing discomfiture over its own sanctions policy. By persistently raising the Southern African issue at the G-7, it continued to prick the consciences of the world's major capitalist states. And by providing early and consistent support to SADCC, and extending support to Mozambique, it displayed genuine sensitivity to the needs and priorities of Southern African states beyond South Africa. In short, in a number of small and not-so-small ways, the Mulroney government made a limited but real contribution to the processes of change and development in Southern Africa.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the articles in the December 1988 issue of Southern Africa Report, 4 (3), especially Linda Freeman, "Rescuing Credibility? Canadian Policy


9. See Tennyson, 129-130. The close Indian-Canadian relationship through the 1950s was described as the "Indo-Canadian entente". The Canadian approach in international fora reflected its growing concern with playing a 'bridging' role between east (i.e., Asia) and west, and strengthening the Commonwealth for this purpose.

11. According to Stephen Chan, Canada sided with the "African maximalists" in supporting the creation of a strong Commonwealth Secretariat, in opposition to the British and Indian 'minimalist' view. While the latter view won out in 1964, Canadian Arnold Smith became the organization's first Secretary-General, and helped to ensure that the Secretariat increasingly developed an autonomous role as an 'international actor' in its own right. Smith was very much preoccupied with African issues as Secretary-General, and worked hard to bring Canadian foreign policy into line with broader Commonwealth expectations. Stephen Chan, The Commonwealth in World Politics (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988), 24-25, and interview with Robert McLaren, former Canadian Ambassador to Zimbabwe and Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, Ottawa, 10 Aug. 1989.


15. See, for example, speech by the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Baie Comeau, Quebec, 6 July 1985. In D. Anglin, ed., Canada and South Africa, Challenge and Response (Ottawa: Carleton International Proceedings, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University), Summer 1986.


18. See Paul Ladouceur, "Canadian Humanitarian Aid", in Anglin, et. al.


22. See, for example, Redekop, "Commerce over Conscience", 94-97, and Pratt, ed., "Canadian Policies Toward South Africa...".


24. See Nossal, "The 'idiosyncratic' variable and Canadian foreign policy...", 12.


28. See Redekop, "Commerce over Conscience...", 84-85; and Freeman, "The Effect of the World Crisis...", 126.


34. UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 47th Meeting, 23 October 1985, A/40/PV.47, 26-27; cited in Anglin, ed., Canada and South Africa, Challenge and Response (Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1986), 61-62.

35. See "Notes for a Speech by the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark ... at the Centre de Ressources Universitaires en Developpement International", DEA Statement 88/44, Laval University, Quebec, 26 Sept. 1988.


40. See "Text of speech on India's Southern Africa Policy as enunciated by Pandit Nehru by High Commissioner Bhasin at the University of Botswana on April 6, 1988", 3-4. High Commissioner Bhasin, in an interview, noted that India was "under no illusions" concerning the active trade in Indian goods to South Africa which continued via Singapore and Mauritius. Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, 21 Oct. 1989.


46. See, for example, Nossal's suggestions in "Out of Steam?...", 14.


48. According to IMF statistics in U.S. dollar figures, Canadian and Australian exports to South Africa were roughly comparable through the 1986-89 period, at around $US100 million; but Canadian imports from South Africa consistently exceeded Australian imports:

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Figures are in millions of dollars. While these figures are roughly indicative, in neither case do they accord precisely with the figures provided by national statistical agencies. See Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF Yearbook 1990 (Washington: IMF, May 1990).

49. It should be noted that the 1986 import figure was extraordinarily inflated, due to the effects of importers bringing in extra stocks of South African goods in anticipation of sanctions, and to the one-time impact of a deal in which Wardair leased three redundant South African Airways Airbuses. This deal seemed to violate the spirit, though not the letter, of the Canadian ban on air links with South Africa. See Kohut; and Freeman, "Where's the Beef?...", 7.


53. According to one of the key participants in the formulation of Canada’s policy towards Southern Africa, Bernard Wood, Canada was in a substantial way "public enemy number one" from Pretoria’s point of view. Author’s interview, 17 May 1989.

54. Many Canadians, particularly those associated with NGOs, experienced great difficulties and long delays in obtaining visas for travel to South Africa during the mid- to late-1980s -- a tit-for-tat response to the curtailment of Canadian consular services.


57. Stephen Lewis, speech delivered at Queen’s University, 5 Feb. 1989. Another specific reason for Third World support of Canada’s bid for a Security Council seat, according to the North-South Institute, was credibility earned through "one of the largest and most impressive aid programs in the world" -- a source of credibility which is threatened by recent budget cuts. See the North-South Institute, "The Wider World, Challenges for the Second Mulroney Mandate" (Review ’88/Outlook ’89), Ottawa, 1989, 2.

58. Author’s interview, Canterbury, 26 Nov. 1990.


60. Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa...", 287.


64. See Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa", 288; and Derek Ingram, "Commonwealth Notebook", The Round Table 305, 1988, 104-106.

65. Valpy, "An Interview with Stephen Lewis", 15. According to Lewis, Mulroney used the analogy of a situation in which 5 million blacks in Canada dominated 20 million whites, wondering rhetorically how long the United States would tolerate such a situation. Thatcher, he reports, was 'intensely aggravated'.


67. By all accounts, Clark spent a large (to many professional diplomats, excessive) percentage of his time on this issue. One indication of this is that Canada's Ambassador to South Africa, Ron McLean, was regularly brought back for consultations -- a highly unusual situation for an ambassador. Confidential interview, Department of External Affairs, 7 Feb. 1990.


71. Margaret Doxey, "Constructive Internationalism: A Continuing Theme in Canadian Foreign Policy", The Round Table 311, 1989, 301.


74. Nossal, "Out of Steam?...", 15.

75. Freeman, "Leading from the Rear...", 6.

76. See Appavoo, "The Small State as Donor...", 222-227, for a discussion of the similarities and differences in Canadian and Swedish approaches to Southern African liberation movements.

77. See Ladouceur, "Canadian Humanitarian Aid for Southern Africa".

78. Interview with Canadian diplomat, Lusaka, 6 Dec. 1989.


84. "SADCC CIDA Program Update" (Hull: CIDA, 1990), 22.

85. Interview with CIDA Officer, Harare, 7 Nov. 1989.


89. Stephen Godfrey, "The SADCC, New Challenges to Canadian Foreign Policy" (Ottawa: Inter Pares, 1987), 4.


92. Although in addition, it should also be noted that the EC collectively had the most substantial economic interest in the SADCC region of any Northern bloc. 38.6% of SADCC exports and 41.5% of its imports were traded with the Community. See Ostergaard, "Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance", 146.

93. Interview with Irene Mathias, Field Director, WUSC Zimbabwe, Harare, 1 Nov. 1989.

94. One project in Botswana which was cited as an example of 'good aid' by an official in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development was a 15-year project to localize the Botswana Mining Commission, which included the provision of technical assistance, including staffing, but also extensive training, so that when they were no longer needed, the Canadians were "willing to leave". Interview, Gaborone, 22 Sept. 1989.

95. This, at least, is the opinion of Chris Sharp, a long-time development expert in Botswana, and formerly Director of the World Bank Family Health Project there. Interview, 26 Sept. 1989.


99. On the relative strength of the aid programmes of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, see Olav Stokke, "The Determinants of Aid Policies: General Introduction", in Stokke, ed., Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty (Uppsala: the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989), esp. 15-18. Among my interviews in Botswana, the view of Patrick Molutsi (Department of Sociology, University of Botswana), cited in the text, was quite typical. A candid USAID official in Botswana also agreed that comparatively speaking, middle powers "do a much better job in aid". Interviews, Gaborone, Sept. 1989.


102. Recall, for example, Linda Freeman's comment in 1980 that "Philanthropic interests in development assistance have generally been expressed by Canadians working through non-governmental organizations...". "Canada and Africa in the 1970s", 800.


105. For example, the Mozambican Foreign Minister was invited by the Canadian government to attend the 1987 CHOGM in Vancouver as an Observer; and at the Vancouver CHOGM, a Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique (SCFM) was created, to which Canada contributed. See Valpy, "Minister 'explaining' needs to Canada", The Globe and Mail, 17 Oct. 1987; and "Dynamic start for special Mozambique fund", Commonwealth Currents, April 1988.


110. Interview with Charles Hove.

111. See Godfrey with Swatuk, "Canada and Angola..."; Godfrey, "The SADCC, New Challenges to Canadian Foreign Policy", 9-10; interview with Bob Gibbins, Executive-Director, Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa (CAPSSA), Harare, Nov. 1989; and interview with Canadian diplomat, Harare, Nov. 1989. On the cautious and unenthusiastic attitude of Canadian companies towards African markets more broadly, see Freeman, "The Effect of the World Crisis...", 132-133.

112. See Godfrey with Swatuk. By 1990, it should be noted, only half of the EDC line of credit had been taken up.


117. Interview with Ed Gorn.


119. Freeman, "Rescuing Credibility?...", 3-4.
120. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa", 111; more generally, see Matthews, 107-111.


124. Freeman, "Rescuing Credibility?…", 4.

125. I am indebted to Larry Swatuk for suggesting this formulation.

126. According to Douglas Anglin, Prime Minister Mulroney’s commitment on this issue was reinforced by the May 1986 SADF bombing raid on the capitals of fellow Commonwealth members Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia, which led to the scuttling of the EPG’s ‘mission to South Africa’. Given the close personal relations which were developing between Mulroney and Mugabe and Kaunda, this is very plausible. Interview, Ottawa, March 1988.

127. North-South Institute, "Canada’s Foreign Policy: Testing Our Resolve" (Review ’86/Outlook ’87), 7.


129. See Timothy M. Shaw, "South and Southern Africa in the New International Division of Labour: Prospects for the 1990s", in Swatuk and Shaw, eds.

130. The argument that Canadian foreign policy has been disproportionately beholden to the views and interests of the Canadian "dominant class" has been developed by Cranford Pratt. See his "Dominant class theory and Canadian foreign policy: the case of the counter-consensus", International Journal 39 (1), Winter 1983-84, 99-135.


132. Interview with Canadian diplomat, Ottawa, Feb. 1990.

134. See Freeman, "Rescuing Credibility?...", 7-8; and Valpy, "An Interview with Stephen Lewis", 14-15.


137. DEA Statement 89/47, 10.

138. DEA Statement 89/47, 2.
Chapter 8
Little Big Power?
Swedish Policy Towards Southern Africa during the 1980s

Nowhere is the paradox of middle power international activism in areas of little direct economic or strategic interest more striking than in the case of Swedish policy towards Southern Africa. In the absence of the Commonwealth connection, Sweden had an even narrower historical base of contact with this region than had Australia or Canada. Yet over the past three decades, it has developed what is, in proportional terms, probably the most active and extensive policy involvement of any extra-regional state therein. This raises again the twin questions of why it became so deeply involved in the region, and what effects this involvement has had, notably in promoting change and development.

I will argue in this chapter that Swedish involvement in Southern Africa can best be understood as emanating from a combination of internationalist interests and behavioural tendencies characteristic of Western middle powers; and an unusually strong domestic base of popular interest and engagement issuing from distinctive features of the Swedish political economy and culture. This latter source of Swedish policies, discussed more generally in chapter 4, may be termed the "solidarity tradition". This tradition takes in the forms of popular participation, and types of policies, which have led to the characterization of Swedish involvement in the region as unusually "progressive". However, the two sources of Swedish policy are closely interconnected. Thus, the activism which came to be associated with the solidarity tradition was initially stimulated largely by Swedish interests and behaviour vis-a-vis international organizations -- especially the UN -- which was quite typical of middle powers such as Canada, the Netherlands and India during the 1950s and early '60s. This internationalist behaviour subsequently became an important source of popular appeal and state legitimacy within Swedish society, but also within the broader international community. Later, as we shall see, Sweden's "progressive" associations with, for example, regional liberation movements in Southern Africa and some of the
Frontline States were used for purposes of "bridge-building" characteristic of middle power internationalism.

The effects of Swedish policy in the region are more ambiguous than progressive sympathizers elsewhere in the West have often presumed. Indeed, some of what is most useful about Swedish policy flows from the lessons furnished by the disappointments and setbacks of its involvement in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, it will be argued that, overall, Sweden had a significant and useful impact in supporting change and development during the 1980s, particularly (though not exclusively) through its development assistance efforts.

Although the primary temporal focus of this chapter will be the period from 1984 to 1989, this focus will not be as closely adhered to as it was in the previous two chapters. This is because Swedish policies have had a greater degree of consistency and continuity -- i.e., a more consistently regionalist orientation -- than the policies of Australia and Canada, where upsurges in activity were closely linked to regional and Commonwealth crises. Thus, the 1984-89 period cannot, and will not, be neatly distinguished from the progression of previous policies.

1. Historical Underpinnings of Swedish Policy

A striking aspect of the historical development of the Swedish presence in the 'South' generally, and Southern Africa specifically, was the absence of pre-World War II political connections of any kind -- colonial or Commonwealth. Similarly, after World War II, Sweden's decision to maintain a policy of armed neutrality in the Cold War context freed it from alliance sympathies, pressures and interests vis-a-vis the rapidly decolonizing regions of Asia and Africa. Further, with the limited exception of South Africa, Sweden's commercial interests in these areas were for the most part negligible. The upshot was that, in forging its post-war foreign and development policies toward Southern Africa, the main political signals to, and pressures upon, the Swedish government came from the UN internationally, and humanitarian groups and interests domestically.
This is not to suggest that there were not older social and economic connections between Sweden and Southern Africa. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, several prominent Swedish explorers, scientists, and traders were active in, and wrote about, the region. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several thousand immigrants from Sweden and other Nordic countries settled in South Africa, integrating easily into European society there. The most lasting early contacts with the region were forged by missionaries and commercial interests. Swedish mission fields were established in Zululand in Natal in the late nineteenth century, and subsequently in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and (in 1941) Tanzania. Church contacts and "Christian solidarity work" certainly influenced the post-war development of Swedish involvement in Southern Africa, helping to heighten popular awareness of, and interest in, the region.

Somewhat later, a number of major Swedish companies -- mainly in the strong engineering and machinery and equipment manufacturing sectors -- established themselves in the South African market, beginning with the ball-bearing manufacturer SKF in 1914. Along with Swedish investment, Swedish-South African trade expanded sharply after World War II, but remained very limited in relative terms (well under 1% of Swedish foreign trade). Nevertheless, from the South African perspective, Swedish firms became significant suppliers of manufacturing inputs to strategically-important industries. In 1985, for example, 2.2% of South Africa's imports of capital goods, electrical and electronic equipment came from Sweden, making it the eighth-largest supplier of these products to the South African market. The fact that a large percentage of Swedish trade with South Africa was conducted by large Swedish multinationals also had important implications for the subsequent imposition of Swedish trade sanctions, as will be discussed subsequently.

The growing Swedish interest in South and Southern Africa in the post-World War II era began from a very low level. In the early years of this era, Swedish neutrality was interpreted in a very cautious and legalistic manner, conditioning its approach to foreign policy generally. Also, Sweden's neutral status during the
Second World War, and subsequently in the Cold War, left it somewhat "outside the game" of international affairs in post-war Europe, which was where most of the action was. Its growing internationalism, and particularly its growing interest in 'Third World' decolonization and the issue of apartheid in South Africa, were largely stimulated by its expanding involvement in, and commitment to, the UN system -- the forum, above all others, in which these issues acquired steadily increasing international political salience. As noted in chapter 4, Swedish interest in the UN, and hence the emerging 'Third World', was sharply stimulated by the role of Dag Hammarskjold, UN Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961.

However, Swedish interest in Southern Africa specifically was also stimulated by groups and individuals at home. Concerning South Africa itself, a relatively positive, if remote, popular image began to turn sharply more negative towards the end of the 1950s, largely due to the efforts of several key individuals. Prominent among these were the author/journalist Per Wastberg, and the missionary Gunnar Helander, who was later expelled from South Africa. The work of these and other opinion makers found fertile ground among the extensive network of Swedish "popular movements" (unions, free churches, educational associations, temperance associations, miscellaneous NGOs, etc.), who were receptive to appeals based on humanitarian and anti-racist principles. The South African police shooting of literally hundreds of peaceful black demonstrators at Sharpeville in 1960 had a catalytic impact on growing popular opposition to apartheid.

The Swedish government was not receptive to early calls for economic and other sanctions, however. The main lines of policy on sanctions, set at this time, were sustained for the next twenty years. As reported by Patricia Appavoo, the government used two main justifications for its opposition to unilateral sanctions against South Africa (or indeed any other country):

1) it was considered contrary to international law and would especially contravene agreements under the GATT. 'Specially for small countries that are greatly dependent on foreign trade, it is of vital interest that obligations under concluded agreements are respected';
2) 'isolated actions having no effect might be more likely to strengthen the
confidence and intransigent attitude of the South African government'.

Underlying this "principled" opposition to sanctions, of course, were the valuable commercial ties of important Swedish corporations -- although in general, these corporations do not appear to have had much direct influence on the development of the Social Democratic government's Third World policies. Sweden did support General Assembly efforts to mount programmes of assistance for the families of victims of apartheid, and for the education of South African and Namibian refugees. And when the Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia later in the 1960s, and an arms embargo against South Africa in 1977, Sweden passed legislation to enforce them. Beyond this it would not go, however, for reasons strikingly similar to those used by Canadian and Australian decision-makers.

The other major catalyst for the developing Swedish interest in Southern Africa during the 1960s was the growth of its aid programmes in the region. As noted in chapter 4, Sweden was a relative late-comer to the 'aid game'. From the mid-1960s, however, its ODA expenditures grew rapidly. Several factors contributed to an extraordinary degree of concentration of these expanding ODA resources in Southern Africa. Swedish decision-makers were keenly aware of the fact that, as a relatively small country, Sweden's aid resources had to be concentrated in order to have any appreciable impact. Without colonial, Cold War, or domestic ethnic constituency pressures to influence them, they had a relatively free hand in choosing where to concentrate. Early recipients were determined by such factors such as the presence of Swedish mission fields, and the use of English as a working language.

From the early 1960s, Tanzania quickly became the single largest recipient of Swedish aid. It had both of the characteristics cited above, to which was added its deep impoverishment, its appealing commitment (from 1967) to socialism, and the appealing personification of that commitment, President Julius Nyerere. In short, "it appeared an ideal recipient to a wide spectrum of Swedish opinion." Although Tanzania was geographically and historically an East African state, its staunch support for Southern African liberation movements brought Swedish aid workers into close
contact with these groups, helping to pave the way for subsequent 'humanitarian assistance' to them. Considerations of language, and Sweden’s growing foreign policy interest in the South African issue, influenced decisions to launch development assistance programmes in Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland soon after they achieved independence in the mid-1960s.

