PROJECTS OF GOVERNANCE: GARRISONS AND THE STATE IN ENGLAND, 1560s-1630s

by

Andrea M. Shannon

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
December 2013

© Copyright by Andrea M. Shannon, 2013
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARRISONS AND ENGLAND’S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARRISONS, AUTHORITY AND THE STATE</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER OUTLINE</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: A SURVEY OF ENGLISH GARRISONS, 1500-1642</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALAIS AND THE CONTINENT</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC GARRISONS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: “THEY ARE MOST TO BE TRUSTED, THAT HAVE BEST INTEREST IN THE STATE”: TOWN, CROWN, COUNTY AND PLYMOUTH FORT</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A NEW FORT FOR PLYMOUTH</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PEOPLE (OF PLYMOUTH) VERSUS FERDINANDO GORGES</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLYMOUTH FORT AND THE COUNTY OF DEVON</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLYMOUTH FORT IN PEACETIME</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: TOWN AND GARRISON IN PORTSMOUTH</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAINS AND MAYORS</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLDIERS AND TOWNSPEOPLE</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: “A ROD READY PREPARED”: TOWN, CROWN AND GARRISON IN BERWICK-UPON-TWEED</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ELIZABETHAN GOVERNMENT OF BERWICK</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE GOVERNOR, THE MAYOR, THE MARSHAL AND HIS BROTHER</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I WILL RULE THEM, AND THEY NOT ME.”</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“BERWICK IS OUR ENGLAND”</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This dissertation offers the first in depth examination of the government of garrisons in England between the 1560s and the 1630s, via the close examination of three case studies: the garrisons at Plymouth, Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed. The garrisons located at vulnerable locations along England’s frontier existed to help maintain the internal peace and safety of the realm. The central government, the crown and the privy council, and those who lived in these vulnerable areas agreed about the value and necessity of defence. They also agreed that defence served the larger goal of stable and orderly domestic government. They disagreed, however, over the government of garrisons. The central government and those upon whom it relied to govern in the localities thus entered into negotiations over the nature of garrison government. In these negotiations, the Elizabethan central government regularly and successfully asserted the queen’s right to appoint a garrison captain and successfully maintained him in his jurisdiction once appointed. The regime took specific, goal oriented action to maintain the stable and Protestant polity that was, in their view, established under Elizabeth I. The result was expansion of the state. This study questions, therefore, the extent to which the early modern English state expanded through an undirected process of state formation. While the garrisons under study here reveal that England underwent significant military development during this period, these garrisons still did not constitute a standing army. The Elizabethan central government still lacked the physical coercive power to implement their ambitions without recourse to negotiation. Domestic garrisons reveal, however, that state building occurred not in spite of the fact that power was negotiated, but rather because it was negotiated. The central government’s hand at the bargaining table was not as weak as is sometimes portrayed, particularly with regard to military matters. Defence of the realm was part of the royal prerogative and so actions taken concerning the government of garrisons carried considerable legitimacy. Moreover, as the font of all official authority within the state, the central government was the ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional dispute. Those who possessed official authority in early modern England feared the diminution of that authority, through actions perceived as illegitimate, in the eyes of those over whom they governed. Equally unpalatable, however, was the diminishing of one’s authority through the encroachment of the authority of another. Against this eventuality, one’s only recourse was the central government.
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED**

**APC**  Acts of the Privy Council  
**AO**  Auditors of the Imprest  
**BL**  British Library  
**CP**  Cecil Papers  
**CSPD**  Calendar of State Papers Domestic  
**E**  Exchequer  
**HHA**  Hatfield House Archives  
**ODNB**  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography  
**SP**  State Papers  
**TNA**  The National Archives  
**WO**  Ordnance Office and War Office
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A project such as this accrues a great many debts – more, in fact, that can be acknowledged properly by a few words at the beginning of the finished product. First I must thank my friend and supervisor, Dr. Krista Kesselring. Her patience and guidance was as valuable as it was boundless. And it really needed to be boundless. Dr. Kesselring always believed in this project, and its’ author, even if that author was sometimes in doubt herself. The other members of my supervisory committee also worked very hard to help me make this dissertation. Drs. Cynthia Neville and Tim Stretton were enthusiastic and knowledgeable commentators throughout the process, providing insightful comments and challenging questions. My external examiner, Dr. Mark Fissel, appeared only at the end of the road (as external examiners do), but proved enthusiastic about the project, offering valuable thoughts about the future direction of this work. I have always found the Dalhousie Department of History a friendly place to work, and regularly received support – both practical and moral – from members of the faculty not directly involved with the supervision of this project. To them I owe thanks. Valerie Peck and Tina Jones, administrative assistants in the history department, are like family to graduate students. Val and Tina not only help you when need to know some procedure or another, but actively cheer you on as you make your way. They are always ready with a kind word, and for that I thank them.

Financial assistance for this dissertation was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Dalhousie Department of History. The materials on which it is built come from a variety of repositories in the United Kingdom. Thanks go to the staff at The National Archives and the British Library in London. I also wish to thank those who staff the various local and regional archives I visited while researching this dissertation. Everyone was always very friendly and helpful despite having too much work and too few resources. Innumerable thanks go to Charlotte and Gareth Pritchard who are always willing, whenever I wash up on English shores, to house, feed and provide transportation to their “third daughter.” This dissertation represents an ongoing fascination with their country that began with my first visit nearly twenty years ago.

Any sort of work like this is impossible without the support of one’s peers and friends. Many who once lived near now live far, and some always lived far, but all helped in all manner of ways. I will not offer a list of names for fear of omitting one, something I by no means wish to do. Most important of all, however, is the love of my family – my mother and father, Lois and Barry Shannon, and my brother and sister-in-law, Stacey and Lindsay Shannon. Finally, to Adam, who has had to live with me living with this - no easy task. I owe him more than I can say. Oh, and thanks to Boo for messin’ up all my papers.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1576, the townsmen of Hull resolved to solicit the queen and the privy council for a “reasonable yearly aid,” “sum of money” or “other consideration” to help maintain the dilapidated castle and blockhouses for which they were responsible.¹ Some months later, after hearing that the privy council had appointed a commission to survey the state of the fortifications, the townsmen resolved that the men they appointed to pursue their suit for assistance should not “by any means condescend or agree” to have the queen place in those forts “a garrison of soldiers.”² The townsmen’s earlier deliberations about what, exactly, to do with the old fortifications makes clear why they were so emphatic about not having a garrison placed in them: Hull had had a garrison before. Henry VIII built and garrisoned the fortifications in 1542 and, “in the process of time,” the townsmen found themselves “marvellously annoyed by…the lieutenant and garrison divers manner of ways.” The townsmen did not specify the exact nature of the disputes, but did explain that they grew “unto such hatred upon both sides that in the end it braste out into quarrels and lastly into suits.” Eventually the townsmen, through the procurement of “great gifts and expenses,” managed to get the lieutenant and the garrison “wholly displaced

¹ Hull History Centre BRB 2, Bench Book Four, f. 147. Thank you to Helen Good for the Hull references.
² Hull History Centre BRB 2, Bench Book Four, f. 150.
forever.” In 1551, the king delivered the fortifications into the town’s care, under the condition that the town be responsible for their maintenance. The Hull townsmen’s experience with the garrison was at once both common and unique: common, insofar as tensions and tempers often flared between townspeople and town authorities, and the officers and men of a resident garrison. Hull’s experience was unique, however, in that the townsmen succeeded, at least in their own estimation, in procuring the displacement of the garrison. This was something that Edward VI’s successors rarely permitted. In fact, it may well have been a combination of past experience and current realities that prompted the vehemence with which the Elizabethan Hull townsmen forbade their brethren from agreeing, under any circumstance, to the placement of another garrison.

This dissertation examines England’s domestic garrisons between the mid-Tudor period and the 1630s, using the garrisons located at Berwick, Portsmouth and Plymouth as case studies. More particularly, it examines garrisons as projects of governance: forums where contemporaries claimed and exercised political authority. England’s domestic garrisons were subject to the authority and government of a captain or, as in the case of Berwick-upon-Tweed, a governor, appointed by the crown to command the garrison. Members of the garrison were subject to the authority of this captain and, therefore, not answerable to the other bodies of crown commissioned authority responsible for governing the town or county that contained

---

3 Hull History Centre C BRS/53/1.
the garrison. Thus, jurisdictional disputes regularly erupted over the precise nature and extent of the authority of the garrison commander and the extent to which the soldiers under his authority might participate in non-military activities within the locality where they resided. The parties involved in these disputes resorted to the central government, the crown and the privy council, to settle these disputes. Owing to their particular jurisdictional conditions, therefore, garrisons provide us insight into the operation of authority in early modern England, the nature of the relationship between centre and periphery and the considerable capacity for active state building that the negotiation of authority gave to the central government.

The garrisons located at vulnerable locations along England’s frontier existed to help maintain the internal peace and safety of the realm. These garrisons, together with the militia, existed to prevent the incursion of foreign enemies onto English soil and to avoid the internal discord and disruption that such an invasion brought. Both the central government, the crown and the privy council, and those who lived in these vulnerable areas agreed that better defence was valuable and necessary. They agreed that better defence served the greater aim of domestic order. Disagreement occurred, however, over the proper distribution of authority with regard to garrisons. Thus, the central government and those upon whom it relied to govern in the localities entered into negotiations over the nature of garrison government. Competing notions of the proper distribution of authority within the state prompted these negotiations: the central government, particularly the Elizabethan central
government, desired control over England’s martial structure to rest directly in their hands. Local authorities, in contrast, frequently asserted that the best defence derived from defensive measures directed by the local authorities themselves.

While this study of domestic garrisons agrees that negotiation was the means by which contemporaries ordered and reordered authority within the early modern state, it insists that negotiation was a means to an end: parties entering into negotiations had particular aims in mind when negotiating. The Elizabethan central government regularly and successfully asserted the queen’s right to appoint a garrison captain and successfully maintained him in his jurisdiction when conflict arose between the garrison captains and other crown sanctioned agents of authority. The regime acted in this manner in order to maintain the stable and Protestant polity that was, in their view, established under Elizabeth I. The central government took purposeful action toward the government of garrisons, action that resulted in the expansion of the state. Since the maintenance of a particular kind of polity prompted these actions, they call into question the extent to which the early modern English state expanded through an undirected process of state formation.

The literature on early English state formation asserts that the lack of physical coercive power on the part of the crown limited its ability to engage in active state building. The story of domestic garrisons, however, reveals that state building occurred not in spite of the fact that power was negotiated, but rather because it was negotiated. The central government’s hand at the bargaining table was not as weak as
is sometimes portrayed, particularly with regard to military matters. Defence of the realm was part of the royal prerogative. There was considerably legitimacy, therefore, to the central government’s assertions that it alone might appoint men to the government of garrisons. Moreover, as the font of all official authority within the state, the central government was the ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional dispute. This gave the central government considerable influence in a system in which authority was negotiated. Those who possessed official authority in early modern England feared the diminution of that authority, through actions perceived as illegitimate, in the eyes of those over whom they governed. Equally unpalatable, however, was the diminishing of one’s authority through the encroachment of the authority of another. Against this eventuality, one’s only recourse was the central government.

**Garrisons and England’s Military Development**

Garrisons were, of course, military institutions. Garrisons existed to help defend, and sometimes govern, regions considered vulnerable to attack or to disorder. As such, garrisons comprise a significant component of England’s martial development. For a long time, late Tudor and early Stuart England suffered a rather poor military reputation. Corruption and inefficiency plagued England’s militia.\(^4\) Elizabeth’s expeditionary forces to Ireland and the Low Countries acquitted themselves adequately, but not memorably. Charles I’s expeditions to Cadiz and the

Isle of Rhé were dismal failures. According to this interpretation, the military revolution, the dramatic leap forward in terms of military tactics, technology, size and professionalism that swept continental Europe in the sixteenth century, did not arrive on English shores until the Civil War in the middle of the seventeenth century.\(^5\) Prior to this point, England was effectively demilitarized. The Tudors had curbed the power of England’s aristocracy by successfully reducing it to an honour and service nobility.\(^6\) Without a standing army to replace them, England had no capacity for the consistent practice and perpetuation of military knowledge.\(^7\) Within England itself, moreover, the early modern period was one of marked peace. For over 100 years, between the cessation of the Wars of the Roses and the English Civil War, land war never had a serious impact on the majority of the English population. Experience of war on land was the preserve of the relative few who served in the Low Countries or Ireland. Thus, both the military experience and the military aspirations of the


\(^7\) For Conrad Russell, for example, the near two year gap between the “functional breakdown” of government in 1640 and the opening salvos of war in 1642 was because it took that long for English people to remember how to fight. Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 455.
majority of the English populace evaporated. In short, for some historians, England before 1642 was a military backwater, a place where one might hear exhortations in favour of the longbow, rather than the crack of gunpowder or artillery.

It is true that the English during this period produced no commander to rival Mansfeldt or Parma. The English saw no famous military victory on land, nor did they possess that gold standard of military development: the professional standing army. It is not true, however, that the English remained completely ignorant of contemporary martial developments. If there was a military revolution in Europe, and that itself appears to be up for debate, many English people were broadly in step with general European technological developments. The pre-Civil War period saw the proliferation of didactic books on the practice of modern warfare, and a fashion for military yards or artillery gardens in London and elsewhere.

---

9 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, 102.
knowledge was not simply academic. The notion that English military prowess languished after the reign of Henry VIII ignores the extensive military involvements of Englishmen both in the Low Countries and in Ireland in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{12} While England did not possess a standing army, there was considerable “institutional memory” in the military organizations that England did possess, including in the ranks of the nobility.\textsuperscript{13} The shift from armed retainers to a militia system simply meant a change in form and not function for the nobility. It was noblemen, for example, who were most likely to be lord lieutenants and, therefore, responsible for the militia in their county. In a similar vein, Barbara


Donagan notes the existence in the early seventeenth century of “a cadre of military families” dating back to at least Elizabeth’s reign.\textsuperscript{14} Within noble circles, then, military knowledge was still transmitted generationally.

Moreover, the English had soldiers in pay even in times of peace: the gunners and garrison troops who occupied English defensive fortifications both at home and abroad. Although he devotes just one subset of his larger work to garrisons, James Raymond contends that these men, along with Henry’s administrators and the royal bodyguard, “all helped to create some form of ‘institutional memory.’”\textsuperscript{15} While Raymond’s work confines itself to the reign of Henry VIII, his assertion is true for the rest of the period. Between the reign of Henry VIII and the English Civil War England always maintained men in garrison somewhere: at home and often abroad. Garrisoning was a military practice the English did with regularity throughout the period under study and, therefore, formed part of English military institutional memory.\textsuperscript{16} Still, despite the regularity with which the English maintained garrisons, garrisons have not received sustained analysis. While garrisons receive honourable mention from historians like Raymond, garrisons themselves have not received much

\textsuperscript{14} Donagan, “Halcyon Days,” 69.
\textsuperscript{15} Raymond, \textit{Henry VIII’s Military Revolution}, 115.
\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, as Barbara Donagan points out, garrisoning was often done by generations of the same family.
focussed treatment. The exception is David Grummitt’s recent work on Calais.\textsuperscript{17} One aim of this study, then, is to remedy this deficiency by making garrisons themselves the subject of analysis.

The regularity of English garrisoning reinforces the argument that England possessed some form of consistent practice of arms prior to the Civil War. Similarly, this study corroborates the observation that military practice was often a family affair, and a noble family affair at that. Indeed, the notion that England suffered military stagnancy until at least 1642 often seems more historiographical than historical. It is a notion perpetuated by the idea of the military revolution, which argues that military development occurred in a specific, and largely technological, manner. And while the military revolution thesis has much to answer for with regard to the negative interpretation of martial culture and practice in early modern England, Phil Withington argues that it is not the only culprit. For most of the twentieth century, social and economic history also did its part to downplay the significance of military practice and culture. Social history, particularly the ‘new social history’ of the 1970s, sought to analyse English people in their totality. Since England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries experienced a prolonged period during which land wars did not directly affect the daily lives and experiences of most of the population, martial culture was largely disdained by the majority of people and became the preserve of a

\textsuperscript{17} David Grummitt, \textit{The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-1558} (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2008). Grummitt examines both the military and political significance of the Calais garrison.
relative few. But Withington argues that this notion rests on the false assumption that war did not affect most English people. Quite the contrary was true: English people were cognizant of, and participated in, numerous conflicts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, militarism was more pervasive in English society than previous historiographies have allowed. 18

Recent scholarship bears out Withington’s assertions. Experience of war and matters military were not simply the preserve of a relative few. English society was not demilitarized. John S. Nolan argues that, by the end of the sixteenth century, there were few people in England not touched by war. While only 0.13% of England’s population served overseas, “the military effort of the years between 1585 and 1603 touched every level of society, disrupting the economy, substantially altering the role of the state in local government, and making demands on everyday life.” 19 To be sure, these were not positive effects of war and military preparedness, but they do put paid to the notion that war did not affect most people’s lives in sixteenth-century England. Despite the fact that they fought no battles on home soil, save for a skirmish or two during the period’s rebellions, English people knew they were at war and, by the 1580s certainly, knew that war might come to England. Even Geoffrey Parker acknowledges that, while he thought England woefully unprepared

to face a Spanish attack in 1588, the average Englishman was likely quite determined
to fend off a Spanish foe.\(^{20}\)

Equally significant, however, is the realization that the changes made to the
organization of England’s defensive forces during the Elizabethan period were
certainly not haphazard. The Elizabethan regime took deliberate steps to help ensure
the better defence of England against attack and by and large succeeded in
implementing those steps. The trained bands serve as a case in point. Instituted in
1573, by the 1590s the trained bands had become a permanent and reliable pool of
men for service both at home and abroad.\(^{21}\) The reestablishment of the lords
lieutenant, who oversaw both the trained bands and the general militia levees that
continued to exist alongside the bands, placed the direction of these forces under the
supervision of one or two individuals selected and overseen by the queen and the
privy council.\(^{22}\) Of course, it remains true that these forces never faced the
anticipated invasion. Thus, there is no means of gauging the actual effectiveness of
the development of the trained bands, or the reimplementation of the lord lieutenants.
It remains important nonetheless that the regime considered and implemented such
measures. They demonstrate that military matters were not peripheral to English
political culture, but an integral part of that culture. What is more, such measures

\(^{20}\) Younger, “If the Armada had Landed,” 26.
\(^{21}\) Nolan, “Militarization,” 399-400. Nolan argues that, by the 1590s, the trained bands
were effectively “the army of the Elizabethan state,” 399.
\(^{22}\) Neil Younger, “Securing the Monarchical Republic: the Remaking of the Lord
demonstrate that the central government might, and did, marshal the existing
resources of the English state in order to effect significant change to English military
structures.

The garrisons examined in this dissertation were part and parcel of this
development: the military development England did have, rather than the one it did not. Garrisons were part of this conscious realignment of England’s martial resources. Such development was significant not only to the ‘fiscal-military state’, but also to the development of the state in toto. The Elizabethan regime undertook these measures to ensure the survival of Elizabethan England: the survival of the Elizabethan Protestant settlement and the internal peace and orderly government of England. Measures to improve England’s defence were projects of governance intimately bound up with, not separate from, the larger project of the maintenance of internal order.

**Garrisons, Authority and the State**

Since garrisons were projects of governance, they reveal much about the operation of authority and the structure of the state. Recent work on the state in early modern England focuses our attention on the quotidian operation of the Elizabethan and early Stuart state.  

---

complex structure of the early modern English state, and that authority within it operated via a process of negotiation. The complex nature of the early modern English state meant that it was not fundamentally divided by a neat centre-local binary consisting of two separate, ultimately antagonistic, worldviews. Instead, this


24 The center is usually taken to mean the physical spaces and institutions of government attached to the monarch, such as the court, the privy council and the household, as well as other institutions fixed in Westminster, such as the central law courts. The locality consisted of the many boroughs and 39 counties that comprised England, and the parishes and hundreds that sub-divided each county. Local government consisted of the mayors, town councillors, justices, sheriffs, constables and church officials who executed their duties in the provinces. Parliament is variously considered as either an aspect of central governance or the point at which central and local interacted. The historiography of the relationship between these two main components of English government in the early modern period coalesces around the larger historiographical debate about the causes of the English Civil War. The older “court” versus “country” thesis postulated that the central-local divide was largely an ideological one: the country formed the constitutionalist opposition to the court-centered absolutist tendencies of the Stuarts. Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country: the Beginning of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1969). The so-called revisionist historians challenged the notion of a long-simmering ideological divide, although the central-local divide remained in place. For Alan Everitt, country, or local, sentiment did exist in early modern England, but as a function of insular provincialism rather than as a consequence of ideological opposition to constitutional infringements. Alan Everitt, “The County Community,” in *The English Revolution 1600-1660*, ed. E.W. Ives (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), 48-63. See also idem, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1966). While other scholars moderated the insularity of England’s localities, they still emphasized the primacy of local identity over national consciousness, and argued that local concerns tended to trump national ones. For examples see: John Morrill, *Revolt in the Provinces*, Second Edition (London: Longman, 1999) and Anthony Fletcher,
historiography views politics more broadly, and includes not just “the conduct and management of affairs of state,” but also “the social distribution and use of power” and “the manner in which relationships of power and authority, dominance and subordination are established and maintained.”25 The key, therefore, to understanding the structure of the state is to focus on the continuous process of inclusion and exclusion, dominance and authority, within and between the many communities that comprised early modern England. Reflecting on the use of the word community, Alexandra Shepard and Phil Withington argue that English historians tend to employ the term in its gemeinschaft sense: small, close knit, cooperative groups that are gradually supplanted by gesellschaft, the larger society or the state, that destroys these small communities.26 Such binaries work well enough when one is trying to explain something like the English Civil War, but they account less easily for the quotidian operation of the early modern state.27 Instead we should consider early modern communities as dynamic entities capable of adjusting to and realigning, both within and without, to changing circumstances. “Communities,” for

27 Indeed, it was a sense that the “county community” thesis, championed by Everitt et. al. offered us nothing fundamentally different from the “court-country” thesis that prompted many to shift the basis of analysis to the everyday operation of authority in England.
Shepard and Withington, “were present, so to speak, amidst the turmoil of their own refashioning.”

This emphasis on process, on the continuous adjustment and readjustment of communities, is the crux of recent literature on negotiated authority and early modern state formation. Here the relationship between the center and the localities is an organic one: changes to the state, writ large, occur as a result of the cumulative effect of multifarious negotiations and appropriations that take place in and between the many communities identified by Shepard and Withington. Changes to and within the structure of the state were a social and cultural process. Focussing on process means that the structure of the state changes, but is not changed: individuals or groups of individuals rarely possess an a priori conception of how a state ought to be constructed and then take action intended to bring such a condition about.

Michael Braddick sums this up nicely when he describes the early modern English state as having patterns but not blueprints. Indeed, Braddick’s *State Formation in Early Modern England* represents the most explicit formulation of this notion of negotiated authority and its relationship to state growth. People in early modern

28 Ibid., 7.


England exercised authority through a constant process of negotiation and legitimation. Those in positions of authority lacked the capability to enforce that authority through physical coercion. There was no standing army, no police force, nothing approaching an effective physically coercive apparatus of political power. Underpinning all authority, then, were ideas generally held about the proper ordering of society. Such ideas both legitimated and constrained exercises of power. A magistrate’s actions, for instance, were legitimate because a magistrate was understood to have a specific role. At the same time, this magistrate might not simply do as he pleased: activities perceived as outside the generally held idea of magistracy were illegitimate and subject to objection. Having no capacity to force people to accept his actions, the magistrate had to ensure that his actions conformed to these generally held ideas.31 Political power operated in this manner everywhere politics took place, from parish to court.

Since political power always operated in the same manner, Braddick argues, a divide between the centre and the locality did not comprise the fundamental divide of the early modern English state.32 A central-local divide, however, persists in this analysis despite claims to the contrary. Its persistence is most noticeable in Braddick’s discussion of the “fiscal-military state”: the branch of the state concerned with defence, war and finance. On matters related to defence, there was no broad

31 Ibid., 1-9.
32 Ibid., 92-93.
consensus that supported central government initiatives to see the militia, and to a lesser extent the navy, improved. Fiscal-military negotiations were failed negotiations, at least from the central government perspective, and this branch of the state failed to grow. This stands in contrast to negotiations undertaken concerning the “patriarchal state,” those institutional forms through which officials exercised power in order to maintain social harmony. These negotiations were by and large successful: both the officially and unofficially empowered in England perceived the existence of threats to the social order that required rectification. Thus, this branch of the state grew.

What occurs in the pages to follow appears, on one level, to bear out Braddick’s conclusions regarding the fiscal-military state. Initiatives and decisions taken by the central government with regard to garrisons did not always meet with universal approval. The jurisdictional conflicts that occurred in and around garrisons owed much to the fact that there were differing ideas about the proper government of garrisons. And yet, the fiscal-military state grew: garrisons represented another node of legitimate, crown sanctioned authority quite separate from other such authorities. Through domestic garrisons, the central government succeeded in having authority within the state distributed in the manner it saw fit, and not in the manner thought appropriate by other agents of authority on whom it otherwise relied to govern. This occurred not because garrisons represented the coercive power that the political elite erstwhile lacked: despite their relative permanence, the garrisons under study here
did not comprise a standing army. The crown, in tandem with its closest advisory bodies, still did not have the capability to impose its will on its subjects by force alone: it was compelled to negotiate. The growth of the state that garrisons constituted occurred not in spite of the fact that the central government was compelled to negotiate but because it possessed the ability to negotiate successfully, even in areas where it is often considered to have failed to do so.

What occurred in and around England’s domestic garrisons did occur between different communities, each of which possessed an idea of the proper distribution of authority within the state. This study emphasizes, however, the vitality of the central government as one of these communities. In our historiographical haste to demolish the central-local binary as the only ideological divide in England, we have downplayed too much the political centre as one of the many communities of belonging in early modern England. It was a community of belonging that, like all others, possessed ideas concerning the proper distribution of authority within the state and took deliberate action to see that distribution brought to fruition. We shall often see the central government - the crown in concert with its closest advisors - acting with purposeful intent with regard to garrison government and presenting a united front as they settle disputes, or uphold or reject the claims to authority of the members of other communities. While it has been useful to see beyond a single, overarching centre-local binary, the existence of multifarious communities of belonging and networks of power did not preclude the emergence of binaries within
the early modern English state. A central-local divide was perhaps not the only important division within the early modern English state, but this study shows that reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated.

Jurisdictional disputes are just such binaries. Jurisdictional disputes occurred because two individuals, or communities, staked a claim to an authority that they argued belonged to them, or ought to belong to them, to the exclusion of all others. Such claims were informed by ideas about what ought to be. Notions regarding the correct distribution of authority within the state informed such claims. This is not to say that such disputes were always lofty, principled conflicts: ideas regarding the proper structure of authority were usually a mixture of the principles and the interests of those staking the claims. The central government was a direct party in negotiations over the distribution of authority, and in negotiations over the establishment of jurisdictions. On other occasions, the central government acted as an arbitrator when negotiations between jurisdictions broke down. In both instances the central government, as much as town mayors and garrison captains, possessed ideas about how and by whom the state ought to be governed.

Garrisons underscore that while negotiation was the process by which authority operated in England, it was nonetheless a process informed by ideas: ideas generally held but, just as significantly, ideas specifically held by the members of the

---

33 For more on networks of power and overlapping communities of belonging see Michael Braddick and John Walter, “Grids of Power: Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Early Modern Society,” in Negotiating Power, 1-42.
various and interconnected communities that comprised the early modern English state. Thus, this study is in keeping with much recent historiography that argues that understanding early modern political practice is impossible without some understanding of early modern political culture: the ideas and values through which contemporaries understood their world, their place in that world, and how to achieve profit and advancement. State formation literature also has its genesis in this historiographical tradition; however, its treatment of ideas is curiously passive. Ideas were the measure against which contemporaries judged the actions of their governors and deemed them legitimate. But how ideas informed the action to be so judged is left relatively unaddressed. Moreover, since much state formation literature is concerned with the relationship between the officially empowered and the not officially empowered, it likewise has relatively little to say about how ideas informed

the interplay between the politically empowered. Since jurisdictional disputes often involved differing claims to authority, they allow us to see how contemporaries leveraged ideas in order to establish, maintain, or expand their place within the early modern English state.

The concept of negotiated power, upon which the notion of state formation rests, addresses the mechanics of authority in early modern England, but is less useful for assessing motivations. The concept of negotiated authority does not explain why a particular individual or community sought to exercise authority in a particular way at a particular time. Some scholars argue that this is because the notion of state formation actually terminates in the present, in the emergence of the modern state. Speaking of state formation’s influence on British history in the last decade, Steven Ellis argues that the new British history is “just as much a grand narrative as traditional nationalist history.” The new British history still culminates in the present, except now it explains the emergence of the state rather than the nation. This does not, however, address why matters occurred as they did. If we set aside present centred analysis, he argues, and look at central-peripheral relations as they existed at the time, we see that “the character and ambitions of the monarchy itself” significantly shaped those relations.35 This is true for greater Britain, and it is true

within England as well.\textsuperscript{36} Other scholars also challenge the notion, suggested by the negotiation paradigm, that contemporaries could only envision incremental changes to the structure of the state. K.J. Kesselring argues that prophecy and supernatural belief were means by which contemporaries might imagine and articulate fundamental alterations to the social order, and not just a readjustment of their place within it.\textsuperscript{37} Similarly, James Holstun argues that the English Civil War saw many instances of revolutionary praxis, which is to say that people had ideas and acted on them.\textsuperscript{38}

The suggestion that understanding motivation is as important as understanding mechanics need not send us headlong back to another historiographical binary, principle versus self-interest, so long as we acknowledge that the two were rarely mutually exclusive. People then as now often sought an ideal, but rarely pursued it entirely without regard to their own profit and benefit. Indeed, this is arguably a necessary condition of negotiation. In the pages to come we shall observe negotiations regarding the nature and structure of authority within the early modern English state. The particular subject of these negotiations was the

government of garrisons, but the broader framework was the government of the state writ large.

Chapter Outline

This study consists of three case studies, bookended by two chapters that take a larger perspective. The first chapter provides a survey of English garrisons, both abroad and at home. This chapter briefly reviews the rough size and location of England’s garrisons, before turning to the particular character of garrisons: to the people who comprised their government and their rank and file, and some of the privileges and exemptions owed to garrison soldiers. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, it takes garrisons out of the shadows and places them in the limelight, and so begins to remedy the historiographical silence on English garrisons. Most importantly for our purposes, however, this chapter provides important context for interpreting the individual case studies, by providing an introduction to the social and structural composition of domestic English garrisons.

From there we turn our attention to Plymouth, where the queen erected a new fortification in the early 1590s. Here we observe the queen successfully assert her authority to appoint the captain of the new fort and garrison, despite the objections of the town authorities who first sought the establishment of a new fortification. The crown’s installation of Ferdinando Gorges as the captain of the new fort and, eventually, as a member of the martial establishment of Devon, occasioned
jurisdictional disputes between Gorges and both the town and the martial men of the county. This chapter, therefore, introduces us to two recurring themes of this study: the first is how the central government, the queen together with her closest advisors, sought to establish and maintain close oversight over the government of garrisons. The disputes that occurred in and around garrisons, therefore, took place within the larger context of that aim. The second theme is how the personalities of the individuals involved in jurisdictional disputes shaped and informed those disputes. That is to say that the ideas and attitudes bequeathed to individuals by their experiences and membership in one, or more, of England’s many communities of belonging and identity, influenced their behaviours and reactions to real or perceived infringements upon their authority.

The study then moves on to an examination of the garrison at Portsmouth. Here, as in Plymouth, jurisdictional disputes occurred between the mayor and townsmen of Portsmouth, and the captains of the garrison, regarding the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. Again, as in Plymouth, the personality of the individuals involved shaped the nature of the relationship between the two authorities. In Portsmouth we shall observe, however, that the presence of two authorities did not always have to breed contention: the presence of a crown appointed authority might sometimes be useful for townsmen by providing a fruitful link to the ear of the central government. In this chapter we will also observe more closely the relationship between garrison soldiers and townsmen, and the points of
tension that existed between the two. Since garrison soldiers were not wholly professional in this period, and they did not see soldiering as a means of earning a living exclusive of all others, soldiers often took up employments as a means of supplementing their earnings. This created tensions that exacerbated the already fractious issue of debatable jurisdictions. As in Plymouth, however, all of these disputes took place within the framework established by the central government: that the garrison captain, as much as the mayor and townsmen, possessed a legitimate jurisdiction that was not to be diminished.

Soldiers moonlighting in trades was also an issue between town and garrison in our last case study: the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed. Berwick-upon-Tweed stands out from the other case studies owing to its size, location, and governmental structure. Berwick was England’s largest domestic garrison and, after 1560, possessed a governor and council who oversaw both the garrison and, to a certain degree, the non-military government of the town. Moreover, Berwick’s situation on the border between England and Scotland meant that its environs were governed by different legal and political structures than those areas that surrounded Plymouth and Portsmouth. But for all its differences, the overarching themes that emerge in this chapter will be familiar: jurisdictional disputes, both between the garrison members, and between the garrison and the townspeople, were informed by the claims to authority made by the participants. On the part of the town of Berwick, such jurisdictional disputes helped them define, or refine, a sense of their own civic
identity, to the degree that by the 1590s the townsmen were making overtures to the central government not that dissimilar to those made by Portsmouth and Plymouth.

The last chapter once again broadens the focus, and links the observations made in the case studies to broader trends in the government of the early modern English state. It situates the developments in garrison government, particularly in the Elizabethan period, in the context of other military developments that occurred during the same period, such as the development of the trained bands and the reestablishment of the lords lieutenant. It argues that all such developments were linked to the particular context of the Elizabethan period, and to the ideas and aims of those at the centre of English government. The government of garrisons, therefore, was linked to the safety and orderly government of the state more generally. How, and by whom, garrisons ought to be governed was part and parcel of a greater conception of how, by whom and to what end the state itself ought to be structured and governed. Garrison government reflected the aims of the Elizabethan regime, and it reflected the aims of her successors. Thus, while negotiation was the means by which the central government enacted its policies, the end was more state building than state formation.

Initial research for this project revealed that the garrisons at Plymouth, Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed offered the largest amount of extant source material for a project of this kind. The source material for Berwick-upon-Tweed is the most voluminous and probably enough for a monograph similar to David
Grummitt’s on the Calais garrison. Yet the intent of the project was not to examine a single garrison in depth, but to show that garrisoning was a broader English practice not limited to the relatively well known garrisons at Berwick and Calais. Still, Berwick’s inclusion was crucial: it would have been foolish to ignore the rich vein of evidence generated by England’s largest domestic garrison. The significance of the establishment of the new fort at Plymouth in the 1590s, and its attendant disputes, is evident in both the State Papers and in documents housed at the British Library. It seemed likely, and proved to be the case, that more sources regarding Plymouth Fort, its captain and local authorities existed in local repositories in Plymouth and Devon. The availability of such sources prompted the inclusion of Plymouth in this study. But it was also what those sources revealed about the intents of the town and of the central government in establishing the new fort there in the 1590s that made the story of Plymouth Fort especially insightful. By contrast, Portsmouth at first seemed to operate on silent running. Documents produced by the central government revealed the existence of a garrison there, 100 men strong by the end of the sixteenth century, but little else. The diary of John Oglander revealed that he served as deputy of the Portsmouth garrison. The papers of that diligent record keeper, which are housed on the Isle of Wight, revealed the contours of garrison governance in Portsmouth in the early seventeenth century. Documents compiled by the townsmen of Portsmouth showed that the relations between the townspeople and the garrison,
the town government and the garrison government, shared important characteristics
with the other garrison case studies.

This study does not claim to be the last word on English garrisons. Indeed, it
should be merely an important beginning. As we shall see in chapter one, Plymouth,
Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed were only three, albeit three of the largest and
most significant, of a number of garrisons maintained within England throughout this
period. Most were much smaller than these three, although one in particular was not:
the Tower of London. The Tower is perhaps notable in this study for its absence.
The Tower certainly does fit into a study of garrisons generally, and a study of
jurisdictional dispute more particularly. And, indeed, disputes did occur between
Tower authorities and those of the Tower’s immediate environs. In fact, the Tower’s
multiple purposes – mint, ordnance office, prison, garrison – probably rendered it rife
with jurisdictional issues. On the other hand, that the Tower co-existed with the
largest, wealthiest, and most unusual of England’s urban communities renders it more
worthy of specific examination, something which the Tower sorely lacks, rather than
as a case study. The case studies chosen here were selected as a representative

39 R.B. Manning, “The Prosecution of Sir Michael Blount, Lieutenant of the Tower of
1595, the involvement of the Tower garrison in a riot perpetrated by London
apprentices occasioned a tense episode between the Tower and the city corporation.
The city corporation brought a Star Chamber suit against the lieutenant of the Tower,
Sir Michael Blount, that placed Blount under suspicion of treason.
40 A quick search for works discussing the Tower of London will return plenty of
popular histories, discussions of the Tower's architecture, and tales of the
sample, rather than an exhaustive catalogue. They provide a variety of important vectors of analysis: the negotiations over the establishment of a new fort and garrison in Elizabethan Plymouth; the day to day realities of living with soldiers at a long standing, but somewhat ignored, garrison at Portsmouth; and the operation of the largest domestic English garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed.

supernatural; however, the Tower, unlike London itself, has received relatively little academic attention.
CHAPTER TWO: A SURVEY OF ENGLISH GARRISONS, 1500-1642

English garrisons of the Tudor and early Stuart periods hide in plain sight. While there has been no examination of garrisons as projects of governance, one might expect garrisons to have received some attention from English military historians, but this is not the case. The long dominant view that sixteenth-and early seventeenth-century England did not experience a military revolution, and with it the development of a standing army, left little reason to subject garrisons to sustained analysis. Garrisons, if they were mentioned at all, were just like the militia and the overseas forces raised for the Low Countries and Ireland: poorly trained, poorly disciplined, poorly equipped and poorly paid, particularly in comparison to contemporary continental armies. English garrisons were, in short, backward and certainly did not evidence a military revolution or its usual outcome, the standing army.¹ More recent histories of England’s early modern martial capacities, however, have begun to challenge some of the assumptions that helped render England’s garrisons invisible. England, many now argue, was largely on par with Europe in terms of military development: development that even in Europe did not warrant the adjective revolutionary.² Contemporaneous with this reassessment of English

¹ According to C.G. Cruickshank, England’s garrisons “were [not] even the germ of a standing army.” C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, 1.
² For a good overview of recent English military history see: David Lawrence, “Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier”, 16-33. Recent historiography does not argue that England’s military was well paid, well equipped
military history is a movement among some military historians to understand early modern military development on its own terms. After all, what was so revolutionary about the military revolution was that it ushered in the modern age of military technology and tactics that, in turn, enabled the development of highly professional, standing armies. Gauging military development according to such a standard is, ultimately, teleological: it imposes modern standards of value and utility upon the past.3

Still, despite new thinking about early modern England’s martial development and capabilities, garrisons have yet to receive sustained analysis. The important exception to this is David Grummit’s work on the Calais garrison. Grummitt not only provides us with the first complete picture of the size, organization and personnel of England’s largest garrison, he also reveals the significance of that garrison to the English polity more generally. The Calais garrison was probably the most important locus for the dissemination of martial knowledge and culture in the early Tudor period. Owing to its position as a training ground for English soldiery, as

and well trained; it simply argues that this condition did not render England’s military completely anomalous.

a launching ground for English continental ambitions, and as an important place of trade and diplomacy, the government of the Calais garrison was intimately bound up with the ambitions of the English crown. That government of England’s martial institutions was central to Tudor rule more generally is one of the most significant contributions of Grummitt’s work, and an observation that applies as much to the late as the early Tudor monarchy.4

David Grummitt made a garrison the focus of his analysis. This chapter similarly brings garrisons to centre stage by providing a general overview of the location and social composition of England’s garrisons from roughly the beginning of the Tudor century until the outbreak of the Civil War. It begins by surveying England’s garrisons abroad: on the continent, in Ireland and in Scotland, before turning to the domestic garrisons upon which this project focuses. It reveals that garrisons comprised a regular English military practice throughout this period. The second section delineates some of the particular characteristics of English garrisons. English garrisons possessed some characteristics of a permanent, professional military force. And while this does not mean that garrisons constituted a standing army, it

does suggest the existence of a coherent, identifiable and vital martial element of English government and political culture of which garrisons were a part, alongside the militia and the overseas forces. This, together with the particular characteristics of garrisons, informed the nature of the conflicts and the instances of cooperation that we will encounter in the pages that follow.

*Calais and the Continent*

At the turn of the sixteenth century, England’s largest permanent military establishment was Calais. Held by English kings since 1347, Calais was the last part of France to remain under direct English authority. Resident in the fortified town of Calais itself and, by the later years of Henry VIII’s reign, a system of smaller castles and bulwarks that defended the town’s approaches, the Calais garrison consisted of a regular force of about 700 permanent soldiers. 5 There were, of course, a greater number of English soldiers in Calais when Henry’s campaigning armies arrived from England. Calais served as a launching point for both Henry VIII’s 1513 and 1544 French campaigns, each of which resulted in a short-lived second English garrison in France: Tournai from 1513 to 1519, and Boulogne from 1544 to 1549. At first, about 5,000 English troops garrisoned Tournai, but Henry VIII reduced that number to

---

1,000 after the completion of the citadel there in 1517. By that time, however, Henry VIII was toying with using Tournai as a bargaining chip in his relations with France’s King Francis I, and in the autumn of 1518, Henry VIII and Francis I hammered out a number of treaties, one of which provided for the return of Tournai to France in 1519.

