AMBIVALENT ALLY: CULTURE, CYBERNETICS, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN GRAND STRATEGY

by

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To my family – for your love and patience.
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ABSTRACT

Canada consistently balances competing inclinations for proximity and distance with the United States. Yet the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy has rarely focused on this particular behaviour trait or readily accepted that such an ambiguous stance is actually underpinned by a strategic logic, let alone the crux of a purported grand strategy. And the few that are open to the notion of a Canadian grand strategy often overlook the domestic decision-making determinants of behaviour, are largely empirical-descriptive in content, or are chronologically limited to either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. This dissertation rectifies these shortcomings by providing a theoretical-explanatory and empirically-informed account of Canada’s post-war grand strategy, in which its domestic origins, strategic policies, and cultural predispositions are all carefully explored. It does so by applying the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour, which combines strategic cultural factors that guide policy-makers on security matters with cybernetic policy processes, through which beliefs, inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. It tests this model on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period: (1) Canada’s policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defence over some six decades, and (2) its policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences on NATO defence strategy during the Cold War. The findings reveal that Canada’s strategic policies fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two doctrines span the range of feasible policy options – the “goldilocks zone” – required to ensure that any trade-offs between security and sovereignty, as the central values being pursued in the cybernetic process, are minimized. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour has a high degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and is best described as the goldilocks grand strategy.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

Aerospace Defense Advanced Technology (ADAT)
Air Defense Initiative (ADI)
Air Defense Master Plan (ADMP)
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
American-British-Canadian (ABC)
anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
Canada-United States of America Chiefs of Staff (CANUSA)
Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG)
Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST)
Continental Air Defence Integration North (CADIN)
Defense Committee (DC)
Distant Early Warning (DEW)
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
ground-based interceptors (GBIs)
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA)
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)s
Joint US-Canada Air Defence Study (JUSCADS)
Long Range Theatre Nuclear Weapons (LRTNW)
Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP)
Military Committee (MC)
Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)
Multilateral Force (MLF)
multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)
mutually assured destruction (MAD)
National Missile Defense (NMD)
National Security Council Report (NSC)
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)
National Security Memorandum (NSAM)
North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)
North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
North Warning System (NWS)
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
Over-The-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B)
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD)
Reorganized Objective Army Division (ROAD)
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)
Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE)
sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
Standing Operational Doctrine (SOD)
standard operating procedure (SOP)
Strategic Defense Architecture (SDA)
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
United States Air Force (USAF)
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D. S. M.
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Canada’s historic approach in dealing with the United States on key strategic issues combines two seemingly contradictory behavioural tendencies. On one hand, Canada is undoubtedly a loyal American ally, as reflected in its intimate bi-national relationship within North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and closely aligned role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. On the other hand, this loyalty is tempered with a degree of ambivalence with our superpower ally, reflecting the fact that Canadian and American strategic preferences on key politico-military issues (e.g., missile defence, the Iraq War) occasionally diverge. In such cases, Canada would find itself in the awkward position of disagreeing with the United States, possibly by refusing to fully cooperate with Washington, and offsetting the sting of rejection through measures designed to maintain a semblance of allied solidarity and allay any possible American ire.

Observers will undoubtedly disagree on the true extent to which Canada’s preferences and behaviour actually diverge from that of the United States. Critics of the close Canadian-American relationship will continue to argue that relations remain too intimate, irrespective of any disagreements, while supporters will consistently see the relationship as too distant almost regardless of how much cooperation actually exists. Yet such relatively subjective assessments should not obscure the fact that Canada’s position towards the United States rarely embodies either proximity or distance to an absolute degree, and the level of disagreement amongst both critics and supporters of Canada-US relations – in which there is ample evidence for both sides to draw their

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1 My thanks to Frank Harvey for bringing this point to my attention.
respective and contrary conclusions – is actually symptomatic of this fact. It is for these reasons that Canada’s post-war strategic role, with its simultaneous and often conflicting preferences towards our neighbour, can be best described as an ambivalent ally.²

This study explores how Canadian strategic behaviour can so successfully balance competing inclinations towards proximity and distance with our superpower ally – a defining behavioural trait of Canada’s foreign, defence, and security policies, or as this author prefers to call it, “grand strategy.”³ As Henry Kissinger once wisely noted, Canada was “beset with ambivalences” that “required both close economic relations with the United States and an occasional gesture of strident independence.” This meant that Canada’s “instinct in favor of common defense conflicted with the temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter.” However, as he goes on to conclude, Canada also used this “narrow margin for maneuver…with extraordinary skill.”⁴ This study will focus specifically on two key features of this strategic and reasonably successful (if not optimal) behaviour: the underlying policy continuity that limits the degree of variance exhibited in the country’s actions, and the consistent pattern that Canada’s modest and largely adaptive shifts in behaviour follow. In so doing, this study offers a systematic, nuanced, and accurate account of Canada’s grand strategy and provides an overtly theoretical explanation for the resilient continuity and consistency evident in Canadian behaviour.

³ Grand strategy, rather than a novel explanatory tool, is used in this study as a descriptive term that refers to a particularly strategic type of behaviour, in which relevant national instruments are used to attain security-enhancing political goals. As such, it is used in a comparable manner to those terms, such as international security policy, that are favoured in most accounts of Canada’s foreign and defence policies.
⁴ Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 383.
Weaknesses of Conventional Accounts

The existing literature on Canada’s foreign, defence, and security policies can be divided into two camps. The mainstream interpretation, which currently dominates the academic debate, accepts the notion that Canada is at least capable of independent strategic thinking, even if it does not always partake in it. Andrew Richter’s study of Canada’s military strategy in the early Cold War is a good recent example of this position, as is Sean Maloney’s examination of Canada’s strategic policy-making in the 1950s. It is also implicitly featured in accounts that focus on Canada’s nuanced position and policies during the Korean and Indochina Wars, two foreign policy episodes that were exemplars of what was termed the country’s “diplomacy of constraint,” as well as in historical accounts of Canada’s role in Cold War peacekeeping.

Yet mainstream accounts rarely embrace the notion that Canada has pursued a consistent strategy beyond the confines of either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. The consensus seems to be that such strategic foresight has only arisen when the threats to Canadian national security are unambiguous and the costs of inaction high; otherwise, Canada has shown a strong inclination to forego both strategic planning and the adequate funding of its key strategic capabilities. As such, despite a minority holding an overly optimistic perspective on Canada as a principal power, most scholars

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have a much more pessimistic and “declinist” view of Canada’s continuing status even as a middle power.⁸ In other words, most accounts of Canadian foreign policy are quite critical of the country’s strategic direction since the end of its so-called “golden age.” Common criticisms include Canada’s shrinking governmental largesse shown towards foreign affairs, defence, development, and other key national security related portfolios, the resultant deterioration in “hard power” instruments of statecraft,⁹ and the reliance on haphazardly formulated idealist values or short-term political goals rather than strategic national interests.¹⁰ Observers also note the general disconnect between Canada’s foreign and defence policy – an unfortunate situation that has only been abetted by the growth of bureaucratic in-fighting, the failure of the defence management process to match military means with defence policy ends, and the dispersal of central authority amongst various departments and agencies.¹¹

The conventional wisdom is that Canada’s fractured, reactive, and astrategic decision-making process largely precludes recourse to consistent strategic behaviour or long-term grand strategy.¹² Simply put, it is either doubtful on the existence of Canadian strategic thinking or posits a distinction between the strategic acumen displayed in the

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⁸ For more on the principal power argument, see David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto; New York: Wiley, 1983).
¹⁰ For a criticism of this value-based foreign policy, see Roy Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
early Cold War and the frequently criticized approach of later years.\textsuperscript{13} Some of the more generous commentators might acknowledge that Canada displays some form of underlying strategy in its behaviour. James Fergusson, for instance, accepts that Canada might pursue a “niche” or “plug-and-play” security strategy, and goes on to say that this approach might be the most feasible and “by default the most useful option” available to Canadian policy-makers, even if it is unclear whether this strategy is a conscious one. But he also strongly criticizes this strategy for its overly responsive and reactive tendencies.\textsuperscript{14}

Successive governments beginning under Pierre Trudeau’s leadership have sought to improve the planning process through bureaucratic reforms aimed at achieving greater efficiency, tighter coordination, and a more strategic policy-planning element, though the results have proven less than satisfactory.\textsuperscript{15} These domestic problems are in turn magnified by Canada’s geopolitical position next to the United States, and the attendant ambiguity and dilemmas that inevitably comes with, to use John Holmes’ phrase, “life with uncle.”\textsuperscript{16} Astute observers within the mainstream perspective have often made reference to this element of ambiguity. Yet most of these accounts neither accept that Canada’s frequently ambiguous policy positions reflect a strategic logic, nor examine this vitally important Canadian behavioural trait in a truly systematic manner. And the few that do are largely empirical-descriptive in content and tend to overlook the policy-

\textsuperscript{13} Gray, “The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” 7-18 and Nossal, “Pinchpenny diplomacy,” 88-105.
\textsuperscript{15} Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power; and Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd Edition (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), Chp. 9.
making process and domestic determinants of behaviour, and overstate the full extent of this behavioural ambiguity.\textsuperscript{17}

An alternative interpretation emphasizes Canada’s relationship with the Americans as the key driver in its foreign and defence policy. To be sure, the mainstream perspective acknowledges the central importance of the United States, with many scholars neither appalled by Canada’s exceedingly close relationship with Washington, nor worried about the possibility of an even more intimate arrangement. Indeed, some even advocate just such a tighter relationship to rectify the strategic deficits of Canadian foreign and defence policy.\textsuperscript{18} However, in the extreme “critical” formulation, it envisions Canada’s relationship to the US as being one of effective \textit{peripheral dependence} on a range of economic, defence, and security matters, irrespective of any domestic chagrin at this lack of independence.\textsuperscript{19} On one hand, it often purports a greater degree of long-term continuity in Canadian policies – due to the constant and overwhelming geo-strategic influence of the United States – that is simply not evident in the mainstream approach. On the other hand, even a modest defence of the critical view, in which Canadian policy-makers are constrained by our dependence on the Americans, largely eschews the notion that Canadian behaviour is either strategic or independent. It is perhaps embodied by

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{19} See Stephen Clarkson, ed., \textit{An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?} (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart [for the University League for Social Reform], 1968).
\end{small}
\end{flushleft}
Herman Kahn’s quip that Canada is a “regional power without a region.” As a result, proponents advocate a more independent strategic approach to the United States.

My study challenges both the mainstream and alternative interpretations of Canada’s foreign policy. It takes issue with the mainstream view that Canadian behaviour is situational and simplistically reactive, and clearly illustrates how a cybernetic policy-making process actually results in a consistent and successful form of strategic behaviour. Canada has shown itself more than capable of balancing contradictory inclinations of proximity and distance towards the Americans. In contrast to the alternative interpretation, it is Canada’s impressive capacity for strategically adaptive behaviour towards the United States – rather than consistent (albeit un-strategic) notions of peripheral dependence – that leads to policy continuity and patterned consistency. In so doing, Canada clearly confounds the central policy conclusions of the literature, which is prone to suggest that the country needs to demonstrate greater distance or proximity to the Americans and would benefit from greater attention to national interests. In contrast, my study will show how Canada’s grand strategy has in its success clearly challenged these dire predictions.

This research also more fully explores the closely related concepts of strategic culture and grand strategy. Both will be used to shed light on the Canadian case and represent the independent and dependent variables under examination, respectively. Strategic culture refers to those cultural elements concerned with politico-military matters. While first introduced by Jack Snyder to examine the Soviet Union’s cultural

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inclination for nuclear war-fighting, it would achieve a new prominence with Colin Gray’s account of American strategic behaviour and nuclear weapons policy.\textsuperscript{21} According to Alastair Iain Johnston, this first-generation of strategic cultural analysis would be followed by two subsequent “generations” – one offering a more critical perspective concerning the instrumentality of culture, while the other providing a narrower conception of culture and behaviour.\textsuperscript{22} Johnston’s own work constitutes a rigorous addition to the third-generation, in which culture is largely defined in ideational terms and used to explain grand strategy.\textsuperscript{23} Yet strategic culture has never officially moved beyond this three-fold typological division. Few adopted Johnston’s own theoretical framework, while an unresolved ontological and epistemological debate emerged between Johnston and Gray on the proper delineation of strategic culture.\textsuperscript{24}

Canadian foreign policy scholars, recognizing the potential utility of cultural analysis, have offered their own respective accounts pertaining to the Canadian experience. Some prefer to use political culture in reference to those cultural elements that “have a bearing on the making and conduct of Canadian foreign policy;”\textsuperscript{25} while much of the more recent literature has sought to explore Canada’s multiple strategic


\textsuperscript{22} Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” \textit{International Security} 19, 4 (1995): 32-64. Notable scholars in the second-generation include Bradley Klein, Reginald Stewart and Edward Lock, while scholars of the third-generation include Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey Legro, and Alastair Iain Johnston (though Johnston’s own work can be seen as an important improvement upon and therefore distinct from other third-generation accounts).


cultures and its regional strategic cultures. Some have even written more explicitly theoretical accounts that sought to bridge the ontological and epistemological divide between Gray and Johnston. However, despite its greater theoretical nuance, the literature on strategic culture still has difficulty going beyond descriptive understanding to causal explanation – by either lacking the causal specificity or mechanism to explain the predominance of one strategic culture over another or by the insufficient attention to the domestic decision-making environment. As some astute observers note, strategic culture still “lacks a falsifiable middle range theory” and has “substantial room for refinement.”

In comparison, recent studies of grand strategy have incorporated a range of different explanatory frameworks and levels of analysis into their respective accounts. Some prefer domestic-level explanations for grand strategy, while others turn their attention to structural determinants of state behaviour, even if such a parsimonious approach is limited to a narrow subset of structurally-inclined realist scholars. One avenue favoured by many recent realist-inclined scholars has been to combine domestic

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and structural explanations within a neo-classical realist framework.\textsuperscript{31} Meanwhile, some accounts have preferred to use grand strategy in a more heuristic or prescriptive capacity, as a means to inculcate greater strategic qualities in a country’s behaviour.\textsuperscript{32} Yet this literature also contains inherent conceptual ambiguity. Simply put, grand strategy remains an elastic and loosely defined term that makes it very difficult to achieve definitional specificity. This ambiguity is at least hinted at by Daniel Drezner, who notes that grand strategy can be “set out in advance, with actions following in sequence” or consist of “strategic narratives” that connect “past policies with future ones.”\textsuperscript{33} In other words, grand strategy can be viewed as a framework for action that embodies a particularly rational/strategic way of thinking or alternatively be a type of behaviour that a state may exhibit in its foreign and defence policies, which means that the term is largely used in a descriptive capacity to make sense of a country’s collection of policies. Some accounts even tend to combine elements of both.\textsuperscript{34} This study ultimately sides decisively on the latter conceptualization of grand strategy, and its argument is largely concerned with identifying the key variables capable of explaining grand strategy behaviour.

Canadian scholars have not displayed equal interest in the subject of grand strategy, whether conceptually on its own merits or as it pertains to strategic behaviour. Indeed, the Canadian foreign policy literature remains quite critical of Canada’s capacity to pursue a consistent and long-term strategy, so perhaps this trend should not be


\textsuperscript{34} For example, see Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” \textit{International Security} 21, 3 (1996/97): 5-53.
surprising. That being said, a few scholars have embraced this concept to provide a uniting theme to the country’s strategic policies. David Haglund, for example, remains the most prominent proponent of a uniquely Canadian approach to grand strategy, embodied in the concept of a “North Atlantic Triangle” and actualized in key historical and symbolic metaphors that have helped guide policy-makers on strategic questions.35 Others refrain from using grand strategy per se, but are still open to the notion that Canadian behaviour is guided by some sort of underlying strategy – Fergusson’s “plug-and-play” strategy fits into this category, as does Nils Ørvik’s “defence against help,” and R. B. Byers’ idea of “security policy” or “international security policy,” all of which are at least closely associated with grand strategy.36 Indeed, much as definitional elasticity has confused the discussion on grand strategy, there continues to be some uncertainty as to the proper usage of both Ørvik and Byers’ terminology – as either a prescriptive framework to guide policy-makers or an overarching description.37

This study brings some much needed clarity to the extant literature on strategic culture and grand strategy. Previous accounts of strategic culture may have benefited from Johnston’s refined and explicit explanatory approach, but few are willing to adopt such methodological complexity in their research designs. Instead, many scholars have either consciously ignored such methodological and epistemological issues, or as

Canadians have preferred, sought a compromise position that might be admirable in its intention but has proven much less compelling as an explanatory framework for the country’s behaviour. My research will bring greater methodological specificity to strategic culture by an altogether different avenue – by exploring how cultural beliefs and inclinations are actually processed in a policy-making environment. By including cybernetic theory within the explanatory framework, the study will be able to provide a more accurate portrayal of how policies are formulated and implemented. In so doing, it also creates synergistic dialogue with foreign policy theories like cybernetics.

Similarly, despite its resurgence in popularity, scholars continue to adopt sometimes contradictory positions with regard to grand strategy – as a means to make sense of and prescribe appropriate policies or simply as a description of a particular kind of behavior. Little consensus exists on the proper way to conceptualize grand strategy and the overly broad scope of the concept has only magnified this problem. Canadian scholars may generally avoid using the term grand strategy, but its own distinct terminology has done little to escape from these definitional problems and indeed only muddled the conceptual waters further. This study will clearly conceptualize grand strategy as a dependent variable to be explained by the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour. To prevent any further definitional ambiguity, it will adopt a particularly narrow definition of Canadian grand strategy – as a key behavioural trait that carefully balances proximity and distance on a range of different strategic politico-military issues. This will add rigour and specificity to a concept too often used in an ad hoc and casual manner, while also providing an important systematic explanation of Canadian behaviour towards the United States. This behaviour is often discussed in the Canadian literature, whether by Ørvik,
Byers, but it is much more rarely explored in any great depth or explained in a theoretically astute manner.

**The Cultural-Cybernetic Model of Behaviour**

My research will involve an examination of the *cultural-cybernetic* sources of grand strategy – this involves (1) the strategic culture factors that guide policy-makers on national security matters and (2) the cybernetic policy-making processes through which cultural beliefs, behavioural inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. Structural-material factors, such as the disparity of power between Canada and the United States, will not be ignored. Indeed, they provide an important environmental context that encourages and constrains feasible policy choices. But at least in the Canadian case, structure alone does not determine the actual substance and direction of the country’s strategic behaviour. An analysis of domestic-level variables as part of a theory of foreign policy is in turn required. In that sense, this study can be situated within the broad rubric of realist theory, in which classical realist precepts concerning interest and domestic factors are prioritized and the neo-classical emphasis on explicit, positivist theorizing is adopted. Indeed, by exploring a case with minimal structural determinants, the study represents a useful corrective to the neo-classical tendency to implicitly prioritize structural conditions.

Strategic culture is a distinct subset of a commonly held socio-political culture, which makes it similar to political culture but smaller in scope and concerned with an even narrower range of issues. It is rooted in the constructivist notion that a state’s
preferences and interests are largely generated and shaped by a state’s identity and should not be treated (as many structural accounts of foreign policy often do) exogenously. 38 Indeed, strategic culture gives a sense of hierarchy and priority to those particular preferences and interests that are concerned with defence and international security matters. It can also be largely distinguished from other cultural traits by its focus on strategic issue-areas. The focus on identity and culture promises “a conceptual framework that explains the underlying meaning and relative priority states attach to seemingly abstract foreign policy goals.” 39 Strategic culture, while historically and indirectly shaped by larger geopolitical-structural forces, remains a domestic-ideational form of explanation, in which the society’s cultural inclinations are manifest through the beliefs and consequent actions of policy-makers. 40 This definition, rooted in the classical tradition of realism, will provide an explanation that goes beyond the stale methodological arguments that dominate the literature on culture. It builds upon neo-classical realist accounts that maintain an ontological openness to non-material and non-structural factors and social constructivist theories that problematize a state’s identity as a source of its interests and policies. 41 In addition, it complements traditional accounts of Canada’s foreign policy that often prefer classical theories like realism, as well as more recent accounts that use culture to explicate Canada’s strategic behaviour. 42

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40 This definition, by accepting the fact that certain cultures can be shaped by material factors, departs from a number of other accounts of strategic culture, including those used by Colin Dueck and Alastair Johnston.
This study also incorporates elements of John Steinbruner’s cybernetic theory or “paradigm” in order to show how cultural inclinations are mediated in the Canadian policy process. Cybernetics posit that government behaviour does not reflect analytical or rational outcome calculations, but is instead reliant on a “minimally articulated” notion of purpose, objective, or value – the central goal being “simply survival as directly reflected in the internal state of the decision-making mechanism, and whatever actions are performed are motivated by that basic value.”

The cybernetic decision process, largely concerned with reducing complexity and controlling uncertainty, envisions a reasonably simple (albeit successful) decision mechanism with a short-term frame of reference.

To minimize complexity and uncertainty, policy-makers largely coalesce in the implementation of pre-programmed behavioural patterns or standard operating procedures (SOPs) and show extreme sensitivity to those environmental factors – termed feedback or critical variables – that could threaten this value. If the critical variables go past a certain tolerable level and begin to endanger the value, cybernetic decision-making would involve the application of incremental changes within a given SOP’s parameters, and if this is not sufficient, “the discarding of the [SOP] in use and taking up the next item in the response repertory.”

However, it should be noted that the adoption of an alternative SOP, if not quite incremental, would still entail a relatively moderate change – guided by the conservative goal of bringing the critical variable back to a tolerable range.

In some respects, the cybernetic process bears more than passing resemblance to Alex Mintz’s poliheuristic approach, which advances a model in which decision-makers operate under “imperfect/bounded rationality in an environment characterized by

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44 Ibid., 75.
imperfect information (prospective uncertainty)." True, poliheuristic theory entails a more expansive approach that combines cognitive and rational theories through a two-step process: decision-makers first rely on a heuristic-based, non-compensatory mechanism to eliminate most decision alternatives, and then adopt a rational, alternative-based analysis of the remaining options. But cybernetics also includes heuristics and arguably a non-compensatory principle as a means to simplify the decision process. On one hand, it involves the non-purposeful and adaptive pursuit of an over-riding value/objective. This higher order priority essentially mirrors the poliheuristic emphasis on a “key dimension that is more important than the rest,” which is used in a non-compensatory, elimination-by-aspects manner to reduce the alternatives to a more manageable level. On the other hand, the cybernetic process relies on adaptive SOPs to bring the environment variables back to a certain tolerance zone, which can be considered an organizational and cognitive-heuristic means to simplify the decision process even further.

Cybernetics is largely neutral on the origins and content of the value in question and the type of behavioural response that the government pursues, and it is precisely on these areas that strategic culture offers important insight. First, strategic culture can

46 According to Mintz, cybernetics and expected utility theory are considered compensatory in nature, in which the actor analyzes alternatives based on its ability to satisfy a criterion or maximize utility.
48 In some respects, the possible benefits of applying an identity-based strategic cultural analysis to cybernetic theory is comparable in character to what constructivism can bring to rational and structural theories (e.g., greater insight on the sources and contents of preferences, interests and possibly behavior inclinations). For examples, see James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism and Constructivism in
provide context and additional content to the value that concerns policy-makers. Second, a collective cybernetic decision process also requires that “the separate activities of the individuals involved in the process must be directly coordinated to some degree,” whereby the “established routines...[are] rendered consistent.” Cultural factors, by encompassing and helping unite disparate individuals through an intersubjective framework, facilitate the sort of implicit coordination required for successful adaptive responses. And by serving as a strategic cultural lens that frames reality for policy-makers, they also reduce the level of uncertainty of an otherwise complex environment.

Third, cybernetic theory entails a cognitive and organizational reliance on pre-programmed SOPs that are implemented as responses to shifts in the critical variables and ensure the continued maintenance or achievement of the value. Moreover, these pre-programmed SOPs can be conceptualized as the dominant patterns of behaviour arising from and often subsumed under a country’s strategic culture. This provides a simple way to operationalize and test cultural inclinations, which otherwise would be too ill-defined to be of much use as an explanation. As such, this study will expand upon Douglas Ross’ notion of Standing Operational Doctrines (SODs) to describe these SOPs. SODs refer to “tendency groupings” or “SOP policy aggregates”—in other words, implicit strategic doctrines that are derived from societal norms and used as heuristics or cognitive shortcuts to help ensure a relatively consistent and coordinated policy output.

Policy-making remains a fragmented process involving shifting (and sometimes competing) coalitions of actors with differing policy preferences. In a cybernetic policy—

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process, SODs provide the culturally-derived heuristic framework through which coalition preferences, rather than fully integrated, are loosely and implicitly coordinated – this is done largely by structuring and affecting the particular balance amongst these coalitions, which ultimately changes the policy outputs that emerge out of this process in accordance to a given SOD. As such, shifts between SODs would entail changes in the relative balance between coalitions, and would do so in accordance with a cybernetic pattern. For example, when confronted with significant environmental pressure (e.g., changes in the critical variable), decision-makers discard the current strategic doctrine for the SOD that is next in the response repertoire, and the political fortunes of the coalitions change as a result.

A cybernetic approach is clearly amenable for use in conjunction with ideational and cultural theories. At its core, cybernetic theory posits that “human beings lack the analytical capacities to scan over a wide range of alternatives and make fine grain optimization decisions.” As David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski go on to acknowledge, this opens the door to psychological and satisficing processes capable of leading “policy makers to focus on, or at least strongly prefer, certain types of policy instruments over others.”51 For the purposes of this study, policy-makers use heuristic shortcuts that lead them to focus on a higher-order priority (e.g., the value) and to rely upon SODs to achieve that objective. This results in long-standing patterns of behaviour and a consistent and strategically-informed Canadian grand strategy, which is unfairly dismissed by the dominant perspectives in the Canadian foreign policy literature.

To be sure, both Sylvan and Majeski question how multiple actors from diverse bureaucratic departments and agencies can communicate and agree upon beliefs and patterns of thought on some potentially novel situation. This study adopts a broader intersubjective perspective on such issues, in which strategic culture is capable of both informing the beliefs and behavioural inclinations of the country’s policy-makers and setting the basic parameters of the strategic debate on various policy responses. This point is reiterated by Ross, who accepts that a cybernetic analysis of Canadian behaviour involves the examination of the “fundamental clusters of attitudes concerning the nature of Canadian foreign policy, the threats, problems, and challenges confronting it, and the dominant interests and values that must be served in actually formulating and executing policy.”52 As such, the dominant SODs that are part of the cybernetic response repertoire represent concrete frameworks or guides of action that are embedded in and inseparable from those societal beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural inclinations of a country’s strategic culture.

My research clearly complements the wider theoretical trend towards combining a holistic ontology with a positivist epistemology and quantifiable methodology. In so doing, it offers important contributions to the wider international relations, foreign policy, and strategic studies literature, and more narrowly to Canada’s own foreign policy debate. First, my research expands upon recent neo-classical realist accounts53 by retaining a more inclusive approach to ideational variables and a less determinant position on the role of structural and geopolitical factors, at least in this particular case. In that sense, it clearly represents a return to more traditional realist concerns over domestic

53 For a good example of a recent neo-classical account, see Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders*. 
and ideational factors – though in its theorizing and methodology, it can be perhaps better situated within the neo-classical framework. Second, its conceptualization of strategic cultures as a continuum of varying predispositions, behavioural inclinations, and doctrines represents a significant departure from how realists (neo-classical or otherwise) and constructivists have so far examined this subject. Indeed, the study’s use of a strategic cultural continuum helps to avoid relying upon and ultimately reifying strategic cultural categories that are better suited for descriptive rather than explanatory inferences.

Third, the study incorporates Steinbruner’s cybernetic theory of decision-making. This theoretical synthesis offers a useful way to highlight how the beliefs and behavioural inclinations in a country’s strategic culture(s) are selected and processed in the Canadian policy-making environment. By incorporating a theory like cybernetics as an intervening element, it provides a novel way to conceptualize strategic culture as a causal factor that can be used to explain and predict – and not merely describe – a state’s behaviour. This study facilitates dialogue with one of the few foreign policy theories tested on the Canadian case, thereby contributing some much needed theoretical innovations concerning Canada’s foreign policy. Moreover, by testing a modified version of the cybernetic model of behaviour, it provides a novel account of the strategic policy-making process – and in so doing, sheds light on the continued utility of cybernetic theory.

Fourth, by prioritizing explanatory over descriptive inferences, the study represents an important addition to the Canadian foreign policy literature that still largely relies on atheoretical, descriptively-oriented, or at least implicitly theoretical accounts of Canadian foreign policy. Notwithstanding the quality of insight from these descriptive narratives, there are certainly benefits from using explicit theoretical explanations and

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54 See Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*. 
modeling – where the variables are clearly identified, any hidden assumptions are made explicit,\textsuperscript{55} and the study can be situated in a broad theoretical debate that could result in cumulative knowledge.\textsuperscript{56}

Lastly, this study tests the cultural-cybernetic model of explanation on notable cases of Canadian foreign policy behaviour. This offers novel interpretations of how Canada has adapted to American preferences within the context of two of its key military alliance commitments – to NORAD and NATO – over much of the post-war period. By opening up the analysis beyond a single event, critical decision, or single issue-area, this allows the possibility of demonstrating continuity and patterned consistency across different issues over time. It also promises insight on both Canada’s post-war political-military strategy and on how close US allies may adapt to future directions in US strategic policies. Previous accounts may have documented particular moments and key decisions, but have often done so in the context of a more narrowly defined time period.\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{Explaining Policy Continuity and Patterned Consistency}

Canada occupies a unique geo-strategic position in North America. Geographically, it occupies a large if sparsely populated territory, surrounded by three oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic) and the “world’s longest undefended border” that it shares with its only direct neighbour, the United States. Canada no longer has any illusion that its oceanic “moats” makes it immune from external dangers, having long since

\textsuperscript{56} On the need for social scientific theories of Canadian foreign policy, see Brian Bow, “Paradigms and Paradoxes: Canadian Foreign Policy in Theory, Research and Practice,” \textit{International Journal} 65, 2 (2010): 371-380.  
\textsuperscript{57} For example, see Richter, \textit{Avoiding Armageddon}. 

become “bridges” to “unexpected extraterritorial and military responsibilities.”

But there is little doubt that it sits in a fortuitous geographic position indeed. The second key feature is the massive disparity of power between Canada and the United States. Other factors, most notably economic interdependence and a shared diplomatic culture, mitigate some of the worst excesses of this imbalance in relative power. But as Patrick Lennox notes, this “asymmetry in material capability” does place “Canada in a position of dependency on the United States for its physical and economic security at home in North America.”

Geopolitical and structural reality represents an important underlying influence on a state’s grand strategy. On one hand, it alludes to the key factors in the material environment that could directly affect or possibly threaten and endanger the Canadian state. This certainly corresponds to the general tone of the realist tradition, which places the explanatory onus for a state’s behaviour on its surrounding material conditions and the relative power of the state in question. On the other hand, it can also play a more indirect role by shaping the historic parameters of Canadian strategic culture, and thereby the debate on feasible policy options in this country. This notion does not necessarily contradict the more flexible formulations of both realism and constructivist-cultural analysis. It is, however, neither embraced nor explored in their respective literatures, which still prefers to maintain a clear distinction between the material and ideational.

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60 Both classical and neo-classical realists might accept a role for non-structural variables, but they often see such factors as being secondary in importance – whether by positing the supremacy of power and interest explanations (classical) or using non-structural factors to supplement structural explanations (neo-classical). In turn, constructivists have been keen to undertake comparative analysis in which material and
True, Canadian scholars have proven more than willing to explore the material and structural conditions that shape the country’s policies. And unlike some of their peers, they have often eschewed the use of a structural model that represents an admittedly simplistic and overly generalizable conception of reality. Instead, their accounts have often been constructivist or classical realist in nature – both in their inclusive approach to a variety of different factors and in their preference for traditional analysis that seems to privilege diplomatic histories over social scientific explanations.\(^{61}\)

Yet material and essentially “realist” conditions can retain an important degree of indeterminacy in cases like Canada, where a country benefits from a relatively benign threat environment. In such circumstances, the state retains some capacity to attach meaning to and interpret such conditions, and a greater degree of agency to choose among a delimited range of policy choices. Colin Gray is certainly correct to note that Canadian policies towards the United States emerge “because of political and economic judgment, not because of geopolitical necessity.”\(^{62}\) Any explanation of Canada’s grand strategy needs to go beyond strictly parsimonious structural-material models of behaviour to incorporate domestic-level analysis in order to better explain a state’s behaviour in a manner that entails greater specificity and accuracy. This requires a more complex model of behaviour, in which structure and agency, the material environment and its cultural meaning, are all carefully distinguished. Previous accounts of Canadian behaviour, while open to such complexity, often lack the social scientific frameworks necessary to make

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\(^{62}\) Gray, *Canadian Defence Priorities*, 17.
explanatory sense of such broad factors. Indeed, the literature has been particularly weak in incorporating foreign policy theories capable of shedding light on important “second-image” factors.\(^6^3\) This study provides an important addition by focusing on some of the key domestic-level conditions that shape a country’s strategic choices but remain under-explored in the literature.

Canada’s strategic culture – composed of two domestic-ideational subcultures partially formed by underlying geopolitical-structural forces – infuses the country’s policy-making process and guides our strategic behaviour. The Conservative Continentalism subculture posits that Canada should maintain a close identification with the country’s role as a North American nation and loyal ally to the United States. In contrast, the Liberal Independence subculture posits that Canada adopt a more independent, often internationalist, perspective in order to avoid parochial concerns over alliance solidarity with the superpower. Both subcultures, while categorized according to their distinctive and competing attitudes and beliefs, can be usefully conceptualized along a single continuum based on the relative degree of predisposition towards either proximity to or distance from the United States.\(^6^4\) Continentalism encompasses the proximity side of this continuum, while Independence serves on the distance side. This helps to illustrate that each strategic culture can maintain a range of predispositions and distinctive behavioural inclinations; the more extreme positions and strategic inclinations

\(^{63}\) For more on second image analysis, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

\(^{64}\) I chose the terms “Conservative” and “Liberal” as a means to denote the continental and independence inclinations within Canadian strategic culture. Of course, this creates inevitable comparisons with the names of the two major political parties in Canada. At first glance, each party is strongly associated with a particular strategic culture – the Conservatives being generally inclined towards good relations with the US (e.g., under Harper and Mulroney) and the Liberals being keen to maintain a modicum of distance from the Americans (e.g., under both Trudeau and Chrétien). Of course, this is a modern association that did not exist in the pre-war period and there are notable exceptions to this rule. Moreover, it overlooks the similarities underlying Canadian government policies, irrespective of the party in power.
are on the outer edge of the continuum, rarely discussed as feasible or realistic policy choices by the country’s foreign policy elite, while Canadian strategic behaviour often straddles the modest mid-range between the two subcultures.

Strategic culture does inform the policy responses that emerge in Ottawa. Equally important, however, Canadian policy-makers must also deal with what Steinbruner calls the complexity problem. This involves the uncertainty condition, which entails an environment in which there is “limited time and information” for optimal decisions and “uncertainty over exactly how to pursue national interests,”65 as well the challenges of a disaggregated policy process, in which “separate, disagreeing actors” often with different cultural predispositions towards strategic issues must “jointly determine the decision and jointly affect the outcome.”66 As a result of this environment complexity, policy-makers formulate policies through a process that is largely in accordance to a cybernetic pattern – by utilizing heuristic shortcuts derived from its strategic culture that reflect both the value or objective being prioritized and the established SODs designed to structure the policy-making process and ensure that policy outputs are geared towards the continued maintenance of the value in response to environment pressures.

On one hand, Canada’s strategic culture provides content for the central values in the Canadian cybernetic policy-making process – to maintain security against domestic and international threats and sovereignty in the face of US continental predominance, both of which reflect Canada’s particular conceptualization of “survival.”67 Canada is

65 Dueck. Reluctant Crusaders, 37.
66 Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 18
only able to safeguard its territorial and economic security in close cooperation with the United States, though such a partnership *in extremis* can result in a possible trade-off to Ottawa’s political interest in ensuring the country’s sovereignty and independence. The reverse is also true: Canadian effort to safeguard its political interest in sovereignty in North America and independence abroad by maximizing the distance from Washington could, if pursued too far, begin to threaten Canada’s security interests. Ottawa could find itself facing possible security threats alone, or perhaps more likely, dealing with US unilateral security measures capable of threatening the country’s economic security and sovereignty and curtailing its capacity for independent action. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether Canada could even achieve anything more than just a facade of sovereignty or independence in the absence of American cooperation.

Security and sovereignty are clearly closely connected to one another, with the pursuit of one possibly resulting in the failure to achieve the other – such a situation represents what can be called, pursuant to Steinbruner’s analysis, trade-off complexity.\(^{68}\) The successful pursuit of both values, without necessarily resulting in the sort of value integration more common in non-cybernetic approaches, is dependent on ensuring that Canada is neither too close to the Americas, nor too distant. Indeed, movement in either direction could disrupt the balance between them and endanger both values. Canadian decision-makers therefore seek to maintain security-sovereignty values within a limited range in the continental-independence continuum, in which proximity is equally balanced with distance and security is more often than not balanced by sovereignty. This has resulted in a grand strategy that is marked more by policy continuity and patterned consistency than fundamental change.

\(^{68}\) For more on trade-off complexity, see Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, 16-17.
This position is an original contribution to the wider Canadian foreign and defence policy literature, which had hitherto been highly critical of the country’s behaviour and fixated on the perceive malaise at the heart of Canada’s approach to strategic affairs. Mainstream accounts generally blame the frequent Canadian tendency to keep some distance from the Americans, often expressed in Canada’s lax response to various defence and security matters. More particularly, it can be attributed to Canada’s hesitancy to support key American initiatives. As Jack Granatstein has argued, the Canadian government’s “on-off position” on missile defence and “yes I will – no I won’t” policy on Iraq represent “perfect examples of pandering to the home folks and squandering political assets south of the border.”69 There might be debate on the specifics of the Canadian position, but this should not obfuscate the underlying consensus on the need for closer and more strategically adept cooperation with our superpower ally.70

In contrast, the alternative interpretation is largely united in their criticism of Canada’s perceived closeness and subservience to the Americans. While often conceptualized on economic matters, the dangers of peripheral dependence and the need for greater independence can be easily extended to defence and security matters – as scholars such as Jamie Minifie, John Warnock, and Michael Byers have clearly done so.71 Yet both interpretations are clearly deficient; indeed, they miss the strategically


70 This is perhaps most visible on the issue of missile defence, where supporters and critics might disagree on the wisdom of this specific policy choice but generally agree on the importance of close cooperation between the two neighbours.

motivated range between two extremes, the patterned and consistent movement within that range, and the many successes and few failures evident in Canada’s grand strategy.

On the other hand, strategic culture informs and is inextricably linked to the dominant SODs that guide how Canadian policy-makers deal with the Americans – the Continental proclivity for continental soft-bandwagoning towards the United States and the Independent preference for defensive weak-multilateralism.72 Policy-makers traditionally rely on these two doctrines as the foundation for its grand strategy, as both are “established by prior experience”73 and have been proven successful in responding to external pressures, balancing the proximity-distance inclinations, and maintaining security and sovereignty. In effect, SODs constitute frameworks of action to guide Canada’s strategic policy choices, and do so by providing a heuristic structure for the coalitions of actors that dominate the country’s fragmented policy-making process. Simply put, some coalitions seek closer relations with the Americans, while others prefer to keep our distance – and the relative balance between and coordination amongst these groups, which helps to determine which coalition is able to get more of its preferences implemented, is implicitly set by the parameters of a given SOD. For instance, continental soft-bandwagoning would entail a balance that clearly favours the coalition seeking closer relations with the Americans, just as defensive weak-multilateralism would favour groups more inclined towards an arms-length relationship with our US ally.

72 Continental soft-bandwagoning is borrowed from Justin Massie, while defensive weak-multilateralism is inspired from the terms “defensive internationalism” and “weak multilateralism,” used by Massie and Frank Harvey, respectively. See Massie, “Making sense,” 625-645 and Frank Harvey, “Dispelling the Myth of Multilateral Security after 11 September and the Implications for Canada,” in Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, eds. David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), 200-218.
Many accounts of grand strategy are concerned with first-order strategic adjustments in a state’s “overall strategic capabilities and commitments.” However, this study is concerned with modest “second-order” adjustments within a state’s grand strategy,74 which this author calls strategic adaptations.75 Importantly, this term better describes the modest and reactive behaviour evidenced by secondary powers, which prefer planning that is “adaptive rather than assertive” and often eschew “grand global designs or strategy to implement such a design.”76 True, Canada took a more proactive approach to collective defence in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. But the country soon returned to its traditional form of diplomacy that “was by nature responsive, the margin for movement or error tiny.”77 As Edgar McInnis concludes, “[t]he story of Canada’s postwar foreign policy is one of adaptation.”78

Strategic adaptation also places useful attention to the adaptive cybernetic pattern of Canadian behaviour, in which any such adjustments are largely incremental responses to the exigencies of a given situation – such as to perceived alterations in the policies or capabilities of allies or adversaries. Even the more significant policy shifts, in which environmental stimuli capable of disrupting the security and sovereignty values triggers the adoption of an alternative SOD, are still relatively modest in scope and do not

74 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 12-13. First-order adjustment is exemplified by the American adoption of an overarching containment strategy directed at the Soviet Union, while strategic adaptations can be found in the strategic-doctrinal shifts in administrations pursuing containment (e.g., Eisenhower’s New Look, Kennedy’s Flexible Response).
constitute a first-order strategic adjustment. Simply put, the primary SODs in the policy repertoire are designed to ensure the continuance of these values, and therefore eschew more extreme or untested strategic-doctrinal choices.

Canadian grand strategy does seem to entail at least some element of path dependency, in so far as the pattern of incremental policy changes implies that previous decisions do have a way of narrowing future policy choices. However, one should avoid overstating the path dependent nature of policy choices in this context. Cybernetic processes maintain policy responses within a certain delimited range, and the incremental and modest policy shifts result in behaviour that certainly resembles path dependence. Indeed, in the broad sense of meaning that “history matters,” it would be difficult to deny that past decisions do have an impact on present and future policy choices. But cybernetics is also largely about adaptive responses to environmental stimuli, which have proven successful in securing central values and are capable of more extreme shifts in behaviour in the event of sufficient environmental stress. In contrast, path dependence in its analytical definition is based on the notion that temporal sequencing can be self-reinforcing, which means that the “relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time.” As such, path dependent behaviour is guided by the deterministic sequence of past decisions and policies, in which initial benefits might lock in one path and increase the costs of policy changes in the future. It therefore offers a fundamentally different form of explanation than cybernetics, which is firmly rooted in adaptive responsiveness to environmental pressure.

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In the absence of some sort of ameliorating mechanism, path dependence can also eventually lead to the sort of dysfunctional or inefficient types of behaviour that the cybernetic process – with its simplified and minimally purposeful goal of achieving key values – largely avoids. The differences between the two concepts might appear overwrought, especially given that observed behaviour would be similar in both cases. But given the frequent reference to path dependence in historical studies, it does seem important to clarify and distinguish between the two explanatory mechanisms in order to achieve greater conceptual clarity. Equally, this study’s exploration of the cultural-cybernetic sources of behaviour can be seen as an alternative explanation for apparently path dependent patterns of behaviour, and therefore a rebuttal to the more analytical or explanatory arguments for path dependence.

The study provides an important challenge to those critics who exaggerate the degree of variation in Canadian behaviour and look for evidence of “strategic adjustment” when challenging perceived shifts in Canadian foreign policy (e.g., Iraq, missile defence); and other critics who might not see much change in the country’s policies, but are unlikely to detect much that would be worthy of the term strategic in Canada’s perceived tendency for over-accommodation and subservience. Contrary to the predictions of such critics, Canadian strategic behaviour is considerably more balanced, strategic, and accommodating to American preferences than either critic acknowledges. Simply put, observers of Canadian foreign policy often fail to see the strategic and

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80 I have used Pierson’s “self-reinforcing sequence” in reference to the narrow definition of path dependence. However, James Mahoney does raise an alternative conception of path dependence, which he terms “reactive sequence.” Rather than a process that reinforces earlier events, a reactive sequence entails “backlash processes that transform and perhaps reverse earlier events.” James Mahoney, “Path dependence in historical sociology,” *Theory and Society* 29, 4 (2000): 526 (emphasis in original).
culturally-informed motivations for the actual policies that were implemented in practice and what they meant to (or did for) the relationship.

Of course, other more extreme SODs can be imagined along the strategic culture continuum and perhaps even identified in the public debate over Canada’s foreign and defence policies. But the cybernetic preference for “satisficing” policy responses means policy-makers tend to make incremental changes within each strategic doctrine until an environment factor (the critical variable) is pushed outside its tolerable range and threatens the value. At that point, there is generally a modest (albeit more significant) shift to the alternative SOD in the country’s historic policy repertoire. The balance amongst the dominant coalitions in the policy-making process changes as a result, and policy outputs are pursued in accordance with the new SOD that restores the critical variable back to its preferred range. It is for this reason that Canada’s pattern consistent post-war behaviour, rather than being termed a defence against help or a niche strategy as some observers prefer, can best be described as a “goldilocks” grand strategy. Contrary to the claims of critics (and much like the goldilocks character in the fairy tale), Canada is neither too close nor too far from the US, but rather sits in a goldilocks range that is “just right.” Figure 1.1 provides a useful illustration of Canada’s strategic culture continuum and the patterned consistency that marks its behaviour.

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81 The goldilocks grand strategy is a reference to both the tolerance range for the security-sovereignty value and that core strategic behavioural trait that successfully balances proximity to and distance from the United States. The term goldilocks was first coined in reference to Japanese grand strategy. See Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007).
My study will first provide an in-depth examination of the key characteristics of these two strategic subcultures and an assessment on the SODs that mark the Canadian cybernetic policy-making process and underpin Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy. Policy-makers essentially “make” grand strategy within the limits afforded by the country’s material capabilities and a geopolitical-structural environment, in which relative power still remains an important if not necessarily determinant factor. But they only do so through a strategic cultural lens that is embedded in the wider normative inclinations inherent in society and ultimately informs their motivation and preferences; and a cybernetic process that deals with uncertainty and environmental complexity by relying on culture-based heuristic SODs to help structure the relationships between...
shifting coalitions of actors. In so doing, this study is able to offer a theoretically-informed explanation for strategic policy decisions and choices, and one that is attentive to the key factors that underpin and constrain policy-making – the “interests, motivations, and preferences” of actors, the processes “by which decisions are formulated and implemented,” and the environments “in which these actors and processes operate.”

Canadian policy-makers are assumed to be conservative, minimally purposeful (non-purposeful might be too strong a term), and cybernetically adaptive. The primary or default SOD to ensure this outcome is continental soft-bandwagoning. This doctrine originates from the Second World War, when the prospects of a British defeat led Canada to forge exceedingly close ties with the Americans, even as these ties led to some uncomfortable complications in the ensuing years. As such, continental soft-bandwagoning is focused on satisfying American security concerns and simultaneously ensuring at least modicum of distance from the United States. A good example can be found early in the Cold War, when Canada’s participation in continental air defence reflected our strong proclivity towards bandwagoning, but was sufficiently “soft” to not offset or unbalance the security-sovereignty values; partly due to the facade that the NORAD relationship was situated within the NATO context, but more importantly as a result of a Cold War environment that reduced the salience and appearance of a loss of independence.

Canadian policy-makers, however, monitor those environment factors that are capable of disrupting Canada’s competing and culturally-derived inclinations towards

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83 W. Ross Ashby offers an inherently non-purposeful cybernetic model, though Steinbruner argues that this formulation is “too extreme to be strictly tenable.” Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, 64.
proximity and distance, and thereby endanger the balance needed to ensure security and sovereignty values. This environmental stimulus is largely represented by America’s strategic preference, as embodied in those key politico-military initiatives that periodically emerge from Washington policy debates. These critical variables are used to assess the salience of this potential environmental pressure or provocation and can trigger a feedback mechanism that results in either incremental policy changes or a shift in SOD. Four criteria are used to judge the salience of the critical variables, based on the degree to which they (1) entail a possible and significant participatory role for Canada; (2) are important to and prioritized by the United States; (3) are underpinned by a particular conception of threat that Canada does not share; (4) are unpopular or controversial domestically and/or internationally, which can be the result of the initiative itself or through its association with an unpopular or controversial administration.

These criteria can be divided into two sets: 1 and 2 form the broad conditions necessary for US strategic preferences to become a form of stimuli or pressure, thereby forcing Ottawa to make a decision of either cooperation with conditions (e.g., continental soft-bandwagoning) or rejection, again with some qualifications (e.g., defensive weak-multilateralism); 3 and 4 are the primary criteria used by Ottawa to judge whether one SOD or the other forms the basis of Canada’s policy choice. Some of these criteria and the values that they impact, it should be noted, are closely related to a government’s domestic political survival, even if these factors remain conceptually distinct.

If these four criteria are high, the critical variable would be pushed outside its tolerance range and the central values would be endangered. These values reflect a non-compensatory higher order priority – whereby any other possible benefit cannot
compensate for the loss or disruption of the values – that helps to determine Canada’s foreign and defence policies. In response, Canadian policy-makers rely on a secondary strategic doctrine, defensive weak-multilateralism, which entails greater rhetorical distance from the United States but more modest changes to the actual policies themselves. For example, policy-makers found American interest in missile defence much more threatening to its security-sovereignty values, in so far as such a policy was not seen domestically or internationally as being compatible with Canadian interest in strategic stability and multilateral non-proliferation. To resolve this dilemma, officials ultimately decided to balance official non-participation on missile defence with a variety of other policy responses geared to offset any lingering American concerns on this issue.

My prime hypothesis posits that Canada’s two strategic subcultures (the independent variable) are mediated through a cybernetic policy-making process (the intervening variable) and actualized as the country’s goldilocks grand strategy (the dependent variable). These two strategic cultures give substance to the central value and primary SODs in the Canadian policy-making process, but it is only through this cybernetic process that these ideational elements are translated into a form of pattern consistent strategic behaviour, termed the goldilocks strategy. Yet these two subcultures are shaped by and given explanatory weight as a result of Canada’s benign geopolitical-structural position in North America (the antecedent variable). In the absence of this antecedent or permissive condition, if Canada operated in a high-level strategic threat environment in this continent, for example, it is likely that the posited causation – domestic-level cultural-cybernetic variables resulting in grand strategy – would apply.

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84 A good examination of some of these methodological-causal terms can be found in Stephen Van Evera, Guide to methods for students of political science (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), Chp. 1.
much more weakly, if at all. Yet for the purposes of this study, the antecedent variable operates as a relatively uniform case condition, which exhibits very little variance for the duration of the post-war period, and indeed for much of Canada’s existence as a self-governing Dominion. This makes the study a particularly good one for isolating and ascertaining the importance of domestic cultural-cybernetic factors.

A key auxiliary to this prime hypothesis is the role of US strategic preferences as the key environmental factor that preoccupies decision-makers. In extreme circumstances, it can magnify the trade-off between security-sovereignty values and result in a shift between the two culturally-derived strategic doctrines at play in the cybernetic policy process. As such, a crucial part of this study’s case analysis will be an assessment of whether all four criteria associated with the critical feedback variable are necessary to create a significant trade-off between security and sovereignty, and an assessment on the relative importance and relationship between these criteria in triggering a change in SOD.

To be sure, the environmental factor is clearly linked to the antecedent condition, in so far as a shift in American strategic preference could conceivably alter Canada’s geopolitical-structural position and make the threat environment more precarious. Yet it is equally important to distinguish between the two concepts. The critical variable, reflecting an assessment of the crucial environmental or operational milieu for Canadian policy-makers, is an integral part of the cybernetic process outlined in the prime hypothesis’ causal relationship. Importantly, it does not represent a fundamental shift in the antecedent condition and should not be mistaken for a condition variable that
independently “govern[s] the size of the impact” of the cultural-cybernetic variables (though its impact on the prime hypothesis undoubtedly has some similarities).\textsuperscript{85}

The prime hypothesis will be tested in five ways. First, it will assess the degree to which policy-maker beliefs and the primary reasons for their policies reflect culturally-based predispositions towards the United States, and are therefore in accordance with and can be situated within the parameters of its strategic culture.\textsuperscript{86} This will help to determine the initial accuracy of this study’s description of Canada’s strategic culture and the utility of conceptualizing cultural predispositions and inclinations along a continental-independence continuum. Second, it will examine how these strategic cultural factors are standardized in a cybernetic policy-making process – by assessing the underlying importance of security and sovereignty values in guiding Canadian behaviour, and demonstrating that decision-makers ultimately rely on established and culturally-derived SODs to guide Canada’s foreign, defence, and security policies.

Third, it will assess the extent to which the critical variable (US strategic initiatives), in those circumstances in which the key criteria are met, threatens to go beyond its tolerance range and endanger the security-sovereignty values; the relationship between the four central criteria of this particular environment factor will be further explicated. Fourth, it will examine the manner in which the Canadian policy-making process deals with this environmental pressure. In the absence of such stimuli, one would expect to see the decision-makers selecting policies that are clearly in accordance with continental soft-bandwagoning; in other words, by offering clear support for our American ally and minimizing the appearance of being overly intimate or subservient in

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{86} This point is made in Massie, “Making sense,” 630.
this relationship. In the event of environmental stress, one would expect to see policy-makers adopting positions that combine an ambivalent and hesitant stance towards the United States with some admittedly supportive policies, in accordance with defensive weak-multilateralism. Any changes between these two strategic choices should be dependent on alterations to the critical variable and security-sovereignty values.

Fifth, this study will explore in more detail the causal mechanism behind which SODs, as cultural-cybernetic heuristic frameworks, actually inform policies. It will do so through an assessment of the relative balance between different coalitions of actors involved in the Canadian policy-making process. If Canadian decision-makers are pursuing a continental soft-bandwagoning SOD, one would expect the dominant coalition – involving policy-makers, bureaucratic agencies and/or departments – to be one with clear preferences that result in closer relations with the Americans. In contrast, one would expect a defensive weak-multilateralism SOD to involve the ascendance in the policy-making process of a coalition of actors with preferences that result in distancing from the United States. In each case, the marginalized coalition would still be able to mitigate some of their more extreme demands of the other group, though fewer of its own preferences would ultimately be implemented.

**Plan for the Study**

The study is primarily concerned with explaining Canada’s post-war strategic behaviour towards the United States. It will proceed in eight chapters. This introductory chapter offers an initial explication of my argument, outlines its central contributions to
existing accounts of Canadian foreign, defence, and security policies, and concludes with a chapter-by-chapter breakdown of the study.

Chapter Two, *Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice*, provides an overview of grand strategy, with specific emphasis on developing an agreed upon definition that both builds upon its distinguished conceptual lineage and can be methodologically useful for a positivist research agenda. It then reviews a number of different theoretical explanations for grand strategy, and offers an overview of strategic culture. While acknowledging the conceptual and methodological challenges of this sort of explanation, I argue that strategic culture does capture an integral component underlying grand strategy and holds definite explanatory promise – though it needs to be informed and operationalized with cybernetic theory.

Chapter Three, *A Culture-Cybernetic Framework for Canadian Grand Strategy*, extends this conceptual exploration into the Canadian case study. It will first provide an overview of Canada’s structural and geo-strategic environment, with a particular emphasis on shedding light on its pre-war strategic behaviour. It then assesses the country’s two particular strategic subcultures (Conservative Continentalism and Liberal Independence), and shows how these two subcultures inform the value and SODs that dominate Canada’s strategic policy-making process. The cultural-cybernetic framework will then be tested on the two case studies in the rest of the study.

Chapters Four to Seven provide the case analysis that further explicates how strategic culture – through a cybernetic policy-making process involving different governments, officials, and departments and agencies – translates into Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy. These actually represent two single overarching cases on the
subject of Canada’s approach to strategic defence and NATO defence strategy. However, due to the substantial length of both of these cases, each has been subdivided into two parts. On the strategic defence case, the first part provides evidence of Canada’s continental soft-bandwagoning doctrine on air defence against bombers, while the second part reveals how this doctrine shifted to defensive weak-multilateralism when the question turned to active defences against ballistic missiles rather than simply air-breathing threats. On the second case, the first part looks at how Canada approached the creation of NATO and agreed to contribute conventional forces to the Alliance, and the second part shows how the initial qualms that arose from this substantial commitment eventually led to the country’s gradual reduction and eventual withdrawal from Europe.

Chapter Four, *Canada and Strategic Defence – Part I: Air Defence and NORAD*, focuses on Canada’s approach to dealing with US plans for the first iteration of strategic defence, specifically the strategic air defence systems of the early Cold War that were designed to deal with Soviet nuclear-armed bombers. It shows that when directed at various air defence initiatives, Canada was quite supportive of American plans for air defence – this includes the tactical cooperation and joint construction of radar networks in Canada’s northern territory in the early 1950s, the more strategic cooperation evident with the creation of NORAD in the latter part of the decade, and after the directionless interlude of the Diefenbaker years, the subsequent deployment of nuclear-armed air defence systems by the Canadian armed forces.

Chapter Five, *Canada and Strategic Defence – Part II: ABM, “Star Wars,” and GMD*, continues the analytical narrative by showing how Canada proved far more ambivalent when it came to the prospect of strategic missile defence systems. It provides
further details of Canada’s general disagreement over US missile defence plans and how this external variable pushed the security-sovereignty values beyond its acceptable range. It then teases out how Canadian policy-makers, who had initially displayed continental soft-bandwagoning behaviour towards the United States, selected the more ambivalent defensive weak-multilateralism doctrine on the three central missile defence initiatives – the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) plans of the Johnson and Nixon administrations; the so-called “Star Wars” research program initiated by President Ronald Reagan; and lastly, the modest missile defence system deployed by President George W. Bush in the post-9/11 period. Canada was forced to balance a general refusal to openly participate or even endorse strategic defences with less visible efforts to assuage any lingering American security concerns. Yet this study also demonstrates that there are clear limits to Canadian ambivalence, in so far as the growing importance of this policy issue for the United States reduces Canadian latitude and ensures increasing efforts to placate its superpower ally.

