AN EXAMINATION OF THE DETERMINENTS OF QUEBEC’S PARADIPLOMATIC ACTIONS

by

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DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my mother, Lynn Harper in eternal appreciation and gratitude for the constant and support and encouragement. Without you, this endeavor would not have been possible.
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The aim of this thesis is to examine Quebec’s two international policy goals: vigorous participation in the global economy and the preservation and promotion of the French as the national language within Quebec. The goal is to determine whether culture or economic determinants are the primary driver of the province’s paradiplomatic activity. The first section of this thesis surveys previous literature on Quebec’s paradiplomatic activity, and identifies the theoretical frameworks which best suit the purpose of this study. Here, the thesis draws on a number of sources from academics and scholars who have contributed to the study of Quebec’s paradiplomatic activity. This thesis then identifies two important case studies, further outlining Quebec’s international presence since 1965. In conclusion, the thesis argues that there has been an evolution from cultural determinants to more economic and materialist interests. The author recommends further examination and a comparative analysis of subnation states in the international political economy.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACCT  Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation
ACQS  The American Council for Quebec Studies
CONFEMEN  Conference of National Education Ministers
ENAP  Ecole national d’administration publique
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 1988
INCP  International Network on Cultural Policy
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIICD  New International Instrument on Cultural Diversity
NORAD  North American Aerospace Defense Command
OCAM  Organization of the Colonial French Community
OIF  Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
PLQ  Parti Liberal du Quebec
PQ  Parti Quebecois
UIJPFL  International Union of French Language Journalists and Press
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WTO  World Trade Organization
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION

Quebec has longed pursued two prime policy goals: vigorous participation in the global economy and the preservation and promotion of French as the national language within Quebec. This thesis sets out to explore and examine the determinants of Quebec’s role on the international stage. This analysis will examine Quebec’s involvement in paradiplomatic activities since 1965, whilst highlighting important government policies that have contributed to the province’s position in the international realm.

The rise of subnational units within liberal democracies is a relatively new phenomenon. This occurrence is triggered by the necessity of the political entities within these federal states to protect culture and identity, all of which they deem the state to be doing inefficiently and/or insufficiently. Quebec has been a world leader as a sub-nation state in pressuring the federal state to allow itself to act internationally on its own behalf. Quebec’s active engagement in the international community has been driven by factors related to cultural protection and economic prosperity.

In order to understand how the phenomenon of Quebec becoming a legitimate international subnation actor occurred, we will begin in the past, by exploring the history of Quebec’s involvement in international relations, particularly cultural and economic organizations and agreements in which Quebec has sought membership. This historical overview will provide an introduction to the most important feature of Quebec’s international presence: the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine. It will provide an overview of the main events and government policies that have influenced Quebec as a legitimate international actor. This material will provide a historical baseline and backdrop for understanding the Quebec’s two prime policy goals. With that, this thesis will explore the following
question: do economic determinants outweigh cultural determinents in the motivation behind Quebec’s foreign policy. This thesis will argue that economic determinants are of utmost importance to the province of Quebec, and that cultural protection is of a lower significance. This thesis will recognize that there has been an evolutionary shift from cultural protection to materialist interests for the province of Quebec, and aims to point towards this progressive evolution of culture and economics at the forefront of Quebec’s foreign policy.

1.1 Historical Background

For close to fifty years, Quebec has been actively engaged in the international community. To this day, the government of Quebec maintains a network of twenty-five offices abroad, covering twenty countries and asserting a unique role in the international community. Thus, Quebec has become the most advanced case of international involvement for a non-sovereign state. However, it is important to note the different stages through which Quebec’s international relations and policies have evolved.

Both the United States and France had diplomatic representatives posted in Quebec City well before the province became part of contemporary Canada in 1867.¹ Quebec had representatives abroad before Canada was allowed to conduct its own foreign relations, but it was not until 1931 that the Government of Canada had full autonomy on matters related to foreign policy.² In that same year, the province of Quebec presented

itself as the only government institution where French-speaking Canadians could be a majority and therefore in a capacity to exert control within areas within the jurisdiction of the province.³

Several major steps led to Quebec’s foreign policy initiatives in the 1960s. In 1816, the province of Quebec opened up a bureau in London in the United Kingdom. This was followed in 1834 with the opening of a United States Consulate in Quebec City.⁴ In 1859 France also opened a Consulate in Quebec City.⁵ By 1882, Quebec appointed an Agent générale in Paris and continued to appoint others in 1911 in London and 1925 in Brussels.⁶ In 1937, the Judicial Committee of Privy Council (the highest Court having jurisdiction in Canada) ruled that section 132 of the British North America Act was not valid regarding provinces.⁷ This section gave Parliament of Canada “all powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.”⁸ The ruling recognized provincial autonomy in its spheres of jurisdiction, including international treaties. Thus, this became the basis on which Quebec claimed its right to be active on the international scene.

In 1940, Quebec opened a trade office in New York City - an initiative undertaken by Adelard Godbout’s Liberal government.⁹ This international presence was

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⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
prompted by economic interests. By opening a trade office in New York City, “this would help the province get out of the Great Depression through direct access to US money markets.” Union Nationale Premier Maurice Duplessis kept the office open. The trade office in New York City began to grow in the ensuing years, and much credit was given to the change within the province brought by the Quiet Revolution under Liberal Premier Jean Lessage, elected in 1960. The opening and maintaining of this trade office is an important marker of a continuous international engagement by the province.

1.2 The Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine (1965)

The 1960s marked the beginning of what one Quebec scholar, Nelson Michaud, describes as the “Stage Setting Era (1965-1985)” in which the scene was set for Quebec’s international activities. February of 1965 can be established as the precise date when the stage was set for Quebec’s contemporary international relations. According to Michaud:

The modernization of governance was at the very heart of the Quiet Revolution. This meant, first, the establishment of a professional public service. A successful and swift implementation of these sweeping changes could only be possible by learning from the experience of other governments.

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13 Ibid.
In order to facilitate these changes, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Minister of Education and Deputy Premier, signed a series of initial agreements with the French government.\(^{14}\)

The Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine was nothing but the expression of full autonomous responsibility of a provincial government in the fields under its jurisdiction.\(^{15}\) The language is very explicit in this regard:

Quebec is not sovereign in all matters: it is a member of a federation. But it constitutes, in a political sense, a state. It possesses all elements: territory, population, autonomous government. It is also the political expression of a people that is distinct in many ways from the English-speaking communities inhabiting North America.

In all matters that are completely or partially under its competence, Quebec intends from now on to play a direct role that conforms to its personality and its rights … Quebec is determined to take its proper place in the contemporary world and to make sure it has, externally, as well as internally, all the means necessary to realize the aspirations of the society it represents.\(^{16}\)

Gerin-Lajoie then went on to make the point that there was no reason why the fact of implementing an international convention should be disassociated from the right of negotiating and concluding such a convention.\(^{17}\) Further, he did not find it acceptable that Ottawa practice “surveillance and control” over Quebec’s international relations.

The Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine is the rationale presented by the Quebec government from which issued a legal argument affirming the capacity of Quebec to manage its own foreign policy in fields relevant to its constitutional powers. According to Gérin-Lajoie, “Quebec is more than just one federated state among others. It is the political instrument


\(^{17}\) Balthazar, Louis, “The Quebec Experience; Success or failure?” *Regional and Federal Studies*, 1999, 9:1, 155.
of a cultural group, distinct and unique in greater North America.”\textsuperscript{18} And it was in the Quebec Legislative Assembly in 1967, during the second reading of the bill establishing the Ministère des relations intergouvernementales, that, alluding to provincial constitutional rights, he asserted that Quebec’s international relations are defined as “the external extension of its domestic fields of jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{19} The rationale behind the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine is that it provides a road map or guide for the sovereign rights of the province, particularly within its jurisdiction, that should be applied in international relations. In terms of culture, health, and education (all of which fall under provincial jurisdiction via the Canadian Constitution), this would allow Quebec to have an international voice on treaties pertaining to these areas of jurisdiction, and thus be treated independently of the federal government.

During the ensuing twenty years, “notwithstanding the changing color of the government,”\textsuperscript{20} Quebec kept a foothold in foreign relations, notably within the community of French-speaking countries that subsequently formed la francophonie. Quebec attended the meeting of the Conference of National Education Ministers (CONFEMEN) in 1968; gained membership within the Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) as a participating government; and participated in the New Summits of Francophone Heads of State Government in 1985.\textsuperscript{21} These two

examples illustrate situations in which Quebec was within its jurisdiction constitutionally, participating in memberships of sectors that relate to culture, education or health.

In the 1970s, Premier Rene Levesque of the Parti Quebecois utilized foreign policy as a means of support for a referendum. The Parti Quebecois:

Sought a diplomatic immunity for its foreign representatives, made statements on human rights issues, and considered an independent defense policy for a sovereign Quebec, including its potential withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).²²

Though the 1980 referendum on sovereignty was unsuccessful, by reinforcing a distinct foreign policy, it reaffirmed that by seeking external recognition outside of the central state, Quebec sought to become legitimate in the international community.

The second stage defining contemporary Quebec foreign policy is the “Consolidation Period” from 1985-2002. The consolidation period for Quebec’s international role began with Bernard Landry’s contribution in the last weeks of the Pierre-Marc Johnson Parti Quebecois-led government.²³ Landry produced a White Paper outlining the principles of Quebec’s global participation and the areas of their application; it directly aimed at consolidating Quebec’s world presence.²⁴ According to Michaud, “it was conceived as an answer to the need for both self-assertion and recognition by foreign actors of Quebec’s legitimacy on the international scene.”²⁵ With the election of Robert Bourassa’s Liberal government in 1985, this policy statement was

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²⁴ Ibid., 391-392.
²⁵ Ibid., 392.
not initially implemented. Instead, the Bourassa government centralized Quebec’s international relations by creating the Ministry of International Relations in 1988.

After the creation of the Ministry of International Relations, two more policy statements emerged during this period. First, in 1991, under the new framework brought by the creation of the Ministry, the minister was required to publish an international relations policy. This was a policy that emphasized the exercise of consolidation between the province and Ottawa, putting the emphasis on the economy and the world’s interdependence in that terms of financial integration. The third policy statement was published in 2001. This statement consisted more of a ‘strategic plan’ to meet the requirements of the recent Loi sur l’administration publique. This policy statement consisted of objectives and issues on which Quebec intended to focus its efforts on, including multilateral trade negotiations as well as to ensure certain domains such as “identity and recognition” would still be protected.

Michaud highlights the significance of the 2001 statement, arguing that “more than ever before, the use of the concept of ‘foreign policy’ is underscored and used in policy statement. This can be explained in part by the more administrative nature of this document.” It is important to understand that this is a reflection of the Quebec government’s willingness to not simply “react to external pressures” on its domestic policies, but position itself to actually influence international standards. In 2006, this was

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28 Government of Quebec, Le Quebec dans un ensemble international, 30.
reaffirmed in another *White Paper* published by the Quebec government. It asserted that there are “growing international pressures in areas falling specifically under the jurisdiction of federated entities”\(^{30}\) which motivated the Quebec government to reinvest in its delegations network, to provide adequate resources, and to consider a definite move towards a genuine foreign policy position.

The last period of Quebec’s foreign policy, labelled by Michaud as “Toward Foreign Policy (2002-Present),” has been characterized by the desire of the government of Quebec to create new international engagements and establishing a genuine foreign policy. Foreign policy activities, as put forward by Michaud and Ramet, “are characterized not only by a doctrine of, and the commitment of resources to, international relations, but primarily the will of a state to actively influence the international context to its advantage.”\(^{31}\) This new stage was launched by the Quebec Legislative Assembly’s adoption of a bill that states “any international treaty of importance and involving Quebec’s own responsibilities should be evaluated by the provincial legislature before it being enacted locally.”\(^{32}\) This means that any treaty that Canada enters must have Quebec’s prior consent if it encroaches on Quebec’s jurisdiction. The adoption of this bill was of unanimous among all political parties, signalling that any governing party could influence certain aspects of Quebec’s international activities and agreements.

In 2003 the Liberal party was elected under the leadership of Jean Charest, and re-elected again in 2007 and 2008. The Charest government fully supported the new


measure as well as the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine. In February 2004, Charest delivered a speech at Ecole nationale d'administration publique (ENAP), and paraphrased Gerin-Lajoie in stating, “that which is Quebec’s jurisdiction at home, is Quebec’s jurisdiction at large.” This mantra can be found in government documents related to the Ministry of International Relations as well as Intergovernmental Affairs. This agreement, arguably, resulted in the federal government assuring Quebec of a separate seat within the Canadian delegation to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The symbolism that derived from this seat allowed for the recognition that Quebec is a legitimate actor in the international arena.

In review, The Stage Setting Era (1965-1985) was what can be described as a “trial and error” approach to foreign policy. It was, as Michaud describes, an “organized anarchy” in which foreign policy was primarily innovative for the province at the time, yet also limited within its scope. Quebec’s international agreements were limited, primarily, to its relationship with France. This can be attributed to the difficulties of planning ahead since international relations are traditionally the purview of the federal government. Each circumstance that involved international activity of Quebec was ‘ad hoc,’ or case by case. Michaud explains further:

In this stage, interests took precedence over the constraints, since expertise was needed quickly to open to the world a society awakening to new realities. And the personalities of premiers Lesage, D. Johnson, and Renee Levesque, no doubt improved the chances for the new vision to be implemented.

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
The concept of ‘vision,’ as mentioned by Michaud, is an important variable when examining the first stage of Quebec’s foreign policy. It took political leadership and vision to pursue these government initiatives.

The second phase, the consolidation period, built upon the first stage in terms of pursuing interests, but restraints from the federal government diminished Quebec’s political resources and leverage on the international arena during this time. Despite this, this stage is a reflection of policies and organizational realignments such as the change in the ministry of international relations’ mandate. Further, Premiers Bourassa and Bouchard had a keen interest in economic matters, and thus paid less attention to cultural identity than their predecessors. The third phase was “ushered in by globalization,” as Quebec entered the realm of foreign policy-making. Globalization changed the direction in which Quebec conducted its foreign policy. That is, initially Quebec sought to exhibit its uniqueness as a province within Canada, but globalization challenged this and these interests now had to be defended and protected from this phenomenon. Despite this, globalization brought to the forefront other international actors such as nongovernmental organizations, thus diminishing the constraints it faced in the second phase.

Quebec has maintained an international presence since 1965 under the guise of the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine. The province is an active participant in international forums such as La Francophonie and UNESCO. It has also entered into over 550 international

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38 Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among companies and governments within multiple nations. The process is driven by international trade and investment, and aided by information technology. This process has had effects on the environment, culture, as well as political systems and economic development and prosperity. It has been a deeply controversial occurrence as it has effected various cultures throughout the world.
agreements, with more than 300 of them still in effect. Though Quebec has been involved in international activities since before Confederation in 1867, the involvement of the province has flourished since the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine of 1965. In addition, other provinces have followed suit in developing their own policies related to international activity.

