CONSPICUOUS SEXUALITY: BOURDIEU’S AFFECTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE NORMATIVE ORIGINS OF HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

by

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To alienate conclusively, definitionally, from anyone on any theoretical ground the authority to describe and name their own sexual desire is a terrible consequential seizure. In this century, in which sexuality has been made expressive of the essence of both identity and knowledge, it may represent the most intimate violence possible

Eve Sedgewick
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ABSTRACT

Through an elaboration Bourdieu I argue that the embodiment of heterosexist norms produces negative dispositions towards gay men and women. Though this position relates to the literature on homophobic violence in its critique of social structures that contribute to homophobia, analyzing dispositions as nonconscious, bodily effects differentiates Bourdieu's position. Here Bourdieu provides a means for theorizing how norms are reproduced on the surface on the body as looks, gestures, and feelings, and not in the unconsciousness or the deep-seated beliefs of individuals. The particular contribution that Bourdieu makes to the study of homophobia argues that homonegativity is transferred from “body to body, below the level of conscious control” (Bourdieu, 2000, 95), and not only through the verbal denunciations or the rational devaluation of sexual minorities.

Below the present work engages several of Bourdieu's central concepts, namely habitus, doxa, and symbolic violence, and applies his theoretical perspective to homophobia and homophobic violence. This engagement is necessary as Bourdieu does not address homophobic violence in his writing. In applying Bourdieu in this manner this work contributes to the scholarship on Bourdieu as well as the study of homophobia and homophobic violence.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Through an elaboration of Bourdieu I argue that the embodiment of heterosexist norms produces negative dispositions towards gay men and women. Though this position relates to the literature on homophobic violence in its critique of social structures that contribute to homophobia, analyzing dispositions as nonconscious, bodily effects differentiates Bourdieu's position. Here Bourdieu provides a means for theorizing how norms are reproduced on the surface on the body as looks, gestures, and feelings, and not in the unconsciousness or the deep-seated beliefs of individuals. The particular contribution that Bourdieu makes to the study of homophobia argues that homonegativity is transferred from “body to body, below the level of conscious control” (Bourdieu, 2000, 95), and not only through the verbal denunciations or the rational devaluation of sexual minorities.

Below the present work engages several of Bourdieu's central concepts, namely habitus, doxa, and symbolic violence, and applies his theoretical perspective to homophobia and homophobic violence. This engagement is necessary as Bourdieu does not address homophobic violence in his writing. In applying Bourdieu in this manner this work contributes to the scholarship on Bourdieu as well as the study of homophobia and homophobic violence.

To Bourdieu dispositions function as sites for the social reproduction of homonegative norms. Here, Bourdieu's work explains why despite gains in formal equality by gay men and women, and public political support during events such as pride parades, many people still report physical discomfort about proximity to gay men and
women and non-heterosexual sexual practices. In this case homonegative sentiment remains despite rational political recognition and acceptance. Given that such experiences are often pre-reflexive and non-cognitive, this work argues that conscious intervention such as the formal presentation of difference in schools, may not be an effective means of promoting positive change and reducing homophobia. Lastly, this position suggests a correlation between embodied norms experienced as feelings of disgust, shame, and discomfort about gay bodies, and the observed body-centric character of homophobic violence.

This position contrasts arguments informed by rational choice theory, which fail to articulate the non-conscious bodily transmission of norms through looks, gestures, emotions, and sentiments. Further, it suggests the limitation of cognitive dissonance (Burtch and Haskell 2010) as a means of social intervention, as this does not address the dispositional aspects of socialization. Rather than critique the existing scholarship on homophobic violence, this work contributes another level of analysis to the critical literature on homophobic violence by calling attention to the physical, material aspects of socialization. In this case, though supporting such efforts to combat discourses of homophobia, this work suggests that strategies that address dispositions need more attention and development.

However, if efforts at reducing homonegativity on a more conscious level prove effective, then this thesis would need to be reexamined. Indeed, given that the position developed herein suggests that change occurs slowly, a reduction in the body-centric nature of homophobic violence, and the observed levels of physical discomfort would
falsify the present argument. However, given the current data, this work maintains that
the physical embodiment of homonegativity in the form of dispositions contributes to the
character of homophobic violence, and the social reproduction of anti-gay norms.

For the case at hand, a thorough examination of Bourdieu's concepts of habitus,
symbolic violence and doxa suggests that his theoretical framework of affective
phenomenology gains significant explanatory purchase on homophobic violence. He
clearly articulates the process by which dominant heterosexual norms produce negative,
visceral, noncognitive dispositional relationships to queer bodies and to bodily
comportment. To Bourdieu, who represents the most substantial sociological and
theoretical foundation for the work at hand, processes of socialization result in the
“application of the fundamental schemes to one’s own body, and more especially to those
parts of the body that are most pertinent in the terms of these schemes” (Bourdieu, 1990,
73). Heteronormative socialization produces material, nonconconscious and affective
bodily results in the form of negative dispositional responses to queers bodies. Here,
vioence therefore derives from policing violations of the bodily schematics authorized
by dominant normative frameworks.

Further, in observing the statistical data concerning homophobic violence one
very quickly locates a correlation between maleness and homophobic violence. Given
the observable data that will be presented in Chapter 2, one is compelled to narrow the
focus, asking why men predominantly, almost exclusively, commit acts of homophobic
violence. This suggests that attention to the relationship between homophobic violence
and masculinity, and the social constitution of both, is of paramount importance.
In addition to focusing on the relationship between masculinity, heteronormativity, and homophobia, situating the question of violence in relation to gains in formal equality provides a stark relief. Such a contrast between legal and political rights on one side, and the lived experience of gay people and homonegativity on the other, reveals a broad social problem. Further, it suggests that despite these formal gains, homophobia and homophobic violence are still statistically significant social problems. Simply put, despite some formal advances in areas such as marriage, gay men and women are still often the victims of attacks. In these cases Bourdieu's affective phenomenology provides a significant theoretical contribution to contemporary understandings of violence by showing how the embodiment of norms produces feelings of disgust, shame, and discomfort about certain bodies and bodily use. Sociologist Stephen Tomsen's recent study of anti-gay sentiment supports this position, where “this irrational, corporeal or even visceral sense of loathing came from people who often gave support for gay men and lesbians in relation to other issues” (Tomsen 2009, 32). Despite some formal legal recognition, moments of close proximity with queer bodies, with the possibility of intimacy or touching, are often characterized by this kind of visceral negativity.

As suggested, Chapter 2 describes contemporary homophobic violence and anti-gay sentiment. Additionally, it begins to open the field of homophobic violence in its presentation of the commentaries and analysis accompanying the empirical data; here, the contributing authors suggest that the discursive effects of heterosexism, the enforced commitment to traditional male/female gender roles, and an inherited conception of
homosexuality as deviant, immoral, and abnormal contributes to violence, homonegativity, and heteronormativity. Further, feminine and non-masculine characteristics and behaviours in boys are identified as deviant, and serve to contribute to stereotypical representations of homosexuality. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for discussions of motivations for hate, crime, and violence, homophobic terms refer to negativity or an abject position.

Chapter 3 builds on these perspectives by engaging with some of the seminal theories of sex, sexuality, and gender, which given observable data, constitutes the most appropriate framework for an analysis of homophobic violence. The fundamental question at the heart of this chapter points to the durability of norms and the importance of getting at the social roots of violent conduct: why is it that when we simply scratch the surface of legally and formally recognized rights, that we find bigotry, hatred, and ignorance that so easily mobilizes and finds expression in violence? In answering this question Chapter 3 further engages the literature on homophobic violence, which as a theoretical field, stresses the importance of different processes of normalization and socialization that contribute to homophobia, the power of norms and places of socialization to produce particular subjects, the role that discourse has on the disciplining of bodies and practices, the dominance, dehistorization and naturalization of particular norms; and finally, with Bourdieu, the way in which our dispositional relationships to one another are formed through exposure to, and immersion in, such processes.

In surveying the field Chapter 3 further argues that homophobic violence is rooted in a pervasive, and predominately negative, embodied, normative articulation of
homosexuality. In developing an understanding of the root of this bias, the chapter reconstructs the positions two of the most influential, seminal thinkers that question sex, sexuality, and gender: Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. Like the preceding concerns, Foucault and Butler's theoretical perspectives help shed light on the norms and practices that perpetuate heteronormativity, but they also offer a significant insight into theories of the body – this elaboration is necessary in order to fully articulate the theoretical relationship with Bourdieu. Here, processes of normalization, especially in relation to the disciplining of sexual difference, are clearly found in school settings for example, at which point difference from the prevailing heteronormative framework is perhaps first identified and violently suppressed. The critical theoretical framework outlined above explains the interplay of gendered norms and bodies by calling attention to this pervasive heterosexism, and provides a means to assess and understand the significant evidence for the normalization and embodiment of homonegativity. Further, with Bourdieu's affective phenomenology, one comes to understands how the embodiment of these norms finds expression in negative dispositions and sentiments, which can in turn crystallize as overt physical violence. In sum Bourdieu makes a significant contribution to theorizing homophobic violence by arguing that the embodiment of norms situates and informs a practical, material relationship to bodies and practices. Additionally, this visceral consequence of socialization constructs the very grounds upon which differences are perceived and given meaning.

Chapter 4 is a sustained consideration of Bourdieu's work that differentiates his approach from an analysis of masculine values or heterosexist discourse. This
engagement and elaboration is necessary as Bourdieu work does not approach questions of homophobic violence in his writing. The original contribution of the present work, therefore, is to develop and apply Bourdieu's significant theoretical apparatus to the problem of homophobic violence. Here, as suggested, Bourdieu's frame of analysis locates some explanatory power for how people relate to one another, through their dispositions towards particular bodies and ways of being, as bodily orientations or structures that are precognitive and nonconscious. Bourdieu's affective phenomenology refers to the way in which discourse and socialization contributes to what he calls the “durable transformation of bodies” (Bourdieu 2001, 29). With such an analytical trajectory, the target is not to ask how widespread beliefs cause us to think differently about others, but also to examine how discourse affects the response of our own bodies. This, it seems, provides the theoretical groundwork for answering questions concerning the entrenchment of homonegativity, and the violence we still encounter despite some positive gains in formal equality.

To Bourdieu the process of normalization instills in us more than a set of practices, beliefs, skills, and knowledge. Rather, exposure to particular discourses affects our very bodies as physical responses, or what we might refer to as our dispositional relationships with others. As disposition, and initial precognitive responses, Bourdieu insists that we must think of them as an act “of knowledge and practical recognition which takes place below the level of consciousness” (Bourdieu 2001, 42). Put another way, the process of socialization affects what is seen and how it is experienced. In the case of homophobia two men holding hands is instantly conspicuous and the two men are
physically and materially experienced with mistrust, discomfort, disgust, and hatred. Further, for Bourdieu, these initial dispositions and physical reactions affect further responses, including distancing oneself, overt derogatory comments and physical assault. Crucially, here, is that not only are overt, conscious actions at play in processes of socialization, but so too are sentiments, dispositions, and gestures; they reinforce, reproduce and perpetuate the initial reaction, and serve as the site for the material, bodily, objective reproduction of norms.

The understanding of the effects of dispositions on socialization and interpersonal relationships developed through Bourdieu places some significant challenges for social, political intervention and positive change. Indeed, in the conclusionary remarks in Chapter 5, the work steers the current 'dispositional enquiry' toward recent theories of affect and contemporary queer theory, which together with Bourdieu, suggests the myriad ways in which socialization occurs on an affective plane. Here, Bourdieu's position suggests that there is no easy solution to the problem of homophobia. An example of the power of this kind of material entrenchment is found in Tomsen's recent study of observers of pride events. For Tomsen, the “mixed fascination that accompanies a suspension of prejudice need not result in any ongoing shift toward more tolerant views” (Tomsen 2009, 28). Indeed, even in moments and spaces charged with positive affectivites, such as the celebratory atmosphere of open sexualities during a pride parade, in general, there still remains a pervasive “influence of essentialist ideas about sexual categories among the general public” (Tomsen 2009, 22). To Bourdieu, whose social theory is far more attuned to the conservation, transmission and reproducibility of social structures and
dispositions, emancipation from domination of this kind can only really occur through gradual change and slow attrition.
CHAPTER 2 THE REALITY OF HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

Patrick Hopkins’ (1998) presents a concise overview of some of the issues surrounding the term ‘homophobia’ (172), and he sets out some clear definitions of the term that this work adopts. First, in line with Hopkins, the term does not have the same meaning as other phobias, and should not be understood or treated through the clinical psychology of a medical field. That is, homophobia is not a ‘phobia’ in the clinical sense of the word, as it is not characterized by an irrational fear. For Hopkins “even when we choose to use the term ‘homophobia’ for cases of brutality, fanatic claims, petitions for fascistic laws, or arbitrarily firing gay employees, this does not mean that we must always characterize homophobia as an irrational, psychiatric/clinical response” (Hopkins, 173). This approach is too clinical and too individualistic, and fails to recognize the broader social implications and origins of homophobia by dismissing it as “simply an obsessive individual psychological aberration” (Hopkins, 173).

Rather than an isolated individual aberration, homophobia is social and political, and can be thought of as particular manifestations or crystallizations of a larger and more encompassing field of heterosexism. This work therefore adopts, but does not limit the term ‘homophobia’ to broadly refer to “physical violence and strong verbal, economic, and juridical abuse against gays” (Hopkins, 172). From this definition, heterosexism and homophobia can be thought of a pervasive privileging of heterosexual bodies and practices, one which maintains this privilege, and sustains the heterosexual/homosexual binary that identifies homosexuality as a target of violence and discrimination. “Heterosexism” writes Hopkins, “situates the political arena such that homophobia can
and is bound to exists…[it] is culpable for the production of homophobia” as it “constructs the field of concepts and behaviours” (Hopkins, 173). The following presentation of particular acts of violence and statistical evidence of homophobic hate crimes is done for the purpose of illustrating broader social problems of heteronormativity, and not identifying isolated, deviant, individual criminal acts separate from the social context in which they are given meaning and purpose.

With that in mind, the following section presents statistical and empirical data from the most recent Statistics Canada reports of police-reported hate crimes, media reports concerning homophobic violence, scholarly articles that survey the persecution of gay men and women, and studies on the relationship between increased suicidality and sexual orientation. The focus of this chapter is to present the diverse manifestations of homophobic violence, both as overt physical attack, and additionally, as the manner in which such violence appears in language, discourse, law, dispositions, and sentiment. It sets up a substantial body of empirical evidence to serve as a descriptive account of contemporary homophobic violence upon which the work will subsequently draw. Neither the particular instances of violence presented, nor the statistical aggregate of individual crimes will be isolated and analyzed as such; they are taken – in the spirit of Hopkins – to be specific homophobic events that emerge against a larger social framework of heterosexism and heteronormative privilege.

2.1 Homophobic Violence in Canada

It has been 10 years since Michael Stark and Michael Leshner became the first same-sex couple to be legally married in Canada in 2003 (CBC, 2013). On the surface
this milestone might give some us some solace, and indeed one cannot but view this as an achievement of tolerance and equality on some level, but placing such a symbolically rich event against the reality of continuing violence in Canada provides an illustrative backdrop. Simply put, despite the deepening history of such gains in formal equality, one can observe a statistical increase in violence committed against gay men and women in Canada. Additionally, in spite of similar, more recent landmark gains for marriage rights in the United States, evidence below shows similar instances of anti-gay violence in America.

The most recent Statistics Canada figures on police-reported hate crimes, presenting research conducted in 2010 and published in 2012, contains both troubling and encouraging data. In contrast to the 2009 numbers that show a staggering 42 percent increase in total hate crimes in that year (building upon a 35 percent increase in 2008), 2010 indicates an overall decrease of 18 percent in total hate-crimes. However, despite this observed reduction in crimes motivated by race and ethnicity (-20%) and religion (-17%), hate crimes motivated on the basis of sexual orientation show an increase (+3%) (Statistics Canada, 2012). This is the only category that shows an increase in reported hate crimes, and therefore seems a particular worry for anyone interested in preventing such crimes in general, and members of Canada’s queer population in particular.

Measured against the total reduction in hate-crimes from the other categories, this trend seems worrying. Similar instances of violence were found in Cowan et. al (2010) where, in a survey of two thousand gay men and women in California, over one quarter reported that they had experienced a hate crime because of their sexual orientation (Cowan et. al,
In addition to the questions that these statistics raise concerning an increased level of homophobic crime, stands the observation that hate crimes committed against gay Canadians are more frequently violent in nature when compared to other categories such as race, ethnicity and religion. Additionally, such attacks are committed against individual bodies, rather than on property or through speech (Statistics Canada 2012).\textsuperscript{1} Simply put, the very character of hate crimes committed on the basis of sexual orientation is different from other hate crimes; they are largely violent attacks (69%) and violent more frequently than the categories of race or ethnicity (34%) or religion (17%) (Statistics Canada, 2012). These types of attacks could be committed in other fashions, arson, destruction of property, and hate speech are examples of possible crimes – indeed, arson is the most common type of crime committed in other categories. Yet, when perpetrators target victims based on their sexual orientation, they commit crimes against the body. The 2012 report suggests that “injuries were reported in 59% of violent incidents motivated by sexual orientation, compared to 40% of racially motivated violent incidents and 14% of religiously motivated violent incidents (Statistics Canada, 2012).

In Canada there are four particular offences that the Canadian Criminal Code (Canada, 2013) recognizes as hate crimes: advocating genocide, public incitement of hatred, wilful promotion of hatred, and mischief in relation to religious property. Beyond these four offences, any criminal offence that is motivated by hatred towards a particular group, such as “race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor” can be considered a

\textsuperscript{1}Note that Hopkins (1998) also found this also to the case in the statistical evidence that he reviewed.
hate crime (Statistics Canada, 2012, 5). With these basic criteria one is able to recognize
the diverse nature of such crimes; that is, that they are not always crimes against
individual bodies, and further, that they are not necessarily violent physical attacks. This
observation provides a particularly illustrative backdrop against which the full
implications homophobic hate crimes more clearly come to light. As stated, hate crimes
based on sexual orientation are largely violent attacks and violent more frequently than
any of the other categories mentioned above. Homophobic hate crimes could be
committed in other fashions, arson, destruction of property, and hate speech are examples
of possible crimes, yet when perpetrators target victims based on their sexual orientation,
they predominately commit crimes of physical violence against the body. If one is to
broach the topic of homophobic violence, this observation needs to be properly
explained.