In the late-1960s, Swedish foreign policy was significantly "radicalized", as much of Swedish society was swept up in a broad international upsurge of left-wing fervour. Support for North Vietnam’s struggle for national self-determination, as it was generally interpreted in Sweden, became the focus for widespread anti-imperialist sentiment which spilled over into the Southern African issue area. Olof Palme, who became Swedish Prime Minister in 1969, became well-known for his outspoken criticism of US involvement in Vietnam and, less conspicuously, for his support of Southern African liberation during this period. He subsequently maintained a deep concern for ‘Third World’ causes.11

This radicalization was reflected in a vigorous debate within the governing Social Democratic Party over the recipients of Swedish aid. The upshot of this debate was the establishment of ‘country programming’ as the key organizing principle in Sweden’s bilateral aid programme, with the ideology and policies of the recipient regime (i.e., its ‘political correctness’) becoming a major criterion in recipient selection. In this context, aid was extended to North Vietnam and, briefly, Cuba. For Southern Africa, the most important development arising from this debate was the 1969 decision to extend direct humanitarian assistance to regional liberation movements.

This decision probably did more than any other to establish Sweden’s progressive reputation in relation to Southern Africa. It certainly went well beyond what other Western governments were prepared to consider at the time. Yet it is worth noting that the Swedish government was very sensitive to the international legal implications of this policy, particularly for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It was careful to justify this new ‘humanitarian
assistance' in terms of the UN's stand in 1969 supporting the liberation of people suffering from colonial and racial oppression.\textsuperscript{12} It also insisted on distinguishing between support for a liberation movement and support for its armed struggle, which it argued was not implied by its assistance.

While Sweden provided humanitarian assistance to liberation movements throughout Southern Africa, the main recipients were the MPLA and Frelimo in Angola and Mozambique. This reflected the particularly strong stand taken by the government against Portuguese colonialism, and thus Swedish "niche-playing". Since the attention of the Anglo-American world was concentrated on South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, "as in Vietnam, Sweden found a special role for itself in (Lusophone) southern Africa and it was proud of the fact that it was the first West European state to support liberation movements in the Portuguese territories."\textsuperscript{13}

When these two movements became the governments of their respective countries in 1975, Sweden transformed its humanitarian assistance into substantial country programmes, and established close political relationships with these regimes -- a pattern subsequently repeated in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Angola and, in particular, Mozambique were also the primary foci of the main, and most radical, Swedish solidarity group, the Africa Groups in Sweden (AGIS).\textsuperscript{14}

Sweden's extensive developmental support to liberation movements and Southern African states led over time to the emergence of a relatively large cadre of citizens with direct experience of, and dedication to, the people and countries of the region. Many of these worked in agencies of the state -- in particular, SIDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others became involved in solidarity work. Collectively, they gave Southern African issues a higher degree of domestic political salience in Sweden than in virtually any other Western country.

Sweden's progressive policies on Southern Africa were also reinforced by cooperation with "like-minded" Nordic fellow travellers, although Stockholm was usually the pace-setter. In 1978, this cooperation was formalized with Nordic Foreign Ministers' agreement on a common "Nordic programme of action against South
Africa. The programme consisted of: action against new investments in South Africa and negotiations with Nordic enterprises with a view to limiting their production there; a recommendation to cut off sporting and cultural contacts with South Africa; introduction of compulsory visas for South Africans; increased Nordic support for refugees, liberation movements and the victims of apartheid; and in the UN, concerted efforts to bring about a decision in the Security Council against new investments in, and trade with, South Africa, and a scrupulous application of the Security Council's arms embargo. This multilateral approach was characteristic of small- and middle-sized states' foreign policies, increasing the Nordics' collective weight and courage on this issue. It emboldened the Swedish government to become the first Western state to legislate a ban on new investment in South Africa in 1979 -- the first crack in its self-imposed injunction against unilateral (i.e., non-Security Council) sanctions.

Thus, by the 1980s, the Swedish government had established a large-scale and relatively "progressive" presence in the Southern African issue area. How was this presence pursued in the 1980s?

2. Sanctions Against South Africa

Through the 1980s, Sweden took a number of escalating steps culminating in the adoption, along with other Nordic states, of one of the strongest sanctions policies in the world: a near-total embargo on merchandise trade. Yet the eventual adoption of the trade ban in 1987 was very controversial and, according to one representative of Swedish industry, "very unexpected". This prompts two somewhat contradictory questions: first, given the strength of anti-apartheid feeling in Sweden, why was the trade ban so controversial? And second, given the constraints which limited the sanctions adopted by other Western states (notably Australia and Canada), why was it eventually possible for Sweden to go considerably further in adopting a total trade ban? Finally, a third question should be posed: what impact did Swedish sanctions have, both on South Africa directly and within the international community,
in expanding pressure for change?

In order to address these questions, a brief review of the sequence and bases upon which Swedish sanctions were adopted is in order. As noted above, the first crack in Sweden's opposition to unilateral sanctions came with the ban on new investment in 1979. Several factors apparently led to this crack. Interestingly, a crucial one was the accession to power of a "bourgeois coalition" government between 1976 and 1982 -- a short hiatus in the long run of SAP rule. During this period, the Liberal party took charge of foreign policy. It had long been identified with a strongly "progressive" foreign policy stance, including calls for sanctions and larger allocations for development assistance. Simultaneously, the SAP in opposition (as often happens) became more radical. Also, public interest and pressure in the late 1970s was sharply stimulated by South African and international developments, notably the Soweto "disturbances", the death in detention of Steve Biko, and the Security Council arms embargo. In this context, the government apparently decided in the fall of 1977 to begin to unilaterally adopt smaller steps short of full trade sanctions, in hopes of setting an example which would help to precipitate Security Council action. This symbolic, example-setting rationale became a persistent theme in the subsequent adoption of successive sanctions steps. It underpinned the measures agreed in the 1978 Nordic Programme of Action, and in the 1979 investment ban.

Although the investment ban constituted a policy breakthrough, it nevertheless contained a number of significant qualifications and loopholes. These led one group of critics to conclude that:

The law has ... had negligible adverse effects on the South African economy and Swedish subsidiaries relative to the level of involvement prior to the introduction of this legislation. A possible side effect may have been the projection of independent Africa by Sweden as a progressive force (sic), thus creating goodwill which, in turn, could be exploited commercially.

Following the report and recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee appointed to assess the implementation of the ban, the government (once again in the hands of the SAP) closed one major loophole in April 1985 by prohibiting the leasing of equipment
by investors in South Africa. By this time, the Southern African situation was again "in crisis", and the international community was under pressure to respond. The Swedish government saw another potential opportunity to lead by example (see note #19). There followed a succession of escalating measures: a ban on imports of agricultural products from South Africa and Namibia in January 1986; a tightening of visa regulations in April; a prohibition on the transfer or consignment of patent and manufacturing rights to South African and Namibian companies, and the imposition of a licensing requirement for all trade with South Africa, in July; and an all-party resolution in Parliament urging businesses to voluntarily restrict trade with South Africa in the autumn. Nevertheless, in late July of 1986, the new Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, was still declaring that "Sweden would not approve (full) economic sanctions unless a United Nations decision to introduce mandatory sanctions was made." Yet by March of 1987 the government had reversed itself, and long-standing Swedish foreign policy principle, by introducing legislation bringing a (near) full trade embargo into effect on 1 July 1987. What precipitated the shift? Why was such an extensive trade boycott possible? And what effect did it have? The strong resistance to a full trade embargo which continued during the Swedish sanctions debate in 1986 was rooted in principles which have already been noted. Most significantly, it was anchored in the long-standing view that the interests of a small, heavily trade-dependent country were ill-served by a "unilateral" breach of GATT principles through the imposition of sanctions. Such a step would set a dangerous precedent which could, eventually, rebound against it. The sanctions debate seems to have brought into open contradiction the "realist-idealist" dichotomy in Swedish political culture identified in chapter 4. Many bureaucrats, particularly those concerned with trade and commerce, had long favoured the management of Sweden's commercial affairs on a quiet and pragmatic basis. They were strongly opposed to this new departure. They were joined in opposition to sanctions by the well organized Swedish business community, and the Moderate party in the Riksdag
Yet in Sweden, as (to a more limited degree) in Australia and Canada, these substantial forces of resistance were overcome. Broadly-based "popular pressure" was important in this regard. The Isolate South Africa Committee (ISAK) -- a solidarity organization established in 1979 which, by 1989, had 68 national member-organizations -- spearheaded a vigorous public campaign for stronger action, including total sanctions. A high point in this campaign was the February 1986 "Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid", co-organized with the United Nations Association, which brought together 1,000 delegates representing some 700 national, regional, and local organizations. According to Bo Huldt, director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, the SAP government became concerned in the context of this public ferment about losing support to both the Communists on the left and the Liberals on the (nominal) right, both of which were strong boycott advocates. These "popular" forces and political calculations were certainly reinforced by a significant number of sanctions supporters within the state -- notably within SIDA and parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition, however, international developments contributed to the trade boycott decision. Sweden was used to being the Nordic pace-setter on Southern African policy, yet on this issue, it was behind Denmark and Norway, both of which had introduced legislation imposing full sanctions in June and November of 1986 respectively. Subsequent decisions by Sweden and Finland to follow suit maintained the Nordic common front, which must certainly have emboldened the Swedish government in taking this new departure. More broadly, as noted above, the Swedish government was now quite committed to the pursuit of a progressive, "example-setting" role internationally, aimed at prompting the international community towards the eventual goal of mandatory Security Council sanctions. With Commonwealth, Congressional, and EC partial sanctions now in place, Sweden needed to go beyond these measures, to a general trade boycott, to maintain this vanguard role. In this respect, the country's popular collective self-image as an active
and progressive internationalist state was at stake in the sanctions decision.

Yet this explanation is insufficient. For, if the assertion made in chapter 7 that Western sanctioners' bottom line during the 1980s was the avoidance of specific, sectional employment losses is correct, I must explain how it was possible for Sweden to impose a general trade boycott without incurring such losses. Here, the volume, content, and agents of Swedish trade are crucial. To begin with, Swedish trade with South Africa was not large. In 1985, for example, Swedish exports to South Africa were the equivalent of $US131 million, while imports were roughly $US55 million (0.4% of Swedish exports, and 0.2% of imports — see also Table 1). By 1986, following the ban on imports of South African and Namibian agricultural products, Swedish imports from South Africa were not much more than $US20 million, so that the monetary effects of ending remaining merchandise imports were minimal.

The somewhat more valuable export trade consisted mainly of engineering products, pulp and paper, motor vehicles and office equipment. Thus, with the exception of pulp and paper, most Swedish exports were manufactured goods, mainly produced by Swedish multinationals which could shift much of this production to affiliates in other states. Indeed, some 50% of Swedish exports were accounted for by the nine large multinationals which maintained direct investments in South Africa. Thus, the costs of the trade boycott to Swedish exporters were again for the most part minor, although the adjustments involved were certainly inconvenient. With regard to employment, an interdepartmental working party which reported in November 1986 estimated the net loss of jobs as a result of a trade embargo at between 500 and 800, but could not specify exactly which industries, companies and localities would suffer. It was felt, however, that such relatively small and non-specific employment effects could be handled by "the normal methods used in labour market and regional development policies". In this respect, Swedish sanctions were facilitated by the country's advanced labour market adjustment provisions. With hindsight, most observers agreed that, particularly given the country's strong economic growth in the mid- to late-1980s, the domestic economic/employment
Table 1
Swedish Trade with Southern Africa, 1984-1988
(SEK Millions; $Cl = SEK5.3 [approx.])

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<tr>
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<td>870.8</td>
<td>762.2</td>
<td>931.4</td>
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<td>785.0</td>
<td>716.9</td>
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<td>78.9</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>127.7</td>
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<td>364.1</td>
<td>153.3</td>
<td>191.7</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>412.1</td>
<td>153.2</td>
<td>127.4</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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Source: Ulrikeshandel ("Foreign Trade")
effects of the trade boycott were insignificant. It was, in sum, relatively easy for Sweden to impose.

This leads directly to the most important, and difficult, question: what impact did Swedish sanctions have in contributing to pressure for change in South Africa? Clearly, just as the direct economic impact of sanctions on Sweden was minor, so too their direct economic effect on South Africa was very small. This fact, plus the very consistency and predictability of Sweden’s advocacy of mandatory UN sanctions, support for the liberation movements, etc., led some opponents of sanctions in South Africa and elsewhere to try to dismiss the significance of Swedish sanctions. Sellstrom cites the leader of a major Western state’s delegation to the 1985 SADCC Consultative Conference complaining to the Swedish delegation about their regional policy that "It is so easy for you Nordics. You have no interests at stake". In a reference to what he viewed as the impotence of the Frontline States, he reportedly went on: "Your are just another Backline State...".34

Clearly, tiresome predictability without the backing of significant power will reduce any state’s foreign policy impact over time. Yet the impact of Swedish sanctions cannot be so easily dismissed. For one thing, the cumulative economic effects of Nordic sanctions against South Africa, especially when combined v://:h Commonwealth, US, and some EC members’ measures, was not inconsequential.35 In addition, within pro-government circles in "white" South Africa, the psychological impact of the Swedish trade boycott, while probably fairly short-lived, was significant at the time of its introduction. This is reflected in the reaction of the pro-government English-language daily, The Citizen, which editorialized that "the Swedes should stop mucking about in a sub-continent in which they have no real stake... One day, when Sweden’s hostility becomes too dangerous, and its direct interference in our internal affairs too much to bear, it should not be surprised if ‘Swedes go home!’ becomes a popular slogan".36

As noted above, the Swedish government’s own rationale for successive sanctions initiatives was largely based on their potential impact as an example to other
states, and hence a stimulus to broadly-based international sanctions pressure. It is
difficult to ascribe much success to this approach. Indeed, it is more difficult to posit
a link between Swedish/Nordic sanctions and those of major Western powers than it is
between Commonwealth sanctions and those of the EC and US Congress. Sweden’s
investment ban in 1979 was not emulated by other, non-Nordic Western states until
more than half a decade later, manifestly in response to the crisis in South/Southern
Africa, and not the Swedish example. The Nordics’ general trade boycott in 1987
came after the crest of the sanctions wave in the mid-1980s, and was not emulated by
any other Western state.

Yet, there was at least some value in Sweden’s periodic "breakthroughs" on
sanctions, setting precedents which cracked the consensus surrounding long-standing
international shibboleths. These initiatives surely made it somewhat easier for other
states when, on several occasions, they finally did decide to adopt similar measures.
Certainly, other self-perceived "progressive" states and governments, including
Canada’s, were sensitive to Swedish/Nordic policies and precedents. Furthermore,
Swedish actions provided anti-apartheid movements in other Western countries with
useful ammunition in pressing their own governments to take stronger steps against
South Africa. And, in conjunction with its humanitarian assistance programmes,
Stockholm’s sanctions provided symbolic political support and encouragement to
liberation movements in their own struggles for change.

Thus, the broad impact of Swedish sanctions was not negligible, and cannot be
dismissed. Insofar as they did have some real impact, however, it was to a
significant degree political and diplomatic. The next section therefore addresses this
diplomatic dimension of policy.
3. Diplomatic Efforts in Support of Change

There are, generally speaking, at least two distinct ways in which non-great powers can attempt to exercise diplomatic influence in issue areas where their tangible power resources are limited. The first is by working quietly within international fora to build international coalitions with the collective weight to influence outcomes. The second is by taking high profile initiatives with symbolic effects which may stimulate others to action. The two are not mutually exclusive: a successful influence attempt will often combine elements of both. The choice of technique or emphasis will be largely determined by a state’s diplomatic resources in the issue area in question, as well as the "style" of its political leaders and diplomatic practitioners.

It will be clear from the preceding section that, by the 1980s, Sweden’s diplomatic emphasis vis-a-vis South Africa itself was on high profile symbolic initiatives. This approach was determined largely by its relative lack of diplomatic connections and resources. Lacking the Commonwealth connections of Australia and Canada, the G-7 status of Canada, or indeed the EC membership of Denmark and the Netherlands, Sweden was left with the UN as its primary locus for multilateral diplomacy. Within this forum, it was very active. From the late 1960s, it consistently called for the imposition of mandatory sanctions by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As discussed above, it buttressed this diplomatic appeal with "advanced" initiatives on sanctions which it hoped would stimulate other states, and eventually the Security Council, to action. It collaborated effectively with the other Nordic states in an effort to amplify its diplomatic appeals and increase the symbolic impact of its sanctions initiatives. Significantly, despite its support for Southern African liberation movements engaged in armed struggle, it continued to stress that it supported sanctions as "the only remaining instrument at hand in the United Nations which can lead to a peaceful solution of the ongoing conflict" (italics added). This position reflected a characteristic Western middle power preoccupation with the pursuit of relatively peaceful, negotiated resolutions to international disputes.
Yet the UN was notorious (until the Gulf War, at least) for the enormous difficulty its members had in reaching agreement on concerted action on major international political issues. This was certainly the case with South Africa; and the direct effects of Sweden’s symbolic diplomacy there were, as discussed above, very limited. (It was largely because of the UN’s relative incapacity for political action that both Australia and Canada chose to concentrate their diplomatic efforts in the Commonwealth.)

Within the region itself, Sweden downgraded its mission in Pretoria to the status of a "legation" headed by an "envoy". However, despite the ANC’s call, supported by the international anti-apartheid movement, for the complete diplomatic isolation of South Africa, there was a tacit but broadly-based Swedish consensus that the legation was serving an important function and should be maintained. On the issue of whether or not to retain diplomatic links with South Africa, the debate which occurred in Canada seems to have been a non-starter in Sweden.

However, it was amongst SADCC states and regional liberation movements that Sweden enjoyed a diplomatic comparative advantage, obtained by virtue of its ‘internationally advanced’ sanctions policy and generous aid programmes. In this context, after some equivocation and experimentation, it settled during the 1980s on a diplomatic approach which was in the classic middle power ‘bridge-building’ mould. Three examples of this approach, in two quite different issue areas, are cited below.