Chapter Six, Canada and NATO Defence Strategy – Part I: Present at the Creation, examines how Canada’s adapted to first British and later American preferences on collective organizations in the first several years of the post-war period. It shows that Canada initially pursued continental soft-bandwagoning towards the United Nations, but soon shifted its preferences towards cooperation with its key allies, notably Great Britain and the United States, in a process that eventually led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. As the threat from the Soviet Union intensified, Canada eventually decided to deploy air and ground forces in Europe that continued in one form or another for the duration of the Cold War.
Chapter Seven, *Canada and NATO Defence Strategy – Part II: From Deterrence to Denuclearization*, extends the narrative by examining Canada’s response to NATO’s evolving defence strategy to the Cold War’s conclusion. It shows that Canada developed some qualms on the cost of its conventional commitment, but continued with its continental soft-bandwagoning when NATO adopted a wider nuclear weapon role for its shield forces. Yet even this support was soon balanced by a more critical mindset under the Pearson government, and soon thereafter Canada’s partial withdrawal from Europe and denuclearization of its forces. It provides details on how a shift in the critical variable resulted in a strategic-doctrinal shift to defensive weak-multilateralism, which forced Canadian policy-makers to balance continued support for NATO’s with periodic attempts to reduce Canada’s role or minimize its involvement in it.

In Chapter Eight, *Conclusion*, I bring this study to a close by reiterating the central arguments of the cultural-cybernetic explanation, illustrating the major theoretical and empirical findings of this argument, and offering tentative suggestions on possible future directions for further theoretical inquiry and research.

This study is concerned about the continuity and consistency inherent within Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy. Strategic culture informs the dominant value and pre-programmed SODs that are selected within the policy-making process. Yet it also demonstrates the important role played by key environmental factors on the policy-making process. Strategic culture remains a necessary condition for strategic behaviour, but it is only through a cybernetic policy-making process and in response to key environmental factors that cultural inclinations help shape the peculiarities and scope of the strategy itself.
CHAPTER TWO – GRAND STRATEGY, CULTURE, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE

The Canadian debate on security matters has rarely been discussed as a matter of grand strategy. Indeed, it was only a few short decades ago that some notable commentators bemoaned the dearth of strategic thinking in this country. John Gellner once bluntly remarked, “[t]here is simply no tradition of independent Canadian strategic thought,” while Colin Gray used the memorable term “strategic theoretical parasitism” to describe Canada’s penchant for relying on the strategic thinking of its erstwhile allies.87 Yet it would be imprudent to prematurely discard notions of grand strategy. As Douglas and Christopher Ross usefully remind us, “there is nothing in the definition of grand strategy which specifies the type of state able to engage in such planning…State actors of any size should be able, in theory, to engage in such planning.”88

The chapter begins with a conceptual overview of grand strategy to provide a definition of the term that could later be applied to the case of a middlepower like Canada. The second section examines possible explanations for a state’s grand strategy, with specific emphasis on foreign policy and international relations theory. The chapter concludes with an evaluation on the utility (and conceptual and methodological challenges) of strategic culture, and offers insight on how cybernetic theory could be used to supplement such cultural explanations.

Canada and Grand Strategy

In the immortal words of Carl von Clausewitz, “Strategy [is] the use of engagements for the object of the war.” This definition nicely summarizes the core of what is traditionally meant by strategy, and has survived remarkably well since the posthumous publication of *Vom Kriege* (translated to *On War*) in 1832. Colin Gray, for instance, makes reference to “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy,” while historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed it “the process by which ends are related to means, intensions to capabilities, objectives to resources.” But despite their slightly different wordings, the Clausewitzian distinction between tactical means and strategic ends remains at its core. True, as even Gray notes, Clausewitz’s definition does contain an emphasis on military engagements that adds to its “operational” or “battlefield” flavour. Yet this concern with bridging tactical and/or operational means to political ends, even if the means were largely military and the ends were primarily placed in the context of a war, precludes the notion that the Prussian officer was wedded to operational or even tactical thinking.

Signs of a “higher level” of strategy would be more fully spelled out by British military theorist Sir Basil Liddell Hart over a half-century ago, who added to Clausewitz’s definition by introducing a broader conception of tactical or operational means that explicitly includes military and non-military instruments of power: “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the

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90 Quoted in Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 17
attainment of the political object of the war.” Of course, he was still largely concerned with political ends for the purpose of prosecuting a war, though with admirable foresight on the need to secure the subsequent peace. But by expanding the notion of means to include non-military instruments of power, Liddell Hart did an admirable job in advancing a “grand” perspective of strategy. As he notes, “fighting power is one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take into account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will.”

Since that time, however, the idea of grand strategy has grown to incorporate a more holistic view of both tactical means and political ends. No longer is grand strategy limited to achieving political ends only in the immediate circumstances of war, but can include a much broader set of policy goals during times of both war and peace. As Paul Kennedy observed, “[t]he crux of grand strategy lies in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests.” Whether one conceives of the relationship between military and non-military means and political policy ends as a “bridge,” a “dialogue” or a “means-ends chain,” questions of grand strategy should neither be mistaken for strictly military matters, nor limited to the Clausewitzian phrase “grammar of war.”

Yet there is the danger that the definitional broadening of grand strategy could be taken too far. According to some scholars, discussions around grand strategy that expands it to include all available resources and instruments of a state in pursuit of all available international goals would have questionable utility, in so far as the subject would resemble the totality of a country’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{97} One solution is to narrow what one includes in the “means” within the wider grand strategy rubric. Grand strategy, while concerned with a plethora of different foreign policy goals, should solely be focused on the role of military instruments in achieving these goals. Both Robert Art and John Mearsheimer, for example, are advocates of just such a narrow definition.\textsuperscript{98}

It is certainly appropriate to place a strong emphasis on the role of the military instrument in a state’s grand strategy. Power remains an important currency in an “anarchical” international society. And notwithstanding increased attention to “soft power” and diplomatic suasion, military force retains its privileged position as the most costly and dangerous type of state currency. Gray points this out with uncharacteristic bluntness: “Some of history’s more appalling ideas cannot be thwarted by better ideas, rather do they need to be shot.”\textsuperscript{99} However, an undue emphasis on solely military means seems to be an overly restricted way to define grand strategy. If limited to military instruments of power, it would begin to resemble nothing so much as military policy. After all, the instrument of military policy would logically be the armed forces, but there is nothing that dictates that the goals of such policy cannot be non-military in nature. This

is especially true for a country like Canada, where the diplomatic rationale for its armed forces – as an “adjunct to various non-military techniques of statecraft”\textsuperscript{100} – looms large.

A potentially more useful approach is to maintain a broad perspective on the “means” of grand strategy and balance this equation with more restricted political ends.\textsuperscript{101} By accepting a narrow set of political ends, this definition has the benefit of both upholding the traditional meaning of grand strategy and maintaining an important distinction from the wider concerns inherent in foreign policy itself. Moreover, in its specification of political ends, it also better clarifies the relative importance of certain policy instruments (military and non-military) and whether such instruments are being used in service of grand strategy or for other political/economic goals.

A good example of this sort of conceptualization, where a broad view of means is balanced by narrow political ends, can be found in the works of Colin Dueck. For example, he argues that grand strategy is a “calculated relationship of ends and means” applied against one or more potential opponents under circumstances in which force might potentially be used. Dueck is also careful to not precipitately discard non-military instruments from the grand strategy definition, but “only insofar as they are meant to serve the overall pursuit of national goals in the face of potential armed conflict with potential opponents.”\textsuperscript{102} Clearly, this would make it difficult to mistake grand strategy for foreign policy. The clear emphasis on an opponent also serves as a reminder that strategy, rather than operating in a vacuum, is played against another player who has the ability to

\textsuperscript{101} In some respects, this is precisely what a grand strategy limited to military means implicitly seeks to achieve, as military power is not necessarily usable for all foreign policy ends. But by culling non-military instruments from the equation, this conception also loses a critical core of what made grand strategy unique; namely, that different instruments of statecraft – military, diplomatic and economic – can be synergistically directed towards certain political ends.
\textsuperscript{102} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusader}, 10.
react, respond and potentially undue one’s best laid plans; it is not for no reason that strategy is often seen as possessing a “paradoxical logic.”

Grand strategy, as refined by Dueck, also places a strong emphasis on trying to reconcile political ends with limited means. Countries do not possess unlimited resources that can be placed at the disposal of policy-makers; such individuals must instead set goals and priorities in a domestic environment characterized by resource scarcity and political constraints. If such a claim applies in the case of the United States, it would be an even more apt description for small countries without the strategic reach and abundant resources of great powers. After all, the requirement for small countries to be prudent and strategic in their policies, given their obvious shortfalls in material capabilities, would be even more necessary. It is therefore incorrect to assert that a country pursuing a grand strategy requires sufficient “human, industrial, and military resources” or that “Grand Strategy is only found on the side of the big battalions.” This places too great an emphasis on grand strategy, as defined in a narrowly material sense, while forgetting that the crux of the term is actually on the strategic need to match potentially limited means to political ends. David Haglund, one of the few authors to argue for the existence of a Canadian grand strategy, is indeed quite right to conclude that grand strategy might therefore “appear to be a more urgent imperative for those states that are not bounteously endowed with the material attributes of power.”

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104 Dueck, Reluctant Crusader, 10. For further information on domestic political constraints in grand strategy formulation, see Christensen, Useful Adversaries.
In addition, it might be an overstatement to assume that only foreign policy concerns that involve conflict and the possible use of force can be considered “in the realm of strategic interaction.”

For example, the use of force between Canada and the United States had largely become unthinkable through in the twentieth century, notwithstanding military contingency planning by both countries in the interwar period. Relations are now marked by a dizzying array of political, economic, diplomatic, military, and social/cultural linkages. And Canadian policy-makers have placed an inordinate amount of time and resources to ensure the smooth functioning of this relationship. But security is not simply a matter of direct military threat, nor does a security threat only arise as a consequence of an adversary or opponent. A powerful ally can be a source of genuine concern. And any consequent grand strategy must be equally prepared to adapt to this ally’s reactions and strategic moves.

This broad conception of security concerns lies at the heart of what has been termed the “defence against help” strategy. Introduced by Nils Ørvik in reference to Scandinavian countries and later Canada, this strategy refers to instances where a small state feels threatened by a larger neighbour and therefore builds up its own military capabilities. But the small state, rather than fearing a traditional military threat from its larger neighbour, is concerned instead with the possibility of “unwanted” help from a larger neighbour that could endanger its sovereignty. This arises in cases where there is a situation of strategic interdependence, where security is indivisible but the smaller state

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107 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 10.
108 The United States formulated War Plan Red (or the Atlantic Strategic War Plan) for a hypothetical war with Great Britain during the interwar period, with a central goal being a preemptive invasion of Canada (Plan Crimson) to prevent British use of this territory. Canada had meanwhile formulated its own contingency military plan, Defence Scheme No. 1, to defend against an American invasion. See Richard Preston, “Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 3 (1974): 47-58.
lacks the capability to secure its side independently. In such a scenario, the larger state may be forced to buttress the security of its neighbour, whether unilaterally or by cooperation, in order to address its own security concerns. The threat of unwanted help can range from a relatively benign (if politically unpalatable) encroachment on a state’s territorial sovereignty to the unilateral provision of military “assistance.” But whatever the case, it does seem clear that incorporating a broader view of security – which can encompass direct military threat, unwanted assistance, and the infringement of sovereignty – might prove both analytically useful and more applicable to Canada.

Such a perspective on grand strategy, where the political foreign policy ends are confined to matters of national security but not strictly limited to concerns of a direct military threat, is also not necessarily foreign to recent usages of the concept. Grand strategy, according to Barry Posen, must identify threats to state security and limit discussion only to those foreign policy elements that concern those security matters. Yet he is also careful not to explicitly specify what exactly constitutes a security threat, which leaves room for a broader interpretation of security. An alternative way to examine this issue is to place “national interest” and potential threats to those interests at the crux of any grand strategy. While keen to emphasize the role of military instruments in grand strategy, Robert Art does an excellent job of specifying different priorities amongst national interests, and not all threats to these interests are posed by military force.

110 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13, 220.
111 See Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Chp. 2. The notion that grand strategy should effectively identify a state’s national interests can be seen in both Kennedy, “Grand Strategies in War and Peace,” 5 and Layne, The Peace of Illusion, 13.
Questions of national security, interests, and attendant threats to those interests are all integral to actually understanding what constitutes grand strategy. Yet Canada has found it difficult to articulate security matters in terms of national interests, let alone grand strategy, preferring instead to place emphasis on Canadian “values” rather than to admit to something as “grubby” as “self-interested aims in foreign policy.” Yet it is also notable that even criticisms of recent Canadian malaise on security issues are often worded on strategic grounds. Perhaps the best example can be found in the works of the late R. B. Byers, who used the memorable term “capability-commitment gap.” There is perhaps no other term that so nicely encapsulates both the ends-means dilemma for Canada and, according to Byers, Canada’s ultimate failure to strategically connect capability with its commitments. He advocated the development of a “security policy” as a means to rectify this strategic deficit. As Byers describes it, security policy is meant to serve as a “bridge” between defence policy and foreign policy, and encompasses: “those political-strategic objectives and instruments which have been identified and established by the government as central to national security interests.” With its emphasis on a means-ends chain and political-strategic objectives, there can be little doubt that Byers was making reference to strategy – and grand strategy at that.

The security policy concept was meant to provide a strategic means-ends framework capable of bridging Canada’s foreign and defence policies. A definitive account would sadly not be completed by Byers himself, but the concept was refashioned as “international security policy” and became the subject of a seminal 1995 collection

112 Haglund, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited, 10.
113 Byers, Canadian Security and Defence, 5.
titled *Canada’s International Security Policy*. This collection brought together some of our most prominent scholars of military and strategic affairs to discuss different facets of Canada’s international security policy. Since its publication, scholars have found themselves adopting the term international security policy, though more often as a description for Canadian behaviour, as opposed to a prescriptive or heuristic framework device that guides its foreign, defence, and security policies.

Consensus remained elusive as to the strategic content underlying Canadian initiatives on security matters. Some have noted the continuity that underlies Canada’s approach to international security, as evident in the “internationalist” behaviour pursued by successive Canadian governments since the end of the Second World War, as well as the various policy-planning documents (both white and green papers) that have been released during this period. Others detect a notable shift towards a “narcissistic” or “sanctimonious” approach to international security affairs, which can be contrasted with the greater strategic acumen displayed in the early Cold War. As Daniel Madar and Denis Stairs pessimistically conclude, “the recourse to grand strategies” remains “the prerogatives of the greater states.”

Other scholars, however, are much more open to the idea of a Canadian grand strategy that would be capable of providing a uniting theme to the country’s foreign, defence, and security policies. Haglund has been perhaps the most prominent proponent.

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117 Madar and Stairs, “Alone on Killers’ Role,” 730.
of a uniquely Canadian approach to grand strategy, embodied in the concept of a “North Atlantic Triangle” and actualized in key historical and symbolic metaphors – such as the counterweight and the linchpin – that have served as a guide to policy-makers.\textsuperscript{118} Others may avoid the terminology of grand strategy in preference for security policy, but in a complementary fashion still posit the existence of a uniquely Canadian strategic culture that guides policy-makers on crucial matters of national security.\textsuperscript{119} Most recently, former Defence Minister David Pratt has brought renewed attention on the benefits of a grand strategy.\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, even among more scholars more critical of current government policies, there has been a visible effort to follow Byers’ footsteps in the worthwhile endeavour to inculcate a greater degree of strategy and to the Canadian policy process, Don Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald perhaps being foremost among them.\textsuperscript{121}

This study will help to further flesh out the notion that Canadian behaviour in the post-war period, and not simply in the early Cold War, can be described as reflecting a reasonably coherent grand strategy. Rather than using either foreign policy or international security policy as the description for this behaviour, it will instead return to the older label of grand strategy. For the purposes of this study, grand strategy can be conceptualized as a means-end “chain” meant to efficiently safeguard national security and is observable in a country’s behaviour and within its policies, in which a state identifies those long-term political foreign policy goals and interests that can be broadly considered security-enhancing, ascertains the threats or challenges to those goals from

\textsuperscript{118} For example, see Haglund, \textit{The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited} and “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo)Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy,” \textit{American Review of Canadian Studies} 29, 2 (1999): 211-235.
\textsuperscript{119} Massie, “Making sense,” 625-645.
\textsuperscript{120} See Pratt, “Is there grand strategy in Canadian foreign policy” 1-24 and “Canadian Grand Strategy and Lessons Learned,” 61-78.
both adversaries and allies, and utilizes the relevant resources, capabilities and instruments of statecraft (both military and non-military) – in conjunction with the relevant resources, capabilities and policies of allies\textsuperscript{122} – for the achievement of these goals. This definition, while going some way to clarify this esoteric concept, would also benefit from greater methodological rigour by delineating how to best conceptualize grand strategy.

On one hand, one can use grand strategy as a way to explain a state’s foreign policy behaviour; in other words, as an explanatory concept that helps shed light on foreign policy practice. It can be conceived in a causal fashion, in which grand strategy or strategic doctrine explains why a state undertook a particular action, or in a more heuristic manner that frames national interests and means-ends thinking in order to shed light on a state’s action. A good example is provided by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, who in a seminal article sought to provide further clarity to the American strategic debate by providing a four-fold typology of grand strategy options.\textsuperscript{123} Their analysis certainly added a degree of specificity on the appropriate global role for the United States, with few doubting the astuteness or internal logic of their descriptive classifications or its utility in explaining American grand strategy.

Yet this approach can be criticized for its largely untheoretical and heavily descriptive content, which prevents the use of any number of theoretical explanations designed to help explain foreign policy behaviour, with any debate limited to the

\textsuperscript{122} Ross and Ross, “From ‘Neo-Isolationism’ to ‘Imperial Liberalism’,” 165 (emphasis in original). This point is also hinted at by Liddell Hart, who notes the need to take into account the coordination and direction of “all the resources of a nation, or band of nations.” Liddell Hart, Strategy, 336 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{123} This typology included neo-isolationism, cooperative security, selective engagement and primacy. See Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” 5-53.
accuracy of the typology itself.\textsuperscript{124} Posen and Ross may provide a good descriptive understanding of a state’s behaviour, but they are much less successful at identifying the mechanism behind how grand strategy explains behaviour.\textsuperscript{125} True, this approach is often successful at providing heuristic descriptions and framing foreign policy prescriptions within a policy debate. There are also benefits associated with obtaining a well-formulated \textit{descriptive} account with an attendant \textit{prescriptive} capacity. But within a positivist research project, this should not come at the expense of an \textit{explanatory} and \textit{predictive} capacity, or at the very least aspirations to generate such inferences.

On the other hand, one can approach grand strategy as the type of behaviour that needs to be identified and explained. Grand strategy does have certain characteristics that make it distinct from foreign policy. First, it has the contradiction of being both more narrow and broader than foreign policy. It is more narrowly conceptualized, including an interest-based formulation of “means” and “ends,” but also includes a wider array of policy instruments (both military and non-military) capable of connecting seemingly separate foreign, defence, and security policies. Second, it also represents a more rare form of practice that – with its more stringent requirements for policy coherence, recognition of security threats, and an awareness of means and ends – not all countries are able to undertake or require. Third, there is also an implicit prescriptive element, given that a properly conceived grand strategy should, at least according to “realist”

\textsuperscript{124} Other second-order theoretical explanations used for foreign policy explanations include organization and bureaucratic theory, cybernetic theory, prospect theory, multiple advocacy, operational code, poliheuristics, decision-units, and group think.

\textsuperscript{125} For example, Posen and Ross label President Clinton’s grand strategy as “selective (but cooperative) primacy,” which might be a very good description of the administration’s foreign policy behaviour, but is lacking as an explanation for that behaviour. In the absence of more rigour, such a descriptive moniker can very quickly degenerate into a post hoc explanation that obscures more than it enlightens.
precepts that emphasize national interests and the prudent use of a state’s resources, also result in a successful set of policies.

Yet these characteristics simply mean that grand strategy constitutes a particular variant of a state’s behaviour, and one with which the Canadian foreign policy literature is not altogether unfamiliar. Ultimately, it would be imprudent to simply dismiss grand strategy as being too conceptually broad. Foreign policy is just as difficult to operationalize, and the same could very easily be said of the concept of power, despite its often privileged position within international relations.126 As long as sufficient attention is paid to questions of definition and identification, there is nothing inherently problematic about using a state’s grand strategy as the object of analysis. Moreover, my research has added a degree of specificity by focusing on the key trait – the balance of distance and proximity to the United States – that underpins Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy.

Instead of being reliant on descriptions or even a well-conceived typology, this study also focuses on providing an explanation for an identified grand strategy. With little preconceived notions on what should form this explanation, any number of theories designed to explain foreign policy may be used for this inquiry. This clear bent towards explaining strategic behaviour also minimizes the potential that a grand strategy description may be mistaken for a post hoc explanation. A typology, while perhaps still useful, should be more explicitly embedded within a framework that seeks to foremost explain and predict a state’s actual behaviour.127

126 This last point is noted in Haglund, “What good is strategic culture?” 479-502.
127 For a good example of this sort of analysis, see Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, Chp. 2.
Explaining Strategic Choice – Part I: Setting the Stage

If grand strategy is indeed a term that could describe Canadian behaviour, the subsequent step should be to search for explanations for a state’s strategic choice. This would help our understanding of why a state decided to pursue a particular grand strategy and what circumstances that could lead to changes to a strategy. Yet there is little agreement on the sources of strategic behaviour.

One approach, common amongst scholars wedded to post-behavioural notions of parsimony, is to place explanatory weight on the geopolitical environment – often defined in structural-material terms – as the key factor shaping a state’s grand strategy. This position is most clearly articulated in what Kenneth Waltz has famously labelled as “third-image” or “structural” realism. Structural or neo-realism, posits an anarchical system marked by the risk of violent inter-state conflict. Security is scarce, competition rampant, and states must rely on their own material capabilities for survival. The logic of anarchy creates a “selection effect,” based on a process of socialization and competition, that disciplines state behaviour to follow realist dictums (e.g., internal or external balancing) and creates costs to states that do not follow these prescriptions (e.g., lower survival rate). As a result, states become undifferentiated or alike in their respective functions, with the distribution of power being the only variable of any consequence. Anarchy and its many consequences (e.g., self-help behaviour, balance of

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128 For the seminal account of structural realism, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979). First-image theories place the explanatory onus on human nature, while second-image theories are based largely on state-level factors. For more on the three “images,” see Waltz, *Man, the State and War.*

129 This term is used in Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 151.
power dynamics) rather than Hans Morgenthau’s notion of *animus dominandi* become the central force guiding strategic behaviour amongst states.\(^{130}\)

Patrick Lennox offers a useful extension of Waltz’s approach, with particular applicability for smaller countries like Canada. He shows that the Canada-US relationship, marked by the disparity of material capabilities between the two countries, has elements of a hierarchical ordering principle. Structural specialization theory, as Lennox terms it, “proposes that hierarchical structures can and do form within the broader international anarchy, and that these structures have independent effects on the patterns of state behaviour.”\(^{131}\) Anarchy still exists, and may be especially acute when it involves matters of “high politics.” But with the existence of hierarchy with anarchy, it becomes necessary to assess the interplay of both anarchical and hierarchical determinants of state behaviour. Hierarchy also reverses Waltz’s dictum that states are functionally undifferentiated, as subordinate states are forced to adopt specialization in their foreign policy behaviour for survival – though he is much less convincing on the applicability of survival in the North American context.

To be sure, both Lennox and Waltz are also careful to distinguish their structural theories of international relations from a theory of foreign policy (or grand strategy). Lennox makes clear that hierarchy is only a “permissive or generative cause of” state behaviour, in this case specialization of “system-ameliorating tasks unsuited to great powers.”\(^{132}\) And according to Waltz, structure can explain “big, important, and enduring


\(^{131}\) See Lennox, *At Home and Abroad*, 5.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 11.
patterns”\(^{133}\) in international relations, but remains a more indeterminate explanation for actual state behaviour. Other non-structural, unit-level variables are required to explain state behaviour, as Waltz most clearly acknowledged early in his career: “So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system…that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two.”\(^{134}\) It is fair to say that this caveat continued to guide his later works, even if it was not so prominently displayed.\(^{135}\)

This differentiation between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy has not gone unchallenged. For example, according to some observers, structural realism contains implicit behavioural assumptions, and this can and should be extended towards the formulation of foreign policy hypotheses.\(^{136}\) James Fearon, in turn, states that the very subject of what structural realism purports to explain (e.g., balancing, disposition to competition) “is and should be states’ foreign policies and their consequences.”\(^{137}\) John Mearsheimer has perhaps offered the most forceful argument. Anarchy, according to “offensive realism,” constitutes a far more insecure condition that forces states to “look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”\(^{138}\) As a result, grand strategies are designed to achieve regional hegemony.\(^{139}\)

\(^{133}\) Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 58.
^{134}\) Waltz, Man, the State and War, 160. Also see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121-122.
^{135}\) This point has been reiterated by other realists. For instance, see Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity,” International Organization 44, 2 (1990): 137-168.
^{137}\) James Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, 1 (1998): 297. This point is also noted by Colin Dueck: “In practice, structural realism both requires and implies a theory of state behaviour.” Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 17.
^{139}\) Global pretensions of hegemony might eventually result, but this remains unlikely due to the “stopping power of water” and the absence of “clear-cut nuclear superiority.” Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 145.
Yet offensive realism carries certain obvious limitations as a theory of foreign policy. It is self-consciously developed as a theory to explain great power behaviour. For countries like Canada without “hegemonic potential,” behavioural expectations would be dramatically different – neither power maximization, nor the more modest defensive balancing of Waltz’s theory is a feasible strategic option. A more fundamental problem is its central theoretical premise that structural factors alone provide a sufficient explanation for strategic choice. Dueck calls this a “dubious theoretical assumption” and acknowledges that “domestic-level motives and intentions vary from state to state, and that such intentions often have a dramatic and independent impact upon foreign policy behaviour.”

As Thomas Christensen argues, a neglected component to the realist literature is the potential requirement for a state to mobilize the public behind a grand strategy, which can result in particularly aggressive or ideological strategies. Other scholars have emphasized the interplay between political groups and role of domestic political-military culture to explain less aggressive policies. Ultimately, domestic sources of grand strategy can constitute a wide range of different material and ideational factors, including domestic groups, social ideas, constitutional limitations, historical patterns of behaviour, and domestic political constraints.

Realism is not necessarily averse to or incapable of using domestic-level variables in its theoretical approach. “Classical realism” is concerned with identifying the bases of foreign policy, and has traditionally been open to including domestic and ideational

141 Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*.  
factors alongside that of power – whether this was John Herz’s advocacy of realist liberalism, E.H. Carr’s acceptance of elements of idealism, or even Morgenthau’s recognition on the moral limits of state behaviour. Classical accounts may be ill-suited to explain international political outcomes, as their emphasis on domestic-level variables leads to descriptive and “reductionist” forms of explanation. Yet as Waltz himself acknowledges, theories of foreign policy are required to explain how “the units of a system will respond to...[structural and systemic] pressures and possibilities.”

Many current “neo-classical realist” scholars have chosen to synthesize the insight of classical and structural approaches to explain particular foreign policy action. The neo-classical approach, while largely accepting the paramount importance of structural-material influence, has also incorporated domestic, cognitive, and ideational factors in explanations of grand strategy. Structure helps to shape the material contours of the wider geo-strategic environment, which pressures and encourages certain strategic choices. Domestic-level variables, in turn, better reflect the often complicated and constrained policy environment facing a state’s political leaders in formulating and implementing any grand strategy. Not surprisingly, one can situate a number of scholarly explanations for grand strategy within this canon.


147 See Colin Dueck’s *Reluctant Crusader*, Chp. 1; Christopher Layne’s *The Peace of Illusion*, Chp. 1; Thomas Christensen’s *Useful Adversaries*; and Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Changes in US Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq,” *Security Studies* 19 (2010): 26-65. One can also include Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” account of alliance formation, where he accepts
Criticism of neo-classical realism has been particularly vocal from scholars eager to delineate the proper scope of realism in order to protect their own theoretical spheres of inquiry. A particularly astute criticism is the failure of neo-classical realism to go beyond the confines of structural realist theory. Two astute observers, for instance, have noted that this theory only seeks to incorporate non-structural intervening factors in anomalous cases where there is a certain “lag” in systemic structural influence, which will ultimately have the “last word in determining the foreign policy of a state.” Others argue that neo-classical realism can be conceptualized as a natural and logical outgrowth of structural realism – a “theory of mistakes” that accepts domestic variables can help explain why some state behaviours diverge from the structural ideal, even if it also entails definite limits on how a country’s behaviour can depart from realist predictions.

Yet neo-classical realism, for all its faults, still provides at least a good starting point for a theory of foreign policy that could help explain Canada’s post-war strategic choices. Much like its structural predecessor, the theory offers a rigorous scientific approach to theory-building. Unlike structural realism, it also provides a useful reminder on the need to maintain a more holistic ontological perspective of reality, one capable of understanding the interplay between the international and domestic, the material and the ideational. It is also better suited for detailed and highly specified explanatory accounts of state behaviour – what Thomas Juneau has usefully termed “neo-classical realist strategic

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150 Quoted in Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” *Security Studies* 17, 2 (2008): 311. This at least raises the question of whether neo-classical realism, by incorporating other variables in order to explain away anomalies to structural realism, can be considered a “progressive” as opposed to “degenerative” theoretical turn – though Rathbun himself rejects such a conclusion.
analysis.” True, it does have a tendency to rely foremost on structural explanations, with domestic and ideational factors largely relegated as supplemental or residual variables to help explain behavioural anomalies. But it would still be premature to simply dismiss the theory as “structural realism in disguise.”

That being said, neo-classical realism could also benefit from being more open to the insights of other theoretical approaches, not all of which are necessarily wedded to structural or material explanations. Social constructivism, for instance, is concerned with the ontological substance of reality and sees the social world being largely ideational and intersubjective in nature. Many constructivists even accept that the social world has an “indeterminate” material element and have gone so far as to embrace a positivist epistemological lens. Alexander Wendt, for example, posits the existence of a material “corporate” identity for states, and remains an ardent proponent of a positivist “scientific realist” epistemology. Others have adopted an “epistemological affinity with pragmatism” and an attendant “commitment to the idea of social science.” True, some constructivists have a certain affinity to “idealist” or normative theorizing and advocate greater dialogue with critical theory or postmodernism. But as Theo Farrell warns, a

154 See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
more prudent approach might be to further engage in dialogue with classical and neo-
classical realism.157

On the other hand, neo-classical realists should remember that classic and
contemporary strategic thought has always been open to non-material and non-structural
factors. Carl von Clausewitz included five elements of strategy in his analysis, with the
moral element – the “intellectual and psychological qualities and influences” affecting
any engagement – being no less important than the others.158 Michael Howard later
identified four dimensions of strategy, and was not alone in placing a strong emphasis on
the social character of a nation.159 As Bernard Brodie once quipped, “Whether with
respect to arms control or otherwise, good strategy presumes good anthropology and
sociology.”160 Perhaps most comprehensively, Colin Gray introduces 17 dimensions
within a “whole house” of strategy, with this eclectic grouping including people, strategic
culture, societal institutions and domestic politics. As he concludes, the actual number of
dimensions is immaterial as long as “everything of importance is properly corralled.”161

To be sure, these strategists belong to the pre-behavioural methodological era, in
which positivism, scientific accuracy, and parsimonious precision are not necessarily
prioritized. In Gray’s words, “Strategy does not yield to the scientific method.”162 Or as
Hedley Bull would comment, “scientific rigour” in strategic studies “does less than

158 Gray, Modern Strategy, 23. The other factors are physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical.
160 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 332 (emphasis added). The remaining
factors included logistical, operational, and technological.
161 Gray, Modern Strategy, 24. The seventeen dimensions include: people, society, culture, politics,
economics, logistics, organization, military administration, information/intelligence, strategic
theory/doctrine, technology, military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary, and time.
justice to the classic tradition of strategic thinking." Structural realists, in contrast, prefer parsimonious and easily measurable structural explanations as part of their commitment to the behavioural revolution. But as neo-classical realists and constructivists have shown, it is possible to both adopt scientific methods and embrace a more holistic ontology. Neo-classical realists, notwithstanding some limitations, have ultimately been willing to incorporate domestic and ideational factors into their own analyses. Constructivism meanwhile represents a return to the classical approach and has done so on the structural realist’s own epistemological and methodological ground.

My research is well situated within the accepted ontological parameters of the wider “classical” strategic tradition, which despite some methodological shortcomings should not be casually dismissed. It also nicely corresponds to the wider trend within international relations theory, which has moved away from simplistic parsimonious explanations towards a holistic ontology and less parsimonious explanations. This research can be situated within the broad realist tradition and benefits from the insight of neo-classical realism, constructivism, and more classical approaches. It adopts a broad ontological perspective that is open to a variety of structural-material, domestic, and ideational variables, as favoured by the classical realist approach, and to balance it with the scientific rigour of neo-classical realists and moderate constructivists alike.

**Explaining Strategic Choice – Part II: The Promise of Strategic Culture**

Culture is identified by Colin Gray as one of his seventeen dimensions of strategy. If not quite contending for an “extraordinary” position within this grouping (as only

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politics, people and time do so\textsuperscript{164}, the importance of what has been termed “strategic culture” can be inferred by the frequency in which Gray and others have written on it. Strategists are also not alone in their scholarly interest of cultural matters. Culture may have been noticeably absent for much of the debate in international relations, but many within comparative politics have spent significant time and effort to understand the role of “political culture” – a concept that constitutes an important if often unrecognized conceptual predecessor to the current strategic culture literature.

One should also note that culture is no longer such a foreign concept within international relations itself. Constructivists, for example, have certainly broadened the scope of the field with their inquiry into the ideational, intersubjective nature of reality or the particular national “identity” of state actors and its role in producing state action. They have also not been averse to using more anthropological or sociological terms like culture. One of their seminal edited collections was the aptly named \textit{The Culture of National Security},\textsuperscript{165} which sought to inculcate greater attention to the cultural and institutional environments in security studies. Indeed, one of the contributors to this collection would go on to adopt a rigorous and explicitly scientific explanatory method that reignited the current debate on strategic culture, though not in the manner that some traditionalists would necessarily approve.\textsuperscript{166} Structural and neo-classical realists, if not quite embracing the independent explanatory power of cultural analysis, have at least conceded that culture is able to “supplement” if not “supplant” realism.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{164} See Gray, \textit{Modern Strategy}, 43.
\textsuperscript{166} See Johnston, \textit{Cultural Realism}.
realism, in particular, seems open to research collaboration with more positivist conceptions of strategic culture, especially “epiphenomenal” strategic culture where the goal is to illuminate the importance of cultural factors without necessarily supplanting material-structural conditions favoured by both (neo-)classical and structural realists.  

Strategic culture, with its historic lineage to political culture and a new following due to the “constructivist turn,” provides a useful way to tease out some of the nuances of Canadian grand strategy. To be sure, one should be cautious when approaching such a contested concept, lest an inadequate attention to conceptual and definitional clarity leads to a theoretically misinformed account. But with classical strategists, constructivists, neo-classical realists, and elements in the US defence community now using the concept, there does seem to be good grounds for adopting culture as an explanatory tool. The elastic nature of the concept, combining as it does ideational elements as well as material realities, has certainly been decried by positivists. Some have tried to better gauge its casual mechanism by redefining it solely as an ideational phenomena. Yet there are benefits to using this concept in a broad manner that is capable of subsuming a number of disparate elements.

Strategic culture may be formed from two very old, often misused and frequently ambiguous terms, namely “strategic” and “culture,” but it remains a relatively recent addition in the annals of strategic studies. The actual term was first introduced by Jack Snyder, who in a 1977 report to the RAND Corporation argued that particularly Soviet

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168 John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?” *International Studies Review* 11, 3 (2009): 523-551. The author goes on to identify four conceptions of strategic culture, with two (epiphenomenal and conventional constructivist) being suitable for significant research collaboration and the other two (post-structuralist and interpretivist) being more problematic.

169 This phrase is from Jeffrey Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, 2 (1998): 324-348.

170 On the last point, see Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” 5-6.
strategic thinking may result in different strategic behaviour. In other words, Soviet strategic culture can be used to explain the Soviet Union’s general proclivity towards unilateral approaches to damage limitation, particularly its emphasis on “unrestrained counterforce strikes” and active and passive defences. This “Soviet Strategic Man” is the result of a cultural socialization process among the Soviet national strategic elite, the members of which acquire through instruction or imitation “ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior.”171 Culture helps to explain why this strategic approach tends to persist in spite of environment shifts, though Snyder later acknowledges that such a “vague” concept should only be used in the “last resort”.172

Snyder’s concept of strategic culture certainly broke new ground in both its acceptance of a cultural propensity towards nuclear weapons and the delineation that culture was particular to a small elite community. The notion that ostensibly neutral strategic concepts could be infused with ethnocentrism and a penchant for “mirror-imaging” was a newfound concern in an American strategic community, even if there were historical antecedents.173 Michael Desch, in his useful critique of cultural approaches, points to the “national character studies” of Axis powers in the Second World War.174 Even “national role conceptions,”175 which were popular amongst foreign policy scholars in the 1970-80s, has some resemblance to strategic culture, though remaining far more generalizable in content. One should also add the concept of political culture, which examined collective psychological “orientations” with cognitive, affective,

171 Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, 38, 8.
174 Desch, “Cultural Clash,” 144-145.
and evaluative components and sought to challenge the formal legalism that had dominated political inquiry up until that point.\textsuperscript{176}

The similarity between political culture and strategic culture goes beyond simple semantics. Strategic culture can very well be termed an ideational “orientation” towards narrow strategic matters, as opposed to broad political issues. And Snyder’s emphasis on ideas and emotional disposition can potentially subsume political culture’s cognitive, affective, and evaluative components. Moreover, political culture has also been criticized as being an overly vague and even ethnocentric concept that should only be used if structural and institutional explanations have been ruled out.\textsuperscript{177} To be sure, there are differences between the two terms. Political culture has been conceived as an ideational element distinct from behaviour, while there is still debate whether strategic culture includes “patterns of behaviour” in its definition. But there is still good reason to consider strategic culture as the narrowly defined heir to the political culture – though some scholars like John Duffield apply the older concept to issue-areas that could be equally explained using strategic culture.\textsuperscript{178}

Strategic culture has found particular favour amongst scholars sceptical about the promise of a parsimonious structural realist theory and eager to “move away from a search for universal strategic idioms and towards cultural and strategic relativist

\textsuperscript{178} John Duffield applies political culture to help explain Germany’s national security policy. Yet his explanations for why strategic culture is not used – that it generally refers to military-related matters and is only concerned with the “cognitive aspects of culture” – ignores the rich content of grand strategy and the more expansive definitions available. See his “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” \textit{International Organization} 53, 3 (1999): 777.
approaches.” The burgeoning literature on strategic culture is certainly a testament to the scholarly spark provided by Snyder’s thoughtful piece, as is the vigorous debate on the nature of strategic culture that has been underway over the last few decades. Alastair Iain Johnston, a prominent if controversial proponent of strategic culture, has usefully identified three separate (if partially overlapping) generations of scholarship within the strategic culture literature – though this division was introduced in the mid-1990s and does not take into account possible shifts within the scholarship since that time.

The first-generation shared Snyder’s concern over nuclear matters, but sought to establish a more concrete relationship between strategic culture and nuclear weapons policy. Colin Gray understood strategic culture as constituting “modes of thought and action with respect to force,” deriving from the “perception of the national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterization...and from all the many distinctively American experiences...that characterize an American citizen.” Gray’s goal was to identify a particularly American “national style” on strategic nuclear matters, which was seen as being “astrategic” in nature. But his definition of strategic culture also differed from that of Snyder. For instance, he recognized that America’s national style is rooted in an older historical tradition, involving its origins as a country, as opposed to Snyder’s emphasis on recent Soviet history and civil-military relations. In addition, rather than putting emphasis on the culture of a national security elite, Gray posits that either “the

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180 See Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 32-64 and Johnston, Cultural Realism, Chp. 1. This three-fold division has been largely accepted by most other students of strategic culture. Michael Desch does, however, offer an alternative typology that divides cultural theorizing into three waves (Second World War, Cold War, and post-Cold War), and further divides it into specific issue-areas (organization, political, strategic, and global). See Desch, “Culture Clash,” 141-170.
public is a repository of strategic culture, or that the strategic decision makers and the public at large share a strategic culture.”

Gray was not alone in seeking to understand strategic culture within the first-generation context. Carnes Lord and David Jones, for instance, followed his lead in their own respective analyses of the American use of military force and Soviet strategic behaviour. But Gray’s work certainly embodied the general thrust of the first-generation, in so far as neither Lord nor Jones put forth different assumptions of what constitutes strategic culture – though Jones is more explicit in seeking to explain a broader array of actions beyond nuclear strategy.

Strategic culture remains a broad umbrella concept within the first-generation, incorporating as it does geography, ideology, political culture, socio-economic standing, ethno-cultural make-up, and patterns of behaviour. However, Johnston has been quick to criticize this amorphous definition. As an aggregated set of variables, it is both difficult to disentangle and potentially unfalsifiable. And by including behaviour as an element of culture, it becomes potentially tautological as well. He also criticizes the first-generation’s inability to accept more than one strategic culture and its “sweepingly simple conclusion that there is one US strategic culture” that leads to only one type of behaviour.

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184 See Jones, “Soviet Strategic Culture,”
186 Ibid., 8.
The second-generation of scholarship, which offered a highly critical and even Gramscian-based analysis of strategic culture, is perhaps most notable for emphasizing the potential instrumentality of culture. According to Bradley Klein, strategic culture is better viewed as a form of “cultural hegemony,” whereby an American strategic elite propagates a declaratory nuclear doctrine based on mutually assured destruction (MAD) in order to culturally justify an operational “war-fighting” policy. However, such scholars also embody the central problem of the second-generation approach – that elites can be socialized in and even constrained by their own instrumentally disseminated strategic cultures.

The third-generation of strategic culture scholars emerged in the 1990s, and proved to be quite vigorous not only in their respective theoretical approaches, but also in their willingness to expand upon the previous generations. While following on the cultural turn of its predecessors, it has often opted against explicitly using strategic culture in its analysis. Instead, scholars tended to focus on more narrowly conceived and carefully operationalized cultural variables, often rooted in more recent historical experience than that offered by first-generation scholars, and without including behaviour as part of their definition of culture. The latter point is especially important, as culture can thereby be identified as having an independent and non-tautological causal impact on state behaviour. Elizabeth Kier, for example, examines the interplay between the beliefs of civilian elites and the military’s organizational culture in the formulation of military

188 This generation coincided with the constructivist challenge to realism in international relations. As Jeffrey Lantis notes, the constructivism brought renewed attention to the question of “identity formation,” which involved a number of elements inherent within strategic culture, including “organizational process, history, tradition, and culture.” Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Strategic Insights 4, 10 (2005): 1-15.
doctrine. Other scholars, heeding the warning of the second-generation on instrumental declaratory doctrines, are more explicit in illustrating that their dependent variable is indeed state behaviour rather than doctrine. Jeffrey Legro, for instance, looks at the respective cultures of military bureaucracies – their “collective philosophies of war fighting” – to help explain the varying levels of adversarial cooperation in the Second World War. Thomas Berger meanwhile focuses on the anti-militarist political-military cultures of Germany and Japan to explain their own restrained post-war behaviour.

Alastair Iain Johnston, while certainly fulsome in his praise towards the advances of the third-generation, also recognizes its conceptual and methodological weaknesses. For instance, the narrower and less historically grounded definitions of culture make it both closer in content to “belief-systems analysis” and more difficult to compare attendant research outcomes with first- and second-generation scholarship. The definition of culture itself suffers from an additional flaw – by only delimiting options for decision-makers, the third-generation requires other intervening cultural or non-cultural variables to explain actual decisions, which raises further questions on the extent to which individuals are socialized within the dominant cultural trend. Johnston’s own research seeks to fill these problematic gaps in third-generation scholarship. Not surprisingly, this involves a carefully delineated argument on the explanatory power of strategic culture, as opposed to the eclectic types of cultures examined in the third-generation, with the term strategic culture carrying far deeper historical roots more similar to the first-generation.

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191 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. Berger is not listed as a third-generation scholar by Johnston, as his research only appeared after Johnston introduced his typology. But his work does feature many similarities to third-generation research.
192 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 20-21.
than the third. As such, it is certainly curious that Johnston is often grouped in the third-generation, when it is in fact perhaps closer to a *sui generis* example of a fourth-generation of scholarship.\(^{193}\)

Johnston has clearly offered the most theoretically rigorous and methodologically precise definition of strategic culture, which borrowing from elements of Geertz’s widely cited definition of religion consists of “an integrated system of symbols…that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs.”\(^{194}\) This definition not only directly associates strategic culture with grand strategy behaviour, but is also careful to delineate strategic culture as constituting only ideational causal variables (e.g., a set of symbols). Johnston is also careful to specify “strategic-culture objects” such as texts, documents, doctrines, over which a scholar can perform content analysis to assess the grand strategy preferences embedded in these cultural artefacts.

Johnston’s methodology, for all its admirable sophistication, has proven to be controversial. As he himself notes, content analysis of strategic-culture objects should begin “at the earliest point in history,”\(^{195}\) which explains the unusual approach of focusing his study on the strategic culture and grand strategy of the Ming dynasty. The attendant difficulty and debatable relevance to the current policies of states likely explain why so few scholars have chosen to follow his lead. One can certainly concede that the separation between strategic culture and behaviour makes any notion of cultural causality

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\(^{193}\) For example, Jeffrey Lantis refers to Johnston’s book *Cultural Realism* as being “often cited as the quintessential third generation work on strategic culture,” though he also notes that it contains “unconventional research approaches”. Lantis, “Strategic Culture”. In contrast, Stuart Poore has noted Johnston’s identification of a third-generation of scholarship without necessarily placing Johnston within this grouping. See Poore, “Strategic Culture,” 57-62.

\(^{194}\) Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, 36.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 40.
far more robust. But it has also been vehemently questioned by a number of scholars eager to demonstrate that this approach, while methodologically unassailable, remains fundamentally problematic as a research approach to strategic culture.

Colin Gray, for example, has criticized Johnston’s methodological distinction between culture and behaviour as contradictory from both a standard linguistic perspective and more sophisticated sociological definitions. As Colin Gray bluntly remarks, Johnston’s approach “contains errors of a kind that... are apt to send followers into an intellectual wasteland.”\textsuperscript{196} Instead, Gray offers what he terms a “strategic culture as context” approach, in which culture is “both a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour.”\textsuperscript{197} The mutually-constitutive relationship between strategic culture and behaviour does carry some methodological limitations. This fact is clearly recognized by Gray, who displays a remarkably interpretive strain in his argument for “understanding” rather than strictly “explaining” strategic behaviour through the strategic cultural lens.\textsuperscript{198} It is, however, precisely this interpretive understanding of methodology that Johnston questions in his rebuttal. Rather than accepting this divide between understanding and explaining, it is his contention that descriptive understanding entails an implicit explanation. As he goes on to point out, any recognition that behaviour can be triggered by other factors – as Gray implicitly accepts – requires a methodology that can accept the possibility that culture does not matter.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{196} See Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 51.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{198} The distinction between explanation and interpretation, which Gray and others invoke, is in reference to Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
\textsuperscript{199} Johnston, “Strategic cultures revisited,” 519-523.
But despite the cogency of his response, this methodological and inter-generational debate between Gray and Johnston appears to have resulted in little actual conclusion. On one hand, Gray appears to have effectively dismissed these methodological differences as being inconsequential; and partly under his leadership, a number of strategic culture studies have been commissioned by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency.\textsuperscript{200} On the other hand, strategic culture has increasingly been discussed on a trans-national basis with regard to the European Union, thanks in large part to the 2003 European Union Security Strategy that explicitly advocated the construction of a European-wide strategic culture.\textsuperscript{201} In both cases, the theoretical content and scope of strategic culture appears to have been minimized in favour of practical, methodologically agnostic, and policy-driven analysis. There has been more theoretically-driven analysis over strategic culture, but this case appears to represent an even more fundamental rejection of positivist methods than offered by Gray – an ideational and interpretivist perspective that accepts “context all the way down.”\textsuperscript{202}

An alternative account seeks to bridge the gulf between Gray and Johnston. This approach, largely advocated by Canadian scholars of strategic culture, remains deeply sympathetic to Gray’s criticism of Johnston’s “overtly positivist” methodological approach. As Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal note, the distinction between culture and behaviour is both “inconsistent” with ordinary definition of culture and fails to recognize the difficulty of separating “ideational factors from behaviour” in a world

\textsuperscript{200} See Gray, “Out of the Wilderness,” 9. The Defence Threat Reduction Agency has commissioned a number of essays to formulate a Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum, with the goal to assess its applicability to WMD decision-making.


“so inherently complex.” There is also recognition that more can be done than simply interpretive description of strategic culture. This might not entail forthright agreement on the scientific and causal methods offered by Johnston, but a disagreement on these methods does not necessarily entail a consequent rejection of a positivist epistemology and an embrace of interpretivism.

Strategic culture is, according to this definition, more similar to the first-generation than either the third-generation or Johnston own particular view, in so far as it subsumes “habits of ideas, attitudes, and norms toward strategic issues, and patterns of strategic behaviour.” But Johnston’s positivist epistemological aspirations are not necessarily discarded, though some of their more stringent methodological requirements are relaxed. To do so, they adopt the concept of “explicative understanding,” which accepts that the gulf between “understanding” or interpreting reality through use of description and scientifically “explaining” reality through notions of causality – embodied as it is by Gray and Johnston, respectively – as being overdrawn. This approach recognizes that understanding is actually a “prerequisite” for causal explanations and acknowledges that social scientific explanations often consist “in such interpretations of the raw material of their research.” Explanations are still possible in social scientific inquiry, but they are more contingent and “peculiar” in character.

That being said, strategic culture still has important limits as a tool to garner scientifically valid explanatory inferences. As Christopher Twomey has argued, strategic

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203 Bloomfield and Nossal, “Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture,” 287.
204 Ibid., 288 (emphasis added).
205 Ibid., 286-307. Also see Haglund, “What good is strategic culture?” 489.
206 George Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 135, 134. The author rejects a sharp methodological and epistemological divide in the “explanation-understanding controversy,” and instead posits that the central issue is the ontological character of their objects – namely, whether the object is intentional or non-intentional.
culture often lacks the specificity required for use as causal variables, pays insufficient attention on how policy-makers actually choose amongst multiple cultural inclinations, and by seeking to explain actual behaviour as opposed to preferences or interests, makes an intellectual leap from belief to behaviour with insufficient attention on the domestic policy process itself.\textsuperscript{207} Explicative understanding may be a worthwhile goal, but it cannot obscure the fact that analysis is often far more successful at descriptive understanding rather than explicative explanation.\textsuperscript{208}

**Strategic Culture and Cybernetic Theory**

To rectify some of the shortcomings of previous accounts of strategic culture, my study will make two noteworthy changes to the analytical concept. First, it will achieve further “empirical accuracy”\textsuperscript{209} by identifying two competing strategic subcultures – Conservative Continentalism and Liberal Independence – and further conceptualizing them through the use of a continuum of varying predispositions and behavioural inclinations. This means that ideas and attitudes toward strategic issues, rather than being reliant on largely descriptive taxonomy, can be examined on a single continuum. Strategic inclinations, which this author uses in place of “norms,” will be identified and plotted along this continuum. This term reflects both the content of the behaviour in question and the fact that norms regulate a state’s behaviour by providing “motivation and energy for action.”\textsuperscript{210} But it is also being more open to unrealized or hypothetical

\textsuperscript{207} Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security,” 338-357.

\textsuperscript{208} For good examples of more descriptively-oriented accounts of strategic culture, see Nossal and Bloomfield, “Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture,” 286-307; and Massie, “Making sense,” 625-645.

\textsuperscript{209} Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture,”353.

\textsuperscript{210} Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 82.
inclinations that might be embedded in society but are not evident in actual behaviour, which permits greater differentiation between culture, as an explanation, and the strategic behaviour being explained. In this case, the most important strategic issue by far is the Canada-US relationship. As such, the continuum encompasses the strategic inclinations that underpin the country’s adaptive behaviour and push it towards closer proximity or greater distance towards the United States.

As a result, this study avoids reifying the descriptive categories of a country’s strategic culture and accepts the possibility that supposedly dichotomous strategic subcultures themselves might in fact be different more in degree than kind. Indeed, a strategic culture continuum will also help to show not only that the strategic inclinations embedded in a country’s strategic subcultures might themselves vary, but that some inclinations are more salient within a polity than others. Strategic culture can still be usefully divided into overarching categories (e.g., Conservative Continentalism, Liberal Independence) in order to make a more direct link with the traditional literature that still prefers a descriptive taxonomy. But by also conceptualizing strategic culture as a continuum, one can better identify the whole range of norms and behavioural inclinations that exist within the confines of the two strategic subcultures, which better reflects the “plethora of different national cultural themes that compete and interact throughout different elements of society.”

Second, my study has adopted elements of cybernetic theory into its explanatory framework. On one hand, cybernetics offers a novel way to illustrate how strategic inclinations within a country’s strategic culture are selected, standardized, and processed in a complex policy-making environment. As mentioned earlier, a strategic culture

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continuum involves plotting ideas, attitudes, and attendant behavioural inclinations towards strategic issues. This involves an implicit assessment of key national interests, which provides an important element of context to the goal or value that is being pursued by a cybernetic organization within the rubric of survival. As Robin Marra reminds us, “Survival can and does encompass many different dimensions, e.g., national survival, political survival, fiscal survival, survival in a bureaucratic sense,” and one can certainly add culturally-derived notions of survival to this list.212

Meanwhile, the related notion of “patterns of strategic behaviour,”213 which has caused so much consternation amongst positivist students of strategic culture, can be usefully conceptualized within a cybernetic frame of reference as Standing Operational Doctrines. It should be noted that patterns of behaviour should not be confused with behaviour itself, as that would clearly violate the social scientific requirement that independent and dependent variables be separated in order for a hypothesized causal relationship to exist and tautology to be avoided. The emphasis should instead be placed on the notion of “patterns,” which refers to the fact that how one has previously acted (the pattern) has an effect on current behaviour. The related concept of “doctrine,” by referring to an ideational-heuristic roadmap that is explicitly meant to guide action and can therefore subsume norms and other behavioural inclinations, nicely encapsulates this pattern effect. It remains an ideational factor, which helps to avoid the above mentioned fallacy. But doctrine is also very closely related to previous behaviour, in so far as historic behaviour is in fact implemented doctrines.

213 Nossal and Bloomfield, “Towards an *Explicative Understanding* of Strategic Culture,” 288.
A cybernetic organization implements SODs in order to achieve a minimally-articulated notion of survival, as informed by a country’s strategic culture. Any given SOD is rooted in past behaviour and remains “in the doctrinal repertoire of an organization so long as its operational record remains – or appears to remain – failure-free.”\textsuperscript{214} In a complex and fragmented organization, SODs create some basic unity amongst the competing coalitions of actors involved in the country’s foreign, defence, and security policies. This conceptual distinction between a strategic culture continuum and culturally-derived SODs also helps to disentangle potentially problematic elements of strategic culture, while keeping intact what makes the concept so useful and interesting. As a result, a greater degree of specificity is gained and the possibility of a tautological explanation is minimized. Moreover, given that cybernetic behaviour tends towards incrementalism within a narrow range of policy choices, it also helps to explain why certain SODs are at play in a polity and others are not.

This study seeks to explicate a better understanding of both Canadian strategic culture and its attendant grand strategy behaviour. Grand strategy offers a promising description for Canada’s particular approach to security and strategic matters. Strategic culture – when framed, disciplined, and operationalized through a cybernetic prism – offers a useful explanation of the country’s strategic adaptation over the post-war period, especially given that it corresponds nicely to the holistic ontological approach being advocated by an eclectic group of neo-classical realists, constructivists, and classical strategists. Indeed, methodological qualms on the utility of an existing concept like strategic culture can be seen not as a reason to dismiss or ignore it, but rather as a \textit{raison d’être} to better refine it with further analysis.

\textsuperscript{214} Ross, \textit{In the Interests of Peace}, 31.
CHAPTER THREE – A CULTURAL-CYBERNETIC MODEL OF CANADA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Canadian policy-makers in the post-war period have pursued a goldilocks grand strategy, the core of which involves the adept balancing of proximity and distance towards the United States that helps to maintain security and sovereignty. It is marked by a remarkable degree of policy continuity and patterned consistency, in which policy changes reflect modest adaptations to the external environment. This description of Canadian behaviour – strategic, patterned, adaptive, constant, and successful – is a departure from the standard accounts of Canadian foreign policy. Canada can be considered a *middle power* with the potential (often unrealized) for strategic action; it can also be considered a *principal power* with the capacity for independent action; and on many issues, it also embodies the type of consistency most evident in *peripheral dependence*. The literature is able to offer models and descriptions that capture different aspects of Canadian behaviour.\(^{215}\) But no existing single description, let alone explanation, is entirely in accordance with the breadth of Canada’s strategic policies.

By incorporating a structured combination of elements of these behavioural models, this study is able to provide a more complex and accurate description of Canada’s historical and contemporary strategic behaviour. It will examine the goldilocks grand strategy using selected cases of Canadian behaviour, and show how this behaviour is both effective and balanced – a point that much of the literature overlooks. Canada’s geo-strategic position in North America, largely defined by the disparity of power between itself and the United States, reflects the structural context for this strategy.

\(^{215}\) For a good overview of these different models/descriptions, see Michael Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, Or Satellite: Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, 1984).
However, cultural beliefs and cybernetic processes provide the central explanation for its strategic behaviour. Simply put, the cultural-cybernetic model offers a theoretically-informed portrait of Canada’s policy-making process, with conclusions that are more consistent with the patterned behaviour evidenced in this country’s policies. This interpretation also provides a nuanced explanatory framework capable of linking and distinguishing among different levels-of-analysis, including individual/societal (cultural beliefs), domestic/state (cybernetic processes) and international (structure). While more complex than the explanations often used in the literature, this model also provides a novel, accurate, and theoretically innovative account of Canadian strategic behaviour – and a predictive guide on the future directions of its goldilocks grand strategy.