In addition to the statistical evidence of particular instances of violence, there is
an emerging trend that is similarly worrying. The disturbing aspect concerns yet another
Statistics Canada report that was released in 2008 indicating that “gays, lesbians and
bisexuals are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to be the victims of violent
crimes, including sexual assault, robbery and physical assault” (Statistics Canada, 2008 in
Canwest, 2008). This survey, containing data collected nationally in Canada in 2004
suggests that even outside of crimes that are officially recognized as hate crimes, queer
Canadians are found to be statistically significant targets of criminal behaviour. The
findings show that the “the odds of being victimized were nearly twice as high for gays
and lesbians” (Canwest, 2008). Even when the motivations behind the crimes are unable
to be proven, gay Canadians are more likely victims compared to heterosexual Canadians.

Equally troubling is the research coming from Cowan et. al (2010) that reveals that violence against gay men and women is chronically under-reported by the victims. Likewise, Tucker and Potocky-Tripodi (2006) suggest that the targets of gay violence often do not notify local law enforcement “because they expect an unsympathetic or even hostile response from the police.” They note that “this expectancy may be based on either their own prior experiences with law enforcement personnel, the shared experiences of others, or both” (177). This indicates to some extent that law enforcement have been indifferent, or possibly even discriminatory, when confronting gay victims of violence. At the very least it shows that those who identify as non-heterosexual are distrustful of police, and this suggests even higher rates of victimization. Indeed, Statistics Canada held similar reservations regarding the overall amount of crime, suggesting that their studies likely account for one-third of total crimes committed (Canada, 2012). Paired with these additional studies one is given to suspect even higher levels of homophobic crimes than has been observed.

2.2 Homophobia and Homophobic Language in Schools

In addition to the statistical accounts of homophobic violence, a recent study by Jewell and Morrison (2010) of negative behaviour and violence directed at gays and lesbians in the context of Canadian universities illustrates similar levels of persecution. Of the students surveyed, “2% indicated they had physically hit, pushed, or damaged property belonging to a gay man, 43% had told an antigay joke, 32% had spread negative
talk, and 9% had distanced themselves from a gay man” (2099). Further, students
admitted to other instances of homonegative behaviour including 43% who yelled
insulting comments at gay men, 14% who played practical jokes on gay men and 11%
who warned gay men to keep their distance (2098). The data collected by the authors
 corresponds to a similar nation-wide victimization survey conducted by the Gay, Lesbian,
and Straight Education Network in the US. In this instance the authors “found that about
44 percent of the youth in their sample were assaulted (pushed or shoved) due to their
sexual orientation, and 22 percent were punched, kicked or injured with a weapon”
(Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 29). Further, observed levels of verbal abuse, intimidation and
persecution are equally excessive in Canada, as the PFLAG Canada website indicates that
LGBT students are likely to hear “anti-gay” slurs about 26 times a day (PFLAG Canada,
2013).

Brian Burtch and Rebecca Haskell’s (2010) work on homophobia, transphobia,
and bullying in Canadian high schools presents similar statistical evidence. Their findings
show that of the students surveyed, “25 percent reported experiencing physical
harassment because of their sexual orientation…[and] 31 percent had hurtful rumors
spread about them by electronic means” (Burtch and Haskell 27). Additionally, the
particular data that they collected from British Columbia high schools indicated that
“levels of harassment that were up to 80 percent higher than their heterosexual peers”
(Burtch and Haskell 28). The excessive nature of this persecution compels scholarship to
address the very real and profound physical, psychological effects such systemic violence
has on the victims.
For example, Laing and Davies 2011 study from Manchester concerning the effect of crime rates on the behaviour of gay men in public is quite illustrative: 66% avoided areas at night, 18% installed extra locks in their homes, and 23% added extra lighting in order to prevent property damage. Burtch and Haskell also note that the threat of victimization had similar effects on the students that they surveyed: “73 percent felt unsafe in at least one place in school compared to 49 percent of heterosexual students” (Burtch and Haskell, 27). Similarly, one might also consider the example of Lindsay Willow, a teacher and lesbian in Nova Scotia. Willow was investigated for allegedly sexually abusing a female student in 2006, the only evidence being that the two were witnessed leaving a change-room together. According to Burtch and Haskell, the false accusation was instigated by a co-worker and the allegation was criminally investigated despite the student involved denying any foul play. They continue, that “although she kept her job, Willows’ employers barred her from extra-curricular activities that involved time alone with students” (Burth and Haskell, 39). Willows was eventually cleared of all charges and awarded compensation, the ordeal itself, which was well-reported in the media, represents a clear limiting of possible interaction between students and gay teachers, and is based in homonegative stereotypes.

Sociologist Ellen Faulkner provides a succinct summary of this homonegativity, or abjectivization of homosexual bodies:

The belief that gays spread disease and sickness and the promotion of AIDS as a homosexual disease; the view that queers are dangerous and pose a security risk; the view that gay and lesbian persons are highly sexed and sexually deviant; and finally, the suggestion is made that gay and lesbian persons conspire to destroy social institutions such as the family and this destroy society as a whole (Faulkner, 2003, 70-71).
For Burtch and Haskell, these “stereotypes about the sexual promiscuity of LGBTTQ people may lead students to be wary of others they suspect of being queer in change rooms.” Further, such “stereotypes equating sexual predation and homosexuality cause people to fear victimization unnecessarily and to police spaces where they feel vulnerable” (Burtch and Haskell, 39). Additionally it limits the possible modes of expression and ways of being social, in this case, in restricting a teacher who may very well cherish the time she spends with her students, homophobia appears as very challenging social and pedagogical impediment. This is certainly an example through which one sees the functioning of a homophobic logic in a manner, although not physically violent, that still presents significant challenges to gay Canadians.

The above case further raises the questions of the conspicuousness of homosexuality in general. The current social position that homosexuality occupies within a predominately heterosexist framework, forces it to appear as difference. What is important to note in this case, as Pierre Bourdieu does in *Masculine Domination* (2001), is that within a society dominated by heterosexual norms, there exists a whole entire set of everyday practices that heterosexuals simply take for granted. For example, the act of placing a photo of your loved one on your desk at work, participating in affectionate behaviours such as holding hands, or even being-with children, is entirely conspicuous. Such everyday gestures bear the potential to be interpreted on the basis of homonegative stereotypes, and thus endure a certain violence in their very exercise.

In addition to changes in behaviour and fears of victimization, of further concern is the large body of research that establishes a convincing statistical relationship between
suicide rates and sexual orientation in LGBQT youths and young adults (Bolten and Sareen 2011, King et al 2008, Saewyc et al 2007, Paul et al 2002). The bulk of this work clearly establishes higher suicide rates for those in the sexual minority, suggesting that more frequent and intense bullying in schools, and higher levels of stress through intimidation, abuse, and rejection, both at home and in the larger social fabric. Further, these scholars argue that more frequent levels of intense and visceral bullying of children presumed to have a non-heterosexual sexual orientation, contributes to higher suicide rates. Similar conclusions were reached by Kimmel and Mahler (2003) who suggest that gendered bullying and persecution has many potential psychological and behavioural consequences including “becoming withdrawn and sullen, using drugs or alcohol, becoming depressed or suicidal, or acting out [violently]” (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003, 1448). This is crucial, for it reminds us that persistent exposure to negative environments and verbal persecution, although not always providing the same level of media spectacle as particular instances of overt homophobic hate crime, prove to be just as deadly and violent.

Studies looking at homophobia in children and schools frequently cite the use of homophobic terms in youths as being particularly problematic (Burtch and Haskell 2010, McCann 2010, Plummer 1999). To many youths homophobic language represents the worst identities that children can imagine, embody, or be subject to. Terms such as ‘gay,’ ‘fag,’ or ‘faggot,’ are on the far-end of a spectrum of terms that bullies employ, and for scholars such as C.J. Pascoe (2005) this creates an ‘abject’ identity that functions to secure the dominant positions of masculine, heterosexual boys (334). Pascoe writes that
those who regularly employ homophobic terms “assure themselves and each other of their masculinity through repeated repudiations of a non-masculine position of the abject” (Pascoe, 2005, 339). In this context, gay abject identities exist in opposition to a standard of masculinity upheld by boys who more closely resemble normalized characteristics, as Pascoe notes, “to be a fag is, by definition, the opposite of masculine” (Pascoe, 339). Not only does this language promote the dominance of masculine, heterosexual values, but it stigmatizes and devalues difference.

David Plummer’s work on the use of homophobic terms in youth is particularly interesting in so far as he is able to trace the life-cycle of such terms (Plummer, 1999). As mentioned, homophobic are terms commonplace on school grounds, especially in areas that are unmonitored by teachers and staff, such as playing fields and locker rooms (Burch and Haskell 2012, Plummer, 1999). Plummer's observations of boys’ behaviour and interviews with men about their childhood experiences reveals that early on boys begin to use homophobic terms to call attention to difference, and in particular, to non-masculine attributes and behaviours in other boys. Examples may include, depending on the social context, crying too frequently, shyness, dressing differently, academic excellence, slightness of build, lack of aggression, or any instance of “attributing female characteristics” to boys (Plummer, 47). Early on, boys who are targeted know and feel they are different, and their difference, whether actually on the basis of their sexuality or not, is articulated in negative terms, and is reinforced by the violent behaviour and responses of other boys.

Of importance is that “the use of homophobic terms starts and gains considerable
significance prior to sexual maturity” (Plummer, 58). That is, boys are using homophobic terms not to describe any form of sexual behaviour, but merely to describe attributes that external to dominant social categories; in this case, in light of a rigidly gendered account of what a boy should be – difference from what Plummer calls *hegemonic boyhood*. This dominant form of masculinity functions in the same manner for Deborah Tharinger, whose work on homophobia in schools comes to similar conclusions. For her, the social dominance of particular masculine characteristics:

Serves as an idealized form of masculinity by which boys and men can be measured, by themselves and by others, to determine the extent of their "manliness." This idealized, or hegemonic, representation of masculinity is signified by the traditional forms of work that men and boys do, the popular sports they play, and the extent to which they can demonstrate power over women and other men (Tharinger, 2008, 224).

Tharinger also notes that such a demonstration of power from boys more often than not takes the form of bullying, intimidation, and violence on the playground. In this way, homophobia and homophobic terms “ensure that not too many boys challenge the existing gender order” (Tharinger, 2008, 225).

Plummer’s work concerns the progressive use of homophobic terms, referred to above as a life-cycle. As suggested above, homophobic slurs are used before sexual maturity, when boys know nothing of their sexual connotations, as Plummer puts it, such “words refer to difference, children do not understand that the term refers to sexuality” (Plummer, 43). Thus, two important aspects must be noted: first, during this “presexual use of the term” (Plummer, 45), feminine and non-masculine characteristics and behaviours in boys are identified as deviant, and serve to contribute to stereotypical representations of homosexuality. Second, and perhaps more importantly for discussions
of motivations for hate, crime, and violence, homophobic terms refer to negativity or an abject position, well before they acquire any actual sexual content. As Plummer puts it, “prior to the homosexualisation of homophobia” (Plummer, 44), homophobic terms are merely insulting words that point out undesirable characteristics on the basis of a masculine criteria of differentiation. In this case “gay simply refers to negativity” (Plummer, 49), although at a level of intensity that is far greater than other insults. Indeed, as has been noted, encountering such terms more than 20 times per day is certainly excessive and further highlights why such violent phenomena and persecution must be understood; even the lack of overt physical violence has drastic consequences. Violence and discrimination do not simply happen to people, they affect their very lives, and limit, constrain, and devalue possible behaviour.

2.3 Perpetrators of Homophobic Violence

The data thus presented is concerning for it reveals levels of hate, fear, and simple ignorance among many young Canadians, and highlights the extent to which many gay Canadians encounter violence, fear, and persecution. Additional statistical evidence helps to gain some clarity surround the perpetrators of such violence. Tobi Cohen notes in his discussion of Statistics Canada' article in the Vancouver Sun that “the Statistics Canada figures suggest young people between the ages of 12 and 22 are responsible for 6 in 10 hate crimes; the majority of those accused being 17 or 18” (Cohen, 2010). Thus, the data from Statistics Canada reveals that young Canadians are far more likely to target people on the basis of their identity. This is similar to the evidence that Hopkins found in his research:
The gender demographics of physical homophobic attack suggest something about the correlation between masculinity and homophobia. Consider the findings in a recent study on violence against lesbians and gays by Gary Comstock: (1) 94 percent of all attackers were male; (2) 99 percent of perpetrators who attacked gay men were male, while 83 percent of those who attacked lesbians were male (Hopkins, 1998, 182).

In each of the data sets presented, young men were responsible for the vast majority of violence and persecution. This is also found to be the case in Burtch and Haskell who observed that “almost all of the aggressors were male” (Burtch and Haskell, 37). This was similarly at play in Stephen Tomsen's analysis of homophobic violence in Australia where “most perpetrators were psychically ordinary young men, though with a marginal social existence” (Tomsen, 2006, 395). This proves to be supported in a variety of additional cases.

Take, for example, the brutal murder of David Curnick reported by The Canadian Press in 2005. In this case David, a 54-year-old teacher, was murdered in his apartment in 1994 after being stabbed 146 times with his own kitchen knife (Canadian Press, 2005). Another telling case, this time from St. Catharine's, Ontario, is given in Jeff Janoff’s (2005) book on homophobic violence in Canada. In this case two young men brutally attacked a gay man, kicking him in the head more than thirty times causing brain damage (Janoff, 48). In 2010 in Edmonton, Shannon Berry, a lesbian, was attacked by a male stranger, kicked in the face, and knocked unconscious; in 2011, in Halifax, five men attacked Dylan LaVigne and his partner Andrew who were walking downtown hand-in-hand; further in that same year Chris Cochrane, a local Halifax transgender artist who performs as Elle Noir, was attacked and shot in the arm during an attempted home invasion by a man claiming to be a police officer. Additionally, in PEI in October 2010 a
gay couple’s house was firebombed while they slept (Logan, 2010). In Halifax, gay activist Raymond Taavel, was murdered outside of MENZ bar while trying to break up a fight between two men. Lastly, in 2013 in New Glasgow, 27-year-old Scott Jones was stabbed in the back and had his throat slashed. Jones lived, but was left in a wheelchair. Each of these incidents involved male assailants. The date is quite conclusive: young men are far more likely, almost exclusively so, to commit violent crimes against gay men.

2.4 Conclusion

What these numerous examples illustrate is that violence against gay men is a systemic problem, and one with which Canadian society is increasingly implicated. The simple fact that so many people face violence and persecution merits an investigation of its roots. Further, the insight from the statistical data indicates that young men are by far the most likely to commit violent acts against gays. This suggests some kind of connection between emerging male identities and violence – an observation that Hopkins also makes. Indeed, research data gathered in Jewell and Morrison’s 2010 article supports this finding: “results indicated that antigay behaviors were conducted to reinforce traditional male gender roles, alleviate feelings of discomfort, and convey heterosexual identity” (Jewell and Morrison, 2010, 2095).

In each of the studies and articles reviewed, a relationship between a dominant form of masculinity, an “ideal of maleness that might include being able-bodied, athletic, white, heterosexual” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 29), and socially abject homosexual identities, is at the heart of explanations of homophobic violence. To point out a very salient example of such privilege and power of such a discourse, one need simply recall
that it was only in 1973 that the American Psychiatric Association finally removed homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (Janoff 2005, Foucault 1978). Here, homosexuality considered as ‘scientifically’ abnormal and as deviant behavior, signals nothing other than the clear and decisive hegemony of heterosexuality. According to Janoff (2005) the sheer power that heterosexual discourse held meant that individuals convinced that they were ‘suffering’ from homosexuality commonly underwent “aversion therapy, including looking at images of naked men and receiving electrical shocks” (40). Here, as Janoff remarks, “homosexuality is constructed as a sin, an illness, a congenital disorder, a deviance, or a symptom of social degeneration” (38). This is still a prevalent belief, and one need look only as far at the attempts at curing homosexuality made by Christian groups in the United States. In these cases, heterosexual values are so dominant that they produce feelings of disgust, sickness and other psychological trauma in homosexuals who are only able to see themselves through the lens of the dominant social discourse. Martha Nussbaum's work, for example, clearly establishes the use of the language of disgust in the persecution of gay men in the US (Nussbaum, 2009). This relates quite significantly to the alarming level of suicide in gay teens, and in particular, to the even higher levels in areas that are politically conservative and uphold traditional gender roles (Tanner, 2011). On the basis of this observation, the particular question this work seeks to answer are quite straight-forward: why are people with a different sexual orientation more frequently the target of violent physical attacks? Why are these attacks so often violent attacks against the body, and particular parts of the body? Given the observable data, one is
compelled to narrow the focus, asking why men predominantly, almost exclusively, commit such acts of homophobic violence. This suggests that attention to the relationship between homophobic violence and masculinity, and the social constitution of both, is of paramount importance.

As suggested in the introduction, theories of sex, sexuality, and gender therefore constitute the most appropriate framework of analysis for explaining the durability, pervasiveness, and normalization of homophobic violence and persecution. The following chapter therefore begins with an examination of the most salient concerns of the literature surrounding homophobic violence, before turning to an extended examination of Patrick Hopkins, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler whose work has been so influential in theorizing about sex, sexuality, and gender. In turning the analysis developed via these thinkers to Bourdieu, and his conception of symbolic violence and affective phenomenology, the aggregate perspective developed suggests that processes of socialization informs material, embodied relationships and to bodies and particular body parts. In a social setting dominated by heteronormative values, these physical affectivities contribute to the physical experience of quotidian homonegativity, and isolates the bodily logic of homophobic violence. This argument, hinted at here as the way forward, is captured by the practical logic of Bourdieu's affective phenomenology that is more finely tuned in Chapter 4. Presently, however, the work turns to address the literature on homophobic violence, before turning to a sustained engagement with Foucault and Butler that sets the stage for the analysis of Bourdieu's contribution.
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

Having provided a descriptive account of contemporary homophobic behaviour in Chapter 2, the first section in the present chapter reviews the relevant literature on homophobia. The overarching concern presented in this section relates homophobic violence to masculine excess and the dominance of heterosexual values. Therefore, it is an extension of the analysis and commentaries that accompanied the presentation of statistical accounts of violence and anti-gay behaviour in the preceding chapter. Stephen Tomsen, one of the most influential sociologists working on homophobic violence, writes that “attacks on gay men, lesbians and other sexual minorities all importantly reflect the imposition of gender norms and the various modes of society's policing of sex/gender identities” (Tomsen 2009, 20). This underlying current suggests that an examination of the major theorists of sex, sexuality and gender can gain some significant explanatory purchase on homophobic violence. That said, after detailing the most salient concerns of the field of research surrounding homophobia, the work will then reconstruct the positions of Butler and Foucault, two leading figures whose work helps theorizes sexual violence of this kind by analyzing the bodily affects of socialization. Prior, however, the work examines Hopkins' seminal essay “Gender Treachery,” for it can be read as a kind of aggregation or summary of the concerns of the field. However, despite these theoretical advances, and indeed some gains in formal, legal equality, homophobia still remains an aspect of contemporary sexual norms and dispositions. This, it seems, is where Bourdieu's affective phenomenology can be quite fruitful as an explanatory framework. Bourdieu's work complements this field of study insofar as it analyzes
contemporary forms of socialization, but additionally as it provides a novel account of anti-gay practice through his emphasis on dispositions and affective relationships. As Barry Adam notes in his much cited “Theorizing Homophobia” (1998) “social theory needs to identify not only how discourse produces subjectivity but how already constituted actors deploy discourse” (Adam, 401) – this is precisely what Bourdieu's work captures so elegantly.