The first, in the politico-diplomatic sphere and on behalf of the UN, concerns Sweden’s relationship with the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO. As the first and largest Western provider of direct support to regional liberation movements, the Swedish government had forged "special relationships" with these groups. Over a period of decades, these relationships had been institutionalized, with each year’s assistance programme set on the basis of a series of bilateral consultations and negotiations strikingly similar to those with country recipients. In general, Sweden’s approach to liberation movements had given these organizations an
enhanced degree of international recognition and legitimacy, for which they were duly appreciative. The relationship had been further cemented by the close and long-standing personal relationships built up between a number of SIDA and Foreign Ministry officials on the one hand, and leading figures in the liberation movements on the other.\textsuperscript{43}

SWAPO was not included in the decisive trilateral\textsuperscript{44} negotiations which produced the "New York Accords" in December 1988, paving the way for the UN-supervised transition to independence in Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Yet as the movement which had sustained a costly armed struggle against South African rule for well over a decade, and as the single most important nationalist group in the country, its role in the success or failure of the agreements and subsequent transition process was obviously crucial. There was a real danger that mistrust or misunderstanding on its part of the deals being made "behind its back" could lead to the demise of the whole process.\textsuperscript{45}

In this context, Swedish diplomats argue that they actively engaged in "influencing and encouraging" SWAPO through the negotiation process, "discussing with (them) the alternatives, what could be possible, constraints on other sides, and so on...". According to these diplomats, they understood that "loud complaints" by Sweden aimed at the South Africans would not be listened to, but that "if we see areas where we think SWAPO could and should do things differently", this is "where Sweden can use its weight".\textsuperscript{46} Outsiders cannot confidently evaluate the importance of the Swedish role in this regard. However, it is worth noting that this type of Swedish role is not unprecedented. Swedish diplomats were responsible for brokering the dialogue launched in 1989 between the US and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), using their good relations with both parties to help bridge gulfs of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and mistrust.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, it is quite plausible that the Swedes' relatively good connections with all parties (save the South Africans) enabled them to play a useful role in facilitating the imperfect, but ultimately successful, transition process in Namibia.
Sweden performed a similar 'bridge-building' role, albeit in the economic sphere and in relation to International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in facilitating an accommodation between two of its oldest friends and largest recipients in Southern Africa -- Tanzania and Zambia -- and the IMF and World Bank. In Tanzania, Sweden initially supported the government there in its resistance to the pressures and prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank, maintaining "an ongoing row" with these organizations for a number of years. However, around 1982, "the evidence of a severe economic crisis had become overwhelming. Within SIDA, with its deep knowledge of Tanzania’s problems, a common understanding emerged that fundamental policy changes had to be initiated.\textsuperscript{48} According to a Swedish diplomat who was with SIDA’s office in Tanzania at the time, "we didn’t see that they had any other clear programme (besides an IMF/World Bank SAP) for recovery...".\textsuperscript{49}

Having belatedly and rather skeptically climbed aboard the IMF/World Bank "bandwagon", Sweden set about trying to help mend fences between the Tanzanian government and the Bretton Woods Institutions.\textsuperscript{50} SIDA organized a "Tanzanian Advisory Group" which undertook a "thorough, independent study" of how the country should respond to its prolonged economic crisis. Its conclusions were presented to a seminar in late 1984, the outcome of which, according to the Swedish official interviewed, was an awareness among Tanzanian officials that changes had to be made for the country to survive (presumably meaning an acceptance of SAP-style policy prescriptions). This official felt that the Advisory Group and seminar processes (organized as they were by a trusted friend) made it easier for the Tanzanians to understand and accept the need for change. It presumably also helped reconcile the many Swedish officials who closely identified with the Tanzanians and had themselves resisted the impending developments.\textsuperscript{51}

In Zambia, Sweden pursued a similar "bridge-building" role when the Zambian government abandoned a particularly ambitious and radical SAP in May 1987 and formulated a "home-grown" National Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) in its stead.\textsuperscript{52} Whereas a number of other major donors took a hard line in
response to this action (including Canada, which suspended planning for new programmes while Zambia was in IMF/WB "purgatory"), Sweden took a more conciliatory approach. It quickly expressed "doubts" with regard to the NERP, particularly over its use of price controls and what the Swedes (and most other outside observers) saw as an over-valued exchange rate for the country's currency, the Kwacha. In 1987, it placed the import support portion of its bilateral aid programme on a one-year (vs. the usual two-year) basis; in 1988, when no "appropriate" policy changes were forthcoming, it reduced its import-support; and in 1989, it phased it out altogether. Concurrently, in mid-1988, SIDA, along with the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian aid agency NORAD, proposed to the Zambian government that they commission and finance an independent study of what should be done on the crucial issue of Zambia's exchange rate policy (the principal catalyst for Zambia's withdrawal from its earlier SAP was the radical "auction system" which had been introduced for the Kwacha). The resulting report, by Oxford International Associates, was apparently a "major contributor" to the thinking behind the Zambian government's own subsequent economic plan designed as the basis for the reconciliation with the IMF/WB which its ever-worsening structural economic problems made unavoidable.53

In short, in each of these three examples, Swedish officials used diplomatic bona fides and weight built up through progressive South African and development assistance policies in an effort to "build bridges" between Southern African states and liberation movements on the one hand, and large multilateral organizations and/or processes of international accommodation (as in the Namibia-Angola Accords) on the other. Without minimizing the differences between the first example and the second two, the broad effects of its efforts in each of these instances were similar: to integrate/re-integrate its Southern African "partners" into the mainstream of international political and economic life. Whether Sweden's use of its diplomatic influence in this manner -- particularly vis-a-vis IFIs -- is considered "progressive" or not will be a matter of profound controversy, depending on whether one views
accommodation with such powerful global institutions as in the long-term best interests of the Southern African states and groups in question. My own view is that, concerning relations with IFIs, so long as SIDA remains skeptical and critical in its acceptance of these Institutions' policies, and continues to push for greater sensitivity to the social and political ramifications of SAPs, it has been right to facilitate African states’ accommodations with them. However, this debate is beside the central point to be made in the context of this thesis: i.e., that Sweden effectively used its particular diplomatic comparative advantages in this issue area in ways quite consistent with the middle power behavioural characteristics discussed in chapter 2. The next sub-section focuses on the development assistance policies which were a crucial basis for its politico-diplomatic influence in the region.

4.1 The Developmental Dimension - Development Assistance

As noted in chapter 4, Sweden was the first country to reach the UN-set ODA target of 0.7% of GNP in 1974, and has for more than a decade remained committed to achieving aid expenditures of 1% of GNP. Of this unusually large aid budget per capita, over 40% has been concentrated in Southern Africa. Between 1981 and 1985, Swedish aid disbursements averaged 14.2% of the OECD DAC total in the region, and in 1985, Sweden was the second largest donor in the region after the United States -- but with a much better reputation for responsiveness to regional priorities (vs. its own political and strategic agenda). While these figures are somewhat dated, their essence did not change during the remainder of the 1980s. Collectively, Nordic aid to the region, which is often closely coordinated, runs at close to 30% of the DAC total. It is not surprising, then, that Sweden’s aid programme has been a source of significant politico-diplomatic influence in the region.

In addition, Sweden’s aid programmes in Southern Africa (and elsewhere) have been highly regarded in terms of quality. Hans Lembke wrote in 1986 that Sweden’s development cooperation policy "has long since been acknowledged as ideal: altruistic in its motivation, reticent in its conditionality and political influence,
flexibly responsive to needs in terms of form and modalities, and efficient in its procedure. While this assessment could not stand unqualified, Swedish aid policy makers have been consistently and conscientiously concerned with the developmental quality of their programmes. Sweden’s Southern African ODA effort can thus be regarded as niche-playing with a vengeance: clear functional specialization in the development cooperation field, further concentrated and specialized in a single region. Yet Sweden’s Southern African aid efforts have also had their shortcomings and setbacks. These will be returned to below.

Sweden has country programmes in all SADCC states except Malawi and Swaziland (but now including Namibia, where an SEK 80 million programme was launched with independence). In 1985, it had the largest aid disbursements of any donor in Angola and Tanzania; the second largest in Mozambique; and the third largest in Lesotho and Zambia (note that its relative concentration in the ex-Portuguese colonies has persisted). In addition, through the 1980s, it maintained large programmes of assistance to the leading regional liberation movements. In 1986-87, for example, $US 7.5 million was allocated to the ANC and $US 8.5 million to SWAPO out of a regional humanitarian assistance budget totalling $US 29 million.

Furthermore, in conjunction with the other Nordic states, Sweden played a major role in support of SADCC during the 1980s. Even earlier than Canada, Sweden created a distinct SADCC regional frame in SIDA’s 1981-82 budget, and by the end of 1988, it had contributed SEK 1070 million (roughly $US 150 million) to SADCC projects. The Nordic states collectively were by far the largest donors to SADCC itself. This role was not completely selfless, as we shall see. Nevertheless, it was important in establishing SADCC’s credibility, and bringing its "Programme of Action" to life.

Historically, Sweden’s ODA programme content in Southern Africa was shaped by the quite rigid disjunction between aid policy and commercial policy and interests which was maintained up to the mid-1970s. As noted in section 1, the
development of Swedish aid policy was strongly influenced by humanitarian and what Pratt has termed "radical internationalist" (more generally, idealist) groups and ideas. In addition, SIDA, and hence the implementation of aid policy, had (and has) a high degree of autonomy from other governmental and commercial interests. Thus, in terms of the idealist-realist bifurcation of Swedish political culture identified in chapter 4, aid policy was largely the preserve of idealist elements. Bo Sodersten writes that "by the mid-1970s Swedish aid was probably the most liberal and generous of any large donor country. This period has been described by the former head of SIDA, Anders Forsse, as the 'flower-power' period of Swedish foreign assistance". The upshot for country programme content was that emphasis was placed on assistance in the social and rural sectors, as opposed to the more typical donor emphasis at the time on large economic infrastructure projects, of which numerous white elephants were made. This emphasis was maintained in the Southern African programmes of the 1980s. For example, the main sectors of concentration in Sweden's Botswana programme were the provision of sources of safe water in rural villages, education, and (more recently) district development support; in Zimbabwe, major programme sectors included education and health; and in Zambia, areas of emphasis included agriculture, education, and health.

By the latter part of the 1970s, however, the rigid division between aid policy and commercial/economic considerations had begun to erode. Several factors combined to produce this development: the rapid growth of Swedish aid appropriations, which stimulated increasing pressure from commercially-oriented interests to ensure that some of this large pool of capital directly served Swedish economic interests; growing structural economic problems in Sweden starting with the first "oil shocks" of 1973-74, reinforcing this pressure; increasing competition among industrialized/donor states for export markets, leading in particular to the growth of "concessionary credit" schemes; and, not least, pressures from recipient countries to provide assistance to their "productive" and export sectors which were, it was increasingly agreed, crucial to their development prospects. These pressures
contributed to the creation of a small agency to promote imports from developing countries (IMPOD) in 1975; an agency to promote industrial cooperation and joint ventures between Swedish and LDC enterprises (SWEDFUND) in 1978; an agency to promote technical cooperation and transfer of technology (BITS), mainly outside of the main bilateral recipients of Swedish aid, in 1978-79; and a programme of concessionary credits, administered by BITS, in 1981.64

While the evolution of a less purely humanitarian focus in Swedish development cooperation coincided with the advent of a non-socialist government between 1976 and 1982, the pressures which produced it were largely independent of this political shift. The new programmes and agencies were maintained by the Social Democrats after their return to power. In the context of the changing international division of labour, and the structural difficulties for the "Swedish model" to which it gave rise, Swedish ODA evolved to resemble more closely programmes in other European states. The extent of these changes should not be exaggerated, however: by 1985-86, combined appropriations for more "traditional" aid programmes through SIDA and through multilateral aid agencies still exceeded 80% of total Swedish aid expenditures.65

Several more specific initiatives led to a significant expansion of Swedish assistance for industry and economic infrastructure in Southern Africa particularly. In each case, Sweden was clearly responding to the requests and priorities of regional states and organizations, although the initiatives in question also had the potential to generate significant commercial benefits for Swedish interests. From the mid-1970s, Sweden became quite deeply involved in support to Tanzania's industry sector. 20-30% of its extraordinarily large Tanzanian country programme went to this sector; and it was one of the few donor countries to provide significant support to Tanzania’s industry strategy. Of particular longer term significance was the approximately 30% of industry assistance allocated to small-scale industry through an innovative sister industry programme (SIP); otherwise, Swedish assistance to Tanzanian industry largely fell victim to the deep crisis in that country’s industrial sector.66 From 1983,
Sweden also became involved in the rehabilitation of three major state-owned companies in Mozambique, again on a sister-industry basis, with generally positive results.67

However, of greatest significance in the expansion of Sweden’s aid-based involvement in economic infrastructure in the region was its SADCC programme. Responding to SADCC’s own initial priorities, more than 80% of Sweden’s SADCC assistance went to the transport and communications sector, with most of the remainder concentrated in the energy sector. With regard to the former, the bulk of expenditures were on collaborative Nordic efforts to rehabilitate and modernise the transport systems through Mozambique to the port of Beira (the Beira Corridor), and through Zambia and Tanzania to Dar es Salaam (the Tazara system). In addition, the Nordic countries jointly provided a technical assistance unit to the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) in Maputo, beginning in 1979. Thus, while Swedish support to SADCC was not explicitly tied to procurement in Sweden, it is not hard to see that expenditures on SADCC projects provided ample opportunity for commercial benefits to Swedish and other Nordic industrial manufacturers (see Table 2 for a summary of Nordic commitments to SADCC projects).68

What, then, should be concluded concerning the motives and interests underlying Sweden’s extraordinarily large aid commitment to Southern Africa? On balance, it is fair to conclude that these motives and interests were and, despite some "commercialization", remain primarily humanitarian and developmental in nature. This is not the same as saying that the Swedish aid programme was "apolitical", however. Rather, aid expenditures in general, and in Southern Africa in particular, were buttressed by relatively large and politically-potent humanitarian and solidarity lobbies, tapping into the strong idealist value base in Swedish political culture, captured in such popular ideas as equality, justice and solidarity.69 The popularity of these ideas, championed by a wide range of groups within Swedish society, meant that the "aid constituency" supporting consistently large aid expenditures (mobiliized
Table 2 - Nordic Commitments (a) to SADCC, by Projects, 1981-90, Mill USD (b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport + Communication</th>
<th>Food + Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. ass. SATCC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 major roads, Zambia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway depot, Botswana</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buoy vessel, Mozambique</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrification, Airport, Lesotho</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container terminal, Nacala</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. ass., SATCC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container handling equipment, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crane, Tazara</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological networks</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave link, telecomm</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil terminal, Tanzania</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port training institute, Mozambique</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road, Botswana</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. ass., SATCC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, Mozambique</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway telecomm, Botswana</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigational aids, Mozambique</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, Lesotho</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave links</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. telephone switchboard</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazara, rail repairs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazara, wagons</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container handling, Mozambique</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>274</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Sectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical grid, Botswana</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy secretariat, Angola</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum training centre, Angola</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower, Lesotho</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrification, Lesotho</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower, Mozambique</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuelwood, Malawi</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Transmission</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower, Mozambique</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity to Beira</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*a Commitments refer to funds pledged to particular projects.


around the target of 1% of GNP) remained solid throughout the 1980s, apparently with little regard to economic conditions at home. Concerning Southern Africa, support for extensive Swedish development cooperation was underpinned largely by quite widespread anti-colonial, -racist, and -apartheid sentiments, mobilized primarily by solidarity groups such as the Africa Groups and ISAK, supported by a wide range of "popular movements". These influences were reflected in Sweden’s choice of recipients: including liberation movements and large programmes in "Marxist" Angola and Mozambique, for example, but excluding the more conservative regimes, tarred with the brush of political cooperation with Pretoria, in Malawi and Swaziland.

In both the general case of Sweden’s development cooperation programme as a whole, and the more specific case of its aid commitment to Southern Africa, the programmes in question can thus be seen as having bolstered the legitimacy of the Swedish state among substantial segments of Swedish society. These programmes were often interpreted as reflecting the pursuit abroad of Sweden’s core social values -- notably including equality, justice, and solidarity. They supported Swedes’ collective self-image of an active internationalist country responding to clear moral/humanitarian imperatives. As discussed previously, this self-image co-existed with a more pragmatic and "realistic" approach in the areas of economic and security relations, particularly within Europe. The latter approach/self-image (it should be noted) has recently gained ground, given the demise of the Cold War and the rapid evolution of the EC during the 1980s.

In addition, Sweden derived significant international political benefits -- notably a higher international profile and positive international reputation, particularly among African and other ‘Third World’ states -- from its relatively generous regional development assistance policies, along with its broader anti-apartheid credentials. As Ostergaard notes, "Acting in conformance with the near universal condemnation of the apartheid regime naturally gives a favourable boost to the Nordic countries’ reputation in the international community...This has great importance for countries like Denmark (and Sweden) since, in this way, small countries without physical
sources of influence can attain high status and profile on the international scene.\textsuperscript{71}

Finally, to recognize the importance of developmental and humanitarian motives and integrity in Swedish aid to Southern Africa is not to overlook the clear economic benefits which some Swedish interests have derived from it. Most obviously, the country's large aid programmes have provided direct employment to substantial numbers of aid workers employed by the state and by NGOs, as well as numerous consultants.\textsuperscript{72} Further, while only 20\% of bilateral aid is formally tied to purchases of Swedish goods and services, almost 50\% of this aid is in fact spent in Sweden.\textsuperscript{73} Sweden's large trade surplus with SADCC states was largely driven by aid-financed purchases (see Table 1). These and other commercial and economic relationships between Sweden and Southern Africa are the focus of the next subsection.

One further comment should be made concerning Sweden's aid relations with Southern Africa, however. The generally strong developmental focus and integrity of its programmes in the region did not prevent it from being closely linked with some of the more economically crisis-ridden states therein during the 1980s. For example, Sweden was among the largest and longest-standing donor/supporters of Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique -- perhaps the three most disappointing states in the region in terms of the gap between their apparent developmental promise and their actual performance. This is not to suggest that even a major donor like Sweden can be held directly accountable for the contemporary crisis in these countries. Indeed, it is partly indicative of the limited impact development assistance has had in Southern African states, highlighting the relatively greater importance of a variety of other factors: resource endowments, international terms of trade, degree of peace and stability, degree of administrative and political efficiency and integrity, etc. But neither can major donors be absolved of some share of responsibility for the disappointments and failures of development -- certainly not for specific projects which cannot be sustained after donor support is ended, for example. And in the specific case of Tanzania, where the excessive expansion and subsequent extreme
underutilization of industrial capacity during the 1970s and 1980s have been significant elements of the contemporary crisis, Sweden’s share of responsibility, as a strong supporter of Tanzania’s frustrated industrial strategy, is relatively clear and direct.