The chapter offers a conceptual overview of the study’s explanatory framework. The first section examines the underlying geo-strategic and structural context that helps to shape Canada’s strategic culture and offers a useful historical-empirical sketch of the country’s pre-war strategic behaviour. The second section elucidates the cultural-cybernetic sources of Canadian grand strategy. It conceptualizes Canada’s strategic cultures as a continuum and shows how embedded cultural inclinations provide the substance for the Standing Operational Doctrines that dominate its policy responses. Together, this synthesis will help to explain why policy-makers adopt certain strategic doctrines, but not others, and why Canada pursues a goldilocks grand strategy that is marked by continuity, consistency and modestly adaptive behaviour. The chapter concludes with the elucidation of the particular methodological tools that will guide how this model is explored in its case studies.
Canada in North America: Geopolitical and Structural Reality

Senator Raoul Dandurand observed in 1924 that Canadians “lived in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials.” Dandurand’s comments, while exaggerated and premature, contain an important element of geopolitical truth – Canada does have the good fortune of being protected by oceans on its east and west coasts, shielded by inhospitable terrain and the Arctic Ocean to the north, and little to fear from the only country with which it shares a land frontier. This oceanic barrier between North America and Eurasia, backed by America’s sheer hemispheric dominance, has done much to alleviate the security imperative for Canadian foreign and defence policy. It should therefore come as little surprise that the strategist R. J. Sutherland once called geography the most important “invariant” in Canada’s strategic situation, while F. R. Scott notes that relations with the United States “itself determines Canadian foreign policy more than any other factor.”

True, Canada has its own share of geographic vulnerabilities. With the world’s second largest land-area, longest coastline, and a relatively small population, Canada remains an exceedingly difficult territory to demonstrate sovereign control, let alone defend against external threats. In the words of Denis Stairs, Canada is a “polity composed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living in a space too large, with a topography too varied.” It is not without reason that Canadian history has

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been described as a matter of “defending the indefensible.”219 Meanwhile, changes in technology, notably the advent of bombers and ballistic/cruise missiles, have only further limited the protection afforded by these oceanic barriers.

In the words of John Holmes, Canada “grew up in traction” between two great powers.220 As difficult as this balancing act has been, it did result in one important benefit – Canada never had to deal with these vulnerabilities alone. As a colony and later dominion of Great Britain, Canada was able rely on British military largesse to defend its territory. The military fortifications interspersed across Canada’s vaunted “undefended border” with the United States are a testament to this fact.221 British imperial troops were only withdrawn following the passage of the British North America Act (1867), in recognition of the difficulty of defending Canadian territory against America’s sizable military power. The Treaty of Washington (1871) then put an end to lingering Anglo-American hostility and signalled America’s acceptance of the “barrier to Manifest Destiny…represented by the transcontinental Dominion.”222

Great Britain continued to guard the maritime approaches to North America with a small military presence in Halifax and Esquimalt until 1906, which carried “an implicit promise of help in the case of an attack.”223 And even this tentative guarantee would come to an end when the Second World War forced the United States to take full

responsibility for hemispheric defence. Canada would then find itself perhaps inevitably
drawn towards America’s geo-strategic orbit. To be sure, Canada lacked both the
“constitutional connection” to its new superpower patron and was too small to shore up
the American “strategic or political position among the great powers.” Yet the United
States remained “bound to defend Canada from external aggression almost regardless of
whether or not Canadians wish to be defended” – an involuntary security guarantee
that greatly alleviated Canada’s own sense of insecurity and to this day allows it to
minimize its resource allocations to national defence and security.

Of course, this ubiquitous American presence further accentuates Canada’s sense
of geographic isolation. As Kim Richard Nossal usefully reminds us, “[t]he other states
contiguous to Canada are neighbours in name only.” More importantly, it also
stimulates an attendant concern that, in extreme situations, the US could move towards
the unilateral implementation of its own security measures. This does not mean that the
United States actually represents a military threat, with such assertions more often made
in reference to Canadian autonomy, values, and identity than national security. But it
does mean that Ottawa would be unable to prevent or even mitigate American
infringement of Canadian sovereignty. While not beholden to the traditional security
dilemmas that plague other countries in less hospital environments, Canada was faced
with an acute and no less problematic “sovereignty dilemma” or “double security

224 Robert Bothwell, “Foreign Affairs a Hundred Years On,” in Canada Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of
Canadian Foreign Policy, : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 26. Early hints of this shift can be seen in the interwar period, when Canada was
clearly wary of British efforts to strengthen imperial defence and, like its southern neighbour, sought to
preserve a sense of limited liability.
225 Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 202.
226 Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 29
227 For instance, see Roger Swanson, “The United States as a National Security Threat to Canada,” Behind
dilemma,” in which what secondary powers “might gain at the start in security, they
forfeit ultimately in sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{228}

This Canadian dilemma has at various times strained the relationship between the
two countries. It has, however, also stimulated the development of what has since become
a core principle in how Canada responds to US security concerns – in order to avoid
“unwanted” help from its American neighbour, Canada could not become a “strategic
liability to the United States through military weakness or otherwise.”\textsuperscript{229} Yet the notion
of an American security guarantee to its neighbour is certainly not a new one. It was even
raised by Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who once quipped to Lord Dundonald in
1902 that “the Monroe Doctrine protects us against enemy aggression.”\textsuperscript{230} The exact
beginning of this guarantee is more debatable. Some go as far back as the Rush-Bagot
Treaty (1817) that helped to demilitarize the Great Lakes.\textsuperscript{231} However, this ignores the
fact that the United States was still more of a military threat than a security guarantor
before the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{232} Indeed, bilateral relations only improved after the “slate
cleaning” period at the turn of the century, which involved diplomatic negotiations and
technical arbitrations that culminated in the International Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{228} Roussel, \textit{The North American Democratic Peace}, 2. The notion of a “sovereignty dilemma” is raised in
\textsuperscript{229} Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, “Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-US Security Relations,”
\textit{American Review of Canadian Studies} 38, 1 (2008): 64.
\textsuperscript{230} Quoted in Brebner, \textit{North Atlantic Triangle}, 277.
\textsuperscript{231} Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 202.
\textsuperscript{232} One can note the numerous times in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century in which the United States posed a
significant \textit{military} threat to British North America and later Canadian territory, as demonstrated by
invasions (1775-76, 1812-14), Anglo-American crises during the Civil War (1861-65), cross-border raids
by groups from both sides (1837, 1864, 1866), and the US attempts at coercive diplomacy during the
Venezuelan crisis (1895-96), and Alaska Panhandle boundary dispute (1903). See Brebner, \textit{North Atlantic
\textsuperscript{233} J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, \textit{For Better or for Worse: Canadian-American Relations: The
Promise and the Challenge} (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 40. Also see Brebner, \textit{North Atlantic
Triangle}, 272-273.
It would be a mistake to assume that the principles that guide Canada-US geo-strategic relations today can be readily used to explain Canada’s early strategic behaviour. But one can discern early elements in how Ottawa interacts and deals with the United States during these formative years. For instance, Canada showed itself very careful to forestall domestic turmoil that could lead to a military intervention or the deployment of so-called “police forces” by the United States. This concern led to the Wolseley Expedition to re-establish order on Métis territory in the Red River (1870), the creation of the North West Mounted Police for the Northwest Territories (1873), and the Yukon Field Force that was deployed amidst the gold rush in the Yukon (1898).\textsuperscript{234} It also provides an early hint of the central principle underlying Ørvik’s notion of defence against help – “the need to manage Canadian security problems that might affect America’s security, thereby depriving the latter with a pretext for intervention.”\textsuperscript{235}

The full exposition of this geopolitical principle would only be made through an exchange of comments by Canadian and American leaders in the interwar period. The United States, concerned with the Japanese challenge in the Pacific, was the first to raise the subject. President Franklin Roosevelt gave a speech in Quebec City on 31 July 1936 that spoke of America being a “good neighbour,”\textsuperscript{236} which was followed on 14 August at Chautauqua, New York, where he reminded potential adversaries that “we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighbourhood.” This message was forcefully repeated in a speech on 18 August 1938 in Kingston, Ontario, where he pledged that the “people of the United States will not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened


\textsuperscript{235} Roussel, \textit{The North American Democratic Peace}, 113.

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 165.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King was not unaware of the dilapidated conditions of Canadian defences, as this issue was brought to his attention in a 1936 report by Colonel H. D. G. Crerar and resulted in his decision to approve a modest Canadian military build-up. He offered his assurance two days later at Woodbridge, Ontario that the government was “putting our own means of defence in order,” and that “enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory.” Michel Fortmann and David Haglund refer to this security bargain as the “Kingston Dispensation,” which provides “the normative core of Canadian-American defence and security cooperation” that still governs geo-strategic relations between both countries to this day.

The Kingston dispensation would find further expression in the Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 August 1940. Announced in an informal press released by both political leaders, this agreement nonetheless heralded the beginnings of the Canada-US security alliance. With this agreement, both countries formed the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), an advisory board made up of military and diplomatic personnel from both countries that considered continental defence matters. This was followed in 1941 by the Hyde Park Declaration that entailed the integration of the war industries of both countries. Defence cooperation had become increasingly institutionalized, though Canada would adroitly avoid placing its military forces under American command in all but the

239 Perras, Franklin Roosevelt, 44.
most extreme circumstances.²⁴¹ Yet these agreements marked the high point in Canada’s access to Washington for the duration of the war. With its entry as a direct participant in the conflict, the United States shifted its attention to two trans-oceanic military campaigns in Europe and the Pacific, and its attentiveness to Canadian concerns declined as a result.²⁴² As R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein conclude, “From being a vital link in the defence of the hemisphere in 1940-41, Canada had become a mere appendage of limited importance.”²⁴³ Officials in Ottawa were clearly not caught unaware of this possibility, with Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson advising the prime minister in 1941 that “Americans are once more viewing Canadian questions in a more modest and more nearly domestic perspective.”²⁴⁴

In geopolitical terms, Canada is first and foremost a country defined by its relationship with the United States and location in North America. Canada has a special place as among the oldest ally of the Americans, with a unique role in the homeland defence of the continental United States itself.²⁴⁵ That being said, an argument can be made that Canada’s is more properly placed within the wider trans-Atlantic geopolitical region. This idea was perhaps best formulated in John Bartlet Brebner’s classic work on

²⁴¹ Canada accepted American “strategic direction” of its military forces in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan—1940, which was drafted as a contingency in the event of British defeat and a subsequent Axis invasion of North America. It would, however, refuse similar command and control arrangements for Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), which was a contingency plan in the event that Britain survived and the United States became involved in the conflict alongside its Commonwealth allies.

²⁴² Canada’s declining influence can be contrasted to the First World War, when the Canadian Prime Minister sat along the five British Cabinet Ministers and other Dominion Prime Ministers in the Imperial War Cabinet. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 280

²⁴³ R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: Hakkert, 1975), 104

²⁴⁴ Quoted in Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 14.

the *North Atlantic Triangle*, with Great Britain and the United States playing the part of the two much larger angles within an isosceles triangle. It was more recently extended by David Haglund as the crux of Canada’s grand strategy, with Western Europe since replacing Great Britain within the isosceles and NATO providing a more concrete expression of the triangle.246

It is undoubtedly true that Canada’s geo-strategic position does have something of a trans-Atlantic flavour to it. After all, while geographically located in North America, Canada was a former colony (and later Dominion) of Great Britain and only achieved its autonomy with the Statute of Westminster in 1931. But it is much more debatable whether the North Atlantic Triangle or trans-Atlanticism actually represents an accurate gauge of Canada’s post-war position. First, irrespective of the importance of its trans-oceanic ties, Canada clearly places priority on its role in North America. Second, it ignores the degree to which the Canadian internationalism has been shaped by its continental position, whether as a means to maximize our international effect by leveraging this unique continental relationship, differentiate ourselves through the use of a “strategy of specialization,” or provide a semblance of a “counterweight” to the United States.247 As Joel Sokolsky notes, “[t]he reality of geopolitics is that bilateral security relations with the United States do not end at the North American strategic perimeter.”248

Two structural characteristics of Canada-US geo-strategic relations stand out. While not necessarily as invariant or “unchanging” as geography, these material factors

are a resilient part of the North American geopolitical landscape over the last several decades. First, there is the massive disparity in material capabilities between both countries. The United States remains a continental-sized superpower, with roughly ten times the number of people as Canada since the 1950; an economy that is roughly thirteen times the size of the Canadian economy; and most notably, military spending that is up to thirty times higher than that of Canada. This material disparity is also clearly evident in how much each country spends in securing the North American continent, with the US paying for roughly 84 percent of NORAD’s budget and staffing 94 percent of its personnel.\(^{249}\) In that respect, one can reasonably conclude that some hierarchical principles do indeed play a role in the geo-strategic environment of North America.

The second structural characteristic, which at times balances and other times reinforces these hierarchical tendencies, can be termed “complex interdependence.” The Canada-US border, for instance, has $500 billion in trade flowing across the border each year, which “represents approximately 80 percent of Canada’s exports and two-thirds of its imports.”\(^{250}\) The United States might not be as vulnerable to or dependent on the Canadian market, which gives it a degree of “structural power” in the relationship.\(^{251}\) But it certainly remains highly sensitive to the flow of commerce with a county that is its “largest trading partner” and represents both the “leading market for 38 American states” and a larger one than all 27 European Union countries.\(^{252}\) And overlaying this economic

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\(^{250}\) Lennox, *At Home and Abroad*, 5


interdependence is the high degree of convergent interests and values, a shared diplomatic culture against the use of “coercive issue linkages,” and a high level of institutionalized cooperation between the countries, which has certainly done much to mitigate the continental power disparity. As Brian Bow goes on to note, if the United States “is not willing and/or not able to make linkages...then the overall asymmetry of the [Canada-US] relationship matters less.”

This section has elucidated the basic contours of Canada’s geopolitical and structural reality: geographic isolation from Eurasia; security guarantee from the US; concern over sovereignty protection; political inclination for internationalism abroad; and the interplay between hierarchy and complex interdependence. Canada might have lingering concerns over unwanted help from the United States, but this should not obscure the extent to which Canada operates in a largely benign security environment. Other countries may indeed have their policy choices limited by what Christopher Twomey has called the “crucible of conflict,” in which the possibility of conflict makes “material factors heavier and more focused” and cultural and domestic factors less salient. In North America, however, given the absence of a harsh strategic reality, one can better observe the cultural and cybernetic determinants of behaviour. Importantly, by not directly challenging the role of structural-material factors more broadly, this case can be considered complementary rather than competitive to traditional realist accounts. It also complements more sophisticated constructivist accounts that acknowledge that this


culture dimension cannot necessarily be separated from more concrete “political-strategic” or “trade-commercial” dimensions.\(^{255}\)

To put it simply, this geopolitical-structural environment can be usefully viewed as a contextual or “operational milieu” for Canadian decision-makers. It does not necessarily determine or cause a state’s strategic behaviour, but it can constrain Canada’s policy options and compel Ottawa “to make significant decisions and choices” in its foreign, defence, and security policies.\(^{256}\) As Colin Gray explains, geopolitical factors “limit the likely success of certain Canadian policies” and “provide reactions or feedback that may prove decisive in the charting of future policy courses,” but do not “determine” the “direction of Canadian defence and foreign policies.”\(^{257}\)

**Culture and Cybernetics: Towards an Explanatory Framework**

Canada’s politico-military strategy was largely forged in the violent crucible of the Second World War. In a remarkable testament to its resilience, it has survived relatively unscathed from the many challenges, crises, and pitfalls of the post-war period. Its legacy in the form of the Canada-US security alliance remains to this day “the cornerstone of post-war Canadian defence policy.” But as was hinted earlier, there was also a second inheritance that proved more troublesome, if not exactly dangerous in a military sense. Sutherland goes on to describe it as “the Canadian aversion to the

\(^{256}\) Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence*, 138.
\(^{257}\) Gray, *Canadian Defence Priorities*, 19.
presence of American forces in Canada and extreme sensitivity to the potential
derogation of Canadian sovereignty.”

Canada certainly had good reason to be concerned with America’s military presence. The United States was undertaking projects such as the North-West Staging Route, the Alcan Highway, and Canol project, all of which led to a presence that included more than 30,000 US Army personnel (and up to 43,000 if one includes civilians) by mid-1943. Indeed, the Canadian government was initially unaware of this significant American presence in its sparsely populated northern territory, at least until British High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald warned of these “colossal” projects and the attendant “Army of Occupation” – an undiplomatic term that was revealingly used by the US army itself.\(^{259}\) This presence was only a temporary aberration, but sovereignty concerns would continue to linger in the Canadian consciousness, even as renewed security concerns arising from the Soviet Union and the threat posed by bombers and ballistic missiles led to numerous bilateral air defence and radar projects.

This perennial Canadian concern over security and sovereignty nicely illustrates the two central objectives that policy-makers have sought to pursue, even as it encapsulates the potential trade-offs inherent within a “double security dilemma.” As one scholar wisely notes, “the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat but the United States was the immediate danger.”\(^{260}\) Canada is centrally concerned with minimizing the potential trade-offs between security and sovereignty, which requires a careful balancing act in how it responds and adapts to US strategic preferences. Simply put, Ottawa’s effort to

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\(^{258}\) R. J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in *The Arctic Frontier*, ed. R. St. J. Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1966), 261.

\(^{259}\) Grant, *Sovereignty or Security?* Chp. 5.

achieve proximity with the United States must be matched by commensurate moves to maintain a semblance of distance. As Shelagh Grant reminds us, security and sovereignty reflect “two sides of the debate involved in the search for a compromise that would provide maximum security with minimal loss of sovereignty.”

The cultural-cybernetic model provides a domestic-level explanation for this defining behavioural trait in Canadian grand strategy. Canada’s two strategic subcultures provide overarching categories that encapsulates the beliefs and attitudes that underpin these behavioural inclinations. When conceptualized as a continuum of different predispositions and inclinations, these ideational factors help to inform a cybernetic process by which the Canadian policy-makers rely on pre-programmed and heuristic SODs – derived from and inextricably linked to Canadian strategic culture in the form of patterns of behaviour – in a minimally-purposeful and adaptive manner. The two dominant doctrines, termed continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism, provide the basic parameters of the goldilocks strategy that allows it to keep security-sovereignty values within a tolerable range.

Canadian Strategic Culture: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Strategic Inclinations

As noted earlier, Canada’s geo-strategic position in North America remains too indeterminate and ill-suited to serve as a direct cause of its behaviour. But geopolitics has certainly helped to give shape to those different cultural attitudes and beliefs on strategic issues that permeates Canadian society. These are in turn reflected in both the central debates over the country’s strategic role and the security policies implemented by successive governments. While a national society-wide phenomenon, Canada’s strategic

261 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? xvi.
culture is inextricably linked to elites of its so-called “strategic community.”” As Beatrice Heuser notes, policy-makers “carry within themselves all these [broad cultural] ideas, convictions, beliefs and points of reference.” Indeed, both of Canada’s two strategic subcultures not only have distinct interpretations of geopolitical reality, but also sharply different answers to how Canada can and should relate to the United States.

On one hand, Conservative Continentalism reflects the positive attitude that historically developed in Canada towards the United States. North America might have previously been a “zone of peace,” but there was little normative affinity between the two countries. This subculture is therefore a product of the twentieth century, and harkens back to the interwar “doctrine of the two spheres” that distinguished the “morally righteous New World from a debased Old one.” This state of “peaceful coexistence” has developed the normative affinity, mutual identification, and shared threat perception that mark a “security community.” This subculture, however, also reflects a deeper identification with the United States that verges on being a transnational collective identity. As David Haglund notes, the Canadian reaction to the 9/11 attacks displayed all “the hallmarks of in-group solidarity at a moment of crisis.”

Canada also closely identified with the British Empire as both a colonial appendage and later Dominion. Indeed, Canada adapted to both Great Britain and the United States as its great power patrons in the immediate aftermath of the Second World

War, though the latter soon came to dominate Canada’s strategic attention. It is also clearly related to what Kim Richard Nossal has termed the “defence of the realm” – that curious Canadian tendency to have an expansive and flexible definition of what needs to be defended beyond the country’s immediate territory, whether this is in the form of an Anglosphere or a North Atlantic community.  

However, there is no doubt that Canada’s collective identification or “we-ness” with the Americans remains *sui generis*. Canada and the US might have pursued different paths towards independence, but both share a liberal democratic approach to domestic governance, an Anglo-Saxon heritage based on a common ancestry, and a shared sense of belonging that has at the very least facilitated a very strong “in-group” dynamic within North America. This affinity has only been magnified by the growth of cultural, economic, and family ties that join the two countries together and mitigate the more severe implications of structural hierarchy. True, this undoubtedly raises the possibility that the US might use such interdependence as a tool of influence and even coercion. However, the existence of a shared diplomatic culture that proscribes such action, while perhaps not as salient as it once had been, still plays an important role in reassuring the smaller partner.

This subculture entails a relatively benign, even familial attitude towards the United States. Canada might have little choice other than to accept its geopolitical destiny in North America, but this subculture also recognizes the fortunate happenstance and indeed privilege of being situated next to an exceedingly friendly and generous

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268 See Bow, *The Politics of Linkage*, Chp. 1. Bow argues that this culture has declined in importance since the 1970s as a result of the fractured American policy-making process, even if this trend also opened up the US policy-making process to pro-Canada elements and facilitated institutional integration.
superpower. As then Minister of External Affairs Louis St. Laurent noted in his 1947 Gray Lecture, which presciently laid down key foreign policy principles, Canada and the United States were “like farmers whose lands have a common concession line...settling, from day to day, questions that arise between us without dignifying the process by the word ‘policy.’” To be sure, it also reflects only a “relatively” benign attitude, as this subculture does implicitly warn that a refusal to be closely aligned to the United States on certain key issues could result in potential consequences – these can range from possible economic retaliation to a reduced Canadian voice on bilateral matters of importance.

St. Laurent would go on to admonish his audience on the need for “constant watchfulness” and “imaginative attention” on this relationship. Yet this warning was normatively framed as a matter of Canada’s obligation to “accept our responsibility as a North American nation.” As such, it becomes our failure to be a good ally, rather than fickleness or impatience of our powerful neighbour, which is ultimately to blame for any negative American reaction.

Continentalism propagates the belief that Canada’s foremost concern should be its strategic relationship with the United States. Other interests exist and undoubtedly will be pursued, but preference should always be given to relations with our superpower patron. Simply put, the United States is too important an ally to let other concerns risk a significant rupture in the relationship. This is partly the result of a generally pessimistic view of Canada’s ability, in the absence of American cooperation, to unilaterally

270 For instance, J. L. Granatstein warned of possible American retaliation as a result of Canadian refusal to join the “coalition of the willing” against Saddam’s Iraq. See his “Empire Strikes Back,” National Post, 26 March 2003, A15.
safeguard its territory and populace and have a significant voice on the international stage. Equally, it is underpinned by the belief that most of Canada’s political and economic interests, whether conceived narrowly as economic trade or in a broader “imaginative-generative” sense,272 can only be achieved through its relationship with the United States.

This subculture has a relatively optimistic view of Canada’s position in North America, with security being plentiful and sovereignty concerns largely unfounded or at the least exaggerated. Political control over Canadian territory might be modestly curtailed, but the potential benefits arising from closer Canada-US alignment, such as having greater say on issues that might affect the country, are seen to easily outweigh such inconveniences.273 In sum, the subculture essentially agrees with the notion, once said by head of the American Section of the PJBD Fiorello LaGuadia, that “it is far better to trust to the honour of the United States, than to the mercy of the enemy.”274

Not surprisingly, the strategic inclinations encapsulated within this subculture are primarily directed at facilitating more expansive cooperation and integration with the United States.275 Perhaps the most robust expression of this integrationist impulse can be found in the discussions over the idea of a “grand bargain” after 9/11, in which Canada would trade significant defence integration and border security harmonization with the Americans in return for secure access to US markets. Notably, arguments for this sort of

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273 Massie, “Canada’s (In)dependence,” 493-516
274 Quoted in Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt,* 81.
275 Other prescribed types of behaviours are also associated with this subculture, most notably the inclination for greater commitments and quiet diplomacy. However, it is this norm for expansive bilateralism that best reflects the Continentalist inclinations for proximity with the Americans.
strategic integration, both expansive and deep, have so far failed to gain much traction.\textsuperscript{276} However, proposals for more modest forms of “sectoral” integration have proven to be a resilient part of the strategic debate in this country, whether in the form of missile defence cooperation, maritime and land force integration, or a limited continental security perimeter. That being said, Canada has historically preferred looser bilateral arrangements with the United States. NORAD is still largely limited to a narrow issue-areas (e.g., air defence, early warning), while most movement towards expanding NORAD responsibilities to include missile defence or maritime and land forces have proven half-hearted at best. Indeed, Canada has often found itself keen to balance existing bilateral ties with other multilateral arrangements. Continentalism is not necessarily adverse to such linkages, though it lacks the balancing or counterweights rationales for them and is inclined to embrace those, such as NATO, that incorporate and facilitate closer strategic relations with the United States.

On the other hand, \textit{Liberal Independence} is representative of Canada’s relative isolation within the confines of North America. The often overwhelming American presence, magnified by the rapid growth of unequal economic linkages in the post-war period, has no doubt fostered a certain amount of concern and even distrust towards our ally, which is similar in kind if not degree to the Dominion’s pre-war discomfort towards Great Britain. This has its origins in the often turbulent early history between Canada and the United States, when fears of manifest destiny – whether conceived as military

encroachment or an inevitable union – dominated Canadian strategic concerns. Even today, the thought that the Canadian “mouse” could be easily crushed by the American “elephant,” by unwanted help or economic retaliation, has continued to linger.277

It is hard to deny the close cultural affinity that exists between Canada and the United States or the rapid growth of economic ties that culminated with the addition of Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994). The Independentist subculture does not deny the existence of these material facts, but offers an alternative interpretation of such a reality. While a transnational collective identity might result in “we-ness” and “in-group solidarity” with the Americans, it also generates a more suspicious attitude that can be usefully described as counter-hegemonic or unabashedly nationalist in nature. Canada should care much more about its own interests than the United States, in so far as too close an affiliation with the US would inevitably distort the country’s defence and security policies. In some sense, this reaction shows that collective identities can be held hostage to what Sigmund Freud has termed the “narcissism of minor differences.”278

Meanwhile, the growth of economic ties is viewed not as an unalloyed benefit arising from Canadian geography, but rather as further evidence of American economic encroachment that should be avoided if possible. At the very least, it makes Canada more vulnerable to economic retaliation and linkage politics from the United States.279 At its most extreme, it is seen to curtail the country’s foreign policy autonomy, which raises

278 Haglund, “And the Beat Goes On,” 356
279 Brian Bow, “Rethinking ‘Retaliation’ in Canada-US Relations,” 63-82.
questions of whether the country gained independence from Great Britain only to become a “satellite” of the United States.\footnote{Kenneth McNaught, “From Colony to Satellite,” in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? ed. Stephen Clarkson (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart [for the University League for Social Reform], 1968), 173-183.} Fears that Canada was seduced by the American economic market into selling its foreign policy and economic “soul,” while particularly acute in the 1960s, has proven very difficult to shake.

The Liberal Independence subculture does not necessarily entail hostility, as there is undoubtedly a degree of neighbourliness in Canada-US relations that counterbalances any lingering sense of historic grievance. But it does involve a very strong awareness of the power imbalance that marks the Canada-US relationship, which no recent history of cooperation can ever truly mask.\footnote{It is for good reason that Richard Preston labeled the Canadian identity as being “troubled,” marked by a friendly and familial “long peace” that is balanced by the numerous conflicts and crises that marked the historic Canada-US relationship. See Richard Preston, “Two Centuries in the Shadow of Behemoth: The Effect on the Canadian Psyche,” International Journal 31, 3 (1975-76): 413-433.} As such, the general attitude of the Independentist subculture can be best described as suspicious towards closer alignment, which would only give the US additional leverage and means to pressure Canada.

This subculture believes that the best way to avoid consequences of this power imbalance, not to mention the possibility of economic coercion, is to keep the United States at a distance. As such, the tighter embrace prescribed by the Continentalism would only be self-defeating. Canada should not necessarily discard its relationship with the United States altogether, but it would only be one among a diverse array of interests, some of which could take precedence. Canada’s ability to take an independent stand apart from our superpower patron, to pursue its own interests irrespective how it might affect its relationship with the Americans, and to tell our ally “when their breath is bad,”\footnote{Holmes, Life with Uncle, 137} all are founded on a generally optimistic view of Canada’s material capability to undertake
independent action. Canada is neither dependent on American largesse in North America, nor unable to have influence in the international sphere without the US at our side.

True, the Independentist subculture shares with Continentalism the belief that security is abundant within North America. It is, however, more sceptical of the role of the Canada-US alliance in underpinning this situation, even as it is much more optimistic that security is prevalent (if not exactly plentiful) outside of North America. In any event, it retains a high degree of confidence in Canada’s ability to navigate whatever security challenges might arise, and do so without relying on the United States. At the same time, despite this general optimism, this subculture retains a very strong “realist” caution in its assessment of Canada’s relationship with America, and is considerably less sanguine or cavalier on the possible consequences that a close alignment might have on Canadian sovereignty and policy autonomy.

The strategic inclinations embedded within this subculture are geared towards maximizing the distance between Canada and the United States. It entails at least an element of what can be best described as isolationism or non-alignment, in so far as this subculture is inclined to minimize those international commitments that could possibly infringe on Canadian independence. On that level, it certainly harkens back to the interwar period, when Canada joined with the United States in avoiding substantive commitments to the League of Nations. In its more recent formulation, Liberal Independence is more often equated with Thomas Hockin’s notion of voluntarism, which

283 This isolationist sentiment is perhaps most commonly associated with Mackenzie King’s chief foreign policy advisor of the pre-war period O. D. Skelton. This might appear a curious placement, given that Skelton was a strong supporter of relations with the United States. However, Skelton’s views also took place during the interwar period, when isolationism was largely directed at Great Britain and can be described as anti-imperial (and perhaps anti-British) in nature. For more on Skelton’s views, see Norman Hillmer, “O. D. Skelton and the North American Mind,” International Journal 60, 1 (2004-2005): 93-110.
refers to Canada’s patient effort to “supplement, even transform, balance-of-power politics” by its commitment to multilateralism.\textsuperscript{284} As St. Laurent once said, it has never been Canada’s opinion that the “continent could live unto itself,” nor could “regionalism of any kind...provide the answer to problems of world security.”\textsuperscript{285} The arguments for a counterweight are perhaps most clearly made with reference to NATO. As a Minister of National Defence reportedly quipped, “with fifteen people in the bed you are less likely to get raped!”\textsuperscript{286} A more idealist argument, which sees the Atlantic Alliance as a symptom of rather than a constraint on American hegemony, emphasizes the role of the United Nations. Unlike NATO, the UN is seen to represent an organization that embodies the opinion of the international community and is less beholden to or dependent on the United States.

That being said, proponents of this argument rarely specify the process by which organizations like NATO or the UN can actually offset American preponderance. Despite hopes of Canadian policy-makers like Escott Reid, NATO never did develop into the sort of broader political and economic “community” that could provide institutional constraint on the United States.\textsuperscript{287} Meanwhile, the United Nations remains an even more problematic avenue for Canada to maximize distance and thereby independence from the Americans. Canada’s historic role as a UN peacekeeper might seem to presage just such as option, but it remains to be seen whether such a change in direction would actually


\textsuperscript{285} St. Laurent, “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs.”

\textsuperscript{286} Quoted in Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 207.

\textsuperscript{287} Instead, Canada had to settle for largely rhetorical commitment to such “imaginative-generative” goals through Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. See David Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the co-operative security alliance,” \textit{International Journal} 52, 3 (1997): 464-482.
entail an increase in independence, or more likely represent an illusionary facade under which Canada could further reduce its international commitments.

It is clear that multilateral inclinations have often been expressed more in terms of rhetoric commitments than substantive arrangements – an “illusion of independence” that would shatter if Canada ever did “break more forcefully with the direction of American foreign policy.” In that sense, the Independentist subculture is inclined not only towards substantive multilateralism, but also to a form of “dishonest multilateralism” that ignores the deficiencies of such measures, often relies on them to avoid significant international contributions altogether, and exhibits the “uninspiring purpose of seeing how low Canadian expenditures on international affairs can be kept without forfeiting Canada’s position in international forums.” This can even entail a penchant for a form of unilateralism or even isolationism under the rhetorical guise of multilateralism.

Table 3.1 summarizes the major attitudes, beliefs, and strategic inclinations that help to distinguish the Continentalist and Independentist subcultures. To be sure, the intensity to which actors might hold these attitudes and beliefs does significantly vary, which in turn has an effect on the actual norms and behavioural inclinations that may be evident within the two subcultures.

290 See Douglas Ross, “Canada's functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction,” International Journal 54, 1 (1998-9): 120-142. In some ways, this harkens back to Canadian isolationist grand strategy during the interwar period, when Canada was part of various international agreements but was keen to use them as a means to minimize Canadian commitments abroad.
Table 3.1 – Attitudes/Beliefs/Inclinations of Canada’s Strategic Subcultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premise</th>
<th>Continentalism</th>
<th>Independentist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Central geopolitical-structural influence</td>
<td>complex interdependence</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nature of Canadian identity</td>
<td>continental, collective</td>
<td>nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. General attitude to the United States</td>
<td>positive/familial, relatively benign</td>
<td>suspicious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How “special” is the Canadian-American relationship</td>
<td>distinct from other state-to-state relations</td>
<td>operates under the same rules as other state-to-state relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Importance of Canada-US alliance</td>
<td>vital interest</td>
<td>other interests are equally as important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Canada’s capacity for independent action</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Possibility of US coercion?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Best way for Canada to prevent coercion</td>
<td>proximity, closer alignment</td>
<td>distance, unaligned approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Importance of security</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Importance of sovereignty</td>
<td>low to medium</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Canada-US integration?</td>
<td>Yes; advocacy for strategic and sectoral integration, e.g., missile defence, binational integration; general cooperation and interoperability</td>
<td>No; integration should be minimized or avoided altogether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Multilateral arrangements?</td>
<td>Ok, if necessary; preference for alliances; are considered secondary to Canada-US relations</td>
<td>Yes; advocacy for multilateral arrangements (UN, NATO) over Canada-US alliance; a tendency for rhetorical commitments as much as substantive ones; military alliances are ok, if necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A similar dichotomy was used by Justin Massie in the form of Canada’s two external identities, as a sovereign state and a reliable neighbour of the US, which according to Massie are located in the country’s strategic culture of “continental soft-balancing.” Of course, this raises questions on whether other strategic cultures or subcultures can be properly identified in the Canadian context. After all, while introducing a conception of a strategic culture that is capable of incorporating the continental-independence division, Massie also introduces two other strategic cultures that are seen to be in competition and helps to explain Canada’s “irrational” strategic approach: soft-balancing atlanticism and defensive internationalism.291 Massie is also not alone in differentiating between Canada’s penchant for internationalism – as a member in a number of multilateral institutions and forums – and its proclivity to have an Europeanist or trans-Atlantic identity.292

These two additional impulses identified by Massie and others are no doubt important factors underpinning Canadian foreign policy, particularly its commitment to the United Nations and NATO. But it would also be imprudent to separate and isolate these strategic inclinations as distinct cultures apart from the more fundamental continental-independence imperative. In so doing, it obscures the extent to which Canada’s role as an internationalist middle power and NATO member are in fact underpinned by the desire to achieve a semblance of “independence” from the United States, whether by pressing for a functional principle that helps to distinguish it on the international stage or by involving other countries in a multilateral alliance to serve as a counterweight. This study will therefore conceptualize these internationalist and

atlanticist impulses, not as distinct strategic cultures, but rather as behavioural
inclinations rooted in particular variations on the Independentist subculture’s need to
maintain distance from the Americans.

That being said, one can also posit the existence of distinct regional strategic
culture(s) that exists below the level of the state and can have an independent effect on
the country’s strategic policies, with Quebec being the most likely case. But this notion
of distinct regional strategic cultures is plagued by an unclear mechanism in how these
cultures can actually affect policy and, more importantly, an exaggerated sense of
difference from the country’s wider cultural inclinations. Rather than complicating the
analysis with the addition of regional cultures, this study posits that any regional
differences will be small and can be subsumed within Canadian strategic culture.

Lastly, the continental-independence divide within Canadian strategic culture
bears more than a passing resemblance to the debate between quiet diplomacy and the
independent approach. Quiet diplomacy, centrally concerned with leveraging Canada’s
“special relationship” with the United States and keen to avoid public disagreement,
clearly reflects elements within Conservative Continentalism. The independent
approach, suspicious of quiet diplomacy and keen to loosen ties with the US, can also be

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293 This is certainly hinted in J. L. Granatstein’s notion that Quebec, with its pacifist, anti-militarist, and
dovish inclinations, has distorted Canadian foreign policy since the late 1960s. See Granatstein, Whose War
Is It? Chp. 6.
294 For example, the notion of “two solitudes” has since been replaced by a notable trend towards “strategic
convergence” between French and English communities on key defence and security issues, which raises
questions of whether regional strategic cultures can be usefully disentangled from national ones. Roussel
295 See Clarkson, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?
296 Peter Lyon, “Quiet Diplomacy Revisited,” in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? ed. Stephen
Clarkson (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart [for the University League for Social Reform],
1968), 29-41.
compared to some of the more ambitious ideas within Liberal Independence. As Adam Chapnick coyly observed, the dichotomy captured in this exchange has been “notable not so much for having enriched the debate as for having changed it.” And it has done much to illustrate a fundamental feature that underpins Canada’s approach to strategic affairs – the tension in how to best position Canada in relation to the United States. It has since reappeared in the writings of other astute commentators: former diplomat Allan Gotlieb’s realist-romanticist division; Justin Massie’s remedialist debate over “choice”; Erika Simpson’s use of Defenders and Critics of nuclear weapons; and Michael Tucker’s division between “activist” and “conservative” tendencies in arms control.

To be sure, elements of this debate can be detected in this study’s conception of Continental and Independentist subcultures. But it would also be a mistake to assume that this study can be equated or reduced to this earlier work. The identification of cultural tendencies within a broader cybernetic framework promises greater analytical substance that can go beyond prescriptive advocacy. Meanwhile, quiet diplomacy and independence themselves represent a dichotomy that “compressed and simplified a much more subtly varied landscape of ideas.” In contrast, this study avoids this problem by plotting the

297 See Stephen Clarkson, “The Choice to be Made” in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? ed. Stephen Clarkson (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart [for the University League for Social Reform], 1968). Elements of the independence approach are also reflected in the views of Jamie Minifie and John Warcock.


predispositions and inclinations along a continuum, which can illustrate the full range of policy responses at play and debated in the Canadian polity.

Standing Operational Doctrines in the Canadian Policy-making Process

Canada’s two strategic subcultures display a significant amount of variation based on the relative intensity of these attitudes and beliefs. For example, the Continentalist attitude of familial trust towards the United States can conceivably range from mild affection to a level of attachment in which Canadian and American interests are virtually indistinguishable. The Independentist subculture, in turn, can range from cautious detachment from the United States to a degree of suspicion that can only be described as anti-American. In their more modest formulations, the differences between the two subcultures are more in degree than in kind, though this divide in extremis can reflect different and indeed polar opposite ways of relating to the United States.

Beliefs are certainly closely related to attitudes, in so far as the intensity of the general attitude of attachment or disenchantment with the Americans would likely be strongly correlated to the relative strength of many beliefs concerning the United States – the relative importance of relations with our ally, the belief in the feasibility and benefits of pursuing a more unaligned approach, etc. Yet the relationship between these two factors, while undoubtedly very close, retains some amount of attenuation. For example, beliefs can involve strategic calculations that complement certain attitudes towards the United States, but cannot be broken down or simplified as reflecting such attitudes.

For the sake of analytical simplicity, however, these two ideational factors will be collapsed into an overarching conceptual category. After all, beliefs and attitudes are
clearly related to one another, albeit not perfectly, while the most important elements of both – attitudinal predisposition towards the US and relative importance of Canada-US relations – can together be distinguished across the two subcultures according to their relative intensity. This also allows for the conceptual re-imagining and further operationalization of strategic culture as a continuum of Canada’s basic and varying predispositions towards being an ally of the US. To achieve a modicum of parsimony, this study will gauge the intensity of this predisposition based on the degree to which relations with the US are prioritized. This belief seems to best encapsulate the strategic cultural element in how Canada relates to the United States, while reflecting core national interests that are more closely related to behavioural inclinations than attitude alone.

Strategic culture is not simply reflective of the attitude and beliefs that underpin a country’s conception of interests; it is also equally about those strategic inclinations that lead directly towards certain types of strategic behaviour. While inextricably tied to Canada’s general predisposition towards the United States, behavioural inclinations actually prescribe actual types of behaviour for the country to follow, while proscribing others. By providing ideational guidance on a country’s actions, these ideational factors represent more concrete and self-contained constructs that can be differentiated more in kind than degree. As such, rather than simplifying them based on their degree of intensity, these inclinations can be identified and plotted along a Continental-Independence continuum (see Figure 3.1).
Some of these inclinations, generally located in the middle goldilocks range of the spectrum, are clearly on display in the country’s strategic policy debate and its grand strategy. Others, however, are at best unrealized inclinations that can only be logically-derived or identified in the country’s debate over foreign policy, whether discussed as policy options by academics or included in political party platforms. True, some more modest elements may go beyond simple debate to percolate into Canadian policies; for example, the degree of integration undoubtedly evident in the binational cooperation and military interoperability between both countries, and the hints of non-alignment in Canada’s participation in the United Nations. As a whole, however, these more extreme inclinations have never been featured as feasible options in Canada’s policy process.
Clearly, Canada’s strategic culture is broader than its grand strategy, encompassing as it does a wider spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and inclinations on strategic issues than is actually expressed in its foreign, defence, and security policies. And elements of both subcultures, reflecting contrary inclinations towards proximity and distance with the Americans, are certainly means to help solve Canada’s fundamental dilemma of achieving security and maintaining sovereignty. David Haglund calls this the “iron law” in Canadian politics – a requirement to “avoid drawing ‘too close’ to the United States,” while always ensuring “that relations between the two countries are never allowed to deteriorate to such a degree that Canada’s prosperity and survival might be placed in jeopardy by American wrath.”301 Yet it is equally important to discover the process by which Canadian political leaders, who have rarely been seen as strategically astute or even rational, have come to follow this iron law.

The goldilocks strategy reflects those inclinations in the continuum’s mid-range. It does not stray too far in either direction of the spectrum, and is therefore representative of either shifts between subcultures or alternatively the incorporation of elements of both cultural inclinations. Whatever interpretation one uses, it is clear that a key part of the story is explaining why certain inclinations are reflected in behaviour and others are for the most part hypothetical. To call it an iron law or raise the attendant concern of security and sovereignty, as accurate as these descriptions and suppositions may be, does not constitute an explanation for Canadian strategic behaviour.

Yet strategic culture alone remains too broad to go beyond mere descriptive or heuristic forms of explanation to account for and make predictions about Canada’s strategic choices. As noted by Colin Dueck, strategic culture “at the national level tends

to act as a constraint, and a filter, rather than a determinant ‘cause’ of grand strategy in and of itself.”

To add greater specificity to the analysis and to show how strategic culture is actually processed in a policy-making environment, this study combines elements of cybernetic theory with strategic culture – a cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour. Fortunately, by reconceptualising strategic culture as a continuum consisting of a spectrum of varying predispositions and inclinations, cultural factors become amenable to be processed and operationalized within a cybernetic process.

Canada’s traditional interest in security and sovereignty can be conceptualized as the central values being maintained and balanced in the cybernetic process. Importantly, such an approach also has an important and highly beneficial consequence – it nicely avoids the risk of either being drawn into financially exorbitant American defence projects or being solely responsible for the expensive costs associated with Canadian defence and sovereignty missions. Limited liability may not be as prevalent a condition as it was in the pre-war period, but neither is it an inconsiderable factor.

Clearly, the ideal balance for the values is situated in the goldilocks range of this Continental-Independence continuum of strategic inclinations. On one hand, Canada’s willingness to be closely aligned to the United States, while certainly required to ensure security, may prove detrimental to Canadian sovereignty if taken to its extreme. Strategic or even further sectoral integration inevitably raises the spectre of American infringement on Canada’s territorial control and sovereign autonomy, and creates an image of subservience to its much larger neighbour. But security may itself become endangered, particularly if such a close association helps to generate and magnify external threats or results in an involuntary Canadian commitment to US policies. The latter point has been

302 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 36.
especially salient, as can be seen in Ottawa’s long-standing insistence on maintaining command over any military deployments, and a similar concern certainly animates Canadian suspicions over missile defence and further defence integration.

On the other hand, an attempt to achieve some semblance of non-alignment either alone or through the prioritization of NATO or the United Nations would prove equally harmful. Canada has long relied upon its close defence relations with the United States to provide more security than it was capable of achieving alone, and any effort to maximize distance from the Americans could leave the country quite vulnerable to whatever security threats emerge in the future. Equally, Ottawa would likely have to work twice as hard to satisfy American security concerns. The need for defence against help may no longer be as salient in today’s geo-strategic environment. But Canadian officials would do well to remember the benefits of having a “friendly agreement in advance” with the United States, lest they be forced to take unilateral action that would threaten Canadian sovereignty and in extremis economic security. Moreover, with its highly favourable burden-sharing arrangements, Canada’s partnership with the United States has surely alleviated the financial and material cost of maintaining sovereignty over this large and sparsely populated territory.

Importantly, a cybernetic process keeps these security-sovereignty values in a state of balance that minimizes potential trade-offs between them, and does so through a

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304 The term “friendly agreement in advance” was reportedly used by President Roosevelt in talks with Great Britain concerning American access to bases in British imperial West Indian territories. While noting that it was the US preference to have such an agreement, there was also an implicit threat that the US would – if deemed necessary – take the territories in any event. This warning was relayed to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who had at first balked at the idea of American access of bases in Newfoundland. See Perras, Franklin Roosevelt, 76.
process marked by minimal or bounded rationality. Behaviour is minimally-purposeful and heavily incremental, therefore being more in accordance to the philosophical approach of an “engineer,” to use Denis Stairs’ term.\textsuperscript{305} Cybernetic behaviour is also based on routines that, with their degree of concreteness and coherency, can be conceptualized as Standing Operational Doctrines, so-called because SODs represent distinct and self-contained heuristic frameworks for strategic action geared towards keeping this value within the confines of its tolerance range. While reflecting ideal types of behaviour, Canada’s actual strategic behaviour and security policies do follow the basic dictums expressed by two SODs, with any policy shifts between them done in a cybernetic pattern. It is through this process that strategic inclinations in the middle of the spectrum become realized, while others at the margin do not.

Continental soft-bandwagoning, which serves as the default doctrine in the Canadian policy repertoire, is primarily meant to ensure the continued existence of a close relationship with the United States. This doctrine has its origins in the security bargain struck at Kingston and Ogdensburg and is extremely receptive to close bilateral cooperation with the US – a clear example of a “bandwagoning” rather than balancing approach to the Americans. It also places relatively greater weight on national security requirements over political interest in ensuring sovereignty. Indeed, it demands such cooperation not only as an action that is normatively valued, in so far as it fulfils that internal need to be a good neighbour to our ally, but also as a necessary requirement to achieve both goals. This does not mean that absent such cooperation, Canadian security

\textsuperscript{305} Engineers are concerned with “installing bridges of standard design over rivers that almost anyone in power would have had to cross.” Denis Stairs, “Architects or Engineers? The Conservatives and Foreign Policy,” in \textit{Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93}, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2001): 27.
would be immediately endangered or its sovereignty revoked. But it does mean that Canadian security and sovereignty would be more difficult and costly to achieve alone and more at risk of occasionally being trammelled by our American ally.

Multilateral alliances and institutions are not necessarily arrangements to be avoided, especially given the strong sense of internationalism that the Americans have displayed throughout the post-war period. But the UN and even NATO, rather than substitutes to Canada’s relationship with the US, are instead largely used to supplement and reinforce the alliance. Indeed, any move to prioritize these institutions at the expense of this continental relationship would be difficult and unwise. After all, with Canadian independence from Great Britain ensured by the 1931 Statute of Westminster and the latter’s subsequent decline, Canada lost what was arguably its only true counterweight to American continental preponderance in the post-war period. As such, while policymakers may flirt with the idea that multilateral organizations could serve as a possible replacement, nothing more serious is likely to result. This SOD is therefore geared towards accepting multilateral arrangements that are complementary to this continental relationship, and reject those that might work at cross-purposes.

However, unlike the more extreme Continentalist inclination towards unmitigated cooperation, continental soft-bandwagoning is not necessarily dismissive of the challenges that could be posed by extreme proximity. Stronger cooperation, as worthwhile as such a goal may be, must be tempered with some degree of prudence, lest the Canadian mouse find itself accidentally tied to the elephant’s foot. In that sense, while this SOD might be associated with what can be considered bandwagoning behaviour, it

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clearly can be considered “soft” or moderately distant in nature. As such, it embodies that particularly Canadian penchant for defence against help. In other words, bilateral cooperation might be embraced, but not necessarily at the expense of the sort of security and sovereign protection that such cooperation is meant to guarantee. Some forms of cooperation are clearly within the acceptable range, while others are considered beyond the purview of the Canada-US alliance, at least as it is presently conceived.

The central criterion for accepting some forms of cooperation and rejecting others is a relatively simple one, as befitting a cybernetic policy-making process. Cybernetic theory, for instance, does posit a simplified process in which only a few critical environmental variables are monitored and assessed according to their ability to push the value beyond its tolerance point. In the Canadian case, the environmental factor that can unbalance and create trade-offs between the security-sovereignty values centres primarily on American strategic preferences, as reflected in those initiatives, projects, or trends that often emanate from Washington. Canada rarely takes the initiative on such matters, often preferring to instead follow its larger and more senior partner. While the United States rarely offers an open invitation, there is equally very little doubt when it does want a partner to join it, either to participate, endorse, or simply acquiesce in a politico-security initiative.

Four criteria are used to judge whether the critical variable would endanger security and sovereignty, with the first two creating the conditions necessary for a US initiative to require a Canadian response and the latter two forming the basis for how Canada responds to the Americans. First, Canada’s participation, endorsement or acquiescence in any initiative must be valued, if not absolutely required, by the
Americans. Otherwise, there would be little incentive for or pressure on Canada and therefore little environmental stress to cause much trade-off between security and sovereignty. Second, the initiative in question must on some level be considered a strategic priority by the United States. This primarily stems from the understanding that Canada has much greater freedom of action on those initiatives that Washington has minimal or half-hearted interest in pursuing. Ultimately, if an initiative is low in priority, there would be few consequences to either Canadian security or sovereignty in rejecting American overtures – environmental pressure would be reduced.

Third, the initiative must be underpinned by a particular American threat perception that is significantly different, in degree as well as possibly in kind, to that which is prevalent in Ottawa. A divergence of threat perception, most commonly when the Americans have a heightened sense of threat compared to their smaller ally, makes it more difficult for Canada to justify close cooperation and increases disagreement on the appropriate policy measures needed to deal with these dangers. Fourth, any strategic initiative must itself have characteristics that, based on a quick gauge of its relative controversy amongst international or domestic audiences, would prove difficult for Ottawa to easily accept. This judgement can be based directly on the initiative itself or it can be the result of the nature of the American administration promoting or implementing it, whether it has poor relations with Ottawa or is unpopular with the public. The former makes it difficult to have the sort of mutual understanding necessary for smooth bilateral cooperation and would only magnify the impression of subservience; the latter only increases the cost of cooperation for any politically sensitive government interested in
subsequent re-election. In either case, the opprobrium of the US overtures would be essentially based on guilt by association.

If all four criteria are present, Canada would confront environmental pressures that could potentially disrupt the balance between security and sovereignty. Simply put, Canada would face definite incentives and pressure to be even more closely aligned with the Americans. While potentially increasing security, this can also threaten Canadian political interest in ensuring sovereignty and independence. Continental soft-bandwagoning, with its quasi-automatic following of the American lead on such matters, offers an ill-suited policy response to such a development. Instead, Canada adopts the alternative SOD in its policy repertoire – defensive weak-multilateralism – to facilitate further distancing from the United States and thereby the re-balancing of the security-sovereignty values back within their tolerance zone.

That being said, the actual differences between the two SODs should not be exaggerated. After all, cybernetic theory envisions largely incremental policy changes capable of compensating for the critical feedback variable and bringing the values in question back into balance, and not much more beyond that. As such, defensive weak-multilateralism is neither dismissive of the other doctrine’s penchant for bilateral cooperation with the Americans, nor necessarily naive concerning the potential benefits that could be accrued by a greater commitment to international institutions. Clearly, however, it does entail both greater sensitivity on threats to sovereignty and greater normative affinity towards multilateralism and institution-building – not only as a means
to seek refuge from its great power patrons and avoid international commitments, but also as a means of fulfilling that idealist vision of being a “good international citizen.”

While accepting bilateral cooperation as part of Canada’s geopolitical reality, this alternative SOD is also more open to being openly critical of the United States, and when possible keen to situate any cooperative ventures within a larger multilateral field. This helps to establish a useful semblance of distance from the Americans, while providing an opportunity for Canada to assert its own distinct identity and status as a middle power. These two goals are certainly related. As Adam Chapnick reminds us, the functional principle was often invoked as idealistic rhetoric to provide “the appearance of Canadian independence” and to “justify the pursuit of Canadian global interests.” Importantly, the United States has shown itself equally willing to “absorb a great deal of rhetoric about divergences because it sees the Canadian government as being able to go only so far in its disengagement.”

This also touches upon an important element of defensive weak-multilateralism. On one hand, it seems to offer an ambitious, voluntaristic, and distinctively Canadian commitment to “middlepowermanship,” in which multilateral behaviour and international order are prioritized and Canada’s dependence upon the United States is lessened. In that sense, this SOD advances multilateral policies that have a defensive and “balancing” bent, as a means to create further distance from the Americans. Indeed, there might even be attempts at influencing or channelling American behaviour in cases when the danger is seen to be particularly acute – even if these efforts admittedly “yielded no visible record

of success in either Korea or Vietnam.” On the other hand, it also entails a superficial or “weak” committal to such idealist goals. True, Canada must inculcate greater distance from the US in order to rebalance security and sovereignty, and minimize any trade-off between them. However, a more radical departure in Canadian behaviour would in fact only further disrupt these values and risk a more serious breach to the relationship. It would also violate a core tenet of cybernetic theory – minimal changes in policy responses that are only sufficient to compensate for feedback variables and preserve the value(s). Instead, defensive weak-multilateralism pursues a more modest approach, in which any distancing from the United States is largely rhetorical in nature and this pretence of independence is balanced by continued, less visible forms of cooperation. This “two-track approach” may be contradictory and ambiguous, with more than a whiff of dishonesty about it, but it has also proven to be a remarkably resilient and reasonably successful approach to strategic affairs.

Policy continuity and patterned consistency within Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy is therefore maintained by a general reliance on modest changes within and between these two SODs. To be sure, a state may face a significant environmental threat to this value (e.g., another catastrophic terrorist attack), in which case Canada may be forced to make a more fundamental adjustment by adopting a more extreme and untested strategic doctrine. As Steinbruner acknowledges, “a cybernetic decision maker might well take strong, aggressive, radical action under certain kinds of environmental

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311 The two-track approach refers to how Canada sought to balance support for American nuclear strategies with simultaneous advocacy for arms control and strategic stability. See Lagassé, “Canada, strategic defence and strategic stability,” 917-937.
provocation.” However, it should be remembered that Canada does not appear to have radically departed from its goldilocks strategy even after the 9/11 attacks. As such, any discussion on the requirements for more radical policy changes is at best premature. Moreover, the critical feedback only becomes an environmental threat if a few important criteria are realized. An important part of the case study will therefore be an assessment on whether all four criteria are necessary for the critical variable to threaten the security-sovereignty values, and the relative importance and relationship between them.

That being said, the application of cybernetics inevitably raises the question on the appropriateness of applying elements of this theory to the Canadian case. My response to this concern is three-fold. First, cybernetics was ably applied in Ross’ seminal account of Canadian foreign policy during the 1950s-1970s Indochina conflict. It is clearly not a foreign theoretical approach to the study of Canada’s foreign policy, though it is an under-utilized one. Its application in this study therefore represents the return to an older and already tested theoretical model. Second, there is generally no widely accepted or used theory of foreign policy to explain Canadian behaviour. Indeed, despite a rich descriptive literature, this subject continues to be generally under-theorized, and the few explicitly theoretical accounts – whether using bureaucratic politics, domestic interest groups, or the garbage can policy process model – remain isolated cases. As such, by building upon Ross’ own theoretical approach, this study also represents an important contribution to the wider theoretical literature.

Lastly, cybernetics seems particularly well-suited to describe Canada’s often dysfunctional and fragmented policy-making process. Observers have long criticized the absence of a rational and strategically sound policy-planning process in Ottawa. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau even tried to inculcate a more substantive planning and coordinative element to Canadian external affairs, though few would consider his effort to have been an unmitigated success. And as anyone familiar with the bureaucratic complexity and budget cuts of the post-Cold War years can testify, it has become even more difficult to argue that matters have significantly improved since then. Canada’s national style remains largely ad hoc, “situational” and ultimately “reactive” to world events. As Douglas Ross acknowledges, in a statement that is perhaps truer today than it was then, Canada’s policy community represents “something less than the intellectual aristocracy of Canadian society.” By emphasizing minimally-purposeful and adaptive policy-making, cybernetic theory better encapsulates the reality of Canadian policy-making – fractured, uncoordinated, and occasionally politicized.

**Research Strategy and Methodology**

This study provides a preliminary assessment of the cultural-cybernetic explanation for grand strategy. On one hand, it apples the cultural-cybernetic framework as a “generalized specific explanation” for Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy. On the other hand, grand strategy constitutes a particular type of strategic behaviour, in which national instruments are applied to achieve security-enhancing political goals. As such, it

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314 See Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*.
315 Madar and Stairs, “Alone on Killers’ Role,” 730.
316 Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*, 32.
represents “well-defined, smaller-scope subclass of the general phenomenon” of foreign policy behaviour, which by moving down the “ladder of generality” will help create conditions for more contingent generalizations.318

My research challenges the two dominant schools of thought on Canadian foreign policy: (1) the mainstream school that argues Canada is a declining middle power and is generally critical of government policy for moving too far from the United States; and (2) the alternative school, most often associated with peripheral dependence, that is critical of government policy for remaining too close to the Americans. As this study illustrates, both interpretations are clearly deficient; indeed, they miss the strategically motivated range between two extremes, the patterned and consistent movement within that range, and the many successes (and very few failures) evident in Canada’s grand strategy.