3.1 TERMINOLOGY

The term 'homophobia' was first introduced by the American psychologist George Weinburg (1972) in his work Society and the Healthy Homosexual to describe a kind of disgust, dread or intense discomfort of being close to gay men and women. In his work, the term homophobia in a way, “turned the standard interpretation of homosexuality on its head” (Bryant and Vidal-Ortiz, 2008, 388). This was a reversal of the inherited scientific orthodoxy that held that homosexuality was linked to some kind of physical disorder or psychological deviancy. This inheritance was a legacy of the emergence of the social scientific discourse that focused on sexual 'deviancy' in the late 1800s wherein 'the homosexual' became an object of study, scrutiny, intervention and discipline (Foucault 1978; Halperin, 1990). The resulting medicalization and pathologization of homosexuality was indeed 'turned on its head' with Weinburg's work, redirecting the stigma by suggesting 'the homophobe' as the deviant identity, and not the 'homosexual'.

Additionally, notes sociologist Gregory Herek, “a watershed moment came when the American Psychiatric Association’s Board of Directors voted to remove homosexuality from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in
1973” (Herek, 2007, 915). For Herek, this, in combination with Weinberg’s terminology were “two historic events” (Herek, 2004, 6) in the field of sexuality studies. For Tomsen they “reflected the impact of Gay Liberationist efforts to lift homosexuality out of its deviant position in medicine and professional psychology” (Tomsen 2009, 17). This historical background remains integral to the current work, as the social traces of discriminatory institutions and beliefs, are as Herek notes, “anchored in strong affect and longstanding beliefs, and repeatedly reinforced by society over the course of development” (Herek, 2007, 913). Acknowledging the historical influences of homonegativity that the term ‘homophobia’ first attempted to overcome helps provide a layer of accepted coherency to the field as such.

However influential, the term homophobia is not satisfactory to many theorists, as Adam notes, it is too “rooted in psychology, suggesting a parallel to other phobias” (Adam, 1998, 388). Indeed, after having contributed to the theoretical and historical reversal outlined above, it was almost immediately criticized for being individualistic and overly psychological (Kitzinger, 1987; Plummer, 1981). As Tomsen suggests, “it too was tied with a specific identity and pathology, that of the homophobe as a “disturbed minority condition” (Tomsen 2009, 18). Given the nature of observable anti-gay phenomena, homophobia as a term seems unable to capture the social elements of this kind of behaviour, as well as the commonplace, everyday experience of anti-gay behaviour and attitudes. Additionally, as Herek (1984) notes, unlike other phobias, homophobia as “anti-homosexual sentiment is often highly rational and rewarding and it enhances the social esteem of those who display it” (Tomsen 2009, 18). Further, Herek
“observed that research does not confirm that these sentiments are usually like a clinical phobia, and many anti-homosexual individuals do not display physiologically typical phobic reactions to homosexuality” (Tomsen, 2006, 391). It is clear that the term itself, if taken to signal an isolated, deviant, clinical phobia, does not capture the lived experience of violence and oppression nor does it capture the social function of anti-gay violence.

Other terms, notably heterosexism and heteronormativity, soon emerged as a means to theorize the social and commonplace aspects of 'homophobia'. Herek suggests that “heterosexism can be understood as a cultural ideology embodied in institutional practices that work to the disadvantage of sexual minority groups even in the absence of individual prejudice or discrimination” (Herek, 2007, 907). Indeed, this understanding of the wider privileging of heterosexual values, notes Adam, “offers a more sociological notion of something structured, institutional, and material, as well as ideological” (Adam, 1998, 388). This contributes a larger framework of analysis that looks not only to individual manifestations of violence or discriminatory behaviour, but to institutions, social customs, religion and law that support or encourage them. Still, others thinkers have opted to use the term 'heteronormativity' that stresses the discrimination of everyday language, representation and discourse” (Tomsen 2009, 19). “Heteronormativity” in this case arises as “an effect of language, codes or 'law” (Adam, 1998, 388). In sum, it is each term, rather than contradict or compete, stresses a certain aspect of anti-gay behaviour, belief or practice, and situates questions of 'homophobic violence' with normative excess, and not individual and pathological violence.

Of the three terms homophobia is certainly the most wide-spread, and if not taken
as an actual identity or individualized, clinical phenomena, can be quite helpful as framework of analysis. Homophobia redefined by taking into account heteronormativity and heterosexism as complementary theoretical devices, refers to “the negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek, 2007, 906-7). Overall, despite its initial shortcomings, to Bryant and Vidal-Ortiz “‘homophobia’ has been a conceptual tool and a discursive resource for individuals and collectivities to name and respond to their oppression” (Bryant and Vidal-Ortiz, 2008, 387). It is with this less clinical sense of the word homophobia that the current work proceeds.

3.2 The Concerns of The Field

Tomsen argues that a basic way of approaching questions of homophobic violence is to first situate homophobia as consequence of essentialist claims about human sexuality as properly and biologically heterosexual. This concern can be traced throughout various writings on homophobia and homophobic violence, and perhaps overall, the collection of perspectives aimed at understanding and combating homophobia can themselves be understood as writing against the excesses of biological essentialism. To begin, for Tomsen, essentialism in a nutshell argues that “sexual desire, acts and identities are the outcome of biological forces” (Tomsen 2009, 2). In this case, to be identified as a certain biological sex comes with explicit social and normative imperatives. As a consequence of subverting this assumed link, “homosexuality is frequently conceived as a biological or psychological malfunction that afflicts a minority of people” (Tomsen 2006, 390). As Foucault points out, the historical emergence of the homosexual as a distinct and
threatening sexual species that required intensive regulation and treatment (Foucault, 1978, 43) is directly responsible for the growth of essentialist position. The traces of this essentialism, as will be established later in this chapter, still bears significant impact in the form of homonegativity.

It was Jeffrey Weeks (1986) who provided perhaps the first sustained sociological critique of this position, in which “sexual urges reflect pregiven or instinctive biological drives” (Tomsen 2006, 390). The counterpoint is, of course, to offer a constructionist perspective that challenges these biologically reductionist claims. To Weeks, sexuality:

Is a result of diverse social practices that give meaning to human activities, of social definitions and self-definition, of struggles between those who have the power to define and regulate, and those who resist. Sexuality is not given, it is a product of negotiation, struggle and human agency (Weeks 1986, 25).

From this position the human experience of sexualities and sexuality is indeed “socially varied and fluid” (Tomsen 2009, 3), and violence therefore is relates to attempts to police, enforce and maintain the particular normative demands of biological essentialism, a framework most significantly attributed to Judith Butler's theoretical perspectives on gender (Butler, 1990). This includes the exclusivity of heterosexual sex as normal, and in many cases the elevating of masculine values. For Tomsen and Mason, homophobia is also directly related to norms that focus on “the sanctity of the body, with rigid limits imposed on the circumstances and socially admitted forms of male to male physical contact” (Tomsen and Mason, 2001, 269).

Relatedly, Tomsen argues in a more recent work that “the cultural understanding of the human body as naturally heterosexual and of non-heterosexual desire as a bodily threat or fault is reflected in constructs of gay men and lesbians as unclean groups of
social outsiders” (Tomsen 2009, 21). This in turn relates to the policing and ostracizing of gay men and women, as “transgressive sexual practices, such as prostitution and homosexuality, have also been characterized as unhygienic, representing not just a danger to the physical and mental health of an individual but also the body politic” (Tomen and Mason, 2001, 263). That is, gay men and women are not just individual aberrations, but could potentially destabilize the established social order.

To the above authors, the social norms associated with heterosexuality help explain homophobic violence, as they engender violence through the socialization of difference and the maintenance of the dominant social order. For example, in _Masculinities_ (1995) Raewyn Connell argues that the social excess of masculinity or “hegemonic masculinity” is a set of “evolving and varied social practices in societies which either legitimate, or attempt to guarantee, the shoring up of patriarchy and male domination of women” (Tomsen and Mason, 2001, 266); in this case it is male dominance over other men. Indeed, in similar fashion, American sociologist Michael Kimmel argues that homophobia is literally men's fear of other men, and as Herek suggests represents “a man’s fear that other men will expose him as insufficiently masculine” (Herek, 2004, 9). As Herek argues in an earlier work, in this case homophobia functions to secure personal male inadequacy by acting out violently and dominating others (Herek, 1986). In this sense, according to Tomsen and Mason, from a sociological perspective, “gay bashing serves a dual purpose of constructing a masculine and heterosexual identity through a simultaneous involvement with violence and by establishing homosexuals as an opposed group of social outsiders” (Tomen and Mason,
A different perspective on homophobic violence has been developed mainly through Queer Theory. With this frame of analysis, notes Adam, “heterosexual masculinity builds itself precisely through the simultaneous exploitation and denial of homosexuality” (Adam 1998, 394). Sedgewick (1984), for example, analyzes modern representations of “men and male desire to powerfully argue that the homo/hetero divide, and an underlying anxiety about homosexuality, is central to contemporary understandings of masculinity” (Tomsen 2007, 12). Indeed, for Butler whose significant contribution to theorizing gender and violence will be addressed later in this chapter, this constant reinforcement illustrates the social construction and artificiality of hetero/homo, male/female social logics. For example, C. J. Pascoe's (2003) work argues that there is a relationship between homophobia and adolescent masculinity that is constructed via ‘fag discourse’ in which homophobia is “is not simply a homophobic threat targeting gay youth, but rather part of a broad disciplinary mechanism to which all boys – heterosexual and homosexual – are subject” (Bryant and Vidal-Ortiz, 2008, 390).

For Adam, as Queer Theory locates “the problem of heteronormativity in the logic of textual reproduction, its alleviation follows naturally as a discursive practice of transgressive writing, dress, performance, or parody” (Adam, 1998, 395). To Adam, these theories “may disarm homophobia in the realm of ideas but as little clear effect on the day-to-day practices of the workplace, mass media, law, religion, education, or public institutions” (Adam, 1998, 395). Yet, despite Adam's reservations, thinking critically about the everyday consequences is an extremely powerful tool for the analysis of
contemporary homophobia.

### 3.3 A Framework for Further Analysis

Overall this work argues that explaining systemic violence against minorities and difference in general demands an attentiveness to the dominant belief structures that are able to designate particular identities and ways of being as unwanted, deviant, immoral, or abnormal. This way of thinking about dominance is established most profoundly by Foucault’s seminal text, *The History of Sexuality* (1978), which sets the groundwork that will be built upon here. Here, Foucault traces the emergence of a discursive conception of sexuality, that is, his research locates a historical period in which talking about sex, particularly in terms of the truth of sexuality via scientific discourse, creates particular sexual identities, or sexualities. Understanding Foucault involves not only grasping the productive forces involved in the producing the truth about sexuality (“what is sexuality?”) but also pointing out that moment when sex becomes of particular interest to so many (“when is sexuality?”) (Halley and Parker, 2011, 5). The reading of Foucault developed here argues that the explanation of systemic violence in general demands an attentiveness to the dominant belief structures that are able to designate particular identities and ways of being as unwanted, deviant, immoral, or abnormal.

From such a perspective, one is able to critically examine particular overarching, widespread beliefs and values, often taken to be natural or biological, that serve as a foundation upon which particular instances of violence are deemed appropriate, merited, or even just. These beliefs, ways of being, and identities that are considered and constructed as ‘other’ or ‘external’ to dominant beliefs, are often viewed as direct threats.
those dominant social structures, and not simply as violations of particular codes of conduct. This is an argument that Hopkins (1998) addresses with remarkable lucidity. Further, this is made quite clear in relation to gender by Butler (1990) and masculinity by Bourdieu (2001) in the following sections. Here, Butler's work provides the most significant examination of the relationship between gender and violence, and in particular, the policing of the normal and its relationship to homophobic violence (Butler 1990, 2004). Further, as will established with Bourdieu, the physical embodiment of dominant beliefs, taken as normal and natural, often produce negative sentiments and feelings in those who do not, or cannot, maintain a particular social standard (Bourdieu 2001). Further, complementing the field with an elaboration of Bourdieu sheds some light on the excessive, body-centric aspect of many homophobic attacks, and illustrates why heteronormativity still yields negative dispositions and sentiment.

Below, Butler, Foucault, and Bourdieu all offer significant theoretical perspectives that explain how the physical embodiment of norms perpetuate heteronormativity and homonegative practice. An additional example of the merit of such critical, normative approaches can be found in particular readings and critiques of legal practices wherein the rational evaluation of evidence is marred by dispositional, affective responses to particular bodies and practices. For example, in Luny’s (2003) discussion of homosexual provocation or ‘gay rage’ defense, the success of cases is not so much built upon a logical examination of the evidence at hand, but rather the construction and reproduction of gay stereotypes and a gendered logic. That is, Luny argues quite convincingly that in many cases what is at stake is the “symbolic feminization” (Luny, 2003, 314) of male bodies.
and identities, whose masculinity is threatened by being potentially penetrated by an aggressive gay man. Additionally, the difficulty that courts have understanding the male body as a possible victim of sexual abuse, or female-female domestic violence feeds into a similar discourse, as ‘traditional’ sexual assault cases are built upon a gendered logic of the passivity and receptivity of the female body; simply put, in many cases it is difficult for the legal system to understand the male/female bodies without recourse to traditional, accepted normative frameworks which are blind to the vast difference and interplay of sex, gender and sexuality.

By appealing to such a framework the remainder of this chapter collects theoretical perspectives that are critical of the dominant, ascendant social position of particular norms of gender, sex, and sexuality. In the case at hand, it is heteronormativity which denotes homosexuality in such a manner. The privileging of heterosexual values, and the consistent cultural hegemony that they maintain, defines homosexuality in highly negative, derogatory, or abject terms. Here, heteronormativity, together with the hegemonic position of traditional masculine values are complicit in the continuation and legitimization of homophobic violence. This ‘normative violence’ functions in tandem with the everyday reproduction of negative dispositions to queer bodies and relates to the body-centric nature of homophobic violence. This dispositional perspective introduced at the end of the present chapter, will be explained more thoroughly in relation to Bourdieu's affective phenomenology in Chapter 4.

**3.4 The Social Logic of Hopkins’ “Gender Treachery”**

Patrick Hopkins opens his succinct, insightful work on homophobic violence by
discussing the most common derogatory word that boys used toward other boys in his high school experience; it was simply ‘girl.’ For Hopkins, what this rather banal swapping of physical sexual characteristics amounts to is first a denial of the target’s masculinity, and second, that femininity itself and common feminine characteristics intrinsically have less value than male ones. For the accuser, the feminine is pejorative and conferring femininity onto a male identity or body diminishes it, places in lower on a hierarchical social structure that venerates both masculinity and heterosexuality.

For Hopkins, it was the case that in employing the term ‘girl’ the accuser recognizes that the target is displaying attitudes, has characteristics, or is behaving in a way that does not conform to “a gendered standard of behaviour, and a gendered set of identities” (Hopkins, 1998, p.169). The target may, for example, be a young effeminate boy who prefers guitar to hockey, characteristics that do not match the majority of other boys. In the particular context at hand, factors such as independence, rationality, emotional control, aggressiveness, and even “a certain way of walking” (Hopkins, p.171) can be markers of general socially acceptable or normalized masculine attributes and behaviours. These behaviours, in turn, designate what is properly male or masculine from that which is considered deviant, or in the extreme, abject. These negative characterizations of stereotypically ‘gay’ attributes, here taken to be simply non-masculine, are formed on the basis of a strict heteronormative gender bias, in which ‘straight’ and ‘male’ are taken as natural and morally good.

Perhaps the most fundamental heteronormative position is that one should have particular characteristics, and behave in certain ways, simply on the basis of sexual
identity. That is, heteronormativity is gendered insofar as it separates everyone on the basis of a binary identity. As such identities derive from a simple male/female binary, they, as Hopkins puts it, “demand criteria for differentiation” (Hopkins, 171) as either distinctly male or distinctly female. The statistical and empirical evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests a relationship between masculinity and violence against gay men, thus the consideration focuses on what males should be like, and how they should act. These characteristic are clearly identifiable in most social contexts, and constitute what is understood as acceptable or normal male behaviour, which Hopkins clearly recognizes:

(Hetero)sexual prowess, sexual conquest of women, heading a nuclear family, siring children, physical and material competition with other men, independence, behavioral autonomy, rationality, strict emotional control, aggressiveness, obsession with success and status, a certain way of walking, a certain way of talking, and having buddies rather than intimate friends (Hopkins, 171).

Men and women who do not live up to these prescribed gender norms are considered to be inhuman or abject. Men, if displaying un-masculine characteristics are also called ‘bitches’ or ‘sissies,’ and as Hopkins suggests, “girl, like these other terms, signifies a failure of masculinity, a failure of living up to a gendered standard of behavior” (Hopkins, 169). Further, and more directly sexual, men are understood as active, and as penetrating. The binary logic is quite simple. Luny makes the heteronormative logic quite clear in her analysis of homosexual provocation: “to the male subject who penetrates is conferred masculinity, activity, dominance and power. To the male subject who is penetrated is conferred femininity, passivity, subjugation and powerlessness” (Luny, 2003, 316).

For Hopkins, those who either fail to achieve, or who choose to act against a
standard of gendered behaviour are preforming a kind of “gender treachery” (Hopkins, 1998). He writes: “any of these traitorous activities may result in a serious reaction from those individuals and groups whose concept of personal and political identity is most deeply and thoroughly sexed by traditional binary categories” (Hopkins, 171). He therefore sees an overarching homonegative framework as being the condition of possibility for particular acts of violence – for it provides the categories through which difference is acknowledged and targeted. Violence therefore, for Hopkins, is so frequently committed against gays simply because “homosexuals, intentionally or not, directly challenge assumptions concerning the relational aspects of the binary sex/gender, and as such threaten individual identities” (Hopkins, 171-2).