1.3 Relevance

Exploration of Quebec’s role on the international stage is worthwhile for three reasons. First, it will serve as a source of information for provincial officials in this policy area, as to what drives Quebec’s foreign policy. This is because Ottawa can no longer negotiate international agreements without provincial approval particularly if they pertain to areas of provincial jurisdiction such as education, health and natural resources. Quebec has promoted a relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. This has resulted in other Canadian provinces initiating foreign policies that pertain to their jurisdictional interests. In addition to this, non-Canadian practitioners will find it useful when it comes to understanding the increasing relevance of Canadian provincial activities in the international realm.

Second, this thesis aims to understand why Quebec has a foreign policy. In terms of policy and decision-making process, it may be beneficial to further study why a

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39 Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among companies and governments within multiple nations. The process is driven by international trade and investment, and aided by information technology. This process has had effects on the environment, culture, as well as political systems and economic development and prosperity. It has been a deeply controversial occurrence as it has effected various cultures throughout the world.

province may feel it can serve its interest abroad more adeptly than the central state. Foreign policy is generally for fully sovereign states, but increasingly, central and sub-nation states face the contemporary challenges and effects of more tightly integrated systems through the phenomenon of globalization. More so, central states are beginning to lose control over their prerogatives, and consequently, subnational states are becoming increasingly important international actors. The study of Quebec as an international actor is a relevant case study when examining and discussing the shift in relative power within foreign policy from the central state to the subnational state.

The final rationale for this study is that there are two competing interpretations concerning the determinants of Quebec’s international activities. The first interpretation is that Quebec’s international activities are based on culture, or more specifically, the protection of the French language embedded in Quebec’s culture. Quebec has sought, through international accords with other nations, to protect language and identity, and promote educational ties. Quebec’s involvement in La Francophonie, an international organization that promotes and protects the French language, illustrates Quebec’s involvement in culturally based initiatives abroad. Scholars such as Louis Belanger and Ronald Atkey attribute these involvements to their argument that by the government investing in international organizations such as La Francophonie, Quebec is asserting the important of culture in their international objectives.

The second interpretation is that the determinants of Quebec’s international policy are functionally based. I intend to use the materialist-idealistic argument as presented by Alexander Wendt in his book entitled: Social Theory of International Politics. Wendt essentially reconciles cultural and functional based arguments in this theory. He argues

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that the international system is a hard case for constructivism on both the social and
construction counts. Generally speaking, it acknowledges both a social side in which
norms and law govern most domestic politics, and a self-interested and coercive side that
seems to rule in international politics. The international system is not a very “social”
place, and so provides intuitive support for materialism in that domain. Constructivists
argue that while the dependence of individuals on society makes the claim that their
identities are constructed by society relatively uncontroversial, the primary actors in the
international politics, states, are much more autonomous from the social system in which
they are embedded. Therefore, their foreign policy behavior is often determined
primarily by domestic politics. This framework, then, will be applied to this thesis in
assessing the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy.

The frameworks of political culture and matieralist-idealist interest within the
structure of Wendt’s social theory of international politics are chosen for a number of
reasons. First, this thesis is primarily based on government documents released by the
province of Quebec, as well as secondary resources. Thus, utilizing theories that
cooperate with the qualitative method, particularly case studies, is most appropriate
because it allows for the ability to explore the internal perspective of the subject, provide
detailed description of the phenomena and text, and provides an emphasis on the
movement of the process in which Quebec has exerted paradiplomatic actions. By using
these theoretical frameworks and the case study method, this provides flexibility, which
is necessary in the application of theories. This allows more room for interpretation in the

42 Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory in International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
43 Ibid., 6.
area of primary resources (government documents) on economic and cultural pursuits of the province.

The theoretical frameworks will also help to analyze the way to explain social and political occurrences. These occurrences will be explained at length throughout the thesis, but as mentioned, political culture and social theory of international politics allows for interpretation. With the case study approach, it strengthens my aim to provide an in-depth elucidation of the argument that the determinents of Quebec’s foreign policy is economic, and outweighs cultural interests; and that there was a progressive, evolution of these determinants in Quebec’s foreign policy. It also allows for the flexibility in recognizing that there was an evolutionary shift from culture to economic interests. Further, what strengthens the case study research design is that it takes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research thus benefiting the qualitative approach. The type of case study I will be utilizing will be the critical case in which I have specified my hypothesis and have chosen cases on the grounds that it will allow for a better understanding of the circumstances under which the hypothesis does or does not hold. Further, but adding government documents relating to La Francophonie and Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States, it helps in the collection and process of relevant information.

1.4 Literature Review

It has been established that there are two competing motivations underpinning the determinants of Quebec’s international activities: political culture and functional-interest. First, I will provide a brief overview of theories: functional-interests ascribed to sub-
national states as international actors and economic interests, as well as political culture and social theory. Second, I will give a short outline and review of the literature from the culturalists who claim culture drives Quebec’s foreign policy. Finally, I will review the ideas of scholars who claim that Quebec’ international activities are interest-based.

1.4.1 Theoretical Perspectives

The theoretical aspect of the literature is based on the economic interests of the Canadian provinces. There are a number of scholars who have contributed to the small body of literature on provincial foreign policy include Christopher Kukucha, Michael Keating, Douglas Brown, Brian Hocking, Earl Fry and Panayotis Soldatos. It is Christopher Kukucha who has done the best job of researching and analyzing the active involvement of the provinces in the international realm. He argues that, “the provinces have perpetuated their own autonomy with regards to their own sectoral interest,” with Quebec being a dominant figure among them.

Brian Hocking has similarly contributed invaluable scholarly work regarding the integration of state and sub-nation state actors into the international political economy. Hocking explores “multilayered diplomacy” in which he examines the role of sub-

47 Ibid.
nation states within multiple governments, but more specifically (for the purposes of this thesis) Canada. He isolates environments, agendas, and the process\textsuperscript{52} by which the sub-nation state goes about their trade policy at the domestic and international levels.

Michael Keating is an important scholar that contributes to Hocking’s analysis on sub-nation state involvement in international trade. Keating takes a more holistic approach to the study of sub-nation states, acknowledges that paradiplomacy extends beyond domestic institutional variables such as sectoral issues, institution building, and civil society.\textsuperscript{53} By taking a more holistic approach, it has failed to disaggregate the policy process except to note that other domestic actors are relevant.\textsuperscript{54} Andre Lecours has challenged the culturalist framework in determining what drives Quebec’s international activities. Lecours’ argument and contribution to this body of literature is that he looks to how sub-nation states such as Quebec legitimize themselves through “opportunity structures.”\textsuperscript{55} This ultimately builds on the theory that Quebec engages in international activities to enhance its own self-interest.

For the purpose of this study it is most useful to look at the contributions of Douglas Brown and Earl Fry on the provinces and Canada’s global trade relations. Though this literature is limited, Brown and Fry suggest that the provinces could better manage their own foreign policy initiatives through a decentralized state.\textsuperscript{56} They also recognize that globalization has played an important evolutionary role in the changing

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
interests of federal and subnation states. Quebec in particular has been the instigator in foreign policy initiatives, not limited to educational agreements with France, but also international trade agreements with nations such as the United States.

In terms of culture and theory, political culture is relevant for this study. Almond and Verba argue that culture can be scientifically analyzed and used as a variable that is autonomous, and that political systems are embedded in culture. Almond and Verba have identified three components of culture: (1) cognitive; (2) affective; and (3) evaluative. These components are based on the individual, psychological level. In light of this, Almond and Verba contend that there is a relatively stable cultural background against which political activity takes place. Despite their assessment, theories of political culture are plagued with obstacles. The theory suffers from inconsistencies and vague definitions of what culture is, and fails to account for the disproportionate influence of elites, suffers from low predictive power, bias and unclear causality. Regardless, there are two severe problems in which culturalists face. First, political culture fails to go beyond individual psychology to examine the effects of mass behavior on institutions, such as political norms and practices. Second, culturalists tend to ignore or dismiss too quickly the idea that political structure could influence culture. Such a co-dependent relationship would be extremely difficult to analyze.

Returning to Wendt’s social theory of international politics, it is applicable to this thesis in that it explores the dichotomy between ideas and material interests. Wendt’s

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social theory of international politics “is concerned with the fundamental assumptions of social inquiry: the nature of human agency and its relationship to social structures, the role of ideas and material forces in social life, the proper form of social explanation, and so on.”

In this manner, Wendt caters to both the functional and cultural aspects of trying to answer why Quebec conducts foreign policy. He does this by pitting materialism and identity; he utilizes social theory in relation with constructivist, materialist, and individualist ontologies to help better explain international politics. The next chapter will explore the theories of political culture and Wendt’s social theory of international politics more closely. I will present a more extensive analysis of these main theories and explore the ways in which they have been applied and developed in the context of Quebec’s international activities. Nevertheless, the alternative contributions presented by the functionalists and culturalists will be useful in my examination of the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy.

1.4.2 Quebec and Culture

A number of scholars have specifically addressed the dominance of culture in Quebec’s international activities; examples include Louis Belanger, Ronald Atkey, Stephane Paquin, Laurier LaPierre and Nelson Michaud. Belanger asserts that

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61 Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory in International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
Quebec’s diplomatic activity is motivated by the pursuit of seceding from Canada; thus the province’s international activities are driven by the need to protect its culture. Though it is possible that culture has contributed to Quebec’s foreign policy, it can only be limited as an undercurrent as opposed to the driving force behind the provinces’ activity. This is because financial prosperity has trumped cultural protection, especially within Quebec’s international activities. Culture is important to the province of Quebec; however, its foreign policy is driven by economic initiatives including tourism, and international trade agreements. This thesis will explore this argument further.

Both Paquin and LaPierre’s have a similar approach. Paquin considers the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine as the official foundation of Quebec’s international activities, as it promoted Quebec’s culture abroad.67 LaPierre complements Paquin’s argument that culture is the foundation of Quebec’s international activities by utilizing the jurisdiction argument. LaPierre’s argument is that provincial jurisdiction can be a province’s leverage in international affairs, 68 which is exactly what Quebec has historically done. LaPierre’s approach is largely a historical analysis of the manifestation of Quebec’s foreign policy and does not recognize other activities, such as trade, that the province has involved itself in.

Atkey and Michaud share a comparable perspective on culture and whether or not it is a determinant in Quebec’s international activities. However, Atkey was writing within a different era. Atkey’s method in arguing for the culturalist position is through a comparative analysis among the Canadian provinces. Atkey’s comparative analysis, I would argue, has resulted in a muddled conclusion. He argues that other provinces are

seeking strictly international trade agreements, whereas Quebec is seeking trade agreements as well as ‘accords’ in the area of culture. These agreements, which are symbolic, provide recognition and cooperation among the accord-signing states. However, Atkey overemphasizes the importance of the culturalist argument in his analysis. It is important to note that Atkey was writing several years after the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine; thus at this time, cultural pursuits were much more prominent in the dialogue from the government. The importance of Atkey’s contribution is that, at the time, culture was what was, at the outset, guiding Quebec’s foreign policy. This thesis will discuss further how Quebec’s foreign policy has evolved, particularly the changes from 1965 to the 1980s.

The culturalist argument as presented by these scholars largely ignores the economic activity Quebec has participated in. This is not to say they have not contributed to the study of Quebec’s foreign policy. For these scholars, it was imperative to look at societal factors that drive Quebec’s international activities. Where I would argue the rationalization is weak is by not acknowledging domestic institutional and sectoral factors, which would be consistent with the functional-interest argument. While these contributions highlighted the role culture has played in the development of Quebec’s international activities, it suffers from specific weaknesses. Further, it is difficult to utilize the political culture argument in terms of arguing that it is a determinant in Quebec’s international activities. Where political culture will come in to great use is how it highlights how political culture interacts with institutions and other attributes of a polity to produce a propensity for certain types of political outcomes.

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70 Ibid.
Nevertheless, it is a flexible method in which it will be uncomplicated in testing different propositions about the links between culture, economic interests and Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions.

1.4.3 Economic Determination

There are several scholars that contribute to the economic determination argument of Quebec’s international activities. For example, Kukucha has provided extensive research on provinces and their role in the international economy. Kukucha asserts that Quebec’s reasoning to be active in the international community is no different than any other province in that they are motivated by economic interests. Rowswell complements Kukucha’s position that economic interests and functional interests have been the driver for Quebec’s foreign policy. He supports his argument by examining and describing Quebec’s push for more economic trade than Ottawa and other provinces, especially during the Free Trade Agreement 1988 (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations.

Louis Balthazaar, also a functionalist, maintains that Quebec is the most advanced case of international involvement for a non-sovereign state, fundamentally as a result of pursuing its own economic interests. Balthazaar contends that functionalism is highly salient, as it is a reflection of “necessity” as opposed to reflecting a search for special status both within Canada and on the international level. This sentiment is echoed by

74 Ibid.
documents produced by the government of Quebec pertaining to its Ministry of International Affairs. The document, “Quebec’s International Policy: Working in Concert” will be the most useful in highlighting the government of Quebec’s goals to foster economic growth and prosperity.  

Another distinctive contribution to my area of research on Quebec’s international activities is by Panayotis Soldatos. Soldatos argues that the cultural basis, which may or may not have contributed to Quebec’s international activities, has declined in its importance of “national building” or the “politicization of Quebec’s external activities” and transformed into a “de-ideologization and normalization” with more economic determinism and cooperative paradiplomatic actions.

Kukucha recognizes the important cultural aspects of Quebec’s involvement in international pursuits such as its membership in La Francophonie or its seat in UNESCO. Rowswell mentions in passing the loss of identity in a globalizing world and its impact not just on Quebec and why it feels it ought to protect it, but for the rest of Canada. Finally, Soldatos begins his argument by stating that culture may have been the trigger in the development of Quebec’s foreign policy, as presented by Gerin-Lajoie in 1965, but then argues that it has evolved into a situation of economic determination. The variable of culture cannot be ignored when studying what drives Quebec’s international activities. Quite often within the literature, scholars who argue for the

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economic position neglect the power culture have had an historical importance within dialogue of the government’s policy and decision-making process.

1.4.4 Conclusion of Literature Review

While there is yet to be any real consensus in terms of whether culture or the economy drives Quebec’s international activities, there is ample discussion on Quebec’s foreign activities in general. It is also recognized within the literature that there was some type of shift in foreign policy interests by the government of Quebec, from culture to the primacy of economic pursuits. My research will pinpoint where the discrepancies lie in where culture begins and functional-interest ends (or continues). This thesis will highlight that there has been an evolutionary process in Quebec’s foreign policy regarding the shift from cultural importance to economic. Going forward, my research will be focused on qualitative data to support my analysis that economic motivations have become more important than cultural ones in driving Quebec’s foreign policy. With respect to my theoretical framework, I will continue exploring theories on subnation states and their functional-interest based pursuits. Further, the discussion of research that I will prioritize will be discussed in the section that follows which focuses on the methodology I will employ from this point forward.