It is precisely because the developmental integrity of Sweden’s ODA has been relatively strong that these disappointments, and the Swedish response to them, are highly significant. There is no great mystery in explaining the shortcomings of aid projects and programmes which are blatantly self-interested, economically and/or politically. The developmental deficiencies of Swedish aid create more serious questions for, and challenges to, supporters of development assistance generally. SIDA responded to these challenges in the late-1980s as a "functional leader" would be expected to: by undertaking a serious rethink and reorganization of its approach, while maintaining its overall commitment to the idea of development assistance. It had found that, as the economic crisis deepened in Sub-Saharan Africa and the capacity of African public administrations consequently declined, Swedish personnel were increasingly taking over responsibility for the implementation of "their" projects, thus undermining the long-term sustainability of these projects and the self-reliance of recipients. Its response was to introduce the "Changing Roles" initiative in 1989, designed to increase recipient responsibility for their own development. Areas of action, broadly stated, were to include:

- strengthening the institutional capacity of recipient countries for project implementation, post-completion maintenance and, where appropriate, organic growth of aid-funded facilities;
- as part of that process, transfer of responsibility to recipient countries for procurement of goods and services;
- raising the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel, both SIDA’s own staff and consultants, through improved pre-deployment training and redefined job functions.74

Implementation of this initiative will not be rapid: it is expected to span at least a three year period. Nor will it be without problems and disadvantages, including slower project implementation.75 However, it holds out some promise of improving the sustainability and self-reliance of the development process in Southern
African states. It is therefore an interesting and important departure. Indeed, if development assistance is to make an effective contribution to the long-term development prospects of the member-states of SADCC, it will be largely because of the consistent efforts, and experience-driven innovations, of committed donor states, perhaps the most notable example of which is Sweden.

4.2 Commercial/Economic Linkages:

As noted in the previous sub-section, Swedish government agencies such as IMPOD, BITS and SWEDFUND were quite energetic in their use of aid funds to try to foster broader economic and commercial links between Swedish and Southern African interests from the late 1970s on. These agencies were certainly not oblivious to Swedish economic self-interests, but were also responding to SADCC states' requests for assistance in the development of productive enterprises, in penetrating new export markets which could generate much needed foreign exchange, and in securing new technologies. Swedish efforts were thus at least partly influenced by the internationalist ideology of the 1980 Brandt Commission report, North-South: A Programme for Survival, with its emphasis on mutual vulnerability and interdependence; and on the emphasis emanating from UNCTAD and the NIEO agenda on the need for more equitable trade and investment relations between North and South. From the SADCC states' perspective, the Nordic countries as a group were near-ideal Northern partners for expanded economic links, given their limited vested interests in the region, their long-standing and "recipient-friendly" development assistance programmes, their strong anti-apartheid credentials -- in sum, their status as "trusted partners".

Swedish efforts in this regard have had some limited successes. For example, Ostergaard concludes from a variety of evaluations of the sister industry programme (SIP) in Tanzania that it has been, on the whole, "a unique, innovative and effective model for technology and knowledge transfer to the developing countries". Between its inception in 1976 and 1989, it was responsible for the establishment of 32 new small-scale Tanzanian industries, employing 800 workers. However, with total
SIDA expenditures of SEK 150 million during the same period, the programme had cost roughly SEK 120,000 (over $US 18,000) per job; while questions had been raised concerning the appropriateness of the products manufactured by the new industries to Tanzania’s developmental needs. In Zimbabwe, as of 1989, SWEDFUND had succeeded in facilitating three joint ventures which, according to one Swedish official, constituted 75% of the new investments in the country since independence up to that time. However, the fact that this was probably only a slight exaggeration is more indicative of the difficulty of investing in Zimbabwe, as well as the low level of interest in the country among foreign investors, than of any major new Swedish economic presence in this key Southern African state.

Indeed, Swedish efforts through the end of the 1980s had not succeeded in altering the region’s status as a very minor economic partner. As noted in chapter 4, Swedish trade and investment relations with the developing world as a whole are limited and declining. With Southern Africa specifically, Swedish imports from the SADCC region in 1986 amounted to a mere 0.21% of its total imports; while its exports were only slightly larger, at 0.33% of the total. As indicated in Table 1, with few exceptions (Zimbabwe being one), trade links with the region were small and stagnant during the 1984-88 period, with Sweden’s large trade surplus being driven (as previously noted) primarily by aid-financed purchases. From the SADCC perspective, the Nordic market as a whole took 2.7% of the region’s exports, and provided 6% of its imports in 1986. Investment links were comparably minor.

Interestingly, Swedish interests do not seem to have derived significant economic advantages from their country’s support for regional liberation movements once these movements made the transition to government. In the case of Zimbabwe specifically, Swedish companies apparently expected to benefit from Sweden’s support for both ZANU and ZAPU. This support had included Scania trucks which, although officially furnished for humanitarian purposes only, had apparently been used to transport “freedom fighters” and had become known as “terror trucks” among white Rhodesians. However, in the immediate aftermath of independence, there was
considerable continuity within the Zimbabwean bureaucracy and private sector, with many key positions still being held by whites (indeed, this is still the case within the private sector). In consequence, Sweden’s high visibility support to the liberation movements had the ironic effect of producing hostility among key elements of the new country’s bureaucracy in the short term, and thus inhibiting the development of new economic ties — although this disadvantage turned to a slight advantage as the bureaucracy was steadily "Africanized".  

One particularly interesting and ambitious collective Nordic effort to foster "extended cooperation" (i.e., beyond aid to broader economic and cultural ties) with Southern Africa was the "Nordic-SADCC Initiative", launched at the January, 1986 SADCC Consultative Conference. This initiative had its origins in the 1979 proposal of a Norwegian researcher working for UNCTAD, Helge Hveem, for an initiative embodying some aspects of the NIEO among a limited number of developed and developing countries as a means of breaking the stalemate which had immobilized the NIEO negotiations. Since the Nordic states had been among the strongest Western supporters of the NIEO concept and process, this notion of a "mini-NIEO" struck a responsive chord among a number of Nordic politicians and officials, as well as Nordic NGOs. In 1982, the Finnish Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, proposed the establishment of a special arrangement between the Nordic countries and a group of developing nations at a meeting of the Nordic Council of Ministers (although the concept was most frequently described as a mini-NIEO, Ostergaard suggests that Sorsa had in mind a Nordic parallel to the EC’s Lome Convention). Following the report of a Committee of officials in late 1984, evaluating the possibilities for a programme of extended cooperation and recommending SADCC as the developing region partner in such an arrangement, the idea was formally presented to SADCC in early 1985; and after further refinements, the Joint Declaration launching the Initiative was signed in 1986. 

The Initiative envisioned a "comprehensive approach" to development problems, involving cooperation in four main areas: the stimulation of joint
ventures and other forms of Nordic enterprise investment in the productive sector; increasing intra- and inter-regional trade; increasing social and cultural contacts between the two regions; and improving the effectiveness of Nordic development assistance through enhanced coordination. In its first several years, this novel initiative was, not surprisingly, marked by a plethora of feasibility studies, and little concrete action. Nevertheless, Sweden and Norway in particular demonstrated a firm, if small, commitment to the idea by setting aside discrete budgetary allocations for it (SEK 30 million in Sweden’s 1987-88 budget).

Initially, enthusiasm for the Initiative was high, not only among SADCC states and officials and at least some Nordic politicians, but also among Nordic and other academic researchers. However, over time, various problems emerged which tempered this enthusiasm. The difficulties in achieving a consensus among officials of the 14 different governments involved on concrete courses of action proved, predictably enough, formidable. Indeed, even among the "like-minded" Nordics, there were differences of opinion and approach. Furthermore, the notion of extended cooperation in the trade and productive sectors depended on generating enthusiasm within, and securing the cooperation of, the Nordic private sectors. However, government encouragement could not alter the basic reluctance of these sectors to invest in the SADCC region, based on the perceived political instability of several SADCC countries, problems with earnings in soft and non-convertible currencies, and the large financial stakes required to enter the regional market. As Bertil Oden has noted, the irony of the Initiative was that while it aimed to broaden cooperation to non-aid fields, the groups which could actually do this wanted to know, "where’s the aid?".

By the end of the decade, aside from some useful consultancy studies, the concrete output of the "Link" consisted of a $US 32 million NORSAD Fund to promote and facilitate Nordic-SADCC joint ventures which, some two years after its announcement, was due to become operational in 1990; a SADCC economic bulletin, the *Southern African Economist*; and a small fund (something over $US 1 million) to
promote cultural cooperation and exchanges. For SADCC’s part, its initial enthusiasm for the Initiative had largely dissipated. The NORSAD Fund, while not unwelcome, was seen as limited in volume and too much skewed to the promotion of Nordic interests; and the cultural programme was seen as creating pressure on the SADCC Secretariat to move into the coordination of cultural matters, contrary to SADCC’s deliberate decision to focus on economic concerns. In general, there was a feeling that the Nordics had whetted SADCC’s appetite for considerably more than had actually developed -- something which some Swedish officials acknowledged was probably true.91

In sum, it is apparent that while the Initiative was not altogether unhelpful, it failed to meet the high expectations with which it was saddled. There are certain to be many useful lessons from the history of the Nordic-SADCC Initiative, but they will, for the most part, be more negative than positive, highlighting the limitations and obstacles to the extended or comprehensive cooperation envisioned.

More broadly, the relatively strong and sometimes quite imaginative efforts to expand economic contacts between Sweden and the SADCC region through the 1980s, juxtaposed with the stagnant reality of those contacts, serve to highlight the substantial perceptual and structural obstacles to them. This raises the interesting question of whether Sweden’s extraordinary focus on Southern Africa in other areas (notably development assistance and diplomacy) can be sustained, given the absence of compelling economic motives for doing so, the dramatic ongoing developments in Europe and in South Africa, and the current political-economic "crisis" in Sweden itself.92 It is difficult, at some remove from current Swedish thinking, to predict how this question will be answered. However, the length and strength of Sweden’s official commitment to the region, combined with the relative strength of societal links through solidarity groups, NGOs, and ex-cooperants, make it unlikely that there will be a dramatic reduction of interest and involvement in the region. On the other hand, there must almost certainly be some reduction, given the pressing new challenges to stability and prosperity both at home and in Sweden’s immediate
regional neighbourhood. We are thus entering a period in which Sweden’s unusual
degree of foreign policy focus on Southern Africa is likely to be somewhat, though
not dramatically or precipitously, decreased.

5. Security Assistance

Even more strikingly than in the cases of Australia and Canada, given the
vigour of its opposition to colonialism and apartheid in the region, Sweden was deeply
reluctant to become involved in security assistance of any kind. This involved it in
some anomalous policy positions. In particular, as noted above, its early and
extensive support for regional liberation movements -- so crucial to its progressive
image in relation to Southern Africa -- was never extended to include either practical
or rhetorical support for these movements’ armed struggle, which was so central to
their own raisons d’etre. The region’s liberation movements were sufficiently
appreciative of the economic support and concomitant degree of political legitimacy
provided by Swedish assistance that they apparently did not question this anomaly
with Swedish policy makers.

Similarly, one might have expected that, when the issue of security assistance
to the Frontline States in general, and Mozambique in particular, became prominent
internationally during 1986 and 1987, Sweden would have responded favourably given
its long-standing ties with Frelimo and close understanding of the situation in
Mozambique. In fact, however, according to one quite senior SIDA official, the
government never really accepted the idea of providing this type of assistance,
deciding that it could not (or did not want to?) handle politically the predictable
conservative attacks on Swedish aid being used "for military purposes". 93
Ultimately, in March 1988, the government did decide to take "extraordinary bilateral
measures of a non-military character to strengthen the security around the projects in
Mocambique where Swedish development assistance is involved". 94 Like Canada,
this amounted to a small budgetary allocation for such items as radio equipment, but
no support for military or para-military forces. Indeed, Sweden was not even
prepared to go as far as the limited military training assistance provided by the Canadian government.95

Also in common with Australia and Canada, the one exception Sweden was prepared to make to its general resistance to involvement in the security affairs of the region was its willingness to contribute to UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. Thus, it was willing and eager to contribute military forces to the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia -- a "prestige" operation in UN peacekeeping terms. In this case, it paid a price, of sorts, for the persistence and profile of its anti-apartheid policies, when the South African government rejected the planned participation of more than 500 Swedish troops in UNTAG -- although Pretoria subsequently agreed to allow some 75 Swedish police to participate in the Namibian transition.96

Thus, among the small sample of Western middle powers treated in this thesis, there was a common lacuna in the important area of security assistance -- a shared squeamishness in confronting the possibility of supporting "out of area" causes with direct or indirect military means, no matter how compelling they might be. As noted earlier in this thesis, this was different from the stance adopted by such once and present great- and super-powers as the US, France and, in particular, Britain. This point of distinction will be revisited in the concluding chapter.

6. Explanation and Analysis

It would be a mistake to minimize the real differences between the Southern African policies of Sweden on the one hand, and Australia and Canada on the other. The combination of the former's neutral status in international politico-strategic affairs, and a domestic political culture marked by the relative strength of reformist and indeed more radical groups and ideas, captured in the persistent theme of solidarity with the poor and oppressed of other countries, produced Southern African policies over the past two-and-a-half decades noteworthy for their "progressiveness". Yet Swedish policies, and in particular the manner in which its "progressive" political
connections were utilized, also manifested internationalist behavioural characteristics typical of Western middle powers as a group. Several examples, drawn from the preceding analysis, serve to illustrate this point.

From its introduction of a ban on new investments in 1979, Sweden maintained one of the most "advanced" sanctions policies of any Western state. The only countries with comparable policies were the other Nordics. Yet despite the strength of anti-apartheid opinion, the range of groups advocating sanctions, and the very minor adjustments which economic sanctions involved for the Swedish economy, the decision to impose a trade ban in 1987 was a very hard fought and difficult one. This underscores the persistent strength of the foreign policy principle that sanctions should only be imposed on the basis of a mandatory Security Council decision and, behind this, the strength of the view among many Swedish decision-makers that the country's best interests lay in strict adherence to, and defence of, GATT rules and norms. In this regard, the Swedish government's approach was very "middle power-ish". When full trade sanctions were finally decided upon, the decision was made in the context of multilateral Nordic action. Further, the Nordic trade ban was fashioned in the context of a rapidly evolving international normative climate. By the mid-1980s, some limited economic and other sanctions had been agreed to, however reluctantly, by all major Western states and groups. Thus, Sweden's 1987 sanctions departure merely kept it one step ahead of the shifting Western mean, attempting to lead by example. This, too, was quite consistent with much of post-war middle power behaviour.

Second, Sweden's progressive policies enabled it to establish close politico-diplomatic ties with Frontline States of all ideological (but particularly more left-wing) stripes, and with the region's major liberation movements. During the 1980s, however, it periodically used its influence with these parties in an effort to facilitate international negotiations, and restore international relationships of various types. Thus, it used its good offices with SWAPO to encourage its acceptance of, and participation in, the UN-supervised transition process; and it took a sophisticated,
conciliatory approach to facilitating reconciliations between Tanzania and Zambia, on the one hand, and the IMF and World Bank, on the other. This ‘bridge-building’ was quintessential "middlepowermanship".

Third, the extraordinary size and relative developmental integrity of Sweden’s development assistance programmes in Southern Africa were clearly underpinned by the strength of "humane internationalist" ideas in its political culture, and the related vigour of the aid lobby, solidarity organizations and other popular movements concerned with the region. Yet it also illustrated, in extreme form, the propensity towards both functional and regional specialization, or "niche-playing", which has been noted as a middle power behavioural characteristic elsewhere in this thesis. Sweden’s extraordinary degree of ODA concentration in Southern Africa can be interpreted as reflecting its objective standing as a relatively small middle power, which would logically incline decision-makers towards even greater specialization in a small range of relatively high profile areas. It should also be noted that Swedish decision-makers were not oblivious to the effects of its development assistance policies, as well as its Southern African policy as a whole, on its overall international reputation, notably within the UN and among Third World states and organizations. As suggested previously, Western middle powers were characteristically sensitive to the broad international political benefits to be derived from a reputation for "enlightened" or "constructive" internationalism, or "good international citizenship". Such a reputation also helped to reinforce the legitimacy of such states within their own societies.

Finally, fourth, it should be noted that, as with Australia and Canada, the development of Sweden’s relatively progressive Southern African policy was possible in large part precisely because the region was at some remove from its own more immediate and compelling economic and strategic concerns. This observation, too, underscores a middle power propensity towards niche-playing, or "picking one’s spots". And while such activism in issue areas of little immediate self-interest is liable to prompt feelings of ennui, or even intense irritation, among some major
power policy makers, it may nevertheless (or indeed in consequence) have some considerable impact on the issue area in question.

This leads directly to the question of the impact Swedish policies towards Southern Africa did have during the period under review in promoting pressure for change in South Africa, and in promoting economic and political development in the region beyond. As asserted at the outset of this chapter, and illustrated in the analysis which followed, the impact of these policies was not as significant, or as unambiguously positive, as many elsewhere in the West -- notably in the anti-apartheid movement -- were wont to assume. In development cooperation, for example, and in the attempt to stimulate equitable "extended cooperation" through the Nordic-SADCC Initiative, Sweden was party to the setbacks and frustrations experienced within the region. And on sanctions, Sweden's attempt to stimulate stronger Western action through the "power" of its example was not particularly successful.

However, the fact that, despite disappointments and setbacks, successive Swedish governments have remained committed to a high level of development assistance in Southern Africa, and have continued to actively engage in efforts to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of this assistance, is important, not only for states in the region, but indeed for the future evolution of ODA policies elsewhere as well. More specifically, Swedish/Nordic political and economic support of SADCC was of real importance in giving its Programme of Action some momentum, and in establishing its credibility as an important regional actor. Sweden's diplomatic role in ensuring SWAPO's participation in the UN transition process is difficult to confirm or assess, but may have been of considerable significance. And while Sweden's sanctions example was not as influential as the Swedes themselves hoped it would be, it (with the actions of other Nordic states) stood on the horizon as a living symbol of the threat of further sanctions, and had some impact as a moral and political lever for anti-apartheid movements and analysts elsewhere (including Canada\(^98\)). In short, for a northern European country of 8.4 million with no colonial
history and few significant economic connections in Southern Africa, Sweden did indeed have a disproportionate impact.