This position is echoed in Kimmel and Mahler’s (2003) work on adolescent masculinity and homophobia. In thier work the authors suggest that violence is often “based on criteria for adequate gender performance, specifically the enactment of codes of masculinity” (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003, 1445). That is, gay identities threaten traditional roles simply by being different, through the complication, inversion or rejection of expected behaviours. For example the violence committed against gay men in Iraq, detailed in a recent 2009 Human Rights Watch report, telling and its symbolism revealing. The disgustingly violent absurdity of putting glue into anuses of men suspected of being gay reveals a normative, gendered binary logic. These men were not doing what men should be doing as they were violating a gendered hierarchy and the proper social order. Simply put, men should not be penetrated.
### 3.5 Kimmel on Violence and Masculinity

Before finishing up the presentation of Hopkins, it is useful to speak a bit more about the construction of masculine identity, and its relationship to violence, the structure of which is only outlined in his work. Michael Kimmel (2005) is equally relevant in this regard insofar as he thoroughly explores the relationship between masculinity, sexuality and violence, and can function to fill in the gaps that Hopkins skips over. In a work containing several essays on male sexuality, Kimmel presents a broad sociological account of the construction of masculine identity in North America. In his previous work (2003) Kimmel suggests the “the single most obdurate and intractable gender difference remains violence, both the willingness to see it as a legitimate way to resolve conflict and its actual use” (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003, 1450). This, Kimmel observes, much in line with the statistical evidence presented in Chapter 2 showing that men almost exclusively commit homophobic attacks, seems to be case with most of the violence he studied in schools.

His later work, therefore, is an attempt to build upon this observation by exploring masculinity, and the construction thereof, in a wider context. Like many of the authors presented, Kimmel suggests that part of the explanation for violence comes from attempts to correct or police difference from hegemonic masculinity. Kimmel presents us with a succinct definition of this concept, one which accounts for its explanatory power, but shifting contextual definitions. Hegemonic masculinity, for Kimmel, is “the image of masculinity of those who hold power” (Kimmel, 30) that is “described in relation to what one is not” (Kimmel, 31). In this context violence is explained when “woman and gay
men become the other against which heterosexual men project their identities” (Kimmel, 37). This aligns Kimmel with many of the thinkers thus presented, but his work continues, by describing both the logic of the experience of masculinity, and particular characteristics that increase the propensity for violence.

Kimmel argues that masculinity is largely a “homosocial enactment” or an identity that develops between men “in relation to the gaze of male peers, and male authority” (Kimmel, 2005, 33). This, perhaps, aides in the explanation of why homophobic violence is most committed by men against, as an extension of the policing power of the logic of hegemonic masculinity. Additionally, Kimmel suggests that “masculinity as a homosocial enactment is fraught with danger, with the risk of failure, and with intense relentless competition” (Kimmel, 33). Is this experience of risk, which leads Kimmel to his most insightful point: hegemonic masculinity constructs the male identity in such a way that men expect to be in positions of power and authority, which given the competition for positions of power, always leads to situations of experiences of powerlessness: “they are the feelings of men raised to believe themselves entitled to feel that power, but do not feel it” (Kimmel, 40). This leads Kimmel to suggest that “masculinity is not the experience of power, it is the experience of entitlement to power” (Kimmel, 229). “Violence” for Kimmel is therefore, “restorative, a means to reclaim to power” (Kimmel, 196). The most likely target in such a situation would be those who the perpetrators deem weak, and the criteria for evaluating weakness stems from heteronormative values.
3.6 Hopkin’s Theses

This short Kimmel segue provides us with some insight into the logic of the construction of masculinity, which helps to gain significant explanatory purchase on the relationship between masculinity and violence. In order to further explain this violent reaction against gender traitors, Hopkins establishes three interrelated theories: the repression hypothesis; the irrationality/ignorance hypothesis; and the political response hypothesis. Each of these theories contributes to explaining the kind of violence at issue. Yet most importantly, as is also the case with Kimmel, these theses reveal gender categories as social constructs that need constant reinforcement.

The repression hypothesis suggests that men react to homosexuality by becoming more masculine: “they overcompensate, metastasizing into toxic, hypermasculine, ultra-butch homophobes who seem to spend more time worrying about homosexuality than openly gay men do” (Hopkins, 173-4). This reaction produces men who react violently to feminine or passive men, seeing them as a threat their own self-understanding, and to masculinity as such, or as simply easy targets. Kimmel agrees, seeing such cases as “exaggerating all the traditional roles of masculinity” (Kimmel, 370). For many men, this means repressing same-sex desires, which often takes the form of violent outbursts against openly gay men. Such assailants may even be married, or maintain heterosexual relationships. Hopkins writes:

They manage psychologically to compartmentalize their erotic orientation and same-sex sexual experiences so radically that they live two separate, torturous lives….Horrifyingly, some others undergo an even worse schism in their personalities, resulting in a bizarre, malignant, and persistent internalized war between homophobia and homophilia. The war can culminate in what John Money calls the exorcist syndrome, in which the
repressive picks up, seduces, or even rapes a gay man, and then beats him or kills him in order to exorcise the repressive’s ‘homosexual guilt’ (Hopkins, 174).

He points out that “it is not so unusual for openly gay men to talk about their days in the closet and report that they were assertively heterosexist/homophobic” (Hopkins, 174), thus lending empirical support to the repression hypothesis.

The irrationality/ignorance hypothesis suggests that it is a simple lack of education about homosexuality gives rise to violence. The main force “is a fear, based in ignorance and resulting from social training” (Hopkins, 175). Like the repression hypothesis, violence erupts during those moments when people feel as if they have to prove who they are, simply by attacking who they are not: “homophobic activity wins approval from peers and authority figures, protects one from becoming the target of other homophobes, and reaffirms one’s place in a larger context of gender appropriate behavior” (Hopkins, 177). In this case, homophobic violence situates individuals, and produces and affirms traditional masculine identity, which follows the logic already noted by Kimmel above: woman and gay men become the other against which heterosexual men project their identities” (Kimmel, 37). Data collected from Jewell and Morrison’s 2011 research preformed at a Canadian university campus supports this thesis:

Participants engaged in antigay behaviors to alleviate feelings of discomfort experienced on encountering gay men…used antigay behaviors to reprimand men perceived to deviate from society’s gender role expectations…[and] male participants were motivated to engage in homonegative behaviors to demonstrate their own heterosexuality (Jewell and Morrison, 2011, 2107-8)

Here, the empirical evidence suggests that men ‘perform’ masculinity in order to perpetuate, protect, and enforce traditional gender norms.
The final consideration is the political response hypothesis that suggests that violence and discrimination against homosexuals is a rational, political argument: as Hopkins notes, “radical feminists and certain radical gay men directly challenge the hetero-male-dominated structure of society, rejecting patriarchal rule, conventional morality, and patriarchal modes of power distribution” (Hopkins, 171). Thus, the negative reaction concerns struggling not only against a group grasping for more social and political resources, but one in which challenges particular characteristics of the systems itself. This thesis has merit simply due to the overt challenges that gays are making, for example, to have marriage recognized, or to be able to participate, openly, in offices of the church. However convincing, it is not necessarily the precondition for violence, as Hopkins notes, “most homophobes, even those who openly admit their involvement in physical and verbal attacks on gays and lesbians, do not consider their activity to be political” (Hopkins, 178). The impetus to violence comes from some other source, and from the evidence and theoretical positions here articulated, this source is the threat that homosexuality presents to traditional gender roles and the social dominance of heteronormative discourse.

3.7 Butler and Gender Performativity

Much of Judith Butler’s work is a theoretical engagement with the concept of gender and represents a deepening of the descriptive accounts of the logic of heteronormativity presented above. It is through Butler that one grasps why it is that gender occupies such a central place in identity, although for her it is quite separate from identity, and additionally, why it has such power in relation to the production and policing
of particular bodies and practices. According to Chamber and Carver’s exposition of Butler (2011), part of the impetus behind her work, as with many of the scholars already cited, is to “expose the power-relations involved in naturalising and therefore stabilizing, categories and relations that have in fact been constructed historically and contingently with power” (Original emphasis). Echoing Foucault, with whom this work will subsequently engage, the authors suggest that this kind of power “is then exercised in the present within and through those categories by means of exclusion and devaluation” (Original emphasis, Chamber and Carver, 22). That is to say, Butler exposes such relations by elucidating heterosexism and a close constellation of related norms as an exclusionary practice that devalues homosexuality and transsexuality. It is the general approach of such a critique that situates Butler as contributing to conceptual framework that gains some purchase on homophobic violence. One might object that much of Butler’s work is an attempt to free up, or trouble traditional categories of gender in order to open up the possibility for the recognition and livability, and therefore not in itself a theory of violence. Yet, it is accounting for the possibility of such normative transformation that Butler’s work exposes the violence of gender and sexuality.

Therefore, this section takes up several of Butler’s works, focusing on the way in which her concept of gender functions throughout as contributing to a theoretical account of homophobic violence. Specifically, the following section highlights the manner in which, through Butler, violence is identified as product of the regulatory aspects of a pervasive heteronormative framework; additionally, her adoption of Foucault speaks to the process of normalization which illuminates the possible sites and logic of
homophobic violence. Moreover, the manner in which she theorizes the objectivity of
gender provides further insight into the violence committed against gay bodies and
practices, to which Butler refers as “phobic violence against bodies” (Butler, 2004, 9). It
is the objective reality of gender, within a Butlerian perspective, which both signals the
manner in which gender normatively reproduces and exposes itself to violence.

Gender, for Butler, can be thought of as “the repeated stylisation of the body,
[and] a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time
to produce the appearance of substance, the appearance of a natural sort of being” (Butler,
1999, 40). For her, there is a kind of objectivity of gender – that is, it is present in the
world as exteriority. According to Chamber and Carver, Butler’s conception of gender
“consists of the repetitious activities that make individuals and therefore their bodies
what they are through unselfconscious citation of ideas, concepts, or norms” (Chamber
and Carver, 39). This means gender is historical, insofar as it is contingent upon the
specific acts that have come before. It is the externality of gender as a doing, or an action,
that produces a certain way of being in the world, and additionally, opens itself up to the
possibility of repetition.

Gender, therefore, is constitutive of identity, but it is not an identity. For Butler,
the results of the external practice of gender, that is, the outcome of particular acts and
gestures charged within meaning within a particular social context, produces the effects
of having an identity. Gender thus contributes one’s experience of one’s own body, and
the bodies of others, in reference to normative value that specific acts have within a social
setting. That is to say that gender is a wholly social practice, which both highlights the
manner in which gender reproduces and additionally, exposes one to violence and discipline.

As a social and historical practice, the repeatability, or citationality of gender establishes the pattern in which it continues – gender works to “recreate various bodily and psycho-social phenomena in order to produce a workable reference to one stereotype or another (i.e. femaleness or maleness) and thus to begin the familiar patterns of citationality and repetition that produce a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’” (Chamber and Carver, 2011, 40). Gender, therefore, is not simply in and of itself the experience of being a man or a woman, but a sense of being and a mode of being present to others, which is created through the embodiment of socially recognizable gestures and behaviours over time.

Butler’s conception of gender is structured to “combat forms of essentialism which claimed that gender is a truth that is somehow there, interior to the body, as a core or as an internal essence” (Butler, 2004, 212). That is, it aims to establish the limits of specific, restrictive conceptions of gender that see particular configurations of sex, gender and sexuality as abnormal, deviant, and wrong. In this sense, for Butler, a restrictive conception of gender can be through of as functioning similar to the command to “obey the Law” (Butler, 2004, 46). In such an instance, seemingly recalling Derrida’s argument about the foundation of a law on constitution, she writes that the very command “becomes the utterance that performatively attributes the very force to the law that the law itself is said to exercise” (Butler, 2004, 46). That is, the ‘doing’ of gender creates the spaces for its legitimacy – or has over time – and provides the force though which it is internalized or functions to regulate or police the behaviours of others. In focusing “on
the gestures and other subtle bodily actions that signal to an observer that ‘the person is a woman’” (Chamber and Carver, 39), Butler identifies the culturally and historically contingent markers, that when enacted, produce particular bodies and practices. In a moment which recalls Hopkins’ alliance to such a conception, she writes that “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ [i.e. nouns, adjectives] that are said to be its results” (Butler, 1999, 33-4, in Chamber and Carver).

The manner in which we read, see, and repeat gender, as well as Butler's suggestions that gender is not a thing, as in a substance, but rather an action or a doing, can perhaps be more clearly brought to light in relation the use of homophobic language discussed in Chapter 2. In such a case, language does not refer to the object in itself, but helps to produce, maintain, police, and regulate it. With such an example, language is not “descriptive and referential, but inscriptive and constructive” (Chamber and Carver, 34). What language constructs, here, is a particular, restrictive gender binary (and there specific masculine and feminine genders), and a heterosexist social space – that is, a space in which heteronormative values and norms occupy a central, hegemonic, or privileged position. In such a situation, “to be called unreal, and to have that call institutionalized as a form of differential treatment, is to become the other against which the human is made” (Butler, 2004, 218). That is, gender functions within a heteronormative space to produce homosexual and transsexual bodies as deviant, and normal bodies as homophobic. In such a case, the externality of gender suggests that homophobic violence is a function of a particular social equation: that of presumed sexuality and the regulatory apparatus implied by normative gender.
For Butler, this signals the importance of asking “how the organization of gender comes to function as a presupposition about how the world is structured” (Butler, 2004, 215). Or in order words, asking how heteronormativity came to occupy a hegemonic social position that devalues non-hetero bodies and practice. Part of answering such a line of inquiry, which leads one both to ask questions about the substantive content of salient norms and the manner in which they reproduce, is succinctly grasped in Butler’s self-described motivations to “counter the normative violence implied by ideal morphologies of sex and to uproot the pervasive assumptions about natural or presumptive heterosexuality” (Butler, 1999, xx). This provides a clear indication of her own goals, and serves additionally to give voice to the rationale guiding the work at hand. In particular, in addition to theorizing the externality of gender, or gender as practice, Butler attempts to counter the normative violence inherent in the normalization and naturalization of hegemonic masculinity, presenting “an assault on, and hence exposure of that kind of naturalization of human attributes” (Chamber and Carvers, 48).

Butler’s take on the normative violence of the naturalization of ideal sex morphologies situates her within the critical discourse established above, many of whom, including Hopkins, seem to draw significantly from her work. For her, reliance on the biological or natural, in this case the male/female binary, as the source of legitimate behaviour fails to properly understand the way in which our access to the natural is fatally limited by our immersion in processes of socialization and discipline, that is, in particular discourses that produce our very means of access to the world. For Chamber and Carver, “the prediscursive can only ever be a particular product of a particular
discourse” (59-60). Simply put, any understanding of what sex should mean in relation to gender, or which types of practices and acts should drive from the biological sex of a given body, are already infused with particular normative constraints about sex. Butler argues that “the very attribution of femininity to female bodies takes place within a normative framework in which the assignment of femininity to femaleness is one mechanism for the production of gender itself” (Butler, 2004, 10). That is, gender emerges a norm, and part of a normalizing discourse, not via the association or connection of biological sex with gender, but through the social and historical work, or process of, maintaining that link.

Thus, in following Foucault’s work in tracing the historical emergence of a particular discursive conception of sex, who states that “we must not make the mistake of thinking that sex is an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold effects of sexuality of the length of its surface of contact with power” (Foucault 1978, 155), Butler aims to question the primacy of the natural. She writes: “the binary categorization of sex conceals the strategic aims of that very apparatus of production by postulating ‘sex’ as ‘a cause’ of sexual experience, behavior, and desire” (Butler, 1999, 31). That is, maintaining a conception of sex, gender, and sexuality that derives normative expectations of the latter from rigid male/female binary occurs through social and cultural particularities. Through the maintenance of such a position, “gender functions to secure certain forms of reproductive sexual ties and to prohibit other forms” (Butler, 2004, 47). Yet for her, “transgendered lives are evidence of the breakdown of any lines of casual determinism between sexuality and gender” (Butler, 55). Simply put, the lived experience
of those who do not fit the male-masculine, female-feminine social logic, those who fall outside of naturalized restrictive conceptions of sex and gender, and the everyday experience of a vast amount of gender variance and difference, signals the inadequacy of such categories. In other words, lived experience is in excess of dominant categories.

Another example illustrates the types of discourse and power that are caught up in the producing and maintaining specific normative conceptions of gender: In a discussion of the Vatican’s attempt to have the term ‘gender’ removed from any official, legal definitions on status of women on the grounds that it was simply code for homosexuality. In this case, Butler writes that “the regulation of gender has always been part of the work of heterosexist normativity and to insist upon a radical separation of gender and sexuality is to miss the opportunity to analyze that particular operation of homophobic power” (Butler, 186). That is, by accepting the naturalizing discourse, one fails to recognize the myriad way in which the normalization of binary gender categories themselves constitute and conceal a form of violence. Additionally, and perhaps much more explicitly, Butler highlights the surgical sexual correction of children as another example: “the bodies produced through such a regulatory enforcement of gender are bodies in pain, bearing the marks of violence and suffering…here the ideality of gendered morphology is quite literally incised on the flesh” (Butler, 53). For her, “a restrictive discourse on gender that insists on the binary of man and woman as the exclusive way to understand the gender field performs a regulatory operation of power that naturalizes the hegemonic discourse” (Butler, 43). For Chamber and Carver such “normative violence proves to be primary violence in that it may enable the secondary violence that we then think of as typical. On
the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, normative violence may be primary in that it serves to erase such typical violence” (Chamber and Carver, 80). That is, the regulatory framework constructed can lead to everyday practices that aim to produce normal bodies or fix abnormal ones, resulting in suffering, unlivable lives.

The manner in which gender functions as a norm merits further examination. For Butler, norms function both to secure and conceal a particular discourse, but it also functions to make the world intelligible. That is, gender operates strategically by securing its position in a naturalizing or powerful discourse, by identifying examples of its objective reality (bodies that conform to the ideal social space) and securing such a reality against that which is different. For her, “a norm operates within social practices as the implicit standard of normalization” (Butler, 42), that is, the norm functions to separate bodies according to its internal criteria, and to populate individual bodies with said criteria, which means the experience of a norm is “to become subjected to an abstract commonality” (Butler, 50). That is, to become a subject within the limits of that which in normatively available. Consequently, “when gender norms operate as violations, they function as an interpellation that one refuses only by agreeing to pay the consequences: losing one’s job, home, the prospects for desire, or for life” (Butler, 214). Difference from such commonalities bears significant results. The historical precedent of such common abstractions, and their associations with and placement within various discourses – scientific, religious, psychological, etc. – is what lends them such social force and power. For Butler, critiquing the salience of particular norms means coming up against an “ontology of gender” that has a very specific view of what that term is (Butler, 214). In
order words, “certain kinds of practices which are designed to handle certain kinds of problems produce, over time, a settled domain of ontology as their consequence, and this ontological domain, in turn, constrains our understanding of what is possible” (Butler, 2002, 7). This for her, is taken from her engagement with Foucault, in whom one comes to see how “power dissimulates as ontology” (Butler, 2004, 215).