Nearly thirty years later, English armies again rode into Boulogne. In September 1544, Henry VIII left 3,000 men to garrison the town under the command of Viscount Lisle, an experienced Calais officer. On the day of Henry VIII’s triumphant entry into Boulogne, however, Francis I and Charles V signed the Treaty of Crépy. Henry VIII’s ally and his enemy had concluded peace: English forces in France would now face the full brunt of Francis I’s French army. The English garrison at Boulogne, therefore, faced French attack almost immediately after the town’s capture. Despite a brutal siege that began in 1545, the French did not capture Boulogne by force. As he had with Tournai, Henry VIII ceded Boulogne back to France by treaty, in this case the Treaty of Camp in June 1546.

---

7 Ibid., 176-185.
9 Ibid., 24-25. The Treaty of Camp specifically provided that Boulogne be returned to France eight years from 1546, in 1554. In the end, the expense of maintaining the garrison for a further eight years proved too rich for Henry’s blood. Thus, Boulogne returned to French control four years early, in 1550.
officially ceded Boulogne back to France in 1546, the terms of the Treaty of Camp stipulated that the town remain in English hands for eight more years. In 1550, in order make peace with France, the English returned Boulogne for £140,000, four years earlier than had been agreed at Camp. The 1550s marked the nadir of English continental fortunes. Much worse than the early return of Boulogne, however, was the loss of Calais. Mary I inherited from her half-brother an onerous debt, one that affected Mary I’s military expenditure and resulted in a reduction of the garrison in the Calais pale.\textsuperscript{10} When Mary I declared war on France in 1557, Calais received some reinforcement. Further reinforcements arrived slowly, however, despite the apparent imminence of a French assault.\textsuperscript{11} When that attack came in early January 1558, Calais fell in a matter of days.

English troops returned to the continent in September 1563, when Elizabeth I agreed to send 6,000 troops to Normandy to assist the Protestant faction in France. Of these troops, 3,000 garrisoned the port of Newhaven. The garrison at Newhaven lasted only ten months, from October 1563 until July 1564. Poorly fed and poorly paid, the already beleaguered English troops fell to a plague that claimed 500 men a week in June 1564. Only a month later, the remainder of the garrison was dispatched back to England, and it would be nearly twenty years before Elizabeth I committed troops to the continent again. In August 1585, Elizabeth signed the Treaty of

\textsuperscript{10} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, 45.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 168-169.
Nonsuch, whereby she committed herself to the provision of English forces in the Netherlands. In return, the queen received the ports of Flushing and Brill as cautionary towns placed under her control as pledges for the repayment of war expenses.\textsuperscript{12} England maintained 1,400 men between Flushing and Brill until 1616, when James VI/I sold the towns back to the Dutch.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Ireland}

For Henry VIII, the path to glory lay in France. Henry VIII fancied himself the new Henry V, and thus expended his considerable military energies on reclaiming his rightful place as king of France. Given Henry's particular penchant, England's other military endeavours often suffered benign neglect. Lowest on the pecking order of early Tudor priorities was Ireland. Like his late medieval English predecessors, Henry initially preferred to leave Irish government to a governor, usually an Anglo-Irish magnate like the Earl of Kildare.\textsuperscript{14} Any standing Irish military force was thus relatively small: by the terms of their commission, governors were to

\textsuperscript{12} Charles Wilson, \textit{Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands} (London: Macmillan, 1970), 86.
\textsuperscript{13} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth's Wars}, 120. James VI/I sold Flushing and Brill back to the Dutch in 1616. Not long after, in March 1617, one Sir William Lovelace informed Dudley Carleton of a print originating in the Low Countries that depicted the king “in his doublet and hose with both his pockets drawn out and hanging loose” with the inscription: “have you any more towns to sell?” TNA, SP\textsuperscript{14}90/205.
\textsuperscript{14} Steven G. Ellis, \textit{Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the Conflict of Cultures 1470-1603} (London: Longman, 1985), 151. This is not to say that English kings did not, militarily or otherwise, intervene in Irish affairs. It is only to emphasize that by and large they preferred not to.
keep a bodyguard consisting of at least twenty men at arms, which occasionally grew to a greater number.\textsuperscript{15} Aside from the governor’s personal retinue, there was the Brotherhood of Arms: established in 1474, the Brotherhood consisted of about 160 men. Dublin Castle also possessed a small contingent of about fifty gunners.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1534 Kildare Rebellion, however, marked a turning point in the English government’s attitude toward rule in Ireland. Perpetrated by a Kildare, the family from which the crown often chose its governors, the rebellion took English forces over a year to suppress. After the rebellion, Henry VIII altered his strategy. The king increased England’s military presence in Ireland and placed the governorship exclusively in the hands of a crown selected Englishman, a policy continued by Henry VIII’s successors. And while the 700 men left behind in 1535 dwindled to 340 in 1537, the aftermath of the Kildare rebellion nonetheless represented the beginning of a permanent, standing English garrison that assisted the civic government of the island beyond the confines of Dublin and the Pale.\textsuperscript{17} However much Henry VIII may have disliked it, his reign marked the beginning of permanent, direct English military involvement in Ireland. After 1534, the English military presence in Ireland only increased. While the English military presence remained in the hundreds of men between the 1530s and the 1560s, it steadily increased from 1560 onward: 1,500

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 117 & 129.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 131-132.
English soldiers were in Ireland in the 1560s, 2,500 in the 1570s, 8,000 in the 1580s, and 21,000 during the Nine Years’ War by the century’s end.18

During the first half of the sixteenth century, crown soldiers largely remained garrisoned in Dublin or in other forts around the pale. Around mid-century, however, the English sought to extend their influence beyond Dublin and its immediate environs. The establishment of new forts and garrisons was part and parcel of this endeavour. The English erected a new fortress and garrison, Fort Protector, in Laois in the early 1550s. In the latter part of that decade and the early part of the next, the Earl of Sussex constructed major fortifications in the midland regions, at Maryborough and Phillipstown.19 By the 1580s most Irish provinces saw the presence of English soldiers, although they were most numerous in Munster. After the defeat of Desmond, a plantation scheme was developed for Munster that, in theory at least, was to be defended by the proprietors themselves. Nicholas Canny notes, however, that the practice differed somewhat from theory: in order to retain the interest of those investors whose outlays exceeded their initial expectations, the English government provided the plantation with horsemen and soldiers in the queen’s pay.20

---

18 Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British 1500-1650* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 66. Ciaran Brady disagrees with Canny somewhat on the numbers. Brady argues that, while overall the trend was toward a general increase in English military presence, it was not an even process but one with periods of expansion and contraction. Ciaran Brady “The Captain’s Games: Army and Society in Elizabethan Ireland,” in *A Military History of Ireland*, 145.
19 Brady, “Captain’s Games,” 141.
Irish forces overthrew the Munster plantation in 1598 during the protracted period of warfare which engaged the English in Ireland from the mid-1590s to the end of Elizabeth’s reign and the submission of the Earl of Tyrone in 1603. The martial government of Ireland increased as a result of Tyrone’s defeat. It was largely soldiers and captains disbanded from the English army at the end of the Nine Years’ War who manned and commanded these garrisons. Over time, Canny argues, these captains and soldiers became as much a civilian administration, assisting officials in the implementation of state directives, as a fighting force.21

Scotland

For a very brief period in the middle of the sixteenth century, the English also possessed garrisons in Scotland. Edward VI’s regent, Edward, Duke of Somerset, embarked on a new approach to Scotland soon after the ascension of the young king.22 Somerset planned to create an English pale in Scotland, much like in Ireland and at Calais, by erecting a series of garrisoned forts in the Scottish lowlands. These forts would then act as bases from which mobile forces of light cavalry might patrol large areas, protecting the assured Scots and hampering the ability of the Scots to invade

21 Ibid., 163, 302-303.
northern England. Sometime began his invasion in September 1547 and after achieving an early victory at Pinkie, set about building the forts. Almost immediately, however, the garrisons suffered from problems of supply that hampered their ability to control the surrounding territory. The Franco-Scots alliance of 1548 proved fatal to Somerset’s already vulnerable garrisons in Scotland. The English struggled to erect new forts just to keep the French at bay. For two years, French and Scots troops, bad weather and poor supply ate away at the English presence in Scotland. In 1549, the English abandoned their largest fort at Haddington and Somerset’s protectorate, weakened by soaring military expenses and domestic rebellion, toppled. By 1551, the English abandoned the last of their Scottish garrisons.

Domestic Garrisons

After the end of Somerset’s Scottish ambitions, English garrisoning on the British mainland was confined, once again, to England itself. The early sixteenth century saw a significant amount of English fortification building. The events of the 1530s prompted Henry VIII to turn his attention to his domestic defences, and with

---

23 For more on Somerset and the formation of his Scottish policy, see: M.L. Bush, *The Government Policy of Protector Somerset* (London: Edward Arnold, 1975). Bush argues that Somerset’s garrisons were not intended to extend direct English rule over Scotland, but rather to bring the Scots to obedience, to “accept Edward VI as the husband of their queen and as overlord of their kingdom,” 19.


good reason: the king’s break from Rome placed England in a precarious international position. A 1538 alliance between Charles V and Francis I meant that England faced a hostile continent stretching from the Low Countries to Spain. The later commentator William Harrison argued that these developments gave Henry more cause to suspect other European rulers than to trust them, and so he resolved “to stand upon his own defences.”

Henry’s actions do seem to bear out Harrison’s assertion: the king embarked on a programme of fortification building practically unseen in England since Roman times. By 1542, England possessed a series of manned fortifications, girding the country along its southern and south eastern coastlines. Many of the these fortifications, such as the castles in the Downs, were new, while others, such as Camber, consisted of significant additions to existing towers or blockhouses. By 1542, 255 gunners and soldiers occupied the fortifications along England’s south and south eastern coast. Castles such as Deal, Walmer, Camber and Calshot kept larger contingents of men consisting of a captain, an under captain or lieutenant, a porter and often an under porter, anywhere between eight and fifteen gunners and five or more soldiers. The smaller bulwarks and towers usually made do with a captain,

29 TNA, E101/60/6.
between two and six gunners, and a couple of soldiers. The bulwarks by and large did without a lieutenant and often without a porter.

This flurry of fortification building touched most of the major ports and harbours on the south coast. The new forts of Pendennis and St. Mawes protected Falmouth in Cornwall. Portland Castle, and its smaller partner Sandsfoot blockhouse, protected Weymouth harbour. The crown assisted the town of Poole in erecting Brownsea Castle. The Solent received particular attention, with new bulwarks built at East and West Cowes, on the north side of the Isle of Wight, and the new castles of Calshott, Hurst and Southsea protecting the entrances to Southampton and Portsmouth respectively. 30 The defences of the town of Portsmouth itself, a series of ditches, towers and bulwarks protecting the town, underwent a good deal of repair throughout the 1540s. 31 Indeed, the only major southern port to see little in the way of improvements was Plymouth. The fifteenth-century castle, wall and bulwark on the Hoe, and the walled inner harbour remained the only town defences until mid-century, when the crown indented with the town to fortify and garrison St. Nicholas Island (now Drake’s Island) in Plymouth harbour. 32

While England’s northern frontier saw less active fortification construction during Henry VIII’s reign, the borderland between England and Scotland was nonetheless amply provided with fortifications, the most substantial of which was

32 Ibid., 484. For the indenture see TNA, SP10/6/24.
Berwick-upon-Tweed. After centuries of changing hands between Scotland and England, Berwick fell under permanent English control in 1482. The English gained a town of war in Berwick, and so there was no need to begin substantial fortifications from scratch. All the same, the fortifications at Berwick required constant maintenance: a project completed in fits and starts, although a major renovation began under Mary I and continued into the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. A permanent garrison always occupied Berwick-upon-Tweed. As at Calais, the numbers of soldiers in Berwick swelled when tension flared into open war.

While Berwick-upon-Tweed, located in the east march, was England’s strongest and most important military outpost in the north, lesser fortifications provided additional force in the remaining marches. The castles at Wark and Norham assisted Berwick in securing the east march. Carlisle’s fortifications dominated the west march, with lesser posts at Askerton, Naworth, Bewcastle and Scaleby. The mountainous middle march was replete with small fortifications. Their proximity to Scotland made the borders particularly needful of defence, both against potential Scottish incursions, and for the better government of the borderers themselves. But subjects in need of a more watchful presence were not restricted to England’s

33 A detailed account of the works at Berwick-upon-Tweed may be found in Colvin, King’s Works, Vol. IV, Part II, 613-664.
34 Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 105, 104-106. While its focus is on the Scottish Middle March, Anna Groundwater’s The Scottish Middle March, 1573-1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2010) includes useful information about the English side as well.
borderlands: in the aftermath of the Pilgrimage of Grace, Henry VIII constructed substantial new fortifications further south at Hull, and installed a garrison to man the new defences.\textsuperscript{35}

Successive Tudors largely renovated and elaborated the defensive infrastructure laid down by Henry VIII. Edward VI and Mary I built few new English fortifications, and Elizabeth I built only two: Upnor Castle, near Chatham, in 1559-1567 and Plymouth Fort, c.1592-1598.\textsuperscript{36} Of all the existing fortifications, Berwick-upon-Tweed and Portsmouth underwent the most extensive renovation. Elizabeth I continued Mary’s elaboration of the fortifications at Berwick-upon-Tweed. The mid 1580s saw the remodelling of the walls and earthworks at Portsmouth and the period after 1588 saw Portsmouth’s fortifications enlarged once again.\textsuperscript{37} The rest of Henry VIII’s coastal fortifications underwent periodic overhaul and repair, usually corresponding with periods in which the threat of invasion was thought particularly strong.

With a few exceptions, then, the domestic defensive fortifications that existed at the end of Henry VIII’s reign remained throughout the Tudor and early Stuart periods. The extent to which each remained garrisoned, however, tended to vary over time. The early 1550s in particular saw a scaling back of manned coastal

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37] Ibid., 405.
\end{footnotes}
fortification. On 26 February 1551, the privy council resolved that there were a number of “superfluous” fortresses and bulwarks that “stood the King’s majesty in very great charge.”\textsuperscript{38} The captains and soldiers of those determined to be superfluous were paid to the following Lady Day and then dispatched. This was the fate of the men at about seven bulwarks in Essex, near Harwich. On 9 October 1552, the privy council recorded the money saved in wages from the discharge of the officers of the bulwarks in Essex.\textsuperscript{39} That same year, the crown disbanded the garrison established at Hull by Henry VIII c. 1542, and placed the custody of the fortifications into the hands of the mayor and aldermen of the town. By 1576, the town found it difficult to bear the expense of maintaining the buildings and sought to surrender them back to the crown.\textsuperscript{40}

Other fortifications saw their retinues reduced. On 7 August 1550, the council told John Killigrew, the captain of Falmouth, “to dismiss twenty of the soldiers presently entertained there,” but “retaining the other twenty to maintain the ordnance.”\textsuperscript{41} Two years later, the council requested further reductions: Killigrew was to dismiss “four of his own servants or of soldiers in wages.”\textsuperscript{42} On the same day, 4 May 1552, the council requested further reductions to forts in the south and west.

John Lewston, captain of Portland castle, was to discharge two of his own men. The

\textsuperscript{38} APC, Vol. III, 225.
\textsuperscript{39} APC, Vol. IV, 139-140.
\textsuperscript{40} Hull History Centre C BRS/53/1.
\textsuperscript{41} APC, Vol. III, 100.
\textsuperscript{42} APC, Vol. IV, 33-34
council asked John Waddam, captain of Sandsfoot, to dismiss two of his men, and one of the five gunners. Finally, John Killigrew was again asked to reduce his soldiers or servants by four.

The reduction in England’s garrison strength was, however, short lived. Elizabethan England saw the re-intensification of manned domestic fortification and the garrisons established, or re-established, by Elizabeth I were often maintained at similar strengths by her successors James VI/I and Charles I. Shortly after Elizabeth came to the throne in 1558, Berwick-upon-Tweed became England’s largest garrison at nearly 1,000 men. Shortly after James VI/I came to the throne in 1603, the king drastically reduced, then eventually eliminated, that garrison. But Berwick was rather the exception than the rule. The coastal fortifications in Kent, Deal, Walmer and Sandgate, serve as an example. In 1569, twenty-one men manned Deal and Walmer and nineteen men manned Sandgate, an increase from the previous decade.

---

43 Both Portland and Sandsfoot Castles protect the entrance to Weymouth, Dorset. Soldiers are often listed as under the jurisdiction of the captain and the lieutenant, hence the request that captains discharge so many of their “own men.” For example, TNA, E101/60/4 is a list of “the names of the persons being in the king’s majesty’s fortresses” and their wages, c.1541. The entry for the “the great castle at the Downs,” or Deal Castle, lists the names of the captain, deputy, porter and gunners, but not soldiers. The entry for the captain, however, indicates that he was allowed 2s. a day for his own wage, and 6d. a day “for eight men.” Likewise the deputy, who was permitted 6d. per day in addition to his wage for “a man.” Later documents make this relationship between the captain, the deputy and the soldiers more explicit. TNA, SP12/60/3, a list of the queen’s monthly charges for her fortresses in Kent c. 1569, shows that at Deal castle there was “the captain’s four soldiers” at 6d. each per diem and “the deputy’s soldier” at the same wage.

44 APC, Vol. IV, 33-34.
when Deal and Walmer claimed only eight men and Sandgate only three.\textsuperscript{45} These three fortifications retained their 1569 numbers, give or take one or two, throughout the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods.\textsuperscript{46}

Throughout the late sixteenth century and into the middle of the seventeenth, England possessed a number of manned fortifications, particularly in the south. Relatively large contingents of men manned Pendennis Fort near Falmouth and on the Scilly Islands off Land’s End. The three major fortifications in the downs, Deal, Walmer and Sandgate, helped to defend the southeast, as did Dover Castle. Smaller fortifications, smaller in both physical size and contingents of men, complemented the larger ones. For example, St. Mawes stood across Falmouth harbour from Pendennis and Mote’s Bulwark was located near the pier in Dover. A number of

\textsuperscript{45} TNA, SP12/60/3 and TNA, SP12/6/46.
\textsuperscript{46} Deal mustered twenty men, including officers, in October 1611, but was back up to twenty-one in 1614 and 1615. TNA, SP14/66/104, TNA, SP14/78/17 and TNA, SP14/81/71. The numbers vacillated between twenty and twenty-one through the period, and the same was true for Walmer and Sandgate. Walmer mustered nineteen men in, for example, 1607, 1614 and 1620, but a c.1635 list of fortifications and their retinues had Walmer at eighteen. TNA, SP14/28/70, TNA, SP14/78/12, TNA, SP14/116/126 and TNA, SP16/347/76. Sandgate mustered nineteen in 1609, 1612 and 1617, but dropped to eighteen in 1620 and so remained, it seems, as the 1635–6 list indicates eighteen men at Sandgate. TNA, SP14/48/56, TNA, SP14/70/76, TNA, SP14/93/93, TNA, SP14/117/8 and TNA, SP16/347/76. A similar tale can be told of Pendennis, where a crew of fifty men was installed there probably sometime in the 1580s or 90s, and remained thereafter. The captain of Pendennis, Sir Robert Killigrew, wrote the council of war in 1632 and requested that the fifty additional men recently put into the fort be retained rather than dismissed. In making his request, he gave a brief summary of the garrison there, stating that the garrison was increased to fifty men in Elizabeth’s time, when “the Spaniards had a design to surprise and fortify [the] place.” TNA, SP16/218/34.
fortifications on the Isle of Wight assisted with the defence of the Solent, and as did the garrisons located on Guernsey and Jersey. A garrison at the Tower of London protected England’s largest city.

Insofar as early modern English garrisons receive historiographical attention, those located outside of England itself garner the lion’s share. The Irish garrisons were part of Tudor ambitions for the pacification and government of Ireland, a topic that receives a good deal of attention. Likewise the continental garrisons, which were tied to both the history of English foreign policy and territorial ambitions and, in the case of the Low Country garrisons, to the character and development of English Protestantism.\(^{47}\) English garrisons in Ireland and the Low Countries played supporting roles in matters considered more significant to the development of the English state: the government of Ireland and the survival of Protestantism. Prior to the Civil War, garrisons within England receive short shrift.\(^{48}\) This is not a coincidence. Before the Civil War, garrisons belonged to the weakest and least


developed limb of the English state: the “fiscal-military” branch. The recent historiography of the English state, in other words, has done as much to elide domestic English garrisons as has the history of the military revolution.

But garrisons existed in England prior to the Civil War and they played a role in the larger history of English government during that period. The second half of the sixteenth century saw not only the maintenance of existing garrisons, but in some cases their expansion. The period also saw the establishment of some new garrisons. An active interest in the government of garrisons on the part of the central government accompanied this revival of domestic English garrisons. In the pages to come, we shall see that the central government made concerted efforts to consolidate or maintain oversight over the individual who governed a garrison and, as a result, over the government of the garrison itself. The central government’s interest in the government of garrisons was by no means peculiar. It was the companion piece to the changes that the Elizabethan regime made to the government of the militia and it stemmed from the same root: the safe and stable government of England in the face of enemies external and internal. The pages that follow explore this phenomenon in more depth. For the moment we shall retain a broader focus, and sketch out the nature and personnel of these garrisons to prepare the way to contemplate their particular place within the early modern English state.

49 The working relationship between garrisons and the militia addressed later in this study, particularly in Chapter Three, pp. 102-112.
Clearly, garrisoning was something the English did consistently across the Tudor and early Stuart periods both abroad and, more importantly for this study, at home. To say that these garrisons comprised a standing army, however, overstates the case. However much recent historiography rehabilitates English martial capabilities in this period, this historiography does not argue that the Tudors and early Stuarts possessed a professional, standing army that was the end result of a military revolution. What more recent historiography does argue is that English military practice was not as deficient and backward as is often thought and that, generally speaking, English military developments were largely in step with military developments on the continent. These developments encompassed both the adoption of new technologies, such as gunpowder weaponry, and developments in military professionalism. David Trim argues that England, like all other European nations at the time, possessed a military establishment that was professional, if we deploy that term as an adjective rather than a noun, as a descriptor rather than an object. Used in this manner, professional describes a person or body that possesses some characteristics of a profession, but does not represent “a fully-fledged profession in the modern sense.” Trim argues that there are seven markers of a profession: a discrete occupational identity, specifically, “a feeling of separateness between soldiers and the rest of society”; formal hierarchies and “recognized career paths”; permanence;

---

a formal system of pay; a distinctive expertise and means of an education therein; and a distinctive self-conceptualization: not expertise, but a mentality, a culture and a mythology. Early modern militaries may thus be described as professional because they possessed some, but not all, of these characteristics.

What this means in practical terms is that, unlike other early modern professions, there was not much in the way of a formalized or institutionalized means of becoming a soldier. There was no military equivalent of the Inns of Court, nor was there a formal and structured apprenticeship system. This does not mean, however, that England possessed no means by which to train soldiers and perpetuate military knowledge. England possessed a martial institutional memory that helped to transmit military knowledge and practice from one generation to the next, one campaign to the next. This institutional memory consisted of both the martial institutions England did possess, such as the militia and the trained bands, and a martial community: men who made soldiering a way of life and who possessed a certain self-conceptualization, or mentality, related to this vocation. By virtue of their relative

---

51 Ibid., 6-7.
52 Ibid., 12. Trim argues that no European military between the years 1400 and 1700 achieved all seven characteristics.
54 A number of scholars explore the notion of a martial ethos, a worldview that informed the behaviour and attitudes of the men who followed the practice of arms. In addition to David Trim, see R.B. Manning, Swordsmen: the Martial Ethos in the
permanence and their personnel, therefore, England’s early modern garrisons embodied part of this institutional memory.  

A quick glance at some of the men who figure large in the pages to follow lends credence to this argument. Sir Adrian Poynings, captain of Portsmouth from 1560 until his death in 1571, hailed from a family with not only a lengthy military history, but one with a long history of garrisoning. Born in Ghent in about 1512, Adrian Poynings was one of the illegitimate sons of Sir Edward Poynings. Sir Edward was a soldier and administrator under both Henry VII and Henry VIII, in Ireland and on the continent. Although best known to for his activities in Ireland in the last decade of the fifteenth century, Poynings served as deputy lieutenant of Calais before his dispatch to Ireland in 1494. He also served as lieutenant of Dover Castle and lord warden of the Cinque Ports. In 1515, Poynings and his retinue of 500 men assisted with the capture of Tournai, after which Henry VIII appointed him governor of the town.  

Edward’s son and Adrian’s half-brother, Thomas, served as marshal of Calais in the 1540s, and commanded Guisnes Castle between 1540 and 1544. Thomas was an experienced soldier and commander who, according to David Grummitt, solidified

---


his martial reputation battling the French in the mid-1540s. Thomas died on active
duty, succumbing to disease at Boulogne in 1545. Adrian began his military career
in Thomas’s retinue in Calais, and served with Thomas at Boulogne. After Thomas’
death, Adrian became captain of the town in 1547. In 1548 Adrian’s nephew, Lord
Clinton, replaced him as captain, although Adrian continued to serve there until 1550.
Thereafter, Adrian Poynings served as lieutenant of Calais Castle.

Sir Adrian Poynings, therefore, knew a thing or two about martial matters in
general and about garrisons more particularly: knowledge that he attained through
both personal experience and kinship. So, too, did one of his successors at
Portsmouth, Charles Blount, later Lord Mountjoy. Charles Blount was an
experienced soldier in his own right by the time of his appointment to Portsmouth.
His father, though not a career soldier, participated in Henry VIII’s 1544
expeditionary force to France and took part in the Siege of Boulogne. His
grandfather was active in garrisoning on the continent, serving as lieutenant of
Hammes Castle from 1509-1529, and as governor of Tournai from 1515-1517. Thus,
when Charles Blount assumed command of the Portsmouth garrison, he was not only
a man with martial experience to his credit, he also came from a family with a
consistent martial pedigree. To the foregoing two examples we might certainly add

57 David Grummitt, “Thomas Poynings, first Baron Poynings,” ODNB.
58 M.A. Stevens, “Sir Adrian Poynings,” ODNB.
59 James P. Carley, “Charles Blount, fifth Baron Mountjoy,” ODNB.
60 Ibid. William’s father, Sir John Blount, had also held the lieutenancy of Hammes
Castle in the late fourteenth century. See also Grummitt, The Calais Garrison, 62.
more. Henry Radcliffe, Earl of Sussex, who served as captain of Portsmouth between Adrian Poynings and Charles Blount, saw service in Ireland in the 1560s. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, captain of Plymouth, was an experienced soldier on his appointment to that post. Lord Grey de Wilton and Lord Willoughby, both governors of Berwick-upon-Tweed, had extensive martial careers.

Of course, martial experience was not the only factor that influenced the crown’s choice of garrison commanders. Social rank certainly played its part. Although militarily experienced, only relatively high ranking nobility held command of Berwick after the establishment of the governorship there in 1560. With the exception of Sir Francis Vere, the captains of Portsmouth were all titled, or soon to be, after Sir Adrian Poynings’ tenure. The social profile of English garrison commanders, therefore, illustrates the central role played by England’s nobility in England’s martial affairs. At the same time, the garrison commanders also underscore the fact that

61 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, ‘Henry Radcliffe, fourth Earl of Sussex,” ODNB.
62 The involvement of the nobility in the command of garrisons – particularly garrisons that were large, like Portsmouth, or where there was oversight over both soldiers and civilians, such as at Berwick-upon-Tweed – corroborates the arguments of historians who assert that the Tudors did not effectively de-militarize the nobility in the sixteenth century. The Tudors, so the de-militarization argument goes, consolidated their hold on the throne by curbing noble power; that is, by changing the nobility from a collection of militarily powerful local magnates to honour-bound servants of the state. See: Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 and Mervyn James, Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). More recently, however, historians argue that, while the Tudors may well have been interested in thwarting over-mighty subjects with designs on the throne, they did not treat the nobility as a threat en masse. Far from excluding the nobility, the military changes that occurred in the
English soldiering was not yet a profession, despite displaying characteristics that may be considered professional. According to Trim, an important element of a full-fledged profession is the presence of formal hierarchies and recognized career paths through which people advance in their chosen field. This was not a detectable element of English garrisoning at this time. Neither the crown, nor military men themselves, conceived of a hierarchy of commands, through which one might advance. To be sure, one might conceive of the possession of a garrison command as an advancement of one’s career, insofar as one was thus in receipt of a grant of the crown. But it was not a promotion, in the sense that possessing one garrison command was a step closer to another conceived as more prestigious. Garrison commands were not conceived as a *cursus honorum*, a known hierarchy of positions through which one might attain advancement.

The garrison commanders, moreover, were not the only ones with military experience. The service histories of garrison soldiers are more difficult to ascertain than those of their better known and socially established commanders, and the vast majority of men who served in England’s garrisons leave at most a name in the record of the sixteenth century, such as the shift from armed retainers to a militia-based system of defence, incorporated the nobility into its structures of command. G.W. Bernard, “Introduction: the Tudor Nobility in Perspective,” in *The Tudor Nobility*, ed. G.W. Bernard (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 1-39 and Penry Williams, *The Tudor Regime* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 126-133. R.B. Manning argues that the Elizabethan period in particular experienced a revival of military chivalric culture and a re-militarization of the English peerage, as a result of overseas wars. Manning, *Swordsmen*, 51-80.
and sometimes not even that. Where garrison soldiers came from and their particular background is, therefore, difficult to determine. But certainly some were men who had made their living in wars, and garrisons were places where they might find some kind of employment in peacetime, during their middle age, or as a result of injury sustained in other martial service. A pair of examples from Berwick-upon-Tweed in the late sixteenth century illustrates that experienced soldiers might solicit and be granted places in garrison in respect of their service, and in order to provide them with an income that their injuries rendered difficult to obtain otherwise. In May 1591, Governor Hunsdon wrote his deputy Henry Widdrington and instructed him to place one Richard Morton in the next available footman’s room. According to Hunsdon, Morton had been “grievously wounded” in Scotland and had “since been hurt in France in service there.”63 Hunsdon wrote his deputy again in January 1592, to grant a place to one Edward Stringer. Stringer was “an old soldier of the garrison and one that often times had been hurt in her majesty’s service,” most recently in France. According to Hunsdon, he was at the time in a “very poor state and not able to relieve himself.”64

Of course, the composition of garrisons was not exclusively old soldiers and England’s martial elite. Garrison soldiers possessed certain protection from processes of law and other obligations that made a garrison place an attractive prospect and

---

63 TNA, WO55/1939, no. 136v. Governor Hunsdon to Henry Widdrington, marshal of Berwick, 7 May 1591.
created a thriving market for such positions. Soldiers were exempt from serving on juries, and possessed advantages when it came to the taxes and levies owed by civilian subjects. In 1613, the inhabitants of Portsmouth claimed that the town was “taxed £20 towards the ship money and the garrison £14.” And although the tax burden for the garrison was less, they had still managed not to pay. But perhaps the greatest advantage to garrison soldiering was that creditors were not able to sue soldiers for debt without first obtaining the permission of the garrison commander. This advantage was surely what one Edward Arnold had in mind when he obtained a soldier’s place in the Portsmouth garrison in the late 1610s or early 1620s. Arnold’s creditor, Thomas Dier, wrote to the Earl of Pembroke in 1622 and explained that Arnold and one John Gibbs were bound to him for £40, on the condition that £22 would be repaid within five years. Arnold and Gibbs, however, skipped town - “fled the country” - and ended up in Portsmouth. Dier complained to the Earl that

65 On exemption from jury service: Hampshire Record Office 44M69/G3/26. Earl of Sussex, captain of Portsmouth to Sir Walter Sandys, high sheriff of Southampton County, 14 July 1592. Also, a list from Lord Zouch, lord warden of the Cinque Ports to the sheriffs of Kent, of the retinue and garrison of Dover Castle, so that they be exempt from serving on juries. CSPD, James I, Vol. II, 422.

66 “Soldiers Observations and Townsmen’s Answers 1613”, in A Supplement to Extracts from Records in the Possession of the Municipal Corporation of the Borough of Portsmouth, ed. Robert East (Portsmouth: 1886), 94. Hereafter: Supplement. The soldiers did not deny that they paid less, but they argued that the difference was only a pound. The town, they claimed, “is taxed but £15 and the garrison £14.”

67 See, for example, Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/39. Earl of Pembroke to Sir John Oglander, Pembroke’s deputy at Portsmouth, 4 December 1621. In this letter, the creditor who is appealing to Pembroke, the captain of Portsmouth, refers to the inability of garrison soldiers to be sued directly as “the privilege” of a soldier’s “place.”
“because the said Arnold hath procured a soldier’s pay there,” Dier could “take no course of law against him for recovery of his debt, without [the Earl’s] leave.”

Soldiers’ protection from suits of debt was not absolute. The papers of John Oglander describe three instances in which creditors petitioned the Earl of Pembroke for permission to sue soldiers or gunners for debts due. In all these instances, Pembroke instructed his deputy, Oglander, to examine the matter. In two of the instances, if Oglander found matters to be as the petitioner claimed, then he was to establish a reasonable time for the debt to be repaid. If the debt was not paid within that time, then the Earl would allow the petitioner to “take the benefit of the law to help himself.” Pembroke did just that in the case of John Parrat, gunner, who was in debt to one John Ford. This was the same direction Pembroke gave to Oglander about the resolution of the Arnold case. In another instance, Pembroke instructed Oglander to “either stop part of [the soldier’s wages], or enjoin some other course for the discharge” of the debt, as Oglander saw fit.

Still, the protection from creditors, even when temporary, remained a distinct advantage. It may not have erased debt, but it certainly bought some time and rendered garrison places a highly sought after commodity. The sale of pays was so rampant at Berwick that it elicited particular comment, and it is clear that many of

---

68 Isle of Wight Record Office OB/BB/52. Pembroke to Oglander, 15 November 1622.
69 Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/39, Pembroke to Oglander, 4 December 1621.
70 Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/52.
71 Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/40, Pembroke to Oglander, 4 March 1622.
the places were sold to those seeking protection from debt. On 4 November 1596, William Selby Sr. wrote a letter to his son, William Selby Jr., in which he imparted to the younger Selby that the “selling of pays continue[s] in this town as hot as it ever did.”72 The correspondence between Henry, Lord Hunsdon, governor of Berwick and his marshal, Henry Widdrington, corroborates Selby’s observation and explains why such a situation prevailed at Berwick. More than a decade prior to Selby’s observation, Hunsdon told Widdrington that it was a “common practice when any man owes more than he is able to pay either here in London or in the country…he makes friends to get a pay in Berwick.”73 Four years later, Hunsdon imparted to Widdrington that the benefits of being a Berwick garrison soldier were common knowledge. “All the world” knew that anyone who falls into bankruptcy, or “robs his master and runs away with his money,” runs to Berwick for refuge.74

Governor Hunsdon sometimes had difficulty placing those on whom he had bestowed pays. The men who commanded garrisons possessed the power to grant places in the garrison, and often did so as a favour or reward to someone who had shown them service in one capacity or another. From time to time, Hunsdon wrote his deputy, instructing him to place selected individuals in the next available soldier’s room. In February 1584, Hunsdon wrote a follow up letter to Widdrington regarding the placement of one Thomas Eaton, who Hunsdon had previously requested be

72 TNA, SP59/32, f. 238.
73 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 16v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 31 October 1583.
placed in the next void room. Since Hunsdon’s first letter, however, a number of places had come free, yet none had been filled by Eaton.75 A few years later, an exasperated Hunsdon wrote that it appeared to him that no warrant he sent granting somebody a place in the horse or foot bands was ever duly executed.76 One imagines that part of the trouble here was that captains were reluctant to place these men in void rooms which they themselves might sell for a tidy profit.

When rewarding men with places in their garrisons, garrison commanders did not necessarily consider military experience a necessary prerequisite. In April 1622, one W. Thorne wrote to John Oglander on behalf of one Mr. Numan who sought a place at Portsmouth.77 According to the writer, Numan was a servant of the Earl of Pembroke in his capacity as lord chancellor. We do not know if Numan received his request, but it seems likely that Benjamin Upham did. In September of the same year, Pembroke told Oglander that when a soldier’s place came free, Oglander was to have Benjamin Upham fill the void. Upham was the husband of “one who nursed a son of [Pembroke’s] brother of Montgomery’s” and, “out of that respect,” Pembroke was willing to grant Upham’s “earnest suit” to be a member of the Portsmouth garrison.78 At Berwick, Hunsdon acted similarly. He requested that John Amyett, the “kinsman”

75 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 27v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 25 February 1584.
76 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 45v–46r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 19 May 1586.
77 Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/44.
78 Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/50.
of one of the queen’s physicians and Hunsdon’s “very good friend” Doctor Bayliff, be
placed in a soldier’s room.79

Thus, a mixture of experienced soldiers and soldiers of convenience peopled
England’s early modern garrisons. Garrisons formed part of early modern England’s
martial institutional memory because in garrisons one found professional soldiers:
men of various social ranks who chose soldiering as their primary vocation. These
men belonged to a martial community and their membership in that community
coloured, as we shall see, their sense of themselves and their place within the early
modern social hierarchy. The buying and selling of garrison pays and the granting of
garrison rooms for favour or reward, however, meant that garrison places often went
to those for whom soldiering was not their primary vocation. This is not to say that a
bankrupt or someone who received their place through favour might not become an
effective soldier, or at least come to possess some degree of martial prowess; however,
it is to say that garrisons also contained men who did not identify so strongly with the
martial community and its values. For these men, the privileges and benefits they
received from being a garrison soldier informed their attachment to the garrison. In
short, being a garrison soldier did not always require, or inculcate, a distinct identity
or sense of belonging exclusive of all others.

79 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 43v. Hundson to Widdrington, 26 March 1586. To be fair, it
was not always clear whether or not those placed as favours had military experience
or not. Indeed, although Widdrington’s letter book is replete with requests from the
governor for the placement of particular individuals in the garrison, many of them
said little more about those individuals other than that they were able men.
Garrison soldiers in England may not have been culturally differentiated from the rest of society, but they were certainly jurisdictionally differentiated. Indeed, the privileges that provided the incentive to join the garrison derived from this jurisdictional distinction. This distinction existed for a reason, a reason which the Earl of Sussex, captain of Portsmouth, once articulated to Sir Walter Sandys, high sheriff of Southampton County. Sussex complained to Sandys because Sandys had fined many of his garrison men for not appearing on juries. The Earl explained to Sandys his error: garrison men possessed an exemption from jury service because garrison men were “appointed for special service for defence of the realm” and so not liable to such obligations.\textsuperscript{80} The privy council told all the mayors, sheriffs, and other officers near Camber Castle, Sussex, the same thing in October 1585. The queen had appointed Thomas Walton, captain of the castle, to service in the Low Countries. In the meantime, his deputy was in charge of the castle. The privy council reminded the Sussex officers that although the captain was gone, they were still not to “call or appoint” the castle soldiers “to any other service than their service of watch and ward in [the] castle,” despite the fact that many soldiers resided in the towns and villages near to the castle. Castle soldiers were free from such services and the payment of any “duties,” because “they were to remove and go to their charge upon all commands.” Since this was a duty common to all garrison soldiers, all garrison soldiers

\textsuperscript{80} Hampshire Record Office 44M69/G3/26. Earl of Sussex to Sir Walter Sandys, 14 July 1592.
were entitled to exemption: "all soldiers living in garrison wheresoever" were "free from all other services and payments whatsoever."\textsuperscript{81}

Both Sussex and the privy council intimated that garrison soldiers possessed privileges because they were appointed specially for the defence of the realm, and so defence of the realm should be their exclusive concern: they should not be away from that business serving on juries or fighting a suit of debt. That a relatively permanent body of men should be exclusively concerned with the defence of the realm is a conception compatible with the notion of a professional, standing army closely coordinated by a state's central political authority. At the same time, a garrison was a military entity that was not necessarily permanent: it might stand for a lengthy period, but it existed for a specific purpose, was tied to a specific geography, and was disbanded or dismissed when its purpose was no longer necessary.\textsuperscript{82} A garrison occupied Berwick-upon-Tweed to defend against Scots incursions into England and to assist in the government of the borderlands. A larger, more geographically dispersed garrison developed in Ireland to assist in the subjugation and government of that island. Garrisons occupied the fortifications in Plymouth and Portsmouth to defend against threats emanating from the continent. Though such garrisons stood for a long time, it is debatable whether contemporaries conceived of them having a life beyond

\textsuperscript{81} Charles Howard, Christopher Hatton, William Burghley, Francis Walsingham and Francis Knolles to the mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace and other her majesty’s officers near Camber Castle. BL, Stowe 150, f. 48.

\textsuperscript{82} Much like any other Tudor and Stuart army, or the militia.
their specific purposes. In fact, the reduction and disbandment of Berwick in the early seventeenth century illustrates this point: James VI/I thought that, after the union of the crowns, the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed no longer possessed a viable purpose, and so it disappeared. Likewise, it was probably an open question as to whether such a large, standing military force would be necessary in Ireland once that territory was suitably subdued and brought firmly under the rule of the English crown.

That said, a garrison that was *de jure* temporary might easily become *de facto* permanent, particularly if the reason for its existence never really went away. After 1603, the continental forces that worried Elizabethan England were no longer, technically, a threat. But who was to say for certain how long such a situation would obtain, or what other threats might cross the vast ocean that touched England’s south coast? It is perhaps no coincidence that Portsmouth and Plymouth, whose garrisons existed for more general defensive purposes, remained outposts of Britain’s military forces down to the present day, whereas Berwick-upon-Tweed has a regimental museum.\(^3\) In any case, the larger point is that just as the descriptive term “professional” may be applied to the individuals who comprised the garrison’s ranks,

\(^3\) This is not to say, of course, that Portsmouth lacks martial tourist attractions, nor is it to say that Berwick-upon-Tweed completely relinquished its martial function after the ascension of James VI/I. Berwick became a garrison again during the Bishops’ Wars and throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was home to a regiment of soldiers. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Berwick was a base in the sense that we now use that term: it was the place where standing soldiers lived, but it was not the place that they occupied militarily.
so too might it be applied to the place of garrisons within the early modern English state more generally. For although we cannot call England’s domestic garrisons a standing army, they were perhaps not so far removed from it as they once seemed.