NOTES


2. Sellstrom, 18-19, and note #88.

3. Major Swedish companies established in South Africa, with year of establishment, were:

- SKF: 1914
- Alfa Laval: 1920
- Electrolux: 1926
- Transatlantic: 1927
- ASEA: 1946
- Atlas Copco: 1946
- Sandvik: 1948
- Fagerström: 1948
- Secoroc: 1948

Cited in Sellstrom, note #67.


5. Interview with Bo Huldt, Director, Scandinavian Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 25 August 1989.

7. In interviews in Sweden, the relatively strong and clear-cut tradition of anti-racism in Swedish society was among the more frequently cited motives for its active opposition to apartheid. However, some of those interviewed noted that this value was easy to sustain in racially homogenous Sweden, but that some strains were emerging in this area with the increasing presence of Southern European immigrants, in particular.


9. Several factors contributed to the relative isolation of Swedish Third World policies from business influence, including: the relatively distant relationship between the labour-allied Social Democrats and the Swedish private sector; the government's 'Economic Darwinist' philosophy concerning the relationship between Swedish business and the world market, captured in the phrase that Swedish industries were expected to "swim in cold water"; the fact that Sweden's commercial links with most developing regions were minimal; and the fact that the Swedish economy, and its major corporations, were very prosperous during this period, and had no need of direct government stimulation. See Christian Andersson, "Breaking Through", in Pierre Fruhling, ed., Swedish Development Aid in Perspective (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1986), 36-38; and L. Adele Jinadu, "The Political Economy of Sweden's Development Policy in Africa", Conflict and Cooperation 19 (3), 1984, 180.

10. Appavoo, 138. See also Sellstrom, 28-29.

11. Indeed, Palme often seemed more interested in, and adept at, foreign policy than domestic policy. It has been suggested that this is a point of contrast with his successor, Ingvar Carlsson -- for example, by Supad Kumar Ghose, "Individual Leadership and Swedish Foreign Policy in the Post-Palme Period", unpublished paper written as a part of the seminar on Scandinavia in World Affairs.


14. After 1978, the Africa Groups created an organization for recruiting Swedish solidarity workers, mainly for Mozambique, but also for Angola, ANC and SWAPO settlements, and Zimbabwe. This organization was funded primarily from the Swedish aid budget. See Sellstrom, 27 and note 85.

15. Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prohibition of Investments in South Africa and Namibia and other measures against Apartheid", an unofficial translation
of the Swedish Government's new bill on prohibition of investments in South Africa and Namibia, Stockholm, Feb. 1985, 31-32. In the field of academic research on Southern Africa, as well, Nordic states have a well-established tradition of formal and informal cooperation, including the jointly-financed Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala.


17. The explanation for the adoption of the 1979 measures which follows is drawn mainly from the author's interview with Dr. Ake Magnusson of the International Council of Swedish Industry. Prior to his employment with the Council, Dr. Magnusson wrote a study of Swedish-South African relations, and was secretary to the Parliamentary Committee which investigated the possibility of adopting unilateral sanctions in 1977.

18. Made up of the Liberal party, the Centre (agrarian or rural) party, and the Moderate (conservative) party.

19. For example, Olof Palme, in the last speech he delivered prior to being assassinated, to the "Swedish People's Parliament against Apartheid" in February 1986, asserted that:
"One of the reasons why we very carefully make sure our measures are within the framework of international treaties is that it is then far more probable that other countries will follow our example. This was the case as regards the ban on investments. Likewise, the interest in the Swedish ban on imports of agricultural products from South Africa has been very substantial".


23. Exceptions in the sanctions legislation were made for publications and news matter, and for "articles intended for humanitarian or medical purposes". Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, "Prohibition of Trade with South Africa and Namibia", Stockholm, March 1987, 37-38. In addition, the boycott did not apply to (the very limited) trade in services.

24. Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1 Sept. 1989; and International Council of Swedish Industry, Swedish Business and
South Africa (Stockholm: 1983).

25. ISAK does not have individual members. Its organizational membership is interesting to the non-Swedish observer because of its very broad base. In addition to predictable members such as church organizations, the Africa Groups, and the Swedish-Tanzania Friendship Association, it includes such groups as the Swedish Nurses Association, the Swedish National Association of Youth Clubs and Neighbourhood Centres, Friends of the Earth, etc. Interview with Lotta Johnnson, International Secretary, ISAK, Stockholm, 25 Aug. 1989; and untitled ISAK publicity brochure.


27. Interview, Stockholm, 25 August 1989. Huldt noted that this concern over "being cut into two pieces" has been present within the SAP since World War II, since the party has always embodied a tension between "extreme left" and "bourgeois" tendencies.


30. "Prohibition of Trade with South Africa and Namibia", 27.

31. "Swedish technology and apartheid", 6. The various ways in which Swedish corporations with significant trade and investment in South Africa were able to maintain their connections by shifts in production, new ownership arrangements, etc. are the subject of an ISAK "expose", Adolfsson's "Staying on at any cost".

32. "Prohibition of Trade with South Africa and Namibia", 31-32.

33. An exception was Dr. Magnusson of the International Council of Swedish Industry, who argued that, from Swedish companies' point-of-view, the effects of Sweden's sanctions policies were "disastrous". While this is certainly an exaggeration, there were doubtless costs in foregone investment and trade discouraged, if not altogether prevented, by the boycott. Thus, Swedish sanctions likely involved some fairly marginal sacrifices in corporate profitability. Another cost, impossible to capture statistically, was the domestic "image cost" to Swedish companies of continuing to operate in South Africa. Interview, 1 Sept. 1989.

34. Sellstrom, 4.


37. For example, a Canadian diplomat interviewed in February 1990 reported that a "round robin" had just been completed with the Nordic countries to ascertain their policies on support to the ANC.

38. Note, for example, Australia's relatively successful role in organizing the Cairns Group in the international agricultural trade negotiations of the GATT. Australia's approach clearly involved both quiet coalition building, and high-profile symbolic example setting. See Richard Higgott and Andrew Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round", *International Organization* 44, Autumn 1990.


41. Bo Huldø argued that the issue of whether or not to maintain diplomatic links with governments of which Sweden strongly disapproved was settled during the period in which Greece was governed by a repressive military junta between 1967 and 1969. The consensus which emerged at the time, and which was applicable to the case of South Africa, was that "the more problematic your relations are, the more you need diplomatic relations". Interview, 25 Aug. 1989.

42. The main difference was that the cycle of negotiations was one year for liberation movements, and two years for country programmes. Interview with Swedish diplomat, Stockholm, 28 Aug. 1989.

43. Many of the SIDA and Foreign Ministry officials interviewed for this thesis had at one stage or another been responsible for liaising with a liberation movement, whether in Luanda (SWAPO and the ANC), Lusaka (the ANC), Dar es Salaam (Frelimo), etc. Their personal friendships with liberation movement opposite numbers were transparent, and naturally persisted when these colleagues became members of post-liberation governments. There are clearly both advantages and
hazards in such a situation, since personal friendships may inhibit clear-eyed assessments of the problems and weaknesses of recipient governments.

44. Including the governments of South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, with American mediation and active Soviet participation.

45. As it was, a misunderstanding and/or miscalculation on SWAPO's part led to a large-scale movement of SWAPO fighters into Namibia in contravention of the Accords at the start of the transition process on April 1st, 1989. This was followed by a slaughter of hundreds of these fighters by South African security forces and the near-collapse of the Resolution 435 transition process.


50. For a good statement of Sweden's qualified and skeptical endorsement of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment, see Development Assistance via SIDA 1990-91 (Stockholm: SIDA, 1989), 4-6.

51. Interview, Lusaka, 7 Dec. 1989. See also Elgstrom, who focuses particularly on Swedish support to the Tanzanian industry sector -- the main casualty of the changes. He notes that "People in the (SIDA) industry division had warm and intense feelings for 'their' project proposals, and also closely experienced the disappointed reactions among their Tanzanian counterparts" (19).


54. Sellstrom, 6; and Tom Ostergaard, "Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance: An Analysis of Nordic Aid to the SADCC Region", in Oden and Othman, eds., 136-137.

55. Excluding Iceland.


60. See Appavoo, 280-302.


62. That is, export financing schemes which combine credit borrowed by official agencies on international capital markets with aid funds. In Sweden, the grant element of these mixed or concessionary credit arrangements averaged 25%.

63. See, for example, Karre and Svensson, 239-250; and Sodersten, 175-187.

64. See Sodersten, 185-87; and SIDA, *Sweden and Development Cooperation* (Stockholm: SIDA Information Division, 1986), 12-15.

65. See Karre and Svensson, 241.


69. See Jinadu, 178.

70. See Sodersten, 188-189; and Karre and Svensson, 258-262 and 269-271. Interviews in Sweden in the fall of 1989 with several bureaucrats, an industrialist, a scholar, and a politician revealed a general consensus on the unlikelihood of any
reduction in relative aid expenditures, given the extent of popular support for the aid programme. Through 1991, the extended economic and political "crisis" in Sweden had not yet shaken the solidity of this aid constituency.

71. Ostergaard, "Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance", 142-143. It should be noted that, by creating large programmes of development assistance, the Nordic states have in fact been able to create "physical sources of influence".

72. Elgstrom estimates (p. 10) that SIDA-Stockholm provides 390 "man years" of employment, while Development Cooperation Offices (DCOs) in the field employ a further 100. An additional 250 "man years" are accounted for by SIDA-employed people on contracts at development aid projects. Over SEK 1 billion of the aid budget was allocated to popular movements and NGOs in 1987-88 (Development Assistance via SIDA 1990-91, 46). These groups' share of total aid allocations had reached 7.2% by 1985-86 (Karre and Svensson, 241). In addition, aid expenditures account for employment at SWEDFUND, BITS, SAREC (the Swedish agency for research cooperation with developing countries), the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, etc.

73. Karre and Svensson, 245.

74. "Changing Roles: SIDA's revolution", Development Journal 2, 1990, 9. The "Changing Roles" concept, it should be added, is compatible with, and no doubt influenced by, the emphasis on "African capacity building" championed by the World Bank, as well as Canada's CIDA (through its focus on human resource development).

75. Arne Strom, "Tanzania: Field office voices doubt", Development Journal 2, 16.


77. Ostergaard, "Nordic Aid to Industrial Development...", 14.

78. Interview, Harare, 7 Nov. 1989. The three joint ventures were: Nitro-Nobel Zimbabwe, producing civil explosives for use in mining; Optima-Zimbabwe, producing pressure stoves; and a company in Matabeleland producing hand tools.


84. Hveem, "If not Global, the (Inter-)Regional...", 11.

85. For fairly complete listings of the ideas and studies generated, see Ostergaard, "Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance", 161-162; and Haarlov, 78-80.


87. In addition to the articles cited above, see also Kimmo Kiljunen, "Nordic-SADCC Cooperation", Cooperation and Conflict 22 (3), 1987; and Reginald Herbold Green, "NIEO, NIED, North-South Relations and Like Minded Groups: With Special Reference to Nordic/SADCC Initiative", paper prepared for the Symposium on Selective Preferential Arrangements Between Developed and Developing Countries (Mini-NIEO), Helsinki, 28-30 Nov. 1986.

88. These differences existed at the inter-state, inter-agency, and inter-official level. With regard to the former, Ostergaard puts it thus: "Said in a crude manner: Denmark and Sweden sometimes have different opinions, Norway is somewhere in between these two, and Finland usually does not disagree with Sweden". "Aiming Beyond Conventional Development Assistance", 167.


95. In the 1960s, when Canada agreed to Julius Nyerere's request for military assistance to Tanzania, it did so after Nyerere had already been turned down by Sweden. See Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa", in Lyon and Ismael, eds., Canada and the Third World, 110.

96. Interview with Swedish diplomat, Windhoek, 19 Oct. 1989. As this diplomat pointed out, the South African position was inconsistent, insofar as it did agree to the participation of Danish and Finnish troops in UNTAG, despite the fact that their governments pursued very similar South African policies in the context of the Nordic Programme of Action. Ironically, this apparent inconsistency may be interpreted as a public relations success for Sweden, as it seems to indicate that it had obtained an international reputation as the most "progressive" of all Western states in the fight against apartheid.

97. See, for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Statement on international development co-operation policy by the Minister, Mrs. Lena Hjelm-Wallen", Stockholm, 1988, 10.

98. In a presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies at Carleton University in May 1989, for example, Linda Freeman argued in a critique of Canadian policy towards South Africa that Canada should be measuring its performance against that of the Scandinavian countries as opposed to the UK, as Canadian officials were inclined to do. As a number of members of DEA's Southern Africa Task Force were present at this session, it may be presumed that this use of the Swedish example was not without some impact.
Chapter 9
Conclusions

For each of Australia, Canada and Sweden, Southern African issues were a significant -- sometimes major -- foreign policy priority during the 1980s. Given the geographic remoteness of the region from each of these three countries, and the minor nature of their direct economic and strategic interests therein, several dominant international theoretical approaches of the post-war era -- notably various realist approaches, and "radical" political economy formulations particularly of the dependency type -- have difficulty accounting for these cases. Yet, the fact that such international activism was common to several similar states (including, but not limited to, those analyzed here) suggests that this behaviour cannot be dismissed as merely idiosyncratic or aberrant. At the core of this thesis has been the argument that these cases can be usefully accounted for largely within a proper understanding of the attributes, interests, and behavioural characteristics of (Western) "middle powers" and "middle power internationalism".

This chapter draws together analytical and theoretical conclusions from the preceding chapters. It proceeds in three parts: a comparative summing up of the empirical analysis contained in the case studies of Australian, Canadian and Swedish policies toward Southern Africa; some broader theoretical and analytical implications concerning the foreign policies of Western middle powers; and some concluding thoughts on the future prospects for the international relations of states of this type, specifically in relation to the resurgent North-South agenda.

Summing Up: Australian, Canadian and Swedish policies towards Southern Africa during the 1980s

1. Sanctions against South Africa:

Within each of Australia, Canada and Sweden, the demand for substantial economic and other sanctions against South Africa was a long-standing one, having
been made with increasing vigour by various external and internal groups since the early 1960s. Sanctions advocates had included the UN General Assembly, various African and 'Third World' international organizations, Southern African liberation movements, a range of NGOs and solidarity groups, liberal church organizations, etc. Yet in each case, these demands had long been rejected, for similar reasons. These had included the overriding interest of small/medium-sized, trade-dependent nations in operating within, and thus reinforcing, the norms and rules of the liberal trade regime embodied in the GATT; and the proposition that, without the participation of South Africa's major trading partners through mandatory UN Security Council action, individual middle power sanctions against South Africa would be futile, and quite possibly counter-productive. This reasoning was shared by most foreign and economic policy-makers in Australia, Canada and Sweden, and dominant economic interests or social forces therein.

By the mid-1980s, however, Australia, Canada and Sweden had all become vigorous sanctions advocates. Australia and Canada had taken leading positions among Western states by championing and implementing partial Commonwealth sanctions; Sweden (with the other Nordic states) had gone even further, implementing a near-total trade embargo by mid-1987. In each case, these policy shifts must be situated within the changing international normative context surrounding the South African issue. This normative context was in turn linked to the increasing tempo of popular pressure for change within South Africa, and violence generated by the confrontation between "popular forces" and the repressive apparatus of the state. Piece by piece, sanctions precedents had been established, the "uniqueness" of the South African situation had come to be accepted, and pressure for additional, stronger action had grown. Thus, by the middle of the decade, with the most sustained insurrection yet rocking South Africa, and Pretoria fomenting disruption and violence in neighbouring states, middle powers such as Australia, Canada and Sweden were in a position where the maintenance of their reputations as relatively "enlightened" and
"progressive" Western countries virtually necessitated the acceptance of new, stronger sanctions. It was largely on the strength of these reputations, in turn, that they had in the past sometimes been able to ameliorate or inhibit growing international conflict situations.

Thus, the typical justification offered by these states for sanctions -- that they offered the last best hope for securing a "peaceful" transition in South Africa -- while smacking of motherhood, was not mere idle rhetoric. These middle powers had, as suggested in chapters 2 and 3, arrived at the judgement that their own long-term interests -- both economic and strategic -- lay in preventing international conflicts from escalating into wider confrontations, and in focusing on international organizations as the means to resolve or at least control such conflicts, particularly when they threatened to become more generalized. These peacekeeping/peacemaking interests and propensities had in turn become an important part of their respective dominant self-images, and a significant source of state legitimacy among their "political classes". In Australia and Canada, there was a related "enlightened capitalist" or partisan Western cast to their Southern African policies during the mid-1980s. At least some key policy-makers in these countries felt that they could perhaps see better than the major Western powers themselves that the long-term interests of the West depended upon acting quickly and decisively to support democratic change in the RSA, and thus pre-empting growing revolutionary and anti-Western pressures and forces.

The Swedish case was distinctive, in that without Western alliance linkages and "peer pressure", and with more broadly-based and consistent domestic pressure for strong anti-apartheid action, the state was both able and inclined to go further in the sanctions measures it eventually adopted than virtually any other Western state. Swedish policy-makers hoped that in so doing, they (and their Nordic collaborators) would set an example which would stimulate stronger measures by major Western powers and hence the UN Security Council. Yet the underlying rationale for this
"advanced" position on sanctions -- that it was both morally necessary, and held out
the best hope of pre-empting further violence and instability in Southern Africa -- was
fundamentally similar to that offered by Australian and Canadian policy-makers.

In none of these cases did sanctions involve truly significant economic costs or
adjustments. Herein, of course, lies a major part of the explanation for their
willingness to adopt more aggressive sanctions policies than some major Western
powers -- notably Britain and, to a lesser degree, West Germany. It has been argued
in this thesis that no Western sanctioner was prepared to risk significant, concentrated
and thus politically-potent employment losses in pursuit of change in South Africa.
This cannot be seen as the whole story of why these states supported sanctions and
many larger Western powers did not, however, since sanctions "foot-draggers" in the
EC and Japan could certainly have adopted some additional partial sanctions (on coal,
for example) which would have had minor domestic impacts, but considerable effect
in South Africa.

The limited economic interests of Western middle powers in the region made
their tendency towards a degree of moralizing on South and Southern Africa
somewhat galling to larger Western states. Nevertheless, their sanctions policies were
of some real significance in contributing towards growing international pressure for
change in South Africa. Their significance was not so much economic as it was
symbolic, political, and psychological. Australia’s, and to a lesser extent Canada’s,
close historic and societal connections with ‘white’ South Africa gave their sanctions
policies a degree of psychological potency among South African whites, the
importance of which was under-emphasized given the general emphasis on economic
forms and effects of sanctions. Canada, and to a lesser extent Australia, used its
Commonwealth connections to good effect to advance the (limited) sanctions
momentum of the mid-1980s, and to help keep the threat of further sanctions pressure
alive and credible through the latter part of the decade. Sweden’s periodic
"breakthroughs" on sanctions set helpful (if less influential than the Swedes had
hoped) precedents; while the Swedish example was used to some effect by anti-
apartheid activists in other Western countries. Thus, while the importance of these middle-sized states' sanctions policies should not be exaggerated, and while they certainly generated some resentment among states with larger stakes in the RSA, their impact cannot be dismissed.