However, while a direct challenge to the dominant perspectives on Canadian foreign policy, my research does not entail the systemic testing of different explanations for Canadian grand strategy – partly because the strategic studies literature is often vague concerning explanations for and definitions of grand strategy, and partly because of the lack of detailed or highly specified causal explanations in the Canadian foreign policy literature. After all, the above mentioned “schools of thought” consist of broad and loosely defined categories that lack the explicitly causal explanations required for the systematic testing of multiple theories. Instead, the study consists of a “plausibility probe” that seeks to develop a cultural-cybernetic model and provide a preliminary application of this framework on the macro-case of Canadian grand strategy.319 This is

expected to generate some novel theoretical findings to the strategic culture, cybernetic, and grand strategy literature and thereby help in a “building block” fashion to wider theory development. It also represents an initial step towards greater explicit and explanatory theorizing within the Canadian foreign policy literature.\textsuperscript{320}

To be sure, there may be methodological problems associated with not undertaking a broader cross-national comparative analysis beyond that of a single country, most notably over-generalization and selection bias. Canada may not be a crucial case for the existence of grand strategy, as that likely belongs to great powers by dint to the very high expectation that such states require such strategic thinking for survival. Nor is it necessarily sufficient for the validation on the role of cultural-cybernetic factors in causing strategic behaviour. But the value of a “crucial case,” introduced by Harry Eckstein some decades ago, has certainly been questioned.\textsuperscript{321} Importantly, there are reasons to believe that a macro-level case study on Canada’s grand strategy may still be the most appropriate methodological choice for the purposes of this study. By challenging the two dominant perspectives on Canadian foreign policy, neither of which expects to find much evidence of an independent and consistent grand strategy at play in Canada, this study represents an important test to disconfirm their “least-likely” hypotheses that would only “weakly predict” a Canadian grand strategy.\textsuperscript{322} And due to its reasonably benign structural position within North America, Canada is not subject to some of the pressures that could obfuscate and interfere with domestic-level determinants.

\textsuperscript{320} This theory-building research objective is discussed in George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, Chp. 4.
\textsuperscript{322} For more on “least-likely” cases, see George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}. 
of behaviour, while also being a beneficiary of the sort of environment stability that facilitates the “adaptive capacity of cybernetic decision mechanisms.” As such, there is some reason to believe that an examination of the Canadian case might better illuminate the role of cultural-cybernetic factors in underpinning a country’s strategic behaviour. Importantly, the study applies an intra-national and within-case analysis that helps to reduce and control the number of variables that would otherwise impact a multiple cross-national comparison of grand strategies.

To further refine the selection process and ensure that the analysis maintains the specificity required for contingent generalization, this study will utilize two additional methods. First, it is specifically concerned with how Canada’s post-war grand strategy has dealt with two key politico-military issues – the first looks at Canada’s response to US strategic defence initiatives, including the closely related issues of air defence and missile defence, and the second examines how Canada has adapted to NATO’s defence strategy over the course of the Cold War. Both constitute particularly representative examples of Canadian grand strategy, in so far as each concerns a hard strategic issue that (1) involves different actors and departments within Canada’s policy-making community, (2) has been consistently prioritized by Canadian policy-makers in various foreign policy and defence white papers as being critical for both its relationship with the United States and its approach to international security, and (3) directly concerns key elements of American security interests and policies. Together, these three criteria nicely encapsulate the requirement for grand strategy to involve diverse and relevant national instruments (means) used for vital, security-enhancing political goals (ends). Indeed, an assessment on the role of cultural-cybernetic factors across both cases will provide an additional

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means to test the study’s prime hypothesis, and to do so as part of a within-case analysis that is still largely confined to a Canadian grand strategy macro-case.

Second, each of the two cases span a lengthy time period that encompasses much of the post-war period. This certainly adds a degree of complexity to the case analysis. But to forcefully demonstrate policy continuity and patterned consistency of Canadian grand strategy, it is equally necessary to observe Canada’s behaviour over a significant period of time; to do otherwise would only weaken the explanatory power of the cultural-cybernetic framework being tested in this study. But these two cases also allow another means to further sharpen the selection process – each period under examination can be further divided into distinctive and chronological parts. Several such micro-cases can be identified in the two cases, the division or “breaks” between them based on changes in Canada’s grand strategy as it responds and adapts to American strategic preferences. This “diachronic” method, as Arnold Lijphart has termed it, provides a useful way to assess the key variables at different points of time in each of the two cases. In so doing, it is clearly similar to the “before-after” research design that achieves control by dividing the “sequential development of a longitudinal case” into two sub- or micro-cases. Yet the diachronic method extends the “before-after” design into a “pathway,” in which the longitudinal case is divided into multiple micro-cases rather than just two.

The study examines the cases using analytical-historical narratives. Narratives offer particular benefits in documenting the casual process for historical cases that cover an “extensive temporal space” and to do so in ways that “make the entire process

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325 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 166.
326 The use of analytical narratives is also the methodological norm for neo-classical realist accounts of grand strategy and foreign policy. See Rose, “Neoclassical realism and theories of world politics,” 153.
visible.” This method remains theoretically-informed and analytical, in so far as the inclusion of an explanatory model – in the case of this study, the cultural-cybernetic model – disciplines the narrative form sufficiently for it to serve as a plausibility probe. It also incorporates “process-tracing,” a methodological tool often associated with analytical-historical narratives, in order to outline the casual mechanism of the cultural-cybernetic model in its case analysis. As such, process-tracing helps to ascertain the causal chain by which (1) strategic culture is implemented as SODs that structure policy-making coalitions and policy outputs, and (2) environmental factors stimulate adaptive changes in SODs that result in pattern consistent shifts in grand strategy. By applying theory-testing on the case, it is clearly situated within a “deductive” methodology. Falsification will provide theoretical insight on the utility of both strategic culture and cybernetic processes as explanations for behaviour, as well as conceptual discipline and analytical rigour to this analysis, thereby differentiating this study from more “atheoretical” or “configurative idiographic” research designs.

An important element in falsifying the argument is the identification of confirming or disconfirming evidence. Evidentiary confirmation takes place when the cases demonstrate that: (1) policy-makers had an underlying interest in pursuing both security and sovereignty; (2) policy-makers relied on established SODs that kept the value within an acceptable range; (3) SODs resulted in appropriate policy-making coalitions and led to policy outputs that were in accordance with the respective doctrine;

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329 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 75.
(4) there were generally only incremental changes within a given SOD; (5a) changes in the critical variable resulted in a shift between SODs; (5b) shift between SODs did not result in dramatic changes in behaviour; and (6) the goldilocks strategy did not result in serious consequences for Canada.

In contrast, disconfirmation takes places when the cases show that: (1) policy-makers were unconcerned with security-sovereignty values or had an alternative conception of value; (2) policy-makers departed from established SODs and/or pursued policies that did not keep the value within an acceptable range; (3) SODs did not lead to appropriate policy-making coalitions or resulted in policy outputs that did not accord with a given SOD; (4) there were significant changes within a given SOD; (5) changes in the critical variable that threatened to push the value outside of its accepted range did not result in changes in SOD or resulted in fundamental and dramatic changes in SOD and behaviour; and (6) the strategic behaviour did result in serious consequences for Canada.

This argument may pose certain methodological difficulties. The explanatory mechanism, for instance, combines different ideational-cultural and organizational factors within a framework that is admittedly complex. And the cultural variables themselves, despite some effort at simplifying them through a cybernetic process, may still be seen as overly broad and therefore difficult to accrue scientifically sound and parsimonious inferences. But such methodological complexity does not negate the potential for the generation of useful insight on both grand strategy and other behavioural phenomena, nor does it nullify the scientific positivism that underlies this study’s epistemology.
CHAPTER FOUR – CANADA AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE –
PART I: AIR DEFENCE AND NORAD

By dint of its geographic location, Canada had a unique role to play in US plans for the strategic defence of North America. Indeed, despite some initial hesitancy triggered by its prospective cost, Ottawa eventually proved itself to be a reliable and cooperative partner on a variety of air defence initiatives in the early Cold War, which culminated in the binational NORAD command that was cemented in the late 1950s and imbued with the operational control over both countries’ air defence forces. Many of these measures, while resulting in the sort of pressures and compromises on Canadian sovereignty and independence that Ottawa had long sought to avoid, were also deemed too important for Canada to simply shirk its responsibilities.

Yet Canada’s role in strategic air defence was just as quickly challenged by the advent of new technology by the 1960s – the development of ballistic missiles, which had soon replaced long-range bombers as the delivery system of choice. On one hand, the air defence mission gradually declined in importance from the 1960s onward. NORAD’s *raison d’être* largely shifted to the early warning and tracking of ballistic missiles, which helped to ensure American nuclear retaliation in the event of an attack. On the other hand, Washington soon became infatuated with the prospects of a ballistic missile defence for North America. As will be shown in Part II, however, ballistic missile defence would also prove to be a much more technologically difficult and politically contentious issue, especially for Canada.

The following chapter provides a detailed explanation for Canadian policy responses to American plans for strategic air defence in the initial decades of the post-war
period, with the subsequent chapter extending the analysis by examining how Canada approached missile defence in later years. It tests the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour in order to trace the causal mechanism that leads to the key decisions informing Canada’s strategic-doctrinal approach to air defence. These decisions represent stages in the evolution of its goldilocks grand strategy and can be broken down into three central parts: (1) Canada’s initial hesitancy when confronted with overly ambitious but unsubstantiated air defence plans; (2) Canadian cooperation on air defence that led to the NORAD arrangement; and (3) its eventual decision to accept nuclear-armed air defence weapons. Each allows for a chronological break in the broader case, in which Canada confronts a distinctive American initiative that reflects its preferences at that moment and comes to a temporary conclusion.

Canada’s behaviour stems from a confluence of domestic-level factors that constrain its grand strategy. Strategic culture provides the ideational motivation and behavioural guidance for policy-makers dealing with the contentious issue of strategic defence. Specifically, it helps to account for the often differing cultural tendencies towards proximity and distance to the Americans. Cybernetic processes in turn play a crucial role in disciplining these inclinations by the use of heuristic guidelines – these shortcuts direct policy-makers in the pursuit of a minimally articulated sense of values, which in the Canadian case is embodied by the long-standing concern to balance both security and sovereignty. In addition, this process help to structure the coalition of actors involved in the policy-making process and leads to policy responses that fluctuate between two SODs, thereby providing the scope of Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy.
This chapter is primarily concerned with showing how Canada’s policy responses to air defence followed a consistent pattern encapsulated by the continental soft-bandwagoning SOD. As will be more fully revealed in Part II, Canadian strategic behaviour underwent a noticeable strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism by the mid-to-late 1960s. Yet the overall behavioural pattern that emerges is revealed to be an essentially a cybernetic one, whereby the shifts in how Canada deals with strategic defence reflect changes between the two strategic SODs that only come into effect when Canada’s sense of security and sovereignty are threatened.

**MCC Proposals and the Canadian Dilemma, 1945-47**

Canada might have emerged from the Second World War with its territory unscathed and economy thriving. Yet the American deployment of sizable army contingents on its northern territory during the war raised attendant concerns over Canadian sovereignty. Canada obtained negotiated assurances in 1943 and 1944 that the American military presence would be short-lived and any facilities built promptly returned to proper government control.330 For the Canadians, however, the memory of what British High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald had termed the “army of occupation” would linger long after the last US soldier had left.

Concerns over security and sovereignty were assuaged at the conclusion of the war, but this respite was only temporary. The growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that the allies of the two superpowers had little choice but to choose sides in what became the Cold War. With Canada’s long-standing geo-strategic

relationship to the Americans, defensive alliance recently cemented at Ogdensburg, and
growing suspicion of the Soviets following Igor Gouzenko’s revelations of Canadian-
based spy rings, the choice was an especially easy one.331 John Holmes certainly put it
best when he noted that “if the chips were down, Canadian governments…had no doubt
which side they were on.”332 Importantly, the Soviet development of intercontinental
bombers armed with atomic gravity bombs by the early 1950s ensured the possibility of
direct attacks on the continent. For the Americans in particular, it became difficult to
ignore the fact that both countries “constitute a single target system,” which made
Canadian territory “a very important piece of real estate.”333 As the Post-Hostilities
Planning Committee had presciently noted, this interdependence of defence problems
required that “the defence of Canada…be closely coordinated with those of the United
States after the war,” though the report also acknowledged the possibility that the US
might be tempted to “exert undue pressure on Canada.”334

Canada was first made aware of American concerns over the Soviet threat and the
need for both expanded post-war defence cooperation and strategic defences through the
Permanent Joint Board on Defence and later the Canada-US Military Cooperation
Committee (MCC). In 1946, the PJBD appended a memorandum on defence cooperation
– based on a paper by General Guy Henry, a US Army member of the Board – that

331 For more on the Gouzenko Affair, see Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, Chp. 3.
332 John Holmes, Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 14.
333 R. J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 204 and Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky,
“Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada’s Defence Policy in an Unstable World,” International Journal
Relationship with the United States: General Considerations,” 23 January 1945 (Department of External
Affairs Files), in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, Volume 3 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1972), 375. For an excellent examination of this Committee, see Munton,
“Planning in the East Block,” 687-726.
recommended for the post-war security plan to have emergency provisions for the establishment of a Canada-United States of America Chiefs of Staff (CANUSA). The official response from senior officials in Ottawa was incredulous. Lester Pearson, ambassador to Washington, was “struck by the sheer formality” of the document, while the Clerk of the Privy Council Arnold Heeney noted that he had expected something “quite different” from “a basic security pact...[that contained] a statement of fundamental military obligation.”

In response, the PJBD drafted the 34th Recommendation that only contained some of the more “innocuous” suggestions of this memorandum, with the more controversial placed in a 35th Recommendation for later approval.

Discussion would eventually take place in the newly created MCC, which in 1946 approved both an “Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-US Security” and a “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan” to replace the Joint Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) that governed the Canada-US wartime partnership. The former was guided by a worst-case scenario that foresaw a Soviet atomic threat to North America as early as 1950 and recommended a comprehensive air defence effort that included air warning and surveillance systems, air bases, and anti-aircraft defences. The latter did not mention CANUSA, but included the equally controversial Appendix A for an “Air Interceptor and Air Warning Plan.” This appendix envisioned a massive radar perimeter that would include interceptor stations and a greatly augmented fighter aircraft fleet by

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336 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 17.
1950, with an Arctic expansion to this perimeter by 1955 as well as a “combined Air
Defence Headquarters with operational control over all continental air defence forces.”

Hume Wrong, the new ambassador to Washington, was uneasy with the joint
appreciation’s conception of the Soviet threat, particularly the “sense of urgency and
overemphasis on potential danger that seemed to colour American policy.” He was
also confused as to the nature and intention of American defence planning and urged the
prime minister to pursue further information on these matters. Arnold Heeney was
troubled by the scale of the envisioned plan. So too was Lester Pearson, who commented
to Mackenzie King that the envisioned radar perimeter would “strain our capacity” and
“would probably mean that our military activities were concentrated almost wholly on the
protection of North America.”

Charles Ritchie and George Glazebrook at External
Affair were meanwhile focused on its alarmist judgement on the Soviet intention to fight
a major war and its imprecise use of military estimates.

Officials in Ottawa were clearly uncomfortable with the apparent direction being
taken by the MCC, especially the tendency to embrace air defence plans that in terms of
scale, price, and ambition would make the continental defence projects of the Second
World War pale in comparison. This should not itself be surprising. As revealed in Escott
Reid’s 1947 memorandum, “The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study in the

337 Ibid., 20. In the United States, the radar network would have a chain of stations along the Pacific coast, a
triangular group of stations with points in Maine, South Carolina and North Dakota, as well as an Alaskan
chain. Canada would have an early warning line just south of the Arctic islands, and additional stations in
Vancouver Island, from along the fiftieth parallel from the Prairies to the Maritimes, and further ground-
control intercept stations in eastern side of Canada (Ontario to the Maritimes). The Americans would have
deployed 975 fighter aircraft, while Canada would deploy 684 aircraft. This phase of the plan was expected
to be in place by 1950, at which point the radar perimeter would be pushed further north. Importantly, a
similarly ambitious and continent-wide radar perimeter system was subsequently proposed by the US Air
Defence Command in 1947 with Plan Supremacy.
339 Quoted in Michael Fawcett, “The Politics of Sovereignty – Continental Defence and the Creation of
340 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 338 and Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 158.
Possibility of War and some of the Implications for Canadian Policy,” Ottawa was actually home to a number of divergent views on the true extent of the Soviet threat. Contrary to some of the more alarmist perspectives taking shape in Washington, Ottawa viewed Soviet leaders as cautious and realistic, imperialist without being ideological, “politically expansionary but not militarily aggressive.” Undoubtedly, this “realist” view of the Soviet Union was informed by the despatches from astute members of Canada’s diplomatic mission in Moscow, including Arnold Smith, Leon Mayrand, and especially Dana Wilgess.

The Canadian military was more ready to give the MCC the benefit of the doubt in terms of both the appreciation of the threat and the resultant plan itself. Importantly, however, they still shared with their East Block colleagues a relatively sanguine perspective on the immediacy of the Soviet military threat – that it would be largely “diversionary” in nature. As noted by the soon to be Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton in a 1946 statement, “the Americans [in the joint appreciation] say that they are to be the object of the main attack, and we say that at the outset we would be the object of a diversionary attack.” Claxton was in turn supported by senior military officials, most notably by Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Robert Leckie, who raised serious strategic and financial issues over the air defence projects envisioned in Appendix A of the joint security plan.

341 Don Page and Don Munton, “Canadian Images of the Cold War, 1946-47,” International Journal 32, 3 (1976-77), 599. Escott Reid’s memo was circulated within External Affairs and led to comments by eighteen officers and Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent.
342 See Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, Chps. 2-4. These despatches were also complemented by memorandum written by Soviet experts at External Affairs in Ottawa, such as Leo Malania.
343 Quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 342. This possibility of a diversionary Soviet attack against North America was fully spelled out in a 1947 essay written by Brooke Claxton, titled “Observations on Defence Needs of Canada.”
344 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 26.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King was undoubtedly concerned over the strategic initiatives that appeared to be emanating directly from Washington, and probably not unduly so given his prior experience with the American wartime presence in the Canadian North. He was therefore particularly receptive to the advice of officials at External Affairs and National Defence. Both departmental actors held reservations on the MCC proposals – the Department of External Affairs focusing on the political dangers of air defence ties, and defence officials questioning the strategic logic of such measures. National Defence might have been more receptive to the joint appreciation, but even this did not entail any substantive endorsement of the proposals, especially once the Air Interceptor and Air Warning Plan was finally completed and became known.

Canada had been following a continental soft-bandwagoning SOD towards the United States since the end of the Second World War, when a shared sense of threat and necessity led Ottawa to adopt a particularly receptive attitude towards American strategic initiatives. This was certainly not without limits. Canadian officials had more than a little trepidation at the thought of continued cooperative ventures with such a large partner. This fact was perhaps most provocatively spelled out in a memorandum written by Escott Reid from External Affairs in 1942, titled “The United States and Canada: Domination, Cooperation, Absorption,” which in the words of Denis Smith warned against the possibility that Canada might be relegated to the “status of a helpless dependent power.” Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 17. But it was also shared by much of the Ottawa establishment, as revealed in the work of the Post-Hostilities Committee, and was also on display with Ottawa’s insistence to curtail US activities in the Canadian North and its successful effort to avoid being placed under US “command” under ABC-22. That being said, Canada-US cooperative
activities were clearly unprecedented in scope and little effort was made to achieve
distance by refusing to collaborate on these matters. And if one takes the name of the
* Permanent Joint Board on Defence* at face value, there were certainly expectations that
an unapologetically cooperative approach to the Americans would continue long after the
war, even if the speed and scope of such initiatives were reduced in favour of military
demobilization and defence cuts.346

Clearly, however, the coalition of actors responsible for Canada’s strategic policy
displayed little of this cooperative attitude when examining the MCC proposals. Melvin
Conant was certainly correct to note that “the special military relationship between
Canada and the United States [briefly] lapsed but never quite reverted to its pre-war
condition.”347 Indeed, Canadian officials were arguably shifting in the direction of a
possible rejection of these perceived American overtures, which seemed to embody the
very sort of environmental pressure that one would expect to trigger a change in SOD.

First, it appeared to herald a strong American preference for a comprehensive air
defence system that would require in-depth Canadian cooperation, at least if the sheer
scale of the various proposals – from CANUSA to the ambitious radar perimeter of
Appendix A – is any indication. Canadian officials were also by no means in agreement
with the United States that the Soviet threat required such robust measures. As a result,
there was little in the way of political cover to justify such expensive and intrusive
measures. In fact, the domestic controversy surrounding the MCC proposals for Canada

346 Canada emerged from the Second World War with what many considered to be the fourth most
powerful military, behind only the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. By 1946, the Canadian
military was told to plan for a much smaller force: 10,000 in the navy, 25,000 in the army and 20,000 in the
air force. Notably, all three services were not able to achieve even these modest levels. See Richter,
*Avoiding Armageddon*, 15-17.
(1960): 220.
can be nicely encapsulated by what one 1946 newspaper headline disparagingly termed the “Fortified, Atomic Maginot Line,” which even forced the prime minister to state to assure the House of Commons that article was “wholly misleading” and contained “many serious inaccuracies.”

Meanwhile, US President Truman might not have been particularly controversial or disliked by either the Canadian populace or amongst officials in Ottawa during this period, but there was also little doubt that he lacked the close wartime bonds evident with his larger-than-life predecessor that could make such plans easier to swallow.

With all four criteria in place, Ottawa would face the unwelcome prospect of an American strategic initiative potentially capable of disrupting the balance between security and sovereignty. Simply put, the MCC recommendations could conceivably better assure the country’s security, even if officials in National Defence did question the effectiveness of such measures given the nature of the Soviet threat. But Canadian officials were also deeply uneasy with what it entailed for Canadian sovereignty and independence. As William Willoughby notes, it would give “nationalistically-disposed Canadians grounds for accusing the Government of turning the country over to the ‘Yankees.’” Importantly, Ottawa could also no longer rely on the continued application of its continental soft-bandwagoning SOD as the basis for Canada’s position. This doctrine prescribes exceedingly close cooperation with the Americans with only a semblance of distance. It would have little problem with the MCC proposals, but acquiescing to such expansive measures would only further magnify these security-sovereignty trade-offs.

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The cultural-cybernetic model therefore predicts that policy-makers would choose the next SOD in the policy repertoire capable of bringing Canadian sovereignty and independence back into their tolerance zone. In the Canadian case, this entails the adoption of defensive weak-multilateralism in order to rebalance Canada’s position towards Washington. This SOD is centrally concerned that Canada-US cooperation can be perceived as a form of subservience that detracts from Canadian sovereignty and independence of action. Its policy response involves an increase effort at rhetorical distancing from either the initiative in question or the United States more generally, possibly including a refusal to endorse the American plan. Yet it also permits a minimal, preferably low-profile form of cooperation in order to assuage American security concerns – a compromise that requires policy-makers to ask, to borrow Joel Sokolsky’s words, “how much is just enough?”

Canadian officials clearly balked at the prospect of implementing the MCC proposals. And discussions between Prime Minister King and US President Harry Truman on 28 October 1946 failed to immediately resolve this issue, and indeed only gave a sense of presidential approval on the planning work being done in the MCC. But the King-Truman meeting did result in some very useful diplomatic discussions on the subject in November and December, which finally revealed to Canadian officials how little support the MCC proposals actually had at the White House and Pentagon. Washington neither demanded Canadian cooperation in implementing the MCC recommendations, nor prioritized the sort of comprehensive air defence network suggested in the joint security plan’s draft appendix. In fact, Ottawa was surprised to

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discover that the Americans were quite moderate in their fears about the Soviet Union’s capability to attack North America – and in any event, preferred to focus resources on strategic offence, embodied in the Strategic Air Command. As a result of these revelations, Canadian concerns over the MCC proposals precipitously declined and any potential move to defensive weak-multilateralism was stymied. Instead, the MCC plans were accepted by the Canadian military and the Canadian cabinet approved a “Joint Statement on Defence Collaboration” based on the PJBD’s otherwise controversial 35th Recommendation.  

Air Defence and the NORAD Agreement, 1948-58

Canadian officials were assured that agreement on this planning document did not entail any requirement to implement it. The incipient shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism was halted, and the post-war SOD that had served Canadian officials so well in the Second World War was maintained. Yet American preferences towards strategic defence were also beginning to change. Strategic offence seemed appropriate enough against a hypothetical atomic threat, but it gave little comfort when the Soviets developed a TU-4 bomber capable of one-way missions against North America in 1947. Washington’s fears were only heightened by the Soviet testing of an atomic bomb. 

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351 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 28-29. This statement called for the exchange of selected individuals and observers; encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization and training; mutual and reciprocal availability of military facilities in each country; and control of each country over activities on its territory. See “Joint Statement: by the Governments of Canada and the United States of America Regarding Defence Co-operation between the Two Countries and Statement by the Prime Minister Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King,” in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, ed. R. A. MacKay (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), 228-229.  

fission device in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. As a result, the United States took initial steps to finally prioritize air defence. It would first fund the temporary Lashup radar system in 1949, followed by the construction of the Permanent early warning radar system beginning in 1950 and the reallocation of resources to US Air Defence Command, until then a poor cousin of both SAC and Tactical Air Command.353 By the end of 1952, the Truman administration in one of its final acts approved National Security Council Memorandum 139 (NSC-139), which called for “an effective system of air, sea and land defences ready no later than December 31, 1955.”354

Canadian officials were not worried or surprised by this shift in American strategic preferences towards air defence. Indeed, Canada’s own sense of the Soviet bomber threat had grown in tandem with this heightened American concern. As noted in the Canada’s Defence Programme, 1949-1950, defence planners were becoming increasingly worried about a “war for survival” in the event that the Soviet Union sought to “dominate the free nations.” The white paper noted the possibility of direct Soviet attacks “launched by air or sea” on North America, even if it still viewed the “most likely kind of attack” to be “diversionary raids.”355 Meanwhile, defence spending was finally on the increase by 1948. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), which was forced to operate without active squadrons in the preceding few years, received 85 Vampire fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom by 1948, followed by 56 F-86 Sabre aircraft from the United States as an interim measure in the event of delays with the development of the

355 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada’s Defence Programme, 1949-50 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1949), 11, 12.
Canadian-made CF-100 Canuck interceptor.356 Squadrons of RCAF fighter aircraft were activated, many of which were earmarked for the newly established Air Defence Group.

North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, followed by Communist China’s entry as a belligerent in the war, seemed to confirm the worst fears held by the West. As Lester Pearson and Brooke Claxton, Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence, concluded, “the whole of Asia and Europe...might fall rapidly under Soviet domination.”357 In response, Canada launched a $5-billion procurement program and increased defence spending to $1.97 billion by 1952. This consumed an unprecedented 45 percent of its federal budget and totalled 8.8 percent of the country’s gross national product, which was only superseded by the United States, Great Britain, and France.358 Much of this funding was directed at Canada’s sizable expeditionary commitments, including the brigade group fighting with UN forces in Korea by 1951 and even larger land and air force deployments that arrived in Central Europe by 1951 and 1952. A significant portion of funding was, however, earmarked for the Air Defence Group (renamed Command in 1951), though more squadrons were still stationed in Europe than North America at this time – twelve squadrons versus nine.

Unlike Canada’s tepid response to the conclusion of the MCC, Canadian policymakers were now fully in agreement with the Americans, both in the country’s commitments to Europe (to be examined in more detail in Chapter Six) and air defence for North America. A crucial difference between the two episodes was the fact that

356 Richter, Avoiding Armageddon, 16; and Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 38-40.
Washington now placed air defence as an increasingly high strategic priority. No longer was strategic defence only advanced by members of the American air force on behalf of their own parochial service interests and largely dismissed by their superiors. This was especially true under US President Dwight Eisenhower, who in pursuit of his New Look strategy was much more eager than his predecessor to fund a significant air defence system. After all, air defences capable of blunting any Soviet nuclear attack were considered a vital means to make the administration’s nuclear threat of “massive retaliation” against the Soviet Union credible.359

Importantly, Canada also had a crucial role to play in these plans. Washington was well aware that there was still insufficient warning time to protect American industrial targets from Soviet trans-oceanic strategic air attacks, especially those in the northeast that were close to the Canada-US border. Canadian territory in turn promised at least a semblance of “defence in depth” against the Soviet bomber threat, even if such a measure – as George Lindsey notes – could also leave the Canadian “outer surface” of the network highly vulnerable to attack.360 In the words of the US General Ennis Whitehead in 1950, “our highly industrialized, high populated border...is wide open and will continue to be so until we extend our presently programmed radar northward.”361

Ottawa confronted a clear change in America’s strategic preferences towards continental air defence and the purported Canadian role in such an endeavour. But there was now little hesitation on Ottawa’s part for wide-ranging cooperation with the

360 However, the addition of the DEW Line allowed the interception of Soviet nuclear bombers further north of Canada’s populated areas, and therefore helped to alleviate this problem. See Richter, *Avoiding Armageddon*, 41.
361 Quoted in Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, 43.
Americans on strategic defence. A central reason for this change can be placed on
Canada’s threat perception. Rather than challenging the perceived American alarmism,
Canadian officials had grown to share many of the security concerns driving their
superpower ally. The evident Soviet capacity and perhaps even willingness to undertake a
strategic air offensive on North America was no longer in doubt by the 1950s. True, the
Soviets did seek to mollify sentiment in the West by reducing some of their forwarded
deployed forces in the Central Front in the mid-1950s. But External Affairs still saw the
benefit of air defences against “the increased Soviet capability in atomic and thermo-
nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.”

As Canada’s Defence Programme 1951-52 also makes clear, even the disclaimer about the greater likelihood of
diversionary attacks was replaced by the unambiguous requirement for the “immediate
defence of Canada and North America from direct attack.”

In addition, contrary to the MCC proposals before it, these air defence plans
proved to be largely absent of significant controversy. This is partly due to the renewed
Canadian sense of direct threat from the Soviet Union, which made the possible
protection of both countries’ population and industrial targets difficult to ignore. One
should also not discount the good “atmospherics” of Canadian-American relations for
much of this period. Aside from some brief moments of tension in the early part of the
Korean War, Canada’s relations with the Truman administration were largely free of

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362 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External
Affairs, “Comment on General Foulkes’ Note on Reappraisal of the Military Requirements of NATO,”
363 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada’s Defence Programme, 1951-52 (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1952), 3 (emphasis added).
364 The term “atmospherics” was used by former diplomat and scholar John Holmes, and from Kim Richard
controversy. And Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s relationship with the Eisenhower administration was if anything even stronger, thanks to the US president’s broad respectability arising from his wartime role and the close bonds that this generated with the Ottawa establishment. Not surprisingly, it was this period of relative equanimity in bilateral relations that formed the inspiration for the report *Principles for Partnership* by Livingston Merchant of the State Department and Arnold Heeney of External Affairs.

Canada also had little concern over the role of strategic defence in American nuclear strategy, which as Lawrence Freedman reminds us was predicated on an “imbalance of terror…that would keep the Soviet Union’s expansive tendencies at check.” Admittedly, Canadian officials did have qualms over the massive retaliation doctrine, which was finally codified in NSC-162/2 on “Basic National Security Policy.” Lester Pearson was particularly vocal over his concerns that this doctrine meant “our destiny may be decided, not by ourselves, but across the border ‘by means and at places not of our choosing.’” This concern was particularly acute when the doctrine was applied for limited wars in peripheral regions like East Asia. For officials in Ottawa, “the

365 Tension between the two countries arose from the initial delay over Canadian military participation in Korea, which was only abetted by the clumsy American pressure on its ally and US General MacArthur’s often disdainful attitude towards allies. As a result of this tension, Secretary of State of External Affairs Lester Pearson commissioned a report on Canadian-American relations (the Grandy Report) that was never finalized, released, nor published. See Adam Chapnick, “Inevitable Co-Dependency (And Things Best Left Unsaid): The Grandy Report on Canadian-American Relations, 1951-?” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9, 1 (Fall 2001): 19-28 and Robert Prince, “The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950-51,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 27, 4 (1992/93): 129-152.


thought of initiating nuclear war over strategic stakes that were considerably less than those threatened by all-out Soviet assault on Europe was morally and politically unthinkable.”\textsuperscript{369} Yet Canadian nuclear anxiety was much less evident when it came to the Central Front in Europe, where defence planners were “vigorous in pursuing the nuclear option as a means of reducing the conventional force commitments…required.”\textsuperscript{370} Indeed, Ottawa had little problem when NATO adopted Military Committee document 48 (MC 48) in 1954 that called for conventional and tactical nuclear forces to temporarily hold back the Soviets until the Alliance was able to counter-attack with strategic nuclear weapons.

One should recall that air defences were an important adjunct to this doctrine. In addition to protecting the nuclear deterrent itself, an effective air defence system capable of protecting the populace was necessary for the US to credibly threaten massive retaliation, and perhaps more fancifully to undertake the sort of military mobilization still envisioned at this time.\textsuperscript{371} Canada was clearly aware that the New Look entailed such an air defence effort, as spelled out in a report by the Joint Planning Committee to Chiefs of Staff Committee.\textsuperscript{372} In turn, it displayed little hesitation to refocus attention on air defences for North America, which led to a relative decline in focus on Europe and a gradual decline in Canadian defence spending as a percentage of gross national product.

\textsuperscript{369} Ross, \textit{In the Interests of Peace}, 46. The United States threatened nuclear use during the Korean War, though Canadian officials discouraged such threats during the Wiser consultations. Eisenhower also reportedly contacted British and Canadian leaders to ask their views on nuclear use during the Dien Bien Phu crisis in 1954. Both governments responded negatively, though Eisenhower still formally authorized nuclear use for limited wars in local situations in 1955. For more on the Wiser consultations, see Timothy Sayle, “A pattern of constraint: Canadian-American relations in the early Cold War,” \textit{International Journal} 62, 3 (2007): 689-705.

\textsuperscript{370} Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament,” 118.

\textsuperscript{371} Jockel, \textit{No Boundaries Upstairs}, 77.

and federal spending after 1953. But as Claxton’s replacement at National Defence Ralph Campney observed, Canadian contributions to continental defence helped to ensure that the United States, by being properly protected, “would continue to carry a large share of the burden of defending Europe.”

As a result, Canada no longer faced the sort of environmental factors that were capable of both causing a trade-off in security-sovereignty values and triggering a change in SOD towards more distancing policy responses to bring the values back within their tolerance zone. In this context, rather than being held in abeyance as it was in the face of the MCC proposals, continental soft-bandwagoning could be fully adopted without endangering Canadian sovereignty or going beyond the scope of the goldilocks grand strategy.

National Defence was clearly at the forefront of this cooperative attitude. Officials no longer questioned the strategic logic of air defences, as the threat of a direct Soviet attack had taken on renewed importance in the 1950s. Instead, the central concern in the department was the need to ensure that any air defence system was operationally effective. This was clearly raised by a succession of internal department reports, which had recognized the need for “mutual re-enforcement” and new command arrangements. The RCAF would have been the prime beneficiary, and soon emerged as the staunchest proponent of further air defence cooperation. Its influence was only magnified by the close cooperation that existed between the RCAF and the United States Air Force (USAF), aided by their joint planning group established in 1954 at USAF Air

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373 Quoted in Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 38.
374 Richter, Avoiding Armageddon, 42. A 1951 report by the Joint Planning Committee for the Chiefs of Staff noted the requirement for a single operational air defence system. This was followed by a November 1951 memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee on the need for tactical air force cooperation, and a 1954 Joint Planning Committee report that examined different command arrangements for air defence.
Defense Command headquarters. Both saw air defence as a joint effort, “and less and less of one in which sovereignty should play a role.”

External Affairs was, in contrast, much more wary of how such cooperative ventures could negatively impact Canadian sovereignty. Perhaps most immediately, any joint air defence system was seen as entailing the possible deployment of American forces on Canadian territory, and thereby appear to infringe on Canadian sovereignty in a manner similar to what occurred during the Second World War. The question of proper command authority for an operational air defence system was an equally sensitive issue. In some respects, this apprehensive attitude was remarkably similar to how the department viewed the MCC proposals – though a crucial difference in this case being the unambiguous American interest in cooperation and the highly favourable attitude that such overtures generated in Canada’s defence community. Officials at External Affairs might have some hesitation with further cooperation on air defence. But they also recognized that Canada had little choice other than to accede to American wishes on this issue. As Joseph Jockel concludes, the department was “resigned to the closer defence arrangements,” but was “not excited by the prospect.”

Canada’s policy-making coalition was thus structured, in accordance with the principles of continental soft-bandwagoning, to be very receptive to cooperation but still sensitive of its attendant political consequences. As such, the St. Laurent government embraced significant cooperation with the Americans on strategic defence. But as recommended by officials at External Affairs, the government also sought assurances to

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protect Canada’s political interest in sovereignty. This did not entail a fundamental change in SOD, as proximity was clearly prioritized over the effort to ensure distance. But it did require certain conditions to be attached to any agreement to make things more palatable for both the Canadian public and Canadian political leaders interested in ensuring their subsequent re-election.

Ottawa ultimately agreed in 1951 to a contiguous extension of the US Permanent radar network, also termed the Aircraft Control and Warning System, onto Canadian territory with the construction of an additional 31 radar stations. This agreement originated in a joint RCAF-USAF proposal, titled “A Plan for the Extension of the Permanent Radar Net of the Continental Air Defense System,” which was first examined by the Interdepartmental Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions earlier in the year. It was eventually approved under PJBD Recommendation 51/1. It resulted in the joint construction and manning of what was termed the Pinetree Line extension on Canadian territory, with the costs shared between both countries (approximately one-third paid by Canada and two-thirds by the United States). Importantly, Canada also attached certain conditions that were meant to minimize the political consequences of this agreement. First, the St. Laurent government was worried that the public release of the Pinetree’s favourable financial arrangement might give the appearance of financial assistance. As a result of these concerns, the Pinetree notes were kept secret and only released in 1953, at a time when even larger defence projects were underway. The Americans also wrote a letter explicitly stating that this agreement did not entail a form

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of financial assistance. Second, Canada obtained a number of assurances from the United States on its involvement and control over these radar stations—construction was to be largely undertaken by Canadian agencies, US personnel were to obey Canadian law, and Canada retained the title to and the right of manning these stations. These conditions helped to safeguard the country’s sense of sovereignty, an especially important requirement when cooperation included the presence of American personnel on Canadian territory.

The extension of radar coverage over Canadian territory also opened up the even more sensitive issue of “tactical cooperation” between the two air forces. American preponderance in interceptor squadrons and the creation of radar networks on Canadian territory offered a strong incentive for the USAF to undertake cross-border interceptions of aircraft. Canada also found tactical cooperation attractive, largely due to the country’s limited number of fighter aircraft squadrons and interest in pushing any interception away from the country’s populated southern region. But Canadian officials from External Affairs and even National Defence recognized that blanket tactical authority to the USAF would “lead to a loss of sovereign control.” Instead, they sought with some success to include conditions to limit USAF’s ability to intercept, investigate, and shoot down aircraft in Canadian airspace. For instance, PJBD Recommendation 51/4 permitted US

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380 Canada also followed a similar pattern when confronted with the American interest in continuing its military presence in Newfoundland after it joined Confederation in 1949. The final agreement allowed SAC to lease facilities at Goose Bay and Harmon airfield for their strategic nuclear bomber force, but Canada was able to limit the terms of the leases and maximize Canadian sovereign control over these bases. See David Bercuson, “SAC versus Sovereignty: The Origins of the Goose Bay Lease, 1946-52,” *Canadian Historical Review* 70, 2 (1989): 206-222.
interception and investigation (without shooting authority) of an aircraft, but only under certain limited conditions. And PJBD Recommendation 53/1 allowed cross-border interception if the other side was unable to intercept an aircraft, but had the requirement that any external aircraft must obey the country’s rules of interception and engagement and be undertaken under orders issued by its appropriate military authorities. However, in a trend that would become increasingly apparent, Canada’s effort at ensuring sovereignty protection was becoming more nominal than real – both countries had very similar rules of engagement and the tactical control authority to issue engagement order was delegated to American officers.\(^382\)

Despite these improvements, the United States was still far from satisfied with its existing strategic defence capability. From 1950-53, a number of US committees and study groups (Project Charles, Project Lincoln, Project East River, the Lincoln Summer Study Group, the Kelly Committee and the Bull Committee) raised the purported benefits of achieving a few extra hours of warning for bomber interception.\(^383\) Following the Bull Committee’s report, Eisenhower approved NSC-159 that called for the establishment of a radar network and recommended an “approach on the highest levels to bring home to the Canadian Government the urgency and character of the threat.”\(^384\) The USAF also began testing equipment for an early warning system under Project Counterchange (renamed Project Corrode) and formally requested use of Canadian territory. While accepting this arrangement, Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton “sought to buy time and

\(^{382}\) Ibid., 51-52, 57 and Richard Evan Goette, “Canada, the United States and the Command and Control of Air Forces for Continental Air Defence from Ogdensburg to NORAD, 1940-1957,” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 2009), 202.

\(^{383}\) The Lincoln Summer Study Group was notable for involving two Canadians, John S. Foster and George R. Lindsey, and for its discussions of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and the McGill or Mid-Canada Line. See Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, Chp. 4.

\(^{384}\) Quoted in Cox, Canada and NORAD, 8.
more technical expertise by requiring…that Military Study Group be formed." Canada also ensured that Project Counterchange/Corrode in no-way entailed a commitment to such an early warning system, with any sites requiring Canadian approval and being under its ownership.386

In the end, Ottawa successfully pursued a cost-saving strategy – the United States would fund, construct, and man the much more expensive Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line along the 70th parallel, while Canada promised to fund and construct the Southern Canadian ‘McGill’ line (renamed Mid-Canada Line) along the 55th parallel, which offered system redundancy and a better sense on the direction of attack.387 And much like the Pinetree Line, Canada was also able to attach conditions to the American military presence. As noted by R. J. Sutherland, this resulted in “an explicit recognition of Canada’s claims to the exercise of sovereignty in the Far North.”388

With the demonstration of a Soviet thermonuclear capability in 1953, Washington became increasingly interested to the possibility of “strategic cooperation,” in which there would be an integrated and seamless strategic defence system capable of fully utilizing either country’s air defence forces to intercept and engage Soviet nuclear-armed bombers.389 This was especially salient after 1954, when the US Continental Air Defense Command was stood up and given operational control over the air defence forces of the various military services. American preferences stemmed from the fundamentally different magnitude of threat arising from Soviet hydrogen weapons, which had a

386 Fawcett, “the Politics of Sovereignty,” 37.
388 Sutherland, “Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” 271.
389 For more on the role of Soviet thermonuclear capabilities in accelerating continental air defence integration, see Goette, “Canada, the United States,” Chp. 9.
destructive potential that was hundreds and potentially thousands of times greater than regular atomic weaponry. This fact was not lost on Canadian officials. No longer did senior military officials like General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, argue that a population could somehow withstand a nuclear bombardment, not when the weapons were thermonuclear in character.  

Defence Minister Brooke Claxton also reiterated that this “dreadful instrument of destruction” was “so much more powerful than was the A-bomb that it constitutes a weapon of a different character.”

Canada continued to be receptive to the notion of expanding air defence cooperation to a higher strategic-level in the latter half of the 1950s. Yet knowing Canada’s long-standing concerns over sovereignty, the United States was at first quite hesitant to even bring up the matter of further air defence cooperation lest it be prematurely squashed. As US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson once quipped, “Our Canadian friends have a parliament and they are a little fussy about their southern neighbour – whom they are fond of – but they don’t want to think we’re running their country.” Indeed, the United States would at first only propose “operational integration” of their respective air defence forces, as the US chiefs concluded in 1955 that “a combined Canada-US command is probably not acceptable to the Canadians at this time and should not be proposed.”

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390 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 88-89.
392 Quoted in Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 98.
393 Ibid., 100. The distinction between command and operational control was first raised by General Charles Foulkes at a 1955 political-military meeting of officials from the US State Department, External Affairs, and other relevant agencies. It was originally the “brainchild” of Air Marshal Roy Slemon. A similar distinction also marked the RCAF’s relationship with US Northeast Command, which had responsibility for the American air force assets in Newfoundland and Labrador. See Goette, “Canada, the United States,” 252-253.
Canadian military officials were clearly amenable to this solution, which should not be surprising given that it had already been studied by the RCAF-USAF planning group and nominally approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, when an ad hoc group of RCAF and USAF officers under the auspices of the MSG studied this proposal in 1956, they recommended its approval. As their report acknowledges, the Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan (MCC 300/8) lacked the authority and means of dealing with this problem, while the Canada-United States Emergency Air Defence Plan (CANUSEADP 2-56) only sought to coordinate separate Canadian and American air defence plans. Given these present shortcomings, the group concluded that an effective air defence required “decentralization of control under a single authority” with responsibility for the “operational control” of both countries’ air defences forces.394

External Affairs was in turn notably silent on these developments for much of this period, though clearly officials were much more tentative on this whole air defence enterprise. Ambassador to Washington Arnold Heeney was quite clear in a letter to Lester Pearson that he was unhappy with “heavy-handed military expressions on political sensitivities,” and that any distinction between command and operational control was “pretty narrow in practice.”395 Following the ad hoc group’s recommendation to the MSG, officials were “seized of the diplomatic aspects of the agreement...[and] involved in more recent developments by its representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee.”396

Officials like R. M. MacDonnell and Jules Leger largely accepted the requirement for

394 Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defences of Canada and the United States in Peacetime, Appendix to Eight Report of the Canada-US Military Study Group, DEA/50309-40, Ottawa, 19 December 1956, in DCER, Volume 23 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1956), Vol. 23-41. It also recommended a Commander-in-Chief, Air Defence, Canada-US (CINCADCANUS) with operational control over all continental air defences forces, which was justified in terms of the NATO principle of unified command.
396 McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 41.
further air defence integration, recognizing that the air-breathing threat remained a pressing consideration at this time. But they also showed greater concern on the implications of a joint command and the need to ensure proper political control over it.397 And as revealed at a Chiefs of Staff Committee in February 1957, the External Affairs representative was clearly interested in securing “adequate consultations…on matters which might lead to the alerting of the air defense system.”398

The St. Laurent government was close to approving this agreement, with the item even being placed on the agenda of the Cabinet Defence Committee for 15 March 1957. Yet with a federal election to be held on 10 June, the issue of operational integration was seen as simply too politically sensitive and the item was removed. But contrary to initial expectations, the government was soundly defeated by John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives. With the new prime minister’s approval, a North American Air Defence Command vested with the operational control over both countries’ air forces was finally stood up in August 1957.399 This quick approval was undoubtedly due to the strong support of General Charles Foulkes and new Minister of National Defence George Pearkes. As Foulkes himself acknowledged, “we stampeded the incoming government with the NORAD agreement.”400

External Affairs was also successful in getting an exchange of diplomatic notes to retroactively approve this agreement, thanks to a supportive Prime Minister Diefenbaker who was coming under increasing pressure due to the informality of the NORAD

397 Richter, Avoiding Armageddon, 44-45.
398 Quoted in Cox, Guarding North America, 39.
399 The initial proposal was at first based on the concept of a single commander (CINCADCANUS). Yet when announcing the agreement, there were references to an integrated command and an integrated headquarters, though without mention of CINCADCANUS. Eventually, the headquarters versus command issue was blurred, and the new organization was titled North American Air Defence Command.
400 Quoted in McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 45.
agreement. Diplomatic notes were signed on 12 May 1958 and contained a commitment for political consultations on those issues that could impact North American defence, which led General Foulkes to even claim that this meant “we have to be consulted every time the US contemplates using force anywhere in the world.”\textsuperscript{401} Importantly, the notes also had enough references to the Atlantic Alliance that Canadian political authorities could claim a nominal link between NORAD and NATO, specifically through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) that provided general information to the rest of NATO on politico-military developments in North America – though this body did not give NATO any privileged information or had any oversight over NORAD itself. This nominal link made the agreement politically palatable and ensured at least a semblance of distance on the matter – though the classified “terms of references” also made clear that any such linkage was purely fictitious.

**Nuclear Weapons and Air Defence, 1958-65**

The NORAD agreement was certainly a high point in the trend towards expanded cooperation on continental air defences, even if it was equally anomalous in light of Canada’s long-standing preference for informal and flexible arrangements that would minimize any loss of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{402} Yet in a manner that foreshadowed the troubles


\textsuperscript{402} Canada’s preference for looser defence ties was often also shared by the United States, which was keen to avoid close arrangements that could limit their freedom of action. See Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel, “Continental defence: ‘Like farmers whose lands have a common concession line,’” in *Canada’s National
ahead, it also proved controversial for the newly elected government. Lester Pearson’s Liberal opposition had little problem criticizing Diefenbaker’s handling of the entire affair – for the procedural manner in which this decision was made, the apparent diminution of sovereignty that it entailed, and the deliberately ambiguous manner by which the prime minister tried to explain and justify this decision. But with the previous Liberal government having done much of the groundwork for this agreement, there was more than a little irony to this whole controversy.

In 1961, the Diefenbaker government finally agreed to improve the Pinetree Line in what became known as the Continental Air Defence Integration North (CADIN). Pursuant to this agreement, Canada would add two Bomarc-B sites, seven heavy radars, a SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) system, and 47 gap filler radars, though the last was never actually constructed. With the cancellation of the Avro Arrow program in 1959, the government also had a pressing need to find a replacement for the increasingly obsolete fleet of CF-100 Canucks. The Cabinet Defence Committee on 5 February 1959, while reiterating the utility of the Bomarc ground-to-air missile, noted the continued requirement for interceptor aircraft. The RCAF eventually acquired 66 F-101B Voodoo interceptors from the United States, which were made available under a triangular deal in which Canada agreed to take over sixteen Pinetree radar stations and to cover the operating costs for five radars, while the US approved the procurement of


Canadian-manufactured F-104G Starfighter aircraft that became the mainstay of Canada’s 1 Air Division.\footnote{Cox, \textit{Canada and NORAD}, 24; Cox, \textit{Guarding North America}, 177-179; and H. Basil Robinson, \textit{Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 195.}

The Voodoo interceptor and Bomarc-B missile acquisitions, while a necessary measure to upgrade Canada’s air defence system, also posed a significant political challenge. True, both systems were “dual-capable” and could be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads. But at the time, it was generally agreed that these weapon systems would only achieve their full effectiveness if nuclear-armed.\footnote{There is some ambiguity on whether the Bomarc-B was actually dual-capable. Many accounts say it was never designed to be conventionally-armed, unlike the ‘A’ variety. But as Don Munton notes, technical journals at the time say that this missile system could have used either conventional or nuclear armaments. See his “Going fission: tales and truths about Canada’s nuclear weapons,” \textit{International Journal} 51, 3 (1996): 516.} Canadian officials were also clearly not unaware of this fact. The Cabinet Defence Committee had considered the possibility of a nuclear capability when discussing the cancelled CF-105 Arrow and its Bomarc replacement, and Defence Minister Pearkes’s recommendation to acquire the Bomarc-B system was supported by such influential mandarins as Norman Robertson and R. B. Bryce.\footnote{The first point can be inferred from a memorandum given to the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the Canadian Defence Committee meeting. See D. V. Lepan, Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 122nd Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, DEA/50046-40, Ottawa, 5 February 1959, in \textit{DCER}, Volume 26 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1959), Vol. 26-167. On the latter point, see Robert Bothwell, \textit{Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 162, 411.} Meanwhile, Diefenbaker’s cabinet had clearly debated whether the Voodoo aircraft was best suited for a nuclear role.\footnote{Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions, PCO, Ottawa, 9 August 1960, in \textit{DCER}, Volume 27 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1960), Vol. 27-296.} As Prime Minister Diefenbaker himself stated on 20 February 1959 to the House of Commons, “[t]he full
potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.”

Yet the Diefenbaker government was also clearly unwilling to make a final decision to acquire nuclear warheads for these weapon systems or for the other nuclear-capable systems designated for deployment with NATO forces in Europe. The dual-key arrangements favoured by the Americans from 1959 onwards raised the sensitive issue of Canadian autonomy. Washington would retain custody of these weapons, but upon presidential release, Canada would be able to decide whether to use them. As such, “Canada would control the second key, but American custody would mean detachments of US troops at Bomarc and Voodoo bases.” This did not mean that the prime minister fundamentally disagreed with either the requirement for these weapons or the Soviet threat that helped justify them. But he was also exceedingly concerned with the political ramifications of the Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and was under the strong impression – based less on public opinion polls and more on his own personal survey of letters – that the public was firmly against such an arrangement. As H. B. Robinson at External Affairs noted, “His reliance on views expressed in public correspondence, even crackpot letters, to quote a member of his staff, was ‘phenomenal.’”

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410 The two other weapon systems were for forward deployed forces in Europe, and included the CF-104G Starfighter for strike-reconnaissance missions and the Army’s Honest John (previously Lacrosse) short-range artillery rocket. The Royal Canadian Navy also reportedly acquired nuclear-capable systems, even if it did not acquire the nuclear arms for these systems.
411 Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet, “Deploying Nuclear Weapons, 1962-63,” in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, eds. Don Munton and John Kirton (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), 103. The Eisenhower administration had also reportedly offered US nuclear weapons that were to be under Canadian custody and control, with pre-delegation given to Canadian authorities, all of which would be in violation of the US Atomic Agency Act. Cox, *Canada and NORAD*, 27.
Diefenbaker’s dithering led to the curious and politically unpalatable situation in which Canada had constructed installations and completed the deployment for certain weapon systems, such as the Bomarc, which still lacked any sort of armament. It proved particularly maddening to the Americans, who some reports indicate only agreed to the triangular agreement to supply the Canadians with Voodoo interceptors if they were to be equipped with nuclear warheads. Tensions were only heightened after the Cuban missile crisis. Diefenbaker gave an address to the House of Commons that seemed to question US claims about Soviet missiles on Cuba and initially refused to have Canadian air defence forces placed on alert, which was only partially mitigated by the Defence Minister Douglas Harkness’ decision to go on de facto alert. The prime minister, from his perspective, felt snubbed by the lack of political consultations with Washington that was promised in the NORAD exchange of notes – and the fact that the military went on partial alert under Harkness’ authority did little to mollify him.

Other arrangements were in turn proposed to the Americans, in an effort to alleviate some of the fissures in the Canada-US alliance that emerged during this episode. The first entailed having the nuclear warheads located in the United States, to be sent to Canadian bases and installations if the circumstances warranted. The second involved the nuclear warhead being stored on Canadian territory, albeit without a critical component that would only be sent during an emergency. The United States listened politely and even entered exploratory talks, but its interest proved more illusionary than real – and both were rejected. Yet the Diefenbaker government was still no closer to actually

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413 According to David Cox, however, the United States eventually relented to Canadian concerns – and the resultant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) offered vague promises for “mutually agreed” weapon systems. Cox, Canada and NORAD, 25 and Guarding North America, 179
414 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 298-300 and Bow, The Politics of Linkage, 52.
acquiring nuclear warheads for its weapon systems, with many of these alternatives seen as delaying tactics until the government had regained its parliamentary majority. However, the Americans were quickly losing patience. The retiring NATO commander US General Lauris Norstad then criticized Canada’s failure to live up to its alliance obligations in early 1963, which was quickly followed by the formal notification from the US Department of Defense that it rejected the “missing parts” arrangement.

Diefenbaker’s refusal to acquire nuclear weapons, and the bilateral crisis that this generated, is a potential anomaly for the cultural-cybernetic model of explanation. First, it represents a more extreme policy choice than would be predicted by the model. True, with its concern over potential infringements on Canadian autonomy, Diefenbaker’s policies bear a certain resemblance to defensive weak-multilateralism. But the latter SOD is equally concerned with ensuring a modicum of cooperation as it is with minimizing infringement of Canadian sovereignty. And the prime minister made little effort to achieve a workable arrangement on nuclear sharing or to counteract the widening bilateral rift that his policies were generating. As such, Diefenbaker’s extreme policy choices threatened to result in an unbalanced strategy that went beyond the goldilocks range of strategic inclinations. Indeed, the degree to which Diefenbaker’s actions disrupted the workings of Canada-US relations is difficult to exaggerate, with two notable scholars describing this incident as the “one big kerfuffle [that] ever arose between them in the Cold War over continental defence.”

Second, it is equally questionable whether Ottawa confronted the sort of environmental stimuli capable of threatening security and sovereignty values and triggering a change in SOD. Undoubtedly, the Americans were eager to improve air

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defence effectiveness with the addition of nuclear warheads, even if concerns over specific weapon systems like the Bomarc lingered, and viewed Canada’s cooperation on this matter to be of crucial importance. Yet there was also little fundamental disagreement on Canada’s part concerning the requirements and rationale for these weapons. Officials at National Defence saw military and political benefits in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and External Affairs was at least initially far from critical of such an arrangement. Diefenbaker himself was “an ardent anticommunist, profoundly mistrustful of the Soviet leadership, skeptical about the prospects for arms control, and generally accepting of nuclear weapons.” In addition, it was also far from clear that Canada’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was either controversial or politically unpalatable. Public opinion surveys at the time show that, while the populace had mixed feelings towards nuclear weapons, it was becoming increasingly open to accepting them. For instance, a February 1961 Gallup poll indicates that 54 percent were in favour compared to 21 percent opposed, and that figure had increased in a subsequent Gallop poll in November to 61 percent in favour and 31 percent opposed.

These conditions indicate that the Canada should have in fact continued with the continental soft-bandwagoning SOD and accepted US-supplied nuclear warheads at this time. Yet contrary to these predictions, the Diefenbaker government refrained from negotiating in good faith with the Americans. Meanwhile, the consensus over nuclear weapons was collapsing. Minister of External Affairs Howard Green, who had very strong relations with the prime minister, alongside Norman Robertson soon brought External Affairs towards a more critical stance. As one diplomatic observer notes, Green

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had become “the despair of General Pearkes and the senior officers in the Department of National Defence and of their counterparts in Washington.” 419 The policy-making coalition that did emerge featured these critics playing a successful obstructionist role against supporters like Defence Minister Douglas Harkness, as well as elements in the East Block that continued to support nuclear weapons.420 In other words, Diefenbaker’s policy-making coalition and its policy choices represent precisely the opposite of what one would normally predict.