Conclusion

Garrisoning was a regular English practice throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The size, number and location of those garrisons varied, but there was never a time when England had no soldiers in garrison. These garrisons thus formed a component of England’s military institutional memory: a sustained military practice and culture that placed England broadly in step with martial developments on the continent. Though garrisons possessed some of the characteristics of a profession, and some of the characteristics of a standing army, English garrisons of this period were neither of these things. It is, moreover, significant to note the degree of consolidation undertaken by the Elizabethan regime with regard to domestic defence. The regime’s assertion of its authority over the government of garrisons, coupled with the alterations it made to the government of the militia, suggests that the regime began to see the different elements of England’s military defences as a single body that existed not for the purpose of a specific event, but with the general purpose of defence of the state.

Still, claims of Elizabethan achievement in this regard may easily become overblown. By asserting their authority, the regime asserted its authority over a
collection of old and injured soldiers, a collection of bankrupts and pensioners. True: England’s garrisons were not comprised of crack troops. At the same time, the privileges awarded to members of garrison permitted garrison places to be full rather than empty, at little cost to the exchequer. And while it remains true that these men remained untested by an invasion that never came, there is no reason to assume out of hand they would not have succeeded somewhat in helping to stay, or at least delay, some kind of invasion. The possession of a highly trained, standing army was, as it remains today, in itself no guarantee of victory.

On the one hand, such arguments are irrelevant to this study: although we are concerned with a martial topic, this is not a history of English military development. On the other hand, though, the nature of these garrisons as they were – not in terms of what they were not, not in terms of what they were lacking in comparison to a continental standard deemed more advanced – is critical to understanding the instances of conflict and of cooperation that occurred amongst garrison personnel, and between those who belonged to garrisons and those who did not. In short, the particular characteristics of garrisons, profiled here, shaped the negotiations that took place between parties involved with garrisons. The jurisdictional anomalies that attracted men to serve in garrison, and the special purpose that justified these anomalies, meant that garrisons would do more than defend the territorial boundaries of the state: they would also become mired in the peculiar interplay of negotiation and authority at the heart of state formation.
CHAPTER THREE: “THEY ARE MOST TO BE TRUSTED, THAT HAVE BEST INTEREST IN THE STATE”: TOWN, CROWN, COUNTY AND PLYMOUTH FORT

In 1592, labourers broke ground on the new fortifications situated on the Hoe in Plymouth. By the early 1590s, people in and around Plymouth grew concerned that existing defences, such as those on St. Nicholas Island in Plymouth Harbour, were inadequate in the face of Spanish designs. The fort begun in 1592, however, was not entirely what the townsmen envisioned when they first solicited the crown for monetary contributions toward a new fortification. The townsmen believed that the same jurisdictional conditions would apply to any new fortification as they had with the fort on St. Nicholas: the new fort would be under the townsmen’s jurisdiction, with some general oversight exercised by the crown and the privy council. Instead, the central government altered the arrangements for the new fort, and the old fort on St. Nicholas, by insisting on its right to select the captain, and to maintain his jurisdiction over the government of both the fortification and the garrison. In doing so, the central government established the framework in which the disputes and negotiations over the jurisdictions of the townsmen respective to the garrison captain took place. Within that framework, however, the ideas and interests of the individuals involved shaped the particular nature and intensity of those disputes. This was true not only between Ferdinando Gorges and the townsmen of Plymouth, but also amongst the county military establishment, upon the appointment of Gorges to the position of colonel general of the Devon militia forces.
A New Fort for Plymouth

Concerns about the safety of Plymouth and its environs emanated from both the centre and the locality in the late 1580s and early 1590s. Located near the boundary of Devon and Cornwall, Plymouth was a significant trading port, possessed of good anchorage, and lay relatively open to the sea.

The expedition that Elizabeth launched to destroy those Armada ships that managed to return to Spain was a failure. Consequently, Phillip II repaired his surviving ships and embarked on an extensive programme of new ship building. In short, Spanish naval power recovered quickly, and the threat of another invasion loomed.\(^1\) As early as 1589, those living in and around Plymouth began to raise doubts about the ability

---

\(^1\) Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, 154-160.
of the town’s existing defences to meet this renewed threat. That year, a group of local gentlemen offered to build a sconce on Plymouth Haven.\(^2\) The year after, the inhabitants of Plymouth “desired some number of soldiers to lye near unto their town because they greatly fear[ed] some sudden attempt from the enemy.”\(^3\) The spring of 1590 brought no respite. In April, the council instructed the lord lieutenant of Devon, the Earl of Bath, to have soldiers ready to go to Plymouth in an emergency. They likewise instructed the mayor to see Plymouth’s primary defensive structure, the small fort on St. Nicholas Island, well manned.\(^4\) Autumn brought further expectation of invasion. In October, the council commanded Sir Francis Drake to take precautions against a naval attack.\(^5\)

In the face of such alarms, Drake and the mayor of Plymouth petitioned the queen in 1590 “to contribute toward the erecting of a fort.”\(^6\) The petitioners argued that the town lay open to an enemy who, if they landed just a small force in the night, might seize the town’s supply of ordnance and then easily take the town itself. The small fortress that existed on St. Nicholas Island only protected the harbour, and the town proper only possessed a few borrowed cannons with which to fend off an encroaching enemy. Many of Plymouth’s inhabitants felt so vulnerable that, during the last invasion scare, they had threatened to abandon the town entirely. Had not

\(^2\) APC, Vol. XVIII, 63.
\(^3\) Ibid., 337.
\(^4\) Ibid., Vol. XIX, 79.
\(^5\) Ibid., Vol. XX, 51 and TNA, SP12/233/112.
\(^6\) BL, Lansdowne 65, no. 12.
Drake moved his own family into town and set up a nightly watch and ward, the townsmen thought it likely that many would have made good on their threat. Such anxiety was not good for trade, and threatened the town’s prosperity. Drake and the mayor asked the crown for a contribution of £1000 or £1200. With this money, and that to be solicited from individuals, the petitioners promised to erect a fortress strong enough to withstand a force of 50,000 strong for at least ten to twelve days, without further cost to the queen. This strong and cost effective fort would render “the town and whole country…more resolute and safe, which would be a great encouragement to the realm.”

The crown also thought Plymouth was vulnerable. When the central government expected a Spanish attack in 1587, the council instructed the lord lieutenant, the Earl of Bath, to prepare the county defences. The council further instructed Bath to pay special attention to Plymouth, “because the town of Plymouth is to be doubted most as a place fittest and aptest for landing and harbour of ships.”

Aside from a good anchorage, Plymouth provided other enticements to an enemy, particularly a Spanish one: the town was a prominent trading port, a gathering place for English naval ships, and home to that notorious pesterer of Spanish shipping, Sir Francis Drake. With regard to English defence in general, then, the vulnerability of Plymouth was not something to ignore. And so, on 3 May 1592, the queen issued a

---

7 Ibid.
8 APC, Vol. XV, 288.
declaration stating her intention “that for the surety and defence of that town and the
country adjacent…Plymouth shall be walled and made defensible by enclosing the
same with ditch…walls…bulwarks and other defences.” As a “place of frequent
resort…for our navy Royal,” as also for trade and navigation, the queen “considered
how perilous it might be [in] many ways to the state of our whole country” if
Plymouth was not better defended against enemy attack.⁹

Once the crown resolved to have a new fort constructed at Plymouth, the
issue of the captaincy of that fort became a matter of contention between the central
authorities and the mayor and townsmen of Plymouth. The Plymouth townsmen’s
relationship to the fort on St. Nicholas Island shaped their expectations of the new
fort. The c.1549 indenture between Edward VI and the town of Plymouth gave the
town jurisdiction over the new fort on St. Nicholas Island. In fact, the crown’s
contribution was primarily monetary, with the town bearing the rest of the cost and
responsibility. The king contributed money to the completion of the fort, and the
wages of four resident soldiers; however, the town of Plymouth bore the ongoing
maintenance costs and responsibilities. At its own cost, the town maintained the fort,
supplied it with munitions, and provided four “sufficient and able gunners” to “reside
and make their continual abode” on St. Nicholas. The mayor and commons of the
town were to see that at least three of the four men were present on the island at all
times, and at night all four. Moreover, the mayor and burgesses were to visit the

⁹ TNA, SP12/242/31.
island weekly, to ensure that the fort was properly manned and maintained. In times of necessity, and again at their own cost, the town of Plymouth was to furnish at least sixteen more men. Clearly, then, the main responsibility for the fort lay with the town, although the king retained the ability to appoint commissions for surveying the fort and the “establishing of other ordinance for the good government, order and safe keeping” of the same.\(^{10}\)

In 1580, Elizabeth I renewed this indenture, although the new indenture asserted more explicitly that the privy council held ultimate oversight over the command of the fort. Elizabeth’s indenture stipulated that the town “shall not at any time…make or appoint any captain to have the charge or government of the said fort…or of the soldiers…but such as shall from time to time be allowed of by the honourable privy council.”\(^{11}\) While this statement insists that the privy council had the final word on any captain, it appears that the townsmen might still nominate that captain themselves on the occasions when it was necessary to have one. Otherwise, the mayor and burgesses of Plymouth continued, for all intents and purposes, to be themselves captain of the fort on St. Nicholas Island. It appears that the stipulation regarding the selection of a captain for the island was put to the test in 1583. A letter from the mayor and aldermen of Plymouth to the council intimates that a captain was being considered for appointment to the fort on St. Nicholas Island. The townsmen

---

\(^{10}\) TNA, SP10/6/24.  
\(^{11}\) TNA, E211/633.
argued that “since they were to have a captain appointed,” the town ought to be able to choose that captain. The townsmen put their case succinctly: they granted that by the terms of the indenture, any captain had to meet with the approval of the privy council or, in a pinch, with the approval of the lord admiral or the lord lieutenant of Devon. But the indenture still permitted the Plymouth townsmen to select the captain, to “make choice of such a captain as they suppose their friend.” If this was no longer what the crown desired, then Plymouth should be relieved of the burden of maintaining the fortification.\textsuperscript{12}

The new indenture of 1580, which informed the controversy of 1582, arose because the central authorities grew concerned about how well Plymouth looked after its charge. In the late summer of 1581, the privy council wrote to the mayor and inhabitants of Plymouth. The queen, they explained, granted the keeping of the island to the town “upon condition of performance of certain covenants.”\textsuperscript{13} It came to the council’s attention, however, that the town had not performed these covenants adequately.\textsuperscript{14} Since the island was “a place of importance,” the council required that the town better act upon its duty of care toward the fort. To ensure that the town performed such duties, the council wrote to the town Recorder and a local Justice of the Peace and sent them to Plymouth to survey the state of the fort, and to report

\textsuperscript{12} TNA, SP12/167/9 I.
\textsuperscript{13} APC, Vol. XIII, 151.
\textsuperscript{14} The “covenants” referred to here, and also referred to in Plymouth’s subsequent letter, are those set out in the indenture between the queen and the town of Plymouth for the care of St. Nicholas Island c.1580. TNA, E 211/633.
whether “the informations made against [the mayor and inhabitants of Plymouth] be true or no, and there upon take such further order as shall be convenient for her majesty’s service.”

The townsmen figured that the investigation into their keeping of St. Nicholas might result in the appointment of a captain. Should this occur, the mayor and aldermen requested that Francis Drake be given the post, on the grounds that Drake was a brethren of the town and a friend. Drake’s vested interest in the safety of Plymouth, the townsmen reasoned, ensured that he would defend the fort with an eye to the benefit of the town. The mayor and aldermen intimated their awareness that others sought the post, but were adamant that only a man of Drake’s connection to Plymouth would suffice. The men of Plymouth drove home this point by reminding the council that they would “be annoyed if the government [of St. Nicholas] should be granted unto one that…shall not have a special care over us.”

However displeased the queen was about Plymouth’s care of St. Nicholas Island in the 1580s, she was not concerned enough to alter the established arrangement for the government of that fort. The crown seemed neither willing to remove St. Nicholas from the town’s government, nor to quibble about the suitability of Drake as captain thereof. Throughout the 1580s and into the 1590s, the crown appeared concerned about Plymouth’s defence, but not so concerned as to become too

---

16 TNA, SP12/167/9.
particularly involved. In response to Plymouth’s request to have some soldiers to stay near the town, the privy council told the Earl of Bath that while they did not see any immediate necessity for such a course, they nonetheless “could like well...some sufficient guard or garrison of...the town” just in case. But the central government did not wish, at that time, to be involved in any construction project to improve Plymouth’s defence. The council instructed Bath to call before him the mayor of Plymouth and see “whether they could not be contented at their own charges (because her majesty [was] not to be moved to be at any charge of like fortifications in respect of the necessary use of her treasure otherwise) to cause some entrenchments about the town to make the same in some sort defensible.”\(^\text{17}\)

Even after Drake and the mayor’s 1590 plea to the council for the construction of a fort, the crown still appeared reluctant to commit. In December 1591, the council wrote to several local men, stating their resolve to see Plymouth better fortified. Since they had not decided “whether [it] were most fit...to erect some fort to the best advantage on the seaside within or near to the town or to make a wall about the town,” the council requested the men meet to decide which of the two options they deemed more appropriate. Although the local men seemingly had a choice, the remainder of the council’s letter dwells only on the wall option, intimating that this was the council’s preferred choice. If it appeared that “a wall shall be of as good safety and guard to the town,” then the local men should proceed

\(^{17}\text{APC, Vol. XVIII, 337.}\)
to consult experts regarding size and cost. An imposition on the yearly export of pilchards might then be instituted “towards the charge of performing of the wall.”18 The council made no comment on how the gentlemen should proceed if they decided that a fort was the most appropriate solution.

Although by 1592 the crown agreed to a substantial new fortification, the central government had not always appeared enthusiastic about the prospect. The central government’s lukewarm attitude toward the construction of any kind of new fortifications might give a Plymouth townsmen reason to believe that a new fortification of any sort would be built and governed in the same manner as St. Nicholas: the crown contributing money for construction and maintenance, with the ongoing costs and the routine governance placed within the jurisdiction of the townsmen. But this was not to be the case. In 1593 John Gayne, mayor of Plymouth, wrote to Burghley that the matter of the new fort’s government had “bred some scruples in [the townsmen’s] minds.” Gayne was thus glad to hear that it pleased “her majesty…that the fortification here begun shall be left to the town’s government.” In light of this revelation, Gayne assured Burghley that the “inhabitants do now willingly promise to yield their contributions towards the furtherance of the work.”19 From quite early on, then, the townsmen suspected that the crown might alter the

18 Ibid., 122.
19 TNA, SP12/245/31.
arrangements for the government of Plymouth Fort, and take it out of the hands of the Plymouth townsmen.

In 1592, just before the queen proclaimed her intentions to fortify Plymouth, the central government sent military engineer Robert Adams to survey the ground. Adams was to confer with the locals, particularly one Arthur Champernown, “who already hath a draught of the town with his opinions for the fortifying of the same,” to see if local plans for the fortifications were suitable or if they should “be altered either for the more strength or the less charge.”20 The queen also made it clear that before she made any decision about Plymouth’s fortifications, she would have Adams’ opinion. Adams duly performed his charge and, by April 1592, had drawn up a plan that reflected his opinion about the fortifications.21 While Plymouth’s defences most certainly needed reinforcement, Adams recommended that any new defences should not favour the town at the expense of Plymouth Sound. The bulk of the new fortifications should have as their priority the defence of the harbour.22 It appears as though the central government took Adams’ suggestions to heart: as construction progressed, most of the work focussed on the fortification on the Hoe, and not the walls and ditches meant to fortify the town. As Richard Preston has noted, it

---

21 TNA, SP12/241/116.
22 For more on the planning, construction and architecture of the fortifications, see: Colvin, *The History of the King’s Works*, Vol. IV, Part II., 484-488.
appeared that “the fort had been given priority” and “the walling of the town had been quietly shelved.”

Little wonder that the townsmen had some scruples about the crown’s intentions for the new fortifications. And while the mayor’s letter to Burghley intimated that the town had received assurance that the command would be theirs, two months later Sir Francis Drake and others saw the need to make another overture to the council. Drake, together with other Plymouth townsmen, told the privy council that the inhabitants of Plymouth would be more forthcoming with money towards the completion of the fort “if the continual government thereof might…be committed to the mayor and commonality of the borough.” In response, the council reassured Plymouth that they thought it “fit that her majesty be moved that the government” of the fort be committed to the mayor and townsmen, apart from “time of imminent danger, when for the better defence and safety some men of skill and experience may be thought more meet to take charge thereof.”

Despite privy council assurances, however, this did not occur. The council’s apparent turnabout here begs explanation. The early 1590s, of course, were a “time of imminent danger.” Paul Hammer describes the years between 1589 and 1594 as a period of “deep war”: a

---

time of mounting threats and military commitments.\textsuperscript{25} It is possible, therefore, to take the privy council at its word: that, times being different, they certainly would work to see the town possess government of the fort.

At the same time someone, either within the privy council or near to it, drew up a more elaborate response to the Plymouth’s townsmen’s assertion that they ought to govern the new fort because their vested interests in the town’s security and prosperity made them its most effective guardians. It was a lengthy refutation of this argument, and one that had little to do with whether or not England faced an immediate threat. The response turns on two related themes: that every fortification existed to protect the “state” and not for the protection of particular and private interests, and that since a fortification protected the state, it must be governed by one whose interests were bound up with those of the state, not one whose interests were local and private. To commit the fort to the town’s custody undermined the entire purpose of a fort. A fortification, especially one situated on a “frontier,” was a key to a prince’s state: it could not, therefore, exist simply for the aid of such a narrow interest as an individual town. This was because the town’s interest might, in certain circumstance, actively undermine the defence of the state. Should an enemy land, it might be necessary for the men of the fort to “bridle and keep in order the town.”\textsuperscript{26} A commander who possessed vested interests in the town he defended might be less

\textsuperscript{25} Hammer, \textit{Elizabeth’s Wars}, 175.
\textsuperscript{26} BL, Lansdowne 76, no. 35.
inclined to turn his guns on that town, if the situation warranted. What is more, a fort is a focal point for the defence of the whole county. “The country” would more willingly provide its assistance “to a sufficient man appointed by her majesty” than to a townsman, “with whom they have continual jarrings” about “petty matters” like “liberties” and “tallages.” Finally, forts such as Plymouth also existed for “the safety of her majesty’s ships” which, although the queen acknowledged the townsmen of Plymouth cared about this, was a thing that pertained to the safety of the state writ large.

So, townsmen might not command the fort because a fort served to protect more than just the town. Townsmen, moreover, were not experienced in matters defensive: they had “known not service” and so their “negligence and ignorance [might] put all in hazard.” The author pointed to the Plymouth townsmen’s own negligence toward the care of St. Nicholas Island as a case in point. Plymouth showed “careless regard...to the government of the island,” which the queen had placed in their care. This served as a warning to the queen about what might happen when forts or “such like places of defence be committed to the charge and government of unexperienced towns men or to unskilful merchant men.” It mattered not, moreover, that these inexperienced townsmen had helped to pay for the fortification. The contribution of funds to assist in matters of state did not entail a stake in the
disbursement of those funds: “a parliament...granting her majesty a subsidy” did not get to “appoint her a Treasurer.”27

While it mattered that townsmen lacked the proper skills, the main issue was one of interests and perhaps even loyalties, and their relationship to effective defence. Townsmen and merchantmen, the author continued, “more respect[ed] their ordinary trade of merchandize, then the care they ought to have of a fort of this importance, converting always the yearly stipend allowed for defence, to their own profit, without the maintenance of any soldier or skilful person to attend the same.” It was not possible for a prince to “commit the charge of a fort...to any that hath dependence of other than himself: and with least reason of all to them...of the town.” A fort is “fit only to be put into the hands of some gentleman...who hath seen service, and on whom her majesty may safely rely.” The implication is that a townsman, who is very likely to be a merchant, has developed trade interests that were sometimes at odds with state interests. Gentlemen, by contrast, rely solely on their prince for their material wellbeing. The writer offered his blunt verdict:

They are most to be trusted, that have best interest in the state. A merchant may live as a merchant, and a townsman a townsman in all worlds and under all princes. A gentleman shall never live as a gentleman but under his natural prince.28

Of course, townsmen and merchants were not universally disloyal: such a statement was “both odious and absurd.” Yet the recent history of Plymouth indicated that the

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
maxim sometimes held true: “who hath been more faithful of the two [townsmen or gentlemen] the late experience of those countries in her majesty’s brother’s time doth sufficiently declare.” During Edward VI’s reign the town of Plymouth itself had been “possessed by rebels, and then a gentleman commanded to keep the island, which also they attempted to have gotten.”

Even more recent experience may have also influenced the queen. Elizabeth I surely remembered that Sir Francis Drake, a suitor for the town, often disregarded the specifics of her orders when entrusted with command.

This more elaborate justification for denying the town of Plymouth both the choice of captain and jurisdiction over the new fort makes the privy council’s intimation that the town should receive government of the new fort, if only times were safer, sounds like an excuse. It may well have been. But both those at the centre of English politics and those at the periphery agreed on Plymouth’s

---

29 BL, Lansdowne 76, no. 35.
30 Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, 156–160. Of particular irritation to Elizabeth was the outcome of the expedition in the autumn of 1588, intended to destroy the remainder of the Armada. The crown contributed money and material to this mission, with the remainder of the burden borne by a syndicate organized by Drake and Sir John Norris. The syndicate’s backers were keen to see a return on their investment, and so the fleet often undertook actions toward the maximally profitable, rather than the tactically preferable. In the end, the expedition failed to destroy the remnants of the Armada, and it would be five years before Drake received another command.
vulnerability to attack. The impetus to construct a new fortification to rectify this problem came from the locality, as one might expect. The threat to the people who lived in Plymouth was more live because it was more immediate. So, Sir Francis Drake and the Plymouth townsmen opened negotiations with the crown, with the aim of convincing the crown to contribute to a new fort. Like good negotiators, Drake and his friends recognized that the other party possessed interests and that the path to successful negotiation was to show the other party that both sets of interests coalesced. Drake and the townsmen argued that a new fortification was mutually beneficial: the townsmen’s desire to better protect their town would, in turn, better assure the defence of England in toto. Because there was agreement about the problem, this negotiation succeeded and the state grew: the crown created another office, another embodiment of the state in the guise of the captain of the new Plymouth Fort. The state grew, but not in the manner the townsmen wished: the townsmen wished to occupy that office themselves or, at least, choose the occupant. The crown denied the townsmen this ability.

The inherent risk in reminding another party of their interests is that the other party will actually consider those interests. As Clive Holmes suggests, knowledge of the situation at the centre is crucial to understanding what occurred in the locality.32 In the crown’s view, the townsmen had taken rather poor care of St.

Nicholas Island. Drake, a major supporter of this new fort, often chose to follow his own interests rather than the queen’s orders. Moreover, the captaincy of a new fort created a new office to confer on influential courtiers and their clients, particularly martial courtiers and clients.\(^3\) This was important to all monarchs but perhaps particularly important to Elizabeth I: it represented a means for the queen to reemphasize her ultimate authority over her soldiers and commanders, despite her gender.\(^4\) It reinforced the idea that defence of the realm lay distinctly within the royal prerogative. Finally, the central government’s denial of the Plymouth townsmen’s claims to government of the new fort was in keeping with a general pattern of behaviour on the part of the central government towards England’s domestic martial institutions. The alterations the regime made to the existing jurisdictional conditions concerning the government of St. Nicholas Island, as well as the actions it took towards the government of the new fortification, wrested control of these defences out of more diffuse and local control and placed it more directly under the oversight of the central government. The central government took similar

\(^{33}\) Ferdinando Gorges, the first crown appointed captain of Plymouth Fort was connected to the Earl of Essex. Preston, *Gorges of Plymouth Fort*, 43-50.

\(^{34}\) Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, 3-4. The Earl of Essex’s dubbing of twenty-four knights on the field in France, on 8 October 1591, occurred during the negotiations over the captaincy of Plymouth Fort, and may have brought home to the queen a need to reaffirm her control over martial appointments. See also Paul Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: the Political Career of Robert Devereux, Second Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 223.
actions, and achieved similar outcomes, with the reestablishment of the lords lieutenant to oversee the militia and with the government of other garrisons.

The People (of Plymouth) versus Ferdinando Gorges

For the first captain of Plymouth Fort, the crown selected Sir Ferdinando Gorges: a career soldier who had served in both France and the Low Countries, where he held the post of captain in the garrison at Brill. Gorges remained captain of Plymouth Fort for the rest of his life, except for two years between 1601 and 1603, when the crown stripped him of his post for his suspected involvement in the Essex rebellion. After Gorges’ demotion, the townsmen of Plymouth tried again to gain command of the fort. The crown once again rejected the town’s request and appointed Sir John Gilbert to the post. It was not long, however, before Gilbert and the mayor of Plymouth fell to quarrelling. In November 1601, the mayor of Plymouth wrote to Lord Admiral Nottingham with a laundry list of Gilbert’s abuses. Gilbert forced 140 Plymouth mariners into the fort, and chose 100 of them to serve on his own ship. Gilbert angered quickly, drew his weapon often, and guarded the fort poorly.

35 Preston, *Gorges of Plymouth Fort*, 43-44.
37 HHA, CP76/73.
39 HHA, CP89/95.
40 Ibid., 284.
To Richard Preston, Ferdinando Gorges’ biographer, the poor relationship between Gilbert and the town confirms that “the quarrel between the town and Gorges had been one of fundamental principle and not a mere clash of personalities.” The townsmen resented both Gorges and Gilbert because the townsmen knew what they were: agents of crown “centralization.” Preston’s conclusion is neither wholly correct, nor wholly misguided. The crown’s denial of Plymouth’s ability to name the new fort’s captain was not the result of any longstanding or conscious plan to centralize; however, it was the result of the central government’s intention to see authority within the state distributed in the manner it conceived as most appropriate. Gorges’ presence, and Gilbert’s, was a reminder of the regime’s decision to exclude the fort from the town’s jurisdiction. It was a reminder that authority within the state was not distributed in a manner thought proper by the townsmen. This coloured their relationship with the men who occupied the captaincy. This is not to say, however, that Ferdinando Gorges did not directly contribute to the tensions between himself and the townsmen. Gorges was a career soldier: a fact that shaped his understanding of the nature and purpose of his authority and, as a result, his behaviour towards the townsmen. The crown and privy council, as the ultimate arbiter of the disputes between Gorges and the town, tried to moderate his behaviour, but nonetheless backed his authority.

---

42 Ibid., 68.
Sir Ferdinando Gorges arrived in Plymouth amidst new alarms about Spanish intentions toward England. In October 1595, the mayor of Plymouth and others wrote the privy council thanking them for sending such an able man as Ferdinando Gorges. The privy council had instructed the townsmen that upon any attempt by the enemy, they were “to use the advice and direction” of Gorges. This was, the townsmen stated, a situation “right pleasing” to them. Gorges was worthy and experienced, an asset in such dangerous times, and the townsmen were prepared to follow his directions in matters defensive. As the Spanish threat faded over the winter, however, so did the town’s enthusiasm for the worthy and experienced captain. The mayor petitioned the privy council about a number of contentious matters that had arisen between the town and Ferdinando Gorges. The townsmen asked for a decision on Gorges’ refusal to allow soldiers under his command to be arrested for felonies or debt and, further, that Gorges be forbidden to meddle with the liberties of the town. Gorges had impressed John Hele, deputy town clerk, to serve

43 In the summer of 1595, a Spanish raid occurred on England’s west coast. TNA, SP12/253/30.
44 TNA, SP12/254/20.
45 As we shall see, the townsmen of Portsmouth also claimed they were unable to arrest soldiers for felony offences, such as murder. This indicates that, while there was nothing in writing suggesting that this was part of the garrison captain’s rightful jurisdiction, it was an authority regularly claimed by garrison captains and, seemingly, not disputed by the central government. Indeed, when the privy council recounted the privileges of the captain and garrison of Camber Castle to the non-military authorities near to it, they included the following proviso: that all “mean offences” committed by the castle garrison were to be punished directly by the captain, and all “high offences” were to be certified to the lord warden of the Cinque Ports and
on St. Nicholas Island upon his delivery of a message from the mayor. The mayor demanded Hele’s discharge, and assurances that Gorges would not impress townsmen in the future. Finally, the mayor asked that the townsmen be left alone to muster and lead their own men in militia service.46

Gorges’ actions, so disliked by the townsmen, stemmed from his understanding of the nature of his authority as captain of the fort. The grant that gave Gorges the fort’s government also gave him the authority, in times of necessity, to summon into the fort, island or town “such and so many of our subjects armed or unarmed for the better defence thereof.”47 The grant further stipulated that local authorities were to render such assistance when the captain deemed necessary. If we take Gorges at his word, he clearly believed that he lived in a time of necessity and that this was why the queen had sent him to Plymouth. He feared that England faced an experienced and well supplied enemy. Gorges described to Cecil an enemy “practiced,” “disciplined” and “royally provided to be fit for...an attempt” on

punished according to his discretion. To be sure, matters pertaining to the government of the Cinque Ports may not be directly comparable to those pertaining to Plymouth or Portsmouth; however, the fact that the privy council made a point of reminding mayors, sheriffs and JPs that the punishment of soldiers lay outside their responsibilities evidences a similar jurisdictional distinction for garrison soldiers. Moreover, when the privy council reminded the local officials that garrison soldiers were exempt from all “services and payments,” they stated that this was not just a privilege of Camber Castle’s soldiers, but of “all soldiers living in garrison wheresoever,” thus intimating that such privileges were not unique to the garrisons within the jurisdiction of the lord warden of the Cinque Ports. BL, Stowe 150, f. 48.

46 HHA, CP48/44.
47 TNA, SP12/256/113.
England. Gorges had intelligence of a Spanish plan to land an army in the east of England, raise an army in the north and, while this “hurly burly” engulfed England, instigate a rising in Ireland. He left it to the privy council to decide the veracity of this intelligence, but warned that “if God had not prevented [the Spanish] this last time, they would have without resistance performed their designment upon these parts.” What Gorges saw of local defences did little to convince him that Plymouth and its environs might repel an invasion of the magnitude of which he thought the Spanish capable. In April 1596, Gorges expressed to Burghley his concern about enemy activities and the confused response of the locals. “I do not see what course is taken,” he wrote, “by any man here to any purpose for the impeachment” of the enemy “but all men for the most part full of fear and in doubt what to do.” Gorges maintained that he wished to right this problem. To this end, Gorges asked for a wider scope of authority on two occasions in the mid-1590s. On one such occasion, Gorges asked Robert Cecil for a commission which “expressed in plain words” what the queen wished him to “do at times of occasion.” In both instances, Gorges assured Cecil he desired such authority not for his own personal aggrandizement, but only so that he might see the queen’s service properly done which was, after all, why he believed she had sent him to Plymouth.

48 TNA, SP12/265/41.
49 TNA, SP12/265/42.
50 TNA, SP12/257/19.
51 TNA, SP12/257/19.
52 TNA, SP12/262/88.
The performance of his duty, as he understood it, was clearly important to Gorges. He believed that the queen had sent him to Plymouth to defend that place against an enemy he seemingly both feared and respected. As an experienced soldier, Gorges believed he had better knowledge of the enemy army’s capabilities than most others in Plymouth with whom he had to cooperate. Gorges’ understood “imminent danger,” that state in which townspeople and other local Devon residents were to surrender themselves to Gorges’ commands, more broadly than the townspeople. For Gorges, it was too late to prepare when Spanish ships were in the harbour, or even on the seas.

But more than practical experience shaped Gorges’ behaviour: Gorges was also a career soldier, and this shaped his sense of self, his sense of his place within the social hierarchy, within the order of deference and obedience. We have no reason to doubt that Gorges was genuine in his belief that Spain posed a serious threat to England, and that the men of Plymouth and Devon were unprepared; but his sentiments were likely not entirely altruistic. Like all early modern people, particularly those in positions of authority, Gorges knew well the benefits of receiving obedience and deference.\(^{53}\) In June 1596, the townsmen of

\(^{53}\) Neil Younger makes a similar argument about the Earl of Essex. Essex, he argues, was a true military enthusiast, and believed that it was better for England to fight an offensive war against Spain, rather than the defensive one it did fight. This is not to say, however, that Essex pursued this goal without an eye to his own benefit. Neil Younger, “The Practice and Politics of Troop-Raising: Robert Devereux, Second Earl
Plymouth sent a sergeant to summon Gorges to a meeting discussing defence. Gorges disliked this, and complained to Robert Cecil that if the townsmen wished to discuss defence, then they should come to him. The mayor apparently did go to Gorges, and the two exchanged heated words. Such an incident had relatively little to do with Gorges’ actual martial experience, but a great deal to do with matters of honour and deference: in this situation, Gorges clearly thought himself the one to be shown deference and obedience.

The central government backed Gorges’ authority, and his discretion, against the complaints of the town; however, it also attempted to school Gorges in diplomacy. When Gorges informed the council that the townsmen had refused his request for the “assistance of certain townsmen to watch and guard” the fort, the council wrote to the mayor and aldermen of Plymouth and admonished them for their recalcitrance. The queen had shown “a princely care of [their] safety” by erecting a fort there and displayed further generosity by placing an individual of great skill in command. The council explained that while they “cannot exactly prescribe when and how [Gorges] shall demand…you afford your assistance, nevertheless as we doubt not of his discretion to require your help only upon very just occasion and at such times

---


and in such manner as is convenient.” As the crown had full confidence in
Gorges’ opinion, the townsmen would do well not to “stand nicely and curiously
upon points of no great moment, but to yield so much credit to [Gorges’]
experience and sufficiency (which hath moved her majesty to place him there)
as to think that he will give no other direction and make no other demands then
shall be for her majesty’s service and your own good.”55

The council’s letter to the mayor and aldermen of Plymouth was both an
endorsement of Gorges’ military experience and expertise and a reiteration to
the town of Gorges’ authority in matters relating to defence. That said, Gorges
might have handled the situation with more tact. The council sent an
additional letter to Gorges himself, reminding him not to be quarrelsome. They
informed Gorges that while they had reminded the town of its duty, Gorges
should not “stand with them upon any nice points of commandment of no great
importance, but so long as they be aiding unto you in good sort and as shall be
meet for the performance of her majesty’s service there, you shall do well to
hold good and friendly correspondence with them without constraining or
urging of them farther than is needful.”56 Gorges was right, but it was better if
there were no unnecessary scenes about who ought to summon whom.

56 Ibid., 458.
Matters between Gorges and the town proceeded reasonably smoothly through late 1596 and into 1597. Letters of intelligence flowed from Plymouth to the privy council, and many of them reflect at least a certain level of cooperation between Gorges and the townsmen. The crown continued to indicate its confidence in Gorges' abilities. In the autumn of 1597, the council wrote to Gorges, commending him for the pains he took “for the strength and defence of the fort,” and that they did “very well allow of all and every particular” performed by Gorges toward that end.57 The council again acknowledged Gorges' military expertise when, on 23 November 1597, they ordered him to Falmouth to confer with Sir Nicholas Parker regarding the intended fortifications there.58

Relations soured, however, owing to the presence of 200 soldiers from the Low Countries temporarily stationed in Plymouth and in other ports in the west. In late November 1597, the council placed Gorges in command of the companies in Plymouth because Gorges was, by this time, both captain of the fort and a deputy lieutenant of Devon.59 By April, the council caught wind of “of a great disorder…between the townsmen and the soldiers.” The council commended the care taken by the Earl of Bath and the others to resolve the

58 Ibid., 145. Gorges duly went to Falmouth to discuss fortification with Parker. TNA, SP12/265/42 and TNA, SP12/265/45 both contain Gorges' opinions as to the best course to take with regard to the fortification of Falmouth.
quarrel, but still thought it necessary that both the soldiers and the townsmen “should understand her majesty’s mislike of the want of discretion and government of both of them.” They instructed Gorges to remind the soldiers to use the townsmen with courtesy, and at the same time reduce their expenses.

“There is no reason,” the council stated, “to appoint several lodgings for every soldier” when they might easily sleep two or more to a bed. At the same time, it was even more unnecessary for the townsmen “to exact so much for their lodgings.” For the crown, then, both parties were guilty of some malfeasance.

The town, however, clearly thought that the blame lay more particularly with Gorges. On April 18, the council informed Gorges that the mayor of Plymouth had lodged certain complaints against him and his lieutenant, and requested that Gorges appear before them to answer these complaints. Gorges’ examination and the complaints of the town resulted in a reiteration and elaboration of articles first issued in February 1596, which “were supposed to be to good effect and purpose for the maintenance of the privileges of the town and of friendly agreement betwixt the inhabitants of that town and the commander of the fort.”

Back in February 1596, after the initial fracas between Gorges and the townsmen, the queen had given “allowance” to “certain petitions” made by the

60 Ibid., 391.
61 Ibid., 408.
62 Ibid., 501.
mayor. The crown ordered, first, “that Sir Ferdinando Gorges meddle not within the said borough in matters of justice, nor in the things that belong to the mayor.” Second, that Gorges “have nothing to do” with the town’s “castle” wherein the town stored its own defensive supplies. Third, “that no inhabitant of the town be by him commanded to watch out of the town or by any other service touching the fort or island but in the time of present danger,” when the townsmen “will join with him to do [their] uttermost.” Fourth, that neither Gorges nor his soldiers search or meddle with any ship that comes into port, “unless it be for her majesty’s special service.” Even then, Gorges should first inform the mayor, so that he might “take one of the…brethren and the searcher of the port with him.”63 The privy council repeated these articles almost verbatim in 1598, but added a clarification of the town’s responsibilities toward the fort or, as the council put it, “certain other articles presented unto us by Sir Ferdinando Gorges, to be likewise observed on the town’s part towards the commander of the fort.” There were five new articles in all. The first attempted to regulate the quotidian relationship between the townspeople and the soldiers, and stated that “if any townsmen give occasion of offence unto any soldier of the fort, the mayor and other officers of the town shall take order for just and due satisfaction unto the party grieved.” The second and third articles dealt with the provision of supplies necessary for defence. The townspeople shall be

“ready at all times upon the approach of any enemy with such furniture as they are appointed to have” to go wherever and do whatever Gorges tells them “for the aid and defence of her majesty’s fort, island, town and country near adjoining.” Likewise, “upon the approach and landing of an enemy,” Gorges may appropriate any supplies that may be had in the town, but he must provide a receipt.

The final two articles were an elucidation of the fort commander’s security function, a function that Gorges had heretofore performed but which had never been committed to paper. The fourth article stated that any foreign prisoners taken into the town must be brought to the attention of the commander, and the town must take proper order for their secure custody, “so as they be not suffered to run up and down at their pleasure as heretofore they have done.” The last article gave Gorges the authority, in no uncertain terms, to examine individuals arriving in the port from abroad. “No passenger,” the articles stated, shall “be suffered to arrive in the town coming from any foreign part, but that there shall be notice given to the commander of the fort, to the end that they may be examined upon such points as shall be necessary for the present to the furtherance of her majesty’s service.”

Once again, the crown thought to give Gorges a strong presence, but to have him exercise that presence in a more agreeable manner. The addition of

64 Ibid., 501-503.
these articles, which defined the town’s responsibilities toward Gorges, reveal that the crown did, as Gorges suspected, wish him to be supreme in matters defensive. That said, the council sought to clarify the boundaries of the captain’s authority, particularly with regard to when the captain might expect the unquestioned assistance of the townspeople. While in the original articles Gorges might commandeer the assistance of men and supplies from the town when he perceived “imminent danger,” in the new articles the townspeople were to be ready more specifically “upon the approach of any enemy” to render assistance. Moreover, whenever the townspeople rendered supply, they were to receive in return “under his hand writing a note of the particular receipts,” presumably to ensure repayment.

Shortly afterward, the privy council wrote to the mayor of Plymouth and Gorges respectively. The council explained that while they had “thought good rather by some good orders to reduce both [parties] to a friendly agreement then straightly to examine and punish the disorders committed,” neither party was wholly “free from fault.” Still, some persons had shown themselves more blameworthy in instigating this latest spat between Gorges and the town. Thus, the council ordered Gorges to dismiss Jennings, his lieutenant, and the town to sequester George Barnes, the town clerk, for three months.65 One suspects that the crown hoped that with the clearer statement of the duties of each party, and

65 Ibid., 517-518.
what was clearly the exemplary punishment of Jennings and Barnes, the relationship between Gorges and the townsmen would proceed more amicably.

The Elizabethan regime’s decision to remove the government of the new fort from the townsmen’s jurisdiction was the overarching framework within which the disputes between the town authorities and Ferdinando Gorges took place. The situation likely fostered some resentment on the part of the men who governed Plymouth, and whomever the crown chose to be the captain of the fort probably faced an uphill battle to win the townsmen’s good graces. But there is no doubt that Gorges himself bears some responsibility for the ill will between captain and town. Ferdinando Gorges is the first of a number of abrasive garrison captains in this study, men who seem particularly antagonistic toward the non-garrison authorities with whom they had to live and cooperate. The preponderance of such a disposition means that one cannot simply attribute Gorges’ behaviour to a quirk of personality, to an accident of nature.

Gorges, and many other garrison captains, were career soldiers, members of the martial community. Membership in the martial community shaped Gorges’ conception of his place within the hierarchy of obedience and deference. In other words, it shaped his sense of honour, which in turn shaped how he perceived the actions of the townsmen. As Brendan Kane argues, honour in early modern England was less a “series of set codes,” as it was a “dynamic two part claim right.” It was both the claim by an individual to be treated in a certain manner by a particular group of
people, and it was the right of that particular group of people to accept or reject that claim. Gorges believed that he ought to be deferred to by the townsmen, and made that claim to deference based on both his office, as a crown chosen captain of a military garrison, and his conception of deference due to martial men based on his experience within the martial community. And while all early modern people were prone to affronts of honour over seemingly small matters, the survival of chivalric values amongst the martial community rendered these men particularly attached “to the struggle for pre-eminence.” Military men sometimes saw little distinction between public and private combat; they viewed war in personal terms, and non-military matters in warlike terms. Martial men were quick to anger, or even resort to violence, when they perceived an affront to honour. Since Ferdinando Gorges was a member of this martial community, he likely filtered disputes over precedence through this lens, resulting in behaviour that sharpened the disputes between himself and the townsmen.