1.5 Outline

The central question of this thesis is: what are the determinants of Quebec’s international activities? This thesis argues that economic interests are the driving force behind Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions, though; it was not always of the utmost
importance. It is well understood that Quebec has been engaging in international pursuits and ventures for over fifty years. By situating this historical perspective, this thesis demonstrates how there was a shift from ‘anarchic’79 identity-based paradiplomacy to functional, clearly defined, economic interests. This thesis offers amplification of the arguments as presented by academics and scholars by placing both arguments within the context of Quebec’s international activities.

In order to grasp the rationale behind Quebec’s international activities, it is essential to develop theories in a way that moves beyond its use as a term to describe this phenomenon. This chapter showed the process by which Quebec developed and maintained its international presence as well as the arguments within the literature surveyed as to what drives Quebec’s foreign policy, thus framing the debate. The following chapters will explore the theoretical perspectives in greater depth as well as a comparative case study. I believe that the best way to answer my research question is to compare two case studies: (1) Quebec’s involvement in international organizations as a sovereign member state; and (2) the economic drivers behind Quebec’s relationship with the United States. These two case studies are the best way to answer this for two reasons: (1) after surveying the literature, no academic has done a thorough, side by side examination of Quebec’s involvement in La Francophonie and the economic relationship the province has with the United States; and (2) by comparing these carefully selected cases, I will be able to accurately portray the evolution Quebec’s foreign policy and to determine what my cases have to say about the broader literature. Further, this allows me to control as many variables as possible, namely how the government of Quebec, with

changing political parties, has been involved in the development of the province’s foreign policy.

These case studies will be Quebec’s involvement in La Francophonie, to test the culturalist position, and Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States which to test the salience of the provinces’ economic incentives. I believe that this is the best way to examine the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy because they are unique and rich in information, allowing me to identify similarities and differences among a wide variety of factors. The final chapter will highlight the relationships between the various situations as presented by the cases studies. The final chapter will then outline my analysis and conclusions and provide answers to my initial research question based on the findings that arise from the previous chapters.
CHAPTER 2  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter elaborates on the main theoretical approaches to explaining and understanding the determinants of Quebec’s pursuit of a foreign policy and subsequent international activities. In general, political scientists have had trouble in situating the politics of Quebec’s international activities, and in particular, determining whether ‘cultural’ interests or economic interests drive it. There is no agreement among political scientists specifically about the primary motivation by which Quebec pursues an international presence. There are two main theories that draw our attention to the different facets of Quebec’s international activities. Each of these theories has clear normative and ideological implications. As we will see, there are specific challenges and determinants that relate to dominant social, economic and political power in terms of researching and examining Quebec’s foreign policy. In the sections to follow, I will assess two theoretical approaches: political culture and social theory of international politics. Both of these theories have been used to provide the broad-brush strokes for studying the underpinnings of Quebec’s foreign policy.

Before moving onto the exploration of the theoretical approaches of political culture and social theory of international politics that will help in explaining and understanding the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy, it is best to define what ‘culture’ is in terms of this thesis and how it fits into the political culture framework. The term ‘culture’ has several different meanings. For the purpose of this study, I will use Lucien Pye’s definition:

Culture encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity … [It] is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and the subjective dimensions of
This definition permits this study to encompass various aspects of what culture may be commonly known for. The culture of a nation comprises many aspects, and is shaped and molded by the background of its people, language and beliefs. These factors have shaped Quebec’s identity in terms of identity politics, language rights and certain beliefs and ideologies (political or religious), all of which have defined the province’s purpose in pursuing an international policy. This does not give rise to the conclusion that culture is the determinant of Quebec’s foreign activities, as I have yet to interrogateate the details of whether culture or economic prosperity determine Quebec’s foreign activity. What is important, however, is that the political culture of Quebec cannot be ignored. Protecting and maintaining the francophone identity and the French language have been critical issues on which the province has been outspoken, particularly since the 1960s - the decade in which this study begins.

Pierre Laporte, a former minister in the Lesage government, identified the need to protect and maintain the francophone identity and culture in Quebec in the *White Paper* of 1965 on cultural policy. LaPorte’s definition is as follows: “A nation cannot be defined in terms of birth and ethnic origins. Rather, a nation is based on the consciousness it has of forming a distinct entity animated by a common will, and on the power it holds to shape its own destiny.”

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81 It is important to note that the *White Paper* was published the same year of the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine.

82 Government of Québec, declaration by Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, July 19-22, 1965 (see the entire declaration). Moreover, a White Paper from the ministère des Affaires culturelles (1965), which was not tabled in the Legislative Assembly but was made public by the newspaper La Presse in September 1966, states that, under the Constitution, Québec has exclusive responsibility in cultural affairs, particularly in terms of defending and promoting French-language culture within its territory, p. 24.
notions of boundedness and independence are conveyed. The *White Paper* established the difference between national identity and national existence. It adds that the province’s culture: “is essentially by means of culture that collectivity expresses itself, translates its mentality, learns to identify and recognize itself.” According to the *White Paper*, “the Quebec state has the right to take charge of national culture in order to assure a healthy national existence – to offer the collectivity of a controlling intellect and a life-giving consciousness.” Essentially, this rhetoric lines up with the theoretical understanding of political culture as described by Pye. Both the Quebec government and the theoretical framework of political culture identify that the culture of a nation as a manifestation of histories and of the political collectivity. The *White Paper* continues to explore this:

> The second principal sense of the word culture comes from anthropology …. In this case, culture is no longer attributed to the individual, but to the whole of a society. Culture thus understood encompasses the language, the system of values, beliefs, myths, knowledge, techniques, and social institutions that make up the heritage of a society. All collectivities, advanced or archaic, possess such a culture ….

The Quebec government has historically identified and recognized the importance culture has played in its political history. Culture has historically been privileged in political dialogues within the Quebec government; thus, we must utilize the theoretical framework of political culture, recognizing that there is a distinct culture within Quebec. This distinct culture makes it worthy of studying how culture could possibly be a determinant in the province’s pursuit of an international presence. The following section will explore the theory of political culture, and will subsequently discuss how it correlates to this study.

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83 Government of Québec, declaration by Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, July 19-22, 1965 (see the entire declaration). Moreover, a White Paper from the ministère des Affaires culturelles (1965), which was not tabled in the Legislative Assembly but was made public by the newspaper La Presse in September 1966, states that, under the Constitution, Québec has exclusive responsibility in cultural affairs, particularly in terms of defending and promoting French-language culture within its territory, p. 10.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.
2.1 Political Culture

It was not until the 20th century, with the introduction of survey methodology, that political scientists began to get serious about measuring and using culture to explain political phenomena. Although political culture is more of a variable than a theory itself, its proponents specifically encourage exploration of that variable, which is allegedly not given enough credit in rational-choice theory, Marxism or public choice theory. Thus, theories of political culture require more analysis.

To emphasize the differentiating features among scholars pertaining to political culture, we can look to other definitions of culture by political culturalists. For example, Arend Lijphart argues that there are two different classifications of political culture: (1) political culture of the masses; and (2) political culture of elites. He further develops this notion by creating sub categories of society based on degree of homogeneity. A homogeneous society consists of (1) a depoliticized democracy and (2) centripetal democracy. In contrast, a heterogeneous society consists of (1) consociative democracy and (2) centrifugal democracy. Almond and Verba and Lijphart’s definitions and categorization of political culture indicate the flux in the two definitions, consequently resulting in debatable and unclear language. Thus, scholar Richard Wilson argues that it is necessary to choose a cultural definition that is suitable for the structure of a study.

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87 Ibid., 26.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
Apart from differentiating definitions of culture within the theory, there is another problem that stands out as particularly severe. First, political culture fails to go beyond individual psychology in examining the effect of mass behavior (i.e., political norms and practices) of institutions. This is largely because the link between individual psychology and mass behavior is difficult to analyze; however, scholars such as Inglehart have made attempts to do so. Inglehart has offered a new take on modernization theory – one that identifies how economic development leads to structural changes (for example, urbanization and mass education) and to attitudinal changes as well (for example, greater distrust and skepticism regarding hierarchical institutions).

By using Inglehart’s framework, we can avoid the culturalists’ tendency to ignore or dismiss too quickly the idea that political structure could influence culture; however, such a co-dependent relationship would be extremely difficult to analyze. This is also where the constructivist framework will be beneficial to this study, by analyzing political structure and cultural influence, and thus making up for the shortcomings political culture presents. To facilitate this, one could make the argument that societies (such as Quebec) that focus on economic endeavors would want to promote their cultural idiosyncrasies. An example of this would be Quebec utilizing its cultural uniqueness to its own economic advantage, i.e. promoting tourism within the province and investing and purchasing arts and culture that derive from the province as well.

The quarrel between culturalists and market liberals is dominant within the examination of the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy and the application of the

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93 Ibid.
95 This will be further explored in the case study pertaining to Quebec’s involvement in *La Francophonie*. 
theoretical framework of political culture. Market liberals see politics only in terms of individuals pursuing their material self-interest. Identity politics does not register in the material and interest-driven world of the market liberal. Accordingly, market liberals would argue that in a market economy individuals would “outgrow the identities that seem to cause so much trouble,” and get on with “serious business of pursuing material success.”

97 Despite this, few if any, market liberals have directly confronted culturalists and identity politics. Albert Hirschman points out that political arguments for capitalism once emphasized the fact that a commercial society would replace the destructive pursuit of glory by aristocrats in feudal society with the more civilized and easily managed pursuit of material interest. But while these arguments flourished several hundred years ago in Europe, they are rarely heard today.

Political culturalists could become better at specifying which population’s culture is important to study and at factoring in contributions to political culture other than childhood socialization. Bias might also be difficult to counter when examining culture conducive to political institutions. However, one could argue that bias is difficult to avoid under any theoretical framework. Despite this, the point of political culture as a variable, after all, is often to provide an explanation of why certain favorable outcomes occur in certain societies and not in others. Finally, Reisinger argues that the portrayals of political culture fail to accord sufficient weight to the effects of behavior on

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100 Lane, Ruth, “Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?” *Comparative Political Studies*, 1992, 25:3, 364.
He asserts that though it may appear that individual attitudes, which compose political culture, it might not affect political norms and practices, shaping political institutions.

Political culturalists concede that the link between individual political culture and mass behavior is difficult to define. Pye contends that clarifying this link is one of the greatest challenges facing political culture today, arguing that it is difficult to obtain knowledge of a system as a whole (mass political behavior) from analysis of its subsystems (individual orientations). Pye writes, “The situation is analogous [sic] to our ability to say ‘something’ about what a building will be like from knowledge about what the building elements are like, but to truly ‘picture’ the building we need also to know the blue-prints and total design.”

Inglehart’s modernization theory highlights the most troubling aspect of political culture: the redundancy of the effects of institutions on culture. For example, Almond’s description of the political system is that culture is “embedded” in the institution itself. This is an important issue, as political culturalists have in the past criticized institutionalists for viewing culture as little more than a product of institutions. Inglehart confronts this criticism in his discussion of democracy and life satisfaction, arguing, “It is of course possible that high life satisfaction could result from democracy

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103 Ibid.
rather than the other way around.”\textsuperscript{106} However, he adds that, “it seems more likely that the global sense of well-being would also shape one’s attitudes toward politics than that what its [sic] experience in one relatively narrow aspect of life would determine one’s overall sense of life satisfaction.”\textsuperscript{107} That is, in terms of this study it is important to point out that the institution is what is being examined, and thus, has had enormous effect on how Quebec culture is perceived through international perceptions. The question then, is about what the causal mechanisms are. As mentioned above in the \textit{White Paper} published by the Quebec government in 1965, the government (institution) has asserted in this case that culture is derived from the masses, thus Inglehart’s framework may be best suited for this study.

The question then, is how to create an interactive relationship between the theoretical framework of political culture and the determinants of culture driving Quebec’s foreign policy. The problems explained above rationalize why it is difficult to create such a theoretical framework, given the lack of specificity and validity in the cultural assumptions and lack of attention to institutions of the state. Further, what is difficult in using identity politics, or political culture as a theoretical framework is that identity politics is often discussed in terms of culture, but identity does not in fact reduce to culture.\textsuperscript{108} Further, most theories argue that the relationship between society and politics emphasizes how social forces come to be influential in politics. In identity politics, the emphasis is different, for identities that pervade society are often the product


\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
of politics – especially when it comes to identities that either lay claim to or dispute the legitimacy of a state.109

With that in mind, it is important to look back to Inglehart’s framework and the context of this thesis. Throughout this thesis, it will become evident that the driving force behind Quebec’s political activity abroad is economic determination. I will later explain that there was a significant shift from protecting and maintaining Quebec’s cultural identity to promoting it for economic means, and, thus seeking other monetary pursuits that would benefit the province.110 For Inglehart, this is what he would call a “value change,” in which he identifies post-materialist value change as only one aspect of a much broader cultural shift linked to a massive causal sequence of historical and institutional events. Inglehart argues that we can discern coherent and predictable patterns of economic, social, political, and cultural change.111 With that, societies are path dependent – from preindustrial to modern to post modern. As they experience similar socio-economic conditions, they undergo “similar cultural changes in politics, economics, sex and gender norms, and religion.”112 Thus, societies are adaptable, because societies need “mutually supportive political, economic, and cultural systems”113 to persist. Those societies who do not adapt to this path dependency as outlined by Inglehart, will likely “perish” in the long run. In terms of Quebec’s foreign policy, Inglehart’s path dependency acknowledges that there will be an evolution of policies either in the form of a society or a political institution.

110 This will be discussed at length in the following two chapters.
112 Ibid., 49.
113 Ibid.
In terms of applying Inglehart’s political culture theory and his post modernist framework to this study, it would seem legitimate to suppose that Quebec is on this path dependency in which the province must adapt to globalization and societal changes beyond its borders. By merging Inglehart’s political culture and his most modernist framework, the theory of path dependency is relatively sound. It will allow for the exploration of any changes from 1965 to present in how Quebec promotes culture abroad and whether or not the province has heavily invested in its culture with regards to its foreign policy.

2.2 Social Theory of International Politics

Alexander Wendt has developed a theory of the international system as a social construction. To reiterate from the first chapter, according to Wendt, social theory “is concerned with the fundamental assumptions of social inquiry: the nature of human agency and its relationship to social structures, the role of ideas and material forces in social life, the proposed form of social explanation, and so on.”\textsuperscript{114} Wendt utilizes socio-constructivism in terms of applying a theoretical framework to the international system. He argues that on the social side, while norms and law govern most domestic politics, self-interest and coercion seem to rule international politics.\textsuperscript{115} Consequently, socio-constructivism reconciles both cultural and economic determinants in a theory in terms of examining the determinants of Quebec’s foreign activity. Self-interest is represented by economic pursuits on the part of the Quebec government. Although culture is framed as being of utmost importance in terms of domestic and international policies, economic

\textsuperscript{114} Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory in International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 6.
prosperity is essentially at the heart of all policies relating to Quebec’s foreign relations. This will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter when La Francophonie is explored as a case study.

Further, Wendt urges the consideration and plausibility of social theory in international politics, particularly as a constructivist approach. It is important to clarify that social theories are not theories of international politics. Wendt takes classical international theories of Grotius, Kant and Hegel, all of which were “briefly dominant in international relations between the world wars, in the form of what international scholars now, often disparagingly, call ‘Idealism.’” What is useful is that he takes these classical theories and applies them to social theory.