Butler’s engagement with Foucault represent a clearly articulated engagement with the violence of socialization and the productive potential of discursive power. She sums up what she takes from Foucault, in her explanation of the power of a norm to produce and police gender, quite succinctly. She writes:

(1) Regulatory power not only acts upon a pre-existing subject but shapes and forms that subject; moreover, every juridical form of power has its productive effect; and (2) to become subject to a regulation is also to be subjectivated by it, that is, to be brought into being as a subject precisely through being regulated (Butler, 41).

Gender, therefore, as a particular type of power, creates the space of possibility for the bodies that inhabit and internalize its practice. To be “subjectivated” means precisely that. Put differently, the practice of gender produces identities that are themselves able to be reproduced; it produces recognizable, identifiable subjects. In order to come to terms with what such a conception offers an explanation of homophobic violence, the work now turns to address Foucault.

3.8 Foucault and Discursive Power

Foucault’s early work on sexuality (1978) represents a theoretical linchpin for the account of homophobic violence that has been articulated above, through the development of his discursive conception of sexuality which this section will explore.
Additionally, Foucault’s genealogical method situates the historical emergence of particular accounts of homosexuality. These accounts, made on the basis of specific conceptions of proper human sexuality, not only provide a theoretical explanation of the violence that such discourses engender, but also yield a theory of socialization that accounts for the productive capacities of discursive power as such, and subsequently identifies sites of its operation. Simply put, Foucault establishes how homosexuality became known as scientifically deviant, biologically abnormal, or morally abhorrent, and further, theorizes the social agency that such categories maintain through their proliferation as perceived illness or deviant identity.

It in near the end of Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality* (1978) where he clearly surmises what this work takes as an account of violence. The task that Foucault sets out for himself, however, is not an explicit explanation of violence. Rather, his work outlines the articulation of a particular form sexuality, presented as an object of study within the framework of a genealogical inquiry into human sexuality. Here, sexuality operates with what he calls discursive or disciplinary power. Generally, Foucault argues “discourses do not emanate from their objects; quite the contrary: objects depend for their existence upon discourse...‘sex’ (an object of discourse) proves to be a complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexuality” (Foucault, 152). That is, he aims to show how a particular definition of sexuality came to be the objective reality or truth of sexuality as such. Such a truth emerges for Foucault as an association of particular discourses – here scientific enquiry into biological life, maximizing human populations, and a trace of religious influence of what constitutes proper human sexual activity are pertinent. It is in
charting the consequence and function of such a process that one can derive a theoretical account of violence. This, it seems, situates him and the concerns that one derives from his work, within the framework already established. As suggested above, Foucault writes that

We…are in a society of “sex” or rather a society with a “sexuality”: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality (Foucault, 1978, 147).

It is the manner in which power speaks to the body, on the basis of discourses that already devalue homosexuality, and through the various mechanisms of socialization and discipline – psychology, religion, school, and language for example – that one sees the space for violence. For in each instance the practices adopted in relation a restricted conception of sexuality isolate homosexuality insofar as it is considered deviant and immoral. In this sense, in reading Butler, one might suggest that power speaks to the body through the discipline imposed, identities made possible, and practices sanctioned by normative gender. That is, through the disciplining and maintenance of bodies that fail to conform to the internal criteria.

It is in accepting the truth of sexuality through cultural themes of health and reproduction, and through the way scientific discourse functions as power and knowledge about sexuality, that homosexuality is constructed as deviant, abnormal, or abject in a specific way. That is, as sites and subjects of intervention, disciplining, rejection, incarceration, and abjectification. As Foucault’s concept of power seems to be that which actualizes, permits, or functions within his account of socialization, it therefore merits
further examination. Although it is likely the most examined aspect of Foucault’s work, his conception of power still merits some engagement for it provides further detail to the process of normalization and socialization outlined with Butler, and additionally, speaks to the manner in which everyday norms and practices contribute to the operationalization and legitimization of forms of violence. Generally, power for Foucault might be understood as extensions of “fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture” (Foucault 1985, 4), but it has an additional and crucial connotation, specifically, its relational character. Power relations, for Foucault, suggest that power is not only a something, a substance of some sort for example, that one possesses. Rather, as power is conceived as relational, it can be seen as the way in which people relate to each other. Here, power is not necessarily consciously exercised, nor is something inherently bad, or restrictive. Rather, it is that which constitutes social reality, the behaviours internalized according to commonplace rules and normative guidelines.

On the function of such a conception of power, Foucault writes: “I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, 39). Thus it is not a coercive conception of power which restricts – although power can and does function is the manner – but rather one which has productive capacities, insofar as it enables certain ways of being and interacting. Power “incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely” (Foucault, 2000, 341). As suggested, one might say that
Butler envisions gender functioning according to a Foucauldian conception of power, or rather, that Butler relies upon such conception of power when theorizing contemporary gender relations.

Foucault undertakes an analysis of sexuality that is historical and genealogical insofar as it identifies the moment “a discourse in which the sexual conduct of the population was taken both as an object of analysis and a target of intervention” (Foucault, 1978, 24). In other words, he locates the moment, or historical emergence of a discursive form of sexuality, that is of as sexuality as form knowledge that produces bodies and practices as sites for the operation of power. Of particular note, of course, is the historical emergence of homosexuality as a specific form of sexuality, and as particularly effective example of the exercise of discursive power. Of this 'homosexual', Foucault writes at length:

Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious nature and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with him, less a habitual sin than as a singular nature... Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind interior androgyny, a hermaphrodisim of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species (Foucault, 1978, 43).

Historically, this power, argues Foucault, “had neither the form of the law, nor the effects of the taboo. On the contrary, it acted by the multiplication of singular sexualities. It did not set boundaries for sexuality; it extended the various forms of sexuality … it produced and determined the sexual mosaic” (Foucault, 1978, 47). At the moment when sexuality was undertaken as a particular form of study, and therefore at the moment when an array
of authoritative knowledge about sexuality accumulated, the possible categories of
recognized, intelligible sexual subjects multiplied.

This proliferation of sexualities, however, does entail a liberation, for what
Foucault identifies is a multiplication practices that are conceived of as perversions. The
identification of deviance as a site of disciplining is crucial for theorizing homophobic
violence. This is because the particular conception of sexuality that Foucault sees as
emerging in his study– imbued with themes of proliferation, reproduction (one may think
both religious and biological here) – produced particular unwanted or abnormal
behaviours as deviant subjects. Power produces, in this instance, through its capacity to
identify, categorize and subjectivize specific forms of behaviour as constitutive of
individual identities; power, in this sense, categorizes people into intelligible subjects, of
which there are two main possibilities for violence: first, and most apparent, is the
violence of disciplining bodies, wherein there are innumerable practices including the
exemplary violence to which nonconformist are subject, a situation of interpersonal
violence committed on the basis of normative heterosexism. In this case, one can argue
that contemporary homophobic still bears the trace of the discursive sexuality that
Foucault identifies: It marks sexuality as something to be worked upon. Second, and
more subtle, is the practice of self-discipline, or perhaps self-violence, in which the
embodiment of discourse produces different power-effects, of self-hatred and disgust.
Here, the process of socialisation creates ways of relating to one’s own body, perhaps
with recourse to criteria that alienates one’s own experience of one’s own body, a logic
which Hopkins adopts his account of forms of homophobic violence, and additionally,
one that provides a theoretical framework that accounts for the increased suicidality outlined above.

For thinkers such as Bourdieu, such self-violence signals the kind of insidious manner in which dominant discourses are able to perpetuate a certain kind of violence: the dominated contribute and participate “by tacitly accepting the limits imposed, [that] often take the form of bodily emotions – shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety, [and] guilt” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004, 341). If homosexuality as abnormality and deviance is taken as truth, those wishing to be normal will look at themselves with a kind of disgust. The example of homosexuality as disorder, although quite blatant, is an illustration of a type of social and systemic discrimination. The influence of the dominant discourse maintains not only the ground upon which violence against gays is permitted, and to a certain extent encouraged, but sadly, produces such strong homonegative sentiments that gays often commit violence against themselves.

3.9 FROM DISCOURSE TO EMBODIMENT: BOURDIEU’S DISPOSITIONAL THINKING

Bourdieu’s work is a significant theoretical step in identifying the process by which social norms and beliefs come to maintain dominant or hegemonic positions, and furthermore, the ways in which systems of classification, recognition, and categorization maintain their social salience. Of particular interest to the question of homophobia and homophobic violence is the articulation of what Bourdieu refers to as “sexual structures” and the “historical mechanisms responsible for their relative dehistoricization and eternalization” (Bourdieu, 2001, viii). That is, his work seeks to understand how
relatively arbitrary social values, such as the masculine norms discussed above, become in a sense naturalized. Here, what Bourdieu poetically refers to as the “transformation of history into nature, [or] of cultural arbitrariness into the natural” refers simply to how certain values or beliefs, such as male/female heterosexual relationships, become understood as natural (Bourdieu, 2); likewise, this understanding or belief in the naturalness of such relationships sees homosexuality a deviant, abnormal, or malfunctioning behaviour. This situates Bourdieu within the critical framework outlined above alongside of Hopkins, Butler and Foucault.

What differentiates Bourdieu’s approach from a simple analysis of masculine values or heterosexual discourse is that he seeks to locate some explanatory power for how people relate to one another and their dispositions towards particular bodies and ways of being in structures which are pre-cognitive. Thus, Bourdieu is referring to the way in which discourse contribute to what he calls the “durable transformation of bodies” (Bourdieu, 29). With such an analytical trajectory, the target is not to ask how widespread beliefs cause us to think differently about others, but rather like Foucault and Butler, how discourse affects the response of our own bodies in relation to not just to other bodies and practices but to our own bodies and our own ways of being.

For Bourdieu, the process of socialization, or coming to adopt a certain system of beliefs instills in us more than a set of practices, beliefs, skills, and knowledge. Rather, exposure to particular discourses affects physical responses, or what we might refer to as our dispositional relationships, with others. Bourdieu writes: “these structures only derive their efficacy from the dispositions which they trigger and which help to reproduce them”
As disposition, and initial pre-cognitive responses, Bourdieu insists that we must think of them as an act “of knowledge and practical recognition which takes place below the level of consciousness” (Bourdieu, 42). Put another way, the process of socialization affects not only what we see, in the case of homophobia two men holding hands is instantly conspicuous, but how we see it, the two men are viewed with mistrust, physical discomfort, or in the extreme, hatred. Further, the initial dispositions and physical reactions affect further responses – extending the homophobic example this would include name calling, gestures, derogatory comments made to others about the gay men, and physical assault – that reinforce, reproduce and perpetuate the initial reaction.

Bourdieu’s main focus in *Masculine Domination* is what he sees as the hegemonic position that heterosexual masculinity occupies in Western society. He presents one example that is particularly telling when he argues that a skirt, rather than a form of feminine sexual liberation, is rather “sexual liberation subordinated by the male point of view” (Bourdieu, 29). This is not, as one might originally suspect, because men find women in skirts attractive, or because what is deemed acceptable attire for women confirms to an idealized masculine vision of a sexual object. Rather, he calls attention to the particular movement that skirt restricts – the opening of the legs, reclining in a chair, or the placing of the feet on a desk. For Bourdieu, these are “postures that have been charged with moral significance” (Bourdieu, 25), and restricted – especially in the case of the opening of the legs – to men. The skirt functions both to ensure that women move in ways that are gendered, and further that they do not affect negative responses in others.

Bourdieu gives another example, in line with what has already been presented
above in referencing Hopkins, when speaking the negative manner in which strong, independent women are viewed by many men. He argues that “women who break the tacit relation of availability, and in a sense appropriate their body image, and with it their body, appear as ‘unfeminine’…the affirmation of intellectual independence, which also reveals itself in bodily manifestations, produces similar effects” (Bourdieu, 67). The gendered logic of appropriate behaviour distinguishes proper feminine conduct from that of women who are acting like men, displaying masculine qualities.

Bourdieu argues that such discrimination and domination is the “product of an incessant (and therefore historical) labour of reproduction, to which singular agents (including men, with weapons such as physical violence and symbolic violence) and institutions – families, the church, the educational system, and the state – contribute” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004, 341). The labour refers to a constant reproduction of a social hierarchy, one that is not given as such, but which has a historical emergence – think, for example, of the attachment of the state and education systems to the pseudo-scientific depiction of gay man as socially deviant, dangerous, and abnormal found in Foucault.

A more recent, concrete example would be the attempts of the Canadian government to construct homosexuals as threats to national security; Janoff (2005) notes that by 1968 “the Directorate of Security and Intelligence reported having collected the names of close to nine thousand suspected and confirmed homosexuals in the Ottawa area” (Janoff, 38). These efforts represent a labour that produces the belief in the dominant social structure and the subsequent categorizing its various elements as truth, as
legitimate, and as the proper way the social order should be.

According to Schubert's exposition of Bourdieu “violence results when we misrecognize, as natural, those systems of classification that are actually culturally arbitrary and historical” (Schubert, 2008, 184). Eldridge and Johnson's social research argues that this occurs “by promoting the supposed inferiority of gay men and lesbians through such structural means as existing laws that restrict the rights of gay and lesbian people” (Eldridge and Johnson, 2011, 338). Here, think marriage rights or the lack of social and tax benefits for same-sex couples. Further, more everyday examples of this type of structural violence include stereotypes about gay people: effeminacy among gay men; promiscuity and hyper-sexuality; masculinity and butchness of lesbians; the ‘gay’ lisp; and finally, perversion and pedophilia. In this same vein, what must also be considered as structural or symbolic violence are various generalized views and misconceptions about gay people. Eldridge and Johnson make this explicit point in their 2011 study what they refer to as the cultural dominance of heteronormative values:

The basis of modern prejudice toward gay and lesbian people includes the following beliefs: that gay and lesbian people make excessive demands for change; that discrimination toward gay and lesbian people is a thing of the past; and that gay and lesbian people prevent their own acceptance by the dominant culture by exaggerating the importance of sexual orientation (Eldridge and Johnson, 384).

This constellation of beliefs, each one of which maintains some kind of heteronormative bias, represents the structural violence that is committed against gay men and women on a daily basis. Reinforcing gay stereotypes, telling gay jokes, equating homosexuality with femininity, and ignorance of the systemic issues facing gays represents the kind of labour that produces systemic violence, and as such, is the foundation upon which particular
inequalities flourish. Lunny, in her 2003 article concerning the legal defence of anti-gay violence as defence from homosexual advances, writes that “heterosexuality demarcates, consolidates, regulates and reifies its identity through continual invocations to not only what it is, but what it is not” (Luny, 2003, 315).

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter looks at several theoretical explanations for homophobic violence. In particular, it focuses on the processes of socialization which produce homonegative attitudes and dispositions. With Hopkins and Kimmel one comes to see homosexuality as a threat to traditional gender roles and the social dominance of heteronormative discourse, and additionally that the very content of masculine norms contributes to violence. From Butler, one is able to understand both how the process of gender normalization contributes to violence, and additionally, how the objectivity of gender suggest an openness to violence. The reading of Foucault suggests that contemporary homophobic violence functions as an extensions of his conception of discursive sexuality, as sexuality as such is taken up as something upon which one can work, wherein violence appears as interpersonal disciplinary practices, or the embodiment of particular norms that may led to a situation of self-hate and self-disgust, that is as an experience of the self as pathological or deviant. As dangerous as this is, it still cannot explain the excessive, overtly violent reaction that some have towards gay men. The level of angry and deadly force cannot simply be committed on behalf of maintaining a social privilege, as Hopkins so aptly suggests “the blood pooling up on the ground beneath that dying body is evidence for something more than the protection of heterosexual privilege” (Hopkins,
1998, 171). This it seems, suggests a more detailed analysis of the embodiment of discourse, or the durable transformation of bodies which is introduced in the final section on Bourdieu. If, for instance, gay men and women are normatively abjected as has been suggested above, then the dispositional response to their bodies and practices by those who have been socialized within such a context merits investigation. This suggest a further engagement with Bourdieu, for developing a richer account of his work will provide a substantial account for homophobic violence.
CHAPTER 4 BOURDIEU’S DISPOSITIONAL THEORY OF VIOLENCE

Understanding homophobic violence in Bourdieusian terms, what has been presented above as related to the form of normative, bodily violence found in Hopkins, Butler and Foucault, entails a thorough elaboration of some of Bourdieu’s central concepts. Specifically, the present chapter examines habitus, doxa, practical logic symbolic violence, and the framework provides for analyzing social phenomena. This reconstruction is necessary as Bourdieu himself never directly tackles the question of homophobic violence, and so it is only through such an analysis of Bourdieu’s main conceptual tools that one is able to develop a perspective that gains purchase on this phenomena. In general, Bourdieu's work provides a framework for analyzing human behaviour that accounts for the social rules or generative principles of the social world, as well as the process of socialization that frames the possibilities for individual choice and personal freedom. It is a sociological analysis that looks at the interplay and relationship between structure and agency, without claiming the primacy of either category, and with specific attention to the physical, bodily results of socialization. This last aspect marks Bourdieu's particular analytical or epistemological significance to the present task, wherein Bourdieu takes up a particular concern with the embodiment of social norms and shared affective life, what he calls a “dispositional philosophy” (Bourdieu, 2000).

In the context of explaining the structure and agency of homophobic violence, one might therefore understand Bourdieu as attempting to ascertain its social roots, observed as statistical regularities or tendencies, as well as analyzing what is at stake in the individual decisions made in a moment of violence, perhaps better put, as trying to
understand the force and origin of individual orientations or dispositions towards violent conduct. His work, in his own words, is “a science of dialectical relations between objective structures…and the subjective dispositions within which these structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them” (Bourdieu, 1977, 3). That is, Bourdieu wants to think the relationality (what he will call habitus) of the limits, constraints and possibilities of the given social world on one hand and the agentic capabilities of individuals on the other.