But for all the discord between Gorges and the townsmen, much of which Gorges caused through his own actions and reactions, the central government did not displace him from his post: at least, it did not displace him for quarreling with the mayor. The central government encouraged Gorges to be more reasonable, not to

---

dwell so much on small affronts. But it saved any admonitions of Gorges for private letters intended for Gorges only. The privy council clarified the bounds of his authority with respect to that of the town, and vice versa, but they did not diminish the captain’s authority or jurisdiction in any way. Toward each party the central government maintained the image of the protector of each party’s rightful jurisdiction, and the ultimate arbiter of the quarrels that arose between them. If the spectre of disorder that might arise from the ongoing dispute between two legitimate agents of crown authority concerned the central government it all, it clearly did not concern it enough to alter the course they had chosen for the government of the fort.

Plymouth Fort and the County of Devon

In addition to supporting Gorges’ authority against the complaints of the townsmen, the queen and the privy council also granted Gorges’ request for greater authority with respect to the military preparedness of the local area more generally. In September 1596, the crown appointed Gorges a deputy lieutenant of Devon.69 About a year and a half later, the queen made Gorges the general colonel of the county militia forces, with responsibility to attend all the musters and “view the state of the whole forces of that country.”70 The erection of Plymouth Fort and the appointment of Gorges as its captain thus held consequences for the wider county

69 APC, Vol. XXVI, 189.
70 APC, Vol. XXVIII, 303-306.
community in addition to the townsmen of Plymouth. To be sure, the issues that the fort raised for the county were different than those it raised for Plymouth. Those who enjoyed authority over Devon’s military affairs were less concerned about who was selected to be the fort’s captain. Although the county leadership apparently had someone in mind for the post, they did not expend the same effort as the Plymouth aldermen to convince the crown that they ought to be able to choose the captain. Nor did the county leadership seem particularly upset that the crown eventually did select the captain, and that their man did not get the post.71 Perhaps the crown was correct in its assessment of county town relations: the “continual jarrings” between town and county over matters like “liberties” and “tallages” did often set the two at odds, and so the county thought that if the captain was not their man, at least he was not the town’s man. But more likely is the fact that, in changing the arrangement between town and crown regarding the government of the new fort and St. Nicholas Island, the crown effectively demoted the town of Plymouth. The county leadership, having never been involved with the government of Plymouth’s pre-existing fortification on St. Nicholas Island, had no reason to feel cheated. What was problematic for the county community was the absorption of a new node of authority into existing structures of command, and the additional financial burdens incurred from the costs of construction. In short, the new fort and garrison at Plymouth

71 Preston, Gorges of Plymouth Fort, 59. The choice of the county men was one Carew Reynell.
touched the county authorities in two particularly sensitive areas: their pocketbooks and their reputations.

The townsmen, despite their complaints, were not the only ones on whom the onus of payment rested. Since the fort extended “to the common safety and benefit of the whole country,” all the beneficiaries of its protection shared in the cost. The crown placed an impost on every hogshead of pilchards exported, and collected it at every port that exported that commodity. The pilchard tax remained in effect for as long as it took to complete the fortifications. The queen contributed £100 a year out of the customs of Devon and Cornwall, and half of the forfeitures due for the export of “prohibited wares.” Finally, subjects of means in Devon and Cornwall were to exhibit their care for the safety their locality with a monetary contribution toward the new fort.  

Despite that fact that Devon and Cornwall potentially faced the brunt of any foreign invasion, Elizabeth I still found it difficult to separate her subjects from their money. The impost on pilchards proved an unsteady and sometimes unpopular source of revenue. Some port officers simply did not bother to collect the impost. By the summer of 1593, progress on the fort was “greatly hindered and slackt” because the custom on pilchards was only being collected at Plymouth. Merchants learned to avoid Plymouth and take their wares to other ports where they might bypass the pilchard impost. The council admonished port officers to be more diligent in their  

---

72 TNA, SP12/242/31.
duties.\textsuperscript{73} Be that as it was, however, it seems collection was regular enough to be considered burdensome. In 1596, the council heard that fishermen in Penzance, Fayd, and other ports in Devon and Cornwall complained that the impost on pilchards was “so grievous and burdensome” that the fishermen would either have to give up their trade or face impoverishment. Thus, the council asked the lieutenants and deputy lieutenants of Devon and Cornwall to consider how the fort might be finished without the pilchard impost.\textsuperscript{74}

The crown had no better success at extracting contributions from the local gentry. In the summer of 1593, the council again admonished the “[j]ustices of the peace, gentlemen and others” of Devon for their recalcitrance in procuring contributions to the fort. While the Earl of Bath keenly contributed £100, no one else contributed anything. Considering the benefit the fort accorded the Devon gentry, the council hoped the justices “shall not need any more to be moved” to elicit contributions.\textsuperscript{75} The council hoped in vain. The next summer, the council sent out another call for contributions. This time they instructed the Earl of Bath to determine “some reasonable contribution to be had of such persons as be of ability,”

\textsuperscript{73} APC, Vol. XXIV, 478. The council’s admonitions may have produced results, but only for a limited time. A 1595 account of the money gathered and spent on Plymouth Fort records that the pilchard impost yielded £217 in 1593 and £365 10d. 6s. in 1594, both years improving on the £148 9d. 0s. netted in 1592. By 1595, however, the impost money was back down to 1592 levels, falling that year to £146 5d. 0s. TNA, SP12/255/23.

\textsuperscript{74} Devon Record Office 1392M/L1596/28.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., Vol. XXIV, 477-478. The council also sent a similarly worded letter to the justices and officers of Cornwall.
and to keep a book in which to record the names of those who contributed and of those who, “upon reasonable demand,” refused to give. The council requested the Earl of Bath to forward this record to them, so that they might see who had “natural care of their country, and who the contrary.”

Despite the council’s threat to have Bath name names, contributions remained thin on the ground. Thomas Gorges’ August 1595 letter to Burghley lamented the parsimony of the “chiefest gentlemen” of Devon and Cornwall. Such men gave “so unwillingly” towards the project that, if Gorges had not solicited their contributions in person, he thought what they had given would have been “much less.” Gorges was pessimistic, moreover, about further contributions. While the deputy lieutenants of both counties continued to call upon local gentlemen, he feared whatever they might collect would “not be much.” At the end of May 1592, only very shortly after the work had begun at Plymouth, Robert Adams wrote Burghley with both good news and bad news: the works were going well, so well that they necessitated a “larger contribution.” Adams did not know from whence new funds might come: the town, he said, was eager but had “small means.” The engineer had even less hope, however, “of the cold charity of [Plymouth’s]…fellow feeling neighbours.” Adams’ comment suggests that although local men generally supported the project, they remained reluctant to pay. Even in maritime counties, then, where danger was most persistent,

76 TNA, SP12/249/57.
77 TNA, SP12/253/78.
78 TNA, SP12/245/20.
and despite regular reminders from the crown that the new fort tended “to the
defence and preservation of the whole country,” the local gentry were loath to
contribute out of their own pockets.  

In addition to money, the inhabitants of Devon also provided men and
resources. This too caused some consternation in the county, especially among the
members of Devon’s military establishment: the deputy lieutenants and others who
oversaw local defence and commanded the county militia bands. Like other major
fortifications, Plymouth received assistance in times of emergency from the local
militia forces, which is what occurred in the summer and autumn of 1596. While
the lord lieutenant of Devon, the Earl of Bath, perceived the potential negative effects
of the situation on the local populace, the situation ruffled the most feathers amongst
the county gentry who commanded the bands sent to Plymouth. As we know,

---

79 APC, Vol. XXIII, 351-352. This reminder to the deputy lieutenants of Devon was
just one of many that the council issued in December 1592. They also wrote to the
mayor and customers of Plymouth, reminding them how “the fortification doth
especially tend to the good and benefit of the inhabitants of the…town.” The council
also wrote to the lord mayor of London that “many wealthy merchants in the City of
London are interested in the matter of their trade to Plymouth.”

80 APC, Vol. XXV, 442.

81 As early as August 1596, Bath wondered if it was necessary to continue sending
men by fifties to Plymouth during harvest time. He thought perhaps they might only
be sent if Gorges thought the chances of the enemy practising any “annoyance”
particularly high. In a postscript to this letter, Bath instructs its recipient, Edward
Seymour, to seek a quick discharge of the men if he finds that “the country do mislike
and murmur at this their repair to Plymouth by fifties.” Devon Record Office
1392M/L1596/6. As summer gave way to autumn, Bath once again expressed to
Seymour how he wished that “the repair of the forces to…Plymouth” should be “so
ordered as thereby no discontent should grow to the people.” Devon Record Office
Ferdinando Gorges held a low opinion of local attitudes towards defence: “whatever the one will make the other will attempt to mar” and all ignorant of what to do.\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, the provision of men for the fort exacerbated this infighting amongst the local militia colonels because it touched on something that these men felt particularly tetchy about: the relative number of men under each man’s command.

In 1592, the privy council, Bath and the rest of the colonels sorted out a controversy between Sir John Gilbert and George Carey about the allotment of soldiers in each man’s respective band.\textsuperscript{83} The provision of local men for Plymouth Fort set off a similar disagreement between Devon militia colonels Edward Seymour and Richard Champernown. In September 1596, the privy council summarized for the Earl of Bath the requests made to them by Richard Champernown. Champernown wanted “a complete regiment granted unto him in like manner as Mr. Seymour and Mr. Carey” and he wanted it “to be supplied and raised by allowing and assigning unto him some convenient portion out of Mr. Seymour’s division and charge.” The fact that 250 of his men were “appointed and upon any occasion to be drawn away for defence of Plymouth” was among the reasons why Champernown

\textsuperscript{82} TNA, SP12/257/19.
\textsuperscript{83} APC, Vol. XXIII, 271.
felt entitled to compensation. 84 Indeed, by this time Richard Champernown had already sent men to Plymouth. In July 1596 Edward Seymour wrote to Ferdinando Gorges about the fifty men, poorly trained and armed, that Seymour had heard Champernown had sent him. Seymour’s displeasure with Champernown is evident when he tells Gorges to send him “the names of such men, as he shall send unto you, how they are armed, and out of what hundred they are, and I doubt not but you shall have a company to your content.” 85

The council refused to decide the dispute between Champernown and Seymour, and instead referred it back to Bath to resolve. By December 1596, Bath thought the matter settled: sometime between September and November the deputy lieutenants and militia colonels came to an agreement. Bath informed the privy council of the happy result. So when Seymour informed him that Champernown was not pleased with the results of the “composition lately made,” Bath was livid. He told Seymour that while he might tolerate disagreement between his friends, he would not be shown up before the privy council: “it shall be well known to him or any man else that I will rather hazard my friend than lose mine honour.” Bath continued to say that when Champernown informs Bath of his displeasure, Bath will “show him a piece of [his] mind, which shall not be much to [Champernown’s] liking.” 86

84 Ibid., Vol. XVI, 197. Also Devon Record Office 1392M/L1596/10.
85 Devon Record Office 1392M/L1596/5.
86 Devon Record Office 1392M/L1596/22.
Similar discontents arose when the crown appointed Gorges as colonel general of the county militia. The crown selected three men, Sir Thomas Acton, Arthur Champernown and Sir John St. Leger, to serve under Ferdinando Gorges in the training and mustering of the county forces. We do not know what Acton and St. Leger thought about the arrangement, but Arthur Champernown was not pleased. This was perhaps not surprising, given that Arthur Champernown had been overlooked for the captaincy of Plymouth Fort: Champernown had been Plymouth’s choice “to be under us commander” of Plymouth Fort. But it was the crown’s plan to have him command and train 150 men under Sir Ferdinando Gorges that truly upset Champernown, and he made his displeasure known to the privy council. He argued that he was Gorges’ senior in arms, that he had held higher rank in the field, and that he was Gorges’ equal, if not better, in experience, skill and martial judgement. To be placed under Gorges’ command, Champernown argued, meant disgrace “in my own country and in the opinion of all men of war who know us both.” Champernown saw his new position as a demotion, a position not fitting his experience and skill. Such a position affronted Champernown’s honour: his sense of himself and his authority derived from the opinion of others in the martial community. Again, the privy council tried to mollify Champernown, but did not accede to his wishes. The privy councillors told the Earl of Bath that their “meaning

87 APC, Vol. XXVIII, 303-306.
88 Plymouth and West Devon Record Office 1/360/10.
89 HHA, CP 51/31.
was not to appoint him at this time a simple trainer, nor to derogate anything from
his due deserts.” But they meant to see Champernown perform his appointed duty:
“having already the title of a sergeant major we think him worthy of that place and
office,” and Bath must “hold and accompt” Champernown to that office.90 The Earl of
Bath, concerned as he was about his own standing in the opinion of the privy council,
might surely be relied upon to see this aim enforced.91

The “fiscal-military” state was the branch of the English state that, according
to some, experienced the least growth in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. In most parts of England, it is noted, directives from the centre of English
politics meant to bolster the country’s defences fell on deaf ears. Unlike the spectre of
disorder raised by such ever present menaces as poverty, vagrancy, and immorality,
the threat of foreign invasion was, if present in local minds at all, only present now
and again. Defence remained low on the list of local priorities and thus was unlikely
to elicit local action or open local purses. The one possible exception to this rule were
the maritime counties. They stood to bear the brunt of any invading enemy and,
even when England was not formally at war, were vulnerable to raid by pirates and

91 And so, it seems, Bath did. A September 1598 letter from Bath to his deputy
lieutenants instructed them to “collect so many particulars of [Arthur
Champernown’s] latest abuses” because the privy council had sent for Champernown
to answer in person for his “respectless and undutiful behaviour.” Devon Record
Office 1392M/L1596/6.
marauders. Devon and Cornwall were maritime counties and during England’s long standoff with Spain, they experienced numerous invasion scares. But even in Devon and Cornwall, it remained difficult for the queen to get her subjects to contribute monetarily to better defence. And the Earl of Bath’s sensitivity to any hint of discontent about the repair of militia soldiers to Plymouth Fort reveals that, even in areas that faced the most immediate threat from foreign invasion, the threat of domestic disorder was more immediate still. The relationship between the county of Devon and Plymouth Fort does, therefore, provide another illustration of the limited power of those at the centre of the English state to impose wholesale their directives on those on the periphery. The central government had trouble building a new, state of the art fortification and finding men to put in it.

At the same time, the central government seemed quite adept and successful at distributing martial authority in the specific ways it desired. Like the Plymouth townsmen, Arthur Champernown laid claim to an authority that was, ultimately, in the crown’s purview to accede to or deny. Again, like the claims of the Plymouth townsmen, the crown denied Champernown’s claim. In Champernown’s opinion, this decision damaged his honour and reputation. Considering the importance of honour to early modern people, this was something of a risky strategy for the central authorities: one does not want to antagonize those on whom one must rely in order to govern. Fortunately for the central authorities, honour was not a unitary concept, a

---

single code of conduct. Champernown’s sense of honour consisted largely, although not exclusively, of his reputation within the martial community. A major part of the Earl of Bath’s, it seems, consisted of his reputation with the privy council. The Earl of Bath’s statement that he would rather lose his friends than his honour is a reminder that the ties of honour operated both horizontally, to regulate behaviour amongst one’s peers, and vertically, to reinforce the ties of hierarchy and deference. And at the pinnacle of this hierarchy sat the crown.

*Plymouth Fort in Peacetime*

Shortly after James VI/I’s ascension to the English throne, the new king reinstated Sir Ferdinando Gorges to the captaincy of Plymouth Fort. Not long after that, in the summer of 1604, another incident occurred between the townsmen and Gorges. One William Parker, a member of the Plymouth town council, endeavoured to set discord between the mayor and Sir Ferdinando Gorges by misinforming Gorges about speeches that the mayor had delivered to the town council in a private conference. The Plymouth council dismissed Parker, and the mayor of Plymouth wrote to Cecil, explaining how the affronts that Gorges had recently offered the


95 Kane, *Politics and Culture of Honour*, 15.
mayor were attributable to Parker’s actions, and that Parker had been duly
punished.  

This incident between Gorges, the mayor and William Parker represents
the last of the great clashes between the townsmen of Plymouth and the captain of
the fort. Indeed, the early seventeenth century was a time of relatively peaceful
coexistence between the captain of the fort and the town of Plymouth, a fact that
stands in stark contrast to the fractious 1590s. Perhaps, after the reinstatement of
Gorges as captain, the townsmen resigned themselves to the fact that they were not
going to attain the government of the fort. That fight had been effectively lost. But
there nonetheless remained two jurisdictions, two nodes of legitimate authority and
thus, as in all garrison towns, the potential for continued jurisdictional conflict.

After 1604, however, circumstances changed. Formal peace with Spain,
ensured by the Treaty of London, eased the threat of foreign invasion. Gorges still
believed that the best way to preserve peace was to prepare for war, and that formal
peace provided a false sense of security. He wrote disapprovingly to Robert Cecil,
now Earl of Salisbury, and the privy council on numerous occasions regarding the
state of England’s defences. Yet, however much Gorges thought England was

96 HHA, CP 105/151.

97 In 1607, Gorges wrote to the privy council that, “those occasions of alarums being
ceased,” local people’s minds were “wholly turned to self love of private commodity,
and a senseless security of perpetual peace.” HHA, CP120/153. And it was no longer
just the local populace that was unprepared for war. Again, in 1607, Gorges wrote
Robert Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, with his view of current affairs in Europe.
Gorges gave this opinion, “to the end his majesty might examine the estate of his
forces.” After all, Gorges argued, “the only means to continue a peace inviolable is
militarily unprepared, the sense of imminent danger had disappeared. And in the meantime, Gorges’ martial interests increasingly shared time with his colonial ones. In the first few years of the seventeenth century, Ferdinando Gorges became fervently involved in the New England colonial endeavours that would define the second half of his life. These interests led Gorges to spend more time at his home in London, rather than at the fort, where he had often acted as a link between Plymouth merchants and the court. Gorges’ colonial interests, therefore, proved both a distraction from his commitments at the fort and a common interest between himself and at least some of the Plymouth townsmen. Peace and common interests likely gave Gorges and the Plymouth townsmen the ability to deal with whatever disputes may have arisen, without recourse to the central government.

Gorges resigned the captaincy of Plymouth Fort in 1629. His replacement as commander of the fort was James Bagg, who was from Plymouth. Bagg’s tenure was likewise devoid of the controversies of the 1590s. If the latter part, indeed the greater part, of Gorges’ tenure at Plymouth had been as tumultuous as the earlier part, then it

always to be sufficiently provided both to defend and offend.” To that end, Gorges explained, Salisbury should know the woefully inadequate state of Plymouth Fort: that it was never finished; that what was finished is now in disrepair; that the fort was never properly furnished with ordnance; and that what ammunition he did have was largely spent. HHA, CP120/154. In 1608, he again reminded Salisbury of the threat still posed by Spain, and that England’s lack of military preparedness had not gone unnoticed by its neighbours. TNA, SP14/32/33.

98 Preston, *Gorges of Plymouth Fort*, 127. Preston states that Gorges’ primary residence was mainly Plymouth until about 1619 or 1620, after which he spent increasing amounts of time in London.
might be easy to attribute the quietness of Bagg’s tenure to the fact that the town had finally achieved what it had desired: a Plymouth man in charge of the fort. On the other hand, the crown did not abdicate the authority to name the captain of the fort and Bagg achieved that office in much the same way as Gorges. As Gorges had been a client of the Earl of Essex, an influential figure at the centre of English government, so Bagg was a client of the Duke of Buckingham and likewise benefitted from that relationship. To be sure, the creation of Plymouth Fort and with it the separate jurisdiction that the captain of the fort enjoyed were not entirely what the town of Plymouth had sought when it first had solicited the crown for a contribution to the better defence of Plymouth. When the first captain arrived, therefore, the townsmen were perhaps less likely to be amenable to his actions and demands. Of course, Gorges did not make it easy. His sense of his own authority led him into conflict with the townsmen. The relative quietness of relations between the captain and the town in the early seventeenth century reveals that it was not only the fact of dual jurisdictions that brought conflict, but the ideas brought to bear on them by those who occupied those offices. The town of Plymouth and Ferdinando Gorges were able to live amenably once the town had resigned itself to his presence, which clearly

the crown was intent on maintaining, and once peace and common interests tempered Gorges’ sense of his own authority.¹⁰⁰

**Conclusion**

The story of Plymouth fort and its first captain reveals how successful the central authorities might be in seeing authority within the state distributed as it saw fit. Though the queen and her privy council found it difficult to pay for the new fortification, they nonetheless successfully installed the captain of their choice, maintained him in his authority despite the vocal objections of a local populace and, when they so chose, placed him in a position of authority within the county militia. These actions certainly upset some of those, like the Plymouth townsmen and Arthur Champernown, on whom the central government relied to govern the state successfully. But these were not the only men on whom the central government relied. The queen, and by extension her privy council, worked within the confines of the early modern state to achieve their goals. They possessed, as Norman Jones argues, the power that derives from “deference to hierarchy, greed, and fear of disgrace and

¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the town seems not to have solicited the crown for the naming of the captain after the Gorges’ resignation, and they did when the crown removed Gorges for his involvement in the Essex revolt.
dishonour.”101 The Earl of Bath’s assertion that he would rather risk his friends than his honour was an articulation of this very power.

The central government was a direct participant in the negotiations over the new fort at Plymouth. In these negotiations, it sought particular results: the placement of the command of the fort in the hands of a captain appointed by the queen. We shall leave, for the moment, the central government’s reasons for seeking such results. What is important to note here is that the central government took intentional, goal oriented action with regard to the government of Plymouth Fort, and successfully achieved those goals. The net result was more than an intensification of the state or a thickening of government: the result was a palpable alteration to part of the structure of the state.102 The new arrangements for the government of Plymouth Fort took an authority that had once been largely in local hands and placed it more firmly in those of the central government. Once the central government


102 In his study of the intensification of the Tudor state in the west country, J.P.D. Cooper asserts that the fact that “the Tudors survived, and indeed, flourished, owed more to their relationship with the gentry than to any major innovation in the formal structures of the state.” While it is true that the new arrangements for the government of Plymouth Fort and St. Nicholas Island were perhaps not major innovations to the structures of the state, it is important to note that the central government’s ability to manipulate the operation of authority within the state did sometimes result in significant alterations to the structures of that state. J.P.D Cooper, Propaganda and the Tudor State: Political Culture in the West Country (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 1-11 and 87.
succeeded in this, it reverted back to the role that we will see it perform regularly throughout this study: adjudicating jurisdictional disputes between two legitimate nodes of authority or empowering delegated agents to do so.
CHAPTER FOUR: TOWN AND GARRISON IN PORTSMOUTH

In 1565 William Paulet, Marquis of Winchester, lord treasurer of England and, for a brief period in 1545, governor of Portsmouth, rendered his decision in a dispute between the mayor and burgesses of Portsmouth and the captain of the fortification there, Sir Adrian Poynings. After inquiring into the dispute and considering the evidence presented by both sides, Winchester determined that, since time out of mind, Portsmouth had enjoyed “all like liberties and free customs as the citizens of Winchester or Oxford without any let or interruption of any other person until the late erection of the said fortifications.”¹ In making this statement, the Lord Treasurer acknowledged that the development of Portsmouth’s fortifications in the early sixteenth century, and with it the establishment of a garrison to man those fortifications, had altered the accustomed manner of life and government in the town. The inhabitants of Portsmouth accommodated another node of crown commissioned authority, which in time of invasion was to be the ultimate authority in the town, surpassing even that of the mayor and burgesses. The captain possessed authority over soldiers and gunners who enjoyed certain privileges and exemptions that townspeople did not. Such a condition was permanent so long as the central government maintained a garrison in Portsmouth.

Since the crown did just that throughout the Elizabethan, Jacobean and Caroline years, the aims and intentions of the central government once again formed the overarching framework for the negotiations regarding the respective spheres of authority of the garrison captain and the mayor. Within that framework, much as we have observed in Plymouth, the perceptions and interests of the individual disputants shaped the nature and extent of jurisdictional conflict. Such perceptions and interests provided the basis for both cooperation and conflict between town and garrison government. But the story of the Portsmouth garrison also reveals that conflict between town and garrison was not isolated to disputes between the men who governed. Conflict also arose over the degree to which garrison soldiers might participate in the civilian life of the town. While it is clear that garrison soldiers and townspeople did not live isolated lives, garrison soldiers might not become Portsmouth townsmen without relinquishing their place in the garrison and vice versa. Garrison soldiers and Portsmouth townspeople remained jurisdictionally differentiated from one another.

Captains and Mayors

Portsmouth possessed soldiers and gunners to man its fortifications from the Henrician period onward. By the early sixteenth century, Portsmouth was already an important port for the navy and possessed England’s only dry dock. Portsmouth’s

---

2 For more on the size of Portsmouth garrison, see Appendix A.
situation at the eastern edge of the Solent and across from the Isle of Wight rendered it strategically important for the protection of the eastern approaches to the Southampton Water, as the following map indicates.

Sometime in the 1560s Henry Bickley, erstwhile mayor and alderman of Portsmouth, drew up his will. The first paragraph of that will read: “I, Henry Bickley…thanks be to God, in good and perfect memory, notwithstanding in fear of my life from Sir Adrian Poynings, captain of Portsmouth, and his servants, do now make my last will and testament.”

The captaincy of Adrian Poynings was not a happy time for the townspeople of Portsmouth, as the will attests. In 1564, the town lodged a formal, written complaint with the lord treasurer about Poynings’ behaviour towards the town. The central government’s investigation into the complaints made by the mayor and burgesses of Portsmouth resulted in an articulation of the physical

---

3 East, Supplement, 79.
boundaries of the authority of the mayor and of the captain. A half a century later Thomas Monday, a former burgess of Portsmouth, took a place in the garrison. When the rest of the Portsmouth burgesses told Monday that he now lived under the government of the garrison captain and not of the mayor of the town, they articulated a reality of life in Portsmouth: soldiers and townspeople shared the same physical space, but were subject to separate governing authorities.

The queen appointed Sir Adrian Poynings captain of Portsmouth in 1559 or 1560. Despite briefly leaving the post to serve in Normandy, Poynings clearly resided in Portsmouth long enough to raise the ire of the town authorities. In their 1564 complaint, the townsmen accused Poynings of interference with the town’s customary practices, of physical abuse of town officers, and of inhibiting those officers from enforcing “the laws of the realm.” The townsmen offered eleven instances of Poynings’ misconduct. In roughly four of the incidents, Poynings interfered with arrests or punishments meted out by the town authorities. In June 1562, the town authorities detained an armourer called Thomas Boulton, who they held for transfer to the assizes at Winchester. Upon hearing of Boulton’s detention, Poynings demanded the deputy mayor deliver Boulton into his own custody. The deputy mayor refused. In response, Poynings kept the deputy mayor “all that night as his prisoner in [Poynings’] own house, watched and guarded by his servants.”

The ambiguity here stems from conflicting evidence. Adrian Poynings’ entry in the ODNB has him appointed captain in 1560; however, the town’s complaints about his behaviour begin in 1559.
townsmen took offence, and made a point of observing in their complaint that Poynings treated the deputy mayor like a criminal rather than a fellow officer of the queen.\(^5\)

A very similar incident occurred about a year later, on 30 June 1563. That night, Poynings sent about a dozen armed men to interfere with the constable, who was on the hunt for a specific “suspect person,” as well as any other “malefactors...and disordered evil rule keepers” who might be about. Poynings’ servants “did violently lay hands on” this constable and took him to Poynings’ house where the men kept him prisoner all night. In preventing the constable from completing his search, Poynings allowed the suspect to escape and interfered with the enforcement of the queen’s peace. On other occasions, Poynings allowed “malefactors” to escape by even more direct means. In June 1564, Poynings’ servant released one William Moore from the market stocks. In September of that year, Poynings’ servant arrived as the mayor and his deputy committed one William Gofford into custody for refusing to pay certain customs owed to the town. Poynings’ servant “took the prisoner from the sergeant by the arm and thrust him away saying get thee hence I will discharge thee.” When the mayor demanded the return of his prisoner, Poynings’ man “made a flip with his finger” and uttered “many unseemly

\(^5\) “Complaint made by the Mayor and Burgesses of Portsmouth to the Lord Treasurer of England, Respecting the Oppression they had received from Sir Adrian Poynings,” Extracts, 393-394.
and noisome words.” The mayor evidently felt he had no choice here but to let his prisoner go.  

In forcing William Gofford’s release, Poynings engaged in one of his most grievous behaviours: interfering with the customary practices and government of the town. According to the townsmen, ships that regularly used the passage between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight were required to bring “one boat load of rock stones” once a year for the tower near the haven. Similarly, ships using the passage between Portsmouth and Gosport owed 12d. a year for the privilege of using that passage. Poynings forbade ships to pay these dues and obstructed officers who attempted to collect them. The townsmen claimed that Poynings then set about collecting these dues himself. Poynings found other ways to disrupt the town’s incomes. Between 1560 and 1564 Poynings encouraged three men to build houses in town without the town’s consent, and further told them not “to pay the town any rent…nor otherwise to observe the orders of the Town.” The townsmen claimed that these houses kept “victualing” and “regrate[d] and forestall[ed]…the market,” as did one of Poynings’ own servants who kept a victualing and gaming house. When the mayor and brethren called before them all the town’s victuallers to be “bound by…recognizances for the keeping of good rule,” Poynings’ servant refused to be so bound. When the mayor complained about this to Poynings, the captain told the

---

6 Ibid.
mayor he “should not have to do with his [Poynings’] man” nor any “that serve under him.”

Finally, many local officers who attempted to carry out their duties met with threats and violence. Poynings’ servant once drew a weapon on a town officer who was trying to collect the annual ships’ duties. A complaint to Poynings only brought threats of more of the same treatment should they continue to try to collect. Many times Poynings and his servants broke into the town’s pastures and let their horses roam freely. The hayward once impounded these horses, only to have the pound broken open and the horses taken back. On occasion Poynings’ servant actually paid the 4d. impound fine, but when Poynings found out he had the hayward put in the stocks and the money taken away. Poynings apparently told the hayward that if he collected the money again, he “should not escape so.” Perhaps not surprisingly, the town claimed that the hayward would not serve the town in that capacity any longer.

If we take the townsmen at their word, Poynings’ activities seem inexplicably antagonistic. It is of course possible that Poynings was just a horrid individual. It is more likely, however, that his actions stemmed from his understanding of the nature of his authority in Portsmouth. Very early in Poynings’ tenure at Portsmouth, mayor John Trenall read the queen’s proclamation forbidding the consumption of meat on

---

7 Ibid., 394-395.
8 Ibid., 392-398.
fish days. Trenall read the proclamation in the marketplace, as usual. Afterward, Poynings called on the mayor and the other brethren, and “demanded how they durst proclaim in the town” without “making him privy thereof first.” The mayor replied that it was his duty to serve the queen “in that behalf” and he need not inform anyone thereof beforehand. In response, Poynings commanded that no proclamation be read without his prior knowledge, “upon pain of that should follow for his and their so doing.” Poynings’ behaviour puzzled the mayor: no one had ever made such a claim before.9

Certainly, Poynings’ behaviour was incorrigible. At the same time, some of his assertions were perhaps understandable. Poynings was the captain of the fort and garrison and, as such, responsible for the maintenance of Portsmouth’s defences. One might forgive Poynings for believing, therefore, that he ought to be in charge of collecting and disbursing the dues meant for the maintenance of the tower near the mouth of the harbour. Likewise, Poynings was not incorrect when he pointed out to the mayor that men under his command were not subject to the mayor’s authority. But the violence with which Poynings went about asserting his authority and his reaction to the mayor’s reading of the queen’s proclamation suggest that Poynings may have considered his authority to be more extensive than it actually was. As was the case at Plymouth later in the century, the Portsmouth garrison possessed no written document that outlined the relationship between the town authorities and  

9 Ibid., 393.
those of the garrison. In the absence of any specifics, Poynings likely let experience
guide his actions. Sir Adrian Poynings was an old hand at garrisoning. Born in
Ghent in 1512, he had served in Calais and Boulogne. After his captaincy at Boulogne
ended, he served as lieutenant of Calais Castle. His Calais experience is particularly
relevant, because in Calais the commander of the garrison governed both town and
garrison. Poynings was a professional soldier and an experienced garrison
commander who came from a family of soldiers and garrison commanders. Owing
to their similar personal backgrounds, therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that this
dispute between Poynings and the townsmen of Portsmouth should bear a similarity
to that between Sir Ferdinando Gorges and the townsmen of Plymouth almost thirty
years later. Gorges’ and Poynings’ military experience, and through it their
membership in the martial community, likely comprised a significant part of the
mental filter through which they perceived their authority as captains of garrisons, as
well as their perceptions of others’ authority in relation to their own.

-------------------
10 It must be remembered, however, that the presence of more formal, written
regulations did not preclude jurisdictional conflict, as we shall see at Berwick-upon-
Tweed.
11 This was particularly true after 1536, when an act of parliament established the
Calais council under the oversight of the lieutenant – often styled governor – of Calais.
Susan Rose, Calais: An English Town in France 1347-1558 (Woodbridge: Boydell &
Brewer, 2008), 127. Arguably, however, this was simply the culmination of an
ongoing process in the government of Calais. As David Grummitt asserts: “the crown
handed over responsibility for the government and defence of Calais” to the
lieutenant over the course of the fifteenth century. Grummitt, The Calais Garrison,
63.
12 Stevens, “Adrian Poynings,” ODNB.
But Portsmouth was not Calais. In 1565, the lord treasurer found that the mayor of Portsmouth enjoyed full authority, without “let or hindrance” from the garrison captain, in matters pertaining to the government of the town and to the collection of its traditional customs. After considering the various privileges granted and confirmed by the queen and her progenitors, it was clear to the treasurer that Portsmouth had enjoyed certain “liberties and free customs” and that the inhabitants of Portsmouth should continue to enjoy all manner of “privileges, customs, jurisdictions, liberties or pre-eminences” granted by those documents. More specifically, the jurisdiction of the mayor of Portsmouth extended over all of the ground and buildings found by a recent commission to be within the bounds of the town. The treasurer also found the townspeople to be rightly entitled to “all such benefits, profits and emoluments as well by land as by waters as they or their predecessors have used to have and enjoy before the making of the said fortifications.”

Moreover, the captain was not to interfere with these “liberties and jurisdictions” that were to “remain and continue so far as heretofore they have been most commonly used.”

But the treasurer acknowledged that the captain of the garrison possessed a jurisdiction as well. The captain’s authority extended over “all the precincts, limits and bounds of all the queen’s highness’ fortifications, bulwarks, fortresses, God’s house and the lands belonging unto the same and not further.” He required that the

---

Townspersons make certain allowances for the fortifications and the men who defended and maintained them. The townspeople were to permit the captain and those serving him “free egress and regress over and through any of the wastes or void grounds” of the town, without let or interruption, so that the fortifications might be properly surveyed and maintained. The treasurer also provided that the queen might take any portion of this void ground for necessary fortification or defence.\textsuperscript{14} The captain’s authority superseded that of the mayor’s in times of invasion. The lord treasurer observed:

that the same mayor and burgesses and the [residents] of the said town at all times of invasion or landing of any manner of foreign enemies in or about the said town of Portsmouth or liberties of the same shall be under the rule, order, conduct, government and direction of the now captain there, his deputy, or successors and their deputies within the said town, and the liberties thereof so long and until contrary orders shall be given by the queen’s majesty her heirs or successors.\textsuperscript{15}

In Lord Treasurer Winchester’s view, Poynings had overstepped his authority. But the office that Poynings occupied nonetheless carried with it a specific jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction remained a fact of life in Portsmouth for the foreseeable future. The changes wrought by the crown’s erection of fortifications there were permanent. The civic governors and inhabitants of Portsmouth were going to have to live with the presence of a garrison captain whose authority extended over the whole of the fortifications, and who held supreme authority in

\textsuperscript{14} The treasurer did stipulate, however, that the queen would pay some reasonable rent for this land, should she need to use it.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 405.
times of invasion. We do not know what the townspeople of Portsmouth hoped to achieve in lodging their complaint against Poynings. If the town desired Poynings’ dismissal, or the complete subservience of the captain’s authority to that of the mayor, then they achieved neither. As it did in the face of all such complaints, the central government kept the offending captain in his post. Sir Adrian Poynings was captain of Portsmouth until his death.

Poynings’ successor as captain of Portsmouth was Sir Henry Radcliffe, later Earl of Sussex. Sussex’s tenure as captain of Portsmouth also saw jurisdictional wrangling between the mayor of Portsmouth and the captain. In 1589 the privy council took evidence from witnesses in a dispute between John Jennens, the mayor, and the Earl of Sussex. The witnesses gave evidence about three incidents. The first was a dispute between the mayor and a soldier about the soldier’s purchase of butter in the market. The mayor told the soldier, who had purchased a pound of butter, that soldiers should not have butter before the town was served. The mayor then allegedly attempted to take the butter from the soldier by force. At this point, the soldier put on his hat and told the mayor to stand back.\footnote{It is unclear whether the soldier put on his hat as an insult to the mayor, or so that he might have both hands free to protect his butter from the mayor’s grasp. Those who seem to testify in favour of the soldiers’ version indicate that he did so in order to better protect his butter.} The mayor, now angry that the soldier stood before him wearing his hat, told him he would take his hat and
throw it in the “channel.” He also told the soldier he would take him to the “Whitehouse.” In the end, the mayor undertook neither of these actions.

The other two occasions concerned the watch. On one occasion, the watchmen stopped the mayor and some others who were about town, on matters concerning a “marriage,” at about eleven or twelve at night. The watchmen stopped the men and enquired as to the business that kept them out so late. At this point the mayor apparently grew irate, calling the watchmen “knaves.” One witness also testified that he told the watchmen that “my Lord of Sussex had nothing to do in the town.” On another occasioned, the mayor appointed a watch at each of the town’s gates. Sussex’s lieutenant sent the mayor’s watchmen away. The men went back to the mayor’s house where they mayor told them “to go back again to their places” and to not come back again “until they were beaten away.” A number of men testified that on both occasions, and in the incident concerning the market, the mayor claimed that he was the queen’s lieutenant in Portsmouth and that he was a better man than the soldiers or Sussex’s lieutenant. One Richard Popinjay testified that the mayor told him that the Earl of Sussex had nothing to do with anything within the town, but only with the “towers and fortifications.”

---

18 HHA, CP210/15, no.18.
19 HHA, CP210/15, no. 21.
20 HHA, CP210/15, no. 24.
As far as one can tell, the mayor denied many of the utterances he was alleged to have made.\textsuperscript{21} He denied that he had ever asserted the he was the queen’s lieutenant and that he had ever claimed to be superior to the soldiers or the Earl’s lieutenant. He defended his actions in the marketplace, stating that many townswomen had complained to him that the soldiers purchased all the butter at the market and left none for the townspeople. He also asserted he had received authority to set up the watch from “the justices,” and that this warranted his posting watchmen at the town gates.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, another witness testified that the mayor told Richard Popinjay that “that captain should not have anything to do with the townspeople nor the mayor with those which were under the captain.”\textsuperscript{23} This assertion acknowledged, perhaps in the face of suspicions that he believed otherwise, that the soldiers fell under the authority of the garrison captain. It is not known whether the mayor explicitly claimed the authority to punish soldiers who interfered with the town’s business, but the actions of members of the garrison reveal they certainly believed that he had done so. Two watchmen who had witnessed the incident in the market testified that they overheard the mayor ask one Richard Whiting if he had punished the soldier with whom the mayor had had his altercation. Whiting replied that he had examined the soldier, and found no cause for

\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately, the mayor’s own evidence, and that of others who appear to corroborate his view, are quite damaged and in parts wholly illegible.
\textsuperscript{22} HHA, CP210/15, nos.1-5.
\textsuperscript{23} HHA, CP210/15, no. 9.
punishment. If, however, the mayor thought Whiting in the wrong he might
complain to Sussex’s lieutenant, who would see both the soldier and Whiting
punished for their mistake. 24

It is unclear from this evidence what the Earl of Sussex’s attitude was toward
these disputes between his soldiers, his lieutenant and the mayor. It would appear
that whatever the Earl did, if anything, in the wake of these complaints did not please
the townsmen. In December 1593, Sir George Carew wrote to Robert Cecil
expressing his approval of the queen’s selection of Sir Charles Blount, later Lord
Mountjoy, as Sussex’s successor. Mountjoy, he said, possessed a better disposition
toward the garrison and town than had the Earl. The town now hoped to prosper, a
development previously impossible owing to the mutual dislike between the town
and the Earl. 25 Carew was correct about Mountjoy: the townsmen liked him better
than Sussex, and they rewarded him for his pleasant disposition. When the
townsmen gave Mountjoy the lease of a void piece of land in the town, they did so “in
consideration of his great love and favour showed towards the said mayor and
burgesses.” 26 When Mountjoy died in April 1606, the mayor and burgesses wrote to

24 HHA, CP210/15, no. 19.
25 Sir George Carew to Robert Cecil, 21 December 1593. Calendar of the Manuscripts
26 Ibid., 208.
the Earl of Salisbury expressing their grief at the passing of their good lord and high steward.\(^{27}\)

Mountjoy’s good deeds towards the town included assisting Portsmouth in securing letters patent of incorporation in 1600. Portsmouth already enjoyed many of the privileges of an incorporated town, although it did not possess the independent commission of the peace and the status of a corporate body before the law that incorporation conferred.\(^{28}\) According to Peter Clark and Paul Slack, charters of incorporation were “treaties of alliance” between the crown and the small, urban elite that had developed in sixteenth-century towns. Civic incorporation represented the mutual satisfaction of both parties’ interests: the urban elites achieved the consolidation of their power, and the crown received the stable government and good order that it sought.\(^{29}\) Civic incorporation then, like most embodiments of the early modern state, was the result of negotiation.