Wendt argues that social theory may not fully explain international politics in particular, but students of international politics, must understand the importance of the social aspects of the state in the international system, because no one can “see the state or international system. International politics does not present itself directly to the senses, and theories of international politics are often contested on the basis of ontology and epistemology, i.e., what the theorists ‘sees.’” Wendt argues that too often international relations theorists “eschew state-centric theorizing” to concede much of international politics to Neorealism. Wendt’s social theory of international politics, on the other hand, argues that state-centric international relations theory can generate insights that might help move the international system from the “law of the jungle” toward the rule of law.

117 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory in International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3.
118 Ibid., 10.
119 Ibid., 7.
The most important aspect of Wendt’s social theory of international politics is his sociologies of structure - most specifically, material-ideational. The debate surrounding the relative importance of material forces and ideas in social life in international relations scholarship is important to the debate concerning the determinants of Quebec’s international activity. Wendt illustrates, for the purpose of creating a “single continuum,” that one must define the central question as: “what difference do ideas make in social life” or, alternatively, “to what extent are structures made of ideas?”^120 Wendt argues that it is possible to hold positions anywhere along this continuum, but in practice, “social theorists cluster into two views, materialist and idealist.”^121 Both of these views acknowledge a role for ideas, but they disagree about how deep these effects go.

Materialists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and organization of material forces. There are at least five important factors which recur in materialist discourse: (1) human nature; (2) natural resources; (3) geography; (4) forces of production; and (5) forces of destruction.\(^1\) According to Wendt, all five of these can matter in various ways:

By permitting the manipulation of the world, by empowering some actors over others, by disposing people toward aggression, by creating threats, and so on. These possibilities do not preclude ideas also have some effects [sic] (perhaps as an intervening variable), but the materialist claim is that effects of non-material forces are secondary.\(^2\)

This is a bold claim and, as Wendt suggests, the effects of material forces must be strictly separated from the effects of ideas; however this is not often done. Thus, Wendt asserts that in contemporary political science, it has become commonplace to juxtapose “power

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^120 Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory in International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23.
^121 Ibid.
^122 Ibid.
^123 Ibid.
and interest to ‘ideas’ as causes of outcomes, and to call the former ‘material’ forces.” Wendt asserts that while power and interests are a distinct and important set of social causes, this only supports materialism if their effects are not constituted by ideas.

Idealists, on the other hand, believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness (or the distribution of ideas and knowledge). This can sometimes be viewed within the structure as shared among actors in the form of norms, rules, or institutions, and sometimes it is not. Despite this, social structure can matter in various ways: “by constituting identities and interests, by helping actors find common solutions to problems, by defining expectations for behavior, by constituting threats, and so on.” All of these possibilities do not deny the role of and for material forces, but the idealist claim is that material forces are secondary - significant insofar as they are constituted with particular meanings for actors. Wendt provides an example of this, citing that “the material polarity of the international system matters, for example, but how it matters depends on whether the poles are friends or enemies, which is a function of shared ideas.” The materialist, on the other hand, would treat such a situation with causal terms; thus, idealists emphasize the “constitutive effects of ideas.”

It is also important to note that idealism is a theory of international politics, but idealism in social theory does not entail idealism in international relations. In social theory, it is also important to note what it is not. First, idealism in social theory is not a

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125 Ibid., 24.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
normative view of how the world ought to be, but a scientific view of how it is. Idealism aims to be just as realistic as materialism. Second, idealism in social theory does not assume human nature is inherently good or social life inherently cooperative. Third, idealism does not assume that shared ideas have no objective reality. Shared beliefs and practices to which they give rise confront individual actors as external social facts. Fourth, idealism does not assume that social change is easy or even possible in a given, socially constructed context. Finally, idealism does not mean that power and interest are unimportant, but rather their meaning and effects depend on actors’ ideas. Therefore, idealist social theory “embodies a very minimal claim: that the deep structure of society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces.” Although most mainstream international relations theory is materialist in its nature, most modern social theory is idealist.

Consequently, the differences between materialists and idealists are that they tend to understand the impact of ideas differently. Primarily, materialists privilege causal relationships, effects, and questions; whereas in contrast, idealists privilege constitutive relationships, effects, and questions. This is because “causal and constitutive effects are different,” but they are not mutually exclusive. By understanding these distinctions, the difference between the two and the relationships they also have to social theory of international politics are clarified.

130 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory in International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 24.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., 25.
It is also important to note the methodological implications of following a constructivist theory. The difference lies in what type of question is asked. For example, rationalists are interested in how incentives in the environment affect the price of behavior. To answer this question they treat identities and interests as if they were given, but this is consistent with the constructivist question of where those identities and interests come from – and vice-versa. This is not to say that the constructivist approach is better, but that in pertaining to this study, it is a different, more useful approach in studying the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the key to the constructivist approach lies in its critique of “rationalist” or materialist conceptions of “interest.” Materialist theory presupposes that interests are exogenously formed – prior to social interaction – and accordingly, once formed, interests never change. Wendt’s fundamental claim is that state interests are shaped by their identities, which in turn are socially constructed by the international culture that exists at a given time. Thus, given that international cultures differ through time, so state identities and interests vary, which has fundamental consequences for interstate behavior and for “structural change” in world politics.

2.3 Discussion

This chapter provided an overview of two major theoretical approaches that will contribute to this study. Political culture and social theory of international politics will help to examine and assess the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy initiatives.

136 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory in International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 34.
138 Ibid.
Given political scientists who have approached this question are divided on whether or not Quebec is culturally or economically driven to have a presence on the international stage, in applying these two theories, there may be potential to reconcile both determinants.

The key notion of political culture that can be best applied to the Quebec situation is its opposition to material self-interest. Because identity politics does not register in the material and interest-driven world of the market, the province of Quebec has made enormous strides both internally and externally in protecting its cultural identity. This supports the culturalist argument that Quebec is putting itself forward on the international stage in order to protect its culture and identity, but what is lacking in this argument from political culture is the other side of Quebec’s international activities, which consists of trade agreements pertaining to its economic interests. Political culture is an accurate foundation for Quebec’s identity politics, but as previously mentioned, it still does not account for the behavior of institutions - in this case, the government of Quebec.

Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics is ultimately the best fit for this study. It reconciles both identity and material (economic) interests and applies them to the social aspect of the state in the international system. With regards to examining and understanding what drives Quebec’s international activity, this theory helps both culturalists and functionalists in their arguments by making them congruent. Further, Wendt’s materialist-idealist conception of social structure will aid in understanding both sides of the debate over Quebec’s foreign activity. Wendt’s social structure of material-idealism allows one to recognize that ideas, or identity and culture,
is legitimately constituted; however power and interests are just as important albeit distinct within this symbiotic relationship.

If the theoretical framework of political culture is going to be used for this study, then there must be a legitimate way in which we can measure culture. As noted previously, measuring culture has proven to be a difficult task for political culturalists. To measure culture for this study, one will look at changes in government: does identity or economic interest change with the governments? For example, does the Parti Québécois spend more on international activities when in power than the Liberal Party? By investigating political parties’ policy implementation while in power, we can look to identify whether identity interest influences Quebec’s international action; thus we can measure it by examining provincial party platforms. Further, by examining Quebec’s foreign policy and how it evolves through response to government change, it may be easier to identify whether or not the province is driven by economic or identity-based pursuits in terms of its international presence.

Essentially, the case studies will be the study of change, and whether or not the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy change in response to a government change. Thus, if culture is the determinant that is driving Quebec’s international action, it should come and go with the change in government. However, the constructivists would argue that change in government brings a different interpretation of cultural preferences, thus, instigating the materialist versus idealist argument. For example, if political culture were to hold true, we should identify an increase of government spending and initiatives in the form of policy papers, briefings, an increase in funding in the ministry of culture, and an expansion of international accords on culture, language, and identity when the Parti
Quebecois is in power. We should see more economic determinism from the Liberal Party of Quebec\textsuperscript{139} when they are in power, also along the lines of spending and budget allocations, initiatives, policy papers and bilateral and international trade agreements. However, this study will illucidate that no matter which ideology was supported by the Parti Quebecois or the Liberal Party of Quebec, financial interests carried through every political platform from 1965 to present day.

The following two chapters will consist of case studies. The case studies consist of Quebec’s membership in \textit{La Francophonie}, and Quebec’s position and contribution to the 1988 FTA negotiations. These case studies will allow for the examination of the provincial political parties and their involvement in the determinants of Quebec’s international activities. For example, under the leadership of the Parti Quebecois, realistically we should see more international agreements and provincial legislation on education, language, and culture. Second, by looking at trade agreements, with emphasis on the FTA, one will look to who Quebec signs these agreements with, and/or more frequently. For example, does Quebec sign more economic agreements with the United States, or with France? Is there continuity? By surveying the Quebec political parties and their legislative conduct both provincially and internationally, the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy should become manifest.

\textsuperscript{139} The Liberal Party of Quebec is closely associated with the Federal Liberal Party of Canada, which promotes unity among the provinces, and has traditionally fought with Quebec with regards to the province positioning itself as an international actor.
CHAPTER 3    CASE STUDY: LA FRANCOPHONIE

This chapter addresses three questions: how does La Francophonie serve Quebec’s foreign policy interests, economic development goals, and the maintenance of the French language? To answer this question, we will examine how and why La Francophonie developed, how it helps Quebec preserve its language and culture, how it supports Quebec’s economic goals, and how it promotes Quebec’s interest in cultural diversity. The province of Quebec’s involvement in the international organization, La Francophonie, is an example of the extraordinary degree to which foreign policy activities are carried out by the provincial government of Quebec. In fact, it provides evidence that Quebec is one of the most politically powerful subnational units of government in the world, having extensive and varied international relations.140

L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (abbreviated OIF, or La Francophonie) is the sole international organization to which Quebec belongs “as if it were a sovereign state, a result of a legal understanding between Quebec and Canada.”141 Quebec represents itself within La Francophonie, whereas in other organizations such as UNESCO, it is merely a member, observer or participant under Canadian representation. Quebec’s autonomous standing within La Francophonie is a unique position for a subnational state, and helps the province of Quebec to promote its culture and identity internationally.

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To begin, it is best to explain and identify what *La Francophonie* undertakes and executes as an international organization. According to the organization, *La Francophonie* represents “one of the biggest linguistic zones in the world,”¹⁴² and its members share more than just the French language. The organization indicates that members of *La Francophonie* share a vested interested in the “humanist values promoted by the French Language.”¹⁴³ The organization was created in 1970. Its mission “is to embody the active solidarity between its 75 member states and governments (56 members, and 19 observers), which together represent over one-third of the United Nations’ member states and account for a population of over 890 million people, including 220 million French speakers.”¹⁴⁴ *La Francophonie* coordinates political activities and actions of multilateral cooperation¹⁴⁵ that benefit French-speaking populations. This cooperation promotes international respect for cultural and linguistic diversity – particularly with the French language – as well as international sustainable development in French-speaking nations.

The question then is, why is the province of Quebec’s involvement in *La Francophonie* a critical case study in determining what drives Quebec’s international activity? *La Francophonie* is an organization that pursues cultural objectives, by either protecting or promoting the French language exclusively. The organization has created initiatives among French-speaking nations to promote cultural pursuits domestically and internationally. It is also an organization that recognizes the impending pressures of globalization, or rather the fear of “Americanization” of nations in which the French

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¹⁴³ Ibid.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
language may be lost. Therefore, *La Francophonie* is a suitable case study as it includes Quebec’s pursuit of the protection of its culture, a pillar of which is the French language, and as it qualifies as a recognized, legitimate international organization made up of multiple francophone nations in which Quebec belongs and actively participates.

To reiterate, Quebec has longed pursued two prime policy goals: vigorous participation in the global economy and the preservation and promotion of French as the national language within Quebec. Earl Fry has pointed out in his scholarly works on subnational states’ involvement in the international political economy that, similar to “many small nations, Quebec’s economy depends heavily on international exports, particularly to the United States.”\(^{146}\) This statement by Fry highlights that although preservation of culture for many small nations and sub nation states may be imperative, having a prosperous economy is equally, if not more, important. However, at the same time, as scholars Jody Neathery-Castro and Mark Rousseau, suggest, “Quebec (metaphorically) remains a small French-speaking island within English speaking North America.”\(^{147}\)

Quebec’s future as a French-speaking society is critical for economic opportunity and advancement for the 80 per cent of Quebecers whose native tongue is French.\(^{148}\) Because economy and culture mutually influence each other in various ways, Quebec faces the paradox that its active global participation can challenge the maintenance of the French language within Quebec. As we will see, Quebec’s involvement in *La Francophonie* aids in Quebec’s quest to achieve the policy goal of participating in the


\(^{148}\) Ibid.
global economy. The organization does so by providing a forum in which French-speaking nations can address issues of language and economic participation.

3.1 Origins of La Francophonie

La Francophonie is an international organization comprising francophone or French-speaking member states and governments. The aim of La Francophonie is to “enhance the political, economic, and cultural standing of the French language internationally.”¹⁴⁹ The origin of La Francophonie proliferated in the wake of the Second World War.¹⁵⁰ France and Quebec were key instigators of the growing alliance among francophone countries. Having already suffered traumatic defeat in the Second World War, France’s prestige was “further diminished in global independence movements (particularly the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria).”¹⁵¹ French elites feared that a decline in the instrumental value of their language would mean economic loss.¹⁵² In addition to France’s economic and cultural uncertainty, the Quebec Quiet Revolution originated as Quebec nationalism was led by francophones:

[Who] sensed their relative powerlessness in English-speaking North America; they observed a relative decline in population; they feared an influx of immigrants preferring to learn English; and they realized Anglophones controlled the mass media of communication, thus setting the agenda for problem-solving.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Ibid., 488.
Ultimately, elites in French-speaking countries sensed their minority status within states and led the movement which would later be known as L’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), or *La Francophonie*.

The beginning of the organization developed out of intergovernmental bodies promoted by the colonial ties between France and Africa; however, many elites and members of the provincial government in Quebec also became prominent in this development. In 1950, Quebecer Emile-Dostaler O’Leary founded the International Union of French Language Journalists and Press (UIJPFL) to advance cooperation among francophone media on an international level.\(^{154}\) By 1961, French or partial French-speaking universities joined the organization, which today is responsible for linking 692 educational establishments in 81 countries. Further, with an annual budget of more than US$56 million, every year it provides over 200 grants to qualifying projects.\(^{155}\)

Despite strong France-Quebec diplomatic relations, tensions came to a head in 1967 during French President Charles de Gaulle’s visit to Quebec for Expo ’67. In a speech to the crowd in Montreal, de Gaulle remarked, “*Vive le Quebec libre*” (‘long live an independent Quebec’).\(^{156}\) The Canadian federal government saw this as a direct challenge to Canadian sovereignty, and the statement was badly received by most anglophone Canadians.\(^{157}\) This tension between Canada, Quebec and France continued through several years of efforts to develop an international francophone organization, the ACCT. In 1966, the descendent organization of the colonial French community, OCAM,

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\(^{156}\) Ibid., 16.