Clearly, a central reason for this anomalous outcome lies with the personality of John Diefenbaker himself, who held few meetings with the Cabinet Defence Committee and rarely deferred to his foreign policy advisors.421 The prime minister had developed a suspicious attitude towards the advice that was given by National Defence following the unexpected controversy generated by the NORAD agreement and the departure of Pearkes, which sharply curtailed the policy influence of supporters of nuclear sharing. True, he also had strained relations with officials from External Affairs, who were seen as “Pearsonalities” more loyal to the opposition Liberal Party and their leader Lester Pearson than the government. However, this fact was at least mitigated by his close relationship with Howard Green. As Howard Lentner notes, Diefenbaker might have sought a compromise between the positions of Harkness and Green, but “his inability to

419 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 114. Both Green and Robertson were interested in pursuing disarmament and had an instinctive revulsion towards nuclear weapons. As their colleague Arnold Heeney observed, each person seemed to reinforce the other’s views. See J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-68 (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1981), Chp. 11.
420 Individuals in or close to the East Block who continued to be supportive of nuclear weapons include Arnold Heeney and Robert Bryce, who were Canada’s ambassador to the United States and secretary to the Cabinet, and those in External Affairs’ Defence Liaison (1) Division. See Richter, Avoiding Armageddon, 96 and Granatstein, A Man of Influence, 345.
achieve it in effect bolstered Green’s position.” Diefenbaker also had notoriously poor relationship with President Kennedy, which the latter’s widespread popularity after the Cuban missile crisis did little to allay, and was under the mistaken impression that nuclear weapons were exceedingly unpopular in Canada.

Importantly, while the Diefenbaker government adopted an idiosyncratic approach that departed from cultural-cybernetic predictions, it also proved exceedingly short-lived. By early 1963, Diefenbaker was facing not only signs of growing American impatience but a Liberal opposition that, due to an influential report by Defence Critic Paul Hellyer, had finally reversed its opposition to nuclear weapons. Pearson himself might still have been personally sceptical about nuclear weapons, but he was now committed to accepting them as part of the country’s alliance obligations. The prime minister tried to explain away his delay in accepting nuclear weapons, but his statements only served to obfuscate matters even further. In a remarkable display of cabinet conflict, it also led to a “clarification” from Defence Minister Harkness, a rebuttal by the US Statement Department, and eventually Harkness’ resignation. An election was called quickly thereafter, which resulted in Diefenbaker’s defeat and the return to power of the opposition Liberal Party under Lester Pearson.

Diefenbaker’s absence had a noticeably positive impact on the tone of Canadian-American relations. It also lessened some of the obstructionist tendencies at External Affairs, which had led to a stalemate between National Defence and External Affairs that prevented any consensus on nuclear weapons. Relations might not have quickly improved between the two departments, but at least a festering issue was finally removed under Pearson’s tenure. The newly elected Liberal government, following months of

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422 Lentner, “Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 52.
negotiations with the Kennedy administration, finally accepted the acquisition of nuclear weapons for its armed forces – these warheads would be under the legal and physical custody of the Americans, and only for use under the joint authorization of both governments. It might have been a preliminary arrangement, but it was a clear indication that the previous government’s dithering had been replaced by a clear return to continental soft-bandwagoning. A permanent secret agreement on nuclear weapons authorization was later signed in 1965, which included at the behest of External Affairs the codification of previous understandings regarding civilian and military consultations between the two countries.

Despite efforts to improve radar coverage and fighter interception, both countries continued to be highly vulnerable to Soviet bomber attacks. Continental air defence simply lacked the kill probability required to protect the populace against Soviet bombers armed with highly destructive hydrogen bombs that were capable of destroying whole population centres. Indeed, both countries were only able to provide a limited area defence capable of blunting light to medium attacks, as opposed to the more rigorous defence against heavy attacks that would require very low leakage. As such, the United States soon found that its nuclear superiority was a “wasting asset” in the face of a growing Soviet retaliatory capability. Air defence remained important, but primarily as a means to safeguard the American nuclear deterrent. Canadian officials largely accepted

424 See Betts, “A Nuclear Golden Age?” 3-33.
this change, even though it entailed not only the protection of the American nuclear
deterrent for both retaliatory purposes and for the type of pre-emptive attack that
continued to appear in American nuclear war plans.427

Conclusion

Canada demonstrated a high degree of strategic sensitivity to American overtures
on air defence in the early Cold War. With its occupation force quickly withdrawn from
Europe and its military spending dramatically cut, Ottawa at first showed little interest in
focusing on the task of strategic air defence. By the 1950s, however, officials would find
it increasingly difficult to discount the growing interest in air defences emanating from
the United States. Aside from the troubling interlude of the Diefenbaker government,
Canada adapted to such strategic preferences with policy choices involving wide-ranging
cooperation balanced with minimal effort at distancing. This culminated with the birth of
NORAD and the belated Canadian acquisition of nuclear warheads.

Canadian policy-makers adopted this undeniably cooperative grand strategy due
to key changes in the environment. Air defences became increasingly prioritized by
American political authorities, who in turn showed little hesitance in communicating their
strong desire for collaboration with their Canadian counterparts. This made it difficult for
officials to either ignore or avoid making a decision on this crucially important strategic
issue, as Diefenbaker ultimately learnt to his regret. Canada also shared a similarly
heightened sense of the Soviet threat with its superpower ally, and was not burdened by

427 See Cox, Canada and NORAD, esp. 9-13 and Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Canada’s Cold War
nuclear experience,” in Pondering NATO’s Nuclear Options, ed. David Haglund (Kingston: Queen’s
Operating Plan, have often involved pre-emptive options – though it is more debatable whether pre-
emption can necessarily be equated with “first-strike.”
any significant domestic political controversy over either air defence or the broader purpose of such active defences within American strategic doctrine. These factors minimized the perceived disruption to Canada’s security-sovereignty balance and made acquiescence to air defence collaboration less onerous.

As predicted by cultural-cybernetic theory, Canada’s policy-making coalitions were therefore structured in accordance to the strategic-doctrinal precepts of continental soft-bandwagoning. And the policy responses that emerged were largely patterned to this Standing Operational Doctrine, combining as it did strong cooperation with some modest effort to attain at least a semblance of distance. There might have been some instances when Canada’s policy choices seemed to diverge away from the goldilocks range of acceptable strategic behaviour and threatened to result in an unbalanced and inconsistent grand strategy, exemplified by the tumultuous years under Prime Minster John Diefenbaker. But this aberrant behaviour proved equally anomalous and ultimately short-lived.
Canada has dealt with American preferences on strategic defence for over sixty years, first as a full participant in air defence and later as a potential participant in all manner of missile defence projects, both research and development and in two instances involving actual deployment. No other ally is so intimately involved in the defence of the American homeland itself, or by dint of the air defence and later early warning mission has such an implicit role in ensuring the survivability of the American strategic nuclear forces. Few countries also had to deal with American missile defence plans so frequently, notwithstanding Canada’s consistent refusal to fully support such initiatives – though the manner in which this refusal is combined by modest forms of cooperation reveals the careful balance inherent in Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy.

This chapter provides an explanation for how Canada has adapted to US plans for strategic missile defence since the latter half of the Cold War, thereby shedding light on the broad continuity and adaptive and consistent pattern evident in Canada’s grand strategy as it pertains to strategic (air and missile) defence. It also utilizes the diachronic method of subdividing the case into individual micro-cases, which will reveal that Canada’s strategic behaviour on missile defence has evolved over the course of three separate initiatives: (1) Canada’s decision to refrain from participating in early missile defence efforts with the Sentinel and Safeguard ABM systems; and (2) its more pointed refusal to participate with the American “Star Wars” research effort; and (3) the most recent 2005 decision to adopt an arms-length approach to US President George W. Bush’s missile defence plans.
In the chapter, I show how Canadian policy responses to strategic defence displayed a remarkable degree of continuity and patterned consistency. Importantly, this does not mean that all Canadian responses are necessarily identical or that Canada’s behaviour is unchanging. Observers are quite right to point to the differences in how Canada has approached some iteration of strategic defence compared to others. But it does mean that the manner by which Canada has dealt with strategic defence – defined broadly to include air defence, missile defence, and other potential measures directed at actively defending against strategic nuclear-armed delivery systems – has many more points of similarity than is commonly acknowledged. And when Canadian behaviour indeed changes, it does so according to an adaptive process that results in a resiliently consistent pattern of adaptations.

My research applies the cultural-cybernetic model in order to trace the causal mechanism that leads to the key decisions within each of these micro-cases. It demonstrates that Canada, while adhering to a continental soft-bandwagoning stance towards air defence, was forced to adapt its response to American missile defence plans as a result of the latter’s disruptive potential to Canada’s security-sovereignty values. Rather than rejecting missile defence outright (as some critics would prefer) or wholeheartedly embracing it (as others would like), Canada instead selected the ambivalent defensive weak-multilateralism doctrine that combined a general refusal to openly participate in missile defence with less visible efforts to assuage any lingering American

security concerns. And contrary to the predictions of many of these critics, Canada’s application of the goldilocks grand strategy to strategic air and missile defence has proven reasonably successful in ensuring that its security and sovereignty values are balanced.

NORAD Renewal and ABM, 1965-75

The deployment of ballistic missiles as the primary vehicle for the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers by the 1960s heralded the decline of the “defensive” justification for strategic defences. The United States quickly moved to reorient its strategic defence effort, hitherto focused on active defences, towards the early warning of any incoming ballistic missile attack. With sufficient warning time, Washington would have the capability to disperse its air defence interceptors and strategic bombers, and launch its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the face of a Soviet first-strike.429

As such, NORAD's role was reconfigured to emphasize surveillance, early warning, and attack assessment based on the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars in Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, United Kingdom, alongside a number of space-based satellite systems – first with Missile Alarm and Detection System and more successfully with the Defense Support Program. Canada continued with its residual air defence and new early warning role within NORAD. There was also a maritime surveillance dimension to this early warning role, in so far as Soviet ballistic missile submarines positioned near coastal areas could fire shorter-range missiles on a depressed trajectory to attack targets in North America. Canada was involved in both

429 The need for early warning was foreseen in the 1955 Killian Report, which was followed by General Operational Requirement 96 that called for a surveillance system in 1955 – though this requirement was only finally approved in 1957 with GOR-156. Cox, Guarding North America, 226.
maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare missions with the United States Navy—though this cooperation was not institutionalized or binational in character.\textsuperscript{430} With its two Baker-Nunn space surveillance cameras, Canada also took part in NORAD’s Space Detection and Tracking System for satellites. Yet Canadian territory was also no longer considered vital in the early warning mission, even if Canada still provided the communication routes for two of the BMEWS radars.\textsuperscript{431}

Despite declaratory acceptance of MAD, US defence planners were never quite comfortable with this strategic situation. They were also rightly concerned that America’s vulnerability to Soviet nuclear retaliation only compromised the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantees to Europe, especially when the US threat of nuclear first-use was designed to deter conventional Soviet aggression against its European allies. As a result, the Kennedy’s administration propagated a Flexible Response strategy that was designed to ensure an expanded range of conventional \textit{and} nuclear options. With US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s preference for “assured destruction,” this flexibility was refashioned in order to allow for a degree of damage-limitation if it ever did come to nuclear war.\textsuperscript{432} So began a curious trend in which declaratory doctrine paid lip service to assured destruction and notions of MAD, but nuclear planners continued with their emphasis on counterforce targeting and flexible strike options.\textsuperscript{433}

\textsuperscript{430} The Soviets never did test their shorter range sea-based ballistic missiles on depressed trajectory, though Yankee submarines were still viewed as a possible threat in the event that the Soviets wanted to hold their long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles in reserve. Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the Cold War at Sea, 1945-68,” in \textit{The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985}, ed. W.A.B. Douglas (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1988): 223-225.


\textsuperscript{432} Cox, \textit{Canada and NORAD}, 35.

\textsuperscript{433} Yet it would be up to Kennedy’s successors to actually achieve greater flexibility in American nuclear war plans. See William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy’, and the Search for Limited
attack assessment function in turn played an important supplementary role in assessing
the scale of any incoming and therefore the “controlled response” to it.434

ABM technology was viewed as an even more tempting prospect, even if it was
also technologically difficult. ABM could conceivably help to protect SAC bases, ICBM
silos, and other elements of the American nuclear infrastructure, but also held the
promise of protection for the populace at large. Both the Killian and Gaither Reports of
the 1950s had recommended that the United States accelerate its effort to develop anti-
ballistic missile systems to complement its existing anti-bomber defence.435 And the
subsequent demonstration of a nuclear capability by Communist China in 1964 surely
reignited interest in missile defence. ABM itself dates back to the US Army’s Nike–Zeus
high-altitude air defence system, which never received full funding or political support
and with its initial plan for large-scale deployments left unfulfilled.436 It did form the
basis for the Nike-X program that eventually evolved into the long-range Spartan
interceptor and short-range Sprint missile, both of which served as the foundation for the
two ABM initiatives of this period – the Sentinel and Safeguard systems under Presidents
Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, respectively.

Canadian officials were certainly not caught unaware of these developments. In
January 1956, Canada participated in a Tripartite Conference on Defence Against
Ballistic Missiles with representatives from the United States and Great Britain, with a
focus on the technical characteristics of ballistic missiles, early detection and tracking

(2005): 34-78.
436 NORAD had drawn up plans under the North American Air Defense Objectives Plans 61-65 for
deployments to protect Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Windsor, and Vancouver. Ann Denholm-Crosby,
radars, and interception requirements. Bilateral efforts also continued with the Americans on both missile tracking and the Nike-Zeus system itself. Indeed, the RCAF seems to have been fully expecting that there would be an operational requirement to defend against ICBMs, at least if one takes the Canadian General Air Staff Target at face value. External Affairs was also well aware that an active defence against ballistic missiles could follow the construction of BMEWS radars. As Norman Robertson notes, given Canada’s provision of communication routes to the BMEWS radars, it was crucial that consultations be established in the event of such an eventuality.

The United States was determined to protect itself against Soviet nuclear-armed bombers and required Canada’s cooperation and access to its territory to do so effectively. And Canadian officials were under no illusion on the existence of this Soviet threat or the importance that Washington attached to this issue, even if political authorities did their best to ensure some distance in this defence arrangement. By the 1950s, Canada appeared to be on the cusp of expanding its preferences to include missile defence, thereby continuing to pursue its continental soft-bandwagoning doctrine on this new iteration of strategic defence. With the return of the Pearson government and its acceptance of nuclear-armed air defence weapons, one could easily be mistaken for assuming that missile defence cooperation was near on the horizon. As Philippe Lagassé

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437 This led to the Tripartite Technical Committee and its subcommittees that would go on to periodically meet for further discussions. The US-UK-CAN Sub-Group F on Defence Against Ballistic Missiles focused on radar and decoy discrimination, while sub-groups D, E and M worked on warning and tracking, weapon assignment, and interception components. See Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 17 and Jeremy Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942-2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2004) 74-75, 81.
438 Jeremy Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 70. This document was reportedly very similar to the British Air Staff Target OR/1135.
notes, ABM answered the ballistic missile threat “in a manner akin to the way that air defences answered the menace of long-range bombers.”\textsuperscript{440}

Beginning in the 1960s, Ottawa agreed to the reorientation of NORAD away from strictly air defence and increasingly towards early warning and attack assessment. Canada continued to provide assets to support continental air defence efforts. According to the 1964 \textit{White Paper on Defence}, however, such resources were expected to “decline through the balance of the decade.”\textsuperscript{441} Clearly, the document proved prescient on that point, as interceptor numbers from both countries were cut, the Mid-Canada Line and DEW Line extensions to detect intrusions on the Pacific and Atlantic approaches were closed, and the Permanent and CADIN-Pinetree systems thinned.\textsuperscript{442} Notably, the white paper also pointed out that an “anti-ICBM” system, if developed and deployed, could have a “profound effect on North American defence.” Yet contrary to the expectation of those hoping for a more proactive stance, it concluded that “there are no major questions of policy in this area which are ready for resolution at this time.”\textsuperscript{443}

This non-committal position came to a temporary end in 1967, when Robert McNamara announced that the United States would proceed with the development of a Sentinel ABM system. This would entail of a two-tiered layered defence system consisting of Spartan and Sprint missiles at fifteen sites, capable of protecting cities from accidental launches and Chinese ICBMs, perhaps with a breakout capability against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{444} Prime Minister Pearson responded four days later with a public statement, in which he noted that Ottawa had “no intention at this time of taking part in

\textsuperscript{440} Lagassé, “Canada, strategic defence and strategic stability,” 922.
\textsuperscript{441} Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{White Paper on Defence} (Ottawa: March 1964), 14.
\textsuperscript{442} Jockel, \textit{Canada in NORAD}, 66-67.
\textsuperscript{443} \textit{White Paper on Defence}, 14.
any such ABM system.\textsuperscript{445} The Americans were now moving towards the development of an ABM system, but they would do so without any Canadian cooperation. Despite the prime minister’s own desire to repair Canada-US relations, Ottawa opted for a more significant arms-length approach towards the United States. In light of its past cooperation on air defence, Canada’s decision to refrain from cooperating on missile defence might first appear puzzling.

However, Canadian officials confronted a different environment in the late 1960s compared to the decade before it. The United States and Canada had previously constructed a comprehensive air defence system, which at its height included some 3,000 interceptors, 575 surface-to-air missile batteries, and 480 radar installations in four radar networks, along with coastal radars and seaward extensions of the DEW Line – including Texas Tower platforms and picket ships – to prevent end-running of the Arctic radar system.\textsuperscript{446} True, there can be no denying that the Johnson administration had also prioritized missile defence, with the announced Sentinel system having an expected price tag of $5 billion, a not inconsiderate amount for an administration fighting an expansive and costly war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{447} Yet ABM also lacked the broad political consensus that underpinned the earlier iteration of strategic defence. Despite the discomfort generated by the notion of MAD, there remained some notable adherents to its strategic logic – including Defence Secretary McNamara himself. Perhaps even more salient was the questionable cost effectiveness of any ABM system, a fact that was true in the late 1960s

\textsuperscript{445} Quoted in Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, 50.
\textsuperscript{447} Following the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the United States began to rapidly increase its military role in Vietnam, including a gradual and sustained strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam under Operational Rolling Thunder from 1965-68 and a dramatic build-up of American ground forces in South Vietnam that continued for the rest of the decade.
and became even truer when MIRV (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle) technology resulted in a significant increase in the number of nuclear warheads. It is therefore telling that McNamara, even as he announced the decision to go ahead with the project, also summarized the limitations and potential dangers of the Sentinel system.\(^{448}\)

There can be no denying that the United States, while perhaps lacking the domestic consensus on the value of ABM, still intended to field a missile defence capability. However, this opened up the next question to face policy-makers – if the Sentinel system was indeed to proceed, did it require Canada’s participation? And Washington did give some tentative indications that it valued Canada’s possible participation. For instance, an American representative to the PJBD in 14 October 1966 noted that “ABM would likely have implications for Canadian territory and airspace.”\(^{449}\) And there were at least hints that the United States valued Canadian territory as a site for possible ABM radars.\(^{450}\) But as noted by James Fergusson, officials in Ottawa also found it difficult to access American thinking on ABM – at least without a more definite signal that they might be interested in participating in the project. Instead, they had to rely for the most part on the “limited information provided by the United States in formal briefings or through unofficial contacts, rumours, and speculation.”\(^{451}\) However, even with its uncertain place in any ABM scheme, Canada understood that it lacked the same strategic salience for American defence planners as it once did.

\(^{448}\) McNamara criticized ABM for being too focused on a limited range of threats and, if ever developed into more robust system directed against the Soviets, could generate a destabilizing arms race. For more on Macnamara’s views on ABM, see Charles E. Costanzo, “Shades of Sentinel? National Missile Defense, Then and Now,” *Aerospace Power Journal* 15, 3 (2001): 64.

\(^{449}\) Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 42.


\(^{451}\) Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 38.
Previously, Canadian territory and its active participation were required to make any such anti-bomber defence effective, and US officials made this fact known to their counterparts in Ottawa. With ABM, information was harder to come by and the US offered fewer comments on how the system could impact or involve Canadian territory and airspace. Indeed, a Canada-US study group formed in 1968 to more fully examine Canadian participation in ABM had little to show for its effort and was terminated a few years later. As such, there was little reason to believe that Canada would play an important role in the Sentinel system. Early indications that Canadian territory had lost its salience can be found in the location of the BMEWS radars to detect ballistic missile launches, none of which was located in Canada. Moreover, the Sentinel system was designed to undertake terminal interceptions and therefore had to be located near the area requiring protection, which created little rationale to place Spartan or Sprint interceptors on Canadian territory to protect American cities.

However, with its role in continental defence and NORAD, Canada had little choice other than to respond to the American initiative – and there were definite reasons why it was not positive. First, unlike today’s kinetic hit-to-kill interceptors, both Spartan and Sprint interceptors relied on nuclear warheads to offset the limited accuracy available for missile technology at the time. Canadian officials at National Defence and External Affairs were aware that Nike-Zeus relied on nuclear warheads, with the country’s own studies on missile defence noting that the non-nuclear interceptions were technologically...

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453 Canadian officials should have been well aware of this fact, given their knowledge and limited involvement on the Nike-Zeus missile. However, this did not stop External Affairs from drafting a memorandum that reiterated the air defence logic of moving engagements northwards. It would, however, make more sense for exo-atmospheric interception in the boost or midcourse phase of a ballistic missile trajectory. Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 43, 274.
infeasible. With the recent controversy over nuclear weapons still fresh in Ottawa, there was little wonder why Canadian officials were not open to reigniting the debate by cooperating on a nuclear-armed ABM system.

Second, previous governments had little problem with how air defence helped to blunt the Soviet capacity to strike North America with nuclear weapons. Deterrence was defined largely in unilateral terms, with any notion that the US should itself be vulnerable to a nuclear strike considered both highly destabilizing and anathema to strategists of the day. The Pearson government, however, had to struggle with the question of ABM at a time when MAD had gradually supplanted the unilateral deterrence of the Soviets. Officials at National Defence were by no means unfamiliar with the notion that mutual vulnerability might actually be a stabilizing development. As noted in the 1964 defence white paper, this meant that “calculated all-out thermonuclear war would be irrational and is, therefore, improbable.” In such a context, missile defence was seen as posing a potentially disruptive element to the mutual deterrence that existed between both superpowers. Lester Pearson was himself known to have serious qualms with missile defence and, shortly after McNamara’s announcement, he stated as much in his comments about how Sentinel could lead to a “new dimension” in the arms race.

The Pearson government also had to contend with the growing public discontent with the United States arising from the latter’s increasingly bloody intervention in Vietnam, which made any agreement on ABM a politically sensitive matter. If embraced in the same manner as air defence, Canada would have made a move towards closer

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454 Ibid., 35.
456 White Paper on Defence, 10.
457 Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 70
proximity to the United States that was capable of endangering its perceived sovereignty and independence. Indeed, such cooperation would have represented a policy choice outside of the goldilocks range of acceptable behavioural inclinations and a definite shift towards a more unbalanced grand strategy.

As such, one would predict that the environmental factors surrounding this new American initiative would trigger a change in SOD away from the continental soft-bandwagoning that had dominated Canadian policies for much of the last two decades. However, with Sentinel system lacking unanimous domestic support and not requiring Canadian involvement, Ottawa also did not experience the same sort of pressure to respond positively to this initiative. It had more room to refuse cooperation without dire consequences. A shift to defensive weak-multilateralism was expected, but it would not be a wholesale shift or entail as much effort to assuage American security concerns.

As a result, the policy coalition that emerged under Pearson lacked the strong proponents of strategic defence that existed in the previous episodes. External Affairs not only displayed little interest in the value of missile defence, but even wanted to focus on a possible agreement prohibiting ABM systems as part of its arms control and disarmament policy, which it was pursuing with increased vigour in negotiations leading up to the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).\(^\text{458}\) As James Fergusson concludes, the department “feared that the United States wanted and/or needed Canada to participate.”\(^\text{459}\) Officials at the East Block were, however, concerned that a refusal to cooperate on ABM would endanger Canada’s privileged role in NORAD.

\(^{458}\) Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 45. Missile defence was viewed as a possible facilitator for vertical nuclear proliferation and therefore contrary to the spirit of the NPT. In addition, an ABM system that used nuclear warheads could make it difficult for Canada to eventually pursue a ban on nuclear weapons in space.

\(^{459}\) Ibid., 36.
The close functional similarity between air defence and missile defence meant that NORAD was the natural loci for the Sentinel system, and the agreement was up for renewal soon thereafter. This point was raised in a paper by the Division of Continental Policy at External Affairs in 1965, and it would also mark the department’s effort to separate NORAD and ABM as separate issues.460

National Defence had much less of a fundamental objection to ABM itself, even if some of their more astute analysts did question the strategic rationale of the Sentinel system. Like their diplomatic colleagues, defence officials were intent on ensuring that the NORAD arrangement remained strong, but they were more pessimistic that NORAD and ABM could be separated. With Canada’s participation in ABM seen as the best way to keep NORAD relevant, National Defence was perhaps most concerned that Canadian involvement was neither needed nor even wanted. However, despite Pearson’s initial inclination that the two issues could not be separated, this would change in an April 1967 meeting between McNamara and Hellyer. In it, Canada’s defence minister was assured not only that ABM and NORAD could be separated, but that the United States was also “not requesting Canadian participation,” even if McNamara still indicated a cooperative arrangement remained possible.461

As a result of this exchange, Prime Minister Pearson effectively sided with his foreign policy advisers and chose to refrain from any possible participation in American ABM plans – it was simply seen as too contrary to the internationalist goal of ensuring a situation of MAD between the two superpowers. Discussion in Ottawa had largely been limited to how ABM would impact NORAD, as opposed to the strategic value of missile

460 Ibid., 37-38, 44.
461 Ibid., 45.
defence per se. And given these high-level American assurances that it would not, officials largely acquiesced to this outcome. Importantly, the prime minister also offered the caveat of “at this time” in his official response, thereby leaving open the possibility of participation in ABM at a later date. This ambiguity was favoured by National Defence, in so far as defence officials were more openly in favour of ABM cooperation, but it was also valued by External Affairs for the greater diplomatic flexibility that it brought in dealings with the Americans. 462

True, left-wing elements of the Pearson government, such as President of the Privy Council Walter Gordon and Minister of Justice Pierre Trudeau, also questioned Canada’s commitment to NORAD. However, Pearson dismissed their concerns and proceeded to renewal NORAD for an additional five years in 1968. The new agreement did include a clause that specified that the command’s renewal will not “involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence.” 463 Clearly, then, the ABM exclusion clause provided some much needed assurances to these critics who remained apprehensive about the NORAD-ABM link, even if it had more debatable “practical or legal effects.” 464

Canada still had the option of eventually deciding to participate in ABM. With the arrival of US President Richard Nixon in the fall of 1968 and his decision to replace Sentinel with a “thin” Safeguard ABM system, it did appear that the time had finally arrived. After all, Sentinel was geared to provide a limited defence of urban areas in the continental United States, and could at least be labelled as a possible threat to MAD. In

462 Ibid., 48.
464 Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 778
contrast, Safeguard was an even more modest point-defence system designed to protect ICBM and command and control sites, a mission that could be seen as helping to better secure the second-strike retaliatory forces in support of MAD.

Despite this difference, however, little had fundamentally changed since Pearson first gave his answer to the Sentinel system. On one hand, Lester Pearson might have retired from politics in 1968, but his successor Pierre Trudeau emerged from the nationalist left-wing of the Liberal Party eager to re-orient Canada’s foreign and defence policy away from the United States. A long-standing critic of ABM, it was quickly evident that Trudeau’s views had not changed much since becoming prime minister – as was revealed in March 1969, when Trudeau was quoted as saying that the ABM system under consideration would endanger world peace.\(^\text{465}\) Indeed, the prime minister was an early convert to the idea of “mutually assured deterrence,” as the acronym was spelled out by British historian Michael Howard.\(^\text{466}\) He would also go beyond his predecessor in his 1971 white paper, *Defence in the 70s*, to acknowledge that a “catastrophic war between the super powers constitutes the only major threat to Canada,” and therefore that the overriding defence goal was to prevent nuclear war by supporting “a system of stable mutual deterrence.”\(^\text{467}\) Even after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, officials remained convinced that the country was now risk-adverse and keen to “avoid a general war and to keep Eastern Europe quiet.”\(^\text{468}\)

\(^{468}\) Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 192.
MAD largely seen as underpinning this period of reduced superpower tensions, the Trudeau government refocused its effort to help ensure that MAD was sustained.

On the other hand, Canadian supporters of the Safeguard ABM had to contend not only with the controversy generated by its use of nuclear warheads, but also the notoriously unpopular administration under President Richard Nixon. The country had witnessed an increase in anti-Americanism and nationalism since the late 1960s, partly due to the growing American economic presence on Canadian territory and partly the result of the discomfort that the Vietnam War had generated amongst some of its closest allies. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, polls indicate that half the Canadian population thought American influence on Canada was excessive. It certainly did not help that the Nixon administration oversaw a notable escalation in the Vietnam War and was not terribly disposed to its northern neighbour, as reflected in both its challenge to Canada’s territorial claim in the Northwest Passage and Ottawa’s failure to attain exemption in the “Nixon shock” of 1971. The president might have famously called for a more “mature” relationship to replace the “special relationship” in his 1972 visit to Ottawa, but his relationship with Trudeau remained notably frosty.

Canadian defence officials might have initially hoped that Pearson’s ambiguous response would allow them to be someday involved in the ABM system, even with the NORAD agreement’s exclusion clause. However, they soon discovered that US officials

469 Polls indicate that 53 percent of Canadians thought American influence in or on Canada was excessive in 1966, and this climbed to 57 by 1974. In comparison, only 27 percent had the same thought in 1956. Ibid., 41.
470 In August 1971, President Nixon abruptly suspended the dollar’s convertibility with gold and imposed import surcharges in a unilateral effort to redress America’s balance of trade deficit. Canada had generated a trade surplus in merchandise, arising from the Autopact agreement signed in 1965, and was seen as part of the problem. Notably, Canada did not receive any exemption from this “Nixon shock.” See Bruce Muirhead, “From Special Relationship to Third Option: Canada, the US, and the Third Option,” American Review of Canadian Studies 34, 3 (2004): 439-462.
471 Muirhead, “From Special Relationship,” 455.
had a stricter definition of this clause and refused to change this position until the Canadian government was openly committed to ABM.\textsuperscript{472} Any such expectation was quickly dashed under the new prime minister. Indeed, Trudeau was intent on continuing his predecessor’s more distant approach, though he was also careful not to publicly oppose or rebuke the Americans on their decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM, to the chagrin of those seeking an even more critical stance on this issue.\textsuperscript{473} In any event, Trudeau’s more cautious stance towards ABM seemed to have been vindicated only a few short years later, when both superpowers signed the 1972 ABM Treaty that ensured only two limited ABM sites would be permitted, which was further reduced to only a single site with the 1974 Protocol. By 1975, the United States only had one operational ABM site in Grand Forks, North Dakota with a limited number of interceptors (capped at 100), and even this system was just as quickly deactivated after several months of service – though its phased array radar continued to be used in support of NORAD’s early warning functions.\textsuperscript{474} Notably, in a move that clearly indicated a desire to balance distance with low-key cooperation, Canada still permitted NORAD’s early warning role to be assigned to Safeguard during its short operational life, even if command and control remained in the hands of US Continental Air Defense Command.\textsuperscript{475}

\textsuperscript{472} See Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, Chp. 1
\textsuperscript{473} Warnock, “Canada and North American Defence,” 82
\textsuperscript{474} See Douglas Ross, \textit{Coping with Star Wars: Issues for Canada and the Alliance}, Aurora Papers 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), 28-34.
\textsuperscript{475} James Fergusson has reviewed a number of Cabinet documents concerning the NORAD renewal of 1973 and 1975. He notes that there does not appear to be much evidence that the Canadian cabinet considered the transfer of NORAD’s early warning functions for use during the brief operational life of the Safeguard ABM system. See Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, 279.
ADI, SDI, and Mulroney’s “Polite No,” 1975-90

Many Canadian officials were undoubtedly glad that missile defence was now off the table, even if this made air defence both redundant and anomalous. NORAD was only renewed for two years in 1973, which gave both countries time to further re-assess the requirements for air defence. By 1974, however, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger finally made it clear that anti-bomber defences should also expect budgetary cuts. NORAD’s air defence mission was explicitly downgraded the following year. But its renewal did feature a more realistic accounting of the command’s current responsibilities, including sovereignty protection and integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA), with the latter ensuring a “launch-on-warning” posture and facilitating the limited nuclear options envisioned in the “Schlesinger doctrine,” as enshrined in National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242).476 Trudeau was undoubtedly pleased with this renewed focus on sovereignty, in so far as it complemented a central thrust of his 1971 defence white paper.477 At the recommendation of the PJBD, both countries agreed to reconfigure the regional boundaries under NORAD to make them accord with national boundaries. This reconfiguration was finally completed in 1982 with the replacement of the outdated SAGE systems with Regional Operational Control Centres.478

Yet NORAD also faced another challenge in the 1970s – some of the key air defence assets were in pressing need of replacement. The US was well aware that the current air defence system required significant capital replacement. Officials had

476 Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 95-96.
477 Defence in the 70s, 8-11.
meanwhile briefed their Canadian counterparts at National Defence and External Affairs of an approved planning concept for a modernized air defence system by the late 1960s. It included the development of an advanced interceptor; a joint civilian-military array of radars called the Joint Surveillance System to replace the Permanent system; Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft; and new Over-The-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars, which were able to detect low-flying aircraft at very long ranges. There was little direct mention of assets located on Canadian territory, including the CADIN-Pinetree and DEW Lines that were becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. As revealed in the 1971 defence white paper, however, Canada did show interest in the OTH-B radar and had made plans to test this system in the Canadian Arctic.479 There was also some interest that the northern deployments of AWACS could be a possible alternative in the event that the OTH-B tests proved unsuccessful.

With the American downgrade of air defence, it became more questionable whether this planning concept would ever be fully implemented. The United States proceeded with the Joint Surveillance System and the development of OTH-B radars. Importantly for Canada, the OTH-B radar test that took place in the Canadian Arctic proved unsuccessful – the Aurora Borealis disrupted the signal and made this new type of radar system that relied on bouncing signals off the ionosphere useless in such conditions. In addition, the United States had fewer AWACS for continental air defence and there was little possibility that these aircraft could be used to replace Canada’s radar requirements. Defence planners in Washington began to focus on a ground-based

479 Defence in the 70s, 30.
Enhanced Distant Early Warning Line, and let it be known that they expected Canadians to help to cover the costs of this project. ⁴⁸⁰

Canada retained a strong interest in continued air defence cooperation. The country benefited from a favourable cost-sharing arrangement in NORAD, which meant that it was able to pursue the task of sovereignty protection more cost-effectively. ⁴⁸¹ Continued cooperation on air defence also made strategic sense. If missile defences were to be deployed in substantial numbers, there would be an attendant need to also reinforce air defence measures – to use a popular analogy from former NORAD commander US General Robert Herres, it would make little sense to build a roof (against ballistic missiles) without walls (against bombers and advanced cruise missiles). ⁴⁸² Lastly, Canada’s decision to refuse similar cooperation on Sentinel and Safeguard also made it even more imperative that air defence cooperation be maintained. Defensive weak-multilateralism involved an arms-length approach to ABM, but also required that such distancing be matched with continued cooperation – this would help to ensure that Canadian grand strategy remains balanced within the prescribed goldilocks range.

As such, Ottawa was undoubtedly receptive to the latent American preference to replace the northern radar line. But it also proved more difficult to accept in principle than to actually implement, in so far as Canada also had a simultaneous interest to replace the CADIN-Pinetree Line. The latter project was a priority for a Trudeau government keen to translate its rhetoric on sovereignty protection into a reality, but officials were

⁴⁸⁰ Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 99.
alarmed to discover little interest south of the border. As John Anderson concludes, “It seemed possible that the defense budget would have to pay the full cost of replacing the CADIN/Pinetree Line, that the resulting expenditure would not be seen by the American government as an effective contribution to the modernization of the North American air defense system, and that the Canadian government would be pressed as well to make a sizable financial contribution to replacement of the DEW Line.”

Canadian officials, keen to have an agreeable cost sharing arrangement, found it difficult to get sustained high-level US attention on this matter. Simply put, while recognizing the need for modernization, the United States did not place much emphasis on the issue of air defences. A bilateral group was formed at Canada’s insistence in 1976, but produced little in the way of results. It would only be in 1979 that significant progress emerged with the jointly funded Joint US-Canada Air Defence Study (JUSCADS). This study noted that the air defence system “remained much the same as it was in the late 1950s, leaving significant gaps in coverage for bomber warning and apparently ignoring airspace integrity enforcement problems.” It also brought attention to the threat of stand-off “precursor” attacks by long-range and low-flying air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).  

483 Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 99. It should also be noted that in an air defence policy review, completed prior to the broader Defence Structure Review, Ottawa did propose in, a joint civilian-military radar system similar to the American Joint Surveillance System that was never implemented.
485 The bilateral group was termed the Ad Hoc Canada–United States Steering Group on the Sharing of Responsibilities for Modernization of the North American Air Defense System.
486 Quoted in Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Canada’s Territorial Air Defence (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1985), 11.
487 If the Soviet Union armed its advanced bombers with ALCMs, it would have a stand-off capability for precursor strikes capable of blinding and potentially crippling America’s command and control system.
The United States proved to be particularly receptive to the JUSCADS recommendations. It had grown increasingly alarmed by the continued growth in the Soviet nuclear arsenal and expanded blue-water naval force, which was only amplified by the Americans’ own post-Vietnam military retrenchment.488 With the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Carter administration undertook the first real increase in defence spending in several years and approved Presidential Directive 59, which reoriented American nuclear strategy towards a “countervailing” posture that envisioned expanded targeting options, counterforce and counter-leadership strikes, and the ability to fight in a prolonged nuclear war.489 The USAF was in turn tasked to draft an Air Defense Master Plan (ADMP). Canadian officials already agreed on the requirement for a master plan to govern air defence and had little problem when JUSCADS was used as the basis for the ADMP, which was still in the process of completion when Carter lost the election.490

US President Ronald Reagan came to office intent on accelerating this effort. In October 1981, he announced an ambitious strategic modernization program under National Security Decision Directive 12 (NSDD-12) to fund new heavy ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles, a new generation of intercontinental bombers, ALCMs and

488 Critics of détente pointed to the Soviet advantage in ICBMs warheads and ballistic missile launchers. This created the possibility that the Soviets could use half of their ICBM force to wipe out the US land-based deterrent, with the rest of their forces held as a strategic reserve. This possibility of a “window of vulnerability,” in which the Soviet’s residual capacity could offer some political or coercive advantage, was first raised in Paul Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” Foreign Affairs 54, 2 (January 1976): 207-232. Yet recent accounts show that US estimates overstated both Soviet ICBM accuracy and silo hardness. See Pavel Podvig, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s – A Research Note,” International Security 33, 1 (2008): 118-138.


SLCMs in what amounted to a de facto “fourth leg” of the nuclear triad, a more survivable communications and command system, and new strategic defence measures. This was followed by NSDD-13, which continued his predecessor’s emphasis on a nuclear “countervailing strategy,” even if leaks of the Defence Guidance reveal a greater emphasis in forcing the “earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.” With the USAF’s ADMP also completed that year, the administration incorporated this plan within its own strategic modernization program, albeit with some revisions.

Officials at National Defence were able to review sections of the draft ADMP before it was submitted to the secretary of defense in early 1981. Later that year, Trudeau and Reagan signed the Canada-US Joint Policy Statement on Air Defence and NORAD was renewed for an additional five years – notably, the new agreement included a name change to North American Aerospace Defence Command and the elimination of the ABM exclusion clause. The ADMP in turn formed the basis for negotiations over a North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM) agreement between the two countries. The plan had four key elements: a North Warning System (NWS) replacement for the DEW Line, composed of minimally attended long-range radars and fully

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491 Ross, Coping with Star Wars, 35.
494 R. B. Byers, “NORAD, Star Wars, and Strategic Doctrine: The Implications for Canada,” in Aerospace Defence: Canada’s Future Role? Wellesley Papers 9 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 45. The Reagan administration also requested revisions to ADMP to make it more responsive to the nuclear war-fighting. This might have had some impact on the envisioned command, control and communication systems and the subsequent focus on space-based assets.
495 The former was triggered by the 1978 COSMOS 954 incident, in which NORAD failed to immediately inform the prime minister of a Soviet satellite crashing on Canadian territory. The latter was accepted by officials as a result of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was seen as a sufficient safeguard against Canadian participation in missile defence. See Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 102-110.
automated short-range radars; OTH-B radars in the United States; AWACS aircraft to provide a surveillance and control element for interceptors; and new F-15 fighters to replace the USAF’s existing fleet of interceptors. However, negotiations over the NAADM were still ongoing when the Liberal government was finally defeated in the polls in 1984.

In 1983, even as the United States was renewing bilateral air defence cooperation with Canada, President Reagan surprised many observers by announcing a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – an exceedingly ambitious research and development program meant to provide missile defence options for future administrations. It considered a range of technologies, including the Homing Overlay Experiment that studied kinetic-energy interceptors and the High Frontier program’s emphasis on directed-energy and space-based weapons. With the 1983 SDI announcement, Canada once again confronted a definite renewal of the American preference for strategic missile defence. Importantly, it also showed that Canada could no longer rely on the ABM Treaty, which technically permitted SDI research, to avoid a decision on this matter. Simply put, if Ottawa did indeed decide to cooperate on research, it could easily be construed as acquiescing to participate in any future operational missile defence system.

496 Trudeau had approved the 1975 Defence Structure Review, which increased funds for capital replacement projects and already led to a new fleet of CF-18 Hornets to replace its air defence interceptors and strike-reconnaissance aircraft in Europe. While prompted by pressure from our NATO allies, its procurement did solve an important question concerning Canada’s air defence modernization effort. See Canada’s Territorial Air Defence, 10.
497 See John Jungerman, The Strategic Defense Initiative: A Critique and a Primer, Policy Paper 8 (San Diego, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1988). Even after signing the ABM Treaty and dismantling its Safeguard ABM site, the US military was largely unhindered in its research on missile defence related technologies, specifically on ground- and space-based kinetic interceptors and directed energy weapons – much of this research would form the basis of SDI projects. Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 116-117.
SDI was also capable of disrupting Canada’s balance between security and sovereignty and further cementing defensive weak-multilateralism. First, the Reagan administration was clearly more supportive than its predecessors on the question of missile defence. True, it did have well known sceptics such as US Secretary of State George Shultz. But many officials “belonged to an ideological right that included right-wing republicans and neo-conservatives.” Some saw SDI as a solution to the problem of the MX ICBM’s vulnerability, while others likely viewed the project in a more visionary light, whether as a damage-limiting adjunct to an ambitious war-winning nuclear posture or as a first step towards a defence-dominant world.

Second, it is equally true that Canada’s participation on SDI, much like with both Sentinel and Safeguard, was not necessarily required. According to the Gerold Yonas of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, SDI was a research program that was expected to last until the early 1990s and would be followed by three subsequent phases – the second being engineering, testing and design of interceptors; the third being the deployment of the BMD system; and a final phase in which the defences were complete and offensive missiles were at their low point. Officials in Ottawa therefore had little idea whether the resultant system would require Canadian territory, even if critics of SDI were quick to raise concerns that some components might indeed be located in Canada.

498 Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 205.
499 Ibid., 156. Among the key members of Reagan’s hard-line foreign and defence policy appointees, advisors and consultants include Caspar Weinberger, Richard Perle, Fred Ikle, Alexander Haig (until his replacement by George Shultz), Admiral James Watkins, Paul Nitze, Richard Allen, and Colin Gray.
500 The president was perhaps a believer in SDI’s potential to overturn MAD, at least based on his incredulous reaction at being told that the US had no anti-ICBM defences in 1978. See Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, Chp. 1.
501 Ross, Coping with Star Wars, 17.
502 Canada would reportedly be a good staging point for systems such as the exo-atmospheric re-entry vehicle interceptor system, the high-altitude endo-atmospheric defence interceptor, and Braduskull. See Douglas Ross, “SDI and Canadian-American Relations: Managing Strategic Doctrinal Incomptatabilities,”
That being said, there was greater expectation within External Affairs and other key players that SDI would in fact involve an invitation to participate.\textsuperscript{503} American officials had notified their counterparts on the possible areas where Canadian participation on SDI research might prove useful, including on ballistic missiles, command and control, and microelectronics.\textsuperscript{504} And as Canada’s ambassador to Washington Alan Gotlieb astutely noted in a memorandum sent to Ottawa in 1985, with SDI appearing as a “religious movement in which no doubts were permitted,” the United States “would likely view allied responses to SDI, invited or not, as a loyalty test.”\textsuperscript{505} In any event, the matter finally came to a head in March 1985, when US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger gave an open invitation for NATO allies – including Canada – to participate in SDI.

Third, Canada might have been open to accepting NORAD renewal and the attendant modernization of its air defence systems. Such measures represented a useful way to ensure Canadian sovereignty. But it was also becoming clear that modern air defences were now needed to counter advanced Soviet bombers, ALCMs, and SLCMs. Indeed, this threat was repeatedly raised in different Senate reports as well as in External Affairs Minister Joe Clark’s introductory words in the 1985 NAADM agreement.\textsuperscript{506}

However, SDI proved to be a much more difficult venture for Canada to easily accept, let

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\item[503] This can be partially attributed to the broad nature of SDI research, which could benefit from the financial and technological support of American allies. But it is also likely the result of the Reagan administration’s belated recognition that having countries attached to this initiative could prove valuable.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{504} Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, 82}
\item[505] Gotlieb noted these concerns in a memorandum dated 5 March 1985, which was paraphrased in Ibid., 89
\end{footnotes}
alone embrace. SDI research might be permitted, but there was little doubt that an operational system would entail a fundamental departure from the ABM Treaty and the sacrosanct notion of MAD that it embodied. Modernized air defences could be justified as an insurance that the American nuclear deterrent was survivable against a blinding or decapitating precursor strike, and even if this assertion did not go unchallenged. But the thick defences envisioned in SDI were another matter altogether.

Fourth, SDI looked at a number of possible interceptor technologies for the eventual system. It might not be burdened by the opprobrium attached to nuclear weapons, but SDI also proved controversial due to the distinct (though exaggerated) impression that its research was solely concerned with developing a space-based system. The dangers of space weaponization, which had become increasingly salient in Canada since Trudeau’s call for an anti-satellite ban in 1982, was frequently raised by the Liberal Party once they were confined to the Official Opposition. One should also not underestimate the controversial ambitions of SDI itself, which seemed to challenge two-decades of conventional wisdom concerning MAD, or the unpopularity of the Reagan administration as a result of its aggressive policies and abrasive tactics. The Canadian populace might not have been united in opposition over SDI, but it was apparently pretty evenly divided on it. As a May 1985 Gallup poll indicates, 53 percent favoured participation compared to 40 percent who opposed it. In a Southam poll taken in August 1985, this changed to 40.5 percent and 42.3 percent.

508 Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 82-84.
509 See Ross, “SDI and Canadian-American Relations,” 150
With the controversial nature of the initiative and in the absence of any mutual understanding on its requirement, Canada could not cooperate on SDI without ignoring its own concerns about the project and appearing to discard its own sovereign independence on this matter. This required a more arms-length approach to minimize any trade-offs between security and sovereignty inherent with cooperation. Unlike ABM before it, however, the United States also attached greater importance to SDI and was keen to have positive responses to it. To ensure a balanced grand strategy that maintained proximity with efforts at distance, this meant a more explicit effort to placate possible US sensitivities on this matter.

The policy-making coalition that took root in Ottawa in the mid-1980s was structured largely along the lines one would expect for the defensive weak-multipolarism SOD. National Defence was at the forefront in arguing for participation as a full partner in SDI. This point was hinted at in the first formal briefing on SDI that took place in August 1984, when Defence Minister Robert Coates offered supportive words on how the initiative heralded a shift away from MAD towards assured survival. It would later be made even clearer in the debate on a joint External Affairs-National Defence memorandum, where defence officials indicated that SDI was vital to ensure access to American plans on continental defence – though they did acknowledge that the requirements for North American air defence modernization did help to safeguard NORAD. In this effort, National Defence was supported in part by the Department of Regional and Industrial Expansion, which saw some industrial advantages if Canadian businesses, with active government support, became involved on SDI.

The following three paragraphs are heavily based on Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, Chp. 2.
In contrast, External Affairs and its Minister Joe Clark remained more sceptical on the value of SDI and prone to believe that agreement on research could very well entail involvement in an operational system. But as James Fergusson notes, External Affairs was itself divided between those more favourably disposed to SDI in the Canada-US relations group, which saw SDI involvement as a means to ensure closer bilateral cooperation, and an international security and arms control faction that objected to SDI on those very grounds. To be sure, External Affairs and National Defence worked closely alongside the Privy Council Office in an ad hoc interdepartmental working group, and an attempt to bridge their divergent views took place in the discussions over a joint memorandum. But once sent to the External Affairs Minister’s office, this memorandum would run afoul of Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, who was (and remains) a determined opponent to missile defence. This was indicative that the department, despite internal divisions and owing to the influence of those ill disposed to SDI, would play an increasingly obstructionist role to colleagues at National Defence Headquarters with much more cooperative preferences on missile defence.

The Privy Council Office in turn played a supporting role aimed at achieving a way out of this impasse. This can be seen in the analysis of Robert Fowler, assistant secretary of the foreign and defence policy secretariat at the Privy Council, who often recommended “shades of grey” approach to SDI, in which both complete cooperation and rejection of the invitation were dismissed as being infeasible. Instead, he advocated compromise positions that allowed for some degree of cooperation – for example, by allowing Canadian companies to compete for SDI contracts – without full endorsement of
the project. It is perhaps telling that Prime Minister Mulroney, facing a bureaucratic stalemate on this issue, would form a task force led by Arthur Kroeger, who lacked a governmental position at the time, to subsume the divergent views of these bureaucratic actors. And Kroeger’s report to the prime minister identified a number of options that were similar to those identified by Fowler, as was his recommendation that participation should be limited to Canadian companies.

The Mulroney government would adopt Kroeger’s recommendation by offering a “polite no” towards formal participation in SDI. In the words of Minister of National Defence Erik Nielsen in September 1985, Canada might have decided against “government-to-government” cooperation on SDI, but allowed that “private companies and institutions interested in participating in the programme will continue to be free to do so.” As such, despite its own proclivities towards increased bilateral cooperation with the Americans, the government ultimately sided with an arms-length approach in accordance to defensive weak-multilateralism. Ottawa might have refrained from officially endorsing SDI, but it did so in a manner that was clearly sensitive to American concerns – by noting that such research was legitimately within the confines of the ABM Treaty and was also prudent in light of the Soviet’s Galosh ABM system. And like

511 Robert Fowler wrote a memorandum to the prime minister, dated 7 January 1985, which detailed four options: publicly opposed SDI, publicly support SDI, take no position, and publicly supporting only research, which he ultimately recommended. On the Kroeger Task Force on SDI, Fowler again dismissed the option of either full cooperation or full rejection of SDI, and argued instead for a compromise position that would permit Canadian companies to be involved in SDI.
512 Quoted in David Cox, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense,” in Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation, eds. Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 254. The original invitation actually had a deadline of only six weeks, but it was later made open-ended.
513 The Soviets deployed ballistic missile defences in the late 1960s around Moscow and Leningrad/St. Petersburg. The A-35 ABM defence system around Moscow included nuclear-armed Galosh interceptors that were supplemented with the dual-capable Guild surface-to-air missiles. The Tallinn system around Leningrad relied on a limited number of Gammon interceptors. For more information on this system, and how these ABM sites impacted US targeting policy, see Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie and Robert Norris, “The Protection Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, 2 (2004): 68-77.
Prime Minister Lester Pearson before him, Mulroney also kept the door open to possible Canadian participation in any future deployment decision.

Importantly, however, Canadian officials also did not neglect the related matter of air defence cooperation. For instance, several months before Mulroney’s SDI decision, the NAADM agreement to upgrade continental air defence was finally signed at the March 1985 “Shamrock Summit” between the heads of both countries. It was agreed that the NWS was to be operated and maintained by Canada, while the AWACS “designated” for North America were to be co-staffed by Canadian military personnel. And at Canada’s suggestion, the United States agreed to Forward Operating Locations and Dispersed Operating Bases on Canadian territory for interceptor aircraft and AWACS, respectively. The resultant cost sharing arrangement for the NWS involved a 60/40 split between the US and Canada, which meant that Canada’s contribution to the total cost was close to 10 percent.514

Canada had been negotiating the NAADM agreement even before President Reagan had announced SDI, so it is important not to exaggerate the linkage between air defence modernization and SDI. The former would likely proceed irrespective of the latter. As Christopher Kirkey reveals, officials were primarily motivated to negotiate an air defence agreement to improve sovereign responsibility and ensure a role in the event that systems ever became space-based.515 That being said, National Defence sought full cooperation on SDI primarily to ensure the continuation of the binational relationship in

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514 “North American Air Defence Modernization Agreement.” For more on this agreement, see Anderson, “Canada and the Modernization,” 176-180 and Kirkey, “Negotiating the 1985 North American,” 153-182. Both countries were not able to agree to a funding arrangement for the Forward Operating Locations and Dispersed Operating Bases before the signing of this agreement, but they did undertake an evaluation on cost-sharing for them – this was submitted to the American Air Defence Responsibilities Sharing Steering Group on 31 December 1985, and an agreement for both sides to share the costs of these bases equally was reached in 1986.

NORAD – and modernized air defences went a long way towards doing just that. Indeed, as David Cox highlights, Ottawa seemed to place particular emphasis in reinvigorating the NORAD alliance in both the NAADM agreement and when the binational command was renewed once again in 1986, shortly after Mulroney had given his response to SDI.516

Interestingly, the Kroeger Task Force on SDI did examine one possible option put forward by Colonel Bill Weston at National Defence – that the government could “engage SDI from an air defence modernization perspective on the basis of the difficulty of separating missile defence and air defence research in the areas of space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and target identification and tracking.”517 This option might have been officially rejected by Kroeger himself and played little role in the prime minister’s “polite no” to Weinberger’s invitation. However, one can infer that it did become an implicit element of the government’s strategic-doctrinal response. SDI was rejected, but the government then accelerated research and technology cooperation on precisely those elements of air defence modernization closest to SDI.

Canada’s involvement in the Strategic Defense Architecture 2000 (SDA 2000) study best exemplifies this supposition. Canada was an active participant in Phase 1 of the project, directed at exploring the short- and long-term requirements for air defence, with the former becoming the basis for NAADM and the latter enshrined in NSDD-178 as the Air Defense Initiative (ADI).518 True, the invitation to participate in Phase 2 of SDA 2000 on missile defence and space was quickly retracted following Mulroney’s

516 Cox, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense,” 257-258
517 Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 102.
“polite no” to SDI, with only an unclassified version of the complete SDA 2000 study ever being released. As James Fergusson notes, while relations at the senior levels continued unharmed, the working relationships at lower-levels of government were nonetheless adversely affected.\textsuperscript{519} However, Canada was able to partially offset these setbacks with its participation in ADI, which coordinated projects aimed at developing new ground- and space-based technologies for the surveillance, tracking, and engagement of future air-breathing threats.\textsuperscript{520} Canada had members appointed as liaisons to different ADI-related programs and had a seat at the ADI Coordinating Committee, the Operations Requirement Panel, and the Canada-US Aerospace Defense Advanced Technology (ADAT) Working Group. Canadian companies like SPAR Aerospace and Canadian Astronautics were also used as subcontractors for the surveillance portion of ADI Architecture Studies. The government did press for a seat at the powerful Interagency ADI Steering Committee. And at subsequent meetings of ADATS, ADI was formally added to the ADAT project list and Canadian membership on the ADI Steering Committee was finally resolved, which greatly eased its access to ADI information – though whether this meant that Canada gained a position on the Steering Committee remains unclear.\textsuperscript{521}

\textsuperscript{519} Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, 124.

\textsuperscript{520} For further details on ADI, see Hayward, \textit{The Air Defence Initiative}, esp. 7-21.

\textsuperscript{521} See Charles Tutwiler, “The United States and the Future of North American Air Defense,” in \textit{The US-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense}, eds. David Haglund and Joel Sokolsky (Colorado; London: Westview Press, 1989), 196-198. Further details are provided by David Kattenberg, who notes that Canada had submitted a cooperative ADI agreement to formalize its participation in the program. The results of these negotiations are not clear, but there are at least some indications that the US was at least on the verge of finally relenting to Canada full integration into ADI, if it did not indeed do so. See David Kattenberg, “Sneaking Canada into SDI,” \textit{The Nation}, 27 February 1988.
Even as the Mulroney government challenged the Americans on the broader interpretation on the ABM Treaty,\textsuperscript{522} Canada was involved in an ADI program that focused on advanced air defence technologies that were closely related to SDI projects. This seemed to implicitly embody the spirit, if not the letter, of the option recommended by Weston at the Kroeger Task Force on SDI – and it reveals that the Mulroney government went beyond his predecessor in assuaging American security concerns. It also nicely encapsulates defensive multilateralism’s nuanced approach to strategic affairs, in which distance on some key matters is balanced by implicit cooperation on others.

\textbf{NMD, GMD, and Martin’s Refusal, 1991-2005}

With the end of the Cold War, Washington’s ambition for strategic defences against bombers, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles abruptly declined. American air defence projects such as the OTH-Bs were cancelled, the NWS operated significantly below full capacity, and many of the more advanced ADI-related plans were quickly shelved.\textsuperscript{523} With much of the concern over air-breathing threats dissipating, NORAD found itself in a much more uncertain position. Effort to revitalize the command by incorporating a counter-drug role, which found their way into the renewed NORAD agreement of 1991, proved short-lived. Meanwhile, tentative plans to expand the command into a Global Surveillance Initiative for ballistic missile launches were briefly entertained in the early 1990s, but were similarly ineffective.

\textsuperscript{522} Cox, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence,” 255.  
\textsuperscript{523} OTH-B was cancelled, but two of the completed installations on the west and east coast were placed into storage. Meanwhile, the NWS had many of its unattended short-range radars turned off, with Ann Denholm-Crosby noting that it was operating at roughly 50 percent of its capacity, and only four of the planned Forward Operating Locations were actually completed. See Denholm-Crobsy, \textit{Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making}, 90; Jockel, \textit{Canada in NORAD}, 145; and Joel Sokolsky, “The Bilateral Defence Relationship with the United States,” in \textit{Canada’s International Security Policy}, eds. David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 1995), 171-198.
Meanwhile, Reagan’s ambitious vision of SDI was scaled back into the Bush administration’s Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). This system never went beyond a planning stage, but was envisioned to include ground-based interceptors (GBIs) at the old Safeguard site in North Dakota that would be expanded with additional GBI sites, a space-based surveillance and tracking system (Brilliant Eyes) and thousands of kill vehicle satellites (Brilliant Pebbles). Yet these plans were further diluted under the Clinton administration’s newly renamed National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which only envisioned a maximum of two GBI sites, ground-based radars and a constellation of infrared surveillance satellites. Clinton might have signed the National Missile Defense Act in 1999, but he would ultimately choose to defer the NMD deployment decision – initially expected in 2000 – for his successor to fulfil.