\(^{27}\) HHA, CP115/163. The mayor and corporation of Portsmouth to the Earl of Salisbury, 12 January 1610.

\(^{28}\) G.H. Martin, “The Charters and their Significance,” in *Portsmouth: Royal Charters, 1194-1974*, ed. G.H. Martin (Portsmouth: City of Portsmouth, 1995), XX. Portsmouth received its first Charter of Liberties in May 1194. Subsequent Charters of Liberties were granted by John in 1200, Henry III in 1229 and again by Henry III in 1256. Subsequent monarchs issued confirmations of these charters, including all the Tudor monarchs up to and including Elizabeth I.

\(^{29}\) Peter Clark and Paul Slack, *English Town in Transition 1500-1700* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 128. Robert Tittler sees the matter in a similar light, although he emphasizes the key role played by the reformation. One of the major effects of the reformation begun by Henry VIII and continued by his son was a desire, on the part of England’s towns, to obtain or retain former ecclesiastical property. This resulted in an extensive exploration of a town’s legal positions and privileges.
From the preamble to the charter itself we learn what the crown gained from granting Portsmouth incorporation. Incorporation provided clarity: the many “disputes, questions and ambiguities” that periodically arose over the validity and force of the various liberties granted to Portsmouth by the queen’s predecessors led to “many and serious inconveniences” for both the townspeople and other “faithful subjects.” Incorporation provided clearer and more stable government in Portsmouth, which in turn served the safety of the town specifically and the state more generally. Portsmouth was the foremost port town of the county of Southampton and faced the open sea. Owing to Portsmouth’s specific geographic situation, the crown thought it “more necessary” to consider the town’s “strength and security.” Incorporation settled Portsmouth in a more “certain and undoubted means” of keeping “good rule and governance.” Moreover, granting Portsmouth residents the ability more fully to “enjoy their liberties and privileges” induced the townspeople to “more strongly feel themselves bound to undertake and perform service.”

However much incorporation aided defence, however, the queen still had no intention of disbanding the garrison or diminishing the authority of the captain.

Like Clark and Slack, Tittler argues that the clarification and elaboration of town privileges were not only beneficial to the town. The impetus for incorporation came from both above and below: from towns that wished a more secure legal footing in the post-reformation property game, and from a “Tudor monarchy which was increasingly paternalistic, centralized, and authoritarian.” Robert Tittler, *Townpeople and Nation: English Urban Experience, 1540-1640* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 27.

The letters patent of incorporation stated that:

> the power of the said Lord Mountjoy, now our captain of Portsmouth aforesaid, or of our lieutenant there, or of the captain or lieutenant of any of our aforesaid successors...in the exercise, use or occupation of any privileges, liberties, immunities or other matters whatsoever granted heretofore to any captain or lieutenant of our said borough of Portsmouth, or by any captain or lieutenant of our same borough of Portsmouth heretofore used, had or obtained, should suffer no damage, prejudice, derogation nor harm by pretext of these our letters patent, nor anything in them contained, nor should it any wise be occasioned.\(^{31}\)

The charter of incorporation also suggests that the presence of a garrison in Portsmouth was not incidental to the town’s achievement of incorporation. The text of the charter specifically cites “the humble petition of Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy…our captain or lieutenant within our…borough of Portsmouth” as influential in the decision to confer incorporation.\(^{32}\) It is entirely possible that Mountjoy, as captain of the garrison, was able to pitch incorporation in such a way that it spoke well to the crown’s defensive priorities. It surely also helped that Mountjoy possessed influence at the political centre: a capable courtier and a sometime favourite of the queen, Mountjoy was generally well connected in court

---

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 29. The townspeople of Portsmouth had themselves linked the incorporation of Portsmouth to the better safety of the realm in a manner similar to that articulated in the letters patent of Incorporation. An undated petition from the corporation of Portsmouth to the lord high admiral requested that he solicit the queen to grant Portsmouth “larger liberties.” Such a grant would encourage “the better peopling” of the town that, in turn, would contribute to better defence. In fact, Portsmouth would in short time be “so well peopled to the good defence and safety of” the town that the queen might be “unburdened of her great continual charges” in that regard. “Petition from the Corporation of Portsmouth to the L. high Admiral,” *Extracts*, 446.

circles. The mention of a petition from Mountjoy corroborates Catherine Patterson’s argument that towns cultivated patrons to assist them in their negotiations with other bodies within the English state, mostly notably the crown. So, while the existence of the garrison captain was sometimes fractious and burdensome for a town, it did not always have to be so. The link between Mountjoy’s petition and incorporation reveals that the existence of a garrison, and with it a crown appointed captain, might sometimes offer the possibility of a useful patron and another useful connection to the political centre.

Certainly, whether or not the garrison captain proved a burden or a boon to the town depended on the captain himself and the perceptions and interests he brought with him to his post. Poynings, Sussex and Mountjoy were all militarily experienced men, from militarily experienced families. That all three men belonged to the martial community, however, did not mean that their interests were entirely the same. Like Leicester and Essex, Blount possessed a genuine interest in both soldiering and

33 Mountjoy inherited the Barony of Mountjoy in 1594, thus becoming the Lord Mountjoy mentioned in the incorporation. Carley, “Charles Blount, Fifth Baron Mountjoy,” ODNB.

34 Bonds of patronage, Patterson argues, connected the early modern town to the larger English state. Patronage was the life-blood that animated pre-Civil War government by satisfying the notions of honour and deference held by those who participated in it. Towns actively cultivated powerful patrons through gifts, honorary freemanships, and appointments to local office so that these patrons might help local governors navigate the complex skein of institutions and jurisdictions that comprised the English state. A patron mediated and facilitated the town’s relationship with the crown, the county, the “competing jurisdictions” within a town, and even offered a means of conflict resolution, should internal factional strife arise. Patterson, Urban Patronage in Early Modern England, 6-7.
possessing influence at the centre of English politics. His own interests, therefore, made him more prone to good relations with the townsmen of Portsmouth, for he saw the advantage to be gained from those relations. In 1597 the crown asked Portsmouth to choose two representatives for parliament. The mayor and burgesses selected the two men “at the insistence and motion of … Charles Lord Mountjoy.”

What is more, the high steward of an incorporated town represented the town in its relations with the privy council. Such a position, therefore, gave Mountjoy access to that body from which he had been excluded, and provided another reason to support Portsmouth’s incorporation. Poynings either did not desire, or was not able to achieve, the political connections and careers of an individual such as Mountjoy. For whatever reason Poynings and Sussex clearly did not see a reason for friendly relations with the townsmen of Portsmouth.

After Mountjoy’s death in 1606, James VI/I placed Sir Francis Vere in command of the Portsmouth garrison. Vere’s tenure at Portsmouth was short, owing to his abrupt and somewhat premature death in September 1609. After Vere’s death,

---

35 Extracts, 211-212.
36 Phil Withington, The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8. Mountjoy was unable to achieve an appointment to the privy council in the 1590s. Although he was friends with Robert Cecil, Mountjoy’s disinclination to commit openly to either the Cecil or Essex factions denied him a strong backing for this appointment at court. The high stewardship of Portsmouth, therefore, might have offered him a way around this. Carley, ODNB
37 D.J.B. Trim, “Sir Francis Vere (1560/61–1609),” ODNB.
James VI/I appointed William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke. Pembroke’s captaincy got off to a rocky start. Roughly three months after Pembroke’s appointment, the mayor and corporation of Portsmouth dashed off a worried letter to the Earl of Salisbury. Pembroke’s lieutenant made statements to the effect that if Pembroke’s patent were not sufficiently forceful to command the mayor, constable and other officers of the town at all times, then Pembroke should seek to have his patent made sufficiently powerful to do so.

It is unclear why Morgan made such statements, but they alarmed the townsmen. The mayor and corporation assured Salisbury that they never denied that they would be obedient to the Earl’s “martial government,” by which they presumably meant the exercise of the captain’s authority according to the regulations set down in the wake of the Poynings affair. Indeed, the townsmen go on specifically to refer to the lord treasurer’s 1565 resolution. They inform Salisbury that if Pembroke were to receive this more powerful patent, it would effectively undo all the privileges granted to the town by the king’s progenitors for 400 years. In an acknowledgement of the fact that the central government alone possessed the authority to elaborate the garrison captain’s jurisdiction, the townsmen asked that if any deliberation on the nature of the captain’s authority were to take place that they be allowed opportunity to provide all previous ordinances established “for the

---

38 TNA, SP14/48/110. Grant to the Earl of Pembroke of the offices of keeper and captain of the town and isle of Portsmouth, 16 October 1609.
39 HHA, CP126/148.
quietness and distinction of the government and several jurisdictions in the said town.” Pembroke, it seems, was not interested in the greater authority that his deputy claimed for him. Like all his predecessors at Portsmouth, Pembroke brought with him his own ideas and interests. Pembroke was a courtier, not a military man: he was prominent at James VI/I's court and by the time of his appointment to the captaincy of Portsmouth already held a number of offices. Thus, Pembroke left the day to day operation of the garrison to his deputy there. This did not mean that matters between town and garrison flowed smoothly: they did not, as we shall see.

The town of Portsmouth’s incorporation in 1600 changed little in terms of the jurisdictional relationship between the authority of the mayor and the garrison commander. Incorporation certainly bolstered Portsmouth’s civic authority, but it

---

40 HHA, CP126/148.

41 Although banished from Elizabeth I’s court for a scandal involving a lover whom he impregnated but refused to marry, Pembroke was among the English courtiers who rushed to meet James I on his coming down from Scotland. James I favoured Pembroke, making him a gentleman of the privy chamber in 1603, the same year in which he received the Order of the Garter. In 1604 he was made high steward of the Duchy of Cornwall, lord warden of the Stannaries and lord lieutenant of Cornwall. By 1611, Pembroke was a privy councillor. Victor Stater, “William Herbert, Third Earl of Pembroke,” ODNB.

42 In 1623, Sir John Oglander, Pembroke’s deputy at Portsmouth, put to paper his reasons for leaving that office and, in doing so, gives us a sense of the demands placed on the deputy. Put simply, Oglander gave up the position because it took up too much of his time for too little profit. Though the office was “somewhat profitable so again it was very chargeable” and it caused him to neglect his own estate. Oglander had also heard that the king of Spain had proposed to have Portsmouth as a cautionary town to better secure the jointure of the Infanta; Oglander did not seem keen on this prospect. Still, he thought that Pembroke believed Oglander had executed his duties well, and liked him “as well as any that ever had” that office. Isle of Wight Record Office OG/BB/63.
did not extend that authority over the garrison. Portsmouth’s military governor enjoyed the same “privileges, liberties, immunities” as he had before. There remained two distinct and legitimate nodes of authority within Portsmouth. This serves to remind us once again that the disputes that arose between mayors and garrison captains took place within an overarching framework established by the central government. But the fact that it was the garrison captain who assisted the Portsmouth townsmen in achieving incorporation also reminds us that, within that framework, the interests and perceptions of the specific individuals involved shaped that nature of their relationship.

It is significant that all the Elizabethan captains of Portsmouth belonged to the martial community. R.B. Manning argues that military men possessed “values, assumptions and traditions that set them apart from gownsmen,” or England’s non-military governors.43 This was true: professional military men like Poynings and Sussex, and Ferdinando Gorges for that matter, possessed ideas and interests derived from their membership in that community. The differences in outlook and behaviour between individuals such as Mountjoy and Poynings indicate, perhaps, that variation also existed within the martial community. Differences in martial experience and social status differentiated men such as Poynings from men such as Mountjoy, and, as

---

a result, shaped their specific attitudes toward command. Further, the link made between more settled civil government and better defence illustrates that the martial community did not hold a monopoly on ideas about military matters and the defence of the realm. In claiming that the expansion of town liberties meant better, more settled government and, in turn, better defence, the townsmen of Portsmouth also articulated a notion of citizen defence current in contemporary political culture. Phil Withington argues that the humanist idea of the citizen soldier was very much part of the corporate citizenship ideal that animated public life in the towns and cities of early modern England. The idea that the townspeople themselves were the best defenders of their own homes was a claim made, at some point or another, by all the town authorities under study here.

That a member of the martial community assisted the townsmen of Portsmouth in achieving incorporation is also a reminder that the differences between swordsmen and gownsmen were not absolute. Swordsmen and gownsmen were not two solitudes, perpetually isolated and opposed to one another. Charles

____________________

44 Phil Withington argues that early modern militarism, the practices and attitudes relating to warfare and defence, should not be reduced to revived notions of chivalry and chivalric values that were the exclusive preserve of a martial community. Militarism was, in fact, more culturally pervasive in early modern England than previously thought, and the reduction of martial values and ideas to a chivalric throwback serves to obscure this fact. This point is well taken; but that men who made their living by soldiering possessed particular ideas, ideas that may have had chivalric vestiges, remains a distinct possibility.

Blount, Lord Mountjoy, provided the townsmen of Portsmouth with a patron, a mediator between themselves and the central government. Indeed, for Catherine Patterson the existence of such patrons is itself a reminder that town and crown were also not two, separate entities, bound either to quarrel or to cooperate. Such a conception, she argues, reinforces an “antagonistic view of relations between urban government and the outside world.”46 Bonds of patronage, such as that developed between the townsmen of Portsmouth and Mountjoy, reveal the connections between early modern townsmen and the outside world. Towns were not isolated and inward looking bodies, but fundamentally connected to the larger English state.47 At the same time, the existence of patrons also reminds us that while the distribution and exercise of authority in the early modern state were the result of negotiation, negotiation itself presupposes an opposition. It presupposes, in other words, the existence of at least two opposing views that require resolution. Thus, while town and crown did not exist in perpetual opposition, negotiations over the nature of garrison government illustrate that significant divisions still occurred between the crown and other bodies within the English state in spite of their interconnection.

46 Patterson, Corporate Boroughs, 6.
Soldiers and Townspeople

In 1618, Thomas Monday of Portsmouth took a soldier’s place in the garrison. As a consequence, he was “dismissed and degraded” from his place as a town burgess. In taking a soldier’s place, Monday had put himself under the government of the garrison captain, a condition that was “contrary to the ancient orders and constitutions of [the] town for any burgess to be.”

Thomas Monday’s reasons for joining the garrison are unknown. He may have joined for the 8d. a day that a garrison soldier earned. Since the soldiers’ wages were often in arrears, however, it seems unlikely that a steady income was the motivating factor. Far more likely was that Monday sought the privileges and protections that came with being a garrison soldier. Many of the soldiers who comprised garrisons were not soldiers by trade, but rather persons who had attained their positions as a reward for service or, more


49 In 1630, the soldiers of the Portsmouth garrison reminded the privy council that they had “received no penny of their pay due to them this three years.” TNA, SP16/169/33. This, of course, was not the first time a member of the Portsmouth garrison, or its commander, had to solicit the council for pay. In 1558, Captain Turner reported to the privy council the “dearth and scarcity of victuals and other necessities incident to the soldiers…which may yet be redressed if it may stand with [their] Lords pleasures to consider me with a pay.” TNA, SP12/2/12. In 1590, the Earl of Sussex solicited the council for the pay of the gunners. TNA, SP12/232/60. Finally, in 1613, the soldiers requested that any “articles” or “orders” preventing them from practising trades within the town of Portsmouth “be suspended until [they] be paid all their arrears.” “Soldiers’ Observations and Townsmen’s Answers,” Supplement, 94.
often, purchased them in order to take advantage of the privileges of a soldier’s place. Portsmouth garrison was certainly no exception in this regard.

From about 1591 on, 100 soldiers and gunners comprised the garrison at Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{50} Many garrison men were soldiers of convenience: men who once followed another living, or plied another trade, before the privileges of a garrison soldier led them to seek a garrison place. What brought most of them to the garrison was the fact that they were long on debt and short on cash. Little wonder, then, that garrison men often sought ways to earn a little on the side by practising their various skills, trades or other employments. Such activities did not endear them to the inhabitants of Portsmouth - to whom many soldiers were also indebted - who perceived garrison soldiers as possessing privileges and exemptions to which the townspeople were not entitled.\textsuperscript{51} In 1624, the inhabitants of Portsmouth complained to their civic governors that many townspeople were at an economic disadvantage because of the soldiers. Some inhabitants, for instance, eked a small living from renting horses and, sometimes, going with the renters as a guide for their journey. But now this living had been “taken away from them by the soldiers of the garrison,” who also rented horses and offered similar services. To make matters worse, the “poor inhabitants” of Portsmouth were “taxed unto all payments,” while the soldiers

\textsuperscript{50} See Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{51} In 1613 the soldiers complained that the “townsmen will not trust them with any meat, drink or clothes.” The townsmen replied that they had “trusted the soldiers above £1000 more than they are likely to receive.” \textit{Supplement}, 93.
paid “no duties or taxes unto the town.” The townspeople argued that they were unable to pay the taxes they owed until something was done about the soldier’s extracurricular activities.52

In letting out horses, it is possible that some garrison soldiers tried to circumvent rules put in place by the Earl of Pembroke, captain of the garrison, that were intended to proscribe soldiers’ non-military employments. Unfortunately, the actual articles set down by Pembroke appear not to have survived, but we may glean their tenor from both the dispute that gave rise to them and their subsequent invocations. Back in 1613, the mayor and brethren of Portsmouth had complained to the privy council about certain behaviours of the garrison personnel. The soldiers, the townsmen stated, kept inns and alehouses without the mayor’s license. What is more, the townsmen could not arrest or punish a soldier who had committed any violent act including, they claimed, murder. In light of these behaviours, the townsmen asked that the king renew their charter, to further clarify the respective jurisdictions of the mayor and the captain of the garrison.

Since no charter renewal occurred, it is clear that the central government eschewed that request. Instead, the privy council instructed the mayor and

52 “Extracts from Leet Jury Presentments,” *Extracts*, 114. In addition to the taxes which the townsmen referred to here, in 1613, the townsmen also claimed that the soldiers paid less ship money than the town. The soldiers did not deny they paid less, but argued the difference was only one pound: fourteen rather than the fifteen paid by the town. *Supplement*, 94.
townsmen to consult the garrison captain and let him hear their grievances.\textsuperscript{53} Pembroke, it seems, tried to hear both sides of the story: at least, the extant list of “soldiers observations” and “towns answers” suggests that this was the case. Among the observations made by the soldiers, many concerned the townsmen’s unwillingness to let them work and the monetary contributions the soldiers did, they claimed, make to the town. The soldiers make essentially the same complaint under two separate headings: in their first observation the soldiers bemoan that the townsmen “will not suffer them to keep shops nor have any work,” which was similar to their fourth point that “the townsmen will not suffer them to keep trades and work.” The soldiers also refute any claims that they contributed nothing to the townspeople in return for their residences or incomes. The soldiers claimed that they paid “all duties,” did “service for their tenements and lands” and paid “towards the [repair] of the church and [maintenance] of the poor.”\textsuperscript{54}

The townsmen’s responses to the soldiers’ complaints indicate that the soldiers believed that the captain of the garrison, “their governor,” had the ability to license alehouses or other shops where soldiers offered their services and wares. The townsmen wasted no time setting the soldiers straight on this point, by observing that such matters belonged to the “civil government” of Portsmouth and, therefore, the garrison captain could not license alehouses or shops. Indeed, the townsmen refuted

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 92-93.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 93-94.
most of what the soldiers claimed. Regarding the matter of soldiers' work, the town argued that there were “more shopkeepers, tradesmen and day labourers then townsmen, and ten soldiers daily work at the King’s Dock.” To the soldiers’ claim that they paid town dues and duties, the townsmen were blunt: the soldiers did “no duty or service for lands and tenements nor [paid] amercements nor [paid] towards [repair] of the church.”

It was in response to these points of contention between soldiers and townspeople that the Earl of Pembroke drew up a set of articles intended to resolve the issues. Whatever the exact nature of the articles signed by the Earl of Pembroke, the townsmen claimed that these prohibited soldiers from practising trades or keeping alehouses or victualling houses. In the spring of 1630, the civic governors of Portsmouth contacted the privy council regarding the enforcement of the Earl’s articles. In June, the soldiers of the garrison petitioned the privy council in response, telling the councillors that the town had recently misinformed them about the nature of the articles signed by the Earl. This misinformation led the king to issue “an absolute commandment” under his privy signet that the 1613 articles be observed and

55 Ibid.
56 TNA, SP16/304/58. The mayor, etc., of Portsmouth to the privy council, c.1635. Here, the townsmen remind the councillors that in 1613, the Earl of Pembroke “set down certain orders in writing to be…observed between the townsmen and the soldiers in garrison, there amongst which one was that no soldier of the garrison should ever after use any trade within the said town…one other that no soldier or gunner should at any time after keep or maintain any such alehouse or victualling house within the said town while he should be a soldier or gunner there.”
enforced. The soldiers themselves corroborated the fact that Pembroke’s articles prohibited them from taking on extra work when they argued that the enforcement of the articles deprived them of “the use of any industry in [one’s] particular trade.” The soldiers could not tolerate such a situation because, they said, they had not received their pay in three years. They requested that the councillors solicit the king on their behalf, to see that this “heavy doom against their livelihood” be suspended until such time as their case might be heard as the townsmen’s had. At such a hearing, the soldiers claimed, they could prove that a “soldier hath a just right (without prejudice to the charter of the town) to the privileges they desire,” and that the town would suffer “no discommodity” by the soldiers practising trades. In any case, they added, “the garrison and those articles cannot subsist.”

The privy council referred the garrison’s petition to the council of war. After reviewing the garrison’s petition and hearing in person from a garrison soldier, the council of war decided to suspend the articles of 1613 and permit the soldiers to continue “their several trades and employments…until the garrison be fully paid their arrears from his majesty.” The suspension of Pembroke’s articles, however, was only temporary. The council further resolved that a final order on the matter would be delivered by the privy council “when both parties, either by themselves, or their

57 TNA, SP16/169/33. Humble petition of the “poor soldiers” of the Portsmouth garrison to the privy council. 23 June 1630.
58 TNA, SP16/170/41
learned council” could attend.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, it appears that the king himself favoured the articles’ enforcement. According to the townsmen, in c.1631 the king himself had approved the 1613 orders and commanded that they be “put in execution.” He further stated that if the mayor and townsmen should “find any opposition against the same”, they should certify those who opposed them directly to the king or his privy council. Again, in 1632, “it…pleased [the] honourable Board to order that all said orders of 1613 should be from thenceforth duly observed.” Finally, in 1633, “the right honourable the Lord Viscount Wimbledon now captain and governor of the said fort did in writing under his hand and seal command that officers and soldiers of the said garrison…observe the said articles and orders.”\textsuperscript{60}

None of this stopped the garrison men from continuing to practise trades. In October 1634, two soldiers were presented to the Portsmouth Leet Jury: Thomas Compton “for opening his shop’s window,” and William White, a baker, for doing the same. Both men, moreover, had gone into business “since the Lords’ order.”\textsuperscript{61} In 1635, the mayor and townsmen followed the king’s c.1631 order and made a certificate to the privy council listing offending soldiers. The townsmen began by reiterating all the occasions on which the privy council, and others, confirmed the observance of the 1613 articles. Despite this, however, the soldiers listed had

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} TNA, SP16/304/58.
\textsuperscript{61} “Leet Jury Presentments,” \textit{Extracts}, 120. William White was also a cheat: his “penny wheaten loaf” was found to be short one and three-quarter ounces.
nonetheless “set up and exercised trades” in the town, or kept “victualing houses there.” The townsmen divided their schedule into two parts: those men in breach of the articles since “before the last order,” and those “increased since the last order.” Among the former, the townsmen listed eight tailors, one mercer, three bakers, one shoemaker, one hellier, two carpenters and four ship carpenters. In the latter category, the townsmen counted nine more tailors, four alehouse keepers, two more carpenters and one scrivener. 62 We do not know what, if any, action the privy council took in the wake of the town’s complaint, but the townsmen give us some indication of the punishments meted out to the offenders. These men were “to pay such penalties as by the statute are inflicted for the same.” Some refused to pay. Others paid, but “wilfully” continued their business, resulting in the “impoverishment of the said town.” 63

When the townsmen and soldiers disagreed over the nature of Pembroke’s articles in 1630, seventeen years had passed since their creation in 1613. Apart from the complaint made by the townspeople in 1624, these years seemingly passed without a major dispute over their violation or their lack of enforcement. It is possible that the relative quietude over this matter reflected the consistent

62 TNA, SP16/304/58.
63 Ibid. What, if any, resolution the privy council or the town took in 1635 to stop soldiers from practising their trades was not enough to deter the soldiers. In October 1638, the inhabitants of Portsmouth presented another list to the town’s leet jury of garrison men who continued “shopkeeping and trading.” “Leet Jury Presentments,” Extracts, 122.
enforcement of Pembroke articles. The letting of horses, the activity named by the townspeople in 1624, certainly seemed the kind of work in which one might engage if one was prohibited from practising a more formal trade. Moreover, Pembroke’s even handed dealing with bankrupts indicates his willingness to balance soldiers’ infractions with non-soldiers’ requirements.64 But the fact that the townsmen sought to see them confirmed in 1630 perhaps speaks most to their perceived value. The Earl of Pembroke’s articles illustrate one again how the individuals shaped the nature of the relationship between town and garrison. Pembroke, it seems, took pains to negotiate peaceable relations between townspeople and garrison soldiers. It is telling that the controversy over the nature of the articles should have occurred after Pembroke’s death in 1630. The townsmen arguably sought to make permanent the resolutions of a particular captain.

Also notable was the reaction of the central government in the wake of the disagreement over the nature of the articles. The townsmen intimated the direct involvement of the king in matters pertaining to the discipline of garrison soldiers. The king himself, they stated, instructed them to forward directly to the council or to himself the names of those soldiers breaking the articles. Prior to this, the central government acted to resolve conflict through their appointed agent: the garrison captain. The central government would either defer a matter of contention to the captain for his resolution, as it did with Pembroke in 1613, or otherwise admonish the

64 See Chapter Two.
captain into stricter observance of his duties. It did not directly request the names and details of offending soldiers. The Portsmouth garrison did have a governor in the 1630s: Viscount Wimbledon. Like many of the garrison’s previous governors, Wimbledon brought with him extensive military experience. He was not young, but age was not always seen as an impediment to ability: Lord Grey was not young when he assumed the governorship of Berwick-upon-Tweed. And yet, the names of the offending soldiers in the 1630s went not to him, but directly to the central government. To be sure, relations between town and garrison still took place within a framework erected by the central government. But the actions taken by the central government towards the garrison at Portsmouth suggest that the framework had changed.\textsuperscript{65}

Still, for all the tensions that existed between the townspeople and the garrison, garrison men were not complete outcasts in the town of Portsmouth. Garrison members might become townsmen, just as Thomas Monday had become a member of the garrison. Indeed, in 1635 the mayor elect of Portsmouth was one William Winter. On being so chosen, the townsmen compelled Winter to “absolutely

\textsuperscript{65} Roger Lockyer, “Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon,” \textit{ODNB}. Wimbledon’s equivocation during action in the Cadiz expedition earned him criticism and the moniker “Viscount Sitstill.” Although neither the Duke of Buckingham nor the king rebuked him directly, he was not invited to participate in the expedition to the Île de Rhé and remained outside the council of war and the king’s presence. His appointment to the Portsmouth garrison, therefore, seems somewhat more like a putting out to pasture than a reward. This marks a departure from previous appointments to that post.
and freely renounce from being of the garrison, and...[to] promise hereafter to be none of their company.”

Winter’s renunciation implies that, up to that point, he had been a member of the Portsmouth garrison. Indeed, Winter was not the first garrison man to gain entry into Portsmouth’s civic government. Joshua Saviour, master gunner, became a freeman in 1594 and then became a member of the town’s governing body in 1603. One of Saviour’s predecessors in the office of master gunner, Roger Staynton, also enjoyed the same privilege until the mayor and other burgesses booted him out in 1554 because of his attitude and demeanour. A similar incident occurred many years later, in 1607, when the townsmen dismissed John Stevenson, “a soldier,” from being a burgess.

The men of the Portsmouth garrison and the non-military inhabitants of Portsmouth are prime examples of the interconnected and overlapping nature of community and belonging in early modern England. It is clear that garrison soldiers and townspeople, though they were subject to different governing authorities, did not live discrete lives. This often caused tension between the two groups, but not so much tension that there was never communication or cooperation between the two

68 “Book of Frankpledge and Court Leet, Book 1,” Extracts, 190-191. Staynton “divers and sundry times” forgot “the oath and the duty of a burgess” and openly denigrated the worth of the office before the mayor and the other burgesses, “saying if it had been worth...a clouet to wipe his shoes he should not have it.”
69 Ibid., 217.
groups. Clearly, it was not impossible for a member of the garrison also to be a member of the Portsmouth civic establishment, and vice versa. But they could not be both at the same time. When Thomas Monday joined the garrison, the townsmen referred to “ancient orders and constitutions” that precluded a burgess from also being a garrison soldier. By contrast, there is no evidence that Joshua Saviour was made to do the same. One must guard against arguments from silence, but Saviour’s admission to the governing body of Portsmouth occurred during the captaincy of Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, a high point in town-garrison relations. The point is that the insistence upon, or the remembrance of, ancient orders and customs was always in the hands of those who wished to see them enforced. And it was entirely possible that what was perceived as a hard and fast rule at one time was conveniently ignored or forgotten at another.

Certainly, part of what drove conflict between town and garrison was the ambiguous nature of the respective jurisdictions of the mayor and townsmen, and the captain of the garrison. Indeed, the authority of the mayor of Portsmouth relative to that of the garrison captain, and the exact boundaries of the authority of each, had been a bone of contention for nearly a century. The dispute between the town and the garrison that erupted in 1613, and continued on and off for years thereafter,

---

70 To find any extant orders that pertain specifically to this issue, we have to go back to January 1546 and a letter from the privy council to the then garrison captain, one Mr. Grimston. The council instructed Grimston “to receive none [of] the inhabitant[s] of the town to be a soldier, except it should chance him being before a soldier to marry the widow of any inhabitant.” APC, Vol.I, 266.
illustrates that issues relating to the respective spheres of authority of the mayor and townspeople of Portsmouth and the commander of the garrison persisted, despite the lord treasurer’s efforts to clarify them in the wake of the Poynings dispute. To a degree, such disputes persisted arguably because of the very way that the lord treasurer had articulated the scope of each man’s authority back in 1565. The lord treasurer took a very spatial approach to designating the areas over which the mayor and the captain exercised their authorities in Portsmouth. The central government remained silent, however, about how precisely each respective authority was to be exercised when soldiers and, presumably, townspeople (but mostly it appears to have been soldiers) crossed the border, as it were, and engaged in activity within the geography to which they did not belong. The lord treasurer did not engage with this issue in 1565, and neither did the crown in the letters patent of incorporation of 1600, preferring instead simply to insert a clause suggesting that all things pertaining to the respective authorities of the mayor and the garrison captain should remain as they had been previously established.

Conclusion

In 1565, the lord treasurer determined that, since time out of mind, Portsmouth had enjoyed “all like liberties and free customs as the citizens of Winchester or Oxford without any let or interruption of any other person until the
late erection of the said fortifications.”\textsuperscript{71} The inhabitants of sixteenth-and early
seventeenth-century Portsmouth accommodated another node of crown
commissioned authority within the town, and a group of people governed exclusively
by that authority. This made Portsmouth similar to other garrison towns; however, as
the lord treasurer pointed out, such conditions were not exclusive to garrison towns.
Similar jurisdictional conditions obtained in cathedral towns, like Winchester, and
university towns, like Oxford.\textsuperscript{72} Garrison towns, therefore, did not occupy an entirely
unique place within the early modern English state. Further, as Alexandra Sheppard
argues, jurisdictional conflict sometimes makes it appear as though the members of
those respective jurisdictions were two solitudes, living in perpetual discord and
isolation from one another. She argues this was not true in Cambridge, and neither
was it true in Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{73} If it were, then there would have been no need for the
Earl of Pembroke to regulate the soldiers’ participation in the civil and economic life
of the town.

That said, the reason behind Portsmouth’s jurisdictional peculiarities did
inform the disputes observed in the foregoing pages. The fact that the garrison was a
military institution which existed to assist in the defence of the realm informed both

\textsuperscript{71} “The Lord Treasurer’s Decree,” \textit{Extracts}, 404.
\textsuperscript{72} Catherine Patterson, “Corporations, Cathedrals and the Crown: Local Dispute and
Royal Interest in Early Stuart England,” \textit{History} 85:280 (2000), 546-71. And:
Alexandra Sheppard, “Contesting Communities? ‘Town’ and ‘Gown’ in Cambridge,
c.1560-1640,” in Sheppard and Withington, eds., \textit{Communities in Early Modern
England}, 216-234.
\textsuperscript{73} Sheppard, “Contesting Communities?,” 216-234.
the selection of the garrison captain, the central government’s maintenance of his jurisdiction and the attitudes and behaviours of those who belonged to it. Early modern English people existed simultaneously within numerous communities of belonging and networks of authority. One’s sense of oneself, and one’s place in those networks of authority, had many constituent parts. For most of these garrison soldiers, being a garrison soldier was part of their identity: a part most strongly adhered to when their privileges, often bought and paid for, were under threat. For some of the garrison captains, being captain of that garrison was a major component of their sense of self and their sense of their place within the early modern hierarchy of authority; for others, that office comprised less of that sense. This informed every captain’s style of authority, and the behaviour he exhibited when he perceived encroachments on his legitimate authority, on his jurisdiction. In turn, this also informed the relationship between the garrison captain, and those who governed the town of Portsmouth. For the townspeople of Portsmouth possessing a garrison was, by turns, both a blessing and a curse: dealing with a man such as Sir Adrian Poynings, for whom the possession of the captaincy of Portsmouth perhaps formed a good deal of his own sense of authority and place, was unpleasant and unfruitful; having access to a man such as Lord Mountjoy, or even the Earl of Pembroke, was positively useful.

In Portsmouth, as in other garrison towns, it was not a general dislike of soldiers that ultimately drove dispute between town and garrison. What occurred at Portsmouth was not a “civilianized” population bristling at the presence of martial
men with whom they had nothing, culturally, in common. The argument that
townspeople themselves were the best defenders of their homes and, by extension,
the realm was an expression of a martial philosophy current in the contemporary
political culture, the philosophy that underpinned the notion of militia defence. At
the very least, it suggests that in the conflicts between garrison captains and mayors,
garrison soldiers and townspeople, the issue was not militarism versus civilianism, the
militaristic views of a minority versus the largely pacific worldview of the majority of
the English populace. This issue was differing conceptions of militarism: the
conceptions of townsmen and some garrison captains were not two solitudes, but
rather points on a spectrum.

74 The term “civilianized” is Keith Thomas’, as quoted in Withington, “Citizens and
Soldiers,” 13.
In 1564 Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford and governor of Berwick, wrote to the privy council to apprise them of some matters of note concerning Berwick and the borders. In his letter, Bedford explained that some of the soldiers of the Berwick garrison would rather suffer “sharp imprisonment” than do a night’s watch on the walls of Berwick-upon-Tweed. This was because the weather had been so cold that some night watchmen had “in the morning been found dead.”¹ Only a month later, Bedford remarked again to Cecil about the terrible “winterlike weather.”² It was only the autumn.

Bedford’s comments illustrate that the Berwick soldiers’ experience was much different than the soldiers’ experience at Plymouth or Portsmouth: there were no reports of Portsmouth garrison men dying of exposure. Climatic differences aside, however, the garrison at Berwick itself was quite different than that at Plymouth or Portsmouth. Positioned as it was on the frontier between England and Scotland, Berwick was not only large but active: the garrison’s raison d’être was to assist in the defence and government of the northernmost part of England. Consequently, Berwick garrison soldiers saw much more active duty than their southern

¹ TNA, SP59/8, f. 159.
² TNA, SP59/8, f. 194. This letter was dated 13 October; the earlier one, which discussed the death of the watchmen, was dated 2 September.
counterparts. The garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed, therefore, stands out amongst our three case studies. It was much larger, more active, and possessed of a unique governmental structure. Moreover, the town and garrison existed within a contested geopolitical location, itself possessed of distinct legal and governmental structures. These factors shaped garrison life at Berwick-upon-Tweed. The differences between Berwick and our other case studies, however, should not obscure the significant similarities. Once again, the perceptions and interests of the individuals involved in the jurisdictional conflicts both within the garrison and between the garrison and the town shaped those disputes in important ways. And, as always, these conflicts took place within the larger framework of central government aims and interests.

---

Amongst the many weighty issues that faced Elizabeth I at the beginning of her reign, the security of her realm’s northern frontier loomed large. While the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis ended the war between Mary I’s husband Phillip II and Henri II of France, the marriage of the dauphin to Mary, Queen of Scots in the spring of 1558 seemed to cement French, and Catholic, interests in Scotland. The following year Henri II died and Mary Stuart, now queen of France as well as Scotland, began more overtly to assert her claim to the throne of England. In February 1560 Elizabeth I signed the Treaty of Berwick, by the terms of which she promised to help the Protestant Lords of the Congregation fight against the French regency of Mary of Guise. In July of that year, Elizabeth sent troops who assisted with the Protestant lords’ victory. The ensuing Treaty of Edinburgh pledged a new Anglo-Scottish concord. In spite of the treaty, however, troubles persisted when Mary Stuart returned to Scotland in 1561, refused to ratify the agreement and refused to abandon her claims to be recognized as at least the heir to Elizabeth’s throne, if not its rightful claimant.  

International developments were not Elizabeth’s only worries: there was also the related problem of the security and stability of England’s northernmost counties. The early Tudors had done much to extend crown authority in the north: they had reduced the power of the northern nobility, increased the amount of land owned

---

directly by the crown, established crown interests with the local gentry and expanded
the jurisdiction of central government bodies, such as the council of the north. But
these were pyrrhic victories. While the early Tudors successfully reduced the ability
of northern magnates to use their vast military resources to threaten the crown, in
doing so they also prevented them from using their vast military resources to protect
and defend the borderlands. The early Tudors had essentially dismantled a social and
political system based largely on the provision of defence against Scots raids and the
activities of the border surnames, but they did not provide an adequate replacement
for their services this in regard. The result was an increase in disorder and
lawlessness, particularly in Northumberland. While the extent of that disorder has
often been overstated, it was sufficient to cause concern in London.5

In such circumstances, then, it is not surprising that Elizabeth and her advisors
studiously considered the state of her northernmost town and garrison: Berwick-
upon-Tweed.6

5 Steven G. Ellis, “Civilizing Northumberland: Representations of Englishness in the
Ralph Sadler’s observations were particularly damning. Whether or not this increase
in disorder was real or perceived is a matter of debate. Ellis argues that there was an
actual increase in disorder and lawlessness in the northeast as a result of Tudor policy.
Others argue, however, that pervasive northern disorder was largely a central
government perception, albeit one that northerners themselves helped to perpetuate.
Northern officials often exaggerated the extent of disorder and violence in order to
maintain the favourable tax conditions granted to them for living in, and helping to
defend, such a vulnerable region. Newton, North-East England, 167-169.
6 Cecil wrote a number of memoranda between the spring of 1559 and the summer of
1560 concerning the size and government of the garrison at Berwick. From 1559:
The result of this consideration was a significant expansion in the size of the garrison, and significant alterations to the garrison’s government. The “new establishment” of Berwick, drawn up in the autumn of 1560 and in place by January 1561, increased the size of the garrison to approximately 1,500 men. This was indeed the largest the garrison had been since England regained Berwick-upon-Tweed once more, this time

---

TNA, SP59/1, f. 153 consists of “remembrances for the Borders,” of which one was a “new establishment” for Berwick; TNA, SP59/1, f. 195, “things especially to be considered in the orders of [Berwick’s] establishment”; TNA, SP59/1, f. 204, a set of “instructions and orders” for Berwick marked “not executed” by Cecil and TNA, SP59/1, f. 197, another “device…not executed.” From the summer of 1560: TNA, SP59/2, f. 275 and TNA, SP59/2, f. 276, Cecil’s notes regarding the ordering of the officers and garrison of Berwick.

7 TNA, SP59/4, f. 169.
permanently, in 1482. The queen halved this number in early 1564, reducing the garrison to approximately 800 men. But even this reduced number was still far larger than the 200 or so men who had kept the garrison prior to her ascension. Elizabeth maintained the garrison at roughly this strength until the end of her reign.

In addition to increasing the size of the garrison, the central government also altered the structure of the garrison’s government. During the first half of the sixteenth century, two captains governed Berwick: the captain of the castle and the captain of the town. Four additional officers assisted: a marshal, a treasurer, a master porter and a master of the ordinance. In addition a number of clerks and constables also served the garrison. After 1560 a single figure, with a grander title, replaced the two captains: a governor. The primary officers remained largely the same: the marshal, who was second only to the governor and acted in his stead when the governor was not present, the treasurer, and the porter. Together, these four officers

8 Shortly after England regained Berwick permanently in 1482, Edward IV appointed the Earl of Northumberland warden of the East Marches and keeper of the town and castle of Berwick. According to the indenture between the crown and the Earl, the size of the garrison at that time was 600 men. John Scott, *Berwick-upon-Tweed: The History of the Town and Guild* (London: 1888), 101-102. By c.1531, that number had dropped considerably, to approximately 152 men. E101/58/10. This number was augmented only slightly by 1558, with the addition of fifty-eight soldiers and thirty gunners. TNA, SP59/1, f. 61.
9 TNA, SP59/7, f. 151. For a more in-depth discussion of the size and organization of the Berwick garrison, see Appendix A.
10 TNA, E101/58/10 and TNA, SP59/1, f. 61.
were the queen’s “councillors for the governance and order” of Berwick. 11 Under these officers, the garrison was divided among roughly a dozen captains, each of whom possessed a band of soldiers numbering approximately 50, 100, or 150 men. The clerks and constables remained, as did the horsemen of the old garrison.