\(^{157}\) Ibid.
began to plan a 32-country meeting to take place in 1969 at Niamey, Niger, to establish a multilateral aid organization. The meetings between ACCT and OCAM would eventually lead to the creation of *La Francophonie*. At the initial organizing conferences in 1969 and 1970, the question immediately arose of Canadian and Quebec membership. France wanted to exclude Canada from the planned organization, reserving membership solely for Quebec. Canada opposed this, arguing that Quebec would have a seat within the Canadian delegation.\(^{158}\) France lobbied hard for an independent membership for Quebec, and Canada eventually agreed. This was the first time Quebec had ever assumed an independent membership within an international organization.

For years, Quebec’s standing within *La Francophonie* remained rigid in terms of the province’s relationship with the federal government.\(^{159}\) Once Pierre Elliot Trudeau, then Prime Minister of Canada, departed from federal politics, Quebec and New Brunswick’s governmental standing in *La Francophonie* were fully accepted and regularized by Ottawa.\(^{160}\) These early Canada-Quebec disagreements over Quebec’s position as an international actor would presage later battles over such matters as budget and competences in *La Francophonie*.\(^{161}\)

Nevertheless, the organizational structure of what is now known as the OIF or *La Francophonie* has continued to evolve to reflect its increasing interests. Currently, *La Francophonie* comprises of 56 member states and governments and 14 observer states,


\(^{161}\) Ibid.
all of which have in common the use of the French language.\textsuperscript{162} Canada is an autonomous member, as are the provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick as separate delegations. The membership is highly varied, including industrial democracies such as France and Belgium as well as some of the world’s poorest and most non-democracies.

In 1986, French President Francois Mitterrand initiated the first summit of heads of member nations of \emph{La Francophonie} and biennial summits have been held ever since. Policy objectives and strategies are largely determined at these biennial summits. Though the founding purpose of \emph{La Francophonie} was “to engage in actions supporting the development and spread of the French language and cultures,”\textsuperscript{163} its scope of action has expanded since 1986. Under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1997-2002) and Abdou Diouf (2002-2009), \emph{La Francophonie} has “developed an agenda to exercise influence in international affairs and tackle some of the challenges in globalization.”\textsuperscript{164} In particular, \emph{La Francophonie} pursues four major objectives in areas where its experience is valuable: (1) promoting the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; (2) promoting peace, democracy, and human rights; (3) supporting education, training, higher education, and research; and (4) developing co-operation for sustainable development and solidarity.\textsuperscript{165}

For its part, the government of Quebec emphasizes the need to aid developing member countries and the promotion and protection of the French language and culture.\textsuperscript{166} Quebec’s purpose and involvement within \emph{La Francophonie} is to utilize this


\textsuperscript{163} Quebec Ministry of International Relations, \textit{Quebec’s International Policy}, 27.


\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
respected international organization to legitimize itself as a capable, independent state from Canada, advancing political and economic relations, particularly with France and other nations. Quebec has been a major participant of La Francophonie since its origins, and utilizes the organization as a stepping stone in which it can attain its linguistic, cultural and economic goals.

3.2 Quebec and La Francophonie

The paradox in which the province of Quebec seeks to protect its identity while seeking economic pursuits internationally in a globalizing world will be highlighted in this section. The province’s two goals: (1) participating actively in the global economy and; (2) protecting and deepening its French language and culture, are contradictory in nature. For example, growing international trade in the global economy increases economic interdependence between nations. Thus, Quebec is connected as an interdependent sub-nation state in the international economy, all of which challenges culture not only for Quebec and French-speaking nations, but all culturally diverse countries. What will become evident throughout this chapter is that there are circumstances in which linguistic and cultural distinctiveness can and has been turned into an economic advantage for Quebec.

For example, English has become a primary second language in many nations around the world, “diminishing the traditional role of French.” An example of this can be found in the rules and guidelines for the World Trade Organization (WTO), which

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actually hinders Quebec’s ability to subsidize its cultural industries, a practice followed in nearly all non-English speaking nations as well as a number of anglophone nations. Grant, Wood, and Weinstock assert that 80 per cent of Quebec’s citizens are native French speakers, and that the Quebec government “has long been committed to maintaining French as the official language of Quebec.” While francophones are a majority in Quebec, they only account for 2 per cent of the North American population. Thus, Quebec is a singular, “island-like” population within North America, and its odds at maintaining this status as a francophone subnation state are hindered by the expansion of international trade and globalization. Quebec’s “island-like” position challenges Quebec’s ability to maintain French as its national language.

The government of Quebec has taken a proactive stance in protecting and preserving Quebec’s identity by strengthening the use of the French language within the province, by means such as implementing legislation to maintain the language of the majority of the population. The government has also been a major financial partner of TV5 for nearly 30 years. TV5 is the top French language channel in the world, and in Quebec it has “been unmatched in its distinctiveness by the rest of the Canadian television landscape.” In addition to this, Quebec has implemented centres for reading

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173 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
and cultural activities within the province as well as creating 225 centres across 18 countries throughout the world.\textsuperscript{177} All of these examples indicate that the government is assertive and proactive in maintaining the French language.\textsuperscript{178} Participation within \textit{La Francophonie} allows the government of Quebec to promote this effort within the province as well as internationally.

Within \textit{La Francophonie}, many partners such as France, Quebec and Canada have demanded what is known as the “cultural exception”\textsuperscript{179} in international trade. These member nations and \textit{La Francophonie} argue:

Culture and culture goods are unique commodities, unlike steel, personal computers, or cell phones, and should not be subject to the rules of the WTO regime. [OIF] believes cultural goods represent an aspect of a nation’s cultural identity and heritage and that various arts industries (such as publishing, film, and music,) need protection in the form of government subsidies to support them from foreign invaders, especially the encroachment of Hollywood on the worldwide film industry.\textsuperscript{180}

\textit{La Francophonie} has addressed these concerns under the more inclusive concept of “cultural diversity,”\textsuperscript{181} which espouses a “state’s right and need to promote and subsidize its own cultural industries.”\textsuperscript{182} The aim of this concept is not only to apply to French-speaking nations, but all nations in which English is a second language, such as Spanish-, Portuguese- and Arabic-speaking nations. By seeking this recognition from the WTO, \textit{La Francophonie}\textsuperscript{177} “The Charter of the French Language,” The Government of Quebec, http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C_1/C11_A.html [Accessed July 5, 2013].
\textsuperscript{180} Adapted from www.francophonie.org/actions/index.cfm.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
Francophonie has had increased international support for “plurilingualism”\textsuperscript{183} from many non-English speaking nations. \hfill 183

More importantly, with the exception of La Francophonie, where the Quebec government is a participating member, the federal government is the exclusive representative of Canada in all international governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{184} Since Quebec has been a member of this organization since 1970, the provincial government has placed great importance on the institution’s development.\textsuperscript{185} That is to say, “it is through La Francophonie that Quebec best affirms its international personality in a multilateral setting.”\textsuperscript{186} Further, “Quebec’s participation in the proceedings of this international organization is an important feature of its international strategy and provides the political leverage needed to make a difference on a number of international issues, by forging alliances and formulating common positions.”\textsuperscript{187} Simply by being allowed to be a member of La Francophonie without the supervision of the federal government, Quebec can continue to actively participate in official proceedings and collaborate with other agencies and nations abroad.

3.3 Cultural and Economic Implications of La Francophonie

It is evident that the government of Quebec’s participation in La Francophonie serves as a platform to promote, protect and defend the French language and culture.\textsuperscript{188} However, there are economic ramifications in being a proactive member state of the

\textsuperscript{183} The notion behind plurilingualism is that a single language (English) is not sufficient for international relations.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 30.
organization. Neathery-Castro and Rousseau explain that, “While defending the French language and culture remains a fundamental preoccupation for Quebec, active participation in the global economy is both a major desire and a necessity.”\textsuperscript{189} Further, both Neathery-Castro and Rousseau argue that membership within \textit{La Francophonie} helps further both culture and economic goals.

For example, \textit{La Francophonie} has allowed Quebec to develop its trade policy, particularly with developing countries in francophone Africa, while demanding pluralism in trade rules and the language of exchange.\textsuperscript{190} The Quebec government acknowledges that, “international trade plays a vital role in Quebec’s economy and in creating greater wealth for society as a whole.”\textsuperscript{191} Clearly, Quebec’s economy is highly dependent on exports. In addition, Quebec’s involvement in \textit{La Francophonie} has allowed the province to take an active role in technical assistance to its less-developed members.\textsuperscript{192} Quebec is not a major provider of international aid, but membership in \textit{La Francophonie} allows Quebec to devote its energies to helping a limited number of countries, with those belonging to \textit{La Francophonie} among its top priorities. An example of this is Haiti, where Quebec’s “monetary aid is channeled through \textit{La Francophonie}, but the effort is multifaceted.”\textsuperscript{193} Further, there are approximately 75 Quebec police officers participating in the UN stabilization mission in Haiti, and, since 1997, Quebec has contributed more

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{191} “Quebec’s International Policy: Working in Concert,” \textit{Ministry of International Relations: Quebec’s International Polic}, 2006, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 95-96.
\end{itemize}
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than CAD$11 million in humanitarian aid and grants for development projects in Haiti.\textsuperscript{194} Quebec’s participation in development aid matters because it has made a commitment to assisting less wealthy member states within \textit{La Francophonie}, signaling that it intends to be taken as a legitimate state actor apart from Canada. This correlates to economic interests of the province, as it sees developing economic relationships with less wealthy nations as a move to eventually gain new trade relationships.

The government of Quebec believes that by utilizing English as the exclusive language of international trade, English-speaking nations have an advantage over non-English speaking nations. The issue of “English only” in international trade has a trickle down effect for two reasons: “(1) it creates hurdles within negotiations when business people must negotiate in another language; and (2) non-anglophone nations must support and finance English language training, expending funds that English-language nations can invest directly in endeavors like information technologies and science research.”\textsuperscript{195} Therefore, Quebec believes that non-Anglophone nations should push for guaranteed official status in the WTO for all four major New World trade-area languages (Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French).\textsuperscript{196}

Language and culture propel Quebec’s active economic and cultural participation in \textit{La Francophonie}. Thus, it may be argued that language, culture, and the economy are intertwined. To illustrate this point, we can look to Quebec’s participation in the global economy. If the province has difficulties in participating in the global economy while

\textsuperscript{194} Adapted from www.francophonie.org/actions/index.cfm.
simultaneously maintaining the French language and cultural development within the province, difficulties arise within the social structure of the province. For economic advancement and upward social mobility, Quebec’s largely French-speaking working class needs a Quebec economy that functions in French.\(^{197}\) Concurrently, if the French-speaking middle class (journalists, academics, writers, and the like) produces French-language cultural products, they require a French-speaking audience.\(^{198}\)

One scholar, Brian Weinstein, points out that the “maintenance of French as the national language must have broad support.”\(^{199}\) Quebec’s leadership across political parties remains committed to the protection of the French language.\(^{200}\) For example, former Minister of International relations Louise Beaudoin stated that, “Support for Bill 101 is a bipartisan consensus – the Parti Quebecois and the Parti liberal du Quebec agree French must be maintained as the national language. There is support for French as the language of the workplace and economic success.”\(^{201}\) Quebec’s membership in *La Francophonie* adds a bi-partisan commitment to these concerns. Intertwining economics and language helps propel Quebec’s active participation within *La Francophonie*. Within this organization, Quebec and other like-minded nations and subnation states find support to protect and enhance French language and culture.

Quebec has been a long-standing active member of *La Francophonie*. It has used this position to further legitimize itself as a state apart from the Canadian government.

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198 Ibid.
201 Louise Beaudoin, Remarks at the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States meetings, Pittsburgh, 18 November 1999.
Further, *La Francophonie* has served as an external outlet in which Quebec has facilitated both of its goals: to be connected to the global economy and to preserve its cultural heritage and French language in light of the threat globalization has had in diminishing the importance of culture.\(^{202}\) Given the difficulties of globalization, many scholars point to the economic and social costs of international trade policies (particularly those promoted by the WTO)\(^{203}\) on citizens in developed and developing countries alike. Therefore, scholars have pointed to *La Francophonie* as an organization “posted to challenge what is often deemed as ‘Americanization.’”\(^{204}\) Quebec participated in an effort under the auspices of *La Francophonie* and UNESCO, entitled the “International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.”\(^{205}\) The issue of cultural diversity was one where “Quebec showed its capacity to exert influence on the international scene.”\(^{206}\) By working with experts from civil society, academia, *La Francophonie*, and the federal government, Quebec was instrumental in UNESCO’s 2005 adoption of the convention.\(^{207}\)

As mentioned, cultural policy has been a pivotal issue for many nations in light of the ‘Americanization’ and speedy adoption of the English language for economic and trade-related matters. As a result, “countries have begun to try to minimize the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) impact on domestic policy options, soon after its creation in 1994. In June 1998, “Canada’s Minister of Heritage, Sheila Copps, invited culture

\(^{205}\) Ibid.
\(^{207}\) Ibid.
ministers from 19 other countries to Ottawa to resume a dialogue begun two months earlier at UNESCO Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development.\textsuperscript{208} The conference resulted in an International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP),\textsuperscript{209} which is an “informal, international venue where national ministers responsible for culture can explore and exchange views on new and emerging policy issues and develop strategies to promote cultural diversity.”\textsuperscript{210} Since the INCP’s emergence, it has grown to include 20 countries, one third of which are francophone.\textsuperscript{211}

In addition, \textit{La Francophonie} took the initiative to hold conferences between 1999 and 2001 to “discuss and promote a New International Instrument on Cultural Diversity” (NIICD).\textsuperscript{212} By 2002, \textit{La Francophonie} “became the first organization to support an adoption of such an instrument.”\textsuperscript{213} Neathery-Castro and Rousseau describe the success of this:

The contribution of \textit{La Francophonie} to the UNESCO Convention were one of the main achievements of the OIF and demonstrated the increasing political dimension of the organization. Recent OIF Summits have regularly confirmed OIF’s desire not to let cultural goods and services be reduced to the status of ordinary commodities.

Therefore, member states affirm their sovereign rights to define freely their cultural policies and to wield the tools necessary to do so.\textsuperscript{214}

The INCP and the NIICD are two examples of Quebec finding support for the protection of cultural diversity through an international organization. Quebec’s

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Organisation International de la Francophonie, 2002.
membership in *La Francophonie* has helped to spring board the province into the international realm as a legitimate voice whose concerns are taken seriously. Further, Quebec was the promoter behind cultural diversity issues both within the Canadian government context, as well as *La Francophonie*. This has resulted in Quebec becoming an authoritative voice within the organization.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Quebec’s participation and membership in *La Francophonie* seems to have fostered and facilitated its paradoxical goals: to be connected to the global economy whilst preserving its cultural heritage and French language. Quebec’s participation in *La Francophonie* has proven to be a skillful display of asserting priorities in the international arena. As Weinstein illustrates, Quebec has enjoyed multiple benefits in its participation with *La Francophonie*, including:

1. International prestige deriving from its governmental status that puts it on par with the member states in the OIF;
2. An important environment in which to consolidate Quebec’s influence in multilateral forums like the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU);
3. Strengthened alliances with the other member countries and governments; and
4. Mutually beneficial cultural, economic, and commercial exchanges, including entrée to emerging markets that play to Quebec’s economic strength in the pharmaceutical, telecommunications, energy, and transportation sectors.  