With the memory of the political controversy generated by SDI, most officials in Ottawa were more than happy to leave matters on GPALS and NMD quiescent.\(^{524}\) Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had been a sharp critic of SDI during his time in the Official Opposition, while the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was equally cautious on NMD, though some American officials reportedly saw its left-leaning Minister Lloyd Axworthy as the principal obstacle.\(^{525}\) It was becoming readily apparent that an interdepartmental consensus between Foreign Affairs and National Defence would prove even more difficult if NMD was ever deployed. This was perhaps most clearly evident in a public spat that emerged between Lloyd Axworthy and Minister of

\(^{524}\) However, when SDI was reoriented into GPALS, Canadian officials actually faced the prospect that Washington would move to the development, testing, and deployment of this system as early as 1996. And in a rare moment of mutual understanding, both National Defence and External Affairs agreed on the criteria necessary for Canada to participate in GPALS – though this bureaucratic consensus would prove short-lived. See Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 135-136.

National Defence Art Eggleton in 2000, in which Axworthy stated at a conference that NMD could trigger a destabilizing arms race and Eggleton responded by publicly rebuking his colleague and stating his own thoughts on the wisdom of extending cooperation.\textsuperscript{526}

Even then, however, the government offered some tentative signals that it might be interested in some form of accommodation, with the \textit{1994 Defence White Paper} hinting at continued Canadian interest in missile defence,\textsuperscript{527} and the 1996 NORAD renewal containing a consultative clause to allow for the expansion of NORAD’s missions without the full renewal process. As Ann Denholm Crosby notes, this clause seemed to hint at a possible addition of a missile defence function to NORAD in the near future, and was largely accepted by the cautious officials at Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{528} With the steady decline of NORAD’s traditional air defence role, cooperation on missile defence was surely a tempting prospect. But Ottawa was still keen to ignore NMD until interceptor deployments had begun, in a policy of four no’s – “no architecture, no deployment decision, no invitation and nothing to decide.”\textsuperscript{529} It did so “with the connivance of Foreign Affairs and National Defence,” as “neither department could predict, if push came to shove, which way the government might go on NMD.”\textsuperscript{530}

US President George W. Bush shared none of his predecessor’s qualms about missile defence. Similar to what occurred two decades earlier, the president relied upon

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{footnote}{Ibid., 154.}\end{footnote}
\begin{footnote}{Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{1994 Defence White Paper} (Ottawa: 1994).}\end{footnote}
\begin{footnote}{Quoted in Crosby, \textit{Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making}, 102. Canada had also displayed some surprising interest in theatre missile defence technology. For instance, Ottawa participated in several NATO studies in the mid-1990s, examined a missile defence role in its initial proposal for the Iroquois-class destroyers and contributed to the Dutch Advanced Phased Array Radar programme. James Fergusson, “Not home alone: Canada and ballistic missile defence,” \textit{International Journal} 56, 4 (Autumn 2001), 680.}\end{footnote}
\begin{footnote}{Fergusson, \textit{Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence}, 150}\end{footnote}
\end{footnotes}
officials from the right-wing Jacksonian side of the Republican Party, who were often much more alarmist on the ballistic missile threat from “rogue states” – as revealed by the pessimistic conclusions of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.\textsuperscript{531} Indeed, the catastrophic terrorist attacks on 9/11 only strengthened the requirement to “plan against capability, and assume the most malignant intent.”\textsuperscript{532}

As a result, President Bush abruptly announced the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001 and proceeded with the operational deployment of GBIs at two sites at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force base, California to form the backbone of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, with plans for an additional GBI site and x-band radar to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively. Washington then took steps to fold ballistic missile defences as a “leg” in its strategic nuclear posture in what the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review called the New Triad. As leaks of the classified document reveal, the United States saw a greater counterforce role for US nuclear forces against WMD proliferators and saw missile defences as a useful complement to such efforts.\textsuperscript{533}

Canadian officials were aware that their reliance on the “four no’s” to avoid a decision was coming to an end. However, contrary to the cooperative signals from the previous decade, Prime Minister Paul Martin soon committed a “volte face” on missile defence.\textsuperscript{534} Simply put, Bush’s preference for GMD seemed to embody those

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were all members of the hard-line Project for the New American Century. For more on the Jacksonian approach, see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), esp. Chp. 7.
\item Fergusson, “Shall We Dance,” 13-22.
\end{enumerate}
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environmental factors that one would expect to only strengthen defensive weak-multilateralism. First, while his predecessors might have sought a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty or an expansive research effort, the Bush administration went even further in prioritizing missile defence. Indeed, this was clearly on display with the American decision to both withdraw from the ABM Treaty and deploy GMD capabilities that may not be fully tested. It was also evidenced by the significant funding given to the Missile Defence Agency, totalling over $10 billion a year by the second term of the Bush presidency.535

Second, there was little indication that the operational GMD system would require any components stationed on Canadian territory. True, Canada could serve as a ready replacement in the event of problems with upgrading the Thule radar site in Greenland, as was briefly discussed in the late 1990s. And it could still be advantageous to have an x-band tracking radar on Canadian territory to cover the gap between the BMEWS radar up north and the continental radars further south.536 But the real impetus for Canadian participation was the president’s desire to garner broader legitimacy for this project, especially after many of his post-9/11 policies led to the dramatic haemorrhaging of international good will. With its European allies also being far from enthused about strategic missile defences, it would be a mistake to ignore the perceived value of having a previously recalcitrant country like Canada endorse or participate in this initiative.

As a result, Canada could not simply assume that America’s ambiguous views on missile defence and Canadian involvement would allow it to avoid dealing with this issue entirely (as took place for much of the 1970s and 1990s) or to have as much room to

536 Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 179-180, 228-229
manoeuvre if it still chose to respond (as took place to both Sentinel and Safeguard).

Indeed, the limited nature of GMD compared to its Star Wars predecessor would have only increased the American expectation that Canada’s acquiescence and endorsement should be readily forthcoming. After all, its small number of interceptors made it more questionable whether GMD could feasibly endanger the strategic balance among great powers, while its rationale against rogue states made it less difficult to swallow.

Yet fundamental differences with the Americans made it equally difficult for Canada to respond in a positive way. On one hand, while foreign and defence policy statements of the period clearly prioritized the WMD challenge, these documents also reveal that Canadian officials preferred multilateral non-proliferation measures as the primary mechanism to manage proliferation.\footnote{WMD proliferation is mentioned in both the 1994 Defence White Paper and foreign policy white paper released the next year. It would be given an even more prominent position – along with countering terrorism and stabilizing failed and failing states – in the 2005 International Policy Statement.} Simply put, many officials never did see such military-technological measures as a viable solution, even if missile defence can be a very rational, sensible, and cost-effective response to WMD proliferation.\footnote{Harvey, “The international politics of national missile defence,” 545-566. Also see James Fergusson and David S. McDonough, “WMD Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Outer Space: A Canadian Perspective,” in Canada’s National Security Strategy in a Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).} On the other hand, critics would frequently raise troubling arguments that GMD presaged a thick missile defence system or represented a first-step to space weaponization. Irrespective of its actual merits, these arguments still had a strong resonance in a country heavily invested in notions of MAD and which had long stigmatized weapons in space. It surely did not help matters that the USAF tended to speak in less than nuanced terms about “space dominance,” that the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review offered a vigorous stance on nuclear counterforce capabilities, or that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its
spiral-development model of acquisition meant that the existing GMD architecture could very well be thickened in the future.\textsuperscript{539}

Polling taken in the period leading up to Martin’s decision on missile defence also indicate that the Canadian populace was strongly divided on the wisdom of missile defence cooperation, which created a political risk – perhaps not insurmountable but still present – for a weak minority government to appear too close to the United States on this initiative. For example, a 2004 poll shows 52 percent against cooperation, while a 2005 poll show 54 percent were against cooperating on missile defence compared to 34 percent who approved. Following Martin’s refusal to participate on missile defence, polls indicate that 57 percent approved his handling of the affair compared to only 27 percent who disapproved.\textsuperscript{540} Opposition to missile defence was perhaps strongest in Quebec, though as Pierre Martin reminds us, the differences in opinion between Quebec and English Canada should not be overstated.\textsuperscript{541} It did not help matters that President Bush’s popularity had fallen sharply from the brief high point immediately after 9/11, with an Ipsos-Reid poll in 2004 indicating that 82 percent of respondents had an unfavourable view of the president.\textsuperscript{542} Clearly, the unpopularity of missile defence in Canada from 2004 to 2005 was “a proxy for deeper anxieties about what the American administration (is) doing.”\textsuperscript{543}

\textsuperscript{540} A poll in March 2004 also showed opposition to missile defence was even higher at 69 percent. Polling data cited in Donald Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence: Saying No to Mr. Bush,” \textit{Journal of Military and Strategic Studies} 12, 3 (2010), 27, 30, 35, 38.
\textsuperscript{543} Quoted in Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence,” 35.
With all four factors in place, the cultural-cybernetic model would predict that GMD represented a potentially disruptive element to Canada’s balance of security and sovereignty. Canadian participation could perhaps offer some benefits to Canada-US relations, and even this was debatable, while a Canadian refusal would do little to restrain the United States from pursuing missile defences and could very well endanger NORAD.\footnote{Douglas Ross has used the term “tactical accommodationists” to describe this particular Canadian tendency in arguing for missile defence. See his “American Missile Defence, Grand Strategy and Global Security,” in The Dilemmas of American Strategic Primacy: Implications for the Future of Canadian-American Cooperation, eds. David S. McDonough and Douglas Ross (Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2005), 55.} Yet the controversy over the GMD system and the unpopularity of the Bush presidency itself made cooperation on missile defences exceedingly difficult to be politically embraced. With little of America’s strong interest in missile defences, it was unlikely that Canadian political leaders would expend the political capital necessary to do so. Simply put, cooperation would create a perception of subservience capable of endangering Canada’s sense of sovereign independence. It is also apparent that Canada was still able to benefit from GMD protection – though more advanced technology capable of better differentiating missiles directed at Canada from those aimed at the United States might change this in the future.

That being said, the policy-making coalition that emerged prior to Martin’s decision on missile defence seemed to be, at first glance, heavily directed at cooperating on GMD. National Defence had long been forceful advocates on missile defence, and officials were undoubtedly keen in gaining further access to US plans for GMD and to have input in interception priorities for the system – even if the evidence is certainly ambiguous whether the Americans would allow such input in the absence of a significant
contribution to the system, as opposed to one that is the asymmetrical or “in-kind.”

National Defence was also concerned on the future of NORAD. To be sure, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks renewing interest in both countries on air defence, there was no longer any expectation that a refusal on GMD would automatically endanger NORAD. Simply put, the command offered capabilities that were necessary for airspace security and difficult to replace. But there were more nuanced concerns that NORAD’s future in aerospace, which dealt with the early warning of ballistic missiles, could be jeopardized.

Officials at Foreign Affairs suggested that exploratory talks should begin with the Americans on missile defence. Both Foreign Affairs and National Defence, with the support of the Privy Council Office, soon agreed on the nature of the talks and led a delegation to the Missile Defence Agency in January 2003. And the department would later submit a memorandum to cabinet recommending the start of negotiations on participation. Some place the onus on the department’s change in position to Lloyd Axworthy’s retirement from politics. Others have emphasized the role of Minister of National Defence John McCallum in convincing his counterpart Bill Graham on the wisdom of participating in missile defence, which made it difficult to department sceptics

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545 Canadian defence officials often made reference to the fact that Canada could offer an asymmetrical or in-kind contribution – rather than a financial contribution to an otherwise very costly system – in order to be involved in and benefit from missile defence. In contrast, American officials had hinted on two occasions that a more substantial commitment was required for Canada to be fully protected and have input in the interception process. See Barry, “Canada and Missle Defence,” 28-29 and Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 239-240.


547 A deployed missile defence system could use NORAD’s own ITW/AA systems. But with additional early warning and tracking systems in development and likely to be assigned to other commands, there was a strong possibility that the US could assign some of NORAD’s own systems to a US-only command. This would leave NORAD with a more limited role in air defence. See Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Renewing NORAD – Now if not Forever,” *Policy Options* 27, 6 (2006): 53-58.

548 Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, 230, 232.
like Jim Wright to successfully challenge.\textsuperscript{549} But irrespective of the reasons, it is fair to say that the two central bureaucratic actors involved in Canadian grand strategy adopted a cooperative stance, which was more in accordance to continental soft-bandwagoning than defensive weak-multilateralism.

The Canadian government under Prime Minister Chrétien had stayed silent on the issue of missile defence, even when the Americans withdrew from the ABM Treaty and began constructing the GBI silos at Fort Greely. With National Defence and Foreign Affairs now coming to a consensus, the government soon began formal discussions on an outline for Canada’s possible participation through NORAD. These efforts found fertile ground with the new Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, who was eager to help repair some of the cracks in the Canada-US relationship after the 2003 Iraq War. Notably, the prime minister appointed David Pratt, a stalwart supporter of the Canadian military and proponent for missile defence, as McCallum’s replacement at National Defence.\textsuperscript{550} Pratt quickly exchanged letters with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requesting formal negotiations on possible participation in the GMD system.\textsuperscript{551} However, Martin’s new government, which was soon embroiled in a “sponsorship scandal,” emerged from the June 2004 election with a greatly reduced minority in Parliament. Even then, it would still follow-up the exchange of letters with an August 2004 amendment to the NORAD agreement that permitted information from NORAD’s ITW/AA functions to be used by the GMD system.\textsuperscript{552}

\textsuperscript{549} The former is raised in Richter, “A Question of Defense,” 143-172. On the latter, see Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, \textit{The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar} (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 121-124
\textsuperscript{550} Stein and Lang, \textit{The Unexpected War}, 117-118
The policy-making coalition that had so far dominated under Prime Minister Paul Martin seemed in tune with the continental soft-bandwagoning doctrine, and the government clearly went along with these bureaucratic preferences for greater cooperation. With the exchange of letters and an amendment to NORAD transferring its key functions to the GMD system, the only remaining step for full participation now seemed to be how NORAD (and thereby Canada) would be involved in the GMD system itself. Yet an important element in the policy-making process that emerged with greater force under the Martin government was in fact the internal divisions within the Liberal Party caucus itself.

Previous governments also had internal cleavages on missile defence, but these often involved influential members of the cabinet (Howard Green, Joe Clark, and Lloyd Axworthy) that played out within the larger bureaucratic tussle between External/Foreign Affairs and National Defence. In contrast, Paul Martin faced dissension on missile defence from different factions within his own party, especially with the women and Quebec caucus that voiced their strident opposition in late August 2004 and began to introduce resolutions urging the government to abstain from missile defence.553 With his precarious minority position in Parliament and need to secure “progressive” votes from Quebec and elsewhere, Martin was much more beholden to these left-wing elements within the Liberal Party. As Lester Pearson who once reportedly remarked following his

553 Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence,” 29, 33 and Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 251. The Quebec wing (supported by the youth wing) introduced a resolution in early December 2004 that was expected to take place the following year at the national convention in March, while the women’s caucus threatened to submit a similar motion.
retirement, “the role of the party caucus, especially in minority government situations, was usually underestimated.”

As a result, the Martin government grew increasingly silent on the issue of missile defence in the latter half of 2004. An official visit by President Bush to Ottawa and Halifax at the end of the year did not help matters, in so far as the president made a point of publicly raising Canada’s participation in missile defence. Martin soon began to adopt a position of defensive weak-multilateralism that had served his predecessors so well. He publicly reiterated his government’s criteria for Canada’s participation at a Christmas news conference, including no weapons in space, no interceptors on Canadian territory, no Canadian financial contributions, and a say in any interceptions over Canada.  

Not surprisingly, these criteria were largely concerned with highlighting both Canada’s autonomy from the Americans and its work against space weaponization. This was followed by Martin’s decision in February 2005 to finally reject participation. Foreign Minister Pettigrew informed US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, while the Prime Minister made an announcement in Parliament a few days later – though this attempt at replicating his Conservative predecessor’s “polite no” was certainly complicated by Canada’s ambassador to the United States Frank McKenna’s ill-timed comments that Canada was already a participant with the transfer of NORAD’s ITW/AA functions, which resulted in undiplomatic leaks to counter this impression by the Prime Minister’s Office.

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555 Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 249.
Clearly, then, Prime Minister Martin decided to belatedly follow his predecessors by adopting a more arms-length stance on American missile defence. And despite the bureaucratic consensus towards cooperation, the policy-making coalition that finally emerged under Paul Martin was structured along the lines predicted by the cultural-cybernetics model. Both Foreign Affairs and National Defence, which were supportive of participation, were largely sidelined. High-level officials like Jim Wright and Ken Calder tried to convince sceptical members of the Liberal Party caucus in a last-minute attempt to reverse this policy direction, but to little avail. Instead, it was the prime minister and his advisers in the Prime Minister’s Office that seemed to determine policy, and these actors were much more interested in minimizing the cleavages within the Liberal Party and strengthening their electoral fortunes. Indeed, there is evidence that the prime minister “made no attempt to obtain bureaucratic advice before the final decision...He had given up on the bureaucracy months earlier.”

Martin’s decision may have been heavily determined by domestic political considerations and “party politics,” as Dave Rudd has argued. And Ottawa could have been more adept in the manner by which this decision was transmitted to the United States. But it would also be overstatement to consider this decision “a blow to the manner in which bilateral defence...[is] conducted with the Americans and other nations.” Canada’s actual policy response did not represent a dramatic departure in either style or substance from previous episodes on missile defence. As one would expect from the goldilocks grand strategy, Canada made certain that its defensive weak-multilateralist

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556 Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 169-170
557 Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 252.
559 Fergusson, “Shall We Dance?” 14.
doctrine combined opposition to missile defence with offsetting measures – perhaps even more necessary given very high American expectation of Canadian endorsement – to minimize the impact of distancing on this matter. In their absence, Canada was likely to create further trade-offs with its security and sovereignty values and push its grand strategy out of its preferred goldilocks range. As such, it clearly shows an admittedly simple but very effective form of strategic reasoning, as one would expect given a cybernetic process.

Most importantly, it agreed to transfer NORAD’s ITW/AA functions to be used by the GMD system. This helped to safeguard the bilateral command’s role in the early warning of ballistic missiles for the near future and also likely helped to satisfy some of the more serious concerns amongst the bureaucrats in National Defence and Foreign Affairs. It might not have been sufficient for all the stakeholders in these departments, as there were undoubtedly officials with a vested interest in the missile defence mission or were more pessimistic on the 2004 amendment as a long-term solution. But it surely helped to quell what could otherwise have been more significant bureaucratic opposition to this decision. A number of external factors also mitigated the possible consequences arising from Martin’s decision. First, NORAD was in a relatively secure position as a result of the post-9/11 emphasis on air-breathing threats, from hijacked planes to cruise missiles. Second, in response to the 2002 creation of the US Northern Command, Canada had created a Bi-National Planning Group co-located with NORAD to review all continental defence arrangements (with the exception of missile defence). This might not have resulted in a significant expansion of the command, but it did reinforce the
impression that Canada shared the Americans’ concerns over continental defence in the post-9/11 period.

True, the Martin government refrained from following Mulroney in the pursuit of greater company-level cooperation on missile defence. But it did recognize that additional measures were necessary to placate the Americans, and this could be found in the 2005 budget announcement that took place just before the prime minister’s decision on GMD participation. The budget offered almost $13 billion increase in defence funding and $650 million in border and port security, which was seen by Martin as a “made-in Canada contribution” that “created enough room to say no to missile defence, without leaving himself open to US accusations that Canada was not doing its share on the international security front.” There are also indications that the Canadian decision to extend its deployment to Afghanistan, specifically Kandahar, was at least partly motivated by the desire to alleviate any lingering American concerns on Canada’s reliability as a post-9/11 security partner.

Despite some of the more alarmist commentary at the time, Canada’s decision on missile defence – much like the previous two refusals – did not have much in the way of immediate consequences. To borrow from what John Clearwater has said regarding Pearson’s response to Sentinel, “[t]rade, diplomatic contact and military cooperation increased annually. The sky did not fall. And neither did NORAD.” To be sure, this does not mean that NORAD’s continued existence as a bi-national aerospace defence

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560 For example, both countries had agreed to a draft Memorandum of Understanding to guide missile defence cooperation on research, technology, testing, and evaluation that could have resulted in economic benefits, but the prime minister decided against pursuing this option. See Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 249-250.
561 Quoted in Barry, “Canada and Missile Defence,” 36.
562 See Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, Chp. 9 and 10.
563 Quoted in Ross, “American Missile Defence,” 37.
command will continue uninterrupted. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that bilateralism between US Northern Command and Canada Command may come to dominate the Canada-US strategic relationship. But it does mean that Martin’s reapplication of a defensive weak-multilateralist doctrine allowed Canada to refrain from participating in GMD, while providing just enough of implicit cooperation to protect the country’s role in NORAD and its broader strategic relationship with the Americans. Bilateralism might very well supplant the binationalism that emerged in the late 1950s, but there is little evidence to suggest that such an occurrence resulted from Martin’s “volte face” or would be disadvantageous to Canada’s strategic interests.564

The United States has since proceeded with the deployment of an operational GMD system that includes 30 interceptors, which still exists today. US President Obama placed limits on the GBIs in Alaska and California and cancelled his predecessor’s plans for additional sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. But even this “phased adaptive” approach to missile defence, with its reprioritization against shorter-range missiles and preference for the Aegis system, envisions a gradual increase in US interception capabilities against longer-range missiles in their latter stages.565 Canada has, however,

564 James Fergusson does raise the argument that, by not securing a role in a binational NORAD command linked to missile defence, Canada loses access to American thinking and planning on strategic defence and the global strategic picture. There might indeed be benefits to having such access, but what exactly is gained is much less specified, especially in the absence of a significant financial or territorial contribution. See James Fergusson, Beneath the Radar: Change and Transformation in the Canada-US North American Defence Relationship (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2009), esp. 11-12. Joseph Jockel offers a more sanguine argument on bilateralism in “Saving NORAD: Should Ottawa Seize the Obama Moment,” SPP Briefing Papers 2, 3 (2009): 1-14.

565 The phased adaptive approach in its initial stages envisions a growing number of Aegis ballistic missile defence ships and Standard Missiles located near Europe. In Phases 3 and 4, the United States will have at least 43 Aegis ships, and an additional Aegis-Ashore site in Poland, and a growing number of more advanced and higher velocity missiles that would offer a modest capability to hit intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles, though the exact number is yet to be determined. See “The Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” Arms Control Association Factsheet, December 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach. For preliminary analysis, see James Fergusson, “The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence,” On Track 15, 3 (2010): 36-38 and Michael
shown little to no inclination to revisit this contentious issue. This may certainly change if strategic defences ever become situated within a broader trans-Atlantic ballistic missile defence architecture, the latter being a real possibility given NATO’s growing interest in a missile defence system. But at least for the moment, Ottawa’s most recent decision appears to have put an end to the debate on Canadian participation in the strategic defence.

Conclusion

The purpose of Chapters Four and Five has been to illustrate how Canadian goldilocks grand strategy has evolved towards strategic air and missile defences. Policy responses were largely modified in an incremental manner, with the most significant policy shift (e.g., Canada’s decision to refuse participation) occasioned in response to changes in environmental input factors, and even then still exhibiting a high degree of policy continuity. There might be clear differences between how Canada has approached air-breathing threats compared to ballistic missiles, but this should not obfuscate an underlying similarity – cooperation on air defence entailed some serious reservations and conditions, while non-participation was offset by a surprising amount of cooperative behaviour. Figure 5.1 provides a useful illustration of the strategic evolution of Canadian policy responses over the years.

Canada has dealt with American preferences on strategic defence for nearly several decades. It has evolved through a number of distinct stages – first, Ottawa’s initial hesitancy to participate on American air defence plans in the late 1940s; second, cooperation on setting up radar perimeters and tactical air defence procedures that culminated in the binational NORAD arrangement; third, Diefenbaker’s initial hesitancy to accept US nuclear-warheads for Canada’s air defence weapon systems, resolved with
Pearson’s election and a nuclear role for the Canadian military; fourth, Ottawa’s initial decision to refrain from participating in ABM with the Sentinel/Safeguard system; fifth, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s “polite no” to SDI; and lastly, the Martin government’s refusal to participate in GMD.

Each of these stages represents an important step in the evolution of Canadian goldilocks grand strategy on strategic defence, with the first stage being most in accordance to continental soft-bandwagoning and the subsequent stages involving a consistent pattern of behaviour encapsulated by defensive weak-multilateralism. Canada’s policy responses were largely made in an incremental manner and the strategic adaptations in response to American strategic preferences were all well within the delineated goldilocks range, as one would expect with its balanced grand strategy. Its strategic behaviour ensured that trade-offs between security and sovereignty were limited and the consequences minimized, which meant that its strategy – if perhaps not optimal – was very much successful.
CHAPTER SIX – CANADA AND NATO DEFENCE STRATEGY –
PART I: PRESENT AT THE CREATION

Canada emerged from the Second World War with the strategic ambition to achieve a middle power role on the international stage, which would help to balance its post-war ties with the United States. With the United Nations locked in a stalemate, Canadian officials soon joined with their like-minded counterparts in the creation of a collective defence organization – the North Atlantic Alliance. As Paul Buteux notes, NATO provided “a consultative framework within which Canada could help build coalitions of like-minded states that could mitigate the unilateralism of American policy.” Great Britain played a crucial role in the formation of the Alliance, but Washington soon came to dominate its institutional organs and defence strategy: “the United States has much more than a single member’s voice in strategic decisions…[i]t largely controls the development of military technology and makes decisions which predetermine the strategy of the [NATO] alliance.”

In the following chapter, I examine Canada’s policy responses towards both British and increasingly American preferences on collective defence on the eve of the Cold War, with a specific interest on its role in the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. It shows that Canada maintained a strongly supportive stance for the United Nations. But when hope for this collective security organization were betrayed by aggressive Soviet behaviour, Canadian political leaders shifted their continental soft-

bandwagoning doctrine towards the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. And as the Soviet threat hardened, they made the decision to deploy air and ground forces to NATO. This chapter is divided into three parts: (1) Canada’s initial support and later disenchantment with the UN; (2) its decision to support the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance; and (3) Canada’s conventional forces deployments to Western Europe at the beginning of the 1950s. Part II will continue the narrative by assessing the continuity and consistency in Canada’s key policy responses from the mid-1950s onwards.

**Canada and the Failure of the UN, 1945-47**

Ottawa had embarked on an unprecedented military mobilization effort during the Second World War, but its sizable military establishment proved unsustainable beyond wartime exigencies and was quickly demobilized at its conclusion.\(^{568}\) Importantly, the country did not also make the mistake of falling back to its pre-war sense of continental isolationism, due to the hard work of officials like Lester Pearson, Hume Wrong, Escott Reid – and the often underappreciated role of the Prime Minister himself, who preferred a more modest approach but reluctantly assented to post-war internationalism. As a result, Canada played an important role at the 1945 San Francisco conference that established the United Nations, even if this involvement was more notable for its modest contribution to the Economic and Social Council than for championing middle powers.\(^{569}\) Canadian officials also expected that the UN Security Council would be able to prevent a return to the wars that marred the previous half-century, even if they understood that America’s

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\(^{568}\) Most measurements rank Canada’s military power at the end of the Second World War as fourth, behind only the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. This included an army totaling 500,000 personnel, a navy of 100,000 and an air force of 250,000. See Richter, *Avoiding Armageddon*, 168.

cooperation was essential for this task. And should this organization falter, “the United States alone could provide the sinews of a pax.”

Canada was cognizant of its limited strategic resources and prudent in its international commitments. Indeed, only a few short months after the San Francisco conference, Prime Minister King announced his intention to withdraw the Canadian Occupation Force consisting of 18,000 troops and 10 air force squadrons (originally 13) from its duties in Germany. Military officials were initially hopeful that such duties could perhaps legitimize the ambitious post-war plans of the three services, but soon discovered that political leaders had little sympathy for such ploys. Meanwhile, in the absence of securing a greater voice in the European post-war settlement, External Affairs had little interest in continuing with these costly duties. Indeed, despite Great Britain’s effort to dissuade us on grounds of Commonwealth solidarity, the Canadian military withdrew from Europe by 1946 and military demobilization continued apace.

This decision seemed to signify disenchantment from European affairs and Britain’s calls for Commonwealth solidarity. It can even be considered something of a rebuke to the notion of a North Atlantic Triangle, at least to the pre-war conception in which relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth were still a significant factor. But it should not be mistaken for the policy of non-commitment that marked Canadian behaviour in the interwar period. After all, Canada was heavily engaged in and invested

572 See Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, Chp. 1. All three Canadian services had written ambitious plans for the post-war Canadian military, which were largely rebuffed by political leaders. These plans included the Army’s 1943 “Notes on Post-War Army Organisation,” the Air Forces’ 1943 “Brief on Post-War Planning for the Royal Canadian Air Forces,” and the Navy’s “The Continuing Royal Canadian Navy,” which was not dated.
with the United Nations, as shown by its membership in the UN-created Atomic Energy Commission, successful bid for a seat on the Security Council in 1947, and participation on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea.\textsuperscript{574} Mackenzie King would even sound a warning on the dangers of a return to isolationism at San Francisco, lest the “task of preserving the peace…be left exclusively to Great Powers.”\textsuperscript{575} Admittedly, the prime minister still retained his characteristic caution on international matters. But it is notable that he chose Louis St. Laurent, who was more instinctively internationalist, to take up his recently vacated portfolio as secretary of state for external affairs in 1946. With King’s declining influence in Parliament and his replacement by St. Laurent in 1948,\textsuperscript{576} it was readily apparent that there would be no return to the pre-war status quo.

Importantly, even as political authorities in Ottawa retained at least a semblance of its non-committal policy to Great Britain and the rest of Europe, Canadian military planners continued their wartime collaboration with counterparts in the US and Great Britain. At the behest of the newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Montgomery in 1946, secret tripartite discussions were held between the military staff of these American-British-Canadian (ABC) countries on standardization, “combined action…[and] all aspects of defence and preparedness.”\textsuperscript{577} As General Charles Foulkes later writes, these discussions focused on the subject of “intelligence, strategy, tactics, research and weapon development,” as well as “plans for dealing with a major

\textsuperscript{574} See Holmes, \textit{The Shaping of Peace}, Chp. 3.
\textsuperscript{575} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{577} Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Bernard Law, \textit{The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein} (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958), 394. These discussions were kept secret, and were first revealed in the Field Marshal’s memoirs.
aggression.” This fact was not lost on Prime Minister King, who noted in his diary in 1946 that “the UK, the US, and Canada must all work together and have their [defence] plans made complementarily.”

Clearly, then, Canada appeared to be increasingly taken in with the possibilities offered by the UN and its related agencies, even as its views on further commitment to Europe grew more cautious. Yet Ottawa’s fixation with the United Nations can actually be seen as an important element of support for the strategic preferences of our new American superpower patron. After all, Washington was at the forefront of the effort to transform its wartime United Nations alliance into a new post-war institution to replace the now moribund League of Nations. And Canadian diplomats adopted a low-key and supportive attitude towards British and American positions at the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations. This fact was certainly on display when Canada took the less than popular position of supporting the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council, which can be contrasted to the often bombastic and even obstructionist stance of our “strategic cousin” Australia and her foreign minister Herbert Evatt. As Adam Chapnick concludes, the “Canadian approach at San Francisco had been designed with the interests of the United States and Great Britain in

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578 Foulkes, “Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,” 3. Much of these discussions were between the respective planning staff of the ABC countries, including America’s Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Britain’s Joint Planning Staff and Canada’s Joint Planning Committee, which discussed command and control, areas of responsibility, and logistics, and eventually joint strategic concepts and plans. See Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 7. Important agreements that resulted from these discussions include the 1947 Plan to Establish Standardization (replaced by the Basic Standardization Agreement in 1954, and eventually including Australia and New Zealand) and the Unified American-British-Canadian Screw Thread agreement. See Thomas Durell-Young, Supporting Future US Alliance Strategy: The Anglo-Saxon or ABCA Clue (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1990).
mind.” Indeed, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who had personally taken charge of the Canadian delegation at San Francisco, relied largely on advice from some of the more cautious elements in the East Block, such as Hume Wrong and Norman Roberston, rather than their idealist counterparts.

True, Canada’s “participatory internationalism” at the United Nations provided an important mechanism to help the country “escape the dangers of a too exclusively continental relationship with our neighbor without forfeiting the political and economic advantages of that inevitable and vitally important association.” But aside from this limited degree of distancing, Canada seemed much more interested in strengthening its cooperation with its great power patrons in the UN, if only to ensure the continued effectiveness of this organization. As such, Canada’s behaviour followed what was essentially a continuation of its wartime doctrine of continental soft-bandwagoning, in which strong cooperation is balanced with only minimal effort to achieve distance. Yet Canada’s strong position on the UN also proved short-lived. While satisfied by the work of the UN Economic and Social Council, officials soon grew disillusioned by the tendency of the Soviet Union – responsible for the vast majority of all vetoes in the first decade of the UN’s existence – to abuse its power. Of course, following the revelations of the Gouzenko affair and the Soviet intransigence at the Council of Foreign Ministers, it would be fair to say that Canada was more disappointed than surprised.

581 Chapnick, The Middle Power Project, 142.
582 Ibid., 144.
583 Lester Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, eds. Alex Inglis and John Munro (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 32 (hereafter Mike: Vol 2)
584 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 63. In the first decade of the post-war period, there were a total of seventy-eight uses of the veto power by the Permanent Five at the Security Council, with seventy-five of them made by the Soviet Union. The remaining three vetoes from 1945 to 1955 included one by the Republic of China (which had a seat at the UN until it was expelled in 1971) and two by France.
By 1947, President Truman had offered economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey in an attempt to forestall Soviet pressure on both countries, which heralded the onset of the Cold War between both superpowers. With other European countries plagued by economic malaise and at risk of communist infiltration, Washington later in the year announced the European Recovery Plan – more popularly known as the Marshall Plan – to provide economic assistance to help rebuild Western Europe. Even with this financial generosity, however, European countries continued to have a deep sense of vulnerability to Soviet pressure and subversion, which was only magnified by the Soviet Union’s modus operandi in several Eastern European nations, most notably Hungary, Poland, and lastly Czechoslovakia. Soviet “salami tactics,” in which communist parties took part in government and eventually consolidated their power under Soviet direction, were seen as potentially replicable in some of the more unstable Western European countries.585

Canada’s sudden disenchantment with the United Nations, even amongst some of the organization’s most resolute defenders such as Lester Pearson and John Holmes, can therefore be attributed to Soviet behaviour. Soon, what Winston Churchill had clearly foreseen as an “iron curtain…across the Continent” in his 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri came to pass.586 To be sure, some Canadian officials had initial hope that the UN Security Council could somehow be reformed, perhaps by changing the rules regarding the veto power exercised by the five permanent members. Yet such a solution was soon rejected as being overly ambitious and infeasible.

585 See Mark Kramer, “Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944-53,” in Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 51-102. These tactics differ from those used in Bulgaria, Romania and Eastern Germany, where Soviet consolidation was reliant on the application its military, and Yugoslavia and Albania where local communist partisans who had fought against Nazi-rule came to power.

In a speech in 13 August 1947, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Escott Reid was perhaps the first to raise the possibility of a “regional security organization” into which members could “pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of other members if any power…committed aggression.”

Reid was even more forthright in his internal memorandum completed around the same time, in which he concluded that the West had to “organize in advance an alliance which would become immediately effective if the Soviet Union should commit aggression.”

It was not long before Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent placed his own official imprimatur on this idea. As he warned the General Assembly on 18 September 1947, countries may prefer “greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.”

Officials at External Affairs had in turn relayed the content of these statements to influential members of both the British and American governments – George Ignatieff speaking to Gladwyn Jebb of the British Foreign Office and Canada’s Ambassador to the United States Hume Wrong doing so to John Hickerson at the State Department.

Mackenzie King’s own views on the subject were much more conservative than those of his advisors at External Affairs. Canada could react to our great power allies and

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589 Statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent in the General Assembly, 18 September 1947 (extract), in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, ed. R. A. MacKay (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), 97.
590 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 34-35, 68. Another frequently cited source of the North Atlantic security arrangement is the editor of Foreign Affairs Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who brought up the possibility of a “coalition of peace” under Article 51 in an influential article that came to the attention of both Hickerson and Jebb. See Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Coalition for Peace,” Foreign Affairs 27, 1 (1948): 1-16.
could play a lead role on functional issues such as economic and social matters. But as
the prime minister concluded in his diary, it was the great powers like the United States
and Great Britain that had “the main responsibility for initiating matters of major and
world wide significance.” Rather than taking the lead, Canada should instead leave it
to its great power patrons to press for any new collective defence initiative, even if
King’s public pronouncements provided little doubt where his own preferences on this
matter lay. Fortunately, with many of its key allies also sharing concern over the Soviet
threat, Canada would not have to wait long before a solution was finally proposed.

The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-49

Great Britain would be among the first to raise the alarm about the deteriorating
strategic situation in Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, it was first raised by Winston
Churchill at Fulton, Missouri in 1946, who broached the issue of a “fraternal association
of the English-speaking peoples” to provide “overwhelming assurance of security”
against the purported Soviet threat. Churchill was undoubtedly premature in
advocating an Anglosphere alliance, at a time when Canada was sensitive to anything that
resembled a renewed Commonwealth and the United States still had slim hopes of
continuing its wartime collaboration with Moscow. However, it would be less than two
years later that British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, speaking to US Secretary of State
George Marshall in December 1947, raised the prospect of a firm American commitment
to Europe. According to memorandum of the discussion, Bevin reportedly proposed a

592 Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” 5 March 1946. This fraternal association would involve common
threat assessments, standardization of weapons and doctrines, and exchanges of officers and military
advisors. It was also expected to involve the “joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases.” which would
reduce the financial outlays and increase the capability of the American and British Empire Forces.
“western democratic system” that “would not be a formal alliance, but an understanding backed by power, money and resolute action.” Marshall indicated interest at the British proposal, but remained noncommittal as well – though he did recommend that work on uniting Western Europe be done as an interim measure.

Ernst Bevin briefed the rest of his cabinet on 6 January 1948 about his proposal for a “spiritual union” of Western countries in a memorandum titled “The First Aims of British Foreign Policy.” Soon thereafter, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee sent messages to his counterparts in Ottawa and Washington with details on his foreign secretary’s proposal. With positive responses from both leaders, Bevin gave a speech to the British Parliament on 22 January outlining a more concrete vision of a united Western Europe, in which the UK, France, and the Benelux countries would be bound under an arrangement modeled after the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk. This “inner circle” would in turn be backed by the power and resources of North America in a more loosely defined “outer circle.”

If generally well-received in Europe, Bevin’s remarks were viewed more cautiously by observers in the United States, some of whom were less than impressed by references to the Treaty of Dunkirk, while others were more jaundiced on the prospect.

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593 Quoted in Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, 37.
595 Martin Folly, “Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty,” *Diplomatic History* 12, 1 (1988): 61. The terms inner and outer circle were not used by Bevin in his speech, but they were often mentioned by officials at the Foreign Office, at least according to John Henrikson, director of the Office of European Affairs at the State Department.
596 The Treaty of Dunkirk was viewed as being particularly unsuitable, in so far as it was largely directed against a revanchist Germany rather than the more pressing threat of the Soviet Union. Except for France, other European countries sought a stronger association than that provided by the Treaty of Dunkirk.
that Washington might reverse its policy on entangling alliances. Yet this did not stop Bevin from sending representatives, including the Foreign Office’s Gladwyn Jebb, to better ascertain American interest in his proposal. This was later followed in early March with messages from British Prime Minister Atlee Clement to both Prime Minister King and President Truman requesting trilateral discussions to, in the words of the message directed at Mackenzie King, establish a “regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance.”

Both countries responded positively to this request, and at the conclusion of these discussions, other countries were eventually invited to negotiate the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949.

Even this early in the post-war period, Canada was already becoming familiar with the requirement to identify and adapt to American preferences in the context of strategic defence for North America. But it is notable that London, rather than Washington, was to be the first to broach the possibility of a North Atlantic security arrangement and requested the tripartite ABC “security discussions” that laid the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty. Officials in Ottawa were forced to adapt at least in this instance to British strategic preferences, likely a reflection of the Mother Country’s lingering (albeit rapidly declining) influence with its “Siamese Twins of North America.” It also had the benefit of taking place at a time when the United States, while moving to counter the Soviet Union, had neither shaken off its long-standing

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598 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Telegram 220, DEA/283(S), London, 10 March 1948, in DCER, Volume 14 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1948), Vol. 14-296. Bevin’s initial conception of an inner circle and an outer circle was later modified in this telegram to include three systems: a union between the UK, France, and the Benelux countries with American backing; an Atlantic system that would bind the Americans (and implicitly Canada) even more tightly to Europe; and a Mediterranean security system involving Italy (and possibly others). This three-part arrangement would eventually become a single North Atlantic system.
599 Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, xxv.
isolationist instincts, nor fully grasped the mantle of a global superpower. As Escott Reid notes, with the Truman administration still divided on the merits of external commitments, “[t]he one thing the North Atlantic treaty of 1949 is not is an example of Canada being persuaded by the United States to support its Cold War policies.”

This initiative may have been launched at Ernst Bevin’s insistence, even if some of its content might be attributed to the vocal pronouncements over the past year by astute Canadian officials. Yet it was ultimately Washington’s preferences that dominated the concerns of British and Canadian officials. On one hand, the United States represented the linchpin to any Atlantic security system. After all, Bevin’s proposal was largely an innovative mechanism to ensure a stable American commitment to Europe. On the other hand, due to some initial qualms with the possible direction of our neighbour’s grand strategy, Canadian officials were particularly keen to situate our relationship with the United States within a broader North Atlantic framework. To be sure, according Dana Wilgress at External Affairs, Canada was in agreement with the “basic principles” of the Truman Doctrine. But he also had concerns about its extreme Manichean vision of the monolithic communist threat, and acknowledged that the doctrine could be “pushed to too great an extent” and result in the humiliation of the Soviet Union. Simply put, the Truman Doctrine was seen as having the potential for “dangerous swings in policy” arising from its crusading and even missionary underpinnings. An alliance framework

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could in turn tame such extremes and place the American approach “towards Europe on a consistent and long-term basis.”

Canada emerged from the Second World War with a strong tendency to cooperate with its great power patrons. This characteristic was especially visible in relation to the United States, but a similar sense of solidarity could also be seen at this early stage in how the country dealt with Great Britain, an important qualifier being that Canada’s sensitivity on issues of Commonwealth solidarity had to be respected. Moreover, when its preference for the UN ran into the reality of Soviet hostility and the onset of the Cold War, Ottawa continued with a cooperative stance – this time towards the British offer of greater collaboration within an Atlantic security system. Importantly, it was the American embrace of this initiative that made it acceptable to officials in Ottawa. If the US had instead insisted on a more unilateral strategy, then Canada might have decided against pursuing a “crusade” for the North Atlantic Treaty.

In Bevin’s proposal for tripartite security discussions on an Atlantic arrangement, Canada faced an initiative that – at least in terms of the sort of environmental pressure that it signifies – its officials could not easily ignore. Great Britain had prioritized an Atlantic system that was capable of “consolidating the ethical and spiritual forces of this western civilization,” with Whitehall at the lead in providing “political and moral guidance” if not material support. By harnessing American strategic policy “to British interests,” this initiative promised to serve as a bulwark not only against an aggressive

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604 Ibid., 401.
Soviet Union but equally to Britain’s own strategic irrelevance. While occupying a less prominent role in its strategic calculations, Britain clearly had an interest in having Canada involved from the start, as evidenced by its initial invitation to Canada and the United States for secret security discussions to be held in March 1948 in Washington. This is partly due to the latter’s ability to bring the more cautious Americans on side, and partly the result of Britain’s desire to strengthen its own position through the inclusion of its largest Commonwealth Dominion.

Even if Canada could not easily ignore Bevin’s request, it is also clear that Canadian officials found the nature of the initiative particularly appealing. As noted earlier, with its faith in the United Nations in rapid decline, Canada was itself increasingly interested in collective defence as an alternative arrangement, especially in the event that effort at UN reform proved stillborn. Indeed, officials like Escott Reid had an even more expansive vision than that proposed by Great Britain – by making it open for other members of the UN beyond any geographical region. This shared sense of mission was only heightened by events at the beginning of 1948, first by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February and later by the Soviet pressure on Scandinavia, especially Norway.605 Indeed, the British Prime Minister’s initial request for tripartite security discussions with Canada and the United States were largely justified by these developments.606

605 Soviet pressure was seen to be increasing on Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Finland would eventually succumb to this pressure by signing the Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty. Sweden would adopt an independent position of neutrality, backed by a strong military and defence. In March 1948, the West’s fear was that Norway would also succumb to this Soviet pressure, which eventually led to that country signing onto the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This led to what has been termed the “Nordic balance.” See Steve Lindberg, “The Illusory Nordic Balance: Threat Scenarios in Nordic Security Planning,” Cooperation and Conflict 16, 1 (1981): 57-70.
606 See Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Telegram 220, 10 March 1948; and High Commissioner for United Kingdom to Under-Secretary of State
Prime Minister King reacted to this most recent instance of Soviet bellicosity with alarm. As he ominously recorded in his diary, it was no longer possible to say that “there was not immediate danger of war,” to which he ominously acknowledged, “[we] might see fire around the world before long.”607 Yet officials in Ottawa remained more cautious than the prime minister in their assessments. For instance, the head of the First Political Division at External Affairs Charles Ritchie concluded in his 1946 working paper “Political Appreciation of the Objectives of Soviet Foreign Policy” that the Soviets were unlikely to initiate a premeditated war against the West.608 This conclusion would in turn reappear in the dispatches and reports of officials like Dana Wilgress and Escott Reid, as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee.609 But even moderate voices acknowledged that war could still very well break out, by miscalculation or accident if not necessarily by design, and it was this possibility that was utmost on the minds of policy-makers.610

Canada was largely in agreement with the increasingly more pessimistic threat assessments that justified this cooperative venture. Importantly, despite some fears that it could potentially lead to the Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations, Canadian officials had also accepted this possibility as a necessary risk. Simply put, the only other alternative was seen to be a significant reform of the UN Security Council that, if it was somehow implemented over a great power veto, was virtually guaranteed to result in the

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610 Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, 18.
Soviet Union’s withdrawal.\textsuperscript{611} That being said, this does not mean that there were no other political controversy attached to this initiative. A good example can be found in Mackenzie King’s reaction to Clement Atlee’s message to his Canadian and American counterparts on 14 January 1948, updating them on Bevin’s discussions with Marshall on a Western European union “backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and Americas.” King objected strongly to this statement and nearly balked at the British proposal, though he was eventually mollified by a clarification on the meaning of this statement.\textsuperscript{612} At the very least, these incidents shows that “[a]nything even vaguely suggesting Commonwealth centralization was anathema to Mr. King.”\textsuperscript{613}

Yet these occasional lapses in anti-British sentiment also proved to be more an aberration than a presage of things to come. Simply put, Canada soon came to realize that closer ties with Great Britain might provide an escape from its limited position in North America. Canada had once been able to “play London off Washington…and vice versa,” but it soon became clear that a more substantial “counterweight” was now needed to balance America’s post-war continental preponderance. Escott Reid had written a number of memoranda from 1942-1944 that raised the idea that “the troubling influence of the United States in Canadian security affairs should be diluted through a far broader arrangement.”\textsuperscript{614} Even Ambassador Hume Wrong would acknowledge that there might be benefits in placing Canada’s continental defence measures within a broader North

\textsuperscript{611} This point is raised in “The United States and the Soviet Union,” 30 August 1947.
\textsuperscript{612} This sensitivity also led Canada to reject participation in the British and American-led airlift operation to supply West Berlin following the Soviet blockade in mid-1948, due to the perception – abetted by leaks in the London press – that the British request for Canadian air transport essentially amounted to a call for a united Commonwealth effort. See Holmes, \textit{The Shaping of Peace}, Chp. 5; Eayrs, \textit{In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied}, Chp. 1.
\textsuperscript{613} Pearson, \textit{Mike: Vol. 2}, 42 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{614} David Haglund and Stéphane Roussel, “Escott Reid, the North Atlantic Treaty, and Canadian Strategic Culture,” in \textit{Escott Reid}, ed. Greg Donaghy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 48
Atlantic context. As Pearson later informed the prime minister, perhaps influenced by his ambassador, a North Atlantic Treaty meant that “the joint planning of the defence of North America would fall into place as part of a larger whole and the difficulties arising in Canada from the fear of invasion of Canadian sovereignty by the United States would be diminished.”

These four environmental factors together form the central characteristics of the critical feedback variable, and ensured that the British preference for an Atlantic security system would in fact be wholly embraced. Much like how Canada ultimately responded to the air defence initiatives emerging from Washington at this time, officials in Ottawa coalesced around the strategic-doctrinal lines of continental soft-bandwagoning towards Great Britain – even if this SOD, which takes into account Canada’s continental circumstances, is designed to describe relations with the United States.

Yet Canada was also finding it increasingly difficult to ignore America’s post-war predominance, and a key auxiliary to its calculations was surely the degree to which Britain’s proposal was compatible to America’s own preferences. Fortunately, the United States eventually proved to be a willing partner in the establishment of a North Atlantic Alliance. True, it was at first not necessarily convinced on the need for such an arrangement, especially so soon after its own heavy financial commitment with the European Recovery Plan. But officials like John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles at the State Department, as well as George Marshall himself, proved to be particularly

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sympathetic with the British idea. And much like their counterparts in Ottawa and London, the Soviet Union’s troubling behaviour towards Czechoslovakia and Scandinavia helped to stiffen the resolve of those in Washington who were favourably disposed to a greater commitment to Europe – and indeed led to its positive response to Great Britain’s well-timed proposal for tripartite security discussions.

As predicted by the cultural-cybernetic model, policy-makers proved to be primarily cooperative when faced with environment factors that did not disrupt the country’s higher order priorities on security and sovereignty. For instance, due to the shared sense of threat and lack of controversy, Canada was more able to cooperate on this new security arrangement without the appearance of losing its own independence in the process. This meant the continental soft-bandwagoning SOD, in which full support for this initiative would only require a minimal effort at distancing, continued to prevail in Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy.

External Affairs took the lead in pushing for Canada’s full support for the British proposal of an Atlantic security system. Indeed, officials at the East Block played a not inconsiderable role in the exploratory discussions that took place in 1948 and their impact was still evident – albeit perhaps less visible – in the official negotiations for a North Atlantic Treaty. Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent had helped to lay the initial groundwork for a new security organization in his 1947 speech to the United Nations, and many of his key officials such as Escott Reid and Lester Pearson were increasingly vocal proponents of such an arrangement – and along with Ambassador to the United States Hume Wrong played an important role in exploratory discussions to

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come. In that regard, this episode differs in important ways from Canada’s approach to American air defence requests, in which the policy-making coalition was dominated by National Defence and the Canadian military, with officials at External Affairs playing a more critical secondary role.

Yet External Affairs also had important divisions that this unity of purpose proved unable to paper over. On one hand, some Canadian officials looked at the British initiative as an opportunity to achieve a broader economic, social, and constitutional union among Western nations. Escott Reid was the most forceful advocate of this perspective. It can be seen in his August 1947 speech at Couchiching Lake, where he called for a “regional security organization” and “international federal institutions,” and in his November 1947 preparation of a draft “Treaty for Greater National Security” open to all members of the UN. As he later reveals, Reid was both open to including Commonwealth countries like India and Pakistan in the new organization and consistent in his thinking that any “overwhelming preponderance of force” should include economic and spiritual force. On the other hand, there were officials who had a more realistic assessment of what was achievable at these negotiations. As Adam Chapnick notes, “the goal of Canadian policy was unequivocal: involvement in an exclusive defence arrangement against the Soviet menace.”

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Ambassador to Washington Hume Wrong, who would testily inform Lester Pearson that “we are not establishing a federation but an alliance.” It was undoubtedly shared by other moderate voices at External Affairs, including Dana Wilgress, A. D. P. Heeney and Norman Robertson, none of whom were particularly wedded to Reid’s position.

To be sure, Lester Pearson was at the very least sympathetic to Reid’s line of reasoning. For the alliance to stiffen Western Europe’s resolve, it had to contain “provisions for closer political, economic and cultural cooperation, which sets up new international institutions, and which sets forth the principles of Western society.” Later, he would note that the North Atlantic Treaty could eventually lead to “the creation of a union of all the free states of the world in a collective defence agreement.” Yet Pearson’s idealist streak and rhetorical flourish were tempered by a sense of realism. While calling for the establishment of “international constitutional machinery,” he had made such remarks in support of political and military consultations to prevent a repeat of what took place in the Second World War, when Canada was excluded from the strategic direction of the war; it was not necessarily in support of an economic and social union, at least as Reid might have understood it. Pearson had also rebuked Reid on the
grandiosity of his March 1948 draft treaty, instead preferring a “quick business-like arrangement between UK-US-Canada cum France and the Western Union.”

Canadian policy-makers were very receptive to the British proposal for discussions to establish a multilateral Atlantic security system. As such, Canada’s policy-making coalition seems to have come together along the strategic-doctrinal lines of continental soft-bandwagoning, in which the tendency for unambiguous cooperation is balanced by only modest effort to minimize any infringement on its independence, with the latter directed largely towards the United States. Notably, Canada sought to achieve this distancing by institutional measures, which in its most extreme form was exemplified by Reid’s exhortations for a North Atlantic economic and social community. To be sure, Canada had to be largely satisfied with a North Atlantic Treaty that contained more rhetorical than substantive provisions on economic and social matters. But even such limited distancing made it easier for Canada to sign the resultant accord. As Pearson would later explain, the failure to achieve strong non-military provisions would result in “a definite weakening of support for the treaty in the House [of Commons] and in the country.” With Quebec led by the isolationist Maurice Duplessis, who was keen to portray Louis St. Laurent as a British colonial warmonger, the prime minister was very much interested in softening any potential fallout with the addition of non-military provisions.

A small coterie of officials from External Affairs dominated this policy-making coalition, with their counterparts at National Defence and the Canadian armed forces

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largely excluded from this process – though Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton was informed about the discussions in Washington and Chief of the General Staff General Charles Foulkes was a participant at the initial meetings.\textsuperscript{628} But External Affairs was itself heavily divided between the respective views of Hume Wrong and Escott Reid, with Lester Pearson perhaps sharing elements of both of their perspectives. Indeed, with his occasional interventions to restrain but never halt Reid’s activism, Pearson effectively allowed – whether inadvertently or not – a certain balance to develop between both sides in the negotiations, as one would expect from this doctrine.

Canada had accepted Bevin’s request for trilateral ABC security discussions as a first step to achieve an Atlantic security system, which took place in a series of six meetings held in secret at the Pentagon from 22 March to 1 April. Participants were undoubtedly buoyed by the signing of the Brussels Treaty, which established a purported union consisting of the UK, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands less than a week earlier. Indeed, shortly after the completion of this first phase of discussions, St. Laurent would point out that free nations might in the end emulate the Western union’s example by forming an “association for collective self-defence” capable of providing a “dynamic counter-attraction to communism.”\textsuperscript{629} The Canadian delegation, led first by Lester Pearson and later by Hume Wrong, was instructed to be open to accepting “anything which the UK and the US jointly agree is required to defend our common

\textsuperscript{628} Eayrs, \textit{In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied}, 36, 70. In contrast, Sean Maloney argues that the Canadian military was largely absent from the decision-making process leading to a North Atlantic Alliance. Yet this assertion overlooks two points. First, Defence Minister Brooke Claxton was informed about these exploratory discussions. Second, General Foulkes also participated in the March-April security discussions held in Washington, which seems to place his role in the September 1948 exploratory military discussions with American and Brussels Treaty members in London as a natural outgrowth of these initially discussions. See Maloney, \textit{Learning to Love the Bomb}, 8.

interests.” But the prime minister also made it clear that their preference was in a broad-based “Atlantic Pact.” Officials were therefore very much prone to be highly cooperative at these discussions. Equally, however, this does not imply that they would necessarily be subservient to American (or indeed British) preferences, which can be seen in how Canada departed from our close allies on a range of issues – from its preferences against the inclusion of Italy and Portugal from membership to its relatively cautious stance on the mutual assistance pledge.

Ottawa’s critical but very cooperative stance was perhaps best exemplified in its strong opposition to the alternative arrangements under discussion in the first few meetings. Contrary to Reid’s earlier musings, Canadian participants showed little enthusiasm for the idea of a “world-wide pact” of free nations brought up at the first meeting. Two other alternatives to the Atlantic Pact were also discussed: an extension of the Brussels Pact to include Canada and the United States, and a presidential “declaration that an attack on any Western European country would be considered by the Americans as an attack on the United States.” The US delegation under J. D. Hickerson initially preferred an extension of the Brussels Pact, which would have made Canada the “odd man out” of this arrangement. Fortunately, Hickerson would reverse course and eventually come to embrace a broad conception of a North Atlantic Pact, thanks in part to both Canadian and British persuasion. All three delegations were able to come together

630 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, Telegram (Not Sent), DEA/283 (S), Ottawa, 23 March 1948, in DCER, Volume 14 (Ottawa: DAIIT, 1948), Vol. 14-318.
632 Pearson, Mike: Vol. 2, 44.
in the drafting of the Pentagon Paper, which took the form of an American document to better facilitate Washington’s eventual assent to the Treaty.634 Yet the pace of discussions had slowed considerably following the conclusion of these security talks – the Soviet Union had initiated an “appeasement offensive” that reduced the sense of urgency and some in Washington clearly preferred a unilateral presidential guarantee to Western Europe, including George Kennan and Charles Bohlen at the Statement Department, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council.635 Canadian officials were able to convince Kennan on the need for a North Atlantic Treaty,636 while Great Britain helped to restore America’s confidence in this arrangement by agreeing to a ground force commitment to Europe.637 But these efforts at suasion might have come to naught, except for the US Senate’s passage of the Vandenberg Resolution in 1948, which called for US association in “regional and constitutional arrangements…based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.”638 Following this resolution, the ABC countries invited representatives from France, Belgium and The Netherlands to the “Washington Exploratory Talks on Security.” Progress was at first slow, due to the American decision

634 All three delegations first drafted their own respective guidelines, and would each appoint a member to a committee (Theodore Achilles, Gladwyn Jebb, and Lester Pearson) to draft a consensus document, which was agreed before discussions concluded on 1 April 1948. The Pentagon Paper would remain secret until its publication in a 1974 edition of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. 
635 Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, 104; Wiebes, “The Pentagon negotiations,” 355; and Petersen, “Who Pulled Whom and How Much,” 102-103. Kennan proved particularly eager to restrain the State Department’s enthusiasm for an Atlantic Pact and played a role in rewriting and diluting such provisions in NSC-9, which combined the views of the Pentagon Paper and the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff report. Daryl Hudson, “Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and American Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 1, 1 (1977): 49-51. 
637 Folly, “Breaking the Vicious Circle,” 72-73. Previously, Great Britain had hoped to avoid sending ground forces to Europe and to instead rely on its air force located in the UK. This would have allowed it to defend the Empire and Commonwealth, which had three pillars to protect – the United Kingdom, the sea lines of communications to the US and Dominions, and the Middle East. 
to not use the Pentagon Paper as the basis for discussion and the sudden doubts now being raised by some of our European and US partners. Yet these difficulties were overcome and the Washington Paper guidelines were completed. Participants moved quickly towards drafting a North Atlantic Treaty between December 1948 and March 1949, eventually involving Luxemburg and Norway.