2. Diplomacy:

Diplomacy has traditionally been viewed as an area of middle power emphasis and comparative advantage. This has been largely a matter of necessity rather than choice: in the absence, for the most part, of decisive "structural power", such states have had a strong incentive to develop sophisticated diplomatic (or persuasive) skills. Thus, it is not surprising that much of the focus of the Southern African activism of Australia, Canada and Sweden during the 1980s was on diplomatic efforts and initiatives. Furthermore, their focus on Southern Africa in each case illustrated a general characteristic of much middle power diplomacy -- that is, a propensity towards concentration on specialized issue-areas, or "niche-playing". This, too, is more a matter of necessity than choice, but can be turned to image-making advantage (as will be discussed below).

Each of the case study states either had, or developed, certain specific diplomatic comparative advantages which were brought to bear in this issue area. Despite its historically-strong affinity with South Africa, Australia had the weakest links in the region itself, and limited longer-term interest in expanding those links, given its own structural crisis-driven preoccupation with the Asia-Pacific region. Yet, for both domestic and international political reasons discussed in chapter 6, the Australian government did not feel able to stand aside from vigorous diplomatic involvement in Southern African issues during this period. Focusing its efforts within the Commonwealth, the Hawke government sensibly concentrated its limited, but relatively sophisticated, resources on a couple of high profile initiatives with significant potential for international "knock-on" effects -- and for raising Australia's anti-apartheid profile. Its advocacy of the Eminent Persons Group idea (and subsequent nomination of Malcolm Fraser to it), and its work on the financial
sanctions issue within the CFMSA did not yield the results which were ideally hoped for, but were imaginative initiatives which enjoyed a substantial international profile. They also succeeded in raising Australia’s profile in this issue area.

Canada’s Southern Africa diplomacy had a higher profile than the other two case study states primarily because of its weighty diplomatic connections -- in particular, its status as a member of the "Summit Seven", as well as its relatively close relations with the US. However, as discussed in chapter 7, Canada’s standing as the smallest of the G-7 states meant that it had a limited amount of political capital and capacity for influence among its Summit "partners". The result was that expectations among some Southern African states in particular regarding Canada’s ability to sway the major Western powers on this issue were inflated (a condition, it should be noted, which Prime Minister Mulroney had himself encouraged with his threat to sever relations ‘absolutely’ at the UN General Assembly in 1985). Thus, when Mulroney failed to persuade the other Summit leaders to take stronger action on sanctions, and when the Canadian government’s own actions fell short of the expectations created in 1985, a degree of disenchantment set in among some Southern African states and groups (as well as domestic anti-apartheid activists) concerning Canada’s role.

Nevertheless, insofar as the Commonwealth played a credible and useful role in promoting international pressure for change in South Africa, and in linking the South African issue to support for the Frontline States, Canada’s contribution to this effort was crucial. Indeed, Mulroney’s willingness to confront Margaret Thatcher over this issue and support the rest of the Commonwealth’s common front not only enhanced his own anti-apartheid credentials, but was probably important to the continued viability of the organization. And Joe Clark’s role as chair of the CFMSA, while unspectacular and periodically subject to public embarrassment, was dogged and sincere, helping to maintain a similarly unspectacular, but useful Commonwealth focus on the need and opportunities for promoting international pressure on South Africa.
Sweden, lacking the same range of international organizational connections (a function, in part, of deliberate post-war foreign policy choices), concentrated its diplomatic efforts on the largely symbolic role of example-setting. Its efforts in this regard were coordinated with the other Nordic states, and were focused largely within the United Nations. This example-setting function was not very effective in a direct sense, but was of some importance (as suggested above) in the less direct functions of setting precedents which made subsequent initiatives by other Western states somewhat easier, and in increasing the leverage of anti-apartheid coalitions in these states. 

Where Sweden had developed a diplomatic comparative advantage was in its relations with Southern African states and liberation movements. During the 1980s, it used its influence in this regard for purposes of "bridge-building" -- a classic middle power function. Chapter 8 deals with instances of this bridge-building activity in two substantially different contexts: reconciling SWAPO to the UN transition plan for Namibian independence, worked out without its participation by the US, Angola, Cuba and South Africa; and facilitating agreements between Tanzania and Zambia, on the one hand, and the IMF and World Bank on the other. With regard to the latter, Sweden's role must surely be a source of distress from a "radical internationalist" perspective. Insofar as these organizations are viewed as representing "the global account of (an inherently oppressive) imperialism"\(^3\), any "compromise" with them will be viewed as detrimental to the development prospects of the states in question. However, from the more pragmatic perspective of being willing to "compromise with...irresistible forces of history"\(^4\), and then working for reform from within, the Swedish approach may be viewed as classic "middlepowermanship", and indeed potentially as a more sophisticated and effective approach to enhancing Southern African states' development prospects.

In sum, the Southern African diplomatic activities of Australia, Canada and Sweden during the 1980s did not produce any spectacular breakthroughs or advances. However, they contributed, in a number of small but significant ways, to advancing
pressure for change in South Africa, and to enhancing the longer-term development and security prospects of Southern African countries. They were also useful, on balance, to the international and domestic images of these three states as "progressive" and "enlightened" international actors or, in Gareth Evans' terms, "good international citizens".

3. The Developmental Dimension:

There are two aspects to this policy dimension, as conceived in this thesis: development assistance and commercial relations (trade, investment, technology transfer, etc.). Development assistance was an area of relative strength in the Southern African policies of Sweden and, to a more limited extent, Canada -- along with a number of other "like-minded" small and middle-sized European states. In contrast, it was, by the mid-1980s especially, an area of weakness in Australian policy towards the region. In response to its weakening structural position within the international economy, Australia dramatically reduced its ODA expenditures during this period and increasingly concentrated them in its Asia-Pacific "neighbourhood", virtually dealing itself out of the "aid game" in Southern Africa. Subsequently, in response to the rising political salience of the region in its foreign policy, the Australian government substantially increased the size of its aid programme there. It remained a relatively minor player, however, while its programme had a definite look of impermanence about it. The trajectory of the Australian aid programme in Southern Africa is relevant to the other two cases examined in this thesis, since they, too, face deepening structural challenges, and increasing incentives to focus their aid resources closer to home (Sweden in Eastern Europe, and Canada in its new OAS partners). Thus, there is certain to be some pressure to reduce the aid commitments of both to Southern Africa, even as the region faces critical new challenges in the post-apartheid era.

Nevertheless, during the 1980s, both Sweden's and Canada's aid commitments in the region were relatively solid and well-regarded. In particular, both played an important role in lending credibility to SADCC's programme and approach, setting
aside discrete and significant resource allocations for the organization in its early years. Canada's CIDA took some significant steps during this period towards a more responsive and developmentally-effective aid presence in the region. These advances have now been undermined, however, by two rounds of cuts to aid expenditures, and a concomitant excessive preoccupation with supporting IMF/World Bank SAPs. The political credit and influence the Canadian government obtained in Southern Africa during the 1980s, substantially on the basis of its relatively strong, consistent, and responsive aid programme, suggest that it would be a mistake to give up its comparative advantage (relative to the largest Western powers) in this area, as the government now appears to be doing.

Sweden's extraordinarily large aid commitment in Southern Africa was, as discussed in chapter 8 and alluded to above, a source of significant politico-diplomatic influence within the region. The large volume and relatively high degree of developmental integrity (or quality) of its regional aid programme did not shield it from setbacks and disappointments, however, as its largest recipients sunk into deep economic crises. However, its response to these disappointments -- the re-conceptualization and re-organization of its aid programme embodied in the "Changing Roles" initiative -- is that of a functional leader, committed to working out more effective modes of development assistance which may (should they be learned from and emulated) constitute an important example to other donor states.

As with the other two case study states, there will be some decline in the volume of Sweden's ODA programmes in the region, as it deals with its own political-economic crisis and re-focuses on the rapidly changing (and hence less stable) European context. However, given the historic depth and breadth of its aid involvement in Southern Africa, and the concomitant degree of societal interest in, and connections with, the region, such changes are unlikely to be dramatic or precipitous.

In chapter 7, the question of whether the development assistance policies of Western middle powers were qualitatively different from those of major Western
powers was posed. Recent trends in the ODA policies of Australia and Canada in particular indicate that the differences are more a matter of degree than of type, and that any such differences are probably declining. However, the research undertaken for this thesis also suggests that during the 1980s at least, there was a tendency for middle power ODA policies to be relatively more responsive to the priorities of Southern African recipients (i.e., for the relationship to be based on a relatively more equitable process of dialogue). Such a finding should not be considered surprising. Middle-sized states are for the most part unable, and are therefore less inclined, to try to impose their views on other governments; and are likely, consequently, to be more inclined towards the use of persuasion as a general mode of foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, there has been at least some appreciation among the governments of "like-minded" middle powers that a relatively generous and responsive aid programme can be a way of distinguishing themselves, both at home and abroad, from most larger powers, and can be a way of enhancing their reputations and (indirectly) their influence in certain international fora. Whether such differences in approaches to aid policy will be maintained in the future, in light of changing global structural conditions and related domestic crises, is taken up in the third section of this conclusion.

The second aspect of the developmental dimension of policy addressed in this thesis was the effort to promote more extensive commercial relations between the case study states and their SADCC counterparts. This focus was based on the broadly internationalist assumption that the long-term development prospects of Southern African states could be significantly enhanced through new North-South joint ventures, technology transfers, trade opportunities, etc. However, the real possibility, privileged by radical theories particularly of the dependency genre, that such linkages can also be exploitative and, indeed, detrimental to the long-term development interests of Southern states was also recognized. The key to determining the actual effects (positive or negative) of North-South commercial exchanges lies in the specific terms and conditions upon which they are made; no uniform generalizations regarding
the overall effects of such linkages are ultimately sustainable.

Nevertheless, it was suggested that expanded commercial relations with interests from Western middle powers with few historic vested interests in Southern Africa held considerable appeal for regional states. They could produce some diversification of external economic linkages, while placing SADCC states in a stronger position to influence the terms of such linkages. Several efforts -- in some cases quite vigorous and imaginative -- by the case-study states to expand commercial relations with SADCC members on a mutually-beneficial basis were noted. Of particular interest were the CAPSSA (Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa) initiative, and the "Nordic-SADCC Initiative", by which Sweden and other Nordic states attempted to promote "extended cooperation" (including trade, production, and cultural links) with SADCC countries. It is significant that leadership on CAPSSA was taken by the Canadian private sector, through the Canadian Exporters' Association, with active government support; while in the Nordic-SADCC Initiative this relationship was reversed, with leadership taken by government aid agencies which sought (with limited success) to enlist the support of their private sectors. This difference may be interpreted (using Pratt's categorizations) as reflecting the relative dominance of "liberal internationalism" in the North-South policies of Canada, versus "reform internationalism" in those of the Nordic states.

In general, these and other initiatives aimed at promoting stronger economic relations with Southern African countries enjoyed some successes, and hold out the promise of some small but tangible economic benefits to certain corners of the region. Their successes were ultimately very limited, however. In no case did they bid fair to alter the region's status as a minor economic partner with each of Australia, Canada and Sweden. In what we are constantly reminded is an increasingly competitive global economic environment, these observations do not bode well for these countries' longer-term political and developmental engagement in, and commitment to, the region. In each case, domestic/corporate pressures to focus attention and resources on areas with greater potential as markets for trade and
On the other hand, during the 1980s, the very limited nature of Australian, Canadian and Swedish economic links with the region as a whole, including South Africa, was a source of relative politico-diplomatic freedom in relation to the region. It afforded these states a greater degree of running room on the sanctions issue vis-a-vis their dominant economic/class interests, for example; and meant that their activities generated less suspicion concerning their motives among the SADCC states. This observation highlights again the issue-specific nature of opportunities for foreign policy impact and influence. Limited economic and/or strategic interests in an area would ordinarily forestall a country from becoming heavily involved therein, or would dramatically weaken the credibility of efforts to do so. However, the fact that evolving international norms had strengthened the idea that apartheid and its consequences were issues of universal concern substantially legitimized involvement by countries like Australia, Canada and Sweden in Southern Africa. Their involvement was also legitimized by international organizational connections (the Commonwealth in the cases of Australia and Canada), and by sustained involvement via development assistance programmes (particularly in the cases of Sweden and Canada).

4. Security Assistance:

Each of Australia, Canada and Sweden evinced a profound reluctance to confront squarely problems of security in Southern Africa, by supporting SADCC states (and development projects) threatened by South African-supported insurgencies, especially Mozambique, with significant security assistance. Although each eventually adopted measures which were officially linked to the security needs of these states and projects, the measures were distinctly minimalist in character, in the sense that they were more or less the minimum required to sustain their credibility in the Southern African issue area. They were not carefully correlated with the actual needs of the states in question.

Two related factors largely determined this hesitation on security assistance.
The first was that, at base, Southern Africa is marginal to their core strategic and economic interests. It would therefore be very difficult to justify domestically a substantial military-security involvement in the region, implying as it would a significantly heightened set of stakes therein. This was closely related to a second factor: the strength of the popular self-image within these states, developed over the course of the post-war era, of their countries as peacekeepers and (where possible) peacemakers in international affairs. The strength and popularity of these self-images, albeit of somewhat shorter duration in Australia than in Canada and Sweden, bred a generic and powerful resistance in each to any type of activity which might be construed as contravening or jeopardizing these roles.

Can this be viewed as a distinct middle power characteristic? Not without further qualification. Even among the sub-set of Western middle powers identified by the North-South Institute's Middle Powers project and set out in chapter two, Spain was more forthcoming in providing security assistance than the states compared in this thesis. And an unequivocally small European state -- Portugal -- was also more forthcoming in this respect. These two cases suggest that a key variable in determining a state's attitude to security assistance may be the presence or absence of a long history of colonialism, and thus of direct military involvement in distant regions. Among the sub-set of "like-minded" middle powers studied in thesis, however, there seems to have been a generalizable hesitance to engage in the security dimension of foreign policy, except in cases of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping and supervisory operations, where quite the opposite attitude has prevailed (as indicated by their enthusiastic support for the Namibian UNTAG operation).

It should be added that this policy lacuna is, under most circumstances, quite appropriate. There are more than enough countries willing to engage in military-security interventions of various types as it is; a strengthened and more widely-accepted norm of non-intervention in out-of-country security affairs except in the context of UN-sanctioned operations would, on balance, be a largely positive development. However, in this particular instance, it was inappropriate to the
circumstances and conditions confronting the regional states which Australia, Canada and Sweden sought to support in their broader regional policies.

5. The Significance of Middle Power Policies in Southern Africa:

Overall, the empirical analysis in this thesis supports the view that these three middle powers played limited, but significant roles in relation to Southern Africa during the 1980s. Each made useful contributions, in a number of policy dimensions, towards the process of political change which is now taking shape in the region — although their roles in the longer-term process of change and development in the post-apartheid era are clouded with doubt. As repeatedly emphasized, the vigour and significance of these roles were certainly out of proportion with their objective "stakes" -- economic and strategic -- in the region. This raises the obvious question of why these countries chose to pursue such activist policies in Southern Africa during this period. Each certainly had specific characteristics and interests which raised the salience of the Southern African issue: for example, Australia's history of racism and societal affinities with South Africa; the individual commitments of Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark; and strong domestic anti-apartheid pressures in Sweden linked to certain strongly-held values embedded in its political culture. Nevertheless, it has been argued in this thesis that their common and, in many respects, broadly similar activism on this issue can be largely explained in terms of "internationalist" interests and behavioural characteristics linked to their positions as "middle powers" in the international community. How do we account theoretically for these interests and characteristics?
Theoretical and Analytical Implications

1. The basis and nature of middle power internationalism:

This focus on the internationalist propensities of middle-sized states is not new. However, this thesis has tried to show that this phenomenon rests on a broader base of pressures and forces than has typically been posited. Thus, it does not -- indeed could not -- rest only on values embedded in the political cultures of middle powers; nor does it depend solely on stimuli emanating from the state's external environment -- either politico-strategic or economic. Rather, it rests on the interaction and interpenetration of these elements. A reasonably consistent pattern of "middle power internationalism", as conceived in this thesis, has developed in middle-sized Western states during the post-war era on the basis of three broad sets of forces or, in Cox's terms, "spheres of activity". These are: their interests in, and approaches to, the problem of world order (i.e., their interests/approaches vis-a-vis the international politico-strategic environment); their interests vis-a-vis the sphere of production, and the economic and social forces it generates (or their interests/approaches in relation to the world political economy); and the complex of dominant values, social forces, and institutions embedded in their own "forms of state", or state-society complexes. Broadly speaking, the first two spheres of activity -- i.e., the politico-strategic world order and the world political economy -- created a relatively consistent interest among middle-sized Western states in internationalist solutions to problems of order-building and crisis-management; while their own dominant values, and material and institutional capabilities and interests, created the will and capacity to actively pursue their internationalist interests.

Thus, in the sphere of world order during the post-war era, foreign policy-makers in at least some middle-sized powers arrived at the conclusion that, in a dangerous and unstable international environment dominated by two heavily-armed superpowers, their interests lay in inhibiting and forestalling to the greatest extent possible international conflicts which risked escalation into larger, possibly direct super-power, confrontations. The best vehicles for doing this were the complex of
international political and strategic organizations developed during this era -- the UN, NATO, later the CSCE, etc.; and certain policy techniques or instruments, such as mediation and peacekeeping. This is the area in which traditional conceptions of "middlepowermanship" were most often identified. But in addition, as Peter Katzenstein has argued, some middle-sized Western states ("small European states" in his terms) had a strong economic interest in supporting the norms and institutions of the post-war "liberal international economic order" -- the Bretton Woods Institutions and the GATT. Their, and their dominant classes', strong interest in maintaining a relatively open, liberal and stable international economy also contributed to the development of internationalist interests and behavioural patterns, through active support for, and participation in, the major institutions of this economy. Later, when the stability of the international economy seemed threatened by "Southern" dissatisfaction and demands for a New International Economic Order, some of these states (notably the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) were particularly active in seeking to forge a reformist response which would allow the international economy to meet these challenges, while retaining its essential continuity and viability.