Nevertheless, Quebec, the member states of *La Francophonie*, and the organization itself will continue to face the threat of globalization and ‘Americanization,’ particularly in the area of international trade.

This chapter elucidated Quebec’s growing international involvement. Nelson Michaud argues that the “cultural diversity process might be viewed as a ‘critical test

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case’ of Quebec’s international aspirations.”\textsuperscript{216} Michaud adds that, “while constrained within the Canadian federal framework from pursuing fully its own international agenda, Quebec has leveraged its leadership role within \textit{La Francophonie} to expand its international authority.”\textsuperscript{217} A Quebec government publication lists the following means that it believes will help the province attain its ambitions for participating in international organizations:

1.) Access to all information and participation during the initial stages of negotiations toward establishing Canada’s position;
2.) Full member status in Canadian delegations and exclusive responsibility for designating its representative;
3.) The right to speak for itself at international forums on matters related to its responsibilities;
4.) Recognition of Quebec’s right to give its approval before Canada signs or declares itself bound by a treaty or agreement; and
5.) The right to express its position when Canada appears before supervisory bodies of international organizations for matters involving Quebec or affecting its interests.\textsuperscript{218}

In addition to this, Quebec negotiated what is called an “historic agreement with the Canadian government,”\textsuperscript{219} in 2006 to allow the province to be an official representative on Canada’s Permanent Delegation to UNESCO, as a full participant.\textsuperscript{220}

This chapter has illustrated and outlined the factors contributing to Quebec’s involvement in \textit{La Francophonie} and the influence it has exerted through its membership of this organization. Quebec’s involvement has been infused and intertwined by culture, language protection and economic ambitions. Further, the organization has allowed Quebec to; essentially, prove itself as a legitimate international actor, apart from the


\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
Canadian federal government. As Neathery-Castro and Rousseau point out, “among subnational governments, Quebec enjoys multiple international relations that could not be imagined by any state in the United States.”\footnote{Neathery-Castro, Rousseau, “Quebec and La Francophonie,” in Stephan Gervais, Christopher Kirkey and Jarett Rudy, eds. Quebec Questions: Quebec Studies for the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford University Press, 2010): 410.} Despite historical tensions with the federal government, Quebec has been able to create its own international identity and discourse. What can be concluded from this case study then is that cultural heritage and French language is a dominant force within Quebec’s economic objectives and international presence.
CHAPTER 4  QUEBEC AND THE UNITED STATES

Quebec’s relationship with the United States is important when examining and analyzing the determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy. This chapter will be divided into two sections. First, I will explore the Quebec-United States relationship and what the province’s objectives are in maintaining this relationship. Second, I will examine Quebec’s economic relations with the United States, examining the economic ties between the province and the nation state and the roles the FTA and NAFTA have had in maintaining and enhancing bilateral relations.

The purpose of this case study is to understand the province’s relationship with the United States. Quebec does not share linguistic similarities with the United States, thus suggesting that ties between the province and the state must be economic. The difficulty, as with any case study, is that it will be difficult to reconcile this relationship with the multitude of individual relationships Quebec shares with nations globally. This will be overcome by focusing on the notion that the United States is Quebec’s largest trading partner. Thus, a good standing relationship between the two is imperative.222

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222 During the 1988 FTA negotiations, many provinces argued that Canadian identity would be seriously eroded, its social policies jeopardized, and its cultural productions threatened by American competition. The climate was much different in Quebec and Alberta. Both major provincial parties were in favor of the FTA. Quebec at the time was much less integrated into the US economy, unlike the province of Ontario. Although it is argued that sovereignists supported FTA and NAFTA because they felt that it was strengthen the prospects of Quebec political sovereignty, if they enjoyed guaranateed access to the American market, the US made this clear this was not the case. President Rondald Reagans visit in Quebec City in 1985, address the special character of the French province and President Bill Clinton gave a well thought out speech on the virtues of federalism at the Conference in Mont-Tremblant, Quebec, in 1999. Both visits emphasized that a united Canada was what would be a requirement in terms of developing and negotiating free trade agreements.
4.1 Quebec-US: Historical Ties (1960-Present)

According to scholar Louis Balthazar, the province of Quebec has had close ties prior to the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine in 1965 with the United States. Balthazar states that, “Quebec has been inextricably linked to the American continent. Therefore, the French provinces’ inhabitants and its rulers have always had a deep interest in its immediate neighbors to the south.” Since the Second World War, Quebec has had an increasing presence in the United States. This presence was reinforced at the time of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960’s in a variety of ways. According to Balthazar, “Canada’s central government has reacted to this political presence sometimes positively, sometimes negatively. Washington’s response has been generally prudent and careful to maintain harmonious relations with Ottawa and support Canadian unity,” while tacitly recognizing Quebec’s distinct character.

Although Quebec had colonial ties with the United States prior to the British Conquest of 1760, it is appropriate to begin a review of their historical ties in the 1960s as it correlates to the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine, in which Quebec began to actively seek out an international presence. In 1962, Quebec’s New York mission was upgraded to a delegation general, a type of embassy. The reason behind this was to attract capital to finance the province’s projects, the most important being the 1963 nationalization of all

224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
hydro-power companies.\textsuperscript{227} Quebec turned to Wall Street because Canadian investors were “lukewarm”\textsuperscript{228} to this endeavor. The delegation general and Quebec’s new relationship with Wall Street, helped to flourish the province’s relationship with not only several brokerage firms, but the United States as well. The Quebec government subsequently made dramatic financial gains as a result of the new public corporation of Hydro-Quebec.

The Premier at the time, Jean Lesage (1960-6), travelled extensively to the United States. The goal of his travels was to not only foster international ties with Washington, but to strengthen colonial ties with states with French-speaking people in New England and in Louisiana. In 1970, delegations were opened in Boston and in Lafayette.\textsuperscript{229} In Boston, Quebec promoted its own modern culture, which would take precedence over the cultural relations with traditional French-Canadian associations. In Lafeyette, Quebec utilized its delegation to promote programs for teaching French among the Cajuns.\textsuperscript{230} However, Louis Balthazar notes that these two delegations were closed in 1986, citing as the explanation that “Quebec policy became dominated by economic interests.”\textsuperscript{231} Other delegations were opened in Chicago (1969), Los Angeles (1970), and Atlanta (1978).\textsuperscript{232}

As mentioned in the first chapter, in 1965 the government of Quebec called for the right to negotiate international treaties in matters pertaining to its own jurisdiction

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{229} Hero, Alfred O., Jr., \textit{Louisiana and Quebec: 1673-1993}, (Tulane University Series in Political Science, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995): 34.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
(i.e. health, education, and language). Naturally, Ottawa asserted its claim to be solely responsible for external affairs. Nevertheless, Quebec maintained its position with the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine, and as we have concluded, Quebec has since then been thoroughly active in external affairs.

In 1970, Premier Robert Bourassa (1970-6; 1985-94) announced the construction of huge dams in James Bay, in Northern Quebec. This project entailed not only a substantial increase in Hydro-Quebec’s production of electricity for Quebeckers, but also an eventual export to American states. In light of the potential to export to the United States, Bourassa called for massive investment, 60 percent of which came from American investors, managed by the First Boston Corporation. Again, this resulted in further economic ties with the United States.

In 1976, the Parti Quebecois came to power in Quebec City with “the commitment to hold a referendum on its proposal of sovereignty-association.” According to Balthazar, this commitment garnered “shock in the US milieus” interested in Canada. Investors did not want to buy into a potential political upheaval, and, “one would expect difficult times for Quebec in its relationship with the United States and a downgrading of its political representation” in the event of such an upheaval. What occurred instead was that even more than the Parti Quebecois’ Liberal predecessor, the new government remained opened to American investment and sound economic

233 See the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine 1965.
238 Ibid.
relations. The Parti Quebecois “made it clear that Quebec’s proposed new relationship with Canada would occur democratically and peacefully.”\textsuperscript{239} With that promise, several members of the legislature visited the United States to quell American economic fears of political upheaval and clarify the Parti Quebecois’ platform in maintaining economic ties with the nation. As a result, economic relations with the United States continued to expand under the Parti Quebecois. The government of Quebec opened up another bureau in 1978 in Washington, with the objective to promote tourism, as well as serving as a “pied-a-terre for officials visiting the capital.”\textsuperscript{240} The referendum on sovereignty-association was defeated, and the Parti Quebecois continued to strengthen and foster its American economic ties to the end of the government’s second mandate (1981-5).\textsuperscript{241}

Given that this was a time of great economic recession, the government continued to call for American investment.

In 1986, the federal government under the Progressive Conservatives of Brian Mulroney began negotiations for a new trade pact with the United States. An agreement was concluded in the form of the FTA of 1988. This agreement was greeted with strong opposition from provinces throughout Canada, with the exception of Alberta and Quebec. In Quebec, both the “Liberal government of Robert Bourassa and the Parti Quebecois opposition were very favorable toward it,”\textsuperscript{242} and Quebec provided strong popular support that allowed for the re-election of Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives and the advent of the FTA. Further, many Quebec political and economic leaders of

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 52.
various ideological stripes saw financial opportunity for the province with the new Free Trade Agreement. Quebec wanted greater access to American markets, which also proved valuable for Ontario with its Canada-United States Automobile Agreement (Auto Pact).\(^{243}\)

The 1990’s saw Quebec’s championing of the FTA, as well as NAFTA, which would come to include Mexico. Despite the election of the Parti Quebecois in 1994, again, there was no change in policy with regards to economic relations with the United States and Quebec’s membership of both the FTA and NAFTA. Nevertheless, Quebec went through another sovereignty-association referendum in 1995, but this time economic relations were not significantly affected between the province and the United States. This may have been due to the fact that the government of Quebec at the time was clear on its support for NAFTA, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Even so, the Parti Quebecois lost the referendum for a second time.

Relations with the United States grew tense in the new millennium. There are various reasons for this, but most importantly, most Quebeckers “were displeased with the Bush administration in the United States.”\(^{244}\) Quebeckers strongly opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003\(^ {245}\) and “by and large, the conservative tenets of the Republican government.”\(^ {246}\) In terms of economic interests, throughout the Bush administration’s tenure, economic trade was less profitable due to economic downturn in the United States.


\(^{245}\) Ibid., 616.

\(^{246}\) Ibid.
and the strengthening of the Canadian dollar. Despite this economic downturn, Premiers Bernard Landry (2001-3) and Jean Charest (2003-12) continued to support amicable relations with the United States.

4.1.2 Discussion

This historical analysis has provided a brief insight into Quebec-United States relations. I will delve further into Quebec’s involvement in the Free Trade Agreement in this chapter. Nevertheless, we can conclude that Quebec governments, no matter what provincial party is in power, always favor a close political and economic relationship with the United States, particularly since the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine in 1965. As noted in the case study on La Francophonie, we can determine thus far that economic growth is a key concern for the government of Quebec. Thus, there are two key objectives of this government: (1) participate actively in the global economy and; (2) protect and deepen its French language and culture. There are two questions that still have to be asked: do culture and economic determinants drive Quebec’s international relations? Or does one outweigh the other in importance?

Up to this point, it seems evident that economic ties that encourage the province’s financial prosperity are more important than simply promoting and protecting culture and language, and, in the case of Quebec, the province has managed to turn the protection of culture into an economic pursuit. Louis Balthazar supplements this argument, stating that, “promoting economic interests means having American capital invested in Quebec, thus

creating jobs and technological expertise, and opening a large market for Quebec products.”\textsuperscript{248} Despite this, Balthazar highlights that, frequently, Quebec nationalists argue that the government is “selling out to Americans” and “Americanizing”\textsuperscript{249} Quebec. The government response has traditionally been to highlight the benefits of economic investment in the province.

The government of Quebec has also recognized that it is essential to maintain economic ties with the United States in order to not only seek out capital to finance its public debt and major semi-autonomous corporations like Hydro-Quebec, but to also export the provinces’ resources to a large market such as the United States.\textsuperscript{250} Further, NAFTA has “solidified North America’s position as one of the world’s leading zones of economic activity.”\textsuperscript{251} Thus, as scholars have noted, it “is important for Quebec to be on the spot to negotiate with the firms that will float its bonds on the financial market.” American markets are more lucrative than most, particularly for Quebec producers. Thus, Quebec’s presence and willingness to be a partner within the FTA and NAFTA is crucial to the province’s economy. Balthazar provides an example to stress this, noting, “When Quebec exporters are confronted with countervailing duties on account of public subsidies, or anti-dumping duties, Quebec officials and their lawyers can best defend the interests of these exporters in the various places where they are penalized.”\textsuperscript{252} This is not always the case, as some issues that may occur within trade agreements with other

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{250} “Quebec’s International Policy: Working in Concert,” Ministry of International Relations: Quebec’s International Polic, 2006, 11.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid.
nations may fall to the responsibility of Ottawa. This allows Quebec to be independent on an international trade level, whilst remaining in the federation.\textsuperscript{253}

Although this chapter thus far has focused on the economic relations between Quebec and the United States, it should be noted that the defence and promotion of the province’s culture has been another objective of maintaining close ties with the United States. Given the English language is nearly universal in North America, Quebec has had cause for concern with regards to losing its culture – more specifically language – within the continent. Further, if the United States is an important trade partner for the province, Quebec is more assertive in defining its distinctiveness from the rest of Canada in promoting tourism and by “promoting the province’s cultural products.”\textsuperscript{254} One Quebec-US Relations scholar, Marcel Daneau, expands on this:

In the last 50 years, Quebec has been a cauldron of cultural products of all sorts, in literature, music, dance, theatre, and visual arts. It has become a vibrant part of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). It is important that Americans be aware that the French language used in Quebec, although it has its own peculiarities, is a species of international French. Quebec literature may therefore be used in teaching French in the United States, and Quebec universities are well equipped as their counterpart in France, if not better, for learning of French.\textsuperscript{255}

Daneau also notes that the United States is also home to the first academic association outside of Canada devoted exclusively to Québec: The American Council for Quebec Studies (ACQS), and the first university-based research and teaching centre – the Institute on Quebec Studies – established at State University of New York College at Plattsburgh in 2004.\textsuperscript{256 257}


\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.
Since 1965, Quebec has endeavored to push cultural pursuits at the international level. However, it has simultaneously pushed for stronger economic ties with the United States. As noted throughout the first half of this chapter, the province has used various means in achieving, maintaining and strengthening its economic ties with the United States. The next section of this chapter will focus solely on economic relations with the United States. It will consist of an extensive economic overview of relations between the province and the United States.