With these negotiations set to begin, Canada’s internal divisions within External Affairs between supporters of a military alliance (Wrong) and advocates of a broader economic and social union (Reid) soon injected an added complication to the process. In his capacity as the acting under-secretary, Reid was finally in a position to forward his overly ambitious instructions for these negotiations to Hume Wrong, including a provisional draft treaty with “40 articles and a system of weighted voting.” Pearson sought to restrain Reid on more than one occasion, but even the compromise set of instructions to Hume Wrong still had strong words to include non-military “provisions for consultation, cooperation and common action in the economic field.” Wrong also had to deal with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was not only highly critical on the wisdom of including these economic provisions but was also interested in further diluting the Treaty’s mutual assistance pledges.

The latter problem was considered most serious, though the threat to reject participation was considered but never used, as Acheson proved amenable to a much smaller amendment to this provision. On the former issue, Pearson and Reid continued

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to press Hume Wrong to include non-military provisions in the Treaty, which he was able to secure in both the preamble and in Article 2, the aptly named “Canadian Article.” This might have been too modest to satisfy Reid, who had originally sought to include at least four non-military provisions in his March 1948 draft treaty. But as Pearson acknowledges, “this article is perhaps as strong as we can secure…and it is therefore acceptable as it stands.” It also more fully reflects Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy, which in the continental soft-bandwagoning formulation prioritizes close proximity with only rhetorical distancing. As limited as Article 2 might have been, it did make Canada’s signature on the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 all the more easier.

**Canada’s Contribution to the NATO Shield, 1949-52**

The signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty were undoubtedly satisfied by this trans-Atlantic achievement. But there was also little that was at first truly concrete with this new arrangement – the Treaty might be signed, the Alliance might be in effect, but the Organization that soon became synonymous with this arrangement had yet to be created. In that regard, it represents a departure from NORAD, which was the culmination of various military initiatives rather than a diplomatic agreement that was later fleshed out. However, American and British commanders were soon formulating their own organizational “schemes” for the Alliance, though they might have very well been influenced by Canada’s Chief of the General Staff, who had sent a March 1949 memorandum to both General Alfred Gruenther (United States) and General Leslie Hollis

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645 The North Atlantic Treaty had established a nominal multilateral alliance amongst its members, but it would be some years before this alliance became institutionalized in the form of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, involving both institutional political and military machinery or integrated forces-in-being.
In it, General Foulkes proposed regional planning arrangements and a strategic reserve of “uncommitted…personnel and material,” with coordination and planning undertaken by a smaller Strategic Reserve Group. And clearly, there was some similarity between Foulkes’ ideas and the British and American proposals for regional defence committees and a Combined Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

Officials at External Affairs, such as A. D. P. Heeney, were less than wedded to Foulkes’ “purely private paper,” preferring instead a more cautious approach in dealing with our key allies. Yet Canada’s own position on the matter, which was finally approved by the cabinet on 18 May, was clearly influenced the chief of the general staff. After all, it included support for regional arrangements and a strategic reserve and an acceptance that a small committee – initially termed the Steering Group and later becoming the Standing Group – be formed as a “principal body for defence plans.” But the St. Laurent government’s position did depart from Foulkes’ recommendations in one crucial respect. Rather than advocating for membership on the Steering Group, Canada decided that it would only serve if invited – a cautious position very much cognizant that participation on such a select body could be an expensive proposition.

649 Ibid. and Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 137.
651 Sean Maloney refers to Lester Pearson’s interest in Article 2 as the central reason for his decision to “block” Canada from obtaining a seat on the Standing Group. See Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 16. But Canada adopted a hesitant position towards membership on this body not because of Pearson’s machinations, as the policy had the broad support of the Cabinet, but rather out of the government’s recognition of Canada’s limited military capabilities.
invitation forthcoming, the prime minister and officials at External Affairs likely gave a
sigh of relief, even if Foulkes and other military officials were undoubtedly less than
enamoured by this turn of events.

Canada’s views were well-received by the North Atlantic Treaty Working Party,
which was established to review and make recommendations on the alliance’s military
organization. It was also not the last time that Canada was able to have its views
heeded on the scope and organization of NATO. Shortly thereafter, the country
succeeded in convincing its allies that Military, Defence, and Finance/Economic
Committees meetings be held simultaneously with those of the North Atlantic Council.
And when France sought to involve NATO in global planning, Canada was able to
convince its allies that knowledge of global strategy might be useful, so long as NATO
itself did not partake in global planning. Canada certainly displayed an impressive
capacity to influence NATO in these early years, much like it did in the exploratory
discussions that helped to establish the Atlantic Alliance.

Canada’s position on the North Atlantic Alliance’s growing organizational
machinery was strongly influenced by General Foulkes. In that regard, it represents an
important departure from how the North Atlantic Treaty was actually negotiated and also
a hint of things to come. After all, Canada’s political leaders and diplomatic officials had
largely dominated the policy-making coalition in the Treaty negotiations, with National
Defence and the military noticeably absent from much of the process that brought about

652 Officials did have some difficulties in their proposal that if the Steering Group was discussing matters
that concerned or involved a particular NATO country, then the member in question had a right to be at
those meetings. Yet this argument was eventually accepted by its allies – and also harkens back to how
Canada argued for a right of representation on the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration when its
interests were at stake, On the latter, see Chapnick, The Middle Power Project, Chp. 3.
653 See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, Chp. 4.
NATO. With the establishment of the military alliance, however, diplomatic bargaining soon gave way to military planning – and thereby a consequent increase in the role of military and defence actors within Canada’s policy-making coalition, which Foulkes’ influence at this early stage seemed to presage.

Canada had few qualms with offering advice on the creation of NATO’s institutional organs and machinery, but was much more cautious when it came to the more costly question of either forward deployed military forces or even military and economic aid. Indeed, with the exception of Escott Reid, Canadian officials were largely under the impression that military coordination within the Alliance would actually result in defence savings rather than further expenditures.654 Not surprisingly, when the minister of defence forwarded five-year forecasts of both expected and desired defence spending to the Cabinet Defence Committee in November 1949, the cabinet displayed little enthusiasm to adopt Claxton’s higher figures.655 Even Claxton’s more modest budget request for 1950-51 of $425 million would face significant opposition from Finance Minister Douglas Abbott, though it would eventually be passed with the support of St. Laurent.656 At this point, there was no expectation that Canada would need to return to Europe several years after its occupation force was finally withdrawn. Instead, Ottawa would initially pursue a modest military aid program that consisted of training officers

654 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 191. For a good example of Reid’s prescience, see Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/283 (S), Ottawa, 12 March 1948, in DCER, Volume 14 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1948), Vol. 14-301.
655 Brooke Claxton projected that the defence expenditures would rise from $382.9 million in 1949-50 to $416.1 million in 1954-55, but sought an increase to $584.9 million for 1954-55 (with a high point of $633.2 million for 1950-51). These figures are also quoted by James Eayrs, though he mistakenly writes that the 1950-51 projection is $507.8 million, when in fact it should be $567.8 million. See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 192 and Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, “North Atlantic Treaty; Next Meeting of Defence Committee,” DEA/50030-T-40, Ottawa, 29 November 1949, in DCER, Volume 15 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1949), Vol. 15-407.
from Western European militaries, with even this hesitant step partly arising from the desire not to appear out-of-step with the United States.657

True, Canadian officials had acceded to the Alliance’s initial strategic concept in Defense Committee document 6/1 (DC 6/1), titled “Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,” with little in the way of amendments compared to some of our allies.658 But this document was still coy on the requirements for military “forces-in-being” for Europe. It also recognized the importance of economic recovery and stability, while acknowledging that much of the burden for countering Soviet air and land offensives would be on Western Europe’s shoulders.659 Further details were provided in the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) approved in April 1950, which integrated the plans prepared by NATO’s Regional Planning Groups and called for 90 divisions of ready and reserve ground forces be established in Europe by 1 July 1954. This sizable force was meant to provide a conventional “shield” capable of halting and stabilizing the expected Soviet advance as far east as possible, in preparation for later phases to involve NATO-wide mobilization and a strategic counter-offensive based on American air-atomic capabilities or “sword.”660 Of course, given that there were only a total of 13 divisions in Europe at the time, even the United States seems to have concluded that the plan was “in excess of actual requirements and moreover to be impossible of attainment

by 1954.”\textsuperscript{661} As such, NATO strategy was actually predicated on immediate nuclear strategic bombardment and the evacuation and re-conquest of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{662}

Canada was therefore not necessarily out of step with its key allies in both accepting DC 6/1 and the MTDP, and not doing very much to fulfil their recommendations.\textsuperscript{663} European countries had sought a North Atlantic Treaty arrangement to provide confidence, in the form of a stable and long-term American guarantee of protection, and forestall possible indirect Soviet infiltration and subversion. A direct military threat from Moscow, while perhaps taking early shape with the Soviet test of an atomic device in 1949, had still not fully coalesced, which made economic recovery rather than rearmament a more central concern. The United States was meanwhile undoubtedly more concerned about its Soviet competitor. Indeed, soon after agreeing to the MTDP, Washington would also sign NSC-68 that called for a substantial increase in defence spending – all in preparation for the year of maximum danger when the Soviet Union was expected to field 200 atomic bombs, which perhaps not incidentally was to take place in the same year that the MTDP force goals were to be reached. Even then, however, US military preparations significantly lagged behind the ambitious words of both the MTDP and NSC-68.

\textsuperscript{661} Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee, PCO, 25 April 1950, in \textit{DCER}, Volume 16 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1950), Vol. 16-479.


\textsuperscript{663} This account of the creation of the MTDP does differ from that of Sean Maloney, who refers to the MTDP as being created from various emergency war plans in response to the possibility that the Soviet Union used the Korean War as a feint to attack NATO. See Maloney, \textit{Learning to Love the Bomb}, Chp. 1. In fact, the MTDP was originally created in April 1950 before Korea, and it was actually the revised version (DC 28) of the MTDP that was completed in late 1950 – and this simply provided an update to take into account the increased possibility of war at the time. As such, it would be a mistake to consider this plan to be an “emergency plan” or to conclude that NATO’s permanent force structure was codified by “bureaucratic glitch.”
The Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, which took place only a few months after the completion of the MTDP, stiffened the resolve of NATO. The European members were no longer so sanguine on the prospect of direct Soviet aggression, while the Americans suddenly showed much less hesitation on the need to back up containment with greatly increased military force. Washington was in turn successful in convincing Congress to pass increasingly large defence appropriations, which soon doubled defence outlays and allowed the wide-ranging military rearmament program required to support these new strategic obligations. Escott Reid called this “one of the most important events in post-war history,” and it surely heralded an important change in what was now permitted in defence against the Soviet Union.664

Canada was corralled into forming the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade that was eventually sent to fight under UN auspices in the Korean War, at least following its modest naval and airlift contributions. And it showed relatively few qualms on the closer issue of strategic defence, as described in Chapter Four. Yet the prospect of a military deployment to Europe proved to be a more difficult request. To be sure, Canada did begin to increase defence spending starting in 1951-52 – at first by a modest sum of $40-50 million and subsequently increasing the budget to $782 million, which was nearly twice the initial budget request for that year.665 With growing American pressure on her allies, Canada had little choice other than to follow the example of the United States. However, while acquiescing to the creation of a NATO Integrated Force at the September meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Lester Pearson remained coy on the possibility of a 

665 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 192, 201-203.
Canadian contribution to these forces-in-being. The country soon accepted the deployment of one-third of an infantry division and twelve fighter squadrons to Europe, a decision made at the NATO Defence Committee meeting in October as part of the new revised force requirements of the MTDP under DC 28. But even then, the government continued to muse about the possible transfer of the Korean commitment to Europe.

With this decision, Canada finally continued its previous diplomatic support with more concrete military commitments to NATO’s Integrated Force. This reflected a reversal of Canada’s previous understanding of the North Atlantic Treaty, which had little expectation for substantial forces-in-being, but it represented a continuation of the highly cooperative Canadian approach that helped to establish NATO in the first place. As such, continental soft-bandwagoning continued to dominate Canada’s grand strategy into the 1950s, due to a number of environmental factors, not least of which was the renewed American concern over the continued vulnerability of Western Europe. While admittedly slow to completely take up its global military responsibilities, the United States wasted little time following the North Korean invasion. By the end of 1950, the Truman administration agreed to deploy over five divisions and several air wings to NATO, though not before receiving assurances of an expanded Europe effort led by Britain and France (and the promise of eventual German participation).

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668 For more on the possibility of transferring the 25th Infantry Brigade to Europe instead of Korea, see Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament,” 109-111.
669 See Duffield, Power Rules, Chp. 2
subsequent two years, the United States increased its troop strength to 345,000 and also launched a $15 billion military assistance program to supply equipment to its European allies. 670

Canada was certainly under no illusion that the United States now viewed the establishment of a NATO Integrated Force as a priority, nor was it unaware that – despite the American military forces now stationed in Europe and its leadership embodied in the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) – the United States would be willing to bear this burden alone. Washington was more concerned that the larger European countries contribute to the Integrated Force, but Canada’s membership in NATO virtually guaranteed that a commensurate Canadian contribution would not be ignored. And lest this be forgotten, the United States made this preference quite clear with its ambassador in Ottawa and more indirectly at the NATO Council of Deputies and other institutional organs. 671

With America’s deepening commitment to Europe and pressure on her allies to ante up, Canada was forced to adapt to this environmental stimulus. Yet Ottawa’s resultant continental soft-bandwagoning policy choice largely came together as a result of two central input factors. On one hand, Canadian officials were in agreement with their American counterparts on the increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union, which following the Korean War was no longer seen as being confined to indirect infiltration or subterfuge. This was perhaps most clearly brought home by Communist China’s military counter-offensive in Korea in October 1950 that was widely seen as the “ultimate test of

670 Richard Kugler, Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s, N-3105-FF/RC (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990), 54.
NATO. “Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson gave voice to similar fears at a speech in the UN General Assembly. As he warned, the Soviet Union had shown its willingness “to run the risk of a third world war” in which it would benefit from a “preponderance of force in the conventional methods of warfare and…a considerable stockpile of atomic weapons.” A similar sense of alarmism was also featured in internal memorandum, with perhaps the most notable being a joint document presented to cabinet by Minsters Lester Pearson and Brooke Claxton. Under the innocuous title of “The International Situation,” the ministers would pessimistically conclude that “the only safe assumption [now] is that the period of greatest danger has already begun.”

On the other hand, the prospect of Canadian military involvement in Europe was not necessarily viewed with a great degree of controversy. Indeed, Canada reacted with understanding to the American request, which is certainly a testament to the strong relationship forged during the Second World War and continued under Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. That being said, this policy response did display some initial hesitancy. Officials in the Finance Department, most notably Minister Douglas Abbott, were much less willing to accept the high defence spending required to fulfil this commitment, while Lester Pearson himself seemed less than forthright on the issue of a Canadian commitment at the North Atlantic Council meeting in September 1950. It can also be seen in the continued prevarications as to whether some of the European

672 Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament,” 111
military commitment could eventually come from forces being generated for the Korean contingency, which was finally put to rest by US General Omar Bradley in early 1951.676

Yet even these were simply minor qualms and delays on a decision that soon had an air of inevitability. Simply put, the West had grown increasingly concerned about another European war that, with the strong numerical advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union, would likely feature the rapid conventional defeat of Western Europe and the quick escalation to a nuclear level.677 With other countries strengthening their own forces in the European theatre, the question facing Canadian policy-makers soon became not whether to deploy forces, but rather when and in what form – a question that was soon answered by the Standing Committee’s recommendations embodied in DC 28, which contrary to some accounts, Canada clearly sought to modify with some limited success before eventually acquiescing to it.678

Importantly, even as Canada joined with its American and European allies to form an Integrated Force, NATO defence strategy was still predicated on having strong conventional shield forces. Nuclear weapons served as a strategic counter-offensive “sword,” but the goal was to achieve sufficient conventional strength – at both the start of hostilities (D-Day) and in the weeks ahead (D+30 and D+90)679 – to not use this sword prematurely. NATO conventional mobilization was meant to enable the “roll back [of]

677 By 1950, NATO was limited to a dozen divisions compared to the Soviet Union’s 22 divisions in East Germany alone, alongside 7 divisions in surrounding countries, 32 divisions in the western region of the Soviet Union and 30 divisions available from its allies. See Duffield, Power Rules, 29-30
678 NATO Standing Committee papers contained force tabulation errors and mention of two-years of military training. In response, Brooke Claxton was able to revise military training to read reserve training and correct force tabulations to be circulated at the Defence Committee meeting. See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, 143-145. As such, Canada did not agree with this commitment without any form of consultation or influence, as noted in Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 11.
679 According to DC 28, NATO countries were expected to have 49 divisions by mid 1954 on D-Day, which would be increased to 79 and 90 divisions by D+30 and D+90, respectively. See Duffield, Power Rules, 47.
Warsaw troops from occupied territory,” and therefore worked in tandem with strategic nuclear weapons.\footnote{David Schwartz, *NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 33. The author distills these points from US General Omar Bradley’s testimony to the House Appropriates Committee hearings in 1952, in which he describe the role of NATO shield forces in the NATO strategy.} Canadian officials were by no means disinterested in such a nuclear capability in the 1950s, nor were they unaware on the possible advantages of atomic weaponry in either air or forward defence. At this early stage, however, it is important to not underestimate the perceived benefits of an Allied defence strategy that was primarily geared towards strengthening the conventional shield. And absent the realization on the full cost of a solely conventional approach, which was only brought home in the late 1950s, Canada had yet to develop an incentive to look further into nuclear weapons as a possible cost-saving exercise.

Without the environmental feedback capable of triggering a change in SOD, Canada’s policy-making coalition was largely structured in accordance to continental soft-bandwagoning. External Affairs continued to have elements that were hopeful that NATO could become more than a military alliance, for instance by developing some institutional machinery around Article 2. This view was advocated by Lester Pearson, Escott Reid, and Dana Wilgress, though others were much more pessimistic on such an endeavour. The department did make some efforts to fulfil the wishes of their Minister, but even these would often run aground by the even more strident opposition at Trade and Commerce, Finance, and the Bank of Canada.\footnote{Pearson, *Mike: Vol. 2*, 6-67; Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, 177-179, 181.}

By the time of the Korean War, however, officials in the East Block had not only become much more interested in NATO as a military alliance, but even embraced the notion of greatly increased defence spending, to the degree that some actively requested
more ambitious military rearmament proposals from their military colleagues.\textsuperscript{682} There
was also little in the way of argument when Prime Minister St. Laurent finally acquiesced
to a military commitment to NATO. Frankly, with the renewed sense of threat posed by
the Soviet Union at this time, even normally cautious officials came to accept the
requirement for a Canadian military contribution.

National Defence was also consistent in its advocacy for higher defence spending
and deployment of ground and air contingents to Europe. Importantly, the military
services soon discovered that subscribing to these commitments could also provide a
useful means to further expand Canada’s armed force. This can be seen with Air Marshal
Wilfred Curtis’s initial recommendation under the Paris Plan for Canada to deploy twelve
fighter and twelve light bomber squadrons, which represented “an end run around the
NATO military command so as to bring about pressure for a substantial increase in the
overall aircraft strength.”\textsuperscript{683} To be sure, a dispute arose on whether the Canadian Army
should be deployed with the Americans, as recommended by General Foulkes, or with
Great Britain, as per General Guy Simond’s suggestion. This incident is particularly
notable for General Simond’s argument that Canada had an interest to be positioned
alongside the British in order to “counter-balance to the power of the US,”\textsuperscript{684} which
shows that a modicum of caution towards the Americans was not necessarily alien even
within the military. Indeed, the eventual solution, the RCAF with the Americans and the
Canadian Army with the British, nicely encapsulates the country’s balanced approach to
strategic affairs – one that enjoyed some limited distancing even while soft-

\textsuperscript{682} Eayrs, \textit{In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied}, 200-201.
\textsuperscript{683} Quoted in Maloney, \textit{Learning to Love the Bomb}, 12.
\textsuperscript{684} Quoted in David Bercuson, “The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine,” in
\textit{Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future}, eds. Margaret MacMillan and David Sorenson
(Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1990), 27.
bandwagoning, but was still careful to gain approval from the Americans before such action.

The St. Laurent government was undoubtedly influenced by the consensus between External Affairs and National Defence on the requirement for a Canadian military contribution. Indeed, this sense of unanimity would also appear in the cabinet deliberations on this matter, in which reportedly only Paul Martin – and not even the often frugal Finance Minister Douglas Abbott – who questioned whether “the proposed defence and mutual aid programmes are not set too high.”  

At the behest of certain elements at External Affairs, Canada would continue to be involved in periodic initiatives to achieve some substance to Article 2 during the 1950s. Yet this effort to achieve some semblance of distance would have an increasingly rhetorical quality to it, especially given the sustained and costly work being done to ensure that NATO forces-in-being could blunt a Soviet attack.

While External Affairs under Lester Pearson maintained a privileged position in government deliberations under St. Laurent’s tenure, one can also detect a notable increase in the role of defence and military officials beginning in this episode. This is perhaps an inevitable outgrowth on NATO’s development as a military alliance, which placed a premium on both military planning and institutional organs with strong military representation, such as the Military Committee and the Standing Group. But it also emerged from the influential Chief of the General Staff – and in 1951 Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee – General Charles Foulkes, who used the existing ABC network to influence the eventual organization of the Atlantic Alliance and would have

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685 Quoted in Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament,” 112.
his influence further solidified with the creation of the Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence Questions that acted as a “shadow Cabinet Defence Committee.”

Canadian policy-makers were therefore largely aligned in a coalition very much receptive to the strategic-doctrinal precepts of continental soft-bandwagoning, in which cooperation with American preferences is clearly prioritized and only minimal effort is made to be distant from our superpower ally. As a result, the St. Laurent government agreed to the NATO Integrated Force at the North Atlantic Council meeting in September, approved the revised MTDP at the Defence Committee a month later, and acquiesced to the relatively sizable deployment of one-third of a division alongside twelve fighter squadrons. The former took the shape of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade located with the British Army of the Rhine in Germany, which when combined with the two infantry brigade groups located in Canada as part of the strategic reserve formed the 1st Canadian Division. The latter consisted of the 1 Air Division, armed with F-86 Sabres and the Canadian-produced CF-100 Canucks, that joined their USAF counterparts in France. With US General Dwight Eisenhower appointed SACEUR and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) created soon thereafter, NATO’s Integrated Force and Canada’s military commitment to it took on more definite shape as 1951 came to a close.

Even as NATO’s military sinews were being strengthened, however, Canadian officials were soon raising tentative concerns on the parlous state of the Alliance’s non-military character. Lester Pearson was at the forefront of these initial efforts to put some institutional flesh on the barebones of Article 2. By mid-1951, with the US pressing for the inclusion of Greece and Turkey on largely strategic-military grounds, many European

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686 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 17.
countries had also grown increasingly concerned on the extent of NATO’s militarization – a concern that some members in the Canadian House of Commons, most notably the leftist CCF, clearly shared.687 The Truman administration was keen to ameliorate these concerns and by the North Atlantic Council in September showed “for the first time…real interest in Article 2 of the Treaty.”688 A Committee of the North Atlantic Community was quickly formed, headed by Lester Pearson and mandated to study non-military forms of cooperation, even as the rest of NATO agreed in principle to American preferences on Greek and Turkish membership. Canada clearly welcomed this opportunity to work in this Committee of Five, which only strengthened Canada-US relations even as it created a perception of distance and policy independence. However, given the waning interest in Washington on this particular issue, little would eventually come of the Committee’s report.

Conclusion

Canada had high expectations for the United Nations following the San Francisco conference, and this sentiment was surely shared by many of its key allies, not least of which being Great Britain and the United States. But when confronted by the onset of the Cold War, Canadian officials began to voice the need for a possible alternative to the deadlocked UN and were therefore especially receptive to a British initiative that envisioned a new trans-Atlantic security arrangement. Canada participated in the initial

688 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Heads of Posts Abroad, “Review of the Ottawa Meeting (The Seventh Session) of the North Atlantic Council,” Circular Document No. A85/51, DEA/50030A140, Ottawa, 15 November 1951, in DCER, Volume 17 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1951), Vol. 17-476. According to a State Department telegram, Washington was also concerned about the prospect of a European federation, which in the absence of commensurate development of the North Atlantic Community was seen as being prey to either German dominance or non-alignment. See Milloy, The North Atlantic Organization, 72.
security discussions and played an important role in the negotiations of the North Atlantic Alliance. With the formation of NATO, however, Canada began to adapt to the new reality that it was American preferences – rather than British – that dominated Alliance deliberations. Yet it continued with its extremely cooperative approach to the incipient NATO defence strategy, which culminated in the decision by the St. Laurent government to forward deploy air and ground forces to Europe.

Canada’s policy responses, first with the United Nations and later with NATO, were largely in accordance to the continental soft-bandwagoning SOD. As such, officials prioritized cooperative relations to its great power patron, first with Great Britain and increasingly the United States. Yet even this behaviour was balanced by some attempt to ensure a semblance of distance in its position, even if this was often overshadowed by the sheer scope of the Canadian support for its great power patrons. It would reach its apogee with Canada’s insistence on a Canadian article to the North Atlantic Treaty, but would continue in a less vocal manner into the 1950s. In so doing, Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy was able to pursue a balanced approach to proximity and distance that helped to minimize any potential trade-offs between security and sovereignty.
Canada proved to be among the most supportive members of NATO, as evident in its willingness to forward deploy sizable ground and air forces to the Alliance’s Integrated Force. But this military role, at first out of proportion to its relative size in NATO, was financially unsustainable and ultimately short-lived. Under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Ottawa would cut its forward deployed forces in Europe, shift the remainder to a non-nuclear role, and begin to go beyond many of our allies in our advocacy of arms control and disarmament – this would culminate in the early 1990s by our military withdrawal from Europe.

This chapter provides an overview of Canada’s changing military commitment to Europe, which evolved to a nuclear role in the 1950-1960s and shifted to a steady conventional decline and denuclearization from the late 1960s onwards. As such, it continues the analytical narrative begun in Part I. By testing the cultural-cybernetic model, this case elucidates the causal chain by which Canadian officials responded to the American preferences towards NATO defence strategy with a strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism that rebalanced the goldilocks grand strategy and minimized security and sovereignty trade-offs. The chapter can be divided into three parts: (1) the Canadian decision to finally adopt a nuclear-armed commitment by the early 1960s; (2) the modest force reductions initiated by Lester Pearson; and (3) the process of denuclearization and eventual withdrawal of this military commitment.

It shows that Canada’s commitment to NATO defence strategy soon evolved into a nuclear role in the 1950s, which culminated in the acquisition of nuclear warheads by
the Pearson government. But Ottawa soon took steps towards a more arms-length approach to NATO, in which the cooperation of the past was replaced with a more cautious and even critical position. However, as predicted by the cultural-cybernetic model, this strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism did not entail a fundamental departure from previous policies – significant cooperation continued in NATO, but it was balanced by more explicit if rhetorical effort to achieve distance.

The New Look and NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1952-63

The United States was certainly aware of the growing “gap” in NATO’s actual conventional force capabilities and the requirements appearing in DC 28, which explains its support for the creation of a Temporary Council Committee to review each country’s military capabilities and capacity to fulfil these force requirements. But it was also open to revising these requirements to make them more achievable. First, SHAPE would make the new estimate SG 20/32 – approved as MC 26/1 in the November 1951 NAC meeting in Rome – that called for a smaller number of divisions at the onset of hostilities. Despite the intrusive nature of the Temporary Council Committee process, the Committee would also make some downward force estimates in its recommendations that eventually formed the basis for the now famous 1952 Lisbon force goals. With Britain’s increasing financial problems and France focused on its war in Indochina, along with continuing delays with German rearmament, even these new force requirements were still overly optimistic. NATO had made great strides to largely meet the force requirement for 1952, but the Lisbon goals for 1953 and 1954 were out of reach. These goals might have

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689 Kugler, *Laying the Foundations*, 58. NATO had 25 ready divisions for M-Day and could mobilize an additional 20 divisions in thirty days (M+30), which came close to the Lisbon goals for 1952 at 25 and
been reduced by the end of the year, but the new strategic concept MC 14/1 continued to emphasize a conventional defence force capable of stabilizing a Soviet military thrust into Europe and working in tandem with a “strategic air offensive against the enemy.”

Canada accepted both the militarization of NATO and a commensurate military commitment to Western Europe, even as it was largely satisfied by the discussions surrounding Article 2. Yet this continental soft-bandwagoning posture was under increasing strain as a result of the high financial cost and attendant controversy that it generated, which was only magnified by the periodic attempts by the United States – in the Temporary Council Committee and the Military and Defence Committees – to get Canada to increase its effort. For example, Canada was asked to help fulfil the Paris Plan by strengthening its air contingent with a further twelve squadrons of light bombers and to also increase its mutual aid fund with contribution of raw materials. It certainly did not help matters that the new US administration under President Dwight Eisenhower was now focused on emphasizing nuclear rather than conventional capabilities as part of its New Look strategy. With SAC atomic assets increasingly vulnerable to Soviet attack, Eisenhower sought to supplement this nuclear strategy with an important conventional component, including a renewed early warning and air defence effort.

nearly 54 divisions, respectively. According to these force goals, however, NATO was expected by 1954 to have nearly ready 42 divisions on M-Day and a total of 90 divisions on M+30. At a December meeting, the overly ambitious goals for 1953 and 1954 were further reduced by ten percent. See Duffield, *Power Rules*, Chp. 2.


Great Britain had released a 1952 Global Strategy Paper that called for NATO reliance on nuclear rather than conventional forces. American defence planners at the time largely rejected its conclusions, but there were also unmistakable parallels to what became Eisenhower’s New Look. Duffield, *Power Rules*, 77-78.
Some officials in Ottawa were more than a little worried that the New Look could entail an American disengagement from Europe, and thereby precipitate a consequent Canadian withdrawal as well.693 Others were equally concerned that Eisenhower’s preference for continental defence would only represent another demand on Canadian defence policy, at a time when it could ill afford it.694 And Canada indeed refocused its effort to deploy interceptor aircraft and early warning radars in North America, while agreeing to initiatives that facilitated tactical and strategic air defence cooperation with the USAF. Canada’s military commitment to Europe might not have declined, but officials were no longer wedded to increasing the defence budget or expanding the Canadian force presence, with the defence outlays by 1952-53 reaching a high point of $1.97 billion or 45 percent of the total federal budget before gradually declining.695

With this continuing pressure to remain in Europe and further defence requirements for North America, Canadian officials confronted something of a quandary in the pursuit of continental soft-bandwagoning. Simply put, they faced similar input factors that necessitated NATO’s rearmament and led to Canada’s military contributions to the Central Front. The United States still demanded that the rest of NATO focus on strengthening their conventional military capabilities, and Canada needed to be part of that effort, even if it was no longer at the forefront. True, the Soviet’s leadership change upon Stalin’s death in 1953 had taken some of the poisonous vitriol out of its rhetoric, with the attendant “spirit of Geneva” lessening some of the internal pressure among many

695 Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and Rearmament,” 104.
NATO allies to reach their conventional force goals. However, it is important not to overtstate the degree to which this changed the context or rationale for NATO’s forces-in-being. Indeed, Canadian officials seemed much more worried that this apparent change in Soviet tone would only create a sense of complacency amongst NATO countries, and thereby widen the disparity of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.696 “[I]n this warming climate of today,” warned Lester Pearson, “we shall need to be resolute against the temptation to relax our vigilance or abandon our defense efforts.”697

Washington also gave little indication that its own concerns over the NATO military gap had lessened, which meant that the rest of the allies (including Canada) still had to contend with less than subtle American interest on this subject. Yet Canada had to deal with an even more salient factor, and one that was both intimately tied to this more ambiguous threat perception and represented a departure from its experience at the onset of the 1950s – this was the domestic controversy attached to the continued high levels of defence spending. Simply put, while the exigencies of the Korean conflict had made the American calls for NATO’s military rearmament easy to digest, it became much harder to rationalize such actions as the prospect of a hot war receded.

Canadian policy-makers remained in support of continental soft-bandwagoning, as opposed to defensive weak-multilateralism that might have entailed more explicit distancing from the Alliance. But they did seek incremental ways to make such choices easier to swallow. For instance, instead of either acquiescing to greater contributions or undertaking a premature withdrawal, External Affairs was more interested in maintaining current force commitments to Europe – and placing them on more stable and

long-term foundations. As one Canadian official warned, “[g]iven that there are real economic and political limits to what can be done in a particular period, I think it important that the necessity for a slower rate of advance be accepted and generally recognized.”\textsuperscript{698} Meanwhile, Lester Pearson once again became interested in the possibility that increased non-military cooperation provided an avenue to strengthen NATO in the face of this apparent Soviet peace offensive, while preventing the sort of complacency that could lead to a weakening of its military character.

National Defence meanwhile recognized that the increasing largesse that it had enjoyed at the immediate onset of the Korean War was coming to an end. Indeed, defence officials were especially keen to at least maintain Canada’s NATO commitments. As the Joint Planning Committee study concluded, the Eisenhower administration had “assumed all the international obligations which it and previous Administrations have undertaken,” and therefore did not envision substantially reducing its military commitments to Western Europe. Even with the conclusion that the “demands on Canadian resources...are likely to be substantially heavier,” this study likewise gave little indication that it foresaw the need to reduce Canada’s own contributions to the Integrated Force.\textsuperscript{699} In other words, senior military officials adopted a preference for the continued status quo in Europe, which paralleled the strategic thinking of their colleagues in the East Block, without of course the latter’s interest in non-military cooperation.

To be sure, the St. Laurent government did make some comments about a possible withdrawal of some of its forward deployed forces, which if enacted would seem


\textsuperscript{699} Report by Joint Planning Committee to Chiefs of Staff Committee, “United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy,” 15 June 1954.
to herald a more definite change to defensive weak-multilateralism. In 1955, for instance, Pearson hinted at a possible drawdown of the 1 Air Division in a few years, while Minister of National Health and Welfare Paul Martin reiterated in 1957 that this commitment was dependent on other countries carrying “their equitable share of the sacrifices.” Yet these musings remained tentative and largely ambiguous, as one would expect given the advice coming from both External Affairs and National Defence. Notwithstanding the continuing cost of maintaining these forces in Europe and the potential for financial savings, Canada still showed little inclination to fundamentally depart from its existing NATO commitments, though it had even less enthusiasm to increase them.

Even as Canada’s military commitment to Europe effectively stalled, however, Ottawa would join with many of its key allies in looking at nuclear weapons as a possible qualitative means to offset the conventional limitations of NATO’s shield forces. At the very least, a NATO defence strategy further predicated on nuclear weapons, whether by further emphasizing the sword and/or reinforcing shield forces with tactical nuclear weapons, would mitigate some of the pressure on NATO countries to increase their conventional defence efforts. And if our forward deployed forces were able to have access to NATO nuclear weapons, which some in the military clearly preferred, Canada would be able to not only continue its continental soft-bandwagoning approach to NATO defence strategy but finally be able to do so on a potentially cost-effective footing.

As such, while creating difficulties for Canada by renewing focus on continental air defence, the New Look’s emphasis on nuclear weapons – as an asymmetrical counter to Soviet conventional superiority – also offered officials eager accede to American

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preferences a potential way out of this impasse. As noted in Chapter Four, some
Canadian officials including Lester Pearson and Norman Roberston had qualms about
nuclear weapons in general and Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine in particular.
Yet this should overshadow the extent to which numerous officials, especially in (but by
no means limited to) National Defence and the Canadian military, were relatively
sanguine on the prospect of a greater nuclear role. Indeed, it promised not only to help to
overcome the growing controversy that plagued increasing defence spending, but also to
reaffirm Canada’s cooperative policy choices in response to American strategic doctrine.

Surprisingly, President Eisenhower was at first reluctant to fundamentally change
NATO defence strategy to bring it more in line with his own strategic musings. He was
especially hesitant to reduce the American military commitment, lest it trigger a
commensurate reduction in the Western European defence effort. Yet the administration
did make some tentative moves to incorporate within NATO its “long haul” concept of
defence planning, which envisioned a conventional build-up that could be “stretched out
to avoid exceeding the economic capacities of the allies.” 701 And the United States
gradually came around to the possible benefits of applying the New Look more fully to
NATO, first by increasing the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal, 702 and later by
reinforcing NATO shield forces with non-strategic nuclear weapons – an addendum to
the New Look that seemed to be closer in spirit to graduated deterrence, which had
among its proponents British Rear-Admiral Anthony Buzzard, Henry Kissinger, and

701 Duffield, Power Rules, 81.
702 For example, the US nuclear stockpile grew from 1000 in 1953 to 18,000 by the end of the decade.
Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill,” 23
Lester Pearson, than to any sort of massive retaliation, properly so-called.  

By the early 1950s, the US deployed smaller and shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons, including atomic artillery shells and a range of different nuclear-capable tactical missiles (e.g., Honest John, Matador, and Regulus). 

Tactical nuclear weapons carried the promise of qualitatively enhancing NATO’s shield forces. For instance, US General Alfred Gruenther initiated an assessment by SHAPE called the Capabilities Study (also known as the New Approach or New Look study), which was meant to provide “an estimate of what could be done by NATO with the military forces expected to be available in 1957 and taking account of the impact of unconventional weapons.” According to a summary of its findings, atomic weapons were expected to be used on the earliest onset of any war, even against a Soviet conventional attack, and major readjustments in military forces were required to take into account expected atomic conditions. This study eventually found its way to the NATO Military Committee, where it formed the basis for NATO’s new strategic concept (and belated response to Eisenhower’s New Look) MC 48, titled “The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength of the Next Few Years.” This document focused largely on the initial

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703 Graduated deterrence, which was first coined by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, had its most vocal and influential advocate in Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, the former Chief of British Naval Intelligence. See Anthony Buzzard, “Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence,” *World Politics* 8, 2 (1956): 228-237. For a broad overview on this subject, see Friedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 107-111. Pearson was also an advocate of graduated deterrence, and in so doing seemed to presage NATO’s growing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. See Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, 261.

704 American defence planners had contemplated the possible utility of nuclear weapons for battlefield use in Central Europe as early as 1949, which led in 1951 to project “Vista” that studied the impact of using smaller atomic warheads in a tactical role. These efforts were given a subsequent boost with the successful detonation of a low-yield warhead two years hence. See Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, 261 and Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, 36.


phase of operations, “in which each side would strive to deliver a large portion of its accumulated stockpiles of atomic weapons as rapidly and effectively as possible.”\textsuperscript{707} It placed a premium on the earliest use of nuclear weapons and the requirement to have nuclear superiority at both the tactical and strategic level, with the forces-in-being being mobile and having an “integrated atomic capability.”\textsuperscript{708}

Canada’s own views on MC 48 were largely positive. General Charles Foulkes raised little in the way of concern during the discussions at the Military Committee. This positive response was reiterated in a National Defence brief given to the Canadian representative on the Military Committee, which concluded that MC 48 was “in a form which, as far as Canada is concerned, can be accepted in its entirety.”\textsuperscript{709} External Affairs remained more cautious on some of the implications of this new strategic concept. Officials such as Benjamin Rogers at Defence Liaison (1) Division, cognizant on the magnitude of a first-use doctrine, recommended further discussion on the implications of this document.\textsuperscript{710} Meanwhile, Lester Pearson had commissioned an External Affairs study on “The Strategic Concept of the Nuclear Deterrent,” which raised some prescient observations that an over-reliance on nuclear weapons could pose problems in the face of more limited Soviet military actions. Despite this caution, however, the department did not voice any serious objection over the passage of this document. As Sean Maloney

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{708} Ibid., 237.}
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notes, Defence Minister Ralph Campney informed Foulkes that MC 48 now “represents Canadian Government policy” and the document itself would subsequently be raised in the defence estimates for 1955-56.711

Clearly, MC 48 heralded an important change in NATO strategy, which led to the rapid expansion of NATO’s tactical nuclear arsenal and the growing use of “pentomic” divisions geared towards fighting under atomic conditions.712 However, its results also proved to be disappointing to those NATO allies hopeful that the Soviet tendency towards more accommodating behaviour following Stalin’s death could finally result in a reduced conventional defence effort. After all, rather than allowing more a commensurate reduction in the size of NATO’s shield, the new strategy was still reliant on large conventional forces as a means to force the Soviets to use large conventional formations that were highly vulnerable to atomic bombardment.713 Furthermore, MC 48 also hinted at some new military requirements, such as air defence, that would be an additional defence burden for NATO countries. This did not entail a significant drawback from Canada’s perspective, as it was primarily interested in maintaining rather than substantially reducing its military commitment under the continental soft-bandwagoning SOD. And any additional military burden that resulted from this strategy was largely offset by MC 48’s greater recognition of the importance of Canada’s strategic defence efforts in North America.

712 The pentomic divisional structure entailed the use of five smaller “battle groups” to replace the three regiments of a standard division. These groups were meant to be highly mobile and to operate independently of each other, thereby representing smaller targets for tactical nuclear bombardment, while being more reliant on their nuclear firepower due to the smaller size of each of the battle groups. Krugler, *Laying the Foundations*, 95-96.
713 See Duffield, *Power Rules*, Chp. 3.
While acceptable to Canadian officials, MC 48 did little to quell Great Britain’s growing disenchantment with NATO’s continued reliance on strong shield forces. After all, with its ongoing plans to reduce the size of its large conventional forces, Whitehall had hoped for a face-saving mechanism to permit a partial military withdrawal from the Europe. They did seek a reappraisal of the strategic concept to better take into account their idea that NATO’s shield should only serve as a “tripwire” – a very pure form of massive retaliation that even American officials disparaged as “thermonuclear bombs or nothing” – rather than the more ambitious concept of ensuring a “pause” in the Soviet attack. However, President Eisenhower was then beginning to recognize the problems that arose from the New Look’s heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and showed little interest in acceding to British wishes. Indeed, in an early portent to his successor’s eventual flexible defence strategy, the administration had signed NSC-5501 and NSC-5602/1, both of which advocated greater conventional flexibility if confronted with more limited Soviet attacks – a sign that the New Look was undergoing further changes that became known as the “new” New Look, but could be better described as “Differentiated Responses.”

While perhaps sympathetic to Great Britain’s economic woes, Canada too showed little enthusiasm to side with them on this issue. As noted earlier, officials had grown

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716 For a comparison between the two terms, see Kugler, *Laying the Foundations*, 88.
717 To be sure, the United States still had some important elements that were at the very least sympathetic with the British proposal. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford, for example, had envisioned substantial reduction in the size of the American military forces, including a partial withdrawal of its overseas commitments. However, a leaked version of the Radford plan only resulted in furor and sharp criticism. Duffield, *Power Rules*, 115-117.
worried that the Soviet more peaceful overtures could result in a weakening of NATO’s political *raison d'être* and lead to a dangerous degree of military complacency, which the British proposal seemed to only abet. On one hand, at a time when NATO members were beginning to question the need for the Alliance, both Pearson and General Foulkes agreed that a unilateral British move to withdraw its force would only further weaken the political glue that held the Alliance together. Second, with France transferring its forces to Algeria and German rearmament proceeding more slowly than expected, Ottawa had a strong interest in ensuring that NATO’s conventional forces were strong on the Central Front. Indeed, as revealed by the comments by Lester Pearson, Canada was clearly concerned that the Soviets had the capacity to undertake either limited war or political/military blackmail, especially once the development of its own nuclear deterrent finally created a “balance of terror.” In such a situation, and contrary to the British tripwire thesis, “[t]he mere reiteration by NATO of its willingness to use its deterrent atomic power might not in some circumstances convince the Soviet Union that it would in fact be used.” Tactical nuclear weapons were still seen as an adjunct to NATO’s conventional shield forces, but were also no longer seen as a panacea for all scenarios.

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721 This was especially true after SHAPE wargame exercises revealed the devastation of even a limited nuclear exchange in Europe. For example, the 1954 Sage Brush exercise was held in an American state (Louisiana) that represented a territory the size of Greece and Portugal, and concluded that 70 small atomic devices dropped on military targets would effectively wipe out life in that territory. A year later, the Carte Blanche exercise envisioned a limited exchange involving 355 nuclear devices largely over West German territory, which was expected to cause 1.7 million fatalities and 3.5 million wounded. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 104.
Officials in Ottawa did support the British call for a reappraisal of NATO defence strategy. However, Canada also refrained from embracing Great Britain’s preference, as one would expect if there had been a strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism. Instead, officials worked closely with their American ally and others with similar concerns in NATO to ensure that the resultant 1956 Political Directive focused less on the Soviet’s political tactics, which seemed to justify Whitehall’s emphasis on a tripwire shield, and more on the Soviet Union’s growing capacity for limited conventional attacks that required strong conventional shield forces. This directive would be used to form the basis for the new strategy document MC 14/2, approved in 1957, which maintained its predecessor’s emphasis on early use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO shield forces against an all-out attack, but also contained an important corollary to MC 48 – shield forces still needed to have conventional flexibility to confront more peripheral provocations without “recourse to nuclear weapons.”

Even as Canada sided clearly with the Americans to block the British proposal, some officials were also contemplating ways to reinforce NATO’s political purpose by finally instilling some substance to Article 2. This represented Canada’s final effort on this issue and it is perhaps not without irony that it took place at a time when officials were also pressing for NATO shield forces to have a greater capacity for both tactical nuclear use and flexible conventional options. Yet these parallel policy tracks did have an important connection, which only underlies the fact that this effort at modest distancing took place within the context of continental soft-bandwagoning. In addition to serving as

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an important reminder that NATO was not simply being further militarized, Ottawa’s push for non-military forms of cooperation was meant to provide the Alliance with a strengthened *raison d’être* and thereby buttress – rather than challenge – Canada’s continued commitment to Europe. In that respect, it sought to cure some of NATO’s political malaise that the threatened British withdrawal only magnified, just as MC 48 and MC 14/2 was a response to the related risk of limited aggression by superior Soviet conventional forces.

It is also perhaps appropriate that Lester Pearson, along with Gaetano Martino of Italy and Halvard Lange of Norway, would spearhead this new effort in the Committee of Three, also known as the Three Wise Men. After undertaking a detailed survey on the views of the NATO members on non-economic cooperation, the Committee submitted its report at the very same December 1956 meeting that approved the Political Directive – and shortly after the Suez crisis demonstrated the potentially deep political fissures that marred the Atlantic Alliance.723 Canada’s involvement provided an important avenue for the country to be seen to pursue an independent path, at a time when its military policy was becoming increasingly in sync with American preferences on NATO militarization. However, it is important not to underestimate the degree to which this policy track was compliant with American preferences. After all, officials at the State Department shared the concerns of their Canadian counterparts on the declining cohesion of the Alliance and also saw the potential utility of greater non-military cooperation. Indeed, Canada would serve on the Committee of Three largely at the behest of US Secretary of State Dulles.724 Equally important, Canada was much more pessimistic on the possibility of using the

Committee to facilitate economic cooperation. With Pearson’s belief that “the probability of obtaining substantial (economic) reforms was nil,” Ottawa instead turned to the related—albeit less immediately controversial—issue of political consultations. And even these recommendations were carefully “calculated to not to water down NATO’s military flavor.”

If Canada’s attempt to have some distance from NATO militarization proved to be largely rhetorical, the same cannot be said with how it followed up with the strategic military guidance codified in MC 48 and MC 14/2. Indeed, Canada was soon taking part in the required force structure planning necessary for NATO countries to be armed with nuclear-capable weapon systems and eventually to have access to nuclear warheads. These plans were eventually embodied in MC 70 on “The Minimum Essential NATO Force Requirements 1958-1963,” which after extensive discussions was finally approved in May 1958. This planning document did leave the same conventional force structure that appeared in MC 48, and was clearly influenced by SACEUR General Lauris Norstad’s wishes that the NATO shield forces be sufficiently capable of holding “an attack until the total weight of the retaliatory power could be brought to bear.” As such, it prevented Great Britain from justifying its military retrenchment on strategic-military grounds, even if it did little to prevent London from eventually implementing a partial withdrawal of its ground and air force commitments.

726 Schwartz, *NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas*, 34. MC 70 maintained MC 48’s requirement to have 30 ready divisions in the Central Region, even though NATO was still expected to fall short of this number. See Duffield, *Power Rules*, 130.
727 Great Britain did succeed in withdrawing roughly thirty percent of its ground forces from the British Army on the Rhine, which went from a force of 78,000 to 55,000, while its Second Tactical Air Force was halved to only 220 aircraft. It had planned to further reduce its ground forces to 45,000, but was finally
However, MC 70 also gave more concrete proposals on how to incorporate both tactical (and intermediate-range) nuclear weapons in NATO’s force structure, and included force recommendations for each country drawn up by both SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) at SHAPE. As revealed in the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1957, Washington had also shown itself willing to devolve control over tactical nuclear weapons in the form of a NATO nuclear stockpile. The Joint Chiefs of Staff might have preferred bilateral arrangements with individual countries, but they were eventually overruled after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite made it important to demonstrate NATO solidarity. Not all countries agreed to host the stockpile, with France and the Scandinavian countries being the most notable exceptions, but several countries chose to sign agreements by the end of the decade.

The St. Laurent government was an enthusiastic supporter of this process, if only to place Canada’s continental soft-bandwagoning doctrine on a more cost effective footing. But it remained equally keen to prevent any new additional (and thereby costly) commitments to Europe, whether by expanded force goals or the need for expensive new conventional equipment – a sentiment that was shared by St. Laurent’s successor John Diefenbaker, who came to power in 1957 prior to the approval of MC 70. For instance, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee was by March 1957 looking at a number of possible nuclear-capable weapons, including atomic delivery systems for both the 1 Air

728 Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 114.
Division and Air Defence Command forces closer to home, the Lacrosse and Little John
missile systems for the Army, and atomic depth charges, torpedoes, and nuclear-capable
guided missiles for the Navy.\textsuperscript{730} But these same officials would balk at SHAPE’s initial
recommendation that Canada provide two new types of aircraft to Europe, in addition to
the CF-86s and CF-100s already stationed there, and quickly refused SACLANT’s
request in MC 70 for a second aircraft carrier and additional maritime patrol aircraft.\textsuperscript{731} It
also can be seen with the Canadian refusal, when requested by the International Staff at
SHAPE as part of the Annual Review process, to increase its defence expenditures by
two percent for 1959-60.\textsuperscript{732}

Canada had little problem agreeing to a number of nuclear-capable weapon
systems. The Army received the Honest John short-range rocket, due to the unavailability
of its initial choices. The Air Force meanwhile settled on the acquisition of the F-104G
Starfighter aircraft, following a triangular deal with the Americans that also involved
acquiring Voodoo interceptors for air defence in North America. These aircraft,
rechristened CF-104G, would in turn transform the role of Canada’s 1 Air Division from
air defence to strike and reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{733} While the procurement of these systems
proved to be quick and relatively uncontroversial, the same cannot be said for the
attendant nuclear warheads.

\textsuperscript{730} Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, DEA/50045-A-40, Ottawa, 19 March

\textsuperscript{731} See Maloney, \textit{Learning to Love the Bomb}, 112-115. For Canada’s initial reaction after a draft of MC 70
was circulated, see Minutes of Meeting of Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, DEA/50030-

\textsuperscript{732} Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council, “NATO

\textsuperscript{733} Less well known is the fact that the Royal Canadian Navy, while not known to have been armed with
nuclear weapons, still acquired a number of nuclear-capable systems geared towards anti-submarine
warfare. See Munton, “Going fission,” 509-510. For a detailed look at each service’s changing views the
procurement of these nuclear-capable weapon systems, see Maloney, \textit{Learning to Love the Bomb}, Chp. 7.
This chapter will not go into detail on the specifics of the Diefenbaker interregnum that delayed the acquisition of the warheads for several years, As fully described in Chapter Four, the reasons have much to do with Diefenbaker’s eccentric proclivities and his misplaced concerns on the control of the warheads earmarked for the country’s continental air defence systems, with the question of the warheads for the nuclear-capable systems deployed in Europe being much less of a concern. Suffice to say, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker would oversee a rapid deterioration of Canada-US ties – and only upon his defeat in the 1963 election would Canada finally make arrangements to arm its many weapon systems with nuclear warheads. Due to the prime minister’s intransigence, it did take a torturous several years before Canada was fully able to fulfil its military commitment to NATO defence strategy, first hinted in MC 48 and MC 14/2 and later cemented in the force structure plans of MC 70. Importantly, however, once the Pearson government came to power in 1963, Canada quickly returned to fulfilling its commitment to NATO in accordance to continental soft-bandwagoning.

Flexible Response and Pearsonian Ambiguity, 1963-68

MC 70 provided the initial blueprint for the inclusion of tactical nuclear warheads into NATO’s force structure. But even as Diefenbaker’s government wrestled with the issue of Canadian political control over US-supplied nuclear warheads, other countries in NATO were grappling with another consequence arising from MC 70. Specifically, while largely concerned with incorporating tactical nuclear weapons, the strategy document also saw the need for forward deployed and nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). At the behest of the 1955 Killian Report, the United States already saw
IRBMs as an interim strategic force before ICBMs finally became operational. Soon enough, both the US Army and Air Force had land-based IRBM programs to develop Jupiter and Thor missiles, respectively. These missiles not only had less sophisticated technological requirements than ICBMs but once deployed to Western Europe would be capable of targeting the Soviet Union. At the Alliance’s meeting in December 1957, Washington finally announced its intention to deploy land-based IRBMs to selected Western European countries, provided that countries were indeed willing to play host to these new strategic weapons – though only Italy and Turkey joined Great Britain in hosting IRBMs by the early 1960s.

With the rapid development of America’s ICBM force, alongside the implicit understanding reached by Washington and Moscow after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States made the decision to phase out the Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe in 1962-63. Yet the initial Anglo-American agreement on Thor missiles was used by Great Britain as a way to get further technological aid for its own nuclear deterrent program. While the missiles were withdrawn by 1963, Great Britain did acquire the US Polaris sea-launched missile, armed with British nuclear warheads and on British-built submarines. Meanwhile America’s preferential treatment of Great Britain only served

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735 Great Britain had accepted USAF’s Thor missiles on its territory in 1957, in exchange for greater nuclear information sharing between the two nations. Yet other NATO countries proved to be much more cautious with the prospect of IRBMs on their territory, especially since both Thor and Jupiter missiles represented soft, highly vulnerable targets. See Melissen, “Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959,” 262-267 and Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Chp. 4.
737 With the cancellation of its Blue Streak program, Great Britain had some tentative thoughts about acquiring more Thor missiles, but eventually settled for the American Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. However, Kennedy’s termination of this program would create a small crisis in the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, eventually leading to the provision of the Polaris missile – which
to excite the French and German interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. France eventually emerged as a nuclear power by the mid-1960s, while West Germany never did cross the nuclear threshold – though the fear that it would only accelerated NATO’s effort to find a suitable nuclear sharing mechanism.

The Kennedy administration might have played a central role in advancing the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal as a way to head off this purported “fourth country” nuclear problem. But the new president’s Flexible Response strategy also proved more difficult to reconcile with these nuclear sharing arrangements – and there was likely little regret when MLF was finally put to rest. Flexible Response, focused on confronting Soviet aggression below the strategic nuclear threshold, emphasized greater capacity for conventional military actions and sub-strategic or tactical nuclear options. It implied a greater degree of control over nuclear options that, while having escalatory potential, also maintained distance between tactical and strategic responses. For example, the withdrawal of IRBMs meant that limited nuclear use would not automatically result in a strategic nuclear exchange, even as the continued presence of tactical weapons kept the potential for escalation alive. As such, it clearly dampened enthusiasm for an MLF

 incidentally was precisely the delivery system that British military officials were most interested in. For more on this crisis, see Ken Young, “The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, 4 (2004): 614-635.

The MLF was originally envisioned to include Polaris-armed submarines, including those belonging to Great Britain and the United States, but this was later changed to a force of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles. For a good account of the MLF, see Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, Chps. 6-9.

This can be contrasted with how tactical nuclear weapons were viewed under the Eisenhower administration, which saw them as a means to reinforce massive retaliatory deterrent and as a tool of war-righting to help offset the Soviet Union’s superior conventional capabilities. Interestingly, this view of nuclear use – as a tool to reinforce the political deterrence of an opponent – was earlier raised by Great Britain in the Mottershead Report in 1961. See Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, Chp. 2
that would only further devolve control over intermediate-range delivery vehicles.\(^{740}\)

Indeed, by the time Johnson took over from Kennedy, the United States was already turning towards a “software” solution involving nuclear consultations in NATO’s newly established Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).\(^{741}\)

It is important to recognize that Kennedy’s strategy was not necessarily a revolutionary change from that of his predecessor. After all, Eisenhower had already accepted the requirement to strengthen NATO shield forces against limited Soviet aggression with MC 14/2, while also acquiescing to the French-British-American Live Oak contingency planning group designed to provide options against low-level Soviet military action in Berlin.\(^{742}\) A number of studies released in the last years of his presidency showed an interest in conventional defence, even if Eisenhower was himself unwilling to accept the full brunt of these recommendations.\(^{743}\) Yet Kennedy seemed much more ready to push NATO to deal with limited military contingencies, which would be outlined in the 1961 Acheson report and further codified under National Security Memorandum 40 (NSAM-40). America’s enthusiasm was only magnified by the second Berlin crisis, which led Kennedy to reinforce its ground and air forces in Europe and to successfully corral its partners – including Canada – to do the same.\(^{744}\) While

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\(^{743}\) Two studies by officials from the State Department and the Pentagon concluded the need to strengthen NATO’s non-nuclear capabilities, which would eventually be brought together in a joint State-Defense report titled “NATO in the 1960s.” Duffield, *Power Rules*, 153.