With this in mind, the primary goal of this chapter is to engage with Bourdieu as an extension of the framework outlined in the previous chapter, in order to apply his work to the explanation of homophobic violence. This engagement with Bourdieu will begin with a reading of Bourdieu complemented by commentaries on and applications of his work, and then turn to consider analysis of the role of emotion and shared affective life in the rise of ACTUP (Gould 2009). Overall, this chapter will employ Bourdieu's terms in order argue that the social and political position of gay identities in the prevailing sexual habitus is primarily negative. This most empirically validated in observed, consistent rates of symbolic and evidentiary violence in police reported hate crimes, school settings, as well as dispositional, emotional, and affective responses to non-heterosexual bodies and practices in these contexts.

4.1 An Introduction to Bourdieu's Dispositional Philosophy

It is helpful to sketch out Bourdieu's position in general before examining his conceptual framework more closely. In doing so one is able to get a sense of Bourdieu's approach to the study of the social world and highlight his particular suitability to questions of violence. In general Bourdieu’s work might be thought of as a
philosophically inclined sociology with an anthropological leaning, what scholars of Bourdieu have referred to as “a culturally focused sociology” (Crossley, 2008, 87), mixed with “a phenomenology of the affective life” (Grenfell, 2008, 23). Grenfell describes this approach as “taking what has been learnt from the analyses of structures as symbolic systems in order to uncover the dynamic of principles, or logic of practice, which gives them their structuring power” (Grenfell, 45). That is, Bourdieu's work is thoroughly sociological insofar as it locates durable, objective social structures that inform, constrain and structure individual actions (norms and social institutions), while also examining the ways in which individuals can reinforce social structures (individual actions, dispositions, sentiments) through everyday, commonplace actions and orientations – what Bourdieu will call a practical logic (Bourdieu 1990).

Grenfell notes that there is a productive connection between this type of practical logic, perception and intelligibility. For him, from Bourdieusian perspective, “everything we know about the world is both established and developed as a consequence of individual acts of perception” (Grenfell, 45). What Grenfell means here is that with Bourdieu social forces play a productive role in shaping both a phenomenological and an affective relationship with the world, that is how we see and feel the world around us. Further, acts of perception tend to reinforce the initial conditions of perception. Crucially, Bourdieu argues that perception is a property of bodies, and not as an act of a detached rational self engaging with and evaluating the rules imposed by dominant social structures. Thus, for Bourdieu processes of socialization give the world a certain meaning, yet additionally provide significant guidance to emotional and affective responses. In other words, Bourdieu's goal in outlining the logic of practice is not to strip
away the contextual particularities of the social world in order to identify a formal logic of decision making or world perceiving; this is something that one might gather from employing the term 'phenomenology.' Rather, Bourdieusian phenomenology hijacks the term insofar as it privileges the everyday, commonplace 'fitting-in' or bodily, visceral understanding of the regularities of a given social context and its norms and practices.

It is this immediate relationship between the human body and processes of socialization, these subjective, affective dimensions of social life, that situate and inform our relationship to and perception of an objective reality. In addition, insofar as they operate on an affective plane, that is, through physical, embodied, and meaningful relationships, they give life to norms and social institutions. As mentioned above it is these subjective dispositions that in a sense actualize the social world; recall Bourdieu's description of his work: “a science of dialectical relations between objective structures… and the subjective dispositions within which these structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them” (Bourdieu, 1977, 3). Here, the actualization of the social within the individual is simply the embodiment of shared social forms and their expression in disposition, sentiment and affective responses. These structural constraints shape and guide everyday orientations or ways of being in the world, and it is immediacy between social forms and individual bodies that Bourdieu labels a practical logic. Thus, Bourdieu's notion of embodied structures of knowledge has cognitive and material effects. That is, habitus permeates the mind or cognitive faculties by situating our perception of the objective social world, but at the same time thoroughly imubes all bodily comportment. Here, these practical, embodied and dispositional or affective relationships with the world emerge from, and tend to reproduce, existing social structures.
According to Grenfell, these structural elements “have defining principles which are both pre-constructed and evolving according to the logic of differentiation found within the social universe” (Grenfell, 2008, 45). Here, Bourdieu's logic of practice points out the ways social institutions and individual dispositions contribute to the intelligibility of the world as an affective phenomenology, but additionally, that they are durable, mutually reinforcing, referential, and reproducible. Simply put, his work is particularly attuned to the identifying durability and reproducibility of human practices and ways of thinking and feeling about social universe. He does this by observing a dynamic relationship between the statistical continuity of probabilistic individual behaviours, which are the objective, identifiable and durable regularities of human practices, and the seemingly indelible marks that socialization leaves on individuals in the form of dispositional responses, means of cognition, recognition, sentiment, and feeling.

It should be stressed that Bourdieu does not articulate this relationship as an antecedent to a deterministic social model that would reduce human agency to simply the result of social pressures or deep-seeded dispositions. That is, Bourdieu is not trying to identify a formulaic, or hidden casual relationship that is really at play when we observe human action and decision making. This is perhaps better expressed by Maton (2008), who argues that Bourdieu's work attempts to explain the simple observation that “social practices are characterized by regularities...[and] yet there are no explicit rules dictating such practices” (Maton, 2008, 50). Understanding this fundamentally sociological perspective is that which best marks the distinction between a casual, formal logic, and

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2 Notably, however, this manner of thinking the sociability of norms against the individual embodiment that is being setup here begins to fall away with Boudieu's concept, habitus. Institutions, norms, and dispositions are not related casually, but dynamically. This will become clearer later when the discussion turns to habitus.
Bourdieu's practical logic: that is, it is restrictive in that it limits the explanatory role of individual freedom in light of the physical effects of socialization on the human body, but it is not wholly deterministic. His work accounts for aggregate human behaviour, and analyzes the regularities and persistence of human practices, norms, and institutions, by providing a theoretical ground – namely habitus – for the force of affective, dispositional relationships.

Similarly, Grenfell notes that “this phenomenological structural relation is a product of environmentally structural conditions that offer objective regularities to guide thought and action” (Grenfell, 2008, 45). In Bourdieu's own terms, an individual's actions “without being the product of obedience to certain rules, obeys certain regularities” (Bourdieu, 1990, 64). This provides some important insights for the present enquiry into homophobic violence, for accounting for individual movements of violence, we are inevitably drawn to broader questions of social dominance and privilege, that which can be thought of as the durability or regularity of heteronormativity and its consequences. In this sense, the relationship between dominant social norms and difference, for example, necessitates a kind of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991, 2001). This is a kind of visceral privileging of dominant social presences that occurs through dispositional responses to difference, which will be further discussed below. Applying and relating this kind of Bourdieusian prespective to homophobic violence suggests that the structural regularity of heteronormativity produces often unacknowledged, seemingly natural, and negative emotional and affective responses on the one hand, and a powerful, visceral and unquestioned sense of the primacy, normalcy and naturalness of heterosexuality and a male/female gender binary on the other. For the case at hand, this seems a very
appropriate model for examining homophobic violence, given the observed durability of homonegative violence despite some positive social gains and developments in formal equality.

In expanding upon this generalization of his work, the following sections look to explore Bourdieu’s central concept of habitus, practical logic, doxa, and symbolic violence. Such a presentation of Bourdieu provides a means by which to further analyze Bourdieu’s dispositional thinking as an explanation of homophobic violence.

Approaching the question of homophobic violence through the theoretical framework offered by Bourdieu suggests a relationship between symbolic violence and more evidentiary forms of violent behaviour, and further, it suggests that the content of salient homophobic norms, norms associated with the body, bodily secretions, and disgust (Nussbaum, 2009) contributes to the character of homophobic violence. For the case at hand, it is in reading Bourdieu in such a manner that one sees heterosexism as not only providing a space of realization for the myriad of homonegative symbolic violence, but additionally, as accounting for the excessive nature of overt, physical violence, through the embodiment of highly negative, abjectified dispositions to homosexual bodies and practices. With these preliminary remarks in mind the work will now turn to address Gould’s application of Bourdieu, for it is an excellent pathway to a deeper understanding his work.

4.2 Gould’s Emotional Habitus

As suggested, a particularly thoughtful and creative elaboration and application of Bourdieu’s work, and in particular his concept habitus, is found in Gould’s *Moving Politics* (2007). Here, we can start to put a bit more flesh on some of Boudieus concepts.
by examining how Gould applies Bourdieu to help explain the role of emotion in social moments. Specifically, her work employs Bourdieu in order to make sense of the profound effect of emotion and the role of shared affectivities in the emergence and success of AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP)\(^3\) as a social movement. With this particular work (as with Bourdieu in general), Gould is writing in contrast to a rationalist paradigm that maintains that emotions are a kind of confusion or distraction that undermines rational political engagement and analysis. Maton's elaboration of Bourdieu makes a similar point, arguing that he writes “against accounts such as rational choice theory that suggest conscious choice or rational calculation as the basis of action” (Maton, 2008, 54). Rather, Bourdieu reduces the import of rational calculation in developing a theoretical account for the role of disposition and emotion, which is the practical logic outlined above. Here, sentiment, disposition, emotion, and similar affective responses become central to social and political analysis.

Informed by this kind of Bourdieusian perspective, Gould takes emotion and affect to be appropriate concerns when examining political reality, individual choice and action. For her, dispositions are “a crucial means by which human beings come to know and understand themselves and their contexts, their interests and commitments, their needs and their options in securing those needs” (Gould, 2007, 17). Thus, in a sense, emotion and affect broadly speaking, become necessary conditions for the intelligibility of political life. Indeed, they provide the impetus through which any aspect of human-life, such as the social and legal inequality of those who experience same-sex desire, becomes charged with an affective meaning. Simply put, for Gould and Bourdieu,

\(^3\) ACTUP is an advocacy group that supports the lives of people with AIDS, and works to bring about legislation, medical research, treatment, and public awareness.
emotion, disposition, and sentiment make social interaction meaningful by populating the affective phenomenology of political life. Indeed, for Gould, thinking in terms of emotions provides a richer analytical framework that acknowledges these affective dimensions of human life, rather than relying on a reductive or simplistic rational calculation of individual self-interest as a means to explain the emergence, consolidation, and eventual decline of a social movement.

Gould looks to Bourdieu as a kind of philosophical and sociological authority who provides the theoretical terms for such a framework. For her, taking Bourdieu as a starting point allows her to think in terms of the “emotional habitus”\(^4\) of a specific social movement, in her words, the “socially constituted, prevailing ways of feeling and emoting, as well as the embodied, axiomatic understandings and norms about feelings and their expression” (Gould, 10). For Gould, this kind of shared emotional framework is the condition of possibility for certain affective social movements, as it allows for the articulation of a certain connectedness, of something held in-common by a particular group. It helps to return to Maton at length to help clarify this position. Maton writes that

> Habitus links the social and the individual because the experiences of one's life course may be unique in their particular contents, but are shared in terms of their structure with others of the same social class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, occupation, nationality, region, and so forth. For example, members of the same social class by definition share structurally similar positions with society that engender structurally similar experiences of social relations, processes and structures. We are each a unique configuration of social forces, but these forces are social, so that even when being individual...we do so in socially regular ways (Maton, 2008, 53).

This kind regularity and similarity amongst distinct individuals is not necessarily a conscious choice of those recognized as belonging to a group, indeed, individuals may

\(^4\) What is missing from such derivations of Bourdieu is an attention to the relationality that he wish his term 'habitus' to capture.
not even feel as though they belong to any specific category or are identifiable in any socially or statistically durable way. That is, the social homogeneity aggregates not the substantial characteristic of any single social category, but rather the relationality of their position with respect to other positions, and the social, durable effects this produces. Here, immersion in or subjection to the specific social, political context conditions (objective reality) makes a particular set of human characteristics ‘in-common.’ For the case at hand, the reality of being subject to violence and discrimination in a predominately heteronormative culture marks a common reality for many gay men and women. For Gould, the cohesion of a social movement such as ACTUP revolves around the framing of this shared quality, and perhaps more specifically, hinges on the ability to politicize or mobilize the shared emotional habitus that such conditions structure and engender.

Bourdieu’s framework fits well in the framing of such shared affectivities, with habitus gaining particular purchase for Gould, as it analyzes an objective political reality and the salient normative structures, but also the shared yet individual emotional, bodily responses of those enmeshed within that context – that which this work wishes to engage as an integral aspect of homophobic violence. In Gould's case habitus serves as an entry point in the analysis of action. She writes: “Bourdieu defines a habitus as the socially constituted, commonsensical, taken-for-granted understandings or schemas in any social grouping that, operating beneath conscious awareness, on the level of bodily understanding, provides members with a disposition or orientation to action” (Gould, 33). Her work then, is the contextualizing of the orientation to action of queer identities within the framework of heteronormativity, that looks at more than simply the rational
calculation of projected benefits of participation in a social movement. Gould writes:

“Lesbians' and gay men's positioning within a heteronormative society, for example, has helped to generate an ambivalent emotional habitus in lesbian and gay communities that includes contradictory feeling states about both homosexuality and dominant heterosexual society” (Gould, 35). Schubert (2008) makes a similar point in her discussion of Bourdieu, writing that

Categorizations make up the world, political struggle is a means of legitimizing those systems of classifications and categorization, and violence results when we misrecognize, as natural, those systems of classification that are actually culturally arbitrary and historical...members of the dominant class need only go about their daily lives, adhering to the rules of the system that provides them their positions of privilege. Hierarchies and systems of domination are then reproduced to the extent that the dominant and the dominated perceive these systems to be legitimate” (Schubert, 2008, 184).

The objective content of the heteronormatively bias sexual habitus has been examined in the preceding two chapters as the socialization of a (en)forced commonality. In other words both the subjection to and internalization of negative and abjectified non-heterosexual norms by both marginal and dominant sexualities, provides the affective impetus to political motivation.

To Bourdieu, what is held in common by a social group is not solely determined by the objective political reality, but is rather the result of various engagements and interactions between members and the complex reality with which they interact – although this kind of division is somewhat ill-fitting for the relationship the Bourdieu is trying to articulate. Employing another of Bourdieu’s central concepts ‘the field,’ Gould writes that “from living and acting within various social contexts—what Bourdieu calls

5 Perhaps, more broadly speaking Gould is adding an affective, emotional dimension to the definition of social movements as such.
fields, each with its hierarchical structure, regularities, logic, and stakes—one acquires a practical sense” (Gould, 33). With this practical sense one 'learns' not merely in term of a rational understanding, but in actually embodying, and therefore providing a space for the active renewal of the appropriate behaviour defined by dominant social institutions and norms. Gould makes this clear:

The habitus concept encapsulates the dialectical relationship between structure and practice: they make, unmake, and remake one another. Social structures do not come into being or survive except through human practices which, while creative and improvisatory, are themselves structured and not reducible to the conscious, willed, independent actions of rational actors in pursuit of their interests (Gould, 33).

Here think of many visceral and emotion responses to different body types and sexual desires, both in terms of reactions to the bodies desires of sexual minorities in a largely heteronormative society, but again, of the internalization of such sentiment by the dominated themselves discussed in the preceding chapters. Consider additionally, the manner in which you can feel wholly out of place in an uncommon social setting, travelling to another country, being part of a foreign religious ceremony. For Gould, “the habitus concept illuminates the processes—bodily, nonconscious, affective—through which actors are conscripted...into the social” (Gould, 2007, 34). In this way, the rise of ACTUP for Gould, hinges on the politicization of disposition, and her work in large part is an analysis of the dominant sexual habitus that informs such an affective dimension of political life.

4.3 HABITUS

As should be clear by now, habitus is an important, primary conceptual tool for Bourdieu, for with it he explains his understanding of the complex relationships between
objective social structures, disposition, and human action. Bourdieu's own definition of the term clearly calls attention to the relational aspect of the concept, as for him habitus “expresses first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination” (Bourdieu 1977, 214). This simply to say that habitus is a concept that relates the social forces and the individual dispositions. It elucidates the dynamic and reflexive process of socialization using language that is explicitly of the body, by turning analytical attention toward emotions such as guilt, shame, anger and disgust (as these are the most appropriate for current enquiry) and the social norms that engender them.

As suggested, for Bourdieu this visceral immediacy of social norms exists as a kind of practical logic or a 'feel for the game'. Here, when someone feels comfortable in a given social situation “he feels at home in the world because the world is also in him, in the form of habitus” (Bourdieu, 2000, 143). In elaborating on this idea, Maton writes that a sense of comfort, understanding and belonging of this kind occurs because when “your habitus matches the logic of the field, you are attuned to the doxa, the unwritten 'rules of the game' underlying practices within that field” (Maton, 2008, 57). Gould, for example, would suggest that ACTUP was such an effective political strategy insofar as it was able to mobilize gay guilt and shame, which from Bourdieusian perspective, would generate from an incongruity between structural expectations and individual difference or resistance. In Bourdieu’s words, habitus is a kind of relationship or “visceral attachment

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6 Doxa, as will be discussed below, “broadly refers to the misrecognition of forms of social arbitrariness that engenders the unformulated, non-discursive, but internalized and practical recognition of that same social arbitrariness” (Deer, 2008, 119-120).
of a socialized body to the social body” (Bourdieu, 145), of a field and social norms to individual practices and dispositions.

Maton describes this internalization and attachment, what might otherwise be labelled as structuring in Bourdieusian terms, as related to “ways of acting, feeling, thinking and being”. Crucially for him, however, is the manner in which the concept of habitus “captures how we carry within us our history, how we bring this history into our present circumstances, and how we then make choices to act in certain ways and not others” (Maton, 2008, 52). Thus, for Maton, habitus frames and situates choice in relation to both the lived history of individuals and the prevailing social climate in which such a history occurs. Yet, this kind of generalization lends is self quite easily to a misinterpretation of Bourdieu. Namely, that the unfolding of history or the social in and through individuals overrides any sense of human agency or freedom, of the creative interpretation of human agents in relation to the force and structuring power of field and habitus. Importantly for Bourdieu, however, is that the definitive characteristic of 'carrying our history within us' is dispositional, affective and genetic, and not imperative; simply put, he does not mean for it to be deterministic, but that habitus does indeed represent a kind of check, limitation or situating of personal freedom and rational choice.

For Grenfell, “this phenomenological structural relation is a product of environmentally structural conditions that offer objective regularities to guide thought and action” (Grenfell, 2008, 45). This perhaps makes sense if related to the observed rates of suicide among gay youth, and further, speaks to the active force of norms that is actualized within individuals. This is especially the case, as observed in the preceding chapters, in conservative areas where the sexual field may be extremely homophobic.
Here, Bourdieu would refer to the internalization of the expectations of a given social context as the “subjective expectations of objective probabilities” (Bourdieu, 1990, 59). This sense or awareness of the social regularities is often fostered through individual difference from them, and helps to explain the habitus and practical logic as a “feel for game.” For Bourdieu, this kind of awareness produces strategies for navigating the social field, such as removing oneself from rural or conservative areas in question. Yet, as is the case in such fields that exhibit a powerful homonegative social logic, one might not be able to envision a way out or a strategy of escape, other than to escape from one's own body. The outcomes of the affective pressures of hegemonic heterosexuality in these cases appear to yield extremely limited subjective expectations, and this makes suicide an immediate solution in navigating precarious objective probabilities.