4.2 Symbiotic Economics

Earl Fry is, arguably, the leading scholar on sub-nation state activity in terms of the international economy. Fry’s article, “Quebec’s Economic Relations with the United States: A Case Study of Multi-level Interdependence in an Era of Globalization,” is most insightful when it comes to examining the specifics of exactly how much the sub-nation state and its behemoth of a trading partner are intertwined. For example, if Quebec were a sovereign nation-state, it would have ranked as the world’s seventh-largest exporter to the United States in 2007. This, according to Fry, is a “rather remarkable achievement for a province with only 7.7 million inhabitants.” Further, it is important to note that the relationship Quebec and the United States maintain is much more complex than most other scholars have observed. There is more to the relationship than Quebec growing,

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257 The American Council for Quebec Studies is funded by the American federal government as well as individual donations. See: http://www.acqs.org/news/
259 Ibid.
extracting or fabricating a product and then shipping it to the United States. In fact, Fry points out that:

Quebec’s relationship with the United States exemplifies the complexities found between nation-states in a period of globalization. Globalization describes the growing interconnectedness and interdependence among nations and societies around the world. For example, over the past several decades, international economic exchanges such as trade and investment flows have been growing more rapidly than such exchanges within individual nation-states.  

For example, many jobs in Montreal or Quebec City exist because consumers outside of Canada are willing to buy the products made in the province, or because foreign investors are willing to purchase companies within Quebec which produce these products.

Further, there are more linkages between the province than strictly investment and financial flows. The interactions between the province and the United States include, but are not limited to, agreements and initiatives regarding: resources, environment, energy, terrorism, conflict, sports and entertainment, cyberspace, immigration, culture, crime and disease. All of these interactions occur on multiple levels of government, at the federal, state/province, local government and private sector levels. This part of the chapter will explore the economic integration of Quebec and the United States, but it is important to recognize that the relationship is more than just economic trade and the recognition of Quebec’s unique culture and identity.

Canada and the United States have the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. This is measured by the combined value of cross-border imports and exports of goods and services (totalling US$371 billion in 2007) and foreign direct investment (FDI)

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activity. Accordingly, “80 percent of all Canadian exports have been destined for one foreign market, the United States. Until China became the largest exporter to the United States in 2007, Canada had held that position for each and every year since the end of the Second World War.” This trading relationship has included all the provinces, and more specifically, Quebec. However this relationship, as Fry notes, has created an “economic labyrinth” between the two states. Stephen Blank asserts that there now exists a “deeply integrated continental system of supply chains structured by networks linking production centers and distribution hubs across the continents.” He adds that these supply chains, “depend on an efficient and secure physical infrastructure of rails, roads and bridges, pipelines and wires, and ports and border crossings, and on a coherent and consistent system of regulations that affect individuals, machines, firms, and goods.”

An important question is, how does Quebec fit into this “labyrinth” of trade between Canada and the United States?

Douglas Brown and Earl Fry’s book, States and Provinces in the International Economy, assesses how provinces fit into the global economy. In terms of Quebec, Douglas Brown best explains how the province is situated within the integrated economic relationship between Canada and the United States:

Many in Quebec are gangling [sic] in North American economic integration as a means of achieving recognition of its identity and reducing Quebec’s dependence upon the rest of Canada… These intense asymmetrical links render Canada’s economy, if not wholly integrated,

264 Ibid.
then at least highly sensitive to developments south of the border and make certain that Canadian economic policy is almost by definition also Canadian foreign policy towards the US.267 This is where province-state relations are most significant because they represent the vast majority of continental-based international activity and are more long-standing. Given that provinces have no expressed constitutional authority over trade and foreign relations, Quebec has, essentially, ignored this and moved forth in asserting economic ties with the United States, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Nevertheless, the international economy is fiercely competitive, and provinces’ are finding themselves competing lest their economic futures be threatened.

Quebec has the second-largest population among the Canadian provinces. In 2007, the province ranked as the third-leading provincial exporter to the United States, behind Ontario and Alberta.268 In 1993 Quebec exported CAD$27 billion to the US, and in 2005 trade exceeded CAD$57 billion.269 Quebec has two sectors that regularly exceed $3 billion: helicopters and airplanes (CAD$6 billion), and unwrought aluminum (CAD$4 billion).270 Other major sectors include newsprint, uncoated paper and paperboard, turbojets, turbo propellers, and circuit boards.271 Quebec has benefited immensely from the FTA that went into effect in 1989, and subsequently the NAFTA in 1994.272 According to Fry, “Under both the FTA and NAFTA, Quebec’s companies have been able to take full advantage of liberalized trade and investment arrangements with the

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269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
United States.” He adds that, “exports to the United States and FDI in Quebec are up dramatically since these two regional agreements were implemented.” Between the implementation of the FTA and 2000, Canada-US economic integration has tripled. However, between 2000 and 2006, trade increased by only 12 percent. This limited growth in economic ties “represents a major challenge for Canada in general,” and Quebec in particular.

Between 2000 and 2003, there was a 15 percent drop in Quebec exports to the US, a ten billion dollar decline that can for the most part be explained by the bursting of the high-tech bubble and appreciation of the Canadian dollar. Quebec’s exports rebounded in 2004 (up 5 percent) and 2005 (up 2 percent). More importantly, as the global market expands, the “initial advantages resulting from NAFTA have been eroded due to an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements signed by the U.S. government.” Quebec now faces challenges exporting to the United States, competing with emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil.

With respect to the economic downturn in 2008, early warning signs were visible to Quebec in 2006. This recent downturn has diminished US consumer demands for Quebec-based products. More importantly, Fry highlights that during periods of

274 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
economic recession, “Quebeckers worry that, in spite of NAFTA provisions, the US federal and state governments will become more protectionist in their trade and investment policies and invoke ‘Buy America’ provisions”\(^{280}\) which require government contractors to use US-made products exclusively. These fears were eventually quelled with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and subsequent re-election in 2012. Nevertheless, Quebec is susceptible to any economic shifts within the United States and the rest of the international political economy.

Quebec’s two major trading partners are France and the United States. The United States, however, is without a doubt the predominant trading partner in trade, investment and tourism.\(^{281}\) As mentioned, the Liberal Party of Quebec and the Parti Quebecois have historically been staunch supporters of liberal trade with the United States. Further, Quebec governments were also a major force in pushing for the creation of the FTA and NAFTA.\(^{282}\) Former PQ Premier Bernard Landry “even voice[d] strong support for going beyond NAFTA and establishing a North American customs and monetary union,”\(^{283}\) which would use the US dollar as its official currency.

According to Fry, in 2007, “Quebec’s merchandise shipments to the United States totaled CAD$52.2 billion, representing 75 percent of its total international exports.”\(^{284}\) This means that Quebec sends more of its goods to the United States than it does to any other Canadian province combined. Despite this, Quebec has also attracted a “lower


\(^{282}\) Ibid.

\(^{283}\) Landry, Bernard, La cause du Quebec (Montreal: VLB editeur, 2002), 205.

percentage of US FDI in Canada than its share of Canada’s population and GDP would seem to warrant.”  

This is due to the fact that a large concentration of FDI from the United States to Canada is centered in Ontario as the motor vehicle manufacturing hub of the country. A challenge for Quebec is to remain competitive against provinces such as Ontario (vehicle manufacturing sector) and Alberta (natural resources), and increase foreign direct investment. Further, the government has openly committed to concentrate its economic efforts in the United States in sectors such as trade, security, energy and the environment. According to the government of Quebec, the province’s number one priority is to “strengthen and increase economic exchanges with the United States … and diversify trade by branching out to certain expanding markets.”  

This statement asserts that Quebec’s international activities are dominated by economic motives.

The government of Quebec established its first office abroad in the United States almost 70 years ago in 1940, and as Louis Balthazar points out, “Quebec now maintains six delegations or bureaus in the United States, more than the number of consulates operated there by the national governments of Ireland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Singapore, and 70 other nation states.” The purpose of these delegations is to work towards more export opportunities to the United States, and “entice American companies to make direct investments in the province.”  

Quebec’s representation in the United States works with state officials and business executives. For

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287 Ibid.
example, prior to its closure, the Quebec delegation in Boston considers that its role “is to foster and consolidate relations between the Government of Quebec and the six New England states, by negotiating multi-sector agreements and conducting activities in the fields of recognized importance such as energy, the environment, security and transportation.”  

The delegation’s official brochure adds “in the fields of culture, education and tourism, the Office strives to promote Quebec’s institutions and talents through a variety of events or exchanges with Quebec’s partners in Boston and throughout New England.”

The government of Jean Charest was extremely proactive in initiating further trade agreements with the United States. Charest used the Ministry of International Relations and its network of offices in the United States for arranging official visits to the United States annually, as well as those of other ministers who would meet with state officials. In June 2008, Premier Jean Charest led a trade mission to Southeast United States to establish the Southeastern US-Canadian Provinces Alliance. In addition to this, in 2008 Charest also announced “Quebec has joined the Western Climate Initiative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” This alliance included Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario.

The most high profile agreement between Quebec and the United States is the Quebec-New York economic summit, which brings together the Premier and the

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292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
Governor of New York. In 1999, “these two governments established a trade-corridor project to upgrade their economic relationship, and the 2008 summit resulted in a pledge to make the corridor ‘greener’ with an emphasis on cross-border renewable energy project.” The Quebec Federation of Chambers of Commerce also entered into a partnership arrangement with businesses in Vermont and New Hampshire aimed at strengthening economic ties.

By far, the Quebec government maintains the “deepest and most expansive ties to the United States of any provincial government in Canada, or, for that matter, any other subnational government in the world.” Economically speaking, the rationale for the Quebec government’s involvement in the United States is logical. New York, for example, is the number one destination for Quebec exports in 2007. These economic ties to the United States are vital for job creation, business diversification, and overall economic modernization and competitiveness in the province.

The Quebec government’s 2006 international policy report emphasizes that the United States is a major priority for Quebec. This is spelled out in priority two, “strengthening and increasing economic exchanges with the United States and Europe,” and in priority three, “contributing to the security of the North American

296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
Since the initial release of this government report, Quebec has increased its resources devoted to the United States through upgrading several of its United States Offices. Another imperative goal Quebec has sought out is to ensure that NAFTA is respected by all of its members, as it has significantly improved economic prosperity within the province by advancing investment and making the province more competitive in North American markets.

NAFTA was not fully implemented until 2008. According to Fry, NAFTA’s goals are “limited and focused, with the intent to eliminate, progressively, tariff and non-tariff barriers, to trade in goods and services, to establish clear rules for investment, and to strengthen intellectual property rights, and, in the process, to create effective dispute settlement mechanisms.” The majority of these ambitions has been achieved, and will allow for further economic ties between Canada and the United States. In addition provincial governments will likely begin to take lead in introducing economic strategies with the United States.

According to the Quebec government’s international policy report, the government plans to “pursue other policies aimed at solidifying its commercial interest with the United States.” Presently, the province supports the development of “fast and efficient border controls at the forty-ninth parallel,” which would allow goods and people

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303 Ibid.
to cross with little hold up. In addition to this, Quebec is promoting itself within the United States as a desired tourist destination. The government also has openly committed to “sustain robust economic expansion”\textsuperscript{307} while at the same time, “producing a cleaner and greener environment.”\textsuperscript{308} In short, the government of Quebec has been an outspoken and firm supporter of trade with the United States, and hopes to build on this relationship to increase its economic prosperity.

4.2.1 Discussion

This chapter has examined the relationship between Quebec and the United States, but more specifically, it has also explored how this relationship is crucial for Quebec’s economic prosperity, which has become a top priority for the government. As mentioned above, having strong relations with the United States has proved economically beneficial for the province; thus, it is no wonder that the government of Quebec is continuing on a path to maintain and increase trade ties with the US.

More importantly, what this chapter has highlighted is that, whichever political party was in government, the government continued on an upward path to seek out and increase the growth of the province’s economy. Throughout this thesis, I have sought to address the role of a political party’s particular ideology, whether it is the Parti Quebecois’ stalwart promotion of Quebecois culture, or the Liberal Party’s international pursuits, in Quebec’s cultural and economic objectives. Further, Quebec’s policy decisions regarding the province’s international presence have been heavily influenced by


\textsuperscript{308} Ibid., 53.
economic determinants. This has been demonstrated in this chapter whilst examining the case study of Quebec’s economic partnership with the United States.

The government of Quebec continues to seek economic growth via its relationship with the United States, by soliciting foreign direct investment and exporting extractive materials and resources. Despite the 2008 economic downturn, Quebec is still in a good position to benefit substantially from being situated directly adjacent to the United States.\(^{309}\) The Quebec government’s expansive international policies towards the United States will continue to help solidify growing financial prospects.

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored Quebec’s long pursued two prime foreign policy goals: vigorous participation in the global economy and the preservation and promotion of French as the national language within Quebec. This thesis has not only explored and examined Quebec’s foreign policy since 1965 and onwards, but has highlighted that participation in the global economy has been at the forefront of this international activity. In addition to this, it was brought to the forefront that Quebec has experienced an evolution of its foreign policy with regards to its cultural and economic determinants. Nevertheless, this project has reinforced the observation by scholars such as Earl Fry, Christopher Kukucha, Douglas Brown, et al. that economic prosperity is of utmost importance to Quebec; however, the province has used its cultural uniqueness for economic implications as well. This examination has also opened the door to further analysis on the participation of subnation states in the global economy.

In this concluding chapter, I will first reiterate the timeline in which Quebec has become an active actor in the international arena. Then, I will review the major changes which occurred to shift the political landscape from a preoccupation with protecting Quebec’s language and culture, to becoming an aggressive actor in the international economy. I will revisit the theoretical approaches which were surveyed throughout chapter one and chapter two. Next, I will recapitulate the case studies and how they have both helped and hindered this study. Finally, I will consider the impact of Quebec’s

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involvement on the international stage and further questions that could be explored regarding subnation states in the context of a new era of globalization.

There has been an accelerated deployment of paradiplomacy from provinces, resulting in impressive economic growth since the early seventies of missions abroad, as well as the establishment of provincial delegations and bureaus abroad and the conclusion of international agreements. Panayotis Soldatos, scholar on paradiplomatic activities of subnational states, argues that paradiplomacy is increasingly effective. He utilizes the example of Quebec’s foreign policy paradigm:

There is a lot of debate among theorists and decision makers on the degree of specificity and even uniqueness of Quebec’s paradiplomacy. It is based on Quebec’s pioneer role in inaugurating, during the sixties, the modern paradigm that combines federated involvement in external relations with national motives, cultural components, constitutional controversies, and conflictual dimensions.

Soldatos reiterates that there has been an increasing acceptance of restrictive federal parameters of provincial statutes. Consequently, Quebec has become more “pragmatic” in its paradiplomatic endeavors since 1965, treading carefully within its provincial jurisdiction.