\(^{744}\) Ibid., 154-161. Canada would increase its brigade group by 1,100 personnel to bring it to full war-time strength in 1961, as a result of the increased tension from the second Berlin crisis. See McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defense Policy*, 109.
convinced on the need for conventional defence efforts, both Kennedy and Johnson also thought that the onus should properly come from Western Europe, even if their calls for quantitative European increases had less than ideal results.\textsuperscript{745}

However, the United States did take some initial steps to strengthen NATO’s shield forces. For instance, it reversed Eisenhower’s preference for pentomic divisional formations that made them less formidable in a purely conventional environment.\textsuperscript{746} Instead, American ground forces were reequipped with new equipment meant to provide greater mobility and firepower, based on the Reorganized Objective Army Division (ROAD) concept, even as high quantities of equipment were prepositioned in Europe to complement the increase in the US airlift capabilities.\textsuperscript{747} Tactical nuclear weapons for NATO shield forces were also not ignored. After all, the US military had deployed 2,500 warheads in Europe by the end of the 1950s; this figure would quickly grow from 3,500 to 7,000 by 1966 and featured a number of new weapon systems, including the Sergeant, Pershing, Mace, and Nike-Hercules missiles.\textsuperscript{748}

Despite this ambition to fulfil the promise of Flexible Response, the United States was at first confident that NATO’s existing defence strategy, MC 14/2 and MC 70, had enough flexibility to take into account expanded conventional force options and controlled sub-strategic nuclear use. The Alliance did make some tentative moves towards a Force Planning Exercise to try to bridge Flexible Response’s conventional

\textsuperscript{745} West Germany proved most willing to increase its own conventional force levels following the Berlin crisis, and would finally reach its previous pledge of having 12 ready divisions and armed forces totaling nearly 500,000 by the mid-1960s. Yet this would only compensate for the attendant decline in British and French forces, with the former continuing to be under financial duress and the latter shrinking significantly in the aftermath of the Algerian War (and being less reliable after its exit from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966).
\textsuperscript{746} Krugler, \textit{Laying the Foundations}, 95-96
force requirements with NATO’s still lax effort to fulfil them, which was later incorporated into a strategic reappraisal in the form of MC 100/1. While designed to reassess the need to revisit the last strategic concept, MC 100/1 fell victim to French obstructionism – and its insistence that NATO should follow its own lead by adopting a very pure version of massive retaliation. Yet the French capability to obstruct this process would come to an end with its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966, which coincided with trilateral discussions between Washington, London and Bonn for limited troop withdrawals by the United States and Great Britain. This set the stage for NATO to pursue a new Political Guidance in 1968 and the subsequent codification of Flexible Response under MC 14/3, the last major NATO strategy document of the Cold War.

Canada was surely aware of America’s growing effort to inculcate Flexible Response as the new strategic leitmotif for NATO. Even during the troubled tenure of John Diefenbaker, officials in Ottawa continued to pursue discussions on how to best contribute to this NATO defence strategy. For instance, General Charles Foulkes discussed with his NATO colleagues the possibility that Canada’s ground contingent could be restructured to serve as a flexible mobile reserve force as early as 1959 – though little would immediately come of Foulkes’ proposal. Under the Pearson government, Ottawa finally procured nuclear warheads in fulfilment of its commitments under both MC 14/2 and MC 70. Clearly, this also complemented the new American strategic

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749 France’s doctrine of “nuclear sufficiency” represented a pure version of Massive Retaliation that bears a strong resemblance to the British trip-wire concept, and was later codified in the 1972 and 1994 French Defence White Papers. Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, 96

750 This paragraph is heavily based on Duffield, *Power Rules*, Chp. 5.

preference for Flexible Response, in so far as this strategy also envisioned an important (albeit less publicly enunciated) role for tactical nuclear weapons. Canada had meanwhile already acceded to the strategic revisions begun by President Eisenhower. With Flexible Response representing a natural extension to these revisions and so many members of the Pearson government so closely associated with NATO, one can also perhaps be forgiven for assuming that Lester Pearson would only accelerate these efforts.

However, Canadian officials confronted a different array of environmental factors in the 1960s, which weakened the continental soft-bandwagoning policy consensus that had prevailed under St. Laurent and would result in a more substantial strategic-doctrinal shift by the end of the decade. While publicly committed to Flexible Response by 1961, the United States often pursued policies that, from the selectivity of nuclear options to the strengthening of its conventional forces, frequently fell well short of its public declarations on Flexible Response.752 Indeed, Washington continued to make suggestive noises about further troops withdrawals to counter its widening balance-of-payments deficit – a threat that it would eventually fulfil as part of the trilateral talks with Britain and Germany.753 This is not to deny that the United States undertook some significant qualitative improvements in its military force posture, especially with the tactical nuclear arsenal and the ROAD concept, but both Kennedy and Johnson still retained a degree of ambiguity in their actual preferences for NATO defence strategy.

Importantly, the rest of NATO were well aware of these mixed signals emanating from Washington. And contrary to Kennedy’s initial hopes, most European militaries (aside from the West German Bundeswehr) were generally ill-inclined to increase their

own conventional force levels. Simply put, the United States had a relatively weak hand to actually pressure its allies to reinforce their conventional military capabilities – and what little political capital it had was directed towards prodding the larger countries in Europe to increase their own military contributions. With its small population base and limited resources, Washington had little hope that Canada could provide anything more than a token military support for Flexible Response. As such, while the previous episode featured more concentrated American interest in both NATO conventional defence and Canadian military contributions, officials in Ottawa did not at this moment face the same sort of stimuli or interest from our superpower ally.

In any event, the prime minister was leaning towards a more cautious response to this American initiative, one which accepted the precepts of Flexible Response but was not willing to offer more than a minimal effort to support it. On one hand, Canada appreciated the American recognition that Eisenhower’s New Look, predicated on nuclear superiority rather than mutual vulnerability, had become outdated. Yet an important corollary to MAD was a belief in the Soviet capacity and willingness to undertake more limited forms of aggression, which NATO had to counter without resorting to strategic nuclear use.754 Canada was not caught unaware of this axiom, with Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer’s 1964 White Paper on Defence emphasizing that the Soviets could “promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out war.”755 But Canada was more cautious about the alarmism that underpinned this strategy. After

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754 NATO had traditionally judged Soviet divisions as being comparable to those in the West, and therefore imputed to the Soviet Union an insurmountable superiority in conventional forces. However, Robert McNamara led an independent assessment of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and concluded that Soviet divisions were much smaller than their Western counterparts, most were undermanned, and many were likely to remain near the Soviet-Chinese border. With the disparity in conventional forces much smaller than previously anticipated, this reassessment concluded that NATO had the realistic capability to achieve conventional military parity with the Warsaw Pact. See Duffield, Power Rules, Chp. 4.

755 White Paper on Defence, 11.
all, Kennedy intended to develop a capacity to respond symmetrically to the full-range of Soviet actions, an ambitious proposal that was justified by the perceived Soviet military threat and the dangers of continued inaction. In contrast, Pearson was hopeful on the prospect for American-Soviet rapprochement and saw the dangers of limited forms of Soviet aggression primarily in the developing world rather than in Europe.

On the other hand, Flexible Response focused on full-spectrum military capabilities that carried at least the promise that Canada might be forced to increase its own conventional military efforts – a controversial proposition for a government disinclined to see the Soviet threat in alarmist tones and eager to expand the country’s federal social programs. And at this point, Canada found it difficult to even maintain its present contributions, to say nothing of increasing them. Importantly, both Kennedy and Johnson had also placed emphasis on sub-strategic nuclear use, which seemed to provide a possible means for Canada to continue its reliance on nuclear weapons as an asymmetrical contribution to NATO defence. Even here, however, Ottawa could no longer rely on nuclear weapons as a panacea for its troubles. Indeed, soon after acquiring nuclear warheads, Canada’s long-standing aversion to these weapons suddenly came to the fore. The prime minister would publicly contemplate the eventual reduction and abandonment of Canada’s nuclear role, but even his tentative comments did little to quell the growing dissatisfaction within his own caucus. It surely did not help matters that Flexible Response was often viewed as a conventional-only strategy – this made it all the more difficult to publicly justify the continued reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.

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Lester Pearson might have hoped to return to his esteemed Liberal predecessor’s fully cooperative stance towards both Canada-US relations and the Atlantic Alliance. However, pursuant to these environmental conditions, it became more difficult to back rhetorical approval for the new Flexible Response strategy with the more concrete policy action envisioned by continental soft-bandwagoning. To do so, Canada would be placed in the unenviable position of maintaining its conventional commitments to Europe, which were seen as obsolescent in the current strategic environment and a drain from Pearson’s domestic agenda, or continuing with an increasingly controversial nuclear role that was difficult to square with the NATO strategy’s conventional focus. As such, the policy-making coalition that emerged in Ottawa was much less unanimous on the need for continental soft-bandwagoning – though the resultant strategic-doctrinal shift was gradual and more limited in scope. After all, Washington was ambiguous in implementing Flexible Response and largely concerned with European contributions, which meant that Canada did not face sufficient stimuli to adopt a dramatic shift to the alternative SOD.

National Defence at first provided the most prominent voice in Canadian policy deliberations to call for a greater defence effort and stronger military cooperation within NATO. For example, an early draft of the 1964 white paper provided an orthodox view of Canadian defence policy that was suspicious of détente and, while in keeping with Defence Minister Hellyer’s interest in mobility, still prioritized our contribution to the conventional deterrent in Europe. This draft was roundly criticized by the rest of the cabinet, not least of whom by the prime minister himself, and would be revised to emphasize greater flexibility in Canadian defence roles and renewed emphasis on
international peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{757} The final document did not envision any fundamental departure from Canada’s traditional roles in the North Atlantic and some of its conclusions can even be criticized for its 1950s strategic sensibilities.\textsuperscript{758} But its emphasis on mobility and peacekeeping hinted that Hellyer’s own thoughts were not necessarily in keeping with Canadian defence orthodoxy.

Rather than focusing on Canada’s traditional commitments to NATO and NORAD, Hellyer’s attention was soon directed at the creation of a Mobile Command to facilitate the new emphasis on peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{759} He would also seek to minimize bureaucratic inefficiencies through a process of military reorganization, which in the final stage of unification reduced Canadian civil-military relations to an especially low ebb, as demonstrated by the so-called Admirals Revolt.\textsuperscript{760} Indeed, while National Defence traditionally shared similar preferences with the military, Paul Hellyer’s leadership instead resulted in a growing disconnect between the two. The defence minister would even go so far as to advocate a significant reduction of Canada’s commitment to Europe in order to achieve “important financial and organization advantages.”\textsuperscript{761} Importantly, Hellyer’s actions helped to curtail the military’s once prominent role in the policy-making coalition. Previously, Canadian military officers had enjoyed a privileged position on matters concerning NATO defence strategy. But as Sean Maloney surmised,

\textsuperscript{757} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{759} Maloney, “‘Global Mobile,’” 20-34.
the Canadian military was likely too preoccupied with the process of reorganization to have much of an effect in how Canada approached NATO in the 1960s.\(^762\)

In contrast to National Defence’s equivocal stance on NATO, External Affairs emerged a key proponent of the status quo. Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin might have been sanguine on NATO’s capability to withstand Soviet aggression, but he was very much interested in ensuring continued political unity within the Alliance, especially given the increasing likelihood of France’s possible departure.\(^763\) On one hand, this made the department more interested in non-military ways to strengthen NATO and ensure reconciliation with France, which involved a Canadian mediatory role and an effort to deepen discussion of arms control and détente within NATO. On the other hand, Martin proved to be a consistent critic of a Canadian military withdrawal. Indeed, when Hellyer had proposed to review this commitment, he was able to convince the prime minister and the rest of the cabinet to reject it. Greg Donaghy nicely summarizes Martin’s argument, that “Canada’s adherence to the status quo was essential because of the continued Soviet threat, the fragile nature of the alliance, and the possibility that the United States and Germany might adopt ‘more nationally oriented’ foreign policies.”\(^764\)

Prime Minister Lester Pearson offered perhaps a more ambiguous stance to the question of Canada’s continued military role in NATO. While sympathetic to Hellyer’s

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\(^{762}\) Sean Maloney, *The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-NATOization and Denuclearization* (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2005), 17.

\(^{763}\) France had in 1959 pushed for a three-power directorate (with the United Kingdom and the United States) to take charge of the West’s political and military strategy, which was France’s last substantive NATO proposal. It was followed by moves to distance France from the Alliance, by signing the 1963 French-German Élysée Treaty and later withdrawing the French Atlantic Fleet from NATO command in 1963 – this culminated in its 1966 decision to leave NATO’s integrated military structure. See Anna Locher, “A crisis foretold: NATO and France, 1963-66,” in *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960s*, eds. Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 107-127.

vision for the Canadian military, he was also much less prone than his predecessors to see Canada’s ground and air commitments to Europe as being sacrosanct, especially if it allowed him to reduce defence spending. To American chagrin, he would even publicly offer his own personal musing on the future of Canada’s commitment to Europe, hinting on several different occasions that Europe’s burgeoning economic strength could allow for Canada’s military to be redeployed elsewhere. That being said, the prime minister still sided with Martin in the face of Hellyer’s proposal to review the Canadian commitment and restrained his powerful Finance Minister Walter Gordon from cutting too deep into defence spending. Yet there were limits to the degree to which he was willing to curb the preferences of Gordon and those in the Quebec wing of the Liberal caucus – this became increasingly evident as the 1960s progressed and likely arose from the vagaries of being in a minority government, which forced it to compromise with other parties (e.g., New Democratic Party) that had even more critical views.

The Pearson government therefore settled on a more incremental approach to NATO strategy, which combined Hellyer and Gordon’s desire to reduce Canada’s military commitments with Martin’s preference for the status quo. If changes were to be made, they would be done so preferably in an incremental manner and on the margins. For instance, despite his personal musings and pressure from critics, Pearson consistently refused to withdraw the Canadian military from Europe. Instead, Ottawa made gradual reductions of the country’s air commitments – from twelve squadrons to eight by 1964. And following France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, Canada withdrew an additional two squadrons in what was renamed the 1 Canadian Air Group.

now stationed in Germany.\textsuperscript{766} Yet these reductions were modest in nature, especially given the questionable utility served by nuclear-armed aircraft located on highly vulnerable bases.

Importantly, Canada’s ground forces were intact in their forward positions on the Central Front. To be sure, the Pearson government also offered a commitment towards the newly created land component of NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, which was geared towards rapid deployment to those areas most prone to Soviet pressure.\textsuperscript{767} As such, while not necessarily strengthening its deployed ground forces, Canada did not ignore the growing Alliance interest in strengthening flexibility of response. However, one should also recognize that this commitment was limited to a ground contingent positioned in North America and already earmarked for the strategic reserve in support of the mechanized brigade group in Europe.\textsuperscript{768} As such, it provides the appearance of a strengthened commitment without the cost or the political trouble of actually increasing its forward deployed forces.

The Pearson government, which had made these modest force reductions from Europe largely for financial reasons, would also begin trimming the defence budget. For instance, it had cut plans to replace the Navy’s naval frigates and the RCAF’s CF-101s and CF-104s even before the completion of the 1964 white paper. And pursuant to its declining interest in a continued nuclear role, it also approved a five-year $1.5 billion procurement plan that had “no funding for equipment designed exclusively for nuclear

\textsuperscript{766} English, “Problems in Middle Life,” 50 and Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO,” 459.

\textsuperscript{767} In addition to Berlin, NATO’s weakest areas of defence were widely considered to be the southeastern “flank,” where Greek and Turkish tensions were well known, and in Scandinavia which had countries like Norway that refused both nuclear weapons and NATO ground forces.

\textsuperscript{768} See Maloney, “Fire Brigade or Tocsin?” 585-613 and “‘Global Mobile,’” 20-34.
weapons or warheads.” Paul Hellyer’s effort at cost-savings through reorganization might have been designed to offset some the impact of these cuts on the military, but it did little to plug the haemorrhaging taking place within the capital portion of the budget – a trend that was only accelerated in 1967 with a dramatic 15 percent cut from the budget.

Even then, Canada showed little inclination to undertake a more fundamental policy departure from NATO, displaying once again that this shift in SODs was gradual rather than immediate. While offering a relatively tepid response to the American MLF proposal, which no doubt irritated our American counterparts, Ottawa did not play anything approaching an obstructionist role – and its own warnings about MLF were surely echoed by influential members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Officials would also do their best to inculcate greater political unity by mediating French-NATO disagreements and pressing for NATO’s involvement in détente, with the latter including discussions over a non-aggression pact and Ground Observation Posts, neither of which were successful. With its circulation of a paper on “Future of the Alliance” in March 1965, Canada also helped set the stage for the “Harmel exercise” on the future direction of the Alliance. Canada might have had some disquiet about the nature and timing of this exercise. However, by concluding that the political purpose of the Alliance should be squarely placed on advancing détente, it did ultimately go some

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769 Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies*, 100.
distance towards healing the political wounds inflicted by French behaviour – and perhaps also set the stage for NATO’s post-Cold War political role.\textsuperscript{774}

Shortly after approving the Harmel Report, Canada acceded to the strategy document MC 14/3, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” by which the Alliance officially incorporated Flexible Response in its defence strategy. With this new strategy guidance, NATO agreed to develop full spectrum of military capabilities to respond to possible Soviet attacks, with a three-step process to deal with large-scale conventional aggression – direct defence with conventional forces, deliberate escalation, including with nuclear weapons, and a general nuclear response.\textsuperscript{775} Canada had assented to MC 14/3 with little in the way of comment. Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that Canadian diplomats effectively ignored this new guidance in order to throw “their weight behind the Harmel Report.”\textsuperscript{776} For instance, Canada had greeted the Harmel exercise with more than a little scepticism. And MC 14/3 also coincided with British and American military reductions and growing interest by European countries in following their examples, which raises questions on the extent to which other countries actually subscribed to this strategy. Canada’s tendency to not base its actual defence policy on MC 14/3, preferring instead to use a formula based on the

\textsuperscript{774} Frédéric Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report,” \textit{Contemporary European History} 7, 3 (1998): 346-360. The Harmel exercise was undertaken by a Special Group under the direction of Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, which had four sub-groups to different issue-areas, specifically, East-West relations, inter-allied relations, general Alliance defence policy, and developments outside the North Atlantic area.


\textsuperscript{776} Maloney, \textit{The Roots of Soft Power}, 17.
amount of monies available, was therefore in good company – and very much in keeping with Canadian interests.

To be sure, certain members of the Liberal caucus – including Walter Gordon, who after a brief hiatus would return as the President of the Privy Council, as well as Pierre Trudeau, Donald MacDonald, and Jean Marchand – were not necessarily satisfied with the pace of changes and continued to press for deeper cuts. While normally hesitant to adopt such an unsubtle position, Prime Minister Pearson proved to be more receptive to these views, especially after Britain and America both agreed to their own military reductions in 1967. Yet External Affairs Minister Paul Martin was only willing to countenance the withdrawal of two additional squadrons from six to four, and brought this point home with two memoranda presented to cabinet in 1967. However, Martin also proved adept at bringing his more critical cabinet colleagues to his view, and there were no further reductions under Pearson’s tenure – though this victory would prove especially short-lived.

Denuclearization and Withdrawal, 1968-93

The Pearson government had begun to shift away from its immediate predecessor’s fully cooperative stance towards NATO – strong verbal support continued within NATO councils, but military contributions lessened and emphasis turned towards non-military cooperation. Yet it policy change remained incremental and limited, with proposals for a more substantial drawdown of the Canadian military effectively blocked by the influential External Affairs minister. However, it would accelerate under Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s leadership, who represented the critical Quebec wing of the caucus and

was suspicious of the policy advice emanating from External Affairs – perhaps not to the extent of Diefenbaker, but more so than his immediate predecessor.

Yet Trudeau’s leadership did not take place in a vacuum, but rather coincided with important environmental changes that had been building throughout Pearson’s tenure. True, the government did not necessarily face a sudden rise in American concern over the conventional balance in Europe, nor was Canada’s military contribution all of a sudden of interest to officials south of the border. Indeed, the United States was largely preoccupied with extracting itself from Indochina and surely had set the stage with its own modest force reductions in Europe. But Washington also undertook moves to qualitatively strengthen NATO’s shield forces, and displayed a more cautious stance towards détente and a less sanguine attitude on the conventional balance along the Central Front. This meant that there were definite limits to its otherwise benign neglect of NATO and tolerance of Canada’s penchant for free-riding. As such, while retaining some flexibility in how it actually responded to NATO’s defence requirements, Canada still had to be careful to ensure that any reductions were balanced with offsetting measures,

Importantly, other environmental factors ensured that the government would be even more inclined than its predecessor to reduce its military footprint from Europe. First, the new prime minister had a particularly relaxed view of the Soviet challenge. Like other members of the Liberal Party’s Quebec wing, Trudeau believed that the once feared communist bloc was monolithic, with economic pressures making for more and not less political disunity, while the Soviet Union itself was no longer “implacably hostile to
us.” 778 Therefore, it became increasingly difficult to justify even maintaining Canada’s current force contributions or accepting that only modest force reductions were possible.  

Second, perhaps more importantly, US President Johnson had been expanding America’s involvement in the Vietnam War for much of the decade, which created a backlash towards perceived American militarism that resonated in many countries, including Canada. Indeed, the war had proven so controversial under Lester Pearson’s tenure that the normally quiescent Prime Minister departed from his tendency for quiet diplomacy to publicly rebuke our superpower patron with his Temple University speech. 779 Clearly, Trudeau’s leadership reflected the growing Canadian malaise, prevalent in Quebec but not limited to that province, towards closer association with the United States. And rather than dissipating with time, this controversy was only magnified by US President Richard Nixon, whose expansion of the war sparked outrage in America and among its allies.  

The prime minister had other reasons to be concerned about the prospect of continuing with NATO’s status quo. For example, Trudeau was increasingly optimistic on the economic capacity of European countries to take up more of the conventional defence burden. He also embodied that reflexive Canadian aversion towards nuclear weapons, which had steadily grown since Pearson took office and showed no sign of abating. Unlike Diefenbaker, however, the Prime Minister’s concerns were largely directed at Canada’s nuclear-armed forces in Europe rather than air defence systems in North America. For instance, the CF-104 strike-reconnaissance aircraft were seen as

779 Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 30-32.
being possible first-strike weapons, due to their well-documented basing vulnerability, while even the Honest John batteries that would likely be used at the onset of hostilities were viewed with disquiet.\textsuperscript{780} As a result, the government was especially inclined to accelerate its military withdrawal from Europe and move decisively towards denuclearization.

With these environmental factors increasing in salience, the Trudeau government faced further incentive than even its predecessor to complete this shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism. The policy-making coalition that coalesced at this time was also much more strongly associated with this doctrine. For example, the government permitted a stronger policy-making role for those elements in the Liberal caucus – exemplified by the Quebec-wing, but also including members such as Donald MacDonald, who would replace Gordon as President of the Privy Council – who shared the prime minister’s left-leaning political views. Also, Trudeau was particularly keen to open up the policy process to certain individuals, either directly by the inclusion of a number of outsiders as foreign policy advisors (e.g., Ivan Head) or more indirectly through the frequent exchange between Trudeau, his ministers, and prominent academics and intellectuals.\textsuperscript{781} As a result, Trudeau empowered a number of individuals who were keen to challenge the policy prescriptions of departmental actors and less wedded to the military status quo in Europe. And given the prime minister’s own views on the matter, there was also little doubt as to where his own sympathies lie.

To be sure, Trudeau also faced opposition from External Affairs, which under Mitchell Sharp’s leadership continued to be a bastion of support for maintaining the

\textsuperscript{780} Michel Fortmann et al., “An Emerging Strategic Counterculture?” 544, 547.
\textsuperscript{781} For a good overview on the beliefs of many of Trudeau’s key advisors, see Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, Chp. 4.
status quo in NATO. With Hellyer’s transfer to Transport, National Defence under Minister Leo Cadieux would return to its more traditional roots in its support for NATO. The defence minister was a staunch advocate of the status quo in Europe, but he also lacked the stature of his predecessor or his counterpart in the East Block, which reflected a relative weakening of National Defence’s policy role that continued into the 1970s.\footnote{Ibid., 69 and Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 4-5. Also see Douglas Bland, “Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence,” *Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper* 27 (1988).}

Moreover, Trudeau also had little attachment to the military, which was seen as complicit in linking Canada’s defence policy too closely with its alliances, and was a suspicious of the advice emanating from the “‘Anglo-Saxon’ preserve” at External Affairs.\footnote{John English, *Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau: 1968-2000*, Volume 2 (Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2009), 57-58.} Simply put, the prime minister sought to counter bureaucratic organizations that were seen as insufficiently adept for the “required policy innovation and policy coherence.”\footnote{Peter Aucoin, “Organizational Change in the Machinery of Canadian Government: From Rational Management to Brokerage Politics,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 19, 1 (1986): 8.} As such, the prime minister was more reliant on his foreign policy advisors and central agencies like the Privy Council Office, which came at the expense of the access and influence that the traditional bureaucratic actors had enjoyed.\footnote{Ibid., 10-11 and John Kirton and Blair Dimock, “Domestic access to government in the Canadian foreign policy process 1968-1982,” *International Journal* 39, 1(1984): 74.} Yet it would be these traditional actors that played an important obstructionist role in the policy-making process, thereby helping to ensure that some of the more extreme preferences of their colleagues – such as Pelletier and Marchand, both of whom shared neutralist sentiment and flirted with the notion of non-alignment\footnote{English, *Just Watch Me*, 58.} – were held in check.

Trudeau had come to power with the intention of overturning some of the key policies of his predecessor. The policy-making coalition that formed during his first few
years in office certainly demonstrated an affinity towards defensive weak-multilateralism. It is therefore unsurprising that Trudeau quickly rejected the policy conclusions of those actors keen to support the more cooperative status quo in Europe – first with the foreign policy paper by Norman Roberston titled *Foreign Policy Review*; second with a Defence Policy Review, which itself followed a paper by the Chief of Defence Staff titled “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces”; and lastly with reports by the inter-departmental Special Task Force on Relations with Europe and the joint External-Defence report, both of which came to very similar conclusions and represented a consensus of the traditional bureaucratic actors on the continued importance of Canada’s military contribution to NATO.787

Instead, Trudeau would turn to his close advisor Ivan Head to form what became known as the “non-group” to provide a more critical review of Canada’s commitments to NATO. It would release a report titled “Canadian Defence Policy: A Study,” which offered more radical notions for Canadian defence policy – that the military should be reduced over the next decade to 50,000 personnel, to be used largely for domestic operations; that its previously sacrosanct ground forces in Europe be reduced by two-thirds from 10,000 to 3,000; and that Canada fully divest itself of its controversial nuclear role, including its Honest John missiles and CF-104 strike-reconnaissance aircraft.788

The non-group released its report to the cabinet in March 1969, which led to an extremely vocal argument between key actors in its policy-making coalition, with some of the proponents of the status quo (including Leo Cadieux and Mitchell Sharp) even

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788 See Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 20-21; Michel Fortmann et al., “An Emerging Strategic Counterculture?” 552.
going so far as to threaten resignation. A compromise position soon emerged between the two sides. As announced by Trudeau in April and later reiterated by Cadieux in September, Canada would cut both its air and ground forces by half – from four to two squadrons for the 1 Canadian Air Group and from 10,000 to 5,000 troops – and would denuclearize its forces over the next several years. The Army units withdrawn were then assigned to ACE Mobile Force (Land), while the squadrons that remained in Europe shifted to a photo reconnaissance role. And shortly afterwards, Trudeau also agreed to a Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group in Canada to reinforce the Northern Flank of Norway in wartime. And much like Pearson’s promise to ACE Mobile Force, the CAST Brigade had the added benefit of being a less costly form of contribution.

Trudeau’s effort to inculcate greater distancing from the United States within NATO took the immediate form of its substantial reduction in the Canadian armed forces deployed to the continent, even if this drawdown did not result in the substantial reduction envisioned by Head, nor a fundamental change in Canada’s relationship to the Alliance. Importantly, Trudeau also displayed a degree of pragmatism that limited the degree of distance entailed by his policy choices. This characteristic is evident in the resultant compromise in Canada’s force reductions from Europe, and can also be seen in the very rationale used by the prime minister to justify the decision – to better align Canada’s defence policy away from alliances and towards its national interests closer to home. With its emphasis on sovereignty protection, Trudeau was not only able to satisfy a domestic audience that these policy choices were not beholden to any organization or

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789 English, Just Watch Me, 63.
790 Maloney, The Roots of Soft Power, 36
ally, but also reassure our US ally that this realignment would not come at the expense of its security in North America. After all, there were certain limits to the degree of distancing required by the defensive weak-multilateral doctrine, especially when the United States was not directly pressuring its ally on this matter.

The Trudeau government’s willingness to balance its effort at an independent foreign policy with more implicit forms of cooperation is also readily apparent in other instances. First, the prime minister might have overseen the denuclearization of Canada’s forces in Europe by 1972, but this took place at a time when NATO’s tactical nuclear role was increasingly under question and its ability to discuss such matters was secured through participation on the Nuclear Planning Group. To be sure, as Sean Maloney notes, there is no direct evidence that Trudeau or his advisors used the NPG as a rationale to divest Canada of a nuclear role.\(^{791}\) However, it is also difficult to believe that knowledgeable members of the cabinet either never raised the NPG when discussing Canada’s nuclear role or were unaware that, with the advent of nuclear consultations, being nuclear-armed no longer had the same cachet as it once did. And even if politicians were unaware of the NPG, policy-makers in External Affairs and National Defence were surely not – and this might very well have affected their willingness to compromise on this issue.

Second, despite some of the alarm that greeted Trudeau’s announcement of a partial Canadian withdrawal, it is important to recognize that there was very little in the way of consequences. Simply put, as a result of reducing what effectively amounted to a

\(^{791}\) Ibid., 17.
token military force, Canada only had to deal with Europe’s largely vocal objections.\textsuperscript{792} Even Trudeau’s much ballyhooed failure to be able to expand economic trade with Europe, which is often blamed squarely on its decision to cut its commitments to the continent, should not be overstated. After all, there is little indication that European countries would have responded favourably to Trudeau’s Third Option even if Sharp and Cadieux had prevailed, at least if Europe’s past behaviour was any indication.\textsuperscript{793}

Moreover, the fears that this Canadian action would result in a domino effect, by which other NATO countries would quickly follow suit, never did come to pass. Indeed, European countries quickly redressed Canada’s reduced presence by approving the NATO Allied Defense in the Seventies initiative, which resulted in greater prioritization and led to a $1 billion increase in Europe’s defence spending in 1972.\textsuperscript{794} It is also important not to forget that Canada also benefited from “an American administration which was prepared to accept a reduced Canadian standing commitment to NATO.”\textsuperscript{795} Europe might have made noises about Canada’s action, but Washington was prepared to accept both reductions and a non-nuclear role – and therefore reacted to Canada’s decision with equanimity.

Third, the prime minister showed a willingness to modify his so-called Trudeau Doctrine, if the circumstances seemed to warrant it. For example, the United States had

\textsuperscript{792} Canada was armed with sizable tactical nuclear arsenal for much of the 1960s. But this should not obscure the decline of importance attached to tactical nuclear weapons, which were maintained in existing numbers as a symbol of American commitment but left as an obsolescent vestige of an earlier era. NATO was focused on the eroding conventional defence balance that only widened in the 1970s and the possible deployment of LRTNWs. Indeed, NATO tried to develop political guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, with a number of NPG studies on the question of first-use and follow-on nuclear use. But with the Soviet capacity to respond in kind, their conclusions were less than appealing. See Legge, \textit{Theatre Nuclear Weapons}, Chp. 2.


\textsuperscript{794} Duffield, \textit{Power Rules}, 200

\textsuperscript{795} Sokolsky, “Canada in NATO,” 220.
grown more concerned over the conventional balance in Europe by the mid-1970s as a result of the steady improvements in the Warsaw Pact’s combat and logistics capabilities. And when the Americans finally began to voice some concerns about the sustainability of Canada’s defence commitments, the government initiated the 1975 Defence Structure Review, which provided an important amendment to his 1971 defence white paper that injected new funds for the declining capital portion of the defence budget to allow for new Leopard battle tanks, CF-18 Super Hornets and other equipment. This increase in defence spending helped to replace obsolescent equipment “whose primary purpose would be to augment the Canadian contribution to NATO or NATO-related tasks,” and also nicely complemented Carter’s subsequent effort to increase the Alliance’s conventional capabilities with the short-lived Long Term Defence Plan. It might not have been a return to the financial largesse of the 1950s, but it kept the military “at a respectable enough level to make Canada credible, even if barely, in NATO’s military structure so that the alliance could be useful in politico-diplomatic terms.”

Even as he helped to ensure a continued presence in Europe, Trudeau also took the lead in some diplomatic initiatives that helped to reinforce an impression of independence – from his “strategy of suffocation” of the late 1970s, which was a call to reduce the superpowers’ nuclear armaments, to his “peace initiative” crusade in the last years before his political retirement. True, Trudeau’s diplomatic endeavours had questionable results, though the latter at the very least helped to reinforce – if perhaps not cause – the trend away from the vitriolic rhetoric that prevailed in the early years of the

796 Ibid., 222.
798 Hillmer, “Canada, the North Atlantic Organization,” 64.
Reagan presidency. Yet they did allow for an additional element of rhetorical distancing, and in accordance with the cultural-cybernetic model, it came at a time when Trudeau was responding to increasing pressure to ensure the continued viability of the Canadian commitment.

Canada might have played a less prominent role in NATO deliberations since the 1970s, but this should not be seen as a direct consequence of a defensive weak-multilateral doctrine. After all, NATO institutions ensured a Canadian voice in these discussions and a slight reduction in Canada’s already token military presence was unlikely to dramatically alter its volume. Aside from the prime minister’s clear preference for personal initiatives, Canada’s absence is likely due to the nature of the issues themselves. After all, despite some tentative NATO effort to reinforce its conventional capabilities, the organization’s attention was focused instead on the question of Long Range Theatre Nuclear Weapons (LRTNW), which concerned the US proposal to forward deploy GLCMs and Pershing II ballistic missiles to Europe. Much like the debate over Thor/Jupiter IRBMs and the MLF, the deployments of GLCMs and Pershing IIs were largely an issue between European countries and the United States, with Canada’s voice in such matters minimal even in the best of situations. And Canada was surely kept abreast of these nuclear matters through its participation on the NPG,

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800 This included the Long Term Defense Plan and the Conventional Defense Improvement initiative. The former was initiated at the behest of the Carter administration, while the latter was meant to complement President Reagan’s own strategic modernization build-up, even if had only lukewarm support from the administration. Neither effort led to substantial improvements in conventional defence forces. For further information, see Duffield, *Power Rules*, Chp. 6.
which had initiated a number of studies on Alliance nuclear use in the 1960-70s and formed a High Level Group in 1977 to make recommendations on LRTNWs. \(^{801}\)

The Trudeau government expanded upon Pearson’s initial strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism. Even when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney came to power in 1984, he did little to fundamentally alter his predecessor’s decision on NATO. Yet even this outcome was largely in accordance with the environmental factors of this period. After all, the Reagan administration had only continued the trend towards declining interest in the conventional balance in Europe, which began in the late 1960s and early 1970s and was only temporarily halted in the latter half of the decade, due to the Soviet Union’s increasingly visible conventional force improvements. Indeed, in contrast to its lacklustre interest in NATO’s Conventional Defence Improvement initiative, President Ronald Reagan much preferred to rectify what he saw as a growing imbalance in strategic forces. This meant improvements of the American nuclear arsenal, air defence systems, and maritime forces – and what attention the United States did pay to Europe was largely on LRTWMs to improve this strategic force balance. \(^{802}\)

As such, Canada faced continued American disinterest in its particular force contributions to Europe. But like before, it would be a mistake to assume that this disinterest implied that Canada’s precipitated withdrawal from the Central Front would have been greeted in an equally sanguine manner. Indeed, given that the administration had grown increasingly alarmed about the Soviet Union in other areas, it was likely that any such move would have only refocused American attention on the conventional force balance in Europe. Yet Canada still retained an important degree of flexibility in how it

\(^{801}\) See Legge, *Theatre Nuclear Weapons*.

\(^{802}\) Duffield, *Power Rules*, 221.
was required to respond to American preferences on NATO defence strategy, provided that any move to achieve some distance on this issue was limited and/or balanced with offsetting measures – though whether the country reinforces its cooperation or adopts even more explicit forms of free-riding would largely depend on other environmental factors.

On that note, the new government undoubtedly took a more alarmist line on the Soviet threat and was more willing to contemplate a more robust military posture than its Liberal predecessor, as outlined in its 1987 white paper. This had the effect of reducing some of the opprobrium that came with contributing military forces to Europe, and ensured that – if all the other environmental factors remained the same – Mulroney would likely at least halt any further military retrenchment from the Central Front. By the latter half of the 1980s, however, Reagan’s stance had shifted away from its hard-line “evil empire” position and focused instead on working with the Moscow on a number of arms control initiatives, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) that put an end to the LRTNWs in Europe. This made Mulroney’s own calls for greater conventional defence efforts against the Soviet threat seem ill-placed. Some officials in Ottawa might have very much wanted to fully reverse Trudeau’s military withdrawal from Europe. But with this apparent divergence in threat perception undercutting any such arguments, there was little incentive to do so. Importantly, while lacking some of Trudeau’s more rose-tinted assessments of US-Soviet relations and detente, the Conservative government did have another reason to be cautious about buttressing its military commitment – it would entail a high financial cost for a country that was now mired in a growing deficit and could therefore ill afford it.
The Mulroney government undoubtedly had a strong ideological inclination to increase defence spending and reinforce Canada’s contributions to NATO, even if these other environmental factors promised to constrain these preferences and ensured that any policy responses would represent only a modest policy change at best. At first, leadership on this issue was provided by External Affairs under its Minister Joe Clark, which prepared a foreign policy green paper in 1985 that spoke of a three-ocean nation and emphasized both sovereignty protection and national defence. National Defence also agreed with many of these ideas, and under Defence Ministers Erik Nielsen and Perrin Beatty took the lead of such efforts with the 1987 defence white paper, Challenge and Commitment. This led to a significant strengthening of National Defence as a bureaucratic actor within the policy-making coalition. And as revealed in the 1987 white paper process, the civilian leadership at National Defence was also especially receptive to the wishes of the military. This meant that the schism between civilians and uniformed officers that had reached a crescendo under Hellyer’s leadership was fully reversed.

However, it is also important to note that even National Defence and the military did not necessarily show a strong inclination to reverse Trudeau’s weakened commitment to NATO. For instance, Nielsen insisted that National Defence have a renewed focus on missions such as sovereignty protection, which only added to the commitments that the military was already struggling to fulfil. And the military’s preferences were also far

from uniform on the need to retain forces in Europe, as evidenced on the chief of the
defence staff’s advice to Nielsen that envisioned more drastic reductions and was
ultimately rejected. From the ambitious defence white paper did not offer much in
support of the NATO commitment. While calling for an increase in defence spending to
support a number of new capital projects, much of its attention was instead focused on
other defence requirements, such as for a three-oceans navy, that were only tangentially
related to NATO.807

And National Defence also had to contend with the powerful Minister of Finance
Michael Wilson, with his penchant to exercise “control over the government’s
expenditure plans.”808 External Affairs too had grown concerned about National
Defence’s more aggressive stance, and joined with Wilson in their criticisms, even if they
were perhaps more willing to acquiesce to their defence counterparts. As Douglas Bland
concludes, it was the Finance Minister “who raised the most serious challenges to the
defence program.”809 The conflict between Finance and National Defence might have
been temporarily resolved in a compromise between the two sides to restrain the white
paper’s initial funding plan.810 Yet with the deficit surging and the tensions of the Cold
War declining, Mulroney soon faced increasing controversy to even maintain Canada’s
NATO commitments. And in a manner that bears strong resemblance to the subsequent

806 Michaud, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 269
807 For a discussion of these new roles, see Joel Sokolsky, “Trends in United States Strategy and the 1987
808 Nelson Michaud, “Bureaucratic Politics and the Shaping of Policies: Can We Measure Pulling and
810 Mulroney did have a tendency to seek compromises amongst different competing interests, in what has
been called brokerage politics. See Aucoin, “Organizational Change in the Machinery,” 17-18.
Liberal government’s own modus operandi, the Department of Finance began to play an even stronger obstructionist role in the policy-making coalition.\textsuperscript{811}

As a result, despite its own initial inclination to reverse Trudeau’s policies and return to continental soft-bandwagoning, the Mulroney government largely continued to follow the strategic-doctrinal precepts of defensive weak-multilateralism. However, it is also clear that the government lacked some (if not all) of its predecessor’s concerns over sending Canadian military reinforcements to NATO, and therefore its own doctrinal commitment to defensive weak-multilateralism was more modest in nature, as one would expect given this particular balance of environmental stimuli. As such, while adding a 1,200-strong contingent to the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany, the government’s other efforts – such as its promise consolidate Canada’s commitments (including CAST and those promised to ACE Mobile Force) to the Central Front – were much more in keeping with Trudeau’s less costly demonstrations of commitment.\textsuperscript{812} And despite promise of the 1987 white paper to resolve the capability-commitment gap, the prime minister largely continued with the modest increase in defence spending adopted by his predecessor after the 1975 Defence Structure Review, and even this quickly ebbed soon after the release of its white paper.\textsuperscript{813}

Canada did halt any further reductions from Europe and even began to increase its military footprint. But the latter effort was remain especially modest in nature. Indeed, given the declining American attention on NATO’s conventional balance and Canada’s

\textsuperscript{812} Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 60-63.
role therein, officials in Ottawa also had a reduced need to embrace distancing policies in
order to appear independent – or to offset such distancing with implicit cooperation. With
that in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that the Mulroney government is often perceived
as an exemplar of continental soft-bandwagoning. After all, while continuing with much
of his Trudeau’s policies, the prime minister refrained from using some of the vocal and
rhetorical forms of distancing of his predecessor, preferring a much closer personal
relationship that tended to overshadow those occasions when it refrained from fully
supporting its ally, whether on SDI or NATO. And the government was also much more
publicly supportive of a significant increase in defence spending, even if the defence
budget never received such financial largesse and actual capital replacements continued
at the pace set by Trudeau’s Defence Structure Review.

Canada maintained its small commitment to the Central Front, which the
Conservative government improved but only at the margins. Yet the end of the decade
coincided with the end of the Cold War, and therefore a fundamental alteration of the
balance of the environmental input factors. With no pressing strategic threat, the United
States and indeed the rest of Europe lost what little interest they had on the Canadian
military presence. Canada therefore faced not simply a gradual decline in American
interest in Europe, but an apparent and veritable collapse of this environmental stimulus.
At that moment, it becomes more difficult to assess whether Canada indeed follows a
continental soft-bandwagoning or a defensive weak-multilateral doctrine, in so far as
America’s strategic preferences on NATO were unclear.

However, it is notable that Canada would use this opportunity to finally complete
the disbandment of 1 Air Group and the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and the
complete withdrawal of its forward deployed force over 1992-1993. After all, the United States continued to maintain a sizable contingent in Europe to help stabilize the region and as an insurance against a revanchist Russia, which provides at least a hint that our ally would have preferred that it be joined by Canada in this endeavour. Importantly, the fact that Canada would choose to withdrawal its entire military contribution from Europe indicates that other environmental factors were still at play – that maintaining these forces in the absence of a Soviet threat and in the face of the increasingly urgent deficit crisis would have been too controversial for either the Progressive Conservative government or its Liberal successor under Jean Chrétien. In that sense, one can place how Canada eventually ended its military commitment to NATO in Europe – at least prior to its redeployment in a peacemaking capacity to the Balkans – as an example of defensive weak-multilateralism.

**Conclusion**

Chapters Six and Seven has shown how Canadian behaviour towards first the UN and later NATO evolved for the duration of the Cold War. Successive governments largely pursued modest and incremental policy responses to American strategic preferences. Initially, Canada had a definite preference for the United Nations, but soon adopted a remarkably proactive approach to the North Atlantic Treaty. Soon thereafter, Canada undertook a substantial rearmament program and conventional force deployments to Europe, and when these efforts proved to be unsustainable, moved to a reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. However, the Pearson government made the first steps towards a strategic-doctrinal shift with his modest air force reductions. And under Pierre Elliot
Trudeau, the government made further cuts to the air and ground force contributions to Europe and finally decided to denuclearize the country’s armed forces, both of which were largely continued under Mulroney. This strategic-doctrinal shift towards defensive weak-multilateralism was triggered by changes in environmental factors that created a feedback variable that disrupted Canada’s fine balance between security and sovereignty. An illustrative outline of how Canada has adapt its goldilocks grand strategy to the exigencies of NATO’s evolution can be found in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 – Canadian Policy Responses to NATO Defence Strategy, 1945-93

Legend
- Key Canadian decision on NATO defence strategy
- General pattern of Canadian policy responses to NATO defence strategy
- - - Canadian policy movement that did not result in a definite decision
= = = Standing Operational Doctrine
There were certainly major differences between how the St. Laurent government adapted Canada’s policy choices and pursued its grand strategy within NATO, and how his many successors – such as Pearson, Trudeau and even Mulroney – did so. Aside from the force reductions from Europe itself, the most obvious example of this difference can be found in the steady decline in the size and funding of the Canadian military, which have only been stymied but never fully reversed. Yet there was also an often underappreciated similarity between Canadian policy responses, in so far as policy-makers often emphasized the non-military nature of NATO in the early Cold War, even as subsequent officials – despite growing rhetorical distancing – were limited to modest force reductions and sensitive to American sensibilities on this matter. Canada’s grand strategy might have been caught between these two doctrines, but the narrow scope of its inclinations within the goldilocks zone also meant that the government’s policy responses displayed an important element of policy continuity and patterned consistency.
This study has tested the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period. The first looks at policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defences over some sixty years, with particular attention on the establishment and evolution of NORAD. The second examines Canada’s policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences pertaining to the establishment and evolution of NATO during the Cold War, with specific emphasis on shifts in Canada’s military commitment to Europe. Both cases are centrally concerned with the evolution of Canada’s behaviour towards two of its key post-war strategic commitments – NORAD and NATO. As such, while specific and manageable in content, Canada’s policy choices over these two issues are sufficiently at the core of the country’s foreign, defence, and security policies as to be representative of its grand strategy. Both also examine Canadian behaviour over a period of many decades, which allows for a long-term assessment on the major trends and patterns in the country’s politico-military strategy.

The cultural-cybernetic model, while accepting that geopolitics and other structural factors can represent an operational milieu and possible behavioural constraint, emphasizes the cultural-cybernetic determinants of a country’s behaviour. Strategic culture embodies the various predispositions and behavioural inclinations embedded in the country’s society and carried by members of the strategic policy community. The cybernetic process in turn limits the range of inclinations at play in the policy-making process, standardizes the policy responses into Standing Operational Doctrines, and
delineates the general scope of behaviour required to achieve the country’s objectives. These domestic-level variables are especially salient in those cases that lack the sort of geo-strategic pressure capable of potentially overwhelming ideational and organizational factors. As a country situated in a benign “strategic backwater,” in the words of Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel, Canada provides a useful case to highlight the role of culture and cybernetics without the interference of other possible factors.814

The findings of this study reveal that Canada’s policy responses to strategic defence and NATO defence strategy, as exemplars of its grand strategy, fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two SODs span the “goldilocks zone” of feasible policy choices required to ensure that the twin goals of security and sovereignty are kept within a tolerance range that minimizes any trade-offs between them. Security is largely achieved by having sufficient proximity within Canada-US relations, while sovereignty and the closely related concept of independence is obtained by making sure that Canada has a modicum of distance from our superpower patron. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour, which consists of policy choices largely situated within this strategic-doctrinal range, has a high degree of policy continuity and can be termed the goldilocks grand strategy.

In both cases, the shifts in Canadian behaviour between SODs also followed a particularly consistent and adaptive pattern. On one hand, Canada generally responded favourably to American strategic policy initiatives that required closer proximity but, by dint of either their implied content or surrounding context, did not disrupt its security and sovereignty values. In these episodes, the government’s policy-making coalition was

structured to pursue policies that are in accordance to continental soft-bandwagoning, which prioritizes strong cooperation with only a minimal semblance of distance. On the other hand, when confronted by an American overture with possible trade-offs between security and sovereignty, Canada’s policy-making coalition was restructured and its policy choices changed to be in accordance to the next SOD in the policy repertoire – defensive weak-multilateralism, which prioritizes a more openly distant position with modest cooperation, and therefore represents a reversal of the other doctrine’s priorities.

Continental soft-bandwagoning, originating in the Canada-US security bargain that took place on the eve of the Second World War, remained the dominant SOD for much of the 1940s and 1950s. It led to highly support policy responses, as exemplified by the growth in air defence cooperation and the expansion of its conventional military and later nuclear role in Europe. Moreover, this cooperation was generally balanced by concurrent effort to achieve a semblance of distance, whether by ensuring that Canadian sovereignty was protected on air defence or by creating for itself a role as the stalwart advocate for non-military cooperation within NATO. By the mid-1960s, however, Canada would begin to adopt defensive weak-multilateralism in its policy responses. By then, Ottawa had grown cautious on the latest iteration of strategic defence, designed against the new ballistic missile threat, and began to retrench from its commitments in Europe. Simply put, successive missile defence initiatives and the continued NATO contributions had both become increasingly stigmatized – partly due to the growing difference in Canada and US threat perception that continues to this day, and partly arising from the controversial nature of either the initiative in question or the American administration in power at the time.
The mid-to-late 1960s was clearly an important time for Canada’s grand strategy, in so far as it witnessed a strategic-doctrinal change in how Canada adapted to both strategic defence and NATO strategy. It is perhaps no coincidence that this decade saw a growing nationalist surge in Canada and the American decision to expand its military intervention in Indochina, which henceforth created a durable stain on the reasonably pristine image of Washington. That being said, there was at least an inkling of this strategic shift in the past decade, when Canadian officials sought to limit their unsustainable conventional force deployments to Europe by greater reliance on nuclear weapons. And Canada’s continued reliance on the defensive weak-multilateral doctrine long after the 1960s suggests that the wounds generated in that decade, while perhaps no longer as wide, have yet to fully heal.

**Research Implications and Suggestions**

The cultural-cybernetic model tested in this study generated some useful theoretical insights. First, it provides a novel refinement on the theory of strategic culture, which fits most readily within the social constructivist theoretical framework and has often been used for description and even explicative understanding, but only much more rarely been associated with positivist social scientific explanation. By applying the insights of cybernetic theory, the study was able to better operationalize the broad concept of strategic culture and highlight the role of decision-makers and the domestic policy-making process. It also offered a novel conceptualization of strategic culture as a continuum rather than descriptive typology, which showed how and why only a limited number of cultural inclinations are ever at play in the policy process and therefore more
clearly differentiated cultural predispositions from strategic behaviour. There has often been a dearth of communication between the strategic culture literature and theories of foreign policy that this study has sought to rectify.

Second, while representing a novel synthesis on the insights generated by the strategic culture and cybernetic theory literature, this study can also be situated within the broad realist theoretical canon. For example, it offers a framework that is ontologically open to a variety of domestic and ideational determinants of behaviour, which complements both classical realist and neo-classical realist accounts. However, the study departs from most classical approaches with its explicitly theoretical and methodologically positivist form of explanation. And it also lacks neo-classical realism’s implicit emphasis on the primary role of structural-material conditions, in so far as it uses a domestic-level theoretical model and explores a macro-case without the harsh structural conditions that might be prevalent elsewhere. In that sense, while one can situate the study within either the classical or neo-classical accounts of state action, it can be seen as a useful antidote to some of the ills that plague both theoretical approaches.

Indeed, the cultural-cybernetic model also provides a potential avenue to help further disentangle the interplay between systemic and domestic factors. For instance, Canada’s grand strategy follows a cybernetic pattern that ensures that its policy responses to external stimuli are within a goldilocks zone, as it is within this range that trade-offs between its security and sovereignty values are minimized. As such, the cybernetic process helps the country to avoid more extreme policy choices that, even if debated within society, would be harmful to its interests. Such a model could very well be relevant in an environment still marked by the “crucible of violence,” in which systemic
material constraints and the hint of violence that they entail still exists. In such a case, cybernetic processes would better ensure that a country is able to adapt to such constraints. Such pressures might even further reduce the actual doctrinal range of policy choices, which in itself helps to show how third-image factors can shape policy.

This study offers a number of possible avenues for further theoretical inquiry. On one hand, while cybernetics has offered some insight on how strategic culture actually helps determine behaviour, there are a number of other mid-range foreign policy theories that could be readily adapted to such theoretical synthesis. For example, bureaucratic politics might offer a useful way to show how more conceptually organizational or bureaucratic forms of culture – between External Affairs and National Defence, for example – might affect policy-making. Bureaucratic politics has been one of the few theories applied to explain Canadian foreign policy, and David Dewitt and Jeffrey Plante have made some moves to examine the cultural proclivities of Canada’s central bureaucratic actors. Further inquiry on the Canadian case could certainly prove fruitful, and would clearly complement the burgeoning literature on organizational culture and military doctrine, led by such scholars as Elizabeth Kier and Jeffrey Legro.

On the other hand, the cybernetic-cultural model of behaviour can itself be further refined. For instance, the study tested the model on a single macro-case, Canadian grand strategy. It was able to get around some of the limitations of a single-case study by dividing this macro-case into two separate cases (on strategic defence and NATO defence strategy) and using the diachronic method to subdivide both of them further into smaller

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chronological episodes. Yet there would still be benefits to testing the cybernetic-cultural model on a wider range of country-specific cases, which given the possible different interplay between domestic and systemic/structural factors amongst various countries could lead to a more accurate portrait on the role of strategic culture and the cybernetics. Importantly, by including countries that are under more severe systemic constraints than Canada, it would also have the effect of situating the cultural-cybernetic model more fully within the neo-classical realist canon. An additional way to improve this model’s explanatory power would be to test it against other mid-range explanations for state behaviour, such as rationale choice, bureaucratic politics, or poliheuristics. The study has served as a plausibility probe of the cultural-cybernetic model, in order to first ascertain the utility of this novel form of theoretical explanation. It would therefore only be logical to expand the analysis by making a broader structured and systemic comparison using other theoretical models.

Equally, the study’s two case studies have revealed some important insights that can be applied to the Canadian foreign policy literature. First, Canada’s policy choices have been marked by an underappreciated degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and strategic logic. For example, the mainstream perspective might expect a high degree of strategic acumen in the early Cold War, but it has been much more critical of Canada’s strategic choices since that time, whether in the decline of defence spending or the penchant for idealism that is often at odds from the United States. In contrast, the study illustrates a greater degree of continuity between the early Cold War, in which Canada has often made some effort to ensure a modicum of distance, and the period since
that time that has often balanced rhetorical distancing with careful effort to maintain cooperation.

Meanwhile, the alternative perspective accepts that Canadian behaviour does indeed have a sense of continuity, which stem largely from the dependent structural relationship between Canada and the United States. But it is unable to acknowledge that Canada even has independent strategic interests, let alone account for the modest behaviour shifts that adapt precisely to achieve such interests. However, the study instead reveals that Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy was marked by high degree of patterned consistency, in which behaviour has varied in response to critical feedback variables designed to ensure that Canada’s interests in security and sovereignty are maintained – this indicates that there is a definite strategic logic at play, which has more often than not succeeded in protecting Canada’s core interests and is rarely acknowledged by either perspective.

Second, in addition to providing a novel interpretation of Canada’s foreign policy, the study departs from many other accounts by actually testing a theoretical model to explain Canadian behaviour. After all, the literature has tended towards historical-empirical accounts that – while often well-argued, well-researched, and empirically insightful – are much better at providing descriptive understanding than explanation. Indeed, in the absence of more accounts that attempt to explicitly identify variables and test explanations, Canada’s foreign policy literature lacks a capacity to achieve cumulative knowledge. Simply put, there will be little debate or agreement on the key drivers of Canada’s security and defence policies, and even less ability to make informed judgements on the causes of behaviour, to say nothing of predicting behaviour into the
future. As such, this study offers a useful and explicitly explanatory account of Canadian
behaviour that is both highly detailed in empirical research, but also has the requisite
theoretical framework to differentiate between variables and explain behaviour.

The study also points to other possible research avenues that could benefit the
Canadian foreign policy literature. For instance, it would be useful to add additional
cases to the two cases that were examined in this study. The inclusion of more cases of
Canadian grand strategy will not only add further confirmation for the cultural-cybernetic
model, but will also further buttress the notion that Canadian policy choices constitute a
goldilocks strategy that exhibits significant policy continuity and patterned consistency.
One possible case addition is how Canada has adapted its non-proliferation, arms control,
and disarmament policies to the reality of nuclear weapons. This would fit nicely with the
strong focus on nuclear weapons and strategy in the cases already examined. Another
possibility is Canada’s policy responses in the post-9/11 period, which promises insight
on how an environment shock like the 9/11 attacks might have altered American
preferences and thereby served to disrupt Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy. Further
research on these other areas of Canadian strategic behaviour could prove both
empirically and theoretically useful.

Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy has successfully balanced proximity and
distance, security and sovereignty over the course of the Cold War and beyond. Its
tendency towards cautious adaptation rather than proactive ambition might disappoint
observers hoping for more grandeur in Canadian grand strategy. And its role as an
ambiguous ally of the United States, close but never too close to our superpower patron,
has certainly confounded critics who would like to see either greater proximity or greater
distance in the relationship. But Canada’s well-honed strategic reflexes have certainly served this country very well in dealing with the global superpower, whether on the contentious issues of strategic defence or in the evolution of NATO defence strategy. And contrary to the expectations of critics, Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy will continue to guide this self-described middle power successfully in the uncertain strategic waters of the 21st century.
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