Habitus therefore informs and structures choice in a very particular way as the historical aspect of habitus can be read as an explanation of social and cultural continuity within individual bodies, in a genetic, yet not determinant manner. Bourdieu writes:

The habitus, as the world implies, is that which one has acquired, but which has become durably incorporated in the body in the form of permanent dispositions. So the term constantly reminds us that it refers to something historical, linked to individual history, and that it belongs to a genetic mode of thought, as opposed to existentialist modes of thought (Bourdieu, 1993, 86).

Here Bourdieu introduces this the distinction between genetic and existential in order to dispel reductionist readings of his work that argue that he is presenting a deterministic social model – which was indeed this author’s initial reaction, wherein habitus merely mirrors the prevailing structures of the social environment. Here, genetic speaks to the probabilistic outcomes of specific social conditions, as Maton describes, habitus frames
choice, and “this range of choice depends on our current context (the position we occupy in a particular social field), but at the same time which of these choices are visible to us and which we do not see as possible are the result of our past journey, for our experiences have helped shape our vision” (Maton, 2008, 52). More specifically, the internalization of an abjectified social position constrains the horizon of possibility to such an extent so that taking one's life seems the only possible course of action – as Bourdieu writes, “the dominant cannot fail to apply to themselves, that is, to their bodies and to everything they are and do, the schemes of the unconsciousness, which in their case, give rise to formidable demands” (Bourdieu, 2001, 69).

The language of permanence Bourdieu employs above, wherein he writes that habitus is “incorporated in the body in the form of permanent dispositions” (Bourdieu, 1993, 86) likely gives one pause and certainly merits some further commentary. Permanence, here, refers not to the inevitability of such an outcome, but to “a mental structure which, having been inculcated into all minds socialized in a particular way, is both individual and collective” (Bourdieu, 1990, 66). In other words, permanence signals exposure to and immersion in, or perhaps the unavoidability of an objective reality and the social structures that constitutes it, and thus that which structures and shapes individual dispositions, and not the character, orientation or totality of individual dispositions.

Continuing in this vein, Bourdieu argues that although he is seeks to understand the durability and reproducibility of social structures and individual behaviours and practices, “habitus changes constantly in response to new experiences.” Furthermore, although durable, “dispositions are subject to a kind of permanent revision, but one which
is never radical, because it works on the basis of the premises established in the previous states” (Bourdieu, 2000, 161). Additionally, notes Maton, “because its dispositions are embodied, the habitus develops a momentum that can generate practices for some time after the original conditions which shaped it have vanished” (Maton, 2008, 59). Thus, habitus, dispositions and social structures are subject to possible change, but in each case this change is always made in relation to a pre-existing social structures, norms, and dispositions. For example, individuals who recognize, rationally, the failure of a racist logic, may yet feel a certain discomfort when confronted by racial difference. This kind of implicit bias that habitus outlines is one way that dispositions engenders affective responses. Further, although social structures, norms, and dispositions relate to and reinforce each other, this relationship is not causal, so the absence of a norm or social structure does not immediately imply the absence of a disposition. For the case this explains why we still see statistically observable homonegative behaviours despite some positive social gains and formal, legal recognition. As the data compiled in Chapter 2 attests, despite successfully combating some objective social and legal conditions, the social momentum of heterosexuality manifests in negative disposition.

For Bourdieu, the transmission of dispositions and the incorporation and embodiment of norms resists change “because these principles are, in their essentials, transmitted from body to body, below the level of conscious control and therefore not amenable to transformations or corrections (Bourdieu, 95). Again, Bourdieu here is not attempting to suggest that change cannot take place, but rather that particular acts of conscious intervention will not be effective given the momentum of habitus. Simply put,

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7 Further information regarding ‘implicit bias,’ as well as the opportunity to test individual biases can be found online at Project Implicit: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit
for Bourdieu it is extremely difficult to rationally convince someone to abandon a misogynist or homophobic orientation. For to a large degree the point of reference for evaluating an argument or even for affectively experiencing a woman or gay person is already determined. Additionally, this expands upon the notion of affective phenomenology by highlighting inter-body processes of socialization and normalization through observable dispositional and emotional responses, gestures, and looks. That is, given that habitus situates a perceptual and affective phenomenological relationship with the world, the availability of choice, the perception, awareness or relationship to difference, and even the possibility of change is narrow. Indeed Bourdieu writes that:

Insofar as it is the product of the incorporation...of the principle of vision and division constitutive of a social order or a field, habitus generates practices immediately adjusted to that order, which are therefore perceived, by their author and also by others, as ‘right’, straight, adroit, adequate, without being in any way the product of obedience to an order in the sense of an imperative, to a norm or to legal rules” (Bourdieu, 143).

Here, habitus is certainly restrictive, or put differently, more attuned to an explanation of the durability and reproducibility of social structures and dispositions through habitus. This is put quite succinctly by Maton, who writes that “these dispositions or tendencies are durable in that the last over time, and transposable in being capable of becoming active with a wide variety of theatres of social action. The habitus is thus both structured by conditions of existence and generates practices, beliefs, perceptions, feelings and so forth in accordance with its own structure” (Maton, 2008, 51). For the case at hand, habitus not only provides an explanation for the incorporation and embodiment of homonegativity, but further, provides the logic of its durability via the kind of referential reproducibility that habitus outlines. This outline a kind of feedback mechanism that is
attuned to a specific set of social conditions, and this results in increasing the probability of similar tendencies and structures, or in other words, durable social patterns.

4.4 Conclusion: Habitus and Doxa in the Field of Education

It is quite productive to extend this framework of analysis to consider the heteronormativity observed in school settings. Here, as has been discussed at length in the preceding chapters, a salient marker of this formative social setting is exposure to and immersion in hegemonic masculinity and homophobia. The immersion in this kind of 'sexual habitus,' a myriad of “innumerable stimuli during upbringing” (Maton, 2008, 58), contributes the incorporation of gendered sexual norms as dispositions, emotions, and durable patterns of social interaction. Indeed, Herek argues that “sexual prejudice can also be inferred from a heterosexual’s nonverbal behavior in the presence of a gay man or lesbian (e.g., facial expressions, rate of speech, perspiration, physical distance) and from actions such as avoiding a gay man or lesbian in a social setting” (Herek, 2004, 18). These too, contribute to processes of homonegative socialization; looks, gestures, language and physical violence are the most prevalent aspects of socialization observed in these contexts, and such 'stimuli' have particular consequences for Bourdieu's affective phenomenology. For him the processes of socialization begins early, during which “the child incorporates the social in the form of affects, socially coloured and qualified, and parental injunctions, prescriptions or condemnations” and these are in turn “buried in the deepest level of the body where they are recorded in the form of guilts, phobias, or, in a word, passions” (Bourdieu, 2000, 167). The particular content of such norms, which privilege masculinity and heterosexuality, reflect and contribute to the development of emotions and sentiment – this is captured quite emphatically through Bourdieu's concept
Yet, in addition to their specific content, there are particular consequences associated with the salience of dominant norms that result from dominance itself. This most clearly comes to light in through an analysis of another of Bourdieu's terms, 'doxa' (Bourdieu 1977, 2001) and further, in analyzing and applying what Bourdieu means by “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1991, 2001).

To begin, Bourdieu's term doxa, in similar fashion to the work of Foucault and Butler, relates the naturalization and dehistoricization of human characteristics such as sexuality to processes of socialization. The work of outlining the processes and power structures involved in naturalization is a mainstay of Foucault's genealogical method, where in part, he is able to detail the relative arbitrariness of that which is taken to be good, natural, and right – this is taken up explicitly in Chapter 3 where Foucault traces social ramifications of the demonization of 'homosexuality'. Additionally, Burtch and Haskell note in their examination of homophobia in Canadian schools, that “viewing sex and gender in such strict terms causes us to overlook the wide range of naturally occurring gender identities and expressions and to view those who fail to adhere to hegemonic gender expressions as unnatural” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 101). Bourdieu, although interested in tracing the historical naturalization of a social practices, and for the analyzing its perceptual effects, focuses on its consequences for contemporary social interaction in terms of how it structures affective human relationships. As Deer notes is his in his work detailing Bourdieu, doxa refers to “pre-reflexive intuitive knowledge shaped by experience, [and] to unconscious inherited physical and relational dispositions” (Deer, 2008, 120). Here, like habitus, doxa outlines the nonconscious privileging of heterosexual norms in relation to their structural position in a heirarchized
social context, but additionally, to the social affects of the “arbitrary nature of their sociohistorical emergence and reproduction” (Deer, 121).

What is particularly productive for the case at hand, is to consider the form of discrimination that doxa signals which does not necessarily relate to the particular content of norms themselves. As Bourdieu notes, it is not a “state of mind,” but is rather a “state of body” (Bourdieu, 1990, 68). This marks its conceptual difference from habitus for the study of homophobia, violence, and discrimination. Deer argues that with this line of enquiry, rather than isolate the relationality of field, habits, and disposition, doxa “broadly refers to the misrecognition of forms of social arbitrariness that engenders the unformulated, non-discursive, but internalized and practical recognition of that same social arbitrariness” (Deer, 2008, 119-120). Doxa is thus a way of thinking about the dispositional consequences of the internalization of relatively arbitrary social norms as natural, neutral, or given, and the way this affects the perception of those who fall outside the criteria that marks a dominant group. Additionally, this provides a means for analyzing the observation that members of a dominant social group are often unaware of match between their habitus, social contexts, and dispositions – that is, the taken-for-granted social position they occupy.

In a way, doxa is a means to examine the affective phenomenology that derives from social dominance. Seen in this light, Maton suggests that the phenomenological consequence of doxa is simply that “social agents are typically unaware of the supporting, life-affirming water, the match between their habituses and the fields in which they flourish are feel at ease, and how they come to be in those contexts” (Maton, 2008, 59). To Bourdieu, this ignorance is “the relationship of immediate adherence that is
established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the preverbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense” (Bourdieu, 1990, 68). In other words, a result of social dominance is that the dominant themselves fail to recognize the specific historical conditions that have elevated their particular group, and relatively arbitrary content of their norms and institutions. That is, they physically experience dominance as normal and natural. Here, the objective social guidelines of a field presents its particular logic as embodied universal standards. As Bourdieu notes in his examination of masculine values, doxa is a means to conceptualize “historical discrimination as embodied dispositions invested with all the signs of naturalness” (Bourdieu, 2001, 122). When processes of socialization isolate and elevate certain characteristics as natural or neutral, the embodiment of these norms provides a substantial grounding for discrimination when experiencing difference.

As has been hinted at, this kind of grounds for discrimination is not necessarily a consequence of the specific content of any norms, practices, or institutions. That is, it is not a discrimination that consciously pits the value of one particular norm against another – although this does indeed follow. Rather, the taken-for-grantedness of a specific habitus limits appeals to legitimacy and recognition from the outset, and this devalues the normative content that difference presents without real evaluation or opportunity for expression. For Bourdieu, it therefore follows that part of “the strength of the masculine order is seen in the fact that it dispenses with justification: the androcentric vision imposes itself as neutral and has no need to spell itself out in discourse aimed at legitimating it” (Bourdieu, 2001, 90). Similarly, as Bourdieu notes in an earlier work,

8 Recall Kimmel's claim that masculinity is often the experience of the expectation of power.
The adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness, since it is unaware of the very question of legitimacy, which arises from competition for legitimacy, and hence from conflict between groups claiming to possess it (Bourdieu, 1977, 168).

This, as should be evident by now with Bourdieu, does not only relate to rational evaluation of claims to legitimate modes of being in the world, but through the visceral, physical experience of difference that embodied dominant norms generates. For Bourdieu, the grounds for legitimacy are indeed bound up with the normative content of the dominant group, but not as a logical derivation of that content. Rather, historical social dominance qua dominance establishes the values present in dominant groups as the embodied criteria for evaluating claims to legitimate ways of being. As Bourdieu argues, masculinity “legitimates a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is itself a naturalized social construction” (Bourdieu, 2001, 23). In doing so masculinity, and here heterosexuality, subsume claims to legitimacy through the operation of a socialized, visceral recognition of difference. Likewise, Schubert notes in his elaboration of Bourdieu's work, that the “misrecognition of social privilege as natural superiority in this way serves to solidify that privilege and, for members of subordinated groups, exacerbate symbolic violence and intensify social suffering” (Schubert, 2008, 190). This notion of symbolic violence captures, at least on one level, the bodily results of doxa as the “biological nature” that Bourdieu describes as “a naturalized social construction” (Bourdieu, 2001, 23). For those wholly immersed in a heteronormative social context this is not a conscious privileging of internalized values – though it may indeed provide a substantial foundation for it. Rather, this kind of discrimination occurs at the level of the body, as for Boudieu, “acts of cognition are acts of practical
recognition, doxic acceptance, a belief that does not need to be thought and affirmed as such” (Bourdieu, 2001, 34).

To Bourdieu, “symbolic violence is exercised only through an act of knowledge and practical recognition which takes place below the level of consciousness” (Bourdieu, 2001, 42). It is the bodily results of doxa as the implicit privileging guided by social dominance. This, for Bourdieu, additionally contributes to “the practical experience of one’s own body, which is generated in the application to one’s own body of the fundamental schemes springing from the embodiment of the social structures (Bourdieu, 2001, 64). In school settings, and for the case at hand, the doxic recognition of sexual difference is phenomenologically structured by heteronormativity and hegemonic masculinity, thus providing a substantial, practical bodily orientation to queer bodies and practice. Furthermore, the historical project of providing justification for such implicit bias accounts for the particular normative developments, and the subsequent reinforcement this provides to doxa. This, in turn, relates to physical violence through the embodiment of the justificatory terms of homonegativity, as illegitimate, unnatural and abject uses of the human body.

Here, in applying Bourdieu we clearly realize the profound challenge of combating homonegativity and the excess of the sexual majority in school settings, for we observe the relationship between the relative 'gentleness and subtleness' of symbolic violence and more evidentary, physical attack. In the schoolyard children are already exposed to “postures that have been charged with moral significance” (Bourdieu, 2001, 28), and in policing violations of normative schemes react as much to the 'passions' produced in interacting with different bodies, than with the bodies themselves. For
Schubert, this kind of symbolic violence is everywhere in that we all live in symbolic systems that, and in the process of classifying and categorizing, impose hierarchies and ways of being and knowing the world that unevenly distribute suffering and limit even the ways in which we can imagine the possibility of an alternative world. It is also nowhere because, in its gentleness and its subtleness, we fail to recognize its very existence, let alone the way it is at the root of much violence and suffering (Schubert, 2008, 196).

This is kind of “invisible discipline,” observe Burtch and Haskell, is a “symbolic power at work in the social hierarchies that then value certain sexual identities and gender expression over others” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 94). In Bourdieusian terms, it is a doxic relation that subsequently provides the normative justification and enforcement of social dominance. This kind of subtle yet visceral power is perhaps best understood by Foucault, who describes the effects of disciplinary power and discursive practices, by referring to power’s “capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, 39). For Burtch and Haskell employing Foucault's understanding of power as “movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity; an infinitesimal power over the active body” (Foucault, 1977, 137), helps to explain that “subtle, constant forms of discipline are more effective and more likely legitimized precisely because they go unrecognized as forms of power” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 95).

Continuing with Burtch and Haskell, the normative operations of heterosexual social dominance have evolved to include condemnations of other, non-sexual behaviours. Indeed, like Plummer (2010), they note that “labels associated with queer identities are used to belittle people, but also to describe anything that is undesirable”
Further, in relation to Hopkins' original experience with harassment, Plummer notes that hegemonic heterosexuality performs its self-ascribed superiority over the other, often by aligning the gender of the target with its gender opposite (McCann, Plummer and Minichiello 2010, 508). For Bourdieu, these linguistic markers provide a diagnostic measure, as “utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed” (Bourdieu, 1991, 66). These are clear examples of the excesses of homophobia and masculinity that establish how “homophobic and transphobic bullying, as forms of power and discipline, function as lessons…teaching us which behaviours and associated identities are valued and which are not” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 91). This further solidifies the claim that once you scratch the surface of the gains in formal legal equality, one uncovers a significant amount of discrimination. These kinds of lessons still function in the socialization of youth in Canadian contexts. For, Burtch and Haskell note, the “legalization of marriage may have granted symbolic legitimacy to same-sex relationships, but it provides little protection for many queer youth who enter them” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 19).

The application and elaboration of Bourdieu's central concepts of habitus, doxa, and symbolic violence provides a substantial theoretical grounding for understanding the social origin homophobic violence. Here, by calling attention to the visceral attachment to the particular normative content of heterosexuality and masculinity, the chapter argues that such durable social structures are complicit in the homonegativity visible in Canadian schools. More concretely, the embodiment of these normative frameworks
creates a doxic relationship to difference that comes to be viscerally expressed as negative predispositions to queer bodies. Rightly, Burtch and Haskell note that not enough is being done to combat this, and indeed the authors argue that there is a derth of gay positive messages on campus, similar to Plummer's decade old observation that “prohomosexual sentiment in childhood experience, particularly on the school ground, is virtually nonexistent (Plummer, 1999, 78).

For the authors, “exposure to cognitive dissonance is arguably necessary if children are to be taught what tolerance itself involves” (Burtch and Haskell, 2010, 23), yet as Bourdieu's conceptual tools make clear, for there to be such cognitive dissonance, there must be a recognition of the legitimacy of other forms of human expression, and this faces some significant barriers at the level of conscious intention. That is, for Bourdieu, who like Butler argues that genders are “inscribed in bodies and in universe from which they derive their strength” (Bourdieu, 2001, 103), intervening at the cognitive level faces profound challenges. For, as has been argued, processes of socialization yield significant, durable, dispositional responses that are nonconscious and precognitive. Here Bourdieu recognizes that the actual efficacy of the entrenched normative structures exist not only in the materiality of social institutions, laws and social structures, but also in the very bodies, subjective structures and dispositions of the subjects who populate them. This presents a myriad of objective constraints and suggests that overcoming these barriers might mean a kind of slow attrition, or a gradual dismantling of the structures that support symbolic violence and domination.
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION: AFFECT, DISPOSITION, AND VIOLENCE

The opening chapter of the present work establishes a descriptive account of contemporary homophobia. It argues that particular acts of violence and the statistical evidence of homophobic hate crimes illustrates a broader social problem of heteronormativity. This larger normative lens then provides a explanatory framework for analyzing isolated individual criminal acts, and situating them within a social context. Additionally, it opens up the concept of homophobia by not only looking to reports of police-reported hate crimes, and media reports concerning individual acts of homophobic violence, but more broadly surveying scholarly articles on persecution of gay men and women, studies on the relationship between increased suicidality and sexual orientation, and the challenges facing gay youth in Canadian schools. By continually empirically establishing a larger social framework of heterosexism and heteronormative privilege, the chapter clearly shows the diverse manifestations of homophobic violence; we see homophobia as violent, physical attacks against the body, and secondly, as the manner in which violence appears in language, discourse, law, dispositions, and sentiment.