To substantiate this claim, we can look to Quebec’s federated paradiplomacy in the sixties and seventies. As this thesis has explored, there has been gradual change in the determinants of Quebec’s international presence, but not the same aggression of the provincial government in pursuing an international presence. This project has explored how the role of culture as the primary determinant in Quebec’s foreign policy has dramatically declined since the sixties and seventies. This argues that there is a clear indication that priorities for culture at the international level have shifted towards

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314 Ibid., 52.
economic pursuits. Prior to the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine in 1965, Quebec had a very extensive and sophisticated network of paradiplomatic institutions at home and abroad.\(^{315}\) The province then specialized and “harmonized paradiplomacy through a Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, which later became the Ministry of international Relations and today operates as the Ministry of International Affairs.”\(^{316}\) Since 1965, there has been further recognition by foreign countries, such as France, of diplomatic status for some of Quebec’s offices abroad.\(^{317}\) There were many instances of signing agreements with sovereign states (for example, France), as well as preference for parallel paradiplomatic action, independent of the federal government (again, this refers to the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine) and often in disharmony with it.\(^{318}\)

Throughout the sixties and seventies, Quebec constitutional goals were aimed at the recognition of the principle of “parallelisme des competences,” i.e., Quebec should be able to act internationally in the areas of its domestic jurisdiction (Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine), and the granting of some form of constitutional jurisdiction in foreign policy. These jurisdictions largely included ministries which oversaw languages and culture, education and health, insinuating that trade and investment was not a high priority at the time. Another high priority at this time were “nation-building goals to promote Quebec’s international visibility”\(^{319}\) in anticipation of a sovereign Quebec; and to obtain foreign support and neutrality in the process of acquiring a sovereign status; and to educate,

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\(^{319}\) Ibid.
through such a process, Quebec’s population in the area of foreign policy. Further, foreign-policy was consistently highlighted in pursuing recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society.” Thus, there was a politicization of Quebec’s external activities, “transforming Quebec’s ‘low politics’ paradiplomacy into ‘high politics’ issues for Canada.” And, finally, there was a strong presence of cultural goals in Quebec’s “low politics” paradiplomacy.

All of the above traits have minimized as Quebec entered into the 1980s. This decade reflected a “de-ideologization and normalization of Quebec’s paradiplomacy, with more economic determinism and cooperative paradiplomatic action.” What proves as an obstacle for this study is that there is no specific moment in time which can be pinpointed to this shift. Many scholars argue that there were various moments in which globalization may have begun or shifted policies towards acting with economic interests. Since there is no agreement on what time this occurred, it is difficult to analyze the multiple facets for at which point cultural to economic policies evolved for the province of Quebec. With that, this decade of “de-ideologization and normalization” was certainly visible in the context of Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States. As mentioned in the chapter discussing Quebec’s economic ties with the United States, there was always a push for free trade agreements with the United States such as the FTA (1988) and NAFTA (1994) from the government of Quebec. Douglas Brown and Earl

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322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
Fry have both contributed to the scholarly work on the increasingly active role of provincial and state governments in the international economy.

Brown’s contribution to the study of provincial participation in the international economy identifies the importance of external factors taking precedence over ‘low politics’ such as culture. This has essentially catapulted provinces (and Quebec is no exception) into the field of international trade policy. Brown argues that, “chief among these [factors] is the phenomenon of global interdependence among formal sovereign actors,” and that at the root of this interdependency is the connectedness of global and domestic concerns. This interdependence has been what Thomas Levy has described as the “internalization of domestic policy, and the domestication of international relations.” This can then be attributed to the integration of provinces in the formulation of central trade policy such as that relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization and, ultimately, the FTA and NAFTA. As a result of provinces being included at the table, these negotiations and trade agreements have provided them with an entrance into the international economy.

5.1 Theoretical Perspectives Revisited

In the first chapter, I introduced a number of approaches through which Quebec’s foreign policy can be studied. Chapter two went into much more depth concerning these approaches such as political culture and Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics. I have also emphasized the way in which there was a transition from the cultural

or idealist norms to the neoliberal, materialist focus on globalization, which has increasingly shaped the way provinces have entered the international arena. By placing emphasis on the evolution of the necessity for Quebec and other province’s to become legitimate international actors for the sake of economic prosperity, I have suggested that economic change forms an essential backdrop to the study of Quebec’s foreign policy. Without such a backdrop, we lack an understanding of the social and structural factors that are driving the province of Quebec to become an important international player in terms of international agreements and trade negotiations.

By utilizing Inglehart’s political culture theory, we can see the significance of the path dependency that is emphasized within the framework. This approach emphasizes the manner in which, throughout developed democracies, changes have occurred in the functioning of political institutions and in the ways in which they interact in the international arena. Quebec, in this instance, began with a clearly mapped out plan in terms of its foreign policy found in the Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine. Specifically, the Doctrine was that whichever responsibilities constitutionally fall under the province’s jurisdiction are within the province’s ambit for foreign policy. As this thesis explained, these responsibilities ranged from education to cultural accords with other nations such as France and the United States.

There have been significant changes on the path of Quebec’s foreign policy, shifting to a far greater emphasis on material interests. Again, this reiterates that Quebec’s policies have been path-dependent, and that the province’s foreign policy has simply been subjected to socio-economic conditions that globalization has advanced. If Quebec is to follow Inglehart’s emphasis on the rise of post-materialism, it is possible
that culture, or something else, will come to be the dominant factor in Quebec’s conducting foreign policy. Presently, Quebec is working on numerous accords on security with the United States, as well as health and education agreements through the United Nations with its member states.\(^\text{326}\) Quebec has become an adaptable society, in which by focusing more on the economy and the fiscal prosperity of the province, it will continue to “persist.”\(^\text{327}\) Had Quebec not altered its foreign policy by limiting itself to preserving its culture, it is possible that the province would have fallen behind economically, as opposed to growing as it currently is.

Wendt’s materialist-idealistic approach provides a means of reconciling the goal of protecting Quebec’s French language and culture whilst pursuing economic opportunities and by recognizing the social aspects and goals of the provinces’ foreign policy. Wendt’s social theory of international politics also supports Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions via materialist objectives. This is because materialism or economic pursuits are ultimately constituted by ideas. More specifically, Quebec’s international activities are supported by Wendt’s fundamental claim that state interests are shaped by their identities, which in turn are socially constructed by the international culture that exists at a given time. When applying social theory of international politics to this study, it helps us to understand the institutional change that occurred between 1965 and the 1980s. During this time, Quebec’s foreign policy was initiated by cultural means which fell subject to the changing ways of international culture evolved into a neoliberal, globalized world. It can


be concluded that if international culture shifts with time, so will state or subnation state interests along with it, consequently causing a “structural change”[^328] in world politics.

Changes in international culture provide the necessary conditions for states and subnation states to make political changes and for the emergence of international participation in the global economy. Consequently, Quebec’s foreign policy fits both Inglehart’s framework of having to moderate its international goals in order to ‘survive’ in the new global economic order; whilst Wendt’s theory also applies as it allows for structural change as international cultures differ and evolve through time.

### 5.2 Case Studies Revisited

The case studies of *La Francophonie*, and Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States were intended to exhibit the argument that economic gains and motives outweigh the need to protect culture. Further, they illustrate that there was a shift from cultural to material objectives in Quebec’s foreign policy, particularly at some point in the 1980s. This is evident when exploring Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States, as the province became much more aggressive at this time with the FTA and NAFTA negotiations. As mentioned in the literature review, Quebec’s membership within *La Francophonie* has traditionally been viewed by the ‘culturalists’ as evidence that culture, language, and identity are at the forefront of Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions. However, as the case study explored, *La Francophonie* has also served as an outlet to garner cultural attention which the province has used for economic reasons.

Some examples of this include the promotion of tourism and the creation of relationships and developing trade agreements with La Francophonie member states.

Another way in which Quebec utilizes La Francophonie as a means for economic benefits is the promotion of the French language for the sake of negotiations involving fiscal gains. As mentioned, several scholars such as Jody Neathery-Castro and Mark Rousseau, argue that language, culture and the economy are intertwined when it comes to Quebec’s economic and international activities. This is not to dismiss the role ideas, culture and ideologies play in the policy and decision-making of the Quebec government. Kukucha recognizes this, noting that “international and domestic dominant ideas are a key component of provincial political culture,” in that the implications of dominant ideologies are relatable to foreign trade policy. Political culture has, certainly, played a significant role in defining the goals of Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions. However, neoliberalism and materialism are difficult to reconcile with the protection of culture, and it has arguably been one of the few considerations in what influences the outcome of a provincial international policy at present. Kukucha also asserts that recognizing ideologies is important because, “in matters of foreign trade policy, the provinces differ sharply regarding regional economies, sectoral priorities, and attitudes toward participatory democracy,” thus concluding that it is worthwhile to study how provinces, and in particular Quebec, have been influenced in conducting trade initiatives.

In terms of Quebec’s relationship with the United States, the case study in chapter four illustrates that both actors have made strong, economic commitments to one another and are seeking new ways to strengthen and sustain these ties. Chapter four also brought

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to light that there has been a change in the way Quebec’s goals have been defined. Prior to the 1980’s, it may have been easy for the culturalists to champion their argument: that Quebec’s foreign policy is determined by the objective of strengthening its language, culture and identity. However, these determinants shifted in the 1980s, as “liberalism’s interest in governance and cooperation contributed to the emergence of various regimes,” subnation states included. Ultimately, there has been a clear primacy of material over cultural interests in conducting foreign policy.

The most useful document that pertains to both La Francophonie and Quebec’s economic relationship with the United States has been “Quebec’s International Activity: Working in Concert.” This document has served as a primary indicator of how Quebec views itself on the international stage, and how it intends to continue on the road to economic prosperity by becoming a legitimate international actor. Further, the document provides insight into the “timely strategies” that will enable the province to meet the challenges of a changing global context. Originally released in 2006 under the Jean Charest government, it has since been adopted and continued to apply under the Pauline Marois government going forward to 2014. More specifically, these five objectives guide Quebec’s foreign policy:

1) Strengthening Quebec’s capacity for action and influence;
2) Fostering Quebec’s growth and prosperity;
3) Contributing to the security of Quebec and the North American continent;
4) Promoting the identity and culture of Quebec;
5) Contributing to the cause of international solidarity.

332 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
What is visibly missing from these objectives are the “protection” of identity and culture. The government of Quebec seeks to promote the provinces’ identity and culture; this can be interpreted as serving economic interests, particularly in tourism, as described in both case studies.

To reiterate another key point in the case study on *La Francophonie*, is the issue of language. Again, English has become the primary second language in many nations around the world, and makes it difficult for Quebec citizens to participate when French speakers make up 80 per cent of Quebec’s citizenry. The government has taken a proactive approach within *La Francophonie* to promote the adoption of the French language in international trade, as well as “cultural exceptions” in international trade. By being a member of an internationally recognized organization, this allows a more unified approach from Quebec and other member states who share similar interests in the economy to promote their industries within the globalized marketplace.

Culturalists may have been correct in assuming that cultural concerns drove Quebec’s foreign policy when it was initiated by Gerin-Lajoie in 1965. As globalization was brought to the forefront, Quebec sought not just to be a recognized international player, but a legitimate, thriving economic subnation state that sought international trade agreements and foreign direct investment. It is debatable about whether or not Quebec saw globalization as inevitable, or was ahead of the game in terms of participating in the global economy prior to other Canadian provinces. Nevertheless, it was evident in chapter four when I analyzed Quebec’s relationship with the United States. The government of Quebec has been extremely proactive in initiating trade agreements with...

the United States. Examples of this involved trade missions by Premier Jean Charest to the Southeast United States to create the Southeastern US-Canadian Provinces Alliance, as well as other initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases.

Chapter four explored multiple ways in which Quebec and the United States have developed an extensive relationship. Chapter four largely connected the economic determinants of Quebec’s foreign policy and how the province seeks out its relationships. That is to say, Quebec considers its relationship with the United States to be one of its most important, as the United States is its largest trading partner as it also services to increase autonomy from the rest of Canada. Another prominent fact found within the fourth chapter was that despite changes of government between the Parti Quebecois and the Liberal Party of Quebec, both parties aggressively sought out a strengthened economic relationship with the United States. These economic pursuits come in multiple forms, such as tourism, trade, education and foreign direct investment.

Taken together, the case studies explore Quebec’s position on the international stage, first as a member of an accredited international organization which supports cultural and economic initiatives; and second, in terms of the province’s relationship with an economic super power, the United States. What was important about choosing both case studies was to elucidate how prominent the province of Quebec has become in the international realm. The province is practically considered to be a distinct and legitimate actor; and many nation states have become aware that in order to trade with Canada as a nation state, the provinces must be on board with any and all agreements affecting their

jurisdiction. Quebec has seized on this opportunity and has done a tremendous job at molding itself into a legitimate subnation state worthy of interacting with.

5.3 DISCUSSION AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

This thesis has conveyed the overall argument that economic opportunity outweighs the preservation and promotion of French as the national language within Quebec as the motivation for Quebec’s international policy. It has also identified that though cultural protection and/or promotion was prominent with the initiation in 1965 of Quebec’s foreign policy, there has been a significant evolution from culture to economic interests becoming the underlying focus of the government. Throughout my research, potential questions that would have been beyond the scope of this paper came to light. An example of this would be to study the triangular relationship between Ottawa, Quebec and the rest of the world. Given that Quebec is in a federation, it is subjected to the constitutional constraints of Ottawa. Perhaps another question would be in light of the rise of subnation states and separatist movements worldwide. Separatist movements (of which some governments of Quebec have been an example), and the rise of subnation states in the international economy is a growing field of study.

Other subnation states that share similarities with Quebec, such as Scotland and Catalonia, would warrant comparative study. This is because Quebec, like Scotland and Catalonia, is asserting paradiplomatic actions as a means for international legitimacy. Belanger reiterates this point: “There would obviously be no call for truly international dealings on the part of Quebec if there were no foreign partners available to undertake
such relations with its official representatives, sometimes at the highest levels.” The legitimacy that is garnered through paradiplomatic actions makes it easier for subnation states to move towards secession. If nations around the world accept it as quasi-independent from the federal state, secession may be feasible as well as political acceptance by institutions such as the European Union or the United Nations.

The next step in continuing on with future studies on Quebec’s paradiplomatic actions would be a comparative study with similar subnation states in an age of interdependence in the international political economy. This is because, as Baylis Manning states, “the economic interdependence of the modern world is more than international. It is inter-local […] Every jiggle in the pattern of the international economy is likely to pinch some local group … and convert it immediately into a vocal group.” Quebec has been no exception to this statement by Manning, and has felt this dynamic long before the surge of free trade agreements in the 1980s. Simply put, subnation states like Quebec feel they must pursue other means for their economic wellbeing, beyond that which the State may or may not be doing.

The effects of globalization have been an underlying variable throughout this thesis, though not directly explored given that it is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, Quebec has done an exceedingly good job in becoming a recognized, legitimate subnation state which acts as a quasi-sovereign state within international affairs. The province has been extremely vocal about continuing on the path of maintaining and exploring its own foreign policy among other nation and subnation states. It is unlikely

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that Quebec’s international pursuits will slow down, as interdependency among states is becoming more critical for the survival of nation states and subnation states alike. In addition to this, other Canadian provinces and American states have followed under the leadership of Quebec, implementing their own foreign policies. In the ensuing years, we will see more international participation from Quebec and its provincial counterparts.
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