But they could not have effectively pursued these interests, and other, more cosmopolitan, interests in a more prosperous and just world order, had their activities in this regard not been underpinned by, and appealed to, certain dominant societal values, and had they not had both the institutional and economic capacity to pursue internationalist foreign policy initiatives. In other words, the consistent pursuit of internationalist foreign policy interests must be supported by domestic values, interests, and capabilities, channelled via organizational, class, and institutional structures. Thus, for example, the strong support given in some such states to development assistance; the effort put into the development of new international regimes (e.g., for the law of the sea); the strong domestic support given to peacekeeping and mediation activities; the importance placed on active involvement in multilateral organizations -- all have appealed to, and been supported by, certain dominant societal values and/or interests.
Thus, by situating the internationalist foreign policy behaviour of some middle-sized states in this broadly-based manner, we are able to escape the circularity which has plagued the middle power concept. Middle powers are not middle powers because they have tended to engage in mediation and "bridge-building", or actively support and sustain multilateral organizations, or develop functional leadership roles in certain technical issue areas. Rather, some middle-sized states have engaged in these forms of internationalist behaviour, or "roles", because it has suited their long-term interests vis-a-vis world order, the world economy, and dominant societal values and interests, all supported by significant material, technical, and bureaucratic capabilities, to do so.

2. The inconsistency and selectivity of middle power internationalism:

It will be clear to the most casual observer of the foreign policies of Australia, Canada, Sweden and other "middle powers" that they do not consistently manifest the internationalist behavioural characteristics alluded to above. Indeed Pratt, who is concerned with a narrower, more essentially value-based "humane" notion of middle power internationalism than that adopted here, has described Canadian internationalism as "limited and eroding".\(^\text{17}\) If one adopts a broader definition of middle power internationalism which builds in a greater emphasis on interests as well as values, it is not so clear that Canadian internationalism has been eroding. However, it cannot be disputed that it, and that of other middle-sized states, is limited.

What determines these limitations -- the apparent inconsistency or intermittence of this internationalist behaviour? In some instances, internationalist interests and values have simply been overridden by more immediate, narrowly self-interested and parochial pressures. Thus, for example, in contrast with their general support for the liberal principles and institutions of the GATT, Western middle powers have maintained, or indeed extended, protectionist measures in certain specific areas of importance to many Southern countries -- most notably their textile and clothing industries. Similarly, the commitment of some such states to development
assistance has increasingly been overridden by pressures for fiscal restraint, supported by a range of domestic interests who feel that one of the first areas to be restrained should be expenditures in distant developing countries. Thus, in both Australia and Canada, ODA has proved itself to be a relatively soft target for fiscally-strapped governments.

However, to a considerable extent, the limited nature of middle power internationalism has been determined by a combination of the issue-specific nature of influence, and the resource limitations of middle-sized states. As noted repeatedly in this thesis, power and influence can be meaningfully assessed only on an issue-specific basis. Middle powers, lacking the "global reach" of major powers but possessing varying degrees of relatively sophisticated and/or surplus bureaucratic, technical and material capabilities, must "pick their spots" in attempting to use these capabilities to best advantage. To some extent, these choices will be shaped by perceptions of strong interest or necessity in relation to the issue-area in question. Thus, for example, Australia’s Cairns Group initiative was determined by the critical importance of international trade to its large agricultural sector, and thus to the Australian economy as a whole; Canada’s important role in the Law of the Sea negotiations was driven by its vital interest, and that of many of its citizens, in coastal resources and resource management; and Sweden’s growing interest in environmental problems in Eastern Europe is obviously motivated by the fact that these problems directly affect Swedish quality of life. Indeed, Australian and Canadian activism on the Southern African issue during the 1980s was partly driven by their shared perception of the value of the Commonwealth to them, combined with the realization that a failure on the Commonwealth’s part to take an energetic role in international efforts to end apartheid could well have led to its demise.

However, in issue-areas where these states’ interests are less immediate, the choice of where to concentrate is obviously more discretionary, and will depend on several judgements or influences. These include: politically-potent domestic pressure; implications for the state’s international image and reputation; perceived
political "space" vis-a-vis major powers, in the sense that an activist policy is not expected to harm important relationships with them; and an evaluation that the issue-area in question is one in which their country "can make a difference", based on its particular qualifications and characteristics. These calculations add up to a relatively focused, "niche-playing" approach to foreign policy. As Cooper and Higgott have emphasized in comparing Canadian and Australian foreign policy, the degree to which particular middle powers focus on a limited number of foreign policy issue-areas varies. They contrast what they term Australia's more "discrete" and "heroic" approach to foreign policy "leadership" with Canada's more "diffuse" and "routine" approach. These variations surely rest, not just on differences in style, but above all on the volume and range of resources available to the state in question. Thus, Canada is clearly a larger and wealthier state than Australia, so it is not surprising that it has been able to diffuse its foreign policy activity to a greater range of issue-areas. Similarly, Sweden, as the smallest of the three in both population and economic terms, has been even more strongly inclined to concentrate its international activism on a small number of areas -- its focus on Southern Africa being a prime example. In general, however, even larger middle powers are well-advised to be relatively selective in the exercise of their internationalist inclinations: excessive diffusion is bound to impair impact and effectiveness in some, if not all, of the state's initiatives (as observers of Canadian foreign policy have long cautioned with reference to this country's sometimes too wide-ranging approach to foreign policy).

In each of Australia, Canada and Sweden, Southern Africa was a "niche" of some importance during the 1980s. This reflected some combination of domestic interests and/or pressures, a concern for the useful reputations as "good international citizens", a concern with the viability of a valued international organization (the Commonwealth), the fact that Southern Africa was not, for the most part, a crucial preoccupation of the super-powers, and their specific characteristics or capabilities, either innate or created (e.g., Australia's close historic affinities with white South Africa, and Sweden's impressive development assistance programmes in the region
Southern Africa will almost certainly not retain the same degree of importance as a foreign policy niche in any of these three states during the 1990s. But it should be neither surprising, nor necessarily regrettable, that in a rapidly changing, "transitional" world order, other issue-areas or niches are commanding more of the attention of various internationalist middle powers -- although it would be regrettable indeed if such states substantially reduced their involvement in the critical issues of African development.

It is also true that, given their relative lack of power and hence responsibility (positive or negative) for the condition of world order, and the luxury of being somewhat selective in their international activities, a degree of "moral arrogance" may often be a feature of middle power foreign policies. Such states can choose to focus on, and highlight their activities in, "positive" functional or human rights issue areas, for example; while the contradictions and anomalies in their foreign policies may often be largely overlooked in light of the universal preoccupation with the policies of the "majors". This tendency towards moral arrogance and selective morality has led realist analysts and some major power policy-makers to decry the "status-seeking" and "free-riding" propensities of small and middle-sizes states. Analysts must be alert to these tendencies towards selective morality and moralizing. Certainly, the Southern African policies of Australia, Canada and Sweden were not free of gratuitous moralizing. However, sensitivity to these tendencies should not lead to their overgeneralization, and to the neglect of more substantial manifestations of middle power internationalist behaviour, in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

3. Internationalism as a source of state legitimacy:

It has been argued in this thesis that the tradition of "active" or "constructive" internationalism in a number of middle-sized states has been a source of legitimacy for these states in relation to important segments of their civil societies, and indeed in relation to the international society of states. Legitimacy is conceived here in a broad sense. It is not determined only by the rules and procedures by which governance is "legitimized". Nor is it dependent primarily on the state's ability to ensure the
material needs and social well-being of its citizens — although this, too, may be regarded as a crucial source of state legitimacy in the era of the modern welfare state. Beyond these procedural and material bases for legitimacy, however, the state, in order to command the respect and allegiance of its citizens, should embody certain widely held values and some sense of shared purpose, not least in relation to the community of states and indeed the broader, Kantian, global community.

The active internationalist behaviour and images projected by a number of middle powers over the course of the post-World War II era can be regarded as having enhanced the legitimacy of these states among important groups in their civil societies, notably their "attentive publics" or "political classes". This point is well put by Escott Reid, in assessing the impact of Canadian foreign policy during the 1940s and '50s:

Mackenzie King in the twenties and thirties sought for a foreign policy that divided us least. St. Laurent and Pearson in the late forties and fifties sought for a foreign policy that united us the most. The widely held belief in Canada in their time that under their leadership Canadians were doing great things together in foreign affairs, that Canada was a nation with a mission, was a sustaining myth that helped to define Canadians as a people and strengthened our will to endure.  

This was perhaps a relatively limited, elite-level source of appeal and legitimacy, but an important one nevertheless. It was paralleled in other internationalist middle powers such as Sweden and, more lately, post-Whitlam Australia. Thus, activities and images as mediators, peacekeepers, cooperation-builders, promoters of North-South reform and dialogue, etc., while to a large extent rooted in calculations of broad political and economic interest, and while often inconsistently borne out in practice, nevertheless became sources of non-partisan pride among significant groups within these states. It is a source of appeal and legitimacy which retained considerable potency during the 1980s.

With regard to Southern Africa specifically, in neither Canada nor Australia, although perhaps in Sweden, were there significant numbers of votes to be won or lost on the basis of specific aspects of their Southern African policies. However, in a broader sense, it was useful for these governments to be seen to be playing active --
indeed leading -- international roles in attempting to rectify the egregious moral
offence of apartheid, thereby addressing a long-standing source of international
conflict and controversy, and winning the respect of a wide range of states and
organizations. Images of international statesmanship and leadership -- strutting the
world stage, in the unglamorous Aussie formulation -- were sources of legitimacy in
each of these states, and Southern Africa was a useful issue-area in which to project
these images.

In a somewhat different sense, a reputation for constructive international
activism, or "good international citizenship", has been a source of respect, and thus
enhanced legitimacy (broadly conceived) within the international society of states.
The governments of Western middle power have typically developed an appreciation
of the fact that such a reputation can be a useful (though indirect) foreign policy asset,
in that it can earn for the possessor a degree of receptiveness, or at least a
sympathetic hearing, from other states on issues of critical importance to it. Southern
Africa was an issue area in which a consistent, vigorous and high profile policy,
while not directly affecting their own more concrete interests, allowed Australia,
Canada and Sweden to enhance their international reputations, particularly among
African and other Third World states.

4. The quest for moral purpose among middle power political leaders:

A recurring theme in the case studies in this thesis has been the key role of
individual political leaders and policy makers in driving activist Southern African
policies. This theme was developed in chapter 6, in which the key roles of Australian
Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his foreign ministers -- Bill Hayden and Gareth Evans
-- were stressed, along with the roles played by Hawke’s predecessors, Malcolm
Fraser and Gough Whitlam. But the same theme clearly emerged in chapter 7, in
which the roles played by Canada’s Mulroney and Clark emerged as key determinants
of Canadian initiatives in the 1980s; while in Sweden, where societal interest in the
Southern African issue was more broadly based, the key role of Olof Palme in driving
Swedish activism vis-a-vis the region was nevertheless also noted. In single country
analyses, this has been treated as the individual or "idiosyncratic" variable\(^\text{27}\): an unpredictable, personal "wild card" which can be played when one's theoretical expectations are confounded. Yet, the fact that this phenomenon was a recurrent one, both over time and over a series of countries, suggests that there is a more generalizable principle at work.

In chapter 6, it was suggested that national political leaders, particularly in democratic polities, have a generalizable desire to use their positions to pursue some moral purpose(s). It is not, for most of them, sufficient that they merely retain power, or even promote what they regard as certain incremental "improvements" in the way their countries are run. Their self-legitimization, it was argued, often depends on the pursuit of some broader "mission". While this thesis does not explore the psychological basis for this proposition, the empirical evidence presented, as well as readily identifiable circumstantial evidence, supports it. Furthermore, for the leaders of middle-sized Western states, it was suggested that one of the most common and accessible ways in which to fulfill this need for moral purpose was through international initiatives on issues of broad, "cosmopolitan" concern.\(^\text{28}\) While these initiatives tread a fine line between genuine idealism and egoistic self-aggrandizement (always an uncertain boundary among political leaders), and will always, appropriately, arouse some suspicion, their sincerity cannot be altogether gainsaid.

During the 1980s, marked by unprecedented popular resistance within South Africa, destabilisation in the region beyond it, and the near-universal opprobrium in which the "apartheid regime" was held, one of the most compelling issue areas in which to pursue a moral leadership role was Southern Africa. It is therefore not surprising that political leaders in Australia, Canada, and Sweden undertook or maintained high profile, activist approaches to promoting change and development in the region as a whole. It should not be surprising, furthermore, to see individual middle power political leaders adopt similarly high profile, activist positions in a range of cosmopolitan issue areas in future. Whatever their motives in doing so, such efforts must for the most part be considered a positive phenomenon in world affairs.
5. The essential ambiguity of the middle power idea:

At the beginning of chapter 2, John Holmes's comment that it is hard to say precisely what a middle power is, but "I am for accepting this ambiguity rather than raise hornets, large, middle and small", was cited. The remainder of the next two chapters, and indeed much of this thesis, was concerned with trying to reduce, or at least clarify, some of this ambiguity: delineating different usages of the middle power idea, noting some of their strengths and weaknesses, and setting out the manner in which the idea was conceived in this thesis. At the end of the day, however, one is brought back to the fact that the middle power idea has been, and will likely continue to be, used in a variety of different senses, to refer to a range of quite different kinds of states, in a number of substantially different issue areas. I have tried to demonstrate that this idea, when conceptualized and utilized as it has been here, remains a useful and important way of understanding the foreign policy behaviour of certain middle-sized countries; and that, furthermore, it highlights ways in which these kinds of states can make a contribution to international problem-solving, cooperation-building and reform which may be of some real importance. However, it cannot be pretended that the essential ambiguity implied in Holmes's assessment has been resolved.

To begin with, it was noted in chapter two that this idea has commonly had two major connotations: a more objectively- or structurally-based status-oriented connotation; and a somewhat more subjective, less self-conscious behavioural one. From the perspective of the case studies in this thesis, and indeed from the perspective of assessing how states may be able to organize themselves to meet the new challenges arising in world affairs, the latter, behavioural sense of the middle power idea is the more interesting and important one. However, the two are frequently intertwined. The forms of behaviour highlighted in the latter usage of the term are not unrelated to middle-range capabilities and status. Furthermore, the more status-oriented usage of middle power terminology -- the idea that certain international actors are entitled to a degree of recognition and influence in world affairs
commensurate with their considerably greater importance than run-of-the-mill small states -- is also certain to persist, perpetuated above all by representatives of the medium-sized actors in question.

In addition, as emphasized above, power and influence are issue-specific or contextually-determined phenomena. States which on the world level may be either small or large powers (measured in GNP terms) will in specific contexts have middle-range capabilities, or be in one sense or another positioned in the middle on the issue in question, and may in consequence be stimulated to adopt middle power-type roles. Conversely, a state which is objectively a "middle power" globally may be a major or dominant power in specific regional or functional contexts. Thus, for example, New Zealand, which is a small state in both GNP and population terms, is at least a middle power in the South Pacific context, and takes on roles of considerable diplomatic consequence in this context as a result. Similarly, Zimbabwe and Tanzania are small and poor countries globally but, in the Southern African context, have often been regarded as significant, middle-range actors, either on the basis of a relatively strong economic base (Zimbabwe), or ideological and moral independence and authority (Tanzania, at least in the past). In functional issue-areas, also, an objectively-small state may be a middle-range power: to wit, Iceland's importance in issues of international fisheries management. Conversely, each of India, Brazil, and Nigeria, though middle-range powers globally, have at various times been perceived as potential or actual regional hegemons -- "proto-" or "second-tier imperialist" states. And indeed, Canada's status as a member of the G-7 has had a significant effect on the way it is perceived internationally, and perhaps increasingly on the way it behaves (although whether its behaviour is becoming more that of a "principal power" is highly questionable). The point is that while some states (including the ones studied in this thesis) may be widely perceived as quintessential middle powers across a wide range of issues, this evaluation must be persistently re-examined in the context of the issue area in question -- as well as the possibility that the state's capabilities and/or behaviour may have changed.
Yet another source of ambiguity is the fact that middle power "candidates", judged on the basis of "objective" rankings, behavioural patterns or both, have a variety of dominant self-images, often not including that of a middle power. Most notably, in the context of this thesis, the dominant Swedish self-image is that of a small state -- largely a function of its historic sense of place within Europe. These self-images do have some effect on behaviour, and complicate the task of identifying "typical" middle powers and middle power roles.

Finally, the empirical analysis and theoretical approach in this thesis make clear that a distinction must be drawn between Western/Northern and Southern middle powers. With regard to the Southern African issue, it is clear that the policy initiatives and effectiveness of Australia, Canada and Sweden depended to varying degrees on their strong access and close affinities vis-a-vis major Western powers, as well as Southern African states and groups. Furthermore, their policy capacity in the important functional area of development assistance was dependent on a degree of "surplus" resources which is largely unavailable to Southern states. Their regional policies were also characterized to varying degrees by the increasingly important role of NGOs -- a dimension of the civil societies of Western states which is not as highly developed in Southern countries.

More broadly, it is clear that the three sets of pressures which (it has been argued) produced internationalist behavioural tendencies in Western middle powers -- the world order, the world political economy, and values, interests and institutions embedded in individual state-society complexes -- will be perceived and experienced quite differently in leading Southern states, or middle powers, than in their Western "counterparts". The Western middle power approach to world order is likely to be more inclined towards relatively modest adjustments and reforms, while maintaining its essential integrity and stability; while Southern middle powers are likely to be more determined to secure truly substantial changes to the global status quo. More specifically, their differing structural positions vis-a-vis the international political economy have generally produced a much more urgent desire for much more dramatic
international economic reforms among Southern middle powers than Western ones. Furthermore, the sophisticated bureaucratic, technical and material capabilities, and the relatively highly developed civil societies present in Western middle powers have not generally been duplicated in Southern ones.

Nevertheless, as suggested in chapter 3, there are indications that, within the increasingly heterogeneous South, the global importance of Southern middle powers and/or "NICs" is growing. It will thus be interesting to see whether, as this process proceeds, some of these states increasingly assume "internationalist" roles of the type traditionally associated with the Western states studied in this thesis. To some degree, furthermore, as traditional Western middle powers flirt with structural marginalization while leading Southern states move towards the "centre" of global political-economic life, there is some convergence of interests, and some new potential for fruitful cooperation among an intermediate tier of Northern and Southern states. Although the range of differences which continue to inhibit such "cross-cutting" coalitions are formidable, limited membership, issue-specific coalitions -- for example, the Cairns Group and, to a more limited degree, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa -- point to ways in which such cooperative processes might work.