In each of the studies and articles reviewed, a relationship between a dominant form of masculinity, an “ideal of maleness that might include being able-bodied, athletic, white, heterosexual” (Burtch and Haskell, 2012, 29), and socially abjected homosexual identity is at the heart of explanations of homophobic violence. Given that the observable data confirms a relationship between masculinity and homophobia, the subsequent chapter examines some of the seminal figures in field of gender and sexual theory, namely Foucault and Butler, as well as a myriad of contributing authors that build upon
and their work in developing theoretical accounts of homophobia, heterosexism, and heternormativity. Chapter 3 argues that the pervasiveness of heteronormative values reinforces a widespread belief that heteronormative values are natural or biological, and further, that these essentialist norms have a substantial theoretical link with policing and suppressing difference. This presumed naturalness and superiority serves as a foundation for violence committed against those who do not fit the sexual standard. Violence in this case occurs by policing 'deviant' behaviours, or attacking those considered as weak, disgusting, and abject, or as direct threats to the values that uphold dominant social structures.

The penultimate chapter is a sustained consideration of Bourdieu's theoretical and sociological perspective that culminates in a thorough account of his affective phenomenology. The application and elaboration of Bourdieu's central concepts of habitus, doxa, and symbolic violence illustrates they ways in which embodied norms contribute to homophobic violence. Here, Bourdieu's work argues that a bodily attachment to the normative content of heterosexuality and masculinity creates negative relationships to difference, viscerally expressed as negative dispositions to queer bodies, and to bodily comportment that does not meet the gendered logic of heteronormativity. It is in this moment that Bourdieu's affective phenomenology argues quite convincingly that processes of socialization cause us to feel certain ways about about bodies and body parts, and that they, in a way, become charged with meaning. From this perspective, homophobic violence relates to the way in which practices and uses of the body in the sexual minority violate the established normative order. In this sense, the higher rates of physical assault observed in police reported hate crimes in Canada follows
a certain logic of the body.

The current chapter proceeds along similar lines, and concludes the present enquiry by situating it within the contemporary Queer Theory. In turning to the contributing essays in *After Sex: On Writing Since Queer Theory* (2011) this final chapter will examine some of the more salient concerns that the field's leading scholars present in that volume. Specifically, it will address the relationship between the affective phenomenology developed here via Bourdieu, modern day sexual politics, and the recognized formal political goals of contemporary gay rights. Additionally, after establishing the relationship between this thesis and the concerns of the field, the chapter will then examine its relevance to current work in the politics of affect. Here, importantly, this chapter relates the affective consequences of sexual normalization with this fledgling political theory, and suggests the difficulties of political intervention on the affective plane. Simply put, Bourdieu's work, novel in its perception of violence, remains committed to the identification of patterns of domination and inequality as a means of liberation; this change however, is slow and incremental, and must wear down the material inertia of disposition.

**5.1 Foucault, Bourdieu, and Sexuality Studies**

In a recent collection of essays in sexuality studies entitled *After Sex: On Writing Since Queer Theory*, Lucey (2011) lends significant support to the work at hand by arguing that both Foucault and Bourdieu provide excellent conceptual frameworks for analyzing contemporary sexual politics. Indeed, argues Lucey, the bodily structuring of socialization and discourse, and “the articulation of the discursive realm with the realms of practices and of social and political relations” are key areas in which both authors
provide some theoretical clarity. Lucey contends that these theorists contribute “a crucial element in the development of sexuality studies” (Lucey, 228), by illustrating how “quotidian patterns of understanding are structured by categories that, rather than being 'scientific,' are the historical residue of dominant models of understanding that regularly disallow a critical apprehension of that object” (Lucey, 237). In a similar spirit, the preceding chapters explain the social and discursive consequences of the historical unfolding of masculine and heterosexual dominance, and their material embodiment in disposition and emotion. Further, through its examination of Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, doxa, and symbolic violence, the work clearly establishes the significant visceral and cognitive barriers that not only contribute to everyday violence, but as as Lucey puts it, 'regularly disallow a critical apprehension.'

The particular line of enquiry developed through Foucault's understanding of the bodily effects of power, in tandem with the significant sociological grounding in Bourdieu's dispositional philosophy, points to the significant explanatory purchase that an affective phenomenology of sexuality might offer. As Lucey suggests above, this is crucial insofar is it attends to the contemporary concerns of sexuality studies, specifically in relation to the effects of processes of socialization on perception and affective relationships. To her,

The subjective imperceptibility of the system of regularities (and the attendant peculiarities) that structure action (and language use) within a given cultural arena is a particularly interesting problem when it comes to thinking about sexuality – about what makes sexuality distinctive, about what makes certain kinds of sexuality distinctive, [and] about what grants salience or what produces peculiarity within our sense of sexuality (Lucey, 230).

The everydayness of heteronormativity fosters a certain imperceptibility that Bourdieu's
doxa captures quite succinctly. The primacy of sexual norms of this kind, 'disallow a critical apprehension' insofar as they contribute, as Butler so eloquently insists for example, to the dehistorization and naturalization of 'the normal'. The specific analytical framework offered here through Bourdieu and Foucault then, in focusing on the distinct affectivities and dispositions that norms discourses of sexuality produce, avoids “the prevailing tendency in much critical discourse to locate sexuality too exclusively in the psychological realm and to neglect to extent to which it is lived and experienced as a set of evolving cultural forms into which and within which agents move” (Lucey, 232).

The impediment to experiencing the fluid sexuality of 'evolving cultural forms' that Lucey suggests here is captured quite succinctly in her presentation of Bourdieu. Here Lucey, in similar fashion to the current work, sets up the bodily effects of traditional heterosexual values in opposition to sexual difference. The kind of evolving cultural and sexual norms that we find in emerging in sexual difference (LGBQT), then, provokes a negative response from traditional sexuality – much of which is capture in the descriptive accounts in Chapter 2. This, as Bourdieu argues with his understanding of the logic of practice, is because process of socialization result in the “application of the fundamental schemes to one’s own body, and more especially to those parts of the body that are most pertinent in the terms of these schemes” (Bourdieu, 1991, 73). The dominant sexual norms, fundamental schemes in this sense, have specific social consequences by charging bodies, body parts, and bodily comportment with significant affective energies – simply put, as suggested above sexual norms make you feel certain ways about certain bodies, and certain body parts. The multitude of different bodies, perhaps understood as a kind of excess or exceeding, that does indeed provoke quotidian heteronormativity, yet the
existence and experience of difference itself provides a substantial ground for resistance.

Queer sexualities provoke negative, visceral responses as a consequence of the rigid and hierarchical values of heteronormativity. At the same time, this in itself signals the inadequacy of dominant sexual norms to capture lived experience and desire. This coincides nicely with Freccero's definition of queer, as simply “a certain unsettling in relation to heteronormativity” (Freccero, 2011, 17). This instability itself, noted by Hopkins in Chapter 3, relates to homophobic violence, but as Marcus (2005) argues, it also points out the myriad ways in which “sexual practice, sexual fantasy, and sexual identity fail to line up consistently” (Marcus, 2005, 196, in Halley and Parker, 2011, 7). Marcus continues, that thinking about queerness and sexuality in this way, as an inconsistency and unsettling, “expresses an important insight about the complexity of sexuality” (Marcus, 196). Once again, the lived, affective experience of sex, sexuality, and sexual desire simply exceeds heterosexual categories and identities.

In her contributing essay Love notes that this understanding of sexuality has pushed “queer theorists and activists call for the destruction of stable identity categories – for example, moving instead toward a more fluid understanding of sexual behavior” (Love, 2011, 184). Here, rather than pursuing a project of identifying and defining different sexual categories, such as expanding LGBTQ to contain other forms, the goal is to redefine sexuality so as to eliminate the need for categories of identity altogether. Yet, as Edelman notes, “the limitless array of privatized libidinal experiences and affects, at once underspecified and overdetermined, must submit to the law of culture, to the discipline of sociality, for which it can then come to figure self-indulgent resistance to communal imperatives” (Edelman, 2011, 111). To Edelman, sexuality is limitless in the
sense that is refers to emergent pleasure and desire, but constrained insofar as commonplace understandings fix desire and pleasure in relation to categories of identity. The concept of a stable identity here, although perhaps affectively restrictive in terms of how it limits sexual practice and desire, may be a necessary passage into formal legal recognition in the contemporary political climate. Simply put, the overcoming of LGBTQ identities is only possible after a certain social, legal privilege has been attained (Love, 2011, 184). And, given that the structure of claims to rights and legal protections is predicated on belonging to a vulnerable group, moving beyond current conceptions of sexuality can only be achieved after the recognition of particular rights for members of LGBTQ communities.

Critiquing identity in this fashion argues for a kind of reversal of Foucault's observation that 'the homosexual' became something that you are, rather something that you did. A reversal of this order, built on the understanding of sex as a productive complexity, noted by Foucault in an interview entitled “Friendship as a Way of Life”, means that “the problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of sex but rather to use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships” (Foucault, 2010, 135-136). Here, sex itself is not the issue, but rather kinds of desires implied by different sexualities. The kinds of relationships Foucault envisions, notes Bersani in his contribution to After Sex, pursues “relations that no longer imitate the dominant heterosexual model of gender-based and fundamentally hierarchical relationality” (Bersani, 2011, 99). Certainly, even prior to enacting projects aimed at the destruction of categories of sexual identity, this at least, can continue to be social, political goal. For the contemporary normative impositions of heterosexism still make living difficult for those
whose bodies and desires do not match the prescribed criteria, and as Berlant notes, this is especially the case in relation to sexuality, when processes of socialization and “normativity is a vote for disavowing, drowning out, delegitimating, or distracting from all that’s ill-fitting in humans” (Berlant, 2011, 81). In this case, quite in line with Boudieu's understanding of the logic of practice as feel for the game, sex and sexuality can be understood as “a gesture cluster that can be organized in an identity for the purpose of passing through normative sociality” (Berlant, 2011, 81). Here identifiable categories represent a means by which to make claims to social, political, and legal recognition.

This line of enquiry helps to explain the observation that Cvetkovich makes in this same collection, wherein “queer activists would feel particularly depressed when confronted with a mainstream gay and lesbian political agenda that consists of gay marriage and civil rights” (Cvetkovich, 2011, 171). Here, notes Edelman, there is a kind of limitation of possible social, political horizons that is built into the “latent fantasy of gaining political legitimation at the cost of predating politics on heteronormative temporality” (Edelman, 2011, 111). That is, there is a complicity between the recognizable social demands and the normative constraints of heteronormativity, and this places significant affective restrictions on that which is recognizable as a legitimate form of social expression. The temporality that Edelman speaks of results from the social inertia that Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* establishes, and illustrates how it can narrow the possible horizon of form of living – in this case the prevailing normative structures are built upon a logic of heteronormative temporality insofar as recognized legal family units are seen as legitimate insofar as they are able to reproduce for the future.
Additionally, and more concretely, heterosexual family values structure the majority of the social, legal, and political apparatus, as Cobb suggests “the marriage form (and its not-so-distant child, the couple form) is for intimate stability but also for judicial, political, and cultural legibility that belongs to and exceeds official state regulation” (Cobb, 2011, 214). Much the same way, argues Cvetkovich, “the call for legalized gay marriage simply reproduces neoliberal efforts to make access to rights contingent on a privatized family form and that it contributes to the shrinking of the public sphere” (Cvetkovich, 2011, 171). Here, as Bourdieu would characterize it, we can see the durability of heteronormativity and associated norms such as the private family. With Bourdieu, we can see that the logic of the sexual field is a product of the history of the struggle to impose or define what is at stake in the struggle for universal recognition.

5.2 AFFECT AND THE SOCIALITY OF HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

The work at hand therefore provides a further means of understanding contemporary sexual politics, and can be read alongside much of the contemporary scholarship in this field. Additionally, as has been discussed throughout, exposure to dominant normative frameworks has particular affective repercussions, understood by Bourdieu as dispositional responses. Thinking in terms dispositions and nonconscious relationships in this manner adds another layer of understanding to current scholarship about homophobic violence, and positions the current thesis alongside contemporary affect theory. What is perhaps most significant for the work at hand in this field is the redefinition of emotions, sentiments, and feelings as social, and not individual phenomena. This, once again, speaks to the importance of the social nature of homophobia established early in this work by Hopkins, and indeed, informs a particular
critique of the concept of the hate-crime itself as being being some kind of deviant, individual, aberration.

It is fruitful to return momentarily to Hopkins' theses, in order to frame the affective repercussions of heteronormativity more clearly. Recall that for Hopkins, 'repressed' homosexual desire contributes homophobic violence, as individuals can act out aggressively in response to the psychic trauma of internalized shame, guilt, and desire. Here, Bourdieu's work provides a significant theoretical explanation for the internalization of negative sentiment, emotions, and affect. For Bourdieu, the discursive effects of heterosexist discourse results in feeling particular ways about one's own body and desire. In this case, the “criteria for differentiation” (Hopkins, 171) associated with traditional gender roles takes the form of material experience. Thus, “a certain way of walking” (Hopkins, 171) for example, can indeed produce feelings of disgust, and discomfort as a result of the affective homosociality of hegemonic masculinity. In this light, As both Heyek (2004) and Hopkins (1998) have noted, this “homophobic activity wins approval” (Hopkins, 177) through the securing of the dominant roles unsettled by difference, but additionally, as the restorative aspect of violence is so often positively experienced by the perpetrators.

Bourdieu additionally offers some further insight into the the political response hypothesis. Here, returning to Tomsen's observation that “corporeal or even visceral sense of loathing came from people who often gave support for gay men and lesbians in relation to other issues” (Tomsen 2009, 32) is quite informative. For, as Hopkins notes, the exceptional violence produced in moments of homophobic attack does not match up. Indeed, perpetrators had no real political motive. This suggest that whereas we may be
able to overcome dispositional imperatives through rational reflection, and this seems apparent in observing some gains in formal, legal equality, in moments or contexts that restrict this possibly, dispositional and affective responses provide a significant and convincing explanatory framework for interpersonal violence.

In her introduction to the *Affect Theory Reader* (2011) Patricia Clough writes that affects are understood in the field as “bodily responses, often autonomic responses, which are in-excess of consciousness” (Clough, 2011, 1). This seems to line up quite nicely with Bourdieu's description of dispositions, as being “transmitted from body to body, below the level of conscious control” (Bourdieu, 2000, 95). Additionally, as Gould notes in her presentation of Bourdieu, affect or disposition “beneath conscious awareness, on the level of bodily understanding” and provides a certain “orientation to action” (Gould, 2007, 33). As had been argued, dispositions relate to evidential forms of physical violence as a consequence and intensification of everyday symbolic violence, which Bourdieu argues “is exercised only through an act of knowledge and practical recognition which takes place below the level of consciousness” (Bourdieu, 2001, 42).

Clough continues that for scholars of affect, “affect refers generally to bodily capacities to affect and be affected or the augmentation or diminution of a body’s capacity to act” (Clough, 2011, 2). Here, it seems quite possible to suggest that the kind of negative affective atmosphere produced by heteronormativity certainly augments the potential for homophobic violence. For Bourdieu these normative framework are bound to produce statistical regularities, as the level of dispositional negativity will inevitably crystallize in moments of violence. As unsatisfactory as this may be for analyzing individual motivations in the event of interpersonal violence, it does yield significant
explanatory purchase from a sociological perspective.

That said, the affective framework sheds some light on how norms that focus on bodily comportment might actually function in everyday interaction. As Thrift (2004) notes, “affects do not belong to any particular body, but to the receptivity and capacity in the relationship between bodies” (Thrift, 2004). Affect then, in a sense, mediates relationships with others, as Brian Massumi evocatively suggests, is it “most directly manifested in the skin at the surface of the body, at its interface with things” (Massumi, 1995, 85). To Seyfert, this means that “there is no binary between a bodiless atmosphere and body” (Seyfert, 2012, 31), but rather, that the human body is constantly open to and affected by the external world. This, alongside the understanding of the objectivity of gender developed through Butler, suggests a bodily openness to violence. In this sense, continues Seyfert, “the transmission of affect is no simple influence or impingement of an external force upon a human body, but rather describes the different affective frequencies modulating the diverse ways in which various types of bodies interact” (Seyfert, 2012, 30). This bears significant consequences for the bodily effects of socialization, and indeed the diverse ways in which socialization can take place, in addition to the explicit content of quotidian homonegativity. Here, Ruddick's analysis is quite helpful:

The body ‘itself’ whether a social body or individual human being is in a constant state of de- and re-composition in relation to other bodies, even in the most mundane acts of everyday reproduction...Its awareness is the product of a multiplicity of encounters whose meanings themselves are deeply invested in the materiality of the social field (Ruddick, 2010, 28).

The materiality of the social here is perhaps the best means of articulating the challenges that theories of affect have for political intervention. For, as Spinks 2001 notes, “the way that political attitudes and statements are partly conditioned by intense autonomic bodily
reactions that do not simply reproduce the trace of a political intention and cannot be wholly recuperated within an ideological regime” (Spinks, 2001, 23, in Thrift, 2004, 64). For Thrift, the real, lived consequence of affect is that “hate circulates, emotion circulates, homophobia circulates, and in circulating, polices spaces: marking the moment when we as individuals or collectivities recognize this fascism and the way it patrols our attempts to see past alterity” (Ruddick, 2010, 23). Political intervention on the affective plane is indeed a difficult thought, and for Bourdieu, it a process of slow change and gradual attrition, marked by demands for the state to “give durable and ordinary recognition of a public, published status” (Bourdieu, 2001, 121), and demands public, everyday exposure and support for difference. Further, as Bourdieu notes, “the agent does what is in his power to make possible the actualization of the potentialities inscribed in his body in the form of capacities and dispositions shaped by conditions of existence” (Bourdieu, 2000, 150). Intervention, therefore, might gain the most traction in areas of where dispositions are most notably shaped, and given the resources available to and engaged by the present inquiry, this is likely in the field of education.
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