Berwick-upon-Tweed also had another peculiarity that set it apart from the other garrisons under study here: the head of Berwick’s civil non-military government, the mayor, was on the royal payroll. Wages for the mayor were included with the wages of the officers and soldiers of the garrison. 12 Although paid by the crown, the mayor was not appointed by the crown: as in other towns, the burgesses and freemen selected him. 13 Given this, and the fact that the governor and his officers were the queen’s “councillors for the governance and order” of Berwick, one would assume the relationship between governor and mayor was that of superior and subordinate. 14 As we shall see, however, the jurisdictional relationship between governor and mayor, garrison and town, was not so straightforward. Indeed, the written orders for Berwick, both old and new, provided little clarification in this regard.

11 BL, Lansdowne 155, f. 274. “New Orders for the town of Berwick and the garrison of the same, signed by the queen, 1 October 1560.”
12 TNA, SP59/3, f.65.
13 TNA, SP59/18, f. 163. Here, William Drury, marshal of Berwick, describes to the privy council the fracas that occurred after the selection of a new mayor by the townsmen in the autumn of 1572.
14 BL, Lansdowne 155, f. 274.
The alterations to both the size and the government of the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed indicate that the central government intended Berwick to be the muscle behind government in the borders. The governor of Berwick was also lord warden of the East March. From 1560 on, moreover, both offices were occupied by a southern English nobleman. During the Elizabethan period, four men occupied the governorship of Berwick: William Grey, Baron Grey of Wilton, from 1560 until 1562; Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford, from 1563-68; Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, from 1568 until 1596; and Peregrine Bertie, Baron Willoughby, from 1598-1601.¹⁵ The 1560 orders also prohibited men from Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland and the Bishopric of Durham from serving within the garrison, a thing easier written than enforced.¹⁶ And while it is true that the military service already owed by men from these counties might preclude them from serving in the Berwick garrison, the explicit reminder of this fact in the new orders indicates that there was perhaps something more at work here. Steven Ellis argues that all the Tudors, but particularly Elizabeth, viewed the military skills of borderers as a threat rather than an advantage.¹⁷ Indeed, unlike the men chosen to govern the garrisons of Portsmouth

---

¹⁵ D.J.B. Trim, “Peregrine Bertie, thirteenth Baron Willoughby,” ODNB. It does not seem that a replacement for Willoughby was settled before Elizabeth’s own death in 1603.

¹⁶ BL Lansdowne 155, f. 274.

¹⁷ Ellis, “‘Reducing their Barbarous Wildness,’” 184. Again, Ellis argues that part of Elizabeth’s particular distrust came from her gender, the fact that she could not exert direct control over military men. If this was true of military men from the more
and Plymouth, the governors of Berwick were men who were quite intimately
associated with the members of the central government, often with the queen herself.

The soldiers of the Berwick garrison were also much more active than the
soldiers of Portsmouth or Plymouth. Berwick soldiers frequently assisted the march
wardens in their duties. In April 1565 Sir John Forster, lord warden of the Middle
March, requested twenty soldiers from Berwick to stay with him while he resided at
Harbottle Castle. 18 Two years later, the queen granted Forster fifty horse and fifty
foot from Berwick. 19 The queen also dispatched troops to Lord Scrope, lord warden of
the West March, upon his request for assistance. One hundred foot headed west in
1577, and another 100 in 1595. 20 In the autumn of 1581 Scrope informed the privy
council of recent retributions done in his wardenry by friends of the Armstrongs,
some of whom had lately been arrested for theft and murder. In response, the queen
wrote to Governor Hunsdon and commanded that he send 100 footmen of the
Berwick garrison immediately to Scrope “for the guard of the borders there, to the
terrifying of those common thieves and avoiding of such further attempts.” 21

The governor of Berwick often sent garrison men out to assist in the
government of his own wardenry. On some occasions, this occurred specifically at

settled parts of her dominions, then one imagines it was especially true of ones from

the less orderly parts.

19 TNA, SP59/12, f. 218.
21 APC, Vol. XIII, 263.
the behest of his deputy warden, as occurred in 1599 when Sir Robert Carey
requested 200 footmen from Governor Willoughby to accompany him to the “assize
and meeting with the warden of the middle marches against Scotland.”
On other occasions, the governor sent Berwick soldiers into the countryside to defend against
Scottish incursions. In 1562 and again in 1564, the governor of Berwick sent garrison
men to burn corn planted by Scots on English ground. The Earl of Bedford explained
that this was performed in order to maintain “the queen’s majesty’s title to that
ground.” The governor also dispatched garrison soldiers in reaction to events
occurring in England’s north. Berwick soldiers assisted in the quelling of the
northern rebellion in 1569. Events occurring across the border, too, might
necessitate the repair of a few soldiers into the countryside. In August 1573,
Treasurer Valentine Brown reported to Burghley that the regent of Scotland was to go
the following day to Annandale, opposite the west march. Just in case, Brown had

---

22 APC, Vol. XXIX, 553. This, of course, was not a singular request. On at least two
occasions, Sir John Selby, Governor Hunsdon’s deputy warden, requested that
garrison soldiers assist him in some unspecified wardenry business. On both these
occasions, Hunsdon upbraided Marshal Widdrington for refusing to fulfill Selby’s
request. TNA, WO55/1939, f. 20r-21r, Hunsdon to Widdrington, 21 December 1583
& TNA, WO55/1939, f. 37 r and v, Hunsdon to Widdrington, 11 August 1585.
23 TNA, SP59/8, f. 159. For 1562 see: TNA, SP59/6, f. 131. Sometimes, too, the
governor sent out garrison soldiers to retaliate for Scottish incursions. In January
1566, the Earl of Bedford sent 300 men and the old horse garrison to Chirnside, in
retaliation for Scottish spoils taken within the bounds of Berwick. TNA, SP59/11, f. 55.
24 TNA, SP59/16, f. 63. K.J. Kesselring, The Northern Rebellion of 1569: Faith,
sent forty garrison soldiers “to lie about Wark…to keep watch that none of the rebels resort in at these marches for succors.”

Finally, Berwick soldiers often made forays over the border into Scotland. Hunsdon took 300 garrison foot into Scotland in the aftermath of the northern rebellion in February 1570, to seek English rebels who fled across the border. Four years later, Brown reported to Cecil that Marshal Drury had gone into Scotland with the queen’s “succors.” On less momentous occasions, garrison men were often entrusted with letters to deliver back and forth across the border. It is distinctly possible that the soldiers entrusted with this duty also engaged in espionage. In May 1567 Treasurer Brown wrote to Cecil with, among other things, the most recent news out of Scotland. He explained to Cecil that he had this information because the marshal of Berwick continually had “one or other in Scotland for intelligence.”

---

25 TNA, SP59/19, f. 15. Brown ordered the soldiers to stay for six or eight days.
26 TNA, SP59/16, f. 206. See also TNA, SP59/18, f. 39; Kesselring, *Northern Rebellion*, 91-117.
27 TNA, SP59/18, f. 252. These “succors” were clearly Berwick soldiers, as the rest of the letter discusses how Brown will place their replacements, according to instructions left with him by Drury.
28 TNA, SP59/6, f. 131. Marshal Dacre reported to Cecil that he had received Cecil’s letters directed to himself, the treasurer and one Mr. Randolph. Dacre said that he sent Randolph’s with “a garrison man” because he did not “trust the carriage thereof with a scots man.” See also TNA, SP59/13, f. 164, 19 June 1567. Here, Marshal Drury reports to Cecil that Captain Reid’s ensign bearer, who he sent into Scotland with letters to the queen, has returned. In August 1582, the queen sent Governor Hunsdon’s son, George Carey, into Scotland. Hunsdon ordered his deputy to assign to George “such of the garrisons as he shall think fit to have with him to be returned back with letters as occasions shall serve.” TNA, WO55/1939, f. 8r, Hunsdon to Widdrington, 30 August 1582.
any case, he recounted to Cecil that about a month or so past, they had a message from the Earl of Bothwell delivered by a soldier of the Berwick garrison.  

The garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed was, therefore, both a tool of domestic rule and a mechanism for the assertion and maintenance of the boundary between England and Scotland. This rendered the Berwick soldiers’ experience somewhat different from that of their colleagues at Portsmouth or Plymouth. The men of Portsmouth and Plymouth garrisons rarely, if ever, actively assisted with the government of the immediate vicinity. Moreover, the boundary they defended was more easily defined: it was where the sea ended and the land began. But we should not let these differences blind us to similarities that the Berwick soldier shared with his brethren in garrison in other parts of the realm. In Berwick-upon-Tweed, as in Portsmouth and Plymouth, soldiers lived amongst and interacted with a civilian populace but remained subject to a different governing authority.

*The Governor, the Mayor, the Marshal and His Brother*

On 25 October 1573, a disturbance occurred in the church in Berwick-upon-Tweed. Alderman Robert Jackson sat in his pew, the one in which he usually sat and the one that other aldermen before him “had used in the service time.” Jenkin Storne, Captain Pickman’s soldier, Storne’s brother and John Storie, “horseman,” approached

---

29 TNA, SP59/13, f. 92.

30 The sovereign, of course, claimed dominion over the surrounding seas as well; however, sea defence was, by necessity, a naval matter.
Jackson’s pew “and with force” broke open the pew door. Storne used many “unseemly” words towards Jackson and, although Storne and his friends “never before used to sit” in that pew, insisted they “would need tarry” there. Storne also threatened Jackson: referring to the broken pew door, Storne told the alderman that he would “[bust] a better thing, if he got him abroad.” In the aftermath, Captain Pickman received a warning from the town authorities to see his soldiers “reformed.”

Despite the admonition to Pickman, however, Jenkin Storne repeated his actions the following Sunday. Alderman Jackson sat in his pew again and in came Storne “with two or three others and one Roger Storne,” the latter presumably the aforementioned brother. Storne told Jackson “he would sit in that stall,” then used some “other evil words,” and once again threatened the alderman with physical harm. Then Storne’s companions “thrust him forwards and so brake open the pew, to the disturbance of the whole.” The minister tried to compel Storne to leave the pew, but he refused to until the governor “came and fetched him.” “At two callings” of the acting governor, Valentine Brown, Storne “would not stir.” Captains Birkwell and Yaxley fetched Brown and brought him to the scene. On his arrival, the acting

31 Berwick-upon-Tweed Record Office Bailiff’s Court Book, BBA/C/C1, no. 74r.
32 When the actual governor was not in town, which was often, the highest ranking officer present took charge. Technically, the marshal was the governor’s second in command, but at this point the marshal was also absent, leaving Valentine Brown, the treasurer, acting governor. It is not entirely clear here whether or not Brown was in a different part of the church, or whether he was not present at all.
governor discovered that during the fracas between Storne and Jackson, Captain Pickman had sat “in his place, not offering once to rebuke his soldiers.” After the governor settled everyone down and sent the soldiers to ward, he reminded Pickman of the previous warning to see his men reformed in this matter. Pickman replied that he had indeed “commanded his soldiers not to meddle therein,” and “then railed a new talk to the mayor…making comparison between the honesty of the alderman and the said John Storne.”

Storne and his brother spent the next six days in irons in “Haddock’s Hole.” Their punishment complete, Brown called the soldiers to his house and there, in the presence of the gentleman porter and four other captains, he put Jenkin Storne out of pay and bound Storne and his brother to keep the peace. He also called on Captain Pickman, and after warning him not to enter any soldier into Storne’s place without permission, again admonished him “to look better to the order of his soldiers and not to encourage any of the like hereafter.” What precisely passed between Storne and Jackson, and prompted Storne to accost the alderman in the church, is not known. That Storne singled out Jackson for harassment indicates that the incident came about as the result of a particular matter between the two men. But whatever quarrel Storne had with Jackson, its public manifestation was shaped by the jurisdictional conditions that existed in Berwick-upon-Tweed. Storne knew, as did his captain, that

33 Ibid. Pickman was a repeat offender in the admitting and discharging of soldiers without permission.
the only person with the authority to shift the soldier from his occupation of Jackson’s pew was the governor, or one of the other officers acting in that capacity. This fact did not create the conflict between Storne and Jackson, but it perhaps informed the disdain that both Storne and Captain Pickman showed toward the dignity of both Alderman Jackson and the mayor of Berwick himself.

The church in which both soldiers and townspeople worshipped was a microcosm of Berwick-upon-Tweed itself: two groups of people, subject to two authorities, shared a confined spatial environment. Soldiers and townspeople lived together, they were familiar with one another, and that familiarity sometimes bred contempt. Members of the garrison, particularly the officers, were often dismissive of the mayor and townsmen. In October 1572, then marshal William Drury wrote to the privy council to inform them of “some disorders lately done here by townsmen.” One the day following the selection of a new mayor, the new mayor’s town clerk and two of his brothers threatened the former mayor in the high street. The new town clerk approached the former mayor and some other men, uttered “quarrelous words” to them and then drew his dagger. The old mayor was in considerable danger, Drury said, until some soldiers came upon the scene. Drury himself arrived shortly thereafter. He thought he had “put the matter…to silence and quiet” when another alderman came walking down the street, enquired what the matter was, and was “suddenly also… in like peril” as the former mayor before he too was rescued by some soldiers. Upon speaking to the new mayor to see to the matter, Drury discerned that
it was all about some “former malice,” one which also appeared to be “nourished by
the mayor himself.” Drury further discovered that some of the new mayor’s officers
were also responsible for spreading “a malicious slander against our minister and
preacher” because the preacher had exhorted them, the Sunday before the mayoral
election, to make “an orderly and charitable election.”34

According to Robert Bowes, newly made treasurer of Berwick, matters among
the townsmen had hardly settled down four years later. In August 1576 Bowes
reported to Burghley that while the captains and the soldiers rested “very quiet,"
“obedient and in good love and concord amongst themselves,” the townsmen “after
their accustomed manner,” were all “in mutual discord and contention.” “Some of the
wealthier sort and others,” Bowes explained, had “newly complained of the mayor
and aldermen, for the disorders used in the election of the mayor, the exactions
imposed upon the poor, and [the] wrongful disenfranchisement of divers freemen.”
Bowes took a dim view of this conflict, expressing to Burghley how their “debate and
malice hath wasted their wealth and substance, to the great hurt of this town.”35

Whether officers and garrison soldiers alike shared this negative opinion of the
mayor and brethren is a matter for speculation. But the incident in the church,
together with the comments of Drury and Bowes, renders it likely and so does the
behaviour of William Widdrington, provost marshal. In January 1584, William

34 TNA, SP59/18, f. 163. Drury and Lovel to the privy council. 6 October 1572.
35 TNA, SP59/19, f. 235. Bowes to Burghley, 16 August 1576.
Widdrington accosted the mayor in his own home. The provost entered into a tirade against the mayor and “about a dozen times did call [him] a scab and a shitten scab.” Not surprisingly the mayor demanded that the provost leave, but Widdrington refused. He stated that the mayor “had no commission to command him” and so continued with his “marvellous evil speeches.” In the end, Widdrington’s refusal compelled the mayor to send for the marshal to remove the provost from his house. What was worse for the mayor than the incident itself was that word of the altercation had spread around town. The mayor thought that William Widdrington’s disdain of his dignity compromised his authority.36

According to the townsmen, this sort of behaviour was not unusual for the provost marshal. Ever since he had come to town, William Widdrington had “condemned and despised” the townsmen and encouraged others to degrade the mayor’s authority. He supported anyone who did so. The provost’s “busy and restless…head hath been the chief instrument in setting on and procuring” his brother Henry, the marshal of Berwick, “to use very hard governance” towards the townsmen.37 Indeed, Henry Widdrington’s attitude toward the townsmen was no better than his brother’s. Since the beginning of Henry’s tenure as marshal he had “often times openly reviled, railed upon and miscalled the mayor, aldermen and other officers” by calling them “villains, knaves and rascals.” Further, Henry had “in his

36 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 21v-22r. The mayor of Berwick to Hunsdon, 13 January 1584.
37 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 22r-v. The brethren of Berwick to Hunsdon, 12 January 1584.
fury and misgovernment…openly said that he would take the staff of authority from
the mayor and put him in prison” and “that the soldiers should take the townsmen by
the ears in the street.” He added that he himself would begin with the mayor.\footnote{TNA, SP59/22, f. 223. It was also clear by this point that Henry Widdrington was not being led by his brother, William, but that the marshal was allowing his brother to act as he pleased. The townsmen claimed that Henry permitted his brother to “misuse the mayor and townsmen,” “to miscall and revile them,” and to “intrude upon the mayor’s office, and to do what he list without controlment.”}

Governor Hunsdon himself had occasion to lament his marshal’s disposition. In the summer of 1586, Hunsdon recounted how he had often recommended that Widdrington “forbear the raging speeches” that he “commonly use[d] to all men.” But Hunsdon thought he asked in vain. Widdrington’s inclination to sharp words was “so bred in the bone and so rooted in” him that Hunsdon concluded that there was “small hope of any amendment.”\footnote{TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 46v-47r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, c. June 1586.} To be sure, Henry Widdrington was not a pleasant man. But Widdrington’s attitude towards the town establishment of Berwick was surely also informed by his conception of his personal authority and his authority as marshal of Berwick. The ambiguous jurisdictional relationship between the mayor and brethren of Berwick, and the governor and his officers, fuelled conflict between town and garrison. While marshal Henry Widdrington was more abrasive than most other garrison officers, he nevertheless shared the same general attitude as the rest: that garrison officers were superior to the mayor and the other townsmen.

Indeed, Governor Hunsdon stated this once quite explicitly: the garrison captains
were “far better in all respects both in degree and reputation” than the townsmen, saving the mayor, who was only respected because of his office. Hunsdon, as we shall see, might be just as acerbic as the Widdringtons.

In 1560 the queen made the governor, the marshal, the treasurer and the porter her governing council for Berwick. The roles of the treasurer and the porter were fairly straightforward: the treasurer paid the garrison upon musters witnessed by the governor and the marshal. The porter kept the keys to the town gates, and ensured the proper locking of the gates. The marshal was second only to the governor, and as such, had greater responsibilities with regard to the order and security of the town. He set the watch and visited it personally from time to time to see it properly kept. The marshal also exercised control over the population of Berwick. He was supposed to see that “no person born out of the queen’s majesty’s allegiance” stayed more than two nights within the town without special license from the governor. The marshal was also, it seems, marshal in the old west sense: the queen swore him to “arrest all manner of persons that do break the peace, and either by imprisonment or by bond see the peace duly kept.” By the new orders of 1560, the governor’s job was to call together the other members of the council and to give

40 The porter was also sworn to inform the governor, or the council in his absence, of “any tidings of intelligence” that should be made known to him.
41 The governor’s oath stipulated that, in times of the governor’s absence from Berwick, he was to appoint the marshal his deputy.
42 BL, Lansdowne 155, f. 274. It is not entirely clear here if by “all manner of persons” the queen meant everyone in Berwick, or simply all persons in the queen’s pay.
“faithful and diligent council to all…officers of the said town and marches for the safeguard and good governance thereof.”43 When the queen reissued her “new orders” in 1563, on the Earl of Bedford’s assumption of the governorship, she used more direct language when it came to the governor’s role. “For the politique preservation and governance of that town,” she wrote, “we do ordain the authority for the governance thereof to remain in our said governor.”44 The governor remained responsible for calling together the appointed councillors, but this time the queen explicitly stated that he did this “in order to rule and govern the said town and garrison according to the statutes and orders and ancient customs thereof.”45

The governor ensured that all the officers performed their duties in good order, including the mayor. The governor was to see “that the mayor and his brethren…[did] their duties for the commonweal according to their jurisdiction.”46 Thus, while it appears that the governor possessed overarching authority over the town, the mayor also had a particular jurisdiction: an area over which he held supreme authority second only to the governor or, perhaps, equal to him within that sphere. This rendered the position of the mayor of Berwick quite similar to the position of the other paid officers in the town, except that matters that fell under his purview were less well defined by the queen’s orders. Explicit definitions of the

43 Ibid.
44 TNA, SP59/7, f. 169.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
mayor’s jurisdiction were scarce. On two occasions, Governor Hunsdon defined the
mayor’s authority as extending over the townsmen and their activities, but not in any
way over the men in pay or over the physical geography of the town. Reacting to the
news that his provost marshal had accosted the mayor in his own home, Hunsdon
informed Marshal Widdrington that such a thing was not to happen to any man in his
own house, but especially not to the mayor of Berwick. The mayor was a fellow
“principal officer” of the queen and had, “for the government of that town,” as “much
authority as either you or I have for the garrison.”

On another occasion, not long after the incident involving the mayor and the
provost marshal, Hunsdon again articulated his understanding of the authority of the
mayor with respect to his own. On 24 January 1584, the mayor and brethren wrote
Hunsdon and informed him that they had recently searched the watch. They were
distressed to discover the “great fault” they found therein. Hunsdon reacted angrily
to the townsmen’s actions and on 1 February 1584, he wrote his council at Berwick to
enquire as to how the mayor managed to get onto the walls. In order to do so the
mayor must have had the watchword, something he was not to have because he was
not a member of the queen’s council for Berwick. The mayor was to be present on

47 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 23 r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 22 January 1584.
48 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 24 r-v. The mayor and brethren of Berwick to Hunsdon, 24 January 1584.
the council only when summoned to address “matters of the government of the
townsmen and not of the town.”

By Hunsdon’s formulation the governor, and in his absence the marshal,
possessed authority over both the garrison and the town itself: since Berwick was a
fortified town, almost completely surrounded by fortifications, the governor’s
authority extended over the physical territory of the town. The phrasing of the
queen’s orders certainly made it seem that the governor and his officers had superior
authority to the mayor for both the garrison and the town. It therefore made sense
that garrison officers should think themselves superior to, and be somewhat
dismissive of, the authority of the mayor and his brethren. That said, it is clear that
Hunsdon believed that the mayor’s authority was supreme within his own
jurisdiction, which Hunsdon defined as extending over only the townspeople. So the
mayor might reasonably argue, and he did, that his inspection of the walls was
justified because he was a sworn an officer of the queen and by that oath had
promised to keep Berwick safe. The government of the townspeople included
ensuring their safety. By inspecting the watch, therefore, he merely kept his oath.

49 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 25 r-v. Hunsdon to the marshal, gentleman porter and
treasurer of Berwick, 1 February 1584. Hunsdon makes reference here to the
stipulation, found in the queen’s new orders of 1560 (and in the reissue of these in
1563), that the governor has authority to call to his council “any other wise
man…only to give advice, but not to be accepted as our councillor of that town.”
BL, Lansdowne 155, f. 274.
While the civic and military governors of Berwick-upon-Tweed possessed written orders to assist them in the government of the garrison and the town, the ambiguities that obtained within those orders meant they were subject to the interpretation of those who occupied the various offices of government. The boundary between the jurisdiction of the governor and the mayor was in the eye of the beholder and, as we have seen elsewhere, this condition often served to exacerbate jurisdictional conflict. One’s sense of one’s authority and place within the social and political hierarchy often shaped one’s behaviour. Many garrison officers viewed the townsmen, and their behaviour, with disdain. But Widdrington’s disdain was almost invariably abusive and violent. Of course, Widdrington was the deputy of a largely absentee governor: Hunsdon was present in Berwick only occasionally. Widdrington was, effectively, in charge most of the time, and likely profited from the buying and selling of pays that ran rampant in the garrison. Moreover, the particularities of border government also likely played a part here. The Widdringtons were amongst the gentry families that rose to prominence in border government after

50 It is possible, as K.J. Kesselring notes, that the conflicts between town and garrison during the Elizabethan period, but especially during Widdrington’s tenure, are simply better documented. Widdrington’s behaviour was, however, bad enough that it spurred on a change in the attitudes and behaviours of the townsmen themselves, which is indicative that its prominence in the historical record is a function of more than just the vagaries of the historical record. K.J. Kesselring, “‘Berwick is our England’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town,” in Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England, eds. Norman L. Jones and Daniel Woolf (London: Palgrave, 2007), 99.
the fall of traditional northern magnates such as the Percies. Local family prominence may well have shaped William Widdrington’s sense of his own authority and the deference that he thought others owed him; particularly, perhaps, from the townsmen of Berwick, who themselves existed outside the jurisdiction of Northumberland officials. The animosity between Widdrington and the townsmen of Berwick might be an example of just the kind of “jarrings” about jurisdictions mentioned in the response to the Plymouth townsmen’s claims. Whatever its root, Widdrington’s behaviour annoyed Governor Hunsdon just as it did the mayor and aldermen. This did not, however, result in warm relations between the governor and the town.

“I will rule them, and they not me.”

In May 1584, the townsmen lodged a written complaint about Marshal Widdrington to Governor Hunsdon. They alleged that, besides his abusive and threatening language, Widdrington regularly contravened the orders of the town and hindered the mayor in the execution of his office, particularly in the “due administration of justice.” Widdrington, claimed the townsmen, “hath been a

51 Ellis, “Civilizing Northumberland,” 117. William Widdrington’s father had been deputy warden of the east march in the 1530s, during which time Henry VIII himself had been the warden. On the shift from aristocratic to gentry prominence in border government and society, see Watts, From Border to Middle Shire, 55–60, 264–265.

52 Watts, 15. The town of Berwick was not incorporated into Northumberland until 1842.
bolsterer, maintainer and defender of sundry persons, so that no law nor justice might be done upon them, and he hath taken sundry persons forth of the mayor’s person, and from his officers, after they have been arrested.” The marshal was not bothered that the mayor and bailiff of Berwick claimed that they “ever have had the punishment of all bloodwights, malefactors and felons within that town.” Only recently, for example, Widdrington had taken a murderer from the custody of the mayor and bailiffs, and given him “such convenience and liberty as the like hath not been seen in that town.”53 These actions, the townsmen worried, might encourage people to take the mayor’s authority less seriously.

In addition to overstepping his authority, the townsmen wrote, Widdrington was also bad at his job. He and his brother, the provost marshal, were “careless in looking into the ancient orders, statutes and rules of the town.” They “suffered great want of watchmen upon the walls.” Widdrington had his servants exclude cattle from common fields and licensed Scottish cattle to be kept and fed there instead, contrary “to the statute and orders of the town.”54 About a month or so after lodging their complaint about Widdrington, the townsmen submitted a set of the petitions to the privy council of which Hunsdon was by this time a member. Although framed in general terms, it is clear the behaviour of the marshal was the cause. Two of the petitions dealt with men in pay engaging in activities prohibited by the queen’s orders.

53 TNA, SP59/22, f. 223. The townsmen claimed that Widdrington also threatened to discharge “sundry of the coroners” who had found the death to be “wilful murder.”
54 Ibid.
The townsmen asked that garrison soldiers be restrained from “feat or trade of merchandize” and that they be restrained “from exercising any handicraft,” “fishing,” and “from keeping tippling houses or hostelry.” The governor agreed that soldiers were prohibited from engaging in such activities, and to his knowledge, no one had ever denied this was so. The townsmen begged to differ, responding that both the soldiers and the victualler “intermeddle with the traffic of sundry commodities” and that the marshal freely allowed them to do so. As to the second matter, that of handicrafts and tippling houses: it was true, the townsmen alleged, that after a former complaint Hunsdon had set down orders prohibiting men in pay from engaging in such activities. Such men nonetheless persisted in so doing and when the mayor complained to the marshal, the latter proved “altogether careless for the reformation of such disorders.”

Given that the mayor had no authority to compel the garrison men to refrain from any of these activities, the townsmen were entirely reliant on Widdrington to see the soldiers properly restrained. Thus, the townsmen’s second petition to the privy council requested that the mayor and bailiffs “exercise jurisdiction over all persons in pay and that they may have like remedy for recovery of debts against a soldier as a soldier may have against them.” Hunsdon responded that this “may not in anywise be granted or allowed.” Soldiers shall continue to be tried only in the marshal’s court, where they will receive “as good justice, with as good expedition as in

55 TNA, SP59/22, f. 243.
the town's court, if the marshal does his duty.” There, of course, was the rub: according to the townsmen, Widdrington had only held one court in two years. The orders of the town, they claimed, stipulated that the marshal hold his court only at his discretion. The marshal held the court whenever he pleased, and it did not please Widdrington to do so very often.56

This sense that Widdrington was a rather incompetent marshal was not peculiar to the Berwick town government. That Henry Widdrington was unwilling or unable to follow Hunsdon’s exhortations was a constant undercurrent of his marshalship. Hunsdon found much to criticize in Widdrington. Widdrington was poor at gathering intelligence and keeping Hunsdon abreast of the situation north of the border.57 Worse still, Widdrington took a relaxed attitude toward enforcing Hunsdon’s directives to the garrison. The captains persisted in taking in and dismissing soldiers at their own discretion, despite Hunsdon’s commands to the contrary. Widdrington, it seems, possessed a willingness to wink at garrison

56 Ibid.
57 On 10 September 1582, Hunsdon wrote to berate his marshal for not having written since the fifth. In “such a time of altercations,” wrote Hunsdon, Widdrington should write even if he has nothing but old news. This, at least, would show Widdrington’s “diligence.” Instead, however, it revealed Widdrington’s insufficiency: if Widdrington “had anybody in Scotland,” he “would not want matter to write of daily.” TNA, WO55/1939, f. 8v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 10 September 1582. Hunsdon upbraided Widdrington for lack of intelligence again in November 1585, calling it one of Widdrington’s “greatest faults.” TNA, WO55/1939, f. 41r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 6 November 1585.
infractions.\textsuperscript{58} Besides the captains’ activities, “the garrison men’s’ lying outside of the town” was a situation growing “worse and worse.” Hunsdon saw “great fault” in Widdrington for allowing such behaviour to persist and asked him to be more careful with his charge and to “suffer not everybody to do what they list.”\textsuperscript{59}

But the disobedience continued apace. In January 1589, Hunsdon told Widdrington how sorry he was to discover that both the orders of the town and the orders that he set down in council at his last visit had not been well observed since his departure. Although Hunsdon had forbidden soldiers to marry when he was last in Berwick, he understood that a number of marriages had taken place since his departure. Moreover, the admission of local men into bands continued, as did the soldiers’ habit of staying outside of the town. To be sure, this illustrated the “carelessness” of the captains toward their duties, but it also illustrated Widdrington’s “small care” of his duty towards the queen’s service and the government of the town. Indeed, there was nothing Hunsdon ordered should not be done, but that Widdrington suffered it to occur.\textsuperscript{60}

Finally, Widdrington might be as caustic and quarrelsome in his relations with his fellow officers as he was with the townsmen. Widdrington quarrelled with Robert Vernon, the victualler, but his ongoing enmity appears to have been mainly

\textsuperscript{58} Although there is no direct evidence to support such an assertion, it is also distinctly possible that Widdrington also profited somehow from the sale of places in the garrison.
\textsuperscript{59} TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 6v and 62r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 11 July 1587.
\textsuperscript{60} TNA, WO55/1939, f. 73r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 9 January 1589.
with John Selby, the gentleman porter of Berwick and the deputy warden of the East March. In December 1583 Selby appointed three or four garrison men to ride with him on some wardenry business. Hunsdon heard by Selby’s son Rafe, who was in London, that Widdrington “used hard speeches” toward Selby and accused him of overstepping his authority. Hunsdon marvelled “not a little” that Widdrington acted this way toward Selby. Hunsdon reminded Widdrington that he and Selby were both his deputies, and that as Widdrington had “authority within the town,” so had Selby “as much for the wardenry.” More importantly, however, Hunsdon had previously informed Widdrington that if Selby needed some garrison horsemen to ride with him, or some footmen to lie in the marches for a time, he was to have them. He then lectured Widdrington that such quarrelling between officers did not serve the queen’s interests, nor their respective credits. Widdrington would do well in future to remember that.

---

61 And, therefore, in charge of the wardenry in Hunsdon’s absence.
62 TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 20r-v and 21r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 21 December 1583. Widdrington refused Selby again in August 1585. Selby had requested 100 Berwick men for service in the country, a request not fulfilled by Widdrington on the grounds that he was afraid that if any “fray” should occur, the Scots might besiege Berwick. We might give Widdrington some credit here: he did follow Hunsdon’s advice, and did not use “hard speeches” or make accusations against Selby, but rather attempted to find a legitimate reason to refuse him. Still, Hunsdon found Widdrington’s reasons “slender” and potentially threatening to the safety of the country. Besides, Widdrington once again defied Hunsdon’s command that Selby receive any assistance he should require. But refuse Selby assistance was not all that Widdrington had done. Selby had also taken some prisoners in the country, and delivered them into Haddock’s Hole in Berwick to be executed. Instead, Widdrington delivered the prisoners to the sheriff of Northumberland. Whether Widdrington did this out of
After the incident between Widdrington’s brother and the mayor, Hunsdon expressed to his marshal how he was not only “sorry[,] but greatly ashamed” at having placed “such an officer there as hath neither respect [of his] own credit, nor any regard to your duty toward her majesty’s or care of [Hunsdon’s] own credit.” Indeed, it is curious, in light of the constant rebukes, that Hunsdon did not replace Widdrington with someone more willing, or more capable, in the post of marshal of Berwick. Instead, Hunsdon attempted to threaten Widdrington into obedience by regularly intimating to Widdrington that he was the only thing standing between the marshal and the queen’s wrath. After all, the queen already did not approve of Hunsdon’s choice of Widdrington as marshal, or so Hunsdon claimed. Following the mayor’s complaint about Widdrington’s brother, Hunsdon told Widdrington that the queen already knew of his “insufficiency for that place.” Indeed, for “preferring” Widdrington to it, Hunsdon has had his “part at her majesty’s hands.” Hunsdon then intimated that it was a good thing that the mayor had made his complaint to Hunsdon, for if the mayor were to complain to the queen, Hunsdon warned, “it would go harder with you then you think.”

ignorance or malice is not clear, but Hunsdon expressed surprise at this action, given that no court may fetch anyone out of the town, prisoner or no, without an express warrant from the governor. TNA, WO55/1939, f. 37r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 11 August 1585.

63 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 23r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 22 January 1584.
64 Ibid. Hunsdon trod a similar path with Widdrington after the townsmen’s 1584 complaint against the marshal. Again, if the matter were to come to the queen’s attention, “she would think you an unfit man to serve in that place.” Hunsdon
The Berwick townsmen and the governor had the same problem: Widdrington. From the townsmen’s perspective, Widdrington did not see the garrison governed according to the statutes and orders by which it was supposed to be governed, and compromised the safety and prosperity of the town. Governor Hunsdon thought much the same way. One might assume, then, that the governor and the townsmen shared some common ground here, some basis for cooperation. In fact, the opposite was true. Considering what we know of Hunsdon’s opinion of Widdrington, the following ringing endorsement of Widdrington’s abilities seems a surprising about face for the governor. Writing in response to the latest set of complaints about Widdrington, Hunsdon called the mayor and burgesses of Berwick “malliperts” for writing so accusingly of his “world wise and discreet” marshal. Moreover, the town’s assertion of the marshal’s weakness was outright false: it was “well known” that Widdrington “hath both carefully, diligently and dutifully behaved himself in his

reminds Widdrington that he has had small thanks from the queen for recommending him for the marshalship and, indeed, that the queen did not really think that much of Widdrington. Hunsdon wrote that the queen had many times “been in hand” with Hunsdon for Widdrington’s dismissal. Still, Hunsdon had “pacified” the queen for the time being, but intimated that if the mayor were to make a complaint directly to her, “she will [be] very ready to take hold of it.” TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 29r-30v. Hunsdon to Widdrington. 23 May 1584. Hunsdon made similar comments to Widdrington on numerous further occasions. See: TNA, WO55/1939, f. 36r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 27 July 1585; TNA, WO55/1939, f. 39r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 25 September 1585; TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 61v and 62r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 11 July 1587.
However much Hunsdon had cause to lament his choice of marshal, the governor had very little patience with townsmen who presumed to dictate to him how to rule his officers.

Henry, Lord Hunsdon, was a man jealous of his authority, who disliked anything he perceived as an encroachment on his rightful jurisdiction or that might set a precedent for future encroachments. Hunsdon felt this way toward both the garrison and the town. When in 1583 Hunsdon instructed Widdrington to correct the captains’ habit of placing and discharging soldiers without the marshal’s permission, he instructed his deputy to inform the captains that he marvelled how “any of them dare either deal contemptuously or make any precedent of my Lord of Bedford’s sufferance and thereby accompt it as due to them.” To drive home the point, Hunsdon instructed Widdrington to read the captains the pertinent part of the establishment, “for they shall know well that I will not bear this at their hands; I will rule them and they not me.”

To wink at infractions of the establishment diminished Hunsdon’s authority as governor. Soldiers and captains were not to interpret the rules, but rather to obey them. Suffering disobedience only encouraged disobedience and so was not tolerable. In January 1590 Hunsdon told Widdrington of his surprise upon hearing from the town that garrison men continued to engage in brewing and baking, despite the fact

---

65 TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 86r-87v. Hunsdon to the mayor and burgesses of Berwick, 10 January 1590.
66 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 8r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 1 March 1583.
that Hunsdon had reminded them via proclamation of the prohibition placed on these activities by the establishment. The governor instructed Widdrington to see his proclamation put into immediate execution and to make an example of those who disobeyed. “For if we suffer any of that garrison to disobey proclamations in that sort,” Hunsdon said, “they will seek to overrule us in great matters.”

Addressing the matter of soldiers’ brewing and baking to the townsmen, however, Hunsdon trivializes the soldiers’ infractions against the establishment. The townsmen made many “grievous complaints” about the large number of soldiers engaged in these activities. Hunsdon, by contrast, was credibly informed that only about forty soldiers engaged in such activities, a number that really did not amount to a great “impoverishment to your town.” Indeed, the townsmen did nothing but complain “about the poor garrison,” by which they “chiefly live[d]” and without whom they were “not able to live but very poorly.” Hunsdon wondered why the townsmen might not just let the soldiers alone in their disobedience: might the townsmen not “be contented to let [the soldiers] enjoy some small help amongst you being not a whit prejudicial to yourselves.” The governor conceded to the town that if this behaviour was forbidden by the establishment, then he would see it stopped. At the same time, the townsmen should be careful what they wish for: the strict enforcement of the rules might harm the town as much as protect it. The townsmen claimed that in retaliation for their complaint against the soldiers, the captains had

67 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 87r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 13 January 1590.
commanded their men not to “send to...freemen for ale,” visit their houses, nor buy any “wares or commodities” from them. Hunsdon told the townsmen that this was fair play: “I do allow them very well” to so command the soldiers, “for since you will live so absolutely of yourselves and stand so precisely upon your privileges they are likewise to do the like for themselves.” “I have hear an old saying,” continued the governor, “that one good turn asketh another, therefore, if you will make such strangers to them as to suffer them to receive no benefit by you, they have reason to take order that you shall receive as little by them, and therein they do you no injury.”

When the mayor took it upon himself to search the watch in January 1584, he informed the marshal of the alarming deficiencies he found there. On the mayor’s information, the marshal called on the provost and the clerk of the watch, “at whose examination [the marshal] did exempt the mayor who,” the townsmen claimed, “in office and duty is deeply sworn and charged to the safety of this town.” To this, the governor replied that the mayor and his brethren were not counsellors appointed by the queen and, therefore, not only was the marshal correct in excluding them from their examinations, they should also not have had the watchword that enabled them to go onto the walls in the first place. Hunsdon viewed both these actions as attempts

---

68 TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 82r-v and 81r. Hunsdon to the mayor and brethren of Berwick, 30 September 1589.

69 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 24r-v. The mayor and brethren of Berwick to Hunsdon, 24 January 1584.
on the part of the Berwick town establishment to “intrude” themselves into the
government of the garrison, something that Hunsdon would not suffer. The watch,
Hunsdon informed the townsmen, “appertains not unto you” and the governor did
not like “to have you advertise to me of any disorder or negligence to be used by any
officer there.” Furthermore, the townsmen were swift to complain “if any of the
garrison do intermeddle in any matter of your corporation,” and yet they freely
intruded into matters under Hunsdon’s charge. This led Hunsdon to believe that the
mayor was one “of those that if one give you an inch you will take a mile”: since the
council allowed the mayor to sit with them sometimes, the mayor now accounted
such a position as his right.

A few years later we find Hunsdon similarly incensed with the presumption of
the mayor and townsmen. The mayor had written to Hunsdon on 10 July, protesting
Hunsdon’s order that the meadows surrounding Berwick be divided amongst the
soldiers, rather than run for in the usual manner. This interruption to customary
practice vexed the townspeople, claimed the mayor, particularly since Hunsdon
himself had sanctioned running day in the past. When Hunsdon wrote to Marshal
Widdrington about a week or so later, he was unhappy that the townsmen wrote “so

---
70 This “running day” or “mowing day” appears frequently in the Berwick record. According to the mayor, running day had occurred “ever since Berwick has been English” and was done in order to “encourage every man,” soldier as well as townsman, to keep “good and speedy geldings.” What exactly occurred here is difficult to ascertain, but it appeared to have been some kind of race or competition, by which the participants laid claim to allotments of hay. TNA, WO55/1939, f. 50r-v. The mayor of Berwick to Hunsdon, 10 July 1586.
proudly and arrogantly” to him. Hunsdon argued that running day had not occurred for twenty years before Hunsdon assumed the governorship. When Hunsdon became governor, he ordered the running “for some reasons then me moving,” but has since ordered the fields divided and on those previous occasions had no “mislike” from the town. But now, the townsmen “intrude themselves into more authority within the fields then ever their ancestors did or they can show authority for.” He warned his marshal that he did “not mean to have part of my authority abridged by them,” and that he would see his orders followed, no matter how much the townsmen might “grudge at it.”