The essential ambiguities in the middle power concept make it tempting to conclude that it is too amorphous to be useful. This is not, I have suggested above, the appropriate conclusion to draw. One must certainly be careful in defining the way middle power language is being used. However, particularly in a transitional phase of world affairs, analysts "eliminate" ambiguity at their great peril, for in such an era, ambiguities and uncertainties are unavoidable. We must learn to live and work in such an environment, with the inevitable intellectual difficulties to which it gives rise.
The Future of Middle Power Internationalism

This thesis has concentrated on the historical evolution of the middle power idea and middle power behaviour in the post-war era, and the specific case of Western middle power foreign policies toward Southern Africa during the 1980s. In these contexts, it has highlighted the shared features of the foreign policies of such states, stressing the significance of the roles they have, in certain issue areas, been able to play. However, the conditions under which these forms of behaviour developed and were consolidated have obviously changed (and are changing) dramatically. How are these changes likely to affect the prospects for middle power internationalism, in Southern Africa and elsewhere, during the 1990s and beyond?

A short, and blunt, initial answer is that the prospects for a "refurbished" middle power internationalism in this changing context are not very promising. As noted above, the post-war internationalism of Western middle powers grew out of the interrelated pressures and incentives emanating from the world order of the day (marked by the Cold War cleavage), the liberal international economic order, and the domestic values and interests which coalesced in these states in the form of what Cox has termed the "neoliberal historic bloc". However, also as discussed above, post-war middle power internationalism has always been a somewhat selective and intermittent phenomenon. It was also built on an impermanent economic base, in that it was initially buttressed, or "bank-rolled", by the unprecedented prosperity these states enjoyed during the "Golden Age" growth phase in the world economy lasting until the mid-1970s.

The distinctive features of the international order which supported the emergence of middle power internationalism have now "passed on". The terrifying stability of the Cold War has been superseded by an as-yet unformed "new international division of power" (NIDP). Considerably earlier, the LIEO gave way to a "new" (but still rapidly evolving) international division of labour (NIDL), although the central institutions of the LIEO are evolving also, and continue to play important roles in the world economy. Both of these developments have helped to fuel growin...
incoherence, and a growing crisis of legitimacy, in many developed capitalist countries -- notably including Australia, Canada and Sweden. These changes do not, in themselves, preclude the evolution and continuance of a creative middle power internationalist role: as Cox has argued, such a role has been usefully played in a range of different international orders, and there is every reason to expect that such a role may be even more useful in the order which is now taking shape. However, whether the middle powers which have been the focus of this thesis will be in any condition to play it is uncertain.

In chapter 3, several interrelated contemporary trends were highlighted, each raising questions for the continued viability of an internationalist role among these states. The globalisation of production -- a crucial element of the NIDL -- has contributed to the growing structural economic vulnerability, real and perceived, of Western middle powers. The related internationalization/regionalization of the state, most prominently manifested in the accelerated integration of the EC and progress towards a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), bid fair to impose further, increasingly stringent, limitations on the autonomy of member-states, not least in foreign policy. Strikingly, Sweden, whose particularly activist brand of post-war internationalism was sharply stimulated by its neutrality, has now applied to join the EC, with inevitable compromises to its foreign policy autonomy to follow.

Both the globalisation of production and the internationalization of the state are adding fuel to widespread processes of declining societal coherence and state legitimacy which are strikingly apparent in Australia, Sweden, and, most acutely, Canada. Such processes threaten to impair foreign policy effectiveness by increasingly pre-occupying the societies in question with their own internal difficulties, to the neglect of unprecedented international challenges and opportunities. They may also undermine the international images and reputations of these states, depending on how their particular domestic crises are met and handled, to the possible detriment of their foreign policy effectiveness.

However in relation to each of these trends, chapter 3 also noted counter-
considerations which could give a fillip to the foreign policy internationalism of these states, or at least partially neutralize the negative possibilities cited above. The structural challenges created by the globalisation of production could themselves stimulate creative internationalist responses, as may be seen in Australia's pro-active approaches to agricultural trade through the Cairns Group, and to the perceived need for regional economic cooperation-building through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative. Furthermore, the "new" international division of labour is continuing to change, with the emergence of a new production revolution labelled "systemofacture" by Raphael Kaplinsky. This new production revolution has ambiguous implications for Western middle powers, but may well suit the characteristics of the more corporatist of these states.

Similarly, the internationalization of the state offers opportunities as well as constraints to these middle powers. So long as the EC remains largely intergovernmental, for example, smaller member-states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, joined by former EFTA members like Sweden and possibly Finland, may be able to form working coalitions on broader international (as well as Community) issues which strongly influence EC policy. Similarly, there is some potential for Canada and Mexico to make common cause in the context of a NAFTA, enhancing their collective influence vis-a-vis the US (though of course, in both cases, the way in which such influence may be used is uncertain). Furthermore, these regionalizing processes will create incentives for states to pursue policies which emphasize their continued distinctiveness from major power partners. These could well include vigorous internationalist foreign policies, since these have often been cited as points of distinction from major Western powers in the past.

It is perhaps harder to identify potential stimulants to internationalism in contemporary challenges to societal coherence and state legitimacy. However, some of the groups and ideas which have arisen to challenge the state are distinctly cosmopolitan in orientation: environmentalists, peace groups, human rights activists, etc. Insofar as these groups have an influence on any new societal consensus, or
"historic bloc", which may emerge in these states, internationalism is likely to be refurbish. Furthermore, it is worth recalling the argument in this thesis that internationalism has helped to enhance the legitimacy of Western middle powers in the post-war era. As states cast about for bases upon which to renew their legitimacy, they may be sensitive to the utility of a respected internationalist role in the world community as one such basis.

It is worth emphasizing, in considering the prospects for middle power internationalism in the late twentieth century, its potential importance in meeting the unprecedented challenges of this period, particularly in the North-South context. With the demise of the Cold War (notwithstanding current uncertainties in the Soviet Union) and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the North-South axis of world affairs -- or, more broadly, the axis between rich and poor, developed and developing -- has clearly become the most salient division in world affairs, albeit an increasingly ragged and complex one. Almost all of the greatest threats to world stability, prosperity, ecology, and peace lie along this axis, at a level of diversity and complexity which threatens to overwhelm those groups, governments, and organizations which try to address them. The major powers -- traditionally regarded as the primary source of leadership (or hegemony) in world affairs -- may be able to deal effectively with some of these challenges, but are in no condition to provide creative leadership in anything like the full range of critical problems before the world community. Even the United States, which in the wake of the Gulf War enjoys the title of sole and undisputed military "superpower", is unwilling or unqualified on its own to provide leadership in various economic, environmental, and social fields, partly because of its own deep internal difficulties, and partly because it no longer has the moral authority to command widespread international "followership". In such a context, leadership, or at least constructive contributions to international problem-solving, must come from a variety of sources, often exercised through multilateral/transnational coalitions engaged in creative 'bridge-building' and promoting incremental reforms. As the several recent studies of middle powers
discussed in this thesis have all pointed out, middle powers may be well suited to make important contributions in these areas, given their limited, but specialized and substantial capabilities, and their previous behavioural tendencies.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, traditional Western middle powers, despite their increasing internal and external difficulties, retain certain comparative advantages and propensities in these types of areas. Furthermore, reformist coalition- and bridge-building is as much (if not more) in their interests, and the interests of their civil societies, than anyone else's.

Even if at least some of these traditional middle powers fail to rise to these contemporary challenges, or do so only on a much more limited and irregular basis -- the most realistic scenario -- we may, on Robert Cox's analysis, look to new, emerging centres of power in world affairs to increasingly adopt internationalist, order-building roles of the "middle power" type, in their own and their civil societies' interests.\textsuperscript{37} These are likely to emerge out of Asia (South Korea? a united Korea?), possibly Latin America (Mexico? Brazil?), and perhaps even Africa (most likely from a "new" South Africa). They may even come, more speculatively and in the longer term, from increasingly integrated regional groupings: the Andean Group? Even a re-constituted, post-apartheid SADCC? The point is that middle power "roles" may well remain relevant and important, even if some post-war middle powers become less so.

Finally, what of the future roles of Australia, Canada and Sweden in Southern Africa? Obviously, the circumstances under which these states developed active and significant policies during the 1980s have changed, and are changing, dramatically. In the midst of processes of profound political (though less so economic) change not only in South Africa, but in other regional states as well (peace processes in Angola and Mozambique, promised multi-party elections in Zambia and Malawi, the abandonment of plans for "socialism" and a one-party state in Zimbabwe, etc.), the issues for external states have become much more complex. In a recent article, Chris Brown argued persuasively that, "As apartheid and destabilization disappear, southern Africa will fade from international attention; future change, for better or for worse,
This argument is reinforced by the likelihood, discussed in section 1 of this conclusion, that the (declining) developmental resources and politico-diplomatic attention of Australia, Canada and Sweden are likely to be, indeed are already being, drawn off somewhat to pressing problems in more "local" arenas.

Nevertheless, the difficult challenges of cooperation-building and development in a post-apartheid region are unlikely to be tackled successfully without some outside involvement and assistance. And, while the region will have a lower profile in the foreign policy priorities of the three case study states, they (and particularly Sweden and Canada) will almost certainly not absent themselves from what has, after all, become an area of considerable expertise and strong connections for them, with (it hardly need be added) some potential political and economic "pay-offs" in the post-apartheid era. Nor should the fact of a decline in resource allocations for the region blind analysts to the possibility of some imaginative and useful initiatives being taken with the resources which remain -- notably, in the Canadian and Australian cases, through Commonwealth planning and programmes for the post-apartheid era.

Thus, contemporary Southern African policy review and planning processes remain exercises of considerable interest and importance. There will not be a repetition of the activism of the 1980s, but the lessons learned and connections consolidated can form the basis for a more limited, but still useful relationship.

NOTES

2. In the latter respect, it is worth noting that the Swedish anti-apartheid coalition, ISAK, was active in organizing international meetings of anti-apartheid organizations, in which tactics and strategies could be compared and advanced. Interview with Lotta Johnnson, International Secretary, ISAK, 25 Aug. 1989.


4. Phrase used by Denis Stairs to describe the approach of Canadian foreign policymakers at the founding of the UN. See Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy", Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (4), Dec. 1982, 674.

5. A CIDA official recently reported that some $C40-60 million would be lost to the SADCC programme over the ensuing five-year period as a result of the 1991 budget cutbacks. Existing projects would be completed, but CIDA had been "robbed" of the ability to put most future programmes "into the pipeline". Some of the smaller country programmes (such as Malawi's) were to be even more dramatically affected. Conversation, 15 Aug. 1991.


7. Karre and Svensson also argue, in a mid-1980s analysis, that there has been some convergence between the "Swedish model" of development assistance, and the more general (and less humanitarian) "OECD model" thereof. See Bo Karre and Bengt Svensson, "The Determinants of Swedish Aid Policy", in Olav Stokke, ed., Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty (Uppsala: the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989).

8. I am indebted to Audie Klotz of Cornell University for "raising my consciousness" on the importance of evolving international norms in shaping the policies of Western states toward South Africa. This is the subject of her Ph.D. dissertation.


10. Australian troops were stationed in Malaysia and Singapore, and involved in the Vietnam War until the early 1970s. There was a strong reaction against the involvement in Vietnam in particular, however, and subsequently a quite vigorous embrace of the peacekeeper self-image. It is interesting in this regard that the
Australian government did not intervene militarily in the aftermath of the Fijian coup in 1987, despite the proximity of Fiji to Australia, and the potential ramifications of developments there for stability in the South Pacific.

11. The recent Australian and Canadian involvement in the Gulf War is an exception which proves the rule in this regard. Both states became involved militarily in the Gulf only on the basis of U.N. Security Council resolutions and, unlike Britain and France, for example, strictly limited the scope of their involvement when the war itself began. See A. Cooper, R. Higgott, and K. Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict", paper presented to the International Studies Association, Vancouver, 22 March 1991.

12. To say this, especially in the wake of the Gulf War experience, is of course to beg some difficult questions, about whether UN security operations can be organized on a more routinized and accountable basis, for example. While this type of development would be extremely difficult to achieve, its prospects may have improved somewhat. It is an area in which middle powers, with their extensive multilateral peacekeeping experience, could be expected to play an important role.


19. As Joe Clark asserted the Canadian government had arrived at in relation to the South African issue. Speech at a luncheon hosted by the Council on Foreign
Relations, DEA Statement 89/47, 2.


21. See, for example, the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism (Ottawa, June 1986), 30.


24. See Independence and Internationalism, 137-140, for a recent exposition of the idea of "constructive internationalism".


26. For example, Kenneth Kaunda was quite effusive in his praise of the Australian and Canadian roles on Southern Africa within the Commonwealth. Similarly, following the 1987 CHOGRM in Vancouver, Robert Mugabe suggested that Canada was taking over the leadership of the Commonwealth from Britain -- a suggestion which was no doubt linked to their divergent positions on Southern Africa.

27. See, in particular, Nossal, "The 'idiosyncratic' variable and Canadian Foreign Policy: The case of the Mulroney government and sanctions against South Africa", paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Windsor, 11 June 1988. However, in interviews, various Australian analysts and diplomats also stressed, and puzzled over, the deep interest in this issue area manifested by a succession of Australian leaders -- most strikingly Fraser.

28. Consider, for example, Pierre Trudeau's North-South diplomacy and his "Peace Initiative" (See K. Nossal, "Personal Diplomacy and National Behaviour: Trudeau's North-South Initiatives", Dalhousie Review, Summer 1982, 278-291, and J. Granatstein and R. Bothwell, Pirouette (Toronto: U of T Press, 1990), 363-376; Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland's involvement in international environmental affairs; the roles played by Dutch and Norwegian Foreign Ministers in support of the NIEO (Sei Lovbraek, "International Reform and the Like-Minded Countries in the North-South Dialogue, 1975-85, in Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism), etc. Consider also the roles of leading Third World statespersons: Julius Nyerere as head of the "South Commission"; former Nigerian President General Obasanjo's role in a variety of Commonwealth initiatives; Kenneth Kaunda's
periodic attempts at high stakes mediation; the various initiatives of Indian Prime Ministers, most notably Nehru, etc.

29. Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?", in J. King Gordon, ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: CIIA, 1966), 16.


31. See Higgott and Cooper, "Middlepower Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations"; and Black, "Middle Power Diplomacy and the struggle for change in South Africa: Canada, Australia, and the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa".

32. Pratt explores the requirements for a "refurbished humane middle power internationalism" in the concluding essay of his edited collection, Middle Power Internationalism. They are formidable indeed. My use of the notion of middle power internationalism is not limited to its "humane" variants, and may therefore have somewhat more promising prospects in the coming decade.

33. See Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order".

34. See R. Kaplinsky, "Technological Revolution and the Restructuring of Trade Production: Some Implications for the Western Middle Powers and the Newly Industrializing Countries", in Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism.

35. See Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict".

36. See chapter 2, section 2.


40. The relevant agencies in the Canadian government -- particularly CIDA and the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, are undertaking an extensive Southern Africa review process to be completed by the spring of 1992, based on a
"regional strategic overview for the Southern African region" produced by the decentralized CIDA establishment in Harare (information from conversation with CIDA officer, 15 Aug. 1991). It may be presumed that similar exercises are being undertaken in Australia, Sweden, and elsewhere.
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2 personal interviews and 2 phone interviews with officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

1 interview with AIDAB officer

Canada:

Douglas Anglin, Carleton University, Ottawa, 24 March 1988

Dave Gallagher, Southern African Regional Representative, Oxfam-Canada, Harare, 27 Nov. 1989

Bob Gibbins, Executive-Director, Canadian Association for the Private Sector in Southern Africa, Harare, 8 Nov. 1989


Ralph Hazleton, WUSC, Ottawa, 10-11 Aug. 1989

Phyllis Johnson, co-Director, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), Harare, 13 Nov. 1989

Peter Mahlangu, ANC Chief Representative in Canada, 12 July 1989

Irene Mathias, Field Director, WUSC-Zimbabwe, Harare, 1 Nov. 1989

Robert McLaren, formerly Canadian Ambassador to Tanzania and Zimbabwe and Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, Ottawa, 10 Aug. 1989

Roy McMurtry, former Canadian High Commissioner to the UK, Toronto, 27 Feb. 1991

John Rafferty, Director, WUSC-Botswana, 18 Sept. 1989

Oakland Ross, Globe and Mail African correspondent, Harare, 29 Nov. 1989
Archbishop Ted Scott, Former Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Canada and member, Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, Toronto, 12 July 1989


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Sweden:

Eivor Edvardsson-Kratz, International Department, The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), Stockholm, 24 Aug. 1989

Par Granstedt, Member of the Swedish Parliament, and Member of the Association of West European Parliamentarians Against Apartheid (AWEPAA), Stockholm, 28 Aug. 1989

Bo Huldt, Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 25 Aug. 1989

Lotta Johnnson, International Secretary, Isolate South Africa Committee (ISAK), Stockholm, 25 Aug. 1989

Dr. Ake Magnusson, International Council of Swedish Industry, Stockholm, 1 Sept. 1989

Finn Norgren, Director, Swedish Volunteer Service, Zimbabwe, Harare, 29 Nov. 1989


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E. Brian Egner, Consultant, Gaborone, 3 Oct. 1989

Joshua Gwitera, Deputy Director, ENDA-Zimbabwe, Harare, 14 Nov. 1989

John Holm, University of Botswana Democracy Project, Gaborone, 13 Sept. 1989

Charles Hove, Economist, SADCC Secretariat, Gaborone, 15 Sept. 1989

Derek Ingram, Gemini Press Service, London, 31 Nov. 1990
Bonnie Keller, Planning Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Lusaka, 7 Dec. 1989


Patrick Molutsi, Department of Sociology, University of Botswana, 19 Sept. 1989

Mr. Mothalamme, Deputy Director of Economic and Political Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Government of Botswana, Gaborone, 20 Sept. 1989


Chris Sharp, former director, World Bank Family Health Project, Gaborone, 26 Sept. 1989

Balefi Tsie, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, 12 Sept. 1989


Eleanor Warr (Executive Director) and Peter Hancock, Kalahari Conservation Society, Gaborone, 29 Sept. 1989

Interview with 4 officers of the British Foreign Office

Interview with officer of USAID

Interview with foreign service officer, US State Department

Interviews with 2 officers of the Commonwealth Secretariat