As we have seen, Hunsdon was not pleased with the comportment of his long serving deputy, Henry Widdrington. It was a displeasure that, as Hunsdon himself intimated, caused him trouble not only among the garrison, but among the queen and others at the centre of English government with whom he spent most of his days. Hunsdon’s concerns about the behaviour of his marshal did not derive from a concern about the wellbeing or good government of the townspeople of Berwick, but rather about how his own inability to control his marshal, and discipline his garrison,

---

71 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 51r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 18 July 1586.
72 In the summer of 1587, a letter condemning the state of the Berwick garrison under the government of William Widdrington reached Burghley’s hands. It caused Burghley to remark to Hunsdon that he was perhaps as little worthy of the queen’s trust as Sir John Forster, warden of the middle march. At the time of Burghley’s remark, Hunsdon was tasked with determining the octogenarian Forster’s competence as warden. Watts, From Border to Middle Shire, 101. The letter by one Robert Arden, townsman of Berwick, is also discussed in Kesselring, “Berwick is our England,” 103-104.
reflected upon him. From a modern viewpoint, it is unclear why Hunsdon simply did not sack his marshal. The office of marshal was in his gift as governor, and so it was within his ability to do so. But he did not. Henry Widdrington died as marshal of Berwick. Likewise, Hunsdon died as governor of Berwick. Both men remained in their offices despite the queen’s and Cecil’s periodic displeasure with their performances. There is an interesting parallel, therefore, between Hunsdon’s attitude toward his marshal and the town of Berwick, and the attitudes of those at the centre of government towards the crown selected garrison captains and the town authorities with which they sometimes crossed swords. Hunsdon admonished Widdrington to behave better, much like the central government admonished Gorges and Poynings, even Hunsdon himself, to do the same. But while admonition occurred, dismissal did not: choices, once made, were maintained. Likewise, the jurisdiction of the garrison and the authority of its head were defended in spite of complaints of bad government. When the town criticized Hunsdon’s deputy, Hunsdon closed ranks: he would not allow lesser men to dictate how he ought to govern his subordinates.

“Berwick is Our England”

In Hunsdon’s response to the running day fracas we detect not only the governor’s sensitivity concerning the boundaries of his authority, but also a sense that the townsmen’s demeanour was something new. On numerous occasions, the governor remarked that the mayor and townsmen seemed more prone than their
predecessors to complain about the garrison, the strict enforcement of the ancient customs and statutes or lay claim to authority that was not in their possession. In the autumn of 1583 the mayor and aldermen told Hunsdon that they wished to forbid all Scots from retailing in Berwick. While Hunsdon reckoned they were fully within their right to do this, such a practice had “been omitted” for such a long time that the reintroduction would lead some to think it an “innovation.” But the townsmen claimed that they were “utterly undone” unless the Scottish men were restrained, even though they “never found fault withal heretofore.”73 Some years later, in response to the town’s latest complaints about Widdrington, Hunsdon struck a similar note. The governor had received the mayor’s latest missive, which in his opinion differed little from most of their previous. It was full of “exclaiming of the government, officers and the whole garrison for such matters [that] in former times,” when their wiser and graver fathers lived, was “never exclaimed of or misliked.” It seemed to Hunsdon that the townsfolk would never be satisfied unless they had “thoroughly [their] own wills[,] though it be unjust and unfit in many things.”74

Not only were the town’s complaints more frequent, Hunsdon thought they were also more unreasonable. In March 1583 the mayor informed Hunsdon that himself and four brethren intended to come to London to see to the renewal of their “charter and liberties” and pursue some other suits on behalf of the town. Hunsdon

74 TNA, WO55/1939, ff. 86r–87r. Hunsdon to the mayor and brethren of Berwick, 10 January 1590.
reminded the mayor that as a “principal officer” of the town he was not to leave without special license from the governor or his deputy, and usually for “weightier causes than this.” Hunsdon ordered the mayor to stay in Berwick, and send “a couple” of capable men to London to pursue the town’s business. Hunsdon then made a point of observing that previous emissaries from Berwick tarried very long in London because of the “unreasonableness of your demands.” Hunsdon intimated that the time these men spent in the south might be shortened, and the town saved considerable expense, if the town’s “suits be more reasonable than they have been heretofore.”

Hunsdon’s detection of a change in the townsmen’s attitude was not a figment of his imagination. Following the death of former mayor Martin Garnett in 1579, the Berwick town establishment made a concerted effort to stop the kind of infighting Drury described to Cecil in 1572. What followed was a strengthening of corporate identity amongst the townsmen; a sense, it seems, of common cause. One gets a sense of this unity, and Hunsdon’s dislike of it, from the townsmen’s 1582 letter to alderman Edward Merry, then in London on the town’s business. In this letter, the townsmen expressed their doubt that Merry might “prevail in [their] petition touching the augmentation of the mayor” and other unspecified suits pertaining to the maintenance of their “poor Liberty.” Since success was not likely, they encouraged Merry to return home. Still, they hoped in due time to make the queen

---

75 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 11v. Hunsdon to the mayor and aldermen of Berwick, 14 March 1583.
76 Kesselring, “‘Berwick is our England’,” 101.
aware of the “poor estate” of Berwick, of “what contempt and disliking” is heaped on
the mayor and townsmen by “those that her majesty hath placed here for the uphold
and maintenance of the peace.” The townsmen were certain that once the queen
became aware of the situation, she would take matters in hand so that people would
be encouraged to live in Berwick “under a politque state and government.” The
question was how to make Elizabeth I aware of their plight, for one of the main
avenues of access to the queen had been closed to them. The townsmen told Merry
that they had been very hopeful that his present mission would be successful, since
the governor of Berwick had many times promised them his friendship, and the
furtherance of their suits to the queen. They now realized, however, that the
governor was “not so willing to prefer [their] suits as [they] expected.”

Some of the clearest articulations of the townsmen’s corporate affinity came in
the wake of the death of Marshal Widdrington. Widdrington died on 9 March 1593,
after serving for more than a decade as marshal of Berwick. On 13 March the
townsmen of Berwick wrote Lord Burghley informing him of the marshal’s death.
The townsmen knew that another would take Widdrington’s place and requested that
“choice be made of some wise and well qualified person…with sufficient wealth to
live of his own without oppressing others.” They hoped the replacement would be
someone who would observe “the ancient and new laws established for…government

77 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 6r-v. To Edward Merry from the mayor and brethren of
Berwick, 4 June 1582.
here.” Widdrington’s government had nearly “undone” the town; a replacement who observed the town’s rightful privileges would allow the town to thrive and, as a result, enhance the town’s “military estate.” The townsmen made this link between civic prosperity and martial effectiveness more explicit in another letter, this time to the queen herself. The letter began with a rehearsal of the abuses committed by the garrison and the queen’s officers in the town of Berwick. The townsmen argue that the behaviour of these officers, sent by the queen to safeguard the town, actually placed it in greater jeopardy. The townspeople, on the other hand, had a vested interest in the safety of the town, their home. The mayor informed the queen that “Berwick is our England”: the place where the townsmen, their wives and children lived, worked and prospered. Unlike the soldiers, the townspeople “have no other country” besides Berwick-upon-Tweed and, therefore, the townspeople and the queen have an equal interest in the safety of the town. In fact, at that moment, the townspeople served her better in this regard than the officers of the garrison.

Such an argument was not only a reiteration of the mayor’s justification for searching the walls, it was an argument that also bore a similarity to those forwarded by the town of Plymouth in aid of its claim to the captaincy of the new fort. Indeed, it was similar to the link between civic prosperity, good defence and the greater safety of the state articulated in the crown’s reasons for granting Portsmouth its charter of

---

78 BL, Lansdowne 73, no.18.
79 TNA, SP59/28, f.11.
incorporation. The mayor’s sentiment that “Berwick is our England” and the corollary argument that the townsmen would vigorously defend their home were not only an expression of Berwick’s sense of corporate identity, but also a tactic of negotiation. They were meant to persuade the queen that the town’s interests and the national interest, of which the queen had particular care, actually coalesced. And, as with the townsmen of Plymouth, this argument was not simply a ploy. The townsmen of Berwick likely believed what they claimed: that their particular care for their home would, in fact, result in the better protection of England as a whole.

As it did with the Plymouth townsmen’s arguments, so the central government did with Berwick’s: it rejected them. In spite of the town’s complaints and, again, in spite of the periodic displeasure the queen and others might harbour towards Hunsdon and his government of the garrison, there was no alteration to the structure of government. Indeed, it appears that the central government was content, for the time being, to continue the Carey family’s possession of the government of Berwick. Hunsdon took the town’s overtures to Burghley and the queen following the death of Widdrington predictably poorly.\(^{80}\) We “have received a most bitter letter from” Hunsdon, the deputy mayor wrote Burghley in April 1593, in which the governor informed them that he intended to send his son, John Carey, to act as governor in his absence. The townsmen wished that they had “not cause to fear the

\(^{80}\) In addition to the abovementioned letters to Burghley, the mayor of Berwick wrote two letters to the queen enumerating the abuses inflicted on the town by her officers there. TNA, SP59/28, f. 11 and TNA, SP59/28, f. 31.
sequel” but fear him they did, particularly considering “that his honour in his said letter intendeth himself, his son, Mr. Vernon, other officers and captains to be all one party against us.” What duly followed was another decade of strife between the mayor and townsmen of Berwick, and the officers of the garrison led by John Carey, Hunsdon’s son.

What ultimately ended the strife between the town and garrison was the ascension of a new monarch, James VI/I. Only months after taking the throne, James VI/I established a commission for dissolving the garrison at Berwick. After Christmas 1603, the king reduced the garrison to 100 footmen under the charge of a captain, not a governor, “and such usual officers as are entertained in a company of a hundred foot.” James VI/I ordered the commissioners to select 100 of the oldest and most able of the garrison to form this company. The offices of governor, marshal, treasurer and gentleman porter ceased. The captains and officers of individual bands were permitted to stay in Berwick, and receive full pay until their deaths. The remainder of the garrison was dispersed, at the king’s charge. If they so chose, the king paid for dismissed men to join another military outfit. Common soldiers could go to Ireland, Flushing or Brill; the gunners to the Tower of London or into the navy. The bankrupts among them were simply put out of pay.82

---

81 TNA, SP59/28, f. 13.
82 TNA, SP14/5/5.
In January 1604 James VI/I issued new orders for the 100 remaining men, to be enforced by William Bowyer, their captain. The captain remained responsible for the military discipline of his soldiers, their admission and dismissal from the band and their attendance at musters and alarms. Offences committed by soldiers that were “punishable by the laws of our realm,” however, were to be “left to the trial of the law” and not administered by the captain. Likewise, offences that occurred between townsmen and soldiers were henceforth to be examined “by the mayor and officers of the town.”

Furthermore, the town’s new charter of 30 April 1604 vested the “custody and government of the gates,” and the keys to the same, in the hands of the mayor. By 1604, then, the captain of the rump of Berwick’s garrison possessed a more tenuous authority and jurisdiction than did his counterparts at England’s other garrisons.

The placement of the captain’s authority more firmly under that of the mayor’s was, perhaps, a sign that James VI/I saw the 100-man remainder of the garrison as a temporary measure. To be sure, not everyone thought the disbandment of the Berwick garrison was a good idea. While the precise fate of the garrison was still unclear, an unknown author put to paper the reasons why the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed ought to continue without alteration. The author was at pains to refute those who “maliciously” claimed “that Berwick was ordained for a partition

---

83 TNA, SP14/6/6.
84 Scott, Berwick-upon-Tweed, 323.
wall betwixt the two kingdoms” and that to continue it was “an eyesore in this
island.” On the contrary, claimed the author: Elizabeth I maintained the garrison at
Berwick not “to defend her from her neighbours,” but rather as a “rod ready prepared
to correct and punish” her own northern subjects. The author hoped, of course, that
James VI/I might also find Berwick a similarly useful instrument for the better
government of the borderlands between his English and Scottish kingdoms.

If the 100-man garrison was a compromise by James VI/I, a balm to the
consciences of men like the author of the foregoing defence of the Berwick garrison,
then, by 1611 the king felt that the need for such compromises had ended. That
summer, James VI/I placed the last 100 soldiers on half pay for the remainder of their
lives and freed them “from all military service.” The soldiers of Berwick sensed this
was coming in the spring of that year, and petitioned Lord Salisbury against the
reduction of their pay. They explained that most of them were old, and had “spent
the prime of [their] days” in service “for the honour of our prince.” Surely, they
argued, it would not cost the king much to keep them at full pay for the rest of their
lives, since a “great many” of them had “one foot in the grave already.” The soldiers
attached to their petition a chart with their names, the length of their service and
their “charge of family.” The eldest listed was Henry Boldt, who was eighty six and

---

85 TNA, SP14/5/4.
86 TNA, SP14/61/1.
had served for sixty years. If Boldt spent most or all of those years in Berwick, he likely remembered the rule of Hunsdon and Widdrington (and, indeed, that of Bedford and Grey) and the tensions that existed between the governor, the marshal and the town.

Conclusion

As in 1560, change to the garrison and government in Berwick-upon-Tweed came from the top. James’ vision of a truly united kingdom led him to dismantle the military structure that Elizabeth had established at Berwick-upon-Tweed. Both are examples of state building, rather than state formation: intentional alterations to structures of the state in order to bring about specific outcomes. As with the garrisons at Plymouth and Portsmouth, the Elizabethan regime sought to consolidate its oversight over the government of the garrison. In this respect, the differences between Plymouth, Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed were differences of degree and not kind. Berwick existed in the midst of a geography and political environment quite different from that of our other garrisons and, as a result, the particular form of its garrison’s government was somewhat different. The root cause of the new establishment of 1560, however, was the same as that which motivated the regime’s actions towards its other garrisons: to protect better English territory from invasion and, if necessary, better govern English people within England itself. In a place like Portsmouth, the need for the captain of a garrison to govern English people seemed a

87 TNA, SP14/63/44.
more far-fetched prospect, and so the garrison captain held in reserve the power to
govern the town, to “bridle” it, in a time of necessity. In a place like Berwick, the
bridle might have to be applied sooner rather than later.

Moreover, if the point of the 1560 establishment was to consolidate central
government control over the government of the Berwick garrison, and the increase in
the size of the garrison an attempt to enlarge the central government’s coercive
potential in the region, then central government implemented its policy successfully.
The Elizabethan regime was able to reorder the government of the Berwick garrison,
and install a commander of its own choosing. Whether or not this policy was
successful in achieving a more settled, better governed English border region is, on
one level, immaterial.88 Still, the conflict we observed between garrison officials and
between the town and garrison officials took place within the overarching framework
of central government aims, made manifest by the governmental structures put in
place to govern the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed. To be sure Henry, Lord
Hunsdon, did not play well with others, and neither did the brothers Widdrington.89
Their behaviour, however, was undoubtedly informed by both the governmental
conditions at Berwick-upon-Tweed, and their own perceptions of the nature of their

88 Steven Ellis argues that Tudor policy in the north was disastrous. If Tudor policy
intended to bring about peace and good government, it did the opposite. The Tudors,
therefore, failed “to discharge the most basic duties of monarchy in the region.” Ellis,
“Civilizing Northumberland,” 121.
89 Neil Younger has recently reminded us of Hunsdon’s turbulent tenure as lord
lieutenant of Norfolk and Suffolk from 1585-1596, and his tendency to antagonize the
authority and position. It did not help that boundaries between the governor’s authority and that of the mayor were vague and open to interpretation by the individual office holder. The presence of the garrison, and of those selected to govern it, also shaped the non-military populace of Berwick-upon-Tweed: the Berwick townsmen’s fraught relationship with the garrison and its governors not only helped bolster their own sense of corporate identity, it shaped how they interpreted their place in the nation as a whole. When the Berwick townsmen asserted that Berwick was their England, they did not articulate a sense of national affinity imposed on them by the political centre, but they did articulate a sense of identity profoundly shaped by central government priorities.90

90 Indeed, as central government aims changed with the ascension of James VI/I, so too did the politics and identity of Berwick itself. Kesselring, “‘Berwick is our England’,” 108.
CHAPTER SIX: GARRISON GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE

This study began by challenging the notion that there was a single standard of military development that ought to animate the study of a military institution. It took as a basic premise that early modern English garrisons ought to be taken on their own terms, and not merely assessed as to whether or not they underwent the military revolution experienced by some of their continental contemporaries. Thus, we have seen that garrisons were not just military institutions that belong to the history of the development of military organizational and tactical practice alone. Garrisons were also projects of governance: locations where contemporaries asserted legitimate political power and locations where contemporaries articulated ideas about how authority should be distributed within the state. Put simply, garrisons were locations where contemporaries disputed who should govern whom and in what manner. This means that garrison government speaks to the nature of authority within the state more generally and not just to the government of the part of the state concerned with martial affairs. In order to observe this more clearly, this chapter once again broadens the focus and links what we have observed in the case studies to broader trends in the government of the Elizabethan and early Stuart English state. Taken together, the three case studies reveal that the central government consolidated control over the government of garrisons during the Elizabethan era, a situation left largely in place
and untouched during the reign of Elizabeth’s successor. This provided the overarching framework in which negotiations over the precise nature and boundaries of respective authorities and jurisdictions took place. This framework provided the limits for those negotiations and ensured that the distribution of authority within that state conformed to the desires of the central government.

*England’s Military Development*

One of the major themes to emerge from the foregoing pages is that those at the heart of English government took a proactive interest in the government of garrisons. This was especially so during the Elizabethan period. In all three of our case studies, the central government took active steps to consolidate or maintain oversight over the selection of the individual who governed the garrison and, as a result, over the government of the garrison itself. The regime achieved this by insisting upon the right of the crown to select the garrison governor, and by maintaining the jurisdiction of the selected individual in the face of complaints from other, legitimate nodes of crown sanctioned authority. Such behaviour on the part of the central government was not restricted to garrisons, either: it was in keeping with other major military developments of the Elizabethan period, particularly those pertaining to the militia.

The militia was an ancient institution and its revivification was underway before Elizabeth’s ascension. The Elizabethan regime, however, made two important
changes to its government and structure: the development of the trained bands, and the re-establishment of the lords lieutenant.¹ The militia encompassed every English man between the ages of 16 and 60, a vast number of people, of varying physical abilities, for whom to provide resources. Through the establishment of the trained bands the Elizabethan central government sought to establish a more streamlined, effective fighting force, into which it might more efficiently channel resources.² To be effective, however, the trained bands required specific training and organization that the muster commissioners were unable to provide. The development of the trained bands and the re-establishment of the lords lieutenant were related processes. In 1585 the Elizabethan regime placed lords lieutenant in eighteen counties. By 1588 all counties in England and Wales possessed a lord lieutenant. The primary function of the lord lieutenant was to oversee the militia and to provide troops, when necessary, for foreign expeditions. The county lieutenants displaced the earlier muster commissions that, like commissions of the peace, consisted of a large body of local gentry and nobility. Instead, the lieutenancy operated on a hierarchical model: the lieutenant, appointed from the nobility by the crown, oversaw a number of

¹ There were two important statutes pertaining to the militia passed in the last year of Mary’s reign. The first effectively repealed the Assize of Arms of 1181, by which men provided arms according to their wealth. The second statute regulated musters. Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638* (London: Routledge, 1967), 9.
deputy lieutenants drawn from the more prominent local gentry.\textsuperscript{3} Noblemen thus retained their military import, but now as officers of the crown rather than by virtue of inherited position. By the establishment of lieutenants, the government of the militia proceeded through a relatively straight line from the crown into the county.

The attention the Elizabethan central government paid to domestic defence, and the alterations it made to it, derived from the perception that Elizabeth sat precariously upon the throne and that both Elizabeth herself and the regime she had established faced serious threats from within and without. Elizabeth ruled over a religiously divided country. While she had achieved some measure of success in gaining the outward conformity of her subjects, the queen and her closest advisors knew they had not yet won the battle for hearts and minds. There was real fear, not unfounded, that the death of the childless Elizabeth either from natural causes or an assassin’s bullet would mean civil war and the end of Protestant England. This fear led to some extraordinary proposals, such as Cecil’s plan to establish an interregnum council to rule England should Elizabeth die without the appointment of a suitable successor.\textsuperscript{4} Elizabeth rejected this plan. Neil Younger argues, however, that the re-establishment of the lords lieutenant in 1585 was, in part, Cecil’s way of enacting his plan by other means. Besides providing more efficient leadership for the trained

\textsuperscript{3} Younger, \textit{War and Politics}, 18.
bands, the re-establishment of the lords lieutenant also placed trustworthy individuals in positions of authority in the shires in case the worst should occur.\textsuperscript{5}

In this context, then, it is not surprising to find the central government acting similarly with regard to garrisons. Garrisons required attention because they often stood at the boundaries of the English state, at the nexus of threats internal and external. The danger of invasion was not just that England might be overrun by enemy hordes, it was also that even a relatively small landing force might embolden elements within England itself. This was the tenor of Ferdinando Gorges’ intelligence to the privy council in 1597.\textsuperscript{6} And there was perhaps some reason to be concerned about the government of garrisons. When Elizabeth took the throne, less than a full year had passed since the loss of England’s largest garrison, Calais. The fall of Calais was disconcertingly swift: so swift that suspicion fell on the garrison’s final governor, Thomas Wentworth. The Elizabethan regime arrested and tried Wentworth on his return to England in the spring of 1559. The court acquitted Wentworth, but the trial

\textsuperscript{5} Elizabeth vetoed some of Cecil’s choices for lieutenants, but nonetheless went along with the re-implementation of the office. Younger, “Remaking the Monarchical Republic,” and \textit{War and Politics}.

\textsuperscript{6} TNA, SP12/265/ 42. The idea of insidious Catholicism, with violent outcomes, was a keynote of the war against Spain and operated in tandem with the narrative of the \textit{Book of Martyrs}. It created, moreover, a lasting mindset. Ethan Shagan argues that it formed one of the main interpretive frameworks for the news of the Irish rebellion in 1641. Ethan Shagan, “Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and the English Response to the Irish Rebellion of 1641,” \textit{The Journal of British Studies} 36:1 (1997), 4-15.
itself is indicative of the concern the fall of Calais triggered.\textsuperscript{7} Given the enormity of the loss of Calais the almost immediate concern, upon Elizabeth’s ascension, for the government and security of Berwick was perhaps not coincidental. Concern for the security of garrisons and forts continued to follow concerns about security more generally. Following the entry of Mary, Queen of Scots into England, the northern rebellion and the excommunication of Elizabeth, parliament passed a statute rendering it treason to take by force, withhold, burn, or otherwise destroy any castle, fortress, tower or hold within the queen’s realm or any of her dominions. The statute further rendered conspiring to do so, by word or deed, a felony.\textsuperscript{8}

Garrisons and fortifications might prove dangerous. If a foe gained hold of one there was, to borrow Thomas Wilson’s phrase, “nothing more damageable.”\textsuperscript{9} Concern about the government of garrisons was present, therefore, from the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign. In the right hands, however, garrisons formed part of England’s domestic defences and so the central government looked as diligently to their governance as it did to the governance of the militia. The establishment of the lords

\textsuperscript{7} The French attack on Calais came in early January 1558; the town fell in a matter of days. Grummitt, \textit{The Calais Garrison}, 167-169. Wentworth was indicted on 2 July 1558, while he was still a prisoner of war in France, for conspiring with the French to deliver Calais. The new Elizabethan government paid Wentworth’s ransom in March of 1559 and he returned to England where he was arrested in April. Barry Denton, “Thomas Wentworth, second Baron Wentworth,” \textit{ODNB}.

\textsuperscript{8} 14 Eliz. c. 1. 1571. It was also treason to capture and/or destroy the queen’s munitions and ships.

lieutenant that began in 1585, elaborated and made permanent thereafter, was an effort to shift the control of England’s domestic defensive military apparatus away from diffuse local oversight and place it more firmly in the hands of a narrower group of individuals closely trusted by the central government. The concern exhibited by the crown in the government of garrisons stemmed from the same root. Garrisons, therefore, exemplify the military development England did boast, rather than the one it did not. England’s forces did not undergo techno-tactical, organizational and fiscal developments to the degree that some continental armies did. But English martial institutions did undergo significant military development, one of the main features of which was an effort to consolidate the control of England’s martial forces into the hands of the queen and her closest advisors. What is more, England’s martial development in this period was part and parcel of a vision of the government of the state more generally. The military developments of which garrisons were an important part were intimately connected to issues of who ought to possess authority, and who might be trusted with authority, within the state. The idea that good domestic defence helped to prevent internal turmoil reveals that matters belonging to the historiographical category of the “fiscal-military” state were often connected in the contemporary mind to matters belonging to the “patriarchal state,” the agents and instruments concerned with the maintenance of social order.10

10 Michael Braddick uses the categories “fiscal-military state” and “patriarchal state” to denote the different functions of institutions and agencies of authority in early
The Country’s Good

The actions that the central government took with regard to the government of garrisons were intentional. The central government took such actions not from a general sense that the English state required better defending, but from a sense that it required better defence from particular threats. The specific means, therefore, by which a state’s defence is organized are intimately bound up with conceptions of the state itself, with notions of what the state ought to be and of how and by whom the state should be governed. Elizabeth and her councillors took steps to protect and perpetuate the Elizabethan regime, the political and religious structure that the central government worked to establish and maintain. This motivation was principled, but not exclusively so: the perpetuation of the Elizabethan regime certainly meant the perpetuation in power, prominence and profit of those who occupied its highest offices. Indeed, one might argue that many had in mind the most basic of self-interests: the preservation of their own lives. Should the regime fall, Elizabeth and her advisors likely faced a swift and sticky end. Still, whether prompted by principle, self-interest or most likely a combination of both, the net result was a sense that the central government acted in a public interest that

sometimes must necessarily override the needs of what her subjects perceived to be the particular interests of the constituent parts of the state.

This rhetoric was present in both the central government’s actions and words concerning the proper government of garrisons. It was most explicitly stated by the assertion that “he is most to be trusted that hath best interest in the state.” This statement was born of the idea that the best interests of England as a whole lay with those appointed by the crown to look to its safety, and not by those with particular interests: in this case the Plymouth townsmen and their friends, who had argued that their ties to the locality made them the best suited to its defence.\footnote{BL, Lansdowne 76, no. 35.} It was present in the rejection, not so much in words as in deeds, of a similar argument forwarded by the townsmen of Berwick-upon-Tweed that their own interest in the preservation of their home meant they were the best guardians of its safety. And, finally, it was present in the preservation in the Portsmouth town charter of the supremacy of the garrison captain over the town authorities in times of emergency. Indeed, it was present in the notion, articulated to the townsmen of Plymouth in the 1590s, that it was the garrison captain who was best equipped to decide what constituted a time of emergency.

It was not that town authorities were universally untrustworthy. It was not that the central government considered mayors and townspeople to be actively
conspiring against the state. It was that, in the central government’s view, if the worst did happen, townspeople’s interests might counter the best interests of the state. Local authorities might pull their punches. The central government viewed the argument put forward by the town authorities of Plymouth and Berwick - that the townspeople’s vested interest in the safety of their own homes strengthened the security of the state more generally - as a weakness rather than a strength. A desire to maintain some semblance of one’s home and one’s livelihood might also hinder an all-out effort to defeat an invading enemy or to make sacrifices. As the threat of invasion grew in the latter half of the sixteenth century, this surely must have seemed more pressing. Indeed, there was a more overt suspicion of townspeople in the answers to Plymouth’s demands that the town should rightly select the captain of the new garrison. There was a more explicit articulation in the document that townspeople’s interests might actually be at odds with that of the state, with the generally safety of England as a whole. Merchants possessed international trade connections, particularly in a maritime town like Plymouth. A merchant’s profit and livelihood depended on the maintenance of such connections, and the implication was that merchants would not like to risk doing anything to jeopardize those connections.

---

12 Which is not to say that there were not currents within Elizabethan, and later, political culture that were critical of urban government, and the perceived selfish nature of burgesses with regard to the common good; Withington, *The Politics of Commonwealth*, 12-13. Withington cites Richard Carew’s criticism of the burgesses of the towns in Cornwall as particularly severe invective.
The central government’s stance toward the government of garrisons stemmed in part from a fear that local residents, who formed local government, might put the interests of some few people above the interests of all Englishmen and women. One may see the central government’s point, but should not give over entirely to its view. The arguments forwarded by townspeople were equally valid and in keeping with ideas that had currency in the contemporary political culture. The idea that defence should be undertaken locally, and that it was the responsibility of all subjects, was the intellectual notion behind a militia system and one to which many contemporaries subscribed.\textsuperscript{13} What is more, we might forgive the town authorities for thinking that if better security was an aid to good order, then the crown chosen garrison governors did not always serve that end. As we have seen, the men who the crown chose to govern garrisons might be troublesome, even abusive, to townspeople and town officials. Townspeople consistently and correctly pointed out that mayors and other town authorities were also officers of the crown whose primary task was the maintenance of order: difficult to achieve when the garrison captain was locking the mayor in his house and interfering with the enforcement of the law.

\textsuperscript{13} See Rapple, \textit{Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture}, 19-50, and Markku Peltonnen, \textit{Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39-44. The classical humanist notion prominent in the 1570s and 1580s, Peltonnen argues, was that the wellbeing of a commonwealth depended on active citizens. Active citizenship encompassed participation in the defence of the commonwealth. The citizen-militia was better, therefore, for a commonwealth than the use of mercenaries or professional soldiers. For urban manifestations of this idea see Withington, “Citizens and Soldiers,” 3-30.
The matter of garrison government was not a question of ends, but of means. Both the central government and the localities were interested in having good defence, better defence, perhaps, than the defences that already existed. There is no reason not to take at face value the townsmen of Plymouth’s concerns about their safety in the late 1580s and early 1590s, and their argument that Plymouth’s insecurity put the country at risk. Likewise, we need not seek an ulterior motive in the Berwick townsmen’s opinions on how their home might best be defended. Town authorities were also not disingenuous when they argued that their own care for the safety of their own home meant the better safety of the state more generally. Similarly, the maintenance of order and orderly government was also something sought by both the central government and the localities. These arguments were not just ploys intended to gain a desired concession from the central government: they were expressions of a broad consensus, a shared set of values on the part of both centre and periphery regarding the need for good defence, because good defence served the larger goal of stable and orderly government. Such arguments are evidence of the fundamental interconnectedness of the various elements of the English state: localities were not isolated, inward-looking communities that knew not of and cared not for the broader governance of the realm. But this inclusivity did not preclude disagreement over the best means of achieving the shared goals just described. Garrisons reveal that this disagreement sometimes did take the form of centre versus locality: those at the centre of English government seeking a
distribution of authority within the state that was not entirely liked or endorsed by those in the locality. The reason, therefore, that the centre-local divide lingers in state formation analyses that seek to extirpate it from the historiography is because the centre-local divide did, in fact, exist.

*Men Behaving Badly*

The men whom the Elizabethan regime chose to govern garrisons were often what we have termed professional soldiers: men who pursued a martial life and derived a sense of identity and place from their participation in that life. It is in some ways surprising, therefore, to find the central government placing such individuals in such high regard. Precluded by her gender from participation in the martial world and so becoming the focus of martial loyalty, Queen Elizabeth was often suspicious of the authority that military responsibility conferred on some of her subjects.\(^\text{14}\) Others at the centre, notably Cecil, shared some of Elizabeth’s reticence. They thought that professional soldiers were potentially inimical to peaceful government. Professional soldiers were prone to violence, which was often a consequence of them being particularly tetchy about their honour.\(^\text{15}\) More suspiciously, the honour community


\(^{15}\) Manning, *Swordsmen*, 9. According to Manning, members of the martial community tended to make little distinction between public combat and private. They viewed war in personal terms, and vice versa. Thus, while all members of an
of soldiering was a community that did not always conform to national boundaries.
The argument with regard to this was, in fact, similar to the one forwarded about
merchants in the response to the Plymouth townsmen’s arguments regarding the
government of the new fort: the martial community was a community with an
internal code of honour that transcended national boundaries and a community that
gave members a set of interests not always compatible with the interests of the state.

To a certain degree, the story of domestic garrisons in this period bears out
some of the concerns about professional soldiers and civil government. The ideas and
interests of soldiers sometimes did thwart central government aims. The composition
of the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed offers a case in point. The new orders of
1560 stipulated that there were to be no men born in Northumberland,
Westmoreland or Cumberland admitted into the Berwick garrison. These men
already owed military service by the nature of their land tenure agreements and,
certainly, some of them might possess suspicious cross border affiliations. In
November 1560 the first Elizabethan governor of Berwick, Lord Grey de Wilton,
mustered the newly increased Berwick garrison. He informed Cecil that he found
“many insufficient soldiers” in the new crew, while there were many “skillful, valiant
soldiers trained in long service” whom he was to discharge because they were born in
England’s northernmost counties. Grey did not discharge these men for lack, he

honour society might be driven, ultimately, to violence in defence of their honour,
the journey was perhaps a little shorter for members of the martial community.
claimed, of sufficient replacements.\textsuperscript{16} Cecil clearly did not like this, remarking in the margins of Grey’s letter that there were “plenty of soldiers in England.”\textsuperscript{17} Despite Cecil’s opinions on the matter northern men, particularly Northumberland men, remained in the Berwick garrison. Seven years later marshal William Drury intimated to Cecil that the rule against the admission of soldiers from Northumberland had not been strictly observed for some time.\textsuperscript{18} Twenty years on this remained an issue: in March 1687, Governor Hunsdon informed his deputy that he knew many Northumberland men served in the garrison.\textsuperscript{19}

The persistence of such men in the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed derived, in part, from perceptions. Lord Grey, who actively objected to the dismissal of the Northumberland men, had spent his life as a soldier on the continent, in Scotland and in the marches. His membership in the martial community no doubt shaped his perception of the Northumberland men. Their experience as soldiers and, possibly, his own experience with them as soldiers were the standards by which Grey likely judged Northumberland men and not the county in which they were born.\textsuperscript{20} Since Cecil lacked any capacity to coerce Grey, Grey’s view won the day. It is also likely, however, that the persistence of Northumberland men related to the Berwick captains’ belief that they were entitled to admit or discharge soldiers of their own

\textsuperscript{16} TNA, SP59/3, f. 224. Grey to Cecil, 26 November, 1560.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} TNA, SP59/12, f. 222.
\textsuperscript{19} TNA, WO55/1939, nos. 57 & 58r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 29 March 1587.
volition without informing the marshal or the governor. Governor Hunsdon attempted un成功ly to stem this practice, which he quite correctly identified as contrary to the orders for the garrison. The captains alleged that admitting and dismissing soldiers was a privilege given them during the governorship of the Earl of Bedfords and a privilege that, once granted, was theirs to enjoy in perpetuity.

Hunsdon, on the other hand, viewed the captain’s behaviour as a practice that Bedford simply tolerated. Indeed, Hunsdon would not permit the captains to make any kind of binding “precedent of…Lord Bedford’s sufferance.”

The buying and selling of pays remained a chronic problem in the Berwick garrison. We might expect that it would, since a captain might make a tidy profit from buying and selling places in the garrison to a seemingly large market of people, particularly bankrupts, who sought the privileges and protections of a soldier’s place. What we have called soldiers of convenience, men who sought garrison places for the advantages that those places afforded, comprised a large proportion of the rank and file of England’s domestic garrisons. The existence of such privileges contributed to the discord that occurred between garrisons and the localities in which they were situated and which we observed most particularly in Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed. For these men, their identification as members of any kind of martial community manifested itself most strongly when the privileges of their place were

---

21 TNA, WO55/1939, f. 75r-v. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 19 March 1589. TNA, WO55/1939, f. 8r. Hunsdon to Widdrington, 1 March 1583.
questioned or challenged. In other words, their defence of their privileges derived less from an affront to the dignity and honour of soldiers and more from the desire to maintain a benefit for which they had paid.

William Cecil famously noted to his son that captains in peacetime were like chimneys in summer: not particularly useful and, in some ways, a downright liability. Placing military men in command of England’s garrisons was not a perfect triumph for the crown and its ministers. The ideas and interests possessed by professional soldiers, and the soldiers of convenience who comprised most of the garrison rank and file, seem to have made difficulties for the central government. Sometimes, this was by direct defiance of central government directives, as was the case in the Berwick example. More often, however, it was from the discord and discontent that occurred between garrisons and townspeople, garrison officers and town authorities. Be that as it may, the Elizabethan government never moved to diminish a garrison captain’s authority when conflict erupted between military and non-military jurisdictions, nor did they remove a troublesome garrison commander. The central government mediated between the two parties, but did so without compromising or diminishing the authority of the garrison captain. As we observed with Ferdinando Gorges, the central government might take a captain to task for his behaviour, but it did so to him and him alone. They rarely made their displeasure known to the other party in the dispute.

Of course, Cecil’s quip about captains concerns their utility in peacetime, and the late Elizabethan period was not peacetime. Elizabethan concerns about security stretched, as we have seen, back at least the 1570s. It is an open question, therefore, as to whether Elizabeth and those close to her ever really considered the age in which they lived to be peacetime. Official peace did, of course, come shortly after the ascension of James VI/I. Under England’s new king, garrison government remained largely as the Elizabethan regime had left it, with the exception of Berwick-upon-Tweed. We may speculate about the reasons for this. It is possible that the Jacobean regime’s attitude towards garrisons reflected James VI/I’s ideas about his state and how it ought to be governed. To be sure, the dismantling of the garrison at Berwick was part of the king’s effort to build a unified Britain. The retention of other garrisons, however, was also related to conceptions of the state. James VI/I might not have liked soldiers, or things military, but he probably liked having greater central oversight rather than lesser, and surely another crown appointment to dole out was a bonus. Still, as content as he may have been to have garrisons, James VI/I was not inclined to become overly involved in them. The net result, therefore, was general indifference, which had the effect of entrenching the Elizabethan system. Indeed, indifference is sometimes as powerful as intervention when it comes to making a situation permanent. Recall that when the townsmen of Portsmouth sought the privy council’s help in resolving a town-garrison dispute in the early Jacobean years, the
privy council simply referred the matter to the garrison captain for resolution: an eventuality that actually conferred much more authority on the garrison captain.

*Always Look on the Bright Side of Life*

The presence of a garrison was often troublesome for those with whom the garrison shared space. One of the most significant causes of friction derived from the behaviour of the soldiers themselves. The garrison soldiers might, of course, be disorderly. Sir John Oglander recalled that after the capture of the Duke of Buckingham’s assassin, John Felton, the authorities committed him to Little Ease. Oglander recalled that this was the same prison in which he “was wont to imprison the gunners and soldiers of the garrison.” 23 Because it did not pertain to the tale of Buckingham’s assassination, Oglander did not elaborate on the reasons why he imprisoned garrison men; however, his recollection nonetheless speaks to the fact that garrison men sometimes required punishment. Still, it is an open question whether garrison soldiers were any more rancorous than their non-military contemporaries. What seemed to rankle the most was garrison soldiers’ propensity for moonlighting: they took on trades and work. Such activities did not always sit well with the non-military populace, who did the same work without any special privileges or exemptions. Soldiers’ moonlighting arose from the lack of martial

---

professionalism in the early modern English garrison. The garrison rank and file often comprised men whose membership in the martial community derived from convenience rather than conviction: these men were there for the perks and the protections that the position of garrison soldier offered. These men likely did not consider themselves soldiers in a professional sense: that by joining the garrison, they became soldiers and nothing else. Indeed, we may see by their actions that they saw no impediment to being both soldiers and tradesmen practising whatever extra-military skills they possessed.

Multifarious communities of identity and belonging comprised early modern England. This was often troublesome: it provided fuel for conflict, as the case of garrison soldiers exemplifies. But conflict was not inevitable and the presence of a garrison was not inevitably problematic. Sometimes the presence of a garrison, and with it a crown appointed captain, might be an advantage. Lord Mountjoy, and his relationship with the town authorities of Portsmouth, is perhaps the best example to emerge from our case studies. It is clear that the town authorities of Portsmouth were fond of Mountjoy and that they benefited from Mountjoy’s connections to the political centre. It is possible that Mountjoy treated the townsmen of Portsmouth well out of the goodness of his heart. At the same time, Mountjoy also profited from the relationship. Likewise in Plymouth, where Ferdinando Gorges’ early seventeenth-century interests in colonial endeavours likely gave him common cause with some of the Plymouth townsmen with whom he once quarrelled. Although this
did not benefit the town in terms of its relationship with the central government, it did likely result in a détente between town and garrison, town authorities and garrison captain. Indeed, it seems a more probable explanation for the easing of relations than peace: Gorges, as we have seen, still believed the Spanish to be a threat and bemoaned the state of English defences. The larger point is that the individuals involved shaped the tendency for conflict or cooperation to a large degree. This is not because of any innate tendency to be nice or nasty, abrasive or congenial. Rather, the existence of all early modern people in multiple communities meant that individuals simultaneously possessed an array of interests and ideas that, given the right circumstances, might just as likely provide the basis of cooperation as of conflict. 24

Again, Mountjoy serves as an example: his membership in both the martial community and the court community gave him a particular set of interests that perhaps inclined him to favourable relations with the Portsmouth townsmen.

The relationship between garrisons and the non-military populace among which they existed reveals that the particular communities to which an individual belonged often shaped attitudes and behaviours. This factor influenced an individual’s sense of principle: what they believed ought to be and of how others ought to relate to them. It also shaped their sense of profit: their sense of what was to

24 Neil Younger does not dismiss entirely the notion of personal magnetism. The Earl of Essex, he argues, did appear to be the kind of person for whom people were willing to do things. Younger, “The Practice and Politics of Troop-Raising: Robert Devereux, Second Earl of Essex, and the Elizabethan Regime,” 586.
their best advantage and in their best interest. The basis of conflict and co-operation was, therefore, essentially the same. Whether a relationship was cooperative or divisive depended on the particular admixture of ideas and interests in play in any given situation. That there were myriad communities in early modern England, that early modern people existed within multiple hierarchies of authority, allowed for the incremental adjustments and readjustments of authority through a process of negotiation: interests gave people the ability to negotiate. Negotiations between townspeople and garrison men, however, often reached an impasse, and the participants resorted to the central government for arbitration. The fact that this occurred reminds us that relations between garrisons and the non-military authorities with which they sometimes came into conflicted took place within the larger framework of intentional action discussed earlier in this chapter. Negotiations about garrisons took place within a framework of limitations, a framework established by the central government.

When one takes a broader view, it certainly appears that the cordial relations between Mountjoy and the Portsmouth townsmen was the exception rather than the rule. Our first instinct might be to consider this a victory for the Elizabethan regime amidst a swath of failures: the central government was able, in Portsmouth, to marry local priorities to central ones in a way that both parties perceived as mutually beneficial. The instinct to view this relationship in this way, however, is predicated on the assumption that state growth occurred in a particular manner. The early
modern state grew when negotiations between the center and the locality resulted in a harmonious marriage between the aims of the two parties. There is the further assumption, moreover, that the central government actively sought this harmony. After all, since the crown possessed no adequate physical force to compel adherence to its priorities and policies, it was forced to implement its aims in a manner that it hoped would cause little to no conflict.

The evidence presented in this study warrants a reconsideration of this interpretation. The central government’s persistent toleration of the obstructive and abusive behaviours of some of the men it appointed to govern garrisons gives us cause to consider that the kind of jurisdictional conflict which often plagued relations between garrison and non-garrison authorities was not a threat to the Elizabethan governing system, but a feature. In the very last section of his State of England, Thomas Wilson discusses “policies for security,” or the means by which the state is kept safe from disruption and disorder. Near the end of this section, Wilson makes the following observation:

In all great offices and places of charge they do always place [two] persons of contrary factions and that are bred of such causes, or grown to such greatness, that they are ever irreconcilable, to the end, each having his enemy’s eye to overlook him, it may make him look the [more warily] to his charge, and that if anybody should incline to unfaithfulness in such charges of importance as concern the public safety, it might be spied before it be brought to any dangerous head…

Wilson then provides his reader with an example and the example he gives is a place, perhaps not coincidentally, that was also partly a garrison. “This is seen always,” Wilson explains, “in the Tower, the place of most trust, where the lieutenant and steward, master of the ordinance and lieutenant of the same, have been ever in my remembrance vowed enemies.”

Wilson’s observation, together with the evidence garnered from the government of garrisons, suggests that the Elizabethan central government in particular saw value in jurisdictional tension despite the potential discord it created. At the very least, it suggests that the regime did not fear conflict and displeasure tout court. There is no doubt that the regime sought internal order and stability in the larger view. One way to achieve this was to keep the state’s officially empowered agents in a low level state of competition for the preservation of privileges ultimately in the crown’s gift. To be sure, this resulted in a certain amount of discord in the immediate vicinity of the jurisdictions over which there was dispute. But this was a relatively low risk strategy: the Elizabethan regime did not wish to garrison all towns in England, so such disputes were localized to the towns in which garrisons existed.

The benefits of such a situation potentially outweighed the losses for the central government on a number of levels. Town officials, jealous of their jurisdiction, policed the activities of the martial men who governed the garrison, thereby providing the central government insurance against any residual suspicion that might

26 Ibid.
attend them owing to their membership in the martial community. Likewise, the garrison governors kept an eye on the town governors. The maintenance of the garrison captain’s jurisdiction, and with it the privileges of the men who belonged to the garrison, kept garrison places filled without a further outlay of money on the part of the central government. And finally, jurisdictional disputes permitted the central government to present itself not only as the font of authority, but the protector and arbiter of the boundaries of that authority. When adjudicating between disputed jurisdictions, the Elizabethan central government was usually very careful to insist that each disputant possessed a rightful jurisdiction. Such dispute did not, therefore, diminish the power of the central government; rather it enhanced it: all rightful jurisdictions were granted, and maintained, by the judicious discretion of the queen and her advisors.

_His Majesty is Done Great Disservice_

In 1632, the committee of the council of war turned its attention to the government of England’s garrisons, castles and forts. Its members discovered that there was “great disservice” done to the king by virtue of the “great neglect” of those in charge of these bodies. The council determined that a large part of this disservice stemmed from the fact that there were no “instructions established for the well ordering and governing” of those bodies. Thus, the committee recommended the
creation of a set of instructions to apply equally to all garrisons. Commanders ought to be present at their charge, and only absent by the king’s permission; likewise, soldiers ought to be absent only with their captain’s permission. Good records should be kept of the men of the garrison. They should be trained regularly in the practice of arms, and be “kept in a severe and orderly martial discipline.” Only men who were “fit and able,” particularly those who “have seen and know the wars,” were to be placed in the garrison, no “rogues, thieves, notorious rioters or bankrupts.” The garrison ought to be “duly paid at the time appointed.”

These regulations were, on the face of it, eminently sensible. There is much to recommend here in terms of martial development and professionalism. These new orders would see garrisons comprised only of experienced soldiers, regularly trained. That these regulations applied to all garrisons equally would introduce a degree of uniformity to garrison practice. The regulations concerning regular pay, the non-admission of thieves and bankrupts, as well as the permanent presence of the captain would contribute to the sense that soldiering was a profession of its own, by helping to ensure that such men would practise the soldiering trade to the exclusion of all

---

27 TNA, SP16/219/32. This recommendation was revisiting a matter that the council of war first considered in 1625. That year, the council proposed that a similar resolution be presented to the king, “to be established for England and Ireland” if the king so desired. The council of war clearly shelved the matter in 1625, which is understandable given that the council of war had more pressing matters to occupy it at that time. But its reappearance suggests that the rationalization of garrison government was a matter of ongoing interest at the centre of Caroline government.

28 TNA, SP16/230/40.
other means of earning a living. Not only would such practices encourage martial
development and efficiency, they would also help resolve some of the contentious
issues that arose between garrisons and civilians from precisely those conditions that
these regulations sought to rectify.

The proposed regulations for garrisons were similar to other projects that
emerged from the political centre during the period of the so called personal rule of
Charles I: the book of orders and the exact militia. Like these other initiatives, there
is little about the content of these garrison regulations that is innovative in the
seventeenth-century pejorative sense: their content was not entirely new and without
precedent. In fact, the committee modelled the new regulations on those that once
governed the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed. Much like the books of orders, the
new proposed garrison regulations were, in all likelihood, an articulation of practices
that were always technically in place, but not always put to paper nor always strictly
observed. It is highly probable that men who had martial experience were preferable

29 See Richard Cust, Charles I: A Political Life (London: Longman, 1997), 171-196 and
Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), 485-485-500. On the exact militia see also Fissel, English Warfare, 255-281
and Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 244-297.
30 Derek Hirst, England in Conflict, 1603-1660 (London: Hodder Arnold, 1999), 139-
140; Cust, Charles I, 184-185.
31 The item that follows immediately after the 1625 proposals for the regulation of
garrisons in the State Papers is a copy of the establishment of Berwick, made by
Queen Elizabeth I and “confirmed” by James VI/I “until the dissolution of that
garrison.” The proximity in the record of a copy of the establishment of Berwick
suggests the desire for a fitting precedent, or model, of garrison government and
regulation. TNA, SP16/13/86.
for garrison places and that they were supposed to practise their martial skills regularly. The protections afforded to soldiers against legal processes were not intended to make garrisons havens for bankrupts. Good records and prompt payments were always supposed to be kept and made. Technically, the captain was always supposed to be present at his charge most, if not all, of the time.

But if the proposed alterations to the government of garrisons were similar to other Caroline projects, they were dissimilar to the manner by which Charles’ predecessors dealt with garrison government. While the Elizabethan regime clearly sought tighter central control over the government of garrisons, the regime proceeded to do so on a largely case by case basis, rather than through a general reform. If the presence of the old establishment of Berwick is anything to go by, the Caroline proposals sought to make all English garrisons more like Elizabethan Berwick-upon-Tweed; the Elizabethan regime, by contrast, did not seek to have all garrisons governed as was Berwick. The Elizabethan government of Berwick-upon-Tweed stands out amongst our case studies as unique in its explicit and written regulations and its governmental structure. While at other garrisons the crown maintained its right to appoint captains, and maintained the captain’s separate jurisdiction, the crown did not move to set up a replica of the government of Berwick. There are plausible reasons why the Elizabethan central government should have proceeded in this manner. One of the reasons was tactical: Berwick-upon-Tweed was the only domestic garrison of our three case studies that faced an enemy who was most likely
to attack by land. Our other case studies faced the sea. Arguably, attack by land
might come more swiftly and with less warning. This fact made Berwick-upon-
Tweed similar to Calais, and it is perhaps no coincidence that the Elizabethan regime
rendered the government of Berwick similar to that of Calais.

Another reason was, of course, that Berwick existed within the borders: an
area where, from the central perspective, the crown’s authority seemed tenuous and
the threats from within as dangerous as those from without. This was perhaps just
perception but, in some ways, perception was all that mattered. Whatever the
reasons, the Elizabethan regime displayed an understanding that not all garrisons
were the same, so they need not all be governed in the same manner. Apart from
Berwick-upon-Tweed, the central government was content to insist upon the right of
the crown to appoint captains of garrisons, which was its due: defence of the realm
lay within the prerogative of the crown. The actions that the Elizabethan regime
took towards domestic garrisons carried a high degree of legitimacy: not only was the
crown acting within its right, it acted that way with good reason. Taking action for
better defence was a perfectly legitimate thing to do in a time of danger.

The Caroline proposals for the government of garrisons, together with other
projects such as the exact militia, the books of orders, even the Scottish prayer book,
belonged to a conception of the state that the Caroline regime sought to bring about.

---

32 Diana Newton concludes that while the border was more imagined than real to the
inhabitants who lived near to it, it remained very real to the central authorities.
Garrisons were a manifestation of Caroline state building. In that sense, the 1632 proposals for garrisons were no different than Elizabethan efforts to tighten central control of garrison government. Both regimes engaged in state building. One regime, however, was more successful than the other - if we measure success as failing to trigger a civil war and having one’s head severed in public. The rhetoric used in the 1632 proposals for garrisons frame the problems with existing methods of garrison government as a disservice to the king. If what was meant was that, in doing a disservice to the king, current garrison government also did a disservice to the safety of England or to the peaceable government of the king’s towns, then that was not communicated. These would have been very good reasons to embark, during a time of relative peace, upon a wholesale reform of a sixty year old practice. Suspicions about Caroline policies such as this arose not only over their constitutionality, but also over their necessity. For example, the issue in the ship money case was not only whether or not ship money might be legally extended to inland counties, but also that the reason for doing so was unjustifiable: the threat of piracy did not appear to justify such actions.33

33 The first writ for ship money explained that new ships were necessary because “thieves, pirates and robbers…as well as Turks…molest our merchants and…grieve the kingdom.” “The first writ for ship money,” A Complete Collection of State Trials, Vol. III, 1627-1640, ed. T.B Howell (London: 1809), 831-832. Piracy, and its effect on trade, threatened the prosperity of the entire realm. Derek Hirst observes that coastal counties like Hampshire and Sussex that were vulnerable to raid and attack, found the argument legitimate and paid most readily. In places not vulnerable to attack, piracy
The Elizabethan regime, by contrast, regularly framed its actions towards garrisons in terms of the general good. This is not to say that the discourse of public good was never used by Charles or members of the Caroline regime. But the actions of the Caroline regime did not always seem to match its rhetoric. The notion that private interests should be subsumed to the public good was always part of Charles’ rhetoric; however, the Caroline regime sometimes strained the legitimacy of the argument. There were instances when the rhetoric of public good was used to gloss what were essentially the private and particular interests of the individuals involved. Moreover, Charles himself often thought that the public good was a thing he was best able to define. Once he had identified a policy as in the public interest, Charles felt duty bound to override any considerations posed by custom or the common law in pursuit of the common good. 34

The Elizabethan regime, by contrast, did not always act purely in the interests of the commonweal. But the Elizabethan regime was more successful in its use of the rhetoric of the public interest and in its ability to place its actions legitimately within that rhetoric. The care it took over the government of garrisons benefited the good order of the country and the safety of all, particularly in a dangerous time. And this, surely, was the crown doing its job. In a similar vein, James VI/I reassured parliament that while he had “put down the form of warlike keeping of Berwick,” he intended and its effect on trade did not seem like such an emergency. Hirst, England in Conflict, 148.

34 Cust, Charles I, 185-189.
“to sustain a pretty seminary of soldiers in my forts within this kingdom, besides the
two cautionary towns in the Low Countries.”35 Such reassurances answered concerns
that the loss of England’s largest domestic garrison meant a diminution of England’s
defences and martial capacities.36

Garrisons, of course, do not account for the collapse of English government in
the middle of the seventeenth century. Garrisons were, however, bellwethers of
significant trends. The early modern crown did not possess the coercive power to
impose its will by force. Central government actions did require legitimation: they
did not have to be universally liked, but they had to be seen as legitimate. The study
of garrisons reveals that, even within the limitations of legitimacy, much was
achievable. During the Elizabethan period the central government came to exert
greater control over England’s martial instruments, both garrisons and militia. The
central government achieved this not by circumventing the processes of negotiated
authority, but by working within them. Its success lay in insisting on the crown’s

35 James I, The King’s Majesty’s Speech to the Lords and Commons of this Present
Parliament at Whitehall, 21 March, 1609 (London: 1609), F4v. The king counted the
seminary of soldiers to be maintained at his forts as one of the reasons he required the
large subsidy he asked of parliament. Indeed, the king was at great pains to point out
that his monetary requirements were for “the general good of the commonwealth.”
F2r-v.

36 Just before the dissolution of the Berwick garrison came to pass, an unknown
author put to paper reasons for the continuance of the garrison of Berwick-upon-
Tweed. One of the primary reasons was because it was “the only nursery for soldiers”
in England. While this point was arguable, it does evidence the existence of some
concern that the elimination of the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed meant a
significant weakening of the country’s defences. TNA, SP14/5/4.
legitimate control over the defence of the kingdom and a narrative that emphasized that it was in the best interest of the orderly government of the entire kingdom for the crown to take such action. Much like garrisons, therefore, the early modern state ought to be considered on its own terms: it operated in particular ways and might be shaped and altered to particular ends. The Elizabethan regime, and its Jacobean and Caroline successors for that matter, sought to do just that.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

William Harrison’s 1587 *Description of England* and Thomas Wilson’s 1600 *State of England* both discuss England’s castles and fortresses. Both authors offered similar observations: England possessed very few fortifications compared to other kingdoms. The exception to this general truth were England’s frontiers, where fortifications existed to prevent the invasion of an enemy. Harrison informs us that while there were “very few or no castles at all…within England,” there were some “upon the coasts and marches of the country, for the better keeping back of the foreign enemy whencesoever he shall attempt to enter and annoy us.”\(^1\) Not much had changed by 1600. Wilson observed that England possessed fortresses particularly on the Scottish borders, “for the jealousy of Scotland [and] to withstand the incursions of the Scots upon the borders,” and in the west country, “for the fear of the Spaniard, the capital enemy of England.”\(^2\)

Both men also mused about why England possessed very few fortifications compared to other kingdoms. For Wilson, the English view was that castles provided places of resort to both one’s enemy and the soldiers who ought to be fighting on one’s own side. Possessing no castles meant that if an invading enemy desired a fortification, they had to build one themselves. A lack of fortifications also enhanced the “courage of the people” in the face of invasion. Knowing that they had no place

---

\(^1\) Harrison, *The Description of England*, 222.
to retire to safety forced people to “fight it out at the first brunt.” Elsewhere he noted the fear that fortifying towns “makes the people either cowardly or revolting,” a concern to which he attributed the practice of appointing irreconcilable enemies to share oversight of such key places of trust as the Tower.\(^3\) For Harrison, the utility of castles and holds was more a matter of debate. “It hath been of long time a question in controversy and not yet determined,” Harrison stated, “whether holds and castles near cities or anywhere in the heart of commonwealths are more profitable or hurtful for the benefit of the country.” He cited classical fears that “a castle in a commonwealth is but a breeder of tyrants,” while also noting that medieval kings had razed many, thinking it better to meet a foreign enemy in an open field than to live in fear of their own rebellious nobles. Harrison remained equivocal but did observe that castles “have been the ruin of many a noble city.” Some castles and holds “never cease to encroach upon the liberties of the cities adjoining,” thereby hindering those cities “what and wherein they may.”\(^4\)

England did not possess a surfeit of fortifications, but for both Harrison and Wilson the fortifications England did possess were a significant enough feature of the English polity to warrant inclusion and discussion in their respective surveys. Harrison and Wilson, therefore, acknowledged something that modern historians are wont to overlook: that fortifications, and the men who held them, were a feature of

\(^3\) Ibid., 12, 42.

\(^4\) Harrison, *Description of England*, 220.
the English state worthy of specific attention. Furthermore their discussions of castles and fortifications link those bodies to the government of the state more generally. When Harrison and Wilson spoke of the debatable utility of fortifications to a polity, they placed fortifications in the context of stable government and not just in the context of martial practice. The two writers therefore corroborate a central argument of this study: that fortifications, and the government of the men who manned them, were connected in contemporary minds to the operation of the English state as a whole and not just the operation of the fiscal-military state.

Garrisons were a project of governance.

The Elizabethan central government, the queen and her privy councillors, sought to create, maintain and perpetuate a particular kind of England: one that was Protestant, and, to their minds, well ordered and well governed. It was an England free from turmoil and disorder generated from within, or from the interference of enemies from without. Elizabeth and her advisors possessed no preconceived plan for achieving this end, but it was nonetheless a goal that shaped the actions that they took in distributing authority within the state. It was this fundamental project of governance that led the central government to turn its attention to the state and structure of England’s domestic defences. It sought to have England’s domestic garrisons, and England’s militia, governed in a particular way: specifically, by men appointed directly by the central government and who possessed an authority not subject to any other but the crown’s. Those outside the central government, in our
case those who governed England’s towns, shared the central government’s overarching concern for safety, stability and order. They also believed that this might be achieved through a particular distribution of authority: a distribution of authority that saw the government of garrisons subsumed under their existing authority and not as a separate jurisdiction.

Both the central government and those who governed England’s towns took actions intended to bring about a particular kind of state. Both parties sought a particular, and different, distribution of authority. This opposition is difficult to see at first because the primary goal was the same: order and stability. But the manner in which each party thought this might be achieved most effectively differed. Thus, both parties engaged in state building, in taking measures intended to bring a particular situation about. Regarding the government of garrisons, the central government successfully built the state it sought. It asserted and maintained garrisons as a jurisdiction separate from that of other nodes of officially empowered authority. The central government achieved this without recourse to coercive physical force. It did not use coercive force because it did not require it. The queen, together with her advisors, was the ultimate arbiter of officially empowered authority within the English state. This was one of those generally held beliefs on which the operation of authority in early modern England rested. As the body to whom one appealed for the establishment or maintenance of one’s authority against the encroachments of
another, the central government possessed considerable ability to distribute authority within the state in the manner it saw fit.

The Elizabethan regime sought to have England better defended, so that it might protect and enhance domestic stability and order. The central government did not, in other words, seek martial change or development for its own sake. That it did not do so likely enhanced actions that already carried considerable legitimacy: defence of the realm not only lay within the royal prerogative, but the actions that the central government took with regard to garrisons and the militia took place within a context of legitimate necessity. The Elizabethan regime faced real threats from both without and within. But just because the regime did not seek military development for its own sake does not mean that significant military development failed to occur. The Elizabethan treatment of the government of garrisons, taken together with the regime’s treatment of the government of the militia, illustrates that the regime took considerable pains to centralize oversight of the primary instruments of England’s defence. It certainly remains true that the English crown lacked the fiscal resources to facilitate a well-equipped, well paid martial force. Despite such fiscal limitations, however, the regime managed to place militarily experienced men in charge of their domestic garrisons. The garrison rank and file were, to be sure, a mixture of professional soldiers and soldiers of convenience. Old soldiers and bankrupts filled the ranks of England’s domestic garrisons. But the presence of at least some experienced soldiers meant that garrisons were repositories for the
preservation and perpetuation of martial knowledge. The presence of bankrupts was not ideal, but had the distinct advantage of keeping garrison places occupied without additional monetary expenditure.

Certainly, English domestic fortifications of the late Tudor and early Stuart periods were not state of the art and the garrisons that manned them did not consist of highly disciplined, highly trained soldiers. They did not constitute a standing army or a military revolution in the usual sense. It might be argued that English military practice and structure were in the process of becoming a standing army. This may be so, but we have been concerned with what English military practice was in the period under study, and not what it would become. Likewise, with reference to the structure and operation of the state: we have been concerned with how it operated in the period under study, and not with how it did or did not lead to the emergence of the modern state - a state in which the central authority is strong because it has cornered the market on both the ideological and coercive means of legitimating its authority.

The Elizabethan regime relied upon negotiation in order to govern, but this did not mean that the Elizabethan state was weak or fundamentally flawed. The Elizabethan state worked. The study of garrison government reveals that the Elizabethan regime utilized negotiated authority, supported by the considerable ideological legitimacy the crown possessed, to make conscious alterations to the structure of the state. Once the central government created new jurisdictions, new
manifestations of the state, it reverted back to its role as maintainer and defender of legitimate authority. At least with regard to the government of garrisons, the Jacobean regime continued in this mode. But every strength may become a weakness if mishandled, and it has been suggested here that this is what began to occur in Caroline England. Garrisons do not account for the collapse of the English state in the middle of the seventeenth century, but they hold important clues as to why that collapse occurred.
APPENDIX A

PLYMOUTH, PORTSMOUTH AND BERWICK: GARRISON SIZE

Plymouth

Gorges’ grant of command gives us a sense of the intended size and structure of the Plymouth garrison. Gorges was captain to sixty soldiers, one gentleman porter and three master gunners.¹ A good deal more evidence, however, suggests that the number was nearer fifty than sixty. In February 1596, the Privy council looked into the feasibility of taking fifty men from the Low Countries to serve in Plymouth Fort.² That same month the council wrote to the lord mayor of London and asked him to select fifty men “of such as are masterless and may best be spared.”³ In November of that year, the queen decided to increase the guard to 100 men. When the council wrote Gorges informing him of the increase, they instructed him to select twenty-five men to serve at the queen’s charge, in addition to those already allowed to him to serve in the fort. The inhabitants of Devon were to provide the other twenty-five to make up the 100 men.⁴

While the initial number of fifty men was within a year increased to 100, the number decreased to forty early in James VI/I’s reign. The garrison remained at roughly that size throughout the early Stuart period. In an undated document, James

¹ TNA, SP12/256/113.
² TNA, SP12/256/49 & 12/256/60.
³ APC, Vol. XXV, 250.
I suggested that if forty men would suffice for the garrison at Plymouth, Gorges’ own pay might be taken from the allowance of the other ten men.\(^5\) There is little positive proof that James I carried out this cost cutting proposal, and we have to wait another thirty or so years before we have another indication of the number of men employed in Plymouth Fort. A list produced in 1636 enumerates England’s forts and castles and provides the names of their commanders and the strength of their garrisons. This list refers to forty-five men in Plymouth Fort, to be “reformed” to thirty five.\(^6\) Two years later, in 1638, thirty five men were still on the payroll at Plymouth and St. Nicholas, although an unknown number of new soldiers were added as of September of that year.\(^7\)

**Captains of Plymouth Fort**

- Sir Ferdinando Gorges 1594–1629
- Sir John Gilbert 1601–1603 (during Gorges’ incarceration)
- Sir James Bagg 1629–1638
- Sir Jacob Astley 1638

**Portsmouth**

Portsmouth possessed soldiers and gunners to man its fortifications from the Henrician period onward. Until the late sixteenth century, however, it is difficult to

---

\(^5\) TNA, SP15/35/38

\(^6\) TNA, SP16/347/76.

\(^7\) TNA, SP16/409/26.
ascertain the exact size of the garrison at Portsmouth. A privy council warrant of April 1549 required payments to the extraordinary and ordinary garrison then serving at Portsmouth. Although this provides no indication of the size of the ordinary garrison, it does at the very least acknowledge its existence. In July 1545 the privy council ordered the sheriffs and gentlemen of Oxford, Berkshire and Surrey to bring “the whole power of those shires” to Portsmouth. This order put 500 men in garrison at Portsmouth, a number reduced to 300 in November. It appears that these men stayed until April 1551, when the privy council ordered Lord Fitzwater, the captain, to discharge the garrison before the end of the month. In January 1558, the queen ordered 300 soldiers to Portsmouth; these men were dismissed at the end of March 1558.

By the time Sir Adrian Poynings assumed the captaincy in the late 1550s, it is unclear how many ordinary soldiers served in Portsmouth. Scattered evidence suggests, however, that at least some contingent of soldiers and gunners manned the fortifications at Portsmouth between the late 1550s and the 1590s. In 1559, for instance, the mayor and burgesses of Portsmouth relate that captain Adrian Poynings sent the sergeant of his band, “with more than forty soldiers which served under his

---

8 APC, Vol. II, 357.
10 Ibid., 270-271. This same volume records a dispute amongst the Oxfordshire soldiers at Portsmouth in December 1545, indicating that at least some of the 300 soldiers retained in garrison were of the contingent sent in July of that year.
11 Ibid., Vol. III, 262.
12 TNA, SP11/12/59 and TNA, SP12/1/34.
charge,” to the house of one John Holloway. Nearly three years later, when the privy council requested that Poynings come to London, they asked that he bring with him a note of the amount of armour at Portsmouth, over and above what sufficed to furnish the garrison.

Indications of the presence of soldiers at Portsmouth are scanty at best for the next fifteen years or so. A c.1579 list of gunners in ordinary and pension lists fourteen gunners in ordinary, none in pension, and twelve vacancies. Six years later, in the summer of 1585, Burghley’s note of exchequer accounts lists a payment to the Earl of Sussex for his wages, and that of his band, for one month. In 1586 there was some concern about the age of the men serving at Portsmouth. A memorandum regarding the security of Portsmouth, Hampshire and the sea coasts noted that were gunners of the Portsmouth garrison growing too old to “stand to their pieces.” The memorandum stated that these gunners had served at Portsmouth for thirty-five or forty years, a tenure that meant such men had been gunners of the garrison since the last years of Henry VIII’s reign. The author of the memorandum recommended that

---

13 “Complaint made by the mayor and burgesses of Portsmouth to the Lord Treasurer of England,” *Extracts*, 397.
15 TNA, SP12/133/27. That document, however, still listed Sir Adrian Poynings as captain, whereas Sir Henry Radcliffe had been captain there since 1571, so it is perhaps not the most accurate reflection of the number of gunners serving at that date.
16 Roberts, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Salisbury*, Vol. III, 100. The amount of the monthly charge was £47 8s.
17 TNA, SP12/191/9.
more gunners be sent to Portsmouth. This recommendation was fulfilled, eventually, when fifteen extra gunners arrived there sometime in the autumn of 1587.\(^{18}\)

Between 1589 and 1591, the number of soldiers serving at Portsmouth increased. A rough estimate by Burghley of the number of men in pay at Portsmouth in 1591 records sixty men, “beside the old garrison,” and fifteen gunners.\(^{19}\) The extra sixty began serving in August 1589 and were further supplemented by another forty men in 1591. Francis Cotton, paymaster of Portsmouth, declared that between 1589 and 1591 he paid the wages of sixty soldiers. Between July 1591 and January 1593 he paid the wages of 100 soldiers, which included “an increase and new supply of [forty] men to furnish up the complete number of 100.”\(^{20}\) The size of Portsmouth garrison remained at roughly 100 men from 1591 onward. In the autumn of 1594, Francis Cotton drew up another account of the money he disbursed at Portsmouth. He included amongst his payments the “entertainment and wages of one hundred soldiers…serving the queen’s majesty in the town of Portsmouth for the better

\(^{18}\) A letter from Sussex to Burghley, dated November 1587, requests that the extra gunners be sent down. Shortly after that, on 11 December 1587, a warrant was sent to the Exchequer to pay fifteen extra gunners at Portsmouth 8d. per diem. TNA, SP12/205/59 & TNA, SP12/206/27. More conclusively, a May 1590 “certificate of wages due to fifteen gunners at Portsmouth between September 1589 and May 1590” lists the gunners’ names and the date they entered service. Most entered service in December 1587, or had replaced someone who had. TNA, SP12/232/9.

\(^{19}\) TNA, SP12/238/78.


BL, Add 18764, f.4 is also a list of soldiers at Portsmouth from December 1590 to January 1591. The total number of soldiers listed is sixty.
defence thereof.” Three years later Hampden Paulet, the garrison lieutenant, wrote to the privy council to complain that 100 soldiers was too small a garrison to set forth a sufficient watch. He asked that the garrison either be increased, or that the 300 county soldiers recently arrived to better defend the town be continued. The privy council did not grant his request, as the reappointment of Charles Blount to the captaincy of Portsmouth in May 1604 makes clear. His reappointment provides a snapshot of the Portsmouth garrison at the beginning of the Jacobean period. The garrison consisted of one master gunner, twenty nine gunners, one armourer, one fife, one drum and 100 soldiers. Although not specifically mentioned, the captain always had a lieutenant, to whom he might entrust the command of the garrison in his absence. The last extant pay book for the Portsmouth garrison dates from 1616, and reiterates the size and structure of the Portsmouth garrison expressed in Blount’s appointment in 1604.

Captains of Portsmouth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1558</td>
<td>Edward Turnour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord Edward Paulet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1559-71</td>
<td>Sir Adrian Poynings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 TNA, SP14/8/12
24 BL, Add 33278, f. 11. By this time, the Portsmouth garrison was under the captaincy of the Earl of Pembroke.
1571-93  Sir Henry Radcliffe
1593-1606  Sir Charles Blount, later Lord Mountjoy and Earl of Devonshire
1606-08  Sir Francis Vere
1609-30  William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke
1630-38  Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon

Berwick-upon-Tweed

Shortly after England regained Berwick permanently in 1482, Edward IV appointed the Earl of Northumberland warden of the East Marches and keeper of the town and castle of Berwick. The indenture dated 20 May 1483 that bestowed these offices on the Earl also reveals the size of the garrison he commanded. The Earl of Northumberland had 600 soldiers in the castle and town: 500 for the defence of the town and 100 for the castle guard. There were also a number of officers: two lieutenants (one for the town and one for the castle), a marshal, a treasurer, a master porter, and a number of petty captains. In the event of siege, the king permitted Northumberland to bring in 1,200 more soldiers from the surrounding area.\textsuperscript{25}

By the 1530s the number of men in garrison at Berwick was much reduced. A list of the garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed circa 1531 reveals that the garrison

\textsuperscript{25} Scott, \textit{Berwick-upon-Tweed}, 101-102.
numbered roughly 152 men and five officers. Although the military population of Berwick-upon-Tweed swelled during periods of open hostility between England and Scotland, the permanent garrison itself changed only slightly between the middle of Henry VIII’s reign and the ascension of Elizabeth I. A tally of the Berwick garrison drawn up in December 1558 reveals that only the addition of fifty-eight footmen and thirty gunners had increased the size of the garrison from its 1531 numbers. The two tipstaffs, eight constables and all the horsemen totalled 152, as in 1531. The footmen and the gunners brought the total number of the garrison to 240.

---

26 TNA, E101/58/10. Enumerated in this list were the garrison officers, the captain of the town and castle, the marshal, the treasurer, the porter and the master of the ordinance, together with the retinues belonging to each. There were four clerks of the watch, four “principal constables” and four “under constables.” There were seventeen names under the heading “the great retinue gentleman having men.” Ninety-five names were listed under the final category, “horsemen of the great number.”

27 Again, the garrison was augmented with additional troops on a temporary basis, and many more troops were present in Berwick during the 1550s than those of the permanent garrison. In April 1550, the privy council elected to increase the crew of Berwick with 200 of the soldiers recently sent north. *APC*, Vol. III, 5-6. In 1558, Mary I sent 2000 extra troops and thirty extra gunners to Berwick. *APC*, Vol. VI, 243-245. Some of these men were likely still at Berwick when the Duke of Norfolk, as lieutenant-general of the north, appointed more captains in 1560. A document dating from December of that year notes the captains who were present before the arrival of Norfolk and those appointed by the Duke. The latter category contained the names of eleven captains whose retinues of soldiers, taken together, amounted to 1,000 men. The former category contained the names of another eleven captains whose retinues of soldiers, taken together, numbered 1,000 men. Also included in the former category were fifty gunners. TNA, SP59/3, f.106. As Paul E.J. Hammer points out, penury forced the retention of foreign mercenaries as well. Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, 44-45. The same privy council letter mentions that “Allemaignes” should be sent to Berwick from Newcastle.

28 TNA, SP59/1, f.61.
abstract” of the garrison was drawn up in September 1560. According to this document the queen was at a yearly charge for the following: the captain of the town; the captain of the castle, with his forty soldiers, ten gunners and thirty watchmen; the marshal, the treasurer, the gentleman porter, and the master of the ordnance; “the old ordinary garrison”; and the “officers fees” for the mayor, the customer, the comptroller, the master mason and the master carpenter. The list also included four pensioners, the charge of Captain Reed and his three men at Ferne Island, as well as John Bennet, surveyor of the ordnance.

In 1560, however, the size of the military contingent officially assigned to Berwick-upon-Tweed increased significantly. In the summer of that year, the central government drew up a “new establishment” for Berwick. This increased the

29 TNA, SP59/3, f. 100.
30 Near the entry for the treasurer, Cecil scratched in “with four horse and twelve foot;” likewise for the gentleman porter “six horse and 10 footmen.” It is not readily apparent, however, that these were retinues already possessed by these officers, or what were Cecil’s thoughts on what they should possess.
31 Two tipstaffs, eight constables, thirty “gunners of the great ordnance,” 140 horsemen, fifty-eight footmen, one trumpet, one surgeon, twenty-two watchmen.
32 TNA, SP59/3, f. 100.
33 William Cecil composed two memoranda in July that considered, among other matters, the size of the Berwick garrison. TNA, SP59/2, f. 273 and TNA, SP59/3, f. 131. This latter memorial consists of a list of the captains of Berwick and their contingents, signifying that one set of 2,000 men “shall be the ordinary garrison,” while another 2,000 marked out as “the supply.” Two documents of unknown authorship from August of that year tabulated some of the costs of the garrison as it currently stood. TNA, SP59/3, ff. 17 & 19. At the end of August Sir Francis Leek, temporarily in charge of Berwick-upon-Tweed, was ordered to dismiss all but 1,000 of the extraordinary soldiers. TNA, SP59/3, f.26, 28 August 1560. The day after, Leek
size of the garrison by adding approximately 1,200 more men. The new establishment lists only one captain instead of the two separate captains for the town and castle. Assigning to the captain were one secretary and forty household servants. The officers remained the same: a marshal, a treasurer, a gentleman porter and a master of the ordnance. Each of these officers, excepting the master of the ordnance, possessed a personal retinue: the marshal, twenty-four horsemen; the treasurer, twenty horsemen and two clerks; and the porter fourteen footmen and six horsemen. The master of the ordnance commanded no horse or foot, but did receive another officer for charge of all the munitions in the north. Rounding out the office holders were the officers of the town: the mayor, the master mason, the master carpenter, the customer and the comptroller.

The new establishment divided the soldiery of Berwick into two groups: the “old crew called the great retinue” and “a new crew called the extraordinary crew.”

The great retinue, or the old garrison, saw some alteration in the new establishment. The old garrison retained its eight constables and thirty gunners and a reduced contingent of horsemen and footmen. The brief abstract of the old ordinary garrison offered his own opinions to Cecil on Berwick, and reforms that might be undertaken for its betterment. TNA, SP59/3, f. 32, 29 August 1560.

The captain’s annual fee in the “new establishment” was £133 6s. 8d. per year. Under the former schema, the captain of the town and of the castle split this amount, and each received £66 13s. 4d., indicating the consolidation of those two former offices. This document does not use the term governor or lord governor.

The captain of the castle used to have forty soldiers at £6 13s. 4d. each per year. The new captain’s “household servants” were to receive the same amount per annum.

TNA, SP59/3, f. 65.
of September 1560 recorded 140 horsemen and fifty-eight footmen. The new establishment reduced those numbers to eighty horse and forty-two foot.\textsuperscript{37} The old garrison also kept its surgeon and its trumpet, but gone were the two tipstaffs and twenty-two watchmen. To the existing garrison, the crown added about 1,200 soldiers arrayed under twelve captains. Altogether, there were 1,150 soldiers: 345 “armed picks,” 755 “harquebusiers” and fifty gunners of the great ordnance. In addition to this number were the aforesaid twelve captains, twelve petty captains, eleven ensign bearers, eleven drums, six sergeants, two surgeons, a clerk of the cheque and about seven pensioners.\textsuperscript{38}

A January 1561 list of the “money due to the garrison of Berwick…for one quarter year” gives us a better sense of the actual implementation of the new establishment. It is evident that there were some alterations to the original plan, the most significant of which was that Lord Grey of Wilton did not assume the captaincy of Berwick, but the governorship.\textsuperscript{39} There were also some minor alterations to the structure of the new garrison. The “new increased crew” consisted of fifteen captains instead of the proposed twelve: two of the captains commanded 156 men, four

\textsuperscript{37} It is quite likely that some of these men made up the personal retinues that the new establishment allowed to certain of the officers at Berwick.

\textsuperscript{38} The clerk of the cheque himself was allowed one clerk and two “household servants.”

\textsuperscript{39} The governor, treasurer, gentleman porter and master of the ordnance are also named in this document. They were Lord Grey of Wilton, Valentine Brown, John Selby, John Edward and John Bennet, respectively. The office of marshal was listed, but no one had yet been appointed to that office. TNA, SP59/4, f. 46.
captains commanded 105 men, and the remaining nine captains each commanded fifty-three. A few new pensioners were also added, men who were “lately captains cassed from bands.” All told then, in January 1561 the garrison at Berwick numbered approximately 1,500.

Only two years after coming to the throne, therefore, Elizabeth I oversaw an enormous increase in the size of the Berwick garrison. The addition of the new soldiers rendered the garrison “far greater than ever was indeed.” The queen did reduce the garrison to about 800 men early in 1564, and it remained at roughly that strength throughout her reign, but this still made Berwick England’s largest domestic garrison until 1603. Only months after taking the throne, James VI/I established a commission for dissolving the garrison at Berwick. After Christmas 1603, the king reduced the garrison to 100 footmen under the charge of a captain “and such usual officers as are entertained in a company of a hundred foot.” James VI/I ordered the commissioners to select 100 of the oldest and most able of the garrison to form this company. The offices of governor, marshal, treasurer and gentleman porter ceased. The captains and officers of individual bands were permitted to stay in Berwick and receive full pay until their deaths. The remainder of the garrison was dispersed. If they so chose, former members of the garrison could go elsewhere at the king’s charge:

40 Ibid.
41 This is my total, achieved by tallying up the numbers of men listed as receiving pay, inclusive of the officers and their retinues.
42 BL, Lansdowne 155, f. 274. “New Orders for the town of Berwick and garrison of the same, signed by the queen, 1 October 1560.”
“common soldier[s]” to Ireland, Flushing or Brill; gunners to the Tower of London or into the navy.\textsuperscript{43} In the summer of 1611, James VI/I placed the remaining 100 soldiers on half pay for the remainder of their lives, and freed them “from all military service.”\textsuperscript{44}

**Governors of Berwick**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1560-1563</td>
<td>William Grey, Lord Grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563–68</td>
<td>Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568-1596</td>
<td>Henry Carey, Baron Hunsdon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598-1603</td>
<td>Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{43} TNA, SP14/5/5.  
\textsuperscript{44} TNA, SP14/61/1.
APPENDIX B

MAPS

In his 1600 *Survey of England*, Thomas Wilson listed ninety-three castles and fortifications that the queen maintained at her expense and in which she “allowed the maintenance of a captain or lieutenant or some other officer as gunner, porter or constable.” He noted also that the vast majority of those fortifications the queen maintained were located along the sea coasts.1 The queen maintained these fortifications at various strengths. Some possessed quite small contingents: the Black Bulwark and Archcliffe Bulwark (sometimes called the Green Bulwark), near Dover, each possessed fewer than ten soldiers and gunners. A good number of castles maintained contingents of ten to twenty-five men. These medium sized garrisons included the castles in the downs in Kent (Deal, Walmer and Camber,) as well as some on the south coast, such as Hurst in Hampshire. Since the size of the garrison of Berwick-upon-Tweed was quite out of the ordinary for England itself, garrisons numbering fifty to one hundred men may be considered large. The maps below identify and locate other notable medium-to-large garrisons that coexisted with, or were situated near towns.

---

South West England

South East England
Notes:

In Southeast England, the castle of Camber was adjacent to the town of Rye and Deal and Walmer to Deal. In addition to Dover Castle in Dover, a number of small bulwarks protected the surrounding approaches and the pier. A similar situation obtained in the Thames Estuary. The Isle of Wight also contained numerous small fortifications in addition to the main garrison at Carisbrooke.

Borders
Notes:

The garrison at Berwick-upon-Tweed was, of course, the largest manned garrison in the north. Much smaller contingents of soldiers and gunners were maintained at Carlisle, Wark, Holy Island, Ferne Island and Tynemouth.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Manuscript Sources

Berwick-upon-Tweed Record Office

BBA/C/C1 Bailiff’s Court Book

The British Library

Additional MS
Lansdowne MS
Stowe MS

Devon Heritage Centre (Devon Record Office)

1392M Ferdinando Gorges: Correspondence with Lord Seymour, 1596-1600

Hampshire Record Office

44M69/G3 Jervoise Family of Herriard, Hampshire: Shrievalty and Justices of the Peace

Hull History Centre (Kingston-upon-Hull Record Office)

BRB Minutes of Meetings of the Mayor and Aldermen (Bench Books)
BRS Files Relating to Particular Matters

Hatfield House Archives, The Cecil Papers [retrieved from The Cecil Papers database]

CP Cecil Papers

Isle of Wight Record Office

OG/BB Oglander Family of Nunwell, Brading, Isle of Wight: Official Documents and Correspondence
The National Archives

A01 Auditors of the Imprest: Declared Accounts
E101 King's Remembrancer: Various Accounts
E211 King's Remembrancer: Ancient Deeds, Series DD
SP 10 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Edward VI
SP 11 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Mary I
SP 12 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth I
SP 14 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, James I
SP 15 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Addenda
SP 16 Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Charles I
WO55 Ordnance Office and War Office: Miscellaneous Entry Books and Papers

Plymouth and West Devon Record Office

1/360 Manuscripts Relating to the Borough of Plymouth, Second Folio

Printed Primary Sources


James I. The Kings' Majesty's Speech to the Lords and Commons of this Present Parliament at Whitehall, 21 March 1609. London: 1609.


Secondary Sources


